SAGE BENCHMARKS IN DISCOURSE STUDIES

DISCOURSE STUDIES

VOLUME I

EDITED BY
TEUN A. VAN DIJK

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Editor's Introduction: The Study of Discourse: An Introduction

The Emergence of a New Cross-Discipline

In the mid-1960s, the humanities and the social sciences witnessed a remarkably synchronous paradigm shift with the birth of several new but mutually related 'interdisciplines' such as semiotics, psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics, pragmatics as well as the study of discourse.

The articles collected in the volumes of this book are prominent contributions to the latter field of study, traditionally called *Discourse Analysis*, but more appropriately labeled *Discourse Studies*, because it is not limited to a method of analysis, as is the case for *Content Analysis* in the social sciences, but also has important theoretical objectives. And because the study of discourse manifests itself in virtually all disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, it is appropriate to speak of a new 'cross-discipline' or even a 'trans-discipline'.

The story of this new field of study has been told many times, and is as exciting as the contributions it has made to our insights into language use, communication and social interaction. For some of the mother and sister disciplines, this story of the emergence of the study of discourse may be summarized as follows.

Anthropology

Already in the early 1960s, among the first to recognize the relevance of the study of discourse anthropologists such as Dell Hymes (1972) became interested in the ethnographic study of communicative events (beyond the traditional study of myths and folklore), a direction of research followed by many other anthropologists under the label of the 'ethnography of speaking' (or the 'ethnography of communication'; Bauman & Sherzer, 1974; Saville-Troike, 1982) and then more broadly within linguistic anthropology (Duranti, 2001).[1]

Linguistics

Linguists were not lagging far behind during the late 1960s, when some of them realized that the use of language obviously was not reduced to the structures of isolated, abstract, invented sentences – as was the case in structural and generative grammars – but needed analyses of structures 'beyond the sentence' and of

whole 'texts', for instance to account for anaphora and coherence. Whereas initially still largely within the formal paradigm of 'text grammars', also this linguistic approach soon merged with the other approaches to a more empirical analysis of actual language use. The names associated with these early attempts at text and discourse grammars are János Petöfi (1971), Wolfgang Dressler (1972), and Teun A. van Dijk (1972, 1977), in Europe, and Joseph Grimes (1975), Tom Givón (1979), Sandra Thompson and Bill Mann in the USA, the latter two under the label of *Rhetorical Structure Theory* (Mann & Thompson, 1988). The roots of the European text grammars, apart from the obvious influence of Noam Chomsky's generative grammar, are however diverse and range from literary theory and semiotics to Russian formalism and Czech and French structuralism.

Although not under the label of 'text grammar', also early studies in Functional Systemic Grammar, founded by Michael Halliday in the UK (and then Australia), paid much attention to discourse, for instance in the account of 'cohesion', the grammatical expression of semantic coherence (Halliday & Hasan, 1976). This work was later followed by a large number of other studies on the grammatical and semiotic aspects of discourse in the same SF-paradigm (among many other studies, see, e.g., Martin, 1992).

Formal Grammar

On the other hand, increasingly formal and explicit studies of language use for discourse participants, coreference, deictic expressions and tenses, continued to be engaged in, from the 1970s both by logicians and philosophers, such as Hans Kamp (1981) and his *Discourse Representation Theory* and others influenced by the mathematician and formal philosopher Richard Montague. This approach states that discourse semantics is dynamic and depends on context.

Pragmatics

Within the tradition of British analytical philosophy, the 1960s also saw the very successful birth of another new interdiscipline, namely pragmatics. Based on the work of Austin (1962) on *How to Do Things with Words*, it is especially the study of John Searle (1969) on speech acts and an influential essay of H. P. Grice (1975) on conversational maxims that sparked a flow of studies on language use extending the traditional focus on syntax and semantics with a pragmatic component, accounting for the illocutive functions of language in terms of speech acts, implicatures and other aspects of contextually based language use. More generally, Pragmatics has become the discipline that houses many of the studies of language use beyond grammar, such as the influential work on politeness by Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson (Brown & Levinson, 1987).

Semiotics

Within the study of literature and the arts, the mid-1960s also witnessed the emergence of semiotics, the general study of signs and symbol systems. Originally

based on the work of philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce, and structural linguists such as Louis Hjelmslev and André Martinet, this new discipline became popular especially due to the work of Umberto Eco (1976) in Italy, and Roland Barthes (1964) and many others in France. Semiotics was not limited to language, stories and other forms of discourse, but was also studied in other semiotic codes, such as images, film, dance and architecture. Within discourse studies, semiotics has especially been propagated, in a rather different paradigm, by the work of Gunther Kress, and Theo van Leeuwen (Kress & van Leeuwen, 1990; van Leeuwen, 2005).

Conversation Analysis

In sociology, the interest in discourse emerged within the broader framework of 'ethnomethodology', a direction in microsociology focusing on the ways people understand and manage their everyday life. Under the influence of Harold Garfinkel (1967), on the one hand, and of Erving Goffman (1959, 1961), on the other hand, this interest in mundane interaction became very popular with the study of conversation, pioneered by Harvey Sacks, Manny Schegloff, Gail Jefferson in a very influential article in *Language* (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974), followed by many other studies in several disciplines. Whereas discourse grammars studied sequences of sentences, Conversation Analysis (CA) closely analyzed interactional sequences and phenomena such as turn taking, interruptions, pauses, laughter, opening and closing conversations, and many other properties and strategic moves of spontaneous talk now being accessible due to meticulous transcriptions of audio and video recordings (the influential collections by Atkinson & Heritage, 1984; and Drew & Heritage, 1992).

Sociolinguistics

At the end of the 1960s, appeared another new discipline at the boundaries of linguistics and the social sciences, *Sociolinguistics*. Although initially studying variation of grammar, especially pronunciation, due to variables as class, age or gender, some of these studies, also by the founders of sociolinguistics, Bill Labov (1972a, 1972b) and Susan Ervin Tripp (1972), focused on naturally occurring discourse, such as child discourse, storytelling about everyday experiences or the verbal play by African–American adolescents (Gumperz & Hymes, 1972). From a different perspective, later work in 'interactional sociolinguistics' provided more insight into details of interaction and their relation to the social context (Gumperz, 1982a, 1982b).

The Psychology of Text Processing and Artificial Intelligence

A few years later, at the beginning of the 1970s, also cognitive psychology (such as the work of Walter Kintsch, 1974) went beyond the self-imposed limitations of the study of the mental processing of words and isolated sentences, and began to study the production, comprehension and memory of discourse in general

and of stories in particular. Thus, it could be shown that the notion of macrostructure, first developed in text grammar (van Dijk, 1972, 1977, 1980), also had a cognitive basis, for instance in the production and comprehension of discourse topics (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). This direction of research soon became very popular in cognitive psychology, also because of its many obvious applications, for instance in education and the mass media.

One of the many influential notions introduced in this research is that of a *mental model* – a representation of events and situations in 'episodic memory' (the record of all our personal experiences) – as the basis of all discourse production and understanding (Johnson-Laird, 1983; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983).

Another important contribution came from the closely related field of Artificial Intelligence (AI), namely the fundamental role of *knowledge* in discourse processing, for instance in the form of mental 'scripts' of prototypical episodes (Schank & Abelson, 1977).

Although much of this work was (and is) carried out in the various domains of cognitive science, it also has had much influence in linguistics, sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics and the study of literature, such as studies on the comprehension of radio messages (Lutz & Wodak, 1987).

Methodological Common Ground

We see that more or less at the same time, namely between the mid-1960s and the early-1970s, we witness closely related new disciplines emerging in the humanities and the social sciences. Despite their backgrounds in different mother disciplines, and despite a large diversity of methods and objects of study, these new disciplines of semiotics, pragmatics, psycho- and sociolinguistics, ethnography of speaking as well as conversation analysis and discourse studies had several things in common. We may summarize this methodological common ground as follows:

- Interest in properties of 'naturally occurring' language use by real language users, instead of a study of abstract language systems and invented examples.
- A study of larger units than isolated words and sentences, and new basic units of analysis: texts, discourses, conversations or communicative events.
- Extension of linguistics beyond grammar towards a study of action and interaction.
- Extension to non-verbal (semiotic) aspects of interaction and communication: gestures, images, film and multimedia.
- Focus on dynamic cognitive or interactional moves and strategies.
- Study of the role of the social, cultural and cognitive contexts of language use.
- Analysis of a vast number of hitherto largely ignored phenomena of language use: coherence, anaphora, topics, macrostructures, speech acts, interactions, turn-taking, signs, politeness, mental models, and many other aspects of discourse.

It might be speculative to relate this renewal in the humanities and social sciences to the more general revolutionary spirit of the end of the 1960s, as we also know it from the Civil Rights Movement in the USA, the feminist movement worldwide, as well as the student movements both in the USA and Europe. Yet, it is probably no coincidence that against the broader background of African-Americans rebelling against racism, of women opposing patriarchy, and students protesting against traditional university hierarchies, the end of the 1960s also saw the emergence of new scholarly paradigms. Not seldom, these were also defined by young scholars rejecting the theories and methods of their teachers and of the traditional orientations in literature, linguistics, sociology, anthropology and psychology.

Note though, that the social and political nature of the changes in society did not (yet) lead to similar changes in the disciplines. Indeed, initially many of the changes of the new disciplines were formal and only defined by a broader object of study, rather that inspired by a revolutionary spirit aiming to change society. There are (generally European) exceptions to this general 'apolitical' beginning of discourse analysis and sociolinguistics, especially in Germany and Austria, such as the work by Dittmar (1976) on sociolinguistics, by Leodolter (=Wodak) (1975) on language in the courtroom, Wodak (1986) on therapy groups and Wodak & Schulz (1986), on the *Language of love and guilt* – discourses between mothers and daughters.

Although in the social sciences especially frequent reference was made to the 'Critical Theory' of the Frankfurt School, the new studies of signs, speech acts, language variation, stories, communicative events, conversation, film, text processing or discourse structures seldom took place within a broader sociopolitical movement of dissidence and opposition against social inequality. References to Adorno and Benjamin, for instance, initially were found in literature or in the philosophy of the social sciences, rather than in the new disciplines of language use and discourse. More frequent references to the work of Habermas had to wait until Habermas himself had discovered pragmatic theory (Habermas, 1981). In that respect, at least in these disciplines, academic theory and social movement remained two distinct areas of social practice. It is only with such later developments as critical discourse studies that these two different forms of dissent merged.

Integration and Further Developments

Although most of the new (inter- or cross) disciplines mentioned above had different backgrounds, objects, methods and sometimes inconsistent philosophies, the last decades have witnessed increasing integration in the broad field of the study of language use. In the following decades, much work in pragmatics, sociolinguistics, conversation analysis and the ethnography of speaking often overlapped, especially because of their shared interest in the study of conversational interaction in social contexts.

Discursive Psychology

These interdisciplines were soon joined by other directions of research and new paradigms in the 1980s, such as *Discursive Psychology* within social psychology, interested especially in the way 'psychological' notions (such as 'memory') are enacted in discourse in general, and conversation in particular (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Rejecting individual cognitive psychology, laboratory experiments and traditional social psychological notions such as attitudes, *Discursive Psychology*, as pioneered by Michael Billig (1987, 1988), Jonathan Potter (1996), and Derek Edwards (1997), thus sought alignment with ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, on the one hand, and the work of (the later) Wittgenstein, and the social constructivism of Rom Harré and Kenneth Gergen, on the other hand.

Interaction and Cognition

Whereas earlier studies in literature, semiotics and text grammar largely focused on the analysis of written texts, nearly all work in the interdisciplines just mentioned focused on spoken language in general, and on 'talk in interaction' in particular.

Only in cognitive science and some directions of discourse grammar, pragmatics, sociology and anthropology do we find a more cognitive orientation towards the study of language use and discourse – an orientation on the 'mind' generally rejected or ignored by interactional approaches to discourse (see the contribution in van Dijk, 2006). These developments have their counterpart in cognitive linguistics, for instance in the work on meaning and metaphor by George Lakoff (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) – work that also has found application in (critical) discourse studies.

There should be little doubt that before long also this broad gap between interaction and cognition will be bridged, especially since discourse obviously is both a form of social interaction, as well as a form cognition of communication, and because there are many 'mental' notions that are crucial in any kind of discourse study, such as meaning, coherence, topics, inference, presupposition, knowledge, belief, opinion, and so on. Indeed, the very notions of action and interaction cannot properly be defined without 'cognitive' notions such as plan, aim, goal, purpose, coordination, monitoring, and so on. It is within the study of discourse that such an integration of cognitive and interactional approaches is most fruitful. The last decades have seen extraordinary advances in both the study of interaction and that of cognition, and the time has come to integrate these results. Insight into the detailed mental strategies (and their neurological basis) of discourse production and comprehension may thus be combined with what we now know on the details of interactional moves and strategies.

Critical Discourse Studies

At the end of the 1970s, another direction of research emerged in the study of discourse: Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), originally introduced in a seminal

book by Roger Fowler, Gunther Kress, Bob Hodge and Tony Trew, *Language and Control* (1979), and later developed by Norman Fairclough (1989) in the UK, Ruth Wodak (1989) in Austria and Teun A. van Dijk (1993) in the Netherlands (for introduction, see, e.g., Wodak & Meyer, 2001). Although some isolated scholars earlier showed some interest in a more critical approach (e.g., Mey, 1985), we have seen that most of the new studies of language use emerging in the 1960s were at first quite apolitical. Rather late when considered against the revolutionary background of the end of the 1960s referred to above, Critical Discourse Analysis finally began to focus on issues of power, domination, and social inequality, and on the relevance of gender, race and class in the study of text and talk.

Much of this critical work was paralleled by similar work done mostly by feminist women on the relations between language, discourse and gender, and on the ways male domination is reproduced in text and talk (for an early study, see Kramarae, 1980; for the vast number of later studies, see the references in Holmes & Meyerhoff, 2003). Although at first not explicitly carried out within a CDA-framework, much work on gender and discourse is in fact an excellent example of a CDA approach (for an explicit CDA approach to gender studies see, e.g., Lazar, 2005; Wodak, 1997).

Other studies, such as by Wodak and van Dijk, especially focused on the reproduction of racism and anti-Semitism in discourse, for instance in political discourse, the press, and textbooks (among many studies, see, e.g., van Dijk, 1993; Wodak, et al., 1990; Wodak & van Dijk, 2000).

In the same way as the study of discourse spread in most of the humanities and social sciences, also the more critical approaches to language, discourse and interaction can now be found in many disciplines. The awareness has grown that with the increasingly powerful methods of the explicit and systematic description of talk and text, and the more sophisticated theories of cognition and interaction in their social and institutional contexts, discourse and conversation analysts are well prepared to tackle more complex and socially relevant issues.

Though, still reluctantly by the more formally inclined scholars interested in more 'autonomous' approaches to structures of text and interaction, it has become more widely accepted that discourse is profoundly embedded in society and culture, and hence, closely related also to all forms of power, power abuse and social inequality. It has been shown how ethnic prejudices and ideologies are daily produced and reproduced by political and media discourse of the elites, and thus contribute to the reproduction of racism. The same is true for everyday sexism in many kinds of discourse – from conversation to advertising – and the reproduction of the system of male domination.

Obviously, such a critical focus on the discursive reproduction of social inequality cannot be limited to a narrow discourse or conversation analytical approach, and requires further integration with the social sciences. Such an integration will also need to go beyond the gaps that still influence much of scholarly practice, such as between micro and macro approaches in sociology, or between cognitive and interactional approaches throughout the social sciences. This will also require further integration of the discipline that so far as remained

rather distant from the developments in discourse studies, namely political science – a strange phenomenon when we realize that policies and politics are 'done' virtually only in text and talk.

Finally, besides such a critical perspective in the study of discourse, we face the challenge of a vast number of urgently required applied studies. These fields of applications are many, and fortunately much work is already under way. Perhaps most relevant here are the many application in the field of education, from first and second language learning and literacy, to the development of curricula, textbook, classroom interaction, and teaching and learning in general – most of which is discursive (in the broad semiotic sense: text, talk, sound and image). Similar observations hold for the applied studies of the mass media, of journalism education and of course the field of psychological intervention. Indeed, there are few applied fields of study and intervention that do not have an important discursive dimension, and besides its critical perspective, discourse studies need to increasingly also focus on concrete practical issues of contemporary societies.

Dimensions of Discourse and Fields of Discourse Studies

The historical sketch – given above – of the emergence of discourse studies in the various disciplines of the humanities of the social sciences, and its increasing integration with its sister disciplines, such as semiotics, pragmatics and sociolinguistics, already provides first insights into the various dimensions of discourse and the fields of the new cross-discipline. Let us now examine this configuration of the new discipline and its object of study more closely.

Thus, for instance, we on the one hand have *cognitive* studies of the mental processes involved in the production or comprehension of discourse, and *interactional* studies of everyday conversation or institutional talk, on the other hand. The same is true for more *cultural* approaches in the ethnography of speaking, and – in a quite different, more critical, perspective (focusing on e.g., popular culture or youth culture) – in the 'Cultural Studies' developed by Stuart Hall and others in the UK (Hall, et al., 1978). Strangely, following the same general division of the mother disciplines, the *historical* approach to discourse – outside of the theory of historiography and oral history – so far has been quite marginal in discourse studies, with the exception of, for instance, the work on anti-Semitism by Ruth Wodak (Wodak, et al., 1990).

Besides these interdisciplinary approaches in discourse studies, the 'core' of the new discipline remains *the systematic and explicit analysis of the various structures and strategies of different levels of text and talk.* Let us briefly review these, also in order to show how the vast field of discourse studies is organized in various subdisciplines that also have become more or less independent, as also was the case for, say, lexicology, phonology, syntax and semantics within linguistics.

Discourse Grammar

The strong influence of linguistics on discourse studies and its development still shows in the prominent position of grammatical analysis in many discourse studies. We have seen above that this influence of linguistics also played a central role in the development of discourse studies, namely in the first 'text grammars'. We also saw that various directions in formal grammar (as well as in logic and formal philosophy) continue to be one of the productive areas of formal discourse analysis. Unfortunately, this formal direction of research is virtually unknown in other domains of discourse studies.

Within less formal 'discourse grammars', we continue to have studies of the *sound structures* of discourse (Bolinger, 1989; Brazil, 1975), for instance in studies of intonation, as well as studies of *discourse syntax* (Givón, 1979) continuing for instance the early work on anaphora, which also has links to formal discourse studies.

Strangely, *discourse semantics* has remained an underdeveloped area of discourse grammar. Yet, if there is one level of discourse that contributes to the specific discursive nature of text and talk, it is the study of meaning, as we also know from the first studies of coherence in the 1960s and 1970s. Part of discourse semantics, and shared with work in cognitive linguistics, is of course the research on metaphor, already mentioned above. Also very relevant is the study of semantic implication (entailment) and presupposition, for instance as one of the basic dimensions of coherence: In order to establish coherence relations between the propositions of a discourse, we often need to spell out the 'missing links' of the propositions implied or presupposed by the propositions explicitly expressed in discourse.

There are many more aspects of discourse meaning that need systematic analysis and that cannot simply be reduced to the semantics of words and sentences. For instance, discourse may describe (prescribe, account for, etc.,) events, actions and actors and may do so in many ways: more or less explicitly or implicitly, more or less generally or specifically, more or less precisely or vaguely, with many or few details, as background or as foreground, and so on. There are many constraints on sequences of descriptions, such as an increasing focus from broader to narrower objects of description (e.g., from a house to a room in the house, from a room in the house to furniture in the room, and from furniture to an object on such furniture, and so on – and in general not vice versa). The same is true for descriptions of time and tense sequences and, the way persons and social actors are described, and so on.

One new line of research, carried out within the general framework of Functional-Systemic grammar, is that of Appraisal Theory, which examines the way opinions are expressed in discourse (Martin & White, 2005).

Discourse meanings may be characterized in terms of sequences of propositions, but we know that meanings are not limited to local or sequential structures, but also may characterize whole discourses. The classical example are the 'topics'

of discourse, traditionally described in terms of 'semantic macrostructures', and typically expressed in headlines, leads, introductions, conclusions, initial 'thematic' sentences, and so on (van Dijk, 1980). In linguistic terms, topics are global meanings that dominate the local meanings of sequences of sentences or turns of talk. In cognitive terms, topics represent the most important information of a discourse, as it is being assigned by speakers/writers or recipients. Topics also represent the kind of information that is best recalled when understanding discourse, and it is the kind of meaning we usually plan ahead before starting (or continuing) to speak or write. Despite the fundamental relevance of such global meanings in the organization and processing of discourse, it is strange that many directions of discourse and conversation analysis ignore or do not make explicit such global semantic structures. Indeed, much more semantic research will be necessary to examine in much more detail the relations between such 'macrostructures' and the 'microstructure' of local meanings of words and sentences. At the same time, these studies of local and global meanings of discourse of course need to be related to the *cognitive analysis* of discourse, also because they require an explicit account of the fundamental role of knowledge in the local and global coherence of text and talk.

We see that both at the local and the global level of discourse meaning, there is a vast area of discourse analysis that remains virtually unexplored, but that should form an important element of future research on discourse grammar.

Stylistics

Better explored, especially also in sociolinguistics and literary studies, has been the dimension of language and discourse 'style', for instance in what has come to be known as the subdiscipline of *stylistics* (Eckert & Rickford, 2001; Scherer & Giles, 1979). Notoriously difficult to define exactly, also because it has so many non-linguistic meanings (such as the style of clothes, houses, people, etc.,), style may briefly be defined in terms of the variable expression of discourse as it is conditioned by aspects of context.

The most obvious manifestations of style may be found, as we also know from sociolinguistics, in the various way people may pronounce *sounds*, thus producing more or less formal, more or less casual, more or less higher or lower class 'styles' of speech. Contrary to involuntary 'accents', such sound variation is called part of the 'style' of a discourse if the speaker is able to control such variation of pronunciation, for instance to accommodate to the way the recipients speak, or to signal familiarity or a more formal relationship.

Similarly, also lexical variation has traditionally been seen as one of the basic characteristics of discourse style, usually under the condition that the underlying meanings remain (more or less) the same. In other words, 'saying the same thing in other words' has often been the rather informal definition of style. Again, such variation is stylistic if it has contextual conditions or consequences, as when politicians or newspapers of different political ideologies use the lexical item 'freedom fighter' or 'rebel', rather than 'terrorist', or vice versa, or want to keep a balanced expression when talking about 'insurgents'. That is, word choice

is one of the ways people betray their underlying opinions, social attitudes and ideologies, also because the use of lexical items is associated with underlying norms and values.

Apart from such 'ideological' variation of lexical style, there is also a more social one, for instance in order to express or establish more or less formal positions or relationships. Thus, politicians in the UK will rather speak about 'expelling economic immigrants' than about 'throwing scroungers out of the country' as some racist tabloids (and politicians) may do, in which case popular styles may combine with racist (ideological) style. Lexical styles typically come in levels, such as high (very formal, official), medium (everyday public), and low (colloquial, popular) or even very low (vulgar) levels of expression. More in general, thus, lexical style signals important aspects of the context, such as the formality of the event, the social power, position and status of speakers or recipients, the relations between the participants, the opinions and ideologies of the speakers, and so on.

Such is not only the case for lexical style (or pronunciation) in talk, but also shows at other levels of discourse, as we know from the stylistic difference between an English broadsheet, quality newspaper (now also often in smaller format) such as the *Guardian*, on the one hand, and the popular style of the tabloid *The Sun*, on the other hand, which also shows in size, type and color of headline, pictures, lay-out and many other forms of multimodal expression. The same is true for the difference between the syntax of a *Guardian* editorial and that of a *Sun* editorial.

Although usually limited to a study of context-dependent grammatical variation of expressions (sounds, lay-out, words, sentences), we might extend stylistic analysis also to other levels of discourse, as long as we maintain one (lower) level constant. For instance, elite and popular newspapers may write very different stories about the 'same event' (that is, with the same underlying topic or semantic macrostructure), adding or omitting different details, and we might also call this a difference of 'style' between the newspapers.

Rhetoric

Discourse studies is often defined as the contemporary discipline of what used to be called *rhetoric* since antiquity, that is, the practice and study of 'good' public speaking and writing, for instance in parliament, in court or in literature. Also today, and especially in the USA, the 'new' rhetoric is sometimes defined as a special (sub) discipline in the humanities that overlaps with discourse studies. As is the case for stylistics, rhetoric is often associated with the study of literature, rather than with the study of discourse more generally (among a vast amount of studies of rhetoric, Sloane, 2001).

In order to avoid collapsing rhetoric with discourse studies in general, we narrowly) define rhetoric as the subdiscipline of discourse studies focusing on the use of special 'rhetorical' structures of text and talk, such as metaphors, comparisons, irony, hyperboles, euphemisms, etc., that is, the kind of structures that were traditionally called 'figures of style' in classical rhetoric. Unlike other

structures of text and talk, these 'rhetorical' structures are optional, and used especially to convey or produce specific effects, for instance as part of strategies of persuasion. These 'figures' emphasize or de-emphasize meaning and thus, draw special attention of recipients, which may lead to less/better memory of the meanings thus, [de]emphasized. For instance, if politicians or newspapers want to diminish the negative associations of the word 'racism', they may use the less harsh term 'popular discontent' instead. And vice versa, if they want to emphasize the negative aspect of the arrival of many new immigrants, they might typically use the expressions 'wave' or 'invasion', which are at the same time metaphors and hyperboles (van Dijk, 1993).

Given these examples, it is not surprising that rhetoric is especially popular in the humanities – for instance in the study of literature – and in the social sciences, for instance in studies of political rhetoric or advertising, although strictly speaking such studies should not be limited to figures of speech, but also deal with the cognitive effects of such language use on the recipients and the whole communicative context. Also, it should be emphasized that discourse has many other 'persuasive' dimensions apart from these special rhetoric structures, such as argumentation, the use of emotion words, and so on.

Superstructures: Discourse Schemas

Whereas stylistics and rhetoric were traditionally closely related to literature and grammar, there are other structures of text and talk that go far beyond the grammatical characterization of discourse, and which may be called 'superstructures', because they are abstract *form-schemas* that globally organize discourse across sentence boundaries.

A well-known example is the form-schema of argumentation, including such conventional categories as premises and conclusions. These have been further detailed in contemporary argumentation studies, a major subfield of discourse studies (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Henkemans, 1996).

Similarly, stories are often analyzed in terms of abstract narrative schemas, featuring such categories as Summary, Orientation, Complication, Resolution and Coda, more or less in this order, as we know from much narrative studies, another large field of discourse studies (Labov & Waletzky, 1967; Ochs & Capps, 2001).

In the same way, many other discourse genres have 'canonical' structures that have become conventional and more or less fixed 'forms' or 'formats' of a genre. A scholarly article typically consist of such categories as Title, Abstract, Introduction, Theoretical Framework, Data/Subjects, Analysis, Conclusions, depending on the discipline and the subject matter. News reports in the press similarly have one or more Headlines, a Lead, Main Event Description, Context, Backgrounds, History and Comments, as formal categories for the organization of specific kinds of information – typically obtained by different news production strategies, sources or professionals (van Dijk, 1988). Many professional and institutional discourse types may have such conventional formats. Even informal conversations have such fixed formal categories, such as greetings and leave [illegible]. Much work on professional genres deals with such 'schematic'

structures of text and talk (Bhatia, 1993; Gunnarsson, 1997; Swales, 2004; Ventola & Mauranen, 1996).

Note that all these structures are *global*, and not local: Just like topics or semantic macrostructures, they characterize discourse as a whole, or apply to larger fragments of discourse. Also, even when originally they might have had specific meaning functions, they are *formal* categories defining abstract schemas. Thus, the headline of a news report is a fixed, obligatory category that applies to any news report, whatever its meaning or content. Yet the *function* of such a headline is semantic and cognitive: It expresses the main topic of the text, which in turn organizes its local meanings, and signals the most important information about an event.

Whereas most other structures of sentences and discourse correspond to various subdisciplines, there is no subdiscipline that specifically deals with these schematic structures in general. Rather, different text types or genres may be associated with such schemas, as we have seen for the conventional schema of an argumentation.

Discourse Pragmatics

We have seen that pragmatics is one of the overlapping sister-disciplines of discourse studies: Many studies of discourse are also called 'pragmatic' because they somehow have to do with the study of 'language use', rather than with grammar. Here such a general use of the term 'pragmatics' will be avoided, because obviously the study of 'language use' also takes place in socio- and psycholinguistics and other disciplines, and we prefer to use the notion in a more restricted, technical way than as some kind as 'wastepaper basket' of linguistics as the philosopher Yehoshua Bar-Hillel used to say). Part of such a broader study of language use, as we also have seen above, are for instance the ways language users express or signal politeness and deference, and in general manage 'face'. Thus, whereas the study of grammar and style specifically focuses on *form*, and semantics focuses on *meaning*, these pragmatic aspects rather are specific properties of *interaction*, such as the social relations between participants.

Incidentally, although nearly all internationally influential studies referred to in this chapter are written in English, we should not forget that vast amounts of discourse studies have been published in French, German, Spanish, Russian and other major languages. Thus, the study of discourse pragmatics was carried out in Germany already since the early 1970s, for instance in the work of Wunderlich, Ehlich, and Rehbein (see the papers in Wunderlich, 1972), scholars who later contributed many other studies in the field of discourse analysis. The same is true, for instance, for the work on pragmatic discourse markers and argumentation by Ducrot (1972, 1980, 1984), in France. It is not feasible here to review all relevant work in other languages than English.

More specifically, pragmatics will here be understood as the subdiscipline of discourse studies focusing on speech acts or illocution, that is, the specific social acts accomplished by language users and that typically are (only) accomplished by text or talk, such as assertions, promises, questions, congratulations, and so on.

Like sentences and their meanings (propositions), also speech acts usually come in sequences, as is the case in conversations, parliamentary debates, and other types of discourse. And as we do for sequences of propositions, also sequences of speech acts can be said to be locally or globally coherent, for instance when one speech acts provides reasons for the next one (such as in the sequence Assertion-Request 'It's stuffy in here. Could you please open the window?'). Similarly, the global speech act performed by this chapter is one of an assertion, whereas the global speech act of an editorial in the press may be an accusation or a recommendation and the weather forecast a prediction (van Dijk, 1981).

Conversation Analysis

Last but not least, the vast field of research commonly labeled 'Conversation Analysis' (CA) specifically focuses on the *interactional* nature of language use and discourse. Although early work in CA specifically dealt with informal, spontaneous everyday conversation, later studies also more generally deal with 'talk in interaction', that is, also with institutional dialogues of many kinds. Emerging from microsociology and ethnomethodology, these studies are specifically interested in the 'local order' of social structure, and how also institutions and organizations are daily produced and reproduced by talk (Boden & Zimmerman, 1991; Drew & Heritage, 1992).

Although often presented as a separate subdiscipline, the study of talk-in-interaction obviously belongs to the broader study of discourse. Many of the interactional aspects of talk are closely related to grammar, semantics, pragmatics and other dimensions of discourse: Turn taking is based on clues from intonation, syntactic structure or meaning units. Openings and closings of talk are schematic categories that have similar functions as Introductions, Headlines, on the one hand, or with Conclusions, on the other hand, prominent in many spoken or written types of discourse. Moves and strategies of interaction are organized also in terms of meaning, as is the case for agreements and disagreements. Self-presentation strategies have both interactional as well as semantic and formal characteristics, as we also know from such well-known disclaimers as *"I am not a racist, but..."*. Indeed, most of the conditions of local and global coherence, of style and rhetoric, characterize both spoken and written discourse, and it does not make sense, therefore, to distinguish two disciplines of discourse studies. On the other hand, studies of written discourse (for instance in argumentation), should not neglect the interactional dimension of such discourse. And in many forms of Computer Mediated Communication (CMC) today, such as chatting, talk-in-interaction is written or multimodal rather than spoken.

In sum, the complex and subtle structures and strategies of interaction are multiply related to all other levels and dimensions of discourse, and may be studied in a unified framework. Studies on the formal or meaning aspects of discourse may be complemented by a study of their interactional dimensions, and vice versa, as we have seen above, the analysis of talk in interaction is inextricably related to other local, sequential and global dimensions of discourse, from intonation and syntax, local and global meanings, to schematic organization and speech acts.

Genre Analysis

From the brief summary given, we see that the study of discourse is a vast field, consisting of many subdisciplines, and at the same time overlapping with other new interdisciplines, such as sociolinguistics, and with sister disciplines such as pragmatics and semiotics. It either is a part or overlaps with virtually all mother disciplines of the humanities and social sciences.

This overlap with other disciplines also produces the kinds of studies that focus on different *genres*, such as the study of many types and subtypes of text and talk in politics, the media, education, science, law, business, the bureaucracy and also parliamentary speeches, news reports, editorials, textbooks, classroom lessons, laws, business letters, phone calls, annual reports, meetings, bureaucratic forms along with a host of other genres (Bhatia, 1993; Lemke, 1990).

Note though that genres are not merely described in terms of their structures at any of the dimensions mentioned above, but especially also in terms of their *contexts* (van Dijk, 2007). Thus, a parliamentary debate has very few exclusive structures – its topics, its forms of rhetoric, its argumentation, and so on may be part of any discourse about the same subject – and hence needs to be defined in terms of specific context categories, such as MPs, political parties, government and opposition, constituents and voters, as well as in terms of political goals and processes, knowledge and ideologies. Some of these contextual elements may be accompanied by specific discourse forms, as when members of the same party in British parliament are traditionally addressed as 'my honourable friend'.

Such contextual approaches may be combined with the more traditional descriptions of discourse genres in terms of their structural characteristics, for instance stories in terms of narrative schemas, style, topics or the perspective of the narrator, or news reports in terms of its canonical schema, featuring headlines and leads, and other categories – besides some special lexical items preferred in news discourse (e.g., the short formal word 'bid' in English headlines, rather than the longer noun 'attempt').

Note that genre analysis is merely a collective label for what in many respects have become more or less autonomous subdisciplines of discourse studies, such as conversation analysis, narrative analysis, argumentation analysis, the study of classroom interaction, political discourse analysis, media discourse analysis, and so on.

With the usual increasing specialization we know from other disciplines, it is likely that in the future we'll have discourse analysts specialized in the study of news in the press, high school textbooks, schizophrenic talk, parliamentary debates, life stories, soaps (telenovelas), and so on for many hundreds of other discourse genres defined as discursive social practices.

Applied Discourse Studies

Although we may thus expand the field of discourse studies as far as the study of the human activity of text, talk and communication may bring us, we now have summarized at least some of its major subdisciplines. Each of these subdisciplines

has its own background, theories, terms, objects of analysis, methods, aims, introductions, handbooks, journals, conferences, and even associations of scholars.

Each of these subdisciplines have a more *applied* dimension, when no longer mere theory or description is relevant, but concrete applications, interventions and the use of science in the solution of social problems are required. *In linguistics*, we are familiar with the use of grammar in the study of first or second language learning, translation, and other aspects of language use. In discourse studies, the number of possible applications is so vast that they cannot even be summarized here, because they pertain to any aspect of language use, interaction and communication, from literacy to the formation of journalists, peace negotiation and the critique of advertising and political manipulation. Pervasive and probably most relevant are all applications in education, such as curricula, the production of adequate (and non-racist, non-sexist, etc.,) textbooks, programs of classroom intervention, testing and so on.

Now we have some more insight into the structures of talk and text, as well as their cognitive basis and social and cultural contexts, we in principle are also in a better position to engage in the treatment of the many social issues that have a discursive dimension. People may not first think of text and talk when dealing with racism, for instance, until it is shown that racist prejudices and ideologies that are the basis of racist discrimination are largely acquired by discourse, especially the public discourses of the elites, e.g., in politics, the mass media and textbooks. Much critical and practical studies on discourse combine theoretical, descriptive and 'applied' dimensions, and indeed hardly differentiate between such dimensions of scholarly activity. Critical discourse analysis focuses on social problems and not on scholarly paradigms, and tries to understand and solve such problems with any kind of method, theory or description that may be relevant – taking into account the experiences and perspectives of the participants.

Looking Ahead: The Future of Discourse Studies

In the previous pages we have occasionally formulated speculations and wishes about the future developments of the study of discourse. If the 'logic' of the historical development of the language sciences is followed, in which the nature and size of the object of study was gradually extended from sounds, words, syntax, meanings, speech acts, and interaction, to the contexts of society, culture and cognition, we may expect that research in the coming years will consolidate this further expansion as well as explore new extensions.

More – and More Explicit – 'Traditional' Descriptions

Firstly, there are 'traditional' areas that need (much) more attention, such as the study of the many dimensions of discourse semantics, and the further integration of micro- and macro-semantics. Secondly, we need a much more explicit

integration of rhetoric into the study of discourse, instead of the separate, more traditional formulation of 'figures of speech'. Thirdly, the complex notions of style and register need to be made more explicit than has been done so far, thus also integrating linguistic, sociolinguistic and discourse analytical studies of language use in its social context. And finally, we need more general insight into the structures of conventional discourse formats, beyond the well-known ones of narrative and argumentation. Many discourse types have such canonical schemas, related also to their interactional and institutional functions, and much more classical descriptive work will be necessary within a more general, typological approach of discourse. This is finally also the case for a more general theory of genre and specific genre descriptions. In that respect, discourse analysis is still a young discipline. The number of discourse types hardly ever studied is probably much bigger than the discourse types that have been studied.

Semiotic Extensions and Computer Mediated Communication

It has already been emphasized that discourse studies overlaps with its sister discipline of semiotics with which ideally it should merge in the future – both being involved in the study of communicative events. Thus, even when limiting the study to discourse in a more traditional sense, we need to realize that such discourse has many 'non-verbal' dimensions, such as intonation, gestures, applause, music and other aspects of oral performance, as well lay-out, printing types, color, pictures, drawings, film, and so on for written discourse (van Leeuwen, 2005). In sum, also under the influence of the tremendous variety of Computer Mediated Communication (CMC) discourse and communication events have become truly 'multimedia' events, in which sounds, music, movement and images combine, in which spoken and written modes of discourse are closely integrated, for instance in 'chats', and in which 'interaction' (e.g., between humans and machines) has acquired new meanings (Danet, 2001; Herring, 1996). Most of these forms of discourse still need to be studied, and in that respect also discourse studies is still a young discipline.

Other Disciplines

We have seen how discourse studies emerged from several disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, especially literary studies, linguistics, psychology, sociology and anthropology, later joined by communication studies. There are many more disciplines in which discourse is a valid and important object of study. We have mentioned political science and history, both disciplines that have regrettably played a less prominent role so far in discourse studies (and vice versa). There is no doubt that also these disciplines will have a strong discourse analytical dimension in the future. Even in such disciplines as geography and economics, discourses are objects of analysis, and discourse analysis may hence also play a more prominent role in those disciplines.

The Cognition-Interaction Gap

We hardly need to repeat what has already been said about the regrettable gap between social and psychological studies, focusing on interaction and cognition, respectively. Interaction and cognition mutually presuppose each other, and any integrated study of discourse in the future will need to deal with both these aspects of language use. Cognition will need to be studied also in a social paradigm because knowledge and beliefs are shared by other members of collectivities and acquired in forms of social interaction we call 'learning'. And vice versa, there are many aspects of interaction that are in fact cognitive dimensions of action, such as the very meaning or interpretation of social conduct, as well as notions such as intention, plan, goals, motivation, purpose, coordination, and so on. Modern cognitive science has a lot to offer to contemporary interaction studies, whatever the relevance of more autonomous approaches for the initial advancement of a new field. We not only need more cognitive and neurological studies of words and meanings, but also of the organization of more complex interactional and discursive structures, such as text schemata or topics, as well as the understanding and management of context.

Context

Indeed, while focusing on text and talk, we tend to forget the many dimensions of a theory of context that is still in the making and that needs to be further developed in the future, and in several (sub) disciplines. It is crucial in any account of the structures of text and talk to describe and explain how they may vary with different structures of the communicative event as these are subjectively represented in context models by the participants. Contexts and their impact on discourse are very complex and future studies need to disentangle these different dimensions of contextual control and consequences. Most studied have been gender, region and class as 'variables'. However, there are a vast number of other aspects of the social and communicative situation that need to be further studied in the future, such as time and space/place settings, the social and institutional roles and relations of participants, and the nature of intentions, plans and purposes as well as the fundamental role of knowledge in discourse production and comprehension. We need to know how local (micro) situations may thus combine with more global (meso and macro) levels of context interpretation and influence, for instance how daily practices of members of institutions are controlled both by specific interaction types (e.g., interviews or meetings) as well as more global (knowledge about the) structure of institutions or organizations.

Methods and Theories

Compared to formal grammar, most discourse studies are quite informal. This is as such no problem (also because informal studies are more accessible to more students and non-academic readers), but that does not mean that discourse analysis should be less explicit and systematic. The description of structures

and strategies at all levels earlier mentioned should take place in terms of explicit theories, and analyses of specific discourse types should be systematic and relevant, and not merely a personally-subjective interpretation, paraphrase or comment on text or talk, as is still often the case in many studies that purport to do 'discourse analysis'.

It should be stressed though that unlike content analysis discourse analysis is *not* a method but a discipline. There is no such thing as psychological or sociological analysis either. Even when studying the 'same' object, such as a news item or a parliamentary debate, we may have recourse to many 'methods', also depending on the kinds or structures we want to focus on, and especially also depending on our aims of study.

Conclusion

If we measure the success of a discipline by its propagation in other disciplines, the study of discourse has been very successful indeed. There are only a few disciplines and areas in the humanities and social sciences that have not engaged in some form of discourse studies. This is not only true for the mother disciplines of discourse studies, such as linguistics, cognitive psychology, sociology and anthropology, but now also for social psychology, communication studies, political science, history, and even for such less discursive disciplines as economics and geography. There is nothing surprising about that, because humanity, society and culture are primarily characterized by their social interaction in general and language use or discourse in particular. In fact, instead of wondering about the vast field and potential of discourse studies, one may ask why discourse studies as a general cross-discipline was not 'invented' before – although in a sense rhetoric had some of these functions since antiquity.

In this introduction we have briefly sketched the history and the organization of the new field of discourse studies, as well as formulated some suggestions for future developments. It may have become clear that the study of discourse has made considerable progress in a few decades since its early studies of narrative, conversation and grammar in the 1960s and 1970s. It is now a vast cross-discipline with equally vast sub-disciplines, each with its own handbooks, journals and congresses, as is the case for argumentation, narrative, media discourse and scientific discourse analysis. Within the original mother disciplines also many studies are associated with discourse analysis, as is obviously the case in literary studies, linguistics and anthropology. This is even more evident in sister-disciplines such as sociolinguistics, semiotics, ethnography, and especially pragmatics. All these new subdisciplines or sister disciplines of discourse studies also have entered the stage of useful applications in the study of social problems and implementation of many social practices.

In sum, discourse studies has come of age, and has become a major cross-discipline within and related to other major disciplines in the humanities and social sciences – and as one of the major disciplines accounting for the most human of all phenomena: language use.

Acknowledgement

For comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this chapter, I am indebted to Ruth Wodak.

Notes

1. To limit a potentially vast bibliography, this introductory chapter only will cite some influential books on discourse in English. For detailed further references, see the articles collected in this book.

Further Reading

Besides the basic books referred to above, here are some suggestions for further (especially also introductory) reading in various areas of discourse studies and its sister-disciplines:

General introductions to discourse studies: Georgakopoulou & Goutsos (1997); Johnstone (2002); Renkema (2004); Schiffrin (1993); Van Dijk (1997); Wooffitt (2005).

Readers of discourse studies: Jaworski & Coupland (1999); Wetherell, Taylor, & Yates (2001).

Handbooks of discourse studies: Schiffrin, Tannen & Hamilton (2001); Van Dijk (1985).

Conversation Analysis: Lerner (2004); Ten Have (1999); Ochs, Schegloff & Thompson (1996); Wooffitt (2005).

Pragmatics: Mey (2001); Verschueren (1999).

Sociolinguistics: Blommaert (2005); Bratt Poulston & Tucker (2003), Coulmas (2003); Holmes (1992); Sarangi & Coulthard (2000); Trudgill (1995); Wardhaugh (1998).

Stylistics: Eckert & Rickford (2001); Toolan (1997).

Rhetoric: Lucaites, Condit & Caudill (1999).

Critical Discourse Studies: Caldas Coulthard & Coulthard (1995); Fairclough (1995); Lazar (2005); Toolan (2002); Wodak & Meyer (2001).

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1

Interviewing Persons with a Learning Disability: How Setting Lower Standards May Inflate Well-Being Scores

Charles Antaki

How does one ask people about their quality of life, and what does one do if those people have a learning disability? "Few would dispute that a basic aim of everyone who formulates questions for use in social research is to have their questions understood by respondents as intended" (Foddy, 1993, p. 183). Indeed, but "having their questions understood" is a special worry for researchers when the respondent has been diagnosed as having some cognitive disability. This article is about what can happen when questions are asked "sensitively."

Interview techniques and questionnaire design have been sites for sustained development for at least the past 50 years (Foddy, 1993). The debate has thrown up a number of problems with phrasing that seem solvable, and there are a number of authoritative sources to which one can turn for such solutions (e.g., Foddy, 1993; Fowler & Mangione, 1990). But there is reason to believe, since the opening-up of the interactional domain by ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts (Garfinkel, 1967; Sacks 1992), that things are not so simple. Recent developments in understanding "institutional talk," for example in the collection in Drew and Heritage (1992) and especially in close analyses of structured tests (Marlaire & Maynard, 1990; Maynard & Marlaire, 1992) and standardised interviews (Houtkoop-Steenstra, 1995, 1996; Suchman & Jordan, 1990), show that the work that goes on to actually ask a question and receive an answer is much more complicated than the official script might suggest, and this work poses a serious threat to claims that the questions are standardized.

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The problem is exacerbated when the respondent is diagnosed to be in some way cognitively disabled and unable to understand complex questions. In such circumstances, the interviewer may not always be able to follow the strict letter of the interview schedule and is even more likely to fall prey to what Garfinkel (1972) notes happens whenever professionals actually make use of idealized instructions, formulas, rules, and so on. That is, the interviewer will mobilize her or his set of ordinary, unstated, advisory rules to deal with difficult cases. As Maynard and Marlaire (1992) found when examining the standardized testing of children on a linguistic task and referring to the interviewer's nonofficial talk, "the reportable score...depends upon this infrastructure, or substrate, or scaffolding, of organised, practical skills" (p. 196). In what follows, I want to look at this "interactional substrate." I shall make a close comparison between script and delivery in a set of quality-of-life assessments of people with learning disabilities (in North American terminology, people with mental retardation) to see just where the interviewers' unstated advisory rules take them. What I shall try to bring out is what the deviations from the script tell us about the interviewer's treatment of the respondent as being "incompetent," not only mentally but also socially, as a person with reduced personal expectations.

In making this claim, I shall be invoking the sorts of conversational devices identified by conversation analysis (CA). One question that will occur to readers is whether CA, with its base in the talk of people without a learning disability, can cope with the talk of people who are diagnosed as being not fully competent cognitively. This is, in part at least, an empirical matter, and so far as it has been tried, the answer seems to be that it can. Brewer and Yearley (1989) find that, leaving aside certain features that require normatively measurable memory abilities (such as large-scale sequential planning), learning difficulties did not debar people from using the kind of conversational structures and devices CA has identified in the talk of people without a learning disability. Separately, Wootton (1989) takes a possibly more difficult case of the talk of a child severely affected by Down's syndrome to demonstrate the illumination CA can give. Evidence in the 1990s has been accumulating more quickly, and certainly Perkins (1997), reviewing the work reported in a conference devoted to the analysis of order and disorder in talk, felt able to conclude that the applicability of CA is now uncontentious. Given all this, we can at least approach the talk of people with a learning disability with some faith that they will orient to the same communicative regularities in interaction as do people without such a disability.

The Scripted Questions

The standard, psychometric, psychological account is that quality of life is as publicly measurable as any other psychological state and by the same public means. Let me say that in this article, I take no position on whether the construct "quality of life" is a good or bad one nor on whether it serves this or that political purpose and so on. My only interest is in comparing the official description of what is meant to happen in the interview with exactly what does happen

(so far as we can tell from what the audio transcript shows us of the participants' own orientations to the action) and in saying something about the way the interviewers' unofficial and unstated practical reasoning allows, or prompts, a certain pattern of treatment to emerge and a score to be recorded.

Most quality-of-life assessments involve some kind of interview or questionnaire (Hughes, Hwang, Kim, Eisenman, & Killian, 1995). The particular questionnaire whose administration I shall be looking closely at in this article is the Quality of Life Questionnaire (QOL.Q) (Schalock & Keith, 1993; see also Schalock, Keith, Hoffman, & Karan, 1989, 1990, for its development; Rapley & Lobley, 1995, for its acceptable reliability for a British population). It is a routinely used, psychometrically validated, unexceptionable addition to the psychologists' battery of tests, and according to the psychologist responsible for its selection in the interviews we shall see below, it was chosen and administered without fuss or second thought.[1]

What is the "Official" Account of the Interview?

A word is in order on what I take to be the official version of what this interview should be like and against which I shall be offering a comparison from the interactional transcript. The introductory paragraph on this particular instrument reads as follows:

> The QOL.Q may be administered to persons with mental retardation who have an adequate receptive and expressive language. The examiner needs to be sensitive to the possibility that the respondent may not understand some of the items or the meaning of some of the words. If this happens, it is okay to paraphrase the item to improve understanding. If this happens frequently, or if the person is known not to have adequate receptive or expressive skills, it is acceptable to have two persons who know the individual well complete the questionnaire.

And after a paragraph of instructions to be read to the respondent, the instructions to the interviewer continue thus:

> If the respondent consents, the examiner proceeds to administer the 40 items. When reading the items, pay close attention to the exact wording. You may paraphrase items and repeat them as often as necessary to ensure the respondent's understanding of the item content.

As with any set of instructions, there is a great deal that remains implicit. Perhaps the most important omission is the lack of instruction about how to "paraphrase items and repeat them." It would seem to be of crucial importance that this be channeled along some principled guidelines, but none are provided. In other words, if interviewers depart from the script (as we know interviewers do from the work of Houtkoop-Steenstra, 1995, 1996; Maclaine & Mc[illegible], 1998;

Suchman & Jordan, 1990), then what they will be doing is not adhering to some strict psychometrically correct procedure guided by mental-heath theory (indeed. Garfinkel's [1967] argument is that such procedure is a chimera) but rather revealing some combination of their "training" and their unofficial folk craft in designing questions for these recipients. I shall try to show that the way they design their deviations is in the direction of what might be called *sensitiveness* and that this can have the effect of raising the respondent's score without official warrant.

The Data

The data are transcripts of 10 administrations of a questionnaire (as noted above, the Schalock & Keith [1993] QOL.Q) in a routine Psychological Services "audit" of people in supported housing in a city in Northern England (for a fuller description of aspects of these data not relevant here, see Antaki & Rapley, 1996a. 1996b; Rapley & Antaki, 1996). Respondents were all former residents of a local long-stay institution for people with learning disabilities (in U.S. terminology, mental retardation) and had been previously classified as having moderate or mild learning disabilities. Interviews were conducted in the participants' new homes. All participants were asked for, and gave, their consent to the tape recording.

I shall concentrate on one, typical interview between the psychologist and a man pseudonymised as MA and bring in examples from other interviews as I go along (each interview was conducted by one of two psychologists, and I shall not distinguish between them). Perhaps I should make clear that the persuasiveness or otherwise of my case rests on how well or badly I unravel the workings of scripted question delivery. It is not primarily a statistical demonstration done by counting up categories across cases; it is an argument that this is the kind of distortion that script delivery suffers as the interaction progresses. Nevertheless. there will be a couple of points in the argument where some brute statistics will help, and I shall provide them then.

Analysis

I shall turn first to an exemplary question-and-answer pair, then go through the range of such pairs as they increasingly deviate from the printed schedule. I will quote the official version of the question and the official response alternatives to make points about discrepancies between the official and the live versions. The notation used is derived from Gail Jefferson's conventions, which are widely adopted in CA (see Atkinson & Heritage, 1984, pp. ix ff) and which are set out in the appendix. In the extracts presented here, all personal names have been changed, as have most place names and any other details that might identify the respondent.

An Example of Sensitive Paraphrase

The following is a good example of the sort of paraphrase that reworks the official question into one that is easier for the respondent to answer:

Question 21: How did you decide to do the job or other daily activities you do now? *I chose it because of pay, benefits or interests* (3), *Only thing available I could find* (2), *Someone else decided for me* (1).
Actual delivery and response:

409		(3 secs, including paper rustling)
410	Interviewer.	how do you (.) decide to ↓do **what** (.) you >do at
411		the moment< (.)°↑yeh?_
412	MA	(well) clean ↑up
413	Int.	yeh? (.) d'y (.) d'y <u>do</u> what you do bec'z (...) you
414		↓have to: (.) or because you"re ↓told to (.) or cos you ↓want to do it
415	MA	to <u>do</u> it
416	Int.	hah?
417	MA	↑yeh
418	Int.	↓cos ↑you want to do things
419	MA	yes
420	Int.	°yeh?°
421		(2 secs)
422	Int.	ok (sniff) [moves onto next question]

Recorded score: 3

Notice here that the official question is about paid work, but the interviewer has previously established (in earlier lines 177–180, not reproduced in this article) that MA is "about 70" years of age (and thus older than retirement age). The interviewer has to offer a suitably reworded version. This comes out as "how do you (.) decide what (.) to >do at the moment<° yeah?°" (line 410). The previous material does not seem to offer much of an indication as to what such a pro-verb (as Sacks called them; see 1992, Vol. 1, pp. 342 ff) as *do* might stand for here (or even its phrasal version *do-at-the-moment*, delivered in a burst); so this is rather an underspecified paraphrase. MA has an attempt at specifying it with "(well) clean up," and the interviewer recycles the question in a further paraphrase, which nevertheless still uses the pro-form *do what you do*. We might wonder whether MA's turns at 415 (an echo of "to do it" from the interviewer's previous turn), 417 ("yeh"), and 419 ("yes") do constitute the score 3 and the sentiment "I chose it because of pay, benefits or interest" that it is meant to stand for; but for the moment, the thing to notice is the paraphrase.

Dijkstra, van der Leen, and van der Zouwen (1985) report that only about a third of questions in standardized interviews (with respondents without a learning disability) get a literal delivery. Things are rather worse in the interview with MA: Only 3 of the 28 question-and-answer pairs come up to the official presumption of strict literalness without paraphrase.

This is a point at which some further gross statistics might be helpful. To get a sense of how often in the entire 10-interview corpus questions deviated from literalness, I counted the times a question was delivered in a way that would count common sensically as *word for word* (a technically rather problematic phrase), *nearly word for word*, and, finally, *not word for word*. I hasten to say that each of these terms would bear a great deal of examination, but the purpose I want to make them serve here is exactly the sort of rough-and-ready judgment that (I imagine) would be made by the interviewers themselves while actually delivering the questions and without time for formal reflection and drafting. The criteria I used for literalness were that the item stem and its response alternatives be delivered word for word, with allowance made for some small degree of filled pausing ("ums" and "ers") and self-repair ("that hap- *happen* to you"). More generously, I allowed the substitution of synonyms or synonymous expressions (for example, substituting the word *work* for *employment*, or *a bit satisfied* for *somewhat satisfied*). I counted as "nonliteral" anything grosser: This ranged from reducing the number of response alternatives to wholesale paraphrase of the entire question.

The first pass is to see what is made of each question the first time it is asked. None of the 10 interviews had more than 3 exactly literal first-time deliveries of question-stem and response alternatives, and most (6) had only one such delivery. On a more liberal – but of course psychometrically discouraged – allowance of near literalness, each interview would yield about 3 more such deliveries. But even with this allowance, the most word-perfect interview had no more than 8 literal or nearliteral deliveries out of 33 occasions on which a question was asked for the first time, and the mean, over all 10 interviews, was about 13%, or 1 question in 8.

How literal were questions when they were repeated? The textbook instruction is that in response to unsatisfactory first answers, "the interviewer's job is to explain to the respondent that choosing one answer from the list is the way to answer the question . . . and to read the list of responses again" (Fowler & Mangione, 1990, p. 39). But this virtually never happened in this set of interviews. If we took a purely numerical count of all questions in the interviews (on a crude categorization, including first deliveries, repetitions, subsequent versions, corrections, and so on), the proportion of literal or near-literal versions of what is on the official schedule drops to about 2%. In other words, the conversation-analytic cliché of some phenomenon being "massively" the case works out here, for nonliteral delivery of a scripted question, to something like "98% of the time."

In other words, then, and speaking only of this set of interviews, an interviewer can be expected to pose people with learning difficulties literal, scripted, psychometrically proper questions only very infrequently; deviation of one kind or another is the norm. Now it is worth remembering that, as we saw in the instructions above, this particular questionnaire disarms textbook injunctions to literalness by allowing its administrators to paraphrase the items. But it does so without providing any guidance at all about what constitutes a proper or improper

departure from the wording on the page. That is left to the interviewers' discretion, so what they actually do say is a matter of some interest.

How Sensitive Questions Lower the Bar to Socially Positive Answers

Let us move on now to extracts that depart more markedly from the official script and in which the lowering of the criteria for a high score is still more exaggerated. Note, however, that I do not mean to suggest that every deviation from the script can usefully be characterized as one that lowers the bar to a socially positive answer, only that this is a common and striking pattern in the data and one with quite serious consequences, as I shall try to bring out below. I shall also start to bring in more evidence from other interviews in the set just to underline the point that what I am saying is not some eccentricity on the part of this interviewer or this interviewee. The extracts from the interview with MA always come first.

In the first case we look at, there are two things we have already seen (the simplification of the response alternatives and the interviewer's paraphrase). The feature I shall move on to now is the interviewer's nontake-up of possibly relevant material offered by the respondent.

Nonofficial Material Apparently Ignored

Scripted Question 24: How much control do you have over things you do every day, like going to bed, eating, and what you do for fun? ***complete*** (3), ***some*** (2), ***little*** (1).

Actual delivery and response (in part; we shall see its later development after discussing this segment):

521	Int.→	how ↑much:: (.) con↓trol (.) d'you have (.) over the
522		things you ↓do [°yeh?°
523	MA	[(eh?)
524	Int.	how much control do you have (.) over what you ↓do
525	MA	what (.) ↑'e::↓re?
526	Int.→	↑well (.) (li-) (.) ↑yeh (..) wha- (.) things that–like
527		going out (.) an' (.) when you get up an'
528	MA	well I (go out) (.) on a ↑Wednesday::=
529	Int.	=yeh
530	MA	up ↑Merchant↓man

Recorded score: 3.

On its first delivery (at 521–522), the interviewer's question is hearable as having been concluded at the end of the main clause ("the things you do"). So MA's "(eh?)" might be heard as a pass or a request for more. The interviewer recycles the question from the beginning but again only reaches the end of the main clause now slightly altered to "what you do"). Again, MA offers something, and this time his "what (.) "e::re?" is a specific candidate for clarification

(understandable as whether the question is about control over things "here" in his current, nonhospital, home). This would be in keeping with the spirit of the scripted question. But notice that the interviewer's take up is prefaced with a "well," signaling a disagreement (compare the immediate and emphatic "yes. here" he could have said). He goes on to diverge from MA's offer and reorient the question *away* from the current home, with the dis-preference markers of "well" and two repaired false starts ("(li) yeh (..) wha-") and a correction ("things that - like going out"). The phrase "an' when you get *up* an" that he adds is a partial move back to the domestic round that is specified in the official question, but it is not oriented to by MA.

In other words, the interviewer's delivery (and the respondent's uptake) deletes the specific domestic items of the official questionnaire in favor of leisure activity and, for leisure activity, allows the very specific going to (what is recognizable as) the pub to stand for the range of things the scripted question is meant to ask about (the "things you do every day"). This is in line with the deviation we saw above, where the question was delivered not as in the script. Here, a still stronger case can be made, I think, for the consequentiality of the deviation for the score that the psychologist enters. If we are to understand (as we are probably meant to) by the scripted phrase a general appreciation of all of life's mundane decisions, it would be easily argued that this narrowing alone renders the question a poor delivery of the script. More to the point, it is another example of lowering the bar: The respondent can score highly by controlling one thing in his life (going to the pub), even though the question asks about his life in general, a lowering that would be curious if offered to a person without a learning disability.

But there is more trouble ahead, and it is in the remainder of what MA gives. Or, to put it more finely, it is in the material that MA offers after the interviewer has offered what might be hearable as the termination of the topic and a preparation to move to the next. Note how, at line 535 below, the interviewer offers "right right." In the circumstances of the interaction – without a third-party mechanism for turn allocation (e.g., a chairperson, as in the selection interview discussed in Button, 1992, or the political meeting discussed in Larrue & Trognon, 1993) – it is the interviewer who disposes of the old topic as suitably answered and who can propose the next one. So his "right right," like the other terminators we have previously seen, can be oriented to as the close of a chapter and the alert that he is about to inaugurate a new one. But note that MA does not allow the interviewer to keep the turn:

531	Int.	right ↑so (.) are you in charge of doin'that?
532	MA	↓yes
533	Int.	yeah? (..)↓you don"t have to ask anyone if you can
534	MA	↑no no
535	Int.→	right right
536	MA→	(see) on a Thursday (..) I go to 't (...) club
537	Int.	mhm
538	MA	(they- they) complained said I- >not s'posed to (go in) in<
539		club (.) they said (you're-you not the boss) (..)

540	Int.	[HHhhh (..) right so ↑you"re in charge
541		[(rustle)
542		(rustle)
543	MA	(cough) If I (syll) club(syll) on a ↓Thursday I ↑would
544	Int.	°right°
545	MA	nothing to do with_them
546	Int.	°ok°=
547	MA	=↑is ↓it?
548	Int.	↑no::↓ I think you're ↑right
549		(2 secs, including some rustling)
550		↑ok(...) [Int. moves onto next question]

The interviewer solicits a yes or no answer to a pointed version of the scripted question at 531 and repeats a version of it at 533. The answers MA gives are consistent, and the interviewer's "right right" at 535 might indicate the point at which he makes an entry on the response sheet (a 3, standing for *complete*[control]).

But leaving aside the discrepancy we noted above between the range of activities in the script and the narrow focus of the delivery, what do we make of the material MA offers at 536? Some aspects of this stretch of talk have been analyzed elsewhere (Antaki & Rapley, 1996a), and a case can be made that here MA is embarking on a troubles telling (Jefferson, 1988), which the interviewer declines to accept as troubles recipient, and nothing comes of the story (which seems to hinge on MA being treated badly by people at a club: lines 538–539, "they complained said I-not s"posed to [go in] club"). The interviewer's specific use of a "so" initiator in his uptake offers what is to be taken as a formulation of what the respondent has said, but the interviewer's formulation is a patently nontroubled account: It puts it that MA is, in fact, "in charge." This effectively rules the trouble out of bounds as a pursuable topic unless MA corrects the interviewer, and we might read 543 and 545 to be an attempt at correction; but the interviewer's assessment of it with a near-idiomatic platitude ("no I think you're right," line 548) is a hearable shutdown (see, as above, Drew & Holt, 1988, on idioms as termination points of trouble tellings) and nontake-up. Moreover, the "so" formulation works as a declarative yes-no question, with the projected "yes" answer being positive; this is an efficient way of eliciting a "happy" answer from the respondent (and there is more on this effect of yes-no question design in Houtkoop-Steenstra & Antaki, 1998).

The record will show that the interviewer has just recorded (or will at some point record) the most positive entry of 3 for this answer, yet it would not be implausible to hear the trouble tale MA tells (about something like exclusion from a club) as being inconsistent with the *complete* control over "things you do every day" that a 3 represents. This is the larger point that I want to make: The interviewer is recording a high, positive score in spite of something that is at least reasonably possible to hear as not positive. What might be in operation is, again, the interviewer's upward recalibration of what would be, for a person without a learning disability, unsatisfactory.

Here is another example of how answers to this question attract a different lower standard for what counts as a positive answer about the degree of control the respondent can exercise in his or her life:

Code	MT/MR/JW	
605	I	>can I just come back to< the:se (.) Anne? Yeah?
606		(.) how much [control do you have over things you
607	AN	[(syll syll)
608	I	do (.) every day like (.) going to bed (.) eating meals
609		(.) and what you do for ↓fun
610	AN	yeah they ↑do let me eat meals (.) they make ↑inice
611		meals for us
612	I	the staff
613	AN	the ↑st↓a:ff
614	I	(.) ok (.) who who decides (.) when you go to bed and (.)
615		what you have to eat
616	AN	(don't) be ↑si:↓ck
617	I	yeah (.) do you (.) do you decide those things (.) or do
618		you (..) ask the ↑staff [or-
619	AN	[(yis) I ↑ask the ↓staff
620	I	or do ↑they tell ↓you what to do
621	AN→	dd I ↑help ↓em
622	I	yeah?
623		(3.5)
624	AN→	be ↑good to ↓em
625	I	(.) ↓good
626	AN→	I ↑mop fer ↓em
627	I	yeah
628	AN→	mop the ↑kitchen ↓out
629	I	↑good
630	AN→	(when they put) swept it ↑↓u:p
631	I	°↓right°
632	AN	(.) all the ↑↓bi:ts
633	I	yeah you do those things
634	AN	(.) (yis) I ↓do:
635	I	that's ↑good (.) sa lotta ↑work ↑isn't ↓it
636	AN	I've ↑took me ↓↑pi:lls
637	I	(.)°right° [↑(when-)]
638	AN	[I've ↑had me ↓↑pi:lls
639	I	good
640	AN	I ↑'ad them at ↓two o'↑↓clo:ck
641	I	right ((clears throat))
642	AN	me pills (↑zeppelin) and me big ↓white ↑one
643	I	°hh oh°
644	AN	I ↓did

Recorded score: 2 (*some* control)

Note the familiar pattern: paraphrase and reduction of the question, pursu of an answer in the face of what is treated as an irrelevant response (in line 61

and disattention to AN's concerns about not being sick (616) and taking her pills (636), which envelope the account of her "work." Again, the interviewer has to reduce all this into a single score, and she opts for 2 – *some* control. We might see this as another example of upgrading. The interviewer seems to treat AN's menial domestic duties as evidence that she has a middling amount of control. They might not seem so for a person without a learning disability.

Let us see another example of lowering the bar, this time in the way a question is "sensitively" edited right at the outset.

Question Edited Right at the Outset

Question 37: Do you participate actively in those recreational activities? ***Usually,*** *most of the time* (3), *Frequently, about half of the time* (2), *Seldom or never* (1)

Actual delivery:

CA	KK/TH		
1	I		at ↑Christ_mas (.) righ" (.) ok ↑then .hhh er:::
2			(3 secs)
3			°.hh right er::m°
4			(2 secs)
5			>so (↑when) you're at – when you're< at your ↓parties?
6			(..) ↑what d'you ↓do (.)
7		→	(>"ve a b"t of a<) (..) have a >bit of a< ↓drink do you?
8	JO		yea [hh:
9	I		[eh hehh hehh hehh hehh ↑do you ↓like your
10			drink (.) John?=
11	JO		=yeah
12	I		heheh (.) ↑what d'you ↓drink
13	JO		I ↑ager
14	I		heheheheh
15			(2 secs)
16			[moves on to next question]

We see the same pattern: The interviewer makes a colloquial, folk-theoretical guess, that, for John, what it means to "participate actively in those recreational activities" is to "have a bit of a drink." Not only has the interviewer made the question psychometrically unrecognizable by narrowing its field, the non-officialness of the language might encourage an answer different from what might be elicited by the formal version. In any case, it is another example of lowering the bar to a positive response in a way that would be odd, and perhaps unacceptable, to a person without a learning disability whose horizons for "participating actively in those recreational activities" would be wider than "having a bit of a drink."

In the last illustration of lowering the bar, let us take a more lengthy extract to see the interviewer's conflation of several questions.

Questions Conflated

Official Questions 36, 37, and 38:

Question 36: How often do you attend recreational activities (homes, parties, dances, concerts, plays) in your community? *3–4 per month* (3), *1–2 per month* (2), *less than 1 per month* (1)

Question 37: Do you participate actively in those recreational activities? *Usually, most of the time* (3), *Frequently, about half of the time* (2), *Seldom or never* (1)

Question 38: What about opportunities for marriage? *I am married, or have the opportunity to date anyone I choose* (3), *I have limited opportunities to date or marry* (2), *I have no opportunity to date or marry* (1)

Actual delivery and response (This is rather a long extract, used to make the point that Questions 37 and 38 are not explicitly delivered):

775	Int.→	mm_hhm(..) ↓°right° .hhh ↑d'you um (...)
776		↑how often do you go <u>out</u> and ↑<u>do::</u> (.) ↓things like ↑go
777		(ter) (..) do your ↓<u>dan</u>cing an" [go to clubs like that
778	MA	[↑(well)
779	MA	(w'll) I go out on ↑Saturdays
780	Int.	yeh?
781	MA	Saturday ↑morning
782	Int.	every Sat [urday?
783	MA	[(↑'ad thi- ↑'ad thi-) (.) 'e 'ad
784		this ↑(f't ↓rain) I don't (know syll)
785	Int.	°right°
786		(1.5 secs)
787	MA	he w's ↓five foot ↑four (...) °yeh° (..)
788	Int.	<u>eh</u>? (..) >I <u>mean</u> you- cos you go to ↑<u>foot</u>ball matches
789		as ↑well< don't you?
790	MA→	↑aye ↓I'm ↑the::↓re
791	Int.→	yeh? (...) oh you ↑watch it on the ↓<u>te</u>lly
792	MA	↑ye::s
793	Int.	what (.) if it's ↑<u>rain</u>ing
794	MA	↑oo:h (syll syll syll ↑lousy) (.) [it was
795	Int.	[eh?=
796	Int.	do you ↑go an' watch 'em (..) d'y- (.) ↑go
797		and watch 'em <u>pl</u>[<u>ay</u>
798	MA→	[I ↑<u>went</u> (.) I went at <u>e:r</u> (...) ↑Old Trafford
799	Int.	yeh(..)
800	MA	watch cricket _match (..) [they got back at ↑(ever syll
801	Int.	[right
802	MA	syll syll (..) ↑syll) (..)
803	Int.→	d'you watch the ↑<u>Test</u> ↑Test match on the ↑telly?
804	MA	↑(y'h)
805	Int.	yeh? (..) ↑ aven' done very ↑well 'ave we?
806	MA	↑no:: =
807	Int.	=hh hehh [hhhhh
808	MA	[↑(d'<u>you</u> play cricket?
809	Int.	↑<u>mmm</u> (.) a ↓little bit (..) y [eh?
810	MA	[(d'you ↑syll ↓syll syll?)

811	Int.	↑no:: I don't play ↑football (..) ↓no
812	MA	no d'you ↑know ↓why (.) you ↑know Sharon ↑told ↓me:
813	Int.	uh huh?
814	MA	you say y'r getting too ↑old (..)
815	Int.	↑you're getting too old?
816	MA	no ↑you're tch- she- ↓(said) (.) that (t'get) ↑your (syll syll)
817	Int.	HHHHHH (..) w'll I >don't think< I'm too old ↓yet (..) .hh (sniff)=
818	MA	(cough)
819	Int.	(loud cough cough sniff) hh .hhh
820		(2 secs)
821	→	°↓o:↑k:::° (...) and yer(.) yer ↑keen on yer ↓dancing
822		aren't you?
823	MA	yes=
824	Int.	yeh? (...) so y- you ↑really get ↑into that
825	MA	ye:h (.) they 'ad a ↑party down the:re an':: ↓like
826		↑Christmas car-↑er ↓party
827	Int.	mm
828	MA	and er 't- er (..) the ↑(syll) comes round to check
829		↑e:re (...) (syll syll syll syll syll).hh (loud cough)
830	Int.	↑what's bad for you? (..)
831	MA	↑this
832	Int.	dancing?
833	MA	↑mm
834	Int.	↓nah it's ↑not
835	MA	('es ↑right syll syll syll syll syll down ↑the:re
836	Int.	yeh?
837	MA	(loud cough) come back at nine o'clock at (.) ↓ni:ght.
838	Int.	mm (..) [(syll syll)
839	MA	[(syll syll (.) ↑taxi ↓comes an': ↑picks you ↑up
840		an" ↑takes [you ↑back
841	Int.	[°°yeh°°
842	Int.	(w'll) it's good exercise though isn"t it?
843	MA	↑eh::
844	Int.	→ y'get ↑out and meet people?
845	MA	↑ooh ↓aye
846	Int.	yeh? (..) (sniff) (..) °o↓k° [Int. moves onto question 40]

Recorded score (for each of the three questions): 3

The interviewer's initial question at 775 is a version of the official question (Question 36. listed above), which shows the reduction and transformation we noted above: It drops the alternatives, it paraphrases into more colloquial language, and it nominates a singular particular example. That much replicates the manner that has replaced the scripted version as standard as the interview has progressed. Of interest to us here, though, is the way in which the development of the answer (through a series of specifying prompts and MA's responses) gives the interviewer license to enter positive scores not only for this question but also for the related Questions 37 and 38, which he does not explicitly ask.

The motivation for the conflation might be to simplify the questions, perhaps by the avoidance of repetitions that violate conversational implicatures; but a

I have been arguing throughout, the way the simplifications are worded has the effect of lowering the bar to a positive social response. Let us deal first with the cognitive account of the simplification. In scripted interviewing, the interviewer has little institutional room for maneuver and must deliver the questions in series, even though this might violate conversational implicatures and occasion an interactional difficulty: for example, what might be heard as the respondent being "puzzled." Here is an example from Houtkoop-Steenstra's (1996) transcript of a telephone survey:

(The respondent has offered, 10 turns back, that he is "in the military")

37	I:	.hh ↑okay now we'd like to ask about your employment ↑STATUS
38		(.)
39		did you do any work for ↑PAY last week?
40	R→	did I do any work for pay? [yeah
41	I	[mmhmm
		(...)
42	I	A:nd what was your ↑JOB last week
43		that is what KIND of work were you doing
44	R→	.hhh uh:: I"m a platoon leader in the::- (0.5) ARMY
45		(...)

We can see that R's response at 40 is prefaced with a check, and his response at 44 is prefaced with an intake of breath and an "uh::," Both of these might be heard to mark some kind of nonsmoothness occasioned by the questions, and it would not be implausible to attribute it to the interviewer's violation of a Gricean maxim (perhaps quality) in repeating a question to which the answer has already been offered (that he is "in the military").

Now let us see whether this might happen in our data. The official questions ask how often the respondent "attends recreational activities," whether they "participate in those recreational activities," and whether they have "opportunities for marriage." As to the first of these, we see MA offer at 779 "(w'll) I go out on Saturdays," which is not obviously an answer to the question posed. His subsequent turns are no clearer. Now (at 788), the interviewer actually nominates a specific activity (going to football matches), which is a concretization (and, as we have seen before, a narrowing) of "recreational activities." The answer seems to be that MA does ("aye, I'm the::re"), but for reasons that are not obvious (but could be that MA is here pointing to the television set, or television room, as "there"), the interviewer further narrows the activity to the more sedentary "you watch it on the telly." The same lowering of the bar – in spite of MA's mention of more actively going somewhere – happens for cricket: At 798/800, MA says he "went e:r (...) ↑Old Trafford [...] watch cricket match" (Old Trafford is a stadium where cricket internationals – "Tests" – are staged), but the interviewer recalibrates this downward as "d'you watch the Test match on the telly?" The interviewer uses MA's answers to *these* unambitious questions – rather than the more active versions that MA himself offers – as license to enter the maximum positive score of 3.

As to the question on participation, it is possible that the interviewer has come to the judgment that such a question would be inappropriate for someone who is (as was established much earlier in the interview) about 70 years of age. Perhaps it would strike him as merely absurd to ask whether MA is an active sportsman (at 808, it is MA who asks the interviewer if he plays sports). This, of course, is plausible, but we might wonder why the maximum score of 3 is entered. As to Question 38 (opportunities for marriage), the answer to this is (apparently) conflated into the same stretch of talk (at least, no other more obvious material appears anywhere else), perhaps on the folk grounds that marriage opportunities are well indexed by the degree and scope of one's leisure activities (even though, here, these are narrowed by the interviewer to dancing, attending cricket and football matches, or watching them on the television). It is possible also that the interviewer is, still in a folk way, sensitive to a threat to MA's face and is reluctant to ask a question that might be unduly sensitive. In any case, there is nothing in the transcript that approximates the official question, unless it is line 844: "y"get out and meet people?" Yet, MA is scored as 3: *I am married, or have the opportunity to date who I choose.*

We might just pick up this orientation to Question 38 as a sensitive topic in another interview:

MT/KK	CL	
363	I	yeah (.) °↓right o↑kay°.hhh (..) ↑↑er:::m (...)
364		and you've ↑got a ↑boy↓friend ↑haven't ↓you
365	CL	yeh
366	I	aheheheh (..)* ↑what's his ↓name again?* ((*high pitch*))
367	CL	Steven
368	I	oh ↑that's ↓right (..) > (so) have you been
369		together for a< ↓long time?
370	CL	yeh (...)
371	I	°oh that's nice° .hhhh (..) °↓right° (..)
372		so [moves to next question]

Recorded score: 3

The interviewer at line 364 preannounces a question about CL's boyfriend. This is intelligible as a version of Question 38 ("What about opportunities for marriage?"). Note, again, the familiar paraphrase of the question and its reduction to domestic dimensions, and especially note that the interviewer shepherds the answer in the positive direction. By soliciting agreement that the respondent has a boyfriend, she prefigures a "no-problem answer" (Heritage & Sorjonen, 1994). She then asks his name and treats it as already known to her. This, again, might be a matter of the interviewer orienting to the sensitivity of "opportunities for marriage" to this respondent: She casts herself as fully appreciating the respondent's positive interpersonal situation – she knows her boyfriend's name. The "so" in line 368 to 369 ("so have you been together for a long time?") cements the question as having proceeded from an agreed premise (that the respondent does indeed have a boyfriend) because, as Houtkoop-Steenstra (1997) points

out, *so* in such contexts treats the presumption as factual. In doing all of this, however, the official scripted question, and its three alternative answers, is obliterated in favor of a question with a lower bar on which the respondent scores maximum points.

Discussion

What I wanted to do in this article was to use the apparatus of CA to examine the administration, by professionally trained interviewers, of a scripted questionnaire. These administrations yield quality-of-life scores that are now on the respondents' official records. The score is consequential both for the respondents (who might be resettled in a different environment or returned to the institution they came from) and for the social services authority that is responsible for them (whose provision of quality of life might be compared with other social service authorities). It is, apparently, in everyone's interest that the questionnaire be delivered faithfully to reproduce the item validity of the questions and not to introduce the sort of extraneous information that psychometricians cast as "noise."

Why, then, do we find only a very few question-and-answer exchanges (at best, about 1 in 8; at worst, about 1 in 50) that seem to reproduce the script with high fidelity? And why do we find consistent deviation from the official script by simplifying the response alternatives, or paraphrase, or the offering of a folk version of the question or conflation of several questions?

The start (but not the end) of the answer is, of course, that the script is a fiction, and interviewers have to use their practical reasoning to deliver its questions in real talk. CA work on interviews from Suchman and Jordan (1990) through Marlaire and Maynard (1990) to Houtkoop-Steenstra (1996) shows that in delivering scripts, interviewers balance two competing motivations: on one hand to play square with the psychometric prescription to be literal and on the other hand actually to deliver the questions in an interactionally sensitive way.

Some of that interactional sensitivity is foreshadowed and licensed by the interview schedule instructions, by the official diagnosis of the respondents as learning disabled, and by the manifest confusion and misunderstanding in (some of) their responses. But there is more to it than that. We not only see the interviewers design questions to lower the *cognitive* difficulty of the task, but they design questions to lower the bar of what will count as a *socially* positive answer. The interviewers mobilize what Garfinkel (1967) calls their unstated advisory rules or what Maynard and Marlaire (1992) call their unassessable interactional skills and turn the official questions into ones that the respondents can cope with. Thus, a formal question such as "do you participate actively in . . . recreational activities?" becomes "so (↑when) you're at- when you're at your parties (..) what d'you do (.) ('ve a b't of a) (..) have a bit of a ↓drink do you?" Or an answer like

"I help them [...] be good to them [...] mop for them [...] mop the kitchen out]" is taken as evidence of *some control* over "things you do every day, like going to bed, eating, and what you do for fun."

Such questions assume that the respondents cannot answer the "proper" or "normal" questions. Is lowering the social bar in this way understandable as motivated by generosity or perhaps by politeness? It is possible; certainly, Houtkoop-Steenstra (1997) suggests that a good number of the distortions she finds in survey questions might be accountable as illustrations of interviewers' attention to respondents' face, in Goffman's (1967) terms, and we also find evidence in this very set of data that yes/no questions can get designed so as to promote the most positive alternative on the official list of options (Houtkoop-Steenstra & Antaki, 1998). One might say, then, that to lower the bar is generously to head off the threat that the respondents' answers will embarrassingly fail to reach even the lower of the rungs on the ladder of alternatives.

But to assume the worst in that way is a curious infection of a technical, "clinical" exercise that is supposed to assume nothing. Moreover, to assume the worst is arguably against the respondent's interests. If a respondent's "high" score is achieved only because the hurdles are set low, then he or she ends up with a score that is ostensibly measured on questions of "normal" difficulty but actually given in response to easier ones. Thus, a respondent might score high on recreational activities just by watching television or on opportunities for marriage by agreeing with the question, "y"get out and meet people?" and so on. The questions are revised, and the answers edited, to make a judgment not about the respondent's quality of life but about the respondent's quality of life in the circumstances. But those circumstances disappear when the official score is entered in the records; then it becomes the score on the questionnaire as it is printed in black and white, with its questions of "normal" difficulty.

Maynard and Marlaire (1992) found children scoring badly because of the ways the interactional demands of the interview broke through its psychometric floodgates: These interactional demands were "good reasons," they observed, following Garfinkel (1967), "for bad testing performance." The interactional demands at work in these psychological quality-of-life interviews are just as powerful but this time with the converse effect. Rather than work to decrease the subject's score, sensitive questioning tends improperly to increase it: Using unofficial, low, folk criteria is, in other words, a bad reason for good testing performance.

I said at the outset that I would take no position on the political debate about quality-of-life testing. The conclusions of this study are nevertheless suggestive. They are, of course, based on one set of interviewers, with one set of respondents, and using one interview schedule. Nevertheless, the data offer evidence that questions are routinely transformed in such a way as to increase the probability of higher scoring to less ambitious questions. If there is to be a debate over whether interview testing attends properly to the interests of the respondents, then such a finding might contribute to it.

Appendix

Transcription notation: The transcription symbols used here were derived from those developed by Gail Jefferson (see Atkinson & Heritage, 1984, pp. ix–xvi).

(.) (..) (...)	(.) is a pause of about .2 of a second; (..) is about .5, and (...) is about .8 of a second
.hh	A dot before an "h" denotes an in breath. The more hs, the longer the in breath.
hh	An "h" denotes an out breath. The more hs, the longer the out breath.
hehh	Laughter syllables with some attempt to capture "color"
hahh	
Go(h)d	(h) denotes "laughter" within words
[^t]	dental click
(guess)	Roman text within brackets is the transcriber's guess at an unclear part of the tape.
cu-	A dash denotes a sharp cutoff of a prior word or sound.
lo:ng	Colons show that the speaker has stretched the preceding letter or sound. The more colons the greater the extent of the stretching
(syll syll)	Unclear speech rendered as approximations to number of syllables
run=	Equal signs link material that runs on
=on	
↑↓	Arrows indicate rising or falling intonational shift. Double arrows indicate very marked shifts
?	Upward intonation (not necessarily a question)
under	Underlining indicates emphasis
CAPITALS	Capital letters indicate speech noticeably louder than that surrounding it
°soft°	Degree signs indicate speech spoken noticeably more quietly than the surrounding talk. Double degree signs indicate greater softness
>fast<; <slow>	"Greater than" and "less than" signs indicate that the talk they encompass was produced noticeably quicker or slower than the surrounding talk
over [lap	Square brackets between adjacent lines of concurrent speech denote
[lap	the start of overlapping talk
→	Side arrow indicates point of special interest in the extract, addressed in the text
[...]	Material left out of the extract

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Note

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2

Discourse Studies and the Ideology of 'Liberalism'

Robert de Beaugrande

> The word is the fundamental object of the study of ideologies. (Vološinov, 1973 [orig. 1929]: 15)
>
> Look at the very connotations of the word 'liberal', which outside the political context is taken to mean gentle, generous, nice. But put the political wrapping around it . . . (data from the Corpus of South African English)
>
> particularly in the West, we often use the word 'liberalization'. That is not a bad word. (data from the Bank of English)

A. Science and Ideology

'Ideology' is a deeply problematic term. In many registers of discourse, it routinely connotes some fixed, unreasoning dogma that foments conflicts, as when Shils (1958) cited Fascism, Nazism, Bolshevism, and McCarthyism as examples. Geertz (1973: 197 ff.) commented upon this conception:

> Like the politics it supports, it is dualistic, opposing the pure 'we' to the evil 'they', proclaiming that he who is not with me is against me. It is doctrinaire in that it claims complete and exclusive possession of political truth and abhors compromise. It is totalistic in that it aims to order the whole of social and cultural life in the image of its ideals, futuristic in that it works toward a utopian culmination of history in which such an ordering will be realised.

Source: *Discourse Studies* vol. 1, no. 3, 1999, pp. 259–295.

The favoured candidate to defend against 'ideology' in this darkly pejorative sense is held to be 'science' (Geertz, 1973; Zima, 1981; Pêcheux, 1982):

> the essential criteria of an ideology [are its] deviations from scientific objectivity [. . .] The problem of ideology arises where there is a discrepancy between what is believed and what can be [established as] scientifically correct. (Talcott Parsons)

Such a pronouncement complacently implies that science itself can and should be free of all ideology, and indeed heralds the 'end of ideology' (Geertz, 1973: 199) in the final triumph of 'objectivity' and 'correctness'.

Yet dictionary definitions suggest that 'ideology' is a more neutral, normal, and even necessary framework: 'a systematic body of concepts esp. about human life or culture' (*Webster's Seventh*, p. 413); 'a body of doctrine or thought that guides an individual, social movement, institution, or group' (*Random House Webster's*, p. 668); or 'a belief or set of beliefs, especially the political beliefs on which people, parties, or countries base their actions' (*Collins COBUILD*, p. 718). Surely these broad definitions might hold for science too.

Perhaps the ideology of science is so hard to recognize because there we encounter not so much a particular 'body of concepts' (or 'doctrines' or 'thoughts') as a set of general methods for arriving at 'concepts' – not so much a 'theory' as a modality for producing and testing theories. Such an ideology effectively functions as a *meta-ideology* – an *ideology of methods* as distinct from an *ideology of content* – and cannot be challenged and discredited in the direct and definitive ways that radical political ideologies like Nazism or McCarthyism can. Refuting a scientific theory like the 'steady-state theory' of the universe did not refute the science of astronomy or its methods, but rather vindicated its methods (in this case, observing red shift in the spectra of light dispersion).

But we do find a popularized ideology which can be called **scientism**, holding that only scientific knowledge is true and valid, and that the progress of science will eventually explain the entire universe and solve all of humanity's problems. This fits Geertz's pejorative sense quoted earlier by being 'totalistic' in that it aims to 'order the whole' of the universe, and 'futuristic in that it works toward a utopian culmination' of human knowledge. And the scientists may tend to be 'doctrinaire' in 'claiming complete and exclusive possession of the truth and abhorring compromise'.

The 'doctrinaire' stance can entrain the scientist in a lonely and vertiginous paradox: the history of science demonstrates that all scientific theories so far have been proven wrong, yet the ideology of scientism encourages you to claim your current theory to be, at long last, the sole true one, whereas the scientists who support rival theories must be mistaken or misled by personal or institutional biases (Kuhn, 1970; Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). The paradox can erode the essence of science as an institution that should freely grant and defend the legitimacy of alternative explanations, and should acknowledge that these may contribute the most when we integrate them.

Scientism has also helped to inhibit science from accrediting ideology as a major object of scientific inquiry. Karl Mannheim's (1936) attempts to incorporate

a 'non-evaluative conception of ideology' into his 'sociology of knowledge' were stymied by the prospect that 'nowhere is resistance to claims of objectivity greater than in the study of ideology', as remarked by Geertz (1973: 195), who added: 'men do not care to have beliefs to which they attach great moral significance examined dispassionately, no matter for how pure a purpose [. . .] they may find it simply impossible to believe that a disinterested approach to critical matters of social and political conviction can be other than a scholastic sham'. Yet Geertz also saw a major 'problem' in the way 'social science' tries to 'handle ideology as an entity in itself – as an ordered system of cultural symbols rather than in the discrimination of its social and psychological contexts' (1973: 195 ff.).

Scientism thus subverts the authentic interests of science when the exaggerations and mystifications of the authority and power of science render the individual scientist unproductively possessive and defensive about his or her own 'objective truth'. Moreover, science is prevented from effectively confronting and discrediting anti-scientific ideologies such as racism and sexism, and from blocking their attempts to expropriate and exploit scientism and raid sociology, psychology, or genetics for 'proof' of the 'natural inferiority' of minorities and women.

If, as philosophers of science like Kuhn (1970) have emphasized, a scientific theory can be discredited only by another theory, then we may reasonably assume that an ideology can be effectively discredited only by another ideology – and not by some ivory-tower standpoint purporting to be free of all ideology (discussed later). Science can profitably investigate ideology, and, at the same time, explicitly develop creditable alternative ideologies for itself and for the institutions it sustains. Building upon Ulric Neisser's (1976: 2) concept of 'ecological validity', i.e. whether 'a theory has something to say about what people do in real, culturally significant situations' and says it in ways that 'make sense to the participants', we could promote the ideology of ecologism, wherein the theory and practice of science are dialectically reconciled in a transdisciplinary enterprise of sustaining humane and democratic practices of action, interaction and discourse (de Beaugrande, 1997). Some trends in this direction have already been emerging, witness the impact of the *Gaia Atlas of Planet Management* (Myers et al., 1993) and of Gell-Mann's (1994) landmark exposé of *The Quark and the Jaguar*. I would also see a similar drift in 'critical linguistics' and 'critical discourse analysis', even if these sometimes do not seem to provide for humane counter-ideologies.

B. The Ideology of Modern Linguistics

One science that has been deeply reluctant to study the nature and functions of ideology is modern linguistics. In the major treatises I have surveyed in fine detail, dating from the early 20th century up into the 1970s (de Beaugrande, 1991), the term 'ideology' simply does not appear. Adapting Geertz's terms from sociology, its absence might reflect the mainstream programme of linguistics, believing that the properly scientific method would be to 'handle language as an entity in

itself – as an ordered system of symbols rather than in the discrimination of its social and psychological contexts'.

This austere programme encouraged mainstream linguistics to develop an ideology of **idealization**, holding that language is based upon an ideal mode of order that is not readily evident in the ordinary practices of real discourse within society. Such was the source of the many static dichotomies that in effect *disconnect ideal language from real language*, such as 'langue versus parole' or 'competence versus performance' (de Beaugrande, 1998a). One label for this ideology, which is also being heavily camouflaged as a standpoint freed of all ideology, might be the neologistic term **linguisticism**. 'Linguisticism' sustains the doctrine that 'language' is an abstract, uniform, and stable system whose nature and properties can be determined only by the ratiocinations of 'linguistic theory' and not from observing and recording discursive practices. De Saussure (1966 [orig. 1916]: x) hinted as much when he speculated that 'other sciences work with objects that are given in advance', whereas in 'linguistics', 'it is the viewpoint that creates the object'. Hjelmslev (1969 [orig. 1943]: 18), who aspired to be a devout successor to de Saussure, was more dramatic: 'linguistic theory cannot be verified (confirmed or invalidated) by reference to any existing texts and languages'.

The same ideology was signalled, albeit less patently, by the declaration that 'language is a well-defined object in the heterogeneous mass of speech facts', whereas 'speech cannot be studied', nor indeed can it be 'put in any category of human facts, for we cannot discover its unity'(de Saussure, 1966 [orig. 1916]:14, 9, 11). The trend was reinforced half a century later, when Chomsky (1965: 3 ff., 201) announced that 'linguistic theory is primarily concerned with an ideal speaker–hearer in a completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly', whereas the 'observed use of language' 'surely cannot constitute the subject-matter of linguistics, if this is to be a serious discipline'; indeed, 'from the point of view of the theory', 'much of the actual speech observed consists of fragments and deviant expressions of a variety of sorts'.

The key question to challenge linguisticism might be: what shall be the sources of evidence for this 'primary concern', if, as Chomsky (1977: 192) cheerily grants, the 'ideal speaker does not exist in the real world'? The de facto answer would be: the 'linguistic intuition' of the linguist 'himself' as a 'native speaker' (Chomsky, 1965: 20). Yet Chomsky (1965: 8) has expressly denied that the 'speaker of a language' 'is aware of the rules of the grammar or even' 'can become aware of them'. So either linguists acting as native speakers are also unable to 'report' 'the rules of the grammar'; or else they hold superhuman powers for 'becoming aware of and reporting' what other speakers cannot. Either linguists do represent the community and cannot 'report'; or they can report and do not represent the community.

Viewed in this light, the ideology of linguisticism legitimizes a remarkable arrogation of power by the theoretical linguists to be the sole authorized representatives of a purely hypothetical 'speech-community' and therefore immune to contradiction or counter-evidence from real speakers in a real community. This arrogation sharply illuminates the consequences of linguisticism declining to study 'actual speech', and accounts for the tendency, typical of ideology, to

foment conflicts within the discipline. Once linguists have cut themselves off from the rational basis for developing and validating empirically sound theories of language, the fashion arises of fabricating 'linguistic theories' from the top down and applying them to odd handfuls of trivial invented sentences; and the contentious fragmentation of 'theoretical linguistics' we have actually seen is a natural consequence (de Beaugrande, 1998a).

The ideology of linguisticism has evidently foundered upon its own implicit dualism: equating *language* ('langue', 'system', 'competence', etc.) with *perfect order*, whilst equating *discourse* ('parole', 'speech', 'performance', etc.) *with massive disorder.* The direct corollary would be that using a language to produce discourse triggers an abrupt and catastrophic transition from stable and integrative order over to unstable and disintegrative disorder. Since this corollary is patently absurd, we must conclude that the linguisticism has made a capital mistake by attributing to 'language' an *idealized mode of order* which *is fully determined and finalized within the abstract system.* The ideology of 'ecologism' proposes instead a *dialectic* whereby the *real order of language elaborately supports the order of discourse without fully determining or finalizing it*; discovering how that support actually operates is now a stimulating challenge for a transdisciplinary science of text and discourse (de Beaugrande, 1997).

C. The Ideology of Corpus Linguistics

The early stages of corpus linguistics at present might be favourable for deliberating upon what ideology it could develop out of its strong potential to discredit the mainstream ideology of linguisticism. Corpus data immediately deconstruct the vision of 'observed use of language' constituting a mass of disorder and 'deviance'. But the order of discourse, not surprisingly, is not the mode of static and abstract order envisioned by linguisticism. We can easily recognize how the *standing constraints* that persist on the plane of the system (e.g. the English article going before the noun, not after it) continually interact with *emergent constraints* that are only decided on the plane of the discourse (e.g. the lexical choices appropriate to a political debate). And the *local constraints* among sets of selections and combinations interact with the *global constraints* of register, discourse domain, topic, and so forth. Linguisticism naturally projects disorder onto discourse after taking into account only a narrow and arbitrarily defined subset of local standing constraints which get reconstructed in a 'grammar' and hugely overburdened with the task of sustaining a fully determined and finalized system which is not (and cannot be) 'reflected' in discourse. As Sinclair (1991: 496) has remarked, 'much of the apparent disorder is created by the perspective that is initially adopted'.

Corpus research also suggests describing the order of real language in terms of **colligability**, subsuming the 'preferences' of some grammatical options for appearing with certain others and holding the 'grammar' together; and of **collocability**, subsuming the 'preferences' of some lexical options for appearing with certain others and holding the 'lexicon' together. In a dialectical parallel

the order of discourse partly realizes and is partly realized by the order of language in the actually occurring grammatical **colligations** and lexical **collocations.**[1]

The concept of the integrated **lexicogrammar** in systemic functional linguistics (e.g. Halliday, 1994) further suggests that the grammar and lexicon hold each other together. This factor could explain why so many 'grammars' sponsored by linguisticism and designed to be independent of the lexicon have remained so fragmentary and so remote from authentic data. The lexicon, in its turn being regarded as another heterogeneous mass of disorder, has received scant attention in mainstream linguistics (Bolinger, 1970).

A major principle that corpus linguistics could now field against linguisticism would be that the order of language is dynamic and transitory, and in principle not describable by any static or 'synchronic' theory. To a significant degree, a language is always in the process of being created and negotiated whilst discourse is in progress; and a different generation of linguistic theories will be needed to explain how. The ideology sustained by corpus linguistics would accordingly be a version of *dynamism* wherein the specification of a theory will be far more actively data-driven and 'bottom–up' than the theories sponsored by linguisticism. Theories will no longer originate 'from the top down' every time some ambitious linguist chooses to fabricate his or her personal idealization and illustrate it with a handful of fictional sentences. Instead, data-based theories will evolve by being adjusted and tuned through continuing research on steadily larger corpora of authentic discourse (Sinclair, 1997).

This evolution will undoubtedly affect the familiar dichotomies and divisions whereby those older theories aspired to freeze language into a Saussurian 'well-defined object'. If these are to survive the test of authentic data, they need to be deconstructed and re-theorized as *dialectical interactions*: langue – parole, competence – performance, synchronic – diachronic, syntagmatic – paradigmatic, grammar – lexicon, language acquisition – language learning, and so forth.

Alternatively, less familiar terms or concepts can be introduced wherever the data seem to justify them, such as the parallel dialectics between 'colligabilities' and 'colligations', and between 'collocabilities' and 'collocations'. In the present article, I explore the prospect that 'ideology' may also find a new home as one of the sources of global constraints upon the orders of language and discourse, e.g. in the broad sense of 'a systematic body of concepts about human life or culture' (compare Billig, 1991; Christie and Martin, 1997; Van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1998). These concepts would be applied during discourse below conscious awareness and thus seem to be fully identical with life or culture; and those who hold contrasting ideologies seem to be distorting the 'real world', whence the well-known tendency of ideologies to foment conflicts. To recognize the value of a contrasting ideology, you might first need to register the contingent and partial quality of your own; but doing so would require adopting, at least temporarily, another ideology from whose standpoint your own could be contemplated and contrasted. A vicious cycle impends: how to step outside your own ideology when you are not even able to see it as anything but the reality of life.

For similar reasons, criticizing or attempting to change another person's ideology may be perceived as acutely threatening, perhaps like trying to make them

switch from reasonable over to unreasonable. People may well defend and cling to their ideology even when they perceive symptoms of disorientation, fearing that they might lose whatever orientation they still have. The accumulating symptoms would foment increasing alienation, which could readily be expressed (though not alleviated) by hostility and aggression against people who hold a contrasting ideology.

How then can science investigate ideology if the latter is so deeply anchored at the base of human awareness? The principle of making an ideology explicit from the standpoint of a contrasting ideology might incur the usual risk of construing differences as distortions, especially where the ideology under investigation is defiantly positioned against science itself, as is religious fundamentalism. Also, even if we can design non-threatening techniques for bringing ideology to the conscious attention of the people who subscribe to it, we may risk transforming its functions we want to describe, perhaps in the way that literary techniques deliberately use framing or irony to undermine the illusion of reality in a narrative, and thereby disrupt the 'willing suspension of disbelief' (Coleridge) that literature solicits.

An alternative method would be to investigate large corpora of authentic data in terms of how ideologies leave *traces within the order of discourse*, even (or especially) when the discourse reflects or works out the *disorders* within the society (Wodak, 1996). The traces should be conspicuous wherever the discursive order sponsored by one ideology is experienced as discursive disorder from the standpoint of another ideology. Conversely, discursive order may be merely superficial when our data show the same conception being appropriated by contrasting ideologies in order to project a deceptive consensus, e.g. onto the meaning of 'democracy' (de Beaugrande and Williams, in press).

However, research with large corpora may well discover that far less conspicuous selections and combinations of discourse options are also sensitive to ideological groundings. Such was the discovery when feminism, though using more limited data, moved beyond the usual issues of 'sexist language' (e.g. male pronouns for everyone) to investigate the traces of the ideology of patriarchy inherent in the much deeper organization of domains like 'grammar' (de Beaugrande, 1988b; Cameron, 1992; Wodak, 1997; Kotthoff and Wodak, 1998). Certainly, the degrees of detail and delicacy within language that have been exposed by sorting and searching large corpora of data extend far beyond anything detected before (Sinclair, 1996). Might not a similar exposure be achieved for the traces of ideology?

What then of the ideology of research for the corpus linguists themselves? By the arguments advanced here, might they not overlook the traces of their own ideology and focus unduly on contrasting ideologies? One answer might be that research could recruit representatives of diverse ideologies, whereby the potential blind spots of any one would be compensated for by the vigilance of the others. To be sure, recruiting scientists by explicit reference to their personal ideologies would be a sensational tactic after scientism has cultivated for so long the illusion of science standing free of ideology. And the problem of even

identifying the suitable range of ideologies would be far from trivial, especially during early stages of the research.

An alternative answer could be that corpus research has a general effect of sensitizing researchers toward the normally naturalized constraints upon discourse, including ideological ones. The patterns that emerge from the multiple means to query a database are often unpredictable and surprising enough that we behold an image of own intuitions and habits of speaking which had never entered our conscious awareness before. As we repeatedly discover just which among the staggering range of potential selections and combinations are typically made, we are prompted to examine the order of discourses in unprecedented detail, a bit like the biologists who examined cell tissue under a powerful microscope for the first time. At the same time, we can escape the quandary of linguisticism which replaced real language with ideal language and then claimed superhuman access to the 'perfect knowledge' of the 'ideal speaker' by virtue of 'intuition' as distinct from data. Working with large corpus data emphatically refers the linguist back into the community of real speakers who produced and received the data and among whom we ourselves informally belong. How typical and representative we might be and how useful our intuitions might be are questions to be decided during the research and not by the glib arrogations of linguisticism (cf. Francis and Sinclair, 1994).

D. Ideology in Critical Discourse Analysis

The ancestors and precursors of what is presently called 'discourse analysis' include the data-driven approaches in linguistics and neighbouring disciplines (e.g. anthropology, ethnography, sociology) that were arrayed against the linguisticism of idealization, and were for decades targeted with dismissive polemics promulgating the doctrine that 'observed use of language' 'surely cannot constitute the subject-matter of linguistics' as a 'serious discipline'.

When 'discourse analysis' finally emerged as a field with that name in the 1970s, the early concerted efforts of western 'critical linguistics' were also getting under way (e.g. Mey, 1979 [orig. 1974]; Fowler et al., 1979). The 'critical' work was clearly distinguished by its resolve to accept 'ideology' (along with 'power', 'domination', etc.) as a legitimate object of investigation, finally in line with the neglected proposals of Vološinov (1973 [orig. 1929]: 9), who envisioned a 'Marxist theory of ideologies' as 'the bases for studies of scientific knowledge' before he disappeared in Stalin's death camps.

Perhaps to eschew the idealizing and formalist tendencies of conventional 'linguistics', this work adopted the broader heading **critical discourse analysis**, devoted to 'the analysis of linguistic and semiotic aspects of social processes and problems' (Wodak, 1996: 15). A key question for the new discipline is naturally how 'ideology' as such should be defined. In most of this research, the old pejorative connotations of 'ideology' have persisted but in a more precisely defined function: 'ideologies are particular ways of representing and constructing society which reproduce unequal relations of power, relations of domination

and exploitation' (Wodak, 1996: 18; compare now Wodak, 1997; Wodak et al., 1998). Fairclough (1992: 67) offers a similar definition: 'ideology is significations generated within power relations as a dimension of the exercise of power and struggle over power'. Lemke's (1995: 12 ff., his italics) definition seems the most darkly pejorative: 'ideology *supports* violence and is critically shaped by and in a context of violence' and by 'physical pain and social dehumanisation'.

No doubt such definitions reflect the justified urgency to critically analyse and deconstruct those ideological discourses which most actively legitimize or mystify power, inequality, domination, exploitation and violence, such as racism and sexism. Moreover, the traces of such ideologies in discourse should be the most accessible to practical analysis. However, in terms of the present discussion, building these pejorative effects into our basic definition of 'ideology' incurs at least three serious drawbacks. The first drawback concerns the ideological commitment of critical discourse analysis itself, especially when it repudiates the idealizing ideology I have called 'linguisticism'. By the definitions I have just quoted, the ideology of critical discourse analysis might be charged with sustaining one more 'exercise of power' and 'domination' – a prospect Fairclough (1996) himself has recently aired. How could we prevent our critical engagements with ideologies from being hit by the fall-out of a rigorously pejorative concept of ideology?

The second and closely related drawback follows from the plausible prospect that an ideology can be effectively opposed or deconstructed only from the standpoint of another ideology. A pejorative definition forecloses our efforts to develop ameliorative counter-ideologies, such as 'ecologism', which expressly promote equality and solidarity, e.g. in alliances with feminism and multiculturalism; and for defining such a counter-ideology to guide the projects of discourse analysis itself. Fairclough (1996, pers. comm.) has expressed concern that if 'ideology' as 'understood in the critical tradition' gets redefined as I propose, the concept might get 'appropriated', 'disarmed', or 'compromised', leaving us with the 'relativist conclusion that values are merely different, that all values are as good as all others'. Such relativist tendencies can undeniably be diagnosed in several trends in 'post-structuralism' and 'post-modernism' but by no means in 'ecologism', which insists that we cannot evade the choices between promoting *either* power *or* solidarity, *either* inequality *or* equality, and cannot retreat either into relativism or into objectivity. Fairclough would probably concur with ecologism that the hallowed 'scientistic' stance of objectivity in pursuit of 'pure truth' can imply an acquiescence to the existing structures of power and domination, as when a linguisticism dedicated to the 'ideal speaker–hearer in a completely homogeneous speech–community' elided the significant social consequences of language variations in a real speech–community (de Beaugrande, 1998a).

My point is rather that critical discourse analysis should not run the risk, inherent in many leftist and Marxist critiques, of appearing to offer only opposition and negation without a coherent alternative programme. At this stage of post-modern society, we behold a one-sided array of entrenched but ecologically unsound ideologies, such as consumerism, individualism, capitalism, free-marketism, and so on, whilst very few effective counter-ideologies on the other

side even have established names, let alone organized groups of adherents. Persuading people to exchange one ideology for another is hard enough; persuading them to throw out their ideology in favour of none at all seems frankly unrealistic.

The third and again closely related drawback concerns the question of whether *all* discourses are ideological (Hodge and Kress, 1988; Gee, 1990; Lemke, 1995) or *only some* discourses are ideological and others are not (Fairclough, 1995; Wodak, 1996; Van Dijk, 1998a). If (as is often the case) both positions favour a pejorative definition, the first is plainly the more pessimistic than the second in implying that power and domination will always control discursive practices; such an implication would certainly be rejected by emancipatory ideologies such as feminism. The second position would imply an enterprise of 'de-ideologizing' discursive practices: of purging ideologies rather than changing or replacing them. How this might be achieved without fostering some disorienting ideological vacuum remains to be seen.

Some of Fairclough's (1992: 91, my italics) deliberations might signify differences in *degree* rather than in *kind*:

> Is *all* discourse ideological? I have suggested that discursive practices are ideologically invested if they incorporate significations which contribute to sustaining or restructuring power relations.[. . .] But *all* discourse is *not thereby irredeemably* ideological. [. . .] the fact that *all* types of discourse are *open in principle, and no doubt to some extent in fact*, in our society to *ideological investment* does not mean that *all* types of discourse are *ideologically invested to the same degree.*

In a similar vein, Wodak's (1996: 19, my italics) conception of critical discourse analysis '*does not claim that all discourse* is ideological: "it does not follow that because *all practices are in ideology or inscribed by ideology,* all *practices are nothing but ideology*" (Hall, 1985: 103)'. And Lemke (pers. comm.) counsels that 'a discourse formation is not necessarily inherently ideological, but is so only by virtue of its uses; it is the social function of the discourse which is ideological, and not the discourse itself.

The question bears on both theory and practice. If we favour the data-driven theories advocated earlier, then we should not pre-empt our conception of 'ideology', which has only recently begun to be theorized in earnest. The broad conception I have advocated of 'ideology' being a source of global constraints upon discourse in general would be most conducive to putting our prospective theories of ideology onto the broadest empirical basis and would be more perceptive toward the covert ideological groundings which leave less conspicuous traces among the selections and combinations of discourse. A pejorative conception, in contrast, would tend to attract our vision to the more conspicuous traces we can already link to ideologies of power and domination in intuitive and pre-theoretical ways.

In terms of practice, fundamental problems impend when we try to distinguish the set of discourses (or the portions within a single discourse) which count as 'ideological' from the set which do not. Moreover, the pejorative definition

implies that once the 'ideological' ones have been discovered, the 'non-ideological' ones can be left out of our analyses, at least for the time being. But critical analysts, including Fairclough and Wodak, have often noted the significant tendency of ideological discourses of power to become less overt in order to encourage illusions of openness and democracy. If so, the demarcation between the two sets would be transient and unreliable, and we would tend to exclude some discourses whose ideological groundings could be discerned only after detailed critical analysis. This factor could be especially acute if the findings of critical discourse analysis itself become popularized in the news media, and the institutions of power and domination respond by adopting more devious and covert discursive strategies to escape detection.

Some of these problems might be attenuated by Fairclough's proposal to recognize differences in degree. But the problem may not prove much simpler of distinguishing *degrees of 'ideological investment'* (how ardently you support the ideology) from *degrees of discursive overtness* (how forcefully you express your support). A devious institution could exploit strategic confusion here too, such as covertly accepting one ideology (e.g. racism) while overtly promoting another (e.g. 'equal opportunity' achieved by phasing out affirmative action).

Fairclough (1992: 88 ff., my italics) was evidently aware of such problems when he critiqued the 'textual view of the location of ideology, which one finds in Critical linguistics – ideologies reside in texts':

> While it is true that the forms and content of texts do *bear the imprint of* (*are traces of*) *ideological processes and structures*, it is *not possible* to '*read off*' *ideologies from texts*, [. . .] because meanings are produced through *interpretations of texts*, and texts *are open to diverse interpretations* which may *differ* in their ideological import. [. . .] Claims to discover ideological processes solely through text analysis run into the problem now familiar in media sociology that text 'consumers' (readers, viewers) appear sometimes to be *quite immune to the effects* of ideologies which are supposedly 'in' the texts.

In my view, these arguments might lead to a different conclusion. Rather than saying that 'to read off' ideologies from texts is just 'not possible', we might say that *different interpreters can and often will 'read off' different ideologies from the same texts*. Even if we leave aside the old disputes over whether the 'sameness of the text' is a meaningful concept – an issue which has hardly been clarified by the 'post-structuralism' with its concepts like 'dissemination', 'bricolage', 'jouissance', 'free-play of the signifier', and so on (de Beaugrande, 1988a) – we may incur a replay of the chicken-and-egg problem: you 'read off the ideology' of a text under the controls of the ideology you already hold. But, as I have indicated, you are likely to focus on a contrasting ideology and interpret it as a distortion; conversely, you are not well positioned to 'read off' your own ideology, which would appear natural and transparent and so largely invisible.

Moreover, 'immunity' confirms rather then refutes my view: the control unconsciously exerted by your own ideology naturally generates resistance to the

'effects' of another sustained by a 'text'. Actual conversions would be limited chiefly to cases where you are uncommitted regarding the relevant ideological parameters, or where you become aware of some newer inclinations or sympathies, e.g. when your social position has switched from 'have-not' over to 'have' and your populism changes into elitism.

At all events, whether ideologies can be 'read off' from texts and how are empirical questions to be resolved through practical tests and not just theoretical pronouncements. At least, the prospects do not seem unfavourable for gathering and comparing a representative spread of 'read-offs' from a team whose ideologies mutually contrast. Also, extensive experience with corpus work might render critical analysts keenly attuned to the discursive traces of ideologies and hence far better at 'reading off' than we might have expected.

Still, Fairclough is indisputably justified in contending that analyses of the texts by themselves are far from sufficient. In his view,

> ideology is located both in the structures (i.e. orders of discourse) which constitute the outcome of past events and the conditions for current events, and in events themselves as they reproduce and transform the conditioning structures. It is an accumulated and naturalised orientation which is built into norms and conventions, as well as an ongoing work to naturalise and denaturalise such orientations in discursive events. (1992: 89)

The analyst would seemingly require extensive background data about 'past events' and 'current events', as well as about the processes of 'accumulating and naturalizing orientations' and 'conditioning structures' which have perhaps been 'transformed' anyway. Surely some 'reading off' from texts would be an allowable heuristic strategy for telling us where to look?

The insufficiency of texts in isolation has been made one point of contention in a tireless series of attacks by H. G. Widdowson against critical discourse analysis. He diagnoses 'confusion' 'about the nature of discourse (as distinct from text) and about analysis (as distinct from interpretation)', and has 'suggested that this confusion is bred of commitment' (Widdowson, 1995: 171). Fairclough (1996: 50) infers that critical discourse analysis is being accused of 'ideological commitment' and 'prejudice', and sees in Widdowson's attacks 'a version of the classical liberal distinction between' 'science and impartiality' vs 'ideology, commitment, prejudice and partiality'. But matters can hardly be so simple after Widdowson himself has affirmed:

> all the discourses of theory, including those of linguistics, are ideologically loaded, cultural constructs designed to establish control and a sense of security. This is not in the least surprising of course, since theories are made out of language. (Widdowson, 1991a: 39)

Notice the implication here that all discourses are ideological. Nor would Widdowson accept the attitude of mainstream linguistics to achieve an ideology-free scientific status by idealizing language, after he has roundly vowed that

'there can be no idealisation without ideology' (1991a: 39). His advocacy is substantially more general: he would

> not want to suggest that we should avoid the cultural partiality of disciplinary discourses and strive instead to be neutrally objective, [but rather that] we should guard against being too readily persuaded into believing in the validity of relevance of any particular discourse, no matter what apparent authority it might have. (1991a: 40)

So Widdowson is rebuking Fairclough and others on the grounds that

> a good deal of critical discourse analysis talks about the linguistic features of texts as if they inevitably expressed meaning, particularly ideological meaning, whether the writer intended them to or not. [. . .] Such analysis [. . .] states what the text means to the particular reader who happens to be assuming the role of analyst, and then claims that this is what the text itself means. (1991b: 5)
>
> There is rarely a suggestion that alternative interpretations are possible. There is usually the implication that the single interpretation offered is uniquely validated by the textual facts. (1995: 169)

What is being accurately described here is a favoured tactic of both *traditional and formalist literary criticism*, though neither of the two would want to appeal to 'ideological meanings'. Critical discourse analysis, in contrast, quite plainly asserts that

> interpreters are more than discourse subjects in particular discourse processes; they are also social subjects with particular accumulated social experiences, and with resources variously oriented to the multiple dimensions of social life, and these variables affect the ways they go about interpreting particular texts. [. . .] it is important to take account of the ways in which interpreters interpret texts if one is properly to assess their political and ideological effectiveness. (Fairclough, 1992: 136)

The 'overwhelming emphasis' in Fairclough's 'recent work' has accordingly been consigned to 'showing how shifting discursive practices, manifested in texts which are heterogeneous in forms and meaning, can be analysed as facets of wider processes of social and cultural change' (1996: 55). So Widdowson's rebukes are quite simply misplaced and vacuous.

The key difficulty I would see – one not raised by Widdowson – is that Fairclough's method consigns 'ideological effectiveness' only to the pursuit of domination, and not to resistance or solidarity. The field is thus not well fortified against relativism, as we encounter it when Widdowson elsewhere erases the profound ideological differences among three approaches to language. Labov's (1970: 192) contention that 'working-class speakers are more effective narrators,

reasoners, and debaters than many middle-class speakers who temporise, qualify, and lose their argument in a mass of irrelevant detail' is commented in these terms:

> we may wish to acknowledge that Labov's argument is devoted to a good cause and wish to be associated with the ideology which informs it. But [. . .] its promotion of a particular mode of use by referring to some absolute criterion of precision is, like the campaign of the Plain Language Movement, not essentially different from the efforts of [. . .] custodians to promote the mode of use of their preference by referring to some absolute criterion of correctness. (Widdowson, 1988: 346)

Here, relativism scales stunning heights by equating *egalitarian projects* to restore the dignity of stigmatized language varieties and to defend ordinary citizens against manipulation by powerful corporations and bureaucrats, with *elitist projects* to perpetuate and reinforce that very stigmatization.

Moreover, only the 'criteria' of 'correctness' *are absolute* because they cannot be rationally measured or justified. The criteria of 'plainness' and 'effectiveness' *are not absolute* because they can be rationally measured and justified in terms of mutual respect and openness among socially and linguistically diverse groups. The sociolinguistics of Labov and the 'the campaign of the Plain Language Movement' are sustained by counter-ideologies against a linguistic elitism which modern linguistics, in its aspirations to be an ideology-free science, could not effectively combat as long as it merely replaced a simplistic, crude idealization with a complex, sophisticated one.

Fairclough's writings imply that a counter-ideology would be 'partial' and 'sustain relations of domination':

> [Critical discourse analysis] would argue that we are all [. . .] writing from within particular discursive practices, entailing particular interests, commitments, inclusions, exclusions, and so forth; [. . .] Aspects of these discursive practices may serve to sustain relations of domination and may hence be ideological – no theory or science is immune from that possibility. (1996: 53)

Some optimism persists. His aspirations would thus be that 'the values of [critical discourse analysis] do not (unlike others) sustain relations of domination – they do not actually work ideologically' (1996: 49). Moreover, critical discourse analysis is theoretically better-placed to recognize its own 'partiality' than most theories.

Here I pursue a different tactic than has been advocated in these discussions. Instead of seeking to 'read off' the ideology of a given text (*pace* Fairclough), and also instead 'offering a single interpretation as uniquely validated by the textual facts' (*pace* Widdowson), I examine a large set of contexts for the terms derived from one central term which I think we would all peacefully grant to harbour ideological resonances, although (as we shall see) these are unstable and

contested. My analysis is not intended to be authoritative, much less 'validated' but rather heuristic in suggesting some topics and directions for the deeper analysis recommended by Fairclough. Just as corpus research continually points to questions we can pursue with a still larger or more specialized corpus, so might discourse analysis working with corpora find unexpected leads toward relations between discourse and society which only become well-defined whilst we examine large sets of authentic data.

E. On the Meanings of 'Liberal' in Three Corpora

I chose the term 'liberal' and its derivatives, such as 'liberalism' and 'liberalization', because they have been much used of late by groups with disparate interests in various meanings, e.g. for freedom from government regulations and for solidarity of white people with black people. The same tendency may well emerge from data-studies of other key terms in the discourses of post-modern society. I compare data drawn from three corpora representing different regions, the United Kingdom, the United States, and South Africa.[2] Before you read on, you might want to test your own intuitions about what the terms would mean if you used them yourself. Who are the 'liberals', and would you want to be one of them?

E.1 United Kingdom Data

The Bank of English was developed at Birmingham University by John Sinclair and his team, and as of June 1996 had reached the unprecedented size of some 323 million words of running text from contemporary spoken and written sources (Sinclair, 1996). The UK sources in this corpus returned exactly 1000 lines centring on occurrences of the keyword 'liberal' by itself or in its derivatives. I disregard the 288 lines for 'Liberal Democrat(s)' (and 34 for 'Liberal Party') on the grounds that the name of a political party can be notoriously arbitrary and opportunistic, witness the vastly different parties bearing this same name in the UK, Russia, and Japan.

Predictably, a fair number of occurrences, especially for the Process-Verb[3] 'liberalize' and its Noun-Form 'liberalization' concerned economic policy. Prominent collocates included 'economic' and 'economy' themselves as well as 'technological progress', 'capitalism', 'financial policies', 'free market', 'trade', 'protection', and 'privatization', with the 'IMF' near at hand [1–4]. I underline the contextual clues I find relevant to determining the meanings of the key-words.

[1] Driven by technological progress and economic liberalisation, global capitalism is changing fundamentally.
[2] financial policies that are consistent over time; liberalisation and privatisation to promote free markets.
[3] about the economy. The IMF wants a new government to liberalise the economy and privatise public companies.

[4] even essential. One is trade; to persuade voters that liberal trade is in their interests, less protection at home.

In such contexts, the core meaning would plausibly be: activities and policies designed to remove restraints on the 'free' manipulation of the 'market' of goods, services, and labour. In view of the adverse effects upon ordinary wage-earners and consumers, a deal of mystification may be needed to 'persuade voters that liberal trade is in their interests' [4].

Some corpus data gave more precise indications of what a 'liberal' system offers to 'investors', such as 'cheap labour' and 'few environmental restraints' [5]. The collocation 'liberalize + prices' (86 occurrences in the corpus) evidently offers a handy euphemism for raising prices with no controls, and consumers can be thankful if a 'small basket of foods' is exempted, though these may still be unaffordable to the 'unemployed' whose 'benefits' have been 'cut' [6].

[5] in Taiwan finds cheap property, labour, and raw materials, liberal investment laws and few environmental restraints.
[6] the prices of everything but a small basket of foods would be liberalised and generous unemployment benefits would be cut.

Such data may suggest why public discourse might be eager to maintain that 'capitalism' and 'liberal democracy' are 'inexorably' allied, e.g. by asserting that 'American micro-electronics accelerated the fall of communism' [7]. Yet that optimism is belied by data on societies like Chile, where 'economic liberalization' and 'market reforms' got so easily combined with 'political repression' [8], and by data explicitly linking 'liberal' with 'rapaciousness' [9] and with opposition to 'populism' [10].

[7] a movement towards ever higher technological capability. This movement has led, he argues, inexorably towards capitalism and liberal democracy. It was, for example, American micro-electronics that threatened to render obsolete the entire Soviet arsenal and thereby accelerated the fall of communism.
[8] Democracy is well established after the traumatic Pinochet interlude, which combined political repression with economic liberalisation. Chile had a 10-year start over other Latin American countries in market reforms, and began bringing down its own trade barriers without waiting for others to reciprocate.
[9] A tried-and-tested alternative to rapacious western liberalism was at hand. India's colonial past still shapes
[10] He will not turn populist, but instead push ahead with liberal policies and go faster with privatisation

Particularly intriguing were the attestations reminding us that favouring big capital over labour and consumers is also a cherished principle of the traditional

merger is under way to give us not just occasional alliances on specific issues like opposing 'monopoly' [13] – a stance many current 'liberals' have evidently abandoned anyway – but a political species of 'liberal conservatives' [14–15], or at least 'conservative governments' that find it expedient to call themselves 'liberal' [16].

[11] viewing city development conservative and liberal plans, plans to support the private market
[12] its American democratic inheritance. That conservative-liberal philosophy remained, and still remains, powerful
[13] In theory, it [the argument against monopoly] could be shared by liberals eager to break the power of big business and conservatives intent on restoring some semblance of perfect competition
[14] trace their ancestors to the liberal, parliamentary, elitist and moderate conservatives served any regime which served them.
[15] many Conservatives, those who can be called liberal Conservatives, were thoroughly opposed to the increasing trend towards economic collectivism
[16] voting system, it was not immediately known whether the Liberal (conservative) government would continue to run

The irony is all the richer in view of the habit of the British Conservative Party to

[17] blame everything that has gone wrong in British society on the liberal 1960s rather than on their party which has been in power since 1979.

Toward the opposite pole of the political spectrum, a few data alluded to the prospect of being a 'liberal communist', but specifically in eastern Europe, where 'new political movements' [18] or 'expulsion from the Party' would be imminent consequences [19]:

[18] But it would also encourage millions of liberal communists to form new political movements
[19] largely communists expelled from the Party for their liberal views. The second was the so-called Left Alternative,

The core meaning of 'liberal' could still be: policies designed to remove restraints on the 'free' manipulation of the 'market', but the implications would be starkly different within a strictly state-controlled economic system. In view of the later deterioration of the Russian economy, the western economists who congratulate 'capitalism' on its victory over 'communism' (e.g. in sample [7]) might ask themselves (or the Russians) if the horrendous effects of naked profiteering and corruption were perhaps just results of the most thorough and relentless application of 'capitalism' to a society which had no understanding of how to control and modulate it.

I was surprised to find 'bourgeois liberals' being opposed to 'affluent proletarians' until I noticed the context concerning how 'jokes are becoming less

[20] Unfortunately, as our humane, bourgeois liberal culture gives way to the affluent proletarian mass culture of Essex and Hollywood, our jokes become less subtle and a new element begins to emerge.

[21] So why is he so popular? Because thousands love his sexist, racist and deformed-people jokes and he has brilliant comic timing. Believes that wishy-washy white liberal do-gooders are undermining the soul of the British comedy.

Here, being 'liberal' would mean defending racial minorities, women, and the handicapped against the public ridicule which, we are briskly told, 'thousands love' and which constitutes 'the soul of the British comedy'. I have always wanted to ask the users of the dismissive label 'do-gooders' if they admire 'do-badders' and aspire to be among them.

'Liberals' who do defend racial minorities and women might be targeted by the New Right conservative backlash as 'radicals', but I found only one instance in UK data [22], plus one in which a concern for 'minority cultural rights' was contrasted with the 'language of tradition' and was 'despised' [23]. The routine attack upon liberalism in the UK data was closer to the opposite: being mindlessly uncommitted and vague in one's good intentions [24–26], rather than, say, being 'tough on crime' [27].

[22] And that fits into radical sort of liberal adult education awareness for some encouraging

[23] language of tradition but instead deploy the despised liberal rhetoric of minority cultural rights.

[24] How should one describe Bresson's cinema? A liberal humanist approach flounders in generalities

[25] men like Raplin exist shows what you get with a liberal agenda; You pump people full of drugs and pipe dreams

[26] Women can't be sexist as they are the oppressed? Bollocks. That is a lily-livered liberal wank view and holds no water with me. I can spot massive violent prejudice when I see it

[27] his 'tough on crime' policies unimpeded by Tumim's liberal interference. For how long, though, is a moot point.

The vulnerability of women emerged again when they, rather than men, were bluntly called 'sexists' who harbour 'massive violent prejudice' [26], much as the victims of racism and their defenders are called 'racists' by the New Right (Van Dijk, 1993, 1998b). A vicious twist with a long tradition was to cast aspersions ('lily-livered', 'wank') on the manhood of 'liberals' who champion women's rights.

In sum, the UK data indicated that the meaning of 'liberal' was most precisely determined in contexts of economic activity and policy, as a designation for 'privatizing' everything [2–3] and allowing the free market to run its course, unrestricted by such annoyances as 'environmental restraints' [5] and 'unemployment benefits' [6]. This stance happens to be dear to the traditional opposite,

'conservative' ideology [11–15]. The economic meaning was usually contextualized amelioratively to uphold the credo that

> [28] the virtues of the economic system that underpins liberal democracy significantly outweigh its vices

along with congratulatory invocations of benefits like 'higher technological capability' [7]. For foreign investors, the 'cheap labour' and the lack of 'environmental restraints' in Taiwan [5] simply constitute attractions for shrewd businessmen, rather than short-term and long-term degradations in the lives of the local inhabitants. Even 'political repression' can get contextualized into a laudable impulse for a 'head start' in 'market reforms' to 'bring down the trade barriers' [8], whereby Pinochet thanked the US and its CIA for overthrowing the democratically elected socialist government and installing him as dictator.

Intriguingly, the further away the contexts moved from the economic meaning, the more pejorative they became. Only a small part seemed to be motivated by threadbare New Right tactic of 'blaming everything that has gone wrong in British society on the liberal 1960s' [17]. A more decisive motive seemed to be the trenchant hostility in public discourse of spokespersons and groups against a different type of restrictions, namely those protecting of the rights of women, minorities, and accused offenders of the law. Such protections were defamed as the concern of 'wishy-washy do-gooders' and 'lily-livered wankers' [26], whilst the British public is being re-educated by a 'comedy' of 'sexist, racist and deformed-people jokes' [21]. So the ameliorative and pejorative contextualizations did not contradict each other after all, however much they may contradict the spirit of genuine democracy.

E.2 United States Data

The US data came from the US-based sources in the Bank of English and totalled 287 lines. Since 'the proportion of English from identifiable US sources in the Bank of English is maintained at around 25%' (Sinclair, pers. comm. March 1998), the overall frequency of occurrences was not significantly lower than for the UK data with 1000 occurrences for a volume three times as large, if we set aside the party name of 'Liberal Democrat(s)' with just seven occurrences in the US data vs 288 in the UK data. Perhaps the Americans, with their fossilized two-party system, take no keen interest in discussing the political parties of other nations.

Some data concerned the same economic activities and policies we saw in the UK data, again with 'liberalizing prices' as a handy euphemism for freely jacking them up [29–30], a move sometimes foisted upon a nation from the outside [30]. The notion that maintaining a 'liberal free-market' makes you a 'democrat' scaled the peaks of irony for the 'changed Khmer Rouge' [31], but then who can predict just how many 'millions' may 'die' in the 'killing fields' of the 'free market' as it rationalizes people out of their jobs and abolishes welfare and unemployment compensation?

[29] He wants a market economy instituted rapidly, with liberalized prices. He wants the state bureaucracies to drop the subsidies
[30] price reform. Jan Vanous: If Russia liberalizes prices, Ukraine has no choice but to follow
[31] some one million Cambodians died in the infamous Khmer Rouge killing fields. Until this month, the Khmer Rouge appeared intent on proving to the world that they've changed and are now liberal, free-market democrats.

Yet unlike the UK data, the US data also reflected the contradictory view that 'liberals' are opposed to current economic 'realities' or cannot apply their principles to these [32], and are out of touch with the broad population anyway [33]:

[32] is a little like Bill Clinton's: how to reconcile liberal principles with certain harsh realities
[33] The vast majority of Americans are not liberals. They should simply listen to the real speeches

Alternately, 'liberalism' was identified as the ideology specific to the 'bourgeoisie' [34] and the 'middle class and the rich', where the term 'money liberals' did seem piquantly apt [35]:

[34] The bourgeoisie is assumed to be necessarily liberal in politics and if a liberal order is not created then
[35] This is the stuff of social equality. But virtually none of these virtues are evident when all the government does is distribute cash benefits – even if, as money liberals typically recommend, benefits go to the middle class and rich as well as the poor.

Another contrast to the UK data emerged where 'liberals' were said to actually favour social welfare programs [36–37]. In both cases, the contexts connoted disapproval, e.g. in suggesting that 'liberals' were somehow acting unfairly by 'simply imposing taxes on the rich minority' in order to the 'fund the public sphere'.

[36] thought that congressional Democrats were tax-and-spend liberals, wedded to big government.[4]
[37] large tax increases needed to fund the public sphere – liberals can simply impose the increases on the rich minority

The diversity of social groups among or close to the 'liberals' was conspicuous in the US data, e.g. 'human rights' advocates and environmentalists [38], feminists [39] (whose cause disqualifies male supporters as 'lily-livered wankers' [26]?), blacks [40], or white spokespersons for blacks [41] (the core meaning in South Africa, as I later show):

[38] to recoup with a coalition of human rights-oriented liberals and antiwaste moderates
[39] Socialist feminism in the United States reemerged in the 1960s, when liberal feminists became frustrated with the pace of social reform and began to seek more fundamental sources of women's oppression. By focusing on women's economic roles
[40] says, 'He's got the wrong vision. He's not liberal and most blacks are liberal'
[41] It just is another example of benevolent white liberals dissecting and analyzing the attitudes of black people

Discursive moves to discredit 'liberal' ideology were more imaginative than in the UK data (back in [22–6]). The US data variously portrayed it not just as wishy-washy [42–3], but also subservient to ethnic groups like Arabs in 'caftans' and African Americans in 'dashikis' [44], 'not progressive' [45], deficient in 'understanding the 'stubborn facts of human experience' [46], incapable of integrating 'affective life' with 'intellectual interests' [47], 'sanctimonious' [48], 'fearful' of the 'plebs' [49], or compromised if not indeed criminalized by the support of 'drug users' who hold a 'permissive and anti-conventional outlook' [50–1].

[42] all we ever get to see is the conservative against the liberal, and the liberal has no politics at all, anyhow.
[43] the differences among individuals. This is because, to liberals, there is no absolute truth, everything is relative
[44] of a caftan or whatever those things are the Yankee liberals are all running around in now'. 'Dashikis'
[45] an idea of an agency to put even these into effect. The liberals of today are not a part of a progressive movement
[46] Lacking any true insight into these stubborn facts of human experience – corruption, evil, irrational desire – liberals also fail to understand that evil often lies beyond purely rational treatment
[47] The body, the unconscious, the pre-rational are all important to sound thought. But because the liberal has sought no positive discipline for emotion and feeling, there is an open breach between his affective life and his intellectual interests.
[48] GOP ticket in 1952. And the privileges of sanctimonious liberals chafed against his [Nixon's] prepolitical past: a childhood
[49] long enough to explore. In any event, among most French liberals, fear of the plebs outran their hopes for it.
[50] These veterans of the '60s era of sex and drugs and rock'n'roll support a liberal social agenda. And they're more attuned to the special-interest groups linked to the Democratic Party than to the big-business associations of the GOP.
[51] among those who have gone to college, drug users are more likely to have majored in the social sciences, fine arts, and humanities than in

the natural sciences. They are also more likely to favor liberal politics, to be estranged from religion, and to have a generally permissive and anti-conventional outlook

The oddest linkage of all was made among groups who are not convinced that 'the principle of free speech' should protect the hate speech of 'racists': 'bigots' got juxtaposed with 'liberals', and 'feminists' with 'sexists' (compare sample [26] again).

[52] not when they engage in violence or vandalism. But when they speak or write, racist assholes fall right into this Oliver Wendell Holmes definition – highly unpopular among bigots, liberals, radicals, feminists, sexists, and college administrators: 'If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other, it is the principle of free speech'

Applying 'the principle of free speech' to 'hate speech', where the 'negative presentation of the outgroup' (Van Dijk, pers comm.) casts aside all restraint, is an alarming demonstration of how the principles of democracy can be used to subvert it. This notion of 'freedom' is difficult to oppose from an 'ideology' of 'liberalism' that purports to 'outflank or transcend ideology' and puts its 'faith' in 'reason as a faculty that operates independently of any particular world view' (Fish, 1994: 134 ff.).

At all events, 'liberals' in the US can expect a barrage of 'attacks' [53], and even their 'contented moderation' is anathema to the 'red-hunters on the 'Right' [54]:

[53] today and continued his attacks on what he calls the liberal establishment. His main target was New York, a city

[54] For the time being, the tones of contented moderation had driven out the discourse of anguished zeal. Great Liberal Fear. But red hunters on the Right gave liberal intellectuals a terrible shock.

Not at all surprisingly, US politicians were far more wary than in the UK of being classed as 'liberal' [55–6], and 'measures' to 'repeal liberal rights' are being busily drawn up even (or especially?) for California [57].

[55] clear from Clinton's reactions over the weekend to the liberal label, him fighting back, that this ticket is not liberal

[56] McGovern: Well, I think Bill Clinton is probably more liberal than his present image. I hope my saying that won't harm his campaign

[57] the court overturned a portion of the initiative that would have stripped defendants of any rights that aren't provided by the US Constitution. That part of the measure was designed to repeal more liberal rights provisions in the California constitution.

Scorning 'liberals' for a failure to be 'tough on crime' (sample [27]) is an ironic argument in an age where the 'liberal free-market' is rapidly eroding opportunities for honest work.

The old antipathy between liberalism and religious doctrine, which has furnished history with some bemusing sidelights [58] (but compare sample [94] later), is currently focused upon the inflammatory issue of 'abortion' [59–60], where being 'liberal' means allowing the women involved to decide for themselves without being threatened by criminal prosecution.

[58] When in 1889 a canon of Santo Domingo de Calzado who had preached against freedom of the press and the 'damned error of liberalism' and called it a sin for Catholics to vote for Liberals, was brought to trial for 'having condemned political liberalism from the pulpit' he was supported by many of the region's clergy.
[59] he argued for better social services and more liberal abortion laws. But the sharpest criticism today
[60] that voters have overwhelmingly rejected a proposal to liberalize the country's strict abortion laws. Returns from

How this meaning might relate to economic ideologies is a deep question indeed. Is the fierce opposition to abortion (a) simply a gaudy political football of the New Right; (b) the centrepiece of a broad attack upon feminism and the rights of women; (c) a ploy to gain moral high grounds for the ideology of 'Christian fundamentalism' which can accuse the 'liberal' society of slaughtering the innocents; (d) a measure to encourage an oversupply of cheap labour in coming generations; or (e) some queasy mixture of all of these? Here is another issue for in-depth research.

The US data signalled a curious mix of disparate visions regarding the history of 'liberal' ideology [61–3], also disagreeing on whether or not it is currently coming or going [62–8]:

[61] rests upon a quite different set of premises. Liberalism in this sense was symbolically a child of Voltaire
[62] Outside a small circle of theorists, liberalism connoted a worldview defined in the 1930s and reborn in the early 1960s that no longer inspired many activists or voters.
[63] the New Republic is profoundly distressed to discover that liberalism has undergone an eclipse since 1912 when the bulk of
[64] argues that the Western idea of economic and political liberalism has triumphed over alternatives such as fascism.
[65] own credit and did a little something to vindicate liberalism by opposing unjustifiable appeals to arms.
[66] they will have to pay more attention to the discrepancies in their record. They will have to either shift liberalism to new and stronger ground or repair the manifest breaches in their defenses, liberals deserve the eclipse from which liberalism is suffering.

[67] the liberal remains unprepared to face the worst: and on the brink of what may turn out another Dark Ages, he continues to scan the horizon for signs of dawn. The record of liberalism during the last decade has been shameful evasion and inept retreat. Liberalism has compromised with despotism because despotism promised economic benefits to the masses

[68] Pragmatic liberalism has flatly betrayed ideal liberalism. The values that belong to the latter have been compromised away, vitiated, ruthlessly cast overboard. The permanent heritage of liberalism has been bartered for the essentially ignoble notion of national security, in itself a gross illusion

Taken all together, the US data were substantially less focused than the UK data, though important similarities could readily be detected. Perhaps because there is no respected 'Liberal Party' in US politics, the term has not stabilized an ameliorative economic meaning, but has been heavily coloured by the 'tax-and-spend' anathema accompanying the long-term attack on social welfare – ironically, a policy elsewhere proudly called 'liberal'. The non-economic meaning of 'liberal' is evidently being blurred by the highly vocal New Right offensive, enlisting the term to cast scorn upon their long and diffuse list of enemies all across society, including not just minorities and women (especially feminists), but also, intellectuals, environmentalists, and advocates of civil rights or of curbs on the economic power of the private capital that bankrolls the New Right. The blurring is consummate when those who obviously fall under the traditional economic core meaning of the term, such as Bill Clinton (contrast [32] with [55]), repudiate the label.

E.3 South Africa Data

The Corpus of South African English (CSAE) has recently been established at the University of Port Elizabeth under the supervision of Chris Jeffries and Linda Pearce Williams, and has grown from one million to some three million words. This corpus was originally inaugurated as part of the International Corpus of English (ICE) under the direction of the late Sidney Greenbaum at University College London (Greenbaum, 1996). These corpora would provide, for the first time in history, a base of authentic data about local varieties of English that have hitherto led a contradictory existence of being used by large populations but rarely recognized as valid alternative language systems.

Linda Pearce Williams has kindly supplied the total of 247 data lines from the CSAE. This total represents a vastly higher proportional frequency rate than for the UK and US data from the Bank of English, which is roughly 100 times larger. To appreciate why, we should keep in mind that in South Africa, the terms 'liberal' and 'liberalism' – but not 'liberalize' and 'liberalization', these being more recent economic terms – have long carried the highly specific meaning of mostly white people and policies that promoted the human rights of black Africans.[5] Such a meaning aroused much discussion and controversy in

the grim landscape of apartheid especially the founding of the Liberal Party in 1953. It was eventually outlawed in 1968 by a decree with the amazingly candid name, for a supposedly parliamentary state, of 'Prohibition of Political Interference Act'. Thus, the only 'Liberal Party' in my data to be actually banned was also the only one whose ideological position was most sharply defined in terms of promoting human rights.

Being 'liberal' in South Africa as the thumbscrews of apartheid were ruthlessly tightened would expose you to drastic hostility of the government and its allies in institutions and the media, in the form of house arrests, 'banning orders' and so on, but – presumably to avoid galvanizing white resistance – usually stopping short of the martyrdom by detention, torture, and killing, visited upon black activists like Steve Biko, the key advocate of 'Black Consciousness'. Moreover, some black Africans mistrusted the 'liberals' of trying to preserve the system in a milder modality to keep from radically transforming it. Biko himself once described 'the liberal establishment, including radical and leftist groups', as 'a curious bunch of non-conformists' and 'do-gooders' (that slap again!) whose 'artificially integrated circles are a soporific to the blacks while salving the conscience of the guilt-stricken whites' (1978 [orig. 1972]: 63 ff.).

In view of this historical background, the high frequency of occurrences in the CSAE is easily understood. More specifically, we can predict that the data will indicate how the ideology of 'liberalism' is being forcefully unsettled by the establishment of a democratic majority government in 1994. The uneasiness can be pungently sensed when the Liberal Students Association at Wits University ruefully announced a lecture on 'Resuscitating Liberalism'.

Reflections about the past 'mission' [69] were typically accompanied by perplexity on having lost it [70–74]. Some contextual cues, like 'pivoted and sold' [72], 'basking' and 'worshipful disenfranchised' [73], or 'jealousy' [74] may be symptoms of a spiteful serve-them-right tone of those who opposed the liberals all along.

[69] the liberal students of that time had a very clear mission in life. Our mission was to oppose apartheid. That was our purpose
[70] Some people say that the liberals' day was yesterday, a day when we were secure in the conducting of a holy war
[71] As I look at this hall I see some things haven't changed. But the cause has changed. I don't know what liberalism is or means now.
[72] The moral high ground that such liberals occupy is because they have been pivoted and sold to black people as true freedom fighters.
[73] they have lost the formerly serene sense of basking in the gratitude of the worshipful disenfranchised. As the bearer of a famous liberal name told me not long ago: they don't need us any more, you know
[74] I think there is a jealousy here. There are liberals, so-called, who feel displaced. They're no longer the black man's favourite whites

A prominent representation of 'university' influence was also indicated [75–6], with hints of elitism and radicalism even as contrasted with other 'liberals'.

e.g. respecting 'one-man-one-vote' suffrage [76], which was a rallying motto central issue both for the Black Consciousness Movement and the African National Congress (Biko, 1979: 126 ff.; Mandela, 1994: 239 ff.).

[75] we took it for granted that being liberal meant being a university person, or ex- or child-of. Also, being white.
[76] It was liberal to stand up for a better deal for the blacks, even for what was then called 'one-man-one-vote', which post-university liberals considered pretty terroristic in itself

Elitism was clearly one theme for disparaging white liberals:

[77] white 'liberals', however good their intentions, seem oblivious to their racial socialisation. Too many, of 'liberal' and sometimes 'left' persuasion, remain in a comfortable white social cocoon
[78] smacks of the typical liberal naivety and paternalism born out of white privilege

But then only white people who were well-situated could have had any effective political impact during the apartheid era; and those people did after all take a stand against the very system under which they had prospered and which could be expected to sharply curb their 'privileges'.

Today, their status as critical voices under the new system is being exploited to represent them having turned against 'blacks' [79], and to disqualify them as 'hypocrites' [80] and even 'racists' [81].

[79] In the old days the Afrikaner establishment saw liberalism as a hobby of upper-class English-speakers who disliked the Afrikaners more than they disliked the Africans. Now the new liberated establishment sees liberals as upper-class English-speakers taking whacks at blacks, on every available grounds
[80] we must expose First World hypocrisy by speeding up the democratic revolution in South Africa, for that is what your pathetic liberal drivel is really against.
[81] We spent all of the afternoon complaining about racist liberals (isn't it refreshing to find new ogres?).

Despite the sweeping changes, criticism of the new social order is subject to much the same derision as was criticism of the old:

[82] the proper liberal role is to make people cross with you. You've got to be gadfly, and if the rump of state does not get irritated
[83] Liberals ought to be over the moon, but in fact there is endless carping and griping. Open a paper, and there is some spokesperson of liberalism running something down, predictable and tiresome.
[84] the corpus of liberalism, which in the public mind becomes associated [illegible] and slightly hysterical denunciation.

Small wonder if some supporters of liberalism feel exasperated at public ingratitude:

[85] 'Liberal' is now a dirty word among those who were not even born when liberals fought for their rights.

In contrast to the UK data, the South African data nowhere associated 'liberal' with 'conservative', a term in the name of a political party on the far right in the apartheid context, witness such sinister data as these:

[86] Amnesty has also been granted to Conservative Party and Volksfront member Saint Michael Schutte for being in possession of seven AK-47 rifles
[87] a Conservative Party MP, DP du Plessis, repudiated fellow CP MP Koos Botha for bombing a school earmarked for black students.
[88] Convicted Hani murderer [Chris Hani, secretary-general of the South African Communist Party, shot down in April 1993 to disrupt the transition to democracy] and former Conservative Party politician Clive Derby-Lewis continued his testimony before the truth commission's amnesty committee

But 'liberal' was multiply associated with 'communist' [89–90, 93–94], although in a totally different meaning than we saw to be specific to eastern Europe in samples [18–19]. The apartheid regime had indiscriminately pasted the label on all their adversaries and persecuted them under the 'Suppression of Communism Act' of 1950. Even Joe Slovo, long-time General Secretary of the South African Communist Party and imprisoned on Robben Island together with the leaders of the African National Congress, was suspected of 'liberal' tendencies [91] despite being reputed (like Biko) to regard 'liberals' as 'hypocrites' [92].

[89] It was the hour of the raised voice of the liberals who saw themselves as the conscience of the nation. And it was also the time of the communist voices
[90] newspapers were seen to be unpatriotic reckless liberalistic communistic pinko. You know you know all those all those labels
[91] There are those who think that Slovo remained a true believer to the end, that the more liberal formulations of his last years were merely another tactical feint
[92] For Slovo, of course, all liberals are hypocrites and he is happily illiberal.

In more academic registers, the two ideologies were idiosyncratically linked in terms of their world-views [93–4], along with the 'semi-socialist ideas of the Christian culture' [94] (but compare sample [58]):

[93] the vacuity of the communist vision of human nature is equally discernible in the liberal anthropology of rationalist, autonomous individuality;

it cannot hope to escape the fate which befell its companion ideology. In this sense liberalism and communism are but the two sides of a single Modernist coin

[94] This vociferous form feeds on the radical liberal perspectives and sometimes semi-socialist ideas of the Christian culture of the educated

Nelson Mandela (1994: 285) himself certified in 1962 that 'the Liberal Party and the Communist Party were arch-enemies', but he too noticed how the terms were getting blurred together in order to discredit them both.

The academic data that collocated 'liberal' with 'egalitarian' and 'equality' were sternly pejorative:

[95] the appeal to basic rights can settle only a modest number of contentious issues, and the tendency of egalitarian liberal theory to make all contentious issues a question of right, [and to] blur the separation of the public and private spheres has even more disastrous consequences

[96] the dominant liberal obsession with equality leads to incoherence in theory and increasing conflict and antagonism in practice

After reviewing all these pejorative data we may feel a little wistful to hear recent calls to action like this one:

[97] Join the Democratic Party if you share its commitment to the values of liberalism and democracy and its vision of fighting for the freedom of every person to shape his or her own future.

The contexts were quite different and far less numerous for 'liberalization' in the meaning we saw in the UK data. Perhaps to avoid confusion with 'liberal' in the traditional South African meaning, 'neo-liberal' is currently used for the economic meaning. I found the same usage 224 times in the UK data but, interestingly enough, not even once in the US data, where we noticed some confusion about the history of the ideology ([61–8]).

The data displayed the typical collocatable terms like 'invest' [98], 'globalisation' [99], 'competition' [100], and 'privatisation' [100]. The 'suspicion' and 'hostility' of labour unions [101] provided clues about the implied meanings: 'invest offshore' [98] → evade paying the national income taxes vitally needed for better social services; 'join the international economy' [99] → bow to the will of multinational corporations and banks; 'fiscal discipline' [100] → no upgrading social welfare programmes; 'flexible labour markets' [100] → power of owners and management to fix wages; 'improved competition' + 'export drive' [100] → undersell other countries by underpaying the productive workforce at home (cf. de Beaugrande and Williams, in press). If [102] was a bit more frank, [103] was extremely so in calling these economic policies by some well-earned names.

[98] foreign exchange controls will be liberalised by allowing individuals to invest offshore for the first time

[99] the whole business of globalisation and liberalisation. We are now under enormous pressure as a country to join the international economy

[100] the foundation proposes a 'multi-pillared' strategy of legal reform, financial liberalisation, fiscal discipline, flexible labour markets, improved competition and an export drive.

[101] union movements, which now view privatisation with suspicion and hostility and which have expressed misgivings about trade liberalisation

[102] Any finance obtained from the World Bank would be on policy terms dictated by it. The usual neo-liberal conditions – privatisation, liberalisation of trade, monetary restraint or high interest rates, deregulation, cutting state subsidies, and so on.

[103] the global community we are supposed to be part of. The shift to the left is primarily a resounding rejection of neo-liberal society, in its uncaring, alienated politics, as well as its free market economics of unabashed profiteering

We might well speculate that the future well-being of the democratic South Africa will depend chiefly on whether the old 'liberalism' of egalitarian human rights can withstand the 'enormous pressure' from the 'neo-liberalism' of 'uncaring, alienated politics' and 'unabashed profiteering', whilst the huge majority of black Africans continue to live in poverty and hopelessness.

F. Further Issues for Analysis

The data presented here are but a small sample of 103 passages out of the total of 1534 data samples examined – not even one tenth, although still far more real data than you will find in many publications by linguists, especially by ones who idealize language. To work as a discourse analyst confronting plentiful corpus data, you are compelled to be selective and to rely in early stages on your own expectations and intuitions about which data might be more relevant or interesting. Later, the parameters you find will send you back to the larger sets in search of more specific or subtle indicators.

Obviously, the methods for doing a 'critical discourse analysis' of corpus data are far from established yet. Even when we have examined a fairly large set of attestations, we cannot be certain whether our own interpretations of key items and collocations are genuinely representative of the large populations who produced the data. But we can be fairly confident of accessing a range of interpretative issues that is both wider and more precise than we could access by relying on our own personal usages and intuitions. Moreover, when we observe our own ideological position in contest with others, we are less likely to overlook it or take it for granted.

Nor can I point to any consensus about which among the many analytic techniques of previous linguistics we might apply. Do we focus on morphology, syntax, semantics, or pragmatics, or some combination of these (de Beaugrande, 1996)? Or do we focus on less familiar factors like 'colligability' and 'collocability'

which cut across all of those in ways we are just beginning to grasp (de Beaugrande, 1998b)? Or, again, do we focus on the 'discursive structures, strategies, and moves' whereby ideological discourse enacts, 'at all levels of the text, the positive presentation of the ingroup and the negative presentation of the out-group' by means of 'polarisation', 'metaphor', 'hyperbolic emphasis', 'negative lexicalisation', 'rhetorical mitigation', 'euphemisation', and so on (Van Dijk, 1998b: 18)? Moreover, what are the implications of using key words as the units of search and analysis when our major interest is in contexts and in the positions of speakers (Lemke, pers. comm.)? We plainly need some means for searching and analysing relations among meanings or belief-systems as well, but the necessary software would demand a highly innovative design.

To be consistent with the principles described in section C, we cannot settle these questions from the top down, but only from our ongoing bottom–up work with plentiful data. Not merely do corpus data in no way manifest the disorder projected by 'linguisticism' since de Saussure, they manifest an amazingly delicate order despite their enormous quantity and variety. To deal with all that, we shall need to pursue multiple inquiries guided and co-ordinated by some evolving dialectical agenda, where a 'critical' ideology could strategically guide our focus toward interconnected data that are indicative of power and domination but also others of solidarity and equality.

Consider in this connection 'the principal observation of corpus linguistics in the last decade': 'meaning affects the structure profoundly' (Sinclair, 1991: 496). One significant reflex of this is that the collocability and colligability of any one item, such as a Noun or a Verb, are unequally distributed among its alternative forms, such as Singular and Plural (Sinclair, 1991: 494 ff.). I in turn found that the Adjective 'liberal' is far more variable and contested in its collocations than the Noun 'liberalism', whilst the Verb 'liberalise' or (in US data) 'liberalize' is by far the most restricted. The (invariably Third Person) Subjects of the Verb were nearly always governments, institutions, or whole countries, all representing enough power to make resistance seem futile. The Objects were nearly always abstractions, coming mainly from a single semantic domain with the headword 'economy', such as 'prices', 'trade', 'markets', 'financial system', and 'tariffs'; 'laws' appeared at a much lower frequency. A few data signalled ongoing evolutions in usage, such as using the Verb in Intransitive colligations, e.g.: 'two regimes which, having *liberalised* under pressures'; and 'steps were taken to explore whether Tanzania should *liberalise* politically as well as economically'. Clear innovations included the 'closet *liberalisers'* in the British Parliament, and the way Poland and Hungary were said to 'run import regimes that *out-liberalise* those of many OECD countries'. I can see no rational way to account for all these emergent constraints except by reference to the ideological status of the key words.

Whilst engaging with such data, you may detect a dual evolution in your interpretative work: both toward a *convergence* of meanings for a given key word among sets of data; and toward a *divergence* between sets so loosely associated as to make a common core meaning quite difficult to formulate. What might be the common core shared by the set of economic contexts (these from the UK data)

such as 'open and liberal economic policies' or 'the money-capital concept linked to the classical liberal ideology', and by the set of ironic goodwill contexts such as 'liberal Christian god' or 'dressing up their doctrine with a liberal sprinkling of post-Daisy Age happy harmonies', or again by the set of plenitude contexts such as 'a liberal supply of live food including small insects' or 'a liberal application of face powder on top of foundation'?

Or might the expectation that a given expression has a stable and determinate core meaning be unduly proximate to the 'linguisticist' vision of language being a stable and determinate system? Corpus data may be telling us that the meaning of an expression typically *requires* a band of fluctuation and indeterminacy in order to adapt so effortlessly to emergent constraints during discourse. Contestations over meanings are one implication of this band, as when the connotations of 'liberal' with generosity and freedom can be handily exploited for policies of selfishness and compulsion.

Still, the fluctuation could plausibly be constrained by the attractions of analogies among the meanings. We might consider if whether the meaning of 'liberal' as 'wishy-washy' [26] may stand in some analogy to the officially laissez-faire policies of the core economic meaning, or is merely an empty projection of 'negative lexicalization' (in the sense of Van Dijk, 1998b) to dismiss everyone to the left of the New Right, whatever their ideologies. If the analogy is implied, then it is itself just manipulative as the 'free' in 'free market'. The massive evidence marshalled by Martin and Schumann (1996) among others demonstrates that economic 'liberalism' in its current form is far from laissez-faire; multinational corporations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, are literally forcing their 'free market' ideology onto whole populations and governments with the conviction that

> continual wage reductions, longer work-hours, cuts in social welfare, even the complete abandonment of social welfare in the US, are supposed to make the nations 'fit' for global competition. (Martin and Schumann, 1996: 312; my translation)

The two financial journalists are moved to ask: 'how much free market can democracy stand?'

> Now what the founders of the post-war welfare states had learned from bitter experience is becoming ever more clearly visible: free-market economy and democracy are by no means inseparable blood-brothers, who harmoniously nourish prosperity for everyone. Instead, the two central guiding models of the old industrial states of the West stand in constant contradiction to each other. (1996: 311; my translation)

We could run extensive data queries to detect the means whereby public discourses in countries like the UK and the US carry a heavy 'ideological investment' (Fairclough) in papering over the 'contradiction', e.g. by thematizing the 'virtues of the economic system that underpins liberal democracy' [28].

We could also run multiple data queries to observe and describe the emergence of a set of evasive terms within the ideological proximity of economic neoliberalism to designate and yet obscure the complex and devious tactics for profiteering at the expense of ordinary workers: 'rationalizing', 'privatizing', 'restructuring', 're-engineering', 'downsizing', 'outsourcing', 'multiskilling', 'increasing productivity', and so on, all mean: fewer jobs with harder work for lower wages and no benefits at all, whilst the gains for owners and shareholders soar. The *New York Times* calculated from the statistics of the US Department of Labor that, between 1979 and 1995, 43 million workers lost their jobs; and two thirds of those who found other jobs were forced to accept much poorer working conditions (reported in the *International Herald Tribune*, 6 March 1996).

Then irony is consummated when neo-liberalism adopts the strategy of claiming to be no ideology at all. The European Union Commissioner for Competitiveness, Karl van Miert, recently defended privatization by declaring: 'the decision to liberalize certain branches which offer public services is *by no means ideological*, but the expression of a *natural adaptation* to economic and technical developments' (*Le Monde diplomatique*, January 1996, my translation and italics). His 'choice of words', Martin and Schumann (1997: 190 ff.) comment, 'already betrays the unexamined ideology that is always recognisable when politicians invoke "nature" whilst handing out state properties, tax revenues, and economic privileges'.

The echoes in Fairclough's concept of 'naturalization' are highly serendipitous here. We can return to our data to look for more subtle choices of language intended to make 'liberalism' seem natural if not virtually inevitable. I would highlight what is underlined in these data:

[1a] Driven by technological progress
[2a] financial policies that are consistent over time
[7a] a movement towards ever higher technological capability [. . .] has led [. . .] inexorably towards capitalism and liberal democracy
[10a] He will [. . .] push ahead with liberal policies and go faster with privatisation
[29a] He wants a market economy instituted rapidly
[30a] If Russia liberalizes prices, Ukraine has no choice but to follow
[12a] That conservative-liberal philosophy remained, and still remains, powerful
[34a] The bourgeoisie is assumed to be necessarily liberal
[64a] the Western idea of economic and political liberalism has triumphed over alternatives

When efforts are made to 'persuade voters that liberal trade is in their interests' [4], the contradiction is to be actually reproduced in the awareness of the population. They are to see themselves only as shoppers wanting cheaper goods, and to forget being also workers who will get lower wages to shop with when 'protection at home' has been abolished.

However, we also need to consider the prospect that ideological terms may *not* appear in a corpus with a frequency corresponding to their influence, because they have been quietly incorporated into the state policies. The radically 'conservative' Reagan–Bush governments and their supporters in the business and financial communities did not have to confuse the voters by expressly advocating 'liberal' policies, leaving their New Right allies free to hurl the term 'liberals' at the advocates of the rights of women and minorities and of social welfare programmes. Yet on an international plane, 'liberal' remains in vogue as an agreeable label for of economic policies that could be more honestly called 'unabashed profiteering'. Here too, instability in the meaning is an ideological advantage.

Still another advantage of the instability is to hinder the consolidation of an effective counter-ideology. What can we rationally call the opposite of 'liberal' policies when the usual converse 'conservative' is not merely unattractive for critical thinkers and ecologically oriented intellectuals, but is also becoming hardly distinguishable from 'liberal' anyway, as our data indicated? We certainly would not declare ourselves '*illiberal*' which the *Random House Webster's* variously defines as 'narrow-minded, bigoted, miserly, lacking culture or refinement' (p. 670).

Now, if ideological terms are so strategic for the advancement of the ideology itself, a lack of accredited terms for counter-ideologies is a serious problem. I have suggested the problem to be a general one, also holding for consumerism, individualism, capitalism, and free-marketism, now that the terms 'socialism' and 'communism' are losing favour. The problem is indeed one major motive for advocating a 'critical' enterprise that formulates and promotes an explicit counter-ideology such as 'ecologism', whose name can profit from the serendipitous echoes with the 'ecology movement' (e.g. Myers et al., 1993) and also with Neisser's (1976: 2) concept of 'ecological validity'.

I certainly could not deny that the sincere ambition of critical discourse analysts to transcend ideology is admirable, since their goal is to overcome practices of power and domination, as we have seen in section D. But I feel uneasy recalling the ominous precedents of various groups, including scientists and economists, whose self-serving denials to hold any ideology constituted one major motive for critical discourse analysis in the first place. Or, if we agree to call the 'ideology' (in my sense) of critical discourse analysis by some other name – say, 'position', 'agenda', or 'programme' – we risk being scolded for terminological squeamishness and also risk obscuring the oppositional status of our programme vis-a-vis the ideologies of domination. Besides, critical discourse analysis currently *does have power*, as manifested in being a favoured domain for books, journals, and even academic job descriptions – and also a conspicuous target for continual attacks such as Widdowson's.

At all events, I hope to have made a reasonable case for broadening our base to explore the ideological aspects of discourse made available by large corpus data before we can decide such questions as whether or not all discourse implies ideology. The various debaters of this question would presumably agree that the ideological constraints on and in discourse are substantially more pervasive

and subtle than most people, including most linguists, remotely suspect. If so, then surely we should look at extensive discourse data with an open mind respecting its potentially ideological character.

Our methods will of course demand extensive refinement for such tasks as sorting out corpus data according to ideologically relevant factors, such as political settings and historical periods, along with sources, registers, genres, audiences, and perhaps even individual speakers or writers. For example, we might well find significant distinctions between public speeches or editorials vs casual conversations in homes, pubs, or grandstands, even for the same groups of speakers. If an ideology encourages consistency on some issues, it may encourage inconsistency on others in order to avoid drawing distasteful conclusions and making painful admissions (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Psychotherapy and psychoanalysis labour in a veritable minefield of such avoidances.

If, as so much work in critical discourse analysis implies, ideology is essentially a construct for power and closure, a paradox might be conjectured for the enterprise of developing an ideology of solidarity and equality wherein concurrent alternatives are accepted with openness and respect. I would again draw an analogy to a scientific theory, which in classical science wages war against all others until a newer theory discredits it. I would submit that this adversarial and confrontational notion of science should itself be regarded as a discredited theory or falsified paradigm. The significant problems of the post-modern, multicultural society can be solved only by 'post-classical science' that integrates alternatives (de Beaugrande, 1997). So too should 'ecologism' as an integrative ideology for both society and science transcend the combative proclivities of the ideologies of earlier ages with their horrifying rosters of atrocities. Only this integration can provide the consensus and strength to effectively deconstruct such anachronistic and recidivist ideologies as an 'economic neo-liberalism' propelling global society backwards into the primitive stages of robber-baron capitalism, non-unionized labour, subsistence wages, chronic unemployment, and endemic poverty. The alternatives are as clear as our imperatives: we *cannot choose not to choose* between power and solidarity, between inequality and equality.

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Notes

1. On the origins of these terms, compare Firth (1968); Greenbaum (1974).
2. All three data sets were kindly extracted by Linda Pearce Williams from the Bank of English in Birmingham during her visit early in 1998, and from the Corpus of South African English at her home University in Port Elizabeth. I also wish to thank Stephen Bullon at COBUILD for completing some data lines for me.

3. 'Process-Verb' in the sense of functional grammar (Halliday, 1994; de Beaugrande, 1997), i.e. not an Auxiliary or a Modal Verb.
4. This line appeared in a UK source, but quoting a US source.
5. My sketch of South African politics is purely for the orientation of unfamiliar readers, and has drawn upon Plaatje (1982 [1916]); La Guma (1972); Biko (1978); Paton (1981); Kuzwayo (1985); Mandela (1994); and on the recent South African press (e.g. *Mail and Guardian*) as well as the corpus itself. Whether these representations are currently accredited and by whom is a question far beyond the scope of the paper; the continuing flood of discoveries, admissions, confessions and so on has plunged South Africa's sense of its own history into a ferment which may not settle down for many years.

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3

The Discourse Structure of News Stories

Allan Bell

1 On Analysis

This chapter offers and exemplifies a framework for analysing the discourse structure of news. Why would one want to undertake such an enterprise? Why analyse news story structure? What is the pay-off for the labour-intensive analysis of the text of news stories?

Stories are central to human nature. The stories people tell are a core part of their social identity, and the construction of a life story is crucial to our self-identity. The idea of the story is also central to news media. Journalists do not write articles, they write stories – with structure, order, viewpoint and values. So the daily happenings of our societies are expressed in the stories we are told in the media.

In addition, the media are important social institutions. They are crucial presenters of culture, politics and social life, shaping as well as reflecting how these are formed and expressed. Media 'discourse' is important both for what it reveals about a society and because it also itself contributes to the character of society. Linguistic research on the media has always emphasized this last concern, focusing where issues of ideology and power are closest to the surface. But pre-requisite to all such questions is a sound discourse analysis, and this is something that students of media – in their eagerness to get to the 'real meat' of ideological detective work – have sometimes skimmed over at their peril.

To the linguist, a first answer to a question about why undertake such a study is 'because it is there'. News is a major register of language. Understanding how it works is important to understanding the functioning of language in society. Such a study also enables us to compare news with other kinds of stories, such as the ones people tell in face-to-face conversation. And we can compare the

Source: Allan Bell and Peter Garrett (eds), *Approaches to Media Discourse*, 1996, pp. 64–104.

discourse structure of news with other media genres such as editorials, and one type of news medium with another, for instance tabloid and broadsheet press, or newscasts on different television stations.

The text is central to news. News content is not independent of its expression, and we can only hope to have a clear understanding of the nature of news content by close analysis of the news text. A close, linguistically proficient analysis of the text needs to be the foundation for all attempts to unpack the ideologies underlying the news. Such an analysis shows that even simple-looking news stories are often rather complex, and the events they describe rather less distinct than we supposed. It also illuminates how stories are made. This is important for news audiences – to know something of how the news products they consume are manufactured. The very idea that the news is a 'product' may itself come as something of a surprise, and analysis can show something of the make-up of the product.

My approach to news discourse focuses on the question 'what does this story actually say happened?'. It begins by taking the news media's concentration on factuality on its own terms, together with the ordinariness of our acceptance, as readers, of such stories and what they tell us (cf. Scannell). It is not a question – at least initially – of whether these reports represent what 'really' happened. What we are *told* happened is important in the news just as it is in courts of law, which devote much of their time to scrutiny of accounts of events.

This analytical framework seeks chiefly to deduce an 'event structure' for a story – that is, to reconstruct, from the often fragmented information presented, what the story says actually happened. It thus concentrates on the basics of storytelling, which in the news are encapsulated by the journalist's 'five Ws and an H': who, what, when, where, why, how. Only after we are clear what the story says will we be in a position to see what it does not say. We will find, as shown below, that news stories are regularly not saying what we think they say on first reception. They are not telling a simple, clear tale, but are replete with ambiguity, unclarity, discrepancy and cavity.

Such close analysis is prerequisite to a more sophisticated approach to questions of ideology in news texts. It makes us aware of the complexity and ambiguity of news. It enables us to examine whether a headline fairly represents the story it accompanies. It shows who are the sources of information in the news – and which information has no explicit source at all. It leads us to consider why these particular events have been reported at all, and why they have been gathered together into a single published news story.

This chapter is organized thus: first I outline a framework for analysing the discourse structure of news, then exemplify it briefly through examining a number of single-sentence newspaper stories. I then present detailed guidelines for analysis of discourse structure, and proceed to close analysis of one news story. Lastly, I examine one of the most important and interesting aspects of news story structure – time – again with an example analysis of press stories.

2 The Framework

The approach to media discourse analysis used in this chapter was developed in Bell (1991). It draws on elements from general frameworks of story analysis, especially Labov's analysis of narratives of personal experience told in conversation (Labov and Waletzky, 1967; Labov, 1972), as well as from van Dijk's framework for analysing news discourse (1988b). The analysis of time in news stories derives from Bell (1995b, 1996). The frameworks used to analyse the structure of different kinds of stories have a lot of their elements in common (e.g. Labov, 1972; Rumelhart, 1975; van Dijk, 1988b). Labov's is one of the most familiar and contains six elements: abstract, orientation, action, evaluation, resolution and coda (see Bell, 1991 for application of this framework to news stories).


Figure 1 shows the elements needed to describe the discourse structure of news stories. A story normally consists of attribution, an abstract, and the story proper. Attribution of where the story came from is not always made explicit. It can include credit to a news agency and/or a journalist's byline, and may also state place and time ('dateline'). The abstract consists of the lead sentence or 'intro' of the news story and – for press news – also a headline. The lead covers the central event of the story, and possibly one or more secondary events. This necessarily entails giving in the lead itself some information on actors and setting involved in the event. The body of the story itself consists of one or more episodes, which in turn consist of one or more events. Events must describe actors and action, usually express setting of time and place, and may have explicit attribution to an information source. Episodes are clusters of events which share a common location or set of news actors (and need only be specified when a single story contains two or more clearly distinct sets of events).

As well as the above elements which present the central occurrences, there are three additional categories of material in a news story: background, commentary and follow-up. These represent the past, the (non-action) present, and the future of the events described in the main action of the story.

The category of *background* covers any events prior to the current action – story past time. These are frequently previous events which probably figured as news stories in their own right at an earlier stage of the situation. If the background goes back beyond the near past, it is classed as 'history'. Example 3 of the one-sentence stories below contains just such background.

Commentary provides the journalist's or news actor's present-time observations on the action, assessing and commenting on events as they happen (rather than the actual narration of the events themselves, or other parties' verbal reaction to them). It may provide context to assist understanding of what is happening, or evaluative comment on the action, or expectations of how the situation will develop. The story in figure 4 analysed below contains both context (S9: S = Sentence) and evaluation (S1, S3).

Follow-up covers story future time – any action subsequent to the main action of an event. It can include verbal reaction by other parties or non-verbal consequences. Because it covers action which occurred after what a story has treated



gure 1: Model discourse structure for news texts (after Bell, 1991: 171)

as the main action, follow-up is a prime source of subsequent updating stories – which are themselves called 'follow-ups' by journalists. The story in figure 6 below contains follow-up material in S2.

3 Analysing the Single-Sentence Story

This chapter deals with the structure of press news only, and a specific kind of press news: the 'hard' or 'spot' news which we recognize as the staple diet of daily media – stories of fires, wars, accidents, disasters, dangers and all manner of the mayhem that befalls human life. The minimal well-formed hard news story is just one sentence long. Many newspapers publish one-sentence stories, either to fill odd corners, or gathered in a column of news briefs. In a lot of broadcast news, many stories may consist only of a single sentence. The single-sentence story is also an appropriate proxy for examining the structure of longer stories in general. The news story is always focused in its first sentence – its lead or intro (Bell, 1991). We can see this most clearly when the story itself is reduced to just that sentence, but the lead is itself a microstory even when a full story follows. It compresses the 'news values' that have got this story through to publication.

The single-sentence story is therefore a good place to start as an introduction to analysis. Here are the texts of five one-sentence spot news stories published in British daily newspapers in February 1994. They are all from the international news agencies – Associated Press, Reuters and Agence France Presse – which act as models of Western journalistic style.

(1) **Clashes kill eight**
At least eight people have died in tribal fighting in the Bimbila region of northern Ghana. – AFP

(2) **Fumed out**
Tokyo: Two *sake* brewers were seriously ill after being overcome by fumes when one fell into a half-full vat and the other was trapped trying to rescue him. – Reuter

(3) **Deportation setback**
Storms over Iceland delayed the deportation from Norway yesterday of 12 American anti-abortion activists who had allegedly planned to stage demonstrations during the Winter Olympics and were detained by police when they arrived at Oslo's airport. – AP

(4) **Icicle horror**
A woman was fighting for life last night after a giant icicle fell 30 storeys from a New York skyscraper and speared her.

(5) **Awaiting the end**
Communist North Korea is building an underground mausoleum and waterproof glass coffin to await the death of its "Great Leader", President Kim Il-sung, a South Korean press report said. – AFP

Example 1 covers a single event and can be diagrammed as in figure 2 (in this and subsequent figures, some nodes of the structure are omitted to simplify the tree diagrams). It has a headline – 'Clashes kill eight' – as have all these single-sentence stories, and an attribution to the source agency, Agence France Presse. It consists of a single event, which specifies:

- actors – 'at least eight people'
- action – 'have died in tribal fighting'
- setting, specifically place – 'in the Bimbila region of northern Ghana'.

The structure of this story is as minimal as it can be. Yet, of course, even here it is quite likely that we are not dealing with just a single action – the eight victims may well have perished in widely separated incidents.

Example 2 compresses a chain of five actions into one sentence:

1 first *sake* brewer falls into vat
2 second brewer goes to save him
3 second brewer also gets trapped
4 both brewers overcome with fumes
5 both now seriously ill.

The most notable thing about example 2 is the order in which it tells these. My list above is in chronological order, that is the time sequence in which things actually happened, beginning at (1) and ending at (5). But the news typically begins with the most recent main happening (as also in examples 3 and 4). So the narrated order of the actions in story 2 is 5-4-1-3-2. It starts with the most




Figure 2: Discourse structure of the one-sentence story in example 1 (some nodes of the structure are omitted for simplification)

recent happening, then the next most recent, then goes back to the first and causal action, then fills in the remaining steps (again in reverse chronological order). The story is thus told in a radically nonsequential fashion – an issue we will return to in detail later in the chapter.

Most of these single-sentence stories overtly narrate more than one event. In terms of the model story structure indicated in figure 1, their structure is therefore complex. Example 3 contains a sequence of four events, with a complex embedding of background involving multiple time points and locations. The four events are (in chronological order):

1 Anti-abortion activists had allegedly planned to stage demonstrations during the Winter Olympics
2 detained by police when they arrived at Oslo airport
3 had been scheduled for deportation from Norway yesterday
4 deportation delayed by storms over Iceland.

Three of these events have their own different place specification. Each has a different time specification: event 1 includes a future ('planned to stage demonstrations') which did not in fact happen, and event 3 is as yet a 'non-event' which has still not occurred – deportation. Figure 3 diagrams the discourse structure of this example (again with some of the potential nodes of the tree diagram omitted to reduce complication). It shows some of the complexity of action, place and time that can be covered by even a single-sentence story. Such a story offers a considerable challenge to the reader's comprehension, as I shall discuss further below, particularly because of its multiple embedding of disparate events, some of which have not in fact (yet) happened. There is also obviously a lot more to be told about what has happened 'behind the scenes' of this story, the factuality of which will doubtless be in dispute between the different parties. The story also has one notable gap that readers have to fill from their world knowledge – why storms over Iceland should delay a deportation from Norway. We are probably to understand that the storms delayed or diverted an incoming aircraft on which the activists were meant to leave.

Looking across these five example stories, we can see patterns in their discourse structures. Firstly, all of them specify main event, news actors and place – the journalist's *what, who* and *where*. Example 1 contains only those elements. Time is expressed in most of them. News agency attribution is present in all except (4), and (5) also credits a local agency. But none attribute their information to any other source such as bystanders, spokespeople or officials.

Secondly, these stories proclaim their news value. As single-sentence stories, they probably originated as the lead paragraphs of longer stories from the international agencies. Their role is therefore to concentrate the news value of the whole story. News values are those factors which take a story into the news. They include attributes such as negativity, immediacy (or recency), proximity, lack of ambiguity, novelty, personalization and eliteness of the news actors (Bell, 1991). A story's news value focuses in the lexicon of newsworthiness in its lead sentence




Figure 3: Discourse structure of the one-sentence story in example 3

In (4), for instance, almost every word makes a claim to news value: 'fighting for life', 'giant icicle', 'fell 30 storeys', 'New York skyscraper', 'speared'. Most of the stories contain death, violence, or the imminent threat of these. The facticity of the stories is stressed through the detail of person, place and time already mentioned, and through the use of figures.

Thirdly, all but one story (3) begin with *who* – the main news actor. The stress on personalization and elite news actors guides the order of constituents within the sentence, even if this will result in a passive-voice verb. News-writing mythology holds that verbs should be active, but passivization is quite common as the only means of getting the main news actors to the start of the sentence. We thus have a *grammar* of news value as well as a lexicon. Syntactic rules such as passivization are applied to serve the values of news discourse, as is linkage through temporal conjunctions such as *after* and *as* (2, 4). In most cases one event is the sequel to or result of another, as also in examples 3 and 4.

Fourthly, time is sometimes expressed directly in these stories as 'yesterday' or 'last night'. But often there is no direct reference to current calendar time. We interpret these stories as 'reported within the past day'. But this immediacy criterion may not always be the case, and some of these stories could well be days-old news (e.g. 1, 2) and we readers would be none the wiser.

Fifth, since these are all international agency stories, they often carry explicit place of origin in the dateline (2). Otherwise place is sometimes expressed in the canonical form of a prepositional phrase, such as 'in the Bimbila region of northern Ghana' (1).

Lastly, information content, brevity and clarity can be seen tussling with each other. Sometimes, as in (3), clarity is the loser and the result is a sentence or a story in which the degree of layering and the dispersion of the events reported jeopardizes comprehension. This accords with van Dijk's finding (1988b: 77) that lead sentences in news stories can often be syntactically and informationally complex.

4 What Does the Story Actually Say?

I now turn to consider in more depth one longer news story, subjecting it to close analysis of its discourse structure. The Guide to analysis below presents a step-by-step procedure for establishing what a story says happened – that is, the *event structure* of the story. The fruit of analysing the discourse structure of stories in this way is an understanding of what the story says actually happened. At least at this stage, I am concerned only with what the story says, not with whether or how closely that corresponds to 'the facts' of what happened.

The event analysis takes into account not just the overt specifying of events themselves, but what the story says about news actors, locations and times of occurrence in order to tease out the structure of the story. Moving through each of these aspects, we will commonly have to modify our conception of what

happened as further specification of persons, time or place makes it clear that our earlier models were inadequate.

Figure 4 contains the text of a very routine news story from the (UK) *Daily Mirror*. I chose such a story because it is common rather than exceptional. The first group of analyses seek to uncover what the story is telling us actually happened – what events occurred, where they occurred and when, and who was involved (that is, four of the journalistic five Ws and the H, with the exception of 'why' and 'how': cf. Manoff and Schudson, 1987). This analysis yields structures for these four aspects: events, times, places and news actors. In theory, these four should all mesh into a unified picture of what the story says happened. In practice, they often do not quite fit together, and it is precisely these differences which may cast the most interesting light on the story. The category labels I use below are from Bell (1991), reproduced earlier as figure 1, the model tree diagram of news story structure. Working through this example, I follow the sequence of steps indicated in the Guide, although not all the points listed there are useful for analysing this – or any individual – story. There is a logic to the order in which I have listed the steps, but not all steps are necessarily going to contribute equally to an understanding of every story. Neither are they necessarily always best followed in this particular order or independently of each other – it may often make sense to carry out some later steps before those I have listed here as earlier.

Guide

How to analyse and interpret the discourse structure of a news story. First number the sentences of the story. The first steps listed under each numbered point below (in roman type) are basic analytical moves. The later steps under each point – indented and in italics – are the more interpretive procedures.

What

1 **Headline**
What events take place in the headline? Summarize and number each event.

2 **Lead**
What events take place in the lead or intro? Summarize and number.

3 **Events**
What events take place in the story? Summarize and number, then enter numbers alongside each sentence of the story (as in figure 6).
Re-categorize events in headline and lead as necessary to correspond with the fuller picture you now have from the story as a whole.

What is the central event of the whole story? (Usually the main 'hard' news event in the lead.)

4 Headline, lead and story

What is the relationship of the headline to the lead?

What events in the lead are included/excluded in the headline?
What news values lie behind these inclusions and exclusions?
Is the headline a valid representation of the lead?

What is the relationship of the lead to the story as a whole?

What events in the story are included/excluded in the lead?
What news values lie behind these inclusions and exclusions?
Is the lead a valid representation of the whole story?
Is there any information that is given in the lead but not returned to in the rest of the story?
How does the lead begin telling the story as well as act as an abstract for it?

Who

5 Story attribution

Is the story as a whole attributed? To whom (agency, journalist)?

6 Sources attribution

Is there any attribution within the story? Who is attributed? (list)
Beside each sentence, note down whom it is attributed to (if anyone).
Precisely what is attributed and to whom?
What speech verb is used in the attributions? (list)

What claims do the attributed sources have to authority?
Who is quoted directly? Indirectly?
Why have the particular speech verbs been used?
What parts of the story are not attributed? Why?
Where is attribution unclear or ambiguous? Does this have any repercussions?

7 News actors

What news actors are mentioned? (list: people, organizations, nations, etc.)
How are they labelled or referred to? (list)

What kinds of people or entities are mentioned in the story?
Why are they in the news? Are the news actors elite?
Is the news story personalized?
Are there patterns in the way the story refers to them or labels them?

Does specifying who the news actors are modify the event structure you developed earlier?

Where

8 Places

What place expressions are used? (list)
Where do they occur in the story? (sentence number)

9 Place structure

What locations does the story take place in? (list)

Does the story stay in one location or move from place to place and back? Why?
Is it clear what is happening in which location?
What sort of places are the events happening in? Is there a pattern to this?

Does specifying locations in this way modify the event structure you developed earlier?

When

10 Times

What time expressions are used in the story? (list)
Where do they occur in the story? (sentence number)

11 Time structure

What is the time structure of the story? Take the time of the central event as Time 0. Label earlier events as Time -1, -2 etc., and later events as Time +1, +2 etc. in the chronological sequence in which they actually occurred. Beside each sentence, note down the number of the time or times at which the actions mentioned there occurred.

How does the order in which the story is told relate to the chronological order of events?
What has the story been written in this order? What values lie behind the order?
Does the order help or hinder a reader in understanding what is going on in the story?
Does specifying times of occurrence in this way modify the event structure developed earlier?

12 Background

Is any background given (events prior to the central action – either recent previous events or more historical events)?

Does any of the background indicate any particular ideological frame behind the story?

13 Commentary

Is there any commentary on events? – evaluation of events (editorializing)? Context for what has happened? Expectations of how the situation will develop?

Does any of the commentary (especially evaluation) indicate any particular ideology behind the story?

14 Follow-up

Is there any follow-up to the central action of each event (subsequent events, either reaction (verbal) or consequences (non-verbal))?

Does any of the follow-up indicate any particular ideology behind the story?

Event and Discourse Structure

15 Event structure

Collate your successive re-categorizations of what happened in the story, drawing on news actors, place and time as well as the actions themselves. List in chronological order the events and their associated actors, times and places and the sentence numbers in which they occur (as in table 1 example). This represents the event structure as you finally assess it to be. Note any alternatives, which represent discrepancies or unclarities in the story itself.

Is the story told in instalments? That is, do the events follow one after another or are they interspersed with each other?

16 Discourse structure

At this stage you can draw a tree diagram of the discourse structure (e.g. figures 2, 3, 5). Note that the apparent order which these example figures display is only arrived at after a succession of rough drafts! Such a structure is also idealized in the sense that it masks ambiguities and unclarities.

17 Cohesion

What linkages are expressed or implied between the sentences or events in the story? How? (list)

What linkages are omitted? (list)

What do the linkages (or their absence) between sentences or events mean for understanding the story?

Is a cause-and-effect relationship between different events implied by the way they are ordered?

Does the story flow smoothly, or does it jump about? Why?

18 Confusion

Has it now been possible to say precisely what happened in the story? Or are there still ambiguities, gaps or confusions, as exemplified in the possibility of alternative event or discourse structures? (list, explain)

EVENT STRUCTURE			TIME STRUCTURE
3	HL	**2 held as IRA blitz is foiled**	+2
1			0
1 (2?)	S1	POLICE and MI5 agents have swooped in an undercover operation which netted bomb-making equipment – and may have foiled a major IRA blitz on the British mainland.	0 (+1?)
1 (2?)	S2	They recovered enough Semtex explosive to devastate a large office block.	0 (+1?)
1? (2?)	S3	And security services believe they have intercepted a highly-placed IRA quartermaster who supplies equipment to terror cells.	0? (+1?)
3	S4	Last night two men were being held in London under the Prevention of Terrorism Act.	+2
		Pistol	
1	S5	One, in his 30s, was arrested at Accrington, Lancs, with between 10 lb and 15 lb of high explosives, bomb-making equipment, a pistol and ammunition in his car.	0
1	S6	Plain-clothes police wearing flak jackets and carrying semi-automatic weapons seized the suspect in a car park next to Charlie Brown's Auto Centre.	0
2	S7	Within two hours another man, in his 50s, was held at Wembley in North London.	+1
1	S8	A terraced house in Accrington was under police guard last night.	+2
3	S9	The suspects can be held for up to seven days before being charged or released.	+3

Figure 4: Example story with Event and Time Structures (*Daily Mirror*, **London**, 23 February 1994; reproduced by permission of Mirror Group Newspapers)

1 Headline

The headline appears to narrate two events – (1) the holding of two suspects, and (2) the foiling of an IRA blitz. The two events are clearly closely linked, or may even in effect be the same action – the blitz may have been foiled precisely through the capture of the two people. The journalistic 'as' of the headline would thus not be an accident; it would specify precisely the temporal and causal relationship between the two events. Alternatively, there may have been action which foiled the blitz, and then led to the capture of two suspects. We cannot tell from the headline alone. We must read on.

2 Lead

The lead appears to tell of one event: a security service 'swoop' which discovered bomb-making equipment. This action is clearly related to, but not quite identical with, the two events in the headline. The 'foiled' statement in the headline is now shown to be an evaluation of the significance of the raid rather than a separate action of any kind. We thus find that the lead sentence clarifies the ambiguity of the headline, but it of course remains possible that the operation consisted of raids on more than just one location.

3 Events

We can now move to tease out the event structure of the story as a whole. The lead and the following three sentences (i.e. S1–4) invite the interpretation that there has been a single raid. But the second half of the story tells of two suspects being arrested in widely separated locations. It takes until S7 to become clear that we are dealing with quite separate events, and it remains unclear whether they were in some sense part of a single security operation, or whether they coincided by chance. The central action of both events is clearly the respective raids (assuming that Wembley involved a raid – we are told only that the man was 'held', in a strangely active use of a stative verb, akin to 'arrested'). To this point, it seems we can describe the story as being about a total of three events, assuming we treat the continuing detention of the two suspects as a separate event:

1 Accrington arrest
2 Wembley arrest
3 detention of two suspects.

The Accrington arrest seems to be the central event of the story and most of the story apparently concentrates on it (see figure 4 for Event Structure).

4 Headline, Lead and Story

We have already seen that the content of the lead in this story disambiguates the headline. But a closer look at the headline shows that the '2 held' statement with which it begins does not derive from the lead at all but rather from S4. This is an infrequent pattern, since a majority of headlines are derived solely from lead sentences and not from information further down a story (Bell, 1991).

There is also a contrast in the modality of the verbs used in the headline and the lead. The lead hedges its evaluation as 'may have foiled', but the headline presents this as unvarnished fact – 'is'. The central event of the lead, the raid, is represented in the headline *only* by the gloss of 'foiled' – that is, the tentative evaluation expressed in the lead has become the unhedged description of action in the headline. This is a classic news 'over-assertion' of a kind I found commonly in a study of editing changes made to news copy (Bell, 1983, 1984). The original

copy-editor. The shift is driven by the attempt to make a story as definite as possible ('unambiguity' is one of the classic news values: Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Bell, 1991). So it appears that the headline is not a valid representation of the story as a whole to the extent that through omitting the modal verb, the headline overstates the certainty of the evaluation contained in the lead. Modality is probably rarely expressed in headlines.

Further, we are not told whose opinion it is that a major IRA blitz may have been foiled. There is no sourcing of the evaluation. It is not mentioned again in the body of the story. We are probably to assume the source is the 'security services' quoted in S3, but it may in fact be the product of the journalist who wrote the story. A more likely possibility is that this statement is a gloss inserted by the copy-editor in order to raise the news value of the story – to 'beat it up'. Evidence for this is the fact that it appears in S1 after a dash – an avoided piece of punctuation that betrays late and hasty addition of the second half of S1.

5 Story Attribution

This story attributes no journalist as author nor agency as provider. We must assume it is written by a staff reporter who was not 'bylined'.

6 Sources Attribution

More importantly, the story does not directly specify the source of its information. The nearest we get to sourcing is in S3 where we are told what 'security services believe' in relation to the results of their actions. We can presume they were also the source of some of the information about the event itself, as well as possibly of the evaluation in S1. The use of 'believe' rather than 'say' in S3 is probably significant, indicating either that the security services were not prepared to provide information 'on the record' for the media, or that this was a chance comment that the journalist has built into more than the source would have wanted. We can note that the S9 background about detention powers probably comes from the journalist's own knowledge rather than any source.

7 News Actors

The news actors specified in the story are:

security services (S3)
  police (S1, S6, S8)
  MI5 agents (S1)
two IRA suspects (S4)
  one arrested in Accrington (S5)
  second arrested in Wembley (S7).

There is also another reference to an IRA member – 'a highly-placed IRA quartermaster' (S3). The way the reference is phrased in S3 implies that this

character is not the same as the person/s involved in the events of S1–2. Use of co-ordinator 'and' to introduce the sentence, plus indefinite article 'a . . . quartermaster', implies a different person. If it was the same person we would rather expect a phrasing like 'security services believe the suspect is a highly-placed IRA quartermaster . . .'.

On the other hand, given the detail of weaponry listed with the Accrington suspect in S5, S3 seems more likely to also refer to him. But since that would entail S1–2 referring to the Wembley suspect, this interpretation is not entirely satisfactory either. The remaining possibility is that this refers to a third person not otherwise mentioned, but that seems least likely of all.

Notice how we are gaining more information as our analysis moves into the story, and that new information modifies our understanding of earlier information. But it does not always *clarify* that understanding, and at this point we have to say that the identity of the quartermaster is unclear. Such questions of reference identity are not uncommon in news. In studies of editing practice (Bell, 1984), I have found cases where editors were obviously unable to decode whether expressions in different sentences were meant to refer to the same or different places or people. Their attempts to clarify reference sometimes took the wrong interpretation, and converted a second reference to a city already mentioned in a story into a first reference to another city.

8 Places

The story uses expressions of place in the following:

blitz on the British mainland (S1)
held in London (S4)
arrested at Accrington, Lancs (S5)
with . . . ammunition in his car (S5)
seized the suspect in a car park next to Charlie Brown's Auto Centre (S6)
held at Wembley in North London (S7)
a terraced house in Accrington (S8).

What is not said is more striking than what is said: there is no specification of where the raids and arrests took place until S5 and below. This contributes to our unclarity about what has taken place.

We may also wonder why the story details 'Charlie Brown's Auto Centre', since this is unlikely to be known to anyone beyond the immediate Accrington area. For locals, however, the description might signify that the raid was in a central, busy area of the town, for example. This may be a clue that the origin of this part of the story was in a local Accrington reporter's account which has not been appropriately edited for national readership. In contrast, Wembley – which no Briton needs an introduction to – is glossed as being in North London, presumably for international readership. So within two sentences we have conflicting indications of the presumed readership, local versus international, through the kind of shared knowledge that is and is not presupposed.

9 Place Structure

It seems then that the story has (at least) three locations – raids in Accrington, Lancashire, and in Wembley, North London, plus the site or sites in London where the two suspects are being held prisoner. So we can confirm our specification of probably three events in the story. If we had more detail, we might wish to regard other actions – such as the guarding of a terraced house in Accrington S8) – as further separate events, since it seems likely that the house was not located at the car park which was the scene of the Accrington suspect's arrest.

What is most striking, however, is that the further we get into the analysis, the less clear it becomes exactly what we are being told happened. What on the surface appeared a simple little story turns out to be rather complicated and opaque. In particular, it is by no means obvious which of the two sets of news actors, locations and actions detailed in S5–7 are actually being referred to in S1–3. because those first three sentences contain no unambiguous references to persons, and no reference to place at all. For instance, we cannot be sure which place the Semtex explosive was found in (S2), or which (if either) suspect is the quartermaster of S3.

10 Times

The specification of time is often surprisingly sparse in a news story (aside from tense and aspect marking on verbs). It is frequently left to the inference that 'this must be recent because it is news'. The time expressions in this story are:

last night (S4)
within two hours (S7)
last night (S8)
for up to seven days (S9).

No time is expressed until the fourth sentence of the story, with the presumption of recency governing our reading up to that point. There is no specification of the time of day when the two arrests were made, although we know there was no more than two hours between them. We presume the arrests took place during the day before the story was published – certainly before 'last night'. But in fact it is possible that the news is older than this, dating from the night before last or even earlier. It is not uncommon for stories to remain silent on the time of their events. Occasionally it becomes obvious that the presumption of recency is wrong – and sometimes this silence on timing appears to serve the misleading implication of immediacy.

11 Time Structure

Closely related to teasing out the event structure of a story is specifying its time structure: what happened in what order, what is the story's chronology? The

time structure of this story is rather straightforward except for the lack of clarity over absolute timing, and what actions are part of what event.

Time structure is shown on the right of figure 4. We take the time of the main news action as T0 – the operation described in S1, which I will assume to refer to the Accrington raid (though it may cover both). Thus S1, 2, 5 and 6 all describe aspects of the raid. I will interpret S3 as also referring to Accrington. All these are therefore T0 events. S7 occurs at the time of the Wembley raid 'within two hours', therefore at T + 1: the next time point after T0. S4 and 8 both refer to 'last night', subsequent to both arrests, that is T + 2. S9 can be considered subsequent again, therefore T + 3.

This is a comparatively simple time structure, as even a short news story can easily involve ten or more actions in non-chronological order, as we will see in a later example. This story is also unusual in not leading with the most recent event, perhaps because of the staticness of 'held' that I noted earlier. But we can also note that the headline *does* in fact major on the most recent event – the detention of the two suspects. There has thus been a difference of opinion over what constitutes the central news event in this story. The journalist who wrote the story, including the original lead, thought it was the raid. The copy-editor who edited it and wrote the headline thought it was the detention of two suspects. Such disagreements are a common locus of newsroom anguish.

Because time is such an important element in news stories and merits more discussion and illustration, I will return to it below with examples where it plays a more important role.

12 Background

The category of background (cf. figure 3) covers events prior to the central action of the story, and may include either recent past events or more remote history. This story contains no background.

13 Commentary

Commentary concerns context, evaluation or expectations for events that are happening. In this story we have already noted the evaluative comments concerning foiling an IRA blitz (S1, headline), and the assessment of the significance of the security services' discoveries (S3). In addition, there is context given about the Prevention of Terrorism Act (S4), which spells out (S9) the provisions under which the suspects can continue to be detained.

14 Follow-up

If we take the raids to be the central event of the story, then the detention of the two suspects counts as follow-up to that event. Follow-ups commonly become the lead in subsequent stories, and we have noted already that the headline (written later than the story, of course) tends in this direction.

15 Event Structure

We have noted the ambiguity and lack of clarity in the *who* and the *where* of this story. The left side of figure 4 shows the event structure as best I can judge it. Usually it is *time* that is the problematic factor in understanding what happened in a story. In this case it is the place structure which is the more confusing, and to a lesser extent the identity of the news actors, because it is by no means clear which place is referred to in different parts of the description – Accrington or Wembley. Table 1 schematizes this event structure, linking action, actors, place and time for each event.

Table 1: Event structure of IRA story (figure 4)

Event		Sentence	Actors	Place	Time
1	Raid, arrest, seizure	Headline S1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8	Security services, IRA	Accrington	0 +2
2	Arrest	S7 (S1? 2? 3?)	Security services, IRA	Wembley	+1 Within 2 hours
3	Detention ('held')	Headline S4, 9	2 IRA members	London	+2, +3 Last night


16 Discourse Structure

Figure 5 diagrams the discourse structure of the story in accordance with the interpretation I have offered, again omitting some of the detail so that an already complex diagram does not get more complicated still. The neatness of the eventual tree should not disguise the fact that it presupposes a series of (albeit increasingly refined) rough drafts. Event 3 is placed as a follow-up to both events 1 and 2. The constituents of each event are the straightforward ones of actors, action and setting, plus commentaries and follow-ups.

If we take other interpretations of the ambiguous information in the story, it will mean shifting some constituents to other points of the diagram. So, if we understand the 'blitz foiled' comment as applying to both the Accrington and Wembley raids, we will attach that Evaluation to both events 1 and 2 (or possibly to the Story as a whole). If we decide the quartermaster was the Wembley suspect rather than the Accrington one, we will re-attach that Evaluation to event 2.

17 Cohesion

News stories are standardly written as a series of one-sentence paragraphs, and commonly express little linkage between the sentences. With each news sentence usually also its own paragraph, there is no larger unit of text organization. There is routinely no flow of time sequence from one sentence to the next, and a lack



gure 5: Discourse structure of IRA story in figure 4

of devices such as adverbs expressing linkages between sentences. It is common for cohesion between sentences to be unclear or non-existent, and we may be genuinely doubtful what actions within the story belong together, at what point location actually shifted, or what material is attributed to whom.

It is the lack of such signposting, together with the mix of locations, that contributes to the ambiguities of this story. In the absence of any indications to the contrary, we would normally take S1–3 to be describing a single set of happenings, although there are no explicit linkages to mark this. Things become clearer after S4 where links are expressed: 'one' at the start of S5 links the news actor back into S4, and 'the suspect' in S6 continues the thread of reference. The signposting in S7 equally clearly indicates that this is a different event – 'another man' in another place at another time. However, the jump back to Accrington again in S8 is rather disconcerting to a reader.

18 Confusion

I have noted a number of points where it is unclear, ambiguous or confused what actually happened in this story, to whom, and where. To list these as questions (such as a journalist doing a follow-up story might ask a source):

Were the two arrests part of a single operation or coincidental? (S1)
Which arrest did security forces consider represented a 'foiled IRA blitz'? (S1)
Was Semtex recovered at Wembley as well as Accrington? (S2)
Was the Accrington or the Wembley suspect the quartermaster? (S3)

The grounds for confusion in this story are possible because of the lack of cohesion and specific reference across the story. This is commonly a source of problems for accuracy of both reporting and understanding. In a study of reporting of climate change (Bell, 1994), I found that the practice of not expressing cohesive links between sentences of a story enabled one journalist to refer alternately to the greenhouse effect and ozone depletion between successive sentences of a story in a way that seriously confused these two basically distinct atmospheric phenomena.

The packaging of the two raids in one story implies that they and the suspects were closely linked. However, we are told so little about the Wembley arrest that we cannot be sure of this. In fact, when we examine the role of the security services as news actors in the story, 'police' are twice specified in relation to Accrington (S6, S8), but MI5 are mentioned only generally in the lead sentence. It seems possible that Accrington involved only the police, Wembley involved only MI5, and the timing was coincidence rather than a single operation. This unclarity of reference in fact serves to enhance news value through co-option of a minor story into a bigger story (Bell, 1991). One reading of the story is that most of the serious action is linked to Accrington, and very little to Wembley. The ambiguity of reference therefore enables the Wembley event to be co-opted to the Accrington raid, building it into more than it would be just on its own – when it might not have been reported at all.

The detailed analysis I have run through in this section has shown us a good deal about the character of this story – indications of how it was made, evidence of inconsistencies and gaps, and manifestations of the news values behind it. We can see the claims it makes to be newsworthy mainly in the negativity of its content – in the presence of conflict, discoveries of weapons and explosives, use of force – together with involvement of elite news actors (the security services), co-option of possibly separate stories to reinforce each other, reduction of ambiguity over the significance of the arrests, and possibly enhanced immediacy.

The journalist's own ultimate abstract of a story is the one-word 'slugline' by which each story is identified in the news processing system – now in practice also presumably the filename under which the story is saved in the computer. The slugline is often a good guide to news value, and it is instructive to speculate what slugline a particular story might have carried. The likely candidates on this example story seem to me to be: 'swoop', 'blitz' or 'foiled'.

5 News Time

Time, as we have seen in the analyses so far, is an important dimension of news stories and merits more discussion in its own right. Time is expressed in stories at different levels of language – in the morphology and syntax of the verb phrase, in time adverbials whether lexical or phrasal, and in the discourse structure of stories above the sentence. One characteristic of all kinds of stories appears to be so shared across genres and cultures that it has been called 'canonical' – events tend to be told in the chronological order in which they occurred.

Time in story has interested widely different groups of scholars (Toolan, 1988) – literary theorists, and cognitive psychologists researching discourse comprehension, as well as text and discourse linguists. Literary theory tends to treat chronological order as the unmarked or basic form underlying fictional narrative, and identifies the time structure of a novel as interesting just where it departs from chronology. Genette's general theory of narrative discourse (1980) developed in relation to Proust's *A la recherche du temps perdu* is primarily devoted to time. Time order is his dominant category, analysed in terms of 'anachronies' – departures from chronological sequence. Cognitive psychologists make the distinction between *event structure* and *discourse structure* (Brewer, 1985) – between the order in which events actually happened and the order in which they are told in a story (my own framework above allows for an event structure in discourse which is non-chronological). There is only one real-world event structure but many possible discourse structures. The chronological is apparently the 'natural' order because it matches its discourse structure to the event structure.

Fairy stories are typical – even archetypal – of the canonical time ordering of stories. So, in 'The Three Little Pigs':

> The first little pig meets a man carrying straw, buys the straw, and builds a house out of it. The big bad wolf comes, huffs, puffs, blows the house of straw down and eats up the pig.

The second little pig meets a man carrying sticks, buys the sticks, builds a house, and ends up getting eaten too by the wolf.

The third little pig meets a man carrying bricks, . . . etc.

But the wolf fails to blow the brick house down, the pig puts a pot on the fire to boil, the wolf climbs down the chimney to get at the pig, but instead gets boiled for dinner.

End of story.

Analysis of a Story's Time Structure

News is by nature time-bound – it is a perishable commodity. Time is a defining characteristic of the nature of news, a major compulsion in news-gathering procedures, and an influence on the structure of news discourse. Figure 6 shows the text of a typical agency story, as published in Wellington's *Evening Post* newspaper. The time structure of the story's events is listed down the right-hand side. Time zero is the story present, the time of the lead event in the lead sentence. Times prior to this are labelled Time –1 for the event immediately preceding, moving back up to Time –6 in this story, the earliest occurrence in the reported background. The story also reports on events subsequent to Time 0, labelled Time +1 (the diagnosis), and so on. Here I report only briefly for illustrative purposes on a more detailed analysis drawn from Bell (1995b).

The lead sentence covers three temporally and causally sequential events, but in reverse chronological order. The result (Higuchi's departure to hospital) precedes cause (hunger strike), which itself precedes prior cause (disqualification from elections). They are linked by temporal expressions, usually *after* for a sequence as in examples 2 and 4 of the single-sentence stories analysed earlier, or *as* for simultaneous events (as in the headline in figure 4). The temporal expressions commonly imply a causal link, even though this may not always seem warranted.

In figure 6, Time Zero is explicitly identified in the lead sentence – 'today' – with other earlier or later time points signposted in the later sentences. Some of the time references situate events in calendar time (*since August* in S6), others in relation to each other (*just 24 hours after* . . . in S1, *earlier* in S3), still others are deictic with the present as reference point.

Labov found that a defining characteristic of personal narrative as a form is the temporal sequence of its 'clauses'. That is, the action is invariably told in the order in which it happened, what I have labelled canonical order – 'matching a verbal sequence of clauses to the sequence of events' (Labov, 1972: 360). News stories, by contrast, are seldom if ever told in chronological order. The time structure of the story in figure 6 is very complex, with nine points in time identified in the analysis. The story as a whole divides into three sections: S1–2, S3–5, S6. The lead sentence alone covers three events and times, as we have seen. Each of the three sections represents a cycle through events taking us further back in time, presenting in reverse order of actual occurrence (plus a couple of excursions into story future time) the chain of events which have culminated in the lead

TIME		STRUCTURE
Protest cut short		
S1	Lima, Jan 18. – The estranged wife of Peru's President Alberto Fujimori was taken to hospital today just 24 hours after she began a hunger strike to protest at her party's elimination from congressional elections.	0 –2 –3
S2	Doctors said she was suffering from tachycardia, or an accelerated heartbeat.	+1
S3	Earlier, [deposed first lady Susanna] Higuchi, sitting under an umbrella in a scorching summer sun outside the National Electoral Board's headquarters, had pledged to press on with her protest.	–1
S4	The electoral board said on Monday Higuchi's Armonia-Frempol party had not qualified for the April Congressional vote because it failed to present a full list of candidates for the 120-member legislature.	–3 +2 –4
S5	Board member Manuel Catacora said today that since Higuchi had presented her party's congressional slate just 10 minutes before the filing deadline, a provision allowing parties five days to correct any error did not apply.	0 –4 0
S6	Higuchi, a 44-year-old civil engineer, has been estranged from Fujimori since August when she protested an election law that banned her from running from [*sic*] public office. – Reuter	–5 –6

Figure 6: International news agency story as published in the *Evening Post*, Wellington, 20 January 1995 (reproduced by permission of Reuters)

event of this story. The earliest events are reported last of all, with the final sentence describing events from some six months previously which are the antecedents to the present occurrences.

In the body of the story, perceived *news value* overturns temporal sequence and imposes an order completely at odds with linear narrative. It moves backwards and forwards in time, picking out different points on each cycle or giving more detail on previously mentioned matters (S4 and S5). This violation of our expectations that narratives usually proceed in temporal succession is a distinctive feature of news stories – the inverted pyramid structure. Van Dijk has called this the instalment method (1988b: 43), by which an event is introduced then returned to in more detail two or more times. The radical discontinuity of time between sentences imparts a general lack of syntactic, semantic and discourse cohesion

within the news story, as we have seen in the figure 4 IRA story. The reverse-chronological structure has a direct pay-off (and in part doubtless an origin) in journalistic practices – stories are routinely cut from the bottom up to fit into available space. The important information must therefore come as early as possible, and the story should be capable of ending at any sentence. So, in the IRA story, at least the last two sentences could be cut without affecting the earlier part of the story (for more discussion of this question, see Bell, 1991).

Earlier Forms of News Telling

As news consumers we are so accustomed to this approach that we forget how deviant it is compared both with other narrative genres and with earlier norms of news reporting. Figure 7 shows a story from the *New Zealand Herald* of 11 June 1886. It reports the eruption of Mount Tarawera, a volcano located some 200 km to the south-east of Auckland, where the *Herald* is published. The eruption caused significant loss of life and reshaped an extensive area of the New Zealand landscape.

It is a typical disaster story which would run in any modern newspaper, but here it is narrated in absolute chronological order. Events are told from the viewpoint of the readers in Auckland – first hearing the sounds of the distant eruption and speculating on their cause, then eventually receiving the news of the real cause. Where the historical story begins at the beginning, the modern lead sentence would run something like this:

> 'Mount Tarawera erupted last night killing at least 30 people and sending hundreds more fleeing . . .'

Research on the development of modern news narrative style indicates that the inverted pyramid structure developed in American journalism at the end of the nineteenth century. Schudson (1982, 1989) found that until the 1880s, stories covering presidential State of the Union addresses did not summarize the key points at the beginning. However, by 1910 the lead as summary was standard.

> AT an early hour on Thursday morning a noise as of the firing of cannon was heard by many Auckland residents.
>
> From the continuousness of the firing, the loudness of the reports, and the apparent occasional sound resembling salvoes of artillery, many people both here and at Onehunga were under the impression that a man-of-war, probably the Russian Vestnik, had run ashore on the Manukau bar and that these were her signals of distress.
>
> Vivid flashes, as from the firing of guns, were also seen both at Onehunga and also from the cupola of the Herald Office, which served to almost confirm the impression that there had been a marine disaster. At about 8.30 a.m., however, it began to be circulated about town that a

catastrophe, far surpassing in horror even the most terrible of shipwrecks, had taken place.

The first news was, through the courtesy of Mr Furby, the officer in charge of the telegraph department, issued by us in an extra and consisted of the following message, sent from Rotorua, by Mr Dansey, the telegraphist there, who manfully and bravely "stuck to his instrument" in the face of the most dreadful danger:

"We have all passed a fearful night here. At 2.10 a.m. there was a heavy quake, then a fearful roar, which made everyone run out of their houses, and a grand, yet terrible, sight for those so near as we were, presented itself. Mount Tarawera suddenly became active, the volcano belching out fire and lava to a great height. A dense mass of ashes came pouring down here at 4 a.m., accompanied by a suffocating smell from the lower regions.

"Several families left their homes in their nightdresses with whatever they could seize in the hurry, and made for Tauranga. Others more lucky, got horses and left for Oxford."

Figure 7: News as chronological story: *New Zealand Herald*, 11 June 1886

News Time and News Comprehension

The discontinuous, non-chronological nature of the time structure of contemporary news stories invites the question of how well readers and hearers understand them. Introducing their study of narrative comprehension, Ohtsuka and Brewer (1992: 319) state: 'If the reader is to comprehend a narrative text, the reader must be able to derive the underlying event sequence from the given text sequence.' If this is strictly so, then it has dire consequences for the comprehensibility of news. The example analyses in this chapter show it takes considerable effort for the academic analyst – let alone the casual audience – to unravel the time structure.

Psychological research on the comprehension of narratives[1] has illuminated both the time structures of different kinds of stories, and the effects which different orderings have on audiences' comprehension. Ohtsuka and Brewer (1992) found that readers understood the canonical/chronological version of a story most easily. There was a significant drop in comprehension level for a second version of the same story which was presented in directly reverse chronological order, and for a third version which told some of the events using flashbacks. A final version contained 'flashforwards' which could not be immediately related to what had already been narrated, and here comprehension was little better than chance.

Relating these principles and findings to news stories, we can see that while the canonical/chronological pattern is not used in modern news, nor is the backwards pattern used in its pure form of telling an entire story from last event

Flashback appears to be the staple time structure of news stories, and this is abundantly evident in the stories examined in this chapter.

The findings to date on comprehension of news stories are equivocal on whether the non-linear time sequence of standard news writing is in fact harder to comprehend, or whether chronological order is easier. Lay readers clearly have some ability to reproduce news formats. Lutz and Wodak (1987) tested the form in which subjects retold news stories, asking them to write a lead sentence themselves. They found that most middle-class students reproduced a standard, reverse-chronology news format. But while some lower-class informants included much of the desired information, their retellings did not follow news style.

In another study, Duszak (1991) had readers reconstruct the randomized sentences of a news story. Most identified the lead sentence correctly, but there were two relevant tendencies in how they ordered sentences after the lead. Informants appeared to be avoiding the radical discontinuousness of news formats by grouping apparently cohesive sentences together. And they tended to reassemble events in a more chronological order than the original had, for instance putting background material earlier in the story rather than at the end. It seems that readers have a default strategy by which – in the absence of cues to the contrary – they re-impose chronological order on events in the discourse. Duszak rightly interprets this as a 'powerful drive' to retell events chronologically, clashing with readers' knowledge of the ordering promoted by news schemata.

More research is needed on the effects of time structure on news comprehension. The hypothesis that the non-canonical news format does adversely affect understanding is a reasonable one on the basis of comprehension research into other narrative genres, but the degree to which familiarity with news models may mitigate these problems is unclear.

Brewer hypothesizes that certain discourse genres are particularly intended for comprehension. In these, 'the order of events in the discourse will map the order of the underlying events' (Brewer 1985: 187) – that is, they will be written in chronological order. Among the genres supposedly designed for comprehension he explicitly and rightly includes news stories – with no comment on the fact that news stories virtually never follow the easily comprehensible canonical order. They consist of series of flashbacks, flashforwards and reverse tellings which, when they are used in films or novels, challenge the audience's powers of decoding.

So why do journalists write in an order which we know to be less easily comprehended, when one of their declared goals is reader comprehension? Ohtsuka and Brewer (1992: 331) ask the same question of non-chronological orderings in any kind of narrative: 'why don't authors always write texts in canonical form?' Their answer is that authors have purposes – and narratives have functions – other than just comprehension. They serve to entertain and persuade, for example. With news stories, however, the question is especially sharp, because comprehension by the audience is one of the main explicit aims of news writing. The answer lies in a marriage of journalistic values, journalistic practices and technological development, which is strong enough to overturn the drive to comprehensibility.

The values of media control the way in which news is presented. We can account for the way news stories are structured only with reference to the values by which one 'fact' is judged more newsworthy than another – and so more worth remembering and understanding. In particular the value of immediacy, as we have seen, is a powerful force in news discourse. The reason for this is the dominating role that time plays in the practice of news-work (Bell, 1995b). Time rules news-work in a way it does few other professions: the product must be finished by a set time or it is useless. Schlesinger's study of BBC newsroom practices rightly characterizes news-work as 'a stop-watch culture' (1987: 83). Newsrooms operate against the clock, measuring daily achievement by the ability to produce a required number of stories for the deadline. The drive to get the news first is embedded deep in the news ethos, and radically affects the structure of the news text – to the extent of motivating attempts to disguise the age of news which is less than fresh. These work practices both drive and are reinforced by technological development. From the invention of the telegraph, which gave rise to modern news coverage as we know it, to the presentation of live news as it happens through the satellite and the cable, innovation in technology has been aimed at reducing the time between the occurrence of a news event and its telling.

6 Conclusion: Application and Applicability

The detailed analysis of news stories presented in this chapter has told us a lot about the character of the stories – indications of how they were made, evidence of discrepancies and gaps, and manifestations of the news values behind them. There is considerable pay-off from a comparatively straightforward discourse structural analysis of this kind. It can open up a subtext of the news, for instance of implied linkages which may not stand up to scrutiny. It can lead us closer to 'what the story actually says happened'.

In the IRA story, for example, we have been able to infer a good deal about its production and potential reception as well as about the text itself. We have seen the joins between the different input texts that have gone to make this one story; the divergent local and international readerships at which these inputs were targeted; and the conflicting views held by journalist and copy-editor over what was really the story in these events. We have noted the unspecificness of much of what we have read, reflected in alternative possible discourse structures for the story, which make it impossible from this text alone to determine exactly what were the persons, places and events involved. We have seen how the routinely jumbled time structure and lack of cohesion between sentences has served to make some things unclear, and looked at some of the repercussions that may have for comprehension of news stories. We have been able to assess the validity of the headline, and the reliability of evaluations put forward in the story.

It is particularly salutary how our specification of events, persons and places changed as the analysis moved further down the story. The interpretation based only on the headline and lead was rather misleading. If this had been a single-sentence story of the kind analysed earlier in the chapter, the level of unclarity and ambiguity would have remained very high. Projecting this experience back on to the earlier examples, it seems likely that the interpretations I offered of their event and discourse structures would be proved quite mistaken if we had access to the full text of the stories from which they have been cut.

The system of analysis I presented in the Guide earlier covers most of what we might want to know about a story's discourse structure, but there are other questions we might ask in relation to it, such as:

- What vocabulary is used in the lead to claim news value for the story? What is the order of sentence constituents within the lead? What news values lie behind that order?
  Is there a conflict between the journalist's goals of brevity and clarity in the lead?
- What figures or similar 'hard facts' does the story contain? How does the story use these to buttress its news value?
- How much of the story consists of talk? What kind of talk – statement, accusation, reaction, announcement?
- What are the news values which have made this a published news story?

The analytical framework concentrated on the journalist's five Ws and an H. But it is significant that two of those did not figure explicitly – 'how' and particularly 'why'. 'How', of course, is in many ways represented as the detail of 'what', but 'why' is not overtly addressed in the IRA story – or in many others. It is no accident that Carey characterizes 'how' and 'why' as the 'dark continent' of journalism (Carey, 1987; cf. Bell, 1996). Secondly, while there is good insight to be gained from an understanding of a profession's own understanding of its work (Manoff and Schudson, 1987), it must not be forgotten that such categories should themselves be subjected to analysis and deconstruction.

The analytical work involved in this framework is not small. The demand is in fact a true reflection of the real complexity of texts such as news stories, which sometimes appear deceptively simple. In doing such work, it is essential to move systematically, picking off the analysis point by point.

Yet while we need to be selective in our analyses and know what is an appropriate point to cut off at, it is evident to me that many of the insights yielded come only near the end of detailed work following a pattern such as that outlined in the analysis Guide. Because the analyses are time-consuming if undertaken at all comprehensively (cf. van Dijk, 1991: 10), we need to complement full-scale work on a few texts with more piecemeal, specific analyses on larger samples. But the reward of such work is a better knowledge of what the stories of our time are saying, and an understanding of the way they may be produced and received.

Notes

This chapter is in large part the fruit of a fellowship I held in 1994 at the Centre for Language and Communication Research, University of Wales Cardiff. So also was the idea for the Cardiff Round Table as a whole and this publication of a range of approaches to media discourse. I am grateful to the Centre – and particularly to its Director, Nikolas Coupland – for support and warm hospitality on that and later occasions. During the fellowship, I taught a course on news language and discourse, and much of the present chapter grew from that material and experience. I work normally as a researcher and journalist rather than a teacher, and it was salutary how hard the students found it to understand and apply these analytical approaches. This was the main motivation behind the Round Table meeting and this collection. I am greatly indebted to co-editor Peter Garrett for the encouragement and insight he brought to my chapter and to the book as a whole.

1. In this section, I report at second hand the findings of other researchers on story 'comprehension' which are relevant to my concern with temporal order. This begs methodological and theoretical questions that are beyond my scope to address in this chapter – such as the relationship between recall and comprehension, and between written and oral channels, and the dynamic way in which audiences interpret meanings in everyday life. Compare Richardson's and Allan's chapters in *Approaches to Media Discourse* (1996).

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4

Crossing Genders, Mixing Languages: The Linguistic Construction of Transgenderism in Tonga

Niko Besnier

1 Introduction

This chapter takes as point of departure three seemingly unrelated developments in social and cultural anthropology. The first concerns recent rethinking of anthropological approaches to gender as a social and cultural category. Heralded by feminist anthropologists in the last decades of the twentieth century, this shift is spurred on by the insistence that gender (and, by implication, all other social categories) is always embedded in a complex maze of other social divisions that criss-cross all social groups: social class, race and ethnicity, religious identity, age, sexuality, citizenship in its various manifestations, position in structures of production and consumption, and so on. On both large-scale dimensions and in microscopic fashion, all aspects of social identity and dimensions of social difference can potentially inform or even determine the meaning of gender, dislocating sameness where it is least expected, and potentially establishing connections between surprisingly distinct categories, persons, and entities. A corollary to the recognition of the inherently embedded nature of gender is the assertion that "all forms of patterned inequality merit analysis" (di Leonardo 1991: 31), and that such analysis is the *sine qua non* of an anthropological coming-to-terms with the meaning of gender.

The second development I am concerned with arose with the increasing malaise among anthropologists, also characteristic of the 1980s and 1990s, with the tacit equation of culture with place, and the continued assumption that social

Source: Janet Holmes and Miriam Meyerhoff (eds), *Handbook of Language and Gender*, 2003, pp. 279–301.

groups could simply be defined in terms of geographic co-presence. Appadurai (1996), among others, demonstrates that locality is a problematic category for an ever-increasing number of people, for various possible reasons: place (of origin, affective ties, residence, etc.) may not be a singular, well-defined entity, as is often the case of the migrant. Place of origin may be a site of violence and horror, which is best erased from memories and daily lives, as in the case of refugees from civil wars and genocidal situations (e.g. Daniel 1996; Malkki 1995). Alternatively, place can have shifting, context-bound characteristics that vary with persons and contexts (Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Lovell 1998). Consequently, as Marcus (1995) argues, the age-old pattern of anthropological fieldwork that objectified "the Other" in distant lands is giving way to a more dynamic, "multi-sited" pattern of research, in which the ethnography "follows" persons, objects, or metaphors as they travel across geographies and histories.

The third anthropological preoccupation I invoke is the effort to come to grips with the various forms and meanings of modernity. Modernity, the condition of experience associated with capitalism, industrialism, consumption, and other characteristics of life in "the West," has long occupied a privileged if backstaged place in anthropology and the social sciences. At its inception, anthropology was defined as the study of what modernity was not; even recently, much work in anthropology continued to tacitly assume an unproblematic contrast between modernity and traditionalism (Spencer 1996: 378–9). However, recent thinking has unsettled the facile dichotomy between tradition and modernity, demonstrating, for instance, that the two categories are mutually constitutive, and that forms of tradition and forms of modernity are commensurable in many contexts. Furthermore, neither tradition nor modernity is a unitary condition: there many forms of modernity (as illustrated by the "alternative modernity" of Japan, for example) and, as Comaroff and Comaroff point out, "[n]or should this surprise us. With hindsight, it is clear that the cultures of industrial capitalism have never existed in the singular, either in Europe or in the myriad transformations across the surface of the earth" (1993: xi).

In this chapter, I explore how these various strands of thinking can be tied together, and inform concerns of language and gender. I explore the role of language use in constructing gender in the context of an investigation of how other social and cultural categories define gender. For example, men and women in many societies have different interests (in the various senses of the term) in "tradition" and "modernity," in the maintenance of the status quo or the emergence of new social arrangements, and language behavior and ideologies are often constitutive of these differing investments. In this project, I take gender not as a given, but as potentially emerging out of conflict and negotiation between members of a society, conflict and negotiation in which language plays an important role.

The empirical basis of my discussion is an ethnographic examination of the lives of transgendered males in Tongan society. Like all larger societies of the Polynesian region (Besnier 1994), Tongan society counts in its ranks a substantial number of men who "act like women," a category that Tongans refer to variously as *fakaleitī*, *leitī*, or *fakafefine*. The first term is the most commonly heard at this moment in history; it is a lexical compound made up of the ubiquitous polysemic

prefix *faka-*, which in this context means "in the manner of"; *leitī* is borrowed from the English word "lady," which is only used to refer to transgendered persons (i.e. never to female "ladies"). Transgendered Tongans prefer the unprefixed version of the term to refer to themselves, arguing somewhat tongue-in-cheek that they are not *like* ladies but they *are* ladies (I explore additional reasons for the preference of the shorter word in Besnier 1997: 19–20). The last term, *fakafefine*, literally "in the manner of a woman," is slightly old-fashioned, but it is readily understood because its meaning is transparent from the sum of its parts.

In the discussion that follows, I first introduce Tongan society as a diaspora scattered widely in the Pacific Rim, whose center of gravity is an independent nation-state coterminous with a group of islands in the Southwestern Pacific, the Kingdom of Tonga. I briefly describe the sociocultural meaning of the two principal languages spoken by members of this diaspora, Tongan and English, a meaning which is undergoing rapid change as expatriate Tongans in New Zealand, Australia, and the United States increase in number and prominence. I then turn to the position of *fakaleitī* in Tongan society, which I show to be varied and full of inherent contradictions. I demonstrate that English has become a trademark of *fakaleitī* identity in the islands, as it encodes a cosmopolitanism and modernity which many *leitī* find useful to foreground in their daily lives. However, this trademark has a price, in that many *leitī* are not fluent in English and most do not have access to the material means of backing claims of cosmopolitanism with tangible tokens of it. In addition, mainstream society can utilize the claims associated with the use of English to dislocate *leitī* from the local context and further marginalize them.

2 Tongan Society as a Diaspora

The fieldwork on which this chapter is based was conducted principally in the capital of Tonga, Nuku'alofa. However, the Tongan diaspora figures prominently in all aspects of the economic, social, and cultural life of the island society, and its importance continues to increase, despite efforts from some quarters to contain and minimize it. As a nation-state and an island-based society, Tonga therefore cannot be considered independently of overseas Tongan communities. Altogether, about 150,000 persons claim Tongan descent, of whom about 97,500 reside in the archipelago, a loose clustering of 150 islands, 36 of which are permanently inhabited. Overseas Tongans live principally in Auckland, Sydney, the San Francisco Bay Area, urban Southern California, and Salt Lake City, but there are small groups of Tongans or single individuals just about everywhere in the world. The size, diversity, and importance of the diaspora is particularly striking in light of the fact that significant emigration only began in the 1970s.

Tongans are Polynesians, and their society has been one of the most stratified and politically centralized of the region since its early-nineteenth-century unification under the rule of a sacralized king. A British protectorate between 1900 and 1970, Tonga is today an independent state. State and society are both founded on a marriage between selected aspects of a purported tradition and selected

aspects of a version of modernity (Philips 2000: 235–6). For example, the State is "the only remaining Polynesian kingdom" and an upholder of Christianity, features that Tongans consider to be illustrative of timeless tradition, while also emphasizing the fact that Tonga is an economically forwardlooking entity, a symbol of modernity. However, different elements of society and the State may differ on key points as to which aspects of tradition and which aspects of modernity should be made relevant to Tonga: for example, parliamentary representation and the scope of the nobility's political power are topics of acrid debate, particularly since the emergence of a Tongan Pro-Democracy Movement in the 1980s (Campbell 1992: 218–22). Those in power view dissenting voices as signs of an undesirable modernity, often associating them with the diaspora.

Despite rapid increases in the Tongan populations of cities such as Auckland, the most important urban centre for Tongan society continues to be Nuku'alofa, the capital of the nation-state, inhabited by about 25,000 people, many of whom have moved there from rural areas of the country in the last few decades. Nuku'alofa is the prime destination of overseas Tongans' visits to the island kingdom, in part because its international airport is the most important point of entry into the country from Hawaii, New Zealand, Australia, and Fiji. It is the venue of most national celebrations, including ceremonies relating to kingship, government, and nationhood (e.g. coronations, important funerals, and yearly festivals of culture). Nuku'alofa is the focal point of both the rest of the nation and the diasporic dispersion. It serves as the point of convergence for most of the intensive flows of goods, money, and people that keep the diaspora together.

In the context of the rapidly increasing transnationalism of their society, many Tongans see the maintenance of a quality of "Tonganness," as well as the very definition of this quality, as areas of concern (Morton 1996; Small 1997). Tongans refer to this quality as *anga faka-Tonga*, "behavior in the fashion of Tonga," or, when speaking English, "the Tongan way," echoing comparable phrases used in neighboring societies. The quality is concretized most forcefully in high culture, including the performing arts, the manufacture and exchange of *koloa* "valuables" (tapa-cloth and mats), ceremonies affirming hierarchy and kinship, and of course language. However, Tongans often invoke *anga faka-Tonga* when referring to culture in the broader anthropological sense, particularly when the context calls for a contrast between locality and extralocality. For example, overseas Tongans and locally based but cosmopolitan Tongans lay claims on "Tonganness" that other Tongans sometimes challenge (Morton 1998). "Tonganness" is deeply tied to place, but in potentially conflicting ways.

3 Tongan and English

The tensions associated with the definition and maintenance of local identity and related dynamics are perhaps most clearly enacted in the competition between the two principal languages utilized in Tongan society, Tongan and English. Just about everyone in Tonga knows at least rudiments of English, which is a prominent language in schooling and even, in the case of a few schools, the

only language of instruction. However, Tongans vary widely in terms of their fluency in English and the degree to which they feel comfortable speaking and writing English. Both fluency and readiness to speak English (which are not necessarily coterminous, as I will illustrate presently) depend on an aggregate of factors closely linked to the structuring of social inequality in Tonga. First, English is a prestige language, as elsewhere in the Pacific where it is the main post-colonial cosmopolitan language: linked to a colonial past, it dominates contexts of employment, education, modernity, transnationalism, contacts with the external world, and new forms of socio-economic hegemony such as entrepreneurship. Elite Tongans of either rank or wealth are more likely than non-elite Tongans to have resided in English-speaking countries under favorable circumstances (pursuing their education or visiting, for example), and therefore generally have had more opportunities to become fluent speakers of English. They are also intimate with the privilege and cosmopolitanism that English indexes.

In contrast, most non-privileged Tongans are often reluctant to speak English, ostensibly, according to explanations offered, because they fear making linguistic errors. In practice, their reluctance is not so much a matter of defective grammatical competence, but of not having the social self-assurance to assert oneself credibly as a privileged, modern, and cosmopolitan person without fearing shame (*mā*) and exposing oneself to ridicule.[1] While many non-elite Tongans have resided overseas, they have invariably been employed in menial job contexts, in which communication with native speakers of English is confined to job-related topics (e.g. understanding directives). In Tongan communities in cities such as Auckland and the San Francisco Bay Area, the life of many less-than-privileged first-generation migrant Tongans continues to be predominantly Tongan-centered and Tongan-speaking. As is the case of many migrant communities, it is only the overseas-born generation that acquires fluency in the dominant language.

The association of English with privilege is not unmitigated, for at least two reasons. First, most Tongans exhibit a high degree of allegiance to their own language. It is not uncommon to hear Tongan being used as an everyday tool of resistance to the hegemony of English. For example, it is used widely in the workplace, however steeped this workplace may be in the English language and associated symbols. In Nuku'alofa streets, youngsters do not fail to crack loud jokes in Tongan at the expense of any foreigner (*Pālangi*) they pass, whom they assume not to understand the language. But the prestige of Tongan is also asserted in contexts where English is not a competing code, as in oratory, ceremonialism, and song-and-dance concerts, and thus it is not solely associated with resistance.[2]

Second, there are contexts in which people use English widely without access to the material resources to "justify" their code choice, and without any obvious fear of shame either. One example is the very popular Nuku'alofa flea market, where English is a common medium among sellers and often also customers. What is interesting, though, is that the flea market is also one of the most visible local sites of modernity and transnationalism, for several reasons. Most simplistically, the goods sold (principally second-hand clothing) are from overseas, and thus the market is a place where people go to buy the product of transnational

links. In addition, socially marginal groups and "local Others," that is, persons who are already marginalized because of their non-mainstream religious affiliation or lifestyle (e.g. Mormons, Charismatic Christians, entrepreneurs), are overrepresented among the sellers. Furthermore, the act of selling, particularly secondhand objects, flies in the face of the "traditional" order: in the "Tongan way," selling used items makes others suspect that the sellers are so poor that they are forced to sell their possessions, a state of substantial *mā* "shame." However, sellers whom I interviewed described with pride how they had overcome the strictures of traditionalism and become modern persons, a process that some attributed to their religious affiliations.[3] The prominence of English and the modernity that suffuse the flea market are thus not coincidental, and they indicate that Tongan and English are embroiled in potentially complex structures of competing prestige, along with the categories with which each language is associated, a theme which will figure prominently in the analysis that follows.

4 *Leitī* in Tongan Society

It is impossible to come up with a precise definition of who a *fakaleitī* is in Tongan society, for the same reasons that defining "man" or "woman" in any social context is neither feasible not fruitful. As for all social categories, one cannot isolate a set of necessary and sufficient conditions to determine who is a *fakaleitī* and who is not. Nevertheless, stereotypes abound, as they do wherever a marginalized minority is concerned in all social groupings. One can therefore utilize these stereotypes to provide a working definition of the category, bearing in mind at all times that they are stereotypes, and hence that they are prone to distortions, underlain with covert moral judgments, and subject to socio-political manipulation.

Mainstream Tongans stereotypically associate a *fakaleitī*'s presentation of self with a "feminine" comportment (e.g. emotional way of talking, an animated face, "swishy" walk). In domestic or rural settings, *leitī* do "women's" work (e.g. laundry washing, cooking, flower gardening, child-minding, caring for elderly parents) and don't do or don't like to do physically demanding work associated with men (e.g. subsistence gardening, wood chopping, construction). In urban contexts, they hold occupations that have feminine associations (e.g. seamstress, hairdresser, cook, "house-girl"), because they either cater to women or are commonly performed by women. *Fakaleitī* are commonly characterized as wearing women's clothes and make-up, although in practice most *leitī* wear either men's or gender-neutral clothes. Their leisures and interests are concerned with beauty, creativity, and femininity (e.g. talking and doing fashion, hairstyles, and decor). They play netball and definitely not rugby (but many, like men and in contrast to women, do get drunk, and often). Finally, "because" they are like women, as the local logic goes, *fakaleitī* have sexual relations with "straight" men, that is, with men who are not identified as *fakaleitī*. Most "straight" men engage them in frequent banter over their "true" gender identity and the possibility of sexual relations, often portraying *fakaleitī* as the sexual aggressor, a strategy designed in part to emphasize the out-of-control nature of *fakaleitī*'s sexuality (a theme

familiar to many sexually defined minorities around the world), and in part to invalidate their claim that they are "real women," since sexual aggression is a male trait.

What these stereotypes do not capture is that *leitī* identity is highly variable, considerably more complex, and criss-crossed by dynamics that reach far beyond the confines of narrow characterizations of gender and sexuality. An important theme that will not often arise under elicitation is the notable way in which *leitī* orient their lives toward aspects of modernity to an extent and in ways that other Tongans do not. While mainstream Tongans tacitly recognize, in their rapports with and attitudes toward *leitī*, that this orientation is part and parcel of who they are, they do not explicitly point to it as a characteristic marker of the identity. I will argue here that it is as central to understanding the meaning of the category as its gendering.

5 *Leitī* and English

It is here that language and language use begin to offer a particularly rich *entrée* into the intricacies of the problem. First of all, verbal behavior is one of the most consciously foregrounded features of *leitī* identity, yet also one of the vaguest. When asked, "How do you know when someone is a *fakaleitī*?," mainstream and *leitī* Tongans often reply, '*Oku te 'ilo'i 'i he le'o* "You know by the voice," where *le'o* "voice" also means, more generally, "way of speaking, speech mannerism." When pressed further, informants typically suggest that *leitī* speak with a high-pitched voice and at a fast tempo, and engage in dramatic emotional displays. However, attempts to determine this distinctiveness more precisely run into the same conceptual and analytic difficulties as characterizations of the linguistic characteristics of gender or sexual minorities elsewhere in the world (cf. Hall and O'Donovan 1996; Gaudio 1997; Ogawa and Smith 1997; and many others).

What is particularly striking but often left unmentioned by informants is the salience of English in *leitī*'s linguistic repertoire. The most immediate piece of evidence of this salience is the name of the category itself: a borrowing from English used exclusively to refer to transgendered males, the word *"fakaleitī"* in and of itself indexes the English language, its contexts of use, and its symbolic associations with modernity and cosmopolitanism, an indexicality that probably operates largely at a subconscious level.[4] This indexicality may be further reinforced by two factors: the original meaning and connotation of the English word "lady" (evoking sophistication, class, good breeding); and *leitī*'s own preference for the unsuffixed version of the term, which "denativizes" the term even further by stripping it of the Polynesian morpheme *faka-*. (Going one step further, *leitī* sometimes pronounce the term as if it were an English word, voicing the dental stop, diphthongizing the vowel cluster, and shifting the stress from the word-final long vowel onto the diphthong.)

The orientation to English that is part and parcel of *leitī* identity goes further. No matter how fluent or elementary their English proficiency may be, *leitī* pepper their conversations with one another and others with English. *Leitī*'s code-switching

can occur in any context, and can target a wide variety of linguistic units, from single words to large discourse chunks. The most frequent examples in my corpus, not surprisingly, are to be found in face-to-face interviews with me, since *leitī* see me primarily as a speaker of English, even though my Tongan is perfectly adequate, and perhaps more importantly as someone with whom they wish to establish a rapport for which the appropriate language is English. The following excerpt from a typical one-to-one interview illustrates the ubiquitous nature of borrowings and code-switched strings[5] (I = interviewee, N = Niko [myself]):

I: Ka koe'uhí, 'e ki'i- te nau *feel secure.*
N: Hm.
I: Pea mo e anga ko e fie nofo faka-Tongá, *you know, how our culture,* 'oku- 'oku *tight up* pē'a e *respect*
N: Hm.
I: ki he mātu'a mo e *sisters* mo e *brothers* mo e me'a.
N: Hm.
I: Ka ko e taimi ko ē 'oku nau- nau māvahe ai ko ē 'o nofo faka'apitanga, pehē
N: 'Io.
I: 'a e *camp.*
N: Hm.
I: Ko e fo'i- fai tahataha pē 'oku tu'u 'i he 'ulu, *that's all.*
N: Hm.
I: *They don't really care,* pe ma'u ha me'akai pe 'ikai.
N: Hm.
(Transcript 1993: 3, p. 6)

Translation
I: *And because, just- they will* feel secure.
N: *Hm.*
I: *And they have a desire to live in the Tongan way,* you know, how our culture, *the* respect *is quite* tight up
N: *Hm.*
I: *for the parents and the* sisters *and the* brothers *and so on.*
N: *Hm.*
I: *But when they move out and start living together as roommates in a house, it [becomes] like*
N: *Yes.*
I: *a* camp [i.e. an encampment, where norms of respectability are ignored].
N: *Hm.*
I: *Every- each does whatever goes through his head,* that's all [i.e. and nothing more].
N: *Hm.*
I: They don't really care *whether they even get food or not.*
N: *Hm.*

This excerpt, taken from an interview with a *leitī* who is relatively fluent in English, presents several interesting features. First, many words and phrases that the interviewee utters in English could equally have been uttered in Tongan, and in a couple of instances the Tongan equivalent may have been more felicitous. Second, some of the terms that my interviewee utters in English in fact refer to concepts that are highly specific to Tongan society and culture. Such is the

of "respect," a word that in Tongan English has the locally specific meaning of "avoidance behavior between cross-sex siblings and some inter-generational relations," which is much more succinctly denoted in Tongan by the widely used term *faka'apa'apa*. Such is also the case of the English kinship terms "brothers" and "sisters," which do not do a good job of capturing the kinship categories relevant to "respect," best understood in terms of crosssiblings (*tuonga'ane* "[woman's] brother", *tuofefine* "[man's] sister").

What is particularly interesting is that even *leitī* who do not have grammatical fluency in standard English nevertheless engage in code-switching with a frequency and poise that would rarely be witnessed among mainstream Tongans of comparable linguistic abilities. The following is an excerpt from an interview with a *leitī* who is much less fluent in English than the interviewee in the prior excerpt, despite years spent working in Australia. Nevertheless, English words and sentences abound in the interview:

I: Ne- 'Aositelelia, sai'aupito 'a 'Aositelelia ia ki ke kau leitī. **He ko e- *mastly*** ko e sio ki he- ki he-, *have you heard about the Mardi Gras,*
N: 'Io, 'Io.
I: 'Oku topu 'a 'Aositelelia hē,
N: Hm.
I: ( ) he nofo pehē.
N: Hm.
I: Ē? *Lesbian.*
N: Hm.
I: *And also the- ladies and the gay.*
N: Hm.
I: *( ) understand?*
N: Na'á ke fa'a kau ki ai?
I: *I only joins but I-* na'e kai- na'e 'ikai ke u **'alu au ki he ngaahi fale pehē.**
N: 'Io.
I: *I just went inside and watch them,*
N: Hm, hm.
I: Ē? *But I never do this one.*
(Transcript 2000: 2, p. 6)

Translation
I: *It was- Australia, Australia is very good to its transgendered people. Because it's-* mostly *if you look at the- at the-* have you heard about the Mardi Gras,
N: *Yes, yes.*
I: *Australia is top* [*topu*, a recent borrowing from English] *on that front,*
N: *Hm.*
I: ( ) *living like that.*
N: *Hm.*
I: *Right?* Lesbian.
N: *Hm.*
I: And also the- ladies and the gay.
N: *Hm.*
I: ( ) understand?
N: *Did you often partake in it?*
I: I only joins but I- *I didn't- I didn't go to that kind of houses* [presumably, gay bars].

N: *Yes.*
I: I just went inside and watch them,
N: *Hm, hm.*
I: *Hm?* But I never do this one.

In short, grammatical competence, concerns for efficiency of expression or the untranslatability of certain terms, and the fear of shaming are of little relevance to my interviewees' code choices. Rather, what is foregrounded in their code choices in interviews with me, as well as in face-to-face interaction with everyone else, is the indexical meaning of English and possibly the indexical meaning of the very act of code-switching (cf. Stroud 1992).

6 The Public Construction of *Leitī* Identity

With Kulick (1999: 615), I consider an analysis based on talk produced in the context of ethnographic interviews both limited and limiting (although not completely devoid of value, as long as the ethnographer places his or her own position under ethnographic scrutiny). What is of interest in the Tongan material is that the patterns of code choice I elicited during ethnographic interviews with my informants echo strikingly patterns of language use in other contexts, and thus are representative of patterns of wide social scope.[6]

Take, for example, public talk in the context of the annual beauty pageants that *leitī* have staged, with increasing aplomb since the early 1990s, in some of the most prominent venues in the country. These events are particularly interesting because, for many Tongans, they represent a context in which *fakaleitī* identity is most clearly elaborated. *Leitī* themselves and their non-*leitī* champions (principally members of a cadre of influential professional women *d'un certain âge*) see the pageant as a prime opportunity to present themselves in the best light and to seek control of their public image, and thus as a subtle but efficacious context for political affirmation. The Miss Galaxy beauty pageant is the most salient of these events, although it is only one of several comparable events held throughout the year. Like other important events in Tonga, the pageant has a high-ranking or otherwise prominent patron, who in recent years has been recruited from within the ranks of the royal family. Half of the jury of six or seven is composed of non-transgendered Tongan dignitaries (e.g. high-ranking army officers, intellectuals, and the winner of the mainstream Miss Heilala pageant for "real" women, which precedes the transgendered pageant), while the other half are "distinguished" Expatriates (i.e. temporary foreign residents of Tonga, such as businessmen, spouses of diplomats, and the occasional visiting anthropologist).

Sponsored by various businesses and organizations (e.g. hotels, hairdressing salons, rugby teams), contestants appear on stage in various costumes, ranging a gamut familiar from South Pacific pageants in general, which includes evening dress, *pule taha* "island wear" (ankle-length skirt and matching short-sleeved top, worn with a tasseled fiber belt), and "their own creations" (see Photograph 1). Each appearance is ostensibly designed to allow contestants to present themselves

as attractive and feminine persons, following familiar patterns of beauty pageants around the world. The core of the pageant consists of several judged events, including an individual talent display, a brief interview (of the what-would-you-do-to-save-the-world? type), and catwalk parades. Interspersed are entertainment routines, which may include a hula performance by the emcee, a rock-and-roll standard sung by a local talent, a dance routine performed by all contestants to a popular Tahitian or disco tune, and a short classical and torch-song concert by non-transgendered performers.

What I designate "extra-locality" pervades the entire atmosphere of the Miss Galaxy pageant. It is a feature of the pageant that organizers and contestants take great pains to elaborate, and that the audience expects of the show, although these expectations are always mitigated by the view that this extra-locality is fraudulent.

The most immediate and spectacular manifestation of extra-locality is the very name of the event. Both funny and poignant, "Miss Galaxy" lays a claim on as ambitiously cosmopolitan an image as can be imagined, and plays on hyperbole in the same fashion as some of the camp aspects of the pageant (e.g. the more extravagant costumes and performances), creating humor while attempting to retain control of this humor. But extra-locality also saturates other aspects of the pageant. For example, one of the events requires contestants to appear in "national" costume as representative of foreign "countries" (e.g. Miss Rarotonga, Miss Switzerland, Miss South America). Similarly, at the organizing stage, candidates provide their age, vital statistics, occupation, and personal aspirations, which one of the organizers enters on bio-data sheets.[7] Clearly, what participants in the pageant aim for in this emulation of international pageant practices is the



Photograph 1: The contestants at the end of the pageant posing around the newly elected Miss Galaxy 1997, the incumbent, and the emcee.

appearance of a glamor whose reference reaches beyond the confines of the local context. The extent to which participants are aware of the inspiration for these practices depends on their relative worldliness. While some *leitī* involved in the programming of the show have had the opportunity to watch televised international pageants, others must rely on second-hand reports of such events, what they can infer about them from watching the mainstream Miss Heilala pageant, and their imagination.

In addition to bearing the names of the countries they represent, Miss Galaxy contestants go by female-sounding stage names of their own choosing, and which they often use in everyday contexts. These stage names are often coinages that bear linguistic similarity to the person's original Tongan name (e.g. "Suzie" from Sosefo), and are either English names (e.g. Priscilla Pressland) or exotic-sounding names with no connotation other than their generic foreignness (e.g. Aisa De Lorenzo, Aodushi Kiroshoto), but never Tongan names. The extra-local flavor also pervades the stage decorations (in 1997, flower arrangements and rather unfortunate bouquets of phallic-shaped multicolored balloons), the background music (for the opening, a medley of triumphalist classical themes such as the William Tell Overture), and the singing and dancing. When events are explicitly designed to add local color (e.g. a *tau'olunga* performance, a popular Tongan tune sung by one of the organizers), they are bracketed entertainment routines designed to fill the time while contestants are getting changed back-stage, and often look like strained token gestures. When a contestant does decide to perform a Tongan dance for a judged event, it is generally a spoof.

Perhaps the most powerful index of extra-locality is language use. Throughout the pageant, the dominant language is English. When contestants first present themselves, for instance, they do so in English:[8]

> Aisa: ((*walks up to the mike*)) Good evening ladies and gentlemen. My name is Aisa De Lorenzo, I'm eighteen years of age, and I represent, ((*pauses, raises arms triumphantly*)) BLUE PACIFIC TAXIS! ((*walks down catwalk*)) (1997: Sony: 2 1:07:36–1:08:20)

Each contestant will have memorized and rehearsed her lines prior to the pageant, and will take utmost care to pronounce them correctly and loudly. This does not prevent occasional slip-ups, which the audience will immediately ridicule boisterously. The important point is that, for most contestants, speaking English before a large and distinguished audience of elite Tongans (many of whom are bilingual) and foreigners represents a serious challenge: many *leitī*, particularly pageant contestants, speak minimal English, as poverty and marginality have barred them from opportunities to learn the language. A significant number have not traveled overseas, and those who have resided in industrial countries have not done so under privileged conditions.

By centralizing the English language and its associations, *leitī* position themselves on the side of prestige and worldliness, and in opposition to the use of Tongan and its localized connotations. But their sociolinguistic behavior, both in and out of the pageant, adds further complexity. Indeed, despite the obvious

difficulties that *leitī* experience in speaking English during the pageant, many Tongans expect them to speak English more readily on a day-to-day basis than non-transgendered Tongan men, for a number of reasons. First, Tongans generally see *fakaleitī* as self-assured and brash creatures that know no shame (*ta'emā*).[9] While in actuality a significant percentage of *leitī* are self-effacing, the demeanor of other *leitī* underscores this stereotype. One illustration of this shamelessness is their very participation in a pageant that constitutes the prime locus of the formation and reinforcement of popular stereotypes of *fakaleitī*: contestants' behavior in the pageant can be moderately outrageous and is certainly viewed as exhibitionistic.

Second, stereotypes of *leitī* view them as oriented toward modernity, the West, transnationalism, and social change. Once again, the extent to which this stereotype reflects reality varies across individuals, but here as well it is certainly founded on undeniable (if partial) evidence. The uncompromisingly extra-local design of the pageant falls right in line with this expectation, both establishing and confirming the stereotypes held by audience members. Viewed in this light, the prominence of English in both public and private contexts is hardly surprising, since English is the language of extra-locality.

Finally, Tongans tend to view the use of English as having feminine undertones: as in many other societies in which a language of modernity competes with a code of traditionalism (e.g. Gal 1979), the former is associated with women's aspirations for upward mobility and emancipation from the strictures of traditionalism (compare Meyerhoff). When questioned on the matter, most Tongan men and women will state that women speak better English overall than men, and that this is due to the fact that girls study harder in school and that women are talkative "by nature." These familiar-sounding assertions bear witness to the fact that the gendering of language use is tacit and embodied in practice, rather than explicit and grounded in overt consciousness.

As a result of this gendering, men who speak "too much" English do so at the risk of compromising their masculinity in the eyes of society at large. This concerns *fakaleitī*, who willingly go to great lengths to dislocate themselves from their masculine attributes. Interestingly, it also concerns overseas-born Tongans: their awkwardness in performing Tongan maleness, including speaking Tongan as a preferred language, frequently brands them as *fakaleitī*-like, regardless of whether they present any identifiable sign of effeminacy in their comportment. The use of English thus has many associations in addition to extra-locality: it potentially indexes deficient Tonganness, deficient masculinity, femininity, and transgendered identity, traits which may or may not overlap but which are all readily equated to one another. Thus failure to perform Tonganness can easily become a sign of imperfect masculinity and vice versa, unless it is mollified by convincing mitigating factors, such as elite status or wealth.[10]

Patterns of language use in the Miss Galaxy pageant, as well as the overall non-local ambience to which they contribute, are not without irony. As discussed earlier, most contestants live in relative poverty. In tune with their under-privileged status, many *leitī* speak English poorly. Sustaining the level of extra-locality expected of them is therefore difficult for many contestants, who switch to Tongan

once they have delivered simple memorized lines. But English still remains dominant in the pageant: it is the language that the emcee uses to address the audience and, when he addresses the contestants, he does so first in English and then provides a Tongan translation, usually *sotto voce.* These communicative practices maintain English in the foreground, at the expense of Tongan.[11]

The difficulty contestants have in maintaining English as their working language during the pageant places them in an awkward position. For example, in the interview event, contestants are given the choice of answering in English or Tongan, and most choose the latter. In 1997, one contestant chose English, and the audience initially reacted with a loud murmur of temporary admiration for her courage. However, it took little time for her to stumble, as she searched for an English word while waving her hand campily, while the audience, satisfied with the expected proof of the fraudulence of her claim to cosmopolitanism, began hooting and ridiculing, forcing her to abort her brave attempt:

Emcee: What would you say about being a hairstylist, or- being- a working- what- what does it mean, like, to be working at Joy's Hair Styles? ((*sotto voce, summarizes the question in Tongan)) Ko e hā e me'a 'oku ke fai 'i he* hair salon?

Masha: ((*takes cordless mike*)) Well thank you very much. ((*audience laughs, then shouts with admiration and encouragement*)) If you want your hair to be curled, ((*beckons with her hand*)) come over. ((*audience explodes in laughter and whooping, Masha laughs and then becomes serious and requests silence with the hand*)) Uh, I like it very much, and uh-I enjoy working there, with uhmm- ((*pauses, word-searches, waves her hand, audience explodes in laughter, drowning the remainder of the answer*)) blowers, ((*unable to finish, mouths*)) (thank you). ((*hands mike back and returns to her position*))

(1997: Sony: 4 0:02:45–0:03:55)

Contestants thus are caught between a rock and a hard place: if they answer in English and make mistakes, they will be laughed at, and if they answer in



Photograph 2: Masha Entura searches for the English word she needs to answer her interview question.

Tongan, this very fact will be ridiculed as evidence that they are unable to carry through the artifice of extra-locality to its logical end. The ridicule that greets the choice of Tongan is congruent with many other aspects of mainstream Tongans' attitudes toward *fakaleitī*, both at the pageant and in day-to-day interactions. Mainstream Tongans indeed consider *fakaleitī* identity as essentially bogus: here are these men pretending to be women, and not just any women but cosmopolitan sophisticates, and yet they cannot even maintain their end of a simple conversation in English. At the pageant, it is not uncommon for drunken men or women to try to rip contestants' outfits and expose them as what they "really" are, namely persons with male physiologies. Nothing generates greater hilarity than contestants losing their bra in the middle of a performance. In day-to-day interactions between *fakaleitī* and mainstream Tongans, the latter often express mock annoyance at the "fraudulence" of *leitī* self-presentation and identity, while *leitī* argue back with "proofs" that they are "real women."

However, like all ideological linkages that disadvantage some and benefit others, the linkages I have described are not immune to contestation on the part of those whom they marginalize. This was powerfully illustrated by a minor humorous incident in the 1997 pageant, when one of the contestants, the quick-witted 'Āmini or Lady Amyland, sponsored by Joey's Unisex Hair Salon, turned the tables on the audience during the interview event (and, perhaps, on society at large, even if only for a fleeting moment). Before she has a chance to answer the emcee's question, Lady Amyland is heckled by a drunken *leitī* in the audience, who urges her to answer her interview question in English (*faka-Pālangi*). The heckling draws some laughter, since everyone knows that Lady Amyland's English is poor and that she would make a fool of herself if she tried. But 'Āmini's repartee wins the prize:

Emcee:	Miss Joey's Unisex Hair Salon! What do you have to say to promote Joey's Unisex Hair Salon? ((*lowers voice, translating into Tongan*)) *Ko e hā e me'a 'oku ke fai ke* promote *ai 'a e- ((rolls eyes, searches for Tongan word)) fakalakalaka ai 'a Joey's Unisex Hair Salon.*
'Ahi:	((*heckling from audience*)) *Faka-Pālangi, 'Āmini!*
Audience:	((*laughter*))
'Āmini:	Sorry excuse me, I'm a Tongan ( ) ((*rest of answer drowned by deafening laughter, vigorous applause, cat-calls*)) (1997: Sony: 4 0:05:42–0:06:26, see Photograph 3)

'Āmini answers the heckler by reaffirming her Tongan identity and therefore her duty and privilege to answer the question in Tongan, an unexpected move which the audience (and any Tongan viewer of the video recording) found extremely humorous, because the claim is embedded in a context in which everything is done to foreground non-locality.[12] What Lady Amyland is doing here is part of a wider tacit project on the part of at least some contestants to take greater charge of the pageant and its effect on the audience. This project consists in stripping the audience (and society at large) of its privilege to ridicule contestants, and to take control of the boundary between humor and seriousness.



Photograph 3: Lady Amyland savors the effect of her quick-minded repartee to a heckler.

But the project goes further, and its meaning becomes clear when viewed in light of the previous analysis. Note that Lady Amyland asserts her claim to Tongan identity not in Tongan, but in English; the covert message is that one can assert one's Tonganness while controlling the tools with which one does so, and while using tools that are not part of the sanctioned repertoire. In addition, the preface of her repartee ("Sorry excuse me") is an inside joke which non-*leitī* audience members are unlikely to make sense of, a reference to another *leitī*'s awkward attempt, a few years earlier, to speak English to a prospective *Pālangi* date. The overall effect of Lady Amyland's repartee contests the power of dominant forces to dictate what counts as markers of locality and what does not; asserts that the claim to be part of the "galaxy" does not necessarily deny one's local identity; and proclaims that being a *leitī* does mean giving up one's place in Tongan society.[13]

7 Conclusion: The Linguistic Constructions of Tongan Transgenderism

This chapter has investigated the linguistic behavior and ideologies of *fakaleitī* and mainstream Tongans, and the relationship of these various behaviors and ideologies in the constructions of identities, stereotypes, and life trajectories. I argued that, in a society that remains essentially monolingual, the presence of English is strongly felt, being associated with contexts where cosmopolitanism, modernity, and capitalism are foregrounded, elements of increasing importance to the very nature of Tongan society. Among the subgroups of Tongan society who are enthusiastic users of English, *fakaleitī* figure prominently, even though

most do not have access to the kind of resources which might justify, in the eyes of greater Tongan society, the implicit claim to prestige status that the choice of English entails: wealth, status in the traditional hierarchy, cosmopolitanism, and grammatical fluency in English.

Fakaleitī code-switch for complex and diverse reasons, and in this respect they do not differ from code-switchers in all other societies of the world. However, one of the most salient, although largely unarticulated, motivations for code-switching that this chapter has explored is the fact that the use of English represents for many *fakaleitī* a symbolic escape hatch out of social marginality (compare Meyerhoff, on women on Malo, Vanuatu). The claims embedded in their use of English and their code-switching serve as an idiom of resistance against the symbolic and material oppression that they experience as both transgendered persons and poor Tongans. However, this strategy is not without risk. Like all resistant action, these claims can be turned around and used against them to further marginalize them. *Leitī*'s language choices place them at risk of being perceived by non-transgendered Tongans as alienating themselves from a local context that offers both unpleasant but also potentially rewarding symbols and resources for everyone. Being generally poor, *leitī* are not in a good position to define for the rest of society what counts as "local," and the perception that they are alienating themselves from a pre-defined localness over which they have little control is potentially disadvantageous.

This chapter has attempted to explore the intersection of gender, modernity, and locality by focusing on the differences and conflicts in the subjectivities of members of one society. Reading dominant characterizations of modernity from sociology and cultural studies (e.g. Featherstone, Lash, and Robertson 1995; Jameson and Miyoshi 1998), we are led to expect that Tongans would experience tokens of modernity and globalization, for example, in a kind of Durkheimian (solidarity-enhancing) unison. What I have shown here is that they not only differ from one another in the way they experience these tokens and in what they do with them, but they also actively challenge each other's experiences of these tokens. Furthermore, they enlist these experiences to argue over the meaning of seemingly highly localized categories and dynamics, including gender.

In this chapter, in line with a substantial body of recent research, I have explored the potentially heterogeneous nature of gender as a social category, and have sought to unravel this heterogeneity in terms of the varied positions that members of the "same" gender can take *vis-à-vis* modernity and localness. I have also sought to distinguish between different meanings of modernity, from material to ideational manifestations of it. Finally, I have investigated the complex interplay of modernity with locality. The chapter has explored the role of language in creating and indexing these social and cultural dynamics. The discourse- and ethnography-based analysis I have developed here illustrates the complex role that categories other than gender play in defining gender. It also shows that the meaning and valuation of such categories as gender, modernity, and localness are objects of conflict and contradiction, both across subgroups of society and across contexts

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Notes

1. The fact that, in Tonga as in many other parts of the Pacific, English is the language of choice when one is drunk lends further support to this analysis (compare Harvey 1991 on the role of Spanish in Quechua drunken conversation).
2. Tongan has a notable system of honorifics ("speech levels"), centered principally on the lexicon: certain words are used solely when addressing or speaking of members of the nobility or the royal family other than the sovereign, and others when addressing or speaking of the sovereign or God. These register variations are the subject of ideological elaboration, but in practice they concern a very restricted range of linguistic structures and their use is very flexible (Philips 1991). They are of no significant relevance to the materials presented here.
3. One interviewee, who belongs to a small Charismatic Christian sect, explicitly linked her "liberated" stance to the fact that she had accepted Jesus into her heart, which enables her to ignore tradition-based gossip and shaming. Because they reject the (often oppressive) structuring of mainstream Christian denominations, Charismatic Christians place themselves on the margin of a society where church-mediated and church-directed exchange is so determinative of social life. This is also true, to a lesser extent, of Mormons (Gordon 1990) and other people who have somehow extricated themselves from the duties of reciprocity and exchange, often at a cost to their social standing.
4. There is a substantial and evergrowing corpus of borrowings from English in the contemporary Tongan lexicon, many of which have been phonologically nativized (Schütz 1970). Some words were borrowed early in the history of contact (e.g. *taimi* "time", *siasi* "church"), and have lost all connotations of foreignness. More recent borrowings, while highly integrated in everyday linguistic usage, continue to subtly index the connotations of English as a medium of communication, as evidenced, for example, by cases where both a borrowing and a word of Polynesian origin have roughly the same meaning (e.g. *kiti* and *leka* "kid"). The borrowing of *"leitā"* probably dates back to the early decades of the twentieth century (Futa Helu, personal communication).
5. In the orthography in general use for Tongan, an apostrophe represents a glottal stop, a macron superscripted to a vowel represents gemination, and an acute accent above a word-final vowel indicates that stress shifts from the penultimate to the accented vowel to denote the definiteness and specificity of the noun phrase ending with the

6. Don Kulick extends his criticism to analyses that focus primarily on talk produced in other "on-stage" circumstances, for example, for media dissemination, or during performances of various kinds. The point is well taken, and falls in line with a long tradition in linguistic anthropology of emphasizing the importance of seeking an understanding of social dynamics by focusing on day-to-day interaction. However, one should also not forget that "public" discourse may also act as an important medium through which identities are created and negotiated, representations constructed and challenged.
7. Some of the information provided is fake or unrealistic, while other details are designed to be humorous. For example, contestants regularly claim "high-status" feminine occupations such as "nurse" and "public relations" (*sic*) to add glamor to their profile, as well as "future plans" to be "computer operator," "flying attendant" (*sic*), and "to be a good wife." The same practice of emulating international beauty contests is found in the pageants that transgendered persons stage in Jolo, Southern Philippines (Johnson 1997) and in urban South Africa (Reid 1999), both of which exhibit fascinating similarities to the Tongan material.
8. In the following discussion, I have not attempted to hide the identity of those concerned since my analysis is based on a public event. Extracts are identified by year of recording and video reference number.
9. A Tongan businessman told me that he had employed a *fakaleitī* to sell his products door-to-door precisely because *fakaleitī* worry little about shame, in addition to being gregarious and talkative. These traits are thus not necessarily seen as negative assets.
10. Many of the symbolic associations I describe here of course echo patterns found in many other societies. One is reminded of Willis's (1977) celebrated analysis of working-class masculinity among adolescents in English schools, Bourdieu's (1985) analysis of social class and "refinement" in France, particularly as it relates to gender, and Ortner's (1991) study of social class and gender in New Jersey, among many other relevant examples.
11. English, as with other tokens of modernity and cosmopolitanism, also occupies a prominent role in many other public events in Tonga, including the Miss Heilala beauty pageant for "real" women. However, in other events, these tokens are commonly on a par with Tongan and tokens of "Tonganness." In the Miss Heilala pageant, for example, the contestants' ability to perform tokens of Tonganness, including their linguistic skills, are scrutinized very closely. This scrutiny frequently places overseas-born contestants at a disadvantage, as discussed in Teilhet-Fisk (1996) and Besnier (2002).
12. The humor already began with the heckle itself, which is uttered in Tongan, despite the fact it urges the contestant to speak English, and which refers to the contestant by his everyday name, rather than her transgendered name.
13. I do not wish to imply that Lady Amyland's act of resistance was the result of a carefully engineered strategy on her part. For one thing, she was probably drunk, as many contestants are. However, we know from Scott (1985, 1990) that everyday acts of resistance need not be the outcome of calculated designs.

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5

The Power and Politics of Genre

Vijay K. Bhatia

Introduction

All discourse forms, especially those used in institutionalized contexts, are socially negotiated. At the very heart of most frameworks for the analysis of discourse, especially as genre, is the belief that there is nothing like a universal form of discourse for structuring knowledge. There can only be a 'consensus or an agreement' (Bruffee, 1986: 777) among the members of specific disciplinary communities to express their concerns in specific discursive forms. Most institutionalized forms of discourse, therefore, are socially constructed, interpreted and used. Goodrich (1987) explains this institutionalization of discoursal practices in terms of 'social authorship' as against the more familiar subjective authorship.

> The right to a discourse is organized and restricted by a wide variety of means, to particular roles, statuses, professions and so on. Similarly the institutionalisation of discourse is limited in terms of its legitimate appropriation, and the restrictive situations of its reception – church, court, school, hustings and so on.

Foucault (1981) also sees *social authorship* of discourse in terms of two interrelated aspects. The first one, according to him, is:

> Who is speaking? Whom among the totality of speaking individuals, is accorded the right to use this sort of language? Who is qualified to do so? Who derives from it his own special quality, his prestige, and from whom, in return, does he receive if not the assurance, at least the presumption

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> that what he says is true? What is the status of the individual who – alone – have the right, sanctioned by law or tradition, juridically defined or spontaneously accepted, to proffer such a discourse?

The second, he explains in terms of institutional sites from which the authorized speaker makes his discourse and from which the discourse derives its 'legitimate source and point of application.'

Pêcheux (1982) also stresses the importance of institutional forms in discourse when he says

> what can be and should be said – in the form of a speech, a sermon, a pamphlet, a report, a programme, etc.

Like other forms of discourse, genres are also socially constructed and are even more intimately controlled by social practices. Genres are the media through which members of professional or academic communities communicate with each other. They are, as Berkenkotter and Huckin (1995) point out,

> . . . intimately linked to a discipline's methodology, and they package information in ways that conform to a discipline's norms, values and ideology.

Myers (1995: 5) also points out,

> Disciplines are like cultures in that their members have shared, taken for granted beliefs; these beliefs can be mutually incomprehensible between cultures; these beliefs are encoded in a language; they are embodied in practices; new members are brought into culture through rituals.

The consensus is arrived at and negotiated through professional conversations and practices amongst the informed and practising members of a professional community. Interactions and conversations enable consensus, on the one hand, and have a regulatory or limiting effect on the other, as to what should or should not be admitted into a community's body of knowledge. Genres, in other words, are socially authorized through conventions, which, in turn, are embedded in the discursive practices of members of specific disciplinary cultures. These discursive practices, to a large extent, reflect not only conventions used by specific disciplinary communities, but also social conventions, including social changes, social institutions and social knowledge, all of which, in a way, could be seen as significantly contributing to what in genre theory is regarded as 'genre knowledge.' Genres, in whatever manner one may identify them, whether as *a typification of rhetorical action* (as in Miller (1984), and more recently, Berkenkotter and Huckin (1995)), as *a staged, goal oriented social process* (as in Martin (1993)), or as *shared communicative purposes* (as in Swales (1990) and Bhatia (1993)), are products of an understanding or a prior knowledge of generic conventions. These generic conventions are responsible for regulating generic constructs, giving them internal

ordering, which in discourse literature, for various reasons, has been given different names, some of which include discourse structuring, staging of discourse and generic structure potential (GSP).

Complexity of Generic Forms

Although generic forms are products of conventional knowledge embedded in disciplinary cultures, they are dynamic constructs. Typical realizations of these institutionalized forms are often characterized by their generic integrity, on the one hand, and their propensity for innovation, on the other (see Bhatia, 1993, 1995). These two aspects of genre may appear to be somewhat contradictory at first, but as we shall soon discover, these two characteristics are complementary to each other. In fact, it will not be inaccurate to suggest that one is, in a way, an essential prerequisite to the other. Generic integrity is the product of the conventional features of a specific generic construct. Although these conventions are embedded in the rhetorical context, they often constrain the use of linguistic resources (lexico-grammatical as well as discoursal), and are frequently invoked to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the genre or even determine the choice of the genre to suit a particular context. Within generic boundaries, experienced users of genre often manage to exercise considerable freedom to manipulate generic conventions to respond to novel situations, to mix what Bhatia (1993) calls 'private intentions' with socially recognized communicative purposes, and even to produce new forms of discourse. Therefore the tension between conformity and creativity, so often made an issue of in applied discourse studies, is not necessarily real. As Dubrow (1982: 39) points out, 'a concern for generic traditions, far from precluding originality, often helps to produce it.' Similarly, Fowler (1982: 31) points out:

> Far from inhibiting the author, genres are a positive support. They offer room, as one might say, for him to write in – a habitation of mediated definiteness, a proportioned mental space; a literary matrix by to order his experience during composition . . . The writer is invited to match experience and form in a specific yet undetermined way. Accepting the invitation does not solve his problems of expression . . . But it gives him access to formal ideas as to how a variety of constituents might suitably be combined. Genre also offers a challenge by provoking a free spirit to transcend the limitations of previous examples.

In fact, a subtle exploitation of a certain aspect of generic construct is always seen as tactically superior and effective. It is almost like the advertiser's exploitation of the cliché *the shape of things to come* in the following opening headline of an advertisement for a car.

> The shape of things to come: Mitsubishi Cordia

Or, the use of the famous statement about the British colonial empire in the Lufthansa advertisement, *The sun never sets on Lufthansa territory* or in the following slogan for an

idea of waste of energy is lost unless it is associated with 'Don't be foolish.' The whole point about such associations is that they communicate best in the context of what is already familiar. In such contexts, words on their own carry no meanings; it is the experience which gives them the desired effect. Therefore, if one is not familiar with the original, the value of the novel expression is undermined. Just as the advertiser makes use of the well-known and the familiar in existing knowledge, a clever genre writer makes use of what is conventionally available to a discourse community to further his or her own subtle ends. The innovation, the creativity or the exploitation becomes effective only in the context of the already available and familiar. The main focus of this paper is on these two interrelated aspects of genre theory, i.e., the constraints on generic construction, a preknowledge of which gives power to insiders in specific discourse communities, and the exploitation of this power by experienced and expert members of such disciplinary cultures to achieve their 'private intentions' within 'socially recognized communicative purposes.'

Organizational Preferences and Generic Controls

The other interesting area of generic variation, although within a restricted range, one finds in organizational preferences. In the case of academic publications, we often come across what we commonly refer to as housestyles. Although every single journal claims to have its own style sheet, most of them can be characterized more by their overlap rather than variation.

Similarly, in the case of newspaper genres, especially the news reports and the editorials, we find an unmistakable 'generic identity' (Bhatia, 1993) in almost all of the exploits of these genres from various newspapers, although all of them have their own preferences in terms of style, stance and substance. Some may be more objective, while others more interpretative; some more socially responsible, while others more sensational. In spite of all these differences, most of them display common characteristics in terms of their use of generic resources, in terms of their structure, interpretation and communication of intentions. These somewhat different orientations to the events of the day do not make their stories very different in terms of their generic form.

Even in the case of business communities, we often find different organizations displaying their unique identities through their organizational preferences in the matters of their choice of generic forms, but the broad range of genres they tend to exploit to further their organizational objectives show remarkable similarities rather than differences. All these areas of generic use indicate that although their preferred generic forms show a subtle degree of variation for what could be seen as 'tactical advantage,' they never disregard some of the basic features of individual generic constructs, which give these genres their essential identities.

The Power of Genre

There is no better illustration of the saying 'knowledge is power' than the one in the case of generic power. Power to use, interpret, exploit and innovate novel

generic forms is the function of generic knowledge which is accessible only to the members of disciplinary communities.

How do these disciplinary communities maintain what we have called generic integrity in their discursive practices? Let us look at this phenomenon by looking at the academic community.

Maintaining Generic Integrity: Editorial Intervention

In some forms of academic discourse, especially the research articles, one can see generally two kinds of mechanism in place to ensure generic integrity: the peer review process, and editorial intervention. Both these mechanisms, though operating at different levels, are actively invoked to ensure that all accounts of new knowledge conform to the standards of institutionalized behaviour that is expected by a community of established peers in a specific discipline. Although individual judgements can vary within the membership of specific disciplinary communities, a high degree of consensus is often ensured by selecting like-minded scholars from within well-defined disciplinary boundaries. For example, if we survey a few journals which regularly publish articles on discourse analysis, we will find that although all of them publish articles on various aspects of discourse, they have a very different set of reviewers to certify accounts of knowledge claims for inclusion in the respective journals. If one encounters names like Cazden, Geertz, Goffman, Gumperz, Hymes, Milroy, Saville-Troike, Scollon, Tannen, and Zimmerman on the editorial committee of a journal, one could safely guess that they will be unlikely to accept articles outside a sociolinguistic orientation on discourse. Articles on other aspects of discourse are more likely to be discouraged and even rejected. If, on the other hand, one finds names like Ackerman, Bazerman, Berkenkotter, Comprone, Doheny-Farina, Huckin, Linda Flower, Miller, or Odell, one would expect them to welcome papers with a strong rhetorical orientation. Similarly, if one finds names like Carter, Christie, Halliday, Hasan, Kress, Martin and Rothery, one will come to the inevitable conclusion that the journal will favour a more systemic orientation to discourse.

After peer review, the second most important intervention comes from the editors, who enjoy all the power one can imagine to maintain the identity and integrity of the research article genre. Berkenkotter and Huckin (1995) document an in-depth and fascinating study of this kind of editorial control to maintain generic integrity. They point out that for the construction and dissemination of knowledge 'textual activity' is as important as the 'scientific activity.'

Generic Conventions as Authority: The Case of Citations and References

To us academics, the power of genre is nowhere better illustrated than in the publication of research articles. Swales in his research report *Aspects of Research Article Introductions* (1981) was the first one to point out the importance of the description of previous research on the rhetorical activity of knowledge dissemination as distinct from knowledge creation. In order to become acceptable to

the specialist community of fellow researchers, one must relate his or her knowledge claims to the accumulated knowledge of the discipline, without which his or her claims in the field are unlikely to find recognition through publication. In this context it is hardly surprising that literature review occupies an important place in the researcher's repertoire of skills in most academic disciplines. Referring to the importance of citation in scientific research activity, Amserdamska and Leydesdorff (1989: 451) point out,

> In a scientific article 'the new encounters the old' for the first time. This encounter has a double significance since articles not only justify the new by showing that the result is warranted by experiment or observation or previous theory, but also place and integrate innovations into the context of 'old' and accepted knowledge . . . References which appear in the text are the most explicit manner in which the arguments presented in the article are portrayed as linked to other texts, and thus also to particular body of knowledge.

Power to Innovate (Mixing and Embedding)

Although this pressure for the 'democratisation' (Fairclough, 1992) of discourse is becoming increasingly intense in some countries, especially in the USA, it is unlikely to make a significant dent in the so-called integrity of professional genres, at least not in the foreseeable future. However, one can see an increasing 'fragmentation of discursive norms and conventions' (Fairclough, 1992: 221), often leading to genre-mixing and embedding in institutionalized orders of discourse (see Bhatia, 1994, for a detailed discussion of this), on the one hand, and creation of new genres, on the other. To a large extent, these changes in discursive practices are making professional genres increasingly dynamic and complex.

The dynamic complexity of academic and professional communication is further increased by the role of multimedia, the explosion of information technology, the multi-disciplinary contexts of the world of work, the increasingly competitive professional environment, and above all, the overwhelmingly compulsive nature of promotional and advertising activities, so much so that our present-day world of work is being increasingly identified as a 'consumer culture' (Featherstone, 1991). The inevitable result of this is that many of the institutionalized genres, whether they are social, professional or academic, are seen as incorporating elements of promotion. Fairclough (1992: 207) rightly associates some of these changes with what he calls 'commodification' of institutional orders of discourse. Referring to such changes in discourse practices, he (1993: 141) points out,

> . . . there is an extensive restructuring of boundaries between orders of discourse and between discursive practices, for example, the genre of consumer advertising has been colonising professional and public service orders of discourse on a massive scale, generating many new hybrid [illegible]promotional genres . . .

As an instance of such a hybrid genre, Fairclough (1993) discusses the case of contemporary university prospectuses, where he highlights an increasing tendency towards marketization of the discursive practices of British universities. Bhatia (1995), in his discussion of genre-mixing in professional discourse, gives examples from several settings, where genre-mixing and embedding is becoming increasingly common. He also mentions several instances where one may find an increasing use of promotional strategies in genres which are traditionally considered non-promotional in intent, especially academic introductions, including book introductions, forewords, prefaces of various kinds, which are becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish from publishers' blurbs.

Shared Knowledge – Privileged Access/Insider Information

If generic conventions, on the one hand, give suitable expression to the communicative intentions of genre writers (who are members of a particular discourse community), on the other hand, they also match their intentions against their intended reader's expectations. This is possible only when all the participants share, not only the code, but also the knowledge of the genre, which includes the knowledge of its construction, interpretation and use. A necessary implication of this shared genre knowledge is that it is not routinely available to the outsiders, which creates a kind of social distance between the legitimate members of a discourse community and those who are considered outsiders. Although this creates conditions of homogeneity between the insiders, at the same time it also increases social distance between them and the outsiders, sometimes resulting in disastrous consequences for the one who does not have access to such shared knowledge. This shared knowledge could be in the form of linguistic resources used to construct a generic form, or it could be in the awareness of the rules of language use, some of which are socially learnt, as the ones associated with classroom discourse and academic genres, while other scan be legally enforced, such as the ones associated with courtroom procedures. Allen and Guy (1989), based on a personal communication from Worthington (1984: personal communication), report an excellent example of the lack of shared knowledge from the account of the courtroom interaction.

> An off-duty policeman in a store had shot and killed an intruder. Investigation had shown a set of burglar tools at the back of the store. The prosecutor was trying to show that there was no ground for presuming criminal intent, and that this was cold-blooded murder. The victim's wife was testifying for the prosecution. Here she is being cross-examined by the defense.
>
> Defense Lawyer: Could you tell the court and the jury **what your husband's** occupation was?
> *Wife:* He was a burglar.
>
> This supported the defense's contention of criminal intent, and secured acquittal for the policeman.

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> Defense Lawyer: Could you tell the court and the jury what your husband's occupation was?
> Wife: He was a burglar.
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If only the wife had been slightly more familiar with the conventions of the courtroom examination, the task of the defence lawyer would not have become that easy.

Another example of the use of insider information to get access to information can be illustrated by the following headline from an advertisement for 'The Schroder Singapore Trust,' which reads,

> The Schroder Singapore Trust Has Grown Over 60% In 3 Years

The information being given here can be extremely misleading, except to those who are well aware of the discursive practices of the professional community of financial managers. Anybody trying to make sense of this statement should know that this 60 percent growth in three years on its face value could be misleading, to say the least. Although it carries the usual statutory disclaimer in the form of a note in small print saying, 'Past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance, the price of units may fall as well as rise and cannot be guaranteed,' a lay person might still be led to think that his investment will probably get him close to a 60 percent return. The fact, on the other hand, could be that the unit value might have declined by 100 percent in the last one year or so, and may still be showing the downward trend at the time of the advertisement. There could be several other possible scenarios which will be accessible only to those with the inside knowledge of the way these genres function rather than to outsiders.

Maintaining Solidarity within a Professional Community

One of the most noticeable characteristics of any professional or academic discourse community is the availability and typical use of a range of appropriate genres, which their members think serve the goals of their community. The recurrent use of such discoursal forms create solidarity within its membership giving them their most powerful weapon to keep the outsiders at a safe distance. Hudson (1979: 1) rightly claims,

> If one wished to kill a profession, to remove its cohesion and its strength, the most effective way would be to forbid the use of its characteristic language.

In this context, it is hardly surprising that most of the attempts by the powerful reformist lobbies in many Western democracies to introduce plain English in legislative contexts are seen as imposition from outside and have been firmly rejected by the professional legal community.

The main purpose of legislation, as Bhatia (1993) points out, is to govern the behaviour of individuals and institutions in society through the use of rules and regulations. In order to keep control firmly in the hands of the legislature rather than the judiciary in a parliamentary democracy, statutory acts are written not only clearly, precisely and unambiguously but all-inclusively too. This rigour and

adequate specification of scope in legislation helps the legislature to control a totally subjective and idiosyncratic interpretation of the statute book.

All attempts to reform legislative language, including those by the plain English campaign (see Thomas, 1985; Eagleson, 1988; Kelly, 1988), have to a large extent met with very limited success, for the simple reason that they are seen as a transgression of the generic integrity of the whole tradition in the legislative process. Although the plain English movement has been quite effective in influencing the redrafting of general commercial and administrative documents, including insurance policies, residential leases, tax return forms, social benefit claim forms and other papers for better *accessibility* and *usability* by a larger section of society, when it comes to legislative provisions, it has not been able to soften the attitude of the parliamentary draftsmen significantly in many of the Commonwealth countries. The other argument for the preservation of these generic characteristics of legislative discourse is that the real legislative power in all parliamentary democracies must rest with the legislature and not with the judiciary. This is one of the most important reasons why clarity, precision, unambiguity and all-inclusiveness are so highly prized in British legislative discourse, which gives a relatively high degree of transparency to legislative intentions.

Power and Control in Legislative Context

Writing legislative discourse in terms of simple principles without adequate specification of the required scope, on the other hand, means giving wider powers to the judges and the courts to interpret the intentions of the legislature, which is not considered highly desirable in parliamentary democracies.

We find an excellent illustration of this point in the Basic Law drafted by the People's Republic of China. It is meant to be a mini-constitution for post-1997 Hong Kong based on the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1978. It is written in the form of very simple principles and guidelines, a generic form, which can be seen as almost exactly the opposite of what we find in a typical legislative discourse from any of the countries of the Commonwealth. It is written in the form of basic principles on which there can hardly be any disagreement, lacking very significantly in details of all kinds. One of the important issues raised there is that of status of the laws previously in force in Hong Kong. Article 8 of the Basic Law states,

> The laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law shall be maintained, except for any that contravene this law, and subject to any amendment by the legislature of the Hong Kong special Administrative Region.

As one may see, like the other Articles of the Basic Law, this one too is expressed in terms of somewhat universal principles which are applicable to everything one could think of in the context of pre-existing legislative machinery. One may

be tempted to point out that there should be no serious problem in expressing legislation in terms of general principles. There are several legal systems which adopt such a strategy. The French legislative system is a good example of this. However, problems have occurred in this context, primarily because the transition of power has still some way to go. A number of issues are still unresolved and to make it worse, all this is happening in the context where two very different systems are in operation, the most elaborate and exhaustive legislative style used in the UK and their extremely diluted plain English versions captured in the Basic Law. Every time a new ordinance is considered or promulgated in Hong Kong, it becomes a matter of fresh negotiation between the two governments.

Obviously, this generic form of writing gives maximum power to the one who has the authority to interpret it. Since the Basic Law is meant to take effect only after July 1, 1997, after the territory is handed over to China, the eventual control over its interpretation will be concentrated in the hands of the future SAR government of the PRC. However, in the intervening period leading up to the hand-over, the interpretations of many of its sections have been disputed by both sides, for the simple reason that the genre in which it is written allows maximum power to interpret it to those who have the power to do it, which for the time being is shared by the two parties.

The power and politics of genre are the two sides of the same coin. In one context, it can be seen as a legitimate force often used to maintain solidarity within a disciplinary community, whereas on the other hand, it is used to keep outsiders at a respectable distance. On the one hand, it empowers some people. the insiders, while at the same time, it tends to silence others, especially the outsiders. That is what I meant by the power and politics of genre. We have seen the power of genre, let's turn to its politics now.

The Politics of Genre

Exploitation, Innovation and Manipulation of Generic Conventions

I have tried to present genre as a dynamic and clarificatory rather than a static or classificatory construct. I have also tried to maintain that it has a propensity for innovation, exploitation and manipulation. I would now like to take this argument further to discuss the nature of this exploitation or manipulation and constraints on such exploitation.

Genres are dynamic constructs, even though they are essentially seen as embedded in conventions associated with typical instances of language use in social, academic or professional settings. An understanding or a prior knowledge of conventions is considered essential for its identification, construction, interpretation, use and ultimate exploitation by members of specific professional communities to achieve socially recognized goals with some degree of pragmatic success.

The nature of genre manipulation is invariably realized within the broad limits of specific genres and is often very subtle. This can only be handled within the concept of genre because such liberties, innovations, creativities. exploit- [illegible] choose to call them, are invariably realized within

rather than outside the generic boundaries, whichever way one may draw them, in terms of recurrence of rhetorical situations (Miller, 1984), consistency of communicative purposes (Swales, 1990), existence and arrangement of obligatory structured elements (Halliday and Hasan, 1985) or a combination of these (Bhatia, 1993). The moment it becomes a free-for-all kind of activity, communication itself will become more of a problem. The reason is that the flouting of generic conventions leads to the opting out of the genre altogether and is noticed by the members of the concerned disciplinary community as being odd. Any attempt, therefore, to overlook, ignore or undermine the power of conventions at this stage can result in disastrous consequences.

Although a good understanding of genre knowledge is a prerequisite to any manipulation of generic resources, it is by no means sufficient to get such innovations and exploitations accepted in a disciplinary community. Kress (1987: 42) mentions two significant ways in which generic innovations are accepted, either they are backed by a stable social occasion or by authority.

> Unless . . . there is a change in the social structures – and in the kinds of social occasions in which texts are produced – the new generic forms are unlikely to succeed. That is why childish innovations fail; not because they do not constitute perfectly plausible solutions to particular textual/cognitive problems, but because they are supported neither by a stable social occasion, nor by 'authority.' This latter is of course the case where a writer of 'authority' creates a new generic form, which, seemingly because of the writer's authority alone, succeeds in establishing a new generic convention.

Gate-keeping Function of Discourse Communities

Berkenkotter and Huckin (1995: 102) in their study of gate-keeping at an academic convention, i.e., the study of abstracts submitted for the Conference on College Composition and Communication (CCCC), discuss an interesting instance of the power of generic control in well-defined contexts. On the basis of their analysis of the process of selection of papers for the CCCC convention, they claim that,

1. The high-rated abstracts all addressed topics of current *interest to active, experienced members of the rhetoric and composition community*; the low-rated abstracts often did not.
2. Almost all of the high-rated abstracts *clearly defined a problem*; the low-rated abstracts often did not.
3. The high-rated abstracts all *discussed this problem in a way that would be seen by experienced insiders as novel and therefore interesting*, whereas virtually none of the low-rated abstracts did.
4. The high-rated abstracts usually *projected more of an insider ethos* through the use of terminology, special topoi, and/or explicit or implicit references to the scholarly literature of the field than did the low-rated abstracts. [Emphasis added.]

They also point out that often 'the genre was shaped significantly by the interests of the program chair.' This is generally done through the theme statement issued when papers are invited for the convention. Depending upon the interests of the program chair or of the discourse community he/she represents, the emphasis can shift from one year to the other. Based on their study of CCCC abstracts for four years between 1988–92, they find two main levels of gate-keeping (1995: 115):

> (a) the external reviewers and (b) the program chair. We have observed many cases where the reviewers rated an abstract Excellent and yet it was not included in the program. Presumably, the chair disagreed with the reviewers' judgements. . . . In short, each convention bears the stamp of its principal gatekeeper.

They further point out that (1995: 115),

> In one particularly unfortunate case, a very interesting abstract was submitted to the Technical Communication area one year, where it received an Excellent rating from a reviewer and the program chair but was not included in the program (presumably because of a bad 'fit'). It was revised slightly and resubmitted the following year to the Discourse Analysis area. Again it received an Excellent rating, but again it was not included in the program. The author of this abstract probably never knew that she had written an outstanding abstract. All she would have been told was that her paper had been rejected for the program.

Another interesting case of such a gate-keeping encounter, though of a slightly different nature, between two different discourse groups was recently referred to by William Bright (1996). Giving his view of 30 years of American linguistics, he referred to the following extract from a letter written by Chomsky,

> . . . the level of rumour-mongering and of personal hostility . . . outright falsification so scandalous that they raise serious questions about the integrity of the field . . . I do not want to be associated with a journal . . . . which publishes flat lies . . . couched in rhetoric of a sort that might be appropriate to some criminal, but that one is surprised to find in a scholarly journal.

No wonder Chomsky never published in the journal, not because he was kept out but he decided to keep himself out. Gate-keeping can obviously work both ways.

Hegemony and World Englishes – Generic Variation and Control

Another important aspect of generic control raises the issue of hegemonic attitude to maintain generic standards, which in much of contemporary discourse and genre studies are dominated and even determined by essentially Western [illegible] dominant and widely

used global language for academic as well as professional purposes, it is no longer the sole property of any one community of people, be they English, American, Australian or any other. Like cricket, English has also become more universal not only in usage but also in its character. True to the reality of present-day variation in English, one needs to think in terms of world Englishes, rather than English as a single monolithic variety of English (for a detailed discussion and references see Kachru, 1986, 1994 and 1996). This variation in the use of English across the globe is getting increasing recognition in the sociolinguistic literature in the last decade or so; however, in some of the genres, especially used in the academia, the power to control and maintain generic standards can be, and often is, interpreted in terms of the dominant community, which undoubtedly happens to be a Western community. Anything which appears to be different from the norms set by the dominant community is viewed as deficient and in need of correction.

In some areas, genre writers have become increasingly sensitive to local knowledge and have started constructing, interpreting and using genres in forms which display such sensitivities, especially in the case of advertising and some other business genres, where it has become an established practice now to develop local teams to act alongside the expatriates in most of the multinational advertising companies. The reason for such sensitivities is also not difficult to understand. In the case of academic genres, especially in research publications, the politics is still controlled by those who have the power. Much of the academic discourse still fails to acknowledge the sources of variations, especially those of marginality and excluaion, giving the impression that there is, or should be, no variation in the way genres are constructed, interpreted and used.

Implications for Language Teaching and Learning

What are the implications of all this for language teaching? Applied genre analysis, unlike many other analytical frameworks, is neither static nor prescriptive. Potentially, it is dynamic and explanatory. It is for the language teacher to use it the way one would like to use it, for innovative exploitation of generic resources or for a limited exposure to standardized generic contexts. Although it is essential for the learner to be familiar with specific generic conventions associated with a particular professional setting, it is neither necessary nor desirable to restrict the experience of linguistic behaviour to just the conventionalized and standardized aspects of genre construction and use.

How can one bring in creativity in genre-based language teaching and learning? Since genre analysis gives a grounded description of linguistic behaviour in professional settings, it is possible to bring in a fair amount of creativity in language teaching by adjusting communicative purposes, the nature of participation in a particular communicative setting, the social and professional relationship between the participants taking part in a particular genre-construction exercise, and above all, by bringing in variability in the use of generic strategies to achieve the same communicative purposes.

There are two schools of thought, I should say. Those who believe in the explicit teaching of genres, especially the regularities of textual form and typifications, and others who see this as too constraining and advocate free expression. The truth, however, rests somewhere in the middle. All genres, primary as well as secondary, involve regularities and, hence, these regularities must be learnt by anyone who has even the slightest ambition of being part of any specialist disciplinary community. As Bakhtin (1986: 80) points out 'genres must be fully mastered to be used creatively.'

However, in order to make this happen, the first prerequisite is to have an awareness of the conventional knowledge that is situated within a specific disciplinary genre or a 'system of genres.'

Bazerman (1993: viii) attempts to resolve this tension between institutionalized expression and individual expression when he points out,

> . . . the individual learns to express the self against the compulsive society . . . We are not ourselves because we set ourselves apart from each other. We become ourselves as we realize ourselves in relation to each other. The social is everything we do with each other and what we become as we do it. We individuate by identifying ourselves on a social landscape, a landscape come to know as we interact with it. We discover and create ourselves and others by what we do with each other.

There are at least three things which stand out clearly from the foregoing discussion. First, language learners need to become aware of the conversations of the disciplinary community to which they aspire to be members of, which could be done through 'centripetal participation in the learning curriculum of the ambient community' (Lave and Wenger, 1991: 100). Second, acquisition of genre knowledge, which leads to an understanding of generic integrity, is necessary but not sufficient for any subsequent exploitation or manipulation of generic conventions. And, finally, genre knowledge should be best viewed as a resource to exploit generic conventions to respond to recurrent and not so recurrent rhetorical situations, rather than a blueprint for replication.

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6

On the Complexity of Discourse Complexity: A Multidimensional Analysis

Douglas Biber

1. Introduction

There has been considerable interest within linguistics, psychology, and education concerning the linguistic characterization of discourse complexity. Although most of this research takes a comprehension perspective, addressing the question of what linguistic characteristics of a text make it more or less understandable or readable, there are also two major production perspectives on this issue: complexity differences in the language produced by different social groups, and complexity differences in the language produced in different situations. The present article focuses on the analysis of linguistic complexity across situations of use.

Much research on text comprehensibility has been motivated by an applied interest in the linguistic factors influencing the readability of a text (see e.g., Klare, 1984, for on overview), whereas other processing research has been theoretically motivated, analyzing the influence of more-or-less derivationally complex linguistic structures on performance. These two perspectives are combined in the recent collection of papers edited by Davison and Green (1988). Readability research has long recognized that lexical and structural factors make separate contributions to the overall complexity of a text; the recent papers by Frazier (1988) and Smith (1988) futher claim that there are different kinds of structural complexity involved in the syntactic processing of sentences.

Variation in discourse complexity across social groups is often assoctaied with the proposals of Bernstein (1962, 1970), who posited the existence of two competing "codes" – "restricted" and "elaborated" – and attempted to characterize the discourse of different social groups with respect to these codes (cf. the critique

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by Dittmar, 1976). Studies analyzing the linguistic complexity of texts produced by different social groups have considered both structural and lexical features. For example, Poole (1973, p. 98) considers 19 "indices of code elaboration," including "indices of structural complexity" (such as the frequencies of subordinate clauses and relative clauses), "indices of language elaboration and modification" (such as the frequencies of total adjectives and adverbs), and "indices of verb complexity" (such as the frequency of passive verbs and preverb length). Van den Broeck (1977) focuses on five measures of complexity: mean length of T-unit (i.e., a main clause and all associated dependent clauses), a subordination index, a multiple embedding index, a passivization index, and the ratio of agentless passives to *by*-passives. Findings have not been consistent in this research area, and further research is required to investigate the kinds and degree of complexity differences across social groups.

The present article, however, approaches discourse complexity from the perspective of differences across situational varieties, or "registers," rather than taking a social or psycholinguistic perspective. This perspective adopts a product (rather than process) approach, focusing on the linguistic characteristics of texts produced under differing situational constraints and purposes. For example, many studies have claimed that written texts are more structurally complex than spoken texts because authors have more time for production in typical writing situations than speakers in typical speaking situations. Similarly, studies have claimed that speakers with informational purposes will produce more complex texts than speakers with personal purposes.

Although most studies focusing on speech and writing have reached the overall conclusions that writing is more complex, elaborated, and explicit than speech (e.g., DeVito, 1967; O'Donnell, 1974; Olson, 1977), some studies reach quite different conclusions; for example, Poole and Field (1976) and Halliday (1979) claim that speech is more structurally complex than writing. In part, these contradictory findings can be attributed to the failure to control for the kind of text being analyzed (cf. the critiques by Tannen, 1982, and Biber, 1986, 1988). However, they also reflect our incomplete understanding of the linguistic characteristics of discourse complexity. De Beaugrande and Dressler (1981, p. 45) make the general comment that it would be "wrong to imply that the production and reception of texts are well explored at this time. . . . The true complexity of the operations involved doubtless exceeds by several orders of magnitude the most complex models developed so far."[1]

In a series of recent studies (Biber 1986, 1988; Finegan & Biber, 1986), I analyze several linguistic correlates of discourse complexity within a multidimensional model of linguistic variation among English registers. Biber (1986) identifies three major "dimensions" of variation among spoken and written registers and finds that complexity features are associated with all three. Finegan and Biber (1986) further analyze the complexity features included in Biber (1986), showing that discourse complexity is at least a two-dimensional construct.

Biber (1988) uses an exploratory factor analysis to identify six basic dimensions of variation among registers in English. The study analyzes the distribution of 67 linguistic features across 481 texts taken from 23 spoken and written registers

(e.g., academic prose, press reportage, conversation, radio broadcasts). The dimensions have both linguistic and functional content. The linguistic content comprises a group of linguistic features (such as pronouns, hedges, present tense verbs) that co-occur with a markedly high frequency in texts. These co-occurrence pattens are identified quantitatively by the factor analysis. The functional content of a dimension is based on the assumption that linguistic co-occurrence reflects shared function; thus, each dimension is interpreted to characterize the situational, social, and cognitive functions most widely shared by the co-occurring linguistic features.

Although these dimensions represent a wide range of linguistic features and functions, they include many features associated with discourse complexity, and they confirm the finding that discourse complexity is a multidimensional construct that interacts in intricate ways with other functions. For example, different types of dependent clauses, which have traditionally been regarded as being among the most important indicators of discourse complexity, are found on all six of the dimensions. On the first dimension, causative subordination, sentence relatives, and WH clauses co-occur with interactive and involved features (as opposed to features marking informational integration); on the second dimension, present participial clauses co-occur with narrative features; on the third dimension, WH relative clauses function to mark an explicit and elaborated style of reference (as opposed to situated reference); on the fourth dimension, infinitives and conditional adverbial clauses co-occur with modals and suasive verbs marking an overtly persuasive and argumentative style; on the fifth dimension, past participial postnominal clauses and past participial adverbial clauses co-occur with passive constructions and conjuncts as markers of a technical, impersonal style; and on the sixth dimension, *that* complement clauses to verbs, *that* complement clauses to adjectives, and *that* relative clauses on object position co-occur with demonstratives, final prepositions, and existential *there*, reflecting an on-line informational focus. (These interpretations are based on the shared communicative functions of the co-occurring features on each dimension and analysis of the distribution of features across genres; a full discussion of the interpretations is given in Biber, 1988.)

The approach used in Biber (1988) might be labeled a macroscopic, exploratory approach. It is macroscopic in that it analyzes a broad range of linguistic features representing many grammatical classes and discourse functions, and it analyzes a broad range of the registers in English. A major advantage of a macroscopic approach is that it enables analysis of a discourse system relative to a variety of other interacting systems. Thus, Biber (1988) shows that the system of discourse complexity interacts in important ways with a number of other discourse systems, including interactiveness and personal involvement, informational focus, narrative focus, marking of reference, persuasive stance, and impersonal or technical style. The underlying assumption of this approach is that discourse systems are not autonomous; but rather that they represent a series of interlocking form/function sets that can only be fully understood by considering their relation to the whole range of varying linguistic features.

A macroscopic approach can be usefully complemented, though, by more detailed analyses of particular systems, because the functional interpretation of macroscopic co-occurrence patterns depends on prior analysis of the form/function associations within each system.[2] It is for this reason that the present study focuses exclusively on the system of discourse complexity.

The approach used in Biber (1988) is exploratory in that it does not test particular hypotheses concerning the dimensions; rather, the primary statistical procedure (exploratory factor analysis) identifies a set of co-occurrence patterns that fit the data, and the researcher then must interpret those patterns post-hoc. There are two potential problems with an exploratory approach: (a) the analysis can capitalize on chance co-occurrence patterns,[3] and (b) certain results can be difficult to interpret because they have little basis in prior research studies. Thus for some analyses a theory-based approach is preferable to an exploratory one, because it is more constrained, less likely to capitalize on chance variation, and directly interpretable. In a theory-based approach, multidimensional models are proposed on theoretical grounds, and statistical procedures (such as confirmatory factor analysis) are used to test the adequacy of each model and compare the relative strengths of competing models. In this case, only those models that have a solid theoretical grounding are tested, and the functional interpretation of the dimensions in a model is carried out before the statistical analyses.

The present study thus differs from the analysis in Biber (1988) in two respects: it focuses exclusively on linguistic features associated with discourse complexity, and it adopts a theory-based rather than exploratory approach. It builds directly on that previous study, however, by testing several of the associations among complexity features indicated there.

2. Overview of the Study

The present study analyzes the distribution of 33 linguistic markers of complexity across 23 spoken and written registers. If discourse complexity is a single, unified construct, and all kinds of texts are complex (or not) in the same way, then all 33 of these linguistic features should be distributed on a single dimension of variation. However, if these features instead comprise distinct co-occurence patterns. then a multidimensional account of discourse complexity is required. The exploratory analyses in Biber (1986, 1988) and Finegan and Biber (1986) indicate that this latter possibility is the case; that discourse complexity is a multidimensional construct. In the present analysis I statistically compare a unidimensional model with several multidimensional models hypothesized on theoretical grounds, using confirmatory factor analysis to determine the relative strengths of each competing model. The analysis confirms the earlier findings concerning the multidimensional nature of discourse complexity and identifies a particular five-dimensional model as the most adequate representation of the parameters of complexity in these data.

2.1 Texts Used in the Analysis

The texts used in the study are summarized in Table 1. These texts represent variation along several situational parameters relating to discourse complexity, including:

1. Opportunity for careful production and revision versus the demands of online production (e.g., an academic paper vs. academic lecture);
2. Topic and purpose (e.g., an academic paper with an informational purpose vs. a face-to-face conversation where the focus is on interpersonal concerns);
3. Opportunity for interaction and clarification; and
4. The possibility of direct reference to the physical and temporal situation.

Table 1: Distribution of texts across 23 registers

Register	No. of texts
Written – Registers 1–15 From the LOB Corpus	
1. Press reportage	44
2. Editorials	27
3. Press reviews	17
4. Religion	17
5. Skills and hobbies	14
6. Popular lore	14
7. Biographies	14
8. Official documents	14
9. Academic prose	80
10. General fiction	29
11. Mystery fiction	13
12. Science fiction	6
13. Adventure fiction	13
14. Romantic fiction	13
15. Humor	9
16. Personal letters	6
17. Professional letters	10
Spoken – From the London-Lund Corpus	
18. Face-to-face conversation	44
19. Telephone conversation	27
20. Public conversations, debates, and interviews	22
21. Broadcast	18
22. Spontaneous speeches	16
23. Planned speeches	14
Total	481
Approximate Number of Words	960,000

For example, regarding No. 3 and No. 4, referents must be clearly specified in written exposition, because reader and writer do not typically share space

and time, and they cannot easily interact; in contrast, referents can be less fully specified in face-to-face conversation, because both speaker and hearer can rely on a directly shared space and time, and hearers can directly request clarification.)

By analyzing the linguistic forms typically found in a number of different registers, associated with different production opportunities, communicative purposes, and interactional possibilities, it is possible to analyze the various types of discourse complexity from a textual perspective. The texts included in the present study include many combinations of these situational parameters, as illustrated by Table 2.

Table 2: Summary of some situational differences among selected registers used in the study

	Production	Purpose	Interaction
Academic prose, official docs., press editorials	Careful production and revision	Informational exposition	Minimal
Fiction	Careful	Aesthetic	Minimal
Speeches, interviews	On-line	Informational	Moderate
Letters	Moderately careful	Interpersonal and affective	Moderate
Conversations	On-line	Interpersonal and affective	Extensive

2.2 Linguistic Markers of Discourse Complexity

The present study focuses on 33 linguistic features that have been associated with discourse complexity. The occurrences of these features are counted in each text, and these counts are normalized to frequency per 1,000 words.[4] Table 3 lists the features in groups according to their primary discourse function and grammatical category. The first six features are actually associated with a reduced complexity; these features fall into three groups: structural reduction, less specified reference, and fragmented structure, representing reductions in structural elaboration, specificity, and integration. At the same time, these features reflect more difficult or complex tasks, because they are typically produced in demanding, on-line situations.

The remaining features in Table 3 directly represent increased discourse complexity. These fall into four major groups: integrated structure (features that enable a large amount of informational content to be packed into relatively few words), lexical specificity (features that reflect a careful word choice and words having relatively specific semantic content), passive constructions, and dependent clauses. The category of dependent clauses, which is the feature most frequently associated with structural complexity, actually comprises five subgroups: post-nominal modifying clauses, attitudinal clauses, complement clauses, adverbial clauses, and participial clauses. As noted in Table 3, these are not exclusive categories (e.g., certain participial clauses can also be considered passive construc-

Table 3: List of 33 surface features associated with linguistic complexity

I. Features Associated With Reduced Complexity
- A. Structural reduction
  - 1. *That* deletions
  - 2. Contractions
- B. Less specified reference
  - 3. Pro-verb *Do*
  - 4. Pronoun *It*
  - 5. Demonstrative pronouns
- C. Fragmented structure
  - 6. Clause coordination

II. Features Associated With Increased Complexity
- D. Integrated structure
  - 7. Nouns
  - 8. Prepositions
  - 9. Attributive adjectives
  - 10. Nominalizations
  - 11. Phrasal coordination
- E. Lexical specificity
  - 12. Word length
  - 13. Type/token ratio
- F. Passive constructions (cf. past participial constructions)
  - 14. Agentless passives
  - 15. *By*-passives
- G. Dependent clauses
  - G1. Structural elaboration of reference – postnominal modifiers (cf. participial postnominal clauses)
    - 16. WH relative clauses on subject position
    - 17. WH relative clauses on object position
    - 18. "Pied piping" relative clauses
    - 19. *That* relative clauses on object position
    - 20. *That* relative clauses on subject position
  - G2. Attitudinal clauses
    - 21. Sentence relatives
  - G3. Complement clauses
    - 22. WH clauses
    - 23. *That* complement clauses to verbs
    - 24. *That* complement clauses to adjectives
    - 25. Infinitives
  - G4. Adverbial clauses (cf. participial adverbial clauses)
    - 26. Conditional adverbial subordination
    - 27. Causative adverbial subordination
    - 28. Concessive adverbial subordination
    - 29. Other adverbial subordination
  - G5. Participial clauses
    - 30. Present participial postnominal clauses
    - 31. Past participial postnominal clauses
    - 32. Present participial adverbial clauses
    - 33. Past participial

All of the features in Table 3 are surface structure markers, and as such they are not fully representative of the linguistic correlates of discourse complexity. A complete model would include features representing cohesion, informational packaging (e.g., given vs. new information, topic, theme), and rhetorical organization. The present article is restricted to a comparison of models of discourse complexity as marked in the surface structure; but it shows that, even in this domain, discourse complexity is an extremely rich construct, comprising at least five separate dimensions.

2.3 Overview of Confirmatory Factor Analysis

The present investigation of discourse complexity is based on statistical comparisons among a series of confirmatory factor analyses.[5] In a confirmatory analysis, models are proposed on theoretical grounds, and competing models are evaluated in terms of their relative goodness of fit (see, e.g., Long, 1983).

This approach can be best described by contrasting it with a traditional exploratory factor analysis (such as in Biber, 1988). The goal of both techniques is to uncover underlying dimensions of variation, where each dimension, or "factor," is represented by a group of features that co-occur frequently in texts. An exploratory factor analysis identifies factors quantitatively in a way that accounts for the maximum amount of "shared variance" among features, where shared variance corresponds to a frequent co-occurrence of the features in texts. The resulting factors are interpreted on the assumption that features co-occur in texts because they share discourse functions. The theoretical analysis in this case is post hoc. That is, although theoretical considerations are important to an exploratory factor analysis in that they guide preliminary decisions concerning the texts and linguistic features to be included, the statistical analysis itself is not constrained by theory, and thus it can build on chance correlations among features as well as theoretically significant correlations.

In contrast, a confirmatory factor analysis can be motivated at all stages by theoretical considerations. Similar to exploratory factor analysis, these include, first of all, decisions concerning the texts and linguistic features to be analyzed. However, when using confirmatory techniques, the statistical analysis itself can be constrained by theoretical considerations to determine the number of factors, the particular features associated with each factor, and whether the factors are intercorrelated or not. The strength of this approach is that a number of competing models, each motivated on theoretical grounds, can be statistically compared to determine which best fits the data. Thus, when there is adequate background research to enable sound theoretical predictions, a confirmatory approach is preferable to an exploratory one.

The confirmatory factor analyses were computed using the LISREL VI statistical package (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1984). The analyses are based on a correlation matrix of all linguistic features. For each particular model, the researcher specifies various theory-based restrictions, such as the number of factors and the particular features included on each factor; the LISREL statistical procedure then estimates the statistical parameters of that model, including the actual

"loadings" of the features on the factors and the intercorrelations among the factors. Factor loadings, which can range from −1.0 to +1.0, measure the strength of the association between a factor and a linguistic feature. If theoretical considerations predict that a feature is not associated with a given factor, then the researcher specifies the loading of that feature on that factor to be 0.0. Otherwise, LISREL estimates the magnitude of the loading.

In a later step, the estimated parameters are used to generate a matrix of *predicted* correlations among the linguistic features. The adequacy of each model can be evaluated by comparing the original correlation matrix to the predicted correlation matrix; if the two matrices are highly similar, then the proposed model is judged to be statistically adequate. This approach can also be used to compare the relative strengths of competing models – the model that produces the best predicted fit to the original correlation matrix is considered the strongest. A more detailed discussion of the statistics used to evaluate and compare statistical models is given in the Appendix, but the discussion in the following sections does not assume familiarity with those details.

2.4 Theoretical Models Indicated by the Exploratory Analysis in Biber (1988)

As noted in Section 1, many features associated with discourse complexity were included in the exploratory analysis of Biber (1988). The four models of discourse complexity tested in the present study are based on structural and functional criteria identified in this earlier analysis. (In addition, I test a one-dimensional model here because of its widespread adoption in previous research.)

The first model reflects a basic three-way distinction in the 1988 analysis, among complexity features marking reduced structure, elaborated structure (i.e., the various kinds of dependent clauses), and integrated structure. Although this model receives strong support from structural considerations, because it groups all dependent clauses on a single dimension, it is not well-supported functionally, because dependent clauses are distributed on all six speech/writing dimensions in the 1988 analysis. The earlier analysis does indicate, however, a fundamental distinction between referential elaboration (Dimension No. 3 in the 1988 analysis) and other types of elaboration. The second complexity model tested here thus distinguishes between referential elaboration and other kinds of "framing" elaboration (in addition to the dimensions of reduced structure and integrated structure).

The other two models are five-dimensional. The first of these separates passive constructions (both main clause and dependent clause) from the other four dimensions, based on the patterning of passive constructions as a separate dimension in the 1988 analysis (Dimension No. 5). Finally, a second five-dimensional model is tested that divides "framing" elaboration into two groups on structural grounds: adverbial clauses versus complement clauses. This division is indicated in part by the 1988 analysis (e.g., *that* clauses as verb complements and as adjective complements are two of the main features in Dimension No. 6), but it is based primarily on structural considerations.

It is possible to propose other models on structural grounds (e.g., distinguishing participial clauses from other types of dependent clauses). However

these additional models are not indicated in the exploratory 1988 analysis, and there is no other evidence that these groupings are functionally as well as structurally coherent; thus, they do not have sufficient theoretical basis for consideration here.[6]

Table 4 presents summary statistics for all five of the models analyzed in the present study. In the following sections, the relative strengths of each model will be discussed in turn.

Table 4: Goodness-of-fit statistics for five models of discourse complexity

Model M1. One dimension: Reduced versus elaborated and integrated structure

Chi-square M1	3435.0	($df = 495$)
Delta	.594	
GFI*	.632	

Chi-square difference M0 – M1 = 5036 ($df = 33$, $p < .001$)

Model M3. Three dimensions: Reduced structure/specificity, Elaborated structure, and Integrated structure

Chi-square M3	3163.4	($df = 492$)
Delta	.626	
GFI	.670	

Chi-square difference M1 – M3 = 272 ($df = 3$, $p < .001$)

Improvement in Delta M3 – M1 =.032 (3.2%)

Model M4. Four dimensions: Reduced structure/specificity, Structural elaboration of reference, Integrated structure, and "Framing" structural elaboration

Chi-square M4	3018.8	($df = 489$)
Delta	.644	
GFI	.691	

Chi-square difference M3 – M4 = 144 ($df = 3$, $p < .001$)

Improvement in Delta M4 – M3 =.018 (1.8%)

Model M5a. Five dimensions: (a) Reduced structure/specificity, (b) Structural elaboration of reference, (c) Integrated structure, (d) Adverbial structural elaboration (causative, conditional, concessive, and "other" adverbial clauses; present and past participial adverbial clauses; sentence relative clauses), and (e) Complement clauses (WH clauses, THAT clauses as complements to verbs and adjectives, infinitives)

Chi-square M5a	2989.4	($df = 485$)
Delta	.647	
GFI	.694	

Chi-square difference M4 – M5a = 29 ($df = 4$, $p < .001$)

Improvement in Delta M5a – M4 =.003 (0.3%)

(*Table 4 continued*)

(*Table 4 continued*)

Model M5b. Five dimensions: Reduced structure/specificity, Structural elaboration of reference, Integrated structure, "Framing" structural elaboration, and Passive constructions

Chi-square M5b 2600.3 ($df = 485$)

Delta .693
GFI .730

Chi-square difference M4 – M5b = 419 ($df = 4$, $p < .001$)
Improvement in Delta M5b – M4 = .049 (4.9%)

Chi-square difference M5a – M5b = 389 ($df = 1$, $p < .001$)
Improvement in Delta M5b – M5a = .046 (4.6%)

Chi-square difference M1 – M5b = 835 ($df = 10$, $p < .001$)
Improvement in Delta M5b – M1 = .099 (9.9%)

Correlations Among Factors:

	Reduced	Ref. Elab.	Integrated	Framing Elab.	Passives
Reduced	1.00	–	–	–	–
Ref. Elab.	–0.41	1.00	–	–	–
Integrated	–0.83	0.51	1.00	–	–
Framing Elab.	0.94	–0.22	–0.67	1.00	–
Passives	–0.69	0.39	0.79	–0.58	1.00

3. Models of Surface-Structure Discourse Complexity

3.1 A One-Dimensional Model: Reduced versus Elaborated Structure and Specificity

The first model to be considered is a one-dimensional (1-D) model of discourse complexity (model M1). The exploratory analysis in Biber (1988) does not provide theoretical support for this model, but because it is the model often assumed in research studies, it is considered here. According to this model, discourse complexity is a unitary construct, and thus all linguistic features associated with discourse complexity should load onto a single factor.

A summary of the goodness-of-fit of the 1-D model is presented in Table 4. The 1-D model is statistically significant in that it represents a significant improvement over the "null model," which is a model that specifies that there are no relationships among these linguistic features. (The chi-square difference score of 5036 shows this to be a significant model.) The model is also a theoretically meaningful one in that it accounts for a large portion of the observed correlations. This is indicated by the Delta coefficient value of .594, which shows that 59.4% of the relationships among these linguistic features is accounted for by the 1-D model. The 1-D model is thus a significant and theoretically meaningful one; the following sections show, however, that it is less adequate than multi-

3.2 A Three-Dimensional Model: Reduced Structure and Specificity, Elaborated Structure, and Integrated Structure

The first alternative model to the 1-D model tests whether the features marking structural elaboration and those marking informational integration should be considered as separate constructs. The 1-D model is based on the claim that these two groups of features represent a single underlying construct, discourse complexity, which is directly opposed to features marking reductions in structure, and specificity. The model tested in this section is based on the claim that integrated structure, elaborated structure, and reduced structure represent three separate constructs or dimensions. Features such as *that* deletions, contractions, and the pro-forms *do* and *it* are specified as representing the reduced structure dimension. Features such as nouns, prepositions, attributive adjectives, and nominalizations reflect a high informational focus and a relatively dense integration of information in a text; long words and diversified vocabulary (i.e., high type/token ratio) reflect a careful, precise word choice. Together, these features represent a dimension marking integrated structure. Finally, all forms of structural dependency, including relative clauses, complement clauses, and adverbial subordinate clauses, are specified as representing the elaborated structure dimension.

In one form of this model, we might hypothesize that these three dimensions are completely independent (or "orthogonal"); according to this hypothesis, structural reduction, integration, and elaboration are unrelated in their distributions and functions. It is possible to test this hypothesis by specifying the intercorrelations among the factors to be zero. The computed goodness-of-fit statistics for this model, however, show that it is less adequate than the 1-D model; the 3-D model with uncorrelated factors has a chi-square value of 4032.1, resulting in a Delta coefficient of .524 (52.4%), which represents a poorer fit than the 1-D model (which had a Delta coefficient of 59.4%).

A more plausible model is the 3-D model allowing intercorrelations among the factors, which represents the claim that integrated structure, elaborated structure, and reduced structure are separate but interrelated dimensions. The statistical summary of this model is given in Table 4 (Model M3). The chi-square value of 3163.4 ($df = 492$) represents a significant improvement over the 1-D model, and the Delta value of 62.6% represents a 3.2% increase over the 1-D model. The 3-D model with correlated factors thus provides a significantly better representation of the relationships among these linguistic features than the 1-D model.

3.3 A Four-Dimensional Model: Reduced Structure and Specificity, Structural Elaboration of Reference, Integrated Structure, and "Framing" Structural Elaboration

The dependent clauses included in this study can be divided into several different subclasses. The exploratory analysis in Biber (1988) indicated that one of the basic divisions among dependent clauses is between postnominal modifying

clauses, which specify and elaborate the identity of referents, and what I call here "framing" dependent clauses, which provide discourse frames of various types. Postnominal clauses include WH relative clauses, *that* relative clauses, and participial postnominal modifiers (clauses with "WHIZ-deletion"). All of these modify a noun head, specifying the reference of that noun or providing elaborating details about that noun. The framing clauses are less closely related structurally; they include sentence relatives, WH clauses, *that* complement clauses, infinitives, and various types of adverbial subordination. These can be considered "framing" in the sense that they either provide a discourse frame for a portion of text (as in the case of many types of adverbial subordination; see, e.g., Ford & Thompson, 1986; Thompson, 1983, 1985), or they provide an overt assessment of the speaker/writer's stance (in the case of sentence relatives, *that* complement clauses, and WH clauses; see Beaman, 1984; Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech, & Svartvik, 1985; Winter, 1982).

Model M4 in Table 4 presents the summary statistics for this four-dimensional model in which referential structural elaboration is separated from "framing" structural elaboration. The chi-square value of 3018.8 represents a statistically significant improvement over the 3-D model, and the Delta value of 64.4% represents a 1.8% improvement.

Consideration of the loadings for the features in this model (not presented in Table 4) shows that the Framing Factor is relatively diverse. Four features have strong loadings over .40: sentence relatives, WH clauses, conditional adverbial subordination, and causative adverbial subordination. However, the other features have relatively low loadings, some near zero (*that* complements, infinitives, and concessive adverbial subordination), indicating that this dimension is less well-defined than the others.

3.4 Five-Dimensional Models

It was noted previously that there are a number of ways that the dependent clauses included in the study can be subgrouped, and given that the "framing" elaboration dimension is relatively diverse, alternative models with theoretical support are worth further investigation. One of these other groupings, separating out complement clauses as a separate factor, is indicated in the 1988 exploratory analysis and is thus tested here. The summary of Model M5a in Table 4 shows, however, that this model represents a chi-square difference of only 29 over Model M4; this is a statistically significant improvement, but it corresponds to an improvement in Delta of only 0.3%. This model thus contributes little towards further understanding of dependent clauses.

A second five-dimensional model separates out passive constructions including agentless passives, *by*-passives, past participial postnominal clauses, and past participial adverbial clauses) as a separate factor. This model receives strong support from the 1988 analysis, in which passive constructions constituted the major features on one of the speech/writing dimensions. The summary of Model M5b in Table 4 shows that it provides the best fit of all models considered here. It represents a significant improvement over all other models

relatively strong improvement in Delta over other models – nearly a 5% improvement over the 4-D model, and nearly a 10% improvement over the 1-D model.

Table 4 also shows the intercorrelations among the factors in Model M5b. These intercorrelations are moderately high. For the Passive factor, they range from .79 (62.4%) to .39 (15.2%), whereas those for the Reference factor range from .51 (26%) to –.22 (only 4.8%). The Framing Elaboration factor shows an extremely high correlation of .94 (88%) with the Reduced factor, indicating an extremely strong positive relationship between structural reduction and a type of structural elaboration. That is, framing structural elaboration is strongly associated with these forms of reduced structure and specificity, indicating that these two groups of features are commonly used in the same communicative situations.[7]

The factor loadings for this last five-dimensional model (Model M5b), given in Table 5, indicate that the factors are relatively well-defined. On the Reduced Structure factor, all loadings are over .50; on the Integrated Structure factor, all loadings except one are over .50; and on the Passive factor, three of the four features have loadings over .70. In contrast, the Referential Elaboration factor shows some lower loadings, with *that* relative clauses having a loading near 0.0,[8] and the Framing Elaboration factor is the least coherent in the analysis, with five features having loadings below .20.

Overall, Model M5b accounts for 69.3% of the relationships among these linguistic markers of complexity (or 73% according to the GFI estimate). This leaves approximately 30% of the variance unaccounted for. In part, this remaining variance is due to the particular functions of individual features apart from their shared functions; and in part, this remaining variance could represent additional parameters of complexity not isolated here. In particular, the Framing Elaboration factor needs further investigation, to identify the salient subfactors represented there and additional linguistic features associated with those factors. Model M5b, though, accounts for a large amount of the shared variance among these linguistic features and thus provides a good first model of the dimensions of discourse complexity with respect to these surface structure features in English. In the following section, I consider the linguistic characteristics of different spoken and written registers with respect to these dimensions.

Table 5: Factor loadings for Model M5b, with five dimensions: reduced structure/specificity, structural elaboration of reference, integrated structure, "framing" structural elaboration, and passive constructions

	Reduced	Reference Elab.	Integration	Framing Elab.	Passive
1. *That* deletions	.83	.0	.0	.0	.0
2. Contractions	.92	.0	.0	.0	.0
3. Pro-verb *Do*	.79	.0	.0	.0	.0
4. Pronoun *It*	.75	.0	.0	.0	.0
5. Dem. pronouns	.75	.0	.0	.0	.0

(*Table 5 continued*)

(*Table 5 continued*)

		Reduced	Reference Elab.	Integration	Framing Elab.	Passives
6.	Clause coord.	.56	.0	.0	.0	.0
7.	Nouns	.0	.0	.66	.0	.0
8.	Prepositions	.0	.0	.84	.0	.0
9.	Attributive adjs.	.0	.0	.82	.0	.0
10.	Nominalizations	.0	.0	.76	.0	.0
11.	Phrasal coord.	.0	.0	.51	.0	.0
12.	Word length	.0	.0	.96	.0	.0
13.	Type/token ratio	.0	.0	.36	.0	.0
14.	Agentless passives	.0	.0	.0	.0	.76
15.	*By*-passives	.0	.0	.0	.0	.71
16.	WH rels. – subj. pos.	.0	.45	.0	.0	.0
17.	WH rels. – obj. pos.	.0	.85	.0	.0	.0
18.	"Pied piping" rels	.0	.87	.0	.0	.0
19.	*That* rels. – obj. pos.	.0	.20	.0	.0	.0
20.	*That* rels. – subj. pos.	.0	.04	.0	.0	.0
21.	Sentence relatives	.0	.0	.0	.54	.0
22.	WH clauses	.0	.0	.0	.41	.0
23.	*That* clauses – vbs.	.0	.0	.0	.17	.0
24.	*That* clauses – adjs.	.0	.0	.0	–.03	.0
25.	Infinitives	.0	.0	.0	.06	.0
26.	Cond. adv. subord.	.0	.0	.0	.42	.0
27.	Caus. adv. subord.	.0	.0	.0	.65	.0
28.	Concess. adv. sub.	.0	.0	.0	–.08	.0
29.	Other adv. subord.	.0	.0	.0	–.19	.0
30.	Pres. part. postnom.	.0	.30	.0	.0	.0
31.	Past part. postnom.	.0	.0	.0	.0	.77
32.	Pres. part. adv. cls.	.0	.0	.0	–.26	.0
33.	Past. part. adv. cls.	.0	.0	.0	.0	.42

4. The Discourse Complexity of Spoken and Written Registers

Two conclusions resulting from the model testing carried out in Section 3 are:

1. Discourse complexity is not a single, unified construct; rather, the results here indicate five separate but interrelated dimensions of complexity based on surface structure features, and consideration of linguistic features associated with information packaging, cohesion, and rhetorical organization will likely reveal additional dimensions.
2. Given this multidimensional nature of discourse complexity, a complete description of a text (or register) cannot focus exclusively on the degree of complexity; rather, the complexity of a text is described here within a five-dimensional space, so that texts are complex in different ways as well as to differing extents.

In the present section, I use this five-dimensional model to provide a preliminary description of the discourse complexity of spoken and written registers. To do this, a dimension score for each complexity dimension was computed for each text, by summing the frequencies of the linguistic features on that dimension. For example, the dimension score for the Reduced Structure factor is computed by summing the frequencies of *that*-deletions, contractions, pro-verb *do*, pronoun *it*, demonstrative pronouns, and clause coordination for each text. Before the dimension scores are computed, the individual frequency counts are standardized to a mean score of 0.0 and a standard deviation of 1.0, so that all counts have comparable scales.[9] The dimension scores are used for relative comparisons among texts (rather than for absolute characterizations). Individual texts can be compared directly in terms of their dimension scores, and registers can be compared in terms of their mean dimension scores.

Table 6 presents statistics from a General Linear Models procedure for each of the five dimension scores as predictors of the differences among 14 spoken and written registers. The F scores show that there are significant differences among the mean scores of these registers with respect to all five dimensions, and the r^2 scores show that all five dimensions are strong predictors of the register differences. Three of the dimensions – Reduced Structure, Integrated Structure, and Passive Constructions – are extremely strong predictors, having r^2 values ranging from 59.5% to 83.8%. The other two dimensions – Elaboration of Reference and Framing Elaboration – are weaker but still relatively strong predictors, with r^2 values of 36.6% and 32.1%.

Figures 1 to 5 present plots of the dimension scores of these 14 spoken and written registers. The figures can contribute to the interpretation of the factor analysis by identifying the situations associated with markedly high or low occurrence of each type of discourse complexity. That is, although the factors can be interpreted directly based on previous research, those interpretations can be extended by analysis of the distribution of each complexity type across texts.

From a quick overview of Figures 1 to 5, it is apparent that each of these five types of complexity is distributed differently among registers, confirming the claim that each dimension is responsive to different functional considerations. Figure 1 shows that the Reduced Structure Dimension is strongly associated

Table 6: Statistical significance and importance among the mean scores of 14 spoken and written registers with respect to the five complexity dimensions

Dimension	$F(13, 337)$	$p <$	r^2
Reduced structure	128.2	.0001	83.8%
Elaboration of reference	14.3	.0001	36.6%
Integrated structure	71.2	.0001	74.2%
Framing elaboration	11.8	.0001	32.1%
Passive constructions	36.4	.0001	59.5%




Figure 1: Inverse reduced structure dimension scores for 14 registers

with the mode distinction between speech and writing – all spoken registers have negative scores on this dimension, showing a greater than average frequency of reduced forms, whereas nearly all written registers have positive scores, reflecting a less-than-average frequency of reduced forms. (The poles of this dimension have been reversed, so that negative scores represent high frequencies of reduced features and positive scores represent a marked absence of reduced features.)

However, it would not be accurate to characterize this dimension as a simple distinction between speech and writing. First of all, two written registers have negative scores: a very small negative score in the case of romance fiction (cf. the small positive score for general fiction), and a large negative score in the case of personal letters. In addition, there is a considerable range of values among the negative scores of the spoken registers: from nearly −10 for face-to-face conversations, down to approximately −1 for prepared speeches and broadcasts.

In fact, the distribution of scores along this dimension might be better explained in terms of the interaction between purpose of communication and opportunity for careful production. Conversations are the least formal and least informational register included here, and thus they permit the most reduction in form. In addition, they are produced on-line without prior planning, making it relatively difficult to use fuller forms. Text Sample 1 illustrates reduced forms in a conversational text; these forms (marked in bold) include numerous contractions, as well as deletion of *that* in complement clauses (e.g., *I know <that> one can't . . .*), and frequent use of pronominal *it* and *that* (e.g., *that is a great deprivation*). (This text portion also illustrates the use of Framing Elaboration features, discussed later.)

Text Sample 1: Conversation

(Reduced Structure features are in boldface, Framing Elaboration features are capitalized and italicized, and <O> indicates deleted *that* in complement clauses.

A: **you're** rushing off # – –
B: I was thinking #
B: *THAT IF* I go # .
B: I might get into Sainsbury's *BEFORE* they **close #.**
B: our **housekeeper's** left # –
A: how absolutely awful
B: so . I mean <O> **that** is a – – a great de**privation #** –
A: well it is #
A: **isn't it** # – –
B: she's got a good office job # –
B: good money # –
B: but . I know <O> one can't suppose # –
A: just saying to mine this morning #
A: **I don't** know *WHAT* I'd do *IF* she left # –
A: she will of course #
A: *BECAUSE* she said *WHEN* she came # –
A: *THAT WHEN* the children are old enough #
A: she would get a driving job # .

Interviews and spontaneous speeches are similarly influenced by on-line production, but they have a much more informational purpose and thus show a less frequent use of reduced forms. Planned speeches are less influenced by the production circumstances due to the effect of prior planning, and so they show relatively few reduced forms. (Because there is considerable ellipsis of whole words and phrases in broadcasts, they are actually more reduced in form than their score of –1 indicates.)

The written registers are fairly uniform in their infrequent use of reduced forms, in line with their informational purposes and extensive opportunity for production. However, their scores do range along a continuum: official documents and academic prose with the largest positive scores, corresponding to their extreme informational focus and formality; biographies, press reportage, professional letters, and editorials with relatively large positive scores, corresponding to their relatively informational and formal purposes; general and romance fiction with scores near zero, reflecting their aesthetic purpose and their mixing of narrative with fictional dialogue; and finally, personal letters with a large negative score, reflecting their interpersonal purpose and a relative lack of planning and revision during production.

In contrast, the distribution of scores with respect to the Structural Elaboration of Reference Dimension, shown in Figure 2, appears to be completely unrelated to mode differences (between speech and writing) or to differences in production circumstances. Rather, this type of complexity seems to be strictly related to purpose: informational versus noninformational. Informational purposes require a frequent use of this type of elaboration, whether in speech (interviews,




Figure 2: Referential elaboration dimension scores for 14 registers

spontancous speeches, prepared speeches) or in writing (official documents, academic prose, editorials, professional letters, press reportage, biographies). Non-informational purposes, on the other hand, show a markedly infrequent use of these forms, again, whether in speech (conversations and broadcasts) or in writing (fiction and personal letters). The frequent use of these features in informational registers is illustrated in Text Samples 2 and 3, taken from a (written) official document and a (spoken) interview.

Text Sample 2: Official Document

(Referential Elaboration Dimension features are in boldface, Integrated Structure Dimension features are italicized, and Passive Constructions are capitalized.)

Questions about marriage and children WERE again INCLUDED, as they had BEEN *at the 1911 and 1951 censuses* . . . . The *1961 census questions* related *to* all *women* who WERE or had BEEN MARRIED, and so repeated the *enquiry* MADE *fifteen years* earlier *NY the 1946 family census* CONDUCTED *on behalf of* the *royal commission on population.* The *questions about children* . . . extended *to* all *women* **who** WERE or had BEEN MARRIED.

Text Sample 3: Interview

(Referential Elaboration Dimension features are in boldface, and Framing Elaboration features are capitalized and italicized.)

Speaker A:
for instance *WHEN* we're looking #
at the legislative framework **within which**
marketing . operates # –
it will be fairly important #
to – – give # .

our – students # –
a full understanding #
of the – different legal systems # .
operating in different . countries # –
– **which** provide the environment for # –
exporting # – –
or importing indeed # –
SINCE a number of our students **who come from abroad # –**
may be engaged #
in importing . activities #
into their – . – native countries # – –
again #
WHEN one #
is looking at the way **in which** one –
the techniques # .
by which one – analyzes # .
markets #
behaviours #
and social situations # –
– we would – hope #
THAT our students would have **a full understanding** # –
of the cultural differences # –
which – will help them. . . .

Text Sample 2 illustrates the common use of relative clause constructions for referential specificity in official documents (e.g., *all women **who** were or had been married*). Relative constructions are used even more frequently in the portion of an interview given in Sample 3. In this case, these constructions are used both to specify the identity of referents and to provide elaborating details regarding a referent (illustrated in turn by the following two relative clauses: *the – different legal systems **operating** in different . countries # – – **which** provide the environment for # – exporting).*

The distribution of scores with respect to the Integrated Structure Dimension, given in Figure 3, depends on an interaction between communicative purpose and mode, distinguishing informational written registers from all other registers. Thus the informational written registers all show a frequent use of integrative features; these registers include the expository registers (press, official documents, and academic prose) as well as informational narrative (biographies) and informational written interaction (professional letters). The extremely dense use of these features in written informational registers is illustrated by Text Sample 2 (from an official document). These features include nouns, often in noun–noun (–noun) sequences (e.g., *census questions, family census*), attributive adjectives, and prepositional phrases (e.g., *on behalf of the royal commission on population*).

All other registers show an infrequent use of this type of complexity; these include all spoken registers, as well as fictional narrative and personal written interaction (personal letters). With regard to the spoken informational registers (e.g., speeches and interviews), production constraints apparently limit the extent to which information can be carefully integrated; and with respect to the




Figure 3: Integrated structure dimension scores for 14 registers

noninformational written registers (e.g., fiction and personal letters), the purpose does not require a dense integration of information.

The "Framing" Structural Elaboration Dimension (Figure 4) seems to be related primarily to communicative purpose, with little relation to mode or production differences. These features are relatively frequent in those registers that promote the expression of personal attitudes, justifications, and feelings: interviews, spontaneous speeches, conversations, professional letters, prepared speeches, and personal letters. They are much less frequent in those registers having informational, impersonal, "factual" purposes, such as press reportage, biographies, and academic prose; and they are markedly infrequent in official documents, which are typically direct statements of "fact" with no acknowledged author. These features are also markedly absent in broadcasts, which are radio reportage of events in progress (sports events, parades, etc.). These texts were recorded in the 1960s, preceding the current practice of interactive, personal reportage of events; these broadcasts are thus similar to official documents in being direct factual reportage with no acknowledged speaker and little personal commentary.

Text Sample 1 illustrates the use of framing elaboration in conversation, Sample 3 illustrates these features in an interview, and Sample 4 illustrates these features in a professional letter. These samples differ in mode and in informational purpose (conversations being spoken and noninformational, interviews being spoken but informational, professional letters being written and informational), but they share a focus on the expression of personal attitudes and opinions with justification for these positions. Several of the framing functions of these elaboration features are illustrated in these text samples. For example, WH clauses and conditional clauses are used to contrast various possible actions or points of




Figure 4: Framing elaboration dimension scores for 14 registers

view (e.g., *I was thinking THAT IF I go I might get into Sainsbury's before they close and I don't know what I'd do IF she left*, from the conversation sample; *for instance WHEN we're looking at the – legislative framework*, from the interview). Causative adverbial clauses are used to justify certain attitudes or opinions, as in the following example from the interview sample, where the speaker justifies a self-correction: *a full understanding of . . . legal systems <provides> the environment for exporting – – or importing indeed – SINCE a number of our students . . . may be engaged in importing activities.* Similarly in the professional letter sample, causative clauses are used to explain the opinion that: *any such drastic change would ultimately require the action of the board of directors BECAUSE if would involve a change in the constitution . . . and BECAUSE any such change would in turn require a vote. That* complement clauses are used to overtly frame an attitude or position relative to a "stance" verb or adjective[10] (e.g., *we would hope THAT our students would have a full understanding*, from the interview sample; and *I understand THAT certain XYZ populations are . . . impacted*, from the professional letter). Thus, although these elaboration features vary in their particular characteristic functions, they share general "framing" uses common in more personal, attitudinal registers.[11]

Text Sample 4: Professional Letter

(Framing Elaboration features are capitalized and italicized.)

. . . Any such drastic change would ultimately require the action of the board of directors *BECAUSE* it would involve a change in the constitution . . . and *BECAUSE* any such change would in turn require a vote . . . *IF* it is not possible *TO* add your concern this year, it would certainly be possible *TO* add it next year . . . Please understand *THAT WHILE* I am sympathetic to what you are trying to achieve, and *THAT WHILE* I understand *THAT* certain XYZ populations are . . . impacted . . . I am not at present entirely in sympathy . . .

Finally, the Passive Constructions Dimension, plotted in Figure 5, seems to reflect quite narrow functional considerations, being frequent only in written informational exposition (official documents, academic prose, and to a lesser extent press reportage and editorials). These features are markedly infrequent in all spoken registers, all narrative registers (fiction and biography), and all written interactional registers (personal and professional letters). Passive features differ from the Integrated features in that they are found only in written exposition rather than in all written informational registers (i.e., including biographies and professional letters). This dimension thus seems to be related specifically to an expository organization of information. Text Sample 2 illustrates the frequent use of passive constructions in official documents.

Thus, each of these complexity dimensions comprises a distinct set of linguistic features having particular grammatical and discourse functions; each dimension defines a unique set of relations among spoken and written registers; and each dimension is responsive to different aspects of the communicative situation, including mode, production circumstances, and purpose. As previously noted, these dimensions define a five-dimensional space of discourse complexity, and the complexity of particular registers can be analyzed within this space – with respect to both the types and extent of complexity.

Figures 6 and 7 plot the five-dimensional complexity profile of 11 registers: six written registers in Figure 6 and five spoken registers in Figure 7. These figures show that registers differ markedly in their complexity characterizations, and that no register is consistently complex with respect to all dimensions. Official documents and professional letters (on Figure 6) can be considered the two most consistently complex registers, but official documents are markedly noncomplex with respect to the Framing Elaboration Dimension, and professional letters are markedly noncomplex with respect to the Passives Dimension.




Figure 5: Passive constructions dimension scores for 14 registers




Figure 6: Complexity dimension scores for six written registers




Figure 7: Complexity dimension scores for five spoken registers

In addition, comparison of Figures 6 and 7 indicates a fundamental distinction between the discourse complexities of written and spoken registers: Written registers differ widely among themselves in both the extent and kinds of discourse complexity, whereas spoken registers follow a single pattern with respect to their kinds of complexity, differing only with respect to extent. Thus, Figure 6 shows that written registers use much of the available complexity space defined by these five dimensions. Four basic profiles can be distinguished among the written registers:

1. Noncomplex with respect to the dimensions of Reduced Structure, Referential Elaboration, Integrated Structure, and Passives, but markedly complex

with respect to Framing Elaboration – this profile characterizes personal letters and general fiction, with the only difference between them being that fiction is unmarked (rather than markedly noncomplex) with respect to Reduced Structure and Referential Elaboration;

2. Moderately complex with respect to the first four dimensions (i.e., reduced structure, referential elaboration, integrated structure, and framing elaboration) and noncomplex with respect to the use of passive constructions – this profile characterizes press reportage and biographies, which are very similar to each other in their kinds and extent of complexity;
3. Moderately complex in avoiding reduced structures, highly complex with respect to referential elaboration, integrated structure, and framing elaboration, and noncomplex with respect to the use of passive constructions – this profile characterizes professional letters; and
4. Highly complex with respect to reduced structures (i.e., avoiding them), referential elaboration, integrated structure, and passive constructions, and markedly noncomplex with respect to the use of framing elaboration – this profile characterizes official documents.

In contrast, spoken registers follow a single complexity profile on Figure 7: noncomplex in permitting the use of reduced structures, moderately complex in the use of referential elaboration, noncomplex in the use of integrated structures, highly complex with respect to the use of framing elaboration, and noncomplex with respect to the use of passive constructions. (The only departure from this profile is shown by the broadcasts register, which is unmarked on all dimensions.)

These two figures thus indicate that there is a fundamental difference in discourse complexity associated with the production differences between speech and writing. Written production gives the addressor maximum freedom to manipulate the linguistic characteristics of a text in accordance with a number of situational parameters, including purpose, interactiveness, and degrees of personal involvement. In spoken production, though, the on-line production circumstances apparently restrict the kinds of discourse complexity possible. Thus, Figure 7 shows differences in the *extent* of complexity associated with situational parameters such as purpose and involvement, but only a single basic profile of the *kinds* of complexity associated with the spoken mode.

Overall, the complexity characterizations of registers differ in three respects: (a) the particular dimensions marked as complex or not for each register, (b) the extent to which a register is marked as complex on each dimension, and (c) the number of dimensions on which a register is marked as complex. Both the extent of complexity and the particular type of complexities for a given register are determined by the situational characteristics of that register. However, as previously shown, the exploitation of complexity features is apparently restricted by mode, so that written registers differ greatly among themselves in both the kinds and extents of discourse complexity, whereas spoken registers are mostly restricted to differences of extent.

5. Summary and Conclusion

On the basis of an analysis of many kinds of surface complexity features across many kinds of spoken and written texts, the present study has identified a five-dimensional model as the most adequate for these data, and it has described the complexity characteristics of spoken and written registers with respect to that model. The five dimensions reflect the influence of a number of situational parameters, including production circumstances, purpose, and involvement. None of the dimensions is associated with an absolute distinction between spoken and written texts; rather, mode interacts with other situational characteristics (such as an informational purpose) to determine the relations among registers with respect to these dimensions. However, when all five dimensions are considered together, they identify a fundamental distinction between written and spoken registers: Spoken registers are apparently limited in the kinds of complexity they can exploit, whereas written registers show much greater differences among themselves with respect to both their kinds and extents of discourse complexity.

The study raises several issues requiring further investigation. First of all, the study is based only on surface structure features of English. Inclusion of features relating to information packaging, cohesion, and rhetorical organization would enable fuller models (cf. Biber, in press). Second, some of the dimensions require further analysis even with respect to surface structure features. In particular, the "Framing" Elaboration Dimension should be analyzed further, to better understand the discourse functions underlying this dimension, and to identify any additional dimensions inadvertently collapsed with this one. Third, the situational interpretations in Section 4 are preliminary: more detailed analyses of these features in particular texts will enable a richer interpretation of the situational and functional correlates of each dimension. Finally, the analysis here is based only on the distribution of linguistic features in English texts; further research is required to uncover the dimensions of complexity in other Western and non-Western languages. The present analysis provides a new framework for the analysis of discourse complexity and identifies five important dimensions of complexity in English; additional research is needed to expand this analysis to other discourse systems and languages.

Author's Note

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Notes

1. Some previous register-based studies have proposed multiple parameters of variation that include complexity features on different parameters. Chafe (1982) proposes two

parameters (fragmentation versus integration, and involvement versus detachment) on functional grounds: Carroll (1960) and Marckworth and Baker (1974) use multivariate statistical techniques to analyze the parameters of variation among written registers.

2. For example, see the analysis of the "stance" System (including evidentiality and affect) in Biber and Finegan (1989).
3. As shown in Biber (1990), however, the dimensions resulting from the exploratory factor analysis of Biber (1988) do seem to be quite stable and reliable (in that they are replicable in various subsets of the text corpus).
4. The linguistic feature counts were carried out by computer programs, described in Biber (1988, especially Appendix II). The analyses in Biber (1990) indicate that the feature counts are highly reliable across text samples from within texts, and across texts within registers. Apart from extremely common features, such as nouns, verbs, and prepositional phrases, the features have positively skewed distributions. These distributions reflect the fact that these are functional/stylistic markers that occur relatively rarely (or not at all) in the majority of texts but with relatively high frequencies in particular registers. A visual inspection of scatterplots indicated that these features tend to have linear (rather than curvilinear) relationships with one another.
5. These analyses are undertaken within the general framework of covariance structure analysis, which provides a set of techniques for theory testing using correlational data (see, e.g., Hayduk, 1987).
6. The models tested here are thus based on theoretical considerations: a one-dimensional model commonly assumed in other studies, and four multidimensional models indicated by Biber (1988). Modification indices were not used in the analysis here. For each factor in each model, the functional/structural grouping of features indicated by previous research was specified as loading on that factor with "free" loadings (i.e., loadings that were estimated by LISREL), and all other features were fixed as having a loading of 0.0.
7. Correlations over .9 can be taken to indicate colinearity (Hayduk, 1987, p. 176), which is especially problematic in regression analyses (when two predictors are highly intercorrelated). Thus, the high correlation between the Reduced Structure Dimension and the Framing Elaboration Dimension indicates that these should not be used as separate predictors in a multiple-regression analysis; rather, a higher-order factor should be constructed out of the two. In the present study, though, I keep these two factors separate, because they are not used together as predictors in any analysis, and because they are clearly distinct in their structural (i.e., linguistic) characteristics.
8. This finding replicates the different distributions of WH relatives and *that* relatives found in Biber (1988). Ed Finegan (personal communication, 1990) has pointed out two functional differences between these relative clause types. First, whereas WH relative clauses can be either restrictive or nonrestrictive, *that* relative clauses are consistently restrictive. Second, there is an apparent tendency for *which* to be used in preference to *that* for plural (versus singular) antecedents. In addition, the use of *that* entails some loss of information relative to the more specific WH relative pronouns. The alternation between these forms in present-day English requires further empirical investigation.
9. For example, nouns have a mean frequency of 180.5 occurrences per 1,000 words (in the entire corpus) and nominalizations have a mean frequency of only 19.9 occurrences per 1,000 words. If these raw frequencies were used in computing the dimension score for the Integrated Structure factor, the frequency of nouns would carry much greater weight than nominalizations. Standardized scores put all frequencies on a single scale.

so that all features on a factor carry the same weigth in the dimension score. For example, if a text had 216 nouns and 34 nominalizations, it would have a standardized score of approximately 1.0 for both features, because the standard deviation for nouns is 35.6, and for nominalizations it is 14.4. That is,

for nouns: (216 – 180.5) / 35.6 = .997
and for nominalizations: (34 – 19.9) / 14.4 = .979.

Thus, this text is similarly marked for both nouns and nominalizations, having one standard deviation over the mean for both features, and the standardized scores reflect this fact.

10. Stance marking in English, including evidentiality and affect, is further discussed in Biber and Finegan (1989).
11. Given this interpretation, it is surprising that editorials, which are personal and opinionated, do not have a higher score on this dimension. Their intermediate characterization might be due to their relatively "protected" status. That is, because most readers of editorials cannot respond, there is less risk that editorial writers will lose face due to a direct challenge and, thus, the writers have a lesser need to overtly frame and justify opinions (in contrast to the directly interactional, and potentially confrontational, nature of letters. conversations interviews, and even speeches).

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Appendix

The observed and predicted correlation matrices are compared using a chi-square goodness-of-fit statistic (generated by LISREL). A small chi-square value indicates that the predicted correlation matrix is not statistically different from the observed matrix, and that the model thus provides a very good fit to the data. In practice, however, the chi-square goodness-of-fit test does not by itself provide an adequate evaluation of a model, since the chi-square statistic is greatly influenced by sample size. Thus, practically any model based on a large sample will be rejected as inadequate ($\chi^2 < .05$, indicating that the predicted correlation matrix is significantly different from the observed matrix), although it is possible to find numerous statistically acceptable models based on very small samples. For this reason, Bentler and Bonett (1980) developed a technique for comparing the relative adequacy of various models, rather than focusing on outright rejection or acceptance of a model.

The Bentler and Bonett technique uses a "null model" (referred to here as MØ) as a baseline for evaluating the adequacy of particular models and the degree of improvement between models. In a factor analysis, the null model specifies that the observed variables are mutually independent; thus, the model has no common factors, the unique variances are equated with the variances of the observed variables, and all common factor loadings are set to zero. In the present analysis, the null model (MØ) has a chi-square value of 8471.3 for 528 degrees of freedom. Theoretically based models are evaluated positively to the extent that their chi-square goodness-of-fit statistic is significantly smaller than this chi-square value for the null model. In particular, if the difference in chi-square values between the null model and a theory-based model is significant, then that model represents a statistically significant improvement over the null model. (This is because the difference score between chi-square values also has a chi-square distribution.) For example, Table 4 shows that the factor analysis for a one-dimensional model of complexity (M1) represents a statistically significant improvement over the null model:

$$8471 \text{ (the M0 } \chi^2) - 3435 \text{ (the M1 } \chi^2) = 5036,$$

where the degrees of freedom is $528 - 495 = 33$. (This is significant at $p < .001$.)

The null model can also be used as a baseline to asses the theoretical importance of a given model, by determining the percentage of the observed correlations accounted for by the model. This is indicated by the Delta coefficient (Bentler & Bonett, 1980, p. 599), which represents the difference in chi-square values between the null model and a theory-based model as a proportion of the total chi-square value for the null model. For example, for the one-dimensional model of complexity (Table 4),

$$\Delta = (8471 - 3435) / 8471 = .594.$$

The Delta coefficient of .594 shows that 59.4% of the relationships among these linguistic features is accounted for by the 1-D model. The Goodness-of-Fit Index is a slightly more liberal measure of strength produced by LISREL (.632 in this case). Both of these coefficients indicate that the 1-D model is relatively strong and represents an important theoretical improvement over the null model.

7

The Dialogic Unconscious: Psychoanalysis, Discursive Psychology and the Nature of Repression

Michael Billig

This paper will discuss the possibility of making links between discursive psychology and psychoanalytic theory. At first sight, these two ways of understanding psychological phenomena seem utterly incompatible. Discursive psychology, which is being developed as a challenge to orthodox social psychology, discourages speculation about 'inner' processes (e.g. Antaki, 1994; Billig, 1997*a*; Edwards, 1991, 1994; Edwards & Potter, 1992, 1993; Harrê, 1995; Harrê & Gillett, 1994; Parker, 1992; Potter, 1996; Potter & Wetherell, 1987, 1995). Discursive psychology takes inspiration from the philosophical tradition of Wittgenstein's later philosophy and from the development of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. These traditions of analysis stress the need to examine in detail the outward accomplishment of social life, showing how social order is reproduced through discursive interaction. Discursive psychology applies this project to psychological phenomena. It argues that phenomena, which traditional psychological theories have treated as 'inner processes', are, in fact, constituted through social, discursive activity. Accordingly, discursive psychologists argue that psychology should be based on the study of this outward activity rather than upon hypothetical, and essentially unobservable, inner states. In this respect, discursive psychology seems inimical with psychoanalytic theory, which presumes that hidden, unconscious motive-forces lie behind the surface of social life. Psychoanalytic theorists often treat outward social activity as a cipher for unobservable, inner motivational processes. The apparent incompatibility between the new discursive psychology and psychoanalysis might be expressed crudely: discursive psychologists turn the person inside out, converting inner mental life

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into outward social activity, while psychoanalysts move in the opposite theoretical direction by turning social life outside in.

It will be suggested that matters are not quite so simple, especially if one takes seriously the notion that conversational interaction is not only a mode of expression, but is also mode of repression. There is a case, it will be argued, for considering that there is a 'dialogic unconscious', which is constituted in dialogue and which functions as a form of repression. If the repressive aspect of conversation is considered, then discursive psychology and psychoanalytic theory may not be utterly incompatible, at least if theoretical adjustments are made on both sides.

In developing these themes, the present paper will attempt to argue within the basic assumptions of discursive psychology, especially the Wittgensteinian notion that psychological language stands in need of outward, rather than inner, criteria. It will be suggested that this position does not preclude psychoanalytic forms of explanation, but, under certain circumstances, encourages them. Nevertheless, to develop psychoanalytic themes based on the idea of a dialogic unconscious, it is necessary to expand the image of social interaction, which discursive psychology has inherited from conversation analysis and ethnomethodology. At present, conversation analysts have revealed in depth how everyday morality is routinely accomplished in conversational interaction. If the unconscious, as well as the conscious, is constituted in interaction, then the everyday interaction is not only reproducing moral norms, but it also reproduces immoral temptations, which are routinely resisted and repressed. To investigate these issues, it will be argued, it is necessary to examine the absences, rather than presences, in dialogue.

If this is done, then one should be able to investigate not only how everyday morality is accomplished within talk-in-interaction, as conversation analysts and ethnomethodologists have demonstrated; also it will be possible to see how repression is routinely accomplished. In so doing, discursive psychology will be attending to some of the traditional concerns of psychoanalysis. Most importantly, the basic psychoanalytic process of repression, whose routine operation even Freud considered to be mysterious, might be observed directly as it is constituted through social, discursive interaction.

Before discussing these themes, it is necessary to say a few words about the use of the terms 'psychoanalysis' and 'discourse analysis', for both terms cover a variety of different intellectual positions. In discussing psychoanalysis, the emphasis will be on the writings of Freud, rather than on later schools of thought. Of course, it should be possible to link the notion of a dialogic unconscious with concepts derived from other psychoanalytic schools. Indeed, this needs to be done, if the idea of a dialogic unconscious is to be fully developed. However, this initial paper concentrates upon Freud's writings. Not only have Freud's writings a unique historic and cultural significance, but arguably they still constitute the clearest presentation of psychoanalysis's central, enduring concepts.

Just as there are a variety of psychoanalytic schools, so very different approaches to the study of language are to be found under the broad heading of 'discourse analysis' (see, for example, the compendia edited by van Dijk, 1985, 1996). The type of discourse analysis to be explored in this paper is that which has been heavily influenced by conversation analysis, ethnomethod-

philosophy of Wittgenstein. This form of analysis concentrates on studying actual utterances in their particular contexts. In this respect, it differs substantially from Foucauldian and Lacanian approaches. Foucauldian studies tend to view discourses as cultural totalities, and they seek to identify these totalities rather than examine the ways in which people use utterances in specific circumstances. Foucault's notion of a 'discourse' is, to use Saussure's distinction, more *langue* than *parole* – concerned with the hypothetical total structure rather than particular usage. Similarly, Lacan, who takes seriously the link between language and the unconscious, operates with a somewhat abstract theory of language, which explicitly gives priority to *langue*, or the total linguistic structure, rather than to *parole* (see, for example, Lacan, 1979, pp. 20–21; for more details, see Billig, 1996, 1997*c*). By contrast, the present approach, in common with much discursive psychology, is firmly rooted in the study of the utterance and the particular, occasioned use of language. The present approach, therefore, differs from those psychologists who have been recently investigating the links between psychoanalysis and discourse in terms of Foucauldian and Lacanian ideas (see, *inter alia*, Burman & Parker, 1993; Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn & Walkerdine, 1984; Hollway, 1989; Parker, 1990, 1992; Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 1995).[1]

In consequence, the notion of the dialogic unconscious, as outlined in the present paper, is neither Lacanian nor Foucauldian. It does not refer to a presumed 'fallen' structure of signification. Nor does it refer to utterances, which cannot be spoken because the speaker lacks the cultural and discursive resources for composing such an utterance. On the contrary, the dialogic unconscious comprises utterances which could well have been spoken, but which remain unspoken. These are utterances which in some sense have been dialogically repressed in particular conversational settings.

Discourse Analysis and the Unconscious

Discursive psychology has set itself the project of investigating how psychological states are constituted through discursive activity. This means paying attention to the use of psychological language in conversation. The point is not to treat psychological language (such as 'I feel happy' or 'my thoughts on this matter are . . .') as symptoms of inner processes. The analysis of psychological language, for discursive psychologists, is not a second-best strategy, as if the 'real' topics of psychology were internal, and thereby unobservable, phenomena. Quite the contrary, discursive psychologists assume that the traditional topics of psychology refer to phenomena which are outwardly observable. If one wishes to study 'feelings', psychologists should be paying attention to what people are doing when they claim to have feelings.

The principles behind this approach can be found in the later writings of Wittgenstein, who stressed that, because language is socially shared, there must be public criteria for the use of psychological words. If there were not such criteria, speakers would not be able to speak so readily of feelings, emotions or states of mind (see Shotter, 1993*a*,*b*, 1995, for discussions of Wittgenstein and

his contribution to discursive psychology). As Wittgenstein stated in *Philosophical Investigations*, 'an "inner process" stands in need of outward criteria' (1953, remark 580). He claimed that 'the characteristic mark of all "feelings that there is expression of them, i.e. facial expression, gestures' (1967, remark 513). The implications are profound. Psychologists should not search for the ghostly, unobservable essences, which are presumed to lie behind the use of feeling-words. They should be examining in detail the ways people make claims about psychological states and what they are doing when they make, or dispute, such psychological claims: they should be asking 'what is the purpose of this language, how is it being used?' (Wittgenstein, 1967, remark 716).

The techniques of conversation analysis and ethnomethodology enable discursive psychologists to answer such questions, for they permit analysts to investigate the microprocesses of speech acts in which psychological language is used. Analysts can study how, for example, claims to have particular emotions or psychological states are discursively accomplished. In this way, emotions and psychological claims are seen to be socially constituted and accomplished (Edwards, 1995*a*). For example, traditional psychologists assume that 'remembering' is something which takes place within the cognitive system of the isolated individual. By contrast, discursive psychologists treat remembering as a social and collective activity (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Middleton & Edwards, 1990; Potter & Edwards, 1990). They examine in detail the speech acts involved in making claims about remembering and forgetting, and they ask what such claims are accomplishing socially (e.g Billig & Edwards, 1994; Edwards & Middleton, 1986). Consequently, remembering, far from being treated as an unobservable, internal process, becomes a directly observable, social activity based upon speech acts.

Discursive psychology's stance of exploring observable social action, rather than searching for hidden, inner states, is reflected in the analysts' own theoretical language. Their concepts tend to emphasize action and activity, rather than inner process. Following the example of Harvey Sacks, the word 'do' features prominently in discursive analysis (Edwards, 1995*b*). 'Feelings' are activities which have to be 'done' (or accomplished socially and discursively). Discursive psychologists do not search for the feelings behind observable actions (or doings), but concentrate upon the doings, without which no one, including analysts, could talk of feelings.

It should be little surprise that an approach, which discourages phenomenological language as a tool of analysis, has little theoretical space for the vocabulary of psychoanalysis. If inner consciousness is not an explanatory concept, then there would appear to be even less reason to hypothesize an inner unconsciousness. The main texts of discursive or rhetorical psychology contain hardly a mention of the 'unconscious', 'repression' or Freud. Occasionally, and somewhat briefly, psychoanalysis is discussed, but typically in ways which discount its significance (see, for example, Gergen, 1994, p. 169; or Shotter, 1993*a*, pp. 138*f*; but see also Shotter, 1990, pp. 129*f*; for an argument that cognitive psychology has forgotten its Freudian heritage).

Discursive psychology, if it turned its attention to psychoanalysis, might easily treat psychoanalytic language as a topic of investigation, rather than as a theoretical resource for analysing other forms of discourse. This was a tactic which Volosinov/Bakhtin recommended years ago in his critique of Freudianism (Volosinov, 1994; see also Daelemans & Maranhao, 1990). Just as discursive analysts presently study how people use psychological language in everyday conversation, so they could examine how the language of unconscious motives is used in both lay and professional discourses. The distinction between the lay and the professional is not firm. As Moscovici (1976) has shown, psychoanalytic concepts are no longer confined to professional, psychoanalytic circles, but have been represented, and altered, in ordinary language. In this respect psychology, including psychoanalysis, has a wide cultural and political significance in contemporary Western society (Parker, 1994; Rose, 1990).

Discursive psychologists could specifically examine the current use of psychoanalytic concepts, thereby examining in discursive detail the phenomenon identified in broad outline by Moscovici. Such an examination of psychoanalytic discourse would not necessarily demand special methodological or theoretical treatment. Whether analysts were studying the language of consciousness or unconsciousness, the methodological techniques could be the same. The analysts would not themselves be using psychoanalytic concepts as analytic tools. They would see what is being 'done' with talk about 'hidden, unconscious motives'. They would not claim that 'hidden, unconscious motives' stand behind, or cause, this talk. For example, they would study how people talk about 'repression', but they would not assume that the talk itself was based upon repression. In this respect, such analyses would not be examining the repressive aspects of discourse; nor would they be probing the discursive aspects of repression, as understood by psychoanalysts.

Return of the Repressed Repression

Although the unconscious may be largely absent from the topics studied by discursive psychology, it is not to be easily eliminated. As psychoanalysts well understand, the repressed returns to haunt consciousness. Discursive psychologists, not to mention conversation analysts, might exclude the concept of repression from their theoretical vocabulary, but, occasionally, the repressed repression can be detected, lurking on the edges of analysis. Two examples can be briefly mentioned. Wetherell and Potter (1992), in their analysis of racist discourse, present an example of a 'benevolent racist', who disclaims being racist. This person, they suggest, fits Karen Horney's image of the individual resolving a neurotic conflict through fantasies about the ideal self (p. 54). Billig (1992), analysing how English families talk about the British Royal Family, at one point has recourse to the notion of projection (pp. 106–109; see also Billig, 1997*b*). Speakers are discussing whether the heir to the throne would be allowed to marry a non-white. The speakers disclaim their own racism, and they also deny

that the Royal Family, with whom they claimed to 'identify', is racist. Billig suggests that the 'racism' is projected onto others: the speakers oppose the idea of a non-white marrying the heir to the throne, but attribute this position to others – to 'the public' in general. The details of the analysis are not what matter for the moment, only the analyst's use of psychoanalytic terminology.

What, one might ask, are the analysts 'doing', when they use psychoanalytic terms? In both examples, analysts are considering the utterances of speakers, who are denying that they are racist, while expressing views which can easily be heard as racist. The analysts, in presenting this material, distance themselves from the respondents' denials of racism (see also van Dijk, 1992, 1993*a*). If the respondents disclaim any racist motives, the analyst, in using psychoanalytic terminology, alerts readers not to accept those disclaimers: the possibility of racist motives, unacknowledged by the holder of the motives, is left open. In this respect, as Parker (1992) has suggested, psychoanalytic concepts can be useful for a discursive psychology which has an acknowledged critical, political stance.

The analytic move of using psychoanalytic terminology does not represent an abandonment of the basic tenets of speech act theory, but is, in some respects, derived from them. The possibility of using psychoanalytic descriptions follows from the assumption that there are outward criteria for the use of psychological concepts. As Wittgenstein continually argued, because there are public criteria for the use of psychological language, we do not describe our own psychological states directly, whilst being forced to infer the states of others indirectly and with less certainty. On the contrary, as Wittgenstein wrote, 'every day we hear one man saying of another that he is in pain, is sad, is merry, etc. without a trace of doubt' (Wittgenstein, 1980, remark 138). Thus, we can legitimately claim confidence in our descriptions of another's psychological state. We may be confident, even if the other person disagrees with our assessment; in this case, we can argue that the other's description of themself conflicts with the outward criteria by which such descriptions must be made.

Wittgenstein, at one point, commented that 'it also happens that one says "I know that you felt like this then, even if you won't admit it now"' (1980, remark 138). In this sort of situation – where one person claims to know the feelings of another better than the person themself – the possibility of psychoanalytic explanations is raised. Such an explanation signals that the other's self-descriptions are unconvincing. Not only is a more convincing account of their motives offered, but also an account why the self-descriptions are unconvincing – why the person is unable to admit something about themself which is apparent to another and which should be, but is not, apparent to themself. In these circumstances, unconscious motives may be cited convincingly. Wittgenstein gives the example of someone who cannot explain why they suddenly climbed on a chair: 'Perhaps in such a case', he suggested, 'we should say that he acted with *unconscious* intention' (1988, remark no. 222). In another example, Wittgenstein wrote about someone, attempting to draw the picture of one individual but actually producing a portrait of another, being 'guided by forces in his unconscious' (1967, remark no. 262).

There are two points which can be noted about these usages of unconscious explanations. In the first place, such explanations depend upon

more 'normal' explanations. The psychoanalytic language game can never replace in its entirety the language games of ordinary psychological explanations, for they are to be used when the ordinary games appear to break down (Brearley, 1991; Cioffi, 1991; Hopkins, 1995). Second, the possibility for making explanations, which cite unconscious motivations, is not prohibited by the assumptions of speech act theory, on which discursive psychology is based. Indeed, the possibility follows from the Wittgensteinian assumption that emotions are social constructs and that it is not inevitable that the individual actor is privileged in producing more convincing self-descriptions than any outside observer can. Under some circumstances, others may doubt a person's self-ascriptions, or may wonder at the failure to produce any self-descriptions; then they may speculate why the person cannot admit to themself what appears apparent to outsiders. This sort of discursive move is to be expected in a society where psychoanalytic conceptions have passed into common sense (Moscovici, 1976). As is illustrated by the two examples taken from the analysis of speakers denying racism, discursive analysts can make the move too.

Conversation and Constraint

An important question needs to be addressed: if the discursive approach does not theoretically prohibit psychoanalytic speculations, at least in the way that it prohibits speculation about inner cognitive processes, then why are psychoanalytic notions so rarely employed? One might answer such a question historically, pointing out how psychology in general has repressed its psychoanalytic heritage (Parker, 1994; Shotter, 1990). In this respect, discursive psychology would merely be continuing a long established intellectual habit. On the other hand, one might attempt to answer more specifically by showing how discursive psychology's routine procedures of theory and methodology combine to inhibit discussion of the unconscious. It will be suggested that discursive psychology has adopted practices from conversation analysis, which tend to draw attention to the presences, rather than the absences, in discursive utterances. In particular, there are two principles of conversation analysis, which inform discursive psychology and which militate against psychoanalytic concerns with absences: (*a*) analysts should try to conduct their analyses from the participants' perspectives, as revealed in what the participants say; (*b*) analysts should use what participants say in order to reveal the structural organization of conversation.

(*a*) Conversation analysts, as well as ethnomethodologists, frequently claim that one of the strengths of their approach is that they focus 'on how participants themselves produce and interpret each other's actions' (Pomerantz, 1988, pp. 360–361). Conversation analysts do not seek to explain interaction in terms of sociological structures, which lie 'behind the backs of the participants' (Boden, 1994; Heritage, 1984). Instead, they observe how participants make sense of, and account for, the social world. In this respect, conversation analysis, to quote Deirdre Boden, assumes that 'human beings are knowledgeable agents in the production (and reproduction) of their lives and their history' (Boden, 1994, p. 13).

This assumption of knowledgeability forms the core of the ethnomethodological enterprise: 'By giving back to social agents their knowledgeability of their own social actions, it was then possible to sit back and observe the structuring quality of the world as it happens' (Boden, 1994, p. 74). In this way, ethnomethodologists, to quote Boden again, consider social order as 'a member's order than an analyst's construct' (p. 65).

The assumption of actors' knowledgeability is both a methodological facilitation and a restriction. On the one hand, analysts are bidden to take seriously what people actually say and do, rather than assume actors are simply re-enacting given roles within a hypothetical social structure. There is no doubt that this principle has productively concentrated attention on the fine detail of social life. On the other hand, the assumption is theoretically restricting in that the analyst is discouraged from taking a stance, which observers of others often do take and which is central to the whole project of psychoanalysis. This is the stance, which claims that 'members', or social actors, sometimes are unaware of the reasons for their actions and that their accounts, far from indicating knowledgeability, express a lack of knowledge and, indeed, repress self-knowledge. By assuming knowledgeability at the outset, the analyst cannot easily investigate how the repression of knowledgeability might be accomplished.

(*b*) The second principle aims to find within the utterances of social actors the structural organization of everyday life (Boden, 1994; Heritage, 1984). According to Buttny, much social interaction, such as adjacency pairings in conversation, has a 'normative organization' (1993, p. 39). Conversation analysts seek to discover this normative organization, which is presumed to lie within, and not behind, what participants say. This is why turn taking and sequential organization have been so central to conversation analysis. According to Boden (1994), 'turn taking and the sequenced structuring of action' lie 'at the heart' of social interaction (p. 53). The organizational pattern is presumed to be discoverable through understanding the sequential constraints on speakers. Drew (1995) claims that 'turns' in conversation are treated 'as the product of the *sequential organization* of talk' (p. 70). The organization is presumed to be present in the accounts which speakers themselves give. Thus, the analyst seeks to note conversational devices, which 'are *demonstrably or observably relevant* to the participants themselves' (Drew, 1995, p. 76; emphasis in original). By so doing, analysts hope to discover the 'stable and organized properties of conversational structures' (p. 76).

These structures are so normatively powerful, that they shape to a large extent what is said in conversational interaction. Drew (1995) claims that, according to the perspective of conversation analysis, participants' inner cognitive states are autonomous from their talk. What people say 'is not determined by, or the automatic product of, the processes of the mind'; instead, utterances in conversation 'are shaped most proximately by the sequential position in which the turn is produced' (Drew, 1995, p. 70). It is as if speakers find themselves inhabiting a normative structure which is more powerful than their individual feelings and to which they have to conform for interaction to proceed. This structure is present within the interaction and the analyst, therefore, seeks to examine [illegible]

among participants' actions to uncover the *sequential ordering* of accounting' (p. 59, emphasis in original). When analysts have located an instance of accounting, they should search for the conversational antecedents and consequences of these accounts. Most importantly, they should 'examine what *connects* these parts together as a coherent discursive practice of accounting' (p. 60, emphasis in original).

The upshot is that analysts tend not to search for absences in conversation, for the given conversation is to be seen as coherent in itself. It is presumed that participants are knowledgeable about the conversational structure, which is determining their 'conduct in talk-in-interaction' (Drew, 1995, p. 78). Similarly, it is presumed that this knowledge is expressed in the utterances themselves and, thus, the structure is knowable through these expressions. In consequence, the determination of particular utterances is to be understood in terms of other utterances! Again, the emphasis is upon the uttered presences of conversation. Analysts work with the text (or transcription) of the interaction, rather than using the text as a sign of something else, which is itself absent in the text, but which leaves traces. The meaning of a particular conversational turn is not to be sought in the inner states of mind of the speaker; nor is it to be sought in a hypothetical 'social structure'; it is to be found in the relations with the preceding interventions, and checked by the subsequent ones. What was, and what will be spoken, provide the means for understanding the function and meaning of what is said. In this respect, the analysts put themselves in the same position as the participants. What this means is that analysts search for the connections between utterances which are present in the conversation. What is absent from the conversation tends to be absent from the analysis.

Conversational Morality and its Flaws

By following the theoretical and methodological presuppositions of conversation analysis, researchers have provided an impressive corpus of knowledge about the intricate structures of contemporary conversations. They have demonstrated in detail the shared practices by which participants manage everyday interactions and, thereby, reproduce the normative structures which permit conversation to progress. For example, conversation analysts have claimed that there is a 'preference for agreement', which facilitates expressions of agreement and militates against expressions of outright disagreement (Bilmes, 1987; Pomerantz, 1984). There are ways of 'doing politeness', which hedge requests in indirectness, so that they are not heard as conversation-threatening commands (Brown & Levinson, 1987; McHoul, 1987). Conversationalists, in asking questions, offer possible answers and 'in so doing, they help to promote a friendly or cooperative atmosphere' (Pomerantz, 1988, p. 371). There is the structure of turn taking, which 'gives talk its rather syncopated and agreeably collaborative quality' (Boden, 1994, p. 71). Above all, there is politeness. As Chilton (1990) has written: 'Politeness formulations are universal and pervasive in everyday intercourse largely conventional and often benign. The preferred response is reciprocal politeness' (p. 222).

All this might be taken as suggesting that conversation analysis reveals little more than codes of etiquette. However, the theoretical importance of ethnomethodology and conversation analysis is that they demonstrate how social order is reproduced (Heritage, 1984). At root, the codes of conversation and politeness are codes of morality. Thus, Garfinkel (1967) claimed that ethnomethodology was revealing the accomplishment of 'practical morality'. In this respect, the micro-processes of conversational interaction reveal how everyday life is infused with moral concerns. Even the momentary pauses and fractional hesitations in routine conversations can be filled with moral import. For example, turn taking is not merely a structure which permits a conversation to proceed agreeably: it is a moral matter. As Boden (1994) suggests, by learning the routines of turn taking 'we take on that reciprocal moral code that guides human action' (p. 54).

If conversation analysis provides an investigation of practical morality, it also conveys an image of the nature of this morality. This is a morality which is seen to be routinely and successfully accomplished: it is not a morality which demands greater standards of ethics than can be practically realized. Often, but by no means always, a somewhat upbeat, positive rhetoric is used. Analysts, in quotations already presented, use terms such as 'benign', 'cooperative' and 'agreeable'. 'Members' are seen to 'collaborate', in order to 'accomplish' this morality; even the term 'member' suggests a belongingness. Because internal speculation is discouraged, the characteristics of the 'members' appear to be constituted through the talk-in-interaction. And this talk is seen to be a collaborative accomplishment, which is structured by the normative demands which are shared by the members. The result is that it is easy for 'members' to appear analytically as cooperative turn takers, who do not possess a clouded hinterland.

This positive image of social morality is very different from Freud's view. In the Freudian account, another, more dangerous, side of human nature is visible: immorality always lurks on the edge of overdemanding morality. For a Freudian, polite codes of civilized behaviour function to restrict impulses, which continually threaten social order. The more that the demands of politeness are heard to fill conversational spaces, the more the Freudian would suspect the repression of immoral impulses. The Freudian would not ask how the conversational structures of morality are accomplished, but what temptations these structures are trying to prevent. For example, if agreement is the socially preferred norm, then perhaps disagreement and disruption constitute a hidden temptation, whose delights must be repressed from consciousness.

Such questions tend not to be asked by conversation analysts, whose perspective to date has emphasized the achievement of conversational morality, rather than the repression of immorality. This can be illustrated by considering the conversational device of 'repair', which has been much studied by conversation analysts (e.g. Schegloff, Jefferson & Sachs, 1977; Pomerantz, 1984). Introducing a discussion of conversational repair, Nofsinger (1991) states that 'conversation, like other forms of human behaviour, is not perfect'. People can start to say the wrong things, or they can forget a word. According to Nofsinger, 'it is important for our understanding of each other that we fix these flaws before they lead to more serious and fundamental problems' (p. 124). Nofsinger

is taken from Pomerantz (1984; the same example is also analysed by Potter & Wetherell, 1995). One speaker suggests to another that the latter had not brought a great deal of fruit cake. The silence with which the remark is greeted leads the original speaker to 'back down' and reverse the original statement, suggesting that, after all, a little piece of cake can go a long way. The silence and the backing down indicated that the original statement was being heard as a possible criticism, which would disrupt the collaborative interaction. And so a repair was called for.

Much effort has been spent in detailing what Boden (1994, p. 75) calls the 'impressive range of repair', such as 'self-repair' versus 'other repair' etc. For present purposes, two points are worth noting. In the first place, repairs are seen to be necessary in order to rectify 'flaws', which threaten the structure of conversation. Second, the analytic attention is upon the repair rather than the so-called flaw. The flaws, which threaten the structure of conversation, cannot be explained by that structure. Analysts tend to demonstrate how and why the repair structure operates. Why the flaw should have arisen in the first place is typically left unexplained, even though flaws must occur as often, if not more often, then the repair work which follows them. Significantly, there is no technical terminology for describing how and why 'flaws' are 'accomplished'. The technical vocabulary is reserved for the repair work, which is seen as the accomplishment. Indeed, the very use of the word 'flaw', as used by Nofsinger, suggests that such utterances pose a threat to the conversational accomplishment.

Given the intricacy of speech, especially in relation to the codes of indirectness and mitigation by which politeness is routinely 'done', one can see the normative structures of conversation as highly constraining. Speakers are constrained to wait their turn, express demands indirectly, mitigate refusals and so on. In these ways, rudeness, or conversational immorality, is kept at bay. What is not asked – indeed, the standard ways of doing conversation analysis discourage the question – is why rudeness so frequently appears, or almost appears, before being quickly repaired. By contrast, the interruptions of social order – or, to use Freud's phrase, the 'parapraxes of everyday life' – have often constituted the starting point for psychoanalytic inquiry. The flaws indicate a hidden realm of desire, rather than chance accidents which happen because humans are not perfect beings. The moral codes constrain; their structures inhibit; but they do not totally dominate. Their intricacy of restraint can be read as a sign that the temptation to immorality stalks the practice of conversational morality, awaiting the opportunity to colonize vacated spaces.

Temptations of Rudeness and the Dialogic Unconscious

According to psychoanalytic theory what is prohibited beckons as temptation. If the forbidden were not tempting, there would be little need for complex moral codes. For temptation to be successfully curbed, it must not only be resisted but also denied. Social actors must chase the immoral desire from the conscious mind, lest the surface of everyday life be disrupted. All this is relevant to the practice of everyday morality, which can be witnessed in the course of even the

most casual conversations. This morality suggests a realm of discursive immorality: self-repairs, successfully accomplished, indicate a temptation resisted. This can be the temptation to act directly in ways which rudely throw off the complex restraints of discursive indirection.

One might stipulate that the possibility for 'doing politeness' depends upon the capability for 'doing rudeness' and, thus, that there is a permanent flaw in the apparently agreeable, cooperative structure. Developmentally, politeness and rudeness are linked. If politeness is routinely taught, as it must be for the skills of conversational turn taking to be acquired, then so must rudeness. Each time the adult says 'you must say *please* . . . don't speak when others are speaking . . . don't use that word – it's rude', the adult is telling the child what not to say, when speaking politely. In addition, the adult is telling the child about rudeness; in pointing out what must not be said the adult is equipping the child with dangerous, disruptive tools. Moreover, the parent, in instructing the child about these matters, tends to speak in direct ways which would not be classed as polite in adult company (Aronsson, 1991). In this way, the teaching of politeness, which is itself constituted through language, provides models of rudeness.

If all forbidden acts promise the possibility of pleasure, because they are forbidden, then rudeness and disagreement might be thought to haunt all those routine, banal enactments of discursive morality. Each conversational exchange, which successfully unfolds a normative structure without breakdown, might be said to express that structure of discursive politeness and to repress the corresponding one of rudeness. However, the notion of repression implies more than that something is hidden: it implies that what is hidden is desired as a source of pleasure. What evidence, one might ask, is there for supposing that rudeness (or politeness's repressed other) is a hidden, tempting pleasure? In Pomerantz's example of successful repair, one might ask why the first speaker broke the codes which prohibit direct criticism. Was the second speaker then tempted to challenge the first speaker, instead of remaining silent? Was the spontaneous self-repair a sign of temptation avoided? These questions are discouraged in conventional conversation analysis, whose theoretical vocabulary does not provide the words for describing a 'dialogical id' in battle with the 'conversational superego'.

Thomas Scheff (1990) has suggested that the fear of 'shame' holds social interaction in play. Should the normative structure be broken, an unrepaired conversational breakdown may ensue. The outcome is likely to be recognized as 'shameful' and the speaker feels shame, which, according to Scheff, 'is probably the most intensely painful of all feelings' (1990, p. 169). The speaker in Pomerantz's example corrects herself, lest she be heard as making an inappropriate criticism of her fellow conversationalist. Had she not done so, a scene – or conversational breakdown – might have ensued with all its attendant embarrassment and shame.

The use of psychoanalytic terminology is appropriate if there are reasons for thinking that what is shameful is also tempting. One might suggest that all social restrictions are accompanied by the desire – whether or not conscious, and whether or not constant or intermittent – to transcend the restriction. If this is so. then one should expect impoliteness to be an object of temptation and to represent a desired freedom. This temptation is both inhibited and created by

the fear of shame and by the routines of practice, which accomplish politeness. Moreover, these routines, by their very accomplishment, regularly succeed in driving the disruptive thought from the mind. Sometimes, the rude insult might just slip out, despite ourselves. And regularly, too, and again without conscious forethought, the words of repair will spontaneously slip out.

However tempting this line of argument, with its suggestion of dialogical id and superego, nevertheless it is necessary to offer some signs that the rudeness is a temptation, which must be routinely repressed. One criterion for the existence of unconscious desires is that they regularly, but unpredictably, leak into conscious awareness and into the flow of social activity. Freud, especially in *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, claimed that the 'parapraxes' of social life, such as lapses of memory, indicated the workings of repressed desires. However, the case of humour is particularly interesting. According to psychoanalytic theory, in humour the socially repressed is not only expressed but is enjoyed. Freud claimed that 'our enjoyment of the joke' indicates what is being repressed in more serious talk (*Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious*, p. 138). Mulkay (1988) has argued that humorous discourse, by being marked off from 'normal' serious discourse, sustains 'one of the basic requisites of the serious mode: namely that disagreement should be avoided as far as possible' (p. 79). The point is not merely that humorous discourse expresses disagreement and impoliteness, but that the latter, which are repressed in normal discourse, can be enjoyed in the format of humour. Comic heroes are frequently figures who disrupt the patterns of restrictive politeness. From Diogenes of Sinope, living in his tub, through to Groucho Marx and John Cleese there is a common thread. Audiences find pleasure in the character who sweeps shame and the social rules aside. Sometimes, as with John Cleese's character of Basil Fawlty, the constraints of politeness are turned into weapons of rudeness: 'thank-you-so-much', he proclaims in a parody of politeness (see Brown & Levinson, 1987, pp. 229–230 for a discussion of the way that overpoliteness can become a means of insult).

It might seem curious that displays of rudeness, which ordinarily will be treated as unethical, are greeted with pleasure in the context of humour. Freud claimed that the pleasure of a tendentious joke expressed a repressed desire: 'To the human psyche all renunciation is exceedingly difficult, and so we find that tendentious jokes provide a means of undoing the renunciation and retrieving what was lost' (1991, p. 145). This is true of the urge to be impolite. According to Freud, 'the prevention of invective or of insulting rejoinders' occurs so commonly that 'tendentious jokes are especially favoured in order to make aggressiveness or criticism possible against persons in exalted positions who claim to exercise authority' (p. 149). The comic hero becomes a figure for identification, to be admired for doing precisely that which we would fear to do. Our laughter betrays the repressed wish for disinhibition, whilst, because the joke is 'only' a joke it confirms that inhibition. Peter Sloterdijk (1988), discussing Diogenes, who insulted Alexander the Great with impunity, talks of the 'dialectic of disinhibition' (p. 103). Inhibitions are released within the joke; pleasure is performed safely, especially if we, the inhibited, can enjoy vicariously the insults. The joker, recognized as such, reaffirms the boundary between normal and humorous discourse,

thereby strengthening the inhibition. Even Alexander the Great could join in the laughter at Diogenes. The disinhibition is localized, contained within the joke. Yet, the whole business of laughter and delight only makes sense if there is a wish which stretches beyond the moment of humour: otherwise why would the comic figure be greeted with delight rather than outrage?

For Freud, the forces of desire were universal and biologically based; as such they threatened the very nature of social order. Polite dialogue, thus, depended upon the sublimation of forces, which owed their origin to non-civilized, non-dialogical factors. The opposition between desire and civilization was, for instance, clearly expressed in later works such as *Civilization and its Discontents* and *The Future of an Illusion*. However, repression, and thereby the unconscious, must be formed in dialogue. Without moral requirements, which must be consciously expressible, there would be no reason to repress desires. One can go further. Language, which is necessary for the production of morality, is not merely a vehicle for transmitting moral prescriptions. Language constructs and requires its own morality of talk, and thereby its own repressed desires. In consequence, the location of desire outside the processes of dialogue and social order is not necessary. The temptations of impoliteness do not stand outside the dialogic process, but are constituted within it. The desires to be rude, to contradict, 'to speak one's mind', to have done with the constraints of politeness are formed within dialogue. Such desires cannot antedate, nor stand outside, the constrictions of politeness. In this respect, it makes sense to talk of the unconscious being dialogically constituted.

If the impulses for rudeness are formed in dialogue, then, so it may be argued, are their repression. Dialogue must create its own ways to push the temptations of rudeness aside from routine consciousness, and to permit the conscious aims of dialogue to continue. The person's sense of their own self will be involved, investing this repression with greater force than a social misdemeanour which can be lightly broken. In talking politely and agreeably – in doing consideration of others' feelings, through repair, indirection and a thousand other conversational devices – we are reproducing ourselves as tolerant, moral, polite selves. The intolerant, rude, hurtful possibilities (and desires) have to be routinely pushed aside from conscious awareness. The mere thought of being rude – of criticizing directly, snapping back, discarding the constraints of discursive etiquette – raises temptation in ways which should not even be thought of if interaction is to proceed routinely in its structured, reflexively monitored smoothness.

It might be said that the routine conversational intricacies, which are revealed by conversational analysts, depend upon a repression which is not routinely revealed. The pushing aside of temptation must be itself pushed aside, for, as Freud stressed, the process of repression is itself to be repressed. One might suggest that the theoretical stance of conversation analysis, as practised in the main, expresses this repression. Its image of the speaker, acting to agree, avoiding disruption, and sustaining the normative structures of dialogue, reflects the self-image of the caring, considerate, tolerant speaker with no further interior life. At the same time, residing within us is the capacity to hoot with pleasure at uncaring, inconsiderate and intolerant actions.

Dialogic Unconscious in Action

If the foregoing arguments are accepted, then it should be possible to analyse discourse, in order to examine the processes of repression in action. The dialogic unconscious will be constituted within talk, and the analyst, seeking to understand how repression is being discursively accomplished, will need to examine the absences of discourse. What is not said, but could easily have been, and, indeed, on occasions is almost said but then removed from the conversation, becomes of prime significance. Such analyses would extend the scope of conversation analysis, while remaining within discursive psychology's project to show how psychological phenomena are constituted within social activity. However, such analyses would not add a 'psychoanalytic dimension' in any simple way. The notion of the dialogic unconscious should leave neither discursive psychology nor psychoanalysis untouched.

In the first place, an analysis of the dialogic unconscious in discursive action lends itself to ideological analysis. The focus can be shifted from the individual to the social and to the construction of the unconscious. Repression, then, is not a universally static process, but something which is part of ideological and socio-historical currents (Frosh, 1989). Particular codes of politeness differ culturally and historically (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Katriel, 1986). So do the topics on which people are expected to converse and remain silent. Freud's patients found it difficult, even in the privacy of the psychoanalytic consulting-room, to talk of personal, sexual matters, which are now the common themes of television discussion shows (Carbaugh, 1988; Livingstone & Lunt, 1994). On the other hand, his patients would be unlikely to have been as troubled by some of the themes of 'race' as were the speakers studied by Wetherell & Potter (1993) and Billig (1992). The latter two examples illustrate the conditions of ideological analysis. Analysts not only have to stand back from what the particular speakers are saying; analysts also must attempt to distance themselves from, and reflect upon, the social conventions and ideological assumptions which enable such accounts to be given (Parker, 1992, 1994; van Dijk, 1993*b*).

The analyst of the dialogic unconscious needs to investigate how routines of talk can prevent the utterance of themes/accounts/questionings, which might seem reasonable to outsiders but which are collaboratively avoided by the particular speakers as a localized form of politeness. To the outsider, including the analyst, it can look as if there is a joint conspiracy to achieve a collective refusal of knowledgeability. If, as Boden (1994) suggests, rationality is localized, then the local rationality can also be seen as an irrationality, with its collaborative talk accomplishing discursive repression.

The traditional procedures of psychoanalysis are not, by themselves, suited for observing the repressions of the dialogic unconscious. In traditional psychoanalysis, one form of dialogue – the psychoanalytic conversation – is privileged as a means for discovering repressions which are presumed to have taken place elsewhere. As will be suggested, Freud was uncertain how repression was actually accomplished, being more concerned to show its incompleteness. What he did not take seriously was the possibility that conversations – including those between

the psychoanalyst and patient – repressed through their expression. As conversationalists talk about one set of topics, they are keeping others from discussion. How possible topics routinely remain undiscussed – and how possible questions remain unasked – requires the sort of microanalysis pioneered by conversation analysts, applied to discursive absences as well as presences.

As will be suggested, the analysis of discursive absences might provide clues about the operation of repression. In this respect, the notion of the dialogic unconscious might help to illuminate issues at the heart of psychoanalytic theory. After all, Freud himself believed that the idea of repression, rather than that of the unconscious, was the real discovery of psychoanalysis: he claimed that 'nothing like it had ever before been recognized in mental life' (1995*c*, p. 18). However, Freud was loth to conceive of repression in dialogic terms.

A brief example can be given of the sort of routine dialogic repression, which is overlooked in classic psychoanalytic theory. The example is taken from the famous 'Dora' case, presented in Freud's 'Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria'. The 'Fragment' is a classic piece of psychoanalytic writing, notable for the detail of Freud's exposition and his imaginative interpretations (Marcus, 1986). In recent years, this case has become an object of intense reinterpretation. Feminist critics, in particular, have claimed that the case illustrates the dynamics of male power, which Freud overlooked and which, by his overlooking, he exemplified (for critiques of Freud in relation to Dora, see *inter alia*: Cixous & Clémont, 1986; Gallop, 1986; Gearhart, 1986; Irigaray, 1989; Jacobus, 1987; Lacan, 1986; Masson, 1990; Moi, 1986; Ramas, 1983; Rose, 1986). The background can be briefly given (for details of the historical situation of Dora herself, see Appignanesi & Forrester, 1993; Decker, 1991; Loewenberg, 1985; Rogow, 1978, 1979). Dora, as a young woman of 19, was brought to Freud for treatment by her wealthy, domineering father. She was suffering symptoms of hysteria and had recently threatened suicide. The life of Dora's family was intertwined with that of another family in a complex pattern of deceit. Dora's father was having a protracted affair with a young married woman, Frau K., although he denied this to his own family. To facilitate the affair, he encouraged increasing contact between the two families. Frau K. befriended Dora, often leaving her young children in Dora's care. Herr K. had been propositioning Dora since she was fourteen, on occasion grabbing her, trying to kiss her and, once, on holiday entering her bedroom while she slept. Dora told her father about K.'s advances, but he refused to believe her, claiming that she, in her hysteria, was engaging in sexual fantasies. This was one of the symptoms, which Dora's father hoped Freud would cure.

It was clear that Freud did not trust Dora's father, yet he followed the remit to restore Dora to psychological health. To this end, Freud sought to uncover repressed desires, which he assumed lay behind her hysterical symptoms. Dora was, according to Freud, really in love with Herr K., and her ready denials, when Freud put the idea to her, were further proof of the desire and its repression. Freud, after the analysis was terminated, came to the further conclusion that Dora also had erotic desires for Frau K., and that she also repressed these from conscious awareness.

Critics have claimed that Freud fell into the trap of pathologizing Dora, the victim of a pathological, patriarchal family. Freud's methodology was to use the psychoanalytic dialogue as a means of uncovering repressions, which were presumed to be individual and non-dialogic. His evidence for Dora's repressed wishes came from his interpretations of what Dora was telling him. In a later essay 'Repression', Freud specifically suggested that repression was '*individual* in its operation' (1995*b*, p. 572, emphasis in original). In searching for the individual aspects of repression, Freud's attention was directed towards Dora's individual inner life – to her dreams, fantasies, private thoughts and so on. He paid little attention to the conversations in which she would have routinely participated. One might argue that these conversations were crucial for the situation, in which Dora was caught. Moreover, if one takes the notion of the dialogic unconscious seriously, they might have provided models for the individual repression, in which Freud was interested.

According to the account which Freud presented, Herr K. sent Dora flowers every day for a whole year, whenever he was in the neighbourhood. He constantly bought her presents and spent 'all his spare time in her company' (1995*a*, p. 188). Freud adds an astounding, but unelaborated, remark: Herr K. pursued Dora 'without her parents noticing anything in his behaviour that was characteristic of love-making' (p. 188). How, one might ask, was this failure to notice achieved. It was, of course, a convenient failure for all concerned, except for Dora, the youngest and most vulnerable of the participants. What was said by Dora's parents when the flowers were delivered yet again, or when Herr K. arrived with another wrapped present for the adolescent? As he stood in the hallway, with all the conventional demeanour of a lover, what routines of greeting were developed? Did they make jokes about his being a suitor?

Here was a process of repression being socially produced in overt family activity, as all refused to draw the obvious conclusion or to ask the dangerous question. K.'s visits and flowers, by virtue of their frequency, must have taken on the character of a habit. If jokes were uttered, did these become family jokes, which by their familiarity repressed the truth they expressed? Or did a silence, filled by other words, become routine? One might predict that a pattern was established, so that the repression was reinforced through routine, especially dialogic routine. In short, one would want to know how the routines of greeting, as well as the routine ways of talking about the visits when the topic occurred in conversation, functioned to repress other, more obvious interpretations.

Similar discursive processes of avoidance can be seen in the two examples of racist discourse, discussed earlier. The denial of prejudice is not challenged. Speakers use conventional expressions, which polite white speakers are not expected to dispute: 'I'm not prejudiced but . . .' is rhetorically structured for agreement (Billig, 1991; Wetherell & Potter, 1992; van Dijk, 1992, 1993*a*). Questioning must be absent for the conversation to proceed without 'flaw'. For instance, the English families, talking about royalty, were collectively denying their own racism, while arguing for the impossibility of a non-white monarchy. A discursive projection was constructed: it was others – 'public opinion' or an amorphous 'them' – who would prevent any interracial marriage – not the Queen.

with whom the speakers were claiming to identify as the figure of nationhood. In this way, the speakers were distancing themselves from the racist practices, which they were tacitly supporting but attributing to others. Complex discursive strategies were used to maintain the position. Speakers avoided the word 'white', with its connotations of racial purity and, thereby, of racism (for details, see Billig, 1997*a*). The discursive balance was preserved by the avoidance of awkward questioning, as speakers collaborated to accomplish the collective projection.

If repression is dialogically and socially constructed then topics of repression will vary culturally and historically. The bourgeois citizenry of Freud's Vienna might have developed complex discursive codes to repress the topic of sexuality. However, the Viennese, whose elected mayor at the time of Freud's conversations with Dora was an openly racist demagogue, would be surprised, perhaps shocked, by today's inhibitions about 'race'. They would have difficulty adjusting to today's complex discursive codes of utterance and absence, by which racism gains entry to respectable homes with the demeanour of denial, rather like Herr K. being welcomed through the hallway with his bunch of flowers.

Dialogic Nature of Repression

Finally, some implications from the notion of the dialogic unconscious can be drawn in relation to Freudian ideas about the nature of repression. Necessarily these implications can only be outlined briefly. Discursive psychologists have suggested that public discourse often provides the model for individual functioning. For example, Billig (1996) proposed a rhetorical model of thinking, suggesting that internal debate is based upon public argumentation; children learn to think inwardly on the basis of their participation in the outward rhetoric of debate (see also Shotter, 1993*a*, *b*; Wertsch, 1991). The same approach can be applied to repression. Through participation in dialogue, which represses as it expresses, people acquire the skills of repression. These dialogic and social skills, when internalized, provide the basis for the sort of repression which Freud called individual in its operation.

Although Freud might have seen repression as the key concept of psychoanalysis, his writings are somewhat sketchy about describing the routine operation of repression. Routines are to be expected for, as Freud claimed, repression 'demands a persistent expenditure of force', for the repression of any particular thought is not 'an event which takes place once' (1995*b*, p. 572). When Freud attempted to describe how repression operates, he often lapsed into conceptual difficulty or mechanical metaphor (see Soyland, 1993, and Gellner, 1985, for discussion of Freud and metaphor). In 'The ego and the id', Freud envisaged the conscious part of the mind (the ego) repulsing unconscious forces from the id. Yet, the repulsion, accomplished by the ego, must itself be repressed. Thus, the ego must be unaware of itself and its accomplishments. Conceptually, therefore, the ego cannot be identified with consciousness for in some respects it 'behaves just like the unconscious' (1995*d*, p. 631). But how can consciousness be just like the unconscious, prelinguistic id? Freud recognized that there were conceptual

problems: 'We land ourselves in endless obscurities and difficulties if we keep to our habitual forms of expression (p. 631).'

Part of the problem lay in Freud's insistence that repression was, at root, a non-linguistic process, which was as mysterious as the non-verbal, instinctual id. There were, he admitted, linguistically constituted forms of repression, but these were more superficial, less basic forms. Freud, in his essay on 'Fetishism', specifically distinguished between repression proper (*Verdrängung*), which was non-linguistic, and disavowal (*Verleugnung*), which operated through language (Freud, 1977, pp. 352*ff*). Repression keeps affect away from consciousness, whereas disavowal is aimed at only the idea of the affect, rather than the affective forces themselves (see Laplanche & Pontalis, 1983, for further references to Freud's distinction). What is clear is that Freud believed that the basic process, by which the ego deflects the desires of the id, was the non-linguistic *Verdrängung*, rather than *Verleugnung*. And about the ways *Verdrängung* operated he could say little except by way of the mechanical metaphor.

It is possible to challenge the primacy of the non-linguistic forms of repression, while still keeping within the internal logic of Freudian theory. As Freud stressed, the necessity for repression only arises as a consequence of social morality. In 'On narcissism', he wrote that 'for the ego the formation of an ideal would be the conditioning factor of repression' (1995*e*, p. 558). Without a sense of conscience – and a punitive ideal to live up to – the ego would not need to censor desires. It can be argued that, from a developmental point of view, the notions of morality only arise within language: indeed, as conversation analysis suggests, talk-in-interaction forms the basis of routine, practical morality. If language-in-interaction creates moral imperatives, then it may also provide the means for their routine accomplishment. This would include the routines of dialogic repression.

Once the issues are put like this, then a step is made towards clearing some of the mysteries of repression. If repression is thought to be individual, unconscious and asocial, then the individual cannot learn (let alone be taught) how to repress. Something mysteriously innate, and non-cultural, must spontaneously occur, when cultural norms make their presence felt. On the other hand, if language-in-interaction itself depends upon repression, then in learning how to use language the child is learning lessons of repression. Polite talk will provide the models for individual repression, just as argumentation provides the models for internal deliberation (Billig, 1996). The child who learns the codes of discursive politeness, which are integral to learning to talk, learns how to change the subject, to avoid questioning ('it's rude to ask'), to turn threatening topics into humour, and so on. In learning these dialogic skills, the child is acquiring routines, which can be applied to their own individual mental life. Shockingly shameful thoughts may flash into consciousness; the individual knows how to change the subject, attribute thoughts to others, or tag them with humour. Above all, the person is acquiring routines of thought – or the buzz of internal chatter – which can keep the shocking waiting outside, pressing the bell and only gaining admission if it can appear, like Herr K., as a friendly, respectable guest.

If this line of argument is accepted, then the routine conversations in Dora's household were not irrelevant to her 'condition'. They, and other conversations,

provide the models for any self-disavowals enacted within the interior mental life. The theoretical implications are considerable. On the one hand, the notion of a dialogic unconscious serves to make the basic processes of repression appear less mysterious and more openly observable than is posited in Freudian thinking. On the other hand, the dialogic unconscious depicts ordinary conversations as more psychologically and ideologically charged than they typically appear to conversation analysts. In consequence, the idea of the dialogic unconscious opens the way to an unlikely combination of psychoanalytic and conversation analytic ideas in ways which could broaden and deepen the project of discursive psychology.

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Notes

1. Hollway (1989), in an interesting and original investigation, uses psychoanalytic ideas to investigate dialogue. In certain respects her work parallels some of the present arguments. However, she does not use conversation analytic notions, which stress the occasioned character of discourse. She tends to use Lacanian ideas of signification which, from a conversation analytic point of view, do not tie in closely with the details of the utterances, which she studies.
2. There has been a tendency for conversation analysts to study agreement rather than disagreement, or to see disagreement as a disruption to the joint accomplishment of social life. However, more analysts are beginning to see the importance of argumentation in social life. To quote Schiffrin (1984), argument can be a 'form of sociability' (see also Billig, 1991, 1996; Grimshaw, 1990; Horowitz, 1996; Schiffrin, 1987; and see Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984, for analyses of argument in science). The effect of this stance on the theoretical vocabulary of conversation analysis remains to be seen. Already some analysts are counterposing the supposed 'preference for agreement' with an occasioned 'preference for disagreement' (Billig, 1991; Horowitz, 1996).

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8

Investigating Narrative Inequality: African Asylum Seekers' Stories in Belgium

Jan Blommaert

1. Introduction

In a remarkable paper, Dell Hymes and Courtney Cazden investigated 'the possibility that one form of inequality of opportunity in our society has to do with rights to use narrative, with whose narratives are admitted to have cognitive function' (Hymes and Cazden, 1980: 126).[1] On the basis of observations on speaking rights in university classes they concluded that the use of particular ways of narrating focused upon the expression of emotions and personal experience and voiced in an 'anecdotal' mode was easily dismissed, while other narrative modes in which academic voicing and emotional detachment were more prominent were clearly privileged. Thus, 'contributions to class discussions based on narratives of personal experience did not get the floor' (1980: 127) and 'the truth of the matter would be that only the "anecdotes" of some would count' (1980: 131). The rights to use particular narrative modes are unevenly distributed, and this pattern of distribution disenfranchises those who have to rely on 'disqualified' narrative modes for conducting their business in society.

My aim in this article is to document and discuss autobiographical stories told by African asylum seekers in Belgium. I will try to highlight aspects of the structure and functions of narratives in an attempt to show how they represent crucial communicative resources for asylum seekers. Without recourse to the long and detailed narratives about home, escape and travelling, asylum seekers cannot make their motives and causes for seeking asylum fully understood. In highlighting these aspects, I display a concern for narrative–textual shape inspired by authors such as Hymes (1981, 1996, 1998) and Haviland (1996, 1997), as well as one for narrative–textual dynamics inspired by what has come to be

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known as a 'natural histories of discourse' approach (Bauman and Briggs, 1990; Briggs, 1997; Gal and Woolard, 1995; Silverstein and Urban, 1996) emphasizing entextualization practices (de- and recontextualization practices) as crucial ingredients of 'interpreting' and 'understanding' text. These approaches to text will be set within a wider project that bears affinities to that of critical discourse analysis and can be summarized as investigating language-as-social-process in order to gain a more precise insight in power relations (see, e.g. Wodak, 1995).

The problem I wish to address through an analysis of these stories is that of narrative inequality in the context of asylum applications in Belgium. The asylum procedure involves a complex set of discursive practices and language ideologies that are, in practice, being used as criteria for 'truth', 'trustworthiness', 'coherence' and 'consistency'. Such discursive practices require access to communicative resources that are often far beyond the reach of African asylum seekers not only linguistically but also narratively and stylistically.

Like so many bureaucratic procedures, the asylum application procedure used to be 'blackboxed'. Hence, direct evidence of the official procedure interviews is not (yet) available,[2] and I have been forced to use the research tactic employed by, for example, Labov in his *Logic of Nonstandard English* (1970) (as well as, e.g. by Hymes reanalysing Labov's data in Hymes, 1996: chapter 8); I have also had to use 'second best' data and look at preconditions for talk in these data. The asylum seekers' narratives undoubtedly illustrate the way in which communicative resources are mobilized for 'making sense' of the asylum seekers' case; at the same time, they suggest at least the possibility of narrative inequality when measured against the norms and expectations inscribed in the discursive patterns of the asylum application procedure.

The lack of attention to the crucial functions of densely contextualized (and contextualizing) narratives is partly due to the particular treatment of text in bureaucratic procedures, particularly the shaping of textual trajectories in which 'original' stories are continuously reformed and reformulated. Hence it illustrates the fact 'that talk is often structured vis-à-vis mediated relationships it bears to objects and texts that are dispersed in time and space' (Briggs, 1997: 454–5) – in this case, vis-à-vis preconceived criteria of textuality and narrative appropriateness that are inscribed in practices of noting, summarizing and reading narratives, making 'files', interviewing and interrogating, translating and so forth (together with their products: specific texts formats and individual texts) within administrative procedures, themselves part of a huge text tradition such as that of Belgian law and bureaucracy. I argue that this process of (re)structuring talk into institutionally sanctioned text involves a dynamic of entextualization that is based on power asymmetries. This process also involves the problematic of the availability and accessibility of linguistic–communicative resources – an often overlooked 'context' of talk, but one that will be given prominence in this article (see also Blommaert, 2001).

Narrative inequality assumes a variety of shapes and has a multitude of dimensions. Three dimensions will be discussed in some detail here: (i) the accessibility and availability of linguistic–communicative resources; (ii) particular contextualization demands; and (iii) the ways in which texts are shifted through

the procedure. In my discussion, I focus on preconditions for discourse: the sort of 'material' for communication that asylum seekers have access to and what it means to be confronted with a bureaucratic system in which particular 'materials' are expected and required.

In the next section, I briefly provide some background on the situation of asylum seekers in Belgium and on the fieldwork project in which the data discussed here were gathered. In section 3, I turn to the issue of communicative resources and discuss some of the features of language competence observable in the talk of the asylum seekers. Section 4 presents a discussion of the particular type of sub-narrative that I call 'home narratives'. Home narratives are often long and sometimes anecdotal stories on the situation in the refugees' home societies, involving usually very detailed information on local events, the crisis from which refugees fled and so on. Home narratives are contextualizing accounts, and the particular contextualization trajectories they follow require close inspection. In section 5, I try to situate the home narratives in the discursive patterns that occur during the asylum application procedure.

2. Asylum Seekers in Belgium

The data discussed here were gathered during a fieldwork project in which more than 40 African asylum seekers were interviewed, most of them being illegal or in limbo, their asylum application either being undecided or having been rejected.[3] The interviews were open interviews in which asylum seekers were invited to tell the story of their escape, their reasons for escape, their experiences with the Belgian asylum procedure and with life as an asylum seeker in Belgium. The interviews were conducted in French, English and (in a small number of cases) Dutch. Dutch was the mother tongue of the interviewers; thus in most cases the interviewers and the interviewees had to rely on a language other than their native language to do the interview, and as a rule non-native varieties of those languages were being used.

The interviews were obviously very different from the ones taken in the official application procedure. The main difference was, however, not the open format of our interviews. The official interview also contains important 'open' slots. These open interview parts obviously offer a lot of material for detailed scrutiny and cross-questioning by the officials, and so become a threat rather than an opportunity for asylum seekers. Another shared feature between our interviews and the ones held in the procedure was the use of non-native languages as a lingua franca in the interview, implications of which will be discussed in section 3 of this article. The main difference was probably the key in which the interviews were put: ours were obviously inconsequential (though some subjects either suspected or hoped that the interview they did with us would have some benefit), and overall they were held in a friendly and sympathetic atmosphere.

In Belgium as elsewhere in Europe, asylum seeking has become a topic of heated political debate in recent years. The last decade has witnessed a rapid increase of asylum applications. This, combined with the increased complexity

of the cases – many asylum seekers do not offer a 'typical' motive for seeking asylum, as we shall see further – has led to bottlenecks in the administrations in charge of asylum regulations. In the past, it took years to reach a decision on some applications. In the meantime, applicants lived in the country in appalling conditions of poverty and marginalization (pushing them into the crudest systems of labour exploitation, including prostitution); often the administrative treatment was reduced to a very superficial inspection of the application in attempts to speed up the procedure and reduce the backlog of applications. The infrastructure for hosting asylum seekers rapidly (and chronically) proved to be grossly inadequate and violence became a constant ingredient of the treatment of asylum applicants by the police force. This flooding of the administrative apparatus went hand in hand with negative stereotyping of asylum and asylum seekers (Blommaert and Verschueren, 1998: chapter 8), associating asylum seekers with crime and qualifying most of them as 'adventurers' who sought asylum exclusively for economic purposes (in popular parlance: 'to take advantage of our generosity').

In September 1998, a young Nigerian woman called Sémira Adamu died during her forced repatriation. Her asylum application, based on the argument that she would be forced to marry an old and violent man in Nigeria, had been rejected. She was put on a plane for Togo and seated between two policemen; when she started to shout, the police officers put a small pillow over her mouth. Sémira Adamu went into a coma and died. Her violent death caused a public outcry both among asylum seekers and among the public at large. Asylum seekers came out of hiding and demonstrated, occupying churches and schools. A number of organizations were formed for the improvement of the living conditions and the chances of asylum for asylum seekers, and the government ordered a public inquiry into the procedures of repatriation of rejected applicants. For a brief period, asylum was a priority on the political agenda, and the negative stereotyping of asylum was transformed into a public image of victimhood. In the spring of 1999, the protests gradually faded and the issue of asylum seekers resumed its previous shape and course.

As shown later, the asylum procedure relies heavily on an investigation of applicants' stories. On their arrival in Belgium, they are interviewed about the causes and motives for fleeing their country and seeking asylum. The general format applied in this procedure is that of a criminal investigation. Well over 90 percent of the applications are turned down, often – as we shall see – on very doubtful grounds. Politically, the 'control' of immigration (i.e. the *reduction* of the number of effective immigrants) combined with a policy of 'humane repatriation' of rejected applicants is a generally accepted doctrine. The new phenomenon of massive asylum seeking is rarely seen as an issue in its own right, rather it is associated with the more general issue of immigration and immigrant policies in Belgium, and it is usually presented as a further complication of an already thorny issue of 'integration'/assimilation of foreigners into the local cultural, linguistic and social communities.

The discursive patterns by means of which these political categories are being constructed and situated in the larger fr[illegible]

society are beyond the scope of this article (see Blommaert, 1997; Blommaert and Verschueren, 1998); suffice it to state here that the issue of asylum seekers is obviously one in which rhetorical accomplishments and discursive constructions of reality are crucial. The politics of asylum in Belgium is a politics of representation in which discursively constructed and disseminated gross categories (e.g. 'political', hence 'legitimate' asylum seekers versus 'economic', hence 'illegitimate' asylum seekers) are crucial political instruments.

The historical situatedness of our data deserves some attention. The interviews we organized with asylum seekers were conducted between October/November 1998 and March/April 1999, i.e. during the brief period in which asylum seekers came out of hiding and were eager to tell their stories to all those interested, and during which there was some positive media and political attention for these stories. This accounts for the fact that we could collect data at all. During these few months, asylum seekers became visible and their stories became publicly accessible. Second, it explains the nature of their stories: they are apologetic and argumentative, using a discursive space shaped by the Sémira Adamu crisis, in which new views of asylum seeking, motives and experiences could be articulated. For a brief period, asylum seekers had a legitimate voice, and their case was taken up by many opinion makers and politicians.

3. Resources

One of the characteristics of the administrative world we live in is the unchallenged and apparently unchallengeable assumption that bureaucratic and administrative clients would have complete control over the medium and communicative skills in which bureaucratic and administrative procedures are being carried out. In Belgium (as undoubtedly elsewhere) administrative procedures require highly developed literacy skills as well as (some degree of) access to a standardized variety of a language (in Belgium: Dutch, French or German). It should be noted, in passing, that literacy requirements seem to increase in size and scope the lower one gets into society. People on low incomes often have to go through a mass of complex and very diverse paperwork in order to get social welfare benefits, privileged access to social housing, medical treatment or education. Thus, Jim Collins' comment that 'modern educational systems produce stratified literacies: elites are socialized to an interpretive relation to texts, and nonelites to a submissive relation to texts' (1995: 84) becomes pressingly relevant.

The first requirement, literacy, is taken for granted and is rooted in a sociocultural tradition in which generalized schooling provides (stratified patterns of) literacy to *all* Belgian citizens. Being literate is a sociocultural given in Belgium. The second requirement is more controversial and multilayered: the emphasis on standard varieties is rooted in political–linguistic struggles of the past, discussion of which would take us outside the scope of this article. Standard varieties of languages were used as emblems of national identity in many parts of the world; the outcome of the struggle in Belgium gave rise to a highly complex and politically very sensitive language legislation in which tolerance for other

speech varieties (nonstandard forms as well as foreign languages) is restricted. Thus, nonstandard varieties are allowed in the domain of orality and non-official language use; as soon as the bureaucratic and administrative arenas are being entered, the standard (written) variety of the language is imposed.

The fact is that the communicative requirements imposed on clients are conditioned by historically contingent phenomena such as the social distribution of communicative resources through, for instance, the education system, the mass media and so forth. In more than one way, the requirements thus presuppose membership of the society, or at least of social units with similar linguistic economies and communicative sociologies. Assumptions of choice in pragmatic theories (for instance in conversation analysis) are very often based on the implicit acceptance of such membership, and tend to obscure significant inequalities in the range of possible choices some people can control. Constraints on choice, anchored in inequality of speech repertoires, are certainly crucial features of our asylum seekers' data, and competence in the medium of narration is one issue. It makes a significant difference whether the narrator uses a language or language variety over which she or he has adequate control. Narrating in a second, third or other foreign language may considerably reduce the set of resources which speakers can select for structuring their story and thus for 'making their point'. As we shall see, this does not pre-empt the fact that they make their point; it does however influence the way in which interlocutors perceive their story and *get* the point.

In what follows, I first document some problems in language proficiency. After that, I turn to what I call 'ethnocoherence': patterns of coherence that can be discerned in such narratives, despite the sometimes considerable problems of language proficiency.

3.1 Problems of Language Proficiency

Let us now take a closer look at some examples from the corpus. They illustrate the difficulties experienced by many speakers in expressing themselves in French, English or Dutch. More often than not, stories are told in hesitant styles packed with self-corrections and mid-sentence changes of tactic, footing or topic, less than adequate lexical selection, problems in verb inflection (e.g. tense and aspect marking), problems in selecting adequate pronouns, and so on. At the same time, the stories that are being told are topically and structurally quite complex, as we shall see in the next section. The problems with language proficiency considerably complicate matters.

Extract 1 illustrates the types of stories which result from the use of 'broken' French coupled with a detailed and complex home narrative. The interviewee, a man from Angola, is explaining an episode of Angolan history to the interviewer.[4]

Extract 1

oui/l'autre président . . .(xxxxxx)/on l'a empoisonné/c'est le président Mobutu/ qui a mis le poison retardé/ il est parti au russe/ l'URSS/ pour traîter/ il a retourné/ il est mort/ mais on a abandonné son corps hein/oui/ {{*Question: c'était un président*

de MPLA?}} c'était le même mouvement MPLA/ dans le temps/ année septante-cinq/ quand il est mort on dit/ comme on ==il est marxisme/ on a pris on a choisi =on= on a fait faux testament/ cette testament c'était au temps du russe qui a fait ça/ comme toi tu =le= le président il est mort/ il a décidé Eduardo qui va me remplacer/ sans vote/ parce que il est toujours du même parti/ Eduardo il est d'origine angolais/ mais il est des Cap Verdiens/ parce que ce sont des anciens prisonniers/ et Portugais il a mis à l'île hein/ nous sommes à l'océan/ et on a mis une prison là-bas/ parce qu'il est venu pour commander l'indépendance/ c'était une petite ville =une petite= une petite village/ on a mis au pouvoir/ maintenant le président/ c'est on dit/ il dit que non/ tous les gens/ qui parlent Lingala/ les gens du Nord/ ce sont des gens plus malins/ plus intelligents/ par rapport au gens du Sud/ en Angola nous sommes quatre couleurs/ comme le Bré=le Brésil.

Translation:

yes/the other president . . .(xxxxxx)/they have poisoned him/ it's president Mobutu/ who put the delayed poison/ he has left to Russian/ the USSR/ to treat/ he gave back/ he died/ but they have left his corpse, right/ yes/ {{*Question: it was a president of the MPLA?*}}/ it was the same movement MPLA/ in those days/ year seventy-five/ when he died they say/ like they=he is Marxism/ they took they chose= they=they have made false testament/ those testament it was in the time of Russian that has made it/ since you you=the=the president is dead/ he decided Eduardo who is going to replace me/ without vote/ because he is always of the same party/ Eduardo he is of Angolan origin/ but he is of the Cape Verdians/ because they are former prisoners/ and Portuguese has put on the island, right/ we are at the ocean/ and they have put a prison over there/ because he had come to command the independence/ it was a small town= a small=a small village/ they have put to power/ now the president/ that is what they say/ he said that no/ all the people/ who speak Lingala/ the people from the north/ they are more clever people/ more intelligent/ in relation to the people from the south/ in Angola we are four colours/ like Bra=Brazil

As demonstrated in the next section, a tremendous amount of information is squeezed into narrative passages such as this one. The point I wish to make here is that the narrative structure and the salience of what the man tells us are overshadowed by the code in which he tells it: a variety of colloquial and informally acquired French in which grammatical, syntactic and lexical errors are frequent when measured against normative standard French. The sequence of events is not marked by the usual tense and aspect markers; nouns and adjectives are used as synonyms ("il est marxisme" instead of "il est marxiste"; "russe" instead of "Russie"); articles are deleted ("Portugais" instead of "le Portugais" or "les Portugais" and so on. The Angolan man is struggling with the code. Hence, contextually crucial and sensitive episodes such as the one in which he describes the change of power in his country (crucial and sensitive because they form the basis of the reasons why he escaped from his country) are narrated as:

Extract 2

dans le temps/ année septante-cinq/ quand il est mort on dit/ comme on ==il est marxisme/ on a pris on a choisi =on= on a fait faux testament/ cette testament c'était au temps du russe qui a fait ça/ comme toi tu =le= le président il est mort/ il

a décidé Eduardo qui va me remplacer/ sans vote/ parce que il est toujours du même parti/

Such ways of narrating crucial and sensitive matters are offered to interviewers who are also non-native speakers of French. But there are various sorts and degrees of 'non-nativeness', having to do with what sort of variety has been acquired by the speakers, through which types of channels and means (formal–informal learning, spoken and/or written, which genres). In this case, the interviewers were Belgian-Flemish highly literate university students with a more or less developed competence in 'schoolbook French', i.e. a variety of the standard language rarely used in practice. Students such as the group of interviewers in this project do not have much exposure to French, and they actively use it only on relatively rare occasions. So the interaction situation is one in which one party uses – and I adopt Fergusionian terminology for the moment – a very 'low' variety of French and another a very 'high' variety, while both parties have difficulties with the production of spoken French and none of them is 'fluent'. The passage in Extract 2 therefore appears very confusing, rambling and incomprehensible to the Belgian interviewer.[5]

The asylum seekers often acquire their varieties of European languages in informal circumstances: outside school, through exposure to specific varieties of speech, with dialect and/or jargon influences. This, as well as the effect it has on the interaction with the interviewers, can be seen in Extract 3 where the same Angolan man (P) explains the sort of currency used in Angola:

Extract 3

P: mais en Angola on mange les dollars/ nous avons les
Q: on mange?
P: oui on mange= =d=dollars/ au magasin on achète en **dollars / à cause de** (mon= au magasin on dit) c'est les magasins des français/ **Elf**

Translation:

P: but in Angola we eat dollars/ we have the
Q: we eat?
P: Yes we eat==d'dollars/ in the shop we buy in dollars/ because (sho= in the shop they say) it's the shop of the French/ Elf

The interviewer Q interrupts P with a request for clarification on the phrase "***on mange les dollars***". The phrase "***manger***" followed by the name of a currency is a colloquial Congolese French expression meaning 'to use a specific currency'. Interestingly, P does not recognize Q's request for clarification as referring to "***manger***" but understands it as a request to clarify why *dollars* are being used as currency in Angola. So his answer elaborates on the fact that the shops are owned by the French petrol company Elf.[6]

The next example illustrates how expressing sometimes even quite simple concepts or experiences can become highly problematic because of the limitations imposed by the code in which the story has been told. A woman from Angola tells her experiences in a detention centre for asylum seekers. She

tries to explain that there is a problem with *ventilation* in the centre; the whole fragment in Extract 4 is a struggle to find the right way to express 'ventilation'.

Extract 4

il y en a des familles qui vivent ici/ des enfants/ mais.. Il n'y a pas des choses de vapore==pour vaporiser des cigarettes/ parce que la cigarette là-bas ce n'est pas de==c'est de==de tabac/ les gens il va fumer du matin au soir/ il n'y a pas de fenètres pour sortir euh/ enlév==entrer le vent==il n'y a pas/ presque tout c'est fermé/ dans les toilettes c'est la même chose/ des fenètres ça n'ouvre pas

Translation:

there are families who live here/ children/ but... there are no things to vapore= to vaporize cigarettes/ because the cigarette there it is not the== it's = tobacco/ the people he smokes from morning till evening/ there are no windows to get out ehr/ take aw=get wind in=there are none/ almost everything is closed/ in the toilets it's the same/ the windows they don't open

Metapragmatic framing, speech act selection and other phenomena that belong to the sociocultural anchoring of language are also sources of communicative problems in our data. Often, the use of a common medium in interviews between native and non-native speakers triggers the assumption from the native speaker that the interlocutor not only shares the *linguistic* code, but also the *pragmatic and metapragmatic* codes. Giving metapragmatic instructions about the way in which the interview will be conducted (a common opening phase of research interviews) is one such locus of problems. The following fragment is taken from the start of an interview with R, a male refugee from the Ivory Coast. The tape starts running, and the interviewer B begins by giving some 'director's instructions' to R.

Extract 5

B: Ik denk dat het gemakkelijkst zou zijn als je begint/met hoe dat je naar hier bent gekomen ehr
R: =met vliegtuig
B: ja/waarom wa=waarom je naar hier gekomen bent/ehr/en hoe je hier geraakt bent/dat jij gewoon/ we gaa=we gaan niet veel vragen stellen/'t is wat/dat jij gewoon praat/wat praat
R: ja
B: zeggen watje..
R: =ja het is heel moeilijk om te zeggen (...)

Translation:

B: I think that it would be easiest if you start/with how you got here ehr
R: =by plane
B: yes/why wh=why you came here/ehr/and how you got here/that you just/ we won=we won't be asking many questions/it's what/that you just/talk a bit
R: yes
B: say what you..
R: =yes it's very hard to say (...)

B's intention is to provide some metapragmatic instructions for the interview. But mentioning one topic of inquiry "how you got here" in line (1) triggers a response from R ("by plane", line 2). R had interpreted line 1 as a question, not as part of a set of preliminary instructions. B repairs the mistake in line 3–4, R acknowledges this in line 5, and B hands the floor to R in line 6. Two problems can be identified with respect to R's misinterpretation of B's statement in line 1. First, the interview was in Dutch, B's mother tongue. Dutch, for R, is a new, foreign language which he masters admirably but not completely. The original utterance in line 1, spoken by B, was "*hoe dat je naar hier bent gekomen*" ("how-that-you-to-here-have-come"), in which the vernacular Dutch '*hoe*' ('how') is meant to stand for *the total set of circumstances* of R's coming to Belgium. It is not uncommon in varieties of Dutch to ask "how [Dutch *hoe*] did you get here" with the intention of learning the *reasons* for one's being there. But R, a non-native speaker of Dutch, only picks up the 'typical' *instrumental* meaning of 'hoe' ('how'), and answers that he came here "*met vliegtuig*" ("with-plane"). B's repair in line 3 consists of differentiating and specifying the precise semantic directions of his questions – 'how' as well as 'why'. So part of the mistake is based on differential competence in Dutch, more precisely, it is based on R's lack of familiarity with the semantic and pragmatic nuances of colloquial Dutch.

Second, there is also a mistake in *speech act interpretation.* R fails to pick up the *declarative* nature of B's utterance in line 1, and interprets it instead as a *question* to which he has to reply. In all likelihood, R interprets the circumspect formulation "I think that it would be easiest if you start/with how you got here" as an indirect, deferent question, rather than as the neutral declarative statement intended by B. Both problems have to do with the intercultural nature of the communicative event. The prima facie sharedness of the medium – R has an admirable knowledge of Dutch – can trigger an illusion that not only the lexical and grammatical aspects of the language but also the complete set of sociocultural, pragmatic and metapragmatic aspects are shared by the participants. This is not usually the case. In this fragment we see that differential competence in a language can be hardly noticeable, as it can lie in aspects of language that are less clearly visible than, for example, wrong lexical choices or grammatical (e.g. gender, article or inflectional) errors.

3.2 Ethnocoherence

The various difficulties with competence in the medium of the talk, reviewed so far, all suggest that stories are told in 'simple' varieties of languages. But this does not mean that such stories are 'simple', nor that narrators fail to bring about significant degrees of narrative structure or coherence in their stories. Even though the language may be simple and plain, and despite 'errors' in the language, stories can be narratively complex and display obvious patterns of coherence. But coherence seems to emerge in peculiar (*ethno*) ways, since speakers have no access to the full potential of grammar and syntax of the languages they have to use.

Let me illustrate this with an example from our data. The fragment is taken from the beginning of an interview with Habiba, a Somali woman. H is Habiba; A and B are interviewers.

Extract 6

H: I'm from *Somalia and my name is Habiba Mohammed and I=I have *five childrens and I coming here before the children are coming=when I was euh when I=I'm arrive in Belgium I was *alone\
A: ah\
H: yeah\in sake of the war=the war of Somalia\
A: uhuh\
H: And. I w=I'm. Twen=*thirty five years old\
A: uhuh\
H: and euh I was working in Somalia ICRC International red Cross
A: that's
H: ICRC *Red Cross\
A: ah OK OK jaja
B + H: [acknowledge]
H: and I was euh office assistant\
A: ja
H: yeah. So Somalia is starting war *nineteen ninety one
A: uhuh\
H: so until ninety one to ninety five I was in Somalia
A: uhuh\
H: and [baby starts crying] wa [laughs] and I have *four children at that time and euhm.. My husband comes from euh *north Somalia
A: uhuh
H: and I *south Somalia is fighting north at=at south is fighting\
A: uhuh
H: so my=my husband and my children have no. *safety for their lives
A: uhuh

Habiba clearly has difficulties speaking English. Her statements contain Dutch calques such as "in sake" (from Dutch "*in zake*", i.e. 'concerning', erratic plural marking ("childrens") and verb inflection ('and I coming here') and so on. But let us re-transcribe Habiba's narrative, deleting the interviewer's backchannelling interventions as well as the clarifying insertion sequence (on 'ICRC', two turns). These backchannelling interventions are important, because they support the structuring of Habiba's narrative; but by deleting them we arrive at a number of narrative statements:

Extract 7

1. I'm from *Somalia and my name is Habiba Mohammed and I=I have *five childrens and I coming here before the children are coming=when I was euh when I=I'm arrive in Belgium I was *alone\
2. yeah\in sake of the war=the war of Somalia\
3. and. I w=I'm. Twen=*thirty five years old\

4. and euh I was working in Somalia ICRC International red Cross
5. and I was euh office assistant\
6. So Somalia is starting war *nineteen ninety one
7. so until ninety one to ninety five I was in Somalia
8. and wa= and I have *four children at that time and euhm.. My husband comes from euh *north Somalia
9. and I *south Somalia is fighting north at=at south is fighting\
10. so my=my husband and my children have no. *safety for their lives

There is a considerable degree of narrative structure and coherence in this fragment, despite the 'broken' English in which it is made. First, Habiba brings new information in each of her statements. The statements do not overlap; each of them introduces a new element in the story. Also, there is a clear break in this sequence of narrative statements. Although each of the statements adds new information, Habiba marks a thematic break between statement 5 and 6. Statements 1–5 all refer to Habiba herself, they identify her (name, age, country of origin, profession); statements 6–10 are about '[the war in] Somalia' and provide background to the reasons why she came to Belgium. The break between both thematic parts is marked by cohesive devices: "and" in the first part, "so" (and "and") in the second. The use of these particles creates a complex pattern of information in the story:

Extract 8

PART I

1. I'm from *Somalia
2. **and** my name is Habiba Mohammed
3. **and** I=I have *five childrens
4. **and** I coming here before the children are coming
   {clarification} =when I was euh when I=I'm arrive in Belgium I was *alone\
   yeah\in sake of the war=the war of Somalia\
6. **and.** I w=I'm. Twen=*thirty five years old\
7. **and** euh I was working in Somalia ICRC International red Cross
8. **and** I was euh office assistant\

PART II

1. **So** Somalia is starting war *nineteen ninety one
2. **so** until ninety one to ninety five I was in Somalia
3. **and** wa= and I have *four children at that time
4. **and** euhm.. My husband comes from euh *north Somalia
5. **and** I *south Somalia is fighting north at=at south is fighting\
6. **so** my=my husband and my children have no. *safety for their lives

We can go a bit further. In part II, two levels can be distinguished. Not all the statements in part II are equally relevant. Statements 1, 2 and 6 are 'main' statements, setting important argumentative and narrative frames. Statement 1 introduces the general historical frame of the war in Somalia; statement 2 places Habiba in that historical frame, and statement 6 draws a general conclusion from this general sketch of Habiba's family's situation in the war. Statements 3, 4

and 5 elaborate on statement 2: they clarify and specify statement 2, Habiba (and her family) living in Somalia during the war years. Thus we arrive at the following structure for part II:

Extract 9

PART II

1. **So** Somalia is starting war *nineteen ninety one
2. **so** until ninety one to ninety five I was in Somalia
3. **and** wa= and I have *four children at that time
4. **and** euhm.. My husband comes from euh *north Somalia
5. **and** I *south Somalia is fighting north at=at south is fighting\
6. **so** my=my husband and my children have no. *safety for their lives

The main statements are marked by "so" the subordinate ones by "and". The structure is crystal clear, and Habiba accomplishes it by means of only two cohesive markers: "and" and "so".

The narrative patterns we find in stories such as that of Habiba not only contain a wealth of information, structured into patterns that reflect relevance and affect – Goffmanian footing – they often also contain intricate argumentative patterns in which theses are formulated, refuted, demonstrated by means of evidence and so on. Emphasis, logical or associative sequences, cause–effect relations, argument elaboration patterns are all marked by speakers. In order to make their point, speakers draw upon complex sets of related arguments, illustrations, conclusions, deductions and so forth.

Let us take a look at another example. The following fragment is taken from an interview with an Angolese couple P (husband) and D (wife); the Belgian interviewer is GM. The interview was in French. The following fragment occurs as part of an exchange on the role of the media in the Sémira Adamu case. The Angolese couple had been interviewed by local TV reporters, and GM asks whether they believe that this media exposure would have a beneficial effect on their asylum applications. The answer is negative: the authorities publicly claim that they would adopt a more flexible attitude towards asylum seekers; yet as soon as the latter present themselves to the authorities, the answer they get is that "they will have to follow the procedures". The Angolese woman elaborates this further:

Extract 10

1 4: à la télé on dit/*ooh noon/on peut pas donner tous lees personnes après cinq ans
2 les==on a fait euh dix ans/ les choses comme çà/ on va regarder les procédures /mais le
3 premier jour on dit à la télé /ooh noon /on va *donner les gens qu'on a fait cinq ans dans
4 notre pays/ parce qu'il y a eu des enfants qui étu=étudient ici depuis longtemps/ on a fait
5 *six ans==*cing ans et les enfants ils vont à l'école==c'est le bourgemestre de Bruxelles

6 qui a dit comme ça==
7 GM: ==hmm=
8 D: =ouais/ les enfants sont *integrés chez nous depuis longtemps==il part à l'école/mais
9 maintenant je pense qu'on va les donner les ==pour donner les enfants==là à ses parents/
10 *mais après quelques jours on a dit/OOH NOOON on va euh==suivre les procédures
11 [hits hands on legs] MAIS *COMMENT ON PEUT SUIVRE LES PROCEDURES?
12 [annoyed] depuis moi je suis ici en Belgique/ je suis sans papiers/ tu mé suis?/ sans
13 papiers/ ici/ exemple/ pas pour moi pour le moment/ il vient ici comme un==a une femme
14 ici dans le journal==hier==on=a=lu/ sans papiers/ venue ici/ il a trois enfants==cinq
15 enfants ici en Belgique/ sept ans==six ans sans papiers/ alors/ à ce moment-là vous disez/
16 faut suivre les procédures/ la femme là/ depuis l'été vous avez eu les procé=les papiers/
17 vous avez jeté les papiers dé la femme/ on sait pas qu'est=q procédure/ *quelle procédure
18 on peut suivre?/ pour la femme/ c'est *ça les problèmes/ les *Belges peut pas donner les
19 gens un papier comme ça/ ils pensent qu'on donne/ *aah tous les gens ils restent dans
20 notre pays/ mais euh==*SI LONGTEMPS ils part dans le pays des gens pour rester là/à
21 *Portugal il y a des Belges==on a *fait quelque chose là-bas

Translation:

1 D on the telly they say/ *ooh nooo / we cannot give all the people after five years the==they
2 have done ehr ten years/ the things like that / they are going to look at the procedures / but
3 the first day they say on the telly/ oooh nooo / we will *give the people that has done five
4 years in our country / 'cause there have been children who stu=studied here since long /
5 they have done *six years==*five years and the children go to school== it's the mayor of
6 Brussels who says like that==
7 GM: ==mhm==
8 D: =yeah/ they children they have integrated here since long=he leaves for school but now I
9 think that they'll give them the=to give to the children=there to their parents/ *but after a
10 few days they said/ oohh nooo we will ehr=follow the procedures [hits hands on legs]

11 BUT *HOW CAN WE FOLLOW THE PROCEDURES? [annoyed] *since I arrived here
12 in Belgium I've got no papers/ do you follow me?/ no papers/ here/ example/ not for me
13 for the moment/ there comes here like a=there's a woman here in the
14 newspaper=yesterday=we have read/ people without documents/ came here/ he's got three
15 children==five children here in Belgium/ seven years=six years without documents/ so/ at
16 that moment you say/ got to follow the procedures/ that woman there/ since the summer
17 you have e=u the proce=the documents/ you have thrown away that woman's documents/
18 we don't know what's=wh=procedure/ *what procedure one can follow/ for the woman?
19 That is the problems/ the *Belgians cannot give to the people th=documents just like that/
20 they think that they give/ *aaahh all these people stay in our country/ but eh=*so long
21 they leaves to countries of the people to stay there/ in *Portugal there are Belgians=they have done something there

The Angolese woman tries to make a crucial point in understanding her condition and experiences as a refugee: the gap between what Belgians believe happens to refugees, and what really happens to them in Belgium. She makes this point in 'broken' French, part of the features of which do not appear in the English translation (e.g. ambiguous 3rd person "on", meaning "they" as well as "us" and impersonal "one"). However, more interesting is the elaborate argumentative structure of D's talk. Prompted by GM's suggestion that TV exposure would create a more favourable climate for asylum seekers to obtain their documents (i.e. to be 'regularized' and given legal residence permits) she argues that this is not the case. She describes what happened. First, largely in reported speech ("ooh noo", performance marked by lengthened vowels) she describes how the Mayor of Brussels declared on TV that people with children who go to school in Belgium and who have been in the country for a number of years would be regularized (lines 1–6). Next she describes how the Belgian authorities shifted their position a couple of days later, again using reported speech (line 10). She then states her own position: "but how can we follow the procedures?", and starts elaborating on that theme using an anecdote picked up from the newspaper. This then leads to a conclusion and a coda, in which the situation of asylum seekers in Belgium is compared to the freedom with which Belgians settle elsewhere in the world.

Despite her 'broken' French, D constructs a clear pattern of arguments, schematically represented as follows. Note also how the central motif of the argument, the issue of how to follow procedures, is marked by parallelisms (indicated by arrows ⇐):

Extract 11

1. Background
They will give the [documents] to the children to their parents
because they have been integrated here (says the Mayor of **Brussels**)

2. Point of departure:
[But] afterwards they say that we have to follow the procedures ⇐

3. Refutation

3.1. Core
But how can we follow the procedures? ⇐

3.2. Elaboration
1. Ever since I arrived here, I lived without documents
2. Anecdote: Report
yesterday we have read in the newspaper
A woman with no documents and 3/5 children
No documents for 7/6 years

Comment
And then they say that you have to follow the procedure ⇐
[BUT] you have thrown away that woman's documents
We don't know what procedure to follow ⇐

4. Conclusion and coda
That is the problem
The Belgians cannot give documents just like that [i.e. they *don't* give papers just like that, procedures must be followed, and this is problematic]
[BUT] Belgians believe that everyone just stays in their country
[WHILE] Belgians themselves can be found all over the world (Portugal)

We see a well-organized narrative pattern emerge over and beyond difficulties in handling the linguistic code. The core of the argument is clearly marked, and the refutation is accomplished by means of comparison of D's situation with that of someone else (the anecdote) and leads to a convincing point: staying in Belgium is not as simple as Belgians tend to believe it is; in fact, Belgians have an easier time when they decide to go and live abroad.

Stories told in 'simple' language are not necessarily 'simple' stories. But they may be stories that are open to all sorts of misinterpretation by interlocutors who, often, have a different (yet equally limited) competence in the medium in which the interview is done. It requires some effort to detect coherence in the stories told in 'broken' varieties of Dutch, English or French, because coherence and structure have to be sought at levels of linguistic structuring not easily penetrable to non-specialists and difficult to pick up while the story is told.[7] We will turn to such forms of structuring in section 4. But before that, we have to refer back to what we said at the beginning of this section: in our society, administrative procedures and the rights that are dependent of their 'correct' fulfilment require and assume the sharedness of linguistic and communicative resources. The fact of the matter is that these resources often lack from the repertoire of the asylum seekers interviewed by us. Consequently, issues of resources are crucial elements in the forms of narrative inequality investigated here. Inequalities

in speech repertoires condition narrative inequalities and thus inequalities in the allocation of social rights.

4. Home Narratives

4.1 A Contextual Account

One feature in many interviews is the way in which interviewees attempt to provide detailed contextual accounts of their lives, local circumstances, politics and conflicts in their home society formulated in the shape of sub-narratives of the larger narrative. We call such contextual accounts 'home narratives'. Often these narratives are triggered by an awareness that the story cannot be fully understood unless other people know some details about the society they come from, the particular events that caused their flight, and so on. Such exposés can be highly complicated. They can disturb an expected pattern of sequential event narrating ('first this, then that') and give a muddled impression (see Ochs and Capps, 1996, for a general survey of features of similar narratives). The details given by interviewees can also backfire: details are open to scrutiny and one inaccuracy, inconsistency or contradiction in the story can be enough to disqualify asylum seekers, as will be shown in section 5.

The following fragment is taken from an interview with R, a male refugee from the Ivory Coast. The interview was in Dutch. At one point, the interviewers (B and T) ask "What were the precise reasons why you came here?". What follows is a long contextualizing narrative, placed between two general framing statements which are given in bold.

Extract 12

1	R:	(sighs) **ja/voor/alle mensen is het moeilijk de politiek van Ivoorkust/ te begrijpen/**
2		want/ er wordt nooit iets over gesproken/ maar bij ons is er/ is er nog het leger van
3		Frankrijk aanwezig/ onze/ euh onze luchthaven is de basis van het Franse leger/ en die
4		mensen zijn toch daar/ en we=we hebben geen recht om zelf ons=onze regering te te te
5		kiezen/ ja die mensen worden door Frankrijk genoemd/ maar wij=wij zijn geen kolonie
6		meer/ sedert achtendertig jaar zijn wij/ euh/hebben wij onze onafhankelijkheid gekregen/
7		maar tot nu toe worden onze ministers altijd door Frankrijk gekozen/.../ ons land ligt/ in
8		het midden van West–Afrika/ en dat is een strategische positie/
9	B, T:	ja ja
10	R:	wij=wij zijn niet rijk/ en / OK/ acht jaar geleden/ probeerden wij politieke par=partijen op
11		te richten en zo/ maar de regering zelf heeft achtendertig partijen opgericht/ terwijl dat het

moeilijke is om/ euh/ gekozen te worden of een land te le=te leiden/ als je geen lid van de
partij bent/ dan hebben zij=hebben wij andere/ euh/ toestemming van partijen te creëren
gekre=gekregen/ en daarnaast/ of bovendien heeft de regering zelf achtendertig partijen
gecreëerd/ naast de =plus de=deuh monopartisme zo
B: ja
R: de monopartisme die bestaat sedert zestig tot negentig/ dertig jaar/ en ja/ zij hebben zelf
dertig=ja achtendertig partijen gecreëerd/ de mensen die niet voor de regering werken/ ik
bedoel/ in/ euh/ de=de privé/ het privéwerk is heel weinig/ dan werkt al=iedereen
voor=voor de staat/ en als/ ja de mensen die voor de staat werken/ zijn zoals deuh/
gevangenis/ zij zijn zoals gevangen/ want je/ je=je bent altijd bang/ jouw werk te
verliezen/ misschien in jouw familie met jouw neven en nichten en zo zijn jullie
misschien ongeveer honderd mensen en je bent alleen als persoon die werkt/ dat/ ja/ al die
andere mensen zijn/ die=die zijn arm en/ die rekenen allemaal op jou/ dan moet je jouw
werk houden anders wordt iemand van jouw familie gekocht/ om te gebruikt te worden
tegen je/ ja zo'n dingen/ ja zo'n kleine dingen/ en wij// ja/ ja daar is onze=onze president
van onze partij [wijst naar foto in de huiskamer] wij hebben ook=wij proberen ons hier te
organiseren in België in Nederland in Frankrijk/ de=de grote groep bevindt zich in
Frankrijk in Italië in Duitsland ook in andere landen/ in Nederland/ de mensen van
Nederland komen bij ons/ overmorgen hebben wij onze/ ja grote vergadering in
Brussel/.../ dat is het dan/ ja deuh reden was dat in vijf=vijf en negentig moesten wij/ een
verkiezing doen/ en in vierendertig/ euh vier en negentig moest een lijst van alle bewoners
gedaan worden/ maar de mensen die=die/ euh die=die/deden/ als die bij u komen en die
weten dat je een=een lid van de oppositie bent/ dan wordt je=jouw name=euh jouw naam
niet ingeschreven/ en als jouw naam niet ingeschreven wordt kan je niet stemmen/ en die
hebben zo gedaan/ ja wij hebben geprobeerd/ die lijst terug te vinden/ja/ ja een andere te
maken/
B, T: ja
R: maar dat was illegaal

40 B: ja
41 R: ja/ dan worden wij vervolgd/ **en zo ben ik moeten vluchten**

Translation:

1 R: (sighs) **yeah/for *everyone it is difficult to understand the politics of the Ivory Coast**
2 **because/ it is never discussed**/ but over there we still have the *French army/ ehr ehr our
3 airport is a French army base/ and these people are there anyway and we=we=we have no
4 right to choose our=our own government/ yes these people are appointed by France/ but
5 we are *not a colony anymore...since thirty-eight years we ehr have obtained our
6 independence/ but until now our ministers have always been appointed by France...our
7/8 country is in the center of West–Africa/ and that is a strategic position
9 B, T: =yes yes
10 R: yes/so...yes there is=we are not rich/ and/ okay/ eight years ago we tried to create political
11 par=parties and so but the government itself has created *thirty-eight parties/
12 while this is the difficult thing to ehr get elected or to lead a country.. If you are not a
13 member of a party/ *then they=we obtained different ehr permission to create parties/ and
14 apart from that or on *top of that the government has created thirty eight parties/ apart
15 from the=*plus the thehh monopartism like that
16 B: yes
17 R: yes the monopartism exists since sixty/ till ninety/ thirty years/ and yes they have
18 themselves created thirty=thirty-eight parties/ the people who *don't work for the
19 government/ I mean/ in ehr..the=the private the private sector is very small/ everyone
20 already works for=for the government/ and if.. yes the people who work for the
21 government they are like ehr the prison/ they are like imprisoned/ because you..you=you
22 are always afraid of losing your job/ maybe in your family with your nephews and nieces
23 and so maybe you are about one hundred people and you are the only one who has a job/
24 that/ yes/ all these other people are/ they=they are poor and they all count on you / then
25 you have to keep your job *if not *someone from your family will be bought to be used
26 against you/ yes things like that..small things like that/ and we...yes [sighs] yes there is

27 our president of our party [points to a picture on the wall] / we also have=we also try to
28 get organized here in Belgium in Holland in France/ the=the large group is in France in
29 Italy in Germany also in other countries..in Holland/ the people from Holland will come
30 here the day after tomorrow we have our/ yes large meeting in Brussels...that's it...yes
31 thehh reason was that in nine=ninety five/ we had to do an election/ and in thirty
32 four=ninety four a list of all the *inhabitants had to be made/ but the people who did that
33 when they came to you and they know that you are a=a member of the opposition/ then
34 your name=ehr your name would not be written down/ and if your name is not written
35/36 down you can't vote/ and that's what they did/ yes we tried to find that list/ yes and make
37 another one
38 B, T: yes
39 R: but that was illegal
40 B: yes
41 R: if it/ yes/ then we are prosecuted/ **and so I had to escape/**

Almost 40 lines of monologue separate the question as to why R had to escape from the Ivory Coast and R's conclusion to the answer "And so I had to escape". In this monologue, he tries to capture some of the basic political mechanisms and problems of his home country: French neocolonialism (lines 2–7), monopartism and the difficult transition to multipartism (lines 10–15), political clientelism (lines 17–265), the opposition movement in the diaspora (lines 28–32), and the direct cause of his flight: protest against the manipulation of the elections (lines 32–41). This fragment is again followed by a very detailed account of the political and institutional customs of the Ivory Coast blended with accounts of events leading to R's flight.

4.2 Patterns and Structures

The man from the Ivory Coast starts by saying "for *everyone it is difficult to understand the politics of the Ivory Coast", indicating the need to provide such detailed information on life in the Ivory Coast: a precise understanding of why he escaped from his country would be impossible for people who hardly know anything about life and politics in his country (cf. "because/it is never discussed").

If we look a bit closer into the narrative structure of this fragment, we see the following patterns emerge. First, the narrative can be divided into episodes marked by particular narrative patterns:

Extract 13

1. for *everyone it is difficult to understand the politics of the Ivory Coast
   because ... it is never discussed
2. But over here we still have the French army
   ehr ehr our airport is a French army base
   and these people are there anyway
3. and we=we=we have no right to choose our=our own government
   yes these people are appointed by France
   but we are *not a colony anymore...
   since thirty-eight years we ehr have obtained our independence
   but until now our ministers have always been appointed by France...
   {reason} our country is in the center of West–Africa
   and that is a strategic position
4. {preceded by reply from B, T} yes/so...yes there is=we are not rich/ and..
5. okay..eight years ago we tried to create political par=parties and so
6. [louder] but the government itself has created *thirty-eight parties
   6.1. while this is the difficult thing to ehr get elected or to lead a country..
   If you are not a member of a party/ *then they=we obtained different ehr permission to create parties/
   and apart from that or on *top of that the government has created thirty eight parties/
   apart from the=*plus the thehh monopartism you see?
   6.2. yes the monopartism exists since sixty/ till ninety/ thirty years/
   6.3. and yes they have themselves created thirty=thirty-eight parties/
   6.4. the people who *don't work for the government/
   I mean/ in ehr..the=the private the private sector is very small/
   everyone already works for=for the government/
   and if.. yes the people who work for the government they are like ehr the prison/ they are like imprisoned/
   because you..you=you are always afraid of losing your job/
   -maybe in your family with your nephews and nieces and so maybe you are about one hundred people
   -and you are the only one who has a job
   that/ yes/ all these other people are/ they=they are poor and they all count on you /
   –then you have to keep your job
   -*if not *someone from your family will be bought to be used against you/
   yes things like that..small things like that/
7. and we...yes [sighs]
   yes there is our president of our party
   we also have=we also try to get organized here in Belgium in Holland in France/
   the=the large group is in France in Italy in Germany
   also in other countries..in Holland/
   the people from Holland will come here the day after tomorrow
   we have our/ yes large meeting in Brussels...

8. that's it...yes thehh reason was that
   8.1. in nine=ninety five/ we had to do an election/
   and in thirty four=ninety four a list of all the *inhabitants had to be made/
   8.2. but the people who did that
   when they came to you and they know that you are a=a member of the opposition/ then your name=ehr your name would not be written down/
   and if your name is not written down you can't vote/
   and that's what they did/
   8.3. yes we tried to find that list/
   yes and make another one
   8.4. but that was illegal
9. if it/ yes/ then we are prosecuted/
   and so I had to escape/

We can identify nine narrative episodes marked prosodically or by means of markers such as "but" or "and". The most complex episode is episode 6, subdivided into at least four sub-episodes. If we reorganize this narrative pattern so as to structure it into an argumentative 'answer'-pattern to the question, we see the following (paraphrases are given between accolades):

Extract 14

Why did you escape from the Ivory Coast?
Point of departure
1. For everyone it is difficult to understand the politics of the Ivory Coast

General reason: neocolonialism
2. We still have the French army
3. And we have no right to choose our own government
   {reasons:} we are in the centre of West–Africa
4. {that is why the French are there, because} we are not rich

Specific reason: membership of political opposition party
5. Eight years ago we tried to create political parties
6. {this is problematical, because} the government itself has created 38 parties
   {the government manipulates the democratization process: monopartyism plus 38 bogus parties}
   {iron grip of the régime on society} you are always afraid of losing your job
7. {our party also exists in Europe}
8. The {immediate} reason was {election fraud}
   {the régime tried to commit fraud in voter registration}
   {we tried to counterfeit our own voter registration list}
   but that was illegal

Conclusion
9. Then we are prosecuted and so I had to escape

This home narrative plays a crucial role in 'making sense' for the asylum seeker. The immediate cause of his problems is one issue, the wider context of neocolonialism and an oppressive one-party regime is another. This man broke the law

of the Ivory Coast in trying to counterfeit a voter registration list; but the justification for this act is the wider political context that makes clear that the Ivory Coast is not a democracy, that the laws are dictatorial, and that he and his friends broke that dictatorial law in their struggle for democracy. His asylum application in Belgium was jeopardized on grounds that he broke the law in his home country; his home narrative is an attempt to explain the justified nature of his asylum application. In sum: his home narrative is not a side-track, it is right on track.

4.3 Contextualizing Accounts

Let us go somewhat deeper into the explanatory and argumentative functions of these home narratives. R, in the fragment above, starts his monologue with a deep sigh and a reflection on the ignorance of Belgian people about the intricate realities of the politics of the Ivory Coast. In other interviews, we saw such home narratives framed in terms of absence of attention from the 'international public opinion' – 'everyone should know this' (a phenomenon also noted by Malkki, 1995 among Hutu refugees in Tanzania). In either case, the accurate contextualization of personal experiences in terms of local political, economic, social and cultural terms appears to be a crucial explanatory strategy for attaining understanding.

Text-structurally, home narratives are often framed by utterances situating them in relation to a particular argument or explanandum: preceded by framing statements such as "you must know that . . .", "you see, in my country . . .", "people here don't know that . . ." and so on, and followed by statements connecting the home narrative to a particular argument such as "that is why . . .", "and so . . .". So one of their functions is to provide a particular epistemic format: a metapragmatically framed 'aside' in which crucial referential and indexical 'fillings' are given of terms, concepts and features of the story.

This epistemic format is shaped by means of contextualizing discourses of time and place. The refugee experience is an experience of displacement (similar to the one described for native American groups by Collins, 1998) seen as crucial in understanding the work of identity of such groups in light of changing living conditions, political allegiances, economic practices and physical migrations. Stories from such groups thus display a complex interplay of physical space (e.g. place names), social space (e.g. sociocultural values or ethical codes associated to certain places) and narrative space (discursive articulations through indexical links in a narrative), in which migrant, minority or other social identities are being shaped (cf. Collins, 1998: ch. 6). Malkki (1995) demonstrated how physical displacement – part of the *condition humaine* of refugees – gives rise to forms of remembering that include spatial as well as temporal trajectories of leaving, being transported, settling, staying and returning, all of which become characteristic of the exile identity of the Hutu refugees she investigated (see also Maryns and Blommaert, 2001). In our data, too, displacement becomes a matter of identity, and (re)telling the story of escape and exile as well as the story of dealing with Belgian authorities gives rise to narratives that provide the core of [illegible] the autobiography of refugees takes the

shape of *trajectory* telling. Temporal and spatial elements are used in constructing 'refugeeness', as this identity relies on the fact of having left one place, travelled across parts of the globe and settled in another place. Surely, the increasing structuration of narratives into 'fully formed narratives' testifies to the gradual and discursive practice-based construction of such refugee identities.

In the home narrative in Extract 12, three places are articulated together with three time frames. Three different time frames are used to qualify features or events associated to either Belgium or the Ivory Coast: the present (incorporating the act of telling), the past and a timeless, permanent state of affairs. The timeless and the past frames are used to qualify the Ivory Coast; the present is used to qualify Belgium. We can summarize these in the following schema:

Time	Place
Present	HERE: Belgium • systemic observations: people don't understand politics in the Ivory Coast • political activism in exile
Past (i) Long (38 years) (ii) short (8 years, critical moment 1995)	THERE: Ivory Coast • monopartism, dictatorship • political activism, election incident
Timeless	THERE: Ivory Coast • systemic observations: neocolonialism, strategic location, poverty, clientelism

Richard Bauman (1986, quoted in Briggs, 1997) defines narrative as 'a representation of a segment of social life in such a way as to create a series of sequentially ordered events'. In the home narrative discussed here, the *temporal* sequence of events from past to present which would constitute a 'typical' narrative is 'broken' by a number of systemic observations with respect to the general political and social situation in the Ivory Coast, narrated in a factual timeless present tense. Thus, in response to the question "why did you escape from the Ivory Coast?", the man from the Ivory Coast presents us with a classic narrative in the sense of Bauman's definition, the chronological unfolding of events of which is, however, 'scrambled' temporally. We get a sequence of narrative episodes in which the time frame shifts between present, past and timeless states. If we place the narrative units identified and numbered in Extracts 13 and 14 above in a schema based on the three time frames (and keeping in mind the connection between time frames and places), the sequential-temporal ordering in the narrative appears in the table below (numbers refer to the episodes).

The starting point of the narrative is the here-and-now: an observation of the ignorance of the Belgians about the predicament of the people in the Ivory Coast, considerably complicating life for Ivory Coast refugees in Belgium. Next, a timeless time frame is introduced in which general contextualizing 'facts' are being offered, linguistically articulated in factual and declarative expressions without concrete temporal anchoring (episodes 2, 3, 4). Once this timeless, general context has been sketched, a more concrete and temporally sequential-

timeless contextualizing comment (6.1, 6.4) and once by an episode connecting the events in the Ivory Coast to the present in exile (7). The narrative concludes with a statement (9) that can both be seen as a closure of the sequential account of events and as an anchoring of the whole preceding story into the present situation of exile and asylum seeking in Belgium. It can, of course, also be seen as the point at which both aspects intersect and become one: the present situation of being a refugee.

Present (here)	Past (there)	Timeless (there)
1		
		2
		3
		4
	5	
	6	
		6.1
	6.2	
	6.3	
		6.4
7		
	8	
	9> <9	

This pattern of temporal and spatial deixis is both a generic and an epistemic–argumentative matter. It is generic in the sense that it constitutes the genre of home narratives: nonlinear references to here/there and now/then/always make up the considerable complexity of such stories, the trajectory telling. It is at the same time epistemic–argumentative in the sense that it is directed at a hearer (and at overhearers) who needs to be instructed about these issues. This other-directedness of home narratives makes them fulfil the contextualizing functions they have in the story at large: they provide settings, scenes, referential domains and indexicalities that need to be adopted by the hearer.

In this move, there appears to be an acute awareness of the categories and interpretive resources of the hearer: the assumption used in telling home narratives is that (i) Belgian hearers *do not know* this; (ii) consequently their view of the situation in the home country is *wrong* and prejudges a correct interpretation of the causes and motives for the asylum application; and (iii) hence, the Belgian hearers *need to know* a series of things, so as to modify their categories and interpretive resources in treating the story of the asylum seeker. Home narratives are based upon a perception of *false or inaccurate contextualization* of situations and events in the countries of origin – wars, political conflicts, poverty – and are aimed at recontextualizing or 'recentering' them (Bauman and Briggs, 1990). The recentering is a process of localizing the conflicts, events and upheavals: instead of broad, abstract and impersonal ('decentered') categories of war, conflict, crisis, poverty and so on, concrete and highly personal, 'local' indexicalities are offered: 'this is not *the* war in Angola; this is *my* war in Angola'.

And the centering and localizing is performed by means of stories that blend personal chronological trajectories – autobiographies – with general framing statements on how life was and is over there and what people need to know in order to correctly understand the autobiographical narrative.

5. Narratives, Dense Contextualizations and the Asylum Procedure

5.1 Asylum Procedure and Narratives

We now move back to the comments we made at the outset of this article. In the Belgian asylum procedure, the asylum seekers' stories assume a central and critical role. The basis on which applications are being examined and sanctioned is the textual set of statements taken from the asylum seekers, in which they announce their desire to seek asylum in Belgium and provide reasons and motives for that desire. Inconsistencies in the stories are a major cause for refusing refugee status to asylum seekers. As will be shown later, inconsistencies, ranging from contradictions between two versions of the story over not remembering names, places or dates, and superficial or incomplete knowledge of things assumed to be known to people from one country (e.g. the name of the president, names of towns and cities, etc.) can all serve as cause for refusal. Strangely enough in a legal system backed by sophisticated high-tech and advanced forensic sciences, this kind of legal procedure relies heavily on narrative analysis.

This narrative analysis is, of course, performed in ways that can only be qualified as impressionistic. We have old and time-tested rules of evidence used to investigate statements made by people living in a highly literate environment, whose memories are supported by a (sometimes massive) literate 'archive' (diaries, notebooks, newspaper clippings, photographs, all kinds of small documentary souvenirs of events in one's life, see Radley, 1990), and whose statements are produced and interpreted in an interactional setting in which the interlocutors share the same linguistic resources and communicative skills (see the discussion in section 3 above). These rules of evidence stress textual consistency, linearity, logic, rationality and factuality; they require considerable attention to details; they rely on written language as the basic and most lasting format of declaring 'truth'; in short, they are highly culture- and society-specific and reflect local ideologies of language, literacy and communication. These rules of evidence are applied to statements made by people for whom few of these formats of language and communication can be taken for granted. Hence, what happens in the institutional processing of asylum seekers' stories is often a battle with unequal arms, and the confrontation of different narrative conventions creates a huge problem of justice and fairness.[8]

Attention to asylum seekers' storytelling conventions is scant. Yet their central position in the asylum procedure makes them into an important topic of research, both analytically and politically. The salience of looking at the way in which asylum seekers' stories are being told can perhaps be briefly illustrated with reference to the Sémira Adamu case. When her death was announced in the

media, one of the striking ingredients of many statements was the abundant reference to 'her story'. It was said that, indeed, forced marriage could be sufficient grounds for asylum, but that in her case 'her story did not fit'. The official verdict announcing the refusal of asylum argued:

> The story of the applicant is not precise on many counts. Thus, she could not specify the family name of a childhood friend with whom she stayed. She also failed to specify the date on which she was supposed to have escaped from Lagos. (My translation, Dutch original from *De Morgen*, 3 October 1998)

Other references to how Sémira Adamu interacted with people – again, matters of style – include a statement by the Catholic pastor of Brussels Airport, a man who met Sémira Adamu occasionally. To him as well, Sémira Adamu was not quite trustworthy:

> In the [asylum] Centre nobody believed her. I don't know the real story either. I rely on my intuition. Sometimes, when you asked her something, she just stood up and walked away. Or she started to sing. I once asked her why she had travelled so many thousands of kilometers to escape from a sixty-five year old man. 'Is Africa not big enough', I asked her. She didn't answer that question. (My translation, Dutch original from *De Morgen*, 3 October 1998)

Again, a lack of credibility seems to be tied up with the way in which Sémira Adamu communicated. Even sympathetic voices refer to peculiarities in communicative style. Lise Thiry, a former socialist senator who acted as foster parent for Sémira Adamu, qualified her as follows:

> Apart from that, Sémira sometimes seemed British rather than African to me. She didn't have the outspokenness and extroversion some of these [African] women have. (My translation, Dutch original from *De Morgen*, 3 October 1998)

Communicative style (including narrative style) is always a source for character assessment and character attribution. In a field as sensitive as asylum regulations, where officials' decisions may imply the difference between life or death, relative well-being or poverty, safety or danger, some attention to what actually happens in interaction may not just be desirable, but simply imperative.

5.2 Textual Trajectories

Let us begin with a brief survey of the interactional processes that constitute the core of the asylum application processes. A first observation is that in the totality of the procedure, direct interaction between asylum seekers and officials is restricted to a number of well defined occasions, viz. interviews on the asylum

seeker's story. Soon after their arrival in the country, asylum seekers are interviewed by officials, sometimes (but by no means always) assisted by interpreters. The topic of the interview is their motivation to seek asylum in Belgium: why did they leave their country, how, when? What reasons do they offer for assuming that their lives or life chances are endangered in their country of origin? Who are they, where do they come from? Who assisted them in their exodus? And so on. The story is noted by the official and has the status of an affidavit. From that moment onwards, it is the source and reference text for all other steps in the procedure. The asylum seeker is admitted in the country, and his or her application for asylum is being processed by the authorities. In the process, various other interviews can take place.

Apart from interviews, there are hardly any occasions in which asylum seekers themselves speak. Most of the communication on the case is written and legalistic and hence treated on behalf of the asylum seeker by lawyers, welfare workers or members of NGOs specialized in asylum affairs. So what we have is a handful of events during which the applicant directly produces oral narrative discourse. In between these moments we have tremendous text-production *on* that narrative resulting in written summaries, notes, translations, questions and replies written by lawyers or welfare workers, court rulings in which fragments of the narrative are being quoted and interpreted, and so on. It is an instance of the 'circulation of discourse' (Briggs, 1997: 538 ff.) that characterizes legal and forensic procedures as well as those of welfare work and bureaucracy (see Sarangi and Slembrouck, 1996). *These patterns of circulation are biased by inequalities in techniques of discourse representation; recontextualizations and re-entextualizations of the narratives in specific ('official' and authoritative) generic formats are usually privileged forms of discursive practice reserved to specific professional groups such as lawyers, administrators, 'experts' and bureaucrats.*

This textual complex, in which an oral 'original' narrative is the input for a long series of generically differentiated replications of that original is characterized by an ideology of 'fixed text' (Blommaert, 1997; Collins, 1996; Urban, 1996), in which the difference between the 'original' and its 'copies' are assumed to be minimal (hence in which it is assumed that every translation, summary, quotation, reading of the story is correct and accurate) because 'procedurally correct' text (i.e. text produced or collected according to standard procedures) is supposed to be a transparent, unambiguous set of signs. The story of the asylum seeker is remoulded, remodelled and re-narrated time and time again, and so becomes a *text trajectory* with various phases and instances of transformation. At the same time, the story is treated as a *singular* text, and responsibility for that text (and thus for all re-entextualizations in the text trajectory) is attributed to the asylum seeker. The asylum seeker is constructed as the responsible author for the whole intertextuality complex, despite the enormous differences in text-structure and text-modality, the genre and the code, the social spaces in which versions are being produced and used, and the power and authority attributed to different versions of the text. Commenting on similar phenomena, Briggs (1997: 540) observes that in such cases, the question seems to be 'one of a fundamental asymmetry in the power to determine how utterances can circulate between

contexts, epistemologies, and institutions, the way that narratives can be structured, and what sorts of legal effects can accrue to particular discursive relations'.

The result of this text trajectory is a *suggestion* of justice based on text-ideologies emphasizing the 'correct treatment' of the asylum seeker's narrative into notes, summaries, translations and so forth, but obscuring a variety of forms of appropriation of discourse and of shifting it into domains of authoritative re-entextualizations that are far beyond the control of the asylum seeker. So when the letter to Sémira Adamu speaks of 'the story of the applicant', what is referred to is the total textual trajectory of the narrative.

5.3 A Contest of Contexts

To illustrate this, let us have a look at two re-entextualizations of the story of an Angolese asylum seeker. The interview we did with him and his wife took four hours; the story of his situation in Angola and of his escape to Belgium took more than one hour, and well over 1500 lines of transcript. As always, it is a very complex story replete with home narratives bearing the characteristics discussed in the previous section. The man applied twice for asylum, and twice his application was rejected. These rejections were announced to the applicant in two official letters, partly standard and partly filled in with specific data on the application. In these documents, we find instances of re-entextualization of the man's story. I give fragments from the two texts of the letters (my translation, originals in Dutch and French, respectively):

Extract 15

"The concerned was interrogated on November 23, 1993 at the Commissariat-General [for Refugees and Stateless Persons], in the presence of [name], his attorney.

He claimed to be a 'political informant' of the MPLA. On October 18, 1992 however, he passed on information to UNITA. At the UNITA office, however, he met with Major [name], who works for the MPLA. Two days later, Major [name] had the concerned arrested. Fearing that the concerned would give the Major away at the trial, [name of the Major] helped the concerned to escape. The concerned fled to [locality] where a priest arranged for his departure from Angola. The concerned came, together with his wife [name and register number] and three children, through Zaïre and by plane, to Belgium. They arrived on May 19, 1993.

It has to be noted that the concerned remains very vague at certain points. Thus he is unable to provide details about the precise content of his job as 'political informant'. Furthermore the account of his escape lacks credibility. Thus it is unlikely that the concerned could steal military clothes and weapons without being noticed and that he could consequently climb over the prison wall.

It is also unlikely that the concerned and his wife could pass the passport control at Zaventem [i.e. Brussels Airport] bearing a passport lacking their names and their pictures.

Furthermore, the itinerary of the concerned is impossible to verify due to a lack of travel documents (the concerned sent back the passports).

The statements of the concerned contain contradictions when compared to his wife's account. Thus he declares that the passports which they received from the priest [name] were already completely in order at the time they left Angola. His wife claims that they still had to apply for visa in Zaïre."

Extract 16

"The concerned, of Angolese nationality, has declared being a member of UNITA ('Union Nationale pour l'Indépendance Totale de l'Angola'). He has forwarded a first application for asylum in Belgium on May 25, 1993. His application has been refused by the Commissariat-General on December 15, 1993. After an illegal stay in Belgium of three years, he has forwarded a second application for asylum on November 20, 1996, on the basis of some documents from Angola which he had received. In two faxes (of July 26, 1996 and September 4, 1996), one of his neighbors (calling himself '[name]') informed him that a certain '[name]', a friend of the concerned who was repatriated to Angola by the Belgian State, had been killed by soldiers. Prior to that, the latter had asked [name of the 'friend'] about the whereabouts of the concerned. From that moment onwards, the house of the concerned is supposed to be occupied [in French: *serait occupée*] by soldiers. In a letter of March 15, 1994, people are supposed to have already informed him [in French: *on lui aurait déjà communiqué*] that the priest named '[name]', who had helped him leave Angola, had disappeared. Apart from that, he has offered a communiqué from UNITA (of October 23, 1996) as well as his MPLA ('Mouvement Populaire pour la Libération de l'Angola') veteran's ID."

Let us now take a closer look at these two examples. They are genetically germane and are sequential; Extract 16 obviously adds to Extract 15. Three different types of discourse can be distinguished in the texts:

(a) reported elements from the asylum seekers' narrative in the shape of 'factual' summaries of the applicant's narrative
(b) procedural statements referring to the applicant's status, the administrative actions taken in his respect and by him, and the sorts of evidence offered
(c) explicit metapragmatic statements and comments on the applicant's narrative.

Let us first bring the statements belonging to the first category (reported elements) together from both texts:

Extract 17

-He claimed to be a 'political informant' of the MPLA. On October 18, 1992 however, he passed on information to UNITA. At the UNITA office, however, he met with Major [name], who works for the MPLA. Two days later, Major [name] had the concerned arrested. Fearing that the concerned would give the Major away at the trial, [name of the Major] helped the concerned to escape. The concerned fled to [locality] where a priest arranged for his departure from Angola. The concerned came, together with his wife [name and register number] and three children, through Zaïre and by plane, to Belgium. They arrived on May 19, 1993.
-In two faxes (of July 26, 1996 and September 4, 1996), one of his neighbors (calling himself '[name]') informed him that a certain '[name]', a friend of t

> concerned who was repatriated to Angola by the Belgian State, had been killed by soldiers. Prior to that, the latter had asked [name of the 'friend'] about the whereabouts of the concerned. From that moment onwards, the house of the concerned is supposed to be occupied [in French: *serait occupée*] by soldiers. In a letter of March 15, 1994, people are supposed to have already informed him [in French: *on lui aurait déjà communiqué*] that the priest named '[name]', who had helped him leave Angola, had disappeared.

Obviously, what we have here are extremely concise and highly selective 'summaries' of the story, organized chronologically and marked by tense-aspect markers in the verbs as well as by explicit chronological markers (e.g. "on October 18, 1992", "two days later", "July 26, 1996" and "September 4, 1996"). The account is not exclusively 'replicating' but contains significant amounts of evaluative modal qualifications (especially in Extract 16), indicating doubts about the factual truthfulness of parts of the narrative (e.g. the quotes surrounding the names mentioned by the applicant, the potentialist verbs "*serait occupée*", "*aurait communiqué*"). These summaries reflect the portions of the applicant's narrative deemed 'substantial' to his asylum application and qualified, in one discursive move, in terms of truthfulness and plausibility from the perspective of the procedure. Importantly, this selection of text portions involves text-rewriting and text-structuring practices, and shifts the epistemic centre from the asylum seeker to the administrator processing the application.

The second category (procedural statements) includes statements such as "The concerned was interrogated on November 23, 1993 at the Commissariat-General [for Refugees and Stateless Persons], in the presence of [name], his attorney" and "He has forwarded a first application for asylum in Belgium on May 25, 1993. His application has been refused by the Commissariat-General on December 15, 1993. After an illegal stay in Belgium of three years, he has forwarded a second application for asylum on November 20, 1996, on the basis of some documents from Angola which he had received". It also contains references to evidence offered: "two faxes", "a letter", "a communiqué from UNITA" and "his MPLA veteran's ID". This second category is broadly contextualizing much in the sense that home narratives contextualize the story of the applicant. References to the location of these facts and claims in the procedure re-centre the narrative: the facts and claims offered by the applicant have to 'fit' a procedural context, a context of sequences of activities, criteria of relevance, and criteria of 'testing' the truth of stories. The third category directly connects to this: here we find explicit expressions of doubt such as (explicit metapragmatic statements in italics):

Extract 18

> "It has to be noted that the concerned *remains very vague* at certain points. Thus he is *unable to provide details* about the precise content of his job as 'political informant'. Furthermore the account of his escape *lacks credibility*. Thus *it is unlikely* that the concerned could steal military clothes and weapons without being noticed and that he could consequently climb over the prison wall.

> *It is also unlikely* that the concerned and his wife could pass the passport control at Zaventem [i.e. Brussels Airport] bearing a passport lacking their names and their pictures.
> Furthermore, the itinerary of the concerned *is impossible to verify* due to a lack of travel documents (the concerned sent back the passports).
> The statements of the concerned *contain contradictions* when compared to his wife's account. Thus he declares that the passports which they received from the priest [name] were already completely in order at the time they left Angola. His wife claims that they still had to apply for visa in Zaïre."

The qualifications pertain to elements from the narrative not included in the 'summary' given elsewhere in the texts. The emphasis is on two things: general common-sense plausibility and documentary evidence. Certain arguments are qualified as unlikely on the basis of a general perception of what is possible and what is not (e.g. the unnoticed theft of military uniforms and weapons, the fact that another double-agent, the Major, would both arrest him and help him escape). There is no evidence offered of the *impossibility* of these facts, they just *seem* unlikely. Other elements revolve around the presence and absence of documentary evidence: the faxes, the letter, the veteran's ID, and "the itinerary of the concerned is impossible to verify due to a lack of travel documents (the concerned sent back the passports)".

The pattern of entextualization becomes clear now: what we have here is a complete refocalization of the narrative towards new deictic centres. The story of the applicant is relocated in another space and time-frame: that of the administrative procedure and its pace, that of its standard categories, criteria and textual formats (chronological-sequential and documentary). Whereas the home narratives were shown to have a localizing function – personalizing the story and anchoring it in particular spatial and temporal deictic frames – the highly modified versions of the story we find in the letters from the authorities show a completely different contextualization of the story: away from the local, away from the experiential, the affective, the emotional, the individual positioning of people in conflicts, towards generalizable categories and space-time frames. There is an official version of the conflict (e.g. the war in Angola), used not only in asylum procedures but also in international trade, development cooperation, foreign policy, and so on.[9] In that version, the experiential contextualizations of places, social roles, parties in the conflict and so forth, so prominent in home narratives, are replaced by a rather rigid pattern providing general categorizations (e.g. 'In country X, human rights are consistently violated', 'country Y is a democracy', 'in country Z there is a peace agreement between the warring parties, hence the situation has been stabilized' – the latter is the case for Angola) as well as more or less fixed attributes for roles in the conflict (the good, the bad, 'official' parties versus 'unofficial' parties, the State, the army, civil society etc.). There is a general recentering of the biography of the asylum seeker: the procedurally relevant biography of the applicant is that portion of his or her life that can be rewritten in the shape of a travelogue, starting with (an) event(s) that prompt his or her escape from the country of origin, the process of escape and travel itself

including details of time, duration, medium and itinerary, and his or her arrival in Belgium, all portions of which can be documented by means of place descriptions and time frames.

From this grid, deductive patterns of 'plausibility' and 'likelihood' are derived; whenever there is doubt, documentary evidence is required to remove the implausibility. In the extract given here, one of the crucial elements was the fact that the applicant had told how he had been arrested by an UNITA Major, who was in fact a double-agent just like him; that same Major had consequently helped him escape from prison. In terms of general plausibility within this contextual frame, it is 'unlikely' that the person who arrested the applicant would be the same as the one who organized his escape, the more since there was no documentary evidence supporting the Major's role as a double-agent. Similarly, the absence of documentary evidence of the itinerary of the applicant makes that crucial part of his story "impossible to verify" and hence unlikely or unreliable.

5.4 Noise and Inequality

The recontextualizing moves made through the text-trajectories are, as noted by Briggs above, connected to deep power differences: they involve differential control over contextualization procedures, and they involve differential access to skills used for reformulating, ordering, structuring discourse in such a way as to build a 'convincing' argument. The complex indexicalities of the stories as well as their general localizing-contextualizing functions basically do not fit well with the textual and narrative preoccupations of the asylum procedure. Hence, the particular format of narrating imposed during the procedure is sensed to incapacitate asylum seekers and prejudice their attempts at making sense of 'their' conflict – the basis of 'their' asylum application. A Congolese woman succinctly expresses the textual and contextual difficulties experienced during the interrogations that create the 'basic' version of the narrative:

Extract 19

> Mais ils sont trop durs là-bas parce que.. Tu peux raconter je sais pas/ tu peux raconter quelque chose.. Et la prochaine fois quand tu viens quand tu oublies un seul chose c'est fini tu as=tu es rejettée/ alors euh personne ne peut raconter deux fois la même hist=même histoire exactement/ il y a toujours de petits détails qu'on ne dit pas ou bien qu'on a=qu'on ajoute après/ mais eux ils ne tiennent pas compte de ça/ dés que tu ajoutes quelque chose ils disent ah la fois passée tu n'a pas dit ça alors c'est fini on te rejette/ il faut aussi comprendre les gens c'est. On=on n'arrive jamais à=à=à raconter une histoire de la même façon deux fois ça non

Translation:

> But they are too hard there because... You can tell I don't know what/ you can tell something.. And the next time when you come you forget just one thing it's over you are=you have been rejected/ well ehm nobody can tell twice the same sto=same story exactly/ there are always small details one doesn't say or else one a=one adds afterwards/ but they don't take that into account/ as soon as you add

> you/ one also has to understand the people it's... One=one never manages to=to=to tell a story the same way twice/ that no.

Combined with the problem of resources discussed in section 3, asylum seekers' stories appear to contain too much 'noise' to be easily inserted in the asylum procedure. They tell their story in non-native varieties of a language, sometimes to an interpreter who also has to use a non-native variety; this then is handed over to someone else, who translates and transforms it into an ordered and patterned written narrative, squeezed into the boxes of a standard form; consequently, this story is treated several times by still other people, who select from the story the parts that look 'truthful' and the ones that seem 'unlikely'. What is lost in the process is the narrative of place and time that is at the core of the stories: those parts of the story in which applicants bring international conflicts and phenomena such as war, famine, poverty into their own experiential space, relate personal motives to them, and offer this as arguments for obtaining asylum. As soon as this 'noise' has been cut off from the applicant's story, the chances of being understood, believed and supported are very slim.

This is why the densely contextualizing narratives discussed in the previous section become crucial and problematic in the asylum procedure. They are a necessary genre for asylum seekers, and at the same time an unmanageable (and a priori disqualified) genre in the procedure. They are salient because they are a realization of a genre that does not fit the genre. On the basis of what many asylum seekers can mobilize as linguistic and communicative resources, they are the upper limit of what they *can* do; and that does not correspond to what they *must* or *are supposed to* do.

6. Concluding Remarks

Social structure percolates in and is indexed by the narrative conventions, ideologies and codes of the asylum procedure. I hope to have demonstrated that there is at least a potential mismatch between resources and expectations which is at the heart of the power asymmetry that characterizes encounters between asylum seekers and the state; it locates asylum seekers in a position of conflict vis-à-vis the procedure. But both the power asymmetry and the conflict are socially and culturally invisible because of two reasons, both of which have to do with the pervasiveness of ideologies.

The first reason is the widely shared ideology that clients of administrative procedures in a democratic society such as Belgium have control over the basic linguistic–communicative resources needed to participate fully in the procedures and so to obtain justice and the benefits they are entitled to. Thus, the problem of narrativity in the asylum procedure can be represented as a rather superficial, technical problem and suggested remedies can range from training programmes for interpreters to more support for asylum seekers from 'experts' such as lawyers. The point I have tried to make in this article is that we are confronted with a fundamental problem of inequality in

shape who can talk when, in what ways, and with what effects' (Briggs, 1996: 13), not one that can be captured, as Briggs rightly points out in metaphors such as 'negotiation', 'difference', or 'variation' which all suggest some degree of equality and sharedness and a facility of choice for the inferior party.

The second reason why the power asymmetries and conflicts are invisible is their embeddedness in administrative procedures that are normalized for members of the autochthonous middle class, and that are imbued with great prestige as the symbolic custodians of a sociopolitical system qualified as just, egalitarian and democratic. Every political crisis caused by incidents with asylum seekers resulted in a reaffirmation of the faith in 'our justice' and led to a tightening and increase of the sophistication of the administrative procedure: more people would be hired, they would be better trained, the procedure would be accelerated, handwritten documents would be replaced by computerized standard forms. The administrative text-making machinery was never questioned; on the contrary, it was strengthened and enlarged. Thus the capacity to shift narratives from one context to another and from one authoritative entextualization to another was increased, and with it the power asymmetry with regard to the production, treatment, ordering, and making sense of narratives. This belief in the just, egalitarian and democratic nature of the state and state procedures reminds us of a remark made long ago by Perry Anderson (1976–7) in his celebrated commentary on Gramsci: the assumption of equality in the face of democratic procedures and state institutions such as the law is at the core of capitalist ideology because it obscures fundamental inequalities in society. The state is assumed to represent everyone and to render service to everyone in the same way; at the same time, administrative procedures of the state privilege elite literacies and narrativities and so shape and perpetuate deep social inequalities (a process complicated by the introduction of new technologies in bureaucracy).

Along with the concrete case I have argued here, I hope to have offered arguments for two more general theoretical points, both of which are inspired by Briggs's (1997) highly relevant discussion of narrative and inequality in institutional contexts. First, issues of resources deserve far more attention than they have received so far in the study of language in society. Assumptions of sharedness, as stated previously, seem to determine much of what goes on in the critical analysis of discourse in western societies, whereas the highly layered and hierarchical systems of literacy and communicative skills that dominate our societies seem to dictate a more attentive stance towards phenomena such as accents, differential competence, difficulties in writing and so on. Before people can embark on discursive work captured under labels such as 'conversation', 'exchange' or 'negotiation', conditions of 'sayability', 'expressibility' and 'mobilizability' of resources need to have been met (see the remarks in Briggs, 1997: 538–40). Every conception of 'context' in discourse should include such conditions, because they are a tremendous influence on what happens in discourse and on what happens with discourse. Resources are contexts.

Second, I share Briggs's concern for the circulation of discourse as a crucial ingredient of identity-forming social and political practices in our societies. 'Cases' (administrative, legal, welfare, medical, educational and probably far more) are

formed in the textual trajectories outlined in this article rather than in single instances of communication and single texts. We need to follow the process of text-making-as-social-and-political-process; it is here that people and subjects are constructed, cases are judged and individual lives are being influenced. As soon as we enter worlds in which talk and written text are seen as replicas of one another (and in which someone else's notes of what I said can be offered to me as 'my' story), we enter a world of differential power relations, which needs to be scrutinized in great detail. Michel Foucault's (1975) image of subjects being transformed into knowable objects of clinical observation by means of a multi-layered complex of discursive and material practices is looming large. The apparently small shifts our stories undergo as soon as they enter institutional textmaking systems are instances of such practices of Foucauldian *savoir* in which social issues become individual yet standardized 'cases'. The fact that we tend not to be aware of these processes – and even attribute considerable prestige to the system in which they develop – is a crucial and unavoidable topic for critical studies of language and society.

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Notes

1. Hymes and Cazden's paper was originally published in 1978 in *Keystone Folklore* 22; it was reprinted as chapter 7 of Hymes (1980) and later reprinted again as chapter 5 of Hymes (1996). The paper is not really a joint product; individual sections are attributed to either Hymes or Cazden; for the purposes of this article, I consider it to be a collaborative writing product authored by Hymes and Cazden.
2. In late 2000, Katrijn Maryns obtained permission to record procedure interviews. Fieldwork is underway and genuine 'cases' will be available for research very soon. The first bits of data can be found in Maryns (2000) and Maryns and Blommaert (2000). On the basis of first fieldwork observations, nothing contradicts the patterns and mechanisms of discourse production and reception proposed in this paper.
3. The interviews were conducted by students of the 2nd and 4th year of African Studies at the Ghent University, as part of a course project supervised by the author. The length of the interviews varied from approximately half an hour to four hours. The interviews were recorded between November 1998 and April–May 1999, at the height of the so-called 'Sémira Adamu crisis'; see section 2.

4. I provide English translations, despite the fact that the 'broken' and hence very complicated forms of expressions can hardly be projected in another language in an equivalent way. I use a highly simplified set of transcription conventions in the presentation of the examples, namely:

*	stress on the following syllable
=	latching, rapid succession of turns, or self-correction
/	intonationally marked phrase or sentence end
...	pause
CAPS	high pitch, loud

5. Katrijn Maryns (2000) presents some samples of interviewer–interviewee interactions in the asylum procedure. In the data reported here, there are instances where the Belgian interviewer is wrong-footed by the interviewee for reasons that have to do with proficiency in French or English. Interestingly, interviewers then display a tendency to move into a cross-questioning tactic, insisting on details and accuracy.
6. This was, in fact, the second time that P used the expression "*manger* + currency" in the interview. The first time, Q did not pick it up as problematic. Note in passing how this phenomenon – a man from Angola using Congolese French colloquial expressions – offers us a glimpse of the migration history of the speaker. We can now suppose that the man, after having fled from Angola, has spent some time in the Congo before moving on to Europe. See Maryns (2000) for arguments and case analyses on the issue of identifying asylum seekers.
7. The emergence of structure in these narratives may be an effect of the repeated telling of the story, so that 'fully-formed narratives' are created. Dell Hymes, in correspondence about this analysis, remarks:

> It seems very likely that you have here what could in some cases be the early stages of 'fully formed' narratives of the sort I addressed in my own paper. That if those who tell them were in circumstances which led to them being told again and again, rehearsed, as it were, they might take on increasingly tight form ... It is extremely relevant to find ... that a contrast in initial elements, such as absence/presence of 'So' can be found to distinguish parts already at this stage. (See also Hymes, 1998.)

The point I wish to make in this part of the article is that such structuring not only occurs during very early phases of the narrative development of such stories, as Hymes points out, but that it also occurs despite a very restricted repertoire of linguistic resources.

8. Narrative inequalities based on differing narrative conventions and the differential distribution of communicative resources have been well documented with respect to courtroom discourse. I would like to mention just two cases. Marco Jacquemet (1992) emphasized the role of metapragmatic strategies in attorneys' courtroom tactics against Italian mafia-*pentiti*; the witnesses' communicative style was commented upon in attempts to discredit their credibility, and the normativity of 'correct' courtroom discourse was opposed to the *pentiti*'s use of the Neapolitan dialect. At a more general level, O'Barr and Conley (1996) distinguish between a professional and a lay ideology of law; the former can be characterized as 'rule-oriented', the latter as 'relational'. Both ideologies shape and make relevant differences in courtroom talk, and the failure to respect these differences by lay litigants 'may limit their access to justice' (O'Barr

and Conley, 1996: 118). For reasons explained earlier, the discussion in this section is conjectural.

9. In a letter about this case from the Department of Immigration of the Ministry of the Interior, it is for instance said that 'the situation in his country [i.e. Angola] cannot be considered to be exceptional so as to vindicate a regularization on the basis of art, 9§3'. There are no fixed criteria for judging local situations to be 'normal' or 'abnormal', decisions on this point being the privilege of the Minister of the Interior.

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9

"You Gotta Know How to Tell a Story": Telling, Tales, and Tellers in American and Israeli Narrative Events at Dinner

Shoshana Blum-Kulka

Story-telling in ordinary talk between intimates is one of the most common enactments of narrative discourse. We tell stories to each other as a means of packaging experience in cognitively and affectively coherent ways (Labov & Fanshel 1977, Sacks 1974), or in the terms of Bruner 1990, as a way to test the borderlines between the exceptional and ordinary. Fisher 1987 considers the narrativization of experience a basic human need; the essential nature of human beings is captured by the metaphor of man as *homo narrans*. Extending Kenneth Burke's definition of man as a symbol-making and symbol-using animal, Fisher proposes an all-encompassing definition for the role of narratives (63):

> The idea of human beings as storytellers posits the generic form of all symbol composition. It holds that symbols are created and communicated ultimately as stories meant to give order to human experience and to induce others to dwell in them in order to establish ways of living in common, intellectual and spiritual communities in which there is confirmation for the story that constitutes one's life.[1]

Although the narrative use of language, as insisted by Hymes 1982, is a universal function, such use can be expected to vary culturally as do other ways of speaking. Indeed, oral narrative styles vary by culture for both adults and children, as shown both by work adopting a cross-cultural perspective e.g. Scollon & Scollon 1981, Tannen 1980) and by comparative studies in the context of language socialization (e.g. Heath 1983, Schieffelin & Ochs 1986). My goal here is to apply a culturally sensitive analysis to narratives old in the course of dinner-table conversations in middle- to upper-class Jewish-American and Israeli families.

To apply such an analysis, we need first to understand the nature of the narrative event in question.

Conversational story-telling can be looked at from a social-interactionalist position, as interaction, with a focus on how the narrative emerges in its context, and/or as discourse, with a focus on the textual end product abstractable from the context. The first approach is represented by work on conversational story-telling from the perspectives of both ethnomethodology (e.g. Jefferson 1978, Sacks 1974) and discourse analysis (Polanyi 1989, Schiffrin 1984, Tannen 1984); such work shows the manner in which the structure of oral narratives is conversationally accomplished. Particularly relevant here are studies focusing on narratives during family dinner-table conversations (Erickson 1982, 1988; Ochs et al. 1989; Ochs et al. 1992). A complementary, rich source of information on this dimension is provided by studies in folklore that highlight the poetic and social interactional assets of performance (Bauman 1986, Briggs 1988, Hymes 1981, Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1975, Shuman 1986). By contrast, the discourse approach is best illustrated by Labov's influential work (Labov & Fanshel 1977, Labov & Waletzky 1967), which unveils the structural coherence of seemingly chaotic onversational renderings of personal experience.

The narrative-events examined-here, performed by both adults and children, function as crucial socializing contexts for family interaction in general, as claimed by Bernstein 1971. Hence a further perspective that needs to be added is cross-cultural variation in practices of narrative socialization, as suggested by cross-cultural and cross-ethnic studies of language socialization (Blum-Kulka & Snow 1992, Heath 1983, Miller et al. 1990, Schieffelin & Ochs 1986).

Yet none of these approaches on its own captures the unique nature of family narratives. We need an approach that accounts simultaneously for family story-telling as an event, a social action unfolding in real time, as well as (at the discourse level) a text about other events. The links and transitions between these two realms are provided by performer/tellers. Dinner-table narrative events are unique: they represent a three-way intersection of the act of narration, the textual content and form of the narrative, and the persons responsible. Taking all three dimensions together, narratives become *narrative events*.[2] Like other speech events, narrative events have their specific norms governing the scene, participation rights, message content, message form, and rules of interpretation (Hymes 1974:55–8). In narrative events, these features can be seen as subsumed under three dimensions of narrativity: telling (narration), tales (narratives), and tellers (narrators). In oral storytelling, the realm of telling is embedded (in an open-ended fashion) in the realm of conversation, and the realm of tales within that of telling, as depicted in Figure 1.[3]

Telling is the act of narrating in real time, the actual performance of a story before an audience. In the terms of Goffman (1981:144–5), telling is enacted by the role of the speaker as *Animator*, the one responsible for the sounds that make intelligible speech come into being. The central issue of performance in family narratives is a social-interactional one: who participates in whose stories, and how. To narrate "is to make a bid for power" (Toolan 1988:6); entering the telling mode in the family context raises the issues of narrative participation rights.




Figure 1: Dimensions of narrativity

Even when such rights are assumed by virtue of social role in the family, as with parents, they still need to be renegotiated conversationally on each specific occasion (Jefferson 1978, Polanyi 1989, Polss 1990). For children, both participation rights and modes of story entry remain goals to be achieved with some difficulty. The division of telling-space may vary by role in the family (children vs. adults) as well as by role and culture, as when children in one culture are granted story-telling rights over and beyond their rights in another. Cultures also may differ in the framing of transitions from the realm of conversation to the realm of telling, as well as in the importance of the telling with relation to the tales.

Tale is the stuff from which narratives are made. The term refers to the two dimensions of narrative captured in the poetics of narrative fiction by the distinction of *fabula* vs. *sjuzet* (in the Russian formalists' terms) or *story* vs. *narrative* (Rimmon-Keenan 1983). The *fabula* or the *story* of narratives "designates the narrated events, abstracted from their disposition in the text and reconstructed in their chronological order, together with the participants in these events" (Rimmon-Keenan, 3). In other words, in experience-based narratives, the *fabula* consists of the real-world building blocks used for the construction of the story. The *sjuzet*, on the other hand, relates to the way in which the story is shaped in the making: the "spoken or written discourse that undertakes the telling." In the actual discourse, events do not necessarily appear in chronological order, and content is filtered through some perspective, sometimes called a "focalizer" (Rimmon-Keenan, 74). It is the responsibility of the *Author* (Goffman 1981:144–5) to select the words in which the *fabula* is encoded in a way that is still retrievable for the audience. Cross-cultural variation in *fabula* choice may be expressed in spatio-temporal orientation of narrative plots (e.g. recent vs. not-recent past) or in the type of protagonists that are foregrounded (self vs. other). However, cultural attitudes to the preferred style of *sjuzet* may be expressed through critical comments to children about the way they are telling a story. As one father told his

son, who failed to give a convincing performance of a joke learned from the father, "You gotta know how to tell a story."

Tellers (performers) may or may not be the persons accountable for the story. This is the role called the *Principal* by Goffman (1981:144–5): the one committed to what the words say. In personal narratives, all three speaker roles (principal, author, and animator) can merge into one. In a personal narrative, it is the Principal who has actually experienced the events recounted and claims authorship for the narrative, acting also as Animator. But more generally, and especially when children are involved, the three speaker roles may be realized by different speakers. A mother who repeats to the father a story of personal experience, recounted to her earlier by her child, may act only as Animator (if she quotes verbatim); or she may take authorship rights, if she edits the child's version. In either case, the child remains the principal for the story. From a cross-cultural perspective, the relation of tellers to telling and tale raises issues of authorship vs. performance: How is authorship emically defined? Who, in each culture, is entitled to tell whose stories?

Background and Method

The database for the study consists of 264 narrative events that occurred during two dinner-table conversations with eight middle-class Jewish-American and eight Israeli families.[4] All Jewish-American families were residents of the Boston area; all Israeli families lived at the time in Jerusalem. The narrative events were examined as part of a larger project investigating the pragmatic socialization of children in the presence of a member of the research team who came from the same cultural background as the family. Following initial contacts by phone, the observer visited the home and got acquainted with the family prior to recordings. The same observer stayed with the family throughout the research period. The families were told that we were interested in comparing Israeli to American family dinners, and they were provided with details when interested. The observers were invited to join the families for dinner as a matter of course. Hence the situation in which we are comparing the groups is that of families interacting with a semi-official guest. As will be discussed later, interaction with the observer proceeded differently in the two groups, revealing a cultural difference in this mode of family self-presentation. All families participating in the project came originally from a European background (mainly from Russia and Poland) and hence share a Jewish Eastern-European heritage. The parent generations are native-born American or native-born Israeli. The American and Israeli families were matched for number and ages of children.

Segmentation and Coding

Narrative events were defined broadly as conversations that recapitulate past events. Since the perception of what constitutes a narrative may well differ from

children to adults, or across cultures, we deliberately avoided imposing further structural criteria on tales (e.g. number of events mentioned).[5] The segments extracted from full transcripts of the dinner conversations vary in length from brief exchanges, of a few seconds, to long elaborated happenings, of up to 10 minutes. Boundaries of the segments were decided textually, in agreement among three analysts, on the basis of transition markers signaling entrances and exits from the telling realm. Analysis of the texts proceeded by a set of quantifiable coding categories, designed to capture variation on each dimension of narrativity. The categories used and the findings from the coding are integrated into the discussion.

In the following I address the degree of cultural diversity between Jewish-Americans and Israelis in their attitudes toward telling, tales, and tellers in family narrative events. I argue that, considered from this threefold frame work, family narrative events of the two groups share certain features attributable to the speech event in which they are embedded. Yet the groups differ culturally in the structuring of each dimension of narrativity, and in the relative importance granted to each: Jewish-American narrative events foreground tellers and the act of telling, while Israeli narrative events prefer to focus on tales and tellers. The argument is developed as follows: the degree of cultural diversity is discussed, first, in terms of the division of narrative space between members of the family and styles of story initiation; second, in terms of the spatio-temporal orientation of tales, and the degree of conventionalization in the transformation of tales into telling; and third, in terms of the relationships between ownership of the tale and participation in the telling.

Issues of Telling

Gaining Access to Narrative-space: Children and Adults

Family dinner-table narratives tend to be jointly constructed affairs (Erickson 1988, Ochs et al. 1989). In our case, collaboration takes several forms: stories are co-narrated, constructed through question/answer sequences, or told with sporadic but meaningful contributions from an active audience. In all these, telling is shared by several members of the family, sometimes including the observer. Collaborative process is at work in both Israeli and American narrative events: in almost half of the narratives, more than four members participate. By contrast, less than 5% are performed by just one participant; see Figure 2. What these numbers mask, though, are cultural styles of participation; as will be shown, Israeli and Jewish-American families differ greatly in the way they draw lines of demarcation between *teller(s)* and *audience.*

Israeli and American families differ in their attitudes toward the division of telling-space, as well as in members' modes of participation in narrative events. Consider attitudes toward the division of telling-space between adults and children. In both groups, dinner time is perceived as a prime occasion for spotlighting children as narrators. To reveal attitudes toward children, we first divided




Figure 2: Number of participants in narrative events

narrative events in terms of identity of the predominant *mainteller*(s), as either *child* (or children) or *adult*(s); see Figure 3. In a further analysis, we identified the *initiator* of the narrative event by role in the family as *child, father, mother,* or *observer*; see Figure 4.

The degree to which children are considered conversational partners in adult company is noteworthy across the two cultures. In discussing determinants of cultural variability in conversation, Schieffelin & Eisenberg (1984: 382) note:




Figure 3: Maintellers: division of telling space




Figure 4: Narrative initiation

Cultures vary along a continuum ranging from societies in which children are not allowed or expected to talk to adults or strangers and/or are not thought of as co-conversationalists to those in which children are actively encouraged to talk to adults, who in turn support this interaction and try to understand it. In some societies adults think it is important to elicit speech from children, socializing them in terms of production and interaction skills (e.g., Kaluli in Papua New Guinea, white middle-class American); but in other cultures children are encouraged to be quiet and speak only when spoken to (e.g., rural Louisiana Blacks, Luo in Kenya).

We found that, across the two groups, children take up 42% of all narrative space (see Fig. 3). The case of the middle-class families studied here well exemplifies a cultural pattern which treats children as rightful co-conversationalists; in both the Jewish-American and Israeli families, children around the dinner table share, in the terms of Goffman (1981:131–2), an official status as *ratified* participants.[6] The pattern is most salient in the American families (see Fig. 3). American children act as maintellers in 66% of all narrative events, leaving the adults as maintellers of 34%. But the adults in the Israeli families take up a much higher proportion of narrative space, playing the dominant role in 54% of narrative events. In line with the overall attitude toward the division of narrative space between adults and children, American children are also more active story-initiators (by 15%) than Israeli children.

This difference points to a cultural distinction in modes of narrative socialization at dinner. Notions of tellability and cultural styles of telling are acquired by children both by engaging in the telling and by being exposed to stories told by others. The American families tend to emphasize socialization by allowing for the display of narrative practice; but in the Israeli families, children are given a higher chance to

This does not necessarily mean that Israeli children engage generally in less display of narrative than do American children; stories may be told by children at other points during the day, to siblings or one parent. But it does mean that dinner-table conversations, where both adults and children jointly participate, are perceived by the American families as an occasion to focus on the children as narrators; in the Israeli families, narrative space is divided between adults and children. From the children's point of view, different gains are involved in each practice. Being encouraged to tell stories may be important in developing confidence in performing rights and the skills of narration (Blum-Kulka & Snow 1992); however, acting as primary or even secondary audience to adult stories allows access to the experience of significant others, thereby expanding the bases for identification (Miller et al. 1990) and shaping cultural notions of tellability or *reportability* (cf. Hymes 1981).[7]

Narrative Initiation: Insiders and Outsiders, Women and Men

Adult roles also are differently distributed across the two groups, most notably in regard to the observer. Observers in the Israeli families initiate 15% more narrative events than do the observers in the American families (see Fig. 4). In other words, the observers in the Israeli families seem much more confident in their story-telling rights than their American counterparts. Or, as suggested by Deborah Tannen (personal communication), the Americans may have different ideas about their *obligations*, rather than their rights: with their scientific tradition of "objectivity" in social science, perhaps they feel it incumbent upon them not to participate any more than necessary. This result ties in with other observations on the relations between observers and families in the two groups.

In both groups, observers (with one exception) were invited to join the dinner table as a matter of course; but the nature of their interaction with the family differed in key, and consequently in rules of interaction. In terms of the continuum of formality proposed by Irvine 1979, the generally prevailing key of family discourse (because of intimacy among participants) is that of informality. Yet there are differences of degree between the two groups: Israelis seem to celebrate the outermost informal end of the continuum. Consequently, observers are drawn into the circle of conversation from the onset, and interact with all family members, not only in the role of familiar guests but rather as actual or potential friends. This is in line with the ethos of solidarity in Israeli culture, which tends to symbolically minimize social distance (Blum-Kulka et al. 1985, Katriel 1986). One of the privileges granted to friends is that of both self-directed and other-directed narrative initiation. Observers in the Israeli families accordingly share initiation almost equally with other members present.

Being a familiar guest at the American family's somewhat more formal dinner table does not bestow on the observer the privileges granted to friends; though partaking in the interaction, the observer does so cautiously, under the rules of interaction governing communication between nonintimates. Not being overtly active in narrative initiation is one way in which such caution is exercised.

Hence it is not surprising to find that observers in the American families are engaged in less than 10% of story initiations.

Another difference between Israelis and Americans is in the relative parts played by mothers vs. fathers in narrative initiation. In the Israeli families, mothers have twice as many initiations; in the American families, fathers play a slightly more active role. This finding is in line with general patterns of participation rates in dinner-table talk. Following the categories proposed by Bublitz 1988 for topical action, we have analyzed the proportional role of fathers vs. mothers as topic initiators throughout the entire conversation: out of 47 parent-introduced topics, Israeli mothers introduced 76.5%; but out of 67 parent-introduced topics in the American families, fathers introduced 66%.

One reason for these findings may be the American perception of the occasion as having formal overtones because of the presence of the observer. Though the serving of food is accomplished mostly by the mothers, the fathers in these families take it upon themselves to *entertain the guest*, e.g. to introduce topics and to use narratives to keep the conversation going. By contrast, in the Israeli families, the mothers seem to take charge of the event, both in instrumental terms (here too it is mostly the women who serve the food) and by keeping the conversation going.[8]

Styles of Narrative Initiation

The solidarity ethos of Israeli society, as manifested in attitudes toward the observer, finds further expression in styles of narrative-event initiation. Consider story entry. In an independent study of the same corpora, Polss 1990 has analyzed in detail the types of devices used by initiators and story recipients in the course of story-entry talk. Germane to the discussion of attitudes toward telling is her analysis of the types of devices used in responsive utterances. Following Tannen's distinction (1984, 1985, 1989) between *high-involvement* and *high-considerateness* conversational styles, Polss distinguishes between high-involvement and low-involvement narrative response strategies.

High-involvement responses focus on the tale and the teller; in Tannen's terms, they show active "participatory listenership" (1984:30). These include devices such as request for information, confirmation of information, and listener contribution to the narrative. Low-involvement responses focus on the telling; they signal message reception, thereby confirming the teller's success in aligning story-recipients. These include different types of *uptakers* (Edmondson & House 1981:62–3), e.g. neutral back-channeling responses (*mhmm, uhhuh, yeah, right, okay*, etc.) and emotively colored ones (*really?, good, for heaven's sake*).

Polss found interactive, high-involvement style more characteristic of story entry in Israel than in America: the proportion of high to low involvement styles is 82% to 18% in the Israeli narratives, compared to 69% to 31% in the American stories. Thus Israeli story-opening exhibits a higher emphasis on coparticipation and demonstration of personal involvement. Israeli coparticipants frequently interpret story-initiator information, showing their concern with tale and teller.

(1) Israeli family 7: The conversation takes place as the family is getting ready to sit down at the table. Present also are the daughter (16) and the two sons (12 and 10).[9]

1 Observer:	*etmol hayinu [//] hayiti ecel pnina ve + . . .*	Yesterday we were [//] I was at the home of Pnina and + . . .
2 Mother:	*ve-cvika?*	And Cvika?
Observer:	*ve-cvika ken.*	And Cvika, yes.
Mother:	*nu # ve-ex halax?*	So how did it go?
Observer:	*haya meod nexmad.*	It was very nice.
	[Story]	

The fast rate of speech, lack of interturn pauses, and dialogic unfolding of this story entry places it high on the involvement continuum. The story recipient's high engagement can further be seen by her use of what Tannen (1984:118) calls "cooperative promptings" at every turn (e.g., "So how did it go?"). Americans, by contrast, exhibit less relative focus on interpersonal involvement, devoting their efforts to floor-management tasks aimed at securing the telling.

(2) American family 2: The children are Martin (8m), Daniel (6m), and Tamara (4f). The conversation takes place in the middle of dinner.

Martin:	My best friend got about + . . .
	You see me and my best friend were studying *rockets-?*
Observer:	Uhhuh.
	[Story]

The shared features noted here are high degrees of collaboration and of inclusion of children in narrative events. Cultural diversity is revealed in attitudes toward tellers – the question of who participates – and in styles of story entry. This trend for cultural diversity of a gradient nature, against a background of shared orientations, is also noticeable in attitudes toward tales.

Transforming Tales to Telling

Cultural Variation in Spatio-Temporal Orientation of Tales

Where do tellers find the tales for constructing narratives at dinnertime? Certainly not in fiction; the vast majority of narratives in both groups (90%) are derived from real-life experience. In predominantly adult narratives, fictional topics do not exceed 4%.

In child-involved narratives, fiction does play a role (14%). Israeli children mention fictional characters from story books (Aladdin is one) and tell the contents of movies and books. American children talk about fictional characters from television: Sesame Street, Bugs Bunny, etc.

We have analyzed spatio-temporal framing by coding the two dimensions independently. First, since our definition of narratives included only stories of the past (see Ochs et al. 1989 for a different notion of temporal framing in family narratives), we distinguished narratives by temporal reference, including

today ("I finished my assignment today in um and . . ."), *recent past* ("I met an interesting man on the beach last week"; "Last night Debbie . . ."), or *distant past* ("that happened about five years ago.") Cases which were either timeless (such as jokes and fiction), or lacking in cues for reliable assignment to a "recent" or "distant" time frame, were excluded from this analysis, leaving a corpus of 195 clearly time-framed marked narrative events (out of 264). Second, we defined narrative spatial orientation as geared either toward the *home*, the *world of school and/or work*, or any other location in the *world*. For example, a narrative about how the substitute teacher behaved that day is considered a "today/school" narrative, a visit to the museum last week is a "recent-past/world" story, and a teenager's early childhood memory about a family pet is a "distant-past/home" story.

In terms of their spatio-temporal framing, family dinner narratives defy the expectations of literary critics. Toolan (1988:1–2) defines narratives as "a recounting of things spatio-temporally distant." This might be true for fictional narratives; but most family narratives are definitely not temporally, and only partially spatially, remote from tellers and audience. Considered together for both groups, the majority of temporally marked narratives (63%) concern events of the very recent past – today, yesterday, or last week – leaving 42% to focus on events from the distant past ($n = 195$); see "Past 1" and "Past 2" in Figure 5. In terms of location, half the narratives analyzed fall into the third group, being located in the world. A third concern school or work, with the rest (12%) being located in the homes; see Figure 6.

Within this general framework, however, we find cross-cultural preferences. The distribution by story time in Israeli and American narratives shows that story time is very different in the two groups (Fig. 5). The most striking difference is revealed in regard to the "today" frame: in the American families, almost half




Figure 5: Temporal tale frames




Figure 6: Spatial tale frames

the time-marked narratives focus on *today* (46%). Telling about the happenings of the day thus stands out as the most important single time frame for American narratives. By contrast, in Israeli narratives, "today" stories take up only one-quarter of narrative space (24%). For Israelis, the recent and nonrecent past are the preferred time frames, taking up over three-quarters of narrative space (76%). The difference lies in general preference for time frames, not in choice of topics within the frames chosen. For example, for both Americans and Israelis, stories of the distant past cover a rich variety of topics. These include a series of humorous anecdotes about house painters that the family employed over the years, the story of an exceptional shopping expedition, several camping and travel stories, and anecdotes from the children's earlier years.

Cultural preferences for the tale's spatial frame are revealed in the choices of home orientation vs. school or work orientation (see Fig. 6). For both groups, about half the narratives are world-oriented, concerning spatial frames such as museums, camping grounds, or shopping malls. But Israeli narratives are markedly more home-oriented than American. In a considerable proportion of Israeli narratives (20%), the locus of the tale is at the home; by contrast, home stories are quite rare (6%) in the American corpus. The Israeli home stories include stories about birthday celebrations, family pets, grandparents visiting, or specific incidents that link the world and the home, such as the story of a mother's anxiety on coming home and not finding her two (early teen) sons there when she expected them.

An interesting corollary to Israeli home orientation is provided by analysis of the types of protagonists foregrounded in family narratives (Figure 7). We have divided protagonists as *self*, *other*, or *us*. For both Israelis and Americans, attention is divided almost equally between stories that involve the self as protagonist and those concerning others. The prominence of the self as protagonist




Figure 7: Tale protagonists

is not surprising, given that family dinners provide a unique opportunity for each member to use the narrative mode for raising issues of personal concern before a presumably supportive audience. Stories about others often involve the self too, e.g. the self as critical observer, as when the narrative concerns a teenager recounting an incident between the teacher and another student. The third category, "us stories," are quite rare in both groups; but they are more likely to appear in the Israeli narratives than the American. Furthermore, the nine Israeli "us narrative" events are rather long and elaborated happenings, lasting up to seven to eight minutes each, while the two American "us narrative" events are much shorter (3–4 minutes) and less elaborated.

We have seen that the groups differ culturally on the dimensions of spatio-temporality. For the Americans, the process of transformation from tales of today to the actual telling is enacted in a culturally specific, ritualistic way–that is unparalleled in the Israeli narrative events.

"Today" Rituals: Who will I Tell How My Day Goes?

In an imitation of domesticity, a call girl in an American movie from 1990 (*Pretty Woman*) greets her customer with "How was your day, dear?" But judging by our dinner-table conversations, this conventional query functions socially in much richer ways than merely a sign of wifely concern. Narratives about the day's happening figure in both Israeli and American dinner-table talk, but it is only in the American families that such narrative events take on the features of a proper interaction ritual (Goffman 1976). "Today" narratives seem to combine three ritualistic features: the recurrent nature of the activity type, and the role expectations that it entails; the formulaic, repetitive language of the opening phase; and the ritual constraints governing the type of conversational contribution expected.

As an activity type, "today" narratives resemble early childhood *formats of interaction*, which are "standardized . . . interaction patterns between adult and infant that contain demarcated roles and eventually become reversible" (J. Bruner 1983:120). Within the family context, the roles of demarcation cut across *insiders* and *outsiders*: thus the observer at the family dinner table has in this case no participation rights, never asks (and is not being asked) about other's or his/her own day. This is not surprising, given that "today" rituals, like early childhood interaction formats, are based on a very high level of shared assumptions of both a cognitive and an affective nature. Members of the family have basic cognitive scripts about each other's activities during the day, and they act on the assumption that deviations from such scripts (the stuff narratives are made of) are a matter of mutual interest and concern.

Theoretically, within the family circle, all members have reciprocal rights and duties to participate; but in practice, reciprocity is limited to spouses, since children either self-initiate participation or are invited by parents to do so, but as a rule fail to show the same initiative toward their parents.

Whereas childhood interaction formats act as a language acquisition support system (J. Bruner 1983), "today" narratives act as a critical socializing context for the acquisition of narrative skills. As the analysis of the texts will show, the ritual can be performed with varying degrees of success. The processes involved in causes of success or failure provide contexts of socialization in regard both to the choice of acceptable topics and to appropriate ways of telling.

The opening phase of "today" rituals is marked by clear discourse boundaries at the point of initiation. The stylistic features of the opening gambit are of a formulaic and repetitive nature, allowing for only a limited degree of lexical and syntactic variation.

Consider modes of initiation. Transition from any other topic to the "today" narrative is enacted either by an other-initiated formulaic question (some variation on *How was your day?*), or by a self-initiated *today* + *action verb* phrase ("I had lunch at the Parka today.").

(3) American family 6: The children are Andrew (10m), Jessica (8f), and Joshua (3m). This "today" story is the first, to be followed by several others at the same meal.

1	Father:	Jessie, how was your day?	←
2	Joshua:	Ooooh aaah	
3	Mother:	What was the best part of your day, Jessie?	←
4	Jessica:	After lunch.	
5	Joshua:	I get xxx	
6	Jessica:	xxx	
7	Father:	You were out playing in the rain.	
8	Jessica:	Uh-huh. [=! affirmative]	
9	Mother:	Do you have your templates, Jessie?	
10	Jessica:	xxx	
11	Father:	[=! talking to Andrew] Really? What happened after lunch? You left for the beach yesterday?	

The transition from the previous topic is often minimally marked by the use of a discourse marker (cf. Schiffrin 1987), e.g. *so*.

(4) American family 2: Present are also the children: Daniel (6m), Marvin (8m), and Tamara (3f).

1	Father:	So, Tamara, what did you do today?	←
2	Mother:	<xx help yourself> [>]	
3	Father:	<What'd you do today, Tamara? > [<]	
		End@	

(5) American family 7: The children are Aaron (9.5m) and Abigail (7f).

1	Mother:	So what did you accomplish today?	←
2	Father:	xxx	
3	Aaron:	Uh, uh.	
4	Father:	Yes	
5	Mother:	Yes [= laughing]	
6	Father:	Well #	
		[Story]	

The salience of the ritual becomes particularly evident through self-nomination. The right for telling your day is implicitly felt to be equally shared, as voiced by 4-year-old Sandra. With no preliminaries, Sandra at some point in the middle of the dinner turns to her mother and asks a question.

(6) American family 4: The children are Jordan (7.5m) and Sandra (4f). Sandra's initiation takes place half an hour into the dinner.

1	Sandra:	Mommy to who will I tell how my day goes?	←
2	Mother:	OK let's hear your day.	
3	Sandra:	Well # I xxx played puzzles xxx I made xxx [continued]	

Sandra's question shows that she is already aware of her rights for displaying her day, and moreover that she offers her day as a gift to be received. It is the duty of her family to appoint a receiver for the gift; and indeed, her mother acknowledges the gift, accepting it on behalf of all present (*Okay, let's hear your day*), thereby giving the signal for the ritual to begin. In other words, the ritual requirement in the case of self-nomination is for recipients to display positive acceptance – not only yielding the floor for the teller, as is the case in all narratives, but also paying homage to the specific offering made.

In other-initiated narratives, the opening gambit creates a slot that the recipient is expected to fill with a narrative of the *doings* and *accomplishments* of the day. In this way the ritual constraint that operates determines the type of contribution expected from both initiators and respondents. In ex. 4, the child is *probed to conform* to this *conversational demand* (cf. Dascal 1983:109), while in ex. 5 the adult provides the expected narrative. What distinguishes the family "today" ritual from similar rhetorical routines in other types of interaction (e.g., *How was your weekend?* at the office) is apparently the notion of accountability. In the family, a question like *How was your day?*, especially when addressed to children,

implicitly invites a narrative no less than does an explicit query about the day's happenings. In other contexts, of course, a narrative may be neither invited nor much wanted. It is through the notion of accountability that we can understand how somebody's day can be topicalized, objectified, distanced, and contemplated with care.

(7) American family 8: The children are Jared (11m) and Robin (9f). The mother's move follows a request from Robin to change the subject discussed previously.

1 Mother: I want to talk to Jared about his day, because he said it was so horrible. ←
2 Jared: It was not horrible, it was just boring. ←
3 Mother: Why was it boring Jared?
4 Jared: It was really [//] actually that's not quite true. This person who studies lungs came in for science +\
5 Mother: Lungs?
6 Jared: Yeah, and she said [//] she showed us some slides and brought in a plastic dog's lung
[continued]

As these examples show, both children and spouses are invited to participate in the ritual. But as noted, nomination rights are not quite equally distributed. We encountered only one instance where a child tries to nominate a parent, rather than vice versa.

(8) American family 7: The children are Aaron (9.5m) and Abigail (7f).

1 Andrew: What happened at work today Mother? ←
2 Mother: Well I bet you, one power trouble at work today.
3 Andrew: Oh really. [=! laughs]
4 Mother: [=! laughs] Oh God.
5 Abigail: You should drop your jobbie. ←
6 Mother: I know.
7 ?: Drop your jobbie.
End@

This example shows one way in which the ritual may fail: neither party (certainly not the mother) seems to consider the question as a serious attempt to initiate a "today" ritual. When no narrative comes forth, another child offers a personal comment (T5), which serves to change the topic. In the case of successful "today" narratives, the same slot often is filled by prompts to continue, worded in no less formulaic ways than initiations.

(9) American family 4: Sandra is 4; also present is Jordan (7.5m).

1 Father: So what else did you today Sandra? ←
2 Sandra: Um xx beads, puzzles and I played clock
[continued]

(10) American family 4.

1 Mother: What else did you do today, dear? ←
2 Father: That's all

Such constraints on initiation and participation rights, as well as on modes of telling, turn "today" narrative events into a clearly delimited speech events that impose specific rights and duties on all participants. For the gift of a *today story* to be well received, it must be a substantial gift. The first operating constraint is one of selection. Not all the day's happenings are worthy of telling: adults explicitly call upon nominated tellers to exercise criteria of interest in regard to the tale before launching into the telling; thus 8-year-old Jessica (T3 in ex. 3) is asked to tell *the best part of her day.* A long account of a soccer game by an 8-year-old boy is interrupted as follows.

(11) American family 4: Jordan is 7.5.
Father: Jordan, would you like to tell us something? Other than soccer, what happened today?

Child tellers are required to order the day's happenings by relevance (*Tell us the worst/best part of your day*; *What were the highlights of your day?*) prior to foregrounding one particular chain of events as a narrative topic. Children are also explicitly socialized in modes of telling. They are required, in the terms of Genette 1980, to turn *stories* into true *narratives.* An extreme example of this process is illustrated by the narrative event I refer to as "Everybody's Day."

(12) Everybody's day: American family 5: The family has three children: Dorothy (13f), Beatrice (10f) (also called Harriet), and Matthew (4m).

1 Father: So how was your day Harriet? <You're supposed +\ > [>]
2 Bea: <Daddy [=! offended]> [<].
3 Father: What?
4 Bea: Cut that out. [%com: Bea does not like to be called Harriet]
5 Father: You're supposed to say "Oh it was wonderful xxx"
6 Bea: Daddy [=! annoyed] no lozzie [unclear?] [/] <lozzie> [?][>] [=! laughs].
7 Father: <=! laughs> [<]
8 Mother: xx Why don't you tell us about your day now?
9 Matthew: My [//] your day.
10 Bea: Mine?
11 Matthew: xxx.
12 Father: Your first?
13 Matthew: And your tenth.
14 Father: Oh [=! laughs].
15 Matthew: Bea tell your day. ←
16 Bea: I woke up and I got dressed and xxx [=! speaks very softly].
17 Matthew: What?
18 Father: Speak up.
19 Bea: # um # I woke up and got dressed and went to xx xx
20 Father: You didn't bother to eat any of breakfast or lunch?
21 Bea: Nope.
22 Father: And I made you such nice french toast too.
23 Matthew: No then <my day!> [>].
24 Father: <Oh is it your turn now?> [<] ←
25 Matthew: After Bea comes me [=! laughter]# my day # washed and

26 Father: Matthew!
27 Matthew: Oh [=! laughs]
28 Father: You can do any of that # whatever it was.
29 Dorothy: Matthew now # can I go?
30 Matthew: No. First I wake up # then go to bed # then wake up <then go to bed # then I wake up # then go to bed> [>] [=! laughing].
31 Father: Oh [=! laughs] <you just lost your turn> [<]
32 Matthew: First I wake up # then +\
33 Bea: Matthew!
34 Father: No, stop.
35 Matthew: xxx.
36 Bea: Matthew you had a very <boring day> [>]. ←
37 Matthew: <Here go mommy> [<]
38 Father: First I wake up # then I go to nursery school
%com: [=! imitates the way Matthew speaks]
39 Mother: Listen to this family.
40 Mother: First I woke up and then had breakfast.
41 Matthew: Then you had nothing [=! laughs].
42 Mother: Then I had my shower.
43 Matthew: Then you had nothing [=! laughs].
44 Mother: Then I did the wash. I made the lasagne+ . . .
45 Dorothy: Now it's my turn Matthew. ←
46 Father: First I ate breakfast # then I got up.
47 Bea: Daddy [=! annoyed tone].
48 Mother: Oh [=! laughs].
49 Father: Then I didn't take a shower. Then I brushed my teeth # then I went outside # then I got dressed +\ ←
50 Bea: Daddy [=! shouting]!
51 Mother: Oh [=! laughs].
52 Father: Then I took my shoes off and put my pajamas back on # went to the basement # did some work # caught a pigeon # <made the pigeon for lunch> [>]
53 Matthew: <Oh [=! laughs]> [<]
54 Father: <Then I drove you all to> [<] [/] then I [/] then I went to # Woolworth's bought something that I had to return later in the day as usual because I always have to return everything I buy.
55 Bea: You can't buy things.
56 Father: um # then we went to the library.
57 Bea: And found nothing.
58 Father: And I went with a girl who found nothing. Then we went out <of the library +\> [>]
59 Bea: <Okay> [=! shouted]!
[Turns into a discussion about whose books are on whose library card]

"Everybody's day" displays the typical features of the "today" ritual in its insistence on equality in rights of participation (on turn-taking, see particularly T24, T25, T29, T45), on the repetition of the formulaic questions (T1, T8, T15), and on the type of sequential coherence built up from "your day" questions

responded to by action verb series. But it is a ritual gone sour, negative rather than positive in affective outcomes.

Several indicators in the discourse combine to show us what is going wrong, and thereby also reveal underlying norms for how it should have gone. First, there is a double message in the father's initiation: he uses the formulaic *How was your day?*, but prefixes it with an unusual term of address (which his daughter does not like), and follows it with a metacommunicative statement (*You're supposed to say . . .*). He thus sets a playful tone for the interaction, implying that it is not to be taken seriously. But the mother shifts the key back to a serious tone (T8), and the children spend a considerable amount of metacommunicative energy – in line with the general tendency of American family dinner talk to topicalize turn-taking (Blum-Kulka & Sheffer 1993) – arguing for their share in the family's "today" narrative space.

By shifting the argument constantly from the realm of telling, in which the issue at hand is a share in the "today" ritual, to the realm of conversation, in which the issue is floor management, the speakers indicate most clearly a dissatisfaction with the unfolding of the event. Thus, in T23, Matthew claims his share in the ritual of telling one's day; his utterance is an attempt to enter this specific telling realm. His father's response, *Oh, is it your turn now?*, switches back to the realm of conversation, thereby implicitly inviting talk for talk's sake rather than compliance with the demanding task (in terms of content) of telling one's day. In T24, the framing of the event shifts from the frame of telling one's days, in which it is meaningful to exchange and evaluate personally owned days, to the loosely defined frame "talk about the day," in which the focus is on having a share in the talk, rather than on telling one's own day. Subsequently, the realm of the tale is affected as well, yielding extremely poor "today" stories in terms of information.

The first child to speak on topic, Beatrice (T16–22), fails to provide an interesting narrative; she is interrupted by her younger brother, Matthew (T23), who is dismissed (T33–34) as having defied expectation for making a substantial contribution of any kind. While Beatrice still conforms to the rules, though not very successfully, Matthew steps out of the rules completely. Deliberately or not, his account actually parodizes both the requirement for informative substance (T25, T31) and relevance. His father dismisses him by moving from the realm of telling to the realm of conversation, negating a conversational turn that fails the "today" requirement (*You just lost your turn*); but Beatrice's evaluation of the tale (*Matthew you had a very boring day*) imply a critique of the teller as principal (T36). The mother's metacomment in T39 (*Listen to this family*) suggests an awareness that things have gone wrong; yet her own attempt at a change of *footing* (Goffman 1974:124–60) goes back to the earnest, but not good enough, report mode earlier initiated by her daughter (compare T16 to T40 and T44).

The event culminates with the father giving an echoed, free indirect speech, mocking imitation of Matthew's account (T38), only to go on (T46ff.) to offer a parodized version of a "today" report of his own. Framing the report as a parody of the real thing is indicated by an unlikely reversal of chronology (*First I ate breakfast then I got up*), followed by the negation of an event (*then I didn't ta-*

a shower). Audience response (T47, 48, 50, 53) wavers between clear annoyance, which in the case of the daughter may mean taking offense (see T47), and laughter, which seems to indicate in this case that both mother and son align with the father's choice of telling-frame.

The overall message of this failed narrative event relates to tales, telling, and tellers. In regard to the tale, it evokes the requirements of "today" tellability: to provide a significant contribution to the ritual, you have to select, order, and dramatize the events of the day. A failure to do so shifts the focus of the narrative event from the realm of telling back to the realm of conversation, and changes its key; these transformations result in the disintegration of the "today" ritual. Tellers, encompassing in this event both the role of animator and an accountable principle (Goffman 1981), are highly vulnerable to such transformations, finding themselves being challenged both on account of their tales (e.g. *boring day*) and their participation in the telling.

What is the overall function of the "today" rituals in the American families? In terms of discourse goals, they occupy a curious place between transactional and interactional speech (Brown & Yule 1983:1–2). The role of the ritualistic question *How was your X* can set off different types of speech events. In case it is completed in a two-move exchange, as might be the case among co-workers in an office situation, we have before us an interaction ritual (in Goffman's sense) that will tend to serve mainly phatic interactional goals, aimed predominantly at the maintenance of social relations, rather than the transmission of information. But in the family the same question sets off very different kinds of expectations. Here the transmission of (narratively filtered) information is not only tolerated, but actually required, and the interactional goal achievable is not just social harmony but rather "affective convergence" (Aston 1988:255). The ritualistic mode seems to satisfy this variety of expectations; it provides conventionalized ways for the show of reciprocal interest and affect in the family, while simultaneously serving as a socializing context for transmitting cultural notions of appropriate ways to transform tales into telling.

In contrast, the Israeli time-framed narratives exhibit only few of the features of the "today" ritual. We do find that the activity type is enacted, especially by parents asking their children about the activities of the day. As in the American families, such questions expect a response in the form of a narrative, rather than phatically. Failure to provide a narrative is responded to by further probing (see T4, 5, 8 in ex. 13).

(13) Israeli family 4: The family has two daughters, Ruti (12f) and Naomi (8f), and one son, Yaron (4m).

1	Mother:	*Yaron # tesaper lanu <ma asita ha-yom ba-gan> [>]*	Yaron, tell us what you <did in school todya> [>]
2	Ruti:	*<ma [//] ex haya ba-gan> [<]*	[What [//] how was school> [<]
3	Yaron:	*naim*	Pleasant.
4	Mother:	*naim? ma haya naim? tesaper lanu ex haya naim?*	Pleasant? What was pleasant? Tell us how it was pleasant. We played.

7	Yaron: *be-misxakim.*	With games.
8	Mother: *eze? ba-xuc? ba-xacer?* [continued]	Which? outside? in the yard? ←

But initiation of such narrative events varies with child and family. Transition to a narrative concerned with the day's happenings is initiated either by a variant of *What did you do in school (today)?*, as in ex. 13, or more typically, by a topically specific question, as in ex. 14.

(14) Israeli family 6, with twin girls aged 6: Lilax and Iris.

Father:	*lean halaxtem hayom be-shiur teva?*	Where did you go today during your "nature" lesson?
Lilax:	*la-giva hazoti she-pa'am she-avra halaxnu* [continued]	To this hill that we went to last time.

The time marker *today* tends to appear in stories told about children, rather than by children in response to "today" elicitations. An example is a story told mainly by a mother, with some participation from a child, about the adventure her 4-year-old daughter had at school when a rooster jumped on her; or a story, again told by a mother, about how 6-year-old Rami missed the bus to school. The need to mark narratives temporally tends to be reserved by Israelis for stories from the past. One device is the use of *pa'am*; literally *pa'am* means 'once'; and as in English, it figures in conventional story beginnings. Examples from the family narratives vary in topic, as seen in ex. 15–17.

(15) Israeli family 2: The children are Shlomit (12f), Riki (10f), and Mika (5f).

Father:	*hayiti pa'am be-shuk aravi ve-ani halaxti liknot kishuim vehayu sham* [continued]	I visited once an Arab market and I went to buy some zucchini and there were

(16) Israeli family 2.

Mika:	*ani roca lesaper bedixa. pa'am axat halax ish* [continued]	I want to tell a joke. Once a man went . . .

(17) Israeli family 1: Yoash is a guest, a friend of the family.

Yoash:	*shamati pa'am et ex korim la. hag-veret Milo* [continued]	I once heard, what's her name, Mrs. Milo

Other time-marking devices used include concrete specifications of time (*last week/yesterday/last year/about a month ago*), as well as sequential ordering of events relative to self (*the first time I went to the University*).

Talk about the day's activities lacks the ritual constraints on participation structure: we found no indication in the Israeli discourse of an expectation for all to participate, as in the American families. What seem to be missing are both the accountability requirement, in regard to the most recent time frame, and the

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The difference between the two groups in regard to "today" narratives reflects to some extent a wider cultural difference in the way verbal elements of social interaction are conventionalized. Relative to Israeli society, American social interaction seems much more governed by situationally conventionalized scripts (see Blum-Kulka 1992 for elaboration), which in turn pale by comparison with the degree of linguistic conventionalization observed for Japanese social behavior (Ide 1987). From this perspective, *How was your day*, apart from its broader cultural and familial functions, is yet one more instance of the rich repertoire of routinized interaction rituals in the United States.

Cultural Styles of Collaboration

Issues of Co-ownership vs. Co-performance

The degree of participation in the telling raises the issue of how access to the information contained in the tale, i.e. the *tale-ownership*, is related to the *entitlement* to tell the story (Shuman 1986:137–41). In other words, whose stories in the family are told by whom and to whom? In discussing narratives that call for audience response, Sacks (1978:261) notes that it is the "involvement in it [the story] that provides for the story's telling." Personal experience grants ownership, and shared experience grants joint ownership: "Parties who have experienced an event together are jointly in a position to describe it to someone else" (Goodwin 1981:159). As noted by Miller et al. (1990:298), "The conditions giving rise to joint ownership are more likely to occur in intimate relations than in non-intimate ones." Members of the family, being part of an intimate network, come to the dinner table with knowledge of both shared and unshared events. Although the conditions for claiming joint ownership may be met, the fact that several people are in a position to tell a story does not result necessarily in joint performance: Mothers regularly tell stories *about* children in the presence of the children (Miller et al. 1990), claiming sole performance rights on jointly *owned* stories. The reverse may be true as well; at least during the dinner-table conversations studied here, highly involved audience response to a story of personal experience (or knowledge) may turn the telling into a joint performance, implying a process-motivated claim to joint ownership. Hence ownership rights through access to the tale have no one-to-one correspondence to performance rights through access to the telling.


As the first step in exploring the interrelations between these two dimensions, I consider each independently, and then explore the culturally preferred intersections observed in the family narratives.

One way to approach story ownership is by considering access to the knowledge of the events recounted: is the narrated event (the fabula) known to the teller only, or is it shared by any other participants? Abstracting the nature of the narrated events from the verbal narratives by considering textual indicators, we follow Labov & Fanshel (1977:62–4) in distinguishing individually known *A-events* (known to teller only) from two-party shared *A-B events* (known to teller

and one other participant) and generally known *O-events*. Specific to the family scene is a fourth type of fabula, *F-events*, which are shared by all members of the family.[10] A breakdown of the data using these categories, as presented in Figure 8, suggests that Americans and Israelis only partially share attitudes regarding the degree of novelty expected from narratives around the dinner table.

In both groups, A-events dominate (66% and 69%). This is not surprising, given that dinner time provides a unique opportunity for all to share personal experiences with intimates. Family dinners with young children do not seem to occasion stories concerned with the state of the world; O-event narratives are almost absent from this speech event. For Americans, the next most frequent category following A-events is A-B events (30%). For the most part, these recount events experienced jointly by a child and one of the parents. For the American families, there is a marginal 3.5% of F-event stories. On the other hand, for the Israelis, F-event narratives prove a viable category, representing 9% of all stories told. It is interesting to note that, for Israelis, the percentage of F-event narratives in child-involved narratives rises to 15%, while in the equivalent set of American stories it drops to 2%.

Consider now modes of performance. We can distinguish three major modes of telling: *monologic*, *dialogic*, and *polyphonic*. Even though family narrative events are jointly constructed affairs, styles of collaborations vary from low to high participation by participants other than the primary narrator(s). At the dominantly single-voice end of the continuum, we find monologic narratives, in which one primary narrator remains in control of the floor throughout the event. The audience at such events responds indirectly, sustaining the telling but not involved in the tale. At the multivoiced, polyphonic end, we find narratives that defy the distinction of primary vs. secondary narrator(s), being constructed in close



collaboration between several participants. Between these two ends, we find dialogic narrations, constructed typically through a question/answer format.

A multiplicity of voices at the level of telling (in the polyphonic mode) can also transform relations between tellers. In the terms of Goffman (1974:127), the audience at such events is transformed into "fellow performers" who become "inhabitants of the same realm." For Tannen (1989:12), it is an issue of involvement: "an internal, even emotional connection individuals feel which binds them together to other people as well as to places, things, activities, ideas, memories and words. However, . . . [it is] not a given but an achievement in conversational interaction." In Tannen's analysis of a dinner conversation between friends (1984), she found this achievement of high involvement through conversational style to characterize the three Eastern-European Jewish speakers present.

Monologic narratives tend to be self-initiated, though they may follow a question from another participant. For example, in the Robbery Story analyzed by Polanyi (1989:66), the topic is put forward by a participant other than the storyteller, appealing to the appointed participant's expertise on the events to be narrated. Turning to the two women who got robbed, their friend asks: "I heard secondhand or whatever that you go robbed. – Yeah. – What happened?" Nor do tellers of monologic narratives necessarily have to claim experiential warrants for the tale – although, around the dinner table, tales do tend to be stories of personal experience. The distinctive feature of monologic narratives is the recognizability of a single narrator's voice.

In the dialogic mode, narration proceeds through a question/answer format, whether the story is self- or other-initiated. This is the mode that children use to tell stories from the very early stages of language acquisition (Ninio 1988, Sachs 1979). A well-documented subset of such stories is the joint evocation of shared events, in which the caretaker and the child jointly recount the story (Heath 1982, Snow 1991). But whether or not the events to be recounted are known to both adult and child, elicited narratives with young children tend to remain collaborative, with story contributions distributed between adult and child (Snow & Goldfield 1982).

Polyphonic narration is enacted in principle through both co-performance and co-ownership. Co-performance requires access to the tale, or at least shared access to its social context. This access takes into account an individual teller's *information state* (cf. Goffman 1974:133) as to "why events have happened as they have," as well as participant's familiarity with the underlying sociocultural scripts that make narratives "ring true with the stories they know to be true in their lives" (Fisher 1987:63). Co-ownership may be culturally interpreted as entitling all co-owners with story-telling rights (but not necessarily so; see Miller et al. 1990, Shuman 1986).[11] The outcome will be a jointly constructed narrative, where division lines between primary and secondary narrators are blurred. The issue of telling rights in such cases may vary culturally in regard to all participants, or only in regard to children. If children are included in the circle of right-holders, a child may feel licensed to contribute on topics felt relevant, whether the story is initiated by an adult or another child.

Israelis and Americans seem to differ in preferences for these three modes of performance. Quantitative analysis of a subsample of the narratives included here (Blum-Kulka & Snow 1992) shows that Americans prefer the monologic, display mode in 60% of the cases, with a preference for the dialogic mode in 29%. Israelis, by contrast, make use of all three styles, preferring both the dialogic (49%) and the polyphonic (30%) to the monologic (24%).[12]

But the cultural difference in regard to both ownership and performance rights is revealed mainly in the diverse ways the groups interpret the relationship between these two dimensions. Excluding dialogic, typically adult/child narration from this analysis, we can detect four types of interaction between access to the tale and participation in the telling. In the following I argue that the two groups differ in their preferences for these, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Styles of participation

	Mode	
Event-type	Polyphonic	Monologic
Shared	Israeli/American	American
Unshared	Israeli	Israeli/American

Among the four possible configurations between event type and mode of telling, Israeli and American narratives seem to share two: telling shared experiences collaboratively in the polyphonic mode, and allowing predominantly solo performances of personally known stories. However, the American families support monologic performances even when tales are known to more than one participant; and Israeli narration may unfold in a highly collaborative way, even in unshared tales.

The distribution among these four modes shows these preferences as representing a gradient phenomenon; see Figure 9. In both groups, shared experiences told collaboratively and single experiences told monologically constitute the bulk of narrative events (77% for Israelis, 84% for Americans). For Israelis, the third choice is to tell unshared events in a polyphonic mode (18%); for Americans, it is to tell shared events in the monologic mode (12%). In the following, I illustrate the way cultural styles are manifest within each of the two major modes of telling.

The Monologic Mode: Telling Shared and Unshared Events

A culturally shared and highly prevalent mode of telling (43% for both groups) is the dominantly monologic performance granted occasionally to sole tellers who recount (mostly but not exclusively) personal experience. In one such case, an Israeli woman describes in great detail the nightmarish dream she had about getting lost on one of the campuses of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. In another instance, an American teen-age girl recounts a confrontation she had with a teacher in school. In the following example, the story offered by




Figure 9: Ownership vs. performance in telling tales

observer terminates a series of stories concerning memories of food from childhood, all embedded in members' attitudes towards the religious practices of the parent and grandparent generations.

18) Israeli family 1: The children are Nadav (11m) and Jonathan (10m). The segment follows several exchanges concerning food and eating habits.

1	Observer:	*aval ha-ax sheli Avner haya noda be-bareranuto be-oxel. hu mamash hayu shlosha dvarim she-hu axal ve-zehu.*	But my brother Avner was well-known for his pickiness in food. There were actually three things he ate and that's it.
2	Mother:	*ma?*	What?
3	Observer:	*chips ve-stek ze haya ha-xx. ve-ani zoxeret she-od basar bishvil she-hu yoxal basar notnim lo. Sonya hayta notenet lo avatiax be-onat ha-avatixim xotexet lo she-yaani kaxa* + |	Chips and steak it was xx # And I remember that more meat so he'll eat meat they would give him. Sonya [%com: Sonya is the teller's stepmother] would serve him watermelon in season # would cut it so +\
4	Mother:	++ *lo yargish. bis me-ze ve-bis me-ha-hu.*	(that) he won't notice; a bite ← here and a bite there.
5	Observer:	*ve-kshe-hu higia le-cava hu na'asa gorme kaze oxel ve-mitanyen bemisadot. hayom shuv ani lo yoda'at ki hu dos yesh lahem kol mine isurim. aval ba-tkufa she-hu od haya*	And when he got to the army he became such a gourment, eating and interested in restaurants. Now again I don't know, since he became observant, they have all these

		xiloni hu na'asa axlan bilti ragil ve-hu amar "axshav ani mictaer al kol ha-shanim she-haya oxel kol kax tov <ve-ani> [>] ve-ani lo neheneti me-klum."	rules. But during the period while he was still nonobservant, he turned into a great eater and said, "Now I'm sorry for all these years when there was such good food and I, and and I didn't enjoy it at all."
6	Mother:	*<ken?> [<]*	<Yes?>
7	Nadav:	*ani af pa'am lo ectaer.*	I shall never regret it. ←
8	Observer:	*lo # kol ze ba lomar lax she-ata lo yaxol lada'at ma yihye be-od* +\ @ End	All this means that you can never know what will happen in another +\

The story of Avner, the non-eating child transformed into a gourmet adult-only to lose access (from the teller's point of view) to gourmet food, through newly acquired religious practices – is exceptionally rich in cultural themes, negotiating transitions between life cycles in the Israeli context (child/soldier/adult) and Jewish life styles (non-observant/observant); see Polanyi 1989 for analysis of cultural themes in American stories. For the purposes of the present analysis, the mode of telling is of interest. The example illustrates that, even in the monologic mode, when recounting unshared events, Israeli audience response goes beyond brief *uptakers* (Edmondson & House 1981). In T4, the evaluative detail added by the mother is her own logical inference, never mentioned by the main teller. The child's comment in T7 indicates how carefully he had been listening to the story; in the Israeli families, children typically act as active audience to all stories told, regardless of tellers (adults or children) and topic. In the American families, child participation in the role of active audience seems more restricted to child-related topics (Blum-Kulka & Snow 1992).

In the American families, monologic telling is not restricted to unshared events. In 12% of the American (non-dialogic) narrative events, a sole performer is granted telling rights for a tale; this happens in only 5% of the parallel cases in the Israeli families. Consider the following personal experience narratives told with the explicit purpose of entertaining.

(19) The bug: American family 3. The children **are Samuel (10m) Joshua (6m). Talk** on hikes precedes this segment.

1 Mother: Daniel loves that.
%com: [Daniel is her husband]
2 Samuel: Really?
3 Mother: I on the other hand [//] He loves to commune with nature. Me, I can take nature through a glass window.
4 Samuel: xxx
5 Mother: A glass window # with the bugs out # and anything that's more than four feet removing themselves from my presence I can't deal with them [=! laughs]. We had a bug once in the shower # and Samuel called me in on a Friday afternoon # wouldn't you know it # and he screams "Ma!" and there is this thing # if it wasn't two inches big # I thought it was the ←

most disgusting and somehow as disgusting as they are small # they get worse when they get larger # and there I was # it wasn't even afraid # it wasn't running # it was taking its time # it was sort of taking a little walk across the shower. I would at least appreciate it if they were afraid +/

6 Observer: But no. ←
7 Mother: +"But no, it sat there, very territorially, so I said "Get rid of it," he said "I'm not getting rid of it, you get rid of it," and of course Daniel was nowhere around.
8 Observer: Of course, right.
9 Mother: So we had to shpritz it to death. ←
10 Observer: Of course. ←
11 Mother: Oh, it was horrible, and the darn thing was so resilient it wouldn't die, you know I find that absolutely appalling +\
12 Observer: It wasn't xxx
13 Mother: That's right, well by the time we finish with them, they would be +. . . Cockroaches are going to inherit this earth one of these days.
14 Father: Well, you weren't using insecticide though.
15 Mother: I was using mildew spray xxx and that bug had the nerve to walk around in it yet # but finally it gave up # the ghost # and then we had to dispose of it. So I said "Go ahead # Samuel # dispose of it." He says "I'm not touching it # you touch it." So I took it out with thirty layers of tissue # so that I wouldn't even feel its shape and I picked it up and I threw it into the bathroom toilet.
16 Observer: She hasn't gotten over it. ←
17 Mother: I'm still thinking about it. I can see that bug # and I have visions of it rising up yet like a phoenix to haunt me. End@

The Bug Story is initiated by the mother, who remains the primary narrator for its duration. Though both father and older son (Samuel) are familiar with the events, audience response is limited to sustaining the act of telling through appropriate backchanneling and clarification comments (T6, T8, T10, T12, T16). The teller's comment on her relations with nature (*I can take nature through a glass window*, T3) serves as bridging talk to introduce her dramatic encounter with a spider in her bathroom on a Friday afternoon. She then manages to entertain her listeners by using several evaluative devices to highlight the turning points of her narratives (e.g. direct quotes, a shift to the use of the present tense; see T5, T7). Her efforts are fully appreciated – as can be seen by audience reactions in T6, T8, and T16. Finally, she concludes by providing a Labovian coda (Labov & Waletsky 1967:39); visions of the bug rising like a phoenix clearly link the past to the present.

The Bug Story shows that co-ownership of the tale does not necessarily entail equal rights for the telling. Narrative events can distinguish tellers from experiencers. In the Bug Story, the teller is the chief but not sole experiencer in the

events narrated; yet she is granted full telling rights, foregrounding her story-telling skills as individual performer.

The Polyphonic Mode: Telling Shared and Unshared Events

As listeners, we tend to expect collaboration in the telling when access to the tale is shared by several of the participants. Thus stories about a couple's trip abroad may be told to friends jointly, or in a monologic style, but with frequent interceptions from the other "knowing" participant. Shared ownership of the tale in the family may cut across generations, or create ownership affiliations between any group of members, either by true experience or by claimed familiarity with the events. Events that happen to parents jointly, prior to their children's birth, are one source for generationally defined ownership. In one case, the story of the parents' courtship is told in collaboration by both parents in response to a 10-year-old's question: *ex at ve-aba higatem le-ahava me-aruxat-erev pshuta?* 'How did you and Dad come to be in love from a simple dinner?'

The story of the parents' courtship is an example of the type of narrative which may be told again and again, because of its relevance to the history of the family. Memories from a shared past carry the potential to become part of the familial narrative repertoire, their telling triggered by the presence of a new audience. Our presence at the dinner table might have occasioned the retelling or construction of several such *family fables*. Consider the potential of the following recollection of a family reunion as a candidate of being or becoming a family fable.

(20) American family 7: Children are Aaron (9.5m) and Abigail (7f).

1	Father:	Yeah # anyway we had a big family reunion.	
2	Abigail:	What's a family reunion? [=softly]	
3	Mother:	That was all the members of the family [//] all relations.	
4	Father:	Well # you can't be more specific.	
5	Mother:	Not all.	
6	Abigail:	All the members of his side of the family.	←
7	Father:	Yes # it was all of my father's [//] my father and both of his sisters and all their children # and all the grandchildren.	
8	Aaron:	We were one of the grandchildren # right?	
9	Father:	Right.	←
10	Mother:	Um hm.	
11	Father:	So all these people were at this big reunion. And there wasn't enough room to sleep inside the house. So a lot of people bought # had or rented.	
12	Mother:	Rented. Nobody had # everybody rented.	
13	Father:	Yeah? Everybody rented RVs, which are these motor homes which you sleep in. And are not real comfortable.	
14	Mother:	And they're not real private.	
15	Father:	xx didn't seem to mind.	
16	Mother:	Well you just [//] you were so shy Abigail # you you wouldn't talk to anybody. And you just stayed inside the	←

RV and you never wanted to come out # see everybody. You just wanted to stay inside and read books and play with your toys.

17 Aaron: She could read then?

18 Mother: Well she had some books that she looked at the pictures # you know.

19 Aaron: Yeah.

20 Abigail: Picture book? Picture book?

21 Aaron: Pretended to read # pretended she was grown up.

22 Mother: Uh huh. And when anybody tried to talk to you # you'd run away and hide in the RV.

23 Father: Except for Pearson.

24 Abigail: Yeah in the RV I would go. ←

25 Father: You visited xxx P. He picked you up, xxx feet and sat you on his back xxx started asking you about the pictures.

26 Abigail: Huh

27 Father: You succumbed to his charms. xxx have [=! laughter] End@

The polyphonic mode of telling is particularly suitable for stories that have the family "us" as protagonist, and which are relevant in terms of contribution to the building of familial and individual identities. The Family Reunion story is not about self or other, but rather reflexively about "us," the family, and the way we were then. Its relevance stems from stressing family continuity: it seems to be saying "Here is something we did together, even if you children do not remember it all." Revealing several sides of Abigail's younger personality, the story is particularly relevant for the child protagonist: it provides her with a sense of the continuity of the self, combined with the opportunity to reflect on her younger self as compared with her current self. The suggested key for reflection is a humorous one; the child is invited to join the others in laughing at her own shyness then, and the attraction that broke it. The text contains indicators that the story has been told previously. Abigail's first contribution to the narrative (*all the members of his side of the family*, T6) suggests familiarity with the tale, or at least parts of it. A later remark (*yeah in the RV I would go*, T24) can be taken either as her recollection of the events, or as her acceptance of her parents' version. The story is thus on its way to becoming a family fable.

Telling is carried by both parents, with a shift in appointed audiences. The father seems to be talking first to the Observer; but the mother deliberately shifts perspective, appointing Abigail, the heroine of the story, as primary audience (*you were so shy Abigail*, T16). Aaron, the older brother, takes the role of the challenger, doubting his mother's version (*She could read then?*, T17) – and once reassured, insisting on his sister's limitations ([*She*] *pretended to read*, T21). The mother aligns with her son by picking up the 3rd person reference to Abigail (*Well she had some books*, T18); then, treating the exchange with Aaron as a "side-sequence" (Jefferson 1972), she shifts back to addressing Abigail directly. Thus, although in different narrative roles, eventually all family members collaborate in constructing a narrative that may well become part of the family's fable repertoire.

In the Israeli narratives, by contrast, sharing the tale is no prerequisite for participation in the telling. Even when the specific events are strictly of the A-event, "only teller knows" type, in the family they are told against the background of shared sociocultural scripts which in turn provide occasions for nonexperiencer participation. Israeli dinner-table participants seem to take full advantage of their familiarity with such scripts. In 18% of the (non-dialogic) Israeli narrative events, singular tales get a polyphonic telling. In the American families, we detected only three such examples (4%). In the following narrative, the fact that the story concerns an A-event does not prevent other members from taking an active part in the construction of the story.

(21) *Saving a watermelon*: Israeli family 4. The family has two daughters (Ruti, 11, and Naomi, 8) and one son (Yaron, 4). The story follows an account of a car accident the mother was involved in the same day.

1	Father:	*ani etmol* [/] *ani etmol hicalti avatiax.*	I yesterday [/] I saved a watermelon yesterday.
2	Observer:	Oh [=! laughs]	
3	Naomi:	*ex* [/] *ex?*	How? How?
4	Ruti:	*ex hu hicil?*	How did he save it?
5	Father:	*atem to ta'aminu. ani nasati li # hayiti ba-boker # ze haya etmol # ken # hayiti hare etmol ba-boker ba-bank <lifnei hacaharayim.>* [>]	You won't believe it. I was driving, in the morning, it happened yesterday, yes, I was at the bank yesterday before noon.
6	Mother:	*<avatiax al ha-sakin.>* [>]	Watermelon by the knife. [an expression used by watermelon vendors]
7	Father:	*lo ze lo al ha-sakin. mazal.*	No, it's not by the knife. Lucky.
8	Observer:	*ani mekava she-lo <sikanta et acmexa>* [>]	[=! laughs] I hope you didn't endanger yourself [=! laughs]
9	Father:	*<ve-ani nosea li>* [<] *me-ha-super be-giva hacarfatit # ma at mekava?*	And I'm driving from the supermarket on French Hill # what do you expect?
10	Observer:	*she-lo sikanta et xayexa* + \	That you didn't risk your life
11	Father:	*kimat.*	almost.
12	Mother:	*oy va-avoy li.*	[=! exclamation]
13	Father:	*be-super lemata le-kivun ha-ramzor ve-pitom ani roe holexet sham isha im ezo yalda ve-pitom ve-eze sakit matxila lehitgalgel ba-morad # ve-he-yalda roca laruc <le-sham ve-coraxat>* [>] *ve-ha-ima maxzika ota.*	Near the Super in the direction of the traffic lights, and suddenly I see a woman walking with a child (female) and suddenly a bag starts rolling down the slope, and the child wants to run there and is yelling and her mother is holding her.
14	Observer:	*<ha-yalda* xx [<]	The child.
15	Father:	*az ba-hatxala lo raiti ma ze aval ze hitgalgel be-merec.*	So at the beginning I didn't see what it was but it rolled with great vigor; everybody is laughing.
16	Ruti:	*avatiax dafuk.*	Shitty watermelon

17	**Father:**	*raiti* [/] *raiti she-lo keday la'acor et ze im ha-oto, maher acarti et ha-oto ve-racti ve-hiclaxti litfos et ha-avatiax she-hitgalgel be-tox sakit # ve-lo kara lo shum davar # bari ve-shalem hexzarti oto le-zro'ot ha-yalda.*	I saw that it's not worth stopping it with the car, so I stopped the car quickly and ran, and managed to catch the watermelon that was rolling in the bag, and it came to no harm, I returned it safe and sound into the arms of the little girl.
18	Ruti:	+> <*ha-yalda ha-mityapaxat*>. [>]	The sobbing child.
19	Mother:	<*acarta et ha-mexonit*>>]<] [/] *acarta et ha-me* + \	You stopped the car, you stopped the +\
20	Father:	*avarti oto. acarti et ha-mexonit* + \	I passed it. I stopped the car.
21	Mother:	*acarta ve-yaradta me-ha-mexonit ve-hicalta et ha-avatiax?*	You braked, got out of the car and saved the watermelon?
22	Father:	*natati la avatiax ve-hicalti et xaye ha-mishpaxa sham.*	I gave her a watermelon and saved the life of the family there.
23	Mother:	*ve-ma amru lexa ha-mishpaxa ha-zot?*	And what did they say to you, this family?
24	Observer:	Oh [=! laughs]	
25	Father:	*"toda raba be'emet toda ve-shuv toda."*	"Thank you very much really and thanks again."
26	Mother:	*be-amerika ish lo haya ose et ze.*	In the States nobody would have done it.
27	Father:	*be-amerika avatixim ze masoret lehacil.*	In the States there is a tradition to save watermelons.
28	Mother:	*ze rak ba-arec* <*mishehu yored me-ha-mexonit.*> [>]	It's only here that somebody would get out of the car.
29	Father:	<*ma at medaberetxx*> [< >] *dvarim kaele* + . . .	What are you saying, things like this . . .
30	Ruti:	<*be-amerika yesh* xx xx xx>[<].	You have in the States.
31	Father:	*hem meod adivim ba-dvarim ha-ele.*	They are very polite in these things.
32	Observer:	*aval avatiax, im ha-yalda hayta raca la-avatiax az haya yaxol lihyot nora mesukan.*	But a watermelon, if the child would have chased the watermelon things might have become very dangerous.
33	Father:	*lo. hayta sham beaya. zot omeret ha-ba'aya shel ha-isha hayta o ha-avatiax o ha-yalda.*	No. There was a problem. I mean the woman's problem was either the watermelon or the child.
34	Mother:	*ve-hi hexlita ha-yalda* <*be-shlav dey mukdam*> [>].	And she decided for the child quite early on.
35	Father:	<*hi hexlita ha-yalda*>[<] # *aval ha-yalda hexlita avatiax.* END@	She decided (for) the child, but the child decided (for) the watermelon.

This story is offered as a humorous counterpoint to the preceding narrative by the mother, recounting her near escape from a car accident. The father embeds the upcoming story in the ongoing conversation by repeating the verb *save*

(in the previous story, *saved from the incident*) in the new and unexpected context of *saving a watermelon.* Unlike the Bug Story, the watermelon incident is based on events known to the teller only. Yet, in the Israeli family, participants take an active part in the performance from the onset. The high level of involvement (Tannen 1984, 1989) can be glimpsed by just scanning the names of the participants making comments during the event (wife, Observer, both older children) and by noticing the high proportion of overlapped talk.

The nature of audience participation changes with different phases of the narrative event. The event is composed of three phases: the opening (T1–13), which provides the abstract and the general setting (time and place); the main body of narrative (T14–18); and the discussion of its point (T19–35); cf. Polanyi 1989. In the opening phase (T1–13), audience response takes the form of what Tannen (1984:118) calls "cooperative prompting": both children display interest (T3–T4), the wife debates jokingly the kind of watermelon in question (T6), and the observer expresses empathy for the teller experiencer (T8).

The teller presents the main events of the story – including setting, complication, and resolution in Labovian terms – in turns T13, T15, T17. Audience response at this stage is diminished, recipients confining themselves mainly to backchanneling.

But once the happy ending becomes evident, the audience takes on a highly active part both in embellishing the story and in debating its point. In T18, Ruti uses a phrase borrowed from the language of written Hebrew fairy tales ('the sobbing child'), which serves to dramatize the scene of the story's denouement. The child's sobbing is implied in an earlier statement by the teller ('she is yelling', T13), but is never mentioned again. This evaluation of the tale is offered because it coheres with the rest, not because the speaker has first-hand or vicarious proof for it being "true."

The point of the narrative emerges in collaboration among several participants. In response to his wife's clarification question (T21), the teller reformulates the point of the story as concerning 'the saving of a family' rather than 'saving a watermelon' (T22). In the side-sequence that follows, wife and husband disagree about the plausibility of the event taking place anywhere but in Israel. The mother's attempt to explain the narrative's coda, in terms of cross-cultural variability as regards norms of politeness (T26, T28), is rejected by both father and daughter (T29, T30, T31). Note that the girl shows her alignment with her father's position by cooperatively overlapping talk (Tannen 1984:118) that actually completes the father's utterance (T30).

In T32–T35, the three adults return to the issue of the point of the story. By rephrasing the "true" nature of the complication as a case of real danger (T32), the Observer reinforces the transformation of the narrative's point, from being an entertaining anecdote about "saving a watermelon" to being a serious story about saving lives. The discussion foregrounds the status of the narrative as a moral construct (cf. Fisher 1987), giving it meaning through negotiating the nature of the moral dilemma at hand. Husband and wife collaborate in underscoring this new angle, by shifting perspectives (T34–35) to the viewpoint of the

woman with the child, for whom the problem was one of protecting her child rather than the watermelon.

This example shows that Israeli participants do not feel restrained by non-access to actual experience to claim authorship for the story. Though the fabula of the watermelon is derived from the personal experience of the teller, the other participants in the event take a highly active part in the story's construction, especially in negotiating its macrolevel point. The process culminates in a joint agreement as to the point of the story; this agreement, as well as the high degree of participation throughout, reveal a preference for a multivoiced mode of performance in this group. But collaboration goes beyond performance: through the process of becoming *fellow performers* in the telling, participants claim joint ownership of the tale. In other words, in monologic unshared event narratives, ownership rights are reconfirmed through the telling; but in the process of a joint performance of an (initially) unshared event, ownership rights may be generated performatively through the very act of participation in the telling.

These examples show that the two groups differ in attitudes toward the relationship between ownership and performance. Israeli families reveal a flexibility in regard to both dimensions; they strive toward joint ownership for all narratives. This trend is manifested by the high degree of participation in the telling of both personal narratives and shared family events. By partaking in the construction of the story, members of the Israeli family use narrative authorship (Shuman 1986:174–8), to make claims for joint narrative ownership.

In the Jewish-American families, however, participation in the telling seems preconditioned by joint access to the tale. Thus the recollection of shared family memories (the Family Reunion story) is accomplished with the help of several family members. But, in contrast with the Israelis, story authorship is highly valued. Hence we note a trend to allow for the display of individual story-telling skills even in cases where the tale is known to more than one participant (the Bug Story). For these families, authorship through performance is used to assert and/or achieve individual ownership.

Conclusions

I have grounded my analysis of family narrative events in the threefold framework of telling, tales, and tellers. The distinction between the first two dimensions is certainly not my discovery. Under different guises, it concerns students of both narratology (e.g. Genette 1980, Rimmon-Keenan 1983) and folklore (e.g. Bauman 1986, Briggs 1988, Young 1987). My inclusion of tellers within the same paradigm is meant to emphasize the social constitutive nature of oral story-telling – and within it, the role of individual selves (e.g. in the presentation of self as protagonist and/or performer) in relation to the other two realms.

This model permits us to isolate the shared and unshared properties of Jewish-American and Israeli family narrative events. We have found similar patterns with respect to multiple participation, the prevalence of personal experience stories, and a respect for children's story-telling rights. These patterns probably

derive as much from a common Eastern-European oral story-telling tradition as from narrative practices prevalent in middle-class families in the Western world. As documented by Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1974:283), oral story-telling has been a cultural focus in Jewish society from time immemorial; it was frequent and important in traditional Eastern-European communities, it was egalitarian (everybody could tell), and was not limited to specific speech events. By contrast, features like the dialogic nature of many oral narratives (Polanyi 1989) or the deliberate involvement of children in story-telling (McCabe & Peterson 1991) characterize White North American mainstream practices.

However, the two groups also differ in many respects. The differences show up both in the ways of construing each of the three narrativity dimensions independently, and in the interplay between them. Access to telling is less available to Israeli than American children, but is more available to Israeli than American observers. Spatio-temporal framing of tales in the American families locates stories outside the home, but close in time; Israeli families favor stories more distant in time, but located in the home. While most narratives in both groups recount individually known events with self as protagonist, Israeli families are more likely than Americans to recount family-shared events that center around the family ("us") as protagonist.

In the transitions between the realm of conversation and the realm of telling, American families search for clear demarcation lines, occasionally ritualized, as in the "today" stories. The high-involvement style of Israeli story entry tends to blur the boundaries between the two realms. Israeli narrative events often begin and end in a highly polyphonic mode; while the opening phase establishes shared access to the tale, the closing phase focuses on negotiating a shared interpretation of the story's meaning, seamlessly moving back to the realm of conversation.

The relations of the tellers to the tales and/or telling is also perceived in culturally distinct ways. Americans support tellers by attending to individual telling rights, but Israelis tend to support tellers by attending to the tale. Access to story ownership in the American families is asserted through familiarity with the tale, but in the Israeli families it is also achievable through participation in the telling. As a result, monologic modes of telling in the American families extend to shared events, while telling of unshared events is celebrated by Israelis in the polyphonic mode. The proposition unique to the Americans seems to be "Let me tell our story"; for Israelis, it is "Let us (all) tell your (singular) story."

Yet all these families share an Eastern-European background. As such, all could be expected to manifest in narratives the high-involvement conversational style found by Tannen 1984 to typify Jewish New Yorkers from the same background. Spolsky & Walters (1985:64) argue that this high-involvement style has an analogy in Eastern-European learning styles of the Yeshiva, where participatory listenership and rapid turn-shifting "mark the discussion of equals." Another analogy is provided by styles of worship in the synagogue: the Eastern-European temple is seemingly chaotic, compared to the Asian or Western European, yet this "chaos" is governed by underlying ideological principles, which allow for a higher involvement on the part of the individual worshiper.

Ideology is also a strong motivating factor in understanding Israeli conversational style. As elaborated by Katriel 1986, the Israeli style emerged against the background of a strong ideological opposition to all things associated with Eastern-European diaspora traditions, including ways of speaking. On many dimensions of language use, the Israeli style has indeed been shown to break away from traditional modes (e.g. Blum-Kulka 1992, Katriel 1986). But simultaneously it seems to show strong traces of cultural continuity. We first noted this trend in the prolific use of affective nicknames and endearments, which echo in their suffixes Yiddish and Slavic sound patterns (Blum-Kulka & Katriel 1991). The study of family narrative events provides a second example. Compared to the Jewish-Americans, the Israelis are more involved in all aspects of narrative discourse, sharing both tellings and tales.

From this comparative perspective, the impact of Eastern-European traditions is less noticeable in the narrative discourse of Jewish-American families. In their case, it is American culture which seems to have played the formative role. Thus the emphasis on individual rights and self-accomplishment, seen in attitudes toward the telling, could be expected from sociological accounts of American society (e.g. Bellah et al. 1985). The ways that Jewish-American narratives differ from Israeli narratives echo American ways of speaking, although they may well differ in style from narratives in other American speech communities.

Notes

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1. Other approaches to narrative stress the *socioculturally* constitutive role of narrative practices (Bauman 1986, J. Bruner 1986, E. Bruner & Gorfain 1984). As formulated by Bauman (p. 113), "narrative . . . is not merely a reflection of culture, or the external character of social institutions, or the cognitive arena for sorting out the logic of cultural codes, but is constitutive of social life."
2. I borrow the term from Bauman 1986, who follows Roman Jakobson in distinguishing the narrative context of the situation, namely the narrative event, from the story-world evoked through the telling, namely the events narrated.
3. See Young 1987, especially chapters 1–2, for a philosophically attuned discussion of the phenomenological framework for the analysis of the different narrative realms involved (in her terms *storyworlds* and *talewords*).
4. The families were selected by the snowball technique: all adults had to be college-educated, professionally employed, and native-born Israelis or Americans. The full

sample includes three groups: native-born Israelis, native-born Jewish-Americans, and native-born Jewish-American immigrants to Israel. Three dinner conversations were recorded (twice by audio and once by video) for each family, within a period of two to three months; all families (including children) participated in an ethnographic interview following the recordings. For further details on the project see Blum-Kulka 1990, Blum-Kulka & Katriel 1991, Blum-Kulka & Sheffer 1993, Blum-Kulka & Snow 1992, Olshtain & Blum-Kulka 1989.

5. The common practice in studies of children's narrative development is to insist on two consequent and causally or temporally related events (Labov & Waletzky 1967) as a minimal requirement for a segment of text to be considered a narrative. On one occasion, we used this definition to allow for comparability across data sets collected under different conditions (Blum-Kulka & Snow 1992). But we found the definition inadequate for capturing the richness of conversational narratives at dinner. From a young child's perspective, recounting a single past event during one short speaking-turn (not an "extended turn," as in conversation-analytical accounts of story-telling) may very well count as "telling a story." Operational definitions of what constitutes a narrative need to accommodate the type of discourse in which the narrative is embedded, as well as variation in participants' emic perspectives.
6. Goffman (1981:131–2) distinguishes official, ratified participants vs. unofficial (unintentional) *eavesdroppers* and (intentional) *over hearers.*
7. I use "reportability" here in the sense of Hymes (1981:82): the knowledge that competent members of a culture or community have as to what behavior is reportable in that community.
8. An interesting issue, beyond the scope of this article, is the gender differences between the parents, noted at the family dinner table, as related to possible gender differences in speech in the two respective societies at large.
9. Transcription follows the CHILDES system (MacWhinney 1991:122–5) as follows: < > overlap; [>] overlap follows; [<] overlap precedes; # short pause; [/] retracing without correction; [//] retracing with correction; +\ interrupted utterance; + . . . trailing off; + quick uptake; +, self-completion; ++ other-completion; [=! text] paralinguistic material; [%com] contextual information. Punctuation marks are used to mark utterance terminators. Some deviations from CHILDES were introduced: the use of capitals and quotation marks for reported speech, to ease reading; and the segmentation of the text by turns (the relevant units here), rather than utterances. Participants are identified by role (for adults) and by name (for children). Age and sex of child are given in parentheses, in that order: Andrew (8m) = Andrew, aged 8 years, male. Conversational features (e.g. interruptions and overlaps) are marked approximately on English translations from Hebrew. Leftward arrows to the right of the transcript point to the passages being discussed.
10. Examples of textual indicators for event type would be: *A funny thing happened to me today* (A-event); *Remember the time I walked you to school?* (A-B event); *Remember our last camping?* (F-event); *I was surprised by the results of the election* (O-event).
11. As Shuman (1986:31) notes: "One must have information in order to talk about something. However, people with the information are not necessarily entitled to tell what they know."
12. Included in this analysis were all narrative events from one meal of 10 American (five middle-class and five working-class) families and five Israeli middle-class families ($n = 73$).

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10

Dialogue and Confrontation in Venezuelan Political Interaction

Adriana Bolívar

Introduction

The beginning of Venezuela's democratic political system in the modern sense is often associated with two major events: the end of Marcos Pérez Jiménez's dictatorship on 23rd January 1958, and the signing of what is known as the Punto Fijo Pact, which established the rules of participation in the democratic game the same year.

Between 1959 and 1998 most of the changes were the responsibility of two major parties, *Social Democrats (AD)* and *Christian Democrats (COPEI)* which, every five years, participated in elections that brought either one or the other to power (Bolívar, 1992). After 1998 a new party was added to the picture, *Movimiento Quinta República* (Fifth Republic Movement – MVR). This is now the party that controls Venezuelan's social, political and cultural life within the framework of an extreme polarization that separates followers and adversaries of President Hugo Chávez and his government, which began in 1999, seven years after Chávez had led a military coup. The reasons for this division can be found in political and economic factors in Venezuela's history, notably the predominance given to presidential styles that favor authoritarianism (Caballero, 2003, 2004) and the transformation from a primarily rural country to an oil-producing one in the third decade of the twentieth century.

Chávez's gaining of power in 1999 can be understood as a reaction of Venezuelan people against the traditional parties that had governed during 40 years based on personal authority rather than on true dialogue and participation (Bolívar & Kohn, 1999a, 1999b; Bolívar, 1999c, 2001c), as well as a serious

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economic and moral crisis caused by poor administration and corruption (see Bolívar & Kohn, 1999a; Bolívar, 2001a).

My aim in this paper is to focus on some moments during Chavez's government before and after 11th April 2002, which is considered by many as the most conflictive period of the last few years and which sparked further conflict and violence in the struggle for political and economic power. My interest is to find out how violence and confrontation intensify in the course of an interaction in which participants initiate, respond and close communicative cycles around issues and topics that feed group confrontation. Also, I want to find out how different groups of people evaluate verbal aggression individually from their own experience.

I shall argue that in order to critically describe and interpret confrontation in political discourse we have to focus on the participants in the interaction with a view to assigning responsibilities and evaluating effects. One way of doing this is to keep a detailed record of events identifying the macro-exchanges that emerge in the interaction (Bolívar, 2001a). We can say that what we examine is conversation or dialogue at a higher level, in the macro-social text that can be described on the autonomous plane that concerns the recording of experience, and on the interactive plane that accounts for the relation between participants (Sinclair, 1981; Bolívar, 1986, 1994b; Hunston, 2001). My claim is that although both planes are simultaneous, the choices of meaning depend on the interactive plane. I have to acknowledge the influence of the British School of Linguistics, particularly Firth (1951), Halliday (1967, 1968, 1970, 1985), Sinclair & Coulthard (1975) and Hoey (1979, 1983), as well as the influence of research done by critical discourse analysts, mainly those within the framework of Hallidayan Linguistics (Fowler et al., 1979; Fairclough, 1989, 1992a; and Wodak, 2001).

The analysis I present here takes the viewpoint of the linguist who tries to explain how meanings are constructed in everyday interaction, but who is aware that the interpretation and explanation will always be an approximation to what actually happens because "the knowledge obtained by research is partial, situated (i.e. specific to particular situations and periods rather than universally applicable) and relative (i.e. related to the researcher's world view and value system)" (Taylor, 2001:12).

I adopted the critical discourse perspective after my first analyses of political dialogue (Bolívar, 1992) when I realized that the semantic and pragmatic levels were not enough to understand the dynamics of political interaction, or to understand sufficiently the forces that shape its dynamics. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) follows general principles that give ample opportunity to explain meaning and society (see van Dijk, 1993; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997), allowing us also to face the twofold commitment we have as researchers and humans who want to live in a better world (Bolívar, 1997).

While there is no unique method in CDA, method itself is very important in order to legitimize research in the field. This is why CDA analysts take great care to define their central theoretical notions and methods/procedures (see Meyer, 2001:14), just as all discourse analysts should do (see Wetherell et al., 2001). The [illegible] are socio-cognitive.

discourse-historical, dispositive analysis and mediated discourse analysis (see Wodak & Meyer, 2001); and although all of them have made important contributions, I have adopted the label Interactional Analysis as more accurately reflecting my own approach.

Theoretical Framework

The Definition of Context

Meaning is constructed in social context, and this makes *context* the category at the highest level, as studies for over thirty years prove (Duranti & Goodwin, 1997). We have to distinguish between the global context and the context of situation. We take it that the global context can be studied at the historical and cultural level. The definition of context of situation in Firthian terms serves our purposes because it embraces all the elements needed to carry out an analysis of dialogue and confrontation in political discourse or any other discourse. So we take into account the following elements (Firth, 1951:43):

A. the relevant features of the participants: persons and personalities
   1. the verbal action of the participants
   2. the non-verbal actions of the participants
B. the relevant objects
C. the effects of verbal action.

These categories allow us to describe language events and their effects, which may be verbal or non-verbal. Verbal effects may materialize in the production of verbal texts, but non-verbal effects may express themselves in other languages such as body language, or actions such as stone throwing, clapping, blowing whistles, hitting pots and pans in demonstrations, laughing, the use of colors (for instance, white for AD, green for COPEI, red for MVR) and other symbols. The interactions can combine sequences of verbal and non-verbal action in the construction of meaning. In the study of political interaction the context has to take into account the global context of history and culture in order to interpret the meanings constructed today, and it has to examine particular moments in the present to see how they fit in the social text that is created.

Evaluation as the Central Notion

I start from the assumption that discourse is fundamentally about evaluation and that we must try to make the connection between the evaluating activity in the world and the evaluation in text. Evaluation is studied in language by examining how interpersonal meanings are constructed, and by the systems of mood and modality in grammar (Halliday, 1994). Initially I studied evaluation as motivation for intratextual change in newspaper editorials (Bolívar, 1986, 1994a, 1994b, 1996a), but later I extended the notion to other genres and to the description of intertextual patterns and the di[illegible]

(Bolívar, 1999c, 2001a, 2001b, 2003a). My aim as a discourse analyst has been to show how evaluation, defined initially as the type of information that concerns the expression of feelings and opinions, finds its place and function in text by negotiation which has its origin in the real world of phenomena where the purposes for the interaction are determined (Bolívar, 2001e:131).

I believe that to be able to give an account of texts we have to study them in the context of events in the world, as Firth argued many years ago:

> In linguistics as in any other social science, we start with man's active participation in the world we are theorizing about. And we are all participants in those activities which linguistics sets out to study. Speaking, and listening, writing and reading, are simply accepted as meaningful in human life in society. In brief, linguistics accepts speech and language texts as related to the living, and therefore to the meaning of life, and applies its theory and practice as far as it is able, to the statement of meaning in strictly linguistic terms- that is by employing the restricted language of linguistics set in its own theoretical framework (Firth 1957, in Palmer 1968:169).

It is on the basis of these arguments that I would claim that linguistic and discourse categories can be extended in order to understand social processes, since "Our schematic constructs must be judged with reference to their combined power in dealing with linguistic events in the social process" (Firth, 1951:42).

The implications for the study of evaluation in discourse, then, are that, in the same way that we can study *exchanges* in conversation or *triads* in written texts (see Bolívar, 1986, 1994a, 1994b, 2001a), we can identify communicative cycles at a higher level in the flow of social events where we are constantly evaluating the actions of others, our own discourse and the discourse of others. I assume that in democratic political confrontation, the major responsibility for the interaction lies with the leaders who have been legitimized by vote to exercise power. These leaders are constantly being evaluated in terms of what they say and do, or don't do, so it is more likely that they will perform the role of initiators and that they will close cycles with major evaluations regarding what is good or bad, positive or negative, desirable or undesirable for their people and their country.

Corpus and Procedures

For the purpose of studying political confrontation, the above-mentioned points imply that we must collect a corpus of written and spoken texts during the course of events; we have to identify the issues and topics, but focusing primarily on the actors/participants who introduce them. The aim is to see who initiates and responds to interactions and who closes cycles with the voice of the "primary knower" (Berry, 1975) so that we can discover the types of patterns that emerge in the interaction. In this way, we can describe interactions between participants in the spoken dialogue (speaker, hearer) and participants in written text (writer-reader), and make way for other voices or participants in the texts, as represented

by the participants/actors in the real world. Focusing on the participants in events is more than a methodological decision, it is one that affects the collection of the texts and the interpretation and explanation of the context of culture and situation. The description focuses first on the macro-exchanges in which political actors (or those who assume such a role) confront, and then on the effects this confrontation has on those who act as observers or participate in it as citizens.

In order to analyze the macro-exchanges that emerge at particular moments in the interaction we follow the steps summarized below:

- A particular problem/conflict is chosen in order to observe how participants introduce changes in the situation.
- The events are followed in a sequential order starting with those participants who initiate a topic or conflict. The texts are collected in the chronological order in which they are produced.
- Macro and micro-exchanges are collected. For example, micro-exchanges in conversation or in the news and the macro-exchanges that emerge later in the political interaction. These are given a function in the sequence as Initiation (I), Follow (F) or Closing (C). We must be aware that an Initiation of one exchange might also work as the Closing of a previous one.
- Actions and topics are traced in chronological order.
- The effects in language and actions are described, with attention to the accompanying use of symbols (flags, whistles, banners).
- The linguistic resources and discourse strategies are examined with emphasis on the interpersonal value (mood and modality, (im)politeness).

The Participants in the Confrontation

The main participant in the confrontation since 1998 has been Hugo Chávez because he started a new period in Venezuela's political history. Although from the outset his style was reminiscent in some ways of previous populist presidents like Betancourt (see Madriz, 2000) and Pérez in his second government (Bolívar, 2001c), there was a striking difference in terms of the high level of verbal aggression in Chavez's electoral campaign, with a slogan threatening 'to fry the heads of Adecos' in oil, which harked back to the Federal War in the middle of the nineteenth century. In this campaign he proposed radical change and a return to the values of the past to rescue the Republic. In the face of 'decay' and 'death', he proposed 'reconstruction' and 'rebirth' (Molero de Cabeza, 1999). He broke the rules of protocol from the very day he took office (2nd February, 1999) by modifying the oath pronounced by his predecessors: "I swear to God, to my Motherland, to my People, on this moribund Constitution, that I will encourage the necessary democratic transformations for the Republic to have a new Magna Carta suited to the new times. I swear it." (*Alocuciones presidenciales*, 1999, my translation) (see Bolívar, 2001c). The reference to this moribund constitution broke the pragmatic rules of quantity, quality and manner (Grice, 1975), but it emphasized the relevance of his promises in the electoral campaign. Since then, Venezuelans have witnessed many changes: a new Constitution [illegible]

Chavez term to six years and allows him to be reelected, a new name for the country, *República Bolivariana de Venezuela* (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela), a National Assembly instead of a Congress, a new power structure that has added Moral Power and Citizens Power to the branches of government, and new laws, among them the recently approved Law of Social Responsibility of the Media. Also, there is a new internal composition of the Supreme Court of Justice (comprising predominantly government supporters), which gives Chávez more control of power than any other president before him.

From 1999, President Chávez and those close to him have privileged a threatening rhetoric and impoliteness (threats, insults, discrediting nicknames, war metaphors, accusations) which in many ways have contributed to create and reinforce polarization (see Montero, 2003; Bolívar, 2001b, 2002a, 2002b, 2005a, 2005b, and forthcoming); Bolívar et al., 2003). The results of a rhetorical analysis of 2,480 front pages of national newspapers between 1999 and 2002 (Montero, 2003) serve as evidence that the attitude of the opposition went first through a phase of perplexity and astonishment, to another of implicit or moderate protest that introduced *cacerolazos* (the noise made by banging pots and pans), and finally to one of explicit response with increasing verbal aggression against the President and criticism of the government (see Lozada, 2003).

At the end of 2001 insults were combined with actions in the streets: demonstrations, *cacerolazos* by the opposition, fireworks by Officialists (the name given to government followers) and physical attacks on Opposition demonstrators. The violence reached its climax on the 11th of April 2002 when more than a million demonstrators took the streets asking for Chavez's resignation. During this demonstration 19 people were shot dead by snipers. Venezuelans witnessed that and the reading of Chavez's resignation on television by General Lucas Rincón. Chávez was out of power for 48 hours, during which time Pedro Carmona Estanga was appointed president. In his brief government, Carmona Estanga decreed the dissolution of powers and rescued the country's name, changing it back to Venezuela. Apparently the military changed its mind, and Chávez was reinstalled. What actually happened in those 48 hours (12th and 13th of April) remains uncertain (see Lafuente & Meza, 2004). The confrontation continued in 2002, and is still present, with Chávez's followers defending their leader's revolution and his adversaries insisting on the loss of legitimacy of the government because the democracy was being forced into a revolution people did not vote for in 1998.

The opposition is now weakened by Chavez's success in the 2004 referendum that will keep him in office until 2006, despite all the accusations of fraud, his presumed contact with Colombian guerrillas and his alliance with Fidel Castro. The political confrontation has involved the participation of the media, the Catholic Church, the political parties that oppose him (from both right and left wings), the Confederation of Workers (CTV), the Confederation of Trade and Commerce, the National Oil Company, private schools and the universities. The verbal confrontation has even gone beyond the national borders to include President George Bush and some of his collaborators.

The Patterns of Interaction

We only have room to briefly cover some aspects of the confrontation with the media. We have identified several general patterns of interaction that, apparently, show how polarization and violence worked before and after 11th April 2002. The media were the target of the president from the beginnings of his term, especially in his radio and television program *Aló Presidente*, which lasts an average of five hours every Sunday. Indeed, in program number 100 on 17th March, 2002, Chávez claimed that the program was created because the media would not allow them to work (see Bolívar, 2003b, 2005a). For their part, newspapers and television channels have criticized Chávez harshly for his personalism and militarism (Bolívar, 2001c, 2001d, 2005b). In the confrontation with the media, two patterns were found, one that involves physical aggression before April 11th 2002, and another that shows how alignment against the government grew after this date.

Macro-exchange 1: between the President and journalists (from March 2000 to January 2001 – see Bolívar, 2001b).

Initiation: The president exhorts the military to fight for the truth and insults the media (he calls them "all-time deceivers" (*El Nacional*, 24 March, 2000, front page)).

Follow (1): Journalists respond with a demonstration demanding freedom of expression and verbal reaction, returning the insult by calling Chávez *gallina* (chicken) by way of a reminder of the failure of his attempted military coup in 1992 (*El Universal*, May 2, 2000, p. 1–10).

Follow (2): Chávez's followers insult the demonstrators ("You are enemies of the people, You only tell lies, Chavez tells the truth, Out with Journalists! Out!") and attack journalists physically ("Journalist Eugenio Martínez was hit in the face with the Sunday edition of *El Universal*. Most media vehicles were the target of stones and blows" – *El Universal*, 2000, front page).

Closing: Journalists accuse Chávez of provoking and repressing journalists and of putting their lives at risk (*El Nacional*, 5 May, 2000, D/2)

Macro-exchange 2: between humorists and the President (between 20th and 30th October, 2002)

Initiation: Humourist Pedro León Zapata criticizes Chavez' militarism in a caricature (*A mí la sociedad civil me gusta firme y a discreción* – I like Civil Society standing to attention and ready to obey orders – *El Nacional*, 20 October, 2000).

Follow (1): President Chávez responds on the same day from Margarita Island, late at night on a national broadcast, *Pedro León, ¿cuánto te pagan por eso?* (Pedro León: how much are they paying you for that?). It should be noted that Zapata's caricatures have been critical of all Venezuelan governments before Chavez.

Follow (2): Humorists from four widely read national newspapers publish caricatures making reference to Zapata's text and picture (e.g. a sword imitating Chavez's face). They all implicitly refer to militarism and condemn the President's insult.

Closing: Zapata publishes a new caricature using the same words pronounced by the President, ironically thanking him for the free promotion: *y hablando como los locos, Hugo Rafael: ¿cuánto te pagó Zapata por ese propagandón?* (And since we're talking nonsense, Hugo Rafael, how much did Zapata pay you for all this advertising? – *El Nacional*, 30 October 2000).

The National Union of Journalists publishes a communiqué that gathers all the caricatures in one text headed *Al Maestro con cariño. . .* (To Master Zapata with love . . . – *El Nacional*, 5 November 2000, D/7) in a gesture of solidarity by all Venezuelan journalists and artists.

In 2002, in the absence of the traditional parties that had been discredited by Chavez, the media took the lead as political actors and were largely responsible for organizing demonstrations against the government. This is evidenced by the way in which the private television channel *Globovisión* (Global Vision) was nicknamed *Plomo Visión* (Bullet Vision) by the President, and *Globoterror* (Global Terror) by his followers. *Venevisión*, another private channel, became *Venenovision* (Poisoned Vision). More than 200 journalists, several newspapers and television channels (29 in all) received some kind of aggression in 2002, from damage to equipment to bomb explosions (*El Nacional*, 3 January 2003 p. A/1–2).

Between December 2002 and February 2003, the country was involved in one of the longest strikes in its history, called by the Federation of Workers (CTV). The National Oil Industry condemned Chávez's attempts to politicize the industry and put it in the hands of a new Board of Directors integrated by government supporters. The Opposition condemned the increasing violence, Fidel Castro's influence on Venezuela's decisions, the failure of the government's social and economic programs and Chávez's reluctance to accept a recall referendum.

During the strike a new pattern emerged, which included verbal aggression as well as violence, and which involved the issue of cultural values. This was initiated by General Acosta Carles who, following orders given by the President. broke into the warehouses of *Coca Cola* and national brewery *Polar* in Carabobo State to confiscate the products with the intention of giving them to the people affected by the strike.

Macro-exchange 3: between the military (General Carles), the people, and the President (between 17th January 2002 and 11th February 2003)

In this macro-exchange two non-verbal actions were evaluated by Venezuelans: (a women demonstrators were beaten to the floor by the soldiers accompanying the general and by the General himself; (b) the General (G) belched in front of the television cameras when a woman journalist (J) from *Globovisión* tried to interview him. Burping in public is considered impolite in Venezuelan culture, so this generated evaluations from all sectors in society.

Initiation (the violence and a micro-exchange on television):

J: General, today was the deadline of 48 hours given by *Indecu* (the government's consumer protection body) to the company to. . .

G: (belches, holding a can of *Malta*, a soft drink) Excuse me, excuse me miss (belches again)

J: Isn't that rude?
G: No, no, you know it was instinctive, right? And it came out because this has a lot of gas, and it was hot, right?
J: Excuse me General, today was the deadline that Indecu had given the company to distribute the products . . .
G: . . . do you remember this baseball player who did that, he has a refreshment and he goes (belches)
J: This is a serious job and I am asking you a serious question, General . . . in relation to . . .

Follow (1):

The newspapers report the event and reject both the violence and the belching as grotesque. They also imply that the action was robbery rather than confiscation (*El Universal*, p.1 *El Nacional*, p. 2–4, 18, January, 2003).

Follow (2):

The General is accused of dishonoring the uniform and he is reminded of the military code of ethics (*El Universal*, 18, January, 2003, p.2–4).

Follow (3):

Demonstrators take to the streets to condemn the abuse of power, the violence and the belching. The main slogan reads *Ni un eructo más* (No more belches), which can be interpreted as the condemnation of sexism and *machismo* as well as violence and abuse of power (*El Universal*, 19 January, 2003 p. 1–2)

Follow (4):

National Guards demand the removal of General Carles (*El Nacional*, 21 January, 2003, p.1)

Follow (5):

Chavistas (Chavez's followers) attack demonstrators in El Tuy ("Chavist ambush", *El Nacional*, 21 January, 2003, p.1)

Follow (6):

A Zapata caricature makes fun of the cultural revolution (*El Nacional*, 22 January, 2003).

Follow (7):

Lawyers claim that Carles's visit to the *Coca Cola* and *Polar* premises was illegal. (El *Universal*, 22 January, 2003, p. 1–4).

Closing: President Chávez ratifies the General in his position during a demonstration organized by the government on 23rd January 2003, to celebrate the anniversary of the 1958 uprising. Chávez's followers sing *Carles Carles erúctales otra vez* (Carles, Carles, burp again), thus approving what the Opposition evaluated as grotesque. No apologies were made for the General's conduct.

On February 11th 2003 the general was decorated by the President for being a General and for his patriotic services during the strike (*El Nacional*, 11 February, 2003, p. A/3). A graffiti accompanied this decision: *Acosta Carles General del Pueblo* (The people's General).

The strategic use of the President's threatening language after terrorist attacks was highlighted by the media in headlines and editorials (*Verbobomba* – Bomb-verb. *Tal Cual*, 25 February 2003: *El lenguaje del Presidente*

violencia – The President's language commands and legitimizes violence, *El Nacional*, 2 March 2003, front page). These were tense and uncertain moments for all Venezuelans since both sides were accusing each other for the violent attacks.

The opposition nicknamed the General "General Belch", and insulted and harassed him in protest against his behavior. On 23rd January 2004 the General was appointed main speaker in the National Assembly on the occasion of the anniversary of the 1958 uprising, a Bolivarian School was named after him (number 3,200 in San Juan de Los Morros, 6th May 2004). Acosta Carles is now Governor of Carabobo, one of the most important states in Venezuela.

The Effects of Confrontation

The effects in the minds and self-esteem of Venezuelan citizens are worth reporting. In a study that involved 50 persons from my own university (students, colleagues and workers) who were asked to write down a list of the insults they recalled in exchanges between the Government and the Opposition (Bolívar, 2002a, 2003a), it was found that 263 different words had been evaluated as insulting. Women and men in this group (Group 1) tended to evaluate differently but they all agreed on a few words which indicated their perceived values and attitudes in terms of affect, judgment and appreciation (see Martin and Rose, 2003: 15). The insults attributed to the Opposition against the Government (in decreasing order of strength) were about: (a) moral judgment: 'assassins' (everybody), 'assassin' (Chávez), 'corrupt', 'thieves', 'liars', (b) appreciation of social value: 'shanty-towners' (*marginales*), 'scum', 'mobs', 'hordes', (c) appreciation of political value: 'communists', 'Bolivarians', 'dictator', 'Chavist'; (d) appreciation of mental and intellectual value: 'loony', 'nut', 'dumb' (all against Chávez); (d) appraising feeling: 'resentful' (*resentidos*).

As for insults attributed to the Government against the Opposition we found: (a) moral judgment: 'rotten in-groups' (*cúpulas podridas*, to refer to AD and COPEI), 'conspirators', 'fascist', 'traitors', 'liars', 'unpatriotic', 'corrupt', 'thieves'; (b) appreciation of political value: 'adecos' (AD people), 'anti-Chávez', *golpistas*, (involved in a coup d' êtat); (c) appreciation of social value: 'squalids' (*escuálidos*) and 'oligarchs' (to mean high class or privileged); and (d) appraisal of feeling: 'in anguish' (*afligidos*).

In another study, still in progress, to evaluate the insulting repertoire after the referendum, three more groups have been interviewed (100 persons): Group 2, from *Universidad Experimental Libertador* (UPEL-Maracay), Group 3 from the recently created *Universidad Bolivariana*, and Group 4, from *Universidad Central de Venezuela* in Caracas. It has been found that women and men remember a large number of oneword insults and a wide variety of complex expressions (721 in all). The most revealing point is that the words agreed upon by women and men in these three groups are fewer but consistently the same. Only three words are recalled by both women and men in their attributions to the Opposition against the Government: 'assassins', 'thieves' and 'communists', which indicate moral judgment and political appreciation. Four words stand out in the attributions

to the Government against the Opposition: 'squalids' (*escuálidos), golpistas*, 'oligarchs' and 'fascists', which indicate appreciation of social and political value.

Many new offensive expressions appeared after December 2004. Of these, the three groups agree on three words that are attributed to the Opposition against the Government: *malandros* (scoundrels), 'ignorant' and 'illiterate'. Other words mentioned, but without agreement among women and men, are: 'monkeys', 'blacks', 'Indians', 'gorillas', 'homosexuals', 'dirty' and 'revolutionaries', all expressing negative appreciation of the people who follow Chávez, who is referred to as a 'tyrant'. Two words are remembered by all the women and men in Groups 2 and 4 in their attributions to the Government against the Opposition: 'terrorists' and 'assassins'. In group 3, however, the attributions are different. What women and men recall is *plastas* (pieces of shit) and *pendejos* (schmuck).

When we examine the textual value of these words, we realize that most of those that women and men remember form part of a cohesive link with words introduced by the President (*escuálidos, oligarcas, fascistas, golpistas, plasta, pendejo*) (see Bolívar, 2003a for the use of *plasta*). Also, most words attributed to the Opposition have been used by Opposition leaders, the media and the people in demonstrations. What strikes our attention is that the group that might be closer to Chávez, because they study at the university created by the President, perceive more insults that lower their self-esteem (blacks, Indians, monkeys, ignorant). After December 2004, racism and sexism seem to have deepened as well as despise for the other – and a hatred that can only be harmful for everybody.

Conclusions

In 1999, before Chávez became President of Venezuela, we were concerned about the lack of dialogue and participation in our democracy (Bolívar & Kohn, 1999b, Bolívar, 2001d). Now the concern has become alarm because, in the political confrontation, violence and death have found a place. The analysis presented here has shown how, in ongoing interaction, actions and words are evaluated by the participants, and how meanings are created in the course of events where verbal and non-verbal actions combine. We have also seen that words have effects on people's minds and feelings because offensive words only serve to feed the confrontation and hate. Although I claim that, in discourse, initiations are important to identify those who start conflictive macro-exchanges, I believe that in everyday life, the responsibility rests on us all because, as citizens, we must preserve respect for the other and enrich cooperation and understanding. However, the major responsibility lies with those who have been legitimized in power by the vote, and who must not forget their commitment to govern for everybody, bearing in mind that in the long run cooperation and persuasion work better than stressing the differences, threatening, and using fear to reach political goals. Having seen how hate language works in practice it is mandatory to reinforce peace language for the sake of the country and all those involved in the confrontation.

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11

Personal Web Pages and the Semiotic Construction of Academic Identities

Carmen Rosa Caldas-Coulthard

1. Introduction

Visual communication is central to the information society and to the practices of Late Modernity. Pictures, photos, illustrations are everywhere – they permeate our academic work, everyday lives, and activities. It is common nowadays to refer to brand images, corporate images, national images, and self-images. These are interwoven with our professional and personal identities, and they are signposts to lifestyles, cultures, and societies.

In his seminal book *Ways of Seeing*, John Berger (1972: 7) points out that:

> Seeing comes before words – the child looks and recognizes before it can speak. But there is also another sense in which seeing comes before words. It is seeing which established our place in the surrounding world. We explain that world with words, but words can never undo the fact that we are surrounded by it. The relation between what we see and what we know is never settled. The way we see things is affected by what we know or what we believe.
> To look is an act of choice.

Scollon & Scollon (2003b) suggest that humanity has undergone at least four 'ages' in its development: the *oral*, the *literate*, the *imagistic*, and currently, the *information* age. For them, oral societies were constructed through oral narratives; literate societies, through the standardisation of genres and documentation (essays, plans, forms, scripts, charts, tables, etc.); while the still-current imagistic

Source: C. R. Caldas-Coulthard and M. Toolan (eds) ...

society constructs itself through the moving picture – the camera, the analogue and the digital video. The information society, by contrast, is constructed through the digital pathway that makes its meaning through the combination of many semiotic resources. We take this for granted. Meaning-making is dependent on the interplay of different resources, and these surround us in our everyday life. New technologies, especially the Internet and the World Wide Web, are pushing forward, almost daily, new communication strategies and people interact through these new resources.

According to NUA (a resource for Internet statistics run by *INQUIRA*, NUA internet surveys – http://www/nua.com/surveys), an exact estimation of how many people are online throughout the world is not possible. However, they say, there are many surveys that use different measurement parameters and from observing many of the published surveys over the last two years, they claim that up to September 2002, approximately 605.6 million people had online access worldwide.

Just one year later, Global Reach (Global Internet Statistics by Language – www.glreach.com) gives us the following results:

Online Language Populations Total: 649 Million (March 2003)

Language	*Percentage*
Dutch	1.9
Russian	2.7
Portuguese	2.8
French	3.3
Italian	3.6
Korean	4.2
German	6.5
Spanish	8.1
Japanese	10.3
Chinese	11.9
English	35.2

The sheer numbers of people using virtual communication and the affordances of the new media are producing a visual revolution, in which everything from the structure of books to the layout of pages, distribution of images such as photographs, illustrations or digital backgrounds, and the use of typography and colour are brought to bear on conveying specific meanings. Representation, modality and multimodality therefore enter into the very constitution of things since an object's or idea's meaning is shaped by the very process of representing it by way of language or images or other semiotic resources.

Representation for Hall (1997: 61) is the process by which members of a culture use signs to produce meaning – 'things, objects, people or events do not have in themselves any fixed, final or true meaning. It is us, in society, who makes things mean, who signify'.

> Representation, as a cultural process, establishes individual and collective identities, and symbolic systems provide possible answers to the questions: who am I? what could I be? who do I want to be? (Woodward 1997: 14).

Modality is the concept used by communication specialists to talk about different modes or codes of communication – speaking, writing, using images, gestures, sounds, colour, drawings, etc. to communicate a specific message.

Multimodality (Kress & van Leeuwen 2001: 20), the concept used by semioticians and discourse analysts, on the other hand, is 'the use of several semiotic modes in the design of a semiotic product or event'. Modes are resources for making meaning. The same meaning, in any cultural domain, can be expressed in different semiotic modes – (music can encode action, images can encode emotion). We would miss out important aspects of a film without considering the role of music in the ongoing narrative, for example, or of a magazine without interpreting its pictures and illustrations. Therefore, for Kress and van Leeuwen, the particular ways that modes are combined (they may, for instance, reinforce or complement each other) will determined the ways we receive and interpret a message. The authors claim that all semiotic products and events are communicative since they undergo processes of articulation, interpretation, and ultimately, use and action.

An important point to make is that *all messages are multimodal* since all messages make use of multiple modes. Web pages are archetypal examples of multimodal messages. Web authors use many semiotic resources in their pages to communicate their identities – the language used, the photos, the colours,[1] the objects chosen and displayed, all signify symbolically different aspects of their identities.

Multimodal analysis therefore is crucial for understanding and interpreting the world. Our tendency so far as linguists, however, has been to privilege written and spoken texts above all other modes, and to consider objects, actions, and people as simply making up 'the environment in which the text comes to life', as Halliday (1978: 25) suggests.

The internet and the World Wide Web have changed our views dramatically. As Kress & van Leeuwen (2001) have pointed out, the desire for crossing boundaries inspired 20th-century semioticians to develop new theoretical frameworks that are applicable to all semiotic modes.

In this chapter, therefore, I will examine academics' personal Web pages in order to consider the multimodal discursive strategies used by Web page creators to present themselves in terms of:

1. the narrativisation of their lives;
2. the multimodal choices that help to create a particular identity.

I will also want to point out the implications of this kind of one-sided interaction for discourse analysis – the Web-page addresser sends a message not to an implied audience but to anybody out there in the world who happens to open her or his page. The strategies used to address an unspecified audience

My interest here is in looking specifically at how participants in this new genre recontextualise (Bernstein 1981), in the public sphere, a fictionalised representation of themselves. Through what seems to be a light and inconsequential 'message in a bottle' to the world, social activity is presented, evaluated, and possibly new norms of behaviour are being created.

2. Personal Web Pages – The Personal in the Public Sphere – Real or Fictional Story Telling?

On a day of internet surfing, I came across a page, http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs/#who, by one of the members of the University of Birmingham staff, a computational scientist named Aaron. At first sight, this was an academic page, giving the internet surfer information about the professor's career, his publications, courses given, etc. However, there was a link to family issues, which I pursued. This hyperlink seduced me in many ways, especially for the force of the narration. For many minutes, I followed attentively the story being told. This was the 'real', not fictional, story of a young man who died of cancer, Ben, retold by his father, the professor. I saw Ben's wedding photos, then the events of his illness, and finally, the events surrounding his death at 34 years of age.

Many different semiotic resources were posted on this Web page – photos of different occasions of the family life, a map of the cemetery where Ben was buried, the speech delivered by his young wife during his funeral, a poem read by a friend, etc. I was very touched by the telling, so much so that I wrote to Aaron, who then wrote back to me and sent my message to Ben's wife, who then wrote back to me. There has never been any face-to-face interaction with the participants of this virtual exchange. This experience prompted me to look more closely at the question of personalisation of the public space of the University. My data for this paper are therefore restricted to academic Web pages. especially those of the University of Birmingham – pages of teaching staff, postgraduate students, and some technicians.

Academic pages should be in principle public statements, but as Aaron's page demonstrates, academics tend to use the public site to include their private sphere in this kind of communication. Hence, my interest in investigating more the question of how the personal intrudes in the public world of academia and the multimodal resources used by 'webbers' to achieve their goals. (According to a new report from www.nua.com – Internet Surveys by Category. by January 2000, 19 million U. S. internet users, or 29 percent of the total number of users, have personalised Web pages, and 88 percent of users believe that personalisation is the best way for companies to learn about consumers.)

The University of Birmingham index of individual Web pages linked to departments listed, in April 2002, a total of 425 of which only 23 belonged to female academics. This seems surprising since I would expect that many more women were actively involved in communicating virtually. Unfortunately. this is not the case. Not surprisingly, scientists, especially engineers, produce the majority of pages. The arts academics tend to be much more parsimonious

Before I start examining some examples of Web pages, I want to consider briefly the question of computer mediation as communication and the question of recontextualisation.

3. Computer Mediation as Communication, Narration, and the Construction of Identities

Over the past ten years, as Rodney Jones (2002) has pointed out, many areas of investigation, especially in sociology, anthropology, linguistics, cultural and communication studies became interested in Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC). The internet and the World Wide Web are producing new forms of interaction, both in the business and personal spheres as well as new forms of social organisation. New discursive practices have therefore been developed. Jones points out that different professionals like linguists and communication scholars concentrate on linguistic features (registers and genres), sociologists and anthropologists are interested in the development of online 'communities and cultures', while psychologists focus on the cognitive aspects of computer-mediated communication. Jones continues (2002: 3) that although there are many perspectives on CMC,

> the kinds of data that are gathered to answer these varied questions are remarkably limited. Nearly all of the studies look for answers to their questions in the words typed on the screen. Data typically take the form of downloaded 'logs' of computer chat sessions or corpora of emails or Usenet postings, and analysis is generally confined to those words. Interactions are assumed to exist in a kind of virtual vacuum, identities are hardly ever linked to the lives of the people producing the words, and communities and cultures are generally seen to stop at the screen's edge.

The main problem with looking at computer-mediated communication in this way, he suggests, is that it ignores the importance of online behaviour as well as the importance of semiotic meanings.

Another problem with such studies, Jones (2002: 3) suggests, is that they tend to focus on the *mediational means* (Scollon 1998) 'at the expense of looking at the kinds of actions that are taken, leading them into a kind of technological determinism in which actions are interpreted only as "effects" of the media'. For mediational discourse analysts (Wertsch 1991; Scollon 1998, 2001; Scollon & Scollon 2003a, 2003b), the main focus of interest is on the complex and indirect connections between discourse and action – they propose the notion that social identities and practices are not only realised in texts since what goes on in social interaction is much more complex:

> A *mediated action* is defined as a social action taken with

> mediated actions, it being definitional that 'social' *means* socially mediated. The principal mediational means (or cultural tool) of interest is language or discourse, but the concept includes all objects in the material world including other social actors. Within MDA [Mediated Discourse Analysis] there is no action (agency) without some mediational means (i.e., the semiotic/material means of communicating the action) and there is no mediational means without a social actor (agency). (Scollon & Scollon 2003b: http://www. gutenbergdump.net, valid in April 2002[2])

If action is ignored in CMC then, researchers are examining culture *in the cultural tools* (Wertsch 1991) instead of examining culture through its relationships with action, agents, and tools.

The problem with the concentration purely on 'mediational means', as Jones (2002) demonstrates very well in his research on Chinese learners of English using *ICQ*, a chat and instant messaging software, is that often what is sought by users *of ICQ* and other interfaces of this type is not 'communication' at all, but rather 'connectivity', 'social presence', or 'play'. My computer conversations with Aaron exemplify this point. We were connected somehow.

In order to overcome these limitations, I want to propose, based on Jones' research, another way of approaching my Web pages, one which focuses not just on the texts people produce when they are sitting in front of their screens, but on the multimodal resources used to construct identities which the new media now make possible. These identities are inevitably connected to the world outside the computer screen.

By representing themselves in particular ways, a narrator 'gives off', to use Goffman's terms (1959), personal clues about the social role performances he or she is making and this representation indexes these invisible psychological or social cultural states.

Of this vast brave new world, I will concentrate on the question of how identities are presented through multimodal aspects. These are the questions:

- Are my webbers constructed as 'characters' or 'idealisations' differing from the actual person behind the keyboard? (For example, the 2003 case of an American GI who, pretending to be 19 years old, engaged through a chat room with a supposed 19-year-old English girl – he was 30 years old and she was 12 years old. He was then prosecuted for a criminal offence.)
- Alternatively, are they 'hybrid extensions' of their offline identities?

For the most part, I want to claim, online identities are not purely reflections of offline identities or complete reconstructions, but recontextualisations. convenient hybrids of both processes whose uses often have as much to do with what is happening in the offline social life of users as their online social life.

3.1. Webbers' Identities and the Question of Recontextualisation

The discourse of personal Web pages is a discourse about social practices which takes place outside the context of that practice and within the context of another

one – the virtual context. The process of including one social practice into another is a *recontextualisation*, or

> ...a sequence of communicative activities which make the social practices explicit to a greater or lesser degree. Social practices are things that people do, with greater or lesser degree of freedom, fixed by custom or prescription, or some mixture of these two. (van Leeuwen 1993: 30)

Texts and images are representations of given practices, not the practices themselves. As soon as one writes or speaks about any social practice, one is already recontextualising. The moment we recontextualise, we are transforming and creating other practices.

Web pages are recontextualisations that not only represent social practices, they also have to explain and legitimate – in other words, they have to make explicit the 'why' of their representations.

In the corporate world of today's universities, there is a pressure on academics to communicate values, to advertise and 'sell' themselves. They have to recontextualise their self-identities in order to do this.

Giddens (1991) says that in postmodern societies self-identity becomes a reflexive project – an effort that we constantly work and reflect on. We produce and revise a set of biographical stories – the telling of who we are, and how we came to be where we are now.

> Self-identity, then, is not a set of traits or observable characteristics. It is a person's own reflexive understanding of their biography. Self-identity has continuity – that is, it cannot easily be completely changed at will – but that continuity is only a product of the person's reflexive beliefs about their own biography. (Giddens 1991: 53)
>
> A person's identity is not to be found in behaviour, nor – important though this is – in the reactions of others, but in the capacity *to keep a particular narrative going*. The individual's biography, if she is to maintain regular interaction with others in the day-to-day world, cannot be wholly fictive. It must continually integrate events which occur in the external world, and sort them into the ongoing 'story' about the self. (Giddens 1991: 54)

For Giddens, then, the self is not something we are born with and it is not fixed. The self is reflexively made, constructed by the individual (Gauntlett 2002):

> What to do, how to act, whom to be?
>
> These are focal questions for everyone living in circumstances of late modernity – the ones which on some level or another, all of us answer, either discursively or through day-to-day social behaviour. (Giddens 1991: 70)

However, as Lemke (http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jaylemke) points out identity construction is also a verbal

beliefs, and values). People participate in activities through interactions and practices, and this participation, he argues,

> constitutes and shapes a) identity choice, b) identity display, and c) identity construction. Identity is thus a positioning of self or other in a system of meaning-relations and in a network of material practices, including a system of power relations..., and discourse in general serves to construct identity and positioning with respect to this system of meanings.

What webbers do when they create their personal pages is to choose a set of self-characteristics that are important for them (life moments and achievements, relations, places and moments) and construe a persona. From the multitude of identities that academic users have available to them, I will discuss next two main kinds of identity formation in virtual recontextualisations: narrators and characters.

3.2. Narrators as Extensions of Self and as Characters

For the psychologist Kohut (1971), according to Barry O'Connor (in www.selfpsychology.com), a sense of 'self' is

> a fundamental aspect of our life experience, and integrated with the totality of our life. It not only encompasses who and what 'I am', at critical stages of our growth, but in addition it is the totality of the inner workings of our true-self. One could say, that within the development experience of the human, which I would argue lasts our entire lives. There are certain 'way points' that need to be arrived at in terms of realizing 'self-potential'. Significant others are an essential aspect of our self development.
>
> This of course commences at the very earliest stages of our existence with the critical relationship with our mother, and with this the influence of our father on both mother and ourselves. This is further complicated in the modern environment with the diminishment of the nuclear family, and the re-designation of what comprises a family, with or without societal support.

The principal description of the 'self', in my data, follows the pure and minimal forms of identity representation:

- I exist.
- Here I am.
- My name is so and so.
- I come from such a place.
- This is my family.
- Personal Web Pages
- These are my things.
- These are my interests.

Consider these examples (given the space constraints, I will illustrate with only a few pages):

Welcome to the



Who Am I?
I am just a normal (?) British bloke who happens to be called Rob Branston, but I have nothing to do with the famous Branston Pickle. Now I have that sorted out and just on the off chance that the odd person is continuing to have a look, I will tell the rest of you a bit more about me. I am a 24-year-old Economist, researching for a PhD in Industrial Economics at the University of Birmingham in the UK. I am approximately 6 feet 4¼ inches tall (195cm to my metric orientated friends), have short brown hair and green/hazel coloured eyes. If you really want you can see some pictures of me, but I warn you that I am not at my finest!!

At the moment I am looking for a job, so I have been spending a great deal of my spare time working on a page containing an academic orientated CV and information about PhD. I have also made a more 'city' orientated CV as I am not sure what my future direction will be. If you like what you read, why not send me an email? I have also been spending a lot of time updating, expanding and enhancing the suite of pages I created for L'institute – Institute for Industrial Development Policy and the pages for *L'institute* – Ferrara Graduate School in Industrial Economics. As my friend Don Fazio says, I've got some work to do now, so we'll continue this chat a bit later ....

Webpage 1

How is Rob Branston construing his 'self'? The answer to the question 'Who am I' in this case, is linked, interdiscursively, with material goods of a given society – you need to be at least Anglo-Saxon, to recognise the illustration

(Branston pickle) and understand the semiotic value and pun of the naming approximation. Rob Branston then becomes

> just a **normal British** bloke who happens to be called Branston.

The representation of the pickle bottle is crucial for determining not only the self-identity (normal) but also the national one (British).

Some other examples from the data reaffirm **place of origin** as an important aspect of their identities. The webbers are 'outsiders' and need to assert their foreignness:

> I am a **Venezuelan** plant biologist.
>
> I **hail** from a **serene** town Kovilpatti the 'matchless town of matches' in Tamil Nadu.

Naming is a very important form of identification and webbers tend to make sure their names are foregrounded, like these examples:

> According to the Keirsey Temperament Sorter I've got a ENTP (Extraverted iNtuitive Thinking Perceiving) personality type – this means I'm an Inventor – who am I to argue?
>
> **I've an unusual surname – Pryke** and so I've set up a web page listing other Prykes on the net.
>
> **My name is Alberto** and I'm Italian. I'm an Aerospace Engineer and for the time being I'm working as Research Associate at the School of Electronic and Electrical Engineering of the University of Birmingham. If you are interested in knowing something more about me (for professional reasons only please, I'm the happy husband of a wonderful young lady...) you can download my Curriculum Vitae...
>
> One thing that **I would like to make clear is my surname,** is it Cirre or Cirre-Torres? Well, in Spain we use 2 surnames, the 1st is the surname of your father and the 2nd of your mother. When I came here, I wrote my 2 surnames linked by a hyphen, so my 1st surname is Cirre and the 2nd is Torres.

For some webbers the use of the language of 'affect' (Martin 2000) is a strategy used to identify their selves:

> I started writing this page during one lonely, homesick September night, between a Volterra integro-differential equation and a multi-domain boundary element approximation. Warmed only by a strong Italian coffee, with Elton John filling the dark of my room, I was dreaming my dreams of far planets and unknown realms, the depth of the ocean, the mystical power of ancient oriental traditions.


> This page is nothing but the pale shadow of my thoughts of that night, but if even only one among you will find in it a reason to look further into the sky and into himself, then this is one of the most important things I could ever do.

This kind of representation, in fact, reaffirms stereotypical constructions of Latin people – emotional, perhaps 'out of control' – the warm 'Italian coffee, the homesickness, the darkness of the room' construe the identity of the lonely student in a cold and foreign place.

Others identify themselves through humour generally using self-deprecation:

> Welcome to Derek's Home Page. I'm Derek Carter, and at present I'm a third year PhD student studying in the Department of Electronics and Electrical Engineering at The University of Birmingham. **Yes I'm yet another of those boring engineers**, and yes I do spend most of my time in front of computer terminals. My field of research is parallel heterogeneous computer architectures, sounds very impressive doesn't it!

This negative appraisal (Martin 2000) is legitimised through a cartoonesque representation of self:



Webpage 2

Kohut (1971) refers to *self-object experiences*, experiences (usually with other people) that nourish the self and which define the experience of the self and self-esteem.

Significant others, like family relations, are an essential aspect of our self-development. That is why so many family relations are presented in Web pages – the self of the webber is being represented through self-objects that reinforce her or his own performances.

Photographs showing the webber within the family context are therefore extremely common in my examples. Marriage photos or simple stills of family groups recontextualise the webber as not only a member of a group but also as *belonging* to a group. Not only parents, siblings, partners, but even pets are introduced as parts of the self, as the example below shows:

INFORMATION YOU REALLY WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT ME!!



This is us on our BIG Day!!


Hi! My name is Cathy Lowe, and up until 24th June 1995, I was known as Cathy Smart. I am 28 Years Old and married to Tony. We live in Birmingham and have done so for the last 5 years, well I say we, Tony has lived in Birmingham all his life, I moved all the way from Solihull (for my sins) in 1992. I am a very lazy individual, much to my husband's dismay, but I occasionally get off my backside to go Swimming and the odd Step Aerobics Class. I enjoy pottering around in the garden, especially since we had our Garden Pond re-built. I also enjoy reading, once I'm into a good book I'm oblivious to everything around me, even my husband!! We are both also Dog Lovers and up until a two years ago we had a BEAUTIFUL Alsatian called RADAR, unfortunately we had to have him put to sleep as he was very ill, he was only 8 years old.



Here he is

Webpage 3

Physical appearance and embodiment seem to be one of the other ways webbers recontextualise themselves – all my examples present either a photo or an illustration of 'self', especially of the 'face'. Laurie, below, shows us a sort of 'passport photo' of himself, but he self-evaluates his own appearance when he says, revealingly, at the end of the page: 'By the way, I have had a haircut'.



Webpage 4

What makes the 'self' a supposedly 'real self' in such situations is not necessarily contingent on the realm of 'facts' or 'personal information', but rather on the opportunities for users to create the 'real selves' they thought they 'should be' or 'could be', anchored in the semiotic representations chosen, either verbal or non-verbal.

What is interesting about participants' conception of their 'online' selves is that the complexity and multiplicity of these selves are seen as features that actually make them 'more real' rather than 'less real'. Computer-mediated interaction for these participants, because of the choices made, seems to be something which did not fragment their sense of their 'real selves', but expanded it.

We have to see then, as Jones suggests, cyberspace, not as the site of 'cyber society' (Jones 2002), but regard it more as what Scollon (1998) calls a *site of engagement*, a 'field' upon which multiple actions, identities, and communities can be enacted.

The second identity type of construction I want to concentrate on is character.

3.3. Character

Many of the concepts developed in narrative theory are not specific to language. I want to point out here that the way narrators construct characters (and consequently their life stories) is by the choice of how they recontextualise themselves, in particular spaces, in particular settings (like in a literary text). The spaces are created through the representation of locations and objects. The dimension of the 'activity' being engaged in (what participants are doing when recontextualised) is also very important – some characters are recontextualised as moving in spaces, others as static and in particular positions

By using especially the multimodal resource of photographs, narrators construct through their choices of how to present themselves, a particular version of the self, creating scenarios, spaces, and attributes. The visual landscape is part of this characterisation. By interpreting the way the narrators construe themselves via image, we recreate a narrative of their lives – what they do, where they do it, who they position themselves as in the social practices around them.

Photos are memorable – they represent a neat slice of time, not a flow. Susan Sontag (1999) suggests that photos furnish evidence, a more accurate relation to visible reality than other mimetic objects. Coleman (1998: 57) adds that

> Photographs however do not show how things look. What a photograph shows us is how a particular thing or person could be seen or could be made to look at a specific moment in a specific context, by a specific photographer employing specific tools.

Photos are the most plausible and straightforward representations of identity – part of our identity is an awareness of ourselves, as we would want others to see us. The very artificiality of the pose (smiling or not, looking at the camera or not) demonstrates the gap between the way we are and the way we would like to appear as Barthes (2000) suggests in his *Camera Lucida*. Certainly, the smiling face is an attempt not only to produce a positive evaluation from gazers, but also to interact with them.

However, albeit being faithful to the way we 'look', we have to remember that, as Kress & van Leeuwen (2001) point out, in some domains certain visuals are 'truer' than others. The authors call this the *coding orientation* and this has to do with modality. Modality, here, in the linguistic and semiotic sense, as Scollon & Scollon (2003b, www.gutenbergdump.net) explain, is the word that

> linguists and logicians use to talk about alternate realities. 'Irrealis' (not real) contrasts with 'realis' (real). *Ought* contrasts with *is, was, will be. Realis* is something 'real', 'definite', 'perceived by the person speaking'. *Irrealis* is 'imagined', 'unreal', 'indefinite', 'unknown' or 'unknowable'. The linguistic and logical point of the distinction between realis and irrealis is that there *is no external truth or reality* that is being referenced. It is the mode of representation which is telling us what the producer of the language or image wants us to believe.

Images can make the same distinctions in modality. They can represent a person, a thing, or a space according to a scale of 'it might look like this' to 'it looks like this'. This is done through choices of colour, hue, distance, focus, and vectors. However, a photograph tends to make us believe that what we see is *the reality* in this sense. Visual resources tend to be more 'realis' orientated than texts, which are more easily 'irrealis' orientated, as Scollon & Scollon suggest (2003b, www.gutenbergdump.net).

My argument here, when examining the photos used by webbers, is that in fact, although these photos purport to be 'realis' representations of self, what

authors do is to construct, through choices in modality, a 'characterisation' of the self in terms of the ways their identities are being displayed. The interesting point about the photographs below is that although these Web owners are academics and the photos are placed in academic Web pages, the visual/virtual landscapes chosen in a sense construe specific characters and the discourses that surround them – the discourse of action, the discourse of adventure. The



Me, on my way to work!

Webpage 5

Mark Erickson's Grateful Dead Page



Mark's Tape Trade List



Webpage 6

modalities chosen, especially colour (in the original pages, blues, reds, greens), produce 'irrealis' effects. What we have here are therefore projections of ideal selves: the sportsman, the association with a particular musician, are facets of hybrid 'private' identities that also happen to be public (and academic). The examples below illustrate these points:

4. Recontextualisation of interaction

I want briefly to look now at recontextualisations of verbal interactions.

According to Jones (2002), the vast majority of people who engage in computer-mediated communication regard it as an extension (McLuhan 1994) of their 'real-life' social interactions rather than as separate from them. Therefore, Jones concludes, the effects of CMC are to 'ground them more firmly within their existing material communities and circumstances' (Jones 2002: 5). Several of the participants in his research, in fact, were quite adamant in rejecting the traditional dichotomy of 'actual' and 'virtual' reality, insisting that computer-mediated communication is as 'real' as anything else is ('as real as a telephone call').

Contrary to my initial belief that Web page messages were sent to unknown addressees, Web narrators in fact try to facilitate the exchange of information among colleagues and peers and the sense of social 'connectivity'. Narrators are therefore agents acting upon the world – they send messages to particular (not well-defined) people, hoping to influence them in some way or other.

When asked about the recipients of their Web pages, one of the writers I contacted replied:

> I don't have a clear idea, but I would include, in no significant order: colleagues in the school, research students and undergraduates in the school; colleagues in other universities around the world; potential collaborators in many places, several types, in several disciplines; potential research students, people who may be able to learn something from my research or contribute to it by commenting or criticising; journalists who contact me to find out about artificial intelligence or cognitive science; school teachers; school leavers exploring the school's web site and wanting to know what's here; people around the university interested in management issues; people who have heard me give presentations and would like to see the slides (usually extended versions); people who may be interested in a book I wrote in 1978, which went out of print and is now free of charge online....

This is the testimony of another webber:

> At first there was no audience, actually, but one has appeared for many of the things there...[T]he idea was to make a brief visual essay using photos we had to organize our own reflections about our pasts and see if

> that would help us find connections...I have told a few students about them (the different pages) as I try to introduce myself as broadly as possible to them thinking there's no way they could understand the academic slices of my life w/o knowing something of the rest. But I don't like to ramble on in a seminar about how I wrangled horses as a teenager, so if it's on the net I just say, 'go take a look' and get on with the subject. So I guess you could say that much of it, maybe most of it is this: I make little essays, highly personal, about things I or we think about or have done, put them on the net so our own kids and family and a few friends can see them.
>
> ...what's on my websites is the stuff that isn't in my formal academic vita but which is essential to understand what's in the vita.
>
> Incidentally, these pages are now found by search engines and visited by who knows who. I average about 60,000 visits a year.

This shows that the message is addressed to targets, and not virtual beings, out there in cyberspace. An interesting aspect of these interactions however, is their spoken conversational features. Most of the pages examined here have greetings, openings, closings, apologies, and the address to a 'you'. Consider for example:

- Hi, I am (name).... How are you my friends all over the world?
- Hello.
- Welcome!
- Hi, thanks for visiting this page!
- Want to know more about me? Well, then...come and browse through then....
- Hi, have you found something?
- Welcome everybody. I'm sorry it's taken such a long time, but here at last are the beginnings of my web page, with pictures showing highlights of the Big Day.
- Thank you for stumbling upon my humble website. I hope you find something of interest while you're here.
- Do not forget to come back. See you next time.
- Hope you're happy. Be nice to animals. And although this site hasn't got much, you never know.
- That's all, folks.

In Late Modernity, the need to communicate/talk (although through virtual media) continues to be part of people's lives, even if people are stuck in their houses in front of their computers. This is not very different from old times, when people use to visit each other and chat on verandas, at least in warm countries like my own.

One of the opening messages of Paul McIlvenny's page (http://ntpaul.sprog.auc.dk) summarises extremely well the interdependency between the interactants in this virtual communication:

You browse, therefore I am

Through pseudo-interactions webbers seem to continue traditions of diary or biography genres where people tell 'whoever is out there' about their personal experiences, their relationships. The informal aspect seems to diminish the distance between writer and reader – you are there, I do not know who you are. But somehow, like me and Aaron, *you browse and I exist.* That is why, I think, there are so many 'hi, hellos, goodbyes', opening and closings in virtual interactions. The material page is the mediational means for social action.

5. Final Remarks

The University of Birmingham has now managed to standardise Web pages to make them compatible with the corporate image of the University. A corporate team produced a set of guidelines so that webbers should maintain the same institutional 'image'. The photos should look the same, nothing that is 'personal' should be inserted into the pages. This is the discourse of the institution trying once again to standardise, paradoxically, presentations that have to do with people's lives and identities. By doing this, the institution tries once more to exert control over its members.

However, from the examples discussed above, it seems that new creative formats resist corporate discourses. Self-presentation has to do with what we are, whom we deal with, and the choices we make in life. People, as Lemke (2002) suggests, choose the ways they want to display themselves and construct their identities. Identity construction is a complex phenomenon and people project in public spaces, idealisations of what they 'think' they are. The multitude of formats, photographs, and colour choice point to the hybrid formation of identity. The online construction is an extension of the offline persona. And institutions cannot control these representations. There will always be a way out of the institutionalised corporate 'image'.

To conclude, I want to emphasise the importance of the study of multimodality in the new communicative genres. Web pages combine language, image, and graphics into a single integrated text's structure. They are therefore:

- **interdiscursive**: 'positioned within multiple, overlapping and even conflicting discourses' (Scollon & Scollon 2003b, www.gutenbergdump.net) – the discourses of the family, the institution, and emotion;
- **intertextual**: they have links with other mass media, especially with classical and modern narratives of all sorts – books, films, comic strips, paintings, among others;
- **dialogical**: a means through which different kinds of 'conversations' can be established.

Web pages are also *sites of engagement.* In some ways, as Deborah Tannen (2002, cited in Jones 2002: 9) points out, 'Asking linguists to pay less attention to texts

is like asking astronomers to stop looking up so much'. It is, however, only through breaking down the traditional hierarchical separation of different modes of representation and focusing more onto the *social actions*, *social identities*, and *social practices* that we will achieve a true understanding of the society we live in – and virtuality is here to stay. In the virtual world we live in, there is no more looking back.

Notes

1. All the Web pages used in this chapter were in colour. Unfortunately, the illustrations in this book can only be reproduced in black and white.
2. One of the essential features of Web pages is their ephemerality. The authors alter and delete items and even whole pages, as you will find if you attempt to follow this reference, Scollon & Scollon (2003b, www.gutenbergdump.net). This page no longer exists.

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12

Role and Position of Scientific Voices: Reported Speech in the Media

Helena Calsamiglia and Carmen López Ferrero

1. Introduction

In recent years the presentation of scientific knowledge, understood as scientists having regular interaction – direct or mediated – with the general public, has had a significant place in the media, apparently seeking to fill the traditional gap that exists between scientific community and people in general. As Moirand (1997) states, the press has become, in specific topics of interest, the 'meeting point' for scientists with the average citizen. In fact, scientists, as a very specialized community of scholars and researchers, have throughout the 20th century been secluded in universities and research centres, enclosed as it were behind the walls of professional worlds, and lacking contact with the needs and requirements of the general public. The development of democracy and communication, in tandem with the increasing consciousness of the importance of science for the distribution of political power and a better quality of life through technology, have finally broken down these walls. This has been achieved through the generating of journalistic practices where scientists and science are represented and called upon to contribute to the formation of public opinion. This has been done not without distrust and misgiving on the part of scientists and experts but it can be said that nowadays the need for scientific culture is claimed as a social right. Nevertheless, bridging the two worlds, the world of the specialist and the world of lay people, remains a problem, not only from the cognitive perspective but also from the perspective of the representation of science and scientists outside their own domain.

Developments in discourse analysis have involved approaches to the use of language in different contexts. The one that deserves our attention is precisely

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the way in which progress in scientific knowledge reaches the general public in the age of information and communication. Scientific/academic use of language has been recognized as a specific register with its own norms, patterns and style, affecting not only terminology but ways of presentation and reasoning through particular discourse genres and procedures. No wonder, then, that the way a unit or a piece of knowledge is selected and transformed to be presented and explained to non-experts can be a very rich topic of research, since it demands rigorous recontextualization conveyed through discourse procedures affecting both global and local levels of text.

In this article we focus attention on the way in which scientific voices are referred to in the context of a particular case, involving a serious health and diet problem that has been threatening the basic needs of the population in industrialized countries in Europe. This is the case of the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak – commonly known as 'mad cow disease' – which in the past 15 years has affected different countries, creating a state of public alarm and desorienting public opinion owing to the widespread consumption of meat among the population and the subsequent fear of transmission of the disease to humans.

We pursue our search at a time when, after a period of doubt and insecurity, the possibility of transmission to humans was openly stated in a session of the British Parliament, in March 1996. It is from this date on that the 'mad cows' affair explodes in the media, causing all kinds of diplomatic, commercial, political and social reactions. It has been a *fin-de-siècle* health crisis that has deeply worried and disturbed governments due to its consequences affecting a variety of social groups and agencies. Its importance can be gauged by the immediate attention which it received from sociologists and other analysts interested in this critical situation (see, for example, Daban and Grau, 1996; Porta, 1996; Donadieu, 1997; Jasanoff, 1997; Zander, 1997; Ratzan, 1998).

New episodes of the crisis have been again unfolding (2000–1). The disease's genesis has been re-explained in the press in detail, especially during the last months of 2000, when new 'mad cow' cases spread across several countries in Europe, mainly in France, Germany, Portugal and Spain. So the debate and the doubts still remain, with politicians and scientists in a state of alert as to how to solve a problem that has become of great relevance due to the complex texture of its consequences.

The aim of this article is to analyse the role of scientists as social agents – people with something to say and do in the case under study – as they are represented in the Spanish press. Our analysis takes journalism into account as the frame of communication (at the macro-level), an active domain of writing for a wide general public, with genres and conventions of its own; and, as the specific focus of analysis (the micro-level), citation as a form of *poliphony*, a concept taken from the theory of enunciation (Bajtin, 1979; see Voloshinov, 1929; Benveniste, 1971/1974; Ducrot, 1984). Within this framework, we identify reported speech not only through the way that grammar differentiates between direct and indirect style, but widening this view to include what in journalistic practices constitutes a *continuum* of reference to 'other' voices which pragmatic perspective has taken

into account (Reyes, 1993/1994) and in relation to journalistic practices (Waugh, 1995; Méndez, 1999a, 1999b). We consider both levels as a whole from a critical perspective that favours the view that citation means managing the words of others to convey and serve the purpose of the writer, giving a slant to what is said. This contrasts with other views, such as those presented in journalism training, arguing that citation not only makes the writer's discourse more objective and credible, but frees him/her from any responsibility.

2. Background Information: Brief History of the BSE Case

The aim of our study is scientists' reported speech in a corpus of news which reports the popularly known 'mad cow' disease, technically called *Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy*. Although the period we analyse in the present article is the first eruption of this affair in the press in 1996, we emphasize the relevance of this scientific/social topic as a recurrent one in the media. But there are scientific topics that enjoy punctual or acute interest ('patrón de interés puntual o agudo', *Informe Quiral*, 1999: 74), meaning that they generate a great amount of news in a brief period of time. Such is the case of the beginning of the 'mad cows' affair, generating 75 news items in the period of March–April 1996 in the most widely read general Spanish newspapers.

In order to put the news in context, we need to refer to some key scientific data on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy as a degenerative pathology of the brain. The origins go back to an infection known as *scrapie*, identified in 1732 in sheep and goats. In 1920, the human disease *Creutzfeldt–Jakob* (*CJD*) is identified, with intriguing similarities to scrapie. In the 1970s, Stanley Prusiner, the 1997 Nobel Prize winner in Medicine, identified the agent which causes the disease. It is called *prion*, a special variant of a protein (healthy or diseased) found in all brains. The altered protein (prion) causes changes in the normal proteins, and it triggers a chain reaction which finally leads to the brain disease. In 1985, in Great Britain, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) was described as a disease closely related to scrapie. Three years later, BSE was connected to the ingestion of animal feeds derived from meat and bones of infected sheep.

Political data are also relevant to understand the case. We will note the following events: in 1986 the British government officially declares BSE's existence. From then on, various action is taken by the government: organic animal feeds are forbidden, an expert report on BSE is demanded (finally published in 1989), animals are slaughtered. But people are persuaded by the government agencies not to worry about eating meat. There is widespread conviction that there is no connection at all between human and animal brain pathologies. At the same time, powerful economic interests emerge in the face of an uncertain but openly predicted possible crisis of enormous consequences. The British Government officials of different ministries are responsible for indecision and lack of transparency.

In 1990, a Committee appointed by the British Government is set up to monitor the incidence of the disease. It consists of experts in contact with a team of medical researchers in Edinburgh. On 20 March 1996 the British Health Secretary info—

Parliament that a variant of the human encephalopathy (Creutzfeldt–Jakob) could be related to BSE. The evidence is not clear but generates widespread bitter conflict between institutions, government, commercial organizations and the food industry, causing diplomatic relations to be broken off and alarming the average citizen. The focus of the crisis is Great Britain, but other countries in Europe are also under the threat of the disease and its transmission between species. This conflict is taken up by the media where scientific information is mixed with political statements, commercial reactions and citizens demanding clarification.

As regards scientific progress in brain pathologies, in spring 1996 there were some significant scientific advances which reached the mass media. But the scientific community was going at its own pace in the midst of the press storm. In fact, research on such a rare disease as Creutzfeldt–Jakob had been very sparse, only receiving a boost after the BSE outbreak in cattle. Nevertheless, 14 years after the bovine disease was first identified, ultimately causing 92 human victims – mainly in Great Britain – lack of scientific certainty and political dithering undermined European consumers' confidence.

During the period studied in this article, March and April 1996, two scientific articles were published; these were not generated by the sudden crisis and consequently they were not intended to provide a clear-cut response to people's concerns. The scientific information provided by these two articles was taken up in the news report in our corpus. The first article was a medical report produced by the Edinburgh team: 'A new variant of Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease in UK' by R.G. Will, J.W. Ironside et al., published in the medical magazine *The Lancet* on 6 April 1996. It contains no clear proof but considers that exposure to BSE is the most plausible cause for transmission of the disease across species. The second article referred to the ongoing resarch on the 'prion' protein, after Prusiner's findings in the 1970s. The article appeared on 25 April 1996, in the scientific magazine *Nature*, written by D.C. Krakauer, M. Pagel, T.R.F. Southwood and P.M. de A. Zanott, entitled 'Phylogenesis of prion protein'. The first article was leaked to the press by the governmental committee before publication in *The Lancet*. The second was the direct source of information appearing in the press.

The press presented the facts summarized here, their interest sparked off after the British parliamentary session in March 1996, mentioned above. The media brought into their discourse reported speech from different sources which supply reference points for the interpretation of the facts. This use of reported speech is the object of our study.

3. Broad Context of the Study: Discourse and Media

The approach that we take considers reported speech in the context in which it appears. The case under study has newspapers as its context or domain. Thus, in order to control the object of our study we can locate and define it in the light of what van Dijk (1988) and Charaudeau (1997) have proposed concerning different aspects of informative discourse in the press. To begin with, Charaudeau provides a general semiotic approach from the perspective of the *communicative contract*, as represented in Figure 1.




Figure 1: General semiotic approach (Charaudeau, 1997: 72)

The event in the media goes through a process of transformation that results in the *construction of the event* by its representation in words. So the process of transaction allows for strategies within the frame of the communicative contract.

The discourse modes of a media event are viewed as shown in Figure 2.

Given the discourse modes of the media event, schematized by Charaudeau, it is clear that the object of our study is the first phase, that of the *reported event*, where what is being said predominates over reference to fact.

If we rely on Van Dijk's schema for the superstructure of news in the press (Figure 3) we see that if the media story is made up of *situation* and *comments*, the situation in the 'mad cows' case is an oral episode that triggers a variety of comments (oral reactions) from different sources. As the first focus of attention is a statement by the British Health Minister and the subsequent debate in the




Figure 2: Discourse modes of a [illegible]




Figure 3: Hypothetical structure of a news schema (Van Dijk, 1988: 55)

House of Commons, it is a case where words become the core of information. This was the origin of the sensational treatment of the affair in the press.

At the microlevel, journalistic practices have established conventions on procedures of citation because of its constant presence in the news. In style books we consistently find instructions on the proper way to present citations. As an example:

> All alien words, statements or opinions transcribed literally in an informative text have to be signaled with quotation marks, without changing the sense or intention with which they were uttered. . . . The author will always be identified, through the proper name or any other characteristic that supports, justifies or gives authority to his/her words. The identification will be done at least once, in the begining, in the middle or at the end of the transcribed sentence. (Abc, 1993: 52; authors' translation)

Prescriptive guidelines for journalists stress the use of citation to give authority and legitimacy to what is said through the strict (literal) quotation of words spoken by others. It is one of the procedures by which to obtain credibility for the facts under comment as well as one of the means of certifying knowledge of what is being said. Literal quotation is intended to be objective knowledge, far removed from the subjectivity of the journalist.

4. Theoretical Framework

Different studies have been carried out in the past decade on specific aspects of reported speech from a variety of perspectives, on various domains and

languages: see, in particular, the compilation of articles by Lucy (1993) and Janssen and Van der Wurff (1996), including Haverkate's on reported speech in Spanish literary works. We have based our approach on the conception of the *énonciation* theory as initiated by the Soviet scholar Bajtin (1979), formulated by the French linguist Benveniste (1971/1974), developed by different representative authors such as Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1980), Authier-Revuz (1982), Ducrot (1984), Maingueneau (1987, 1991, 1993) and applied to journalism by Waugh (1995) and Méndez (1999a, 1999b). In its first formulation, the theory puts forward the existence of a Speaker that actualizes the virtual system of language (*énonciateur*) in relation to a Hearer (*énonciataire*), two axes from which choices of textual items are made and from which a particular variety of text (*énoncé(s)*) is derived. The two main characters of the communicative act (*énonciateur, énonciataire*) are present in the text through different kinds of lexical and deictic traces whose interpretation gives the key for a degree of personal and interpersonal implication. Most of the studies in this framework have focused on the emergence of *subject* (speaker/writer) in texts, making its basic assumption on the fact that the subject is built through the process of *énonciation*. Ducrot, following the line of the fundamental *heteroglossy* of language as it is claimed by Bajtin, breaks the assumption of a one-to-one relationship between Speaker and text. His hypothesis is that the Speaker can be unfolded in several *voices* (*polyphony*) and postulates making a distinction between (1) the text author or *empirical subject* (*pre*-discursive identity); (2) the construction of the *discourse subject* (a *voice* created in text); and (3) the triggering of *other voices* which contribute to the perspectives adopted by (2) to build a particular position.

In every situation of *énonciation* the author creates a voice taking a position, choosing a role according to the possible addressees. This position and role can be enriched and made precise by the inclusion of different other voices that (2) adopts to confirm or contrast the position taken. The discourse analyst is interested in (2) and (3), that is, in the particular way the author chooses to be concerned with the text (degree of incorporation, modality – *voice-building*) and in the variety of other voices that can be integrated into the discourse. One's own voice can be unfolded, as for example in the case of irony. Other voices can be included, either explicitly, through *citation*, or implicitly, through what is called *concealed citation*. The identification of the presence of various voices and the way they are called up in the text are one of the most challenging analytical problems: to find the *line* taken by the discourse subject in any text.

This theoretical framework allows us to consider quoting as a strategy of the writer not only to convey information but also to give an orientation to the text through the choices made in the linguistic constituents of the quoting procedure.

An integrated approach to a specific discourse procedure such as citation would appear to be very useful in accounting for the sense, direction and effects of the insertion of words from different sources into the main discourse of the journalist. We address the following questions: what is the role of scientific *voices* in cases where they are entitled to talk? Which are the forms of quoting? Is quoted speech a way of absolving journalists from responsibility or a means of orientating their position on the topic of reference? How is all this managed in a situation of

crisis? To give an answer to the questions that arise in the study of the use of this discourse procedure we combine different levels:

(a) the description of grammatical construction and markers of *explicit citation* (Girón Alconchel, 1989; Reyes, 1993; Maldonado, 1991, 1999);
(b) the function accorded by the theory of *énonciation* to reported speech as a form of *polyphony*;
(c) the interpretation accorded by *critical discourse analysis* to the representation and presentation of agents in reported speech (Caldas-Coulthard, 1994; Van Leeuwen, 1996).

From this perspective, the three levels contribute to a discoursive explanation that includes the written press context, the discourse functions accomplished and the linguistic units chosen. Grammars have defined explicit citation in terms of direct/indirect styles. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note, as observed by scholars like Méndez (1999a, b) who study quotations in the press, that the clear-cut differentiation between the two main styles is not entirely relevant for the journalistic domain since there are a number of different ways of using the words of others by combining traits of direct and indirect style – considered as the basic axis defining reported speech. The increasing presence of words from different sources when conflict is projected in news in the press gives rise to a variety of ways of formulating them. If the study of citation was based traditionally on its occurrence in literature, where free indirect speech is typically found, its use in other contexts (daily conversation or newspapers, for example) leads to the incorporation of other parameters in the identification of citation formulae.

Taking into account that we are dealing with written data, we can distinguish different styles:

- *direct citation*: there is a *fracture between the syntax* of D1[1] and D2 because it entails the maintenance of two different deictic centres (affecting tense, space and time adverbs and person-reference words), as a result of the two different enunciations being put in relation one to another; the two segments are connected through juxtaposition and they are signalled by graphic markers such as (:)
- *indirect citation*: there is only *one discourse*, D1, with a single deictic centre. a subordinate clause introduced by a conjunction, and the correspondent agreement of tenses.
- *integrated citation*: it has the form of indirect citation but with segments – of greater or lesser extension – signalled as being cited directly/literally with clear graphic or typographic marking, mainly with quotation marks or marked fonts (boldface or italics). This type of citation allows mixing syntactic traits of direct and indirect style, a phenomenon rejected by grammarians but frequently used by journalists.
- *inserted citation*: words of W2 are brought into the main discourse by means of markers such as '*según* X' or '*para* X', '*in the words of* X', '*according to* X' which have the function of assigning explicit words to a particular agent

> (literal or non-literal, depending on the use of graphic signs of quotation) without any communicative verb.

The narrative style of the news makes the appearance of direct speech rarer while the rest are very frequent, with a broad and loose acceptance of either one or two deictic centres.

Pragmatically speaking, the idea that is brought to the fore is that in any of the explicit occurrences of D2, in any of the forms referred to here, the possibility of obtaining strictly the same original sense through literality is seriously called into question. Even if the exact words are reproduced, they are extracted from the original context and are placed in a new context that can modify the sense. That is the conclusion drawn by Reyes (1993) and by Caldas-Coulthard (1994) and suggest we should question a maxim apparently accepted by the standards of journalism: that explicit quoting means fidelity to the text. As argued:

> Direct style is often opposed to indirect style, somewhat ingenuously, saying that it seeks to reproduce literally the cited words. It would be more exact to view it as a sort of dramatization of a previous expression, rather than a totally similar one. In other words, it is no more or less reliable than indirect speech: they are two different strategies to refer to previous speech. (Maingueneau, 1987: 60; authors' translation)

The question is put in another way: it is fidelity to the voice which is under consideration, so to speak, the original intention and purpose, the original partners of communication.

The presence of different voices evoked in a text leads us to consider the polyphonic character of news in journals (Ducrot, 1984; Authier-Revuz, 1982; Maingueneau, 1987). In that sense, the idea of *one text/one voice* is not at issue. Rather, different *voices* are assumed or directly evoked by the writer, who builds the representation of a world of reference through a combination of a variety of voices. The relative weight, frequency and value of the different voices will, by means of the observation of the empirical data, provide us with a profile of protagonism taken on by the social actors whose words are called upon in relation to the topic.

Finally, studies from a critical perspective of the ways social agents are presented (Caldas-Coulthard, 1994; Van Leeuwen, 1996) allow us to question the neutrality of the writer and pick out the argumentative trend that arises from the fact of choosing who is cited, how he/she is represented, what is cited and for what purpose.

5. Delimitation of the Linguistic-Discursive Object: Form and Function of Explicit Citation

Even if we are conscious that voices can also be integrated in more subtle ways, considered by various scholars as '*hétérogénéité constitutive*' (Authier-Revuz, [illegible]

as 'narrative mode of citation' (Charaudeau, 1997) or as 'echoes, hidden citations' (Reyes, 1994), in this article we are concerned with explicit citation. This kind of citation consists of the main text (D1) and the quoted text (D2). D1 is sequentially the point of departure from which the writer (W1) designs the development of his/her own discourse. Before inserting the cited voice (2), W1 introduces a preparatory *frame* (Girón Alconchel, 1989), which is formed by:

(a) The presentation of the *identity* of the cited voice. It involves the presentation of the agent, by such linguistic means as names, proper names, titles or honorifics, designation of status and public position, relational adjectives, etc. Any of the choices made are significant.
(b) The communicative verbs (*verba dicendi*) that W1 attribute to the voice of cited agents (W2).
(c) Other elements that are not necessary but possible: narratives, descriptions, modalities.

The frame is the *presentation* of W2 made by W1, where W1 is responsible for creating a new context for the cited words. That is why we focus on this precise portion of citation, the pre-citation, which plays the role of *interface* between D1 and D2.

For the study of the pre-citation segment we have drawn on the suggestions in the Van Leeuwen's schema (1996: 66) concerning different modes of inclusion of agents:

In the framework of Van Leeuwen's description, we have considered the five categories stressed by boldface font in Figure 4: (1) *genericization*; (2) *individualization*; (3) *collectivization*; (4) *aggregation*; and (5) *objectivization*. In our data,




Figure 4: The representation of social actors in discourse: Inclusion system network (adapted from Van Leeuwen, 1996)

those are the most frequent forms of representation of members of the scientific community.

Van Leeuwen (1996: 46) considers an important factor in the presentation of social actors to be the choice between *generic* and *specific* reference: actors can be represented as 'classes' (*genericization*) or as 'specific' identifiable individuals (*specification*). The *specification* can be singular (*individualization*) or plural (*assimilation*). Examples of generic forms in our corpus are forms such as 'scientists', 'doctors' without a specific reference to a concrete group of experts.

The process of singular specification in the corpus is expressed by authority voices (individual scientists); as for assimilation, Van Leeuwen (1996: 49) distinguishes two major forms: *aggregation* and *collectivization. Aggregation* quantifies groups of participants, treating them as 'statistics' (example: 'a number of critics'), *collectivization* does not. In *collectivization*, social actors are presented as 'community', as a homogeneous, consensual group; this is the case, for example, of 'WHO experts' in our corpus.

Genericization, individualization, collectivization and *aggregation* are four personalized forms in the process of agent representation. On the contrary, *objectivization* is a form of *impersonalization*, also frequent in our corpus and realized by metonymical references, such as 'texts'.

The five forms considered can be *determined* or *undetermined.* Thus, we have considered the Van Leeuwen's distinction *determination/indetermination*:

> *Indetermination* occurs when social actors are represented as unspecified, 'anonymous' individuals or groups, *determination* when their identity is, one way or another, specified. Indetermination is typically realised by indefinite pronouns ('somebody', 'someone', 'some', 'some people') used in nominal function.... *Differentiation* explicitly differentiates an individual social actor or group of social actors from a similar actor or group, creating the difference between the 'self' and the 'other', or between 'us' and 'them'. (1996: 51–2)

As for the reporting verbs related to the agents, while it is necessary to accept the wide variety of 'verba dicendi' and the impossible task of classifying them,[2] it is also clear that they can confer a content-oriented trend or an evaluative trend. We find interesting suggestions in the way Thomas and Hawes (1994) and Hyland (2000) have indicated types of *content* or *evaluative* approaches channelled through the choice of verbs of communication (see Figure 5).

In content-oriented process, verbs related to findings (*observe, discover, notice, show*) or to procedures (*analyse, calculate, describe, assay, explore*) refer to research acts of science agents. Popularizing acts (*explain, describe, compare, define, exemplify*) are used to clarify and facilitate understanding of specialized concepts.

An evaluation verb 'allow[s] the writer to ascribe a view to the source author, reporting him or her as positive (*advocate, argue, hold, see*), neutral (*address, cite, comment, look at*), tentative (*allude to, believe, hypothesize, suggest*), or critical (*attack, condemn, object, refute*)' (Hyland, 2000: 28).




Figure 5: Critical analysis classification of reporting verbs

Through an accurate analysis of the framing of the quote we can indicate the interpretive cues that are given by the writer, because of the important role of choices in determining the argumentative orientation:

- choice of type of agent (conveying authority or credibility in a particular domain);
- choice of his/her representation in discourse (as an individual or a collective, determined or undetermined, personalized (author) or objectivized (text), etc.;
- choice of reporting verb (locating the agent in a position towards the topic).

In the case of 'mad cow' disease, types of agents that are called upon can tell us which are the sources that are presented as more relevant, those of the scientific community or those with political or civic-social standing. This is a sociological distribution that gives external configuration to the voice. But their representation is achieved by internal configuration through language use; the image of the agent is constructed and related through a specific reporting verb. Our claim is that close analysis of the pre-citation segment, the *frame* of the cited words, will give us important clues to the interpretation of the role and position of scientific voices.

6. Corpus and Data Treatment

We have based our study on a corpus of 75 news items from six different newspapers: *La Vanguardia, El País, El Mundo, El Periódico, ABC* and *Avui*. These are the most widely read general newspapers in Spain (*Avui* circulates in the Catalan-speaking area). The news items considered were published in March

and April 1996 (between 22 March and 27 April 1996, to be exact).[3] This corpus contains the 'reported speech' in the process of communication of news (Charaudeau, 1997).

The 75 news articles (D1) provided the 445 reporting structures (D2) that constitute the microlevel units analysed, both reported speech from non-scientific voices (349 statements) and from scientific voices (96 statements). We have focused the present study on the 96 scientific reporting structures, 21.57 percent of the reported speech in the corpus selected.

We compiled an extensive database to allow us to study quoted speech both from a quantitative and a qualitative point of view. Every citation has a corresponding register which details information on the macro-level of discourse (newspaper, press genre, press section, news author) as well as on the textual micro-level (identification of W2, form of citation, reporting speech choice, text of citation).

7. Analysis

After the delimitation of the object of our study and the presentation of the corpus, in the present section we proceed to study the role and position of scientific voices in the 'mad cows' affair as they are communicated via the Spanish press. First, we analyse the results of the study of the 'quoting frame' of scientific citations: representation of agents and choice of reporting verbs. Then we present a brief analysis centred on the contrast between scientific and non-scientific reported speech; this contrast allows us to obtain relevant data which helps to explain the role and position of scientific voices.

7.1 Analysis of Scientific Voices

We have divided our corpus into three chronological information 'peaks' or phases, given the concentration of the news around each peak, and the silence or 'pause' in between. Note that in phase 1 and phase 2, sources from scientific articles are not available, the source being governmental agencies that interpret the report issued by the scientists (see Section 2). Only in phase 3 is the information related to an article on the prion (from the microbiology field) which appeared in *Nature*.

The three phases, including the percentage of citations, are the following:

Phase 1: 22–24/3/1996 (44.30 percent)
Phase 2: 28–31/3/1996 (33.04 percent)
Phase 3:24–27/4/1996 (22.60 percent)

For every phase we will give some representative examples of the dominant scientific voice and of the associated reporting verbs, so that we are able to see

where there are modulations of the general stance detectable in the distribution of the different ways of representing scientific voices (Van Leeuwen, 1996).

Table 1 presents a summary of the process of representation and position of scientific voices in the different phases considered: we present the most frequent forms of representation of actors and the reporting verbs associated with each kind of representation.

Table 1: Forms of representation of identity and reporting verbs

Phase	Representation of identity	Reporting verbs
1) 22–24/3/1996	*a) Genericization* *b) Collectivization*	*a) Tentative* *b) Positive*
2) 28–31/3/1996	*a) Individualization* *b) Assimilation: collectivization and aggregation* *c) Objectivization*	*a) Research + markers* *b) Controversial: positive, tentative* *c) Positive, research*
3) 24–27/4/1996	*An only source represented as:* *a) Collectivization* *b) Objectivization* *c) Individualization*	*a) Research, tentative + markers* *b) Research* *c) Popularizing + markers*

We have characterized every phase by a title that shows the differences found between the communication of scientific knowledge in each case: from caution (*tentative* point of view) to assertiveness (*positive* perspective) in the first phase; diversification of the scientific voices and their representation (*individualization*, *assimilation* and *objectivization*) in the second phase; presence of a single source in the third phase, which is collectivized, individualized or objectivized.

7.2 First Phase: Caution versus Assertiveness

The systematic observation of citations in this first phase shows that social actors are represented by forms of *genericization* and *collectivization* (a form of *assimilation*). Scientists are presented as a *class* in *genericization* without a specific referent, as we can see in the following examples:[4]

(1) **Los científicos dicen** ahora que esos cuatro años fueron decisivos para que se saltara la barrera de las especies y se desarrollara una versión humana de la enfermedad. (*La Vanguardia*, 23/03/96)

(1) **Scientists** now **say** that those four years were decisive in the breaching of the species barrier and the development of a new human version of the disease. (*La Vanguardia*, 23/03/96)

(2) **Los médicos creen** saber distinguir estos últimos 'porque se producen en menores de 42 años, presentan una analítica diferente desde el punto de vista anatomopatológico y son de evolución más lenta, algo más de

(2) **Doctors believe** they can distinguish the latter 'because they occur in people less than 42 years old, are analytically different from an anatomo-pathological point of view, and are slower to develop, taking somewhat more than 20 months'. (*El País*, 23/03/96)

'Scientists' and 'doctors' are genericized, and so symbolically removed from the readers' world of immediate experience, treated as distant *class*. As we will see in 7.5, other types of voices, non-scientific voices such as politicians, are not genericized.

When the process of *genericization* is chosen, the scientific cited words in press are presented by a *tentative* verb, such as 'believe'. This type of reporting verb is one of the most frequent verbs used in our corpus, always associated with a *generic* or an *assimilate* voice, as Examples 1 and 2 shows, to express caution in front of a critical situation that relates both to social perception and to the limitations of scientific knowledge.

On the other hand, in this first phase, scientific voices are also reported as members of an international organization (World Health Organization, WHO), as a form of *collectivization*:

(3) Per la seva part, **experts de l'OMS van assegurar** ahir que no veuen justificació científica per prohibir la importació de carn de boví procedent de Gran Bretanya. (*Avui*, 23/03/96)
(3) For their part, **WHO experts** yesterday **assured** us they saw no scientific justification for prohibiting meat imports from Great Britain. (*Avui*, 23/03/96)

In Example 3 we can see that WHO experts are presented as a 'community', as an homogeneous, consensual group which have the responsibility of evaluating findings in science and its consequences for the general public. WHO experts are put under a process of *collectivization*. Their influence and political representation in society justify the reporting verbs chosen to present their speech: verbs associated with this collective are always *positive* ('assure'), a type of reporting verb which is never used in our data to introduce scientific class. The collective of WHO scientists is characterized by their assertiveness versus the caution showed by scientists in general.

As we have said, in the computation of reporting verbs, the verbs more frequently used in our corpus are *positive* ('assure'), *popularizing acts* ('explain'), *neutral* ('say', 'state') and *tentative* ('believe'). In this first phase – as in the other two – *positive* evaluation of facts is never in the generic voice of science. Assertiveness is always related to political representation.

All these observations are completed by the content of the quotations, which shows two distinct trends: the medical experts show 'caution' about their findings (Example 2) while the organization reveals 'assertiveness' in mitigating social alarm (Example 3). Knowledge of the context of these news items is crucial, because scientific information is channelled by governmental

in parliament. So, in this first phase, the dominant source is homogeneous and it is presented in agreement.

7.3 Second Phase: Diversification of Scientific Voices

In the second phase of the event, more voices are called upon to inform about 'mad cow' disease. Dominant scientific voices are reported in three different modes: *individualization*, *assimilation* and *objectivization*.

As for *individualization*, the linguistic form of presentation is through determination by use of name and surname, professional identity and institutional status and origin, as Example 4 shows:

(4) **Según afirma Stanley B. Prusiner, profesor de Neurología y bioquímico en la Universidad de California**, en el *Scientific American*, 'Es una teoría, pero puede que los cambios estructurales de la proteína alterada, el prión, sean también responsables de otras enfermedades degenerativas más comunes como el Alzheimer. Y esta posibilidad no debe ignorarse'. (*El Mundo*, 28/03/96)

(4) **According to Stanley B. Prusiner, a teacher of neurology and biochemistry at the University of California**, in the Scientific American, 'It's a theory, but it may be that structural changes in the altered protein, prion, might also be responsible for other degenerative diseases more common than Alzheimer. And that possibility should not be ignored.' (*El Mundo*, 28/03/96)

In this phase, as in the first one, it is noticeable that reporting verbs are distributed differently depending on the identity. Individual authorities are presented frequently with *markers* of reported discourse such as 'for', 'according to' ('para', 'según' in Example 4), contributing thus to the neutrality or distance established by the writer. Reporting verbs used to introduce authorities are above all *research* verbs – 'describe' ('describir'), 'conclude' ('concluir') – not very frequent in the corpus. Two examples of this kind of structures are the following 5 ('described') and 6 ('concludes'), with *individualized* voices ('Vincet Zigas' and 'Carleton Gadjusek' in Example 5, 'Jeffrey W. Almond' in Example 6):

(5) **Vincet Zigas, del Servicio de Salud Pública de Australia y Carleton Gadjusek, del Instituto Nacional de la Salud de EEUU, describieron** en 1957 cómo miembros de una tribu de Papúa Nueva Guinea sufrían una enfermedad mortal caracterizada, primero, por la pérdida de coordinación y, después, por demencia. (*El Mundo*, 28/03/96)

(5) **Vincet Zigas, of the Australia Public Health Service and Carlton Gadjusek of the National Health Institute of the United States, described** in 1957 how a tribe in Papua New Guinea suffered a lethal disease characterized firstly by loss of coordination and then by dementia. (*El Mundo*, 28/03/96)

(6) **El científico Jeffrey W. Almond concluye** en un artículo publicado en el *British Medical Journal*: 'Es obvio que la forma de presentación de la ECJ en Gran Bretaña, en comparación con otros países libres de la enfermedad de las "vacas locas", es una causa que debe ser estudiada'. (*El Mundo*, 28/03/96)

(6) **Scientist Jeffrey Almond concludes**, in an article published in the British Medical Journal that 'It is obvious that the form in which ECJ presents in Great Britain, in comparison with other countries free from "mad cows' disease", is a cause which should be studied.' (*El Mundo*, 28/03/96)

As far as *assimilation* is concerned, *collectives* are presented in a general determined or undetermined form and are now dispersed across different fields (neurology, veterinary, medicine, etc.), institutions (hospitals, health services, etc.) and countries (Great Britain, USA, Australia, etc.). It is not the case, then, of a generic scientific reference as it was during the first phase but of heterogenous *collectives* of scientists: in Example 7, 'Las autoridades sanitarias' and 'los propios médicos del hospital de Canterbury' have specific references:

(7) **Las autoridades sanitarias y los propios médicos del hospital de Canterbury, donde murió Anne Pearson, no han querido hacer comentario alguno sobre el caso, más allá de decir** que 'es imprudente especular sobre cómo la víctima contrajo el CJD, porque su caso está siendo todavía estudiado en un laboratorio de Edimburgo y no hay conclusiones definitivas'. (*La Vanguardia*, 30/03/96)

(7) **Health authorities and the doctors themselves at the Canterbury Hospital where Anne Pearson died did not wish to make any comment** concerning the case, **beyond saying** that 'It is unwise to speculate over how the victim contracted CJD, as her case is being studied at the Edinburgh laboratory and there are no definitive conclusions.' (*La Vanguardia*, 30/03/96)

Forms of *aggregation* are also frequent in this phase, showing the different points of view in the groups of scientists: in Example 8 the determiner 'some' ('Algunos') in front of 'others' ('Otros', 'Y otros') signals different groups of experts who did not agree on the scientific explanation of the phenomenon:

(8) **Algunos investigadores creen** que, además del prión, debe de haber otro agente infeccioso aún no identificado. **Otros** no **descartan** que aparezca un virus. **Y otros están seguros** de que la nueva enfermedad detectada en GB no es ECJ sino la propia EEB de las vacas. (*El Mundo*, 28/03/96)

(8) **Some researchers believe** that, in addition to prion, there must be some other unidentified agent of infection. **Others** do not **rule out** the possibility of a virus appearing. **And others are sure** that the new disease detected in GB is not ECJ, but none other than the EEB occurring in cows. (*El Mundo*, 28/03/96)

In this example, scientists are presented in *aggregation* in terms of Van Leeuween (1996), identified as groups that show disagreement in the evolution of science research. This disagreement is also reflected in a variety of verbs indicating scientific debate and different points of view: in Example 8 a *positive* expression 'are sure' is used next to a *tentative* verb such as 'believe'.

Finally, 'texts', a form of *objectivization*, are in this second phase a notable source for citation, being presented in a general determinate form or by the name of the publication, with no identification of authorship. Personal reference is lost through a metonymic reference (as 'Studies' in Example 9) that gives credibility to the written words – related to the accepted knowledge of the scientific community:

(9) **Los estudios han demostrado** que en ninguna de ellas [enfermedades neurodegenerativas], los leucocitos – el 'ejército' del sistema inmune – se infiltran en el cerebro. (*El Mundo*, 28/03/96)

(9) **Studies have demonstrated** that in none of them [neurodegenerative diseases] do leucocytes – the immune system's 'army' – infiltrate into the brain. (*El Mundo*, 28/03/96)

Citations of texts are presented with significant *research* verbs such as 'demonstrate' ('demostrar') in Example 9 or 'reveal' ('revelar').

As can be seen, in this second phase sources are heterogeneous, in their reference as well as in their mode of representation. Experts come from different fields: neurologists, biologists and microbiologists, veterinarians, etc. bringing about an expansion of information that complements the purely medical data. Journalists begin to quote research on microbiology, looking for a possible explanation of the causes of the infection, trying to confer credibility based on the results of studies.

7.4 Third Phase: A Scientific Move

This phase is typified by a particular instance of scientific communication as it appeares in the British journal *Nature*, about a month after the outbreak of diplomatic and economic conflict generated by the first wave of news. It represents progress made in scientific information.

We find different forms of representation of this source alone: first, as the text published in *Nature*, a form of *objectivization* exemplified in the following citation:

(10) **Un estudio que publica hoy la revista Nature demuestra** que la estructura genética de los priones de las vacas tiene un parecido muy significativo con los priones de los seres humanos. (*El Mundo*, 25/04/96)

(10) **A study published today in Nature magazine demonstrates** that the genetic structure of prions in cows is very significantly similar to prions in human beings. (*El Mundo*, 25/04/96)

Second, as the group of scientists who carried out the research, a mode of *collectivization* represented in Example 11:

(11) **Los científicos de Oxford, incluidos T.R.F. Southwood, antiguo miembro de la comisión asesora del Gobierno británico sobre la enfermedad de las vacas locas, han descubierto** que estas proteinas [priones] de vacas y personas comparten dos rasgos distintivos en su estructura que están ausentes en la proteína de oveja. (*El País*, 25/04/96)

(11) **Scientists at Oxford, including T.R.F. Southwood, former member of the British government advisory commission on mad cows' disease, have discovered** that these proteins [prions] in humans and cows share two distinctive traits in their structure that are absent in the sheep protein. (*El País*, 25/04/96)

And third, as the authorities on the matter, in the process of *individualization* expressed in Example 12:

(12) 'Las ovejas padecen una enfermedad similar desde hace doscientos años pero nunca se ha transmitido a las personas. La enfermedad de las vacas, en cambio, sí puede haberse transmitido. Si así es, debemos buscar una característica que tengamos en común con las vacas pero no con las ovejas. Y es precisamente lo que hemos encontrado', **explicó** ayer **David Krakauer, director de la investigación**, en entrevista telefónica. (*La Vanguardia*, 25/04/96)

(12) 'For the last two hundred years, sheep have suffered a similar disease that has never been passed on to humans. The disease in cows does, however, seem to have been passed on to humans. If this is so, we have to look for a characteristic we have in common with cows but not with sheep. And that's precisely what we have found', **explained David Krakauer, director of the investigation**, yesterday in a telephone interview. (*La Vanguardia*, 25/04/96)

As we see in the examples above, reporting *research* verbs are frequently used: 'demonstrates' ('demuestra' in Example 10), 'have discovered' ('han descubierto' in Example 11), associated with the collective of researchers and with texts. Also, *markers* such as 'for' ('según', 'para'), which show a neutral position, are employed to introduce the group of scientists, and not only to refer to an individual authority (as in the second phase). Finally, the *popularizing* verb 'to explain' ('explicar') is used in this third phase primarily in relation with authorities ('explained' in Example 12).

Nevertheless, when scientists are quoted as a generic group, *tentative* reporting verbs are also assigned, as in the previous phases:

(13) **Los científicos creen** que [los priones] pueden causar graves enfermedades neurológicas cuando pasan de una especie a otra e incluso cuando pasan de un individuo a otro dentro de la misma especie. (*La Vanguardia*, 25/04/96)

(13) **Scientists believe** that [prions] can cause serious neurobiological illnesses when they pass from one species to another and even when they are passed from one individual to another within the same species. (*La Vanguardia*, 25/04/96)

To sum up, in the third phase, the source is a scientific article on microbiology published in one of the most prestigious reference journals in science communication (*Nature*). We cannot find any significant discourse function in the way scientific voices are represented, by individualization, collectivization or objectivization, since all of them are present in the quote frame referring to the same source. The reporting verbs used are in the semantic domain of *research* ('demonstrate', 'discover', 'conclude') and *divulgence* ('explain'), following the patterns of science communication. Moreover, *markers* of neutrality are used frequently to introduce scientific discourse.

7.5 Contrasting Scientific and Non-Scientific Voices

As we have already mentioned, the proportion of speech reported from scientists in our selected corpus is only 21.57 percent of the total amount of reported speech; in other words, non-scientific voices are dominant. For this reason it is interesting to contrast the representation of scientific and non-scientific voices in order to note differences in the role and position of each kind of agent as featured in science communication.

In a previous study – reported in Calsamiglia and López Ferrero (2001), Calsamiglia and Cassany (2001) – the respective contributions of scientific and non-scientific voices in the information on 'mad cows' disease were examined. The present analysis confirms the results presented in the two articles, in which we studied use of quotation in the three first days of diffusion of the news in the Spanish newspapers.

Table 2 shows the distribution of scientific voices in the present corpus in relation to the representation of identity:

Table 2: Presence and identity of scientific voices (96 citations: 21.57 percent)

Genericization (16.66%)	Assimilation (25%)			Individualization (43.75%)			Objectivization (14.58%)
	–Determined	+Determined		–Determined	+Determined		
"Scientists" "Experts"		Gov	Res		Author	WHO	
16	1	14	9	1	29	12	14

Scientific voices are frequently put into a process of *genericization*, as a community without specific reference ('los científicos', 'los expertos', etc.). When there is a process of *assimilation* two specific groups are represented: government advisors (*Gov* in Table 2) and collectives of concrete researchers (*Res*), some of which publish their studies in *Nature*. As for *individualization*, this mode is presented through a scientific authority (*Author*) or a World Health Organization member (*WHO*).

In contrast, Table 3 shows the distribution of non-scientific voices in the corpus:

Table 3: Presence and identity of non-scientific voices (349 citations: 78.43 percent)

Assimilation (27.79%)				Individualization (70.20%)						Objectivization (2%)
–Determined	+Determined			–Determined	+Determined					
	Cou	Inst	Org		Cit	Mer	Org	Polit	Press	Spec	
12	17	41	27		5	12	60	134	24	10	7

Abbreviations used in Table 3 refer to the different forms of representations:

Forms of assimilation:
- *Cou: country* ('Suiza, Alemania, los alemanes, Reino Unido')
- *Inst: institution* ('el gobierno, la Administración española, las autoridades suizas, la UE')
- *Org: organization* ('la Organización Mundial de la Salud, el sector cárnico, las organizaciones agrarias, los sindicatos agrícolas')

Forms of individualization:
- *Cit: citizen* ('dos oficinistas, un quiosquero, un ingeniero cincuentón, un ama de casa')
- *Mer: merchant* ('un carnicero, un exportador de carne, el encargado del restaurante')
- *Org: organization* ('un portavoz de la OMS, el presidente del Sindicato Nacional de Ganaderos')
- *Polit: politician* ('el ministro de la presidencia en funciones, el líder de la oposición laborista')
- *Press: press* ('*Le Monde, The Daily Telegraph*, EFE, special correspondents')
- *Spec: specialist* ('sociólogo, antropólogo').

Forms of objectivization: ('informe, código penal')

As shown, non-scientific voices are represented mainly as individual voices (70.20 percent), politicians being the social agents most cited. The data tell us how, in this case, politicians are called upon to provide information even on science matters. As for the reporting verbs used, the press attributes a *positive* ('assure' in Example 14) and *interaction-oriented* position ('urge', 'call' in Examples 15 and 16) to social agents with a political function. In a critical situation, political

actors are the ones expected to be active on their speeches, decision making, recommendations. They are pushed to perfom symbolically, involving sometimes a risk to their public face:

(14) **Tony Blair, líder de la oposición laborista**, también **aseguró** que continuará comiendo carne de buey, aunque **acusó** al Gobierno de 'ocultar datos' a la opinión pública, y de 'resistirse a decir toda la verdad' para proteger los intereses de los ganaderos. (*La Vanguardia*, 22/3/96)

(14) **Tony Blair, leader of the Labour Opposition**, also **assured the House** that he would continue eating beef, although he accused the Government of 'hiding facts' from public opinion, and of 'refusing to tell the whole truth', to protect the farmers' interests. (*La Vanguardia*, 22/03/96)

(15) Precisamente ayer, **su presidente, Jacques Santer, reclamó** a John Major medidas urgentes para acotar la crisis y permitir que la UE pueda levantar el embargo – siquiera parcialmente – que pesa sobre el vacuno británico. (*El País*, 25/4/96)

(15) Precisely yesterday, **its president, Jacques Santer, urged** John Major to take urgent measures to bring the crisis to an end and allow the EU to lift the embargo (partially) imposed on British beef. (*La Vanguardia*, 25/04/96)

(16) Un sector predominante de la prensa comparte esta tendencia. **Sir Teddy Taylor, abanderado del euroescepticismo, pidió** ayer una prohibición total de vino y queso francés en el Reino Unido en venganza por el boicot francés contra la carne británica. (*ABC*, 23/3/96)

(16) A major part of the press shares this tendency. **Sir Teddy Taylor, avowed Eurosceptic, called** yesterday for a total ban on French wine and cheese in the United Kingdom, in revenge for the French boycott on British meat. (*ABC*, 23/03/96)

On the other hand, when we consider the generic and collective representation of scientific voices (40 citations) plus their objectivized representation as texts (14 citations), we observe that, unlike what we saw with non-scientific voices, the predominant source is not an individual: 'science' is represented by the scientific community as a group, or by texts. Therefore, the scientific community and texts are perceived by society as sufficient markers of authority. However, if we leave the 14 textual citations aside and focus on the 40 citations of personal scientific voices, the proportion of individualized (43.75 percent) and generic and assimilated (41.66 percent in total) citations are very close. A relevant feature is that both assimilated and individualized citations are presented in noun phrases (NPs) with determiner. In the case of individual voices, the determination is related to a personal social identity (name, status, etc.). In the case of generic and assimilated voices – 'scientist' ('los científicos'), 'experts' ('los expertos'), 'researchers' ('los investigadores'), etc. – there is generally just a simple determiner preceding a common noun, having either an anaphoric or generalizing function;

again the linguistic choice appeals to a 'common ground' representation of the role of scientific work.

As for the reporting verbs, we find scientific and non-scientific voices coincide in their use of *positive* and *neutral* verbs, such as 'say', 'state', 'assure' ('decir', 'afirmar', 'asegurar'). Nevertheless, there is a relevant difference in the use of specific verbs in each kind of source. As we have noticed, reporting verbs assigned to non-scientific voices can be described as *interaction-oriented*: 'claim', 'announce' ('reclamar', 'anunciar'), while those assigned to scientific voices are *content-oriented*: 'explain', 'believe', 'consider', 'show', 'emphasize' ('explicar', 'creer', 'considerar', 'señalar', 'destacar'), related to mental activities of knowledge, qualification and focalization. Some of them reflect a *tentative* position ('believe', 'consider'), others ('explain', 'show') are characteristic of *popularizing* discourse.

As a summary, in Table 4 we present the relevant contrasts in the forms of representation of identity and in the choice of reporting verbs to introduce scientific and non-scientific speech:

Table 4: Choice of representation of identity forms and reporting verbs

Voice	Representation of identity	Reporting verbs
Non-scientific	*Assimilation*	*Positive and neutral*
	Individualization	*Interaction oriented*
Scientific	*Genericization*	*Positive and neutral*
	Assimilation	*Content oriented: tentative and popularizing*
	Individualization	
	Objectivization	

8. Discussion

At the beginning of this article, we asked several research questions about the sense, direction and effects of the insertion of words from scientific sources into journalist discourse. Our aim has been to reveal the role of scientific voices on an issue where they are entitled to talk, and to explain the orientation of discourse depending on the forms of quotation, above all in a situation of crisis such as the 'mad cows' affair has been and still continues to be.

Another kind of question is related to the use that journalists make of citation: is quoted speech a way of abdicating the responsibility of journalists or a means of orientating their position on the topic of reference? As Moirand (2000) points out, journalists compensate for what she calls an 'insecurité discursive' by bringing to their discourse the very many voices involved in the problem. By doing so they dramatize the conflict. At all events, the amount of quoted material of non-scientific individuals, mainly politicians, in circulation indicates that responsibility is assigned to socio-political actors, even if the information has its origin in a report by a group of researchers.

Why are scientific voices so scarcely represented? Our proposed division of the journal articles studied into different stages may help to give an answer to this question. This procedure has been useful in allowing us to grasp the modi-
fications suffered by [illegible]

In our analysis, the first and second phases of the news story are just four days apart, while the third phase comes nearly a month later. The first phase is marked by the representation of scientists as a collective dependent on political directives (parliament, ministers, organizations). The scientific community is presented in the context of social life as a class that is expected to give quality information. The first problem arises: the demands of media information and the nature of scientific information collide. They reflect two ways of representing knowledge: science based on ongoing search, on the discussion of hypotheses, with no conclusive evidence; the media representation based on the idea that scientists are able to provide an account that will bring a quick solution to the problem.

The second phase is marked by diversification and individualization, while written studies are drawn upon also as a credible referent. A variety of experts and texts are called upon and, according to the state of knowledge, still not established or accepted, different points of view are reported. This is a legitimate position in the context of science, but again the problem arises when it is presented to a public that needs to make urgent decisions, adding to the confusion created in the first phase.

The third phase is marked by reference to a scientific source, the publication of a microbiology research article about the possible infectious agent of the disease. In this phase the standard way of communicating advances in science is respected. The progress in scientific information is presented and explained within its strict limits through the text and the group, only incidentally individualizing the research actors. But though it seems that some of the causes of the disease are beginning to be explained, in the context of social alarm and economical conflict, this cannot fulfil the more immediate and urgent needs of the general public.

As for the evaluative activity of journalists, it seems that the use of reported speech is a means of orientating their position on the topic of reference, as well as or even more than a way of abdicating their responsibility to inform objectively. Journalists seem to assume that they reflect public needs and fears as well as the loss of control that a health crisis situation generates. If the scientific role is not considered a decisive social role capable of mitigating social alarm on its own, journalists are not able to assign or recognize the limits of scientific knowledge and to present such limits as a worthy fact in itself. In the public context, the consequence is that this knowledge is a source of confusion rather than a contribution to an understanding of the problem.

9. Conclusion

In conclusion, we can say that the analysis of the 'quoting frame', in its canonical components of agent identity and reporting verbs, gives a representation of what the press considers relevant for that part of information which is based on words, not on facts. The most outstanding feature is that multiple voices are called upon to clarify a situation where decisions have to be taken at different levels. In actual fact, the 'mad cows' affair is an example of the propagation of ongoing research through political instance. The circulation of information generated in

a research context, once set in different contexts, may create the confusion that we have been able to describe in the analysis of the choice of reporting verbs, showing different attitudes, understanding and interests.

The study of the 'mad cows' case shows the differing pace of science and daily life as a gap that is manifested through the way the press, reacting consciously or unconsciously to a situation of crisis, gives rise to different voices. Scientific voices have a limited role in the press, much less weight than those of political actors. Individual scientific authorities (researchers) are presented in a lower position than scientists as a generic class or in a civic/administrative role. As for the communicative position, journalists attribute a *neutral* and *popularizing* stance to individual researchers and a *controversial* and *tentative* position to the scientist in general, both of these contrasting with the *positive, interaction-oriented* position attributed to the social agents with a political function.

The position assigned to scientists is a qualified one but not efficient enough, managing a kind of knowledge (a) that rests on *tentative* hypotheses and questions under *research* and (b) because the advances of science do not give rise to results with immediate answers to social needs. In fact, the two representations of knowledge show their contradictions when they are placed side by side: the scientific representation (science domain) and the social representation (society domain). A question remains unanswered: whether confidence in scientific work can be maintained in the media even if what is communicated is the limited state of scientific knowledge.

These conclusions should be contrasted with the analysis of the role and position of scientific voices in the new 'mad cows' episode which peaked at the turn of the century. Approximately five years after the first appearance of the story in the media, a new episode of the crisis has developed. Following this rich communicative event should provide ways of accounting for journalists' responsibility in representing science in social life and their contribution to a better public understanding of science.

Notes

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1. D1 refers to main discourse by writer 1 (W1); D2, to quoted discourse by writer 2 (W2).
2. An exhaustive classification of reporting verbs has been proposed by Battaner et al. (2001): *assertive communicative* ('decir, comunicar, preguntar, asegurar, prometer, manifestar, admitir'), *communicative claim* ('asegurar, recalcar, insistir, reiterar, precisar, puntualizar'), *attention focus* ('observar, señalar, ver, reflejar, advertir, indicar, destacar').

positive evaluation ('alabar, elogiar, aprobar, dar importancia, destacar, subrayar. recalcar'), *negative evaluation* ('reprochar, desaprobar, criticar, acusar, lamentar, atacar, descartar'), *demanding* ('pedir, ordenar, mandar, prohibir, exigir, aconsejar, instar a, suplicar, reclamar, solicitar'), forms of *speech* ('susurrar, tartamudear, suspirar, gritar, exclamar, chillar, carcajearse, reírse, gruñir, murmurar, declamar, tararear, cantar, recitar'), *discourse markers* ('empezar, comenzar, añadir, seguir, acabar, terminar, continuar, concluir'), *discourse action description* ('comentar, desarrollar, considerar, plantear, proponer, tratar, sostener, confesar'), *interaction description* ('intervenir, responder'), *metalinguistic markers* ('narrar, citar'), *opinion verbs* ('opinar, juzgar, considerar, creer, dar su opinión, estar convencido de, calificar, sugerir, estimar'), *counterarguments* ('discutir, objetar, rectificar'), *analysis* ('analizar, distinguir, establecer, hacer una distinción'), *comparison* ('comparar, ejemplificar'), *thinking and observing* ('pensar, especular, sentir, ver, oír').

3. The analysis of citation in the three first days in those newspapers at the moment when it became known that BSE might be transmitted to humans has been studied in Calsamiglia and López Ferrero (2001).
4. In the examples, we stress in bold the linguistic structures (the pre-citations) analysed.

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13

Relativity and Its Discontents: Language, Gender, and Pragmatics

Deborah Cameron

1. The "Social Constructionist Turn" in Language and Gender Research

The approach to language and gender that is probably most familiar to most people (including many scholars who are not specialists in the field) is one that focuses on identifying, describing, and explaining what are taken to be characteristic differences in the discourse styles of women and men. This research tradition (now sometimes referred to variously as "modernist," "essentialist," or "second wave," by contrast with the subsequent "postmodernist," "social constructionist," or "third wave" approaches I describe below[1]) is usually thought to have emerged in the mid 1970s, with Robin Lakoff's pioneering essay *Language and Woman's Place* (1975). Lakoff's account of male-female differences exemplified what came to be called the "dominance" current, which related the linguistic behaviour of men and women to their unequal social positioning. Later, an alternative "[cultural] difference" approach emerged, in which less emphasis was given to inequalities of power: rather, men and women (and, more especially, boys and girls) were seen as members of distinct (sub)cultures within which they acquired differing norms for everyday communication (Maltz and Borker 1982). Since the interactional socio-linguist Deborah Tannen popularized a version of this thesis in her best-selling book *You Just Don't Understand* (1990), a host of pop-psychology and self-help writers (notably John "Mars and Venus" Gray [1992]), have reinforced its status as folklinguistic common sense.

Yet most language and gender research today is informed neither by this view nor by the alternative "dominance" view. At the same time that Tannen's work

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was prompting criticism from some of her colleagues (e.g., Freed 1992; Troemel-Ploetz 1991; Uchida 1992), many researchers were questioning some of the fundamental theoretical assumptions on which both "dominance" and "difference" approaches relied, suggesting that both were flawed by their "essentialist" view of gender. The popularity of Tannen's work on male-female misunderstanding, and of the reductive and stereotypical "Mars and Venus" accounts that followed, gave increased urgency to this questioning process. What emerged over the next few years was a new approach which, as I noted in passing above, has been given a number of labels, including "postmodernist" (Cameron, in press), "social constructionist" (Weatherall 2002), and "third wave" (Baxter 2003).

I have given a more detailed account of this shift and its implications elsewhere (Cameron, in press); the table below provides a brief summary of the key theoretical assumptions characteristic of the new approach and how these contrast with the assumptions made in earlier work.[2]

Within what I will henceforth follow the majority of commentators by calling the "social constructionist" paradigm (though with the terminological reservations

Table 1: Contrasting approaches to language and gender

"Modernist"/"second wave"/ "essentialist" approach	"Postmodernist"/"third wave"/ "social constructionist" approach
Views gender as a stable attribute of individuals, a part of their core identity that is normally acquired in the course of their early socialization. Language-using reflects or marks the speaker's (pre-existing) gender identity.	Views gender as ongoingly "performed" or constructed through engagement in particular local practices; gender is not something you "have" or "acquire" once and for all early in life but something you do continually. Language-using is part of "doing/performing" gender and thus is constitutive of gender.
Focuses on binary gender *difference*: presupposes the existence of two internally homogeneous groups, "men" and "women," and looks for generalizations about differences between them. Most studies deal with "mainstream" gendered subjects – often white, straight, middle-class, and monolingual.	Focuses on gender *diversity*: assumes that there are multiple masculinities and femininities, inflecting or inflected by other dimensions of social identity (e.g., class, ethnicity, generation); intra-group differences and inter-group similarities are as significant as differences between gender groups. Is also interested in "liminal" cases which challenge the binary logic of gender (e.g., transgendered or "queer" speakers).
Favours global generalizations and "big stories": linguistic gender differences are explained in terms of overarching social structures, e.g., male dominance or separate gendered subcultures.	Favours "looking locally" for explanations of gender-related patterns: masculinities and femininities are produced in specific contexts or "communities of practice," and it cannot be assumed that the same patterns will be found in all or most cases.

expressed in note 1), it is possible to distinguish several sub-currents. Some researchers, most of them socio-, applied or "critical" linguists, are influenced by either Judith Butler's formulation of gender as "performative" (Butler 1990) or the "communities of practice" model drawn from Lave and Wenger (1991) and most influentially disseminated to language and gender scholars through the work of Penelope Eckert and Sally McConnell-Ginet (1992, 1999) – or, in some cases, by both of these. Others espouse a form of social constructionism that is theoretically rooted in the ideas of Harold Garfinkel and Erving Goffman (and feminist elaborations thereof, such as Kessler and McKenna 1978; West and Zimmerman 1987), and their preferred approach to the analysis of discourse is conversation analysis (CA), originally an offshoot of Garfinkelian ethnomethodology. Many researchers in the latter group have a disciplinary affiliation to social psychology; some are adherents of "discursive psychology" (cf. Potter and Wetherell 1987) who combine CA methods with poststructuralist theoretical ideas about subjectivity, identity, and "discourse" in the Foucauldian sense (e.g., Edley and Wetherell 1997; Wetherell 1998).

2. Debates within Social Constructionism

Among social constructionist language and gender researchers, and especially the CA-oriented group, there has been vigorous debate during the past few years on the issue of "realism versus relativism" (e.g., Speer 2000). Much of this has turned on the methodological question of whether it is legitimate for analysts of discourse to make gender relevant in analysing data where the participants themselves do not orient to it explicitly as a concern (see e.g., Kitzinger 2000; Stokoe and Smithson 2001; Weatherall 2000, 2002). In "classical" CA (see e.g., Schegloff 1997, 1998) it is axiomatic that one does not go "beyond the data" nor impose analysts' categories in place of participants' own (a position that follows the logic of ethnomethodology, with its insistence on viewing social order as a local "members' accomplishment"). For many feminists, on the other hand, the "classical" approach is open to the criticism that it denies the relevance of gender differentiation/inequality as an overarching principle of social organization, and so prevents analysts from taking proper account of its effect on all social interaction.

This debate is sometimes presented as an argument between more and less radically constructionist positions. Gender "realists" hold that even if gender is diverse and locally variable in its actual forms, differentiation/inequality between women and men is nevertheless a "real" social fact that in some form can be assumed to have "global" relevance. Gender "relativists" deny this, arguing that gender is *radically* local: it is only "there" when participants in an interaction explicitly make it relevant, and an analytically satisfying account of their behaviour in that case should not need to import from outside the data more general or "global" assumptions about gender as a macro-social category. Some researchers who take this position would see the use of global assumptions about gender as covertly reintroducing a form of essentialism, and so vitiating the analysts' claim to be working within a social constructionist framework. Yet some of their

opponents would retort that the kind and degree of essentialism gender "realism" represents is a strategic necessity if discourse analysis is to serve feminist ends. The debate, then, is not only technical and methodological, a question of how to go about the practical business of analysing discourse data, but also political, a question of what feminist discourse analysis is or should be centrally about. For "realists," one key goal of feminist analysis is to show how unequal gender relations are (re)produced in various kinds of talk and text. "Relativists," while they do not necessarily reject that goal, tend to define a feminist analysis as one that eschews a priori assumptions about gender, seeking instead to reveal the constructed and contingent nature of gender categories themselves.

This debate may look quite different from the earlier "dominance versus difference" debate, but while there are indeed some significant differences, there are also similarities. In the "dominance versus difference" case, too, there was a dispute about the relationship of gender to power (whether it is legitimate for analysts to postulate that one always implicates the other), which was played out in arguments about analytic procedure. In her paper "The relativity of linguistic strategies," Deborah Tannen (1993) warned against what she regarded as the typical "dominance" analytic procedure of reading power relations off from the presence in discourse of particular linguistic forms or discourse strategies – for instance, equating the act of interrupting someone with asserting dominance over them. She argued that since the meaning of any form or strategy is contextually "relative," this way of proceeding analytically risks finding meanings in discourse that were not salient for the participants, and attributing to the participants intentions they did not have. (For example, someone who interrupted an interlocutor may have intended not to assert dominance over them but to signal solidarity and support for what they were saying.)

Though the argument is framed differently, there are surely resemblances between Tannen's concerns about "dominance" analysts imposing their own interpretation and/or political agenda on discourse data and the concerns of contemporary analysts favouring the "classical" CA approach. More generally, it seems feminist discourse analysts a decade on are still arguing about some of the same questions the "dominance versus difference" debate turned on, albeit within a different theoretical framework. Where, as analysts, should we look for the workings of gender in discourse? On what grounds is it legitimate to argue for the relevance of gender, and of power relations between gender groups, in analysing a particular piece of data? Though the answers proposed have changed, these questions have evidently not been resolved or transcended by the turn to social constructionism.

Among today's social constructionists, it is generally accepted that discourse strategies do have the property Tannen calls "relativity": the mapping from linguistic form to discourse function is typically many-to-many rather than one-to-one. But as I pointed out in a response to Tannen's 1993 article (Cameron 1998), accepting the postulate of relativity does not in itself resolve all disputes. Relativity, after all, is not only an issue for discourse analysts; it is also a practical problem for participants in discourse. If interaction is to go on in the ways we know it does, participants in any specific case must be able to

multiplicity of interpretations that might in principle be licensed by an utterance or turn-at-talk, and decide what, in that context, would constitute the "best" or most plausible interpretation. The question of how they do that – and how the process might be affected by gender and/or power differences – is not, I would argue, satisfactorily answered in either Tannen's account or the more "radical" social constructionist accounts that have succeeded it.

Tannen's argument was that recipients in practice resolve ambiguities by unconsciously invoking gender-specific assumptions about the function and proper conduct of social interaction. Men place utterances addressed to them in a "status" frame, whereas women place the same utterances in a "connection" frame: the result is often misunderstanding. Thus Tannen (1993) analyses a vignette in which two co-workers, a woman and a man, are walking between buildings on a cold day. The woman asks the man where his coat is (i.e., remarks on the fact that he is not wearing one), and the man responds, "thanks, mom." According to Tannen, the woman's remark was intended to convey friendly concern, but since the man placed it in a status-oriented frame, he took it as a put-down and responded by putting the woman down – "thanks, mom," addressed by an adult to someone other than their mother, implies that the addressee is inappropriately bossy and interfering, and is subordinating the other by treating them as a helpless or irresponsible child.

In the analytic framework favoured by those on the "relativist" side of the current debate, there is no place for the kind of global assumptions about gender (i.e., that men as a group seek status and women connection) that are invoked in Tannen's analysis of the "coat" vignette. However, the relevance of gender to this exchange would be acknowledged in a "classic" CA analysis making use of the "next turn proof procedure." It is a general principle in CA that a recipient's understanding of the prior turn will be displayed in the response they produce in their own next turn: the analyst can therefore warrant claims about what an utterance meant by looking to the next turn. In the "coat" case, the man's use of the gender-specific appellation "mom" is evidence that he takes gender to be relevant. If, on the other hand, he had said something like [sarcastically] "I appreciate your concern," it would still be possible for the analyst to assert that the man interpreted the woman's remark as inappropriate or uncalled for, but there would be nothing to warrant the further claim that this had anything to do with gender. So whereas in Tannen's approach gender is globally relevant, and by implication factors into every act of interpretation, in the CA approach its relevance is limited to just those cases where participants explicitly display their orientation to it by mentioning it.

This is where my own argument begins; for in my view, both these approaches are unsatisfactory: one does not sufficiently restrict the claims an analyst can make about the interpretive behaviour of participants in discourse, while the other, conversely, is too restrictive, suggesting that nothing can be relevant for analysis unless its relevance for the participants is overtly displayed in the words they actually utter. Between these extremes, I would suggest, is another possibility: making use of the insights of Gricean pragmatics (Grice 1975), and the elaboration of those ideas in relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986).

3. A "Pragmatic Turn"?

Though there are some important differences between the Gricean model of communication and relevance theory (which limitations of space prevent me from pursuing here), the key insight these pragmatic approaches share is that meaning is *inferred* rather than *decoded*: derived not simply by processing the manifest content of an utterance or text, but by putting that together with propositions which are retrievable from context or from background knowledge in order to generate inferences about what is meant or intended. Rather than explicitly providing everything necessary for an adequate interpretation, utterances/texts will provide evidence that cues the hearer to look for other propositions (i.e., ones that are not explicitly encoded) that may be relevant for interpretation. There is, of course, no guarantee that the inferences generated by hearers will lead them to the precise meaning a speaker intended to communicate. (Meaning is, in that sense, "relative" or indeterminate.) But the inference-based account does imply that in the normal case the hearer will make the effort necessary to generate *a* meaning: s/he will not simply conclude that since all strategies are multifunctional and polysemous, what this speaker on this occasion means by X is undecidable.

Any inference-based account of meaning must immediately call into question the idea that something – for example, gender – has to be mentioned overtly in discourse to count as relevant for an analysis of what was meant or how it was interpreted. In an inferential account of communication it is assumed that conversationalists in their active efforts to make sense of discourse have far more to bring to bear on that discourse than what is explicitly and overtly encoded in it; furthermore, it is routinely expected that they *will* "go beyond the data" in this way. On that basis, it is possible to argue for the potential relevance of gender (or rather, of conversationalists' background knowledge and beliefs about gender) even in cases where gender is not explicitly at issue in discourse.

For example, the title of my article "Is there any ketchup, Vera?" (Cameron 1998) quotes an utterance which a friend of mine recalled her father addressing regularly to her mother at the family dinner table (the condiment varied – it might be mustard or pickle rather than ketchup – but the form remained constant). I chose to examine this particular case because it provided a counter-example to a claim made in the literature on male-female misunderstanding, that men have difficulty in understanding indirect requests. "Is there any ketchup?" was clearly issued (in this case by a man) and interpreted (by his wife Vera) as an indirect request, that is, both of them understood that the intention was not to request information about the availability or otherwise of ketchup, but to request (indirectly, since the utterance is linguistically coded as a request for information) that Vera go and get the ketchup. My friend also reported that whereas her father's use of this strategy invariably elicited the desired response (the action of getting ketchup), if she, the daughter, used the same strategy, her mother typically treated it as the request for information it appeared to be, responding with an utterance such as, "Yes, it's on the kitchen counter."

Here we might ask, is it plausible to suggest – as an analyst using the next turn proof procedure might be led to suggest – that Vera understands the same utterance as an indirect request when it comes from her husband, but as a request for information when it comes from her daughter? There is certainly a difference in her overt uptake of the utterance in the two cases, but it surely does not follow that Vera must believe the underlying communicative intention to be different. In a pragmatic framework her contrasting responses are most readily explained as a consequence of her deploying certain beliefs (which in this familial context she takes to be background knowledge for all parties present) about the nature of her obligations to other family members: specifically, that a husband who wants ketchup is entitled to have it fetched by his wife, whereas a daughter who wants ketchup is not entitled to the same service from her mother. In that case, beliefs about gender (more exactly, about the gendered roles of wife/mother, husband, and daughter) are relevant for the analysis of Vera's discourse, even though gender is not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the exchanges under discussion.

In my article, I made the more general suggestion that many cases of so-called "male-female misunderstanding" do not involve any misunderstanding (in the sense of failure to retrieve the speaker's intended meaning or some plausible "best guess" at it), but are rather instances of *conflict* between men and women who are either bringing to bear different background assumptions about their roles, rights and obligations, or strategically resisting what they infer to be the other's assumptions (as Vera is doing when she pretends not to hear her daughter's "is there any ketchup" as a request whose intended meaning is identical to her husband's when he utters the same formula). It is for this reason, I argued, that the alleged problem of male-female misunderstanding appears to be common in societies where the influence of feminism has made gender relations a matter of contestation, whereas it does not appear to prompt the same concern in societies where more extreme gender segregation and male dominance remain the unquestioned norm. If the root cause of the problem were what Tannen claimed – that males and females acquire their habitual ways of using language in separate and highly divergent subcultures – one would surely expect to find exactly the opposite.

The kind of conversational gender trouble Tannen struck such a chord by describing is in my view related, then, not to differences in men's and women's ways of communicating, but to the extent to which they diverge in their assumptions about gender itself. Vera and her husband understand one another perfectly and there is no conflict between them, because although their social roles are differentiated along conventional gender lines, they both accept this differentiation as appropriate: they do not disagree on what each is entitled to expect from the other and obligated to provide for the other. For many less traditional couples, this is more a matter of contention and the resulting conflicts are played out in discourse – among other things, through both real and strategic "misunderstandings."

The arguments just outlined (Cameron 1998) were developed in response to Tannen's "cultural difference" approach, but they seem to me no less pertinent

to the debates going on now among social constructionists. Arguably, even the strictest "relativists" covertly depend on mobilizing the kinds of background assumptions about gender I invoked in the above discussion of the "ketchup" example. Even where the relevance of gender is not disputed, because it is explicitly made relevant – as in the utterance of "thanks, mom" in Tannen's "coat" vignette – the analyst in effect has to "go beyond the data" in order to say anything about how or why gender is being made relevant. To understand why "thanks, mom" can be heard in this context as taking the prior turn to be inappropriate, judgmental, and unwelcome to the recipient, we need to access not merely the dictionary meaning of "mom" but a cluster of assumptions and beliefs about social roles and behaviours to which that appellation is likely to direct the hearer's attention, thus enabling her to *infer* that her previous utterance was unwelcome.

A conversation analyst might reply at this point that CA is simply not interested in what might be going on in conversationalists' minds – for instance, their intentions and their reasoning about others' intentions: what matters is to account for the observable orderliness of their conversational behaviour. As a microanalytic approach which looks at the organization of discourse turn by turn, CA's great strength is its ability to provide answers to the question "why that now?" or, in other words, give an account of what is being accomplished locally by the production of a particular turn at a particular moment in the unfolding interaction. But as a number of commentators have pointed out, there are clearly supra-local patterns in the way gender is enacted and talked about, which cannot be accounted for using a purely "local" analytic approach. To answer the question "why that now?" it is often necessary to presuppose an answer to the prior question "why that *ever*?"

For example, analysts have repeatedly found people doing extensive identity work in order to claim certain identities/attitudes relating to sex and gender while disclaiming others: they are at pains to establish themselves as gendered in ways that avoid the extremes of either sexism or militant feminism, and as heterosexual but not homophobic (Edley and Wetherell 1997; Speer 2002; Speer and Potter 2000). In their accounts of this behaviour, analysts implicitly make use, expect their readers to make use, and for that matter must suppose that participants themselves were making use, of such common-sense propositions as "a normal person is unambiguously either a woman or a man," "homosexual identities are stigmatized," and "being openly prejudiced against certain groups is socially disapproved behaviour." The fact that participants in talk recurrently take certain issues as requiring careful management makes sense only in relation to background assumptions like those just listed, which are "global" rather than "local" in the sense that they pre-exist the particular conversation being analysed. Strictly speaking, it is "going beyond the data" to invoke them: but if you do not invoke them, you are arguably missing an important dimension of participants' own behaviour – the use they routinely make of knowledge drawn from sources other than the ongoing interaction itself.

With regard to gender (and other socio-demographic variables such as class, age, and race/ethnicity), we ignore or downplay this dimension of participants' behaviour at our peril, since one kind of knowledge that people routinely [illegible]

to bear on inferring others' probable communicative intentions is their knowledge about the person and/or the type of person they are dealing with. Though the theoretical developments discussed above in connection with the social constructionist turn have led to a strong focus on the speaker's performance of gender, it should not be forgotten that gender is not only performed by speakers but also ascribed to them by the recipients of their discourse. As Weatherall (2000, 2002) has pointed out, there are few situations in which an interlocutor's gender is not manifested – visually, vocally, or both in the case of spoken interaction, and through the explicit naming of authors which is typical, though not invariable, in written texts – and also few situations where it is not regarded by most people as salient information. Whenever I speak, the information that I am a woman is available (conveyed by the pitch and timbre of my voice, as well as my bodily appearance in face-to-face contexts) to be used by my interlocutors in their interpretations; even if my discourse does not evidence any intention to make my gender relevant, interlocutors can always choose to treat it as such.

One manifestation of sexism as a "global" social force is the propensity to treat gender, particularly the gender of women as the marked and subordinated category, as omnirelevant, and, on that basis, to generate inferences which are not warranted by anything in an individual's actual behaviour, but are rather based on propositions about the social category that individual belongs to. Like many women working in highly traditional male-dominated institutions (in my case, Oxford University), I am made aware of this propensity on a daily basis. I pick up the phone and the person who is calling assumes I must be the professor's secretary rather than the professor. I enter a college or university building and the porter assumes I am a student rather than a member of the faculty. Sometimes, the gendered basis for the inference is indeed displayed in what the caller or the porter says (e.g., the porter addresses me as "my love," which he would not do to someone he knew to be a senior academic, nor to a male of any social/professional status); but even when my interlocutor's judgement of me is displayed through a gender non-specific kind of disrespect (e.g., "hey, where d'you think you're going?"), I know very well, from experience and observation of similar scenarios involving men and women over time, that I am being treated in this way because of the meaning my interlocutor attaches to my gender. Similarly, people of colour learn to identify certain kinds of disrespect as connected to their race/ethnicity, though in this case it is (nowadays) even less likely than in the gender case that the interlocutor will make explicit reference to category membership in performing the act of disrespect.

In these examples, there is a temporal or historical dimension: it is the repetition of the same pattern on many different occasions which leads the recipient of disrespectful behaviour to infer, perhaps on the basis of what might otherwise seem scanty or equivocal evidence, that gender or race/ethnicity must also be relevant on this particular occasion. The local instance, in other words, is interpreted in relation to a whole history of comparable instances, as part of a more "global" pattern. So another problem with "relativist" approaches which insist on confining analysis strictly to what can be observed in the local instance is that they downplay or even deny the relevance of participants' histories, and

the cumulative knowledge they have built up during those histories, to their behaviour at any given moment.

It is perhaps worth pointing out that Judith Butler's most famous statement about the socially constructed and performative nature of gender actually emphasizes repetition and temporality: "Gender is the *repeated* stylization of the body, a set of *repeated* acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame, which *congeal over time* to produce the appearance of substance, of a 'natural' kind of being [emphasis mine]" (Butler 1990: 33). The gender "realist" Margaret Wetherell somewhat similarly suggests that interpretative strategies "congeal over time": that rather than coming to every new utterance or exchange with no preconceptions, communicators make use of what she calls "interpretive repertoires ... culturally familiar and habitual line(s) of argument comprised of recognizable themes, commonplaces, and tropes" (Wetherell 1998: 400). She goes on to suggest that in declining to entertain such non-local constructs on the principle of not going beyond the data and not imposing analysts' concerns in place of participants' own, proponents of classical CA are, in fact, imposing their own very narrow concept of what is relevant for participants locally:

> It is the conversation analyst in selecting for analysis part of a conversation or continuing interaction who defines this relevance for the participant. In restricting the analyst's gaze to this fragment, previous conversations, even previous turns in the same conversation, become irrelevant for the analyst, but also by diktat for the participants. We do not seem to have escaped, therefore, from the imposition of theorists' categories and concerns. (Wetherell 1998: 402)

I agree with Wetherell's point here as far as it goes; but what I have been arguing in this discussion is that the problems she is pointing to might usefully be addressed by adopting an approach to the analysis of discourse that is informed by the insights of relevance theory. Though this theory is often thought of as an asocial, cognitivist approach, it is arguably capable of being applied to phenomena which are of interest to feminist and other "critical" discourse analysts: one could focus on the social and ideological propositions that conversationalists have access to, and that they use in making inferences. This approach might enable analysts to give more substance and detail to concepts like "interpretive repertoire" and to describe how in specific instances people mobilize particular interpretive repertoires. It might also enable analysts to ask questions about the social distribution of those repertoires and the assumptions associated with them (i.e., whether there are consequential social and cultural differences at the level of what people take to be "common knowledge" or in Wetherell's phrase "culturally familiar and habitual lines of argument"), without falling into the kind of cultural essentialism for which Tannen's version of interactional sociolinguistics has been criticized.

Perhaps the most important insight pragmatics has to offer to social constructionist feminist discourse analysis, though, is a general theoretical one:

that in "going beyond the data," or bringing "global" assumptions to bear on local instances, analysts need not be automatically thought of as imposing their own procedures in place of the participants'. In any inferential approach to communication, it is axiomatic that participants are using other information besides what is actually encoded in discourse to derive meaning from what is said. By seeking to model this process in a principled way, we might hope to arrive at a better understanding of – and perhaps a greater degree of consensus about – the relevance of gender for communicational behaviour.

Notes

1. There are problems with all these terminologies. The "second/third wave" distinction is somewhat obscure (it alludes to "second wave" feminism, i.e., the post-1968 liberation movement as opposed to the "first wave" nineteenth and early twentieth century suffragist movement, and posits a more recent "third-wave" feminism whose putative date of onset and distinctive characteristics are, however, disputed). The "essentialist/social constructionist" distinction is highly value-loaded ("essentialist" has become a smear-term rather than a descriptive label), and is also misleading inasmuch as all feminist theory since Simone de Beauvoir ("one is not born but becomes a woman") could aptly be described as "social constructionist": the whole concept of gender, as distinct from sex, is inherently social constructionist. "Modern/postmodern" is my own preferred terminology, but I concede it has the (considerable) disadvantage of invoking one of the most variable and contested terms in current theoretical discourse (i.e., "postmodern[ism]").
2. This table presents the two approaches in an "ideal-typical" form that has the effect of maximizing the degree of difference between them: it should be borne in mind, as always with such oppositions, that the reality is more complicated. It should also be noted that the shift from "second" to "third wave" assumptions is not a matter of simple chronology (that implication is another reason why the "wave" terminology is problematic). There was no historical moment before which everyone subscribed to the assumptions set out in the first column, and after which everyone subscribed to the assumptions set out in the second column. Rather there has been a shift in the overall balance between two historically overlapping tendencies, such that "third wave" assumptions are now dominant (which does not mean "second wave" assumptions have vanished altogether).

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14

The Analysis of Discourse Flow

Wallace Chafe

Introduction

Language is a dynamic process. It is easy to forget that fact when one is working with language that has been frozen on paper or a computer screen, where it has been turned into something that can be examined as if it were a fixed object. So much of linguistic analysis has dealt with language in written form that there is a temptation to think of language itself as having the same static quality (cf. Linell 1982). But language in action is better captured with the metaphor of a flowing stream.

There are, in fact, two streams, one a stream of thoughts, the other of sounds. The two have very different qualities. It is instructive to compare the experience of listening to a familiar language with listening to a language one does not know. In the former case it is the thoughts, not the sounds, of which one is conscious, but in the latter case only the sounds. Sounds are easier for an analyst to deal with, simply because they are publicly observable. Thoughts are experienced within the mind, and for that reason are less tractable to objective research. On the other hand thoughts enjoy a priority over sounds in the sense that the organization and communication of thoughts is what language is all about. The sounds exist in the service of the thoughts, and follow wherever the thoughts may take them. It is the thoughts that drive language forward. A basic challenge for discourse analysis is to identify the forces that give direction to the flow of thoughts.

1 Topics

Important among these forces are what I will be calling *topics*. This word has been used in different ways, and I should make it clear that I am not using it to

Source: Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen and Heidi E. Hamilton (eds), *The Handbook*

apply to a constituent of a sentence, as when one speaks of a sentence having a "topic and comment" (e.g. Hockett 1958: 201), or of "topic-prominent" languages (Li and Thompson 1976), or of "topicalization" or "topic continuity" (e.g. Givón 1983). Rather, I am using it to refer to what is sometimes called a "discourse topic" (Brown and Yule 1983: 71), as in "the topic of this paragraph." A topic in this sense is a coherent aggregate of thoughts introduced by some participant in a conversation, developed either by that participant or another or by several participants jointly, and then either explicitly closed or allowed to peter out. Topics typically have clear beginnings, although that is not always the case (cf. Tannen 1984: 41–3), and their endings are sometimes well defined, sometimes not. As long as a topic remains open, participants in a conversation experience a drive to develop it. I began chapter 10 of Chafe (1994) with a quote from William James that nicely captures this drive:

> In all our voluntary thinking there is some topic or subject about which all the members of the thought revolve. Half the time this topic is a problem, a gap we cannot yet fill with a definite picture, word, or phrase, but which . . . influences us in an intensely active and determinate psychic way. Whatever may be the images and phrases that pass before us, we feel their relation to this aching gap. To fill it up is our thought's destiny. Some bring us nearer to that consummation. Some the gap negates as quite irrelevant. Each swims in a felt fringe of relations of which the aforesaid gap is the term. (James 1890, vol. 1: 259)

Sensitivity to the topic structure of talk may be a trait that varies with individuals. Casual observation suggests that people are constrained to varying degrees by the need to develop a topic fully before the conversation moves on to another, and that there is variable recognition of the social right to topic development. One wonders if such differences in conversational style can be traced to differences in the degree to which a person experiences James's aching gap and the need to fill it.

A first step in discourse analysis can be to listen to a recording of a conversation with the goal of identifying topics, segments of discourse during which one or more of the speakers talk about "the same thing." Topics are identifiable above all from their content, but there are likely to be phonetic cues as well: sometimes, though certainly not always, a longer-than-normal pause before a new topic is introduced; sometimes heightened pitch, loudness, acceleration, or a new voice quality at the outset; sometimes a tapering off in these same prosodic features at the end. One may find topics varying greatly in length. There may be occasional stretches of discourse during which there appears to be no topic at all. But most parts of most conversations lend themselves well to analysis into units of this kind.

There appears to be a basic level of topic-hood, with topics at that level typically included within more inclusive *supertopics*. The latter also have identifiable beginnings and endings, but they lack the internal structure that characterizes basic-level topics and do not generate the same drive for closure. James's ach-

Each time a basic-level topic is concluded, any participant in a conversation has the option of abandoning the current supertopic and, by introducing a new basic-level topic, introducing a new supertopic at the same time. With no internal structure of their own, supertopics can be abandoned whenever any included basic-level topic has been completed.

After a particular basic-level topic, or some sequence of them, has been chosen for further study, the next step can be to reduce the flow of language to some written form. The word *reduce* is appropriate. There is no way in which the richness of natural speech, with all its prosodic complexity, its accompanying gestures and shifts of gaze, and ultimately the entire physical, social, and cognitive context in which it took place – no way in which all these factors can be captured in any presently conceivable written form. Thus, any attempt to transcribe spoken language on paper inevitably leaves much out. The transcriber needs a system that is more or less adequate for the questions addressed, but needs always to keep in mind that any system only selects from the totality of observations that might be relevant (Du Bois et al. 1993; Chafe 1993, 1995).

It is useful in this process to identify a unit of transcription that reflects another level of organization. In addition to basic-level topics, language gives evidence of the organization of thoughts from moment to moment into a focus and a periphery: a limited area of fully active consciousness surrounded by a penumbra of ideas in a semiactive state. Each focus is expressed in sound with a brief prosodic phrase, typically one to two seconds long, whose properties include one or more of the following: a distinctive terminal intonation contour, an initial resetting of the pitch baseline, the presence of silence before and after, a change of tempo at the beginning or end, and boundary changes in voice quality such as whispering or creaky voice. Intonation units are a pervasive feature of natural speech. Not only do they provide a useful way of segmenting speech, they are profitably viewed as expressing constantly changing foci of consciousness, and hence their relevance to understanding the flow of thought (Chafe 1994: 53–81).

2 Topic Navigation

In this perspective a topic can be seen as a conceptual unit that is too large to be accommodated within the limited capacity of fully active consciousness. A topic as a whole can thus be present only in a semiactive state. Once a topic has been introduced, the more limited focus of active consciousness navigates through it, activating first one included idea and then another until the topic is judged to have been adequately covered and closure is judged appropriate. This navigation process is often guided by a *schema*, some familiar pattern that provides a path for a speaker to follow (e.g. Bartlett 1932; Chafe 1986). It may also be driven, alternatively or simultaneously, by the less predictable interaction between conversational participants (Chafe 1994: 120–36).

I will illustrate this process with an excerpt from a long conversation in the course of which three women, whose names will be given here as Kathy, Sally, and Chris, were discussing teaching practices in an elementary school classroom.

Kathy was an experienced teacher, Sally was a less experienced teacher, and Chris was a less involved onlooker. We can take up this conversation at a point where its forward movement was momentarily at a standstill. The previous topic had just been closed, and if the conversation was to continue someone had to choose and introduce a new topic. The preceding topics had fallen within the domain of a supertopic I will label Classroom Experiences.

The default option during such a lull in a conversation is for any of the participants to open a new basic-level topic that remains within the current supertopic, in this case to talk about another classroom experience. That choice would leave the supertopic Classroom Experiences open, a situation that can be represented with an open parenthesis. The introduction of a new basic-level topic would then create its own open parenthesis, included within the other. This situation can be represented as follows, where the supertopic is shown in italics:

(*Classroom Experiences* (Classroom Experience 1) (Classroom Experience 2) (Classroom Experience 3

There are two open parentheses that demand eventually to be closed.

An alternative would be for any of the participants in the conversation to introduce a basic-level topic that would close the current supertopic with Classroom Experience 2 and establish a new and different one. Imagine, for example, that someone began talking now about a movie she had just seen, introducing a new basic-level topic that would simultaneously open a new supertopic that could be labeled Current Movies. The effect would be:

(*Classroom Experiences* (Classroom Experience 1) (Classroom Experience 2)) (*Current Movies* (A movie just seen by X

As it happened, Sally chose the default option, opening another topic that remained within the Classroom Experiences supertopic. What she said was:[1]

(1) Sally (0.5) Whát I was gonna têll you about that rèally frústrates me is that,

No one but Sally knew where this topic would lead, and for the moment we can give it the label Something Frustrating. Later we will see how the flow of the conversation would make a different label appropriate.

The words *what I was gonna tell you about* suggest that Sally had planned to introduce this topic earlier. Examination of the larger context reveals that she had tried earlier to do just that. She was unsuccessful in that first attempt because Chris interrupted her with a different topic. What she said earlier was (numbered (0) because it lay outside the excerpt with which we will be principally concerned):

(0) Sally . . Méanwhile in the príncipal's òffice they're tèlling me,

Two other topics intervened before Sally returned to what she had [illegible] in (0), a topic that [illegible]

while the other topics were being developed. It was thus easily available to be reintroduced in (1), which was followed by a second intonation unit whose wording closely resembled that of (0), as we will see.

3 Navigation by Schema

We can now follow this conversation as it unfolded for those engaged in it. At the end we can view a transcript of the conversation as a whole, at the same time considering what, exactly, such a transcript represents. The Something Frustrating topic was at first developed by Sally as a monologue. There is a ubiquitous schema for narrative topic development whose maximum components can be listed as follows (cf. Chafe 1994: 120–36):

- summary
- initial state
- complication
- climax
- denouement
- final state
- coda.

Labov and Waletzky (1967) suggested a similar schema, but inexplicably omitted the climax. An opening summary may or may not be present. Closer to being obligatory is the presentation of an initial state that gives the topic a spatio-temporal and/or epistemic orientation. The complication section disturbs the initial state with events that lead to a climax, an unexpected event that constitutes the point of the topic, the reason for its telling. The denouement then provides a relaxation toward a final state in which new knowledge provided by the climax has been incorporated. There may or may not be a coda, a metacomment on the topic as a whole.

Sally's statement in (1) summarized the content of what would follow by saying that it would entail something frustrating. Not only did she open a new topic and assume the floor, but at the same time by using the word *frustrates* she foreshadowed its organization, creating an expectation that it would involve something desirable followed by an explanation of why that desirable outcome could not be realized. Deciding just how to proceed required additional mental processing time on Sally's part, an interval during which she uttered a prolonged hesitation sound, followed by 1.3 seconds of silence and then an audible breath before she continued:

(2) Sally (0.2) ũh=,
(3) (1.3) (breath) the (0.1) the péop . . the príncipal and stuff they sày to me,

In (3) she repeated, with only partially different words, her earlier attempt to introduce this topic, shown above as intonation unit (0). Early in (3) she decided

to mention the people who had given her advice. Her truncated *the peop* was an attempt at categorizing that idea, but she quickly found a better categorization and produced the interestingly hedged phrase *the principal and stuff*, followed by the quote-introducer *they say to me.*

Looking back at (1), we can see that Sally's consciousness was then operating in what I have called the *immediate mode* (Chafe 1994: 195–223). That is, Sally was talking about what was still frustrating her at the very time she was talking. With (3), however, she moved into the *displaced mode* by shifting to things that had been said to her at one or more times in the past, displaced from the here and now of this conversation. Furthermore, the choice of the *generic mode* (*they say to me*, without reference to any particular event) anticipated that the quote to follow would be generic as well. She was not talking about a particular act of advice-giving, but of events less locally specified. (The context makes it clear that she was not using the historical present here.)

Sally then began the quote, shifting her voice iconically to a higher pitch that lay noticeably above her normal range. The first element in the quote established an affective stance on the part of the principal and the others toward what they were telling her:

(4) Sally (0.9) (tsk) (breath) (begin higher pitch) óh wèll,

The alveolar click (*tsk*) as well as the prosody and wording *oh well* conveyed something of the lack of concern Sally had perceived in the advice: the principal and stuff felt that coping with the third-graders was no big deal.

The next focus established a frame for the recommended action: the idea that Sally should do something specific:

(5) Sally . . whát you dò with those thírd-gràders,

With this utterance Sally created a second level of displacement. Having begun in the immediate mode in (1) (experiencing her current frustration), she used (3) to shift into the displaced world in which she was given advice, and now with (5) she moved into the further displaced world of the recommended action, a more hypothetical world that might be realized at some future time. Thus the sequence of (1), (3), and (5) established a setting that was increasingly displaced from the immediacy of the present conversation:

what frustrates me	(immediate)
the principal and stuff say to me	(past and generic)
what you do with those third-graders	(future and generic)

With this orientation in place, Sally arrived at a point where she could begin expressing the advice that had been given her. Putting it all together and deciding how to express it took a little more time, some of which she filled with two intonation units that shed light on still other aspects of discourse flow:

(6) Sally you knòw,
(7) is you jùst like,

There are two problems that confront anyone engaged in talk. They are created by two kinds of *unconformity*, to borrow a term from geology, where it refers to a discontinuity in rock strata. I use it here to refer to disparate aspects of human experience that must somehow be brought into approximate (but only approximate) conformity if one is to interact with one's fellow humans. First, there is the inevitable unconformity between an individual's experiences – perceptions, actions, and evaluations that are either immediate, remembered, or imagined – and the limited resources a language provides for verbalizing them. Second, there is the unconformity that inevitably exists between one mind and another. There is, in short, both a *verbalization* problem and an *interaction* problem. The language people produce often gives indications that a speaker recognizes both, and (6) and (7) are examples.

So far as the verbalization problem is concerned, language cannot fully or adequately express an inner experience. The verbalization process allows a speaker to get a useful handle on the experience and share it to some degree with others, but the linguistic organization of ideas is not the same as the experience itself. The ubiquitous *like*, found here in (7), is one way a speaker can show recognition of the unconformity between ideas and their verbal expression – a small and passing way in which Sally showed her recognition that what she was about to say would be only a roughly satisfactory representation of what she was thinking.

So far as the interaction problem is concerned, one mind can never fully know what another mind is experiencing, and language can only imperfectly bridge the gap. Someone engaged in a conversation needs both to clothe an inner experience in language that will more or less adequately express it, and at the same time find language that will more or less satisfactorily take account of what is believed to be present in other minds, to the extent that that is possible. The equally ubiquitous *you know*, the sole content of (6), is one way a speaker can show recognition of the unconformity between his or her own mind and the mind of another, in this case signaling that what she was about to say was, to some degree at least, what her listeners might have expected and not something that would be totally surprising to them. (It can be noted that (6) and (7) were attributed to the people characterized as *the principal and stuff*, not to Sally herself, but of course there is no way to know whether they were anything the principal or anyone else had actually said.)

It was time now to move on to the complication section of the narrative schema, in this case the actions recommended by the principal and stuff:

(8) Sally (0.8) táke them=,
(9) and pút them=,
(10) you knòw with= òne of the smárter fòurth-gràders who's vèry [vér]bal and,

(11) Chris [Uh huh,]
(12) Sally (0.1) and wèll-behàved.
(13) (0.5) And you . . hàve them wòrk as a téam you know;
(14) so that the (0.4) (breath) fóurth-gràder can help the thírd-gràder.

At the end of (14) the prosody conveyed a definitive closure of this section. The climax then came with a bang, its impact heightened by the nearly two seconds of silence that preceded it as well as by the forceful wording:

(15) Sally (1.7) (loud) But . . that's búllshit.

The immediately following denouement served to justify this evaluation:

(16) Sally (0.1) Because,
(17) (0.5) thát just tèaches the thírd-gràder=,
(18) with the lèsser intélligence that,
(19) (0.9) that he's wórthless;
(20) . . you know that he càn't léarn [sùmpm on his ów=n.]

4 Navigation by Interaction

With (20), Sally completed her own development of the topic she had opened in (1). Can we say that the conversation had now returned to a state where it would have been appropriate for any of the participants to introduce a different topic, either staying within the Classroom Experiences supertopic or introducing a new supertopic? The question is whether (20) qualifies as a topic ending. We can only speculate on Sally's goal in opening her topic in the first place, but we might suppose that she was using (1)–(20) as a way of eliciting some reaction, perhaps sympathy and advice, from her interlocutors. In any case Kathy reacted in a way that may not have been what Sally was hoping for. What she said overlapped the end of (20):

(21) Kathy [Nó it's nót;
(22) nó it's] nót,
(23) you cán put them in tèams like thàt;

With these three intonation units Kathy succeeded in reorganizing the structure of the ongoing topic. Until now Sally's topic had been organized around the idea that teams do not work, the idea I labeled Something Frustrating. Kathy now introduced the idea that teams *do* work, thereby organizing the topic into a bipartite structure of thesis and antithesis: into the subtopics Teams Do Not Work and Teams Do Work. Thus, the topic we are studying could now be relabeled as Using Teams. But what followed took a path that no one could have anticipated.

Kathy began by justifying her statement in (23) by trying to modify Sally's conception of the make-up of the teams:

(24) Kathy but you dón't put óne with óne;
(25) you pút like twó fóurth-gràders with–

Before she finished (25), however, she decided that her intent would come across more clearly if she could establish the relative numbers of third- and fourth-graders in Sally's class. After nearly a second of silence she briefly thought in (26) of asking for raw numbers, but truncated that attempt also and quickly replaced it with a request for a ratio instead:

(26) Kathy (0.8) Hów many thírd-gràders d–
(27) What's the . . [1 rátio of thìrd- 1] [2 graders to fòurth-graders. 2]

In the middle of (27) there occurred one of those conversational moments when people talk at cross-purposes, a turbulence in the stream of interactive thought. Sally did not immediately hear Kathy's question about the ratio of third-graders to fourth-graders, and not only Sally but also Chris began to pursue directions of their own, overlapping most of (27):

(28) Sally [1 But they're nót 1]
(29) Chris [2 You mean so they dòn't feel sìngled 2] [3 óut or whát. 3]

But Sally quickly abandoned whatever she had begun in (28) and responded to Kathy's question in (27) with some precise information:

(30) Sally [3 Nów I have 3] like fíve thírd-gràders.
(31) I have like (0.3) twénty-two kíds.

These two statements elicited the first of the misunderstandings that drove the remainder of this topic. Sally's answer invited some hasty arithmetic that should have yielded the correct number of fourth-graders, but Kathy made an error:

(32) Kathy (0.2) Ókay,
(33) só you have fífteen fóurth-gràders and fíve thírd-gràders?

We can only speculate on why Kathy said *fifteen*, but the subsequent conversation suggests that she had been hoping for a whole number ratio like fifteen to five, so that each team could have contained three fourth-graders and one third-grader.

The question in (33) was a confirmative one, anticipating a positive answer, but of course Sally responded with a correction:

(34) Sally (0.6) Nó;
(35) (0.9) uh=nó.
(36) (0.1) I have like (0.2) séven (noise) fòurth-graders.
(37) (0.1) (sotto voce) And fíve thìrd-graders.

During (36) there was an extraneous background noise that masked the last syllable, *teen*, of the word *seventeen*, so that Kathy heard only *seven*. On the basis

of ordinary expectations regarding class size she responded with surprise, communicated especially by her prosody:

(38) Kathy You have twélve kíds?

Now it was Sally's turn to be surprised. Thinking she had just explained that the correct numbers were 17 fourth-graders and five third-graders, Kathy's question made no sense:

(39) Sally (0.5) Whát?

But Kathy could only repeat it:

(40) Kathy (0.1) You ónly have twélve kíds?

Sally repeated her previous answer, this time free of the noise:

(41) Sally (0.4) Nó.
(42) (0.3) Séventéen;

Kathy stood corrected:

(43) Kathy (0.2) Óh ókay,

Sally wanted to make certain that Kathy knew that 17 was not the total number in the class, but only the size of the subset on which she had focused:

(44) Sally fóurth-grà[ders,]

Amid all this confusion Kathy abandoned her plan to be precise about the numerical composition of the teams. If she had hoped to specify that each team would be composed of three fourth-graders and one third-grader, she now found it pointless to insist on such exactitude and fell back on a less precise recommendation:

(45) Kathy [so] thén what you dó is you sprínkle the fifth-gràders out évenly.
(46) (0.6) And you máke . . [the fóurth-gràders] (0.1) táke the responsibility for téaching them.

In (45) she made another error, saying *fifth-graders* instead of *third-graders*, probably because Kathy herself had taught a fifth–sixth-grade combination in which it was the fifth-graders who were the less advanced. Sally corrected her with a questioning intonation while Kathy was uttering *fourth-graders* in (46):

(47) Sally [Thírd-gràders?]

Kathy then went on to supplement what she had said in (46):

(48) Kathy And yóu engráin in them,
(49) that it's théir responsibìlity to hèlp those little kíds.

She added a coda that would drive home the success of the recommended procedure. Sandwiched between her final two intonation units was a protest by Sally, evidently to the effect that she herself had done the same:

(50) Kathy Thát's what Í did,
(51) Sally I háve been.
(52) Kathy [and it wórks.]

Even before Kathy finished (52), Chris overlapped with a question whose effect was to open a new, though closely related topic:

(53) Chris [But thén you]
(54) can you sáy it's a [pàrt of your] gráde?

There followed a lengthy discussion of whether and how one should grade the fourth-graders for their mentoring activities. The situation created by (54) was thus as follows:

(*Classroom Experiences* (Classroom Experience 1) (Classroom Experience 2) (Using Teams) (Assigning Grades

My intention with this extended example has been to illustrate how the stream of language is propelled forward by the opening of a topic and the creation of a drive for the topic's development until closure is judged appropriate. I have discussed a basic-level topic, ultimately called Using Teams, as an example of the highest level of topic-hood at which there is a coherent trajectory of development. Once open, a topic may be kept moving along a path provided by a schema, or by the interaction of separate minds engaged in the conversation, or by some combination of both. Interactive topic development may be driven by an interlocutor's desire to agree with or contradict something said by another, or to request needed information the other may possess. This example shows especially well how forward movement may be driven by momentary misunderstandings.

5 The Text

By stringing together all the intonation units that were introduced piecemeal above, one can produce a transcript of this entire segment of the conversation. This kind of object is often called a *text*, and it is the traditional object of discourse study:

1 **Sally** (0.5) Whát I was gonna téll you about that rèally frústrates me is that,
2 (0.2) ùh=,
3 (1.3) (breath) the (0.1) the péop . . the príncipal and stuff they sày to me,
4 (0.9) (tsk) (breath) (begin higher pitch) óh wèll,
5 . . whàt you dò with those thírd-gràders,
6 you knòw,

7		is you jùst like,
8		(0.8) táke them=,
9		and pút them=,
10		you knòw with= òne of the smárter fóurth-gràders who's **vèry [vér]bal** and,
11	Chris	[Uh huh,]
12	Sally	(0.1) and wèll-beháved.
13		(0.5) And you . . hàve them wòrk as a téam you know;
14		so that the (0.4) (breath) fóurth-gràder can help the **thírd-gráder.**
15		(1.7) But . . that's búllshit.
16		(0.1) Because,
17		(0.5) thát just tèaches the thírd-gràder=,
18		with the lèsser intélligence that,
19		(0.9) that hé's wórthless;
20		. . you know that he càn't léarn [sùmpm on **his** ów=n.]
21	Kathy	[Nó it's nót;
22		nó it's] nót,
23		you cán put them in tèams like thàt;
24		but you dón't put óne with óne;
25		you pút like twó fóurth-gràders with–
26		(0.8) Hów many thírd-gràders d–
27		What's the . . [1 rátio of thìrd- 1] [2 graders to fòurth-graders. 2]
28	Sally	[1 But they're nót 1]
29	Chris	[2 You mean so they dòn't feel sìngled 2] [3 óut or whát. 3]
30	Sally	[3 Nów I have 3] like fíve thírd-gràders.
31		I have like (0.3) twénty-two kíds.
32	Kathy	(0.2) Ókay,
33		só you have fífteen fóurth-gràders and fíve thírd-gràders?
34	Sally	(0.6) Nó;
35		(0.9) uh= nó.
36		(0.1) I have like (0.2) séven (noise) fòurth-graders.
37		(0.1) (sotto voce) And fíve thìrd-graders.
38	Kathy	You have twélve kíds?
39	Sally	(0.5) Whát?
40	Kathy	(0.1) You ónly have twélve kíds?
41	Sally	(0.4) Nó.
42		(0.3) Séventéen;
43	Kathy	(0.2) Óh ókay,
44	Sally	fóurth-grà[ders,]
45	Kathy	[so] thén what you dó is you sprínkle the fífth-gràders out évenly.
46		(0.6) And you máke . . [the fóurth-gràders] (0.1) táke the responsibílity for téaching them.
47	Sally	[Thírd-gràders?]
48	Kathy	And yóu engráin in them,
49		that it's théir responsibílity to hèlp **those little** kíds.
50		Thát's what Í did,
51	Sally	I háve been.
52	Kathy	[and it wórks.]
53	Chris	[But thén you]
54		can you sáy it's a [pàrt of your] gráde?

What kind of thing is this? Does it have any validity beyond being a visual representation of a concatenation of utterances that were produced in sequence as the conversation unfolded through time? One possibility, easily discardable, is that it represents something in the minds of one or more of the participants before these things were said. But of course no one could have planned the above, or have predicted that the conversation would proceed in this way. Is it, then, something that remained in the minds of the participants afterwards? Again the answer must be no, though perhaps this time not quite so unqualified a no. Although some of the ideas expressed here were probably retained in some form, varying from one participant to another, for at least a while, the details of how these thoughts were activated and verbalized during the conversation were surely quickly lost. The participants may have remembered for a time that they talked about using teams in the classroom, that Sally did not like the idea, that Kathy did like it, and so on. But the particular sequence of ideas and exactly how they were expressed was surely ephemeral.

It is worth noting that spontaneous conversations differ from "oral literature" in this respect. A person may remember a ritual or story or joke and repeat it later in another setting, though with language and content seldom if ever identical. But people do not repeat casual conversations in the same way. Someone might say, "That was a good conversation," but no one would be likely to exclaim, "Let's say the whole thing again tomorrow." If people do remark occasionally, "I think we've had this conversation before," they are hardly thinking of a verbatim repetition. It is worth reflecting on the fact that the collection and study of texts has in the past been slanted toward narratives and rituals whose value lies in something closer to (though seldom identical with) verbatim repetition. Discourse of that kind is more persistent in memory, and in that respect is a little more like written language. In other words, earlier discourse studies have tended to favor material that has been closer in nature to written text (Chafe 1981).

I do not mean to suggest that a text like the above has no use. What it gives us is a lasting record of evanescent happenings that we can examine visually at our leisure. As a kind of time machine, it is a resource that allows us as analysts to view all at once the dynamic processes by which a sequence of linguistic events was produced. It is a useful tool that can further our understanding of how minds and language proceed through time. By freezing temporal events it helps us identify the forces responsible for creating them. My point is that we should not be misled into interpreting this artificial aid to understanding as something that possesses a transcendent reality.

One may sometimes hear the view that participants in a conversation are engaged in the joint construction of a text. I suggest that it is better to think of a conversation as a uniquely human and extraordinarily important way by which separate minds are able to influence and be influenced by each other, managing to some extent, and always imperfectly, to bridge the gap between them, not by constructing any kind of lasting object but through a constant interplay of constantly changing ideas. The example that has been discussed here suggests a few of the ways in which that can happen.

Note

1. Conventions followed in this and the following transcriptions of speech include the following. The numbers in parentheses are measurements (to tenths of a second) of periods of silence. The acute and grave accents mark the nuclei of syllables with primary and secondary accents respectively. Periods show a decisively falling pitch contour, often accompanied by creaky voice, whereas semicolons show a less decisive fall. Commas show any other terminal contour, except that the high rising pitch associated with a yes-no question is shown by a question mark. The equals sign shows a prolongation of the preceding sound. Square brackets show overlapping speech, sometimes indexed with numbers when there might be ambiguity. That is, a segment enclosed in [1 . . . 1] overlaps with another segment indexed in the same way, etc.

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15

Missing Links in Mainstream CDA: Modules, Blends and the Critical Instinct

Paul Chilton

1. The Critical Stance

Let us first attempt a crude map of the terrain. Critical approaches to text and talk in European scholarship over the past twenty years or so have indeed been interdisciplinary, but this observation has little significance unless one specifies the sources and tributaries. This introductory section is an admittedly partial attempt to sketch the landscape.[1]

'Critical Theory', associated with the Frankfurt School and especially with Jürgen Habermas provides one source in social theory. This source found itself channelled into a sociological variety which did not claim any technical connection with language studies or linguistics (notably, Stuart Hall, Birmingham Contemporary Studies). It was also drawn upon by scholars whose orientation was towards language use, though these scholars were somewhat eclectic in the social theory that they made use of (Fowler et al. 1979; Fairclough 1989; Wodak 1996; Wodak & Meyer 2001). A guiding theme was the notion that language can be used for self-interested ends by power groups.

A further source was the work of Michel Foucault, whose claims were not always viewed as consonant with those of the Habermasian tendency. Foucault's work has given rise to at least two tendencies. One tendency has its context in sociology, political science and to some extent in literary studies, and like Foucault himself, does not analyse language. This tendency has given rise to many studies, too numerous to list here (but cf. for example Shapiro 1984 for examples). Amongst writers in this vein it is common to find the assumption, or claim, that 'discourse' includes the non-linguistic as well as the linguistic. At this point an additional

Source: Ruth Wodak and Paul Chilton (eds), *A New Agenda in (Critical) Discourse Analysis*, 2005, pp. 19–51

influence needs to be mentioned, namely the post-modernist current that was a confluence of ideas from philosophy, literary studies and sociology (Barthes, Derrida, and others). This kind of work had no contact with formal linguistics but made assertions about the nature of meaning ('free floating signifiers'), epistemology and ontology, attacking alleged essentialism, promoting notions such as 'aporia'. This form of relativism provided for the possibility of indefinitely extended critique that runs the risk of being ethically and politically indiscriminate. It is not possible here to address it directly and will not be referred to again in this chapter.

To return to Foucault, the second Foucauldian influence is to be found among those whose declared preoccupation is, by contrast, with language as such (notably Fairclough 1989, 1992, 1995, 2003; to some extent Wodak 1996). Many of these authors would, however, accept that discourse, understood as language-use, is but one (if perhaps the most salient) manifestation of social action. The insistence that language is a form of social-action is probably the most important tenet amongst this group (see Fairclough & Wodak 1997:278–279 for a formulation). Those working in this tradition have often had some degree of formation in linguistics and have to a greater or lesser extent proceeded on the assumption that the nature of social action can be elucidated, even unmasked, by various kinds of linguistic analysis.

One can distinguish here several sub-tendencies among the linguistically oriented. Historically the first was Critical Linguistics ('the East Anglia school'), whose early work, drew on George Orwell for inspiration, Bakhtin and to a lesser extent Habermas and to an even lesser extent Foucault for its social theory. For its linguistic theory it drew at first on Chomsky's early versions of transformational grammar (Hodge & Kress 1993 [1979]). This choice was later replaced by Halliday's so-called systemic-functional grammar (Fairclough 1989: 13–14; Fowler 1996: 11).

The second language-oriented trend, chronologically speaking, is Critical Discourse Analysis, most commonly associated with Fairclough, Wodak and van Dijk (cf. van Dijk 1993; Fairclough 1995; Fairclough & Wodak 1997; Caldas-Coulthard & Coulthard 1996). Fairclough, in particular, is influenced by Foucault, especially in his use of the notions of 'order of discourse' and 'discourse formation'. Wodak's approach to the analysis of language in use ('discourse' is understood by all of these authors to be language) comes from various strands of sociolinguistics and ethnography (cf. Reisigl & Wodak 2001: Chapter 2). Van Dijk's work, emerging from relatively formal text linguistics (van Dijk 1977, 1980, 1998; van Dijk & Kintsch 1983), has always had a cognitive orientation, being concerned with mental schemas that represent the social and give rise to stereotypes, that in turn give rise to various ideologies, among which are exclusionary discourses, especially racism.[2] For many in this group of scholars (especially Fowler, Kress, Hodge, Thibault, van Leeuwen, Fairclough and others, but not van Dijk), Halliday's systemic-functional grammar has supposedly provided the toolkit for deconstructing the socially-constructed (thus linguistically constructed) machinery of power

Yet after twenty years of this form of scholarship, there remain serious problems in the entire endeavour. I will not attempt to deal with the postmodernist work that does not address issues of language per se, since this would take us too far afield philosophically. I will focus on CDA understood in a broad sense, occasionally including Fowlerian Critical Linguistics (Fairclough & Wodak 1997; Fowler 1996).

2. Claims and Aims of CDA

Among the serious problems that, to my mind, bedevil CDA, are the following.

1. CDA claims, sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly, that its practice provides demystifying and emancipatory effects (see for example, Fowler 1996: 55ff.; Wodak & Meyer 2001: 10; Weiss & Wodak 2003: 14f.). There is of course an argument about whether a supposedly scientific endeavour should allow itself social and political motivation in the first place. One may argue for objectivity here on the grounds that acknowledging one's interests is per se a form of scientific objectivity, an argument that may well be crucial for all social sciences. This is not, however, my main point. Rather, I want to pose the question whether CDA has any credible efficacy, on its own terms, as an instrument of social justice. And if not, or even if the answer to that question is just a bit in doubt, do we need it?

2. This question is connected to its methods and linguistic underpinning. CDA has tended to draw, as we have seen, on social theory of a particular type and on linguistics of a particular type. Despite some limited use of work in psychology and cognitive science (e.g. van Dijk 1991, 1993a, 1993b, 1998, 2004, forthcoming; van Dijk & Kintsch 1983; Wodak 1986; Reisigl & Wodak 2001), it appears to be fair to say that CDA has generally neglected developments in these fields. It has eschewed not only generative linguistics but also cognitive linguistics. (The latter at least does not figure in any seriously comprehended way in CDA literature.)

3. I have just questioned whether CDA has had genuine social effects. It is also questionable whether CDA has any theoretically interesting yield for the social sciences, and more especially for linguistics. With regard to the latter, apart from the early attempts by serious linguists working around Fowler, Kress and Hodge, CDA in its later manifestation has made, so far as one can see, no contribution to our scientific understanding of the language capacity in homo sapiens. This is strange in view of the CDA insistence that language plays such an enormous role in social and political life.

3. What is Missing from CDA

There is a common element underlying these three criticisms: CDA despite some interest in (mental) representations has by and large not paid any attention

to the human mind. There are two consequences of this observation, around which this paper is constructed. They are the following:

1. The lack of attention to mind is an important theoretical lack in its own terms. But there is worse.
2. It is possible that taking stock of recent research in the cognitive sciences leads us to the conclusion that we do not actually need CDA.

If there is anything in this argument, then we need to radically reassess what scholars are doing when they research into the relationship between the socio-political domain and the linguistic domain, and the paper concludes with some conclusions on the matter.

4. Why CDA Needs to Consider Mind

CDA has since its emergence been interdisciplinary, but selectively so. The aim of this section is to bring to the attention of CD Analysts the existence of a body of empirical research and speculative literature which they have tended to ignore. It is a body of work that has clear implications for a possible cognitive approach to the analysis of discourse in social and political contexts. There is a simple argument underlying the claim that CDA should attend to this cognitive dimension.[3] It starts with the central tenets of CDA itself (cf. Fairclough & Wodak 1997: 258–284). There are three such tenets:

1. discourse is social action (or 'social practice')
2. social action constructs social reality (objects, situations, identities, social relations...)
3. discourse is the use of language.

It follows that discourse constructs social reality. This must imply some sort of causal relation between language use and social action. There are a number of philosophical questions that seem to arise here, which we can only adumbrate. One is the following. It would appear to be the case that CDA is claiming that discourse stands in a causal relationship to social action (by which we might understand social relationships, group membership, the formation of social and political institutions and the like). But discourse is said to be social action, in which cause we seem to have discourse causing itself. Many discourse analysts, particularly those in the post-modernist tradition, would have little problem with this, since they are prepared to adopt the logical conclusion, namely that everything is discourse. CDA authors on the other hand are inclined to resolve the tension by using the term 'constitute' for cause: 'discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped' (Fairclough & Wodak 1997: 258). So far as it goes, this is a useful concept that at least points to a complex dialectally causal relation. However, it is perhaps time to start probing its nature in more detail. To proceed beyond

that particular formula, one needs to notice that it is entirely stated with respect to a social domain that appears autonomous: social action *qua* discourse has effects on social discourse that is either (a) also discourse or (b) social action but not (linguistic) discourse.

The way out of the loop is to introduce the cognitive dimension (as van Dijk (e.g. 1980, 1998) has done, and does also in the present volume). The argument is straightforward. Discourse, that is to say language in use, is produced and interpreted by human individuals interacting with one another. Language can only be produced and interpreted by human brains (and vocal apparatus, etc.). If language is produced and interpreted in human brains, then it interacts on any account of language with other cognitive capacities (as well as motor systems). In particular, if language use (discourse) is, as the tenets of CDA assert, connected to the 'construction' of knowledge about social objects, identities, processes, etc., then that construction can only be taking place in the minds of (interacting) individuals.

This argument seems to indicate that if CDA is to be a research enterprise, which I take to mean an enterprise that enhances human understanding and knowledge, then what goes on inside people's heads must become a prime concern. There are many ways in which such a research goal might be pursued. In the present chapter I will merely suggest how some of the existing research in certain areas of contemporary cognitive science and psychology, particularly those varieties that take an evolutionary perspective, might be used to enrich and explore in new ways the sorts of social action and social construction that CDA has classically been preoccupied with.

Let us, then, consider the specific area of racism or xenophobia (not of course necessarily the same thing). CDA is good at showing how particular language users establish exclusionary attitudes and maybe practices by recurrently and selectively asserting certain attributes (i.e. social roles, behavioural characteristics, physical appearance, etc.) of social and ethnic groups (e.g. van Dijk 1991, 1993a, 1993b; Wodak 2000; Reisigl & Wodak 2001). In other words, CDA draws attention to the existence of stereotyped categorisations in daily talk, elite talk and texts. CDA also shows how language users categorise behaviour, actions and attributes – all of which may be observable facts – in ways that express attitudes towards such facts. For example, immigration, which denotationally refers to spatial movements of people in relation to political boundaries, is defined as 'invasion' or 'flood'. It is also good at identifying interactive verbal devices for the implication or presupposition of assertions about social and ethnic groups, and in pin-pointing mitigation devices such as 'apparent denial'. Underlying all these features that are found in text and talk referring to social and ethnic groups is the conceptual process of category formation. On the actual cognitive processes CDA seems to have little new to say, despite the fact that there is an abundant psychological and social psychological literature on the formation of concepts (but cf. summaries in van Dijk 1991, 1993a, 1998 and Reisigl & Wodak 2001). In general, CDA has done a fine descriptive job. Whether the description has altered public awareness significantly enough to achieve emancipatory effects is perhaps not the main point here, though it is obviously not irrelevant. The disturbing fact is that racism, xenophobia

and other kinds of exclusionary behaviour continue to appear. This suggests that we may need to delve deeper into *why* this kind of category formation is so persistent a factor in social behaviour, and *why* the language forms associated with it are so potent. These are difficult questions: I am not going to give the answers, but merely propose that anyone seriously interested in these issues needs to address such questions. This means taking an explanatory stance rather than a merely descriptive one and it also means, I am suggesting, taking account of ideas developed in cognitive and evolutionary psychology.

5. Some Aspects of Cognitive and Evolutionary Psychology Relevant to CDA

In this section I review some recent ideas emerging from cognitive science and cognitive psychology. Since an evolutionary perspective has proved a fruitful thinking device in these and other areas, and since it can provide an explanatory framework for expanding the discussion of issues that CDA is concerned with, I will bring that too into the picture. But I make no pretence of completeness in regard to this field.

5.1 Modularity of Mind

Chomsky postulated back in the 1960s that the human language faculty was an autonomous module of mind. In part, the claim was based on analogy with other human cognitive and perceptual abilities that were regarded on empirical grounds as modular, in particular vision and facial recognition. The notion of modularity was more extensively theorised by Fodor (1983), whose ideas have had a wide impact on psychology, theoretical and applied, on cognitive science and on philosophy. Fodor's theory corresponds roughly to Figure 1. For Fodor, the mind has two tiers: a collection of input modules that are autonomous and have a specific job to do (like the blades of a Swiss army knife) and a central processor that corresponds to what people generally think of as intelligence, creative thinking. The former are hard-wired, localised and provide input to the latter, which is not localised and is characterised by 'its non-encapsulation, its creativity, its holism and its passion for the analogical' (Fodor 1985: 4). The last point is worth noting and we shall return to it.

There is much controversy surrounding the two-tier proposal, but the most significant development of the modular concept has been its incorporation into evolutionary psychology, notably by Cosmides and Tooby (1992), who, in broad terms, argue that the mind of humans as we now know them has emerged not by chance or solely by the impact of particular social and physical environments but by the pressures of evolutionary selection. The mental modules evolved for purposes of survival, just like any other organ of the body. Rather than assuming the existence of some generalised intelligence and learning ability, the tendency is to regard the mind as consisting of many specialised modules, interacting among




Figure 1: Information from perceptual organs to input systems (Modules) (Fodor)

one another. One type of evidence that is adduced is similar to the familiar Chomskyan argument for the innateness of language: that children develop very many kinds of specific knowledge very rapidly and on the basis of scant input. Cosmides and Tooby think there is a very large number of such modules:

> A face recognition module, a spatial relations module, a rigid objects mechanics module, a tool-use module, a fear module, a social exchange module, an emotion-perception, kin-oriented motivation, an effort allocation and recalibration module, a child care module, a social inference module, a friendship module, a semantic-inference module, a grammar acquisition module, a communication-pragmatics module, a theory of mind module, and so on... (1992: 113)

Amongst these modules, some of which are empirically attested, some rather more speculative, which should be of interest to researchers interested in the interaction of language and society? Clearly language is one of them, but we will focus on three other possibly modular areas.

5.2 Intuitive Psychology ('Theory of Mind')

Somewhat before Fodor, Humphrey had begun to propose a specific module of social intelligence combined with what is known as a 'theory of mind' module, which refers to what appears to be the innate ability of humans to guess and make pragmatic predictions about the intentions and likely future actions of their fellows (Humphrey 1976). The idea has been picked up and further investigated by Leslie (1991) and Baron-Cohen (2001) in normal and abnormal psychology, and by Whiten (Ed. 1991) in primatology. Essentially the

that humans have an evolved ability to look for the motives and plans of others, an ability that can clearly be used cooperatively or counter-cooperatively. In any event, applied to language behaviour, it suggests that humans naturally and automatically tend to look for interpretations of discourse acts in terms of what speakers are intending to convey and to do.

5.3 Machiavellian Intelligence

Similar claims to those outlined in the preceding paragraph have been made also for primates. Byrne and Whiten (1988) and Byrne (1995), for instance, have made empirical studies of chimpanzees that they believe demonstrate clearly that these creatures engage instinctively in social behaviour that display the following:

- the formation and observation of group and subgroup boundaries
- the formation of coalitions in competitive environments, signalled by, inter alia, grooming behaviour
- the formation and observance of dominance hierarchies
- the practice of tactical deception motivated by individual wants.

It is the latter, tactical deception, that has been dubbed 'machiavellian intelligence'. Its workings follow from the ability to read the intentions of others, and to recognise the ability of others to read one's own intentions, leading to the ability to mask one's intentions (Whiten 1991). If a distinct machiavellian module exists in apes, then, so the evolutionary argument goes, it must exist as a distinct ability also in their descendants, homo sapiens. In the case of language-using creatures, the ability to verbally mislead, deceive and to lie is clearly closely related. CDA researchers should not rush to dismiss the argument that humans have an evolved instinctive and specialised ability to exploit one another upon the basis of abilities developed for cooperative social survival purposes. And there is a further very good reason for CDA to look closely at these ideas. It will have been apparent from the preceding arguments that if an individual A has an innate ability to read the minds of B and use deception for his or her own ends, then conversely, B must have the same ability and could in principle use it to read the intention to deceive. This is a highly significant notion for CDA to which we return at the end of this chapter.

5.4 Intuitive Biology

We have looked at the claims for innate social and psychological modules. Other modules of mind have been researched that have to do with the human mind's relation to the non-social world. One of these is 'intuitive physics': human understanding of gravity, solidity, orientation, force, and so on appear to be hard-wired, that is, be present at birth as some sort of neurological template that enables the child to deal with the surrounding environment without having to learn it in the way that an empiricist psychology would suggest the human mental tabula rasa

has to learn about everything (Spelke 1991). More relevant to the concerns of this paper is 'intuitive biology', which works on the same general principles. What the innate biology module works on is living entities. The research in this field (cf. Atran 1990 and 1994; Kennedy 1992; Keil 1994) indicates that human children automatically make assumptions about the taxonomy of 'natural kinds'. For instance, they seem to take for granted the difference between animate and inanimate entities. Moreover, there is evidence that all human cultures share a basic framework for classifying the natural world (Atran 1990). These folk classifications are highly complex: a reasonable explanation, it is argued, is that there is a common genetic blueprint for it. An analogous argument is often made for the universal innateness of the language instinct. The evolutionary argument would be that human evolution needed to select for the ability to classify the living world because of the survival advantages conferred by such an ability.

One feature of the research on intuitive biology that is of interest to CDA is the claim that this module includes 'essentialism'. That is to say, humans seem intuitively impelled to attribute 'essences' to different kinds of things in their taxonomies of natural kinds. A predisposition to essentialism would provide an important explanatory framework for many social phenomena that interest CDA researchers, and we return to it later in this chapter.

6. Beyond Modules: Cognitive Fluidity

As was pointed out above, while the notion of modularity is widely accepted among psychologists and cognitive scientists, the precise form and significance of the modularity is controversial. Karmiloff-Smith (1992), for example, building on her earlier developmental work with Piaget, argues that modules are merely the basis for development that is subject to variable cultural shaping. But the interpretations of modularity that will concern us here are those of Mithen (1996) and those of Sperber (1994) and Cosmides and Tooby (2000).

Mithen, whose background is in archaeology, seeks an explanation for the apparent 'explosion' of human development that occurred between 60,000 and 30,000 years ago. Mithen's hypothesis is that the mind is indeed modular but does not, as in Fodor's account, have an independent general processor. Rather what happened at the critical moment in human evolution was that the autonomous modules began to intercommunicate: Mithen calls this the emergence of 'cognitive fluidity' (Mithen 1996).

Sperber also accepts the modular story, but accounts for human creativity by postulating (with plenty of evidence from language) a further module, the 'module of metarepresentation', an expanded version of the theory of mind module and closely tied to language and communication. What this module must be doing, in Sperber's view, is handling concepts of concepts and representations of representations. It will also be giving space to concepts from several otherwise encapsulated and non-communicating modules, and allowing recombinations and transformations of the concepts formed in the modules.

Mithen seizes on Fodor's comment about general intelligence having a 'passion for the analogical' and proposes that the mechanism by which the modular domains started to interconnect was metaphor. Specifically, he claims that language evolved in the first place for social purposes and was 'metaphorically extended' as it was 'invaded' by concepts coming from the major domains (Mithen 1996: 214). Along with Sperber he retains the metarepresentational module as a key feature of human intelligence, linked to communication, but sees it as an expanded form of social intelligence. This metarepresentational, communicational and social module takes in non-social concepts from other domains and can process them creatively, perhaps using metaphor or some other form of mental transformation.

What Mithen and Sperber do not do is tell us much about is the nature of these processes, particularly where language, which they regard as a key element, is concerned. This is where the work done in cognitive linguistics over the last few decades becomes signally relevant. In particular, there are well developed theories of metaphor and conceptual blending that could be linked with the Mithen-Sperber hypothesis. In Section 8 below we explore the possible application of some recent theorising in cognitive linguistics on conceptual blends (Fauconnier & Turner 2002).

7. The Point of All This for CDA

Why should the body of work in cognitive science and evolutionary psychology, of which I have sketched but a small fragment, be of interest to CDA? In brief the reasons are as follows.

i. Machiavellian intelligence is of course political behaviour, whether conceived as institutionalised politics or informal social movement politics or day-to-day interpersonal manoeuvring and manipulation. The work summarised above proposes that the basic framework for such behaviour is innate in humans, not primarily derived from socialisation, socioeconomic forces and the like, as proposed in the existing heavily socialised accounts of CDA. It is quite likely (as Mithen and Sperber seem to argue) that an innate social intelligence is in some way fundamental and operates in ways that may be innate. But this is very different from CDA's existing assumptions about the primacy of the social and the political. If the field is to take account of all relevant science, then it seems inevitable that it has to confront the question of how the human mind works when engaged in social and political action, which is largely, for humans, verbal action.

ii. Research on social intelligence has focused inter alia on the formation of social categories, specifically racial categories, and 'essentialism'. This is familiar territory for CDA practitioners. However, the literature outlined above is scarcely if ever drawn on in these studies. In Section 8 below, I introduce some more details that might suggest links of research building on the elements of a cognitive approach already found in CDA work on racism and ideology.

iii. We have seen that when a perspective is adopted that confronts the question of who we are as a species and what we are like, there arises the fundamental question of how we got to be so uniquely creative (often unpleasantly so by our own human values). We have seen the vague but recurrent suggestion in the literature, from Fodor to Mithen, that some metaphorical ability seems to be the explanation of how modular thought is integrated. What is lacking in the evolutionary-cognitive literature is a detailed theory of metaphor. It is also, as it happens, lacking in a lot of CDA work, where it is often simply treated as a 'persuasive' rhetorical device of some sort. However, cognitive linguistics (CL) has two closely related theories of cognitive activity corresponding to Mithen's 'cognitive fluidity'.[4] The CL theories on metaphor are those developed by Lakoff, Johnson and Turner (Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff & Turner 1989; Lakoff & Johnson 1999) and explored empirically by, for example, Gibbs (1994), Boroditsky (1997) and Glucksberg (2000). The second relevant CL theory I am alluding to is conceptual blending developed by Fauconnier and Turner, which is of importance to CDA because it is specifically a theory of what conceptual activity goes on during discourse processing (Fauconnier & Turner 2002).

iv. CDA as an academic and pedagogical enterprise might not be necessary at all. This startling inference could be drawn from the claim – indeed the evidence – that humans have in any case an innate 'theory of mind' and a metarepresentational module. If individual humans are innately machiavellian, they are also innately able to counter one another's machinations. If language is crucial to this ability and associated activity, then they should have an innate ability not just to use language in machiavellian ways but to detect and counter one another's machiavellian use of language. I shall return to this argument, which is put forward by Sperber and others, towards the end of this paper. In the meantime, the question is, given the foregoing remarks: What is CDA for if people can do it anyway?

Having outlined some of the issues that CDA will have to confront if it is going to be genuinely interdisciplinary, I now move on to what this means for research into a specific area of social enquiry that that has been the traditional stamping ground of CDA. The area is racism. Section 8 summarises the work largely ignored by CDA accounts of this area. And Section 9 outlines a CL approach that explains how using cognitive linguistics can provide an account of what the human mind is doing when it does racist discourse. This approach is not entirely neglected in critical approaches to language use: see for instance Lakoff (1991, 1996, 2003), Chilton (1996a and 1996b), Chilton and Lakoff (1999), Rohrer (1995), Dirven (2001), Santa Ana (2002) and O'Halloran (2003).

8. A Cognitive Approach to Racism

Most discourse-oriented approaches to racism also make reference to cognitive issues or to the need for an explanatory framework or both. Van Dijk's approach, for instance, is broadly sociocognitive and is constructed around a standard

psychological model of memory, linking semantic memory to stable social constructs, episodic memory as a storehouse for previously encountered narratives, and working memory, in which context and ongoing discourse are processed (van Dijk 1984, 1991, 1993a, etc.). Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 10–14) review some social-psychological explanations, some psychoanalytic explanations and some cognitive psychology research into categorisation and stereotyping but do not incorporate them directly into their discourse analysis approach. No CDA work, so far as I am aware, draws on the evolutionary cognitive science research outlined in Section 5 of the present paper. Essentially, the explanation of racism that has been discussed in the cognitive science literature draws on the theory of mental modules and on the postulated existence of mechanisms of transfer between autonomous modules. It is worth considering it further because of its potential for linking cognition, language and social behaviour in an explanatory framework.

Mithen (1996: 224–225) argues that racism arise from a particular use of 'cognitive fluidity' acting on particular specialised mental modules, namely *technical intelligence* (tool making, manipulation of objects) and *social intelligence* (thinking about people, together with ingredients such as theory of mind that we have mentioned above). The general idea is pictured in Figure 2.

Mithen's notion is that the area above the line represents the modern (i.e. Pleistocene and post-Pleistocene) mind, while the area below the line represents the separate modules of the early human mind. A better interpretation might be to say that the area above the line stands for cognitive effects that can come about in the modern human mind under certain conditions (maybe the ones that CDA is or ought to be able to specify). Another element in Mithen's framework is that intuitive biology (the natural kinds module) accounts for human readiness to accept the existence of different social groups (and label them races, etc.). But it is cognitive fluidity that accounts for our readiness to treat some




Figure 2: After Mithen (1996: 225)

groups as inferior. This can come about when the thinking-about-people module merges with the thinking-about-tools module. Or when the natural kinds module merges its humans and animals categories for certain groups of the former. What happens is that people can be thought of as either animals (thus inferior) or as objects (tools) or both.

A slightly different, though related account, comes from the work of Atran (1990, 1994), Boyer (1990), Gelman (1994) and Hirshfeld (1994). Gelman's position is that the idea of different human races comes from essentialist beliefs, which are part of the intuitive biology module. As Atran argued, intuitive biology predisposes humans to set up taxonomies of *living kinds* for animals (a schema obviously adaptive for hunter-gatherers in the relevant environment for early humans). Gelman and her colleagues (e.g. Gelman, Coley & Gottfried 1994) have done empirical developmental work with children, producing evidence that children spontaneously attribute 'essences' to living kinds. Their findings show that children consequently also take it for granted that living kinds have their own invisible internal workings, that these internal workings cause certain behaviours, that attributed essential characteristics inevitably develop or grow, and that the attributed identity is permanent, despite changes, because something 'inside' is regarded as fixed. So children and adults develop racial categories, assumed to have fixed essences, by *transfer* from the living kinds module to the people category in the social intelligence module. However, Hirschfeld's (1994) experiments suggest that children have an independent tendency to construct racial categories and thus that it is not a matter of merging elements from the essentialist natural taxonomy module with elements in the people module.

The latter position has serious implications. Does it mean there is a racist module, a domain-specific competence for racial classification'? If such a module included the assumption that some races were inferior to others, does this mean racism itself is innate? Sperber (1994) is worried by this implication and proposes an alternative story within the modular framework. In Sperber's view 'proper' domains evolve for survival under specific environmental conditions, but conditions may change, and the module can take on a different role. This would include the case where such a module interacts with components of a later culture (which could of course include linguistically mediated cognitive components). Consequently, for Sperber, a module can *develop* a cultural domain. The example Sperber gives is the following.

Let us assume, as seems plausible, that a zoological domain (i.e. biology module) evolved in early humans whose job was the conceptualisation of animals. Such a module would be adaptive for dealing with local fauna. Then suppose the fauna upon which the original module was based ceased to exist or be not visible (maybe the community moved to another location). It is likely, Sperber argues that the module remained active and could (perhaps, we may interject, in the way Mithen suggests) take input from culture (or as we may say, from discourse). Sperber's speculation is that any module of this kind might be biologically inherited in the modern human mind, but be a rather general *metatemplate.*

Further, he speculates, such metatemplates can be 'initialised' by cultural input. To quote Sperber directly:

> A cognitive module stimulates in every culture the production and distribution of a wide array of information that meets its input conditions. This information, being artifactually produced or organized by the people themselves, is from the start conceptualized and therefore belongs to conceptual domains that I propose to call the module's *cultural domain(s)*. (Sperber 1994: 55; Sperber's italics)

What happens then is that in the process of cultural transmission (one may want to call it 'discourse') causes a mimicking of the module's actual domain based on information coming from another domain. It follows that

> racial classification might result from an ad hoc template derived from the living-kinds metatemplate, through an initialisation triggered by a cultural input. (ibid.: 58)

As to the precise nature of this cultural trigger:

> the mere encounter with a nominal label used to designate a living thing is enough to tilt the child's categorization of that thing towards an essentialist construal. . . . It is quite possible that being presented with nominal labels for otherwise unidentified and undescribed humans is enough (given an appropriate context) to activate the initialisation of the ad hoc template. (Sperber 1994: 59)

This is of course reminiscent of what discourse analysts have long been saying. However, they have been saying it in a theoretical vacuum. What is crucial is that the point being made by Sperber in the last quotation is based on experimental work with children, and is also coherent with the theoretical cognitive evolutionary framework.

So where does this leave the suggestion of a domain-specific racism made by Hirschfeld? What Sperber says on this score, somewhat disturbingly, is this:

> There is, as Hirschfield suggested, a genetically specified *competence* [my italics] that determines racial classification without importing its models from another concrete domain. (Sperber 1994: 58)

However, and the point is extremely important, Sperber's approach seems to propose that this competence may itself be derived not from a competence that has racial classification as its proper domain at all but more indirectly from a different genetic modular competence:

> Racial classification may be a mere cultural domain, based on an underlying competence that does not have any proper domain. (ibid.)

His hypothesis (he stresses that it is only a hypothesis) is in fact that there is a higher level metatemplate whose job is to generate ad hoc templates for actual zoology and botany domains (living kinds). This metatemplate is 'initialised' for racial classification. The intitialisation of an ad hoc template for racial classification

> could well be the effect of parasitic, cultural input on the higher-level learning module, the function of which is to generate ad hoc templates for genuine living-kind domains such as zoology and botany. (ibid.)

The upshot in relation to the implications of Hirschfeld is that

> no racist disposition has been selected *for* [...] in humans. However, the dispositions that have been selected for make humans all too easily susceptible to racism given minimal, innocuous-looking cultural input. (ibid.; Sperber's italics)

Now if we ask what 'cultural input' might be, it is clear that in view of the genetic endowment for language and the fact that human culture depends critically on linguistic communication, the cultural input initialising racial classification must be talk and text, in other words discourse. We can sum all this up as in Figure 3.




Figure 3: Sperber's initialisation-of-template theory of modules

The value of this kind of approach lies in its potential explanatory power. That is to say, it offers an explanatory account of *how* what Sperber calls 'cultural input' and CDA practitioners may call 'discourse' has any effect in the human mind, *how* it takes hold and has the potential to spread from one mind to another. It also vindicates the work done in CDA, which in effect shows something of how the cultural input is achieved. The gap a Sperberian account fills is the explanation of why the discoursal input should have any effect and be so persistent in human societies. However, there is one area that neither the CDA account nor the Sperberian one tells us about in detail (though Sperber and the other cognitive psychologists and archaeologists certainly come close to it). This area concerns the actual workings of the mind that give rise to what Fodor calls 'passion for the analogical', what Mithen calls 'cognitive fluidity' and what Sperber variously calls 'cultural input', 'initialisation', 'the effect of parasitic information'. In the next section I show how one CL theory, namely blending theory, can give a more detailed account of these processes than is currently available either in the cognitive evolutionary literature we have been surveying or in the standard CDA literature.

9. Using Cognitive Models of Discourse

There are in fact rather few models of discourse that have a distinct cognitive flavour. The most sophisticated formal theory, which also claims a cognitive element, is DRT (Discourse Representation Theory: see for example Kamp & Reyle 1993 and for developments Asher & Lascarides 2003). Another related type of discourse analysis is Werth's (1999) 'text worlds' approach. However. while CDA cannot seriously claim to make a contribution to discourse analysis without taking account of these highly sophisticated models, I shall leave their further exploration to another occasion. For there is in fact another recent theoretical development which is equally indispensable and which happens to have a direct bearing on the matter of cognitive fluidity, and thus also by hypothesis. on the question of racial categorisation and racism as formulated by the researchers discussed in Section 8.

Fauconnier and Turner (2002) present a theory of cognitive blending developed in a series of earlier papers (e.g. Fauconnier & Turner 1996; Fauconnier 1997). Blending theory is an attempt to explain one of many tricks performed by the human mind, specifically in the processing of discourse. The starting point is the notion of 'mental space', which may be a structure called up from long-term memory or a structure on hold in working memory:


> Mental spaces are small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action. They are interconnected, and can be modified as thought and discourse unfold.... In blending, structures from two input spaces is projected to a separate space, the 'blend'. The blend inherits partial structure from the input spaces, and has emergent structure of its own.

> ... input spaces under construction recruit structure from more stable, elaborate, and conventional conceptual structures that may have conventional structures of various sorts: shared frame roles, connections of identity or transformation or representation, metaphoric connections. These conventional connections are fully available to the work of blending. Blending may exploit, simultaneously, more than one kind of counterpart connection (e.g. frame-role connection and identity connection). through entrenchment, blending can influence conventional structures and their conventional connections. Blends themselves become conventional. (Fauconnier & Turner 1996: 116)

These summaries are almost sufficient as a framework for preliminary exposition. In addition, we need to note the characteristic diagrammatic notation developed by Fauconnier and Turner, used below in Figure 4. Its rationale is based in set theory and the mathematical notion of mapping from one domain to another. For present purposes all we need to note is that mappings place elements in different domains in correspondence with one another. An example will illustrate the kind of cognitive phenomenon that is at issue. Consider this kind of discourse, offered by Fauconnier and Turner:

> I claim that reason is a self-developing capacity. Kant disagrees with this on one point. He says it's innate, but I answer that that's begging the question, to which he counters, etc. etc. (ibid.)

This is a familiar academic genre. How it works is by using two mental spaces, one in which the contemporary speaker is making assertions and another in



which Kant is speaking. The two spaces are separate. But they do have something in common (the concepts of thinking, debating, writing) which is connected to both the first two spaces. It is called the 'generic' space. The blend occurs in a fourth mental space which brings together inputs from the modern philosopher space and inputs from the Kant space. The blend space can also draw on other cognitive frames: in this example, it appears to draw on the shared 'debate' frame. Once the blend has emerged, the mind can work in that space, elaborating it, drawing inferences from it, etc. The blended material can feed back into the two input spaces.

It should be already obvious that an explicitly worked out theory along these lines does much to fill in the notion of cognitive fluidity (as suggested also by Turner 2001), the transfer among basic mental modules, postulated by the evolutionary cognitive psychologists and archaeologists. In making that point, I am of course using blending. For I am merging the Fauconnier-Turner model with the modular model. In fact, the suggestion is that it is precisely the modules discussed that can (not always, but can) provide the input spaces in the blending system described above.

Blending crops up in all manner of discourse, however: jokes, poetry, oratory, advertising, ideology, to suggest a few examples. CDA researchers will be interested in ideology. The theory of blending, together with evolutionary cognitive science, could enable us to construct a general cognitive theory of ideology, which has been lacking in CDA.[5] What such a theory would give us, it should be noted, is not a means of combating directly those with whose ideologies we might disagree, but a means of deepening our understanding of what it could mean to give an explanation of how and perhaps why human minds produce such structures. Here we can do no more than sketch out how this task might be broached. Let us take a simple (because extreme) case, which many people in the world today (but not all) would categorically reject: antisemitic nazi propaganda, as found classically in Hitler's *Mein Kampf*.[6]

At the core of nazi antisemitic propaganda was a crucial cognitive blend that spread back into many aspects of discourse. As is well known, *Mein Kampf* uses, inter alia, the following argument:

> X is a parasite (virus, bacillus, etc.) in the body of Y
> bodies can be cured by expelling or destroying parasites
> doctors expel/destroy parasites, etc.
> Therefore, Y can be cured if doctors expel X from Y

What are the cognitive processes involved in an argument of this kind? Following blending theory we can see that we have (i) an input space or source domain, which includes the concept 'parasites'. Now 'parasites' is part of a pre-existing structured cognitive frame, which necessarily includes concepts such as 'host' organism. In fact, it looks uncommonly like what Atran, Sperber, Mithen and others regard as a module of mind that has to do with the taxonomy of living kinds, or naive zoology. Recall that this module, according to several accounts, incorporates essentialism: the ascription of inherent and constant properties of

'kinds'. We also have (ii) a second input space, a target domain, which here is a social group that has contingently become distinct in the culture where the discourse (and the formation of concepts in many minds in that culture) is taking place. Clearly, this space is largely formed by many complex inputs from social discourse, including the kinds of linguistic communication ('discourse') studied by van Dijk (1991, 1993a), Reisigl and Wodak (2001) and others, not to mention the large body of explanatory attempts by the Frankfurt School and studies of nazi language by, e.g. Ehlich (1989). In this instance the social group in question is Jews. It could also include other contingent social entities, say nation states, or geographical regions. It is highly relevant that larger groups can contain, or be conceived as containing, smaller groups. In addition, there is a cross domain mapping which establishes analogies between host-parasite and nation-subgroup (Jews).

In terms of mental spaces, we have (iii) a common (or 'generic') conceptual space. In this instance, the relevant one appears to be the image schema container-contained (on image schemas, and specifically, container, see Johnson 1987 and Johnson & Lakoff 1999 and on the importance of this schema in large-scale systems of political belief Chilton 1996a). Finally, we have (iv) the blend space, where the input spaces are merged. Here, and this is the crucial point, is where further inferencing and elaboration is effected. According to Fauconnier and Turner, it is in the blend space that a cognitive phenomenon that they term 'conceptual compression' occurs (Fauconnier & Turner 2002: 92–93). At the same time, elaboration is a kind of expansion, which in the case of *Mein Kampf*, and antisemitic discourse in general, recruits further cognitive frames,[7] specifically knowledge frames that structure basic knowledge about disease, healers, healing, and curative methods. Also recruited in ideological discourse of this type are cognitive frames centred on the body which draw on the container image schema. Figure 4 represents a simplified picture of the way the mind's 'cognitive fluidity' operates to creatively produce concepts about social groups.

Such models offer CDA detailed hypotheses about how discourse affects social cognition. Notice that they are dynamic, in the sense that they can enter into inference chains. In the present example, the blend 'nations are hosts, Jews are parasites' engages the cognitive frame of biology and disease. In turn, the disease frame permits inferences of the kind:

(i) If *a* is a parasite in *b*, *a* causes disease *c*
(ii) If *c* is a disease, *b* can be cured by *d* with *e* and/or by doing *f*
Where *d* is (say) a doctor, *e* for instance is a medicine that (*e*) kills *a*.
Therefore, to cure *b*, kill *a*.

Such inferences are not strictly logical nor empirical, but based on the blend of one domain with another. Simply labelling a group 'parasites' activates a blend, which in turn activates an inferential chain. The conclusion 'kill *a*' may or may not be implanted and result in real exterminations, pogroms and genocides.

This is a hypothesis about how discourse ('cultural input') can affect ('infect', if one wants to use the metaphor) human minds, and lead to acts by humans

against other humans. This link is missing from current CDA. The cognitive account tells you the mechanisms. What it does not do is tell you *why* such inferences should lead to certain historical events at a certain time and place. If you want answers to this particular *why*, there are several routes to pursue. One is CDA. which might be able to describe the characteristics of the 'cultural input' (the discourse) that might have activated the blends ('initialised the template' in Sperber's terminology discussed above), facilitated the inferences and promoted the conclusion. It might tell us about the social and political conditions that led to certain kinds of communication network that made such input possible or effective. Typically, with the partial exception of the 'discourse-historical approach' espoused by Wodak and colleagues, CDA does not take this latter step. but sticks at the level of verbal detail. To understand *why* particular cognitive effects arise and *why* they result in action at a certain time or place is not a question cognitive scientists or linguists address. It is not evident that CDA is equipped to address this question either, without massive collaboration from, at least, the disciplines of political economy and history.

The cognitive account outlined here attempts to fill in some of the missing links that are implicit, or ought to be implicit, in the CDA project – namely, exactly how (i.e. by what mechanisms) can human utterances conceivably lead to appalling human actions?

10. Passive Receptors or Critical Instinct? Do We Need CDA?

To sum up the argument so far, to understand discourse requires a cognitive perspective. We have reviewed some of the recent work in evolutionary psychology that appears to have considerable relevance for CDA. We have also reviewed one corner of cognitive linguistics, for the same reason. In Section 9, we have shown two things: one, how blending theory can add detail to some key claims in cognitive psychology and two, how a blend of blending theory and cognitive evolutionary psychology can add detail ('depth') to our understanding of ideology, a classic topic in CDA. In this final section we attempt to draw out some of the implications for CDA of taking this route. To accomplish this we can make further use of recent work in cognitive science. Two kinds of question will guide the discussion. First, does the evolutionary and cognitive perspective imply that the human mind is easily manipulated because of the effects due to innate modules and mechanisms like blending? Second, if CDA took into account the cognitive perspective we have outlined, what sort of research would CDA become and could it still claim emancipatory benefits?

The question of how easily or not the human mind can be tricked, deceived or manipulated through the use of language is a core empirical and theoretical question that CDA has never addressed as such. There are well-known psychological studies on such phenomena as 'groupthink' and on the framing of narratives but little detailed discussion of the very possibility of verbal manipulation or how or to what extent it might work in detail (but cf. Allott forthcoming; Chilton 2002; and Saussure forthcoming). Indeed, from Fowler and others on, in the

wake of Orwell's newspeak nightmare, there has simply tended to be an assumption that people are easily hoodwinked by powerful verbalisers. What follows is an attempt to open up this question to closer scrutiny.

We return to recent work in cognitive evolutionary psychology for clues and cues. As was noted earlier, Sperber has postulated a genetically evolved metarepresentation module which he regards as central to a number of characteristically human mental and other behaviours, including creativity and consciousness. Metarepresentation, according to this hypothesis is a second-order module with the ability to form concepts of concepts and mental representations of mental representations, one's own and those of others.

The evolutionary perspective prompts a form of argumentation that goes as follows. Why would homo sapiens have developed such an ability? Because, we may speculate, humans need to know what others are thinking (cf. 'theory of mind', 'machiavellian intelligence'). That is to say, such knowledge has survival value, because it is important to know what others inside and outside one's group are wanting, believing, intending, etc. Further, metarepresentation must be integral to human language/communication, for in processing a speaker's (S's) vocalisation the hearer (H) forms a mental representation of what S is (probably) representing in their own mind. Indeed, communication occurs when H recognises S's intention that H construct some mental representation corresponding with some representation in the mind of S. Comprehension is metarepresentation.

This line of argument has some possible implications for CDA, at least for that part of it that is concerned with strategic deception through language use. Humans may have innate mechanisms for communication and comprehension, but these precisely facilitate tactical deception, that is, machiavellian behaviour. It would make no sense to assume that some had a machiavellian module and some didn't (which doesn't mean that some do not use it and cultivate it more than others, as would be argued for any of the other postulated modules). But if everyone has it, it is also necessary to assume that all individuals have the ability to counter it in others.

The hypothesis is, then, that humans need to be able to detect intentions to engage in deceptive action. Since language use is also a form of action, we must ask whether humans are not also naturally endowed with the ability to detect deceptive language use. Cosmides (1989), on whom Sperber is drawing, regards some such ability as a specialised mental module which she calls the 'cheater detector'. Sperber elaborates on this in a fashion that should attract the attention of CDA:

> The human reliance on communication is so great, the risks of deception and manipulation so ubiquitous, that it is reasonable to speculate that all available cost-effective modes of defense are likely to have evolved.
> (Sperber 2000: 135)

Building on Cosmides, Sperber goes further than Cosmides in grouping together possible component modules of this innate ability. First, there is an in-built facility

for checking the reliability of the source of information, in line with the idea of 'source tagging' (Cosmides & Tooby 2000). The recursive syntax of human languages permits embedding of propositions as complements of reportative verbs. evidential and attitudinal verbs, facilitating the metarepresentation of sources (amongst other things).

Second, theory of mind supplies the ability to 'be sensitive to subtle signs of deceptive intent [and] read the relevant attitudinal and emotional signs' (Sperber 2000: 135). Third, Sperber proposes that there exists a 'consistency filter', by means of which the human mind is innately inclined to check the logical consistency of language input, on the one hand with respect to the internal logical consistency of a stretch of talk (or text), and on the other hand with respect to external consistency with what the receiver believes to be true and with alternative informational input.

Because a speaker S will recognise a hearer's intention to counter S's deceptive intents, Sperber argues that S will try to penetrate H's defences, resulting in 'a persuasion counter-persuasion arms race' (Sperber 2000: 136). This point is in one sense obvious, but it is important to stress the claim that the modular mental basis of such a spiral is an innate ability. Even more specifically, Sperber proposes that this ability will have evolved in such a say as to give rise to a further innate module, a 'logico-rhetorical' module. This is a 'persuader' module that seeks to penetrate H's cheater detector and source tagger. It can display authority and simulate consistency. Again, one must assume that this module too works both ways: that is, it works for S's goals but also for H's defences as a counter-persuader ability. This last point is rather interesting for CDA, since it postulates.

> ...the development of the ability to scrutinise these argumentative displays and to find fault with them. (Sperber 2000: 136)

In other words, humans may already have a critical instinct, even perhaps something like a module for CDA. Naturally, people may not use it. But, firstly, to say that people do not use it, makes a claim that needs substantiating. Do they not? The question is not simple, because recognising failure to deploy critical ability requires criteria that would certainly be highly disputable. Secondly, if people do not, or do not all, or do not all of the time, this would not demonstrate an innate critical potential does not exist. Thirdly, if the claim is that people have the critical potential but do not use it, then what we need to know is under which conditions is this the case? Historians, political scientists and other disciplines can do this job as well as, or better than CD analysts. One of CDA's claims seems to be that it is primarily something about the *discourse* (utterances) that hampers the use of the human critical potential and promotes nefarious notions. This claim has not been substantiated. Nor has CDA developed any detailed theory of how cognitive influence might occur as result of discourse input to a human brain. The cognitive theory outlined in this section is a very modest step in addressing this deficit in CDA.

11. Implications for CDA

Whether the proposals of Sperber, Cosmides and others are valid can of course only rest on further empirical and theoretical work. But sufficient work already exists for the claims to be worthy of consideration.

In this paper we have (a) argued that CDA cannot neglect the cognitive aspect of communication, (b) rapidly summarised some recent work in the field of evolutionary cognitive psychology, (c) rapidly summarised one recent approach in cognitive linguistics, and (d) applied a blend of (b) and (c) to one aspect of an extreme form of racist discourse. This review and application yields two main points. First, the combined cognitive framework can go beyond description and put forward suggestive explanatory stories. Second, the combined cognitive framework raises questions about the status and direction of CDA itself.

What then are the issues for the status and direction of CDA?

i. The combined framework of cognitive evolutionary psychology and CL yields insights into human nature and human societies that CDA itself has not provided. It may be that CDA, given its adopted methods and goals and the linguistic theories it has predominantly drawn on, may be incapable of going beyond description. I am thinking here primarily of the kinds of CDA which take their theoretical frames predominantly from social theory, without the incorporation of cognitive perspectives, and which also draw in rather limited ways on heavily socialised linguistic models. I exclude those less prominent currents that place cognition at the core and which do draw, to varying degrees, on psychology and on cognitive linguistics.

ii. Even if we accept only very tentatively the modular model of mind, and the particular modules for which there is evidence or at least plausible deductive arguments, the consequences for CDA as a socially oriented, possibly emancipatory enterprise, have to be re-examined. Put bluntly, if people have a natural ability to treat verbal input critically, in what sense can CDA either reveal in discourse what people can (by the hypothesis) already detect for themselves or educate them to detect it for themselves? There are obvious responses to this question. One might be that, granted a 'critical discourse' module, such a module still needs to be activated and developed. There are problems with such a move, however. One is that it places CDA in a position of responsibility and perhaps power, if an educating or developing role is granted to CDA practitioners. Another is the problem of knowing what sort of technical analysis CDA could conceivably provide that could give what is required for someone to develop their critical discourse module. Stock responses to CDA include the charge that it is stating the obvious and that no technical apparatus is needed anyway to point out what is not perhaps obvious. Such responses might be taken to suggest that people are indeed aware of the existence of their own critical faculties. Moreover, taking the point that technical apparatus is not needed, this means (a) that CDA has no core scientific programme of discovery or elaboration and then (b) also that its ability to bring strategic and tactical language use to awareness may be no greater than that possessed by the non-expert and that it is merely engaging in ordinary political language use.

iii. The last set of points could be taken to imply that the focal research question might be formulated as the question: What prevents people using their innate cheater-detecting logico-rhetorical modules to protect their own interests? I am suggesting that the answer is not that they cannot analyse the verbal input and need help in spotting, for example, nominalisations or agent-less passives, or intertextual cross-overs. Next to nothing is known about whether such things do really have any cognitive effects and thus social action effects. What is clear, however, is that under certain social, economic and political conditions people may not be able, or may not be willing, to respond critically. One can imagine many such conditions, but it is doubtful that any of them can be elucidated by purely linguistic or discourse-analytical means. For they would seem to have to do with economic forces or socio-political institutions that restrict freedom of expression and freedom of access to information, without which you cannot use your source-tagging abilities, your cheat detector, your consistency checker, etc. This is not to deny the central importance of linguistic communication, but it does cast doubt on whether technical or theoretical research or description in CDA has any special social role. In fact, if the preceding argument is correct – that it is institutional or economic restrictions on communicative freedom that is crucial, then what is needed is historical, social, economic and political analysis not the analysis of language itself. And, interestingly enough, it is Chomsky, whose linguistic models have no social or political critique, who has provided an analysis of the restrictions on expression and access in modern capitalist societies ('A propaganda model' in Herman & Chomsky 1988: 1–35).[8]

iv. The last paragraph argues that CDA's would-be theoretical and technical analyses of text and talk may have no direct bearing on social and political conditions. It may be that it could carry a pedagogical role, but in that case it may be doing no more than any politically aware person. If it does set research goals, within the normal understanding of research in the western scholarly and scientific tradition, then it may necessarily separate itself from social and political goals. The route that has been indicated in the bulk of the present paper goes in the direction of deductively elaborating empirical and theoretical research, and also exploring phenomena like racism from within that paradigm. What I have suggested about racism in Section 9 is of no obvious use in combating racism. If it has any value it is of a scientific kind, in so far as it sketches a hypothesis as to how certain conceptual structures take hold in the mind and spread.[9] There remain questions about the socio-economic and political conditions under which certain cognitive effects take hold of whole populations by way of verbal communications (and perhaps other systems), but these are not specifically linguistic matters on which language experts can pronounce. There remain, too, profound philosophical questions about volition, agency and ethical responsibility.

The upshot of these ruminations is that CDA may not be the field within which the most perplexing questions can be pursued that concern the nature of the human mind, of human language, of human language use and of human society.

Notes

1. I am most grateful to Patricia Chilton, Bill Downes, Ron Scollon and Ruth Wodak for critical discussion to do with ideas in this paper. This does not mean that they would agree with anything I say in it.
2. See below on cognitive science and cognitive linguistics in a socio-critical context. It is important also to mention the important work inspired by pragmatics produced by Verschueren, Blommaert, Bulcaen (Blommaert & Verschueren 1998; Blommaert & Bulcaen 1997), who have tended to keep their distance both from mainstream CDA and from Hallidayan linguistics (see Verschueren 2001). Downes (2002) points out that Hallidayan systemic-functional grammar fails to take account of inferencing and world knowledge in human language understanding. He also argues that CDA fails to resolve the tension between CDA's claim to reveal social functions of discourse and speakers' conscious intentions and rationalisations. These points are somewhat related to O'Halloran's (2003) arguments that the presence of items and structures in text is not necessarily related to the cognitions established by the reader/hearer on the basis of such text features, as well as to his general application of the distinction between low-effort shallow reading and high-effort interest-oriented reading of texts.
3. The more cognitively oriented linguists concerned with social issues do, I think, assume something like this argument; but these are not the authors typically associated with the central tendency of CDA.
4. The theories in cognitive linguistics referred to have developed quite independently of the theories of modularity discussed earlier.
5. Interestingly, such an approach takes us back to the origins of the term *idéologie* as used by Destutt de Tracy, *Eléments d'idéologie* (1817–1818).
6. Cf. Chilton, 'Manipulation, memes and metaphors: The case of *Mein Kampf*' in L. de Saussure, ed. (forthcoming).
7. The mechanisms by which 'recruiting' occurs are not specified by Fauconnier and Turner, but it seems likely that there is overlap between modular knowledge frames. For example, there is at least a culture-based naive medicine frame that intersects with the naive zoology module. Relevance principles may also apply.
8. It has been pointed out to me by Ruth Wodak that in certain highly structured social spheres, e.g. doctor-patient communication, educational institutions; discourse behaviour has been changed as a result of CDA-type activity. This may be correct. However, there is a risk in such claims of drawing CDA's own charge of the 'technologisation of discourse' (cf. Fairclough 1989, 1995, 2003).
9. 'Epidemiologically', Sperber would say (Sperber 1994); cf. also Dawkins on 'memes' (1999) and Chilton (forthcoming).

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16

The Interpenetration of Communicative Contexts: Examples from Medical Encounters

Aaron V. Cicourel

Editors' Introduction

Aaron Cicourel is Professor of Cognitive Science and Sociology at the University of California, San Diego, where he is also employed by the Medical School. For over three decades, Cicourel has worked on the ways in which knowledge is accessed or manipulated in a variety of contexts, including courts (Cicourel 1968), educational settings (Cicourel and Kitsuse 1963), and medical settings (Cicourel 1980). His concern for the structuring of everyday experience through social interaction and his critique of hidden procedures within institutional settings puts his work close to two other contemporary influential figures in the analysis of everyday interaction, Erving Goffman and Harold Garfinkel. With the former, Cicourel shares the focus on situated interpretation – Goffman's famous leading question "What's going on here?" can be repeatedly heard through Cicourel's work – and with the latter he shares the concern for the participants' unconscious inferential processes or implicit principles that characterize everyday thinking. Cicourel's unique approach to sociology, which he termed "cognitive sociology" (Cicourel 1973), is an original blend of European scholarship on the mundane basis of scientific thinking – Husserl's thought as filtered through Schutz's work was particularly influential in Cicourel's early research – and contemporary development within cognitive science. His long-term association with the Center for Human Information Processing and his regular exchanges over the last several years with such scholars

Source: Alo Scandra Duranti and Charles Goodwin (eds), *Rethinking Context: Language*

as David Rumelhard, George Mandler, Michael Cole, and Roy D'Andrade has further informed his concern for the integration of traditional micro-sociology with current thinking within psychology and anthropology on the origin of contextspecific knowledge and memory.

In this chapter, Cicourel returns to one of the main concerns of his intellectual career, namely the question of the definition of context in the analysis of verbal interaction within institutional settings. Whereas formal grammarians and structuralist anthropologists are interested in the discovery of underlying, abstract, often unconscious structures and processes that give meaning to linguistic or ritual forms, Cicourel is interested in the hidden aspects of reasoning and information processing that characterize researchers as well as members of a given culture. "How do you know that?" is a question that Cicourel often asks his colleagues when they present the results of their research projects. The replies (or attempts to reply) he receives in these exchanges constitute for him the starting point for methodological and theoretical reflections on how knowledge is stored and retrieved and issues created or ignored out of a myriad of details which are often used but not talked about by analysts. Cicourel's ideal model of the relationship between language and context is one in which the participants, before the analysts, have simultaneous access to several levels of analysis, including the local organization of turn-taking and their internal syntactic structure, lexical choices and semantic networks, as well as the broader context of the institutional settings where the interaction takes place and within which talk acquires meaning for the participants *qua* social actors (see Corsaro 1985). He distinguishes between two senses of context, which he names "narrow" and "broad," and proposes their integration for the analysis of everyday talk. Methodology is one of Cicourel's main concerns. In particular, he stresses the importance of ethnographic fieldwork and the ways in which it can help situate a stretch of talk within its larger institutional context. In this chapter, his methodological concerns are integrated with a detailed analysis of particular verbal exchanges within a medical facility. By using a technique similar to what film critics call "slow disclosure" (Sharff 1982), Cicourel slowly uncovers further layers of information about the participants, their institutional roles, their previous exchanges, and their shared knowledge. In so doing, he is able to directly address the issue of how much contextual information should be made available in the study of spontaneous everyday interaction. In Cicourel's chapter, we are shown that even the use of initials in a transcript hides unspoken principles and selective strategies. Until we are told that IDA and MR stand for *Infectious Disease Attending* and *Medical Resident* respectively, we could take them to be conventional mnemonic devices void of social meaning. But labelling is important for participants (when they talk about each other) and researchers alike. What does it mean to give a transcript with names of speakers, with their occupational roles, or with initials? What do we evoke when we say that a certain conversation is between a doctor and a patient, or between A and B? On the other hand, how much information should be offered? Shouldn't we avoid the possibility of an infinite regress, whereby the

whereby only the information that the participants themselves make available in the talk should be evoked by the researcher. However, Cicourel points out some possible limitations of this program when applied without a critical attitude. The omission of apparent extratextual information can be problematic to the extent to which it obscures information that was at some point relevant to the researcher during the collection of analysis of the material under discussion. The ideal researcher in Cicourel's model of discourse analysis is thus one who does not hide his or her sources of information and research choices but makes them into a common resource to be shared with the readers in an attempt to unveil the hidden processes of the selection of information which guides participants and analysts alike in the course of their daily lives.

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The interpenetration of communicative contexts: examples from medical encounters

1 Introduction

A researcher's decision to tape-record conversation or discourse creates a contextual frame that limits what is to be identified as relevant data, their organization, and the kinds of analysis and inferences to which these data will be subjected. Research on conversation and discourse varies considerably in the extent to which an investigator will describe the circumstances of taping a conversation and her or his involvement with those taped. Similar conditions exist in other types of research on social interaction. For example, in field research, a participant observer must be sensitive to the fact that elicitation procedures can force informants to become aware of issues or conditions about which they normally are not aware or may be aware of only in the local context of everyday settings. Silverstein (1981) notes that much if not most of what is of interest to researchers is beyond the informant's ability to articulate meanings in ways we would like or expect. The researcher's questions can create contextual frames that may not

laboratory experiments of social interaction where status and role relations are foci of attention. The investigator's and subjects' conceptions of status and role relations are contingent on implicit and formally defined notions of "context" created for the experimental occasion. We seldom know the extent to which simulated social relations reflect or are contrary to the kinds of experiences subjects have in their everyday encounters.

While many researchers will agree that talk and some notion of "context" shape each other as part of an emergent process that changes through time and space, not all students of language use will concede that ethnographic material, participant attributes, and patterns of social organization that are constitutive of talk need to be included in studies of the structure of conversation or discourse. For example, conversation analysts (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974; Schegloff, in press) prefer to focus on such things as sequential organization, and how that organization creates local contextual elements in conversation. The researcher's use of social categories in any analysis must be linked to participants' recognition of the categories as integral to the events being studied. This research attitude can result in a very formal type of analysis. Linguistic approaches to discourse analysis (Brown and Yule 1983) also minimize the role of ethnographic and organizational conditions that can also result in a formal analysis of utterance sequences. What remains unclear is the extent to which the decision to tape or use particular materials includes or excludes explicit and tacit knowledge about reported and unreported ethnographic conditions, participant attributes, and patterns of social organization that can selectively shape subsequent analysis. The researcher can exercise considerable discretion in what the reader will be shown or told about "context."

The content of conversation or discourse material can be made to appear rather transparent when we use brief, formal or informal exchanges among people we do not know, who interact in settings described in a limited way, or when we use casual, mundane everyday conversations among friends during informal exchanges. When the research analyst is working in her or his own society, and the reader is expected to be from the same society, it is especially convenient to use brief, formal or informal mundane conversations. The investigator's ability to comprehend these exchanges is assumed to be self-evident and is seldom if ever an aspect of the analysis. But if a fuller analysis of participants' conversation and ethnographic understandings about activities, objects, and ideas is desired, and that understanding presupposes prior social experience, and/or technical, scientific, or professional training, then other strategies besides a completely local analysis must be employed.

Verbal interaction is related to the task at hand. Language and other social practices are interdependent. Knowing something about the ethnographic setting, the perception of and characteristics attributed to others, and broader and local social organizational conditions becomes imperative for an understanding of linguistic and non-linguistic aspects of communicative events.

In the present chapter, I discuss several settings within a larger organizational

"context" includes an institutionalized framing of activities. In traditional social science theorizing, it is customary to speak of group-derived prescriptive norms that pressure and/or channel people with designated titles, presumed competencies, duties or responsibilities into certain physical spaces at certain times in order to engage in a finite number of specifiable activities. Within this institutionalized context or framing of activities, emergent processes of talk appear that create a more narrow view of "context" in the sense of locally organized and negotiated interaction.

The extent to which the investigator knows about the institutionalized and everyday events that participants and analysts categorize by the use of specific terms varies. For example, the analyst of particular settings may or may not be present when speech events are recorded. Within this more narrow sense of "context," therefore, the analysis of a tape and transcript may or may not begin with the investigator's direct experience with the ethnographic setting in which the speech events were recorded.

When the investigator knows little or nothing about the speech event and the event is rather short-lived and apparently not viewed as part of or influenced by existing institutionalized or bureaucratic activities, what gets identified as context can be more easily located in the talk said to be attended by the participants. The investigator can begin her or his analysis by examining the way the conversation is initiated, the way intonation and stress are used, the content of lexical items and phrases, the occurrence of pauses or hesitations, turn-taking moves, and the way topics are introduced, sustained, and altered or changed. The focus of attention can become the sequential organization of conversation material that presupposes that participants, investigator, and reader all share a common knowledge base that is largely tacit or unstated but which becomes partially articulated by the way the investigator begins to make claims about the categories to which the participants are said to be attending. The investigator and reader presumably can each examine the same data and make claims and counter-claims about the clarity and substance of the analysis.

The methodological strategy of using local talk as the source of information in the narrow sense of context can be self-serving by the way the researcher not only ignores prior and current organizational or institutional experiences of participants, but by the kinds of data that are presented for analysis. For many students of language and social interaction, therefore, the notion of context need not include references to the participants' and researcher's personal, kin, and organizational relationships and other aspects of complex or institutionalized settings. Casual, fleeting speech events, however, are often constrained and guided by normative institutionalized features that we associate with encounters in public places described in general but vivid terms by Goffman (1959, 1963, 1971) among others. These brief exchanges can also carry considerable cultural and interpersonal "baggage" for participants because of long-term social relationships unknown to or unattended by the investigator. The investigator who examines a speech event can therefore be forced to attend to its several senses of context

The present chapter is identified explicitly with the view that both a broad and local sense of context are needed for the study of language use. The focus on discourse in the pages that follow should not be construed as being relevant only to conversational material, but also applies to the study of single utterances. I examine a complex environmental setting in order to underscore the importance of context at different levels of analysis. The following pages begin with a conversation in which three people emerge as speakers. Subsequent sections provide the reader with a brief overview of the organizational settings and the ethnographic circumstances in which the data were obtained. After investigating additional speech events, I close the chapter by illustrating how both immediate and other aspects of context must be taken into account if we are to understand language and social interaction in everyday life. The focus of this chapter, therefore, differs from but also builds on conversation and discourse theorists concerned primarily with the structural features of conversation such as turn-taking, side sequences, topicalization, coherence, and related notions. It is important to locate the analysis of language and social interaction in a wide variety of social activities that are implicitly and explicitly known to the participants and investigator.

2 A Routine Conversation

The speech event presented in Example (1) can be viewed as a routine conversation between three unidentified people who will be identified below.

Example 1: A conversation between three physicians

1	PA:	(?) (low voice level) Is this the same **one** (**we?**)
2		(ya?) did yesterday?
3	IDA:	No. This is the eye lady.
4	PA:	(?)
5	IDA:	Cellulitis
6	PA:	Oh.
7	IDA:	With group A strep..in shock
8	PA:	In shock. (Slight rise in voice level) How about **that.**
9	IDA:	I[t?] was gonna be more interesting |if she didn't
10	MR:	|I'm(?)
11	IDA:	have bacteremia but (laughing and voice level
12		increasing) now she's had |bacteremia so
13	MR:	|There's a little, there's
14		little (voice level increases) problem with that
15		that I'll, will go into more as far
16	IDA:	Yeah.
17	MR:	how much shock she really |was in,
18	IDA:	|was in, right
19	MR:	compared to what [abrupt shift] she's a liver lady.
		[illegible] I don't know what her blood pressure sits

23	PA:	So she didn't have peripheral, evidence of shock
24		really?|Just a low blood pressure.
25	MR:	[No, she wasn't, she wasn't ever clamp, you
26		know
27	PA:	Uh huh
28	MR:	clamped down *or* flushed or anything
29	PA:	OK
30	MR:	I can..and, and she doesn't
31		[abrupt shift] one thing that argues
32		against a lot of neuropathy, you know, from diabetes, for
33		one, she's only had it for three years, but two, you know,
34		her neuro exam an' her an' her peripheral vascular exams,
35		is really normal, is normal sensory, good pulses distally,
36		and stuff, and I just have a hard time,
37	PA:	Yeah
38	MR:	there'd be a lot of sy-sympathetic, you know
39	PA:	Right
40	MR:	phone calls.
41	IDA:	Have they got sinus films on yer yet?

Each dot between words = one second. The solid vertical line indicates points of overlap in the exchange.

Telling the reader that three physicians are involved is an initial attempt at penetrating what is occurring in this encounter. Lines 1–12 strongly suggest that the participants are engaged in a discussion regarding the medical condition of some other party. The investigator's control over when and what material will be shown the reader can, therefore, vary considerably and can create different interpretive frames. Saying that three physicians (they also could be other health care providers) are talking implies that they are probably in a medical facility of some kind, but there is no indication of precisely what kind or part of a health care facility they are in. Nor can we be sure if the patient is nearby, is an inpatient or an outpatient. We know nothing about the physicians' gender or personal characteristics nor their specialities. Nor do we know if this information is relevant to the analysis.

The opening lines (1–8) of Example (1) do not mention the term "physicians" nor is there any indication in lines 1–3 that a "patient" is involved. Having identified the three participants as "physicians," we can also say that they are talking about a "patient" who has been dubbed the "eye lady," for some unstated reason, or a patient who is experiencing difficulty with her eye.

Although the content of lines 1–3 of Example (1) ("Is this the same one [we?] [ya?] did yesterday? No. This is the eye lady.") does not suggest a health care facility, physicians, and a patient with eye problems, the term "cellulitis" in line 5 might be recognizable enough to send us to a medical dictionary as we begin our analysis. Alternatively, we might seek help from informants or examine further sequences of conversation in the hope that other lexical items, phrases,

by IDA in line 7 ("group A strep..in shock"), which could refer to an infection. The comment or observation by PA in line 8 ("In shock. How about that.") could be interpreted as expressing interest in the categories supplied by IDA and perhaps mild surprise. The subsequent remarks by IDA in lines 9, 11 and 12 of Example (1) ("I[t?] was gonna be more interesting if she didn't have bacteremia but now she's had bacteremia so") suggest that PA and IDA are both familiar with the terms "cellulitis," "group A strep," "in shock," and "bacteremia."

The significance the analyst attributes to particular utterances or to their sequential order, and claims about the participants' perception and understanding of a speech event, are often the result of examining subsequent utterances (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974). If we do not invoke institutional and local socio-cultural details with which to identify the participants of conversation, the analysis of meaning is nearly impossible.

I will now abruptly shift my mode of analysis by telling the reader something about the participants in Example (1) and about how the data were obtained. The setting is generally known to the reader and investigator alike because of a commonsense understanding of categories such as "patient," "health care facility," "medical center," "hospital," and "medical school." Stating that the talk is in a medical setting does not tell the reader that there is medical talk taking place nor who is doing the talking and with what credentials. But claiming the participants in a given speech event are physicians talking about a particular (technical sense of) "patient" orients us to categories we associate with particular members of a medical setting and a basis for making claims about the use of these categories in their talk. The term "patient," for example, is used in at least two ways in this chapter.

For the reader of this chapter, the term "patient" probably implies a commonsense notion of someone who is not feeling well or is "sick." For the health care expert, however, the term "patient" can activate thoughts about someone with neurophysiological, biochemical, and psychopathological symptoms and conditions that are part of an extensive technical compositional semantics and clinical as well as mundane experiences. For the most part, the term "patient" will be used in the second sense just noted. Thus, even mundane terms such as "eye lady" (line 3, Example 1) and "she's a liver lady" (line 19, Example 1) imply an activation of technical knowledge and experiences that are part of complex socially organized activities.

3 The Research Setting and Types of Participants

The case material I present in this chapter represents a small portion of data from field research in two teaching hospitals. The material is part of routine institutionalized bureaucratic activities that are typically associated with health care delivery in Western countries. My observations and tape-recording of activities mostly involved physician–patient, physician–physician, or physician–

The medical settings observed are typical of teaching hospitals but are not necessarily representative of other clinic or hospital settings in which there is an absence of House Staff (interns, residents, and training fellows). The inclusion of House Staff adds hierarchical relationships and hence additional bureaucratic conditions that differentiate teaching from non-teaching hospitals. Additional details about organizational conditions, the influence of status and role relationships, and the expertise or background knowledge associated with such designations will be provided as the chapter unfolds.

The range of speech events in these settings can be diverse and can include a quick exchange of greetings, brief exchanges of gossip or rumors about patients, or staff, and discussion about the local baseball or football team's fortunes. There also can be brief and lengthy exchanges between physician and patient, technical discussions among physicians and between physicians and nurses or technicians, and somber or emotionally charged exchanges between family members and health care personnel. The exchanges can occur in a variety of settings such as the patient's room, in a clinic examining room, a hall or corridor, an empty elevator, the cafeteria, at the x-ray facility, the nurse's station, or a laboratory.

Over a period of months, I observed and then began to tape-record various clinical exchanges. These exchanges included outpatient clinics where patients may be seen initially or as a follow-up from prior visits or inpatient service. I also accompanied the resident or attending physician on ward rounds, or visits to the x-ray facility, to daily laboratory rounds, and to weekly grand or teaching rounds where cases of unusual interest are presented before attendings (one or more physicians qualified to supervise residents) from the county and residents from several hospitals.

The ethnographic activities alluded to above obviously provided many opportunities to express my ignorance about medicine and to ask questions of different experts. The field research was facilitated by my official connection with a school of medicine. Knowing some of my informants independently of the research setting because of committee activities in the School of Medicine made participation in the research setting easier and enabled me to ask many "dumb" questions as a non-medical specialist. But familiarity with the settings can also create problems. For example, my colleagues sometimes forgot that I am not a physician and spoke to me as if I were fully capable of understanding technical matters that were discussed. I often pretended to seem informed in order to not disturb the speech event, but later would have to ask for help.

My ethnographic experiences, consultations with people called "physicians," and occasional uses of a medical dictionary enable me to take a number of liberties in describing the material in Example (1). I can tell the reader that there is a female inpatient located in a medical teaching hospital with an eye problem as well as additional difficulties associated with the technical terms "group A strep" (line 7), "shock" (line 7) and "bacteremia" (line 11). I rely on the reader's commonsense understanding and my use of expert informants to claim that the physicians are talking about someone with an infection and perhaps something

Less transparent here is the remark by IDA (lines 9–12) that the case would have been more interesting if the patient did not have bacteremia.

4 Reexamining the Conversation in Example (1)

The exchange in Example (1) does not state that the three participants are attached to a health care facility of some kind nor is there any mention of a patient. The conversation begins in line 1 with the introduction of a topic ("Is this the same one . . .") and a reference to some object or someone that had something done to it the day before.

In Section 2 above, I alluded to the possible content of lines 1–7 of Example (1). An analyst might choose to ignore further discussion of content at this point and instead could focus on who speaks first and how someone responds, identifying turns, the selection of next speaker, topicalization, side sequences, adjacency pairs, registers used, topic and comment, deictic, anaphoric, metaphoric, and metanymic expressions, to mention some familiar aspects of the study of language in social interaction.

The opening question by PA ("Is this the same one [we?] [ya?] did yesterday?") in line 1, Example (1), can be seen as topicalizing an unidentified but particular type of object that other participants presumably recognize as fitting into a specific subset of a general category. We can subsequently categorize this object as a "patient" in the technical sense by assuming the participants are health care providers of some kind. The response by IDA in line 3, Example (1), rejects a particular subset of the unidentified hypothesized category but does allude to another subset by stating "This is the eye lady." In lines 5, 7, and 12 of Example (1), IDA seems to clarify the hypothesis about the category "patient" by describing particulars such as "cellulitis," "group A strep," "in shock," and "bacteremia."

The opening question by PA in line 1, Example (1), might also be loosely interpreted as one part of an adjacency pair (e.g. question–answer sequence) in which the second part consists of the "No" of line 3 by IDA. Perhaps this type of analysis might be stretched even more if we ignore the "No" of line 3 and the "Oh" of line 6 and say that the second part of the adjacency pair consists of fragments from lines 3, 5, 7, and possibly 12 of Example (1). To paraphrase the exchange, PA's question in line 1, "Is this the same one (we?) (ya?) did yesterday?" is answered by IDA in lines 3, 5, 7, and possibly 12 ("No. This is the eye lady," "Cellulitis," "With group A strep...in shock," and "now she's had bacteremia"). If we go beyond this loose illustration of sequential analysis, we can ask how much local context is the analyst required to construct in order to convince herself or himself and the reader that the interpretations being claimed are adequate for some sequence of text?

5 What Counts as Relevant Ethnographic Details?

to IDA when posing the question about the "same one" in line 1. The speech event can be further clarified by noting that PA refers to a Pathology Attendant who is the Chief of the Microbiology Laboratory, and IDA is the Infectious Disease Attending. MR is the infectious disease Medical Resident for the rotation period during which the event occurred.

The exchange reported in Example (1) occurred after MR and IDA had both interviewed the patient and had discussed the case. Their participation in the encounter reported in Example (1) had already been anticipated because of the expected earlier exchange. PA is the expert here and methodically examines a series of small slips of paper each morning at 11:00 a.m. in which new or additional information about a patient's cultures is noted. IDA is also an expert about microbiological aspects of each patient, particularly the clinical ramifications of the case. By addressing IDA, PA asks the responsible clinical expert about the case in order to contextualize the laboratory findings. There are other people in the corner of a large room (which is actually one part of the suite in which the microbiology labs are located). There often is a fourth-year medical student doing a month's rotation in infectious disease cases, a pathology resident who assists PA with laboratory details including the cultures for each patient, slides, and petrie dishes to be examined that morning, an infectious disease resident from pediatrics, and one or two teaching fellows.

In a teaching hospital, IDA may begin with a few comments on the case but normally turns it over to MR for the details. After this, PA first examines the slide or cultures and either directly describes the morphology of the organism(s) or invites the medical student or fellow or a resident to tell the group what organism(s) is/are involved. PA then invariably gives the group additional information about the nature of the organism, the kinds of disease and/or symptoms associated with the laboratory findings, and the patient's likely prognosis with different types of treatment.

The opening line of Example (1), therefore, assumes coherence by reference to a presumed activity done with thus far unidentified others the day before. As noted above, the unidentified others in the present case are the MR and IDA. The response by IDA in line 3 shifts the topic to someone called "the eye lady." The inaudible comment by PA in line 4 of Example (1) could have been a request for details about the case. IDA provides one detail ("cellulitis"). From my watching his facial expression and hearing the intonation of his voice ("Oh" in line 6), I infer that the term is of interest to PA. When IDA provides additional information about the patient, PA repeats the last phrase ("in shock") and with a slightly rising voice level seems to be expressing mild surprise ("How about that"). Then IDA, in lines 9, 11, and 12, refers to how much more interesting the case would have been if the patient had not had "bacteremia" ("I[t?] was gonna be more interesting if she didn't have bacteremia but now she's had bacteremia so"). MR, however, in lines 10 and 13–17 ("There's a little, there's little problem with that that I'll, will go into more as far how much shock she really was in") seems to be questioning the patient's "shock" and these doubts are related to the issue of bacteremia with or without shock.

IDA and MR when the two discussed the case and knew that there were doubts expressed (in two separate medical histories) by other physicians about the patient's "shock." MR's completion of his remark from line 17 (stated as "compared to what" in line 19) was followed by an abrupt shift in the topic. Presumably the patient's "shock" was to be contrasted with an unstated something else ("compared to what") when MR decided to abruptly shift the topic to the patient's liver ("she's a liver lady, you know"). So in addition to being "the eye lady" of line 3, the metaphor shifts to that of "liver lady." The reader's technical knowledge may be strained by the phrase "a liver lady." My participation in the setting tells me we have a patient with a current eye problem and a prior liver problem attributed to a history of alcohol abuse.

On the basis of previous conversations with informants, I can report that one clinical sign of shock is very low blood pressure. MR's remark in line 21 ("It may not be real high to start with") refers to the time of admission for the patient when her blood pressure was observed to be low but where no one (including the patient) was aware of her normal blood pressure. The inference of possible shock, therefore, can be problematic depending on the patient's normal blood pressure. IDA had contributed to MR's remarks through their previous conversations the day before, and the "Right" uttered twice by IDA in line 22 could signal agreement with the present observation by MR and/or IDA's prior contribution. After reading the transcript, however, IDA reported that the intent of saying "Right" twice was to hurry MR into expediting his delivery and remarks.

In lines 23–4, PA provides some clarification of the patient's alleged shock by his "declarative-interrogative" that the patient apparently "didn't have peripheral, evidence of shock really? Just a low blood pressure." Although appearing to be a question, PA's remarks are spoken authoritatively through the use of a somewhat "matter of fact" or "self-confident" intonation and the mildly assertive nature of the content. There is also the ethnographic element that he is the primary expert here and can be indirectly asserting this expertise by his remarks in lines 23–4.

MR's rambling remarks in lines 25–36 of Example (1) address several possible topics that presuppose background in clinical medicine. For an attending, MR's remarks can become the basis for an organizational assessment of the resident or novice in infectious diseases. As non-medical specialists, students of language use in social interaction, we can only superficially assess the import of the material in Example (1) unless we seek the help of informants and have access to the kind of ethnographic information provided thus far.

6 Expanding the Ethnographic Context

I have presented a partial description of the way the selection of different ethnographic or organizational settings and types of speech events or social interaction

technical matters that affect how patients are admitted into a medical setting, are diagnosed, and treated by different health care delivery personnel.

The present case involves a 48-year-old white female whose chief complaint was recorded in her admission history and physical examination as "swelling of the left eye." Additional details can be found in Cicourel (1987). Of interest here is her primary diagnosis of "periorbital cellulitis" or what was described as a "right-upper-lid abscess with periorbital cellulitis." My informants helped me translate this last phrase into an infected, swollen-shut left eye, that seemed highly inflamed to me, with purplish coloring of the skin around the eye that was apparently caused by blood seeping into the skin. The patient's left side of her face was swollen as well as her eye and ear. There was pus oozing out of the area of the eyelids.

I accompanied MR when he first went to the medical ward to see the patient. Before interviewing the patient, MR went to the nurse's station to review the patient's chart. As is often the case with infectious disease patients, an attending physician other than IDA usually will see a patient admitted to the medical service. In the present case, two attendings had interviewed the patient and had ordered laboratory tests before asking for an infectious disease consultation. The results of these tests were reported in the chart. MR's infectious-disease-oriented interview of the patient, therefore, was in part influenced by his having had access to the patient's medical chart. MR's questions, therefore, reflect aspects of these prior experiences.

In addition, this interview is influenced by his prior medical school training. The medical student's knowledge of infectious diseases can be traced to one or two courses (depending on the quarter of semester basis of the medical school) in microbiology. I attended some of the lectures in microbiology and also interviewed the director of the course, who is also PA in the conversation of Example (1). With the help of informants, it is possible to trace aspects of the basic science concepts and clinical medicine experience medical students are exposed to before they enter an intern or residency program. Knowing something about the physician's prior experiences in medical school and as a House Officer can provide the analyst and reader with possible aspects of the background knowledge tacitly or explicitly assumed or employed during a speech event. I do not have time to present all of the content of my interview with PA in his role as the microbiology course director, but instead will provide the reader with a few highlights that can be linked to the conversation in Example (1).

Trying to trace the kinds of basic and clinical science concepts that medical students and House Staff are exposed to before they attain the status of "attendings" is not meant to imply that such codifiable knowledge is the primary source of background necessary for the diagnostic reasoning and treatment directed at patients. In my work on medical communication and diagnostic reasoning, I have stressed the importance of tacit clinical experience and the everyday understanding of mundane social interaction as aspects of a world presumed to be known in common but not necessarily examined reflexively by participants in the medical or any other area of life (Cicourel 1982, 1986, 1987). I call the

codified knowledge (textbooks, detailed lectures, laboratory practices, apprentice-like experiences) into our understanding of bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic language use and social interaction. Inasmuch as sociolinguistics tends to address various kinds of everyday events in which the analyst can "pass" as an expert because of her or his background in language use and social interaction, the analysis of content is often viewed as fairly straightforward. By calling the reader's attention to the role of multiple ethnographic and/or organizational settings and informants, I underscore the complexity of the term "context" or "local" and more abstract senses of culture or social organization for understanding language use and social interaction.

According to the microbiology course director during an interview obtained early in my research and noted above, students should remember the following:

Example 2

"...what are the important bacteria, and, in terms of human disease, and what are their unique microbiologic characteristics...The streptococci can be differentiated into the hemolytic ones and the non-hemolytic ones and green ones. Those that are alpha-hemolytic make green colonies. And among the beta-hemolytic ones we have the group A strep, which is really the only accepted cause of bacterial pharyngitis...The streptococci are in chains, the pseudomonas and the enterobacteriaceae are gram negative rods, and they look a lot alike on the gram stain... And if you look at the streptococci for a minute, the group A strep, is able to cause sore throats primarily because of the M protein... ...what are the unique microbiologic characteristics that permit me to recognize this organism, let's say right out of the blood culture bottle like you've seen us do up there?....Did this patient have cellulitis, or lymphangitis? Yes. Well, then it's probably a group A strep...

The technical remarks by the pathologist made during the interview conducted before the completely independent laboratory conversation of Example (1) refer to the clinical consequences medical students are expected to remember from courses in microbiology. The references to "streptococci" (line 3), "beta-hemolytic ones" (line 6), and "group A strep" (line 7) in Example (2) are directly related to the "sore throats" of line 12 and are a significant aspect of the diagnostic reasoning employed in the present case. Notice the reference to "cellulitis" and its association with "group A strep" in lines 17–18. The pathologist's remarks provide clear evidence of prior training on the part of physicians that plays a role in job-related speech events. Such training may be important not only to participants, but also to the analyst's understanding of medical communication and semantic aspects of diagnostic reasoning in the case under review and in medical settings generally.

of a medical student's laboratory experiences with the microorganisms noted in Example (2). Without this background knowledge based on studying textbooks, listening to lectures, and working in a laboratory setting, it would be rather difficult for a participant to display her or his group membership in the conversation of Example (1). In the case of a medical resident, there will have been prior experiences as an intern in which aspects of the material in Example (1) will have been discussed.

Another source of background knowledge that can influence speech events in medical settings is the way that novice physicians are exposed to an initial lecture (also given to them as a written handout) when they begin their training. The following lines are from lecture notes developed by an infectious disease attending physician. I quote selectively from the written handout given to the House Staff.

Example 3

"I. Septicemia – microbial agents in the bloodstream...
B. One is led to the diagnosis of bloodstream
infection by a **sudden change** in clinical
state...
All sorts of organisms can cause hypotension, but,
in the absence of hypoxia (pneumonia) or heart
failure, gram-negative bacteremia with endotoxemia
is by far the most common cause of sustained
hypotension...
D. Other causes of infectious shock
3. Streptococcal shock (group A strep), often in
the absence of bacteremia, associated with soft
tissue infections (usually severe)..."

Of interest are references to "microbial agents in the bloodstream" (line 1), "the diagnosis of bloodstream infection by a **sudden change** in clinical state" (lines 2–4), and "organisms [that] can cause hypotension" such as "gram-negative bacteremia with endotoxemia" (lines 5–7). A sudden change in clinical state can be a drop in blood pressure (hypotension), which in turn can be linked to the release of bacteria or endotoxins in the bloodstream that can lead to shock. The most succinct remark can be found in lines 10–13 of Example (3) because it comes fairly close to the case described in Example (1). The patient was found to have group A strep and bacteremia as noted by IDA in Example (1). The case revealed bacteremia but MR claimed the patient may not have been in shock. The presence of shock was never confirmed. The remarks contained in Example (3) and given to House Staff at the two hospitals in which I conducted my research directly associate this background material to specific aspects of the exchange in Example (1).

I will close this section by quoting a brief excerpt from MR's original interview with the patient. The interview occurred prior to the speech event reported in

Example 4

1 I wanna take (?) your blood. (?) blood pressure (?)
2 (.....) (mumbling) A lot of people get, bacteria
3 in their blood, and ya get uh shock. [Low monotone
4 intonation] When your blood pressure goes down
5 because it means (?) the bacteria releases certain
6 toxins, depending on (?) area (?) [raised intonation]
7 Has your, blood pressure always run kind of on the low
8 side, ma'am?

Before MR and I entered the ward to see the patient, MR had reviewed the patient's chart and was aware of the two prior medical histories therein and hence was also aware of the suspected diagnosis of bacteremic shock. MR was also aware of many other medical facts and hypotheses about the patient's condition. MR's explanation (only partly shown here) to the patient about her medical problems (linking a drop in blood pressure to a prior release of "certain toxins") can be linked directly to the prior medical histories that existed in the patient's chart, the infectious disease attending's written handout, and the pathologist's description of what medical students should remember of their course work in microbiology. In turn, all of these matters, plus MR's interview with the patient, had an effect on the remarks by PA, IDA, and MR in Example (1).

7 Concluding Remarks

The chapter has presented a few of the large number of interpenetrating medical events that form the local context for language use and social interaction in any given encounter. I have sought to discuss the topic of local context in terms of those cultural and organizational constraints, normative expectations, and immediate conditions that surround local speech events as they unfold.

The notion of interpenetrating medical communicative contexts seeks to place the local mutual shaping of talk and context into a framework that incorporates structural and processual aspects of social organization and reasoning during social interaction. The medical setting I chose as the point of departure for the present chapter was the source of a conversation between three physicians. The material presented in Example (1) can be subjected to different types of interpretation, contingent on the analyst's orientation to language use and social interaction and the extent to which the notions of background and context are employed.

The local interaction in Example (1) is intended to call the reader's attention to outside organizational experiences or institutionally guided and constrained social interaction and/or speech events that are directly relevant to the way local exchanges are likely to occur. For example, the interaction described in Example (1) can be linked to the microbiological aspects of medical education (Example 2) and the lecture on Septicemia (Example 3) given to the House Staff at the beginning of the medical academic year. All social interaction and/or

The analyst's decision to describe the materials in Example (1) as an exchange between three health care delivery workers or professionals creates a cultural context for the analyst and reader and simultaneously calls attention to the use of social categories that hopefully can be attributed to participants' recognition of their relevance for the speech event being examined. The analyst's decision to focus on particular sociolinguistic notions (topicalization, turn-taking, speech act categories, coherence, types of deixis, frozen expressions, preferred sequences, etc.) rather than the interrelationship between discourse and culture or the interrelationship between discourse and linguistic theory can trigger different expectations on the part of the reader.

Telling the reader that the three participants in Example (1) are physicians, that the exchange took place in a hospital microbiology laboratory while they were discussing a patient with suspected bacteremic shock, and preparatory to examining the patient's blood cultures, creates a cultural context within which the analyst and reader can understand what transpires. Our understanding deepens when the physicians are identified as a pathology attending, an infectious disease attending, and an infectious disease medical resident. Not only are the expressive style and the content observed contingent on organizationally constrained status and role relationships that can influence who speaks first, whose views will be influential or will prevail *vis-à-vis* action to be taken, but the analyst's and reader's ability to comprehend the significance of broader and local sociocultural issues may require extensive consultation with medical experts.

The present case actually began with MR and the researcher going to the nurse's station of a university medical center medicine ward to examine the medical chart of a patient suspected of having bacteremic shock. MR was performing an organizational obligation of initiating a consultation requested of the Division of Infectious Diseases.

The material from the microbiology course presented above reflects information medical students are expected to know, and the excerpts from the lecture given to new House Staff reflect the kinds of training experiences a novice like an intern or resident physician is likely to possess when reading a patient's chart and then interviewing the patient.

By the time the case reached the microbiology laboratory rounds depicted in Example (1), the patient had also been interviewed by IDA: MR and IDA had discussed the case in some detail; IDA had interviewed the patient; and IDA had consulted the patient's chart, added to it, and had consulted two standard textbooks on microbiology.

The analysis of material in Example (1), the excerpts on the microbiology course (Example 2), the infectious disease attending's lecture notes for new House Staff (Example 3), and the fragment from MR's interview with the patient (Example 4) represent a small part of a complex set of interpenetrating contexts. In the present chapter, I have documented only minimally the way informants helped me understand organizational conditions, local speech events and social interaction, the meaning of complex concepts, and procedures from basic and clinical medical science and practical experiences. I have, however, ample

I have characterized as unavoidable aspects of organizational and local constraints and processes that are integral to rethinking "context."

A nagging issue that undoubtedly remains for many readers is the familiar one that an infinite regress can occur whereby the observer presumably must describe "everything" about a context. Such a demand is of course impossible to satisfy because no one could claim to have specified all of the local and larger sociocultural aspects of a context. Observers or analysts, like participants of speech events, must continually face practical circumstances that are an integral part of all research or everyday living. As researchers, we obviously privilege some aspects of a context while minimizing or ignoring other conditions. The observer is obligated to justify what has been included and what has been excluded according to stated theoretical goals, methodological strategies employed, and the consistency and convincingness of an argument or analysis. Meaning and understanding in everyday life are contingent on cognitive and linguistic activities, i.e., a knowledge of how to use language structures that we call metonyms, metaphors, and other imaginative constructions associated with particular lexical items, phrases or utterances, and personal experiences. Therefore, some specification of the environmental conditions in which these language practices emerge, are embedded, and evolve should guide the researcher's depiction of context. I have tried to indicate some of the conditions that can be identified in a medical setting to illustrate the way different senses of the term "context" can be pursued conceptually and empirically.

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17

Answers and Evasions

Steven E. Clayman

When Albert Gore was Bill Clinton's vice presidential running mate in 1992, Gore's position on abortion became the focus of controversy. As a legislator, Gore had opposed federal funding for most abortions, but now he was expressing support for it as part of Clinton's health care reform plan. In an aggressive interview conducted by Sam Donaldson, Gore received a barrage of tough questions exposing this apparent contradiction. He was momentarily rescued by a commercial break, at which point he was urged by his media advisor to sidestep questions of this sort: "Don't be afraid to turn their questions. If they ask you about [abortion], just say . . . 'I want to talk today about the new direction that Governor Clinton and I want to take the country.'"[1]

There is a widespread perception that politicians are frequently evasive under questioning from members of the news media, and this perception is not without merit (Bavelas et al. 1988; Bull 1994, 1998; Bull & Mayer 1993; Clayman 1993; Greatbatch 1986b; Harris 1991). The impetus to resist a line of questioning is understandable, given the adversarial character of contemporary journalism. In news interviews – as well as press conferences and other forms of interrogation – journalists are drawn to questions that are unflattering, incriminating, or otherwise hostile in character. If answered straightforwardly, these can inflict damage on a politician's policy objectives, career prospects, and personal reputation. When 1996 presidential candidate Bob Dole was questioned about the addictiveness of tobacco, his equivocal response was roundly attacked by the Clinton campaign and received weeks of unfavorable media coverage. On the other side of the Atlantic, a question about the Labour Party's opposition to nuclear weapons prompted party leader Neil Kinnock to give a cavalier response that was subsequently exploited by the Tories and helped ensure Thatcher's reelection in 1987. And it is not only politicians who face such dangers: no interviewee is immune. In response to a question about the absence of African Americans at the managerial

level in professional baseball, Al Campanis, vice president of the Los Angeles Dodgers, made some racially insensitive remarks which caused such an uproar that he was fired the next day. To avoid consequences like these, interviewees may be motivated to be less than forthcoming in the face of hostile questioning.

However, evasiveness has a downside. Answering questions is treated as a basic moral obligation, not only for public figures in journalistic interviews but also for interactional participants more generally (Schegloff 1968, Heritage 1984:245–53, Raymond 1998). But while interactants generally expect each other to be properly responsive to questions, the responsive conduct of politicians is perhaps more closely scrutinized, so that attempts to resist, sidestep, or evade can be costly in a variety of ways.

Interviewers themselves monitor for evasiveness, and such maneuvers can be met with probing follow-up questions and negative sanctions (Greatbatch 1986a). When Clinton administration Treasury secretary Robert Rubin sidestepped a difficult question about gasoline taxes and instead offered a rosy analysis of the overall economy, he was reprimanded for his slipperiness: "When we ask people like you a simple question . . . you do the light fantastic instead of giving us a direct answer." Sanctions like these, in addition to upping the ante for a genuine answer, also constitute the previous response as indeed evasive, thereby exposing and highlighting that quality for the broadcast audience. Interviewers have not always been quite so aggressive, but the impetus to monitor for and respond to evasiveness is now rooted in the adversarial culture of contemporary American journalism (Clayman and Heritage in press a). Journalist-interviewers gain professional status on the basis of aggressive questioning, and they pride themselves on the skill with which they can pursue and pin down recalcitrant interviewees.[2]

Monitoring by journalists can also extend beyond the occasion of the interview itself. Subsequent news stories about interviews and press conferences often contain excerpts (in the form of quotations and sound bites) that show public figures to be refusing to answer questions, or initially resisting questions, or answering only after being repeatedly pressed to do so (Clayman 1990). When Texas governor George W. Bush, early in his 2000 campaign for the presidency, gave less than forthcoming answers to questions about his cocaine use, there followed a virtual feeding frenzy of stories dissecting the ramifications of his evasiveness. A similar fate befell President Bill Clinton following his artful responses to questions about Monica Lewinsky. An act of evasion can thus become a newsworthy event in its own right, and a persistent source of unfavorable publicity.

Even when journalists allow such maneuvers to pass without comment, there may still be consequences for the broadcast audience and in public opinion. Insofar as a resistant response is noticed by audience members, they will seek to account for the breach of conduct via inferences that are apt to be unflattering or incriminating. Audience members may infer that the interviewee has some ulterior motive for avoiding the question, or that he or she has something to hide. American citizens may have a constitutionally protected right to remain silent in the face of police questioning, so that silence cannot be treated as incriminating in courts of law, but public figures have no such protection in the court of public

In a nutshell, then, interviewees face a dilemma. There are various pressures, both from journalists and from the audience, from within the interview and in subsequent media coverage, to "just answer the question." But when the question is adversarial, there are cross-cutting pressures to take precisely the opposite course of action. For those contemplating a resistant response, the problem is how to reap the benefits while minimizing the various costs associated with that risky course of action.

The management of interactional resistance, and the construction of answers more generally, is a neglected topic in studies of broadcast news interviews. Although there is lively interest in evasiveness as a phenomenon, prior research focuses mainly on distributional matters – on which politicians tend to sidestep questions disproportionately, and on the circumstances under which they do so (Bavelas et al. 1988, Harris 1991, Bull & Mayer 1993, Bull et al. 1996; Bull 1998). Less attention has been paid to more fundamental issues, such as what distinguishes an "evasion" from a genuine "answer," the elementary forms that resistance to a question can take, and how acts of resistance are managed through specific discursive practices (Greatbatch 1986b, Clayman 1993, Bull 1994, Clayman & Heritage in press b).

This article provides an overview of the dynamics of answering and resisting questions in broadcast news interviews. An exhaustive treatment of this complex subject is, of course, beyond the scope of a single essay. The present objective is to delineate some of the main issues involved and some of the main practices mobilized to manage responses that resist the agenda of a question. The primary database consists of more than 100 news interviews broadcast in the United States and England over the past two decades. A second and much smaller data set consists of journalistic questioning in other contexts, including U.S. presidential press conferences and campaign debates.

Conceptual Preliminaries

Evasiveness is an elusive phenomenon, and its analysis is fraught with conceptual pitfalls. The concept is, in the first instance, a familiar part of interactants' ordinary language for characterizing and sanctioning conduct, but it is also deployed by social scientists in technical analyses of such conduct. This raises numerous difficulties, including the question of the perspective from which evasiveness is to be assessed.

One approach treats the ANALYST'S PERSPECTIVE as primary. Here, the boundary between "answering" and "evading" is something that the analyst determines by formulating a clear-cut operational definition, which can then serve as a benchmark from which to assess particular responses. This approach can generate informative results (e.g., Harris 1991, Bull & Mayer 1993, Bull 1994), but it becomes problematic when the analyst's assessment diverges from that of the participants themselves. It is, after all, the participants' own understandings of

tradition that informs this essay, here the PARTICIPANTS' PERSPECTIVE is treated as of primary importance in the analysis of responses. Thus, every effort is made to ground analyses in the understandings and orientations of interviewers and interviewees as these become manifest in the interaction itself.

This ideal can be difficult to achieve in practice. One problem is that the participants may not necessarily agree on the import of a particular response. While an interviewer may treat a given response as improperly evasive, the interviewee who produced it may treat it as an essentially valid way of dealing with a difficult and perhaps flawed question. In this connection, the very terms used by the analyst to characterize responses can become problematic. "Evasion" connotes moral impropriety and thus may be seen as embodying a contestable perspective on the action under analysis.

A more fundamental difficulty is the fact the participants' understandings are not always transparent, and they may at times be designedly opaque. Consider that when an interviewee sidesteps a question, he or she may strive to conceal that fact in an effort to avoid various negative consequences that might otherwise follow (e.g. hostile follow-up questions, negative inferences). Correspondingly, even if the interviewer recognizes that the question has been sidestepped, he or she may decide to "let it pass" in the interest of moving the interview along. It is thus possible that an act of evasion may occur that is fully apparent to both participants, yet neither party registers that fact in any demonstrable way.

Accordingly, well-grounded analytic judgments must draw not only on resources internal to the particular instance under examination, but also on patterns of conduct that cut across numerous cases. Moreover, to maintain analytic clarity, I will adhere to the following terminological convention: I will reserve the term "evade/evasive" for actions that are treated as inadequately responsive by the interview participants; other terms – e.g. resist, sidestep, agenda-shift – will be used more broadly to encompass responses that depart from the agenda of the question, but which the participants may not necessarily treat as inadequate on that occasion.

Doing "Answering"

Any analysis of this subject must begin by considering the fundamental nature of ANSWERING as a type of social action. In the organization of interactional sequences, answers are responsive actions that become relevant only on the completion of a question, and questions in turn set an agenda of topics and tasks to be dealt with in subsequent talk (Heritage in press). Moreover, after a question has been produced, interactants monitor the ensuing talk to determine how it embodies an answer to the question (Schegloff 1968, 1972). What, then, constitutes an answer in this context? This may at first seem obvious: an answer is an action that addresses the agenda of topics and tasks posed by a previous question. What is less obvious is precisely how such responsiveness is displayed by interviewees (hereafter IEs) and recognizable by interviewers (hereafter IRs).

fact that there is no single primary indicator or marker of "answering" – unlike "questioning," which is typically marked by interrogative syntax. How, then, do IEs indicate that they are indeed being responsive to the question at hand? In other words, how do they ACCOMPLISH OR DO "ANSWERING"?

As a point of departure, consider that there are various paths or trajectories that answers may follow. Some answers take a ROUNDABOUT TRAJECTORY; they begin with a unit of talk which cannot in itself be construed as a possible answer, but which is part of a larger stretch of talk that can be seen in its entirety as answering. For instance, when a conservative politician is asked (ex. [1], lines 1–2) about the attractions of a new workfare proposal – which would require those receiving unemployment benefits to work for them – his initial remarks (lines 3–10) do not, by themselves, answer the question. Instead of talking about the advantages of workfare, he begins by attacking the current unemployment program as "ludicrous" (lines 3–7), and he then goes on to say that reducing benefits is not a viable solution (lines 7–10). Only after he has in effect ruled out these other courses of action, taking three full sentences to do so, does he speak directly to the issue of the advantages of workfare (lines 11–13).

(1) UK *BBC Today*: Social Security Cuts

1	IR:	. . . Mister Howell what are the attractions as you see them:
2		uh- of this workfare idea?
3	RH:	.hh Well (.) hh it seems to me to be ludicrous that we
4		are spending according to the government more than
5		eight billion pounds: in support of the unemploy:ed on
6		condition that they do nothing whatsoever .hhh to(r)
7		help society, .hh And I believe the time has come
8		when- when we've got to recognize: that (.) par::ing
9		down benefits is not the an:swer. That isn't how
10		savings can be made.
11		.hhh Savings ku- huge savings could be made: if ahm
12		(.) one the unemployed people were offered the right
13		to work and given an opportunity to work. . . .

Although the initial remarks could not by themselves stand as an answer, they are not irrelevant to the question at hand. Indeed, the initial assessment of alternatives to workfare is a relevant prelude to rendering a comparative assessment of workfare itself. Thus, considered holistically, this entire turn can be seen as occupied with the task of answering the question. And IRs generally treat such roundabout answers, once completed, as adequate.

However, IRs do not in the first instance encounter COMPLETED turns; they monitor and evaluate turns INCREMENTALLY, while they are unfolding. From that in-progress vantage point, the subsequent trajectory of a response may be decidedly uncertain. In the previous example, the IE could simply have attacked the alternatives without ever advancing an affirmative argument for workfare. To

This is a leap that IRs are not always willing to make. Thus, roundabout answers are initially vulnerable to being heard as evasive and are subject to countermeasures from the IR. Consider ex. (2), an excerpt from a 1985 interview with Pat Buchanan, shortly after he began serving as President Reagan's second-term director of communications. The IR rather delicately makes the point (lines 2–6) that other administration officials don't seem to like Buchanan very much and have leaked that view to the press, and he goes on to ask Buchanan (line 7) how that can happen. Buchanan responds (lines 9–11) by noting that *there was a lotta that in the first term*, and he begins to explain why. This could be the first component of a roundabout answer that will eventually deal with the current situation, but it could also be an effort by Buchanan to deflect the discussion away from himself. The IR takes the skeptical view, analyzing it as an incipient evasion; he interjects at line 12 (arrowed), pointing out that *you weren't in in the first term*, thereby treating Buchanan's turn-thus-far as irrelevant and unresponsive.

(2) US, 3 June 1985, *Nightline*: Patrick Buchanan

1	IR:	Continuing our: conversation now with Pat Buchanan.
2		Pat- uh:- (0.2) to put it as gently as I ca:n there're some
3		people: fairly high up in this administration who seem
4		to be able to contain their enthusiasm for you, .hhh
5		And every once in a while stories crop up in thuh press
6		that one can only assume come from some o'those folk. (0.2)
7		How does that sort of thing happen, in an administration.
8		(.)
9	PB:	tlk .hhh Well I think 'ere was a lotta that in the
10		first ter:m Ted, an' = uh: >I think one o'thuh reasons<
11		was you had-=
12	IR: →	= Well you weren't in in the first [term.
13	PB:	[Right, but you had
14		three chiefs of- (.) ehsta:ff virtually, you had Baker
15		(.) Deaver and Meese .hhh An' there was it seemed to me
16		from the outsi:de an awful lot of leaking on one er against
17		one er another, from secondary an' tertiary personnel .hhhhh
18		A:n' since Don Regan came in we've been goin' through a
19		bit of a transition, there was some o'that I think back
20		in April, .hhhh but since thuh transition's been complete
21		I haven't seen any of it an' we don't expect to see as
22		much in the:: uh .hhh in the second term . . .

It is possible that the design of the final question (line 7) unintentionally encourages Buchanan to begin his response as he does. Perhaps to soften what is plainly a face-threatening subject, the IR depersonalizes the question somewhat by asking how *that sort of thing can* happen, and this may license Buchanan's decision to talk initially about the larger history of Reagan administration leaks. But whatever may have prompted this initial response, and whatever direction Buchanan may

A more common type of trajectory establishes the "answering" character of the talk early on. This trajectory may be termed MINIMAL ANSWER PLUS ELABORATION; it begins with a first unit of talk in response that provides the information targeted by the question, albeit in a minimal way, followed by subsequent talk that clarifies and elaborates. For instance, a yes/no question can prompt an initial one-sentence expression of affirmation or negation before that answer is elaborated. An explicit "yes" or "no" may be included in the initial response, which is the normative way of answering a yes/no question (Raymond 1998). For example:

(3) US, 22 Feb. 1985, *Nightline*: South African State of Emergency

IR: tch .hh Are you willing (.) personally to renounce
the violence (.) in that country.
(0.6)
AB: → .hh Yes I will.
I mean I have said so on Saturday I was on a platform . . .

Similarly, a *wh*-type question (*how long* below) can prompt an initial one-sentence provision of the requested information (arrowed) prior to further elaboration:

(4) UK, *Newsnight*: China 2

IR: And how long how long will that take **and how long has**
he got to prove he can do it?
ZM: → .hhhh Ah:: (0.2) it ti-(0.2) maybe it take uh
→ one or two years (.) to to do that. (0.7)
And I think ah that . . .

Like a standard written paragraph, this trajectory of answering begins with an initial unit of talk that minimally fills the information gap targeted by the question, while subsequent talk furnishes details that clarify, support, or elaborate.

Furthermore, the initial remark's relevance to the question is often marked by various surface features of the remark's design. Perhaps the most obvious way of marking question-relevance is to incorporate some of the wording of the question into the initial response (Roth 1996, Schegloff 1998). The repetition may involve a single key word – **confrontation** in ex. (5):

(5) UK, *Newsnight*: Tienanmen Square Uprisings

IR Jonathan first (.) let me ask you:, uh what is the latest
situation are we any nearer: the actual (.) straight
→ **confrontation** between the troops and the students (.) **in**
the square.
JM: ⇒ Well I think we've already had this **confrontation.**
The: uh citizens of Peking .hhhh and of course . . .

A larger phrase may also be repeated, such as **side effects** in ex. (6):

(6) US, 8 Dec. 1985, *Face the Nation*: Cancer Treatment

IR: → .hhh Now tell us about uh = the **side effects**. .hhh Is it as toxic (.) a:s chemotherapy, < Is it as poisonous: an- (.) to the system and what=are the other
→ **side effects**.
SR: ⇒ The **side effects** could be quite seve:re, but they're
⇒ somewhat different than the kinds of **side effects** that one sees with- uh with chemotherapy, .hhh The major
⇒ **side effect** is a buildup of fluid in the body . . . .

An IE may go still further, incorporating the entire framework of the question into the initial response and thereby matching his response word for word to the question at hand:

(7) US, 13 March 1979, *World at One*: Mineworkers Strike

IR: → And what do you think the result of the ballot will be.
AS: ⇒ 1::: think that the result of the ballot will most probably be acceptance of the deal:, (.) but it could be: er closer than most people expect.

This latter mode of response can seem exaggerated or hypercorrect, and it may indicate an undercurrent of resistance or hostility to the question.[3] But the general import of repeating lexical items from the question remains much the same across these examples. Through this practice, IEs can propose that they are attending to the question in detail and are thus properly responsive to the issues that it raises.

Most of the practices examined thus far involve similarities in phrasing, but other practices for doing "answering" work quite differently. Certain INDEXICAL EXPRESSIONS, namely those involving ANAPHORIC REFERENCE, have meanings that are inextricably linked to the prior question. The simplest type involves the use of a pronoun that refers to the issue raised by the question, such as ***that*** in ex. (8) (arrowed):

(8) US, 22 July 1985, *MacNeil/Lehrer*: South Africa

IR: .hhhhh Reports today: are: of course that the violence has continued uh what have you heard tha- whether er not the state of emergency is in fact working.
(0.4)
HB: tch .hhhhh It is perhaps too soon:: to make
→ make a judgement on that . . . .

Here the IR asks whether the South African government's imposition of a state of emergency is working to stop the violence there. The IE's response – ***It is perhaps too soon to make a judgment on that*** – ends with a pronoun that acquires its meaning by referring to the matter raised by the previous question.

It is not only pronouns that have this back-referencing character. For example, certain verbs are also heavily context-dependent for their meaning, such as *was* in ex. (9) (arrowed):

(9) UK, 5 Nov. 1979, *ATV Today*: Innocent Man

Int:		.hh Were you surpris:ed when you: w- went to court,
		an- and indeed went down,
		(0.2)
TS:	→	hhhh .hhh I was mos- I- I certainly was,
		in fact I- I .hh all the way up to the- to the court. . .

In the context of the prior question (*Were you surprised*), the response (*I certainly was*) can readily be understood as meaning "was surprised."

Units of talk that are shorter than a sentence also tend to be parasitic on the question for their meaning. For example, the initial phrasal response below – *Child support offices* – can be understood in context as advancing a claim that "child support offices will be the judge of good cause."

(10) UK, *Today*: Child Support

IR:		.hh But who's going to be the judge of that, the judge
		of good cause:.
RH:	→	.hhhh Child support offices.
		Ahm in the local offices and in our regional centers
		.hh ah we'll look at each case very very carefully . . .

Finally, certain turn-initial discourse markers also refer to the previous question. Answers to *why*-type questions may be prefaced by *because*, which identifies what follows as an explanation fitted to the question. For example:

(11) US, 18 Sept. 1992, *MacNeil/Lehrer*: Perot

IR:		So why don't you go ahead and (.) say:
		I'm (.) a candidate for pr[esident?
RP:	→	[Because that's not (.)
		where the organization is now.
		Our organization (.) is to:tally focused on try:ing
		to get both parties to do the job. (0.7) That's why.

In all these cases, the sense of the initial remark is, by itself, indeterminate at least to some extent. Observers must refer to the question to disambiguate the remark, and in so doing its meaning is "filled in" in a way that is thoroughly question-relevant.

In analyzing these various practices for doing "answering," it may seem that we are expending a great deal of energy for a modest payoff. However, these practices are far more significant than the analysis thus far suggests. As we shall

see, not only do they figure in genuine efforts to answer the question; in addition, IEs can use them subversively in maneuvers that are substantively resistant.

Dimensions of Resistance

Resisting a question is, like answering, a complex phenomenon. We can begin to dissect this phenomenon by drawing a basic conceptual distinction between two dimensions or aspects of resistance.

The Negative Dimension

The NEGATIVE aspect is manifest to the degree that the IE's response falls short of an adequate answer to the question. In the strongest variation on this theme, the IE declines to provide any information at all that bears on the question. For example, when a member of the Labour Party is asked about his willingness to serve in a cabinet committed to unilateral nuclear disarmament, he flatly refuses to answer (arrowed):[4]

(12) UK, Greatbatch 1986b:451: Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament

IR: You wouldn't serve in a Cabinet committed to lu-
unilateral nuclear disarmament of Britian would you
Mister Shore?
PS: .hh What I do believe:: er: Mister Day (which)
→ I will not a:nswer that question, I'm not (.)
→ deliberately answering that question.
What I do believe is thi:s. I do actually genuinely believe
lo:ng believe: (d) .hhh that unilateral initiatives: (.) can
assist (.) multilateral disarmament . . . .

In a less extreme form of negative resistance, the IE provides an answer that is partial or incomplete. For instance, in the face of a two-part question, an IE may address one part while leaving the other unanswered. Thus, in a Nixon press conference[5] held during the Watergate period, a journalist first asks (beginning at arrow 1 in ex. [13]) whether Nixon is personally investigating charges that his campaign funds were mishandled, and he then asks (arrow 2) whether the charges will hurt his bid for reelection.

(13) US, 29 August 1972: Nixon Press Conference

JRN: 1 → Mr. President, are you personally investigating
the mishandling of some of your campaign funds,
2 → and do you agree with Secretary Connolly that
these charges are harmful to your reelection?
RN: Well, I commented upon this on other occasions,
and I will repeat my position now.

3 → With regard to the matter of the handling of campaign funds, we have a new law here in which technical violations have occurred and are occurring, apparently, on both sides. As far as we are concerned, we have in charge, in Secretary Stans, a man who is an honest man and one who is very meticulous – as I have learned from having him as my treasurer and finance chairman in two previous campaigns – in the handling of matters of this sort. Whatever technical violations have occurred, certainly he will correct them and will thoroughly comply with the law. He is conducting any investigation on this matter, and conducting it very, very thoroughly, because he doesn't want any evidence at all to be outstanding, indicating that we have not complied with the law.

Nixon targets only the first question for response (see arrow 3), and he never gets around to addressing the second question about political implications.

Another type of incomplete answer is a simple yes-or-no reply to a yes/no question. In the news interview context, IEs normally are expected to produce elaborated answers (Heritage & Greatbatch 1991), so that minimal yes-or-no responses (arrows 1 in ex. [14]) can be seen as inadequate. They indicate tacit resistance to the broader agenda of the question, and they regularly lead IRs to probe for further elaboration (arrows 2):

(14) US, *Meet the Press*, 24 Oct. 1993

IR: . . . .hh Madam Attorney General you've testified this week- u- in front of Congress abou:t .h violence and television. .hhh And said that if the TV industry didn't in effect clean itself up, clean its act up, .hhh there may be government intervention. Government regulation. (0.4) Thuh New York Ti:mes in an editorial said that (.) you embarked on a quote <dangerous embrace of censorship.> (0.3) Didju?

IE: 1 → No.

(0.2)

IR: 2 → .hhhh Wha:t kind of government intervention are you thinking about? Would you ban: programs like NYPD: Law and Order, would you [uh:

IE: 1 → [No.

(.)

IR: 2 → W- Wh:at are we talking about.

IE: We're talking about (.) asking the media to stop talking (.) about what it promises to do, and do it.

The Positive Dimension

Resistance has a positive dimension as well. This is manifest to the degree that an IE moves beyond the parameters of the question, saying and doing things that were not specifically called for. These departures vary greatly in magnitude and in kind. The most dramatic form of departure involves a substantial change of topic. For instance, following a question about nuclear waste disposal (lines 1–3 in ex. [15]), an expert not only refuses to answer (lines 5–6); she then goes on (lines 7–10) to refute allegations made much earlier in the program regarding the Three Mile Island accident and its health consequences. The issue of power plant accidents is rather far removed from that of routine waste disposal efforts.

(15) US, 6 June 1985, *Nightline*: Nuclear Waste

1	IR:	Continuing our conversation now with Doctor Rosalyn Yalow.
2		Doctor Yalow uh- ehh lemme put it in very simple terms.
3		If it's doable, if it is: easily disposable, why don't we.
4		(1.0)
5	RY:	Well frankly I cannot- (.) ANswer all these scientific
6		questions in one minute given to me. On the other
7		hand there was one horrible thing that happened tonight
8		that you have- .h in addition extended. .hh And that is
9		thuh NOtion that there is an increased incidence of
10		cancer associated with the Three Mile Island accident.

Here the IE veers sharply away from the topic of the question and toward a substantially different area of discussion.

Alternatively, a response may lie within the question's topical parameters but perform a task or action other than what was specifically requested by the question. Thus, in ex. (16), when Senator Bob Dole is asked whether he would support the reappointment of the Federal Reserve Board chairman (lines 1–3), Dole offers a generally favorable assessment of the chairman's past performance (line 4), but he does not specifically endorse his reappointment (presumably in deference to the political independence traditionally granted to the Fed). This evasive maneuver does not escape the notice of the IR, who presses again for an explicit endorsement (line 5):

(16) US, *This Week*: Senator Bob Dole (from Donaldson 1987)

1	IR:	Talking about money, what about Paul Volcker, whose term
2		is up next year? Would you like to see him reappointed
3		to the Fed?
4	BD:	I, I think he's been very effective.
5	IR:	Well, would you like to see him reappointed?

Here. the response is, broadly speaking, within the topical parameters of the question – it is "about" Paul Volcker – but it can be regarded as evasive nonetheless

The most subtle form of evasion is embodied in those responses that alter the terms of the question ever so slightly. Consider ex. (17), from an interview with the deputy secretary of defense, John Deutch, on the subject of Gulf War syndrome. Across this excerpt, the IR tries to get Deutch either to confirm or to deny reports that U.S. troops were exposed to chemical weapons during the Gulf War. However, Deutch will not be pinned down; although he repeatedly offers denials, all are in some way qualified.[6]

(17) US, 12 March 1995 60 *Minutes*: Gulf War Syndrome

1	JD:	hh Our most th:orough (0.2) and careful efforts to
2		determine (.) whether chemical agents were us:ed in
3		the Gulf, (.) .hh lead us to conclu:de that there was
4		no: (.) w:idespread use of chemicals against U.S. troops. =
5	IR:	=Was there any use. = Forget w [idespread. Was there any use.]
6	JD:	[I- I do not belie:ve]
7		I do not believe there was any: o:ffensive use of chemical
8		agents by: .hh uh- Iraqi: (0.2) uh military: (.) troops.
9		Ther [e was not-
10	IR:	[Was there any- any accidental use. Were our troops
11		exposed in any way:.
12		(0.4)
13	JD:	.hhh Uh- I do not believe that our troops were:
14		expo:sed in any widespread way to: u [h: chemical
15	IR:	[In any narrow
16		way. = In any way.
17	JD:	hh .hh The defense science board did an independent
18		study of this matter: .hh [and fou:nd in their judgement=
19	IR:	[(.)
20	JD:	=that there was no:: confirmation .hh of chemical:
21		(0.2) weapon (0.2) widespread use: in the Gulf.

The deputy secretary first denies that our troops were exposed to any ***widespread use*** of chemical weapons (lines 1–4). The IR seeks to disallow this qualifying adjective by asking about *any* use whatsoever (line 5), but the IE again qualifies his response but in a different way (6–8), this time denying only that there was ***offensive use***. When the IR tries to disallow that qualification (10–11), the IE switches back to his previous qualifying adjective, restricting his denial to *widespread* exposure (13–14). This maneuver is countered more aggressively by the IR, who interjects his next pursuit just after the qualifying adjective is introduced and before the IE has reached a possible completion point (14–15). He makes one last attempt to elicit a blanket denial, but the IE holds fast to his more cautious position (17–21). The deputy secretary's caution is not difficult to understand: any confirmation would presumably expose the government to numerous lawsuits, while a flat denial may be unsupportable and may even contradict current or future evidence. He manages to avoid both alternatives repeatedly, and in a rather subtle way. He presents himself as if he were being dutifully responsive,

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Finally, even responses that do address the agenda of the question, but contain additional turn components that shift away from that agenda (as in exx. [18–20]), are treated as problematic in the news interview context (Greatbatch 1986b). This is a product of the distinctive turn-taking system that organizes news interview talk, which obligates IEs to restrict themselves to the action of answering IRs' questions (Greatbatch 1988, Heritage & Greatbatch 1991). Given this normative constraint on IEs' talk, any attempt to produce something other than an answer – even as a supplement to an otherwise responsive answer – may be regarded as an improper diversion from the agenda at hand.

By changing the topic of a question, the task that it poses, or the specific terms in which it is framed, IEs can loosen the strictures inherent in being on the receiving end of an interrogation. Any such maneuver is resistant in the affirmative sense and constitutes an effort to SHIFT THE AGENDA of the question.

Overt Practices

Given the various dimensions of resistance, how are such maneuvers actually managed by IEs? IEs deploy a wide range of discursive practices in such contexts, and these can be understood in terms of the way they reduce the risks associated with a resistant course of action.

One set of practices is used when IEs choose to be up front and explicit about what is taking place. The strategy of resisting a question OVERTLY has, from the IE's point of view, an obvious disadvantage: It renders the resistance conspicuous, and hence more likely to be noticed by the IR and the media audience. However, this disadvantage is offset by an equally important advantage: Having admitted the evasion, an IE can take steps to minimize the damage that it might otherwise cause. Three forms of damage control will be examined as they figure in efforts to shift away from the agenda of the question.

Deference to the IR

IEs often preface their agenda shifts with remarks that display some degree of DEFERENCE TO THE IR. Perhaps the greatest deference is conveyed when the IE actually REQUESTS PERMISSION FROM THE IR to shift the agenda.[7]

In ex. (18), for example, a China expert first answers a question about whether recent civil unrest will strengthen the position of reform-oriented officials in that country (lines 4–13), and he then goes on to talk about various other matters (16–25), including the generational shift in Chinese leadership and problems of corruption. However, he does not raise these other matters without first requesting (arrow 1) and receiving (arrow 2) permission from the IR to do so.

(18) UK, *Newsnight*: Civil Unrest in China

1 IR: Well what do you think do you think this strengthen:s

4	DH:			I think that (0.2) Jao Ze Young just as he was
5				responsible for bringing (.) China out of the turbulence
6				which followed the .hhh uh resignation of Hu Yao Bung as
7				General Secretary in=uh January nineteen eighty seven.
8				.Hhh just as he (.) brought China out of that turbulence
9				he will bring Chi:na out of this turbulence .hhh and I
10				think his stature has already been increased (.) by
11				recent events (.) .h and ah (.) I'll go out on a limb
12				and say: I think it's likely to be increased further
13				.hh by future events
14		1	→	but I would like to make two very quick points.=
15	IR:	2	→	=Very quickly if you would.
16	DH:			There's a genera:tional thing he:re. .Hhh U:um (0.4) ih
17				Deng Zhao Peng is going to be ei:ghty fi:ve on the twenty
18				second of August this yea:r. .Hh he joi:ned the
19				Communist Pa:rty (0.3) .h in nineteen twenty fou:r. .Hh
20				When Mister Baldwin had become prime minister for the
21				first time in this coun:try:. Just. .Hhh (0.3) Secondly
22				(0.3) corruption. .Hh A lot of (.) what is: (.) ca:lled
23				corruption .hh is in fact the by:produ:ct (0.1) of a
24				system of multiple pricing .hhh which I think is going to
25				have to be rela:xed.

A similar request appears in ex. (19), an excerpt from a debate interview concerning health care reform. The IE – a health insurance industry executive who opposes President Clinton's health care reform plan – is asked whether anti-reform TV ads disclose the fact that they were paid for by the insurance industry (lines 1–4). She answers this question in the affirmative (5–8), but she then goes on (arrow 1) to ask the IR for permission to comment on an issue raised earlier in the program by a reform proponent (*Ron*). When the IR grants permission (arrow 2), she proceeds to address this other issue (which has to do with whether the so-called Coalition for Health Insurance Choices is actually an association of insurance companies masquerading as a grass-roots public interest group).

(19) US, 21 Oct. 1993, *MacNeil/Lehrer*: Health Care Ad War

1	IR:			.hhh Well Miss Jenckes he raises an interesting question.=
2				Again just as a matter of stra:tegy your ad doesn't
3				say:: that it's sponsored by the heal:th (.)
4				in[surance companies]
5	LJ:			[Margaret that's abs]olutely incorrect. .hh Our a:ds
6				(.) whether they're on TV, .h our print a-advertisements.
7				that appear in newspapers .hh even radio spots indicate
8				that we have paid for it.=
9		1	→	Let me may- just make one
10				comm[ent in [terms of wha [t Ron: says.
11	IR:			[.hhh [wh- [ih-
12	IR:	2	→	Al[l right.]

15 you always start with like minded people. But whether . .
16 you're an agent or a broker, .hh you have legitimate
17 health care concerns youself. . ..

Requests for permission openly acknowledge that a shift of the agenda is in the works. In ex. (19), the IE specifically indicates (lines 9–10) that she wishes to respond not to the IR's question, but to a point made earlier by another IE. At the same time, however, such requests defer to the IR as the one who is properly in charge of the discussion agenda.

The IE may also offer what Greatbatch 1988 has termed a TOKEN REQUEST FOR PERMISSION to shift the agenda; this resembles an actual request but is not treated as requiring a response from the IR. Thus, in ex. (20). a discussion of newly proposed legislation to restrict access to abortion, an anti-abortion advocate answers a legalistic question about the wording of legislation, but she then goes on to argue that current law is too permissive. She prefaces this agenda shift with a request-like object, *can I also point out* (arrowed).

(20) UK, *Afternoon Plus*: Abortion

1 IR: Jill Knight may I ask you how far that's going to be put
2 into practice and [what- who: is going to deci:de what=
3 JK: ['Ye::s'
4 IR: =i[s serious and what [is a substantial-
5 JK: ['Ye:s' [.hh uh
6 JK: Well of course the doctor:: and u::h thuh-
7 [in other a:reas wh(h)ere medical- th'medical profession=
8 (): [( )
9 JK: =is practiced .hhh doctors've been quite capable of
10 deciding what's serious. (.) and what substantial means,
11 → .hhh And can I also point out, .hh that u::h
12 Professor Huntingford whom you had on .hh your
13 program in December:: .hh supporting the abortion act
14 .hhh u::h eh said (.) really (.) again quite recently
15 there's no do(h)ubt abo(h)ut it=we have got abortion on
16 ^request, .hhh and this is what parliament did NOT ask for . . .

Notice that the IR makes no attempt either to grant or to refuse permission, and the IE does not seem to expect a response. Indeed, she actively discourages a response by building her token request as an incomplete clausal unit (*can I also point out that* . . .), which projects further talk to come. Because they provide so little opportunity for response, token requests are somewhat less deferential than their full-fledged counterparts. Nevertheless, they do show the IE to be "going through the motions" of seeking permission, thereby continuing at least to acknowledge the principle that it is the IR who normally sets the agenda.

Whether they are "genuine" or "pro forma," requests for permission openly acknowledge the fact that an agenda shift is being contemplated. At the same time, however, these practices alleviate some of the interpersonal damage that

to the IR's control over the course of the discussion. Any effort to seek permission mitigates that threat by deferring to the IR and sustaining a sense in which the IR remains at least formally in charge.

Minimizing the Divergence

A second form of damage control involves downplaying the agenda shift by portraying it as insignificant, a minor digression from the agenda established by the question. Requests for permission often contain MINIMIZING CHARACTERIZATIONS, such as reference to "a very quick" or "just one" comment.

(21) UK, *Newsnight*: Civil Unrest in China
DH: But I would like to make *two* very quick points

(22) US, 21 Oct. 1993, *MacNeil/Lehrer*: Health Care Ad War
LJ: Let me may-just make one comment in terms of what Ron says . . .

In addition to temporal and numerical minimizers, the inclusion of the adverb "just" further downgrades what is about to be said, as in the preceding example and again in the following:

(23) UK, *Today*: Child Support
RH: Can I say just to (set) the context . . .

In each of these ways, the divergence is cast as a slight digression from the framework of the question.

Justifying the Shift

IEs may also strive to EXPLAIN AND JUSTIFY their efforts to divert the discussion. Justifications may be embedded within requests for permission. For example, in ex. (24), a discussion of the 1992 vice presidential debate, a Republican strategist first responds to a question about the performance of Ross Perot's vice presidential candidate, Admiral Stockdale, but he then shifts the agenda (lines 14–16) to defend George Bush's flip-flop on abortion, and he prefaces this shift with a token request for permission (arrowed):

(24) US, 13 Oct. 1992, *Nightline:* Presidential Debate

1	IR:	.hhhh Uh Bill Kristol, does: Stockdale's performance
2		tonigh:t take some of the air:: (.) out of the the
3		Pe[rot balloo]n:: just as it was getting bl:own up again.
4	WK:	[p H H Hhhh]
5		(0.6)
6	WK:	Uh:: I'm not sure about that Chris. I think the: ah:
7		two things were remember- we'll remember about Admirable
8		Stock- Admiral Stockdale tonight ah: are his: very strong

10 and his statement about the important of cah- 'portance
11 of character. .h to leadership. Both of those statements
12 will: (reboun:d) to the benefit of President Bush.
13 .hh Ah and on that last point
14 → if I could just speak to Molly's point: uh before the break,
15 uhm President Bush changed his mind about abortion an:d
16 said so. . . .

This token request contains justificatory elements, and these are embodied in how the requested action is characterized. Instead of asking generically to "say one more thing" or "make an additional point," this IE asks specifically to address *Molly's point before the break.* This way of characterizing what he wants to do is not technically necessary for the token request to be intelligible; it is a choice that provides an implicit rationale for the agenda shift. In the context of a debate interview involving partisan IEs, portraying the shift as a response to a point made earlier by an opposing IE tacitly justifies the shift on the grounds of fairness and the principle that partisan accusations should not be permitted to stand unanswered. In addition, the shift is characterized in relation to an impending commercial break, further justifying the maneuver by explaining why it is being launched at this particular point in time.

Justifications can also appear outside of permission requests, where they tend to be more explicit and elaborate. An example is highlighted in ex. (25). The IR asks whether corporate mergers are creating monopolistic entities, and the IE briefly addresses this issue, but he then raises other concerns about mergers. Before doing so, however, he justifies this shift (arrowed) on the basis that it will concern the most important problem with corporate mergers, one that has not yet been addressed in the interview.

(25) US, 5 June 1985, *Nightline*: Corporate Mergers

IR: .hhhh Senator Metzenbaum take me back to the- to that difference: that uh Mister Forbes made a moment ago, between monopolies and what we have today:, which it seems in- in some instances is moving .hh at least (0.2) gr:adually in the direction of a monopoly. is it not? (0.3)

HM: Well I think that some mergers (.) don't have any element of monopoly in them at a:ll. .hh (.) Uh for example General Motors buying Hughes Aircraft (I'm-) not at all certain that there's any monopoly (.) issues there. (0.5)
→ On the other hand I think the real concern tha h:asn't
→ been addressed (.) previously (.) in this program (0.7)
HAS to do with the fact that. . .
((parenthetical comment omitted))
. . . when you have a major merger of this kind, (0.2) of the KINd that we've been talking about on this program, (.hh) you haff to worry A does it eliminate (.) competition

secondly you have to be concerned as to the impact (.)
on the shareholders, (0.4) and third but certainly not
least of the three, (.) is the impact upon the community . . .

The rationales offered for agenda shifts tend, not surprisingly, to exclude naked self-interest as a motivating factor. Instead, such rationales fall into one of two basic categories. One argument, common in panel interviews involving partisan IEs, is based on an implicit principle of fairness and the need to respond to points raised by opposing IEs. Ex. (24) typifies this rationale, but other examples are commonplace:

(26) US, 3 Feb. 1992, *MacNeil/Lehrer*: Haitian Refugee Repatriation

BA: Ahm: let me just respond to a few things that (.)
Congressman Rangel said . . .

(27) US, 21 Oct. 1993, *MacNeil/Lehrer*: Health Care Ad War

LJ: Let me may- just make one comment in terms of what
Ron: says

Alternatively, unsolicited material may be justified on the basis that it has a significant bearing on the overarching subject at hand. This type of rationale is illustrated in ex. (25); other examples include the following:

(28) UK. *Today*: Child Support

RH: Can I say just to (set) the context. . .

(29) US, 5 May 1996, *This Week*: Gas Tax Repeal

RR: But I think there's really a- a mu:ch b:igger (0.4)
this is part of a much bigger picture . . .

In either case, the import of this practice remains much the same. Such accounts acknowledge the fact that a shift of the agenda is in progress, and they even grant that this constitutes a breach of interview etiquette. But by providing a justification grounded in principles of fairness or relevance to the discussion agenda. IEs present that breach in a favorable light.

The Special Case of Refusing to Answer

Justificatory accounts become particularly elaborate and strenuous when the IE overtly refuses to answer the question altogether. This follows from the fact that such refusals constitute a particularly strong breach of etiquette. It is one thing to make some effort to answer the question before proceeding to shift the agenda; it is quite another to decline to answer altogether (Greatbatch 1986b). Accordingly, justificatory accounts are crucial in this context.

Various rationales may be offered to account for a refusal to answer, but they [illegible] element in common: They deflect responsibility away from

is to claim that the information necessary to answer the question is unavailable. Thus, in ex. (30), when a medical researcher is asked whether a new cancer treatment may have other applications, he suggests that the information is not yet available because the relevant research has not yet been done:

(30) US, 8 Dec. 1985, *Face the Nation*: Cancer Treatment

IR: Uh two final questions. Doctor Rosenberg, d'you see this having application for other diseases, like multiple sclerosis or even A:IDS,
(0.4)
SR: We haven't yet begun: to explore that, although I think possibilities exist 'at need to be investigated 'n I think other:: scientists will be looking at those questions.

Notice that the IE does not merely assert that he DOESN'T KNOW the answer, which might taint his reputation as a medical expert. In general, DON'T KNOW accounts in news interviews usually contain some further explanation for the IE's lack of information. Indeed, when a simple don't know account is offered without any further explanation (arrow 1 in ex. [31]), it is pursued by the IR (arrow 2) in a way that strongly implies that the IE ought to know the answer in some form.

(31) US, 22 July 1985, *News Hour*: South Africa

IR: Who are these people.
(0.7)
HB: 1 → I do not know.=
IR: 2 → = You don't know the naych- I don't mean their names obviously but I mean what kind of peopl:e are falling-
[are falling- (0.4) into the category uh those =
HB: [I would ha-
IR: =thetch- need to be arrested.

Alternatively, the IE may suggest that he or she knows the answer but is unable to provide it under current circumstances. The temporal limitations of the broadcast interview are often cited – as in ex. (32), when a nuclear physicist asserts that she cannot answer *all these scientific questions in one minute given to me* (arrowed).

(32) US, 6 June 1985, *Nightline*: Nuclear Waste

IR: Continuing our conversation now with Doctor Rosalyn Yalow. Doctor Yalow uh- ehh lemme put it in very simple terms. If it's doable, if it is: easily disposable, why don't we.
(1.0)
RY: → Well frankly I cannot- (.) answer all these scientific questions in one minute given to me. . . .

An IE also may refuse to answer on the basis that the [illegible]

delicacies of official negotiations to deflect questions. In ex. (33), from a discussion of the federal budget, Senate majority leader Bob Dole is asked whether it will be necessary to cut social programs, raise taxes, or reduce defense spending in an effort to reduce the deficit, but Dole declines to answer (arrowed), arguing that to do so would be premature in advance of formal negotiations.

(33) US. 8 Dec. 1985, *Meet the Press*: Bob Dole

AH: You can't have it both ways either.>On this program< you have said that you don't think, .hhh that you'll eliminate thirty to fifty programs, [an'] Senator Packwood=
BD: [( )]
AH: =says ya have to, .hh Number two you say you hope you will not have a tax increase, [.hhhh And]=
BD: [But I do.]
AH: =number- and number three you say ya h:ope you can have a:l [m o s t] three percent on: .hhh on: on=
(): [( )]
AH: =defe:nse, .hh And yet you hafta cut fifty billion next year. Now which o'those three is gonna give Senator, (0.4)
BD: → I think that's going to happen sometime next year when
→ those of us:: uh in- leadership positions=set=down
→ with the President and make the hard choice. I don't
→ think I'd make it today: .hhhhh ih=in December of 1985.

Notice that this account, by proposing that TO ANSWER would be inappropriate, can also be taken to imply that THE QUESTION soliciting this answer was inappropriate, although this is an unstated implication of an account that remains focused primarily on the inappropriateness of answering.

Occasionally, however, an IE will go one step further by asserting outright that the question is improper and hence unworthy of an answer- in effect, deflecting the question by attacking it. In ex. (34), for example, when a Serbian spokesperson is asked if recent prisoners of war are being beaten (lines 1–2), he suggests that the line of questioning is unnecessarily provocative and biased (5–10):

(34) US, 15 July 1995, *NPR All Things Considered*: Serbia

1 IR: Are they being beaten? Or will you be: are you treating
2 them (u-) humanely according to inter[national conventions.
3 IE: [hhh!
4 (.)
5 IE: Well I mean your line of questioning really suggests that
6 we are the most awful creatures on earth. That we a:re
7 beating the prisoners, raping women, and so on and so forth.
8 .hh Please I think I have been very: uh: uh correct in my
9 answers, an' I would expect you to: .hh be more correct in
10 your line of question=because it's extremely provocative. . . .

By attacking the question in this way, the IE both justifies his failure to provide an answer and deflects the discussion away from the substance of the question and toward the manner in which it was raised.

It is rare for an IE to refuse a question flatly, without providing a rationale of some sort. When that does happen, it can come across as an extremely hostile gesture (arrowed in ex. [35]). Consider how a Labour politician flatly refuses a question concerning his willingness to serve in a cabinet committed to unilateral nuclear disarmament:

(35) UK, Greatbatch 1986b:451: Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament]

IR: You wouldn't serve in a Cabinet committed to lu-
unilateral nuclear disarmament of Britian would you
Mister Shore?
PS: .hh What I do believe:: er: Mister Day (which)
→ I will not a:nswer that question, I'm not (.)
→ deliberately answering that question.
What I do believe is thi:s. I do actually genuinely believe
lo:ng believe: (d) .hhh that unilateral initiatives: (.) can
assist (.) multilateral disarmament. . . .

Here the IE not only declines to offer a justification; he casts his refusal to answer as a deliberate, willful choice. This can be heard as a powerful – albeit implicit – attack on the legitimacy of the question (and, by implication, on the judgment of the IR. who asked it), which is treated as so transparently unworthy that its refusal requires no justification.

At the opposite extreme are refusal accounts that are nonhostile in character and inflict minimal damage to the interpersonal relationship between IR and IE. The most notably benign practice involves refusing to answer AS A MATTER OF GENERAL POLICY; IEs may assert, in effect, that they never answer questions of that sort. In ex. (36), for example, when Arthur Scargill is asked if he is planning to run for the presidency of the National Union of Mineworkers (lines 1–2), he refuses to say then and there, pointing out that he's been similarly unresponsive to *every other pressman over the past forty-eight hours* (3–5):

(36) UK. 13 March 1979, *World at One*: National Union of Mineworkers

1 IR: M:ister Scargill will you run for the presidency of the National
2 Union of Mineworkers.
3 AS: .hhh er Mister Day: I must give you the same answer that I've
4 been giving every other pressman over the past forty-eight
5 hours. .hhh If and when Mister Gormley officially (.) hands in
6 his resignation and that's by no means certain .hhhh cr during:
7 this year or at any time during the next three years .hh then I
8 will give (.) serious consideration to the matter . . .

Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin does something very similar when asked about the direction of future interest rates. He [illegible]

three-and-a-half-year-old policy of not commenting on the future course of the financial markets (lines 2–4):

(37) US, 5 May 1996, *ABC This Week with David Brinkley*: Robert Rubin

1 IR: But which way are they going now?=
2 RR: =>For three and a half years.< .hhh Sa:m. I have had for
3 three and a half years a policy of >not commenting on
4 what markets are gonna do. . . .

As a form of damage control, the general-policy account has advantages that extend beyond its justificatory import. By emphasizing that there is a principled rationale underlying the refusal, this type of account also has the effect of DEPERSONALIZING the refusal. It is presented not as an idiosyncratic response to a particular question from a particular IR, but as a general policy applied to all questions of that sort. This helps to ensure that the refusal will not be taken as an act of defiance against the IR per se. Furthermore, insofar as this practice implies that any further efforts to elicit an answer will prove fruitless, it also FINALIZES the refusal. It thereby inhibits follow-up questions and represents a strong bid to close down the entire line of inquiry.[8]

Covert Practices

Overt practices have their counterpart in strategies for resisting a question COVERTLY. Covert practices are used mainly in the context of positive resistance. or talk that departs from the agenda of the question. What makes them covert is that the IEs avoid any explicit acknowledgment of the fact that a shift is in progress, and they may also take steps to conceal that fact. For the IE, the obvious advantage of a surreptitious strategy is the possibility of "getting away with it"; if done with enough subtlety, it may escape the notice of the IR and many audience members. On the other hand, if the maneuver *is* noticed, it can be particularly costly for the IE. Those who sidestep questions while pretending to answer them risk being seen as devious and manipulative, and this is over and above the negative inferences generated by the resistance itself. Furthermore, such inferences cannot be forestalled via forms of "damage control," because the covert nature of the practice precludes any explicit remedial effort. IEs can, however. reduce the likelihood that the resistance will be noticed by taking steps to render it less conspicuous.

Subversive Word Repeats and Anaphoric Pronouns

Earlier we considered how a stretch of talk becomes recognizable as an "answer," and we described a variety of practices – including lexical repetitions and anaphoric pronouns – that are implicated in processes of doing "answering." However. sufficient for answering to occur

A recognizable answer can be constructed without any of these practices; conversely, when such practices are used, they provide no guarantee that a full-fledged answer has been given. Indeed, IEs can use these same practices subversively to provide a kind of surface camouflage for maneuvers that are substantively resistant.

A straightforward example of this sort appears in ex. (38), an interview with Arthur Scargill of Britain's National Union of Mineworkers. The interview took place just as the mineworkers were preparing to elect a new president, and Scargill was discussed as a likely candidate. In a question seeking to distinguish the candidates on the left, the IR (lines 1–2) asks Scargill to explain *the difference between your Marxism and Mr. McGahey's Communism.* Scargill launches his response (line 3) with a repeat of a key word from the question: *The difference is. . . .* By virtue of this literal repetition, he appears to be moving straightforwardly to answer the question:

(38) UK, 13 March 1979, *World at One*: Striking Mineworkers

1	IR:		.hhh cr <u>W</u>hat's the difference between <u>y</u>our Marxism **and**
2			Mister McGahey's Communism.
3	AS:	→	er The difference is that it's the <u>pr</u>ess that <u>c</u>onstantly
4			call me <u>Ma</u>:rxist when I do <u>not</u>, (.) and never <u>h</u>ave (.)
5			er er given that description of myself. . . .

But appearances can be deceiving: Scargill uses the word *difference* to mean something quite other than what it meant in the IR's original question. In that question, *the difference* refers to a distinction between two candidates, Scargill vs. McGahey, and their ideologies. In the response, *the difference* refers to a distinction between two interpretations – by the press vs. by Scargill – of Scargill's ideology in particular. This semantic shift in the meaning and reference of *the difference* is part and parcel of a more encompassing shift in the agenda. Scargill veers away from the question per se in order to counter a presupposition that was embedded within it – that he is in fact a Marxist. To be sure, this is a relatively mild divergence. in that Scargill does not change the subject so much as propose that the question is inapposite. Nevertheless, he does not, strictly speaking, answer the question in the way in which it was framed. And yet he presents himself as if he were being dutifully responsive. By repeating a key lexical item from the question (*What's the difference. . .* → *The difference is . . .*), he packages his response as if it were filling the information gap targeted by the question.

Like word repeats, anaphoric pronouns can be used subversively. Consider ex. (39), an exchange with a spokesperson for presidential candidate Ross Perot. The IR prefaces his question with a comment on the amount of money Perot is planning to spend on TV advertising during the final weeks of the campaign (lines 1–3), and he goes on to ask whether Perot is *actually gonna get out and meet with the voters . . .* (4–5). The IE begins to respond by saying *Let's talk about this* (6), using a pronoun that refers to the questioning turn and thus seeming to promise a bona fide answer.

(39) US, 15 Oct. 1992, *MacNeil/Lehrer*: Presidential Debate

1	IR:	.hh Mister Milfor:d ah r- your man Ross Perot is gonna
2		spen:d at lea::st ten milli:ion dollars .hh in TV advertising
3		>in the final two and a half weeks of this campaign.<
4		.hhh Is he actually gonna get out and- and meet with
5		voters, campai:gn like the other candidates?
6	CM:	Yeh. well l- let's: (.) talk about this: for a second.
7		Ah- the- the other two: (.) candidates recei:ve over
8		fifty five point two million dollars directly from the
9		taxpay:ers. .hh Mister Perot is spending his own money.
10		In addition to the fifty five million dollars that they
11		get from the federal government, .hh they get over a
12		hundred million dollars in so::ft money. The whole way
13		the (.) political process is financed is something we
14		objec:t to::, .hhhh I- I imagine he will spend ten
15		million dollars on media 'cause what we see is something
16		very extraordinary in Amer:ican politics. .hh Usually,
17		with the passage of ti:me independent candidates go
18		down: in the polls:. .hh Since we have entered the
19		race according to the polls, we've gone from seven to
20		fifteen percent. . . . And we think Perot is gonna win.
		.
		.((Some 20 lines of transcript omitted))
		.
21	IR:	. . . You: you gave a good answer.=You never answered my
22		question, how:ever. .hh >Part of thuh political process<
23		is for candidates actually to get out and mee:t with voters.
24		(0.3) >Is he gonna do tha:t?

Rather than answer the question about meeting with the voters, the IE responds instead to the prefatory comment, offering a lengthy justification for Perot's advertising expenditures (lines 6–14). He then goes on to comment on Perot's rise in the polls and his chances of winning (15–20). This shift is obscured by the initial back-referencing statement, but it is not exactly invisible. The IR pursues the matter (21–24), explicitly sanctioning Milford for having *never answered my question.*

Subversive word repeats and anaphoric pronouns also can be used in combination, as in ex. (40), from a British debate interview concerning a proposal to make abortions more difficult to obtain. The excerpt begins with the IR asking Jill Knight, an outspoken opponent of abortion, about one aspect of the legislation, which would shorten the time period for legal abortions. A key word in the question is *concern*; it is central to the final question (line 13), which asks about the IE's level of *concern* regarding the more restricted time frame, and it also appears in the preceding statement (12) and the earlier lead-in (3–4), both of which make reference to widespread public "concern" about the new restrictions:

(40) UK, *Afternoon Plus*: Abortion

3			same. (.) and indeed (.) have caused great deal of
4			concern. (0.4) But first you'll note .hhh is the
5			clause about (.) time limits h in which h abortions
6			can be .h legally=
7	(JK):		=*(yes)*=
8	IR:		=ha:d. And the time limit h (.) according to the
9			bill has now dropped .h from twenty eight weeks .h
10			(.) to twenty wee[ks.
11	(JK):		[Yes.=
12	IR:		=Now< a lot of people are very concerned about this.
13			[.hh How concerned are you.
14	(JK):		[*yeh*
15	JK:	→	.hhh Uh: (.) I think this is right. I think that um:
16			.hh again one's had a lot of e:uh conflicting
17			evidence on this but .hh what has come ou::t h an'
18		→	I think that .h the public have been concerned about
19		→	this. .hhh is that there have been th'most
20			distressing cases, .hhh of (.) live (.) kicking
21			babies who have been destroyed. .hh I've had nurses
22			come to me in great distress (0.2) about this .hh and
23			uh there was undoubtedly (0.1) throughout the whole
24		→	(ambit) of public opinion .hh very great concern .h
25			on this whole question. . . .

In her initial response, the IE appears to be moving to answer the question straightforwardly. Her first remark (*I think this is right*) refers to the IR's prior talk and seems to be expressing some form of confirmation or agreement. And when she begins to elaborate, she twice uses that same key word, *concern* (arrowed). However, this comes to mean something very different here than it did originally. She uses *concern* to mean "concern about late term abortions"; but in the original question it meant "concern about the more restricted time frame" and, by implication, the more restricted access to abortion that this entails. This semantic shift is intertwined with a more encompassing shift in the topical focus of the response vis-à-vis the original question.

It is useful to consider the ramifications of a more overt mode of resistance. The IE could have said something like "I'm not the least bit concerned about a shorter time frame; what worries me is the destruction of live and kicking babies!" But that would place her in direct disagreement with the viewpoint embedded in the question, and it would make her vulnerable to being seen as insensitive to the plight of those seeking abortion services. Her actual course of action obscures such implications. She presents herself as if she were straightforwardly answering, and agreeably expressing "concern," while surreptitiously veering away from the question in the way in which it has been framed. The cover for this maneuver is provided by the back-referencing confirmation and the lexical repetition, the latter serving as a kind of pivot between the question's agenda and the somewhat different direction pursued subsequently.

Operating on the Question

Agenda shifts can be obscured in other ways. Before "answering" a given question, an IE may first refer to, characterize, or paraphrase the question at hand. These various operations can modify the question in a way that both facilitates and conceals a shift of the agenda. Thus, not only can IEs adjust the surface form of a response to fit the question, they can also, in effect, adjust the question to fit the response that they intend to give.

To illustrate, consider ex. (41), an excerpt from an interview with a presidential candidate, Senator Gary Hart. The 1988 interview was prompted by media reports suggesting that Hart had an extramarital affair with a young woman named Donna Rice. At one point, he was asked specifically if he had an affair with Miss Rice (arrow 1). In the course of his answer, Hart reformulates the question (arrow 2), broadening it so that it is made to concern his marital fidelity over the past 29 years, including periods during which he and his wife were publicly known to have been separated. Upon completing this reformulation, he provides an "answer" (arrow 3), an admission of infidelity. But the parameters of his admission have been set not by the original question, but by the reformulation.

(41) US, *Nightline*: The Best of Nightline

IR:			Uh- (0.5) I told you::. (0.4) some days ago when we spo:ke, and I told our audience this evening that I would ask you both questions. I will ask you the first now: just before we tak a brea:k because I think I know what your answer's gonna be.=
	1	→	=Did you have an affair with Miss Rice?
GH:	2	→	. . . .hhhh Mister Koppel (1.1) if the question: (.) is in the twenty nine y:ear:s of my marriage, including two public separations have I been absolutely and totally faithful: to my wife .hhh
	3	→	I regret to say the answer is no: . . . .

The advantages of such a transformation should be obvious. It enables Hart to appear "forthcoming," but in response to a question that, by virtue of its generality, is much less pointed. His admission is thus less politically damaging than it might otherwise have been. In effect, Hart manages to "steer the question" in a more desirable direction. In this particular example, Hart seems to acknowledge the fact that the question has been modified. Notice that his reformulation is offered tentatively within an *if*-clause (*Mister Koppel, if the question is . . .*). This case is thus comparatively overt in the way in which it shifts the agenda.

Other question reformulations are asserted more forcefully, as if they were faithfully preserving the essence of the original question. Ex. (42) comes from the 1988 vice presidential debate; although not officially labeled a "news interview," this event was organizationally similar in having the candidates respond to questions from a panel of journalists. In the first question to Dan Quayle, a

critical of Bush's decision to choose Quayle as his running mate (lines 4–16); the journalist then asks Quayle why he hasn't made *a more substantial impression* on his own Republican colleagues (16–19). Quayle begins his response (21–24) by reformulating the question in terms of his general qualifications for the presidency:

(42) US. 5 Oct. 1988, Bentsen-Quayle Debate

1	JRN:		hhhh Senator you have been criticized as we all
2			know:: for your decision to stay out of the Vietnam
3			war::, (0.3) for your poor academic record, .hhhhhh
4			but mo:re troubling to so::me are some o'thuh
5			comments that've been made by people in your own
6			party, tch .hhh Just last week former Secretary
7			of State Hai::g. .hh said that your pi:ck. (0.2)
8			was thuh dumbest call George Bush could've
9			ma[:dc.
10	AUD:		[h-h-hhxhxhx [hxxXXXXXXXXXXXX=]
11	JRN:		[Your leader in the Senate]
12	AUD:		=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX[XXXXXXXxxxxxxx(5.8)]
13	JRN:		[Your leader in the Senate] Bob
14			Do:le said that a better qualified person could have
15			been chosen. .hhh Other Republicans have been far
16			more critical in private. .hhhh Why d'you think
17			that you have not made a more substantial
18			impression on some of these people who have been able
19			to observe you up clo:se.
20			(1.5)
21	DQ:	→	.hhhhhh The question goe::s (1.0) to whether
22			I'm qualified (1.1) to be vice president, (0.8)
23			.hhh and in the case of a:: (.) tragedy whether
24			I'm qualified to be president. (0.6) .hhhh (0.7)
25			Qualifications for:: (0.2) the office of vice
26			president 'r president (1.0) are not age alo:ne.
27			(1.5) you must look at accomplishments: (1.0)
28			and you must look at experience. . . .

This is a substantial transformation. On one level, it moves from subjective impressions of Quayle – which may be difficult to explain or refute – to his qualifications considered as an objective matter. There is also a change in the presuppositional loading of the question. The original question is presuppositionally negative: In both the preface and the wording of the question itself, it presumes that Quayle did not in fact make a good impression and asks why this was so. In contrast, the reformulated version is presumptively neutral (*whether I'm qualified*) and thus facilitates a more upbeat response. Despite the magnitude of this transformation, it is asserted affirmatively and without qualification (*The question goes to . . .*). Quayle thus proposes that his reformulation successfully

To appreciate the significance of this practice for managing an agenda shift, it might be useful to consider what the preceding exchange would look like without a reformulation:

(43) [Invented]

JRN: . . . Why do you think that you have not made a more substantial impression on some of these people who have been able to observe you up close?

DQ: Qualifications for the office of vice president or president are not age alone. You must look at accomplishments and you must look at experience.

When the "answer" is made to follow the question without any preparatory work, it is manifestly disjunctive. Against this backdrop, the importance of the reformulation is that it affiliates the matter-to-be-pursued with the matter-that-was-inquired-about, thereby minimizing the discrepancy between the two. In effect, the reformulation provides a version of the question that the subsequent response can be seen as "answering."

In ex. (42), the IE operates on the question as a whole object. But IEs also may operate on a component of the question – a phrase, a prefatory statement, or one part of a multi-part question. In ex. (44), from a Nixon press conference during the Watergate period, Nixon targets the first part of a two-part question for reformulation. The journalist first asks (beginning at arrow 1) whether Nixon is personally investigating charges that his campaign funds were mishandled, and he then asks (arrow 2) whether the charges will hurt his bid for reelection. After a prefatory remark, Nixon produces a reformulation (arrow 3) that highlights the first part of the question:

(44) US, 29 August 1972, Nixon Press Conference

JRN: 1 → Mr. President, are you personally investigating the mishandling of some of your campaign funds,

2 → and do you agree with Secretary Connolly that these charges are harmful to your re-election?

RN: Well, I commented upon this on other occasions, and I will repeat my position now.

3 → With regard to the matter of the handling of campaign funds, we have a new law here in which technical violations have occurred and are occurring, apparently, on both sides. As far as we are concerned, we have in charge, in Secretary Stans, a man who is an honest man and one who is very meticulous – as I have learned from having him as my treasurer and finance chairman in two previous campaigns – in the handling of matters of this sort. Whatever technical violations have occurred, certainly he will correct [illegible] will thoroughly comply with the law. He

> conducting it very, very thoroughly, because he doesn't want any evidence at all to be outstanding, indicating that we have not complied with the law.

This reformulation is subversive in two respects. First, it replaces a key term from the question that implied wrongdoing (*mishandling*) with a more favorable term (*handling*). Furthermore, the remainder of the response deals exclusively with the matter of the investigation; Nixon never gets around to the second part of the question, regarding the consequences for his reelection campaign. This omission may not have been accidental. Dealing with the investigation question enables Nixon to present himself as "doing something" about a scandal within his administration, and thus independent of the morally tainted forces which brought it about. In contrast, the issue of whether the scandal will hurt his campaign seems, at least from his standpoint, less advantageous.

Although this omission is clear in retrospect, it was not evident at the outset that some form of evasion was in progress. Nixon could have gone on to answer the second question. Indeed, it is standard practice for IEs, when "reaching back" to deal with something other than the last component of the questioning turn, to indicate as much by referring to or reformulating that aspect of the question (Clayman 1993). This is because IEs normally address the final component of the question (Sacks 1987); conversely, they take steps to warn listeners when an atypical response trajectory is in the offing. Thus, Nixon's operation was initially accountable as an effort to manage an atypical response trajectory rather than to avoid the second question.

There are still more subtle variations on the practice of operating on the question. In the cases examined thus far, the operation is exposed within a discrete unit of talk, but it also may be embedded within some other activity – assertions of agreement or disagreement, for example. Ex. (45) shows how, in the course of claiming to agree/disagree with some aspect of the question, an IE can embeddedly reformulate that question (arrowed):

(45) US. 22 July 1985, *MacNeil/Lehrer*: South Africa

1	JW:		But isn't this (.) d. declaration of the state of
2			emergency:: (.) an admission that the eh=South African
3			government's policies have not worked, an' in fact that
4			the um- United States (0.2) administration's policy of
5			constructive engagement (.) has not worked.
6	FW:	→	I do not agree with you .hhhh that the approach we have taken
7		→	(.) toward South Africa is- ay- is an incorrect approach.
8			.hhhhh We want (0.5) to see that s- system change. We wanta see
9			South Africa end apartheid. We wanta see basic rights established
10			for all South Africans. .hhhh We wanta see peace and stability
11			in that country, .hhh An' that's a PERfectly respectable goal.
12			Second. The way we have pursued it .hhh I also believe
13			.hhh is the most SENsible way: in dealing with a
14			dangerous situation

Here, the IE first asserts disagreement (*I do not agree with you*) and then characterizes the object of his disagreement (*that the approach we have taken. . .*) in a manner that transforms the terms of the question. The transformation is subtle yet advantageous for the IE, who was then a U.S State Department official during the Reagan administration and is here defending Reagan's policy of "constructive engagement." The original question asked (after some preliminary talk) whether the U.S. policy of constructive engagement *has not worked.* This is reformulated in the statement of disagreement as a question about whether U.S. policy *is an incorrect approach.* The latter version is very much easier for the IE to refute. It is difficult to argue with the original assertion that U.S. policy *has not worked,* since at the time of the interview apartheid remained intact. But one can assert the overall *correctness* of U.S. policy even in the face of its manifest failure to bring about an end to apartheid, and this is precisely what the IE does in his subsequent response.

Two Case Studies

Having analyzed various practices for managing resistance as they are employed across a wide range of interview circumstances, it is now time to apply these analytic resources to some singular cases. One objective of these case studies is to illustrate the power of the analytic apparatus developed thus far to elucidate just how particular noteworthy IEs are able to elude the grasp of an advancing line of questioning. Moreover, while a systematic analysis of audience reactions is beyond the scope of this paper, these case studies are suggestive of the impact that such practices can have on subsequent media commentary and on pubic opinion.

Dan Quayle and the Succession Question

During the 1988 U.S. presidential campaign, the two main vice presidential candidates, senators Lloyd Bentsen and Dan Quayle, squared off in a nationally televised debate. The format had the candidates responding to questions from a panel of four journalists, making it not unlike a multi-IR interview or small press conference. Opportunities to follow up and pursue evasive answers were more limited than in ordinary news interviews, because here each journalist could ask only one question at a time, and the order of questioners was predetermined. Nevertheless, processes of resistance and pursuit were both very much in play.

An extended tug-of-war developed around the issue of presidential succession. It began when Dan Quayle – a youthful senator and George Bush's running mate – was asked what he would do if the president died or became incapacitated for some reason. The purpose of this question was to test Quayle's readiness for assuming the presidency in an emergency: What would be his plan of action? Quayle sidestepped this issue when it was first raised, prompting several follow-

The first journalist to raise this question was Brit Hume of ABC News. Noting the apprehensions people might feel about Quayle being *a heartbeat away from the presidency* (ex. [46], lines 1–4), he asks Quayle to describe, in the event of his sudden succession to power, *the first steps that you'd take and why* (5–10):

(46) US, 5 Oct. 1988, Bentsen-Quayle Debate

1	JRN:		Senator I wan- I wanna take you back if I can
2			to the question Judy as:-asked you about some
3			o'the apprehensions people may feel about your
4			being a heartbeat away from the presidency. .hhhh
5			And let us assume if we can for the sake of this
6			question that you become vice president- an:d the
7			president is incapacitated for one reason or
8			another and you hafta take the reins of power.
9			.hhhh When that moment ca::me, w- what would be
10			thuh first steps that you'd take (0.2) and why::.
11			(3.2)
12	DQ:		.hh First I'd- first I'd say a prayer (1.1) tch for
13			myself (2.3) and for thuh country I'm about to
14			lead, (2.4) And then I would (1.1) assemble his
15			(1.1) people and talk (0.8) .hhh
16		→	And I think this question keeps going ba:ck to: (1.0)
17			the qualifications and what kind of (1.1) of vice
18			president 'n (0.7) in this hypothetical situation
19			(1.0) if I had to assume:: (0.8) thuh responsibilities
20			of: (0.3) president what I would be. (1.0) .hhh
21			And as I have said (1.2) tch age alo:ne. (0.3) .hh
22			although I can tell you h.h after the experience of:
23			these last few weeks 'n the campaign I've added
24			ten years to my a[ge,
25	AUD:		[x-x-x-x-x-x[-x (1.7)
26			[Age alone. (1.0)
27			is not (0.2) the only (0.5) qualification. .hhhh
28			You've got to look at ex:perience. (.) And you've
29			got to look at accomplishments. . . .

Quayle makes an initial stab at answering the question (lines 12–15), but it is rather half-hearted and insubstantial. He says only that he'd *say a prayer* and would *assemble his people and talk.* He then proceeds to reformulate the question (arrowed, lines 16–20), veering away from the issue of his plan of action for assuming the presidency in an emergency and toward the more general issue of his overall qualifications for the presidency. He then goes on to discuss his qualifications at length, ruling out age as a qualification and focusing on experience and accomplishments. In the end, talk about qualifications dominates his response, only the first part of which is reproduced here.

Although this shift is managed covertly and is obscured by the use of an initial question reformulation, Brit H[illegible]

In ex. (47), after a full round of questioning from the other panelists, Hume regains the floor and pointedly pursues the question (line 6). Before doing so, however, he carefully justifies this move by calling attention to the inadequacy of Quayle's previous response, summarizing it in a way that highlights its feebleness: *You said you'd say a prayer, and you said something about a meeting* (4–5). He then presses Quayle to elaborate (6). Notice that some audience members in the hall begin to laugh at this point (8), displaying appreciation of Hume's derisive commentary and aligning with him in his pursuit of an answer.

(47) US, 5 Oct. 1988, Bentsen-Quayle Debate

1	JRN:		Senator I wanna take you back to the question
2			that I asked you earlier about what would happen
3			if you were to: take over in an emergency and
4			what you would do first and why:: .hhhh You said you'd
5			say a prayer:: and you said something about a meeting,
6			(.) What would you do next.
7			(.)
8	AUD:		h-hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh [hh-h- ((laughter))
9	DQ:		[I don't believe that
10			it's (0.6) proper for me:: to: .hh get into the specifies:
11			(0.5) of a hypothetical (.) situation like tha:t (1.2)
12		→	The situation is: (0.8) that if'(0.8) I was called upon
13			(0.7) to ser:ve (0.7) as the president (0.4) of this country,
14			or the responsibilities of the president of this country,
15			(1.0) would I be capable and qualified (0.2) to do that.
16			(0.5) .hh and I've tried (0.4) to list the qualifications.
17			(1.0) of twel:ve year:s in the United States Congress. . . .

But that answer remains elusive, as Quayle again sidesteps the question, although his method of doing so here is rather different. Given that his prior covert maneuver has been exposed by Hume's pursuit, Quayle now chooses a more overt mode of resistance. He explicitly justifies his failure to provide a more substantial answer by characterizing the focus of inquiry as *a hypothetical situation* and suggesting that it would be improper to answer in specifics (lines 9–11). He then shifts the agenda (12–15) in precisely the same direction as before – away from his plan of action and toward his overall qualifications for the presidency. Thus, while Quayle's resistance is now overt and on record, it is also justified and accounted for.

Unfortunately for Quayle, justificatory accounts do not necessarily bring the line of questioning to a halt; such accounts can be argued with and contested. This is what the very next questioner on the panel – Tom Brokaw of NBC News – does, relinquishing whatever question he had planned to asked in order to pursue the succession question yet again. In ex. (48), Brokaw begins with a disclaimer to the effect that that he doesn't mean to *beat this drum until it has no more sound left in it* (lines 1–2). He then takes issue with Quayle's account for not ans- [illegible] *it is after all the reason*

question but with a pointed assertion (12–16) that *surely you must have some plan in mind* for assuming the presidency in an emergency, since it has happened to *so many vice presidents* in recent years. By rejecting Quayle's previous account for not answering, and by pressing the issue in a more pointed way, Brokaw has increased the pressure for a genuine response.

(48) US, 5 Oct. 1988, Bentsen-Quayle Debate

1	JRN:		Senator Quayle I don't mean to beat this drum
2			until it has no more sound left in it but to
3			follow up on Brit Hume's question w:hen you said
4			that it was a hypothetical situation, .hhhh it is
5			Sir after: all: the reason that we're here tonight.
6			.hh [h because you are=
7	DQ:		[Mhm
8	JRN:		=[running [not just for vice president,]
9	AUD:		[x x [x-x-x-xxxxxx=]
10			=xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [xx-x-x-x-x (4.4)]
11	JRN:		[And if you cite the] experience
12			that you had in Congress, (0.2) surely you must have
13			some plan in mind about what you would do: if it fell
14			to you to become >president of the United States<
15			as it ha:s to so many vice presidents .hh just in
16			the last twenty five years er so.
17			(0.3)
18	DQ:		teh .hhh Lemme try to answer the question one more
19			ti:me. I think this is the fourth ti:me,
20			(1.0) [that I have had this question, .h [and I think=
21	JRN:		[(this is-) [Third time
22	DQ:		=that-.hh three times, (0.8) that I have had this
23			question, and I'll try to answer it again for you.
24			(0.3) as clearly as I can. (0.7) .hh Because
25		1 →	the question you're asking. (1.3) is what (.)
26			kind (.) of qualifications .hhhhhh does Dan Quayle
27			have to be president. (1.0) tch
28		2 →	What kind of qualifications do I have
29		3 →	and what would I do: (1.0) in this kind of a situation.
30			(0.4) what would I do in this situation, .hh I would (1.9)
31			make sure. (2.1) that the people in the cabinet, (0.9)
32			'n the people 'n the advisors to the President, (.) are
33			called in, (0.2) an I'll talk to 'em, (0.5) an I'll work
34			with 'em. . . .

After commenting on the number of times he's had this question (lines 19–22), Quayle promises to *try to answer it again for you as clearly as I can* (23–24). Quayle then does something that is very puzzling on its face. He launches into yet another question reformulation (beginning at arrow 1) that begins to reframe the issue once again as a matter of qualifications. However, in the course of this reformu-

which he subsequently elaborates (30–34). Why does Quayle start to veer away from the agenda of the question, only to return to it subsequently?

The solution to this puzzle lies at the nonvocal level. After Quayle launches into his reformulation (at line 3 in ex. [49]) and completes the focal word *qualifications* (4), Brokaw begins shaking his head (6), and he continues to do so until the reformulation reaches a first possible completion point. In this way, Brokaw nonvocally rejects Quayle's bid to shift the agenda.

(49) US, 5 Oct. 1988, Bentsen-Quayle Debate

1	DQ:	. . . and I'll try to answer it again for you.
2		(0.3) as clearly as I can. (0.7) .hh Because
3		the question you're asking. (1.3) is what (.)
4		kind (.) of qualifications
5		.hh [hhhh does Dan Quayle have to be president. (0.5)] (0.5)
6	JRN:	[((H e a d s h a k i n g))]
7	DQ:	tch What kind of qualifications do I have
8		and what would I do: (1.0) in this kind of a situa[tion. (0.4)]
9	JRN:	[((Nodding))]
10	DQ:	And what would I do in this situation, .hh I would (1.9)
11		make sure. (2.1) that the people in the cabinet, (0.9)
12		'n the people 'n the advisors to the President, (.) are
13		called in, (0.2) an I'll talk to 'em. . .

This rejection is consequential; Quayle subsequently abandons the incipient agenda shift and returns to the original agenda (lines 7–8). Brokaw nods approvingly (9), and Quayle proceeds to elaborate on his emergency plan. Thus, while Quayle initially steers the question in a different direction, Brokaw steers him right back.

However, Quayle's return to the original agenda is made to appear as if it is unrelated to what Brokaw has done. Notice that Quayle does not respond immediately to the headshakes; he continues to speak through the headshaking until the reformulation is possibly complete (line 5). He also places some distance between the completion of the headshakes and the start of his continuation, allowing one full second of silence to elapse, and then backtracking a bit when he continues (7). Furthermore, when he finally gets to the plan of action component of the reformulation, he links it to the previous component with *and*; it is thus introduced as a supplementary rather than a contrastive matter. By these various means, Quayle constructs his reformulation so that it can be seen as a single continuous action rather than an "about-face" in response to Brokaw's prompting. In other words, he presents himself as if he had been headed in this direction all along.

In the aftermath of this debate, most observers declared Lloyd Bentsen the decisive winner, and extensive media commentary focused on Quayle's performance and its shortcomings. A common criticism was that he came across as overly "rehearsed" or "programmed" in his remarks. This widespread impression

experience – as a favored response to various kinds of questions (see also ex. [42]). Moreover, he repeatedly uses the same basic practice – which we have termed "operating on the question" – to fit that favored response to the question at hand. This recurrent mode of resistance is first managed covertly, but it is subsequently exposed by persistent follow-up questions from the panel of journalists. at which point it becomes transparently manipulative. Here, then, patterns of response within the event are congruent with and thus appear to have been consequential for subsequent media commentary.

The Affairs of Bill Clinton

Perhaps more than for any other American president, Bill Clinton's conduct in answering questions – not only in news interviews and press conferences, but in courtroom depositions as well – has had clear effects on his political fortunes and public image. He is a notoriously skilled interrogatee, adept at turning questions to his advantage while appearing to be dutifully responsive. However, when these practices have been exposed as strategies of evasion, the negative repercussions have been substantial. The following analysis focuses on questions regarding the delicate subject of extramarital affairs.

Early in the 1992 presidential campaign, allegations surfaced about an extended affair between Clinton and Gennifer Flowers. These allegations emerged just as Clinton was breaking from the pack of Democratic candidates to become the front-runner in the primary campaign, placing his buoyant candidacy in serious jeopardy. In an effort to confront the issue and put it to rest, both Bill and Hillary Clinton appeared on the *60 Minutes* program. That interview has been called one of the great performances in American presidential politics, and it was widely credited with rescuing the Clinton candidacy.

Many factors undoubtedly contributed to this outcome, but at least part of the success can be attributed to the manner in which Governor Clinton dealt with the core questions concerning his relationship with Gennifer Flowers. Although he admits in a general way to having had "problems" and "difficulties" in his marriage. specific questions about the alleged affair with Flowers are met with what seem at first glance to be straightforward denials. However, on analysis it becomes apparent each response falls at least a hair's-breadth shy of a full-fledged denial. Within the framework developed in this article, Clinton's responses are covertly resistant and extremely subtle in the manner in which they elude the agenda of the question.

Consider the first question of this kind, in which the IR, Steve Kroft, raises Flowers's claim of a twelve-year affair with Clinton (lines 1–3):

(50) US, Jan. 1992 *60 Minutes*: The Clintons

1 IR: She's alleging (0.2) and has described in some detail in
2 thuh super market tabloid .hh what she calls a twelve
3 year affair with you.
4 (1.5)

Clinton responds to this allegation (line 5) with a simple assertion to the effect that it is false. This assertion is squarely on-topic, but it is nonetheless only minimally responsive. As demonstrated earlier, given that elaborated answers are the norm in the news-interview context, minimal one-sentence responses are tacitly resistant to the agenda of the question. In the present case, Clinton's unelaborated denial – *That allegation is false* – is not particularly informative about his relationship with Flowers. Is he denying any extramarital affair whatsoever? Or is he merely denying an affair that lasted twelve years? By responding minimally, Clinton is able to issue a denial in a way that avoids specificity regarding what, exactly, is being denied.

The IR notices the ambiguity in Clinton's denial, and he pursues the question in a way that seeks to resolve it (lines 1–4). He tries to pin Clinton down to an absolute denial, reformulating the prior response as *categorically denying that you ever had an affair with Gennifer Flowers*:

(51) US, Jan. 1992, *60 Minutes*: The Clintons

1	IR:	I'm assuming from your answer (0.4) that you're (.)
2		categorically denying (.) that=you ever had an affair.
3		(1.0)
4	IR:	with Gennifer Flowers.
5	BC:	.hh I said that before. (.)
6		.hh °uh° An' so has she.
7	HC:	(hmh hmh hmh)
8		(.)
9	BC:	hh=huh Wh(h)en £these st(h)ories came out£ (0.5)
10		she: an' thec other people invol:ved, (0.2) nh:
11		denied them, (.) An' denied them (.) repeatedly, (.)
12		An' she changed her story when she was paid.

Once again, Clinton seems at first to be cooperating with the agenda of the question by confirming this version of his denial. However, he avoids a straightforward "yes" or "that's right," asserting instead that he had already denied the affair on some prior occasion (line 5), an occasion which remains unspecified in his response. He then proceeds to talk at greater length about Flowers's own previous denials of the affair (6–11), and he suggests that the recent change in her story was motivated by the money she received from the tabloid that first published it (12). Thus, while he fosters the impression of having categorically denied an affair, on closer analysis it becomes apparent that he never quite does so in the here-and-now, on his own accord. He adopts an interactional footing in which he is merely relaying denials previously expressed by himself and others.

This interview went over well at the time, and Clinton would go on to win both the nomination and the election decisively. But his performance would eventually come back to haunt him. Early in 1998, when Clinton was called to give a deposition in the Paula Jones lawsuit, he admitted under questioning that he did indeed have an affair with Flowers. Shortly thereafter, the original

Around the same time, allegations about another affair surfaced, this time involving a young White House intern named Monica Lewinsky. Shortly thereafter, Clinton was questioned about the affair in an interview on *NewsHour*. Once again, what initially appear to be forthright denials of the affair are in fact covertly resistant. In this case, the specific mode of resistance is a subtle shift in the terms of the question, a shift involving the verbal tense in which it is expressed:

(52) US, 21 Jan. 1998, *NewsHour*: Clinton

1 IR: You had no sexual relationship with this [young wo [man.]
2 IE: [ml [Th-]
3 IE: There is not a sexual relationship. That is accurate.

The IR asks Clinton to confirm that he *had no sexual relationship with this young woman.* Clinton eventually issues a confirmation (*That is accurate*), but only after reformulating the issue from past to present tense (*There is not a sexual relationship*). This response does not necessarily rule out an affair that is over and done with, but to the casual listener it might seem that Clinton has denied an affair altogether. This type of tense shift would later become notorious when it was exposed as a strategy employed by Clinton in the Paula Jones deposition.

The Clinton case is a powerful illustration of the distinctive attractions and risks associated with a covert mode of resistance. Throughout these examples, Clinton never owns up to the fact that he is not answering the question fully or straightforwardly; the resistance remains unacknowledged and extremely subtle. This approach enabled Clinton to survive various difficult moments in his original presidential campaign and his tenure in office. But because some of these responses have been exposed as evasive through subsequent events, he has paid a price over the long term in the form of damage to his political and personal reputation. The indictment against him is not merely that he sidesteps questions – many politicians are guilty of that – but that he is deceitful about it. The so-called "Slick Willie" factor should stand as a cautionary note to public figures contemplating a covert mode of resistance.

Discussion

In this age of political cynicism coupled with anxiety about the decline of civility in public life, it is tempting to assume that virtual anomie now characterizes the domain of public discourse. Politicians, in such a world, would no longer be bound by traditional norms and could thus ignore with impunity the questions they receive in journalistic interviews and press conferences. The practices examined in this article, taken together, reveal a more complex state of affairs. Although it is true that resistant and evasive responses are commonplace, these are managed with considerable care. When resistance is done overtly, interviewees take steps to control the damage that may be caused thereby. When it is done covertly, there are corresponding efforts to conceal the resistance or at least

consequences that can follow from the breach of conduct embodied in an act of evasion, and they demonstrate that such an act continues to be regarded AS a breach by those involved.

On the other hand, by virtue of these practices, politicians and other public figures can indeed gain substantial "wiggle room" for pursuing their own agendas even under the most persistent interrogation. It is possible that such practices have evolved over time in relation to the changing culture of the journalistic profession. In both England and the United States, journalistic questioning has become less deferential and more adversarial since the 1950s (Clayman & Heritage in press a, b). This could prompt interviewees to become more resistant and/or to develop more sophisticated methods for dealing with difficult questions, just as they have developed other strategies for managing adversarial encounters with journalists (see Jones 1992). Alternatively, increasingly adversarial questioning could have precisely the opposite effect: Insofar as adversarialness includes a greater propensity to ask follow-up questions that pursue evasive responses (Clayman and Heritage in press a), it could encourage interviewees to adhere more closely to the question agenda. Whether there actually has been a systematic change in public figures' responsive conduct – in either the propensity toward resistance or in the practices for managing resistance – must await further research.

Finally, this analysis has methodological ramifications for efforts to quantify responsive conduct as a prelude to examining its distribution across individual politicians, journalistic environments, or historical time periods. It should be abundantly clear that responses cannot properly be dichotomized as either "answers" or "evasions," for between these black-and-white categories are numerous shades of gray comprised of varying modes and degrees of resistance (cf. Bull 1994). Moreover, these variations may have nontrivial consequences for how the public forms judgments about a politician's moral character. To take just one example, a skillfully managed covert approach could enable a politician to get through a hostile interrogation without any negative repercussions. Alternatively, as the case of Bill Clinton aptly demonstrates, if covert evasions are exposed by subsequent events, the politician may be seen in retrospect as devious and manipulative, and this outcome may be worse for the politician than if he or she had initially acted overtly with appropriate forms of damage control. Accordingly, quantitative and distributional studies would do well to pay much closer attention to the specific practices through which interviewees deal with questions.

Notes

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1. This incident was discussed in a documentary film by Brian Springer entitled *Spin*.
2. This professional skill is often thematized in broadcast journalists' autobiographies

Mr. President! (Donaldson 1987). Both titles are common prefaces to hostile follow-up questions, and they evoke images of an aggressive interviewer doggedly pursuing his elusive prey.

3. This kind of full-form repetition, where the entire framework of the question is preserved in the initial response, appears disproportionately in certain environments. It is often found in exchanges that (i) are highly argumentative, or (ii) involve a response that ultimately departs from the agenda of the question. It may be that the practice of repeating the framework of the question, rather than accepting it and building on it, conveys a modicum of independence from the prior course of questioning, and is thus useful in resistant and hostile environments.
4. Notice that the IE refers to the IR by name ("Mister Day") as he launches his resistant response. It turns out that this is a highly recurrent practice across various forms of resistance. It appears to be related to the pragmatics of address term usage in interaction generally: Speakers often address their recipients by name when expressing deeply felt opinions and personal feelings (Clayman 1998), particularly when such opinions or feelings are oppositional in character.
5. Such multi-part questions are more common in press conferences than in news interviews.
6. This excerpt is from a taped interview segment on *60 Minutes*, and it appears to have been edited in such a way as to highlight and sharpen the tug-of-war between the IR and Deutch.
7. Similar requests for permission and token requests are used by IEs when speaking out of turn (Greatbatch 1988). Such practices generally serve to mitigate departures from the normative turn-taking arrangements in the news interview, and agenda shifts represent a specific type of departure that is mitigated in this way.
8. The array of refusal accounts discussed here may not be equally available to all IEs in all circumstances.

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18

Author Identification, Idiolect, and Linguistic Uniqueness

Malcolm Coulthard

Introduction

It is now over thirty-five years since Jan Svartvik published *The Evans Statements: A Case for Forensic Linguistics* (1968), in which he demonstrated that incriminating parts of a set of four linked statements – purportedly dictated to police officers by Timothy Evans and incriminating him in the killing of his wife and baby daughter – had a grammatical style measurably different from that of uncontested parts of the statements. It was later discovered that both victims had actually been murdered by Evans' landlord, John Christie. This marked the birth of a new discipline – the linguistic investigation of authorship for forensic purposes. Little more happened for a quarter of a century, with the notable exception of work by Roger Shuy in the USA (1993, 1998), but during the past ten years, there has been a rapid growth in the frequency with which lawyers and courts in a number of countries have called upon the expertise of linguists in cases of disputed authorship. The texts examined range from questioned suicide notes, through anonymous letters, mobile phone text messages and contemporaneous police records of both interviews and confession statements, to the essays of students suspected of plagiarism.

Idiolect and Uniqueness of Encoding

The linguist approaches the problem of questioned authorship from the theoretical position that every native speaker has their own distinct and individual

version of the language they speak and write, their own *idiolect*, and the assumption that this *idiolect* will manifest itself through distinctive and idiosyncratic choices in texts (see Halliday *et al.* 1964: 75; Abercrombie 1969). Every speaker has a very large active vocabulary built up over many years, which will differ from the vocabularies others have similarly built up, not only in terms of actual items but also in preferences for selecting certain items rather than others. Thus, whereas in principle any speaker/writer can use any word at any time, speakers in fact tend to make typical and individuating co-selections of preferred words. This implies that it should be possible to devise a method of *linguistic fingerprinting* – in other words that the linguistic 'impressions' created by a given speaker/writer should be usable, just like a signature, to identify them. So far, however, practice is a long way behind theory and no one has even begun to speculate about how much and what kind of data would be needed to uniquely characterize an *idiolect*, nor how the data, once collected, would be analysed and stored; indeed work on the very much simpler task of identifying the linguistic characteristics or 'fingerprints' of whole *genres* is still in its infancy (Biber 1988, 1995; Stubbs 1996).

In reality, the concept of the linguistic fingerprint is an unhelpful, if not actually misleading metaphor, at least when used in the context of forensic investigations of authorship, because it leads us to imagine the creation of massive databanks consisting of representative linguistic samples (or summary analyses) of millions of idiolects, against which a given text could be matched and tested. In fact such an enterprise is, and for the foreseeable future will continue to be, impractical if not impossible. The value of the physical fingerprint is that every sample is both identical and exhaustive, that is, it contains all the necessary information for identification of an individual, whereas, by contrast, any linguistic sample, even a very large one, provides only very partial information about its creator's idiolect. This situation is compounded by the fact that many of the texts which the forensic linguist is asked to examine are very short indeed – most suicide notes and threatening letters, for example, are well under 200 words long and many consist of fewer than 100 words.

Nevertheless, the situation is not as bad as it might at first seem, because such texts are usually accompanied by information or clues which massively restrict the number of possible authors. Thus, the task of the linguistic detective is never one of identifying an author from millions of candidates on the basis of the linguistic evidence alone, but rather of selecting (or of course *de*selecting) one author from a very small number of candidates, usually fewer than a dozen and in many cases only two (Coulthard 1992, 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1997; Eagleson, 1994).

An early and persuasive example of the forensic significance of idiolectal co-selection was the Unabomber case. Between 1978 and 1995, someone living in the USA, who referred to himself as FC, sent a series of bombs, on average once a year, through the post. At first there seemed to be no pattern, but after several years the FBI noticed that the victims seemed to be people working in Universities and Airlines and so named th[illegible]

Industrial Society and its Future, from someone claiming to be the Unabomber, along with an offer to stop sending bombs if the manuscript were published.[1]

In August 1995, the *Washington Post* published the manuscript as a supplement and three months later a man contacted the FBI with the observation that the document sounded as if it had been written by his brother, whom he had not seen for some ten years. He cited in particular the use of the phrase 'cool-headed logician' as being his brother's terminology, or in our terms an idiolectal preference, which he had noticed and remembered. The FBI traced and arrested the brother, who was living in a wooden cabin in Montana. They found a series of documents there and performed a linguistic analysis – one of the documents was a 300-word newspaper article on the same topic written a decade earlier. The FBI analysts claimed major linguistic similarities between the 35,000 and the 300 word documents: they shared a series of lexical and grammatical words and fixed phrases, which, the FBI argued, provided linguistic evidence of common authorship.

The defence contracted a linguist, who counter-argued that one could attach no significance to these shared items on the grounds that anyone can use any word at any time and therefore shared vocabulary can have no diagnostic significance. The linguist singled out twelve words and phrases for particular criticism, on the grounds that they were items that could be expected to occur in any text that was arguing a case – *at any rate; clearly; gotten; in practice; moreover; more or less; on the other hand; presumably; propaganda; thereabouts*; and words derived from the roots *argu* and propos**. The FBI searched the internet, which in those days was a fraction of the size it is today, but even so they discovered some 3 million documents which included one or more of the twelve items. However, when they narrowed the search to documents which included instances of all the twelve items they found a mere 69 and, on closer inspection, every single one of these documents proved to be an internet version of the 35,000-word manifesto. This was a massive rejection of the defence expert's view of text creation as purely open choice, as well as a powerful example of the idiolectal habit of co-selection and an illustration of the consequent forensic possibilities that idiolectal co-selection affords for authorship attribution. The first example will be taken from the area of plagiarism detection.

On Defining and Detecting Plagiarism

At its simplest, plagiarism, or more accurately the type of plagiarism we as linguists are competent to deal with, is the theft, or unacknowledged use, of text created by another. As my own university's website expresses it:

> Plagiarism is a form of cheating in which the student tries to pass off someone else's work as his or her own. . . . Typically, substantial passages are 'lifted' verbatim from a particular source without proper' attribution having been made

Any investigation of plagiarism is based consciously or unconsciously on a notion of *idiolect*. In other words it is expected that any two writers writing on the same topic, even if intending to express very similar meanings, will choose an overlapping, but by no means identical, set of lexico-grammatical items to do so. Indeed, and more importantly for some cases I will treat below, linguists from all persuasions subscribe to some version of the 'uniqueness of utterance' principle (Chomsky 1965; Halliday 1975) and so would expect that even the same person speaking/writing on the same topic on different occasions would make a different set of lexico-grammatical choices. It follows from this that, in any comparison of two texts, the more similar the set of items chosen, the greater the likelihood that one of the texts was derived, at least in part, from the other (or, of course, that both were derived from a third text), rather than being composed independently.

In most cases involving students there is little doubt about guilt, as these two examples of essay openings from Johnson (1997: 214) demonstrate – all items which student B 'shares' with student A are highlighted in bold:

> **A.** It is essential for all teachers to understand the history of Britain as a multi-racial, multi-cultural nation. Teachers, like anyone else, can be influenced by age old myths and beliefs. However, it is only by having an understanding of the past that we can begin to comprehend the present.
>
> **B.** In order for **teachers** to competently acknowledge the ethnic minority, **it is essential to understand the history of Britain as a multi-racial, multi-cultural nation. Teachers** are prone to believe popular **myths and beliefs; however, it is only by understanding** and appreciating **past** theories **that we can begin** to anticipate **the present.**

Even these short extracts provide enough evidence of shared items to question the originality of at least one of the essays, or both, of course, if a third text later proves to be the common source. When this level of sharing is also instanced in other parts of the same texts there is no room for doubt or dispute. The case of essay C, however, is not as clear-cut (items which C shares with one or both of essays A and B are highlighted):

> **C.** It is very important for us as educators to realise that **Britain as a nation** has become both **multi-racial** and **multi-cultural**. Clearly it is vital for **teachers** and associate teachers to ensure that **popular myths and** stereotypes held by the wider community do not **influence** their teaching. By examining British history this will assist our **understanding** and in that way be better equipped to deal with **the present** and the future.

Even though there is still quite a lot of shared lexical material here, it is evident that the largest identical sequences are a mere three running words long. Even so, one would still want to categorize this degree of lexical overlap, if instanced in other parts of the text, as unacknowledged, through more sophisticated bor-

Birmingham observation that 'Typically, *substantial* passages are "lifted"'. I will not discuss here the important question of whether a significant proportion of student written texts, which technically fall within the textual definition of plagiarism, are not the results of deliberate attempts to deceive at all, but rather a consequence of what is coming to be known as 'patchwriting', that is genuine but flawed attempts by students, who have somehow failed to acquire the academic rules for acknowledging textual borrowing, to incorporate the work of others into their own texts (see Pecorari 2002; Howard 1999).

Johnson's (1997) solution to the detection of this kind of student plagiarism or *collusion*, was to move away from using strings or sequences of items as diagnostic features and to focus instead on the percentage of shared individual lexical types and tokens as a better measure of derivativeness.[2] Intensive testing has shown that this measure of lexical overlap successfully separates those essays which share common vocabulary simply because they are writing on the same topic, from those which share much more vocabulary because one or more of them is derivative (see Woolls and Coulthard 1998). For example, in Johnson's study, whereas essays A, B, and C shared 72 different lexical types in their first 500 words, a set of three other essays from the same batch, whose authors had not colluded, shared only 13 lexical types, most of which were central to the topic under discussion. Further work (Woolls 2003) has shown that the most significant evidence is not the mere quantity of shared lexis, but rather the fact that, in the case of some shared items, both texts have both selected them and then only used them once. As such, 'once-only' items are, by definition, not central to the main concern of the text, otherwise they would have been used more frequently. The chances of two writers independently choosing several of the same words for single use are so remote as to be discountable.

If proof were needed of the distinctiveness and diagnostic power of words used once-only – *hapaxes* as they are technically labelled – it comes from successful internet searches in cases of suspected plagiarism. Experience confirms that the most economical method to use when checking the internet for suspected plagiarized text is to search using distinctive collocates whose individual items occur only once in the text in question. I will exemplify with the opening of a story written by an 11-year old girl:

The Soldiers (*all spellings as in the original*)

> Down in the country side an old couple husband and wife Brooklyn and Susan When in one afternoon they were having tea they heard a drumming sound that was coming from down the lane. Brooklyn asks,
> 'What is that glorious sound which so thrills the ear?' when Susan replied in her o sweat voice
> 'Only the scarlet soldiers, dear,'
> The soldiers are coming, The soldiers are coming. Brooklyn is confused he doesn't no what is happening.
> Mr and Mrs Waters were still having their afternoon tea when suddenly a bright light was shinning trough the window.

The first paragraph is unremarkable, but the second shifts dramatically, '*What is that glorious sound which so thrills the ear*?'. The story then moves back to the opening style, before shifting again to '*What is that bright light I see flashing so clear over the distance so brightly?;*'. It is hard to believe that the same author could write in both styles and raises the question of whether the other borrowed text(s) might be available on the internet.

If one takes as search terms three pairs of collocated *hapaxes* 'thrills – ear', 'flashing – clear' and 'distance – brightly' one again sees the distinctiveness of idiolectal co-selection; the single pairing 'flashing – clear' yields over half a million hits on Google, but the three pairings together a mere 360 hits, of which the first thirteen are all from W. H. Auden's poem 'O What is that sound'. The poem's first line reads 'O what is that sound which so thrills the ear' while the beginning of the second verse is 'O what is that light I see flashing so clear Over the distance brightly, brightly?'. If one adds a seventh word and looks for the phrase 'flashing so clear', all of the hits return Auden's poem.

Do People Repeat Themselves?

Whereas (occasional) identical strings in two texts which are supposed to have different authors can be indicative of 'borrowing' or theft, it is harder to argue the case when the texts are (supposedly) produced by the same author but on different occasions – even when there is no suggestion that the author had sight of the first text when s/he was producing the second. The example I want to use is from a famous English murder case, dating from 1978, where one piece of strongly contested evidence was a record of a police interview with a suspect.

In this case, four men were accused, and subsequently convicted, of killing a 13-year old newspaper delivery boy, Carl Bridgewater, solely on the basis of the confession of one of them, Patrick Molloy – there was no corroborating forensic evidence and Molloy retracted his confession, but to no avail. He admitted that he did actually say (most of) the words recorded in his confession, but insisted that he was being told what to say, while he was dictating the confession, by a policeman who was standing behind him. He also claimed that he had only made the confession after being physically and verbally abused for some considerable time.

The police, however, as support for the reliability of the confession, produced a contemporaneous handwritten written record of an interview which they claimed had taken place immediately before the confession and which contained substantially the same information expressed in the same language as the confession statement. Molloy denied that the interview had ever taken place – in his version of events he was being subjected to abuse at that time – and counterclaimed that the interview record had been made up later on the basis of the then pre-existing confession. As is evident from a cursory glance at the two extracts below taken, respectively, from the statement which Molloy admitted making and the interview record which he claimed was [illegible]

the basis of such similarities, that either one of the two documents was derived from the other or that both had been derived from a third. However, at the time of the original trial, no linguist was called to give evidence – in fact there were no forensic linguists practising in Britain at the time – so it was left to the lawyers to evaluate the linguistic significance of the interview and confession. As a result, the same phenomenon, massive identity in phrasing and lexical choice, was argued by the defence to be evidence of falsification, and by the prosecution to be evidence of the authenticity and reliability of both texts, on the grounds that here was an example of the accused recounting the same events, in essentially the same linguistic encoding, on two separate occasions.

Extract from Molloy's statement

(17) **I had been drinking and cannot remember the exact time I was there but whilst I was upstairs I heard someone downstairs say be careful someone is coming.** (18) **I hid for a while and** *after a while* **I heard** *a* **bang** *come from downstairs.* (19) **I knew that it was a gun being fired.** (20) **I went downstairs and the three of them were still in the room.** (21) **They all looked shocked and were shouting at each other.** (22) **I heard Jimmy say, 'It went off by accident'.** (23) **I looked and on the settee I saw the** *body of the boy.* (24) **He had been shot in the head.** (25) **I was appalled and felt sick.**

Extract from disputed interview with Molloy

P. How long were you in there Pat?
(18) **I had been drinking and cannot remember the exact time that I was there, but whilst I was upstairs I heard someone downstairs say 'be careful someone is coming'.**
P. Did you hide?
(19) Yes **I hid for a while** and then **I heard** the **bang** I have told you about.
P. Carry on Pat?
(19a) I ran out.
P. What were the others doing?
(20) **The three of them were still in the room.**
P. What were they doing?
(21) **They all looked shocked and were shouting at each other.**
P. Who said what?
(22) **I heard Jimmy say 'it went off by accident'.**
P. Pat, I know this is upsetting but you appreciate that we must get to the bottom of this. Did you *see the boy's body?*
(Molloy hesitated, looked at me intently, and after a pause said,)
(23) Yes sir, he was **on the settee.**
P. Did you see any injury to him?
(Molloy stared at me again and said)
(24) Yes sir, **he had been shot in the head.**
P. What happened then?
(25) **I was appalled and felt sick.**

this assertion depend on two commonly held mistaken beliefs: first, that people can and do say the same thing in the same words on different occasions and secondly, that people can remember and reproduce verbatim what they and others have said on some earlier occasion. The former belief can be demonstrated to be false either by recording a person attempting to recount the same set of events on two separate occasions, or by simply asking a witness to repeat word for word what s/he has just said. The second belief used to have some empirical support, at least for short stretches of speech (see Keenan *et al.* 1977 and Bates *et al.* 1980), but was seriously questioned by Hjelmquist (1984), who demonstrated that, even after only a short delay, people could remember at best 25 per cent of the gist and 5 per cent of the actual wording of what had been said in a five minute two-party conversation in which they had participated. Confirmatory evidence about the inability to remember even quite short single utterances verbatim was specially commissioned from Professor Brian Clifford and presented at the 2003 'Glasgow Ice Cream Wars' Appeal. This was used to challenge successfully the claim of police officers that they had independently remembered, some of them for over an hour, verbatim and identically, utterances made by the accused at the time of arrest. Clifford's experiment tested the ability to remember a short, 24-word utterance and found that most people were able to recall verbatim no more than 30 to 40 percent of what they had heard.[3]

By the time of the Bridgewater Appeal in 1997, it was possible to provide extra supporting evidence of two kinds. First, as a direct result of Johnson's (1997) work on plagiarism discussed above, which demonstrated the significance of vocabulary overlap, an analysis was done of the shared vocabulary in the two Molloy texts. It became evident that the highlighting in the two Molloy extracts presented above actually understates the similarities between the two texts – a closer examination revealed that there was in fact not one single word in Molloy's statement, neither lexical nor grammatical, which did not also occur in the interview record. I have only seen that degree of overlap on one other occasion, when two students had in fact submitted identical essays for assessment. Ironically, the computer analysis showed the degree of similarity to be only 97 percent – the 3 percent of different words made up of spelling errors produced by one of the two students.

In the Bridgewater case there also was secondary, supporting linguistic evidence, of a different kind, to support the claim that the interview record was both falsified and based on the statement. If we assume that the police officers had indeed, as Molloy claimed, set out to create a dialogue based on the monologue statement, they would have faced the major problem of what questions to invent in order to link forward and apparently elicit the pre-existing candidate answers which they had derived from the statement. In this scenario one would expect there to be occasions when a question did not fit successfully into the text into which it had been embedded – and indeed there are.

In a developing interview, a police question usually links backwards lexically, repeating word(s) from the previous answer. However, in creating a question to fit a pre-existing answer, there is always the danger that the

sequence – (21) 'They all looked shocked and were shouting at each other.' (22) 'I heard Jimmy say, "it went off by accident"' – which appears word for word in the interview record, except that the two sentences are separated by the inserted question 'Who said what?'. However, in this context the word 'said', although it is cataphorically unremarkable – *said* links with *say* – is anaphorically odd because the men have just been described as 'shouting'. One would therefore have expected an anaphorically cohesive follow-up question to be either 'What/Why were they *shouting*?' or 'Who was *shouting* (what)?'; one would certainly not predict 'who *said* what?'. The choice of 'said' is a most unexpected choice – except of course for someone who knows that the next utterance will be 'I heard Jimmy *say* . . .' – then it has an evident logic.

An example of a *grammatical* misfit is where the statement version 'on the settee I saw the **body** of the **boy. He** had . . .' is transformed into 'Q. Did you see **the boy's body**? Yes sir, **he** was on the settee'. The statement version correctly uses the pronoun 'He' because the referent is the 'boy' in 'the body of the boy'. but the reformulated version in the police interview, 'the boy's **body**', would be more likely to have elicited 'it' as a referent. We also find examples of process misfit: in the exchange reproduced below, the question 'what happened' requires a report of an action or an event, but in fact the response is a description of two states:

P. What **happened** then?
M. I **was appalled** and **felt sick.**

Had the reply been 'I vomited', it would, of course, have been cohesive. Similar process misfits are:

P. What were the others **doing**?
M. The three of them **were** still in the room.
P. What were they **doing**?
M. They all **looked shocked**

It is possible to continue in this vein, but I think these examples are sufficient to show that textual oddities like these support the claim, which was based on the identity of expression, that the interview record was created from the pre-existing statement. Sadly, it was not possible to test the acceptability and persuasiveness of these arguments in court, as the Crown conceded the appeal shortly before the due date, when compelling new evidence from document and handwriting analysts emerged to convince the judges of the unsafeness of the conviction.

The Evidential Value of Single Identical Strings

In the Bridgewater Four case there was a whole series of identical strings of words to support the claim that the interview record was derived from the

due to borrowing rather than identical encoding on two separate occasions, the claim of fabrication was supported by other linguistic evidence of a different and independent kind. The final questions I will address in this article are how much weight can one place on a single identical string and how significant is the length of a string when assessing its evidential significance? These questions go to the heart of current thinking about uniqueness in language production.

As Sinclair (1991) pointed out, there are two complementary assembly principles in the creation of utterances/sentences; one is the long accepted principle that sequences are generated word by word on an 'open choice' basis. When strings are created in this way, there is for each successive syntagmatic slot a large number of possible, grammatically acceptable, paradigmatic fillers and thus one can easily, if not effortlessly, generate memorable but meaningless sequences like 'colorless green ideas sleep furiously'. The other assembly principle proposed much more recently as a result of corpus work (Sinclair 1991), is the 'idiom principle', according to which pre-assembled chunks made up of frequent collocations and colligations are linked together to create larger units. In practice, both principles work side by side, which means that any given short string might be produced by either principle and therefore might be either an idiosyncratic combination or a frequently occurring fixed phrase. Nevertheless, the longer a sequence is, the more likely it is that at least some of its components have been created by the open choice principle and consequently, the less likely that the occurrence of this identical sequence in two different texts is a consequence of two speakers/writers coincidentally selecting the same chunk(s) by chance.

The data I will use for exemplificatory purposes come from the Appeal of Robert Brown in 2003. As in the Bridgewater Four case, here too there was a disputed statement and a disputed interview record; the difference was that Brown claimed that the statement was in reality a dialogue which had been represented as a monologue. He claimed that a police officer had asked questions to which Brown said he simply replied 'Yes' (Judge's Summing-up, p. 95 section E), and that, although the interview did occur, the record of it was made up afterwards – 'no police officer took any notes' (Judge's Summing-up, p. 93 section E).

Below are two sentences from the statement matched with items occurring in the (invented) interview record:

(i) Statement I asked her if I could carry her bags she said 'Yes'
Interview I asked her if I could carry her bags and she said 'yes'
(ii) Statement I picked something up like an ornament
Interview I picked something up like an ornament

In what follows I have used examples from Google, rather than from a corpus such as the Bank of English or the British National Corpus, on the grounds that Google is accessible to the layperson for whom the argument is designed. While the above utterances/sentences may not seem remarkable in themselves, neither of them occurs even once in the hundreds of millions of texts that Google searches

String	Instances
I picked	1,060,000
I picked something	780
I picked something up	362
I picked something up like	1
I picked something up like an	0
an ornament	73,700
like an ornament	896
something like an ornament	2
I asked	2,170,000
I asked her	284,000
I asked her if	86,000
I asked her if I	10,400
I asked her if I could	7,770
I asked her if I could carry	7
I asked her if I could carry her	4
I asked her if I could carry her bags	0
if I could	2,370,000
if I could carry	1,600

It is evident that 'if I could' and perhaps 'I asked her' have the characteristics of pre-assembled idioms, but even then their co-selection in sequence is rare, at 7,770 occurrences. The moment one adds a 7th word, 'carry', the odds against it occurring become enormous, with a Google search yielding only 7 instances. Indeed rarity scores like these begin to look like the probability scores DNA experts proudly present in court. However, unlike the DNA expert, the linguist expert has the disadvantage that everyone in the courtroom considers themselves to be a language expert and, among other things, 'knows' that they can remember what they and indeed others said in past conversations and feels confident that they can 'repeat' what was said verbatim at a later date. It will never be enough for the linguist to simply assert the uniqueness of encoding, it will need to be demonstrated in an accessible way.

An Attempt at Court Persuasion

When faced with the problem of having to convince the Appeal Court judges in open court in the *R vs. Robert Brown* Appeal, I prepared the following presentation, which I hoped would both interest and persuade the three judges of the evidentiary strength of the identical formulations discussed above. I should say that, as in the Bridgewater case, this was not the only linguistic evidence to support Brown's claims about the unreliability of the police records.

As a first step I used Google to find out something about other cases involving Lord Justice Rose, who was to preside. The first three citations for the words

> Guardian Unlimited | Special reports | Archer loses **appeal** bid
> ... was not present at today's hearing, had his application for permission to **appeal** against the conviction rejected within hours. **Lord Justice Rose**, sitting with ...
> (*www.guardian.co.uk/archer/article 0,2763,759829,00.html—30k*)

I accessed this citation, part of which is reproduced below as 'Guardian Extract', and from it selected the first phrase quoted from Lord Rose – 'For reasons we will give later in the day' – which I have highlighted in bold. Given the nature of Appeal Court judgments, which are often released after the decision has been announced, this seemed an unremarkable phrase and yet a Google search returned only 7 occurrences of the phrase – all of which, on closer examination, proved not only to be attributed to Lord Rose, but were all in fact different reportings of the same uttering at the end of the Archer appeal. Even reducing the phrase to the apparently less specific 6-word utterance 'For reasons we will give later' only produced two more examples, this time not uttered by Lord Rose. Thus, here was an example of the uniqueness of an apparently ordinary utterance by Lord Rose himself.

Guardian extract

> **Archer loses appeal bid** Lord Justice Rose, sitting with Mr Justice Colman and Mr Justice Stanley Burnton in London, told Archer's QC Nicholas Purnell: '**For reasons we will give later in the day** we are against you in relation to conviction.'
>
> At the start of the hearing Nicholas Purnell QC, outlining the grounds of appeal, said: 'The submission that we make on behalf of Lord Archer is that **the first and fundamental ground** which interconnects with all the other grounds of appeal was that the learned trial judge wrongly exercised his discretion not to sever the trial of Edward Francis.'
>
> Mr Purnell said the decision of the judge, Mr Justice Potts, not to sever the trial of Francis had an **'unbalancing effect on the equilibrium'** of the trial.
>
> Counsel argued that Mr Francis was 'in a position effectively as **a substitute prosecution witness** and a substitute prosecutor'.

I then took three shorter phrases quoted in the same article, this time from Nicholas Purnell, Lord Archer's QC, each of them seeming, at least to this lay reader, to be equally unremarkable phrases for a lawyer to utter, *the first and fundamental ground, unbalancing effect on the equilibrium*, and *a substitute prosecution witness*. For these phrases I found 7, 10 and 4 instances respectively, but again for every phrase all the instances were reports of the same single occasion of uttering by Mr Purnell.

Armed with these examples, taken from an audience-relevant text, I hoped to convince the judges that uniqueness of utterance was a demonstrable fact. Sadly, at a pre-trial case conference, the defence barrister who had chosen to call me as an expert witness smiled indulgently and described my intended presentation as *whimsical* and decided not to use it. Fortunately, my other linguistic

Author Identification in American Courts

While the analytical techniques and arguments and the derived opinions reported above would be and in some cases already have been accepted in British courts, the situation is less clear in the USA. In a recent article entitled 'The linguist on the witness stand: forensic linguistics in American courts', Tiersma and Solan (2002) noted that:

> although the [American] legal system has often welcomed linguistic expertise, there are a number of areas in which they are more hesitant to do so. One example is the use of linguistics to identify authors. (Tiersma and Solan 2002: 229)

Tiersma and Solan cited the rigorous demands of the American legal system's Daubert criteria, which, in their opinion, many authorship identification method fail to meet. The Daubert criteria were created in a Supreme Court ruling at th end of an appeal in the case of *Daubert vs. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.* (50 U.S. 579 (1993)). Essentially the argument was over whether expert evidenc could be rejected on the grounds that the experts involved had not publishe their work. In their ruling the Supreme Court observed that 'the adjecti "scientific" implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science' an then went on to propose four criteria with which to evaluate the 'scientific-ne of a method:

1 whether the theory offered has been tested;
2 whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication;
3 the known rate of error; and
4 whether the theory is generally accepted in the scientific commun (509 U.S. 593) quoted in Tiersma and Solan (2002).

There is an extensive and lucid discussion of the Daubert criteria as applied linguistic evidence in the article by Solan and Tiersma in this issue (pp. 448–

In one sense, Tiersma and Solan are raising purely American proble because in the British and Australian legal systems it is the expert rather t the method that is recognized, so these courts can and do allow opinion evid from anyone considered to have:

> specialised knowledge based on . . . training, study or experience [pro vided that the opinion is] wholly or substantially based on that knowledge (Evidence Act 1995 Sec 79)

However, knowing that their evidence would also satisfy the Daubert cri gives extra confidence to British linguist/experts and it is quite conceivable similar criteria might be introduced into British Courts at some point in

Northern Ireland, for example, has recently ruled that forensic phonetic evidence based solely on auditory analysis, that is with no acoustic support, is no longer permitted.

Although I await the views of lawyer-linguists Solan and Tiersma with interest if not with some trepidation, I would argue that the methods of author attribution discussed above do meet the four Daubert criteria:

1. Whether the Theory Offered has been Tested

Work by many people on a large number of cases has shown that there is no longer any dispute that the occurrence of shared identical items is conclusive evidence that two texts have not been independently created; what remains to be agreed is how few shared identical items are necessary to support a decision.

2. Whether [the Theory] has been Subjected to Peer Review and Publication

Publications like this one and those by Johnson (1997), Woolls and Coulthard (1998) and Woolls (2003) have been subjected to peer review, there have been many presentations on this kind of authorship assignment at international conferences and to peer audiences in universities worldwide. In addition, the Copycatch Gold collusion detection program is in use internationally in over 50 universities, including the British Open University.

3. The Known Rate of Error

This is perhaps the most difficult criterion – in cases of plagiarism it is traditional to err on the side of caution, and so I know of no cases of error. However, in this article, in the final section, I have taken the extreme position that a single and relatively short string can be conclusive evidence; this in itself is a challenge to the academic community to test the error rate and at the same time to fix an acceptable statistical equivalent for 'beyond reasonable doubt'.

4. Whether the Theory is Generally Accepted in the Scientific Community

There is no doubt that the basic tenets of idiolectal variation and the uniqueness of utterance are generally accepted across the whole linguistic community; the disagreements are over how far certainty of assignment depends on the amount and kind of shared vocabulary and on the length of individual sequences and their composition in terms of idiomatic and open choice items.

Conclusion

The evidence discussed above suggests that the concepts of idiolect and uniqueness of utterance are [illegible]

questions about authorship with a high degree of confidence. As demonstrated we can use the concepts to help us search when we suspect plagiarism and to categorize and classify when we already have texts of various kinds whose authorship is suspect or disputed. There are still many author identification problems where the methodology is less developed and reliable and where Solan and Tiersma's cautions are well-heeded, but the future for author identification is encouraging.

Notes

1. For an accessible version of events, from someone who wrote a report on the language of the manuscript, see Foster (2001). The full text of the Unabomber manuscript is available at: *http://www.panix.com/~clays/Una/.*
2. An automated version of this analytic method, produced by Woolls (2002), is now available as the computer program *Copycatch Gold.*
3. *http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/3494401.stm*

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19

Bodies, Beaches and Burn-Times: 'Environmentalism' and Its Discursive Competitors

Nikolas Coupland and Justine Coupland

Linguistic Perspectives on the Natural Environment

While there is as yet no consensus on how the term 'ecolinguistics'[1] should be applied (cf. Alexander et al., 1993; Fairclough, 1993), it would be an appropriate term for a critical perspective which concentrated on the semantics of expressions used to represent the natural environment, environmental practices or policies (cf. Alexander, 1993; Michael, 1991). Alternatively, because language is the medium through which ecological knowledge is fabricated, developed, transmitted and understood, a form of ecolinguistic research needs to investigate how relevant knowledge is shared or confined – for example as between scientific and media texts, and between experts and non-experts. Are non-experts simply informed or actively 'de-skilled' (Giddens, 1991) in the mediation of environmental knowledge? Bell's work on the reporting and reception of climate change information [1989, 1991] gives an important lead, in this regard.

Rather differently from these approaches, we want to argue for a 'competing discourses' formulation for ecolinguistics in the present paper. When people seek, as activists, critics, theorists or green politicians, to change social priorities, values or practices relating to the global environment, we become aware of environmentalism as a site of struggle. These struggles are generally represented as rather concrete disputes over human actions (whether or how to recycle waste, or to drive diesel cars), or over political decisions with practical consequences (whether to build a new by-pass, burn orimulsion in a power station, or limit fishing). But to the extent that such struggles are founded on arguments between political priorities and value systems, established by different groups with varying degrees

of power and influence, and enacted rhetorically (in conversations or the media), it is appropriate to construe them as competing discourses (cf. Lee; 1992, Candlin and Maley, in press).

Discourse in this context is intended in the broadly Foucauldian sense of a particular, internally coherent set of values and orientations, which is held to be normative, persuasive or simply unexceptional within specific groups or movements, which guides practical action, but which is configured around and through a finite set of claims, statements or accounts, amounting to a stance or (partial) world-view. That is, following the broad priorities by many contributors to this journal, discourses are taken to be both ideological and textual, and basically amenable to forms of linguistic or rhetorical or semiotic analysis. 'Environmentalism' itself can therefore be construed as a discourse, or, more appropriately, as an interlinked and evolving set of discourses, established to counter pre-existing discourses.

We see this approach as being able to build quite directly upon the critical theoretic work of Beck (1995) and Giddens (1991), in their characterization of 'the [late-modern, contemporary] risk society' and of popular involvement with environmental risk in particular. Douglas and Wildavsky's (1982) social and specifically cultural perspective on risk similarly *requires* the empirical support of particular grounded analysis. A discourse analytic tradition can support Nelkin's claims about the viability of a linguistic perspective on risk and the need to expose 'the conflicting values that perpetuate disputes over risk' as a supplement to 'rational' and 'objective' approaches (Nelkin, 1985, p. 9). 'Human responses to risk', as Nelkin writes, 'are filled with contradictions' (p. 15), and in the environmental domain these are occasioned by the vast disjunction between the hugely global etiology of risk and the local circumstances of people's particular responses, and by the conflicts between ideologies of modernity/progress and conservatism/restraint.

According to Beck, individuals' responses to environmental risk are necessarily located within the constraining 'freedom' of consumer choice. Contemporary technology and 'progress' have killed off nature and sought to reconstruct it *within* the parameters of technology and consumerism. Therefore, 'the social "consumption" of nature renders invalid all those concepts and theories that conceive of nature as the counter-image of human activity and power, to which it must be subjugated' (1995: p. 38). Since there is a prevailing technicist confusion between nature and society (p. 47), individuals are largely restricted to making their responses to environmental hazards within the domain of consumerist activities, rather than engaging with natural problems and solutions directly. The complexities and contradictions of responding to acknowledged environmental problems should therefore be apparent in the relevant social discourses, and amenable to critical commentary.

An Empirical Approach

One set of

In this paper, we develop an account of how UK print media coverage of these issues sustains a series of contradictory moral, ideological and practical positions. Our intention is to show how imperatives and proscriptions that are articulated as key parts of 'environmental' discourses are systematically undermined by other formations, either within the same or across different texts. That is, we want to illustrate how a rather abstract, but still textually grounded, discourse analytic approach to 'the environment' can show where and how 'environmentalism' is constructed in UK print media, *and* how those same media offer us specific means of challenging or ignoring 'environmental' imperatives. (The attributive 'environmental' is part of the paper's problematic, and should be read as subject to qualification and doubt, whether or not we place it in inverted commas.)

We collected a sample of UK print media during 2 weeks in July 1994 (that is during the 'so-called British summer', where 'so-called' is so-called). The sample was not in any way pre-planned, except insofar as we consciously chose a 'high summer' period. We surveyed all national newspapers and the 23 most popular magazines (10 weeklies, three 2-weeklies and 10 monthlies), judged mainly by circulation statistics.[2] In the first scan of these data, we identified texts making any reference to any aspects of ozone depletion (but not 'ground-level ozone'), UVA and UVB problems, sun-tanning or burning, and protecting skin from sun exposure. The texts included newspaper and magazine reports and features of variable length and prominence, but also weather reports and product advertisements.

Ozone–Melanoma Discourse

As a starting point, we might identify a recurring 'environmental' discourse within these data. It is a discursive formation that is relatively recent, but seemingly much better established in the southern than in the northern hemisphere anglophone cultures.[3] Its key components might be represented as in Figure 1.

We refer to this configuration as 'ozone–melanoma' discourse. Note its progression, at least in how the keywords are arranged in Figure 1, from causes to effects and from problems to solutions. As summarized in the last line of the Figure, the discourse frames this particular environmental issue initially in scientific terms, moving from a scientific cause through an interpretation of health consequences (with 'health' still ingrained in a biomedical domain). But through the need that it asserts for us to be aware of and perhaps responsible for our own health, a moral dimension comes into play, leading to potential revision of self-presentational ideals – specifically in redefining the desirability of fair skin.

The media sample includes a strand of newspaper reports focusing on a particular, new scientific discovery, to the general effect that sun-protection creams may give poorer protection against skin cancer than was previously thought. Text 1 (*Daily Telegraph*, 7 July 1994) is one of these reports, and it articulates many of the key processes and propositions that we have taken to be criterial elements of ozone–melanoma discourse.

The report is located within the referential domain of academic science ('a senior scientist said'; 'professor of chemical pathology'; 'Tests in his laboratories';

Sun creams 'no barrier' to cancer

By Peter Pallot, Health Services Staff

SOME sun creams may not protect against skin cancer, a senior scientist said yesterday.

Manufacturers have concentrated on blocking "burning" ultraviolet radiation — UVB — and have largely overlooked another form of radiation, UVA, said Dr Joseph Lunec, professor of chemical pathology.

Tests in his laboratories at Leicester University showed UVA could damage genetic material within cells which may predispose to cancer, he said.

He had developed chemical markers which identified UVA damage to genetic material in skin cells cultured in the laboratory, he said. But the link had not been demonstrated in people.

His findings are to be presented to a conference in Venice in October and in Australia in November.

Cases of skin cancer have grown rapidly in Britain and now exceed 40,000 a year, although around 90 per cent are easily treated.

Prof Lunec added: "Companies are conducting only a little investigation into UVA and there should be more."

Sun creams are given sun protection factors according to how much protection they offer to UVB. But that was no guide to their effectiveness against UVA, he said.

There has been concern in the sun cream industry about UVA. Boots, the pharmacy chain, has introduced a UVA star rating system.

Prof Lunec declined to say which commercial brands he had used in tests, but he said: "Creams need to contain more anti-oxidant vitamins to offer adequate protection. The people currently producing creams are not fully aware of the effects of UVA.

"In Australia, where exposure to the sun is much greater than here in Britain, they are more concerned about this issue.

"We have been experiencing a spell of hot weather and all the people you see coming into work burned by the sun have been exposing themselves to potentially dangerous levels of UVA."

Last night Prof Gordon McVie, of the Cancer Research Campaign said manufacturers had concentrated on protecting against UVB because all research suggested that this, rather than UVA, was the one that did the damage.

If the science proved sound, it would be the first time that UVA had been implicated as a cancer agent he added.

OZONE DEPLETION
INCREASED HARMFUL UV RAY ACTION (UVA and UVB)
THREAT TO HEALTH AND LIFE

SKIN DAMAGE AND MELANOMA
DEATH RATES (INDIVIDUAL PAIN)
AWARENESS
BURNING VS TANNING
SKIN PROTECTION
CHEMICAL BARRIERS
EXPOSURE LIMITATION
SUN AVOIDANCE

SUN-BATHING IS NAIVE (OR CRASS OR GROTESQUE)

FAIR SKIN IS GOOD

SCIENCE – HEALTH – MORALITY – SELF-PRESENTATION

Figure 1: Key elements of ozone–melanoma discourse

relates a scientific discovery to a health problem affecting large numbers of people. and so to an epidemiological trend ('Cases of skin cancer have grown rapidly in Britain and now exceed 40,000 a year'), although there are reported to be differences between northern and southern hemispheres in these trends and associated risks ('In Australia, where exposure to the sun is much greater than here in Britain'). The threat to health is represented as a physical one ('could damage genetic material'). Therefore what is at issue is 'burning' not 'tanning' ('burned by the sun'). Limiting damage is repeatedly (in fact on four occasions) cast in terms of 'protection' by means of a physical and/or chemical 'barrier' (headline) of varying 'effectiveness'. The text is a prototype of an explicitly 'risk-formative' discourse. It references 'risk' and 'threat' directly. It also establishes a hazardous outcome. gives a probability index, and extrapolates to undesirable consequences/problems.

How, then, might a competing discourses perspective enrich the analysis of how such media texts are socially constituted – how they stand as textualized versions of cultural discourses, relative to other discourses realized by other texts (actual or potential)? Even to claim, as we have done implicitly, that texts like Text 1 articulate an 'environmental' discourse suggests that there are other discourses with which they have to compete. Are there discursive configurations already marshalled as competing discourses to oppose the implications of scientific-medical ozone–melanoma discourse?

First, there is a 'traditional' versus 'contemporary' opposition at work. The original articulation of the scientifically based statement of the ozone hole problem (about a decade ago) expressed a new phenomenon, a new threat, deriving from new technical discoveries. The local story that drives Text 1 is based in a report of findings from *new* research. The issue of being aware of the health consequences locates us – as readers and as the people potentially at risk from cancers – as more aware than we were in the past, or as more aware than 'trad-

[illegible] discourse reacts against older

then arise. What discourses articulate 'traditional' orientations to sun-exposure? Do they still have a currency, and if so, where? Also, are there competing contemporary discourses which similarly oppose ozone–melanoma discourse? Which, how and where? Relating to the first of these questions, our media sample suggests there is indeed a well-established, 'traditional' discourse of sun-exposure. Its key elements might be summarized as in Figure 2, and we might identify this configuration as a discourse of 'sun-is-fun'.

LEISURE IS FUN
SUN IS PART OF SUMMER LEISURE

LEISURE IS MARKED (relative to work)
SUN IS RARE (in Britain)
THE MORE SUN THE BETTER

SUMMER LEISURE IS BODY-BASED
BODY EXPOSURE IS SEXY AND FUN

Figure 2: Key elements of sun-is-fun discourse

Sun-is-Fun Discourse

The *Western Mail* (the self-styled 'national newspaper of Wales') of 12 July 1994 carries a story under the headline 'Doctors issue a roasting on the hottest day of the year' (Text 2). The text begins by characterizing the traditional British day at the beach ('bumper day for ice-cream sellers and deck-chair attendants, yesterday's hottest temperature of the year . . .') and embeds information about

Doctors issue a roasting on hottest day of year

By SIMON PERRY

WHILE IT was a bumper day for ice-cream sellers and deck-chair attendants, yesterday's hottest temperature of the year brought strong warnings from doctors on the dangers of skin cancer.

It took only 20 minutes for people in Wales to burn under the scorching sun.

A burn could be one step towards skin cancer and, with more hot weather forecast today, Health Promotion Wales warned vulnerable people not to go out unprotected in the fierce heat.

Temperatures soaring to 27.8°C (80°F) in Cardiff yesterday. Much of Gwent and southern Powys hit 26°C. The highest reading in Britain was at Lakenheath, Suffolk, where

Weather hits coffee prices — Page 2
Comment — Page 8

sun-lovers were treated to a 30°C (86°F) afternoon. Fair Isle, Shetland, recorded the coolest with just 12°C (54°F).

The top temperature just pipped the year's previous peak of 29.3°C (84°F) recorded at Heathrow Airport on June 24.

The "burn time" — or the average time a fair-skinned person could spend in the sun unprotected without burning — was 20 minutes in South-East Wales yesterday and just five minutes longer near western coasts.

Weathermen also sounded pollution warnings for high sulphur-dioxide levels in the north of England and high nitrogen-dioxide levels in London.

Today, Cardiff weathermen forecast that it will remain hot and sunny, but it will start to cool off tomorrow when temperatures are forecast to fall to 20-21°C (68-70°F), the monthly average.

burn-times and cancer dangers within the story ('brought strong warnings from doctors on the dangers of skin cancer'). The feature goes on to endorse sun-is-fun directly in places: Temperatures soaring to 27.6°C (80°F) in Cardiff yesterday. Much of Gwent and southern Powys hit 26°C. The highest reading in Britain was at Lakenheath, Suffolk, where sun-lovers were treated to a 30°C (86°F) afternoon.

Temperatures are reported to be 'soaring' (an ethereal metaphor) and the representation that they have been 'hitting' high numbers evokes an annual competition to achieve the highest recorded figure (cf. 'The top temperatures just pipped the year's previous peak'). The sun is a 'treat' for 'sun-lovers' who will rue the fact that 'it will start to cool off tomorrow'. The contexting of burn-time information ('20 minutes in South-East Wales yesterday') allows, and arguably encourages, readers to bracket the problem status of the health-risk, or at least builds in the availability of an alternative stance. Although the text clearly references 'burning', 'warnings' and 'dangers' of 'going out unprotected' much as Text 1 did, it also offers sun-is-rare as a mitigation of sun-as-risk, and offers sun-is-fun as a legitimation of body exposure.

This pattern of intermixing discourses is repeated in many different texts in the sample, for example Text 3 ('Fry Noon' from the *Sun* newspaper of 12 July 1994).

FRY NOON

You can get skin cancer in the local park as easily as on a Greek beach

By DAWN NEESON

BALMY Britain is putting Mediterranean hotspots in the shade, with temperatures today expected to top yesterday's 86°F

But it is also casting a shadow of death over thousands of sun worshippers in the form of skin cancer.


Over the last ten years there has been a 56 per cent rise in Britain's death rate from the disease.

Young

This year it will kill 1,800 Britons, compared with 743 in 1974—a rise of 142 per cent. The only cancer to kill more is of the lung but the sun is closing fast.

Women who tend to stay out in the sun longer, but number male victims three to two. And it is the only cancer where young victims outnumber the old.

Women tend to develop the cancer on their legs, as skirts offer less protection than trousers to men. Unlike



more on the torso. Around 3,500 people a year in Britain develop the lethal malignant melanoma and 36,000 the less serious but still dangerous non-melanoma skin cancer.

Rona MacKie, professor of dermatology at Glasgow University, says: "The message about protecting ourselves from the sun's rays is getting through, but people think it only applies when they go abroad.

"I'm astonished at the amount of people who sunbathe in Britain without using sun cream.

"Suggest they spend a hour on a Greek beach at midday without any and they'd quite rightly think you were mad. They don't seem to grasp that an hour in the local park at lunchtime can damage your skin in exactly the same way."

Part of the problem is the long time lag between when the skin is damaged and when cancer develops.

"It can take between ten and 20 years for the effects to be seen."

The Met Office now issues extra violet radiation warnings during summer weekends.

The amount of UVR, rating the ground, is highest between 11am and 3pm when the sun is high in the sky.

Even so, polls suggest that only a third of Britons have changed their sunbathing habits, with just five per cent of women saying they would prefer to be pale and healthy and a fifth still rushing to sunbathe at every opportunity.

If skin cancer is caught early the chances of a cure are good—more than 90 per cent of sufferers live more than five years.

Freckles

Those most at risk are fair-skinned people, especially those with red hair and freckles—Scotland has seen one of the biggest rises in cases with 60 per cent more in the years.

The key symptom is a change to the skin surface. If a brown spot appears that was not there before, or if a mole gets darker, paler or changes shape, itches or bleeds, see a doctor immediately.

Dr John Hawk, consultant dermatologist at St Thomas's Hospital, London, says: "Some of you won't think it is glamorous to be brown, but to sunbathe to a tanned leather will be what is called

This is ostensibly another report about skin cancers, and the text again expresses the associated health-threat in terms closely reminiscent of the previous ones we have considered. But its opening lines project high temperatures as being, once again, good news ('Balmy Britain'), and in places the text glorifies them and marks them as achievements (expected to top yesterday's 86°F'). High temperatures in Britain are unusual, and it is newsworthy that Britain, for once, is outdoing the Mediterranean ('putting Mediterranean hotspots in the shade').


In Text 4, the *Daily Star*'s very similar lead-in to its story of the same day is: 'Stick the Med . . . Britain's real hot stuff'. But the implied competition is over more than temperature itself. In Text 4, heat is overtly constructed as desirable, since those 'under a cooling cloud' are 'some unlucky Scots'. Britain's being 'hot stuff' evokes a competition between European regions and races to be recognized as centres of sexual or at least sensual experience. The practice of bodily exposure to the sun is represented as 'basking', 'sweltering' and 'broiling', images which mix heat, moisture and passivity in ways that are as evocative of receptive sex as they are of some modes of cooking ('roasting').

As later examples suggest, the lexicons of tabloid sex and of summer heat (which itself is linked, of course, to bodily exposure) are entirely consonant with one another. The UK tabloid semi-nude is as likely to be characterized as 'sizzling' or as 'a scorcher' as is a hot summer's day. At the same time, the phenomenon is not purely tabloid. A headline from *The Times* (also of 12 July, not copied here) is: 'Britain to sweat for just one more day', and the feature goes on to comment that 'most of the country continues to bask in sunshine'.

Our argument this far, then, is that there is a recurrent ambiguity in many media texts' formulation of ozone–melanoma discourse, which, interspersed with reports of health-risks and warnings of skin damage, offer a 'traditional' means of resisting its evidentiality and its applicability to individuals, perhaps especially Brits. The *Sun*'s 'Fry Noon' piece (Text 3) itself reports the findings from 'polls' that 'just five percent of [British] women . . . [say] they would prefer to be pale and healthy and a fifth [are] still rushing to sunbathe at every opportunity'. (This is repeated almost verbatim in *The Times* Home News column of that day.) This gap between risk-information and day-to-day practice may be partly explained by the rhetorical alignment we find in some media texts *against their own* imprecations towards safer sun-use. A text such as Text 4 is therefore a self-subversive text, aligning against known eco-risks in the pursuit of hedonistic fulfilment and sensual sun-experience. As it suggests, 'Most human animals . . .' can persist with bodily exposure 'in the hope of getting a good, safe tan' [even] 'after the Government issued skin cancer alerts'. There are known risks, 'But at the moment hardly anyone cares . . . in the top sun spot of Europe!'.

The gendering of sun-is-fun discourse is implicit in the texts we have so far considered. But several other instances from the sample juxtapose verbal articulations of ozone – melanoma discourse with stereotypic visual images of young women in bathing suits. For example, the page 15 spread of The *Daily Express* (7 July 1994, not copied here) has the full-page headline 'Doctor's pin-up insult'.

FINE-O? TOO HOT FOR RHINO!



STICK the Med ... Britain's real hot stuff.

For the average 86°F heat which has us sweltering will last at least a day or two more And it could even hit **NINETY**, say weathermen

As yesterday's top temperature — the best for three years — reached 88° at Northolt, Middlesex. London was also warmer than the Mediterranean.

But while that was good news for almost everyone, the capital's zoo keepers put a damper on our sun fun by asking us to spare a thought for their **RHINOS.**

Cream

For black species favourites Rosie and Josh have had to be given rubdowns with moisturising cream to prevent their thick skins cracking in the heat!

Most human animals, though — apart from some unlucky Scots under a cooling cloud — were just applying lotion to their bodies in the hope of getting a good, safe tan after the Government issued skin cancer alerts.

Lakenheath in Suffolk, with 86°, was as broiling as Bombay and red-hotter than Rome, Nicosia, Istanbul and Barcelona.

Even rainy Manchester basked under clear skies and 79° . though further north the sun definitely didn't have its hat on as the mercury in the Fair Isles stopped at 54°.

But in the south, the 46-year-old July record of 93° could be under threat before the temperature drops later in the week

"It's been very warm but may get warmer still " a London Weather Centre spokesman confirmed.

The main problem may be the usual one — jams, with people heading for the coast in droves as they did yesterday

There were tailbacks on routes to Blackpool and Scarborough And a 10-mile one built up on the M25 in Essex

The extra exhaust fumes could also cause smog.

But at the moment hardly anyone cares in the top sun spot of Europe!

BAD SHOT KILLER

GOLFER Jeremy T. Brenno, 16, died when he slammed his club against a bench after a bad shot, and the broken shaft snapped back and pierced his heart, at Gloversville, New York

Breakfast toast

FIVE Daily Star library workers were toasting their success last night after scooping £10,000 in a radio show breakfast bonanza. Andy Williams entered himself and workmates John Gray, David Goddard, Pat Bridges and Martin Edwards in the Trebor Extra Strong Mintal Challenge on Virgin 1215's Russ and Jono's Breakfast Show They all had to tune in at the same time and then ring in to claim their prize.

Text 4: The *Daily Star*, 12 July 1994. © Express Newspapers plc.

the headline story, under the sub-head 'Women get a raw deal on the NHS [National Health Service], claims Minister'; and (rightmost) the story of high risks even with the use of suncreams, under the heading 'SUMMER SUN TANS HIDE CANCER RISK'. Physically dividing (or linking) these stories is an untitled image of a young woman wearing a swim-suit and jewellery, apparently in bright sunlight, in a submissive pose, her hands held up to her hair. The image lends itself as potential support for the 'pin-up' headline, since it can be seen as an instance of an actual 'pin-up' photograph. But it also visually contextualizes the verbal ozone–melanoma text to its right, again offering a subversive reading of that text. The image's stereotypic qualities conjure traditional, tabloid interpretations of female sexuality which are then proxemically forced into interaction with the right-panel's headline 'SUMMER SUN. . .'.

There are many such instances, including the *Daily Star*'s (11 July, p. 5) close-up of Kim Basinger, pouting, apparently in illustration of the headline 'Star Kim's lip cancer op agony'. The text contrasts two themes: on the one hand 'HOLLYWOOD superstar Kim Basinger', 'Beautiful blonde Kim' (and the photographic image); on the other hand, 'her agonising battle against cancer', 'painful laser surgery on tumours that appeared on her lips', 'the most painful experience of her life', 'It took three nurses to hold me down. They stuck a large needle under my lip', 'they lasered off the cancerous parts' (and the headline). As in previous instances, ozone–melanoma discourse is here in competition with traditional tabloid visual and verbal imagery of female sexuality. What is added in this case is an implicit element of moral chastisement, using the ozone–melanoma issue apparently to chastise those whose lifestyles are hedonistically linked to the sun. Kim is said to be 'allergic to the sun', to be 'married to movie hunk Alec Baldwin', and to have had a 'surfer ex-husband'. Here we get a fleeting glimpse of ozone–melanoma discourse as part of a shifting morality of anti-hedonism. Skin protection as part of (one form of) eco-awareness can be constructed as a new asceticism, aligned against the traditional hedonism of sun-is-fun.

On other occasions, however, 'sun-is-fun' gains unqualified approbation. *Today* newspaper's piece (12 July, p. 11, not copied), headed '86° Absolutely Sweltering', places its verbal text against a photo of forward-leaning Joanna Lumley, tanned and wearing a low-cut T-shirt: '. . . hottest day of the year – several degrees more sizzling than the Greek islands enjoyed . . . The best of British sunshine . . . In the South of France, Nice failed to top 80 fahrenheit . . . And, *Today's* weatherman Philip Eden warns: "Make the most of it. Things will cool down in most places by the weekend. The north is suffering already . . ."'

Overall, the sample suggests that the tabloid press construct sun usage primarily as a deserved reward, a treat. This is a pro-fun, anti-political correctness, and in its own terms even a libertarian discourse. Its stance is distinctively British working class (since 'the Med' has 'more than its fair share', and 'working people deserve their day out', etc.). Sun-use, through (predominantly female) body exposure, falls easily into the pattern of 'just a bit of fun' tabloid representations of leisure. It offers a ready counterposition to the serious, scientific, medical, rational discourse of the ozone–melanoma discourse.

Body-Culture Discourse

But contemporary discourses of the body, even in Britain, have in some ways transcended these tabloid representations. In late-modern societies, the body is semiotically too important, and has too much definitional potential, to function merely as a solar panel for hedonistic leisure. At the same time, it is too potent a signifier to be hidden from view, under the pressures of scientistic priorities. 'Laying out' is not what all late-moderns do, but body-culture more generally is one of their focal concerns. And body discourses refashion and undermine *both* pro- and *anti-* 'post-ozone' rhetoric to a significant extent.

Bodily exposure to the sun entails a bio-medical health-risk, but it also entails a risk to personal and social standing often referred to as 'premature ageing'. Social stereotypes of old age are in many respects based on physical (including physiological and physiognomic) images and definitions of ageing, but sagging flesh and wrinkles are undeniably also the hallmarks of (genuine) deep old age. Woodward's (1991) comments about the 'unwatchability' of old age, based on her observations of responses to fine art portrayals of elderly nudes, is apposite. The notion of 'gerontophobia' is also relevant here, encapsulating many people's experience of reticence and even revulsion when confronted by others', and no doubt the prospect of their own, ageing. There is a traditional (liberal humanist, and sometimes religious) discourse that works against attaching any significance to the body, and therefore to the ageing body ('beauty is only skin-deep . . . age cannot wither . . .'). But in late or high modernity the body has been imbued with remarkable symbolic status, to the extent that, for some, it is the single most potent signifier of selfhood.

Not only Giddens, but also Shilling (1993) and Featherstone (1991) are among those who have recently captured, at the level of social theory, the general characteristics of high modern body-culture. From their writings, we can derive the following elements of another putative discursive formation, which we can refer to as body-culture discourse (see Figure 3). In relation to ageing, it is very clear that body-culture discourse encodes an ageist, anti-elderly ideology. As Shilling writes, the body-as-symbol is par excellence the domain of the 'quintessentially modern individual who is young and never dies' (1993: 196). Consumer culture, in Featherstone's account, recycles ageist images, many of which centre on the youthful body: 'Certain themes, infinitely revisable, infinitely combinable, recur within advertising and consumer culture imagery: youth, beauty, energy, fitness, movement, freedom, romance, exotica, luxury, enjoyment, fun' (1991: 174).

The associated moral agenda is again largely a mass media imposition: 'Advertising, feature articles and advice columns in magazines and newspapers ask individuals to assume self-responsibility for the way they look. This becomes important not just in the first flush of adolescence and early adulthood, for notions of "natural" bodily deterioration and the bodily betrayals that accompany ageing become interpreted as signs of moral laxitude' (Featherstone, 1991: 178)

THE BODY EXPRESSES THE INDIVIDUAL
WE HAVE A MORAL CONTRACT WITH OUR BODIES
HEALTH IS EXTERNAL AS WELL AS INTERNAL
RECREATION IS WORK (THE NEW ASCETICISM)
THE BODY IS A COMMODITY AND A FORM OF CAPITAL
CONSUMERS CAN BE MODELS, BY BODY SHAPING AND COLOURING

BODY-CULTURE RESISTS/DENIES AGEING
BEAUTIFUL BODIES ARE YOUTHFUL BODIES
YOUTHFUL BODIES ARE HEALTHY BODIES
HEALTHY BODIES ARE (OFTEN) TANNED BODIES

Figure 3: Key elements of body-culture discourse

'create' ourselves, to an extent including physically, from all manner of role-models offered to us, particularly via the media.[4] In a consumer culture, we can command the belief (ultimately illusory, but highly seductive and involving) that we can transcend the lifespan and our own ageing (Featherstone, 1991: 177).

Against this background, discourses in the domain of sun, risk, health and tanning take on new meanings. Body consumerism and ageism can infiltrate and colonize both ozone–melanoma and sun-is-fun discourses. In late modernity, science-based and health-based rationales for limiting sunexposure can be supplanted by fear-of-ageing (gerontophobia), but to *the same* practical effect – that is, sun-avoidance. If (young) moderns do limit their sun-exposure, it may be under pressure from a wholly *nonenvironmental* discourse, which asserts attractiveness over health, personal and social priorities over responsiveness to scientific facts, and perceived youthfulness over actual longevity. Exposure to sun brings 'premature ageing', and ageing is what body-culture has been developed to resist.

But there is an internal dilemma. For body-culture to be enacted, bodies need to be seen. Similarly, bodies need to be 'displayed' and 'advertised' if they are to enter the relational market and realize their symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1977). Investment in the body can only see a return if bodies are there to be traded in the open marketplace. In fact, there are few fully legitimate public display-sites for bodies other than beaches, and bodily disclosure as part of summer leisure therefore has a particular salience in late-modernity. Scantily clad bodies (especially female) may pour from the mass media, but people's desires to role-match, even to become the media images, are severely curtailed. From the consumerist standpoint, the fun element of sun may therefore be overridden by the sun's role as a facilitator for, a legitimizer of, bodily revelation. Sun declares the market place open.

Media texts in our sample again reflect the interpolation of bodyaesthetic, anti-ageing (and ageist) concerns into the ozone–melanoma and the traditional sun-is-fun discursive formations, either directly or indirectly. The frequent references to 'damaging your skin' (e.g. the 'Fry Noon' text, Text 2, earlier) implicate the risk of so-called 'premature ageing'. The 'Pinup' text that we referred to (from the *Daily Express*, 7 July 1994), like many others, suggests that even UVA rays 'cause ageing'. And yet, the suntanned body has a persistent semiotic

continues to be a population (and we have seen that, according to media reports and skin-cancer rates, it is a majority) who will forego the benefits of sun-avoidance, whatever their ideological bases.

One possible response is to reassert the hedonistic short-termism of sun-is-fun. As Shilling writes:

> Investment in the body also has its limitations. Indeed, in one sense, the effort expended by individuals on the body is doomed to failure. Bodies age and decay, and the inescapable reality of death appears particularly disturbing to modern people who are concerned with a self-identity which has at its centre the body. After all, what could signal to us more effectively the limitations of our concern with the young and fit, ideally feminine or masculine body than the brute facts of its thickening waistline, sagging flesh and inevitable death? (1993: 7)

Confronting the inevitability of physical decrement, we might shorten the time-span of our physicalized self-identities, and decide to live in rather locally relevant phases ('while I'm young enough to bare my body on the beach'). But this is a radical stance, and consumer culture is ready to step in with an ideological solution to a lived dilemma where it can be turned to economic advantage. It is under these circumstances that medical conglomerates and their advertisers have promoted the notion of 'healthy tanning'. Healthy tanning enacts the late-modern imperatives of ascetic body-culture, by-passing the dated hedonism of sun-is-fun, and pays lipservice to the scientific respectability and personal responsibility required in ozone–melanoma discourse. But above all it legitimizes body exposure to the sun and reinvents this practice as an entirely rational lifestyle choice. It is a classically commodified solution to an ideological dilemma, and it is hardly surprising, therefore, that the largest category of media text-types in our sample is advertisements selling anti-wrinkle, safe-tanning products.

Consider Text 5, page 28 of the July 1994 issue of *Prima* magazine (a magazine directed at young women), the beginning of a feature titled 'It's OK to tan'.

The text, like its title, is essentially a legitimation, cast as a new revelation ('everything has changed'). In fact, it offers an apparently new solution to an implied dilemma. It reasserts skin 'tanning' over skin 'burning', and glamorizes dark (or 'golden') skin. 'Risk' of skin 'damage' is still clearly referenced – in fact the twin risks of melanoma and visible ageing – but they are presented as familiar and controllable ('for the past decade we've been constantly warned', '. . . thoroughly drummed into us'). The magazine, and the technology it introduces to readers, offer the means of control. Sexual allure ('a fabulously sexy golden shade'; 'a glorious golden glow') is to be earned through an urgent ('vital') regimen of self-attention ('a properly achieved tan'; 'a sun-tan, carefully gained'; 'what you mustn't do is burn'). Sun use is reinstated as a legitimate late-modern practice, rescued from the drab asceticism of ozone–melanoma discourse which has been superseded (we are asked to believe) by a new asceticism of control *within* the



It's OK to tan

This summer it is definitely okay to tan – but what you mustn't do is burn. Your Prima tanning card will be vital on holiday, helping you to a fabulously sexy golden shade!

Yes, it's really true! Now you can have that glorious golden glow without putting your health and your skin at risk. For the past decade we've been constantly warned about the dangers of the sun's ultra-violet rays. The risks of increased wrinkling, ageing and, more importantly, skin cancer, have been thoroughly drummed into us. But now it would seem that everything has changed.

A properly achieved tan protects your skin

New research shows that a sun-tan, carefully gained using high-factor sunscreens, could actually protect your skin from any long term damage. Sunburn is the major culprit when it comes to skin damage; so if you can avoid it, then you

Text 5: *Prima*, July 1994. © Gruner & Jahr, UK.

Retrospective

We began this analysis by identifying one strand of an 'environmental' discourse

exposing skin to the sun, linked to ozone depletion in the upper atmosphere. It would *not* be true to say that this scientific discourse is eclipsed by alternative formations. Many texts in the sample do refer to such risks, and build their own meanings in relation to a discourse of ozone–melanoma. To that extent, the textual data suggest the science-led discourse of risk appears to have received a reasonable exposure in the UK print media.

But the media sample also shows that there at least two different, alternative ideological and rhetorical formations which compete with this particular environmental discourse – what we called sun-is-fun and body-culture formations – often within the same media texts. If we look back at what we posited as the key elements of the 'environmental' discourse, we can in fact see how its competitors marshal themselves to *resist* its impact, both by *refutation* and by *colonization*. Sun-is-fun is essentially a refutation, a refusal to recognize one set of priorities and the imposition of an alternative set: it asserts leisure over science; the persistent rarity of sun (in Britain) over a perceived increase in environmental risk; hedonism over asceticism; a 'bit of fun' over serious scientific debate; the working person's priorities over political correctness; traditional values over new science.

In contrast, body-culture discourse largely *colonizes* environmentalism. It overlays the science of skin protection on top of the science of risk; it relocates risk within the individual's use of chemical treatments rather than in large-scale changes to the environment; it overlays the asceticism of self-protection on top of the asceticism of sun avoidance; consumerist solutions on top of natural solutions; individual responsibilities on top of community responsibilities; an apparently new science of safe tanning on top of the newness of ozone depletion science. But body-culture *also* colonizes sun-is-fun discourse. It technologizes leisure and makes 'work' out of 'laying out'; it reinvents 'laying out' as an identity project; it adds a narcissistic dimension to body exposure; it commodifies summer leisure as part of consumer culture.

Of the various opposing formations, therefore, it seems that the complex of body-culture priorities has the strongest potential to resist environmentalism, at least in the specific context of ozone layer depletion. The discourse processes we have examined in this analysis can in fact be seen as a coherent set of devices acting to promote what Giddens (1991) calls the sequestration of nature – late-modern societies' practice of obscuring the facts and imperatives of the natural environment through the distorting effects of mass-mediated institutions. The most profound potential interpretation is that Beck may similarly be correct in arguing that knowledge of environmental hazards does not, in itself, constitute an avenue for remediation – an escape route. Individual judgement about the environment, he suggests, is no longer anchored in individual experience (Beck, 1995: 52). The print media which establish environmental risks themselves lead us into commodified 'solutions' which fail to address the underlying environmental concern.

More generally, we hope to have established that the juxtaposition of 'language' or 'discourse' with 'the environment' is not inherently 'inappropriate' or

constructive for environmental research at a fundamental level. In this paper, we have adopted social semioticians' (or critical linguists') approach to context. Part of Hodge and Kress's (1988) thesis, for example, is that 'The site in which a text occurs typically contains instructions as to how it should be read and what meanings should be found in it' (p. 68). Context is therefore taken to incorporate sets of obligations and predispositions, which act as constraints not only on which messages should be conveyed and how they should be conveyed, but also on how messages should be interpreted. This feeds directly back into a community's dominant value systems and, ultimately, its social and political organization. This perspective has opened up the possibility of reading 'environmental' and other culturally specific values from media texts.

But it is a relatively small step to reconceptualize 'context' as including 'environment', even in the senses of 'natural' and 'global' environment. Ultimately, then, 'environment' is more than just another 'social issue' that can be addressed by linguistics. Linguistic theories of context may help us understand how the concept of 'the [natural] environment' has traditionally been interpreted, and how it may usefully be re-interpreted.

For example, the relationship between linguistic behaviour and context has traditionally been one of 'figure' to 'ground' (Goodwin and Duranti, 1992; Hanks, 1992). The analysis of language and communicative behaviour has traditionally entailed a focal concern with the structural and semantic properties of the behaviour itself (the figure), and an almost universal under-attentiveness to context (the ground). This abstracting of behaviour from context has appeared natural, for example because the structural analysis of language-as-code is analytically more secure than any form of structural analysis of context. *Human action more generally* seems similarly to offer itself for analysis independently of context, in that we can characterize our lived lives as a series of internally structured local activities – going to work, doing leisure, having relationships, etc. – each with their own event structure.

Yet a current consensus amongst context theorists is in challenging the appropriateness of the figure–ground relationship. Language, that is, can no longer be said to exist 'within' a context, from which it is theoretically independent: these are the 'increasingly more interactive and dialogically conceived notions' of context that Goodwin and Duranti refer to (1992: 1). Meaning derives from the interplay between language texts and context, taken to include other textualized meanings. This is Volosinov/Bakhtin's principle of 'dialogic' utterance and 'multiple voicing' (e.g. Bakhtin, 1981). Texts find their meanings in and in relation to the contextual meanings that comprise societies, cultures and ideologies, just as those contexts are continually being confirmed, challenged or refined in the generation and reception of new texts. It follows that language, and in fact all social action, is a complex of processes that, inescapably, dialogically implicates and actively valorizes the natural environment. Environmentalism, in any and all of its guises, must look to language for its constitutive core. As linguists, we

Notes

We acknowledge permissions to print copies of original newspaper and magazine extracts granted by the following: The *Telegraph*, The *Western Mail*, The *Sun, Daily Star* (Express Newspapers), *Prima* (Gruner & Jahr, UK).

1. The published rationale for the symposium referenced as Alexander et al. (1993) was given as follows: 'Areas of work to be presented and discussed include questions such as: How are ecological problems articulated in texts? What do we learn about ecological problems through various texts? Which syntactic, semantic and pragmatic means are used in communication about ecological matters in different contexts? Which linguistic methods are appropriate for this kind of language research? Which theories of language are most adequate for investigation of the ecological problematic?' Many writers involved in those proceedings acknowledged Michael Halliday's seminal contribution to this developing field in his keynote address at AILA (The International Association of Applied Linguistics) 1990 (Halliday, 1990).
2. We are very grateful to Pam Perkins who collated and annotated the media print sample, and contributed important insights to our analyses. The sample was compiled under the guidance of Allan Bell, who has been involved in all aspects of this phase of the study. Chris Lane and Janet Holmes have also made important formative inputs into this work.
3. An explicit aim of our future work is to contrast northern and southern hemisphere mediated and lay discourses about the environment.
4. Giddens's position is: 'The reflexive project of the self, which consists in the sustaining of coherent, yet continuously revised, biographical narratives, takes place in the context of multiple choice as filtered through abstract systems. In modern social life, the notion of lifestyle takes on a particular significance. The more tradition loses its hold, and the more daily life is reconstituted in terms of the dialectical interplay of the local and the global, the more individuals are forced to negotiate lifestyle choices among a diversity of options' (1991: 5).

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20

Figures of Speech: Figurative Expressions and the Management of Topic Transition in Conversation

Paul Drew and Elizabeth Holt

One feature of conversation that contributes to its colloquial character is that, from time to time, speakers use certain forms of idiomatic expressions which may be regarded as FIGURES OF SPEECH. The following fragment from a telephone conversation illustrates this kind of linguistic object, the use of which we shall examine in this article.

(1) [Field:X:(C):1:1:1:6]

	Lesley:	.hh He wz a (.).p a buyer for the hoh- i- the only horse hair fact'ry left in England.
	Mum:	Good gracious,
		(0.3)
	Lesley:	And he wz their buyer,
		(.)
	Mum:	Hm:::
	Lesley:	.t
	Mum:	Hm:.
→	Lesley:	So he had a good inni:ngs did [n't he.
	Mum:	[I should say so:

Just before this fragment, Lesley has told her mother about the death, at the age of 79, of a mutual acquaintance. Here, instead of describing this man's long and full life in some literal fashion, she chooses instead the figurative expression (arrowed turn) "he had a good innings" – an image derived from the game of cricket.

The matter of a speaker's selecting a figurative expression, in preference to a more literal way of saying or describing something, is particularly visible when the speaker changes what was going to be a literal or non-idiomatic form and replaces it with a figurative expression, as illustrated in the self-repairs (arrowed) in the following extracts.

(2) [US:20]

Vic: Dey took their business fuh three days en ney
→ came back en, took care a' her dey gi– .hh
→ showered her with, whatever kinda gifts they wanted.
(0.7)
Vic: In her mi:nd stuck the showering of gifts.

(3) [Field: 86A] (Lesley has called her husband, Skip, at work, to tell him that the police have been round to investigate the burglary of their home the previous night)

Lesley: An they said OH YOU'RE VERY PRECISE when I said what ti:me (.) I thought it was,
(0.2)
Lesley: BU' FORTunately I'd had a peep at the clo:ck .hh
(1.2)
Skip: Well I– I knew about what time it was I knew it was about
(1.1)
Skip: Ten– about uh (ten– say) between ten and twenty pa::st.
(0.2)
Skip: (Obviously knew)
Lesley: .hhh Well I said it was about three twenty one I
→ think because by the time we– (.) we– the penny
→ had dropped an' we got up again that was three twenty fi::ve,

In 2, it looks as though Vic had been going to say that, as a way of "taking care of her," they "give" her (gifts). However, he cuts off "gi–(ve)" and replaces it with the figurative "showered her with . . . gifts." In 3, Lesley alters what she had been going to say at "because by the time we–"; judging from the way she continues her turn, that projects either "by the time we realized . . ." or "by the time we got up again." In any case, she changes it to "by the time . . . the penny had dropped," thereby either replacing "realized" with "the penny had dropped" or inserting that expression into an otherwise non-idiomatic account. In each case, the speaker starts to produce a literal version of something, but then does a self-repair which substitutes that version (or possibly, in 3, adds to it) with a figurative description.

In such cases, a speaker's SELECTION of a figurative expression is particularly exposed in self-repairs involving the substitution of a figurative for a more literal description. But it is generally the case that the use of figurative expressions in conversation is a property of the DESIGN of turns at talk. As with any other feature or component of turn design – lexical, syntactic, intonational, or prosodic – a figurative expression may be selected as part of the way in which a turn at talk

sequential properties of turns that have the selection of a figurative expression as one of their design features.[1]

Parenthetically, we should note that we are taking a somewhat different direction of inquiry than that followed by most research in this field. Very broadly, research into the whole range of idiomatic language (including not only figurative expressions but also proverbs, oxymora, "syntactic idioms" etc.) has been directed toward uncovering the following:

(a) The grammatical characteristics of, and structures underlying, idiomatic constructions (Chafe 1968, Weinreich 1969, Fillmore et al. 1988, Abeille 1995, Nicholas 1995, Schenk 1995).
(b) The semantic interpretative competencies and cognitive processing involved in their comprehension (Bobrow& Bell 1973, Gibbs 1980, Estill&Kemper 1982, Gibbs 1987, Popiel & McRae 1988, Schraw et al. 1988, Schweigert & Moates 1988, Gibbs & Kearney 1994).[2]
(c) The connections between syntactic properties of idioms and their interpretation (e.g. Gibbs & Nayak 1989).

Across all these fields of research in linguistics and (psycho) linguistics, the data or test materials are almost invariably instances of idioms abstracted from any actual dialogic context (indeed, much of the research, especially in the area of idiom comprehension, is experimental). In short, it appears that there has been little systematic investigation into the use of idioms in naturally occurring dialog, at least, in English.[3]

By contrast, we are inquiring here into the interactional role that figurative expressions play when they are used in conversation. Figurative expressions are a feature of the design of turns at talk: They are selected as part of the way turns are constructed so as to "fit" with, or play a coherent interactional role in, the sequences in which those turns are produced. Thus the components of a turn's construction, at whatever level of linguistic production,[4] are connected with the activity that the turn is being designed to perform in the unfolding interactional sequence of which it is a part, and to the further development of which it contributes. That is, the most proximate context in which a turn is produced, and in which it is recognizably coherent, is its SEQUENTIAL context. Hence we treat figurative expressions as one of those linguistic components of turn design through which speakers manage, collaboratively, certain sequentially embedded activities. We explore here whether an account can be given of the occasions when speakers employ figurative expressions, in terms of their SEQUENTIAL DISTRIBUTION or ENVIRONMENTS. Therefore, rather than seeking any kind of "cognitive processing" account for speakers' selections of figurative expressions in speech, we can regard using figurative expressions as a systematic, socially organized practice for producing certain kinds of (verbal) conduct – as, indeed, are all components of the design of turns at talk. Just what that organized practice, and what activities figurative expressions may be employed to perform in conversation, is the focus of this inquiry.

By "figurative expressions" we mean those conventionalized complex units

that are phrasal (e.g. "stark naked," "by and large," "zero tolerance," "window of opportunity") or even lexical.[5] (For an overview, see the introduction to Everaert et al. 1995.) In common with these other idiomatic complex units, figures of speech are formulaic or relatively "fixed" in composition – syntactically, lexically, and sometimes intonationally.[6] Hence, like words, they may be learned separately as single units of the language (Fillmore et al. 1988; but for a different view, see Gibbs & Nayak 1989). Generally, they are semantically opaque; their meanings are not the same as, or cannot be found from, the meanings of their constituent words (Bolinger 1976, Weinreich 1969).[7] This creates the distinction between their literal and figurative meanings – a distinction which, of course, is the starting point of much of the research literature cited above on the recognition and comprehension of idioms. At any rate, the conveyed meanings of such expressions are not literal but metaphorical, as is illustrated by "had a good innings," "shower with gifts," and "the penny had dropped," in exx. 1, 2, and 3 respectively. The metaphorical character of figurative expressions is therefore another property that distinguishes them from some other routinized or relatively fixed expressions (including "automatic language," Van Lancker & Kempler 1987) which are part of the idiolect of a language.

Our primary data are a corpus of telephone calls recorded by a British family at intervals over a three-year period, consisting of approximately 15 hours of telephone conversations between family members, between members of the family and their friends, and occasionally with colleagues.[8] This corpus was supplemented by various other corpora of American and British telephone calls, amounting to about 20 hours of recorded and transcribed conversations (for the transcription conventions, see Atkinson & Heritage 1984). From these data a sample collection was made of approximately 200 instances of speakers using figurative expressions.

Figurative Expressions in Topic Termination Sequences

An initial and fundamental step toward identifying the patterns or organizations associated with a linguistic phenomenon is to see whether that phenomenon has any discernible distribution in talk. While the sense of, or basis for, "distributionalizing a phenomenon" can vary according to one's analytic perspective, here we mean determining whether the phenomenon has any regular or recurrent position in sequences of talk (following the sense of "distributionalize" used by Sacks 1992:2.422). When we adopted this analytic way of examining the collection of figurative expressions in our corpus, a very striking pattern emerged. In this pattern, following a turn in which a speaker produces a figurative expression, the co-participants briefly agree with one another, after which one or the other introduces a new topic of conversation.[9] Hence it appears that the use of a figurative expression is associated with topic termination and transition to a new/next topic.

To illustrate the principal features of this [illegible]

expression "had a good innings" – though now considering the turn in which that was produced in relation to more of the surrounding talk. Lesley and her mother had been talking, for some minutes before this extract, about the illnesses (and possibly "final" illnesses) of some elderly friends.

(4) [Field:X:(C):1:1:1:6]

1	Lesley:	I don't know'f you remember Missiz Milbeck th't
2		use to go to chu:rch.
3		(0.8)
4	Mum:	(Mi[ssiz)
5	Lesley:	[Uh: uh- he wz the vicar's ward'n anyway he
6		die:d suddenly this week .hhh and he wz still
7		wo:rking.
8		(0.3)
9	Mum:	([ )
10	Lesley:	[He was seventy ni:ne,
11		(0.3)
12	Mum:	My: wo:rd?
13		(0.2)
14	Lesley:	Y[e:s he: was um
15	Mum:	[(You've got s'm rea:l) workers down the:re,
16		heh
17	Lesley:	.hhh He wz a p– uh: Ye:s. Indee:d .hh He wz a
18		(0.2) .p a buyer for the hoh– i– the
19		only horse hair fact'ry left in England.
20	Mum:	Good gracious.
21		(0.3)
22	Lesley:	And he wz their buyer,
23		(.)
24	Mum:	Hm:::
25	Lesley:	.t
26	Mum:	Hm:.
27	Lesley:	So he had a good inni:ngs did[n't he.
28	Mum:	[I should say so:
29		Ye:s.
30		(0.2)
31	Mum:	Marvellous
32	Lesley:	.tk.hhhh Anyway we had a very good evening o:n
33		Saturda:y.
34		(.)
35	Mum:	Ye:s?
36	Lesley:	We went to North Cadbury: an' Gordon came too ...

The kind of topic transition with which the production of a figurative expression is associated in our corpus occurs in 4:27–33. In response to Lesley's producing a figurative version of this acquaintance's having lived a long and full life (4:27), Mum assents very positively to that assessment, "I should say so: Ye:s. (0.2) Marvellous" (4:28–31). After this, Lesley introduces what is evidently a quite

Before considering in more detail some of the features of that topic transition sequence, and the role within it of the use of a figurative expression, we present further instances of this pattern of topic transition. To highlight the pattern we are identifying, the turn in which one speaker produces a figurative expression is marked by arrow 1; the turn(s) in which the recipient briefly agrees or concurs with the idiomatic assessment (sometimes followed by the speaker who produced that assessment) is shown as arrow 2; and then the turn in which one or the other speaker introduces a new topic is shown as arrow 3.

(5) [Field:J86:1:4:6]

Gwen: You know it wz: so lovely an' everything[y know
Lesley: [nYe:s.
Gwen: All character 'n (0.3) beautiful.
Lesley: Ye:s.
(0.7)
1 → Gwen: B't I suppose she must **'v come t' the end of 'er (.) tether 'n just walked out the** [n.
2 → Lesley: [Yes.
(0.8)
2 → Lesley: Oh what a shame.
(.)
2 → Gwen: Ye:s [it's a shame
3 → Lesley: [Anywa:y e– so you don't know any mo:re th'n ...

(6) [Field:2:3:9] (The "he" referred to is Robert Maxwell, a well-known British publisher and businessman)

Steven: Well he didn't either 'ee had a bad start (when) 'ee had iz (0.3) .t.k .hh father shot by the Nazis 'nd iz uh uh .hh mother died in: Auschwitz yih know
[so
Lesley: [Oh really:?=
Steven: =So eez [had the: ( )
Lesley: [Oh'z a Je:w is he Je:w?
(.)
Steven: Oh yeah.
(.)
1 → Steven: He's had k– eez a Czechoslovakian Jew so [eez
Lesley: [Yes
1 → Steven: had quite a– checkered career already=
Lesley: =eh heh
2 → Steven: .hhhh [Yeah
2 → Lesley: [Ye:h.
(0.2)
3 → Lesley: .hhh Alri:ght. Well I':ll get my husband then: to get in touch with the address. =
Steven: =Thanks very much.

(7) [Kamunsky III:16] (Talking about a mutual friend's car)

Myrn: Oh. What color izzit. =

Myrn: O how gro[:ss.
Alan: [That's the color 'v iz car,
Myrn: He's (hanitel– he p– uh bl–l–luh.) He colored it dark bro[:wn?
Alan: [Well he wanted a burnt orange, en it came out shit bro:wn.
(0.3)
Alan: ihhhhhhh[ih .hhh ih–hn–hn ihhee
Myrn: [Ooo::::::::::::.
Alan: it's rilly l:loo(h)oo heh it's nh– hnh–hu[hh it's–
Myrn: [D'z it lookba:d?=
1 → Alan: = Yeheh– heh well it grows o(h)n yeh– heh
[.hheh
2 → Myrn: [Ooo::[:oh::
Alan: [I call it 'iz pudding on whee:ls,
(.)
3 → Alan: .hhh B't ahhhhnywhhay, . .((move to talk about who else will be at the party))

(8) [JGI(S):X15:4–5]
P: but u– certain: (.) things wi:ll do that you know they're re– ru– they're BOUND to [.hhh in certain industry.
M: [Yah.
(0.2)
M: Yah,
P: Different things'll pick up when it– begins to be spring of the yea:r and everythi:ng,
M: Yah.
1 → P: .hhh But I think it'll iron itself out,
2 → M: I sure hope[so.
3 → P: [I'll see you Tuesday.

(9) [Rah:(18):5–6] (Discussing difficulties cleaning double glazed windows)
Jenny: An' the trouble is you see if you tighten th'clips too much they snap.
Ann: Yes. Well that's what I do. Breakin'them.
Jenny: Ye:s:[:,
Ann: [I've been a bit more careful this time but the trouble is I don't get th'm
( ) tih the windows actually.
(.)
1 → Ann: You can't wi:n really.
2 → Jenny: No::.
(.)
2 → Jenny: Oh no.
(0.2)
2 → Ann: No.
(0.3)
3 → Ann: Have you been to school this morning.

(10) [Field:M88:1:5:11]

		Robbie:	. . . but I spoze we do learn 'n she hasn't been to other schools'n I've learned 'n awf'l lot 'n last three years.
		Lesley:	Mm:.
			(0.2)
		Lesley:	Mm.
1	→	Robbie:	B't take this with a dollop'v salt you kno::w I'm–I'm ba:sic'ly quite happy b't quite relieved it's the sheer organization 'n getting all, everything done in th' da:y.
2	→	Lesley:	Yes: that's ri:ght,=
2	→	Robbie:	=Ye[s.
3	→	Lesley:	[Yes. Ye[h .tch .hhhhhh. Wuh-
3	→	Robbie:	[Ok a y, W'ddiyou wanna talk t' me abou(h)[t
3	→	Lesley:	[Eh: WE:ll eh WHAT I RANG up about was . . . .

These cases illustrate clearly a sequential pattern in which a figurative expression is produced in a turn that results in the termination of a current topic. That termination is managed by the participants in a brief exchange of agreements, followed by a transition to a new/next topic. From this pattern it appears that figurative expressions are associated with an organization for closing a current topic of talk and moving on to a next topic. Several components of this organization for topic termination/transition will be examined here in closer detail: (i) the character of figurative expressions in this position as summaries of the current topic; (ii) the sequence through which topic transition is managed; and (iii) the ways in which speakers construct a next turn as introducing a "new" topic.

Figurative Expressions as Summaries

At the point where each of extracts 4–10 begins, a speaker is telling the co-participant about something: about the death of a mutual friend in 4, the home of friends who have just separated in 5, the troubled life of Robert Maxwell in 6, the car of a friend in 7, and so forth. The speakers are reporting empirical facts or details; and in each case, the one doing the reporting is the speaker who produces the turn in which a figurative expression is used. Thus, just before ex. 6, Steven and Lesley have been talking about the famous (perhaps infamous) British publisher Robert Maxwell, touching among other things on the rumor that he has a son who is so severely disabled that he lives permanently in hospital, and on Maxwell's risky business dealings (data not shown). Here, at the beginning of the extract, Steven tells Lesley about the death of Maxwell's parents when he was young. He then produces a figurative summary of these tragic circumstances and allegedly nefarious dealings: "so eez had quite a– checkered career already–." The character of this as a summary is perhaps particularly evident, in that this is designed as an upshot of the prior detailing, signaled by "so . . ." (see also 4:27).

In 9, Ann has been telling Jenny about her difficulties cleaning her double-glazed windows, concluding her account of these difficulties with "you can't wi:n really." In each case, the empirical detailing or reporting is brought to a conclusion with a figurative expression which somehow summarizes what the speaker has been reporting.

Used in this way, these figurative expressions serve as summary assessments of what has been reported – assessments being generic forms of summaries (Jefferson 1984:211). They are "assessments" in that these expressions convey a certain positive or negative value to be attached to the circumstances that the speaker has been describing, including optimism ("it'll iron itself out") or resignation ("you can't win"). In producing figurative assessments, speakers move away from, or step out of, their report of empirical details. In ex. 4, when Lesley uses the idiomatic assessment "he had a good innings," she is not now adding to the list of facts about the man that made his life, and death, notable. The figurative expressions do not themselves include further information about the person who died in 4, nor about the house of the friends who have separated in 5, Maxwell's early life in 6, the friend's car in 7, or the economic difficulties facing the P's industry in 8. In producing a figurative expression, the speakers are becoming empirically disengaged. They are not contributing further details but rather are assessing and summarizing the previously reported empirical information. Employing a figurative expression can be a device to summarize a topic, and thereby to draw it to a conclusion.

This disengagement from empirical details, managed through producing a figurative assessment, is highlighted by the way in which that assessment is not connected particularly or exclusively to its contiguously prior turn. Rather, the expression relates back over much of the prior talk/details, to assess aspects of the topic that have been talked about in earlier turns; indeed, the expression may refer back to and summarize or assess circumstances talked about over the whole of that topic. In ex. 4, when Lesley says that he "had a good innings," she is not merely summarizing the information in her immediately prior turns. The idiom plainly does not refer particularly to the immediately prior information that, when the friend died, he was a buyer for the only horse-hair factory in England. Instead, it refers back over the whole topic, including the details in each of Lesley's turns in the extract – that he was the vicar's warden, that he was still working when he died, and that he died aged 79. By connecting back beyond the adjacently prior turn/information, the expression "had a good innings" summarizes the information across the entire prior announcement/telling, and it thereby begins to detach the talk from an item-by-item sequential development of the topic.

Although the data are too extensive to explicate this in detail, this is also true of the other examples cited above. In ex. 5, Gwen and Lesley have been discussing the breakup of the marriage of people they know, in the course of which Gwen mentioned how lovely and full of character this couple's home was (see Gwen's first two turns). Again, "coming to the end of her tether" is a

we have already mentioned that Lesley and Steven were previously discussing Maxwell's business dealings and the rumor concerning his disabled son; hence, when Steven says that Maxwell has had "quite a – checkered career," he can be heard as referring back to and summarizing all those troubled circumstances, as well as the immediately prior information that both Maxwell's parents were killed by the Nazis. In 10, Robbie's figurative summary "take with a dollop of salt" refers back over much of the very lengthy prior topic, concerning her experiences teaching at a school at which Lesley has also taught. Thus a figurative summary can serve as a device to close down a topic by connecting back beyond the immediately prior turn or information, often to the beginning of the topic. A figurative expression has the property of being able to summarize and assess more than whatever is referred to in its contiguous prior turn; in this way it can detach the talk from the progressive development of a "next item" of information relevant to an ongoing topic.

There are, of course, other means besides figurative assessments by which a current topic can be brought to a close; e.g., repetition is commonly associated with terminating a topic. Moreover, there are other kinds of assessments besides figurative expressions with which a speaker can summarize the talk thus far. Hence the account we are developing here is not a general account for the termination of topics: That would require an exploration of the range of techniques by which speakers can summarize and disengage from what they have been talking about (cf. Maynard 1980, Button 1990). Our focus here is to account for a systematic position in which speakers recurrently employ figurative expressions – namely, that they do so in summarizing a topic, and thereby draw it to a close.

It is worth noticing, however, that figurative expressions may have a special place among the techniques available for summarizing and concluding a topic. First, it is striking that they are commonly, indeed overwhelmingly, employed by speakers to summarize what they themselves have been telling/reporting, rather than what the other, their co-participant, has been telling. They are, then, "self-summaries": summaries of one's own talk/topic, and not of the other's talk.[10] Furthermore, their use as generic assessments detached from empirical particulars may give them a certain "power" in summarizing and closing topics – e.g., in contrast to the use of repetitions or other forms of assessment, which are more closely tied to prior empirical details (Pomerantz 1984a). A glimpse of this can be seen in 4:17–27, where Lesley initially repeats one of the details concerning the friend's career. After Mum's initial response to the details of this man's employment, and a pause (4:20–21), Lesley repeats that "he wz their buyer" (4:22); following this, there is something of a hiatus – a slight pause – before Mum does repeated ruminative acknowledgements. In outline, it appears very much as though the topic termination is imminent before Lesley's figurative summary in 4:27. It seems that Lesley is looking for a way to close the topic, tries with a repetition that does not quite succeed (in repeating "Hm:::," Mum doesn't find a way to move out of that topic and onto a next), and then tries again with a "stronger" closing move by producing the figurative

they fail in an initial attempt at topic closure, in ex. 4 through repetition. This suggests that figurative expressions may have greater "power" in drawing topics to a conclusion than other closing techniques such as repetition or (non-figurative) assessments; this represents a rather different approach to the "vividness" (Chafe 1968) or "intensity" (Labov 1984) of idiomatic and figurative expressions.

The Topic Transition Sequence

We outlined in the previous section the properties that are associated with the summary status of figurative expressions, and which make them objects for concluding a topic. The key evidence for their terminal character, however, is that co-participants treat these figurative turns as terminal, as bringing the topics to an end. This is manifest in the brief turns that come after the figurative turn and before the introduction of the new topic. In these turns, the co-participants manifestly decline to develop the topic further. Consider, for example, the sequence in ex. 9, following Ann's figurative summary of the trouble she is having cleaning double-glazed windows.

(from 9)

Ann:	You can't wi:n really.
Jenny:	No::.
	(.)
Jenny:	Oh no.
	(0.2)
Ann:	No.
	(0.3)
Ann:	Have you been to school this morning.

The recipient's (Jenny's) response to the summary "You can't wi:n really" is to agree: "No::. (.) Oh no." Ann, in turn, does a token reciprocal agreement or confirmation, "No", after which she introduces a new topic. The recipient had the opportunity, in the slot after the figurative turn, to continue talking about the topic of Ann's difficulties cleaning windows; she could have developed or elaborated that topic in a variety of ways. Instead, she produces a near-minimal unelaborated agreement; in doing so, the recipient declines the opportunity to develop that topic any further. Her response is topically fitted, but it does not offer any further resources to talk more about that topic. Hence she begins the disengagement from and closure of the current topic.

When in response Ann produces a (nearly) identical token, she likewise declines to take the opportunity in that slot to say any more about the previous topic. She thereby accepts or confirms the prior move by Jenny to disengage from the current topic; as a result, they are now collaboratively moving toward the closure of that topic. That closure is finally sealed by Ann's introduction of

sequence through which co-participants collaboratively disengage from a current topic and move to a next. Two further illustrations of that sequence follow.

(from 6)

1	→	Steven:	He's had k– eez a Czechoslovakian Jew so[eez
		Lesley:	[Yes
1	→	Steven:	had quite a– checkered career already=
		Lesley:	=eh heh
2	→	Steven:	.hhhh [Yeah
2	→	Lesley:	[Ye:h.
			(0.2)
3	→	Lesley:	.hhh Alri:ght. Well I':ll get my husband then: to get in touch with the address. =

(from 10)

1	→	Robbie:	B't take this with a dollop 'v salt you kno::w I'm– I'm ba:sic'ly quite happy b't quite relieved it's the sheer organization 'n getting all, everything done in th' da:y.
2	→	Lesley:	Yes: that's ri:ght,=
2	→	Robbie:	=Ye[s.
3	→	Lesley:	[Yes. Ye [h .tch .hhhhhh Wuh–
3	→	Robbie:	[O k a y, W'ddiyou wanna talk t' me abou(h)t

In each of these fragments, the turn in which one speaker produces a figurative summary (arrow 1) is followed by reciprocal and nearly identical "agreements" by both speakers (arrow 2);[12] after this, one of them introduces a new topic (arrow 3). "Agreement" is meant broadly, to include topically fitted or appropriate responses such as the sympathy tokens ("Oh what a shame") with which Lesley responds and Gwen reciprocates in 5, and the sympathetic or affiliative manner in which M responds to P's report of her troubles in 8. Agreement, sympathy, or affiliation may describe the particular response by a recipient to the figurative summary in question; in any case, contiguity or alignment between the co-participants is expressed in some way (i.e. through the minimal character of the agreements, typically "Yes" or some such object) so as to foreclose further talk about that topic and to enable the speakers to move on to a next topic.

Thus the topic transition sequence associated with figurative summaries (which may apply more generally to topic transitions following other forms of topical summary/closure) exhibits a kind of standard form, which can be represented schematically as:

1	→	Speaker A:	Figurative summary
2	→	Speaker B:	Agreement (or other expression of contiguity)
3	→	Speaker A:	Agreement/confirmation
4	→	Speaker A/B:	Introduces next topic

This can be considered a "standard sequence" for topical closure and transition to a next topic, after a topical summary – the production of a figurative

elided – e.g., instead of producing a further agreement/confirmation token in response to recipient's agreement, speaker A (the one who produced the figurative summary) moves straight to the introduction of a new topic, as in ex. 8.

(from 8)
1 → P: .hhh But I *think* it'll iron itself out,
2 → M: I sure hope [so.
4 → P: [I'll see you Tuesday.

In other cases, speaker B (the recipient of the figurative summary) may produce a minimal agreement token and then open a new topic right away, without waiting for any further token from speaker A. In either case, the production of a figurative summary (arrow 1) is responded to by a minimal form of concurrence by the recipient (arrow 2), which is followed by the introduction of a new topic (arrow 4). This results in an attenuated form of the standard sequence, through the elision of step 3 in the schematic model above. This is evidence that the recipient's topically disengaged minimal concurrence with the prior speaker's production of the figurative summary is sufficient to give either speaker the opportunity to embark on a new topic.

The standard transition sequence that we have described represents the sequence in which co-participants collaborate to close one topic of conversation and begin a next topic. The significance of this sequence is that it reflects – or, more properly, is the product of – the fact that co-participants regularly and systematically orient to the summary and closing implications of the figurative expression in the prior turn. That orientation is displayed in the way that both speakers systematically withhold any further topical development or elaboration. By producing minimal agreements (or other contiguous actions), recipients display their recognition that the idiomatic turn is somehow sufficient to terminate that topic; their responses are therefore designed not to say any more about that topic, but rather to exit from it. Subsequently, speaker A collaborates in the closure, either through further minimal agreements (frequently repetitions of speaker B's response), or by eliding the sequence and going straight to a next topic. Speaker A thereby concurs with speaker B's understanding that the figurative turn was designed to conclude and terminate the prior topic.

Thus the standard topic transition sequence is evidence of a symmetry between speakers' production of figurative idioms and their interpretation by recipients – where "interpretation" refers not to what the expressions themselves "mean" (in the way that psycholinguists have investigated the "interpretation" of idioms), but to the conversational activity they perform (topical closing). This symmetry, or mutual orientation to the topically terminal implicativeness of a turn in which a figurative expression has been produced, is generally embedded in this topic transition sequence. It is particularly visible, however, in cases where the co-participants SIMULTANEOUSLY and INDEPENDENTLY move to step 4 of the sequence, the opening of a next topic. This happens in ex. 10. Recall that Robbie summarizes the difficulties she's been having at the school where she teaches, speaking figuratively: "B't take this with a dollop 'v salt you kno::w".[13] Lesley

are characteristic of the standard transition sequence, steps 2 and 3. After this, each of them simultaneously changes topic – at least, it appears that Lesley is about to, when she drops out in response to the overlapping, topically initial enquiry from Robbie. In her arrowed turn, Lesley does an emphatic inbreath (characteristic of some disjunctive next move), followed by what is clearly recognizable as the beginning of "What" ("Wuh–"), which is almost certainly the start of "What I called about was . . ." But her move to that next topic coincides with Robbie (in her arrowed turn) simultaneously enquiring: "Okay, W'ddiyou wanna talk t' me abou-(h)t" (which also begins with increased amplitude). Hence, Lesley and Robbie simultaneously perform the same action: moving to a new next topic. As it happens, they are probably also both orienting to the relevance of not just any new topic, but specifically the matter of why Lesley has telephoned (this occurs about 15 minutes into the call); i.e., it appears that Lesley was about to announce why she called, at the same time as Robbie asks why she called. At any rate, they are simultaneously treating this as a place where it is relevant to introduce a new topic.

The significance of their simultaneous move to a new topic is that it provides evidence for the shared intersubjective "reality" of this position (to post the production of a figurative idiom) as a point where it is appropriate to change topic. Instances in which both participants embark on the same action simultaneously (in overlap) serve as particularly strong evidence that an observable pattern is the product of a shared understanding (which, of course, need not be conscious) – in this context, that figurative expressions can be used to summarize and close down topics, and thereby to occasion a move to next topics. For this reason, we might regard the use of figurative expressions as an intersubjectively available practice or device for topic termination.

Topic Transition: Introducing a New Topic

Recall that we are describing the components of the sequence in which the use of a figurative expression results in the termination of that topic and the transition to a new topic. We have discussed how idioms can work to summarize the preceding talk/topic; and we have outlined the transition sequence in which participants collaboratively disengage themselves from a prior topic. The final component – the introduction of a next/new topic – is of central importance: It is only when participants move to a new topic that what has been an incipient transition sequence, until that point, becomes fully realized or ratified as a termination of the prior topic and a transition to a next topic.

We have been relying until now on an intuitive, but nonetheless robust, sense of how one participant or the other introduces a next or new topic. For example, in 10, the topic that Robbie draws to a conclusion with the figurative expression "with a dollop 'v salt" has been her teaching experiences. As we have seen, she then changes the subject by inquiring what Lesley has telephoned her about –

of a mutual acquaintance. When Lesley subsequently announces "Anyway we had a very good evening on Saturda:y," that is rather clearly a change of topic. In each of exx. 4–10, the change of topic is similarly "obvious."

The difficulties associated with defining what constitutes a topic, and with specifying analytically the various referential and other linguistic means (shared reference, propositional content, pro-terming, anaphora and deixis, lexical repetition etc.) through which topical connections and hence discourse cohesion are managed, are well enough known not to need recapitulation here (but cf. Li 1976, Schank 1977, Maynard 1980, Brown & Yule 1983 chap. 3, Levinson 1983: 312–16, Schegloff 1990). But note that one important respect in which the concept of topic may be difficult to apply to the analysis of natural discourse is the problem of identifying topical boundaries. Generally, one topic of conversation merges almost imperceptibly into the next, in a seamless "stepwise" progression (Jefferson 1984, Sacks 1992:2.291–302). Hence the precise points of topic shifts or changes, and how such shifts were managed, are often analytically opaque. Of course, if one cannot identify the boundaries of particular topics, then it is difficult to offer an account of the linguistic basis for topical coherence, either in principle or for actual topics.

The changes of topic that follow figurative summaries of the prior topic in exx. 4–10 are not, however, managed in a stepwise fashion. They are "obvious" changes, not only in the intuitive sense of their involving a dramatic change in reference or content, but more particularly because, in most cases, speakers mark that they are about to change the topic of conversation. They do so, generally, in the design of the prefatory (turn-initial) components/features of the turn in which they introduce the new topic (arrowed in the following fragments).

(from 4)
Mum: Marvellous.
→ Lesley: .tk.hhhh Anyway we had a very good evening on Saturda:y. ...

(from #6)
Steven: .hhhh [Yeah
Lesley: [Ye:h.
(0.2)
→ Lesley: .hhh Alri:ght. Well I':ll get my husband then: to get in touch with the address.

(from 10)
Lesley: Yes: that's ri:ght,=
Robbie: =Ye[s.
→ Lesley: [Yes. Ye[h .tch .hhhhhh Wuh–
→ Robbie: [O k a y, W'ddiyou wanna talk t' me abou(h)t

(11) [Field:88U:1:9:11] (Simplified)
Dana: I can't really say hey Mum I've got prob ['ms
Gordon: [hhh ehhh heh heh
Dana: She'd run [a mi:le.](0.3) [( )
Gordon: [hhYhhhehhhh]h[hesssss

Dana: There you go:.
(0.9)
→ Dana: We↑:ll- (0.4) uh::m,hh I(h) can't think 'v anything else u- rea::lly exciting to say?

When, for example, Lesley announces in 4 that she and her husband "had a very good evening on Saturda:y," she marks this as a change to a new topic by beginning her turn with an audible inbreath; she then produces a prefatory discontinuity marker "Anyway," the beginning of which is produced with increased amplitude or stress. Such prefatory components as "Anyway", "Alright" (6), "Well" (11), "Okay" (10), either alone or in combination ("But anyway" in 7, "Alright well" in 6), are disjunctive in that they work to disengage the forthcoming turn from being tied or connected to, or coherent with, its prior turn; i.e., such components are produced to disengage this next turn, topically, from its prior. Hence, by producing such components – often in conjunction with some combination of audible inbreaths and raised amplitude – the speakers in such cases signal that what they are about to say will be unconnected with what they have previously been discussing, and hence that they are about to introduce a new topic.

This is clear evidence that participants themselves treat what they are doing as disengaging from the prior topic, and as introducing a new and quite different topic. In most instances in our collection of topical transitions following the use of a figurative idiom, the introduction of the new topic is signaled by (some combination of) increased amplitude, raised pitch/amplitude, and self-editing or hesitancy (including inbreath) – and, most importantly, by those prefatory discontinuity markers that suspend the relevance of the prior topic. (That is, they instruct the co-participant not to try to look for any connection between what the two of them have just been speaking about, and what is about to be said.) Again, this serves as evidence that the production of a figurative expression, along with the sequence of brief agreements that a figurative turn generates, constitutes a shared practice for closing down a topic and moving on to a next topic: a practice to which participants mutually or intersubjectively orient in conversation.

Failure to Achieve Topical Closure

Some cases in our collection of figurative expressions did not run off in such a straightforward or tightly organized topic-termination/transition sequence. The topic being talked about did not end after, or in the close vicinity of, the production of a figurative summary. In particular, we have two types of cases in which a speaker's attempt to close a topic with a figurative expression did not result in closing that topic – instances that nevertheless relate to the topic termination pattern we have been describing. The first type involves instances where the expression itself happens to occasion further talk

Touched-off Topical Developments

Devices or practices in conversation do not work in an automatic or mechanistic fashion: The practices evident in conversational patterns are RESOURCES that enable speakers to engage, recurrently, in certain activities, using means by which those activities will be coherent, recognizable, and meaningful to co-participants. But the use of those resources DOES NOT DETERMINE the course of the interaction. At any point in an interaction, participants may orient to the possibilities that a conversational practice occasions; nevertheless, they are not obliged or constrained to follow the sequential track implicated in those possibilities. In short, they may choose to take a different direction – to suspend the sequential track implicated in an object and instead take a different track. So it is with figurative expressions and the topically terminal possibility their use occasions. In the first set of cases in which the use of a figurative summary does not result in topic termination and transition, it appears that one speaker finds something further connected to or touched off by the figurative expression – so that the talk moves along from it in a more "step-wise" fashion, characteristic of topical development in conversation.

(12) [Field:X(C):2:1:2:7]

	Joan:	We 'aven't even bought a Christmas tree–: we've dragged an old one down that Kenneth use to 'ave in iz bedroom.[.hh
	Lesley:	[ihYe[:s:.
	Joan:	[An o:ld (0.3) sorta make believe one. You[know, .hh[An' made do with=
	Lesley:	[Ye:s, [yes.
1 →	Joan:	=tha:t. We're 'affing to really (.) tighten our
1 →		(0.7) belts.
2 & 3 →	Lesley:	ihYes well (0.3) so are we:. Because uh (.) it seems to me everybody else seems t' be doing so we::ll . .((Continues about her husband's doing badly because "nobody's buying anything for agriculture"))

Prior to this extract, Joan has been telling Lesley about the financial difficulties her family faces because of her husband's reduced income, and the economies they are having to make as a consequence – economies which she details, then summarizes figuratively (arrow 1). Lesley responds to this figurative summary, first by doing a minimal acknowledgment (arrow 2), and then (arrow 3) by continuing and developing the topic of reduced income. She shifts from talking about Joan's husband's income to her own family's difficulties in this respect: "well (0.3) so are we:" (i.e., "having to tighten our belts"). Thus there is something of a topical shift (in reference or focus) following Joan's figurative summary, but not the kind of clear and marked topic change characteristic of the sequences

in which the figurative expression is PIVOTAL: It is used to summarize the topic-thus-far, but it serves to touch off further related matters (see also Jefferson 1984:203).[14]

In such instances, the figurative expression might have terminated the topic about which the participants had been speaking. Recipients produce minimal agreement tokens to these summaries, and at this point they are potentially disengaged from that topic. However, one of them then finds in the figurative turn the opportunity to continue somewhat "on topic." Hence the figurative expressions in such cases bring the participants to a point at which they COULD HAVE disengaged from a previous topic and introduced a new topic; however, they DECLINE to do so, pulling back from disengagement and opting instead to continue the topic (albeit in a stepwise move). This, then, is the first way in which the standard sequence for closure and change of topic is not realized, because one participant chooses to exploit the topical opportunities that happen to be touched off by the figurative expression.

Disagreement, Disaffiliation, and Multiple Figurative Idioms

The second type of case in which the production of a figurative summary does not result in topic termination and transition involves some manifest lack of accord, affiliation, or agreement between the participants. Recall that the standard sequence described above is characterized by agreement or a measure of accord between them. In exx. 1 and 4–11, the recipient of the turn in which a figurative expression has been produced (speaker B in the schematic model) concurs with speaker A's figurative summary assessment. These agreements may take quite minimal forms (e.g. "Yes"; or "No" where appropriate, as in 9, see Jefferson 1994); or they may consist of appropriate expressions of sympathy (ex. 5), affiliation (exx. 8 and 10), etc. Whatever form of agreement or accord is used by the recipient, that speaker is in effect not only agreeing to the prior speaker's summary assessment: He or she is also implicitly accepting or confirming the prior speaker's move to close down the previous topic, by declining to take the opportunity in that slot to add anything or say anything more substantive about the matter being discussed. In other words, substantive agreement to the prior speaker's assessment also conveys a kind of "procedural" agreement, to draw that topic to an end. The recipient, in producing in this slot a minimal agreement (etc.), simultaneously concurs both with the prior speaker's assessment and with his or her move to close that topic (through the figurative summary). In this fashion, topics can be closed with agreement between the participants, through the relatively brief sequence outlined schematically above.[15]

To begin with, there are cases that seem to be a variant of the "standard" topic transition sequence.

(13) [Heritage:1:6:5–6] (Talking about clipping Mrs H's dog's claws)
Mrs. H: En that's botherin' me yo [u know I=
Ilene: [Yes

	Ilene:	Well that's it because you've o:nly just got to cut the tips off.
	Mrs. H:	Mm::.
		(.)
	Ilene:	You know you– you musn't cut it very far down,
	Mrs. H:	Yes.
	Ilene:	You musn't cut it onto the bla:ck because it's li:ke cutting into our own quick.
	Mrs. H:	Yes of course it ti[s.
1 →	Ilene:	[En they'll scream blue murder if you d(h)o th(h)a(h)[t
2 →	Mrs. H:	[hih hih Y(h)eh ah Well I've given it up as a bad job anywa[y.
	Ilene:	[eh heh heh hih
4 →	Mrs. H:	You kno:w, .h But l:look ah I wz (0.2) I'm havin:g sti:ll a big pro:blem with my: sister's ba:ck . . .

Just prior to this extract, Mrs. H. has been explaining to Ilene – who evidently breeds dogs, and whom Mrs. H. treats as something of an expert – that she has been having difficulties clipping her dog's claws. She has asked Ilene if she can recommend a reliable vet in the neighborhood who would do it for her. In broad terms, the extract resembles earlier cases: Speaker A (Ilene) produces a figurative summary (arrow 1, "they'll scream blue murder"), in response to which Mrs H. produces a minimal agreement form (arrow 2) and subsequently opens a new topic (arrow 4) – which happens to be her primary reason for calling, to ask Ilene's son, a physiotherapist, to treat her sister's back.

But in one respect, at least, this differs from earlier cases. Mrs. H's response to Ilene's production of a figurative expression is not restricted to concurring with Ilene's prior turn. Instead, she continues by adding to her agreement – done with a slight chuckle, reciprocating the chuckling laughter in Ilene's prior turn – a figure of speech of her own: "Well I've given it up as a bad job anyway." Certainly this does not extend the termination sequence very far; nevertheless. it results in a termination sequence which is not quite so attenuated as the "standard" sequence described above.

There is perhaps some slight difference between the positions of the co-participants at this point; the difference just surfaces when Mrs. H says, "I've given it up as a bad job anyway." At the beginning of this extract, Ilene has been asked to recommend a vet who might clip the dog's claws, and she is warning about the dangers of trying to clip them oneself – a danger she graphically summarizes figuratively. However, it appears that Mrs. H is displaying that she does not need to be advised not to attempt to clip them herself: She has already decided it's too difficult for her. Hence she is asking Ilene to recommend a vet (data not shown), and this is made explicit in her figurative summary. To a degree, then, Mrs. H RESISTS the advice implicit in Ilene's warning. (On the sensitivities of giving and receiving advice, and resistance to advice more generally, see Jefferson & Lee 1992, Heritage & Sefi 1992.) When Mrs. H adds that she has "given it up as a bad job anyway," she conveys that the warning, and

This kind of case, in which the recipient responds to her co-participant's figurative summary with one of her own, is fairly benign, in the sense that the difference in the positions expressed figuratively is perhaps only incipient; the difference does not approach overt disagreement or conflict (in this respect, note both Mrs. H's initial minimal agreement and her reciprocal chuckling). Significantly, the co-participants then move successfully to open a new topic.

In other instances, however, the differences between participants become more manifest at the interactional surface of the talk. Although one speaker may attempt to close the topic by producing a figurative summary, this is not accepted by the recipient. The recipient withholds the kinds of minimal agreement associated with the standard topic transition sequence, with the result that the co-participants do not achieve a topic termination and transition to next topic. Instead, the topic becomes protracted until further attempts are made to get the other's agreement, often through additional figurative summaries.

(14) [SBL:3:1:3–4] (Talking about asking the committee of a women's organization, of which Marylou and Claire are members, about showing some giftware at an event)

1	Marylou:	Maybe we sh' do tha:t.
2	Claire:	Mm hmg AN' AN' EH– A:SK how many: MIGHT BE
3		inTRESTED duh come BEC'Z IF YEE DON'T HAVE
4		ENOUGH THET'S INTERESTED W'L THEN (.) fooey
5		ON IT YIH [KNOW.
6	Marylou:	[We:ll I don't think it's a matter 'v it
7		having t' be right no:w. I think it's something
8		thet will snowba:ll.
9		(0.7)
10	Marylou:	Yihkno: [w?
11	Claire	[Mm::[h m .
12	Marylou:	[I think it's somethin' thet (.)
13		'll haftih be worked up
14		(1.6)
15	Marylou:	W[hich is alright en it can be done at
16	Claire	[(Weh–)
17	Marylou:	any ti:me en [I don't care whether a: lot 'v 'm
18	Claire:	[M m h m ?
19	Marylou:	come 'r not because
20		(0.7)
21	Marylou:	uh: if they don't wan' to.
22		(0.7)
23	Marylou:	But the thing i:s ah: the more the better,
24		(0.3)
25	Marylou:	Bu [t they don't haftuh (place order) in the club =
26	Claire:	[WE:LL YOU KNOW EVERY O N E A' T H E
27	Marylou:	=they c ['n u–have their own frie:nd [s (and uh)
28	Claire:	[Mh [.hhh Ever' one
29		a' those o:fficers yih know darn well's gonna

For several minutes before this, they have been talking about Marylou's wanting to show some giftware, which people might purchase, at an event being organized by a women's committee; but she's not sure of the propriety of suggesting it to them. Claire, another member of the committee, has been encouraging Marylou to ask them if they'd like a showing. The extract begins at the point where Marylou concludes (14:1) that "maybe we should" ask the committee about showing the giftware, with which Claire agrees. In a general sense, Claire is affiliating with Marylou; she is encouraging Marylou to go ahead and ask (the committee) "how many might be interested to come" to a sale of the giftware, on the grounds that she can be sure it will sell well (14:26, 28–30). There is, however, a difference between them at another level. Claire agrees that Marylou should ask the committee, in order to judge the likely interest in such a sale – her point evidently being that if there is insufficient interest, then "fooey ON IT" (14:3–5), presumably conveying that that would be the end of it. Marylou does not assent to this position, taking instead the position: "We:ll I don't think it's a matter 'v it having t' be right no:w." (lines 6–7). The difference between them is that, for Claire, it would be useful to get an indication of whether there is sufficient interest; but Marylou's position is that she could broach it with the committee in the hope that interest will build over time.

Marylou summarizes her position figuratively in 14:7–8, "I think it's something thet will snowba:ll." This does not elicit from Claire any form of agreement/concurrence; instead there is a pause (14:9), following which Marylou further solicits Claire's agreement, in response to which Claire produces only the non-committal token "Mm::hm." (14:11)– which manifestly withholds agreement. (Cf. Pomerantz 1984a; and for a further account of the difference between various response tokens, including "Mm hm", and their interactional and sequential implicativeness, see Gardner 1997.) This absence or withholding of agreement on the part of Claire to Marylou's proposed figurative summary results in the continuation of the topic. Specifically, Marylou pursues her case for believing that it does not matter if few are interested to begin with, because it's something that will gather momentum; in the course of this, Claire continues to withhold agreement (in 14:14, 18, 20, and possibly 22). Then (14:23) Marylou attempts another idiomatic summary, "But the thing i:s ah: the more the better." (For an account of such formal idioms, employing a general syntactic pattern – here, "the X-er the Y-er" – see Fillmore et al. 1988.) In continuing to explain the case for her position, Marylou can be seen to be pursuing Claire' s agreement (Pomerantz 1984b), culminating in her producing a second idiomatic summary.[9] This also fails to elicit Claire's agreement, and the matter remains unresolved, at least in this extract.

Earlier we noted that, in the standard topic transition sequence, there is a conjunction between (a) the recipient's agreement or concurrence with the prior speaker's figurative summary assessment, and (b) the recipient's accepting the opportunity to terminate that topic and move to a next. Recipients' minimal agreements in response to the figurative summaries (sympathy tokens, etc.) conjoin those substantive and procedural agreements. Ex. 14 begins to illustrate

production of a figurative expression does not result in topical closure and transition. Quite simply, the ABSENCE of topic closure is associated with a difference or disaffiliation between speakers – in effect, with a form of incipient disagreement. Such disagreement is not overtly expressed; rather, it is implicit in the absence of agreement in the recipient's response to the figurative summary. The prior speaker (the one who produced that summary) treats that absence as a withholding of agreement by the recipient, as Marylou does in 14; this results in a continuation of the topic and a pursuit of some resolution, perhaps through subsequent attempts to secure agreement. At any rate, when the production of a figurative summary of a topic fails to lead to the termination of that topic and the transition to a next, then the failure and its attendant topic continuation are associated with a lack of accord, and perhaps with incipient disagreement, between the participants.

A final instance rather dramatically illustrates this association between (a) the failure of a figurative summary to achieve topic closure, and (b) disaffiliation between speakers. It appears, from what has been said immediately before this extract, that Ilene's son is interested in buying a house which Raybee is selling. The estate agents (realtors) acting on Raybee's behalf have claimed that they introduced Ilene' s son to the property, through their having sent him details of the house (the documents referred to here) – a claim Ilene disputes. What hangs on this is whether Ilene's son is free to negotiate a price directly with Raybee, or whether he should instead negotiate with the agents ("Moss and Company").

(15) [Heritage:OI:1:2–3]

1	Raybee:	Well as far as I'm con:cer:ned i:t's: that um I'll
2		haf to acce:pt Moss 'n Company's a:rgument that (0.3)
3		your son was introduced to the property via them. =
4	Ilene:	=Ye:s well no:w .h obviously one's going to have
5		to do that but I can assu:re you; .hh that he was
6		not.
7		(.)
8	Ilene:	.hhh We've checked now on all the papers 'e has an'
9		Moss 'n Comp'ny said they were sent through the
10		post we have had n:nothing from Moss 'n Comp'ny
11		through the post.
12		(0.3)
13	Ilene:	Anyway, (.) Tha:t's th– uh you know you can't (.)
14		argue ih it's like (.) uh:[m
15	Raybee:	[Well
16		(.)
17	Ilene:	banging yer head against a[brick wa:ll.
18	Raybee:	[E z far as I'm
19		concerned on this situa:tion, all private
20		negotiations between us must cea:se.
21		(0.2)

23 Ilene: M m [hm
24 Raybee: [Ah:nd (.) any negotiation:s you: wish to
25 enter in on the property you have to go via Moss 'n
26 Co.
27 Ilene: Mm:.
28 Raybee: .hh I been on t' th' solicitor (he thought that)
29 yihknow give me s'm: legal gui:dan[ce
30 Ilene: [Yeah:.
31 Yah.
32 Raybee: A::nd I'm really left between th' devil 'n deep
33 blue sea: I have no option BU:T.h (0.2) to revert
34 to that.
35 (.)
36 Raybee: Uh:[: because of the c– the cost invo:lved an:d
37 Ilene: [Mm
38 Ilene: Ye[ah.
39 Raybee: [w'n it beek– ended up in an argument,
40 Ilene: Ye:s well it (.) we've just hadda terrific
41 argument wi:th Mistuh Michael.
42 (0.5)
43 Raybee: Oh:
44 Ilene: Uh::m anywa::y uh:m, (0.2) Now he re:ckons thez
45 been another offer put i:n,
46 Ilene: I don't know whethuh that's true or not.

At the point where this extract begins, Raybee informs Ilene that she (Raybee) "has to" accept her agents' version, that they did send the necessary details to Ilene's son. While recognizing that Raybee is constrained to do this (15:4–5), Ilene very directly contests the agents'version (lines 5–11). She then summarizes figuratively the position in which she finds herself: "like banging yer head against a brick wa:ll" (15:14, 17). There is plainly no expression of concurrence or agreement by Raybee, who instead continues (in overlap, 15:17-18) to set out her position (15:18–29), which she then summarizes as being "left between th' devil'n deep blue sea:" (15:32–33). Although Ilene's response to that is initially a minimal token of concurrence, "Yeah" (15:38), Raybee happens to complete her summary turn in a fashion which Ilene treats as an opportunity to continue discussing the dispute between her and Raybee's agents. Neither of the figurative expressions with which each summarizes her position elicits the other's agreement or concurrence, and hence neither results in topical closure. The lack of affiliation between participants is quite manifest in the way that neither accedes to or concurs with the other's figurative summary of her position.

Parenthetically, we can discern from this a rather different account for the phenomenon of multiple idioms from that provided particularly by writers in stylistics. Noting that idioms often occur in flurries, and true to their dismissal of idioms as belonging to the unoriginal and therefore degraded forms of language (e.g. Black 1972:169), they have explained the occurrence of multiple idioms as [illegible] speaker uses an idiom, this infects

such "contamination," we can see in these cases that multiple (figurative) idioms may instead be associated with the pursuit by each speaker of her position – one with which her co-participant is reluctant to agree or concur. Hence one or the other may subsequently produce another (alternative) figurative summary of her position, possibly in an attempt to close the topic with some minimal agreement between them.

Such instances as these in exx. 13–15 illustrate the other major type of cases in our corpus, in which the production of a figurative assessment does not result in disengagement from and closure of a topic, with the introduction of a new topic. This occurs when there is some conflict or non-alignment between participants, manifest in part through the recipient's unwillingness to agree to – or perhaps more aptly, in 14–15, to concede to – the prior speaker's figurative assessment.

Conclusion

We should make it clear what we have not meant to claim in this account of the association between speakers' use of figurative expressions and topic termination/transition in conversation. First, we do not suggest that this is a general account of where or why figurative expressions are used; this was simply the most striking and recurrent pattern or organization evident in our corpus. Undoubtedly, there are other organizations that may be discovered through further research, and that may reveal other discourse or pragmatic functions of figures of speech. Second, we are even further from offering a general account of the way that speakers in conversation close one topic and move on to a next. It is clear that there are other devices or methods that speakers can use to summarize and bring a topic to a close, including repetition and other summary objects (some of which have been discussed in the literature; cf. Maynard 1980, Jefferson 1984, and Button 1990). In neither of these respects, then, are we proposing general accounts, if "general" is taken to mean that this is the only way that figurative expressions are used in conversation, or the only way that participants manage topical closure in conversation. It is, however, a general account in a different sense: It is an account which cuts across the other kinds of discourse variables with which it is thought figurative idioms are associated (in the very sparse research literature that is relevant here), such as their uses in narratives and stories, in talking about third parties (rather than about self or co-participant, Strassler 1982), or in complaining (Drew & Holt 1988).

The "logic" of our investigation has been to treat a linguistic object, with whatever syntactic and other linguistic properties such objects may possess, as an interactional device. That is, the properties of figurative expressions, particularly their non-empirical or "general" applicability, are a resource for managing certain interactional tasks in conversation. One of those tasks has been identified here, namely summarizing and drawing a topic to a close. The sequential pattern associated with the occurrence of figurative expressions is the product of the kind of resource that figures of speech

the sequential distribution of a linguistic object (here, figurative expressions), along with its distribution in topic termination and transition sequences, gives us access to the interactional functions of that object, i.e. to the kinds of interactional "problems" for which participants need to have solutions, and the way that this object is fitted to managing that task. Focusing on the sequential distribution of a linguistic object helps us, then, to appreciate its social interactional function(s).

Important questions about language processing and the cognitive correlates of such processing may need to be addressed through experimental studies of, e.g., the speed of recognition of the literal or figurative meaning of certain idiomatic expressions. But there are equally important questions concerning why speakers of a natural language use figurative idioms at all. We have suggested that we should investigate WHERE they are used, to determine the orderliness of their being used FROM TIME TO TIME (recalling our opening sentence). From this orderliness we can detect the social functions (rather than cognitive aspects) of the use of figures of speech in interaction. Finally, we have shown, through certain details of the topic termination and transition sequence, that participants themselves orient to these properties and functions of figurative expressions, even in instances where the production of a figurative expression fails to result in topical closure.

Notes

We have presented versions of this paper, over several years, to conferences and groups in many countries. We wish to thank all those, too numerous to list here, who have commented on this research, and who have made suggestions, observations etc. that have helped us clarify and refine or analysis. We are particularly indebted to Auli Hakulinen and Joerg Bergmann for their incisive and helpful comments.

1. In some cases shown in this paper, the turn in which a figurative expression occurs consists just of that expression, in a single unit turn, as here in ex. 1. However, in other cases, a figurative expression occurs with other surrounding material, in a multi-unit turn.
2. A very significant subset of this research effort focuses on linguistic competence and the appropriate comprehension of idioms – or rather, on the "deficient processing of proverbs and related nonliteral expressions" (Van Lancker 1990), either by those whose competencies are not fully developed, especially children (Gibbs 1987), or by those who are impaired, such as aphasics and those with certain neurological abnormalities (Van Lancker & Kempler 1987, Van Lancker 1990, 1991).
3. There are some exceptions, notably Strassler 1982 and McCarthy 1998. These studies explore idioms in naturally occurring spoken English; however, their focus on the pragmatics of idiom usage concerns broader patterns of association or correlations of idiom usage, e.g. between idioms and talk about a third person, rather than about self (Strassler 1982:103). Nevertheless, some of McCarthy's findings (1998, ch. 4), particularly concerning the "shifting from the event line to the evaluation line . . .,

4. On grammar as a feature or property of turn design, and thereby sequentially bounded, see Ochs et al. 1996.
5. However, it should be noted that many seemingly "lexical" idioms have their origins in standardized collocations and are really quasi-lexical, e.g."pushover" (meaning "very easy").
6. But on issues concerning the modification or syntactic flexibility of idioms, see Green 1975 and Nicolas 1995. Ex. 10, below, illustrates the kind of lexical flexibility that some idioms may allow: Here a "dollop" of salt is a recognizable and orderly version of the standard idiom "take with a pinch (or grain) of salt" – orderly, in that "dollop" plainly conveys an upgraded sense of skepticism.
7. In this respect, the kind of expressions we are investigating probably correspond to those which Fillmore et al. (1988:504–5) call "decoding idioms".
8. We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the Field family and their friends in allowing us to record their conversations; and of Gail Jefferson, who transcribed all these data.
9. By "new," we mean a next topic, different from that which has been concluded following the production of a figurative expression. Hence, speakers may return to a topic previously talked about in the conversation, e.g. in exx. 5–6. The point is, though, that they CHANGE topic.
10. This is only a broad generalization, which does not apply to all cases – particularly since, in many instances where co-participants have been talking about some third party, they may have contributed equally to the "tellings" that make up the topic. (Nevertheless, at the points where figurative expressions are used, the one who is the principal teller/speaker at that point tends to be the one who uses the figurative expression.)

    Furthermore, there may be a kind of bias operating here, in that many cases involve complaints or troubles of some kind (Drew & Holt 1988). Thus one participant may be telling the other about some complainable matter or trouble; and the interactional delicacies associated with closing the topic of a personal trouble suggest that resources to exit from the troubles-topic may be available to the troubles-teller, and not so easily available to the other person (Jefferson 1984).
11. It is also possible, in ex. 5, that Gwen makes an initial move toward closing when she produces a non-figurative assessment of how lovely the couple's home was (Gwen's first two turns in the extract).

(5) [Field:J86:1:4:6]

Gwen:	You know it wz: so lovely an' everything [y know
Lesley:	[nYe:s.
Gwen:	All character 'n (0.3) beautiful.
Lesley:	Ye:s.
	(0.7)
Gwen:	B't I suppose she must 'v come t' the end of 'er (.) tether 'n just walked out then.

The pause following Lesley's minimal agreement/acknowledgement suggests a slight hiatus, associated with the fact that her previous assessment was insufficient to close the topic. Again, her production of a figurative summary may be a move to bring about the topic closure that was attempted or imminent in the turns before.

12. Lesley initially responds in 6 with a low, brief chuckle, in which she seems to recognize

might otherwise have produced in her prior response slot. Her doing so simultaneously with Steven's "Yeah" indicates, of course, that it was independent of, and unprompted by, Steven's turn. (On the possible relations between puns and summaries/story endings, see Sacks 1992:2.419–30.)

13. The imperative mood here, "take this with a dollop 'v salt", suggests that Robbie is telling Lesley that she (Lesley) should not take all her (Robbie's) previous complaints too seriously – that she's not too disheartened by teaching at the school.

There are other idiomatic aspects of Robbie's summary turn, particularly her use of the idiomatic (but not, perhaps, figurative) "getting everything done in the day."

(from 10)
Robbie: B't take this with a dollop 'v salt you kno::w I'm– I'm ba:sic'ly quite happy b't quite relieved it's the sheer organization 'n getting all, everything done in th' da:y.
Lesley: Yes: that's ri:ght,=

Note that her self-repair – she began with "getting all," after which "all" appears to be replaced with "everything" – may be akin to the instances illustrated in exx. 2–4: self-repairs in which speakers begin with a non-idiomatic version, but subsequently change it to an idiomatic formulation.

14. This shift in the focus of the topic (again, not marked as a change to a new topic) exploits the opportunity afforded by the figurative expression to develop the topic in a stepwise fashion. We use "exploit" here to draw attention to the possibility that speakers may use (whether intentionally or deliberately is not in point here) the opportunities that figurative idioms afford, not only to summarize and exit from a prior topic, but also to lead them, in an apparently topically connected fashion, to a "next" topic, something they wish to talk about. In such cases, the figurative expression has a bivalent character, summarizing a prior topic and simultaneously pointing forward to another matter. A case in which the pivotal work of the figurative expression seems especially to result from the speaker exploiting its bivalent property is the following.

[NB:II:2:5] (Speakers have been talking about the assassination of Robert Kennedy a few days before, to which Nancy refers when she says "everybody is talking about it")
Nancy: Yeah it's been a rough week an everbuddy is (.) you know
(0.2)
Emma: Mm hm
Nancy ta:lking about it en everbuddy: course I: don't know whether it's that or just that we're js:t (.) completely bo:gging down at work,h .hhhhmh
(.)
Nancy: E [r whatta WIH: WITH ME: with my finals? hhhh
Emma: [Oh: well e v r y buddy's sa::d
Nancy: hhuh uh:[:
Emma: [Oh ho:w'd you do with yer finals.

Nancy manages what is really a two-stage idiomatic exit from the topic of the assassination. Initially, she summarizes it as having been a "rough week" (which is idiomatic, if not quite figurative). Then she offers, as a possible reason for it having

bo:gging down at work". (Note that the transition from her first reference to "everybody," through a next "everybody," and then to "we," seems to enable Nancy to disengage from talking about "the population at large/in the city," and to move to focus instead on her colleagues at work, "we".) The figurative "bogged down" at work is then pivotal, by allowing her the opportunity to suggest another factor that has contributed to its having been a rough week – a factor associated with another kind of "work", namely the finals examination she has taken for a course at a local university. This touches off (as it might well have been designed to do) an enquiry from Emma about how she has done in her finals. So this idiomatic utterance, and in particular the figurative "bogged down" at work, has been pivotal in the transition from talking about the assassination to talking about Nancy's course and the examination. In this way, the bivalent properties of figurative summaries may perhaps be exploited as a device for managing, rather smoothly, the move to a next topic (and perhaps even a particularly favored topic).

15. The matter of securing the other's agreement, affiliation, or sympathy may be of some interactional moment, since figurative idioms are used so recurrently in complaint sequences, where a complainant can have some interest in whether or not his/her recipient will affiliate with him/her (see Drew & Holt 1988).
16. Note that this last figurative expression conveys a position which perhaps draws closer to Claire's, since *the more the better* has elements of Claire's suggestion that going ahead with the show and sale might depend on a sufficient number of people being interested – while nevertheless allowing that the thing may "snowball."

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21

Universal and Culture-Specific Properties of Greetings

Alessandro Duranti

There is widespread evidence that greetings are an important part of the communicative competence necessary for being a member of any speech community.[1] They are often one of the first verbal routines learned by children and certainly one of the first topics introduced in foreign language classes. They are also of great interest to analysts of social interaction, who see them as establishing the conditions for social encounters. It is not surprising, then, to find out that there is a considerable number of ethological, linguistic, sociological, and ethnographic studies of greetings. But despite the attention greetings have received in the social sciences, there is to date no generalizable definition of greetings and therefore no systematic way for deciding what qualifies as "greetings" in a particular speech community. Nonetheless, researchers have felt at ease identifying "greetings" in different languages and providing hypotheses about what greetings "do" for or to people. In this article, I suggest that this has been possible due to the widespread belief that greetings are verbal formulas with virtually no prepositional content (Searle 1969) or zero referential value (Youssouf et al. 1976). Students of greetings have argued that people are either not believed to "mean" whatever they say during greetings or they are seen as "lying" (see Sacks 1975). In fact, I will argue, these claims are not always tenable. As I will show, not all greetings are completely predictable and devoid of prepositional content. Before making such a claim, however, I must establish some independent criteria by which to determine whether a given expression or exchange should qualify as a "greeting." Short of such criteria, critics might always argue that the apparent counterexamples are not greetings at all.

In what follows I first briefly review the existing literature on greetings in a variety of fields and identify some of the factors that contributed to the common

belief that greetings are formulas with no prepositional content. Then I introduce six criteria for identifying greetings across languages and speech communities. Using these criteria, I go on to identify four types of verbal greetings in one community where I worked, in Western Samoa. In discussing the fourth Samoan greeting, the "Where are you going?" type, I will argue that it blatantly violates the common expectation of greetings as phatic, predictable exchanges, and I show that it functions as an information-seeking and action-control strategy. Finally, I examine a Samoan expression that has been translated as a greeting in English but seems problematic on the basis of ethnographic information, and I show that, as we would expect, it does not qualify for some of the criteria proposed in this article.

Previous Studies

The literature on greetings can be divided along several methodological and theoretical lines. In what follows, I will briefly review the contribution of human ethologists, ethnographers, conversation analysts, and speech act theorists.

In the ethological tradition, exemplified by Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt's work, greetings are studied as a means to uncovering some of the evolutionary bases of human behavior. By comparing humans with other species and adult-adult interaction with mother-child interaction (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1977), greetings are defined as rituals of appeasing and bonding that counteract potentially aggressive behavior during face-to-face encounters. The presupposition here is that humans and animals alike live in a permanent, phylogenetically encoded condition of potential aggression (or fear of aggression) and, were it not for such adaptive rituals as greetings, individuals would be tearing each other apart. Fear of aggression is also used by Kendon and Ferber (1973) to explain eye-gaze aversion during certain phases of human encounters – people look away just as primates and other animals do to avoid the threat of physical confrontation – and by Firth (1972) and others to interpret the common gesture of handshake across societies as a symbol of trust in the other. This line of research is characterized by two features: (i) a focus on nonverbal communication (for example, Eibl-Eibesfeldt's 1972 study of the eyebrow flash), which is often analyzed independently of the talk that accompanies it; (ii) the assumption of shared goals between humans and other species; and (iii) the assumption that the same type of greeting behavior will have the same origin, motivation, or explanation across situations. The focus on nonverbal communication has been important in counterbalancing the logocentric tendency of other studies of greetings (see below) and has revealed commonalities across cultures that would have been missed were researchers concentrating exclusively on verbal behavior. The second feature, namely, the assumption that humans and animals share similar goals, presents other kinds of problems. It might be easy to accept that all species share a concern for survival and safety, but it is less easy to [illegible]

others suggested that greetings in all societies are about continuity of relationships, but the representation, conceptualization, and perception of continuity by humans are likely to be much more complex than those found in other species, partly due to the use of human language (Leach 1972). Furthermore, without minimizing the aggressive potential of human psyche and human action, we must remember that there are other things in life besides fighting or avoiding fights. Hence, even if we accept that greeting behavior might have phylogenetically originated from avoidance behavior, we still must demonstrate that such an origin is relevant to the specific context in which a particular greeting is used.

A second set of studies of greetings is ethnographically oriented. These studies tend to be descriptive in nature, focusing on culture-specific aspects of greeting behaviors, but they also share an interest in a few potentially universal dimensions such as the sequential properties of greeting exchanges and the importance of status definition and manipulation. This is particularly true of two classic studies of African greetings: Esther Goody's (1972) comparison of greeting and begging among the Gonja and the Lodagaa – a stratified and an acephalous society respectively – and Judith Irvine's (1974) study of Wolof greetings.

Ethnographically oriented studies tend to highlight the importance of identity definition in greetings. Some of them also reveal the subtle ways in which greetings are connected to or part of the definition of the ongoing (or ensuing) activity. This is especially the case in Caton's (1986) and Milton's (1982) studies, which provide clear examples not only of the religious dimensions of greetings in some societies but also of how what is said during greetings both presupposes and entails a particular type of social encounter (see also Duranti 1992a).

The emphasis on the sequential nature of greeting exchanges is the most important contribution of the work of conversation analysts. Schegloff and Sacks's work on conversational openings and closings, for instance, shows that greetings should not be analyzed as isolated acts but as a series of pairs, adjacency pairs, whereby the uttering of the first part by one party calls for and at the same time defines the range of a possible "next turn" by a second party, the recipient (Sacks 1992; Schegloff 1968, 1986; Schegloff and Sacks 1973). Sacks's (1975) study of "How are you?" as a "greeting substitute" in English provides a stimulating description of the interactional implications of choosing to greet and choosing to answer in a particular way; we learn why answering "fine" has different consequences from answering "lousy," and hence we are provided with a sociological justification for lying. As I will show later, the extension of these insights into another language and a different speech community shows that it is not always as easy to determine what is a greeting "substitute." Nor is it always the case that routinized questions can be easily answered by lying.

Finally, greetings have been analyzed by speech act theorists, who focused on their function as acknowledgment of another person's presence. Searle (1969) and Searle and Vanderveken (1985) proposed to analyze English greetings as an example of the "expressive" type of speech act,[2] aimed at the "courteous indication of recognition" of the other party (Searle and Vanderveken 1985:216), and

in other research traditions, Searle (1969) and Searle and Vanderveken (1985) also assume that greetings have no prepositional content, while Bach and Harnish (1979:51–52) interpret the act of greeting as an expression of "pleasure at seeing (or meeting)" someone. The claim that greetings have no prepositional content – or almost zero referential value (Youssouf et al. 1976) – is at least as old as Malinowski's (1923:315–316) introduction of the notion of "phatic communion," a concept that was originally meant to recast speech as a mode of action, a form of social behavior that establishes or confirms social relations and does not necessarily communicate "new ideas." The problem with the characterization of greetings as "phatic," and hence merely aimed at establishing or maintaining "contact" (Jakobson 1960), is that it makes it difficult to account for differences across and within communities in what people say during greetings. Finally, the view of greeting as an act that displays pleasure might make sense in some contexts and especially in those situations where verbal greetings are accompanied by smiles and other nonverbal as well as verbal displays of positive affect (for example, the English "Nice to see you"), but it might not be generalizable beyond such cases.

The interest in the biological basis of greetings, their social functions, their sequential organization, and their illocutionary force have revealed a number of recurrent properties of greetings and have presented interesting hypotheses about the form and function of greetings. At the same time, the emphasis on the "social functions" of greetings has contributed to the trivialization of what people actually talk about during greetings. If the only or main goal of greeting is to acknowledge another person's presence, what is actually said during a greeting may be seen as socially insignificant. In this article I argue that this lack of consideration of the prepositional content of greetings presents considerable empirical problems, and I suggest that we need ethnographically grounded analyses of greeting expressions to solve such problems.

One of the problems in ignoring the content of verbal greetings is that it establishes loose connections between social functions and the talk used to achieve them. As a consequence, differences in what people say can be ignored and we end up supporting the view that "once you've seen a greeting, you've seen them all," a corollary of the more general principle "once you've seen a ritual, you've seen them all." (Hence, why bother with the study of different societies, given that all you need can be found in your own backyard?)

The context for understanding what people say during greetings is nothing more or nothing less than the culture that supports and is supported by the encounters in which greetings occur or that are constituted by them. The method by which such encounters need to be studied must then minimally include (1) ethnography,[4] (2) the recording of what is actually said, and (3) at least a working definition of the phenomenon that is being investigated. Too many of the existing studies of greetings are based either on observation, interviews, or field notes, without the support of film or electronic recording or on recordings without proper ethnographic work (see Duranti 1997, chap. 5).

The Universality of Greetings

The starting assumption in this study is that we must be open to all kinds of conventional openings in social encounters as potential cases of greetings. Although some speech communities have activity-specific items that are used only for greetings (the American English "hi!" and the Italian "ciao," for example[5]), the existing literature shows that many communities do not have such expressions, and what people say during greetings might be identical to what is being said during other kinds of speech activities, the English "how're you doing?" being an example of such a type. For this reason, to concentrate only on lexical items and phrases exclusively reserved for greetings (or, more generally, salutations) would be tantamount to admitting that many languages do not have greetings or have a much restricted set of types. The criteria provided below are offered as a solution to this problem.

Criteria for Identifying Greetings across Languages

Building on the studies mentioned above and a few others, it is possible to extract a set of six recurring features to be used as criteria for the identification of greetings in a speech community:

1. near-boundary occurrence;
2. establishment of a shared perceptual field;
3. adjacency pair format;
4. relative predictability of form and content;
5. implicit establishment of a spatio-temporal unit of interaction; and
6. identification of the interlocutor as a distinct being worth recognizing.

As it will become apparent in the following discussion, some of these features could be grouped into larger categories. For example, features 3, 4, and 6 cover what is actually said in greetings, whereas features 2, 5, and 6 are reformulations of what other authors have identified as potential functions of greetings. In addition, features 1 and 5 (and in some ways, 2) define the spatial and temporal organization of the exchange. Although future studies may prove the need to regroup or even eliminate some of the distinctions that I am proposing, for the purpose of this article I have chosen to keep the six criteria distinct to ensure a broader spectrum of potentially relevant cases. Finally, I should mention that although both verbal and nonverbal aspects of greeting behavior were taken into consideration in the choice of defining features, later on in the article, I will favor verbal over nonverbal aspects of greetings. This is simply due to my efforts in this case to draw attention to the importance of the specific verbal expressions used in greetings and is not meant to undermine the importance of gestures and motion in the analysis of social encounters, which I have addressed elsewhere (Duranti 1992) and intend to return to in the future.

Criterion 1: Near-Boundary Occurrence

Greetings are routinely expected to occur at the beginning of a social encounter, although they may not always be the very first words that are exchanged between parties. This first feature of greetings is related to their potential function as attention-getting devices and their ability to establish a shared field of interaction (see criteria 2 and 5). As defined here, greetings must then be distinguished from closing salutations or leave takings, despite the fact that in some cases the same expression might function as both opening and closing salutation.[6]

Criterion 2: Establishment of a Shared Perceptual Field

Greetings either immediately follow or are constitutive of the interactants' public recognition of each other's presence in the same perceptual field,[7] as shown by the fact that they are usually initiated after the parties involved have sighted each other (Duranti 1992a; Kendon and Ferber 1973). In some cases, making recognition visually available to the other party may constitute the greeting itself (viz., with a toss of the head, a nod, or an eyebrow flash); in other cases, visual recognition is followed by verbal recognition. There are differences, however, in the timing of the verbal exchange vis-à-vis other forms of mutual recognition or verbal interaction. In some cases, talk may be exchanged before the actual greeting takes place. This is the case, for instance, in the Samoan ceremonial greetings (see below), where participants may exchange jokes, questions, or a few brief remarks before starting to engage in what is seen as the official greeting. A possible hypothesis here is that the more formal – or the more institutionally oriented – the encounter, the more delayed the greeting, and that the more delayed the greeting, the more elaborate the language used. Thus we would expect brief and casual opening salutations to occur simultaneously with or at least very close to mutual sighting and long and elaborate greetings to occur after the parties have had a chance to previously recognize each other's presence in some way. One of the most extreme examples of this delayed greeting is the one described by Sherzer (1983) among the Kuna, where a visiting "chief" who has come to the "gathering house" is greeted after he and his entourage ("typically consisting of his wife, his 'spokesman,' and one of his 'policemen,'") have been taken to someone's house to bathe.

> Then they return to the "gathering house," where the visiting "chief" and one of the host village "chiefs," sitting beside one another in hammocks, perform *arkan kae* (literally handshake), the ritual greeting. [Sherzer 1983:91]

Such chanted greetings are quite extended, including a long sequence of verses that are regularly responded to by the other chief, who chants *teki* 'indeed'.

Observationally, this property of greetings is a good index of the function of the greeting and the type of context and participants involved. Immediate and short greetings tend to index an ordinary encounter, whereas delayed [illegible]

greetings tend to index something special in the occasion, the social status of the participants, their relationships, or any combination of these various aspects.

This idea of greetings as reciprocal recognitions could be an argument in favor of Bach and Harnish's (1979) classification of greetings as "acknowledgments." Greeting would be a response to finding oneself within someone's visual and/or auditory range – if such a person is a candidate for recognition. As we shall see, the view of greetings as acknowledgments does not imply the acceptance of Bach and Harnish's view of greeting as a universal expression of attitudes or feelings.

Criterion 3: Adjacency Pair Format

Although it is possible to speak of a "greeting" by one person, greetings are typically part of one or more sets of adjacency pairs (see Schegloff and Sacks 1973), that is, two-part sequences in which the first pair part by one party (A) invites, constrains, and creates the expectation for a particular type of reply by another party (B); see examples 1, 4, and 6 below. The adjacency pair structure makes sense if greetings are exchanges in which participants test each other's relationship (e.g., Are we still on talking terms? Are we still friends? Do I still recognize your authority? Do I still acknowledge my responsibility toward you?). The sequential format of the adjacency pair allows participants to engage in a joint activity that exhibits some evidence of mutual recognition and mutual understanding. The number, utterance type, and participant structure of these pairs vary both within and across communities (see Duranti 1992a:660–662).[8] For example, some African greetings are organized in several adjacency pairs (Irvine 1974).

If we take the adjacency pair format to be a defining feature of greetings, a one-pair-part greeting – not as uncommon as one might think – would be "defective" or in need of an explanation.

Criterion 4: Relative Predictability of Form and Content

Since what is said during a greeting or part of a greeting exchange is highly predictable compared to other kinds of interactions, researchers have often assumed that greetings have no propositional content and their denotational value (to be assessed in terms of truth) can be largely ignored. Whether people say "hi," "good morning," or "how are you?" has been seen as an index of properties of the context (for example, the relationship between the parties, the nature of the social encounter) rather than as a concern participants manifest toward gaining access to new information about their interlocutors. This aspect of greetings needs to be further qualified in at least three ways. First, it should be made clear that information is exchanged in human encounters regardless of whether there is talk. Even when there is no speech, there are usually plenty of semiotic resources in an encounter for participants to give out information about themselves and make inferences about others. Such semiotic resources are based on or include participants' mere physical presence, their gestures, posture, and movements,

information exchanged beyond the prepositional content of what is said. For example, prosodic and paralinguistic features are a rich source of cues for contextualization (Gumperz 1992). Finally, even common formulaic expressions can be informative. In fact, if we start from the assumption that what is said and done in any human encounter lives along a formulaic-creative continuum, greetings might simply be interactions that tend to fall toward the formulaic side. We cannot, however, in principle assume that, because greetings are formulaic, (i) they are always completely predictable, (ii) they have no information value, and (iii) participants have nothing invested in the propositional value of what is said. First, the fact of considering an exchange highly routinized does not make its content completely predictable or uninteresting for social analysis, a point well illustrated by Bourdieu's (1977) analysis of gift exchange and Schegloff's (1986) discussion of telephone openings. It is still important to ascertain how participants manage to achieve the expected or preferred outcome. Second, the occurrence of certain routine and highly predictable questions and answers during greetings does not imply that the parties involved do not exchange some new information. Third, whether or not the participants are interested in the information that is being exchanged should be an empirical question and not an unquestioned assumption.

Criterion 5: Implicit Establishment of a Spatiotemporal Unit of Interaction

The occurrence of greetings defines a unit of interaction. Sacks (1975) alluded to this feature of greetings by saying that they occur only once in an interaction and that they can constitute a "minimal proper conversation." More generally, greetings clearly enter into the definition of larger units of analysis such as a day at work, different parts of the day with family members, or even extended interactions over several months – for example, when done through electronic mail (Duranti 1986). That the "unit" is something more complex than a continuous stretch of time (e.g., a day) is shown by the fact that two people meeting in two different places during the same day may in fact exchange greetings again. An empirical investigation of when greetings are exchanged throughout a day by a given group of people who repeatedly come into each other's interactional space might provide important clues on how they conceptualize the different space-time zones in which they operate. It might also give us a sense of the relation between natural units (such as a day-night cycle) versus cultural units (such as a meeting).

Criterion 6: Identification of the Interlocutor as a Distinct Being Worth Recognizing

The occurrence of greetings and the ways in which they are carried out typically identify a particular class of people. Syntagmatically, a greeting item (e.g., English "hello," "hi," "hey, how're you doing," "what's up") might be accompanied by address terms or other context-dependent and context-creating signs that identify participants as belonging to social groups of various sorts. Paradigmatically, the very use of greetings (as opposed to their absence) identifies

public arenas. That this is more than a tautology may be shown in various ways, including Sacks's (1975) arguments that in English the people we greet with the (substitute) greeting "how are you?" constitute a class he called "proper conversationalists." Even in those societies in which apparently *any* two people entering the same perceptual field would be expected to exchange greetings, distinctions are in fact made. Thus, for instance, among the Tuareg, according to Youssouf et al. (1976:801), once two people are seen progressing toward one another, the parties *must* meet, and once they have met, they must greet each other. Such moral imperatives, however, must be understood against the background of a social world in which avoiding greeting would be interpreted as a potentially threatening situation:

> The desert people have a history of intertribal warfare and intratribal feuds. If the Targi meets another, or others, in [the desert], the identification of the other – as early as possible – is critically important. For, once another person is sighted on a intersecting trajectory, there is no turning aside . . . for that can be interpreted as a sign of either fear or potential treachery and ambush, which invites countermeasures. [Youssouf et al. 1976:801]

This means that, implicitly, the use of greetings can distinguish between Us and Them, insiders and outsiders, friends and foes, valuable and nonvaluable interactants. For example, in many societies children and servants are not greeted. The absence of greetings then marks these individuals not only as nonproper conversationalists or strangers but also as not worth the attention implied by the use of greetings.

An Empirical Case Study

Any proposal for universal criteria needs empirical investigations to support it. In the rest of this article, I will offer a brief discussion of Samoan greetings as a way of assessing and refining some of the claims made so far. In particular, I will be concerned with two main issues: (i) the relationship between universal features and culture-specific instantiations of such features, and (ii) the distinction between verbal expressions that are greetings and those that, although they might look like potential candidates, are not greetings.

It should be understood that what follows is not an exhaustive study of Samoan greetings. Such a study would require a project expressively designed with the goal of collecting all types of greetings used in Samoan communities; in fact, as far as I know, such a comprehensive project has never been attempted for any speech community. Although the data discussed here are drawn from a range of interactions originally recorded for other purposes, they do contain a considerable number of exchanges that qualify as greetings according to the above mentioned criteria. Furthermore, in using Samoan data, I have the advantage

Four Types of Samoan Greetings

On the basis of the criteria mentioned above, I examined audio- and videotaped data collected in a Western Samoan community during three periods for a total of a year and a half of fieldwork.[10] I identified four types of exchanges that can qualify as "greetings": (1) *tālofa* greetings; (2) ceremonial greetings; (3) *mālō* greetings; and (4) "where are you going?" greetings.[11] The analysis presented here is also based on my own observation of and participation in hundreds if not thousands of Samoan greeting exchanges.

Before discussing these four types of greetings, I need to mention a few basic facts about the community where I worked; more detailed information on this community may be found in Duranti 1981 and 1994 and in Ochs 1988. (For a more comprehensive ethnography of Samoan social life, see Shore 1982.)

Despite modernization and a considerable amount of syncretism in religious and political practices, members of the Western Samoan community where I carried out research still hang on to traditional Polynesian values of family relations and mutual dependence. Their society is still divided between titled individuals *(matai)* and untilled ones *(taulele'a)*, and the matai are distinguished according to status (chiefs, orators) and rank (high chief, lower-ranking chiefs). Having a title usually comes with rights over land and its products and the duty to participate in decision-making processes such as the political meetings called *fono* (see Duranti 1994). Status and rank distinctions are pervasive in everyday and ceremonial life in a Samoan village. The language marks such distinctions in a number of ways, the most obvious of which is a special lexicon called *'upu fa'aaloalo* 'respectful words' used in addressing people of high status and in talking about them in certain contexts (see Duranti 1992b; Milner 1961; Shore 1982). Such words are part of some of the greeting exchanges that I will discuss below.

None of the greetings I discuss qualifies as the most "basic" or unmarked greeting item or exchange in Samoan society. As I will show below, the greeting that is the highest on the "formulaic" end of the formulaic-creative continuum, and hence with the least prepositional content, "tālofa," is the rarest in everyday life and hence is an unlikely candidate for the role of the most basic type or the one the other greetings are substituting for.

The Tālofa Greeting

This greeting can be used in a number of settings, including open and closed areas (for example, either outside or inside a house), whenever two people become visibly and acoustically accessible to each other. Unlike the other Samoan greetings I will discuss below, the tālofa greeting is at times accompanied by handshaking, a gesture likely borrowed from past Western visitors and colonial authorities. In fact, this is a greeting that is today most commonly used with foreigners. Contrary to what was described by Margaret Mead (1928:14), people from the same village today rarely greet each other with "tālofa" (see Holmes 1987:112),[12] which is reserved for people who have not seen each other for a long time.

hour-long audiotape of an "inspection committee" *(asiasinga)* going around the village and meeting dozens of people, I found three examples of "tālofa." All three examples involve only one member of the inspection committee (Chief S, the highest ranking chief of the group) who initiates the greeting. In one case, "tālofa" was exchanged with a group of chiefs from another village waiting for the bus. Although I have no information on the people who were greeted with "tālofa" in the other two cases, the interaction is not incompatible with the hypothesis that the parties involved had not seen each other for a while or are not very familiar with one another.[13]

Like the expressions used in the other Samoan greetings, *tālofa* may occur by itself or may be accompanied by an address term, either a name or a title, for example, "tālofa ali'i!", or "greetings sir(s)!" Here is an example that shows the adjacency pair format of the greeting and its rather simple AB structure:

(1) *[Inspection, December 1978: While standing outside, the committee members have been interacting with a woman who is inside the house, when Chief S directly addresses another woman from the same family, Kelesia.]*

Chief S:	tālofa Kelesia!
	Hello Kelesia!
	(0.2)
Kelesia:	tālofa!
	Hello!
Chief S:	*((chuckles))* hehe.

Tālofa is homophonous with and probably derived from the expression *tālofū* or *tālofae* – usually pronounced /kaalofa/ and /kaalofae/, respectively[14] (see the appendix) – used to display empathy for someone who is judged to be suffering or under any form of distress (see also Ochs 1988:173). This other use of the expression *tālofa* is found in the following excerpt from the same transcript, where a member of the inspection committee invites the others to feel sorry for the old woman Litia, who got up at dawn in order to clean her lawn in time for the committee's inspection. As shown by the following comment by Chief S, Tūla'i's sympathy is not shared by everyone else. In the next turn, Chief S proposes, albeit with some hesitation, to fine Litia.

(2) *[Inspection: The orator Tūla'i sees the old woman Litia, here pronounced/Likia/, cutting the grass.]*[15]

1	Tūla'i:	kālofa sē ia Likia- 'ua uso pō e-
		empathy Voc Emp Litia Perf rise night Comp
		Hey, feel sorry for Litia. (She) got up at dawn to –
2	Chief S:	'ae- 'ae- 'ae- 'ae kakau nga / / sala
		but but but but ought to fined.
		But, but, but, but she should be fined.
3	Litia:	e sēsē mātou i le faimea taeao.
		Pres wrong we:incl-pl in Art do-thing morning
		We shouldn't be doing things in the morning.

This example shows that it is not the occurrence of a particular expression that

pair part of a greeting exchange with Kelesia, in (2) the orator Tūla'i uses *tālofa* as an attempt to draw sympathy for the old woman Litia (pronounced /Likia/ in line 1) but not to greet her. In fact, the ensuing interaction with Litia does not contain a greeting. In an apparent response to the men's comments, Litia's first turn in line 3 is a negative assessment of her being up and running early in the morning, which could be interpreted as veiled apology.

In his Samoan-English dictionary, G.B. Milner (1966) suggests that *tālofa* is a compound made out of the words *tā* 'strike' and *alofa* 'love, have compassion'. *Ta* could also be the first-person singular, positive-affect pronoun. In this case the long /aa/ (spelled *ā*) would be accounted for by the combination of two consecutive /a/: *ta* + *alofa* → /taalofa/, originally meaning "(poor) me feels sorry". Although *tālofa* as a greeting does not have the same meaning of *tālofa* as an expression of empathy and therefore looks like a good candidate for a word with very little or no prepositional content, specialized for greetings, its rarity in everyday life makes it an unlikely candidate as the unmarked greeting in a Samoan speech community.

The Mālō Greeting

In my data, this greeting is most commonly used when one party (A) arrives at a site where the other party (B) already is. It has the structure given in (3).

(3) *Mālō-greeting:*

A: mālō (+ intensifier) (+ address + title or name)
B: mālō (+ intensifier) (+ address + title or name)

The word *mālō* has several meanings in Samoan. Its use as an opening salutation is closely related to its use as a compliment or encouragement to people who are working or have just finished doing something (see below).[16] An example of the mālō greeting is provided in (4), from an audiorecording of the "Inspection" tape mentioned above:

(4) *[Inspection: The committee members, including Afoa, a chief, and Tūla'i, an orator, arrive at the orator Taipī's family compound and see Taipī's wife Si'ilima.]*

1	Afoa:	mālō Si'ilima! *Congratulations/hello Si'ilima!*
2		(0.5)
3	Si'ilima:	mālō! *Congratulations/hello!*
4		(0.5)
5	Afoa:	'ua lelei mea 'uma! *Everything is fine!*
6	Tūla'i:	[māngaia – (0.3) māngaia le- (0.5) le fangua: – *Nice – the land looks nice –* [17]
7		

8 (2.5)
9 Tūla'i: fea le koeainga?
Where (is) the old man? [...]

Here, line 1 contains the first pair part, and line 3 contains the second pair part. In this case, the structure of the exchange is:

(5)

A: mālō + Name (first pair part)
B: mālō (second pair part)

In other cases, we might find more complex turns not only with names but also with titles and intensifiers (e.g., *lava* 'much, indeed').

(6) *[Inspection]*

Tūla'i: mālō ali'i Faikaumakau! (mālō + address + title)
Congratulations, Mr. Faitaumatau!

Faitaumatau: mālō lava. (mālō + intensifier)
Much congratulations.

In most cases, the exchange is initiated by the arriving party. This makes sense if we interpret this use of *mālō* as a greeting as an extension of the use of *mālō* as an expression of congratulation to someone who is engaged in a task or has just successfully completed one. In the latter case, called the "*mālō* exchange" in Duranti and Ochs (1986), the first *mālō* recognizes one party's work or activity and the second *mālō* recognizes the role played by the supporter(s) (*tāpua'i*). The second *mālō* in this case is usually followed by the adverb (intensifier) *fo'i* 'quite, also', which further underscores the reciprocity of the exchange. Differently from the greeting *mālō*, the complimenting *mālō* typically occurs in the middle of an interaction; hence it does not conform to the first two criteria described above (near-boundary occurrence and establishment of a shared perceptual field). But when the complimenting *mālō* does occur at the beginning of an encounter, it can function as both a compliment and a greeting. An example of this use of *mālō* is provided in excerpt (7), where the woman Amelia surprises the inspecting committee (see the "repair" particle '*oi* in Chief Afoa's response) by initiating the interaction with a congratulating "mālō." This *mālō* is followed by the display of the reason for her congratulations, namely, their "inspecting" or "visiting." (*le asiasi* is the nominalization of the predicate *asiasi* 'visit, inspect'.[18])

(7) *[Inspection]*

Amelia: mālō ā le asiasi!
congratulations Emp Art visit
Congratulations indeed (for) the inspecting!
Tūla'i: 'oi! // mālō!

Chief Afoa:	mālō fo'i.
	Congratulations also (to you).
Tūla'i:	'ua 'ou iloa::-
	I realize that –
Amelia:	pulengu'u ma oukou kōfā i le komiki!
	mayor and you-all honorable (orators) in the committee
	(To the) mayor and you honorable (orators) in the committee!
Tūla'i:	mālō // lava iā ke 'oe le kingā!
	congratulations Emph to you the mother
	Congratulations indeed to you, the mother (of the family)!
	[. . .]

In this case, the exchange is enacted as a series of reciprocal compliments, as shown by the syntax of the last utterance by Tūla'i: "*mālō* indeed to you, the mother (of the family)!", but it also works as a greeting. This is predictable given that it conforms to the six criteria introduced earlier and no other greeting with Amelia follows.

In 1978, I was told by a Samoan instructor who had taught Peace Corps volunteers not to use *mālō* as a greeting. He, like other adult Samoans with whom I spoke, considered the use of *mālō* as a greeting a relatively recent and degenerate extension of the use of *mālō* as a compliment. (This view is supported by the fact that *mālō* is not mentioned as a greeting in any of the earlier ethnographic accounts.)

How can we explain the extension of the *mālō* from one context to the other? In the *mālō* greeting, the party who is about to enter another's living space calls out to the other by starting an exchange of mutual support and recognition. Since the other is likely to be busy doing something or to have just finished doing something, *mālō* is an extension of the one used in those contexts in which one party is more explicitly seen as "doing something" and the other as "supporting the other party's efforts." When the mālō exchange is started by the person who is stationary (e.g., inside a house), it could be seen as an extension of a congratulatory act to the newcomer for having made it to the present location, overcoming whatever obstacles he encountered or could have encountered.

In its ambiguous state between a congratulating act and a greeting act, this Samoan greeting shares certain similarities with the English "How are you?" discussed by Sacks (1975) and others. In both cases, we have a greeting item that is not exclusively used for greeting and in fact is imported, as it were, into the greeting exchange from other uses and contexts. In both cases, we have a relative or incomplete ritualization of the term so that it can be still taken "literally." There still is, in other words, some of the force of the mālō compliment in the mālō greeting. At the same time, differently from the English "How are you?", we cannot define the mālō greeting as a "greeting substitute" because there is no other obvious candidate for the same types of situations.

Ceremonial Greetings

Ceremonial greetings

a head nurse) arrives at what is either foreseen or framed as an official visit or public event. As discussed in Duranti (1992a), ceremonial greetings (CGs) only take place after the newly arrived party goes to sit down in the "front region" of the house. CGs are the most complex among the four types of Samoan greetings discussed here. They are made of two main parts, a first pair part, the "welcoming," and a second pair part, the "response."

(8)

A: [WELCOMING]
B: [RESPONSE]

Each of these two parts may, in turn, be **divided in two major subcomponents**, a predicate and an address.

(9)

WELCOMING	RESPONSE
a. Welcoming predicate	a. Responding predicate
b. Address	b. Address

The welcoming predicates recognize the arrival of the new party and welcome him or her into the house. They are the same predicates that in different contexts function as verbs of motion meaning "arrive, come." A list of some such verbs is given in Table 1, with information relative to the specific social status indexed by each term. Whereas *maliu* and *sosopo* are said to (and imply that the addressee is) an orator (*tulāfale*), the verb *afio* is used with (and implies that the addressee is) a chief (*ali'i*). The deictic particle *mai*, which accompanies all of them, expresses an action toward the speaker or, more precisely, toward the deictic center (see Platt 1982), which in all the cases discussed here is the totality of the shared space already occupied by the welcoming party and defined according to the physical shape of the house (see Duranti 1992a).

Table 1: Welcoming predicates used during ceremonial greetings (CGs)

Samoan term	English translation	Social index
maliu mai	'welcome'	<orator>
sosopo mai	'welcome'	<orator>
afio mai	'welcome'	<chief>
susū mai	'welcome'	<chief or orator>[a]

[a] This particular verb is used with the holders of titles descending from the high chief Malietoa and can be used with either a chief or an orator. It is also the most commonly used term for high status individuals who are not matai, e.g. pastors, school teachers, doctors, government officials. It is thus often used as an "unmarked" term when one is not sure of the social identity of the addressee or when one knows that the addressee has a title but wishes to treat him or her with deference. In my living experience

The responding predicate exhibits less variation and is often omitted. The address is the most complex part and the one that allows for more variation. It can also be repeated when the speaker differentiates among the addressees:

(10) Address:

a. Address form
b. Generic title
c. Name (specific) title
d. Ceremonial attributes (taken from *fa'alupenga*[19])

The address may have up to these four parts. The address form (see Table 2) shows distinctions similar to the ones found in the welcoming predicates. Some of the forms are in fact nominalizations of those predicates. The distinction between what I call a generic title and a name title is found only in some cases. In the village of Falefā, where I conducted my research, there were two orator title names (Iuli and Moe'ono) that also had a generic title, Matua, which I have elsewhere translated as "senior orators" (Duranti 1981, 1994).

Table 2: Address forms according to status

Samoan term	English translation	Social index
lau tōfā	'your honor/highness'	<orator>
lau afionga	'your honor/highness'	<chief>
lau susunga	'your honor/highness'	<chief or orator>

Any of the following combinations were commonly used during CGs and other formal exchanges in addressing the people holding the Iuli or Moe'ono title:

- an address form (*lau tōfā* '*your honor*')
- address form + generic title
  (*lau tōfā* + *le Matua* 'your honor + the senior orator')[20]
- address form + generic title + name title
  (*lau tōfā* + *le Matua* + *Iuli* 'your honor + the senior orator + Iuli' or *lau tōfā* + *le Matua* + *Moe'ono* 'your honor + the senior orator + Moe'ono').

If a person has a *matai* title, the name given at birth (called *ingoa taule'ale'a* 'unfilled name') will not be used in the CG. Only those who do not have a *matai* title – such as pastors, some government officials, and foreigners – might be greeted with the address form followed by the birth name. For example, a pastor whose untitled name is Mareko would be addressed as "lau susunga Mareko" (your honorable Mareko). In this case, the proper name replaces the "name title." If a person does not have a *matai* title and does not hold a religious or administrative office and his name is not known to the welcoming

related; this is a convention used with untitled people when they perform ceremonial roles on behalf of their family, village, or religious congregation.) Other times, an ad hoc "title" is created on the spot based on whatever information about the newcomer is contextually available. For example, people who did not know me personally often referred to me as "the guest from abroad" *(le mālō mai i fafo)*. If they saw me filming, I became "the cameraman": *le ali'i pu'e ata*, lit. 'the (gentle)man (who) takes pictures'.

The adjacency pair structure of the CGs is hard to perceive at first, and these greetings are particularly hard to transcribe because they are typically performed by several people at once and never in unison. This means that the speech of the different participants typically overlaps and interlocks, producing a nonchanted fugue (Duranti 1997b). Here is an example from a meeting of the village council *(fono)*. One of the two senior orators in the village, Moe'ono, has just arrived and gone to sit in the front part of the house. The orator Falefā, who is the village "mayor" *(pulenu'u)* and whose house is being used for the meeting, initiates the greeting and is followed by a few other members of the council. (I have here slightly simplified the transcript for expository reasons.)

(11) *[Monday Fono, August 1988; ceremonial greeting of senior orator Moe'ono]*

Falefā:	ia'. māliu mai lau kōfā i le Makua
	Well. Welcome your highness, the senior orator.
Malaga:	lau kōfā i le Makua
	Your highness, the senior orator.
?:	lau kōfā i le Makua
	Your highness, the senior orator
	(2.0)
Moe'ono:	ia'. ('e'e ka'ia) le kākou ngu'u
	Well. ((I) submit to) our village
??:	[(lau kōfā le Ma:kua)
	(*Your highness, the senior orator*)
	(7.0)
Moe'ono:	mamalu i le- (1.0) susunga a le ali'i pulengu'u ngei
	dignity of the – (1.0) highness of Mr. Mayor here
	(7.0)

This exchange seems to qualify easily as a greeting, according to the six criteria established above. Like other exchanges I have either witnessed or recor this one occurs a little after the newcomer, Moe'ono, has arrived to the h (criterion 1) (but see more on this later). It also defines a shared perceptual fi as defined by the welcoming predicate with its deictic particle *mai* (criterio The greeting is sequentially organized as an adjacency pair (criterion 3). expressions used in greeting are predictable but not completely so (criterio The exchange establishes the ensuing interaction as a formal one in which pu identities will be evoked, in this case, a formal meeting of the village co orator (criterion 6). So

For example, before the CG shown in (11) above, one of the people in the house uses a *mālō* with Moe'ono – although no audible response can be heard – and a few minutes later, Moe'ono himself exchanges *mālō* with an orator who has just come in and has already been greeted with a CG. My hypothesis is that these other greetings or greetinglike exchanges are between different social personae and that they are performing a different kind of work. The CG recognizes the party's positional identity that is judged relevant to the forthcoming activity, typically a formal type of exchange (e.g., a political or business meeting, a ceremonial exchange), and is done between an individual as a representative of a group and a collectivity (the people already in the house).[21] The *mālō* greeting, on the other hand, although it may be addressed to collectivities,[22] usually is a preliminary to short and relatively informal exchanges. Its use projects a sense of immediacy and is a prelude to some business that can be easily dealt with, without even entering the house. Example (12) below reproduces some of the verbal interaction preceding the CG illustrated in (11). Senior orator Moe'ono and the orator Talaitau have arrived at the same time, but only Moe'ono goes to sit in the front region of the house; this transcript starts a few seconds before the one in (6) above and shows that the notion of "acknowledgment" or "recognition" proposed by speech act theorists as the illuctionary force of greetings must be qualified. We need to specify what is being acknowledged. Physical presence? Status? Social role in the ensuing interaction? For example, when we enlarge the context of the CG in (1), we find out that both Moe'ono's physical presence and his status have already been recognized before the CG is produced. After Moe'ono's remark about the presence of the videocamera in lines 5 and 6, the orator Manu'a provides a justification for the presence of the videocamera (lines 13–15), which starts with a formulaic apology (starting with the expression "vaku . . .") indexing Moe'ono's higher rank. Manu'a might be apologizing for a number of things, including his speaking at all to such a high-status person before proper greetings have been exchanged, his speaking about such nondignified matters as videotaping, or his (and the other matai's) failure to ask for Moe'ono's approval before allowing the camera to be used.[23]

(12) [*Monday Meeting, August 1988*]

1	Moe'ono:	(he) sole!
		(Hey) brother!
2	?:	((to a woman outside)) (ai) **sunga!**
		(?) *Woman!*
3	?:	(??)
4	Manu'a:	e- mālō lava!
		Tns- congratulation Emph
		Is – hello, hello!
		|
5	Moe'ono:	māngaia ali'i le- lea ke va'ai aku **ali'i**
		Nice sir, the – that I see sir(s),
		e fai le pu'enga aka ali'i (o le –)

7	Talaitau:	(?sē) *(?Hey)*
8		oi. oi sole! *Uh-oh, brother!*
9	Moe'ono:	[o le kākou fongo ali'i *of our meeting sirs*
10	Talaitau:	ai 'o le ā le mea lea nga ili ai le pū a le pulenu'u. *Maybe that's why the horn of the mayor was blown.* [
11	Manu'a:	(leai fa'afekai) *(No thanks.)*
12		(0.7)
13		'e vaku lau kōfā le Makua, *With due respect, your highness the senior orator,*
14		(2.0)
15		'o si koe – 'o si koe'inga e sau e pu'e – se aka o (le –) *The dear old ma – the dear old man (who) comes to film (the –)*
16		(1.0)
17	?Moe'ono:	((Sigh)) haaaa! *Haaaa!*
18	Manu'a:	o:: –
19	?:	(??lea)
20		(3.0)
21	??:	(??fangu?)
22	?:	(leai!) *(No!)*
23	??:	(???) [
24	Moe'ono:	e lelei kele le ali'i 'o Falefā *Mr. Falefā is very good*
25	Falefā:	ia'. māliu mai lau kōfā i le Makua *Well. Welcome your highness, the senior orator.*

If acknowledgments of physical presence, status, and rank have already been done, the CG, which is started by the orator and mayor Falefā in line 25, must do something more. I suggest that the CG allows the people present to *collectively* recognize Moe'ono's presence *as* the senior orator, someone who has specific rights and duties within the forthcoming event, the meeting of the fono. Conversely, the CG gives Moe'ono the opportunity to recognize the presence and hence future role played by the rest of the assembly. *It is as social actors engaged or about to be engaged in a particular (and to some extent predictable) type of interaction that participants' presence is recognized by means of a CG.*

It is, of course, possible to argue that CGs are not *real* greetings and a distinction should be made between "greetings" and "welcomings," with the CGs being an example of the latter. The translation of the predicates used in the first pair part would support this hypothesis. My experience in this community,

individuals who meet in a closed area, which is likely to be the site for further activities also involving or indexing their positional roles. This position is supported by a number of observations.

In Western Samoa, I heard high-ranking persons who met on the road, for example, while inside a car, apologize for the improper way in which they find themselves in each other's presence. The expression used is "leanga tātou feiloa'i i le auala" ([too] bad [that] we meet on the road). This expression was explained to me by a person who had just used it to imply that meeting on the road is not the proper way for high-ranking people to come together. In other words, the implication is "we should have met elsewhere." Where? For instance, at someone's house. If such a meeting had taken place, ceremonial greetings would have been exchanged (as well as food and perhaps gifts). This, to me, indicates that for high-ranking Samoans ceremonial greetings are part of what makes an encounter proper or canonical.

The formality or ritualistic nature of the CGs is not a reason for not considering them greetings. For one thing, such formality is quite common in everyday encounters. As documented by Bradd Shore, Margaret Mead, and other ethnographers, Samoans are used to rapidly shifting, within the same setting, from an apparently casual exchange to a much more eloquent one, in which fancy epithets and metaphors are used and individuals get addressed with longer names, inside of longer turns at talk. In other words, CGs are much more routine than we might think and, in fact, statistically much more common than the tālofa greeting. In Western Samoa, whenever I went to visit persons of high status, if I entered their house and sat on the floor in the "front region" (see Duranti 1992a, 1994), I would be greeted with a CG. No matter how hard I tried at times to avoid the CG by acting informally and engaging my hosts in conversation, I was rarely able to avoid it. After a few seconds of my arrival, someone would clear his or her voice and start a CG with the usual shifting activity marker *ia'* 'well, so'. Only kids or young, untitled folks may enter and leave a house without being the target of CGs. Part of this sharp social asymmetry is still at work in the Samoan community in Los Angeles, where young and untitled members of the families I visited are never introduced to me and do not expect to participate in the greeting rituals that in American society often include the youngest children in the family.

The "Where Are You Going?" Greeting

When two parties, at least one of whom is ostensibly going somewhere, cross one another's visual field of perception and are close enough for their voices to be heard by one another (the volume of the parties' voices being adjusted proportionally to the physical distance between them), they may engage in what I will call the "where are you going?" greeting:[24]

(13) Scheme of "Where are you going?" greeting

1 A: Hi!

This goal may be either a place or a task.

First, we must recognize that the adjacency pair in the scheme in (13) conforms to the criteria introduced earlier for greetings. It is typically used when party B is seen moving along the road or a nearby path by party A, who is stationary (e.g., inside a house, in front of a store), but it can also be found in cases in which A and B pass each other on the road. Under these circumstances, the initiator usually stops to address the other (moving party), who may or not also stop to respond. (This is different from the Mehinaku greeting discussed in Gregor 1977.)

The greeting may continue with a leave-taking exchange of the following kind:

(14) Leave-taking after "where are you going" greeting
3 A: Then go.
4 B: I/we go.

The existence of "where are you going?" greetings in Samoa and other societies (see Firth 1972; Gregor 1977; Hanks 1990) suggests that we cannot easily extend to other speech communities Searle's analysis of English greetings as an expressive type of speech act (see above). As may be gathered by an examination of its content, the "where are you going?" greeting is more than an expression of a psychological state. It is an attempt to sanction the reciprocal recognition of one another's presence with some specific requests of information that may or may not receive satisfactory response. Although they are highly predictable and conventional, "where are you going?" greetings force participants to deal with a wide range of issues including an individual's or group's right to have access to information about a person's whereabouts, culture-specific expectations about the ethics of venturing into public space, the force of questioning as a form of social control and hence the possibility of withholding information as a form of resistance to public scrutiny and moral judgment (Keenan 1976). As in the neighboring language of Tokelau (Hoëm 1993:143, 1995:29), Samoan speakers who greet with the "where are you going?" question feel that they have the right to an answer, and the question itself is a form of social control. With the last part of the exchange, shown in (14), the questioner formally grants the other party permission to go. The speech act analysis proposed for English greetings, then, cannot be easily extended to these greetings, given that to initiate a "where are you going?" greeting is definitely more than (or different from) a "courteous indication of recognition" (Searle and Vanderveken 1985:216) or a conventional expression of pleasure at the sight of someone (Bach and Harnish 1979:51–52). To ask "where are you going?" is a request for an account, which may include the reasons for being away from one's home, on someone else's territory, or on a potentially dangerous path. To answer such a greeting may imply that one commits oneself not only to the truthfulness of one's assertion but also to the appropriateness of one's actions. It is not by accident, then, that in some cases speakers might try to be as evasive as possible. Samoans, for instance, often reply to the "where are you going?" greeting question with the vague 'to do an errand' (fai le fe'au). Even when they give what appear to be more specific

and "I'm going to Apia," speakers are still holding on to their right to release only a minimum amount of information – with bragging being an obvious exception ("I'm going down to the store to buy a five pound can of corn beef for Alesana!"). Just as in the Malagasy situation discussed by Elinor Ochs Keenan (1976), the tendency in these encounters is to violate Grice's (1975) cooperative principle and not to be too informative.

The violation of this principle, however, does not have the same implications discussed by Sacks (1975) regarding the American passing-by greeting "How are you?". In the American case, the common assumption is that the party who asks the question as a greeting is not really interested in an accurate or truthful answer. It is this lack of interest that justifies what Sacks sees as a social justification for "lying." People are expected to provide a positive assessment (fine, good, okay) regardless of how they are actually doing or feeling at the moment. In the Samoan case, instead, questioners would like to know as much as possible about the other's whereabouts, and the vagueness in the answer is an attempt by the responding party to resist the information-seeking force of the greeting. Furthermore, the consequences of one's answer are also different. Whereas in the American English greeting substitute "How are you?", as argued by Sacks, a lie is a preferred answer regardless of its truth value, in the case of the Samoan "Where are you going?" greeting, vagueness is conventionally accepted, but violation of truth is potentially problematic if later detected.

That the Samoan "Where are you going" greeting is, at least in part, about rights and duties, expectations, and possible violations is shown by the fact that, when questioned by someone with higher authority, Samoan speakers might be expected to give more specific answers. Likewise, they might display their uneasiness about a situation in which they have been placed, uneasiness about the very fact of being visible and hence vulnerable to public questioning by someone with authority. This is indeed the case in (15) below. In this example, the inspection committee encounters a group of young men on the road. One of the members of the committee, the orator Tūla'i, recognizes a young man from his extended family and addresses him:

(15) *[Inspection]*

A	1	Tūla'i:	fea (a)li('i) a alu iai le kou – kengi 'i ukā? *Where (sir) are you going inland with your pals?*
B	2	Young man:	sē vange afionga ali'i ma kulāfale mākou ke ō aku 'i ukā *With your permission, honorable chiefs and orators, we are going inland*
	3		e – (0.8) e kapenga mai le – (0.2) suūvai – (0.2) o le Aso Sā. *to – (0.8) prepare the – (0.2) food (0.2) for Sunday.*
A	4	Tūla'i:	ia' ōloa ('ā) *Okay, go then,*
B	5	Other man:	(mākou) ō. *(We) go.*

the social organization achieved by it. First, the content displays a noticeable status asymmetry between A and B (which is represented by more than one speaker). Despite the relatively polite questioning by orator Tūla'i (the address form "ali'i" he uses does not have the gender and age selectional restrictions as the English "sir" or the Spanish "señor" but does convey some consideration for the person addressed),[25] there is no question that in lines 2 and 3 the young speaker does his best to show appreciation of the specific statuses represented by the members of the inspection committee, since the respectful term /afionga ali'i/ refers to the chiefs in the committee and the term /kulaafale/ refers to the orators. These terms are in contrast with the casual, almost "slang" word /kengi/, a borrowing from the English *gang*, used by the orator Tūla'i in referring to the young man's group. Furthermore, the young man also indicates through his opening remark /vange/, an apologetic expression for an unbecoming (past or future) act (corresponding to the /vaku/ we saw earlier in [13], line 13) that anything he might do or say to such a distinguished audience is likely going to be inappropriate. In fact, even his group's presence in front of the committee may be seen as an inappropriate interference in the chiefs' and orators' actions, or at least in their interactional space. There are some remnants here of possible avoidance relations with people of high *mana* that have been characterized as typical of ancient Polynesia (Valeri 1985).

Despite the conventionality of the exchange, what is said and how it is said is extremely important. The illocutionary point or goal of the greeting is not just "a courteous indication of recognition, with the presupposition that the speaker has just encountered the hearer" (Searle and Vanderveken 1985:215). Although recognition is certainly involved, the exchange plays out a set of social relations and cultural expectations about where parties should be at a particular time of the day and what they should be doing then, all expressed through an actual exchange of information about the parties' whereabouts. It is the higher status party, that is, the orator Tūla'i in this case, who asks the question. The only thing the young men can do is answer as quickly and as politely as possible and hope for a quick and uneventful exchange. In this interpretive frame, the final granting of permission to go ("ia' ō loa") is also ambiguous between a formulaic closure (corresponding to the English "See you" or "Good-bye") and a meaningful sanction of the young men's goals and destination by a man of higher authority.

Expressions That Are Not Greetings

Given my claim that the six criteria introduced above should allow researchers to identify greetings across languages and communities, it is important to establish whether the same criteria can allow us to exclude words and exchanges that are *not* greetings. A good candidate for such a test is the Samoan term *tulouna* or *tulounga*.[26] In Augustine Krämer's (1902–03) extensive ethnography of Samoan history and social life, *tulounga* was translated to the German *gegrüsst*, the past participle of the verb *grüssen* 'greet'. The English version of the German text

the English *greeted*. Here is an example from Krämer's book; (16) shows the original, and (17), the English translation.[27] The passage is taken from the beginning part of the *fa'alupenga* (ceremonial address of the village of Falefā, which is the site of the exchanges analyzed in this article).

(16)

Tulounga a 'oe le faleatua	Gegrüsst du das Haus von Atua
tulounga a 'oe le 'a'ai o Fonotī	gegrüsst die Stadt des Fonotī
	[Krämer 1902:277]

(17)

Tulounga a 'oe le faleatua	Greeted you, the house of Atua
tulounga a 'oe le 'a'ai o Fonotī	greeted Fonotī's city
	[Krämer 1994:360]

The translation of *tulounga* with "greeted" at the beginning of each phrase achieves the goal of mirroring the word order of Samoan (verb first). But the translation is problematic first of all on empirical grounds, given that *tulounga* is not used in any of the ceremonial greetings I described above. For example, *tulounga* is never mentioned in the ceremonial greetings despite the fact that they are quite formal and, as we saw above, include sections of the ceremonial address (*fa'alupenga*) of the village, the context in which *tulouna* appears in Krämer's text. Instead, I found *tulounga* (pronounced /kuloungа/; see the appendix) in the first speech given during the meetings of the fono. In this context, as I suggested in Duranti 1981, it makes sense to translate it to "acknowledgment" or "recognition":[28]

(18) *[April 7, 1979: first speech of the meeting, by orator Loa]*

Loa: ia'.
Well,
(2.0)
kuloungа ia (1.0) a le aofia ma le fongo,
recognition indeed . . . of the assembly and the council,
(3.0)
kuloungа le vilingia ma – kuloungа le saukia,
recognition (of) the suffering and – recognition (of) the early arrival,
(2.0)
kuloungа Moamoa 'o kua o Lalongafu'afu'a
recognition (of) Moamoa,[29] *the back of Lalongafu'afu'a*[30]
[. . .]

The translation of *tulouna* (*or tulounga*) with *recognition* (one might even consider the term *apology*, given its obvious relation to the expression "tulou!" [excuse (me)][31]) is consistent with the description provided in Milner's dictionary:

Expression used before mentioning

established order, and apologizes for any offence he might inadvertently give when speaking before the distinguished assembly. (N.B. This expression is used repeatedly in uttering the ceremonial style and address of a social group or village *[fa'alupenga]*). [1966:286–287]

When we match *tulounga* against the six criteria provided above, we find that it matches only two or perhaps three of the criteria for identifying greetings:

(i) It is part of a relatively predictable part of a speech (criterion 4).
(ii) It contributes in part to the establishment of a spatiotemporal unit of interaction (to the extent to which it contributes to clarifying the type of encounter in which it occurs) (criterion 5).
(iii) It identifies the interlocutors as distinct and yet related beings (criterion 6).

But *tulounga* does not qualify according to the three remaining criteria:

(a) It does not occur close to an interactional boundary (criterion 1). Instead, it is used in the middle of a speech.
(b) It does not establish a shared perceptual field (criterion 2). Such a field has already been established by a number of other expressions and rituals.
(c) It is not in the form of an adjacency pair (criterion 3). There is no immediate or obvious response to the particular section of the speech in which the speaker uses *tulounga*.

Conclusions

The analysis of greetings presented here shows that semantic analysis must be integrated with ethnographic information if we want to provide an adequate pragmatic analysis of speech activities within and across speech communities. Whatever greetings accomplish, they do it by virtue of the participants' ability to match routine expressions with particular sociohistorical circumstances. To say that greetings are constituted by formulaic expressions only tells half of the story. The other half is how such formulaic expressions may be adapted to, and at the same time help establish, new contexts.

I have argued that we cannot compare greetings across speech communities unless we come up with a universal definition of what constitutes a greeting exchange. After proposing such a universal definition consisting of six criteria, I have shown that the tendency to see greetings as devoid of propositional content or expressing "phatic communion" is too limiting and, in fact, inaccurate. Greetings are, indeed, toward the formulaic end of the formulaic-creative continuum that runs across the full range of communicative acts through which humans manage

My analysis of four different types of Samoan greetings offers an empirical corroboration of the six criteria and proposes some new hypotheses about the work that is done during greetings in human encounters. In particular, I have shown the following:

1. The notion of "greeting substitute" used for English greetings such as "How are you?" may not be extendable to other speech communities. I showed that in Samoan, since no particular greeting can be identified as the most basic or unmarked one, there is no sense in claiming that any of the expressions used in greetings are "greeting substitutes."

2. In certain types of greetings, most noticeably ceremonial ones, recognition has already taken place before greetings are exchanged. This means that "acknowledgment" of another's presence per se cannot be the function of greeting, unless we redefine the notion of "acknowledgment" to make it more culture- and context-specific. For example, physical recognition might have taken place (i.e., participants might be signaling that they have sighted one another), but context-specific social recognition might still be needed; that is, participants need to be acknowledged for what they represent or embody in a particular situation or course of action. The act of greeting, in other words, does not necessarily imply that the speaker has *just* encountered the hearer, as proposed by Searle and Vanderveken (1985:216), but that the encounter is taking place *under particular sociohistorical conditions* and the parties are relating to one another *as particular types of social personae.* This is the case across a number of greetings. It undermines the possibility of cross-culturally extending speech act theorists' analysis of English greetings as an "expressive" type of speech act aimed at the "courteous indication of recognition" of the other party (Searle and Vanderveken 1985:216).

3. Contrary to what is assumed by most existing studies of greetings, greetings are not necessarily devoid of prepositional content; they can be used to gather information about a person's identity or whereabouts. The Samoan "Where are you going?" greeting, for example, is seeking information about the addressee and, unlike what is argued by Sacks (1975) about the English "How are you?", in answering the Samoan greeting, a lie is not the "preferred" answer, or at least not preferred by the one who asks the question. The questioner would rather find out as much as possible about the other party's whereabouts. For this reason, the "Where are you going?" greeting can also work as a form of social control and therefore be quite the opposite of Bach and Harnish's (1979:51–52) view of the act of greeting (in English only?) as an expression of "pleasure at seeing (or meeting)" someone.

Notes

1. Although the absence of greetings or their relatively rare occurrence in certain societies has been mentioned at times – the classic example being American Indian groups such as the Western Apache studied by Basso (1972), who are said to prefer

speech communities do have verbal expressions that conform to the criteria I define in this article, although their use and frequency may vary both across and within communities. (See Hymes's comments about North American Indians in Youssouf et al. 1976:817 fn. 6.)

2. Although Searle and Vanderveken claim to be discussing the English verb *greet*, as shown by the following quote, they in fact treat *greet* and *hello* as part of the same class:

> "Greet" is only marginally an illocutionary act since it has no prepositional content. When one greets someone [but usually one does not greet by using the verb *greet!* A.D.], for example, by saying "Hello," one indicates recognition in a courteous fashion. So we might define greeting as a courteous indication of recognition, with the presupposition that the speaker has just encountered the hearer. [1985:215–216]

3. Austin defined behabitives as "reactions to other people's behaviour and fortunes and . . . attitudes and expressions of attitudes to someone else's past conduct or imminent conduct" (1962:159).
4. By *ethnography* I mean here the study of human action within a particular community through participant-observation of spontaneous encounters for the purpose of gaining an understanding of the participants' perspective on what is going on in such encounters. For a review of ethnographic methods applied to the study of verbal interaction, see Duranti (1997a: ch. 4).
5. Italians use *ciao* for both opening and closing salutations.
6. This statement is ambiguous. It should be understood as meaning either one of the following scenarios: (i) in a given speech community, the same verbal expression may be used in both greeting (viz. opening saluation) and leave-taking; or (ii) a greeting item can exhaust the encounter and in that sense function as both an opening and closing expression. An example of the first situation is the word *ciao* as used in Italy. An example of the second situation is the English question "How're you doing?" when it is not followed by an answer.
7. The use of the notion of *perceptual field* allows for the inclusion of visual and auditory access. The issue of technologies that allow for nonreal time communication (writing in general) is left out of the present discussion. (But see Duranti 1986 for a brief discussion of greetings in electronic mail.)
8. Philips (1972:377) used the notion *participant structure* in referring to structural arrangements of interaction. For the related notion of "participation framework," see Goffman 1981:226 and M. H. Goodwin 1990.
9. I am avoiding here the term *Samoan society*, given the existence of many communities around the world where Samoan is regularly spoken, including two independent countries, Western Samoa and American Samoa, each of which with different kinds of language policies and language practices, including different levels of bilingualism.
10. July 1978–July 1979, March–May 1981, August 1988.
11. As I said earlier, these four types of greetings do not exhaust the typology of Samoan greetings. There is at least one more possible candidate, the informal" 'ua 'e sau?" (Have you come?), said to someone who has just come into the house. (For a similar greeting in Tikopia, see Firth 1972.) The lack of personal experience with this greeting and the absence of examples of this greeting in my data have prevented me from including it in the discussion. One of the reviewers also suggested the expression *uā* as an abbreviation of the same greeting.

13. The laughter that follows excerpt (1) could be interpreted as an index of the awkwardness of the exchange under the present circumstances.
14. Although I have no quantitative data at this moment to support such a statement, I must mention that the greeting *tālofa* is one of the few Samoan terms that can be pronounced with the initial /t/ even in the "bad speech" pronunciation (see the appendix); in other words, it does not necessarily change to /kālofa/ even in those contexts in which all other /t/ sounds disappear. This feature of *tālofa* might be related to its common use with foreigners.
15. For abbreviations used in interlinear glosses, see the appendix.
16. This meaning makes the Samoan *mālō* related to the homophonous Tongan term *mālō*, meaning "(to be) laudable, worthy of thanks or praise" as well as "thank you" (Churchward 1959:325), and to the Hawaiian *mahalo* 'thanks, gratitude, to thank' (Pukui and Elbert 1986:218).
17. Given the different word order of English and Samoan, it is impossible to adequately reproduce here the pauses in the English translation. Samoans say "is nice the land" rather than "the land is nice." This explains why many examples of repairs are in the predicate phrase.
18. Samoan distinguishes in this case between *le asiasi* 'the inspecting/visiting' and *asiasinga* 'the visit/inspection' or the 'visiting/inspecting party'.
19. What I call "ceremonial attributes" here are parts of the *fa'alupenga* 'ceremonial style of address' for people of high status or their entire community. (There is a *fa'alupenga* of the entire country.) They include metaphorical expressions that identify particular titles and their connections to ancestors, places, and important events in Samoan history. See Duranti 1981, 1994; Mead 1930; and Shore 1982. Krämer 1902–03 (and 1994) contains all the *fa'alupenga* as known at the time of his study.
20. Syntactically, the name of the title may be simply juxtaposed next to the addressed term, as in (iii) above, or be linked to it with an oblique preposition (e.g. *'i/i* or *'iā/iā*), as in "lau kōfā i le Makua" (literally, "your honor from the senior orator"). The word *kōfā* also means "opinion (of a chief)." Orators are expected to present the position of their chief.
21. It is also possible to have CGs exchanged between two groups, for example, when two or more individuals arrive simultaneously. In these cases, however, the individuals, especially when their number is low, are each addressed within the same extended CG (Duranti 1997b).
22. Here is an example of a response by an individual to all the members of the inspection committee:

Tūla'i:	mālō (Timi)! // (?)
Timi:	mālō (1.0) afionga i ali'i – ma failāunga!
	(3.0)
	'ua lē faia lou lima inga 'ua 'ē ka'oko!
Tūla'i:	*You haven't done your hand [i.e., played cards] since you've been operated on [i.e., you've gotten a tattoo]!*

23. This third hypothesis makes this exchange similar to another one that took place a decade earlier, when another matai spoke on my behalf to explain to the Moe'ono of those days – the father of the person holding the Moe'ono title in this interaction – what I was writing on my notebook (see Duranti 1992b:91–92).
24. Given its context of use, this type of exchange is the most difficult to catch on tape unless the

greetings was made after returning from the field, although I witnessed and participated in hundreds if not thousands of these exchanges, I have very few clear and reliable "where are you going" greetings in my corpus. Despite this limitation, however, I think that some hypotheses may be made about their organization and in particular about the importance of their propositional content.

25. The term *ali'i*, which historically comes from the Polynesian term for "chief" (Proto-Polynesian *aliki*), maintains in Samoan this meaning for the higher-ranking *matai*. In (15), instead, it is used as a separate address form. It may also be used like a title in English and other Indo-European languages: for example, before a first name (*ali'i Alesana* 'Mr. Alesana') and as a descriptor (*le ali'i lea* 'this gentleman/fellow'). In contemporary Samoa, the term does not have restrictions in terms of age, gender, or animacy. Thus *ali'i* may be used with a young child, a woman (e.g. *ali'i Elenoa* 'Ms. Elinor"), or even an object (*le ali'i lea* can mean 'that person" or 'that thing"). Such a variety of uses makes it difficult to provide a translation of its use in the first line of (15), but it is clear that it should be understood as showing some form of respect, however minimum, of the addressee's social persona. It contrasts, for instance, with the informal address terms *sole* (for male recipients) and *sunga* (for female recipients), which may be translated with English terms such as *lad, brother, or man* and *lassie, sister*, or *girl*, respectively.
26. The alternative spelling and pronunciation is probably due to hypercorrection resulted from the sociolinguistic variation between *n* ([n]) and *ng* ([ŋ]) (see Duranti 1990; Duranti and Ochs 1986; Hovdhaugen 1986; Shore 1982).
27. To make it consistent with my transcription conventions (see the appendix), I have changed Krämer's spelling of *tuloga* to *tulounga*.
28. The English *acknowledgment* parallels the way in which *tulounga* is sometimes used by Samoan speakers, who seem to treat it as a nominalization as well. For example, in example (18), the first *tulounga* is followed by a genitive phrase "a le aofia ma le fongo" (of the assembly and the council).
29. Moamoa is the name of the *malae* 'ceremonial green' of the village of Falefā.
30. Lalogafu'afu'a is the name of the malae of the village of Lufilufi, the capital of the subdistrict of Anoama'a where Falefā is located. The spatial metaphor "the back of" is meant to convey the idea that the people of Falefā are expected to support and protect the people of Lufilufi.
31. "Tulou!" (Excuse me!) is commonly used to excuse oneself for inappropriately entering the interactional space occupied by people of high status (Duranti 1981).

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Appendix

Transcription Conventions

All Samoan examples are taken from transcripts of spontaneous interactions recorded by the author in Western Samoa at different times between 1978 and 1988. In the transcripts presented in the article, I adopt the conventions introduced by Gail Jefferson for conversation analysis (see Sacks et al. 1974), with a few modifications.

[*Inspection*]	A name in brackets before the text of an example refers to the name of the transcript.
Tūla'i:	Speakers' names (or general descriptors) are separated from their utterances by colons.
?:	A question mark instead of a name indicates that no good guess could be made as to the identity of the speaker.
??:	Repeated question marks indicate additional unidentified speakers.
?Tūla'i:	A question mark before the name of the speaker stands for a probable, but not safe, guess.
(2.5)	Numbers between parentheses indicate length of pauses in seconds and tenths of seconds.
[	A square bracket between turns indicates the point at which overlap by another speaker starts.
=	The equal signs indicate that two utterances are latched immediately to one another with no pause.
=[	The equal signs before a square bracket between turns signals that the utterance above and the one below are both latched to the prior one.
(I can't do)	Talk between parentheses represents the best guess of a stretch of talk which was difficult to hear.

approximately the length of the blank spaces between parentheses.

(( )) Material between double parentheses provides extralinguistic information.

[. . .] An ellipsis between square brackets indicate that parts of the original transcript or example have been omitted or that the transcript starts or ends in the middle of further talk.

// Parallel slashes are an alternative symbol indicating point of overlap.

o:: Colons, single or double, indicate lengthening of the sound they follow.

Abbreviations in Interlinear Glosses

Art = article; Comp = complementizer; Emp = emphatic particle; incl = inclusive; Perf = perfective aspect marker; pl = plural (as opposed to singular or dual); Pres = present tense; Voc = vocative particle.

"Good Speech" and "Bad Speech"

Samoan has two phonological registers, called by Samoans *tautala lelei* 'good speech' and *tautala leanga* 'bad speech'. "Good speech" is strongly associated with Christianity, written language (e.g., the Bible), and Western education (Duranti and Ochs 1986; Ochs 1988; Shore 1982). It is thus required of children and adults most of the time in the schools and during church services and most church-related activities. "Bad speech" is used in everyday encounters in the homes, at the store, or on the road and is also characteristic of most formal contexts in which traditional speechmaking is used, including the ceremonial greetings discussed in this article. There is also a considerable amount of shifting between these two registers (Duranti 1990; Ochs 1985, 1988). All the examples reproduced here are given with the pronunciation originally used by the speakers, which is usually "bad speech." When discussing words or phrases in the text of the article, I have usually used "good speech," unless I am referring to words actually used by people, in which case I put them between obliques to frame them as different from traditional orthography, e.g. /lau kōfā/ and /fongo/ instead of *lau tōfā* and *fono*, respectively. This means that the same word may be found in two different versions: for example, the expression *tulounga* is /kulounga/ in the transcript of a speech in a fono in which it was used. I followed standard Samoan orthography, with one exception: I substituted for the letter *g*, which traditionally stands for a velar nasal ([ŋ]), *ng*, which is more reader-friendly for non-Polynesianists. The inverted apostrophe (ʻ) stands for a glottal stop ([ʔ]).

22

Moaning, Whinging and Laughing: The Subjective Side of Complaints

Derek Edwards

Introduction: The Subjective Side of Complaining

Complaining deals not only with the complaint's object, the thing being complained about, but also its subject, the complainer (or 'complainant'). Let us call this the *subjective side* of complaining, the way that a complaint may index the speaker/complainer. Complainers may display or manage a range of speakerindexical characteristics that we can gloss as attitude, stance, investment, jocularity, and so on. A complaint can be done in ways that enhance its objectivity and seriousness, and its chances of being taken seriously. On the other hand, rather than simply reporting factual and complainable matters, a complainer may (also, or instead) be heard as moaning, whinging, ranting, biased, prone to complaining, paranoid, invested, over-reacting, over-sensitive, or whatever other vernacular category might apply. The present study explores this 'subjective side' of complaining, not as an analytically discernible characteristic of speakers, but as a performed, managed, interactionally produced and interaction-sensitive feature of how complaints are done. Of course, not only complaints, but discourse of all kinds, are available for evaluative inferences about the speaker: 'our accounts may themselves be evaluated ... in terms of the propriety or fairness or justice or accuracy with which we have reported some (external) events, or our motives in doing so' (Drew, 1998: 295–6). Sacks (1992) also drew special attention to the speaker-indexical properties of compliments and complaints, particularly with regard to 'safe' and 'unsafe' ones.[1]

Some studies distinguish between *direct* and *indirect* complaints. Direct complaints are made against the talk's current recipient (e.g. Dersley and Wootton, 2000); indirect complaints are made about someone or something

else (e.g. Drew, 1998). The present study focuses on indirect complaints. This focus is dictated partly by what is available in the materials used for the study, but also by the need to restrict the scope and complexity of the analysis. We should also note that the direct/indirect dichotomy is not always straightforward. For example, Sacks (1992) observed how complaining about a restaurant to one's fellow diners may implicate the one who brought you there, requiring some delicacy in how it is done. Similarly, there are settings such as family therapy and neighbourhood complaints mediation (Stokoe, 2003), in which complainees (those against whom complaints are made) may be present but not directly addressed.

Various studies of everyday talk have focused on how some object is made a 'legitimate complainable' (Pomerantz, 1986). *Objectification* of a complaint is one way (in fact, a variety of ways) of handling the subjective side; the more a complaint can be built as a factual description of its object, the less available it is to be heard as stemming from the speaker's disposition to see, feel, or interpret things negatively. Members' objectification methods include 'script formulations' (Edwards, 1994) in which specific events are offered as instances of generalized, recurrent patterns; extreme case formulations (Edwards, 2000a; Pomerantz, 1986); independent corroboration by other victims and witnesses (Edwards and Potter, 1992); graphic narrative description (Geertz, 1988; Potter, 1996; Wooffitt, 1992); verbatim quotations with 'active voicing' (Wooffitt, 1992); invocation of category-based knowledge entitlements (Potter, 1996; Whalen and Zimmerman, 1990); uses of factual presupposition;[2] and joint production of the complaint itself. The latter, joint production, is a notable feature of indirect complaints where the complaint's recipient affiliates with, and may join in with, the complaint's production. There are examples of joint production in the data used in this article.

The analytical focus of this study, however, is on ways in which a complaint's subjectivity is actively managed. A subjective stance of some sort is typically a performed feature of the complaint's production and receipt. While drawing heavily on the principles and methods of conversation analysis, it is also a particular feature of discursive psychology to explore the close, mutually implicative nature of subject–object relations, as a managed feature of discourse of various kinds. In the case of complaints, this is a matter of how talk constructs the object of a complaint in combination with the dispositions and mental states (in commonsense terms) of the complainer, in ways that handle the indexical and interactional features of complaining.

Identifying Complaints

In order to collect samples for analysis, it was necessary to start with at least a loose, to-be-refined notion of the phenomenon, in this case, 'complaints'. Speech acts such as questions, requests, and commands are types that once seemed relatively straightforward to define in terms of grammar and felicity conditions (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969). Yet even for those types, problems of 'indirectness', [illegible] turn-taking and indexicality, have hugely

Levinson, 1979, 1983; Schegloff, 1988). 'Complaints' elude formal definition, and remain a largely normative and vernacular, rather than technical, category.[3] That is to say, characterizing something as a *complaint* or an *accusation* is properly understood as part of the phenomenon, part of the practices in which people themselves may use words to construct the nature of things. In conversation-analytic terms, complaints may start to be technically specifiable, if they turn out to occur in bounded sequences with clear beginnings, endings, and interactional characteristics. Although some complaints are indeed clearly bounded (Drew, 1998), others are not so well marked (Dersley and Wootton, 2000; and this applies to several examples used for the present study). Let us explore, then, the vernacular sense of *complaint*.

The word *complain* overlaps and contrasts with a range of relevant alternatives such as *criticize*, *(be)moan*, *accuse*, and *denigrate*. But it is a feature of complaining, as an actual conversational activity (rather than a topic for conceptual analysis), that the word itself is seldom used. The same stretch of talk might also be glossed as criticism or accusation, troubles-telling, or merely story-telling or factual reportage, which are potentially relevant alternatives for speakers when characterizing their activities. Speakers may even work against the notion that what they are doing is complaining, rather than simply reporting some observations. For example, callers to helplines for reporting child abuse often express their 'concerns' (Potter and Hepburn, 2003), where any suspicion that they may have a personal grievance with their neighbours might threaten the factual objectivity of what they are reporting, and question for whose sake they are reporting it. Given that a complaint involves some kind of *grievance*, this immediately makes relevant something that a speaker may work to minimize, which is any kind of motivated, or dispositional, basis for what they are saying. This makes complaints particularly interesting when examining the management of subjective investment in descriptive discourse.

We start, then, from the notion that 'complaining' is a defeasible vernacular category with normative, oriented-to properties and consequences. There is a set of participant roles: a *complainer*, an *object* or complainee (if the object is a person), and a complaint *recipient*, who will also be the object/complainee in cases of direct complaints. Various kinds of 'footing' (Goffman, 1979) are possible, where a speaker may offer a complaint on someone else's behalf, or as a relay or 'animator' of another person's complaint. Complaints are also inherently *negative*, just as criticisms are, and take the form of morally implicative stories and descriptions of people and places. The complainee's *agency* is normatively invoked, such that someone can be held culpable or negligent. Complainers may 'work up' a complainee's agency, through how their actions are described and sequentially narrated. For example, 'overdetermined descriptions of actions' (Drew, 1998: 318)[4] can suggest deliberateness, and thereby enhance the actor's culpability. A complaint also includes a *grievance* (or infringement, or transgression), which is something that 'criticism' need not include; or, to put it another way, something that makes criticism start to sound like complaint. Typically,

The following analysis focuses on ways in which indirect complaints handle or manage the complainer's subjectivity, including their disposition to complain, and their current 'attitude' to the complaint's object. It is worth emphasizing at this point that 'subjectivity' is not simply a threat to a complaint being taken as serious and factual. It may do that, but it may also enhance factuality and seriousness, and be oriented-to in that way by recipients, by signalling how aggrieved, long-suffering, and non-disposed to complaining, the complainer may be.[5]

Materials and Method

The main materials used for this study were the extensive set of mundane domestic telephone conversations collected by Elizabeth Holt and transcribed by Gail Jefferson using the conventions developed for conversation analysis; special thanks to Gail Jefferson for the considerable time and expertise involved in transcription. These materials are supplemented, for one specific analytic feature, by examples from the specialized setting of neighbourhood complaint mediation, collected by Elizabeth Stokoe. The use of conversation-analytic transcription enables a focus on precisely how complaints are delivered and taken up in talk-in-interaction. Extracts are selected not only as clear or representative examples of a phenomenon, but also on the basis that they generally contain several of the phenomena under analysis, which makes for a more economical use of multiple data sequences.

The procedure was to work through the audiotapes and transcripts, collecting candidate examples of complaints. Examples were excluded that seemed to be criticism or accusation without complaint; in other words, those that lacked a sense of grievance. This collection was then further reduced to those which displayed the range of 'subjectivity-managing' features that became the focus of close analysis. The analysis itself applies the basic principles of conversation analysis, with a view to discursive psychology's central concern with how psychological characteristics (in this case, the subjective side of complaining) are handled as part of talk's performance of social actions.

Analysis

The analysis outlines four ways in which a speaker/complainer's subjectivity is displayed and managed. Although the four may occur together, there is no claim or requirement that they are always present whenever a complaint is made. Rather, they are to be understood as optional members' methods; that is to say, recurrent and systematic ways in which the (potential) subjectivity of a complaint may be handled, and where, on each occasion, there is some interaction-oriented work being done through their use:

1 *Announcements.* Before elaborating a complaint, speakers may formulate

which also provides for how the complaint recipient might appropriately respond to it.

2. *Laughter.* Laughter may display 'attitude' and provides for receipt.
3. *Displacement.* Complaints may be directed at a common-sensically lesser or less obvious object, sometimes comical in its choice and description.
4. *Lexical descriptions.* Words alternative to *complain*, such as *moan* or *whinge*, characterize a complaint's subjective basis, and may be used to counter and undermine its factual grounds or seriousness.

Analysis 1: Announcements

A recurrent feature of complaints is that the complainer signals not only that a complaint is coming, but also their stance or reaction on the matter. By formulating how they are affected, whether at the time of the offence or now at the time of reporting it, the complainer provides the essential *grievance* component of complaining, signals its seriousness and current relevance (given that it is usually a past event), and also attends to the recipient's task of how to hear and respond:

(1) Holt:M88:1:5:22

1	Rob:	→	↑Well ↓and the <u>o</u>ther thing I wz disgusted b- I'm
2			↓sorry you're getting'n <u>ea</u>rful'v this you couldn't'v:
3			phoned't a better ↑<u>ti</u>:me,hheh ↑he [h
4	Les:		[.hh ↑<u>Oh</u> that's
5			alri:ght,
6	Rob:		Well the ↑other thing ↓I've (.) found very strange
7			is ↑there weren't any <u>dic</u>tionaries in the classroom
8	Les:		.t.k.<u>hhh</u> [h
9	Rob:		[<u>Not</u> actua [l
10	Les:		[↑<u>No</u> children's dih- e-w'l not
11			many children's dictionaries,hh
12	Rob:		W'l, they ↑<u>ha</u>ve those little (.) b<u>oo</u>klety ↓things

Extract 1 is several minutes (22 pages of transcript) into a phone call between Robbie and Lesley, two schoolteachers who are sharing stories and complaints about various other staff at their school. The announcement is in line 1: 'the <u>o</u>ther thing I wz disgusted b(y)', and the complaint proper is in line 7, the absence of dictionaries. The use of the extreme case formulation (ECF) 'weren't any' helps mark it as a complaint (Pomerantz, 1986).

The extract contains features that display the interaction-orientation of the upcoming complaint and its announcement. Robbie cuts off the announcement (line 1) to insert an apology to Lesley (lines 1–3) for what is clearly to be a further complaint in a series. The description "n <u>ea</u>rful'v this' implies that Lesley may be tired of hearing them. Lesley's '↑<u>Oh</u> that's airi:ght,' grants Robbie permission to continue, although there is no expression of enthusiasm, and no obvious uptake of Robbie's irony and laughter ('you couldn't'v: phoned't a better ↑<u>ti</u>:me,

of complaining. Following Lesley's less than enthusiastic receipt of a projected additional complaint, Robbie downgrades her subjectivity announcement from 'disgusted by' (line 1) to 'found very strange' (line 6), still prior to delivering the complaint. Further recipience problems and downgrades are then done on the complaint itself, with Robbie shifting from the extreme 'weren't any dictionaries' to the softened 'not actual' and 'not many' (lines 9–12; cf. Edwards, 2000a, on the interactionally occasioned uses of ECF softeners).

The details of extract 1, therefore, show the participants' sensitivity, during the announcement and production of a complaint, to the complaint's projected and ongoing receipt. The complainer's subjectivity and stance are a feature of that. Note that the first object repaired is not the complaint itself, but the nature and strength of Robbie's feelings about it. Faced with a possibly non-affiliative receipt, Robbie downgrades the grievance (from 'disgusting' to 'strange'), and jokes at her own reporting of it (lines 2–3), prior to making the complaint proper.

Extract 2, from a phone conversation between Lesley and Joyce, is the start of a complaint sequence that we return to later, in extract 6:

(2) **Holt:C85:4:2**

1	Les:	→	°Oh:.° .hh **Yi-m-You ↓know I-I-I'm broiling about**
2			**something hhhheh** [**heh .hhhh**
3	Joy:		[**Wha::t.**
4	Les:		**Well that sa↓:le. (0.2) at- at (.) the vicarage.**
5			(0.6)
6	Joy:		Oh ↓ye[:s,
7	Les:		[.t
8			(0.6)
9	Les:		**u (.) ih Your friend 'n mi:ne wz the:re**

Lesley's expression 'I'm broiling about something' again serves as an announcement of an upcoming complaint. As Drew (1998) notes with regard to this sequence, it formulates the complainer's sense of grievance, which is a canonical component of complaints:

> Reporting in this way their emotional response – their sense of grievance – enables complainants to characterize how far the other's behavior has caused offense. In this respect it may be noted that these expressions of indignation are formed as first person assessments, for example, as 'I was so angry,' 'w'l tha tee:d me o::ff,' rather than as generalized assessments (in the form 'it was so ...'). (Drew, 1998: 311)

But note also the way Lesley delivers her announcement. The term *broiling* metaphorically signals a particularly strong reaction to an event that turns out to be a person saying to her at a vicarage jumble sale,[6] somewhat teasingly, 'hhello Lesley, (.) ↑still trying to buy something f'nothing'. Without detailing the whole story sequence, extract (2) contains, already in the announcement

Combined with the metaphor 'broiling', this is hearable as Lesley announcing an upcoming complaint whose possibly ironic, even comical features, and her proposal not to be taking it too seriously, are projected in how the announcement is delivered. Lesley's announcement, through its combination of a strong metaphor and laughter, manages to provide a sense of Lesley being truly aggrieved, while not making too much of it. Again all of this is accomplished, or at least projected, along with the further ironic remark 'Your friend 'n mi:ne' (line 9), prior to the complaint itself being told.

Extract (3) is the beginning of Lesley's relaying to Gwen, a complaint made by a third party, Jean-Claude, who has written a letter to Lesley. The complaint itself is examined in extract 10; here we are looking at Lesley's initial announcement of it:

(3) Holt:J86:1:4:1

1	Les:		We:ll. We ↑got a ↑letter t'da:y, an' ih- (.) it wz
2			very: Jean Clau↓:de you kn[ow.=how'e]goe:s,
3	Gwe:		[Y e : : s?]
4			(0.2)
5	Les:	→	.hhh An' (.) an' really it made us lau:gh, [but- it=
6	Gwe:		[hhh!
7	Les:	→	=wz very ↓sa↓:d.
			(0.2)
8	Les:		[Eh:m]
9	Gwe:		[Oh::]:?
10			(1.4)
11	Les:		eHe says that his mother's left his ↓fa ↑ther,

Lines 1–7 contain the announcement, in which Lesley signals various subjective takes on the yet-to-be-recounted complaint. For her own part, as the complaint's relayer or 'animator' (Goffman, 1979), it is something both humorous and sad (lines 5–7), where Lesley's prime response is probably the humour of it. There are several bases for claiming humour as primary: (1) it comes first, in line 5, with 'it wz very ↓sa↓:d' offered second, where it works as a corrective (introduced by 'but') to any impression that she might be making light of someone's distress, or indulging in *Schadenfreude*; (2) it is a first person assessment (cf. Drew, 1998: 311), characterizing Lesley's actual reaction, in contrast to the generalized assessment 'it wz very ↓sa↓:d'; (3) Lesley has already prefaced Jean-Claude's complaint as dispositional, as a recognizable kind of thing that he does, and therefore as perhaps not too serious[7] – 'it wz very: Jean Clau↓:de you know.=how'e goe:s' (lines 1–2).

The upcoming complaint is not in fact the content of line 11, that Jean-Claude's mother has left, but develops in extract 10 in ways that we shall explore with regard to displacement and humour. The point here, as with extracts 1 and 2, is the quite detailed subjectivity-managing work done by Lesley in how she announces the complaint, prior to relating it. An expression of sympathy and

go on to share a laugh on the basis that they are not being heartless. This echoes other studies of phenomena such as the role of 'weak agreement' in producing and projecting disagreements (Pomerantz, 1984); the work done by 'show concessions' (Antaki and Wetherell, 1999); and Sacks's remarks on how complaints themselves are recognizable through, rather than despite, their being accompanied by contrastive appreciations of the complaint-object (Sacks, 1992: vol. 1, 359).

Extracts (4) and (5) are further examples of announcements that formulate the speaker's subjectivity; in these cases the speaker is also the complainant:

(4) Holt:X(C):2:1:9:1

1	Moi:		(...) Les I just wanted a' ↓sa:y .hhhhheh:m::: .t I'm
2			sorry about what I hea::rd abou:t (.) an' I'm not being
3			nosey is there anything I c'n do: or (.) can I help in
4			any wa[y o: :]r would you] rather not]talk about it.]
5	Les:		[↓eh::] h e h heh↑]What about]the ↑bu::rglar]
6			(0.2)
7	Moi:		.t ↓Ye:s
8			(.)
9	Les:		↑Uhhh! .hh (.) ↓No:::. It's very kind of you: .h
10		→	↑No:::. .hh In fact (.) ↑we ↓thought it wz killingly
11			funny really,

(5) Holt:88U:1:4:5

1	Dana:	(...) an' I wz going abs'utely crazy I mean I wz
2		sat there .hh leaping up'n do:wn
3		(0.9)

In extract 4, Lesley's '↑we ↓thought it wz killingly funny really' precedes her account of a recent burglary at her house. In this case, rather than simply announcing the story, it prefaces it by correcting Moira's assumption that it might be a delicate or painful matter to talk about (lines 1–4). On the contrary, Lesley laughs off any sense of seriousness and delicacy (line 5), and goes on to formulate the whole thing as 'killingly funny'. Again, the initial focus for both Moira and Lesley is on feelings and attitude, rather than the event itself. Extract 5 is Dana's preface to a rather jocular complaint about having been kept waiting for a lift home by someone who kept ignoring all signals that Dana wanted to leave.

One thing to note in these examples is that subjectivity formulations, and their use within story and complaint announcements, can be used to enhance, as well as to undermine, the factuality or seriousness of the event concerned. The extremity of 'going abs'utely crazy' and of 'leaping up'n do:wn', lend themselves both to the seriousness of anything that might cause such reactions, but also to a potential for jocularity, or indeed both (Edwards, 2000a). It is a matter of specific lexical choices, and how they are used, indexically and sequentially, on any occasion of telling. We have seen that formulating a reaction or grievance

occasioned by events, can enhance a complaint's credibility. An important function of complaint announcements is to signal to the recipient what kind of stance or attitude is being adopted and proposed.

Analysis 2: Laughter

Laughter occurs in some of the extracts we have already examined: see extract 1, line 3, extract 2, line 2, and extract 4, line 5. This is in addition to reports such as 'really it made us lau:gh' (extract 3), and '↑we ↓thought it wz killingly funny really.' (extract 4). Laughter occurs at various junctures: in announcements of upcoming complaints, in the course of complaining and narrating complaints, and in complaint receipts. The unexpected prevalence of laughter in the complaint sequences collected for this study is probably related to their being indirect complaints, and ones that often concern past circumstances. In any case, detailed studies of laughter in conversational interaction (e.g. Glenn, 1995; Haakana, 2001; Jefferson et al., 1987) have revealed various kinds of 'serious' business being performed, including participant alignment and misalignment. Accordingly, rather than interpreting the laughter that accompanies complaints in terms of people simply finding their troubles amusing, we explore the recipient-designed work it does in managing stance, 'take', or attitude. In particular, laughter can signal that a complainable item, even when serious, is not something that the complainer is disposed to moan about, indulge in, or make heavy weather of (Jefferson, 1984).

Extract 6 continues a few turns after the end of extract 2, in which Lesley announced (with laughter) her upcoming complaint about an incident at a vicarage jumble sale. In extract 6 she relates the incident:

(6) Holt:C85:4:3

1	Les:		AND uh ↑we were looking rou-nd the ↓sta:lls 'n
2			poking about 'n he came up t'me 'n he said Oh:
3			hhello Lesley, (.) ↑still trying to buy something
4			f 'nothing,
5	():		.tch!
6	Joy:		.hh[hahhhhhh!
7	Les:		[↑ .hhohhh!
8			(0.8)
9	Joy:		Oo[: : :]: L e s l e y]
10	Les:	→	[↑Oo:.]ehh heh ↑heh]
11			(0.2)
12	Joy:		↓I:s [n ' t] [↓he
13	Les:		[↑What]do ↑y[ou ↑sa↓:y.
14			(0.3)
15	Joy:		↓Oh isn't he ↓drea:dful.
16	Les:		°eYe-:-:s:°
17			(0.6)

19 Joy: Wh<u>a</u>t'n <u>a</u>w::f'l m<u>a</u>::[:::n
20 Les: → [ehh heh-heh-↑h<u>e</u>h
21 Joy: <u>Oh</u>:: honestly, ↓ <u>I</u> cannot stand the m<u>a</u>n it's j<u>u</u>st
22 (no [:)
23 Les: [<u>I</u> thought well I'm g<u>o</u>n' tell J<u>o</u>yce that,
24 → ehh[h<u>e</u>h [heh-heh he-e].<u>uh</u>: ↑.e [h .eh↑ .hhhhh
25 Joy: [( ) [<u>0 h : : : :</u>.] I [d<u>o</u> think he's
26 dr<u>e</u>adful
27 Les: .tch O<u>h</u>: dea-r
28 Joy: <u>Oh</u>:he r[eally <u>i</u>] :s,
29 Les: [↑<u>He</u> dra-]ih-h<u>e</u> (.) took the w<u>i</u>n' out'v my
30 → sails c'mpl<u>e</u>tel(h)y

The analytic focus here is not the complaint itself (see Drew, 1998, on this sequence), but how Lesley manages her sense of grievance, and her attitude as complainant. Although Lesley does plenty of laughing (lines 10, 20, 24, 30), Joyce notably does not, but continues to receive the complaint as serious (cf. Jefferson, 1984, on the withholding of affiliative laughter in troubles-telling receipts). Yet Joyce does not sound misaligned; it is as if she is taking it seriously on Lesley's behalf, while Lesley herself, as the aggrieved complainant, provides all the complainable materials that Joyce needs (lines 1–4), while making light of it. It remains a clearly identifiable complaint, but one told as an almost delightfully painful story, rather than something serious with real damage done.

It is worth considering what it is that Lesley may be managing here. The offence itself, rather than being a clear insult, can easily be heard as an ironic remark, teasing or poking fun at her. In that case, for Lesley to be simply offended could display her as having no sense of humour, or as over-sensitive. That the man was teasing, rather than doing serious character assassination, seems warranted by Lesley's expressed difficulty in knowing how to respond ('↑ What do ↑ <u>you</u> ↑<u>sa</u>↓:y' line 13; and 'h<u>e</u> (.) took the w<u>i</u>n' out'v my sails c'mpl<u>e</u>tel(h)y' lines 29–30). Some ambiguity of intent is always part of a good tease, and can present problems for recipients (Drew, 1987). Lesley's mixture of complaint and laughter conveys a sense of being wrong-footed by the man, and unsure of how best to evaluate the episode, and therefore what stance to take on it both at the time and now in the telling. Whether the man was poking harmless fun at her, or slandering her, or both, is probably what makes him so 'dreadful', which is Joyce's response in line 15 immediately following not the reported incident itself, notably, but Lesley's '↑What do ↑<u>you</u> ↑sa↓ :y.'

Extract 7 is a report of a complaint that is now, so to speak, ancient history:

(7) Holt:88U:2:4:25

1 Car: (...) I said well (.) <u>Ron</u>ald said he 'ad mell<u>o</u>wed which
2 'ee <u>had</u> I m<u>e</u>an .t.hhh It was r<u>a</u>ther- h<u>i</u>s b'aviour wz
3 <u>rath</u>er different from: wh<u>e</u>n 'ee met me in the office
4 after m<u>y</u> f<u>a</u>:ther'd died'n said ↑<u>Oh:</u> they tell me y<u>ou</u>r
5 f<u>a</u>:ther h<u>a</u>s died 'n I nearly said sh'd 'ee've asked

6 → your p(h)erm(h)issio(h)o[n
7 Ski: → [Oowehhhh hhah ha:h uh-:
8 .uh:: .uh .hfhhhh

Carrie is telling Skip about a man who once made an insensitive remark to her, following the death of her father. Her laughter is in line 6. The complaint itself is no longer a live issue; the offender has reportedly 'mellowed' (line 1), which Carrie herself confirms ('which ee' had' – lines 1–2). She reproduces the complaint in the form of a re-enacted, actively voiced dialogue (lines 4–6; cf. Lesley in extract 6). Note the precise placement of her laughter, not inside the complaint-object, which is what the man said to her, but rather inside her own ironic response: 'I nearly, said sh'd 'ee've asked your p(h)erm(h)issio(h)on'. Carrie is rehearsing her reaction to the man's insensitivity. The insensitivity complaint remains hearable, but Carrie also manages, in its telling, to display that she is not making heavy weather of it.

A particular feature of Carrie's story is that her jocular, ironic reply did not actually happen; it is reported as something she 'nearly, said' (line 5). This device, of nearly having said something, whatever its basis in fact or memory, enables what may be a current stance or attitude to be back-dated to the original events, as (in this case) an ironic rather than painful reaction to a piece of insensitivity. In the telling, and in the precise manner of its formulation and laughed-through delivery, Carrie conveys a recipient-designed stance upon the event as speaker/complainer. Skip's nonverbal response (lines 7–8) receives it just as Carrie offers it, as a somewhat shocking (his initial news-receipt 'oowehhhh'), but also laughable story (the immediately subsequent laughter particles 'hhah ha:h').

Jefferson remarks on a pervasive asymmetry of laughter in troubles-tellings (a phenomenon that overlaps somewhat with indirect complaints), where troubles-tellers may laugh, but recipients withhold laughter:

> ... a laughing troubles-teller is doing a recognizable sort of job. He is exhibiting that, although there is this trouble, it is not getting the better of him; he is managing; he is in good spirits and in a position to take the trouble lightly. He is exhibiting what we might call 'troubles-resistance'. But this does not mean that ... a recipient is invited to join in the merriment, to also find the thing laughable ... In troubles-talk, it appears to be a recipient's job to be taking the trouble seriously; to exhibit what we might call 'troubles-receptiveness'. (1984: 351)

One useful thing that this subjectivity-work (displaying 'good spirits', etc.) accomplishes, is enabling a complaint story to be told without placing the current recipient in the awkward position of hearing 'an earful' of troubles (see Robbie's apology in extract 1), and perhaps being expected to offer advice or help (see Moira's opening in extract 4, where both sensitivity and possible assistance are invoked). Indirect complaints, being delivered to an uninvolved complainee, require some kind of management of the

relevance – indeed, of the complainee's uninvolvement. Various risks may arise if not forestalled, such as the complainee hearing the complainer's grievance as here-and-now rather than there-and-then; or the complaint as somewhat 'direct' or implicative of them (cf. Sacks, 1992: vol. 2: 297). Laughter can manage recipiency by marking the speaker as not-here-in-this-telling worried/upset/angry, and so on, but rather, that those 'feelings' are a proper part of the (elsewhere) offence, and yet still felt, and even re-animated in the telling.[8]

Analysis 3: Displacement

Ironic delivery of complaints can be accomplished in various ways including laughter, the use of excessive and extreme versions of events (Edwards, 2000a), and a caricatured tone of voice best appreciated by listening to the audiotape. The device examined here, however, is the use of a 'displaced' complaint object. That is to say, where there is an obvious and serious object for complaint, such as being burgled or losing one's parents through marital separation, the speaker may complain instead about what might be considered, normatively, to be secondary or incidental details. Displaced complaints resemble 'buffer topics' in troubles-tellings, these being topics 'biased towards nonserious treatment' that can provide 'a time out for pleasantries' (Jefferson, 1984: 351ff.). Buffer topics may be relevant or not to the trouble itself, and Jefferson focuses on their relevance in laughter sequences where, unlike with troubles proper, recipients will do affiliative laughter. Displaced complaints include some buffer topics of that kind, but are nevertheless objects of complaint.

Extract 8 continues Lesley's report to Moira about the burglary (see extract 4) that Moira has tentatively and sensitively inquired about, and that Lesley has prefaced as 'killingly funny really'. Extract 8 begins at a point in the story after Lesley's husband had got out of bed to investigate a noise downstairs, and discovered evidence of a break-in:

(8) Holt:X(C)2:1:9:3

1	Les:		(...) u-we:ll what I did ↓ have agains' this bu:rglar
2		→	.hh was he: his ↑ muddy fee:t.hh
3			(0.3)
4	Moi:		khh! (.) h[a ho hu-uh]
5	Les:		[You know: ↑ a]ll over the cushion[::s eh-]
6	Moi:		[You:r]
7			ti:dy mi:n:d. O[h : : :]dear
8	Les:		[We:ll h]heh! .hh You ↑ should see ↑ the
9			↑window ↓s:ea:t.h

Rather than objecting to the obvious offence, indeed crime, of being burgled, what Lesley complains about is the muddy footprints the man left. Burglary is something familiarly characterized as a traumatic personal violation, and Moira had oriented to that in broaching the topic very delicately in her initial inquiry

as 'displaced' is signalled in Lesley's contrastive expression, 'what I did have agains' this bu:rglar ... ' (line 1), which contrasts it to what one might expect to be complainable, the crime itself. In fact, nothing appeared to have been stolen, and the muddy footprints were apparently the only effective damage. But again, the irony not only orients to that displaced, downgraded object (muddy feet rather than break-in and possible theft), but also displays Lesley's above-it-all coping attitude, produced in contrast to Moira's initial projection of it all as a very sensitive matter.

Moira's expression 'you:r ti:dy mi:n:d' (lines 6–7) subjectivizes Lesley's complaint, in line with Lesley's ironic production (Lesley responds in line 8 with another laughter token 'We:ll hheh!'). At the same time, Moira acknowledges that for *someone such as Lesley*, muddy footprints are a serious enough matter ('Oh::: dear', line 7). Through displacement, uptakes and laughter particles, Lesley and Moira manage to share a notion of a burglary that did some damage, but that Lesley is well on top of, and able to laugh about. The nature of the break-in and its consequences, the offence and grievance, is tied up with the management of subjective attitude to the event and its telling.

In extract 9 Lesley responds to a later inquiry about the burglary, from Arthur:

(9) **Holt:X(C)2:2:2:2**

1	Art:		(...) How how've you settled in now after thē: (p)
2			visitor.
3			(0.2)
4	Les:		.hhh Oh: (.) eh hheh he .hh Well- (0.2) .h (.) I
5		→	↑mus' say this finger ↓print stuff makes a me:ss but
6	Art:		Oh:.
7	Les:		An' I can' get the mud off the cushion: but a ↑part
8			f'm that we're alri:gh[t?
9	Art:		[What a ↓nuisance.
10			(0.2)
11	Les:		Ye: [s.
12	Art:		[(Fancy) galloping all over the cushion this is
13			ridiculous isn't

The displaced complaint on this occasion is the fingerprint dust left by the police (line 5), followed again by the muddy cushion (line 7). The notion of displacement is normatively relevant again, in that the obvious object for complaint would expectably be the burglar and the break-in, rather than the police doing their normal investigative work. Note how Arthur makes his inquiry (lines 1–2). He does not broach the topic with as much delicacy as Moira in extract 4, but still his inquiry is into how Lesley might be coping with the experience ('how've you settled in now'). He also uses the euphemistic category 'thē: (p) visitor', rather than, say, 'the burglar', where the pronunciation 'thē:', with the long vowel, displays an orientation to the category *visitor* as somewhat 'thoughtfully' selected

These details are the context for the fingerprint complaint, whose *displaced* status is somewhat marked in how Lesley delivers it, preceding it by 'well' and 'I ↑mus' say', which offer it as a contrast to what might be expected from her.[9] Rather than reporting how she is coping with the experience of having been burgled, Lesley offers a complaint about the mess left by the police. Arthur receives that in line 6 as news ('Oh:.'), and takes Lesley's complaints seriously (line 9). The sequence continues in mildly ironic manner, with Arthur appreciating the point of Lesley's complaint, while nevertheless formulating it in an upgraded, metaphorical, and rather comical manner as 'galloping all over the cushion' (line 12). Similarly, Arthur's description 'ridiculous' (line 13), in line with the gently ironic tenor of this sequence, connotes laughing at something and not just condemning it (which a term such as *awful*, or *disgraceful*, would do). Through citing displaced objects of complaint, then, Lesley has again managed to convey the genuinely complainable nature of those things, but also their ironic status and, with that, how well she is coping with the more obvious experience of having been burgled, that Arthur (like Moira in extract 4) had delicately inquired about.

Extract 10 starts a few lines after the end of extract 3, where Lesley has announced to Gwen the laughable but also 'very ↓sa↓:d' content of a letter from Jean-Claude, in which 'He says that his mother's left his ↓fa↑ther' (extract 3, line 11). Jean-Claude's complaints about it are reproduced here by Lesley, accompanied by laughter from both her and Gwen:

(10) Holt:J86:1:4:2

1	Les:	.hh An' he s- Oh:-: it's such a sad letter really he
2		writes um: .tch .hhhh (0.3) oh I haf to buy my own
3		stea:ks 'n[£cook th'm£ ehh ↑heh [h
4	Gwe:	[.hhh [aah-ah-[ah-ah-[ah
5	Les:	[.hhh [An'
6		my father wakes me up every mo:rning an' he snores
7		all ni:ght
8	Gwe:	Oh↑:[↓:.
9	Les:	[And uh eh- (0.3) e-he wants me as a sla:ve an'
10		I've got to cook .hhh an' clean for him: an' .hhh (.)
11		do the washing an' £look£ a:f[ter the shee [ps.hh
12	Gwe:	[h h : : : : [ha-ha-ah-
13		ah-ah-ah-ah.hhhehhh ↑I:t looks as though the fa:ther
14		stayed in the ↑house the ↓:[n.
15	Les:	[.h ↑Yes m:Madam ↓Duval's
16		gone off to Rouen.

The section omitted between extracts 3 and 10 deals with how the parental separation was not unexpected, and Lesley and Gwen discuss the topic more sympathetically later in the call. Our focus here is on how Lesley recounts Jean-Claude's complaint about his father. There are various indications of irony and

'smile voice' (marked by the £ signs) manner of Lesley's delivery in lines 3 and 11, performed inside the description of the mundane household chores and services that Jean-Claude is now complaining about having to do. There is the standardly comic 'snores all ni:ght' (lines 6–7), which is also extrematized, at least in Lesley's reproduction of it ('all ni:ght'; cf. 'every mo:rning' and 'wants me as a sla:ve'), and the comical French spelling error 'sheeps' (line 11), faithfully reproduced by Lesley, and laughingly received by Gwen. What makes all of this a laughing matter is not only its enactment as funny, but *displacement*. Jean-Claude's reported complaints are not about the trauma or sadness of his parents' separation, family break-up, his father's distress, or his missing his mother, but rather his father's snoring, and his having to do the household chores.

As we also noted for extract 3, Lesley's remark in extract 10, line 1, 'it's such a sad letter really', is echoed in other remarks throughout a long sequence, in which she displays sympathy and concern as well as jocularity. Lesley works at ensuring that her jocular treatment of the letter does not index her as laughing heartlessly at Jean-Claude's expense. This is discursive psychology in action, a speaker's display and management of subjectivity and attitude in talk. In keeping with discursive psychology's general approach to such matters (Edwards and Potter, 2005), there is no implication here that Lesley or anyone else is expressing 'actual' or 'underlying' states of mind. Rather, these notions of investment, irony, attitude, etc. indicate participants' practices and concerns, performed and oriented-to in how they talk.

Analysis 4: Lexical Descriptions

When speakers formulate the kinds of speech acts done in complaining, the word *complain* is not the only option. An ad hoc selection of related alternatives might include *blame, accuse, criticize, slander, slag off, castigate, denigrate, censure* and *condemn*. We have noted that some of these alternatives, such as *accuse* and *criticize*, while applicable to lots of actions that could also be called complaints, do not require the sense of transgression and grievance that *complain* possesses. But there is a further indefinitely extendable set of alternatives that not only include a sense of grievance, but also add an element of subjectivity and investment on the part of the complainer. These include *moan, grumble, go on* and *on, gripe, carp, grouse, nag, bellyache* and *whinge*.

The word *whinge*, for example, reflects the major indexical danger of complaining, that it is an action that may rebound upon and index the complainer. It is used not only to characterize the complainer, but to counter the complaint. Take the celebrated Australian expression *whinging Pom*, generally applied to British visitors who complain about the climate, the dangers of insect or snake bite, being unlucky at cricket, or whatever other standard misfortunes may afflict them. The expression implies complaining for some flimsy, insufficient reason, and negatively rather than constructively solution-oriented.[10] Additionally, the category *Pom* calls up an MCD[11] for the whinger, such that the act of whinging

not in its object, but in the complainer. As a corollary, the person who applies the category 'whinging Pom' is reflexively displayed as 'true blue Aussie', not prone to whinging, and whose analysis of the circumstances being whinged at would be more favourable, or more constructive. The relevance of that reflexivity comes into its own where complaints are being countered and discounted.

The relevant term that features most often, in the conversational data used for this study, is *moan*. In extract 11 Lesley is talking to her mother ('Mum') about Lesley's mother-in-law 'Nan' (named elsewhere), whom she has been characterizing as a hypochondriac who prefers to stay in bed and have other people (including Lesley herself) do her shopping, cooking and housework. That is what mum is responding to in line 1, with the strongly dispositional formulation, 'y'won't cure'er ↓now love it's too late':

(11) Holt:1:1:12

1	Mum:		Ah well- (0.2) y'won't cure'er ↓now love it's too late
2	Les:		No an'she wz ever so na:sty tuh Mark when'ee ca:lled
3			I [as'week]
4	Mum:		[Was she]:?
5	Les:		Oh: ↓yes.
6			(0.8)
7	Les:		He came: back r:ea::lly: sh:aky
8			(0.4)
9	Mum:		Oh:. (um) what'd she say to'im.
10			(0.7)
11	Les:		Oh::: all about sh:-he lea:ves'er too l:on:g an:d um
12			.tch.hh An' I: wz RUDE tuh MISSI:Z uhm:: someb'ddy or
13			other once ↑SIX YEARS AGO this was hhuh hah[h°ah
14	Mum:		[Oh:.
15	Les:	→	.hh She wz moaning on about m-me:: an:' (.) m:oaning
16			on about him'n [ohh
17	Mum:		[(well) she's got a ba:d meh- uh long
18			mem'ry. abou:t (0.2) that sort'v thing (...)

In the context of complaining about Nan, Lesley dismisses Nan's reciprocal complaints as 'moaning on' (line 15). The phrase 'moaning *on*' portrays Nan's moaning as repetitive and prolonged. In addition to the category *moaning on*, the grounds for complaints/moans about Lesley herself are also undermined by the long time since Lesley's transgression happened (emphatically '↑SIX YEARS AGO this was'), and the downgraded, vague, almost forgotten nature of it as a one-off ('once', line 13) rudeness towards 'MISSI:Z uhm:: someb'ddy or other' (lines 12–13). Along with these other details, the description MOANING ON, like *Whinging Pom*, manages both to characterize the complainer as disposed to complain, and to dismiss the complaint as poorly grounded, and negative. Line 1 is also interesting from the perspective of 'moaning' being unconstructive (see again note 10); Mum's remark 'y'won't cure'er ↓now love' projects Lesley's [illegible]-solution-oriented, rather than the kind

Mum's uptake about Nan's 'long mem'ry' (lines 17–18) picks up Lesley's sense of Nan as dispositionally *prone to* complain about a range of things ('that sort'v thing', line 18). In fact, Nan's dispositions, as the explanation of why she complains, are already strongly formulated in line 1. So we have here a jointly produced portrait of Nan, in which Nan's complaints about Lesley are grounded not in their object, Lesley, but in the subjectivity of the complainant, Nan herself. Examining how complaints are countered throws into sharp relief the features of complaining that speakers/complainers attend to when mounting a complaint. Terms such as *moan* and *whinge*, along with 'scripted' descriptions of the complainant's recurrent *moaning on*, shift the cause of the complaint from its object to the dispositions of he or she who complains.

There are formulations of the act of complaining that, rather than pointing to the complainer as moaner or whinger, characterize it in benign terms. Extract 12 provides brief examples in which, relevantly, Robbie is doing self-characterization, in the context of a jointly produced, strongly affiliated complaint sequence:

(12) Holt:M88:1:5:42

Rob: Well thanks ↑ever so much f 'r listen↓ing to me an' letting me get it off my↓chest.

And shortly afterwards:

Rob: perhaps have another chat again an' sort'v (release) a little stea-:-:m↑.hhh heh heh (heh)

The idiomatic metaphors of releasing steam, and getting things off your chest, manage to convey subjectivity without bias. They formulate benign motives for talking, being expressions that imply doing something that has to be done, in the sense that steam pressure builds up and requires releasing (see Lakoff, 1987, on anger metaphors), and that burdens that weigh down on one's chest need to be removed. Such motives for complaining stand in stark contrast to others such as spite, rancour, or Nan's propensity to moan about nothing.

Given the usefulness of terms such as *moan* and *whinge* in countering complaints, I close this section with examples from a special setting where complaint-countering is prevalent: neighbourhood dispute mediation.[12] Recall first, Lesley's use of *moan* in extract 11:

15 Les: → .hh She wz moaning on about m-me:: an:' (.) m:oaning
16 on about him'n[ohh

We noted that the expression *moaning on* implies something extended and repetitive, and how that starts to index the complainer rather than the object/complainee. This is further conveyed by the repetition of the verb with two object complements 'about m-me::' and 'about him', where the complaint's specific object is unclear – moaning about what in particular? What had anybody done? There is an implied lack of discrimination, a sense of repetitive attacks

complaining for no good reason. Terms such as *moaning* and *whinging* lend themselves to essentially intransitive uses, as actions directed at no clear object or cause but, rather, informing us about the complainer. Although they *can* take clear objects, they are often used intransitively (with no object, as in 'whinging Pom'), or else with objects that are very unspecific. Here are three examples of *moan*, taken from two different neighbourhood mediation sessions:

(13) Med-1:5

1	Ann:		(...) but I shouldn'ave t'[do that 'n my own house,=
2	Med:		[°mm°
3	Ann:		=sh[ouldn'ave t'sit with my telly as low as it'll=
4	Med:		[°mm°
5	Ann:		=go cuz she's sayin' th't she cn hear m'telly, ↑I **'EAR**
6		→	'ER ↓telly I 'ear (0.6)[it's ↑just ev'ryday thi:ngs
7	Med:		[°mm°
8	Ann:	→	she['s moaning about.
9	Med:		[°mm

(14) Med-1:5

1	Ann:		so every time I come ou:t I fee:l (0.5) like when
2			she goes t'peg the[washing ↓out] o:r (.) the other
3	Med:		[°mm: hm,°]
4	Ann:		day it rai:ned, (.) I wouldn't go o:ut becuz (.) I
5			>thought'w'l< if I go out she prob'ly gonna start
6		→	moa:nin' abo[ut somethin' ↑else.
7	Med:		[°mm°

(15) Med-5:30

1	Mac:		U::UHH (.) an' then I: (.) said (0.2) u::h >som'ing
2			about< I like t'do: (0.5) a bit o'garden:'n he said
3			I:don't ↑mind if you ↓do a bit of gardening,
4			(.)
5	Mac:	→	he wz (.) ↓moaning about som'ing else I can't
6			↓remembe:r,

In extract 13, Anne is countering a neighbour's complaint about various kinds of household noise, including that from her television set. The object of the verb *moan*, however, is '↑just ev'ryday thi:ngs' (line 6). The television noise is being used as an instance of the category 'everyday things', and Anne nicely formulates it as both routine and reciprocal: 'she en hear m'telly, ↑ I 'EAR 'ER ↓telly' (lines 5–6). The sense is conveyed, therefore, of a neighbour who is disposed to complain about non-complainables (in the same sequence Anne also mentions complaints about footsteps on the stairs).

Extracts 14 and 15 contain the same vague moan-object: 'moa:nin' about somethin' ↑else' (extract 14, line 6), and '↓moaning about som'ing else I can't [illegible]' (extract 15, lines 5–6). 'Something else' is a nicely chosen

adds to that sense. Again, the impression is of an essentially *intransitive* kind of moaning, an activity done by, and indexical of, the complainer, rather than something caused by a specifically complainable event or circumstance. The phrase 'start moa:nin' (extract 14, lines 5–6) works in the same way as 'moaning on', implying a sustained activity being embarked upon, given whatever pretext, by the complainer. Through the choice and application of lexical descriptions, then, speakers can characterize the activity of complaining in ways that either support or undermine its causation, constructiveness, and legitimacy. Much of the everyday work done in countering complaints works up their subjective, irrational, dispositional causation.

Discussion

The idea that making a complaint may require the management of speaker-indexical matters such as motive, disposition, or subjective investment, was raised by Harvey Sacks with regard to direct complaints, in a consideration of what next turns might do.

> ... if you say 'You interrupted me' and I say 'You're always complaining', then the next move might turn on a discussion, not of my interruption, but of your complaining ... And if you don't want your complaining to be the topic, then you may have to avoid making things which are formulatable as 'complaints'. And in that regard, if somebody does something routinely which is capable of being complained about, and you complain about it each time, you're in a good position to be treated as complaining. (Sacks, 1992: vol. 1, 637–8)

Sacks pointed to two features that we have also focused on here: the speaker-indexical dangers of complaining, and the way in which recurrent actions work in practical reasoning as a basis for ascribing dispositions ('you complain about it each time, you're in a good position to be treated as complaining': see Edwards, 1995).

Sacks's idea that 'complaining' might therefore be something to avoid being characterized as doing, raises the issue of the analytical status, and formal identifiability, of the speech category 'complaint'. Complaining will sometimes be overt and obvious, but it is also likely to be a subtle business in which speaker/complainers work against the indexical category of dispositional moaner, while providing object-descriptions that permit the complainable nature of those objects to be heard and taken up by recipients. It is a feature of the ironic and jocular delivery of complaints examined in this study, and of the choice of displaced objects, that speaker/complainers manage to accomplish some 'serious' complaining within an ironic delivery. The tendency of recipients to acknowledge the seriousness of an ironically delivered complaint, even when laughing along with it, may be in recognition of the

and displacement bring off. There is a tendency in making complaints, as with invitation refusals and 'dispreferred' actions[13] generally, to project oneself as doing it reluctantly, or only through necessity.

One feature of *indirect* complaints is that they are often performed at some distance from the offence itself. They are often reports of past events, past complainables. This gives rise to a kind of duality between the situation pertaining when the offence took place, and the current situation of talking about it, in which the initial complaint has to be re-animated. Subjectivity announcements, and the detailed activity of complaining, attend to this notion of what kind of grievance it is/was, how the complainer is now dealing with it, and how the current complaint-recipient should hear it as relevant to them, here and now. Past complainables seem to be routinely done ironically, whether humorously or as something now coped and dealt with. This is reminiscent of a thousand holiday, family and peer group disaster stories, everyday 'war stories' in which all kinds of things that went wrong get to be the stuff of tall tales, funny stories, and accounts of triumphing over adversity and seeing the funny side of it all. There is a surprising frequency in the data used for this study, of some kind of ironic take being done. The laughter and irony are probably there, not because people find their misfortunes all that funny, but rather, as recipient-designed management of attitude, coping, and (as Sacks anticipated) general avoidance of being seen as a complainer.

Irony and humour, in enacting a complaint, are members' methods for displaying and managing the speaker/complainer's stance or attitude, such that the complaint recipient is not placed in the potentially awkward position of having to work out how to respond. But humour is also done as *part of* the act of complaining, not merely as a contrast to it, nor to suggest that the complaint is weak or unfounded. It can even be part of getting a complaint taken seriously, precisely by signalling that the complainer is not disposed to make too much of it. This may be a basis for serious uptakes of humorous deliveries, where the humour is not taken to be inviting the hearer to laugh, nor showing that it is nothing serious. Rather, it is doing what Sacks suggested might be necessary, avoiding finding yourself 'in a good position to be treated as complaining'.

Institutional relevancies come into play. In the neighbourhood mediation data, which figured briefly in the final section of the analysis, complaining is not only frequent, and of endemic relevance to the setting, but there is also an orientation to the setting, to the need for mediation or police action (cf. Meehan, 1989), and to the role of mediator as a questioning, sympathetic, but non-partisan complaint recipient. A complaint in such a setting also has to be made severe enough to be worth resorting to that kind of setting, requiring those kinds of resources. This is reminiscent of couple counselling, in which couples work up the extremity and intractability of their mutual complaints during initial troubles-telling (Edwards, 2000b), in response to the question of what brings them there. In the mundane telephone calls, that provided the bulk of materials for this study, a complaint can be something much more casual and underplayed, and not at all the kind of thing requiring or orienting to formal mediation procedures.

they are the site for complaints to have to be broached, worked up, and performed 'from scratch', where there is no institutional or pre-established relevancy or requirement for it, or for its severity or seriousness. As Drew notes, 'we do not complain to just anyone: we choose who to complain to and what kinds of complaints might appropriately be made to which kinds of recipients' (1998: 323–4). That kind of situated, recipient orientation remains a topic in need of investigation.

The phenomenon of 'displacement' may be a way of avoiding talking about personal feelings on sensitive matters, such as how Lesley or Jean-Claude felt, how hurt they are, how vulnerable it feels to have someone break into (or walk out of) your home like that. Recall that Lesley's 'muddy cushions' complaint (extracts 4 and 8) was preceded by a delicate inquiry by Moira, into something Moira did not name, and that Lesley would perhaps 'rather not talk about'. Psychological explanations might be offered for avoiding sensitive and painful matters, including the Freudian, psychodynamic possibility, where the term 'displacement' is also used, of some kind of avoidance or repression of deep, painful feelings. However plausible such explanations may be, the discursive-psychological analysis offered here is different, in three ways: (1) we are examining it as interaction; (2) it makes sense in interactional terms; and (3) the psychology is presumptive, and may be a case of providing a psychodynamic or mentalistic explanation for something whose nature is to be found in the observable dynamics of social interaction (Billig, 1999; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Wooffitt, 1992). It is not so much a matter of disproving psychodynamic explanations as obviating them, or at least of analysing social interaction in its own performative, occasioned, and sequentially organized terms.

The major focus of this study has been the subjective side of complaints as a performed and managed feature of how they are made. In making and reporting complaints, speakers display some kind of stance or attitude, both to the complaint-object and to the current action of telling. Complainers work to objectify complaints (Pomerantz, 1986), and also use displays and formulations of emotional investment, or ironic stance, in ways that may either enhance or distract from a complaint's seriousness and consequentiality. It is not only a matter of softening complaints by playing them down or laughing through them, nor a matter of choosing between irony and seriousness. Rather, it is a matter of how complaining is effectively done, in which speaker-indexical features, and potential recipient uptakes, have to be managed.

Notes

1. 'Safe' compliments and complaints are those that have no negative implications for other people present, who might be characterizable under the same membership category used for the compliment/complaint.
2. Edwards (1997, 1999) examines the uses of presupposed and 'given' information in factual rhetoric; Sacks notes specifically with regard to complaints that 'a possibly

3. Identifying something as a complaint may depend on contextual features of the talk: 'routinely a piece of praise plus "but" plus something else, tells you that the something else is a "complaint," where it isn't obvious, often, that it is a complaint. That is to say, isolated, it wouldn't be a complaint' (Sacks, 1992: 359).
4. 'Overdetermined' descriptions are those where instead of, say, 'I had a drink', the speaker reports that she 'took the drink and drank out of it' (Drew, 1998: 318).
5. Drew (1998: 311) also notes that 'reporting ... their emotional response – their sense of grievance – enables complainants to characterize how far the other's behavior has caused offense.' This echoes discussions of the everyday rhetoric of emotion talk, where emotional reactions may be opposed to rational judgements, making an emotion-driven report unreliable; but they can also be used to signal the spontaneity and genuineness of whatever version of events they are attached to (Edwards, 1997, 1999).
6. A jumble sale is an informal, occasional, usually charitable sale of cheap bric-a-brac that people donate to raise cash for some kind of community project.
7. Characterizing a complaint as expectable from the complainant, i.e. as dispositional, can be a way of undermining its factual basis or seriousness. See Edwards (1995, 1997) on the relations between 'script formulations' and dispositional characterizations of actors, and the relation of that to factual reporting.
8. The specific placing of the laughter may signal sensitivity to this then-versus-now 'risk' of indirect complaints. Examples include: 'I thought well I'm gon' tell Joyce that, ehhheh heh-heh he-e.uh: ↑.eh.eh ↑.hhhhh' (extract 6); 'I nearly said sh'd 'ee've asked your p(h)erm(h)issio(h)on' (extract 7); and 'you couldn't'v: phoned't a better ↑ti:me,hheh ↑heh' (extract 1).
9. Something you 'must say' contrasts with something you might *want* to say. Lesley is complaining about fingerprint dust left by the police. She is complaining while implying reluctance to do so, or an orientation to the delicacy of doing so. Again, this is a small token of subjectivity or 'attitude' management, of managing speaker-indexical implications of saying something.
10. One feature that can make a complaint a candidate 'moan' is the absence of orientation to constructive next actions or solutions. Meehan notes, in a study of telephone calls to the police, how 'complaints' (in the sense of reported disturbances, offences, etc.) are normatively oriented to subsequent police action: 'they will try to formulate events in police-worthy form' (1989: 117).
11. Membership Categorization Device: see, for example, Hester and Eglin (1997), Sacks (1992).
12. Thanks to Elizabeth Stokoe for making some neighbourhood mediation data available. Some of the discussion in this article, on the nature of complaints and what they are designed to manage, was helped by examining a wide range of materials that it is impossible to include within the scope of a single article.
13. 'Dispreferred actions' in conversation analysis are actions such as refusing invitations and declining offers, where speakers orient in various systematic ways to the normative expectation that such things will be accepted (Atkinson and Heritage, 1984).

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23

Trial Discourse and Judicial Decision-Making: Constraining the Boundaries of Gendered Identities

Susan Ehrlich

Introduction

Recent formulations of the relationship between language and gender, following Butler (1990), have emphasized the performative aspect of gender. Under this account, language is one important means by which gender – an ongoing social process – is enacted or constituted; gender is something individuals *do* – in part through linguistic choices – as opposed to something individuals *are* or *have* (West and Zimmerman, 1987). While the theorizing of gender as 'performative' has encouraged language and gender researchers to focus on the agency and creativity of social actors in the constitution of gender, to my mind there has been less emphasis placed on another aspect of Butler's framework – the 'rigid regulatory frame' (Butler, 1990) within which gendered identities are produced – that is, the limits and constraints on speakers' agency in constructing such identities. This emphasis on the 'performative' aspect of Butler's work, rather than on her discussions of the regulatory norms that define and police normative constructions of gender, may arise because, as Cameron (1997) suggests, philosophical accounts of Butler's 'rigid regulatory frame' often remain very abstract. For Cameron (1997: 31), too often in feminist philosophical discussions, 'gender . . . floats free of the social contexts and activities in which it will always be . . . embedded,' obscuring the fact that the routine enactment of gender is often, perhaps always, subject to what she calls the 'institutional coerciveness' of social situations. In other words, cultural norms (i.e. Butler's rigid regulatory frame) make certain performances of gender seem appropriate

and intelligible; in Butler's (p. 49) words, they 'congeal over time to produce the appearance . . . of a natural kind of being.' These same cultural norms render other performances of gender inappropriate and unintelligible and at times subject to social and physical penalties and sanctions (e.g. homophobia, gay-bashing, the 'fixing' of intersexed infants).

By examining data from a public institution, a Canadian sexual assault trial, I demonstrate how culturally dominant notions of male and female sexuality can impose constraints on the formation of participants' gendered identities. Moreover, I show how the gendered identities ascribed and assigned to individuals can depart from the identities individuals intend to claim or adopt.

Significant to an investigation of 'talk' in trial contexts is the fact that interpretations and understandings of the talk are discernable not only in the talk's local discourse (i.e. in the trial), but also in the non-local assessments and judgments of non-speaking recipients (i.e. juries and/or judges). Thus, while the Crown attorney (i.e. the lawyer representing the state) in the sexual assault trial 'talk' described later represented the complainant as *resisting* her perpetrator of sexual assault to the extent possible, judges at both the trial level and the appeal level represented the complainant as *participating* in consensual sex with the accused.[1] Put somewhat differently, the gendered sense-making framework, or *discourse*, that the judges imposed on the events in question departed quite dramatically from the gendered sense-making framework, or discourse, invoked by the Crown attorney in her questioning of the complainant. Through her questioning of the complainant, the Crown attorney allowed a feminist understanding of sexual violence to emerge: one that acknowledged the unequal power dynamics that can shape and restrict women's behavior in the face of men's sexual violence. Yet such an understanding of the complainant's behavior failed to find its way into the judicial decisions of the trial judge or the appeal judge. Indeed, the fact that it was not recognized in these judicial decisions is illustrative, I suggest, of the way that dominant, androcentric discourses (i.e. Butler's rigid regulatory frame) can render certain performances of gender as unintelligible and incoherent. Thus, this chapter considers the notion of 'the female voice' to the extent that it demonstrates the way a feminist perspective, when manifest in a public context, can be distorted or rendered invisible by the androcentric discourses that often dominate in these contexts.

The Participant Structure of Trial Discourse

In describing trial practices, Hale and Gibbons (1999: 203) make a useful distinction between 'two intersecting planes of reality' in the courtroom: the reality of the courtroom itself – what they call the 'courtroom reality' – and the reality that comprises the events under investigation in the courtroom – what they call the 'external reality.' In the court's representation of this 'external reality,' visual images (e.g. photographs, diagrams) and physical entities (e.g. weapons, clothing) are

is . . . through testimonial evidence which consists of descriptions of the events by witnesses – versions of the second reality presented through language.' That is, within the context of legal adjudication processes, language is the primary means by which witnesses and lawyers convey information about the events that are the subject of a court's deliberations. And, while much of the courtroom language representing this 'external reality' ostensibly occurs between lawyers and witnesses – that is, it is dyadic – the participant structure of the speech event of the trial is in fact more complex than this. Given that the primary target of courtroom interactions between lawyers and witnesses is a third-party, overhearing recipient – a judge and/or jury – trial talk is more accurately characterized as multi-party (Drew, 1985; Cotterill, 2003). One way of conceptualizing this multi-party structure is by appealing to Goffman's (1981) notion of the 'gathering.' According to Goffman (1981: 136), 'interactional facts' have to be considered in relation to 'the full physical arena in which persons present are in sight and sound of one another' – what Goffman labeled a 'gathering.' Put somewhat differently, Goffman (1981) argued that the two-person, face-to-face, speaker–hearer model is too crude a construct to account for significant aspects of talk-in-interaction given that speakers will alter how they speak and/or what they say 'by virtue of conducting their talk in visual and aural range of non-participants' (Goffman, 1981: 136). These 'non-participants,' according to Goffman, can include unratified recipients such as bystanders or eavesdroppers as well as ratified recipients. Within the courtroom context, judges and juries constitute ratified recipients, and for Levinson (1988), who elaborates on Goffman's framework, they are the 'indirect target' of trial talk.

For my purposes here, what is important is Goffman's recognition that participants who are not actively and directly participating in an interaction may nonetheless influence many of its properties. While Goffman talks explicitly about how speakers may alter their linguistic identities under the influence of unratified indirect recipients of talk (e.g. bystanders), in this paper I am interested in how ratified indirect recipients of talk, that is judges in trial contexts, may influence and control the (gendered) meanings and interpretations assigned to speakers' linguistic identities. I shall argue that, in order to understand the complexity of gendered identities and, in particular, the way they can be constrained by cultural norms (i.e. Butler's rigid regulatory frame), we need to be attentive to the work of indirect recipients within an interaction or, in Goffman's (1981: 136) words, to 'the full physical arena in which persons present are in sight and sound of one another.'

Data

The data analyzed here come from a Canadian criminal trial involving sexual assault: Her Majesty the Queen v. Ewanchuk, 1995. The case involved a sexual assault that took place during a job interview between the accused (also referred to as the defendant) and the complainant (also referred to as the plaintiff)

The accused was a carpenter and wished to hire individuals who would sell his work for him. While the complainant suggested that her job interview be held in a mall, the accused expressed a preference for more privacy and proposed instead that the interview take place in his van. The interview was conducted in a polite, business-like fashion, according to the complainant's testimony. During the interview the complainant left the door of the van open because she was hesitant about discussing the job offer in his vehicle. After the job interview, the accused invited the complainant to see some of his work in his trailer (i.e. caravan) which was attached to the van. Again, according to the complainant's testimony, she purposely left the trailer door open out of fear of being alone with the accused in a confined space, but the accused ignored her efforts and closed and locked the door. The accused initiated a number of incidents with the complainant that involved sexual touching, with each incident becoming progressively more intimate than the previous. The complainant said that she complied with many of his requests out of fear that any resistance would prompt the accused to become more violent. However, when his touching progressed to the complainant's breast, she used her elbows to push him away and said 'no.' The accused resumed his sexual touching and began to massage the complainant's inner thigh and pelvic area, at which point the complainant again said 'no.' The accused resumed his advances by grinding his pelvis into hers, touching her vaginal area and placing his penis on the complainant's pelvic area under her shorts. He stopped after the complainant said 'no' a third time. After these incidents, the accused opened the door of the trailer at the complainant's request and the complainant left the trailer. She later charged the accused with sexual assault.

The trial judge acquitted the accused of sexual assault relying on the defense of 'implied consent' and the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld this acquittal. The Supreme Court of Canada overturned this acquittal and entered a conviction of sexual assault for the accused. In what follows, I analyze data from the 1995 trial, the 1995 decision of the trial judge and the 1998 decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal. In particular, I contrast two sets of data from this case: excerpts from direct recipients' talk, that is question–answer sequences between the Crown attorney and the complainant, *and* excerpts from indirect recipients' discourse, that is the judges' decisions. Specifically, looking beyond the face-to-face aspects of communication to the discourse of indirect recipients allows us to consider the regulatory norms – that is, Butler's rigid regulatory frame – and the constraints they can impose on identities.

Question–Answer Sequences in Trial Discourse

Like other types of institutional discourse, courtroom discourse has been the subject of much research over the past two decades – research that, among other things, has highlighted its asymmetrical character. As others have noted about courtroom discourse (e.g. Atkinson and Drew, 1979; Walker, 1987; Conley and

the right to initiate and allocate turns by asking questions of witnesses but the reverse is not true. And, such differential participation rights, it has been argued, bestows considerable conversational power and control upon the participant who is sanctioned to ask questions (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998). For example, in discussing doctor–patient interaction, Drew and Heritage (1992) note that the question–answer pattern that characterizes most such interactions not only allows doctors to gather information from patients, but can also result in doctors directing and controlling talk: introducing topics, changing topics, and selectively formulating and reformulating the terms in which patients' problems are expressed. Similar claims have been made about lawyers in their role as questioners in the courtroom. However, given the *adversarial* nature of courtroom discourse within the Anglo-American common law system and the *legally sanctioned* power of lawyers to ask questions, lawyers may exercise even more conversational control than doctors in their respective institutional settings.

Adversarial dispute resolution, of which trials are a notable example, requires that two parties come together formally, usually with representation (e.g. lawyers), to present their (probably different) versions of the dispute to a third party (e.g. judge, jury, tribunal) who hears the evidence, applies the appropriate laws or regulations, and determines the guilt or innocence of the parties. Lawyers have as their task, then, convincing the adjudicating body that their (i.e. their client's) version of events is the most credible, or in Capps' and Ochs' (1995) terms, 'the official story.' Apart from making opening and closing arguments, however, lawyers do not themselves testify. Thus, through the posing of questions, lawyers must elicit from witnesses testimony that will build a credible version of events in support of their own clients' interests in addition to testimony that will challenge, weaken, and/or cast doubt on the opposing parties' version of events. Atkinson and Drew (1979: 70) note that while trial discourse is conducted predominantly through a series of question–answer sequences, other actions are accomplished in the form of such questions and answers. For example, questions may be designed to accuse witnesses, to challenge or undermine the truth of what they are saying, or, in direct examination, to presuppose the truth and adequacy of what they are saying.

Direct Examination of the Complainant

In contrast to the adversarial, combative nature of cross-examination, direct examination, that is the questioning of one's own witness, has been characterized by both legal practitioners and scholars as supportive and cooperative (e.g. Woodbury, 1984; Barry, 1991; Maley, 1994). According to Cotterill (2003: 129), direct examination 'represents an initial, dominant narrative statement, which is then responded to, challenged and sometimes subverted in cross-examination questioning.' Because the emphasis in direct examination is on developing new information, open-ended questions tend to be more frequent in direct examination. Moreover, Woodbury (1984: 211) suggests that open-ended questions have a strategic function

third-party recipients (e.g. judge and/or jury) that lawyers are trusting of their witnesses. Indeed, Harris (2001: 68) argues that lawyers must exercise a high degree of control over *all* witnesses, but that the strategies required to do this differ depending on whether the witness is 'friendly' or 'hostile.'

Because the varying versions of events that emerge in trial discourse are determined to a large extent by the questions that lawyers ask of witnesses (e.g. their controlling of witnesses' topics, their selective reformulations of witnesses' prior answers, etc.), Cotterill (2003: 149) argues that courtroom narratives are best characterized as 'dual-authored texts,' 'with the emphasis on the voice of the lawyer as the primary and authoritative teller.' Due to the 'dual-authored' nature of courtroom narratives, in what follows I analyze question–answer sequences between the Crown attorney and the complainant using the analytic framework of Conversation Analysis, broadly conceived. Conversation Analysis is fundamentally concerned with the sequential analysis of utterances, that is 'how utterances are designed to tie with, or 'fit' to, prior utterances and how an utterance has significant implications for what kinds of utterances should come next' (Wooffitt, 2001: 54). I adopt this approach to question-answer sequences in the direct examination of the complainant because the nature of the questions asked by the Crown attorney has significant implications for what kinds of utterances come next, specifically the kind of testimony the complainant produces and the kind of discursive identity she projects.

In the direct examination of the complainant in the Ewanchuk case, the Crown attorney typically began by asking a broad Wh-question (e.g. 'What happened then?'), that is a Wh-question that allowed the complainant to construct an extended narrative. In response to this broad Wh-question, the complainant would provide an answer that described an event or a series of events. Immediately following such an answer, the lawyer would ask a more narrow Wh-question, that is a Why-question that attempted to elicit more specific information: the plaintiff's motivation for performing a particular action that she had described. For example, in (1) below, the Crown attorney begins by asking a broad Wh-question about the events that transpired once the plaintiff reached the defendant's van. The plaintiff's answer is followed by a more narrow Wh-question – a Why-question inquiring about the plaintiff's motivation for suggesting that she and the defendant talk inside the mall, as opposed to in his van. What emerges in the answer to the Why-question is the complainant's desire to talk to the defendant in a public place.[2]

Q: Was he inside the van or trailer when you first got there?
A: I believe he was inside the van, but – he might have stepped out to meet me.
Q: What happened once you got there?
A: I asked him if we could go inside the mall, have a cup of coffee and talk about whatever.
→ Q: Why did you want to go inside the mall to talk?
A: Because it was – it was a public place. I mean, we could go in and sit down

According to Woodbury (1984: 211), the narrow Wh-questions that follow broad Wh-questions in direct examination serve a narrative function. Since it is important that lawyers and witnesses co-construct 'a coherent and maximally detailed account' for the sake of third-party recipients, Woodbury maintains that narrow Wh-questions allow witnesses to elaborate on details that contribute to the coherence of the narrative. But, what is it that determines the *kind* of details that will make a narrative cohere? Why, for example, does the Crown attorney in the Ewanchuk case follow up her broad Wh-questions with Why-questions that probe the plaintiff's reasons for performing certain actions in the series of events under question?

It is my contention that the narratives elicited from the complainant through the Crown attorney's questions cohered as feminist narratives. That is, the Crown attorney allowed a feminist understanding of sexual violence to emerge in the complainant's testimony. In particular, it became clear through the question–answer sequences of the Crown attorney and the complainant that the threat of men's sexual violence can create an asymmetrical power relationship between men and women which, in turn, can shape and restrict women's efforts to resist their perpetrators. Consider examples (1)-(5) below which all come from the direct examination of the complainant (I have repeated example (1) below), and all contain a Why-question from the Crown attorney that asks why the complainant has performed a particular action. The answers elicited by these questions (italicized below) reveal the strategic nature of the complainant's actions; that is, the particular actions the Crown attorney asks about are represented by the complainant as ways she attempted to discourage the accused's sexual advances.

Example 1

Q: Was he inside the van or trailer when you first got there?
A: I believe he was inside the van, but – he might have stepped out to meet me.
Q: What happened once you got there?
A: I asked him if we could go inside the mall, have a cup of coffee and talk about whatever.
→ Q: Why did you want to go inside the mall to talk?
A: *Because it was – it was a public place. I mean, we could go in and sit down somewhere and talk.*

Example 2

Q: What happened then?
A: He said, Why don't we just talk inside the van here. And he sat into his driver's seat, and I opened the door, and I left the door open of the passenger seat and I sat down there.
→ Q: And why did you leave the door open?
A: *Because I was still very hesitant about talking to* ***him.***

Example 3

A: He went around to – no, first, he said, Okay, I'd like to pull the van into the shade. It was a hot day, and there was cars that were parked under the shade for an shade of a tree, I believe, and he got out, and he went and he stepped inside, and he said, Come on up and look. So I stepped up inside, took about two steps in, I didn't, like, walk around in it. And then he went to the door, closed it, and locked it.
(some intervening turns)
Q: Had you expected him to lock the door?
A: Not at all. I left the door completely wide open when I walked in there for a reason.
→ Q: And what was that reason?
A: *Because I felt that this was a situation that I shouldn't be in, that I – with anybody to be alone in a trailer with any guy with the door closed.*

Example 4
Q: Did you talk about other things while you were sitting in front of the van?
A: Yes. He asked – we talked a little bit more on a personal level.
Q: What do you mean by that?
A: I believe I told him that I was living on my own. Well, not totally on my own. There was about three other people living there and that I had a boyfriend.
→ Q: Why would you tell him those things?
A: *Because I felt that he should know because I just – I felt – I felt that he might feel a little more threatened if I had said that.*

Example 5
Q: What happened after you talked about your personalities?
A: We were still mentioning a lot of personal things. Like I was still mentioning that I had a boyfriend. I believe I said his name.
Q: What was his name?
A: His name was Allan.
(some intervening turns)
→ Q Why were you mentioning your boyfriend Allan?
A: *Because, like I said, I felt like if he ever – if – it might prevent him from going beyond any more touching.*

In example (1), when asked why she suggested going inside the mall, the complainant explains that it was a *public* place. (Presumably, sexual advances are less likely to occur in public places.) In examples (2) and (3), when asked why she left the doors open to the front of the van and the trailer, respectively, the complainant explains that she was 'hesitant' about talking to the accused alone 'with the door closed.' In examples (4) and (5), when asked why she was mentioning her boyfriend, Allan, the complainant explains that she wanted the accused to feel 'threatened' and that she wanted to 'prevent him from going beyond any more touching.' Clearly, what the Crown attorney succeeds in eliciting in asking these particular Why-questions is a sense that the complainant is not passive, but rather is actively attempting to create circumstances that will discourage the accused's sexual advances.

Examples (6)–(9) are somewhat different from (1)–(5), as the Crown attorney does not ask questions about actions intended to discourage and/or prevent the accused's sexual advances, but rather asks about actions that could be construed as preambles to consensual sex.

Example 6

Q: Did he say anything when he locked the door?
A: He didn't say anything about the door being locked, but he asked me to sit down. And he sat down cross-legged.
Q: What did you sit on?
A: Just the floor of the trailer.
→ Q: Now, why did you sit down when he asked you to sit down?
A: *Because I figured I was in this trailer, the door was locked, he was not much more than this stand is away from me here, probably only a couple of feet away from me. I felt that I was in a situation now where I just better do what I was told.*

Example 7

Q: And what happened then?
A: He told me that he felt very tense and that he would like to have a massage, and he then leaned up against me with his back towards me and told me to rub his shoulders and I did that.
Q: And up to the time he told you he was tense and wanted a massage, had the two of you talked about you giving him a massage?
A: I believe all he had said right before that is that he liked to have them, and he was tense feeling and that was all.
Q: Had you ever offered to give him a massage?
A: No.
Q: Did you want to give him a massage?
A: No.
(some intervening turns)
→ Q: If you didn't want to give him a massage at that point in time, why did you touch his shoulders?
A: *I was afraid that if I put up any more of a struggle that it would only egg him on even more, and his touching would be more forced.*

Example 8

Q: And what happened then?
A: Then he asked me to turn around the other way to face him, and he said he would like to touch my feet or he would like to massage my feet, so I did. And he was just touching my feet.
Q: Did you want him to massage your feet?
A: No.
→ Q: Why did you turn around?
A: *Because I guess I was afraid. I was frozen. I just did what he told me to do.*
Q: Did he ever ask you if you would like him to massage his feet – your feet?
A: No, he just said, Turn around I'm going to.
Q: What happened after you turned around?
A: He was massaging my feet, but he didn't stay there. He was moving up my

again, and then he'd move back up again, and *I just sat there, and I didn't – I didn't do anything. I didn't say anything. I knew something was going to happen, and I didn't want to fight. I didn't want to struggle. I didn't want to scream, because I felt that that would just egg him on more.*

Example 9

Q: And what happened when he reached to hug you?

A: He just did, and I, at this time, I was trying really hard not to cry. I had been wiping my eyes when he was on top of me when he couldn't see me, and I just . . . . I just responded by just lightly putting my arm on him when he hugged me because I was afraid that he would think I was really scared, and that I would leave there telling people.

→ Q: And why were you worried about him thinking that?

A: *Because I didn't think that he would stop there, that it would get worse, and it would be more brutal.*

Put somewhat differently, in examples (6)–(9), the Crown attorney asks why the complainant complies with the accused's requests: in (6), why she sits down when asked; in (7), why she begins to massage the accused when asked; in (8), why she turns around to face the accused when he asks to massage her feet; and, in (9), why her fear of the accused leads her to reciprocate his hug. In response to these questions, the complainant says a variety of things: that she was afraid; that she felt she should do what she was told; that she feared if she did not comply with the accused's requests or if she put up a struggle that she would 'egg him on even more,' 'his touching would be more forced,' and 'it would be more brutal.' Indeed, such responses reflect strategies that many victims of sexual violence employ to prevent more prolonged and extreme instances of violence. As researchers on violence against women have asserted, submitting to coerced sex or physical abuse can be 'a strategic mode of action undertaken in preservation of self' (Lempert, 1996: 281). That is, if physical resistance on the part of victims can escalate and intensify violence, as some research shows (e.g. Dobash and Dobash, 1992) and many women (are instructed to) believe, then submission to coerced sex is undoubtedly the best strategy for survival. Significant about the Crown attorney's questioning in (6)–(9) is the fact that her questions allow the complainant's actions to be revealed as strategies of resistance, rather than as precursors to consensual sex. In fact, all of the Crown's why-questions highlighted in examples (1)–(9) function to elicit responses that emphasize the complainant's active deployment of strategies meant to discourage and resist the accused's escalating sexual violence.[3] Put another way, the complainant's actions were contextualized within a framework, or discourse, that acknowledged the potential structural inequalities that characterize male–female sexual relations and the effects of such inequalities on women's strategies of resistance. We will see in the next section that, by contrast, the trial judge and the appeal judge contextualized the complainant's actions within an alternative framework or discourse – one that erased the unequal power dynamics of male–female sexual relations and, concomitantly, construed coerced sex as consensual sex.

Judges' Discourse

As stated in a previous section, the trial judge's decision to acquit the accused in this case was appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal, where the acquittal was upheld, and then to the Supreme Court of Canada, where the acquittal was overturned. In this section, I discuss both the decision of the trial judge and the Alberta Court of Appeal judge, including the defense both judges invoked in acquitting the accused – 'the defense of implied consent.'

The first noteworthy aspect of both of these decisions, given that the Crown attorney and the complainant depicted the complainant as attempting to discourage and resist the accused, was the consistent representation of sexual relations between the accused and the complainant as consensual sex. Consider the following excerpt from the trial judge's decision, at a point when the judge is describing the 'facts' of the case:

Example 10

B [the complainant] told A [the accused] that she was an open, friendly and affectionate person; and that she often liked to touch people. A told B that he was an open, friendly and affectionate person; and that he often liked to touch people. A and B talked. They touched each other. They hugged. They were sitting on the floor of the trailer and they were lying on the floor of the trailer. A told B that he would like a body massage, and B gave A a body massage. For the body massage, A sat in front of B so that B could massage A's back. They later exchanged places so that A could give B a body massage. B later lay on her back, and A gave B a foot massage. After the foot massage, A massaged B's bare legs and he massaged her bare inner thighs. During this period of two and one half hours, A did three things which B did not like. When A was giving B a body massage, his hands got close to B's breasts. B said "No", and A immediately stopped. When B and A were lying on the floor, A rubbed his pelvic area against B's pelvic area. B said "No", and A immediately stopped. Later on A took his soft penis out of his shorts and placed it on the outside of B's clothes in her pelvic area. B said "No", and A immediately stopped. During all of the two and one half hours that A and B were together, she never told A that she wanted to leave. When B finally told A that she wanted to leave, she and A simply walked out of the trailer.

(from Reasons for Judgment (Moore, J., C.Q.B.A.), November 10, 1995)

These same 'facts' are confirmed by the Alberta Court of Appeal judge in his support of the trial judge's 'doubts about consent.'

Example 11

Yet, if review of the evidence that supports the trial judge's doubts about consent [illegible]

> said to be criminally assaultive were preceded by *an exchange of consensual body massages, partially on the floor of the trailer, hugs and assurances of trust and restraint*. . . . Beyond that (and somewhat inconsistent with an appellate profile of Ewanchuk as a relentless sexual predator) every advance he made to her stopped when she spoke against it.
>
> (from Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice McClung, February 12, 1998)

In general, these descriptions of what transpired between the accused and the complainant – with the exception of the descriptions of the three times that the complainant said 'no' – emphasize the consensual, mutual and reciprocal nature of their sexual relations. Indeed, the appeal judge states quite explicitly that the hugs and the body massages were reciprocal (i.e. 'an exchange') and 'consensual' (in italics above). Particularly striking is the fact that both judges represent as consensual and reciprocal events that the Crown attorney and the complainant depicted as coerced sex. That is, on many occasions – and this is exemplified in examples (6)–(9) – the complainant said she complied with the accused's wishes out of fear that his violence would otherwise escalate. Yet, the judges represent these events as ones that the complainant engaged in without coercion. For example, in line 5 of example (10), the trial judge states that the complainant and the accused hugged each other in a reciprocal way (i.e. 'They hugged') whereas in example (9) the complainant says that she responded to the accused's hug out of fear, that is 'because [she] was afraid that he would think [she] was really scared' which in turn would lead to even greater brutality. Likewise, in lines 7–8 of (10), the judge states simply that the complainant gave the accused a body massage in response to his request (i.e. 'A told B that he would like a body massage, and B gave A a body massage'); yet in example (7) the complainant says that she agreed to massage the accused only because she 'was afraid that if [she] put up any more of a struggle that it would only egg him on even more and his touching would be more forced.' Finally, we see that in lines 11–12 of (10), the judge states the accused massaged the complainant's bare legs and inner thighs, as if this were a consensual act (i.e. 'After the foot massage, A massaged B's bare legs and he massaged her bare inner thighs'); but in example (8) the complainant says that she complied with the accused's massages because she did not want to 'egg him on more.' In sum, despite the fact that the complainant conveyed in her direct testimony that she had little choice but to comply with the accused's sexual advances, the judges' decisions failed to qualify or modify the sexual advances in such a way. Indeed, there is a sense in both decisions that the complainant's consent was freely given. By contrast, it is noteworthy that in the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, there are many descriptions of the 'facts' that acknowledge the coerced nature of the sexual contact between the accused and the complainant, for example 'At some point the accused said that he was feeling tense and asked the complainant to give him a massage. The complainant complied, massaging the accused's shoulders for a few minutes.' 'The complainant did not want the accused to touch her in this way, but said nothing as she was afraid that any resistance

In previous work on the language of Canadian sexual assault trial judgments, Coates, Bavelas, and Gibson (1994) noted that judges recognized resistance on the part of complainants only when it took the form of persistent physical struggle. Coates *et al.* (1994: 195) elaborate: 'The language of appropriate resistance seemed to us to be drawn from male–male combat between equals, where continued fighting is appropriate, rather than from asymmetrical situations . . . where physical resistance would lead to little chance of success and a high probability of further harm.' While the excerpts from the judges' decisions do not seem to deem physical struggle as the only appropriate form of resistance, they do seem to require that resistance at least take the form of verbal refusal. For example, based on lines 14–19 of example (10), it seems that verbal refusals are the only indicators or signals that the trial judge recognizes as resistance on the part of the complainant. That is, although the Crown attorney is successful in eliciting testimony (for example, (1)–(9)) that depicts the complainant as attempting to discourage and resist the accused in a variety of ways – including submitting to coerced sex, the trial judge appears to only perceive her resistance on the three occasions that she said 'no' to the accused.

The Defense of Implied Consent

Under Canadian criminal law, an accused will be found guilty of sexual assault if the Crown attorney proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not (or could not) consent to the acts. As stated earlier, the trial judge did not find the accused guilty of sexual assault, but rather acquitted the accused, relying on the defense of 'implied consent.' The Alberta Court of Appeal upheld this acquittal and the defense. For both of these judges, then, the complainant was considered to have *implied* consent; moreover, the Alberta Court of Appeal judge defined implied consent as 'consent by conduct.' One of the questions that arises from these judgements concerns the kind of 'conduct' that these judges deemed as signaling consent. Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal judge found that the complainant was a 'credible witness' (from the trial judge, Moore) and that she was genuinely afraid of the accused: 'Certainly the complainant was afraid of Ewanchuk as the trial judge found' (from the Court of Appeal judge, McClung). However, both judges also commented in their decisions that she did not communicate her fear to the accused. Consider the follow excerpt from the trial judge's decision:

Example 12

All of B's [the complainant's] thoughts, emotions and speculations were very real for her. However, she successfully kept all her thoughts, emotions, and speculations deep within herself. She did not communicate most of her thoughts, emotions and speculations . . . . Like a good actor, she projected an outer image that did not reflect her inner self. B did not communicate to A by words, gestures, or facial expressions *that she was 'frozen' by a fear of force.* B did not communicate that *she was frozen to the spot,* and that fear prevented her from getting up off the floor and walking out of

The picture that emerges from this description of the complainant is that she was 'frozen to the spot' and 'that she was "frozen" by a fear of force' (italicized above), yet she kept her emotions and feelings hidden from the accused. And, on the basis of this type of 'conduct,' the trial judge acquitted the accused, suggesting that the complainant's conduct *implied* consent. Given that the accused would have to draw inferences in order to understand the complainant as 'implying' consent, one wonders what kind of cultural background knowledge these inferences would rely upon. In other words, what kind of cultural assumptions might give rise to the inference that concealing emotions and being frozen to the spot conveys consent? What becomes clear from questions such as these is the ideological nature of the cultural assumptions that the accused is understood to rely upon in drawing such an inference. That is, by ruling that a woman who is emotionless and frozen to the spot is *implying* consent, the judges are invoking assumptions about women's lack of agency and passivity in the course of 'normal' heterosexual sex. As Cameron and Kulick (2003: 36) remark about such societal assumptions, 'the denial of sexual agency to women means that saying "yes" to sex (or initiating it) is disapproved of. Nice girls should demur coyly in order to demonstrate that they are not sluts or nymphomaniacs, but this is a ritual, formulaic gesture and men should not be deterred.' Clearly, the accused in Her Majesty the Queen v. Ewanchuk was not deterred by the complainant's emotionless and frozen demeanor (indeed, not even by her three verbal refusals); and, such behavior was authorized by the trial judge and the Alberta Court of Appeal judge presumably because of the weight of cultural beliefs that equate a woman's sexual passivity with consent.

Conclusion

Recent approaches to language and gender, while emphasizing the agency and creativity of speakers in constructing gendered identities, have paid less attention to the normative discourses (i.e. Butler's rigid regulatory frame) that police and regulate the intelligibility of such identities. In this paper, I have suggested, following Goffman (1981), that a full understanding of identity construction requires looking beyond the face-to-face aspects of interaction to what Goffman calls the 'gathering.' Put somewhat differently, I have used a sexual assault trial to demonstrate how participants who are not directly and actively involved in an interaction can nonetheless influence the meanings and understandings that are assigned to that interaction. More specifically, I have attempted to show how the identity *imposed* upon the complainant in this sexual assault case – as a participant in consensual sex – departed quite dramatically from her identity – as a victim of coerced sex – as it was co-constructed in her direct testimony.

Capps and Ochs (1995: 21) argue that adjudicators in legal cases never determine the truth of a case; rather, 'on the basis of divergent versions of events, jury members [and adjudicators] construct a narrative that is plausible and

are undoubtedly many factors contributing to the determination of an 'official story,' I am suggesting here that a crucial determining factor, especially in the context of a sexual assault trial, is the intelligibility – or lack thereof – of participants' 'performances' of gender. Indeed, in the judicial decisions analyzed so far, the version of events endorsed by the trial judge and the Court of Appeal judge relied upon a very particular understanding of gender and sexuality – one that viewed women's verbal refusals as necessary to resistance and equated women's lack of physical responsiveness with consent. As demonstrated before, the Crown attorney and complainant invoked an alternative, feminist sense-making framework in this trial – one that viewed submission to coerced sex as a way for the complainant to resist more extreme and prolonged instances of violence. Yet, this alternative way of assigning meaning to the events in question did not seem to resonate with the sense-making frameworks of the trial judge and the Alberta Court of Appeal judge. McConnell-Ginet (1988, 1989) has argued that counter-hegemonic viewpoints or discourses may encounter difficulty functioning as background knowledge in linguistic exchanges that do not take place among familiars (McConnell-Ginet, 1988: 92). In other words, because the Crown attorney's discursive strategy involved a feminist understanding of sexual assault, it had difficulty surviving as a contextualizing framework within a public institution, such as a trial. Rather, this trial – or at least crucial and defining aspects of it – relied on dominant, androcentric background assumptions (i.e. Butler's rigid regulatory frame) to inform and constrain its interpretation of events.

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Notes

1. Within the Canadian criminal justice system, Crown attorneys represent the state and complainants assume the role of witnesses for the state. That is, complainants are not *directly* represented by Crown attorneys.
2. The arrows within the transcripts point to narrow Wh-questions asked by the Crown attorney.
3. In previous work on the language of sexual assault trials (Ehrlich, 2001), I have argued that defense lawyers strategically invoke the 'utmost resistance standard' in trial discourse as a way of undermining the credibility of complainants. Until the 1950s and 1960s in the United States, the statutory requirement of utmost resistance was a necessary criterion for the crime of rape (Estrich, 1987); that is, if a woman did not resist a man's sexual advances to the utmost then the rape was said not to have occurred. While the 'utmost resistance standard' is no longer encoded in legal statutes in the United States or Canada, the adjudication of sexual assault cases often [illegible]

it is possible that the Crown attorney's questioning of the complainant in the Ewanchuk case anticipated, and was designed to counteract, such a strategy on the part of Ewanchuk's lawyer.

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24

The Occasioning and Structure of Conversational Stories

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1. Orientation

What do we mean by a story? Recent usage has turned almost everything, even the non-verbal, into a narrative.[2] For example, Ochs and Capps (1996) have a remarkably inclusive definition of narratives of personal experience as "verbalized, visualized, and/or embodied framings of a sequence of actual and possible life events." The absence of a common guiding framework has led to the blossoming of criteria used by different narrative researchers for identifying their respective units of study. When one looks for personal experience stories in natural conversations, the most striking fact is that they are not always clearly recognizable by traditional narrative-internal criteria such as the presence of a protagonist and events creating conflict, reference to events in the past, presence of a climactic complicating action, or closure of the storyline with a resolution. Further, the onset of conversational stories does not always clearly demarcate the narrative segment from the preceding talk. Some stories are explicitly introduced into the ongoing conversation with a preface like "do you remember when ..." or "did I tell you about ...," or are elicited by instructions to tell a story. But in children's talk or talk between adults, there are many marginal cases.

Our focus is on identifying a conversational story and how it is occasioned. Given that the story is part of discourse and the storyteller a participant in an interaction, some of the structural organization of the story is directed to its function in a particular conversation. "Narrators linguistically shape their tellings to accommodate circumstances such as the setting as well as the knowledge, stance, and status of those in their midst" (Ochs and Capps 1996). We intend to examine how the embedding contexts of telling alter the internal structure and

features of conversational narratives, attending to some issues raised by Jefferson in her classic study of the conversational embedding of stories (1978).

2. Narrative Genre vs. Narrative Production

Now that we have the video and audio technology to look at conversational sequences, we have the possibility of two different levels of analysis in the study of talk. One level is the live interaction, negotiated on the spot in dialogue or through listener response. Another level is that of talk about talk using genre and speech act vocabulary, that is, classification by speakers and listeners or even by coders, and reference during talk to something said before or about to be said: "she told a story about ...", "he told me to ...", "he asked me to ..." This is what Hymes referred to in his development of an ethnography of communication (1972) or what is sometimes called metapragmatics. This level includes our category and prototype system for talk. There is a similar distinction in the study of speech acts like requests. What happens in real-time circumstances can differ from what is retrospectively recognized, remembered, reported, or judged, and therefore from what enters into speech act theories – the recollection of speech acts in tranquillity (Ervin-Tripp, Strage, Lampert and Bell 1987).

There are thus two forms we could call a story. One is the social genre that has prototypes and ideal forms and provides a model for what we expect when we ask "Tell me that story about when ..." The genre is talked about and has a cultural existence in member instruction and evaluation. The second is whatever happens when people talk about the past, the future, or recurrent events or practices in ordinary conversation. When we look at conversational events in a transcript, we do not know how much notions of prototypic genres affected performance, or even whether the speaker considered what was said to be a story. Very little work has addressed the relation between talk about talk and the interactional events such talk refers to. One exception is the work of Bauman (1993), who examined a speaker's "metanarrational comments" and "disclaimers of performance on the grounds of insufficient knowledge" (p. 188) as an indicator of the speaker's construction of genre conventions. However, although Bauman emphasized the relevance of such metapragmatic comments to the analysis of the features of narratives that embed them, he did not attempt to relate speakers' notions of prototypic narratives to what gets said in ongoing talk. It seems obvious that interactional events as remembered have some bearing on talk about talk. But do the prototypes and genre classifications have any effect on ongoing talk? When we cannot interview the tellers we have to make inferences from the narrative features, evaluations, and changes under conditions of evaluative monitoring.

Some theoretical approaches[3] view narrative genre as a "dynamic expressive resource, in which the conventional expectations and associations that attach to generically marked stylistic features are available for further combination and recombination in the production of

genre or norm and narrative as a spontaneous, often ambiguous conversational event – may converge or diverge from one another, depending on the occasioning conditions which influence narrative features.

3. Standard Narrative

The standard characterization of personal narratives in social science research grew out of the Labov and Waletzky analysis (1967). Labov's first elicited stories carne from his "danger of death" sociolinguistic survey question, which was designed to produce style shifts toward the vernacular variety of the speakers, in the heat of emotional recall. Eventually more than 600 American east coast adolescents and adults were posed the standard question "were you ever in a situation where you thought you were in serious danger of getting killed?" As a result, Labov elicited stories of near-death experiences that got rendered in fully formed narrative structures, upon which Labov and Waletzky later built their theory. They proposed that it is only spontaneous accounts of past personal experience, "not the products of expert storytellers that have been re-told many times" (p. 12), which could provide a window on the most fundamental forms of narrative structure. However, the methodology they used in order to obtain narratives is not appropriate for either spontaneous or first-time narratives. On the contrary, danger of death stories are likely to be retold, to be seen as attention-grabbing and entertaining to listeners, and to be thought appropriate for prototypic performance occasions. A human protagonist is at the center, and usually there is some kind of conflict and suspense even in brief telling. Thus, what Labov and Waletzky pursued in personal experience narratives, that is, first telling of thematically dramatic experiences, involves a contradiction in terms; the inherent ever-present conversational relevance of such stories makes them amenable to repetition and stabilizes their structures. In spite of the specificity of the so-called "invariant structural units that are represented by a variety of superficial forms" (p. 1) to this very limited genre of danger of death stories, the internal features that Labov and Waletzky (1967) found have been taken as fundamental in most narrative research since. Labov (1972) defined narrative as "one method of recapitulating past experience by matching a verbal sequence of clauses to a sequence of events which (it is inferred) actually occurred.... We can define a minimal narrative as a sequence of two clauses which are temporally ordered.... There is temporal juncture between the two clauses, and a minimal narrative is defined as one containing a single temporal juncture" (pp. 360–361). The narrative clauses, he pointed out, had to be coordinate, not subordinate or conditional, as are clauses used in representations of practices or recurrent events, or in backgrounding of information. The Labov and Waletzky narrative can be taken as typical of a certain culturally defined type of narrative that optimally occurs under elicitation.

Peterson and McCabe, beginning their study of narrative development in

in McCabe, In press). Their strategy for collecting narratives is to have a familiar interviewer engage the child subject in a conversation. During those informal conversations, the experimenters use what they call a conversational map, a series of short, deliberately unevaluated narratives about things that supposedly happened to themselves and could possibly have happened to the child (e.g., getting a bee sting). Such a methodology carries considerable ecological validity lince it is the naturally occurring conversation, at least from the perspective of the child participants in the study, that occasions the topics of narration. However, adults could push their agenda of obtaining data quite strongly in such elicitation contexts, sometimes not giving children enough chance to select or expand on their own favorite topics. As a result, it becomes difficult to strip off the effects of heavy narrative scaffolding from the outcome structure.

The elicitation method, which is employed most commonly to obtain comparable narratives from different subjects in developmental studies, folklore, and sociolinguistic interviews, demonstrates that stories are cultural constructs. If we are asked for stories, we know what is meant, and we are able to identify good stories and good story-tellers. Most research on narratives has relied on elicited stories or prefaced stories, those most likely to be identified by both speakers and audiences as fitting the cultural prototype.[4]

4. A Boundary Case

As opposed to elicited stories, stories occasioned in the conversational situation often do not exhibit many of the prototypical narrative genre cues that are thought to be embedded in the structure of a story. The example below illustrates a marginal case of classification that occurs in conversation when stories are spontaneous, not elicited. After the Loma Prieta earthquake, a student taped a conversation that included two brothers and other student friends. He had received an assignment to tape and analyze about an hour of naturally occurring interaction.

(1) Earthquake story[5]
Albert and Ned are two brothers. **Olga is Ned's friend,** Cynthia her roommate. All are college students.

53 Al: you know that-
54 that *nice *glass *china ***display case in our** *dining room?
55 Ned: =in the *dining room=
56 Cyn: =o-o-oh=
57 Al: **trashed/
58 Cyn: =forget id=
59 Ned: =*absolutely= trashed/
60 Al: whole thing a=bsolutely..yeah =
61 Ned: =*every *single bit= **of *glass and**
62 * pottery in th-
63 Olga: and *

65 Al: crystal
66 Ned: *everything ..*trashed/
67 Cyn: =o-o-oh my go-o-o-d=
68 Al: =oh a er *antiques *genuine= *antiques
69 Ned: =and the *amount of *money= we have lost
70 is going to be **astronomical/
(UCDisclab:QUAKE)

Features. This example does not meet the usual criteria of narrative. There is (a) no animate protagonist, (b) no sequence of events, (c) no temporal juncture, (d) no temporal connectives, (e) no conflict. Why does this seem to people who hear it to be a story? There is the introduction of the "protagonist," a piece of furniture, by a "common ground" preface (53). There has already been an event in time, an earthquake, so the story is about an implicit temporal sequence, an earthquake followed by the outcomes of the earthquake. Most important, the rhythm of the telling, the alternation between ellipsis and expansion, the lexical and syntactic repetitions, the evaluation by the listeners (56, 67) and by the tellers (68–70) and the probing by participants (63) is appropriate to the excitement of a dramatic story, so it seems to listeners to be a story.

Context of telling. Example (1) occurred in a spontaneous conversation, in a series of *rounds* about different facets of the earthquake experience. To have restated the obvious, to have given a temporal, causal sequence such as "we were in the classroom and suddenly it shook" would have made no sense because everyone present already had experienced the beginning. The highly salient experience of the earthquake established the common ground for the round participants to reveal their individual observations in the immediate aftermath of the shared disaster.

Stories of disasters recently experienced by everyone in the room probably have these common properties – they often occur in rounds, and they are both semantically and syntactically elliptical, building on common knowledge and conversational sequences leading up to the story. As told later when the common knowledge is forgotten, or to audiences who don't share the same history, the stories must be reshaped to provide both orientation and temporal sequences to fill in what is not shared.[6] In fact, when Luebs (1992) interviewed 14 people two months after the Loma Prieta quake, the speakers provided extensive orientation and full-fledged narrative structures. Moreover, since the narratives were not part of naturalistic conversation, but were elicited by the researcher, most of them included codas, that is, verbal or nonverbal ways of showing that a narrative is over. Luebs' data confirm that elicited narratives move closer to the prototype.

4.1. Databases for Study

Adult data. The UC Disclab adult data consist of 180 transcripts collected in a variety of contexts, but primarily from informal natural groups taped in natural [illegible] students[7] in California, with 500 fines of transcription archived using

American school data. We created a non-task waiting room context for best friends of seven and ten to tape natural sociable conversation in a California public school, where the children were varied ethnically and some were bilingual. These ten dyads and triads are in the UCDisclab archive.

Family data. The Ervin-Tripp family data consist of 38 transcripts from 8 multi-child California families with at least one child 3 years old. Some families were videotaped over a period of 18 months in their homes. We observed meals or child free play with siblings and a visiting peer, with the goal of differentiating the social marking features in children's speech with peers, siblings, and adults.

Turkish preschool data. We obtained child–adult conversations at preschool sites[8] in Istanbul, Turkey. Both of the preschools had 3-to-5-year-olds, providing around 40 children from whom we taped different kinds of elicited and spontaneous extended discourse. The informal preschool system provided multiple settings such as classroom environments, various organized and spontaneous play groups, and casual chats to search out the early deployment of narrative skills. For the examples included in this paper, we analyzed around 60 hours of audiotaped talk.

4.2. Locating Narratives in Transcripts

To identify candidate instances of narrative segments, we employed several methods: computerized search for specific linguistic markers such as temporal connectives, reading over the datasets for larger-level indicators of narrative such as reference to irrealis events or past events, prefaces by narrators, prompting by audiences, or audience evaluations. No single method is adequate by itself for identifying all the segments of talk that are of interest. This problem brings us back to the definitional problem we discussed in the beginning of the paper. If we have to determine what constitutes stories, we are probably better off in considering the narrative genre as a continuous cline, consisting of many subgenres, each of which may need differential research treatment. Since there currently exists no single model that includes criteria encompassing all the range of oral narrative forms, we need to approach the problem employing different tools.

Once we identified narratives, the next step was to look back at the antecedent context to find how the narratives were situated, and how they were occasioned by what was said before. We were surprised at how often this context changed the interpretation of the narrative.

5. Observed Features and Contexts of Conversational Narratives

We found that using judges to identify proto-narratives in the family transcripts produced a wide variety of short descriptive [illegible]

temporal junctures in the family and the adult data, we found projections of future events, fantasies, descriptions of regularities, reports of conversations, and reports of events that have occurred – including dreams. It was important in the case of young children to use a linguistic criterion for choosing text materials, so as not to impose categories that are not in the system of the child. If we used temporal connectives as a search criterion – such as *when, while, after, before,* and *and then* – we found that they first appeared in child speech in commands and in planning for future coordinated action, rather than in experience or fantasy narratives (Ervin-Tripp and Bocaz 1989). In other words, planning displays some narrative qualities in child usage. The temporal clause in such sequences defines the relation between two activities of a single actor or between two actors' activities.

"I'm going to make a garbage can when I'm all through with the train lid." (3.0)[9]

Temporal clauses occurred both in reference to *simultaneous events* such as "you listen while I read" (3.3), and to *successive events,* as in "can I have your worm when you get finished" (3.1).

Young children describe sequences of actions in elaborate future plans, including directorial planning of complex dramatic play with coordinated scenarios that are temporally detailed. There is especially rich past and future reference whether the child plays the director planning the actions, or an actor undertaking the script. Outside of dramatic play, young children talk less often about the past than adults do. Among the narrative-like sequences we found were generic descriptions of scripted events, describing what happens on a regular basis, or if you do something, what results.

The following dramatic play enactment illustrates an occasioning of talk about the past. The actor playing the patient is preparing a command to operate on her leg, but describes a personal experience in the past to account for the injury. We see from other child texts (see 3 below) that injuries are usually asked about and are explained by a story of what happened. The child inserts this common type of topic sequence into dramatic play.

(2) Doctor–patient play of 4–5 year olds

1	Kit:	pretend there's something wrong with my leg. my leg-
2		let's pretend that I tell you that my leg's–um-
3		let's pretend I tell you– first, you operate on it.
4		um, but before you operate on it,
5		let me tell you something, okay nurse?
6	Jill:	um, 'kay.
7	Kit:	um, when I was walking down the street,
8		I saw this piece of glass and I picked it up,
9		then I didn't see too well, then it goes way up to here.
10		see now. it's–now it's over there.
11		can you–can you operate on it, nurse?
12	Andy:	I can.

This segment begins in the directorial voice (1–3) which switches without any marking into enactment in the patient's voice (5). Kit starts with a request for the floor (4,5) which Jill acknowledges (6), and Kit then begins the story with a subordinate backgrounding clause (7) establishing the place of the event and the protagonist's activity at the time of an action (8) by the protagonist, reported by a telic verb. Gestures showed the injury (9,10). There is a sequence of narrative events (9). The story provides the explanation of an injury needing repair in the dramatic medical scenario planned at the beginning (1–3), so it is an inserted elaboration before the medical scenario unfolds (11).

We made similar form-based searches in our extensive database of adult materials, looking for markers of temporal juncture[10] as a way to locate story sequences. We found relatively few extended stories. Those referring to the past often were brief, as in the examples to follow. They were stimulated by the sight of objects, pictures, people or television. While the children relied often on the setting as a source for talk, in the adults, we found more stories that continued prior talk, either in story rounds, or in stories to support or challenge conversational claims. There were scripts, that is stories about customary events, and stories that reported dialogue only. The focus of much of the students' social talk was on character, on the implications of events rather than on the events themselves, and on daily problems that they could not solve. In the last type of interaction, the discussions of problems, we can expect some of the kinds of sequencing that Jefferson (1988) has reported for troubles talk.

Unlike Labov and Waletzky's narrators, our tellers of spontaneous stories did not take a long time to build to a high point. It was rare that stories involved drama or suspense. The character anecdotes usually presented a brief event, and the problem situations began with a single event to initiate a topic, with interchanges about alternative outcomes. These stories in young adults are analogous to the stories Ochs, Smith and Taylor (1989) have found in American families, which propose problems and alternative outcomes. These speakers did not seize the floor for a long performance of a story with suspense.

5.1. Elicited/Prefaced Narratives

It is elicited or prefaced stories that best demonstrate that the structure of stories is strongly related to the circumstances of their telling. They are likely to fit some paradigm of a good story, since the prototype is evoked for tellers. The elicitation signals that the respondent has to undertake a performance. The preface signals that the teller is willing to identify what is to be read as a story. They are, in some sense, accountable to the public standards for a story.

While adults may preface or volunteer stories to entertain, in many of the examples we found there was questioning from the audience to prompt the teller, and to give the teller the floor. But a question can focus a reply on a narrow issue rather than on a full story, thus altering the temporal ordering in the [illegible] relation[illegible]

(3) Broken foot elicitation
Melody is 4;7, Lisa is 2. Dave and Georgette are researchers in the home of the children making a videotape. There is an overlapping hosting conversation by the father which interweaves the two sets of speakers.

4 Dav: OK. in the course of the next months,
5 we hope to be out here a few more times.
6 Geo: what happened to your foot, Lisa? Fa: =would= you like any-
7 Mel: =um= [to G] she, she =cut it= thing to eat or drink?
8 in the wheel. D: =not me= [to Fa]
9 she cut. Fa: =Georgette do you?=
10 =when.when=, =when the= G: =no thank you=
11 friend was next door, then, then
12: then, then, then, then she was pushing her on the bike,
13 and it got caught in the spoke or the wheel.
14 G: oh boy
15 M: and she broke a bone.
16 G: oh boy.
17 L: a bone. (Melody) I broke this
18 : =(it go slip) = [to G] Fa: =what kind of= sandwich would
19 : (the bone slipped) you like to eat, Melody?
20 M: Uh, *um* what kind do you have?

(Ervin-Tripp Family Transcripts: Fleursll)

The focus of Melody's reply was specifically selected by a narrow "what happened to your foot?" question, which prompts Melody first to a summary (7) and then backwards in time to the circumstances that brought this result (10–13). As a story, it gets audience reaction (14,16). The disruption of the real time temporal order in the story results from the specificity of the eliciting question.

Most children observed in the Turkish nursery schools by Aylin Küntay did not produce stories for other children, who gave them no prompts. It was adults who often supported children's elicited stories with prompts to get started and to continue. In the following example, Emre has been talking to the adult researcher (Ad) about a children's entertainment center that he visited over the weekend:

(4) Alligator game prompting [Translated from Turkish] (Age: 4;11)

1. Emre: there is a Scoreboard, shows our score
2. > Ad: is that so? how did you – did you make a lot of points?
3. Emre: (I) did
4. *but* once I won a lot of things
5. that alligator-shooting game did not give us
6. because some part of it was broken
7. > Ad: is that so? what happened?
8. Emre: got broken
9. we had won a lot of shillings
10. at that time it got broken
11. Ad: my gosh!

14. those people who control Piramit – they fixed that
15. and *then* we got all that shilling.
(Aylin Küntay: Eryavuz preschool)

This story has a classic construction with a high point and resolution, but the temporal marking appears to be affected by the adult prompting. The adult question (2) takes the child from a description to a specific event. In answering the question, the child begins by a short reply to the question, yet the *but* signals a newsworthy issue or violation of expectation (4), even as the story is beginning, marked with *once*. The story then begins. The resolution does not immediately follow the complicating action, but the adult question interrupts the flow (7). At this point the child repeats and moves back in time to recapitulate the sequence of winning before the equipment broke, even using a pluperfect affix to mark anteriority before the time evoked by the question, and then points out the problem resolution with a *but then* marker. While *eliciting* seems to bring out prototypic stories, *prompting* can alter the temporal sequence by its focusing effect.

5.2. Rounds of Stories

In many conversational settings, stories implicitly invite related stories from other participants. Goffman (1974) states that "an illustrative story by one participant provides a ticket another participant can use to allow the matching of that experience with a story from his repertoire" (p. 510). Adults, in their interactions characterized by a series of stories, pick out some features from previous stories and work them into their ongoing story without bothering to frame each story anew (Ryave 1978), much as speakers in sequential self-introductions use the same frame repeatedly. Umiker-Sebeok (1979), analyzing preschool children's narratives produced spontaneously within natural conversation with other children, found that the most common response to a narrative was similar narrative. At age three, response narratives in Umiker-Sebeok's data did not seem to advance the conversation "as a conjoint elaboration of a conversational topic" (p. 107), but appeared as "dangling narratives" that generally concerned the same general topic.

In the following Turkish preschool example, Can initiates the series of narrative contributions by establishing the theme to be visits to the doctor's office. Single statement initiations that do not go beyond minimal event representations are very common in this younger age. The children await the teacher's interested reaction before building upon their original one-line narratives. In this particular example, the teacher demonstrates interest by saying "is that so, dear?" (2), setting up the topic of visits to the doctor as interesting for all the children.

(5) Visits to the doctor
Beril (4;0) is one of the two girls in a seven student class. Osman is 4;0. Can is 3;7. It is breakfast time, and all of the children are sitting around a table, with their Teacher (Teach) and the researcher (Res) present.

3	Beril:	my mother took me to the doctor, too
4	Can:	shall I say what (*he/she*) said
5	Can:	(*he/she*) said let him eat waffles a bit later
6	Teach:	said let him not eat too much waffles, right?
7	Can:	said let him bite in teeny-weeny bites with his teeth
8		and then also pickles..
9	Teach:	did you get a shot Can?
10		no:
11	Can:	*(1)* don't really like
12	Teach:	let him eat little
13		little by little
14		let him not eat much
15		xxx wouid you like biscuits? {to Res}
16	Res:	no, thanks
17	Beril:	Teacher, the doctor told me don't eat anything
18	Teach:	the doctor?
19		but if we don't eat we can't grow
20	Beril:	no *(he/she)* said have breakfast but
21		don't eat those that your mother brings
22	Teach:	is that so?
23	Osman:	my mother did not take me to the doctor's
24	Teach:	because you aren't sick, right?
25		don't get sick, ideally

(Aylin Küntay: Ubaruz preschool)

Beril, after replicating Can's one-liner in line (3), follows on Can's subtopic about his doctor's nutritional advice. Aside from demonstrating thematic continuity, Beril's story features formal similarities to Can's, such as employing quoted speech of a doctor. Osman then contributes (23) by reporting non-occurrence of the topical event in his life. In Turkish children's rounds like the above, second narrators frequently claimed to have exactly the same experience as first narrators, down to the same details.

Since the overarching motivation for rounds of Turkish children in classroom settings seems to be to gain the teacher's interest, they usually try to top other children's stories with their own versions. If an initiation story attracts the attention of the teacher, other children select out of the thematic possibilities of the original story to construct their own. Usually, some of the thematic content gets replicated in the following stories. As Cortazzi (1993) suggests, usually "later narratives are highly pre-specified, showing marked parallels of topic, theme, character of events with preceding narratives" (p. 32–33).

Rounds allow for the ellipsis of presupposed information or allusion to information from earlier stories. The highly elliptical Earthquake narrative (1) occurred in a series of rounds with successively changed protagonists. Students began by telling where they were when the earthquake happened, and what they and people around them did. They added second-hand stories about what other

hierarchy. After a discussion about the behavior of their dogs, Cynthia said that nothing of hers fell down, turning the topic to inanimate objects, including the immediate cues in the room in which the taping occurred.

(6) Earthquake round

1 Cyn: ==yeah our room our room looks like nothing happened at all,
2 Dom: ==I was I was worried about this [pointing at empty beer
3 bottles on shelves] i-i-it's like coming home to find a big
4 pile of lads, [lads refers to empty bottles]
5 Ned: this is the first this is the first indication
6 that this was something
7 because the last one that happened was like a six
8 [referring to Richter scale] in Los Gatos and I was sitting

16 Ned: and then Al and I come back and we are just all *oh my
17 =*god there it is tilted nearly fallen off just hanging=
18 Al: =yeah.. instant hand up supporting them because they are just-=

The three who were present here co-produce a description of the state of the beer bottles. At this point Dom continues a round of reports on each person's room, including non-effects.

34 Al: nothing happened in my room.
35 Cyn: ==things were moved.
36 Ned: [to A] yeah funny thing Al=your room is a m-=
37 Geo: =you couldn't tell=
38 if something happened to your room.

There is an acceleration (39) as Ned emphasizes the extent of damage in their house, summarized by Al (43). At this point the two brothers overlap in two dramatic descriptions, Al with exaggerated generalization (43), Ned with emphatic prosody in (44).

39 Ned: oh my mum and dad cannot get to Pete's room
40 to see what it's like..= they ca*n't= get to George's
41 Al: =yeah=
42 Ned .all the book-=
43 Al =*natural *disasters= just do *not* stop *happening at *our house.
44 Ned ==*all the *bookcases *everything *fucking c-
45 our *house is **chaos.
46 Al ==yeah.
47 Ned it's *chaos.. =the bookcases=
48 Olga: =the bookcases = came off = the wall?=
49 At: [to O] =Olga =
50 Ned: ==the bookcases all fell down= *books *everywhere *fumiture=
51 Al: =you know =
52 Ned: *moved=

supports the generalization by describing the bookcases. But it is Albert who gets to the worst case of all, the shelving containing the antique crystal, and the brothers produce a duet narrative.

53 Al: you know that-
54 that.*nice *glass *china *display case in our *dining room?
55 Ned: =in the *dining room =
56 Cyn: =o-o-oh= =
57 Al: **trashed.
58 Cyn: =forget it.=
59 Ned: = *absolutely= trashed.
60 Al: whole thing a =bsolutely..yeah =
61 Ned: = *every * single bit= of *glass and
62 *pottery in th-
63 Olga: and *crystal?
64 Ned: * all the crystal..*trashed.
65 Al: crystal
66 Ned: *everything ..*trashed.
67 Cyn: =o-o-oh my go-o-o-d=
68 Al: =oh a er * antiques *genuine= *antiques
69 Ned: =and the * amount of * moneys we have lost
70 is going to be **astronomical.
(UCDisclab:QUAKE)

The round thus began with what happened to items on shelves in each of the participant's campus rooms, moving from a vivid local example in the immediate environment, through another male's room to the most extreme case personally known, the parental home of Albert and Ned. At this point what triggers the dining room narrative is the two strong generalizations in (43,45). To illustrate the generalization, Ned and Albert move emphatically through a coordinated but elliptical description, with considerable rhythmic emphasis. The line length is shorter, with stronger stress and more focus on predicated descriptors, compared to the beer bottle description where more action is mentioned and there are human participants. The final evaluation by Ned, in a longer, syntactically complex sentence, changes the rhythm to summarize the major outcome.

Rounds can also lead to conventionalized story-telling, since they can provide occasions to be given the floor and to produce a tale that can use prior models as scaffolding and the obligation of mutual appreciation as support.[11] In the following example, women at a Senior Center were discussing what they thought of changes in clothing fashions, and moved into the topic of making graduation dresses. The following is an excellent example of the frequent feature in all-female groups of women telling real-life narratives of their own embarrassing experiences to create amusement.

(7) Making grade school graduation dresses
Setting: Senior Center

Ann told a story about how hard it was to finish in time, which ended with an evaluation.

14 Ann: I remember I was so traumatized with that dress [laughs)

After general laughter, Bev started her own story on a similar theme.

16 Bev: what did *I pick but an Indian *linen..

Bev's story quickly moves into a problem. Her laughter (31) suggests that she already had the intention of making a humorous report on her solution. Deb's laugh (33) collaborates in the key.

29 Bev: and I uh if you did not leave enough yeah?
30 for your seams you know and then
31 uh, I had [laugh] all but one sleeve for puffed sleeves?
32 and one was not gonna be as full as the other one so-o
33 Deb: [laugh]
34 Bev: my grandmother used to bring a lot of things from overse-
35 you know, from uh, Europe, she used to travel a lot, my
36 dad's mother? and she had some beautiful ribbon
37 so I used it for the sash I remember it was an orchid.
38 sash, and uh, that- that dress did up, but uh,
39 what was I to do about the sleeves.
40 so I walked crooked up the stage.
41 All: [laugh]
(UCDisclab: WCON1)

Here, Bev reports a situation which for a young girl would be a painful dilemma, the lack of fabric for making the dress sleeves symmetrical for a major public event. Her story about the sash (34–40) sustains the suspense; *"but what was I to do about the sleeves?"* and takes the listeners explicitly to her problem of a crooked dress. Then she states the punch fine, the embarrassing solution of walking crookedly (40). This story is typical of women's humorous narratives about themselves (Ervin-Tripp and Lampert 1992). We can surmise that Bev knew at the start that she would present a problem narrative with a witty outcome. This is a prototypic narrative.

Adult round participants use prior models as scaffolding, with the possible aim of developing mutual appreciation as similar events. Kirschenblatt-Gimblett (1979) studies "story-dominated conversations" of Eastern European Jewish adults finds "in these story-dominated events, there is a preoccupation with narratives as things in themselves. For this reason, and because the narratives are preformulated and relatively self-contained (they can be understood without reference to any preceding conversation or narration), there is a tendency for story-dominated events to be organized like beads on a string" (p. 291).

In sum, rounds are a type of a speech context that

be cycles of jokes, cycles of humorous personal narratives, cycles of stories of one's room in an earthquake. If rounds provide a mutually cooperative audience that allows floor to the speaker, there is the possibility of elaborating a performance in terms of the cultural norms. Rounds can thus involve continuity of genre, continuities of latent topic, continuities of key, emulation of form, and presupposition or ellipsis.

5.3. Environmentally Cued Narratives

More common than rounds in our conversational data are story triggers in the local environment. Here, unlike rounds, there are no models provided in the preceding conversation. There is considerable variability of structure.

(7) Bird burials

1 Ellen: don't look...there's a dead bird.
(20 turns)
21 Ellen: a-a-aw let's bury it.
22 Dina: =let's= not [laugh]
23 Bill: =I - I= don't think so! some cat will probly =get it =
24 Ellen: =my dad= always
25 did it for us
26 =[laugh] =we'd put it in a shoebox and bury it.
27 Dina: =[laugh]= how sweet.
28 Bill: a-aw
29 Ellen: then we'd make crosses out of popsicle sticks.
33 Dina: that's cute though...that's really nice.
34 Ellen: we'd have a funeral for it and everything.
we'd say a prayer [laugh] and bury the thing.
(UCDisclab: LCON2)

This is an example of the reminder report, which describes scripts rather than presenting a conflict with a resolution. There is a serial connective *then*, but the use of *would* marks this as a description of customary practice. There is, however, audience evaluation (27, 33) in this case, as if this were a narrative.

Children's conversations often include reference to what is in their immediate environment, since their activities tend to build on available resources for play. The following is an example of environment-cued fantasy of ten-year-olds in California. The imaginary characters and the disruption of order are characteristic of boys' stories as early as four (Nicolopoulou, Scales and Weintraub 1994).

(8) Microphone story

Two ten-year-old boys alone in a testing room eating lunch notice the microphones strung from the overhead light.

1 Sam: what's this for?
2 Jer: it's a microphone
3 [S & J start to sing into microphones]

Singing or other stage performances are frequent reactions to microphones at this age. At this point, Sam begins to build up a scene of disorder.

4 Sam: [laughing] I was screaming!
5 [laughing] (hey..I'll be acting like this)
6 hey Jeremy Jeremy Jeremy I'm gonna be laughing in this
7 and the light falls down [laugh]
8 what would you do if the light fell?

The past tense (4) marks irrealis and a possible story beginning. In (5–6) the tense is moved to the future and in (8) to the conditional, setting the stage for more fantasy. In (8) we see the imaginary disruption of order, which creates a problem to be solved by the fantasy narrative.

9 Jer: I'll be under the table
10 Sam: [laugh] no.. and you did it!
11 Jer: I'd be outta this class [laugh]

(5)
12 Sam: it'll hit you on your head! [laugh]
13 Jer: you know what I'd do,
14 I'd be Superman and catch it.
15 be Superman and get squashed like a pancake.
16 Sam: I'll be Flash and get the fuck out.
(UCDisclab: GFIVE3)

In this sequence, Sam changes his position from challenger (10, 12) to capping with a character shift (16). Besides being fantastic responses to an environmental stimulus, these stories show how posing alternative outcomes can be part of collaboration in competitive bouts of story-telling.

5.4. Narratives Presenting Problems

As opposed to stories that resolve the complicating situations they set up during being told, some narratives invite audience participation in a possible problem-solving process by formulating problematic situations or protagonist behavior. Ochs, Smith, and Taylor (1989), who studied what they call "detective stories" during dinnertime talk, noticed that such problem-solving narratives can be characterized by interactive negotiation of the incomplete resolution.

The two most frequent contexts for temporal series in young adults' talk in the data are personal characterizations and problem situations. The problem situations are presented with potential endings, which participants co-construct. These differ somewhat from "troubles talk" (Jefferson 1988) when they refer not to chronic problems but one-time events.

A Taiwanese engineering student is conversing with two Asian-American women about the topic of [illegible]

(9) Asian women

Hel: you know...I was talking with a friend about
that asian caucasian dating thing...
and my complaint to { [p] to my friend}
is that that is that asian guys just don't ask
=y' know?.
Min: = yeah = they're not as (xxx) as (xx)
Hel: do you agree?
Yuan: totally agree
Hel: so then if that's true then how come when you guys
get like mad at at *us
if we go out with caucasian people
then you guys don't ask..
you guys don't get off your butts
(I)*answer me
Yuan: it's becau:se..
Hel: (I) you expect us to wait
Yuan: ==*ri:ght
Hel: ="yeah =
Yuan: *ri::ght
Hel: no, seriously
Yuan: (4) hm I don't know I don't what to say
Hel: ==yeah..i don't know either

This segment poses a problem of tension between Asian men and women, in which Helen presents a challenge to Yuan in the *you guys* form (12,13) and pressures him (14) to answer the challenge, then herself providing the answer (16). In the conversation, Asian males are accused of causing the problem about which they are angry (10) both by their behavior (12, 13) and by their unrealistic expectations (16). The topic of male anger triggers a description from Min in which the theme is Asian male anger. The story is basically in the form of a long quotation.

Min: ==did you guys see in the Daily Cal
about stuff..about the vandalism in Dwinelle
I actually like saw it..but um..there's this..
there's this like group of people who call themselves
the (1) Asian Male something or other they like
wrote like all over spray painted or marked =all over=
Yuan: =o:h AMU?=
Min: ==*yea AMU..they like wrote kill whitey and then like
in the girls' bathroom downstairs they're like like y'know
basically just slamming on asian woman
for dating caucasian men
like stay within your own kind..stay within your own group..
know what I mean? and it was just
Min: scrawled *all over the stalls and the walls was writing
Yuan: hm-mm

Helen's evaluation (39) explicitly refocuses the topic again on anger, and triggers a story from Yuan which begins with the response marker *well* (*40*), suggesting he intends the listeners to find a continuity from the topic to his story.

40 Yuan: well, I just met a caucasian guy yesterday
41 and we were just talking right?
42 and he he he speaks a little bit of Chinese
43 and he got a job uh got a job with a company like
44 uh doing tradings and stuff
45 and he was just telling me
46 yeah...you know...some Asian women...man
47 some Chinese women you just take them and
...[clarification of bam – bang]
48 bang them...you know
49 like (2) have sex with them
50 yeah bang them...and then yeah so y'know
51 I'm just going to work here a couple of years
52 and then go back to Thailand and get a wife
53 you know what am I supposed to response-
54 to response to that?
55 Hel: you can bop him
56 Yuan: all I can say is you know
57 MM: tell him you're pissed
58 Yuan: all I can say is being in this world
59 there's somebody who like to hit other people
60 and there's somebody who like to get hit...you know
61 so (1) what can you say?
62 Hel: did you hit him?
63 Yuan: no
64 Hel: why not?
65 Yuan: cause whoever the girl that wants to go out with
66 him, that's her problem...that's not my problem.
(UCDisclab: ASDAT)

This story picks up the racial anger theme, identifying the speaker with the anger of the graffiti writer implicitly by an example of what could produce that anger, white men's disrespect for Asian women. The story here has a structure of a prototypic narrative involving a conflict, but the conflict is unresolved. The narrator evidently did not show his anger to the Caucasian antagonist, and was left feeling dissatisfied. The businessman's statement (46–49) is presented without comment. There is a possible narrative transition marker *then* (50) but no overt reply is reported, and the action shifts to interior reflection. Yuan describes information about his own plans (51–52) implying a conflict with the stance of the businessman.[12] He leaves the story with a question about what he should have done (61). In the context of the graffiti topic, the two women have no hesitation in assuming Yuan's anger, and provide an answer to his question (55–57). It is not [illegible]

prompted (64–66). The story has two unusual features: the failure to report the ending, which had to be prompted, and the solicitation by the teller of alternative outcomes. These mark the story as a problem situation.

5.5. Narratives As Performances

Every narrative, insofar as it attempts to get some point(s) across, has an evaluative aspect. However, only some narratives receive a very animated and dramatic enactment so that a performance aspect is attributed to them (e.g., Bauman 1986; Hymes 1972). In such cases, the teller foregrounds the evaluative component of the story, with less emphasis placed on the events comprising the story. Cortazzi (1993), in contrasting performance narratives with interview narratives, asserts that performance becomes highlighted if the topic is appropriate to the audience, and if participants have reciprocal relationships and shared norms for evaluation. Schiffrin (1981) talks about one feature, that is, usage of historical present tense, that "makes the past more vivid by bringing past events into the moment of speaking..." (p. 58). Among some of the other common features that are employed as tools for highlighting the evaluated point of the story are constructed speech and animated intonation (Tannen 1989).

The following segment coming from two sisters sitting in a cafe demonstrates how constructed speech can be used to constitute a story. Sara is a topic change; she is involved in Mimi's job hunt. Bringing her up brings up also talk about her personality, first a descriptor from Mimi "standoffish" and then a carefully staged mocking mimicry, which Lina launched (9) before Mimi's comment about weirdness (10) suggesting it is an independent but perhaps corroborating expression. The mimicry is a "story", in the form of a dialogue. But it is only a fragment, with no event sequence.

(10) Sisters in a cafe talking about a job search

5 Lina: xxso you decided to call Sara?
6 Mimi: yeah. it's weird cause she's kinda..I don't know
7 don't you think that she's kinda standoff-
8 she's kinda-
9 Lina: she left this message
10 Mimi: her and Jill are both kinda weird I think
11 Lina: =she always goes she goes=
12 Mimi: =they're =
13 Lina: [slow whiny] "I'm calling for Mi-i-mi-i"
14 Mimi: she's- she =calls me Mi-i-mi-i =
15 Lina: =did you hear her message?.
16 Mimi: yeah.
17 Lina: she goes [slow whiny] "I'm calling for Mi-i-mi-i.
18 um if you want you can work at the video store.
19 um tell her to cali me, bye Mi-i-mi-i" [laughs]

(UCDisclab: SISTRS)

that Lina gets the floor for a full quotation mimicking Sara's voice, a production she appears to be planning by line 11. As a conversational tactic this example corroborates and illustrates the points made by Mimi, but the urgency of her production, and her overlaps while accelerating till she gets the floor suggest another feature, a goal of achieving a good performance, in this case of a witty mimicry. Also, as obvious from the content of the conversation, not much of what the story conveys is new information. The only conversational purpose of the story appears to be to display a shared assessment of a third person in a vivid way.

In the Turkish child database, totally "spontaneous" narratives by a child were not very common. Teachers, at times explicitly, disallowed children to tell stories outside of the time allotted for story-telling. When interviewed, a teacher reported that she really did not like it when Hasan, who told story (11) broke into his "quite fantastical and irrelevant" stories in the middle of "serious" group activities. But even without encouragement, children occasionally told some stories that were not precipitated by any remark, question, or topic in the preceding conversation. What seemed to trigger such narratives was probably the tellability attributed to the events by the storytellers. The content tends to be not banal, but out-of-the-ordinary events lending themselves to highly theatrical performances that attempt to build and uphold some suspense in the audience. Labov (1972) proposes that eventfulness is an intrinsic aspect of events and is expressed by evaluative devices: "evaluative devices say to us: this was terrifying, dangerous, weird, wild, crazy; or, amusing, hilarious, wonderful; more generally, that it was strange, uncommon, or unusual – that is, worth repeating. It was not ordinary, plain, humdrum, everyday or run-of-the-mill" (p. 371). Children also tended to repeat such narratives, and consolidated highly elaborate structures through repetition. As Goffman (1974) aptly writes "effective performance requires first hearings, not first tellings" (p. 508). The following narrative is from a 4-year-old boy replaying a particularly dramatic reported near-death experience of a (nonexistent) sibling.[13]

(11) Brain-washing

During a gymnastic session at the preschool, a four-year old boy spontaneously launched into a dramatic story about his non-existent younger brother. When Hasan was asked to retell the story the second telling was very like the first.

1 **Res:** **tell** ***(it)*** again.
2 Hasan: my sibling opened medicine/medicine box – took (it)? [self-correction]
3 was able to open (it)?
4 broke that lid?
5 ate them up
6 ate all all all (*of them*) up?
7 **Res:** a-ah! [=expressing surprise]
8 eee? [=so then?]
9 Hasan: ate them?

12 Res: then?
13 Hasan: then (*we*) took (*him*) to doctors
14 Res: what did (*they*) do at the doctor's?
15 Hasan: what's this? {re: taperecorder}
16 Res: this – (*we*) will listen (*to it*) later
17 Hasan: are you) going to listen (*to it*)*?*
18 Res: uh-huhu
19 what did (*they*) do later at the doctor's?
20 Hasan: doctors ehh.. ee tube – (*they*) inserted a tube towards
21 (*his/her*) belly
22 Res: hmmh
23 Hasan: and after that e eh.. (*his/her*) stomach – e (they) cleansed
24 (*his/her*) brain.
25 Res: Uuuuh! [=expressing astonishment]
26 Hasan: yes!
27 Res: is (*he/she*) fine now?
28 Hasan: ee if (*they*) hadn't washed (*his/her*) brain,
29 he/she would have died {postposed pronoun}
30 Res: god forbid!
31 now (*he/she is*) fine, that means
32 Hasan: (they) washed (*his/her*) brain
33 after that (*he/she*) got well
34 and never took medicine without permission again.
(Aylin Küntay: Eryavuz Preschool)

From the perspective of the 4-year-old boy, the events are so impressive that he seems to be carrying them around in a story-package that waits to be opened up in every appropriate occasion. The exigency of conveying the story gets reflected in the animated tone of voice he uses to tell the story. In turn, such enthusiasm may have led to the development of a full-fledged narrative structure. The temporal sequencing of the orienting events into a personally evaluated complicating action (1–11), the building up of suspense through an extended resolution (20–26), which also receives an evaluation by the presentation of a counterfactual event (28–29)[14] and the usage of a narrative-ending coda to return to the present time (34) depict all the essential elements of a Labovian story structure.

Not all the out-of-the-blue stories exhibited the Labovian elements in a very straightforward fashion. For example, first-person fight stories, while constituting a major portion of the boys' spontaneous tellings, never attained structural complication. There seem to be two main reasons for this: (1) young narrators do not necessarily take on the task of using the sequential unfolding events strategically to create suspense, and (2) the action structure of fight stories that reinforce a self-aggrandizing story is so predominant in the minds of the speakers that they do not go beyond elaborating on the manner of their participation in a fight.

5.6. Tactical Narratives

of the tactical use of narratives was Goodwin's (1990:243ff.) instance of a story told in the midst of a dispute to humiliate the opponent. Support may be in the form of a description, or of a single vignette, as in example (10). Structurally, such narratives are often highly abbreviated, containing only enough information to support the position. Also, they may begin in the middle of a sequence. Example (13) contains a narrative but it does not conform to Labov's criterion of temporal iconicity.

Below is an example of a tactical narrative from the Turkish child database. In a context of a long conversation, Emre has been telling the adult researcher about some horror movies. The adult states (1) a generalizing conclusion that he does not get scared of anything if he can watch such violent movies, a statement Emre challenges by a story. Here the child provides a continuous narration demonstrating an instance of a personal history narrative brought in to support a reply that runs counter to the assumption behind the question. The result is an elaborate narrative with extensive presentation of emotional reaction.

(12) Scary films (Age: 4;11)

1	Ad:	so you don't get scared of anything?
2	Emre:	get scared-
3		for example I get scared of *sey* chow do you say
4		in the cartoon very good-
5		at first there was a very ugly man
6		I didn't get scared of him
7		but then he got uglier in the film
8		I didn't watch it
9		and then I left the TV without turning it off
10		since I got so much frightened
11		my mother was in the kitchen
12		I immediately ran to the kitchen

(Aylin Küntay: Eryavuz Preschool)

The narrative is introduced clearly as an example (3) of the generalization (1) and is constructed as a contrast between a stimulus and non-response (5–6) in agreement with the adult's assumption, and a contrasting *(but then–)* stimulus and fear responses (7–9) in disagreement with her generalization. The next line (9) *and then* escalates to a more vivid example of fear. He provides explanations (10, 11) in the form both of motivational evaluations and place information before the climax and marks the ultimate challenge to the adult's generalization by illustrating his flight (12) as occurring *immediately.* The evaluation (10) can also be seen as a reply to (1) tying the example back to its prompt. Thus the narrative foliows a direct reply, is marked as an example, and is punctuated with recurrent challenges to the stimulating question. It never loses its marking as a reply.

In the following example, the conversational topic had begun with questioning of Ann about her plans to become a feminist therapist, which she illustrates with a quotation narrative, which is the second-hand story of a friend. In the

Her point relating this story to her career goals never was completed, because Cathy interrupted with a specific narrative.

(13) Temper

8	Cath:	=*wo-o-h =
9		you wanna hear about *harassment from a *guy
10		(like) *right after we *saw you,
11		this guy grabbed my *butt, on my way to dinner, on the sidewalk//
12	An:	*o::h =my *go:::d =
13	Iris:	=oh my *go:::d=
14	Cath:	==**no:: it was kind of funny though.
15		I- you- you know I
16		=knew him from the **party = the night be*fore.
17	Tere:	=you **knew who he **was, right/.
18	Cath:	*but.. and he's nice looking
19		and he's a nice guy/
20		but it was just kind of { [fast] *weird
21		because I didn't recognize him at first}
22		I *had to turn around and like,..
23		*actually it took me about a *block to even make the
24		connection/

In this report, Cathy identified her story as an example of the general topic introduced by Ann, supporting Ann's point. She uses a preface (9) to take the floor, identifies the location of the event (10) and moves directly to the high point. The audience reaction (12, 13) confirms the appropriateness of the story and gives her warrant for holding the floor later to speculate about her own reactions. The orientation, evaluation, and her resulting behavior all follow. The audience even collaborates and confirms (17). This story presented a problem appropriate to the topical context, and was followed by a round of harassment stories.

64	Cath:	==(well you know what *maybe)
65		it's kind of *cool sometimes
66		if you're in the right frame of mind.
67		I **really have to be in the right frame of mind,...
68		**drunk. { [laugh] ( )}
69		*no, I *really-I *do have to be in
70		=the right frame of mind. *Simon was just =
71	Tere:	=guys do it to me all the *ti:me,.. I mean guys I *know=
72	Cath:	lucky I didn't *backhand him for that...
73		that's *all I have to *say about it..
74		it was there- I mean if it had been,..
75		if *that had been say like mid*week last week when I was
76		really up*set about stuff,..
77		*I would've turned around and- and...
78		**nailed the guy,.. I swear to god
79		I would've *hi[illegible]

81 Cath: ==**anybody who fucks with me that way last week I
82 would've killed.

Cathy shifts the topic from harrassment to mood in contrasting situations, a shift not followed by the other women (71). She then creates hypotheticals about her willingness to retaliate when in a bad mood (77–79), building to an extreme (82). Her anger about the unresolved event even leads to an ambivalent reply to Teresa's teasing (93), which may have been based on a misinterpretation of Cathy's laugh (92, 95).[15]

91 Cath: I have a *temper *anyway but
92 [laugh] I *really have a temper wh=en (a guy) =
93 Tere: ={ [high] **do you=
94 **really?}
95 Cath: [laugh] **Terry that was not even funny,..
96 *yeah it was but... *it wasn't. <3>
97 *well, yeah.

Next Cathy produces a story, but it is not built up temporally as a narrative; rather, Cathy presents the high point (100) that provides proof of her claims to a fiery character (99).

99 Cath: *you= guys wanna see me in one of my bad moods,
100 *Iris saw me sh- throw my shoe through my window.
101 Iris: [laugh] oh *yea::h I {[laugh] remember that.}
102 Cath: *I don't remember what I was ma:d about,
103 I *broke my window with my shoe.
104 Tere: **go:d,
105 Iris: **I remember what you were mad about....
106 you were *gonna uh- urn..
107 you had been waiting all *day to ga- go out,..
108 your mom said she was gonna be back in the *morning,..
109 = and she didn't come back,=
110 Cath: =**....h and left = me without a *car.
111 Iris: ==yeah....
112 Cath: *that was when I was sharing a car with my *mo:m.
113 that was like my-,..
114 *that was a while ago....
115 that was like my *junior year in high school
116 or something
(UCDisclabCAFE1)

What turns out to be a story about a temper tantrum was not presented as a narrative. Cathy, whose conversational focus is on her own personality and capacities, says she remembers only her own burst of temper and its outcome, not what caused it. It is left to her friend Iris to go back in time (105) and construct the content f[illegible]

to a high-point, and the resolution and coda that one sees in a full narrative. Rather, a speaker seizes a piece of a past sequence for her local conversational needs and gives a fragment of the event sequence.

6. Conclusions

When we see data from other societies, we recognize that there are conditions where long, well structured, personal experience narratives are heard frequently. Alves (1995), for example, found that even Portuguese village children speaking to other children can tell such stories spontaneously, because, he says, such tellings are encouraged and modeled. Americans ask "have you heard this before?" as if retelling to the same audience is undesirable, thus ruling out the repeated rehearsal that elaborates the descriptive, dramatic or humorous features of stories. Ochs, Smith and Taylor (1989) have recorded families in which long personal narratives are not modeled and parents do not report their personal experiences as narratives, instead treating children's reports of the past as problem situations.

Audience participation norms are culturally variable, as we have seen from Watson-Gegeo and Boggs (1977) and others. In our data there is some evidence of occasional backchannel encouragement. Among the questions to be considered in cultural information are these: Can a story be retold or must we ask if it is new? Under what conditions is retelling authorized, and how? Does the storyteller have to demand the floor by prefacing or do listeners recognize and orient to cues of upcoming narratives? Are there occasions and people that can be expected to produce elaborated stories? Many of these cultural factors have their effect through altering the very performance conditions which we have proposed affect the prototypical structure in narratives.

There are also *production conditions* that facilitate longer and more elaborated stories. Among them are:

(a) The opportunity to rehearse and reshape a story. Stories that are retold already have a basis in form, and a reteller has the knowledge of how the first occasion was evaluated by the audience. Even a story that is someone else's gives the teller this advantage.
(b) Stories are likely to be less elliptical where less shared knowledge can be presupposed, and orientation must be supplied. Stories across generations are like this.
(c) On the other hand, shared experience can be motivating of shared interest, as we see in the stories shared by family members or veterans. Prompts, collaboration, and evaluations from an audience indicate attentiveness and willingness to hear a long story, leading the speaker to turn what could have started as a tactical move into a performance.
(d) Elicited, prefaced or audience-prompted stories can be seen by tellers [illegible] aesthetic standard involving the cultural

tellers' most shaped, retold, and dramatic experiences. If the speaker is free to choose a rehearsed and reshaped story, there is likely to be more plot build-up than in conversationally occasioned novel accounts.

(e) Stories that are told in response to narrow questions, or to make particular conversational points, are more likely to select a time in the narrative to begin which does not entail a build-up or elaboration. The telling may include just the high point, or just constructed speech, or just a description. Stories that are told to illustrate a problem can lack resolutions, and alternative outcomes may be solicited from or volunteered by the participaing group.

In sum, the presence and absence of the features of the prototypical story can be systematically related to the conversational circumstances.

Notes

1. The second author's dissertation concerns both spontaneous and elicited narratives of children in two Turkish preschools.
2. Throughout this paper, the terms "narrative" and "story" will be used interchangeably. However, the distinction between narrative and story is a valid one, which is central in some accounts. For example, Rimmon-Kenan (1983) has a three-way distinction between "story", "text", and "narration", where story refers to a series of of logically and chronologically related events, and **narration** is the manner of talking about these event sequences. The origin of the story/narrative bifurcation comes from the Russian formalists' split between fabula and *sjuzhet* (Propp 1968) and gets disseminated into other researchers' work (for example, Chatman's (1978) distinction between story and discourse). Such accounts strive to isolate a paradigmatic core from actual narrative versions, by moving away froin the surface language phenomena towards a deeper structure. Since our main concern in this particular study is only the actual use of language in extended discourse, the distinction will not be honored in the writing.
3. For example, the rhetorical approach (for e.g., Abrahams 1968, 1976, Bauman 1986, 1992; Ben Amos 1976; Hymes 1971), which grew out of the folkloric tradition as a challenge to structuralist approaches, regards stories not as highly confined and named entities in a given culture, but as parts of situated face-to-face communicative events and interactional sense-making situations.
4. In fact different prototypes appear when one compares elicited stories from people of different cultural backgrounds. For example, Minami and McCabe (1991), Michaels (1981), and Rodino *et al.* (1991) have compared elicited stories from different cultural sources, and have shown contrasts in children's story organization in terms of high points, the degree of focus on events or on people's characteristics, and audience encouragement of elaboration or brevity of presentation. So even if we are talking about the prototypic story, we need to identify what features and structural components are commonly highlighted or ellipted in a given culture.
5. Transcriptions are based on Gumperz and Berenz (1993); *is stress; = overlaps= ==latched response; ... pauses; () seconds of pause; { } feature boundaries; / falling terminal juncture.

7. These data were obtained by assignments to students, so they are biased to ages 18–30 with a few exceptions involving families or senior centers.
8. Eryavuz Center and Ubaruz Center will be used as pseudonyms for the two preschools. Although social class is not one of the factors that is explored systematically in the study, an attempt was made to include children representative of families of different socio-educational backgrounds. Almost all of the children in Eryavuz Center carne from higher-middle to upper-class families. Ubaruz Center catered to the children of the staff of a major university, and therefore included children of all backgrounds, mostly lower-middle class and middle-class.
9. Ages are given after quotations in the case of child speakers.
10. Looking only for marked sequences leads to the omission of stories like the earthquake event.
11. The kind of structural elaborations found by Nicolopoulou (1996) when children have audience support in preschool narratives-for-drama suggest that many other manipulations of audience relations to story-telling could alter structural complexity.
12. Linda Young (1994) has described an Asian communication pattern in which background information is presented first, often without further explanation, relying on inference.
13. A later interview with Hasan's father revealed that Hasan didn't have any brothers or sisters. However, the father reported that their neighbor's son, to whom Hasan may be referring as a sibling, had been hospitalized recently for swallowing some headache pills.
14. Such usage of postposed third-person pronouns is very rare in Turkish. In this context, it signifies some ambivalent attitude or emotion on the part of the narrator towards the protagonist – empathy mixed with disapproval and antagonism.
15. Laughter is common in women's self-critical and revealing speech (Ervin-Tripp and Lampert 1992).

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25

Discourse, Social Theory, and Social Research: The Discourse of Welfare Reform

Norman Fairclough

1. Sociolinguistic Theory

The Editorial of the first issue of this journal committed it to promoting the 'building of sociolinguistic theory', arguing that on the one hand sociolinguistics has often been only 'weakly social' in failing to connect with social theory, and on the other hand language-oriented traditions in social science have 'shunned the technical resources that linguistics and semantics offer' (Bell et al. 1997). I agree with Coupland's more recent claim (Coupland 1998) that there is a profound interest in language in recent social theory. This constitutes a so-far undeveloped potential for socially enriching sociolinguistics. At the same time, there is a pervasive failure amongst social theorists to operationalize their theorisations of language in ways of showing specifically how language figures in social life within social research. This is partly a matter of theory stopping short – theoretical frameworks and concepts which centre language within social life are not pushed in the direction of theorisations of language itself. So I agree with Coupland that sociolinguistics can advance social theory – though I see this not as a simple addon, but as a transdisciplinary relationship wherein the logic of one theory is put to work within another (Dubiel 1985; Fairclough 1997; Halliday 1993). Whereas I agree also with Coupland that a single integrated sociolinguistic theory is both implausible and undesirable, I would want to add that integrated *theorizing* is crucial: much recent social theory is committed to overcoming the unproductive divisions between 'macro' and 'micro' theories or 'structure' and 'action' theories by centering its theorising on the dialectic of structure and action (Archer 1995; Bhaskar 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992; Giddens 1990), and I believe sociolinguistics should follow the same route.

2. The Place of Sociolinguistics in Social Research on Modernity

The interest in language in recent social theory is substantially attributable to understandings of modernity which in one way or other centre upon language or imply an enhanced role for language in modern social life as compared with pre-modern social life. The turn to language in recent social theory references a turn to language in recent social life. But different theoretical categories are used to reference similar perceptions of social change within modern society: for some theorists it's a 'turn to language' (or semiosis), for others a 'cultural turn', or an 'ideological turn', or 'a knowledge turn'. These are of course not simply different terms for the same thing, because the theoretical differences are sometimes substantive, but they do nevertheless constitute different takes on broadly the same sorts of social change. Part of the difficulty of the category of 'discourse' is that it slides between these different theorisations.

The turn to language is evident in various narratives of modernity which centre on language, e.g. the influential narrative of modernity as time-space compression and latterly 'globalisation' (Giddens 1990; Harvey 1989, 1996). Social systems are contrasted in terms of their properties of temporal and spatial distantiation, the extent to which social relations are 'stretched' in time and space. Whereas social relations in pre-modern societies were centred upon people being co-present, modern society has involved a progressive 'stretching' of social relations, so that in contemporary ('late modern') society there is a compression of time and space to the point where relations of power can be instantaneously enacted on a global scale – e.g. massive shifts of capital can destabilise governments in a matter of days. Time–space compression disembeds persons and practices from particular local contexts, and undercuts traditions – it entails a process of 'detraditionalisation' and a corresponding enhancement of the reflexivity of social life, understood as living social life on the basis of knowledge about social life. People live in ways which are mediated by discourses which construct work, family, gender (femininity, masculinity), sexuality and so forth in particular ways, which emanate from experts attached to social systems and organisations, and which come to them through the mass media (print, radio, television, the internet). If the 'texts' of early modern society were printed, it is this multisemiotic discourse that constitutes the 'texts' of late modern society. We might say that contemporary social life is 'textually-mediated' – we live our practices and our identities through such texts. This implies a more central role for discourse, for language and other forms of semiosis, in contemporary social life in comparison with earlier social life.[1] There are other narratives of modernity which centre discourse in different ways (for instance, Habermas's version of critical theory, post-structuralist and post-modernist theories of Foucault, Lyotard and Baudrillard, the post-Marxism of Laclau and Mouffe, and the feminist theories of Butler, Fraser and Haraway).

In addition to such 'grand narratives', the dialogue with social theory needs to include more middle-range and local social theory which opens up empirical work on specific fields, such as the theories of Bourdieu (1988, 1991) and Bernstein

theorisation of discourse. If we develop the categories of CDA in a transdisciplinary way through internalizing the logic of these theories, we can operationalize this theorisation in ways of analysing discourse (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999).

If theories of modernity ascribe in one way or another a central place to language, they tend not to specify how it does the social work that is ascribed to it. What is missing is a theoretical specification of the social power of language which could be operationalized as ways of showing in detail within particular social research projects how language and other forms of semiosis perform the social magic which they are credited with. Smith's work is a case in point. It is immensely valuable in producing a feminist sociological account of the social effectivity of texts in contemporary social life, without specifying how texts have these effects. This is where discourse analysis (and more broadly sociolinguistics) can contribute to developing social theory. But this should not be conceived of as simply adding existing theorisations of language onto existing social theories. It is rather a matter of each internalising the theoretical logic of the other, and allowing it to work within its own theorising. It is a matter for instance of doing discourse analysis and developing the theoretical categories of discourse analysis in a way which tries to work with Smith's concept of textually-mediated social life, and of doing sociological analysis and developing sociological categories in a way which tries to work with discourse analytical concepts such as 'interdiscursivity' (Fairclough 1992). In short, developing one theory in dialogue with another, being open to having one theory transformed through internalising the logic of another.

What I shall specifically do in this paper is explore how discourse and text analytical categories might be developed through internalising certain social theoretical logics. The social theoretical logics I shall discuss relate to the theorisation of: (a) social practices (Althusser and Balibar 1970; Mouzelis 1990); (b) different and competing practices (for Bernstein, 'coding modalities') within a given field (Bernstein 1990, 1996); (c) processes of classification in social practices as processes of differentiation and dedifferentiation ('equivalence' in Laclau and Mouffe's terms, 1985). Let me emphasize that my aim is not to produce a finished retheorisation, but to explore what it means to work in a transdisciplinary way.

3. New Labour

I shall give the theoretical concerns of the paper a particular focus by referring to a discourse analytical study I am currently working on, on the political discourse of the 'New Labour' Government in Britain (Fairclough 2000). I shall refer in particular to New Labour's 'reform' of social welfare.

The Labour Party won the general election of May 1997 in the U.K. under the leadership of Tony Blair with a substantial majority after eighteen years of Conservative Party government. Under Blair's leadership, Labour came to the conclusion that its

'Clause 4' of the Party's constitution, amounting to acceptance of capitalism in its new 'global', 'neo-liberal', form. Referring to the Party as 'New' Labour was also seen as important in convincing the electorate that Labour really had changed. This went along with a shift in the focus of the Party's appeal towards 'middle England', the relatively prosperous middle class and upper working class many of whom had supported the Conservatives. Although such matters of interpretation are inherently controversial, the Labour Party is widely perceived as becoming a party of the centre rather than the centre-left.

The repositioning of 'New' Labour has involved significant changes in British politics and government. It represents itself as initiating a 'new polities', a politics of the 'Third Way', which transcends the division in British politics between the ('old') left and the ('new') right. There is a new political discourse which combines elements from Thatcherite Conservative discourse with elements of communitarian and social democratic discourses (a favourite way of summing this up is 'enterprise as well as fairness' – 'enterprise' is a Thatcherite word, 'fairness' is 'New' Labour's preferred alternative to the social democratic 'equality'). There is an attempt to 'reinvent' (or 'modernize') government, involving new forms of 'partnership' between the Government, business, and the voluntary sector. And there is a change in political style which is most obvious in the leadership style of Tony Blair. What is open to question is whether the 'new politics' of 'New' Labour constitutes a new form of social democracy (Giddens 1998), or is a neo-liberal politics which is essentially a continuation of the Thatcherite 'new right' (Marxism Today 1998).

Given that political and governmental processes are substantively linguistic processes, there is a clear general rationale for using the resources of language and discourse analysis in researching politics and government. However, the case is even stronger for New Labour, not only because there has been an unprecedented focus on questions of language both within the Government itself and among those who have commented on it, but also because the 'reinvention' of government (Perri 6 1997, 1998) seems to entail a relative 'turn to discourse' in the way government is conducted. In particular, a move towards a more 'networked' form of governing involving what New Labour calls 'partnerships' with for instance business and the voluntary sector means that government becomes more 'dispersed' among agencies whose activities cannot be directly overlooked from the centre (though the shift towards such networking is in tension with New Labour's taste for strong central control). The emphasis consequently shifts to government interventions to change 'cultures' ('cultural governance'). For example, the Government is intent on introducing 'customer-focused services' in welfare and public services, treating the public as customers and consumers. Changing the 'culture' of government agencies in that direction is very much a matter of changing the language, getting staff to adopt and internalize a new language (e.g. renaming claimants as 'customers'). At the same time, the Government is giving unprecedented attention to how its policies and actions are represented in the media, to putting an advantageous media 'spin' on everything

4. Texts and Social Practices

My objective in this section is to work with the logic of a theory of social practice in order to specify theoretical categories for the social analysis of texts (text, texture, genre, discourse, style, intertextuality, order of discourse), and to show how the theoretical framework which emerges from this can be used in a textually-oriented political analysis of New Labour.

4.1 Social Practices

The analysis of social practices constitutes a theoretically coherent and methodologically effective focus for social scientific research (Archer 1995; Bhaskar 1986; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999). The great strength of the concept of practice is that it allows analysis of social structures to be brought into connection with analysis of social (inter) action – see further below.

All social practices involve forms of work, identification, that is the construction of social identities, and representations of the social world (this is a reworking of Mouzelis 1990 – see also Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999). All social practices are practices of production – work. In claiming that all social practices are work, the aim is not economic reductionism, but on the contrary to insist that people collaboratively produce their social lives in all domains of life, so that economic production is only one special form of social production. All social practices can be characterized in terms of the materials they work on, and the means of production available (techniques, methods, theories), and the social relations within which they produce (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 41). Furthermore, all practices involve identification, the construction of social identities – every practice is associated with particular 'positions' for people (Bhaskar 1986 refers to the 'positions-and-practices system') in terms of which their identities and social relations are specified. However, there are different 'performances' in these positions depending on the social (class, gender, ethnicity, etc.) memberships and life histories of those who occupy them (Archer 1995), and different identities attach to different performances. Finally, people also produce representations of the social world, including representations of themselves and their productive activities – people never simply act, their representations of their actions and domains of action are an inherent part of action, action is reflexive. Different representations tend to be produced from different positions.

4.2 Texts – The Dialectics of Discourse

A social practice as a practice of production brings together different elements of life into a specific local relationship – types of activity, spatial and temporal locations, material resources, persons with particular experiences, knowledges and wants, semiotic resources including language. We can roughly [illegible] four main

I understand 'text' in a broad sense, including spoken as well as written language, and combinations of language with other forms of semiosis including gesture and visual images. In that these diverse elements are brought together to constitute a practice, we can call them 'moments' of that practice (Harvey 1996). A focus of analysis is on processes of 'articulation' (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) – on how elements are brought together as moments within practices, which may achieve stabilization as relative permanencies, but may also be disarticulated. In being articulated together within a practice, elements are transformed. The moments of a practice are in a dialectical relationship – each moment 'internalizes' the others without being reducible to any of them (Harvey 1996). It is in this sense that text *is* physical activity, *is* power, *is* knowledge and desire, etc., yet at the same time something different from all of them. Each of the four categories of element contributes its own distinctive generative powers to the production of social life, though the generative powers of each works through the mediation of the generative powers of the others. From this 'critical realist' perspective (Archer 1995; Bhaskar 1986; Collier 1994) it is relevant to ask, what is the distinctive generative power of text? (See below.) The question of how texts figure in social practices, how in specific terms they are dialectically related to other moments, has to be answered empirically practice by practice, and for each of the three major aspects of practices distinguished above (work, identification, representation).

What is the distinctive generative power of text? What in Hasan's terms is the 'semologic' (Hasan 1999)? It is the power to socially produce, i.e. to work, in its textual moment; the power to produce texts. I shall refer to this as 'texturing', adapting the term 'texture' from Systemic Functional Linguistics (Halliday and Hasan 1976). So the production of social life in social practices is partly the production of texts. The creativity of texturing as a mode of social production consists in generating new meanings through generating new combinations of elements of semiotic systems (including new 'wordings'). Any difference of wording entails a difference of meaning, though the nature of that difference is a matter for social negotiation and renegotiation as wordings are repeated in shifting contexts (Derrida 1978; Hasan 1999). Is the generative power of text attributable purely to properties of language and other semiotic systems? Language and other semiotic systems are open systems with an unlimited capacity to make meaning through generating syntagmatic and paradigmatic connections. Yet there is also a social structuring of semiotic diversity – the social order of discourse (see below) – which limits the generative capacity of language and other semiotic systems by limiting the combinatorial possibilities of genres and discourses. What I am suggesting is that there is a double structuring of the semiotic, the structuring of semiotic systems and the structuring of orders of discourse, and that the specification of the generative power of text needs to be in terms of both.

4.3 Genres, Styles and Discourses

[illegible] of genre, discourse and

For any particular practice, the question of genre is the question of how texts figure (in relation to other moments) within work, the production of social life, and therefore within the social interaction that constitutes work. Different genres are different means of production of a specifically textual sort, different resources for texturing. Social production, i.e. work, both produces social life and reproduces social life; it is simultaneously creative and conservative. Our theorization of genre must capture that; Bakhtin's (1986) theory of genre is indispensable in its subtle combination of the relative fixities of genres and their openness to new articulations.

The question of styles is the question of how text figures (in relation to other moments) in the identification of people involved in the practice (the construction of identities for them, and differences between them). Different styles attach to different identities.

The question of discourses is the question of how texts figure (in relation to other moments) in how people represent the world, including themselves and their productive activities. Different discourses are different ways of representing associated with different positions. They constitute different visions of for instance the field of government and the wider conjuncture of social fields it is a part of, and different classification (or *di*-visions) of that social world.

4.4 Field, Order of Discourse, Intertextuality

There is one further important characteristic of social practices – they are organised into networks. Networks are more or less stable, more or less fluid. Networks articulate together different forms of work (social relations), different identifications, and different representations, corresponding to the different practices they combine. Practices are networked together within particular areas of social life which have a relative internal coherence and are relatively demarcated from others (for instance, politics, or education). Following Bourdieu I shall call these 'fields' (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Both the internal organisation of fields, and the way social life is divided between fields, are open to change. The social relations of fields are relations of power and struggle, in which the external boundaries and internal structure of the field are stakes.

Since social practices are always networked within fields, analysis of the textual moment is always concerned with specifying how different genres, different discourses, and different styles are articulated together in particular sorts of relationships. We can use the term 'order of discourse' (Fairclough 1992) to talk about fields as relative permanences specifically in terms of these articulations within the moment of text. The term 'intertextuality' (or 'inter-discursivity', Fairclough 1992) can be used on the other hand to talk about shifting articulations of genres, discourses and styles in specific texts.

4.5 Structure and Action

Men (sic) make their

> and inherited circumstances with which they are directly confronted. (Marx 1973)

A preoccupation in recent social theory has been how to overcome the unproductive divide between theories of structure and theories of action, though the quotation from Marx above symbolizes a long tradition of dialectical thinking about structure/action. Theorisations and analyses oriented only to structure are incomplete because structure as well as being the precondition for action is the outcome of action, is transformed in action. This is what Bhaskar (after Giddens) calls the 'duality of structure' (Bhaskar 1986). Theorisations and analyses oriented only to action are incomplete, because action not only produces social life, it also reproduces structures which are its precondition. This is what Bhaskar calls the 'duality of praxis'. Social science should include theories and analyses of both structure and action, and of their interconnection. Social analysis based upon social practices and positions constitutes a theoretically coherent and methodologically effective focus for social research precisely because it allows structure and action to be brought into connection (Bhaskar 1986). On the structural side, positions within practices are pre-given 'slots' in which people have to act, and the position-practice system has a relative durability over time. But, on the action side, although positions are defined abstractly for collective actors, they are occupied by individuals who belong to diverse categories of social agent (working class, middle class; women, men; black, white; and so forth), and who have an individual sense of self (Archer 1995). The dynamics of the social and individual relations played out in practices transcend and transform the position-practice system.[2]

Analysis of the textual moment of social practices mediates between the perspective of action, that is the specificity of the particular text, its specific forms of intertextuality, and the perspective of structure i.e. the order of discourse. The order of discourse is seen as both a precondition for and constraint on textual action, texturing as a mode of work, and an effect of textual action, both reproduced and transformed through textual action. The categories of genre, style and discourse are understood in a way which facilitates movement between the perspectives of structure and action. They are categories both of the order of discourse and of the text. Genres, styles and discourses are on the one hand relatively permanent elements of orders of discourse, and on the other hand instantaneously and shiftingly constituted in specific texts in ways which may to a greater or lesser degree reproduce or transform the permanences of orders of discourse. Those who favour neatness may regard this tension within the categories as simply confusing, but it is essential to a dialectical movement between the perspectives of structure and action in the analysis of texts and discourse.

4.6 New Labour, Government and Text

The field of government can be seen from the perspective of this paper as a network of social practices, which changes over time and varies from place to

and place, one needs to look at how exactly practices are networked together. Part of that exercise is looking at the textual moment of the field, at how different genres, discourses and styles are articulated together within its order of discourse. Some changes in practices and orders of discourse can be identified with specific governments, others are longer-term. Although the specific network of practices under New Labour is distinctive, some of its features are longer-term and apparent for instance in the Conservative governments which preceded it.

The 'reinvention of government' (Perri 6 1997, 1998) under New Labour involves shifts in the field of government. We can think of this as shifts between the field of government and other related fields which transform the field of government itself – the 'inside' of government is transformed through transformations in its relationship to the 'outside'. This involves shifts in the relationship between the fields of government, politics, media, market research, business, voluntary work, and so forth. Shifts in these relationships are internalized as a new conjuncture of practices constituting the field of government itself (the field of government selectively 'takes in', recontextualizes (Bernstein 1990, 1996), practices of politics, media, market research and so forth). For instance, the state becomes 'managerial', incorporating business management practices into government (Clarke and Newman 1997). This applies also for the textual moment: government under New Labour is a new order of discourse, a new articulation of genres, discourses and styles.

Althusser and Balibar (1970) characterize practices of production in terms of the sort of 'effects' they produce. The work of government produces social effects (new social practices and conjunctures of practices) through producing political effects (groupings and alliances of people around/behind desired social effects). Part of the analysis of a particular form of government is specifying the genres of government, the textual means of governing and producing the effects of government.

New Labour has meant changes in the genres of government, including changes in which genres are articulated together and how they are articulated together – for instance, 'focus group' discussion has been incorporated into the array of genres, and articulated with more mainstream genres through the mediation of research reports and press releases which 'translate' focus group discussions into forms which can be incorporated into for instance official documents. Or again, media genres such as the press release or newspaper feature article have taken on a more prominent role among the genres of government and come in a sense to dominate mainstream governmental genres (Franklin 1998). At the same time, the adoption of more 'managerial' practices in government means that mainstream genres such as consultation documents (so-called 'Green Papers') have also changed (see below). In broad terms, New Labour has accentuated the longer-term shift towards achieving the effects of government through managerial rather than political means. This means that, in terms of the textual moment, the political discourse of New Labour is a promotional discourse, which avoids and excludes political dialogue.

field. New Labour has had a radical impact on political discourse through the discourse of the 'Third Way', which has appropriated much of the Conservative discourse of Thatcherism (and is in that sense 'post-Thatcherite', Driver and Martell 1998) which it has combined into a new mix with elements of communitarian and social democratic discourses, leaving the Conservative Party floundering in search of a distinctive political discourse of its own.

A third part of the analysis is specifying the distribution of political styles, and how they figure in the constitution of identities and differences. These include the identities of parties, tendencies and individuals. New Labour has (especially through the person of Tony Blair) achieved a dominant political style, a textual construction of an identity which is effective in conveying its mix of values (youthfulness, compassion, toughness, etc.) and capturing the cultural mood. (I am writing in the northern hemisphere spring of 1999 – this might of course change.)

5. New Labour Welfare 'Reform': The Textual Moment

I focus now on analysis of the textual moment of a specific aspect of New Labour in government, the 'reform' of social welfare. I shall pursue the theme of working in a transdisciplinary way by drawing upon other theoretical logics in addition to the theorisation of social practice – specifically, Bernstein's sociological theory of the field of pedagogy (1990, 1996), and Laclau and Mouffe's theorisation of hegemonic struggle (1985).

5.1 'Reform' of Social Welfare

One of the major commitments of the 'New' Labour government is the 'reform' of the welfare state. I use scare quotes for 'reform' to indicate that it is a contentious representation of what the Government is doing – for instance in the words of an *Observer* editorial (14 February 1999) an 'anodyne' term which represents as 'neutral, technological and essentially benign' what can otherwise be represented as 'the salami slicing of welfare benefits' and 'the rebasing of the welfare state around means-testing rather than universalism and income redistribution'. The Government argues that 'reform' is necessary because the system is increasingly expensive yet ineffective in relieving poverty and 'tackling' social exclusion, and encourages a 'dependence' on welfare amongst people who could work. Welfare state reform in Britain is in many ways analogous to reforms underway elsewhere – the U.S. shift from welfare to 'workfare' for instance is widely recognised as having been a model for New Labour, and there are similar attempts at reform in other E.U. countries. But international 'neo-liberal' tendencies to reduce welfare provision do not preclude national specificity: Clarke and Newman argue (1997, 1998) that the post-war British welfare state was part of specific social and organisational 'settlements' which have been 'unsettled' by radical social

Welfare reform is a major process which is likely to extend over several years. I shall focus on just one point in that process, the publication of the so-called 'Green Paper' on welfare reform. A Green Paper in the British system is a consultative document in which the Government sets out options and its own position and solicits public discussion. It is a preliminary to legislation. The welfare Green Paper (entitled 'New Ambitions for Our Country: A New Contract for Welfare') was published in March 1998. This particular point in the reform process itself involves a network of practices, and in its textual moment a network of genres, discourses and styles.

5.2 Generic Chaining

The production of effects within the field of government depends upon the constituent practices articulated together (networked) within it being 'chained' together in particular ways. For instance, there are two practices whose positioning in these chains seems to be regarded by commentators as distinctive for government under New Labour. The first is 'experiments in democracy' (Giddens 1998) such as using focus groups and citizens' juries (e.g. the 'People's Panel'). One view of the function of such experiments is in testing reactions to government initiatives as part of a wider strategy for managing consent. The strategic location of these legitimizing exercises in the chaining of practices is important. So too is the location of enhanced forms of media management which have been critically referred to as 'government by media "spin"' (Franklin 1998), which can be seen as part of the shift towards 'cultural governance' (which entails a preoccupation with representations and the control of representations). One feature of New Labour noted by commentators such as Franklin is that every move by government appears to come with a prepared media strategy, implying a chain structure punctuated by media-oriented practices.

One aspect of texturing as work (social production) in a textual mode is the arrangement of genres in what we can call 'generic chains' as part of the chaining of practices, i.e. the regular sequential ordering of different genres. We find generic chains of the following general form in the welfare reform process: . . . . speech – (media reports) – document <press release> – (media reports) – speech <press release> . . . That is, a document such as the Green Paper on welfare reform is likely to be prepared for and followed up by speeches on the part of important ministers, but each of these (like the document itself) comes with its own press release (systematically incorporating a media 'spin' – see below on this term), and each subsequent move in the chain is responsive to media reactions to earlier moves. Practices such as focus groups may be inserted into such chains through research reports which also come with press releases attached. On occasion press conferences will also figure in such chains.

The press release for the Green Paper on welfare reform is reproduced in Appendix 1. I shall begin the analysis of it here, but go into more detail in section 5.6. This is a 'boundary' genre which links the fields of [illegible]

(administrative) genre or rather sub-genre (i.e. occurring as part of other genres) – a set of background notes. The latter also hybridizes the former: the date and reference number between the headline and lead paragraph. The 'report' is also a resource for producing reports, and the latter part of it consists of important elements of that resource – key principles of the Green Paper, key quotes from Field and Blair. It is in a sense an official summary, but a summary which selects and orders what it summarizes with a partly promotional intent. In this respect too the 'report' hybridizes media and governmental genres. It is a sort of 'transitional' genre. In sum, the hybridity of the press release as a genre arises from its positioning in generic chains.

The process of summarizing is crucially important not only in press releases but throughout the practices of government. The Green Paper itself includes its own internal summaries – the first chapter is a summary of the whole document, there is a summary of the main points in the last chapter, the Prime Minister's Foreword incorporates his summary, the press release constitutes a summary oriented to media uptake, and the document is then summarized over and over again in speeches. It is through summarizing that media 'spin' is added. By media 'spin' I mean a particular representation of an event or series of events (including a speech or a document) designed to manage the way they are perceived by the public. Differences in summaries are also significant in the negotiation and contestation of political differences within the Government as well as between the Government and other parties and interested groups and organisations. Summarizing is a form of representation and is linked to the question of discourses – the different summaries referred to above involve differences in discourses.

5.3 Recontextualization

Summarizing can also be seen as an aspect of what Bernstein calls 'recontextualization' (1990, 1996). Every practice (and every network of social practices – every field) recontextualizes other social practices according to principles which are specific to that practice/field, which derive from the particular form of social production (work) associated with that practice/field. For instance, the press release is a practice which here recontextualizes according to its own particular logic two other practices: a press conference held by Frank Field to launch the Green paper, and the documentary practice of the Green Paper itself (also Blair's Foreword as a distinct genre or perhaps sub-genre within that practice). Practices in being recontextualized are so to speak uprooted, torn from their own social circumstances, and they appear in the recontextualized form of discourses.[3]

The concept of recontextualization draws attention to the link between production (work) and representation: the way other practices are represented depends on the work that is going on, as well as different positions occupied by people who are involved in the work. Using the concept of recontextualization to think about the textual moment draws attention to links between genres (ways [illegible] and discourses (textual representations). It points [illegible] ongoing

link between analysis of genres and analysis of discourses (and indeed analysis of styles). But in order to move in this direction we need to look elsewhere for a perspective and categories which will allow us to operationalize a processual view of representation. I suggest we can find them in the political theory of Laclau and Mouffe (1985). But further categories of Bernstein's are needed to make that connection: the categories of 'framing' and 'classification'. Thinking with these categories is a way of socially enriching the text-analytical categories of 'genre' and 'discourse'.

5.4 Genre and Framing

'Framing' in Bernstein's theory is a matter of control – in the terms I have been using, the control and regulation of work, i.e. of social production, and therefore of the action and interaction which constitute work. Framing according to Bernstein is either 'strong' (where control is one-sided) or 'weak' (where control is shared). I want to suggest, following Chouliaraki (1998), that it is productive to think of genres as devices for framing, i.e. as means for controlling work in a textual mode. Framing is a matter of both properties of individual genres and the chaining of genres. In the case of welfare reform, the chaining of genres constitutes a strong 'framing' of its process of production, i.e. one facet of the powerful one-sided control and management of the process of achieving political consent by the Government. I shall focus in this section on one chapter of the Green Paper itself (chapter 3, 'The importance of work'), returning to the press release in 5.6. Readers will find the first 14 paragraphs of the chapter (there are 40 in all) in Appendix 2.

The Green Paper consists of a (signed) Preface by the Prime Minister Tony Blair, followed by a Summary of the whole document, Chapter 1 which sets out the case for welfare reform, Chapter 2 which identifies four 'ages' of welfare, and eight 'key principles' of welfare reform which constitute the topics of chapters 3–10. Chapter 11 is about the longer-term future of welfare, and there is an Appendix on the evolution of social security.

I have already suggested that the political effects of government in the production of consent are sought by New Labour not through political dialogue but through management and promotion despite representations of the welfare reform process (e.g. 'It is vital that reform is informed by a full debate on the proposed framework', Summary chapter para 31). The framing of this promotional practice of governance is strong, that is the Government tightly and unilaterally controls the process. Referring specifically to the Green Paper, it is characterized by a strongly framed promotional genre.

Each of the central chapters (3–10) is structured as follows: a chapter title ('The importance of work' in the case of chapter 3) below which there is a coloured box containing one of the eight 'principles' of the proposed welfare reform. In this case 'Principle 1': *The new welfare state should help and encourage people of working age to work where they are capable of doing so.* There is then an unheaded introductory section f[illegible]

taking up the bulk of the chapter (paragraphs 6–40) setting out proposed future welfare practices; and under the heading 'Measures for Success' a short list of criteria against which the success of the proposed reforms will be judged (end of paragraph 40). Each of the chapters tells readers what the case is for welfare reform but above all what the Government has done, is doing and intends or aims to do in the way of welfare reform.

In these accounts, welfare reform is represented as a managerial process of problem-solving, finding solutions to obstacles in the way of the objectives formulated in the eight 'principles', with the problem-solver represented as virtually exclusively the Government itself. Specifically in this chapter: work is the means of averting poverty and welfare dependency, but there are obstacles to people working, so the Government will take certain steps to facilitate work. This argumentative structure is repeated in places within the central 'Policy Direction' part of the chapter, though its focus is heavily on the 'solutions' (the predominant type of clause has an actional process with the Government as agent – what the Government has done, is doing, or will do). Representing welfare reform as managerial problem-solving and structuring these central chapters of the document in terms of problem-solving is part of what makes the genre promotional: the Government's policies are sold as merely technical solutions to an agreed problem.

Although in the nature of things there are many unanswered questions at this consultative stage in the reform process, no questions are asked:[4] the grammatical mood is declarative. The potential for questions is indicated by their marginal presence at the end of the Summary chapter where the reform process is constructed as debate:

> it is also vital that reform is informed by full debate on the proposed framework. We are consulting widely on the content of this Green Paper and we want your views. For instance, how can we best deliver on our guiding principles? Are there ways in which the policy direction can be improved? Are our tracking measurements for success right?

Statements are categorical assertions – again, although in the nature of things there are uncertainties about what has happened or what is the case and hesitations about what should be done, there are no 'maybes' here. The Government is constructed as in full and solitary control. The simulation of certainty and being in control are part of the representation of welfare reform as problem-solving and part of the promotional rhetoric of the document.

Moreover, there is a slippage between the process of consultation over proposed welfare reform and the process of implementation, between consultation document, planning document, and publicity document. This is evident in the use of coloured boxes (eight in all) in the chapter. These boxes contain bullet points or in one case numbered points, with or without headings. Such boxes are widely used in planning documents. The clearest example of this sort of use [illegible] of the chapter, the 'Success Measures': there is no discussion of

were itself a planning instrument in the implementation of welfare reform. Such boxes are also widely used in publicity. The document oscillates between describing the proposed welfare reform, and publicizing it, as it might publicize particular schemes to claimants in implementing the welfare reform. Welfare reform is not simply represented as problem-solving in the document (which would be a matter of what discourse is drawn upon), it is enacted as problem-solving – there is an ambivalence of genre.

These boxes figure as a structuring device: they mark and signal to readers careful authorial planning of and tight control over the text and texturing. They are a resource for strong framing, strong unilateral control by the writer (the Government) over the texturing. For instance the box in paragraph 5 lists in their sequential order the main sections of the 'Policy Direction' part of the chapter which takes up 35 of its 40 paragraphs. The boxes also figure as a pedagogical device, directing the reader to the main points and the main structures of the projected new world of welfare. These are 'reader-friendly' but also thereby reader-directive features, which construct the social relations of the document as asymmetrical relations not only between the one who tells and the one who is told but also more specifically between teacher and learner, with strong classification (insulation) between the two subject positions (see 5.5). The many section headings work in a similar way.

There is an oscillation between informing and persuading ('telling' and 'selling') throughout the document – correspondingly between the social relations of 'telling' constructed in the pedagogical way referred to above, and the social relations of 'selling' (relations between the one who sells (persuades) and the one who potentially buys (accepts)). Take paragraphs 5–7 as an example. One aspect of this oscillation is the shift between third person ('the Government', para 5, the first and third sentences of para 6, the second sentence of para 7) and first person ('we', the second sentence of para 6 – notice the explicit commitment to changing culture, 'cultural governance', the first sentence of para 7). This oscillation between 'the Government' and 'we' occurs throughout the document in the 'solutions' part of the problem-solution structure. Notice that 'we' is open to an ambivalence which is an aspect of the promotional character of the genre – for instance, is the 'we' of 'our ambition' in para 6 the Government, or the Labour Party? and more generally, is the Green Paper government report or party 'propaganda'? Another aspect of the oscillation between informing and persuading is the shift in explicitness of evaluation. The two sentences with first person are also the two most explicitly evaluative – the first including the noun 'ambition' which has a marked positive evaluation in contrast with 'aim' (which occurs here twice as a verb), and 'nothing less than'; the second including several words/expressions which are positively (first two) or negatively (second two) evaluative in this context: 'comprehensive', 'break the mould', 'old', 'passive'.

5.5 Discourse and Classification

I referred earlier to different discourses constituting different visions (...

are framing in its textual mode, i.e. forms of control, discourses are classification in its textual mode, i.e. forms of power. Discourses are forms of what Bourdieu calls 'symbolic violence' (Bourdieu 1991). Discourses classify people, things, places, events etc. – and indeed other discourses. The central question is what sort of boundaries and 'insulations' (Bernstein 1990) are set up between discourses. The recontextualization of practices as I said earlier transforms them into discourses, and imposes upon them classifications and divisions, variably according to different positions in the recontextualing practice. Classification may be strong or weak (Bernstein 1990) – entities may be sharply or loosely divided, strongly or weakly insulated from each other.

The Green Paper selectively recontextualizes social practices to constitute a discourse of social welfare, a vision of the world of welfare. The first division, classification, is between what is included and what is excluded – the analysis of discourses has to attend to absences as well as presences. For instance, the population of the world of welfare in this discourse of social welfare is a sparse one, consisting essentially of the Government and welfare claimants. Welfare staff figure in a very few instances, and a claimant organisation ('lone parent organisations') only once in this chapter – claimant and campaign organisations are rare in the document as a whole. On the other hand, welfare professionals such as doctors are simply absent.

The second division is amongst the entities (persons, things, events, discourses, etc.) which are included. This 'internal' classification is strong – in the case of persons included within the world of welfare, the Government and welfare claimants are strongly divided, insulated from each other. Overwhelmingly, the agent in actional processes is the Government – 'the Government', 'we', or a Government initiative such as one of the 'New Deals'. Overwhelmingly, claimants figure as Goals or Beneficiaries in actional processes. The Government acts, claimants are acted upon. Welfare staff rarely act, welfare professionals never, and claimants generally only where their actions are initiated/managed by the Government (e.g. in paragraph 9: *It aims to help young unemployed people . . . to find jobs*). The dominance of the Government over the process of welfare reform enacted in the strong framing is in a sense repeated in the strong classification, the exclusive agency of the Government in the represented world of welfare.

Claimants (and staff) do however figure if only marginally in another participant role: as agents in verbal processes and experiencers in mental processes, mainly in paragraph 14. There is also a scatter of other examples elsewhere in the chapter where claimants are subjects of mental process verbs (e.g. 'the vast majority of single parents want to work', 'some people feel forced to give up their job'). These can be seen as recontextualizations of what people say in other practices; they take the form of reports of particular things people have said or thought (i.e. they are 'reported speech' and 'reported thought'). In the reporting of speech, the practice that is being recontextualized is sometimes explicitly identified, and sometimes not. Here it is not, but it is evident that the practice is market research (opinion polls, surveys, perhaps focus groups) – that [illegible] in terms of what claimants (and staff) say or think.

of single parents want to work': not only is the practice where these 'wants' were expressed unspecified, so also is who precisely expressed them (possible alternative: 'in a poll of single parent opinion, the vast majority of those asked said they wanted to work'). The Government speaks for these people. Part of the classification which divides the Government from claimants is that the latter do not act (without Government management) but do react (verbally, mentally), though both the ways in which they react and how reactions are represented are controlled by Government (van Leeuwen 1995). One might say that this 'reinvented' form of government includes market research as a technology for legitimizing the Government speaking for the public. Apart from these examples, what others (including relevant others such as welfare professionals, claimant groups) say is not reported. The Green Paper is monological, univocal, dominated by the voice of the Government and excluding other voices.

The Government's welfare reform policy is summed up as 'welfare to work', getting people off welfare and into work, so the practice of work is heavily but again very selectively recontextualized. A key issue is what is seen as included within the practice of work – what 'work' is. Work is overwhelmingly constructed in the document as 'jobs' in the traditional sense – relatively stable and regular work providing enough to live on. The fact that an increasing proportion of work is casual, part-time, and poorly paid, is not focused in the document. Nor is the question of whether for example, women's work in households counts as 'work'. Recent debate over what should count as 'work' does not figure – whether e.g. governments should deliberately stimulate the 'third' (e.g. voluntary) sector and legitimize it as 'work' (Giddens 1998). This is an aspect of the first division, between what is included and what is excluded: these other discourses of work are not explicitly included, though they do have an implicit presence.

For the most part, the word 'work' is used without modification to mean 'jobs' in the sense above. However, there is a shift to the expression 'paid work' twice in the document, once in para 1 of chapter 3. Why this shift? It is significant that it occurs here, at the beginning of the chapter dealing centrally with work. The shift is informationally backgrounded – 'paid work' in sentence 3 is the unmarked theme and is thus constructed as simply a repetition of 'work' in sentence 1. There is no explicit contrast between paid and other sorts of work. Nevertheless, the shift does implicitly signal a contrast – the specification of 'work' as 'paid work' is an implicit acknowledgement that there are other understandings (and discourses) of work. There is also a trace of an alternative discourse of 'work' later in the chapter in paragraph 9 which is the only such case in the document. A list of 'opportunities' for young unemployed people includes: 'work with an employer who will receive a job subsidy', 'work with a voluntary sector organisation', and 'work on the Environmental Taskforce'. Only the first is a 'job' in the usual sense. On the other hand, when the document refers to what parents do in caring for children, it does not refer to that activity as 'work'. As with reported speech so with discourses, an important variable is whether they are attributed (to voices) and located (in practices). What we have here is a covert recontextualization of what people say about work in other practices (—at

The Green Paper is cut off from debates over the nature and future of work, through strong classification which is manifested in the exclusion of relevant other voices, and in the dominance of one discourse of work over an alternative which is only covert. Yet one might think that these debates are crucial for a policy which depends entirely on moving people from welfare into work, given that the number of 'jobs' in the traditional sense is shrinking. Without some fundamental rethinking of the nature of work, the policy looks at best incoherent, at worst dishonest.

By contrast with the representation of work, there is a diversity of discourses in the representation of the social relations of welfare within the document, and that diversity is evident to a degree in the introductory section of this chapter, specifically in paragraph 5, which includes the following representations of the practices of the new world of welfare: 'promote work', 'help people move from welfare to work' (and in Principle 1, 'help and encourage people to work'), 'develop flexible . . . services', 'responsibilities and rights are fairly matched'. The construction of the social relations of welfare as 'helping' relations has been central to the British welfare state, but 'helping' is mainly focused in this document on getting people off welfare and into work. 'Promoting' and 'developing flexible . . . services' by contrast belong to a managerial discourse, and the former connotes cultural intervention. There is also legal/contractual discourse in 'responsibilities and rights'. But the main feature of the construction of the social relations of welfare is the mixture of bureaucratic/professional welfare discourse ('helping' etc.) and managerial/cultural ('promoting' etc.), with the latter predominant. An example of the latter is in paragraph 21 of chapter 3: 'personalised', 'flexible' services are 'delivered', through a single 'gateway' for 'customers' by 'personal advisers' who develop 'tailor-made action plans' for individuals. There is a new discourse here which 'relexicalizes' (Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew 1979) welfare services. Cultural effects can be achieved in so far as the Government can win acceptance for such shifts in discourse and the new identities and values they entail. In so far as this document represents (as it is claimed to) a 'third way' between traditional social democracy and neo-liberalism, it would seem to lie in this discoursal diversity in the recontextualisation of (the social relations of) the new world of welfare – a point at which the classification and division between subjects is relatively open.

5.6 Equivalence and Difference

If we use Bernstein's categories of framing and classification to think about genre and discourse, we can analyse the Green Paper as simultaneously regulating the work and social relations of government, and representing the world of welfare (producing a vision of that world through division). But we still need a way of showing how regulation and representation are bound together in the process of texturing; that is, we still need a way of analysing representation processually. Classifications are not simply imposed through the generic framing of interaction

We can draw upon the political theory of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) to find a way of theorizing and operationalizing this perspective. They theorize the political process (and 'hegemony') in terms of the simultaneous working of two different 'logics', a logic of 'difference' which creates differences and divisions, and a logic of 'equivalence' which subverts existing differences and divisions. I want to suggest first that this can usefully be seen as a general characterization of social processes of classification: people in all social practices are continuously dividing and combining – producing (also reproducing) and subverting divisions and differences. Social practice, as Laclau and Mouffe suggest, is an ongoing work of articulation and disarticulation. My second suggestion is that this can be applied specifically to the textual moment of social practices. Elements (words, phrases, etc.) are constantly being combined and divided in texts; prior combinations and separations are constantly being subverted. The point that texts are constantly combining some elements and dividing others is a rather obvious one. But what I am suggesting is that we see these processes as part of the textual moment of the social process of classification, and that by doing so we can see the integration of that textual process with the textual work of controlling and regulating social relations and interactions. That is, we can see the integration of discourses with genres.

It is easier within the limits of an article to show this process in a short text than in a long one, so I shall refer again to the Green Paper press release (Appendix 1). The press release is a recontextualization of a press conference given by Frank Field and of the Green Paper itself including the Prime Minister's foreword. It is a recontextualization which is shaped by the genre of the press release, the work it is doing (the effects it is trying to produce) and the way the work is regulated and controlled.

As I said in 5.2, the press release is a combination of two genres, 'report' and background notes. I am only concerned here with the former. The headline and lead (which I take to include the first three paragraphs – i.e. sections separated by spaces) give a summary of the Green Paper and press conference which is elaborated in the rest of the 'report'. The logic of the report genre is an additive and elaborative one favouring repetition and expansion. The 'report' is also a promotion, and the summary in the headline and lead also incorporates a particular 'spin' which needs to be subsequently sustained and developed. The direct reproduction of the eight 'principles' which constitute the Green Paper's self-summary falls outside these reporting and promotional logics – the press release is also a sort of official summary which is expected to give the 'complete picture'.

Turning to discourse and classification, the headline and lead selectively focus certain aspects of the vision of the 'reformed' world of welfare in the Green Paper: the reform as a 'contract', 'promoting opportunity instead of dependence', 'work for those who can, security for those who can't'. This selective focus constitutes the 'spin'. There is actually internal evidence of differences of position and focus between Field and Blair (Field takes a more ethical stance towards welfare reform, Blair sees it more in terms of

the eight principles with the rest of the report. For instance the construction of welfare as a 'contract' is not included in the principles, and is not prominent in the Green Paper until chapter 11, which deals with the long-term future rather than the immediate reform. The section selected from Blair's foreword is the last four paragraphs which are the only ones in which he refers to the new welfare 'contract'. This focus is therefore a significant one, and it had an effect on media coverage of the Green Paper – several national newspapers for instance reproduced a table in chapter 11 summarizing the vision of a 'new welfare contract' for 2020!

Let me come to division and combination – the logics of difference and equivalence. The second paragraph of the lead incorporates two divisions taken from the Green Paper – 'opportunity instead of dependence', and 'work for those who can, and security for those who can't'. The latter is a double division: the division between those who work and those who can't is mapped onto the division between 'work' and 'security', restricting by implication the social security offered by the welfare system to those who are unable to work. These divisions condense important features of the New Labour welfare 'reform': an acceptance of the New Right construction of welfare as morally objectionable in promoting 'welfare dependency', the commitment to 'equality of opportunity' as an alternative to 'welfare dependency', shifting the focus of welfare towards getting people off welfare and into work (which gives the division between those who can work and those who can't primacy over the division between those who have work and those who haven't).

These divisions are repeated and elaborated in the quotations from Field. The first paragraph of those quotations contains in addition to a repetition of 'work for those who can; security for those who cannot' a division between 'a cycle of dependency and insecurity' and 'an ethic of work and savings'. Although the various elements put together here can be found in the Green Paper, this particular division is Field's, it is 'spin' as creative elaboration, a process of representational work. It is combination as well as division: 'dependency' combined with 'insecurity', 'work' with 'savings'. The division is again a double one – 'dependency and insecurity' as against 'work and savings', but also 'cycle' as against 'ethic'. The latter seems somewhat incoherent. Field's specific position and difference from others within New Labour is evident both in the foregrounding of the ethical aspect of welfare 'reform' – which is present in the Green Paper, but marginal – and more subtly in the rewording of 'dependence' as 'dependency', which is a more direct evocation of the New Right theories of 'welfare dependency' referred to above and again foregrounds the moral dimension. The two instances of 'genuine' in the third and fourth paragraphs of the Field quotation also accentuate the moral dimension, and also show that division can be covert – 'those in genuine need' are covertly set off from those not in genuine need (those whose claimed needs are not genuine). The moral division between the deserving and undeserving poor is echoed here.

At the same time, the division between those who can and those who cannot

who cannot work', and 'those of working age' and 'those in genuine need who can't work'. The former hybridizes two divisions, 'can/cannot' and 'want to/don't want to', formulating the shift in New Labour thinking from seeing work as an option for the disabled to expecting those who are able to work to do so. The latter generalizes the category of those who can work to those of working age – the message is that if you are of working age you work unless you are too severely disabled to do so, a message which is underscored by the combination of 'work' and 'welfare' which subverts the division between them – 'work is the best form of welfare'.

Summing up the quotation from Field, the vision of welfare which is summarized in the divisions of paragraph two of the lead is further worked up through the divisions and combinations of the quoted material. This is a localized instance of how the politics of New Labour, the 'Third Way', is constantly in process as its elements are worked (textured) together in texts – in this case for instance in a way which foregrounds ethical and moral aspects of welfare 'reform'. The process of working up the discourse takes place according to the logic of the genre, involving in this case a movement from summarizing gist in the headlines and lead, to repetition and elaboration in the rest of the 'report'. The genre is of course a relatively simple one, and the interplay between discourse/classification/division and genre/interaction/regulation is much more complex for instance in the Green Paper itself.

Differences of position and perspective between Field and other New Labour leaders which are well known and can be extensively documented elsewhere are also evident here. The ethical focus is Field's rather than Blair's – which does not mean that it is absent from Blair's political discourse, just that it is not worked into the same salience. Conversely, it is the Blair quotations which elaborate the construction of welfare as a 'contract' – though again it is also part of Field's political discourse. In the first paragraph of the Blair quotation there is a three-way division which sets the 'third way' against 'dismantling welfare' and 'keeping it unreformed', and constructs the former as a 'new contract between citizen and state', and in terms of a marked form of combination which is pervasive in New Labour discourse – the 'but also' relation.

I use this term for combinations which can be paraphrased with 'x but also y' (or 'not only x, y'). The example here is: 'we keep a welfare state from which we all benefit, but on terms which are fair and clear' (or: 'but we also make the terms fair and clear'). Other instances of the 'but also' relation are: '. . . the vast majority of us benefit . . . But we all contribute . . .', 'We benefit but we pay', 'fair not just for the existing generation, but fair between generations'. The pervasiveness of the 'but also' relation in New Labour is a part of the politics of the 'Third Way' – the 'Third Way' is all about transcending divisions, reconciling what had been seen as unreconcilable, combining themes from the 'old' left and 'new right'. There is a very prominent New Labour 'but also' relation which is alluded to here and most directly formulated in the lead as 'reciprocal duties between government and the individual' but interestingly not formulated in its usual form – 'rights and responsibilities'. Rather, the [illegible]

of the 'Third Way'. Also, by combining universality ('we all benefit') with the everyday concept of 'fairness', and constructing the contract as a 'fair deal', Blair connects the 'reform' with everyday values and criticisms of the existing system (in terms of 'unfair' abuses of it). This everyday and one might say populist construction stands in contrast with the austere, theoretical, and moral construction of the lead: 'reciprocal duties between government and the individual' – one might see this as part of a difference in style between Field and Blair.

6. Conclusion

In addressing the question of sociolinguistic theory which I raised in the opening section, I have drawn upon several social theories in a transdisciplinary way, using them to think theoretically about language within the operational context of research on the political discourse of New Labour, trying to enhance the capacity of the particular area of sociolinguistics I have been concerned with (discourse analysis) to advance social theory in the direction of language. There are gains, I am suggesting, both for the sociolinguist and for the social theorist.

The gains for the sociolinguist from thinking with theories of social practice are more explicit and coherent specifications of how the semiotic (language, discourse in the abstract sense, text) figures as an element of the social. What I have specifically argued is that there is a textual moment in any social practice, and that the textual moment has three facets for which we can use the categories of genre, discourse (as a count noun), and style. The category of intertextuality can be specified as the textual aspect of the articulatory character of social practice. Other categories such as dialect and register could also be grounded and differentiated in theorisations of social practice. I argued that theories of practice can be enhanced with theories of fields as networks of practices whose textual aspect is orders of discourse. I also argued that a socially-grounded theorisation of texts as processes involving the interplay of genre and discourse (as a count noun) could be developed through thinking with the categories of recontextualization, classification and framing, and the logics of difference and equivalence. What this gives is a way of specifying the process of texturing as work – the production of social life in its textual moment. My concern has been to discuss a particular way of working, in a transdisciplinary mode, and again this could be pushed in different directions, for instance towards the concern of many sociolinguists with linguistic constructions of identity.

The gains for the social theorist are in pushing social theory in the direction of language so that social research flows into language research rather than stopping (as so often) on the threshold of language.[5] These gains come from the incorporation of social theories into theorisations and eventually analyses of language so that the latter become more fruitful for social theorists to think, theorize and analyze with. The key issue is textual analysis, and the place of textual analysis in social research. The concept of 'texturing' claims that there is always a textual moment to the work, the production of social life, in any soc-

analysis. The challenge for sociolinguists is to develop forms of textual analysis (including of course interactional analysis) which are socially compelling, and I am suggesting that the way to do this is by drawing social thought into our theorisation and analysis of texts.

Notes

1. Thinking in policy terms, the recent emphasis on the 'learning age', the need (especially the economic need) for 'lifelong learning', can be construed as a recognition of this (Department of Education 1998).
2. With respect to the social dynamics, Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) gives a different account, in terms of the dual inscription of the social in places/institutions (fields and their positions) and in bodies (and habitus), and tensions between position and habitus as a source of transformation.
3. They appear in an 'imaginary' form according to Bernstein, and it is the transformation from real to imaginary that is the space in which the play of ideology takes place. I do not develop the point here, but this strikes me as an interesting basis for thinking about discourse and text ideologically. See Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999).
4. The Green Paper on learning (Department of Education and Employment 1998) makes an interesting contrast in this respect, and shows what is possible. Questions are directed to the reader throughout the document, and gathered together over four pages in the final chapter.
5. Let me give one example of social theory stopping on the threshold of language, where the rubicon of text analysis really needs to be crossed. According to Bernstein (1990, 1996), although the symbolic violence of classification imposes 'voices' on subjects which limit their 'messages' in social interaction, 'message' can subvert 'voice' – what is repressed in classification can re-emerge in social interaction. There is, in other words, a voice-message dialectic. Bernstein does not acknowledge the need for text analysis in formulating this important position, yet it is through close analysis of texturing, of textual processes, that this dialectic can be shown in practice (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999).

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Appendix 1: Frank Field Launches New Contract for Welfare

Date: 26 March 1988
Ref: 98/077

Frank Field, Minister for Welfare Reform, today unveiled the Government's Green Paper on Welfare Reform "New Ambitions for Our Country – A New Contract for Welfare".

Mr Field said the Government's programme for welfare reform would promote opportunity instead of dependence, and would be based on work for those who can, and security for those who can't.

The Green Paper, for the first time, sets out a series of success measures to be achieved over the next 10–20 years. It presents a new welfare contract, based on reciprocal duties between government and the individual.

The Green Paper sets out eight key principles guiding welfare reform:

* The new welfare state should help and encourage people of working age to work where they are capable of doing so.
* The public and private sectors should work in partnership to ensure that wherever possible, people are insured against foreseeable risks, and make provision for their retirement.
* The new welfare state should provide public services of high quality to the whole community, as well as cash benefits.
* Those who are disabled should get the support they need to lead a fulfilling life with dignity.
* The system should support families and children as well as tackling the scourge of child poverty.
* There should be specific action to tackle social exclusion and help those in poverty.
* The system should encourage openness and honesty and the gateways to benefit should be clear and enforceable.
* The system of delivering modern welfare should be flexible, efficient and easy for people to use.

Mr Field said:

"This Green Paper has a central aim: work for those who can; security for those who cannot. We want to replace a cycle of dependency and insecurity with an ethic for work and savings.

"The document builds on the £3.5 billion New Deal for the young and long term unemployed and the Budget that made work pay, raised Child Benefit and put quality childcare within reach of all families. At the same time we are modernising and putting money into schools and hospitals and will soon have the first ever national minim wage to help the low paid.

"The arguments for reform are clear, society has changed and the state has not kept pace with it. As such, spending on Social Security has doubled yet more people live in poverty and insecurity.

"The Green Paper offers pensioners a decent income in retirement and a new beginning for disabled people. Those disabled people who want to work will get help to do so, while those who cannot work will get genuine support.

"Work is the best form of Welfare. To those of working age we offer greater help to get into work, and a modern system to provide help for those in genuine need who can't work."

In a foreword to the Green Paper, the Prime Minister said:

"We must return to first principles and ask what we want the welfare state to achieve. This is the question this Green paper seeks to answer. In essence, it describes a third way: not dismantling welfare, leaving it simply as a low-grade safety net for the destitute; nor keeping it unreformed and under performing; but reforming on the basis of a new contract between citizen and state, where we keep a welfare state from which we all benefit, but on terms that are fair and clear.

"There is a very simple reason why we need such a contract more than ever today. The welfare state we have is one from which the vast majority of us benefit through a state pension or Child Benefit or use of the NHS. The welfare state isn't just about a few benefits paid to the most needy.

"But we all contribute through taxes and charges. We benefit but we pay. It is a contract between us as citizens. As such, it needs to be a fair deal, within a system that is clearer, more relevant for the modern world, efficiently run and where costs are manageable. One that is fair not just for the existing generation, but fair between the generations.

"That is the fundamental reason for reform. It will take time. Frank Field has started the process in this Green Paper. Now that the process is underway, we want all the nation to be part of it. There will be consultation and time for discussion at every stage. Our objective is to build a genuine national consensus behind change. The welfare state belongs to us all. It is part of our inheritance. We must now all work together to re-build it for the new century that awaits."

Notes to Editors

1. The Green paper *New ambitions for our country: A New Contract for Welfare* is available from Stationery Office bookshops. It is also available in Braille, audio cassette and in Welsh (Cmd 3805, price £11.50).

2. A summary version of the Green paper has also been produced and is available free of charge from the following address:
Welfare Reform
Freepost (HA4441)
Hayes
UB3 1BR
Tel: 0181 867 3201
Fax: 0181 867 3264
The lines are open Monday to Friday from 9am–5pm

3. **Consultation**
Feedback on the content of the Green Paper should be addressed to:

The Welfare Reform Green Paper Consultation Team
Department of Social Security
7th Floor, The Adelphi
1–11 John Adam Street
London WC2 6HT

Appendix 2: Excerpt from 'Green Paper' on Welfare Reform

Chapter Three

The importance of work

Principle One

The new welfare state should help and encourage people of working age to work where they are capable of doing so.

1. The Government's aim is to rebuild the welfare state around work. The skills and energies of the workforce are the UK's biggest economic asset. And for both individuals and families, paid work is the most secure means of averting poverty and dependence except, of course, for those who are retired or so sick or disabled, or so heavily engaged in caring activities, that they cannot realistically support themselves.
2. For many people the absence of paid work is a guarantee of a life on low income. One of the reasons children make up a higher proportion of those at the bottom of the income distribution is that a growing number of parents, especially lone parents, are out of work. Paid work also allows people to save for their retirement.
3. For too long, governments have abandoned people to a life on benefits. Far too many individuals and families are penalised, or gain too little, if they move from benefit to work.
4. **Chapter One** described how work has changed over the last 50 years. The rewards for skills have grown, widening the wage gap. Some people reap the rewards of fairly paid work, while others are either stuck on benefit or switching between benefit dependency and short-term, low-skilled jobs. There has also been a shift in balance from full-time manual jobs to part-time and service-sector posts. In households with two working adults, the loss of a job for one can mean that the other would be better off giving up work too.
5. The Government aims to promote work by:

   - **helping people move from welfare to work through the New Deals and Employment Zones;**
   - **developing flexible personalised services to help people into work;**
   - **lowering the barriers to work for those who can and want to work;**
   - **making work pay, by reforming the tax and benefit system, including a Working Families Tax Credit, reforming National Insurance and income tax, and intro-ducing the national minimum wage; and**
   - **ensuring that responsibilities and rights are fairly matched.**

■ POLICY DIRECTION

Welfare to Work – The New Deals

6. The Government's biggest investment since taking office has been in a large-scale **welfare to work** programme. Our ambition is nothing less than a change of culture among benefit claimants, employers and public servants – with rights and responsibilities on all sides. Those making the shift from welfare into work will be provided with positive assistance, not just a benefit payment.

7. Our comprehensive welfare to work programme aims to break the mould of the old, passive benefit system. It is centred on the five aspects of the New Deal for:

   - **young unemployed people;**
   - **long-term unemployed people;**
   - **lone parents;**
   - **people with a disability or long-term illness; and**
   - **partners of the unemployed.**

8. Alongside these national programmes, we are also piloting targeted help for areas of high long-term unemployment through the new Employment Zones.

Young unemployed people

9. For young people, entering the labour market is a critical rite of passage to adulthood. One of the factors causing social exclusion is an unacceptably high level of youth unemployment. The **New Deal for Young People** is a radical step forward because it emphasises quality, choice and above all meeting the needs of individuals. It will address all the barriers to work that young people face, including homelessness and drug dependency. It aims to help young unemployed people, aged 18 to 24, to find jobs and remain in employment. In the Budget, the Chancellor also announced that partners of young unemployed people who have no children would be included in the New Deal, and given access to the same opportunities for work.

The New Deal for Young People

- **Is being piloted in 12 pathfinder areas.**
- **Will go nationwide in April 1998.**
- **Is an investment of £2.6 billion.**
- **Will offer participants, aged 18 to 24, four opportunities:**
  - **work with an employer who will receive a job subsidy of up to £60 a week;**
  - **full-time education or training;**
  - **work with a voluntary sector organisation; or**
  - **work on the Environmental Taskforce.**

All these options involve training.

- **Support will also be given to those young people who see self-employment as the best route out of benefit dependency.**
- **Includes a special £750 grant to employers to provide their New Deal employees with training towards a recognised qualification.**
- **For those who do not wish to take up offers of help there will be no 'fifth option' of simply remaining on benefit.**

10. Every young person who receives Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA) for six months without securing work will enter the New Deal Gateway – an exercise in promoting job-readiness and providing a tailor-made package of help. People with particular disadvantages may enter earlier. For those with adequate skills and appropriate work experience – the 'job-ready' – the immediate focus will be on securing an unsubsidised job. For those young people less equipped to enter the job market, the Gateway will provide careers advice and guidance, assessment of training needs, work trails with employers

Long-term unemployed people

11. For those who lack skills and become unemployed, the risks of remaining out of work for a long period are high. So prevention is better than cure. The Government's plans for lifelong learning, described in **Chapter Five**, are designed to raise skills in the adult population and promote employability, so that people find it easier to get and keep jobs.
12. There is already a sizeable group of long-term unemployed people who may need additional help to overcome barriers to work. Employers are often sceptical of the job-readiness of a person who has been out of the labour market for long periods. And, over time, skills, confidence and health can deteriorate. The New Deal for the Long-Term Unemployed represents the first serious attack on the waste of talents and resources represented by long-term unemployment.

The New Deal for the Long-Term Unemployed

- **Due to start in June 1998.**
- **Initial investment of £350 million.**
- **For those aged over 25 who have been out of work for more than two years.**
- **Substantial job subsidy of £75 a week for employers for six months.**
- **Changes to benefit rules to improve access to full-time education or training. Additional pilots are due to start in November 1998:**
  - **Pilots of an intensive approach for 70,000 people, providing individualised advice, counselling and help, which may include training and work experience, at a cost of £100 million.**
  - **Special assistance tailored to the needs of those aged over 50.**

Lone Parents

13. The twin challenges of raising children alone and holding down a job are considerable. The vast majority of single parents want to work, to gain a decent wage and a foothold on the ladder out of poverty. But the old welfare system did little to help, simply handing out benefits rather than offering active support in finding and securing work, training or childcare. **The New Deal for Lone Parents** will provide a more active service.

The New Deal for Lone Parents

- **Piloted in eight areas since July 1997, offering help to 40,000 lone parent households.**
- **Available nationwide to lone parents making a new or repeat claim for Income Support from April 1998.**
- **Available to all lone parents on Income Support from October 1998.**
- **The service is aimed at lone parents whose youngest child is at school, but is also available to those with pre-school children.**

14. There will be a full, independent evaluation of the first phase of the New Deal for Lone Parents, available in autumn 1999. Early indications are encouraging. Lone parent organisations, employers and lone parents themselves have all welcomed this New Deal, and the staff responsible for delivering the [illegible]

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Coherence in Text vs. Coherence in Mind

T. Givón

1. Introduction

Most linguists and experimental psychologists derive their understanding of text coherence, such as it is, almost exclusively from the study of well-edited written text,[1] and the behavior of text comprehenders. Both traditional tilts are of course understandable. Coherence is much easier to demonstrate *prime facie* in a well written text, where repeated cycles of careful editing have produced maximally-consistent global structures. Coherence is also much easier to investigate experimentally by manipulating, controlling and recording the behavior of text comprehenders. One must recognize, however, that the price of methodological convenience in both disciplines may be rather steep. The phenomenon of text coherence as a natural cognitive process may be distorted beyond recognition; so that one winds up studying artifacts of either text editing or experimental design, and often of both.

The aim of this paper is to introduce a measure of realism into the discussion of discourse coherence, by reminding us all of the incredible complexity that a serious empirical study of coherence must entail, and how such complexity can only be studied by combining the methodological resources of several disciplines. My approach may be characterized by the following theses:

(a) **Single vs. multiple strands**: Text coherence is a complex, composite meta-phenomenon, involving multiple strands. While each of the strands may be discussed or manipulated independently, coherence is fundamentally an epi-phenomenon.

(b) **Product vs. the process**: Coherence is fundamentally *not* an objective property of the produced text. Rather, that text is a by-product of the

mental processes of discourse production and discourse comprehension, which are the real loci of coherence.

(c) **Single vs. multiple perspectives**: Text coherence is fundamentally a collaborative process, involving two minds attempting to achieve, simultaneously, many goals. Some of those goals may be in conflict, and the collaboration between the two interlocutors toward resolving such conflicts and achieving their respective goals is a matter of degree.

(d) **Production vs. comprehension**: One must index one's study of the mental processes of text coherence separately to discourse production and discourse comprehension.

(e) **Written vs. oral discourse**: Fundamentally, the production of spontaneous oral communication is the most revealing medium where a realistic study of text coherence should be located.

(f) **Knowledge-driven vs. grammar-driven processes**: Human discourse production and comprehension involve two distinct processing channels: one older, slower and vocabulary-driven; the other younger, faster, and grammar-driven.

(g) **Local vs. global coherence**: In both processing channels, both local and global aspects of coherence are involved.

Of these seven, I will focus more narrowly on (a), (f) and (g). Thesis (b) remains the underlying methodological *leitmotif* of the study. The other three – (c), (d) and (e) – will be either taken for granted or be supported primarily by cited references.

I will begin by recapitulating some of what text-sensitive linguists know from studying the external artifact – the recorded or written text. How to extrapolate from the product text to the mental processes involved in text production and text comprehension remains a key methodological issue.

2. Coherence and Grounding

2.1. Coherence Strands in the External Text

From a methodological, heuristic perspective, coherence may be defined as an observable property of the external, recorded text:

(1) **Coherence as continuity**:
"Coherence is the **continuity** or **recurrence** of some element(s) across a span (or spans) of text".

Of the many elements that can recur across text, six more visible, concrete elements are the easiest to track; and their coherence is thus the easiest to measure. They are:

(a) referents

(c) aspectuality
(d) modality/mood
(e) location
(f) action/script

In processing the first five elements of coherence – (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) – grammar is massively involved, a subject we shall return to in considerable detail further below. The use of grammar as an instrument of discourse coherence has salutary consequences for both the text analyst and the text comprehender. For the text analyst, tracking recurrent elements through the text is facilitated by their predictable association with grammar. One needs to only study then the distribution of grammar in text; and this is a clear methodological windfall. For the text comprehender, overt grammatical signals – syntactic constructions, morphology, intonation – cue the text processor, they guide it/him/her in the construction of a coherent mental representation of the text; and this is a vital cognitive boost.

2.2. Coherence as a Mental Entity

A number of separate issues must be considered if one is to treat coherence not only as a methodologically-useful observable artifact of the external text, but also as a cognitive phenomenon in the mind that produces and comprehends the text. First, there are cognitive operations that must occur in both text production and text comprehension. These operations do not of themselves constitute text coherence. Rather, they impose or guarantee whatever coherence we find in the external text.

Second, there are at least two mental text-traces that one must consider. And each of the two stands, at least potentially, in some isomorphic relation to the external text:

(a) working memory buffer ('immediate recall')
(b) episodic memory ('longer-term recall')

While I intend to confine most of my remarks to the latter, perhaps a few words could be said about the former.

2.2.1. The Working Memory Buffer

It is fairly well established that the working memory buffer for text is severely limited, perhaps retaining no more than 2–5 clauses at a time, or roughly 8–20 seconds of verbatim text (Gernsbacher, 1985; Squire, 1987; Carpenter and Just, 1988; Just and Carpenter, 1992; *inter alia*). By 'verbatim' one means not only the vocabulary but also the surface grammatical form of utterances. During the short time-span of the buffer, whatever portion of the 'external' speech signal that is at all to survive in longer-term memory must be translated rapidly, into

essential for both the text producer and text comprehender, although their mental episodic representation need not be identical.

Surface information of grammatical cues probably does not survive beyond the working memory buffer, and thus most likely does not reach episodic memory. One may consider the grammatical signals associated with natural language clause as the mental processing instructions[2] that guide the speech comprehender toward constructing a coherent, structured mental representation of the text. Put another way, grammatical signals are part of the transfer mechanism used for placing the clausal information at some coherent – connected, grounded – location in episodic memory. They are thus responsible for at least some of the connectivity – or coherence – of the mentally represented text.

2.2.2. Episodic Memory

Unavoidable metaphorical usages such as 'mental trace', 'mental storage', 'mental model' or 'mental representation' need not conjure up an image of binding isomorphism between the external text and its episodic mental representation. Nor should these metaphors imply any particular stability of that representation over time. Both of these issues remain wide open, and are probably a matter of degree. In describing the sub-cortical hippocampus-based (medial temporal lobe) neurological mechanisms that supports at least the early phases of episodic memory, Squire and Zola-Morgan (1991) observe:

> "...This system is fast, has limited capacity, and performs a crucial function at the time of learning in establishing long-term declarative memory. Its role continues after learning during a *lengthy period of reorganization and consolidation* whereby memories stored in neocortex [the hippocampus is sub-cortical; TG] eventually become independent of the medial temporal memory system. This process, by which the burden of long-term (permanent) memory storage is gradually assumed by [the] neocortex, assures that the medial temporal lobe system is always available for the acquisition of new information..." (p. 1385; emphases added; TG; see also Squire, 1987)

Not only is the information in episodic memory malleable during a protracted period of "reorganization and consolidation", but retrieval of this information for reflection or speech production, even from the more permanent neocortical storage, is heavily dependent on the context within which it is accessed or 'reproduced'.[3] The flexibility and context-dependence of longer-term episodic recall are indeed well documented (cf. Loftus, 1980).

However little we know about the real details of text representation in episodic memory, either hippocampal or neocortical, I will take it for granted that text is represented at least in part as a **network of connected nodes**. This network structure displays at least two well [illegible]

(2) **Mental text structure:**

a. **Hierarchy:**
Episodic text representation has at least some depth of hierarchical organization, so that nodes ('chunks') are connected both 'upward' and 'downward' to other hierarchically adjacent nodes – clauses to their governing chains, chains to their governing paragraph, etc.[5]

b. **Sequentiality:**
Episodic text representation displays at least some sequential chaining at each hierarchic level, so that nodes are connected to both preceding and following sequentially-adjacent nodes – a clause to a preceding and following clause, a chain to a preceding and following chain, etc.

Both the degree of hierarchic depth and the length of sequential chains remain wide-open empirical issues. It is easy to demonstrate that both vary enormously from one external text to the next.[6] And there is no reason to assume that they do not vary even more extensively from one mental text representation to the next. Further, other – 'idiosyncratic' – connections, neither hierarchic nor sequential, probably also exist between nodes in the network.

I will be concerned here primarily with use of episodic representation *during* the on-line processing of incoming discourse. For this use, the longer-term neocortical episodic representation of the text is probably irrelevant. It is the early and extremely flexible episodic representation in the hippocampus-based system that concerns me most here.

2.3. Coherence as Grounding

2.3.1. Preamble

If one accepts the assumption that mentally-represented text has some sequential-hierarchic network structure, one can see why coherent episodic representation is the chief guarantor of fast on-line access to episodic information during both text production and text comprehension. The guarantee of on-line access to individual nodes in the network of mental text lies in their **connectivity** or **grounding** to other nodes in the network. From the perspective of the text receiver ('hearer'), connectivity allows for coherent storage. From the perspective of the text producer ('speaker'), connectivity makes it possible to produce a text that the hearer can comprehend. Following Gernsbacher (1990), I will assume then that text comprehension is synonymous with the construction of a **structured mental representation** of the text. That is:

(3) **Coherence as grounding:**

a. In order to guarantee fast on-line access to nodes in the mental representation of text, nodes must be **grounded** at least to some degree. That is, a node must be **connected** to either some sequentially adjacent, hierarchically adjacent, or non-adjacent node(s) within the mental text-structure.

b. The more connections a node has – the more grounded it is – the more

The grounding of information nodes in the mentally-represented text, especially during on-line text comprehension, involves two main directions – anaphoric ('backward') and cataphoric ('anticipatory'). Anaphoric grounding has been studied much more extensively. It involves connecting incoming new information chunks to some existing mental representation – either of the text or of other mental entities. The second, cataphoric grounding, has been studied in much less detail. It involves the opening of pending connections in yet-to-be completed structure, in anticipation of text that is in the process of being constructed (Gernsbacher, 1990). Somewhat paradoxically, incoming text-nodes are grounded cataphorically to text-nodes that have not yet been processed, although some may have already been stored in the immediate recall buffer. In the space below I will briefly flesh out the notions of anaphoric and cataphoric grounding.

2.3.2. Cataphoric ('Anticipatory') Grounding

Traditionally, cataphoric grounding has been discussed almost exclusively in terms of **indefinite reference,**[7] and then mostly in terms of the *absence* of anaphoric grounding. A more careful study reveals that cataphoric grounding is a much more extensive grammar-cued phenomenon, involving referential, temporal and thematic coherence.

In the grammar of **referential coherence,** referent NPs are identified as either those that will be important, topical, and thus persistent in the subsequent discourse, or those that will be unimportant, non-topical, and thus non-persistent. Topical referents are most commonly given special grammatical marking, while non-topical ones are left unmarked. As an example of this grammar-cued contrast, consider the use, in spoken American English, of the indefinite articles 'a(n)' and 'this' in the introduction of new indefinite NPs into the discourse. A typical example of this contrast can be seen in the following Dear Abby letter (Wright and Givón, 1987):[8]

(4) **The indefinite articles *a(n)* vs. *this*:**

"Dear Abby: There's *this guy* I've been going **with** for near three years. Well, the problem is that **he** hits me. **He** started last year. **He** has done it only four or five times, but each time **it** was worse than before. Every time **he** hits me it was because **he** thought I was flirting (I wasn't). Last time **he** accused me of coming on to *a friend* of **his**. First **he** called me a lot of dirty names, then **he** punched my face so bad **it** left me with a black eye and black-and-blue bruises over half of my face. It was very noticeable, so I told my folks that the car I was riding in stopped suddenly and my face hit the windshield.

Abby, **he**'s 19 and I'm 17, and already I feel like *an old married lady* who lets her husband push her around. I haven't spoken to **him** since this happened. **He** keeps bugging me to give **him** one more chance. I think I've given **him** enough chances. Should I keep avoiding **him** or what?

Black and Blue".

The new referent marked by 'this' recurs as the

The cataphoric persistence of 'a'-marked vs. 'this'-marked indefinite referents in the oral English has been studied in narratives produced by 8–12-year old native speakers of American English. The results are summarized in (5).

(5) **Mean topic persistence (TP) of the indefinite 'a'-marked and 'this'-marked subjects and objects in spoken English**; (expressed as number of times the same referent recurred in the sub-sequent 10 clauses; Wright and Givón, 1987)

grammatical coding	mean TP value	N
'this'-subject	6.95	28 (65%)
'this'-object	2.40	15
total 'this'		43
'a'-subject	1.54	13
'a'-object	0.56	94 (88%)
total 'a':		107

There is a clear interaction between grammatical subjecthood and the indefinite article 'this': 65% of 'this'-marked NPs appeared as subjects, while 88% of 'a(n)'-marked NPs occurred as non-subjects. Indeed the contrast of grammatical roles – subject vs. direct object vs. others – is one of the most important cataphoric grammatical signal for both indefinite and definite NPs. To illustrate this, consider the cross-language comparison of topic persistence of referents given in Table (6). The survey represents distributions in 5 unrelated languages. The **topic persistence** of subject and object NPs in active-transitive clauses is expressed as their recurrence in the following 10 clauses of text. The results are expressed as the contrast in frequency between low-persistence referents – those that recur only 0–1–2 times (0–2) in the following 10 clauses, and high-persistence referents – those that recur more than twice (>2).

(6) **Cataphoric persistence of subjects and objects of transitive clauses in Sahaptin, Panare, Bella-Coola, Korean and Spanish**[9]

	number of occurrences in the following 10 clauses					
	0–2		>2		total	
language	N	%	N	%	N	%
Sahaptin						
subj	9	19.6%	37	**80.4%**	46	100.0%
obj	21	**61.8%**	13	38.4%	34	100.0%
Panare						
subj	9	31.0%	20	**69.0%**	29	100.0%
obj	19	**65.5%**	10	34.5%	29	100.0%

(*Continued*)

(*Continued*)

	number of occurrences in the following 10 clauses					
	0–2		>2		total	
language	N	%	N	%	N	%
Bella Coola						
subj	27	21.4%	99	**78.6%**	126	100.0%
obj	82	**65.1%**	44	34.9%	126	100.0%
Korean						
subj	53	35.3%	97	**64.7%**	150	100.0%
obj	106	**72.0%**	44	28.0%	150	100.0%
Spanish						
subj	19	19.0%	81	**81.0%**	100	100.0%
obj	70	**70.0%**	30	30.0%	100	100.0%

Other grammatical devices may also be used for the cataphoric grounding of topical indefinite referents. A common one is restrictive relative clauses in combination with the indefinite article:

(7) a. A man **with no shoes on** came into the office and...
b. A woman **who spoke no English** then stepped forward and...
c. Someone **who's very anxious to meet you** is coming over tonight...
d. A guy **I haven't seen in years** has just called me and...

In addition to tagging the newly-introduced NP as an important topic in the subsequent discourse, the information in the REL-clause makes the referent salient, grounded to the current location in the discourse. So that the referent can now be attached at a **relevant** location in the mental representation of the incoming text.

2.3.3 Anaphoric Grounding

2.3.3.1. Preamble: Definite Reference

Speakers code a referent as definite when they assume that it is **identifiable** or **accessible** to the hearer. By 'accessible' one means that it is represented in – and can be retrieved from – some pre-existing mental structure in the hearer's mind. When speakers re-introduces a referent in such a context, they ground it by various grammatical devices. Such grounding serves to establish a **mental connection** between the referent's occurrence in the current text-location and its previous anaphoric trace in some extant mental structure. Grammar-guided anaphoric devices most commonly ground re-introduced referents into three types of mental structures:

(8) **Mental structures for anaphoric grounding:**
(a) Model of 'I'

We will take up these three types of anaphoric grounding in order.

2.3.3.2. Grounding to the Speech Situation
Grounding referents – or other coherence elements – to the current speech-situation is achieved by indicating their spatial or temporal relation to the two participants in the discourse – speaker and hearer. This involves well-known **proximity** and **orientation** devices such as:[10]

(9) a. **The interlocutors:**
'I', 'you', 'we', 'y'all'
b. **Other referents:**
'this one', that one', 'that one over there'
c. **Location:**
'here', 'there', 'way over there'
d. **Time:**
'now', 'then', 'long ago, 'in the future' 'today', 'yesterday', 'tomorrow' 'this week', 'last week', 'next week'

2.3.3.3. Grounding to Generic-Lexical Knowledge
Culturally shared, generic-lexical knowledge is represented mentally in the permanent semantic memory. Referents may be grounded to this mental structure in two distinct ways. First, some referents are globally accessible because they are uniquely identifiable to all members of the relevant speech community ('culture', 'sub-culture', 'village', 'family') at all times. Some examples of such referents are:

(10) **Globally-accessible generic definites**

referent	**relevant social unit**
a. **The sun** came out.	all humans
b. **The president** has resigned.	a nation-state
c. They went to **the cemetery.**	a community
d. **The river** is frozen over.	a community
e. Call **the sheriff!**	a county
f. **The Gods** are angry.	a religion
g. **Daddy** is home!	a family

Generic access to definite referents is frequently intermixed with episodic text-based access, yielding a hybrid system of double grounding. A double-grounded referent is accessible partly through an anaphoric connection to its episodic trace in the episodic representation of the current text, and partly through connection(s) to generic-lexical knowledge. This hybrid type of grounding is often referred to as **framed-based** or **script-based** reference (Anderson, Garrod & Sanford, 1983; Yekovich and Walker, 1986; Walker and Yekovich, 1987). Typical examples are:

(11) **Double-grounded frame-based reference:**
a. My boy missed **school** today,
he was late for **the bus**.
b. He showed us this gorgeous **house**,
but **the living room** was too small.
c. She went into a **restaurant**
and asked **the waiter** for **the menu**.

The definite referent 'the bus' in (11a) receives its anaphoric grounding from two separate sources – the antecedent referent 'school' in the preceding text, plus generic-lexical knowledge of the frame 'school' and its sub-component 'bus'. Similarly in (11b), the definite referent 'the living room' receives its anaphoric grounding in part from the antecedent referent 'this gorgeous house' in the preceding text, and in part from generic-lexical knowledge of the frame 'house' and its sub-component 'living room'. Likewise in (11c), both definite referents 'the waiter' and 'the menu' receive their grounding in part from the antecedent referent 'a restaurant' in the preceding text, and in part from generic-lexical knowledge of the frame 'restaurant' and its sub-components 'waiter' and 'menu'.

Frame-based referential access is often accomplished through conventional knowledge of whole-part, possessor-possessed relations:

(12) **Whole-part, possessor-possessed frame-based access:**
a. She grabbed **the fish** and chopped off **its head**.
b. **John** just got a job working for **his father**.
c. **The house** was a mess, **the roof** leaked.
d. **She**'s upset. **Her kids** keep flunking highschool.
e. **The table** is missing **one of its legs**.
f. **My wife** called and said...
g. **Your house** is on fire.

In (12f, g), the anaphoric antecedent is not accessible from the current text itself, but rather from the speech situation, i.e. the identity of the speaker and hearer. But the use of frame-based knowledge to affect full grounding of the definite referent is of the same type.

2.3.3.4. Grounding into the Current Text

By far, the bulk of the grammar of anaphoric grounding involves access to anaphoric traces in the episodic mental model of the current text. Out of this vast array, one can separate several clusters of devices that seem to specialize in cuing access to rough locations – or configurations – in the mental text structure. One can illustrate the use of such devices by citing their characteristic anaphoric gap – or **referential distance** (RD). This purely heuristic measure records the gap – in number of clauses backward – between the referent's current text-location and its last previous occurrence.

(13) **Comparison of mean referential distance (RD) values and degree of categorial distribution for common anaphoric devices** (from Givón, ed. 1983a; 1983b; 1984b; Sun and Givón, 1985)

construction	mean RD (# of clauses)	degree of clustering around the mean
a. zero anaphora	1.0	100% at mean
b. unstressed PRO	1.0	95% at mean
c. stressed PRO	2.5	90% between 2–3
d. Y-movement	2.5	90% between 2–3
e. DEF noun	7.0	25% at 1.0 35% scattered 5.0–19 40% at 20+
f. DEF-Noun with modifier(s)	10.0	55% scattered 5.0–19.0 45% at >20
g. L-dislocated DEF-N	15.0	60% at >20 (25% at 4–9) (13% at 10–19)

One must emphasize that referential distance is primarily a heuristic measure of convenience. Distance by itself is not necessarily of great cognitive significance. Rather, distance tends to coincide with some mental entities – both structures and operations. The main division in (13) is probably between devices that signal maximal continuity (13a, b) and those that signal discontinuity (13c-g):

maximal continuity	===>	zero anaphora, unstressed pronoun
discontinuity	===>	stressed pronoun, full lexical noun

As an example of how this major distinction is deployed in text, consider the following passage of fiction. Of the referents that play any significant role in the narrative,[11] continuous ones are bold-faced, and discontinuous ones are italicized:[12]

(14) "...**He** circled it wearily as a wolf, **[Ø]** studying it from all angles, and when finally **he** stopped within a dozen feet of *the dead man*, **he** knew much of what had happened at this place.

The dead man had ridden a freshly shod horse into the playa from the north, and when **[Ø]** shot **he** had tumbled from the saddle and *the horse* had galloped away. *Several riders* on unshod ponies had then approached the body and *one* had dismounted to **[Ø]** collect the weapons..."

Cognitively, the maximal-continuity anaphoric devices signal the default choice of **continued activation** of the current topical referent. From the perspective

under the same thematic chain-node. The topical referent is the node label of the thematic chain.

Discontinuous anaphoric devices, on the other hand, signal the **terminated activation** of the current topical referent, and activation of another topic for which there exists an anaphoric mental trace. Among such devices, the short-distance devices (13c, d) tend to signal the activation of another referent without terminating the current chain. An example of such a use of a stressed pronoun can be seen at the end of (14) and its continuation:

(15) "... *Several riders* on unshod ponies had then approached the body and *one* had dismounted to [Ø] collect the weapons.
The clothing had not been stripped off, nor was *the body* mutilated..."

The full indefinite NP 'several riders' in (15) terminates the activation of the preceding chain *and* its topical referent ('the dead man'), and opens a new chain, becoming its topical referent. The stressed pronoun 'one' then singles out one member of this group briefly, but this is done without terminating the thematic chain. The chain is then terminated, returning implicitly to the earlier topic 'the dead man'. This is done indirectly by double-grounding the frame-based reference, via 'the clothing' and 'the body'.

As an example of the use of the other short-distance discontinuous referent device, Y-movement ('contrastive topicalization' (13d)), consider:

(16) "...After buying a copy of *The Racing Times* at a Manhattan newsstand, Ed Piesman, a dentist and an avid horse-racing fan, said he preferred the new paper to the venerable *Daily Racing Form* because "the columnists are much better" and some of the statistics "are much much better". *But* the news dealer who sold him the paper said people like Dr. Piesman are few. **"The Racing Time, I sell two a day**, maybe five when there is a big race", said Ashok Patel, whose stand at 72nd Street and Broadway is adjacent to an off-track betting parlor. **"The Daily Racing Form, I sell 40 or 50 a day"**..."[13]

Two topical referents persist throughout the paragraph, 'The Racing Time' and 'Daily Racing Form'. When they are switched for contrast, the object-fronting Y-movement construction is used – without terminating the paragraph.[14]

Several long-distance anaphoric devices are characterized by the following conflation of functions:

(a) Like other full-NP definites, they are topic-switching devices, deactivating the current topic/node.
(b) Their anaphoric topic is re-activated after a long gap of absence (i.e. of cognitive de-activation).
(c) The mental trace of the re-activated topic in the episodic memory is found in another chain, across at least one chain boundary, but often across a paragraph boundary.

As illustration of a long-distance anaphoric device, consider the use of L-dislocation (13g) in informal spoken American English:[15]

(17) H: ...Well my dad was born in Sherman, that's close to where [...] is. He was born in Sherman in 1881, and he died in '75. Yeah. And ah, so, ah of course, **my great grandfather, they came in there**, I think, y'know, part of them from Tennessee and part of them from Illinois. And I don't really know much about that far back, Tom. **But my grand-dad, he was a hard-shelled Baptist preacher**, and he just, y'know, farmed and ranched.
T: In Texas?
H: Yeah, yeah.
T: So he was already in Texas?
H: They must've come there when he was small, y'know, 'cause he spent...
T: Your great grandfather moved and your grandfather was really raised in Texas.
H: Yeah, yeah. In other words, about three generations of us... were in Texas...
T: In Texas...
H: And of course we eh, **my dad, all he ever did was farm and ranch**...

Some grammatical devices are better described as theme switching or **paragraph-initial** devices. Rather than coding the re-activated topic, they signal the beginning of a new thematic paragraph. Consider, for example, the use of fronted adverbials in:[16]

(18) "...Their trail when they left Wells' body lay in the direction he himself was taking, and that meant the waterhole was off-limit for Shalako unless he wished to *fight* them for it, and no man in his right mind started a *fight* with Apaches.
When the time for *fighting* came, the man Shalako *fought* with a cold fury that had an utter impersonal quality about it. He *fought* to win, *fought* with deadly efficiency, with no nonsense about him, yet he did not *fight* needlessly.
Despite his weariness and that of the horse, he began backtracking. Peter Wells was not likely to be alone, so his presence indicated a camp nearby, and a camp meant water. Yet Shalako puzzled over his presence there at such a time..."

Both new paragraphs in (18) are introduced by pre-posed ADV-clauses. In both, thematic discontinuity overrides referential continuity, so that in spite of the continuing main participant ('Shalako', 'he'), a new thematic paragraph is initiated.[17]

2.4. The Extreme Bounds of Coherence

It is possible, at least for those who interpret coherence as an objective property of the external text, to view coherence as akin to 'grammaticality' in the Chomskian sense – a text either has it or doesn't have it. Within the framework of network-like mental text structure I am proposing, it is more useful to view text coherence as a matter of degree. One could then set up the theoretical extreme upper and lower bounds of coherence, then see how various kinds of text stack up vis-a-vis

A useful description of the extreme bounds of coherence can be extrapolated from Wittgenstein's (1918) discussion of tautology and contradiction in logic. The upper bounds of coherence is logical **tautology**, as in:

(19) John came home, John came home...

In 'text' (19), all nodes in the second clause – subject, verb, locative – cohere maximally with corresponding nodes in the preceding clause. The second clause is thus maximally grounded, and the text maximally coherent – but also maximally redundant.

One type of lower bounds of coherence is the logical sense of **contradiction**:

(20) John came home, John didn't come home...

In 'text' (20), all nodes in the two clauses seem to cohere maximally – except for the crucial modal node of truth value, which thus makes the two clauses logically incompatible as members of the same text.[18] The more common cognitive, pragmatic sense of incoherence involves the absence of recurrent element(s) across the text, as in:

(21) John went to Italy, the cow jumped over the fence...

Most coherent – interpretable – texts fall somewhere in the middle between the two extremes of total redundancy and utter incoherence. In moving across adjacent clauses, one encounters some recurring and some non-recurring elements.[19] But neither the amount of new (=disjointed) information nor the amount of old (= connecting) information in a single clause is totally unconstrained. The constraint on the amount of new information in the clause may be given as (Givón, 1975; Pawley and Syder, 1983; Chafe, 1986, 1987a):

(22) **constraint on new information**:
"Clauses in natural text tend to have only one chunk
(usually a word) of new information per clause".

If one accepts the clause as the incremental unit of processing new textual information (Givón, 1984a, ch. 7; Chafe, 1986, 1987a, 1987b), then (22) can be viewed as a constraint on the amount of new information that can be added to mentally-represented text during a single processing increment.

The second constraint, at the other end of the scale, governs the amount of old information in the clause, and may be given as (Givón, 1984a, ch.7; Givón, 1990a, ch. 20; Chafe, 1987a):

(23) **constraint on old information**:
"Clauses in natural text tend to have **at least one chunk**
(usually a word) of old information per [illegible]"

The most common element of old (=connecting) information in the clause is its main topic, most often the subject; the vast majority of clauses in natural text have subjects; and the vast majority of subjects are definite – i.e. connecting information.

There are good reasons to suspect that principle (23) represents the **minimal grounding requirement** for coherent interpretation of the clause, rather than an optimal level. The number of grounding connection in an average clause is probably larger, and referential coherence is only one grounding connection in the clause.[20]

If multiple grounding of a clause is indeed the norm, then this norm can be cast as a principle of grounding, coherence and mental access:[21]

(24) **Multiple grounding, coherence and mental access:**
"The more grounding connections the clause has, the more mentally accessible it is, and thus the more coherent it is relative to the text in which it is embedded".

3. Knowledge-driven vs. Grammar-cued Coherence

3.1. Preamble

In a recent review, Walter Kintsch (in this volume) has suggested that two parallel processing channels are active simultaneously during text comprehension. One, the "strong method", is driven by domain-specific knowledge contained in the **lexical information** (nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs) in the clause. The other, the "weak method", is driven by the **grammatical information** in the clause. Kintsch contrasts the two channels as follows:

> "...We have finally found a use for syntax in a psychological processing model. It provides the comprehender with a "weak" but general method for comprehension, to be complemented by the "strong" knowledge-based and domain-specific methods. As in problem solving, weak and strong methods have their respective advantages and uses, and the complete comprehender would not forego either..." (Kintsch, in this volume, p. 158)

Perhaps a more apt characterization of the contrast between grammar-driven and knowledge-driven text comprehension is that of "rough-grained" vs. "fine-grained". One may illustrate the relation between the two processing modes with an analogy from transportation. Suppose you are heading toward a particular house on a particular street in a particular neighborhood of a distant city. You travel first on the freeway – fast, efficiently, with relatively little conscious attention – until you reach the city, your rough-grained destination. Now you must exit

attending carefully to traffic signals and street names, until – slowly, laboriously – you reach your fine-grained destination.

3.2. Grammar as an Automated Discourse-processing Mode

One must note that text comprehension – the construction of a coherent mental representation of the current text – need not rely on grammar cues at all. It is well established that there exist two modes of discourse processing in human language – the **pre-grammatical** and the **grammatical**. The pre-grammatical mode is both ontogenetically and phylogenetically prior (Givón, 1979a, ch. 5; 1989, ch. 7; 1990b; Blumstein and Milberg, 1983; Lieberman, 1984; Schnitzer, 1989; Bickerton, 1990). In Table (25), the two processing modes are compared in terms of their structural, functional and cognitive properties.

(25) **Pre-grammatical vs. grammatical discourse processing**

properties	**grammatical mode**	**pre-grammatical mode**
STRUCTURAL:		
a. **grammatical morphology**	abundant	absent
b. **syntactic constructions**	complex/ embedded	simple/ conjoined
c. **use of word-order:**	grammatical (subj/obj)	pragmatic (topic/comment)
d. **Pauses:**	fluent	halting
FUNCTIONAL:		
e. **processing speed:**	fast	slow
f. **Mental effort:**	effortless	laborious
g. **Error rate:**	lower	higher
h. **context dependence:**	lower	higher
COGNITIVE:		
i. **Processing mode:**	automated	attended
j. **acquisition:**	late	early
k. **evolution:**	late	early

The slow, analytic pre-grammatical mode of discourse processing is heavily vocabulary driven. This tallies with the fact that vocabulary is acquired before grammar, in both first and second language acquisition. Thus, pre-grammatical children, adult **pidgin** speaker and **agrammatical** aphasics comprehend and produce coherent connected discourse, albeit at slower speeds and higher error rates than those characteristic of grammatical language. A- coherent pre-gram-

(26) [anticipating a trip]
In atnga. Sit dawn. tan ki.
in airplane sit down turn key
'(We'll go) in the airplane, sit down, turn the key,
Vruum vruum! Tan tu da rayt. Atnga!
vr. vr. turn to the right airplane
And vroom vroom! (We'll) turn to the right. Airplane (flies)!'

As an example of coherent adult second-language pidgin, consider:[23]

(27) "...oh me?...oh me over there...
nineteen-twenty over there say come...
store me stop begin open... me sixty year...
little more sixty year... now me ninety...
nah ehm... little more... this man ninety-two...
yeah, this month over... me Hawaii come-*desu*...
nineteen seven come... me number first here...
me-*wa* tell... you sabe gurumeru?...
you no sabe gurumeru?...
yeah this place come...
this place been two-four-five year...
stop, ey... then me go home... Japan...
by-n-by... little boy... come...
by-n-by he been come here... ey...
by-n-by come...
by-n-by me before Hui-Hui stop...
Hui-Hui this... eh... he... this a...
Manuel... you sabe-*ka*..."

As an example of coherent narrative produced by an agrammatic aphasia patient, consider (Menn, 1990, p. 165):

(28) "...I had stroke... blood pressure... low pressure...
period... Ah... pass out... Uh... Rosa and I, and...
friends... of mine... uh... uh... shore... uh drink,
talk, pass out..."
"...Hahnemann Hospital... uh, uh I... uh uh wife, Rosa...
uh... take... uh... love... ladies... uh Ocean uh Hospital
and transfer Hahnemann Hospital ambulance... uh...
half'n hour... uh... uh it's... uh... motion, motion...
uh... bad... patient... I uh... flat on the back...
um... it's... uh... shaved, shaved... nurse, shaved me...
uh... shaved me, nurse... [sigh]... wheel chair... uh...
Hahnemann Hospital... a week, a week... uh... then uh...
strength... uh... mood... uh... up... uh... legs and
arms, left side uh... weak... and... Moss Hospital...
two week... no, two months..."

lexical words in the clause. These lexical clues do not disappear in the presence of grammar, in fluent adult speakers. Rather, as Kintsch (in this volume) suggests, vocabulary-guided inferences remains a **parallel processing channel** alongside grammar-cued inferences.

4. Local vs. Global Coherence

Much of the experimental psycholinguistic work on text coherence has in fact centered on vocabulary-driven global processes, i.e. Kintsch's domain-specific general knowledge inferences. This is especially conspicuous in the work on causal inference (Trabasso and van den Broek, 1985; Trabasso and Sperry, 1985; Fletcher and Bloom, 1988;), as well as in earlier discourse-oriented work (Rummelhart, 1975; Johnson-Laird, 1980; van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983; Morrow, Greenspan and Bowers, 1987; Glenberg *et al*, 1987). The same focus on knowledge-driven global coherence is apparent in the "story grammar" paradigm (Mandler, 1978; 1982; Mandler and Johnson, 1977; Johnson and Mandler, 1980; Stein, 1982; Stein and Glen, 1979), or its near equivalent "story schema" (Schank and Abelson, 1977; Wilensky, 1980, 1982; De Beaugrande, 1982).

In a recent review, McKoon and Ratcliff (1992) refer to vocabulary-driven global inferences as "elaborative inferences", "instrumental inferences" or "inferences from situation models". They characterize this global approach to text coherence as follows:

> "...It is widely believed that readers automatically construct inferences to build a *relatively complete* mental model of the situation described by the text ..." (1992, pp. 17–18)

In outlining their **minimalist, localistic** alternative, McKoon and Radcliff suggest that vocabulary-driven global inferences are somehow "not automatically encoded" during text comprehension, and do not depend on the immediate recall buffer. In this, global inferences presumably contrast with local inferences, which are "automatically encoded" during text comprehension and depend on the immediate recall buffer. Whatever the ultimate status of this distinction, it is worth noting that the sense of "automatic encoding" used by McKoon and Ratcliff (1992) could not be the same one we used earlier in referring to grammar as an "automated discourse-processing mode". To begin with, the experimental text-frames used by McKoon and Radcliff have little to do with grammar-driven inferences. Rather, they contrast local vs. global vocabulary-driven inferences. Further, many processes subsumed under lexical access, whether under **spreading activation** (Collins and Quillian, 1969, 1972; Rips, Shoben and Smith, 1973; Smith *et al.*, 1974; Collins and Loftus, 1975; Glass and Holyoak, 1975; Smith, 1978; *inter alia*) or under **multiple activation** (Swinney, 1979) are said to involve considerable automatic

In the remaining portions of this paper, I will outline and illustrate how both vocabulary-cued and grammar-cued text processing involve *both* local and global aspects of coherence. Further, I will suggest that flexible, opportunistic, negotiated aspects of coherence (cf. C. Goodwin, 1986, 1988, 1992, in press; Coates, 1987) may pertain to *both* its local and global structure. If my analysis turns out to be correct, then we must conclude from it that:

(a) Discourse has both local and global coherence structure.
(b) Grammar must have evolved as a mechanism for speeding up the processing of both local and global aspects of text coherence.
(c) Vocabulary-cued – Kintsch's "knowledge-driven" – text processing remains a parallel channel of text processing.

When grammar-cued processes can get us there faster, lexical knowledge may be merely redundant. But beyond a certain point, vocabulary-guided processing is indispensible for fine-grained text comprehension. Further, in a number of well-known instances the use of grammatical and lexical information is intertwined. Finally, quite often the very same grammatical device clues a mixture of local and global coherence.

5. Mechanisms of Coherence

5.1. Preamble

We return now to deal with two central issues in the study of text coherence as a mental process – vocabulary-guided vs. grammar-cued coherence, and local vs. global coherence. The evidence that I will survey will be primarily of the kind that text-oriented ('functional') grammarians consider as their stock-in-trade: the distribution of grammatical and lexical information in well-defined environments in the recorded "external" text. The methodological slant of such work is relatively explicit: Specific text environments are interpreted as **communicative tasks**. And specific grammatical devices that coincide with such environments are interpreted as the **automated signals** that trigger the **cognitive mechanisms** that perform these tasks. It is obvious that the connection between text environments, communicative tasks, grammatical signals and cognitive mechanisms is at the moment largely inferential. But the claims I make are explicit, and thus open to further empirical testing. What I intend to demonstrate here are three interlocking sets of facts:

(a) All major coherence strands involve both vocabulary-guided and grammar-cued processes.
(b) All major coherence strands display both local and global coherence processes.
[illegible] coherence involve both

5.2. Spatial Coherence

5.2.1. Vocabulary-guided Spatial Coherence

It is relatively easy to show vocabulary-guided spatial coherence in text, and further, that such spatial coherence could be both local and global in scope. Consider:

(29) a. **More local:**
They left the **living room** and went **directly** into the **kitchen.**
b. **More global:**
In **Los Angeles,** they found a big mess and fired the manager. In **Chicago** the following week, things were looking much better.

As is typical of vocabulary-guided inferences, frame-based information plays an important role in identifying the spatial coherence as more local in one case, more global in another. Thus, the knowledge that a kitchen tends to be adjacent to the living room (29a) is implicit in the cultural frame "typical American home". Likewise, the knowledge that Los Angeles is geographically non-adjacent to Chicago (29b) comes with the cultural frame "U.S. geography".

The status of spatial prepositions in English is problematic, in the sense that they may be considered either grammatical or lexical-semantic. But regardless of their status, some prepositions cue local and some less-local spatial configurations. Thus, for example, 'in(side)', 'at', 'on(top of)', 'under', 'near (by)', 'in front of' and 'behind' tend to code more local spatial relations, where the figure is relatively close to its spatial ground. On the other hand, 'far (from)', 'away (from)', 'out(side) (of)', 'to(ward)' and 'from' tend to code more global spatial relations, where the figure is more remote from its spatial ground.

Note that some verbs incorporate spatial-orientation features in their lexical meaning. Thus:

(30) a. So he **came** to the house and...
(▷ I was there; he came **toward** me)
b. So he **went** to the house and...
(▷ I was not there; he went **away** from me)

5.2.2. Grammar-cued Spatial Coherence

Situation-based spatial reference is obviously confined to the immediate speech situation. Even so, it can be both more local and more global:

(31) a. Give me **this** book. Now **that** one you can keep.
b. You sit **right here,** and you **here** and you **here.** Now everybody else please sit **way over there.**

Similarly, text-based spatial

(32) a. He came to **the house** and stayed **there** for a week.
b. He kept out of **the office** but stayed **nearby**.
c. He went up **the hill**, and **that's where** he found the body.
d. They went further down, and **right there** they found...

More-global grammar-cued spatial reference may be seen in:

(33) a. This is all for **the Gulf desert**. Now **elsewhere** this Tuesday evening...
b. So he camped **at the fort**. But the rest of them moved **further away** and...
c. All was quiet in **Transylvania**. But **other** countries were not quite as lucky.

Quite often, spatial coherence is established by a mix of vocabulary-guided and grammar-cued means. And this mix may involve more-local or more-global spatial reference:

(34) a. **Local mixed-cues spatial coherence:**
He left **his cubicle** and stepped **into** the **lounge right across the hall** and...
b. **Less local mixed-cues spatial coherence:**
He left **his cubicle** and **left** the **building**. On the **other side** of the **street** he hailed a cab and...

In (34a), the location nouns 'cubicle', 'lounge' and 'hall' furnish part of the spatial coherence information, guided by the relevant frame-based knowledge of "office". But the grammatical cues 'into', 'right' and 'across' further reinforce the more local spatial interpretation. In (34b), the location nouns 'cubicle', 'building', 'side', 'street', together with 'cab' and the verbs 'left' and 'hail', furnish part of the spatial coherence information, again guided by frame-based inferences. But the grammatical cue 'other' reinforces the more global spatial interpretation.

Note, further, that at particular locations in discourse – typically at the opening of a discourse, a chapter or an episode – the whole spatial framework for an impending text is laid out in some detail. An example of such spatial orientation ('scene setting') at a story-initial context can be seen in (35) below, the second paragraph of a novel:[24]

(35) "...Seven days of [Ø] riding the ghost trails **up out of Sonora, down from the Sierra Madre, through Apache country**, keeping **off the sky lines** and watching the beckoning fingers of the talking smoke..." (p. 1)

In signalling spatial coherence in (35), a mixed array of lexical and grammatical means are employed.

Spatial re-orientation often takes place at paragraph-initial environments. One of the most common device there is a **pre-posed adverbial** with an

(36) a. ...Meanwhile **back on the ranch**, the crew is busy with fall roundup...
b. ...**At all other locations**, the AP reports, order order has been **restored**...
c. ...Finally, **at the house where they found the body**,
the missing gun all of a sudden turns up...

In each case, grammatical and lexical signals are combined. In each case, the fronted adverbial performs at least two communicative functions: It signals the termination of the preceding thematic paragraph and the initiation of another. And it affects spatial re-orientation. In each case, the spatial re-orientation contains specific global coherence clues, ones that refer backwards – anaphorically – to spatial information in the preceding paragraph or even further back. In (36a), this is implicit in both 'back' and 'the ranch'. In (36b), it is implicit in 'other'. In (36c), it is implicit in the restrictive REL-clause 'where they found the body', which refers back to an event assumed to be already accessible in episodic memory.

5.3. Temporal Coherence

5.3.1. Vocabulary-guided Temporal Coherence

Vocabulary-guided temporal coherence is most often intermixed with grammatical signals, such as prepositions. The coherence may be strictly local, as in:

(37) a. On **Tuesday** she was late, on **Wednesday** she was late again, and on **Thursday** she didn't show up at all.
b. You go to work in the **morning**, at **noon** you take a short lunch break, and in the **afternoon** you...
c. They started calling him at **five** and they kept till **six** and he finally showed up at **seven**.

When vocabulary-guided temporal coherence is less local, the simultaneous use of grammatical devices such as pre-posed adverbials is almost obligatory, as a paragraph-initial or chain-initial device:

(38) a. ...So they made a deal and signed the papers.
The following **Tuesday**, at **eight** in the **morning**, the guy calls and says...
b. ...So he went to sleep. **Two hours later**, she...
c. ...And so things went on this way the whole winter.
Next **spring**, a new chief was appointed...

Again, implicitly or explicitly, anaphoric connections are made by the temporal adverb, tapping into information accessible in episodic memory. The anaphoric clues are partly embedded in the lexical time-word – 'Tuesday', 'eight', 'morning', 'hour', 'spring'. Often, the clues involve modifiers

5.3.2. Grammar-cued Temporal Coherence

5.3.2.1. Tense-Aspect and Temporal Coherence

Most non-pidgin languages code at least two major distinctions of temporal coherence through their tense-aspect-modality system. These distinctions contrast three tense-aspectual markers:

(a) preterit ('perfective', 'past')
(b) progressive ('durative')
(c) perfect ('anterior')

The **preterit** aspect codes the more common temporal *norm* of discourse, whereby events are recounted in the same sequential-temporal order in which they occurred (Hopper, 1979). These sequential events are, further, temporally adjacent, so that the temporal coherence relation between them is strictly local.

The in-sequence norm can be then contrasted with two counter-norms. The **progressive** aspect codes events that are simultaneous with other events. Such events are by definition non-sequential, but due to their extreme temporal adjacency their temporal coherence is by definition rather local. The contrast between the preterit-sequential and progressive-simultaneous aspects is illustrated in:

(39) a. **Sequential (preterit-past):**
After she came home, he **cooked** dinner,
and they ate and went to bed.
b. **Simultaneous (progressive-past):**
When she came home, he **was cooking** dinner.
Then they ate and went to bed.

A more natural example from written narrative also illustrates the much higher text-frequency of the in-sequence preterit norm:[26]

(40) "...Within the mouth of the draw he *drew* reins again. With his first glance he *recognized* the body for what it was, but only when he *was* quite sure that he *was* alone *did* he approach it. He *circled* it as wearily as a wolf, **studying** it from all angles, and when he finally *stopped*, within a dozen feet of the dead man, he *knew* much of..."

The **perfect** aspect codes counter-sequence events, more specifically events that occur earlier but are placed later in the verbal depiction. Consider the contrast between (41c) and (42c) below:

(41) **Sequential preterit-past:**
a. She came back into the room,
b. looked around,
c. **spotted** the buffet

(42) **Perfect past:**
a. She came back into the room
b. and looked around.
c. She **had spotted** the buffet beforehand.
d. She went to get a sandwich...

The difference between the sequential preterit and the counter-sequential perfect in (41) and (42) below may be given diagrammatically as:

(43) a. **Actual order of events:**
...A, B, C, D...
b. **Order of narration in the preterit past:**
...A, B, C, D...
c. **Order of narration with the perfect:**
...A, C, **B**, D...

A more natural illustration of the contrast between the sequential preterit and the counter-sequence perfect in narrative can be seen in:[27]

(44) "...He *circled* it wearily as a wolf, studying it from all angles, and when finally he *stopped* within a dozen feet of the dead man, he *knew* much of what **had** happened at this place.
The dead man **had** ridden a freshly shod horse into the playa from the north, and when shot he **had** tumbled from the saddle and the horse **had** galloped away. Several riders on unshod ponies **had** then approached the body and one **had** dismounted to collect the weapons..."

Table (45) summarizes the frequency distribution of the major tense-aspects in two English texts.

(45) **The distribution of tense-aspect-modality in low-brow fiction and academic text in English**[28]

	academic		fiction	
category	N	%	N	%
past (sequential)	2	2	74	56
irrealis	18	20	8	6
habitual (sequential)	62	70	/	/
progressive	/	/	43	32
perfect	7	8	8	6
total:	89	100	133	100

In the fiction text, most sequential events were coded by the preterit-past, but the presence of dialogue provided for a relatively large portion of non-
coded events. In the aca-

5.3.2.2. Temporal Adverbial Connectors

Another grammatical sub-system used in the coding of temporal coherence are adverbial connectors. These can be as small as single-word conjunctions, such as '(and) then', 'later', 'afterwards', 'soon', 'earlier (on)' and others. Most of these connectors have an implicit anaphoric temporal reference, some more local, some more global. The latter tend to be associated with more major thematic transition. Thus compare:

(46) a. He had a quick dinner **and then** got up and left.
b. He ate dinner, **then** slept, **then** got up and left.
c. He ate dinner. **Later (on)** he got up and left.
d. He ate a good dinner. **Afterwards** he slept for 8 hours.
e. They ate dinner. **Soon** the dishes were cleared and...
f. He ate dinner. **Earlier on** he had slept for 8 hours.

Almost all the temporal connectors in (46) are sequential. The lone exception is the counter-sequential 'earlier (on)' (46f), which is further amplified by the perfect aspect.

5.3.3.3. Temporal Adverbial Clauses

The last grammar-cued device used extensively in establishing temporal coherence in discourse are temporal ADV-clauses. The temporal sub-ordinator of such clauses provides the specific cataphoric temporal relation between the adverbial and main clause. This relation is in one sense local, since it pertain to the very next clause:

(47) **Temporal links of adverbial clauses:**
a. **Precedence:**
Before she came, he left.
b. **Subsequence:**
After she came, he left.
c. **Simultaneity:**
While she was working, he left.
d. **Point coincidence:**
As she was coming, he saw her.
e. **Terminal boundary:**
Till she left, he worked steadily.
f. **Initial boundary:**
(Ever) since she came, he's been ignoring her.
g. **Intermediacy:**
Between her starting the project and
her quitting in a huff, nobody slept.

But the temporal relation could be more remote, and thus in a sense also more global:

(48) **Way before** she came, he left

Pre-posed ADV-clauses tend to be used as **coherence bridges** at the onset of a new thematic clause-chain or paragraph. Their more global, anaphoric coherence strands are not cued by the adverbial subordinator itself. Rather, they are signalled by a combination of grammatical and lexical cues inside the adverbial clause. This is especially true in presupposed ADV-clauses, i.e. those that have a past or perfect tense-aspect:

(49) a. After **he said that**, she decided...
b. Having **told us this incredible a tale of woes**, he...
c. During **her next visit**, the Queen said...
d. In the **last attempt to assassinate him**, they tried...
e. When **they finished telling her about it**, she said...
f. After **what she told him** finally sank in, he got up...

5.4. Thematic Coherence

Thematic coherence is most likely an epi-phenomenon. It may be an additive consequence of all the more concrete strands of coherence falling together, but is unlikely to be the mere sum of its various parts. In this section I will illustrate one aspect of thematic coherence that is primarily vocabulary-guided, and a number of aspects that are heavily grammar-cued. Each one turns out to involve both local and global aspects of coherence.

5.4.1. Vocabulary-guided Action Coherence

By action coherence I refer here to culturally-shared, conventional, generic knowledge of **sequential action schemata** ('scripts', 'routines'). Both thematically and syntactically, such sequences display maximally-tight coherence – typically with continuing reference, location, temporality, aspectuality, modality and perspective:

(50) a. She opened the fridge, took out the milk carton,
poured herself a glass and drank.
b. He put on his pajamas, got in bed,
turned off the light and went to sleep.
c. They shot the deer, skinned it,
quartered the carcass and hung it to cure.

In each case in (50), reversing any local sequential order will disrupt the thematic coherence. Respectively:

(51) a. *She opened the fridge, poured herself a glass of milk,
took out the milk carton and drank.
b. *He put on his pajamas, got into bed,
went to sleep and turned off the lights.
c. *They skinned the deer, shot it,
quartered the carcass and hung it to cure.

inherently incoherent about pouring oneself a glass before taking the milk-carton out of the fridge. One can transfer liquids from one container to another inside a fridge. It is only in the more global context of the routine "going for a glass of milk" that the order is incoherent. Similarly in (51b), there's nothing inherently incoherent about going to sleep (but not falling asleep, or waking up later) and then turning the lights off. It is only in the more global context of the routine "going to bed at night" that the order becomes incoherent. And similarly in (51c), there is nothing physically impossible about skinning an animal and then shooting it. It is only in the more global context of the habituated routine "hunting game animals" that such an order becomes incoherent.

5.4.2. Grammar-cued Thematic Coherence

As noted earlier, human discourse is multi-propositional, with clauses making up chains, which in turn make up paragraphs (etc.).[29] One of the grammatical sub-systems that helps cue this hierarchic organization of discourse combines conjunctions, intonation and pauses – which in the written language are mimicked as punctuation – [30]) and paragraph indentation. These devices are inherently cataphoric: The grammatical cue is placed between the two clauses, signalling the degree of thematic continuity of the *next* clause.[31]

Given the strong correlation between thematic and referential continuity, consider now the results of one study of low-brow English fiction text, where referential continuity across various grammatically-cued inter-clausal transitions was recorded (Table 52).

(52) **Referential continuity across adjacent clauses separated by *zero*, comma, period and paragraph indentation; with 'and' and 'then' in written English** (Hayashi, 1989)

conjunction type	**% subject switch (DS) across the conjunction**
and	15%
, *and*	70%
. *And*	81%
and then	16%
, *and then*	36%
. *and then*	100%
, then	50%
. Then	56%
. PARAG+Then	100%
comma (alone)	10%
period (alone)	72%

An equally strong association exists between conjunctions that are themat-

that are thematically disruptive or contrastive ('while', 'but', 'though', 'yet') and referential discontinuity. Table (53) summarized the results of one distributional study.

(53) **Referential continuity across adjacent clauses separated by various conjunctions in written English** (Hayashi, 1989)

conjunction	% subject switch (DS) across the conjunction
and (all punctuations)	29%
, *while*	77%
but (all punctuations)	85%
, *though*	100%
. *Yet*	100%

The conjunctions that signal tighter thematic continuity presumably cue more local coherence, while those that signal greater thematic disruption cue more global coherence – since they are typically found at chain or paragraph boundaries.

5.5. Referential Coherence

5.5.1. Grammar vs. Lexicon, Local vs. Global

The largest portion of the grammar of discourse coherence in most languages is connected, in one way or another, with the grammar of referential coherence. The following list of grammatical devices is by no means exhaustive:

(54) **Main sub-systems in the grammar of referential coherence:**
Without lexical information
(a) zeros, agreement, pronouns
(b) same-subject (SS) cataphoric morphology
Combined with lexical information
(c) different subject (DS) cataphoric morphology
(d) determiners, articles, numerals
(e) grammatical case-roles (subject, direct object)
(f) role-changing constructions (passive, inverse, antipassive, dative-shift)
(g) existential-presentative constructions
(h) restrictive modifiers (relative clauses, adjectives)
(i) word-order devices (L/R-dislocation, Y-movement, cleft)

Among these devices, the major dichotomy is between those that signal **continued activation** of the current topical referent, and those that signal its **terminated activation**. Statistically, this dichotomy overlaps to a large extent (but not absolutely) with the dichot-

absolutely) with the split between local referential coherence (continuity) vs. global referential coherence (discontinuity).

The dichotomy between grammatical devices that signal continued reference vs. those that signal disrupted reference also coincides, in the main, with the dichotomy between purely grammatical referential devices (54a, b), and those that combine grammar-cuing with lexical information (54c-i). The most obvious source of lexical information in the latter group is the lexical noun itself. Compare:

(55) **Grammar without lexical cuing (continuing reference):**
- a. **Zero:**
  ...The woman came in and **[Ø]** stopped...
- b. **Anaphoric pronoun:**
  ...The woman came in and stopped.
  Then **she** moved again...

(56) **Grammar combined with lexical cuing (terminated reference):**
- a. **Indefinite noun (modified by an adjective):**
  ...The woman came in and stopped.
  There was a tall man sitting there...
- b. **Demonstrative plus noun:**
  ...The woman came in and stopped.
  "There's something wrong with **this room**"
  she thought...
- c. **Definite noun:**
  ...They went in together. The woman stopped,
  But **the man** kept going...
- d. **Definite noun (modified by a REL-clause):**
  ...The woman came in and stopped. She saw
  the man who had questioned her earlier sitting there...
- e. **Word-order device (L-dislocation):**
  ...The woman came in and stopped. She was finally home.
  But **the man, he** never came back...
- f. **Grammatical role and voice change (passive):**
  ...The woman came in and braced herself for a long wait.
  The man was still being searched, so it seemed...

Combining lexical cues with grammatical ones is indispensible when reference is terminated (56). Even when the next topical referent to be activated has an accessible antecedent in some extant mental representation, a search for that antecedent must be instituted. Purely grammatical information cannot be conclusive, as it was in signaling continuing reference (55). Thus, the grammatical device "full NP" *per se* (56) could only signal discontinuing reference. Other grammatical devices signal **definiteness**, i.e. accessibility of the co-referent in some existing mental model (56b, c, d, e, f). Other grammatical devices yet may narrow the search down to episodic memory (56c, d, e, f). Other yet may point the search more finely beyond the current thematic chain (56d, e.f). But [illegible] antecedent can occur without full specification

Above and beyond the head noun, other lexical clues for referential identification may be furnished by **restrictive modifiers.** Thus in (56d) above, the specific vocabulary items in the REL-clause "who questioned her earlier" guide the more fine-grained search for coreference, under the assumption that the proposition "A man questioned the woman" is still accessible in the hearer's episodic memory.

5.5.2. Text Frequency, Markedness and Cognitive Default

In this section I briefly review the frequency distribution of zeros and anaphoric pronouns vs. full NPs in coherent discourse. Two facts are conspicuous about the two continuing reference grammatical devices. Functionally, they mark a continuing referent, one that was also topical in the preceding clause. Structurally, they display zero lexical expression of that referent. The distribution of zero/pronouns vs. full NPs in natural text reveal that referential continuity is the more frequent norm, and discontinuity is the exception. Consider first the distribution of zero/pronouns vs. full definite nouns in Ute, English, and two English-based pidgins.

(57) **Text frequency of clauses with anaphoric subject pronouns (incl. zero) vs. full subject nouns in spoken Ute, spoken English and two spoken Pidgins**[32]

	ZERO/PRONOUN		DEF-NOUNS		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Ute	288	**93.5**	20	6.5	308	100.0
English	540	**74.4**	185	25.6	725	100.0
Spanglish pidgin	109	**68.9**	54	31.1	163	100.0
Filipinglish pidgin	132	**73.3**	48	26.7	180	100.0

When the sample of full NPs includes indefinite nouns, the predominance of zero/pronouns is a little less pronounced. As illustration, consider the frequency distribution in Sacapultec Mayan (DuBois, 1987)[33].

(58) **The distribution of grammatical subjects, objects and 'others' in the zero-pronoun and full-NP categories in Zacapultec** (from DuBois, 1987)

	NP type					
	zero/pronoun		**full-NP**		**total**	
grammatical type	N	%	N	%	N	%
transitive SUBJ	169	**93.9**	11	6.1	180	100.0
intransitive SUBJ	136	**51.9**	126	48.1	262	100.0
all subjects	305	**60.9**	197			

What Table (58) reveals is the predominance of referential continuity – **93.9%** continuous referents – in the *transitive subject* category. Such subject are semantically almost entirely **human agents.** Intransitive subjects, in contrast, more commonly introduce new – discontinuous – participants into the discourse, and are also less likely to be human agents. The level of continuous reference there drops to around **50%**, and matches the level found in direct objects. The 'other' categories, indirect objects of various types, are almost categorially non-*continuous*, with only **13%** zero/pronouns.

The predominance of the subject-coded participant in coherent text can also be show by the following distribution in spoken English narrative.

(59) **Number of participant-referents per clause in spontaneous oral English narrative**[34]

# of participants per clause	N	%
1 (SUBJ only)	39	38.6
2 (SUBJ & OBJ)	54	53.4
3 (SUBJ, OBJ, OTH)	8	8.0
>3	/	/
total:	101	100.0

The distribution of total NPs in the various grammatical roles in the text in (59) can be now computed as:[35]

(60) **Frequency distribution of various grammatical NP roles in spontaneous oral English narrative**

NP role	#	%
SUBJ	101	59.0
OBJ	62	36.0
OTHERS	8	5.0
total:	171	100.0

The grammatical subject, the clause's *primary topic*, codes the event participant that is the most continuous – both anaphorically and cataphorically. NPs occupying this pivotal grammatical role constitute 60% of all referents in text. Direct objects, the clause's *secondary topics*, constitute the bulk of the rest (36%). Non-topical "others" make up a negligeable residue (5%).

The conclusions that one may draw from the various distributions presented above are as follows:

(a) The grammatical cues that signal referential continuity are the most frequent referent-coding devices in text.
(b) Zero lexical marking of referents is a concomitant of the referent's

(c) Zero lexical marking is thus the default choice in the grammar of referential coherence, the unmarked case.
(d) There is a strong association between the high-continuity grammatical device and grammatical subjecthood.
(e) Even with the less-continuous direct objects (and subjects of intransitive clauses) thrown in, the ratio of all topical referents per clause approximates 1 topic per clause.

These conclusions beg for a comprehensive hypothesis about the cognitive role of topical referents in the representation and retrieval of text in episodic memory.

6. The Grammar of Referential Coherence as Processing Cues

6.1. Preliminaries

In this section I sketch out more explicitly the cognitive interpretation of the grammar of referential coherence, an interpretation that has been implicit in the preceding discussion. I will take it for granted that the clause is the minimal unit for accruing new language-coded information into episodic memory. And further, that a clause in connected discourse always has one topical referent (most commonly its grammatical subject). The function of the clausal topical referent may be now given as the hypothesis:

(61) **Function of the clause's topical referent:**
  (a) Adjacent clause-nodes that belong to the same equitopic chain in mentally represented text are attached under their governing **chain-node**.
  (b) The clausal topic serves as the **node label** or **filing address** for the clause, insuring that it gets attached under its rightful chain-node.
  (c) As long as the incoming information is filed under the same chain-node, the same topic remains **activated**.
  (d) In order to discontinue one clause-chain and initiate another, the currently-active topic must be **de-activated**, and a new one **activated**.
  (e) Only one chain-node at a time can be activated, insuring unambiguous addressing of incoming new information.

The significance of using nominal referents – rather then other coherence strands such as locations, times, actions or abstract themes – as the chain-node labels lies in the conflation of four factors that are not wholly independent of each other:

(a) Nominal referents are perceptually-cognitively salient.
(b) Nominal reference is acquired early in ontogeny.
(c) Nominal reference evolved early in phylogeny.
(d) Nominal referents code culturally central entities.

individuated, spatially compact; and in particular:
(i) **The prototype subject-agent:**
human, active, conscious, willful.
(ii) **The prototype object-patient:**
concrete, inanimate, compact, manipulable, usable.

6.2. Cognitive Model

6.2.1. General Operations

I will assume that the grammar of referential coherence, in so far as it involves the episodic mental model of the current text, cues two main mental operations:

(a) **Attentional activation operations (cataphoric):**
Opening (activation) or closing (de-activation) text-nodes for attaching incoming new information.
(b) **Search & retrieval operations (anaphoric):**
Searching in the episodic text representation for the anaphoric grounding of referents. of 0 39/coher.92

By activating a topical referent, one activates the text-node labeled by the referent. Three possible operations are subsumed under 'attentional activation'.


(62) **Main attentional instructions:**
a. continue activation of the currently active topic/node
b. terminate activation of the currently active topic/node
c. activation of a currently inactive topic/node, by either:
(i) activating a new referent (indefinite)
(ii) re-activate an existing referent (definite)

Memory search and retrieval operations apply only in the case of (62c-ii) – when a currently inactive definite referent is re-activated. The re-activation of a definite referent requires searching for its anaphoric antecedence in some relevant mental structure (speech-situation model, lexical knowledge model, episodic text model). A precondition for re-activating a definite referent is that its anaphoric antecedence be accessible. In other words, a definite referent can only be re-activated if its current text-location is grounded to its antecedent text-location in the episodic mental model of the current text.

The main grammar-cued mental operations relevant to referent activation are summarized in (63) as a series of ordered, binary choices. For each binary choice, one option is assumed to be the **unmarked** ('default') case. This is the more frequent choice in natural text, the one that is cognitively less costly. The other option is the **marked** case, the less frequent choice in natural text, the one that is cognitively more costly.

The [illegible] operations outlined in (63) are to be interpreted the set

(63) **Major grammar-cued mental operations for referential coherence**



(64) **Major grammar-cued mental operations for referential coherence**

(a) if **ZERO/PRO** ⇒ continue current activation (keep filing incoming information under same node)

(b) if **FULL NP** ⇒ (i) defer activation de[illegible]

(ii) continue current activation (keep filing incoming new information in the current active node).

(d) if **IMPORTANT** ⇒ then
de-activate the current active node. then

(e) if **INDEF** ⇒ (i) do not search for antecedence;
(ii) initiate a new text-node;
(iii) activate the new referent/node;
(iv) attach the new referent/node to the current text-location;
(v) file incoming new information under the new node;

(f) if **DEF** ⇒ determine the source of definiteness among the three disjunctive options:
(i) Speech situation mental model
(ii) Generic-lexical mental model
(iii) Episodic text mental model;
then

(g) (i) search for antecedent in appropriate mental model;
(ii) ground the antecedent to its co-referent in the current text location;
(iii) initiate a new text-node, labeled by the grounded topical referent;
(iv) activate the new referent/node;
(v) attach the new referent/node to its current text-location;
(vi) file incoming new information under new node;

6.3. Some General Principles

The cognitive model outlined above, of grammar-cued attentional activation of text-storage nodes, abides by a number of general principles. The first one involves the relationship between a topical referent and the text-node of which it is the activating label:

(65) **Node activation via referent-activation:**
"A text-node in episodic memory is activated, and thus is open for storage of in-coming new information, when its topical referent, or node-label, is activated".

The second principle identifies the activation of text-nodes as a limited capacity mental process, a property one would expect of any attentional sub-system:[37]

(66) **One-node-at-a-time constraint:**
"Only one text-node is open – activated – at any given time".

Principle (66) probably applies at any given hierarchic level within the mental text structure. So that only one chain-node at a time is open for attaching clause-nodes; only one paragraph-node at a time is open for attaching chain-

The next principle relates the grounding of referents that serve as node-labels – both indefinite (new) and definite (old) referents – upon their activation:

(67) **Grounding as condition for activation:**
"A node – and thus the referent-label that activates it for text-storage – must be grounded before it can be activated for text-storage.
a. A new (indefinite) referent is grounded only to its current text location in the episodic structure still under construction.
b. An old (definite) referent is attached to its current location in the episodic text structure; but it must also be grounded to some other location in some preexisting mental structure".

The grounding of a referent-node to its current text location is by definition a local operation. The second type of grounding, applying only to definite NPs, involves more global connections between non-adjacent location in the current text-structure, or between two different structures.

7. Discussion

7.1. Local vs. Global Coherence

I think both the experimental work on text processing and the grammar-in-discourse studies by linguists strongly suggest that coherence involves both local and global processes. This seems to be as true of vocabulary-guided ('knowledge-based') processes as it is of all major grammar-cued processes. Pitting the two types of coherence against each other as mutually exclusive alternatives is not a viable approach.

7.2. Vocabulary-guided vs. Grammar-cued Coherence

The hybrid model of language processing and text coherence suggested by Kintsch (in this volume) is probably the right approach to pursue. Information about the coherence structure of text is thus processed through two parallel channels:

(a) Knowledge-based inferences, supported by the lexical vocabulary of the clause.
(b) Grammar-cued inferences, supported by the syntactic structure, grammatical morphology and intonational cues of the clause.

If the clause is indeed the basic processing unit for language-coded information, then both processing channels aim at the very same cognitive task:

(68) **Main on-line task in text processing:**
"Determine where and how to attach the new information in the [illegible]

The vocabulary-guided channel relies on the automatic activation of lexical meanings. That activation is always there, since it is necessary for understanding the propositional information of the clause, regardless where and how that information is stored in episodic representation. Text production and comprehension can proceed by relying exclusively on this channel, as is the case in early child language, second language pidgin, and agrammatic aphasia. The vocabulary-guided channel is also a slow, context-dependent and error-prone.[38] Nonetheless, it is a fine-grained processing channel. It guides the processor to exact, final mental destinations, and it is attuned to fine shades and gradations of meaning and context.

The grammar-cued channel is a later ontogenetic addition to the arsenal language processing, and probably also a later phylogenetic addition. It is a rough-grained processing route, moving the bulk at high speed and lower error rates in a relatively context-free fashion.[39] But it very seldom gets the processor to exact, final mental destinations. To reach those, the grammar-cued channel must be disengaged, and processing must rely on the ever-present, automatically activated, vocabulary-coded "knowledge-based" channel.

The only discourse context where lexical information seems clearly superfluous, for establishing text coherence, is the *default* context of continued current activation. This is the context where lexical information is consistently "deleted" from the clause. But this is also the context where grammatical clues are dispensed with, and where one most consistently finds:

(a) zero-coded NPs
(b) reduced (non-finite) verbal morphology
(c) zero-coded thematic conjunctions.

This paucity of signal in both processing channel is possible because the default mental task of continued current activation requires no further operation. The task in unambiguous – attach incoming clausal information to the same, currently-activated text-node. Constraint (66) – "one node at a time" – insures that this most frequent processing task is both cognitively least ambiguous. That such a task is also linguistically the least marked, i.e. requires minimal coding, is only to be expected.[40]

The traditional notion that zeros and pronouns "create ambiguity" is, from a cognitive perspective, an exact upside-down rendition of the facts. It is only in the least ambiguous processing tasks that one can safely resort to zeros and pronouns, because their lexical identity is unambiguously activated.

7.3. Why is Anaphoric Grounding So Necessary?

One of the most striking features of text coherence is the seemingly absolute anaphoric grounding requirement (67): Currently-topical referents that have antecedence in mentally represented prior text must be grounded to that antecedence. This requirement creates coherence connections that are often distant and in that sense global. And these distant connections cut across the hierarchic

(69) **The anaphoric grounding constraint:**
"When an important topic is re-introduced into the discourse, access to the information filed under its antecedent text-location must be assured".

But why such a rigid constraint? The answer is, I think, fairly obvious. If a referent is an important topic, its topicality and relevance must be justified upon activation in its current text location. As we have seen, this type of justification is systematically furnished for indefinite referents upon their first introduction into the discourse. They are cataphorically grounded by such information. But the information that justifies the importance and relevance of a definite referent with prior text antecedence has already been furnished at least once – at its prior text location. Obligatory anaphoric grounding makes that information available again – at the referent's current text location. This dispenses with the need to re-assemble the information again and again from scratch.

Anaphoric connections between a referent's current and prior text locations are time-saving devices in the processing of coherent discourse. They make it possible to tap into information that has already been assembled and stored in episodic text – when it again becomes relevant.

7.4. Grammar, Episodic Storage and Working Memory: The Thematic Flexibility of Episodic Representation

In their most recent review of the cognitive status of the working memory buffer, Just and Carpenter (1992) describe it as a **limited capacity** mechanism, in terms of both storage and processing. These two aspects of the buffer are thus in competition for a limited amount of "activation". While not explicitly stated in the review, the most likely limited capacity here is probably some species of attention.

The recall capacity for surface linguistic form, and thus for grammatical clues associated with the clause, is severely limited (Gernsbacher, 1985; Carpenter and Just, 1988, 1992; *inter alia*). These limits are somewhere in the range of 2–5 clauses, or 8–20 seconds,[41] a "moving buffer" beyond which grammatical form is not preserved.

Within the 8–20 second time-span of working memory, the grammatical information associated with the clause must be translated into the clause's location and manner-of-attachment in episodic mental representation. The clause's grammatical clues may thus be considered a **translation mechanism**; they insure the coherent encoding of incoming information in episodic memory. The limited buffer capacity suggests that, with grammar, such translation occurs within the range of 8–20 seconds, and that grammatical cues are unnecessary beyond that point. But couldn't they still be useful?

There are at least two good reasons why grammatical clues are probably not stored in episodic memory. The first reason is evolutionary: The grammar-free storage of episodic text develops in the child long before grammar; it is supported by the same hippocampus neurology in prehuman pre-
and it had

other words, the mechanism for coherent episodic mental representation has *always* been grammar-free.

There is a more compelling reason why the original grammatical information coming with each clause should not be preserved in episodic memory: It may actually be communicatively harmful to preserve such information. Grammar is a translation mechanism that helps contextualize clausal information in its *current* communicative context: current speech situation, current goals, current perspective, current text, current thematic structure. But once stored, the information is always – by definition – retrieved and re-used in *another* communicative context. This is true in the case of later retrieval and re-telling on another occasion (cf. Loftus, 1980; Squire, 1987; Squire and Zola-Morgan, 1991; Slobin, 1987; *inter alia*). But it is equally true about repeated access and retrieval during the on-line processing of the same current text.

The speech-situation context shifts constantly, as does the thematic context, even during the "same current text". This is particularly clear when one notes the shifting, flexible, negotiable nature of coherence in oral face-to-face communication (cf. C. Goodwin 1982, 1986, 1988, 1992, in this volume; Coates 1987, *inter alia*). A simple-minded example will illustrate how unstable the grammatical form is across consecutive, adjacent turns that have 'the same' propositional reference. The grammatical signals associated with three core proposition in (70) below – "Guy want see Bill", "Bill want John..." and "John ask guy..." – are bold-faced:

(70) JOHN: **There-s a guy here who want-s to see you.**
BILL: **Why do-es he want to see me?**
JOHN: **You want me to ask him?**
BILL: **Yeah, why do-nt you ask him.**

Retrieving propositional information from episodic memory together with the grammatical clues that were originally attached to it would render the information rather confusing, since those grammatical clues are incompatible with the proposition's current communicative context. The sharp decay of grammatical signals beyond the short-term buffer is thus not a loss, but rather a vital communicative necessity.

Notes

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1. Among linguists, the perspective of well-edited, written, narratives text is implicit in much of the early work on coherence (cf. Longacre, 1971, 1976; Halliday and Hasan, 1976; Grimes, 1975; *inter alia*).
2. This approach to grammar as an automated discourse processing mode follows Givón

vocabulary-guided clues are responsible for a considerable portion of text coherence, especially in pre-grammatical communication (early child discourse, second language pidgin, agrammatic aphasic speech).

3. Dan Slobin (in personal communication) has noted that speakers and hearers bring a different contexts – goals, frames, relevance considerations – into verbal interaction. The mental text-trace that survives in episodic memory is heavily dependent on these varying contexts.
4. See e.g. van Dijk and Kintsch (1983); Gernsbacher (1990); *inter alia*. One may argue that there is a at least a partial one-way conditional relation between the two, so that:

   "if hierarchic, then sequential"
   (but not necessarily vice versa)

   The 'chunking' process that produce hierarchic representation – apparently in any modality and at any level – of sequential information beyond a certain length, is well documented (cf. Chase and Simon, 1973; Chase and Ericsson, 1981, 1982; Ericsson, Chase and Faloon, 1980; Ericsson, 1985). So that to all intent and purpose, for sequences beyond a certain minimal length of 3–4 items, one may interpret the relation between hierarchy and sequence as a *bi-conditional*.
5. See Carpenter and Just (1988) for a review of the role of chunking, i.e. the creation of hierarchic structure for long term storage (cf. Chase and Ericsson, 1981, 1982; Ericsson, Chase and Faloon, 1980; Ericsson, 1985).
6. Some texts are 'flat' or 'shallow', other have 'deeper' hierarchical structures. Some node-sequences (at whatever hierarchic level) are long, others are short.
7. Similar devices also exist in most languages to distinguish definite NPs that are slated to be more important ('persistent', 'topical') in the subsequent discourse from those that are slated to be unimportant ('non-persistent', 'non-topical').
8. The indefinite (unstressed) 'this' is not used in formal or written English. The letter cited here was written by a teenager using the informal oral style.
9. The data were taken from: Sahaptin (Sahaptian) oral narrative, Rude (1992); Surinam Carib (Carib) oral narrative, Gildea (1992); Bella-Coola (Salish) oral narrative, Forrest (1992); Korean written narrative, Kim (1992); Spanish written newspaper prose, Hidalgo (1992). See also Givón (ed. 1994).
10. The grammar of deixis is much more extensive, and may involve the tense-aspect modality system and other verbal inflections, as well as other grammatical sub-systems.
11. Several full-NP referents are thematically incidental or unimportant, and were not boldfaced. Thematic importance ('topicality') tends to correlate statistically with "playing the subject role in a clause".
12. From L'Amour (1962, p. 7).
13. The New York Times, Daily Business Section, June 3, 1991, p. C1.
14. For a discussion of various contrastive topicalizing devices, see Givón (1990a, ch. 16).
15. From the conversation of a retired New Mexico rancher, recorded ca. 1978 (see Givón, 1983a).
16. From L'Amour (1962, p. 8). For more details about the use of pre-posed ADV-clauses as thematic-discontinuity devices see Thompson (1985), Ramsay (1987), or Givón (1990a, ch. 19).
17. A somewhat similar situation was studied experimentally by Tomlin (1987).
18. The cognitive notion "same text" is akin to the logician's "same meta-level" (Russell's (1919) "same type") or the text linguist's "same universe of discourse".
19. When two adjacent clauses are disjointed in a set

20. See further below. Even when the clause contains only two main elements – an old-information subject and a new-information verb – chances are the verb carries tense-aspect-modality markers that signal other (temporal, thematic) grounding connections.
21. There may be time costs for processing each grounding connection, and some upper limit per clause. A clause can presumably be over-grounded, with confusion arising as to which direction of connectivity is more weighted, more relevant, or stronger. Marcelo Dascal (in personal communication) notes that one implication of constraints (23) and (24), taken together, may be that the ideal clause-size is two chunks, one new information, the other old (grounding) information. The issue is fundamentally not one of logic but rather of cognition, and must be resolved empirically.
22. Recorded by L.C. Givón, 5–20–81 (cf. Givón (1990b).
23. Hawaii Japanese-English Pidgin; from transcripts supplied by D. Bickerton; see also Bickerton and Givón (1976).
24. L'Amour (1962, p. 1).
25. The use of pre-posed adverbials to signal the opening of a new paragraph has been discussed earlier above.
26. From L'Amour (1962, p. 7).
27. L'Amour (1962, p. 7).
28. The fiction text was L'Amour (1962, pp. 83–85). The academic non-fiction text was Haiman (1985, pp. 21–23).
29. For the relation between clauses, chains and paragraphs, see Grimes (1975), Longacre (1971, 1976), Chafe (1986, 1987, 1988), Givón (1990a, ch. 19; 1991).
30. For the use of punctuation, intonation and grammar in signalling thematic continuity, see Chafe (1988); Givón (1990a, ch. 19; 1991). For cognitive aspects of pausing, see Eisler-Goldman (1968).
31. We have already noted how the grammar of reference, tense-aspect-modality and adverbials collaborates in signalling inter-clausal, inter-chain and inter-paragraph coherence. In other languages, the grammar of clause-chaining and paragraphing involves other devices, such as verb serialization, cataphoric switch-reference morphology, and more vs. less finite verb morphology – thus also tense-aspect-modality. See again Givón (1990a, ch.19).
32. After Givón (1983b; 1984b).
33. Excluded from DuBois' original Table 2 are NPs occupying the role of *possessor*. These are not grammatical arguments of the clause, but rather modifiers within the noun phrase. Similar figures have also been reported for Modern Hebrew (Smith, in press).
34. Life-story of a retired New Mexico rancher; first two typed pages of transcript; see Givón (1983a). The count excluded single NPs coming under their own separate intonation contour (see discussion in Chafe, 1988). All eight 3-participant clauses had one time-adverb, which strictly speaking is not a clausal participant, but was counted as one here.
35. A similar computation can be done with the Sacapultec distribution in Table (58).
36. The model presented below follows, in the main, the one presented in Givón (1990a, ch. 20) and Givón (1992).
37. See Posner and Snyder (1974); Schneider and Shiffrin (1977). Since grammatical cues seem to be to quite an extent a sub-conscious, automated system (rapidly decaying; immediate-recall dependent; not preserved episodic memory), the attentional sub-system involved here is probably a more modal-specific species of *covert attention* (Inhoff *et al*, 1989; Posner & Petersen, 1990; Nissen and Bulleme, 1986).

39. Grammar-cued processing is not, strictly speaking, wholely context free. Rather, the relevant notion of "context to be scanned" is reduced in grammar-cued processing to scanning for fewer, more conventionalized, more discrete structural clues of syntax, morphology and intonation.
40. For the relation between informational predictability (or frequency) and code quantity see Zipf (1935), Givón (ed. 1983b, 1985) or Haiman (1985).
41. Approximating from Swinney's (1979) figure of 250 msecs per lexical word, and an average of 4 words per clause in fluent spoken language.

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27

Action and Embodiment within Situated Human Interaction

Charles Goodwin

1. Introduction

The production and interpretation of human action, and the part played by language in that process, is a central topic for pragmatics. Frequently, analysis proceeds by treating language as both primary and autonomous, and lumping everything that isn't language into the category 'context', e.g., a surround that provides resources for the anchoring of deictics or relevant social categories. In this paper. I argue against the usual analytic and disciplinary boundaries that isolate language from its environment and create a dichotomy between text and context. This paper proposes and develops an approach to the analysis of action within human interaction that takes into account the simultaneous use of multiple semiotic resources by participants (e.g., a range of structurally different kinds of sign phenomena in both the stream of speech and the body, graphic and socially sedimented structure in the surround, sequential organization, encompassing activity systems, etc.). It is argued that actions are both assembled and understood through a process in which different kinds of sign phenomena instantiated in diverse media, what I call semiotic fields, are juxtaposed in a way that enables them to mutually elaborate each other. A particular, locally relevant array of semiotic fields that participants demonstrably orient to (not simply a hypothetical set of fields that an analyst might impose to code context) is called a *contextual configuration.* As action unfolds, new semiotic fields can be added, while others are treated as no longer relevant, with the effect that the contextual configurations which frame, make visible, and constitute the actions of the moment undergo a continuous process of change. From a slightly different perspective, contextual configurations provide a systematic framework for investigating the

public visibility of the body as a dynamically unfolding, interactively organized locus for the production and display of meaning and action.

When action is investigated in terms of contextual configurations, domains of phenomena that are usually treated as so distinct that they are the subject matter of entirely separate academic disciplines, e.g., language and material structure in the environment, can be analyzed as integrated components of a common process for the social production of meaning and action. This also provides an alternative geography of cognition to one that views all cognitive phenomena as situated within the mental life of the individual. Here, cognition is a reflexively situated process that encompasses both the sign-making capacity of the individual, for example through the production of talk, and different kinds of semiotic phenomena, from sequential organization to graphic fields, lodged within the material and social environment. This emphasis on cognition as a public, social process embedded within an historically shaped material world is quite consistent with both Vygotskian perspectives and recent work in the social and anthropological study of scientific and workplace practice (which Hutchins, 1995, in a groundbreaking study, has called 'cognition in the wild'), but adds to such perspectives an equally strong focus on the details of language use and conversational organization.

A central question posed for the analysis of how social action is constructed and understood through talk is determining what it is relevant to include within such a study. Frequently, scholars with an interest in pragmatics have focused almost exclusively on phenomena within the stream of speech, or in the mental life of the speaker. Thus in Searle's (1970) analysis of speech acts the hearer exists only as a figment of the speaker's imagination, not as an active co-participant in her own right, e.g., someone who herself engages in conduct that contributes to the constitution and ongoing development of the action(s) being accomplished through the talk of the moment. In the human sciences in general, language and the material world are treated as entirely separate domains of inquiry. Thus, within anthropology departments one finds one group of scholars, which focuses on language as the defining attribute of the human species, working in happy isolation from archaeologists down the hall, who argue that what makes human beings unique is the capacity to reshape the material environment in ways that structure human action on an historical time scale. Each of these proposals about what makes human beings a distinctive species is at best a partial truth. A theory of action must come to terms with both the details of language use and the way in which the social, cultural, material and sequential structure of the environment where action occurs, figure into its organization.

The accomplishment of social action requires that not only the party producing an action, but also that others present, such as its addressee, be able to systematically recognize the shape and character of what is occurring. Without this it would be impossible for separate parties to recognize in common not only what is happening at the moment, but more crucially, what range of events are

someone else has just done.[1] The necessity of social action having this public, prospectively relevant visibility, so that multiple participants can collaborate in an ongoing course of coordinated action, casts doubt on the adequacy of any model of pragmatic action that focuses exclusively on the mental life of a single participant such as the speaker. Within this process the production of action is linked reflexively to its interpretation; to establish the public, recognizable visibility of what they are doing speakers must build action that takes into account the particulars of what their addressees can and do know. This does not by any means ensure that congruent interpretation will automatically follow, or that relevant participants positioned at different perspectives will view events in the same way (see C. Goodwin, 1995, for an analysis of how the accomplishment of ongoing collaborative action can on occasion systematically require that different kinds of participants view the same event in alternative ways). However, the organization of talk-in-interaction provides for the contingent achievement of relevant intersubjectivity through the continuing availability of processes such as repair (Schegloff, 1992 et al., 1977). When the term *action* is used in this paper, it should be understood as encompassing this interactively organized process of public recognition of meaningful events reflexively linked to the ongoing production of these same events through the use of appropriate semiotic resources within an unfolding temporal horizon.

In this paper, it will be suggested that a primordial site for the analysis of human language, cognition, and action consists of a situation in which multiple participants are attempting to carry out courses of action in concert with each other through talk, while attending to both the larger activities that their current actions are embedded within, and relevant phenomena in their surround. Using as data video recordings of young girls playing hopscotch and archaeologists classifying color, it will be argued that the production and interpretation of human social action is built through the simultaneous deployment of a range of quite different kinds of semiotic resources.[2]

Talk itself contains multiple sign systems with alternative properties. Strips of talk gain their power as social action via their placement within larger sequential structures, encompassing activities, social structural arrangements, and participation frameworks constituted through displays of mutual orientation made by the actors' bodies. The body is used in a quite different way to perform gesture, again a class of phenomena that encompasses structurally different types of sign systems. Both talk and gesture can index, construe, or treat as irrelevant, entities in the participants' surround. Moreover, material structure in the surround, such as graphic fields of various types, can provide semiotic structure without which the constitution of particular kinds of action being invoked through talk would be impossible. In brief, it will be argued that the construction of action through talk within situated interaction is accomplished through the temporally unfolding juxtaposition of quite different kinds of semiotic resources, and that moreover, through this process, the human body is made publicly visible as the site for a range of structurally different kinds of displays implicated in the constitution of the actions of the moment.


2. Talk-in-Interaction

To explore some of the different kinds of phenomena implicated in the organization of face-to-face interaction within a setting that is the focus of the participant's orientation, I will use the following brief dispute which occurred while three young girls were playing hopscotch. One of the girls, Rosa, played only a peripheral role in the events that will be examined here, and analysis will focus on the actions of the other two. I will call the party whose actions are being challenged *D*iana (i.e. the *D*efendant), and her *C*hallenger *C*arla.[3] In hopscotch, players jump through an ordered grid of squares drawn on the ground. If the player's foot touches a line, or if she fails to land on the correct square, she is 'out' and her turn is over. A player is prohibited from landing on a square with a marker, such as a stone or a beanbag on it. After a successful jump through the grid, the next jump is made more difficult by throwing markers on squares in a particular sequence.[4]

The dispute being examined here begins when Diana stands at the top of the hopscotch grid (she has already successfully navigated the entire grid from the bottom), throws her beanbag into a particular square, and starts to hop through the grid. Right after the beanbag lands (in what will be argued to be the wrong square) and as Diana starts to jump, Carla walks into the grid, physically stops Diana from continuing, and then argues that Diana has made an illegal move by throwing her beanbag onto the fifth square instead of the fourth. (Note that the squares could have become confused if Diana, who is throwing from the top of the grid, instead of the usual throwing position at the foot/start of the grid, had assigned numbers to the row in dispute so that they read from her current left to right, and thus failed to take into account that she was now looking at the grid from a reverse angle).


The following is a transcript of the talk that occurs here, with an English translation on the right, and a diagram of how the participants have been numbering the squares in the grid in their current game (the actual grid on the ground contains no numbers, only blank squares):

A number of different kinds of phenomena have to be taken into account in order to describe the interactive organization of the dispute that is occurring here. I want to focus on how some of these phenomena consist of sign systems that are built through use of the distinctive properties of a specific medium. For example, spoken language builds signs within the stream of speech, gestures uses the body in a particular way, while posture and orientation uses the body in another, etc. To have a way of talking about these sybsystems I'll refer to them as *semiotic fields*. The term *semiotic* is intended to note the way in which signs are being deployed, while *field* provides a rough term for pointing to the encompassing medium within which specific signs are embedded. What I want to demonstrate now is that the action that occurs here is built through the visible, public deployment of multiple semiotic fields that mutually elaborate each other. Subsequent analysis will investigate the way in which additional fields with [illegible]
added to [illegible]



1 Carla:	Chiriona porque-		*Cheater because-*
2	**Éste es el cua:**tr	O	*This is the fo* ur
3 Diana:		Ai::	*Hey::*
4 Carla:	Y tú vas en el CUATRO.		*And you go in the **FOUR**.*
5	No vas en el QUINTO.		*Don't go in the FIFTH.*

Carla builds her action by deploying a number of different semiotic fields simultaneously. First, the lexico-semantic content of the talk provides Carla with resources for characterizing her opponent, *Chiriona*, ('*cheater*' line 1)[5] and for formulating the squares on the grid as particular kinds of entities, ***el Cuatro*** ('*the four*' line 4) and ***el Quinto*** ('*the fifth*' line 5). A term such as 'the fifth' explicitly constitutes the square being talked about as a consequential item within a larger sequence of similar items. Second, these descriptions are embedded within larger syntactic structures that contrast what Diana actually did, with what she should have done. Moreover this contrast is made more salient, and indeed shaped as a contrast, by the reuse of a common syntactic frame (e.g. '*Y tú vas en NUMBER||No vas en NUMBER*'), which highlights as significantly different both the negation at the beginning of the second unit, and the numbers being disputed which occur in the same slot at the end of each unit. Third, prosodically the numbers being disputed are further highlighted by the heightened, contrastive stress that each receives within a larger framework of parallelism, displayed by producing each line with the same pitch contour. Thus, in both lines 4 and 5 Carla's pitch makes a high jump just after *vas*, then falls over *en el*, then raises over the first syllable of each number, the space where contrast is being marked, and [illegible] the final syllable




In building her utterance, Carla combines lexico-semantic content, a common syntactic frame, and reuse of a rhythmic pitch contour capable of vividly highlighting the central point of an argument being built through contrast, to tell Carla why what she has done is wrong.

Fifth, this exchange is embedded within a larger course of action within a particular activity, playing hopscotch. Carla begins the dispute by using her own body to stop Diana's movement through the grid. The characterization of Diana as a cheater uses the game-relevant action that Diana has just performed as the contextual point of departure for the current action and characterization.[6] Carla's subsequent talk provides a warrant for why she is entitled to both provide such a categorization, and prevent Diana from continuing. She argues that Diana has just made an illegal move. Note that in Spanish, a pro-drop language, the second person pronoun found in line 4 *tú* *'you'* is not required grammatically, and indeed no such pronoun occurs in the almost identical syntactic frame produced a moment later in line 5. The fact that the pronoun is being produced when it could have been omitted suggests that it is doing some special work. One component of this may be rhythmic, and indeed dropping the pronoun when *No* occupies the same slot, – just before *vas* – at the beginning of line 5, enables Carla to build a pair of parallel utterances. However, the pronoun may also help to shape the talk beginning at line 4, not as a *description* of what Diana just did (e.g. 'You went in the Five'), but instead as an utterance that carries a *deontic* force, i.e. an argument about how her actual behavior contrasts with what was called for by the rules of the game in progress ('You [should] go in the Four. Don't go in the Fifth'), with the *tú* perhaps referencing not Diana as a unique individual, but instead a player in her position who should act in a particular way. Through such structure in the talk, the game in progress is formulated as a rule-governed institution with normative consequences for discriminating permitted from illegal behavior. The structure of the encompassing activity is thus explicitly oriented to, and drawn upon as a resource for, the constitution of action within the detailed

activity, while simultaneously constituting action within it, e.g. denying Diana the opportunity to complete her turn.


Sixth, this talk occurs within a particular participation framework (C. Goodwin, 1981; M.H. Goodwin, 1990, 1997; Heath, 1986; Kendon, 1990). With both their bodies and their gaze, Carla and Diana orient toward each other. Note that this framework is not itself a speech act, such as a challenge. Instead, it builds through embodied stance a public field of mutual orientation within which a wide variety of speech acts can occur. Rather than being itself a momentary action within an exchange, it constitutes part of the interactive ground from which actions emerge, and within which they are situated (see also Kendon, 1990). However, as we shall see later in this sequence, this framework is built and sustained through the visible embodied actions of the participants. As such, like the actions that occur within it, the framework is open to challenge, negotiation, and modification. Though it surrounds larger strips of diverse individual actions, it is itself a dynamic, interactively organized field.

Seventh, this framework of embodied mutual orientation makes it possible for sign systems other than talk to also function. As Carla pronounces ***Cuatro*** and ***Quinto***, she displays these same numbers with handshapes:



Unlike many gestures which display aspects of meaning that are not present in the stream of speech (Kendon, 1997; McNeill, 1992), these hand gestures provide visual versions of the numbers being spoken by Carla, i.e., ***Cuatro*** and the simultanous four-fingered handshape, and are alternative instantiations of a common lexical item, the number *four*. This tight overlap makes it possible to investigate with clarity one issue posed for the analysis of embodied action. If one conceptualizes action as the communication of propositional content, and/or as providing the addressee with the resources necessary to recognize some action being instantiated in the current talk (for example something that might be very loosely glossed here as a challenge), then the hand gesture is entirely redundant with the information provided in the stream of speech, and thus need not be taken into account in the analysis of the action occurring here; embodiment except in the stream of speech is irrelevant.

In opposition to such a position, it will be argued here that the handshapes displaying the numbers present in the accompanying speech are not simply a visual mirror of the lexical content of the talk, but a semiotic modality in their own right. Analytically, it is not sufficient to simply characterize their content with a lexical gloss that describes the handshapes as redundant versions of the numbers in the talk (e.g. as alternative signifiers for a common signified such as *five*). Instead, the issues posed for a participant attempting to use such signs to build social action involve the organization of relevant phenomena within specific media, e.g. Carla has to use her body in a quite precise way while taking into account the visible body of her co-participant. She is faced with the task of using not only her talk, but also her body, to structure the local environment such that her gestures can themselves count as forms of social action. What precisely does this involve? Unlike talk, gestures can't be heard. In looking at the data we find that Carla actively works to position her hand gestures so that they will be perceived by Diana. Unlike many accompanying gestures, Carla's hand is explicitly positioned in Diana's line of sight. Indeed, the work of thrusting the gesturing hand toward Diana's face twists Carla's body into a configuration in which her hand, arm and the upper part of her torso are actually leaning toward Diana:



Carla's gesture is thus organized with reference to a specific embodied configuration, one that includes not only her own body, but also that of her addressee.

Though the content being displayed here is congruent with what is being said within the talk, a quite different kind of work, involving the precise deployment of semiotic resources with properties quite unlike the structure of speech, is required in order to build social action with the gesturing hand.[7] This same process of making visible congruent meaning through the articulation of different kinds of semiotic materials is also found in the production of the contrast found in lines 4 and 5. The number handshapes are framed by contrastive movements of Carla's arm and hand. As Carla says *'Y tú vas en el Cuatro'*, she stretches her arm forward with the palm toward Diana. However, as she begins the next phrase, she turns her hand around, while keeping the elbow which anchors the gesturing arm in the same position, and moves the upper arm to a new position closer to her own body, while still maintaining the forward thrust of her torso. By using the visual and rhythmic structure of her moving body, Carla is able to establish a contrast within a larger gestural frame that parallels the one produced through reuse of common syntactic and prosodic frames in the talk. In brief, Carla is performing her action not only vocally, but also through a simultaneous sequence of gestural and body displays. Though done with quite different media, these displays make visible the same two numbers that occur in the vocal stream, and highlight the contrast between them through a congruent display of contrastive items within a larger framework of parallel equivalence (e.g. the common syntactic frame in the talk, and the arm and torso establishing the variable hand-shapes as alternative values within a common framework of visible, embodied action).[8]


Given all of this embodied organization, the question still remains: why isn't the action that Carla is performing done entirely within the stream of speech? Why does she go to all of this extra semiotic work? Within interaction, participants don't produce talk or build action into the air, but instead actively work to secure the orientation of a hearer (C. Goodwin, 1981), and design the current action and utterance in fine detail for the particularities of the current addressee (C. Goodwin, 1981; Sacks et al., 1974). What Carla is doing here will fail as a form of pragmatic action if Diana does not take it into account. Through use of the gesture, Carla is able to specifically organize central components of her current action with reference to Diana's current visible orientation, i.e. positioning them right in Diana's line of sight. The gestures provide Carla with a semiotic modality for *insisting* that Diana take what she is doing and saying into account, indeed a way of quite literally getting into Diana's face with the particulars of the action. The way in which Carla thrusts her gestures toward Diana's face, as well as her walking into the grid when Diana is in the process of making a jump, help constitute what she is doing as a challenge to Diana. Carla's thrusted gestures are a proxemic challenge to Diana's personal space, as is her incursion into the game-relevant territory of the grid in the course of Diana's attempt to move through it. These proxemic and territorial dimensions may be quite consequential in that Diana has actively attempted to continue her movement through the hopscotch grid despite Carla's challenge by continuing to jump until Carla pushes her in

a posture that could allow her to pursue her turn at jumping further. On another level the gestural movements enhance and amplify the indignant force of the action.

In brief, talk and gesture mutually elaborate each other within (1) a larger sequence of action and (2) an embodied participation framework constituted through mutual orientation between speaker and addressee. It would seem that something like this set of concurrently relevant semiotic fields is what is being pointed to by the phrase 'face-to-face interaction'. However, this is by no means a fixed array of fields. Thus on many occasions, such as phone calls, or when participants are dispersed in a large visually inaccessible environment (e.g., a hunting party, or a workgroup interacting through computers), visible co-orientation may not be present. I'll call some particular subset of possible fields that is being oriented to at a particular moment as relevant to the organization of a particular action a *contextual configuration.*

3. Changing Contextual Configurations

What happens next provides the opportunity to investigate in more detail how the shape of the current contextual configuration has consequences for the organization of action. As Carla says '*Quinto*' in line 5, Diana looks down, moving her gaze away from Carla's face and gesturing hand, and toward the grid.



The participation framework which provided an essential ground for Carla's use of her gesturing hand is no longer operative. When Diana looks away, Carla finds herself in the position of looking and gesturing toward someone who is now publicly dis-attending her. Such phenomena demonstrate how any participation framework is an ongoing contingent accomplishment, something not under the control of a single party (who can at best make proposals about the structure of participation that should be operative at the moment), but rather something that has to be continuously achieved through public displays of orientation within ongoing processes of interaction.

Not only the gesture but also the action Carla is performing, the challenge to Diana, is called into question by virtue of the way in which Diana is no longer visibly acting as a recipient to it. Let me note in passing that here, unlike in some approaches to 'speech acts', action is being analyzed here as a multi-party interactive phenomenon.

Does Carla in fact analyze these events in this way? Does she treat what Diana has done as undermining her current action, and if so what can she do about this?


As can be seen in the transcript on p. 401 without the slightest break in her fluent, dynamic production of speech Carla restates the argument she has just made in a different way with a different kind of gesture. As Diana's head moves downward Carla drops her gesturing hand. However, she now uses her foot to do a deictic stomp at a place constituted by the intersection of three different, mutually relevant, semiotic fields:

- First, the place where Diana is now looking, the target of her gaze, and thus the place that she is visibly displaying to be the current focus of her orientation and attention.
- Second, one of the squares in the hopscotch grid that is the focus of the current dispute, indeed the square where Diana threw her beanbag
- Third, a square that is explicitly being talked about within Carla's current speech.

The structure of Carla's talk also changes in ways that adapt it to this new configuration of orientation and gesture. In lines 4 and 5 Carla used numeric expressions functioning as names to specify the entities being disputed: ***el Cuatro*** and ***el Quinto***. Such language talked about these phenomena, but did not in any way presuppose that the participants were actually looking at the grid squares being talked about. Though available in the local scene, the grid was not being put into play as something that had to be actively attended to and scrutinized in order to properly constitute the actions in progress at the moment. One could look elsewhere, and indeed this is precisely what Carla and Diana both did by gazing toward each other, and it was this structure of mutual orientation that Carla exploited by placing her numeric handshapes directly in Diana's line of sight.

By way of contrast, after Diana looks down, Carla uses the deictic expressions 'this' and 'that' (lines 6, 7) to specify the particular squares at issue while

Such deictic expressions presuppose that their addressee is positioned to see what is being pointed at (which is being further specified by the concurrent foot point), and indeed the entities being pointed to are located precisely at the target of Diana's gaze. Orientation to the grid is now an explicit, crucial component of the operations that have to be performed to properly constitute the action currently in progress. The grid as something to be actively scrutinized is now in play as a relevant semiotic field implicated in the organization of the actions of the moment in ways that it wasn't a moment earlier.



4	Carla:	Ytú vas en el **CUATRO.**	*And you go in the **FOUR.***
5		No vas en el **QUINTO.**	*You don't **go in** the **FIFTH.***



6		Este es el quinto	*This is the fifth*
7		y ese ┌ es el **qua:tro.**	*And that ┌ is the four*
8	Diana:	└ No- (uhmm)	*└ No- (uhmm)*
9	Diana:	Pero éste **es el cua:tro?**	*But this is the **four**?*
10	NN:	N ┌ o. °Estás en el cinco	*N ┌ o °This is the five*

In brief, what one finds within this single turn at talk is a switch from one contextual configuration to another.[10] The second contextual configuration contains a new semiotic field, the grid as something to be looked at, that wasn't necessary for the first. Despite the addition of this field, most of the semiotic fields in play during lines 4–5 remain relevant. The way in which contextual configurations are constituted through specific, somewhat contingent mixes of particular semiotic fields provides for the possibility of underlying continuity, even while relevant change is occurring (e.g., sets of fields can overlap from one configuration to another). Rather than replacing one perceptual world with an entirely different one, there is relevant change in a continuing contextual gestalt as configurations are reconfigured. Despite this continuity, the shifts that do occur are both significant and consequential for how participants build appropriate action. Thus, the shift in focus to the grid that occurs here also involves changes in the kinds of sign systems, in both talk and gesture, used to refer to the entities being talked about. Though Carla is still pursuing her challenge, there has been a change in context or more precisely, the particular contextual configuration of relevant semiotic resources that are providing organization of the action of the moment.

Through the shift, Carla can pursue her argument in a different arena and this might be quite relevant. Suppose that Carla and Diana are in fact counting and labeling the squares on the grid in different ways (this in fact seems quite likely). If Diana is numbering squares from her left to right at the top of grid, while Carla is numbering them from the bottom of the grid, they are each labeling the squares where the beanbag was thrown and where Diana is now standing differently (e.g. for Diana the beanbag is in square four, while for Carla it landed in square five; see the diagrams on the first data display). Simply telling Diana not to go in the fifth can be quite ineffective if Diana believes that she didn't do this, and in fact threw her beanbag to square four. By physically stomping on relevant squares while she names them, as happens in lines 6–7, Carla can visibly show exactly how she is counting and labeling the squares in dispute. Though the shift to the grid may have been triggered by Diana's dropping her gaze there, this provides Carla with a new way of making, and publicly displaying, the grounds for her initial argument.

The most crucial property relevant to the organization of action displayed through what happens here is *reflexive awareness.* Central to Carla's construction of action is ongoing analysis of how her recipient is positioned to co-participate in the interactive frameworks necessary for the constitution of that action. When Diana looks away, Carla takes into account what Diana is doing and reorganizes her action in terms of it (see also C. Goodwin, 1981). This reflexive awareness is not simply an 'interior' element of the mental processes necessary for defining the action (as it could be analyzed for example within traditional speech act analysis), but a public, visible component of the ongoing practices used to build the action, something that leads to systematic, relevant changes in the shape of the action. Moreover, within this process the addressee, as an embodied actor in her own right, is as crucial a player as the speaker.

such rapid, reflexive adapt-

is appropriate to specific contextual configurations. Here, Carla is able to refer to and identify the same entities – specific positions in the hopscotch grid – with a number of different sign systems, each of which has quite distinctive properties. These include numeric linguistic expressions functioning as names (which do not require looking at the entity being referred to – lines 4–5, though this can be built into their structure through syntactic affiliation with a deictic expression – lines 6–7), iconic hand gestures (which presuppose orientation toward the hand rather than the entity being described through the hand), deictic linguistic expressions and deictic or indexical gestures (both of which make relevant gaze toward the entity being pointed to). Not all of these resources are relevant and in play at any particular moment. However, the ability to rapidly call upon alternative structures from a larger, ready at hand tool kit of diverse semiotic resources, is crucial to the ability of human beings to demonstrate in the ongoing organization of their action reflexive awareness of each other and the contextual configurations that constitute the situation of the moment.

Looking at these same phenomena from another perspective, we find that the analyst cannot simply take an inventory of all semiotic resources in a setting that could potentially be brought into play, and use this inventory as a frame to describe a relevant context. As these data demonstrate, not all possible and relevant resources are in play at any particular moment. Indeed what happens here depends crucially on the way in which the grid *replaces* the hand displaying numbers and focus on each other's face, as what is being oriented to at the moment. To describe the context we have to track in detail the temporal unfolding of the interaction, while attending to what the participants themselves are constituting for each other as the phenomena to be taken into account for the organization of the action of the moment (see also Schegloff, 1993). We are thus faced with the task of describing both the larger set of possibilities from which choices are being made, and the way in which alternative choices from that set structure the events of the moment in consequentially different ways.

4. Semiotic Structure in the Environment

Another crucial component of this process is the hopscotch grid being talked about and pointed at. The grid differs radically from both talk and gesture in many important respects. Unlike the fleeting, evanescent decay of speech, which disappears as material substance as soon as it is spoken (unless captured in another medium such as writing or tape recording), the hopscotch grid has both an extended temporal duration – it is there in exactly the same form throughout the game, and in the present case of a painted grid on a playground, day after day for new games – and is built of concrete material so durable that it can support the weight of multiple actors jumping through it. Rather than constituting a mental representation, it is as corporeal, solid, and enduring as the ground the players are walking upon. However, it is simultaneously a thoroughly semiotic structure. Indeed, it provid[illegible]

that make up the game are impossible in a hypothetical 'natural environment' unstructured by human practice, e.g. a field without the visible structure provided by the gridlines. Simultaneously, the game is just as impossible without embodiment of the semiotic structure provided by the grid in a medium that can be actually jumped on. The notion that the primary focus for the analysis of human action should be the isolated mental states of individual actors here becomes impossible. As demonstrated quite powerfully in the work of Hutchins (1995), human cognitive activity is situated within historically shaped social systems that encompass both actors and crucial semiotic artifacts such as the maps needed to navigate ships.

Like a map, the hopscotch grid does not produce single actions (a particular 'out' for example), but instead provides a public framework for the constitution of diverse, game-relevant classes of action (outs, successful jumps, etc.). Moreover, the medium in which it exists is crucial for the specific kinds of action that actors perform, such as jumping through it and visually inspecting the feet of other actors to see if a line has been stepped on etc. However, though constructed in a medium with properties quite unlike those of speech, the grid nonetheless parses its structure into relevant units that are comparable to those being picked out with the language structures used to refer it. Thus the deictic terms used to talk about particular squares presuppose bounded entities (e.g. 'this' as visibly contrastive with 'that'), and some of the numeric expressions presuppose elements in a larger series of equivalent units, precisely the structure displayed visibly by the building of the grid as an ordered series of smaller identical squares. More generally, once the grid as a relevant semiotic system is taken into account, our framework for the analysis of the organization of action encompasses not only sequences of talk and the bodies of actors, but also the material structure in the surround. Participants visibly attend to such graphic fields as crucial to the organization of the events and action that make up activity reflexively situated within a setting, and which contribute structure to that action.[11]

5. Embodiment in Institutional and Scientific Practice

Viewing action as something accomplished through the juxtaposition of diverse semiotic materials provides resources for specifying in detail precisely those semiotic materials that provide for the uniqueness of culturally situated activities. However, with this framework it is also possible to demonstrate how activities that might initially appear to be quite unique and esoteric, such as the details of scientific work, are in fact built through use of far more pervasive, indeed generic practices for the accomplishment of action within situated human interaction. To demonstrate this we will now look at some archaeologists using a Munsell color chart to code the color of the dirt they are excavating.[12]

1 Pam: Okay that should be, ***wet*** enough.
2 (1.5)

4 Jeff: We're lookin at that right there?
5 (0.3)
6 Pam: Mmm,
7 (0.4)
8 Jeff: Much darker than tha:t.
9 Pam: Yeah. [I'm not-=
10 Jeff: [There
11 Pam: =I'm just tryin ta put it ***in*** the:re.=
12 =eh hih an(h)ywhere. °hih heh huh




Munsell Book

Most of the same semiotic fields that we saw in the hopscotch example are relevant here. Two participants using their bodies to sustain a participation framework for common, joint activity are clearly using both talk and gesture to carry out some larger sequence of action. However, despite these similarities, this scene has an opaqueness that the hopscotch dispute hadn't. Though we can understand (1) the talk of the participants, which consists of quite simple, ordinary English phrases and not a technical vocabulary; (2) the frameworks of orientation being displayed through their bodies; and (3) crucial aspects of the gestures being used – for example that they are pointing gestures – we don't quite understand what the participants are doing.

13 Jeff: I'll take it. *((takes trowel))*
14 (2.0)
15 Pam: Down.
16 (1.2)
17 Pam: En this one. *((Points))*
18 (0.4) *((Moves Trowel))*
19 Jeff: nuhhh?
20 (1.8)
21 Pam: Or th[at one? (whoops) *((Points))*
22 (0.8)
23 Pam: Fou:r.
24 (0.8)
25 Pam: Is it that?
26 Na:That's- not-
27 ↑What was the ***br***owness of that?
28 Jeff: mm[h,





This sense of basic, recognizable interactive organization running smack into an opaque wall, a domain of phenomena which seems absolutely crucial to what the participants are doing, but which I don't understand simply by speaking the same language or living in the same country, is what has struck me almost every time I've done fieldwork in a new professional or scientific workplace. These difficulties, the gnawing sense of not being able to adequately understand what's happening, arise not from a general unfamiliarity with the community or setting. Instead, my inability to understand what is happening is made apparent by the way in which the partici-

access to. Here these two archaeologists are staring intently at a weird little book with holes, pointing to it and arguing as they move a trowel with dirt under it.

In essence, the visible actions of the participants show that they are orienting to a new, semiotic field which is crucial to the local constitution of action, but which cannot be understood without more detailed knowledge of the setting and activities in progress. This same argument could be made about the documents, television and computer screens, and other tools that participants in other settings, such as an Airlines Operations Room, an oceanographic ship, a chemistry lab, etc. attend to in performing the distinctive work that constitutes those settings. Quite clearly, ethnography is required (Cicourel, 1992). However, the parameters of that ethnography, what has to be known, emerge from the visible organization of the activity in progress. The issue is not what life is like in general for archaeologists, but rather what precisely is the structure of the specific semiotic fields and activity systems that are providing organization for the actions they are performing in order to do the work that constitutes their lifeworld. What is going on with that little book and why is it so important? Note that though lodged within professional settings, these charts and documents have structural similarity to the hopscotch grid. In all cases, the participants are using a semiotically structured built environment as a constitutive component of the actions in progress.

In brief, the opaqueness of this setting, the way in which its status as something lodged within a specific, technical profession emerges as consequential, is visible through the way in which the participants are attending to a special semiotic field as criterial for what they are doing, while in other respects continuing to make use of more general interactive resources for the organization of talk and action within human interaction. Their simultaneous orientation to, and use of, this semiotic field as a constitutive feature of the actions that give their work its professional character, makes it relevant for researchers to include that field in their analysis if they want to come to terms with its institutional properties, or even to get a handle on just what it is that these people are doing. Were this field to be omitted, it would be like describing the actions of Carla and Diana without taking into account the game they are playing and the resources that make both that game, and their arguments about it, possible (e.g. the ability to adapt to changes in an interactive participation framework by using the grid to insistently pursue an action, while changing the structure of that action so that it remains visible and appropriate to the contextual configuration of the moment).

Before proceeding to a brief discussion of what the archaeologists are pointing at, two additional points will be briefly noted. First, it is possible to adequately come to terms with much, perhaps most, of what is happening in many interactions while leaving some fields opaque and unanalyzed. An audio tape of the hopscotch game would preserve a great deal of the structure of talk-in-interaction. Indeed, this acceptance of partial opaqueness is not only a possibility for analysts, but one that is systematically exploited by participants themselves in professional settings characterized by asymmetries in knowledge and access to the resources that make up the setting. Patients not only can't see many of the documents, instruments and representations that doctors focus on during an encounter, but

can see them (e.g., an electrocardiogram). Such asymmetries are central to work settings as mundane as checking out in a supermarket, where the clerk is focused on machines for ringing up the transaction, while the customer stands by with bored resignation. However, in the archaeological sequence, all relevant participants are using a specific field as a central resource for the actions that give their work both its professional character and its local organization as a sequence of interaction.

Second, what we have to investigate emerges from the way in which the participants themselves display a particular field to be consequential and relevant through the orientation of their bodies and the organization of their action. Rather than wandering onto the fieldsite as disinterested observers, attempting the impossible task of trying to catalog everything in the setting, we can use the visible orientation of the participants as a spotlight to show us just those features of context that we have to come to terms with if we are to adequately describe the organization of their action. This has methodological as well as theoretical implications. For example the participants' visible orientation provides a guide for what should be included within the frame of the video image, and what materials should be collected from the setting (e.g. the book they are looking at) to facilitate subsequent analysis.

6. The Munsell Chart as an Historically Shaped Field for the Production of Action


The activity the archaeologists are engaged in is classifying the color of the dirt they are excavating. They are doing this for a number of different reasons. Many phenomena of interest to archaeologists, what they call *features*, are visible only as color changes in the dirt they are excavating. For example the cinders produced by an ancient hearth will leave a black stain and the decaying wood of a post and rubble used to hold it up will produce a tube of dirt with color systematically different from the soil around the post.


The very activity of excavating features systematically destroys them. As dirt is removed to dig deeper the patterns of visible color difference are destroyed. In part because of this, careful records have to be kept of each stage in the excavation. The documentary proof that a feature existed is to be found in not only photographs, but also records describing in detail how the color of the dirt surrounding a feature differed from that within it. These two student archaeologists are coding the color of the dirt in order to fill out one of the forms that tracks their excavation.

To code the color of dirt, archaeologists use as a standard reference the subsection of the Munsell color chart (a tool used by many professions concerned with the accurate description of color) that covers the range of colors that will be found in soil.[13] This is carried to the field in a small loose-leaf notebook, and this is what these archaeologists are looking at here.




SOIL DESCRIPTION: A ZONE upper plow zone	D M85 backdirt	B lower plow zone	C subsoil	plow scar
Color (Wet) 10YR 3/4 dk yellowish brown	10YR 4/3 brown to dk brown	10YR 3/6 dark yellowish brown	10YR 4/3 brown to dark brown	10YR 4/3 brown to dark brown
Texture sandy silty loam	sandy loam	loamy sand	sandy loam	loamy sand
Consistency somewhat sticky somewhat plastic	fairly sticky fairly plastic	sticky somewhat plastic	slightly sticky, plastic	sticky, plastic
Mottles scattered light	heavily w/ 10YR 5/4 sand and areas of 10YR 3/3 silty loam. Scattered charcoal and burnt earth.	lightly w/ lighter soil.	heavily lighter and darker	somewhat light and dark
Cultural/Natural cultural				
Comments				





SOIL DESCRIPTION: A ZONE upper plow zone	D M85 backdirt	B lower p
Color (Wet) 10YR 3/4 dk yellowish brown	10YR 4/3 brown to dk brown	10YR 3/ yellowish
Texture sandy silty loam	sandy loam	loamy sa
Consistency somewhat sticky somewhat plastic	fairly sticky fairly plastic	sticky somewhat
Mottles scattered light	heavily w/ 10YR 5/4 sand and areas of 10YR 3/3 silty loam. Scattered charcoal and	lightly w soil.
Cultural/Natural cultural		
Comments		



square on the grid. Moreover the material characteristics of the sign system were crucial to the operations that could be performed with it (e.g. looking at the conjunction of a foot and a line to see if a girl was out). The Munsell chart has exactly these same properties. It contains not one but three different sign systems for describing each point in the color space it represents: first, an actual color sample; second a specification of that point as the intersection of three underlying variables for Hue, Chroma and Value (each page in the book is organized as a grid of Chroma and Value samples for a single Hue); and third, a color name such as *dark yellowish brown.* Each of these sign system makes possible different operations and each is embedded within different strands of the larger suite of activities that intersect at the work sites where the chart is used. Thus the color sample allows direct visual comparison with the dirt, something that is not possible with the phonetic or graphic structure of a color name. It is the most useful and appropriate medium for doing the job of actually classifying the dirt.


However, providing such an iconic representation of the color of each bit of dirt excavated on each coding form and each published report about the site would be prohibitively tedious and expensive. For these tasks, which involve transporting information about the color from this site to other relevant work-

grid coordinates is ideal. The grid coordinates provide a form of precise reference that transcends the color systems of specific languages. However, tying such numbers to the colors they identify requires access to the chart itself (though differences in numbers can be observed without the chart). For general discussion and publication, the color names are both most economical and perfectly adequate. In brief, rather than simply specifying unique points in a larger color space, the Munsell chart is used in multiple overlapping activities (comparing a reference color and a patch of dirt as part of the work of classification, transporting those results back to the lab, comparing samples, publishing reports, etc.), and thus represents the 'same' entity, a particular color, in multiple ways, each of which makes possible different kinds of operations because of the unique properties of each representational system.[14]

7. Heterotopias

Adjacent to each color patch on the Munsell chart is a hole. To classify the color of the dirt they are examining, the archaeologists put a small amount of dirt on the tip of a trowel, wet it, and then move the trowel from hole to hole until the closest match between the dirt and an adjacent color patch is found.

Foucault (1970, 1986) uses the term *heterotopia* to mark "a relatively segregated place in which several spatial settings coexist, each being both concrete and symbolically loaded" (Ophir and Shapin, 1991: 13). With elegant simplicity, the Munsell page with its holes for viewing the sample of dirt on the trowel juxtaposes



in a single visual field two quite different kinds of spaces: (1) actual dirt from the site at the archaeologists' feet is framed by (2) a theoretical space for the rigorous, replicable classification of color. The latter is both a conceptual space, the product of considerable research into properties of color, and an actual physical space instantiated in the orderly modification of variables arranged in a grid on the Munsell page. It is simultaneously a material object and a conceptual tool. It relies upon the specific properties of material media to build cognitive structure that could not exist within the confines of the skull: for example, the arrangement of possibilities for color classification into an ordered grid that can be repeatedly scanned, the production of actual reference samples that can be visually compared both with each other and with the material being classified, the preservation of the reference samples across time and space, etc. All of these operations depend upon the properties of specific physical objects. However, such objects do not exist, and could not exist, in a pure 'natural' word, e.g. a domain not structured by human practices.

By juxtaposing unlike spaces, but ones relevant to the accomplishment of a specific cognitive task, the chart creates a new, distinctively human, kind of space. It is precisely here, as bits of dirt are shaped into the work-relevant categories of a specific social group, that 'nature' is transformed into culture.[15]

8. Building Action within Talk-in-Interaction with the Munsell Chart


We will now investigate how the resources provided by the chart are made visible and relevant within talk-in-interaction. At line 17 Pam moves her hand to the space above the Munsell chart and points to a particular color patch while saying 'En this one'.


Pam's action at line 17 has structural affinities with the way in which Carla pointed out phenomena on the hopscotch grid in lines 6–7 of that example. Both actions use deictic terms that characterize the entity being pointed at as one bounded region within a larger set of similar spaces; both are affiliated with pointing gestures which specify the region indicated by the talk, and in both cases what is being indicated and pointed at is a built environment for the production of meaning and action (see also Heath and Luff, 1996; Hindmarsh and Heath, in press: Hutchins, 1995; Hutchins and Palen, 1997; Ochs et al., 1996), and indeed in both cases this environment is structured as a grid. Both moves are embedded within larger sequences of action.

13 Jeff: I'll take it. ((*takes trowel*))
14 (2.0)
15 Pam: Down.
16 (1.2)
17 Pam: En this one. ((*Points*))



19 Jeff: nuhhh?
20 (1.8)
21 Pam: Or t[hat one? (whoops) *((Points))*
22 (0.8)
23 Pam: Fou:r.
24 (0.8)
25 Pam: Is it that?
26 Na: That's- not-
27 Wh[at was the ***br***owness of that?
28 Jeff: mm[h,





Within the field of action created by the activity of color classification, what Pam does here is not simply an indexical gesture, but a proposal that the indicated color might be the one they are searching for. By virtue of such conditional relevance (Schegloff, 1968), it creates a new context in which a reply from Jeff is the expected next action.

In line 19 Jeff rejects the proposed color. His move occurs after a noticeable silence in line 18. Dispreferred actions in conversation, such as this rejection, are frequently preceded by gaps (Pomerantz, 1984). However, when the tape is examined, something else seems to be going on. The silence is not an empty space, but a place occupied by its own relevant activity (M.H. Goodwin, 1980). Before a competent answer to Pam's proposal in line 17 can be made, the dirt being evaluated has to be placed under the viewing hole next to the sample she indicated, so that the two can be compared. During line 18 Jeff moves the trowel to this position. Because of the spatial organization of this activity, specific actions have to be performed before a relevant task, a color comparison, can be competently performed. In brief, in this activity the spatial organization of the tools being worked with, and the sequential organization of talk in interaction, interact with each other in the production of relevant action (e.g. getting to a place where one can make an expected answer requires rearrangement of the visual field being scrutinized, so that the judgment being requested can be competently performed). Here, socially organized vision requires embodied manipulation of the environment being scrutinized.

This has a number of additional consequences. First, Pam's own ability to evaluate the appropriateness of the color she proposed changes when Jeff moves the sample to the correct viewing hole. Only then is she in a position to rigorously compare the dirt with the Munsell color. Pam's action of pointing to a particular color patch at line 17 could be heard as a request to perform *this* action, that is, to put them both in a position where that patch might be evaluated, rather than a definitive judgment that is subsequently disagreed with. Indeed, a moment later, in line 23, Pam suggests another possible color. However when the trowel

The process of color classification involves a sequence of embodied movements through space and time. Contextual fields, including both talk and the possibilities for seeing and categorization provided by the Munsell chart, are being continuously reshaped in order to accomplish relevant action. The range of phenomena that can be seen and evaluated changes at each step in this process. The relevant locus for analyzing the problematic status of a specific proposal is not primarily the mental state of a particular actor, but instead the different possibilities for seeing relevant phenomena that alternative positions in this sequence provide.

Analogous to what we saw in the hopscotch example, the gestures that occur here are situated within multiple semiotic fields simultaneously. First, pointing at a color sample, rather than, say, identifying it with a spoken color name, selects a representational system from a larger set and by this heightens focus on its relevant visual properties, which is precisely the task of the moment. Second, in addition to the way that the pointing finger locates a particular patch within the larger array, which we can gloss as the *reference space*, the hand carrying the gesture also constitutes a relevant action within the *participation space* being sustained through the orientation of the participants bodies toward the material (chart and dirt sample) that are the focus of their attention.





Pam: En this one.

Pam's hand moves right into Jeff's line of sight as he gazes toward the chart. Rather than telling him what color to look at, she shows him. Third, as noted above, Pam's proposal constitutes a request that he move the sample to the viewing hole for his patch. By pointing at the patch she makes a relevant move within the *local action space* (e.g., a spatial locus that can specify an action through its embeddedness within a locally relevant activity) by showing him where to position the sample next.

9. Using Graphic Fields to Build Action

It is common to talk about structures such as the Munsell chart as 'representations'. However, exclusive focus on [illegible]

embedded within the organization of human practice. With its viewholes for scrutinizing samples, the page is not simply a perspicuous representation of current knowledge about the organization of color, but a space designed for the ongoing production of particular kinds of *action.* In this respect it has close structural affinities with the hopscotch grid.

What kinds of analytic frameworks are necessary for systematic investigation of how phenomena such as the Munsell chart and the Hopscotch grid contribute to the organization of action within human interaction? Shifting focus from how a graphic field, such as the hopscotch grid or Munsell chart represents something, to how it constitutes a framework for action in its own right, does in some ways parallel Austin's (1962) argument that talk should be analyzed as a form of action, rather than as simply a way of describing the world. However, unlike speech acts these grids do not constitute particular actions, but instead provide frameworks for building *classes* of action (e.g. outs, successful jumps, illegal moves, a range of diverse color categorizations, etc.). Their structure and temporal organization is quite different from that found in individual acts (though they are analogous to the underlying semiotic frameworks used to constitute speech acts). The accomplishment of particular concrete actions requires that these structures be deployed in conjunction with other relevant meaning-making practices, such as the game-relevant body of an actor jumping through the hopscotch grid, pointing elaborated by relevant talk, or dirt being moved under the Munsell chart, while an archaeologist attempts to find the best match in order to code that bit of dirt with a specific category provided by the chart. What is required is a framework for the analysis of action in general, including what has traditionally been analyzed as speech acts, that takes into account the quite different kinds of materials that are juxtaposed to each other in order to accomplish action within situated human interaction. Moreover, though it is convenient to gloss a range of quite disparate phenomena, e.g. both gesture and inscribed grids, as *visual,* it is by no means clear that what is being pointed at is confined to a single embodied modality. Gesture has not only visual, but also crucial kinesthetic components, and as Streeck (1996) argues, these may be crucial to the way in which the body knows the world through the hand.

Though the Munsell chart and the hopscotch grid do not themselves construct specific actions, their role in the hybrid systems I have described is absolutely crucial to the process through which precisely those actions that constitute the detailed particulars of the endogenous settings in which they are embedded are accomplished (e.g. seeing and classifying dirt as an archaeologist). If these frameworks are absent, the relevant actions cannot occur. A body jumping on a surface that does not contain a hopscotch grid is not playing hopscotch, and is deprived of the public, visible semiotic resources that would allow her and her coparticipants to judge whether her foot landed successfully or out. Rather than functioning simply as representations, the structures being examined here, including the scientific description and analysis of color provided by the Munsell chart, are lived spaces inhabited by actors who move through them while using the structure

10. Conclusion

Despite its simplicity, the mix of semiotic fields found in a scene such as the hopscotch game locates a perspicuous site for developing an approach to the analysis of human action that takes into account simultaneously the details of language use, the semiotic structure provided by the historically built material world, the body as an unfolding locus for the display of meaning and action, and the temporally unfolding organization of talk-in-interaction.

Analyzing action as something accomplished through the temporally unfolding juxtaposition of multiple semiotic fields with quite diverse structure and properties, has a range of consequences. First, the analytic boundaries between language, cognitive processes, and structure in the material world dissolve. The actions made visible in both Carla's talk and that of the archaeologists were not constituted in any single field, such as the talk, but rather within a larger configuration in which a range of different fields (the talk, the pointing foot or finger, the semiotic structure provided by the grid or Munsell chart, the larger encompassing activity, etc.) mutually elaborated each other. In both settings, the participants use as complementary resources both the specifics of different kinds of sign systems provided by language, and historically shaped structure instantiated in artifacts and the physical environment.

This framework is analytically different from many approaches to both cognition and embodiment that focus primarily on phenomena lodged within the individual. For example, much study of metaphor has taken as its point of departure the embodied *experience* of the speaker, e.g. the way in which metaphor emerges from the structure of the human body, its position in a world structured by phenomena such as gravity (e.g. the pervasive relevance of *Up* and *Down* in human cognition and language) and 'preconceptual structures of experience' (Johnson, 1987: 15). While providing valuable insight into many kinds of conceptual organization, such focus on the interior life of a single actor does not develop a systematic framework for investigating the *public* visibility of the body as a dynamically unfolding, interactively organized locus for the production and display of relevant meaning and action.

Crucial to the organization of the events being investigated here is the ability of *other* participants to systematically see how a co-participant's body is doing specific things by virtue of its positioning within a changing array of diverse semiotic fields.[16] Diana is seen to be following or not following the rules of the game in progress by virtue of how her body is positioned within the hopscotch grid. Such actions are public and accountable (as demonstrated by Carla's challenge and attempt to prevent Diana from continuing). Their analysis requires a framework that focuses not primarily on Diana's interior life (though what she wants to do is visible to all), but instead on the visible juxtaposition of her body and the grid, within a recognizable course of activity. Proposing a possible match by pointing to a particular square on the Munsell chart has an analogous structure, e.g. analysis requires specification of the properties of the chart being pointed at, the detailed sequential [illegible]

within, the semiotic structure provided by historically shaped frameworks for action, instantiated in both material media and the systematic practices of a group performing the activities that constitute its lifeworld. Such public visibility is also crucial to analysis of how the body is used to perform action within interaction. Carla takes into account the patterns of orientation visibly displayed by Diana's gaze and posture by changing her own actions in response to them. Central to what is occurring in these data (and in face-to-face interaction in general) are socially organized, interactively sustained configurations of multiple participants who use the public visibility of the actions being performed by each others' bodies, the unfolding sequential organization of their talk, and semiotic structure in the settings they inhabit to organize courses of action in concert with each other.

Second, because of the flexibility provided by the way in which different kinds of semiotic fields can be juxtaposed to each other, there is a continuity between vernacular and institutional interaction.[17] The work-relevant fields that provide any setting with its unique institutional character, and which are central to the accomplishment of the specific work being done there, are but one crucial element in a larger matrix of meaning and action that includes as well far more pervasive frameworks for the organization of talk and action within interaction (e.g. the different kinds of indexical and representational sign systems provided by the structure of talk, sequential organization, gesture with variable mixes of iconic and deictic features, bodily orientation as a public framework for the construal of task relevant intentionality, etc.). Thus, the historical specificity of the Munsell chart is articulated through quite general practices for the production of talk and deictic pointing. Action in both settings draws upon many of the same resources for building semiotic structure and incorporating it into relevant courses of action (multiple ways of designating the same entities, each relevant to alternative contextual configurations and activity complexes, deictic gestures that are simultaneously embedded within both referential spaces constituted through built semiotic environments and participation frameworks constituted through the displayed orientation of the participants' bodies, the distinctive temporal and spatial properties of semiotic structure instantiated in a material visual field, etc.). The particulars that give institutional settings their distinctive character are built through the use of more pervasive resources which have underlying formal similarities. More generally, what has been presented here has tried to demonstrate the relevance of using *situated activity systems* (Goffman, 1961; M.H. Goodwin, 1990; C. Goodwin, 1996b; Goodwin and C. Goodwin, 1987; Levinson, 1992) to investigate the organization of human action, cognition, and talk-in-interaction. Such systems constitute an environment within which the analyst can investigate in detail how participants deploy the diverse resources provided by talk (for example access to a variety of sign systems with structurally different properties), sequential organization, posture, gaze, gesture, and consequential phenomena in the environment that is focus of their work in order to accomplish the courses of action that constitute their lifeworld.

Finally, the human body is unlike most other phenomena in the scene. Within

in progress. Moreover, the actions made visible by the body are quite diverse. Some, such as a display of orientation toward another participant or a relevant feature of the surround, have a temporal organization that extends over multiple actions occurring within an extended strip of interaction. Gestures, including both iconic representations such as the numeric handshapes and the deictic points found here, can have a far shorter temporal duration. Moreover, these two kinds of action function at different levels of organization. Gestures can carry propositional information and function as individual actions, or as components of multimodal actions. By way of contrast, the displays of postural orientation used to build participation frameworks help establish the interactive ground that frames and makes possible the production, reception, and joint constitution of a variety of different kinds of action built through gesture and talk. The body functions in yet another way when prosody and intonation are used to display alignment and stance (Couper-Kuhlen and Selting, 1996; M.H. Goodwin, 1998). Rather than locating a homogeneous field for analysis, the notion of embodiment encompasses many different kinds of phenomena.

The same is true for context. The constitution of relevant context (Goodwin and Duranti, 1992) is in the first instance an issue for the participants, and not primarily for the analyst (a point long emphasized by conversational analysts, e.g. Sacks, 1995 [1992]; Schegloff, 1987). As the rearrangement of contextual configurations in both the hopscotch and the Munsell data demonstrated, context is not simply a set of features presupposed or invoked by a strip of talk, but is itself a dynamic, temporally unfolding process accomplished through the ongoing rearrangement of structures in the talk, participants' bodies, relevant artifacts, spaces, and features of the material surround that are the focus of the participants' scrutiny. Crucial to this process is the way in which the detailed structure of talk, as articulated through sequential organization, provides for the continuous updating and rearrangement of contexts for the production and interpretation of action. Within the rich matrix of diverse semiotic resources that create relevant contextual configurations, action, setting, and the meaningful body reflexively constitute each other through temporally unfolding processes of situated human interaction.

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Notes

1. The study and theoretical formulation how such multi-party social action is recognized and accomplished has been a major topic in Conversation Analysis. See for example Schegloff's (1968) early formulation of *conditional relevance*, the analysis of Adjacency Pairs in Sacks (1995 [1992]) and Schegloff and Sacks (1973), the study of how hearers make projections about what is about to happen in an unfolding utterance in Jefferson (1973) and Goodwin and Goodwin (1987), and much other work in the field (see Heritage, 1984, 1989, for descriptions of work in the field, and the theoretical issues being dealt with).
2. See Agha (1996, 1997) for other most relevant analysis of how action is built through the conjunction of multiple semiotic resources.
3. Ideally, I would like the readers of this paper to be able to actually view the data clips being analyzed so that they can check out my analysis of the sequence for themselves. With the development of Quick-time movies and CD ROM's this is becoming possible, though issues of confidentiality must also be addressed.
4. For more detailed exposition of the rules of hopscotch see M.H. Goodwin (1998). Girls' games, such as hopscotch, have traditionally been offered as evidence that girls' social organization, capacity to deal with rules, and ability to successfully engage in disputes is inferior to that of boys (see for example Lever, 1978). For example it is argued that a game such as football has more players who occupy an array of structurally different positions than hopscotch or jumprope. Note that if this stereotype is true, girls, and the women they become, should be less fit than men to engage in the dispute forums, such as the legal system and politics, that define power in a society. M.H. Goodwin's studies of girls' actual interaction in the midst of games strongly contradicts such a view. She demonstrates that the disputes that systematically emerge within a game such as hopscotch provide girls with a rich arena for the analysis of each other's actions in terms of rules, with a place where rules can be challenged and negotiated, and with an opportunity to develop an embodied habitus of power as girls use the full resources of forceful argument to oppose each other's positions (see for example M.H. Goodwin, 1985, 1994, 1995, 1998, 1999). Carla's actions in the present data are certainly consistent with such an argument. In a more general study of the social worlds built by children through their talk-in-interaction on the street, M.H. Goodwin (1990) found that some of the dispute processes of girls, such as the He-said-she-said, were in fact far more extended and complex than those of boys.
5. Norma Mendoza-Denton (personal communication, 1995) points out that this example shows how the bilingual phonology of the children operates, taking the English word *cheater* and codeswitching in the middle of it at a morphological boundary by changing the /t/ of *cheat* to /r/. Although the vowel quality is primarily Spanish, the word has an English phonologial process operating within it, with the intervocalic flapping of /t/.
6. The way in which utterances derive both their meaning, and their status as particular kinds of actions from their placement within larger sequences, has long been the subject of sustained analysis within conversation analysis. See for example Sacks et al. (1974), Schegloff (1968), and Heritage (1984).
7. Describing these movements in writing is not entirely effective. The rhythmic and visual patterning of these movements can be seen much clearly on the video. Ideally I would like be able include video clips with a paper such as this.
8. This contrast is also displayed through crucial rhythmic components (Erickson, 1992)

9. Carla also used a deictic stomp accompanied by *éste* in line 2 to indicate a relevant square in the grid. At this point Carla is actually pushing Diana in an attempt to stop her progress through the grid. As the two moved apart Carla switched to the iconic handshapes thrust into Diana's face, an action that had the effect of leading Diana to gaze up toward Carla and her outstretched hand.
10. See Goodwin (1981) for analysis of how ongoing talk is reorganized to make it appropriate to a new contextual configuration defined by a structural change in the type of recipient located as the addressee of the moment. See Hanks (1996a, b) for analysis of both deixis and the relevance of the organization of spaces in the environment to the organization of action. For analysis of narrative spaces relevant to the organization of pointing see Haviland (1996). The issue of relevance, posed by the pervasive possibility of alternative categorizations of the same entity, has long been a central theme of work in conversation analysis. See for example Schegloff (1972).
11. See also analyses by anthropologists such as Duranti (1992) and Frake (1975) investigating how the social and cultural space within which an interaction occurs contributes organization to the speech actions that occur within that space.
12. The analysis presented here is drawn in part from a more extensive study of how color practices are socially organized through use of artifacts such as the Munsell chart (C. Goodwin, 1996a, 1999). Such situated activity systems for the classification of color are lodged within the work practices of a community, and are explicitly contrasted with traditional study of color categories, which analyzes them as psychological or physiological phenomenon shaped by the cultural and linguistic differences visible in the semantic systems of different languages (for example Berlin and Kay. 1969). For other relevant analysis of how the Munsell chart is used to organize scientific practice, see Latour (1995).
13. For more extended analysis of a range of different ways that visual images and documents provide scientists with what Lynch (1988) has called an 'externalized retina', that is a site for publicly and visibly constituting the social objects that are the focus of scientific work, see the papers in Lynch and Woolgar (1988).
14. See Sacks (1995 [1992]) and Schegloff (1972) for a relevant demonstration of how alternative reference forms for phenomena such as persons and places make it possible for speakers in conversation to design reference for different kinds of addressees, activities, and relevancies.
15. A vast amount of research in feminist scholarship, anthropology, and the study of scientific practice has demonstrated that what counts as *nature* is very much a cultural construal. For this reason, the term *nature* has been put in quotes. The way in which *nature*, like any category, is a human semiotic construal, does not, however, undercut the fact that for archaeologists themselves a contrast between 'natural' phenomena and cultural artifacts is central to the organization of their practice. The prototypical work done in excavating a site is precisely separating cultural remains, which are taken back to the lab, from what are classified as natural phenomena, such as dirt, which are left in the field. What is at issue is a distinction that the participants themselves are using to organize their work.
16. Such public visibility and construal of relevant events is crucial to many areas of human social life. See C. Goodwin (1994a) for analysis of how such public practices for organizing vision enabled lawyers defending the policemen who beat Rodney King to shape what the jury saw on the tape, in a way that exonerated the policemen while shifting the focus of attention to the actions of Rodney King.
17. See Drew and Heritage (1992) for

through systematic constraints of the systems organizing talk in mundane, vernacular talk-in-interaction.

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28

Constructing Inferences during Narrative Text Comprehension

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An adequate psychological theory of text comprehension should be able to account for the generation of inferences when readers construct a *situation model* of what a text is about. A situation model is a mental representation of the people, setting, actions, and events that are mentioned in explicit clauses or that are filled in inferentially by world knowledge (Bower, 1989; Garnham & Oakhill, in press; Glenberg, Meyer, & Lindem, 1987; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Kintsch, 1988; Morrow, Greenspan, & Bower, 1987; Singer, 1990; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). For example, suppose that an adult reads a novel. Several classes of knowledge-based inferences are potentially constructed during comprehension: The goals and plans that motivate characters' actions, characters' knowledge and beliefs, traits, emotions, the causes of events, properties of objects, spatial relationships among entities, expectations about future episodes in the plot, referents of nouns and pronouns, attitudes of the writer, emotional reactions of the reader, and so on. Some of these inferences are normally generated "on-line" (i.e., during the course of comprehension), whereas others are normally "off-line" (i.e., generated during a later retrieval task but not during comprehension). Researchers in cognitive psychology and discourse processing have attempted to identify and explain which classes of inferences are normally generated on-line (Balota, Flores d'Arcais, & Rayner, 1990; Graesser & Bower, 1990; Graesser & Kreuz, 1993; Kintsch, 1993; Magliano & Graesser, 1991; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992; Singer, 1988, in press; Whitney, 1987).

In this article, we present a constructionist theory that makes decisive predictions about the classes of inferences that are constructed on-line during the comprehension of narrative text. One of the shortcomings of early constructionist theories (Anderson & Ortony, 1975; Bartlett, 1932; Bransford, Barclay, &

Franks, 1972; Schmidt, 1982; Weimer & Palermo, 1974) is that they failed to make specific predictions about the inferences and meaning representations that are constructed during encoding. Because of this shortcoming, some researchers (e.g., McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992) have concluded that constructionist theories assume that a complete, lifelike cognitive representation is constructed and that virtually all classes of inferences are generated on-line. During the past decade, however, the research conducted by constructionist theorists has revealed that only a subset of inferences are on-line. The constructionist theory presented in the present article accommodates these empirical findings and thereby positions constructionism on more solid footing.

The proposed constructionist theory embraces a principle that has a long history in experimental psychology and that distinguishes it from other contemporary psychological theories in discourse processing: *Search (or effort) after meaning* (Bartlett, 1932; Berlyne, 1949, 1960; Spiro, 1980; Stein & Trabasso, 1985). A more precise specification of this search-after-meaning principle has three critical assumptions:

1. *The reader goal assumption.* The reader constructs a meaning representation that addresses the reader's goals. These goals and meaning representations are normally pitched at deep levels of processing (e.g., semantics and the referential situation model) rather than at shallow levels (e.g., wording; and syntax).

2. *The coherence assumption.* The reader attempts to construct a meaning representation that is coherent at both local and global levels. Local coherence refers to structures and processes that organize elements, constituents, and referents of adjacent clauses or short sequences of clauses. Global coherence is established when local chunks of information are organized and interrelated into higher order chunks.

3. *The explanation assumption.* The reader attempts to explain why actions, events, and states are mentioned in the text. These explanations involve naive theories of psychological and physical causality in an effort to achieve coherence in understanding.

Thus, readers attempt to construct a meaningful referential situation model that addresses the readers' goals, that is coherent, and that explains why actions, events, and states are mentioned in the text.

Previous constructionist theories have either explicitly or implicitly adopted one or more of these assumptions. The proposed constructionist theory is distinctive because it explicitly adopts all three assumptions and it directly focuses on the problem of inference generation. Previous constructionist theories have been vague or indecisive in delimiting the classes of inferences that are generated on-line. This was not a salient objective for these theories in the past because there was very little research on inference generation two decades ago. Now that inference generation has received more attention in the fields of experimental psychology, cognitive science, and discourse processing, it is time to sort out what a constructionist theory would provide. The three assumptions of the search-after-meaning principle

A constructionist theory that embraces the search-after-meaning principle offers predictions that are not uniquely shared by alternative theoretical frameworks in the discourse-processing literature. By way of illustration, the proposed constructionist theory predicts that the following three classes of inferences are generated on-line under most processing conditions:

1. *Superordinate goals* of characters that motivate explicit actions in the text. For example, the superordinate goal of "getting revenge" motivates the action of a victim killing a villain; getting revenge explains why the victim kills the villain.
2. *Causal antecedents* that explain why an action, event, or state is explicitly mentioned in the text. For example, the event of a character becoming ill is explained by the causal antecedent "the character went bankrupt."
3. *Global thematic inferences* that integrate major chunks of the text or that convey the point of a message. For example, a story might be an instantiation of the virtue "practice what you preach."

In contrast, the theory predicts that readers do not normally construct inferences that forecast future episodes in the plot and inferences that track the spatial locations of objects within a spatial region.

According to the proposed constructionist theory, those inferences that are predicted to be generated on-line are not generated under all conditions of reading. Readers abandon such attempts at search-after-meaning under one or more of the following conditions: (a) if the reader is convinced that the text is "inconsiderate" (i.e., lacks global coherence and a message), (b) if the reader lacks the background knowledge that permits the establishment of explanations and global coherence, or (c) if the reader has goals that do not require the construction of a meaningful situation model (e.g., proofreading the text for spelling errors).

Our primary focus is on narrative text rather than on other discourse genres (such as expository, persuasive, and descriptive texts). This emphasis is nonarbitrary. Narrative text has a close correspondence to everyday experiences in contextually specific situations (Britton & Pelligrini, 1990; Bruner, 1986; Kintsch, 1980; Nelson, 1986; Schank, 1986). Both narrative: texts and everyday experiences involve people performing actions in pursuit of goals, the occurrence of obstacles to goals, and emotional reactions to events. Knowledge about these actions, goals, events, and emotions are deeply embedded in our perceptual and social experience because it is adaptive to understand the actions and events in our social and physical environment. The inferencing mechanisms and world knowledge structures that are tapped during the comprehension of everyday experiences are also likely to be tapped during the comprehension of narratives; there is no justifiable reason to believe that readers would turn off these pervasive interpretive mechanisms during reading. Of course, this claim does not imply that there is a perfect overlap between the inferences generated during everyday experiences and the inferences generated during narrative comprehension. In particular, global thematic inferences may not be generated when we com-

In contrast to narrative text, expository text is decontextualized and is normally written to inform the reader about new concepts, generic truths, and technical material (Brewer, 1980; Bruner, 1986; Nystrand, 1986). The typical reader does not have extensive background knowledge about the topics in expository texts, so readers generate fewer inferences than they generate during the comprehension of narrative text (Britton & Gülgöz, 1991; Graesser, 1981). Narrative text is an important genre to study, given that we are interested in inference generation and the construction of referential situation models.

One major goal of this article is to present a constructionist theory that makes decisive predictions about the knowledge-based inferences that are generated on-line during narrative comprehension. These knowledge-based inferences are critical building blocks in the referential situation model that readers construct. It is beyond the scope of this article to dissect the vast number of shallow-level inferences that are needed to "flesh out" linguistic code and explicit propositional code. It is widely acknowledged that most of these shallow-level inferences are reliably generated on-line (Frazier & Flores d'Arcais, 1989; Perfetti, 1993; Swinney & Osterhout, 1990), perhaps automatically (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992). Most of the uncertainty and controversy addresses the status of deeper knowledge-based inferences that presumably are generated during the construction of situation models. It is also beyond the scope of this article to discriminate between those inferences that are automatically versus strategically generated on-line. The distinction between automatic and strategic inferences was central to McKoon and Ratcliff's (1992) *minimalist hypothesis*, but it is not central to the proposed constructionist theory. Instead, the relevant contrast is between on line and off-line inferences while readers *comprehend* text.

A greater appreciation of the constructionist theory is achieved when it is contrasted with alternative hypotheses, models, and theories. Therefore, in this article, we compare the predictions of the constructionist theory with the predictions of alternative theoretical frameworks: an explicit textbase position, a minimalist hypothesis, a current-state selection (CSS) strategy, a prediction–substantiation model, and a promiscuous inference generation position. The fact that these frameworks furnish different predictions about the on-line status of inferences supports the claim that the constructionist theory offers nontrivial predictions.

A second major goal of this article is to review the empirical evidence that tests the proposed constructionist theory and alternative theoretical frameworks. As it turns out, the fact that we are investigating knowledge-based inferences has some critical methodological consequences. In particular, a satisfactory empirical test of these models must ensure that the readers have adequate world knowledge to generate the inferences. We therefore advocate a *three-pronged method* (Magliano & Graesser, 1991; Suh & Trabasso, 1993; Trabasso & Suh, 1993) that coordinates (a) the collection of verbal protocols that expose candidate inferences, (b) the articulation of alternative theoretical frameworks concerning inference generation, and (c) the collection of time-based behavioral measures that test [illegible] inferences [illegible]

reads text, sentence by sentence. If an inference is exposed by these verbal protocols, then there is some assurance that the readers have adequate background knowledge to make the inference.

In this article, we do not articulate the constructionist theory to the point of covering all levels of language processing and of furnishing a detailed processing trace of the construction of inferences. In principle, the constructionist theory could be integrated with more comprehensive psychological models of text processing, such as Kintsch's construction–integration model (Kintsch, 1988), Just and Carpenter's READER model (1992), or Gernsbacher's structure-building framework (Gernsbacher, 1990). In principle, we also could present a detailed processing model that traces the construction of particular inferences on the basis of the text, relevant world knowledge structures, and the reader's goals (see Graesser & Clark, 1985, for one attempt). Although it is beyond the scope of this article to furnish this level of detail, the key components of a processing mechanism are described in sufficient detail to show how it narrows down the set of potential knowledge-based inferences.

Comprehension and Knowledge-based Inferences

It is important to clarify what we mean by "comprehension" and "knowledge-based inferences" because they are central ideas in the constructionist theory. As mentioned earlier, the constructionist theory is applicable only in cases when the reader attempts to comprehend the meaning of a text. All bets are off when, for example, the reader is merely proofreading the text for spelling errors or the reader is scanning the text for a particular word. As mentioned earlier, the constructionist theory makes predictions about those knowledge-based inferences that participate in the construction of a situation model. The distinctive properties of the theory are not pitched at the shallow-level inferences that are needed to construct syntactic code, propositional code, and the explicit textbase.

What Does It Mean to Comprehend?

Comprehension has traditionally been one of the elusive, controversial constructs in cognitive science (Kintsch, 1980; Schank, 1986; Weizenbaum, 1976; Winograd & Flores, 1986). It is perhaps impossible to propose a definition that is complete and that would be accepted by all researchers in all disciplines. Everyone agrees that comprehension consists of the construction of multi-level representations of texts. Everyone agrees that comprehension improves when the reader has adequate background knowledge to assimilate the text, but what else exists or occurs when comprehension succeeds? How does a researcher determine whether a computer really understands a text or whether one person really understands another person?

Comprehension improves to the extent that the reader constructs more levels

> The truck driver saw the policeman hold up his hand. The truck driver's vehicle stopped, but a car rear-ended the truck driver.

The *textbase* level of representation would include a propositional description of the explicit text (Kintsch, 1992; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978). For example, the first sentence would have the following propositional representation:

> PROPOSITION 1: saw (truck driver, PROPOSITION 2)
> PROPOSITION 2: hold-up (policeman, hand)

Each proposition has a predicate (i.e., verb, adjective, or connective) and one or more arguments (i.e., noun or embedded proposition). The textbase level would also connect the explicit sentences by argument overlap. The first sentence would be connected to the second sentence by the overlapping argument "truck driver."

The textbase provides a shallow representation of the explicit text but does not go the distance in capturing the deeper meaning of the text. Deeper meaning is achieved by computing a *referential* specification for each noun. For example, he car would rear-end the vehicle of the truck driver rather than the body of the truck driver. Deeper comprehension is achieved when the reader constructs *causes and motives* that explain why events and actions occurred. Readers would infer that an abrupt stop of the truck caused the car to rear-end the truck, even though the text never states that there was an abrupt stop. The reader would infer that the truck driver had the goal of stopping the truck and performed some intentional action to stop it, even though this was never explicitly stated. Deeper comprehension is achieved when the reader infers the *global message*, or *point*, of the text, such as "accidents occur even when people follow society's rules." However, this level of representation may be difficult to construct without the pragmatic context of the text, such as who wrote the text, why it was written, who read the text, and why it was read. Nevertheless, according to our definition of comprehension, readers attempt to construct representations at all of these levels.

A definition of comprehension is incomplete without a principled way of determining what content to elaborate at the various levels. The proposed constructionist theory was indeed developed to provide a more discriminating specification of content elaboration. Most readers would not normally construct a detailed description of the subplan that the truck driver executed to stop the truck (e.g., he moved his foot to the brake pedal, he pumped the brake, he calculated the distance between the truck and the policeman). These details would normally be omitted from the constructed representation. Yet it might be important to construct these details when the reader is an insurance agent trying to settle an insurance claim for the accident. Thus, the goals of the reader and the pragmatic context of the message must also be considered. It is widely acknowledged that it is not sufficient to build a theory of comprehension on the basis of the text alone.

Some researchers have enriched the definition of comprehension by adopting a "systemic" perspective that

coherence of the text; comprehension succeeds when there is harmony among explicit ideas within the text (Britton & Eisenhart, 1993). A second sense of harmony addresses the compatibility among the three major components of a communication system: the author, the text, and the reader (Britton & Gülgöz, 1991; Rosenblatt, 1978; Tierney & Shanahan, 1991). That is, comprehension succeeds to the extent that there is harmony among three representations: (a) the author's intended meaning of the text, (b) the explicit text, and (c) the reader's constructed meaning of the text. Writers compose the content and wording of text in service of their communication goals, whereas readers attempt to recover the writers' goals during comprehension. Comprehension breaks down to the extent that there is discord among the author's intended meaning, the explicit text, and the reader's constructed meaning. Inconsiderate text is incoherent and underspecified, so it fails to deliver a successful transmission of information from author to reader.

There are several important benefits when comprehension succeeds. The reader draws inferences that are relevant and correct. The reader asks good questions that tap potential knowledge gaps, anomalies, and contradictions. The reader's answers to questions are relevant, correct, and informative. The reader can paraphrase the message and generate good summaries. In fact, inference generation, question asking, question answering, paraphrasing, and summary generation have traditionally been the litmus tests of whether computers can understand text in the field of artificial intelligence (Kass, 1992; Lehnert, Dyer, Johnson, Young, & Harley, 1983; Schank & Abelson, 1977). When comprehension succeeds, the reader is able to detect whether an incoming statement in the text involves a contradiction, anomaly, or irrelevancy with respect to the earlier information (Glenberg, Wilkinson & Epstein, 1982; Graesser & McMahen, 1993; Markman, 1979; Otero & Kintsch, 1992). However, sometimes comprehension does not succeed and the reader settles for a simplistic, shallow representation of the text. A reader may have the illusion of successful comprehension even though the reader's simplistic representation fails to capture all of the explicit text and the depth of the material (Glenberg & Epstein, 1987; Weaver, 1990).

What is a Knowledge-based Inference?

The purpose of this section is to delimit the classes of inferences that our constructionist theory addresses rather than to offer a complete and perfectly accurate taxonomy of inferences. Researchers in psycholinguistics and discourse processing have proposed several taxonomies of inferences (Clark, 1977; Graesser & Kreuz, 1993; Harris & Monaco, 1978; Kintsch, 1993; Magliano & Graesser, 1991; Nicholas & Trabasso, 1981; Reiger, 1975; Singer, 1988), but a consensus has hardly emerged.

Knowledge-based inferences are constructed when background knowledge structures in long-term memory (LTM) are activated, and a subset of this information is encoded in the meaning representation of the text. The meaning rep-

(Kintsch, 1988, 1992, 1993; Kintsch, Welsch, Schmalhofer, & Zimny, 1990; Schmalhofer & Glavanov, 1986; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). The background knowledge consists of specific and generic knowledge structures that are relevant to the text. The specific knowledge structures include memory representations of particular experiences, of other texts, and of previous excerpts within the same text. The generic knowledge structures include schemata (J. M. Mandler, 1984; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977), scripts (Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979; Schank & Abelson, 1977), frames (Minsky, 1975), stereotypes (Wyer & Gordon, 1984), and other structured packets of generic knowledge. Most background knowledge structures are meaningful and contextually rich. That is, they are grounded in experience, with content organized by meaningful relations, for example, a script of eating at a restaurant. These rich structures furnish much of the content needed to interpret, explain, predict, and understand narrative events. However, other background knowledge structures are abstract and decontextualized, such as the schema for the thetorical format of a fairy tale (J. M. Mandler, 1984; Stein & Glenn, 1979). Background knowledge structures (either specific or generic) are activated through pattern recognition processes by explicit content words, combinations of content words, and interpreted text constituents. When a background knowledge structure is very familiar and therefore overlearned, much of its content is automatically activated in working memory (WM) at very little cost to the processing resources in WM (Graesser & Clark, 1985; Kintsch, 1988, 1993).

When a knowledge-based inference is directly inherited or copied from a background knowledge structure, the process of incorporating it into the meaning representation of the text imposes small or intermediate costs to WM. However, sometimes a novel knowledge-based inference is constructed. A novel inference is a product of several incremental, cognitive cycles of searching memory and accumulating information from multiple information sources (Just & Carpenter, 1992). The precise mechanisms of constructing these novel knowledge-based inferences are not well understood, although several researchers have offered speculations (Graesser & Clark, 1985; Graesser & Zwaan, in press; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Wilensky, 1983). These novel knowledge-based inferences are believed to place more burdens on WM. A potential inference has a lower likelihood of being generated online to the extent that its generation imposes greater demands on WM.

Examples of knowledge-based inferences are presented in the context of the following parable by Ambrose Bierce, entitled "How Leisure Came."

> A Man to Whom Time was Money, and who was bolting his breakfast in order to catch a train, had leaned his newspaper against the sugar bowl and was reading as he ate. In his haste and abstraction he stuck a pickle-fork into his right eye, and on removing the fork the eye came with it. In buying spectacles the needless outlay for the right lens soon reduced him to poverty, and the Man to Whom Time was Money had to sustain life by fishing from the end of the wharf.

Inferences relevant to "How Leisure Came"

nference	Brief description	Text that elicits inference	Inferences
Referential	A word or phrase is referentially tied to a previous element or constituent in the text (explicit or inferred).	". . .on removing the *fork* the eye came with *it*"	Fork is the referent for it.
Case structure ssignment	An explicit noun phrase is assigned to a particular case structure role, e.g., agent, recipient, object, location, time.	"the man leaned his newspaper against the sugarbowl"	Against the sugarbowl is assigned to a location role.
: Causal :edent	The inference is on a causal chain (bridge) between the current explicit action, event, or state and the previous passage context.	"In his haste and abstraction he stuck a pickle fork into his right eye. . ."	The man was careless and mis-aimed his fork.
.: Superordinate	The inference is a goal that motivates an agent's intentional action.	"A Man to Whom Time was Money, and who was bolting his breakfast in order to catch a train. . ."	The man wanted to get to work and earn money.
5: Thematic	This is a main point or moral of the text.	The entire passage	Haste makes waste.
6: Character tional reaction	The inference is an emotion experienced by a character, caused by or in response to an event or action.	". . .the needless outlay reduced him to poverty"	The man became sad.
7: Causal sequence	The inference is on a forecasted causal chain, including physical events and new plans of agents. These inferences do not include the character emotions in class 6.	". . .on removing the fork the eye came with it"	The man became blind in his right eye.

8: Instantiation noun category	The inference is a subcategory or a particular exemplar that instantiates an explicit noun or an implicit case role that is required by the verb.	". . .breakfast. . ."	Bacon and eggs.
9: Instrument	The inference is an object, part of the body, or resource used when an agent executes an intentional action.	". . .the Man to Whom Time was Money had to sustain life by fishing from the end of a wharf"	The man used a rod and reel (to fish).
10: Subordinate al–action	The inference is a goal, plan, or action that specifies how an agent's action is achieved.	". . .who was bolting his breakfast"	The man grasped his fork and moved it toward his mouth.
11: State	The inference is an ongoing state, from the time frame of the text, that is not causally related to the story plot. The states include an agent's traits, knowledge, and beliefs; the properties of objects and concepts; and the spatial location of entities.	". . .the Man to Whom Time was Money had to sustain life by fishing from the end of a wharf"	Fishermen are poor; the city has a wharf.
12: Emotion of der	The inference is the emotion that the reader experiences when reading a text.	". . .on removing the fork the eye came with it"	The reader is disgusted.
13: Author's nt	The inference is the author's attitude or motive in writing.	The entire passage	Bierce wants to lambaste workaholics.

of the inference and its relation to the explicit text. These classes do not exhaust all of the potential inferences during comprehension, but they do provide an initial foundation for discussing the constructionist theory.

The order in which the inference classes are listed in Table 1 is not altogether arbitrary. Inference classes 1, 2, and 3 are needed to establish local coherence, whereas inference classes 3 and 4 are critical for establishing explanations. Classes 4, 5, and 6 are important for establishing global coherence. Classes 7 through 11 are elaborative inferences that are not needed for establishing coherent explanatory meaning representations. Classes 12 and 13 address the pragmatic communicative exchange between reader and author. The order of listing the inference classes is weakly correlated with the amount of attention that the inference classes have received in the psychological literature. Referential inferences (class 1) have received the most attention, whereas inferences about author intent and attitude (class 13) have received the least attention. The local inferences that are elicited by one or two sentences have received more attention than the global inferences. Inferences that are elicited from rich textual cues have received more attention than inferences that are remotely derived from the text by virtue of background knowledge structures.

The researchers' preferences in the selection of inferences to investigate can be attributed both to methodology and to theory. The most familiar and defensible research methods in experimental psychology carefully manipulate stimulus texts, so there is a preference for investigating local text-bound inferences. Early theories in psycholinguistics, text linguistics, and reading focused on inferences that were derived symbolically from explicit linguistic elements (Brady & Berwick, 1983; Brown & Yule, 1983; Katz & Fodor, 1963; Kempson, 1977). These inferences were derived by rules, meaning postulates, and compositional analyses that stripped away most of world knowledge. It is very tedious and difficult to specify the numerous knowledge structures associated with text, so theorists and empirical researchers have normally avoided a systematic analysis of world knowledge. Nevertheless, a mature theory of inference generation would need to analyze world knowledge in detail. Consequently, some researchers have pursued rather ambitious projects that map out the world knowledge structures that participate in text comprehension (Alterman, 1985; Dahlgren, 1988; Graesser & Clark, 1985; Mannes & Kintsch, 1991; Schank & Abelson, 1977). Clearly, it is important not to confuse the likelihood that a class of inferences is generated on-line and the amount of attention that the class of inferences has received in the scientific literature.

There is an important distinction between *text-connecting* inferences and *extratextual* inferences (Graesser & Bower, 1990; Singer & Ferreira, 1983; Trabasso & Suh, 1993). In the case of a text-connecting inference, the current clause being comprehended is related to a previous explicit statement in the text; the previous statement is reinstated (i.e., activated or reactivated) and is inferentially linked to the current clause. The referential inferences (class 1 in Table 1) are always text-connecting inferences. In the case of extratextual inferences, the inference is copied or derived from generic and specific knowledge structures that are

The taxonomy in Table 1 does not include some classes of inferences that normally are difficult to generate and are therefore off-line. First, there are logic-based inferences, which are derived from systems of domain-independent formal reasoning, such as prepositional calculus, predicate calculus, and theorem proving (Newell & Simon, 1972; Rips, 1990). Second, there are quantitative inferences and statistical inferences that are products of complex formulae and mathematical procedures (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). These inferences are usually a struggle to generate (Bruner, 1986; Graesser & Clark, 1985; Kintsch, 1993; Schank, 1986), as everyone who has attempted to solve analytical brain teasers and algebra word problems knows. Of course, this does not mean that these inferences are never generated during the comprehension of narrative text (Lea, O'Brien, Fisch, Noveck, & Braine, 1990).

For the convenience of communication, we consider whether each class of inferences is in one of two discrete states: on-line versus off-line. However, there undoubtedly is a probabilistic continuum between on-line and off-line. The continuum can be attributed to fluctuations in reader abilities, reader goals, text materials, samples of inferences, experimental tasks, and so on. The continuum can also be explained by the theoretical possibility that inferences are encoded to some degree rather than all-or-none (Gernsbacher, 1990; Kintsch, 1988; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992; Sharkey & Sharkey, 1992). The degree to which an inference is encoded might be strengthened or attenuated as more information is received. Technically speaking, when we claim that a class of inferences is generated on-line, our intention is to convey that it has a substantially higher strength of encoding or higher likelihood of being generated than the contrast classes of inferences that are off-line. A full-blown theory would account for likelihood of generation, the strength of encoding, the time-course of generation, and the exact locus of generation (within the text) for each class of inference.

A Constructionist Theory of Inference Generation

As discussed earlier, the proposed constructionist theory emphasizes Bartlett's (1932) principle of search (or effort) after meaning. This principle embraces the reader goal assumption, the coherence assumption, and the explanation assumption. We elaborate on these distinctive characteristics of the constructionist theory in this section. In addition to these distinctive characteristics, the theory adopts some components, assumptions, and predictions that are widely accepted by psychological researchers in discourse processing (Gernsbacher, 1990; Just & Carpenter, 1992; Kintsch, 1988; Sanford & Garrod, 1981; Singer, 1990; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). These uncontroversial assumptions are succinctly enumerated in this section before turning to the theory's distinctive characteristics.

Uncontroversial Components and Assumptions

relevant *background knowledge structures* (both specific and generic), and the *pragmatic context* of the message (i.e., the author, reader, setting, and purpose of the exchange).

2. *Levels of cognitive representation.* Following Kintsch and his colleagues (Kintsch, 1988, 1992; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983), three levels of code are constructed as a result of comprehension: the *surface code* (i.e., the exact wording and syntax), the *textbase* (explicit text propositions plus inferences needed for text cohesion), and the *situation model.*

3. *Memory stores.* There are three memory stores: *short-term memory* (STM; which holds the most recent clause), *working memory* (WM; which holds approximately the last two sentences, plus information that is actively recycled in WM), and *long-term memory* (LTM). It should be noted that some models do not distinguish between STM and WM.

4. *Discourse focus.* Attention may be focused on any of the three levels of cognitive representation (see assumption 2). From the standpoint of the situation model, the discourse focus is analogous to a mental camera that scans across the scenario and zooms in on particular characters, actions, events, spatial regions, and hot spots (Bower, 1989).

5. *Convergence and constraint satisfaction.* Both the explicit information and inferences receive more strength of encoding to the extent that they are activated by several information sources (i.e., there is convergence), and they satisfy the conceptual constraints imposed by the various information sources (Golden & Rumelhart, 1991; Graesser & Clark, 1985; Kintsch, 1988; Mannes & Kintsch, 1991; Sharkey & Sharkey, 1992; St. John, 1991).

6. *Repetition and automaticity.* Repetition increases the speed of accessing knowledge structures and the elements within a knowledge structure. In the case of an automatized package of knowledge (e.g., a familiar generic knowledge structure), the content is wholistically accessed and activated at little cost to the processing resources in WM.

Distinctive Components and Assumptions of the Theory

The proposed constructionist theory embraces the search-after-meaning principle (Bartlett, 1932; Berlyne, 1949; Spiro, 1980; Stein & Trabasso, 1985). At a general level, this search-after-meaning principle asserts that comprehenders attempt to construct meaning out of text, social interactions, and perceptual input. The principle has three assumptions that empower the constructionist theory with distinctive predictions: (7) satisfaction of reader goals, (8) achievement of both local and global coherence, and (9) explanation of explicit information.

It is important to emphasize that the search-after-meaning principle is an effort, not necessarily an achievement. In most reading contexts, the fruits of these efforts are realized because writers–authors construct messages to be understood. However, there are conditions that prevent the reader from constructing a meaning representation that provides coherence, that explains the explicit text, and that satisfies the reader's goals. If the reader fails to devote any effort, then these

insufficient time for comprehension. A globally coherent message is not constructed if the text is choppy, incoherent, and pointless. An explanation may not be generated when there is a random sequence of events or a puzzling sequence of propositions that satisfy a researcher's counterbalancing constraints. Inferences are not constructed without the prerequisite background knowledge structures.

7. *Satisfaction of reader goals.* When readers comprehend a text, they are motivated by one or more goals. In some contexts, the goals are ill defined and general. This is the case when an adult reads the morning newspaper to become informed about current events and when a person reads a novel to be entertained. The reader must understand the meaning of the text under these conditions. In other contexts, the reader's goals are specific. This is the case when a reader tries to determine whether it is a good time to invest some money in the stock market (while reading a newspaper) and when a reader tries to form a mental picture of what a character looks like (while reading a novel). According to the reader goal assumption, readers are persistent in their attempts to satisfy their goals and therefore will construct inferences that address these goals.

We distinguish among three levels of goal specificity: default, genre-based, and idiosyncratic. At the first, most undifferentiated, level, the reader's goal is to construct a meaningful situation model that is compatible with the text. This level is the least constrained and is regarded as the default level.

At the next level, there are goals associated with the genre of the text. Readers of fictive narrative have the goal of being entertained in some fashion (e.g., excited, enthralled, amused, or frightened), whereas readers of expository text have the goal of being informed about events and facts in the real world (Brewer, 1980; Kintsch, 1980; Pearson & Fielding, 1991; Zwaan, 1993). Brewer (1980) has contrasted four "discourse forms" that reflect different goals of reading text: to entertain, to persuade, to inform, and to have an aesthetic–literary impact. Zwaan's (1993) experiments on reading and memory have demonstrated that substantially different information is extracted from a text when it is called a newspaper article versus a literary story.

The final level of goal specificity involves idiosyncratic reader goals. These goals may lead the reader to construct virtually any type of code (i.e., surface or textbase vs. situation model) and virtually any dimension of the situation model (e.g., spatiality, causality, plans, or traits of characters). An adequate account of idiosyncratic goals would need to incorporate a general theory of human motivation, which is quite outside the boundaries of our constructionist theory. The constructionist theory offers a priori predictions about inference generation in the context of default goals and genre-specific goals, whereas its predictions are ad hoc in the context of idiosyncratic goals. The ad hoc prediction is that inferences are generated if they are directly relevant to the idiosyncratic goals.

Reader goals must be carefully analyzed in the experiments conducted by researchers in discourse processing. The task demands constrain the goals that readers adopt and therefore the inferences that they construct. Readers may not generate deep inferences, for example, if the tests, materials, and tasks only require shallow

For example, suppose that an experiment is conducted in which the reader's task is to recognize whether character A or B is activated by a pronoun *she*. Suppose further that the words are presented very quickly (250 ms per word), and the reader is asked to recognize which of two words had been presented, as quickly as possible (namely, character A vs. B after presenting *she*). Shallow processing is sufficient to complete this task because (a) the task merely involves the recognition of explicit text, (b) the material is quickly presented, (c) shallow processing is satisfactory for performance, and (d) the recognition test requires the discrimination of only two characters. The reader might adopt an artificial reading strategy that is similar to monitoring a list of unrelated items. The reader might be frustrated from having the normal comprehension goal of constructing a meaningful situation model. in contrast, a meaningful situation model would be constructed in a task that allows readers to read at their normal pace and that tests them on deep inferences relevant to the situation model.

8. *Local and global coherence.* The comprehender attempts to build a meaning representation that establishes local and global coherence among the events, actions, and states in the text. Once again, this does not mean that a coherent representation is necessarily achieved at all levels, however. If the reader believes that the text is not considerate and lacks global coherence, then the comprehender settles for local coherence. If the reader believes that the text lacks local coherence, then the reader regards the text as incoherent. Stated differently, the reader attempts to construct the most global meaning representation that can be managed on the basis of the text and the reader's background knowledge structures. A globally coherent cognitive representation is successfully achieved when the following conditions are met: (a) the textual features support global coherence, (b) the reader has the prerequisite background knowledge, and (c) the reader does not have a specific goal that prevents understanding of the material. When there is a breakdown in one or more of these conditions, the reader settles for local coherence or gives up trying to achieve any coherence at all.

Coherence is achieved to the extent that elements and constituents in a text are conceptually connected by virtue of background knowledge structures, the constructed situation model, linguistic features of the text, or all three. There is an imprecise but important distinction between local and global coherence. Local coherence is achieved when conceptual connections relate the content of adjacent text constituents (i.e., a phrase, proposition, or clause) or short sequences of constituents. For example, in the story "How Leisure Came," there is a causal connection between the "man's haste and abstraction" and the event "he stuck a pickle fork into his right eye." Global coherence is achieved to the extent that most or all of the constituents can be linked together by one or more overarching themes. For example, the theme "haste makes waste" ties together most of the content of "How Leisure Came."

Features of the explicit text have a prominent role in the construction of local coherence (de Beaugrande, 1980; Halliday & Hasan, 1976; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; Mann & Thompson, 1986). In fact, the term *cohesion* is sometimes reserved for local connections that are based entirely or primarily on linguistic

knowledge. Referential cohesion is established, for example, when an explicit noun in a sentence is connected referentially to a previous noun phrase or proposition in the text. Another example of cohesion is when a connective (e.g., *because, so, and, therefore*) explicitly links adjacent clauses with a particular type of conceptual relation.

Nevertheless, features of language and the explicit text do not go the distance in establishing local coherence. Sometimes readers need to infer the relations between constituents. The classes of inferences that are important for establishing local coherence are referential inferences (class 1 in Table 1), case structure role assignments (class 2), and those causal antecedent inferences (class 3) that connect adjacent constituents. There is substantial evidence that the process of inferring these relations increases comprehension time (Bloom, Fletcher, van den Broek, Reitz, & Shapiro, 1990; Haberlandt & Bingham, 1978; Keenan, Baillet, & Brown, 1984; Myers, 1990; Myers, Shinjo, & Duffy, 1987; Singer, 1990).

The establishment of global coherence involves the organization of local chunks of information into higher order chunks. For example, a moral, main point, or theme of a text (class 5 in Table 1) organizes many of the events and episodes in narrative. A higher order chunk has its tentacles attached to constituents that span large stretches of text. As a consequence, readers sometimes need to link an incoming constituent to an excerpt much earlier in the text; the earlier excerpt is in LTM but no longer in WM. In these situations, reinstatement searches are executed to fetch the earlier text and to place it in WM. These reinstatement searches take additional processing time (Bloom et al., 1990; Dopkins, Klin, & Myers, 1993; Fletcher & Bloom, 1988; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; Singer, 1990, 1993; Suh & Trabasso, 1993; van den Broek & Lorch, 1993).

Detailed analyses of global coherence are available in several fields: text linguistics (Grimes, 1975; Halliday & Hasan, 1976), artificial intelligence (Dyer, 1983; Hobbs, 1979; Lehnert, 1981), education (Meyer, 1985), and cognitive psychology (J. M. Mandler, 1984; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). Some global structures are contextually specific and detailed, such as a script for eating at a restaurant (Schank & Abelson, 1977). Others are abstract frames. In one type of REVENGE structure, for example, characters A and B have a positive bond, character C harms B for unjustifiable reasons, and subsequently character A harms character C. Readers infer these global structures and thereby construct thematic inferences (class 5 in Table 1). Unfortunately, there have been very few empirical tests of whether these inferences are generated on-line (Seifert, McKoon, Abelson, & Ratcliff, 1986).

Although it is beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed account of the representation and processing assumptions of the constructionist theory, it is worthwhile to point out briefly how coherence could be achieved computationally. Coherent representations have traditionally been expressed in a symbolic form and have been constructed by procedures that manipulate symbols (Dyer, 1983; Fletcher, 1986; Golden & Rumelhart, 1991; Graesser & Clark, 1985; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; Lehnert, 1981; Trabasso, van den Broek, & Suh, 1989;

of nodes (i.e., nouns, states, events, or goals) that are connected by relational arcs of different categories. The global structures have either been tree hierarchies or nonhierarchical networks. The process of constructing the coherent representations during comprehension has normally consisted of recursive transition networks or production systems (Allen, 1987; Anderson, 1983; Just & Carpenter, 1992).

More recently, researchers have adopted connectionist architectures for computing coherence (Britton & Eisenhart, 1993; Holyoak & Thagard, 1989; Kintsch, 1988; Read & Marcus-Newhall, 1993; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). In Kintsch's (1988) construction–integration model, for example, all N nodes in the total node space (involving the textbase, situation model, and background knowledge) are connected with one another in an $N \times N$ connectivity matrix. Each connection between two nodes is assigned a positive excitatory weight, a negative inhibitory weight, or a zero weight. As each constituent in the text is interpreted, the activation values of the nodes in the node space are modified by a spreading activation process through the node space, as stipulated by the connectivity matrix; a parallel constraint satisfaction process settles on activation values for the nodes by converging on the best compromise of the constraints imposed by positive, negative, and zero-weight connections. After the last clause in the text is comprehended, each of the N nodes has a final activation value. Those nodes that meet some criterion of activation are included in the final coherent meaning representation, whereas the other nodes are not included.

According to the constructionist theory, a computational model would need to be designed in a manner that ensures that readers make every effort to establish both local and global coherence. In Kintsch's construction–integration model, for example, there would need to be a special set of nodes in the node space and connections in the connectivity matrix that explicitly capture the coherence assumption. Similarly, the model would need to be augmented with a special set of nodes and connections that incorporate the reader goal assumption and the explanation assumption. In other words, the three distinctive assumptions of the constructionist theory do not naturally emerge from the version of the construction–integration model reported in Kintsch (1988).

9. *Explanation.* Comprehenders attempt to explain *why* episodes in the text occur and *why* the author explicitly mentions particular information in the message. Thus, comprehension is typically guided by why-questions rather than other types of questions (e.g., what-happens-next, how, where, or when). There is extensive evidence that causal explanations of actions, events, and states play a central role in our understanding of narrative (Black & Bower, 1980; Bloom et al., 1990; Bower et al., 1979; Fletcher, 1986; Graesser, 1981; Rumelhart, 1975; Schank, 1986; Singer, 1990; Trabasso & Sperry, 1985; Trabasso et al., 1989; van den Brock, 1990). The importance of causal explanations is also bolstered by theories outside of the discourse-processing arena. For example, it is compatible with theories of causal attribution in social psychology (Hastie, 1983; Hilton, 1990; McLaughlin, 1990; Pennington & Hastie, 1986; Read, 1987; Read & Marcus-Newhall, 1993) and with theories of planning and mundane reasoning in artificial

Researchers have analyzed the information that is accessed when individuals answer why-questions (Graesser, 1981; Graesser & Clark, 1985; Graesser & Franklin, 1990; Graesser & Hemphill, 1991; Graesser, Lang, & Roberts, 1991; Graesser, Robertson, & Anderson, 1981; Lehnert, 1978; Schank & Abelson, 1977). Explanations of why involuntary events occur include their causal antecedents and enabling states (class 3 in Table 1). The reasons why characters perform intentional actions include their superordinate goals (class 4) and the causal antecedents that trigger these goals (class 3). Regarding goals, superordinate goals are appropriate answers to why-questions but not subordinate goals and subplans. For example, consider the following question in the context of the "How Leisure Came" story: "Why did the man buy spectacles?" Appropriate answers to this why-question would include the superordinate goal "in order to improve his eyesight" but not the subordinate goal "in order to pay the doctor." Regarding causal chains, causal antecedents are appropriate answers to why-questions but not causal consequences. An appropriate answer to the example question would be the causal antecedent "because his right eye was damaged" but not the causal consequence "because he was reduced to poverty." Therefore, the claim that comprehension is guided by why-questions rather than other types of questions substantially narrows down the set of inferences that readers normally construct.

Comprehenders are particularly sensitive to actions and events in the world, rather than to constancies and ongoing states. This is because changes frequently convey new and interesting information: discrepancies from normal states in the world, violations of normative standards, danger, obstacles to an agent's goals, goal conflicts between agents, methods of repairing planning failures, emotions that are triggered by goal failures, and abnormal occurrences that have adaptive significance to the organism. The comprehender's attention is captured and explanations are sought when there is an abnormal deviation from the homeostatic balance in a physical, social, or psychological system (Berlyne, 1960; Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Hart & Honore, 1985; Hilton, 1990; Lazarus, 1991; Mackie, 1980; G. Mandler, 1976). States become important only to the extent that they enable actions and events that dynamically unfold. It should be noted that the state inferences in Table 1 (class 11) do not include those states that enable actions and events.

Explicit actions and events are easy to explain when they are motivated or caused by a previous event, action, or state mentioned in the text. Explicit events and states are also easy to explain when they are very typical of the activated scripts and other background knowledge structures. For example, drinking a glass of wine is a very typical action in a BAR script. Such an action is stored in the generic script for BARS and in thousands of specific experiences involving bars. In contrast, the same voluntary action of drinking wine would be more difficult to explain if it could not be causally linked to the previous text and if it was not typical knowledge in the background knowledge structures (such as a person drinking wine in the context of a classroom). There is a coherence break when an incoming clause cannot be readily explained by prior [illegible] ground knowledge [illegible]

in the activated information sources. It takes more time to explain these atypical actions and events (Bower et al., 1979; Hastie, 1983), but this atypical information is more distinctive and discriminable in memory than is the typical information (Bower et al., 1979; Graesser, Gordon, & Sawyer, 1979; Hastie, 1983). If the reader's attempt to explain an incoming clause fails, the reader may wait for the subsequent text to explain it (Stein & Trabasso, 1985).

A pragmatic level of explanation must also he considered when readers comprehend explicit actions, everts, and states in the text. The reader considers why the author would bother mentioning the information conveyed in each explicit clause. Readers normally follow the Gricean postulate that whatever the author expresses is relevant and important (Grice, 1975; Roberts & Kreuz, 1993; Sperber & Wilson, 1986). When static information is presented at the beginning of the novel (e.g., a description of the protagonist's house), the author is presumably supplying a rich setting to anchor the story world. An explicit state might also be intended as a clue that ends up solving a mystery (e.g., there was a red stain on the shirt of a character).

A Processing Model for the Constructionist Theory

We present a processing model at this point to clarify what cognitive mechanisms would be involved in the production of inferences. The processing model would apply to situations where readers are attempting to comprehend considerate narrative text, without any idiosyncratic comprehension goals. We do not present a complete processing model. Instead, we briefly sketch a simple model that captures those inferences that are products of the explanation assumption and global coherence. These inferences are the most distinctive in the sense that they are not predicted to be generated by a number of alternative models of inference generation. Our processing model could be expanded to accommodate idiosyncratic reader goals and the establishment of local coherence; however, the resulting inferences would be generated by most theoretical frameworks and therefore are not particularly controversial.

Our processing model is built on the computational platform of Just and Carpenter's READER model (1992). There is a set of production rules that scan and operate on the contents of WM at each comprehension cycle, as text is comprehended online. The grain size of the comprehension cycle is defined as an explicit action, event, goal, or state in the discourse focus. A production rule has an "IF(condition, cognitive processes)" composition. If the specified conditions are met, then the cognitive processes are executed; if the conditions are not met, then the processes are not executed. All of the production rules are evaluated and executed in parallel, as is assumed in the READER model. The production rules are "soft" rules rather than "hard," brittle rules. That is, a condition is satisfied when there is a configuration of WM content that meets or exceeds some activation threshold; when cognitive processes are executed, the activation values of WM content are modified.

The READER model assumes that there is a limited supply of processing

precise upper bound in the capacity limitations. However, a few points need to be made about the amount of resources that are consumed by particular cognitive processes. According to the model, the process of accessing and utilizing generic information sources places very little demand on WM because this information is overlearned and automatized (see assumption 6). Access to generic information in LTM is very quick and executed in a parallel, rather than a serial, fashion. Access to specific information sources in LTM is accomplished more slowly (in parallel); the utilization of content within a specific information source is comparatively time consuming, at times in a serial fashion, and places more demands on WM. Therefore, it takes a noticeable amount of time to reinstate information that appeared much earlier in the text being read, after the information exits WM. Comprehension processes, including inference generation, slow down to the extent that the demands on WM approach the upper bound of capacity limitations. When the demands on WM exceed the upper bound, there is a catastrophic deterioration of comprehension, and few inferences are constructed. It should be noted, once again, that these assumptions are compatible with the basic processing mechanism of Just and Carpenter's (1992) READER model.

In Table 2, we present six production rules that implement the explanation assumption and the global coherence assumption. For each rule, there is a specification of the condition element, a succinct description of the cognitive processes and an elaborated description of these processes. The condition element for rules A, B, C, and D declares the type of statement in the discourse focus (i.e., action, goal or state vs. event) that "fires" the production rule. For rules E and F, the rule is fired when particular content in WM has an activation level that reaches some threshold. When a production rule is fired, various cognitive processes are executed: (a) searching for information sources in LTM and WM, (b) searching for information within information sources, (c) increasing the activation value of content in WM, and (d) verifying whether potential inferences are compatible with constraints of the WM content that is highly active. All six production rules are evaluated and possibly fired at each comprehension cycle, as text is comprehended on-line, statement by statement.

Production rules A, B, C, and F handle the explanation-based inferences. These inferences are needed to explain *why* characters perform actions, *why* events occur, and *why* information is explicitly stated in the text. Production rule A generates superordinate goals (i.e., motives) of character actions and goals. Production rule B generates causal antecedents of actions, goals, and events. Production rule C generates inferences that explain why statements are explicitly mentioned in the text. According to production rule F, these inferences are encoded in the situation model if their activation values meet some threshold.

All six production rules are needed to establish global coherence. According to production rule E, global plot structures are activated when WM contains a particular configurat on of actions, goals, events, states, and emotions. Some of this WM content was established by explicit text and some by inferences: goal inferences through rule A, action/event/state inferences through rule B and emotional reactions of characters

le 2: Production rules of the constructionist theory that model the process of explanation and establishing global coherence

luction	Condition	Succinct description of cognitive processes	Elaborated description of cognitive processes
A	Explicit statement in the discourse focus is an intentional action (A) or goal (G) of a character.	Explain why the character performed action A or has goal G.	1. Search information sources in WM and LTM for plausible superordinate goals of A or G. 2. Increase the activation of superordinate goals in WM to the extent that (a) they are in multiple information sources and (b) they are compatible with the constraints of WM content that meet some threshold of activation.
B	Explicit statement in the discourse focus is an intentional action (A), a goal (G), or an event (E).	Explain why the character performed action A, why the character has goal G, or why event E occurred.	1. Search information sources in WM and LTM for plausible causal antecedents of A, G, or E. 2. Increase the activation of the causal antecedents in WM to the extent that (a) they are in multiple information sources and (b) they are compatible with the constraints of WM content that meet some threshold of activation.
C	Any explicit statement (S) in the discourse focus.	Explain why the writer mentions S.	1. Search text genre schemas in LTM that would accommodate S. 2. Increase the activation of the genre schema to the extent that it is compatible with the constraints of S and with WM content that meets some threshold of activation.
	Explicit statement in the discourse focus is an intentional action (A) or an event (E).	Track the emotional reactions of characters.	1. Search information sources in WM and LTM for salient emotional reactions of characters to A or E. 2. Increase the activation of the emotional reactions in WM to the extent that (a) they are in multiple information sources and (b) they are compatible with the constraints of WM content that meet some threshold of activation.
	WM contains a particular configuration (C) of goals, actions, events, emotions, and/or states that meet some threshold of activation.	Create global structures.	1. Search for information sources in LTM that match configuration C. 2. Increase the activation of the information source in WM to the extent that it is compatible with the constraints of WM content that meet some activation threshold.
	An implicit statement or structure in WM meets some activation threshold.	Construct inferences that receive high activation in WM.	The implicit statement or structure is constructed as an inference in the situation model.

M = working memory; LTM = long-term memory.

Production rule C generates genre schemata, such as a schema for a mystery story, or a schema for a joke. Once again, a genre schema ends up being encoded if its activation value in WM managers to meet some threshold.

The six production rules implement the reader's active comprehension strategies when reading narrative text. As we discuss later, other models of inference generation do not postulate this ensemble of production rules. For example, McKoon and Ratcliff's (1992) minimalist hypothesis does not highlight these classes of inferences as being important for text comprehension. Except for the causal antecedent inferences, all elaborative inferences have an equivalent status in the minimalist hypothesis, namely that they are not consistently made during comprehension. If we were to implement the minimalist hypothesis in the form of a production system model, then the only production rules would be B and F. However, even rule B would need to be modified because the minimalist hypothesis states that causal antecedent inferences are made only under two conditions: (a) when the inference establishes local text coherence or (b) when there is a break in local text coherence that prompts a strategic search for causal antecedents (in the prior text or other information sources). The condition element of the production rules would need to be tuned to these discriminations. Unlike the minimalist hypothesis, the constructionist model always searches generic and specific information sources for causal antecedents of explicit events, actions, and goals; the search occurs regardless of whether or not there is a break in local text coherence. In summary, alternative models of inference generation would not have exactly the same set of production rules and the condition elements would not be tuned in exactly the same way. In a subsequent section, we examine assumptions and predictions of some alternative models.

Predictions of the Constructionist Theory

The constructionist theory makes distinctive predictions about which classes of inferences are likely to be generated on-line during the comprehension of narrative text. As discussed earlier, there undoubtedly is a continuum between on-line and off-line, but we assume a discrete demarcation for ease of communication.

In many contexts, readers have a general goal of reading a coherent text for understanding or for entertainment (rather than an idiosyncratic goal). The default or genre-based level of goal specificity would apply, as discussed earlier, and the predictions of the constructionist theory are clear-cut. The theory predicts that the following classes of inferences are ger crated online: referential (class 1), case structure role assignment (class 2), causal antecedent (class 3), superordinate goal (class 4), thematic (class 5), and character's emotion reaction (class 6). The referential, case structure, and causal antecedent inferences (classes 1, 2, and 3) are needed to establish local coherence in the text. The inferences that assign case structure roles to explicit noun phrases and prepositional phrases establish local coherence within a clause. The referential infereness and causal antecedent inferences are prevalent when establishing local coherence between clauses. The causal antecedent and superordinate goal inferences (classes 3 and 4, respectively)

intentional actions. Thematic inferences (class 5) are generated during the establishment of global coherence. The emotional reactions of characters (class 6) and the superordinate goals (class 4) also play a prominent role in global plot configurations of stories (Dyer, 1983; Lehnert, 1981; Stein & Levine, 1991) and are therefore needed for the establishment of global coherence. Interesting story plots involve goal conflicts and salient emotional reactions of characters to episodes in the story world.

The constructionist theory predicts that several classes of "elaborative" inferences in Table 1 are not normally generated on-line: causal consequences (class 7), instantiations of noun categories (class 8), instruments (class 9), subordinate goals/actions (class 10), and states (class 11). These inferences are not needed to construct a coherent explanation of the explicit content in the narrative so they have a lower likelihood of being generated on-line.

An elaborative inference in one of the above five classes might be constructed on-line by virtue of convergence and constraint satisfaction (see assumption 5). This occurs when an inference receives a high strength of activation from multiple information sources, and it satisfies the constraints from multiple information sources. It is important to point out that there are theoretical and empirical criteria for identifying these elaborative inferences that are products of convergence and constraint satisfaction (Graesser & Clark, 1985; Kintsch, 1988; Mannes & Kintsch, 1991). Therefore, the predictions of the constructionist theory remain tractable.

As a case in point, causal consequence inferences are normally not constructed on-line according to the constructionist theory. That is, readers do not forecast a hypothetical plot that involves new plans of agents and long event chains into the future. According to the constructionist theory, the only causal consequences that are generated on-line are (a) superordinate goals of existing plans that may end up being achieved in the future plot (class 4 inferences), (b) emotional reactions of characters to events and actions (class 6 inferences), and (c) causal consequences that have a high strength of encoding by virtue of assumption 5. Researchers have frequently proposed that causal consequences are not made on-line because there are too many alternative hypothetical plots that could potentially be forecasted, because most of these alternatives would end up being erroneous when the full story is known or because it takes a large amount of cognitive resources to forecast a single hypothetical plot (Graesser & Clark, 1985; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Kintsch, 1988; Potts, Keenan, & Golding, 1988; Reiger, 1975). However, a causal consequence inference is likely to be generated on-line if it is highly constrained by context and there are few if any alternative consequences that would be likely to occur (Keefe & McDaniel, 1993; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986; Murray, Klin, & Myers, 1991; van den Broek, 1990).

In some contexts, readers are motivated by idiosyncratic goals. They are predicted to generate those classes of inferences that are directly relevant to the idiosyncratic goals. For example, if their goal is to gain a vivid mental picture of the spatial setting and to track the location of objects, then spatial state inferences (class 11 in Table 1) would be constructed on-line even though it is time-consuming to [illegible]

normally generated on-line when readers read naturalistic stories for understanding and entertainment (Zwaan & Van Oostendorp, 1993). In some contexts, the reader's idiosyncratic goals are pitched at a shallow level of comprehension, such is proofreading a manuscript for spelling errors or performing in an experimental task that involves word recognition. In such cases, the reader would not construct a meaningful situation model, and virtually none of the inferences in Table 1 would be generated on-line. Therefore, there is not an invariant set of on-line inferences when considering all of the reader goals that potentially motivate reading. However, there are clear-cut predictions when the reader goals are pitched at a default level or a genre-based level of goal specificity.

The status of author intent or attitude (class 13) is uncharted at this point of inference research. There has been very little theoretical discussion of the psychological impact of author intent and attitude (Hunt & Vipond, 1986; Rosenblatt, 1978) and no empirical research investigating on-line processing. From one perspective, the reader is expected to generate inferences about author intent and attitude because it explains why the author expresses particular clauses in the text and why the author wrote the text. From another perspective, however, there are several reasons for being pessimistic about the likelihood of generating these inferences on-line. There rarely is a rich pragmatic context that anchors communication between the author and reader of a story, so there is very little information to support such inferences. In fact, the author of a text is normally invisible to the reader. There are cases in which there is a rich pragmatic context, for example, a letter to a friend or a politician writing a story to be read by a constituency; in these cases, readers are predicted to generate inferences and explanations about author intent and attitude on-line. A second reason to be pessimistic is that the reader may fail to achieve a globally coherent interpretation of the text per se; establishing a globally coherent message is presumably a prerequisite or corequisite of computing author intent and attitude. There is a yet a third reason to be pessimistic. People do not normally construct author intent and attitude when they observe events and actions in the everyday world, so this cognitive skill is not overlearned through everyday experience.

The status of reader emotions (class 12) is also uncharted. In one sense, reader emotions are reactions of the reader to the text rather than inferences per se. The reader experiences suspense, surprise, fear, curiosity, amusement, and other emotions while reading episodes in the narrative (Brewer & Ohtsuka, 1988; Graesser, Long, & Mio, 1990; Jose & Brewer, 1984). The reader may identify with a character and empathetically experience some semblance of the character's emotions. These reader reactions do not refer directly to the situation model depicted in the story plot so they are not really knowledge-based inferences. In another sense, however, they are inferences that refer to the pragmatic context of the author–message–reader system. Authors write texts to elicit particular reader emotions, readers have these emotions, and readers cognitively acknowledge (consciously or unconsciously) that they are experiencing these manipulated emotions. Readers may experience the appropriate emotion during an episode, with elevated physiological arousal, in a manner carefully crafted by

that they should be having a particular emotion during a particular episode, even though they are not physiologically aroused or in the mind set of experiencing the appropriate emotion. When a reader reads a story for a second or third time, the reader may cognitively infer that an episode is surprising or suspenseful even though the entire story is known and there is no uncertainty about the plot (Gerrig, 1989). Clearly, the phenomenon of reader emotion is complex. For this reason, the constructionist theory does not offer a decisive prediction about its processing status (i.e., on-line vs. off-line).

In summary, the constructionist theory predicts that six classes of inferences are normally generated on-line (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6) and five classes are off-line (7, 8, 9, 10, and 11). These predictions prevail when reading narrative under the default and genre-based reading goals. All things being equal, there should be a higher strength of encoding for the first six classes than for the second five classes. A decisive prediction is not offered for inferences referring to reader emotion (class 12) and to author intent and attitude (class 13).

The significance of these predictions can be appreciated once we consider the predictions of other theories of narrative comprehension. We cover alternative theoretical positions in the next section.

Other Theories of Inference Generation during Narrative Comprehension

In this section, we discuss other theoretical positions that offer predictions about inference generation during narrative text comprehension. It is beyond the scope of this section to present all of the components and assumptions of each theoretical position. Instead, we directly focus on the salient features of each theoretical position and then declare the resulting predictions. In Table 3, we summarize the inference classes that are predicted to be drawn on-line by each theoretical position.

Explicit Textbase

This is a straw-man theoretical position that asserts that no knowledge-based inferences are constructed during comprehension. None of the production rules in Table 2 would exist according to this position. Early psychological theories of discourse processing indirectly endorsed this position to the extent that they focused exclusively on explicit text in the construction of meaning representations. This position is not a serious contender among contemporary discourse-processing theories, but it is an interesting extreme position to consider conceptually.

Minimalist Hypothesis

McKoon and Ratcliff (1989, 1992) recently

le 3: Predictions of on-line inference processing, derived from six theoretical positions

of inference	Explicit text-base	Minimalist hypothesis	Current-state selection strategy	Constructionist theory	Prediction–substantiation model	Promiscuous inference generation
s 1: Referential		×	×	×	×	×
s 2: Case structure role assignment		×	×	×	×	×
s 4: Superordinate goal		×	×	×	×	×
s 5: Thematic			×	×	×	×
s 6: Character emotional reaction				×	×	×
s 7: Causal consequence				×	×	×
s 8: Instantiation of noun category					×	×
s 9: Instrument						×
s 10: Subordinate goal–action						×
s 11: State						×
s 12: Reader emotion						×
s 13: Author intent						×

: × = on-line prediction.

that are encoded automatically during reading are those that are based on easily available information (either from explicit statements in the text or from background world knowledge) and those that are necessary for establishing local coherence. The inferences needed to establish local text coherence are classes 1, 2, and 3 (referential, case structure role assignment, and causal antecedent). Therefore, inferences in classes 1, 2, and 3 are the only inferences that are automatically encoded. McKoon and Ratcliff (1992) did not offer predictions about which inferences are strategically generated on-line. However, they did specify that strategic inferences (a) are more time consuming to construct (greater than 500 ms), (b) are constructed when local coherence cannot be established during the interpretation of a clause, and (c) are not as consistently encoded during comprehension (i.e., there are fluctuations among readers, reader goals, and tasks). These claims permit us to extrapolate some predictions about what inferences are most likely to be constructed on-line after readers have more time to process a given clause. Given that strategic inferences are only probabilistically generated on-line, whereas automatic inferences are consistently generated, then inference classes 1, 2, and 3 should have a higher likelihood of being generated on-line than the other classes of inferences in Table 1. The minimalist position would assume the existence of production rules B and F in Table 2 but not production rules A, C, D, and E. As discussed earlier, it would be essential to tune production rule B more precisely to capture the exact conditions under which causal antecedents are generated according to the minimalist hypothesis.

Current-State Selection Strategy

This is a model of narrative comprehension that specifies various rules for making causal connections between explicit events, actions, and states in STM (Bloom et al., 1990; Fletcher, 1986; Fletcher & Bloom, 1988). The CSS strategy of Fletcher and Bloom (1988) merged a causal network model of narrative representation (Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985) with the STM assumptions of earlier models by Kintsch and his colleagues (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; Miller & Kintsch, 1980). This hybrid model was compared with the earlier, proposition-based, "leading edge" rule of Kintsch and van Dijk (1978). The leading edge rule relies heavily on argument repetition as the main basis for linking propositions. The CSS strategy would assume the existence of production rules A, B, and F in Table 2 but not production rules C, D, and E. Moreover, production rules A and B would be tuned somewhat differently than that of the constructionist theory.

The CSS strategy specifies that causal connections are made between the current clause and a causal antecedent (i.e., an antecedent event, an antecedent state, or a superordinate goal) if the causal antecedent resides in STM. A causal antecedent remains in STM as long as it has no causal consequent. When a connection is made, the causal antecedent is transferred out of STM to LTM. If no causal antecedent can be found for an incoming clause, a local causal coherence break occurs, and a search for a cause is made in LTM.

The CSS

systems, a strategic search for causal coherence occurs at local coherence breaks. However, the kinds of coherence assumed by the two positions are different. For example, referential coherence and argument repetition are critical in the minimalist hypothesis, whereas causal coherence is critical in the CSS strategy. Another difference addresses the generation of superordinate goal inferences. According to the CSS strategy, there must be a failure in establishing a local causal antecedent for global coherence to be achieved through the retrieval of a goal mentioned much earlier in the text. In contrast to the minimalist position, the CSS allows a goal to reside in STM for more than one clause as long as it does not find a consequent. Once the goal is connected, however, it is removed from STM and is retrieved as a cause only when there is a subsequent break in local causal coherence. Breaks in other kinds of local coherence are not relevant to the CSS assumptions.

The CSS strategy predicts that four classes of inferences are generated on-line: referential inferences (class 1), case structure role assignments (class 2), causal antecedents (class 3), and superordinate goals (class 4). Technically speaking, the superordinate goals are generated under limited conditions in the CSS strategy described above. However, Fletcher and Bloom (1988) did have a version of their model that predicted that the superordinate goal inferences are made whenever possible (i.e., the "CSS + Goal" strategy). The original CSS strategy is similar to the minimalist hypothesis in that it emphasizes the achievement of local coherence; it differs from the minimalist hypothesis in that the kind of coherence is causal rather than referential (i.e., argument repetition). The CSS + Goal strategy is similar to the constructionist theory in its emphasis on the formation of causal explanations and its predictions that causal antecedents and goals are constructed on-line. However, the constructionist theory predicts that two additional classes of inferences are constructed on-line to achieve global coherence: thematic inferences (class 5) and the emotional reactions of characters (class 6).

Prediction–Substantiation Model

This model asserts that reading is expectation-driven in addition to explanation-driven. That is, readers generate expectations about future occurrences in the plot, and these expectations guide the interpretation of clauses in a top-down fashion (Bower et al., 1979; DeJong, 1979; Dyer, 1983; Schank & Abelson, 1977). Expectations are formulated whenever higher order knowledge structures are activated, such as a script or a theme. For example, if a story activates a RESTAURANT script and the text mentions that two characters entered a restaurant together, then the reader would form expectations that the characters will eat, talk, and be served food. If a story activates a REVENGE theme and the text specifies that character A hurts character B, then the reader would form the expectation that character B will hurt character A. Expectations are normally formulated at a superordinate abstract level rather than being fleshed out in fine detail. For example, a comprehender might expect that character B will hurt character A but will not generate a fine-tuned expectation of exactly how the

The prediction–substantiation model predicts that seven classes of inferences are generated on-line: referential (class 1), case structure role assignment (class 2), causal antecedent (class 3), superordinate goal (class 4), thematic (class 5), character emotional reaction (class 6), and causal consequence (class 7). Inferences in classes 1, 2, and 3 establish local coherence. Those in classes 3 and 4 explain why actions and events occur. Those in classes 4, 5, and 6 are critical for constructing higher order knowledge structures and establishing global coherence. The inferences in class 7 are expectations about forecasted plots. There is only one discrepancy between the theoretical predictions of the constructionist theory and that of the prediction–substantiation model, namely that of the causal consequence inferences. The prediction–substantiation model would incorporate all of the production rules in Table 2 (A through F) and would add an additional production rule to account for causal consequence inferences.

Promiscuous Inference Generation

This extreme straw-man position predicts that all classes of inferences are generated on-line. Thus, all of the production rules in Table 2 would be adopted, plus many others. It is assumed that the reader builds a complete, lifelike situation model by fleshing out all of the details about the characters, props, spatial layout, setting, actions, events, and so on. The meaning representation would be a high-resolution mental videotape of the narrative, along with exhaustive information about the mental states of the characters and about the pragmatic exchange between the author and reader. No researchers have directly proposed this promiscuous inference generation position. We should point out, nevertheless, that McKoon and Ratcliff (1992) have claimed that a constructionist theory would embrace such a position.

As discussed earlier, each of the classes of inferences in Table 1 could potentially be generated on-line if the experimenter tuned the instructions, task, and materials properly. For example, if the experimenter encouraged the reader to have the goal of constructing the spatial layout of the narrative, then the reader would construct spatial inferences on-line. Of course, it might take a long time to construct these inferences and some readers might give up trying. The critical tests of the constructionist theory and the alternative theoretical positions described in this section perhaps consist of experimental conditions in which the reader is not tuned to the class of inferences under scrutiny. For example, would the reader construct spatial inferences when reading the narrative for understanding, for entertainment, or for the specific goal tracking of the traits of a character? If spatial inferences are constructed when readers have these latter goals, then that would be compelling evidence that spatial inferences are generated on-line; if not, then these spatial inferences are not generated on-line.

More generally, several conditions must be met before there is a fair test of whether an inference class is normally

be sufficient time for the reader to construct the inferences, and (e) the instructions and tasks must not be specially tuned to the inference class under investigation.

Empirical Evidence for the Constructionist Theory

There have been some lively debates over the proper measures and experimental designs that test whether or not a class of inferences is generated on-line (Graesser & Bower, 1990; Keenan, Golding, Potts, Jennings, & Aman, 1990; Magliano & Graesser, 1991; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1989, 1990; Potts et al., 1988; Singer, 1988). However, in this article, we do not dissect the methodological problems with each of the existing measures and tasks. There does not appear to be a perfect measure and task; there are merely trade-offs, with each enjoying some benefits and some shortcomings. The evidence presented in this section is based on empirical studies that have minimal methodological problems. An ideal dependent measure would tap processes that occur during the course of comprehension rather than reconstructive processes well after comprehension is completed; this eliminates recall and summarization tasks in which data are collected after a reader finishes comprehending a text. An ideal dependent measure would track the time-course of various cognitive processes by charting response times. Such measures include self-paced reading times for text segments (e.g., words, clauses, and sentences), gaze durations on words in eye-tracking studies, lexical-decision latencies on test words (i.e., whether a test string is a word or a nonword), naming latencies on test words, latencies to verify whether a test statement is true or false, latencies to decide whether a test segment had been presented earlier (i.e., recognition memory), or speeded recognition judgments under a deadline procedure. Moreover, an ideal experimental design would eliminate or control extraneous variables.

To test whether knowledge-based inferences are generated on-line, it is critical to demonstrate that subjects have a sufficient knowledge base and sufficient information sources to produce the inferences. It would be pointless to test whether readers generate an inference if they do not have the prerequisite world knowledge or if an inference test item (i.e., a word or statement) fails to match any cognitive representation that a reader could manage to construct. There is one, very critical, methodological implication of this note of caution: Experimenters should not generate their own inference test items and assume that the subjects are actually making these inferences, particularly if the experimenter ends up concluding that the inference ckiss is not generated on-line. The experimenter must validate that the inferences could be generated by the designated reader population if the readers had sufficient time to do so.

In light of the above cautionary note, researchers have sometimes collected verbal protocols from readers during comprehension to validate that the readers could potentially generate the inferences under investigation. These verbal protocols are collected while the reader comprehends the text sentence by sentence or clause by clause. In think-aloud tasks, the readers express whatever

Daly, Weber, Vangelisti, Maxwell, & Neel, 1989; Ericsson, 1988; Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Fletcher, 1986; Olson, Duffy, & Mack, 1984; Suh & Trabasso, 1993; Trabasso & Suh, 1993). In question-answering tasks, the readers answer particular questions about each clause, such as why, how, and what-happens-next (Graesser, 1981; Graesser & Clark, 1985). In question-asking tasks, the reader asks questions that come to mind about each sentence (Collins, Brown, & Larkin, 1980; Olson, Duffy, & Mack, 1985). These verbal protocols expose potential knowledge-based inferences. The researcher has some assurance that the inference could be made, that the reader population has the prerequisite world knowledge, and that the inference is expressible in language. The researcher can measure the proportion of subjects who produce the inference at particular points in the text that elicit the inference.

Of course, the fact that an inference is expressed in verbal protocols does not imply that the inferences are normally generated on-line. It is possible that readers adopt unnatural reading strategies when producing the verbal protocols (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Therefore, it is necessary to test the on-line status of candidate inferences by collecting appropriate measures from a separate group of readers who do not supply verbal protocols. Such measures include sentence reading times, gaze durations on words, lexical-decision latencies or naming latencies on test items in a secondary task, latencies in making recognition memory judgments on words or sentences, and so on. Researchers have satisfactorily demonstrated that particular classes of inferences exposed by verbal protocols do in fact predict these on-line temporal measures collected from a different group of readers (Graesser, Haberlandt, & Koizumi, 1987; Long, Golding, & Graesser, 1992; Long & Golding, 1993; Magliano, Baggett, Johnson, & Graesser, 1993; Millis, Morgan, & Graesser, 1990; Olson et al., 1984; Sharkey & Sharkey, 1992; Suh & Trabasso, 1993). These studies have shown that some, but not all, classes of inferences from the verbal protocols are generated on-line. Therefore, theories of inference generation can be tested by coordinating verbal protocol analyses and online temporal measures, as we illustrate later. Magliano and Graesser (1991) have advocated the implementation of a three-pronged method that coordinates (a) the collection of verbal protocols to expose potential inferences, (b) theories of discourse processing that make distinctive predictions about which classes of inferences are generated on-line, and (c) the collection of on-line temporal measures to assess whether a class of inferences is actually made on-line.

At this stage of development, most investigations of inference generation have not used the three-pronged method. It takes considerable effort to collect and analyze the verbal protocols, so most researchers have resisted the temptation to pursue the methodology. However, we believe that the most compelling evidence involves the collection of these protocols to ensure that readers have sufficient knowledge to make these inferences. Once we are satisfied that the readers can make these inferences under unlimited time constraints, we can then collect time-based behavioral measures to investigate the time-course of generating these inferences.

tap on-line processing but did not adopt the three-pronged method. The focus is on inference classes 1 through 4 and 6 through 11 because there are essentially no adequate empirical tests of classes 5, 12, and 13. In the second subsection, we report a study that adopted the three-pronged method to investigate text-connecting inferences during narrative comprehension. As mentioned earlier, these inferences specify how explicit clauses in the text are connected conceptually. In the third subsection, we report studies that used the three-pronged method to investigate extratextual inferences during narrative comprehension. As reported below, the available evidence supports the constructionist theory to a greater extent than the alternative theoretical positions presented in the previous section.

Evidence from Studies that Do not Use the Three-pronged Method

As summarized in Table 3, the constructionist theory predicts that the following five inference classes are generated on-line (under normal comprehension conditions in which the reader is not tuned to generate a particular class of inferences): referential inferences, case structure role assignments, causal antecedents, characters' emotional reactions, and superordinate goals. In fact, there is empirical support for these predictions in studies that have used the time-based behavioral measures described above. Support has accrued in the case of referential inferences (Bever & McElree, 1988; Dell, McKoon, & Ratcliff, 1983; Duffy & Rayner, 1990; Gernsbacher, 1990; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992; O'Brien, Duffy, & Myers, 1986; Sanford & Garrod, 1981), case role assignments (Frazier & Flores d'Arcais, 1989; Just & Carpenter, 1980; Swinney & Osterhout, 1990), causal antecedents (Bloom et al., 1990; Fletcher & Bloom, 1988; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986, 1989; Myers et al., 1987; Potts et al., 1988; Singer, Halldorson, Lear, & Andrusiak, 1992; van den Broek & Lorch, 1993), superordinate goals (Dopkins et al., 1993), and characters' emotional reactions (Gernsbacher, Goldsmith, & Robertson, 1992).

In contrast, the constructionist theory predicts that several classes of "elaborative" inferences in Table 3 are not generated on-line (unless the reader has a specific goal to generate these inferences or the inferences are highly predictable through constraints of multiple information sources): instantiations of a noun category, instruments, causal consequences, subordinate goals/actions, and states. These inferences are not needed to construct a coherent explanation of the explicit actions and events in the narrative, so they have a lower likelihood of being generated on-line. Once again, available empirical studies support the prediction that these classes of elaborative inferences are not constructed on-line. The prediction is supported in the case of instantiations of noun categories (Whitney, 1986), instruments (Corbett & Dosher, 1978; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1981; Singer, 1979, 1980), causal consequences (Bloom et al., 1990; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986, 1989; Potts et al., 1988; Singer & Ferreira, 1983), and states (Seifert, 1990; Seifert, Robertson, & Black, 1985).

The central argument, therefore, is that the constructionist theory predicts the exact subset of inferences that are generated on-line and the conditions under

the alternative theoretical positions: the explicit textbase position, the minimalist hypothesis, the CSS strategy, the prediction–substantiation model, and the promiscuous inference generation position.

There is considerable variability in the amount of empirical evidence available for each class of inference. Therefore, at this point, we identify some of the most solid empirical findings and trace the theoretical implications.

Most of the theoretical positions predict that causal antecedent bridging inferences are generated during comprehension. Indeed, there is substantial support for the prediction (see above citations). For example, in studies by Singer (Singer et al., 1992; Singer, Revlin, & Halldorson, 1990), subjects read sentence pairs such as 1a and 1b below.

1a. Dorothy poured the bucket of water on the bonfire.
1b. The fire went out.

An understanding of this sentence pair requires the recognition that the first event caused the second event. The reader must also know something that, when coupled with the fact that water was poured on the fire, accounts for the fire going out; specifically, the reader fills in a causal antecedent enabling event *water extinguishes fire.* According to Singer's model, the reader initially constructs a mental syllogism with a missing premise (called an *enthymeme*) and then solves the syllogism with the inferred enabling causal antecedent (i.e., the inference). In this case, 1a and the inference are two premises that imply conclusion 1b in the solved constructed syllogism. In a contrast condition, subjects read the sentence pair 2a and 2b.

2a. Dorothy placed the bucket of water by the fire.
2b. The fire went out.

In this case, the inference *water extinguishes fire* is not generated in the explanation. The sentence pairs are causally related in the 1a–1b sequence (the causal condition) but only temporally contiguous in the 2a–2b sequence (the temporal condition).

After subjects read one of the sentence pairs, they were asked to verify the inference by answering the question, "Does water extinguish fire?" They pushed either a "yes" or "no" button as quickly as possible. Of course, the answer to this generic fact should be yes in both conditions. The latencies to answer this question were in the expected direction. Answer time for the test question was faster in the causal condition than in the temporal condition. This result has consistently occurred in a number of studies that Singer and his colleagues have conducted (Singer et al., 1990, 1992). The effect occurs when the sequences are isolated sentence pairs and when the sentence pairs are embedded in text. The effect even occurs when the order of presenting 1a and 1b is reversed. Moreover, the effect cannot be explained by extra priming of the question by the words in 1a of the causal condition because the effect

The consistent finding that causal antecedent inferences are generated on-line is sufficient to eliminate the explicit textbase position but not the alternative theoretical positions. The causal consequence inferences provide a more discriminating test among the theoretical positions. Potts et al. (1988) investigated whether causal antecedent inferences and causal consequence inferences are generated while comprehending short two-sentence excerpts. They collected naming latencies on test words shortly after subjects read the sentences. For example, conside the test word *broke* in the context of the following three texts:

> *Causal antecedent condition.* No longer able to control his anger, the husband threw the delicate porcelain vase against the wall. It cost him well over one hundred dollars to replace the vase.
> *Causal consequence condition.* No longer able to control his anger, the husband threw the delicate porcelain vase against the wall. He had been feeling angry for weeks, but had refused to seek help.
> *Control condition.* In one final attempt to win the delicate porcelain vase, the angry husband threw the ball at the bowling pins that stood against the wall. He had never won anything and was determined not to miss this time.

The inference *the vase broke* is a causal antecedent bridging inference while comprehending the second sentence in the causal antecedent condition; therefore, this inference should be generated on-line. The same inference is a causal consequence of the first sentence of the causal consequence condition; in this case, the status of this inference varies among the theoretical positions. The inference would not be generated in the control condition. The naming latencies in the Potts et al. (1988) study were consistent with the proposal that causal antecedent inferences are generated on-line but not causal consequence inferences. The naming latencies showed the following pattern: causal antecedent < causal consequence = control.

The finding that causal consequence inferences were not generated on-line in this study and several other studies (see earlier citations) eliminates additional theoretical positions. Specifically, the data are not compatible with the predictions of the prediction–substantiation model and the promiscuous inference generation position. We are therefore left with three viable theoretical positions: the constructionist theory, the minimalist hypothesis, and the CSS strategy.

Characters' emotional reactions are generated on-line according to the constructionist theory but not according to the minimalist hypothesis and the CSS strategy (see Table 3). Gernsbacher et al. (1992) investigated these inferences by collecting sentence reading time measures and naming latency measures. Subjects read stories that had explicit concrete actions and events and that triggered emotional inferences. An example story involved a main character stealing money from a store where his best friend worked and later learning that his best friend had been fired. In such a story, the emotion of *guilt* is predicted to be generated on-line according to the constructionist theory. Test words were pre-

The test words were either an appropriate emotion (e.g., *guilt*) or an inappropriate emotion (e.g., *pride*). Gernsbacher et al. (1992) reported that naming latencies were shorter for the appropriate emotions than for the inappropriate emotions. This outcome supports the constructionist theory rather than the minimalist hypothesis and the CSS strategy.

Another test that discriminates the above three theoretical positions involves global inferences that link an incoming explicit statement with information several episodes earlier in the story (i.e., information that is outside of WM). According to the minimalist hypothesis and the CSS strategy, these global inferences are made only when there is a failure in establishing local coherence or causal coherence. However, according to the constructionist theory, these global inferences are generated even when local coherence is intact. The evidence favors the constructionist theory (Dopkins et al., 1993; O'Brien & Albrecht, 1992; Singer. 1993; Suh & Trabasso, 1993; van den Broek & Lorch, 1993). The materials in the study by Singer (1993), for example, are illustrated below.

3a. Valerie left early for the birthday party. (global inference condition)
3a'. Valerie left the birthday party early. (control condition)
3b. She checked the contents of her purse.
3c. She backed out of the driveway.
3d. She headed north on the freeway.
3e. She exited at Antelope Drive.
3f. She spent an hour shopping at the mall.
TEST: Do birthday parties involve presents?

Sentences 3b, 3c, 3d, and 3e intervened between the motivating statement (3a), or the control statement (3a'), and the attempt to prepare for the party by shopping (3f). Statements 3a and 3a' should be deleted from WM by the time 3f is comprehended. It should be noted that both versions were referentially and causally coherent. According to the minimalist hypothesis, 3a should not be inferentially bridged to 3f because they are several sentences apart and local coherence is established; the constructionist theory predicted the two sentences should be inferentially bridged to establish global coherence. The time to subsequently answer the test question supported the constructionist position: The latencies were shorter in the global inference condition than in the control condition. Further support for the constructionist theory was provided by an explicit control condition, in which sentence 3f explicitly referred to the inference (i.e., She spent an hour shopping for a present at the mall). Answer latencies to the test question were similar in the explicit control condition and the global inference condition, indicating that the global inference has a status in the text representation similar to an explicitly stated idea. Once again, readers attempted to achieve global coherence even when mechanisms of local coherence are intact.

A Study of Text-connecting Inferences Using the Three-pronged Approach

A discourse model predicted the points in the text where particular text-connecting inferences would be constructed on-line. Specifically, they were interested in the process of reinstating superordinate goals that were explicitly mentioned earlier in the text. Think-aloud protocols were collected from a group of subjects while they comprehended the stories, sentence by sentence. The content extracted from these verbal protocols confirmed the predicted text-connecting inferences of the discourse model; that is, superordinate goals were reinstated by explicit clauses at predictable text locations. A separate group of readers provided recognition test decisions and latencies for test statements at different points in the text (instead of providing verbal protocols). The patterns of recognition decisions and latencies confirmed the model's predictions regarding the locations in the text where the superordinate goals are reinstated.

In Table 4, we present two versions of an example story that was investigated by these researchers (Suh & Trabasso, 1993; Trabasso & Suh, 1993). In the hierarchical version, Jimmy has a main (superordinate) goal of wanting to buy a bike. Jimmy tries to get his mother to buy the bike, but this strategy fails because she refuses. Later on in the story, after the main goal is presumably no longer in WM, Jimmy tries a second approach to getting the bike by asking for a job, earning money, and purchasing the bike by himself. Many of the actions in the second half of the hierarchical story should reinstate Jimmy's goal of buying a bike (G11; see Table 4). In contrast, this goal should not be reinstated by these actions in the second half of the sequential story version. Jimmy's goal of buying the bike is satisfied early in the sequential version of the story because Jimmy's mother agrees to get the bike for Jimmy.

Both the constructionist theory and the discourse model of Suh and Trabasso (1993) predict that the superordinate goal will be reinstated by particular story actions in the hierarchical version. Reinstatement of this goal supports global coherence. It should be noted that the superordinate goal should be reinstated even though there is no break in local coherence. All of the sentences in both stories are locally coherent by virtue of argument repetition (Halliday & Hasan, 1976; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978): The subject of each sentence after sentence 1 is Jimmy. According to the minimalist hypothesis and the CSS strategy, the global goal inference should not be reinstated because there is no break in local coherence or causal coherence.

One prong of the three-pronged method addresses theory. The theoretical predictions of Suh and Trabasso (1993) were based on a discourse theory that specifies in detail how the content of the stories are organized into causal network structures and how the structures are constructed during comprehension (Trabasso & Suh, 1993; Trabasso & van den Brock, 1985; Trabasso et al., 1989). Each sentence is classified by its role in an episodic structure. That is, it is assigned to one of six main categories: settings (S), events (E), goals (G), attempts (A), outcomes (O), and reactions (R). Settings introduce characters and indicate the spatial-temporal context of the story. Events have an impact on characters and influence goals. Goals are desired and valued states, activities, objects, and resources. Attempts are actions carried out to achieve goals. Outcomes index the

Table 4: Hierarchical and sequential versions of the Jimmy story (Suh & Trabasso, 1993)

Category	Sentence
	Hierarchical version
S11	Once there was a boy named Jimmy.
E11	One day, Jimmy saw his friend Tom riding a new bike.
G11	Jimmy wanted to buy a bike.
A11	Jimmy spoke to his mother.
O11	Jimmy's mother refused to get a bike for him.
R11	Jimmy was very sad.
E21	The next day, Jimmy's mother told him that he should have his own savings.
G21	Jimmy wanted to earn some money.
A21	Jimmy asked for a job at a nearby grocery store.
A22	Jimmy made deliveries for the grocery store.
O21	Jimmy earned a lot of money.
A31	Jimmy went to the department store.
A32	Jimmy walked to the second floor.
O31	Jimmy bought a new bike.
	Sequential version
S11	Once there was a boy named Jimmy.
E11	One day, Jimmy saw his friend Tom riding a new bike.
G11	Jimmy wanted to buy a bike.
A11	Jimmy spoke to his mother.
O11	Jimmy's mother got a bike for him.
R11	Jimmy was very happy.
E21	The next day, Jimmy's mother told him that he should have his own savings.
G21	Jimmy wanted to earn some money.
A21	Jimmy asked for a job at a nearby grocery store.
A22	Jimmy made deliveries for the grocery store.
O21	Jimmy earned a lot of money.
A31	Jimmy went to the department store.
A32	Jimmy walked to the second floor.
O31	Jimmy bought a new basketball.

Note: S = setting; E = event; G = goal; A = attempt; O = outcome; R = reaction. The first number after the letter indicates the episode to which the statement belongs. The second number indicates the cumulative number of times that the statement's category has occurred in that episode. For example, A32 refers to the second attempt in the third episode.

success or failure of a goal being achieved. Reactions are emotions and cognitions that evaluate events and outcomes. The numbers in the lettered subscripts in Table 4 refer to the episode in which the sentence occurs (the first digit) and the ordinal number of a particular category within an episode (the second digit). For example, G21 is the second episode's first goal statement and A32 is the third episode's second attempt statement. Trabasso's discourse theory specifies how the sentences are connected with [illegible]

connections are built on-line during comprehension. The discourse theory predicts that G11 should be causally linked (on-line) to sentences A11, G21, A31, and A32 in the hierarchical version but only to sentence A11 in the sequential version.

Another prong of the three-pronged method states that verbal protocols should be collected to confirm that the theoretically predicted inferences are generated on-line. Suh and Trabasso (1993) collected think-aloud protocols as subjects read the stories sentence by sentence. After a subject read each sentence, the subject told the experimenter what his or her understanding of the story was in the context of the story, no matter how obvious it was to the subject. The protocols were tape recorded and analyzed. The theoretical prediction is that the superordinate goal (G11, Jimmy wanting to buy a bike) should frequently be mentioned when A11, G21, A31, and A32 are comprehended in the hierarchical version and when A11 is comprehended in the sequential version. This prediction was confirmed. The likelihoods of mentioning G11 were 1.00, .92, .58, and .92 for the respective actions in the hierarchical version, and .92, .29, .04, and .17 in the sequential version. The verbal protocols clearly confirmed the predictions of the discourse theory.

The other prong of the three-pronged method states that time-based behavioral measures should be collected to more rigorously assess whether an inference is actually made on-line. Suh and Trabasso (1993) collected recognition decisions and latencies for test items that were interspersed with the sentences during comprehension. Test statements were presented after story sentences, and subjects decided as quickly as possible whether the test statement was presented earlier in the text (by pressing a "yes" or a "no" key). A critical test item was the G11 goal sentence. The recognition latency was expected to be shorter if the reader had reinstated G11 during the comprehension of a story sentence. The results confirmed the predictions of the discourse model. Recognition latencies (in milliseconds) were 973, 986, and 1,084 for the critical test item after A11, G21, and A32, respectively, in the hierarchical version; the corresponding latencies were 980, 1, 123, and 1, 209 in the sequential version. Once again, the significant differences between the hierarchical and sequential versions at positions G21 and A32 would not be predicted by the minimalist hypothesis.

The results of Suh and Trabasso's (1993) application of the three-pronged method are compatible with the constructionist theory. The theory predicts that readers generate superordinate goals during the comprehension of narrative to explain why goals, actions, and events are explicitly mentioned. Thess inferences may either be text-connecting inferences or extratextual inferences. Superordinate goals are generated even when local coherence is intact and when the incoming sentence needs to be linked to a superordinate goal that was mentioned much earlier in the text.

Studies of Extratextual Inferences Using the Three-pronged Method

Graesser and his colleagues have used the three-pronged method to investigate extratextual inferences during the comprehension of short narrative texts (Graesser et al. 1987; Long & Golding, 1993; Long et al. 1992; Long, Golding

Graesser, & Clark, 1990; Magliano et al., 1993) and short expository texts (Millis, 1989; Millis et al., 1990). They focused on five classes of inferences because the status of these classes discriminated among alternative theoretical positions: superordinate goals (class 4), subordinate goals (class 10), causal antecedents (class 3), causal consequences (class 7), and states (class 11). Below, we present an example story and an example inference in each of these five classes:

The Czar and His Daughter

Once there was a Czar who had three lovely daughters. One day the three daughters went walking in the woods. They were enjoying themselves so much that they forgot the time and stayed too long. A dragon kidnapped the three daughters. As they were being dragged off they cried for help. Three heroes heard their cries and set off to rescue the daughters. The heroes came and fought the dragon and rescued the maidens. Then the heroes returned the daughters to their palace. When the Czar heard of the rescue, he rewarded the heroes.
Inferences when comprehending "The dragon kidnapped the daughter":

1. Superordinate goal: The dragon wanted to eat the daughters.
2. Subordinate goal: The dragon grabbed the daughters
3. Causal antecedent: The dragon saw the daughters.
4. Causal consequence: Someone rescued the daughters.
5. State: The dragon has scales.

The first prong of the method addresses theory. The theoretical predictions are summarized in Table 3 and were discussed earlier in this article.

The second prong of the three-pronged method involved the collection of question-answering protocols while readers comprehended the stories clause by clause. After reading each clause (that referred to an action, event, or state), the subjects answered questions about the clause. One group answered a why-question, a second group answered a how-question, and a third group answered a what-happened-next question. The question categories were selected to extract particular types of extratextual inferences. As discussed earlier, research on human question answering has strongly established that why, how, and what-happened-next questions are selective in extracting particular inferences (Graesser & Franklin, 1990; Graesser et al., 1981, 1991; Graesser & Murachver, 1985). Why-questions expose superordinate goals and causal antecedents; how-questions expose subordinate goals/actions and causal antecedent events; what-happened-next questions expose causal consequences. States are exposed by more than one of these question categories and can be distinguished by content.

A *constructive history chart* was prepared for each of the inferences that was elicited by the question-answering protocols. The chart identified which explicit clauses in the text elicited a particular inference, the type of question that elicited it, and the proportion of subjects who articulated the inference in the question-answering protocols. The point in the story where an inference [illegible] was [illegible]

measures tested an inference when it first emerged in the situation model, as manifested in the question-answering protocols.

Whenever Graesser and his colleagues evaluated the on-line status of classes of inferences, they always equilibrated the classes of inference test items on the proportion of subjects who produced the item in the question-answering task (Graesser & Franklin, 1990; Graesser et al., 1981, 1991; Graesser & Murachver, 1985). Inference test items were also equilibrated on a number of extraneous measures, such as word length, word frequency, and word class (i.e., nouns, verbs vs. adjectives).

The third prong of the three-pronged method involved the collection of lexical-decision latencies or naming latencies for test words during the comprehension of the stories. Long et al. (1992) reported a study that adopted the three-pronged methodology to test whether superordinate goal inferences and subordinate action inferences are generated on-line when stories are comprehended. According to the constructionist theory, superordinate goals should be generated on-line because they explain why characters perform intentional actions. In contrast, subordinate actions should not be generated because they do not explain why actions occur, subordinate actions merely elaborate the details about how actions are executed. Long et al. used question-answering protocols to extract a sample of superordinate goals and subordinate actions associated with explicit actions in the text. Why-questions uncovered the suprordinate goals, whereas how-questions uncovered the subordinate actions. The two samples of inferences were equilibrated on a number of extraneous variables, such as production likelihood in the question-answering protocols, word frequency, word length, and word class.

Long et al. (1992) collected word-naming latencies to test whether inference words are generated on-line during comprehension. A test word was presented 500 ms after each sentence in a story was read. The subjects were instructed to say the test word aloud as quickly as possible. The test word was sometimes a word that came from a superordinate goal and sometimes a word from a subordinate goal/action. These items were new inferences constructed for the first time in the story by explicit target actions. There also was a control condition in which the superordinate and subordinate inferences were named in an unrelated passage context. Therefore, an *inference activation score* could be computed for each test word by subtracting the naming latency of the word in the inference context from the naming latency of the word in an unrelated context. This computation of inference activation scores has been used by other researchers who have collected lexical-decision latencies to study inference processing (Kintsch, 1988; Sharkey & Sharkey, 1992; Till, Mross, & Kintsch, 1988). Long et al. (1992) reported significantly higher inference activation scores for superordinate goal words than for subordinate goal/action words (which in turn were essentially zero). Using the same design, Long et al. reported a similar pattern of data when lexical decisions were collected instead of naming latencies. The activation scores showed the following pattern: superordinate goal > subordinate goal/

In another study, Long and Golding (1993) reported that superordinate goals are constructed very quickly (within 750 ms) in the case of fast readers with good comprehension. In contrast, inference activation scores were essentially zero in the case of subordinate goal/actions for all readers and in the case of superordinate goals for readers who are not fast, good comprehenders. Precise control over reading time was accomplished by implementing a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) rate of 250 ms per word. There was precise control over the time-course of inference activation by imposing a short 200-ms stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the final word of the sentence and the test word. The results of these investigations of superordinate and subordinate goals are compatible with the constructionist theory and incompatible with most of the alternative theoretical positions (i.e., explicit textbase position, minimalist hypothesis, and promiscuous inference generation position).

Magliano et al. (1993) tested whether causal antecedent and causal consequence inferences are generated on-line and also determined the time-course of their activation. They manipulated inference category (causal antecedent vs. causal consequence), RSVP rate (250 vs. 400 ms), and SOA interval (250, 400, 600, and 1,200 ms). Lexical-decision latencies were collected on test items after each sentence, following the same procedure as the studies presented above. The results indicated that there was a threshold of 400 ms after stimulus presentation (either RSVP or SOA) before causal antecedents were generated, whereas causal consequence inferences were never generated on-line.

Studies using the three-pronged method have revealed that state inferences are not generated on-line. Long et al. (1990) compared causal antecedent event inferences with state inferences in a study that collected lexical-decision latencies. Latencies were shorter for test words that referred to causal antecedent event inferences than for those referring to state inferences. Graesser et al. (1987) collected word reading times using a moving window method and focused on times for end-of-clause words. It was assumed that inferences are generated primarily at end-of-clause words, following the results of previous research (Haberlandt & Graesser, 1985; Just & Carpenter, 1980; Kintsch & Van Dijk, 1978). Graesser et al. (1987) found that end-of-clause reading times were predicted by the number of new goal inferences and causal antecedent event inferences that were constructed during the comprehension of the clause but not by the number of state inferences.

In summary, Graesser's research on extratextual inferences using the three-pronged method was compatible with the predictions of the constructionist theory and one version of the CSS strategy (i.e., the CSS + Goal strategy). Superordinate goals and causal antecedents are generated on-line, whereas subordinate goals/actions, causal consequences, and states do not tend to be generated on-line. Stated differently, the first two inference classes have substantially higher encoding strengths than do the latter three classes. These results are not consistent with the predictions of the explicit textbase position, the minimalist hypothesis, the original version of the CSS strategy, the prediction–substantiation model, and the promiscuous inference generation position.

Summary of Empirical Findings

This section has presented evidence for the constructionist theory of inference generation and against the alternative theoretical positions. Although most of the available research has been on short texts that do not use the three-pronged method, a few studies have adopted the methodology that coordinates theory, the collection of verbal protocols, and the collection of time-based behavioral measures.

When considering all of the evidence, the constructionist theory is supported by the finding that inference classes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 (see Tables 1 and 3) are normally generated on-line, whereas inference classes 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 do not tend to be on-line. These predictions are not made by the explicit textbase position, the minimalist hypothesis, the CSS strategy, the prediction–substantiation model, and the promiscuous inference generation model. The constructionist theory predicts that the latter five classes (7 through 11) are generated on-line only under two conditions: (a) when the reader has a specific goal to generate these inferences, (b) the inferences are highly predictable by virtue of the constraints imposed by multiple information sources (as specified by assumption 5), or both. Unfortunately, there is no solid evidence one way or another about the status of inference classes 5, 12, and 13. One direction for further research is to examine these inferences in more detail. The constructionist theory also correctly predicts that global inferences are generated on-line even under conditions in which local coherence is intact. In contrast, the minimalist hypothesis and the CSS strategy predict that these inferences are made only when there is a breakdown in local coherence or causal coherence.

In closing, it would appear that the proposed constructionist theory provides the best foundation for predicting and explaining inference generation during the comprehension of narrative text. Readers construct rather rich situation models during the comprehension of narrative. However, it is not the case that the reader constructs a complete lifelike rendition of the story, as if a camera captured all pictorial details in fine detail and a narrator tracked the minds of all of the characters. Instead, a predictable subset of the situation is preserved and another subset never makes it into the meaning representation. The search-after-meaning principle goes a long way in distinguishing what knowledge is in the representation versus what is out.

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29

Space: Irrealis Objects in Technology Policy and Their Role in a New Political Economy

Philip Graham

Outlines of the Problem

> Political economy proceeds from the fact of private property. It does not explain it.
>
> Marx (1844 [1975]: 323)

I am concerned here with analysing how various aspects of actual and potential spaces are being prefigured for commodification and ownership in the language of global technology policy. My motivation for doing so is the widespread talk of an emergent form of political economy, otherwise known as digital capitalism, the knowledge economy, global capitalism and so forth. The new economy is a concept that has been codified in policy throughout the world since the early 1990s, and is therefore endowed with considerable social and symbolic force. As the above quote from Marx indicates, because it is presupposed, the concept of *space* is largely ignored in classical discussions of political economy. For whatever reason, when the subject of space is broached by political economists they tend to reduce it to some aspect of time, such as labour, rent, the circulation of money and goods, the depreciation of machinery and so on. That remains largely the case today.

Even in recent efforts to define the meaning of space in 'the new economy' – for example, in Castells' 'space of flows' – space is reduced to an aspect of social *activity*, of *time*: 'Space is the expression of society'; '*space is crystallized time*'; '*space is the material support of time-sharing social practices*' and so on (1996: ch. 6). But to reduce space to an aspect of time ignores the very significant fact that the foundations of capitalist *and* precapitalist forms of politico-economic organization

are built upon the meaning of finite, *geotechnical* spaces that exist independently of what people do. To be of any economic use, these spaces must be occupied exclusively. Land is the exemplar. The legal, and therefore *linguistic*, redefinition of land in the transition from feudalism formed the basis of private property for capitalism. Any transition to a new economy, if it is truly new, will include a fundamental redefinition of geotechnical space (Marx, 1844 [1975]).

As an idea and a reality, privately owned land has become quite taken for granted. However, we can perhaps grasp the kinds of technical, legal and historical work that have gone into making the *idea* of private property a social *reality* by means of a thought experiment.

> Imagine that you live at sea on a vessel that comfortably contains about 40 or so people. You cannot see land on any horizon. You have never seen it. The currents are such that the vessel drifts at regular intervals within indistinct but recognisable boundaries. The community harvests fish at one time of the year, whales at another, and nutritious seagrasses at another. Rain falls predictably enough so that people have enough water during most years. (Graham, in press a)

Here is the problem: given such a situation, how would you go about imagining and defining the space within which the sea-bound community moves so that it could be broken up into separate subdivisions, which could then be owned by particular individuals?

There are four prerequisites. At the very minimum, you would need technical and legal definitions of the space – legally recognized methods for measuring and dividing the sea-space into ownable portions. Some sort of legal system to regulate the entire area is also necessary. There also needs to be some pre-existing set of time-bound relationships and activities being enacted within the space prior to it being legally subdivided (fishing here, harvesting there, teaching children at these times, etc). Otherwise the sea-space would probably not be perceived as being at all useful, let alone divisible. The community would also need the means to patrol and enforce the boundaries of each and every subdivision, as well as the boundaries of the community as a whole. Otherwise anybody could redefine the space in their own terms, thus dispossessing incumbents of their spaces. These were the preconditions that allowed privately owned land (private property) to become a reality throughout Western Europe over approximately 300 years (Hobsbawm, 1962).

Just as in the transition from feudalism to capitalism, the *meaning* of space is undergoing profound transformations which are being largely ignored, both in policy and in social theory (Graham, in press a). In the transition from feudalism, a change in the meaning of land made capitalism possible. Quite suddenly, land could be owned by individual people. In the current transition, the meaning of electromagnetic spectrum is changing in a very similar way. The problem is essentially one of seeing the electromagnetic spectrum (hereafter 'electromag-

Formally defined geotechnical spaces have different qualities from the more abstract 'social spaces' created by human activity (cf. Bourdieu, 1991), even though they are interdependent aspects of the same 'thing'. We make many different kinds of social spaces by doing what we do. For example, a conversation in a workplace creates many different types of social and symbolic spaces all at once: it creates and maintains *interpersonal* spaces, or meaningful relationships between people; *attitudinal* spaces, or culture-specific value systems; *organizational* spaces, within which social behaviours are regulated; and *ideational* spaces, in which special ways of knowing and representing are actively created and preserved, such as in the physics department of a university (cf. Halliday, 1994; Lemke, 1995; Graham, in press a). Our conceptions of space are tied inseparably to our sociohistorical situatedness. They are a function of the entire web of activities, environments and relationships in which we are embedded.

Geotechnical spaces – like land, sea and air – exist independently of what people do; they *contain and constrain* what we do (we cannot grow potatoes in the ocean); and they share a common aspect under in that they can only be 'occupied' exclusively – two different people, groups, factories or cities cannot occupy the same geotechnical space at the same time. It is simply impossible. The same holds for *electrospace*: a particular frequency cannot be used by different people or organizations at the same time (Smythe, 1981). For the simple reason that electrospace is (at least as far as we know) the only globally continuous space capable of facilitating light-speed exchanges of meaning, it is the space within the dominant institutions of any future global knowledge economy *must* occupy (Graham, in press a). Electrospace and socio-symbolic activity (knowledge work) are the land and labour of the new economy. They are currently being prefigured in the *discourses* of policy for privatization and commodification on a global scale.

To show the central role of language in this process, I proceed by first outlining my approach to the problem. I then show the disjunctions and links between social space and geotechnical space; the fundamental differences in the meaning of these two very different concepts of space; how they are expressed, evaluated or ignored in different types of policy; and the implications that all this has within the context of the current transition in human relations.

A Transdisciplinary Approach for Analysis

The basic theoretical assumptions I make here are that: (i) language is the ultimately coordinating element in human social systems and is thus the critical departure point for any social analysis; (ii) perceptions of value are essentially a function of language; (iii) the perceived *Desirability* of anything is identical to its perceived 'value'; and (iv) the *Desirability* of anything is a sociohistorically specific attribution that requires significant amounts of mediated inculcation in contemporary societies (cf. Lemke, 1998; Graham, 2000, in press b). My perspective synthesizes theoretical and analytical resources from CDA (Fairclough, 1992, 2000; Lemke

1995, 1998; Fairclough and Graham, forthcoming); Marx's critique of classical political economy (1852 [1972], 1844 [1975], 1973, 1976); and critical media theory, specifically the body of literature referred to as 'political economy of communication' (e.g. Innis, 1951; Smythe, 1981; Garnham, 1990; Silverstone, 1999). The synthesis is 'transdisciplinary' in the sense that 'the logic of one theory is put to work in the elaboration of another without the latter being simply reduced to the former' (Fairclough, 2000: 165).

CDA is concerned with analysing language 'as one element of the social process dialectically interconnected with others', specifically to show how 'socio-economic systems are built upon the domination, exploitation, and dehumanization of people by people, and to show how contradictions within these systems constitute a potential for transforming them in progressive and emancipatory directions' (Fairclough and Graham, forthcoming). The links between CDA and political economy are thus quite explicit. Political economy, however, is first concerned with the production of *values* (Marx, 1973).

Any analysis of our current system must comprehend the predominance of *exchange values* – a system of values based on the 'exchangeability of all products, activities and relations with a third, *objective* entity [money PG] which can be reexchanged for everything *without distinction*' (Marx, 1973: 162–3). To develop a conception of our current system 'it is necessary to begin . . . with value, and, precisely, with exchange value in an already developed movement of circulation' (1973: 259).[2] Herein lies a further imperative for – and some difficulties associated with – any sociolinguistic analysis of contemporary political economy.

In any global knowledge economy, conditions must allow meanings to be appropriated, alienated, commodified, evaluated and exchanged *en masse* (Graham, 2000). The current global network of electronic and institutional media (including policy institutions), combined with the international regime of law concerning intellectual property, is the means by which these tasks are to be achieved on a global basis. Commodified artefacts of knowledge work must also *appear* more and less valuable. That is, the comparative values of different ways of knowing must be *qualitatively* established as more and less valuable knowledge commodities; they must be *seen as* more valued modes of knowing (Bourdieu, 1991; Graham, 2000).

Consequently, meaning-making processes in institutions of power are under specific *aesthetic* pressures to conform to technocratic conventions of elegance: presentations of high-value, high-power knowledge must look the part. Such aesthetic pressures are inculcated by institutional processes of mediation, the ultimate aim of which is to promote institutional modes of distinction as legitimate, powerful and valuable. In so far as mediation processes are

> central to this process of making distinctions and judgements; in so far as they do, precisely, mediate the dialectic between the classification that shapes experience and the experience which colours classification, then we must enquire into the consequences of such mediation (Silverstone, 1999: 13–14).

Today, the function of producing the perceived value of specific modes of knowing falls to national and supranational commercial and legislative institutions and, more specifically, to their associated 'mediation processes'. The way in which meaning is moved from 'one text to another, from one discourse to another, from one event to another', and which involves 'the constant transformation of meanings, both large scale and small, significant and insignificant' (Silverstone, 1999: 13).

Media theory assumes that the *means* by which people move and transform meanings between social contexts have social effects. Political economy assumes that the way in which we produce and distribute *values* has social effects. CDA assumes that the way people *language* (meant here as a verb) has social effects. Each facet of the synthesis I propose here is nothing more than a lens through which to view social change from specific *systemic functional* perspectives: from the perspective of mediation systems; from the perspective of *value-production systems*; and from the perspective of *language systems*.

Policy Discourses and Utopian Futures: Space, Time, Language and Values

> The future ain't what it used to be
>
> Yogi Berra

Contemporary policy language poses problems of temporality for discourse analysis because it invariably functions in the future tense. The purpose of policy is hortatory, not historical (Haskins, 1904); it is designed to 'get people to do things' and is therefore always future-oriented (Muntigl, 2000: 147). For millennia, policy-makers have developed many ways to create and promote imperatives for future ways of acting: by the allocation of resources, by legal coercion, by force and by propaganda. In many ways, though, these are the blunt objects of policy. A far more ancient and perennial method of getting people to do things is to prophetically create perceptions of value for new, unexplored and unknowable spaces that exist at a time–distance from the here and now – that is, to create *value* for some imagined future place *and* time (Bernier, 1992).

Whether as 'the next world' described by Plato (de Santillana and von Dechend, 1962); the future 'kingdom of priests and . . . holy nation' of the *Old Testament* (Exodus 19:6, in Küng, 1968 [1995]: 370); the more democratic 'holy nation' promised by the *New Testament* (in Küng, 1968 [1995]: 380–3); the mythical 'El Dorado' upon which the South Sea Bubble was built (Morgan, 1929); or the gold-fields of the 19th century in Australia and California (Marx, 1976), Utopian future spaces – imagined and real – have remained as a feature of political discourses since the beginnings of history (Voltaire, 1764 [1972]). Our official Utopias have been perennial 'places' to aspire to, places where life will be better, where, by 'simply passing on through the inevitable steps proposed by whatever particular ideology is in question, we are promised that we will re-enter Eden at a higher, more sophisticated level. Paradise is the first and last

Today's official Utopia is said to be located in cyberspace, with its high-tech knowledge or information economy. Here is a typical example of how our latest paradise is portrayed in the corpus:

> The information economy opens up new ways of doing every day activities – and it offers huge opportunities to all Australians.
>
> We can all choose to participate at our own pace, in our own time, in our own homes, in a truly global economy, a global society. In the global information economy, no one, no market, no information – nothing we may need or want – is beyond reach. The information economy opens up to us unprecedented convenience, flexibility, and choice about how Australians will live, learn, work, create, buy and sell. (National Office for the Information Economy [noie1: 541])

Many historical parallels could be drawn with the claims made for the techno-Nirvana in this description. But for my analytical purposes, three aspects are of interest.

The first is the *factual* appearance of the language – there are clear truth claims made for the existence of the Utopia, for its limitless bounties and boundaries, and for the general accessibility thereof. There are no explicit exhortations for action here. They are rare in policy. That is because today's policy authors cannot easily *command* constituencies to act in such and such a way, as if by royal decree or divine authority. They are compelled by technocratic convention to rationalize their '*proposals*' for action with seemingly rational statements of fact, or '*propositions*' (cf. Halliday, 1994).[3] A command, a kind of *proposal*, cannot be tested for truth. For example, the command, 'Go to the shop!', is neither true nor false. The commands of contemporary policy are often implied in, disguised as, or buried under piles of ostensibly value-free, objective, pseudo-scientific facts (Lemke, 1995). Nonetheless, the facts of policy are unquestionably oriented towards changing the future behaviours and attitudes of whole societies. The displacement between the *propositions* of technology policy and the *proposals* thereof, between statements of fact and imperatives for action, is usually operationalized by drawing on evaluative themes which must usually be inferred intertextually from outside the texts themselves (Graham, in press b). Evaluative themes get condensed with the thematic condensations typical of the policy genre because

> what is a proposition at one point in a text readily becomes 'condensed'... as a participant at another, and participants (especially abstract nominals) are often meant to be correspondingly 'expanded' by the reader into implied propositions through reference to some known intertext, as well as through reference to the immediate co-text. (Lemke, 1998: 43)

Thus, when readers expand thematic condensations, the evaluative, or 'orientational' dimension of meaning, which is inseparable from 'presentational'

The second aspect of interest is the *tense* of the truth statements. They appear to be set in the here-and-now. However, as I will show in the following analyses, by deploying *process metaphor* and by exercising the *potentiality* embedded in certain nominals, such as *opportunities*, policy authors strenuously, though almost invisibly, exercise the tense system to portray future and imagined states as if they actually existed in the here-and-now.

The third aspect of analytical salience is that the Utopia is presented as an extremely *Desirable*, and thus *valuable*, place. These three aspects constitute the main lines of analysis along which I show how social and geotechnical spaces, both actual and potential, are being prefigured in policy discourses to form the foundations of a new political economic form. In what follows, I identify and demonstrate the salience of *process metaphor*, the difference between how *realis* (actual) and *irrealis* (potential) spaces are expressed in policy, and my method for analysing evaluative meanings. I show how these aspects of language are helpful for analysing the way new economy discourses colonize and prefigure currently existing social and geotechnical spaces in order to commodify the most intimate aspects of human activity.

Analysis

Process Metaphor as Method

Halliday (1994: 109–43) identifies six broad categories of processes (or *verbs* in latinate grammar): *material processes*, or 'processes of doing', such as *hit, kick, push; mental processes*, or 'processes of sensing', such as *think, dream, see, hear; relational processes*, or processes that taxonomize, identify or assign attributes to elements in language, such as x *has* [y attributes], x *was/is/will be* [a kind of y], x *is* y*; behavioural processes* that refer to 'typically human' behaviours, such as *cough, laugh, shiver, shit; verbal processes*, or 'processes of saying', such as *said, promise, exhort, mean*; and *existential processes*, or those that claim actual or potential existence for something. Halliday's functional typology distinguishes between processes that relate to 'antithetical' but overlapping 'worlds' of human experience: 'the abstract world of relations' (being); 'the world of consciousness' (sensing); and 'the physical world' (doing) (1994: 108).

But, *process metaphor* allows participants in language to act simultaneously throughout these antithetical realms of human experience. The term *process metaphor* should not be understood here as the term metaphor is generally understood.[4] It is, rather, a form of 'grammatical metaphor' (1994: 342–9). In process metaphor, the process retains its grammatical standing *as* a process, but functions very differently according to Halliday's experiential taxonomy. It can imply action *throughout the whole of human experience all at once.* Here is a typical example from the corpus:

[1] The transition to a knowledge economy and society over the next few decades

In text [1], the phrasal verb *opens up* appears to function as a *material* process, a singular *doing* (Halliday, 1994). In the case of a more 'concrete' construal, one that might be deployed in more 'common-sense' context, such as *George **opens up** the shop*, the singular materiality of the process is clear (Martin, 1999). However, the process relates two highly condensed, extremely abstract nominal groups that compress myriad, complex and massive processes into static things. [*The transition to a knowledge economy and society over the next few decades* and *the possibility of massive productivity gains*.] Furthermore, there are temporally 'loaded' objects in both nominal groups related by the process.

In the first, there is a circumstantial element [*over the next few decades*], which confuses the temporality of the whole clause. In the second, there is a temporally loaded object functioning as head of the nominal group: *the possibility*. . . . The frozen temporal elements shift the apparent materiality and present-ness of the process [*opens up*] to different levels of abstraction across *time and space* [the countries of the OECD are moving *to a knowledge economy and society over* a non-specific period]. The effect is to free the process up, as it were, so that it operates semantically *across all the realms of human experience*, and not necessarily in any material sense at all. In fact, the phenomena to which the process refers need not even exist – now, or in future. In the policy genre, process metaphor is a deceptively powerful tool for construing future human *activity (time)* as a pseudo-spatial, fact-like *object* (*a space*).

We can see the rather surprising metaphorical scope of *opens up* in [1] by substituting other processes that retain the semantic sense of the OECD's proposition: *The transition to a knowledge economy and society over the next few decades* [*opens up*; promises; offers; brings; creates; reveals; shows; presents; indicates; implies; signifies; suggests] *the possibility of massive productivity gains*. But in a more concrete construal involving the same phrasal verb, there appears to be only one other choice that can retain a similar semantic sense: *George* [*opens up*, opens] *the shop*. Within the choices that retain the original semantic sense of the proposition in [1], we see that they would occupy positions on the *verbal* [promises, suggests]; *abstract-material* [offers]; *relational* [indicates, shows = *symbolizes*]; and *material* [creates, brings] planes of Halliday's process typology. In other words, process metaphor lets an abstract and highly compressed nominal group actor-like thing [*The transition to a knowledge economy and society over the next few decades*] grammatically loose among practically *all* the realms of human experience – the conscious, the sensate, the physical *and* the logical – by having for its object an irrealis, highly compressed nominal group.

Realis and Irrealis Spaces

My analysis distinguishes primarily between two distinct types of space *realis* and *irrealis*. The significance of process metaphor in policy language is that it operates officially in the subjunctive in order to regulate behaviour across 'large stretches of institutional time and space. It achieves this, first, by orienting [illegible] actions to[illegible]

that helps distinguish between past, present and future states is most usually expressed in redundancies between tense, mood and modality systems (Iedema, 1998), the functional power of *process metaphor* turns on the actuality⇔potentiality circumstance being embedded in the object to which the process is directed, whether the potentiality is realized literally, as in the words *possibility* and *opportunity*, or whether it is buried in the highly compressed nominal groups are typical of the policy genre. Herein lies the *aesthetic* ruse of process metaphor: when deployed, representations of *irrealis* states look like (are presented *as if* they were) *material action* in the here and now, as actually existing matters of fact.

Brief Notes on Evaluative Meaning and Annotation

Because they are so condensed, enormous amounts of evaluative detail can be unpacked from policy texts (Graham, in press b). However, rather than paying detailed attention to 'appraisal' resources that inscribe or evoke evaluations for particular elements in the discourses (Martin, 2000), or to the relationship between the 'predication and propagation' of values in the text (Graham, in press b), I use an adaptation of the broad categories described by Lemke (1998; see Figure 1) to describe explicit, implicit and propagated (intertextually generated) evaluations wherever necessary. My reasons for choosing a less detailed evaluative analysis are twofold: (i) to concentrate on the historically significant political economic aspects of the phenomenon I describe; and (ii) to highlight the role of process metaphor, which can conflate practically the whole spectrum of evaluative semantics into a single process, and greatly assist in the displacement between propositions and proposals.

Annotations Where 'evaluative condensation' is overt or implied, that is, when a Process, Participant or Circumstance collapses a pre-evaluated proposition that can be expanded into Lemke's rank shifted probe, *it is . . . x that*, I have underlined the evaluator concerned using broken lines and marked it with the evaluative dimension(s) condensed therein ([D] = *Desirability*, and so forth (see Figure 1). Process metaphors, their associated irrealis objects, and their spatial elaborations, are marked in **bold**. Where agency is attributed to the spaces being *opened up*, the Actor is underlined. Examples from the corpus quoted here are identified by file name and concordance word numbers (see Appendix 1 for a list of corpus documents cited).

The generic tendency in policy towards Necessity As I have noted above, although the 'presentational' content of policy texts is overwhelmingly propositional, the evaluative and intertextual ('orientational' and 'organizational') dimensions do most of the work in generating imperatives for action (cf. Lemke, 1995: 42). In more common-sense contexts, the hortatory function of language, which is the *essence* of the policy genre, is not usually expressed in factual assertions. The evaluative dimension of factuality is most usually expressed in positive, high-degree evaluations for *Probability* or *Warrantability*. But, in the policy genre, there is a great deal of 'metaphorical transfer *among* the evaluative semantic dimen-

Evaluative Dimension	Positive degree	Negative degree
[D] Desirability/Inclination	It is *wonderful* that John is coming	It is *horrible* that John is coming
[W] Warrantability/Probability	It is *certain* that John is coming	It is *unlikely* that John will come
[N] Normativity/Appropriateness	It is *essential* that John comes	It is *inappropriate* that John comes
[U] Usuality/Expectability	It is *normal* that John is coming	It is *unusual* that John is coming
[I] Importance/Significance	It is *important* that John comes	It is *irrelevant* whether John comes
[C] Comprehensibility/Obviousness	It is *obvious* that John will come	It is *mysterious* that John is coming
[H] Humorousness/Seriousness	It is *hilarious* that John will be there	It is *serious* that John is coming
[A] Ability /Difficulty [proposals]	It is *easy* for John to come	It is *difficult* for John to come
[Ut] Utility /Usefulness [proposals]	It is *useful* for John to come	It is *useless* for John to come

Figure 1: Evaluative resources for proposals and propositions (adapted from Lemke, 1998: 37)

1998: 47). The general result of metaphorical evaluative transfers in the policy genre is to create evaluations for high degrees of *Necessity*, which is almost invariably transferred – quite directly – from high degrees of *Importance*, and intertextually from expressions of high degrees of *Desirability* for given outcomes (Graham, in press b). Policy authors achieve this metaphorical feat by making evaluative themes extremely abstract and condensed; by nominalizing explicit evaluators and appraisal resources and casting them as agent-like things; by removing human agency from the texts; and by confusing temporality and tense in textual devices like process metaphor. The expectations created by the function of the policy genre also add impetus to metaphorical transfers.

The effect of evaluative transfers from claims for *Warrantability*, typical of technocratic propositions, to the implied *Necessity* for certain actions can be seen in the following example:

> [2] A great deal of effort **must be put into securing** [W:N:I:C] widespread public acceptance and actual use of the new technology [D]. Preparing Europeans for the advent of the information society **is** [W] a priority [I] task. Education, training and promotion **will necessarily** [W] **play a central role.** (eu3: 1, 525)

In [2] we see a highly modality truth claim being made for an imperative for effort on someone's part which ***must be put into*** *securing widespread public acceptance and actual use of the new technology*, the *Desirability* of which is presupposed. If we were to expand [1]

processes: the statement might sensibly be expanded as *it is very Important/ Obvious/True/Necessary that effort must be put into securing...* An evaluation for *Truth* can be construed because, as is typical of the genre, the whole text is agent-less. Even where we are told that something *must* or *should be done*, we are not told by whom (cf. Lemke, 1995; McKenna and Graham, 2000).

Describing the *Necessity* for agentless, nominalized action allows the exhortation to pose as a fact. After the proposal for action by unnamed Agents, we are given an explicitly evaluative (axiological) justification for the proposition, which is also cast as a statement of fact: *Preparing Europeans for the advent of the information society is a priority task.* Here we see how evaluations for *Importance* become translated *directly* into *Necessity* in the policy genre. In more commonsense contexts, *Necessity* is usually expressed as a high-degree of *Normativity* or *Obligation* (cf. Lemke, 1998; Martin, 2000). Translated into Lamke's (1998) rankshifted probe, the proposition says: it is very Important that someone prepares *Europeans for the advent of the information age.* Seen from the generic function of regulating behaviour, however, it says: it is very *Necessary* that someone prepares *Europeans for the advent of the information age*, i.e. that someone *must* prepare Europeans. We are not told why it is *Important* that Europeans are prepared, or who *must* do the preparing.

What we do see, though, is the relationship between an *irrealis* object [*the advent of the information society*], evaluative meaning tending to transfer metaphorically from *Importance* to *Necessity*, and the smuggling in of a second exhortation by what seems like a relational proposition: *Preparing Europeans* <Tok> *is a priority task* <Val>. Thus *education, training and promotion will* necessarily *play a central role* in the new economy. The 'is-ness' of the Tok ^ Val construction gets transferred by the 'must-ness' of the previous statement, and by the *Importance* intertextually embedded in *priority task* towards an even stronger evaluation of *Necessity* for future action upon the *education, training and propaganda* systems of Europe.

Opening Up Future Spaces: Gold Fever and Bubble Blowers in the New Economy

Being concerned with the subject of irrealis spaces, the first part of my analysis is centred on the process metaphorical usage in policy of the phrasal verb, *open up* and its various forms. In the corpus, 'open/s/ed/ing up' collocates with the irrealis objects, *possibility/ies* and *opportunity/ies.*[5] The *possibilities* and *opportunities* opening up are overtly spatial in their constitution. They are presented metaphorically as the spatial aspects of *irrealis* states; as the result of future ways of being, seeing, and *enacting* new spaces (cf. Fairclough, 2000).

Something on the value differentials between *possibilities* and *opportunities* is in order. *Possibilities* may be positive or negative potentialities in terms of *Desirability*, one of the broadest (or at least most highly elaborated) 'species' of value in the English language (cf. Lemke, 1998; Graham, in press b). Possibilities may be evaluated as *Desirable* or *un-Desirable* to varying degrees. *Opportunities*, however, are already pre-evaluated potentialities. They are positively evaluated for *Desirability*: *Opportunities* are always *Desirable* potential realities for *someone* and

moved from potentiality (*irrealis*) to actuality (*realis*). These broadest of evaluative orientations are expressed implicitly and explicitly in the data. Following, for example, is an explicit recognition that possibilities may be *Desirable* or *un-Desirable:*

> [3] As with other technologies that have become intrinsic [N] parts of everyday [U] life like the automobile, different [U:N] physical, social and economic configurations may prevail in distinctive [U] societies with particular [U] traditions, values and political preferences. The Net is no different, it **opens up possibilities, from the ominous** [-D] **to the utopian** [+D], for facilitating the development of new [+D] or the consolidation of old [-D] **social orders.** (oecd6: 2, 656)

Opportunities, however, are unquestionably *Desirable* potentialities, even if those potentialities are not available, or their *Desirability* not *Obvious,* to all:

> [4] However, an element of the population is likely to remain excluded [-D] from the **opportunities opened up** by e-commerce for a range of social and economic reasons.
>
> Whilst a number of publicly-funded initiatives, at **local, regional and national level, aim to improve** [+D] the **opportunities** for this 'e-excluded' group, the Team believes that better [+D] co-ordination of these initiatives is needed [N] – with resources targeted at the most effective [+D] programmes – which **must also be** effectively **marketed** [+N:I]. (uk_eva~2: 32, 909)

In [4] we see the interrelatedness between evaluations of *Desirability* and *Importance* for realizing *opportunities.* The hortatory function of policy is again expressed in *Necessity: initiatives* are required to *improve opportunities* and these *initiatives must be effectively marketed.* There is also a subtle reference to *degrees of Desirability* where *opportunities* are concerned; for some, namely this *'e-excluded' group, opportunities* can be *improved.* That is, they must be made to appear more *Obviously Desirable* than they currently are. Thus, the express need to improve the *opportunities* by means of *marketing* specific *programmes* also implies that this *e-excluded* group lacks the *Ability* to see *opportunities.* Evaluative force is propagated for the *Necessity* of making sure everybody can at least *recognize* opportunity spaces in the new economy, at *local, regional and national levels.*

Language and the Preconditions for Space in Political Economy

As I said above, there are four preconditions for the development and formalization of new spaces of politico-economic significance. In the following sections, I show that these are indeed present in new economy policies. The first aspect is the creation of new geotechnical spaces, but this is the least elaborated aspect of space in the corpus. The second is the pre-existence of informal relations in that space and is the main focus of the corpus. The third is a legal infrastructure for formalizing human relationships. The fourth is the means to patrol, police and defend [illegible]

with 'air, land, and sea', as a 'battlespace', thus committing the world's most expensive and destructive war machine to patrolling and policing the boundaries of electrospace (Brewin, 1998). Further, this analysis is literally an analysis of texts produced within already existing, globally linked, law-producing systems. Therefore, I firstly focus on the activity spaces – the informal relationships – that are being prefigured for formalization in the new economy before moving on to identify the very different way in which electrospace is being prefigured in language for privatization.

Road Rules on the Way to Utopia: Regulating Activity Spaces

The new economy is most often construed as a space created by ways of doing things, which is merely to say that it is *technologically contrived* space, because, 'broadly speaking, technology is *how* we do things' (White, 1940: 15):

> [5] The information economy **opens up new** [D] **ways** of communicating with each other and doing every day [U] activities – and it **offers huge** [I] **opportunities** to all Australians.
>
> [. . .]
>
> And it no longer matters **how far away we are** from each other, because **it takes no time to get there.** This is the information society. (cital: 635)

In other words, the future *activity space* with its *huge opportunities* is created by commodifying *time* between people via *the production of speed*, the direct result of which is to *destroy* time between people (Armitage and Graham, 2001). In fact this statement says that the space between people is where *huge opportunities* lie, as they must in any process of mediation (Silverstone, 1999). These *new ways* of doing things (the very definition of new technologies) are paths to the promised land. Throughout the corpus, there are positive evaluations of *Desirability* for *new*-ness, 'traditional', or 'old', ways of doing things are 'barriers' to progress.

In any case, the Utopia is a space of new activities into which specific institutions are firstly *moving*:

> [6] Telecommunications companies . . . **are moving into e-commerce and application development** and finding new value [+D]. They **are moving more into** Internet Protocols and data transmission. This **is opening up** a whole lot of new **opportunities** for them . . . **in this new environment** that can mean developing software. (ausbey~I: 40, 801)

Here are direct and explicit links between what people do, the *new environment* created by doing old activities in *new ways*, and the perceptions of value that accompanies the creation of new activity spaces. People will find *new value* there.

New Views and New Ways: Discourses of Seeing, Being and Acting

construed in video-geographical terms, as new spaces that would be seen more concretely: *vistas, horizons, perspectives* and so on:

> [7] In the future, the main [I] **possibilities** for manufacturers, whose **horizons** for the moment remain primarily European [-D], will be linked to **the expected opening up of the American market** . . . . (fr3: 16, 736)

In [7], the process metaphor is nominalized and rendered part of a projected nominal group organized around a disembodied expectation. The strategic advantage of nominalizing the process metaphor here is to submerge an admission of subordinate dependency. Future *possibilities* for French *manufacturers*, whose *horizons* are currently limited (an implicitly un-Desirable state in a global economy), *will be linked to expectations* of an irrealis space *opening up.*

The manufacturers' *main possibilities* are linked to an *expected opening up,* (another set of *possibilities*) which are shifted towards higher *Probability* by being *expected* by nobody in particular. Put differently, [7] says: *manufacturers' future opportunities depend on whether the American market opens up;* that is, whether it is 'liberalized' or 'deregulated'. Here is where the admission of dependency comes to the surface. To be realized as overt process metaphor, this construal would have to read something like *the expected liberalization* (i.e. opening up; deregulation) *of the American market* ***will/would open up*** *the main possibilities for manufacturers* . . . .

New *horizons* and new *vistas* go together, but the vistas opened up by the *power of tomorrow's communication technology* are *vistas* on the most intimate aspects of social interaction, and on the bodies and minds of the people who constitute these:

> [8] . . . the power of tomorrow's information technologies **will open up new vistas** by radically improving the capacity [D] to communicate and simulate. . . . Once liberated [D] from some of **the constraints of cost, time and space** of traditional [-D:+U] education, learning systems that encourage individual creativity [+D:-U] may take over.
>
> Biotechnology **will open up new vistas.** The identification of genetic information and applications of genetic engineering are already making their mark in society and will profoundly [I] affect many facets of everyday life [U] in the future. Human health, food production (both livestock and plants) and food processing are all likely to be influenced by advances [D] **at the interface of genetics and technology.**
>
> Work is already well under way on the human genome; by 2005, at the latest, scientists should know the full DNA sequence of **a** typical [U:N] **man or woman.** (oecd7:1,164)

There is clearly a colonizing imperative in all of this. Opening up and securing new *vistas* is *Desirable, Important* and therefore *Necessary.* The spaces are of the most intimate kinds. *Cost, time and space* are *un-Desirable constraints* that will be cast off to enable new kinds of *education.* Once again, the destruction of *time and space* between people makes room for qualitatively new spaces. The map of the *human genome should be* complete shortly, and the sequencing of *a typical man*

skin, eyes, hair and teeth be? What will they look like? How would they smell? Who will decide what are *Normal* and *Usual* physical and intellectual traits? If 'typical' men and women are part of *the new vistas* that *biotechnology will open up*, one might well wonder what the authors' meaning of *individual creativity* in education might be.

Legal Spaces

The geographical metaphors of *trails* and *paths* provide the nexus between social activity and its legal regulation. In the following [9], legal expertise and legal language are the means by which *new paths can and must be put forward*, another geographical feature of the future space of political economic activities:

> [9] France has a meaningful [I] voice to be heard in this respect, which should amount to more than [N:I] just exporting its 'model' of data protection; given the country's experience [N] in these matters, France **must and can put forward** propositions that **open up new paths.** (fr2: 14, 231)

It is legal *propositions that open up new paths*. New legal *trails* are being blazed in France, ones of a very specific nature and orientation:

> [10] The current positive law covering communications would not be capable [A] of serving as a basis for the entire analysis relating to criminal liability. The first cases brought before the courts **open up certain trails** which confirm that inspiration can be drawn from foreign examples. It then becomes appropriate [N] to formulate recommendations which are based both on a clarification of the relevant [N:Ut] rules and recognition of the role [I] of a joint regulatory body. (fr2: 64, 483)

The laws are concerned with intellectual property, with the ownership of the products of people's minds, mouths and relationships. 'How does one become an owner of productive stock? How does one become owner of the product created by means of this stock? Through *positive law*' (Marx, 1844 [1975]: 295). The legal definition of existing social relations is perhaps the most significant aspect of any transition in human social relations. It is the means by which formal feudalism (vassalage and fiefdom) and capitalism came to be (Bloch, 1940 [1961]; Hobsbawm, 1962). The mere mention of a knowledge economy implies new commodity forms and property laws, which depend on the codification of new types of *property*. New *positive law* is needed to own the new kinds of formally defined products of labour, products of everyday human interaction.

(De)Regulation, Information and Infrastructure

There is a great deal of causal circularity in the corpus where *regulation* and *liberalization* are concerned. The circularity is typical of the genre (McKenna and Graham, 2000). For instance:

[11] The gradual **opening up** of the telecommunications market **is leading to** profound [I] changes in the structure of this sector of activity and considerably speeding up its growth [D:I]. (fr3: 17, 819)

In other words, in [11], *the gradual opening up* of the infrastructure *market* is causing *changes in the structure of the sector* as well as *speeding up its growth.* Liberalization is *prima causa,* not an effect of regulation. But the European Commission (EC) says that:

[12.1] Provided the necessary safeguards are in place, **opening up** infrastructure provision **will underpin** the further development of the telecommunications sector, and this development is necessarily **at the heart of the transition towards the Information Society in the European Union.**

[12.2] Liberalisation of infrastructure will reinforce the benefits [D] of the liberalisation of telecommunications services by encouraging innovation and the exploitation of the new technologies, and by **opening up** greater [I] **possibilities** to provide new services in **new ways** [D]. A clear regulatory framework and timetable is required [N] [. . .].

[12.3] In the longer term and as integrated or multimedia services and applications develop, a regulatory framework will be required [N] that addresses the issue of **convergence between telecommunications and broadcasting.** It is already possible technically to use communications infrastructure from each of these domains to provide services in either area.

[12.4] **The development of the Information Society** and of the new integrated applications will make it increasingly difficult, to distinguish [A:0] between the **two service areas. Opening up** infrastructure provision is an essential [N] step for **the future development of the telecommunications sector and the Information Society,** and this document puts forward the measures and principles that are required [N] at a Union level to provide the necessary regulatory framework. (eugpv16c: 45, 542)

In [12], we see the confusion of causal circularity fully blown in which regulation and deregulation are concerned: *provided safeguards* (regulations) *are in place, opening up* (deregulating) *infrastructure provision* will *underpin* further growth of the *telecommunications sector.* This in turn will lead to Europe's transition to an *Information Society.* A dichotomy is established between the space of communication 'pipes', or *infrastructure,* for telecommunication and the *services* that are sold 'through' the pipes.

According to the EC, *the liberalization of telecommunications services* is exceeding that of 'pipe'-space provision. So Europe needs both *liberalization of infrastructure* as well as *liberalization of services.* But *liberalization* [deregulation] requires *a clear regulatory framework* [set of regulations]. But the processes of regulation and deregulation will necessarily get further confused because the services and infrastructure of *telecommunications* are getting confused with those of broadcasting. To add to the confusion, *the development of the Information Society* will make it more *difficult* to tell the difference between telecommunications infrastructure and broadcasting. So even more regulation will be required for continuing

This is a schizophrenic worldview given the appearance of sanity by the process metaphorical deployment of the *greater possibilities* that are *opening up* in paragraph [12.2]. Evaluations for the *Necessity* of new *regulations* appear as the result of *Necessary deregulation*, or *liberalization: deregulation of infrastructure* is necessary to *open up* the *possibilities of the Information Society*. Safeguards are *necessary*; regulation is *required; opening up infrastructure provision* is *essential*. Nobody is doing the *needing* and *requiring*. All this *Necessity* for regulatory action is predicated upon the *Desirability, Inevitability* and *Importance* of the *Information Society*, which, according to text [12], does not yet exist, except as a space of *greater possibilities*.

Market Spaces

The most common irrealis spaces which are to be opened up in the corpus are market spaces:

> [13] <Heading> Internet **opens up** global **markets**
>
> **The market** must lead. The government's first job is to remove **obstacles**, and **champion** [D:I] **the way ahead**.
>
> <Heading> Setting out **a vision and a clear direction**
>
> Where government intervenes, the results must **progress us towards** becoming a knowledge-driven economy [D:I]. We must have a sense of urgency. [N]. We've won against the odds before . . . we can again [U:D].
>
> Throughout our history, New Zealanders have shown a remarkable ability [A] to respond in a positive way to world events [D]. Just as the first shipment of refrigerated meat aboard the SS Dunedin in February 1882 **opened up new overseas markets** for our primary products, so the Internet **opens up new markets** for our knowledge exports. These include such products as software, technology, education, film, television, Web design, telecommunications, financial services, call centres and others, all of which can **travel down** the information **superhighways** to **the world at the speed of light**. (nzknow~1:17, 456)

The authors claim that the *Internet opens up global markets*. While *open up* does not function overtly as process metaphor in this text [13], the metaphorical function is buried in the relations over a stretch of text much longer than any single clause. The phenomenon is worth investigating.

All the spatial objects [markets] that are being *opened up* appear to be past or present actualities. Semantic probing reveals that the authors seem to mean that the Internet *clears the way to; exposes; gives access to markets*; and so on, all of which are realizations on the abstract-material plane. Nevertheless, the authors are clearly concerned with a new territory of opportunities that is *irrealis*. The literary metaphor of the heroic, pioneering trailblazer is deployed to portray the government's role: *to remove obstacles, and champion the way ahead*. Within the first two sentences, the New Zealand propositions become either circular or redundant because of two very different meanings for *markets* and *market*. The *Internet opens*

means a space defined by the activities of producing, buying and selling commodities. The second, in which the *market must lead*, refers to *market* logic, principles and values.

The comparison between 'the new' economy and 'the old' highlights the process metaphor and raises some interesting questions about the nature of *market spaces*. If, as the report claims, a *shipment of refrigerated meat opened up new overseas markets* as early as 1882, then the authors are not concerned with the existence of new *geographical* markets, as none have been 'created' for many decades. Not even the most confused technocrat could buy literally into the assertion that *a shipment of meat opened up markets*. Here is where the process metaphorical function becomes clearer. It has been buried under piles of extremely condensed, ultimately nonsensical propositions.

The *refrigerated meat* did not depart all by itself from New Zealand in search of foreign lands to *open up new markets*; it merely *signified* the existence of new markets, or, more precisely: (i) the newly acquired *Ability* that some New Zealanders developed to keep their products fresh during long sea voyages: the medium of refrigerated ships; (ii) the pre-existence of *Normative* commercial and legal relationships between New Zealand institutions and those in other countries that made trading shiploads of meat practical and legal; (iii) the conditions that made New Zealand's refrigerated meat a *Desirable* commodity for people in other countries; and (iv) the ability of New Zealand farmers to produce enough meat to establish practical commercial and legal relationships throughout the world. Thus, the use of *opened up* here collapses all sorts of Participants, Circumstances, Relationships, Activities, Processes, Evaluations and other abstractions in the strange clause that claims *refrigerated meat opened up new markets*.

Extreme expressions of neoliberal dogma are possible when expectations of the irrealis are overlaid on present states according to neoliberal 'competitive market' dogmas:

> [14] With the advent of information and communication technologies, **the vision** of perfect [D] competition **is becoming a reality**. Consumers can now find out the prices offered by all vendors for any product [D]. **New markets have opened up**, and prices have dropped [D]. When businesses can **deliver** their products **down** a phone line **anywhere, in the world**, twenty four hours a day, the advantage goes to the firm that has the greatest value addition [D:I] the best known brand [D:I], and the lowest 'weight' [D:I]. Software provides the best example: huge added value [D:I] through computer code, light 'weight' [D:I] so that it can be delivered anywhere at any time [D:I]. (nzknow~1:3, 920)

In [14] we see at least one reason why the market space of the new economy is construed so reverently in technocratic policy statements. Contemporary economics is well known for its lack of ability to cope with the unpredictable muck of reality, partly because of an over-reliance on the assumption that all Participants in markets can have perfect information about prices and products (Saul, 1997). So by creating perfect information throughout the whole of human-

If nothing else, this is an interesting comment on the problem of space in contemporary economic thinking. Space between people causes problems because information about products and prices travels very slowly from place to place, if at all (most people in Australia will not know the price of rugs today in, say, a particular shop in Iraq). Thus, in the minds of these policy authors, when space has no meaning, which is to say, when the time–distance *between* people and their exchanges is reduced to zero, then reality will fit the ideal of *aspatial* econometric theories. But at the same time, new market spaces will be created. Once again, we see the *Desirability* of *destroying* one aspect of space through the production of speed in order to create another qualitatively different space that is *purely commercial.*

The process metaphor is again less obvious in [14], partly because of its past tense (*have opened up*), partly because it is agentless, and, partly because of the level of abstraction in the single Participant, *new markets.* Markets are activity spaces, mass activities involving many People, Processes and Things. There are many different kinds of markets: labour markets, financial markets, software markets and so on. We are left unsure as to which *new markets have opened up.* But if we take the *advent of information and communication technologies* as the 'hyper-theme' (Martin, 2000), and assume that *perfect competition and consumers* having perfect knowledge of *prices* are predicated upon the hyper-theme, then the metaphorical function becomes apparent. Put more directly, the relationship is this: *With the advent of information and communication technologies new markets have opened up* [in the first instance, *appeared; come into being; have become accessible,* and so on]. But, even with that relationship made clear, the scope of the metaphor is still not entirely exposed. To see it, we need to consider time and tense.

The temporal relations between ostensibly linked propositions in [14] is confusing because of mixed tenses: the *present-ness* of *is becoming a reality,* and of *can now find out,* conflicts with the *past-ness* of *have opened up* and the *future*-ness of *when businesses can deliver their products down a phone line* (I am assuming that a future **when^then** construction is implied here because the condition of delivering *all products* down the phone line is nowhere near being a reality). We are left unsure as to which elements are causally predicated upon which others, and of the qualitative aspects of the previously *opened up* markets. Presumably, the markets that the authors refer to must have been *opened up* prior to *consumers* having access to price knowledge. The confusion of *present*-ness, *past*-ness and *future*-ness, and the consequent lack of clear causal relationships, makes the propositional content elusive: while perfect competition is construed as a result of *information and communication technologies, new markets* are already presupposed in the availability of information about prices and products. The ability of *businesses* to *deliver their products down a phone line* appears to be set in the future, except for where software and some forms of money are concerned. But in the next paragraph, *the increasing size of the market* is again *opened up by these technologies,* resulting in more *competition,* while *products with a high knowledge component* – those that *can* be delivered over the phone – appear in the present.

When all this is unpacked in terms of causality and temporal relations, the

its producers and its prices are *already* present: new technology *makes these available; exposes them* to competition; *relates* them to all the others; *signifies* their existence to people, along with their *Significance; creates* markets as social and symbolic spaces of interaction; and *facilitates* awareness of all participants in the market process to all others, thus *creating perfect competition.* The superficial singularity and materiality of *opened up* appears to be something that has already happened. However, it collapses and confuses causal relations, uniting past and future happenings, awarenesses, possibilities, knowings and doings for all the participants in the marketspace of the knowledge economy, thus bringing into being an ideal state: *the reality of perfect competition.*

In this *vision,* space is stripped of its economic significance. It is a space constituted by pure and immediate (albeit thoroughly mediated) activities, all of which are conducted at light-speed. It is a space of *pure exchange,* in which *the only activity is exchange itself.* However, a foundational condition for any new economy is the redefinition of geotechnical space, the concrete space *within which* time-bound, commodified human activities are to take place. That space is the focus of the following section.

Policy and Electrospace: Enclosing the Foundations of the New Economy

> Nothing is property unless it can be reduced to possession and exclusively occupied and held. The newspapers of Washington D.C., called attention . . . to the purchase of space overlying a lot of ground by the owner of a tall building adjoining, in order to secure the right to the perpetual use of whatever light and air might fill that space. Air drifts in and out with every zephyr, and light passes through at the rate of 186, 000 miles per second. The purchaser can only own so much of them as he can use. What [was] bought was something more imponderable than light. In economics it is known as land, or natural resources; in everyday English it is space.
>
> (Childs, 1924: 520)

All of the future spaces that are elaborated to any extent in the corpus are symbolic, time-bound activity spaces, social spaces created by people's *labour* – things people do, or *must* do to reach Nirvana. Whether metaphorically referring to vague, irrealis states of being, to extant markets or to currently protected social activities, what is said to be *opening up* in the policy corpus are *possibilities* and *opportunities* for reconfiguring, redefining and further commodifying existing human activities: *education, biological processes, thought, art, language services, cultural production, imagination* and so on, none of which *are new in any sense whatsoever.* They are existing activities that are to be formally redefined for 'removal' to, and commodification within, a 'new' geotechnical space.

Throughout history, the *meaning* of geotechnical spaces – that is to say people's *formal* relationships with each other *in relation to* particular geotechnical spaces (such as the relationship between lord, serf and land in feudalism and capital

electrospace is the space of most significance in the current transition. Electrospace 'is to communications today as land is to crops and water to fish. It is a peculiar natural resource, one whose politico-economic and social aspects have largely been ignored by social scientists' (Smythe, 1981: 300; cf. Childs, 1924). And that remains the case in the corpus I have analysed so far.

The significance of electrospace cannot be understated in the current environment. Until quite recently, electrospace was considered to be 'world property', and 'one of the most important bases of politico-economic power' throughout the world (Smythe, 1981: 307). But today this source of *power* is being privatized on a global scale (Federal Communications Commission [FCC], 1998, 2000; International Telecommunications Union [ITU], 2000). Unlike copper wire, fibre optics or satellite infrastructure, *radio spectrum is the global, finite, non-depletable, concrete resource upon which any global knowledge economy must eventually be built* (Rosston and Steinberg, 1997).

Quibbles over the ownership of radio spectrum may seem mundane in terms of what is being proposed in the new economy corpus: namely, the commodification of practically everything that makes humans human (and inhuman). But it should be noted that the global privatization of bandwidth is an historically unique proposal, and something that the new economy cannot proceed without. Electrospace is *objective* space, the global enclosure of which is presupposed in global policy. Its *meaning* remains largely unexamined in policy. The privatization of electrospace is literally an attempt to enclose conscious human experience on a global scale (Graham, in press a). Today, there exists a developed system of international institutions that provide the legal infrastructure to define and formalize social interaction; to make property, commodity and contract laws; and to enforce them on a global scale. Set apart from this 'international community', there is a small group of highly specialized legislators charged with privatizing electro-space. In the following section, I show how their discourses differ from the globally propagated new economy discourses, with which most readers will be familiar.

Electrospatial Metaphors

The most obvious difference between the discourses that are deployed to commodify social activity and those deployed to privatize electrospace is the metaphorical construals of the space. In the new economy corpus, *bandwidth* is mentioned 198 times in 1.3 million words. Only *once* is it discussed in terms of 'available electromagnetic space', and even then it gets metaphorically confused with data transfer rates and commodity forms:

> [15] **Bandwidth refers to the range of frequencies,** expressed in Hertz (Hz), that can pass over a given transmission channel. The **bandwidth determines the rate at which information can be transmitted** through a circuit.
>
> The phenomenal growth projected in **electronic commerce will significantly affect the demand for bandwidth.** The growth in online transactions for intangibles

In Australia, **demand for bandwidth is expected to grow strongly** for the retail trade; property and business services; education; and health and community services sectors over the next five years. (au_kba: 7, 622).

The authors of [15] confound data transfer rates, commodity categories and also identify bandwidth as *a kind* of space [*the range of available frequencies*]. It is a most perfunctory and confused treatment of what is actually being proposed for the future of electrospace. None of the corpus documents identify the fact that electrospace is a naturally occurring, limited geotechnical space *which must be occupied monopolistically* to be part of any formal political or economic system. To see the discourses being deployed to prefigure electrospace, it is necessary to step outside new economy discourses into the specialized realm of telecommunications policy.

Even this small group of legislators who are charged with privatizing electrospace seem confused. Their language is shot through with all the metaphors and pioneering images that adorn the imperialist mindset. The spatial aspects of the discourses are quite clear. They are marked in bold:

[16] I truly believe that encouraging **more bandwidth**, particularly, to residential consumers in the country, is the next great frontier in communications policy.

As I was saying, **bandwidth is the great::: the next great frontier** in communications policy. And I want the hallmark of this Commission's work to be that we encourage the competitive provision of high speed networks and services using any appropriate technology for all Americans **wherever they live, at home, at work, in schools, libraries, hospitals, whether they live in cities or in rural areas, on reservations.** Wherever there's demand, **there should be bandwidth.** (Kennard, 1998 in FCC, 1998)

Commissioner Kennard's [16] panegyric about the deregulated supply of electrospace implicates the same expansive aspects of social life as those in the policy directed at commodifying human activity. But this time the talk is referring to foundational, concrete space – *newly privatizeable property* – not something that there can be suddenly *more* of by the mere fact of legislative *encouragement.* Electrospace cannot be supplied like so many pounds of bananas. Like land, electrospace can only be *allotted and occupied.* The supply of electrospace cannot be increased any more than the supply of land can. The metaphorical aspect of the language is directed towards *realis* space – the *next great frontier* is an all-encompassing, singular and *global* expanse of *real estate.*

The privatizing talk is marked by the liberatory metaphors that have accompanied such revolutions throughout history (cf. Marx, 1846 [1972]; Fairclough and Graham, forthcoming). Process metaphor plays no part. In the following text, we have another commissioner bidding a hero's farewell to national electrospace:

[17] I think **this is an extraordinary crossroad** in our intellectual thinking with regard to communication services, and we should keep that in mind. In a sense

> communication services we provide to the public, but as well in **the regulatory structure that was built up and served well**, and to a great degree, administering national policy with respect to those sorts of systems.
>
> And so, this really is **one of the many opening salvos** of an important transition, both in terms of the way we provide communication services and the way that we regulate them. (Powell, 1998 in FCC, 1998)

This US warden of electrospace, poised at a *crossroad* in *thinking*, fires off *salvos* whilst *crossing the Rubicon*, bidding fond farewells to old worlds, their *regulatory structures* and their *limitations*. He enthusiastically mixes historical and spatial metaphors to confuse medium, message, regulation systems and the products of human consciousness. The effect is to *entirely obscure* the meaning of privately owned electrospace. Past, present and future *collapse* in these metaphors. Space and time become warped, as the mythical conquests of ancient Rome collide with the prophetic promises, opportunities and possibilities of *globalized* electrospace. Just as the purveyors of new economy policy turn the time-bound activities of people (*labour* in the present context) into a spatial *object*, and faced with a perennial, non-depletable, concrete space, the technocrats of electrospace turn their spatial domain into *time*. It is as if by mythologizing electrospace, by turning it into an object of conquest, it can be made to seem as if it were a *product* of human activity rather than the natural phenomenon it is.

In this policy realm, the push for privately owned electrospace is underpinned by a single spurious assumption, because of the digital nature of our new media environment, communication between people has become *qualitatively indistinguishable:* 'I would say that if not already, in the very immediate future, it gets rather basic. Bits is bits. Voice is data. Data is voice. Video is data. They're all the same' (Chrust, 1998 cited in FCC, 1998). There is much in history to refute such assertions: 'bits is bits'; radio waves is radio waves; talk is talk; space is space – emphasizing the self-identity of any medium is to miss the whole significance of *mediation as a process* that involves people, their cultures and their historical and extant knowledge economies (Silverstone, 1999). We might as well say 'trucks is trucks', regardless of whether they are transporting nuclear weapons, wheat or anthrax. From such a perspective 'all roads lead to Rome'. The rest is so much irrelevant detail.

A Macro Synthesis of the Meaning of 'Activity' and 'Property' Policy

In all of this – in the privatization of formerly common property and in the global regulation of human activity at the most intimate levels – we see an incipient prefiguring of what policy-makers and telecommunications industry experts think should happen in the irrealis world of the knowledge economy. The symbolic activities of humans are to be commodified and traded within a privatized global realm of *electrospace*. The unifying principle underpinning both 'types' of policy is that the new economy will encompass and commodify *all* aspects of human activity *everywhere*, and that it will do so under the commodity logic of capitalism.

need that allegedly underpins the putative *Necessity* of it all is *never questioned.* Regardless, the policy concerned with spectrum ownership is determined to 'reach' people *wherever they live.* Similarly, for policy concerned with those aspects of humanity that are to be modified for, and commodified within, the newly acquired global space include how people *live, learn, work, create, buy and sell.* Put simply, the privately owned, concrete property element will ideally extend to surround and enclose all of humanity; the logic of commodification will ideally infuse every aspect of what it means to be human.

Conclusion

It is not surprising to find that policies produced in an age dominated by a perverse, falsely individualist, neoliberal economics have the most personal aspects of people as the primary focus of the commodification process. We owe such an oppressive global condition to the failure of political economy to understand its object; namely, how human life gets to be a commodity in the first place. Nevertheless, neoliberal economics has become ultimately successful in dominating administrative logic and colonizing the channels of public opinion throughout much of humanity. But political economy and its policy-makers continue to *ignore* space. This is all the more pronounced considering that we are in the historically unique situation of seeing the creation of new private property on a global scale – the global 'privatization' of *electrospace.* It is the single largest continuous expanse of 'arable' space we can possibly realize under existing technical conditions. Consequently, we are in the situation of seeing the creation of the largest division of '*property owners* and propertyless *workers*' in history (Marx, 1844 [1975]: 322).

At the same time as 'the digital divide' is being loudly and roundly touted as the issue that most needs addressing today by one group of legislators, another group of legislators is busily, though on the whole invisibly, working towards the only possible means by which such a fundamental division can be created and sustained. The entire global mass of new economy policy entirely ignores the meaning of this new form of private property, focusing instead on rationalizing the commodification of human thought, language, art, imagination, communication, creativity and emotion. These are the activities of the propertyless knowledge worker that will be commodified in the institutional edifices that control the medium through which all electronically mediated experience must eventually pass. Should full technological realization of the property element prove to be realizable (there are doubts that this can be accomplished), the implications cannot be understated: it would amount to the commodification of *every* aspect of humanity.

Moreover, because it has been the politico-economic basis of power since the advent of radio, the privatization of global electrospace is essentially the privatization of a global political power base. What is now a barely covert influence in world politics must, if the property [illegible]

structural dominance on the part of the future owners of electrospace. What follows from that – the alienation of thought, language and the most intimate aspects of biology – is the apotheosis of a pathology that is oriented to the legal definition and ownership of others' lives, of their life energies and of the products of these. The gene pools of entire populations are now being traded as if they were stamp collections. The current process is, or will be, at its most complete if and when the irrealis objects being claimed process-metaphorically in 'new economy' policies are codified at law, and when the electrospace through which such commodities are to be exchanged is no longer public property by default. The language of policy *is* the operationalized discourse of contemporary political economy. For this reason, if for no other, a sustained critique of policy language is necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, for positive change.

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Notes

1. The term 'electrospace' was coined by Hinchman in 1969 (cited in Smythe, 1981: 300).
2. The term 'exchange value' stands in co-relation to 'use value' (Marx, 1976: 167). It should be understood that the two are *strictly* relational terms: every object of utility (use value) has potential exchange value, and the 'term 'use value' can . . . be applied to all manner of objects, activities and events in particular social and natural settings' (Harvey, 1973: 154).
3. According to Halliday (1994), the difference between *propositions* and *proposals* is that propositions can be tested for truth whereas proposals cannot. I adopt a modified distinction put forward by Thibault (in press) which emphasizes the *attitudinal* dimension of language, thus allowing for a 'prepositional attitude' to be expressed about a 'something' that cannot immediately be tested for truth, such as an arguable claim regarding 'a possible future state of affairs'.
4. Although Shakespearean 'conversion-metaphor' is somewhat similar in function and form (*Oxford English Dictionary*, 1986: 531).
5. I analysed the corpus using *Wordsmith Tools* software.

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30

Medical Discourse: Sociohistorical Construction

B.L. Gunnarsson

Introduction

Scientific language and discourse emerge in a cooperative and competitive struggle among scientists to create the knowledge base of their field, to establish themselves in relation to other scientists and to other professional groups, and to gain influence and control over political and socioeconomic means. In every strand of human communication, language and discourse play a role in the formation of a social and societal reality and identity. This is also true both of the formation of the different professional and vocational cultures within working and public life and of the formation of different academic cultures.

Historically, language has played a central role in the creation of different professions and academic disciplines, and it continues to play an important role in the development and maintenance of professional and institutional cultures and identities. Societal, social, and cognitive factors all make important contributions to the construction of professional cultures. Professionals try to create a space for their field within society. They try to establish themselves in contact and competition with others within their group as well as with other groups. Their knowledge base and its linguistic forms are created in a societal and social framework.

Diachronic Studies on the Development of Scientific Genres

A constructionist perspective on the emergence of scientific discourse and text genres is found in various traditions. Within the tradition of sociology of science,

Source: Keith Brown (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics* vol. 7, Article 2360.
2nd Edition, 2006, 709–717.

several studies have been devoted to analyzing the role of texts in the establishing of scientific fact. The scientific field is seen as a workplace, a laboratory, where social rules determine the establishing of facts and the rank order of the scientists. Knorr-Cetina (1981) was one of the first to describe the writing up of results as a process of tinkering with facts rather than a knowledge-guided search. Latour and Woolgar (1986) described the social construction of scientific facts as an antagonistic struggle among scientists, leading to a purposeful diminishing of the results of others and a leveling up – to a generalized level – of one's own results.

Bazerman (1988) studied the rise of modern forms of scientific communication, focusing on the historical emergence of the experimental article. A social-constructivist approach in relation to written texts is also found in Bazerman and Paradis (1991), which examined the important role played by texts in profession building. Textual forms and definitions are found to impose structure on human activity and help shape versions of reality. Texts are shown to play powerful roles in staging the daily actions of individuals, and to be important factors in the rise of action. In Gunnarsson *et al.* (1997), which examined both professional written communication and spoken interaction, the central theoretical issue is how language, written genres, and spoken discourse are constructed as successive and continuous interplay between language and social realities. A sociorhetorical perspective on the scientific genre is also developed in Bhatia (1987), Swales (1990), MacDonald (1994), and Berkenkotter and Huckin (1995). The emergence of the English scientific text genres has been analyzed in several important works, including Atkinson (1999) and Valle (1999). Extensive studies have also been made into scientific written communication in other languages, e.g., German (Standard German) (Schröder, 1991) and Swedish (Gunnarsson, 1997, 1998, 2001a; Melander, 1991, Näslund, 1991). The differences between academic genres developed within different national cultures have also been analyzed from a socioconstructivist approach, e.g., Mauranen (1993).

The Construction of Professional Discourse

In this article an exemplary picture of the emergence and development of medical written discourse will be sketched. In order to understand the historical development of professional medical language and communication in its rich and varied totality, we must study the dynamic processes behind the construction of medical language.

In this dynamic process, three main layers are distinguished: one relating to **cognitive** types of activities, one to **social**, and one to **macrosocial** or **societal**. Professional culture is built up via these layers, which means that all three must be considered in order to get a full picture. Written texts as well as spoken discourse are constructed as cognitive, social, and societal activities within the different professions and branches of working life. (The term 'profession' is here used in quite a general sense, including academic as well as nonacademic discourse.)

If we begin by considering the **cognitive layer**, we find that each profession has a certain way of viewing reality, a certain way of highlighting different aspects

of the world around it. Socialization into a profession means learning how to discern the relevant facts, how to view the relations between different factors. We are taught how to construct and use a grid or a lens to view reality in a professionally relevant way. Language, texts, and spoken discourse help us in this construction process. We use language in the construction of professional knowledge. Medical terminology, medical text patterns, and medical text and discourse content have developed as a means of dealing with reality in a way that is appropriate for medical purposes.

The way in which language is used is related to existing knowledge within the field and also with conceptions about what constitutes knowledge and the attitude that should be adopted to it. What is therefore important is what scientists consider they know about different sectors of reality at different periods, what knowledge they believe is relevant in this field, and how they consider data should be collected, observed, and analyzed. Attitudes and norms regarding what is professionally relevant and right are thus built into the cognitive structure.

The knowledge base of a field has a network of relations with other fields. The cognitive structure of a professional language thus reveals its dependence on and relationship toward other knowledge domains, and this knowledge-based network can vary over time. In metaphors, in terminology, in modes of reasoning, and in diagrams, the contribution of adjacent fields to the construction of professional knowledge is revealed. For example, many fields owe a debt to statistics, psychology, mathematics, sociology, physics, economics, politics, and religion, and this debt can be seen in the language that is used.

Second, regarding the **social layer**, every professional group, like other social groups, is also formed by the establishment of an internal role structure, group identity, group attitudes, and group norms. The need for a professional identity, for a professional sense of 'us-ness,' for separation from the out-group, has of course played an important role in the construction of professional group language and constantly motivates people to adapt and be socialized into professional group behavior. Socialization into a group also means establishing distance from people outside the group.

The use of medical scientific language during different periods is thus related to the type and level of the scientific community (the social group), its size, structure, degree of professionalization, degree of internationalization, degree and nature of mutual contacts, existence of publications, etc.

Third, as regards the **macrosocial** or **societal layer**, each professional group also stands in a particular relationship to the society in which it operates; it exerts certain functions and is given a certain place within that society. The members of a profession play a role in relation to other actors in society, and the professional group acts in relation to other groups. They play – or do not play – a role on the political scene, within the business world, the education system, in relation to the media, etc. And this cluster of societal functions is essential for language. It is through language that professional groups exert their societal function. If they are going to play a role on the political scene, they have to construct their communicative behavior in a way that is adequate for that purpose. Their relationship to written texts and spoken discourse and to different genres is also

important. Professionals adapt to established genres, but are also involved in forming new genres.

The way in which language is used within science during different periods is linked with the relationship of the scientist and the scientific community to society in general. Factors that are important are the status of the profession and its role in society, both the status of the scientific community and to what degree and in what way it is integrated into society. The societal layer is thus related to economic and political factors. It is related to power and status patterns in the particular society, i.e., the nation-state, as well as on the global scene.

The three layers are strongly related to the emergence and continuous recreation of professional language, and they constitute a part of the construction of professional language and discourse. Historically, language is constructed in relation to all these layers. The cognitive establishment of the field takes place at the same time as the professions fight for their place in society and for the strengthening of their group in relation to other groups.

Stages in the Development of Medical Science

Medical knowledge and practice took a great step forward in the 17th and in particular in the 18th century. However, it was only gradually that it developed into a science in the modern sense. Since the 18th century, all societies have undergone radical change. Changes have also taken place within the medical scientific community:

1. Medical knowledge has grown immensely.
2. Science in general and the philosophy of science have undergone changes. Statistics and empirical methods have developed. Positivism has become the only accepted view in many sciences.
3. The medical profession has gradually become increasingly established and recognized. Today, doctors are considered highly valuable professionals, and medical scientists and medical research are considered highly important to society.
4. The medical scientific community has become much larger. The number of doctors, medical scientists and students of medicine has increased, as has the number of medical journals and conferences.

Important changes have thus taken place relating to medical science, science in general, the medical profession, and the medical-scientific community. This article will explore how language and discourse are essential elements in the construction of science, in profession building and in the shaping of the scientific community, and that academic genres play important roles in this process of constructing scientific knowledge and the role of the scientist in society, and in the growth and strengthening of the social network among scientists.

Changes as to language and text patterns will be discussed in relation to three scientific stages: the pre-establishment stage, the establishing stage, and

the specialized stage. For each layer the three stages can be summarized on a developmental axis:

Cognitive layer:
- Individual findings – Accumulation of findings – Integration into theory

Social layer:
- Isolated researchers – Academic grouping – Advanced scientific community

Macrosocial/societal layer:
- Scientists function within society – Scientists function within society and academic groupings – Scientists function with the scientific community.

Scientificality in Swedish Medical Articles 1730–1985

The empirical results referred to are based on studies on Swedish medical language carried out at Uppsala University. The whole corpus analyzed comprises a total of 360 scientific and popular articles from three fields – economics, technology and medicine – and six periods (Gunnarsson, 1998). The medical subcorpus which will be focused on here consists of 60 scientific articles, 10 from each of the six periods 1730–1799, 1800–1849, 1850–1880, 1895–1905, 1935–1945, and 1975–1985. All these articles come from scientific journals and deal with pulmonary diseases (30 articles) or skin diseases (30 articles). Our analyses have focused on four text linguistic levels: the cognitive, the pragmatic, the macrothematic and the microsemantic. We have also made analyses relating to the vocabulary and terminology (Gunnarsson, 1998).

Content and Content Structuring of the Texts

The content and content structuring of medical articles will be related to the stage reached by the domain of medical science, in terms of degree and type of scientificality, and also the role of scientists in society.

The cognitive analysis examines the content of the text in relation to five 'cognitive worlds': a scientific world, a practical world, an object world, a private world, and an external world (cf. Gunnarsson, 1992). Within each of these, two or three aspects were discerned:

World	Aspect
Scientific	Theory
	Classification
	Experiment
Practical	Work
	Interaction
Object	Phenomenon-focused
	Part-focused
	Whole-focused

Private	Experience
	Conditions
External	Conditions
	Measures

Each proposition in the articles was categorized in relation to **world** and **aspect.** We could thus calculate the proportions of the total number of propositions representing each world and each aspect in texts from different periods.

The analysis showed a very clear increase in the proportion of each text devoted to the scientific world, that is, to the presentation of 'theory,' 'classifications,' and 'experiment,' over the periods. On the other hand, there was a clear decrease in the role of the external world in particular, that is in the proportions of texts dealing with 'conditions' and 'measures' of a political, economic, and social nature. There was also an increase in the proportion of 'experiment/observation' within the scientific world and a decrease in the proportion of 'measures' within the external world.

The cognitive analysis also comprised an analysis of text content in relation to four time **dimensions**, 'cause,' 'phenomenon,' 'process,' and 'result,' which showed that the proportions of each text devoted to describing 'causes' and 'phenomena' have decreased over time, while the proportions devoted to 'processes' and 'results' have increased.

Another analysis focused on the macrothematic structure. The content of the medical articles was categorized in relation to four **superthemes**, 'introduction,' 'theme development,' 'discussion,' and 'conclusions.' This analysis revealed an increase as regards how much of each text is devoted to the superthemes 'introduction' and 'theme development' (that is, to a description of materials, methods, results). The proportion devoted to 'discussion' and in particular to 'conclusions,' on the other hand, had decreased.

A third analysis, which aimed at a description of the pragmatic character of the texts, e.g., the types of **illocution** present, pointed to an increase as regards 'informative' and 'explicative' illocutions and a decrease in 'expressive,' 'argumentative,' and 'directive' illocutions.

To sum up, the changes in the content and content structuring of Swedish medical articles from 1730 to 1985 show the following tendencies: more 'scientific world,' less 'external world'; more 'experiment,' fewer social, political, and economic 'measures'; more 'process' and 'results,' less 'cause' and 'phenomenon'; larger proportion of 'theme development,' smaller proportion of 'discussion' and 'conclusions'; more 'informative' and 'explicative' illocutions, fewer 'expressive' and 'directive' illocutions.

These findings relating to changes in the medical article genre point for one thing to a development of medical science. The knowledge structure of the texts appears to have changed, to include more emphasis on experiment and on process and results. There is also a trend toward a genre of a more purely descriptive character, in which the main part of the text is devoted to developing

features which could be related to a positivist scientific ideal. All these results can be related to the cognitive layer of the construction of academic discourse.

These results also reveal the role played by scientists in society. In terms of text content, the proportion devoted to the external world and external measures has decreased, as has the proportion devoted to conclusions and directives. Such results can be discussed in light of the specialization and professionalization of society. Compared with earlier periods, scientists today act to a greater extent in a discourse community of their own. Science in general and medical science in particular is accepted and highly esteemed in modern society. Considerable funding is given to medical research. The role of large-scale experiments has increased.

The discourse changes can be related to this endeavor among medical scientists to become specialists, and a profession of their own, with their own exclusive domain to deal with. A high degree of scientificality in spoken and written discourse provides prestige.

A more purely scientific genre has emerged. Scientist-writers have turned toward their own group, and the medical article genre has become a within-science genre. The popularization of medical findings is taken care of by others – trained journalists. Scientists can write for their own group, and do not have to bother about a growing distance between the lay public and the experts. The article genre has become more exclusively internal, and less concerned with reaching out to other sectors of society.

These results can also be interpreted in light of the interplay between the cognitive and societal layers. The role played by the medical profession in society interrelates with the presentation of scientific content.

Formal Organization of the Text

The formal organization of the texts and their rhetorical patterns will be related to the stage reached in the development of the medical scientific community. A strong scientific community reveals itself in firm genre conventions, that is, in more homogeneous texts, and also in explicit markings of belonging to a group.

The number and types of headings in the modern Swedish articles vary over time. The use of section headings has increased dramatically. Also the type of heading has changed. In the early periods, headings relate to the content of the article, while in the modern article they relate to its structure: 'Material,' 'Methods,' 'Results,' 'Discussion,' 'Conclusions.' The modern headings thus structure the presentation in a general scientific way, which also reflects a more homogeneous organization of the texts.

An increasing homogeneity is also found in relation to the thematic article structure (Gunnarsson, 1993). The articles from the period around 1980 (1975–1985) were clearly more homogeneous in terms of their linear text structure than earlier articles. Also the introductions in articles from different periods revealed a gradually greater homogeneity. This homogeneity can also be seen in a contrastive perspective; that is, the Swedish pattern has come to resemble that of the English scientific article, as described in Swales (1990).

Another finding relates to the information flow of the text. An analysis of the connection between content structure and graphical disposition in articles from different periods showed that each sentence has become more independent with regard to the surrounding text. It introduces a new angle, which means that it becomes less integrated with its neighboring sentences (Melander, 1993). We thus find a change toward a fact-listing or 'catalogue' style in the modern article.

This tendency toward a catalogue style can be seen as another feature reflecting firmer genre conventions. When texts are organized in a homogeneous and predictable way, there is less need to elaborate on the details. Readers know where in the text they will find different types of content. The tendency toward a more catalogue-like article could also be seen as indicating a strengthening of the scientific community. The knowledge of this community is well established among the specialist readers, and need not be elaborated on.

Other analyses reveal that the number of references per article has increased over time, and that the way of presenting them has become more homogeneous. Another tendency relates to the changed use of personal pronouns. In the articles from the 18th century, the pronoun 'I' was quite a frequent word, while it has more or less totally disappeared in the articles from the latter part of the 20th century. The pronoun 'we,' on the other hand, which was quite unusual during the first two periods, has since the middle of the 19th century had a similar rank. The author's explicit marking of article relevance has also changed over time. Here we find a shift from a societal orientation in earlier periods to a more internal orientation in the last period (Gunnarsson, 1998).

To sum up, the changes as to the formal text organization and the rhetorical patterns show the following diachronic tendencies: more headings; more homogeneous text organization; more homogeneous article introductions; more fact listing; more references; less use of the personal pronoun 'I'; more relevance marking relating to the 'group.'

The medical article has developed toward greater homogeneity – relating to the use of headings, the superthematic text structure, the rhetorical structure of introductions, etc. – which indicates a strengthening of genre conventions. The medical article has become more established as a genre, and its genre conventions have become firmer and thus more homogeneous. This strengthening of the academic article genre, however, is also a sign of a growing and stronger medical discourse community. For the medical discourse community, as for most scientific discourse communities, writing plays an essential role as a group marker, and the establishing of firmer conventions for written text genres is part of the growth and strengthening of this community. The trend toward a more fact-listing and catalogue type of article can also be seen as a sign of a stronger discourse community, in the sense of being more homogeneous and closed. It is a well-known fact within sociolinguistics that communication within a dense group or network needs to be less explicit and elaborated than communication within one more open and less dense.

The modern habit of giving references to the works of colleagues is another sign of a strong discourse community, a discourse community with a clear group feeling. When the group is essential to its members, it becomes important to

indicate one's sense of belonging and one's relationship to other group members. Problems relating to the group also become more important than those relating to the world outside the group. The modern tendency to list references, to use 'we' instead of 'I,' and to mark relevance in relation to one's own group can be viewed from this social perspective. I would suggest that these text features are part of the construction of an increasingly close-knit (dense) medical discourse community.

There is also a connection between these features and the role of medical scientists in society; that is to say, the strengthening of the professional group is paralleled by a process of gradual specialization of the professions. These features are thus also part of the construction of a role for the medical community within society. We can thus see how the social and societal layers interact. Strengthening of the internal group structure is interrelated with the underlining of a role for the group in society.

Linguistic Expressions of Evaluations

The linguistic expressions of evaluation and its variation over time will be related to the positioning of the scientist/author on the developmental axes for the three contextual dimensions. The study referred to was based on an analysis of 30 Swedish scientific medical articles from six periods. All the articles dealt with pulmonary diseases. The study, which comprised an analysis of evaluations linked to descriptions of the subjects studied, the diseases and treatments, the introduction of the author's own initiatives, and descriptions of the research and findings of others, focused on three main aspects: (1) what is being evaluated, (2) through whom the evaluation is taking place, and (3) how the evaluation is being made (Gunnarsson, 2001a).

In articles from all the periods, the object of the study and the initiatives of other researchers were evaluated. The author also referred to his own initiatives in most articles. From a diachronic perspective however, it is more interesting to consider the second aspect; that is, through whom the evaluation is taking place (author's own voice, author through others author through facts). A comparison of the medical texts from the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries shows that in the earliest texts the evaluation is made by the author himself, using his own voice, whereas in later articles it is allowed to emerge indirectly via facts from others, e.g., in references to the other articles.

A change over time is also found in relation to the third aspect, how the evaluation is being made. When articles from the 18th century are compared to articles from the 20th century, we find a weakening tendency; that is, the evaluations in articles from 1730 are expressed in a more severe way. A more obvious change, however, relates to the degree of certainty. Here we find a discernible increase in the use of hedges and other expressions of caution over time (cf. Salager-Meyer, 1994).

We thus find a progressive moderation of the author's own voice in the medical articles; in other words, increasingly the focus is placed on facts. There is another clear change in the author's relationship to facts, which is revealed in increases in the frequency of markers of epistemic modality.

These tendencies were also found in analysis of word frequencies. As mentioned earlier, there is a change in the use of the personal pronouns *jag* 'I' and *vi* 'we' in the articles over time. The occurrences of the pronoun *jag* are reduced by half between the first period (18th century) and the fourth period (1895–1905) and disappear completely during the sixth period (1975–1985). To some extent the pronoun 'I' is replaced by the pronoun 'we.' In this case, however, the increased use of 'we' is mainly explained neither by the use of reader-inclusive 'we' nor by co-authorship. It could rather be linked to the progressive phasing out of authorial identity in scientific prose.

A comparison of the frequencies of a number of markers of modality in the Swedish medical corpus revealed an increase over time. All nine markers – *torde* 'is probably,' *tyder* 'suggests,' *tycks* 'seems,' *tänkbar* 'conceivable,' *tveksam* 'doubtful,' *sannolik* 'likely,' *sannolikhet* 'likelihood,' *möjlig* 'possible,' *möjlighet* 'possibility' – revealed a linear increase in frequency over the six periods. This increasing tendency to be cautious can of course be seen as a sign of the progressive extension of medical knowledge; that is, it can be related to the author's placement on the knowledge axis. The greater the body of collective knowledge, the more aware authors are of its relativity. But it could also be linked to circumstances within the social group, in this case the medical community. In order to survive in a competitive society, which is what the world of medical research undeniably is, one must be careful not to lose face, and take care not to threaten the face of others. Ideas of this kind are proposed in Myers (1989). Myers claims that in order to survive in the competitive academic world, modern scientists adopt pragmatic politeness strategies, and that Brown and Levinson's concepts of 'face saving' and 'face threatening' are also relevant in the analysis of scientific texts (Brown and Levinson, 1987). Scientists tread a narrow path between the need to emphasize their own achievements on the one hand and to criticize those of their peers on the other.

It may well be that the difference in the wording results from the increased knowledge scientists now possess about illnesses and their treatment, i.e., that the difference can be linked to the cognitive dimension. Or it may result from greater awareness of the importance of politeness in a large and well-developed scientific community, i.e., the difference can be linked to the social dimension; doctors/researchers admittedly make evaluations, but they avoid expressing them subjectively and straightforwardly and choose greater objectiveness, thus showing more caution.

Lastly, the variation in linguistic expressions of evaluations will be systematically related to the three scientific stages and the three layers distinguished earlier, and articles from the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries will be placed on developmental axes illustrates the relationship between text and context for medical scientific articles during three centuries.

In the articles from the 18th century, we encounter a number of different individuals – the author himself, his colleagues, and his patients – and their experiences and judgments are described. The typical article is full of explicit, severe, and assured evaluations which concern the object of the study – the illness and method – and also the advocates of the method, its naïve practitioners.

In the way the author writes, he places himself fairly obviously toward the left of all three contextual axes in Table 1; he treats individual findings as if they exist *per se*, he describes himself and his colleagues as isolated researchers and he seems to act within society rather than the scientific community.

Table 1: Text and context during three centuries

Dimension	1700:1	1800:2	1900:3
Cognitive	Individual findings	Accumulation of findings	Theoretical integration
Social	Isolated researchers community	Academic groupings	Developed scientific
Macrosocial	Scientists act within society	Scientists act within society and academic groupings	Scientists act within the scientific community

In the articles from the 19th century, the typical author adopts a considerably more analytical attitude to the research of others. The author himself figures as an evaluator. He also explicitly adduces the opinions of other researchers. The evaluations are of medium severity and the author marks his doubts in different ways. The author is fair and square in the middle of the contextual axes.

In the articles from the 20th century (around 1980), the typical author does not express himself in his own voice or explicitly through others. Evaluations take the form of the presentation of facts, supported by references to other works. Summaries of the research of others form an integral part of the description of the illness/method. What characterizes this and other articles in the subcorpus from this period is above all the attitude adopted to facts. The evaluations are not few in number, but they are weak to medium, severe rather than severe, and they are presented throughout as less certain – in other words these authors should be placed to the right on the contextual axes.

Conclusions

Language constructs science in relation to the cognitive layer (the scientific content), the societal layer (scientists' role in society), and the social layer (relations within the group). This construction process has been in progress since the first doctors tried to establish themselves as medical scientists and it is still continuing. In Sweden this process began in the 17th century. However, it was not until the middle of the 18th century that Sweden became a national writing community. Before 1740, the language of the learned was Latin, but in the Era of Liberty, from the middle of the 18th century, Swedish was gradually accepted as a scientific language, and the construction of medical science and the medical scientific community was related over a long period to the development of the Swedish medical article as a genre. This article has focused on this phase in the Swedish medical history, an account which ended in 1985.

What has taken place since then is an accelerating Anglicization of the academic writing community in Sweden. English is now used in medicine as the medium for Ph.D. theses, for conference abstracts and papers, and for articles presenting original research (Gunnarsson, 2001b). *Läkartidningen*, the Swedish medical journal, still exists, but is no longer the prime forum for presentations of new findings. The Swedish medical scientists of today choose to present their research in English in international medical journals. When they write in *Läkartidningen*, they do so with other purposes than to present original research findings. The Swedish medical scientific community has thus turned diglossic; that is, English is used for certain purposes and Swedish for others. In the Swedish medical journal, articles give overviews and present research relating to basic diseases, but this is no longer a journal for the first presentation of new research (Gunnarsson *et al.*, 1995).

A development of the kind here described is not country specific. The shift from Latin to the national language took place around the same time in most Western countries, and the modern spread of English as a scientific language is universal (Ammon, 2001). The Anglicization of the medical scientific community and the accelerating use of the Internet as a communicative tool has lead to an intensified globalization and also homogenization of science and scientific language. From a sociohistorical perspective this development is most interesting and in the future will certainly lead to important investigations.

See also: Cognitive Linguistics; Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Language; Constructivism; Evaluation in Text; Genre and Genre Analysis; Macrostructure; Pragmatics and Semantics; Society and Language: Overview; Text and Text Analysis; Text World Theory.

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31

Tactical Uses of Stories: Participation Frameworks within Girls' and Boys' Disputes

Marjorie Harness Goodwin

Introduction

Stories are often treated as artifacts that can be abstracted from their local circumstances and examined in terms of their internal features (Labov 1972). Here, instead, I want to look at how they are deeply embedded within larger social processes. My concern is with how children use stories as a constitutive feature of the activities they are engaged in and as powerful tools to arrange and rearrange the social organization of a group. In this paper I examine stories within a particular context, the organization of dispute.

My primary concern is with the participation frameworks that stories provide, allowing children to *construct and reconstruct their social organization on an ongoing basis.* I examine how boys and girls, in their same-sex groups, make use of features of stories to accomplish and restructure social identities within encounters. To investigate how stories constitute tools for accomplishing social tasks I look at how they structure situations within one particular domain, argumentative sequences, a fruitful site for investigating the intersection of genres. As noted by Turner (1986:39–43) a world of theater is often created while redressing grievances, as conflict provides the quintessential arena in which "the structures of group experience (*Erlebnis*) are replicated, dismembered, remembered, refashioned, and mutely or vocally made meaningful" (p. 43). When stories are used in dispute processes they permit the playing out of an event in ful dramatic regalia; through a multiplicity of voices (Goffman 1974), the teller of the story and her hearers animate principal figures in the story and offer commentary upon the unfolding action and characters.

Source: Deborah Tannen (ed.), *Gender and Conversational Interaction*, 1993, pp. 110–143.

Using the same story and dispute resources, boys and girls construct quite different types of events. Boys use stories as a way of continuing an ongoing argument while reshaping the domain in which dispute takes place; by switching from a sequence of counters to a story, a speaker may radically reformulate the participation structure of the moment. Girls, in contrast, use stories to restructure alignments of participants, not only in the current interaction, but also at some future time. Stories can generate in listeners who are offended parties statements of future plans to confront an offending party, which result in confrontations that mobilize the entire neighborhood. I examine how each gender group manages its social organization through storytelling.

Fieldwork and Theoretical Approach

The present study is based on fieldwork among a group of children in a black working-class neighborhood of West Philadelphia whom I encountered during a walk around my neighborhood. I observed them for a year and a half (1970–1971) as they played in their neighborhood, focusing on how the children used language within interaction to organize their everyday activities.[1] The children (whom I will call the Maple Street group) ranged in age from 4 through 14 and spent much of the time in four same-age and same-sex groups:

Younger Girls	Ages 4–9	5 children
Younger Boys	Ages 5–6	3 children
Older Girls	Ages 9–13	15 children
Older Boys	Ages 9–14	21 children

Here I am concerned principally with older children, ages nine to fourteen. Specific ages of the children who are included in the groups reported on in this paper are listed in Appendix A.

As the children played on the street after school, on weekends, and during the summer months, I audiotaped their conversation. In gathering data, I did not focus on particular types of events that I had previously decided were theoretically important (for example, games or rhymes) but instead tried to observe and record as much of what the children did as possible, no matter how mundane it might seem. Moreover I tried to avoid influencing what the children were doing. The methods I used to gather data about the children were thus quite different from those characteristically used in psychological and sociological studies of children's behavior; in such studies efforts are typically made to systematically collect in a carefully controlled fashion particular types of information deemed to be theoretically important. Rather than being based on a laboratory model, the methodology I used was ethnographic, designed to capture as accurately as possible the structure of events in the children's world *as they unfolded in the ordinary settings where they habitually occurred.*

The tapes I collected preserved a detailed record of the children's activities, including the way in which their talk emerged through time. In all, over

two hundred hours of transcribed talk form the corpus of this study. The approach used in this chapter, conversation analysis, constitutes an approach to the study of naturally occurring interaction developed within sociology by the late Harvey Sacks and his colleagues.

Stories within Disputes of Boys

Within the boys' group, games in which points are scored or activities in which there are winners and losers provide a way of distinguishing group members with respect to relative rank. Boys' pastimes permit a range of comparisons in terms of skill and ability, and boys proclaim and protest how they stand in a series of activities. For example, boys discuss ranking in terms of skill displayed in games and contests.

(1)

William: I could walk on my hands better than *an*ybody out here. Except him. And Freddie. ***Thom***as can't walk.

(2)

((Discussing ranking of go-cart members))

Malcolm: I'm the ***driv***er.
Tony: He's the driver. // You know he drives it.
Malcolm: I know what // that- Archie can't ***drive*** that good.
Archie: See- I'm number ***three*** driver. I'm number ***three*** driver.
Malcolm: And ***Dave*** can't drive that good,=
Tony: I'm number // ***two*** driver.
Archie: I'm number ***three*** driver.

In addition, boys compare one another in contests of verbal repartee, as in the following fragments, which occur during a slingshot-making session. Nine boys, aged nine through fourteen, are making slingshots in the backyard of Malcolm and Tony Johnson. The boys have informally divided themselves into two teams, one under the direction of Malcolm (aged thirteen), and the other led by Tony (aged fourteen).[2]

Disputes Built through Reciprocal Counters

Looking at example 3, it can be observed that argument proceeds through a sequence of **reciprocal counters:** two-turn sequences in which a first challenge or threat is answered by a counter to it. Data are transcribed according to the system developed by Jefferson and described in Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974:731–733). A simplified version of this transcription system appears in Appendix B.[3]

(3)

1	Tony:	***Gi***mme the ***things.***
2	Chopper:	You sh:ut up you ***big*** lips. (Y'all been
3		hangin around with thieves.)
4	Tony:	(***Shut*** up.)
5	Chopper:	Don't gimme that.=I'm not ***talk***in to
6		you.
7		(1.4)
8	Tony:	I'm talkin to ***y:ou***!
9	Chopper:	Ah you better sh:ut ***up*** with your
10		little- ***di:***ngy sneaks.
11		(1.4)
12	Tony:	I'm a ***ding*** your hea:d.=How would you
13		like ***that.***

Using such couplets to build an argument shapes the interaction of the moment in distinctive ways. First, it both focuses talk and restricts participation in the debate. Each subsequent challenge selects prior speaker as next speaker. Thus, though nine people are present, only two parties speak in the sequences. Second, the protagonists in this sequence talk in relatively short turns that, typically, are not interrupted.

Within the context of the event that has been in progress, this is striking. The boys have divided themselves spatially into two separate teams, each making its own ammunition in preparation for the slingshot fight, and, during most of this work, parties within each group have been carrying on separate conversations. The effect of this has been considerable simultaneous talk.

The emergence of the dispute sequence creates a point of focus for all present. It thus provides organization not only for those who talk within it, but also for the others present, who become ratified overhearers to it. In brief, argumentative sequences built from paired counters shape in distinctive ways both the interactions of the moment and the talk occurring within it.

Looking at line 9 of example 4, we find that, at a certain point, Tony simply disattends Chopper and turns to other activities.

(4)

1	Tony:	Why don't you get out my yard.
2	Chopper:	Why don't you ***make*** me get out the yard.
3	Tony:	I ***know*** you don't want that.
4	Chopper:	You're not gonna make me get out the yard
5		cuz you can't.
6	Tony:	Don't force me.
7	Chopper:	You can't. Don't force me to hurt you.
8		***((snickering))*** Khh Khhh!
9	Tony:	***((to his team))*** Now you gotta make
10		your noodles.
11	Chopper:	[[You hear what I said boy?

Thus, despite the fact that Chopper wants to pursue the sequence – note his "You hear what I said boy?" in line 11 – he is unable to do so without Tony's continuing coparticipation. Moreover, though an extended dispute occurs here, there is no clear demonstration that one of the protagonists has gotten the upper hand over the other.

One might ask how a speaker in the midst of a sequence of this sort could design talk that would prevent a move such as the one made by Tony. For example, would it be possible to build a participation framework in which such a unilateral exit would no longer be a strong possibility?

Using a Story to Restructure a Dispute

Example 5 is a continuation of the "I'm a dingy your head" dispute seen in (3).

(5)

12	Tony:	I'm a ***din***gy your hea:d.=How would you
13		like ***that.***
14		(0.4)
15	Chopper:	No you won't you little-*h ***Guess*** what.
		Recognizable Counter to Prior — *Self Interrupt* — *Story Preface*
18		(0.4)
19	Chopper:	***Le***mme~tell~ya.=***Guess*** what. (0.8) We
20		was comin home from ***prac***tice, (0.4)
21		and, three boys came up there (.) and
22		asked~us~for~money~and~Tony~did~like~
23		this. (0.6)
24		*hh *((raising hands up))*
25		*"I AIN'T* GOT n(h)(hh) [o (°m(h)oney)."
26	Pete:	[Ah~hih~ha,
27		*hh Hah~hah!
28	Chopper:	*((snicker))* khh
29	( ):	(° look [good.
30	Pete:	[*hh
31	Tokay:	You ***di:*** [d, ***((smile intonation))***
32	Pete:	[Aw:,
33	Chopper:	*((snicker))* *hhh~Khh [°Hey Poo(h)chie.
34	Malcolm:	[Ah~***ha***~aa~aa~***Ah~ha***//ha
35	Tokay:	You there ***Mal***colm,
36	Chopper:	*((snickering))* *hhKh He was the(hh)re.
37	Tokay:	What'd he say ***Chop***per. ***((smile***
38		***intonation))***
39	Chopper:	*((snicker))* *hKh Yeah.=
40	Tony:	=***You*** was there [To***kay***!
41	Chopper:	[*hih *hih
42	Chopper:	Lemme~tell ya, An h(h)e sai(hh)d,

In line 15 Chopper starts a counter to what Tony has just said but breaks it off before it reaches completion.

No you won't you little-

He then produces a prototypical story preface, "Lemme tell ya. Guess what" and. subsequently, in lines 19–25 tells a story about Tony. With his preface he signals that he has a multiutterance unit to complete that will extend over several turns. Although, generally, following such a preface a recipient provides a warrant for the telling by responding at that point, here the storyteller launches quickly into a story.

Participant Frameworks Invoked by the Story

Introducing a story at this point has a range of consequences. First, since the utterance containing Chopper's counter is not brought to completion, Tony is not given the opportunity to respond to it. The return and exchange sequence has. in effect, ended, and participants are no longer within that frame. Second, the story invokes a *participation framework* that is quite different from that provided by the aborted counter. The counter locates Tony as its specific addressee – for example, with the second person pronoun in line 15 ("you little-") – and makes relevant particular types of next actions, such as return counters, from him and not others. Dialogue is restricted to two persons. Though others are present, they are positioned as *onlookers* to the dispute between Chopper and Tony.

By way of contrast the story is addressed to all present and, indeed, Tony, who is now referred to in the third person, is no longer the exclusive, or even the principal, addressee. Rather than being situated as onlookers to a dispute that does not concern them, others present now become the *audience* to the story. Moreover insofar as members of the audience are active coparticipants in the production of a story (C. Goodwin 1984, 1986), they gain rights to participate in the telling in distinctive ways.

Within the story, Chopper portrays Tony as cowardly. In addition, Chopper proposes that Tony's behavior be evaluated in a particular way, specifically as **laughable:** In line 25, as Chopper speaks the words "no(h)(hh)o m(h)oney," he starts to embed laugh tokens in the talk being quoted. This laughter is not heard as part of Tony's words but rather as Chopper's current *comment on* those words Here, rather than simply reporting what Tony said, Chopper enacts Tony's behavior at the moment of climax; indeed as Vološinov (1971) has argued, one never simply reports an action but, rather, takes up a position with regard to what she or he is saying. First, with the phrase "Tony did like this," Chopper announces that an enactment is to follow. He then marks the talk that follows as an enactment through animation cues such as increased volume (indicated by capital letters and emphasis (italicized words, the italicization marking high pitch), which result in focus upon the initial part of the reported denial "*I AIN'T* GOT." Other work (M. H. Goodwin 1980b) has demonstrated that such heightened dramatization in the midst of speech function to obtain enhanced responses from recipients

Thus rather than treating people other than Tony as overhearers, Chopper is now inviting them to participate in the talk of the moment. Moreover, in animating (Goffman 1974:516–544) Tony's talk and drawing attention to it through increased loudness, Chopper proposes that it should be evaluated in a particular way – as laughable. Jefferson (1979) has demonstrated that such laugh tokens can solicit recipient coparticipation in the laugh, and, indeed, that is what happens here. In response to Chopper's talk, Pete (lines 26–27) and Malcolm (line 34) produce laughter. Before Chopper's animation has reached its conclusion, Pete is laughing with him. Shortly afterward, Malcolm (line 34) also laughs, thereby displaying an affiliation and agreement with the mode of argument Chopper is presenting.

In brief switching to a narrative *about* Tony creates a participation framework into which others now have rights to enter with their evaluations of the events heard in the story. Rather than treating people other than Tony as overhearers, Chopper is now inviting them to participate in the talk of the moment.

Audience Alignment toward Opponent/Story Character

Recipients may, of course, respond in a number of different ways, depending on their structural positions with respect to the story: (1) Recipients occupying the identity of prior participant in the recounted event can assist the teller in providing details of the event, (2) a prior participant whose actions are negatively portrayed may counter the claims made against his character, (3) participants absent from the event being discussed can provide requests that lead to expansion of the story or replaying of its key scenes.

In what follows, Tokay not only requests information concerning specifics of the story but also displays intense interest in the report and, with smile intonation, aligns himself with Chopper:

(6)

25	Chopper:		"*I AIN'T* GOT n(h)(hh) [o (°m(h)oncy)."
26	Pete:		[Ah~hih~ha,
27			*hh Hah~hih!
28	Chopper:		*((snicker))* khh
29	(ei2):		(° look [good.
30	Pete:		[*hh
31	Tokay:	→	You ***di:*** [d, *((smile intonation))*
32	Pete:		[Aw:,
33	Chopper:		*((snicker))* *hhh~Khh [°Hey Poo(h)chie.
34	Malcolm:		[Ah~***ha***~aa~aa Ah~***ha/ha.***
35	Tokay:	→	You there ***Mal***colm,
36	Chopper:		*((snickering))* *hhKh He was the(hh)re.
37	Tokay:	→	What'd he say ***Chopp***er. *((smile*
38			*intonation))*
39	Chopper:		*((snicker))* *hKh Yeah.=
40	Tony:		=***You*** was there [To***kay***!
41	Chopper:		[*hih *hih
42	Chopper:		I [illegible]

Tokay's talk is first answered by Chopper, who intercepts a request directed to Malcolm ("*You* there ***Mal***colm") and requests for elaboration ("What'd he say ***Chopp***er"). Second, it is answered by protagonist Tony, who argues that Tokay's asking questions into the story is inappropriate ("*You* was there To***kay***!") in line 40.

Tony elaborates a defense against the portrait being presented of him in lines 45–51; he argues that he didn't, in fact, raise his hands up in cowardice.

(7)

42	Chopper:		Lemme~tell ya, An h(h)e sai(hh)d,
43	Tokay:		***WH:EN***!=
44	Chopper:		="***I*** ain't got no(h) mo [(h)ney."
45	Tony:		[Member=
46	Pete:		[Whew::,
47	Tony:		[that night when we was goin [there,
48	Chopper:		[*((snicker))* **Khh**
49	Tony:		and [them boys came down the street,
50	Chopper:		[*((snicker))* Khhh!
51	Tony:	→	***I*** ain't ***rai***:sed my hands [up.
52	Chopper:		[Go
53			ahead.=You're gonna say it- ***I*** **know**:.
54			*hh ***Di***dn't he g'like this? (0.4)
55			"***I ain***'t go(hh)t
56			no(hh)n [(h)e."
57	Malcolm:		[Ah~***ha***~ha~ha~ha~ha~ha
58	Chopper:		*((snicker))* *hkh
59	Malcolm:		Aw::::
60	Chopper:		*((snicker))* *KHH
61	Malcolm:		((baby voice)) "***I ain***'t got no money."
62			Ah~ [ha~ha.
63	Chopper:		[((*snicker*)) Khhhhheh!

This move is useful to the ongoing development of Chopper's characterization of Tony. Chopper counters Tony's defense: "*You* was there To***kay***!" and then explicitly requests confirmation ("***Di***dn't he g'like this?") of his quote of Tony, which he recycles once again in lines 55–56.

Afterward Chopper's talk receives renewed laughter (line 57), as well as recycling of the refrain ("I ain't got no money") in mocking intonation (line 61) from Malcolm. Refutations are used to Chopper's benefit in the elaboration of the story that he wants to tell. Though Tony repetitively produces counters, these are defensive answers to Chopper's stories rather than first moves in counter sequences. Throughout the storytelling, when Tony attempts to defend himself, he gets himself into greater and greater trouble. Counters result in three further descriptions that instance Tony's cowardice. Recipients ratify Chopper's depiction through laughter and through recyclings of the quote "I ain't got no money" (which gets used as a refrain indexing Tony's cowardice) until Chopper finally entraps Tony.

Building a Multiparty Consensus

Though the introduction of the story constitutes a marked transformation of the dispute, it remains very relevant to it. Of crucial importance is the way in which the story allows Chopper to create a visible multiparty consensus against Tony. Chopper moves to a structure that provides parties not initially designated as ratified participants the opportunity to participate. Maintaining and shaping their participation in particular ways, Chopper is able to demonstrate publicly that his characterization of Tony is one that others share. Through their laughter Pete and Malcolm affiliate themselves with Chopper's position.

Throughout the encounter the story remains a point of focus to which others can return. More important, the rearrangement of argument mode also calls into play a different configuration for social organization. The event shifts from one designating only two parties to the dispute (others present being ratified overhearers but not full-fledged contributors) to one inviting the participation of all those present. In that others may become contributing participants in the activity, even without being officially summoned as witnesses, they may align themselves with a particular side of the dispute, and their participation may display whose version has more support.

The structure of the recounting itself allows for displays of appreciation, both laughter and repetition of lines in Chopper's story produced in a mocking tone of voice, as well as requests for elaboration of the story, which grant Chopper a warrant to develop his line.

Girls' Stories

In contrast with boys, girls do not generally utilize direct methods in evaluating one another. They seldom give one another bald commands or insults, and making explicit statements about one's achievements or possessions is avoided. Such actions are felt to indicate someone who "thinks she cute" or above another, thus violating the egalitarian ethos of the girls. These different cultural perceptions concerning evaluating oneself in the presence of others lead to different ways in which stories that are part of dispute processes are built by the teller and involve others in the process of storytelling. Rather than directly confronting one another with complaints about inappropriate behavior, girls characteristically discuss their grievances about someone in that party's absence. Through an elaborated storytelling procedure called "instigating," girls learn that absent parties have been talking about them behind their backs, and they commit themselves to future confrontations with such individuals.

The activity of reporting to a recipient what was said about her in her absence constitutes an important stage preliminary to the confrontation event. It is the point where such an event becomes socially recognizable as an actionable offense. The party talked about may then confront the party who was reportedly talking about her "behind her back," producing an utterance of the following form:

Bea to Ann:	**Kerry said you said that (0.6)** **I wasn't gonna go around *Pop*lar no more.**	
Bea→Ann	**Bea is speaking to Annette in the present**	
Ker→Bea	**about what Kerry told Bea**	
Ann→Ker	**that Annette told Kerry**	
Bea	**about Bea**	
A→B	**A is speaking to B in the present**	**3 Confrontation**
C→A	**about what C told A**	**2 Instigating**
B→C	**that B told C**	**1 Offense**
A	**about A**	

Informing leading up to the confrontation typically is accomplished through use of stories by a girl who stands as neither accuser nor defendant. This type of storytelling, as noted, is called "instigating" by the children. The instigator may initiate a sequence of events that leads to conflict as part of a process of negatively sanctioning the behavior of a girl who steps outside the bounds of appropriate behavior or as a way of demonstrating her ability to orchestrate such events.

The larger framework of the he-said-she-said dispute provides organization for the storytelling process in several ways.

1. It provides structure for the cited characters and their activities within the story.
2. It influences the types of analysis recipients must engage in to appropriately understand the story.
3. It makes relevant specific types of next moves by recipients: for example, evaluations of the offending party's actions during the story, pledges to future courses of action near the story's ending, and rehearsals of future events at story completion and upon subsequent retellings.

Structure in Telling and Listening to Instigating Stories

Bringing about a future confrontation has direct bearing upon the way a speaker structures her instigating story and recipients respond to it. Through dramatic character development, the speaker skillfully guides her recipients to interpret the events she is relating in the way she wants them to and attempts to co-implicate

hearers in forms of future activity. Recipients' responses to instigating stories are differentiated, depending upon the identity relationship of listeners to figures in the story.

Bea tells two stories dealing with Kerry. Bea's first story recounts to both Julia and Barbara what Kerry said about Julia. Julia then leaves, and Bea starts a new set of stories in which she tells Barbara what Kerry said about *her* (Barbara).

The description of the past is organized so as to demonstrate that the events being recounted constitute *offenses*. Moreover, the presentation of past events is carefully managed, so as to elicit from its recipient, now positioned by the story as an *offended party*, pejorative comments about the party who offended her, without this appearing as the direct intent of the speaker's story.

I start by examining the initiation of Bea's first story, recounting what Kerry said about Julia.[4]

(8)

11	Bea:	***How- how-*** h- um, uh h- h- how about me
12		and ***Ju***lia, *h and all them um, and
13		***Ke***rry, *h[and all them-
14	Julia:	[***Is***n't ***Ker***ry ***mad*** at
15		***me*** or ***s:om***p'm,
16		(0.4)
17	Bea:	***I'on'*** kn//ow.
18	Barb:	Kerry~***al***ways~mad~at somebody.
19		°***I*** ['on' care.
20	Julia:	[Cuz- cuz cuz I wouldn't, cu:z she
21		ain't put my ***name*** on that ***pa***per.
22	Bea:	***I*** know cuz OH yeah. ***Oh*** yeah.

This story beginning has the form of a reminiscence. Bea requests that others remember with her a particular event: "***How- how-*** h- um, uh h- h-how about me and ***Ju***lia, *h and all of them um, and ***Ke***rry." The numerous stutterings in her speech contribute to the highly charged framing of this talk. The proposed story concerns negative attributes of Kerry. The telling of pejorative stories, especially in the context of the he-said-she-said, poses particular problems for participants. That is, such stories constitute instances of talking behind someone's back, the very action at issue in a he-said-she-said.

A party who tells about another runs a particular risk: Current recipient might tell the absent party that current speaker is talking about her behind her back. The activity of righteously informing someone of an offense against her can itself be taken and cast as an offense. Are there ways in which a party telling such a story can protect herself against such risk? One way might be to implicate her recipient in a similar telling so that both are equally guilty and equally vulnerable. However, this still poses problems: Specifically, it would be most advantageous for each party if the other would implicate herself first. This can

lead to a delicate negotiation at the beginning of the story: In lines 11–13, when Bea brings up Kerry's offenses toward Julia, she requests the opinion of others, while refusing to state her own position. In response, Julia asks a question that describes her relationship to Kerry in a particular way: "***Is***n't Kerry ***mad*** at ***me*** or ***s:om***p'm" (lines 14–15). If Bea in fact provides a story at this point demonstrating how Kerry is mad at Julia, Bea will have talked pejoratively about Kerry before Julia has co-implicated herself in a similar position. Bea subsequently passes the opportunity to tell such a story by saying "***I'on'*** know" (line 17). Then Julia provides an answer to her own question: "Cuz- cuz cuz I wouldn't, cu:z she ain't put my ***n***ame on that ***pa***per" (lines 20–21). Only after Julia implicates herself does Bea begin to join in the telling (line 22).

Cited Characters and Current Participants

Instigating stories concern others within one's neighborhood group of friends who are judged to have behaved in an inappropriate fashion. Such stories have certain features in common:

1. The principal character in the story is a party who is not present.
2. The nonpresent party performed actions directed toward some other party.
3. These actions can be seen as offenses.
4. The target of the cited offenses is the present hearer.

The placement of present recipient within the story as a principal figure provides for her involvement in it and, consequently, for the story's rather enduring life span, by comparison with other recountings.

Some evidence indicates that the four features just listed are oriented to by the teller in the construction of her instigating stories. In the data being examined, Bea's initial stories (line 20 in Appendix D) involve offenses Kerry committed toward Julia. These include having said that Julia was acting "stupid" and inappropriately when girls were telling jokes and having intentionally excluded Julia's name from a "hall pass." During these stories both Julia and Barbara are present. However, Julia then departs, leaving only Barbara as audience to Bea. Bea now starts a new series of stories (line 21) in which Barbara is the target of a different set of offenses by Kerry. Thus, when one hearer (Julia) leaves (prior to the beginning of line 21), the speaker modifies her stories. In both sets of stories the absent party who commits the offenses, Kerry, remains constant. However, the recipient of her actions is changed so that the target of the offense remains the present hearer. Through such changes the speaker maintains the relevance of her story for its immediate recipient. What happens here demonstrates the importance of not restricting analysis of stories to isolated texts or performances by speakers but, rather, of including the story's recipients within the scope of analysis, since they are consequential to its organization.

Stories may also be locally organized with respect to the person selected as the offender. The fact that Kerry is reputedly the agent of offensive talk in the story to Julia may well be why she is selected as a similar agent in the stories to Barbara several minutes later.

Larger political processes within the girls' group might also be relevant to the selection of Kerry as offender in these stories. Gluckman (1963:308) notes that gossip can be used "to control aspiring individuals." In the present data, Kerry is the same age as the other girls but has skipped a year in school, and they are annoyed at her for previewing everything that will happen to them in junior high school. The structure of the immediate reporting situation, as well as larger social processes within the girls' group, is thus relevant to how past events are organized within these stories and the way in which particular members of the girls' group become cited figures (Goffman 1974:529–532).

In replaying past events, the teller animates (Goffman 1974) the cited figures within her stories in ways that are relevant to the larger social projects within which the stories are embedded. In a variety of ways the absent party's actions toward the current hearer are portrayed as offensive. Thus, in describing what Kerry said about Julia, Bea (lines 26–31) reports that Kerry characterized Julia as having acted "stupid."

Teller
Animates
↓
Absent Party
Animating
↓
Current Hearer

(9)


26	Bea:	***She*** said, ***She*** said that um, (0.6)
27		that (0.8) if that ***girl*** wasn't
28		there=***You*** know that girl that always
29		makes those funny jokes, *h Sh'aid if
30		that ***girl*** wasn't there ***you*** wouldn't be
31		***ac***tin, (0.4) a:ll ***stu***pid like that.

Continuing on, Bea (lines 35–36) animates Kerry's voice as she reports that Kerry said that Julia had been cursing.

(10)

35	Bea:	and she said that ***you*** sai:d, that,
36		"***Ah***: go tuh-" (0.5) somp'm like tha:t.


As Bea further elaborates her story about Kerry, she relates how Kerry attempted to exclude Julia's name from a "hall pass" (a permission slip to go to the bathroom). At the same time that she describes Kerry's actions as offensive, she portrays Julia as someone whose actions were appropriate and exemplary (lines 64–66) and herself as someone who stood up for Julia (lines 68–69).



(11)

64 Bea An m- And Julia w'just sittin
65 up there actin- actin:, ac- ac- actin
66 sensible. An she up- and she up there
67 talking bout, and she-*I* said, I s'd I
68 s'd I s'd "This is how I'm- I'm gonna
69 put Julia ***na***:me down here." Cu- m- m-
70 Cuz she had made a pa:ss you know. *h
71 She had made a ***pa***:ss.

Throughout her talk, Bea's stuttering adds to the dramatic quality of her talk as she expresses excitement about what she is relating. As Bea animates Kerry's voice, she colors her talk with a whiny high-pitched defensive tone, enacting Kerry's distaste for having to include Julia's name. Immediately following, however, Bea again portrays herself as someone who *defended* the position of her present hearer against the offender.



(12)

93 Bea: But she ain't even put your ***na***me down
94 there. *I* just put it ***down*** there. Me
95 and Martha put it *down*. =An I said, and
96 she said "***Gi***mme-that-paper.=I don't
97 wanna have her ***name down*** here." I s- I
98 s-I s-I said "She woulda allowed ***you***
99 name."

Quite different forms of affect and alignment toward Julia's perspective are conveyed by Bea's animation of Kerry and of herself. Kerry was eager to remove Julia's name from the hall pass, so that she would not be included in the group of girls exiting from the classroom together. Bea, in contrast, stood up for Julia and argued that, had Julia been in a similar situation, she would have included Kerry.

Recipient Responses


In responding to talk, participants pay close attention to the differential access they have to the events being talked about. Briefly, parties who both were present when the action described occurred and are figures in the story may participate in its telling, denying and countering the absent offending party's statements about them. Recipients who were not present at the past event and are not characters in the story may provide general comments on the offender's character, referring to ongoing attributes of the offender in the present progressive tense, for example:

(13)
18 Barb: Kerry~***al***ways~mad~at somebody.
19 °***I*** 'on' care.

(14)
40 Barb: Kerry ***al***ways say somp'm.=When you
41 ***jump*** in her ***face*** she gonna de***ny*** it.

In response to listeners' evaluations of events, the speaker acts upon any indication by recipient of her alignment toward the absent party. For example, when Julia makes an evaluative comment, "OO: r'mind me a-you old b:aldheaded Kerry" (lines 109–110) at the close of the story about Kerry's actions toward Julia, Bea states, "***I*** should say it in fronta her face. (0.8) Bal: head" (lines 111–112). Bea presents a model of how she herself would confront the offending party and invites the recipient to see the action in question as she herself does, as an action deserving in return an aggravated response such as an insult.

Suggestions for how to act toward absent party may also take the form of stories in which *speaker*, rather than recipient, appears as principal character reacting to actions of offending party. Briefly the speaker makes her suggestions by telling her present recipient the kinds of actions that ***she herself*** takes against the offender, these actions being appropriate next moves to the offenses described in the informing stories.



(15)
142 Bea *h And she was leanin
143 against- I- I said, I s'd I s'd I s'd I
144 said, "***Hey*** girl don't lean against that
145 thing cuz it's ***weak enough.***" *h And

146 she said and she said *h she- she did
147 like that.=She say, "Tch!" *((rolling*
148 *eyes))* // like that. I s'd- I said "You
149 c'd ***roll*** your eyes all you ***want*** to.
150 Barb: Yeah if somebody do that to her-
151 And if [you know what?
152 Bea: [Cuz I'm ***te***llin you. (0.5)
153 ***Te***llin- I'm not ***ask***in you." (0.4) An I
154 ain't say no ***plea***:se ***ei***ther.

In this story, Bea tells how she confronted Kerry with marked insult forms, issuing a direct command to her: "Cuz I'm ***te***llin you. (0.4) ***Te***llin-I'm not ***ask***in you" (lines 152–153). The bald, on-record nature of the command is highlighted by placing it in contrast with a more mitigated form that was not said: "An I ain't say no ***plea***:se ***ei***ther" (lines 153–154).

Evaluation through descriptions of past activities is consequential for the process of eliciting from the recipient a promise to confront the offender in the future. On the one hand pejorative actions performed by the absent party can be interpreted as explicit offenses against the current recipient. On the other hand, a speaker's description of her own actions in response to such offenses, that is, confronting the offender, can provide a recipient with a guide to how she should act toward that party. Thus Julia's statement that she will confront Kerry occurs right after Bea has described how she confronted Kerry about having excluded Julia's name from the bathroom pass.

(16)
87 Julia: I'm a- I'm a ***tell*** her about herself.

Offended parties' responses that constitute plans to confront the offending party are made in the presence of witnesses; they thus provide displays of someone's intentions to seek redress for the offenses performed against her. Failure to follow through with a commitment statement such as "I'm a ***t***ell her about herself" can be remarked on as demonstrating inconsistencies in a person's talk and actions, thus reflecting negatively on her character. Indeed, when Julia later fails to confront Kerry, others use her actions in the present exchange to talk about the way in which she had promised to tell Kerry off but then did nothing.

(17)
Bea: Yeah and Julia all the time talking
bout she was gonna tell what'shername
off. And ***she*** ain't do it.

Alignments taken up in the midst of an exchange such as this can thus be interpreted as **commitments** to undertake future action for which parties may be held responsible by others. People who refuse to confront once they have reported their intentions are said to "swag," "mole," or "back down" from a future confrontation. The fact that a statement about future intentions can be treated

as a relevantly absent event at a future time provides some demonstration of how responses to instigating stories are geared into larger social projects.

Thus, through a variety of activities – passing the opportunity to align herself with a definitive position before the hearer does at story beginning, presenting herself as having defended the offended party in the past, and portraying how she boldly confronted the offending party – the speaker carefully works to co-implicate her present recipient in a next course of action. Though the report is reputedly a narrative account of past events involving teller and offending party and speaker's alignment of righteous indignation toward these acts, it may also function to suggest future courses of action for present recipient.

A Comparison of Boys' and Girls' Dispute Stories

The forms of participation made available in boys' and girls' dispute stories may now be compared. The girls' and boys' stories examined here share several features: (1) The principal topic is offenses of another, and (2) one of the characters in the story is a present participant. In the case of boys' stories, cited offenses deal with wrongdoings of a *present participant.* Among girls, however, offenses concern *reported deeds of absent parties.* Such differences have consequences for the trajectory of dispute in girls' and boys' groups; whereas boys can deal directly with an offender, girls must wait to confront the offending party at a future time.

Within boys' and girls' dispute stories *hearer who is a character in the story* is portrayed in different ways. Whereas in Chopper's story Tony has performed objectionable actions in the past as a coward, in girls' instigating stories the present hearers (Julia and Barbara) are said to have performed exemplary actions in the past that sharply contrast with the reportedly objectionable actions of an absent party (Kerry). Among the girls, storyteller skillfully works to align hearer *with teller against an absent third party.* A coalition of what the girls call "two against one" (teller and hearer against absent party) is established in the immediate interaction. From the teller's perspective, the offended party's alignment is important for bringing forth a future confrontation. From the recipient's perspective the fact that at least two parties agree on a particular version of an event provides a warrant for bringing action against a third party. By way of illustration, consider the following speech that Vettie (age eleven) makes to her adversary during a confrontation:

(18)

Vettie: Well I'm a get it straight with the people.
What ***Ke***rry, (1.4)
it's between Kerry, and you, (1.0)
See ***two*** (0.5) two against one. (0.7)
Who wins? The one is two.=Right? (0.5)
And that's Joycie and and Kerry. (0.5)
They both say that you said it.
And you say that you didn't say it.

In contrast the teller in the boys' stories constructs a situation of conflict, not at some future time, but instead between teller and recipient, who is the principal character in the immediate interaction; boys who are hearers (and can be co-tellers of the story) align themselves *with the teller against the present principal character.*

Response from parties other than those who are principal figures in the story are similar in both girls' and boys' stories; such parties aid in the teller's depiction of the offending party by providing comments on the offender's character. Responses of offended parties, however, differ in girls' and boys' groups. Although offended parties in both girls' and boys' groups oppose reported descriptions. they oppose different identities. Boys who are offended parties direct counters to *principal storyteller,* but girls direct counters to *cited figures* who offended them in the past.

The portrayal of characters and events within dispute stories has consequences for the form and timing of interaction that ensues. Thus, whereas boys' dispute stories engender disagreements that permit contesting in the *immediate setting,* girls' stories engender alignments of "two against one" against an absent third party who will be confronted *at some future time.* In that the offending party is absent from the instigating event, girls cannot resolve their disagreements in the present interaction. Girls' he-said-she-said disputes, in contrast with those of boys, may be extended over several days.

An offended party in girls' stories reacts by stating not only that she disapproves of the offending party's actions toward her in the past, but also that she is prepared to confront her offender. When the offended party confronts the plaintiff, she does so with indirect, rather than direct, speech, in that the offenses at issue have been learned about through a third party. Girls' stories constitute a preliminary stage in a larger process of negatively sanctioning inappropriate behavior. After the instigating session, girls replay reactions of offended parties to the stories and rehearse future possible scenarios for confrontation with friends (M. Goodwin 1988b). Following the confrontation, serious offenders of the girls' moral code may be ostracized; the degradation ceremony of ridicule and teasing that results can extend over several weeks. Whereas boys' stories have little motive power beyond the present situation, girls' instigating stories are embedded within a larger social process, the he-said-she-said, a speech event providing for the involvement of participants in multiple phases of activity.

The present study has relevance for theories regarding not only the relationship of speech activities to larger social processes but also gender differences in children's social organization and culture. Whereas boys' arguments display an orientation toward social differentiation and principles of hierarchy, within he-said-she-said disputes girls display a form of organization based on what has been called "exclusiveness," reportedly more characteristic of American girls' groups than of boys'(Douvan & Adelson 1966:200–202, Eder & Hallinan 1978, Feshbach & Sones 1971, Lever 1976, Savin-Williams 1980:348, Sutton-Smith 1979). Girls affirm the organization of their social group through assessing

the behavior of absent parties. The alliances they form in the process of discussing others mark who is included and excluded from the social group of the moment, rather than relative rank.

It is sometimes argued that girls avoid direct competition and are little interested in "negotiational involvements" (Gilligan 1982, Lever 1976, Sutton-Smith 1979). Girls' tendency to be more nurturant than boys' is felt to result in relatively less conflict in their same-sex peer group (Miller, Danaher, & Forbes 1986:547). Within certain domains (M. H. Goodwin 1980a, 1988a) girls do select accounts for their actions that more closely reflect what Gilligan (1982:62–63) terms an ethic of care (as contrasted with an ethic of justice) and appear more concerned with a self "delineated through connection," than with a "self defined through separation" (Gilligan 1982:35) or differentiation from others. Such forms of behavior, however, must be interpreted as situated presentations of self, sensitive to the contexts in which they occur. As the data presented here vividly show, within the he-said-she-said storytelling event, girls react with righteous indignation when they learn their character has been maligned. They display an intense interest in initiating and elaborating disputes about their rights (not to be talked about behind their backs) that differentiate offending and offended parties. Alignments taken up during such disputes clearly demarcate who stands within the bounds of an inner circle of friends, as well as who is relegated to that circle's periphery. Stories thus provide arenas for each gender group to negotiate concerns central to each group's notions of social organization.

Appendix A: The Children

Boys			Girls		
Name	Age	Grade	Name	Age	Grade
Tony	14	8th	Barbara	13	8th
Archie	13	8th	Bea	12	7th
Pete	13	8th	Martha	12	7th
Malcolm	13	8th	Julia	12	7th
Tokay	12	7th	Kerry	12	8th
Dave	12	7th	Annette	10	5th
Chopper	12	7th	Rochele	9	4th
William	10	5th			
Tommy	9	5th			

Appendix B: Transcription

The following example has been constructed to contain a variety of relevant transcription devices in a brief example. It is not an accurate record of an actual exchange. Features most relevant to the analysis in this paper are identified after it.

UNIV BONN

Example Number

(16)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Pam: °Twel- *Thir* [tee:::n.
Bruce: [*Fou::r*//teen. = *hh W~u-mean.
Pam: *((Chanting))* THIRteen (only) Thirtee(h)n.

↑ (0.4) ↑ ↑ ↑
11 12 13 14 15

1. **Low Volume:** A degree sign indicates that talk it precedes is low in volume.
2. **Cutoff:** A hyphen marks a sudden cutoff of the current sound. In the example, instead of bringing the word *twelve* to completion, Pam interrupts it in midcourse.
3. **Italics:** Italics indicate some form of emphasis, which may be signaled by changes in pitch and/or amplitude.
4. **Overlap Bracket:** A left bracket marks the point at which the current talk is overlapped by other talk. Thus, Bruce's "***Thir***teen" begins during the last syllable of Pam's "***Four***teen." Two speakers beginning to speak simultaneously are shown by two left brackets at the beginning of a line.
5. **Lengthening:** Colons indicate that the sound just before the colon has been noticeably lengthened.
6. **Overlap Slashes:** Double slashes provide an alternative method of marking overlap. When they are used, the overlapping talk is not indented to the point of overlap. In the example, Pam's last line begins just after the "***Four***" in Bruce's "***Four***teen."
7. **Intonation:** Punctuation symbols are used to mark intonation changes, rather than as grammatical symbols:

   - A period indicates a falling intonation contour.
   - A question mark indicates a rising intonation contour.
   - A comma indicates a falling–rising intonation contour.

8. **Latching:** The equal signs indicate "latching"; there is no interval between the end of a prior turn and the start of a next piece of talk.
9. **Inbreath:** A series of *h*'s preceded by an asterisk marks an inbreath. Without the dot, the *h*'s mark an outbreath.
10. **Rapid Speech:** Tildes (~) indicate that speech is slurred together because it is spoken rapidly.
11. **Comments:** Double parentheses enclose material that is not part of the talk being transcribed, for example, a comment by the transcriber if the talk was spoken in some special way.
12. **Silence:** Numbers in parentheses mark silences in seconds and tenths of seconds.
13. **Increased Volume:** Capitals indicate increased volume.
14. **Problematic Hearing:** Material in parentheses indicates a hearing that the transcriber was uncertain about.

15. **Breathiness, Laughter:** An *h* in parentheses indicates plosive aspiration, which could result from events such as breathiness, laughter, or crying.
16. **Citation:** Each example is preceded by a citation that locates the tape and transcript where the original data can be found.

Appendix C: Boys' Dispute Story

(19)

Tony: *Gi*mme the ***things.***
Chopper: You sh:ut up you ***big*** lips. (Y'all be**en**
hangin around with thieves.)
Tony: (***Shut*** up.)
Chopper: Don't gimme that.=I'm not ***talk***in **to**
you.
(1.4)
Tony: I'm talkin to ***y:ou***!
Chopper: Ah you better sh:ut ***up*** with your
little- ***di***:ngy sneaks.
(1.4)
Tony: I'm a ***din***gy your hea:d. =How would you
like ***that.***
(0.4)
Chopper: No you won't you little- [*h ***Guess*** what.
Jack: [(°foul) foul
thing.
(0.4)
Chopper: ***Le***mme~tell~ya. =***Guess*** what. (0.8) We
was comin home from ***prac***tice, (0.4)
and, three boys came up there (.) and
asked~us~for~money~and~Tony~did~like~
this. (0.6)
*hh *((raising hands up))*
"***I AIN'T*** GOT n(h)(hh) [o °m(h)oney."
Pete: [Ah-hih-ha,
*hh Hah-hah!
Chopper: *((snicker))* khh
( ): (° look [good.)
Pete: [*hh
Tokay: You ***di***:[d, *((smile intonation))*
Pete: [Aw:,
Chopper: *hhh~ *((snicker))* Khh [°Hey Poo(h)chie.
Malcolm: [Ah~**ha**~aa~aa **Ah~*ha*//ha**
Tokay: You there ***Mal***colm,
Chopper: *((snicker))* *hhKh He was the(hh)re.
Tokay: What'd he say ***Ch***opper. *((Smile
Intonation))*
Chopper: *((snicker))* *hKh Yeah.=
Tony: =***Y***ou was there [To***kay***!
Chopper: [*hih *hih

Chopper: Lemme~tell ya, An h(h)e sai(hh)d,
Tokay: ***WH:EN***! =
Chopper: =“***I*** ain't got no(h) mo[(h)ney.”
Tony: [**Member=**
Pete: =[[Whew::,
Tony: [[that night when we was goin[there,
Chopper: [***((snicker))*** **Khh**
Tony: and[them boys came down the street,
Chopper: [***((snicker))*** Khhh!
Tony: ***I*** ain't ***rai***:sed my hands[up.
Chopper: [Go
ahead.=You're gonna say it- ***I*** know:.
*hh ***Di***dn't he g'like this? (0.4)
“***I ain***'t go(hh)t
no(hh)n[(h)e.”
Malcolm: [Ah~***ha***~ha~ha~ha~ha~ha
Chopper: ***((snicker))*** *hkh
Malcolm: Aw:::::
Chopper: ***H*** ***((snicker))*** KHH
Malcolm: ((***baby voice***)) “***I ain***'t got no money.”
Ah-[ha-ha.
Chopper: [***((snicker))*** Khhhhheh!
Tony: If ***he*** had money. If [he had ***m***oney
Chopper: [***hihh**
Tony: [[and he said he didn't=
Chopper: [[*hih
Tony: =them boys kicked his b'hi(hh)nd. °eh heh
Chopper: ***I*** ain't ***had*** no mon- ***I*** only had a penny
they didn't even ***find*** it.
(0.4)
Jack: °mm***Yeah.***
(0.8)
Chopper: At least I didn't go up there and say,
(1.2)
Chopper: [[“I ***ain***'t got none.”
Tony: [[***We***ll there'd be some problems if ***he***
came found it ***did***n't it.
Chopper: Nope. And[guess what Mal[***colm.***
Malcolm: [°He said [said
((baby voice)) “I ain't got no money.”=
Chopper: =Guess what Malcolm.=Them boys out
there said, *hh “Your football player
ca:n't, play,” And guess where ***To***:ny
was. (0.6) All the way ar(h)ound the
cor(hh)n(h)er. (0.5) *hih [Remember=
( ): [°What?
Chopper: =that night? Them little boys said
“That little p:***unk*** can't fight?” And
Tony started ***r***unnin across the s:treet.

91 Jack: Hey:[:,
92 Chopper: [Not e[ven waitin for em.=
93 Ray: [eh~***heh***~heh.
94 Tony: =WHAT?!
95 Chopper: Member that time, (0.5) Lemme see **we**
96 got about- where we was playin
97 basketball at? (1.2) And//you had
98 Tony: Where ***who*** w'playin basketball at.
99 Chopper: You know, where we were playin
100 basketball? And you wasn't even waitin
101 for us, you was up there r:unnin,
102 Until you got way around the
103 corner.=Them boys said, those boys kep,
104 those boys kept on (***I*** said,) "Hey Tony
105 what you runnin for." He said "***I*** ain't
106 runnin." That boys woulda come next to
107 ***me*** I(h) woul(hh)da, *((snicker))* *hKkh I **woulda**
108 k:icked their ***a***ss. And//Tony was
109 was all the way ar(h)ound the corner.
110 Tony: I don't know what ***you talkin*** bout.
111 Jack: °Talkin//bout bein ***kick***ed. That's
112 what it//is.
113 Pete: Member that time,
114 Tony: I don't remember//what ***you talk***in
115 about.
116 Pete: that we was goin around the corner on
117 Poplar?
118 Chopper: "***I ain***'t got no(hh) mo(hh)ney."
119 Pete: That boy down there
120 Malcolm: ((baby voice)) "***I ain***'t got no money."
121 "I ain't got no money."
122 Tokay: Remember when that boy down in the
123 park, °that time, when he was talkin
124 to [Tony for
125 Tony: [What he-When is he talkin [about.
126 Chopper: [OH YEAH!
127 (0.5)
128 Chopper: "I ***know*** you ain't talkin to
129 ***me***!" Down in the park! *((snicker))* Khh~heh!
130 Pete: eh~heh~heh.
131 Chopper: *hh We was down the park, (0.7) and we
132 was- (0.6) and wh- wh- what was he
133 ***do***in,=
134 Tony: =You can ask ***Ralph*** what happened down
135 the ***park*** Malcolm Johnson cuz ***this***
136 sucker ***lie*** too much.
137 Chopper: ***Uh*** UH. we was playin- (0.3) we was
138 makin a ***darn raft***, (0.5) and them
139 boys (.) was throwin things at Tony,

(0.7) And ***he*** said, (0.6) "Boy!" And-
lemme tell.=(***They***) were talkin to that
little boy. Th'he said, "Boy you
better watch them ***things!***" That big
boy said,
Tony: °What ones.=
Chopper: ="I ***know*** (he ain't talkin to ***me***!)" I
said (0.4) and he said-
"NO: not [you: du(hh)mmy-"
Tony: [What things.
Pete: Ah:~***heh***~heh~[heh.
Chopper: ["The ***li***ttle bo:(hh)y."
Eh~heh~heh. *((snicker))* *hKh
Malcolm: That-
Chopper: That big boy woulda kicked his butt!
Malcolm: That ***li***[ttle boy.
Tony: [That's a lie ***too*** Chopper.
Chopper: Why you talk to that ***li***ttle boy.
(1.0)
Tony: ***I*** said ***what***?
Chopper: Got you got you ***got*** you!
(1.2)
Chopper: Say Hey heh ***heh***
heh, Hey hey HEY! HEY HEY ***HEY***! "I
ain't go(h)t no(h)" (0.8) Da:g!

Appendix D: Girls' Dispute Story

(20)

((Bea, Barbara, and Julia are sitting on Julia's steps discussing substitute teachers during a teacher's strike.))

Barb: ***Teach*** us some little ***six***th grade work.
(0.4) ***That***'s how these volun***teers*** doin
now. A little um, *h ***Ad***din 'n all
that.
Bea: ***Y***ahp. ***Y***ahp.//Yahp. An when
we was in the-
Barb: Twenny and twenny is // forty an all
that.
Bea: ***How*** bout when we was in-
Barb: Oo I ***hate*** that junk.
Bea: ***How-how***- h- um, uh h- h- how **about me**
and ***Jul***ia, 'h and all them um, **and**
Kerry, 'h [and all them-
Julia: [***Is***n't ***Ke***rry ***mad*** at
me or ***s:om***p'm,
(0.4)

17 Bea: ***I'on'*** kn//ow.
18 Barb: Kerry~***al***ways~mad~at somebody.
19 °***I***['on' care.
20 Julia: [Cuz- cuz cuz I wouldn't, cu:z she
21 ain't put my ***name*** on that ***pa***per.
22 Bea: ***I*** know cuz [OH yeah. ***Oh*** yeah.
23 Barb: [An next she,
24 (0.3)
25 Barb: [[talk~bout~***peo***ple.
26 Bea: [***She*** said, ***She*** said that um, (0.6)
27 that (0.8) if that ***girl*** wasn't
28 there=***You*** know that girl that always
29 makes those funny jokes, 'h Sh'aid if
30 that ***girl*** wasn't there ***you*** wouldn't be
31 ***ac***tin, (0.4) a:ll ***stu***pid like that.
32 [(°Sh-
33 Julia: [But ***w***as I actin stupid w[ith them?
34 Bea: [Nope, no,=And
35 she- and she said that ***you*** sai:d, that,
36 "***Ah***: go tuh-" (0.5) somp'm like [tha:t.
37 Julia: [°No I
38 didn't.
39 Bea: She's- an uh- somp'm like ***that***. She's-
40 Barb: Ke[rry ***al***ways say somp'm.=When you=
41 Bea: [She-
42 Barb: =***jump*** in her ***face*** she gonna de***ny***
43 it.
44 Bea: Yah:p Y[ahp.=An she said, 'h An- and
45 Julia: [°Right on.
46 Bea: she said, hh that ***you*** wouldn't be ***ac***tin
47 ***li***ke ***that*** aroun- around ***peo***ple.
48 Julia: So: ***she*** wouldn' be ***ac***tin like ***that***
49 wi' that ***other*** girl.=***She*** the one picked
50 ***me*** to ***sit*** wi'them.='h She said,["Julia you
51 Bea: [Y:ahp.
52 Julia: sit with her, 'h and I'll sit with her,
53 'h an Bea an- an Bea an-
54 an an [Martha sit together."
55 Barb: [SHE TELLIN Y'ALL WHERE TA ***SIT***
56 AT?
57 (0.2)
58 Bea: An so ***we*** sat together, An s- and s- and
59 so Julia was ju:st s:ittin right
60 there.=An the girl, an- an- the girl:
61 next to her? 'h and the girl kept on
62 getting back up. 'h Ask the teacher
63 can she go t'the bathroom. An Julia
64 say she don' ***wa***nna go t'the bathroom
65 w'her. An m- And Julia w'just sittin
66 up there actin- actin:, ac- ac- actin

67 sensible. An she up- and she up there
68 talking bout, and she- *I* said, I s'd I
69 s'd I s'd "This is how I'm- I'm gonna
70 put Julia ***na***:me down here." Cu- m- m-
71 Cuz she had made a pa:ss you know. 'h
72 She had made a ***pa***:ss.
73 (0.2)
74 Bea: [For all us to go down to the bathroom.
75 Barb: [Y'all go down t'the bathroom?
76 Bea: For ALLA-yeah. Yeah. For u:m,(0.4)
77 for- for alla us- t'go to the
78 bathroom.=I's'd-I's'd "***How***: ***co***:me you
79 ain't put Julia name down here." *h So
80 she said, she said *((whiny defensive tone))*
81 "That other girl called 'er so.
82 she no:t ***wi***:th ***u***:s, so,"
83 That's what she said too. (0.2) So *I*
84 said, s- so I snatched the paper
85 wi'her. I said wh- when we were playin
86 wi'that paper?
87 Julia: I'm a I'm a ***t***ell her about herself
88 to***da*** [y. Well,
89 Bea: [Huh? huh remember when we're
90 snatchin that [paper.
91 Barb: [An she gonna tell you
92 another story ***a***ny***way***. // (Are you gonna
93 talk to her today?)
94 Bea: But she ain't even put your ***na***me down
95 there. *I* just put it ***down*** there. Me
96 and Martha put it down.=An I said, and
97 she said "***Gi***mme-that-paper.=I don't
98 wanna have her ***name down*** here." I s-I
99 s- I s- I said "She woulda allowed ***you***
100 name (if you star:ed)."
101 (1.0)
102 Julia: I said Kerry "°How come you ain't put my
103 name."
104 Barb: Here go B//ea, "uh uh uh well-"
105 Julia: "You put that ***o***ther girl (name down)
106 didn't you. I thought ***you*** was gonna
107 have-owl: a hall pass with that ***o***ther
108 girl." That's °what Kerry said. I said
109 (What's-her-problem.) OO: r'mind me a-
110 you old b:aldheaded Kerry.
111 Bea: *I* should say it in fronta her ***face***.
112 (0.8) Bal: head.
113 Barb: Hey member when what we did th(h)e
114 o(h)ther ti(***h***)me.

(21)

((The following occurs 45 seconds later after Julia has gone inside.))

Bea: She shouldn't be ***writ***in things, about me. (0.5) An so- An so- so she said ***Bar***bara, Barbara need ta ***go*** somewhere.

(1.0)

Barb: Well you ***te***ll her to ***c***ome say it in front of my fa:ce. (0.6) And ***I***'ll ***p***ut ***her*** somewhere. (3.8) An Barbara ain't got nuttin t'do with ***what.***

Bea: ***Write***- um doin um, [that- that thing.

Barb: [What do y'***all*** got ta do with it.

Bea: Because because um, ***I*** don't know what we got to do with it. Bu[t she said-

Barb: [W'll ***she*** don't know what ***she talk***in bout.

Bea: But- but she- but we ***di:d*** have somp'm to do because we was ***ma:d*** at ***her.*** Because we didn't ***like*** her no more. (0.6) And ***that's*** why, (0.6) Somebody the one [that use-

Barb: [So, she got anything t'say she come say it in front of my face. (1.0) I better not ***see Ke***rry today. (2.5) I ***ain***'t gonna say- I'm~a~say "Kerry ***what you say*** about m[e. She gonna say

Bea: [*((whiny))* (Nyang)

Barb: I ain't ***say*** nuttin."

Bea: (behind her face) she meant- sh'ent You know you- you know what. She- she cha[gin it.

Barb: [If I ***wro***:te somp'm then I ***wrote*** it.=Then I got somp'm to do with it.=W'then I ***wrote*** it.

(0.5)

Bea: And ***she*** said, an- an- she u:m ah whah.(I'm sorry oh.) I'm a walk you home. ***She*** said that um,

Barb: She get on my ***n***erves.

Bea: She said that um,=

Barb: =***Nown*** I got somp'm ta write about her ***now***::.

(0.5)

Bea: Oh yeah.=She sai:d tha:t, (0.4) that

um, you wouldn't have nuttin ta do with it, and every***thing***, and ***plus***, (0.5)
Bea: [um,
Barb: [WELL IF I WROTE SOME'N *I* HAD SOMP'M- T'***DO*** with it.
Bea: An she said, *I* wanna see what I was gettin read ta say, (2.0) °And um,
Barb: She gonna de***ny*** every ***word***.=Now ***watch***. I c'n put more up there for her the:n.
(2.0)
Bea: [***What***,
Barb: [An in magic marker °so there.
(0.6)
Bea: Oh yeah, oh yeah.=***She*** was. ***she***- w's ***she*** was in Rochele: house you know, and she said that um, that- I heard her say um, (0.4) um um uh uh "***Jul***ia said y'all been talking behind my back."=I said I'm a- I'm a say "H:oney, I'm gl***a***:d. that ***you*** know I'm ***talk***in be***hind your back***. Because *I*- because *I meant* for you to know ***any***way." An she said, I- said "I don't have to talk behind your back.=I can talk in front of your ***face too***." // And she said-
Barb: That's all I write. I didn't write that. *I* wrote ***that***.
(1.2)
Bea: Over here. *I* write ***this-I*** cleared it ***off***. Because ***Lan***da ***wrote*** and I- *h, [and *I* made it *bi*gger.
Barb: [Mmm,
(0.2)
Bea: So she said, [That first-
Barb: [And the other I did with my finger on the cars [and all that.
Bea: [An-so-*I* said, an- an so we were playin ***school*** you know at Rochele's house? And ***boy we tore*** her ***all***- we said, I got uh y'know [I was doin some signs?
Barb: [I better ***not*** go around an catch Kerry.
Bea: And Ro***chele*** called her ***bald***headed right~in~fronta~her face. She said "You ***bald***headed ***thing***." Because she was messin with Rochele.=I said, and so she said, you know we were playin around with her? And she said "You ***bald***headed

thing."=She said, "Rochele YOU DON'T
LIKE IT?" I said I said [that's why-
Barb: [Yeah she gonna
base in some little kid's [face.
Bea: [Yeah. And
she said,// I said AND I SAID= I said I
said "What~are~ya doin to her."
Barb: I better not see Kerry to***day***. I'm a
say "Kerry ***I*** heard you was talkin bout
me."
Bea: I a s[ay-
Barb: [Then she gonna say "I ain't- ***What***
I say about you." I say "Ain't none
yer ***busi***ness what you said.=You come
say it in front a my ***fa***ce since what=
you been tell everybody ***else***." (0.4)
((*falsetto*)) OO:, And I can put more
and I'm a put some- some °bad words in
to***day***.
(0.5)
Bea: ***She*** said, and ***she*** was saying.
[she said-
[***Now***:
n I got somp'm to write [ab***out***.
Bea: [***I*** said,
Barb: I better not catch you t'day.=I'm a
tell her butt o:ff.
(0.4)
Barb: An if she //get ***bad*** at me:***e***: I'm a,
punch her in the eye.
Bea: ***I*** said, ***I*** s- ***I*** said, I said, Hey
Barbara I said, "Why don't you" um, I
s-I-I-I- and *"**Why** don' you stop
messing with her." And she said she
said "She called me baldheaded."
=I said,
Barb: That's right.
Bea: =[An so-
Barb: [That's her name so call her name back.
Bea: ***Guess*** what. ***Guess*** what. Uh- we- w-
an we was up finger waving?=And I said,
I said, I said I said *((does motion))*
like that.=I did.
hh An [just like that.='h and I said=
Barb: [OO::,
Bea: an I an I was doin all those ***sig***:ns in
her face and everything? (0.5) 'h And
she said that um, (1.0) And then she-
an you- and she s- °She- roll her eye

like that, 'h And she was leanin
against- I- I said, I s'd I s'd Is'd I
said, *"Hey* girl don't lean against that
thing cuz it's ***weak enough.***" *h And
she said and she said 'h she- she did
like that.=She say, "Tch!" *((rolling
eyes))* // like that. I s'd- I said "You
c'd ***roll*** your eyes all you ***want*** to.
Barb: Yeah if somebody do that to her-
And if you know what?
Bea: [Cuz I'm ***tell***in you. (0.5)
Tellin- I'm not ***ask***in you." (0.4) An I
ain't say no ***plea***:se ***ei***ther.
Barb: mm hmm.
Bea: *((chews fingers))*
Barb: ***Don***'t do that. (1.5) W'll I'm tellin ya
I better not catch ***Kerry*** to***day***. Cuz if
I catch her I'm gonna give ***her*** a wor:d
from my ***mou***th. (0.6) An if she ***j***ump in
my ***face*** I'm a punch her in her ***fa***:ce.
(1.5) And she can talk behind my ba:ck
she better say somp'm in front of my
face.
(1.5)
((Boy walks down the street))
Barb: OO: there go the ***Tack***. 'h 'hh 'hh Eh
That's your na(h)me.
(1.5)
((Barbara starts down the street))
Barb: °h See y'all.
Bea: ***See*** you.

Notes

This chapter originally appeared in *Discourse Processes* 13(1990):1.35–71.

1. For a more complete description of this fieldwork see M. H. Goodwin (1990).
2. A more extensive analysis of the formation of teams, as well as speech activities, occurring in this encounter appears in C. Goodwin and M. H. Goodwin (1990).
3. The complete cycle of stories from which these data were selected appears in Appendix C. Subsequent line numbers related to this example refer to line numbers in the expanded version of this story in Appendix C.
4. The series of stories from which these data were taken appears in Appendix D. Line numbers in this fragment correspond to line numbers in the more expanded sequence of which this story is a part, which appears in Appendix D.

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32

The Terms of Agreement: Indexing Epistemic Authority and Subordination in Talk-in-Interaction

John Heritage and Geoffrey Raymond

Social psychologists have long noted that social actions involve persons in commitments that others should recognize and validate. Perhaps the preeminent theorist of this perspective was Erving Goffman, who observed in "On Face-Work,"

> [W]hen a person volunteers a statement or message, however trivial or commonplace, he commits himself and those he addresses, and in a sense places everyone present in jeopardy. By saying something, the speaker opens himself up to the possibility that the intended recipients will affront him by not listening or will think him forward, foolish, or offensive in what he has said (1967:37).

And in *Relations in Public,*

> [L]et a participant whom others would rather see silent make a statement, and he will have expressed the belief that he has a full right to talk and is worth listening to, thereby obliging his listeners to give a sign, however begrudging and however mean, that he is qualified to speak (1971:95).

Goffman conceptualized these obligations in the concept of "face," which he conceived as central to the organization of social interaction. This work was extended by Brown and Levinson (1987); drawing on Durkheim's (1915) distinction between negative and positive rites, they distinguished between negative

face (the desire to be unimpeded) and positive face (the desire for approval, appreciation, or ratification).[1] Brown and Levinson operationalized face-work into a set of specifically linguistic strategies that embody connections between language use, social distance, power, and related variables. In this way, connections are made between *face* processes embodied in interaction and facets of social and cultural *identity*; both Goffman's theory and Brown and Levinson's extension are at pains to distinguish these notions. Identity is specific and local to persons, groups, and cultures, whereas the desire to be unimpeded and to be regarded positively – the two central components of face – embody putatively universal elements of human conduct and are conceived as basic to its organization.

Goffman's theoretical conception of face as situated within "the flow of events in the encounter" (1967:7) invited an empirical focus on sequences of talk-in-interaction; these, as Schegloff (1992) observes, are a primordial site of human sociality. One domain of such research, generally recognized as converging with Goffman's concerns, is the management of conversational actions, such as agreement and disagreement, that are clearly consequential for social solidarity. Conversation analysts have used the term *preference organization* to refer to the set of practices through which persons manage courses of action that either promote or undermine social solidarity (Holtgraves 1992; Lerner 1996; Pomerantz 1978; 1984; Sacks 1987; Schegloff 1988, forthcoming; Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977). The most prominent organizational consequence of these practices is to maximize the likelihood of affiliative, socially solidary actions, and to minimize the consequences of disaffiliative, socially divisive ones (Heritage 1984a:265–80).

In addition to the organization of preference, however, participants' concerns with face can be found in the management of rights and responsibilities related to knowledge and information. For example, conversationalists treat one another as possessing privileged access to their own experiences and as having specific rights to narrate them (Pomerantz 1980; Sacks 1984); journalists distinguish between firsthand and derivative access to breaking news as relevant for the rights to describe it (Raymond 2000; Roth 2002); callers to 911 emergency services report matters in quite distinctive terms if they are bystanders to an incident rather than victims (Whalen and Zimmerman 1990); and patients offer medical diagnoses to physicians only under relatively particular circumstances (Gill 1998; Gill and Maynard forthcoming; Heritage and Robinson forthcoming). In each of these cases, the distribution of rights and responsibilities regarding what participants can accountably know, how they know it, whether they have rights to describe it, and in what terms is directly implicated in organized practices of speaking.[2]

In this paper we consider sequences in which participants offer evaluative assessments of states of affairs. We focus on how relative rights to perform these evaluations are indexed within the talk. Although these sequences are occupied mainly with agreement and are fundamentally affiliative, we show that they can involve complex face considerations relating to the management of knowledge and information. We distinguish between assessments that initiate an assessment sequence as "first position assessments," and assessments that are designed to be responsive to these as "second position assessments."[3]

In sequences of interaction, first position assessments establish a representational field in which second assessments will be found to position themselves in some fashion: through agreement, disagreement, or adjustment (Heritage 2002a, Pomerantz 1984). In this sense, first position assessments offer a terrain within which agreement will be sought. We propose that these assessments also carry an implied claim that the speaker has primary rights to evaluate the matter assessed. For example, as we demonstrate, persons offering first assessments may work to defeat any implication that they are claiming primary rights to evaluate the matter at hand. Conversely, persons who find themselves producing a responsive assessment may wish to defeat the implication that their rights in the matter are secondary to those of a first speaker. Because assessments are always produced in real time and are unavoidably produced as first and second positioned actions, they bring unavoidable relevance to issues concerning relative epistemic rights to evaluate states of affairs.

Our primary objective is to explicate the management of these rights, and the means by which this management is achieved. To do so, we focus on the intersection between differential rights to make assessments, turn design, and sequential positioning. As we demonstrate here, persons in the midst of jointly evaluating states of affairs are concerned not only with agreement, but also with who is agreeing with whom (Schegloff 1996a:177) – or, as we shall have it, "the terms of agreement."

Assessments and Their Epistemics

The assessment of states of affairs generally requires some form of access to the state of affairs being assessed (Pomerantz 1984). In (1), for example, a second speaker struggles to find a basis for affiliating with a first assessment whose very construction ("you sh'd see that house E(h)mma") denies the access necessary for building agreement:

(1) [NB:IV:10:2]

1 Lot: [h h] Jeeziz Chris' you sh'd see that house E (h) mma yih'av
2 ↓no idea.h[hmhh
3 Emm: [I bet it's a drea:m.

Emma's response in line 3 ("I bet it's a drea:m.") projects an agreement with Lottie's assessment of the house, while simultaneously thematizing her lack of firsthand experience. Lacking that experience, she manages raw affiliation with Lottie's evaluation by an utterance that expresses, at best, a simulacrum of agreement.

While (1) illustrates the limits of verbalized agreement without access, most assessment sequences incorporate the presumption of concurrent or serial joint access to a referent state of affairs. Such access can be first-order and immediate, as in (2):

(2) [JS:II:28]

1 J: -> T's tsuh beautiful day out isn't it?
2 L: -> Yeh it's jus' gorgeous . . .

Alternatively, it can be second-order and mediated, as in (3). Here Jon and Lyn are a couple who have seen the film *Midnight Cowboy*, while Eve has not:

(3) [JS:II:61]

1 Jon: We saw Midnight Cowboy yesterday- or [suh- Friday.
2 Eve: [Oh?
3 Lyn: Didju s- you saw that, [it's really good.
4 Eve: [No I haven't seen it
5 -> Jo saw it 'n she said she f- depressed her
6 Eve: -> ter [ribly
7 Jon: -> [Oh it's [terribly depressing.
8 Lyn: -> [Oh it's depressing.

As these two examples indicate, access to assessable objects is ranked. First-order access entails rights to assess, which can outweigh the rights of second-order access. In (2) the initial assessment of the weather is marked by its present-tense declarative form as drawn from direct and current experience; in this context of face-to-face interaction, such experience is equally available to the recipient. The co-interactant responds with an agreement ("Yeh") and an upgraded second assessment with comparable features. In (3), by contrast, Eve's assessment of *Midnight Cowboy* at lines 5–6 is marked as based in the account of a third party. Jon and Lyn's responsive assessments, however, renew the claim to direct, first-order access to the movie (first asserted in line 1), and are marked by the "oh"-prefaces as asserting stronger rights to assess it (Heritage 2002a).

First and Second Position Assessments and Rights to Assess

Participants orient to first and second position as involved in claims about rights to make assessments. This is most apparent in cases where there is some incompatibility between the epistemic rights that a speaker wishes to claim and the position in which the assessment is offered. In (4), for example, Norma offers a downgraded first assessment of a third party:

(4) [SBL 2-1-8:5]

1 Bea: hh hhh We:ll, h I wz gla:d she c'd come too las'ni:ght=
2 Nor: -> =Sh[e seems such a n]ice little [l a dy]
3 Bea: [(since you keh)] [dAwf'l] ly nice l*i'l
4 p*ers'n. t hhhh hhh We:ll, I [: j's]
5 Nor: [I thin]k evryone enjoyed jus . . .

Just before this sequence, it emerged that Norma had met the person assessed in line 2 – a longtime acquaintance of Bea – for the first time (see Example (14)

downgraded assessment "She seems such a nice little lady" and Bea's declaratively asserted agreement "dAwf'lly nice l*i'l p*ers'n." By downgrading her claimed access with the evidential verb "seems" (Chafe and Nichols 1986),[4] Norma manages her initial assessment so as to defeat any epistemic priority that might have been inferred sheerly from its first positioning.

The reverse contingency is evident in (5) below. Here Abe and Ben are in the midst of a discussion prompted by Abe's announcement that he has acquired a Burmese cat. As emerged earlier in the conversation, Ben's knowledge of Burmese cats is second-order: it is derived from a neighbor's ownership of the breed:

(5) [TCIIA:1]

1	Abe:		It's the- only cat I ever saw that chased do:gs.
2			(0.2)
3	Ben:		[ehh hhu [hh huhh]
4	Abe:		[(Hadda) [go out'n r] escue a dog thet wz eight times bigger'n
5			he wz th's [morning.
6	Ben:		[e- .hhhhhh Hurra: :y fer the Burme:se.
7	Abe:		e-huh-huh- [heh- [heh-he:h,]
8	Ben:		[F : : : [ight'n fo]o:ls.
9			(0.2)
10	Abe:		Pard'n,
11			(0.3)
12	Ben:	->	.hhh They're fight'n fools those Burmese,
13	Abe:	->	Oh I know 'e is.

The target sequence of assessments (lines 12–13) emerges from Ben's effort (lines 6 and 8) to affiliate with Abe's illustration of his cat's fighting prowess. His clearly responsive "Hurra::y fer the Burme:se." is appreciated with laughter, while his appended characterization of Burmese cats as "F:::ight'n foo:ls." is treated as problematic with "Pard'n,".[5] As a result, Ben's original phrasal assessment, which initially was produced in second position to Abe's first positioned assessment (and therefore fitted to Ben's rights to assess Burmese cats), comes to be produced as a fully sentential declarative assessment ".hhh They're fight'n fools those Burmese," (line 12). In this context, Abe comes to treat Ben as asserting rights to assess Burmese cats that are equivalent to his own, and it is this putative claim of equivalence that Abe resists. Three features of Abe's turn embody this resistance. First, he shifts the terms of assessment from Ben's assessment of the breed in general ("those Burmese"), to the cat which he owns and has primary rights to assess. Second, the "oh"-prefaced design of this assessment indexes his claim to primary rights in this matter (Heritage 2002a). Finally his use of, and stress on, the word *know* underscores his claims in this regard.

As the talk in these sequences demonstrates, participants work to manage the relationship between rights to assess and sequential position by manipulating the design of the turns out of which their assessments are built. In the following sections we examine speakers' resources for managing this intersection of rights to assess and sequential position.

Assessments in First Position: Resources for Indexing Epistemic Rights

Speakers can design first positioned assessments to create three basic forms that modulate the extent of their claimed epistemic rights. Using these resources, producers of first positioned assessments may manage face claims by asserting the socioepistemic rights associated with particular social identities, or by deferring to the rights associated with the identities of others.

Unmarked first assessments. In unmarked assessments, speakers deploy simple declarative evaluations that claim unmediated access to the assessable. These utterances contain no language that either strengthens or weakens the declarative claim that is made. For example, in excerpts (6) and (7), speakers assess their immediate experience.

(6) |VIYMC 1:4]

1 J: Let's feel the water. Oh, it . . .
2 R: -> It's wonderful. It's just right. It's like bathtub water.

(7) |NB VII:2]

1 Emm: =We're painting like ma:d in th' kitchen=
2 -> =a:nd oh evrything's workin out so pretty here

In (8) the first speaker deploys similar resources to evaluate past experiences which were shared with the coparticipant:

(8) |SBL 2-2-3:5]

1 Chl: -> We:ll it was[fu:n Clai[re, ((smile voice))
2 Cla: [hhh [Yea: : [:h,]
3 Chl: [°M]m°

A similar pattern is evident in (9), where the assessment concerns a joint acquaintance:

(9) |NB:IV.7:-44]

1 A: -> Adeline's such a swell [gal
2 P: [Oh God, whadda gal. You know it!

Across these sequences, the first speakers' declarative utterances (arrowed) flatly assert evaluations of states of affairs, and clearly do so on the basis of direct access to them.

Downgraded first assessments. Contrasting with these are assessments designed to exhibit downgraded epistemic access to a state of affairs. Two main resources can be used to accomplish this. First are evidentials (also see (4) above), through which speakers mark mediated access to a referent, and thus downgrade the claims made by the accompanying assessment. In (10), for example, Hyla has been describing a play that she and Nancy have tickets to see:

(10) [HG II:6]

1	Nan:	->	Kinyih tell me what it's abou:t?=
2			
3			. . . . . [27 lines of description deleted]
4			
5	Hyl:		=.hh En she's fixed up, (0.4) en she meets this gu:y, .hh a:n'
6			yihknow en he's (.) rilly gorgeous'n eez rilly nice en
7			evrythi[:ng bud li]ke=
8	Nan:		[Uh h u :h,]
9	Hyl:		=.hh He's ah .hh Hollywood (0.3) s:sta:r's son yihknow who wz
10			a mista:[ke en they [put im in'n [Academy,]
11	Nan:	->	[O o this [s o u n d s [so goo: :___]_: : [d?
12	Hyl:		[school, .hh buh
13			wai:t.='n then, .hhm (0.2) .tch en the: (w)- the mother's .hh
14			sister is a real bigot.

It is clear from line 1 that Hyla is the better informed about the play. This asymmetry is preserved in Nancy's assessment ("Oo this sounds so goo:::d?" at line 11; the evidential formulation of this underscores that the basis for her evaluation is premised on the information provided in Hyla's description.

A second means to downgrade an assessment involves the use of tag questions. By introducing an invitation to agree with the assessment as a feature of its surface syntax, such questions index a putatively secondary access to a referent relative to the coparticipant.[6] In (11), for example, the assessment refers to Vera's grandchildren, whose recent visit included a stopover at Jenny's house. Jenny's declaratively formulated assessment is modulated with a tag question that defers to Vera's rights to assess her own family members:

(11) [Rah 14:2]

1	Jen:		Mm[I: bet they proud o:f the fam'ly.=
2	Ver:		[Ye:s.
3	Jen:	->	=They're [a luvly family now ar'n't [they.
4	Ver:		[°Mm:.° [They are: ye[s.
5	Jen:		[eeYe[s::,
6	Ver:		[Yes,
7	Jen:		Mm: All they need now is a little girl tih complete i:t.

The tag question is positioned so as to invite response as the *first* matter to be addressed by the coparticipant. In this way, Jenny formulates her turn as (in the first instance) a question to be answered rather than as an assertion to be agreed with; thus she cedes epistemic authority in the matter to her coparticipant. The introduction of the invitation to agreement in the surface design of the utterance indexes Jenny's position that Vera has primary rights to assess her own grandchildren.

In a similar case, Norman and Ilene are dog breeders discussing the breeding potential of one of Norman's younger dogs. At line 9, Ilene invokes a comparison with Trixie, another of Norman's dogs.

(12) [Heritage 1:11:4]

1	Ile:		No well she's still a bit young though isn't [she<ah me] an: =
2	Nor:		[S h e : :]
3	Ile:		=uh [:
4	Nor:		[She wz a year: la:st wee:k.
5	Ile:		Ah yes. Oh well any time no:w [then.]
6	Nor:		[Uh:::]: [m
7	Ile:		[Ye:s.=
8	Nor:		=But she [:'s ( )]
9	Ile:	->	[Cuz Trixie started] so early [didn't sh [e,
10	Nor:	->	[°O h : : [ye:s.°=
11	Ile:		=°Ye:h°=

Ilene's assessment asserts that the dog started breeding "early" and the following tag acknowledges Norman's primary rights to assess his own dog.[7]

Upgraded first assessments. Just as assessments can be epistemically downgraded relative to a recipient's attributedly superior rights, so can they be upgraded. The primary resource for this task is the negative interrogative, as in (13):

(13) [SBL:2–1–8:5]

1	Bea:		Wz las'night th'firs'time you met Missiz Kelly?
2			(1.0)
3	Nor:		Me:t who:m?
4	Bea:		Missiz Kelly?
5	Nor:		^Ye:s. hh [Yih kno]:w what<]
6	Bea:	->	[Isn't]she a culte little thi:ng?

Here it is established at the beginning of the sequence that Bea has a more extended acquaintance with "Missiz Kelly" than does Norma (lines 1–5). Bea asserts her corollary epistemic rights in her assessment at line 6. The form of her assessment embodies this stance through the following features working in concert.

First, by virtue of its interrogative syntax, this format mandates a second assessment through the conditional relevance of a question-answer pair more strongly than would a simple declarative. Moreover, by projecting a yes/no (or type-conforming) response, it asserts command of the terms to be used by the recipient in the assessment of the referent (Raymond 2003). Finally, the negative interrogative strongly invites agreement (Heritage 2002b). It thereby invokes an established or settled position and, through that, a more extensive acquaintance with the referent and/or stronger rights to assess it.

All three of these features cooperate to establish Bea's evaluative position as "settled" or "decided" and, as part of that position, to reinforce her primary rights to assess the acquaintance in question.

In a second case, (14) below, Emma is calling to thank Margie for a recent lunch party. She extends a compliment about the occasion into a sustained and favorable evaluation of the others present. This culminates, like (13), in a positive assessment managed through a negative interrogative. Emma's assessment "e-that Pa:t isn'she a do:ll?" emerges as an Nth compliment to her co-interactant:

(14) [NB VII:1–2]

1	Emm:		=Oh honey that was a lovely luncheon I shoulda ca:lled you
2			s:soo [:ner but I:]I:[lo:ved it. Ih wz just deli:ghtfu [: 1.]=
3	Mar:		[((f)) Oh:::] [°( ) [Well]=
4	Mar:		=I wz gla [d y o u] (came).]
5	Emm:		['nd yer f:] friends] 'r so da:rli:ng,=
6	Mar:		= Oh::: [: it wz:]
7	Emm:	->	[e-that P]a:t isn'she a do: [:11?]
8	Mar:		[iY e]h

Here, perhaps in an effort to emphasize the compliment, Emma deploys a format that asserts her own epistemic primacy in relation to "Pat," the assessed party, although she acknowledges her recipient's closer relationship with her. In contrast to the previous case, then, we find a lack of fit between this claim and the actual state of the relations between the parties. This turns out to be a source of subsequent difficulty (see the discussion of (27) below).

In sum, although first assessments index a tacit claim to epistemic primacy, that claim can be modified: practices exist for asserting both upgraded and downgraded epistemic access and/or rights to assess a referent. It is clear that these practices embody selectional choices, given that an unmarked method of assessment (i.e., the use of an unqualified declarative statement), which embodies an unmarked claim of primacy, is also an available option.

Managing Epistemic Rights in Second Position Assessments

Just as first position assessments can incorporate features that index relative access to a referent, so too do second position assessments. The task of indexing relative access is complicated for second speakers by the fact that their access must be managed in relation to the claims embodied in first position assessments, and indeed to the specific practices deployed by first speakers to index those claims.

Second position assessments can take a simple declarative form, as in (15) and (16). Here the participants are jointly assessing shared social occasions. In each case these assessments conclude an extended passage of conversation about the events that are referenced, during which joint access to the events has been thoroughly established as a feature of the talk.

(15) [SBL 2–2–3:5]

1	Chl:		We:ll it was[fu:n Clai[re, ((smile voice))
2	Cla:		[hhh [Yea:: [:h,]
3	Chl:		[°M]m°
4	Chl:		[(an')
5	Cla:	->	[I enjoyed evreh minute o [f it,
6	Chl:		[Yah.

(16) [SBL:2–1–8:5]

1	Nor:		I think evryone enjoyed **jus' sitting aroun'**
2			ta::lk [ing.]
3	Bea:	->	[h h] I do too::.

4 (0.3)
5 Nor: Yihknow e-I think it's too bad we don't do that once'n
6 awhile insteada playing bri:dge er 'hh

As these examples suggest, given equal access to past events, a declarative assessment in first position invites a matching response claiming similar access.

Alternatively, second speakers can modulate their response to upgrade their claimed epistemic access to, and/or rights to assess, a referent. Two main kinds of resources are deployed to this end. First, speakers can design the second assessment so as to convey that their position on the matter is already "settled" – that is, held independently of the view that the first speaker's assessment conveys. In this way they can undercut any relative inferiority in epistemic rights that sheer "secondness" might otherwise convey; indeed, they can advance a claim to primary epistemic rights in the matter under evaluation. Second, speakers can use interrogative syntax in second position to undercut, and supplant, the "firstness" of a first assessment, and to seize the epistemic rights that accrue to that position. These resources are deployed, and their deployment is understood, in relation to the claims that are indexed in first position assessments.

Upgrading with resources that assert a position as "previously held." We discuss two resources with which speakers in second position can present an evaluation as previously held or "settled." Using these resources, producers of second positioned assessments may assert the socioepistemic rights associated with particular social identities: they may "match" the claims of downgraded first position assessments or, alternatively, may compete with epistemic priorities that may be suggested by unmarked first position assessments.

Upgrading with confirmation + agreement token: The first resource to be discussed exploits features of tag questions in downgraded first position assessments. Because a tag question (like other yes/no-type questions) makes a "yes" or a "no" relevant as the first component of a response (Raymond 2003), speakers can produce different actions by designing their responses to satisfy or defeat this expectation. For example, in the following excerpt (discussed above as excerpt (2)), the first speaker uses a tag question to downgrade a declaratively produced assessment of the weather, thereby indexing the similar rights available to a copresent participant.

(2) [JS:II:28]

1 J: -> T's tsuh beautiful day out isn't it?
2 L: -> Yeh it's jus' gorgeous . . .

In response, L agrees with J's assessment while similarly declining to assert primary rights in the matter. By initiating her turn with "Yeh", L satisfies the constraints set by J's tag question and thereby accepts the terms set by J's first position assessment (Raymond 2003). In this respect, L's responsive assessment is wholly occupied with agreement.

Alternatively, speakers can upgrade their claimed access to a referent using [confirmation + agreement token] turn format. In the following excerpt, for example, Mum describes a child in "hot water" because of a "craze" for wearing

two earrings in a single ear (lines 4–9). While the turn-initial "oh" of Lesley's response (line 10) indexes recognition of the "craze" to which Mum's answer to Lesley's question refers (Heritage 1984b), its tag question downgrades her asserted rights to assess the fashion that has landed Miriam in "hot water":

(17) [Holt 1.1:8]

1	Mum:		Miriam's going next week,
2	Les:		Ye:s: yes:.
3			(0.4)
4	Mum:		She['s been in hot water with'er Mum t'day,
5	Les:		[M-
6	Les:		Why: ;?
7	Mum:		.hh We:ll. (0.2) Uh you know (.) there's a cra:ze with the
8			girls now to have (.) a secon:d. (1.1) ring ih- a secon:d
9			uh earring in on [e ear.
10	Les:		[Oh: it's very chea:p isn't.
11	Mum:	->	It's very cheap yes'n this is u- this is what Ann said. An'
12			Ann said (0.3) she- she'll haf (.) tuh have another. (0.5)
13			.hh (.) hole in'er ear . . . ((continues story))

Mum's response takes the form of a full repeat ("It's very cheap") followed by a type conforming token ("Yes"). This response complements Lesley's stance by indexing her own primary rights as storyteller, which initially were projected by Lesley's epistemically downgraded turn. Two features of Mum's assessment work to accomplish this complementarity.

First, Lesley's epistemically downgrading tag is a "yes/no" question: like other questions of this type, it invites a "type-conforming" "Yes" or "No" response as the *first* component of any response (Raymond 2003). In this context, Mum's deferral of the "Yes" is constructed as a marked action. The placement of the agreement token ("Yes") after the partial repeat *separates* the action of agreeing from the action of "confirming" in a way that the normal ordering of response to the question ("Yes it is") does not. Whereas "Yes it is" would be understood as wholly occupied with agreement, Mum's actual response ("It's very cheap yes" . with its initial declaratively formed partial repeat, *confirms* Lesley's evaluation rather than simply *agreeing* with it. By "confirming the assertion" before "responding to the question," Mum also treats agreement with Lesley's assessment as a matter of lower priority. Thus she goes out of her way to subordinate the action of agreeing with the assessment to the assertion of her epistemic rights relative to Lesley's. Finally, Mum's ordering of the [partial repeat] and [agreement token] conveys the position that Lesley's evaluation addresses a matter on which Mum already holds a "settled" opinion which is quite independent of this occasion (Raymond 2003). In this instance, that she held this position previously is also asserted overtly by reference to what "Ann" (Miriam's mother) previously said to her (lines 11–13).

Second, if the first component of Mum's turn is designed to assert the independence and priority of her position in relation to Lesley's, the second component modulates any hint of impropriety that might be glossed from that

treatment. legitimizing Lesley's evaluation and bringing the two women's positions into alignment. This is accomplished by the production of a type-conforming token; this token, in satisfying the constraints set by Lesley's tag question, ultimately accepts the terms set by Lesley's first position assessment (Raymond 2003).

In this example, to assert priority the second speaker draws on the tag question in the prior speaker's turn. In this way she matches the prior speaker's indication of downgraded access/rights to evaluate with her own upgraded claims in the matter. This complementarity is present in a large majority of first positioned [assessment + tag question] formatted utterances in our data.[8]

In (18), the same speakers are discussing Lesley's daughter's dental problems. At line 3, the grandmother (Mum) asks if the problem is related to "eye teeth," using a format that prefers an affirmative response. Lesley's response is complex: it refers to the child's dentist as the authority for a negative response, while stating her intention to send the child to her own dentist for a second opinion (line 8). Mum's renewal of her earlier diagnostic suggestion (line 9), produced in this context of skepticism, reinvokes her earlier question-formed diagnosis while upgrading its likelihood by using a [statement + tag question] format.

(18) Holt X(C)-1-2-7 (p4, 14)

1	Les:		.hh An' I'll: get her fixed up with a de:ntist too:,
2			(0.7)
3	Mum:		Oh w't a ↓nuisance isn't ↓it. Is it ↓ey.:e tee:th?
4			(0.4)
5	Les:		.hh ↑Well the den: u-her dentist says °no:t.°
6			(0.2)
7	Mum:		[↑Hm:.
8	Les:		[.hh But I:'ll send 'er to ↓my den:tist I thi[nk
9	Mum:		[Sounds
10			↓like it ↑d'z'n't [↓it.
11	Les:	->	[.hhh It does rather yes:

Here Lesley is the one with more direct access to the daughter's medical problems: as her mother, she has primary rights to evaluate them. The downgraded rights to assess indexed by Mum's [statement + tag question] are matched by Lesley's epistemically upgraded [partial repeat + agreement] response.

Upgrading via confirmation can be accomplished by means other than partial repeats. Excerpt (19) involves a further case, in which the neighbor (Jenny: also see Example (11)) assesses a member of Vera's family (her son Bill) in first position. As in the prior sequences, Jenny's subordinate rights are indexed in a [statement + tag question!] formatted assessment:

(19) [Rah 14:6]

1	Ver:	=Jillian, she c'n be a little nasty little bi [tch.
2	Jen:	[Well you w'r
3		say: ↑ing thez something in that_=It's a sha:me i [sn't i:t.]
4	Ver:	[Yeh a::n]d-

5 Ver: even Jean said she couldn't do eh uh she said she's alw'z
6 glad when they go:.
7 Jen: Yeh .h well of course you see Bill is so good wih th'm ez
8 well is [n't h [e:.
9 Ver: -> [.kl [That's ri:ght yes.

Similar to the repeats deployed in the prior excerpts, Vera's "That's right" response treats "confirmation" as the primary business of the response, before going on to agreement with "Yes." In addition, the formulation "That's right" more overtly takes an epistemically authoritative stance in relation to Jenny than do the earlier partial repeats.

In these examples, speakers achieve epistemic alignment by downgrading rights to assess in first position assessments and upgrading them in second position. The [confirmation + agreement] format is most commonly used in response to interrogatively formed assessments, particularly those deploying tag questions. This distribution can be understood as a product of the specific set of resources that tag questions make available and relevant. An assessment with a tag question appended offers the recipient an opportunity to disentangle confirmation and agreement as distinct activities in a responding turn. Speakers can simply agree (e.g., "Yes" or "Yes, they are"). Alternatively, by inverting the order of a confirmation and an agreement token, speakers can treat answering and agreement as separable activities and can exploit their separation to assert their epistemic supremacy.

Upgrading with "oh"-prefaced second assessments: A second practice for epistemically upgrading second assessments is "oh"-prefacing. In these cases, the change-of-state sense of "oh" (Heritage 1984b, 1998) is used to index epistemic independence and priority, relative to a first assessment (Heritage 2002a). In contrast to the practice of confirming in turn-initial position described above, which normally exploits an earlier tag question, "oh"-prefaced second assessments are much less constrained in the contexts of their occurrence.

In (20), as noted earlier, Norman is the owner of the dog "Trixie," whom Ilene evaluates (line 9) as having "started so early." This assessment is followed by a tag question which downgrades her epistemic access to this information relative to Norman's.

(20) [Heritage 1:11:4]

1 Ile: No well she's still a bit young though isn't [she<ah me] an:=
2 Nor: [S h e : :]
3 Ile: =uh[:
4 Nor: [She wz a year: la:st wee:k.
5 Ile: Ah yes. Oh well any time no:w [then.]
6 Nor: [Uh:::]: [m
7 Ile: [Ye:s.=
8 Nor: = But she [:'s ( )]
9 Ile: -> [Cuz Trixie started] so early [didn't sh[e,
10 Nor: -> [°O h : :[ye:s.°=
11 Ile: =°Ye:h°=

Simultaneous with the tag question, Norman's "Oh:: ye:s." asserts epistemic priority on the issue. "Oh"-prefacing here conveys a "change of state of orientation" in response to Ilene's assessment. This is a systematic way of claiming that a speaker has independent access to, and already holds a position regarding, the referent. "Oh"-prefacing is thus a resource through which a second speaker can convey that the assessment which follows is independent of the "here and now" of current experience and the prior speaker's evaluation. It achieves this outcome through a "change of state semantics," which conveys that the first assessment has occasioned a review, recollection, and renewal of the speaker's previous experience and judgment, and that this forms the basis for the second assessment (Heritage 2002a). As with [confirmation + agreement], "oh"-prefacing functions to convey superior knowledge of, and/or rights to assess, the matter under discussion.

The following case (21) vividly illustrates this usage. Gay is giving Jeremy a German telephone number. After she has recited 11 digits, thus exceeding the norm (during the 1980s) for a (British) intracountry call, Jeremy comments (line 13) on the length of the number, prefacing his comment with "Gosh." This expression indicates that, for him, this is something new, notable, or surprising. Here Gay could have responded with a simple agreement, which, as in (15) and (16) above, would have conveyed that her agreement was grounded in the "here and now" common experience of an interminable telephone number. Instead Gay begins her response with "Oh it doe:s":

(21) [Heritage:0I:7:3]

1	Gay:		So the ↑number **is (0.2) oh: one oh::.**
2	Jer:		Oh one oh:,
3			(1.0)
4	Jer:		Yeup,
5	Gay:		↑Four ni:ne,
6			(0.5)
7	Jer:		Ri:ght?
8	Gay:		Sev'n three, u-six o:ne?**hh**
9			(0.6)
10	Jer:		Sev'n three: six o:ne?
11			(0.3)
12	Gay:		Ei:ght ni:ne,
13	Jer:	->	°Gosh°it goe:s (.) goes on'n on
14	Gay:	->	Oh it doe:s Germany doe:s.

Two aspects of Gay's "Oh it doe:s" treat Jeremy's remark as reviving an earlier observation of the same type that she had made independently of this occasion. Thereby they convey that Gay, in contrast to Jeremy, finds the length of the number unsurprising. First, as noted earlier, the "oh"-preface indexes prior and independent access to this phenomenon. Second, the partial repeat ("it does"), by confirming rather than simply agreeing with Jeremy's remark, underscores this stance (Stivers forthcoming). By these means Gay also manages

to indicate that she is an "old hand" at phoning abroad. In addition, Gay continues with a turn component that appears to be designed to further suggest her expertise about foreign telephone calls. Her postpositioned "adjusting" component ("Germany doe:s.") recalibrates the referent of her response from this particular telephone number to German telephone numbers in general, and also conveys a degree of prior knowledge on the topic. Moreover, with its hint of a further contrast with telephone numbers in other foreign countries, it implies a still broader expertise in placing telephone calls, abroad. Shortly afterwards, Gay underscores her expertise, informing Jeremy that the "ringing" sound on a German phone sounds like a "busy" signal on a British phone (data not shown).

A third case points to the use of "oh"-prefacing as a means of countering a recipient's upgraded claim of access to a referent that began as the speaker's informational preserve. By inquiring into Lottie's trip (to Palm Springs), Emma casts her as having direct and immediate experiential access to its events that Emma herself lacks. Emma, however, meets Lottie's enthusiastic initial assessment of the trip ("Oh:: Go:d wonderful Emma,") with an "oh"-prefaced, negative interrogative "Oh idn'it beautiful do:wn the:re," which embodies a competitive claim to primacy in assessing the attractions of the location.

(22) [NB IV.10.R:1]

1	Emm:		.h ↑How wz yer tri:p.
2	Lot:		Oh:: Go:d wonderful Emm[a,
3	Emm:	->	[Oh idn'it beautiful do:wn the:re,
4	Lot:	->	Oh:: Jeeziz ih wz go:rgeous::.
5	Emm:		Wh't a ni:ce ↑wut time'djih git i:n. Jst a li'l whal ago?

Lottie herself then responds to this assessment with a further and equally competitive "oh"-prefaced agreement that underscores her own claims to primacy in the matter. This competitiveness is also evident in the referent shifting that is part of the sequence. The sequence begins with Lottie's evaluation of her recent trip; Emma's assessment at line 3 shifts the referent to its general locale, a knowledge domain to which Emma has some claim. In turn, Lottie's response at line 4 uses the past tense ("wz") to shift the referent of her assessment back to her own arena of expertise – the recently completed trip.

In sum, "oh"-prefacing can be deployed in a wide variety of contexts by a second or (as in (22)) subsequent assessor to assert epistemic independence and supremacy relative to a first. In addition to competing with sheer "firstness" (as in (20) and (21)), it can also be deployed (as in (22)) to meet and compete with epistemically upgraded prior assessments.

Upgrading by usurping the "firstness" of a previous assessment. Using two resources – tag questions and negative interrogatives – speakers who are responding to an assessment in second position can assert their assessment as a "first positioned" evaluation. In both cases, interrogative syntax is deployed as a means of usurping a previous speaker's first positioned assessment with a new one that now commands the terms of agreement. With these resources, speakers effectively usurp the socioepistemic claims of others.

Upgrading with tag questions: While tag-questions downgrade first position assessments, their function is reversed in second position: there they *upgrade* second position assessments.[9] In second position, the [assessment + tag] format invites agreement to the position that is taken by the second speaker, thus preempting "first position" in the sequence. In this way it upgrades the second speaker's claimed rights over the first with respect to the matter at hand. This usage is illustrated clearly in (23). In this sequence, Jenny and Vera are discussing Vera's two grandsons after a recent visit to Vera, during which the children also visited Jenny's home. After some discussion of the children, Jenny and Vera face a potential discrepancy regarding what they have just agreed on (in lines 4–6) when each names a different child to complete Jenny's observation "he's a bright little boy." Almost as soon as this discrepancy becomes apparent, (that is, when Vera, the grandmother, produces "Paul" in overlap with Jenny's "little James," lines 5 and 6), Jenny immediately accepts "Paul" by repeating his name (line 5) and then offering several agreement tokens (in lines 5/7). Perhaps to counter the potential inference that she was simply "going along" with Vera in accepting "Paul" as the "bright" boy, Jenny offers a negative assessment of James: "Yeh James's a little devil" (line 11). By initiating her turn with "Yeh", Jenny builds it as a continuation of the prior sequence, effectively offering the assessment as confirmation that she "meant" Paul in the first place because she already viewed James as "a little devil." Ironically, in solving this problem, Jenny inadvertently creates trouble of a different kind: in conveying that she meant to refer to Paul, Jenny comes to produce a declaratively formed, first position, negative assessment of Vera's other grandson, James.

(23) [Rahman:14:1–2]

1	Ver		ehr: they readjer comics:'n evrythink yihkn[o:w
2	Jen:		[Yeh: w' 1
3			I think he's a bri:ght little boy: u [h:m
4	Ver:		[I: do=
5	Jen:		=l [ittle Ja]: [:mes,] uh [Pau:l.yes.]
6	Ver:		[Pau:l,] [mm- m] mm [Pau : : 1,]
7	Jen:		Mm:. [Yes.
8	Ver:		[Yes.
9			(0.3)
10	Ver:		[Yes ( )]
11	Jen:	->	[Yeh James's a little] divil ihhh ↑heh heh
12	Ver:		[That-
13	Jen:		[.huh .hh [h He:-
14	Ver:	->	[James is a little bugger [isn'e.
15	Jen:		[Yeh-
16	Jen:		Yeah [(into) ev'rythi]ng.

Although she steps in to agree with Jenny's assessment, Vera as the grandmother resists the putatively superior access entailed in such a first position assessment.

This resistance is embodied most forcefully in Vera's use of a tag question in turn-final position. By deploying an interrogative form as part of a second position assessment, Vera marks her turn as a "new" first pair part. The "firstness" of her assessment is also manifest in her re-use of "James" (a locally initial reference form deployed in a locally subsequent position (Schegloff 1996c). Moreover, the remainder of her turn is designed as a full-form declarative that effectively disregards Jenry's immediately prior reference to him, and, by extension, her utterance. The status of Vera's utterance as a "first position" assessment is subsequently accepted by Jenny: she cuts off her initial response to Vera's comment (line 15), and then redoes her responsive agreement at line 16 with a type-conforming "Yeah" and an elaboration that gives a potential (and decidedly pallid) specification of the "little bugger" as "into everything." In this case, then, the tag question, by inviting a response, positions Vera's evaluation as a first action to be agreed or disagreed with. In this way, it attenuates its responsiveness to Jenny's initial evaluation, thus asserting Vera's rights in the matter.

Upgrading with negative interrogatives: Just as negative interrogatives upgrade the epistemic claims embodied in first assessments, they also can achieve this outcome for second assessments. Used in second position, negative interrogatives (like second positioned, tags) provide a putatively "new" first pair part for the previous speaker to respond to, and thus attenuate their status as "second position" assessments. In the following case (discussed above), Margie's second assessment downgrades the virtues of the assessed party ("Pat") while deploying a negative interrogative to assert upgraded rights to her opinion.

(24) [NB VII:1–2]

1	Emm:		=Oh honey that was a lovely luncheon I shoulda ca:lled you
2			s:soo [:ner but I:] 1: [lo:ved it.Ih wz just deli:ghtfu [: 1.] =
3	Mar:		[((f)) Oh:::] [°( ) [Well] =
4	Mar:		=I wz gla [d y o u] (came).]
5	Emm:		['nd yer f:] friends] 'r so da:rli:ng, =
6	Mar:		= Oh:::[: it wz:]
7	Emm:		[e-that P]a:t isn'she a do:[:ll?]
8	Mar:	->	[iY e]h isn't she pretty,

As we noted earlier, Emma praises Margie's friend ("Pat") using a negative interrogative (line 7) to upgrade both her rights to assess the friend and, with it, the compliment that her assessment embodies. Perhaps to manage the receipt of this compliment in an appropriately downgraded fashion (Pomerantz 1978), Margie responds (line 8) with an initial type-conforming agreement and a significantly weaker token of praise ("pretty" versus Emma's "a doll") (Pomerantz 1984). At the same time, she asserts her own primacy in assessing her friend by packaging her response as a negative interrogative.

A somewhat more perverse case can be found in a return to excerpt (22):

(22) [NB IV.10.R:1]

1	Emm:	.h ↑How wz yer tri:p.
2	Lot:	Oh:: Go:d wonderful Emm [a,

As we noted above, Lottie is the projectedly authoritative evaluator of her trip. Her initial evaluation, however, is intersected with an "oh"-prefaced negative interrogatively formed assessment. By shifting the referent to the location, this assessment brings the topical focus of the sequence towards Emma's generalized experience of Palm Springs rather than Lottie's more immediate experiences there. In these ways, an assessment initiated in response to Lottie's evaluation is designed to exert control over the onward trajectory of the sequence.

Summary

Above we described four practices with which speakers can upgrade the epistemic claims of second assessments relative to the claims embodied in first positioned assessments. These four practices are of two types. The first two – [repeat/confirmation + agreement] and ["oh"-prefacing] – assert primary rights to assess by embodying the claim that the position asserted was held already and independently by the second speaker. The second two – [statement + tag] and [negative interrogatives] – assert primary rights by manipulating the sequence to "reclaim" the first position assessment slot and thereby the epistemic rights which accrue to that position. These two latter practices reflect an important way in which "first" and "second" position, though at first appearance lodged in the temporal order, are not confined there. Rather, these positions can be negotiated through practices of speaking that reflexively claim "first position" and "second position" (see note 10) as distinct from the raw appearances of temporal ordering in the flow of conversation.

Reviewing these practices, the first – [confirmation + agreement] – is relatively specialized to environments in which first assessments are downgraded by using tag questions. For these reasons, this practice is normally used in circumstances where the speakers achieve alignment concerning their relative rights to assess, and therefore is relatively "mild." Much more combative are the "all-purpose" resources afforded by the use of "oh"-prefacing, tag questions, and negative interrogatives. Whether a first assessment is unmarked, upgraded, or downgraded, the change-of-state semantics of "oh"-prefacing asserts an independent stance, and hence epistemic authority, in relation to an assessable. It can be used in combination with other resources, and can be deployed to address first assessments regardless of their specific formulation. Tag questions in second position function by asserting interactional primacy in assessment sequences: their deployment of interrogative syntax formulates the second speaker's assessment as the axial one calling for agreement. Finally, negative interrogatives are perhaps the strongest of the four practices. Like tag questions, they deploy interrogative syntax to assert interactional primacy in an assessment sequence, but they are significantly more assertive. Thus they combine both the import of a declarative and the sequential implicativeness of an interrogative as resources to wrest the initiative from the first speaker.

Multiplex Deployments of These Resources and the Management of Face

Having developed an analysis of some of the resources through which speakers

now turn to three cases in which the terms of agreement are more complicated. In the preceding analysis we relied on examples involving a straightforward relationship between the participants' prima facie socioepistemic rights and the practices they deploy to manage them as a way of establishing a relationship between the two. There is no guarantee, however, that speakers will assert the rights to which they may be entitled, nor that recipients will align with or support the rights asserted by them. Speakers may assert rights that are (or could be) contested; in some cases they may defer to a recipient with putatively subordinate rights. Here we consider three cases in which participants assert rights which are potentially problematic, or which become a source of conflict or struggle. By explicating the resources through which such circumstances are prosecuted, we can discern the reflexive character of these practices for asserting relative rights to assess in sequences of turns, and thus the management of face and identity issues within these interactions.

The first of our cases involves one party's assertion of the primary right to assess a person that previously had been treated as her recipient's primary right to assess. In (25), Vera and Jenny are discussing Vera's grandchildren after a recent visit. As we noted above, in the course of managing a potential discrepancy regarding what Jenny and Vera have just agreed on (in lines 4–6), Jenny comes to offer a negative assessment of one grandson, James (line 11), most likely to counter the inference that she was simply deferring to Vera's naming of Paul as the "bright little boy." Although Vera produces a similarly negative assessment of James (line 14), she then complicates matters by reversing herself and evaluating James's behavior positively (line 17–18). It is this reversal, and Jenny's response to it, that we now address. This environment may be especially problematic for Jenny: if she is to agree with Vera, she must produce a positive, second position assessment of James even though she has just offered a highly negative assessment. As in the sequence regarding Paul, Jenny has a clear interest in indicating that her reversal is not "merely responsive" to Vera's, especially since she has lesser rights to evaluate the child.

(25) [Rahman:14:1–2]

1	Ver:	ehr: they readjer comics:'n evrythink yihkn [o:w
2	Jen:	[Yeh: w'l
3		I think he's a bright little boy: u [h:m
4	Ver:	[I: do=
5	Jen:	=l [ittle Ja]: [:mes,] uh [Pau:l.yes.]
6	Ver:	[Pau:l,] [mm- m] mm [Pau: : l,]
7	Jen:	Mm:. [Yes.
8	Ver:	[Yes.
9		(0.3)
10	Ver:	[Yes ( )]
11	Jen:	[Yeh James's a little] divil ihhh ↑heh heh
12	Ver:	[That-
13	Jen:	[.huh .hh [h He:-
14	Ver:	[James is a little bugger [isn'e.
15	Jen:	[Yeh-

16 Jen: Yeah [(into) ev'rythi]ng.
17 Ver: -> [Mindju 'eez good] Jenny, 'e wz mischeevious .
18 but w-'e wz good.
19 Jen: -> Oo 'e. wz beautiful here [wuz↑n't'ee. =
20 Ver: [↓Yes.
21 Jen: ='E wz very well beha:ved.

Despite her putatively subordinate rights in the matter, Jenny (line 19) strongly asserts rights to assess James by (1) producing an "oh"-prefaced assessment of James's behavior (2) focused on his behavior at her house. She follows this assessment with (3) a tag question. Each component of Jenny's assessment works against the potential inference that her positive assessment reflected anything other than the actual position she held independently of Vera's immediately prior positive assessment. First, the "oh"-preface indexes Jenny's previous, independent access to James. Second, Jenny supplies the basis for this claim by invoking James's behavior "here" (at her own house), in contrast with Vera's assessment of his behavior in general. Finally, her use of the tag question casts her turn as a "new" first assessment, even though its production immediately follows Vera's positive evaluation of James.

In light of Jenny's systematic deference, up to this point, to Vera's primary rights to assess her own grandchildren, it appears that Jenny's assertion of primary rights in this sequence is designed to defeat any suspicion that her current, positive assessment could be motivated simply by a desire to agree with Vera. Specifically, although her turn is produced in response to Vera's, she deploys an array of practices to establish that the position she takes in that turn is held independently of the circumstances of its production. In this case, then, Jenny uses such practices for asserting her primary rights to assess James (despite her previous deference to Vera) as a method for managing the local, interactional circumstances created by Vera's reversal.

Our second case offers a more ambiguous deployment of these resources. This excerpt is taken from a conversation between Lesley and her elderly mother, in which Lesley offers a series of reports regarding (potential) acquaintances who are currently in the hospital or who have just died. In this case, although Lesley produces an extended description of Mr. Millbeck, Mum fails to recognize him. As Lesley proceeds with the report "anyway," she notes that he was "still working" when he died at age 79. Yet despite Lesley's status as teller and her clearly intimate access to the deceased, she packages her first position assessment (in line 25) using a tag question that eschews any claim of epistemic primacy:

(26) [Holt X(c)-1-1-1]

1 Les: And um (0.4) I ↑don't know ↑ 'f you remember Missiz
2 Mil↓beck th't use to go to ↓chu:rch.
3 (0.8)
4 Mum: °(Mi [ssiz)°
5 Les: [Uh: uh-he wz the vicar's ward'n ↑anyway ↑he die:d
6 suddenly this week .hhh and he wz ↑still wo:r↓king.

7			(0.3)
8	Mum:		([ )
9	Les:		[He wz ↑seventy ni↓:ne,
10			(0.3)
11	Mum:		My: wo:rd.
12			(0.2)
13	Les:		↑Y e: s [he: wz um
14	Mum:		[(You've got s'm ↑rea:l) workers down the:re, heh
15	Les:		He wz a p- uh: Ye:s. Indee:d .hh He wz a (0.2) .p a
16			↑buyer for the hoh- i-the ↑only horse hair fact'ry left
17			in England.
18	Mum:		Good (gracious).
19			(0.3)
20	Les:		And he wz their buyer,
21			(.)
22	Mum:		↑Hm:::
23	Les:		.t
24	Mum:		↑↑Hm: .
25	Les:	->	So ↑he had a **good inni:ngs ↑did**[n't ↓he.
26	Mum:	->	[I should say ↓so: ↑ye: s.
27			(0.2)
28	Mum:		↑Marvelous.
29			(0.2)
30	Les:		.tk.hhhh ↑Anyway we had a very good evening ↑o:n
31			Saturda:y

It is not clear whether Lesley's tag question indexes Mum's rights to judge a person of similar age, or simply acknowledges the self-evident character of her assessment (i.e., that a person who worked until the day he died at age 79 had a "good innings"). Mum, however, matches the position taken by Lesley by using the [confirmation] + [agreement token] format to upgrade the rights that otherwise would accrue to her second position assessment. In this case, then, Lesley manages the potentially problematic circumstance of producing a first position assessment regarding a state of affairs that both she and Mum can claim rights to assess by simply avoiding any claim of epistemic priority, despite her status as putatively the better-informed party.

Finally, in our third case, competitive positions regarding epistemic rights to evaluate Margie's friend are coopted into a deeply ambiguous process of agreement. This example, as noted previously, is an extended compliment sequence. After a generalized evaluation of Margie's friends as "so da:rli:ng" (line 5), Emma's "e-that Pa:t isn'she a do::ll?" singles out one of the guests for particular praise. As observed earlier, the primacy embodied in this first position assessment is further upgraded by Emma's deployment of a negative interrogative format to package it. On the one hand, this format (as noted earlier) invites an agreement produced as a response to a question. On the other, however, the assessment and its format create two problems for Margie. First, as a question, the assessment invites confirmation, but as a compliment Margie's agreement is constrained by conventions governing self-praise (Pomerantz 1978). Second, although Emma

characterizes the persons present as "your friends" (line 5) – thus acknowledging Margie's primary rights to evaluate them – her assessment is packaged with a format which (as we have seen) asserts epistemic primacy and virtually commands agreement.

(27) [NB VII:1-2]

1	Emm:	=Oh honey that was a lovely luncheon I shoulda ca:lled you
2		s:soo [:ner but I:] 1: [lo:ved it.Ih wz just deli:ghtfu [: 1.] =
3	Mar:	[((f)) Oh:::] [°( ) [Well] =
4	Mar:	=I wz gla [d y o u] (came).]
5	Emm:	['nd yer f:] friends] 'r so da:rli:ng,=
6	Mar:	= Oh:::[: it wz:]
7	Emm:	[e-that P]a:t isn'she a do:[:ll?]
8	Mar:	[iY e]h isn't she pretty,
9		(.)
10	Emm:	Oh: she's a beautiful girl.=
11	Mar:	=Yeh I think she's a pretty gir[l.
12	Emm:	[En that Reinam'n::

Margie's response in this context embodies two elements: (1) a minimal, pro forma, type-conforming agreement "iYeh", and (2) a negative interrogative-formed assessment, built as a new first assessment that invites agreement but which is downgraded significantly ("pretty" versus Emma's "a doll").

In the face of this divergent assessment, Emma's response at line 10 reasserts a version of her earlier assessment ("beautiful girl"). It does so within an "oh"-prefacing frame that, in this context, reasserts an overriding epistemic claim. Here it is plausible to see Emma's insistence on this compliment as an effort to overcome Margie's purely "social" resistance to it. Margie's final response again expresses a pro forma agreement; however, her repetition of her earlier evaluation ("pretty") underscores her position as overtly unmovable (as adumbrated in her turn at line 8), while the introduction of "I think" into the utterance explicitly acknowledges its status as a disputed assessment. Here, as in Example (25), one participant's efforts to build a strong positive evaluation of a part of another person's world creates a context in which agreement is contaminated by a competitive epistemic struggle.

Discussion and Conclusion

In his essay "Territories of the Self," Goffman describes an array of territorial "preserves" and ways in which their boundaries "are ordinarily patrolled and defended by the claimant" (Goffman 1971:52). Goffman did not include a discussion of knowledge and expertise in his description of an "information preserve" (1971:63–64), though control over rights to information is evidently the object of linguistic and interactional management (Kamio 1997; Maynard and Zimmerman 1984) and systematic social competition (Abbott 1988). In this paper

we have suggested that rights to evaluate states of affairs are indeed "ordinarily patrolled and defended" by individuals in routine conversational practices through which these rights are ranked by speakers relative to one another.

Our evidence comprises two sorts of observations. First, we have argued that assessing a referent state of affairs in first position implies a claim of primary epistemic and/or moral rights to assess that state. We will abbreviate these as "K+ rights," relative to those of a second speaker, who has lesser ("K–") rights. The evidence for this claim is fourfold:

To begin with, first position assessments are rarely upgraded in the several hundred ordinary conversations we have examined; however they are quite commonly downgraded. Similarly, second position assessments are rarely downgraded but they are quite commonly upgraded. These distributions suggest a recurrent social need to compensate for the primary (K+) claims of first position and the secondary (K–) claims of second position.[10]

This general distributional observation is supported by three others:

Downgraded first position assessments are generally produced by persons who, at least at first appearance, have lesser socioepistemic (K–) rights to evaluate them.

In addition, upgraded second position assessments are generally produced by persons who, at least at first appearance, have greater socioepistemic (K+) rights to evaluate them.

Finally, under conditions where both speakers have putatively equal access to a referent state of affairs, first speakers may downgrade initial assessments using a tag question format, while second speakers respond with declaratives. These two practices cooperate to cancel the epistemic implications of the first and second positioned status of their contributions (see note 7).

This conversational patrol and defense of information preserves is mandated by the fundamental association between the positioning of an assessment and the epistemic claims implied by that positioning. Because social interaction is organized sequentially and because someone must necessarily be first to assess a referent, the management of information preserves is inexorably relevant in social interaction.

Second, we have identified a variety of practices that are deployed in managing these epistemic claims. Downgraded claims in first position are implemented prominently through tag questions and evidentials.[11] Upgraded claims in second position are implemented through an array of practices that either invoke a "settled" and preexisting point of view, or deploy interrogative syntax to compete for first position by usurping a previous evaluation with a new "first positioned" evaluation to which the other should respond. The practices we have identified here are somewhat varied in their privileges of occurrence. The [confirmation + agreement] response format is enabled by and virtually specialized to address, and complement, first assessments that deploy the [statement + tag] format. Although "oh"-prefacing is not tied to a specific first position format, and thus is usable in less complementary and more competitive ways, it is deployed almost exclusively in second position. Negative interrogatives are most aggressive and can be deployed in either first or second position to assert

claims of epistemic supremacy. Some of these practices also have positional and relational variations. For example, the [statement + tag] format, which downgrades claims in first position, can be used by K+ speakers to upgrade a responsive assessment in second position.

Agreement involves more than simply arriving at aligned evaluations. As our analysis makes clear, persons evidently are concerned to establish the independence of the positions that are asserted in accomplishing agreement. This is reflected most prominently in two themes in our data. First, persons work to establish the independence of their access to evaluated states of affairs as a basis for agreement. Second, persons recurrently negotiate the relevance of "confirmation" rather than "agreement" in circumstances where primary access to a state of affairs comes to assume critical importance. In these and other ways, the matter of "who agrees with whom" turns out to be a common, if not ubiquitous, feature of the terms of agreement.

These considerations suggest a systematic dilemma at the heart of agreement sequences. Put bluntly, affiliation and agreement generally are sought from others; when provided, however, they must respect the parties' information territories and their associated epistemic rights. Although this problem may be soluble in the matter of "Burmese cats" by responding to someone who asserts the merits of his own cat in terms of the merits of the breed in general, such a solution involves an unavoidable element of detachment from the concrete specifics of the other's experience. Perhaps this is acceptable in the matter of cats, but a mother's claim to lack loving feelings for her child cannot be met effectively by remarks about "women in general" (Heritage and Lindström 1998). For this reason, Alcoholics Anonymous specifically encourages members to seek out persons with a history of recovering from alcoholism to discuss their problems (Alcoholics Anonymous 2001). In responding to assessments of distinctively personal matters, speakers must manage the independence of their access to the matters under discussion while avoiding too deep an intervention into territories of knowledge, feeling, and relational ownership that their recipients may defend as their own. In such cases, the sociological dilemma of involvement and detachment is an entirely practical matter.

Our analysis of these practices suggests a further observation regarding "face" and related subjects. As we noted in introducing this concept, Goffman and others distinguish between face and identity. As we have shown, considerations of face are clearly implicated in the kind of epistemic negotiations with which we have been concerned here. Yet as Goffman also made clear, face claims commonly invoke elements of enduring social identity. Although multiple identities may be engaged in the sequences we have discussed (and in others like them), dog and cat owners evidently expect to be treated as experts on their pets. Grandparents have ownership rights and expect to have the last word in evaluating their grandchildren. And all participants, as Sacks (1984) and Goffman (1983) observed, have primary rights to know and describe their own thoughts and experiences.

Persons deploy these practices with remarkable frequency in the context of conversational agreement. One might think that interactants' insistence on the assertion of relative epistemic rights is an ugly contaminant of courses of action

which otherwise are the essence of consensus building. One also might think that in this paper we make much ado about nothing: the negotiations and conflicts that we observe are simply made salient, as Labov and Fanshel (1977:346) noted, as a product of looking closely at activities which probably were not experienced consciously, much less recollected by the parties at this level of detail.[12] Yet one also may observe that relative epistemic rights to describe and evaluate objects within different knowledge domains are part of our basic human rights to experience and its expression. The regulation and sanctioning of such rights is no trivial matter, but is rather a part of the interactional "housekeeping" that is a condition of personhood and even sanity (Goffman 1983). That the means by which this housekeeping is managed are lost in a Leibnitzian "surf" is, in this context, all to the good.

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Notes

1. These notions, of course, have a long lineage in Western political and social thought; see Berlin (2002:166–217).
2. Also see Drew (1991); Drew and Heritage (1992).
3. First position assessments commonly emerge in environments that have been made "ripe" for them in various ways. For example, another speaker has made observations which clearly imply a particular evaluative stance towards the entity under discussion and which may trigger the production of an assessment. First positioned assessments are distinctive in that they take an explicit, on-record evaluative stance that is available to be agreed with or disagreed with in next turn. First positioned assessments do not "agree" or "disagree" with the previous comments that lead up to them, though they may be aligned or disaligned with the tenor of those comments.
4. Evidentially qualified claims (using expressions such as "It looks, feels, appears X") are downgraded relative to unmarked declarative claims because they are compatible with the asserted state of affairs not being the case. Thus it is possible to offer the remark "She seems (looks, sounds) X, but she isn't" without self-contradiction.
5. For an account of this kind of "open class" repair initiation, see Drew (1997).
6. A number of authors, including Bernstein (1971), Kollock, Blumstein and Schwartz (1985), Lakoff (1975), and O'Barr and Atkins (1980), have linked the use of tag questions to class, gender, and power. In this section we connect their use not to general social identities but to the acknowledgment of particular, situated rights to evaluate specific states of affairs. Such rights may or may not map onto more general differences in social power.
7. In (11) and (12), the first speaker uses epistemic downgrading to address the coparticipant's clear primary rights to assess the referent. In a sub-set of cases, however, similar downgrading does not appear to address such a contingency. These

[JS:II:41)

J: -> T's- tsuh beautiful day out isn't it?
L: Yeh it's jus' gorgeous . . .

[VIYMC:1:2] ((J and R are in a rowboat on a lake))

J: -> It's really a clear lake, isn't it?
R: It's wonderful.

[Ravioli Dinner: 6 (Mark and Kim are eating dinner involving many samples of free food]

Mar: Not bad for free huh?
(0.3)
Kim: Hm mm.

In these three cases, it is evident that neither party can claim epistemic primacy concerning the referent states of affairs. Given the concurrent, direct, and therefore equal access enjoyed by both participants, the first speaker's use of a tag question can be understood to downgrade the putatively primary rights to assess the referent that might attach to having gone first. This downgrading is accomplished by inviting agreement in the surface design of the turn through the [declarative + tag question] format.

8. The data used in this paper comprise several hundred items of ordinary conversation drawn from Britain and the United States. Most, but not all, of our cases involving symmetry between [assessment + tag question] and [partial repeat + agreement] forms are drawn from British data. What Schegloff (personal communication) calls "the British tag" as a means to downgrade epistemic claims may be much more prominent among speakers of British English than among their U.S. counterparts. For another case of British/U.S. divergence in basic interactional usage, see Jefferson (2002).
9. The fact that tag questions function differently in first and second positions in a sequence is a clear example of what Schegloff (1996b) calls "positionally sensitive grammar."
10. As noted elsewhere, this analysis is based on an examination of several hundred recorded conversations. Robustly founded quantitative analysis is hampered, however, by what Schegloff (1993) calls the "denominator problem." Briefly put, without clear evidence of the parties' relative rights to knowledge *independent of* the talk, we cannot evaluate the extent to which parties assert these rights *in* the talk. Thus we are obliged to focus on those cases in which the assertion of these rights emerges as a matter that the parties are addressing by talking. These methodological issues, of course, bracket the question of whether, or how, these relative rights exist independent of their assertion in the situation itself.
11. These do not exhaust speakers' methods for downgrading the rights claimed by first position assessments. In addition to evidentials and tag questions (which focus on the authoritativeness of the assessment, or on the access claimed by it), speakers also can modulate the rights claimed by a first position assessment by downgrading its "firstness." For example, speakers can preface their turns with "so" or other expressions which indicate that the turn is being offered as an upshot or other product of prior talk, and by that action can acknowledge their recipients' primary rights. For example, in the following excerpt, Shirley offers a "so"-prefaced upshot (in line 43) to display her understanding of Gerri's telling about Dana. By virtue of the very way in which this sequence is initiated (e.g., Shirley's "Did you talk to Dana this

week" and "how is he" (line 7)), Shirley conveys her understanding that Gerri has superior knowledge about Dana. This stance is confirmed further by the telling that Gerri goes on to produce.

[Frankel TCI]

7	Shi:		.hh Uhm how is he.
8	Ger:		(Well) he's fi: ne[(yeh),
9	Shi:		[ss=
10	Ger:		Yihknow he's no:w (.) in (0.2) competition, .hhh=
			((14 lines of transcript omitted))
25	Ger:		.hh A:nd u- (0.2) yihknow I don't- he doesn't think he's
26			going to win.c'z there's a lot'v other students thet, .hh
27			are doing equally well.=
28	Shi:		=M- [hm,]
29	Ger:		[or] and or better.
30	Shi:		M-hm,
31	Ger:		Bu:t, he does feel tha:t (1.0) yihknow, (.) he's proud a'
32			the fact thet he got intuh th'finals. .hhh en he doesn't
33			ca:re if he doesn't make the finals en go o:n .hh=
34	Shi:		=Ri[:ght.]
35	Ger:		[to-] Berkeley er wherever, .h[h en then=
36	Shi:		[Ri:ght.
37			(.)
38	Ger:		become a Harvard attorney I mean 'e doesn't care
39			about*that. et[all.
40	Shi:		[Right.
41	Shi:		Ri[ght.
42	Ger:		[So
43	Shi:	->	.hh So he's doing alright.
44	Ger:		Ye:ah.

After Gerri's telling regarding Dana's participation in an academic competition. Shirley conveys her understanding of its upshot by producing an assessment: "he's doing alright" (line 43). Although Shirley produces her assessment of Dana before Gerri has offered any similar evaluation, she clearly indicates its derivative status, and Gerri's primary knowledge in the matter, by prefacing it with a "so." Thus instead of modulating the access claimed by her assessment, she downgrades its "firstness" – much as speakers have used interrogative forms in second position assessments to counter the default assumptions attached to that position (Raymond 2004).

12. Labov and Fanshel (1977:346) termed this the "paradox of microanalysis," observing, "[T]he more deeply we analyze the underlying speech actions that motivated these sequences of events, the further we remove ourselves from the conversation as it was actually experienced."

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33

Politeness, Power and Provocation: How Humour Functions in the Workplace

Janet Holmes

Introduction

Most workplace humour is inextricably context-bound. Utterances which give rise to great hilarity among work colleagues often appear obscure and opaque to outsiders. This is a reflection of one of the most basic social functions of humour – that it serves to create and maintain solidarity, a sense of belonging to a group. Shared humour is an important in-group vs out-group boundary marker. But humour can also be a management strategy – a way of attenuating or reinforcing power relationships. Humour can be used to reduce inequalities between those of different professional status, alternatively it can be used to emphasize power imbalances, or even to license challenges to status hierarchies. This article explores some of the diverse functions of humour in the workplace, drawing on a database of interactions recorded in four New Zealand government organizations.

There is extensive pragmatic research on humour examining the contribution of conversational maxims and pragmatic inferencing to an understanding of how jokes function in interaction (e.g. Attardo, 1990, 1993; Raskin, 1985), and exploring the communicative function of humour (e.g. Mulkay, 1988; Norrick, 1993). Sacks (1978, 1989) analysed the work involved in telling jokes, and described the joke as a 'conversational achievement'. Other conversational analysts have explored the social meanings expressed by humour (e.g. Pizzini, 1991). Some sociolinguists have examined gender differences in the use of different types and functions of humour in interaction (Ervin-Tripp and Lampert, 1992; Jenkins, 1985; Kotthoff, 1995; Kramarae, 1987; Sollitt-Morris, 1996). But overall there is relatively little sociolinguistic research on humour, and even less on humour

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in the workplace. Most of the extensive literature in this area appears in journals and collections in disciplines such as management, business administration, business organization, social psychology and communication.

Much of this research focuses on demonstrating the social and psychological benefits of humour to business organizations (e.g. Davis and Kleiner, 1989; Decker, 1987; Duncan, 1982; Duncan et al., 1990; Linstead, 1985; Morreall, 1991). Humour is advocated as a means of improving productivity (e.g. Caudron, 1992), and an essential tool for managers (e.g. Decker, 1987). The work of Consalvo (1989) on the distribution and function of humour in business meetings is typical. He asserts:

> The role and constructive uses of humor need to be better understood as humor has the potential to improve quality of life, job satisfaction, and performance in organizations. (1989: 285)

Researchers document the type of humour noted in workplaces (e.g. Vinton, 1989) and the functions of workplace humour (e.g. Cox et al., 1990; Duncan, 1985; Linstead, 1988; Murphy, 1986; Sabath, 1990) with special attention to the advantages of humour for encouraging creativity (e.g. Cade, 1982; Caudron, 1992), and defusing conflict among workers (e.g. Duncan et al., 1990; Fry, 1992).[1] More recently, some researchers have begun to treat humour as a source of insight into the complexity of the workings of business organizations (Hatch and Ehrlich, 1993).

From a sociolinguistic viewpoint, one remarkable feature of much of this research is the reliance on indirect, reflective, or apparently unsystematic methods of collecting data about how people actually use humour in interaction (see Williams, 1988). Participant observation and the use of field notes cannot provide a sufficiently exact account of normal conversational interaction for the purposes of discourse analysis. Similarly, self-report data, interview responses, and answers gleaned from questionnaires involving simulated situations tend to elicit people's beliefs about how they and others use humour, rather than reliable information on what they actually do (see Mott and Petrie, 1995). There is remarkably little research on humour in the workplace which uses tape-recorded material from authentic workplace interaction. Such research is, of course, subject to the familiar problem of the effect on participants' behaviour of their awareness that they are being recorded. On the other hand, it guarantees that the material analysed is an accurate rendition of what was actually produced, unfiltered through the observer's perceptual biasses, and unaffected by memory limitations. For these reasons, we decided to use recorded material for our New Zealand workplace research.

The Language in the Workplace Project

The Language in the Workplace Project was begun in 1996 with the following goals:

(1) to analyse the features of effective interpersonal communication in a variety of workplaces from a sociolinguistic perspective; and
(2) to explore the practical implications of the results of the research for a range of New Zealand workplaces.

Over the last three years we have collected interactions from a range of workplaces, including the four New Zealand government agencies whose interactions provide the data for the analysis in this article. The bulk of the data consists of small, relatively informal work-related meetings and discussions ranging in time between 20 seconds and two hours. Such meetings are regarded by the participants as the focus of their core business and they fulfil a wide variety of purposes in these workplaces, being used to plan, convey instructions, seek advice, check reports, solve a problem or do a task, provide feedback, evaluate proposals and so on. They are also the sites of many different types of humour, as I will demonstrate.

Methodology

It is only relatively recently that humour research has adopted a more ethnographic methodology, using recordings of spontaneous spoken conversations, rather than questionnaires or surveys (see Hay, 1995: 8–10). Recording in workplaces is difficult, especially if the aim is to be minimally intrusive in order to collect data which is as spontaneous and 'natural' as possible. The methodology developed for recording in New Zealand offices was designed to give participants maximum control over the data collection process. After some initial training, a group of volunteers from each workplace tape-recorded a range of their everyday work interactions over a period of about two weeks. Some kept a recorder and microphone on their desks, others carried the equipment round with them. All those involved provided information on their ethnic background, home language, age, contextual information, and permission for the data to be used for linguistic analysis. They also participated in debriefing sessions after the recording process, and, in some cases, in follow-up interviews to discuss the interpretation of the material. This methodology provided a wealth of ethnographic information which enabled the contextualization of interpretations at a different level. This was crucial for qualitative analysis of the kind undertaken in this article.

Throughout the process participants were free to edit and delete material as they wished. Even after they had completed recording and handed over the tapes, they could still ask us to edit out material which, for whatever reason, they did not wish to be analysed. By handing over control of the recording process in this way, we developed an excellent research relationship with workplace participants, based on mutual trust. Over a period of time, people increasingly ignored the recording equipment, and there are often comments at the end of interactions which indicate that people had forgotten about the tape recorder.[2] Also, over time, the amount of material participants edited, or asked us to edit, decreased dramatically. As a result, in return for guarantees of anonymity and confidentiality, our volunteers trusted us with a wide range of fascinating material.

The data base consists of more than 120 hours of material constituting 330 workplace interactions in four government departments. The participants include New Zealand Pakeha, Maori and a range of other ethnic groups, such as Samoan, Chinese and Thai.[3] In each workplace a group of key personnel, representing a range of roles and levels within the organization, recorded their everyday interactions with a variety of interlocutors across a number of work settings. From this database I selected for detailed qualitative analysis a range of interactions consisting mainly of small meetings (involving between two and four people) which a preliminary analysis had identified as including instances of humour. At least five interactions from each of the four workplaces were included, with examples of single sex and mixed sex interactions, involving both Pakeha and Maori participants. My analysis of these interactions identified 200 instances of humour, and these provide the basis for the qualitative analysis of humour in the New Zealand workplace which follows.

Definition

However difficult it may be, it is useful to start with a brief definition of what was counted as an instance of humour. The literature abounds with discussions of this issue, many linked to particular theories of humour.[4] Some theorists distinguish between humour and wit (Coser, 1962), some categorize jokes as instances of humour (Duncan, 1984) while others treat jokes as a distinct category which is different from humour (Long and Graesser, 1988). A number of analysts identify essential components of humour; so that many agree, for example, that humour must always involve some kind of cognitive dissonance, such as the establishment of an incongruent relationship or meaning (e.g. Berger, 1976; Duncan and Feisal, 1989).

Some researchers consider an instance of humour from the point of view of the speaker: something is humorous only if it was intended to amuse (e.g. Pizzini, 1991; Winick, 1976). Use of 'smile voice', and similar paralinguistic or prosodic clues can provide an empirical basis for judgements of speakers' intentions (Crystal and Davy, 1969; Sacks et al., 1974). Some analysts who take this perspective include consideration of failed humour as well as successful humour (Hay, 1996). Others consider humour from the listener's or the audience's point of view, and some identify humour by the listener's response (e.g. Coser, 1960; Norrick, 1993). For such practitioners, laughter is a crucial auditory clue and, when videotapes are used, a smile is an important visual clue. Others take the view that the speaker and the hearer must both be taken into account in identifying instances of humour: so the speaker's intention is relevant and must evoke an appropriate response (e.g. Berger, 1976; Martineau, 1972).

One factor which is rarely considered in analyses of humour is the role of the analyst. The analyst's identification of instances of humour is a crucial component in the analytical process. Instances of humour which are not identified, or which are misinterpreted by the analyst, will obviously be excluded. It seems important, therefore, to take account of the clues used by the analyst who works

with material provided by others. In cases where, as in our research, the analyst is working from audio-tapes (supplemented by discussion), the analyst's role is particularly crucial. Another problem is the status of 'failed humour', where for whatever reason the speaker's humorous intention is not appreciated by the audience (Hay, 1996). This topic has been excluded from the current analysis because it raises many complex issues which there is not space to explore in this article. The following definition, therefore, has been developed for the purposes of this analysis.

> *Definition of humour*
> Instances of humour included in this analysis are utterances which are identified by the analyst, on the basis of paralinguistic, prosodic and discoursal clues, as intended by the speaker(s) to be amusing and perceived to be amusing by at least some participants.

A wide range of contextual and linguistic clues are relevant to identifying instances of humour, including the speaker's tone of voice and the audience's auditory and discoursal response. So while laughter is an obvious (though not unambiguous) clue, it is by no means the only way in which members of an audience signal that they consider something to be humorous.[5] As Hay (1996) documents, audience members may respond to humour in a variety of ways, including an echo response, by contradicting self-deprecating humour, or by producing more humour. While irony may elicit a mere raised eye-bow or twitch of the lips, at the other extreme, a humorous remark may trigger a range of overt responses. Indeed, some of the more interesting, effective, and extended instances of humour encountered were dynamic, interactively achieved and 'jointly constructed' examples, with verbal contributions from a number of participants (Marra, 1998). Addressees often added to a humorous remark, indicating not only appreciation, but a willingness to extend the humour.

The definition adopted for this analysis is obviously not comprehensive. As mentioned previously, it excludes 'failed humour', just as it excludes unintended humour. However, it is adequate for an exploratory qualitative analysis of the functions of humour in the New Zealand workplaces included in our sample. It also has the advantage of highlighting the extent to which humour is an interactional achievement.

Theoretical Frameworks

Many analyses of humour adopt psychological or sociological theoretical frameworks, examining psychological functions of humour such as tension release, the expression of aggression, or hostility (Freud, 1905) or social functions such as the assertion of superiority (Duncan, 1985; Radcliffe-Brown, 1952), or the enforcement of social norms (Bricker, 1980; O'Quin and Arnoff, 1981). In this analysis, I explore the value of Politeness Theory (Brown and Levinson, 1987) to account for the social psychological functions of humour in the workplace,

combined with insights from Critical Discourse Analysis (Van Dijk, 1993, 1998), an approach which provides concepts such as 'repressive discourse' (Pateman, 1980) and 'coercive discourse' (Fairclough, 1995) to more adequately analyse power relationships in workplace interaction.

Politeness Theory provides an account of the ways in which humour takes account of the positive face needs of both addressee and speaker. So humour may express solidarity, indicating concern for the *listener's* positive face needs, as well as self deprecation, which attends to the *speaker's* positive face needs. Politeness Theory also includes consideration of power relations, insofar as they are assumed by, or salient to, the participants. But the main focus of Politeness Theory is an account of how participants handle face threat, and Brown and Levinson's analysis is designed to account for modifications of face threatening acts (FTAs) which are consistent with a basic cooperative intent. Differential power tends to be considered largely as a factor accounting for deferent behaviour (i.e. more mitigated FTAs) by the person with less power, or for the use of less mitigated FTAs by the more powerful participant. Hence, humour which is deliberately used to license a direct threat to the face of the addressee, or instances of humour used to legitimize unambiguously aggressive intent, are not so effectively accounted for within a model which assumes cooperative intent as its starting point (cf. Austin, 1990).[6]

Following Weber (1947), Brown and Levinson provide a useful and widely accepted definition of power, as 'the degree to which H [the hearer] can impose his (sic) own plans and his (sic) own self-evaluation (face) at the expense of S's [the speaker's] plans and self-evaluation' (1987: 77). Such power may be institutionally authorized, or it may be based on less tangible factors. In institutional contexts, such as the workplace, when individuals are acting in role in asymmetrical interactions, they can articulate their power overtly by reference to their position. This is coercive power (Thomas, 1995: 125) enacted through 'oppressive discourse' – discourse in which the intentions are quite explicit and undisguised (Pateman, 1980: 83).

However, it is also possible to 'do power' less explicitly, and this is generally more acceptable in an era when informality is valued, and there is a general trend towards democratization, and a reduction of emphasis on power differences (see Fairclough, 1989, 1992, 1995). Where the underlying intent is controlling or coercive, however, this use of language can be identified as 'repressive discourse' (see Patemen, 1980). Repressive discourse disguises the coercive intent underlying an utterance, or fudges the power relationships involved (Pateman, 1980: 84–5). So while it is fundamentally based on a power imbalance, repressive discourse tends to distract attention from issues of power. It often functions to gain willing compliance, retain goodwill, promote social cohesion and, at least superficially, to reduce asymmetry (see Sollitt-Morris, 1996, 1997). Humour is one means of realizing repressive discourse.

Humour is also a very effective way of 'doing power' less explicitly, and hence some uses of humour are most illuminatingly analysed as instances of coercive or repressive discourse. In other words, humour can be used to achieve the speaker's instrumental goal while apparently de-emphasizing the power

differential.[7] Pizzini (1991: 477) for example, describes how gynaecologists used humour to 'move interview talk along' and 'to stop patients rambling on' [sic] in order to gain the patients' compliance with their agenda. An analysis which treats such humour as simply attenuating an FTA, i.e. as purely an expression of concern for the addressee's face, risks under-analysing the interactional social significance of the exchange, and ignoring the complexity of the communicative goals involved (see Tracy and Coupland, 1990).

Conversely, humour can also be used by the subordinate in an unequal power relationship to subvert the overt power structure. Humour provides a socially acceptable means of signalling lack of agreement, registering a protest, or even a challenge to more powerful participants. Graham et al. (1992: 162) comment on this use of humour to 'veil socially unacceptable behaviour'; and Winick (1976) and Pizzini both comment on the fact that humour enables subordinates to express risky opinions:

> Because humour officially does not count, persons are induced to risk sending messages that would be unacceptable if stated seriously. (Pizzini 1991: 481)

I have labelled this function of humour *contestive.* I turn now to a more detailed consideration of these functions of humour, with exemplification from the New Zealand workplace data.

Functions of Humour in the Workplace

There is an extensive literature on the functions of humour. Martineau (1972), for example, discusses three very broad functions: consensus, conflict and control. Following Ziv (1984), Ervin-Tripp and Lampert (1992) identify four functions: *equalizing* or creating solidarity, *defending* or protecting the self, *sharing* similarities, and *coping* with weaknesses. At a more detailed level, Graham, Papa and Brookes (1992) identify 24 functions of humour on the basis of a comprehensive review of a wide range of papers dealing with the social–psychological functions of humour. Hay (1995: 98) groups the functions of humour in her data into a hierarchy with an overall general function, three broad macro-functions (relating to solidarity, power and self-defence) and twelve micro-functions.

Two familiar methodological problems arise in any such analysis. The first is the well-known fact that all utterances are multifunctional (see Holmes, 1982; Tracy and Coupland, 1990). Hence, a humorous utterance may, and typically does, serve several functions at once.

Excerpt 1 (See Appendix for transcription conventions.)
Context. A young policy adviser, Ivan, and a senior policy officer, Esther, meet for a discussion with a third adviser. The meeting begins with a complaint from Esther.

1 Esther: you were supposed to bring coffee and he was bringing croissants
2 Ivan: was he

3 Esther: yeah we had this discussion last week
4 Ivan: ah you should have got it in writing
[Laughter]

Ivan's remark is an example of good-humoured sarcasm: he is sending up bureaucratic procedures generally. At the local level, he is also parodying Esther, in particular, who is inclined to want everything well documented; hence this is also an example of contestive discourse from a subordinate to a senior. At a more global level, it can be seen as a good tempered response to a criticism, in other words a cooperative attempt to amuse, to keep the tone light and maintain good collegial relations. This analysis is typical in its complexity – almost every example of authentic discourse has several layers of meaning.

The second problem is that of infinite regress.[8] In my view, and this is reflected in the definition provided above, the most general or basic function of humour is to amuse. But then one can ask *why* does the speaker wish to amuse the audience. The answer to this question can be extremely complex, involving a never ending regression proceeding from sociological through increasingly detailed psychological explanations. Why does Ivan want to amuse his colleagues? From a social point of view, he is maintaining collegiality, but the form of his humour reflects the power relationships between those involved (the sarcasm is attenuated or gentle). From a psychological point of view, one can ask if Ivan is motivated by guilt or by a desire to avoid conflict, or both of these simultaneously.

Politeness Theory provides a basis for constraining the level of analysis to an examination of the impact of humour on the face needs of the participants. Brown and Levinson (1987: 102) include 'joke' as a positive politeness strategy, in that it 'claims common ground (point of view, opinions, attitudes, knowledge, empathy)'. Their discussion is very brief, however, focussing on ways in which jokes can emphasize shared values, or attenuate FTAs of various kinds. Exploring the issue further, in principle, there are a number of ways in which humour can be regarded as an expression of politeness:

1. Humour as positive politeness
   1.1 Humour can **address the hearer's/addressee's positive face needs** by expressing solidarity or collegiality.
   1.2 Humour can be used to **protect the speaker's positive face needs** by expressing self-deprecatory meanings or apologetic sentiments.
2. Humour as negative politeness
   2.1 Humour can be used to **attenuate the threat to the hearer's/addressee's negative face** by downtoning or hedging an FTA, such as a directive.
   2.2 Humour can be used to **attenuate the threat to hearer's/addressee's positive face** by downtoning or hedging a Face Attack Act (Austin 1990) such as a criticism or insult.

In other words, humour can function both as a positive politeness strategy expressing solidarity, or as a hedging strategy, a means of modifying illocutionary force

1. Humour as Positive Politeness

With its basic assumption of cooperative intent, and consideration of participants' 'face needs', Politeness Theory provides a convincing explanation of humour oriented to the addressee's positive face needs by indicating friendliness, and to the speaker's positive face needs by conveying self-deprecation.

1.1 Addressee's Positive Face Needs: Solidarity or Collegiality To the extent that a humorous utterance amuses others in the workplace, it contributes to the development of social cohesion at work (Blau, 1955; Holdaway, 1988; O'Quinn and Arnoff, 1981). Shared humour emphasizes common ground and shared norms. A successful attempt at humour indicates that the speaker shares with others a common view about what is amusing – thus creating or maintaining solidarity, while also enhancing the speaker's status within the group. Hay (1995) clearly demonstrates the relevance of this function of humour for the examples collected in the friendship groups she studied. It is also much in evidence in our workplace data. There were many instances of humour between equals in the workplace data which clearly served to express and strengthen solidarity, and so contributed to social cohesion.

This was particularly apparent in examples which were interactively constructed, where several participants contributed to the discourse, and each built on the contributions of others. Excerpt 2, which centres around the need for people to 'panic early', nicely illustrates the way humour can build solidarity between work colleagues.

Excerpt 2

Context: Planning meeting of a group of colleagues. They are discussing the need to coordinate the taking of annual leave to ensure minimum negative impact on the work project.

1	Hel:	people might have to take some leave by that stage as well with this
2		sort of panic before the end of November
3	Will:	oh I'm saving up all mine [laughs]
4	Sel:	well people could panic early [laughs]
5		[general laughter]
6	Hel:	never happens
7		[general laughter]
8	Sel:	well the HR coordinators might crack the whip/so that people
9		panic early yes\
10	Toni:	/I planned to panic early by taking\ the school holidays off but that
11		didn't work [laughs]

People's problems with getting prepared ahead of time elicit the suggestion from Selena that they need to 'panic early' (line 4) – something of a contradiction in terms, since the notion of panic is almost inextricably tied to last minute pressures. The group clearly share a common reaction to the notion, and this is a good example of them 'doing collegiality' through humour.[9] The humorous scenario is interactively achieved or jointly constructed: Helen's comment (line 6) and Toni's

contribution (line 10) both build on the humorous suggestion made by Selena, who elaborates on it further in line 8.

Shared criticisms of others can also serve to cement solidarity between work colleagues. A criticism endorsed by others reflects common values and attitudes. Criticisms of people not present were often a source of amusement for coworkers, as in Excerpt 3.

Excerpt 3

Context: Two young Maori men are discussing plans for a formal presentation which will involve the use of the Maori language by another Maori colleague. Maori is a second language which all three men acquired after childhood.

1 Tom: Sam's probably the fellow who's had the most experience of them
2 all but god his pronunciation it's [laughs]
3 Kit: [laughs]

Sam's pronunciation of Maori is clearly beyond description; indeed it is so embarrassing that it is a source of shared humour for Tom and Kit. The inexplicitness of this exchange is typical of much workplace humour; it reflects shared background knowledge, experience and understandings. Tom and Kit reinforce their shared in-group status with such exchanges.

Humour directed at outsiders to an organization also illustrates the function of humour in expressing solidarity and emphasizing in-group status and group membership. In Excerpt 4, in a workplace where swearing is relatively rare, humour is generated by the unexpectedly strong language directed at outsiders.

Excerpt 4

Context. Three colleagues are discussing a problem which the organization is having with an outside group.

1 Val: so shall we just
2 Sal: pay the bloody/money\
3 Val: /pay them\ pay the sods and sort it out
[Laughter]]

Once again, the extent to which the participants are 'in tune' with each other is reflected in the discourse structure, with Val and Sally jointly constructing turns, and with each producing a slightly 'shocking' word, indicating stylistic harmony as well.

However, while there were many instances of humour expressing solidarity in the New Zealand workplace data, this function did not have the same pre-eminence in the workplace as in Hay's (1995) friendship groups, where it was the over-riding and ubiquitous function of humour. The predominance of the solidarity function is not always as clear-cut in the workplace, particularly where a power differential is involved, as Excerpt 1 illustrated. This point will be discussed further below.

1.2 Speaker's positive face needs: self-deprecation To the extent that a group values humour, its effective use can add to a person's prestige or standing. Not all workplaces encourage humour, however, and sometimes the workplace 'joker'

is regarded as disruptive, and becomes the focus of censure. On the other hand, humour can serve the individual as a useful 'self-defence' or coping strategy (Ziv, 1984). Humour can also be a means of self-disclosure, especially of difficult or embarrassing information (Civikly, 1983; cited in Graham et al., 1992: 175; Kaplan and Boyd, 1965). In a variety of ways, then, humour can protect the positive face needs of the speaker by expressing self-deprecatory sentiments.

The New Zealand workplace data includes a number of examples of humour explicitly addressed to the speaker's face needs, i.e. face-saving humour where the face involved is the speaker's, rather than the hearer's. Excerpt 5 illustrates humour being used to cover an embarrassing memory lapse.

Excerpt 5

Context. Fay, the section manager, is talking to her administrative assistant, Pam, who has finally located a file which she has no recollection of creating.

1 Pam: oh well I must have done it
2 [Both laugh]
3 Pam: oh isn't that gorgeous . . .
4 Fay: when did you send it?
5 Pam: ++ it's a mystery to me [laughs]
6 [Fay laughs uproariously]
7 Pam: it really is

Pam first creates a positive context by explicitly admitting her culpability rather than denying it (line 1). She continues this by describing her lapse as *gorgeous* (rather than, say, 'terrible') and by comically exaggerating her ignorance with a dramatic pause (line 5) followed by *it's a mystery to me*, rather than diminishing it (one might have expected a response such as 'I'm not sure'.) Pam thus manages to preserve her positive face by amusing Fay and deflecting her potential irritation.

Similarly, the humour in Excerpt 6 is predominantly concerned with attention to the speaker's positive face needs as Ray confesses to losing touch with a project.

Excerpt 6

Context. Two young male colleagues discussing the next stages of a project.

1 Len: are you going to attend that meeting then?
2 Ray: yeah yeah I will /(. . .)\
3 Len: /okay\
4 Ray: I'd kind of stopped when I [laughs] got too out of it /[laughs]\
5 Len: /[laughs]\

The speakers both laugh as Ray admits to acting in ways which could be considered less than fully professional, a 'confession' which is framed as humorous self-disclosure. This is typical self-deprecatory humour, where the speaker anticipates embarrassment and responds by turning the source of the embarrassment into a subject of humour. By admitting professional fallibility, the speaker expresses trust in his addressee; by encoding the message humorously, he elicits a sympathetic response in the form of a positive reaction to the humour.

speaker-oriented positively polite device, oriented to the participants' need to be valued.

2. Humour as a Negative Politeness Strategy

A major focus of Brown and Levinson's discussion of Politeness Theory is an account of strategies which reduce the face threat of speech acts such as directives and criticisms. Again, such an analysis is predicated on the assumption that participants wish to interact harmoniously within the constraints of their institutional roles. Negative politeness strategies constitute assurances that the speaker recognizes and respects the addressee's basic wish to preserve self-determination (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 70), and they include hedges and softening devices, as well as other linguistic means of conveying deference and concern for the addressee's negative face needs. Humour is clearly one such device.

2.1 Addressee's negative face needs: hedging FTAs Humour may be used to soften the impact of speech acts such as directives or instructions which might otherwise be regarded as a threat to the autonomy of the addressee. Examples of humour used in this way between equals were common in the workplace data. Humour was often used to reduce the force of a directive between equals where there was no formal institutional basis on which one person had the right to direct the other's behaviour. In such a context, humour reflects a positive concern for the addressee, and is a signal of goodwill and a basic cooperative intent; it functions as a means of maintaining and negotiating respect between participants. In Excerpt 7, Kate attenuates her directive to Melanie with humour.

Excerpt 7
Context. Two policy analysts, Kate and Melanie, are discussing a proposal. Kate suggests that Melanie should take the proposal away and work on it further.

1 Kate: well we've just about done it to death I think
2 it's about ready for you to give give it mouth-to-mouth
3 rescuscitation do you think
4 [Both laugh]

The use of 'we' emphasizes the collegiality at the basis of Kate's relationship with Melanie, while the incongruity of the metaphor is a source of humour attenuating the directive which appears to threaten that collegiality. Between close colleagues, humour used in this way sometimes developed into good-natured banter, a jointly constructed humour sequence in which the person on the receiving end of the directive challenged its initiator, as illustrated in Excerpt 8.

Excerpt 8
Context. Vince and Aidan are working on a proposal.

1 Vin: you're not on page 4 yet?
2 Aid: yes
3 Vin: [laughs] /[laughs]\ [laughs]
4 Aid: /I've been there and come back\ [laughs]

Vince wants Aidan to speed up, but in the interests of maintaining good relations, he does not want to be overtly directive. He conveys his message by an indirect route, using a high-pitched incredulous and humorous tone for a comment which could be interpreted as a criticism of Aidan's slowness. Aidan retaliates, however, with a humorous challenge to Vincent's inference about his speed. Thus complex messages are conveyed in an acceptable way; humour enables Vince to convey a directive which recognizes Aidan's face needs, while Aidan preserves his dignity as well as responding appropriately to Vince.

Interestingly, in the workplace data analysed, humour was more often used to soften an FTA between equals than downwards. Superiors typically hedged directives using standard politeness strategies such as tags, modal particles, and indirect structures. However, as Excerpt 9 illustrates, in some instances humour was used to attenuate a directive between people with unequal power.

Excerpt 9

Context. Manager, Beth, to administrative assistant, Marion, who is chatting to a secretary.

1 Beth: OK Marion I'm afraid serious affairs of state will have to wait
2 we have some trivial issues needing our attention
3 [All laugh]

There are several indications that this utterance is motivated by politeness and oriented to the addressee's negative face needs: the use of the pronouns 'we' and 'our', for instance, function to align the manager and the administrative assistant, expressing positive politeness and solidarity; and the source of the humour itself – the ironic downgrading of their on-task work to 'trivial' compared to the social talk or work gossip in which the two women were engaged – also serves this purpose.

Excerpt 9 is also a classic case of competing discourses (Lee, 1992) – this time involving those of solidarity and power. The utterance reflects Beth's competing loyalties – to Marion as a colleague, on the one hand, and, on the other, to the management team which requires that she move Marion back on task. Hence, at one level Excerpt 9 illustrates the use of humour to maintain good relations between those with differential power, and to avoid the overt enactment of power or authority. But it is also possible to interpret such interactions as instances of repressive discourse, where humour is co-opted for less positive purposes. In power-differentiated contexts, humour can be regarded as a discourse strategy which disguises oppression – a device to sugar the pill. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Section 3 later.

2.2 Addressee's positive face needs: attenuating FAAs Humour can be used to soften the impact of a criticism or even an insult – speech acts which can be described as face attack acts (FAAs): i.e. 'communicative acts which are injurious to the hearer's positive or negative face, and are introduced in a situation which could have been avoided, but where their inclusion is perceived by the hearer to be intentional' (Austin, 1990: 279).[10] Humour which attenuates a critical com-

need to have their wants acknowledged, and their values respected and shared. Humour is thus a very useful strategy for softening criticisms in contexts where work is being regularly evaluated and assessed. In Excerpt 10, Andy implies that Victor has been too wordy, using humour to convey the critical message.

Excerpt 10
Context. Two advisers comparing their evaluations.

1 And: apart from that I've just got what you've got
2 just in a lot less words /[laughs]\
3 Vic: /[laughs] \

The humour lies in the directness of the criticism in a context where attention to face would be predicted. Once again, tone of voice is crucial in conveying Andy's intention to take account of Victor's face needs, to amuse rather than offend.

Where a superior was meeting with subordinates to evaluate their performance, humour was available as a strategy to reduce the face threat of critical comments. In the following excerpt Sara, the superior, is not happy that the team's strategy of passing a problem upwards means this particular problem will end up on her desk.

Excerpt 11
Context. Sara is assessing the procedures used by an evaluation team.

1 Val: then that sat somewhere for a little while and then Len passed it to
2 Clive who passed it to [laughs] me but you know then
3 Sara: yep it's coming back to me I can see it happening
4 [adopts a funny voice] I can see it coming ah [laughs]
5 Val: yeah [laughs] flying through the air at you um [tut]
6 Sara: [laughs]

Sara uses fantasy humour (Hay, 1995) to express her negative response to the results of the team's behaviour. The effectiveness of the humour as a softening device is reflected by the fact that it is picked up by Val (line 5) who makes a further contribution to the fantasy. Jointly constructed humour sequences in this context provide good evidence that the criticism has been conveyed without causing negative affect. With humour as the adhesive, the competing discourses of power and solidarity have been well integrated. Politeness Theory suggests that humour functions here to reflect the speaker's concern for the addressees' face needs.

The requirements of institutional roles at work often make face threatening acts unavoidable. In such contexts, humour provides an acceptable attenuation strategy. Excerpt 12 provides an example where a very direct criticism is attenuated by the humorous, laughing and friendly tone with which it is delivered.

Excerpt 12
Context: Two female policy analysts working on the draft of a letter.

1 Jo: it kind of reads like [laughs] you didn't want to put much time into

Jo's remark causes laughter partly because it is so direct. The workplace is a non-intimate context where such a 'bald on record' approach is unusual or marked. Jo's comment challenges the norms for polite interaction between peers; consideration for the addressee's positive face needs would generally lead to the use of a less direct strategy. The humour caused by the dissonance in such examples emphasizes the general underlying norm that people will tend to treat each other with a certain basic level of politeness in the workplace.

Humorous insults and jocular abuse are more extreme examples of the same phenomenon, while insults are quite naked FAAs explicitly signalling an absence of concern for the addressee's positive face needs. Humour is one available strategy to attenuate the effect of such utterances; it functions to reduce the unacceptability of the FAA (Austin, 1990; see also Hay, 1994). This aggressive type of humour occurred more frequently in workplace interactions where the participants knew each other well. Between equals, working together on an issue, humour was a means of 'managing' suggestions that could be interpreted as critical, or which were undoubtedly intended to be critical, as in Excerpt 13.

Excerpt 13
Context. Three women discussing proposals they are working on.

1 Val: and Celia's finished her proposals I'm sure [laughs]
2 Cel: on the last one
3 Val: ah you sod
4 All: [laugh]

Val insults Celia because she is performing well, and thus showing up the other two. The laughter reflects the incongruity of such a strong term of abuse in the work context between colleagues. At one level, there is doubtless an element of underlying aggression based on envy, reflected in the fact that an insult is the chosen response. However, insults between those who know each other well are also signals of solidarity and markers of in-group membership (i.e. 'we know each other well enough to insult each other without causing offence' (see Hay, 1994). Humour encodes the criticism or insult in an acceptable form; insults can be considered instances of 'doing collegiality' between those who work together closely.

Jocular abuse of this kind occurs in a variety of contexts in the workplace. Colleagues use insulting terms such as *rotter*, *sod*, and *bastard* in jest in situations such as when a colleague passes on an unwelcome job, volunteers them for a task, indicates they will be the person to respond to a tricky client, and so on. While it is possible to analyse these insults as cases where the speaker attenuates an FTA out of concern for the addressee's positive face needs, it seems that Politeness Theory is being stretched to its limits by such an interpretation. The underlying 'dark side' to some insults suggests that an alternative explanation should be sought. An instance of jocular abuse in the workplace is not adequately analysed as an attenuated FTA; nor is it simply a means of expressing solidarity (Hay, 1995). Rather, some workplace insults function as FAAs, and humour provides their 'cover'. In other words, jocular abuse often functions as a covert

strategy for face attack, a means of registering a veiled protest, i.e. what I am calling a *contestive strategy*, as described later.

So, Politeness Theory, with its focus on the speaker's concern for the participants' face needs, provides an adequate explanation for the frequent uses of humour to enact, create and maintain solidarity in the workplace. Politeness Theory also accounts for the use of humour to attenuate or hedge the impact of negatively affective speech acts, such as directives or criticisms, which threaten collegial relations and underscore power relationships. However, it must be recognized that not all participants consistently want to de-emphasize power relationships. Indeed, it is sometimes politic, especially in relation to particular broader workplace objectives, to assert authority in order to ensure that particular goals are achieved. In such cases, humour may be used 'repressively', to maintain control of a situation and emphasize who is in charge. Equally, subordinates may refuse to stay in their 'place', and humour is a powerful device for subtly signalling incipient rebellion in the ranks, or at least for encoding rebelliousness in a sufficiently indirect form to evade censure. Contestive humour challenges the status quo; it is inherently subversive. I turn now to an examination of these alternative power-based and more critical perspectives on the functions of humour in the workplace.

3. Repressive Humour

Politeness Theory provides an adequate account of humour used to express concern for the face needs of others, but it is less satisfactory in explaining humour used to license deliberately face threatening behaviour, especially in asymmetrical relationships. Where it is acceptable for power to be blatantly exhibited (e.g. between young males), humour is often used to legitimize an emphasis on power relationships; in such situations, more powerful participants tend to make fun of those who are less powerful.[11] More commonly, powerful players use humour to subtly control the behaviour of their subordinates (Graham et al., 1992; Hay, 1995; Martineau, 1972; Murphy, 1986). Because it is no longer acceptable in many communities to use explicit orders when addressing professional clients, for example, attenuation devices, such as hedges and humour, are necessary tools for those who wish to achieve particular goals, but who do not wish to appear authoritarian in doing so. The gynaecologists mentioned above who used humour to gain patients' compliance in Pizzini's (1991) study provide one example.

Where power relations are especially salient, humour used downwards by those in authority is often most accurately analysed as evidence of 'repressive discourse', a disguise for a less acceptable message. Context is crucial in identifying the nature of the power relationships, as Excerpt 14 illustrates.

Excerpt 14

Context. Barry, Callum's manager, has asked Callum to speed up his team, which Callum has done by phoning all of them to put the pressure on. When Barry walks into a meeting later in the day, Callum takes the opportunity to protest to his boss.

1 Call: everyone has been running around like crazy men since
2 our phone call this morning
3 Bar: not altogether a bad thing [laughs]

Barry's response (line 3) is unsympathetic and unpalatable to Callum, but he presents it as a humorous comment, making it difficult for Callum to challenge without losing face or appearing to be a whinger. The humorous tone masks Barry's impatience with his subordinate's earlier handling of the situation. The humour provides a 'cover' for a remark which might otherwise be considered unreasonably oppressive in the work context.

As discussed earlier, criticism is a more extreme instance of face threat, often more accurately described as face attack. If criticism is regarded as unavoidable in order to further some goal other than that of good interpersonal relations, then the speaker may choose to hedge it. Humour is one available attenuation strategy, as illustrated in Excerpts 10 and 12. But where a superior is criticizing a subordinate, to some extent the effect must always be a demonstration of power and authority, or 'oppressive' in Pateman's (1980) terms. Humour can be used then in the service of power to minimally disguise the oppressive intent, i.e. as a repressive discourse strategy. Even Excerpt 9 earlier can be analysed from this perspective, despite its positively polite components. And Excerpt 15, where the critical intent is very manifest, certainly illustrates this use of humour.

Excerpt 15

Context. Neil, the boss, has come to collect his administrative assistant, Ken, for a meeting for which Ken is late. Ken is working at his computer.

1 Neil: hate to drag you away when you're obviously having so much fun
2 but it IS after ten
3 Ken: [laughs] some fun

Neil's comment is ironic, as Ken's response recognizes. The irony provides an acceptable cover for the reprimand, which is clearly evident in the tone of voice. The fact that humour is often used to disguise the force of criticisms in asymmetrical interactions underlines the extent to which criticism is experienced in our data (and our culture) as a very heavily weighted threat to face. Though criticism is an activity one might expect to be a normal component of the feedback mechanism in an asymmetrical relationship in workplaces, the fact that it is regularly attenuated suggests it is more accurately classified as an FAA. In Pateman's terms, humour in this context is clearly acting as a repressive discourse device; it is used to disguise the fact that the speaker has the authority to explicitly require the addressee to behave as s/he orders, and to reprimand the addressee who fails to behave as directed or meet required standards.

An analysis which considers the possibility that humour may function as repressive discourse, thus involves examining the underlying power relationships, their salience in the particular context, and the explicitness with which they are being enacted. As the examples involving directives and criticisms in sections 2.1 and 2.2 make clear, humour is one way to 'do power' less explicitly – a

way that is generally more acceptable in a context where informality is valued and status differences are played down. However, the underlying intent is coercive, and so this use of verbal humour clearly qualifies as 'repressive discourse'; it functions to gain willing compliance, while, at least superficially, expressing solidarity and de-emphasizing the power differential.

4. Contestive Humour

Finally, humour may be used to challenge existing relations within the institutional power structure. In such cases, it is used not so much as a politeness device, attending to participants' positive or negative face needs, nor as a repressive discourse device, disguising an underlying power relationship, or conveying a directive or a negatively affective speech act with a sugar coating.[12] Rather, it functions as a critical discourse device, *a contestive strategy*, using one of the few acceptable means available to subordinates who wish to challenge, if only temporarily, the existing authority structures.

Humour is used contestively in the workplace when it serves as a cloak for the expression of 'socially risky' opinions (Winick, 1976), or as a shield for criticism of a superior. In Excerpt 16, Bob casts doubt on his senior's judgement.

Excerpt 16
Context. Chairperson, Henry, planning with Bob, a more junior staff member, a strategy to trounce opposition at a meeting.

1 Hen: they're bound to fall over as soon as you present this stuff
2 it can't be refuted
3 Bob: let's just hope they've been reading the same textbooks as you
4 [Both laugh]

The humour serves as an instance of contestive discourse, attenuating and thus concealing what could be considered the effrontery of a critical speech act in such a context. Bob is effectively conveying scepticism about Henry's views, and indicating that he is less confident than Henry about the predicted outcome. By embedding his different judgement and sceptical evaluation of their chances of success in a humorous utterance, Bob renders it more acceptable. Humour also renders Bob's implied critical judgement and different opinion less accessible for challenge by Henry because it is not explicitly 'on record'.

Similarly, humour may be used in this way to license a challenge to a superior's definition of the situation. Sollitt-Morris (1997) provides a very clear example of such a challenge in a school department meeting where one teacher contests another's attempt to speak for her.

Excerpt 17 (Sollitt-Morris, 1997: 17)
Context. School department meeting. Zeb is the Head of Department and Chair.

1 Zeb: okay let's have a look at this agenda + + exams right we've all got a
2 copy of the third form [laughter] what about the fourth
3 Bet: no Ann hasn't got one yet

4 Ann: no I haven't [with fake American accent] **mom**
5 [laughter]

Sollitt-Morris comments (1997: 17–18)

> In this example Bet takes it upon herself to answer for Ann, which Ann clearly does not appreciate. Rather than tell Bet overtly that she does not want Bet to speak for her, Ann agrees with Bet then calls her 'mom' in a silly voice. 'Moms' speak for children, and 'moms' have a higher status in relation to their children. By addressing Bet as 'mom', which she is patently not, Ann is able to undermine Bet's interference.

In Excerpt 18 May uses humour to direct Jenny, her superior, to take responsibility for the next presentation.

Excerpt 18
Context. Forward planning meeting involving Manager, Jenny, and her team.

1 May: I'm sure you would just love to show off your new whizz-bang
2 computer with all its special effects wouldn't you Jenny
[General laughter]

May does not have the right to tell Jenny what to do. In this case the humour in the form of an ironic assertion serves as a useful disguise for what could be regarded as an implicit challenge to the superior's authority. Support for this analysis can be found in an account of directives in a hospital setting by Maureen Mooney (1980) where, in a meeting between medical personnel, all instances of subordinates giving directives to superiors were treated as humorous. So when a senior nurse used an imperative to suggest that a doctor add a particular patient to his workload (*You do that one*), this elicited general laughter. Nevertheless, in such situations the socially 'unacceptable' or norm-breaking message is effectively put across. Indeed, one of our informants commented that humour was a useful non-threatening strategy for floating subversive or 'outrageous' ideas. And, as with jocular abuse, it is difficult for a superior to challenge contestive humour without losing face.

As analysed above, humour is a common strategy for attenuating insults in the workplace. Because it constitutes such a threat to face, jocular abuse tends to be restricted to those who know each other well, and is most common between equals, where it serves as one means of 'doing collegiality'. However, there are cases in our data where jocular abuse occurs upwards as well as between equals.[13] Subordinates sometimes complained about tasks assigned to them, for instance, or criticisms made about them, by humorously abusing their superiors (e.g. *oh shut up., what a rotten trick to play on a girl*). These jocular insults have different force between status-differentiated participants from between equals. They are always slightly risky and, however jocular, there is an underlying contestive, challenging or 'dark side' to the message which is not adequately analysed within Politeness Theory framework.

To sum up, then, in work contexts humour can be used by subordinates as a subtle (or not so subtle) license to challenge the power structure as well as

those in power to achieve the speaker's goal while apparently de-emphasizing the power differential. Humour is one very effective way of 'doing power' less explicitly, a subtle device for getting things done while also conveying important messages about power relations. An analysis which treats humour as basically a negative politeness strategy, a device for attenuating a FTA, and purely an expression of concern for the addressee's face, risks under-analysing the interactional social significance of the exchange.

Conclusion

Humour is always intended to be amusing, but it may also serve a range of more complex functions in the workplace. Humour generally creates and maintains solidarity or collegiality; and it may hedge or attenuate face threatening acts such as directives, and negatively affective speech acts such as criticisms and insults. In all these functions humour contributes to social cohesion in the workplace. Humour is sensitively oriented to participants' face needs. It is a dynamic means of expressing and constructing solidarity, and an effective strategy for reducing potential offence.

In interactions where relative power is particularly salient, however, the way humour functions in constructing and negotiating relationships is often more complex. Humour is a means of embedding a risky or unacceptable proposition in a superficially innocuous utterance; it is thus particularly useful in the management of unequal work relationships. Humour may be used by the powerful to maintain authority and control while continuing to appear collegial, and by the repressed to license a challenge which subverts that control. Humour may be used by those in authority as a repressive discourse device, concealing the authority structures or power relations involved in order to gain the addressee's compliance. In this case, humour functions strategically, encoding a directive or criticism in a more acceptable form. Alternatively, humour may be used by subordinates in an asymmetrical power relationship as a critical discourse device, functioning to facilitate a challenge to the positive or negative face needs of the addressee. In such cases, humour provides an acceptable form for a challenge to the status quo, questioning the validity or accuracy of statements from a superior, for instance, or clothing an insulting attack on the positive face of a superior with a pretence of play. Humour permits the subordinate to embed the challenge, criticism or insult in a socially acceptable form, which makes the negative communicative intent less easy to challenge.

Many other aspects of the way humour is used in the workplace merit attention. The distribution of humour is not random, for instance, and varies according to many factors, including the type of interaction. In general, humour is most likely to occur in the opening and closing sequences of meetings, and at points of change within an interaction, but some meetings are regularly punctuated with banter. There are particular types of humour which seem to be preferred in particular workplaces; and while the types of humour which occur in mixed-gender

and single gender interactions overlap, there appear to be preferred styles in some organizational contexts. The predominant functions of humour also seem to vary in different contexts. Defusing tension is an important function of humour in some meetings, while in others more frequent functions of humour may include facilitating difficult negotiations, and conveying criticism or instructions in an acceptable form.

Another area of further research only briefly touched on in this paper is the extent to which humour is jointly constructed in workplace settings (Marra, 1998), and how it often serves as a remarkably powerful solidarity building device in the business context. A related factor is the relationship between the use of humour and the relative integration of different participants into the workplace culture or networks. It seems likely that the most frequent targets or butts of banter are also the core members of the organizational networks (cf. Hay, 1994). There is also a distinctly creative aspect of humour, especially evident in some of the larger meetings in our data, where participants were required to brainstorm new projects or produce innovative ideas. This, too, merits further attention.

So, to conclude, this analysis of humour has identified a number of different functions served by humour at work. While Politeness Theory accounts satisfactorily for the positive politeness functions of humour, it is clear that an alternative model is often necessary to analyse the functions of humour in situations of asymmetrical power. I have suggested that an adequate model must integrate politeness theory with a more critical approach to the analysis of humour. In other words, we must be able to account not only for cooperative, face-oriented discourse in a range of contexts, but also for the dark side of politeness – the repressive discourse of manipulative superiors in asymmetrical contexts, as well as the impolite manifestations of the less powerful, the critical challenges to those in power from those in subordinate positions. The power of humour lies in its flexibility for all these purposes – it can function as a bouquet, a shield, and a cloak, as well as an incisive weapon in the armoury of the oppressed.

Appendix: Transcription Conventions

All names are pseudonyms.

YES	Capitals indicate emphatic stress
[laughs]	Paralinguistic features in square brackets
[drawls]	
+	Pause of up to one second
++	Two second pause
/so how\	Simultaneous speech
/yes but\	
(hello)	Transcriber's best guess at an unclear utterance
?	Rising or question intonation
publicat-	Incomplete or cutoff utterance
. . .	Some words omitted

Notes

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1. Gibson (1994) provides an interesting critique of such approaches.
2. Mott and Petrie (1995: 329) adopted a similar methodology and make the same point.
3. Pakeha is a Maori word used in New Zealand to refer to people of European (usually British) descent.
4. See Graham, Papa and Brooks (1992) and Hay (1995) for a good discussion of this issue.
5. Obviously, this analysis is confined to auditory signals of listener response.
6. Attardo (1993) analyses jokes as involving deliberate violations of Grice's maxims.
7. For a sophisticated discussion of the complexities of participants' communicative goals, and the relevance of goal conflict, see Tracy and Coupland (1990).
8. As Sinclair (1985: 16) argues 'The problem is mainly where to stop. Language activity is but one component of our general activity'.
9. For further discussion of ways of 'doing collegiality' at work, see Holmes (in press), Holmes, Stubbe and Vine (1999).
10. Austin notes that Brown and Levinson's model of politeness assumes that 'the speaker wants or needs to maintain the hearer's face, that the hearer poses a threat to the speaker's face, and that the speaker cares what the hearer does in retaliation' (1990: 279). FAAs are not based on such assumptions. Indeed, they account for situations where mutual interest does not govern the conduct of the interaction, and what the speaker wants to communicate is not necessarily cooperative (1990: 278–9).
11. See, for example, Labov (1972), Kiesling (forthcoming), Kuiper (1991).
12. See Holmes (1984) for a discussion of positively affective and negatively affective speech acts.
13. It is interesting to note that jocular abuse downwards from superior to subordinates was rare in the workplaces which have been analysed. It is possible that insults, even if attenuated by humour, would too obviously constitute abuses of power in the workplace, and that they are thus avoided due to legislative restraints. However, this pattern was also noted by Hay in her analysis of jocular abuse in friendship groups. Newer and less well-established group members received less abuse than longer standing and well-integrated members.

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34

Stance and Engagement: A Model of Interaction in Academic Discourse

Ken Hyland

Stance and Engagement: A Model of Interaction in Academic Discourse

Over the past decade or so, academic writing has gradually lost its traditional tag as an objective, faceless and impersonal form of discourse and come to be seen as a persuasive endeavour involving interaction between writers and readers. This view sees academics as not simply producing texts that plausibly represent an external reality, but also as using language to acknowledge, construct and negotiate social relations. Writers seek to offer a credible representation of themselves and their work by claiming solidarity with readers, evaluating their material and acknowledging alternative views, so that controlling the level of personality in a text becomes central to building a convincing argument. Put succinctly, every successful academic text displays the writer's awareness of both its readers and its consequences.

As this view gains greater currency, more researchers have turned their attention to the concept of evaluation and how it is realized in academic texts. Indeed, much of my own work over the past decade or so has been devoted to this. Consequently, a variety of linguistic resources such as hedges, reporting verbs, *that*-constructions, questions, personal pronouns, and directives have been examined for the role they play in this persuasive endeavour (e.g. Hyland, 2000; Hyland and Tse, forthcoming; Swales, 1990; Thompson, 2001). Despite this plethora of research, however, we do not yet have a model of interpersonal discourse that unites and integrates these features and that emerges from the study of academic writing itself. How *do* academic writers use language to express a stance and relate to their readers? This is the question addressed in this article,

that brings together a diverse array of features by drawing on interviews and a corpus of 240 research articles to offer a framework for understanding the linguistic resources of academic interaction. My aim, then, is to consolidate my previous work using this corpus to offer a model of stance and engagement in academic texts.

Interaction and Evaluation

Evaluation, as Bondi and Mauranen (2003) have recently observed, 'is an elusive concept'. For while we recognize interaction and evaluation in academic texts, it is not always clear how they are achieved. The ways that writers and speakers express their opinions have long been recognized as an important feature of language, however, and research has attempted to account for these meanings in a number of ways. Hunston and Thompson (2000) use the term 'evaluation' to refer to the writer's judgements, feelings, or viewpoint about something, and others have described these varied linguistic resources as *attitude* (Halliday, 1994), *epistemic modality* (Hyland, 1998), *appraisal* (Martin, 2000; White, 2003), stance (Biber and Finegan, 1989; Hyland, 1999), and *metadiscourse* (Crismore, 1989; Hyland and Tse, 2004).

Interest in the interpersonal dimension of writing has, in fact, always been central to both systemic functional and social constructionist frameworks, which share the view that all language use is related to specific social, cultural and institutional contexts. These approaches have sought to elaborate the ways linguistic features create this relationship as writers comment on their propositions and shape their texts to the expectations of their audiences. Perhaps the most systematic approach to these issues to date has been the work on appraisal which offers a typology of evaluative resources available in English (Martin, 2000). For Martin, appraisal largely concerns the speaker's attitudinal positions, distinguishing three sub-categories of affect, judgement, and appreciation, roughly glossed as construing emotion, moral assessments, and aesthetic values respectively, and the ways these are graded for intensity. While this broad characterization is interesting, however, it is unclear how far these resources are actually employed in particular registers and to what extent they can be seen as comprising core semantic features in given contexts of use.

Because the work on evaluation and stance is relatively new, much of it has tended to concentrate on mass audience texts, such as journalism, politics, and media discourses, which are likely to yield the richest crop of explicitly evaluative examples. Yet these public genres tend to offer writers far more freedom to position themselves interpersonally than academic genres. Because we do not yet have a model of evaluative discourse that emerges from the study of academic writing itself, we cannot say which features are *typical* in scholarly writing, rather than which are *possible*. It seems, for example, that 'attitude' in academic texts more often concerns writers' judgements of epistemic probability and estimations of value, with affective meanings less prominent (Hyland, 1999, 2000). The role of hedging and boosting, for instance, is well documented in academic prose as

communicative strategies for conveying reliability and strategically manipulating the strength of commitment to claims to achieve interpersonal goals.

An important consideration here is that evaluation is always carried out in relation to some standard. Personal judgements are only convincing, or even meaningful, when they contribute to and connect with a communal ideology or value system concerning what is taken to be normal, interesting, relevant, novel, useful, good, bad, and so on. Academic writers' use of evaluative resources is influenced by different epistemological assumptions and permissible criteria of justification, and this points to and reinforces specific cultural and institutional contexts. Writers' evaluative choices, in other words, are not made from all the alternatives the language makes available, but from a more restricted sub-set of options which reveal how they understand their communities through the assumptions these encode. Meanings are ultimately produced in the interaction between writers and readers in specific social circumstances, which means that a general categorization of interactional features is unable to show how academic writers, through their disciplinary practices, construct and maintain relationships with their readers and thus with their communities.

To be persuasive, writers need to connect with this value system, making rhetorical choices which evaluate both their propositions, and their audience. In sum, to understand what counts as effective persuasion in academic writing, every instance of evaluation has to be seen as an act socially situated in a disciplinary or institutional context.

Stance and Engagement

Interaction in academic writing essentially involves 'positioning', or adopting a point of view in relation to both the issues discussed in the text and to others who hold points of view on those issues. In claiming a right to be heard, and to have their work taken seriously, writers must display a competence as disciplinary insiders. This competence is, at least in part, achieved through a writer–reader dialogue which situates both their research and themselves, establishing relationships between people, and between people and ideas. Successful academic writing thus depends on the individual writer's projection of a shared professional context. That is, in pursuing their personal and disciplinary goals, writers seek to create a recognizable social world through rhetorical choices which allow them to conduct interpersonal negotiations and balance claims for the significance, originality and plausibility of their work against the convictions and expectations of their readers.

The motivation for these writer–reader interactions lies in the fact that readers can always refute claims and this gives them an active and constitutive role in how writers construct their arguments. Any successfully published research paper anticipates a reader's response and itself responds to a larger discourse already in progress. This locates the writer intertextually within a larger web of opinions (Bakhtin, 1986), and within a community whose members are likely to recognize only certain forms of argument as valid and effective. Results and interpretations

need to be presented in ways that readers are likely to find persuasive, and so writers must draw on these to express their positions, represent themselves, and engage their audiences.

Evaluation is therefore critical to academic writing as effective argument represents careful considerations of one's colleagues as writers situate themselves and their work to reflect and shape a valued disciplinary ethos. These interactions are managed by writers in two main ways.

1. *Stance.* They express a textual 'voice' or community recognized personality which, following others, I shall call *stance.* This can be seen as an attitudinal dimension and includes features which refer to the ways writers present themselves and convey their judgements, opinions, and commitments. It is the ways that writers intrude to stamp their personal authority onto their arguments or step back and disguise their involvement.
2. *Engagement.* Writers relate to their readers with respect to the positions advanced in the text, which I call *engagement* (Hyland, 2001). This is an alignment dimension where writers acknowledge and connect to others, recognizing the presence of their readers, pulling them along with their argument, focusing their attention, acknowledging their uncertainties, including them as discourse participants, and guiding them to interpretations.

The key resources by which these interactional macro-functions are realized are summarized in Figure 1 and discussed in more detail below.

Together these resources have a dialogic purpose in that they refer to, anticipate, or otherwise take up the actual or anticipated voices and positions of potential readers (Bakhtin, 1986). Stance and engagement are two sides of the same coin and, because they both contribute to the interpersonal dimension of discourse, there are overlaps between them. Discrete categories inevitably conceal the fact that forms often perform more than one function at once because, in developing their arguments, writers are simultaneously trying to set out a claim, comment on its truth, establish solidarity and represent their credibility. But it is generally possible to identify predominant meanings to compare the rhetorical patterns in different discourse communities.

It should also be borne in mind that evaluation is expressed in a wide range of ways which makes a fine-grained typology problematic. While writers can




Figure 1: Key resources of academic interaction

mark their perspectives explicitly through lexical items (such as *unfortunately, possible, interesting,* etc.), they can also code them less obviously through conjunction, subordination, repetition, contrast, etc. (e.g. Hunston, 1994). Moreover, because the marking of stance and engagement is a highly contextual matter, members can employ evaluations through a shared attitude towards particular methods or theoretical orientations which may be opaque to the analyst. Nor is it always marked by words at all: a writer's decision not to draw an obvious conclusion from an argument, for example, may be read by peers as a significant absence. It may not always be possible therefore to recover the community understandings and references embedded in more implicit realizations.

Distinguishing between these two dimensions is a useful starting point from which to explore how interaction and persuasion are achieved in academic discourse and what these can tell us of the assumptions and practices of different disciplines. This is what I set out to do below. Following a description of the corpus, I sketch out some of the key resources of stance and engagement and discuss what these differences in functionality tell us about the epistemological and social beliefs of disciplinary cultures.

Corpus and Methods

My view of stance and engagement is based on a series of studies which draw on both qualitative and quantitative approaches, comprising the analysis of a corpus of published articles and interviews with academics. The text corpus consists of 240 research articles comprising three papers from each of ten leading journals in eight disciplines selected to represent a broad cross-section of academic practice and facilitate access to informants. The fields were mechanical engineering (ME), electrical engineering (EE), marketing (Mk), philosophy (Phil), sociology (Soc), applied linguistics (AL), physics (Phy) and microbiology (Bio). The value of exploring such a large corpus is that it makes available many instances of the target features in a naturally occurring discourse, replicating the language-using experience of community members.

The texts were converted to an electronic corpus of 1.4 million words and searched for specific features seen as initiating writer–reader interactions using *WordPilot 2000*, a text analysis and concordance programme. A list of 320 potentially productive search items was compiled based on previous research into interactive features (e.g. Biber and Finegan, 1989; Bondi, 1999; Hyland, 1999, 2000), from grammars (Biber et al., 1999; Halliday, 1994), and from the most frequently occurring items in the articles themselves. All cases were examined to ensure they functioned as interactional markers and a sample was double-checked by a colleague working independently.

The interviews were conducted with experienced researcher/writers from the target disciplines using a semi-structured format. These employed open-ended interview prompts which focused on subjects' own and others' writing, but allowed them to raise other relevant issues. Subjects could therefore respond to texts with insider community understandings of rhetorical effectiveness, while

Stance and Features of Writer Positioning

Stance concerns *writer-oriented features* of interaction and refers to the ways academics annotate their texts to comment on the possible accuracy or credibility of a claim, the extent they want to commit themselves to it, or the attitude they want to convey to an entity, a proposition, or the reader. I take it to have three main components: *evidentidity, affect* and *presence.* Evidentiality refers to the writer's expressed commitment to the reliability of the propositions he or she presents and their potential impact on the reader; affect involves a broad range of personal and professional attitudes towards what is said, including emotions, perspectives and beliefs; and presence simply concerns the extent to which the writer chooses to project him or herself into the text. It is comprised of four main elements:

1. Hedges.
2. Boosters.
3. Attitude markers.
4. Self-mentions.

Hedges are devices like *possible, might* and *perhaps,* that indicate the writer's decision to withhold complete commitment to a proposition, allowing information to be presented as an opinion rather than accredited fact. Because all statements are evaluated and interpreted through a prism of disciplinary assumptions, writers must calculate what weight to give to an assertion, attesting to the degree of precision or reliability that they want it to carry and perhaps claiming protection in the event of its eventual overthrow (Hyland, 1998). Hedges, therefore, imply that a statement is based on plausible reasoning rather than certain knowledge, indicating the degree of confidence it is prudent to attribute to it (Example 1):

> (1) Our results suggest that rapid freeze and thaw rates during artificial experiments in the laboratory may cause artifactual formation of embolism. Such experiments may not quantitatively represent the amount of embolism that is formed during winter freezing in nature. In the chaparral at least, low temperature episodes usually result in gradual freeze-thaw events.
>
> (Bio)

Equally importantly, hedges also allow writers to open a discursive space where readers can dispute their interpretations. Claim-making is risky because it can contradict existing literature or challenge the research of one's readers, which means that arguments must accommodate readers' expectations that they will be allowed to participate in a dialogue and that their own views will be acknowledged in the discourse. By marking statements as provisional, hedges seek to involve readers as participants in their ratification, conveying deference, modesty, or respect for colleagues views (Hyland, 1998). Two of my informants noted this:

> Of course, I make decisions about the findings I have, but it is more convincing to tie them closely to the results

> You have to relate what you say to your colleagues and we don't encourage people to go out and nail their colours to the mast as maybe they don't get it published.
> (Bio interview)

Boosters, on the other hand, are words like *clearly, obviously* and *demonstrate*, which allow writers to express their certainty in what they say and to mark involvement with the topic and solidarity with their audience. They function to stress shared information, group membership, and engagement with readers (Hyland, 1999). Like hedges, they often occur in clusters, underlining the writer's conviction in his or her argument (Example 2):

> (2) This brings us into conflict with Currie's account, for static images surely cannot trigger our capacity to recognize movement. If that were so, we would see the image as itself moving. With a few interesting exceptions we obviously do not see a static image as moving. Suppose, then, that we say that static images only depict instants. This too creates problems, for it suggests that we have a recognitional capacity for instants, and this seems highly dubious.
> (Phil)

Boosters can therefore help writers to present their work with assurance while effecting interpersonal solidarity, setting the caution and self-effacement suggested by hedges against assertion and involvement.

Both boosters and hedges represent a writer's response to the potential viewpoints of readers and an acknowledgement of disciplinary norms of appropriate argument. They balance objective information, subjective evaluation and interpersonal negotiation, and this can be a powerful factor in gaining acceptance for claims. Both strategies emphasize that statements not only communicate ideas, but also the writer's attitude to them and to readers. Writers must weigh up the commitment they want to invest in their arguments based on its epistemic status and the effect this commitment might have on readers' responses. These comments from my interview data suggest the importance of getting this balance right:

> I'm very much aware that I'm building a façade of authority when I write, I really like to get behind my work and get it out there. Strong. Committed. That's the voice I'm trying to promote, even when I'm uncertain I want to be behind what I say.
> (Soc interview)

> You have to be seen to believe what you say. That they are *your* arguments. It's what gives you credibility. It's the whole point.
> (Phil interview)

> I like tough minded verbs like 'think'. It's important to show where you stand. The people who are best known have staked out the extreme positions. The people who sit in the middle and use words like 'suggest', no one knows their work.
> (Soc interview)

Attitude markers indicate the writer's affective, rather than epistemic, attitude to propositions, conveying surprise, agreement, importance, frustration, and so on, rather than commitment. While attitude is expressed throughout a text by

the use of subordination, comparatives, progressive particles, punctuation, text location, and so on, it is most explicitly signalled by attitude verbs (e.g. *agree, prefer*), sentence adverbs (*unfortunately, hopefully*), and adjectives (*appropriate, logical, remarkable*). By signalling an assumption of shared attitudes, values and reactions to material, writers both express a position and pull readers into a conspiracy of agreement so that it can often be difficult to dispute these judgements (Example 3):

(3) these learner variables should prove to be promising areas for further research. (Bio)

.... two quantities are rather important and, for this reason, the way they were measured is re-explained here. (ME)

The first clue of this emerged when we noticed a quite extraordinary result. (Phil)

Student A2 presented another fascinating case study in that he had serious difficulties expressing himself in written English. (AL)

Self-mention refers to the use of first person pronouns and possessive adjectives to present propositional, affective and interpersonal information (Hyland, 2001). Presenting a discoursal self is central to the writing process (Ivanic, 1998), and writers cannot avoid projecting an impression of themselves and how they stand in relation to their arguments, their discipline, and their readers. The presence or absence of explicit author reference is generally a conscious choice by writers to adopt a particular stance and disciplinary-situated authorial identity. In the sciences it is common for writers to downplay their personal role to highlight the phenomena under study, the replicability of research activities, and the generality of the findings, subordinating their own voice to that of unmediated nature. Such a strategy subtly conveys an empiricist ideology that suggests research outcomes would be the same irrespective of the individual conducting it. One of my respondents expressed this view clearly:

I feel a paper is stronger if we are allowed to see what was done without 'we did this' and 'we think that'. Of course we know there are researchers there, making interpretations and so on, but this is just assumed. It's part of the background. I'm looking for something interesting in the study and it shouldn't really matter who did what in any case. (Bio interview)

In the humanities and social sciences, in contrast, the use of the first person is closely related to the desire to both strongly identify oneself with a particular argument and to gain credit for an individual perspective. Personal reference is a clear indication of the perspective from which a statement should be interpreted, enabling writers to emphasize their own contribution to the field and to seek agreement for it (Example 4):

(4) I argue that their treatment is superficial because, despite appearances, it relies solely on a sociological, as opposed to an ethical, orientation to develop a response. (Soc)

I bring to bear on the problem my own experience. This experience contains ideas derived from reading I have done which might be relevant to my puzzlement as well as my personal contacts with teaching contexts. (AL)

In these more discursive domains, then, self-mention clearly demarcates the writer's role in the research:

Using 'I' emphasizes what you have done. What is yours in any piece of research. I notice it in papers and use it a lot myself. (Soc interview)

The personal pronoun 'I' is very important in philosophy. It not only tells people that it is your own unique point of view, but that you believe what you are saying. It shows your colleagues where you stand in relation to the issues and in relation to where they stand on them. It marks out the differences. (Phil interview)

Engagement and Features of Reader Positioning

In comparison with stance, the ways writers bring readers into the discourse to anticipate their possible objections and engage them in appropriate ways have been relatively neglected in the literature. Based on their previous experiences with texts, writers make predictions about how readers are likely to react to their arguments. They know what they are likely to find persuasive, where they will need help in interpreting the argument, what objections they are likely to raise, and so on. This process of audience evaluation therefore assists writers in constructing an effective line of reasoning and, like stance options, also points to the ways language is related to specific cultural and institutional contexts (Hyland, 2001). There are two main purposes to writers' uses of engagement strategies:

1. Acknowledgement of the need to adequately meet readers' expectations of inclusion and disciplinary solidarity. Here we find readers addressed as participants in an argument with reader pronouns and interjections.
2. To rhetorically position the audience. Here the writer pulls readers into the discourse at critical points, predicting possible objections and guiding them to particular interpretations with questions, directives and references to shared knowledge.

Again, these two functions are not always clearly distinguishable, as writers invariably use language to solicit reader collusion on more than one front simultaneously. They do, however, help us to see some of the ways writers project readers into texts and how this is done in different disciplines. There are five main elements to engagement:

1. Reader pronouns.
2. Personal asides.
3. Appeals to shared knowledge.
4. Directives.
5. Questions.

Reader pronouns are perhaps the most explicit way that readers are brought into a discourse. *You* and *your* are actually the clearest way a writer can acknowledge the reader's presence, but these forms are rare outside of philosophy, probably because they imply a lack of involvement between participants. Instead, there is enormous emphasis on binding writer and reader together through inclusive *we*, which is the most frequent engagement device in academic writing. It sends a clear signal of membership by textually constructing both the writer and the reader as participants with similar understanding and goals. This was recognized by my informants:

> Part of what you are doing in writing a paper is getting your readers onside, not just getting down a list of facts, but showing that you have similar interests and concerns. That you are looking at issues in much the same way they would, not spelling everything out, but following the same procedures and asking the questions they might have.
> (Bio interview)

> I often use 'we' to include readers. I suppose it brings out something of the collective endeavour, what we all know and want to accomplish. I've never thought of it as a strategy, but I suppose I am trying to lead readers along with me.
> (ME interview)

In addition to claiming solidarity, these devices also set up a dialogue by weaving the potential point of view of readers into the discourse, thereby anticipating their objections, voicing their concerns, and expressing their views. Thus, *we* helps guide readers through an argument and towards a preferred interpretation, often shading into explicit positioning of the reader (Example 5):

> (5) Now that we have a plausible theory of depiction, we should be able to answer the question of what static images depict. But this turns out to be not at all a straightforward matter. We seem, in fact, to be faced with a dilemma. Suppose we say that static images can depict movement. This brings us into conflict with Currie's account,.....
> (Phil)

> Although we lack knowledge about a definitive biological function for the transcripts from the 93D locus, their sequences provide us with an ideal system to identify a specific transcriptionally active site in embryonic nuclei.
> (Bio)

Personal asides allow writers to address readers directly by briefly interrupting the argument to offer a comment on what has been said. While asides express something of the writer's personality and willingness to explicitly intervene to offer a view, they can also be seen as a key reader-oriented strategy. By turning to the reader in mid-flow, the writer acknowledges and responds to an active

audience, often to initiate a brief dialogue that is largely interpersonal. As we can see, such comments often add more to the writer–reader relationship than to the propositional development of the discourse (Example 6):

(6) And – as I believe many TESOL professionals will readily acknowledge – critical thinking has now begun to make its mark, particularly in the area of L2 composition. (AL)

He above all provoked the mistrust of academics, both because of his trenchant opinions (often, it is true, insufficiently thought out) and his political opinions. (Soc)

What sort of rigidity a designator is endowed with seems to be determined by convention (this, by the way, is exactly the target of Wittgensteinian critiques of Kripke's essentialism). (Phil)

This kind of engagement builds a relationship between participants which is not dependent on an assessment of what needs to be made explicit to elaborate a position or ease processing constraints. It is an intervention simply to connect: to show that both writer and readers are engaged in the same game and are in a position to draw on shared understandings. While all writing needs to solicit reader collusion, this kind of engagement is far more common in the soft fields. Because they deal with greater contextual vagaries, less predictable variables, and more diverse research outcomes, readers must be drawn in and be involved as participants in a dialogue to a greater extent than in the sciences.

Appeals to shared knowledge seek to position readers within apparently naturalized boundaries of disciplinary understandings. The notion of 'sharedness' is often invoked by writers to smuggle contested ideas into their argument, but here I am simply referring to the presence of explicit markers where readers are asked to recognize something as familiar or accepted. Obviously readers can only be brought to agree with the writer by building on some kind of implicit contract concerning what can be accepted, but often these constructions of solidarity involve explicit calls asking readers to identify with particular views. In doing so, writers are actually constructing readers by presupposing that they hold such beliefs, assigning to them a role in creating the argument, acknowledging their contribution while moving the focus of the discourse away from the writer to shape the role of the reader (Example 7):

(7) Of course, we know that the indigenous communities of today have been reorganized by the catholic church in colonial times and after,..... (Soc)

This tendency obviously reflects the preponderance of brand-image advertising in fashion merchandising. (Mk)

Chesterton was of course wrong to suppose that Islam denied 'even souls to women'. (Phil)

This measurement is distinctly different from the more familiar NMR pulsed field gradient measurement of solvent self-diffusion.

(Phy)

Over three-quarters of such explicit appeals to collective understandings in the corpus were in the soft papers. Writers of scientific papers expect their readers to have considerable domain knowledge and to be able to decode references to specialized methods, instruments, materials, and models, but these understandings are signalled less explicitly.

Directives instruct the reader to perform an action or to see things in a way determined by the writer. They are signalled mainly by the presence of an imperative (like *consider*, *note*, and *imagine*); by a modal of obligation addressed to the reader (such as *must*, *should*, and *ought*); and by a predicative adjective expressing the writer's judgement of necessity/importance (*It is important to understand . . .*). Directives can be seen as directing readers to engage in three main kinds of activity (Hyland, 2002a):

1. Textual acts.
2. Physical acts.
3. Cognitive acts.

First, *textual acts* are used to metadiscoursally guide readers through the discussion, steering them to another part of the text or to another text (Example 8):

(8) See Lambert and Jones (1997) for a full discussion of this point.

(Soc)

Look at Table 2 again for examples of behavioristic variables.

(Mk)

Consult Cormier and Gunn 1992 for a recent survey

(EE)

Second, *physical acts* instruct readers how to carry out research processes or to perform some action in the real world (Example 9):

(9) Before attempting to measure the density of the interface states, one should freeze the motion of charges in the insulator.

(EE)

Mount the specimen on the lower grip of the machine first, . . .

(Bio)

Set the sliding amplitude at 30mm traveling distance.

(ME)

Finally, *cognitive acts* guide readers through a line of reasoning, or get them to understand a point in a certain way and are therefore potentially the most threatening type of directives. They accounted for almost half of all directives in the corpus, explicitly positioning readers by leading them through an argument

to the writer's claims (Example 10) or emphasizing what they should attend to in the argument (Example 11):

(10) Consider a sequence of batches in an optimal schedule.
(EE)

Think about it. What if we eventually learn how to communicate with aliens.
(Soc)

(11) It is important to note that these results do indeed warrant the view that...
(AL)

What has to be recognised is that these issues.....
(ME)

Questions are the strategy of dialogic involvement *par excellence*, inviting engagement and bringing the interlocutor into an arena where they can be led to the writer's viewpoint (Hyland, 2002b). They arouse interest and encourage the reader to explore an unresolved issue with the writer as an equal, a conversational partner, sharing his or her curiosity and following where the argument leads. Over 80 percent of questions in the corpus, however, were rhetorical, presenting an opinion as an interrogative so the reader appears to be the judge, but actually expecting no response. This kind of rhetorical positioning of readers is perhaps most obvious when the writer poses a question only to reply immediately, simultaneously initiating and closing the dialogue (Example 12):

(12) Is it, in fact, necessary to choose between nurture and nature? My contention is that it is not.
(Soc)

What do these two have in common, one might ask? The answer is that they share the same politics.
(AL)

Why does the capacitance behave this way? To understand we first notice that at large B there are regular and nearly equal-spaced peaks in both C3,(B) and C31(- B).
(Phy)

Stance and Engagement Practices: Corpus Findings

Analysis of the research article corpus shows that the expression of stance and engagement is an important feature of academic writing, with 200 occurrences in each paper, about one every 28 words. Table 1 shows that stance markers were about five times more common than engagement features and that hedges were by far the most frequent feature of writer perspective in the corpus, reflecting the critical importance of distinguishing fact from opinion and the need for writers to present their claims with appropriate caution and regard to colleagues' views.

The significance of these frequencies can be more clearly understood in comparison to other common features of published academic writing. Biber et al. (1999), for instance, give figures of 18.5 cases per 1000 words for passive voice constructions and 20 per 1000 words for past tense verbs. These count interaction

markers can therefore be seen as an important element of academic prose. Perhaps more interesting, however, are the disciplinary distributions. Table 2 shows the density of features in each discipline normalized to a text length of 1000 words. As can be seen, the more discursive 'soft' fields of philosophy, marketing, sociology and applied linguistics, contained the highest proportion of interactional markers with some 75 percent more items than the engineering and science papers.

Stance, Engagement and Disciplinarity

It is clear that writers in different disciplines represent themselves, their work and their readers in different ways, with those in the humanities and social sciences taking far more explicitly involved and personal positions than those in the science and engineering fields. As I noted at the beginning of this article, the reason for this is that the resources of language mediate their contexts, working to construe the characteristic structures of knowledge domains and argument forms of the disciplines that create them.

In broad terms, rhetorical practices are inextricably related to the purposes of the disciplines. Natural scientists tend to see their goal as producing public knowledge able to withstand the rigours of falsifiability and developed through relatively steady cumulative growth (Becher, 1989). The fact that this research often occupies considerable investments in money, training, equipment, and expertise means it is frequently concentrated at a few sites and commits scientists to involvement in specific research areas for many years. Problems therefore emerge in an established context so that readers are often familiar with prior texts and research, and that the novelty and significance of contributions can easily be recognized. The soft knowledge domains, in contrast, are more interpretative and less abstract, producing discourses which often recast knowledge as sympathetic understanding, promoting tolerance in readers through an ethical rather than cognitive progression (Dillon, 1991; Hyland, 2000). There is, moreover, less control of variables and greater possibilities for diverse outcomes, so writers must spell out their evaluations and work harder to establish an understanding with readers.

While there are clear dangers in reifying the ideologies of practitioners, these broad ontological representations have real rhetorical effects. They allow, for

Table 1: Stance and engagement features in the research articles

Stance	Items per 1000 words	% of total	Engagement	Items per 1000 words	% of total
Hedges	14.5	46.6	Reader pronouns	2.9	49.1
Attitude markers	6.4	20.5	Directives	1.9	32.3
Boosters	5.8	19.2	Questions	0.5	8.5
Self-mention	4.2	13.7	Knowledge ref	0.5	8.2
			Asides	0.1	1.9
Totals	30.9	100		5.9	100

Table 2: Stance and engagement features by discipline (per 1000 words)

Feature	Phil	Soc	AL	Mk	Phy	Bio	ME	EE	Total
Stance	**42.8**	**31.1**	**37.2**	**39.5**	**25.0**	**23.8**	**19.8**	**21.6**	**30.9**
Hedges	18.5	14.7	18.0	20.0	9.6	13.6	8.2	9.6	14.5
Attitude mkrs	8.9	7.0	8.6	6.9	3.9	2.9	5.6	5.5	6.4
Boosters	9.7	5.1	6.2	7.1	6.0	3.9	5.0	3.2	5.8
Self-mention	5.7	4.3	4.4	5.5	5.5	3.4	1.0	3.3	4.2
Engagement	**16.3**	**5.1**	**5.0**	**3.2**	**4.9**	**1.6**	**2.8**	**4.3**	**5.9**
Reader ref	11.0	2.3	1.9	1.1	2.1	0.1	0.5	1.0	2.9
Directives	2.6	1.6	2.0	1.3	2.1	1.3	2.0	2.9	1.9
Questions	1.4	0.7	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.5
Shared knowledge	1.0	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.5
Asides	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Total	**59.1**	**36.2**	**42.2**	**42.7**	**29.9**	**25.4**	**22.6**	**25.9**	**36.8**

instance, the sciences to emphasize demonstrable generalizations rather than interpreting individuals, so greater burden is placed on research practices and the methods, procedures and equipment used. New knowledge is accepted on the basis of empirical demonstration, and science writing reinforces this by highlighting a gap in knowledge, presenting a hypothesis related to this gap, and then conducting experiments and presenting findings to support the hypothesis. In soft areas, however, the context often has to be elaborated anew, its more diverse components reconstructed for a less cohesive readership. Writers are far less able to rely on general understandings and on the acceptance of proven quantitative methods to establish their claims and this increases the need for more explicit evaluation and engagement. Personal credibility, and explicitly getting behind arguments, play a far greater part in creating a convincing discourse for these writers.

The suggestion that 'hard' knowledge is cumulative and tightly structured not only allows for succinct communication, but also contributes to the apparently 'strong' claims of the sciences. The degree to which the background to a problem and the appropriate methods for its investigation can be taken for granted means there are relatively clear criteria for establishing or refuting claims and this is reflected in writers' deployment of evidential markers. While writers in all disciplines used hedges in the evaluation of their statements, they were considerably more frequent in the soft disciplines, perhaps indicating less assurance about what colleagues could be safely assumed to accept. The use of a highly formalized reporting system also allows writers in the hard disciplines to minimize their presence in their texts. In the soft disciplines where what counts as adequate explanation is less assured, interpretative variation increases and writers must rely to a greater extent on a personal projection into the text, through self-mention and attitude markers to invoke an intelligent reader and a credible, collegial writer.

In addition to creating an impression of authority, integrity and credibility through choices from the stance options, writers are able to either highlight or

frequent engagement devices in the corpus were reader pronouns and over 80 percent of these occurred in the soft discipline papers where they functioned to appeal to scholarly solidarity, presupposing a set of mutual, discipline-identifying understandings linking writer and reader. They also claim authority as well as communality, however, addressing the reader from a position of confidence as several of my informants noted:

> I suppose we help to finesse a positive response – we are all in this together kind of thing. I use it to signal that I am on the same wavelength, drawing on the same assumptions and asking the same questions.
>
> (Mk interview)

> It helps to locate you in a network. It shows that you are just doing and thinking what they might do and think. Or what you would like them to, anyway.
>
> (Soc interview)

Similarly, questions were largely confined to the soft fields. The fact they reach out to readers was seen as a distraction by my science informants:

> Questions are quite rare in my field I think. You might find them in textbooks I suppose, but generally we don't use them. They seem rather intrusive, don't they? Too personal. We generally prefer not to be too intrusive.
>
> (ME interview)

> I am looking for the results in a paper, and to see if the method was sound. I am looking for relevance and that kind of dressing is irrelevant. People don't ask questions as it would be seen as irrelevant. And condescending probably.
>
> (EE interview)

In contrast, the soft knowledge writers saw them as an important way of relating to readers:

> In my field that's all there are, questions. Putting the main issues in the form of questions is a way of presenting my argument clearly and showing them I am on the same wavelength as them.
>
> (Phil interview)

> Often I structure the argument by putting the problems that they might ask.
>
> (Mk interview)

Finally, directives were the only interactive feature which occurred more frequently in the science and engineering papers. Generally, explicit engagement is a feature of the soft disciplines, where writers are less able to rely on the explanatory value of accepted procedures, but directives are a potentially risky tactic and, as a result, most directives in the soft fields were textual, directing readers to a reference rather than informing them how they should interpret an argument. Two of my respondents noted this in their interviews:

> I am very conscious of using words like 'must' and 'consider' and so on and use

> to take notice of it'. So I suppose I am trying to take control of the reader and getting them to see things my way.
>
> (Soc interview)

> I am aware of the effect that an imperative can have so I tend to use the more gentle ones. I don't want to bang them over the head with an argument I want them to reflect on what I'm saying. I use 'consider' and 'let's look at this' rather than something stronger.
>
> (AL interview)

The more linear and problem-oriented approach to knowledge construction in the hard knowledge fields, on the other hand, allows arguments to be formulated in a highly standardized code. Articles in the sciences also tend to be much shorter, probably due to editorial efforts to accommodate the rapid growth of knowledge and high submission rates in many sciences. These factors place a premium on succinctness, and directives provide an economy of expression highly valued by space-conscious editors and information-saturated scientists, as several informants noted:

> I rarely give a lot of attention to the dressing, I look for the meat – the findings – and if the argument is sound. If someone wants to save me time in getting there then that is fine. No, I'm not worried about imperatives leading me through it.
>
> (EE interview)

> I'm very conscious of how I write and I am happy to use an imperative if it puts my idea over clearly. Often we are trying to work to word limits anyway, squeezing fairly complex arguments into a tight space.
>
> (ME interview)

In sum, these different features, taken together, are important ways of situating academic arguments in the interactions of members of disciplinary communities. They represent relatively conventional ways of making meaning and so elucidate a context for interpretation, showing how writers and readers make connections, through texts, to their disciplinary cultures.

Conclusion

My claim has been that effective academic writing depends on rhetorical decisions about interpersonal intrusion and I have suggested a model which attempts to show how writers select and deploy community-sensitive linguistic resources to represent themselves, their positions and their readers. The account I have provided, however, is necessarily a partial one, representing only the broadest categories of rhetorical function. There are certainly more fine-grained distinctions to be made among these resources which are likely to offer further insights into the rhetorical options available to writers and the patterns of effective persuasion employed by different communities.

There are also obvious limitations with the kind of corpus approach I have adopted. Unlike the detailed studies of

on introductions, Brenton's (1996) study of conference abstracts, or Brett's (199 analysis of results sections, for example, a corpus study is unable to provide i formation about where these features are likely to cluster. Several studies sugge that greater writer intrusion is a characteristic of Introduction and Discussic sections, where argument is emphasized and decisions, claims and justificatio are usually found (e.g. Gosden, 1993; Hanania and Akhtar, 1985). While it seen to be an intuitively reasonable assumption that stance and engagement wo is most likely to be done here, the division of research papers into rhetorical simple and detached Methods and Results, and complex, subjective and autho centred Introductions and Discussions might be unwise. Even the mo rhetorically innocent sections reveal writers' efforts to persuade their audien of their claims, so that stance and engagement are likely to figure, in differe ways, across the research paper. Indeed, as Knorr-Cetina (1981) pointed o many years ago, the IMRD structure is itself a rhetorical artefact.

It should also be noted that this creation of an authorial persona is an act personal choice, and the influence of individual personality, confidenc experience, and ideological preference are clearly important. We are not th instruments of our disciplines and variables such as individuality and ideolecticit are important limitations on the kind of analysis presented here. It may even b the case, as John Swales (pers. comm.) has observed, that a few famous write (perhaps Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Sartre, and Halliday) do not play this inte active game with their audiences. However, writers do not act in a social vacuum and knowledge is not constructed outside particular communities of practic Such communities exist in virtue of a shared set of assumptions and routine about how to collectively deal with and represent their experiences. The way language is used on particular occasions are not wholly determined by thes assumptions, but a disciplinary voice can only be achieved through a process c participating in such communities and connecting with these socially determine and approved beliefs and value positions. In this way, independent creativity i shaped by accountability to shared practices.

I hope to have shown, then, that stance and engagement are important ele ments both of a writer's argument and of a disciplinary context as they seek t bring writer and readers into a text as participants in an unfolding dialogue. Th model presented here offers a plausible description of academic interaction an suggests how writers anticipate and understand their readers' background know ledge, interests, and interpersonal expectations to control how they respond t a text and to manage the impression they gain of the writer.

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35

When Talk isn't Cheap: Language and Political Economy

Judith T. Irvine

Perhaps one of the most durable legacies of Saussure's *Course in General Linguistics* is its radical separation of the denotational sign (qua sign) from the material world. This conception of the sign has endured not just because of the effectiveness of Saussure's own formulation, but probably also because it was consonant with ideas already having a long history in the Western intellectual tradition – most particularly, the separation of mind from body.[1] It was also consonant with emerging views in American anthropology and linguistics at the time. The Boasian concern for the independence of linguistic form from race and culture (given the technological emphasis common in conceptions of culture in the early years of this century) similarly led many scholars to promote the autonomy of linguistics as a discipline and to turn their attention away from the political and economic conditions of speech. Although the Boasians and their descendants included major figures and schools who focused on relationships between language and culture, they did so largely by defining culture in terms of knowledge and ideas. The obverse side of this tradition is represented by those anthropologists and other scholars who, in studying a material and political economy, ignored or played down the study of language, and sometimes even saw themselves as aligned against the "idealists" or "culturalists" who drew on linguistic models and verbal data.

Recent years, however, have seen some uneasiness with this dichotomy, and some attempts at rapprochement. Within linguistics, the consideration of language use and context has reached out to the material and historical conditions of linguistic performance. Thus, for example, linguists like William Labov portray speech as varying according to speakers' socioeconomic class and other affiliations relating to economic and political interest. The implication is that the

class connotations of variants influence the direction of change in the linguistic system. From a more sociological point of view, we see in some quarters a new or renewed concern with ideology, including its linguistic articulation, in the control of material production and distribution (for example, Rossi-Landi 1983). Still, in these views, however much the world of ideas and the world of goods may influence each other, language remains firmly locked in the former – the world of ideas. Linguistic signs stand for aspects of the marketplace; they influence it but are not of it.

Language has more roles to play in a political economy than these. And, problematic though the term "political economy" may be in some respects,[2] it may offer clues as to what those roles are. To recognize that the study of economy must include institutions, practices, and values, as well as goods – and that the values and interests governing much of its operation necessarily involve political processes and relations, not just the autonomous flow of markets – is to begin to move beyond the dichotomy that excludes linguistic phenomena from the economic realm. The allocation of resources, the coordination of production, and the distribution of goods and services, seen (as they must be) in political perspective, involve linguistic forms and verbal practices in many ways – as this paper will demonstrate.

The other side of the problem, and the one more central to my discussion, lies in our conception of Language. In linguistic anthropology a fruitful approach began with the work of the anthropologically oriented sociolinguists Hymes and Gumperz, with their attention to speaking as a socially and culturally constructed activity. This school's significance for the problem of language's relationship with political economy might not be obvious from a cursory glance at some of its early texts, since the early years of the "ethnography of speaking" sometimes tended to focus on cognitive questions (for example, the concept of communicative competence) and to emphasize ideas about speaking as part of a larger, cultural system of ideas, rather more than the verbal acts themselves. But while these initial emphases were not inconsistent with the relegation of linguistics to an "idealist" camp, the shift toward a concern with speaking as a social activity opened the way to a more productive conception of relations among language, culture, and society – and, from there, the way beyond the materialist/idealist dichotomy.[3]

The present paper builds upon that base. It also draws upon recent conceptions of a semiotics inspired as much by Peirce as by Saussure (see Mertz and Parmentier 1985; Silverstein 1980, 1984), for we need to conceive of linguistic phenomena, and the functions of the linguistic sign, more broadly than in the usual structuralist readings of Saussure if we are to move beyond the materialist/idealist conundrum. As I have suggested above, we also need conceptions of economy and of value that are comprehensive enough to include linguistic resources and verbal activities. Toward that end, in this paper I consider a case where linguistic objects and performances are exchanged for cash and goods – a case where language's involvement in an economy is perhaps most direct. This is a type of economic function of linguistic phenomena that, I believe, deserves

language and economy, and to be properly understood it needs to be compared with others.

Part I of this paper, therefore, lays that groundwork: it summarizes and compares some views of the relations between linguistic phenomena and economy (best thought of as political economy). I shall lay out a range of possibilities as to what those relations can be. Part II will explore a more specific topic: a comparative economy of compliments. Ethnographic illustrations in the paper derive largely from my own fieldwork in West Africa (Senegal). As Part II emphasizes, among other things the Senegalese case presents compliments that are paid for in cash – an example of linguistic phenomena as objects of economic exchange.

A major purpose of these discussions is to show that the roles language and speech can play in a political economy are not mutually exclusive. Even though some of these "roles" correspond to views already articulated in the linguistic and sociological literature, views that are sometimes seen as competing, what they actually represent are coexisting functions of language. Rather than rival theories or separate sets of ethnographic cases, they concern different dimensions of language use. Because of language's semiotic complexity (its multiple levels of patterning, and the multifunctional nature of the linguistic sign), there are multiple possibilities for its relationship with a material world. All the types of linkage between linguistic phenomena and political economy mentioned in Part I could be found coexisting in the same community – even in the same verbal performances, as we shall see in Part II.

In outlining language's many relationships with the material world, my object is not to claim it for a "materialist" camp, or to attack the materialist/idealist dichotomy merely by inverting it. Indeed, I argue that cultural systems of ideas are crucial to an understanding of language's full range of roles in a political economy. Language is a complex social fact that can be looked at from many angles, including the economic. It is only by appreciating language's complexity that we can transcend the conundrum.

I. Types of Linkage between Linguistic Phenomena and Political Economy

The linkages compared here can be distinguished in several ways: according to what sign-function they emphasize (denotational reference, indexicality, and so on); according to what kind of linguistic and social diversity they encompass; and according to how they connect language with the social division of labor – as its instrument, as its index, or as part of its substance. That is, does linguistic diversity impede social cooperation? Does the variety of verbal behaviors merely index social groups, divisions, or roles formed on mainly nonverbal bases, or is the variety of verbal performance a precondition for (and thus a defining characteristic of) the social division of labor itself – as the practices constituting a social role, or as the objects of economic activity?

As I suggested earlier, the notion that signs may have an economic and political dimension is hardly new. Nor are most of the extant statements on the

subject inherently faulty. They are, however, incomplete. Some reduce language to only one of its functions, for example referential propositionality.[4] Some describe an indexical relationship but give little account of it. And most omit a consideration of linguistic phenomena as possible *objects of exchange* – exchanged against what we consider to be material objects, not only against other linguistic signs.

Propositionality: signs denote objects and activities in the material world The first kind of relation between language and economy is the most familiar one: linguistic signs denote objects, the natural world, and economic skills and activities. They label persons and groups; and they refer to, and make predications about, the forces of production and the coordination of efforts. Because signs refer to the external world, a society's productive efforts can be organized and a division of labor becomes possible.

In discussing this referential function of language and its communicative implications, however, many writers both in linguistics and in the social sciences have done more than merely elaborate on these statements. Instead, some have assumed that referential communication is the *only* function of language, and that language must be uniform in order for referential communication to work. They assume, therefore, that a social division of labor depends on linguistic homogeneity, or at least is facilitated by it. Bloomfield wrote, for example:

> In the ideal case, within a group of people who speak to each other, each person has at his disposal the strength and skill of every person in the group. The more these persons differ as to special skills, the wider a range of power does each one person control. Only one person needs to be a good climber, since he can get fruit for all the rest; only one needs to be a good fisherman, since he can supply the others with fish. *The division of labor, and, with it, the whole working of human society, is due to language* [1933:24, italics in the original].[5]

Notice that this discussion of the "ideal" case envisions a diversity of skills in the socioeconomic realm but not in the linguistic: "Obviously the value of language [for social cooperation] depends upon people's using it in the same way" (1933:29). Homogeneity in linguistic usage is assumed necessary to ensure referential communication. Utterances *refer* to economic skills, to their realization in acts and events, and to their coordination. Thus Bloomfield's conception of language's role in a social division of labor rests entirely on the referential function.

It would be unjust to Bloomfield to suggest that he never acknowledged the existence of diversity in linguistic skills or performances within a speech community. Indeed, he paid more attention to this than did many other scholars of his day and later (see Hymes 1967). But the rubrics under which he considered diversity – as material to eliminate from his science of language, or as relevant only to historical processes such as "intimate borrowing" – are inimical to any serious sociolinguistic view. For the most part he saw linguistic diversity as incidental to social and regional boundaries, or as contingent upon them. The

with shared reference, and thus with economic cooperation or any other aspect of community. The "literary genius" (Bloomfield 1933:46) is the only figure he mentions whose social position is actually constituted by special linguistic skills.[6]

This picture of linguistic homogeneity as basic to communication and hence to social coordination is a familiar one – as are some of the critiques of it – and I do not want to dwell on it at length.[7] Only two further remarks are worth making here. First: although some aspects of the picture have been condemned, it has not been thrown out altogether. Sociolinguists like Hymes and Gumperz have attacked Bloomfield's (and Chomsky's) portrayal of the homogeneous speech community, and they replace it with a notion of the organization of linguistic diversity; but they do not wholly abandon the view that social coordination is facilitated if the parties to it share some common code. Instead, Gumperz and Hymes shift the emphasis to *interpretation*, as what is shared, rather than performance. In this way referential accuracy can be preserved under multilingual (or multi-varietal) conditions, although denotational reference is not the only function of language sociolinguists envisage.

Second: much investigation remains to be done on just *how* language facilitates coordination of a social division of labor. For example, within the linguistic system the study of directives (requests and commands) is especially relevant, because it concerns the verbal management of the flow of goods and services in an economy. The few studies we have of directives in social and cultural context suggest that, in conspicuously task-oriented situations, speech coordinating the tasks is often reduced and simple compared to speech of other kinds, or speech in other settings.[8] (The reduction and "simplicity" of linguistic form in pidgins and trade languages originating in labor or market settings might be relevant also.) Another, more sociological aspect of linguistic involvement in coordinating a division of labor concerns how people participate in organizational discussions. For instance, a single spokesperson may represent a group and carry out the communicative tasks necessary for its coordination with other groups.[9] In short, coordinating a material division of labor does not universally *require* a very complex system of signs held in common among all coordinated parties.

However, to the extent that a code is held in common, or at least that a semantic system is, it may also facilitate cooperation – or at least co-optation – in an indirect way: by incorporating an ideology that supports a particular socioeconomic system. The lexicon labeling social groups and economic activities, and perhaps also a system of metaphoric constructions and semantically generative principles, would presumably be the main places in the referential structure to look for this.

Indexicality: signs index social groups, categories, and situations entering into the relations of production I turn now to the second type of relation between signs and political economy – to a view that has become familiar to us under the rubric of sociolinguistics: a view of the speech community as an organization of linguistic diversity, having a repertoire of ways of speaking that are indexically associated with social groups, roles, or activities.[10] In other words, there is a diversity on the linguistic plane that indexes a social diversity. Studies

of correlations of this sort, especially as social dialectology, have become commonplace. Less common is any attempt to explain the correlation – why a *particular* linguistic variety should mark a particular social group, except for reasons of external historical contingency, such as the demographic one of migration of ethnic groups speaking different languages. Indeed, most of these studies either state or imply that the social diversity is formed independently from its linguistic marking: for example, Labov's use of an already-existing sociological survey of the Lower East Side that provided a 10-point index of socioeconomic class, based mainly on occupation and income.

Among all these cases and their correlations, what kinds of distinctions might be useful? One possibility has been to distinguish dialects from registers – that is, to distinguish codes associated with persons and groups from codes associated with situations. This classification makes a convenient starting point, but it becomes complicated when – as is so frequently the case – a variety historically associated with one social group is adopted by another to mark a social situation. Similarly, Labov's studies of speech styles and socioeconomic class have shown how the type of linguistic variation that signals class also signals differences in style (thus, situation), in one and the same sociolinguistic process (Labov 1972).[11]

Another approach has been to characterize "types of linguistic communities," distinguished according to degrees of internal differentiation. In an early paper by this title ("Types of Linguistic Communities," 1962) Gumperz proposed that language distance among codes in a repertoire is correlated with degrees of social complexity – social differentiation internal to the community – in an evolutionary scheme ranging from bands through "larger tribal groups" to modern urban-industrial societies (1971[1962]:105). Gumperz (private communication) no longer subscribes to this scheme and its evolutionary implications. He had suggested it at a time when (as he noted, pp. 104–105) "reliable cross-cultural information on speech behavior [was] almost nonexistent." Counterexamples now abound: compare the studies of urban social dialectology in the United States and Britain, where "language distance" between social classes consists largely in phonetic detail, with cases such as the Vaupés region in the northwest Amazon, a small-scale egalitarian social system where mutually unintelligible languages are associated with descent-group-like units in a network of marriage alliances.

Although I too discard this particular evolutionary hypothesis, a valuable aspect of the 1962 paper was its attempt to draw some explanatory link between the form of the social division of labor and the nature of its linguistic indices – in contrast to correlational studies that assume the relationship is entirely arbitrary, or entirely external to the linguistic system. With this problem in view I think it is still useful to look at the topology of linguistic differentiation and social differentiation, and to pay attention to the kind of linguistic phenomena involved. For "language distance" let us substitute some other properties of codes: their *discreteness* and their *autonomy* from other codes in a communicative system. In other words, the question is how functionally independent of one another they are, regardless of their genetic relationship and structural comparability

This might allow us to compare several kinds of sociolinguistic systems: (1) systems where the socially indexing linguistic alternants form a set of discrete usages, versus systems where they are gradient (for example, multilingualism versus differences in vowel height). This contrast concerns the alternants' linguistic form.[12] (2) Systems where the socially indexing alternate varieties are limited to a narrow semantic range, or a set of topically specific items (as with some kinds of respect vocabularies), versus varieties that can apply over a wide referential range (such as dialects differing mainly in phonetics). This contrast concerns the extent to which the socially indexing variety is simultaneously involved with the referential function. (3) Systems where the relevant codes are autonomous (at least potentially), in the sense that they can be independently described or characterized, versus systems where some codes can only be defined relative to other codes (for example, by the addition of a surface-level rule, as with Pig Latin and many other play languages, and also the gender-linked codes of some American Indian languages).

Where these alternants index social groups and roles, I would suggest that their contrasts might have some connection with a cultural ideology of role relations – such as, whether the roles they mark are thought of as essentially autonomous, defined independently of one another, or as dependent and complementary; whether a role is thought to be part of a person's basic identity, thus applying to all situations and governing what other roles he/she may take on; and whether, in principle, the roles (or groups) are exclusive and sharply bounded, as opposed to allowing degrees of participation, or mobility and shifting among them (see Goodenough 1965; Nadel 1957).

A good example of the kind of cases we might look at in this light would be "antilanguages" (Halliday 1976): argots spoken by groups (or in roles) culturally defined as opposing, or inverting, prevailing norms – such as thieves, prisoners, and revolutionaries. As Halliday points out, the linguistic phenomena characterizing these codes cannot be accounted for simply by the need for secrecy or for group boundary markers, although those needs are present. Instead, the codes' origin in *counter-societies* is reflected in many aspects of their linguistic form, for instance in their elaboration of lexicon and metaphor relevant to their special activities and their attitudes toward the normative society, and in their frequent use of formal inversions and reversals, such as metathesis. Also significant is their conspicuous avoidance and violation of forms recognized as "standard" (consider, for example, Reisman's [1974] description of "contrapuntal" speaking in Antigua as a counter to conventions of orderly turn-taking associated with the social forms of white colonial society and its heirs; see also Kochman 1972). These anti-languages are clearly not autonomous codes, then, although the normative codes on which they depend may be. The anti-language is not, and has never been, anyone's native tongue, nor are all its formal characteristics simply arbitrary. Both functionally and formally it is derived from the normative code, just as its speakers define their social role in opposition to the normative society.

The language (and culture) of gender, in different societies, might be another suitable set of cases, some perhaps even showing the characteristics of "anti-languages" (in cases where sex roles are culturally conceived of as antagonistic).

The question is whether the forms of speaking associated with males and females reflect, in some way, cultural conceptions of their social identities, in relation to each other and in relation to other kinds of statuses an individual may hold.[13]

My point is that indexical correlations between realms of linguistic differentiation and social differentiation are not wholly arbitrary. They bear some relationship to a cultural system of ideas about social relationships, including ideas about the history of persons and groups. I do not mean that linguistic variation is simply a diagram of some aspect of social differentiation – as correlational studies often in effect suggest – but that there is a dialectic relationship mediated by a culture of language (and of society).

As a more detailed example, an ethnographic case from West Africa illustrates these suggestions about code discreteness and autonomy.[14] Among rural Wolof of Senegal, there is a series of ranked, endogamous occupational groups, called "castes" in the ethnographic literature on the region. As I have described (Irvine 1975, 1978b, 1982), caste differences are culturally associated with differences in speech style. A style connected with high rank (*waxu géér*,[15] "noble speech") contrasts with a style connected with low rank (*waxu gewel*, "griot speech," so named after the bardic caste which in some respects is said to epitomize low-ranking groups). Linguistically, the phenomena that most conspicuously distinguish the two speech styles are gradient in form and/or application: prosodic differences, such as pitch, loudness, and speed of talk; and the proportional use of emphatic particles and parallel and/or repetitive constructions. The prosodic phenomena in particular can only be defined relative to one another. There is no pitch frequency that absolutely marks a voice as high-ranking or low-ranking, only relatively low or high pitch. The two speech styles are *complementary*, mirror-images diverging from a neutral middle ground to the extent that a social situation defines differences in social rank as relevant.

Contrast this complementarity in Wolof speech styles, then, with the speech of another "caste" group, the Lawbé (Woodworkers). A semi-nomadic population said to have migrated into Wolof territory from a Pulaar-speaking region to the north, the Lawbé are bilingual: they speak Wolof during their temporary visits in Wolof villages (during which they are hired by villagers to cut down trees and carve wooden utensils from them), but they speak Pulaar in their encounters with Pulaar-speakers (the similarly semi-nomadic cattle-herding Peul and the sedentary Tukulor). Wolof villagers claim that the Lawbé also speak Pulaar among themselves, and that their command of that language shows they are "not Wolof."

Given the dearth of published studies of the Lawbé (and I have not closely observed them myself), it is not clear what they speak among themselves – whether what the Wolof claim about them is true or, if true, whether it holds for all Lawbé groups or only some of them. What does seem to be clear, however, is that Wolof villagers assign the Lawbé a different ethnic origin and a separate history, to match their control of a separate language, Pulaar. These same Wolof villagers also describe the Wolof system of caste occupations, its associated symbolism, and so on, as if it were complete without Woodworkers – that is, as if Woodworkers were simply a late, tacked-on addition to an already

self-sufficient social system. In contrast, they describe nobles and griots as complementary ranks such that neither could exist without the other. Without nobles, or without griots, there would be no Wolof caste system at all.

Now, it is probably true that the Lawbé, or at least some Lawbé, are descendants of migrants from a historically separate system to the north, and that their linguistic behavior, as compared with Wolof nobles and griots, is the result of historical facts. But this cannot be the whole story, because historical documents attest that there used also to be Wolof Woodworkers, called by a different name (*seeñ*), and taking their place on lists of Wolof caste occupations.[16] So I would suggest that Wolof villagers' ideas about the history of Woodworkers and their place in an overall set of caste roles have at least partly shifted to match their linguistic behavior and their residential marginality, in a broader cultural scene that ideologically links language differences with historical autonomy (and with regional boundaries rather than caste boundaries).

In this case, we see two kinds of code/role relationships: the speech styles of nobles and griots, nonautonomous styles that can only be defined relative to one another, like their speakers' social roles; and the separate language, Pulaar, whose speakers are culturally assumed to have an autonomous history matching their autonomous code.[17] There is an iconic link here between the *kind* of linguistic differentiation and the *kind* of social relationship it marks, at least in the cultural ideology.

Two other languages present on the Wolof sociolinguistic scene – Arabic and French – can also be considered in the same light. These languages are of interest because they are relevant to the connections between a rural Wolof village and the national and international systems that impinge upon it, and also because we can see these connections mediated, again, by the ideology of language just described. For Wolof villagers, Arabic is the language of Islam, the dominant religion among Wolof for many centuries. Although villagers are well aware that Arabic is also the language of the modern Arab nations, including neighboring Mauritania, for the majority of the community the religious connotations predominate and a form of classical Arabic is the only variety of that language they know.[18] Indeed, many villagers, of various castes and age groups, know some Arabic;[19] in contrast, far fewer people know (or admit that they know) French, the language of colonialism, despite the long-established presence of French-speaking schools, radio, and so on. The level of acquisition of French, especially before the 1970s, has been low compared with its availability in terms of exposure and opportunities for systematic instruction.

From the linguist's point of view, of course, Arabic and French are equally unrelated to any form of Wolof; the three are historically, and denotationally, autonomous. But some Wolof villagers have not always seen them that way. In 1970 I was told that Arabic "is really Wolof underneath, at heart. . . . Only the pronunciation is different." French, on the other hand, was said to be quite alien, even formed in a different part of the body. Thus the local ideology of language was tending to assimilate Arabic into the repertoire of "Wolof" linguistic varieties because of its functional integration into social life, while French

remained (in that view) a "foreign" language belonging properly only to non-Wolof, and not readily acquirable by true Wolof ethnics, except perhaps for persons of low rank.[20]

Since local ideology linked the nature of linguistic differentiation (between Arabic, Wolof, and French) with the nature of the social relationships and activities it indexed, ideas about language were likely to shift if there were some major change in the social situation. It is not surprising, then, that the advent of Senegalese independence, by altering some aspects of the 'political and economic connection with France, eventually affected villagers' ideas about French, now the official language of the Senegalese state.[21] While no one has told me that French "is really Wolof," by 1984 it was apparent that many people who used to consider French unlearnable and unspeakable had changed their minds.

Note, however, that the linguistic ideology whose modifications are described here is no simple reflex of the change of government or even of a shift in economic opportunities. The attitudes toward language in general (and French and Arabic in particular) found in this rural Wolof locality differ from those in some other areas of Senegal, where (for example) French sometimes penetrated earlier, even though instructional opportunities were fewer and economic opportunities no greater. What we see here is a particular rationalization of a particular local experience, a rationalization informed by a framework of other ideas about language and about the kinds of people who speak in certain ways.

It should be clear, therefore, why this discussion of indexical values of linguistic phenomena, and the topology of linkages between codes and social relationships, does not propose a direct analogy between linguistic and social differentiation that would claim to predict the one from the other. To attempt such prediction would be to ignore the role of linguistic ideology – the cultural (or subcultural) system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests – which is a crucial mediating factor. And I should also emphasize that the cultural system (including the linguistic ideology) is a *mediating* factor, not necessarily a causative one. In some cases it may merely rationalize a set of sociolinguistic differences, rather than shape them. The usual assumption that some historical contingency of a non-linguistic sort, such as migration, has brought about a present-day sociolinguistic scene may often be true enough; but it is not all we need to consider. The cultural reformulation of that scene (its persons, groups, and codes) according to some rationalizing criterion is also relevant, perhaps sometimes inventing as much history as it reflects.[22]

Incorporation: linguistic phenomena are included in the economy as practices and as commodities One of the reasons correlational sociolinguistic studies fall short of revealing the full involvement of linguistic phenomena in political economy concerns the fact that forms of speaking are not always merely an index of some independently generated social differentiation but may indeed *effect* social differentiation. The division of linguistic labor is not just an analogy with the division of labor in society, or even a homology (as some have said; see Rossi-Landi 1983), but, in some ways, part and parcel of it. That is, while linguistic phenomena may denote the forces of production and the

relations of production, they may also be among those forces, and they may be objects of economic activity. I turn now to that "communicative economy," to borrow a term used by Hymes (1974:4, 26) to describe the organization of a society's system of communicative (not just linguistic) institutions, vehicles, and contexts. In this view, verbal skills and performances are among the resources and activities forming a socioeconomic system; and the relevant knowledge, talents, and use-rights are not evenly, randomly, or fortuitously distributed in a community (see Bourdieu 1977, 1982; Hymes 1971, 1973). The fact of uneven distribution is itself economically relevant.

Verbal skills as economic resources (and as practices constituting a social role) One way in which linguistic goods enter the marketplace is simply as a consequence of indexical correlations like those noted above. This process is discussed at length by Bourdieu (1977, 1982), who sees it as a process of "conversion" between a "linguistic marketplace" and a material one. In a class-based society, he points out, where social classes and class-linked activities correlate with linguistic variation, the linguistic varieties acquire differential value that translates into economic value. Access to high position and prestigious social circles may require, or seem to require, the ability to speak or write in a prestigious language, variety, or style, whose acquisition becomes the focus of economic activity.[23] People who fail to acquire the high variety, such as a national standard, at their mother's knee must pay for instruction later on, whether through tutoring, how-to books (more often how-not-to), newspaper columns about "proper speaking," or state subvention through the school system.

Bourdieu's discussion focuses on the European industrial nations, especially France, and on the acquisition of standard language among other indices of membership in the bourgeoisie. Much of the argument applies elsewhere too, however, even in pre- or less-industrialized settings. Any case of diglossia, or a case where there are linguistic forms that (for at least some of the population) can only be acquired through special education, will be somewhat parallel. In all these cases code acquisition – actually, second-code acquisition – is surrounded by economic activity because of the perceived value, and distributional scarcity, of the linguistic variety to be acquired.

Now, while Bourdieu's view of the "linguistic marketplace" is clearly useful to our inquiry, it is not without complications. For example, it tends to reduce language to presuppositional indexicality and to derive language's role in political economy entirely therefrom. Little room is left for any statement made in one of the available varieties to make a difference to the political and economic situation – to be anything other than a symptom of it.[24] As Woolard (1985) points out, moreover, Bourdieu's statements on the value of class-linked varieties in the linguistic market, and his emphasis on the institutional domination of a language, are oversimplified. Questions remain as to whether the linguistic market is ever fully integrated, and whether the population that does not control a dominant variety regards its domination as legitimate (1985:740–741).

These questions about integration and legitimacy are especially relevant to Third World situations and the link between local sociolinguistic systems and the languages of national and international relations.[25] Senegal's "linguistic market"

for example, is far from integrated. The political dominance of French was long acknowledged in Wolof communities without being considered legitimate, while, in contrast, members of other ethnic groups often favored French as the alternative to Wolof domination. Within the particular Wolof village described here, changes in the legitimacy of French have already been mentioned; but even though French is no longer resisted as much as before, differences in the legitimacy of French and Arabic show up in the economics of their acquisition. Economic activity surrounding acquisition of Arabic takes place at the grassroots level, where villagers pay for their children's (and sometimes their own) instruction, while economic activity directed toward the acquisition of French – dominant but far less legitimate, in the local view – takes place at the level of the state.[26]

Despite complications, however, it is evident that linguistic skills can be economic resources, and even if some skills are merely status markers their acquisition may be the focus of economic activity. Still, as regards how linguistic phenomena can be economic resources, grammatical competence in a high-valued code is not the only aspect of language to look at. We must also consider skills in the appropriate use of language and in the management of discourse – skills that fall outside "grammatical commence" as usually defined, and that do not depend on the differentiation of a set of codes. Many social roles and statuses are at least partly defined in terms of discourse management: teacher, lawyer, or psychiatrist, for example. Even where verbal skills are not crucial to the performance of some particular social role they may be crucial to gaining access to it; see studies of gatekeeping interviews by Gumperz and his associates (Gumperz 1982; see also Erickson and Shultz 1979).

Among rural Wolof, skills in discourse management are essential to the role of the griot (bard), whose traditional profession involves special rhetorical and conversational duties such as persuasive speechmaking on a patron's behalf, making entertaining conversation, transmitting messages to the public, and performing the various genres of praise-singing. Not everyone who might be born with the appropriate raw talent can become a professional bard – for that one must be born into the griot caste. But within that category, the most talented and skillful griots earn high rewards and are sought after by would-be patrons, such as village-level political leaders (or those who seek leadership positions). High-ranking political leaders do not engage in these griot-linked forms of discourse themselves; to do so would be incompatible with their "nobility" and qualifications for office. But their ability to recruit and pay a skillful, reputable griot to speak on their behalf is essential, both to hold high position and to gain access to it in the first place.

Note that political systems in other African societies (and societies elsewhere in the world too, for that matter) commonly include spokesperson roles, such as the Ashanti "linguist" who speaks on behalf of the king. In contemporary states public relations personnel, press secretaries, and professionals in the communications industry are statuses somewhat resembling these traditional spokesperson statuses and in Senegal, at least, have often drawn their personnel from among the bardic castes.[27]

This point – that some social roles are constituted by discourse management – has been made often by Hymes and others, and I shall not belabor it, even though it is important to our understanding of political processes and access to political positions. I shall just emphasize that its implications reach beyond the cognitive (questions of communicative competence), to include how we conceive of economy. Thus, one must consider the place of verbal skills and rights in a system of transactions that includes both material and nonmaterial goods, services, and values. It is perhaps not a question of looking at a "communicative" economy, therefore, or at some sort of linkage between a sociolinguistic system and an (independently conceived) economic system, but, instead, just at an economy, from which the verbal must not be excluded.

Indeed, linguistic elements and utterances may themselves be goods and services, exchangeable against other goods and services, including material goods and cash. The next sections shift to this focus.

Authentications: signs accompany commodities and give them value

In a 1975 paper, "The Meaning of Meaning," Hilary Putnam presents what he calls a "division of linguistic labor." The discussion turns in several ways on the reference of terms for natural kinds, such as *elm* and *gold*. Putnam writes:

> We could hardly use such words as "elm" and "aluminum" if no one possessed a way of recognizing elm trees and aluminum metal; but not everyone to whom the [linguistic] distinction is important has to be able to make the distinction [between the things or substances]. . . . Gold is important for many reasons: it is a precious metal, it is a monetary metal, it has symbolic value (it is important to most people that the "gold" wedding ring they wear *really* consist of gold and not just *look* gold), etc. . . . Everyone to whom gold is important for any reason has to *acquire* the word "gold;" but he does not have to acquire the *method of recognizing* if something is or is not gold. He can rely on a special subclass of speakers. [These are people who have the job of] *telling whether or not something is really gold* [1975:227–228: italics in the original].

In other words, these people are experts whose knowledge (for example, knowledge of some test for telling whether a metal is really gold), while not itself linguistic, nevertheless renders their usage of the term *gold* authoritative. The economic and symbolic value of gold for the wider community depends on this. Any gold object circulating in the community must be accompanied by some convincing testimonial to its being authentically gold, if it is to command its full value. The testimonial may be oral or written (for example, when the state stamps its insignia on a gold coin).

Most often, we are probably relying not just on a single testimonial statement, but on a *chain of authentication*, a historical sequence by which the expert's attestation – and the label (expression) that conventionally goes along with it – is relayed to other people.[28] For example, I claim that the necklace I wear is made of gold because I acquired it from a trustworthy person who said it was, and who in turn acquired it from a "reliable" dealer, who in turn acquired it

from a reliable source, and so on back to a point at which some expert actually did make the tests that enabled him or her to declare this metal to be gold. Thus my valued commodity (the necklace) is accompanied, not just by one special kind of statement (the authoritative testimonial), but by two: the authoritative and the derivatively authoritative (reportive – all the statements after the expert's, in the chain of authentication).

This kind of process applies not just to gold, but to any exchangeable item invested with social value, where only an "expert" can tell if it "really" is what it purports to be. Such items include not only material objects, but also verbal items like magic spells or other texts. Just *what* is invested with what sort of value, and which persons get into the position to speak authoritatively about the value, must vary from one society to another. What this process suggests, however, is that perhaps *any* system of prestations and counter-prestations – that is, an economy (in a broad sense) – will necessarily include authoritative statements as part of the exchange system. When I pay for the gold necklace, I am paying not only for the necklace itself but also for the chain of authoritative statements that accompanies it. And if I take it to be appraised, I am paying for the statement alone.

Utterances as commodities exchangeable for material goods The above discussion of testimonials focused on statements accompanying an object of exchange, statements necessary if the object is to have its full exchange-value. I turn now to cases where a verbal statement is the object of exchange. Although the appraisal of a piece of jewelry meets this criterion in a way, it only does so because it is part of a longer series of transactions whose object is the jewelry, not the statement. What we consider now are verbal "goods" and practices having value in their own right. Thus, a view of economy that can incorporate verbal practices and products will be useful for understanding systems where linguistic texts can become alienable property, and systems where some forms of speaking are institutionalized and receive financial reward.

What the verbal goods and services are, and where they enter an overall economy, will vary from one sociocultural system to another. Presumably, *any* aspect of a speech act might, separately or in combination with other aspects, be the source of its economic value in a particular system. In any given case we might ask: What aspects of the verbal performance bear the value? Who holds rights in them? Who benefits? Who pays – and in what coin?

For example, magic spells may be as much the property of a community (as with some Trobriand magic [Malinowski 1978 (1935)]) or lineage (as with some Wolof spells) as gardening land is. According to Malinowski (1978 [1935]:64), however, although the community "owns" the major form of gardening magic and has the right to benefit from its application, only one person, the *towosi*, has the right and the ability to perform community gardening spells, though he may delegate the office to a junior relative. All members of the community who expect to benefit from the performance must contribute payments for it – just as they pay for other kinds of specialist services, material or otherwise.[29]

In its capacity as community property, Trobriand gardening magic is apparently inalienable: but verbal properties may be alienable too. Silverstein

(n.d.a) describes proper names in North-west Coast societies as "investment property" and "heirloom antiques," alienable during the lifetime of a bearer. People used to try to accumulate as many names as possible and to control their bestowal (on themselves or on others). Sometimes the bearer of a name would vacate it, bestowing it on some junior relative. Acquiring a new name involved a ceremony in which an audience assembled and called the new bearer by it – receiving, in exchange, large quantities of material valuables. As Silverstein writes: "The wealth thus constitutes a back-prestation in response to the audience's having come and called the new bearer by that name, this act effectively validating the claim to it as being at a certain ranked ordinality with respect to their names" (n.d.a).

Consider, too, the case of "the sick who do not speak" (Sansom 1982). Among Aboriginal Australians of Darwin fringe camps, a person who has undergone a major episode of illness may not verbally recount the story of the illness.[30] The right to tell the "sickness story" is given over, instead, to the persons who "helped him through" – in partial recompense for the debt arising from their care. The story, Sansom argues, is a bit of property exchanged against caregiving, in a community that places little store in material investments.

Although Darwin camp members treat the telling of "sickness stories" as a privilege, in other societies some kinds of talk may be treated as a burden one pays someone else to undertake. The high-ranking Wolof noble pays a griot to make a public announcement for him, because loud public speaking is something he would be "ashamed" and "unskillful" at doing.[31] On many public occasions the noble whispers briefly in the griot's ear, and it is then the griot who volubly and elaborately performs the speech for the audience. In this case, then, the act of public utterance is a service for which the griot is paid in cash.

These examples could be multiplied. It seems preferable, however, to explore one case in greater depth. Accordingly, the following section offers a more extended example of this kind of relation between language and economy. It concerns a particular type of verbal goods – statements of praise and compliment – and the verbal services of the flatterer, among village Wolof as compared with contemporary middle-class Americans. But while one of my purposes is to examine some verbal objects of exchange, the material I present also reflects other linkages between language and political economy, especially the indexical relation discussed earlier. Thus the example illustrates the fact that language is always multifunctional – and its relation to economy is, therefore, manifold.

II. The Multifunctionality of Linguistic Signs: A Wolof Example

Recently there appeared a cartoon in the *New Yorker* magazine, entitled "Flattery getting someone somewhere" (M. Stevens, 28 July 1986). "You're looking great, Frank!" says a man in business suit and necktie to another, perhaps older, man with glasses and bow tie. "Thanks, Chuck! Here's five dollars!" Bow Tie replies, handing over the cash. The joke depends, of course, on the notion that the exchange of compliments for cash should not be done so directly and overtly

We all know that Chuck may indeed flatter Frank with a view to getting a raise, or some other eventual reward; but it is quite improper in American society to recognize the exchange formally, with an immediate payment. A compliment should be acknowledged only with a return compliment, or a minimization, or some other verbal "goods." If it is to be taken as "sincere," it is specifically excluded from the realm of material payments.

Some cultural systems do not segregate the economy of compliments from the economy of material transactions and profits, however. It is doubtful, for example, that the cartoon would seem funny to many Senegalese.[32] With a few suitable adjustments for local scene, the transfer it depicts is quite ordinary. There is, in fact, a category of persons – the griots – specializing in flattery of certain kinds, among other verbal arts. The income they gain from these activities is immediate and considerable, often amounting to full-time employment for those whose skills include the fancier genres of eulogy.

Let us return to a consideration of the social system in which these transfer, and institutionalized acts of eulogy, occur. As I mentioned earlier, the Wolof (and, indeed, most other Senegalese peoples from the Gambia River north) traditionally had a complex system of social stratification usually called a "caste" system. Though undermined by government policies and other factors the caste system retains considerable importance on the rural scene, and even on the urban scene too, according to some observers (see, for example, Silla 1966). Thus Wolof society is a hierarchical one in which hierarchy is an explicitly acknowledged value. It is also personalistic, a patronage system where person and position are closely identified. Compliments to the person are directly relevant, therefore, to the construction of high position, political and otherwise.

The lower ranks of rural Wolof society engage in various kinds of activities – agricultural labor, smithing, weaving, and so on – whose product, delivered to their patron, enhances his or her position and role as redistributor.[33] The higher ranks, as patrons, compete among themselves for political position and influence. Access to such positions is supposed to be based on genealogical rank and moral qualifications as well as on one's ability to attract and maintain a large clientship; but ideologically these criteria are almost indistinguishable from one another, for one's moral character, personality, reputation, and ancestry are all considered to be linked.

Verbal activities fit into this local system of production in several ways, most notably as one of the kinds of productive activities low-ranking persons provide for the higher-ranking. Thus verbal praise enhances the reputation and attractiveness of a would-be patron. It is comparable to physical enhancement, such as hairdressing, and requires a similar reward. (Actually, eulogizing and hairdressing are often done by the same people, or at least by members of the same social category, the griots.) Moreover, the griots' performances supposedly – that is, in the ideology of the system – contribute more directly to the system of production and distribution as well, because their liveliness and excitement arouse the addressees to carry out their own allotted role more energetically and enthusiastically. That is, praise directed to a patron stimulates him/her to (re-)distribute largesse more generously, while other kinds of performances, such

as the drumming and singing directed to a work party laboring on a patron's behalf, rouse laborers to work more vigorously. Physical aspects of the performance are relevant to how this works, or so informants suggest: the forceful gush of humanly shaped, vibrating air (breath) stimulates the energy of the recipient, just as the air blown from a bellows arouses a fire.

The propositional contents of compliments and praise are of course dependent on a cultural system and the kinds of attributes locally invested with social value. Among rural Wolof, personal beauty is in some respects subordinated to "beauty of birth" (*rafet-juddu*), the subject matter of much of Wolof praise, especially of its most institutionalized form, praise-singing (as the Wolof term *woy* is often translated; praise-oratory might be a better term). I shall examine this oratorical form in more detail in what follows. But note that in doing so I am not departing so far from Chuck and Frank's conversational compliment as it might appear. Wolof conversational compliments are often formulaic praise-utterances derived from, or alluding to, the extended forms of praise-oratory. Thanks for a gift, for example, always includes praise and very frequently draws upon these formulaic expressions, or other allusions to praise-oratory. A difference between full-fledged praise-oratory and its conversational vestiges is that the former are performed only by griots, while the latter may be produced by anyone. But the griots' praise-singing is, for Wolof, a cultural model or prototype for praise-utterance in general.

Indeed, except for compliments between lovers, only this type of compliment is proper.[34] Otherwise, anything departing too far from the model is suspect, suggesting an indecent envy or exposing the addressee to the attentions of witches. "Departing too far" means a compliment focusing only on physical appearance or possessions, *and* uttered by someone of same or higher rank than the addressee. (Neither condition alone would be problematic. Lower-ranking people, like a griot speaking to a noble, may freely comment on appearance and possessions; while a high-ranking person may comment on ancestors and generous deeds.)

Returning, then, to the contents of praise: the content of a griot's praise-song normally focuses on the praiseworthy ancestry of the addressee – the ancestry that qualifies him or her for high rank and has contributed to the character and the physical being he or she is. Although the performance includes comments explicitly eulogizing particular ancestors (their generosity, strength, rectitude, beauty, great deeds) and the addressee, much of it consists in naming the ancestors and connecting them to kings or village founders or other heroic figures. Merely setting forth the names would be eulogy in itself, a display of the addressee's verbal family heirlooms, as it were. That the most elaborate displays of genealogical eulogy are performed at life-crisis events and family celebrations is only appropriate, therefore, as are outbursts of eulogistic performance at local-level political gatherings. Praise is not limited to those occasions, however, and in fact the shorter forms of eulogy and compliment need no special scheduling to occur.

Since I have described some aspects of praise-singing elsewhere (Irvine 1978a), I shall focus here on just a few relevant matters: some characteristics

icon, index, and symbol is useful, because it allows us to see praise-singing as a complex semiotic gesture uniting all three types. As icon, praise-singing formally illustrates the roles of laborer and redistributor: the singer is both verbally and physically active, declaiming the praise long and loud, and with energetic, dramatic gestures. Meanwhile the recipient (the high-ranking patron) is silent and motionless, perhaps even hidden from view behind a curtain (depending on the occasion). His/her sole appropriate movement is to hand over the cash that pays for the performance.

These iconic, formal considerations shape several aspects of the linguistic register in which praise-oratory is performed – "griot speech" (*waxu gewel*), as opposed to "noble speech" (*waxu géér*). As I described earlier (and see Irvine 1975), "griot speech" is loud, high-pitched, rapid, verbose, florid, and emphatic, with assorted phonological, morphological, and syntactic devices linked to those characteristics. It is the appropriate style for all expressions of praise and/or thanks, by anyone (griot or not), and for other verbal expressions of rank lower than one's addressee;[35] but, as its name implies, it is conventionally associated with griots, as the professional eulogizers who carry the style to an extreme. Thus the speech style of praise is an index of the speaker's (relatively low) rank and social identity. In a larger sense it also indexes the traditional system of ranks and sources of authority, as compared with other sources such as the French-speaking colonial regime and the national state.

Another indexical function, too, links the praise-song's eulogistic and genealogical content to its addressee, at whom the griot dramatically points. That is, the praise-song indexes the praisee (addressee) because it is pointedly directed at him/her. This addressee is also the praise-song's principal referent, however. The praisee is named, and this name, together with the genealogical statements expanding upon and providing background to it, are part of the performance's symbolic dimension. Here it is important that the griot display the patron's genealogy coherently and convincingly, mentioning only persons of good reputation, and linking the patron to famous heroes and to the ancestors of other notables, perhaps even higher-ranking. Should the griot fail to do this – that is, should he state the relationships incoherently, or reveal skeletons (family relationships) the patron would prefer to keep in the closet, or spend so much time on other lineages that he fails to display the patron's own genealogy adequately – the performance will no longer qualify as truly complimentary. Of course, griots may fail in these ways conspicuously and on purpose, if they are unsatisfied with the payment they have been offered.

This mention of payment brings me to the economic value of praise-singing, an aspect of it for which Peirce's trichotomy is no longer particularly illuminating. It is not illuminating because Peirce focuses on the relations between the sign and what it stands for – not on what it may be exchanged for.[36] But the praise-song costs, and this aspect of it is crucial. It is one of the unavoidable, large expenses a Wolof notable must incur on his way to attaining political position and maintaining any claim to rank; and, moreover, it is a sign of his ability to pay.

all may see and admire the person being praised as a potential patron for their own services. In an important sense, then, the exchange-value of the sign is an understood part of it.

Let us consider what that value rests upon. Wolof praise-songs are a form of property, in that exclusive rights are asserted over them. The rights are of two kinds: rights over the genealogical and historical *content* of the praise-song (it is the patron's genealogy, and in principle at least the griot must obtain permission before performing it for any other addressee); and rights over the *performance* of it. (Rights to perform the long, formal versions of praise-singing accrue only to griots of particular families, although griots may transfer these rights to other griots. In no circumstances may the patron perform "his" [or "her"] own song.)

The value of the performance depends in part on the gloriousness of the content – how praiseworthy the family history really has been, and how important the family has been in political and religious hierarchies – but it depends much more on the skill and reputation of the performing griot. Though even the clumsiest griot receives something for praising a patron, knowledgeable and skillful griots are much in demand and their performances highly paid. This is especially the case when, for example, two nobles from the same lineage are competing for a lineage title and, in the process, for the services of the most famous griots who know their lineage history. And those famous performers, in turn, are careful to keep the supply of trained performers down, in order to keep the price up (as one young griot complained to me).

Thus the complexities of the overall market in which praise-song performances are situated affect their exchange-value (in cash or goods), and are the reason one may indeed, I think, speak of exchange-value here rather than just use-value. Linguistic phenomena are not all limitlessly and publicly available, like fruits on the trees of some linguistic Eden. Some of them are products of a social and sociolinguistic division of labor, and as such they may be exchanged against other products in the economy.

Under what circumstances do utterances or linguistic forms become products exchangeable against other kinds of goods? Perhaps, as material in this paper suggests, when the sign (or some aspect of it) is a scarce good, invested with value – either because knowledge of the relevant linguistic form is unequally distributed, or because performance of it cannot be universally undertaken. That is, performance might be an exclusive right, or it might require time and effort or other costs to the producer – including, for example, as in the Wolof case, an implication of lower rank (a cost explicitly recognized as requiring remuneration and carrying the right to receive largesse).

In these pages I have only scratched the surface of a comparative economy of compliments and praise, and how they do or do not link up with other forms of transaction in a given society. Moreover, these are certainly not the only kinds of utterances worth looking at as objects of exchange. My purpose, however, was to suggest that the project is worth undertaking – that utterances, and indeed various aspects of linguistic form and its production, *can* be viewed as prestations, and thus as part of a political economy, not just a vehicle for thinking about one.

Conclusion

I began by mentioning Saussure and suggesting – as, indeed, it has become fashionable to do – that I would take some post-Saussurean, post-structuralist position, in regard to his segregation of the sign from the material world. Actually part of this position is not so very novel. Anthropology has a long tradition of looking at the material objects exchanged in a cultural system partly in terms of their sign value. A good example would be Evans-Pritchard's discussion of cattle among the Nuer (Evans-Pritchard 1940, 1956). In some circumstances the sign-value of the Nuer ox can be so predominant, and its material substance so irrelevant, that you can substitute a cucumber for it. What I argue for here is, in a way, a parallel treatment of the verbal sign. Ultimately, the goal – which I do not pretend to have reached, though I hope to have moved in its direction – must be a more comprehensive conception of "value," so that the various kinds of sign-values and material values can be seen in their complex integration.

Thus, linguistic forms have relevance for the social scientist not only as part of a world of ideas, but also as part of a world of objects, economic transactions, and political interests. The verbal sign, I have argued, relates to a political economy in many ways: by denoting it; by indexing parts of it; by depicting it (in Peircean terms, the iconic function, illustrated here for Wolof praise-singing); and by taking part in it as an object of exchange. These multiple functions may all co-occur, because they merely reflect the multifunctionality of language in general.

Saussure's segregation of sign-value from the world of material values is linked to his focus on only one of language's functions – its role as vehicle for referential communication. To acknowledge that language has many functions, and therefore that signs relate to the material world in many ways, including as objects of exchange, is important to understanding language's role in a political economy. An opposition between "idealists" and "materialists" that assigns the study of language only to the former is – as social theorists increasingly recognize, on other grounds – a false dichotomy.

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Notes

1. See discussions in, for example, Coward and Ellis 1977 and Derrida 1972.
2. Unlike political scientists, apparently, many anthropologists make a close connection between the term "political economy" and debates over a Wallerstein-derived world-system approach, on which this paper takes no particular stand. One of the issues in the debate, however, is the degree of importance to be assigned to local social relations and their "culture" (I put the word in quotation marks since some writers contest its applicability). To the extent that anthropological views of culture have been bound up with language, then, this paper contributes to the debate by considering the way we think about relations between linguistic phenomena and the forces of production.
3. See Hymes 1961 and 1973.
4. Those that reduce language to presuppositional indexicality are equally problematic. This criticism, differently worded, has been leveled at the writings of Bourdieu (see Thompson 1984).
5. Underlying this conception of language's role in social cooperation was Bloomfield's enthusiasm for behaviorist psychology. See his 1931 obituary of the psychologist A. P. Weiss, which draws a more explicit connection between language, its speakers' nervous systems, and cooperation among members of a speech community (1970: 237–238).
6. But see his discussion, in the last chapter of *Language*, of the roles of traditional grammarians, school-teachers, and administrators as supported by the conventions of linguistic standardization.
7. For a useful historical summary, see Weinreich, Labov, and Herzog 1968.
8. As regards the form of directives, this difference in settings is sometimes confused with matters of politeness or rank, I believe. For studies of directives in social and cultural context, see, for example, Ervin-Tripp 1976 and Irvine 1980.
9. See, for example, Barth 1972 on the political integration of Pathan-speaking social segments into a Baluchi system. Despite the language difference, Barth argues, Pathan segments are easily attached to the Baluchi political hierarchy because a single bilingual spokesman suffices for the communicative needs of the political relationship and its economic arrangements. There is no need for the ordinary Pathan-speaker to convey personal opinions or discuss individual contributions, as (Barth suggests) might be required in a more egalitarian political system, such as is found among other Pathans.
10. "Index" is used here in the Peircean sense of that sign-function in which the sign represents its object by contiguity (as smoke is a sign of fire), rather than by resemblance (as with a picture of a fire) or by rules and conventions (as with the word "fire").
11. Although Labov's conception of "style" differs from that of other scholars, the general point – that variation marking groups and variation marking situations appear to be closely linked wherever we have the information to investigate the relationship – still holds, I believe. See Irvine 1985.
12. A similar contrast, however, might concern categorical versus variable application of a rule.
13. For a recent discussion of the language and culture of gender see Silverstein 1985. For an extended ethnographic example see Abu-Lughod 1986.
14. Fieldwork was carried out in Senegal in 1970–71, 1975, and (briefly) in 1977 and 1984.
15. The transcription of Wolof expressions is based on the phonemic system developed by the Centre de Linguistique Appliqué de Dakar and officially adopted by the

Republic of Senegal in 1971. The system is phonetically fairly transparent: /waxu géér/ [waxu geer]; /gewel/ = [gɛwɛl]; and so on.

16. The relation between *seeñ* and *lawbé* is complex. Yoro Dyao (Rousseau 1929, from a turn-of-the-century manuscript) briefly describes both groups; see also Kobès 1875. Abdoulaye Diop (1981) considers them to have been subcastes, but argues that the *seeñ* were eventually absorbed into a different low-caste category, not into the *lawbé*.
17. That is to say, Pulaar is a language distinct from any form of Wolof, whose existence and form owe nothing to Wolof as far as we know (though the two languages are genetically related), and which has both formal and functional completeness within the main communities of its speakers, the Tukulor and Fula. For Lawbé, it is historically and denotationally autonomous, but has an indexical value within the Wolof system.
18. Note that the village from which my description is mainly drawn is far from the Mauritanian border. In Wolof villages further north, or among Wolof-speakers in Mauritania itself, native speakers of Arabic would be much more conspicuous, and the relationship with them would, no doubt, alter the ways their language is thought of by the local Wolof population.
19. Villagers' competence in Arabic is almost entirely passive. They may recite formulaic prayers, and those who know Arabic best read texts and listen to religious speeches on the radio; but they compose nothing.
20. The views of Wolof city-dwellers might well have been quite different from this even at the time. Wolof villagers acknowledged that French was more widely used in town, but they also claimed that city-dwellers were likely to be people of dubious ethnic, caste and moral background.
21. Senegal gained its independence from France in 1960. Ties with France remained close, however, and a sizable French population stayed on – including, locally a community of French ethnical Personnel. For some time after independence, therefore, many villagers apparently still thought of French in colonial frameworks – whence the statements I heard in 1970. In subsequent years the French Population in Senegal dropped sharply, especially in rural areas outside the tourist zone.
22. See also Silverstein's (n.d.b) discussion of comments on British regional dialects by the Queen's English Society.
23. Silverstein (n.d.b) calls this "commoditization."
24. Again, see Thompson's (1984) critique.
25. For a Mexican example involving the autonomy of Mexicano-speaking peasant communities, see Hill 1985.
26. The acquisition of varieties of Wolof itself should not be left out of the economic picture, although this part of the linguistic "market" operates in a different way (further evidence, presumably, of the lack of integration of the Senegalese "linguistic market").
27. See Silla 1966.
28. See Putnam (1975:246) on the transmission of reference, and Kripke 1972 on the transmission of proper names, from performative nomination or "baptism" through subsequent, warranted referential usage.
29. See also Weiner 1984.
30. The former patient does, however, bear a nonverbal sign of the illness, such as a tic, a scar, or a recurrent cough (Sansom 1982:183).
31. See Irvine 1975, and Part II below. These attitudes are part of a larger sociolinguistic ideology connecting griots (and the lower ranks in general) with noisy activity and the high ranks with quiet, sometimes inert, solidity.

32. Except insofar as it might seem funny to see Americans or Europeans behaving like griots and their patrons.
33. Though I refer principally to "traditional" activities, and have not space to consider the complexities introduced by contract labor and "modern" trades, patronage and values generated through personalistic networks are important there also.
34. Actually, another proper type of compliment focuses on the addressee's religious goodness and piety. In practice, however, these compliments seem usually to merge with the praise-singing type, "goodness" being evidenced by birth and generosity.
35. This is something of an oversimplification. In some circumstances a speaker draws on only some features of the register, not others.
36. Some scholars consider that what the sign may be exchanged for, and what it stands for, are the same: hence Saussure's analogy between money and language, and the connection drawn between *valeur* and *signification*. I believe the equation is problematic, however, particularly as regards the analogy with money. Because money is a system that is maximally structured by exchange-value and minimally by use-value, it makes a tempting analogy for language if one conceives of linguistic signs as those that are maximally structured by denotational sign-value in a system and minimally by any other kind of function. But these forms of "value" may still be distinguished. Moreover, the analogy between money and language may make it difficult to conceive of any other relation between them.

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Political Discourse: The Language of Right and Left in Germany

Siegfried Jäger

1 Introduction

In this chapter I shall analyse the political discourse of the right and of the left in Germany. Elements of these forms of political language may also be found in 'independent' newspapers and in the rhetorics of members or sympathizers of several political parties of the centre. However, I shall deal in particular with contemporary texts and talk of the right and, with some reservations, of the left. I say 'with reservations' because there is no (strong) movement of the left in Germany today. Public discourse in contemporary Germany is predominantly coloured by conservative and right-wing ideologies and ideas, especially as regards everyday thinking and debate. Leftist ideas and ideologies survive only in the niches of little groups and circles, and relics of them can be found in a small number of journals and pamphlets.

Thus it is a reflection of the political landscape of contemporary Germany if the analysis of right-wing political discourse dominates the following discussion. However, there is also some justification for this in the fact that right-wing thinking and debate in the new larger Germany can be seen as a danger for the democratic development of society in this country, and I think that it is also necessary for linguists such as myself to see their own political responsibility, especially in a country in which large sections of the population and many politicians today tend to deny its past political history and to suppress its responsibility for the Holocaust and the 'Third Reich' and other crimes. Furthermore, after the 'fall of the Wall', feelings of nationalism and chauvinism are growing again, and new right-wing political groups are emerging, while the whole political map is drifting towards

Source: Patrick Stevenson (ed.), *The German Language and the Real World: Sociolinguistic, Cultural, and Pragmatic Perspectives on Contemporary German* [illegible]

the right. It is important to realize, for example, that political slogans of a right-wing party like the 'Republicans' (such as 'the boat is full', meaning that no more refugees should be accepted) and concepts like placing refugees seeking asylum in so-called *Sammellager* (that is, concentration camps (!)) have been adopted by most conservatives and even by growing numbers of representatives of the Social Democratic Party (SPD).

But first of all I would like to address the question of what we mean when we talk of political discourse. Political statements occur in all sorts of contexts. You find them in everyday conversation at home, in restaurants, or at work, as well as reading or hearing more or less elaborate fragments of political discourse in the printed press or other media, in school-books and lectures, at universities, in parliaments, and on many other political platforms. But what is the political element of political discourse? What turns discourse into political discourse?

In this chapter I shall call a text or discourse a political one, first and rather trivially, if it deals with matters of public interest such as general public affairs, for example housing or health services, activities of politicians, political parties or trade unions, foreign or home affairs, political aims and concepts, philosophies, ideologies, etc. Secondly, I shall call a discourse political if it deals with political issues but is not classifiable as an instance of the specialized discourse of political science.

Indeed, political discourse is not characterized by any special structural, rhetorical, or stylistic features such as special metaphors, special sentence structures, special text types, etc. It draws on the full repertoire of a given language, although it may do so in special ways, depending on the context, aims, and topics of the specific text. In other words, the political nature of discourse does not so much depend on the competence of individual speakers, it is more a question of their use of language, of their particular aims and intentions, and so on.

So political discourse, as understood in this chapter, is not just the discourse of professional politicians or of political science, even though elements of these special discourses always do penetrate into political discourse, as is the case with any special discourse: political discourse can be described as that part of general or everyday 'inter-discourse' that deals with political topics and themes.

Before proceeding any further, therefore, we should now define exactly what we mean when we use the term 'discourse', and how a linguistic analysis of discourse should be conducted. The approach I shall follow here draws on the ideas of the French social philosopher Michel Foucault, which have been adopted and to some extent modified by German scholars like Utz Maas, Jürgen Link, and myself (see Maas 1984, Link 1982, and Jäger 1991, which combine theoretical (sociolinguistic) and practical political interests). In the framework of this new approach, discourse is not simply equivalent to the notion of 'text'. Discourse analysis does deal with texts (in the old sense) but if we look at how texts are produced in everyday life by everyday people, we see that the older concepts of text linguistics are no longer adequate.

In accordance with the traditional definitions of 'text', I consider 'texts' to mean all forms of written or spoken language. But if you look at the process of

producing texts, you find that they are products of human labour just like other products (for instance knives, roads, cars, etc.). In producing texts, individuals use a set of 'tools', which admittedly are different from the tools they use when building a house or manufacturing a car. But in both cases people think, remember, anticipate, and so on; in addition, they are learning when they are producing 'things', be they texts or other products of labour. In producing texts individuals use words and sentence structures as opposed to a hammer or an axe. Producing texts or other 'things' means using knowledge and facilities acquired in learning processes from other people, which they in turn have learned and/or picked up from others, from their parents and friends, in their peer groups, from their teachers or their neighbours. So the production of texts (and other things) is an intrinsically social and historical fact. Since texts are determined socially and historically, they both 'contain' socio-historical material and have an effect on the social processes in a given society.

But there is another possible aspect of the notion of text we must consider. In many texts there is a utopian component, too. Through 'texts' or in 'texts' you may anticipate possible (or even impossible) future events. Here again, however, there is no difference between texts and other products. If you build a house, you are doing so in order to live in the house or for other people to live in it now or in the future. On the other hand you may produce things that will never be used, or that will turn out to be 'utopian', like Leonardo's aeroplane, which was planned and built and then forgotten for hundreds of years until new 'utopian' products came to be designed, manufactured, and used or, like atom bombs (I would hope), once used, damned and forgotten again.

The concept of text adopted here can be summarized in the following way: it is a product of human labour in a given society and is therefore determined by the efforts of our ancestors and past processes of learning and planning, which are handed down from generation to generation and which to some extent anticipate possible future events. This differs from the traditional concepts of text linguistics, where the text is considered as an isolated object, and the linguist's aim is to look for internal regularities and structures within texts (see e.g. Brinker 1985). I would argue that we ought to take a text as a socio-historical product, which is intrinsically both individual and social. The individual aspect, if you see things this way, is reduced to the individual being interwoven or caught up in the process of 'discourse'. One piece of text is therefore an element or a fragment of all those events which occur in a society and which can occur only because they continue the process or flow of society in history. This is why I propose that we no longer use the term 'text', and why I prefer to speak of 'discourse' as the 'flow' of text and talk (and other products of labour). This means combining Michel Foucault's understanding of discourse with A. N. Leontiev's theory of activity (*Tätigkeitstheorie*; see Foucault 1977*a* and 1977*b*, Leontiev 1982). Looked at in this way, a single piece of text is nothing but an element of discourse, a fragment of social discourse. In other words, if you analyse a piece of text, you have to locate it in its social and in its (past and future) historical contexts. In doing this, you go beyond merely analysing texts and you leave the realm of text linguistics in favour of a new concept of discourse analysis.[1]

2 Language and Ideology of the Far Right in Germany

2.1 The Social, Historical, and Ideological Context of Extreme Right-Wing Propaganda

In accordance with my concept of discourse analysis, I shall first of all sketch in the political landscape of contemporary Germany and its development in recent years.

In 1981–2 the coalition of Social Democrats (SPD) and Liberals (FDP) had come to an end, and the Conservatives (CDU/CSU), in coalition with the Liberals, took over government. At the same time this so-called *Wende* (political change) initiated a political development that made room for extreme right-wing movements, and that culminated in their electoral successes between 1987 and 1989 on various levels, from the European Parliament down to local elections. Although the change from Helmut Schmidt to Helmut Kohl as Chancellor was accompanied by some social problems, one cannot say that these problems were the basis for the renaissance of the far right. The ground for this political change had been prepared by a strong ideological campaign, which was intended to demolish the welfare state and weaken the 'social security net'. At least some sections of the Social Democrats and their Liberal partners supported this development, and in doing so they were assisting the political change.

One cannot describe this in terms of political *hara-kiri*, or simply of treachery. To understand this process we have to look at global economic developments and the growing competition between several parts of the world and national or continental situations of capital, especially that of the USA, Japan, and in Europe the countries of the European Union. Along with this development there emerged radical technological change, which in turn was accompanied by changes to the social and psychological condition of large sections of the population (for a detailed analysis of this interrelation see Hirsch 1990.) At the same time certain concepts of social darwinist and biologistic ideologies were disseminated, in order to legitimize the decline of social security, at least for certain parts of the population, and the growing support of industry by the State.

It was the right-wing parties, and populists like Franz Schönhuber, leader of the 'Republicans', and Dr Gerhard Frey, head of the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU; German People's Union) as well as other small right-wing groups, who profited from this development. Their ideological concepts became socially acceptable again and were supported, since conservatives (of all parties) had prepared the ideological ground for them. Indeed, many voters preferred to elect the original instead of the copy, as the leaders of the renewed right-wing movement proudly proclaimed after their first electoral successes.

This development came to a head in 1989, and it was interrupted very suddenly when the second German state (GDR) ceased to exist (and the Soviet Union began to decline). Chancellor Helmut Kohl was allowed to present himself as a great historical victor, and as the architect of Germany's (re)unification. The events of October 1989 seemed to prove that most of the national aims of the far right had become reality, especially the aim of reunification. Large sections

of the German public fell into a state of national intoxication. As a result, the room for manœuvre that right-wing parties had gained dramatically disappeared. Today, however, several years after these events, it is becoming evident that the new 'golden age' has brought serious social problems and a loss of social security for many people on both sides of the former Wall. Indeed, the elections in some federal states and at local level show that extreme right-wing parties are becoming popular again.[2]

But it was not the larger right-wing parties alone which profited from this development. It was (and is again) the circles of the New Right who were strengthened by it. They propagate their concept of a right-wing 'cultural revolution', as had been envisaged in recent decades by French intellectuals like Alain de Benoist, the leading figure of the New Right in Europe. In Germany's popular right-wing parties the influence of New Right ideas is also becoming apparent although not yet to the extent that official co-operation exists, such as can be seen between Le Pen of the Front National and leading figures of the intellectual right in France like Bruno Megret. In Germany the influence of the New Right can be seen in the form of ideological modifications, new themes like ecology, intellectual support in the formulating of party programmes, legal help in avoiding unconstitutional passages in manifestos, and so on.

The influence of New Right ideas that can be seen quite clearly in most of the right-wing groups and parties in the states of the 'old' Federal Republic has not yet reached the so-called *neue Länder* of the former GDR. Right-wing groups and leaders of far right parties in the East mostly refer to ideological tenets of the National Socialists of the Third Reich. That is why they seem to be much more militant than their counterparts in the West. One manifestation of this is the sudden and rapid spread in the East of racist skinhead groups, who are still very marginal in the West, even though attacks on the homes of refugees and other criminal acts of aggression towards foreigners are widespread in both parts of the country. The number and form of these assaults is comparable in western and eastern German states. I shall come back to these events later on, because they can only be explained if we understand the ideological motives and discourse conditions that are the basis for these attacks.

2.2 The Discourse of the Right in Germany

Having outlined some of the general conditions and contents of right-wing discourse in Germany as elements of this discourse as a whole, I shall now examine the general discourse of the right-wing press, its weight and importance, and some of its linguistic characteristics.

The influence and the importance of the discourse of the far right and right-wing propaganda in Germany, its contents and its goals, the weight and importance of its ideology, its rhetoric, and its effects can best be judged by looking at its newspapers and pamphlets, which reach at least 5 million readers. In addition we should consider the public performances of members of the far right on television, in more widely read publications such as daily newspapers and, not least, the penetration of (large parts of) this special political discourse into the steady flow of the 'inter-discourse' (see Section 1 above).

First of all I shall describe the scope of the right-wing press and some of its major exponents, identifying the key ideological concepts of the far right in the process.[3] Then I shall analyse specific text material like headlines and passages from a typical article from the monthly *Nation Europa*.

Publications of the Right

In the western part of the Federal Republic (the so-called *alte Länder*) there are about 130 right-wing papers. Some of them are weekly newspapers, the rest are journals, magazines, reviews, and other periodicals, some of them quarterlies, but most appearing on a monthly basis. Most of these journals are published by political parties, as is the case with *Der Republikaner*, edited by Franz Schönhuber, or the *Deutsche Nationalzeitung*, central organ of the Deutsche Volksunion. Others are published by relatively small groups, or even by individual political mavericks and right-wing or fundamentalist Christian sects. Between them, these journals cover the broad spectrum of right-wing ideologies.

Some of the bigger and more influential journals include the following:

Nation Europa appears monthly with a circulation of about 10,000 copies and may be considered the central organ of all party functionaries of the far right. The main focus is on 'race' and racism.[4] For the makers of *Nation Europa* there are such things as human 'races', and racism itself is inborn and a simple matter of fact: you cannot fight it; at best you can only mitigate its effects. The core of their ideology is ethnopluralism and apartheid; all other ideological tenets of this militant racist organ, like nationalism and national identity or its bio-ecological concept of society, are derived from its fundamental racist formula. The paper's main slogans are 'Ausländer raus!' (Foreigners out!), 'Deutschland den Deutschen!' (Germany for the Germans!), 'Das Boot ist voll!' (The boat is full!), and so on.

Another monthly publication, reminiscent to some extent of *Reader's Digest*, is *Mut*, which has been appearing for more than twenty years. It has a circulation of about 40,000 copies. Its target audience are members of right-wing conservative middle-class families, who seek confirmation of their 'values' and who want to forget the crimes of the Third Reich. This paper is very clearly an extreme right-wing one, although it tries to package its extreme ideology in a 'refined' writing style and high-quality appearance. It also tries to acquire a 'serious' reputation by commissioning contributions from recognized conservative writers. This enables articles by extreme right-wing writers to gain a spurious respectability by being placed alongside the work of eminent but more 'moderate' writers. The main authors of this periodical are Gerd Klaus Kaltenbrunner and Bernhard C. Wintzek, a former member of the National Democratic Party (NPD).

One other interesting journal that is worth mentioning here is *Criticon*, which was founded by Caspar Schrenck-Notzing in 1970 and acts as a kind of bridge between the conservative right and the far right.

All these publications, and most of their authors, co-operate very closely. However, there is some competition between them, so that the interests of readers from different social and political backgrounds are catered for.

In the 'new' German states there are no high-circulation right-wing journals. The existing extreme right-wing groups produce small pamphlets with fewer

than a thousand copies each. However, magazines from the West are beginning to penetrate into the eastern parts of Germany.

Racism in Extreme Right-Wing Texts

Headlines such as the following appear regularly in all right-wing papers:

Ausländer kosten Milliarden (*Code*, Jan. 1992)
(Foreigners cost billions)
Multikulturalismus ist Völkermord (*Nation Europa*, Dec. 1991)
(Multiculturalism is genocide)

Asylanten-Invasion: Wer betreibt den Völkermord am deutschen Volk? (*Remer Depesche*, Nov. 1991)
(Invasion of asylum seekers. Who is perpetrating the genocide of the German nation?)

Bonn schläft. 1991 erstmals über 240,000 Ausländer – aber nichts geschieht (*Deutsche Rundschau*, Jan. 1992)
(Bonn is asleep. In 1991 for the first time more than 240,000 foreigners – but nothing is done)

'Deutschland den Ausländern!' Überfremdung: Die Union läßt die Maske fallen (*Deutsche Rundschau*, Jan. 1992)
('Germany for the foreigners!' Foreign infiltration: The Union [CDU] drops its mask)

Asylanten immer krimineller (*Deutsche Rundschau*, Jan. 1992)
(Asylum-seekers increasingly criminal)

Asylantenskandal: Sind unsere Politiker unfähig, das Problem zu lösen? (*Deutsche Stimme*, Sept. 1991)
(The scandal of the asylum-seekers: are our politicians incapable of solving the problem?)

Zustrom der Auslander wird immer größer (*Deutsche Stimme*, Sept. 1991)
(The influx of foreigners is growing and growing)

Nachrichten von der Überfremdungsfront (*Nation Europa*, column in each edition)
(Foreign infiltration: news from the front)

Migrationsfolgen und deren Einfluß auf die innere Sicherheit (*Nation Europa*, June 1986)
(Consequences of migration and their influence on internal security)

Rasse und 'Rassismus' (*Nation Europa*, Sept. 1986) (Race and 'racism')

In the texts themselves there are many suggestive formulations like 'full boats', 'invasions of ants', 'bursting houses', 'exploding' or 'colliding cars', or 'aeroplanes flying out of control', and they are full of dubious theories and all the theoretical rubbish of social darwinists like Konrad Lorenz, H. J. Eysenck, Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, and Arthur Jensen. A detailed analysis of some hundreds of these articles shows that there is a limited stock of about thirty prejudices which are brought up again and again to support the central aim of these right-wing authors, which is to push foreigners out of Germany, or 'better still', out of Europe (see Jäger 1988).

In the following passage, I shall consider an article by Christian Mattausch, which appeared in *Nation Europa* in 1986 and which is quite typical of the more

intellectual branch of right-wing racism.[5] Under the headline 'Consequences of migration and their influence on internal security' Mattausch begins:

> The presence of non-Caucasian ethnic groups in western Europe creates problems of historical significance for all states which are affected by it. It is not just the economic pressures that are giving cause for concern; it is first and foremost the efforts of these groups to take root here, and to set up cultural and/or political branches of their homelands.

The expression 'non-Caucasian ethnic groups' points the finger at a central problem of the far right as a whole, namely that they were faced with the planned opening of the internal market within the context of a new 'Europe without frontiers'. They expect a new 'flood' of African and Asian immigrants to penetrate the neighbouring countries, and from there 'flow' into Germany without hindrance. That incidentally is the main reason why they are demanding the erection of a 'fortress Europe', a sort of closed shop with high walls at all European frontiers. Furthermore, the word 'Caucasian' might just as well be replaced by 'Aryan'. But the writer criticizes the reduction of the consequences of this unification to economic issues. There is a warning about 'economic pressures', which is the standard argument against immigrants, but it is not the only argument. Mattausch is concerned with 'culture' as a whole, and this points to one of the central ideological tenets of the far right: the priority of (their understanding of) politics over economics.

Mattausch goes on:

> If this fact is put in the context of its psychological correlate, there is no mistaking the significance of one attribute that determines every aspect of human behaviour: the different nature of non-Caucasian populations, the number and variants of which are constantly increasing with the flood of Afro-Asian economic refugees.

We see that Mattausch does not only focus on the 'non-Caucasian populations' (incidentally the word *Population* is normally used only in connection with animals) but there is another danger: the expected 'flood of Afro-Asian economic refugees'. Mattausch here uses two of the keywords of far right propaganda, which unfortunately have since become part of the whole public discourse in Germany: 'flood' and 'economic refugees'. Flood is a so-called collective symbol, calculated to evoke fears of being drowned or getting killed in a wild outburst of the elements. Today this collective symbol appears in 'mainstream' newspapers, and deep in the centre left of our political landscape. It is used in connection with storms, invasions, and other dangerous occurrences, and it is often used in combinations with other metaphorical fields, such as medicine or disease. For example, formulations like the following are quite common: 'The flood of economic asylum seekers will destroy the body of our Germany like a tumour'. These mixed metaphors ('catachreses') paradoxically serve to hold the argumentation together, by linking different and often contradictory parts of the text.

Mattausch here adopts a central component of the official policy on foreigners in Germany: to distinguish between foreigners who come from (what is now) the European Union and those from the rest of the world. He supports this distinction with racist arguments: he applies the label 'non-Caucasian' to the large numbers of Turks and Kurds living in Germany, while 'Afro-Asian economic refugees' is used to describe asylum-seekers from Sri Lanka and from other countries in the Far East and from Africa.

The author takes advantage of the fact that there is a public discourse of differentiation between different sorts of foreigners, and he tries to establish a connection between his racist construction and this discourse, which itself is used as a means of distinguishing between 'good' and 'bad' foreigners: the good ones are the so-called *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers), who work hard and pay taxes, and can therefore be integrated more easily into German society; and the bad ones are those who create social costs, who are not able or willing to work or to adopt German customs and values. Here we can see in a detailed way how a special political discourse tries to infiltrate everyday inter-discourse, and that this inter-discourse is closely bound up with the ruling and therefore dominant hegemonic interests.

If we compare extreme right-wing texts which appeared some years ago (such as the Mattausch text), with texts from the 'mainstream' press today, we can see that the attempts of the right to exert an influence on the general inter-discourse have become more and more successful. Formulas like 'floods of asylum-seekers', 'our boat is full', expressions like 'economic refugees' and other discriminatory phrases, which until a few years ago belonged exclusively to the domain of right-wing extremists like Franz Schönhuber, can be found in almost any section of the contemporary press. If we compare articles by right-wing propagandists with those of mainstream journalists today, and at the same time look back at the way in which the latter used to write, we can see that the whole political landscape in Germany has been drifting to the right. I think that by making statements such as this possible, the concept of socio-historical discourse analysis shows its intrinsic analytical value.

But let us return to Mattausch's article from *Nation Europa*. Another interesting feature of his writing is his use of scientific-sounding vocabulary to make his text appear serious and credible: consider, for example, words like *Population* (instead of *Bevölkerung*), *europid*, *verhaltensbestimmend* (determining human behaviour). He continues:

> The indigenous populations perceived these new conditions as a menace to their collective identities, which had grown over hundreds or even thousands of years. In those European countries which have been affected by these problems, a deeply rooted feeling of anxiety and in some cases a sense of serious crisis has been growing. There can be no doubt that the process of alienation of the native environment was increased by the influx of groups that cannot be Europeanized and this was responsible for the loss of a sense of security in the [illegible]

In this passage Mattausch discloses his real message: these foreigners are not just different, they cannot be integrated, they cannot be 'Europeanized'. The influx (*Zuzug*) of these people will result in riots and general crisis.

The biologistic and racist position expressed in this passage dominates the thinking of the whole group of extreme right-wing intellectuals like Mattausch, who base their thinking on the work of 'major' scholars like Konrad Lorenz, Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, and others. In the rest of his article Mattausch draws attention to the 'fact' that 'racial' mixture will lead to civil war and riots. Conservative politicians are depicted as idiots, and passages from all kinds of newspapers are quoted to show that Germany is becoming more and more *überfremdet* (overrun by foreigners). Immigrants with a black skin are pictured as especially dangerous because they have a different *Naturell* (mentality), inborn aggression, and deeply rooted criminal inclinations.

Articles like this contain the essential propagandist keywords and collective symbols for the everyday agitation of right-wing extremists. For example, Mattausch uses terms like *afroasiatische Völkerwanderung* (that is, Afro-Asian migration on the scale of entire nations) or like *Suche der Einwanderer nach dem Sicherheitsstaat* (the immigrants' search for a security state). But he also adopts some items of conservative vocabulary in order to build bridges in that direction. The *soziale Hängematte* (literally, 'social hammock'), for instance, is a phrase which was coined by conservative politicians in order to discriminate against the unemployed (cf. the English expression 'feather-bedding'). Another common expression is the *Belange des deutschen Volkes* (the interests of the German people), which can be found in the law on foreigners. The semantics of the word *Belange* is highly vague; it means 'concerns' in a very broad sense, and therefore if you say that foreigners are not allowed to disturb the *Belange des deutschen Volkes*, this can be applied to almost any behaviour of foreigners that is different from German customs and values.

Mattausch tries to relate his formulations to anxieties and fears which affect many people (of all social classes) in Germany. There is, for instance, a widespread fear in Germany of losing a sense of national identity or the homogeneity of the German people. In doing this Mattausch pours oil on the fire which is smouldering under the cover of normal everyday life. He confirms his readers in their prejudices, and thereby helps to strengthen feelings of racism in the inter-discourse. Furthermore, he constructs a 'natural' relationship between a fear of foreigners and the urge or compulsion to drive them out, which enables people to define and consolidate 'their' cultural territory. In this way, he claims that xenophobia and racism are innate human characteristics.

The article ends with the sharp warning that 'the stage is set for a future civil war'. His final words are: 'The shadows of a dark future can no longer be ignored.'

The Reproduction of Racism and Extreme Right-Wing Ideological Tenets in Conservative Texts and in the Daily Press

Following this brief review of the extreme right-wing press and my attempt to analyse an article by a well-known far-right author, I should add at least a few

remarks about some other newspapers, such as the mass-circulation tabloid newspaper *Bild*, with more than 15 million readers (for a sociologist's analysis of *Bild*, see Albrecht 1982).

Racism as a concept which opens the door to extreme right-wing thinking is one of the most important focal points in *Bild*. There have been, and still are, many elaborate campaigns against foreigners in this racist paper, especially in the run-up to elections; but even at 'normal' times *Bild* never tires of attacking and discriminating against immigrants, using suggestive symbols and images like that of the threatening 'flood of asylum-seekers', who will make 'our boat' sink. On the front page on 5 September 1991, for example, the following set of banner headlines appears:

Blutschande / Endlich / Die Töchter wehren sich
Asylanten / Endlich / Bonn wacht auf
Miethaie / Endlich / Die ersten bestraft
(Incest / At last / The daughters put up resistance
Asylum-seekers / At last / Bonn is waking up
Rent profiteers / At last / The first are punished)

This racist and suggestive combination of headlines is by no means harmless. The word *Asylant* (asylum-seeker) is a neologism with deeply discriminatory overtones, and in the context of this set of headlines it is associated with a cluster of negative images. This operates not only on the surface level, but also by implicitly suggesting parallels with the past through the use of keywords like *Blutschande* and *Miethaie: Bild* conjures in the minds of its readers the threat that asylum-seekers will seduce 'our' daughters and wives (like the Jews in the propaganda of the Nazis) and that they will buy up our homes and property and charge extortionate rents (*Miethaie* was an abusive term for Jewish landlords used in the Third Reich). To this extent we can say that *Bild* is working with a kind of 'subcutaneous' anti-Semitism too, although the paper's founder, the late Axel Springer, and his followers always laid great emphasis on being a big friend of Israel.

In an edition of *Bild* which appeared some days before the elections in Schleswig-Holstein and Baden-Württemberg in April 1992 the following headline appeared:

Die Flut steigt – wann sinkt das Boot?
Fast jede Minute ein neuer Asylant (*Bild*, 2 Apr. 1992)

(The tide is rising – when will the boat sink?
A new asylum-seeker almost every minute)

This headline is a very typical example of *Bild*'s use of collective symbols: they simply take suggestive metaphors, put them together, and couple them with nonsense-facts. Logical connections are clearly considered unimportant: why, I ask myself, should a boat sink if the tide is rising?! Nevertheless, *Bild* succeeds in producing its dramatic message of danger, loss of space, and overpopulation

But *Bild* is just one exponent of this sort of journalism. Racism 'occurs' and is produced in almost every other paper in Germany, even in some of the more serious papers like *Der Spiegel*, *Die Zeit*, or the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. The racist articles or racist opinions published in these papers, however, sound less blatant and overt than in *Bild*, which goes on to incite its readers against immigrants and refugees (for a detailed discussion see Quinkert and Jäger 1991 and Gerhard 1992).

Racism in Everyday Discourse and its Mediation by the Press

In a detailed study of everyday discourse (see Jäger 1992*a*), I came to the conclusion that most people in Germany are more or less imbued with racist thinking, even though not all of them can be called blatant racists. That is to say, they produce and reproduce racist opinions and prejudices. These prejudices appear in our 'normal' newspapers as well. That is why I assume that the influence of the press in producing and reproducing racism is so great. Furthermore, in everyday life people share their experiences socially through talk. This also includes racist interpretations of these experiences as well as value judgements, attitudes, and norms.

I shall illustrate this contention with some examples from statements made by our informants, but first I should say a few words about the project itself. Together with some of my students I carried out twenty-two non-standardized open interviews each lasting 45 minutes on average. We conducted these interviews in five large towns in western Germany. The interviewees were men and women of all ages and from various occupational backgrounds. Rather than putting set questions we tried get our informants to speak on various subjects such as their neighbourhood, shopping, travelling by bus or train, the reunification of Germany, and the Gulf War. Normally our interviewees began of their own accord to talk about foreigners. If they did not, we gave them a 'prompt'. This sample, which is reasonably representative of German populations in larger towns, was analysed on the basis of the discourse-theory approach outlined in Section 1 above.

In one interview a 52-year-old woman is asked right at the beginning: 'How do you like the town you live in?' She answers without hesitation: 'I don't like my neighbourhood very much, because there are a lot of foreigners living here, especially Turks.'[6] Asked why she feels disturbed by foreigners in general, she answers:

> It bothers me because the mentality of the foreigners is totally different from that of the Germans, especially as regards cleanliness, as regards . . . I also don't like the discrimination against women, at least that's the way it seems to me; if you see, er, these people in couples, er, the woman has to carry the heavy bags, the men walk some metres behind the women; and I have the impression that women have very little freedom in these countries.

Asked why she feels disturbed by foreigners living in her neighbourhood, she says:

> I don't like it very much. First of all, er, as far as school is concerned; admittedly my own children are a little bit older and they don't go to the local school any more, but I think it is bad, because the education of the children is very, very bad and the children fall behind, and when they go on to further education or training their basic education will be worse than in schools where there are mostly German children.

At this point, the interviewer intervenes, saying: 'But that's not an answer to my question', and the women continues:

> Yes, I have nothing directly against foreigners [*laughing*], but somehow, er, it's not so nice, er, to be surrounded by foreigners; there's really very little contact; the foreigners shut themselves off, the Germans too of course; most of them don't want to have anything to do with the foreigners, and the other way round I think, it is the same way with the foreigners, who don't like to have anything to do with Germans. They have their own religion, they have customs of their own, and, er, somehow I don't like that. I'd prefer to live in a place where there are only Germans.

When the interviewer asks if she would like to improve her acqaintance with Turks, she answers rather brusquely: 'I don't want to have any contact with Turks at all.'

In this passage we find some of the typical attitudes towards foreigners, especially Turks, who are in a sense considered as prototypes of the foreigner: 'We just don't like them, our children suffer from them, they are different as regards their customs and especially their religion, they are not clean', etc. The presence of Turks is a general cause of anger and feelings of frustration. Attitudes like these are very often accompanied by a clear desire to drive foreigners out.

The following argument can also be heard very often: 'We can't take in all the distressed and burdened people of the whole world, can we? I think if they all come, the boat will be exhausted, er, as regards the density of the population, won't it?'

Here we find some of the collective symbols which were mentioned earlier, and which are drawn from the discourse of the media. A great many of these collective symbols, which have been shown to be the 'cement' of media discourse (Link 1991), can be found in everyday discourse as well. In addition, this discourse is interspersed with journalistic keywords (like agglomeration, assimilation, identity, discrimination, interaction, level, rationality, veto) that stand out from the more colloquial nature of the rest of such texts. This and some other features of these texts, such as in some cases verbatim quotations from passages from the newspapers the interviewees habitually read, confirm my supposition that the influence of the media on everday thinking and speaking is enormous.

But how does it work in detail? Do the newspapers just reflect what people think, as is often claimed when the press is accused of instigating racist or other prejudices? Having analysed media discourse and everyday discourse in parallel for some years, I would [illegible]

seen in its ability to promote or play down racist discourses at will. For instance, racist discourses typically increase in prominence in the press and in everyday discourse in the run up to any election. It is true, however, that politicians, who have easy access to the media, play their part in this game, too; but it is the press itself that is capable of managing and influencing the inter-discourse as it pleases (for this notion, see Van Dijk 1991). In short, it can at least be argued that racism is socially reproduced by discourse.

Finally, one further point should be mentioned here: racist (and other) discourse may by no means be harmless, or just a cluster of bad attitudes and worse opinions. As recent events in Germany have shown, there is a high correlation between the rise of racist discourse in the press (see above) and thousands of attacks against immigrants, including arson and even murders. Discourse theory, then, argues that there is a continuum between verbal and non-verbal action. In certain circumstances, verbal action may well be transformed into physical actions like attacks and riots (see Link 1982, Jäger 1992*a*, where this problem is dealt with in detail). In the interviews we conducted we found that some of the interviewees showed considerable willingness to attack foreigners if they did not behave in accordance with German customs and norms.

It goes without saying that racism is one of the central ideological tenets of right-wing parties (and of right-wing conservative politicians, too). Therefore it seems reasonable to conclude that an increase of racist discourse in the German population may signal an increase in the prospects of right-wing extremism too.

3 The Language and Ideology of the Left in Germany

3.1 The Press of the Left in Contemporary Germany

During the last two decades the German left, and together with it the left-wing press, has declined dramatically. Many journals disappeared, or became commercialized, or lost large numbers of their readers. It is not possible to analyse the causes of this decline in detail here, and I shall confine myself to just a few points. First of all we must differentiate between the two mainstreams of the German left since 1968: the orthodox left, which adhered closely to the canonical ideology of Stalin's and (parts of) Lenin's works, and the New Left. The orthodox left disappeared from the political stage after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet Union. Some marginal groups still exist, however, such as the DKP (German Communist Party), which has about a thousand members and publishes the newspaper *Unsere Zeit*.[7] The PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism), successor to the GDR's official SED (Socialist Unity Party), still has some 200,000 members in eastern Germany, but it has not been able to establish a foothold in the West, where it has gained only about 700 members. The attempt to get rid of the old orthodox thinking, undertaken by leading members of the PDS, for instance by Gregor Gysi, was not very successful, and there are many members of this party who still adhere to the old ideologies and politics

Neues Deutschland, the former central organ of the SED, was saved by the PDS, and its former bureaucratic style and ideological contents have been changed to a great extent. It now reflects the debates of the progressive wing of the PDS (and some other socialists) on socialist reforms and anti-capitalist perspectives. These changes can be illustrated by comparing two editions of *Neues Deutschland*, one before and one after the *Wende*. In the edition of 27/8 June 1987, the following headlines appeared:

> 4. Tagung der Volkskammer bestätigte Haushaltsrechnung für 1986: Eine Bilanz der erfolgreichen Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik
> (4th session of the Volkskammer [Parliament] confirms budget for 1986: a record of successful economic and social policy)
>
> DDR-Planwirtschaft funktioniert gut
> (GDR's planned economy is working well)
>
> Wir haben keine Schuldenwirtschaft
> (We do not have a budget-deficit economy)
>
> Steigende Leistung – Sinkende Kosten
> (Rising output – falling costs)
>
> Dem Ministerrat Entlastung erteilt
> (Report of Council of Ministers approved)
>
> Dank für großen Beitrag zum Wohle des Volkes
> (Thanks for major contribution to the good of the people)
>
> Grußadresse des ZK zum 'Tag des Bauarbeiters'
> (Message of greeting from Central Committee on 'Construction Worker's Day')
>
> Festumzug ein Höhepunkt des Jubiläums von Berlin
> (Procession a highlight of Berlin's jubilee celebrations)
>
> Schwarzer Donnerstag für Westberliner Mieter
> (Black Thursday for West Berlin tenants)

This anthology shows that readers were confronted with long and tedious official statements in the style of official bulletins. The consequence of this sort of state journalism was that, with the exception of some functionaries who were compelled to do so, nobody actually read *Neues Deutschland*. Passages like the following were typical:

> Abgeordnete R. W., Vorsitzende des Ausschusses für Haushalt und Finanzen, bezeichnete in der Stellungnahme des Ausschusses die Ergebnisse bei der Senkung der Kosten als unbestechlichen Maßstab für die Fortschritte auf dem Weg der umfassenden Intensivierung.
>
> (In the report of the Budget and Finance Committee, the Chair, delegate R. W., described the results of the cost-cutting exercise as an unerring measure of progress on the road to comprehensive intensification.)

The bureaucratic and clumsy style reflects a complete lack of content, which

By contrast, in an edition of 24/5 March 1990, there are lively debates about the future of the GDR, in which passages are quoted from the work of Theodor W. Adorno, the great scholar from the 'Frankfurt School', who until recently had been accused of being an *Abweichler* (deviator) from the true ideology of socialism. However, whilst in this edition journalists and scholars are still fighting for a new socialist democratic state of the GDR, this has given way more recently to running battles and attempts to criticize the capitalist way of life and the annexation of the former GDR by the West.

I shall now turn my attention from the orthodox left to other left-wing groups. In doing this I shall ignore the many small sects, some of which continue to produce their small papers (for instance the VSP (Unified Socialist Party), a Trotskyist group). Around the beginning of the 1990s many members of Trotskyist or Maoist and other 'Marxist' groups (like MG (Marxistische Gruppe) or even of the DKP moved in the direction of the Greens and changed or modified their political ideologies to a large extent, in some respects adopting blatant political pragmatism (the so-called *Realos*). The political debate of the members and sympathizers of this political group can be found in journals like *Kommune* or in the *tageszeitung*. This means that there have been some changes in the style and form of debate, and there cannot be any doubt that this new 'movement' has contributed a great deal to the emergence of new themes like ecology, which have since been adopted (and often diluted) by other parties. To some extent it could be said that they have developed a new language, nearer to everyday communication, and that their discourse has gained some influence on the general inter-discourse.

At this point I should mention some journals of the moderate New Left on the one hand and the more radical New Left on the other. There are papers like *Links*, *kultuRRevolution*, *Wechselwirkung*, or *Sozialismus*, which have no particular association with any political parties. Like journals such as *Frankfurter Hefte*, an independent journal which is politically aligned with the left wing of the Social Democrats, these publications try to maintain an intellectual debate, based on the ideas of Adorno, Bloch, Althusser, Benjamin, Foucault, and others. They all argue on a relatively high intellectual level, and so far they have had no influence on inter-discourse whatsoever. But some of their authors have access to the major papers too, for instance Elmar Altvater, a well-known Marxist professor of economics, Jürgen Link, professor of literature and discourse theory at Dortmund University, and Joachim Hirsch, who teaches politics at Frankfurt University. So it is fair to say that a German New Left still exists, but it is not organized and has no meaningful influence on the process of politics and the general inter-discourse as a whole.

Finally, I should at least draw attention to two papers of the radical left in Germany: *Arbeiterkampf* and *Konkret*. *Arbeiterkampf* was founded many years ago as the organ of the Kommunistischer Bund (Communist Union), a former Maoist group that is now defunct. The paper itself, a strictly anti-capitalist monthly, still exists, with a circulation of about 3,000 copies. It regularly reports on affairs of the so-called underdeveloped countries, and it deals with all subjects in which

Marxists and Anarchists may possibly be interested. Their analyses are founded strictly on Marxist theory, especially the 'original Marx', but this is not done in the sophisticated and academic manner of most of the other papers of the New Left. *Konkret*, a monthly magazine with a circulation of about 20,000 copies, is also a radical socialist paper with a long tradition. It has always been independent and it specializes in criticizing the left from an even more left position. Its style is readable and its themes are many and various.

The total number of readers of the press of the left in Germany may be estimated at about 1 million.

3.2 The Gulf War in the Discourse of the Left

The way at least large sections of the left debated the Gulf War may serve as a typical example of debates within the left in contemporary Germany. Since it is not possible to go into detail on this topic here, a few remarks must suffice (for a detailed discussion see Kellershohn 1992). The German left is, put simply, a left-wing movement in Germany. This means that it is also caught up in the last sixty years of German history and its discourse. During the Gulf War the problem of anti-Semitism became central. The German left was divided between pacifists on the one hand, who defended peace at any price, and on the other hand those who defended Israel at any price and who accused the 'pacifists' of anti-Semitism. The debate has continued to divide whole groups and journalists on political newspapers and periodicals. The charge of anti-Semitism is probably the most serious accusation left-thinking people in Germany could be confronted with, and so it is not surprising that this debate was conducted very vehemently and in some cases even violently.

This is just one of many delicate topics that the German left seldom likes (or dares) to discuss. One of the main reasons for this is the fact of Germany's past, which has also not been dealt with adequately by the left. Further subjects of this kind include abortion, eugenics, and (at least for some parts of the left) Stalinism. The left normally leaves it to the right to discuss these topics, but there is no getting away from them. Since the left appears to be unable to deal with these topics on a serious theoretical level, it is not prepared to discuss them at all in an adequate way. This is one of the reasons why the left in Germany has remained marginal and politically weak. Some years ago there was a popular slogan: 'Der Geist steht links!' (literally: 'the mind is on the left!', that is, the intellectual climate is dominated by the left). This may have been true then, but not any more: since then the initiative has shifted firmly to the right!

4 Conclusions

The bulk of this chapter has been devoted to the language of the right in Germany, and this is because at least since the early 1980s the focal point of German political discourse has been drifting to the right. This trend represents a significant

new development in Germany's post-war history. Furthermore, the signs are that in the new 'unified' Germany the right will continue to dominate political discourse and the left will continue to decline.

Nevertheless, it is both legitimate and important to consider in conclusion whether there is any possibility of developing counter-discourses, in order to confront at least the most powerful discourses of the right, such as racism and anti-Semitism. In this respect, I think there may be some grounds for optimism. As discourses are linked with power and as they are not directly determined by purely economic circumstances, there is at least a chance that enlightened concepts will eventually prevail; and as far as the topic of this chapter is concerned, it may just be that discourse analysis and improvements in discourse theory will make a positive contribution to this process.

Appendix

Migrationsfolgen und deren Einfluß auf die innere Sicherheit
Christian Mattausch

Die Anwesenheit nichteuropider Volksgruppen in Westeuropa stellt alle betroffenen Staaten vor Schwierigkeiten von historischer Bedeutung. Es sind nicht allein wirtschaftliche Engpässe, die Kopfzerbrechen bereiten – es sind vor allem die Bestrebungen dieser Gruppen, hier Wurzeln zu schlagen und zu kulturellen bzw. Politischen Ablegern ihrer Herkunftsländer zu werden. Setzt man diesem Sachverhalt sein psychologisches Spiegelbild gegenüber, fällt unweigerlich der Stellenwert eines in jeder Beziehung verhaltensbestimmenden Merkmals auf: Andersartigkeit nicht-europider Populationen, deren Zahl und Varianten sich noch durch die Flut afro-asiatischer Wirtschafts-flüchtlinge ständig vergrößert.

Diese Bedingungen, von den einheimischen Bevölkerungen überall als eine Infragestellung alter, über Jahrhunderte bis Jahrtausende gewachsener Kollektividentitäten empfunden, haben in den betroffenen Ländern Europas zu tiefer Beunruhigung, stellenweise sogar zu akutem Krisenbewußtsein geführt. Es unterliegt keinem Zweifel, daß die Entpersönlichung der heimatlichen Umgebung durch den Zuzug nicht-europäisierbarer Gruppen geradezu beschleunigt wurde und bei vielen Bodenständigen zu einem Verlust an Geborgenheitsgefühl geführt hat....

Die Schatten einer düsteren Zukunft sind nicht mehr zu übersehen.

German Text of Interviews (pp. 245–6)

F = Frage A = Antwort x = pause

F. Wie gefällt Ihnen denn die Stadt, in der Sie hier wohnen?

A. Die Wohnlage gefällt mir ja nicht so besonders, weil um mich herum sehr viele Ausländer wohnen; vor allen Dingen Türken.

F. Warum stört Sie das?

A. Mich stört das insofern, weil die Mentalität der Ausländer eine total andere ist als die der Deutschen, vor allen Dingen geht's da um Sauberkeit, um, was mich daran auch stört, die Diskriminierung der Frau, habe ich zumindest das Gefühl; wenn man die

muß, die Männer einige Meter hinter den Frauen laufen und ich hab eben das Gefühl, daß die Frau sehr wenig Freiheit genießt in diesen Ländern.

F. Warum stört Sie das, wenn hier Ausländer in der Umgebung wohnen?

A. Ich find das nicht besonders gut; einmal, eh, auf dem Gebiet der Schule; meine Kinder sind allerdings schon älter und gehen halt nicht mehr in diese hiesige Schule, aber, eh, ich finde es schlecht, weil die Ausbildung der Kinder sehr, sehr schlecht ist und die Kinder dann halt ins Hintertreffen geraten, wenn sie zu einer fortbildenden Schule gehen oder auch später in der Berufsbildung ist die Grundlage eine schlechtere als in einer Schule, wo überwiegend deutsche, eh, Kinder zur Schule gehen.

F. Aber das ist ja keine Antwort auf die Frage; ich mein, dann brauchte Sie das ja nicht zu stören, wenn hier Ausländer in der Umgebung wohnen.

A. Ja, ich hab nichts direkt gegen Ausländer [*Lachen*], aber irgendwie, eh, ist es nicht so sehr schön, eh, von Ausländern umgeben, eh, zu wohnen; der Kontakt ist, eh, ganz minimal nur; die Ausländer grenzen sich irgendwie ab, natürlich auch die Deutschen; die meisten wollen halt mit den Ausländern nichts zu tun haben und umgedreht glaube ich, ist es auch so, daß die Ausländer mit Deutschen recht wenig zu tun haben wollen. Die haben ihre eigene Religion, die haben ihre eigene Lebensweise, und, eh, irgendwie stört mich das. Ich würde also lieber in einer Gegend wohnen, wo nur Deutsche wohnen.

F. Möchten Sie eigentlich auch keinen Kontakt zu den Türken?

A. Ich möchte keinen Kontakt zu den Türken haben.

A. Wir können nicht alle mühselig und beladenen der ganzen Welt hier aufzunehmen, ne. Irgendwo is ja auch, wenn die alle kommen, denk ich ma, dat Schiff hinterher, eh, vonner Besiedlungsdichte her, eh, erschöpft, ne, denk ich mir.

Further Reading

Butterwegge and Jäger (1992)
Ehlich (1989)
Heringer (1990)
Institut für Migrations- und Rassismusforschung (1992)
Jäger (1992*a* and *b*)
Januschek (1985)
Klein (1989)
Liedtke *et al.* (1991)

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Notes

1. It is often the case that the term discourse is simply used instead of 'text'. Therefore I consider it necessary to give a somewhat complex definition of my understanding of discourse. This is even more necessary because there are some other new approaches

such as anthropology, semiotics, literary studies, linguistics, sociology, psychology, and the various branches of communication. Each of these approaches has to recognize the fact that an interdisciplinary approach is unavoidable. This is one of the reasons why the term discourse sometimes sounds rather mysterious. If you take into account the fact that there are a variety of approaches and 'schools' in each single discipline, you may understand why it is not possible to speak about discourse theory or discourse analysis in terms of a firmly established field of research.

In Germany there are a number of different concepts of discourse and discourse analysis, some adopting ideas of the philosopher Jürgen Habermas or other scholars like Karl Otto Apel, others following US-American traditions (e.g. Dell Hymes 1979). Teun A. Van Dijk of Amsterdam University and editor of the new journal *Discourse & Society* describes the growth of discourse analysis during the last two decades and calls it 'a new discipline of sociolinguistics' (Van Dijk 1990: 5). Van Dijk's own concept of discourse analysis is based on cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence research. My concept is developed in Jäger (1991 and 1993); it has been used in empirical analyses of right-wing texts in Jäger (1988) and in the field of everyday racist discourse in Jäger (1992*a*) and in various other publications.

2. This became clear in the elections to the senate in Bremen and the municipal elections in Schleswig-Holstein in Oct. 1991, and the elections to the parliaments of Baden-Württemberg and Schleswig-Holstein in Apr. 1992 showed dramatically that the temporary decline of right-wing parties was over. The 'Republicans', who seemed to have reached a dead end after the fall of the Wall, gained 10.9 per cent of the votes; in Schleswig-Holstein the DVU gained 6.6 per cent.
3. For a broader analysis of the scope of the press of the far right and its ideologies see Jäger (1988) and Jäger and Jäger (1992).
4. My notion of racism cannot be outlined in detail here. I basically concur with the views associated e.g. with the names of Stuart Hall (1989), Étienne Balibar (1989), Georg Auernheimer (1990), and Kalpaka and Räthzel (1990). A fully fledged racist disposition is given if the following three elements co-occur: (1) biologically or culturally founded differences are manifested; (2) these differences are seen negatively (or sometimes positively, e.g. if somebody says that black people make especially gifted jazz musicians); and (3) if these positions are based on real power, so that the person concerned or his/her group is able to act against foreigners. This power is normally given, if the person concerned is a member of the majority or dominant group.
5. The original German can be found in the Appendix to this chapter.
6. The translations inevitably neglect the fact that the speakers use dialects or some other forms of the non-standard speech of the Ruhr area. For the original text see Appendix.
7. *Unsere Zeit* is still being published in a style and format comparable to *Neues Deutschland* before the *Wende* (see below), but it has become absolutely insignificant.

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The Uses and Representations of Local Languages in Tourist Destinations: A View from British TV Holiday Programmes

Adam Jaworski, Crispin Thurlow, Sarah Lawson and Virpi Ylänne-McEwen

Introduction

Travel programmes are very popular in the UK. According to their own publicity, for example, both the BBC's *Holiday* <www.bbc.co.uk/holiday> and ITV's *Wish You Were Here?* <www.wishyouwerehere.com> have been running for over 30 years and boast weekly ratings of up to eight million viewers. While for some package tourists, these programmes have been found to form an important part of their pre-holiday preparations, providing information and tips about holiday destinations, they also aim to provide entertainment on prime time TV (Hanefors & Mossberg, 2000). The basic format of these programmes follows an introduction by a lead presenter and then three or four 'episodes' where other presenters or guest celebrities try out different holidays in a variety of locations. Although most locals/hosts[1] featured in the holiday programmes use English to communicate with the travelling journalists regardless of the official status of English in their territories, it is not uncommon for the presenters to initiate interaction with the hosts in their native language, or to quote 'foreign' language phrases in their commentaries/narratives. Occasionally, the presenters also elicit words or phrases in the host language from the hosts.

The data we have used in this study come from 18 programmes of the BBC's *Holiday* and 10 programmes of ITV's *Wish You Were Here?* broadcast between November 2000 and April 2001. The programmes comprise 106 episodes

featuring 33 destinations (countries or regions), broadly reflecting the most popular destinations of UK holidaymakers (National Statistics, 2002).[2] Perhaps not surprisingly, the most popular destination on the programmes is the UK, where the question of a language barrier in communicating with hosts is also far less likely to arise. Notably, in episodes featuring the UK, most interviews are with other tourists, rather than hosts, although British tourists, tour operators and expatriates are also occasionally interviewed in 'foreign' episodes. We have nonetheless chosen not to include any of these interactions in our data analysis. Many other popular destinations, such as Ireland, the USA, parts of the Caribbean or of Canada, are, of course, largely 'English-speaking' and whatever interactions are undertaken with hosts in these locations, they are invariably conducted in English. In other locations, however, English is spoken by the majority of the local population as a second or foreign language. It is predominantly these settings that our examples come from.

Across all the 106 episodes of the programmes analysed here, we identified 246 instances of interaction between tourists/programme presenters and hosts. For our purposes, we define 'interaction' as any form of mutual engagement between a tourist and a host. This may be verbal (often non-reciprocal, with only one participant assuming a speaking role), or non-verbal, for example, when the tourist and host make eye-contact, or when a tourist/presenter gets a message from a host. We exclude from the category 'interaction' the ubiquitous, one-sided act of tourist gazing – in a more literal sense than the way it has come to be used in tourism studies, following Urry (2002). Our sample includes 63 instances of the use and/or representation of languages other than English, which constitute approximately 26% of all interactions with locals in the total sample.

The data that we deal with in this paper operate at a metalinguistic level in the sense that local languages in the programmes are represented and performed for the benefit of the viewers (see below). This implied reflexivity of language use invites an analysis following the traditions of Critical Language Awareness (CLA) studies (e.g. Clark & Ivanič, 1999; Fairclough, 1992a) as a development of Language Awareness (LA) (e.g. Hawkins, 1987) and folk linguistics (Preston 1996, 2004), and building upon those of Critical Linguistics (e.g. Fowler & Kress, 1979) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (e.g. Fairclough & Wodak 1997). With a central concern for metalinguistic and metapragmatic norms and competencies, CLA has dealt mostly with educational and workplace domains in which desirable or required versions of communication are spelled out for pupils, trainees and employees. However, the framework offered by CLA also encourages an examination of how everyday communication norms and conventions of 'appropriacy' (Fairclough, 1992b) act as manifestations of underlying power differentials, competing ideologies and 'gatekeeping' strategies. This approach is consistent with our general view of metalanguage as a broad socio-linguistic category and a site of much ideological 'work' that social actors do through their representations of and manifested attitudes to language (see Jaworski *et al.*, 2004).

Following Cameron (1990/1999: 62), one of the central tasks of critical a

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The data we have used in this study come from 18 programmes of the BBC's *Holiday* and 10 programmes of ITV's *Wish You Were Here?* broadcast between November 2000 and April 2001. The programmes comprise 106 episodes

Source: *Language Awareness* vol. 12, no. 1, 2001, pp. 1–25.

featuring 33 destinations (countries or regions), broadly reflecting the most popu lar destinations of UK holidaymakers (National Statistics, 2002).[2] Perhaps n surprisingly, the most popular destination on the programmes is the UK, whe the question of a language barrier in communicating with hosts is also far le likely to arise. Notably, in episodes featuring the UK, most interviews are wit other tourists, rather than hosts, although British tourists, tour operators an expatriates are also occasionally interviewed in 'foreign' episodes. We have non theless chosen not to include any of these interactions in our data analysis. Man other popular destinations, such as Ireland, the USA, parts of the Caribbean c of Canada, are, of course, largely 'English-speaking' and whatever interactions a undertaken with hosts in these locations, they are invariably conducted in Englis In other locations, however, English is spoken by the majority of the local popu lation as a second or foreign language. It is predominantly these settings tha our examples come from.

Across all the 106 episodes of the programmes analysed here, we identifie 246 instances of interaction between tourists/programme presenters and host For our purposes, we define 'interaction' as any form of mutual engagement be tween a tourist and a host. This may be verbal (often non-reciprocal, with onl one participant assuming a speaking role), or non-verbal, for example, whe the tourist and host make eye-contact, or when a tourist/presenter gets a messag from a host. We exclude from the category 'interaction' the ubiquitous, one-side act of tourist gazing – in a more literal sense than the way it has come to be use in tourism studies, following Urry (2002). Our sample includes 63 instances o the use and/or representation of languages other than English, which constitut approximately 26% of all interactions with locals in the total sample.

The data that we deal with in this paper operate at a metalinguistic level i the sense that local languages in the programmes are represented and performe for the benefit of the viewers (see below). This implied reflexivity of languag use invites an analysis following the traditions of Critical Language Awarenes (CLA) studies (e.g. Clark & Ivanič, 1999; Fairclough, 1992a) as a developmen of Language Awareness (LA) (e.g. Hawkins, 1987) and folk linguistics (Preston 1996, 2004), and building upon those of Critical Linguistics (e.g. Fowler & Kress, 1979) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (e.g. Fairclough & Wodak 1997). With a central concern for metalinguistic and metapragmatic norms and competencies, CLA has dealt mostly with educational and workplace domains, in which desirable or required versions of communication are spelled out fo pupils, trainees and employees. However, the framework offered by CLA also encourages an examination of how everyday communication norms and conventions of 'appropriacy' (Fairclough, 1992b) act as manifestations of underlying power differentials, competing ideologies and 'gatekeeping' strategies. This approach is consistent with our general view of metalanguage as a broad sociolinguistic category and a site of much ideological 'work' that social actors do through their representations of and manifested attitudes to language (see Jaworski *et al.*, 2004).

Following Cameron (1990/1999: 62), one of the central tasks of critical analyses of language practice is to reveal how institutions like the broadcast media

produce and reproduce linguistic norms, and, in turn, to consider 'how these norms are apprehended, accepted, resisted and subverted by individual actors and what their relation is to the construction of identity'. On this basis, we view our data as 'common sense understandings' or representations by the TV producers of how communication between hosts and presenters shapes up in face-to-face encounters. Specifically, it is our aim in this paper to examine the uses of host languages (other than English) in the TV holiday programmes, and to establish how these language choices position hosts, presenters and TV audiences *vis-à-vis* one another. We address the latter aim in our discussion by defining the uses of languages other than English in our data as instances of *crossing*, which 'is concerned with switching into languages that are not generally thought to belong to you' (Rampton, 1995: 280). These heavily mediated encounters are thus ideologically situated practices which help to better understand the subject-positionings and relations of power which underpin tourism as both an international industry and an intercultural playing field.

It is precisely this kind of strictly linguistic or sociolinguistic approach which, we believe, can make a useful contribution to the already interdisciplinary tourism literature. Indeed, part of the impetus for this move comes from within Tourism Studies, where writers like Franklin and Crang (2001) advocate the need for a more 'multi-sense' understanding of tourism, and a concomitant re-appraisal of its undue emphasis on the visual – typified by the sway of Urry's (2002) otherwise trenchant notion of the 'tourist gaze'. To some extent, any lack of scholarly attention to language is explained by nature of the tourist experience itself; in Cronin's (2000: 82) words, 'sightseeing is the world with the sound turned off'. As Dunn (2002: 3) further explains, tourists usually end up gazing simply because they cannot understand the languages spoken by the objects of their gaze. Either way, analyses of language and social interaction in tourism have been noticeable by their absence. With this said, our concern here is less about making a contribution to the tourism literature, as it is about demonstrating the application and relevance of CLA to a very significant domain of everyday, interethnic interaction – in fact, one of the most substantial cultural industries today. This is done also in the sense of *Language Awareness*'s long-standing attention to the evaluation and prioritisation of different languages and their speakers, especially within the context of 'foreign language' learning (see, for example, Hawkins, 1999). It is all of these concerns which stimulate our particular interest here in the ideological and discursive functions of languages other than English as they are represented in holiday travel programmes.

Before we discuss their functions, however, we want also to comment on these languages as a form of performance, and consider their particular functioning in terms of what Goffman calls the 'theatrical frame' (1974: Chap. 5), i.e. strips of behaviour which are produced and interpreted as, or by analogy to, a rather narrowly conceived stage performance.[3] In this sense, performance involves one or more performers engaged in a make-believe interaction (or monologue in the case of just one performer), and an audience, where performers and an audience are likely to be separated spatially (the former, traditionally, performing on a stage viewed by the audience from an auditorium). Of particular importance to

our data here, however, Goffman recognises how an audience operates in a dual role. On the one hand, every member of the audience engages in the act of buying a ticket, taking a seat in the auditorium, spending real time in the theatre, taking part in the non-performance activities such as having a drink during intermission, and so on, i.e. every member of the audience is a 'theatregoer'. On the other hand, every member of the audience also collaborates as an onlooker in the 'unreality onstage' (Goffman, 1974: 130) – or what, in dramaturgical terms, is known as the suspension of disbelief. In other words, the audience is an essential constituent or co-creator of the performance since it is only through the audience that the performance is itself ratified.

Goffman (1974) also notes how participants' activities may fall out of the ongoing frame. This may take place in moments of disattention to specific actions or participants and usually results in changing patterns of alignment, or footing, among participants (Goffman, 1981). In 'real-life' conversation (i.e. that which is perhaps less overtly, self-consciously staged), this may be achieved linguistically, for example, by adopting a vocative form of address to turn one's attention to a new participant, although this is usually achieved through non-verbal means such as facial expressions, body orientation, gaze (cf. Levinson, 1988). In performance (at least in its most canonical form discussed with all the caveats above), or the theatrical frame, the audience, despite its status as accepted onlookers, is such a disattended participant by the actor-in-character, although it is also true that the specific status of the audience as ratified eavesdroppers is 'maximally facilitated' and, to continue, 'theatrical audiences have only restricted rights to reply to the show they watch and are allowed only a restricted role, but unlike the onlookers at excavation sites, they do have *some* expectations in this regard' (Goffman, 1974: 226).

Examples of new positions that may be taken up by audiences are those brought about by

> the special role of chorus, 'orator,' or other mediating, editorialising functions that can easily be built into the performance. The mediator – a specialised viewer who also participates as a staged character – can comment on whole aspects of the production, treating as an object of direct attention what the projected characters have to treat as something in which they are immersed. He is a footnote that talks. (Goffman, 1974: 226–227)

Other examples of such mediations between the performance and the audience mentioned by Goffman are prologues and epilogues, subtitles in silent films, and other slightly out-of-frame stage voices such as soliloquy in which the actor allows the audience to 'hear' his or her thoughts, and different forms of direct address, which is used to comment on or explain a twist in the plot, elaborate on a moral issue or summarise what has happened so far. In unstaged interaction, an out-of-frame activity may involve asides and collusion, as 'individuals can turn from their companions and give fleeting vent to their "real" feelings, through gesture and *sotto voce* comment' (Goffman, 1974: 233). Goffman's example of such 'electronic collusion' in the case of TV shows is the case of an

voiceover in a quiz show 'telling the folks in TV land what the answer was while the contestant manfully strained at pretending to strain at recalling it' (1974: 233).

Following Goffman's work on the theatrical frame and out-of-frame activities, we treat the TV holiday programmes as instances of scripted performances, with the TV audiences being the accepted onlookers, whose right to participate in and respond to the staged activities is necessarily minimal, but whose role in ratifying the programmes is hugely important. In simple economic terms known as the 'ratings game', without the viewers' mass participation, the programmes would be scrapped by the TV stations producing them. And as we hope to demonstrate in this paper, the use and representation of host languages serves as an important aspect of the programme makers' realignment with the viewers.

Functions of Languages Other Than English in TV Holiday Programmes

An initial analysis of the primary functions of languages other than English in TV holiday programmes identified four main categories of function:

- expert talk (e.g. guided tours, explanations, instructions);
- service encounters (e.g. purchasing foodstuffs in shops or markets);
- phatic communion (e.g. exchanging greetings, thanking – often as part of a service encounter);
- naming and translating (e.g. providing labels for local concepts, artefacts or dishes, translating local place names).

These functions are performed by the presenters and/or hosts either when the two parties are shown interacting with one another, or by either party when no face-to-face interaction is present, for example, in numerous voiceovers by the presenters or when racing commentary is heard during a visit to a race course. Of course, most communicative utterances perform multiple functions, and we found such overlaps in our data. As such, it was not always possible to isolate communicative intent. In looking to code our data, therefore, interactions were categorised in terms of their *primary* functional orientation, while allowing coding in terms of more than one function to retain something of the multifunctionality of exchanges where relevant.

Expert Talk

We define talk as 'expert' when a host is portrayed in the role of an authority or guide and shown explaining a process, system or local custom to the presenter, who is portrayed in the role of learner, listening and perhaps asking questions. Expert talk appears to be the most common function of language used by hosts in the programmes. The majority of these instances take place in English (in our sample, almost as much as 90% of all instances of expert talk). After all, this is

British television, English is its unmarked linguistic code, and it is important for the viewers to understand what is going on. In fact, what is surprising is that, in these highly scripted and edited programmes, there is any room left for languages other than English, which is precisely what makes us wonder what viewers are expected to make of the snippets of 'foreign' languages they do get to hear. Consider Extract 1, for example, featuring Vera, a hotel owner in Tuscany. In this example, the presenter, Mary Nightingale, introduces Vera to the audience in an English voiceover and the latter continues in Italian a highly edited demonstration of the preparation of home-made pasta:

Extract 1 Wish You Were Here?, 26 February 2001 Mary Nightingale in Tuscany, Italy[4]

MN:	(voiceover) I found all the hotels very comfortable and what's nice is	1
	they're all so individual and they feel so (.) Italian (1.0) this farmhouse	2
	has been in the family for generations (.) Vera is the boss (.) and the	3
	chief pasta maker	4
Vera:	(cut to Vera's kitchen where she is making pasta) quest'e' la pasta queste	5
	this is the pasta these	
	sono (.) l'impasto (.) mangiala cruda mangiala cruda	6
	are (.) *the mixture* (.) *eat it raw eat it raw*	
MN:	(picks up a single strand of raw pasta, moves away from Vera, raises the	7
	piece of pasta to the camera) there's a piece of Vera's tagliatelle (.) isn't	8
	that absolutely beautiful (.) it's perfect	9
Vera:	(looks baffled at MN's interest in the piece of pasta)	10

In the voiceover, Vera is clearly cast in the role of a cooking expert (lines 3–4), followed by a kitchen scene where she shares her knowledge and experience of pasta making. In her very short turn, she is shown commenting on what she is doing in a way which is reminiscent of typical TV cooking programmes. Likewise, in this extract, Vera comments on the high quality of her cooking and recommends it with confidence accorded to her by her expert status and fluency in her native language.

However, very quickly, at the end of her turn, *she* becomes an onlooker. The presenter's (MN) evaluation of Vera's pasta in lines 8–10 is directed at the viewer, as is evidenced by both her verbal and non-verbal behaviour: she looks at the camera, away from Vera and speaks in English. As our comment in line 11 indicates, Vera loses her 'expert' status being left just watching the presenter and her crew (unseen by the audience) filming the rest of the scene. Vera becomes sidelined and forms a mere backdrop to the presenter's continued demonstration of the charms of Italian living.

Already in this extract, then, we see both the performance frame of the TV holiday programmes, in which the presenter tells the story of his/her holiday and enacts some 'live' interactions with hosts, but also the disattention to this performance frame and the enactment of a second stream of 'out-of-frame activity' (Goffman, 1974: 210). In the extract above, this is achieved by MN's disattending verbally and non-verbally to Vera, depriving her of the full *participation status* (Goffman, 1974: 224). Vera's role in lines 9–11 gains what Goffman calls the 'toy status, namely, the

as if in frame, an object to address, act to or comment on, but which is in fact out of frame (disattendable) in regard to its capacity to hear and talk' (1974: 224).

From an analytic point of view, we face a dilemma here. Why do the programme makers bother to introduce Vera as an 'expert' only to sideline her immediately. Given the constraints of the programme, they are unlikely to treat her as some kind of superfluous decoration or a participant to be simply ignored. What we would suggest, then, is that Vera acts as a 'vehicle' for injecting some local (linguistic) flavour authenticating the touristic experience of the presenter/viewer (see also below).

As we demonstrate throughout our analysis, this out-of-frame activity of orienting to the audience becomes more consequential to the achievement of the main goal of the holiday programmes, i.e. creating involvement with the audience. Even more importantly, it is also crucial to understanding the metalinguistic function of the 'foreign' languages in these encounters. In Extract 1, MN's overt orientation to the viewers starts in lines 1–4 with her voice overlaying images of Tuscan countryside and the hotel in which she is staying. The extract then shifts back to the performance frame (lines 5–6), in which Vera is centrally positioned as the expert in pasta-making explaining the process to the presenter (and by extension to the viewers). Finally, MN steps out of the performance frame (lines 8–10) by literally turning her back on Vera and orienting herself towards the camera/audience. (What cannot be conveyed by the transcript alone are the proxemics of this re-orientation to the TV viewers which, in lay or 'social' terms, are plain rude.) Clearly misjudging or misunderstanding her televisual role as human scenery, not unlike many other hosts in the extracts we have analysed, Vera is thereby doubly disempowered: first by being cast involuntarily in and out of frame by the presenter, but also by being seen to afford the presenter undue benefit of the doubt in terms of conversational relevance (Grice, 1975) having taken MN's interest in her work at face value.

Service Encounters

Service encounters (e.g. Aston, 1988; Ventola, 1987) are the next most common category of function identified in the data. Presenters are shown interacting with people such as local shopkeepers, market stall-holders, waiters and hotel staff. In the following extract, Jilly Goolden and her teenage daughter, Verity, go shopping for food at a market in France.

Extract 2 Holiday 2000, 28 November 2000 Jilly Goolden and daughter Verity in France

JG:	now what do you fancy?	1
VG:	(to vendor) je voudrais un kilo de tomates	2
	I'd like a kilo of tomatoes	
Vendor 1:	un kilo merci	3
	a kilo thank you	
	[ ]	
JG:	let's go and get cheese	4
Vendor 1:	merci	5
	thank you	

JG:	merci	6
	thank you	
JG:	loads of lovely French cheeses now (.)	7
	[	
VG:	smells gorgeous	8
JG:	what sort of cheese do you fancy?	9
	(vendor hands over cheese)	10
JG:	merci	11
	thank you	
Vendor 2:	voilà	12
	here you are	

In this extract, the presenter and her daughter are shown to interact as clients with the local vendors in service encounters, using brief, formulaic phrases in French. Interaction is minimal and the vendors appear as anonymous and fleetingly encountered servers/helpers on the tourists' journey across the country. The edited nature of the extract, which involves two service encounters in which goods are selected, accepted and paid for, lasts only 13 seconds. This makes the exchanges look even more brief but also more efficient and successful; use of the host language is made to look effortless and no real obstacle to buying food. Additionally, French adds local flavour and authenticity to this episode, even though it does not go beyond the most stereotypical foreign language textbook/tourist phrasebook repertoire.

A similar encounter, in which the desirability of the 'authentic' experience of buying local produce using a local language, and succeeding, is demonstrated in Extract 3, where Mary Nightingale tries out her Italian in a Tuscan delicatessen.

Extract 3 Wish You Were Here?, 26 February 2001 Mary Nightingale in Italy

MN:	(voiceover) the hotels provide packed lunches for around seven pounds	1
	but I think it's <u>much</u> more fun to go to a local shop (walks into a shop)	2
MN:	(to shop assistant) er prosciutto	3
	ham	
Assistant:	prosciutto (.) prosciutto della casa	4
	ham (.) *our speciality ham*	
	[ ]	
MN:	(hesitantly) si (nods) ((si)) ah (.) (voiceover) isn't that gorgeous	5
	yes *yes*	

Again, the use of the host language and interaction with the local shopkeeper are minimal. The presenter's use of Italian invites the shop assistant to use Italian in return, albeit in a simple repetition of the order (line 4). However, in a hesitant attempt at Italian (line 5), the presenter tries hard to maintain the travel frame in a combination of the most rudimentary linguistic skill articulating a singular *si* 'yes', followed by 'safe' or communicatively less entropic strategy of expressing sociability through non-verbal nodding. This is followed by a sudden switch to English voiceover, in which, not unlike the last two lines of Extract 1, the presenter (MN) acknowledges the superior quality of local produce for the benefit of the viewing public and not of the shopkeeper.

Phatic Communion

The third most common function of talk in these programmes is phatic communion – exchanges of 'mere sociabilities' and apparently 'purposeless expressions' (Malinowski, 1923: 150). This again is a type of interaction that tourists might typically be expected to engage in with hosts. Naturally, and as we have already indicated, many of the interactions in our corpus are multifunctional: our next example is no exception, where playful banter is seen woven into a service encounter.

Extract 4 Holiday 2001, 30 January 2001 Craig Doyle in Italy

CD:	(voiceover) the Italians are passionate about food and no one more so	1
	than Massimo one of Siena's larger than life grocers	2
M:	grande grande =	3
	large large	
CD:	= grande	4
	large	
M:	questo è pesto pesto genovese (.) guarda (picks up a packet of pasta)	5
	this is pesto pesto from Genoa (.) look	
	[	
CD:	si si pesto fresh tomatoes si	6
	yes yes pesto	7
	so I need these as well yeah (picks up a tray of blackberries)	8
M:	avanti	9
	let's go on	
CD:	oh yeah	10
M:	tomatoes dried si chiamano ciliegini (shows CD some dried tomatoes)	11
	they're called cherry tomatoes	
CD:	(points over M's shoulder) look at that out there (pops a tomato in his	12
	mouth with a look of mock guilt-cum-innocence)	13
	[	
M:	(looks away briefly)	14
CD:	grazie grazie (.) (CD pays)	15
	thank you thank you	
M:	a posto cosi	16
	anything else?	
CD:	ciche ciche cento	17
M:	no (.) ciche ciche ciu (.) ciao a presto (shakes hands with CD)	18
	bye see you soon	
	[	
CD:	ciao grazie	19
	bye thank you	
CD:	(walks out of shop; voiceover) thank you Massimo	20

Although CD's primary goal in this scene is to buy food for the meal he is going to cook later in the programme, the playful use of Italian and non-verbal behaviour by the presenter and the shopkeeper make it a fairly sociable occasion. They are not just buying and selling, respectively, but apparently having fun. Massimo is cast as an affable caricature of an Italian who is stereotypically

'passionate about food' (line 1). The playful and therefore phatic nature of this encounter is emphasised by CD's Italian–English code-mixing (line 6), mocking repetition of Massimo's utterances (lines 4, 6), and his uninhibited phonetic approximation of Italian regardless of whether it is 'correct' or not (line 17).

Massimo's role in this extract could be also construed as that of an 'expert' explaining/recommending his goods (e.g. lines 5, 11), but the jocular tenor of the interaction makes the propositional content of his talk secondary. For this reason, the Italian in this extract, as the host languages in Extracts 1–3, remains untranslated by the programme makers. What Massimo and CD say in Italian is not greatly relevant, and in CD's case not always 'correct' (line 18). In this moment, CD appears to be attempting to repeat a price given to him by Massimo but which has been edited out. The first part of Massimo's response (line 18) may be a teasing comment on CD's inability to articulate the Italian figure. From the pragmatic point of view, the main aim of this scene is to demonstrate to the viewers the 'ludic' potential of the local language – a sense of pleasurable, but somewhat derisory, play. Admittedly, many of the Italian expressions used in Extract 4 (as is the case with the French expressions in Extract 2) may be fairly easily recognisable to British viewers (e.g. *grande*, lines 3, 4; *avanti*, line 9; *grazie*, lines 15 and 19, and *ciao*, lines 18 and 19) but, again, these are largely politeness formulae which do not carry much semantic weight.

In the next extract, Ingrid Tarrant's exchange with the waiter, who brings her a drink to the poolside, is even more revealing in demonstrating the presenter-tourist's skeletal proficiency in the phatic use of the host language (Swahili):

Extract 5 Wish You Were Here?, 26 March 2001 Ingrid Tarrant in Kenya

(IT on poolside, waiter brings her an exotic looking drink)

Waiter:	jambo *hello*	1
IT:	jambo *hello*	2
Waiter:	our special (.) welcome [	3
IT:	oh asante sana (voiceover) cheers Chris *thank you very much*	4

Here, phatic communion, which is again embedded in a service encounter, is made manifest by the presenter's use of the most basic greeting and thanking formulae in Swahili. In this way, the viewing audience is reassured that a close encounter with a host, even in a most unfamiliar location, requires little more than a couple of routine, courtesy phrases to cope with a simple service transaction. As such, the ludic quality again emerges in the knowledge that, in such status-unequal interactions, no talk is strictly necessary – let alone in the potentially more effortful 'foreign' language.

The use of host languages for phatic communion in the holiday programmes does, of course, transcend the mutual displays of civility between tourists and hosts. When we consider the occurrence of such exchanges with the primary orientation to the audience, they become

characteristic unique to the travel destinations – 'local language'. For example, the interplay of host and audience orientation in Extract 6 makes it clear that the exchange of the Fijian greeting *bula* between the presenter, John Savident, and a local shopkeeper, is used only to invoke the sound of host language as part of the presenter's elaboration of his point about how 'friendly' Fijian people are.

Extract 6 Wish You Were Here?, 22 January 2001 John Savident in Fiji

(JS apparently wandering through a market place)

JS: away from the hotel the town of Nandi [sic] is just ten minutes away (.) 1
Fiji is such a friendly place and you're always greeted with a big smile 2
(cut to a woman smiling) and a call of ((BULA)) the local greeting 3
(to a street vendor) bula 4

Vendor: bula bula John (JS continues walking past her stall, laughs to her) how 5
are you bula bula la la la 6

In this example, both the presenter's and the local's use of Fijian is limited to a single greeting formula, mixed by the vendor with the English greeting 'how are you' (lines 5–6). Note that it is the host again, as in Extract 5, who switches to English, which subverts her role as a 'local' limited to speaking the local language. Interestingly, in an almost imperceptible televisual faux-pas, the vendor greets the presenter by his first name, which clearly indicates the rehearsed nature of this scripted encounter and suggests that the interaction is 'set up' for the sole purpose of 'staging' friendliness with the addition of the authentic feature: the Fijian greeting.

Naming and Translating

The Fijian location provides an example of the fourth main category of local language use – naming and translating. In this function, the local language is used to denote such things as local artefacts, dishes or place names. Extract 7 shows John Savident in the same piece providing names or labels for traditional housing and dress.

Extract 7 Wish You Were Here?, 22 January 2001 John Savident in Fiji

JS: (looks at camera) and just a shell's throw from the beach (.) your very own 1
((bure)) (points to a bungalow; 'ethnic' music plays in the background'; cut to a 2
camera pan of the inside) (1.0) (voiceover) a traditional thatched Fijian 3
bungalow (3.0) (shot of room in a bungalow) (walks on the beach) do you like 4
my sarong by the way? (.) here they're called (.) ((sulu)) 5

The above extract operates wholly as a direct address to the audience. The visual imagery of the bungalow and JS walking on the beach is accompanied by the sound of 'ethnic' music. Together with the mention of the two Fijian words (lines 2, 5), unlikely to be remembered by viewers, this scene creates an authentic and exoticised vision of the destination. But there is a paradox here. Apart from using 'strange' words, the same local concepts are also labelled with two, more easily recognisable terms: 'thatched bungalow' and 'sarong', and these acts of

naming also render the exotic more familiar, adding to the programme's construction of a holiday destination as simultaneously adventuresome and safe.

Extract 8 shows the presenter learning some useful phrases in Korean – translation equivalents of toasting formulae – with the help of a local couple. Here, the act of translating and invoking a local phrase is jointly performed by the presenter (CD) and one of his hosts (KK)

Extract 8 Holiday 2001, 20 February 2001 Craig Doyle in South Korea

CD:	so I met BBC correspondent Kevin ((Kin)) and his girlfriend ((Mirren))	1
	in one of the street bars where he introduced me to the local tipple soju	2
	which will be my reply next time I'm offered a glass	3
KK:	in the UK you say cheers in Korea you say ((gum-bae))	4
CD:	((gum-bae))	5
KK:	((gum-bae gum-bae::))	6

Sharing toasting formulae is an easily recognisable, phatic accompaniment to drinking in a linguistically mixed group and viewers are likely to find such behaviour unremarkable and possibly, even, familiar from their own experience. The use of a host language here, again, has the dual function of exoticising the destination while depicting a customary social situation.

At this point, and before we move on, we would like to note our intention *not* to promote an unduly sinister or one-sided agenda for the presenters. First, of course, they are themselves one of many agents in the production of these programmes, along with directors, editors, script-writers and so on. What is more, as we discuss in some detail elsewhere, there is undoubtedly a complex, complicitous relationship between tourists and hosts (Thurlow *et al.*, forthcoming). As such, to some extent at least, it is possible to view presenters and local people in the holiday programmes as being engaged in a kind of 'commercial' relationship. As Harvey (1992) notes from her own research, local people are rightly capable of exploiting the power of the media and it is not always possible to second-guess their 'political consciousness'. Nevertheless, as long as programme-makers and presenters hold ultimate editorial control, they continue to control the mechanisms of representation. As such, and in accordance with the fundamental principles of CLA, the resulting text is no accident, and the overall impression created an ideologically forceful one.

Metalinguistic and Metapragmatic Comments about Host Languages

One aspect of the direct address of the audience that merits separate discussion is that of metalinguistic and metapragmatic comments (henceforth 'metacomments') on the use and mention of host languages. So far our discussion of overt orientation to the audience has focused on the presenters' use of voiceover (e.g. Extracts 1, 3, 4, 5), body posture and looking at the camera (e.g. Extracts 1, 7), as well as editing of video footage to produce a quick succession of unconnected exchanges (e.g. Extracts 2, 4).

A close examination of some data extracts containing metacomments on host languages confirms that there is often an ulterior motive in their use in these programmes, and that it goes beyond the functions we have discussed so far. In fact, expert talk, service encounters, phatic communion and naming/translating in host languages, should be primarily considered in terms of their viewer-orientation. We have alluded to some of these functions above. In this section, we specify them in more detail according to the following overlapping themes: *having 'fun', out-grouping of hosts*, and *creating a linguascape of the travel destination.*

As we have already begun to show, the unquestionable and unsurprising message coming from all the holiday programmes is that holidays are 'fun'. Even if the educational aspect of travel is included in the programme (usually in very small doses), it is subordinate to the consumerist and hedonistic goals realised through attention to the tourist's comfort, efficiency of service, the pleasures of eating and drinking, shopping and generally engaging in all sorts of *fun* activities. In most of our examples (with the notable exception of Extract 12 below), the presenters are also shown having fun with host languages. It may not be everyone's idea of fun, but the message to the viewers is that managing simple interactions in host languages is not only possible but also rather pleasurable. Consider the following example, in which the presenter tries out a phrase she has presumably learnt from her phrase book (or her producer).

Extract 9 Wish You Were Here?, 22 January 2001 Lisa Riley in Spain

LR:	(voiceover) it's well worth taking a wander up the side streets off the square (camera on LR and friend) where you can find traditional tapas bars just like this one (points to bar) ((shall we take a look)) (LR walks to bar; to barman) hola me puedes dar la carta por favor? *hello can you give me the menu please?*	1 2 3 4
Barman:	(hands over menu) ((unclear))	5
LR:	gracias (to camera, cheerfully) been learning that all day (giggles) *thank you*	6

Although the presenter's comment in line 6 gives the impression of the host language as being 'difficult', her cheerful tone and the giggling suggest a degree of pleasure in using Spanish, and succeeding in achieving the transactional goal of the utterance (requesting and receiving the menu). Arguably, LR uses an otherwise inappropriate, familiar address-form (i.e. second-person *tu* rather than third person *Usted*), which may again betray the prior, off-screen interaction needed to stage the scene as a spontaneous encounter. Nevertheless, picking up a formula in a foreign language is construed as an enjoyable accomplishment, which despite its rote learning and limited scope, gives the speaker a sense of fluency in L2 (Coulmas, 1981; Wray, 2002).

As we noted at the beginning of the paper, an important function of metalanguage includes making judgements or expressing attitudes towards the speakers of different accents, dialects or languages, which serves the purpose of drawing social boundaries between 'self' and 'other', reinforcing similarities and differences, respectively. In our analyses thus far, we have also pointed to the inclusion

and exclusion by presenters of local people from the performance frame. Indeed, the idea of 'othering' of local people in tourist destinations is not new (for overviews see, e.g. Morgan & Pritchard, 1998; Thurlow *et al.*, forthcoming). In this paper we prefer to use the term out-grouping, since, in the context of the holiday programmes, hosts are usually portrayed superficially and tokenistically (Jaworski *et al.*, 2003) but usually without the baggage of pejoration, marginalisation, homogenisation and de-authentication typically associated with 'othering' (Coupland, 1999). After all, the primary message of the holiday programmes is that the holiday destinations are 'safe', and so are their hosts.

Linguistically, the out-grouping of hosts in the holiday programmes is achieved through metacomments drawing the viewers' attention to the fact that host languages are incomprehensible and that they require translation.

Extract 10 Holiday 2000, 21 November 2000 Kate Silverton in Spain

	(KS sitting at a beach bar)	
KS:	(receives a drink from the barman) oh gracias what do **you** *thank you*	1
	recommend I have for lunch now?	2
Barman:	sardinas ((al espeto)) *barbecued sardines*	3
KS:	(cut to grilled sardines on a skewer; soft voiceover) that's barbecued	4
	sardines to you and I (to barman) is that what everybody does on the	5
	beach?	6
Barman:	mainly yeah (.) there's about a hundred of these beach bars and	7
	they all do that	8
KS:	and they're called?	9
Barman:	chiringuitos there's friendly atmosphere on the beach nice	10
	restaurant fresh air from the sea	11
KS:	I think I'll have the (.) sardines	12
Barman:	(to chef off camera) ((UN ESPETO)) POR FAVOR *one barbecued sardines, please*	13
Chef:	(still off camera) HASTA *coming right up*	14

Following the barman's naming of a local dish, the presenter uses voiceover to translate the name of the dish for the viewers (lines 4–5), which, as noted before, explicitly shifts the orientation of the presenter to the viewers. Additionally, the soft voice creates an aura of confidential, secretive communication as if to exclude the host from this communication (which obviously is the case). Besides, the presenter's comment 'to you and I' (line 5), overtly separates the barman, and by implication all other hosts, from the community of actual and implied (British) tourists.

This example is certainly not unique. The following extract includes a similar use of translation and an in-grouping/out-grouping comment.

Extract 11 Wish You Were Here?, 22 January 2001 Lisa Riley in Spain

LR:	(voiceover) there's more to Marbella than sun glitz and glamour (.)	1
	take a short stroll up from the main street and you'll find the old town	2

–	(2.0) this beautiful quarter is centred around the Plaza de Naranjos	3
. . . .	(camera on sign) orange square to you and me	4

Although the last two examples suggest some difficulty in understanding local place names or reading local menus, they are resolved positively by the presenters/tourists finding out their meanings (even though if it is only the approximate meaning as evidenced in Extract 11, line 4 – *naranjos* translating as 'orange trees', not 'oranges' or the colour orange). Again, there is a ludic promise of coping with, but also playing with, host languages and, by implication, local people and culture more generally.

In the next extract, however, the incomprehensibility of the host language is posed as a more serious problem.

Extract 12 Holiday 2001, 23 January 2001 Kevin Duala in Italy

KD:	(voiceover) but Turin hasn't needed to chase the tourist lira (.) it was a	1
	wealthy city especially in 1861 when Turin became the first capital of	2
	the new united Italy (.) Palazzo Real was the official residence of their	3
	first king (shot of Palazzo Real's decorative ceiling, cut to a group of	4
	tourists with a guide speaking Italian, cut to KD speaking to camera with	5
	mock horror intonation and facial expression) the entire tour is in Italian	6
	but you've got to book on the tour to get in (1.0) (glances at guide) I	7
	can't understand a word (to camera) no capito (gesticulates 'no')	8
	I don't understand	

In Extract 12, the guide's talk (untranscribed here, see line 5) is portrayed as truly 'incomprehensible', as the presenter's metapragmatic comments (lines 7–8) reveal that his competence in Italian does not go beyond the level of phrasebook expressions such as *no capito*. The presenter's paralinguistic and non-verbal behaviour also communicates an aura of disbelief at how tourists can be made to do something as useless as joining a guided tour in a language they do not understand. The relational aspect of this example, such as seeking sympathy with the viewers, emphasises the sense of solidarity and in-groupness among the tourists (the presenter and the implied tourists at home) in the face of irrational and unaccommodating hosts.

What is also really apparent from Extract 12, is how the use of Italian by the expert host is presented as meaningless babble; it is in this way that the 'foreign' language is thereby rendered an untranslated linguascape. In fact, one of the most successful ways in which out-grouping is achieved in these holiday travel programmes is through the general disattention to the languages of hosts and their relegation to mere backdrop. Even in Extract 10 above, for example, both the presenter's and the local person's use of Spanish politeness formulae (lines 1, 14) and the naming of a local dish (lines 3, 10) again also serve to create a linguascape.

Although British holiday programmes position English as the international medium of communication (see Jaworski *et al.*, 2003), host languages are used frequently to authenticate holiday destinations in the same way as, for example, the shots of local people and scenery; sampling, descriptions and evaluations of local food and drink; and references to the places' history and customs. In this

sense, host languages create 'linguascapes', together with other uses of the soundtrack, for example, when 'ethnic' music is played (cf. Extract 7), or when in an episode from Egypt, a wall covered with the hieroglyphics in an ancient tomb is accompanied by music from the film *Raiders of the Lost Ark*. In the following extract, French is used phatically between the presenter and a group of local people (lines 6–8), but the subsequent voiceover by the presenter (lines 8–9) again reframes it as linguascape.

Extract 13 Holiday 2000, 14 November 2000 Craig Doyle in Mauritius

CD:	(to camera; walks along the buffet table with chefs preparing and	1
	serving dinner) so what we have tonight is Indian food with a little	2
	twist of Mauritian we've got tuna kebabs there and a bit of roast	3
	deer leg with spices being sliced we've got some pancakes being	4
	made (.) an:d lots of spices and coconut being sprinkled on	5
	(to the chefs behind the serving table) bonsoir	6
	good evening	
Various voices:	(softly) bonsoir	7
CD:	bonsoir (cut to Mauritian landscape; voiceover) yes don't let the	8
	fried rice and fish curry let you forget that this is a French	9
	speaking island	10

The greeting exchange in French is clearly initiated by CD for the benefit of the viewers to 'warn' them that the apparent familiarity of the cuisine associated with the Indian subcontinent, and its widespread use of English, does not bring the promise of English being a 'safe' medium of communication in Mauritius.

Importantly, this use of sound-bursts (as opposed to snapshots) to create an aural backdrop or 'linguascape', begins to reveal a far more multi-sensory tourist landscape – something which, as we noted earlier, has traditionally been overlooked in theoretical discussions of tourism (see Franklin & Crang, 2001). In the remaining part of the paper, we develop this analysis further, dividing discussion into two parts: first, we review and elaborate on the significance of the use of host languages in the holiday programmes and in the domain of tourism in general; second, we offer an interpretation of the data in the light of a broader sociolinguistic framework of language 'crossing' (Rampton, 1995).

Host Languages: Linguascaping the Exotic in Tourism

In all of the above examples, whether presenters' explicit metacomments are present or not, the performance frame, in which the presenters narrate their experiences and engage with the hosts, appears to be subservient to their orientation to the TV audience. Performing phrasebook dialogues, offering translations, providing local terminology, and so on, not only make host languages accessible but also help the viewers to familiarise themselves with the destination as a whole. At the same time, the use of host languages serves to create a more authentic atmosphere in the holiday programmes and thus contributes to the entertainment aspect of the programmes. I

another form of 'fun' activity on a par with trying different local culinary specialities or learning new skills such as sailing, horse-riding, skiing and so on. Although host languages are sometimes portrayed as being difficult to learn or impossible to understand, trying them out in different situations is seen to be enjoyable.

Overall, in the TV travel programmes examined in this study, the use of local languages is quite limited. Certainly, this could partly be explained by the short duration of the coverage of any one destination, which is commonly in the order of three to six minutes (Rice, 2001); it may also be due to the linguistic profile of viewers. The functions for which local languages are used in these programmes are also limited, centring around expert talk, service encounter talk, phatic communion and naming/translating – all types of interaction that a tourist might expect to have on holiday.

As we have discussed them, holiday programmes as a genre are inherently instances of performance. It is also important to remember that TV holiday programmes, although providing viewers with information about particular travel destinations, are broadcast at peak family viewing times and hence also have the function of entertainment. It is this underlying viewer orientation in production values which persists in the use and representation of local languages. Doug Hammond, Executive Producer of *Wish You Were Here?*, has been quoted as saying, 'If the audience is not entertained, there will be no audience' (Rice, 2001: 7). Arguably, in this sense, TV travel programmes constitute a cultural product which is designed to be consumed regardless of whether viewers actually intend to travel to the destinations covered. However, as Rice (2001: 6) reminds us, it is also true to say that the programmes 'play a crucial role in both influencing us about our holiday choices and showing us aspects of life in other countries'. Representations of local people and their language(s) are therefore important considerations in revealing their ideological bases in terms of intercultural/international communication.

In addition, the frame of the TV screen is also indicative of the ideological frame surrounding tourism more generally. Urry suggests that the 'frame' through which tourists experience their holidays, 'the hotel window, the car windscreen or the window of the coach ... can now be experienced in one's own living room' (Urry, 2002: 90–91). According to Urry, Feifer's (1995) so called 'post-tourist' 'does not have to leave his or her house to see many of the typical objects of the tourist gaze' (2002: 90). Moreover, in the TV travel programmes, the tourist destinations are mediated through a consistently anglophone lens, made safe and accessible by being translated – thus Cronin's (2000: 95) observation once again that, for speakers of powerful languages, 'the other is always already translated'. Generally, hosts in the tourist destinations are shown to speak English and, when the presenters do use other languages, it tends to be to enhance the entertainment level for the television viewer rather than to serve any other communicative need. As such, the ethos of the programmes positions English as a global language and British (native) speakers of English as global, or at least globe-trotting, citizens. Local languages, meanwhile, are reduced to the status of rubber-stamp phrases from guidebook glossaries, co-opted for the staging and authenticating of unproblematised, exoticised linguascapes. This is the aural equivalent of precisely

the kinds of 'mediatized motifs' and 'key exoticisms' which Edensor (2001: 67) highlights in his discussion of visual performance in tourism; as he suggests, 'through the use of such 'scenography' the tourist gaze is directed away from extraneous chaotic elements, reducing visual and functional forms to a few images'.

Host Languages: Crossing and a Community of British-International Tourists

We have already suggested that by using a variety of languages in holiday programmes, presenters can demystify holiday destinations and reassure the implied tourists that language is not necessarily an obstacle to successful travel. Host languages add exotic flavour to the destination and can be used with relative ease to get things done (e.g. facilitating service encounters, as in Extracts 2, 3), or to have fun with, or to poke fun at, local people (e.g. while socialising, in Extract 8). And, in the worst possible scenario, if a host language *is* a problem, it, and its speakers, can simply be ignored (Extract 12). There is, however, also a relational aspect involved here as well. The presenters in the programmes are cast in a kind of two-fold tourist role: both as tourists in their own right (thus 'presenter-tourist') and as role-models or proxies for 'viewer-tourists' – a kind of Every Tourist or 'tourist-tourist'. Through participating in various holiday activities, the presenters' main allegiance is to the viewers, not hosts, and all that we see them do in the programmes, including 'conversing' in host languages, is geared towards creating a sense of involvement with and for the viewers – what in media psychology would be referred to as a parasocial relationship (Rubin *et al.*, 1985).

In her study of the use of 'mock Spanish' by Anglo-Americans in the United States, for example, Hill (1998/2001) demonstrates how apparently jocular incorporations and ungrammatical approximations of languages other than English are employed by non-native speakers. Following Ochs' (1990) earlier notion of 'direct indexicality' (i.e. the production of non-referential meanings), Hill argues that playful, flippant snatches of, in her case, Spanish-language materials, serve to elevate the identities (or 'Whiteness') of Anglo-Americans. To our mind, therefore, and extending our earlier discussion about out-grouping/in-grouping, much the same argument may be made for the use of phrasebook expressions by presenter-tourists and the general linguascaping of the tourist landscape; in this case, however, it is the elevation and constitution of a *Britishness* which is at stake.

In fact, we would like to argue that TV holiday programmes' main aim is to create for the viewers a sense of belonging to a *community of (international-British) tourists*, and that this is achieved largely through the presenters' specific exploitation of the sociolinguistic resource known as 'crossing' (see Rampton, 1995, 1998, 1999), which is the use of a language (or variety) of a group which the speaker cannot legitimately claim membership of.

As far as our data are concerned, all uses of host languages by the holiday programme presenters fit many of Rampton's defining characteristics of, and explanations for, crossing. In these terms, therefore, our data may be recontextualised in the following ways.

- Crossing occurs or results in liminal or liminoid (Turner, 1977) moments and activities, i.e. when routine expectations about the flow of events is suspended – holidays (represented in our data as 'holiday programmes') are a liminal/liminoid activity *par excellence* in taking tourists to a world beyond the ordinary world (Selwyn, 1996; Urry, 2002); they usually involve the suspension of everyday norms of behaviour (dress, cf. Extract 7, eating and drinking habits, cf. Extract 8; daily routine, sexual behaviour, communicative patterns, etc.).
- Crossing occurs in the context of ritual and performance art – holiday programmes are media performances staged for mass audiences; they involve scripted, fairly routine accounts of the experiences of travel.
- Crossing occurs at peripheral stages of interaction requiring negotiation of participants' status – most interactional code-crossing in the holiday programmes involves greeting, parting and other politeness formulae in service encounters or in phatic communion; even though status roles in these encounters are seldom ambiguous, crossing may be used as a means for the presenter to assert or reclaim status.
- Crossing occurs in games, which suspend everyday rules and constraints of interaction – playful interactions with hosts in a host language require the adoption of new rules and lengthy preparation (cf. 'been learning that all day', Extract 12, line 6).
- In contrast to in-group code-switching, which is largely unexceptional and unremarkable to the social actors in everyday situations, out-group code-crossing 'is much more likely to be 'flagged' (for example, 'marked by pauses, hesitation phenomena, repetition and metalinguistic commentary', Romaine, 1988: 141)' (Rampton, 1995: 282) – instances of host language use in the holiday programmes are frequently brought to such prominence, especially through metacomments (cf. Extracts 9–12);
- Due to its de-routinisation and the effect of incongruity that crossing may have on some participants, it requires extra inferential work – the uses of host languages transcend their propositional meaning, their main inferential value lying in invoking the images of authenticity and exoticisation on the one hand, and familiarity and trust in a holiday destination on the other;
- Crossers' proficiency (spoken or listening) in the semantico-referential dimension of the out-group language may be quite minimal – in the holiday programmes presenters often display minimal knowledge of host languages (cf. 'no capito', Extract 12, line 8).
- Minimal significance of the propositional content in code-crossing finds compensation in the greater significance of the expressive meaning, which may be augmented, for example, by music – holiday programmes use host languages alongside with music and other incidental noises to create the kind of linguascapes described above (see line 2, Extract 7).

If our characterisation of host language use by the holiday programme presenters as crossing is right, this has certain consequences for how we characterise

the orientation of the presenters to their hosts (into whose languages they cross), and the TV audience (for whom they do the crossing). In this sense, our examples of crossing also evoke Bell's (1999) notion of 'referee design', by which he means style-shifting in the direction of linguistic forms associated with a group different from that of the speaker *and* addressee. What is more, this group is often also absent from the communicative situation. One especially pertinent example discussed by Bell is the use of a Mâori song *Pôkarekare Ana* in two Air New Zealand TV commercials. In one of the commercials, the song provides most of the sound and verbal track as background to the rich and varied visual imagery including Mâori people as the exponents of the New Zealand nation, middle-class Pakeha (i.e. of European descent) New Zealanders in the context of international travel (e.g. at airports), New Zealand scenery and birdlife. With a voiceover in English, the song is performed in Mâori, which is a non-native and an out-group language to both the performers (including the opera singer Kiri te Kanawa) and the target audience for the TV commercial (middle-class Pakeha New Zealanders). Mâori therefore functions in the TV commercial as a symbol of New Zealand national uniqueness and identity, but paradoxically, the cultural imagery and linguistic association is that with a marginalised, othered ethnic minority with whom the performers of the song (and implicitly the makers of the ad) and the target audience, do not identify.

We find a number of analogies between the use of Mâori in the Air New Zealand adverts analysed by Bell, and the use of host languages in our holiday programmes. As we have already emphasised, the interactions with hosts (in English or host languages) are presenters' performances for the target audience of largely monolingual TV audience in Britain. This renders hosts the absent reference group in Bell's sense. They become a snapshot, part of the tourist's narrative about their travels, places seen, people met, and activities performed. This is where tourist gaze becomes tourist haze: the remembering and the telling of tourist narratives. Just as tourist stories are predominately aimed at 'the folks back home', when British TV presenters report from a 'foreign' country, they report back to the British viewers – both as audience and as 'fellow nationals'.

The use of host languages, together with the imagery of hosts and the scenery of the destination produces short, condensed representations of a destination's 'essence', and gives an impression of its accessibility, but the presenters embrace the identities of the hosts only playfully, in short, 'as if' moments, never claiming a new national identity. This point is also consistent with Rampton's view of the way crossing among British, 'multi-ethnic' adolescents affects locally construed identities in talk:

> First, the intimate association with liminality meant that crossing never actually claimed that the speaker was 'really' black or Asian – it didn't ... imply that the crosser could move unproblematically in and out of the friends' heritage language in any new kind of open bicultural code-switching. Second, crossing's location in the liminoid margins of interactional and institutional space implied that in the social structures which were dominant and which adolescents finally treated as *normal*, the boundaries round ethnicity were relatively fixed. (Rampton, 1998: 300)

By appropriating host languages, the presenters in the holiday programmes never claim to be 'really' French, Italian, Kenyan, or Fijian. On the contrary, more often than not, they emphasise their difference from their hosts. For example, by often sending themselves up as incompetent host language speakers they position themselves firmly as *British* tourists. Different from the hosts and similar to the (implied) tourists in front of the TV screens, their ultimate aim is to create a sense of community of (British- international) tourists with their viewers. Through these programmes, and venturing into host languages, they reassure their compatriots about the safety of foreign travel in these destinations: they can remain British even outside of Britain, finding 'home away from home'. Using host languages may be useful and fun, but only the low-level proficiency required on holiday does not threaten anyone to having to become 'someone else'. Just as Rampton talks about crossing creating new cross-ethnic patterns of identification, we regard crossing in the holiday programmes as creating new cross-national or inter-national allegiances, which allow one to maintain a preferred national identity while momentarily venturing outside of one's own national boundary. Even if one ends up in Italy, France, Kenya or Fiji, becoming Italian, French, Kenyan or Fijian is no more than an optional pretend play.

Conclusion

> When tourists enter particular stages, they are usually informed by pre-existing discursive, practical, embodied norms which help guide their performative orientations and achieve a working consensus about what to do. (Edensor, 2001: 71)

In this paper, and returning to Goffman, we have been concerned with the theatrical scripting of tourism both in terms of the everyday performances of host-tourist interaction and the more stylised, deliberate stagings of the tourism industry. In the holiday travel programmes, presenters are clearly both performer and casting director; where they inevitably cast themselves in the lead role, local people are invariably cast as either chorus/extras or understudies. Together with the programme makers (e.g. directors, editors, script-writers), it is the presenters who get to change and choose participant alignments and status. Local people have little control over their own subject-positioning or footing, and the ground is constantly changed for them as they are shifted from participant to object and back again. Again in Goffman's (1981) terms, theirs is truly 'subordinated communication' – in an interactional sense and also in a sociopolitical sense. In fact, within the framework of CLA, what is even more noteworthy is the underlying promotion of the presenter-tourist as a kind of tourist role-model, effectively saying, 'Here's how we celebrity Brits do tourism; these are the places to go, these are the things to do, these are the ways to be a tourist'. As viewer-tourists, we are thereby encouraged to subscribe to the kind of scripted performances shown us by presenter-tourists, and we are also invited to improvise and play at the expense of local people.

While the staging of encounters in tourism is by no means new to academic perspectives, what we are looking to do here is to approach this issue from the specialised perspective of language and communication. In particular, what our analysis shows is how language comes to be ritualised and commodified in tourism performances – what Jack and Phipps (2002) refer to as the 'languaging and translating' of the tourist landscape. By referring to linguascapes and linguascaping, however, we mean also to reveal the very particular deployment and devaluing of local languages as both backdrop and ludic resource.[5] It is in this way, that, as powerful ideological mediators, TV holiday programmes and their style-setting presenters promote a regime of touristic and intercultural truth about local languages which construct subjectivities for hosts and identities for viewers (cf. Foucault, 1980; Mellinger, 1994). Specifically, host languages are appropriated as a primary identity resource by which visitors may construct themselves as tourists. Furthermore, it is through their playful, transient crossings into local languages that they further position themselves as 'cosmopolitan internationals' – not in the sense of their being culturally engaged with, or embracing of, local people (cf. Hannerz, 1996), but rather with repect to their appeals to the elite caché of global citizenship.[6] These are people freely traversing national boundaries but staying firmly rooted in their mutual identification as (British) nationals.

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Notes

1. We recognise that a term like 'host' is inherently problematic and makes assumptions about (a) the relative power status of local people and their motivation to entertain, and (b) the homogeneity of inhabitants who may or may not be native/local and whose role-identities will inevitably vary. We are also not completely happy with the disparaging connotation of 'locals' – itself susceptible to the same homogenising assumption. However, with its apt dual-meaning of a parasitic or symbiotic life-source, we have chosen to retain the label 'host' and to use 'local' only as a premodifier and not in its nominalised form.
2. Holiday destinations featured in the programmes used: UK (16), Spain (14), Caribbean (11), Italy (9), France (8), USA (6), Greece (5), Eire (3), Portugal (3), Austria (2), Canada (2), Egypt (2), Germany (2), Hong Kong (2), Maldives (2), South Africa (2), Australia (1), Cyprus (1), Dubai (1), Ecuador (1), Fiji (1), Finland (1), India (1), Kenya (1), Malta (1), Mauritius (1), Mexico (1), Netherlands (1), South Korea (1), Sweden (1), Switzerland (1), Thailand (1), Turkey (1).
3. Performance as metaphor has become a central point of discussion in critical tourism writing, taking its cue from the early work of MacCannell (1973) (see also Crang, 1997; Edensor, 2001).

4. The extracts were transcribed using a simplified version of Jefferson's (1984/1999) transcription conventions for spoken data. The following conventions were used:
   [(square bracket) – overlapping speech;
   = (equal sign) – contiguous speech;
   underline – emphatic speech;
   CAPS – louder than normal voice/shouting;
   : (colon or double colon) – lengthening;
   (.) – short pause;
   (smiles) – nonverbal and other contextual information;
   ((unclear)) – unclear speech, uncertain transcription.
5. The underlying message this sends to viewers about the value of learning foreign languages is, at best, ambiguous and, at worst, deleterious.
6. Our argument about appeals to global/globe-trotting citizenship is developed further in Thurlow and Jaworski (2004, in press), together with the notion of 'new internationalities' discussed in Jaworski and Thurlow (submitted).

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38

Notes on 'Latency' in Overlap Onset

Gail Jefferson

Introduction

This will be in part a recapitulation and in part an extension of some of the work I did during my two years at the Katholieke Hogeschool Tilburg, exploring the orderliness of overlapping talk. I had been interested in overlap for a long time, and had been noticing evidence of its orderliness. But I had been looking at a few striking, indicative cases. At Tilburg I worked with a mass of materials in which overlap, in one form or another, occurred.

One immediate payoff was this: In the past I had noticed that not *all* overlap was a matter of 'people just not listening to each other', a messy chaotic business, but to the contrary, that it *could*, at least now and then, here and there, be a matter of fine-grained attention. But I'd had no idea just how massively overlap is associated with such attention. In the apparent chaos of overlapping talk, I began to locate a series of systematicities which collected and ordered an enormous amount of material.

I'll be talking about one of those: Transition-space onset.

1. Transition-Space Onset

Looking at talk which might well be characterized as someone starting up 'interruptively', i.e., in the midst of another's utterance, I found again and again that the places at which such talk started were perfectly reasonable 'completion' points.

The overlap could then be seen as a byproduct of two activities: (1) A recipient reasonably, warrentedly treats some current utterance as complete, 'transition ready', and starts to talk, while (2) the current speaker, perfectly within his rights, keeps going.

Source: *Human Studies* vol. 9, 1986, pp. 153–183.

I located a series of 'positions' across the transition space, and I'll just show a few cases of each; an instance of clean transition, and then a couple of instances of overlap.

Possible Completion Onset

1.1 [NB:II:3:R:1]
Emma : G'morning Letitia =
Lottie : = u-hHow'r YOU:. =
Emma : = FI:NE

The equal signs are marking a particular sort of relationship of one utterance to another: an absolute adjacency; immediately as one ends, the other begins.

And it turns out that a great deal of overlap can be seen to be a byproduct of a recipient starting just upon possible completion, with the current speaker going on. I've picked out a few cases in which it seems to me the recipient has particularly good warrant to treat an utterance as completed or transition-ready.

And the overlap can be minimal and unproblematic, as in the following two cases.

1.2 [GTS:I:1:43:R]
Roger : Y'probly ev nutt'na do wih those people.
Louise : Hm:?
→ Roger : Probly ev nothing tuh do with those p*eop*le.
: [huh.]
→ Louise : [I d] o:n't.

The 'particularly good warrant' in this case is that the utterance in question is a repeat of a prior. It turns out to be repeat plus a bit more.

1.3 [MDE:60-1:6:1]
Sheila : Hello:?
Harriet : Hello is Lila home?
Sheila : nNo she's no:t. She:'s et school.
Harriet : Yeh d'you know what time she'd be back in t'day?
(0.2)
Sheila : Zis Harriet?
Harriet : Yeah.
→ Sheila : Hi Harriet. [Uh about fi:ve.
→ Harriet : [Hi:.

And of course the warrant in this case has to do with a 'greeting' as a prototypical adjacency-pair first pair-part, where it's not only that such an object has powerful relevance for a next action, but that having done one, its producer has a certain obligation to permit that next action to occur.

Let me just note that the minimal, unproblematic character of the overlap in this case may not be accidental. Given the relevant identities of these people; that they are connected by the absent Lila, Sheila being Lila's mother, Harriet Lila's

girlfriend, Sheila may be able to project a 'no-name' greeting from Harriet, where 'Hi Sheila' would be too informal for these persons on this occasion, but 'Hi Missiz Lorenzo' would be too formal; the solution, then, a 'Hi' and no more.

So these overlaps occurring at possible completion can be minimal, perhaps achievedly so. But they can become more florid. Again, here are a couple of cases where I take it that the recipient has particularly good warrant to treat an utterance as completed or transition-ready.

1.4 [SBL:3:3:R:5]
→ Milly : O:kay that's all ah wan'duh know
[I thought it w]z mu] c h]
→ Keith : [Y a h w' l
w e w e don' know how much is
↑in:↓come h*ere though,

Somehow 'Okay that's all I wanted to know' has a strong sense of finality about it. But, no, one can perfectly well go on with more.

The last fragment in this little set is another one of those prototypical adjacency-pair first pair-parts, 'How are you?' In this case the one asking the question goes on to produce a candidate answer.

1.5 [Her:0II:2:7:5:R]
Doreen : Yes well pop in on th'way back'n pick it up
Katie : °Thhank you ve 'y much° eh ha-how are you ↓all.
→ [Yer a l]ittle ti:red °nah°
→ Doreen : [Oh wir] all fi:ne, Yes I'm jus: sohrta clearing up

We can note the reasonableness of such further talk for such an item as 'How are you?' That is, it is in the first place merely a pro-forma question which recurrently gets just the sort of pro-forma answer it gets here, 'Fine.' The additional material here provides that there was a bit more to the question than that.

I'll just quickly go through two more positions in the transition space, again showing a case of clean transition, and then a few in which there is overlap, both minimal and more florid. These next two positions entail a slight incursion into the utterance in progress.

Terminal Onset

1.6 [Fr:USI:99:R:2]
((Vic has just accused Mike of having made a statement that 'came from an attitude.' This idiom rather defies translation; suffice it to say it's not a good thing.))
Mike : ↑Din' come f'm'n ↓atti↑too:d? (.) °↑Don'tell me it came↑ f'm 'n ↑atti↓tood.°
(.)
→ Vic : °I ↓came fum↓ en a:ttit[0)°
→ Mike : [Ah ha:h.
↳ Carol : [°Ehka:v.°

I show this particular case because it has two people starting up 'there'. And somehow I find it useful for, in the first place proposing that it *is* a 'there', to have such consensus.

1.7 [Her:I:11:10]
Norma : Oh: yes cz Mi:n:x now is (.) three:: (0.3) three pou:nds
→ eleve [n. ou:nc [es,
→ Doreen : [Ye:s, [Ye:s,

1.8 [NB:IV:1:R:1]
Emma : W't time yih haftih go e:eleven?
(1.2)
→ Lottie : ↓No:: abah a quarduh twe:l [ve twenny] minnis t'twelve.
→ Emma : [O h : :]

1.9 [Rah:B:2:(14):10:R]
((re. why Vera's visiting grandchildren didn't want any lunch.))
Vera : ·h they muucked intuh biscuits. They had (.) quite a lotta
→ biscuit [s'n che] e e ↓ : : : s e,
→ Jenny : [Oh : :] well thaht's it th] en

1.10 [JG:I:8:3]
Marge : Well so anyway I certainly hope thatchu would go with
→ hi [m:beec– hh·hh
→ Colin : [Yeah well tuh tell tell'm [ah'm–
Marge : [BECAUSE HE ha:s already
arranged uhr a h-room up there so I know thetchu'd have a place tih sta:y.

'Last-Item' Onset

1.11 [Her:01:2:2]
→ Jean : So well they won't be here Boxing [Day?
→ Doreen : [Oh ↓ well that
doesn'mattuh

1.12 [SCC:DCD:23]
Sokol : Ah'll tell you'ow she does i:t? ·hhh That's oll sewn
→ tihgethuh by [hay:nd.
→ Bryant : [I thought this wz a very expensive (business)
I, I see [this.
Sokol : [°Yeh.°

1.13 [GTS:I:1:68:R:4]
→ Roger : u-But heck I do the same damn [t h i n g] buh–
→ Louise : [↑Oh ev'ry] b'ddy does
s'sa°↓:me th [ing.°
Roger : [Bud yers wz pretty obvhhi(h)ou:s heh

Note that the overlap in this case is resolved by the current speaker dropping out; i.e., it is not in the first place 'minimal' in the sense that some of the others are.

I've been trying to show very simple cases. I'll just show one – another case of overlapped 'last-item' onset – in which the phenomenon is not so obvious. As it happens, a recipient is 'interrupting' an 'if-then' formatted statement which eventually, after several rounds, turns out to be '. . . if it quiets one thing maybe it quiets . . . your whole . . . gastric . . . kind of business.' What may be happening here is that the recipient is utilizing a simpler version, 'If it quiets one thing it quiets everything,' for which, then, she is starting up at the projected 'last-item'.

1.14 [SBL:2:1:8:R:5]
Bea: VERY often u-*u:: anything thet's given to yuh to:: qhuiet things do:wn quiets mo:re then you wah:nt.
· ((ca. 8 lines omitted))
·
Nora : Well I spoze it does if it quiets one thing maybe it
→ quiet[s yer
→ Bea : [uSURE]ly. [E V RY t h u] EVRY thi:ng.
Nora : [yer w h o :l] e
(0.4)
Nora : who::le gas-s-tric
(0.6)
Bea : E[v– eh–
Nora : [kind'v]business.
Bea : Ev↑rythi:ng. Uh ha:h

So there is this phenomenon: Transition-space onset, speaker continuation, resulting in overlap, it is massively present; obviously so in many cases, more obscurely in others.

This is not to say that *all* cases of overlap are accountable in that way. People do, for various reasons, start up before a current utterance is anywhere near completed or transition-ready. I'll just show a few cases of these. I tried to find a neutral term for them and came up with 'interjacent' onset.

2. Interjacent Onset

2.1 [GTS:I:1:44:R:2-3]
Louise : That's FI:VE TE:N? en tha:t's six foot two:?
(0.2)
→ Louise : 'N how t[all u h r] you ↓A:]l,
→ Roger : [How tall'r] ↓you Al.]
(0.7)
Louise : ih[↑hhuh]↑hu]
Al : [I'm fi]:ve]seven,

2.2 [MDE:60-1:3:1-2]
Sheila : What time did'e get on the plane

Tom : Uh::: (0.2) I: don't know exactly I think ih wz arou:nd
three uh'clo:ck er something a'that sort.
(0.2)
→ Sheila : Oh: maybe he g[o t s'm
→ Tom : [He took it] et fou:r. **Gerda says.**

2.3 [SBL:2:2:3:R:38]
Zoe : an' he sorta ↓scares me,h
Amy : Have you seen im?
Zoe : ·hhh We:ll I(m) I've °↓met eem,°
→ Amy : ·hhhhh W'l *uh actually:
→ Zoe : [when s h e's
[En the way th] e:y ↓pla:y. Oh–:
(.)
Amy : Serious huh?
Zoe : ·h ↑Y-ah,

2.4 [NB:II:4:R:16]
Nancy : He's jist a ri:l sweet GU↓*:y. ·h ·t[·hhhhh
Emma : [↑WONder↓f*ul.
→ Nancy : ↑So: we w'r[s*itting in
→ Emma : [Y E R LIFE] is CHANG[ing
Nancy : [↑↑EEYE::A:H

Among the cases I had stuck together as 'interjacent onset', I had a subset that I was calling 'post continuation onset'. In these, a recipient would start up just after the current speaker had produced a clear indication of going on, following a possible completion. Here are a few of these.

2.5 [SBL:3:1:R:6]
Amy : all thetu stuff Maryou:? requires a lo:↑tta spa↓*:ce.
→ Ah me[a:n][i h]·hhh
→ Marylou : [Spe] [cially] if yer gonna have it open fuh the
public,

2.6 [Fr:GS:4]
Mary : hn (h)he shiz we:ll, (0.5) u-ghesshu get ha:lf
→ en[I sid I GET M O]RE THEN H(h)ALF
→ Sue : [Wuh year wuzit?]

2.7 [SCC:DCD:26]
Bryant : that brai:ding that wouldn't of bean touched with'n
→ i:yn. The m[o:st we'd of done]
→ Sokol : [O h : n o a : w] right, steam

2.8 [NB:IV:4:R:4]
Emma : cz you see she wz: depending on: hhim takin'er in tuh
→ the L.A. deeple s:– depot Sundee so['e siz]
→ Lottie : [Ah:'ll] take'er in:

And that's a reasonable enough place to 'interrupt'. For example, if what has been – adequately and syntactically possibly completely – said so far is something to which a recipient wants to respond, and now it looks like the speaker is at least continuing and perhaps moving on to other matters, then one might want to get in now, while the initial matter is still relevant, even if it means interrupting.

Or, for example, as in the following fragment, the utterance in question might itself be treated as interruptive of something prior. This is taken from an interview of a group of young girls. One of them, Cindy, produces an utterance which could be just a remark, but could also be a story preface. Another, Kathy, then produces a similar sort of utterance. After a first possible sentence completion, Kathy starts a next clause, and simultaneously both the interviewer and the initial speaker, Cindy, make a move; the interviewer asking a question which will provide for a story being told, the initial speaker simply continuing her story.

2.9 [Labov:Quadro:I:1720:5:Simplified]
Cindy : Th:ey got mad on Friday though I dint get home t'leven thirty,
Debbi : ·hhhh [ ] Oh:::::::
→ Kathy : Yeh my mo [ther wz kinda mad I [din get
→ Louella : [Where were you.
→ Cindy : [En I had the ca:r, I don'know we were just– we went t'the basketball game . . .

So it looks like this is certainly some kind of 'there', a place for another or others to start up. Now, there was one really puzzling bunch of these things: someone would start at this 'post-continuation' place, and then immediately drop out. For example:

2.10 [Fr:USI:43:R:2:Simplified]
Mike : Least'e c'd'v] done wz c'm dah::n en letchu know w't
→ happ'n hey [look yi] h gla:ss broke,
→ James : [Tha:t–

2.11 [Her:III:1:4:2-3]
Desk : Just one moment I'll uh he's in uh–actually in suhr:gery
→ et the moment ah'll [see'f I c'n get hold of [him,
→ Heath : [ee– [eeYe:s,

2.12 [SCC:DCD:9]
Phipps : Didju hev it ma:de (0.3) ju– soon ahftih you bowt th'
→ m'terial? ohr ohr ↓lay::tuh. Was i [t in] Febru'ry:
→ Sokol : [W'l I]

2.13 [NB:II:1:R:12-13]
Emma : °God ih° jist like a night ma: [re,
Lottie : [Ihd e-seems like a

→ fairy storeh I [: couldn'believe it.
→ Emma: [I–

2.14 [GTS:I:1:50:R:1-2]
Dan : it is part a'the function a'°th'↓group to begin d'sha:re°
→ in° ↓some a'these things
so [: the others c'n understand . . . °
→ Roger : [W'l

The question was, what on earth is this? They start up after it's obvious that someone is continuing, and then do this 'oops sorry' and drop out. I kept collecting the things, with this sort of question in mind, and after awhile it occurred to me that I'd got it wrong. Maybe they're not starting up 'post continuation'. Maybe the way to characterize where they're starting up – and this would handle, account for, these immediate dropouts – is that they're starting up by reference to the possible completion which precedes the continuation.

Further, there is a massively recurrent, systematic position for next speaker startings, which these things might be treated as instances of. It's another transition-space position. Where, then, just as the other 'transition space' onsets can end up in overlap as the current speaker continues talking, so can this one. I'm calling this position 'unmarked next' position.

3. 'Unmarked Next' Position

I call it 'unmarked' simply because in my transcripts I don't use a symbol to show this particular relationship. A recipient/next speaker produces his talk in such a way that it occurs with neither haste nor delay. It is not pushed up into or latched immediately onto the prior utterance, but permits just a bit of space between the end of the prior and the start of the next. It is 'simply next'. And I have the impression that this is the most common, the usual, the standard relationship of one utterance to another. Here is an instance.

3.1 [NB:I:1:R:1:R]
Curly : Hello:?
Bud : Curly?
Curly : Ye:h.
Bud : Bud Hoffmeier.
Curly : Hi Bud how you doin.
Bud : Fine.

To get a sense of 'unmarked next position' as a locus of overlap I'll sneak up on it gradually, starting with innocuous cases.

For example, there are cases where the overlapped material, while it might well indicate that a current speaker is 'going ahead', does not constitute 'talk' as such. Rather, the speaker is taking a breath, perhaps in preparation for further

talk which does not seem to be of the sort which would motivate 'interruption'; such things as brief 'receipts', 'acknowledgement tokens', etc. The resulting data is innocuous to the point of vacuousness.

3.2 [SBL:2:1:6:R:3]
Tess : becuz I wz going dih haftih get out (.) early in the
morning I have (.) a p– (0.3) transaction et the
→ ba::nk.,·h (__) [hh
→ Bea : [↓Ya:h.
Tess : A:nd uh ·p but it wouldn't a'made any diffrence **cuz ah**
→ wz gunnuh dress t'guh down'n do it
anyWA:Y.,·h (__) [hh
→ Bea : [↓Ya:h.

3.3 [Her:I:11:12]
→ Doreen : en Jonathan's gone tuh Kingston fer a meeting,
·hh h
→ Norma : (__) [Oh:.

3.4 [MDE:60-1:5:1]
→ Sheila : they were already off someplace so Tony
called.,·hh hh
→ Erma : (__) [Oh:.

But these little receipts and acknowledgements also occur 'in the midst' of another's talk; specifically, after it is clear that a speaker is going ahead after a possible completion.

3.5 [Rah:B:1:(13):3]
Jenny : I think she's got a– uh–m: one a'those: uh **permanent**
→ caravahns. (up) [in: Gro] ze↓da: [le.
→ Ann : (__) [M m:] [A:oh.

3.6 [NB:IV:3:R:5]
→ Lottie : becuz they would really be the Spri:ng.
(Let)' [s see tha] t's twunny fi:'dollars . . .
→ Emma : (__)' [Y e a h.]

3.7 [SBL:3:5:R:4]
→ Milly : Well that's it (an)' [it's diffrent then I've e:ver ↑lived
→ Ginny : (__)' [°Yah°

3.8 [Owen:8B15(A):36]
Bette : It really keeps you going actually hol– ah mean both
→ looking forward an'looking ba:ck. (on th)' [holiday . . .
→ Andrea : (____)' [Ye:h

3.9 [Friedell:30]
Hank : Well we better not spend three hundred fifty a month
→ (we) [better be able tuh hold it, (0.6) three hundred,

While in fragments 3.2–3.4 a current speaker may be not only pausing for breath but making a space for various orientation signals from a recipient, in fragments 3.5–3.9 no such opportunity is provided. That is, the recipient is producing such a display just after a speaker has shown that no such thing is called for.

This phenomenon could be accounted for if the recipient/next speaker was designing his talk by reference, not to what occurred immediately prior to the start of his own talk, but by reference to what occurred a bit earlier; i.e., the possible completion of the other's utterance.

The design of the recipient/next speaker's talk could be characterized as providing a bit of space between the two utterances. The bit of silence, then, being part of the recipient/next-speaker's work in the first place.

It would not then be a matter of an utterance reaching possible completion, a silence occurring, and the recipient/next speaker understanding thereby that the prior turn is completed, whereupon he starts to talk, as is sometimes argued. Rather, as is nicely evidenced by 'last item' onset and 'terminal' onset, upcoming completion is projected as the talk in progress is unfolding. In the cases at hand, it may be that the recipient/next speaker undertakes to produce a particular, standard sequential configuration, with a small inter-turn space as a projected part thereof.

What the recipient/next speaker is doing, then, might best be described as producing an action which consists of: permitting a bit of space and then starting to talk.

Now, such an action might not have the recipient/next speaker in such an orientation as would have him listening for or attending to the occurrence of that small particle of sound inhabiting the little silence he is now, as part of his activity, providing for. He is, as it were, in a 'blind spot'. He is no longer in recipient orientation, but in a state of speakership, although he is not yet producing sounds.

Such an account handles these 'post-continuation' acknowledgements and receipts, and also the set of 'post-continuation' onsets followed by immediate dropouts (see fragment 2.10–2.14). They are not being produced 'post-continuation', but 'post possible completion plus a bit of silence'. That is, they are being produced to occur in 'unmarked next position'. As with other transition-space onsets, they happen to collide with a current speaker's producing further talk.

The possibility of a systematic, designed 'latency' in a recipient/next speaker's talk provides for an orderliness to some other sorts of overlap.

I'll mention two. One of them I haven't done any work on, and the data are often very messy. But they might at least partially be accounted for if this 'latency' is produced not only by recipients, but by speakers as well. That is, in a sort of correlate to the way in which a recipient might shift into speakership orientation and not listen for or hear a particle of further talk, a speaker having reached a point of possible completion might not shift into recipient orientation but maintain speakership orientation, and thus not listen for or hear that a recipient has started to talk. The speaker, then, could be characterized as providing a bit of space between two adjacent activities, and/or two adjacent syntactic components.

I haven't systematically collected these, but here are a few cases that will do for the time being

3.10 [SBL:2:2:3:R:38]
Zoe : well with Bud? en the way he says I'm not bid uhhh·w(h)'l
(h)if you s(h)ay two(h)o sump'n then I'm not gunna bi:d,
→ ·(hh) [hh [I] ↑don't] think Elva si – Elva would =
→ Amy : = (Oh th ey) don't ·hh
Zoe : = take that kindly

3.11 [SBL:2:1:8:R:12]
Nora : En the] little edge ed curled up'n wz showing re:d.h
→ · hhh [h [En ah thought gee wh] iz what's thi:s.
→ Bea : (Oh f e r g'dness °say°)

3.12 [NB:IV:10:R:50]
Lottie : we bought s'm hats et Wah uh Wal:d-u-er Cla:rk's they
had uh: those uh (0.2) fisheen ha: [ts yih] know
Emma : [Mm:] hm:,]=
→ Emma : =(doze lid) [dle] (badges)] Yeh]
→ Lottie : *a- do:llar] so I] : bought one fer he↓:r,

One that I have collected systematically occurs after a completion followed by a silence. One participant starts up a bit after another. Again, the possibility is that each now being in speaker orientation is not listening for or hearing that the other has started. In such cases the 'latency' can be on the part of prior speaker or recipient, or as in fragment 3.20 below, can occur as between two recipients of a prior utterance. I'm showing cases across a range of lengths of silence, from a 'micropause' of just over 1/10th second, to a substantial silence of one and four-tenths second.

3.13 [Her:I:6:11]
Helen : Alright ↓fine.
Doreen : Okay,
→ (.)
→ Doreen : (Lo) [ve t'you ↓a] ll
↳ Helen : [B y e : ,]
(.)
Helen : Bye:,
Doreen : ↑Bye:,

3.14 [JG:II(a):6:1]
Maggie : But'e said a lotta times it happens 'e said I could've even
been allergic tih something thet I js:t yihknow (.) ATE
→ (0.2)
→ Maggie : (en) [it j's]t effected me like tha [t.
↳ Sorrell : [°Yeah,°] [°(Mm)°

3.15 [Erhardt:8:1]

(.) to work o:n um tomorrow night.
→ (0.4)
Vicky : (Thur) [s d a]y? [ ]
Pam : (___) [bec'z] Yes.

3.16 [Owen:8B15(A):25]
Bette : [Oh::.
Andrea : [on a G] ood ↓Fri [day.
Bette : [Friday.
→ (0.5)
Andrea : (So) [we 've g o t to take th'MO] torbike or =
Bette : (___) [Where'v you got to get to this]
Andrea : = something

3.17 [Labov:Bat:II:4]
Parky : They've got fo'ovuh there,
→ (0.7)
Parky : (You s) [ee two, (.) trainees en then you see the two=
Lorna : (___) [I-
Parky : = stah:s.

3.18 [GTS:I:2:94:R:1-2]
Louise : ennit's discussion ↓groups:. on a subject with one teach*er.
→ (0.8)
Louise : (I) [t ' s u] m ↑very few cla:sses. as classes.
Roger : (_) [°Hm,°]

3.19 [JG:I:24:8-9]
Laura : But I know thet Joe did say he had a letter from im.
→ (1.2)
Marge : (Eh di) [d he tell you- ·hh
Laura : (___) [That's all he said.
Marge : Well did he tell you that when you phoned im . . .

3.20 [G:84:AD:52]
Cal : You know why niggers are always goin like dis?
→ (1.4)
Bart : (Ban) [d e o d orant?
Len : (___) [They don'know]what they wanna do:.

So there is a great deal of data in which, in varying degrees, someone starts up 'in the course of' another's talk, which can be characterized in terms of 'transition-space' onset or, as in fragments 3.13–3.20 in terms of for all practical purposes 'simultaneous' starts. The account for the 'interjacent' starting has to do with a systematic 'blind spot', each participant being in speakership orientation and not listening for or hearing a bit of talk by another. That is, someone can be systematically described as not having heard.

Now, this is not to say that participants *cannot* be hearing and dealing with

possible completion, or with what is being said, in particular, in that bit of talk. People can and do react to small particles.

4. Consensus or Reaction?

In the following two fragments, someone does a checkout on a prior utterance, and the prior speaker produces a confirmation. In each case, after just a bit of the confirmation object has been produced, we get an acknowledgement of that confirmation.

4.1 [JG:II(a):3:2]
Sorrell : she's a'ready gone cz Claire's there.
(0.3)
Maggie Oh: (.) Claire came in?
→ Sorrell : (Ye) [ah. en she siz] no prob'm she'd work tihda:y
→ Maggie : (__) [°O h: okay,j]

4.2 [JG:I:16:6]
Pete : No ah'll call again,
Grace : You will.
→ Pete : (Ye) [ah.
→ Grace : (__) [Ah-hah ·hh Ah'll tell'im then.

And across a range of circumstances and activities we can see recipients attending to small particles. The cases I'm showing might be seen as a systematic subset of 'interjacent' onset; i.e., 'recognitional' onset.

4.3 [Her:I:6:9]
Doreen : If by any chance, (0.8) theh isn't anybody heuh I've got tih go out jus fer awhi:le, [·hh] What is your– new–
Helen : [Ye:] s
→ Doreen : What is your (telee) [phone] nummuh?]
→ Helen : (____) [Well] we're n] ot on the phone
y [et.
Doreen : [Ah I see:.

4.4 [Rah:II:11:R]
Jenny : But– ee–ee °two pihleece cahrs'd° stopped outsi:de. =
Ida : = eeYe:: [s?
Jenny : [·h An'that whether he tho:wt thet I ed'n
→ (ac) [cidn't [[ohr someth ing I don't kno:w. =
→ Ida : (__) [I : : [: [k n e o: w]
Jenny : = [B't ·h
Ida : [n↓No:::

4.5 [Fr:TC:I:1:2–3]
Shirl : Who w'yih ↑ta:lking to.

Geri : Jis no:w?
→ Shirl : ·hhhh No I called be– like between
(ele) [ven en
I: wasn't talkeen tuh a:nybuddy. (b) Bo-oth
Marla 'n I slept'ntil about noo:n,

4.6 [MDE:60-1:5:2-3]
Erma : did you hear w't'e: she– tol:d Lisa? ·hhh thet they w'r
c'nsidered the cutest couple in [the cla:ss? [( )
Sheila : [·hhhhhh [Yeh– Wul
this: this was official, apparently this goes into the
→ (yea) [rbook.
→ Erma : (___) [Oh: yer kidding. How adorable.

4.7 [NB:IV:13:R:12]
Emma : What city is] it i↓:n.
(0.8)
→ Lottie : Wul 't 's in (Cos) [ta Me] :sa
→ Emma : (___) [Costa] Mes]a

Some of these 'recognitionals' can get quite delicate. In the following fragment it appears that an initial consonant is adequate for acknowledgement to occur. Here, a repair is being made from 'fifty cents' to 'fifty dollars'.

4.8 [Friedell:32]
Sandy : I wz figuring– six twunny five is what I get f'm Merit so
rother [t h e n] be [ing f] ifty cents.
Hank : [A'right] [Okay,
(.)
→ Sandy : u-mean fifty (d) [ollars.] (.) ou:t, we'd be . . .
→ Hank : (_) [Ye:h,]

And in the following fragment a possible alternation between 'shoot' and 'shit' is reacted to upon the occurrence of the crucial vowel. I'll just note that we have a great deal of talk between these two women, and their friends, neighbors, relatives, and this is the only occurrence of the word 'shit'. They routinely use 'shoot', 'doggone' and others of a mild grade, 'damn' and 'hell' being the boundarying expletives.

4.9 [NB:II:5:R:3]
Emma : 'e wantih pull a tooth'n make me a new go:ld uh: ·hhhh
(0.2) bridge fer (.) EI:GHT HUNDER'DOLLARS.
→ Lottie : °Oh:: sh:: (i) [:t.°
→ Emma : (_) [Shi] :t. (0.2) is ↓ri:ght.

In fragments 4.1–4.10 it seems quite clear that a recipient is exhibiting that his response is directed to the particle which directly precedes that response.

I've found a few cases where such monitoring and reaction might be occurring, at those points I've proposed to be 'blind spots'. But at least as far as

I can see, they're ambiguously independent actions or reactions. That is, I can't decide or argue that someone is hearing and responding to some particle, or starting an independent bit of talk with that 'latency' I've been proposing.

I'll start with an innocuous case. In the following fragment, an object which is alternatively used to solicit response or link into a next part of an utterance in progress, 'See,' (cf. 'You know,' 'Right?', etc.), occurs after a possible completion. It is immediately followed by an acknowledgement token by the recipient.

4.10 [SBL:3:5:R:6]
→ Milly : W'l this is what I ↑mea:n. (See) [↓ it's goyn be so =
→ Ginny : (___) [↓ M m h m]
Milly : =↓whu– ↑o:↓n:derf:ul↓

I just don't have the analytic resources to argue one way or the other; the acknowledgement token could be responding to 'See,' as a response-solicit, or could be occurring independently of it, in unmarked next position to the prior part of the utterance.

There are others, rather more interesting and delicate, in which that sort of ambiguity is present. The following fragment is taken from a telephone conversation between two men on duty at different locations during the 1964 Anchorage Alaska earthquake. They refer to each other by their locations: 'City' is the Anchorage fire department and 'Elmondorf' is an outlying army base. They've been connected by a short circuit in the telephone wires, and have taken the opportunity for a chat. The fragment starts after they've been talking for awhile.

4.11 [FD:Finger:2-3]
E'dorf : D'you know w't–w't kinda news'ere broadcastin'down'th' States et (.) pres'nt?
City : I: heard [d'fir:st
Squawk : [(xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [xx)
City : [The firs' one thet dey uh, (0.7) broadcas'wz sixty
[tuh thr–
E'dorf : [Yer loud'n clear Muldoon Tower,
(2.0)
E'dorf : Pard'n?
City : I heard d'[firs'broadcas'Stateside,
Squawk : [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] x[xxxxx)
E'dorf : [Justa minnit.
(1.4)
E'dorf : Go'head.
(1.9)
E'dorf : Go'head,
(0.2)
→ E'dorf : (Ci) [ty,
→ City : (__) [Ye–u– ah heard d'firs'broadcas'state det deh wz bout sixty t'three hunner'dea:d'n (0.4) city of Anc'rage is on dih grou:n'

Just as City starts to answer Elmondorf's question, a squawkbox on the Elmondorf side starts up, with a report in from Muldoon air field. And we can watch City's work by reference to the Squawk. He initially drops out, and then, perhaps because he gets no indication from his coparticipant that he should maintain his silence, may take it that someone else on duty is handling it, so he starts up again. But it turns out that his coparticipant is handling the call, and interrupts him to respond to it.

Thereafter, City remains silent until he's invited back by Elmondorf, with 'Pardon?' And perhaps he hears it as directed to him and not to the fellow on the Squawk because 'Pardon?' is a 'conversational' object, in strong contrast to the 'instrumental' 'You're loud and clear'. But again, just as he gets going, the Squawk goes again, he produces a first clause, and Elmondorf, again with a 'conversational' object, 'Just a minute', gives the Squawk priority.

Now comes the problematic stuff. Elmondorf uses 'Go ahead', which is ambiguously conversational or instrumental. This may cause a problem for City; who is being asked to 'Go ahead', himself or Muldoon Tower? And it is possible that Elmondorf comes to see what the problem is; after two such invitations, he shifts to a non-ambiguous item, 'City'.

It's possible that City hears, in that small particle, 'Ci . . .' that it is he who is being invited to talk, whereupon he starts. It is also possible that it's a matter of consensus; that whatever it is that brings Elmondorf to see that his recipient, City, is having a problem, brings City to see that he is indeed Elmondorf's recipient. That one of them starts minutely later than the other is just another instance of post-silence latency, as in fragments 3.13–3.20. Again, I don't have the resources to choose between these possibilities.

The following fragment *might* be quite exquisite. I'm using the real names of two of the participants, Jeff and Joann, to show just how delicate it might be. This is from a group therapy session for teenagers. At this session, there are observers in a room behind a one-way mirror.

4.12 [GTS:I:2:19:R:5]
((Jeff is reporting a success with his parents, who have stopped interrogating him about his comings and goings.))

Jeff : Nob'ddy se]z inning yih jis keep °whha:lkin.° hh
°yihknow
(0.2)
Jeff : It's j↑bghuggin'↓mhhe(h)now [hm hm
Joann : [↑Don'ta] lk tih ↓them talk
t'u:*:s:.
(1.3)
Jeff : No (.) th– (0.4) drapes er closed now I c'n see through that liddle crack et th'window over there
(2.0)
→ Dan : Yer very ↑°conscious'v th'm being in the:re. (Je) [ff.
→ Joann : [He
keeps:: [↑talk [in'↓there.]
Jeff : [°ih° [It doesn']rilly ↓bother me,

The overlap in question could be occurring at a very touchy moment. Joann having raised the issue of the observers in the first place, it's possible that Dan's remark is addressed to her. Indeed, the appending of the boy's name may be directed to clearing such a possible ambiguity, similar to Elmondorf's work in the prior fragment, with his shift from 'Go ahead' to 'City.'

And similarly to City's problem in the prior fragment, Joann could be monitoring for which of the two who have shown themselves to be 'conscious of them being in there' is being addressed. If that is so, then the 'recognitional' work in this case is a bit finer than in the prior, the alternative names in this case starting with the same consonant. What would be involved here, then, would be another instance of that very fine sort of monitoring and response seen in fragment 4.9 vis-à-vis the 'shoot'/'shit' alternatives; i.e., recognition upon the occurrence of the crucial vowel.

One problem with this fragment is that it is face-to-face interaction and we don't have the video. Dan might be looking straight at Jeff, in which case we have a trivial instance of 'unmarked next position' onset happening to overlap with an appended and unnecessary particle. On the other hand, it turns out that frequently just such actions as Dan is producing; e.g., challenges, confrontations, etc., are done 'blind' – a term introduced by a graduate student of Harvey Sacks, Blaine Roberts. That is, they are done specifically *not* looking at the recipient. And there is at least one other reasonable target for Dan's eyes – the controversial observation window.

So, we have a possible case of a very delicate monitoring for and reaction to an otherwise 'blind spot' particle. Or just another case of overlap in the transition space.

I'll show one more case of possible intermediate reaction to a small particle, or possible independent actions which exhibit consensus. It's taken from a conversation between the two ladies of fragment 4.9. In this case, in a range of ways, we can see Lottie working to have the conversation end, without herself having been the one to end it.

4.13 [NB:III:4:R:3]

	Emma	:	·hhhh Well ah won't KEEP yih honey,
	Lottie	:	Oh ↑that's oka:y, (uh) [(I'm just)
	Emma	:	[Have ↑fun fishin↑ ah hope yih catch a big one,
	Lottie	:	Yeah.
			(0.2)
→	Emma	:	(Al) [right,
→	Lottie	:	(—) [Okay] **honey,**
			(.)
	Emma	:	[ ] Bye bye,
	Lottie	:	Bye bye

For example, 'Oh that's okay' does not disagree with the proposal that she's being 'kept' on the phone. In other such cases we see strong disagreement items, and/or devices for showing that one is happy to keep talking, e.g., introducing a new topic, referring back to a prior one, asking about something in recipient's

Then, the 'Yeah'. It occurs at a point where she could initiate Closings with, e.g., 'Okay.' So she's clearly not doing Closings. But in terms of being in conversation, she's put the talk into a state which John Lee and I call 'attrition/hold'. Roughly, it hasn't been closed off, and thus is still alive, but such an object as 'Yeah' provides no materials for the coparticipant to take off from or work with. If the talk is to keep going, it's up to the coparticipant to find something to say. Thus, the sense of 'attrition'.

Focal for us is her 'Okay' which is alternatively 'latent' or 'recognitional'. It *might* be occurring just and only when Emma has recognizably initiated Closings. That is, withholding an overt entry into Closings until Emma does the initiating, and then pouncing on it the moment she has, reifying it with what might stand as a 'simultaneous second', similar to the terminal pair (the 'goodbyes') (see work on closings of G. Button, forthcoming).

For the terminal pair there is indeed perfect independent consensus; they occur utterly simultaneously. But for the prior pair there is, ambiguously, consensus or fast reaction, one party waiting until the other has recognizably made a move, and then responding to it.

To get a sense of the issues involved here, we can look at another case of Closings; one which is in some ways very similar, but in crucial ways quite contrastive. In this case there is no possibility of seeing 'consensus'. This is a man talking to his elderly mother.

4.14 [Her:I:5:6:R]

	Heath	:	Well yyou leave **that w'n with me.**
			(0.3)
→	Janet	:	Yes (alri) [:ght,]
→	Heath	:	(__) [A l] **right,**
			(0.5)
	Heath	:	Bye:,
	Janet	:	Bye darling,

In the first place, Janet's 'alright' is not necessarily a Close-initiation, but an agreement to an arrangement. By coming in on it in terminal overlap, with another 'Alright', Heath retroactively provides that it is the first of a Close-initiating pair.

And in contrast to fragment 4.13, there is no subsequent consensus. Janet remains silent at a point where she might herself volunteer the first of the terminal pair.

In this case we can see Heath placing his 'Alright' in such a way that, that Janet has done a first is unequivocal; i.e., enough of it has been produced before he starts up. In fragment 4.13, Lottie places her 'Okay' in such a way that it is not clear whether she is responding to Emma's, or whether they have both independently and for all practical purposes simultaneously, moved to close the call. In fragment 4.14 we have a clear case of 'you started it'; in 4.13 a possible case of 'we agree'. (And see fragment 2.1 as another ambiguous case involving a possible 'saying the same thing at the same time' consensus).

Now, the fact that people do have the capacity to react to a very small particle – when they are in various ways primed for its occurrence – may provide them with the capacity to achieve a display of consensus in contrast to response, specifically by responding quickly enough to make it at best ambiguous as to whether they're acting independently or responsively. And in fragments 4.11–4.13 we may be seeing such achieved independent consensus occurring in what is otherwise a 'blind spot' in conversation. That is, the consensus is achieved in part by producing what is systematically characterizable as transition-space overlap; a mere coincidence of two independent activities.

In a sense, I've gone to a lot of trouble and ended up within a membrane's thickness of where I started. That is, I started out with a batch of cases which I initially took to be someone starting up after hearing that another was still talking after a point of possible completion. I argued that they might not be that at all, but yet another sort of transition-space onset, providing for a 'blind spot' in which just those particles which make the new talk 'interruptive', are not heard. And now I'm trying to argue that perhaps *some* of those cases are indeed perfectly well heard.

But I think that membrane-thin difference matters. It can matter in terms of managing to exhibit independent-minded consensus when one has, in fact, responded to what another is doing. It may also matter in terms of something like 'rights to a turnspace'. Roughly, if one can manage one's talk in such a way as to achieve a lawful placement of it, i.e., in the transition space, then one may have every bit as much right to be talking as did the prior speaker in his turnspace. And I would argue that the vast majority of apparent transition-space onsets – Last-item, Terminal, Possible Completion, and Unmarked Next-Positioned – are lawful. That is, that they are produced by reference to seeing that an utterance is just ending or just ended.

But there is this very recurrent business of a recipient starting up in the transition space for an utterance, finding that what he took to be 'an utterance' was not yet an utterance, and that the current speaker is still talking.

5. What is 'Completion'

Perhaps the materials and considerations I've gone through could be the basis for a complaint against the way a lot of recipients do a lot of their talk. That is, if they would only wait a bit longer, they'd see that the speaker isn't finished just because he's arrived at a possible completion point. That is, we could propose that something like Utterance + Pause *should* be the way talk proceeds. Perhaps, indeed, the way it is designed to proceed, where, then, we're seeing a 'breakdown' of conversational rules.

But that doesn't take into account the fact that even a very tiny silence can be treated by a *speaker* as problematic; where, then, they will engage in activities to deal with that problem. Anita Pomerantz (1984) considers this issue: she works with rather substantial silences, of approximately one second. I'll just show a few fragments in which even a tiny delay can cause problems.

Here are two fragments from a same corpus; calls between a family and some of their friends and neighbors. There are two women who call routinely to talk to the mother. When the phone is answered by the youngest boy, he tells his mother that it's 'Auntie Lorna' or 'Auntie Myra'. When the older boys answer, they just tell her 'It's for you.' And that sets up the problem. In one such call we get the following.

5.1 [Rah:B:1:(12):1]
Jessie : °Hello?°
(0.5)
→ Myra : Jessie?
→ (0.3)
→ Myra : It's me:,
Jessie : Oh hello My:ra.

I don't know what the first silence of half a second is about, but I doubt whether it involves Myra waiting to see if Jessie is finished talking or not. What I want to note here is the shorter (0.3) silence, in the course of which I take it that Myra decides that Jessie hasn't recognized her voice, whereupon she provides more voice (with 'It's me'), whereupon Jessie, in unmarked next position, displays recognition – and with the 'Oh' shows that there was indeed a problem (see John Heritage, 1984, on 'Oh' as a 'change of state' token).

In a subsequent call we get a tighter version of this phenomenon, with a silence of under two-tenths of a second; i.e., a 'micropause'.

5.2. [Rah:C:1:(16):1]
Jessie : Hello:?°
→ Myra : Hello Jessie.
→ (.)
→ Ida : [It's m e:.
Jessie : [Oh hello the] ah.

And in this case it so happens that just as Myra sees that there is a problem and moves to resolve it, her recipient has herself resolved it.

This very short 'tolerance' by a speaker for inter-turn silence can be seen across a range of activities. I'll just show a few cases, in which, as in fragment 5.2, a speaker's problem-resolutional activity collides with a recipient's (slightly delayed) response.

5.3 [Rah:A:2:(9):1-2:R]
Jessie : I've only jus goht in en ah thowt w'l p'hahps ih wz a
bit late tih come round [d f'coff] ee:. [ ] If you've ti:me,
→ Alice : N o ↑:
→ (.)
→ Alice : [Have yih?
Jessie : [It's jist] thet evrybuddy seems t'be in to:wn tihday.

5.4 [GTS:I:1:44:4]
→ Roger : I guess I jis didn'wanna be like evrybuddy ↑e:lse.
→ (.)
→ Roger : [[Y'know] w?]
Louise : [[You:] a___rn't.

5.5 [G:93:AD:7:7]
→ Bart : Well you r'member when **McKuen did tha:t?**
→ (0.3)
→ Bart : [[L o:ng] time ago . . .
Cal : [[↓(No:,)]

5.6 [SBL:2:2:3:R:27]
→ Zoe : Ellen had fiftee:n.
→ (0.3)
→ Zoe : [[hundred.
Claire : [[Oh:,

Here's another, that I think is particularly lovely. It occurs in the course of a conversation which is part of a series taking place during a hurricane and flood in New Orleans. Josh is the commander of the New Orleans Civil Defense. Opal is a woman who has been trying to reach her brother by telephone. She finally has reached him, and has told Josh some of the eyewitness materials she got from him.

The point at which the fragment starts involves a nice sort of problem. Josh is attempting to elicit further information, with a device Anita Pomerantz (1980) has described. Roughly, one does not ask, but provides for its relevance by delivering the partial knowledge one has oneself. In this case, however, that Josh is Commander of Civil Defense may be relevant to Opal's hearing of his utterance. She (eventually) produces no more than an acknowledgement token, and a token of the sort I have elsewhere proposed to display particularly 'passive' recipiency.

Parenthetically, the fact that she doesn't do even that for half a second may constitute a real case of silence telling a recipient that some sort of speaker transition should occur.

5.7 [CDHQ:II:252:R:3-4]
Josh : Ah heard uh: first thet there wz rilly s'm water in:
Mohg'n City up uh: waiz deep uhr something.
(0.5)
→ Opal : Mm hm,
→ (0.2)
→ Opal : [[Well] now he]
Josh : [[U h] how fo]:r inlin:d uh did he ↑say 'nything
about s'im: uh↓::*: s'm othuh (0.6) ·k *uh: cities like
Lahfeeyet . . .

What I want to be focussing on is that in the (0.2) silence following the acknowledgement token whereby Opal shows herself to be still aligned as a recipient, both parties come to see that there is a problem, and what the problem is. Simultaneously they produce the same class of remedial activity. Opal starts to report something that a 'he' told her, and Josh asks what a 'he' said, 'he' being the temporarily lost brother with his eyewitness materials.

It seems to me that fragments 5.2–5.7 are particularly nice data for the issue of completion not being a matter of an utterance + pause. Even such tiny silences can be problematic and generate remedial activities. And, as in these cases, result in overlap. But it might be argued that I've got it wrong again; that what I'm treating as completion + problematic silence + remedial activity is in fact a speaker making the briefest of intra-utterance hesitations; that what they say next was in the first place designed to be part of a single utterance. That is, that neither the recipients nor I have waited long enough, and once again what we're seeing is some form of interjacent onset, or 'interruption'. Well, how long shall we wait? Over half a second?

5.8 [NB:IV:13:R:25]
Emma : yih d<u>o</u>n't go tuh work til thre<u>e</u>:,h
(0.4)
→ Lottie : F<u>ou</u>:r.
→ (0.6)
→ Lottie : [[T'<u>da:y</u>] <u>'s Sa:</u>] turday.
Emma : [[<u>O h</u>: f] ou<u>r</u>:.
(.)
Emma : ↑<u>A</u>oh that's ↓°r*ight.°

How about one second?

5.9 [Fr:USI:8-9:R]
Vic : <u>Wu</u>t's <u>l</u>eft <u>a</u>ftih you take th'chez <u>up</u>.
(.)
↱ Mike : <u>No</u>thi[ng. [°( )°
↳ Fred : [There's [ba:re fl<u>oo</u>:r.
→ (1.0)
→ Mike : [[Just f l] <u>oo</u>:r.]
Vic : [[Thez no] ho: <u>le</u>?
Mike : <u>NO</u>::↓::.

I'll stop at one second because some work I've done recently indicates that one second is some sort of 'standard maximum' silence (Jefferson, forthcoming), so whatever one might mean by 'waiting long enough', waiting beyond one second is waiting too long.

Every now and then we can find materials in which a best characterization might in fact be that a speaker takes it he's finished and a recipient isn't sure, so he waits a bit. There was that possibility in fragment 5.7. And here is the one other case I have that feeling about.

5.10 [SBL:3:5:R:10]

	Milly	:	En I said I'd never heard Hunter so that w'd be most interesting. =
↔	Ginny	:	= It certainly could (the) [et le] ast tha:t [one] thet =
	Milly	:	[Y a h] [she tol'] [me]
	Ginny	:	= I heard was
→			(0.7)
→	Milly	:	She tol'me he wz wonder [ful,
	Ginny	:	[Yah

Roughly, there may be a particularly problematic combination of structure and intonation which makes it unclear whether 'At least that one that I heard was' is a completed pro-formed re-use of the prior 'that would be most interesting', or is as yet incomplete, its speaker in a wordsearch for a description, e.g., 'At least that one that I heard was ((pause)) fascinating.'

But as far as I can see, for the vast majority of cases 'utterance + pause' does not capture the routine ways that recipients monitor talk in progress. What it does recurrently catch is a particular sort of problem posed for speakers.

When I talk about how recipients monitor an utterance in progress, I talk in terms of possibly complete actions, and/or syntactic possible completion. Now and again people ask if I've considered intonation, and if so, does it matter? I say I have, and it doesn't seem to.

At the start of this project on overlapping talk I did a mass of transcribing, and was careful to catch a range of intonational features, assuming that would have a lot to do with the phenomenon. But while I was working with the materials, it didn't seem to matter. Speakers would, for example, produce what I heard as 'full stop' intonation and then keep going (see, e.g., fragments 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 1.7, 1.9, 2.5, 2.7, 2.12, 3.5, 3.6, 3.8, 3.11, 3.18, 4.1, 4.5, 4.10 and 4.12). Or, for example, speakers would produce 'continuing' or indeterminate intonation, a recipient would start up, and there would be clean transition (see, e.g., fragments 1.1, 1.5 and 2.3). What held across cases of clean transition and recipient onset resulting in overlap alike was observable completed actions or syntactic possible completion.

But recently, John Local and John Kelly at the University of York have been doing some interesting work with intonation in actual sequences of talk, and getting some possible results in terms of turn transition, etc. (see the following paper in this issue: Eds.); and their work brought me to wonder if I had been looking at the phenomenon properly. Perhaps intonation does matter, and somehow I'd missed it. I undertook a data run, to see how often 'clean transition' and 'overlap' were associated with 'completion' intonation and 'non-completion' intonation.

I immediately ran into two problems. One was that I have only the grossest idea of what 'completion intonation' is, or could be defended to be. But there were some contours I supposed anybody would agree to be completion or non-completion intonation, so I focussed on those. The second problem has begun to be familiar. Roughly, if something 'works' it's there and if it doesn't 'work' it isn't there. So there would be an intonation contour that I'd identify as 'completion intonation'. If it occurred in a case of clean transition, it was unproblematically-

'completion intonation'. But if it occurred in a case of overlap, I found myself doubting that it was really a case of 'completion intonation'.

Nevertheless I counted, and came up with some strong results. I suppose this could mean that the base phenomenon is very strong indeed, if the cockeyed way I was going at it could get results. I used some 800 cases of transition-space overlap involving 'possible completion' and 'unmarked next position' onset. And I matched those with some 800 cases of clean transition, with recipients starting up in those two positions. The results:

Clean Transition:	ca. 70% after completion intonation;
	ca. 30% after non-completion intonation.
Overlap:	ca. 75% after non-completion intonation;
	ca. 25% after completion intonation.

For one, in the vast majority of these cases, intonational features that can be described as signalling intent to stop or continue are matched by what speakers actually do thereafter (in 70% of clean transitions and 75% of overlap; about three quarters of the total corpus).

And in a great number of these cases, recipients can be described as starting up not only by reference to a possibly complete action and/or syntactic possible completion, but to a speaker's signal of intention to stop (again in that 70% of clean transitions, and in 25% of overlap; about half of the total corpus).

And if there is something like an intonational rule that says if a speaker signals completion then he should stop, and if he signals non-completion then a recipient should not start, then *all* of these cases of overlap could be described as the result of one or another party violating the rule. Three quarters involve a recipient starting up where there has been possible syntactic/activity completion but not completion intonation. One quarter involve a speaker producing completion intonation and then not stopping.

How could I have missed this? I suppose it has to do with the fact that the whole of my original corpus consisted in these 'violations'. To use a Man From Mars analogy: plunk this creature down on a city street near some traffic lights. Now every car going through the intersection crashes into a car coming across the other street. Asked what sort of orderliness he noticed, he might propose, 'Crashes occur at intersections!' Pressed about whether the traffic signals matter, he might well say, 'Not so you'd notice.'

But even when an equal number of clean transitions are added to the corpus of transition-space onsets, with all 1600 cases taken in the aggregate, a problematic pattern can be seen: just under two thirds of the entire corpus involves what could be described as some sort of 'violation' of this candidate rule. About 27% are done by speakers (15% stopping without signalling completion and 12% continuing after signalling completion) and about 35% are done by recipients (starting with no completion signal from a speaker).

So, although in three quarters of the cases, speaker's subsequent activities can be seen to match the intonation contour they've used on a possibly complete utterance, and in half the cases recipient's activities can be seen to match the

intonation a speaker has used, it is only in just over a third of the cases (the seventy percent of clean transitions) that the two sets of activities coincide; i.e., a speaker produces completion intonation and stops, and a recipient starts.

Conceivably, then, the intonation contours in question constitute some sort of 'accompaniment' rather than a transition-relevant 'signal', such that in these clean transitions we are seeing an incidental convergence rather than something like cause and effect. Perhaps it's not 'because' a speaker produces completion intonation that a recipient starts up, but it just so happens that a speaker has produced this contour while a recipient has – by reference to such features as action and syntax – found an utterance to be possibly complete.

There is of course another set of materials that would have to be considered: those cases in which a speaker produces a multi-sentence utterance and a recipient remains silent over its course. For example, as in fragment 1.3, 'nNo she's no:t She:'s et school.' 2.2., 'I: don't know exactly I think ih wz arou:nd three uh'clo:ck . . .' 3.2, 'becuz I wz going dih haftih get out (.) early in the morning I have (.) a p– (0.3) transaction et the ba::nk.' 3.14, 'But'e said a lotta times it happens 'e said I could've even been allergic . . .' 4.5, 'I: wasn't talkeen tuh a:nybuddy. (b) Bo–oth Marla'n I slept'ntil about noo:n,' and 4.13, 'Have ↑fun fishin↑ ah hope yih catch a big one,'.

In this very small sample we see both intonation contours used; non-completion in fragments 2.2, 3.2, 3.14, and 4.13, and completion in fragments 1.3 and 4.5. Again then, the relationship of these contours to a speaker's intention to stop or go on, is obscure.

And here's another sort of data which bears on this issue. Some number of recipients starting up in the transition space, finding that the speaker has continued talking, immediately drop out. It was that phenomenon that raised the possibility that what initially looked like 'interjacent', 'post-continuation' onsets were produced to be 'adjacent', 'unmarked next positioned' onsets. Looking back at the small set of samples, fragments 2.10–2.14, we can notice that this phenomenon is associated with both types of speaker intonation. In fragment 2.12, a recipient starts up after completion intonation. But in fragments 2.10, 2.11, 2.13, and 2.14 they start up where there has been possible utterance completion but not completion intonation – and immediately drop out as the speaker keeps going.

That is, it appears that recipients are monitoring not only for a possibly complete utterance, but for a speaker's projected silence thereafter. These could be two distinct and separable aspects of the issue of 'completion'. And recipients could be oriented to the former and not, or not necessarily, to the latter. That is, recipients could be starting to talk by reference to something like 'entitlement', exclusive of a sensitivity to whether a speaker intended to stop or keep going, and had signalled that by one or another intonation contour.

But materials such as fragments 2.10, 2.11, 2.13 and 2.14 suggest that recipients do indeed produce their talk not only by reference to 'entitlement', but by reference to speaker's intentions. However, it appears that they don't use these intonation contours to decide that a speaker is or is not intending to stop or go on. That an utterance is possibly complete, in terms of action and/or syntax, appears to be used to handle both aspects of [illegible]

I take it that the issue is far from settled. And I don't have the analytic resources to handle it. Fortunately, there are sequentially-oriented phonologists like Local and Kelly who are beginning to make some inroads on these sorts of problems.

Author's Note

Some of the results are reported in *Tilburg Papers in Language and Literature*, No. 28, 'Two Explorations of the Organisation of Overlapping Talk in Conversation: Notes on Some Orderliness of Overlap Onset', and 'On a Failed Hypothesis: 'Conjuntionals' as Overlap Vulnerable'. For a version of the former see Jefferson (1983).

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39

Sociolinguistic Resources, Individual Identities, and Public Speech Styles of Texas Women

Barbara Johnstone

Together with two colleagues, I am studying the speech and writing of women from Texas to see how they draw on linguistic resources provided by history, culture, and society in constructing public voices that display personal and regional identity. (See Johnstone et al. 1993 for an overview of the project. See McLeod-Porter 1992; Bean 1993; and Johnstone 1993 for preliminary reports of some findings.)

Our study explores the relationship between individual identity and shared sociolinguistic resources in the description of linguistic variation. It takes a perspective on sociolinguistic variation that supplements the results of studies of language use in relatively tight, focused, homogeneous communities. Using the particularistic techniques of ethnography and discourse analysis, it asks and answers questions about how speakers draw on regional and social models of phonology, morphology, syntax, and pragmatics as they construct and express individual identities in a mobile, multiethnic, linguistically heterogeneous context. Our approach to sociolinguistic variation expands on work by LePage and Tabouret-Keller (1985) and others on linguistic "acts of identity." LePage and Tabouret-Keller point out that people in a given area can be expected to speak alike only if they interact regularly and exclusively with the same people and are trying to express an identity similar to the identities projected by the people they interact with. Their examples of the linguistic heterogeneity possible in a relatively nonfocused speech community come from the Caribbean, where societies are racially and ethnically diverse and where various forms of English, French, and Spanish are available as resources. The heterogeneity that they

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find leads them to suggest that each individual creates his or her own ways of talking, ways that overlap more or less with the ways others talk; they call into question the idea that languages and varieties are widely shared and that people necessarily form speech communities with joint orientation toward group norms.

Sociolinguistic research in the United States and Great Britain has until recently typically taken place in relatively tightly knit communities in which everyone is more or less focused on the same models for talk and makes use of the same sets of linguistic variants. Beginning with the Linguistic Atlas projects, research on language in the American South has likewise sought to describe the speech of relatively closed, stable populations such as small rural towns and urban ghettos, with the assumption that sociolinguistic models that accounted for the relatively stable patterns of variation found there would also account for patterns of variation in other settings. Southern states may indeed at one time have consisted of homogeneous speech communities. For most of the region's history, people could be said to talk the way they did because of where they came from, since people stayed where they were born and interacted with the same people in their community, and few from outside it, all their lives. But does it still make sense, in view of current demographic and economic facts about the South, to suppose that Southerners, or even lower Southerners, or inhabitants of the Appalachians, or Texans, form speech communities analogous to those of Harlem or Detroit or inner-city Belfast? Outsiders and Texans alike tend to think that there is a single linguistic model toward which all Texans either aim or decide not to aim. But clearly all Texans do not speak alike or share the same norms for speech.

It is our view that contemporary Texas is more like the Caribbean than like a neighborhood in Belfast. There are many very different resources available here for the creation and display of idiosyncratic ways of being and sounding, and the many Texans who interact with people outside their immediate communities, either privately or in more public media, have access to varying sets of these resources. Texas is a particularly suitable locale for a study of the linguistic effects of multiple cultural models. It is the quintessentially southwestern state, culturally (and geographically) both southern and western, and it is ethnically diverse, with large Hispanic, Anglo, and African American populations that influence one another. To varying degrees, people in Texas speak English like Southerners, like Californians, like Midwesterners; they speak Spanish, Tex-Mex, Vietnamese, German, Czech; they use features of Black English Vernacular and traditions of African American oratory; they project colorful, direct western personalities or genteel, indirect southern ones (both are stereotypes that they can describe); they try to sound like the people on *Dallas*, the people on *The Cosby Show*, or the people on *Beverly Hills 90210*. Texans shape languages to use as they shape individual identities in the "multidimensional social space" (LePage and Tabouret-Keller 1985:180–186 et passim) suggested by these and other possibilities.

Not all linguistic possibilities are open to all Texans: not all speak Spanish equally well, for example, and some are only able to make small symbolic stabs at sounding southern. Some Texans do continue to live in tightly focused communities

in which linguistic resources are limited and homogeneity is accordingly high. We are not trying to undo the results of dialectology based in such communities, but rather to extend the study of linguistic variation so that it provides a model of the language of people in other, more public contexts as well.

Our research population consists of women who live in Texas. The methodology combines two techniques. (1) Interviews are conducted with women of a variety of demographic backgrounds to elicit attitudes about place, personal identity, and language use. An understanding of generally shared sociolinguistic models on which Texas women draw is thus allowed to emerge from their own senses of who they are and how they show it. (2) Detailed case studies of the language of ten women who have occasion to speak or write in public settings have also been conducted. Our case-study subjects are women who use language in public in a variety of ways: they are teachers, politicians, journalists, storytellers, singers, and orators. These case studies are based on two things. First, we conduct with each woman an interview that is designed to elicit speech in a variety of styles, as well as information about the subjects' histories as speakers and writers and their attitudes about language and speech. As part of the interview, we ask each woman to tell us about what she sees as the main influences on the ways she talks, how she learned to use language as she does, and who and what her models are. Second, we examine other examples of the subjects' writing and speaking in a variety of genres. Subjects of case studies include politician and professor Barbara Jordan, writer and entertainer Sunny Nash, editorialist Molly Ivins, and county spokeswoman Eliza Bishop, as well as other writers and politicians, teachers, an attorney, a labor leader, and a country-western singer and lyricist. Each case study shows how one particular woman draws on shared models for Texas speech, as well as on particular models of speech from family and acquaintance as she creates and expresses a personal identity. The overall project is both sociolinguistic and ethnographic in nature, as we are interested both in how Texans talk and why they talk as they do and in Texans' own understandings of their ways of speaking.[1]

In this article I explore how some of these successful professional women conceive of themselves as language users and why; I also illustrate some ways in which their choices of how to say things serve as a metalinguistic display of the things that they say about who they are. Some of the cultural and linguistic resources that our subjects draw on are easy for them to talk about: they are glad, for example, to discuss how they feel about being Texans and how features associated with Texan speech fit into their linguistic repertoires, and they readily acknowledge the influence of speech styles associated with ethnicity and with vocation. But when we ask about being and sounding like *women*, they hesitate. These accomplished, visible women – many from the generation that grew up struggling for equal rights and influenced by feminism – do not attribute very much about the way they act and speak to female role models or models of women's speech. This article examines why this should be and looks at how these women define themselves as language-users. What will emerge is that the sources of identity expressed in talk and other action are idiosyncratic and particular. Although all of the women whom we have studied draw on [illegible]

expectations and stereotypes as they construct public voices, each does so differently, all draw equally or more on other linguistic and cultural resources, and all attribute the largest part of their identity to very particular facts about their own lives and families. Ideologies about region, gender, and ethnicity do not appear to serve, for these influential women, primarily as constraints on what they can do; rather, models of speech and action that express linguistic ideologies are sources of creativity, selected from and combined in the expression of unique selves.

I look in this article at what four women had to say to us about the sources of their linguistic abilities and styles. All four are middle-aged, between 40 and 60; all are natives of Texas, and all are successful and visible in professions that require them to speak in public, to audiences of people whom they do not and probably never will know and who do not know them, as representatives of their vocations. Linda Chavez-Thompson is Executive Director of the San Antonio Local of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees. She has been involved in union organizing and administration for most of her adult life. She grew up in a Spanish-speaking family in various small towns near Lubbock, Texas. Barbara Jordan, from Houston, is a former U.S. Representative, the first African American woman from the South to be elected to the House. She is especially well known for speeches to the House Judiciary Committee concerning the Nixon impeachment and for two keynote addresses to Democratic conventions. She is now a professor at the University of Texas. Sunny Nash, also African American, is a freelance writer of newspaper columns, screenplays, short stories, and novels, as well as a musician, photographer, and art teacher. She is from Bryan, a medium-sized city in central Texas. Bettye Springer is an attorney in Fort Worth who presents workshops about issues in labor law such as sexual harrassment. She is a West Texan (from Lamesa) of European origin. I examine how these four women talked, in interviews with us, about linguistic models and resources associated with gender, region, ethnicity, and vocation.

My methodology for this aspect of the study is simply to listen carefully and critically to what our research subjects told us about who they are and how they talk. My analysis is of course informed by my understanding that people are not accurate reporters of the finer details about their speech and of the fact that texts, be they literary works or the conversations that I am working with here, do not completely speak for themselves. These women may well be unaware of some of the real sources of their styles, or they may have reason to conceal them. What I am interested in here is how they understand what motivates their choices and how their own understandings of their linguistic images are reflected in their speech.

Resisting Gender Identification

There are vivid traditional models for female speech behavior in Texas. (See Carrington 1975, Crawford and Ragsdale 1992, Exley 1985, Fernea and

Duncan 1977, Furman 1980, and Marshall 1983, for example.)[2] As is Texas in general, Texas women tend to be treated in the state's popular media with a fair amount of positive hyperbole, as tougher and stronger, more glamorous, more neighborly, and "friendlier" than other people are. For white Texans, many of whom are of southern U.S. ancestry, one powerful image is that of the courtly but indirectly powerful "southern belle," with her "iron fist in a velvet glove," as it is often put. There are also popular images (propagated in magazines like the *Texas Monthly*, on TV shows like *The Eyes of Texas*, and in local and national advertising campaigns) of rugged pioneer women working ranches in the southern and western parts of the state. Rural African Americans preserve memories of fiercely independent former slaves farming and raising families by themselves while their menfolk went to the cities to find work. (Some of Sunny Nash's work has in fact involved documenting this history in central Texas.) Contemporary church life provides African American women with other models that involve public speech and action. Traditional models for Hispanic women, perhaps the most restrictive with respect to public action and speech, allow for considerable power within the family. Texas women can also draw on models of womanly speech and behavior from elsewhere. Thus a woman wishing or needing to express a particularly female identity has many resources to draw on, and except perhaps for Hispanic women, such an identity need not imply powerlessness or the lack of a public voice.

But all four research subjects resisted or rejected explanations of their linguistic behavior based on gender. They insisted that they do not, and have never, made or oriented to gender distinctions, and all except labor leader Chavez-Thompson denied that gender discrimination had figured much in their lives. When we asked them whether they had been aware as children of different linguistic or social expectations for girls and boys, they said that such distinctions had not applied to them. Here, for example, Chavez-Thompson talks about noticing different expectations for interaction among men and women when she was a child:[3]

> *Chavez-Thompson:* When [my parents] moved to town, the biggest shock for my mother is that three or four couples could sit and visit in the living room together. The standard for them was that they would visit, eat; the men would go to one place and the women would go to the kitchen and, and, and do the gossip in the kitchen. We approached it differently. In fact, when I was very young, I wondered, "Why did they do that?" you know, because I wanted in and listening in to what the men were saying, because I found that very interesting. And, and they said, "Get away from here," you know, you're sort of like, you're bothering us." Well, I, I was little, so maybe I was bothering them. [*Laughs.*]
> *Johnstone:* [They were] attributing it to being a child, yeah.
> *Chavez-Thompson:* Yeah, because I was a child at the time. ***But I never, I, I really never separated that which women are supposed to do and that which men are supposed to do.*** My first marriage didn't set any barriers; uh, certainly my second marriage did not. And, and so, ***I've really perhaps not, been there for, obstacles many many other women have had placed before them.*** Although some obstacles are, you know, have always been there.

Chavez-Thompson describes how females in her family were expected not to participate in the men's conversation, but when the men would ask *her* to leave, she attributes it to her having been a nuisance, not to her having been a girl. The same reluctance to identify herself with other women characterizes her descriptions of interactions as an adult. She brings up the topic of "obstacles many other women have had placed before them" but denies having faced such obstacles in her marriages.

Chavez-Thompson did describe how being a woman made her job difficult at times. Here she tells about first coming to work for the government employees' union:

> I came to work for the organization in June of 1971. But it was basically just, you know, having to battle the fact that I am a woman . . . and that I am at the same level as business agents of plumbers and pipe fitters and, and whatever organization; it was difficult. Even, even my own – even here within this organization; it was difficult, because a HISPANIC woman, in the union business, is a bigger, a, a, a more rare thing. . . . I signed up the first 13 people in this union. And I had bottles thrown at me, when, when I was out there. . . . It was a long time before, uh, people of that mentality treated me differently than, than a secretary.

When she was asked, however, whether being in this position required her to learn to talk or act in more traditionally male ways, Chavez-Thompson hesitated, first appearing to say yes and then firmly saying no:

> *Johnstone*: Do you think that, when women, including yourself, get into, get into positions like yours, they have to learn to talk like men or to act more like men or would you just, would you describe it some other way, how you managed to do that?
> *Chavez-Thompson: There are times when you have to, to be just like a man, I guess,* if that's, that's, talking is, is –
> *Johnstone:* – Yeah, that's part of it. –
> *Chavez-Thompson:* – is part of that. But I've, I've had a few of, quite a few of those moments, but *I've never acted like anything but what you'd describe as a lady. Or a woman, you know, I just, I do things, as I think they are. The biggest respect that I get from someone is that they look at me as their union representative, not as a woman. Not as a woman acting like a man,* but just because of the talent that I may have, to resolve their problems.

Chavez-Thompson does not want others to identify her with her gender; she wants the people whom she works with to "look at me as their union representative, not as a woman." Nor does she want to attribute to gender any influence her own speech or behavior ("not as a woman acting like a man"). Yet she described situations in which it is clear that others do identify her with her gender and in which it would be easy to describe Chavez-Thompson's behavior as "acting like a man." The following excerpt illustrates both (she was describing a recent conversation with a group of sheriff's deputies):

> *Chavez-Thompson:* But, but, in fact, in fact, in fact, they st-*they call me "Mom."*
> *Johnstone:* Oh yeah?

Chavez-Thompson: Yeah. Now they call me "Mom," but every once in a se- in a, in a while, *I ask them, "What kind of mother are you calling me?"* Uh, because [*laughing*] honest! They're bad sometimes! But the question here for them – and, and for me – is that occasionally a city manager or occasionally a department head, ah, that because I'm a woman they're going to be able to walk all over me, or because I'm a woman I don't know how to take them on. And every once in a while, ah, I have to show them, that they're getting to deal with me at the same level as they would a man. *And, uh, I don't often have to use the strong language that I, I, I am sometimes prone to do. Ah, I know some words, but I, and, and, and I am prone to do that.*

Both in turning "Mom" into a joke about a familiar profanity ("What kind of mother are you calling me?") and in describing her "proneness" to use "strong language," Chavez-Thompson is, by standards that she herself is aware of, "acting like a man"; and in calling her "Mom," others are, at least superficially, treating her like a woman (though the playfully aggressive tenor of the whole interaction could be described as more typically male than female; Tannen 1993a). Yet Chavez-Thompson continues throughout to be very reluctant to acknowledge either. She does not want to describe herself in these ways and does so only when pressed, interestingly often becoming less articulate – hesitating and stuttering – when she does.

Barbara Jordan also denied having noticed gender distinctions in expected linguistic behavior as a child:

Johnstone: Were there other contexts in which you noticed, uh, that girls were **supposed** to speak differently than boys, or less, or more, or
[more carefully?
Jordan: [*I really can't, I really have no recollection of that being a distinction.*

Jordan rejected an explicit question about gender differences in public oratory and denied speaking differently to women than to men:

Porter: I have a couple of questions for you about, about what I'd call women's style of, of speech making. Do you, have any sense of whether or not your style is different from say some of the men counterparts that you've uh encountered in your career?
Jordan: I, uh, I just, I s- I have, *I have no sense of that* because I don't know how a man does his speeches or gets them and, and, um, presentation. I, *I have no idea.*
Porter: Well, whenever you're preparing a speech and you know that you're speaking to an audience predominantly of men as opposed to an audience predominantly of women, do you make adjustments to meet the needs of that particular, those particular groups?
Jordan: [*Laugh.*] *I don't. I really don't.* I, uh, and I have, I will of course think of the group, and, uh, for instance it was late December when I went to Dallas to speak to a group of, uh, the women's foundation or whatever, and when in preparing that speech I thought, "This is a, a women – this is a woman's group and they will want something specifically about women and so after I do the rest of the stuff that I want to say here I better throw in something like that," and I'll try to find a good quote that may be appropriate for the occasion, that sort of thing.

Under Porter's repeated questioning, Jordan did eventually acknowledge that an audience of women might "want something specifically about women" and that as a result she "throws in" something like "a good quote" "after I do the rest of the stuff that I want to say." This acknowledgment of an effect of audience gender on Jordan's speech is about as minimal as possible, and its phrasing reflects its intent, as Jordan departs from her normally very formal style to use expressions like "stuff" and "throw in." When we pressed her about what a women's group might want to hear about, Jordan appeared very deliberately to frustrate our expectations:

> *Porter:* Now would you move towards something that was more story-oriented, anecdotal for women, as opposed to –
> *Jordan:* No, *more theoretical, philosophical in general.*
> *Porter:* For, for?
> *Jordan:* For women, right.

Porter was finally forced to back off the issue, and Jordan had the last word:

> *Porter:* Interesting. Um, so then you're not conscious of any kinds of adaptations that speakers make when they're addressing different [audiences.]
> *Jordan: [I'm not.] I am not.*

Attorney Bettye Springer also resisted suggestions that her linguistic style might be related to her gender or that of her audiences. Here, asked whether her "participatory" style in the workshop that we observed could be a style typical of women, she began to agree, but immediately backtracked, ending by suggesting that a person's style is a matter of "who you go around with."

> *Johnstone:* Some, uh, some people would want to claim that that kind of more participatory style was more more likely to be a woman's style, and the more kind of lecture style was more of a man's style. How do you, how do you feel about that? Big generalization, of course, but –
> *Springer:* Let me think. That very well could be; now the fellow that's in there for my law firm right now that's participating in the mock trial, uh, M___F___, I, I've worked with him a lot on programs and I've seen him take questions and do participatory, but maybe not quite to the extent I do. But I have seen him do that some, uh, but – and I will say that the woman who works with me, uh, who but you didn't meet, but her name is S___G___ – she's a fifth-year lawyer. I guess you'd say I've trained her, and I, we still work together in doing training, and I see that she's adopted the style that I have, because she's seen me the most. *So maybe it's who you go around with.*

Springer brought up the topic of role models (she called them "protegés") in the interview, partly in order, it seemed, to make the point that hers had been men:

> *Springer:* You didn't – One thing that you didn't ask me about, that I thought you might, was did I have a protegé.
> *Bean:* Do tell.
> *Springer:* And, and I really did have a protegé that, that might be of interest to you.

Chavez-Thompson agreed that she had not had many female role models:

> *Bean:* So you've had role models, Hispanic role models, but not too many women.
> *Chavez-Thompson:* No, not too many women. Just very few and far between.

Writer Sunny Nash also repeatedly denied having had role models of either gender:

> *Johnstone:* When you, when you do your writing now, are you influenced by some authors more than others, or?
> *Nash:* No .... Generally, generally, the things just kind of pour out of my own experience.

More specifically, she said that she had not learned how to be a public speaker from either of the women in her family:

> *Johnstone:* How did you learn to be a public speaker, for example?=
> *Nash:*=Oh.
> *Johnstone:* From your parents, from your grandmother?
> *Nash:* No, no, my mother is probably the shiest person in the world [*laughing*]: she doesn't even talk to me. [*Laughs.*] She's very, very shy. . . . And my grandmother talked to herself a lot and, uh, and prayed out loud s- but I think, see I had all kinds of uh projects of my own when I was a kid.

Although a closer linguistic analysis would indubitably show that the linguistic interaction of the interviews, and the speech of our subjects, was in some ways clearly affected by our and their gender, the subjects appeared to be making little *strategic* use of "sex-class-linked" linguistic features (Tannen, in press) in their talk. Like that of Chavez-Thompson, Springer, and Jordan, Nash's speech in the interview reflects her rejection of traditionally female models for Texas speech and of stereotypical models of women's speech in general. None, for example, displays the indirectness or the positive politeness associated with southern female speech style; none makes a display of linguistic hesitancy; all speak with fairly low-pitched voices.[4]

Manipulating Regional Identity

The women's reluctance to talk about their speech styles in terms of gender contrasts strikingly with their willingness to talk about themselves in terms of region. All but Nash claim to orient their style to models of Texanhood, and all including Nash talk about using their Texanness strategically, especially with outsiders. Models for speech and other action identified as particularly Texan are ubiquitous: Texans have for several generations been encouraged to think of their state as unique and superior, and Texas's size and population now makes it a target for specialized advertising that plays on traditional images such as the state flag and the shape of the state, as well as on ways of dressing, acting, and talking which are seen as especially Texan. (See Duffer and Sewell n.d.)

People can "talk Texan" in varying degrees. Some use speech and discourse

only occasionally, mainly with non-Texans, for strategic purposes such as getting attention or seeming exotic. Many Texas speakers symbolize their regional identification on a more regular basis, making more consistent use of a few features that have become linguistic badges of Texas identity. These include the use of *y'all*, at least in the nominative and oblique cases and often also in the possessive (*y'all's*), the monophthongization of /ay/ preceding voiceless obstruents (in words like *night* and *like*),[5] and discourse-level displays of extreme "positive politeness" (Brown and Levinson 1987) such as extended, elaborate greetings. There are, of course, still many small-town or rural Texans, many older, who "talk Texan" because, living in small, homogeneous communities and interacting mainly in a dense, multiplex social network, they have limited linguistic resources from which to choose. These are the speakers favored as informants in traditional dialectology and modeled best by much current sociolinguistic theory, but none of our research subjects are in this category.

Since the traditional stereotypical Texan – the relaxed, neighborly, south-midland-accented cowboy in roper boots and hat – is a white man, state imagery is more easily available to white women than to others. Bettye Springer talked at length about the role of Texanness in her presentation of self to outsiders:

> *Bean:* We do seem to have some sort of attitude about the state. Do you have any particular feeling about the state?
> *Springer:* [*Emphatically.*] Oh I, I do, um and I can tell you, I can – with an anecdote. When I lived in Chicago, particularly in Chicago and everyone was from somewhere, and they were either Irish or they were Polish or they were this or they were that and my best friend in law school was Hungarian, but everybody was something.
> *Johnstone:* That's real important in Chicago.
> *Springer:* And, and people would always ask me, "Well, what are you?" and I'd always tell them, "I'm a Texan." [*Bean laughing.*] Because I can remember growing up, I never was a German, which is what my Daddy was, or anything else; you were a Texan. . . . So I always had that identity and I'm still – there's things that that we have in the state that I'm not particularly proud of, like guns and stuff, but uh . . . but I'm proud of where I'm from.

Springer talked at length about what she felt characterizes the interactive style of Texans – a combination of independence and friendliness – which she illustrated with the example of Texas drivers who sometimes make their own rules on the road but still wave at one another.

When we asked Barbara Jordan if she felt that Southernness was part of what shaped her style, she hesitated, saying that she hadn't always been proud of the region. But her identification with Texas was clearer.

> Well, I, uh, uh, I'm proud of the South too. I wasn't always but, uh, I grew to become, uhh, fond of the South and of course it's the race question that, uh, made the South a negative for me for so long, but when I was a member of Congress, uh, the Southerners would y- sort of get together: there was an affinity among the Southern contingent in the United States House of Representatives which you could not count on in any other region of the country. . . . When when I was there, uh, *Texas was was sort of a a*

thing apart, and we at least we considered ourselves a thing apart [laughing] and just a little bit superior, eh, to tell the truth of the matter. And that's a function of Texas braggadocio, that's what that is.

Linda Chavez-Thompson told us an anecdote of a genre that one hears repeatedly in Texas: a story about surprising outsiders with what is called Texas "friendliness." ("Friendliness," in this context, usually means active courtesy to strangers. For example, "driving friendly," as motorists are encouraged to do with road signs, means pulling onto the shoulder to let others pass. The most commonly adduced contrast with this mode of behavior is the behavior, experienced or imagined, of people from "the East" or "the North.")

Johnstone: You think of yourself as a Texan, then, in addition to–
Chavez-Thompson: – Yeah. Yeah. Very much a Texan. . . . We had a convention here in 1988. The people from California came. I do not know what they expected. And I got more compliments from, "Ohh, ya'll are just WONDERFUL; the people HERE they're so friendly!" I wondered what they had ever heard about Texas for them to think that we wouldn't be. And, I think that this image of Texans, you know, as, uh, guns, you know, the the saloon, the the twang. I, I have no idea what other people think of us –
Johnstone: The kind of Wild West,
[do you think? That's what they were expecting?
Chavez-Thompson: [I think so, sort of like the Wild West, yeah. And, and so they were absolutely floored by how friendly – "We even asked somebody on the street for directions, and they were so nice! They gave us directions." [*Laughter.*] Well, aren't you supposed to?

Springer told a similar story, about surprising an airport bus full of dentists attending a convention by being a "friendly Texan." Both Chavez-Thompson and Nash talked about using their Texanness strategically. Chavez-Thompson spoke of "the showmanship issue":

I'm very guilty, ever since [former governor] Ann Richards came into the picture in Texas, of using her phrases, her Texas twang. I find myself doing that when I am somewhere else. I twang it, you know, I actually do! . . . I can talk like Ann Richards, and I do it deliberately. Again, the showmanship issue.

Nash also employs her Texanness for professional reasons ("I capitalize on the Texas aspect"), although she denied feeling the need for a real regional identity. For example, she used being a Texan (an exotic identity in the context, especially for an African American) to get bookings in the East Coast jazz-club scene that she tried to break into for a time.

All four women, then, claimed that the ways they speak are sometimes influenced by their being from Texas. Some illustrated this in their speech to us during the interviews, too. Both Springer and Chavez-Thompson use monophthongal /ay/, Chavez-Thompson variably and Springer fairly invariably, before voiceless obstruents, and both used *y'all* occasionally, even in the fairly formal context of an interview with two or three professors

Orientations to Ethnicity

Except in occasional, often commercial displays such as German Oktoberfests and Czech kolache-baking contests, the Anglo Texans whom we have studied make reference to their national origins less often than do many other European Americans. (This is attested, for example, in Springer's comments quoted above about how much more important being "from somewhere" was in Chicago than at home.)[6] White ethnicity in Texas is to a considerable extent conflated with regional identity. But if regional identity can be most easily drawn on and exploited by white Texans, ethnic identity is most easily available as a model for action and talk to Hispanic and African American Texans. Jordan, Nash, and Chavez-Thompson all talked about ethnic identity. Each orients to ethnicity in two ways: she draws on ethnic models in some respects, and she actively resists and rejects ethnic models in others. Nash, for example, talked about rejecting her community's ways of talking, at the price of being seen as different:

> *Nash:* My mother didn't speak that often, but when she did, she read to me, and she always used correct language. She always did; she never told me I had to, but she always did, so that's what I heard.
> *Bean:* This is the way it's done, kind of -
> *Nash:* -Un-hnn. And, and now down the street, at the Candy Hill Market, now that's not the way people talked. And they would look at me real funny.

In her writing, Nash orients herself to her perception that whites expect blacks to write in an emotional way and attempts not to write that way, choosing instead a reportorial style. Some of Nash's work is also partly aimed at undercutting what she sees as ethnic expectations: she has, for example, collected and restored antique photographs of and written newspaper columns about local rural African Americans who, contrary to stereotype, were sometimes quite wealthy.

For Barbara Jordan, African American speech style is an inalienable element of her own. Although she does not think of herself as a "preacher," she describes the influence of black preaching style on that of any black orator:

> The, uh, what black or-, oratory is an important ingredient of the black experience because preachers have been so paramount in leadership roles in the black community throughout the country. You are going to find that there are any number of people who are public speakers who try to reflect what they have heard from their minister, and the black minister has a definable and totally, uh, in my opinion different style of oratory than anybody else in the country. And it is because of that role of the black minister, a role which I don't believe is paramount in any other race or group of people but it is that, it is there, it is there for us, and it is because of that preaching that, uh, influences, I think, the way that a person who is black would deliver an, an address or a speech.

When asked if she was "part of that tradition," Jordan exclaimed, "Of course I am! How can I not be a part of that tradition?"

Linda Chavez-Thompson speaks of rejecting ethnic stereotyping as a child by refusing to notice it:

> *Chavez-Thompson:* In school, uh, I know that I was less than ten years old and I remember feeling different because, uh, a little boy and a little girl called me a Mexican. And, Is-you know, I said, "Well, I know THAT" you know, it was like,
> *Johnstone:* [So what?
> *Chavez-Thompson:* [so what's wrong with that? And then, my own, my own, when I say my own, my, my friends, who were Hispanics, Mexican Americans treating me differently, because I used to hang out with some of the Anglo girls in school, because they did, they, they, and I got, *I never really saw and never treated myself as any different.*

But she also described insisting to the manager on proper service in a restaurant where her family was treated sloppily, attributing the sloppiness to their being "the only Hispanic family in the place." Being Hispanic is connected with Chavez-Thompson's vocational identity in a very direct way: most of the members of the union local that she manages are Hispanic, and her job involves using Spanish fairly often.[7] Her speech (in English) to us was not markedly Hispanic-sounding. (Features of Hispanic English include, for example, the pronunciation of *-ing* as [in], the devoicing of /z/, the deletion of the regular past-tense marker when the root ends in an alveolar consonant, and the use of intonation patterns that sound hesitant to non-Hispanics; see LeVine and Franco 1982 and Peñalosa 1981.) She did, however, display her ethnic identity during the interview in nonlinguistic ways, describing at length how her grandfather taught her to make formal speeches (in correct Mexican Spanish) as a child and how moved she felt when she and her daughter visited Mexico City for the first time.

Jordan displayed her willingness to identify herself with her ethnic group in several ways. Her speech style in general is characterized by displays of verbal virtuosity: elevated diction, self-conscious word choice (and commentary about word choice), extremely careful articulation, grammatical complexity, and a lack of editing. These are features that have been identified with African American style (see Balester 1993) and traced historically to the valuation in black culture of the "man of words" (Abrahams 1976). Jordan also switched into markedly African American phonology and intonation at one point in the interview, during a narrative about talking to an elementary-school class. Nash's linguistic style was not noticeably (to us) influenced in the interview by African American models, though perhaps the main theme of the interview was her assertiveness and uniqueness, characteristics that Hecht et al. (1993) have described as "core symbols" for African Americans.

Expressing Individuality

To summarize, the women whose talk I have examined here are uncomfortable defining themselves, or having others define them, in terms of gender. Even when they can cite cases in which they are treated differently because they are women or in which their

them well, they deny talking or acting like women and claim to have been uninfluenced by gender discrimination. On the other hand, they readily acknowledge acting and talking like Texans, either all the time or for strategic purposes; and they are not unwilling to cite ways in which their ethnic identities influence their behavior and speech. Why should this be?

One explanation is psychological. Whitehead and Smith (1986:166) cite a number of studies showing that Americans attribute their own success to their ability, effort, and other internal factors, while they attribute failure to external factors such as the difficulty of the task or bad luck. The women whom I have described here are all highly successful, some despite considerable odds. It may not be surprising, then, that they explain their achievements in terms of psychological predispositions: they have no need to present themselves as victims of the process of identity ascription and no real reason to present themselves as its beneficiaries. But this does not explain why they *are*, in fact, willing to talk about empowerment via region and ethnicity.

Another part of the explanation may have to do with the nature of the handicap imposed by female gender. It could be that, by these people, talking or acting "like a woman" is still seen as a liability in a way talking like a Texan or like an African American or like a Hispanic is not. It could be, in other words, that for these women ascribed gender identity is still a greater social and linguistic burden than is regional identity or ethnic identity. This is despite the fact that a Texas "twang" is a decidedly mixed blessing in terms of linguistic prestige for people in public life (and Texans are well aware of the stigma attached to Southern-sounding speech) and despite the continuing stigmatization of African Americans and Hispanics.

To understand completely why Chavez-Thompson, Jordan, Nash, and Springer talk about talk they way they do, we need to examine their own most common and most spontaneous explanations for the provenance of their acting and speaking styles. For these women, ethnicity, gender, and region are not determinants of how people talk. Instead, they are resources that are selectively and sometimes consciously used in the presentation of self. They reject the notion that they talk and act as they do because they are women or because they are African Americans, or Hispanics, or Anglos, or Texans. What they present to the world when they write, orate, negotiate, or lecture are, they insist, their unique selves, shaped by particular circumstances of birth, family, inclination, and luck. Each claimed repeatedly that she talked and acted the way she did because she always had, because she was born that way, because of influences of particular friends and relatives early in life. Nash, for example, "always knew" that she was talented with words. She refers to her style as something that "started happening" when she was in elementary school. Most explicitly, Nash points out that the linguistic choices she makes are in service of the expression of her individual uniqueness, "who I am":

> *Nash:* Well, it's, it's actually in in the handling of the language. I want to make sure that I am not digressing from who I am when I speak. When I, when I speak, uh,

verbally or when I speak, uh, in the written [mode], "This is me." I don't want to be somebody else when I'm writing a story about [my father-in-law], I want to be the same person who wrote the story about [a farmer]. . . . "That's the same person," you can read the story and say "I bet that's the same person [who wrote that]," even though the material is completely different.

Springer attributes her success in court to "being *herself*," in response to a question that was meant to get her to talk about being *a woman:*

Johnstone: Do people ever talk about differences in style between male and female attorneys in the in the courtroom?
Springer: Yes, they do, a lot. Uh, in the courtroom, uh, difference in style and people have told me that they think that I'm successful in the courtroom because I can identify with the jury, that the juries like me. *And I haven't ever figured out why, except that I try to smile, and I try to just be myself,* and I don't put on any airs.

When Springer does attribute aspects of her style to the influence of a woman (her mother), she does so, interestingly, by means of a biological metaphor that immediately particularizes the source of influence: she claims to have inherited her mother's "teacher genes."

Linda Chavez-Thompson also speaks of a relative, the grandfather who taught her to make speeches in Spanish, as an important source of influence. But she attributes her success as a negotiator and administrator mainly to her own inborn talent, a "sixth sense" that she has always had, as recognized by a man for whom she worked as a secretary:

When I met this gentleman, he, maybe recognized the potential. Uh, whether he recognized *a talent that I might have had. I have almost this, this sixth sense* of people sitting down and beginning to tell me their problem, and *I automatically* can figure out what the solution might be and how do we get there. And *I've always had this*; I, I, I'm sort of like a middle child in the family. There's two older, and there's, there's, uh, five younger, but I'm the one that, that everybody looks to to make a decision.

For these women, the primary reasons for linguistic choice are particular reasons. They talk as they do because they are the particular individuals they are, shaped by the particular circumstances of their birth, family, and community. If there are speakers who are victims of their gender, ethnicity, or place of origin, speakers who "are spoken by" language rather than creating language as they speak, the successful public speakers whom we are studying do not feel that they are in that group. These women are resourceful in two ways: as members of a mobile, heterogenous society, they have many resources from which to choose as they construct ways of expressing their uniqueness, and they are good at doing so. As Linda Chavez-Thompson puts it:

And I think that the advantage – and I use it, believe me, I use it – the advantage is, uh, I AM female. I AM Hispanic. I am, uh, labor. Of course, some people would take that as three strikes against me, but, but that's besides the point.

Not all speakers are as resourceful. For some, limited education or limited contacts outside a small, tight community mean that fewer choices are available; for others, the aptitide or motivation to choose effectively is lacking. I do not mean to suggest that ideologies about gender and other social attributes do not exert enormous influence over how people talk. I do want to point out, though, that the process is an indirect one, always mediated by the individual.

Discussion

In a 1993 article, Donna Eder reports on a study of working-class adolescent girls' teasing about romance and sex. Eder found that the girls referred to traditional concepts of how females were supposed to act in teasing each other, but that the teasing functioned more to strengthen bonds among the girls than to socialize them as females. Stereotypical romantic and sexual behavior was a resource to be played with rather than a source of inescapable influence. This finding leads Eder to call for more study of "the spontaneous and innovative side of an individual's behavior" (1993:29) and to wonder whether adults as well as children might not selectively use dominant social ideologies as resources.

Our study of Texas women suggests that the answer is yes. To see ideologies about gender, ethnicity, and region primarily as constraints on what a person can do is to miss the fact that individuals use ideologies creatively. As speakers decide, consciously or unconsciously, how to sound, they pick and choose from among the available ways of sounding. Our interviews with Texas women show that this is in fact the way they themselves understand their language. People, at least people like these, those who shape public discourse, are motivated at least as much by the need for self-expression – the expression of a unique, differentiated self – as they are by the necessity to replicate social ideologies.

The women whom we are studying take various approaches to being Texans and to being women, as well as different approaches to their ethnic backgrounds and to their vocations. They are members of a common speech community in that they all participate, to one extent or another, in a large public network of influence, but they cannot be said to orient to the same set of norms for speech or other behavior. Instead, their sociolinguistic identities are constructed in discourse. These Texans shape languages to use as they shape individual identities in the social space defined by the axes of region, gender, vocation, ethnicity, and ideologies about talk, as well as by more particular axes of family, community, psychology, and the need for individuation.

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Notes

1. Both in its concern with speech and writing for public audiences and in its use of sociolinguistic data collected in relatively formal interviews, the project thus focuses on relatively non-"vernacular" speech, in contrast to many other sociolinguistic studies. This is because we are interested in the public sources of influence that increasingly supplement private neighborhood and family networks as agents of linguistic change.
2. The material in this paragraph is greatly condensed, in the interest of space. It is drawn from the language-attitude interviews described above and from the enormous literature in history, political science, literary studies, and anthropology on Texas women.
3. Transcription conventions: I have indicated overlapping talk with brackets and latched talk with equal signs; the transcriptions otherwise employ normal English orthography and punctuation. I am more interested in this article in what the subjects said than in how they said it, and this system makes the transcripts easiest to read. Capitalization indicates unusual emphasis. Material that I have left out is indicated with ellipses.
4. There is not much scholarship to date on discourse-level features of southern speech; see Johnstone 1992 for an overview of what has been done. There is, of course, an enormous body of scholarship on language and gender in general, but this is not the place to review it. See Tannen 1993b, for example, for work on gender and interactional style; Eckert 1989 on sociolinguistic effects of gender; Graddol and Swann 1989:12–40 and Sachs et al. 1973 on biological versus learned aspects of vocal pitch.
5. Monophthongized or glide-reduced /ay/ before *voiced* sounds is common throughout the South; it is specifically monophthongization before *voiceless* obstruents that appears to be associated with Texas identity. Bailey 1991 shows that opinion-poll respondents who rate Texas as a "good" or "excellent" place to live are more likely than others to use monophthongal /ay/ before voiceless obstruents.
6. The issue of religious identity and ethnicity connected with it is more complicated. I have not dealt with it here.
7. The variety spoken in this sort of context is not actually called, by its speakers, "Spanish." It is a variety that involves frequent, extremely fluent switches from English vocabulary and syntax to Spanish and back, with the conversation as a whole sometimes seeming more Spanish and sometimes more English. The case can be and has been made that this is a distinct "language" or "dialect" (linguists do not have an appropriate term) rather than the result of switching between two separate languages. Linda Chavez-Thompson, like many Texas Hispanics, calls the variety "Tex-Mex" (another of the case-study subjects uses the expression "speaking mixed") and emphatically denies that people are speaking Spanish when they speak this way; further west, it is sometimes referred to as Pocho Spanish. See Anzaldua 1987, Ornstein-Galicia 1981, and Peñalosa 1981.

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The Role of Knowledge in Discourse Comprehension: A Construction–Integration Model

Walter Kintsch

Discourse comprehension, from the viewpoint of a computational theory, involves constructing a representation of a discourse upon which various computations can be performed, the outcomes of which are commonly taken as evidence for comprehension. Thus, after comprehending a text, one might reasonably expect to be able to answer questions about it, recall or summarize it, verify statements about it, paraphrase it, and so on.

To achieve these goals, current theories use representations with several mutually constraining layers. Thus, there is typically a linguistic level of representation, conceptual levels to represent both the local and global meaning and structure of a text (e.g., the micro- and macrostructure, constituting the *text base* in van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983), and a level at which the text itself has lost its individuality and its information content has become integrated into some larger structure (e.g., van Dijk & Kintsch's situation model).

Many different processes are involved in constructing these representations. To mention just a few, there is word identification, where, say, a written word like *bank* must somehow provide access to what we know about banks, money, and overdrafts. There is a parser that turns phrases like *the old men and women* into propositions such as AND[OLD[MEN],OLD[WOMEN]]. There is an inference mechanism that concludes from the phrase *The hikers saw the bear* that they were scared. There are macro-operators that extract the gist of a passage. There are processes that generate spatial imagery from a verbal description of a place.

It is one thing for a theorist to provide some formal description (e.g., a simulation model) for how such processes can occur and for what the computational

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steps were that led to a particular word identification, inference, or situation model. It is quite another to control construction processes in such a way that at each point in the process exactly the right step is taken. Part of the problem has to do with the characteristic ambiguity of language: How do we make sure that we access the financial meaning of *bank*, and not the meaning of *riverbank*? Why did we parse *the old men and women* as we did – maybe the women were not old at all. Why did we infer that the hikers were scared rather than that they had their eyes open, or a myriad of other irrelevancies? Of all the many ways macro-operators could be applied, how did we get just the right sequence to reach a plausible gist without making the wrong generalizations? The number of possible alternative steps is distressingly large in constructing discourse representations, and without firm guidance, a computational model could not function properly for long. That is where knowledge comes in.

General knowledge about words, syntax, the world, spatial relations – in short, general knowledge about anything – constrains the construction of discourse representations at all levels. Indeed, this is what makes it possible to construct these representations. There is a striking unanimity among current theories about how this is done.

Our conceptions about knowledge use in discourse comprehension are dominated by the notions of top–down effects and expectation-driven processing. Knowledge provides part of the context within which a discourse is interpreted. The context is thought of as a kind of filter through which people perceive the world. At the level of word recognition and parsing, it lets through only the appropriate meaning of an ambiguous word or phrase and suppresses the inappropriate one. Through semantic priming, the feature counter of the logogen for *bank as a financial institution* will be incremented and will reach its threshold before that of *riverbank* in the right context (Morton, 1969). Parsing a sentence is often thought of as predicting each successive constituent from those already analyzed on the basis of syntactic rules (Winograd, 1983). Scripts, frames, and schemata constrain the inferences an understander makes (as in Schank & Abelson, 1977), thereby preventing the process from being swamped in a flood of irrelevancies and redundancies. Arithmetic strategies generate just the right hypothesis in solving a word problem and preclude the wrong ones (Kintsch & Greeno, 1985). In a word, knowledge makes understanding processes smart: It keeps them on the right track and avoids exploring blind alleys. People understand correctly because they sort of know what is going to come. This program of research is well expressed by the following quotation from Schank (1978, p. 94), which served as a motto for Sharkey's (1986) model of text comprehension:

> We would claim that in natural language understanding, a simple rule is followed. Analysis proceeds in a top-down predictive manner. Understanding is expectation based. It is only when the expectations are useless or wrong that bottom–up processing begins.

Empirically, this position is questionable: Even fluent readers densely sample the words of a text, as indicated by their eye fixations (Just & Carpenter, 1980).

making the bottom–up mode appear the rule rather than the exception. Computationally, it is not an easy idea to make work. It is difficult to make a system smart enough so that it will make the right decisions, yet keep it flexible enough so that it will perform well in a broad range of situations. On the one hand, one needs to make sure that exactly the right thing (word meaning, proposition, inference) will be constructed; for that purpose one needs powerful, smart rules that react sensitively to subtle cues. On the other hand, humans comprehend well in ever-changing contexts and adapt easily to new and unforeseen situations; for that purpose one needs robust and general construction rules. Scripts and frames, as they were first conceived, are simply not workable: If they are powerful enough, they are too inflexible, and if they are general enough, they fail in their constraining function. This dilemma has long been recognized (e.g., Schank, 1982; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983), and efforts have been undertaken to make expectation-driven processes sufficiently flexible (e.g., Schank's memory organization packets, or MOPs). In this article, an alternative solution to this problem will be explored.

Construction of Discourse Representations

The traditional approach to modeling knowledge use in comprehension has been to design powerful rules to ensure that the right elements are generated in the right context. The problem is that it is very difficult to design a production system powerful enough to yield the right results but flexible enough to work in an environment characterized by almost infinite variability. The approach taken here is to design a much weaker production system that generates a whole set of elements. These rules need to be just powerful enough so that the right element is likely to be among those generated, even though others will also be generated that are irrelevant or outright inappropriate. An integration process will then be used to strengthen the contextually appropriate elements and inhibit unrelated and inappropriate ones. Weak productions can operate in many different contexts because they do not have to yield precise outputs; on the other hand, a context-sensitive integration process is then required to select among the outputs generated. The integration phase is the price the model pays for the necessary flexibility in the construction process.

The model proposed here has been termed a *construction–integration* model to emphasize its most salient feature. It combines a construction process in which a text base is constructed from the linguistic input as well as from the comprehender's knowledge base, with an integration phase, in which this text base is integrated into a coherent whole. The knowledge base is conceptualized as an associative network. The construction process is modeled as a production system. Indeed, it is a generalization of the production system used in earlier work, such as the simulation-of-comprehension processes developed by Fletcher (1985) and Dellarosa (1986) after the model of Kintsch and Greeno (1985). The main difference is that instead of precise inference rules, sloppy ones are used, resulting in an incoherent, potentially contradictory output. However, this output structure

is itself in the form of an associative net, which can be shaped into a coherent text base via relaxation procedures in the connectionist manner (e.g., Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). Thus, the model represents a symbiosis of production systems and connectionist approaches.[1]

Certain limitations of the present article are worth noting at this point, for it does not offer a solution to all the problems in discourse understanding. Thus, it is not primarily concerned with the specific strategies (or rules) for the construction of text propositions or inferencing. Instead, it relies in this respect on what is available in the literature as well as on whatever future researchers will be able to come up with. The only point it makes is that whatever these strategies or rules are, they will be easier to formulate within the present framework, which allows them to be both weaker and more general. Thus, one need not worry about constructing just the right inference, but can be content with a much sloppier rule. Sometimes, of course, even the latter type of rule may be hard to come by, whereas in other cases (e.g., in the word problems discussed later) promiscuous hypothesis generation is straightforward (while selecting just the right one can be tricky).

Knowledge Representation

The process of constructing a discourse representation relies heavily on knowledge. To understand how it operates, one must first have an idea of how the to-be-used knowledge is organized. Typically, theorists have tried to create knowledge structures to support smart processes: semantic nets, frames, scripts, and schemata. As has been argued elsewhere (Kintsch, in press), such fixed structures are too inflexible and cannot adapt readily enough to the demands imposed by the ever-changing context of the environment. Instead, a minimally organized knowledge system is assumed here in which structure is not prestored, but generated in the context of the task for which it is needed. An associative net with positive as well as negative interconnections serves this purpose.

Knowledge is represented as an associative net, the nodes of which are concepts or propositions.[2] The nodes in this net are interconnected. Connections among nodes have a strength value, which may be positive, zero, or negative, ranging from 1 to −1. Nodes consist of a head plus a number of slots for arguments. Thus, the nodes of the knowledge net are formally equivalent to the propositions used to represent texts (e.g., Kintsch, 1974).[3] The slot specifies the nature of the relation between the head and the argument. Slots may represent attributes, parts, cases of verbs, or arguments of functions. They need not be named, but may be named if the relation is a common one (such as the cases of verb frames). The arguments of a proposition are concepts or other propositions. The number of arguments in a proposition may vary from one to some small number. Examples of common types of nodes in the knowledge net are (a) MARY, (b) CAKE, (c) SWEET[CAKE], (d) BAKE[agent:MARY,object:CAKE], (e) CONSEQUENCE [condition:NOT[WATCH[agent:MARY,object:CAKE],effect:BURN[object:CAKE]]. Examples A and B are lexical nodes that have associated with them perceptual procedures that identify certain patterns in the environment – either the objects

themselves or the written or spoken words, such as MARY and CAKE, respectively. In the following I shall not deal with these perceptual procedures explicitly. The semantic and associative relations into which MARY and CAKE enter, which constitute a part of the general knowledge net, are the focus of interest here. MARY and CAKE appear as arguments in Examples C through E in various roles (the agent and object slots, etc.).

There are two ways of looking at the list of propositions in Examples A through E. On the one hand, it could be considered simply as a portion of a general knowledge network, whereas on the other hand, it could be considered the propositional base of a (brief) discourse, in which a particular Mary bakes and burns a particular cake.[4] Thus, the elements of which knowledge nets and text bases are constructed are the same. Indeed, as will be detailed later, text bases are formed by selecting, modifying, and rearranging propositional elements from the knowledge net. However, text bases are not part of the knowledge net, but separate structures with their own properties.

Concepts are not defined in a knowledge net, but their meaning can be constructed from their position in the net. The immediate associates and semantic neighbors of a node constitute its core meaning. Its complete and full meaning, however, can be obtained only by exploring its relations to all the other nodes in the net. Meaning must be created. As a first step one could add all propositions in the net directly related to a node to obtain what Mudersbach (1982) termed the first level of meaning; then all propositions directly related to the propositions at the first level can be added to form a second level, and so on, until the whole knowledge net is involved. Note, however, that such a construction is a theoretical exercise without direct psychological correspondence. It is not possible to deal with the whole, huge knowledge net at once. Instead, at any moment only a tiny fraction of the net can be activated, and only those propositions of the net that are actually activated can affect the meaning of a given concept. Thus, the meaning of a concept is always situation specific and context dependent. It is necessarily incomplete and unstable: Additional nodes could always be added to the activated subnet constituting the momentary meaning of a concept, but at the cost of losing some of the already activated nodes.[5]

The notion of an associative net is not unfamiliar, but it is usually thought of as relating concepts only, not propositional nodes. Two extremely simple examples will illustrate the nature of such an associative net. First, consider the representation of the homonym BANK in an associative net. Positive connections are indicated by arrows, negative ones by circles. Asterisks indicate further, unspecified nodes. Of course, each of the concepts and propositions shown in Figure 1 participate in the general knowledge net beyond the single connection shown here. As a second example, consider the proposition BAKE[agent: PERSON, object:CAKE] (see Figure 2). Once again, only a fragment of the complete network is shown, just to illustrate certain types of connections.

Representing knowledge in a propositional network has several advantages. Primarily, it provides a common format for the knowledge base and for the mental representation of discourse. Furthermore, we have by now considerable




Figure 1: A fragment of the associative net for BANK (Positive connections are indicated by arrows, negative ones by circles; asterisks indicate further, unnamed nodes.)




Figure 2: A fragment of the associative net for BAKE

experience working with propositional structures, whereas other forms of representation are less well understood (e.g., the spatial-imagery and linear structures of Anderson, 1983; the mental models of Johnson-Laird, 1983; or whatever the appropriate representation in the affective system might be, as in Zajonc, 1980). However, the decision to use a propositional representation does not imply that all other forms of knowledge are to be considered unimportant or nonexistent. It would be desirable to expand the model to include nonpropositional representations, but one would first have to learn how to operate with such forms of representation.

Construction Processes

The steps in constructing a text base according to the construction–integration model involve: (a) forming the concepts and propositions directly corresponding to the linguistic input; (b) elaborating each of these elements by selecting a small number of its most closely associated neighbors from the general knowledge

net; (c) inferring certain additional propositions; and (d) assigning connection strengths to all pairs of elements that have been created.

The result is an initial, enriched, but incoherent and possibly contradictory text base, which is then subjected to an integration process to form a coherent structure.

In Step A of this process, a propositional representation of the text is constructed from a parsed linguistic input, such as the words of a text with suitable syntactic annotations, and from a knowledge system as envisioned earlier. Note that the parser itself is not a part of the present model. The basic process of proposition building has been described in van Dijk and Kintsch (1983, chapter 4) and Kintsch (1985). I will illustrate it here with some simple examples. Consider the sentence *Mary bakes a cake.* The parser output needed is *Mary* (agent of BAKE) *bakes* (predicate) *a cake* (object of BAKE). *Mary*, *bake*, and *cake* activate their corresponding lexical nodes, and MARY and CAKE are assigned the roles of agent and object in the BAKE proposition. As was suggested in Figure 2, BAKE requires a PERSON as agent, hence a test is made whether MARY is a person. This may either involve a search through the knowledge net for the proposition ISA[MARY,PERSON] or, should that search prove unsuccessful, an attempt to infer this proposition (e.g., the net may contain only propositions to the effect that MARY is a name and that persons have names; exactly how such problem-solving activity occurs within an associative net will not be considered here).

The present model, however, differs in a significant way from my earlier conceptions: It does not require that the right, and only the right, proposition always be formed. Instead, the construction rules for building propositions can be weakened, allowing for the formation of incomplete or "wrong" propositions. Proposition building is on-line, and frequently, all the relevant information for building just the right one is not available on-line, leading to false starts or incompleted attempts. In the aforementioned example, this has no interesting consequences; for example, if in response to the phrase *Mary bakes . . .* the proposition BAKE[MARY,$] – the dollar sign indicates an unfilled slot – is formed, it will simply be replaced by the complete proposition when the rest of the sentence is processed. However, consider an example discussed by Frazier and Rayner (1982): *The linguists knew the solution of the problem would not be easy.* Here, the on-line construction of propositions is not so simple. First, the proposition KNOW[LINGUISTS,$] is formed. Then, by the strategy of minimal attachment, the subsequent noun phrase is interpreted as the object of KNOW, yielding KNOW[LINGUISTS,SOLUTION]. The final verb phrase, however, requires a subject, so [NOT[EASY[SOLUTION]]] is constructed. As Frazier and Rayner pointed out, this does not involve a reinterpretation of the sentence. Subjects do not go back, noting in some way that *solution of the problem* had been attached to the wrong proposition, and repair this error. Instead, the incorrectly formed KNOW proposition somehow just disappears; the description of the integration process that follows shows how.

A third example of proposition building, involving pronoun identification, will be discussed here. There exists good psychological evidence that pronouns may activate more than one possible referent (e.g., Frederiksen, 1981). Thus, in

The lawyer discussed the case with the judge. He said "I shall send the defendant to prison." the following propositions would be formed: DISCUSS[LAWYER,JUDGE, CASE]; SAY[LAWYER,[SEND[LAWYER,DEFENDANT,PRISON]]]; and SAY[JUDGE, [SEND[JUDGE,DEFENDANT,PRISON]]]. Eventually, of course, the right interpretation comes to dominate the wrong one, as will be shown shortly.

In Step B of the construction process, each concept or proposition that has been formed in Step A serves as a cue for the retrieval of associated nodes in the knowledge net. The retrieval process itself is modeled after well-known theories that have been developed and tested in the memory literature (Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981). Suppose that node i in the knowledge net is positively associated with n other nodes in the net. Let $s(i,j)$ be the associative strength between nodes i and j. Then the probability that the retrieval cue j will retrieve node j is

$$P(j \mid i) = \frac{S(i, j)}{\sum_{h=1}^{n} s(i, h)} \tag{1}$$

Note that each concept or proposition in the text base serves as an independent retrieval cue, hence the particularly simple form of the retrieval process. (An intersection search would be required if the items in the text base acted as a compound cue.) On each retrieval attempt, an item among the associates of i is selected according to Equation 1. A sampling-with-replacement process is assumed so that dominant associates may be retrieved more than once. The number of retrieval attempts with item i as the cue is assumed to be fixed and is a parameter of the model, k. In the examples that follow, k was chosen to be 2 or 3, mostly to reduce the complexity of these examples. However, one may speculate that the most realistic value of k would not be much higher, perhaps between 5 and 7.

Consider some simple examples.

1. Suppose the word *bank* is presented as part of a text. It will activate the lexical nodes BANK1 (financial institution) as well as BANK2 (riverbank), plus some of their associates; for example, the construction process might pick from Figure 1: BANK1, MONEY, FIRST-NATIONAL-BANK, BANK2, RIVER, OVERFLOW [RIVER,BANK2].

2. Suppose the sentence *Lucy persuaded Mary to bake a cake* is presented as part of a text. The parser should provide a phrase structure tree as output, from which the proposition PERSUADE[LUCY,MARY,BAKE[MARY,CAKE]] is constructed. Each text proposition activates propositions closely related to it in the general knowledge net, regardless of the discourse context. For instance, in the case of BAKE[MARY,CAKE] we might thus obtain LIKE[MARY,EAT[MARY,CAKE]], PUT[MARY, CAKE,IN-OVEN], RESULT[BAKE[MARY,CAKE], HOT[CAKE]], PREPARE[MARY,DINNER]. These propositions are all closely associated with baking a cake (Figure 2). Note, however, that elaborating the text base in this way is not just a question of retrieving associated propositions from the knowledge net. The arguments of these retrieved propositions must be treated as variables that are to be bound to the values specified by the retrieval cue. Thus, because MARY is the agent of the text proposition, MARY is made the agent in the knowledge propositions it brings

into the text representation, instead of PERSON in Figure 2. Similarly, although the informality of the present notation hides this, CAKE now is the particular one MARY bakes, not the generic one in Figure 2. These knowledge propositions function as potential inferences. Out of context there is no way of determining which of them are relevant: Maybe Mary really likes to eat cake, but perhaps she is in the process of cooking dinner, in which case PREPARE[MARY,DINNER] might become a macroproposition (what van Dijk, 1980, calls a *construction*). But it is also possible that next she will burn her fingers when she takes the cake out of the oven, making HOT, which plays no role at all in the other contexts, the relevant inference. At this point, the construction process lacks guidance and intelligence; it simply produces potential inferences, in the hope that some of them might turn out to be useful.

3. In the third example, if the proposition SEND[LAWYER,DEFENDANT,PRISON] has been formed, the knowledge net contributes nothing, because one presumably does not know anything about lawyers sending defendants to prison. (Of course, LAWYER, DEFENDANT, and PRISON would each be associatively elaborated separately.) If, however, JUDGE rather than LAWYER were the agent of SEND, the elaboration process would contribute the information that this implies that the judge is sentencing the defendant and so forth.

Step C in the construction process, the generation of additional inferences, is necessary because not all inferences that are required for comprehension will, in general, be obtained by the random elaboration mechanism described earlier. In some cases more focused problem-solving activity is necessary to generate the desired inferences. Exactly how this is to be done is, however, beyond the scope of this article. I merely wish to point out here that in addition to the undirected elaboration which results from Step B of the construction process, there is still a need for controlled, specific inferences. Two types of such inferences are of particular importance in comprehension. Bridging inferences (Haviland & Clark, 1974; Kintsch, 1974) are necessary whenever the text base being constructed is incoherent (i.e., whenever either the original text base itself or the elaborated text base remains incoherent by the criteria discussed in van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983, chapter 5). Second, macropropositions have to be inferred (as discussed in general terms in chapter 6 of van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983, and operationalized as a production system by Turner, McCutchen, & Kintsch, 1986). Macropropositions are also elaborated associatively, as described in Step B for micropropositions.

What has been constructed so far is a set of propositions containing the (micro)propositions directly derived from the text, a randomly selected set of associates for each of these, the macropropositions generated from the text, and their associates. The final Step D of the construction process involves the specification of the interconnections between all of these elements. There are two ways in which elements are interconnected. (a) The propositions directly derived from the text (hence referred to as "text propositions") are positively interconnected with strength values proportional to their proximity in the text base. Specific realizations of this principle are described in the discussion of Figure 4. (b) If propositions i and j are connected in the general knowledge net with the

strength value $s(i,j)$, $-1 < s(i,j) < 1$, and if i and j become members of a text base, the strength of their connection in the text base is $s(i,j)$. In other words, propositions in the text base inherit their interconnections from the general knowledge net. Strength values are additive, up to a maximum of 1, in those cases in which an inherited strength value combines with a text-base-determined connection.

Consider, for instance, the portion of a network that is generated when the word *bank* activates both BANK1 and BANK2, as well as the associations MONEY and RIVER. A possible pattern of connections is shown in Figure 3, where for simplicity, connection strengths have been limited to ±.5 or 1. Alternatively, the graph shown in Figure 3 can be expressed in matrix form as shown in Table 1. BANK1 is associated with MONEY, BANK2 with RIVER, but inhibitory connections exist between MONEY and BANK2 and between RIVER and BANK1.




Figure 3: Connections between BANK1 and BANK2 and their associates




Figure 4: The text base for *Lucy weeded the vegetable garden*

An example of text propositions that are interconnected via their positions in the text base is shown in Figure 4. LUCY is connected most strongly to WEED[LUCY, GARDEN], and least strongly to VEGETABLE[GARDEN]. Although there are many possible ways to assign numerical connection strengths to express this pattern of connectivity, the one chosen here results in the matrix shown in Table 2.

Table 1: Connectivity matrix for the graph shown in Figure 3

Proposition	1	2	3	4
1. MONEY	–	0.5	−0.5	0.0
2. BANK1	0.5	–	−1.0	−0.5
3. BANK2	−0.5	−1.0	–	0.5
4. RIVER	0.0	−0.5	0.5	–

Table 2: Connectivity matrix for the graph shown in Figure 4

Proposition	1	2	3	4
1. LUCY	–	0.9	0.7	0.4
2. WEED	0.9	–	0.9	0.7
3. GARDEN	0.7	0.9	–	0.9
4. VEGETABLE	0.4	0.7	0.9	–

Inferences inherit positive and negative interconnections from the general knowledge net, as seen in Figure 5. The result of the construction process is, therefore, a network expressable as a connectivity matrix, consisting of all the lexical nodes accessed, all the propositions that have been formed, plus all the inferences and elaborations that were made at both the local and global level and their interconnections.

Integration

The network that has been constructed so far is not yet a suitable text representation. It was carelessly constructed and is therefore incoherent and inconsistent. At all levels of the representation, components associated with the text elements were included without regard to the discourse context, and many of them are inappropriate. An integration process in the connectionist manner can be used to exclude these unwanted elements from the text representation (e.g., see Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986, and Waltz & Pollack, 1985, for discourse).

Text comprehension is assumed to be organized in cycles, roughly corresponding to short sentences or phrases (for further detail, see Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; Miller & Kintsch, 1980). In each cycle a new net is constructed, including whatever is carried over in the short-term buffer from the previous cycle.[6] Once the net is constructed, the integration process takes over: Activation is spread around until the system stabilizes. More specific, an activation vector representing the initial activation values of all nodes in the net is postmultiplied repeatedly with the connectivity matrix. After each multiplication the activation values are renormalized: Negative values are set to zero, and each of the positive activation values is divided by the sum of all activation values, so that the total activation on each cycles remains at a value of one (e.g., Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986).




Figure 5: Inferences generated from WEED[LUCY,GARDEN] and their interconnections

Usually, the system finds a stable state fairly rapidly; if the integration process fails, however; new constructions are added to the net, and integration is attempted again. Thus, there is a basic, automatic construction-plus-integration process that normally is sufficient for comprehension. This process is more like perception than problem solving, but when it fails, rather extensive problem-solving activity might be required to bring it back on track. These processes will not be considered further here.

The result of the integration process is a new activation vector, indicating high activation values for some of the nodes in the net and low or zero values for many others. The highly activated nodes constitute the discourse representation formed on each processing cycle. In principle, it includes information at many levels: lexical nodes, text propositions, knowledge-based elaborations (i.e., various types of inferences), as well as macropropositions.

A few simple examples will illustrate what is at issue here. Consider *Lucy persuaded Mary to bake a cake*, which was discussed earlier. The PERSUADE proposition will pull in related knowledge items, just as was shown for BAKE. However, out of context the integration process will not yield any striking results. In the context of *Lucy made tomato soup and sauteed some porkchops with herbs. She set the table and persuaded Mary to bake a cake*, the integration process has very different results: PREPARE[LUCY,DINNER] emerges as the dominant proposition (macroproposition) because most of the other propositions in the text base contribute to its activation value. That the cake was hot, or that she put it into the oven, disappears from the representation with activation values around zero.

Next, consider the example just discussed, where a perfectly good propositional strategy led to a wrong result. For *The linguists knew the solution of the problem would not be easy*, the text base that was constructed is shown in Figure 6. It corresponds to the connectivity matrix exhibited in Table 3 if connection strengths are assigned as in Table 2. (KNOW[SOLUTION] and NOT[EASY] are connected positively via KNOW[$] but negatively via EASY, which adds up to 0.) The activation vector (.25, .25, .25, .25) corresponding to the assumption that all text propositions are equally activated initially is repeatedly multiplied with this matrix, renormalizing the obtained activation values after each multiplication as described earlier. To decide when the activation vector has stabilized, the following criterion was established: A stable state is reached when the average




Figure 6: The strategic construction of a text base: SOLUTION-OF-THE-PROBLEM is first assigned to KNOW, then to EASY (The Dollar sign is a placeholder.)

Table 3: Connectivity matrix for the graph shown in Figure 6

Proposition	1	2	3	4
1. KNOW[$]	–	0.9	0.7	0.9
2. KNOW[SOL]	0.9	–	−1.0	0.0
3. EASY	0.7	−1.0	–	0.9
4. NOT	0.9	0.0	0.91	–

change in the activation values after a multiplication is less than .001. Although this is an arbitrary criterion, even large changes (by one order of magnitude in either direction) make only minor differences in the final activation values obtained in this and many other cases. In the present case, this criterion is reached after 10 operations, yielding the final activation vector (.325, .000, .325, .350) – that is, the wrong KNOW[LINGUISTS,SOLUTION], which does not fit into the text base, has been deactivated. The integration process similarly resolves the problem of multiple pronoun referents. For *The lawyer discussed the case with the judge. He said "I shall send the defendant to prison,"* propositions were constructed for both lawyer and judge as referents of *he.* However, the process of associative elaboration generated some additional information for SEND[JUDGE,DEFENDANT,PRISON], but not for SEND[LAWYER,DEFENDANT,PRISON]. The resulting text base is shown in Figure 7. To obtain the corresponding connectivity matrix (see Table 4), connection strengths among text base propositions were assigned as in Table 2.




Figure 7: The strategic construction of a text base: The pronoun *he* is identified with two potential, mutually exclusive referents (Instead of writing out whole propositions. the abbreviation [.] is used for the arguments of a proposition when they can be readily inferred.)

Table 4: Connectivity matrix for the graph shown in Figure 7

Proposition	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. DISC	–	0.9	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.0	0.0
2. SAY[LAWYER]	0.9	–	−1.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0
3. SAY[JUDGE]	0.9	−1.0	–	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0
4. SEND[LAWYER]	0.7	0.9	0.0	–	−1.0	0.0	0.0
5. SEND[JUDGE]	0.7	0.0	0.9	−1.0	–	0.5	0.5
6. IMPLY	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	–	0.5
7. SENT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	–

and among associates as in Table 3 (other assignments result in different numerical values for the final activation vector, but its pattern remains the same as long as the essential features of the matrix are preserved – for example, which connections are positive, negative, and zero). Assume an initial activation vector of (.25, .25, .25, .25, .25, 0, 0), reflecting the fact that only the text propositions themselves are activated initially. After 19 multiplications with the connectivity matrix, the two propositions in which *he* had been identified as the *lawyer* have activation values of 0, whereas the corresponding *judge* propositions have activation values of .261 and .283, respectively. Just a little knowledge was enough to choose the correct referent.

After this general description of the construction-plus-activation model, two specific applications will be discussed in more detail: how words are identified in a discourse context, and how a propositional text base and situation model are constructed when comprehension depends heavily on activating a rich knowledge set. For that purpose, arithmetic word problems were chosen as the example, because the knowledge that needs to be activated is particularly well defined in that domain, and unambiguous criteria of understanding exist – a solution is either right or wrong. The purpose of these examples is twofold: to show how the general framework proposed can be elaborated into specific models in these experimental situations, and to compare the performance of these models with empirical observations and experimental results as a first test of the psychological adequacy of these models.

Word Identification in Discourse

The first problem to be considered in detail is how knowledge is used in understanding the meaning of words in a discourse. The previously sketched model implies that word meanings have to be created anew in each context, that this is initially strictly a bottom–up process with context having its effects in the integration phase, and that this construction-plus-integration process takes time, with different factors influencing successive phases of the process.

Context effects in word recognition are ubiquitous in the experimental literature, and the explanation of these context effects has been a primary goal

of theories of word recognition. Typically, it is taken for granted in these theories that because context influences word recognition, contextual factors interact with the perceptual processes. Context effects are said to be top–down and expectation driven and are said to facilitate (or sometimes interfere with) the perceptual analysis. Similar ideas were once current in related fields, such as the "New Look" in perception (Bruner & Postman, 1949) and the filter theory of attention (Broadbent, 1958). People perceive what they expect or want, attention filters out the irrelevant. Some words are recognized because the context favors them; others are not because the context inhibits them. How these top–down effects of context are realized differs in detail among theories, but all the most influential current theories postulate interactive processes in which contextually expected words are favored. In the logogen model (Morton, 1969, 1979), context primes semantic features that enter into the feature counter of a logogen and therefore strengthen that logogen. In Forster's search model (Forster, 1976), perceptual analysis defines a candidate set that is then searched by semantic relations or by word frequency. In Becker's verification model (Becker, 1976), both a set of sensory candidates and a set of semantic candidates are created, with the latter being verified first. In the cohort model of Marslen-Wilson and Welsh (1978), context is used to exclude members of the cohort from the very beginning. Norris (1986) has recently reviewed these models and pointed out that they all involve some sort of priming mechanism through which context effects are mediated.

The model of how knowledge is used in discourse suggests a fundamentally different approach. Following earlier work by Kintsch and Mross (1985) and Norris (1986), the present model is neither interactive, nor does it involve priming. As these authors have argued, word identification is not simply a matter of lexical access. Rather, it is a complex process that responds to different influences at different stages. These stages, however, are merely convenient verbal labels. In fact, processing is continuous, and there is significant temporal overlap between the different subprocesses defining these stages. In the first stage (which was termed *sense activation* by Kintsch & Mross, 1985), the number of word candidates consistent with the perceptual input is progressively reduced through perceptual feature analysis. As in Forster or Becker, a set of sensory candidates is created through perceptual analysis, but its size decreases as the analysis progresses. This process rapidly reduces the number of word candidates to some manageable number, but not necessarily to one. At this point (probably at about 50 ms, see Fischler & Goodman, 1978), the semantic context comes into play. Some small number of lexical nodes has now been selected, each one activating a few of its strongest semantic or associative neighbors in the knowledge network. If there is a node whose associates fit into whatever context is present, it will be taken as the meaning of the to-be-identified word. What fits is determined by the integration process sketched earlier. This is the *sense-selection* stage of Kintsch and Mross.

Note that if the perceptual analysis had been allowed to continue for a sufficient period of time, for most words it would have yielded a result eventually by itself, and probably the same one. It is just that the association check helped

to shortcut this process. With homonyms, however, the association check plays a crucial role: Perceptual analysis alone cannot decide which meaning of *bank* to select in any given context.

Sense selection by means of an association check is the very first of a possibly very long series of contextual plausibility checks (Norris's term). It comes first because the associative/semantic context of a lexical node can be computed rapidly. As more information about the context becomes available, the sentence and discourse meaning begin to emerge, and more and deeper plausibility checks can be performed as long as there still is time. This is the *sense-elaboration* phase, in which the meaning of a word is contextually explored and elaborated. However, once a response has been made in a recognition experiment, or once the process moves on in a discourse, elaboration is terminated. Thus, word meanings are usually identified long before complex inferences are made in comprehending a discourse.

At this point, a "meaning" has been constructed for the word in this particular context. It consists of the lexical node that has been activated (the contextually inappropriate nodes that had been activated have by now been deactivated through the various context checks), the associative and semantic neighbors of that node, the sentence and discourse context in which the word participated, and some inferences and elaborations that were produced in the course of the various plausibility checks that explored the role of that word in the given context.

What do we need to make such a model of word identification work? We shall disregard the perceptual analysis and take for granted that a certain number of appropriate lexical nodes has been activated (e.g., multiple semantic nodes for a homonym). We then need to compute the sentences and phrases in which the word in question participates, or more accurately, the propositions in which the corresponding concept token (for which the lexical node serves as the type) plays a role. Finally, we need to construct inferences and elaborations when necessary.

A model of word recognition that thus far is identical with the one favored here has recently been developed by Norris (1986). Norris called it the "checking model" and compares and contrasts it with the other extant models of word recognition in the literature. In Norris's model, the plausibility of word candidates in any given context is evaluated. The recognition criterion for contextually plausible words is lowered and that for implausible words is increased. By manipulating criterion bias in this way, Norris accounted for a wide range of observations from threshold and other types of recognition experiments.

Instead of equating plausibility with criterion bias, a different mechanism – integration – is used here. This mechanism has the great advantage of being applicable not only at the word-recognition level (which is what Norris was concerned with), but it is equally suited to modeling knowledge integration at higher levels.

When a word is perceived, one or more lexical nodes are accessed, and some of their neighboring nodes that are closely related associatively or semantically are also activated. Similarly, when a proposition is constructed, a number of associatively and semantically related propositions are also constructed. Both related concepts and related propositions serve to determine the plausibility of

the core words and propositions. A richly interconnected structure is thus formed, through which activation can spread, so that positively interconnected items strengthen each other, while unrelated items drop out and inconsistent items become inhibited. Or, said differently, implausible items will be suppressed, whereas plausible ones support each other – at the level of word recognition as well as of textual integration.

Time Course of Activation of Words in a Discourse Context

The model of word recognition just outlined is consistent with a great deal of experimental data. Norris (1986) has reviewed the word recognition literature in great detail and shown that his checking model accounts for the rich empirical findings in that area better than any of its competitors. The construction–integration model is closely related to Norris's model. On the one hand, it is more specific in that it proposes computational procedures by means of which Norris's "plausibility check" could actually be achieved, whereas on the other hand it replaces Norris's shift in criterion bias with the computationally more feasible integration mechanism. It appears likely that the present model can handle all the data the checking model accounts for, in just the same way and for just the same reasons as the checking model. There is, however, another part of the literature on word recognition that is not discussed in Norris (1986): the work on word identification in discourse. The empirical findings in this area are also in good agreement with the construction–integration model.

In a lexical decision task, the subject sees a string of letters and must decide as quickly as possible whether it forms an English word. If a target word is preceded by a closely related word, the response to the target word is speeded up (on the order of 20 to 40 ms) in comparison with unrelated control words. This priming effect has been well documented for some time and is obtained in list contexts (e.g., Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971) as well as in discourse contexts (e.g., Swinney, 1979). However, the discourse context is actually irrelevant to the priming effect. What matters is merely the associative relation between the prime word and the target word. As has been shown repeatedly (Kintsch & Mross, 1985; Swinney, 1979; Till, Mross, & Kintsch, in press; also equivalent results obtained with a naming task by Seidenberg, Tanenhaus, Leiman, & Bienkowsky, 1982), homonyms will prime strong associates of both their meanings, irrespective of the discourse context and in spite of the fact that the context-inappropriate meaning of the homonym never enters consciousness. Furthermore, context-appropriate inferences that are not associatively related to a priming word are not responded to any faster than unrelated control words. However, all of this depends on the amount of time allowed for the processing of the priming word. If the target word closely follows the priming word, so that the processing of the prime is still in its initial stages, the results are as already described. However, if there is enough time for more complete processing of the priming word in its discourse context, quite different results are observed. In this case, context-appropriate associates are still primed, but inappropriate associates no longer

are, whereas context-appropriate inferences now become strongly primed. This time course of knowledge activation can be described in more detail by some illustrative experimental results.

In the study by Till et al. (in press), subjects read sentences like *The townspeople were amazed to find that all the buildings had collapsed except the mint.* After the priming word *mint* they were given a lexical decision task, with the target word being either *money, candy,* or *earthquake.* That is, the target was a context-appropriate associate of the prime (*money*), a context-inappropriate associate (*candy*), or a topical inference word (*earthquake*), respectively. In addition, the interval between the presentation of the prime and the target word (stimulus-onset asynchrony, or SOA) was varied from 200 ms to 1500 ms. In the first case, the prime could only be incompletely processed; with an SOA of 500 ms, a somewhat deeper processing of the prime was possible before a response had to be given to the target word; and with 1,000 ms, extensive processing of both the prime word and its discourse context was possible. The data are shown in Figure 8. To keep this presentation simple, Figure 8 shows the average priming effects observed in the three experiments of Till et al. for SOAs of 200, 300, 400, 500, 1,000, and 1,500 ms. The value shown for associates at 200 ms, for instance, is the difference between the mean reaction time for context-inappropriate and context-appropriate associates at that prime–target asynchrony. It is the average of two such values obtained in two different experiments – showing the data separately for each experiment merely complicates the picture without changing its essential features. The value for inferences, similarly, is based on the difference between topic words and unrelated control words. The purpose of Figure 8 is, therefore,




Figure 8: Context effects as indexed by the reaction time difference to context inappropriate and appropriate associates or inferences as a function of processing time, after Till, Mross, and Kintsch (1988)

merely to give an impression of the over-all shape of the results of this study (for more detailed analyses, the original article must be consulted).

Targets that are contextually appropriate associates of the priming word are primed at all four SOAs. Contextually inappropriate targets, however, are primed only when the priming word is still in its initial processing stages; by 400 ms inappropriate associates are no longer activated. Topical inferences are primed only if there is ample time, more than 500 ms, for the processing of the prime and its discourse context. This observation implies that the topic was not inferred immediately as soon as the relevant information became available, but was left for the sentence wrap-up period. Till et al.'s sentences were written in such a way that the topic could have been inferred before the last word in the sentence. This, however, is not what happened: Topics were inferred only after the whole sentence was read, requiring more than 500 ms of processing time. Thus, the full contextual meaning of the prime required about 1 s to emerge.

Data like these suggest that the initial activation of lexical knowledge is independent of the discourse context. What matters is only the (relatively fixed and stable) associative/semantic context of each word by itself. This stage of sense activation, however, is quickly followed by a process of sense selection in which the discourse context becomes effective: By 500 ms, context-inappropriate associates are deactivated (see also Seidenberg et al., 1982, and Swinney, 1979). If given more time, context effects grow even stronger: By 1,000 ms, contextually appropriate inference words are strongly and reliably primed even in the absence of associative connections (similarly for recognition, see McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986).

Clearly, this pattern of results is in excellent agreement qualitatively with the model of knowledge use in discourse presented earlier. Right after a word is perceived, it activates its whole associative neighborhood in a context-independent way, with the consequence that strong associates of a word are likely to be represented in working memory and hence will be primed in a lexical decision task, whether they are context appropriate or not. The knowledge-integration process then results in the deactivation of material that does not fit into the overall discourse context (such as context-inappropriate associates). Note that in order to disambiguate words on-line, the integration phase cannot be delayed until the end of a processing cycle; word senses are disambiguated before that. In the model, therefore, as soon as a text proposition is constructed and its associates have been generated, they will be integrated into whatever context exists at that time in working memory. Thus, each processing cycle involves many integrations, and the single integration operation performed at the end of each cycle in many of the examples discussed here is merely a simplification, adopted whenever one is not concerned with the on-line generation of word meanings. Finally, contextual inferences should require the most time to become activated on the average because although they sometimes result from the initial knowledge sampling, in other cases repeated sampling or, further, strategic elaboration might be required.

Earlier, an example was given of one of the texts used in the Till et al. (in press) study. The predictions of the model will be illustrated by means of this

example. The aforementioned text (*The townspeople were amazed to find that all the buildings had collapsed except the mint*) has the following propositional representation:

1. TOWNSPEOPLE
2. AMAZED[TOWNSPEOPLE,P3]
3. COLLAPSE[P4]
4. ALL-BUT[BUILDING,MINT]
5. BUILDING
6. MINT

Connection strengths of .9, .7, .4, and 0 were assigned to text propositions one, two, three, or more steps apart in the text base (e.g., P1 is two steps away from P3, connected via P2). Next, each text proposition was allowed to access at random two of its neighbors in the long-term associative net. This process was simulated by having an informant provide free associations to phrases based on each of these six propositions. For instance, the phrase *all buildlings but the mint* elicited the associations *many buildings* and *mint is a building.* Of course, MONEY and CANDY were chosen as the associates of MINT. Each text proposition was connected by a value of .5 to its associates, yielding an 18 × 18 connectivity matrix. Activation was then allowed to spread from the text propositions to the knowledge elaborations. Specifically, an initial activation vector with 1/6's corresponding to the text propositions and zeros otherwise was multiplied with the connectivity matrix until the pattern of activation stabilized. As a result, text propositions achieved activation values between .0987 and .1612, depending on how closely they were tied into the text base, and the knowledge elaborations had much lower activation values, between .0142 and .0239, with both MONEY and CANDY having a value of .0186. Thus, at this stage of processing, MONEY and CANDY are equally activated.

Activation continues to spread, however, and differences begin to emerge among the activation values for the various knowledge elaborations that have been added to the text base. The reason for this is that the knowledge elaborations are connected not only to the text propositions that had pulled them into the net but also to other text propositions as well as to each other. To approximate these interrelations, a connection value of .5 was assigned to any two propositions sharing a common argument. Because the homophone *mint* contributed associations to the subnet that refers to both of its senses, an inhibiting connection of −.5 was assigned to MINT/CANDY and BUILDING, whereas CANDY and MONEY themselves were connected by a −1. Continued multiplication of the activation vector with this connectivity matrix yielded a stable pattern (average change <.001) after 11 operations. At this point text propositions had activation values ranging between .1091 and .0584. Several of the knowledge elaborations reached values in this range, for example, .0742 for both ISA[MINT,BUILDING] and MONEY and .0708 for KILL[BUILDING,TOWNSPEOPLE], whereas others had faded away by this time; for example, MAN, which entered the subnet as an associate of TOWNSPEOPLE, had an activation value of .0070 and, most significantly, .0000 for CANDY. This stage of processing corresponds to the 400- and 500-ms points in Figure 8: MINT

is now clearly embedded in its context as a kind of building, and the inappropriate association CANDY is no longer activated.

The next processing stage involves the construction of a topical inference – what is the sentence about? While the exact operations involved in the construction of such inferences are beyond the scope of this article, van Dijk and Kintsch (1983, chapter 6) have discussed some of the mechanisms involved, such as a strategy of looking for causal explanations, which is what actual subjects appear to use predominantly in the following case. If given enough time, the modal response of human readers is that the sentence is about an earthquake that destroyed a town. Thus, the (empirically determined) propositions EARTHQUAKE and CAUSE[EARTHQUAKE,P3] were added to the text base and connected with the text-base propositions from which they were derived by a value of .5. The two new propositions were given initial activation values of zero, and the integration process was resumed; that is, activation now spread from the previously stabilized subnet into the newly constructed part of the net. Nine more integration cycles were required before the expanded net stabilized. As one would expect, the two new inferences did not alter the pattern of activation much, but both of them became fairly strongly activated (thereby diminishing activation values in the already existing portion of the net). The topical inferences EARTHQUAKE and CAUSE[EARTHQUAKE,P3] ended up with activation values of .0463 and .0546, respectively, among the most strongly activated inferences in the net. At this point, the process appears to coincide with the time interval between 1,000 and 1,500 ms shown in Figure 8.

The construction–integration model thus accounts for the data in Figure 8 by means of an intricate interplay between construction and integration phases: the construction of the text base and the context-free, associative knowledge elaboration during the first 350 ms of processing; the establishment of a coherent text base, which appears to be complete by 400 ms; and finally, an inference phase, involving new construction and new integration and requiring more than 500 ms of processing under the conditions of the Till et al. study. The model does not account for the time values cited here, but it describes a processing sequence in accordance with the empirically determined time sequence.

In many models of word identification, the problem is thought to be "How do we get from a certain (acoustic or visual) stimulus pattern to the place in the mental lexicon where the meaning of this word is stored?" In the present model, word identification is much more deeply embedded into the process of discourse understanding. The lexical node itself provides just one entry point into the comprehender's long-term memory store of knowledge and experiences, and what eventually becomes activated from that store depends on the discourse context. In conceptions of the lexicon like that of Mudersbach's (1982), the meaning of a word is given by its "neighborhood" in the associative network into which it is embedded. Neighborhoods may be defined narrowly or broadly (nodes one link away vs. nodes several links away). In the present model, the meaning of a word is also given by its neighborhood – narrowly or broadly defined – not in the long-term memory net as a whole, but in the subnet that has been constructed as the mental representation of the discourse of which the word is a

part. Because that representation changes as processing proceeds, word meanings change with it.

Figure 9 depicts the changing meaning of MINT in our example. MINT is directly linked to nine propositions in the network; indirectly it is linked to the whole net, of course. If one takes as its contextual meaning only its immediate neighbors, one finds at the beginning of processing mostly closely related propositions from the text base plus three weakly activated knowledge elaborations that in part do not fit into the context at all (CANDY). At the end of the process, however, the context-inappropriate association has dropped out, other inferences have been added, and the activation is more evenly distributed among text propositions and knowledge elaborations. Thus, textual information becomes part of the contextual meaning of a word, in contrast to most traditional conceptions of "meaning."

This example is, of course, no more than an illustration. Parameters in our calculations could be changed. For example, more than just two associates could be sampled initially in the process of knowledge elaboration. In this case the neighborhood of MINT would contain many more knowledge elaborations than are shown in Figure 9, where there is a strong predominance of text propositions. Not enough is known at present to set some of these parameters with confidence. But Figure 9 does reflect certain aspects of the data correctly: the equal initial activation of MONEY and CANDY, the later emergence of the topical inference




Figure 9: The changing meaning of MINT (The activation values of all propositions directly connected to MINT at the beginning and at the end of the process. The [.] notation is used as an abbreviation for the arguments of a proposition.)

EARTHQUAKE. Although much more research is needed to produce a more adequate picture of how the contextual meaning of words is constructed during discourse comprehension, here is a technique that at least may help us to do so.

Arithmetic Word Problems

How children understand and solve simple word arithmetic problems provides an excellent domain to try out the construction-plus-integration model. Unlike with many other types of discourse, there are clear-cut criteria for when a problem is solved correctly, and the formal knowledge of arithmetic that is necessary for its solution is easily defined. However, word problems, like all other texts, share the ambiguity and fuzziness of all natural language. Not only formal, arithmetic knowledge is involved in understanding these problems, but all kinds of linguistic and situational knowledge. What makes word problems hard – and interesting – are often not their formal properties, but the way a problem is expressed linguistically and the way formal arithmetic relations map into the situations being described. Thus, word problems are ideal from the standpoint of knowledge integration because it is precisely the integration of formal arithmetic knowledge and linguistic and situational understanding that is at issue here.

Another reason for choosing the domain of word problems is that there already exist alternative formal models of how children solve simple word arithmetic problems (Briars & Larkin, 1984; Kintsch & Greeno, 1985). Specifically, the work of Kintsch and Greeno will be taken as a starting point here. Their model represents a union of the work on problem solving in arithmetic by Riley, Greeno, and Heller (1983) on the one hand, and that on discourse understanding by van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) on the other. Kintsch and Greeno (1985) added to the discourse-comprehension strategies of the van Dijk and Kintsch model some special purpose strategies for solving word arithmetic problems, which they named the *arithmetic strategies.* For instance, if the model encounters a quantity proposition, such as "six marbles," it forms a set and tries to fill in the various slots of the set schema: what the objects are, the cardinality of the set, a specification of the objects (e.g., that the marbles are owned by Fred), and the relation between the present set and other sets in the problem (the six marbles were given to Fred by Tom, which might identify them as a "transfer set"). Thus, the Kintsch and Greeno model for word problems builds a text base in quite the same way as in the van Dijk and Kintsch general theory of text comprehension, but it then forms a very specialized situation or problem model in terms of sets of objects and their interrelations. It solves a problem by recognizing a particular pattern of relations among sets (such as transfer-in or superset) and then using a stored-solution procedure appropriate to that case.[7] Thus, in terms of the foregoing discussion about knowledge use in discourse, the Kintsch and Greeno model is a "smart" model: Production rules are formulated in such a way that in each situation exactly the right arithmetic strategy is fired.

The Kintsch and Greeno model of solving arithmetic word problems is useful in several ways. The model identifies different classes of errors, such as errors

caused by a lack of arithmetic knowledge, errors caused by linguistic misunderstandings, and errors that do not reflect a lack of knowledge at all but result from resource limitations. Certain formulations of word problems overload the resources of the comprehender, especially short-term memory, leading to a breakdown in processing. As Kintsch and Greeno have shown, within each arithmetic problem type there exists a strong correlation between the frequency of errors made in solving the problem and the memory load imposed by it, even though there are no differences within problem types in either the arithmetic or linguistic knowledge required for solution.

The model distinguishes between linguistic and arithmetic errors and helps us to investigate to what extent errors made by second- and third-grade pupils are caused by a failure to understand properly the text of the word problem, rather than by a faulty knowledge of arithmetic (e.g., Dellarosa, 1986; Dellarosa, Kintsch, Reusser, & Weimer, in press; Kintsch, 1987). If certain linguistic misunderstandings about the meanings of such key words as *have more than, have altogether,* or *some* are built into the knowledge base of the model, the model produces a pattern of wrong answers and misrecall of the problem statements that strikingly parallels some of the main types of errors that experimental subjects make. This is a good example of how much can be achieved even with the use of knowledge-poor representations in studies of discourse processing. The Kintsch and Greeno model knows about arithmetic (its arithmetic strategies), and it knows about the meaning of words (its lexicon; a *semantic net* in Dellarosa, 1986). However, it has no general world knowledge that would allow it to understand the situation described in a word problem. It merely picks out the crucial arithmetic information from the discourse and builds a propositional text base for it. This is good enough for some purposes (e.g., the investigation of resource limitations or linguistic factors in understanding as mentioned earlier, or to predict recall, summarization, or readability as in Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978, and related work), but it is not good enough for other purposes.

The limits of this approach are illustrated by a well-known observation: If a word problem is embedded into a concrete, familiar situation or action context, it is much easier to solve than when the same problem is expressed abstractly (e.g., Dellarosa et al., in press; Hudson, 1983). Thus, *Five birds saw three worms on the ground, and each bird tried to get a worm. How many birds didn't get a worm*? is easy for first graders, but *There are five red marbles and three green marbles. How many more red marbles are there than green marbles*? is very hard, even though the two problems are equivalent in form.

The Kintsch and Greeno model does not account for this difference. What is needed is a model in which all knowledge relevant to the understanding of a word problem becomes integrated into a representation that is sensitive to arithmetic as well as to situational information. In the model to be described shortly, this is achieved by forming many different hypotheses about the arithmetic relations in the problem, instead of only a single one, and then by looking for information in the text in support of each hypothesis. Thus, situational and arithmetic information can combine in forming the problem int[illegible]

Arithmetic Strategies

Arithmetic knowledge forms a special subset of a person's general knowledge network. Sets of objects can be represented by a propositional schema with the slots object, specification, quantity, and role (i.e., their relation to other sets) – equivalent to the set schema of Kintsch and Greeno (1985). Superordinate schemata can be similarly defined. Thus, a TRANSFER-IN schema can be set up with slots for a START, TRANSFER-IN, and RESULT SET. With each such superordinate schema, various arithmetic procedures (such as the counting strategies of Kintsch & Greeno, 1985) can be associated.

Arithmetic knowledge is used in the same way as general world knowledge. That is, propositions that represent various hypotheses about the arithmetic structure of a word problem are constructed as the text of the word problem is read and become part of the subnet. Several possible arithmetic hypotheses are constructed at each point, and whatever evidence in the text favors one or the other of these hypotheses is connected positively to it.

The strategies required for solving arithmetic word problems have been described in Kintsch and Greeno (1985) and Kintsch (1984) and have been incorporated into the computer simulation of Dellarosa (1986). However, they are used here in a different way. In the aforementioned works, the intent was to circumscribe the conditions under which each strategy is applied so accurately that only the correct one is fired in each word problem. Here, strategies fire promiscuously whenever they are supported, however weakly, by the text, and it is left for the integration process to weed out what is not wanted, just as all sorts of general knowledge propositions are activated that later turn out to be useless. A problem is solved when the right superordinate schema is more strongly activated than its alternatives, which then triggers the desired arithmetic procedures.

Three forms of arithmetic strategies need to be considered. There are strategies that form arithmetic hypotheses about sets, strategies that determine the nature of the connections between various text propositions and these hypotheses, and strategies that form superordinate arithmetic schemata on the basis of which arithmetic calculations can be performed.

1. Hypotheses about sets are propositions of the form SET-[object:X, specification:Y,quantity:Z,role:W], where X refers to an object, such as TULIP; Y is one or more other text propositions, specifying X further – for example, PAST[LOCATION[TULIP,IN-GARDEN]]; Z is a quantity proposition with X as argument – for example, FOURTEEN[TULIP]; and W indicates the role of the set in some superschema, such as WHOLE or PART.

2. Whenever a quantity proposition is encountered in the text base, possible arithmetic hypotheses derivable from it are constructed (e.g., two otherwise identical propositions with the roles WHOLE and PART). Propositions in the text base that provide evidence for any of these alternatives are then connected positively to it. Key words can be used for this purpose, as in Kintsch and Greeno (1985): Collection terms such as *altogether* indicate WHOLE sets; *give/take, of these,* and *have more/less than* indicate PART sets. In addition, general world knowledge about situations and actions is used to determine what is a WHOLE and what are

its PARTS. The strategies involved have been described in Kintsch (1984): restricted subsets, conjunction, and time-ordered possession/location.

Restricted subsets. If the specification of one set is more general than that of another, the former is assigned the role of WHOLE and the latter that of PART. Examples are LARGE-WINDOW, SMALL-WINDOW versus WINDOW, or ON-UPPER-SHELF, ON-LOWER-SHELF versus ON-SHELF.

Conjunction. If the object or specification of one set consists of the conjunction of the objects or specification of two other sets, the former is the WHOLE and the others the PARTS. This conjunction may be explicit as in YESTERDAY, TODAY, and YESTERDAY&TODAY, or implicit, as in TEDDYBEAR, DOLL, and TOY.

Time-ordered possession/location. If the specification slots of three sets contain either HAVE[agent,object] or LOCATION[object,place], or the negations of these propositions, as well as information to establish a temporal order, WHOLE and PART roles can be assigned to the three sets according to the resulting patterns. For instance, if the specifications of three sets are TIME1 [HAVE, JOE, P [MARBLES]]; TIME2 [GIVE, JOE, TOM, Q [MARBLES]], which implies TIME2[NOT[HAVE, JOE,Q[MARBLES]]; and TIME3[HAVE[JOE,Z[MARBLES]], SET1 is indicated as the Whole set.

3. The PART–WHOLE schema is the only arithmetic super-schema to be considered in the examples that follow, though various TRANSFER and COMPARISON schemata could have been treated in the same way, as in Kintsch and Greeno (1985). Three hypotheses can be formed about the PART–WHOLE schema, depending on whether the first, second, or third of the sets formed is to be considered the WHOLE set. (Note that the order in which the sets were formed in the word problem, not their true temporal order, is at issue here.) Thus, a proposition with the head PPW, which is simply a mnemonic for PART–PART–WHOLE, expresses the hypothesis that the problem is a PART–WHOLE problem with the third set as the WHOLE:PPW[role[SET1,PART],role[SET2,PART],role[SET3,WHOLE]]. Associated with this schema is the equation $Q1 + Q2 = Q3$, where Qi is the quantity of the i-th set, as well as procedures to solve this equation, depending on which of the quantities happens to be unknown.

Examples and Issues

Three examples will be analyzed here to show how the model understands, or fails to understand, as the case may be, arithmetic word problems. To see how these examples work, it is necessary to present at least the first one in sufficient detail. This problem is intended simply as an illustration of the basic mechanisms of the model – nothing much of interest happens with respect to the arithmetic, and textually, the only thing of significance is that a simple inference is formed, which, however, is crucial for the understanding of the problem. Two more examples, which will not be presented in as much detail, will serve as illustrations of how the model can account for some well-known facts about word-problem solving that alternative models (Briars & Larkin, 1984; Kintsch & Greeno, 1985) do not handle readily.

Inferences

> Manolita tried to weed her father's garden. "You sure weeded it," said Mr. Mundoza. "There were fourteen tulips in the garden and now there are only six." How many tulips did she pull out by mistake?

This problem, modified from the "Thinking Stories" of Willoughby, Bereiter, Hilton, and Rubinstein (1981), requires for its solution the application of one of the LOCATION strategies: There were so many tulips in the garden, then some were pulled out, and now so many are left. A simple, knowledge-based inference becomes necessary: that the tulips that were pulled out are no longer in the garden. The knowledge-activation mechanism of the present model readily supplies this inference, and the problem will be solved successfully.

The model processes this problem in three cycles, which includes the first sentence, the statement by Mr. Mundoza, and the question sentence. The first sentence simply sets up a context and is not directly relevant to the arithmetic. In Figure 10, the way the model understands this sentence is indicated, albeit in abbreviated form. The propositions constructed from the sentence itself are (P1) MANOLITA, (P2) GARDEN, (P3) TRY[MANOLITA,P4], (P4) WEED[MANOLITA,GARDEN], (P5) FATHER'S[GARDEN]. Only the first terms of these propositions are shown in Figure 10. Also shown in Figure 10 are the propositions that were added to the text base through the process of associative-knowledge elaboration (they are marked with an asterisk and, once again, abbreviated: *NAME stands for ISA[MANOLITA,NAME], etc.). Because no simulation of a general knowledge network is available, or even conceivable, the process of knowledge elaboration must be approximated empirically. An informal procedure was adopted for this purpose: Three persons were asked to provide free associations to phrases corresponding to P1 through P5 (as well as to corresponding phrases from the remaining two sentences of this word problem), and the responses generated by at least two




Figure 10: The elaborated text base for the first sentence of the Manolita problem (Each proposition is indicated by a single word. Text propositions are connected by solid lines, their associates by broken lines. Associates are marked with an asterisk.)

persons were considered as the top associates of each proposition in the general knowledge net (up to a maximum of three associations per proposition).

The text base shown in Figure 10 serves as a basis for deriving a connectivity matrix, using the principles illustrated earlier in Tables 1 and 2: Text propositions are connected depending on their proximity in the text base, each text proposition is connected to its associates by a value of .5, and knowledge derived propositions are interconnected by the same value if they share an argument, or by −.5 if different word senses are involved (this does not occur in the present example).

An initial activation vector consisting of .2 s for the five propositions directly derived from the text, followed by 13 zeros for the propositions generated from the knowledge net, was then repeatedly updated by multiplying it with the connectivity matrix until the activation values stabilized, as in the examples discussed previously. In the present case, activation levels stabilize after 10 iterations. The resulting pattern of activation is shown in the first panel of Figure 11. WEED [MANOLITA,GARDEN], whose centrality in the text base is apparent in the graphical representation, has the highest activation value, and the other text-derived propositions also have fairly high activation values. Knowledge-derived propositions are considerably less activated. The four most strongly activated propositions (P1 through P4) are retained in the short-term buffer and enter the second processing cycle.

The second processing cycle is shown in Figure 12. The four propositions held over in the short-term memory buffer from Cycle 1 are joined by 9 new text propositions and 11 associated propositions from the knowledge base. (Because of lack of space, the latter are indicated only by asterisks.) The quantity propositions FOURTEEN[TULIP] and SIX[TULIP] generate four arithmetic hypotheses: that the 14 tulips that were in the garden in the past are, respectively, a PART or WHOLE set, and that the 6 tulips now in the garden are a PART or WHOLE set. What the reader knows about weeding gardens provides the crucial information that discriminates among these hypotheses: The tulips before the garden was weeded are the WHOLE set, and only a PART is left after the weeding. This knowledge is expressed in the connectivity matrix by connecting PAST with WHOLE[14], and PRESENT with PART[6].

The last three propositions that enter the subnet are the superordinate arithmetic hypotheses PPW, PWP, and WPP. They receive support from their corresponding first-order arithmetic hypotheses. Thus, whatever strength each arithmetic hypothesis gathers from the text is fed into the superordinate arithmetic schemata consistent with it. These schemata are mutually exclusive and inhibit each other with connection values of −1. Note that only at this final level is inhibition among arithmetic hypotheses used: The hypotheses that a particular set of objects plays the role of WHOLE or PART set are also mutually exclusive, but they are not allowed to inhibit each other; they merely collect more or less positive evidence, which they then transmit to the superordinate stage where a selection among alternatives is made.

The resulting connectivity matrix then becomes the multiplier of the activation-state vector for the 28 propositions participating in this second processing cycle. Initially, these activation values are positive for the text-derived propositions




Figure 11: The result of the integration process for the three sentences in the Manolita problem (Propositions are indicated by single words; inferences are marked by an asterisk; their arrangement in the figure is approximate. The ordinate shows the activation values of each proposition after the process has stabilized. Propositions carried over from one processing cycle to the next are connected by arrows.)




Figure 12: The elaborated text base for the second sentence of the Manolita problem. Four propositions were carried over from the previous cycle in the short-term memory buffer. Solid lines connect text propositions, broken lines inferences; nonarithmetic inferences are indicated by asterisks only.)

and zero otherwise, except for the propositions carried over in the buffer, which retain the activation values they reached in the last cycle. In this case, the activation vector stabilizes already after seven operations. The results are shown in the second panel of Figure 11. (If the activation process is extended to twice the number of cycles, the activation values for the arithmetic hypotheses, measured to four decimal places, do not change at all.) All text-derived propositions remain strongly activated, while none of the textual inferences (e.g., MUNDOZA is a NAME of a MALE, TULIPS are FLOWERS, RED, and GROW-IN-HOLLAND) reach a high level of activation. This is intuitively quite plausible. As far as the arithmetic is concerned, the problem is at this point understood correctly and practically solved: WHOLE[14] is more strongly activated than its alternative, PART[14]. Similarly, PART[6] is stronger than WHOLE[6]. The correct hypothesis, WPP, is the most strongly activated of the three alternative superschemata.

Note that the text propositions and inferences are, in general, much more strongly activated than the arithmetic hypotheses. Therefore, the activation values of the latter must be considered separately, relative to each other, rather than in relation to the text propositions when it comes to selecting propositions to be

maintained in the short-term memory buffer. This imbalance is required for the model to work. If the arithmetic hypotheses are weighted more heavily, they draw the activation away from the text itself, and the system cannot stabilize: It will flip-flop between alternative, mutually contradictory arithmetic schemata. The arithmetic hypotheses have to be anchored in a stable text representation.

For the third and final sentence, the short-term memory buffer needs to carry over both text propositions to establish textual coherence and arithmetic hypotheses to take advantage of the understanding of the problem that has been achieved so far. It has been assumed here that the four strongest text propositions as well as the four strongest arithmetic hypotheses are carried over in the buffer, as shown in Figure 13. (There are, of course, other plausible alternatives.) The three text propositions generated on the basis of this sentence bring with them into the net six knowledge propositions, one of which is NOT [CONTAIN[GARDEN, TULIP]], which turns out to be crucial for the solution of the problem. In addition, new hypotheses about the question set are formed, and the schemata PPW and PWP, which were lost after the second cycle, are reconstructed. Because the child knows about weeding gardens, the tulips that were pulled out are identified as a part of those that were in the garden in the




Figure 13: The elaborated textbase for the third sentence of the Manolita problem

beginning. Hence, a connection that favors the PART hypothesis over the WHOLE hypothesis is formed between the inference NOT[CONTAIN[GARDEN,TULIP]] and PART[?]. It completes the pattern that is the condition for the use of a LOCATION strategy: some tulips at one place in the past, then some not there, now some are left.

The new net requires 43 operations to stabilize. The knowledge-based inference NOT[CONTAIN[GARDEN,TULIP]] achieves an activation level above the range of the text propositions (Figure 11, third panel). The picture is completely clear as far as the arithmetic is concerned: All the correct hypotheses are strongly activated, and all incorrect alternatives have low or zero activation values.

The final steps in the solution of the problem are procedural. From information associated with the WPP pattern the equation $14 = 6 + ?$ is generated, which is then used to obtain the correct answer. A lot of mountains had to be moved to achieve a very simple result!

The Manolita problem was solved without problem solving. The basic comprehension operations were sufficient; that is, it produced the inference that the pulled-out tulips are not in the garden, which was required for the application of the LOCATION strategy. However, this is not always the case. In many, not necessarily difficult, problems, more focused problem-solving operations are required because the random-inference generation process described earlier fails to generate the required inference. Consider the following "thinking problem":

> Mrs. Nosho was telling Mark about the two huge aquariums she kept when she was a little girl. "There were 30 fish in one and 40 fish in the other, so you can tell how many fish I had." How many fish did Mrs. Nosho have?

In a simulation run of this problem the model failed because it did not come up with the transitive inference HAVE[X,Y]&CONTAIN[Y,Z] implies HAVE[X,Z]. At this point, the process needs to go into a problem-solving mode in which the information in the text is elaborated in a more focused manner than is possible with the automatic-comprehension mechanisms discussed here.

Context Effects

Problems embedded into a familiar situational context are much easier to solve than problems that must be solved without this situational support (e.g., Hudson, 1983). Thus, birds catching worms present a concrete, understandable situation that makes it clear what is the whole and what are the parts, whereas abstract, ill-constrained problems do not. All depends on whether the right arithmetic strategy is used; the situation is of no help.

In the worm-and-bird problem, the text provides a situational constraint for the interpretation of the problem that has very little to do with arithmetic per se. It is the knowledge about birds eating worms that matters. The birds trying to catch the worm are understood as the WHOLE set, with the birds catching worms as one PART, and the birds unable to get a worm as the other PART. This understanding was achieved not because a certain key phrase, like *how many more*,

was parsed correctly but on the basis of general world knowledge. If there are birds, some of whom catch and some of whom do not catch a worm, what is the WHOLE set and what are the PARTS is given by general world knowledge that is not specific to arithmetic. The arithmetic can hardly go wrong here because the well-known situation guarantees the right interpretation of the problem. It is this aspect that the present model deals with most effectively.

Context, however, does not always facilitate problem solution, it may also interfere with it. Consider this typical school problem, with its highly impoverished context:

> Fred has four Chevies and three Fords, (a) How many cars does he have altogether? (b) How many more Chevies does he have than Fords?

Context is no help with this problem; it must be solved on the basis of specialized arithmetic strategies, on the basis of the key words *have altogether* for Question A and *have more than* for Question B. Of course, children are much more familiar with the former (e.g., Riley et al., 1983), but if the right strategies are available, both problems will be solved. In the model, too, the *altogether* in Question A will be connected with the HOW-MANY/WHOLE hypothesis, and the *have more than* will be connected with the HOW-MANY/PART hypothesis in Question B, and both questions will be answered equally well. After the first sentence, PART and WHOLE hypotheses are established for both the Chevies and the Fords, but there is not much to distinguish them; the superordinate schemata PPW, PWP, and WPP are only weakly activated and hardly differentiated. Question A, on the other hand, correctly activates the PPW hypothesis, and Question B yields the WPP result. Thus, if the arithmetic knowledge is available, it makes very little difference which question follows the problem statement.

In contrast, if the problem is only slightly contextualized, the model can be biased in favor of one of the questions, and actually fails when it gets the wrong one. Suppose, the foregoing problem is changed to read

> Fred has a nice collection of antique cars. Four of his cars are Chevies, and three are Fords.

Collection, like some, is constructed as a quantity proposition, and hence PART and WHOLE hypotheses for a set of cars with unspecified quantity are established in the first processing cycle. They are both activated equally, however, at this point. This changes dramatically with the second sentence: The *four Chevies* and *three Fords* are both identified as PART sets because of the phrase *of his*. In consequence, the model begins to favor the WPP hypotheses. When it receives Question A, the WPP hypothesis is decisively strengthened, and the problem is solved correctly. On the other hand, if it is given Question B, the model becomes confused between the WPP and PWP hypotheses, which are both equally activated, and fails to solve the problem.

Thus, we have here an example where the problem context interferes with the solution of a problem. It biases the problem in favor of one particular inter-

fails. It is important, however, to analyze exactly why the model failed to answer Question B correctly: After processing the second sentence, it was so strongly convinced that the *four Chevies* and *three Fords* were both PART sets that it did not carry over the corresponding WHOLE set hypotheses and therefore had no way of using the information in the *have-more-than* question in support of the CHEVIES/WHOLE hypothesis. Thus, rather special circumstances prevented the model from answering Question B. In slightly different circumstances, it could have done so: (a) if the buffer were large enough, the CHEVY/WHOLE hypothesis would not have been lost, or (b) if the model had been allowed to reread the problem statement.

Question Specificity

The final example illustrates some different aspects of word-problem solving; namely the complex role that redundant specifications of sets may have. On the one hand, overspecifying a set can be helpful because it provides more than one way to refer to it. On the other hand, redundant specifications increase the length of the text and thus the likelihood that some important piece of information is no longer in active memory when it is required. In the following problem, three versions of the question are possible:

> Joe had a collection of nine marbles. He started his collection with some beautiful red marbles. Then Lucy added six pink marbles to his collection as a present. (a) How many beautiful red marbles did he start his collection with? (b) How many marbles did he start his collection with? (c) How many beautiful red marbles did he have?

The first processing cycle results in undifferentiated hypotheses about the nine marbles. The set constructed in the second cycle, on the other hand, is clearly a PART set, as is the one constructed in the third cycle. Indeed, at the end of the third cycle, the model understands the problem essentially correctly, with the WPP schema greatly exceeding alternative hypotheses in activation value. To understand what happens next, it is necessary to know which text propositions were maintained in the buffer at the end of the third cycle: Only propositions from the third sentence are carried over, while the propositions from the second sentence are no longer held in active memory at this point. This has non-trivial consequences when the question is asked. In Versions A and B everything is all right, because the question itself identifies the question set as a PART set – *starting a collection* serves this function, just as it did in Sentence 2. Version C of the question, on the other hand, does not yield a correct solution. The question itself does not indicate the role of the question set, and there is no information from the second sentence still available in active memory that would help to identify its role either: because there are already several strong PART hypotheses around, the model tends toward the hypothesis that the question set has the role of a WHOLE; the PWP schema thus becomes more activated than the correct WPP schema.

However, this is far from an unequivocal prediction of failure for Version C of the question. With a slightly [illegible]

intervening (*pink marbles, as a present*), the critical information from the second sentence could have been maintained in the buffer and used to solve the problem. Or even more obviously, the problem solver could reread the problem or perform a reinstatement search (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; Miller & Kintsch, 1980) to activate the required information from long-term memory. Rather the prediction is that children, like the model, would have more trouble with Question C, and fail more frequently, than with either A or B.

Thus, the more specific the question the better. But how irrelevant or redundant material will affect the difficulty of a word problem is a more complex story. It may be quite harmless, or may even facilitate problem solving, if the question exploits a redundancy in the specification of a set. But it may be a source of difficulty and even a cause of failure when the question is asked in an unhelpful way. The present model has the flexibility to handle these complex effects of context: Many small effects are allowed to add up and pull the model one way or another. The "smart" models of Kintsch and Greeno (1985) and Briars and Larkin (1984) have no ready way to cope with these subtle contextual demands: Either the right strategy is used or not.

Discussion

How people recall relevant knowledge when they read a text is reminiscent of another experimental paradigm that has been studied extensively in psychological laboratories: how people recall lists of words. A widely used explanation for the recall of word lists is based on the generation–recognition principle. Some words are recalled directly, perhaps from a short-term memory buffer, and these words are then used to generate other semantically or contextually related, plausible recall candidates. Words that have actually appeared in the to-be-learned list will be recognized among these candidates and recalled, whereas intrusions will tend to be rejected. Generation–recognition theories have had their detractors, and in their most primitive form they are certainly inadequate to account for the more complex phenomena of list recall. However, sophisticated versions of this theory are widely accepted now. Almost every current model of list recall includes a generation/retrieval as well as a recognition/editing stage.

The model of knowledge use in discourse comprehension proposed here has two analogous stages: First, a propositional network must be constructed, and then it must be edited or integrated. The way the construction process is thought of here is a straight extension of previous work on discourse processing. The words and phrases that make up a discourse are the raw material from which a mental representation of the meaning of that discourse is constructed. This mental representation takes the form of a propositional text base. Text bases combine two sources of information: the text itself and knowledge – knowledge about language as well as knowledge about the world. To construct even a single proposition, an appropriate frame must be retrieved from one's store of knowledge, and its slots must be filled in the way indicated by the text. The novel aspect of the present model is that the role of knowledge is greatly expanded in this process. Previously, one could think of the text base – to put it

crudely – as a translation into "propositionaleese" of the sentences in the text. Now, the text base becomes a much richer structure than before. Not only does it contain the propositions directly derivable from the text, but also each of these propositions brings with it a number of other propositions that are closely connected to it in the general knowledge net. Thus, propositions are constructed just as before (e.g., van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983); yet where previously a single proposition was formed, a whole cluster is generated now.

Crucial in the present model is how this cluster of propositions is obtained: by a context-free process of activation of the closest neighbors of the original text-derived proposition in the general knowledge net. Of course, such a process will inevitably activate a lot of material that is irrelevant for any given context and, indeed, inconsistent with it. However, the price that has to be paid for promiscuity is not very high: The resulting text base is a connectionist net in which further spreading activation processes rapidly take care of inconsistencies and irrelevancies. What is gained by this dumb and seemingly wasteful process of random knowledge activation is flexibility and context sensitivity. The research on knowledge activation in psychology, as well as the experience with artificial intelligence systems, suggests that it is very difficult to activate knowledge intelligently. Prediction or expectation-based systems that use frames or scripts do not adapt easily to new contexts; prestructured knowledge hardly ever is exactly in the form that is needed. The construction–integration scheme proposed here may turn out to be more successful in this respect.

The general framework sketched earlier could be extended and elaborated in various ways as more experience with it is obtained. It might prove necessary, for instance, to resort to greater formalization in the propositional notation used here. However, until it becomes quite clear what the gains of greater formalization would be, a robust, easy-to-use system is to be preferred, even at the cost of some imprecision.

Perhaps more important might be elaborations of the knowledge-sampling mechanism. As presented here, each text-derived proposition activates its own strongest associates. It might be worthwhile to explore schemes whereby pairs or clusters of propositions activate their strongest joint associates.

Similarly, other criteria for stabilizing a network might be explored. For instance, networks might be made to maximize some statistic like harmony, as in Smolensky (1986). This might have considerable advantages. For instance, it is not always possible now to compare different networks in terms of how fast they reach equilibrium, because the number of cycles required depends strongly on the number of nodes in the network. In addition, at present there is no really satisfactory way to tell how good an equilibrium a process achieves. In the word arithmetic problems, all one can tell is whether the right hypothesis is more strongly activated than its competitors, but comparisons of the size of that difference across problems are problematic.

Constructive processes other than the ones explored here will need to be considered. For word arithmetic problems, the most important constructions involved the arithmetic hypotheses. The construction of macropropositions could be neglected, mostly because the word problems were short ones and their

macrostructure played no role in the problem-solving process.[8] For many other types of text, construction rules to form successive layers of abstractions and generalizations, as described by Turner et al. (1986), would be of primary interest. The macro-structure of a text could thus be made an integral part of a text base rather than a separate component, as it is presently treated.

Thus, there are a great many rules necessary to make the construction–integration model work for proposition building, assigning references and coreferences, bridging inferences, forming macrostructures, elaborating knowledge, and so on. Some of these construction rules are reasonably well worked out at this point, others are available within restricted domains, but many problems remain as yet unsolved. Thus, some of the same problems are encountered here as in conventional expectation-driven, top–down models of comprehension – but with one difference: Weaker, more general rules can be used here because these rules need not be fine-tuned to an ever-changing context. Whatever rules are still needed ought to be easier to work out within the construction–integration framework.

In van Dijk and Kintsch (1983), an imporant distinction was made between text bases and situation models. The former correspond to the propositional representation of a text, both at the level of the micro- and macrostructure. The latter correspond to a representation of the text that is integrated with other knowledge. Thus, in terms of the present model, the integrated text base – after irrelevant and inconsistent information has been deactivated and important knowledge elements have been absorbed – is a kind of situation model. The qualifying phrase "a kind of" is needed because text bases, integrated or not, are always propositional, whereas van Dijk and Kintsch specifically left open the possibility that situation models may be nonpropositional (e.g., Perrig & Kintsch, 1985). Situation models, under certain circumstances, may thus be like Johnson-Laird's (1983) mental models.[9]

The theory of knowledge use in discourse comprehension has been presented here at two levels: first, it is presented in terms of a general computational mechanism, at the level of what Pylyshyn (1985) called the "cognitive virtual machine"; and second, as a particular model that specifies how this mechanism is used in word identification in discourse and in understanding and solving word problems. The function of the model is primarily explanatory. Certain phenomena can now be interpreted within the framework of the model; for example, why a particular formulation of a word problem is especially hard or easy. Unlike less complex theories, however, there is no direct link between explanation and prediction in the present case. Unqualified experimental predictions are hard to come by in a model as complex as the present one. At best, one might predict that a particular problem should be a difficult one, but that might mean several different things at the empirical level: that the solution fails, that a particular error occurs, that extra memory resources are required, that a reinstatement search will occur, that the problem must be read twice, and so forth. Even if we knew precisely what the "knowledge-use virtual machine" was like, our ability to make precise experimental predictions that are testable in conventional ways would still be severely limited. That, however, is not to say that such theories

are without empirical consequences. Although we cannot predict particular events, predictions concerning classes of events are quite feasible (e.g., the different ways people might have trouble with word problems). Furthermore, our newfound understanding of why and how certain things happen can have important consequences for how certain texts are created in the first place or for instructional practices designed to help people with particular comprehension tasks.

Acknowledgements

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Notes

1. Conceivably, a purer connectionist model might be constructed. In the present model, an associative knowledge net is used to build a text-base net, which is then integrated. McClelland (1985) has put forth the idea of a connection information distributor, which is a subnetwork in which the units are not dedicated and connections are not hardwired. Instead, this subnetwork is programmable by inputs from the central network where the knowledge that controls processing in the subnetwork is stored. One could say that the production rules in the present model have the function of programming such a subnetwork.
2. Formally, concepts and propositions can be treated alike (e.g., Anderson, 1980).
3. This use of the term *proposition* differs from the standard one in logic. Furthermore, not all authors who use comparable semantic units in their analyses use the same term. For instance, Dik (1980) talked about *predicates* and *terms* combining to form *predications*. Wilensky (1986) used *relation* and *aspectuals*. In spite of this terminological disarray and the possibility of confusion with the meaning of proposition in logic, *proposition* appears to be the most widely accepted term and will be retained here.
4. The extreme informality of this notation is chosen for ease of exposition. Frequently, of course, a more precise formalism is needed. It is fairly straightforward to elaborate the present informal notation whenever that is the case. For example, in the computer simulation of word problem solving by Dellarosa (1986), the LOOPS language provides a ready-made type-token distinction. There seems to be no reason, however, to burden a general discussion like the present one with a cumbersome, formal notation when it is not needed.
5. As with *proposition*, this is a nonstandard use of the term's meaning. Meaning is used here as shorthand for the momentary, subject- and situation-specific activated semantic and experiential context of a concept. Clearly, this is not what many people have in mind when they speak about the meaning of a word – though it is a conception of meaning quite appropriate for a psychological processing model.
6. That integration occurs at the end of each processing cycle is proposed here merely as a simplifying assumption. Although there is clearly something going on at the end of sentences (e.g., Aaronson & Scarborough, 1977), integration does not need to wait for a sentence boundary (see the evidence for the "immediacy assumption"; Just & Carpenter, 1980; Sanford & Garrod, 1981). It would be quite possible to apply the

relaxation procedure outlined here repeatedly in each cycle, as propositions are being constructed. This would allow for the disambiguation of word senses before the end of a cycle. Because inferences and macro-propositions are usually not available before the end of a processing cycle, end-of-cycle integration plays an especially important role.

7. Computer simulations of this model have been developed by Fletcher (1985) and Dellarosa (1986) and are available from the author.
8. Longer problems in which the macrostructure does play a role have been investigated by Dellarosa et al. (1988). Depending on whether a word problem establishes a theme of competition or cooperation between two protagonists, *compare or combine* problems will be solved most easily.
9. Unlike the representation of the text itself – the text base, which is always propositional – situation models may have a different representation format, although this possibility was not considered in the present article. Both text bases and situation models are mental models of one kind or another in the sense of Gentner and Stevens (1983), though not necessarily in the more restrictive sense of Johnson-Laird (1983).

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41

Heteronormativity in Action: Reproducing the Heterosexual Nuclear Family in After-hours Medical Calls

Celia Kitzinger

One of the major achievements of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) movements of the last 30 years has been to transform – at least in many quarters – "the problem of homosexuality" into "the problem of heterosexism." So, for example, the focus of social scientific research has shifted from a focus on LGBT people *per se* (e.g., assessing their mental health of their parenting capacities) to the multiple oppressions to which they are subjected – ranging from state-sanctioned execution, torture, and enforced psychiatric treatment (Amnesty International 2001), to institutional discrimination and hate crimes (Herek and Berrill 1991), to the mundane oppressions of everyday life, such as anti-gay jokes and the social gaffes made by well-meaning heterosexuals in talking to, or about, LGBT people (Conley et al. 2002).

Just as "homosexuality" is a social construction invented to diagnose, circumscribe, and control certain kinds of behavior (same-sex sexual relationships) treated as social problems (Kitzinger 1987), so too is "heterosexism" such a social construction. The term represents a second attempt by the LGBT movement (the first was "homophobia"; see Kitzinger 1987) to label certain kinds of behavior (e.g., discrimination, prejudice, and violence against LGBT people) as social problems. Insofar as the social construction of "heterosexism" is successful, it is the behavior of heterosexual people in discriminating against LGBT people that is the legitimate target of social reform. As a social constructionist, one approach I might take to "heterosexism" as a topic (not the one pursued here) would be to investigate how (i.e., through what claims-making actions, with what degree of success, and against what contestations) the LGBT movements have struggled

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to promote heterosexism as a social problem. An alternative approach – the one exemplified here – is to explore how everyday heterosexist reality is constructed: that is, how does it come about that people in ordinary interactions (not motivated by heterosexist prejudice or discriminatory intent) commonly invoke and produce a normative heterosexual world as a taken-for-granted reality?

As a lesbian-feminist activist and scholar, I am concerned about the full spectrum of heterosexist oppression – from the deportation of homosexual asylum seekers to countries in which they are tortured and imprisoned, to the denial of equal marriage rights to same-sex couples, to the minor indignities and exclusions of everyday life. The analysis presented here aims to gain purchase on the latter phenomenon. It is motivated by my strong sense that while LGBT activists are campaigning against blatant oppression and overt discrimination, at the same time all around us a heteronormative social fabric is unobtrusively rewoven, thread by thread, persistently, without fuss or fanfare, without oppressive intent or conscious design. My current research program uses conversation analysis to explore how that is done and aims to understand what strong threads constitute and bind together a normative heterosexist culture that make it so impervious to challenge and so slow to change. In this study, my aim is to make visible (and thereby to enable us all to challenge) some of the mundane quotidian actions that result in the routine achievement of a taken-for-granted world that socially excludes or marginalizes non-heterosexuals.

The term "heteronormativity" is widely used in contemporary political, social, and critical theory to describe socio-legal (e.g., Phelan 2001), cultural (e.g., Lancaster 2003), organizational (e.g., Grace 1999), and interpersonal (e.g., Blasius 2000) practices that derive from and reinforce a set of taken-for-granted presumptions relating to sex and gender. These include the presumptions that there are only two sexes; that it is "normal" or "natural" for people of different sexes to be attracted to one another; that these attractions may be publicly displayed and celebrated; that social institutions such as marriage and the family are appropriately organized around different-sex pairings; that same-sex couples are (if not "deviant") a "variation on" or an "alternative to" the heterosexual couple. Heteronormativity refers, in sum, to the myriad ways in which heterosexuality is produced as a natural, unproblematic, taken-for-granted, ordinary phenomenon.

In contrast with what John Heritage (1984) calls the "normative determinism" (p. 16) of theorists such as Durkheim, Freud, and Parsons, the conversation analytic approach pursued here (like ethnomethodology more generally; Garfinkel 1967) does not depend upon an understanding of actors as the bearers of internalized, culturally transmitted norms that guide or determine their conduct. Heteronormativity is embodied in what people do rather than in their beliefs, values, ideologies, or faiths. Complicity with heteronormativity does not necessarily imply prejudiced attitudes or beliefs (e.g., as these are usually conceptualized by homophobia scales; see Kitzinger 1987) or any deliberate intent to discriminate against LGBT people (Kitzinger forthcoming). Rather, heteronormativity – like other social norms – is embodied and displayed endogenously, in the details of conduct, and may be studied empirically as such.

My empirical investigation of heteronormativity builds on Harvey Sacks's (1995a) analysis of norms,[1] most especially in relation to membership categorization as outlined in his classic lecture "The Baby Cried. The Mommy Picked It Up." Norms, according to Sacks (1995a), provide rules of relevance for selecting categories ("viewers use norms to provide the relevant membership categories in terms of which they formulate identifications of the doers of those activities for which the norms are appropriate"; p. 260), and people "use norms to provide some orderliness, and proper orderliness of the activities they observe" (p. 260). According to Sacks, norms are used to "see a family" when observers see a man beating up a woman and do nothing because "we thought you were married and it wasn't any of our business" (p. 91). Also according to Sacks, people can "pass" as members of categories to which they do not in fact belong simply by virtue of the norm that leads them to be seen that way, as when "a woman walks away from a supermarket with the baby carriage filled with a baby that's not hers" (p. 254). Norms might also occlude families as when older parents observed caring for their child are taken to be the child's grandparents (p. 226), or as in the following account from the mother of two-year old Nathaniel, describing what happened when they were referred to a new doctor: "After I had introduced her to Nathaniel and explained his symptoms she responded by looking at me and asking, 'And who are you?' Since parents do not need to legitimate their right to discuss their own children's illnesses with a doctor, I inferred from this that she did not think I could be his mother" (Liladhar 1999:240). Janine Liladhar (1999) understands the doctor's displayed inference that she is not the mother of her child with reference to race: she is white and her son is black. Observers apparently did not see a family when a white mother playing race-you-to-the-car with her 20-year-old black son was taken to be pursuing a thief (Rosenblum and Travis 2000:169) or when two lesbian parents were asked, "which one of you is the mother" (Dalton and Bielby 2000). In such instances, other cultural norms (about "age," "race," and the proper gender constitution of family members) overturn inferences that could or should be made normatively on the basis of category-bound activities. Through the displayed assumptions of the interactants in such situations, analysts can begin to understand the constitution of the normative concept of the family as, for example, "private," mono-racial, and bi-gendered.

The research reported here develops the Sacksian notion of norms with specific reference to the heterosexual nuclear family. It puts conduct in interaction at the center of theorizing about the social world, and shows how norms and normativity can be grounded and elaborated in detailed empirical analysis of their deployment in action. As such, it is part of the ethnomethodological tradition that aims to "treat the obvious as a phenomenon" (Zimmerman and Pollner 1970:80) and to explicate the seen-but-unnoticed tacit presuppositions (or "norms") of everyday life and contributes thereby to the "sociology of the unmarked" (Brekhus 1998) an understanding of the practices that produce ordinary mundane heterosexism.

Insofar as conversation analysis has focused on social problems – and certainly in relation to the social problems highlighted in the 1988 special issue of *Social Problems* on "Language, Interaction, and Social Problems" – these have been

treated in the form of "trouble" as oriented to by participants in interaction (Maynard 1988:325). However, from the point of view of many social activists, and others concerned with social problems – indeed, including Sacks, the founder of conversation analysis himself, in his early lectures (Sacks 1995b:175–87) – social problems can also be produced, and reproduced, by social actors who are not oriented to any trouble in their interactions. A social problem exists only for us, as analysts eavesdropping on their talk, who see in it the untroubled reproduction of a heterosexist (or racist or classist or otherwise oppressive) world. One important theoretical goal of this article, then, is to highlight the value of conversation analysis in analyzing interactions in which, by and large (and with orderly exceptions), the taken-for-granted, ordinary world is reproduced and reconstituted with no trouble at all – because it is precisely the assumptions with which this taken-for-granted world is imbued that cause "trouble" or "problems" (at best), and oppression and discrimination (at worst), for those who do not conform to its cultural norms.

Family as a Categorization Device

This article focuses on person reference terms drawn from the category of the "family" as these are deployed by interactants in after-hours calls to a doctor. Previous analyses have shown that social participants readily produce family terminology that displays their heterosexuality without being heard thereby as doing anything out of the ordinary (Kitzinger 2005), whereas when people make it apparent in the course of ordinary activities (such as making a dentist appointment or taking out car insurance) that they have same-sex partners there are recurrent interactional problems (Land and Kitzinger 2005). The analysis presented here is particularly germane, then, to the sociological tradition of work on the family – long-considered a social problem, especially in its "deviant" forms: for example, black families (e.g., Stack 1974), or working-class families (e.g., Rubin 1976; compare to Smith 1993). LGBT families, in particular, are at the forefront of contemporary debates about marriage and the family (e.g., Bernstein and Reimann 2001; Weston 1998).

Family researchers have been preoccupied by issues of definition. As James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium (1999) argue, however, "family is not objectively meaningful . . . it is constantly under construction, obtaining its defining characteristics somewhere, somehow, in real time and place, through interpretive practice" (p. 4). This, they suggest, mandates an empirical focus on "the myriad social processes through which persons in the course of everyday life produce and organize 'family' as a meaningful designation for social relations" (p. 4). In common with their innovative empirical research program analyzing discourse about the family across a range of organizational contexts (e.g., Gubrium and Holstein 1990; Holstein 1993), the work to be reported here explores how "family" is constructed in interaction. The production of the heteronormative family is understood as an ongoing, locally managed accomplishment, and the analysis focuses on one of the key practices through which family is constituted in these calls: the use of person references and the inferences that attach to these.

Person references drawn from the category of "family" – such as "wife," "husband," "daughter," "brother-in-law," and so on – are common non-recognitional person references (Sacks 1963, 1972a; Sacks and Schegloff 1979; Schegloff 1996). That is, they are terms routinely deployed as references to third parties in talk-in-interaction where the speaker is treating their co-conversationalist as someone who does not know the person being referred to and/or would not recognize them by name. (Other examples of typical non-recognitional person references include categorical or role references such as "a doctor," "an African-American," "a diabetic," "a woman.") Family reference terms are among the categories whose deployment Sacks began to explore – most famously in "the baby cried, the mommy picked it up" discussion (Sacks 1972b, 1995a), but also at various points scattered throughout his work, including an interrogation of the use of inferences attached to "wife," "sister," and "child" in a counseling call (Sacks 1995a:116) and the (hypothetical) deployment of "heterosexual couple" inferences to disguise otherwise stigmatized identities (Sacks 1995a:593). The present research, then, builds on the early work by Sacks both on norms and on membership categories, and contributes to conversation analysis a more systematic and data-driven approach to the selection and deployment of non-recognitional person reference forms. It explores – in a single corpus of calls – the difference the selected person reference term makes to the sequence that subsequently unfolds, due to the inferences that, thereby, can be seen to attach to the term selected. I begin with a description of the data-set and then consider the way in which the talk produces a heteronormative version of family.

Data

The data corpus comprises recordings of 59 after-hours calls made to a medical practice in a large town in the English Midlands.[2] In 50 of the 59 calls, the caller is someone other than the patient; these calls are the focus of analysis here. According to the terms of reference of the British National Health Service, general practitioners – physicians with no particular clinical specialization – have 24-hour responsibility for the medical care of their patients. This includes the condition that they should visit patients in their own homes if necessary, either because the patient cannot travel to the surgery or because the surgery is closed. The normative purpose of these after-hours calls is to request such a home visit (Drew forthcoming).

This data corpus cannot be treated as representative (as Drew forthcoming points out), either in terms of the kinds of after-hours calls made generally or in terms of the manner in which doctors manage such calls. Moreover, it is likely that definitions of "the family" vary – for the participants in these calls and for people generally – across their occasions of use. Analysis of these calls begins to chart the deployment of family reference terms in one such specific context.

In all of these calls, the doctor is a "locum" (a stand-in for the doctor with whom the patient is registered), such that he knows neither the caller nor the

patient, nor does he know anything about their family circumstances. Interactions between the patients and their usual physicians would be conducted very differently because most references to nuclear family members could be done by using recognitional forms of reference (i.e., their names). However, the range of recurrent occasions in modern societies in which recognitionals cannot be used is vast, and the use of family reference terms is a potent resource in all such contexts.

The data were transcribed according to the system devised by Gail Jefferson (see Atkinson and Heritage 1984) and subsequently developed by other conversation analysts, designed to preserve those small but significant features of talk (cut-offs, silences, etc.) that interactants use in systematic and orderly ways, many of which turn out to be essential to the analyses presented here. Non-recognitional person reference forms – in particular, person reference forms drawn from the category set of the family – were very common across these calls, and I collected and analyzed them in their sequential context. I examined, in particular, *initial* person references – and the inferences associated with them – for what they show about normative understandings of the family and the interactional uses these understandings are put to.

Reproducing the Heteronormative Family

Of the 50 calls in the corpus where the patient is not the person calling, 33 are calls on behalf of people referred to as family members (e.g., spouses, children and grandchildren, siblings, and in-laws), and 17 are on behalf of non-family members (e.g., friends, neighbors, and people for whom the callers have an institutional responsibility. Extracts 1 and 2 are examples of openings of calls on behalf of family members:

(1) [DEC 1-2-12 BREATHLESS]
01 Doc: Hel:lo,
02 Clr: Hel:lo, is tha' du- doctor?
03 Doc: <Yes, Doctor ((deleted)) speaki:ng,
04 Clr: i: i: (Yeah) Couldja's call an' see my wife
05 please,

(2) [DEC 1-1-10 ASTHMA]
01 Doc: Hello:,
02 Clr: Hello, I'm sorry tuh trouble yuh, <my daughter has
03 Ventolin:e::hm one spoonful at night, <.hh I gave
04 her some about an hour ago< I kept (it late) with it
05 being so hot but sh[e st]ill can't brea:the very=
06 Doc: [Yes,]
07 Clr: =easily,

Extracts 3 and 4 are examples of the openings of calls on behalf of people who are not family members.

(3) [DEC 1-2-6 DISCLOCATION]
01 Doc: Hello:,
02 Clr: Hello:, eh. .hhh I've got a friend here (.) an' 'e
03 dislocated 'is shoulder

(4) [DEC 1-2-13 SICK I]
01 Doc: .hh Hello:,
01 Clr: .h Ah good evenin', um: .hh this is a relief warden
02 from:((deleted))
03 Doc: Oh yes:,
04 Clr: Ehm- I'm ringing you up regarding one of our
05 tenants here. <A Misses ((deleted))
// ((some talk from tape deleted here))
06 Clr: That's right dear.
07 Doc: mt Ri:ght,
08 Clr: .hh U:m:- the lady is a diabetic.

In each Extract 1 to 4, the caller makes an initial reference to the patient using a term which displays a relationship between the patient and the caller – either a family relationship (as in 1 and 2) or not (as in 3 and 4). The analysis presented here focuses on the inferences mobilized by these initial person references and on the difference they make to the sequential unfolding of the call. It pays particular attention to the understandings of family thereby displayed and to how these understandings are deployed.

The fact that family reference terms are used at all in these calls is a contingent finding – they need not have been used. It is not sufficient to say of the speakers in Extracts 1 and 2 that they refer to the patient as their "wife" or "daughter" because that is who the patient is. There are alternative, equally "accurate" ways of referring to these persons: "a seventy five year old woman" (Extract 1), "an asthmatic" (Extract 2), and so on. The availability of person reference forms from a number of different category sets (e.g., age, diagnosis) means that person reference in terms of the category set of family can be understood as the consequence of a speaker making a selection from amongst a range of possible alternatives: so in Extract 4 the same person is variously referred to as "one of our tenants" (lines 4–5), "A Misses ((deleted))" (line 5), and "the lady" (line 8). In Extract 5 – which I will later analyze in its broader conversational context – there are also two different person references to the same patient. This extract is notable in that it is the only instance in the dataset in which a family reference term is used after some other form of person reference not indexing family. The patient is referred to initially as "a patient of Doctor ((deleted))" (line 5) and only then – albeit immediately afterwards – as "my husband" (line 6):

(5) [DEC 2-1-15 FOOD POISONING]
01 Doc: .hhh Hello:,
02 Clr: .hh Hello:, um: I'm: ph- (.) phoning up fer
03 Doctor ((deleted))
04 Doc: Yes.

05 Clr: I have a:b- a: patient of:h:: Doctor ((deleted))
06 my husband here,

This initial person reference locates the patient in relation to the doctor rather than, as in all other instances, in relation to the caller. Note that this form of person reference, in principle, could have been used in any and all of the other calls in the corpus – in many of which the doctor subsequently asks for just this information (e.g., see Extracts 20 and 21).

Across these calls, then, family reference terms displaying the relationship between caller and patient are systematically selected as initial person references, where there are equally accurate alternatives drawn from non-relational category sets (diagnostic category, age, sex, occupation, etc.), as well as an alternative type of person reference designed to display the relationship between the doctor and the patient.

In the following sections I explore how the deployment of these initial person references relies on and constructs a normative understanding of family: as related by law and by blood; as co-resident; and as an intimate, caring (gendered) social unit. In an intersection between the family and the institution of medicine as it is organized in England, members of a family are also understood to share the same family doctor.

Code of Law and Bond of Blood

The definition of family employed here is indigenous to the interaction in the sense that person references like "daughter" and "son" are used by the participants and are treated by the interactants themselves – and not just by the analyst – as indexing family relationships. This is most blatantly the case when the term "family" is used as a collective term for the caller, the patient, and any other actual or potential members. So, for example, in Extract 6 the caller refers to her "daughter" (line 1), on the basis of which – and without any intervening talk to warrant it – the doctor later generates a "family" (line 63):

(6) [DEC 1-1-1 DIARRHEA]
01 Clr: My daughter's: uh Melanie she's age four:,
// ((61 lines of diagnostic questioning omitted))
63 Doc: Anyone else:: in the family with: (.) tummy bug
64 or anything?

Likewise, in Extract 7 the caller refers to her "son" (line 5), on the basis of which the doctor later asks about "family" composition (line 75):

(7) [DEC 1-1-11 MEASLES]
01 Doc: Hello:,
02 Clr: Hello, can I speak to the doctor on call please,
03 Doc: Yes, Doctor ((deleted)) speaking,
04 Clr: Hello, ehm (0.5) I was wonderin', I think my
05 son's got measles, an':

// ((69 lines of diagnostic questioning omitted))
75 Doc: [.hh Fine, <Any other children in your family?

By contrast, there are other kinds of relationships which are *not* treated as familial. In Extract 8 the caller refers to the patient as her "boyfriend" – a term that, in contrast with "husband" does not imply a marital relationship. In the course of this call the doctor begins to ask (at line 3) whether "anybody else in the fa-[mily]" has the same symptoms as the patient, but cuts off the word "family" after the first syllable and replaces it with "house". (The warrant for hearing "fa-" as the first syllable of "family" comes from empirical conversation analytic research on the technology of repair: this is an instance of [pre-framed] replacement repair; Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977:370).

(8) [DEC 2-1-16 STOMACH]
01 Clr: Um my boyfriend's uhm: really ill at the moment.
02 <'E's got really bad stomach pains. An' fever.
03 Em::symptoms.
04 Doc: R:ight.
05 Clr: Can anyone: come out tuhnight to look at im?=
06 Doc: =((sniff)) Welb- uh:m: u->sorry< who's 'is doctor?
07 (0.4)
08 Clr: 'is doctor's ((deleted))
09 Doc: R:ight. .hh Wull what's actually been happening
10 with'im
// ((32 lines of diagnostic questioning omitted))
43 Doc: Anybody else in the fa- the house got a fu- o:-
44 [got] hmm
45 Clr: [No,]

In abandoning "family" as the reference term for this unmarried couple, the doctor displays that marriage is integral to his definition of "family." In selecting "house" as an alternative, he displays that his intention in initially selecting "family" was to ask about the health status of other people with whom the patient is co-resident, thereby also displaying an understanding of "family" members as co-resident (see next section). In this call, as in virtually all others in this corpus, it seems from the caller's description of the patient's symptoms that caller and patient are co-present; this is reinforced by the caller's selection of "come" (in her request on line 5), rather than, for example, "go." In virtually all the calls in which the names of female callers have not been deleted from the audiotape, the title "Mrs." is used: callers thereby display themselves as married and this may contribute to their relationship with the patient being treated as "familial," in ways that the caller's in Extract 8 is not.

Marriage – code of law – is one key way in which, according to David M. Schneider (1968), Euro-Americans define kin; biological relatedness – bond of blood – is the other. In Extract 9 below (an extension of Extract 7), the doctor displays an implicit understanding (at lines 79 and 81–82) that children in a "family" are all the biological offspring of the same mother.

(9) [DEC 1-1-11 MEASLES]

01	Doc:	Hello:,
02	Clr:	Hello, can I speak to the doctor on call please,
03	Doc:	Yes, Doctor ((deleted)) speaking,
04	Clr:	Hello, ehm (0.5) I was wonderin', I think my
05		son's got measles, an': (what I should give it to
06		'im) or anythin',
07	Doc:	Sor[ry
08	Clr:	[(and that) whether I should give 'im anything
09		for measles,
10	Doc:	.hhh Oh right, ew: how old is your son?
11	Clr:	Ah he was one last week, .hh[h
12	Doc:	[B:right, an' an'
13		what's actually been happening to 'im=
//		((61 lines of diagnostic questioning omitted))
75	Doc:	[.hh Fine, <Any other children in your family?
76	Clr:	Yeah, I've got another boy,
77	Doc:	Ha- older or younger?
78	Clr:	Ah- [older,
79	Doc:	[Well, must be older, mustn't he?
80	Clr:	Olde [r, yeah]
81	Doc:	[.hhhh] ehhehm! Well, unless you're very
82		quick, sorry .hh
83		ah:m yeah has he had measles?

The inference that the caller's sons are both biologically hers – that she bore and gave birth to them – is displayed through the doctor's assertion (made without waiting for the caller to answer his question) that the other boy "must be" older (line 79). It makes sense only as indexing his recollection that the patient is 12 months old and his knowledge that pregnancy lasts 9 months. This analysis of "must be" is reinforced by the doctor's subsequent acknowledgement, at lines 81–82, that a younger child would be *possible* if the caller had been "quick." The laughter (at line 81) and the apology (at line 82) are oriented to the sexual implications of a "quick" second conception.

Circumstances other than a "quick" second conception under which a woman could have two sons in her family with less than a year's difference in age include (in addition to twins): the adoption of one or both children; the caller and her partner both bringing infants from prior relationships into their "blended" family; and the caller being in a lesbian relationship in which both partners had conceived and given birth within a few months of each other. These alternatives do not involve a biogenetic link between mother and son, and are not oriented to as possibilities by the doctor. His assertion that the second son "must be" older is based on, and thereby reproduces (without any orientation to so doing), the concept of the mother/son relationship as normatively biological.

People who are not biologically related to their child (adoptive parents, step-parents, lesbian/gay co-parents) construct (sometimes precarious) claims to parenthood in the context of this assumption (e.g., the lesbian mother quoted in Hayden 1995 who describes feeling like a fraud "if I act like he's my baby.

I'm afraid someone will ask me about labor [. . .] I have to keep telling myself he *is* my baby" [p. 49]). The dependence of kinship on biology is also manifested when the families of origin of non-biological parents refuse kinship roles with a child (e.g., the mother of a lesbian who referred to the child she was asked to treat as her "granddaughter" as "my daughter's friend's daughter"; Epstein 1994:83).

The Nuclear Family as Co-residential Unit

When the doctor offers a home visit, he routinely asks the caller for a home address, and sometimes also for a home telephone number. In designing his request, he displays certain inferences about the residential arrangements between caller and patient. With only two exceptions in the dataset (a working mother calling about a child at home with his father [DEC 2-1-2] and an adult sister calling about a suicidal brother [DEC 2-1-13]), callers and the patients about whom they are calling generally seem to be co-present, as displayed through:

(a) the formulation of the description of current symptoms (e.g., a knock to a pregnant sister's stomach that happened "bout five minutes ago" [DEC 2-1-3], a wife who has "just fainted" [DEC 1-1-13]);
(b) audible patients off-line (e.g., a crying child [DEC 1-2-14], an adult sister who answers a question about symptoms relayed to her from the doctor by the caller [DEC 1-1-14]);
(c) explicit statements of co-presence; these are made only by distant relatives and non-relatives and function as accounts for the presence of the patient in their homes (e.g., "I have my brother in law staying with me" [DEC 2-1-18], "I've got an old friend stayin' with me down on- from Scotland on holiday" [DEC 1-1-4]). As the analysis below displays, parents of young children, and husbands and wives, treat their co-presence as a taken-for-granted, tacit assumption and instead treat not being co-present as accountable (see [DEC 2-1-2]);
(d) the formulation of the request to the doctor to visit the patient using the term "come" (e.g., "Can anyone come out tonight to look at him?" [DEC 2-1-16] in Extract 8, which invites the inference that caller and patient are co-present [whereas "Can anyone go out tonight to look at him?" would invite the inference that they were not]).

The inference that the patient and the caller are co-present applies across the dataset to both "family" and "non-family" callers. However, when callers are identified as spouses or parents, the doctor makes an assumption of co-residence, whereas when they are otherwise identified, he does not. So, for example, in Extract 10 the caller asks the doctor to "call an' see my wife please" (line 4) and the doctor asks "where do you live" (line 10) – as opposed to "where does she live" – thus displaying an inference that the caller lives with his wife, such that to call and see one is to call and see the other, with the pro-term "you" being understood as plural.

(10) [DEC 1-2-12 BREATHLESS]

01	Doc:	Hel:lo:,
02	Clr:	Hel:lo, is tha' do- doctor̲
03	Doc:	<Yes, Doctor ((deleted)) speaki:ng,
04	Clr:	i:i:Couldja's call an' see my wife please, .h [h
05	Doc:	[Yes:.
06	Clr:	She's breathless. <She can't .hh get 'er
07		breath.hh! .h [hhh]
08	Doc:	[What]'s: her name?
09	Clr:	((deleted))
10	Doc:	Ru-an' where do you live.

In Extract 11, the caller announces that his "wife" has fainted and, after some diagnostic questioning, the doctor asks "What's your address" (line 40) in order that he might "pop round and see her" (lines 40–41), thereby again displaying the inference that the caller's address is also the wife's address.[3]

(11) [DEC 1-1-13 FAINTED]

01	Clr:	=Eh: my wife has uh: just fai:nted, .hh She:'s
02		(0.7) been to:: the doctor's a:nd eh: our doctor
03		at ((deleted)) gave 'er: .hh some painkillers
04		because "e said she had a: um a virus in the bowel,
05		(0.2)
06	Doc:	R:ight,
07	Clr:	Eh: she's been in be:d, and she had a sort've
08		fainting spell
//		((18 lines omitted – describing lead up to fainting))
26	Clr:	. . . she just slumped and banged her head on the bed
27		and fell on the floo:r,
28	Doc:	Mm hm,
29	Clr:	So she's lyin' there now till she recovers,
//		((11 lines of diagnostic questioning omitted))
40	Doc:	What's your address, and I'll pop 'rou
41		an' se[e'er
42	Clr:	[(It's) ((deleted))
43	Doc:	.hh Oh-kay; I'll be about twenty minutes.

The assumption of co-residence displays that it is normative, in these conversationalists' culture, for husbands and wives to live together. As Kath Weston (1998:74) points out, the normative power of co-residence as part of the definition of a family is also evident in the fact that lesbian/gay organizations in the United States have helped to frame domestic partnership legislation that stipulates co-residence for a specified period – anything from three months to a year – before an unmarried couple can register to achieve the legal standing entitling them to benefits available to married couples (see also Kitzinger and Wilkinson 2004a).

The assumption of co-residence is also routinely displayed when parents phone on behalf of children. Following the reference to a patient as "my daug:hter, Jean" (and subsequent talk during which the daughter is said to be two years old), the doctor asks simply "where d'you live" [DEC 1-2-9]; when the

patient is "my daughter who's uh:: .hh just coming fuh nineteen months old" [DEC 2-1-7 SICK], the caller later says, "my address is." An assumption is thereby displayed that the doctor will understand that she and her daughter share the same home address, such that the caller's address is what is needed for the doctor to visit the patient.

By contrast, family members who are not children or spouses are not unproblematically treated as co-resident. In the calls from which Extracts 12 and 13 are taken, the callers show, through their description of the patient's current symptoms and their own attempts to relieve them, that they currently must be at the same location. However, the doctor displays problems with treating these callers and patients as co-resident. In Extract 12, after a caller's account of his adult daughter's medical problems (adult, as the problems are related to the termination of a pregnancy), the doctor does not (as in Extracts 10 and 11) ask some variant of "where do you live?" or "what's your address?" Instead, he designs his question in such a way as to display his inference that caller and patient are only temporarily ("at the moment") in the same home, and that the address he needs is the patient's current location, whether at the home of caller or patient. The inference that the patient might be at either of two possible locations is premised on an inference that patient and caller are not – or may not be – normally co-resident.[4]

(12) [DEC 1-2-11 DAUGHTER]

01	Clr:	I'm ringing about my daughter. She's doubled up
02		in pain ( ) t! stomach
//		((64 lines of problem description and diagnostic questioning omitted))
67	Doc:	An:'whe-whe:re are you at the moment. mhh What's
68		her address.

In Extract 13, the doctor launches his question in such a way as to display an inference that the caller and her daughter do not live together, and then repairs this to display an awareness that, whatever their living arrangements more generally, mother and daughter are currently at the same location.

(13) [DEC 1-2-7 CONTRACTIONS]

01	Clr:	I'm phonin' for my daughter, e:hm (0.7) she's due
02		'er baby the twenty fourth u' this month
//		((56 lines of diagnostic questioning omitted))
59	Doc:	Where does she li-where are you, What's your
60		address

Likewise, callers display what they take to be normative living arrangements in first referring to the patient. No caller in the data corpus ever says that a spouse or child lives with them – that is something which, they take it, goes without saying (despite the number of divorced and separated couples now parenting from separate households; Jacobson et al. 2001). Instead, they use a family reference term and then immediately describe the patient's symptoms (as in Extracts 10 and 11), and it is on the basis of this family reference term that the doctor then displays an inference of co-residence.

Through the normative treatment of some person reference terms as implicative of co-residence, and others as not, the traditional nuclear family of co-resident parents and children is reproduced. The non-normativity of all alternative arrangements is constituted in part by precisely the normative assumptions displayed here. In these calls, the interactants draw on what they take to be normative about kinship and living arrangements in their culture, and use it as a resource in negotiating medical care. Without being oriented to doing any such thing, they are reflecting and reproducing their normative culture.

Intimate Caring, Gender, and Family Designations

The doctor in these calls routinely displays an assumption that any adult calling for a child, thereby demonstrably engaged in an act of caring on her or his behalf, is that child's parent. So, for example, the "little girl" of Extract 14 is subsequently referred to by the doctor as the caller's "daughter" and "the baby" of Extract 15 as "your first," although in neither case do these callers specify that the children about whom they are calling are their own.

(14) [DEC 1-2-3 ULCERS]
01 Clr: I've got a little gi:rl of nineteen months.
02 Doc: R:ight,
03 Clr: An' I've just noticed in 'er mouth. that she's
04 got .hhhh at least three: quite bad ulcers on 'er
05 tongue.
// ((13 lines describing symptoms omitted))
19 Doc: Ri:ght, sorry. .hh So- so how old didju' say-
20 you say your daughter was,

(15) [DEC 1-1-5 COLIC]
01 Clr: It's thee: (0.4) the baby, she's: (0.4) just
02 comin' up on four weeks old,
03 Doc: Right,
// ((107 lines of diagnostic questioning omitted))
111 Doc: [h Is she] the second baby? or (.) your first, yeah

Thus, when callers say they "have" children or babies, this is treated as claiming a kinship relationship. By contrast, the caller who says "I have a gentleman that's in a very bad way" [DEC 1-2-17] is not treated as claiming a kinship relationship. The assumption that an adult calling on behalf of a child is (unless otherwise specified) the parent of that child reflects, and reproduces, cultural understandings that parents (especially mothers) are responsible for the care of their children.

The analysis of Extracts 14 and 15 goes some way towards offering empirical support for Sacks's (1972b; 1995a) famous claim that when we hear "The baby cried. The mommy picked it up," what we hear is that the "mommy" who picks the "baby" up is the mommy of that baby. Apparently the doctor hears, and is intended to hear, "I've got a little gi:rl" and "it's the baby" as indexing familial relations between speaker and child. However, whereas Sacks simply claims

that "baby" is a family reference term, the data presented here show that the terms "baby" and "girl" are, in the context of these calls, treated and understood by these social participants themselves as family reference terms, even though (unlike "daughter") they are not specific to familial relationships and can be used in other contexts to refer to non-kin.

The social norm that parents care for their sick children is apparent in this dataset in that, in fact, it is indeed overwhelmingly a parent, and more specifically a mother, who performs the action of calling the doctor on behalf of a sick child. More importantly from the conversation analytic perspective on normativity advanced here, the activity of calling the doctor is understood by social participants with reference to the social norm that makes caring for children a category-bound activity, such that those who make such calls on behalf of their children overwhelmingly select person reference terms that display the parent/child relationship (e.g., "son," "daughter," etc., as in Extracts 2, 6, 7, and 9). Moreover, as we have seen, those who do not select such person references nonetheless have their more ambiguous – and not, strictly speaking, familial – terminology ("baby," "girl," "boy") treated with reference to this social norm, and are identified as mothers on the basis of the category-bound activity they are performing (caring for children, as in Extracts 14 and 15). These data also, thereby, provide evidence for Sacks's (1995a) claim that "for an observer of a category bound activity, the category to which the activity is bound has a special relevance for formulating an identification of its doer" (p. 259). In sum, the family is produced as a locus of caring not simply because it is, in fact, overwhelmingly parents who do call the doctor on behalf of their children, but also because those who care for children produce themselves, through their selection of familial terminology, as the parents of their children, and not as members of whatever other category sets they can also claim to be members of.

The inference that people calling on behalf of children are their parents can be so strong as to override even clear statements to the contrary, as in Extract 16 in which the caller identifies the patient as a baby who is not her own (lines 1–2). This statement is ostensibly not heard, or not understood, by the doctor. He subsequently queries her identity (line 21), such that she finds herself explaining (in lines 24–25) why it is she, and not the mother, who is calling.

(16) [DEC 1-2-16 BABY I]

01	Clr:	I've got u:m .h my next door neighbor's baby's
02		not very well. <She keeps losin' 'er breath an' .hh
03		um (.) bringin' up sick and everything an' she
04		keeps cryin'. <She's been cryin' for about four
05		hours, .hhh They don't know what's wrong with 'er.
//		((15 lines of diagnostic questioning omitted))
21	Doc:	Are you the mother.
22	Clr:	No, I'm the next door neighbor.h .h
23	Doc:	Right.
24	Clr:	The mother's lookin' after the baby at the
25		moment. hh .hh
26	Doc:	An' she's- I see. Okay doke.

In this dataset, no parent provides an account for why he or she, as opposed to another, is making the call.

Evidence that, as feminists claim, women's caring role is not just statistically more common, but also socially normative is also displayed in these calls. First, more women call on behalf of others than do men (only 11 of the 50 such calls are from men). Second, the trend in the data is that if a male calls on behalf of a patient (of either sex), he is more likely to be offered a home visit than is a female caller.[5] One reason for this may be the doctor's expectation – displayed to female callers, and never to males – that women will be free to bring the patient to see him the following day: as in Extracts 17 (a mother calling about her child) and 18 (a wife calling about her husband):

(17) [DEC 1-1-9 CONJUNCTIVITIS]
01 Doc: An' if you're worried in the morning, bring 'im
02 along to the morning surgery,

(18) [DEC 2-1-15 FOOD POISONING]
01 Doc: If you wanted to bring 'im along in the morning
02 I'll have a loo[k at 'im.]

Family carers are often (though, according to Gubrium and Holstein 1990: 97–112, not always) expected to have intimate personal knowledge about the patient's personal circumstances, previous medical history, and current medical needs. In history-taking from callers identified as "mothers" and "wives," the doctor displays through question design his expectation that callers will be able to provide him with personal medical information. Of wives he asks: "what treatment did he put your husband on?" [DEC 2-1-4]; "Has he had any problems in the past, with 'is stomach," [DEC 2-2-2]; and "Has he ever had anything like this befo:re?" [DEC 2-2-4]; and of a mother: "has she had any illnesses in the past of any note?" [DEC 1-1-1]. Husbands are asked: "She ever had those [codeine phosphate tablets] befo:re," [DEC 1-1-13]; and "Does she have a problem with 'er chest normally," [DEC 1-2-12]. The doctor displays on only one occasion an orientation to the possibility of a spouse not having the information requested: he asks a husband, "When was her last period. D' you know?" [DEC 1-2-15].

By contrast, non-familial callers are not expected to have intimate knowledge of the patient. When a caller identifies herself as an institutional representative (Warden Services), the doctor asks, "does she have any past history *that you know about*" [DEC 2-1-5, my emphasis], thereby displaying an expectation that she may not know.

Non-familial callers are unapologetic about their lack of knowledge of the patient's medical needs:

(19) [DEC 1-2-17 BREATHING]
01 Doc: All he needs is a bit of a Nebulizer, .hh [Diyih]
02 Clr: [( )]
03 Doc: Diyiknow how to use that?

04 (0.4)
05 Clr: No but he knows how to use it, doesn't he!
// ((18 lines omitted, in which doctor advises on drugs))
24 Doc: Is 'e also: got some steroids with "im.
25 Clr: Oh I don't know a damn! I don'know what 'e's got,
26 Doctor

No such blithe confessions of ignorance are ever produced by husbands and wives, or by parents of children. Instead, close family members treat themselves (and are treated by the doctor) as accountable for not having this kind of information: "I don't know what it was earlier on - I wasn't here you know," says Melanie's mother [DEC 1-1-1], who has already explained that she was at work when her daughter's illness started; "It's hard trying to remember everything" says a wife [DEC 2-1-4]. Callers treat themselves as accountable for having intimate knowledge about their children, husbands, and wives (as the caller in Extract 19 does not), thereby re-inscribing the taken-for-granted inference that "close" kin – which they are thereby displayed to be – normatively have this kind of knowledge about each other.

In sum, unless otherwise accounted for (e.g., by the institutional relationship played in the caller's self-identification as a "relief warden" in Extract 6 above), making a call to a doctor on behalf of another implies that the caller is in an intimate caring relationship with the patient. The deployment of family reference terms to refer to the patient, and the inferences which demonstrably attach to these, both display and reconstitute the family as the culturally privileged site of intimate caring it is already understood to be.

The Family Doctor

The analysis in this section shows how co-interactants display the inference that the culture of which they are co-members all family members (parents and children alike) share the same family doctor. This arrangement is, of course, culturally specific and may differentiate U.K. from U.S. (and other) medical cultures. However, the general argument advanced here is generalizable to every culture - that cultural norms (including those associated with heteronormativity) are displayed in talk, and that analysts can read from participants' talk-in-interaction whatever practices are normative in their particular culture.[6]

As noted, the doctor in these calls is a "locum" taking sole temporary responsibility for a multi-doctor practice, and he routinely asks for the name of the doctor with whom the patient is registered. In designing this question, he displays an inference that those calling on behalf of family members are registered with the same doctor as the patient, whereas other callers are not. For example, in Extract 20 a woman calling about her husband's swollen testicles is asked, "have you seen your own doctor at all" – a question which makes sense only if the pronoun is understood as plural, such that the woman's doctor is also her husband's:

(20) [DEC 2-2-4 SWOLLEN TESTICLES]

01	Doc:	.hh How can I help. .hh
02	Cld:	.hhh U::m well my husband's- he's been quite
03		poorly for about the last two or three da:ys,
04		a:nd u:m (.) he's passing water a lot an' 'is
05		testicles are swollen an' 'e's rea- lotta pain in
06		the bottom of 'is body like. (.hhhhh)
07	Doc:	R::igh[t,]
08	Cld:	[(Um)] hmm hmm! ((throat clear))
09	Doc:	(.hh) An:d: >sorry< how long's that-
10	Cld:	.hh[h]
11	Doc:	[b]een going on for.
12	Cld:	Aw, two days. But it's just gettin' wo:rse.
13	Doc:	Has- Have you: seen: (.) your own doctor at all?[7]

Similarly, in Extract 21 a mother calling about a child's sickness is asked, "who's your doctor," thereby displaying the assumption that mother and child share the same doctor:

(21) [DEC 2-1-7 SICK III]

01	Clr:	... my daughter who's uh:: just coming fuh nineteen
02		months old, um: .thh yesterday she was feelin' very
03		sick.
//		((74 lines omitted, of problem presentation, diagnostic questioning, and diagnosis))
78	Doc:	Who's your doctor,

By contrast, non-family members are assumed not to share a doctor, with the question formulated as "Who'[s his doctor?" [DEC 2-1-16] or "Who is his doctor actually" [DEC 1-2-17]. A caller on behalf of an adult son is asked, "Who- who's her doc- your: t! his doctor?" [DEC 1-2-19]. Likewise, the caller who identified herself as "only 'is grandma" (i.e., kin, but not close kin) is asked, "O:kay, an' who's your doctor normally, or his doctor." [DEC 2-1-9]: in the original formulation the doctor displays an orientation to the caller as family; in his repair, he treats her as distant kin, unlikely to share with a grandson a family doctor.

Callers – especially spouses – also make available in their talk the inference that nuclear family members have the same doctor and that others do not. A husband of a wife who has just fainted explains that "She's been to the doctor's and our doctor at ((deleted)) gave her some painkillers" [DEC 1-1-13]; a husband of a couple not registered with the practice asks, "Did you want to know where our doctor was?" [DEC 1-1-6]; and a wife of a husband with possible food poisoning reports unproblematically the advice of a previous doctor to "contact our own doctor" [DEC 2-1-15]. What is interesting about this latter case is that it turns out that husband and wife do not, in fact, have the same doctor. The exchange in which this statement is made is reproduced in Extract 22 (an extension of Extract 5), described earlier as unique in the corpus for the deployment of a non-familial person reference (line 5) – typical of institutional calls – followed

(22) [DEC 2-1-15 FOOD POISONING]

01 Doc: .hhh Hello:,
02 Clr: .hh Hello:, um: I'm: ph- (.) phoning up fer:
03 Doctor ((deleted))
04 Doc: Yes.
05 Clr: I have a:b- a: patient of:h:: Doctor ((deleted))
06 my husband here,
07 Doc: Mm hmḍ
08 Clr: Ahm: we've just come back from:: holiday, from
09 Wales We'[ve h]ad to call the doctor out
10 Doc: [Mm hm] .mhh[h h t. h h h] =
11 Clr: [this morning in Wales,] =
12 Doc: =[egh-khmm! ((sneeze))]
13 Clr: =[for my husband]
14 Doc: Yeah.
15 Clr: Um:: I think it could be: food poisonin'. ='E' s
16 been given: ((swallow)) t! tablets: .hh ta take,
17 to stop the diarrhea, .h[h]
18 Doc: [Y]es,
19 Clr: Um:: hh (0.5) but um:: .hh it hasn't actually
20 stopped it 'n h- he's still sort'uv li:ke losing a
21 lot of li:quid. .hh Still very very feverish.
// ((11 lines of diagnostic questioning omitted))
33 Doc: .hhh An::d uh what- you saw the doctor this
34 morning?
35 Clr: Yes.[But] the doctor advi:sed us if it got any=
36 Doc: [Hm:]
37 Clr: = worse to contact [our] own doctor.
38 Doc: [Hm]
// ((65 lines of diagnostic questioning and diagnosis omitted))
103 Doc: If you wanted to bring 'im along in the morning
104 I'll have a loo[k at 'im.]
105 Clr: [Well, we] actually live the other
106 side of ((deleted)) (.hhh) but- we've: u:m we live
107 at now. So it's quite a struggle tuh get 'im all
108 the way up tuh ((deleted))
109 Doc: I see. <Well so, have you changed your: doctor.
110 Clr: M- u- u:hm: no, 'e hasn't changed 'is doctor
111 because he likes- 'e used to live up by there. =
112 Doc: =Yeah,
113 Clr: t.hh An::d because 'e likes bok- Doctor
114 ((deleted)) 'e ne- 'e decided not tuh change it.
115 eh-hh!
116 Doc: Right. >Yeah.<=

Over the course of this call, a hypothetical family doctor is first conjured into being and then dissolved. This person is first invoked by the caller in seeking to justify the need for a home visit: she reports having been advised by a holiday doctor to contact "our" own doctor (line 37). Later, in response to the caller's account of the difficulties of visiting a surgery some distance from home, the

doctor invokes this same person: "Well, so have you changed your: doctor" (line 109, with "you" and "your" here treated as plural). The hypothetical family doctor finally dissolves in lines 110–14 where "his doctor" makes an appearance instead – and it becomes apparent that husband and wife have different doctors, with this accounted for in terms of "his" previous residence, "his" preferences, and "his" decisions. The way in which a normative inference (here, that spouses share a doctor) acts to shape the interaction is powerfully apparent in this call.

In sum, I have shown that the heteronormative definition of the family reflected and constructed by these social participants in the course of their everyday lives comprises wife and husband, co-resident with their biologically related, dependent children, with the wife/mother taking primary responsibility for caring for sick family members and for contacting the (shared) family doctor. The normative construction of the family is invoked, deployed, negotiated – and occasionally resisted – by social participants for whom the business at hand is caring for a sick person and trying to secure a home visit from a doctor. However, in conducting the business of their everyday lives, without conscious design or oppressive intent, they reproduce their society's heteronormative social order.

Conclusion

In this analysis, I have sought to excavate what Euro-American readers – as cultural members – already "know" and take for granted: that families normatively live together and care for one another. I have analyzed the mundane understandings of family embedded in these calls to show what these understandings are, and how they are displayed by people who are not simply describing, but are actively deploying family reference terms for interactional purposes. In conclusion, I will: (a) examine some of the interactional uses to which these family reference terms are put; and (b) extrapolate from these findings the implications of this quotidian reproduction of heteronormativity for the problem of heterosexism more broadly.

Interactional Uses of Family Reference Terms

The use of heteronormative terms and inferences in these calls is not designed to display anti-gay prejudice or to discriminate against non-heterosexual people. Rather, speakers are deploying person reference terms that they treat as ordinary and natural in pursuit of the interactional goals related to their medical concerns. A key interactional use of reference terms relating to the traditional nuclear family is to render ordinary and natural the action being performed by callers in contacting the doctor on behalf of these particular patients. Calling the doctor is – along with other actions described in the calls (such as sponging down a feverish child, helping a spouse to the toilet, preparing special foods or drinks) – demonstrably an act of caring. Caring activities are, as has been shown in the preceding analysis, category-bound to the particular categories of people who constitute the nuclear family, especially the wife/mother. This means that callers

who contact the doctor and report, "My husband isn't very well," or, "I think my son's got measles," constitute themselves as ordinary people doing an ordinary and natural thing in calling on behalf of these patients in particular – because these patients, referred to by terms which display them as members of the caller's nuclear family, are precisely the people for whom "caring" is an ordinary and natural activity. As demonstrated above, a wife/mother is culturally understood to be bound to her "husband" by marriage and to her "son" by blood, to live with them, to care for them, to have intimate knowledge of their medical needs, and to share with them a family doctor. Calling on their behalf is rendered thereby a wholly non-accountable activity: nothing special is happening in terms of the relationships displayed. Whatever other interactional hurdles the caller has to negotiate (conveying the nature of the medical problem, describing the symptoms as sufficiently severe to merit a home visit, and so on; Drew forthcoming) she does not have to deal with the issue of why she rather than some other person is calling on behalf of the patient. The fact that she is the one calling is rendered ordinary and natural.

Here, nuclear family reference terms are being used, as Donna J. Haraway (1997:53) has theorized, as a technology for producing the effect of "natural" relationships. The use of these reference terms mobilizes the inferences which attach to such relationships, obviating the need for the caller to account for her caring activities and facilitating a smooth and unproblematic doctor/caller interaction. The sheer ordinariness of a parent calling on behalf of a child, or one spouse on behalf of another, makes the use of these terms a powerful resource for "doing being ordinary" (Sacks 1984), with all the interactional benefits (of not having to provide accounts, explanations, justifications, etc.) that attach to being an "ordinary" person doing a "natural" activity.

Nuclear family terms also are used to co-implicate a third party in the decision to call the doctor. Callers frequently display an orientation to their call as constituting a demand on the doctor's time and energy (e.g., via expressions of regret for the necessity of making the call or requesting a home visit: "I'm afraid I'm- I'm sorry, but I've gon' t'av to call ya out" [DEC 1-2-15]). They reduce their own culpability in this respect by allocating some of the responsibility for the call to other family members – in this dataset, always spouses – who have either allegedly requested that the call be made, or whose purported anxieties for the patient have prompted the call. For example, when one caller's suggestion that her daughter may have mumps meets with some skepticism from the doctor, she says, "My husband just said ta phone ya" [DEC 1-2-8]. Another caller, having described how his pregnant daughter is vomiting and has a slight discharge, co-implicates his "wife" in the anxieties this is causing: "It won't stop at the moment, e- which is obviously: (.) worrying me, an:d my wife" [DEC 1-1-7]. Patients who call on their own behalves also occasionally claim that they are doing so in response to the promptings of a spouse, thereby displaying what John Heritage and Jeffrey Robinson (forthcoming), drawing on Jefferson (1984:351), call "troubles resistance" – that is, that they are not calling the doctor lightly and have tried to deal with the problem themselves. The marital unit

terminology of "husband" and "wife" offers a resource for co-implicating other people whose involvement with caller and patient is treated as self-evident.

Implications for the Problem of Heterosexism

The mundane, everyday use of family reference terms in these calls constitutes a major resource for ordinary folk who are not oriented in any way to LGBT concerns but who are simply getting on with the business of their lives. In so doing, the social order they reproduce is profoundly heteronormative: in these calls the nuclear family is always a heterosexual one, individuals are (apparently) universally heterosexual; sexual orientation – of any kind – is simply not an issue. It is precisely this untroubled reproduction of a heteronormative world that – from an analyst's point of view – contributes to the problem of heterosexism.

These casual displays of heterosexuality in the service of local interactional goals constitute a mundane instance of heterosexual privilege by those who take for granted, as others cannot, their access to their culture's family reference terms. Such terms are not available – in any unproblematic way – to lesbian or gay couples in England, where (as in most other countries) same-sex marriage is not permitted under law (see Kitzinger and Wilkinson 2004a). A study in which gay men were asked about their lexical choices in referring to their "lover"/"partner"/"friend"/"boyfriend" points to a plethora of self-consciously articulated difficulties and concerns (Harvey 1997; see also Land and Kitzinger 2005 for an analysis of lesbians attempting to deploy the terminology of "wife" and referring to a female "partner" in the course of everyday activities). The normative understanding is that a family unit properly comprises one (and only one) mother and father – what Sacks (1972b) refers to as the "proper number of incumbents for certain categories of any unit . . . a nation-state may have but one president, a family but one father, a baseball team but one shortstop on the field, etc." (p. 221).

Family researchers have emphasized the range and diversity of "emergent and reconfigured forms of family life" (Lempert and DeVault 2000) in contemporary modern societies. According to the 1991 Census, only 14.6 percent of UK households contained one adult male and one adult female, with between 1 and 3 dependent children, where only one of the adults was in employment (Bernardes 1999). The acknowledged existence of family diversity does not, however, necessarily map onto social members' displayed understandings of the family as a normative concept. It is not necessarily the case that the families of which these callers are members are as rigidly traditional as their displayed understanding of "the family" implies: they include several mothers who work outside the home, fathers/husbands who call on behalf of sick family members, an unmarried couple, a family dealing with a daughter's abortion, the couple who do not share a normative "family doctor" – and presumably other kinds of non-conformity which were not revealed in these calls. If these callers had been interviewed on the topic, they may well have produced more nuanced and complicated accounts of family life; however, what I have shown in their daily interactions, when family terminology is a resource not a topic, is their deployment

of the traditional normative construction of "the family" as a distinct, co-residential, heterosexual marital unit. This commonsense understanding is produced by callers and doctor in interaction and is oriented to as normative even when it is breached, as when accounts are offered for the presence of others (such as friends) in the home (Extract 3) or when non-normative medical arrangements are glossed as normative (Extract 23).

The interactional trouble that arises in these calls when normative understandings are breached enables us to extrapolate the problems that might confront a lesbian or a gay man contacting a doctor on behalf of partner or child (especially any child of whom she or he is neither a biological nor a legally appointed adoptive parent). Such a caller lacks as a resource the culture's family reference terms, and the inferences associated with such a resource, used so smoothly by most of these (apparently) heterosexual callers. Research (based on self-reported data) on lesbians' and gay men's experience of the physician-patient relationship has found that 17 percent report having avoided or delayed seeking health care for reasons to do with their sexual orientation (Stein and Bonuck 2001) while 27 percent report negative or problematic experiences with their children's health care related to sexual orientation or family constellation (Mikhailovich, Martin, and Lawton 2001; see also Riordan 2004, for the experience of lesbian and gay physicians). Although some of these negative interactions are the product of explicitly homophobic behavior including intimidation and humiliation from health care professionals (e.g., Stevens 1992), many must derive from the underlying assumptions of universal heterosexuality incorporated into the culture's family reference terms and the mundane heterosexism (Peel 2001) to which that gives rise. Research on lesbian and gay families more generally (e.g., Stacey 1998; Weston 1991), like the medical research cited above, has used self-report data to highlight the heteronormative context for same-sex couples and their children. The analysis presented here contributes to that literature a detailed analysis of how heteronormativity is grounded in the empirical details of talk-in-interaction (see also Kitzinger 2000, 2005; Land and Kitzinger 2005).

In conclusion, analysis of these family reference terms, the inferences normatively associated with them, and the interactional uses to which they may be put in the context of after-hours medical calls have shown that (and how) tacit, taken-for-granted concepts of "the family" are reflected in, and reproduced by, the talk of social participants. Through their deployment of family reference terms in conducting the business of their ordinary lives, the speakers in this dataset both reflect and (re)construct their society's normative definition of family as composed of a co-residential married heterosexual couple and their biological children. This analysis has also demonstrated that heterosexism can be produced and reproduced, even – and perhaps especially – where there is no sign of trouble in social interactions. It may be particularly important to target for analysis precisely those everyday interactions which seem unremarkable, where nothing special appears to be happening, because what is always happening on such occasions is the reproduction of the normal, taken-for-granted world, invisible because it is too familiar. Here, in the specific context of requesting a home visit from a doctor, we see heteronormativity in action. In unravelling the social

fabric of ordinary, everyday life, LGBT activists and researchers can make visible and challenge the mundane ways in which people – without deliberate intent – reproduce a world that socially excludes or marginalizes non-heterosexuals.

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Notes

1. As Sacks (1995a) points out, his is "a different sense of 'norms regulating activities' than one might usually use in doing sociology or anthropology, where it would be said by and large that the norms are followed by those persons who do the things – or ought to be" (p. 253). Although norms and normativity (as here defined) are central to conversation analysis as a field, few conversation analysts since Sacks have used this terminology in their work; but see Schegloff's analysis of *sotte voce* improprieties as episodes in which "formal notice is . . . taken of the cultural norms applicable here, in the very course of showing a lack of commitment to abide by them" (Schegloff 2003:63). Rather than abandoning important sociological notions such as norms and normativity, I am here respecifying them in terms used by ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts.
2. The calls were recorded by the doctor, and many of the names (of people and places) and other identifying information were deleted by him, at his discretion and before the tapes were released. This appears to have involved recording silence over identifying information. Deletions have been indicated as such; those names that were not deleted (presumably in error) have been pseudonymized.
3. Although the use of "call" in Extract 10 (line 4) may invite the inference that the parties are co-present, at least in British English a request to "call" on someone does not necessarily imply either the co-presence of the speaker and the person to be called upon, or their cohabitation – as is instantiated by this example from a telephone conversation in which Lesley (who, as is clear from other calls in the corpus, does not live with her mother-in-law) asks a plumber's wife: "Could you:r husband call on my mother in law please" [Holt 1–6].
4. Here, as elsewhere in this article, space constraints preclude inclusion of the conversations in their entirety; however, in neither of these extracts could anything in the omitted material reasonably underwrite the doctor's reluctance to ascribe co-residence to these callers and patients. In fact, the situation is rather the reverse in Extract 12 where between lines 2 and 67 the caller reports on a range of different remedies attempted with a daughter who "had a operation to terminate a pregnancy on Tuesday" – three or four days before the call – none of which has been successful in alleviating her pain. This invites an understanding that caller and patient have

been co-present at least sometimes over the course of the last three or four days, and hence might make possible the inference of co-residence, here withheld.

5. The sample of male callers is small, and this finding does not quite reach significance at the $p < 0.05$ level ($x^2 = 3.57$, $df = 1$, $p < 0.10$, critical value 3.84).
6. The norms identified in earlier sections of this article are also culturally specific: the norm of cohabitation is not displayed in those cultures in which husband and wife live separately, either in their natal homes or in men's or women's houses (Barnard and Good 1984:78–83) or in cultures in which children do not normatively live with their parents (Ingoldsby 1995:119); the norm of "caring" between spouses is not displayed in cultures in which husband and wife are neither intimate with nor care for one another, and indeed never meet after their ritual ceremony (Gough 1968).
7. As is evident from the repair, this turn was initially designed to be "Has he seen his own doctor" and was specifically altered to display an inference that the woman would share the same doctor as her husband, and would have accompanied him to the surgery.

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42

Oral Genres of Humor: On the Dialectic of Genre Knowledge and Creative Authoring

Helga Kotthoff

Introduction

Humor poses a challenge to genre theories whose concept of genre imposes an excessively high standard of rigor and is too narrowly based on an interest in classifying ideals of pre-patterned discourse. The high degree of creativity, emergent construction and artistry typical of humor call for a concept of genre which makes sense of modifications and transgressions in communicative processes, as shown by Luckmann (1986, 2002), Günthner/ Knoblauch (1995) and Muntigl/Gruber (2005). Some forms of conversational humor are generic, for example, standardized jokes. Other forms exploit our knowledge of serious genres and activity types (thereby relying on it). Despite, or better because of this, generic boundaries are often transgressed and disregarded in joking; new sub-types arise, such as absurd meta-jokes which violate the well-known expectation of a punch line or other features of the genre. There are genres such as teasing which much more than jokes reflect their emergent construction. We can define prototypes of teasing (and other humor genres), but the genre is nevertheless realized in a great variety of ways. Linguists have also identified some basic generic features of stories, but there are as well many sub-types of humorous stories demanding a certain style of performance, a special framing and significant deviation from their serious counterparts. There are also genres for which we lack a folk taxonomy but which are nevertheless quite generic in their dialogical structure and emergent performance (i.e. joint fantasizing). I will take a close look at the above-mentioned genres and discuss how genre, contextualization and keying relate to each other. Conversational humor often works with contextualization procedures such as code switching, social stylistics,

Source: *Pragmatics* (forthcoming, 2007).

features of oral art, repetition, marked wording, prosody, interjections, laughter, mimicry, etc. that create a humorous keying. These cues index the continually changing contextual presuppositions necessary for situated interpretations in oral discourse. Much of spontaneous humorous discourse involves conversational inferencing in the sense of Gumperz (1982).

Finally, I will discuss what it means for a genre such as gossip to be performed as a play with gossip. Is "playing gossip" still gossip? Intertextuality is another important concept that I draw upon.

1. Genre in the Sociology of Knowledge

Communicative processes following more or less fixed patterns are called "genres." Luckmann (2002: 163) describes typification and routinization processes as going on naturally in human action. It comes as no surprise that in the course of history interlocutors consolidate certain structural expectations about how an activity might begin, develop and come to an end, what role relations it allows, where it typically takes place, what its reputation is, and what functions it is able to realize. Like poetics, theology and literary criticism, classical rhetoric works with a genre concept. Because of the excessive demands for rigor and clarity expected in scientific definitions of genre, "thus far in the illustrious history of the discipline, not so much as one genre has been completely defined" (Dundes, cited following Swales 1990, 34). Genre theorists have mainly been preoccupied with written texts, whereas the work of Bakhtin (1986/1994) and Voloshinov (1929/1975) prompted a 'communicative turn' in genre theory, as discussed by Günthner/Knoblauch (1995). The two authors opposed a static concept of genre such as the ones common in folklore studies and literary criticism. In linguistic anthropology (Hanks 1995, Foley 1997), and likewise in the ethnography of communication, there is a tendency to no longer consider genres as static, monological products, but rather to adopt a performance-centered approach and to study genres in the process of their interactive production within a conversational and socio-cultural context. This includes showing how and why speakers violate conventions and index originality. Conversation Analysis has also had an important influence on genre research. Sacks (1974, 1978), for example, analyzed joke-telling in natural settings. He showed how joke-telling suspends the normal turn-taking procedure. For the length of the joke, the teller reserves the right to speak. This is why jokes are usually introduced before they are told. The announced intention to tell a joke must first be ratified by the prospective listeners.

Joke-telling is temporally and sequentially organized. The story unfolds in a simple series of events located in time (Sacks 1974, 1978). The sequential structure of the joke relies on a series of implausibilities. In order for a joke to be received as such, it is necessary from the very beginning to secure an appropriate reception by the listeners. The conflation of temporal and sequential order allows the sequence of events to appear coherent.

Earlier studies have suggested that disbelief is suspended for the length of the joke. Sacks, however, emphasizes that the implausabilities of jokes must be handled systematically. Jokes are not invalidated by implausibility, but rather implausibilities help to secure the appropriate reception through the canonical order of time (1978). He writes that in receiving a story, listeners should believe the events being told; if necessary, they are expected to suspend 'disbelief'. In telling a joke, the teller concentrates on constructing the punch line so that listeners can figure it out (get it) as easily and quickly as possible. Recipients should understand a joke directly, without receiving hints or additional information, and laughter is the preferred and desired reaction. But Sacks also showed that joke-telling can be used for context-specific purposes. Speakers can, as is the case in Sacks' (1978) example, use jokes to show their knowledge of sexual behavior. An interlocking of functions and goals arises. Of course, one function of jokes is to amuse people. Individual and context-specific functions can also be added. Genres may be reframed strategically in various ways. As Günthner/Knoblauch (1995: 7) explain, reframing can only succeed if there are pre-fixed communicative patterns.

Günthner/Knoblauch hold that pre-patterning is located on three different structural levels: the level of internal structure, the situative level and the level of external structure. Many features of the internal structure of jokes can be identified. At the situative level, it remains clear that joke-telling is typical of informal settings. It may be used to deformalize a context. The external structure is quite loose because we seldom find situations that make joking obligatory. One such occasion is the German "Büttenrede," a speech delivered during the Carnival season. And there are situations when joking is forbidden, for example at funerals. There is an ideology underlying standardized joking as there is for every genre. In Germany, and perhaps throughout Western Europe, men were in the past more likely to tell jokes than women. There was a critical meta-discourse about jokes. Many jokes were, for example, regarded by the women's movement as carrying sexist messages. Most jokes took place in a male world; women were often the butt of jokes (Legman 1970, Kotthoff 2006a). Then the women's movement began to produce numerous jokes aimed at men. In this way, the genre gained a new status in society's communicative household. Briggs/Bauman (1992: 147), applying Bakhtin's concept of intertextuality, describe an "intertextual relationship" as a linkage of texts that are "ordered, unified, and bounded, on the one hand, and fragmented, heterogeneous, and open-ended, on the other." Günthner/Knoblauch (1995: 21) sum up approaches that underline the interrelationship between generic speech practices and social structures, values and ideologies. With Luckmann they see genres as part of a cultural system, as an important link between language and culture. Speakers are always open to modifying typified forms of communicative behavior. I see this flexibility as the advantage of discussing genres within the context of the sociology of knowledge. Knowledge of typified genre realization frees speakers to inscribe new social meanings into a genre. Identical realignments hold true for everyday communication, as has been discussed in connection with the evolution of the creative arts:

> How a competent reader approaches a work of literature, his attitude and expectations, depend importantly upon the genre he sees it as exemplifying. A work that rebels against genre-conventions equally relies on the reader's recognition of the conventions being rejected. Aesthetically relevant features of a work may stand out only if its reader has a background awareness of the historical development of the genre, or of the style, that the work is transforming in its distinctive way and perhaps without direct allusions within the text itself. The work demands to be seen against the foil of the whole tradition from which it stems, and which it modifies by its very existence. (Hepburn, 1983: 496, cited following Swales 1990: 37).

It is also the case that humor is produced and perceived in relation to the norm constituted by codification. The fact that communicative activities violate the norms of their genres does not mean that those genres necessarily disappear.

I will look at jokes, teasing activities, humorous stories, joint fantasizing, humorous gossip and humorous counseling in order to discover the creative potentials that depend on genre knowledge.

2. Beyond the Standards of Standardized Jokes

The genre of the "joke" is familiar to everyone in our culture, and this can be relied on. I have already summarized Sacks' joke analysis. He writes that the joke, constructed as a test of comprehension, always makes special interpretative demands on reception. The demands for plausibility and coherence are different from those in serious discourse. Freud referred to the high 'density' of jokes already in 1905. Sacks (1978) stresses that there are no divergences from the central focus. 'Embellishment' is typical of stories, but not of jokes. Everything that does not direct attention to the punch line should be eliminated in jokes.

But there are indeed aesthetic strategies that improve a joke.

The next joke was told in the US state of Minnesota during a dinner shared by several friends. David, Wendy and Vivian are Americans, Roland is German.

Datum 1[1]

(David (D), Vivian (V), Wendy (W), Roland (R))

1 D: ...which remInds me of a JOke i wanna tell **you.**
2 W: oh yeah. hehe
3 D: uhm
4 V: dAve it's time to GO.
5 W: oh NO::: hehe
6 V: hehehe
7 D: uh this uh THIS guy came over from EUrope
8 in about the MIddle of eighteensIxty you know,
9 around that PEriod, mIddle eighteenhundreds
10 Anyway SOME[illegible]

and the REAson he came Over of course is to make
his fOrtune in this new LAND.
he heard, the further wEst you WENT, the bEtter
chance you had at making a FORtune.
remEmber there was a GUY [that said,
W: [go WEST young mAn.
go WEST young mAn. go WEST.
W: yeah.
D: (? ?) i think his nAme was.
Anyway he comes over and he he lAnds in new YORK.
well All the money that he had OBviously was spent for passage. sEE'
W: yeah. ((glass is tipped over))
D: so, Anyway he uh he goes and he hears that there=s a WAggon train
that's being set Up (-) in new YORK,
and he wants to gEt on this WAggon train.
but (-) he has no MOney. so he goes to the WAggon master
and he says, uh sOmething about,
(-) uh i would like to go as far WEST as you people are gOing.
and he said, wEll, we're going ALL the way over to the Oregon territory.
wEll he says, i'd like to go WITH,
but i don't have any MOney. he says,
but i'd be glAd to do ANY kind of wOrk
that yOU would like me to DO'
wEll, he said uh, how are you with a RIfle.
(-) and he says i'm uh really vEry GOOD with a with a gun. see.
so they said wEll, we're gonna set you on the last
WAggon of the waggon train.
you're gonna sit on the BACK and watch out for Indians.
okay? so they take Off from new YORK.
well they go through you know ohIo,
(-) and pennsylvAnia, and Illinois, and the whole wOrks,
and they go to minnesOta and they get into
the dakOtas before they ever see an INdian.
W: hehehehe
D: so and they're in the dakOtas and they are trAveling,
(-) you know, this guy has got his rIfle, he hollers to the drIver,
and he says, HEY DRIVER, he says, (-)
I SEE AN INDIAN. (-) and the drIver says,
HOW BIG IS HE: he says, well, HE'S ABOUT THAT BIG.
((indicates a very small distance with his fingers))
well, he says, he's TOO far away to shOOt. he says.
jUst WATCH=m. so they go for mIles and that
and he says uh DRIVER,
THAT INDIAN'S STILL FOLLOWING US:
HOW BIG IS HE NOW. OH HE'S THAT BIG.
((indicates a greater distance))
he says, – TOO small to shOOt. they're TOO far awAy.
so: Anyway they GO and that and he says uh
HEY that Indian's still – following us
and he's getting a little CLOser.

59 how big's he NOW? wEll about THAT big.
((indicates a greater distance))
60 ah, he says, he's still TOO far awAy.
61 W: hehe
62 D: so they keep on gOing and that and fInally, he says
63 HEY that Indian's getting closer.
64 and the driver says, HOW CLOSE IS HE NOW?
65 WELL, he says, HE'S ABOUT THAT BIG. ((indicates a greater distance))
66 he says, SHOO::T=m.
67 (-) he sis, i CAN't shOOt=m. so why nOt.
68 he sis he's a frIEnd of mine.
69 (- -) hehe, he says, a frIEnd of yours?
70 how the heck do you figure he's a frIEnd of yours.
71 he sis, hey, I've known him since he was THAT big.
((indicates a small distance))
72 a: hahahahahahahahahahahaha
73 W: thAt's good, hehehehehehehehehehe
74 V: hehehehehe okay
75 D: HARD to find a good, clean jOke.
76 m: hehehehehehe
((Baby cries))

Generic features go beyond those described by Sacks. The joke prefers implicit person characterization for which direct quotations are very important. An essential question for joke performance always remains whether the typification process is staged in such a way that it could be shared by listeners.

2.1. Comical Effects of Social Typifications and Stylizations

With Tannen (1989), Couper-Kuhlen (1999) and Günthner (1999), I regard reported dialogue as a play with double voicing in the sense of Michail Bakhtin. The persons whose speech is delivered are stylized and evoked (Günthner 1999, Kotthoff 1998). These implicit typifications of the dramatis personae are easily identifiable by the listeners because they are based on shared knowledge about typical speech styles, which is confirmed in this manner.

In a well presented joke, scenic narration occurs. Onomatopoetic callings-out, expressive evaluations, gesticulations, mimicry, interjections, typical oral and structural discourse markers and so on are employed as stylistic procedures, just as with funny stories.

63 HEY that Indian's getting closer.
64 and the driver says, HOW CLOSE IS HE NOW?
65 WELL, he says, HE'S ABOUT THAT BIG. ((indicates a greater distance))
66 he says, SHOO::T=m.

Direct quotes are imperative. Elements of spoken discourse, interjections such as "hey" and "well," call prosody and shortenings (SHOO::T=m) can be reproduced most effectively in a quote. There are good and bad realizations of

a genre. In a bad realization (which would not contain the mentioned strategies) the genre remains valid.

A good joke performer not only stylizes direct quotes, but also integrates other special effects, for example, s/he manipulates the tempo of the joke, such as here the iconization of great distance with long lists of the territories traversed.

40 well they go through you know ohIo,
41 (-) and pennsylvAnia, and Illinois, and the whole wOrks,
42 and they go to minnesOta and they get into
43 the dakOtas before they ever see an INdian.

Even the reproduction of a standardized joke is much more than simple reproduction. The specific speaker-listener constellation influences the performance of the joke. Beyond the goal to amuse the public, jokes can have more specific goals, such as to introduce American folklore to a German guest as is the case in the example.

2.2. Meta-Jokes

For a theory of genre, it is important that interlocutors play with the features of the genre. There are question-and-answer jokes, such as elephant jokes:

- How do you fit four elephants into a VW?
- Two in the front, two in the back.

The punch line is based on a demonstration of normality. Most cars seat two persons in the front and two in the back. That elephants are too large to fit into a VW is suppressed, and thus the question is not really answered but it does not present an odd solution either.

What Attardo (1994: 285) discusses as an example of a joke, which fails to deliver the expected punch line and becomes funny precisely because of the failure to do so, is in fact a meta-joke based on the failure to fulfill the normal genre expectation:

"Have you heard the latest?"
"No? Well, neither have I."

There are typical summons which open up a joke telling sequence, such as "have you heard the latest?" or "Do you know the one about X?" one can play with.

3. Stability and Variability in Teasing

Teasing is a genre with even greater variation in situative performance. We start from the common denominator that teasing is a personally addressed jocular remark with a bite, often performed in front of a public. The humorous quality is marked, for example, by the inadequate wording of attributions.

In the next episode, a playful framing is initiated in the first line by the inappropriate combination of *opulent* and *social life*. This steers the reception towards irony since the utterance is stylistically marked.

Datum 2[2]

(David (D), Ernst (E), Inge (I), Johannes (J), Katharina (K), Maria (M), Rudolph (R), several persons at once (m))

1 M: du hasch grad son opulEntes [soziALleben.
2 R: [(? ?)
3 D: totAL. totAL was los grad, well ich nämlich initiatIv
4 geworden bin [jetzt.
5 M: [hahahahahaha
6 K: [hab ich scho(h)n erZÄ(h)HLT. haha [hahaha
7 S: [haha=
8 s: hahahahahaha [hahahahaha
9 E: [WAS sagt er, er freut sich schon
10 auf wEIhnachten und silvEster.
11 a: hahahahahahahahaha [hahahahahaha
12 E: [mUnkelt man. mUnkelt man.
13 D: ich hab angeregt entWEder. Oder. hab ich angeregt.
14 s: hehehehehehehehehe
15 K: wenn nichts 10s sei, weihnachten und silvEster, dann
16 würde er (-) verREIsen. hat er gesagt. [dann FLIEGT er
17 D: [mhm dann FLIEG ich.
18 E: in die karIbik. karIbik. hehehehe [hehehe
19 s: [ha [hahahahahahaha
20 M: [hehehehehehehe

Translation:

1 M: you are leading such an opulent [social life of late.
2 R: [(? ?)
3 D: a lot. a lot has been going on lately, because i
4 have taken the initiative [now.
5 M: [hahahahahaha
6 K: [i have just told about that. haha [haha
7 [haha=
8 s: hahahahahaha [hahahaha
9 E: [What's he saying, he is already looking
10 forward to christmas and new years.
11 a: hahahahahahahahahahahahaha [hahahahahaha
12 E: [it is rumored. it is rumored.
13 D: i have suggested either. or. i have suggested.
14 s: heheheheheheheheh

The dinner takes place at Katharina and David's home. Maria focuses on David's *social life*. She employs an elevated and inappropriate formulation (*opulent social life*), thereby creating a playful-ironic modality. Everybody knows that David prefers a quiet lifestyle. Recently, however, he has taken part in two social events: dinners at their home at Christmas and on New Year's Eve.

David likewise responds ironically to Maria's remark. Above all the formulation *taken the initiative* is quoted from Maria and his wife Katharina, who immediately reacts affirmatively to this and laughs. Many people present know that the view that David normally *does not take the initiative* is not his own. David's self-irony thus draws its potential from Maria and Katharina, who sometimes use such psychological jargon. The others also understand the conflict-laden point of David's reclusive social life and how it is discussed. In lines 6, 7, and 8 several persons laugh.

David not only processes Maria's irony, but he immediately counters it. We must assume that shared knowledge of personal habits and speaking styles and a high degree of familiarity make it possible to respond very quickly and creatively to irony. In lines 9 and 10, Ernst alludes to next Christmas and New Years Eve, which further amplifies the topic and the teasing of David. The background is that Katharina had invited numerous guests this year not only for Christmas, but also for New Year's Eve, among others those present, and that this was definitely too much for David. He has resigned himself good-naturedly to his fate. Everyone laughs at the teasing jest that he is looking forward to the next Christmas and New Year's Eve, which also implies that there will again be numerous invitations to social events.

Ernst expands on the irony by himself starting to tease David. A contrasting perspectivation is still at stake. He speaks about David in the third person, which is typical of teasing (Straehle 1993, Günthner 1996). Maria's ironic implication that David considers his present social life to be "opulent" is now teasingly intensified. David is portrayed as wanting nothing more than to have more parties. In line 12 Ernst refers to a *rumor* he pretends to have heard, thereby suggesting the fictitious quality of his remarks.

In line 13 David seriously reports what his stated preference is (he would like to have a party on either Christmas or New Year's Eve in the coming year). Everyone laughs again. Drew (1987) has shown that teased persons initially react seriously to a teasing attack. David seriously explains how he made it clear to his wife Katharina that in the future he would prefer not to hold big parties at their home on Christmas and New Year's Eve. This reveals his real mood.

But the teasing continues. Starting at line 13, Katharina links David's distaste for an *opulent social life* with his disinclination to travel. David really does not enjoy trips abroad and seldom takes them, and the threat to take one would be the last thing we would expect from him. Everyone present shares this knowledge. David starts to take part in the teasing himself (15). He confirms the views attributed to him. This again is a reaction to the literal meaning. Ernst augments this once more by referring to *the Caribbean*. David himself had recently teased him because of his flight to the Caribbean. For environmental reasons, David was critical of traveling long distances on vacation trips. Again, the participants

laugh. David's "leg is pulled", but he shows the ability to laugh at himself. Teasing can work with irony, as is the case here, and it always works additionally with exaggeration. "Tangential address" (Günthner 1996) is typical; it underlines the performance character of the teasing.

Ironic activities are being carried out here teasingly, which everyone present seemingly finds amusing. People communicate knowledge of one another in this way and thereby affirm their identity as part of the in-group. Friendly irony allows the in-group to deal playfully with social differences, which thereby receive acceptance. The participants leave the domain of official face politics and playfully create a high level of intimacy (Kotthoff 1996). Teasing in this case indirectly communicates a social difference to David. His friends playfully convey to him a construction of how he might see himself in regard to the topic – and also make it clear that they know his real perspective. Friendly irony combines social dissonance und consonance (in the sense of Radcliffe-Brown 1940/1965), individuation and solidarity. David's self-irony shows that he does not feel insulted by the teasing. In datum 2 the social function of the teasing episode can be described as negotiating social norms and accepting differences in regard to them.

There are other forms of teasing, and the knowledge of teasing can be exploited. The listener can define a simple critique as teasing and thereby invite the emergent construction of a teasing episode.

Datum 3 (from Drew 1987)

(Gerald has a new Mustang Sport wagon)

Gerald: Hi, how are you.
Martha: Well, you're late as usual.
Gerald: eheh eheh eheh eheh
Lee: What's the matter, couldn't you get your car started?
Gerald: hehe That's right. I had to get it pushed, eheh eheh

Gerald's laughter in line 3 defines the criticism as teasing. We get an impression here of the recipient's power to negotiate the meaning of a speech activity. Lee ratifies Gerald's definition of the situation through teasing. Drew does not discuss that this is emergent teasing invited by the activities of the recipient.

I see datum 3 as an example of a recipient's reframing of a critique. Martha's remark is quite serious. But Gerald refuses to offer a serious reception of her complaint (late as usual). The occasion of the teasing is a critical incident here. As Drew claims, there is an evident contrast here between the new car and Lee's comment that he could not get it started. The critical component of datum 3 is more evident than in datum 2.

Some teasing episodes are totally fictional. Schmitt (1992) describes a group that meets everyday at a newsstand to chat and have a drink. This group likes to tease an older customer (Müller) for coming just to see Iris, a 22-year old student. This teasing is a provocation without any underlying real event or critical attitude. The group likes to see Müller's reactions. In a playful way, the group invents special situative identities for the steady customers. The owner of the newsstand, Gerhard, for example, pretends to unmask Müller as a secret

admirer of Iris. Müller is spoken about in the third person, which is typical of teasing activities. Müller often gets into the act, and Iris likewise reacts with laughter (1992: 92ff.).

The teasing episodes take place in front of a public. Often they thematize aspects of social relations. Customer Müller counters the newsstand's owner's teasing by pointing out that Gerhard's shoes could use polishing. Although the teasing is carried out in a playful mode, relevant cultural values are at stake, such as age differences in love affairs or standards of cleanliness.

Already, we have seen three moments of variation in teasing:

- Playful provocation based on behavioral differences within a social group
- Teasing as a redefinition of criticism
- Fictional teasing

Some anthropological linguists have analyzed the teasing of children, which shows further variants of that genre.

Eisenberg (1986) discusses how two Mexican families in California manipulate their children by teasing them. It is important that the children learn not to believe what is being said. Very often an adult says something that is highly threatening to the child, like: "We are going to throw Marissa into the garbage can!" This is said with a lot of laughter and a marked sing song intonation. Smiling also contextualizes a humorous keying. Very often emotive threats form the kernel of the provocation. For example, a mother might say that everyone is going to visit grandfather, but Nancy will have to stay home. After Nancy gets excited, it is made clear that Nancy will of course accompany the others. In teasing, children are first threatened, but then the threat is taken back completely, and the adults thus create a possibility to communicate closeness, security and love. The teasing in this setting is used as the first part of a ritual with two parts. The second is the celebration of love, togetherness, and solidarity within the family.

Again, it becomes evident that the genre is used in various contexts for various purposes. Sexual and romantic teasing among youngsters would reveal additional aspects (Eder 1993, Lampert/Ervin-Tripp 2006). Among themselves, adults do not close a teasing sequence by demonstrating their principal social conjunction. They often develop a new teasing topic from a previous one (as we saw in datum 3). A teasing topic can be transformed into a running gag as is the case with Müller and Iris at the newsstand.

4. Humorous Stories about Problems

The dialectic of genre knowledge and creative authoring can also be seen in narratives, for example, when comparing talk about problems with humorous talk about problems. Humorous stories about problems deviate significantly in production and reception from serious stories about problems.

Jefferson (1984) has dealt with trouble telling in conversations and shown that in this context laughter produced by the speaker does not necessarily demand

that listeners also laugh. She discusses episodes in which speakers laugh while talking about difficult problems, e.g.:

Datum 4 (from Jefferson 1984)

(1)[Frankel:TC:1:4:SO]

G: You don't want to go through all the hassle?
S: 'hhh I don't know Geri,
(.)
S: I've stopped crying uhheh-heh-heh-heh-heh.
G: Why were you crying?

Person S laughs after saying that she has stopped crying. Person G (Geri) does not join in. While laughter on the side of recipients is the normal response to the speaker's initial laughter and the normal case in daily discourse, the listeners here display "trouble-receptiveness" (1984: 348). Precisely by not laughing they indicate that they take the problem seriously.

Jefferson writes that initial laughter in the context of problem presentations shows that the narrator displays resistance to the problem; she wants to take the problem lightly. But the hearer may not necessarily share this attitude. The hearer indicates "trouble sensitivity" if s/he tends to react to the problem content by posing questions about it or making serious comments on it. In connection with problem presentations, there is a need for especially strong contextualizations of humor intended to evoke laughter from the hearers.

Jefferson's examples suggest that the trouble teller herself laughs relatively late in the problem presentation; in her data the first laughter particles usually occur in the closing phase of the topic. The positioning of laugh particles thus contributes significantly to the social meaning of the utterances. It makes a difference in what phase of presenting a problem the tellers laugh. If the problematic aspects are already introduced with laughter, the humorous potential of the topic takes the upper hand. Recipients expect something funny to follow.

In the following we focus on strategies of contextualizing harmlessness and humor in regard to the presented problem.

In the next datum, Anni jokes about losing her student status at the university. From the very start, the contextualization of humor prevents a possible "trouble sensitive" reception.

Datum 5

(Anni (A), Bernada (B), David (D), Johannes (J), Maria (M), Katharina (K), Ulf (U))

1 A: aber STELLT euch vor, ich musste mich jetzt im
2 NEUNunddrei (h) ßigsten semester exmatrikullEren.
3 da hamse Extra ne STUdienberatung eingerichtet.
4 M: nEI:: (heheh) n
5 U: es war FOLgende mEldung in der presse, in berLIN
6 hättense jetzt mAssenhaft ihre [lang=
7 A: [genAU. ja
8 U: [eh die bummela (h) Anten
9 A: [genAU. ah-

10 und ich meine, die anderen-
11 U: da hamse einen mit NEUNundfuffzig semEstern entdeckt.
12 A: a:h, NEUNundfuffzig. der hat [mEhr als ich.
13 U: [hehehehehe
14 A: auf V(h) IErzig [wollt ich (h) s brIngen. hehe
15 U: [hehehehehehehe
16 K: ja und dAnn?
17 A: mEInes wissens kam das aus der kUNSTgeschichte.
18 der professor SAUer hat diese Unglückliche aktion entrollt.
19 schEInheilig wollte er sich erkUndigen,
20 was mit diesen gestalten Is, ja?

Translation:

1 A: but imagine, I had to drop out of the university now in
2 my thi (h) rty-ninth semester.
3 there they set up a study advIsory office extra.
4 M: NO::hehehe
5 U: there was the following report in the press, in berlin
6 they now have any number of their [long=
7 A: [exactly. yes
8 [uh the slow (h) pokes
9 [exactly. but only art history.
10 and i think, the others
11 U: they found one with fifty-nine semesters.
12 A: a::h, fifty-nine, he has [more than i.
13 U: [hehehehehe
14 A: to f (h) orty [i (h) wanted to get it up to. hehe
15 U: [hehehehehehehehe
16 K: yes and then?
17 A: to my knowledge that came from art history.
18 K: professor sauer got this regrettable campaign rolling.
19 hypocritically he wanted to find out
20 what's wrong with these characters, he?

The group discusses the topic of who has studied what and when. and Anni says that she has to withdraw from the university in her thirty-ninth semester. Anni presents this information as incredible (*imagine*). Possible embarrassment is thereby avoided from the start. Maria's reception in line 4 indicates simultaneous astonishment and amusement. Ulf has also read that in Berlin measures are being taken against students whose progress is too slow (*Bummelanten slowpokes*), a category in which Anni is now indirectly placed. Ulf does not show any problem sensitivity, like the hearers in Jefferson's analyses, but rather reinforces the problem with negative attributions. The laugh particles (bummeln (h) Anten/ slow (h) pokes) function in his comment like quotation marks. Anni does not resist the attribution of being an overly slow student, but rather confirms Ulf's claims. The students forced to leave the university, Anni further states, are ones studying art history. Ulf can also report that one student was discovered to be in his fifty-ninth semester. Anni immediately competes with him: *he has more than i* (12). Ulf laughs. In line 14 she laughs as she announces her own ambitions

study goals. Ulf laughs with her. Katharina asks seriously, and Anni explains that a professor had hypocritically tried to find out what was wrong with these *characters*. Anni adopts proforma the professor's perspective. But since he had already been presented as hypocritical, it is made clear that the professor was not interested in finding out the reasons, but only in ridding the university of dawdlers. Anni ironically plays with thought patterns that are indirectly attributed to the professor (Kotthoff 1998).

Her announcement that she has been forced to end her university studies in her thirty-ninth semester seems anything but contrite. Nor does she present having been enrolled for so long as a personal inadequacy, but rather as a sort of game: the longer the better. Katharina's question is not understood as a question of how the overly long enrollment could have happened, but rather of how the termination could have happened. In her presentation, Anni turns the tables on the usual societal evaluations. The professor is a negative sort of person: he has spoilt her fun. She is in one sense a loser – but in a game whose norms she rejects anyway. She invites her hearers to laugh with her over the incongruity of the norms. Here a representative of the institution has indeed won, but at least she has had her fun.

In order to accept the casualness of Anni's representation of her withdrawal (Exmatrikulation), however, background knowledge is helpful. Anni has been professionally active as a sinologist for some time and was enrolled as a student only secondarily, in order to supplement her knowledge of Chinese art history. If she were actually unable to cope with her studies, the presentation and reception would probably have been different.

The listeners' reception here again shows that they share Anni's distanced and amused perspective on losing one's student status. Ulf names a negative attribution (*Bummelanten/slowpokes*) as a quotation, which Anni emphatically confirms (9). If Anni had presented her termination as awkward, it would have been tasteless to stress the awkwardness by negative attribution. But Ulf can feel sure that Anni will recognize the quotation character, and thus he indicates that he shares her amused perspective on what has happened. Narratives at the teller's own expense can encourage a sharing of perspectives.

It is important to bear in mind that some stories might be told from different perspectives, tailoring them as much as necessary to fit the current context (Norrick 2000). In a different setting, Anni might very well describe the same event as really creating a problem for her.

5. Joint Fantasizing

Characteristic of this genre is the emergent production of a shared fantasy, often with several conversational participants making short contributions which create coherent scenes through the incremental structuring and augmentation of unreality. The genre shows how interlocutors put each other on inferential tracks and how these tracks can be processed, drawing on the relevant contextual knowledge, so that the humor can be immediately "topped" (to ...

ethnographical term). It shows how several persons closely oriented to each other select formulations which produce a coherent fiction, until the created scene is conversationally phased out again. In this case a scene is an imagined situation, in the sense of Karl Bühler's phantasm, which lies outside the ongoing conversational situation (Bange 1986, Ehmer 2004).

The conversation takes place among thirty-year-old Viennese in a bar in Vienna. Most have academic degrees.

Before the transcript starts, the group has already been discussing a certain Hermes Phettberg. At the time when the recordings were made (1995), Phettberg was a very popular television moderator in Austria and Germany. He wrote a column in a well-known cultural magazine in Vienna (*Falter*), in which he aired his views on life as such, and he had a late-night TV talk show called "Nette Leit Show", on which he interviewed celebrities. The title includes a pun – Leit could suggest either Leute (people) or Lite (light). Thus it could either mean "nice people show" or "nice light show." His professional name is also a pun: it literally means "mountain of fat" (German: "Fettberg").

His popularity was partly based on his unusually corpulent figure, especially for a media personality; he is also a confessing homosexual masochist. With his open way of talking about intimate subjects and his critical attitude toward the Catholic Church, which is quite powerful in Austria, he appealed to an intellectual public.

The group jointly imagines how Phettberg, the anti-type, could be presented as a typical celebrity by the yellow press. The group not only cooperates in creating the content of the fantasy but also in the style of speaking.

Datum 6 (Conversation 19 (Viennese Group I) Episode 9)
Conrad (C), Hugo (H), Lilo (L), several (m), Peter (P), Renate (R)

1	C:	wieviel kilo dEr hat, waaß A kana,
2		wieviel kilo der WIRKlich hat.
3	R:	hundertvierundsIEb [zig?
4	P:	[jEnseits der zwahundert SIcher.
5	H:	[(? ?)
6	C:	[i bin kA BRAvo- leser mit steckbriefsammlu (h) [Ung.
7	L:	[he [hehehehe
8	m:	[hehehe
9	P:	was?
10	H:	woher WEIßT du das über [haupt.
11	P:	[na, aber zwAhundert, des könnt
12		wIrklich sein, ja.
13	C:	Amal hob is glesen.
14	P:	↑dEs wär was. ↑HERmes phettberg lEbensgroß.
15		↑STA:Rschnitt in der brA:vo, [na?
16	m:	[hahahahahahahaha
17	L:	[kommst a jAhr lang aus.
18	H:	na, na. im PLAYgirl. nO viel besser.
19	P:	a jOa.
20	m:	hahahaha

21 L: als EIne ausgabe fÜnfundzwanzig [meter hoch. **hehehehehe**
22 P: [dEr fallt EH **net**
23 unters jugendverbot,=
24 L: hehe
25 P: =weil genitAlien sichst bei dem EH kane
26 durch den bauch, also
27 C: na DER kann nackert ruhig sEIn, [des des
28 H: [DER kann ruhig
29 nackert sEIn.
30 C: mAlen nach zahlen. [HERmes phettberg zum sElber **malen.**
31 P: [das **PHETT**berg puzzle.
32 L: hahaha pfui TEUFL.
33 C: da hast a LEbensaufgabe.

Translation:

1 C: how many kilos he really weighs, nobody knows **that,**
2 how many kilos he really weighs.
3 R: hundred forty-sev [en?
4 P: [over two hundred surely.
5 H: [(? ?)
6 C: [i am not a bravo-reader with a collection of fan [c(h)ards
7 L: [hehehehehehehe
8 m: [hehe
9 P: what?
10 H: how do you know that [anyway.
11 P: [no, but two hundred could
12 be possible, yeah
13 C: once i read that.
14 P: ↑that would be something. ↑hermes phettberg life-sized.
15 ↑celebrity cutouts in bravo, [huh?
16 m: [hahahahahaha
17 L: [lasts for a whole year.
18 H: [no, no in playgirl, much **better.**
19 P: a whole year.
20 m: hahahahaha
21 L: as a single picture twenty-five [meters high. hehehehehe
22 P: [he does not come under
23 the youth age limits.
24 L: hehe
25 P: =because with him you don't see genitals anyway
26 because of his belly, well
27 C: no for him to be nude is all right [the the
28 H: [for him it's all
29 right to be nude.
30 C: painting by numbers. [hermes phettberg to paint yourself.
31 P: [the phettberg puzzle.
32 L: hahaha yucky.
33 C: that's a lifetime task.

Before the transcript begins, someone had commented that Hermes Phettberg would not reach the age of seventy, since he was much too fat. Conrad agrees in

line 1/2 and notes twice that no one knows how much Phettberg weighs. Renate offers a concrete guess with a slight question intonation. Peter in line 4 offers an even higher estimate. So far the talk is serious. In line 6 Conrad makes a statement about himself, which demands extra processing effort to fit it into the topical context. The last word contains a laughter particle. Lilo and some others respond with laughter (lines 7, 8), which suggests that they understood Conrad's statement to be funny. Coherence seems to be formed. Conrad refers to a youth magazine, *Bravo*, which publishes so-called *Steckbriefe* (celebrity trading cards) containing all sorts of information about film, pop and rock stars. Here we have an unusual combination of elements from the life world.[3] Phettberg does not at all fit into the trendy youth magazine *Bravo*, which does not cover intellectual and unconventional personalities. Peter has not understood something (maybe he could not see the comical dimension). Hugo's question in line 10 is directed at Peter, who in line 4 made a claim about Phettberg's weight. Peter in the following softens his assertion a bit. In line 13, Conrad agrees with him.

In the lexeme *Steckbriefsammlung* (celebrity trading cards), we find the first laugh particles of this episode, which elicit responsive laughter; thereby ratifying a humorous perspective on the conversational topic *Phettberg* in connection with *Bravo*. The utterance in line 6 does not immediately make sense and violates the maxims of quality and quantity, because nothing is ever written about Phettberg in *Bravo*. According to Sperber and Wilson (1985), the listeners have to seek a context for the information which requires as little processing effort as possible, thus preferably the one already opened, to which the new information can relate. The widely differing topics of Phettberg and *Bravo* can relevantly be connected if one takes *Bravo* as a context in which celebrity trading cards about Hermes Phettberg could be created. This presupposes that Phettberg could be presented as a teenage idol. In reality, this is so far from the truth that it is amusing. It works as an invitation to enter the realm of fiction. The normative world of stars and starlets is connected with the anti-normative world of Hermes Phettberg. Line 6 bi-sociates two contrastive frames, as Arthur Koestler described in his book on "acts of creation" (1964). The inferencing does not explode maximally in many directions, but in a coordinated manner elaborates the context that was opened up by Conrad.

In line 14, Peter continues to fantasize about the topical area of *Bravo*. The phrase *that would be something* introduces something that is marked as unusual. The line is syntactically and prosodically subdivided into three phrase units, which all have the same rhythm and intonation. The accent is on the first syllable in each phrase; the intonation falls at the end of each. Rhythm and intonation can contextualize comicality, if semantics support this. In this way a humorous keying is reinforced. The youth magazine is known for its celebrity cutouts; one can gradually fit together small pieces to create life-sized celebrity portraits. The pieces can be clipped out of *Bravo* one after the other like puzzle pieces. This sort of world knowledge has to be activated. Drawn out laughter in line 16 indicates that something funny is being processed.

Bravo is introduced in headline style. Formulation (lines 14ff.) certainly is among the procedures which key humor. Metonymically, elements of *Bravo*

(a journal has headlines) are used in order to not only denote this magazine, but simultaneously to stylistically evoke it. The syntactic and prosodic forms recreate the semantic content iconically. This "likeness on several levels" (Jakobson 1960: 369) characterizes aestheticized speech. Conversational humor here enters into the realm of verbal art (Knoblauch/Kotthoff 2002).

Furthermore, the continuation of a very elliptical speech style is striking. Ellipses usually contain the *rheme*, the new information. In line 18, for example, the proposal to present Phettberg in *Playgirl*, as well as the evaluation *no viel besser/ much better* are like small spotlights on an already set stage; lines 19 and 21 also cohere in form and content to lines 14f.

The presented fictionalization is absurd, since Phettberg absolutely does not come into question as a teenage idol, suitable to be presented in *Bravo*. In line 16 the women present laugh. Lilo comments on the fantasy that in the case of Phettberg it would take an especially long time to collect all the pieces (a Jahr/one year); she thereby alludes to his enormous girth. Allusions further aestheticize the discourse. In conversational humor the recipients often actively top the ongoing humor (Norrick 1993). The humorous fantasy is displayed as an ongoing achievement. Hugo in line 18 intensifies the fiction about Phettberg in *Bravo*; he suggests *Playgirl*, a magazine known for erotic photos of nude or scantly clad males. Previously created images are then detailed. Peter would like to see him presented a year long in this magazine as well. Several persons laugh (20). In line 21 Lilo stretches the life-sized figure to one twenty-five meters high and likewise laughs.

Starting in line 22, Peter takes up another aspect of Phettberg's girth and erotic self-display. His belly hangs down, serving as though it were a sort of fig leaf. Conrad and Hugo affirm this impression. Phettberg and youth age limit form a new combination, which is also developed by other interlocutors. Conrad in line 30 alludes to a game for children. The game is called *Malen nach Zahlen/ painting by numbers*. Peter then continues with a further fictionalization from children's games (*the Phettberg Puzzle*). Lines 30 and 31 again use a headline style. The games are presented like an ad. Lilo laughs and inserts an interjection of dismay. Conrad, by pointing out that one thereby has a *Lebensaufgabe/lifetime task*, again alludes to Phettberg's enormous girth.

All the fictionalizations draw on cultural knowledge of entertainment media and thereby make coherence easy. The topic development goes from Phettberg in *Bravo*, Phettberg in *Playgirl*, to Phettberg in children's puzzle games. The coordinated imaginings have a meta-message: Hermes Phettberg, who markets himself as nonconformist, is mercilessly marketed in the fantasies of the young Viennese in a conforming way. They take his body as a starting point for various humorous quips. The interlocutors do something that Phettberg himself very often does but they do it so-to-speak in a diametrically opposite manner. In numerous interviews, Phettberg himself has referred repeatedly to his unusual body, body feeling and sexuality. He acquired his popularity to a considerable degree due to the fact that he staged himself as an appealing anti-type. He contradicts several norms of the boulevard press. He notoriously presented himself in interviews as fat, unkempt, homosexual and masochistic – thereby trying to shock and simultaneously win over the public, which amused at least part of the

intellectual public in Austria. Consequently, it is amusing to see him being integrated into the yellow press world as though he were a quite typical TV celebrity. Thereby the young Viennese also implicitly communicate that they find Phettberg's self-presentation contradictory. Thus, distance can be simultaneously displayed toward both Phettberg and the yellow press. The participants show their knowledge of media contents, and as well their critical attitude to them, without explicitly evaluating them. The evaluation is not made explicit, but is jointly performed. In their imaginings, the norms of the magazine world are violated, and at the same time the social norms of self-presentation are negotiated, using Phettberg as an example.

With a high level of personal participation, thirteen different turns come about which sketch out a fiction and amplify the absurdity of its elements (lines 6, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 30, 31, 33). In this genre the most important thing appears to consist in somehow continuing to spin out the topic within theater frame. This means that a performative special frame was created. A different example of this type is discussed in Kotthoff (2005).

In joint fantasizing, condensed information is quickly added on to produce the most absurd fictive scene; the short turns iconize the tempo of building up the structure. The particular artistry of participation in the formation of such fantasies consists in doing this rapidly (Ehmer 2004). The taking over of constructions is functional in the sense of "on-line" syntactic phenomena (Auer 2005).

6. Playing with Genre Norms

6. 1. Humorous Nutritional Counseling

Below, I present another transcript from a dinner shared by friends (30 to 45 years old) in a German academic milieu. Vegetables are being passed around. Anni responds to them in an unusual way; she claims that she needs to eat a few carrots just for the sake of vitamins, and this time with butter. Then she advises the others with exaggerated emphasis that raw fruits and vegetables ought to be eaten with butter. Her explanations become still more amusing when she reveals the source of her nutritional expertise: from the *Bäckerblume* ('Baker's Flower', a free magazine available in many German bakeries, offering among other things nutritional advice). An amusing episode follows. I will explain the sequence conversation analytically and pragmatically.

Datum 6

(Everyone (a), Anni (A), Bernada (B), David (D), Johannes (J), Katharina (K), Maria (M), several (m), Ulf (U))

1 B: noch jemand ↑rÜebli::? ((bietet diese an))
2 A: ICH muss noch welche Essen.
3 ich hab zu wenig vitamin A: und bE:.
4 weil, du musst se ja mit BUTter essen.
5 sonst is das vitamin A hehe ni (h) cht w (h) Irksa (h) m.
6 B: ja also

7 ((Zwischensequenz, A nimmt sich Butter))
8 A: jetzt tu maln bisschen BUTter drAU (h) f. hehe
9 U: des heißt, man muss eigentlich e:h [die dann auch
10 A: [na ja, ohne **BUTTER**
11 D: UNbedingt. rohkost wIrkt nich ohne. (? ?)
12 B: wUsst ich gar nich.
13 A: ja::::hehe
14 M: ich AUch net. Ich hab [rOhkost IMmer SO gegessen.
15 A: [genau des NÜTZT nIx.
16 brauchst ↑BUTter mit dabEI.
17 ↑BUTTER.
18 D: [hehehe
18 [deshalb war das schOn ernährungs [poli (h) tisch WICHtig.
19 hehe was wi (h) r vorhIn gesagt ham.
20 D: [hehehehehehe [hehehehe
21 a: [hehehehehehe
22 hehehehehehehe
23 M: °wohEr WEISCHT du des?°
24 A: sowas WEIß ich. weil Ich die ↑BÄCKerblume lese.
25 m: hahahahahahahahahahahaha [hahahahaha
26 K: [ICH wEIß es auch **daher.**
27 B: aber bei Unserm bäcker ↑GIBTS jetzt
<
28 [keine bäckerblume me:::hr.
((kindlich)) >
29 A: [ja genAU. des wird jetzt Alles EINgespart.
30 das musst Ich jetzt AUCH schon mal feststellen.
31 B: sonst würd ich sie mir AUCH noch hOlen. [(? ?)
32 K: [ich hab
33 [die früher AUCH immer gelEsen.
34 A: [die BÄCKerblume und die METZgerzeitung.
35 ich war ganz verzwEI (h) felt als
36 [ich merkte, hehe die BÄCKerblume kOmmt nich mehr.
37 B: [kann sein dass es die bei Uns schon LANge
38 nich mehr gab.
39 U: da hab ich ja noch gAr keinen konTAKT aufgenommen.
40 [in meiner journalistischen lAUfbahn.
41 ?: [hehehehehehehehe
42 U: wo ich eigentlich [versUch JEdes blatt irgendwie EInzubeziehen
43 M: [zur bÄckerblume?

Translation:

1 B: anyone else rÜebli:::? (Swiss German for carrot)
2 A: I must eat some more.
3 I have too little vitamin A: and bE:.
4 because, you must eat them with butter.
5 otherwise the vitamin A will no (h) t be (h) effe (h) ct (h) ive.
6 B: well
7 ((incomprehensible side sequence, A helps herself to the butter))
8 A: now put a little butter on t (h) em. hehe
9 U: that means, one should practically e.h [then also
10 A: [well, with ... BUTTER

11 D: Absolutely. raw fruits and vegetables have no effect without.
12 B: I really didn't know that.
13 A: we::::ll hehe
14 M: I didn't either. I have always eaten [raw fruits and vegetables plAIn.
15 A: [that's exactly what doesn't hElp.
16 you need ↑bUtter with them.
17 BUTTER. therefore it was already
18 D: hehe
19 nutritional [poli (h) tically important. hehe what w (h) e said before.
20 D: [hehehehehehehehehehehehe [hehehehehehehehehe
21 a: [hehehehehehehehehe
22 hehehehehehehehehehehe
23 M: °where did you find that out?°
24 A: I knOw that sort of thing. because I read the ↑Baker's Flower.
25 m: hahahahahahahahahaha [hahahahahaha
26 K: [I also found out about it there.
27 B: but at our bakery there ↑ is now
> ((childish))
28 [no more Baker's Flower.
((childish)) <
29 A: [yes *exactly*. everything is being sAved on now.
30 I Also could not help but notice that.
31 B: otherwise I would still pick it up. [(? ?)
32 K: [I
33 [also always used to read it.
34 A: [the ↑BAker's Flower and the BUtcher's Journal.
35 I was really desp (he) erate when
36 [I noticed that BAker's Flower doesn't come anymore.
37 B: [could be that it hasn't been available here anymore for a lOng
38 time already.
39 U: I haven't contacted them at all.
40 [in my journalistic career.
41 m: [hehehehehehehehehehe
42 U: whereas I normally try [to include every publication somehow
43 M: [even Baker's Flower?

What is going on here? Bernada, who is from Berlin, asks the group whether anyone else would like *Rüebli* (*carrots*). This term, spoken in Swiss German dialect (Standard German would be 'Karotten' or 'Möhren') in a diminutive form, represents a code switch and thereby draws attention to the expression as such. The group is meeting in a Swiss town on the German border. Talking like the Swiss (German dialects are a popular source of German humor) affects the creation of a play layer of action in Clark's sense (1996: 357f.): The Berliner even prolongs the *i* of the Swiss diminutive *li* exaggeratedly, thereby reinforcing the playful effect.[4] Marked registers and "borrowed" varieties are effective performative strategies (Coupland 2001). Marked formulations draw attention to themselves and highlight performance.

Anni pretends in line 2ff. that for the sake of vitamins she still *has to eat some more*. Laughter particles in line 5 indicate that these reasons are not to be taken

overly seriously. The scene switches back and forth between joking and seriousness. But no punch line humor moves the text from the realm of bona-fide into that of non-bona-fide (as it is sometimes discussed in humor theory, see Attardo 1994). Anni actually does eat some carrots (*Rüebli*) with butter and offers a nutritional theory that the others respond to seriously (9, 12, 14, 23). Her acceptance of the carrots is not the usual way of accepting offered food, but is easy to understand. Transcripts from conversations often show that utterances contain laughter particles in places where nothing really funny is being said. Above all Jefferson (1984, 1985) corrected the dominant view in humor research that laughter follows from a humorous stimulus. Laughter itself often functions as a stimulus, as a contextualization cue, as an extra element that lends an utterance additional meaning in the sense of: "Take it easy," or "What I am saying is a bit funny." In line 5 the laughter contextualizes comicality (see also Glenn 2003).

In line 8 Anni tells the others laughingly that they should also put butter on their carrots. What inferences could be made from her laughing speech and nutritional counseling? Maybe she can thereby avoid the danger of being considered a glutton. Anni stylizes herself in a transparent way as someone who always acts sensibly. This perspective remains totally implicit and vague. As we all know, this is not unusual in everyday talk. We often invite listeners to make a little extra effort to construct additional meaning. All contextualization cues create, as Gumperz (1982) and Auer (1986) have pointed out, information on how to interpret what is said. Since these cues are analogous, they make sense only in combination with what is said.

David seriously confirms Anni's theory in line 11. He must have stayed in the realm of what Attardo (1994) calls the bona-fide. We see that it is not problematic to react bona-fide to a non-bona-fide utterance. This does not mean that the discourse is shifted back to the bona-fide. It shows instead that two levels are activated simultaneously.

Bernada admits that she does not know how one ought to eat raw fruits and vegetables. This sequence is also spoken seriously. Anni then reacts with a drawn-out *ja* (well), in which laughter particles are integrated (line 13): This *well*, spoken with a gradually falling contour, has a playful sense. We could translate it as, 'There, now you see how much/know'. Anni presents herself as an expert on nutrition and simultaneously comicalizes this role with the laugh particle and other strategies. Maria reacts seriously to the information (14). Though they switch back and forth between both keys, this does not seem to present a problem. The playful keying does not necessarily suspend any of serious meanings that are created. What Anni tells her friends is true, and her suggestions are meant in this sense. But there is an additional layer of meaning. She could of course have pointed out seriously that vitamins in raw fruits and vegetables are more easily digested if they are eaten with some sort of fat, but serious nutritional counseling is not very entertaining. Anni communicates her advice in a double framing: she shows her knowledge and at the same time invites comical perspectives.

In lines 16 and 17, Anni again gives advice in a very exaggerated manner. Above all the word *Butter*, repeated twice with a high onset and spoken loudly, has a comic effect. David responds with laughter.

But only with the term "nutritional politically" (*ernährungspolitisch*) do most of the hearers begin to laugh. This academic-sounding term is too elevated for her modest suggestions. Anni alludes to something they *have said before* (*vorhin gesagt ham*). Prior to the episode recounted in the transcript, there was another in which the participants developed the absurd theory that if something tastes good then it must also be good in a nutritional sense. The extended laughter in lines 19 and 20 also has to do with remembering this absurd theory. The participants are also invited to infer that Anni is supporting her current culinary tastes with theories whose value depends arbitrarily on whether they fit her current tastes or not. This would be one possible way to construct relevance for her talk. But why do people present arbitrary theories and simultaneously pull the rug out from under them? Sudden shifts into a quasi-scientific register, which are contextually inappropriate, come up repeatedly with these intellectuals. They play with academic terminology, theatricalize it as though quoting scientific texts, and thereby frame it as something unusual.

Our everyday conversations are full of citation-like speech that is not introduced as such (Kotthoff 1998, 2002). We can use this mode of speech in order to blend in other persons' ways of speaking. Chiefly shared knowledge is what guarantees that such utterances are not understood on a direct level, but rather as playing with typical utterances in typical genres in a sort of theater frame – be it academic or parental or whatever – that people can laugh about. Phenomena like prosody, gestures and mimicry, seen by Bateson (1953, 1954) as meta-messages indicating, "this is play," perform a basic function in the creation of humor. Goffman (1981) calls these "footing," and Clark (1996, 2004) calls them "pretense" and "layering." The speaker downplays her responsibility for the utterance. This is not to be confused with non-bona-fide speech. Anni really motivates the group to take more butter, but does this in an entertaining manner, contextualized by integrated laugh particles, the manipulation of volume and an exaggerated authoritative intonation, whereby the utterance is made recognizable as a citation. We seem to have no problems with vague communication, as many pragmaticists since Grice have recognized. Nevertheless, Anni's humorous way of speaking can only vaguely be assigned an intention. Humorous intentions can seldom be pinned down exactly. Apparently, such vagueness can be handled without problems in communication.

Now, up to line 18 Anni is the only one who laughs. Bernada, David, Maria and Ulf react seriously, which is not a problem. There is no punch line that must be ratified by laughter. One can very well respond to the serious level of the advice. Anni's comments require no specific sort of response.

Maria asks quietly how Anni "knows that" (23). Anni constructs her answer in a suspense-creating way. The first part of the answer can be understood as in itself bragging (24); it is syntactically independent. A long, immediate laugh follows the information contained in the second statement, *Baker's Flower* (spoken with high onset). But what is funny about *Baker's Flower*?

Baker's Flower (*Bäckerblume* – no pun between 'flower' and 'flour' is intended, since the corresponding German words are 'Mehl' and 'Blume') is a free customer magazine available in many German bakeries. Anni focuses on this magazine

as though it were something special. Cultural knowledge of the mundane, everyday kind comes into play here, since *Baker's Flower* is well known to be a very modest publication, both topically and intellectually. Anni's almost proud reference to *Baker's Flower* as the chief source of her nutritional expertise is humorous to the extent that the magazine clearly does not meet our expectations about what a university graduate normally reads. This is one of the tacit assumptions that Anni rejects when she violates such milieu-specific cultural expectations of normal behavior. Cultural knowledge has to be shared if we are to grasp this sort of humor.

Katharina announces that she has also acquired similar knowledge from *Baker's Flower* (26). Bernada's comment that her baker no longer carries this magazine is given a complaining and childishly whining undertone through the extended *o* in *more* (*German: e in mehr*). She thereby joins in the humorous play of exaggerating the prestige of this lowbrow magazine. Anni confirms the negative trend (28) in bakeries. Bernada also confesses to reading *Baker's Flower* (32), and Anni extends the report of her reading interests to the *Butcher's Journal* (34). A confessional discourse arises, keyed as humorous, and several participants join in. They perform their extreme disappointment at the disappearance of this valued source of information. The staging of humor focused on *Baker's Flower* is jointly produced. In the emergent discourse, the scope of the humor gradually broadens.

The introduction in line 35 of the sense of feeling 'desperate' as a reaction to the disappearance of the magazine points again to exaggeration as a keying procedure. *Baker's Flower* is humorously transformed into an intellectually significant journal. One can take part in this humor by pretending to be quite serious on the explicit level, as Ulf does in the following (39). Ulf is a journalist with high standards and now pretends that he might want to publish in *Baker's Flower* and that that this would help to make up for a personal journalistic deficiency. Several of the friends laugh. Through his participation in exaggerating the status of a trivial popular magazine, Ulf also shows that he is ratifying the humor of the preceding discourse. His remark is integrated into the already constituted humorous discourse and expands on it. Ulf speaks in a serious tone, although the group knows that he normally publishes in much more prestigious journals.

In the emergent discourse, the humor is developed step by step. A level of bona-fide is nevertheless preserved. Again and again we find exaggeration used as a humor strategy.

The humorous counseling as well as the humorous play with the upgrading of modest journals allow the group, consisting of academics, to distance themselves from the norms of the academic world. Speakers index informality by maximizing an intertextual gap from serious counterparts of genres such as counseling or talk about journals.

6. 2. Humorous Gossip

Bergmann (1987/1993) analyzed gossip as a reconstructive, collaborative genre of moral communication. In gossip, "discreet indiscretion" is

gossip has a bad reputation, it is widely indulged in and even fulfills important functions for group formation. The producer of the gossip and the addressees talk about an absent object. The information is delivered as delicate.

In the next datum, the interlocutors play with the genre of gossip.

Datum 7 (Conversation 14 Episode 10)

(David (D), Ernst (E), Inge (I), Johannes (J), Katharina (K), Maria (M), Rudolph (R))

1	K:	Irgendwie hast du=s AUCH nicht mEhr so mit frau donner. ne?
2	R:	[m:::::::::
3	K:	[frÜher war das mal, da gab=s doch mal mEhr kontakt.
4	R:	sie hat en FREUND jetzt wieder,
5	D:	m:::: wie lang gOht des schon?
6	R:	he?
7	D:	wie lang gOht des schon.
8	R:	ja seit SECHS wOchen ungefähr.
9		und sEIther ist sie wieder UMgänglicher.
10	M:	ach sO?
11	I:	was ISCH des für EIner?
12	R:	oh jE. jetzt eh eh RED ich natürlich wieder ausm
13		nÄhkästchen.
14	E:	dEs erfahr ich sowieSO.
15	R:	he?
16	D:	[(? ?)
17	K:	[bei UNS ist das gUt [aufgehoben.
18	M:	[hehe [hehehehehe
19	I:	[hehehehehe
20	R:	es ist der VAter ihres sOhnes.
21	a:	NA::::I:::N
22	I:	po:::
22	K:	erzÄ::h::1.
23	D:	WER das is wolln wa ja gar nicht wIssen, rudolph.
24		das dArf doch KEIner wissen.
25	M:	[(? ?)
26	R:	[also wenn ihr jetzt nÄchstens ins TREppenhaus geht,
27		und die lllo kommt, sagst du, wir wissen NICHT,
28		dass dun verhÄltnis mit dem vAter [deines SOHnes hast.
29	I:	[heheheheh

7 D: how long has that been going on already?
8 R: well for about six weeks.
9 and since then she is more approachable again.
10 M: oh really?
11 I: what sort of person is he?
12 R: oh well.
13 now uh uh i am naturally giving away secrets.
14 E: i will find that out anyway.
15 R: he?
16 D: [(? ?)
17 K: [it is safe with us.
18 M: [hehe [hehehehehe
19 I: [hehehehehehe
20 R: it is her son's father.
21 a: NO::::::::
22 I: po:::
22 K: te:::ll us
23 D: who that is we definitely do not want to know, rudolph
24 no one is supposed to know.
25 M: [(? ?)
26 R: [so if you step into the stairwell sometime soon,
27 and lilo comes, you will say, we do not know,
28 that you are having a relationship with
the father [of your son.
29 I: [hehehehehehehehehehehehehehe
30 D: nor do we know it from rudolph.
31 a: hahahahahahahahahahahaha
32 R: we definitely did not learn about it last monday.
33 a: hahahahahahahahaha [haha
34 K: [rudolph, do you like the sparkling wine...

Katharina asks Rudolph about his current relationship with *Frau Donner*, who works as a psychologist in the neighborhood and is usually addressed informally by everyone as Lilo. The formal reference to *Frau Donner* instead of *Lilo* indexes distance from the lady in question. This is the first step to establishing a possible object of gossip. Rudolph's drawn-out interjection in line 2 is hard to interpret, but somehow signals the delicacy of the subject. He answers in line 4 that *Frau Donner* apparently has a boyfriend again. A wonderful topic of gossip is thus established. David reacts with the same drawn out interjection *m*::: (thereby underlining the delicacy) and with a question in Alemannic (a south-German dialect), which he otherwise never speaks (*wie lang goht des schon*? How long has that been going on already?), and which thereby becomes an indicator of comicalization, a stage separator in Haiman's sense (1990). Now a gossipy conversation is imitated. In line 7 David repeats the question in Alemannic in response to Rudolph's questioning signal. The stylization of the question in Alemannic dialect gives his words a quotation-like character.[5] Rudolph replies normally and comments on *Frau Donner's* relationship. Maria and Inge would like to know more (10, 11). Rudolph verbalizes the difficulties he is having in his role as a gossip informant (*jetzt eh eh red ich natürlich*

uh I am naturally giving away secrets.) The group seems to be fully aware that gossip has a bad reputation. Ernst allays his misgivings. He also has other sources. Katharina pretends to be acting therapeutically (17), as though the informant would be relieved if she could share the secret. There is a humorous incongruity in this, because the opposite is obviously the case. Maria and Inge laugh. Rudolph presents the key piece of information in formal syntax (*es ist... it is...*). In line 21 a sort of exclamation goes through the round which is so exaggerated that it reinforces the theater frame of the gossip. Inge inserts an interjection which playfully underlines the outrageousness of the news (*po:::*). Katharina insists that Rudolph tell them about it. Everyone knows about Frau Donner's child and has already on various occasions wondered about the father's identity. Now David turns the tables: He evinces explicit disinterest in exactly what everyone is so anxious to know (23, 24). Starting at line 26, Rudolph stages scenes of meetings with *Lilo Donner.* They imagine saying to her that they don't know any of the things they have just been talking about. Inge laughs (29). David expands on Rudolph's fantasy of the dialogue (30). Everyone laughs. Rudolph speaks even more concretely in line 32. Everyone laughs again. The imagined dialogue with *Frau Donner* is absurd. The joking episode reaches a climax and ends, among other things, with the drinks being refreshed.

In playing with gossip, some gossiping really is going on. In a humorous frame, people can distance themselves from a speech genre with a bad reputation (Bergmann 1987/1994) and simultaneously still carry on the activity. The main piece of information, that *Frau Donner* is having a relationship with the father of her child, whose identity they have kept secret, is in any case passed on.

The emergent play is so successful because everybody knows not only the genre, but also the ideology underlying it. Key information about Frau Donner is being transmitted in a play frame.

7. Final Remarks: Transcending Genre by Relying on Genre Knowledge

In this paper I have considered humorous genres (jokes, teasing, joint fantasizing) and determined that we can find a basic pattern for them. Nevertheless, the realizations of these genres are related only by a sort of family resemblance in Wittgenstein's sense. Genre knowledge is, however, employed precisely when the speaker goes outside the genre and when the pattern is violated in such a way that further information is located precisely in the violation.

Then I considered humorous realizations of genres that modify a serious genre (humorous stories about problems, humorous counseling, humorous gossiping). Here the framing is done from the start in such a way that a serious mode of understanding is undermined. The humorous realization is co-constructed. The co-construction is of course emergent, but nevertheless (or precisely for this reason) it relies on genre knowledge.

Along with Clark (1996), we can say that in humorous realizations of genres a second meta-communicative layer is made relevant. A level of commentary on the said arises by means of which speakers distance themselves from their messages. In playing with gossip, the gossip is kept as an intertext. The participants also communicate knowledge of the bad reputation of the genre. They take the offensive toward the ambivalence attached to the genre in everyday life (on the one side a bad reputation – on the other pleasure in the exchange of discrete indiscretions). Other intertexts are also included in the game, e.g. therapeutic discourse. People act as though it is more in the interest of the teller to tell something, than in the interest of satisfying their own curiosity.

We viewed genres from a performance perspective and witnessed how an actual co-construction of ongoing discourse indexes social relationships, moral stances and a certain context. With Briggs and Bauman (1992) we can see datum 5, 6 and 7 as maximizing an intertextual gap. Creative improvisation blurs any sharp distinctions among genres. Although the intertextual gap is smaller in realizing jokes, teasings or joint fantasies also these genres of humor demand high performance standards – rather monological in the case of jokes and rather dialogical in the case of teasing and joint fantasies.

Transcription conventions (based on GAT, Selting et al. 1998)

(-)	one hyphen indicates a short pause
(- -)	two hyphens indicate a longer pause (less than half a second)
(0.5)	pause of half a second; long pauses are counted in half seconds
(? what?)	indicates uncertain transcription
(? ?)	indicates an incomprehensible utterance
..[..	
..[.... .	indicates overlap or interruption
=	latching of an utterance of one person; no interruption
hahaha	laughter
hehehe	slight laughter
goo(h)d	integrated laughter
(h)	audible exhalation
(')h)	audible inhalation
,	slightly rising intonation
?	rising intonation
.	falling intonation
.	ongoing intonation
:	indicates elongated sound
°blabla°	lower amplitude and pitch
COME ON	emphatic stress (pitch and volume shift)
(O)me ON	primary and secondary accent syllable within a sentence (only in the original language of the transcript)
'	high onset of pitch
'	pitch goes down
<↓blabla>	low pitch register within the brackets
<smiling)>	comments
((sits down))	nonverbal actions or comments

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Notes

1. The data stem from various circles of friends who were at the time of the recordings between 30 and 40 years old; most have an academic training background. The data are characterized in Kotthoff 1998.
2. The irony in this scene is also discussed in Kotthoff 2002.
3. Literature theorists such as Iser 1992 see that as a typical procedure to create art. They discuss only written texts such as novels or poetry. Humor shows all features which Iser calls artistic staging.
4. This diminutive is well-known in the German speaking world and is identified by most speakers as typical for Swiss German. See for German dialects Barbour and Stevensen 1999.
5. I discuss the potentials of shifting and crossing dialects as a humor strategy in Kotthoff 2006b.

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Against Arbitrariness: The Social Production of the Sign as a Foundational Issue in Critical Discourse Analysis

Gunther Kress

1. Critical Reading

One aspect of critical linguistics (CL) which has attracted the particular attention of some commentators is the status of critical readings. 'What is it', so the challenge is formulated 'that privileges the readings of the critical linguist over those of the ordinary reader?' This is a challenge of a fundamental kind. Why should the readings of one reader have greater legitimacy or privilege than those produced by other readers? Of course, this question has particular topicality in the current, postmodern, period, and in poststructuralist theories, in which the plurality of readings is taken as a given, and the authority of certain readings is challenged, along with a far-reaching challenge to power and its effects. And indeed, as critical discourse analysis (CDA) in its very aims seeks to reveal the structures, locations and effects of power – whether in the operation of discourses of race, or of gender, or of ethnicity; or in the operation of power at micro-levels as in relations across the institutional/individual divide (doctor–patient interactions, for instance); or in the interactions of socially positioned individuals in everyday relations – this challenge is a fundamental one to CDA. There is always the possibility that practitioners of CDA will replicate the operations of power in the readings which they produce.

My suggestion, in response to this challenge, and in its refutation, is that CDA needs to produce a clearly articulated theory of the *reading* of texts as much as a theory of the production of texts, and that such a theory needs, crucially, to be founded on a theory of the social production and reading of signs. As such,

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CDA will become, and this too is an essential step, part of that larger enterprise which deals with the production of meaning in any semiotic medium, namely that of social semiotics. That enterprise is one which attempts to account for the making and remaking of meaning in all those semiotic modes which cultures employ, differentially, but as a matter of course. As just one consequence of such an approach language will need to be seen as just one such semiotic mode, and therefore the longstanding theoretical and political buttressing of language as the primary, most significant, medium ('logocentrism') will be challenged. That has far-reaching effects on structurings of power, not least in what present themselves at the moment as unmentioned givens about language and its role in social, cultural and cognitive structurings.

In this paper I (1) outline a theory of the sign as a motivated and conventionalized semiotic entity; (2) focus on an account of the reception/reading of signs in cultural histories, which introduces and deals with the notions of opacity, mystification and ideology; (3) deal with the question of the boundaries of signs, and the interplay of power and the question of boundaries as punctuations of ongoing semiosis; and (4) provide two analyses which demonstrate both the need for and the critical effect and potential of this theorization. That is, my argument will be that this account acts not merely to remind CDA analysts of other modes through which meaning is made, but demands a significant rethinking of practices within CDA.

Some of the most crucial assumptions which underpin critiques of critical reading (CR), conducted in CL, or in CDA, are:

(a) unproblematized notions of text, and of the text which is to be read: that is, text is seen as unproblematically established, fixed, bounded;
(b) that reading is treated as a mirror-image of text production, that is, the conditions of the production of the text are regarded as identical with those of the reading of the text, in all essential factors;
(c) that as a corollary of (b) producers of texts and their purposes are treated as identical to those of readers of texts;
(d) that language is an autonomous, self-contained system, discrete in all respects from other semiotic and social systems of practices, whether of representation (as kinds of social action) or of action, so that the meanings of the verbal semiotic seem in no sense to depend on the contributory meaning of any other semiotic; and lastly, and most significantly,
(e) the common sense, including the theoretician's common sense, surrounding the question of the sign, particularly (i) the assumption of the arbitrariness of the relation of the signifier and the signified in the sign – the relation of 'form' and 'content' in common-sense parlance; and (ii) the assumption of the stable nature of the sign.

In my view some or all of these underlie criticisms of the enterprises of CL, CDA, CR; and inevitably underlie and buttress the theoretical edifices of most mainstream versions of linguistics, semantics and, surprisingly, even pragmatics. Any activity which goes beyond assumptions of the naturalness and transparency

of language brings these to the surface. In this sense, then, mainstream linguistic theories and descriptions are founded on these assumptions. For instance, (b) and (c) above together imply either a theory in which power is treated as so significant that readings are enforceable and enforced, or else an asocial theory which treats a communicating group as composed of atomistic individuals of exactly the same (biological, cognitive, cultural, social, etc.) make-up. Such implications are naturalized in most mainstream linguistic theories, and in much semantic and pragmatic work also.

However, even in critical theories of text production and reception these questions are not usually brought into focus or discussed: though it is the case that most practitioners in CDA would regard most of these as relevant points, or questions. The exception to this in CDA is the question of the sign; that theoretical category, either in the traditional Saussurian sense, or in any sense of critique, is absent from discussion. At the same time there is an increasing amount of work which is beginning to engage with the question of the sign, particularly in terms of a critique of the traditional conception of the Saussurian sign (Halliday, 1978, 1985; Hodge and Kress, 1988, 1993; Kress, 1978; Lentriccia, 1980). Nevertheless it is the case that even where the discussion has been broadened, its implications have not been taken up. This means, in any case, that through all of this century linguistics, with some exceptions, has remained as the science of the signifier (to borrow a phrase from Tobin [1990], who himself, however, perpetuates the idea of the sign as an arbitrary construct). To the extent that CDA relies on existing linguistic theories, it is always in danger of importing that discipline's unexamined baggage of common sense.


A social theory of the production of the sign is the essential underpinning not only of critical theories of text production and reception, but also of any plausible theory of language and text. In this paper I articulate aspects of a social theory of the sign in relation to four points: the characteristics of signs; the production/reception of signs; rules determining the boundaries of signs; and the multimodality of all texts as signs. As a part of this argument I attempt to provide refutations of the assumptions outlined earlier.

2. Characteristics of Signs

This drawing was produced by a 3½-year-old child.

The child first drew the four circles in the centre, then added two circles on the left, and finally the one circle in the top right corner. Having drawn it, he said 'This is a car'. What is crucial here is the relation of the signified – a 3½-year-old child's idea of 'car' at this point in time – to the signifier – the seven circles. It illustrates a number of fundamental characteristics of all signs.

This relation, and the resultant sign, encodes, on the one hand, characteristics of the producer of the sign, and, on the other, characteristics of the object to be represented. For the producer of the sign, wheels seems to be the most prominent, the criterial aspect of the car, they become, for him, at that age, the signified. Given this producer's physical size it is plausible to assume that when he looked



'This is a car'

at his parents' car the wheels were the most obvious features, especially as at that time 'his' car used to be parked on a driveway which sloped upward from the front door of the house where he and his family were staying, making the wheels seem even more prominent. At the same time, the sign is also motivated by features of the object to be represented, the object which is the stimulus of the signified for this child sign-producer. That is, the car does have wheels.

Similarly, circles, and the arrangements of the circles, are both an apt signifier for the signified 'wheel'. This sign therefore is not the product of an arbitrary association of a signifier and a signified, either from the point of view of the producer, or from a consideration of characteristics of the object. From the point of view of the producer it represents his particular 'interest' in the object, an interest which is itself a reflection of his place in the world, physically, cognitively, socially, culturally, conceptually. This 'interest' is not fixed but is the expression of a temporary configuration of socially and culturally produced internal representations – a drawing done the next day might have produced a different sign, fixing on, selecting different aspects of the car as criterial. Certainly, drawings of cars done by him now, around the age of five years, reflect different interests, and, above all, reflect the increasing awareness of culturally existent conventions, itself an aspect of 'being in the world' – the way cars are represented in books for children, for instance. It is important to insist that the sign is always motivated from the point of view of the object; that is, that the sign always has referential dimensions, in that it is particular aspects of the object which are affected. These then affect the characteristics both of what may be used by the producer to construct signifieds, and of what can function as apt signifiers.

To give another example, from the verbal semiotic, one which complicates the picture somewhat. The same child, at this age, while climbing a very steep hill, said: 'This is a heavy hill.' As before, aspects of his 'interest' – great expenditure of effort for a small child – and aspects of features of the object to be signified produce a particular signified – perhaps something like: 'This activity takes considerable physical effort' – and this expresses aspects of the referent that produced, in part, this signified – the difficulty of climbing the steep hill.

There are two differences compared to the previous example. The object/referent is not a relatively integral object, such as the car, but a highly complex behavioural event and a resultant conceptual structure. And whereas in the case of the car the signifier could be produced newly by the child, here he is operating

in a semiotic system (spoken language) in which signs already exist. He therefore selects an existing sign which in his view most nearly expresses aspects of the signified, namely 'heavy'. That is, an existing sign in one semiotic system becomes the signifier for a newly produced signified. This view of the production of signs has close affinities, formally, with the theoretical work of Hjelmslev (1943/1969) and, deriving from it, that used in the writings of Barthes (1982) and Eco (1976). The significant and crucial difference lies in my attempt to locate this process firmly in the social and cultural histories of the producer of the sign.

In other words, the production of signs, in semiotic systems with already available sign/signifiers, is subject to constraints which the child (or adult producer of a sign) is not subject to in a semiotic medium which does not already provide ready-made signs. Even here, however, the sign is a motivated construct, even though some limitation or circumscription is placed on the production of the sign by the presence of already existent signs. In other words, as a sign-producer moves into greater facility with existing semiotic systems, the production of signs takes place in a situation of ever increasing tension between the meanings of existing signs, which provide the signifiers (Hjelmslev's 'expression substance'), and the producer's need or wish to produce new signs.

Generalizing, I wish to say that signs are always motivated in this manner by the producer's 'interest', and by characteristics of the object. It is 'interest' which determines the characteristics that are to be selected and to be represented. The relation of signifier to signified, in all human semiotic systems, is always motivated, and is never arbitrary. This may seem a tenable hypothesis in relation to some signs only – certain visual icons, onomatopoeia in verbal language perhaps; it will seem entirely untenable in relation to the vast majority of signs in all kinds of semiotic systems, and in particular in relation to signs in verbal language – words, for instance, or sounds. It is as well to recall here Volosinov's statement: 'The form of the sign is conditioned above all by the social organization of the participants involved and also by the immediate conditions of their interaction' (1930/1973: 21).

I will give some more examples and then extend the hypothesis even further, to include all those instances of signs which appear to be quite outside this hypothesis, namely all those instances which appear to be simply re-uses of 'existing' signs.

If the notion of 'interest' is extended to the making of signs by the fully acculturated, fully socialized individual, we will have to take into consideration the individual's social and cultural histories, and her or his present social positioning in the whole complex of social structures which make up an individual's social life. 'Interest' is the articulation and realization of an individual's relationship to an object or event, acting out of that social complex at a particular moment, in the context of an interaction with other constitutive factors of the situation which are considered as relevant by the individual. These might, for instance, include other individuals and their social positionings, present purposes and intentions, structures of power which obtain in the situation, etc. Signs, then, reflect, in their construction, that relation of signified to signifier which expresses this interest. That is, in relation to a particular object or event, 'interest' leads the

producer of the sign to focus on a particular characteristic of an object or event (whether an object or an event in the physical or in the social/cultural, semiotic world) to make that the criterial characteristic of the object or event, that is, make it the basis of the production of a signified.

It may be worth drawing attention to the fact that the process which I am describing here is the process underlying the construction of a metaphor. An aspect of the object or event to be represented by being drawn into the metaphoric relation is selected by the speaker or writer as having, at that point and in relation to the speaker/writer's purposes, criterial characteristics in respect to the object to be represented; that is, it becomes the signified. This criterial aspect simultaneously specifies the characteristics which will make an apt signifier. So in relation to the earlier example of the car, the child decides that wheels are criterial in representing the signified 'car'. That decision then determines what may be an apt signifier, in this case circles. Wheels are selected as the criterial aspect of the object to be represented (the signified), and circles are apt signifiers in the sense that they adequately signify, represent or express the characteristics of the signified. All signs are formed in this metaphoric process. All signs are metaphors.

Two consequences follow for CDA. On the one hand all signs are metaphors, hence code ideological positions in that they realize the social, cultural and therefore political position of their producer. On the other hand all signs are thus equally subject to critical reading. This last point has the important theoretical and methodological consequence that no sign is innocent. There are therefore no texts which can escape critical reading. All texts equally code the ideological positions of their producers. The everyday, innocent and innocuous, the mundane text is as ideologically saturated as a text which wears its ideological constitution overtly.

Consider, for instance, the signified 'social distance'. Any sign which already expresses distance – temporal, spatial or other kinds of distance – can become an appropriate signifier of the signified 'social distance'. Hence, as an example, the so-called past tense can serve as a marker of social distance – the sign of distance in time serving as an appropriate signifier for social distance: the so-called polite formulations, in English: 'I want*ed* to ask you, *could* you . . .' (compared to 'I want to ask you, can you . . .'). With this conception of the sign the first question which arises is about the interest of the user of this sign. What is it that he or she is taking as criterial, and in what process or situation? Other signifiers of distance are available, of course: spatial distance (proximal versus distal) – *this* rather than *that*; conceptual distance (hypothesis versus factuality) – *If it were* . . . rather than *It is* . . .; ontological distance (possibility versus certainty) – *possibly* rather than *certainly*; etc.

Take as a real example the following contrasting pair of textual extracts. Each is the abstract preceding an article in a scientific journal, in one case the prestigious disciplinary journal *Science*, in the other case the popularizing journal *Scientific American*. The articles both report the same set of findings (from Myers, 1990).

(1) Experiments show that Heliconius butterflies are less likely to oviposit on host plants that possess eggs or egg-like structures. The egg mimics are

an unambiguous example of a plant trait evolved in response to a host-restricted group of insect herbivores. (From *Science*)

(2) Heliconius butterflies lay their eggs only on Passiflora vines. In defense the vines seem to have evolved fake eggs that make it look to the butterflies as if eggs have already been laid on them. (From *Scientific American*)

Given the hypothesis that signs are constructed out of the interest of a specific individual we are forced to ask about that interest in each case. What is it that changes the interest of the writer in the two instances, so that in one case we have one characteristic set of verbs, and of tense/modality forms (show, are, are, has) and in the other case another (lay, seem to have evolved, make it look, as if . . . laid). In a traditional account the difference would be noted, and assigned, either in a correlational fashion, or simply as a matter of description, to a (formal and less formal) 'scientific style'. In CL and CDA the modal effect would be noted, though the present account is needed to provide the link between social location of the producer of the form, and the form itself.

Signs can be of any size: a word; a syntactic unit; a clause; a text consisting of many sentences. So, for instance, the choice of one specific textual genre rather than another – an informal note rather than an official memorandum; an informal chat versus an official on-the-record exchange – constitutes the production of a sign, just as does the example above. In this instance too, the producer's interest, as a reflection of a present socal positioning, leads him or her to focus on particular aspects of the object to be represented (the need for formality), which becomes the signified, and to select a specific textual form as an appropriate signifier.

3. The Production and Reception of Signs

The choice of a generic form of text may be thought to be not an instance of the production of a sign, but rather an instance merely of the reproduction of a sign, because (in most instances) the use of a generic text type seems to be simply that: the use of a pre-existing text type, involving no new production. This is certainly the common-sense, naturalized view. However, until I as speaker or as writer have actually made the decision to use this text type, no specific sign exists. There is nothing that fully predicts my production of a sign. Nor is the textual instantiation of any one generic type ever like that of any previous instantiation, even in conditions of great external constraint. Even in a situation of great constraint and awareness of convention, I can act unpredictably, assessing in a particular instance the consequences of my action differently to what would normally be predicted. I can speak formally to my partner over the dinner table when there seems no clear, contextually plausible reason for doing so; and I can speak informally to my superior in a formal situation, prepared to accept the consequences in both cases. But even my decision to act in conformity with an understood convention is the result of an act of choice, and as such is my new production of the meaning of conformity. That, after all, is the source of the immense social, ideological and psychic power of that act. Consequently the notion

of the re-using of the sign, which is the essential underpinning of the idea of the stable sign, is not tenable even in those instances which seem most exemplary. However, the more significant point is to realize that in all instances the characteristics of the signified are never entirely knowable or predictable, given the producer's interest – as a product both of momentary and of much more persistent factors.

Let me give another example. Crawling along in a traffic jam on the motorway, I notice next to us a car towing a speedboat on a trailer. The boat is called 'Weekend Warrior'. The two signifiers *Weekend* and *Warrior* are not new, of course; and quite probably, the conjoined signifier *Weekend Warrior* has been used before, even in British contexts (ignoring its colloquial US usage), so that it may well be an existing sign. I could therefore treat the use of this name for the speedboat as the re-use of a sign, a cliché; and from that I could make my predictable judgements about our temporary neighbour on the motorway. However, I cannot know the signified that he had constructed – what mixtures of age and gender values, what notions of self, perhaps even degrees of irony. In other words, it is much more plausible to see this as the production of a new sign, a newly made conjunction of an existing sign/signifier ('Weekend Warrior') with a new signified – our motorway neighbour's conception of himself. And I would certainly have to abandon any notion of this merely as cliché if I discovered that his wife, who on this occasion was a passenger in the car, was driving the speedboat for all of the weekend. Nor does this begin to touch on *my* remaking of this sign in my *reading* of it; that is, a treatment of signs in a communicative framework.

This view contrasts sharply, on the one hand, with a view that sees an individual's meaning pushed, squeezed, forced into the 'straightjacket' or the 'mould' of existing word-signs; or, on the other hand, with a view which sees the individual's meaning as already accommodated to existing signs, either in the traditional and persistent view of the speaker's re-use merely of existing signs, or in an alternative view, language structuring thought, in effect the Whorfian view of language.

The notion of sign which I am putting forward makes it possible to connect the specificities of semiotic forms, in any medium, with the specificities of social organizations and social histories, via the actions of social individuals in the production of signs. It permits the move from the actions of individuals as social agents, with their interests, to the actions of the group of which individuals are members, with that group's interest, in the fullest sense. This accounts at the same time for the paradox of group interest and values, and divergences and differences within group interests and values. The history of any semiotic system, for instance the history of a language, is thus accounted for by the histories of social groups through the actions of their members in constantly making and remaking the semiotic system.

It also explains the paradox of the appearance of the systematicity of the semiotic system, a characteristic which always recedes and dissolves when it is subjected to analytic probing. A 'language' can be seen to be the working fiction constructed by, and in the interest of, a larger social group, itself consisting of multiplicities of groups: a fiction insofar as its imputed systematicity dissolves wherever searching analysis is applied; yet a working fiction, in the sense that

large 'language communities' do work with such fictions, and have to do so for the achievement of particular social ends, and in the sense that such fictions do work to a certain extent, in very many practical domains.

This view of signs also permits the move from the micro-histories of semiotic events to the macro-history of semiotic systems. The history of a language, for instance, must be accounted for, can only be accounted for, through the myriad of small-scale histories which are the records of linguistic events. It is through the two related notions of interest in the production of the sign and the motivated relation of signifier and signified that (critical) readings are made possible. The former both allows and obliges (critical) readers to seek to hypothesize about the producer's actions, situation, intentions; the latter makes it formally possible to do so. Without either notion critical reading would be impossible, and reading itself would be seen as an activity of the same kind as the looking up of the code handbook to decipher the message in front of the reader.

Nevertheless there is an element absent from my account of the production and particularly the reproduction/reading of the sign. If signs are motivated conjuncts of signifiers and signifieds, how do they come to be opaque? For after all, if the relation is motivated, why is it not transparent? My answer is founded on the notion of interest, as before. In the case of the child's drawing it was the accident of the parent's presence at the naming of the drawing which enabled the reconstruction of the child's interest and so made the sign relatively transparent: the reader, at least hypothetically, was provided with sufficient information necessary for that. Without that accidental presence, neither interest nor motivation would be easily recoverable: any reading, critical or ordinary, would be more difficult, or impossible in those circumstances. A 3½-year-old child's position in the world is, simply, very different from that of an adult.

In quite that way do the interests of fully social individuals differ from each other. At times, of course, that difference may not be very marked. And on very many more occasions, our possibilities of attending to potential discrepancies in interest are severely curtailed, by the multitudinous pressures which surround every act of communication and which curtail attempts at a critical reading. Attention to the interest of the producer of a sign demands the hypothetical reconstruction by the reader of the conditions of production of the sign; given the complexity of any message, that task is impossible other than in extremely unusual circumstances. This factor alone, that is, the complete usuality of difference of interest, and the impossibility of attempting to recover the conditions of production of the sign in each instance, is a factor that pushes 'ordinary readers' into common-sense readings – where the category of 'ordinary reader' is not defined by an individual's qualification as a reader – though that is a significant factor – but by the fact that the reading is done in ordinary circumstances.

Not only are the interests of social individuals different, but also those of social groups, a difference ranging from the merely other to the directly oppositional, antagonistic and conflictual. A sign produced by an individual member of one group within the interest of that group is thus most likely to be opaque in its constitution to a member of another group. Differences in interest are likely to be lesser among members of a particular social group than across different groups, especially in relation to those matters which are constitutive of that group.

In these conditions too the motivations for the production of the sign are likely to be difficult or impossible to recover easily, so that the most likely reading is one which simultaneously treats the sign as stable and known, and, the conditions of its production being unknown, as an arbitrary construct. Of course, where interests are oppositional and conflictual, there is more likely to be a contestation about the characteristics of the sign.

It is at this point that it becomes essential to make overt what I have so far kept implicit, namely that any understanding of the production and reception of signs, that is, a theory of semiosis, has to be set in the context of a social theory of communication in which power is an inevitable component. (It may seem tautologous to use the term 'social' with 'theory of communication', and I do so as a rhetorical means to draw attention to the fact that so many theories of communication are cognitive/psychological in their constitution, treating the communicating individuals as asocial atoms.) While it is quite likely that the child producer of the car/sign produced that sign without any notion of an audience in mind, either specific or general, more mature makers of signs do have an idea of an audience, not, of course, necessarily consciously. And most events of communication take place in relatively well-established social structures, which bring together not only individuals in events of communication, but also social groups in structures of interaction which have relative stability and persistence. In other words, in any society most communication takes place in pre-existing networks which bring together both the individual participants and the groups of which they are members in relatively stable configurations. This ensures a relatively well-developed understanding of who the audience is, and it also ensures a relatively well-developed awareness of interests at issue in that relation.

The presence of power introduces a factor into the production of signs not unlike, in its effects, that of the childish producer. While the child/producer does not attend to his or her audience because there appears no possible area of difficulty in that the child simply and naïvely expresses his or her interest, the powerful producer of the sign can act in a similar fashion motivated not by childish naïvety, but by the wilfulness of power. This can lead to its own naïvety because ease of communication is not his or her primary consideration, or even a consideration at all. In other words, with an increase in the power of one participant in relation to that of his or her interlocutor's comes the possibility of forcing them to accept more and more esoterically constructed signs. Whereas the demands of 'good', efficient communication suggest that the producer of the sign makes the interest which is coded in the sign relation as transparent as possible for the addressee, the presence of power allows her or him to override that consideration. This is not a question of bias – there is no means of producing an unbiased sign, there are only means of producing signs in which the characteristics of the object to be represented are coded as transparently as possible for the envisaged audience. It is nevertheless a question of power producing 'distortion', in the sense of an increase in the opacity of the sign, with a consequent increase in the degree of power brought to bear, and expressed. The actual inherent power of the individuals involved in the event of communication is

not a telling issue – powerful individuals do not need to use or display their power – rather it is the degree of power actually brought to bear on a particular occasion which produces opacity.

Where *group* interests are at issue, the same factors obtain; where one group is actively seeking to control the other, this becomes a strong part of the potentially controlling group's interest. The signs constructed by the powerful group may take at least two forms: as transparent as possible, on the grounds of a wish to maintain the appearance of relations of solidarity with another group within an established structure of interaction; or opaque, on the grounds that the degree of power possessed by the makers of signs allows them to ignore requirements for ease of understanding and to enable them to force the interlocutor into attempts either to recover the motivation that produced the sign, or to accept it at its proposed value.

Of course, the manner in which I am setting out these possibilities is an oversimplification. First, the situation is one of a scale, along which there is a vast range of possibilities. Secondly, interlocutors are perfectly capable of resistant, oppositional and subversive reading, tugging a forelock while ridiculing the boss.

Hence the question is not 'is this sign opaque, or transparent?' or 'To what degree is it either opaque or transparent?' All signs are always transparent to the makers of the sign; and all signs are always opaque to some degree for the readers of signs. The question is: 'How opaque is this sign for this specific reader, and why?' All signs are motivated in their relation of signifier to signified, and all signs are always transparent to their makers, and all signs are more or less opaque to readers. Motivatedness of signs, and opacity and transparency, are distinct considerations. The former relates to the conditions of production of the sign; the latter relates to the uses of signs in structures of communication affected by differential distributions of power: to the conditions of reception.

Ideology can now be seen to have at least two polar forms, in terms of the production of the sign out of a producer's interest. At the one extreme, a producer's position in the world will make him or her produce signs which arise out of that position and reflect his or her interest in relation to particular events and objects. This will produce a set of signs reflecting one kind of interest. Of course, a producer's position in the social and cultural world is always a position which includes multiple locations, many of which will be at odds with others, either simply different, or different in the sense of contrast or opposition. One part of becoming a social subject is to produce meta-signs for the self which provide reconciliations, temporarily or more permanently, of such differences, which provide integration for the individual. These sets of signs, including the meta-signs, produce a particular account of the world, an individual's ideology.

At the other extreme, a sign-maker's position in the world vis-à-vis specific others, individuals or groups, may lead her or him to produce sets of signs which are reflections of their interest in the relation to the other individual or group. That is, the sign is produced to provide a particular sense of the relationship of individuals or groups – for instance, a set of signs which provides an account of relations of domination. If the individual or group producing the sign or set of

signs is successful in having that sense accepted by the other individual or group, then an ideological position in the traditional Marxist sense has been produced.

In most instances of sign production both kinds of interest are at issue, so that signs or sets of signs are nearly always ideological in both senses, with particular degrees of each. That is, signs are fundamentally contradictory, in the sense that they code the producer's interest per se, and their interest vis-à-vis an interlocutor in a specific situation of communication.

In *Social Semiotics* (Hodge and Kress, 1988) we dealt with this issue by producing the term 'ideological complex'. The ideological complex is a structure which contains, at the same time, the representation of a state of affairs as it appears from the point of view of the producer's interest, and another representation of a state of affairs as it appears from the point of view of the interest of the producer vis-a-vis another individual or group.

Text 1

School banishes boy too poor to pay for uniform
by Ian MacGregor (Education Correspondent)

1. A SCHOOLBOY was taught in a class on his own because his parents could not afford a uniform, it was revealed yesterday.
2. The 13-year-old was separated from classmates for several weeks, a community advice organisation said.
3. His misery only ended when friends found enough jumble in an Oxfam shop for a make-shift uniform.
4. 'It was the worst case of this kind we have seen', said Nichola Simpson, head of policy at the National Association of Citizens' Advice Bureaux.
5. 'It was very distressing for a boy so young. 6. And he missed out educationally. 7. Children should not suffer like that, especially because they cannot afford a uniform. 8. It was a very hard-hearted thing to do'.
9. The incident happened in the East Midlands earlier this year when the boy's family moved into the area.
10. His parents were on income support, but education chiefs told them they did not qualify for a grant because their son moved schools mid-term.
11. The case was revealed by the association in a report on uniforms.
12. It said many poor children were suffering at school because local bureaucrats are not helping them pay for uniforms.
13. Many parents on benefits or low incomes were not receiving grants, which are discretionary.

Discipline

14. The news comes as many schools return to uniforms in a bid to make pupils more presentable and disciplined.
15. But the NACAB found local authority provision for uniform and clothing grants was tending to 'wither away'.
16. Assistant director Peter Hildrew added that grants were now a low priority for many education authorities.

17. 'Parents are penalised according to where they live', he said. 18. The system is often arbitrary and seems close to collapse.
(*Daily Express*, Friday, 3 May 1991)

Bearing in mind several of the points made just above, I shall briefly analyse this text. My interest here lies initially in the construction of the concept of poverty in the popular media (see Meinhoff and Richardson, forthcoming); and my specific focus is the clause 'his parents could not afford a uniform' in sentence 1. Given the theory of text briefly sketched earlier, my view is that the text itself is a large, complex sign, in which the interests of a particular producer are realized. This means that these interests will be realized in other parts of this text. Particular points to focus on are the headline, sentences 3, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17 and 18.

The cited clause in sentence 1 presents a syntactic ambiguity. What syntactic analysis/description do we give to *afford*? Overtly it looks to be a transitive verb, with *a uniform* as direct object, and *his parents* as subject. A syntactically analogous form to that reading of this clause is 'His parents (could not) buy a uniform', which is clearly transitive. However, 'affording a uniform' is not clearly transitive; its subject noun is not clearly agentive: *His parents* is not an unambivalently agentive subject. *Afford* is a state of being, not a process under the control of an agent. And clauses which are not clearly transitive do not passivize easily: 'a uniform was (not) afforded by his parents' (and similarly with further tests, such as prenominalizing of the adjective, 'The afforded uniform . . .'). Yet many readers of the *Daily Express* may read across this clause in reading the text, and read it as fully semantically transitive, which I shall call, following Hodge and Kress (1993), a 'transactive'. In support of that reading, these readers might say: 'We scrimped and saved, and we afforded a uniform for our children, so why can't they?!'

There are thus at least two syntactic readings for this clause, very likely corresponding to the readings of different audiences – a hypothesis which could be tested. Other forms which line up with the non-transitive, non-transactive reading are 'too poor to pay . . .', (3) 'friends found . . . jumble', (7) 'Children should not suffer . . .'; and by a further extension, all those clauses which are not transactive, for instance (3) 'His misery . . . ended when . . .'; (6) 'he missed out educationally'; (9) 'The incident happened in the East Midlands . . . when the boy's family moved into the area'; etc.

Forms which align with the transitive, transactive reading are 'too poor to pay (money) for . . .', (3) 'friends found . . . jumble', (2) 'the 13-year-old was separated (by someone) from classmates', (10) 'their son moved schools', etc.

In other words, many of the forms which can be read transactively can also have a non-transactive reading. This serves, or can serve the producer's interest. A sign which can be read in both ways – a syntactic form which can be read as assigning agency to subjects, or which can be read as simply 'involving' subjects – may be what best reflects the producer's interest: on the one hand, it buttresses a politically reactionary view which wishes to hold the poor responsible for their own poverty; on the other hand it serves an interest not to alienate those readers who may be poor, or who have a divergent account of the causes of poverty.

It is important to see that there is a whole pattern of these ambiguous forms (and of clauses with a relational syntax, which tend towards a stative reading of the linguistic-social world). The pattern sets up, facilitates modes of reading. Most of the clauses in this net-like pattern involve the social participants who are implied and implicated – entailed – in my 'focal' clause – 'his parents could not afford a uniform': the boy, the parents, the uniform, the school, the school authorities, the local education authorities, bureaucrats. All of these have a complex place in the then and still current educational and social politics of the British Conservative government. This has, broadly, entailed – apart from far more widely ramified politics – a move to destroy the place of local education authorities (which are seen as obstacles to the imposition of centralizing control) in order to gain control of schools directly, and centrally. Part of the strategy of both government and the right-wing press has been an attempt to undermine the credibility not only of local governmental structures, but also of all forms of social organization which may provide resistance to the 'modernizing' drive of the Conservative state; such as, for instance, 'bureaucracy', seen itself as a leftover from a 'socialist' version of a centralized state (the 'Nanny State'), and an obstacle to Conservative moves aimed at the renovation of the state.

Linguistically, semiotically, this leads to the presence of the clearly, unambiguously transactive clauses 'School banishes boy' (headline), (1) 'A schoolboy was taught . . .', (2) 'The 13-year-old was separated . . .' (both having the impersonal, 'faceless' agent of the passive deleted), (8) 'It was a very hard-hearted thing to do' (where the embedded clause has a deleted agent 'Someone did a hard-hearted thing') (12) '. . . local bureaucrats are not helping them . . .' (when the real culprits are identified), etc.

In this analysis the agents of the transactive clauses are the members of the demonology of the Conservative right: local education authorities, local councils. schools, teachers, bureaucrats. It is they who act oppressively towards the hapless. helpless, powerless individual, both parents and child. The syntax thus clearly represents one facet of Conservative discourse. There are, of course, other facets. and these are by no means complementary. So the transactive reading of 'his parents could not afford' is a politically Conservative reading, which assigns responsibility for 'their' poverty to the poor. And in other texts, schools are represented as sites of resistance to (socialist) local council tyranny, through the agency of parent-power. Of course, this kind of 'common sense' in the Gramscian sense is exactly what we should expect.

At the same time this text provides, as I have mentioned, another reading the non-transactive, which allows a space for those readers who have an oppositional view of poverty. The text is thus the site of at least two discourses on poverty: the Conservative, which assigns responsibility to the poor and to a malign set of social agents; and the oppositional (in this context), which represents poverty as an event in which participants are caught up.

My account provides a description and explanation of this seemingly confused or contradictory syntactic pattern in terms of the production both of the sign of the clause, the sign of the sentence, but more, of the complex sign of the overall text, in terms of the interests of the producer of the text, including his interest in

the perceptions of the text in terms of the receiver's interest. The complexities of that possible reception, which includes divergent audiences with divergent interests, are coded in the complex sign of the text, and in the smaller level signs of clause and sentence.

The micro-history of the production of this text/sign is set in the context of the macro-history of British society at this time, and the latter provides an account of the former. However, the text as sign also encodes and produces as an object a sign which embodies that social state, and in doing so both naturalizes and deproblematizes that state of affairs, *and* produces a sign which in itself projects and produces new signs which reproduce its meanings.

This text also illustrates the operation of power in producing opacity of signs, at all levels. To make that point succinctly, imagine the instructions one might give to a student writing this report, encouraging her or him to be clearer, or to write more clearly.

More can be said about this, in particular in relation to my subsequent discussion of the boundaries of the sign. This text/sign occurs on the right half of a page, which on its left has a largely pictorial 'story', under the rubric 'photonews' of a member of the royal family cuddling, caring for, a child from a foster-family which has dealt with child victims of child abuse. It is hard to think how the reading of the one text can not affect the other.

In relation also to a discussion on the stability of signs, it is relevant to consider the effect of this text on the semiotic system of language, and, in particular, the system of transitivity or valency of verbs. The production of signs which are constructed to enable differentiated readings by two distinct groups on the one hand introduces a systematic instability into the system and to terms in the system – in as far as we wish to maintain that theoretical construct – and, on the other hand, facilitates and entrenches particular readings of verb valencies for particular readers; that is, it shifts the system for particular readers in specific directions.

From the producer's own interest, the 'poverty text' is to be read with the adjacent visual text on the care for abused children. From within the producers' interest vis-a-vis a group of potentially sceptical or oppositional readers of the 'poverty' text the visual 'caring' text is to be taken as merely co-present, and the features of the layout, which bring them together in this manner, are to be read as an accidental factor. In my experience these are the readings given to the text by the readers whose readings I have tested.

In any interaction involving power, signs will therefore be ideological or produce ideology, in the two senses, either as 'world view', or as 'mystification', encapsulated in Marx's metaphor of the camera obscura. Common to both is the effect produced by the wilfulness of the powerful, whose power can be realized, among other things, in their indifference to the need for the best obtainable conditions of communication in any particular situation. This is a factor which makes their communication as opaque as that of children, for reasons which are in part the same – in the case of the child, 'indifference' is an accidental component of the child's interest – and in part entirely different, namely the causes of the indifference in the case of the powerful, that is, the wilful obliteration of the needs of addressees.

4. The Boundaries of Signs

Text 2

Consider the text from the *Sunday Telegraph* (16 June 1991). What determines the boundaries of texts? Do we have here two texts, or one. On the face of it, the answer seems clear: there are two texts, one which I shall call the 'Bullying' text, and another which I call the 'Correctness' text. The relation between them is, it seems, determined by the (accidental) contingencies and exigencies of layout: it just happened that the sub-editor responsible for laying out that page needed a small bit of text to fill a gap, and so stuck the 'Correctness' text where it fitted, into the 'Bullying' text.

Bullying is beyond a joke for victims

by Sarah Johnson

SARAH, a pretty and intelligent 14-year-old, was twice forcibly stripped to the waist by a gang of 10 boys and girls at her school. After a failed suicide attempt, she is now thriving at a new school.

Sarah (not her real name) was photographed and punched and had her hair pulled during the attack in which she was forced to beg on her hands and knees for her clothes back. The head at the Edinburgh school where her ordeal took place dismissed it as "horseplay".

Her story is told in a book on bullying and disruptive behaviour in schools, which sets out a 10-point plan that teachers can use to eliminate a menace which has long been a feature of school life.

The book attacks the British education system for failing to train teachers to cope with disruptive behaviour. It says they are "hopelessly ill-equipped" to deal with the growing problem of bullying.

Its author, Michelle Elliott, is director of the children's safety campaign Kidscape. *In Bullying — a practical guide to coping for schools* — published tomorrow by Longman at £10·95 — Elliott and other experts offer what is probably the first comprehensive compendium of advice.

They also tell some horrific tales of recent cases including those of:

□ "Mark", 9, whose arm was broken by a gang who set on him as he walked home from school in Essex.

□ "Tony", 7, who was set on fire by a child of the same age.

□ "Sandra", 14, who was driven to truancy and eventually contacted Esther Rantzen's *ChildLine* for help.

The girl had suffered weeks of physical attacks and cruel jokes, such as a pack of ketchup-soaked tampons left on her desk or a sanitary towel stuck to her blazer.

In the school dinner queue girls screamed obscene rhymes and names at her — such as "rat-faced lesbian" — and Sandra, whose father has a history of violence against her mother, recalls: "I think the teachers on dinner duty thought it was just a joke."

The book advises teachers to set up "courts" in which bullies should be arraigned by the whole class. But Mrs Elliott warns: "Bully courts may not be the right answer for every school. One head-teacher saw the courts as just another form of bullying."

She also encourages teachers to take a tougher line with the classic excuse: "It was only a joke, Miss" — so why wasn't everyone laughing?

She is concerned about the inability of British teachers to cope with bullies. "When I was trained 25 years ago in the US," she says, "we had a course in dealing with the disruptive child.

"Teachers in this country learn virtually nothing. They get out of training and are suddenly confronted with a group of 10-year-old thugs and don't know what to do."

She criticises the Government for spending £175,000 on a three-year study of bullying "which will simply tell us there is a problem and delay doing anything for another three years".

● ALMOST all the members of a group set up by the Government to advise on the teaching of English oppose the idea of "correctness" in the language.

Twenty-one of the group's 25 members belong to a pressure group representing a highly ideological minority of teachers.

One expert outside the group said: "A lot of them believe teaching children grammar and Standard English is oppression of the working class. They aim to reshape English on multicultural, anti-racist, anti-sexist lines."

The Language in the National Curriculum project, set up in 1989, came to prominence last week when Tim Eggar, the Schools Minister, blocked the publication of teaching materials it had prepared at a cost of £21 million.

Sunday Telegraph (16 June 1991)

Even on this totally innocent account – an account implausible to anyone who is vaguely familiar with practices of sub-editing and layout – a number of observations are nevertheless indisputable. (1) The heading serves, visually, as a heading for all of the text in the columns underneath it. It is difficult not to read all of that text outside the heading of 'Bullying'. (2) The large black dot in front of the 'Correctness' text seems to function as a bullet-point in the larger text, in a way akin to the function of the square markers, drawing attention to a significant subsection of that larger text. (3) The 'Correctness' text is literally framed by the 'Bullying' text, and the former is embedded in the latter in much the same way that a subordinate clause is embedded in a higher clause in a sentence. (4) Anyone reading both texts will be struck by the echoes, the intertextual relations set up between the two texts: teachers don't care about bullying (because) teachers are bullies themselves ('a highly ideological minority of teachers' – in Conservative Britain 'highly ideological minority' is a lexemic variant for [political] 'bullies').

As with the *Daily Express* extract, an attack is made in both of these texts on a particular target, namely, to use the Tory term, 'the educational establishment'. That establishment is held responsible not only for the present state of the British education system, but also for the present moral state of British society. This attack is made in the 'Bullying' text in several places, via an attack on the shortcomings of teacher-training institutions (paras 3, 4, 11, 12); in the 'Correctness' text the attack is made on a group of educational experts who had been established by the government to produce materials to support the training of English teachers. The equation which reaches across and unifies the two texts is that an attack on correctness is an attack on proper manners, which itself is to undermine the social fabric.

So what determines the boundaries of the text/sign? We must choose a particular boundary, which becomes the frame of the sign, its boundary. These choices may be left relatively open and unconstrained, or may be subject to the severest constraint.

Some readers wish to enlarge the scope of the sign, by making the frame larger; for instance, in this example treating the whole page as the relevant sign, and the white borders of the page as the frame. Furthermore, any one reader, even in ordinary reading, may operate with variable boundaries, at times focusing more narrowly, at times much more broadly, depending on a whole range of factors acting together. In my own reading practice I frequently treat the whole paper as constituting the relevant boundary, and indeed the long chains of intertextual relations which are set up by one paper from day to day; which give me quite another but essential frame for reading any item which appears in the paper.

The question of the boundaries of the sign is thus one of the most important questions of all. There seem to me at the moment no formal criteria for settling this issue: there are, however, social–political criteria. Let us take the seemingly relatively uncontentious ground of academic analysis, that is, how a 'relevant' discipline deals with this question. Within many contemporary versions of linguistics the sentence continues to be the proper domain of linguistic speculation, theorization and analysis. Pragmatics allows extra and cross-sentence relations, relations of implicature for instance. In text linguistics or discourse analysis of

many kinds the example above would be seen to consist of two texts; although some versions would also admit the category of intertextuality. Critical discourse analysis sees texts in the widest social contexts, and focuses on the conditions of production and reception of texts, for instance. A social semiotic approach would go beyond a concern with the medium of language alone, and insist that other, visual, semiotic modes are in play here, layout for instance, so that this text is a multi-modal text. Further, a social semiotic approach would attempt to dissolve the category of context itself, preferring to speak of series of interrelating semiotic systems.

In a specific theory many or perhaps all of these criteria will be presented in formalistic terms; yet their motivations are political – ranging from the politics of disciplines and their concerns with boundaries and 'proper domains' – for example, 'the autonomy of linguistics' – to the politics of social and political critique. These are mirrored in the domain of 'ordinary readings', with debates around 'reading too much into' or 'reading things into' a text, a device to enable close control on the boundaries of the sign. In general, there is a close relation between power and the size of the unit treated as the relevant or proper unit of analysis. The smaller the unit the greater the degree of control; and vice versa, the greater the degree of control exercised the smaller the size of the unit. Lesser control therefore enables an expansion of the scope of what is treated as the sign. Of course, size is an historically variable factor, and so it might be better to say that, in general, the greater the degree of control possible, the more closely enforced will be the maintenance of the boundaries of the unit at the currently prevailing size, within a given domain – whether a disciplinary domain or a non-disciplinary domain. Power acts to keep the size of units as small as it is sustainable to do at a particular time.

5. The Multi-Modality of Signs

I wish to make one last point about an essential characteristic of signs. All signs are multi-modal, that is, in effect, all signs are complex signs, existing in a number of different semiotic modes. This is a largely unrecognized fact, and the naturalizings of linguistics have done much to obscure it. Texts such as advertisements, films, televisual texts, etc., obviously *are* multi-modal: a filmic text must be read as a single text, at one level, consisting of multiplicities of semiotic modes – visual, verbal, musical, sound, costume, setting, lighting, proxemics, etc. But even the seemingly uni-modal written text of the *Sunday Telegraph* example consists, as I mentioned, of the visual semiotic of layout, of the semiotic of written language, and of the semiotic of typography. In this connection consider the simple fact that a written text is always *written*: it has to appear in the visual medium. A particular style of handwriting, or of typeface, inevitably accompanies written language: language is imprinted with the visible visual marks of a writing style, or is carried by a particular voice. There is no language other than through the co-presence of another semiotic medium. To that extent the Hjelmslevian notion of expression substance is both a help and a hindrance: a hindrance, in that the


materiality of that substance, and its already existent semiotic organization, makes it anything but a transparent, neutral medium; and a help, in that we are constantly reminded of the relative intractability of the medium of the expression plane.

In fact, a much more radical proposal would be to challenge the unifying category of grammar, and to suggest that the diversity and multiplicity of features and forms subsumed by this category in fact constitute a collection of different semiotic modes. In the case of spoken language this may be easier to demonstrate, and more plausible, as it connects with statements made within linguistic theories themselves, where intonation, rhythm and other prosodic and 'paralinguistic' features have been treated as 'outside' syntax. In that treatment of speech there is the semiotic mode of grammar and syntax on the one hand, and the semiotic modes subsumed under the label 'paralinguistic' on the other. But even in the semiotic of written language it is possible to treat various aspects of syntax as in fact realizations of different semiotic modes. For instance, cohesion and cohesive devices seem of a qualitatively different kind to, for instance, noun-verb concord; and the prosodic element of modality seems qualitatively different to that aspect of clause syntax concerned with propositional relations. Indeed, I would push this principle very far indeed, so that, for instance, 'sylistic' variants such as different kinds of sentence connection (hypotactic or paratactic) would be evidence of yet another semiotic mode.

However, the most pressing issue is the recognition of the increasing role of the visual semiotic in all forms of communication. It is no longer possible to avoid this issue in critical analyses, on the assumption, explicitly or implicitly held, that all (relevant) meaning in a text is, as it were, fully glossed in the verbal component of the text.

Text 3

As my last example, I am taking the front page of *The Parent's Charter*, a publication by the Conservative government in Britain. Nearly all the meaning is here carried in the visual semiotic. Apart from iconographic elements (the use of children, the 'seal', the motto, the logo), it is elements of the visual grammar, both of the page as a whole – its layout/composition – and of its constituent parts, which is most telling, semiotically and ideologically. The page layout uses a centring structure, that is, the dominant visual element is in the centre of the composition. Of the two images, the top right image also uses this structure, with the black child in the centre of the composition. Centring structures are relatively rarer in the western visual semiotic than left–right, top–bottom structures (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 1990, 1992). Further, the more common left–right orientation of the western visual semiotic (with a reading of 'progression', moving from the established to the new) is here replaced by a right–left orientation. This is most noticeable in the central image, but is also the case in the top–right image. Centring composition and right–left orientation together dominate in the 30 images in this 22-page publication (16 images are clearly centring compositions; 16 images have right–left orientation). The ideological effect of the visual is here not merely a supporting one, underlining, illustrating or emphasizing; it has a significance



quite of its own. A reliance on the verbal semiotic alone is becoming too problematic, and only in part due to changing practices and valuations in representational practices.

6. Conclusion

The major point of my argument is that CDA needs the theory of the motivated relation of signifier and signified as an essential foundation and legitimation of the enterprise of critical reading. This does not produce legitimate readings, but it does produce a theory which not only legitimates but also demands critic

reading as the condition of all reading. To restate briefly, such a theory rests on a recognition of:

(a) the interest of producers of signs as individuals and as members of social groups;
(b) the social histories of these individuals and groups;
(c) the micro-histories of the production of the sign, including the social structures which constituted the relevant contextual features;
(d) the structurings of power at work in the production of signs;
(e) the reading/reception regimes in operation at particular points in the reading of signs;
(f) the interests of readers of signs as individuals and as members of social groups;
(g) the boundaries of signs in particular, and the degrees of rigidity or fluidity with which these are enforced; and
(h) the invariable multi-modality of signs.

Beyond this, it seems to me that CDA needs to be clear about the texts which it selects as objects of critical analysis. If the hypothesis of the motivated sign is plausible, then the question becomes which text is ideologically the most effective: the text which overtly declares its ideological constitution and intention, or the text which does not? Which is the most in need of critical analysis? My hunch is that ideological work is done as potently through the bland text as it is through the more overtly ideological text. If that is so, this needs to be taken into account in CDA.

This point connects with my personal position in this enterprise, which I ought to declare. Reading practices – whether in institutions such as school, university, place of work – in relation to culturally salient texts will increasingly become sites of a struggle over discursive freedoms. My own personal and political project is about the maintenance of possibilities of communication in the widest sense, both as a condition of a liberal society, and for the possibility of productive cultural futures. A strong theory of text and of the production and reception of text is an absolute prerequisite of that project.

Acknowledgement

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Narrative Analysis: Oral Versions of Personal Experience

William Labov and Joshua Waletzky

Most attempts to analyze narrative have taken as their subject matter the more complex products of long-standing literary or oral traditions. Myths, folk tales, legends, histories, epics, toasts, and sagas seem to be the results of the combination and evolution of simpler elements; they contain many cycles and recycles of basic narrative structures; in many cases, the evolution of a particular narrative has removed it so far from its originating function that it is difficult to say what its present function is.

In our opinion, it will not be possible to make very much progress in the analysis and understanding of these complex narratives until the simplest and most fundamental narrative structures are analyzed in direct connection with their originating functions. We suggest that such fundamental structures are to be found in oral versions of personal experiences: not the products of expert storytellers that have been retold many times, but the original production of a representative sample of the population. By examining the actual narratives of large numbers of unsophisticated speakers, it will be possible to relate the formal properties of narrative to their functions. By studying the development of narrative technique from children to adults, and the range of narrative techniques from lower-class to middle-class speakers, it will be possible to isolate the elements of narrative.

In this article, we will present an analytical framework for the analysis of oral versions of personal experience in English. We will first introduce definitions of the basic units of narrative and then outline the normal structure of the narrative as a whole. Finally, we present some general propositions about the relation of formal properties to narrative functions, based on our examination of a moderate body of data.

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The analysis will be *formal*, based upon recurrent patterns characteristic of narrative from the clause level to the complete simple narrative. We will rely upon the basic techniques of linguistic analysis, isolating the invariant structural units, which are represented by a variety of superficial forms. From this analysis it is possible to derive a considerable amount of information on the syntax and semantics of English below the sentence level, but this direction of research will not be exploited here. We will be concerned primarily with the characteristics of narrative itself.

The analysis is *functional:* Narrative will be considered as one verbal technique for recapitulating experience – in particular, a technique of constructing narrative units that match the *temporal sequence* of that experience. Furthermore, we find that narrative that serves this function alone is abnormal: it may be considered empty or pointless narrative. Normally, narrative serves an additional function of personal interest, determined by a stimulus in the social context in which the narrative occurs. We therefore distinguish two functions of narrative: (a) *referential* and (b) *evaluative.*

In most previous studies of folk narrative, the basic unit for analysis has been a substantial piece of thematic material, defined at various levels of abstraction by the type of action referred to. Thus the work of Propp (1958) was devoted to the formal structure of such large semantic units. The present study assumes as a basic task the analysis of narratives that might appear as fundamental, unanalyzable units in Propp's scheme. We will be concerned with the smallest unit of linguistic expression that defines the functions of narrative – primarily the clause, although we will refer to cases where phrases and words are relevant to evaluative function. Colby's work (1966) took as data the frequencies of individual words according to a semantic subcategorization; a linguistic approach is quite opposite in direction, focusing upon the syntagmatic structure of words and phrases operating in clauses and higher levels of organization. Schatzman and Strauss (1955) studied class differences in narrative technique by informal means; it is hoped that the methods developed in the present discussion will permit a more reliable and objective approach to studies of this type.

We will be dealing with tape-recorded narratives taken from two distinct social contexts. One is a face-to-face interview where the narrator is speaking only to the interviewer, a person not a member of a narrator's primary group. In the second situation, the narrator is recorded in interaction with his primary group; he is speaking in part to the members of his group, and in part to an outsider on the margins of the group, who provides only a part of the stimulus for the narrative.

The following pages provide 14 examples of the data on hand, drawn from about 600 interviews gathered in the course of four linguistic studies.[1] The narrators include speakers from Black and White communities, rural and urban areas, and they range in age from 10 to 72 years old. In one respect the range is limited: There are no highly educated speakers represented here; in fact, none of the narrators finished high school.

The ultimate aims of our work, require close correlations of the narrator's social characteristics with the structure of their narratives, since we are concerned with problems of effective communication and class and ethnic differences in

verbal behavior.[2] In this article, however, we are concerned with the narratives themselves, and so these fourteen examples appear as anonymous narrations, arranged in descending order of the speakers' ages.

Narrative 1

(Were you ever in a situation where you thought you were in serious danger of getting killed?) I talked a man out of – Old Doc Simon I talked him out of pulling the trigger. (What happened?)

Well, in the business I was associated at that time, the Doc was an old man . . . He had killed one man, or – had done time. But he had a – young wife, and those days I dressed well. And seemingly she was trying to make me.

I never noticed it. Fact is, I didn't like her very well, because she had – she was a nice looking girl until you saw her feet. She had big feet. Jesus, God, she had big feet!

Then she left a note one day she was going to commit suicide because he was always raising hell about me. He came to my hotel. Nice big blue 44, too.

I talked him out of it; and says, "Well, we'll go look for her, and if we can't find her, well you can – go ahead, pull the trigger if you want to." I was maneuvering.

So he took me up on it. And we went to where they found her handkerchief – the edge of a creek – and we followed down a little more, and we couldn't find anything. And got back – it was a tent show – she was laying on a cot with an ice bag on her head. She hadn't committed suicide.

But – however – that settled it for the day. But that night the manager, Floyd Adams, said, "You better pack up and get out because that son of a bitch never forgives anything once he gets it in his head."

And I did. I packed up and got out. That was two.

That was two.

After I came out from New York . . .

Narrative 2

I had dogs that could do everything but talk. And by gorry, sir, I never licked 'em.

(When you have small kids, they're always asking for one more thing, like a drink of water, to keep from going to bed at night. I wonder if you had that problem, and what you did about it?) Yeah, but – a lot of the children I've seen, that their excuse they've got to go to the bathroom, and they don't have to go at all. (How do you cope with it. You can't – you never know . . .) No. I don't remember how we coped with it. I never believed a whole lot in licking. I was never – with my children, and I never – when it was with my animals, dogs; I never licked a dog, I never had to. A dog knew what I meant; when I hollered at a dog, he knew the – what I meant. I could – I had dogs that could do everything but talk. And by gorry, sir, I never licked 'em.

I never come nearer bootin' a dog in my life. I had a dog – he was a wonderful retriever, but as I say he could do everything but talk. I could waif him that way, I could waif him on, I could waif him anywhere. If I shot a crippled duck he went out after it; he didn't see it in the water, he'd always turn around look at me, and I'd waif him over there, if the duck was there, or if it was on the other side of where we're on, I could waif him straight ahead, and he'd turn and he'd go. If he didn't see me, he'd turn around, he'd look at me, and I'd keep a-waifin' him on. And he'd finally catch sight of him, and the minute he did, you know, he would bee-line and get that duck.

I was gunnin' one night with that dog – we had to use live decoys in those days – a fellow named Jack Bumpus was with me; I was over at a place called Deep Bottom,

darker than pitch. And – uh – heard a quackin' off shore. And, I said to Jack, "Keep quiet. There's one comin' in." And – uh – finally Jack said to me, "I think I see 'im." I said, "Give 'im a gun. Give 'im a gun. Try it."

So he shot, and this duck went for the shore with his wings a-goin' like that for the shore. Went up on the shore. Well this dog never lost a crippled duck on shore, he'd take a track just the same as a hound would take a rabbit track. And I sent him over. I said, "Go ahead."

So he went over there. And – gone a while and come back and he didn't have the duck. And that was unusual – I said, "You git back there and get that duck!" And he went back there; and he stayed a little while longer, longer than he did the first time, and he come back and he didn't have that duck.

And I never come nearer shootin' a dog. By gorry, I come pretty near. "*You git back there and get that duck!*" And that dog went back there, and he didn't come back. And he didn't come back. By gorry, we went over there – I walked over there, and here he was; one of my tame ducks that I had tethered out there had got the strap off her leg, and had gone out there, and when this fellow shot, he hadn't hit the duck. The duck came to the shore, he hadn't hit the duck; but the duck was scared and come for the shore. My dog was over there, and he had his paw right on top of that duck, holdin' him down just as tight as could be, and – by gorry, boy, I patted that dog, I'll tell you if I ever walloped that dog I'd have felt some bad. He knew more 'n I did; the dog knew more than I did. He knew that was that tame duck; he wasn't gonna pick him up in his mouth and bring him, you know. He was just holdin' him right down on the ground.

Narrative 3

(Were you ever in a situation where you were in serious danger of being killed?) My brother put a knife in my head. (How'd that happen?) Like kids, you get into a fight and I twisted his arm up behind him.

This was just a few days after my father had died, and we were sitting shive. And the reason the fight started . . . He sort of ran out of the yard – this was out on Coney Island – and he started talk about it. And my mother had just sat down to have a cup of coffee. And I told him to cut it out.

Course kids, you know – he don't hafta listen to me. So that's when I grabbed him by the arm, and twisted it up behind him. When I let go his arm, there was a knife on the table, he just picked it up and he let me have it. And I started bleed like a pig.

And, naturally, first thing was – run to the doctor. And the doctor just says, "Just about this much more," he says, "and you'd a been dead."

Narrative 4

. . . They didn't believe in calling the law or anything like that. They just took things in their own hands. (Did you ever see any shooting of that sort?) Oh, yes. I can remember real well. I w's just a girl. 'Fact, stayed with me quite a while.

Well, there's a fellow, his name was Martin Cassidy 'n' Bill Hatfield. Mr. Cassidy's mother gave him some money an' tell him to go get a bushel of peaches. An' he went down to Martin's house. An' Martin had some moonshine there.

Back down there, they make their own liquor, you know. So – we call it moonshine. Today, they call it white lightnin'; but at that time we call it moonshine.

An' I remember real well what happened. Bunch of us kids was out there playin'; an' no one meanin' any harm about it. But anyway, Mrs. Hatfield come down an' took away her money from Mr. Hatfield, you know, for the peaches, cause she know what he was gonna buy drinks with it. 'Nd Mr. Cassidy was laying out there in the yard.

And Mr. Cassidy just looked up, and he said to Bill, just – just jokin', just in a kiddin' way, he said "Uh huh," he says, "that's – another dollar bill you won't get to spend for drinks, hunh?"

'Nd Bill said, "I'll fix you, ya so-and-so."

So he walked in Martin Cassidy's *house*, his own house, came out with a double-bitted axe, hit him down 'crost the head once, turned over and hit him again, then throwed the axe down and run through the woods.

Just over two dollars that he was sent for peaches with.

Narrative 5

(Were you ever in a situation where you were in serious danger of being killed?) Yes. (What happened?) I don't really like to talk about it. (Well, tell me as much about it as you can?)

Well, this person had a little too much to drink, and he attacked me, and a friend came in, and she stopped it.

Narrative 6

(Were you ever in a situation where you were in serious danger of being killed?)

Yeah, I was in the Boy Scouts at the time. And we was doing the 50-yard dash, racing, but we was at the pier, marked off, and so we was doing the 50-yard dash. There was about eight or nine of us, you know, going down, coming back.

And going down the *third* time, I caught cramps and I started yelling "Help!", but the fellows didn't believe me, you know. They thought I was just trying to catch up, because I was going on or slowing down. So all of them kept going. They leave me.

And so I started going down. Scoutmaster was up there. He was watching me. But he didn't pay me no attention either. And for no reason at all there was another guy, who had just walked up that minute . . . He just jumped over and grabbed me.

Narrative 7

(And what about the street fight?) Then – ah – well, street fight, the most important, lemme see. (You know, the one that you remember the most.) Well, I had quite a lot. Well, one, I think, was with a girl [laughter]. Like, I was a kid, you know.

And she was the baddest girl – *the baddest girl in the neighborhood.* If you didn't bring her candy – to school, she'd punch you in the mouth. And you had to kiss her when she ['d] tell you. This girl was only about twelve years old, man, but she was a killer. She didn't take no junk. She whupped all her brothers.

And I came to school one day, and I didn't have no money; my ma wouldn't give me no money. And I played hookies one day. First time I played hookies, man, put sump'n on me, so I said, you know, I'm not gonna play hookies no more, 'cause I don't want to get a whuppin'.

So I go to school, and this girl says, "Where's the candy?" I said, "I don't have it." She says, powwww!! So I says to myself, "Well, there's gonna be times my mother won't give me money because a poor family, and I can't take this all – and and, you know – every time she don't give me any money. So I say, well, I just gotta fight the girl. She gonna hafta whup me. I hope she [don't] whup me."

And I hit the girl: powwww!!

Narrative 8

(Were you ever in a situation where you were in serious danger of being killed?) I'm gonna die? When I was drownin', I didn't know – like, I was turnin' tumblesaults. But that was th[illegible]

I – I was in a fight downtown once. Like – I went down to a party, and – this – this guy was a soldier – and this guy was a soldier, and he comes on, "gimme a cigarette."

I said, "I don't have any cigarette"

"Well, lemme search you."

I said, "You're not gonna search me."

"Well – I'm a soldier, and I know judo."

I said, "Well, I don't – I don't care if you're a *cop* and you know karate, you're not gonna search me."

And he hit me, man, like I hit him. And like, I – I got next to the guy. He didn't get a chance to use nothing, and I put sump'm on him.

I had – had a couple of guys with me. So we walked around the corner, – after, you know, I knocked him down a couple of times. I said "Well, you know, we'll soon get it."

I walk around the corner about twenty guys come after us, down by the projects. And we're runnin' – and, like – I couldn't run as fast as the other guys. And they was catchin' up to me. And I crossed the street, and I tripped, man. And, like, when I tripped, they kicked me and they was on me and I said, "Like this is it, man"; I pulled a knife.

But – a guy I know from the projects came over and gave me a hand.

And that – that was it, you know. That was it.

Narrative 9

(Did you ever have a feeling, or a premonition, that something was gonna happen, and it did?) Yes, I did. (Tell me about it.)

I was goin' with a girl, one time; we were layin' on a bed – we weren't doin anything, we were talkin' – and, I don't know, I looked into her face, and I saw, like, horns coming out of her head. You know. You know – like – I said, "You look like the devil!"

She said, "What do you mean, I look like the devil?"

"Don't kid around." I said, "I'm not kiddin'. I saw horns comin' out of your head."

And the girl got very angry and walked out. But, we got together, and we went together for about four months.

And, like, this girl tried to put me in a couple of tricks. Like she tried to get some boys to hurt me. You know. And she was a devil.

So, now, anything I see I believe it's going to happen.

Narrative 10

(Did you ever see anybody get beat up real bad?)

I know a boy name Harry. Another boy threw a bottle at him right in the head, and he had to get seven stitches.

Narrative 11

(What was the last cartoon you saw on television?) I don't know, I was watching the Sandy Becker show. (What was the story about?) About this pig. (What happened?)

See he – they threw him out, you know. So he wanted to get back in, 'cause, you know, it was sn- raining hard. So he got on this boat and tried to – go somewhere else. And the boat went over. And he tried to swim.

So this other man was fishing in the rain. So he seen the pig, and went over there and, and picked the pig up and put it in the boat and brought it back to shore, so he would land there.

Narrative 12

(What was the most important fight you remember?)

When I was in fourth grade – no – it was third grade – there was this boy, he stole my glove.

He took my glove, and say that his father found it downtown on the ground. I told him that he – it's impossible for him to find downtown, 'cause all those people were walking by, and just his father is the only one that find it? So he get all upset.

Then I fought him. I knocked him all in the street. So he say he give. And I kept on hitting him. Then he start crying and run home to his father.

And his father told him, he ain't find no glove.

Narrative 13

. . . See, Napoleon he took the ring and put it on the maiden. It was a statue of the maiden. Then he put it on her finger where the ring's supposed to be, and then he put it on the 45° angle. And then he looked in, and then he saw the place where the project was made at. And everything wh – the doctor who made it was dead.

So he came. He took him and the boy – the boy asked could he see it, and when the boy started to see it, he had this thing on – this patch or something – on his back. The Japanese leader could trace him by that patch because, you know, by radar.

And then – he started – so he took the patch off the boy and put it on the dog. And he took a stick and threw it in the water and the dog ran after it. And the radar – it went in the water with the dog.

And then – Napoleon and the dog started running – I mean, Napoleon and the boy started running, and they started running to the place where the project was made. And they started running to the place. And then, when they got there, they found that all of it was dried up and everything.

So when they started to leave out, he had a Japanese man first tell him to surrender. And before he told him to surrender, the dog – the dog came in there. The dog had found them. And the Japanese man came and told 'em to surrender.

See, they was inside the cave and the Japanese man was outside. And he told them to surrender. And he didn't surrender. He first – he told them that he made a trap. Then he said, "You can come in and make sure the project is all washed up," 'cause it was no more there. And they came.

When he sent one of his men to India . . .

Narrative 14

(Did Calvin do something that was really wild?) Yeah. We made Calvin hit – I say, "Calv – "

See, we – it was on a Sunday, and we didn't have nothin' to do after I – after we came from church. Then we ain't had nothin' to do.

So I say, "Calvin, let's go get out – put our dirty clothes on so we can play in the dirt."

And so Calvin say, "Let's have a rock – a rock war." And I say, "All right."

So Calvin had a rock and we, you know – here go a wall and a faraway go a wall. Calvin threw a rock. I was lookin' and – uh – and Calvin threw a rock. It oh – it almost hit me.

So I looked down to get another rock.

Say "Sssh!" an' it pass me.

I say, "Calvin, I'm bust your head for that."

Calvin stuck his head out. I th'ew the rock, and the rock went up, I mean it went

These fourteen examples cover a wide variety of types, from extremely short to relatively long, from highly organized structures to simple serial types. In addition to the narrative themselves, enough preliminary quotation is given so that one can obtain some idea of the stimulus to which the narratives respond – a matter quite relevant to the functional analysis of narrative.

Some difficult questions arise as we examine these narratives:

1. Though each is presented as a single narrative, how in fact do we know whether one or more narratives are contained in a given example? Is narrative structure well enough defined that we can answer this question? For instance, is Narrative 5 a narrative or a fragment of a narrative? Is Narrative 13 a fragment of a narrative or three separate narratives?
2. The structural framework of the narrative cannot be studied profitably without saying something about the sequence of events to which it refers. The fundamental question of narrative analysis appears to be this: How can we relate the sequence of clauses in the narrative to the sequence of events inferred from the narrative?

We will attempt to answer these questions in the following discussion.

The Basic Framework of Narrative

Temporal Sequence

We have defined narrative informally as one method of recapitulating past experience by matching a verbal sequence of clauses to the sequence of events that actually occurred. For example, in Narrative 5 we have four independent clauses that refer to four successive events or situations:

(5)
a Well, this person had **a little too much to drink**
b and he attacked me
c and the friend came in
d and she stopped it.

The temporal sequence of narrative is an important defining property that proceeds from its referential function. Narrative is not the only method for referring to a sequence of events; all recapitulation of experience is not narrative. For example, the events of Narrative 5 might have been presented in the following way:

(5')
c A friend of mine came in
d just in time to stop
a this person who had a little **too much to drink**
b from attacking me.

This form of presenting events depends on syntactic embedding. However, not all alternatives to narrative require this type of subordination. The following series of four independent clauses presents the same material in reverse order:

(5")
d A friend of mine stopped the attack.
c She had just come in.
b This person was attacking me.
a He had had a little too much to drink.

Despite the fact that these two formulations are perfectly logical, orderly, and acceptable ways of representing a sequence of events, they are not narratives as we are about to define the concept. The basic narrative units that we wish to isolate are defined by the fact that they recapitulate experience in the same order as the original events.

However, inspection of the other examples shows that the relationships between clauses and events are not simple. For instance, in Narrative 3:

(3)
d and we were sitting shive.
e And the reason the fight started . . .
f He sort of ran out in the yard –
g this was out on Coney Island –
h and he started talk about it;
i and my mother had just sat down to have a cup of coffee
j and I told him to cut it out.

The sequence of clauses d through j does not match the sequence of events and situations inferred from the narrative. The situation described in g ("This was out on Coney Island") certainly did not follow f ("He sort of ran out of the yard"); the event of i ("and my mother had just sat down to have a cup of coffee") did not follow h ("and he started talk about it") – rather, it preceded it; the referent of clause e is not temporally ordered with relation to any of the events ("and the reason the fight started"). The clauses that do refer to events clearly in the sequence are:

(3')
f He sort of ran out in the yard
h and he started talk about it
j and I told him to cut it out.

So far, we have discussed clauses in general as narrative units. But it can quickly be seen that only independent clauses are relevant to temporal sequence. Subordinate clauses (like the embedded clauses seen in formulation 5') may be placed anywhere in the narrative sequence without disturbing the temporal order of the semantic interpretation, as in the next example taken from Narrative 1:

(1)
k Then she left a note one day
l she was going to commit suicide
m because he was always raising hell about me.

Here clause 1 ("she was going to commit suicide") is the familiar construction of indirect discourse in which we refer to the fact that a person in the past referred to an event that would occur sometime in the future. Clause m, on the other hand, refers to events prior to clause k. One can quote any number of examples to show that any subordinate clause is removed from the temporal sequence of narrative, even if it retains its own temporal reference.

These considerations illustrate the motivation for the definitions of the narrative clause to be developed later in this article. These elements will be characterized by *temporal sequence:* Their order cannot be changed without changing the inferred sequence of events in the original semantic interpretation.

Displacement Sets

The following operations provide a formal basis for establishing temporal sequence among the independent clauses of a narrative. Each clause is assigned a sequential symbol (using lowercase letters), as in the next example from Narrative 8:

(8)
w and they was catchin' up to me
x and I crossed the street
y and I tripped, man.

Each clause is then tested for the potential range of displacement by examining the semantic interpretation that results when the clause in question is moved to all possible positions in the remaining sequence. For example, we find that x can be placed before w without changing the original semantic interpretation, since we can infer that the process of catching up extended throughout the sequence:

(8')
x and I crossed the street
w and they was catchin' up to me
y and I tripped, man.

But x cannot be placed after y without changing the original interpretation, as in:

(8")
w and they was catchin' up to me
y and I tripped, man
x and I crossed the street.

The result of these operations is indicated in the following system of subscripts

of the preceding a clauses and after any of the following p clauses without changing the temporal sequence of the original semantic interpretation.

The set consisting of the clauses before which c can be placed, c itself, and the clauses after which c can be placed, is the *displacement set* of c, symbolized DS(c).

Thus, for the partial sequence of w, x, and y discussed previously, we have

(8''')

${}_0w_2$	and they was catchin' up to me	DS(w) = {w, x, y}
${}_1x_0$	and I crossed the street	DS(x) = {w, x}
${}_0y_0$	and I tripped, man.	DS(y) = {y}

Narrative Clauses and Free Clauses

Two extreme types of displacement ranges that result from this operation are

$${}_0c_0 \text{ and } {}_{x-1}c_{n-x}$$

in which n is the total number of clauses in a sequence. The ${}_0c_0$ clause, with a displacement set of {c}, is locked in position in the sequence; it evidently functions as a *narrative clause* of the simplest kind, maintaining the strict temporal sequence that is the defining characteristic of narrative. The ${}_{x-1}c_{n-x}$ clause, on the other hand, has a displacement set equal to the entire narrative and can range freely through the narrative sequence. This type may be termed a *free clause.*

Coordinate Clauses

Although the free clause has no fixed relation to the temporal sequence, and the simple ${}_0c_0$ narrative clause is strictly ordered by temporal sequence, there are other types of clauses that have more complex relations to narrative sequence. We frequently find sequences of the type ${}_0c_1\ {}_1d_0$, as in this extract from Narrative 14:

(14)

${}_0s_0$	[and the rock] came down
${}_0t_1$	and smacked him in the head
${}_1u_0$	and say (slap!)

Clauses t and u might just as well been reversed:

(14')

${}_0s_0$	[and the rock] came down
${}_0t_1$	and say (slap!)
${}_1t_0$	and smacked him on the head

Both t and u have identical displacement sets, DS(t) = {t, u}, DS(u) = {t, u}, and they may be freely interchanged without any change in temporal sequence. Clauses with identical displacement sets may be termed *coordinate clauses.* (All free clauses

are coordinate in this sense, since they all have the same displacement sets, but it is the coordinate nature of certain narrative clauses that is our primary concern.)

One can, of course, have three or more coordinate clauses in a single sequence, as in the following extract from Narrative 1:

(1)

$_0l_0$ He came to my hotel. Nice big blue 44 too.
$_0m_3$ I talked him out of it,
$_1n_2$ and says, "Well, we'll go look for her,
$_2o_1$ and if we can't find her, well you can – go ahead, pull the trigger if you want to."
$_3p_0$ I was maneuvering.
$_0q_0$ So he took me up on it.

Here clauses m, n, o, and p are coordinate, with identical displacement sets (m, n, o, p), because they could occur in any of the six possible permutations without altering the temporal sequence of the original semantic interpretation. But none of these could be placed before 1 ("He came to my hotel") or after q ("So he took he up on it").

Restricted Clauses

The narrative clauses that we have considered are of two general forms, $_0c_0$ and $_0c_1\ _1d_0$, and appear to have one feature in common. Their displacement sets range from a left zero subscript to a right zero subscript, with no zeros in between. We also find in narratives a third type of clause that does not range freely over the entire narrative, yet has a wider range than the narrative clause. This type of clause has a displacement set that may range across several left or right zero subscripts. Such clauses, which are neither free nor temporally ordered in the strict sense, may be termed *restricted clauses*.

It may be now helpful to consider a narrative as a whole to illustrate the nature of free clauses, coordinate clauses, and restricted clauses and to show how the displacement sets of such clauses are determined. Narrative 6 may be analyzed as follows:

(6)

$_0a_{18}$	yeh I was in the boy scouts at the time	DS {a–s}
$_1b_{17}$	and we was doing the 50-yard dash	"
$_2c_{16}$	racing	"
$_3d_{15}$	but we was at the pier, marked off	"
$_4e_{14}$	and so we was doing the 50-yard dash	"
$_5f_{13}$	there was about eight or ten of us, you know, going down, coming back	"
$_6g_0$	and, going down the *third* time, I caught cramps	{a–g}
$_0h_0$	and I started yelling "Help!"	{h}
$_0i_1$	but the fellows didn't believe me, you know,	{i–j}

$_1j_0$	they thought I was just trying to catch up because I was going on or slowing down	{i–j}
$_0k_1$	so all of them kept going	{k–l}
$_1l_0$	they leave me	{k–l}
$_0m_3$	and so I started going down	{m–p}
$_{13}n_5$	Scoutmaster was up there	{a–s}
$_6o_3$	he was watching me	{i–r}
$_7p_2$	but he didn't pay me no attention either	{i–r}
$_0q_0$	and for no reason at all there was another guy, who had just walked up that minute . . .	{q}
$_0r_0$	he just jumped over	{r}
$_0s_0$	and grabbed me	{s}

Narrative 6 begins with six free clauses, all of which can range over the entire narrative; for each of these, the sum of the subscripts is 18. The third clause, *racing,* is in apposition with *doing* in the second clause, and is treated as derived from *we was racing.* It must be analyzed separately, because it is possible that such an appositive could be temporally ordered in respect to other clauses.[3] The situation and action described in these six clauses prevails throughout the entire narrative: that is, the *8 or 9 of us* continue racing even when the narrator himself is in trouble.

The first narrative clause is g, with a displacement set of {a, b, c, d, e, f, g}, ranging from the left zero of a to its own right zero. Clauses i and j are coordinate clauses of the type just discussed, and so are k and l.

Clause m is a narrative clause with a displacement set ranging over the three following clauses. These following clauses are not in strict narrative sequence; the first one, n, is a free clause ("Scoutmaster was up there"). It should be understood that the test for displacement range must include a procedure for adjusting anaphoric reference. "Scoutmaster was up there" would be a strange utterance in initial position, but if we supply the referent of "there – at the pier," we have "Scoutmaster was up at the pier," which could stand in initial position without changing the temporal sequence of the original semantic interpretation. The reverse situation would apply if a specific free clause in initial position, with several proper names, was displaced to a point later in the narrative: pronoun substitution would be made.

The second clause, o, ("He was watching me") is a restricted clause, with DS(o) = {i–r} extending before n. It could have been placed at any point after h ("I started yelling 'Help!'"), that is, after the action that called the scoutmaster's attention to the narrator and logically motivated his action. It is worth following the logic of this argument in detail, because it is typical of the method for establishing the displacement sets of restricted clauses.

While it is true that the scoutmaster's job was to watch everyone, we interpret the statement o ("He was watching me") to mean that there was a significant change at one point, from watching everyone to watching the narrator in particular. This interpretation hinges on the word "either" – this word coordinates

the negation of "He didn't pay me no attention" with some previous negative statement; the first preceding negative clause is i ("the fellows didn't believe me."). Therefore, we can conclude that both of these statements refer to events that responded to clause h ("and I started yelling 'Help!'"). Therefore, the displacement sets of o and p cannot include h without a change in the temporal sequence of the original semantic interpretation.

On the other hand, clause o could range towards the end, at any point up to clause s. If clause o appeared after s, then the same temporal inference that we now draw – that the scoutmaster began watching after the cry for help – would be altered. It would be the grabbing of the narrator by the "other guy" that would mark the beginning of the scoutmaster's watching.

The same argument holds for clause p, which is a restricted clause with the same range as o.

The rest of the narrative consists of simple $_0c_0$ narrative units. Clause q ("for no reason at all there was another guy") has the temporal status of a punctual act, appearance: the viewpoint is clearly that of the narrator.

Figure 1 is a graphic display of these statements about the displacement sets of the clauses concerned. Each clause is represented by a mark opposite the alphabetic symbol, and the vertical line running through this mark represents the displacement set. We will return to this diagram later in discussing the normal structure of narrative as a whole.




Figure 1: Displacement ranges of the clauses of Narrative 6

Temporal Juncture

If narrative clauses succeed each other in uninterrupted sequence, the zero subscripts alone would show the temporal segmentation of the narrative. But because any number of free or restricted units can intervene between two narrative clauses, we must define temporal relations between any two clauses in the narrative, not necessarily contiguous. We wish to define formally the condition under which any two clauses are ordered with respect to each other and cannot be interchanged without change in the temporal sequence of the original semantic interpretation. Such a condition is met when the displacement range of a given clause does not extend past the actual location of some following clause, and conversely, the displacement range of this following clause does not extend past the actual location of the given preceding clause. More concisely, their displacement sets do not include each other. Two such clauses are temporally ordered with respect to each other. Their displacement sets may in fact overlap, but the displacement set of c will not include d, and that of d will not include c if c and d are temporally ordered.

Two clauses that are temporally ordered with respect to each other are said to be separated by *temporal juncture.* This juncture has no relation to any free or restricted clauses that may fall in between the temporally ordered clauses. In Narrative 6, given in full previously, we find temporal junctures between g and h, h and i, j and k, l and m, m and q, q and r, r and s. Since i and j, k and l are coordinate, we can best represent these junctures by the following diagram:

g I caught cramps
h and I started yelling
ij the fellows didn't believe; they thought I was
kl all of them kept going; they leave me
m I started going down
q there was another guy
r he just jumped over
s and grabbed me.

Definition of the Narrative Clause

We can now proceed to define the basic unit of narrative, the narrative clause, in terms of temporal juncture and displacement sets. It is characteristic of a narrative clause that it cannot be displaced across a temporal juncture without a change in the temporal sequence of the original semantic interpretation. Therefore if the displacement set of a given clause does not contain two clauses that are temporally ordered with respect to each other, then that clause is a *narrative clause.* More simply, we can say that a narrative clause has an *unordered displacement set.* If the displacement set is ordered – that is, if some members are temporally ordered with respect to each other – then the given clause is a restricted clause or a free clause. If such an ordered set is equal to the narrative as a whole, the clause is a *free clause;* if not, a *restricted clause.*

We can restate these definitions formally in the following manner. A narrative N may be represented as a set of n clauses

$$c^1, c^2 \ldots c^i \ldots c^n$$

in which $0 \leq I \leq n$. Then

1. $c^i \in DS(c^j)$ if $c^i \ldots c^j$ and $c^j \ldots c^i$ yield the same temporal sequence in semantic interpretation [or if $c^i = c^j$]
2. If $c^i \in DS(c^k)$ and $c^j \in DS(c^k)$
   and $c^i \notin DS(c^j)$ and $c^j \notin DS(c^i)$
   a. and $DS(c^k) = N$, then c^k is a free clause.
   b. and $DS(c^k) < N$, then c^k is a restricted clause.
3. If condition 2 does not hold, c^k is a narrative clause.

Definition of a Narrative

We can now define quite simply those sequences of clauses that we will consider as narratives. Any sequence of clauses that contains at least one temporal juncture is a narrative. Thus

(10)
${}_0a_2$ I know a boy name Harry.
${}_1b_0$ Another boy threw a bottle at him right in the head,
${}_0c_0$ and he had to get seven stitches.

is a narrative, because a temporal juncture is found between b and c. A statement such as "I shot and killed him" would be a narrative, because it contains a temporal juncture, but not "I laughed and laughed at him." There are many ambiguous cases that allow two distinct interpretations: "I punched him in the head, the mouth and the chest" is normally a list, which does not imply that he was punched first in the head, then in the mouth, and then in the chest. But the temporal interpretation is possible, and it is more likely in "I beat him up and stomped on him."

The upper bound of narrative is not set by this approach, and the question of deciding between one narrative or two must be left to the section that deals with the overall structure of narrative.

Narrative Heads

The finite verb of a narrative clause, which carries the tense marker of the clause, is the *narrative head* of that clause. Heads of coordinate clauses are coordinate heads.

(2)
${}_0u_0$ And – gone a while

$_{0}w_{1}$ and he didn't have the duck.
$_{0}x_{31}$ And that was unusual –
$_{1}y_{0}$ I said, "You git back there
$_{0}z_{0}$ and get that duck."[4]
aa. And he went back there;

Here the narrative heads are *gone, come, did-, was, said, said,* and *went.* The types of grammatical forms and categories that can function as grammatical heads are extremely limited. The principle forms are simple past and simple present. As a rule, no modals appear; abstractly considered, it is possible that *could* could function as a narrative head, though no examples have been found in our materials to date. The progressive (past and possibly present) does appear occasionally as a narrative unit:

(1)
$_{0}u_{1}$ and got back
$_{1}v_{0}$ it was a tent show
.w, she was laying on a cot with an ice bag on her head.
.x; She hadn't committed suicide.
.y. But – however – that settled it for the day.

In this example, "was laying" is in temporal order; it can be displayed before the free unit v and after the restricted unit x, but not before u or after y without changing the temporal sequence of the semantic interpretation. There is considerable semantic and syntactic interest in the questions raised by this use of the past progressive,[5] and many other such issues are raised by the data of narrative analysis; however, this article is confined to the description of the basic units and framework of narrative, and such questions are not pursued here.

In general, the present perfect does not appear in narrative.[6] The past perfect, as noted before, does not function as a narrative head. However, if the clause with the past perfect refers to an event developed in the narrative, rather than to some event preceding the entire narrative, as is the case in Clause x in Narrative 1. Although x would have been true in initial position, it would not have referred to the particular suicide threatened in Clause k. In its present position, x asserts that the threat of k was not consummated at some time prior to the moment in which x is stated – necessarily before the next preceding narrative unit. Therefore, x can be placed before the disclosure of w, at any point after k. It can also occur at any point after the disclosure w with no change in temporal sequence.

A series of past perfect narrative heads can be used to describe a set of events in temporal sequence, placing the entire set at some point prior to the preceding narrative unit.

(2)
$_{0}nn_{1}$ I walked over there
$_{0}oo_{18}$ And here he was;
$_{0}pp_{17}$ one of my tame ducks that I had tethered out there had got the strap off her leg,

$_{43}$qq$_{16}$ and had gone out there,
$_{30}$rr$_{15}$ and when this fellow shot he hadn't hit the duck.

It is true that the three clauses pp, qq, and rr are here in temporal sequence. But no permutation of their order will produce a different temporal sequence in semantic interpretation:

$_{0}$oo$_{18}$ and here he was
$_{28}$rr$_{17}$ and when this fellow shot he hadn't hit the duck
$_{43}$qq$_{16}$ one of my tame ducks that I had tethered out there had gone out there
$_{44}$pp$_{15}$ She had got the strap off her leg.[7]

As indicated by the subscripts, pp and qq are free clauses, and rr is restricted – it cannot precede the shot itself, but can follow at any later point.

Related Narrative Sequences

The definitions we have given for narrative units are deliberately applied to the linear sequence presented by the narrator. This linear sequence may be considered the *surface structure* of the narrative; there are often many narratives with rather different surface structures, but with equivalent semantic interpretations. In the same way, there are many sentences with different surface structures that correspond to the same underlying string of formatives in the original phrase structure of a grammar:

a The rock say "shhh!"
b "shhh!" is what the rock say
c What the rock say is "shhh!"
d It's a fact that the rock say "shhh!"
e The rock's saying "shhh!"

In previous discussions, we showed that for each series of events described in a narrative, there are other equivalent means of verbal statement besides narrative. There are also equivalent narratives with the same semantic (temporal) interpretation. It is useful to relate all of these to a single underlying form. just as sentences b through e are related to the simplest form, a. To do this, we must consider the fundamental semantic relation in narrative.

The semantic interpretation of a narrative, as we have defined it, depends on the expectation that the events described did, in fact, occur in the same order as they were told in. Thus the sequence

$_{0}$a$_{0}$ he attacked me
$_{0}$b$_{0}$ the friend came in

with temporal juncture between a and b, is equivalent in its semantic interpretation to

$_0a_0$ he attacked me
then
$_0b_0$ the friend came in

That is, the temporal juncture is semantically equivalent to the temporal conjunction *then.*

Of course, the a-then-b relation is not the only one at work in narrative. If it were, we would have only a succession of narrative clauses. One also finds implied relations between clauses such as a-and at the same time-b, or a-and now that I think back on it-b. But among these temporal relations, the a-then-b is in some sense the most essential characteristic of narrative. Some narratives (see Narrative 5) may use it exclusively, and every narrative must, by definition, use it at least once.

Though some of these relations are marked explicitly, the majority of them are implied by certain lexical and grammatical features. Moreover, these implicit markers are, in a given situation, often ambiguous: They may stand for more than one relation. Consider the following sequence from Narrative 4:

$_1b_?$ Martin Cassidy's mother give him some money
$_?c_0$ an' tell him to go get a bushel of peaches
$_0d_0$ an' he went down to Martin's house

Though both c and d are connected to the preceding clause by *and*, and though d is clearly ordered with respect to b, b and c are not clearly ordered. The lexical meanings of *give* and *tell* imply a possible simultaneity between b and c. If we substitute for *tell* a verb whose lexical meaning (virtually) denies the possibility or simultaneity with *give*, then b and c are unambiguously ordered:

$_0b_0$ Martin Cassidy's mother give him some money
$_0c'_0$ an' bring up a bushel of peaches from the cellar

One more important point can be drawn from this example. The two possible relations between b and c as they stand are b-then-c and b-and at the same time-c. not c-then-b. This again suggests that the x-then-y relation is the fundamental one in narrative, which is then added to or modified by marked lexical or grammatical forms.

Isolating Primary Sequences

If we give primacy in narrative to the a-then-b relation, we may wish to select the narrative sequence with the most explicit statement of this relation as the basic underlying form and derive other equivalent narratives from it. Such a basic form we term the *primary sequence.* As we will see, the derivation of other forms from the primary sequence has an important interpretation in the functional organization of the narrative structure as a whole. The procedure for isolating primary sequence can be set out as four steps, and illustrated by the following operations on Narrative 6, previously analyzed in Figure 1.

1. A displacement range is assigned to each clause of the narrative.
   $_0a_{18}\ _1b_{17}\ _2c_{16}\ _3d_{15}\ _4e_{14}\ _5f_{13}\ _6g_0\ _0h_0\ _0i_1\ _1j_0\ _0k_1\ _1l_0\ _0m_3\ _{13}n_5\ _6o_3\ _7p_2\ _0q_0\ _0r_0\ _0s_0$
2. Free clauses are moved to the beginning of the narrative.
   $_0a_{18}\ _1b_{17}\ _2c_{16}\ _3d_{15}\ _4e_{14}\ _5f_{13}\ _6n_{12}\ _7g_0\ _0h_0\ _0i_1\ _1j_0\ _0k_1\ _1l_0\ _0m_2\ _5o_3\ _6p_2\ _0q_0\ _0r_0\ _0s_0$
3. Restricted clauses are moved to a point as early as possible in the narrative without changing the temporal sequence of the original semantic interpretation.
   $_0a_{18}\ _1b_{17}\ _2c_{16}\ _3d_{15}\ _4e_{14}\ _5f_{13}\ _6n_{12}\ _7g_0\ _0h_0\ _0o_8\ _1p_7\ _2i_1\ _3j_0\ _0k_1\ _1l_0\ _0m_0\ _0q_0\ _0r_0\ _0s_0$
4. Coordinate clauses are coalesced to single units.
   $_0a\text{–}n_{91}g_{00}h_{00}o\text{–}p_{51}i\text{–}j_{00}k\text{–}l_{00}m_{00}q_{00}r_{00}s_0$

The string of 10 symbols given here represents the primary sequence of the narrative, in which the a-then-b relation is developed most explicitly. The operation of moving free clauses and restricted clauses as far to the left as possible is a method of minimizing the total amount of delay in the statement of any given event or condition. We can, in fact, define both of these as a specific operation: the minimizing of left subscripts.

Formally, we consider a narrative $c^1, c^2 \ldots c^i \ldots c^n$ with left displacement ranges $a^1, a^2 \ldots a^i \ldots a^n$, in which $0 \leq i \leq n$. A *left displacement function* $y(Ni)$ is defined for each permutation $N_1, N_2 \ldots N_m$ of the clauses $c^2, c^2 \ldots c^n$ that preserves the temporal sequence of the original semantic interpretation:

$$y(Ni) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} a^i$$

When $y(N_i)$ is minimal, any sequence c^i, c^j in which $DS(c^i) = DS(c^j)$ is rewritten as c^k and displacement ranges reassigned. The resulting string is the *primary sequence* of the series $N_1, N_2 \ldots N_m$.

We now proceed to show why in most narratives the linear ordering of clauses departs significantly from the order of the primary sequence. For this purpose, we will have to outline the overall structure of narratives as governed by narrative functions.

Overall Structure of Narratives

Orientation

Figure 1 shows a group of six free clauses occurring together at the beginning of Narrative 6. This is characteristic of most narratives to a greater or lesser degree. Of the 14 examples given in the beginning of this article, 11 have such groups of free clauses. When we examine these groups of free clauses in relation to referential function, we find that they serve to orient the listener in respect to person, place, time, and behavioral situation. We will therefore refer to this structure feature as an *orientation section:* formally, the group of free clauses that precede the first narrative clause. Not all narratives have orientation sections, and not all

orientation sections perform these four functions. Furthermore, some free clauses with these functions our in other positions. Finally, we find that the orientation function is often performed by phrases or lexical items contained in narrative clauses. Despite these limitations, the overall view of narrative shows that the orientation section is a structural feature of a narrative structure. When orientation sections are displaced, we frequently find that this displacement performs another function, evaluation, to be discussed later. Furthermore, we find that orientation sections are typically lacking in narratives of children and less verbal adults whose narratives fail in other ways to carry out referential functions, for example, to preserve temporal sequence. This is the case with Narrative 13, the narrative of vicarious experience from a television show, *The Man From UNCLE.* An interesting example is Narrative 5, where the suppression of full narrative structure is plainly motivated by the explicit reluctance of the narrator to identify persons and places. Here, as in many of the critical issues discussed below, it is essential to preserve the context of the narrative. Because such originating context is often missing and cannot be reconstructed in traditional folk tales, it is more difficult to relate analysis to the originating functions.

Complication

The main body of narrative clauses usually comprises a series of events that may be termed the complication or complicating action. In Figure 1, complicating action section of Narrative 6 runs from clause g to m.

In many cases, a long string of events may actually consist of several cycles of simple narrative, with many complication sections. This is the case with Narrative 2, the product of a practiced storyteller who is widely known in his community (Martha's Vineyard) as an expert in this traditional art.[8] The subdivisions of Narrative 2 are plainly marked by structural features to be discussed later, but in Narrative 13, this task is much more difficult and must depend upon informal semantic criteria.

The complication is regularly terminated by a result, as in the simple Narrative 5: clause d – or perhaps c and d – is the result that ends the complicating action of a and b, as shown in Figure 2.



Figure 2: Overall structure of Narrative 5

To isolate the result in Narrative 5, we are forced to use semantic criteria that are often difficult to apply and seldom consistent. Without further functional analysis, it will usually be hard to tell when a narrative is actually over – when the result begins and when it has been given in full

Evaluation

Before proceeding to discuss the result of narratives, we would like to suggest that a narrative that contains only an orientation, complicating action, and result is not a complete narrative. It may carry out the referential function perfectly, and yet seem difficult to understand. Such a narrative lacks significance: it has no point. This is the case with Narratives 11 and 13. Narrative 11 is difficult to follow, although the complicating action and the result seem to be clearly stated.


(11)

$_0a_0$ See he- they threw him out, you know.
$_0b_0$ So he wanted to get back in, 'cause, you know, it was sn-raining hard.
$_0c_0$ So he got on this boat
$_0d_0$ and he tried to – go somewhere else.
$_0e_0$ And the boat went over.
$_0f_1$ And he tried to swim.
$_6g_6$ And this other man was fishing in the rain.
$_1h_0$ So he seen the pig
$_0i_0$ and he went over there
$_0j_0$ and picked the pig up
$_0k_0$ and put it in the boat
$_0l_0$ and brought it back to the shore, so he would land there.
$_0m_0$ And that was that.

There are 13 independent clauses, and 12 of them are narrative clauses. A diagram of displacement ranges for this narrative offers little justification for any internal segmentation (see Figure 3).

Narrative 13 is actually a very detailed statement of a sequence of events and their results – a series of at least three narrative cycles. Yet, the overall effect of

Clause	a	p
a	0	0
b	0	0
d	0	0
d	0	0
e	0	0
f	0	1
g	6	6
h	1	0
i	0	0
j	0	0
k	0	0
l	0	0
m	0	0



Narrative 13 is confusion and pointlessness. This is true for the whole narrative, which is actually 10 times as long as the extract.

Both Narratives 11 and 13 are examples of narratives of vicarious experience, not, as in the other cases, of personal experience. They are lacking the evaluation section that is typical of narratives of personal experience. When we compare Narrative 13 with Narrative 14, a narrative of personal experience, we can appreciate the great difference between unevaluated and evaluated narration.

Narratives are usually told in answer to some stimulus from outside and to establish some point of personal interest. For example, among the narratives given here we find many examples of narratives dealing with the danger of death. When the subject is asked if he were ever in serious danger of being killed, and he says "Yes," then he is asked: "What happened?". He finds himself in a position in which he must demonstrate to the listener that he really was in danger. The more vivid and real the danger appears, the more effective the narrative. If the narrative is weak and uninteresting, he will have made a false claim. (See Narratives 1, 3, 6, and 8.)

Beyond such immediate stimulus, we find that such narratives are so designed as to emphasize the strange and unusual character of the situation – there is an appeal to the element of mystery in most of the narratives. (See Narratives 2, 5, and especially 9.). Then, too, many narratives are designed to place the narrator in the most favorable possible light: a function which we may call self-aggrandizement. (See Narratives 7, 8, and especially 12.)

The functions of narrative have an effect on the narrative structure. A simple sequence of complication and result does not indicate to the listener the relative importance of these events or help him distinguish complication from *resolution.* We also find that in narratives without a point it is difficult to distinguish the complicating action from the result.

Therefore, it is necessary for the narrator to delineate the structure of the narrative by emphasizing the point where the complication has reached a maximum: the break between the complication and the result. Most narratives contain an evaluation section that carries out this function.

Many evaluation sections are defined formally. Multicoordinate clauses or groups of free or restricted clauses are frequently located at the break between the complicating action and the resolution of these complications. This is the case in Figure 1, for the clauses n, o, and p. As the narrator is going down, in the water, the moment of crisis is suspended by three clauses that do not occur in this position by any necessity of temporal sequence. They are restricted clauses that could have occurred much earlier in the narrative – in fact, before the first temporal juncture. After these three clauses, the narrative moves swiftly to a conclusion.

In many narratives, the evaluation section is fused with the result: that is, a single narrative clause both emphasizes the importance of the result and states it. This is the case with Narratives 3 and 12. In Narrative 3, the doctor's statement: "you'd a been dead" tells us simultaneously that the narrator was close to death and that he survived. The evaluation is here shown as related directly to the originating function – to demonstrate that the narrator was indeed close to death

In the case of Narrative 1, we find more than one evaluation section. Narrative 1 begins with a long orientation section of 10 clauses.

(1)


$_0a_{30}$ Well, in the business I was associated at that time, the Doc was an old man . . .
$_1b_{29}$ He had killed one man,
$_2c_{28}$ or – had done time.
$_3d_{27}$ But he had a young wife
$_4e_{26}$ and those days I dressed well.
$_5f_{25}$ And seemingly, she was trying to make me.
$_6g_{24}$ I never noticed it.
$_7h_{23}$ Fact is, I didn't like her very well, because she had – she was a nice looking girl until you saw her feet.
$_8i_{22}$ She had big feet.
$_9j_{21}$ Jesus, God, she had big feet!
$_{10}k_0$ Then she left a note one day she was going to commit suicide because he was always raising hell about me.
$_0l_0$ He came to my hotel. Nice big blue 44 too.[9]
$_0m_3$ I talked him out of it,
$_1n_2$ and says, "Well, we'll go look for her,
$_2o_1$ and if we can't find her, well, you can – go ahead, pull the trigger if you want to."
$_3P_0$ I was maneuvering.
$_0q_0$ So he took me up on it.
$_0r_0$ And we went to where they found her handkerchief – the edge of a creek –
$_0s_0$ And we followed down a little more,
$_0t_0$ And we couldn't find anything.
$_0u_1$ And got back –
$_{21}v_9$ it was a tent show –
$_1w_1$ she was laying on a cot with an ice bag on her head.
$_{12}x_7$ She hadn't committed suicide.
$_1y_0$ But – however – that settled it for the day.
$_0z_0$ But that night the manager, Floyd Adams, said, "You better pack up
$_0aa_0$ and get out, because that son of a bitch never forgives anything once he gets it in his head."
$_0bb_1$ And I did.
$_1cc_0$ I packed up
$_0dd_0$ and got out.
$_0ee_0$ That was two.

The first narrative unit is k ("Then she left a note one day . . ."), followed by l ("He came to my hotel") and m ("I talked him out of it"). We then have two clauses coordinated with m – clauses n ("And says") and o ("I was maneuvering."). These multicoordinate clauses suspend the action at a critical moment – when the danger of death is greatest, and they contain an explicit statement of the attitude of the narrator. His coolness in a moment of crisis emphasizes the danger and reflects well on himself.

Five narrative clauses follow this suspension, resolving the crisis introduced by l and m. A second evaluation section occurs at a subsidiary point when the situation is further resolved – the fate of the lady in question is determined, and simultaneously the immediate threat to the narrator. The action is suspended at this point by the use of a free clause that might have occurred in the orientation section, v ("it was a tent show"), and a direct comment, x, that might have been inferred from w. The resolution is stated with some finality in y ("that settled it"). Finally, there is an added explicit evaluation of a third party that confirms the implications of the previous evaluation section, followed by a conclusion. The overall diagram shows how evaluation sections outline the structure of the narrative.

It should be apparent here that the evaluation sections are responsible for those deviations from the order of the primary sequence of the narrative that complicate the a-then-b relation of narrative. The functions of the evaluation section must be added to the primary narrative function in order to understand how the primary sequence is transformed into the more complex structure that we see here. All of the evaluation sections shown here are related to the originating function of the narrative. From a structural point of view, the first section is the major break in the complicating action.[10]

Not all evaluation sections have the structural feature of suspending the complicating action, as shown in the Figure 4. In many cases, the evaluation may be present as lexical or phrasal modification of a narrative clause, or it may be itself a narrative clause or coincide with the last narrative clause. For this reason, the fundamental definition of evaluation must be semantic, although its implications are structural.



The *evaluation* of a narrative is defined by us as that part of the narrative that reveals the attitude of the narrator towards the narrative by emphasizing the relative importance of some narrative units as compared to others. This may be done by a variety of means:

Semantically defined evaluation:
1. direct statement: "I said to myself: this is it."
2. lexical intensifiers: "He was beat up real, real bad."
   "I whupped that dude half to death."

Formally defined:
3. suspension of the action:
   a. through coordinate clauses and restricted clauses: See Figure 1
   b. repetition (subtype of the above): See Narrative 2, at the moment of crisis when the dog is gone for the 3rd time: "And he didn't come back. And he didn't come back."

Culturally defined:
4. symbolic action: "They put an egg on his door."
   "I crossed myself."
   "You could hear the rosaries clicking."
5. judgment of a third person: here the entire narrative is reported to a person not present at the narrative.

Narrative 12 is a heavily evaluated narrative that shows three of these characteristic forms of evaluation. It is typical of many fight narratives in its two-part Structure. The first subcycle deals with the events leading up to the fight, and its conclusion is the beginning of the second subcycle, the fight itself. In this case, the evaluation of the first section is a statement of the narrator:

$_0d_0$ I told him that – it's impossible for him to find downtown.
'cause all those people were walking by, and just his father
is the only one that find it?

Although the very length of this closely reasoned argument serves to suspend the action, the structural criteria we have been using show it as a single narrative clause. We identify this clause as an evaluation on semantic grounds: It is an explicit statement by the narrator of his attitude towards the situation.

The conclusion of Narrative 12 is also an evaluative statement that coincides with the last narrative unit: The statement of a third person after the entire sequence of events is reported to him.

$_0j_0$ Then he start crying
$_0k_0$ and run home to his father.
$_0l_0$ And his father told him, he ain't find no glove

In addition, we have the evaluation of the act of clause i

$_0h_0$ So he say he give
$_0i_0$ And I kept on hitting him.

It is normal not to hit someone after he says "I give." This incident evaluates the narrative by indicating that the anger of the narrator was so great – due to excessive and unreasonable provocation – that he was carried away to the extent of violating this norm. The other boy had placed himself outside of normal sanctions by his behavior.

All of these forms of evaluation serve the function of self-aggrandizement, showing the narrator in a favorable position as compared to the other boy. It is evident that there are a great variety of evaluation types, more or less deeply embedded in the narrative. But this variety should not obscure the fact that unevaluated narratives are exceptional as representations of personal experience, and unevaluated narratives lack structural definition.

An important characteristic of narratives is the degree of embedding of the evaluation in the narrative framework. There is a wide range, from the most highly internalized type – a symbolic action or the evaluation of a third person – to the most external – a direct statement of the narrator to the listener about his feelings at the time. In the examples given previously, we find internalized evaluation in Narrative 1, in the dramatic statements of narrator and manager; and in Narrative 3, in the statement of the doctor, ("just about this much more," he says, "and you'd a been dead."). The last narrative, Narrative 14, has a dramatic statement of the narrator ("I say, 'Calvin, I'm bust your head for dat.'").

Sometimes the evaluation occurs in a statement of the narrator to himself, less well integrated into the narrative, as in Narrative 7: "So I says to myself, 'Well, there's gonna be times . . .'".

The other end of the scale is shown by a comment at the end of the narrative directed towards the listener, as in Narrative 13: "Just over two dollars that he was sent for peaches with." Still more direct is Narrative 2: "I'll tell you if I had ever walloped that dog I'd have felt some bad."

We might construct a scale of degrees of embedding of evaluation, following examples of the following sort:

Internal ↑
1. And when we got down there, her brother turned to me and whispered, "I think she's dead, John!"
2. And when we got down there, I said to myself, "My God, she's **dead!**"
3. And when we got down there, I thought, "She's dead."
4. And when we got down there, I thought she was dead.
5. Later, the doctors told us she was close to death.
6. I think she must have been close to death.

↓ External
7. You know, in cases like this, it's clear that she was likely as not dead.

Resolution

With this definition of evaluation, we can now return to the problem of defining the result of a narrative. The problem is now quite simple. We can establish the break between the complicating and resolving action by locating the place

of the evaluation. Thus, the *resolution* of the narrative is that portion of the narrative sequence that follows the evaluation. If the evaluation is the last element, then the resolution section coincides with the evaluation. In the examples given previously, the complicating clauses are symbolized ∪ and the resolving clauses ∩.

Coda

Many narratives end with a resolution section, but others have an additional element that we may call the *coda*.

The actual sequence of events described in the narrative does not, as a rule, extend up to the present. The coda is a functional device for returning the verbal perspective to the present moment. This is accomplished by a variety of means, so that the codas cannot be identified by such simple tag lines as "And they lived happily ever after."

a. One device used in a coda is *deixis*. This is the linguistic category that points to a referent instead of naming it explicitly: In this case, it has the effect of standing at the present moment of time and pointing to the end of the narrative, identifying it as a remote point in the past.

(1)
$_0aa_0$ I packed up
$_0bb_0$ and got out.
$_0cc_0$ That was two.

(7)
$_0bb_0$ That was one of the most important.

(8)
$_0gg_1$ And that – that was it, you know.
$_1hh_0$ That was it.

(11)
$_0m_0$ And that was that.

This use of the obviate deictic category – *that, there, those* – contrasts sharply with the use of the proximate in the body of the narrative – *this, here, these*. For example, we have the following proximate evaluation in Narrative 8:

(8)
$_0bb_0$ and they was on me and
$_0cc_0$ and I said "Like this is it, man."
$_0dd_0$ I pulled a knife

b. Another device used in codas is an incident in which one of the actors can be followed up to the present moment in actions that may not be totally relevant to the narrative sequence:

And you know that man who picked me out of the water?
he's a detective in Union City,

c. The effect of the narrative on the narrator may be extended to the present moment:

I was given the rest of the day off,
and ever since then I haven't seen the guy, 'cause I quit.
I quit, you know.
No more problems.

It is interesting to note that all codas are separated from the resolution by temporal juncture. At the same time, it seems that some semantic criterion is necessary to identify codas: The fact that they are frequently not descriptions of events, or of events necessary to answer the question: "What happened?"

The overall structure of the narratives that we have examined is not uniform; there are considerable differences in the degree of complexity, in the number of structural elements present, and how various functions are carried out. However, a composite view of narrative performance leads us to posit a *normal form* for oral versions of personal experience; the degree to which any one narrative approximates this normal form is a significant fact about that narrative – perhaps more significant than any other in terms of fulfilling the originating function of the narrative.

The normal form is quite distinct from the primary sequence of the narrative. As noted above, the need for an evaluation section motivates the transformation of the primary sequence into the more characteristic normal form that appears in the linear sequence presented by the narrator.

One can represent the normal form of narrative using the diagram in Figure 5. Here the originating function of the narrative is applied at the base of the diamond; we proceed up and to the left with the orientation section, then up to the apex with the complication. Frequently, but not always, the evaluation suspends the action at this apex, as represented by the circle. The resolution proceeds downward and to the right, and the coda is represented by the line that returns to the situation (point in time) at which the narrative was first elicited. The simplest possible narrative would consist of the single line of the complication,




Figure 5. The

without a clear resolution; frequently we find minimal narratives that have both complication and resolution ("He hit me hard and I hit him back"). As we proceed to more complex narratives, told by speakers with greater overall verbal ability. we find a higher percentage of narratives that duplicate the exact form of this diagram. Perhaps the most frequent variant is the case in which the evaluation ends the resolution: jokes, ghost stories, and surprise endings take this form. as the story is reshaped by many retellings.

Conclusion

This view of narrative structure helps us to answer the two questions raised at the beginning of this discussion. First, we have related the sequence of narrative elements to the inferred sequence of events in the experience that is being recapitulated, through the definitions of narrative units, restricted clause, free clause. and narrative clause. Secondly, we have outlined the principle elements of simple narratives that perform both referential and evaluative functions. We have shown that the evaluative function requires the transformation of the primary sequence. based on the a-then-b relation, into the more complex normal form of the narrative as presented by the narrator.

With this framework, we are beginning to analyze relative effectiveness and completeness of narrative structure among various subgroups of our population. and, furthermore, to analyze the more complex types of narration developed by skilled storytellers and preserved by oral tradition. It is clear that these conclusions are restricted to the speech communities that we have examined. This view of narrative structure will achieve greater significance when materials from radically different cultures are studied in the same way.

Acknowledgment

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Notes

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1. The materials include: 70 interviews with speakers from various occupations. ethnic membership, and ages on Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts; 230 interviews with speakers representing a stratified random sample of the Lower East Side of New York City; 250 interviews of children and adults from our current research in Central Harlem and 50 interviews from exploratory work in Cleveland, Boston, Philadelphia,

Chicago, Phoenix, and Beaufort County, South Carolina. The basic interview techniques are described in Labov (1964, 1966) and Labov, Cohen, and Robins (n.d.).

2. In our current research in Central Harlem, we are concerned with the functional conflicts between standard English and the nonstandard English of Black and Puerto Rican children. Many of these children show great verbal ability in many areas, including the construction of narratives, but cannot read at all. One purpose of this work on narrative analysis is to show how children use language to carry out the functions that are important in their system of values.
3. As in, "We were running, walking, and then creeping down the road." We might better say that an apparent appositive turns out to be a coordinated clause. Coordinate verbs are always analyzed separately if they are independent, and in most cases in which they are subordinated to verbs of saying and telling. See Narrative 2, which follows: "I said, 'You git back there/and get that duck.'" If the narrator had cited himself as saying, "You get that duck and get back there," he would have been reversing the inferred sequence of events – in this case, two utterances. The same argument holds for the example in Narrative 1 (cited previously), clauses n and o. On the other hand, if someone says: "You try and get it," we cannot understand these as two independent verbs, but rather the use of "and" is equivalent to an infinitive embedding, the same as "You try to get it."
4. As noted previously, the subordination of "get back there" and "get that duck" to "I said" is not the type of subordination that removes clauses from temporal sequence. We can consider this coordination: "I said, 'You git back there,' and I said, 'You get that duck.'"
5. If "was laying" is accepted as a narrative clause, it cannot have the basic grammatical meaning of "simultaneous" as stated by Diver (1963). It would rather differ from the simple past *lay* by the feature "extended." The meaning of "simultaneous" can be supported by arguing that these clauses are equivalent to "When we got back, she was laying . . ." In other cases, Diver pointed out, the use of the past progressive may force a metaphorical interpretation "the action was so swift that it was as if it was simultaneous with the preceding," as in "I was on the masthead; the ship gave a lurch; I was falling through the air; I hit the water." These and other interpretations can be subjected to an increasing number of empirical tests through the analysis of narratives such as the ones given here.
6. Diver (1963) showed this form in his narrative axis with the meaning of "present, before," and gives a constructed example: "All day the sun has warmed the Spanish steps . . . ." One can find such examples in literary works that use historical present sequences freely, perhaps, but they have not occurred in the material we have examined to date.
7. Here the usual adjustments in anaphoric reference have been made. It may be noted that this series of past perfect clauses is one answer to a difficult problem produced by a narrative of this type. The result would lose its surprising effect if these clauses were placed in narrative sequence with regular preterit verbs. By placing the three clauses well out of temporal sequence, it is more difficult for the listener to follow the explanation and surprise is achieved at the risk of a certain awkwardness and confusion. Again, we find that even partial success signals the fact that the narrator of Narrative 2 is a practiced storyteller and has probably told this story many times. We do not take narratives of this type as primary data.
8. As noted previously, Narrative 2 has many formal features that set it aside from the others and identify it as the product of a practiced storyteller. One can point to the embedding of an essentially anonymous "other" in the complicating action, frequent if traditional metaphor, the triple subcycle typical of [illegible]

repetition, and also the determination shown by the narrator in introducing the story. The preliminary material illustrates how a narrator of this sort will get the topic of his favorite stories into the conversation despite the fact that the original stimulus was only marginally relevant. The transition of the interview theme was accomplished solely by the subject, and the actual stimulus for the narrative was his own.

Despite the fact that features appear in this narrative that are distinct from the simpler examples, a formal analysis of Narrative 2 is possible only after consideration of the simpler narratives or, at least, a formal analysis based on such functional considerations as we have introduced.

9. The phrase "Nice big blue 44 too" might as well be considered a narrative clause, derived from "He had a nice big blue 44 too." However, the status of *had* as the head of a narrative clause is still at issue, and it would be tendentious to use a deleted form as evidence. We have therefore been treating this phrase as subordinated to "He came to my hotel," equivalent to "with a nice big blue 44 too."
10. The three evaluation sections of Narrative 1 raise the possibility that we can analyze this narrative as consisting of three distinct subcycles: that it is a complex narrative consisting of three structural units. This article is limited to the consideration of simple narratives, and this possibility must be postponed to a later study of subcycles and complex narratives.

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Gender, Discourse and Semiotics: The Politics of Parenthood Representations

Michelle M. Lazar

Introduction

The aim of this article[1] is to examine the politics at work in representations of parenthood in a national, government advertising campaign in Singapore. Although it is not uncommon these days to find egalitarian or **symmetrical** models of parenting in the media, this is not to say that the more traditional, **asymmetrical** division of labour between women and men in this domain has disappeared. The asymmetry may not be as blatant as it was decades ago, but as this study will show, it continues to thrive in sometimes less obvious and seemingly innocuous forms. The particular concern of this article is to examine the **coexistence** of both symmetrical and asymmetrical forms of representation of parenthood in the same ad or set of ads. The dynamics of the two will be analysed in terms of what I call the Discourse of Egalitarian Gender Relations and the Discourse of Conservative Gender Relations, respectively.

Representational practices are deeply political in at least three key ways. The first involves the question of **relative** representation and non-representation who is represented (or not) in what ways **in relation** to the other? Secondly, there is the issue of **modes** of representation – how is representation achieved textually? What linguistic and non-linguistic resources are deployed, and in what ways? The two points intersect with the third, which is an interrogation of the **power dynamics** at work – what does the representation/non-representation tell us about the (changing or unchanging) contemporary balance of power between, in this case, women and men in the domain of parenthood? Whose interests are served by it, and whose suppressed? Part of the interrogation of interests, in this study, inevitably includes the stake the state has in these representational practices, and the support (or otherwise) for particular orderings of gender relations.

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In what follows, I will begin by locating the present study in terms of the socio-political context of Singapore, and also in relation to previous work that I have undertaken in this area. This is followed by a discussion on the view of 'discourse' adopted in the study, and a case for the inclusion of multisemiotic analysis in the study of discourse. In the succeeding section, I will present the analysis of the two apparently contending discourses of gender relations (the Egalitarian Discourse and the Conservative Discourse) in the advertising campaign in question, which I refer to as the 'Family Life' ads.[2] In the campaign, approximately 14 of the ads deal with representations of parenthood;[3] a brief description of these is outlined in the Appendix. I will conclude by summarizing the findings of the analysis, and suggesting that far from being straightforward, the Conservative/Egalitarian distinction itself is in need of problematization.

The Study in Context

The present study is part of a larger project on a critical discourse analysis of gender (and sexuality) in Singapore's Family Life advertising campaign that I have undertaken over several years. This campaign arose from the changed, pronatalist fertility policy actively pursued by the government of Singapore since the 1980s. At that time the government had become concerned with the rapid decline in the country's birth rate, both in terms of the 'quantity' of births (i.e. nationally), as well as with the 'quality' of births (i.e. the better-educated segment of the population, in particular, were reported as markedly under-reproducing). Amongst the various measures undertaken in order to rectify the situation was the inception of the national, multi-media 'Family Life' advertising campaign. It needs to be said that the launching of such a campaign in itself is quite unremarkable in the Singapore context, which may be dubbed a 'campaign country'. Historically, since the present leadership came to power 41 years ago, an assortment of national campaigns have been utilized as regulative instruments in the service of social engineering. The present campaign under study is no exception.

The 'Family Life' campaign is a two-pronged endeavour: one half of the programme is targeted at single women and men, encouraging them to get married. and another, concurrent, half is addressed to those already married, urging them to have babies soon. In an earlier paper to *Discourse & Society* (1993), I had dealt in part, with the 'first' half of the campaign. In the present paper, my focus is on the 'second' part, in which I am specifically interested to ask what it means in these ads for women and for men to become parents, and what are the power dynamics at work in and through these representations.

In order to appreciate the workings of the Egalitarian and Conservative Discourses of Gender Relations that are co-present in the 'Family Life' ads (and, as we shall see, the complexity of their inter-relationship), it is necessary first to consider why it is that childbearing had become generally unpopular in Singapore, thus precipitating the inception of this national campaign. Apart from the effectiveness of the previous (now defunct) Family Planning or Limitation campaign, which had extolled the benefits of a small family, the practice of having

fewer children had become symptomatic of a coping strategy employed by many Singaporean women who were in the paid labour force. This is perhaps best understood in terms of what Bernard (1972) has described as the transition from the 'One Role Ideology' to the 'Two Role Ideology' (cited in Quah, 1994: 189). According to the 'One Role Ideology', women's roles were exclusively those of childbearing, childrearing and housekeeping. In the case of the 'Two Role Ideology', women's roles were extended to include paid work outside the home in addition to their original domestic responsibilities. In the 1960s and 1970s, when the government had urged large numbers of women to enter and stay in the paid workforce, many Singaporean women found themselves at grips with the 'Two Role Ideology'. The change occurring for women in regard to the public sphere, however, was not matched by concomitant changes in gender roles and expectations in the (distinctly separated) private sphere where housework and childcare were concerned. Optionally, some men have helped out in the home, but it has been just that – 'helping out' or 'lending a hand', which in itself is deemed praiseworthy. There is nothing remarkable, however, when women perform daily domestic chores and care for children – in addition to working outside the home – for that is considered 'women's work' anyway. With little restructuring of the gender order, this means that women in paid employment have come to hold two equally demanding jobs. Commenting to *The Straits Times* (Singapore's main daily), one (female) academic summed up the impact this has had on women:

> Anyone who has attempted to hold two jobs will understand why the key terms recurring again and again in women's letters to the press are 'exhaustion', 'guilt', 'conflict', 'burden', and 'tired[ness]'. They will also see why so many women try to curtail one job or the other – by dropping out of the work force or having only one child. (Heng, 1983)

In fact, some women have opted for childless marriages. Figures have shown that since 1980, the proportion of all ever-married women with no children had risen by a third, to 12 percent, in 1990 (Liak, 1994: 56). The majority, who would like to have children, have tended to postpone childbearing, or space out the birth of their children over a wider period (Fawcett and Khoo, 1980, reported in Hill and Lian, 1995: 150), and they generally have small-sized families. The number of births per woman, moreover, correlated directly with her educational attainment, which caused much consternation to Singapore's eugenic-minded leaders: they were worried that the better-educated class of women, whom they saw as having superior or more intelligent genes, were not reproducing sufficiently. There has also been a noted discrepancy between the numbers of children this class of women are generally willing to have compared to men of a similar educational background. In a relatively recent government survey, it was found that whilst most female tertiary graduates only wanted two children, most male graduates wanted three. The difference was explained by the fact that 'women were aware of the heavy responsibilities in the dual roles of being mothers and career women' (*The Straits Times*, 21 April 1997).

The double bind that has confronted women is not only asymmetrically apportioned at the level of private interaction between women and men, but is

underscored by various public policies and practices of the state (see Lazar, in press). Women are granted (almost) the same access to educational and employment opportunities as men, and are much needed for their economic productivity. However, at the same time, a range of state policies hold sacrosanct traditional, Confucian–Asian values that support men's position as heads of households,[4] and unequivocally emphasize women's reproductive and nurturing roles as mothers. Whilst women are urged to remain economically active, their maternal roles are prioritized for them, as the following rhetorical question by the former Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, makes amply clear: 'Do our women need to value their careers more than, and at the expense of, their families?' (*The Straits Times*, 19 February 1984).

Discourse and Semiotics

Discourse(s)

'Discourse' is here understood in Foucauldian terms to mean a set of related statements that produce and structure a particular order of reality, and which within that reality makes available specific subject positions. In this vein, I find it useful to think of discourse as a socio-historically contingent 'meaning potential' – to borrow a Hallidayan terminology – that both enables and constrains possible ways of knowing about the world, a sense of who we may (and may not be) within that world order, and how we may (and may not) relate to one another. In the domain of parenthood, this means that there is nothing inherently fixed about the identities of 'mother' and 'father', or in the way gender relations between them have tended to be structured. Rather, these are socially formed and fixed in and through discourse. We perceive these relations and identities in certain ways (say, motherhood as 'natural' and fatherhood as 'social') as a result of conventional ways in which the societies we live in have come to express and think about them. What is fixed, therefore, can be analytically un-fixed or dismantled. That is to say, discourses (and the realities and subjectivities that they make available) can be taken apart in such a way as to reveal that they are not immanent truths, but rather are constructed that way from particular positions that serve particular interests, whilst subordinating others.

In this study, I analyse the interplay of two discourses of gender relations that operate in the domain of parenthood: a **dominant** Discourse of Conservative Gender Relations, and a **counter** Discourse of Egalitarian Gender Relations. Both underscore the **relational** aspect of gender construction, that is, ways of being a 'woman' and a 'man' (or, as is the case in this study, 'mother' and 'father') are always explicitly or implicitly co-constructed one in relation to the other. The two discourses, however, structure this relationship in different, indeed (potentially) contradictory, ways. The difference is one of parity; specifically, whether possibilities for ways of being and becoming are equally available and interchangeable between women and men. The Conservative Discourse deriving

from a Confucian–Asian ethic favours a traditional, asymmetrical arrangement between the genders, whereby women and men each have gender-specific roles, responsibilities and expectations to fulfil. The Egalitarian Discourse, in contrast, which is motivated in part by feminism, strives for gender parity in all aspects of personal and public life. At stake in the two discourses is the balance of power between women and men as they enact their respective parental (and other, careerist) identities.

Bridging Discourse and Semiotics

A valuable insight worth importing into CDA from Foucault is that discourse is not equivalent to language use alone. In his view, discursive **statements** are not reduced to sentences and propositions, as is the usual understanding of the term 'statements' in linguistics. Indeed, discursive statements are not units or structures (in the way, say, that sentences are), but a **function** (or meaning) that operates as much through language as through other semiotic modalities. In other words, graphs, maps, classificatory tables, statistical calculations and algebraic formulae (Foucault, 1972) are as much forms of discursive statement as is language.

Extending from this conception of discourse, 'text' can be viewed as the multi-semiotic manifestation of discoursal meaning(s). Typically, however, many studies have tended to conflate 'discourse' with 'language' and therefore, by analysing only linguistic structures and meanings in texts, have had a restricted scope. And if images (for example) are also discussed, they have been considered separate from 'text' – a term which, like 'discourse', is reserved only for linguistic phenomena. What I propose, therefore, is the uncoupling of the two categories 'discourse' and 'language' in favour of discourse encompassing semiosis of various kinds (including language). A critical analysis of discourse, in other words, involves a commitment to the analysis of various strands of semiosis that configure in the realization of particular discoursal meanings in texts. The present study will demonstrate, for instance, how the interplay of language and visual images (including layout, gestures and actions) contributes to the manifestation of the two contending discourses of gender relations in the 'Family Life' texts. Not to attend concurrently to both modes of semiosis, in this case, would be to offer a less than complete analysis of discourse (Lazar, 1999).

Analysing Discourse

Discourse is analysable in terms of a set of representations that express a particular discoursal meaning (e.g. Conservatism or Egalitarianism). To give an example, part of the Discourse of Egalitarian Gender Relations in the 'Family Life' ads can be analysed in terms of particular representations of gender identities: the 'New Man' and the 'New Woman'. The aim of the analysis is to show up these various representations, singly and in constellation with others, which evidence the operation of a particular discourse in the text(s). This being the aim, the starting point of the analysis will be to identify types of representation articulated in

the ads, supported by an amalgam of textual structures and processes that cue these representations. The explication of textual resources involves the **interplay** of several categories of textual structure (be that linguistic, non-linguistic, or linguistic **and** non-linguistic) that work in tandem to manifest a particular type of representation.

In order to analyse the linguistic and visual structures in the texts I use the grammars of Halliday (1994), and Kress and van Leeuwen (1996), respectively. The various aspects of the grammars will be drawn upon in different degrees in the study. As many will know, Halliday's functional grammar is based on a view of language as simultaneously involved in three kinds of meaning-making:

- Ideational (representing the world 'out there' and our inner states – analysable in terms of participant types, processes, and circumstances).
- Interpersonal (enacting social relationships between participants – analytic categories include types of mood and modality choices).
- Textual (making connections within the text, and the text and its social context – analytic categories include thematic and information structures, and cohesion).

The grammar is analysable at the ranks of word, group and phrase, and clause and clause complex (sentence).

The analysis of the images in the texts is based largely on the grammar of visual design developed by Kress and van Leeuwen, following Halliday's theory of triple meaning-making:

- Ideational meaning is of two types: (a) narrative, which includes dual participant ('transactional') or single participant ('non-transactional') action and reaction (or perceptual) structures, realized by vectors of various sorts; and (b) conceptual, which includes classificational ('type of') and analytical ('part-whole') structures.
- Interpersonal meaning includes, amongst others, contact (or mood) – realized by eye contact; and distance or social affinity – realized by frame size and types of shots.
- Textual meaning (or composition) includes such categories as salience – realized by relative size and sharpness of focus; and information value – realized by relative position (centre or margin) within a frame.

My use of the visual grammar is supplemented by insights selectively drawn from Goffman's work on gender in advertisements (1979).

Analysis of Parenthood in Discourses of Egalitarianism and Conservatism

In this section I begin by presenting the analysis of the Egalitarian Discourse of

Gender Relations in terms of the interplay of linguistic and visual resources deployed in the ads. The two discourses are co-present within single ads, as well as across the intertextual spread of the 14 ads in the campaign. The basic distinction between the two discourses, as previously indicated, is one of gender parity, i.e. whether there is an equitable access to possibilities for being. In modern industrial societies, the issue of gender parity largely rests on the possibilities, and the extent of negotiation, that are available to women and to men between the private and the public spheres of life (i.e. between the home/the family and paid work/career).

The Discourse of Egalitarian Gender Relations

The Discourse of Egalitarianism in the ads is identifiable in terms of three types of representation: (1) the representation of parenthood as symmetrical for women and men; (2) the depiction of men in the domestic sphere as devoted, nurturing fathers; and (3) the portrayal of women as mothers as well as successful careerists outside the home.

Women and men One way that egalitarianism between the genders is construed in the ads is through an invitation to view parenthood as being identical for women and men. In many instances, women and men are collectively referred to as joint participants. For example, in terms of lexical choice the gender-neutral noun *parents* or *parenthood* is overwhelmingly favoured (over the gender-specific terms 'mother'/'motherhood' and 'father'/'fatherhood'). And in terms of the choice of pronouns, we repeatedly find either the collective *our/we* or the indefinite pronoun *you* (depending on whether the ad is presented from the first or second person point of view). In either case, gender is again elided, and it appears to represent women and men alike, as constituting a single undifferentiated unit. For example:

(1) *It's the most precious gift **parents** can give* (Lonely Child).
(2) *Becoming **parents** changes **our** lives completely*... (Something Wonderful Happened).
(3) *As **you** gaze at **your** child, **you** will feel so proud to be **parents*** (Experience The Joy).
(4) *Understandably, **parenthood** is a big decision* (Experience The Joy).

As a corollary of being referred to as joint participants, we also find in the above clauses that women and men are represented as sharing a common experience. They are affected by parenthood in the same way, and appear to respond to it identically. The representation of egalitarianism expressed in the language structures, moreover, finds visual support in one of the (print) ads. In *Something Wonderful Happened*, the symmetry is striking on two counts. The couple are shown in a joint action process of pushing a baby stroller together, thereby showing that what they are doing is a joint endeavour. In addition, the couple are portrayed as distributed symmetrically across the picture space (i.e. they are at equal distance from each other, and are roughly equal in size and orientation), which according to Kress and van Leeuwen (1996: 88) expresses a 'covert taxonomic

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belong to the **same** category of 'parents', rather than being classified according to the differential and value-laden roles of 'father' and 'mother'.

Commenting on the now widespread use of such gender-neutral terms as 'parenting' and 'parenthood', some scholars (e.g. Busfield, 1987) have noted that two different but related assumptions underlie their usage. Both of these support the egalitarian thesis put forward in this paper. The first assumption is that gender relations are becoming more symmetrical (as analysed above), and the second assumption is that men are becoming more involved in the day-to-day care of their children – which is the focus of the next sub-section.

Men The Discourse of Egalitarianism in relation to parenthood is also articulated in terms of a construction that is widely known in gender and cultural studies as the 'New Man'. This is a type of masculinity that has gained popularity in the (mainly Western) media since the 1980s, in response to feminism's critique of traditional forms of masculinity. A significant dimension of the modern New Man is a caring, sensitive and nurturing depiction of fatherhood – an involvement that is a far cry from 'authoritarian' or 'distant breadwinner' (Pleck, 1987, cited in Chapman, 1988) images of fatherhood in the past. According to this new portrayal, men are very comfortable with infants and very young children, and are expressive of care and emotion, which traditionally were seen to be the prerogative of women and motherhood. Indeed, what makes the New Father a part of the egalitarian discourse of parenthood is its breaking down of gender stereotypes. As Rutherford (1988: 34) describes, the New Father 'looks soft and gentle and, what's more, he's not afraid to show it'. Somewhat ironically, therefore, the egalitarianism appears to be based on the feminization of men.

In the 'Family Life' ads, the New Father is especially strongly represented in interactions between men and their newborn babies. The portrayal is jointly realized by visual representational structures as well as in compositional structures. In terms of the visual representational structures, three characteristic features of tenderness and emotional bonding are evident: cradling, intently gazing, and sweetly smiling at the baby. Quite obviously, cradling is a transactional action structure whereby the man (Actor) carries the infant (the Goal) gently in his arms. At the same time, however, the cradling is also indicative of an analytical structure that represents a compound relationship between the man as Carrier and the baby as an Attribute, which is visually seen to be extension of him. Coupled with cradling, are the reactional structures of smiling and gazing upon the infant in his arms.

Compositional structures, further, frame these depictions in ways that heighten their emotional value. Close-up shots are especially deployed for this purpose. So, for example, a close-up in *Your Family is Your Future* focuses on the facial expression of a young father, who gazes lovingly and smiles almost tearfully at his infant. Also, in *Something Wonderful Happened*, there is a close-up shot of a large male hand holding the very small hand of a baby to the accompaniment of the following reiterated adjective in the lyrics *'tiny fingers, tiny toes'*. Emphasizing the contrast in the size of the two hands, and the gentleness of the touch, evokes a heart-tugging quality of the father's sensitivity vis-à-vis the baby's vulnerability.

The tender, nurturing role of the New Father in these representations approximates so much to stereotypical constructions of motherhood that in a family shot in *Your Family is Your Future*, there is a reversal in the positions occupied by the father and the mother in relation to their baby. In contrast to traditional representations of the mother carrying the baby and the father protectively wrapping his arm around her shoulders (Goffman (1979) calls these 'shoulder-holds'), in this particular ad, it is the father who is shown cradling the baby, with the mother's arm around him.

The Sensitive New Man is constructed not only visually, but also linguistically:

(1) And *it was only then, as I took her [the baby] into my arms for the very first time and looked down into her tiny, perfect face that I realised my whole life had changed.* (Your Family is Your Future, TV)
(2) They're *[My children are] my life and my future.*
They are my hope, my strength.
The reason I can carry on. (Collage Ad, TV)

In these extracts we find an emotional response to the experience of fatherhood. (The first example from *Your Family is Your Future* is the verbal equivalent of the visual structures earlier analysed). They are both expressed from the first person point of view (*I, my*) and stress (via repetition of *my life*) that the lives of these men are profoundly affected by children (note die material processes: *had changed* and *(can) carry on*). Whereas the impact is succinctly encapsulated in the first of these ads via premodification (*my **whole** life*), this is elaborated over a series of identifying relational processes in the second ad, in which the father identifies himself wholly with his children.

More generally, too, many of the ads show men to be highly visible and actively involved in family life. Apart from representations of men as Actors in the visual structures of these ads, the men are also depicted in analytical terms. To take just one example, in the (TV) ad *Why Build Your Career Alone?* we are presented with various snapshots of a father playing a board game with his family, sitting alongside and watching his son do school work, and sitting with his family gathered around him. In all of these scenes, the man together with the other characters are represented as parts that make up 'the (whole) family'. Such a representation invites an interpretation of egalitarian gender relations, for here is a man who is portrayed as very much involved, and part of the everyday family scene.

Women Whilst men in the Discourse of Egalitarian Gender Relations are represented as involved participants in the domestic sphere, women in this discourse are shown as participants not only in the private but also in the public work space as well. This is a depiction of the modern 'New Woman', as opposed to traditional images of women as full-time caregivers at home. In two of the ads, *Make Room For Love* (TV) and *Babies and Careers* (Print), it is suggested that women can have a career and be successful at it, whilst also fulfilling familial roles. In *Make Room for Love*, this is conveyed in the depiction of 'Mrs Tan', a senior, newly retired career woman. Two pertinent aspects of her identity are revealed in the following congratulatory utterance by a younger (former) colleague: *You had a wonderful career, Mrs Tan.* The clause neatly brings together the woman's dual participation

in the public and private spheres: she is represented as Carrier both in terms of a career (and note the epithet *wonderful* to describe it) and in terms of marital status, indicated by the title *Mrs*. Later in the ad, Mrs Tan is also called *mom* and *granny* by another woman (her daughter) and two youngsters (her grandchildren), respectively, who enter the scene. 'Wife', 'mother', and 'grandmother' all belong within a common semantic field of familial identities attributed to this career woman. In other words, she is offered in the ad as an example of a woman who has had it all – a marriage, a family, and a successful career.

If the portrayal of Mrs Tan – someone of an earlier generation – appears optimistic, then the following declaration in *Babies and Careers* by a 29-year-old woman (the age group of the target audience) is even more heartening: *It's now easier to be successful in both [a career and motherhood]*. The choice of declarative mood together with categorical modality renders the proposition a simple undisputed statement of fact. These, plus the time indicators – *now* and *easier* (a comparative reference presumably being made to an earlier generation) – construe a 'reality' that purportedly reflects current, more enlightened times.

The Discourse of Conservative Gender Relations

Although thus far we have seen a discourse at work that promotes a symmetrical and egalitarian gender order, there is a concurrent overwhelming presence of the Discourse of Conservatism that maintains gender asymmetry in the ads. In what follows, I analyse the gender asymmetry in the construction of parenthood on two levels: (1) the systematically divergent roles performed by women and men within the domestic sphere itself, and (2) the different ways in which women and men may negotiate their respective parental identities **between** the private and public spheres of life. I shall first present the two-level 'asymmetry analysis' in regard to fathers, followed by the analysis concerning mothers. A discussion on the dynamics between the conservative and egalitarian discourses of gender relations will be undertaken in the concluding section of the paper.

Men

(A) Within the Private Sphere: In terms of the construal of the conservative discourse, let us now consider the (asymmetrical) representation of men's involvement in the private sphere. First of all, there appears to be a clear representation of gender role differentiation in the home front. Fathers are mainly depicted in executive (functional) roles, realized in transactional action structures. The role of the executor as Goffman (1979: 32) has noted, is typically performed by men and not women in representations where the two are co-present. To take an example, it is the fathers in the 'Family Life' ads who are consistently represented as the Actors operating such equipment as cameras and camcorders in family situations.[5] In *Something Wonderful Happened*, a young father uses a camcorder to 'record' images of his sleeping infant; in *Because That's Your Family*, the father sets up the camera and runs back to join his family in a self-timer shot; and in *Precious Moments*, the mother passes the camera over to the father to take a

photograph of their children playing together, instead of taking the photograph herself.

Fathers-as-executors extend to men's interactions with children. Fathers are commonly represented with sons, and in these interactions, men are shown in various ways directing their young sons in gendered play and behaviour. For instance, in *Because That's Your Family* (TV), the father is represented showing his son the mechanics behind the running of a toy train, and in *Kids Make You See* (TV), the father teaches his son to ride a bicycle. Even where the man is not in an active instructor or executor role (i.e. as Actor), we have a powerful representation in *Fam, Fam, Fam* (TV) of a boy learning gendered behaviour, nonetheless, from his father through observation and imitation. The father, shown leisurely reading the newspapers with his legs widely crossed, becomes the Phenomenon (or object) of his son's avid gaze, and his body posture and activity are directly replicated in the boy's subsequent actions. The boy's emulation (Phenomenon), in turn, does not go unnoticed by the father (Senser), who smiles approvingly to himself. In this way, the father is still shown very much in the executive role, only this time directing indirectly. Following Pleck (1987) (reported in Lupton and Barclay, 1997), who undertook a historical study of fatherhood in America, all these portrayals seem to support the more traditional, 'sex role model' type of fatherhood, which pre-dates the New Father.

Apart from the executor representation above, fatherhood (compared to motherhood) is largely construed in terms of fun and physical play. While the representation of men's involvement with children in this way is undeniable, it is asymmetrical in so far as gender roles and relations are concerned. Fun, play and popularity appear to be the prerogative of fatherhood and take centre-stage, whereas, as we shall see in the section on 'Women', support and routine care are largely left to motherhood, which is relegated to the periphery. Taking centrestage means that there is greater frequency in the portrayal of fathers' activities with children, and these appear saliently in relatively large shots (e.g. *Fam, Fam, Fam* (Print), and *Kids Make Your World Brand New* (Print)). Moreover, father–children interactions typically centre on leisure activities rather than on intensive day-to-day care-giving activities. This is indicative of differential understandings of care that apply to fathers as opposed to mothers: 'care', where fathers are concerned, is understood purely in terms of fun and relaxation. ('Care' and motherhood will be dealt with in the following section.)

The popular 'fun dad' representation is realized mainly through transactional action structures, In many instances, fathers are the Actors and their children are the Goal or Beneficiary[6] at or for whom the men's physically affectionate behaviour is directed. For example, a father is shown ruffling his son's hair, tickling and playing with him, nuzzling and kissing his children, and making funny faces at them (in *Kids Make Your World Brand New* (TV), *Kids Make You See* (TV), and *Fam, Fam, Fam* (TV)). In some instances, the roles are reversed, that is, fathers are the recipients and the children are the Actors. One such case is found in *Fam, Fam, Fam* (Print), where three young children (Actors) sitting on their parents' bed pillow-fight their dad (Goal), who good-naturedly receives the 'blows'

The playfulness of dads is also significant in portraying them as 'one of the kids', which accentuates their popular appeal. For example, in the same ad (*Fam, Fam, Fam*, TV), the father and children are united in their role as Actors, who conspire to 'steal' and eat cookies from the kitchen counter – cookies freshly baked by the children's mother. The representation of being 'one of the kids' is especially well expressed via a classificational (covert taxonomic) process. Preceding the cookie stealing shot, the father and children are identically represented as they place their heads one on top of the other, in a totem-pole fashion, forming a symmetrical vertical composition. As Kress and van Leeuwen (1996: 81) have observed, 'For participants to be put together in a syntagm which establishes a classification **means** that they [are] judged to be members of the same class and are to be read as such.'

It is important to bear in mind that representations of gender role differentiation – whether in terms of men's executive role or their 'fun daddy' role – are not simply about functional difference but, rather, are implicated in asymmetrical power relations. This is perhaps most striking in representations of fathers as heads-of-households. In *Why Build Your Career Alone?* (Print and TV) this is indicated by the central position occupied by the father in relation to members of his family. Such a shot demonstrates an exhaustive analytical structure, whereby the two adults and three children in this ad are parts (or 'Attributes') that altogether comprise 'the family' (the 'Carrier'). However, although the father is **one** member of the family (and one of **two** adults), he is represented as the most salient – literally the central – figure, flanked by his wife, who stands partially hidden behind him, and his children who encircle him in the front. Furthermore, other portrayals of him in relation to his family represent him as a Carrier himself, with members of his family represented as his Attributes. This interpretation of the analytical structures evokes a proprietal relationship, expressed by the man placing an arm around the shoulders of his family members. In one scene, he has an arm around the woman in the ad, which defines her in relation to him as **his** wife. and in another scene, the man has an arm around a little boy, which defines the child in relation to him as **his** son. Shoulder-holds[7] are a common enough gesture also found in other ads where men are represented with their family (for example. *Experience the Joy, Because That's Your Family*, and *Kids Make You See*).

What I have analysed so far in terms of the Discourse of Conservative Gender Relations are asymmetrical representations of men's roles in the family (i.e. in the private sphere) as (1) executors, (2) popular and fun dads, and (3) heads of households. In the next sub-section, I shall focus on how men are represented as being able to negotiate between their identity as fathers and their public work identity. *(B) The Public versus the Private:* In contrast to ads that address women, those directed at men construct a world in which men basically can have it all without significant tension. Three broad types of representation are found in the ads. which I will examine in turn: (1) the harmonious co-existence of a man's career with family life; (2) absenteeism of fathers on account of their careers as excusable: and (3) a family as beneficial to men's own self-interests.

First, in some ads family life and paid-work life are represented as co-existing harmoniously for men, that is, the identities of father and careerist are reconcilable without one compromising the other. The compatibility between the identities is enacted by bridging representations of men in the public and private worlds. The portrayal of men in the public world of work is signalled by the clothes they wear (long-sleeved shirts and ties),[8] i.e. men here are seen as Carriers whose professional identities are inscribed upon their bodies, and (optionally) also in terms of the representation of an office setting. Although the men, in these instances, are seen primarily in their professional capacity, their identity as fathers is quite easily co-enacted. This is explicitly the case in *Why Build Your Career Alone*? and *Fam, Fam, Fam*: the words *for dad* handwritten on a gift box and *dad* written in icing on a birthday cake, respectively, are displayed in the foreground. The men are shown in turn, via transactional actional or reactional structures, as claiming this identity. In *Why Build Your Career Alone*? (TV) the man is represented lifting the gift up from his office desk with a smile. In *Fam, Fam, Fam* the man, still in his office attire, is represented peering through the kitchen doorway of his home and being pleasantly surprised by a birthday cake being prepared for him by his family. The direction of his gaze forms a vector linking him (in his professional identity) to the cake with the words *Happy Birthday Dad* written on it.

Even where there are admissions that a man's career commitments may compete with his family role, this is rendered as expected and understandable. The following are two verbal examples from the *Collage Ad* (TV):

(1) even *though my work takes me away, when it comes to joy and dreams, my children are the key.*
(2) even *though my work takes me away, my children are my hope and joy supreme.*

The concessive (conjunctive) adjunct at the beginning of the clause complexes sets up a presupposition that men would be away on account of their career, and that this in itself is hardly surprising. Further, the choice of the material process attributes *my career* with an agency of its own, positioning the man himself as the unwitting Goal, haplessly 'taken away' from his family. The remainder of the clause complexes, moreover, appears to compensate the absenteeism by representations of effusive declarations of the importance of his children to him. Through the rhetorical strategy adopted in these clauses, absenteeism of fathers is accepted and forgiven, and not seen as a censure on men to better balance their twin roles. Further, the representations in the examples are one-sided: we are told of the effect children have on the father, but not the effect of his absence upon them. The latter is borne out by Phoenix and Woollett's (1991) observation that the existing literature on fatherhood rarely deals with the impact that fathers' frequent absences on account of their careers have on the development of their children.

Further to the representation of the unproblematic co-existence of family and career for men, men's careers are represented as positively enriched by family life. It is not only the case that, as we saw, fathers are showered with gifts and birthday

surprises from their family members, but that having a family is construed as positively benefiting their personal and career development. In two of the ads – *Why Build Your Career Alone*? and *Your Family* is *Your Future* – the family is portrayed in instrumental terms, as bringing about certain personal qualities deemed necessary for men's professional success. In the following clauses, the selection of material processes (in examples 1–4) and causative constructions (in examples 5–7) systematically represents family life as a helping, enabling agent, and men, on their part, as the recipients – the ones who stand to gain.

(1) *Family Life helps* (*Why Build Your Career Alone*? Print)
(2) *It also provides stability, encouragement and support* (*Why Build Your Career Alone*? Print)
(3) *It's broadened my horizon* (*Why Build Your Career Alone*? TV)
(4) *It gives you a direction, a purpose. And most of all, it gives you a future.* (*Your Family is Your Future* Print)
(5) *[. . .] a happy, well-rounded Family Life makes people wider in their outlook* (*Why Build Your Career Alone*? Print)
(6) *Family Life has made my life really good* (*Why Build Your Career Alone*? TV)
(7) *[It has] made me more stable, understanding and less selfish* (*Why Build Your Career Alone*? TV)

Men are also represented as active participants, but in clauses with mental processes. These convey men's response to the benefits they have received from having a family. The self-revelatory construals by means of the mental processes indicate the positive transformation family life has had on these men.

(1) *I've* ***learnt*** *a lot* (*Why Build Your Career Alone*? TV)
(2) *And it was only then, as I took her [the baby] into my arms for the very first time and looked down into her tiny perfect face that I* ***realised*** *my whole life had changed.* (*Your Family is Your Future* TV)

All these personal benefits accrued on account of having a family translates directly into men's professional success. Herein lies the instrumentality in men's involvement in family life; it enables the preservation and development of their own career interests. Nowhere is this raised so pointedly as in the ad *Why Build Your Career Alone*? (Print), where upon outlining the usefulness of family life (see examples of clauses above), the ad closes with the rhetorical question: *Isn't that what you need for a successful career*? The question presupposes that the answer is in the affirmative.

Another way that family life is construed as having an instrumental effect upon men's careers is that it is shown to imbue the pursuit of a career itself with greater, tangible meaning. Consider the following excerpt from *Your Family is Your Future* (TV):

Now for the first time, I seem to have a direction and a ***purpose*** (cl.7)
And *I know what I'd been working for all my life* (cl.8)
Not for money or status (cl.9)
I've been working for the future (cl.10)
And I know in my arms was the future (cl.11)

Here, by means of the conjunction 'and' (used twice), the instrumental link between family life and work life is established. On the first occasion (clauses 7 and 8), fruits of family life (*direction* and *purpose*) are causally linked (by *and*) to the realization of the significance behind the pursuit of a career. On the second occasion (clauses 10 and 11), the new realization concerning his career is tangibly reinforced in terms of the baby in his arms. The depiction of meaningfulness of one's career in this way, in fact, may be viewed in relation to what scholars such as Burgoyne (1987) have suggested about conventional styles of fatherhood, namely, that men tend to translate their new responsibilities as fathers in terms of an increased commitment to (paid) work.

Women

(A) Within the Private Sphere: In the preceding section, we noted that there were particular executive tasks in the family that almost certainly fell to men. Similarly, in this section, we shall see that most routine, practical care-giving tasks are reserved for women. What is most striking in the conservative discourse of gender relations is the way that motherhood is constructed as entailing total devotedness to others, whereas as we saw in the previous section, representations of fatherhood, to a large extent, looked to the preservation of the self-interest of men. In the final part of this section, we shall see how other-centeredness is also the operative principle behind the negotiation of the public and private spaces for women.

Firstly, let us consider the representation of women within the private sphere as mothers. By 'other-centeredness', I mean women's acute consciousness (or consideration) of their husbands and their children in the enactment of their motherhood identity. The implication to be drawn from this is that women derive self-fulfilment indirectly through the happiness and fulfilment of others.

Already, in the first instance of expecting a baby, women's experience of pregnancy and would-be-motherhood is defined almost entirely in relation to their husbands. Consider the following two scenes from the ad *Something Wonderful Happened*, where the would-be-mother is represented as responding directly to her husband's evident interest in having the baby. In the two scenes, the pregnant belly of the woman is the prime object of her husband's gaze and actions towards her. In the first scene, the husband's gaze is eye-level with his wife's abdomen as she emerges from a gynaecologist's office. The shot cuts to a close-up of the woman's face as she slowly meets her husband's gaze. Whereas his gaze is full of eager expectancy, her look is less certain, pensive, and searching. In other words, her own feelings and thoughts about having a child are unclear to us, but the fact that she locks eyes with him suggests a willingness to engage with him in terms of his evident interest.

The reactive (as opposed to the active or initiative) position of the woman in relation to her husband is also manifest in a later scene in the same ad. Triggered by her husband's action of leaning to keenly listen at her pregnant belly, the woman responds through a configuration of reciprocal transactional processes, whereby she looks and smiles at him (reactional processes) and kisses his forehead actional process). Whilst all those

about having the child is left unrepresented. What *is* represented, however, is her joy as a mother-to-be that is experienced on account of **his** paternal interest.

The only time a woman is represented as claiming motherhood as a self-determined choice occurs linguistically in *Babies and Careers: I want to be a mother. My life would be incomplete without kids of my own.* Notwithstanding the reason she gives for wanting children, she is represented here on her own terms, without reference to her husband. Clearly identified in the first person singular (possessive) pronoun, the woman is represented as the Senser, who desires motherhood, and explains the consequence that not having children would otherwise have on **her** life. However, one clause later, **her** wish gets subsumed within ***our*** wish, i.e. making sure that this is also what her husband wants:

> *We want someone else to make **our** lives complete. To finally make **us** a family and bring new meaning to **our** lives.*

The shift in pronoun from singular to plural, in other words, signals the similar sort of other-centeredness found in the representation of would-be-motherhood, as discussed earlier.

My point in earlier discussion is not that I find problematic representations of men being keen on fatherhood, or that women would want to consult their partners in parenthood. Such portrayals in themselves are fine; indeed, sharing and (men's) keen involvement, as we have seen earlier, make for an egalitarian model of parenting. My point, rather, is that whereas in these examples the experience of motherhood is directly defined vis-à-vis their husbands, the representation of fatherhood is relatively independent of their wives, since it only focuses on their own interaction with the children. Further, as I have shown in *Something Wonderful Happened*, the other-centeredness of women entails a submergence of their own dispositions on becoming mothers within their husbands' expressed desire for fatherhood. What may appear as a joint decision by couples to have children, therefore, may belie divergent and potentially conflicting views held by each party, and one party may be 'pressured' into having the baby. Burgoyne (1987) has found, for example, that men in partnerships with women who are highly career-oriented, or who wish to use commitment to parenthood as a means of cementing an insecure relationship, are more anxious to become parents than their partners, a situation which is borne out in the story-line of *Something Wonderful Happened*.[9] In the light of putting to work the principle of other-centeredness, I would argue that the 'pressure' placed on women may also be self-generated, thus obliging them to respond 'appropriately'.

Other-centeredness applies not only to wives' relationships with their husbands, but also to mothers' relationships with their children. In the 'Family Life' ads, one of the most powerful other-centred gestures mothers can express is to consider the interest of an only child by producing siblings for that child to grow up with. Consider the following extract from *Lonely Child* (TV):

> *You may give your child the best things money can buy* (cl. 1)
> *But the most precious gift of all is a brother or a sister* (cl. 2)
> *The most precious gift you can give your child is a brother or sister* (cl. 3)

What we find in the above is the construction of a 'giving' mother. A giving mother, by implication, is a Good Mother, someone who has the child's best interest at heart. The adversative conjunction in clause 2 suggests to mothers that they may be somewhat misguided, and directs them to choose what is set up as the ultimate thing that mothers can give to their only child. The full impact of the verbal text is best understood in the light of the visual portrayal of the child in the ad. In the visual image, in spite of being surrounded by toys of various kinds (cf. clause 1 above), the child is portrayed as aimless and miserable. The dissatisfaction of the child is conveyed in two concurrent grammatical structures: although the boy is in Actor position, holding a toy motor car in one hand, he is at the same time a Reactor in a non-transactional reactional process, who looks away from the immediate scene into the mid-distance. Similar to Goffman's 'licensed withdrawal', the child is physically present in the scene, yet mentally 'absent' from it. His sullen facial expression and listless body posture, moreover, suggest that he is not looking at anything in particular outside the picture frame, but is merely bored and unhappy. If the child is unhappy, the implication is that the mother has not been other-centred enough, not giving enough. In short, she has been a Bad Mother.

Clauses 2 and 3 in the extract (p. 389) are grounded, in this visual context, in which the onus is placed on mothers to ensure the happiness of the child by having another baby. From the point of view of the construction of other-centeredness in this discourse, this is a rather interesting expectation: women are encouraged to have more children – regardless of how they themselves might feel (cf. the discussion earlier in relation to men) – out of a sense of maternal duty towards their children. The onus on women is particularly emphatic in the print version of this ad: *But there's one precious gift, which only you can give – a brother or sister.* 'Only' accentuates the obligation women have as Good Mothers to keep their child happy by **giving** him or her a sibling. The final segment of the TV version of the ad concretely plays this out through the deployment of a transactional action process, whereby the mother, the Actor, gives a new-born baby, the Goal, over to the delighted boy, the Beneficiary.

Less dramatically, women are also represented in a range of gender-differentiated tasks that emphasize their other-directedness. Visually, this is manifested in transactional actional structures in which the mother is the Actor, and her family, the Goal or Beneficiary. For example, mothers are depicted towel-drying children's wet hair, baking cookies for the family, cheering and applauding children's efforts at tasks, getting children dressed and preparing them for public events, and taking care of children's safety at outings (*Fam, Fam, Fam* and *Because That's Your Family*). The gendered nature of the mundane care-giving tasks the mother performs is emphasized in contrast to what the father is shown doing at the same time, if co-present. To take one example from *Fam, Fam, Fam*, whilst the mother is represented as watching over the safety of her youngest son at the beach by holding on to his float, the father, although also represented as an Actor, is engaged in an activity entirely different in nature from the basic care-giving function performed by the mother. The father is shown enacting his 'popular dad' role by entertaining the child (and the child's siblings) by making funny faces at them.

The care function performed by mothers is not only different from the roles performed by fathers in the same settings, since mothers are also sidelined by the fathers' enactment of their 'fun daddy' role. Unlike the father, the mother is rarely the focus of the children's attention. Instead, she stands at the margin looking in at the bonding that goes on between the father and the children. The spectator role of the mother is realized by transactional reactional structures, where she is the Senser watching her husband, her children, and the interaction that transpires between those two, without being included in their activities. The implication is that women derive happiness indirectly through witnessing the happiness of others. Further, her own care-giving function (e.g. holding on to the boy's safety float) is **subsumed** within the father's interaction with the children. The implication is that the type of care performed by women taken for granted as something mothers do 'naturally', and is therefore quite unremarkable. Feminist scholars (e.g. Ann Oakley, 1974) have long criticized assumptions about the naturalness of motherhood, and the construal of motherhood as being the greatest achievement of women's lives, since these contribute to the perpetuation of women's disadvantaged status in relation to men (Lupton and Barclay, 1997).

(B) Between Private and Public Spheres: Let us now look at the representation of women in terms of their negotiation between the public and private spheres of life. One of the heartening aspects of the egalitarian discourse, which we saw earlier in the article, was that in encouraging motherhood, the pursuit of a woman's career was not overlooked. However, further analysis shows that the negotiation of the public in relation to the private spheres is remarkably dissimilar for women and for men. Whereas for men, the representation was that the two spheres are entirely compatible, for women, the relationship is fraught with tension. In the following examples from *Babies and Careers*, the two spheres of life are set up as co-existing contentiously, through a set of presuppositions.

(1) *I'm really excited about parenthood, but I also love my job.*
(2) *Babies and Careers. Who says you can't have both?*
(3) *How will you divide your time between the kids, housework, and the office?*

In Example 1, the use of the adversative conjunction sets up a presupposition that the two interests are conflictual. In Example 2, such a question can only be asked based on the presupposition that according to some discoursal point of view, it is inconceivable or problematic for women to have babies as well as a career outside the home. A further presupposition that arises from this is that (as in Example 1) babies and careers are incompatibly matched. The asking of the question in Example 3 also conveys presuppositions, namely that it is an extremely difficult juggling act, and that the need for time management between her public and private roles is a concern that is unique to her alone as a woman (since no indication is given of sharing the tasks with a partner). Note also the order of the list presented: *the kids* come first and *the office* comes last, suggesting an implied order of priority prescribed for women.

The fact that these utterances are even made suggests that women's experience of having a family and a career is markedly different to men's. The assumptions that underlie each of these examples are absent in the representation of men in relation to their career and family life. Nowhere is it questioned, though, why the tension should exist for women and not for men. Since men, as we have seen, can have it both ways without any problems, the issue clearly is not that one's public and private identities are inherently irreconcilable. Rather, what is at issue in these representations is the asymmetrical assumptions and expectations in regard to gender.

In constructing a world in which, for women, the twin pursuits of a career and a family are deemed problematic, the solution offered to women (and only women) is to self-regulate the two carefully; to strike a balance. Note the reiteration of this concern:

(1) *Oh, I'm sure you'll do very well, Lin. But do* ***balance*** *your career with a family.* (*Make Room For Love,* TV)
(2) *One of my major concerns right now is* ***balancing*** *family and career. But I have friends who have shown me that it can be done. A lot of Singaporean women are making that choice, too.* (*Babies and Careers*)
(3) *And along the way,* ***balancing*** *what's best by making the right choices and practical decisions.* (*Babies and Careers*)

The need for balance, furthermore, is represented in terms of choices and decisions that women are obliged to make. This is found in Examples 2 and 3 above. Also, it is found in *Make Room For Love* (TV): *There are choices we make today that we'll be living with for the rest of our lives.* In these three examples, note the reiteration of the word *choice* as well as the transitivity structures, in which women are represented as the Actors who (need to) make those choices. Further, note that *choice* in this conservative discourse does not connote freedom or the availability of a range of options. On the contrary, it suggests that women are **not** at liberty to pursue a career and a family anyway they like, but are constrained to select very particular options – which, according to Example 3 above, are deemed to be ***the right choices.***

Why is striking a balance and making the right choice so important when it comes to women? What is this 'right' choice? As we shall see, to balance a career and family does not mean giving the two equal weightage. Rather, it is tipped in favour of fulfilling the family role. Indeed as the analysis of the ad *Too Old* will show, the juggling act is construed as necessary in order to ensure that a woman's maternal role is accomplished. In other words, women's identity as mothers is prioritized for them as their primary identity. The cornerstone of motherhood is other-centeredness, and in the Discourse of Conservative Gender Relations, this is something that needs safeguarding. Thus, a career associated with self-fulfilment and self-directedness is regulated in relation to women's prioritized, other centered maternal identity. The regulation is achieved via two threats or sanctions on women: (1) the inability to bear (more) children as they get older, and; (2) the implication this has for women as deficient or Bad Mothers. These sanctions both

draw upon and reinforce the social disapproval of 'late motherhood'. Let us take each of the sanctions in turn.

The threat of inability to bear children is explicitly presented in the ad *Too Old*. The following is an excerpt from the print version of the ad:

> *Because while you're busy building your career* (cl.9), *or saving for your dream home* (cl. 10), *Mother Nature just won't wait* (cl.11).
> *The older you get* (cl. 12), *the more difficult it can be to conceive* (cl. 13).
> *You may find pregnancy a whole lot tougher* (cl. 14).
> *And the risk of something going wrong increases* (cl. 15).

Note that there is an implied causal relation here that is established linking a woman's career building (thematic clause 9) to her getting older (thematic clause 12). The ramifications of this are built up through a combination of lexical choices in clauses 13–15. The words *more difficult, tougher* and *risk* – accentuated by the comparatives (in the first two instances) and by the verb *increases* (that follows *risk*) – portray a consistently bleak, problematic scenario. Such an outcome, moreover, is constructed as inevitable, based on (the personified) representation of *Mother Nature* as an Actor following her own natural course. The threat of a reduced childbearing capability foregrounds the reproductive function of women, and uses that as a 'natural' justification for getting women (and, therefore, not men) to keep their careerist motivation in check. Further, the scare tactic employed here through an appeal to a (pseudo-)medical perspective on later motherhood ignores a host of other contending, liberatory views on the subject. These include advances made in obstetric knowledge; the fact that in previous generations women continued to have children until later in life; that in many respects women (in industrialized countries) are now healthier than ever; and the positive view taken by 'older' women themselves of becoming mothers after 40 (Woollett and Phoenix, 1991: 40, 220–1).

It is also the case that the threat of a diminishing childbearing capability is not represented in terms of how this would impact on women themselves, but on how it impacts on others in the family. Unlike representations of men and the family, therefore, the focus is once again fixed on other-centeredness. In *Too Old*, the inability to have children is not about the woman being childless, but about her not producing more than one child. And in this respect it is construed as a failure – **her** failure – to give her only son a sibling. Consequently, as we see in the following extract from the TV version of the ad, she is ascribed blame and guilt for depriving him of a brother or a sister. (The extract involves a boy of about six years old chatting with his friend, a girl.)

> Boy: [. . .] *And as for starting a family (14), mom and dad put that off for some more years. (15)*
> *And then they couldn't. (16)*
> Girl: *They had you, silly. (17)*
> Boy: *Eventually. (18) After a lot of trying. (19)*
> *But by that time, mom was getting so old. (20) The doctor said (21) it wasn't advisable to have any more children. (22)*

Girl: *That's awful! (25)*
Boy: *She was too old, you see. (26)*
[. . .]

The boy attributes blame for being an only child squarely on his mother: the demonstrative in clause 23 – ***That's why*** – refers to his mother being *too old* to have a safe pregnancy. Interestingly enough, although in clauses 14 and 15 he says that both his mother and father had delayed parenthood, when it comes to allocating blame, she alone is singled out. Note the shift from the co-ordinate structure *mom and dad* in clause 15 (and the third person plural in clauses 16 and 17) to the singular noun *mom* in clause 20. Subsequently all reference pronouns are in the third person singular feminine, whilst all traces of the father disappear. In this way, blame is asymmetrically apportioned. What is more, according to conservative discourses of mothering prevalent in developmental psychology, mother-blaming appears to be justified. Woollett and Phoenix (1991: 216) explain that studies in the field make an expressed link between mothers and children, such that mothers are held directly 'responsible' for the ways in which their children develop and behave. According to this reasoning, then, the loud complaining of the boy in *Too Old* is not seen as a reflection on him but as symptomatic of his mother's deficiency as a 'Good Mother'. Therefore, when she is blamed, this happens because she has 'asked for it'.

Conclusions

In this article I have suggested a view of discourse-as-meaning-potential that is jointly realised by (though not limited to) linguistic and visual structures and strategies. By arguing for the co-presence of two discourses of gender relations in the domain of parenthood in the ads, therefore, we have two sets of socio-historically contingent meaning potentials at work at the same time. This is indicative of the contemporary social order that Singapore finds itself in as it negotiates between competing forces of traditionalism (hence, the Discourse of Conservative Gender Relations) and modernism (hence, the Discourse of Egalitarian Gender Relations). The question I now want to address in this section is how the negotiation between the two discourses is accomplished in the text(s). Before I do this, however, let me recapitulate the analyses undertaken of the two discourses.

The Two Discourses in a Nutshell

In the Egalitarian Discourse, we saw the representation of identical parenting expressed gender-neutrally in such terms as 'parent' and 'parenthood'); the construction of the sensitive New Man, and the portrayal of the New Woman as someone who has career commitments outside the home. By contrast, we found that in the Conservative Discourse the relationships between the public and private spheres, and the involvement within the private sphere itself, were structured in markedly dissimilar ways for men and for women. In the home front, men

depicted as all fun and play. Moreover, there was no significant tension between their identity as fathers and their professional identity at work. The two were represented as coexisting well, absenteeism on account of their careers was excused, and family life was shown to enhance their self-interest.

A different picture emerged in the representation of women as mothers. Women were constantly encouraged to be other-centred, to the extent of their own self-effacement. In the private sphere, their experience of motherhood was defined in relation to the concerns of their husbands and children, and they performed gender-differentiated tasks that put the others in the centre, occupying a marginal and vicarious role themselves. We also saw that where a career was concerned, this was represented as causing tension, and that women were advised to strike a balance between a career and their families. The 'balance', too, was construed unequally, in favour of prioritizing women's family role, with the underlying threat that they might otherwise face personal and social censure.

The principle that underpinned the analysis of the two discourses was **relationality**, namely, how women and men were represented in relation to each other.[10] In so far as the Egalitarian Discourse was concerned, there was an evening out in terms of representations of gender responsibilities and expectations. The New Man and the New Woman representations, for example, worked in tandem to redress gender stereotypes; fathers had a strong presence in the home front, which has been traditionally the preserve of women, whilst women were portrayed as 'working mothers', disrupting the association of motherhood solely with the private sphere. In so far as the Conservative Discourse was concerned, the asymmetries in representation came into stark relief only when we looked through the lens of gender relationality. If the representations of motherhood and fatherhood are considered in isolation, these in and of themselves may not be faulted. However, where relationality becomes the interpretive principle in the analysis, this changes the complexion on matters. The question that gains prominence is how men are systematically represented in ways that women are not, and how women are systematically represented in ways that men are not. In other words, the politics of representation is one of relative presences as well as of relative absences that are organized along gendered lines. This is fundamentally an issue of power, since possibilities for ways of being (or not being) are unequally available to men and to women, and the inequity benefits one party at the expense of the other.

The Dynamics between the Two Discourses

What is the dynamic **between** the two discourses of gender relations in the Family Life ads? How are the two apparently dissonant discourses co-articulated in the same campaign without jeopardizing an overall sense of coherence? After all this is a strategic ad campaign launched by the Singapore government with very specific social and demographic goals and intended outcomes.

The two discourses, I would argue, are 'managed' in the ads via an implicit strategy of **disproportionate coexistence**. By this I mean that although certain egalitarian values may be present in the ads they are overwhelmed by a prevailing

conservative discourse that is simultaneously at work in the same ads, and which, as a result, renders the egalitarian virtues non-threatening. Further, I would argue that the 'brand' of egalitarianism supported in the ads is itself far from subversive. That is, it does not seriously undermine or challenge the conservative project, which is why the co-existence is even possible. It is an egalitarianism which can be accommodated and/or displaced by conservatism.

In the light of this, it is worth revisiting the three representations of egalitarianism discussed originally. Firstly, the neutering or de-gendering in the use of such terms as 'parent' and 'parenthood' requires scrutiny. At first sight, it suggests symmetry and the mutual sharing of roles and responsibilities. However, as we have seen, in the light of the predominant conservative discourse of gender relations, the apparent neutrality actually glosses over the unequal, gendered work that continues much as before. Further, the notion of sharedness is a tricky one. It encourages a view of gender role complementarity, whereby the functions performed by fathers and mothers are deemed 'different but equal'. Such a view, however, is deeply problematic in that it overlooks the structural arrangements in society that support not just dissimilarity, but a rigidly dichotomous and hierarchical gender order. In other words, we may critically ask what exactly is meant by 'sharing', what and how much is shared, and what this sharing entails for women and for men.

Secondly, it has to be stated that the New Man is not a subversive construction. Scholars in gender and cultural studies have pointed to the disjuncture between the media rhetoric of the New Man and men's actual contributions to childcare in reality. This is no different in the present study. Whilst images of fathers' interest and enjoyment of their children in the ads are heart-warming, there is little evidence to show that there is a significant redistribution of practical childcare responsibilities between fathers and mothers. Moreover, in the light of what I have shown in terms of men's negotiations between the private and public spheres, the New Man or New Father can easily be assimilated within the Conservative Discourse of Gender Relations. The New Man is not an antithesis of conservative masculinity, but may be viewed as a hybridized form of masculinity[11] that gets the best of both worlds with little significant cost to men. I would call this a **politically correct (PC) masculinity**, which is geared to appeal to modern women without sacrificing the benefits that accrue to conservative masculinity. As we have seen from the analysis, fathers stand to gain personally and professionally even though their type of involvement in family life is rather limited. An added dimension of PC masculinity is that it is a class indicator. Griswold (1993) (cited in Lupton and Barclay, 1997), for example, argues that the New Man is a middle-class phenomenon, whereby this class of men are shown up as modern and 'enlightened', setting them apart from the crude and overtly sexist working class men. In the Singapore case, the class argument is construed more broadly to include educational class.

Finally, like the New Man, the New Woman represented in the ads is insufficiently threatening to the status quo. An important characteristic of the New Woman is that she wants a modern career. However, she is not a careerist alone; as we have seen, she is typically represented as someone who combines a career with a family. In other words, already in the first [illegible]

the New Woman is grounded obligatorily, in part, in motherhood. (It is in the light of the conservative discourse that it becomes clearer that this part of her identity is unequivocally prioritized for her as her core identity.) Further, the depiction of the New Woman itself as a careerist-cum-mother is inherently problematic, in that it is based on rather dubious assumptions. Recall the following example from the egalitarian discourse that read: *It's now easier to be successful in both [a paid career and motherhood]* (Babies and Careers). *'Easier'* presupposes that at some point in time it had been 'easy' for women to balance the two, and that it has now become even easier.[12] However, one may challenge that premise by asking: has it ever been easy for women to manage the two jobs successfully? In leaving this unquestioned, however, I suggest that the New Woman construction blurs with that of a Superwoman. Far from being a liberating influence, this Superwoman assumption loads a further burden on to women. It presents them with an unrealistic ideal of 'having it all' unproblematically, and it denies the actual struggles experienced by countless women who are forced to cope with increasingly onerous private and public responsibilities. A very recent study by a sociologist in Singapore, in fact, reports that mothers who also worked outside the home struggled as a result of the high expectations placed upon them, as few duties in the home were shared between couples in dual-career families. (*The Sunday Times*, 18 September 1999). (Cf. Heng's quote on page 375; also recall the reasons earlier cited for Singaporean women's reluctance to become mothers. or to have fewer children.)

In sum, parenthood evidently means different things for fathers and for mothers. The analysis has shown that men have a lot to gain from becoming fathers. They have the option of being more, or less, involved in childcare; but either way, they are not tied definitively to this identity. An other-centered mothrehood, however, is a compulsory identity for women. It is an identity that has strategic importance for others: for children, for men/husbands, and for the state. It is little wonder that motherhood thus construed has long been considered by feminists as oppressive to women, for the needs of others are met at the expense of women's own desires, aspirations and empowerment (Koh and Wee. 1987; Lazar, 1993; Soin, 1996). A critical discourse analysis of media representations of parenthood, fatherhood and motherhood has shown how the disempowerment of women is discoursally maintained by the state in its efforts to boost national fertility rates. As we have seen, the discoursal mechanics are less than straightforward: although at first glance there appeared to be two contending threads of discourse running through the campaign, upon closer scrutiny. the two appear to be braided together. In other words, instead of providing a subversive (emancipatory) current, the discourse of egalitarianism is itself subverted (and deflected) by the discourse of conservatism.

Notes

1. An earlier version of this paper entitled 'Gender, Discourse and Semiotics: Asymmetrical Constructions of Parenthood' was first presented at a meeting on CDA at the University of Birmingham (UK), 6–7 April 1999.

2. I have named these the 'Family life' ads, based on the fact that the majority were produced by the Family Life Co-ordinating Unit specially set up under the Ministry of Finance.
3. Most of the 14 ads were produced in print and televisual media, which means that the total number of actual texts analysed is around 28.
4. Indeed, the original Women's Charter (1961) description of 'head of household', which had been gender-neutrally worded, was recently amended to ensure that only men could acquire the legal status of being the 'head of the household' and 'principal breadwinner' (Soin, 1996).
5. The depictions support an American study cited in Goffman (1979), which reported that 'the male head of household used the camera most of the time' (Chalton, 1975: 94).
6. Kress and van Leeuwen's (1996) grammar does not have 'Beneficiary'. This is a category that I have imported from Halliday's analysis of transitivity structures.
7. The shoulder-hold, although appearing to be an affectionate gesture, is clearly asymmetrical (Goffman, 1979). It is also evident between men, where someone senior can put an arm around his junior, but not vice versa. An example of this can be found in the interaction between 'Peter' (the protagonist) and his younger male colleague in *Why Build Your Career Alone?* (TV).
8. In Hallidayan linguistic terms, this is an attributive relational process that is intensive, i.e., the attributes describe what the Carrier 'is'.
9. In the 'story' of *Something Wonderful Happened*, it is the husband who wants the couple to try for a baby, in order to salvage their ailing marriage. They had drifted apart on account of their respective busy careers.
10. The importance of relationality is reflected in the names given to the two discourses: Egalitarian Discourse of Gender **Relations**, and Conservative Discourse of Gender **Relations**.
11. See also Chapman (1988), who uses the term 'hybrid masculinity' to refer to an adapted form of masculinity that is better able to retain control in contemporary society.
12. Another reading of the clause may be that it used to be hard for women to balance their twin roles in the past, but that it has now become less difficult to do so. The point, however, remains that the ad glosses over answering another pertinent question, namely how this change has become possible. In keeping silent, the ad leaves unaddressed important social issues regarding the general stasis in gender relations in Singapore society.

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Appendix

The following is a list of print and televisual ads referred to in this paper, with a brief description on each ad.

1. *Make Room for Love.* Mrs Tan, a senior colleague, advises her younger female colleague on the importance of combining a career with a family.
2. *Why Build Your Career Alone?* Family life is represented as contributing to a man's career by providing him with invaluable support and stability.
3. *Precious Moments.* Snapshots are shown of three children (siblings) playing together, while their parents warmly look on.
4. *Lonely Child.* A miserable only child cheers up when his mother brings home a newborn baby – a sibling – for him.
5. *Experience The Joy.* Married couples are advised on the benefits of starting a family while they are still young.

6. *Fam, Fam, Fam.* A family is engaged in a number of leisure activities, with the father prominently portrayed in his 'fun daddy' role.
7. *Because That's Your Family.* On the pride and appreciation of two parents as their children surprise them in little ways.
8. *Your Family is Your Future.* As a young father holds his infant in his arms for the first time, he realizes that from then on his whole life will take on a new meaning.
9. *Kids Make Your World Brand New.* This presents a collection of photos of many different children, some on their own, others with a parent.
10. *Too Old.* A young boy complains to a friend that he has no siblings because his mother had given priority to developing her career.
11. *Kids Make You See.* A family represented as enjoying active leisure activities together.
12. *Babies and Careers.* The personal account of a young career woman, who describes her decision to become a mother.
13. *Something Wonderful Happened.* The birth of a baby helps to reunite an estranged young married couple.
14. *Collage Ad.* A special compilation of shots on fatherhood, selected from the full series of ads.

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Reconstructing Topical Sensitivity: Aspects of Face-Work in Talks between Midwives and Expectant Mothers

Per Linell and Margareta Bredmar

Sensitivity in Conversation

When people meet and talk about various topics, whether in institutional encounters or in the private spheres of everyday life, their communication is not a matter simply and only of efficient and rational information transfer about anything that might be present in their minds. Rather, speakers follow a rationality informed by moral choices: "all verbal behavior is governed by social norms specifying participant roles, rights and duties vis-à-vis each other, permissible topics, appropriate ways of speaking and ways of introducing information" (Gumperz, 1982, p. 165).

A *sensitive*, or interactionally *delicate*, topic may be defined as one that cannot be addressed directly or explicitly by the speaker without endangering the interactional harmony of the encounter by threatening the listener's face (and therefore also the speaker's own face). Sensitive topics are primarily those with "moral" implications, that is, they often touch upon interlocutors' responsibilities for leading their lives in good or bad, acceptable or blameworthy ways. The interactional treatment of morality and delicate topics have a strong affinity with issues of mutual face preservation discussed by Erving Goffman (e.g., 1955, 1959, 1983, p. 28). One can talk about both a positive face-need (to present oneself and to cast others as, e.g., competent and socially likeable) and a negative face-need (to want to be unimpeded). For example, if an expectant mother is invited to have an HIV test, there is an implied threat to her negative face both by the mere fact of the tests and by the impositions that would follow a positive test result.

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Brown and Levinson (1987), arguing largely along Goffmanian lines, pointed to the tension in interaction between the two opposed poles of *positive politeness* (being authentic, genuine, involved, immediate, sincere) and *negative politeness* (being considerate, tactful, respectful, discreet). Sensitive, potentially face-threatening topics generally cluster toward the latter, and have been found to be expressed in more indirect and implicit ways, with more deference and negative politeness, than topics that are more neutral with respect to moral implications. We use *indirectness* (of expression) as a cover term for various kinds of "expressive caution" (cf. Silverman, 1994a), defined as any type of deviation from a straightforward ("bald-on-record"), immediate (e.g., nondeferred), explicit, and unambiguous expression of the things and issues meant (including their implications).

In health care there are two major kinds of sensitive topics.[1] Both occur in maternal (prenatal) health care (MHC) talk and are well represented in our data. One category is lifestyle-implicating topics, that is, those that concern modes of living for which the addressee (normally the patient or client) can be held responsible. In our case, these are the topics of smoking and drinking habits, and sexually transmitted diseases. The other recurrent category of sensitive topics in health care contexts is those that relate to serious diseases and disabilities with strongly intimidating aspects, potentially affecting life and death. In our data, these are primarily issues concerning malformations of the fetus/baby, which, in turn, entail issues of serious moral choice, that is, abortion.

Topics such as sex, illness, and dying are difficult to address in ordinary conversation, and they were found to be sensitive also for participants in the institutional contexts of AIDS counseling sessions, as studied by Peräkylä and Silverman (Silverman & Peräkylä 1990; Peräkylä & Silverman, 1991; Peräkylä 1993; Silverman, 1994a, 1994b). We will see how such topics are dealt with in a seemingly much less threatening context, namely, that of routine visits by newly pregnant women to midwives working in primary (preventive) health care units.[2] We argue that the clinical frame may be seen as involving efforts to remove some of the moral concerns from the delicate topics, and yet the participants' actual handling of the topics as "sensitive" reinvokes the moral dimension all over again.

Data

Our data are drawn from a project on authentic encounters between midwives, who are qualified nurses working within preventive MHC units, and expectant mothers, who pay regular visits to these units. Preventive MHC is a service provided to pregnant women in Sweden. The purpose of this societal service is primarily to give personal and professional advice and assistance to women, but it naturally also affords health authorities with some opportunities to check and control progression and conduct during pregnancy. It is optional to take advantage of these communal MHC services, but a large majority of women (95% according to national statistics) do it.

At the time when our data were collected (in the years 1990–1993), a woman could see her midwife as many as 15 times during her pregnancy. (Recent cuts in Swedish maternal services have now brought the number down to about 10.) In our data, the first visit usually takes place in the 10th or 11th week of pregnancy, and involves a good deal of history-taking and information transfer by the midwife. This talk is commonly called the booking interview (Swedish: *inskrivningssamtal*). It is followed by a series of visits, the last one taking place a few weeks or a month after delivery. A couple of these appointments also include an examination by (and talk with) a doctor (either a specialized gynecologist or a general practitioner, the ordinary doctor of the primary health care clinic).

In our project, ethnographic fieldwork was conducted at nine MHC centers, and a large number of interviews with women clients and with midwives and other personnel were conducted. The core data, however, are the tape-recorded (and observed) midwife–pregnant woman encounters. There are two corpora of such data, one of which is used in this article. It consists of 30 booking interviews,[3] that is, the first encounters between the individual women and their midwives.

The booking interview serves to acquaint the expectant mother with the midwife and with the routines and norms of the MHC. The midwife takes in a considerable amount of information about each woman, and this information is entered on a form with preprinted slots. The midwife also communicates information about what is going to happen at different stages of a "normal" pregnancy, particularly with regard to what the different visits to the MHC center will involve. The client receives some printed brochures, and times are fixed for some of the future visits. The overall *phase structure* of the booking interview is as follows:

(a) Greetings
(b) M(idwife) asking W(oman) "how she is," and the ensuing (usually chit-chat type) conversation
(c) Information collection: M filling in W's case-book, posing specific questions, and then entering W's answers on the preprinted form
(d) Instructing W to call the hospital to fix a date for the upcoming ultrasound examination (to be done in Week 12)
(e) Taking W's blood pressure
(f) Informing about the AFP test[4]
(g) Informing about the routines (opening hours, working schedules) of the MHC center
(h) Talking about blood tests to be taken after the interview
(i) Agreeing on times for later visits to the MHC center
(j) Various issues (optionally brought up by W)
(k) Closing the session

The order of these subactivities may vary slightly. In particular, the talk on the blood tests (h) may sometimes occur earlier, after (d), (e), or (f).

The topics of the booking interview are largely agenda-bound, that is, they are predetermined, and many points correspond to items on the printed form. The

the predefined agenda will therefore provide a frame in which topics, which are sensitive by mundane standards, could be broached in a rather "mechanical" or "bureaucratic" way, along with other nonsensitive topics. We see that, nonetheless, they are treated differently from these other topics.

In our data, there are three different topics that are almost always brought up in the interviews and that may be candidates for sensitivity.[5] These are (1) a lifestyle issue, the woman's smoking and drinking habits; (2) tests for sexually transmitted diseases (syphilis, HIV); and (3) a "dreaded" issue implicated by the AFP test. The AFP test is used as an indicator of serious anomaly or malformation in the fetus, and this topic will then bring up the morally loaded issue of abortion. These three topics belong to rather different domains, and in the booking interviews they belong to different frames and contexts; in terms of the aforementioned phases, they occur in (c), (f), and (h), respectively. Accordingly, they exhibit both features that are common to all of them and other features that distinguish between them.

The Expression of Sensitivity

Analyses of conversational episodes pertaining to the three topics just mentioned yield an array of eight features of indirectness and mitigation, which we can interpret as signs of sensitivity. These features range from phonetic and prosodic features of delivery over various grammatical, lexical, and sequential properties of discourse to aspects of contextual embeddings. We now proceed to a systematic account of these observed features of indirectness, and illustrate them through the use of selected excerpts from the three domains. These features are pausing and other perturbations of delivery, reduction of topic prominence, deferral of topic introduction, limited depth of topic penetration, use of special (mitigating) vocabulary, restrained interactional style, use of neutralizing activity contexts, and use of neutralizing cognitive contexts (frames).

Pausing and Other Perturbations of Delivery

Pauses, especially if nondeliberate, may be characterized as a perturbation of a smooth delivery of information and argument. As is shown in the literature (Schegloff, 1980; Peräkylä, 1993; Weijts, Houtkoop, & Mullen, 1993), predelicate sequences often involve such features as hesitations (filled and unfilled pauses), abandoned utterance attempts and renewed turn beginnings, self-repairs, topicless introductory turns (*let's see then*), and so on. Such disfluency features also serve to delay the introduction of the delicate issues. In our data they are characteristic particularly of the syphilis and HIV episodes:

Example I[6] (Tema K:BU4: Episode on rubella[7]/syphilis/HIV; M = midwife, W = pregnant woman, in this case expecting her first child)
((*M returns to the printed form*))
1 M: ehrm (.) then let's see, (.) German measles. do you

3 W: no:, I haven't, but on the other hand [I am (.)
4 M: [mm vacc-]
5 W: of course vaccinated °right°
6 M: we must see to it that the vaccination has taken on
7 too
8 W: mm mm
9 M: (.) chrm you could stay away from hugging spotty
10 children °before°
11 W: *yeah. hh*=
12 M: =°we know° (.) this answer. (2.0) then we'll take (.)
13 a test, also a blood test (1.0) where one can see (.)
14 that (.) so that you haven't got syphilis
15 (.)
16 W: I see ((Swedish: *jaha*))
17 M: this, you see, is something we take **on everybody,**
18 (.) an' I haven't yet found anybody
19 W: *no:*=
20 M: =in all these years
21 (1.0)
22 M: HIV, (0.3) we will test.
23 W: mm
24 M: it's optional, d'you want to do that?
25 W: yes, it-- °it ca-°=
26 M: =(that) I take, you know, in the same **pricking when**
27 I now (.) when I do it on you, right?
28 W: mm
29 M: so it won't be anything (.) extra
30 W: ° no°
31 ((*M turns the page*, 3.0))
32 M: then I talked about ultrasound

In Example 1 the midwife informs the woman about three blood samples. We note that she uses the topic of the rubella test as an introduction to the whole block of tests for which she seeks W's consent.[8] When, in lines 12–14, she moves on to the syphilis test, she does not say, for example, straightforwardly "syphilis we will also test" (let alone, in analogy with lines 1–2, "syphilis, do you know if you have [had] that?"); instead, her approach is slow and stepwise, replete with pauses and with some repetitions. Such perturbations and signs of guardedness are quite typical, and distinguish the syphilis and HIV topics from the adjacent rubella topic. In this case, the word "HIV" is produced in the beginning of a turn (line 22), but it is surrounded by pauses and followed by some verbal material ("we will test").

In the following excerpt, the beginning of a fairly long episode on the AFP test, we see the midwife producing quite a lot of pauses:

Example 2 (TemaK: BUI: Episode on AFP: W expecting her first child)
((*previous topic: appointment dates*))
1 M: mm. (0.7) yes, then I thought I should inform you
2 [illegible] (0.5) in week sixteen, ( ) then you'll

4 (.)
5 W: yes.
6 M: and this blood test that will show then if one has
7 heightened values of (.) °alpha-fetoproteins, that
8 is a protein which is found° (.)
9 W: mm
10 M: °in the blood°. an' that can then, if one has too
11 much of it it CAN mean that there is something
12 (0.5) which is not well with the baby, °right°
13 W: °mm-hm°
14 M: an'(.) what above all you see then, that is those s-
15 (.) open spinal hernias
16 W: mm. (.) °mm°
17 M: one can then also, often in combination with this it
18 can be that they don't have (.) that much brain either
19 W: °°I see°°
20 M: plus hernias in (2.5) ehrm the abdominal wall, that
21 ehrm (1.5) the abdominal wall is not closed so to
22 speak, right
23 W: °mm°
24 M: but the bowels °so to speak°
25 W: °mm°
26 M: °come out like this°. and-ah (.) that is not that (.)
27 bad actually, you know, but it's only that it's good
28 to know about it.
29 W: °^yeah^°

Pauses, if consciously planned, may express cautiousness and guardedness in approaching the sensitive topic. Nondeliberate pausing, too, may indicate some resistance toward introducing face-threatening topical aspects directly. Both of course lead to deferring the direct expression of sensitive aspects.

In addition to pauses in introductory sequences, pauses typically occur just before and/or just after the keyterm, that is, the expression most unambiguously naming the sensitive topic (see Table 1). Although it is certainly commonplace that there is a hitch in speech delivery before keywords (speakers often seem to hesitate a little before finding or deciding on which word to use), pauses and hitches are particularly frequent and salient in our data, especially considering the fact that midwives are involved in carrying out routine activities. The prekeyterm pauses are perhaps more convincing evidence of the speaker's addressing the keyword as delicate than are postkeyterm pauses, which could be interactionally driven (solicitation of acknowledgment, reestablishing eye contact, etc.). Yet, a pause after the keyword(s) may also be heard as an attempt to let the intimidating information sink in. On this point, however, there seems to be a competing, partly opposed, strategy available, namely, to move on quickly without dwelling on the sensitive point (this is addressed further later). Virtually all the midwife's turns in Example 2 are replete with pauses. There are micropauses in the introduction (e.g., Example 2, lines 6–9) and some longer pauses in the "dreadful" description (Example 2, lines 20–22, 24, 26). Another significant feature is M's (apparently)

Table 1: Some properties of midwives' strategies for presenting some topics (incidence in percentages)

	Topics			
	AFP (n = 30)	Rubella (n = 21)	HIV (n = 30)	Syphilis (n = 19)
Pauses in introductory sequence[a]	27	24	27[b]	21
Pauses before or after keyterm[c]	23	10	63	58
Prekeyterm utterance segment[d]	70	52	87	63
Postkeyterm utterance segment[e]	50	57	60	74
Proxy topic[f]	100	76[g]	100	100
Quick retreat from topic[h]	47	24	90	95

[a]A sequence was positively coded if it contained at least two pauses (micropauses or longer).
[b]Note, however, that HIV and syphilis topics often do not have an introductory sequence of their own: they are introduced through the "safe" topic of the rubella test (see text).
[c]A sequence was positively coded if it contained at least one pause before or after the key expression.
[d]Any verbal material except hesitation markers like (Swedish equivalents of) *uh*, *ehrm*, and so forth.
[e]Compare Footnote d.
[f]This notion is explained in the text under "use of neutralizing cognitive contexts" (p. 369).
[g]In the remaining cases (24%). M asks directly about rubella or immunity against rubella.
[h]A quick retreat must not contain any additional remark on the topic.

Reduction of Prominence

One strategy for diminishing the face-threat of some topics seems to consist of reducing the perceptual or cognitive salience of their corresponding expressions. For example, lowering the volume to sotto voce, thereby perhaps also switching to another voice quality, may be a way of indicating the delicacy of a particular issue. We find it particularly in the AFP test episodes, when (some) midwives start to lead up to mentioning particular malformations (as in Example 2, lines 7–8, 10).

Another feature quite frequent in our data is that of syntactic embedding; the use of some verbal material before and/or after the particular delicate or threatening keyterm. To see this point, let us first introduce an example of an episode that is quite different in that it involves morally relatively neutral topics. Consider the following sequence from the dialogue accompanying the filling in of the form:

Example 3 (Tema K: BÄ5:6. Sequence from information collection by M; W expecting her first child)

1 M: >then I'll go through different diseases an'such.<
2 diabetes, you haven't got that, have you?
3 W: no.
4 M: urinary tract or kidney disease?

5	W:	no.
6	M:	epilepsy?
7	W:	°no°.
8	M:	°high blood pressure?°
9	W:	°no°
10		(.)
11	M:	heart disease?
12	W:	^no^
13	M:	lung disease?
14	W:	°no°
15	M:	any (.) gynecological disease or operation, that
16		you had, hadn't you?
17	W:	yes, there I had an operation ((*etc.*))

In contrast to the HIV episodes, the keyterm (usually a noun, explicitly identifying the topic) is here routinely introduced by M straight on (and it is, of course, taken as such from the printed form). In most cases, like in Example 3, the woman will give short negative answers, which receive no overt verbal responses from the midwife, who, instead, moves on quickly through the list of items, without much ado. The rubella, HIV, and syphilis tests are also three items that make up a small list (corresponding to a specific subsection on the printed form), and yet there is ample evidence that they are not treated in the same way. Typically, the keyterms HIV and syphilis do not come first in a turn (or even turn-constructional unit); they tend to be preceded, and/or followed by, other, often rather empty, verbal material. We saw this in Example 1. Example 4 shows something of the same:

Example 4 (Tema K: BU8: Episode on rubella/syphilis/HIV; W has children from before)
((*Previous topic: tallness and weight. W chats with her little child, M leafs through papers, clears her throat. No talk for about 15 seconds*))

1	M:	°°let's see her-°° °then we'll fill in these blood
2		tests we're gonna take.° then I guess they checked
3		up HIV last time you were pregnant?
4	W:	mm.
5	M:	but that's something one repeats.
6	W:	°yeah exactly°.
7	M:	you have nothing against that?
8	W:	no.
9	M:	in the same way we check up °syphilis too°.
10	W:	yes=
11	M:	=German measles on the other hand, that you were
12		immune against, so that's OK, you know
13	W:	mm
14	M:	so that we-- °we need not° (.) that you can't change
15		anything on that, right?
16	W:	°^no^°
		((*W talks to her child, pause for 7 seconds, then a new topic*))

This episode is a rather exceptional case in terms of its absence of pauses (but note M's local use of lowered volume; Example 4: lines 1–2, 9). Yet, rubella is again treated differently from HIV and syphilis. In this case, however, we have a woman whose immunity to rubella is known from her previous pregnancy, but HIV and syphilis are different and must be checked again. Note, though, how the rubella test is used as an exit, a means to retreat rather rapidly from the topic of testing for the sexually transmitted diseases.

There seem to be embeddings of sensitive material at several structural levels. At the level of turn-constructional units, we find the use of prekeyterm or postkeyterm utterance segments, which allow the speaker to avoid having the (threatening) keyword (usually a noun) stand out as the perceptually salient first or last word of the utterance. At a somewhat higher level, we find the use of a "safe" topic, the rubella test, used as an entrance (as in Example 1) and/or an exit (as in Example 4) to the topic of venereal diseases.[9] In the following we encounter other ways of embedding delicate topics in suitably neutral contexts.

Deferral of Introduction

Some of the aforementioned methods serve to defer the introduction of the sensitive topic. Another method to achieve deferral is the use of presequences (Schegloff, 1980; Heritage, 1984, pp. 265ff.):

Example 5		(TemaK: BÄ8: Episode on AFP test; W has children from before)
		(5.0)
1	M:	AFP, did you take that last time?
2	W:	no.
3	M:	what are you going to do this time?
4	W:	no, I think I'll stick to this.
5	M:	yes, but then I write abstains here.
6	W:	yeah.
7		(11.0)

In our data, presequences are characteristic primarily of the AFP topics; for instance, Example 2, line 1: "I thought I should inform you," and Example 5, line 1: "AFP, did you take that last time," and Example 6, line 1, following. The syphilis and HIV episodes may exhibit similar features (Example 4, line 1: "we'll fill in these blood tests we're gonna take"). The use of pre-acts, which we can see as a kind of sequential embedding (cf. the uses of syntactic embedding, discussed in the prior section), may serve the purpose of indicating the delicate character of that which is going to be introduced later on (Schegloff, 1980, pp. 131 ff.). Peräkylä (Silverman & Peräkylä, 1990, p. 308; Peräkylä, 1993, p. 303) observed this feature in counseling sessions.

Limited Depth of Penetration

If the sensitive topic is sometimes approached slowly, indirectly, or gradually,

midwife, soon start retreating. This is especially salient in the malformation/abortion issue. As we noted before, the AFP test is a major method in screening pregnant women for fetal anomalies, and it implicates serious moral considerations. However, if the midwife finds out that the woman knows about the test and knows what stance she will take, the midwife will invariably, as in Example 5, move on without any penetration of the topic at all, thus avoiding the implicated moral issue completely. Example 6 is just a little more explicit:

Example 6 (TemaK: BU10: Episode on AFP: W has children from before)

(4.0)

1 M: AFP, did you take that last time?
2 W: well, that I don't (know)
3 M: that was this thing with the chi[ld having] an open
4 W: [well that]
5 M: spinal [hernia]
6 W: [well] that I took (2.0) I probably took
7 all the tests, ((*laughter*))
8 M: (xx) yes, you did.
9 W: mm
10 M: that was good.
11 W: ^yeah^
12 M: the offer stands of course.
13 W: mm
14 M: and one doesn't take it until preg- the sixteenth
15 pregnancy week so there will be--
16 W: that I want to take (°anyway°)
17 M: mm
18 W: ^yeah^
19 M: (.) then you'll get a new appointment when you've
20 been to the doctor's check up
21 W: yes
22 M: so we'll take it in week so it's fairly important that
23 one takes it in week sixteen you know
24 W: mm
25 M: so that there won't--
26 W: ^yeah^
27 M: be any change on that.
((*new topic*))

In some cases, the AFP gives rise to a long episode. In Example 2 we saw the start of such an episode; Example 7 is almost a direct continuation of the sequence in Example 2:

Example 7 (TemaK: BU1; see Example 2)

32 M: hh. ehrm yeah, so that one has then an opportunity to
33 take such a test.
34 W: mm.
35 M: now I should of course also tell you that this is
36 of course terrible

37 W: it is, isn't it.
38 M: yes, it is, so that it is so to speak *nothing* which (.)
39 W: no
40 M: happens often, but it is terribly unusual
41 W: °yes exactly°
42 M: ^yes^. and it is completely optional if you want to take it.
43 (0.3)
44 W: whereabouts
45 M: hh
46 W: d'you take °it°?
47 M: it's a common blood sample that I (.) take here
48 ((*M shows where on her arm the sample is to be taken*))
49 W: take it here then.
50 M: mm=
51 W: =mm.
52 M: but one takes it in week sixteen.
53 W: m-hm
54 M: mm. (0.5) so you can then (.) read through this brochu-
55 or ehrm (.) slip at home then, and- ah (0.3) then you
56 can (.) tell me (.)
57 W: mm
58 M: when you come to the doctor then, if you want to take
59 the test °or not°.
60 W: °yes exactly°
61 M: mm. what I think perhaps is important that is I think
62 that one (.) goes one step further what do I do if I get a--
63 (.)
64 W: yes.
65 M: that one has so to say (.) thought it over a little bit, so
66 that one won't take a test that one actually doesn't hh
67 *want*
68 W: °mm°
69 (0.3)
70 M: to know, right
71 W: mm
72 (1.0)
73 M: so th- (.) but talk about it at home an'--
74 W: mm
75 (2.0)
76 M: then you'll see.
77 W: °°yes°°
78 M: ^mm^. that (brochure) you'll have (.) also then.
79 W: mm.
((*M goes on to leaf through papers, then a new topic*))

Whereas morally indifferent topics can be approached head-on, the topical episodes of morally sensitive topics are quite different. The co-text for the AFP test and its implied issues is tests and examinations that the MHC "offers." The footing is clearly that of information delivery, but such information could of

course be heard as a (delicate) way of providing advice. The strategy used by the midwife usually involves a preparatory action, "have you heard about AFP?" Only if this is met with a negative answer, or an answer indicating uncertainty, does the midwife go further into the issues. This naturally happens more often with women who have had babies before.

If we generalize across the AFP episodes of the whole corpus, we can discern an approach phase, a central phase, and a retreat phase. The approach phase is characterized by indirectness (in the sense of deferral). For example, preparatory sequences are common; metacommunicative pre-acts (Example 2, line 1: "I thought I should inform you about"; also, "I am going to ask you about"; "do you know anything about") are used to signal in advance that a certain topic will be broached, a certain type of sensitive question will be posed or sensitive information given, and so on. This gives the woman an opportunity to prepare herself, and it gives M (and W) a chance to withdraw promptly, if possible. In fact, midwives regularly take the chance not to go into the matter if the women say that they are familiar with the test and that they know what they want to do. Even if the woman is very laconic on the matter, the midwife accepts this without probing the issue (Example 5).

In most cases, the episode develops into a central phase, defined as the sequence in which parties get maximally close to the (sensitive) topic. In many cases the central phase is characterized by limited degrees of concreteness, precision, and depth of penetration. Often there are abstract and vague references and anonymizing strategies; the talk is temporarily at a general level, rather than addressed to the individual woman; compare the use of "one" (Swedish: *man*) rather than "you" (Swedish: *du*): "if one has heightened values" (Example 2, lines 6–7), "one can then also" (Example 2, line 17), "one has an opportunity" (Example 7, line 32). Ways of retreating from the sensitive parts are often hinted at, and, if possible, also exploited. In some cases, the dreadful aspects and moral implications are avoided altogether.

Accordingly, we can say that parties, led by the midwife, prefer to leave the central phase rather quickly and move into a retreat phase. The retreat can sometimes be very rapid, with M posing questions in forms that allow for short replies on the part of W. In other cases, however, when the intimidating topic has been penetrated, there is a need to neutralize negative and threatening aspects, if these have been brought up. This calls for a longer retreat. In Example 7, M takes some pains to assure W that the malformations are "terribly unusual" (Example 7, lines 36, 40).

The morally loaded issue dormant in the AFP episodes is of course that of a possible abortion (medical reasons for abortion becoming relevant if the test indicates increased levels of AFP). Although this issue is explicitly brought up in those cases in which the midwife goes into describing the possible malformations involved, it never happens that the midwife asks for a particular stance from the woman (at the stage of the booking interview), nor do the women ever overtly speak their minds on this point.

Compared to the AFP episodes, those on smoking and drinking exhibit a rather different form. Let us look at three cases of varying extension, Examples 8–10:

Example 8 (Tema K:BU5: Episode on smoking and drinking: W expecting her first child)
((*straight from previous topic, housing, no pause*))

1 M: d'you smoke?
2 W: °no°
3 (3.0)
4 M: ehrm (.) drink alcohol?
5 W: °no°
6 (.)
7 M: never?=
8 W: =°no°
9 (3.0)
((*new topic*))

Example 9 (Tema K: BM3: Episode on smoking and drinking: W has children from before)
(1.0)

1 M: well, an'then (.) d'you smoke by the way?
2 W: no
3 (0.5)
4 M: °your alcohol habits?°
5 W: well, they are *awfully moderate* ((*laughs*))
6 M: they are, yes.
7 W: *yes*
8 M: once in a while or--?
9 W: well, now that I am pregnant, then I am naturally
10 completely abstinent, of course
11 M: you are, right?
12 W: yes
13 M: mm. then I put down never then. an'you-- >we have
14 talked, haven't we, about your-- we talked about it
15 last time<
16 W: yes
17 M: >this thing about temporary abstinence and that
18 this< [that is so well worked into]
19 W: [yes it would nev-] it would never occur
20 to me
21 M: no, if you don't take (.) headache tablets ((*i.e., aspirins*))
22 W: no
23 M: then you shouldn't drink anything either
24 W: no
25 M: ((*M laughs*)) no (.) then that is fine.

Example 10 (Tema K: BM6: Episode on smoking: W expecting **her first child**)
((*previous topic: W's overweight*))

```
(2.0)
M:  °yes, that's it° °an'then°, d'you smoke?
W:  yes, unfortunately.
M:  about how much then?
    (.)
W:  °one package per day°
M:  °one package per day° (0.5) that was pretty much.
W:  °mm°=
M:  =mm
    (0.3)
W:  I've tried to reduce since I did my test at home then, but I
    I can't manage you see, I can't do it.
M:  mm. do you feel stressed from (.) feeling that now I must
    quit, or?
W:  yes, I do that too. (0.5) yes, it's it's hard, it feels hard
    'cause you know one (.) one knows, one has heard so much
M:  mm mm
W:  [if it isn't--
M:  [an'clearly,] =twenty cigarettes is (.) a whole lot, you know
W:  mm
    (0.3)
M:  so that (.) if you (.) tried--
    (0.3)
W:  yes, most (.) of all (.) I would of course want to be able
    to quit once [for all
M:               [completely straight] over, [yes
W:                                          [so I] mean
W:  I can't keep it (.) somewhere in between for
    [that I can't ma  ]nage
M:  [that you can feel]
W:  no, no, no, I know that it is like that, °actually°
    ((discussion goes on for about 30 more turns))
```

In Example 8, M introduces smoking bald-on-record whereas the midwives in Example 9 and Example 10 display a few features of indirectness. The question in Example 9, line 1, is embedded between "an' then" and "by the way." The use of "and (then)" prefacing in Example 9, line 1, and Example 10, line 1, indicates that the questions have a routine or agenda-based character (Heritage & Sorjonen, 1994), and this marking may somewhat contribute to diminishing moral implicativeness. We also note the lowered volume used in Example 9, line 4, and Example 10, line 1; it seems as if the midwife in Example 10 anticipates that the woman is a smoker (her voice quality may be a reliable symptom). The typical pattern of the smoking and drinking episodes, however, is that the midwife poses the basic questions rather straightforwardly, without any previous pauses

or other perturbations and without prekeyterm utterance segments; the keywords are taken directly from the form; "do you smoke?", "your alcohol habits?" (the latter typically in this elliptical form). If these questions receive clear "nos" from the woman, the topics are typically left without further comments; Example 8 is a case in point. If the woman hesitates just a little before answering "no," a few reminders by the midwife are usually forthcoming. In Example 9, the woman does not hesitate, but prefaces her response with a weak Swedish *ja* (here translated as "well" in Example 9, line 5) and then concedes that she drinks alcohol moderately, before she, after a follow-up question by the midwife, assures the midwife that she does not drink at all during her pregnancy (Example 9, lines 9–10). In such cases, the midwife would still mention the desirability of "temporary abstinence" (Example 9, line 17; using an abstract coinage that means, in literal translation, "point abstinence"; Swedish: *punktnykterhet*) and then leave the issue. In cases like Example 10, when the woman admits that she does smoke a number of cigarettes per day, or that she may drink a glass of wine now and then, a discussion usually evolves in which the midwife issues the "recommendations" by the MHC ("we issue a recommendation of temporary abstinence"; Swedish: *vi går ut och rekommenderar . . .*) and expresses some cautious moralizations. The general pattern of the episodes is this: *first* ask for information about W's habits, *then either* leave the topic (if W provides unambiguous, negative answers), *or* explain what the MHC wants.

Midwives are clearly aware that their recommendations imply an intrusion into private lifestyle. (On this point, one may compare recommendations on other non-lifestyle-related issues, such as the prescription of iron tonics, which, in our data, never involves any face-preserving measures on the part of midwives.) In some talks, the midwives explicitly mention that they are "aware that they cannot set limits" and that they do not want to evoke feelings of guilt with regard to (especially) smoking habits. So, if midwives try to educate and control, they do it in a mitigated manner.[10] The desiderata of the MHC with regard to women's conduct are often expressed in terms of mitigated recommendations, rather than straightforward requests. Thus, the force of prescriptions is downgraded; a recommendation of "temporary abstinence" is a fairly limited intrusion into the woman's lifestyle (midwives do not say "we think you should not drink at all").

Use of Special (Mitigating) Vocabulary

Other strategies for warding off face-threats and avoiding embarrassment include the use of vague or abstract expressions, circumscriptions and euphemisms, mitigators, attenuations, and various qualified "weak" expressions (cf. Drew, 1992, p. 503). Speakers often prefer such expressions to naming the things talked about bald-on-record. Rather than being indiscreet, speakers leave it to their addressees to draw conclusions about things meant and implied. For example, Macintyre (1982) mentioned gynecologists' use of initiations like "Let's have a look *down there*," and Weijts et al. (1993, pp. 304ff) found the same, as well as an excessive use of pronominal expressions in referring to sexual organs and activ-

particularly salient in the episode types considered in this article. Note however, abstract, and somewhat clumsy, coinages like "temporary (*point*) abstinence."[11] In asking about drinking habits, midwives regularly use the abstract noun "your alcohol habits?" rather than "do you drink anything?" which would have focused on the personal agent and her conduct more directly. In one case (not quoted here), in which the midwife first addresses the woman more personally on the matter, she immediately corrects herself, thus taking immediate measures to re-establish the anonymization.

Restrained Interactional Style

The two last paragraphs point to the role of vagueness and incompleteness of discourse on sensitive topics.[12] Another characteristic of the interactional style is the asymmetrical pattern, with the midwife providing information, without too much penetration, and the expectant mother responding, often rather minimally. This is actually quite noteworthy, because there are other episodes in the booking interviews where the two women interact in rather different ways.[13] Consider a spate of talk like Example 11, where the two women indulge in a more symmetrical exchange:

Example 11 (Tema K:BÄ5:4–5. Sequence preceding the information collection phase: W expecting her first child):

		(3.0)
1	M:	>(d'you think it's been) tough, this thing?<
2		(0.5)
3	W:	mm, very tough.
4	M:	yes, it's natural. ^yeah^
5	W:	mm
6	M:	yeah
7	W:	it was the third time, you know.
8	M:	yeah exactly.
9	W:	yeah=
10	M:	=^yeah^
11		(.)
12	W:	yes it was-- it was perhaps not so (.) tough the thing
13		itself uh (0.5) well, it was one got tired from the
14		treatment then
15	M:	mm
16	W:	but- uh (0.5) that waiting, then was I going to have
17		my period or--
18	M:	yeah exactly
19	W:	mm
20	M:	°I see°
21	W:	^yes^. (.) so, mentally it has been tough
22	M:	yes, it must be almost even tougher when one (.)
23		keeps trying anyway so to speak
24	W:	yes (0.3) ^yeah^. that's uh (2.5) no, it's been terrible,
25		I think ((*light laughter*))

27 W: so that was the last try, then I thought never anymore.
28 so that this third time I relaxed in some way, I was--
29 M: yes then [it--
30 W: [it must be as it may this time, that is (0.5)
31 I go just 'cause I (.) sh- [should do it]
32 M: [should do] it ((*laughs*))
33 yes yes, but it is kind of nice to have that attitude
34 for [it's a little–
35 W: [yeah, perhaps that's] why it--
36 M: it works, right?
37 W: yeah
38 M: ^yeah^
39 W: ^yeah^ °so that it--°
40 (0.5)
41 M: 'cause it's a terrible-- I think terribly much lies (0.3)
42 perh- terribly much but it can surely be terribly much
43 on the mental plane if
44 W: mm
45 M: how one succeeds
46 W: mm
47 M: and so on
48 W: mm. I think so too.
49 M: so that uh (.) yeah: (0.5) but it's nice
50 W: yeah
51 M: mm.
((*M starts asking about housing conditions*))

Note here features like the upgrading in second assessments (Example 11, lines 1, 3: "tough," "very tough"; lines 21, 22, 24: "tough," "even tougher," "terrible"), collaborative completion of turns (e.g., lines 35–36), overlapping turns (lines 29–35), shadowing (e.g., lines 31–32), and sequences of mere confirmations (lines 8–10, 37–39, 49–51). By contrast, in the case of morally delicate topics, the two interlocutors do not engage in lightheartedness and they seldom go into details.

Yet, along with paralinguistic strategies for mitigating face-threatening messages such as pausing, sotto voce, and perturbations of delivery, one might expect the use of laughter, which has often been shown to alleviate face-threats (cf. Jefferson, 1985; Adelswärd, 1989). Beck and Ragan (1992) found that patients and nurses often key their talk with laughter and jokes during actual gynecological examinations, and Aronsson and Rundström (1989) found doctors bracketing sensitive talk by using a joking mode when they issued lifestyle recommendations to child patients and their parents. Neither of these latter phenomena is common in our data, however.[14]

Use of Neutralizing Activity Contexts

Discourse cannot be understood without analyzing its contexts. Turning now to contextual resources, we note the following aspects of indirectness.[15] Under this

First of all, the *institutional encounter* itself is of course a particular type of context, partly clinical and medical in character, which makes it different from an everyday-life context. In part, the institutional context may be regarded as an environment created partially to make it possible to talk professionally about issues which are not naturally talked about in everyday life. On the other hand, midwives (and other [para]medical personnel) seem to try to create an informal atmosphere, so as to partially reconstruct a more everyday-life type of conversational frame. One may think of the communicative genre as one in which the midwife, together with her interlocutor, seek a compromise between a professional neutrality and a more conversation-like affiliative stance. In Fairclough's (1992, p. 205) terms, we can talk about the "conversationalization" of a type of institutional discourse.

Secondly, one may exploit *particular activity types* or *phases* in the encounters. For example, among conversational activities one may mention types of information collection being administered by the professional in going through a form. This generates a kind of highly constrained, routine-like interaction, in which specific questions are often posed in sequences of elliptical formulations that allow for short answers (cf. Example 3). With this specific kind of interactional footing, delicate issues might be smuggled into a "neutral" context (cf. Silverman & Peräkylä, 1990, p. 309). In our case, this is true of smoking and drinking, but not of HIV and syphilis.

Another strategy may be to exploit the specific footings of situations in which the medical professional pursues a *physical examination of* the patient. In this kind of situation, the patient has already been stripped of some of her personal integrity, and she is in fact often partly undressed, and the doctor or nurse may then insert a few pertinent questions and comments, as if it were in the background of the physical manipulations.[16] Our data for this article do not include any physical examinations, though, except for taking a patient's blood pressure (for other findings from the more comprehensive corpus, see Bredmar, in press).

A third, and somewhat related, strategy is simply to sneak in sensitive topics in phases that may be regarded as marginalized in the encounter as a whole. There is a tendency for the HIV and syphilis test topics to be relegated to inconspicuous phases, that is, rather late in the encounter, when, one may perhaps assume, all important things have already been dealt with. This squares well with the results of Weijts et al. (1993) on the topic of sex in gynecological consultations.

Use of Neutralizing Cognitive Contexts (Frames)

Under this rubric, we also find a number of different phenomena. Most of them concern the discursive *reframing of issues*, that is, one tends to bring up the delicate topics within frames that are not in themselves morally loaded. Thus, we observed how HIV and syphilis, in our data, are never talked about as diseases, let alone as morally implicative phenomena (cf. note 11). Instead, they are always topically framed as targets of blood tests. We could say that the topic of the tests stands proxy for the more delicate topic (accordingly, the term *proxy topic*). The issue of anomalies and potential abortion is obligatorily introduced through the practical

Another strategy in the discourse is the deployment of anonymization ("we," "the MHC"); compare what Drew and Heritage (1992, p. 30) termed "the self-referring *we* [used] to invoke an institutional over a personal identity." A related strategy in our data is the invocation of routines, that is, practices applied to everybody (although the individual woman may decline to take the tests involved). In our data, a sensitive issue is sometimes framed as if it were of no concern for the individual woman, and instead something forced upon the individuals by the need to check the state of health in the Swedish population. A characteristic feature of Example 1 is the midwife's immediate comment (line 17) that the test "is something we take on everybody." Thus, the testing has nothing to do with any suspicion in the specific case (cf. also Example 1, lines 13–14, cast with the negative presumption: "a blood test where one can see that you haven't got syphilis").

Three Sensitive Domains: Similarities and Differences

The three types of sensitive topics are different in fundamental respects. The smoking and drinking topic is concerned with a lifestyle, which the woman, and indirectly the MHC, can influence, and hence it becomes rational to discuss appropriate conduct during pregnancy. The syphilis and HIV topics are also potentially lifestyle-related, but little can be changed here, at least not within the scope of the current pregnancy. The topical complex of fetal anomalies and possible abortion implied by the talk on the AFP test does not involve lifestyle issues; we are faced with something for which the individual cannot be held responsible. On the other hand, these topics involve a rather frightening future perspective and lead to the morally loaded question of what decision the woman would take on the issue of abortion.

There are also other premises and conditions that distinguish the discursive treatment of the three topics. The context for the smoking and drinking issue is a rather early phase in the conversation, in which the midwife goes through the case-book, that is, there is a printed form to be filled in. The syphilis and HIV episode, on the other hand, sometimes occurs in a late phase of the encounter, as if it was some insignificant matter that the midwife had forgotten to deal with before. It is related to the form (the consent by the woman to take the tests is entered there) and is always introduced in the frame of obligatory tests to be taken.

These differences lead to distinct ways of managing the topics in the dialogues. The major patterns can be summarized as in Table 2. Briefly, we can say that the topics of smoking and drinking are characterized by an immediate approach, a mitigating vocabulary, and a limited depth of penetration. The latter aspects are what indicates sensitivity. The bald-on-record approach may have to do with the fact that the issues involved are routinely raised in many types of health care talk these days. By contrast, HIV and syphilis are not talked about in most doctor consultations, and here they are introduced through a reframing and

Table 2: Typical patterns of indirectness and mitigation and their incidence in three kinds of sensitive topics in midwife–pregnant woman talks

	Smoke/Drink	HIV/Syph	AFP (Malf/Abortion)
Reduced volume	no	yes/no	yes
Pausing	no	yes	yes/no
Perturbations of delivery	no	yes	yes/no
Syntactic embedding	no	yes	yes/no
Presequences	no	yes/no	yes
Limited depth of penetration	yes	yes	yes[a]
Mitigating vocabulary	yes	no	yes/no
Elliptic Q–A sequence	yes	no	no
Inconspicuous phase	no	yes	no
Practical reframing (proxy topic)	no	yes	yes
Anonymization	yes	yes	yes/no

[a]Limited depth of penetration occurs whenever possible, that is, when the woman says she knows about the test.

delayed approach. The same is true of the issue of malformation and possible abortion. There, the presence of presequences is particularly noteworthy.

There are additional common features. With respect to morally loaded aspects, there is a general preference for avoidance, a reluctance to detail accounts or to penetrate issues. The issues are anonymized; they are talked about as handled by the MHC in general, rather than by the midwife herself. Downgrading also applies to some descriptions ("it is very unusual" about anomalies, thus reducing the range of applicability of the description). Peräkylä (1993) likewise found counselors generalizing and anonymizing descriptions and prescriptions, and mitigating the applicability of dreadful descriptions (upgrading their conditionality: "if it were to happen . . ."). At the same time, such similarities may conceal differences. For example, mitigations have a rather different meaning in prescribing lifestyle as compared to estimating the likelihood of a birth defect.

Moral aspects are also typically recontextualized by the institution. Rather than being couched as moral in nature, they are framed as issues of what is medically appropriate. Sometimes, the medical aspects too are backgrounded, in favor of practical aspects. This pattern is perhaps most clearly shown in the case of the AFP test and its background and implications. The course of progression is nearly always this:

1. First *practical* aspects: information about how and when blood tests are taken.
2. Then *medical* aspects: describing the anomalies that may be indicated by heightened levels of AFP.
3. Last *moral* aspects: the dilemma of deciding on abortion is explained. This order may be a natural and logical one, but it is still a significant fact that the moral issues are backgrounded, deferred, and never brought to a climax.

Conclusion

Sensitivity in conversation has been treated in terms of tact (Leech, 1983), face-threats and politeness strategies (Brown & Levinson, 1987), sequential properties of structurally dispreferred responses (especially within Conversation Analysis), and so on. Here we relate it to moral implicativeness, and we take indirectness to be its overt expression. Sensitivity is therefore related both to accountability (what the speaker can be held accountable, or responsible, for; Buttny, 1993) and reportability (what topics can be freely reported on, or not).

Indirectness has been shown to have many different shapes. Many of them can be understood in terms of the speaker's *distancing* himself/herself and his/her interlocutor from the delicate or "dangerous" issues involved. For example, sensitive topics are often gradually approached, only partially penetrated, and quickly retreated from in many episodes. Given that speakers may be said to have several voices or identities available (Bakhtin, 1986; Wertsch, 1991), anonymization may be understood as the speaker's attempt to not speak in his/her personal identity (rather, the midwife is the representative of the MHC system), and to speak as if the topic did not directly concern the individual other (anonymization, Peräkylä's "universalistic approach," 1993, p. 305). Other means to distance oneself from one's own and the other's person include the collective construction of depersonalizing situations with less conversation-like footings, for example, those involving the use of technology or the manipulation of the body.

Another possibility of distancing oneself from sensitive topics lies in the exploitation of the participation framework of a multiparty encounter. For obvious reasons this is not available in a dyadic situation like ours. However, Aronsson (Aronsson & Rundström, 1989; Aronsson, 1991) has shown, in studies of pediatric consultations featuring a doctor, an allergic child, and his/her parent, how physicians may address sensitive topics to the child when they are actually targeted at the parent.[17] Peräkylä's studies of participation framework in his AIDS counseling session data showed that a counseling team could avoid addressing delicate questions to the client directly in basically two different ways. Either the co-counselor could request the main counselor to ask the client a sensitive question, thereby relieving the main counselor of the burden to act as principal and author (in Goffman's, 1981, terminology) of the sensitive question. Another possibility sometimes used was for the counselor to ask the co-client, a close relation accompanying the client (a spouse or a girl/boy friend) first to tell her/his views on topics dealing with the (HIV-positive) client's experience; only then was the latter himself addressed on the same issue (Peräkylä & Silverman, 1991).

One way of neutralizing sensitivity is to reconstruct it within new frames or contexts (cf. Peräkylä, 1993, p. 306). As we have argued, the establishment of institutional contexts may be taken to function as a means to provide opportunities for talking about sensitive issues in neutral contexts, with neutral professionals having no personal interests involved. One aspect of the treatment of moral issues in such contexts is their recontextualization (and reinterpretation) in the direction of a framing of practical, administrative, or technical considerations. For example, Adelswärd (in press) described this "de-moralization" in interviews with conscientious objectors, and modern judicial procedures exhibit

the same phenomena (Linell & Jönsson, 1991). A similar tendency can be seen in the present data, for example, in reconstructing sensitive issues in terms of medical appropriateness ("temporary abstinence"), practical business (taking blood samples), and so forth.

The institutional context in our recorded talks involves several features that seem to warrant a more neutral treatment of sensitive issues. Yet, the actual performance shows that the issues are still sensitive, with (it seems) their moral implications lurking below the surface. Indeed, the exploitation of some of the specific contextual features just referred to contribute to making the issues stand out as special, that is, as delicate or sensitive. Parties try partly to avoid the morally loaded aspects, and in doing just that, that is, exhibiting partial avoidance, they reconstruct the moral loadedness. Bergmann (1992), in his study of "veiled morality" in psychiatric interviews, made a similar point with respect to vagueness; if the psychiatrist describes an event in an indirect and vague way, he/she makes the event "embarrassing, delicate, morally dubious" (1992, p. 154) precisely by speaking about it in this indirect way. In a similar vein, Schegloff (1980, p. 143) noted in the discursive treatment of delicate issues that it is "not so much a matter of 'masking the delicateness' as of 'doing masking of the delicateness', which is not masking at all." In our case, the institutional contexts seem to be arranged in order to recontextualize issues as nonsensitive, and yet parties reconstruct topics as sensitive in and through their conversational conduct.[18] Sensitivity becomes both a precondition for and a product of indirectness in discourse.

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Notes

1. Not all sensitive aspects in discourse are exclusively topical in nature. Some are more endogenous to the discursive interaction as such, in the sense that certain moves or illocutionary actions may be face-threatening in themselves. For example, orders, inquisitive questions, or threats and other imposing moves are often interpersonally delicate, apart from the fact that their topics are often sensitive too. At a general level, Linell and Rommetveit (in press) talked about "discourse-internal ethics" as an intrinsic moral dimension of human discursive interaction.
2. Politeness strategies in health care encounters were treated by Aronsson and Larsson (1987), and Larsson (e.g., Larsson, Johanson, Säljö, & Svärdsudd, in press) described in later studies how lifestyle issues, relating particularly to smoking and drinking, tend to be talked about in indirect, vague, or incomplete ways. Aronsson and Rundström (1989) pointed to the use of pauses, hedges, diminutions, and other

indirectness types in doctors' presequencing of lifestyle critiques and potentially face-threatening advice. Weijts et al. (1993) described the exercise of "expressive caution" (Silverman, 1994a), represented by delays, avoidances, and depersonalizations, in talk on sexuality during gynecological consultations. Conversational strategies to approach morally implicative issues in health care were also treated in Heritage's studies of health visitors (Heritage & Sefi, 1992; Heritage & Lindström, in press).

3. We disregard here the fact that a prior telephone contact occurred in some cases. Also, some of the women had met their midwives during one or several previous pregnancies. The 30 booking interviews are divided among 10 "young" women (ages 17–24), 10 "middle-range" women (ages 25–32), and 10 "older" women (over age 32). Eight of these were first-time mothers, the other 22 had delivered at least one child before (and had also gone to a MHC center before). The other data corpus is longitudinal; 13 women were followed through pregnancy, and in each case six encounters were observed and tape-recorded. These 13 women were all expecting their first child, so the total number of primigravidae in the entire corpus was 21. Six different midwives appeared in the 43 booking interviews.

   The whole project deals with how the participants construct, or reconstruct, views of the pregnancy, the projected childbirth and the circumstances connected with these events, and how these topics and understandings are differently talked into being in the course of the progressing pregnancy. Issues like solidarity talk between women (in spite of the institutional environment), the role of medical technology as a resource for promoting understanding, and the prevalence of the notion of normality in these talks are treated in other studies. For a full documentation of the entire corpus, see Bredmar (in press).
4. Alpha-fetoprotein (AFP) is produced by the fetal liver and is passed via the amniotic fluid through the placenta into the mother's blood circulation, where it can be measured. The maternal serum AFP screening is not in itself a diagnostic test. Other tests (ultrasound, amniocentesis) are used to diagnose suspected fetal anomalies (see Katz Rothman, 1993, p. 236).
5. Other sensitive topics may occur in individual talks, for example, cases of prior abortions, previous problematic deliveries and their circumstances, and issues of malformation and abortion may sometimes surface in other contexts than the AFP test. Likewise, information about problematic marital life or social networks may occasionally make topics like residence and housing conditions (an obligatory topic) morally delicate. However, these types only occur in a few isolated cases.
6. Excerpts are close English translations of Swedish originals. We use standard transcription conventions (such as brackets for overlapping speech, ° ° for *sotto voce* speech, and (.) for a micropause), but note also the following points:

   underscore = marks (the stressed syllabic nucleus of) a focally stressed word
   * * = laughter in the speaker's voice while pronouncing the words enclosed
   >< = accelerated tempo (relative to surrounding talk)
   ^ ^ = words pronounced on in-breath
   -- = utterance fades out, usually with a prosody indicating that the speaker leaves it unfinished
7. The Swedish lay term for "rubella" is *röda hund*, which is consistently used in the talks. A literal translation of the term would be "red dog." It is translated here by "German measles."
8. These tests formed part of the screening procedures undertaken on pregnant women when our investigation was carried out. In the last phase of our data collection, syphilis

9. The rubella test as an entrance is, not surprisingly, more common with first-time mothers (nth-time mothers are usually known to be immune), but the correlations between discursive strategies and first-/nth-time pregnancy seem otherwise less pronounced in our data than could be expected a priori.
10. In general, our results on this point corroborate those of other researchers, for example, Larsson et al. (1994, in press), who have found that topics like smoking and drinking (and sex-related issues) are usually touched upon only superficially, in spite of their potential importance in primary health care.
11. The discursive treatment of HIV and syphilis (in our data) do not seem to involve euphemisms or mitigated substitutions, but note that both words (HIV, syphilis) are rather clinical in nature. Sex is never mentioned in the episodes involved. Note also that midwives almost invariably talk about "HIV" or "HIV positiveness"; only exceptionally do they mention "AIDS," that is, the (dreadful) illness.
12. Vagueness and incompleteness as face-preserving techniques (Brown & Levinson, 1987) have been described for many communicative genres. For example, Marková (1989) analyzed semantic indeterminacy, as well as unfinished sentences and other kinds of incompleteness, in dialogues between patients and therapists as strategies for handling emotionally difficult topics, and Bergmann (1992) showed how euphemistic descriptors are used by psychiatrists to describe events with discretion.
13. It is undoubtedly a significant factor that our data involve only women. Features of indirectness have sometimes been considered as a gender-based indicator of female conversation. Moreover, the two persons of each dyad in our data are, in general, more equal in status than are, for example, a doctor and his/her patient. Because we lack a commensurable corpus of conversations with male doctors (or midwives!) we must, however, abstain from exploring the gender dimension here.
14. The longitudinal corpus includes some instances, as when the topic of sex is raised by the midwife in the postdelivery checkup encounter, for example:

TemaK: B8:6:7

1	M:	it feels good dow- down there?= did you try intercourse?
2		((*The translation "down there" in line 1 is a free one;*
3		*the Swedish original was i underlivet "in the womb"*))
4	W:	=no, we haven't done that.
5	M:	=you haven't done that, no.
6	W:	I forgot how to do it, I say ((*laughs*))
7	M:	((*laughs loudly*)) *you have to take a course* ((*laughs*, 2.0))
8	W:	>he said that, *when we talked about it earlier*, an'then he
9		said,< (0.3) °you can tell her this° we thought of quitting,
10		now that we have got a child. *and* see what she says,
11		((*laughs*))
12	M:	*yes* ((*laughs*))
13	W:	yes, right, we (xx)
14	M:	there's no point any longer, you ⌜say ((*laughs*))
15	W:	⌞*no* ((*laughs*))
		((*shift of topic*))

15. Actually, textual and contextual features are heavily intertwined in discourse, and hence the taxonomy used here is a considerable simplification. We have chosen to be a bit inconsistent in dealing with anonymization, largely a matter of wording, addressing it under the heading of "Use of Neutralizing Cognitive Contexts." For a

16. Larsson et al. (1994) mentioned that the issue of self-examination of the breasts, a sensitive issue bordering on other topics with sexual overtones, tends to be broached during the physical examination phase. Interestingly, the related issue of mammography is not as sensitive, judging from Larsson's (admittedly limited) data. Mammography, on the other hand, is associated with technology (see later discussion under "Use of Neutralizing Cognitive Contexts").
17. Our ethnographic data, however, have documented a case where the midwife addresses, in a joking mode, a 6-year-old boy accompanying his (pregnant) mother with the question: "Well, Charlie, how's mother doing on smoking?"
18. Whether this is due to strategic choice or to psychological-emotional factors, or both, is something that can hardly be determined on the basis of our data.

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47

The Body Literate: Discourse and Inscription in Early Literacy Training

Allan Luke

The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated Self (adopting the illusion of substantial unity) and a volume in disintegration. – Michel Foucault (1977, p. 148)

Introduction

The 'linguistic turn' in the social sciences has had a significant influence on educational research and practice. Since *Functions of Language in the Classroom* (Cazden, Johns, & Hymes, 1972), the development of studies of classroom interaction has provided educators with alternative criteria and models for examining practice. One key consequence has been an ongoing reappraisal of signposts for the achievement of classroom reading and writing. In much research literature, pedagogical theory and teacher education, if perhaps less in many classrooms, there has been a visible move away from criteria for literacy narrowly defined as discrete psychological "skills" internal to the subject, and towards more contextual explanations of literacy as social practice.

Yet models of applied educational linguistics, the ethnography of communication, and ethnomethodology themselves have significant limitations in their capacity to connect patterns of everyday events with larger configurations of discourse and power, identity and authority (Bourdieu, 1977a; McHoul & Luke, 1989). Since the 1960s, the articulation of a sociology of language in educational settings largely has drawn upon symbolic interactionist, ethnomethodological and, at times, structural-functionalist concerns with "roles," "group norms," "intents,"

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and so forth. In much American and British research, analyses of classroom literacy events have remained within the confines of liberal social theory which presupposes and models consensus, and thereby takes a generally benign, acritical view of social and discourse relations between human subjects. The 'sociologies' underlying sociolinguistic and interactionist classroom research are indeed increasingly attendant to situation and context (cf. Deleuze, 1988, p. 11). But what is missing is an explication of how local events and sites connect with what have emerged as larger concerns of a social theory of pedagogy: the cross-generational production and reproduction of knowledge and power, and, more recently, the complex fabric of texts and discourses through which social representation and reproduction is effected.

For Bourdieu (1977b, 1990, 1991), the interactionist tradition omits due consideration of the sources and strategies of capital which precede and underlie educational sites and events. For Foucault (1979), it would be seen to inadequately explain how such events figure in the moral regulation of human subjects, in this case, of school children. My point here is that even where educational analyses have begun to stress the "social construction" of student literate competence, practice and text, without due consideration of how texts, discourses and indeed literacies have differing power, consequences and capital – such models are unable to provide critical social analyses.

This study is part of a critical sociological investigation into what counts as literacy in Australian elementary and secondary schools (Baker & Luke, 1991; Freebody, Luke, & Gilbert, 1991; Luke, in press-c). My aim is to "change the subject" (Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn, & Walkerdine, 1984) of early literacy instruction by offering an alternative vocabulary for talking and writing about classroom literacy events. The argument here proceeds in two complementary moves. It begins with a theoretical reframing of discourses and practices of early literacy instruction by reference both to poststructuralist and feminist work on discourse and inscription, and to critical sociological explanations of the role of discourse in cultural and economic reproduction. My approach is to critique neomarxian analyses of pedagogy as ideological reproduction – and to use this critique as a springboard for applying Foucault's conceptualizations of "technologies of the self" and Bourdieu's notion of the "habitus" to classroom and community literacy events. I then apply this theoretical frame to a discourse analysis of selected classroom events transcribed as part of a survey of recent progressive reforms of literacy teaching.[1] I conclude with comments on the implications of this work for literacy pedagogy and research, specifically for reexamining contending approaches to instruction as modes of training, surveillance, and regulation.

The Politics of Pedagogy and the Body

The theoretical and strategic differences between neomarxian social theory, Bourdieu's sociology of the "habitus", and poststructuralist discourse theory have been the subject of widespread debate and discussion (e.g., Fraser, 1989;

deCerteau, 1984; Macdonnell, 1986). While recognising the various debates between these positions, here I want to draw these templates together to construct a model for literacy instruction as a *material social practice* in the *institutional site* of the classroom. I begin by describing pedagogy as a form of *inscription*, of body writing and mapping. My focus is on techniques by which pedagogic discourses position and constitute the child as subject (Walkerdine, 1986). This done, I reframe ideology as a knowledge effect of these techniques, arguing that the bodily/linguistic *habitus* produced by pedagogical discourse is shaped and reshaped by discourse in a range of other cultural sites. This framework, I argue, enables a reconsideration of whether and how these multiple inscriptions figure in the representation and reproduction of class and gender in contemporary cultures.

Neomarxian approaches to pedagogy generally have assumed that curriculum, instruction and assessment are part and parcel of a process of ideological transmission. These range from more monolithic "iron cage" explanations which stress the inescapability of this transmission (e.g., the works of Althusser, Bowles, and Gintis), to those Gramscian and "emancipatory" models which emphasise human agency as a necessary precondition to resistance and contestation (e.g., the "radical pedagogies" of Freire, Giroux, and colleagues). As Archer (1986) has noted, since the advent of the "new sociology" of education in the early 1970s the theoretical elaboration of such models has centred on attempts to reconcile the relative power of social structure and human agency.[2] This is also a central concern of structuralist attempts to identify and define the variables of "pedagogic discourse" (Bernstein, 1990).

Models of pedagogy as ideological transmission are based on several fundamental epistemological and methodological assumptions. Ideology critique presupposes that something akin to Marx and Engels' *camera obscura* can be identified and, correlatively, that an undistorted version of social/economic reality can be accessed via a science of the social that in fact stands outside of 'ideology' (Luke, in press-a; Thompson, 1984). A related supposition is that within technological and multinational economies and cultures a distinctive logic of capital, a set of identifiable economic interests can be traced to the patterns and systems of ideological presentation and representation, production and reproduction, both in schools and in other public 'education' institutions like the media. By this account, a central feature of capitalist (and noncapitalist) educational systems is seen to lay in the transmission of false consciousness, or of structures of what Habermas (1979) has called "systematically distorted communication". In both phenomenological and neomarxian explanations, even those quite sensitive to intersubjectivity and the possibility of Habermasian "universal pragmatics", the mind/consciousness of the sovereign human subject remains the primary focus or object of pedagogy.

Neomarxian and Frankfurtian sociological analyses of education are thus articulated from several first principles: mind/consciousness, the logic and interests of capital translated into particular semiotic (and pedagogically deployed) systems of false consciousness, and an emancipatory science of the social capable of seeing through those systems. In its positive historical moment,

this science is seen as capable of specifying and advocating pedagogical strategies for redressing false consciousness and distorted communication, presumably with the force of remaking the mind/consciousness of the subject and, to bring the model full circle, altering repressive political and inequitable socioeconomic conditions. If we turn this model to literacy training, we are able to argue that the texts, interactional norms, literate competences embodied in pedagogy are encodings of forms of consciousness readily traceable to particular class interests. These ideologies and forms of consciousness are selectively and differentially distributed to children in a manner which credentials and reproduces position in relation to the means of production (cf. Bourdieu, 1976; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). Various terms have been used to describe the relationship of literacy to class reproduction. These range from the more economicist explanations of "literacy as cultural capital" (Cook-Gumperz, 1986), to more culturally-focussed conceptions of "ideologies of literacy" (Soltow & Stevens, 1981), to those grounded in Gramscian social theory like Graff's (1979) description of the 19th century pedagogical enforcement of a "moral economy".

In contrast, Michel Foucault's (1979, 1980, 1988) explanation of institutional regulation is an attempt to describe the construction rather than presuppose the essence of the human subject. His work begins from a deliberate scepticism towards an autonomous, a priori essence of the sovereign subject and towards its accompanying humanist metaphor: mind/consciousness. *Discipline and Punish* (1979) describes the emergence of modernist disciplinary knowledge. These knowledges consist of techniques of power, regimes of "normalisation" contingent not always on the exercise of overt, coercive force, but rather on the diffuse power of discourses for the recategorisation and surveillance of the populace. By this account, *disciplinary power* lacks a centre because it is enacted in a multiplicity of texts: those of the various human sciences which provide taxonomies and categories for the human subject, and those of attendant institutional practices which have material effects on human subjects in everyday sites.

The "regimes of truth" of science and theory in turn give rise to and are used to legitimate particular "regimes of practice" which enforce a panoptic *gaze* on the human subject. Here Foucault turns to Jeremy Bentham's 19th century theory and architectural design for the "panopticon" as a model for the modern prison. Foucault views Bentham's work as an exemplar of the extension of state power upon "docile bodies". Central to the efficiency of institutional regulation, then, are systems of surveillance and regulation:

> A relation of surveillance, defined and regulated, is inscribed at the heart of the practice of teaching, not as an additional or adjacent part, but as a mechanism that is inherent to it and which increases its efficiency. (Foucault, 1979, p. 176)

This gaze is most visible in the incarcerating processes of criminology and psychiatry, but equally manifest in such institutional practices as psychometrics, psychoanalysis, schooling, and modern human sciences like social behaviourism and structural-functionalist sociology.

The poststructuralist reappraisal of modern science, then, begins from scepticism towards disciplinary discourses as unmediated statements or revelations of the 'real' or the 'true'. The "truth games" (Foucault, 1988) or "grand recits" (Lyotard, 1982) of science are seen to constitute and create 'truths' about human subjects, thereby constructing, positioning and regulating "the insane", "the criminal", or, to take more pertinent examples, "the learning disabled", "the skill deficit child", "the beginning reader" or "the natural learner" (Luke, 1991). Such categories are constructed and 'done' in everyday institutional discourse, in face to face interaction (e.g., clinical or classroom conversation) as readily as in written texts (e.g., official documents, report cards, professional magazines).

But the effects and consequences of discourse are much more than just a naming of the social and natural worlds. Such disciplinary discourses do not yield social control in the coercive and monolithic sense implied in Marxian analysis or even in some versions of classical sociology. It is not a simple matter of the "top–down" imposition of power. Discourses make up practical "grids of specification" (Foucault, 1981) for diagramming, classifying, and categorising the subject in the social. These grids are put to work in institutions in ways which generate self-surveillance, wherein the subject internalises the disciplinary and cultural gaze as her or his own. The effect is one of self-colonisation, where the subject takes on 'responsibility' for monitoring her or his morality, discourse, and body.

In his later work, Foucault (1988) sketches differing social and discursive "technologies". Each of these, he argues, comprises a "matrix of practical reason":

1. technologies of production, which permit us to produce, transform or manipulate things;
2. technologies of sign systems, which permit us to use signs, meanings, symbols, or signification;
3. technologies of power, which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, as objectivizing of the subject;
4. technologies of the self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being . . . (1988, p. 18)

Foucault goes on to argue that the aforementioned disciplinary "truth games" of science, law, morality, ethics and so forth authorise and sanction these specific technologies of sign systems, technologies of power – which "determine the conduct of individuals" and submit them to technologies of the self.

In contemporary schooling, educational discourses coordinate and interleave all four technologies. Such discourses in local sites target the body as a locus of power, as an "inscribed surface of events . . . traced by language" (Foucault, 1977, p. 148). Discourse operates on the subject not as an abstract set of ideas to be transposed into, inside of, or within mind/consciousness, but instead "as a *material* series of processes, power actively marks or brands bodies as social, inscribing them with the attributes of subjectivity" (Grosz, 1990, p. 63). Furthermore, Grosz argues, this focus on inscription "is intended to challenge a prevailing model of

power conceived as a system of ideas, concepts, values and beliefs, *ideology*, that primarily effect consciousness". Hence, rather than eliminating them from any analytic template, we can posit consciousness and ideology as net "knowledge effects" or consequences of discourse, discipline, and inscription.

Foucault's work thus moves away from the presupposition that ideology is a coherent and goal-seeking entity, coded in text and semiosis, and passed from consciousness to consciousness. Instead, it offers a central emphasis on discourse as a form of power which both literally and metaphorically inscribes the collective and individual social body. In contrast with neomarxian theories of the state, Foucault's conceives of social power as having no (organic or mechanical) heart. Because discourse is at once deployed in particular local sites in differing continuities and contiguities, it would be erroneous to take for granted a singular source or continuity for power, or to presuppose that inscription (and pedagogy) operates with total, seamless effectiveness (Eco, 1987, pp. 239–255). In this way, poststructuralist theory allows for the relative unevenness and flexibility of discourse, its diffraction and apparent arbitrariness in local sites.

Foucault thus provides a model for rethinking pedagogy as discourse and inscription. But what are the procedures and consequences of the 'uptake' of discourse by the human subject in classroom events? The body also figures centrally prominently in Pierre Bourdieu's depiction of "socially distinct and distinctive *modes of acquisition*" (1977b, p. 659) of social class-based patterns of language and literacy. "Inevitably inscribed" within the embodied "dispositions" of the habitus, is "the whole structure of the system of conditions, as it presents itself in the experience of a life-condition" (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 172). For Bourdieu, the habitus is posited as a "structuring structure" of generative and constraining disposition, properties, schemas, habits, tastes and so forth – all of which can be traced to "differences objectively inscribed in conditions of existence" (p. 172). Like Foucault, Bourdieu (1977a, p. 115) argues that particular categories and dominant "taxonomies" come into play in the shaping of subjectivity. He also argues that such differences are visible and observable, "objectively inscribed" in the patterns and practices of everyday life. This inscription occurs through "symbolic violence" (Bourdieu, 1991), the representational, semiotic power at work in the texts of such institutions as schools and mass media. As distinct from Foucault, Bourdieu's notion of the habitus grants a centrality to structuring economic and social conditions, and to the ideological character of such conditions prior to training, acquisition, and inculcation.

Bourdieu's stress is on the educational shaping of the habitus as a central aspect of the state's formation and distribution of linguistic and "cultural capital" (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). His model also fashions the body as the locus of control, as the object of a sum of dispositional "products" and "general properties":

> The body is an instrument which records its own previous uses and which, although continuously modified by them, gives greater weight to the earliest of them; it contains . . . the trace and the memory of the social events. . . . The effects of any new experience on the formation of the

> experiences already integrated into the habitus in the form of classifying and generative themes. (Bourdieu, 1977b, p. 660)

The habitus, then, as "the generative, unifying principle at the basis of all linguistic practices," becomes both a marker and proscription of one's class position and "relation to the language market" (Bourdieu, p. 667; cf. Mey, 1985). Describing how "linguistic capital [as] . . . embodied capital" is acquired, Bourdieu (1977b, p. 660) maintains that "language learning is one dimension of the learning of a total body schema which is itself adjusted to a system of objective chances of acceptability." In language socialisation, children actually model a "'preferred' shape of the buccal aperture, i.e., the most frequent articulatory position . . . [as] as component of the *global use of the mouth* (and therefore a component of the body hexis)" (661).

Bourdieu thus offers a more structuralist explanation of pedagogy than Foucault's description of moral regulation (for a complementary example, see Bernstein, 1990). It shares with neomarxian analyses a recognition of the significance of pedagogy in the 'logic' and distribution of capital. "Language is a bodily technique" which is tied to "objective chances" in the subject's life trajectory (Bourdieu, 1977b, p. 660; cf. Bourdieu, 1986). In this way, Bourdieu's analysis of language as cultural capital is tied to a sociology which accounts for the cross-generational reproduction of social class. Like Giddens, Bourdieu attempts to establish an explanation of the cross-generational interaction of social structure and human agency which is nondeterminist. At the same time, he seeks to develop a model which has explanatory power in explaining the material trappings, "tastes," choices and linguistic practices of social classes.

Speech also figures prominently in Foucault's articulation of the "panoptic gaze": "The association of prohibition and strong incitations to speak is a constant feature of our culture. The theme of the renunciation of the flesh was linked to the confession of the monk to the abbot, to telling the abbot *everything he had in mind*" (emphasis added; Foucault, 1988, pp. 16–17). An emphasis, then, in Foucault's explanation of the internalisation of the morally regulatory text is on the technology of the self as a means of taking on the discourse and gaze of the Other. In Burdieu's description of language acquisition, the emphasis remains on the external ideological and social class-based shaping of the "body schema" or habitus (e.g., Bourdieu, 1973). What is key here is that in both models the body is the target of pedagogy and its primary mnemonic device: the morally regulated body remembers.

Yet Foucault does not preclude the possibility of ideology or, for that matter, economic interests figuring in such institutional sites and instances as those of pedagogy. Rather he attempts to displace them from their status in the marxian system as 'given' engines which drive practice, and instead, reframes them as possible "knowledge effects" (Fraser, 1989). Contrary to many conventional characterisations of poststructuralism, ideology and economics do not disappear, but instead resurface depending on the site and discourse in question. Foucault (1980, p. 109) recognises that

> it is quite possible that the major mechanisms of power have been accompanied by ideological productions. There has, for example probably been an ideology of education, an ideology of the monarchy . . . etc.; but basically . . . it is much more and much less than ideology. It is the production of effective instruments for the formation and accumulation of knowledge – methods of observation, techniques of registration, procedures for investigation and research, apparatuses of control.

The "cohesion of the social body," then, is achieved via forms of moral regulation. Technologies of regulation, and the institutions where they are put to work, may indeed have ideological, political and economic concomitants and consequences.

A further central issue in Bourdieu's (1986) sociology is a concern with longitudinally and biographically traced outcomes and effects. This focus on the games of early learning imprinting a "memory trace" that later is influential in bodily disposition and discipline is shared by, among others, Wittgenstein (1967, pp. 1–2):

> One thing we always do when discussing a word is to ask how we were taught it. . . . Although this language is not what you talk when you are twenty, you get a rough approximation of what kind of language game is going to be played . . .

Wittgenstein also emphasises the role of bodily "gestures and facial expressions." Further, and important to the matter of literacy training, Wittgenstein similarly sees aesthetic judgement, what Bourdieu (1986) would describe as "taste," as shaped by one's participation in developmental language games.

I here have assembled poststructuralist and sociological definitions and positions with an eye to a theoretical reframing of early language and literacy training. On this basis, I propose the following model: (1) that the discourses of pedagogy are built around claims about 'truth' and the 'real' which in turn are transformed and rearticulated in the multiplicity of material practices deployed in the site of the classroom. There (2) a disciplinary inscription of the subjectivity of the student occurs, contributing to the construction of a bodily habitus. This habitus, a developing marker of the literate's cultural capital, (3) concurrently and subsequently undergoes multiple transformations at other sites of linguistic/literate practice through the texts of family and community, popular culture, further schooling and so forth, such that (4) one's inscribed habitus is evident in terms of classed and gendered identifiable life styles, differential textual and material practices.

This model of literacy teaching as discourse and inscription can be exemplified by reference to particular institutional discourses, texts and sites. My focus here is on (1) and (2) in the proposed model. What follows is an elaboration of the model: first, through a general description of how the truth claims of educational discourses on literacy construct the subject; and second, through discourse analyses of local classroom literacy events.

Educational Discourse and Subject Production

Educational discourse consists of textual and spoken statements which are circulated across and within a range of sites: from academic research papers and policy documents, to professional books which commonly set out to translate and explain 'theory' and research to practitioners, to teachers' formal and informal professional exchanges, to documents like teachers' guides and official syllabi. Across these texts are varied constructions of the child subject (e.g., the "pre-operational" child, the child "author"), of particular skills or competences (e.g., "reading readiness," "decoding," "critical thinking"), as well as of the visible signs to be taken as evidence that such skills or competences have been achieved or not (e.g., "frustration levels with text," "miscues").

Many educational sites (e.g., policy bodies, school boards, state departments, particular staff rooms, in-service programs) give the appearance of homogeneity and univocality. For instance, a range of programs and theories might intertextually construct and refer to the "natural language learner." But in contemporary secular schooling, the construction and articulation of educational discourse is heteroglossic. For example, if we turn to the construction of literacy in a given jurisdiction, school or classroom, an array of contending truth claims, attempts at falsification, conflicting versions of received wisdom and commonsense all arise. The dominance of a particular set of 'truths' seems to be contingent on a local political field of play which is tied to a broader, complex political economy of educational ideas, commodities, and material practices.

Across late capitalist countries, we would encounter at multiple sites opposing theories of what literacy is, how best to teach it. Such debates feature contending constructions of the literate subject: from classicist versions of the "culturally literate" citizen, to behaviourist characterisations of the child literate as skilled and reinforceable subject, to the romantic constitution of the child literate as the natural, spontaneous language user. It is worth noting here that such constructions historically have been gendered – from the medieval monastic copyist, to the Flaubertian 19th century reader of romantic fiction, to the educated "gentleman" of Commonwealth private school education, to the (male) functional (il)literate of the industrial 1960s. Differing kinds of competence with the technology typically have been constructed in tandem not just with classed but as well with gendered textual labour (Luke, in press-b). We could explore further the various political and economic effects of particular "naturalisations" of the competent child: Since the founding of mass schooling of literacy, the institutions of schooling have worked closely with secular and nonsecular authorities to construct literacy and the literate in the service of particular interests (Luke, 1989). At present, suffice it to say that there are multiple constructions of the literate in play in Western countries. Accordingly, the public debate over literacy could be seen to turn not on which method is most effective at teaching literacy, but rather on the particular claims of economic and moral efficacy of particular kinds or types of literacy and literates.

To see school literacy as a simple instance of ideological reproduction in action thus is somewhat problematic, or at the least historic and site specific

This is not to say that the historical exclusion from socially and politically useful and powerful knowledges and competences of minorities and working class children does not continue to occur in quite systematic ways across Western nations (Cook-Gumperz, 1986). But it is to query the existence of a monolithic dominant ideology of literacy, and of the unmediated or univocal connection between the kinds of literacy produced in schools and those operational in domains of work, life-style, and leisure. However well the body may remember, many literate practices inscribed at the site of the school have little apparent connection to out-of-school sites (Heath, 1980). Many of the practices of school literacy are little more than *simulations* – self-referential practices which appear to serve little other than the maintenance of age, authority, and power relations within the school (Luke & Luke, 1990). Following Foucault and Bourdieu, what seems to be at stake in much contemporary schooling is not the production of literacy for stratified kinds and levels of work, but rather literacy training as a form of moral and political discipline.

This said, it is worth noting that educational discourses on literacy in particular localities do indeed cluster around key or dominant metaphors. In surveys and interviews, 64 urban Australian teachers were asked to rank order (on a 1–7 scale) "the most important goals of literacy teaching": "personal expression and creativity" (1.44) was ranked highest by a significant margin, followed by "development of skills" (1.94), "enhancement of natural growth" (2.94), "academic preparation" (5.53) and "social and occupational mobility" (5.70).[3] These general constructions were corroborated in interviews with teachers and administrators, where many commented on the importance of "literacy and individual growth." Both survey and interview comments were marked (intertextually) by statements that "naturalistic and holistic" approaches to literacy would address the needs of the full range of clientele: migrant second language learners, working class, girls as well as boys, rural and Aboriginal children.

Such interview data is particularly revealing, not of any truths about literacy or the teachers in question, but rather of an educational discourse at work in the textual practice of the government-sponsored survey. All subjects were informed that the survey was co-sponsored by the Federal government and the regional educational authority, their employer (and, indirectly, mine). Hence, the survey text constituted a bureaucratic technology of power and a technology of the (professional) self, a gaze on the practitioner and clinician. The tension is noticeable on interview tapes, marked by wariness, queries about who we would be reporting back to, stated mistrust of the political agenda of the survey, reiteration of a 'party line', and so forth. Yet in light of the foregoing explanation of the traverse of educational discourse, the widely documented problems with viewing interview and survey discourse as a transparent window on the 'real' and 'truth' can be turned to advantage (Game, 1989). Such surveys and evaluations are authorised, authoritative confessionals. What this 'data' reveals is the surface of public and government-observed discourse on literacy. In this case, the cited educational discourse of 'truth' about literacy, the literate subject and the optimal technologies for constituting that subject turns on what Baker (1991, p. 182) calls individualist, "mentalist notions" of what 'reading' is, or could be.

Such discourses of 'truth' about literacy, are in turn reflected, albeit in a diffused and diffracted manner, in the multiplicity of material practices deployed in the classroom. The practical discourses of pedagogy are manifest in research texts and models, in textbooks, classroom talk, writing assignments and marking, test and examination scripts and so forth (e.g., Freebody, 1992; Freebody, Luke & Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert, 1989). Each of these levels of pedagogic discourse also can be described in terms of Foucault's four discursive technologies. Educational knowledge itself stands as an actual "technology of production" insofar as schooling constitutes an economic service-sector activity, one which entails the actual use and consumption of iconic, material commodities and the production of credentialled (student) subjectivities. The commoditisation of educational knowledge into concrete objects of veneration, authorised textual/material goods to be venerated, professed and consumed is well documented (Luke, 1988). Such goods – textbooks, the teachers' guidebooks, reading comprehension tests, instructional software, students' worksheets – comprise "technologies of sign systems," encodings of particular disciplinary narratives, whether scientific or humanist. Furthermore, the school and classroom are sites of instructional "technologies of power" which govern individuals' conduct, submitting them as objects of surveillance.

But of central interest for the analysis of classroom events are those "technologies of the self": those means "which permit individuals by their own means or with the help of others . . . operations on their own bodies" (Foucault, 1988, p. 18). Sociologies of school knowledge have stressed the domination and subjugation of individuals by the institutional organisation of educational work and its relation to larger patterns of production, by the ideological/semiotic codings of textbooks, and by the actual control and direction of students in the twin sites of school and classroom. I here attend to how those disciplinary technologies of the self work with overt technologies of power in classroom talk. My aim is to move from those (staffroom, survey, and textbook) metanarratives of truth about the child and literacy to those practical discourses inscribed in classroom literacy events.

Classroom Inscriptions

In contemporary psychologically-based pedagogy, teachers inscribe and read the student "body as the surface of the mind" (Baker & Luke, 1991). Early literacy training as the site of body mapping and writing, as comprising material practices for the constitution of the literate, is exemplified in various cross-cultural and historical settings. As Heath (1986), Wagner, Messick, and Spratt (1986, pp. 254–255) and other ethnographic researchers have demonstrated, the technologies, icons and products of literacy constitute a "material culture." Here I make the case that ceremonial inscription of the body is a key, and frequently overlooked and undertheorised, element of literacy training.

For many children in Western cultures, the dispositional training of the habitus first comes into play in the routines of family literacy events, however natural

such sites and practices may appear (Heath, 1982; Miller, Nemoianu & DeJong, 1986). One reader recalls his first encounters with text:

> Ann-Marie made me sit down in front of her, on my little chair; she leant over, lowered her eyelids and went to sleep. From this mask-like face issued a plaster voice. . . . After a moment, I realized, it was the book that was talking. Sentences emerged that frightened me; they were like real centipedes; they swarmed with syllables and letters, spat out their dipthongs and made their double consonants hum; fluting, nasal, broken up with sighs and pausings . . . words left their mark on objects, transforming actions into rituals and events into ceremonies. Someone began to ask questions: . . . it was as if a child were being quizzed: what would he have done in the woodcutter's place? Which of the two sisters did he prefer? Why? Did he agree with Babette's punishment. But this child was not entirely me and I was afraid to reply. I did reply, though; my feeble voice grew faint and I felt I was turning into something else. . . . When she stopped reading, I quickly took back the books and carried them off under my arm without a word of thanks. . . . In the long run, I came to enjoy this release which tore me out of myself. (Sartre, 1967, p. 44)

The scientific and literary pedigree of this environment notwithstanding, this reconstruction might fit well into Heath's (1982) "Maintown" community, where the heuristic exchanges of childhood story reading prepare the child for what counts as school literacy. Here, the child is practicing an academic language game. An integral part of such games is differing trainings in bodily position and paralinguistics. For example, in Heath's (1982) study, for white, working-class families, sitting properly and not squirming was part of the ritual of bedtime reading; for black working class children, verbal storying entailed learning and inventing bodily patterns of mime, dance and movement to frame the tale. What is occurring in early literacy (and oral storying) events is the construction of the habitus, the articulation and instantiation of a system of bodily discipline.

What is curious in the above instance is Sartre's reconstruction of early reading as a *disembodied* construction of the Other: as a calling upon of the "child who wasn't entirely me," with the effect of tearing "one out of oneself." The ritual effect here is the bodily and linguistic (and, for Sartre, ontological) constitution of the literate by turning the child/student "into someone else." This would appear an instance of literacy training as a technology of the self, one geared for what Foucault called the inscription of the "dissociated Self" par excellence.

Such inscriptions of the habitus also occur in contemporary classroom literacy events. As part of our survey of Australian classrooms in two urban sites, 18 boundaried literacy-related 'lessons' were audiotaped in two sites, one urban and one rural; transcription was aided by the use of field notes. All lessons observed and taped can be described as discrete classroom events, which according to the self-report data on the large scale survey tend to occur as regular, routinised practices in progressive early childhood literacy training: for example,

"morning news," "modeled writing" sessions, "writing conferences," "story-time," and "shared book experience" (cf. Michaels, 1981). Here I focus on two examples of the latter, which use an enlarged print book for a group collaborative reading as developed by Holdaway (1976). This practice reportedly is common in the two jurisdictions studied, and I construe many of the patterns which emerge in these transcripts as attempts at 'model' practice under the scrutiny of the researcher.

Transcript 1: Billy Goats

[15 5- and 6-year-old children are arrayed around the teacher on the floor in a rugged area; they are working with an enlarged print book about "Billy Goats". The teacher sits before them on a chair, turning pages of the book which is mounted on an easel.]

1 S1: I've gotta pair of socks like that.
2 T: David, will you just sit up straight. Michael, just sit up straight and face the front. When we first look at this, I was looking at this book and there's something different about the goats. But around here [points to picture] . . . what were all the goats wearing? [turns page]
3 S2: Go . . gooo
4 S3: Ah beard, . . a little beard, and they all gotta little beard.
5 T: [loudly] A beard. What do they all got on the first page? What do they all got around their necks?
6 S1: Ah bells, a one has . . .
7 S3: //Bells
8 T: [loudly] Bells. Well actually I was wrong. I thought that no one has bells, but I got it straight anyway. So . . . has the little billy goat got a bell? Michael, if you can't sit down you can practice sitting up straight at recess. OK? Sit down. But . . . ssshhh . . . What's the big billy goat got?

This site is bounded both temporally (i.e., shared book 'time') and spatially (i.e., this 'time' occurs within the confines of the rug reading area; children who move out of this instructional locus are physically and verbally rearranged both before and during the events).

The onset of the event is taken with the rearrangement of student bodies into the 'correct' reading habitus, and with the discursive construction of a collectivity such that this rearrangement can be targeted and retargeted as the lesson proceeds. In turn 2, the teacher's pronominalisation of "we" shifts fluidly to "I" within a single clause. Here, the subjectivities of teacher and student reader(s) are collapsed, effecting an equivalence, a fluid conflation of teacher–student reader. It is this conjoint subjectivity which is interrogated (turns 2, 5, 8), and from this interactively constructed subjectivity that student responses are sourced. Against this, we find 'difference' marked in turn 8. Those who have not internalised the teachers' gaze, those who are not willing participants in the technology, are singled out, not as "I" or "we" but "you." Where the technology of the self fails, the technology of power steps in. Where the gaze apparently has not been internalised by the children, it is externally asserted by the teacher.

This construction is achieved in part through a set of injunctions: in turn 2, a composite set of bodily inscriptions is undertaken. "Sit up straight," "face the front," are preludes to gestural and linguistic imperatives on 'how *we* look' and 'where *we* look'. Posture, movement and visual gaze thus are monitored and directed. So what is occurring here can be described beyond its archetypal IRE exchange structure. In effect who is to take the R turn (which subjectivity? which reader? which body?) is constructed by and within the classroom discourse.

This classroom literacy event constitutes what will count as reading for its participants (Baker & Freebody, 1989). Within the IRE pattern, the language game entails guessing the single word response prompted by teacher gesture and talk (Mehan, 1979). I have here stressed the bodily constraints of such literacy events. This event, like many following the "shared book" pattern, leads on to a choral reading led by the teacher:

Transcript 2: Billy Goat Narrative

"Now I'm coming to gobble you up," roared the Troll. "Well come along I've got two spears and I'll poke your eyeballs out at your ears. I've got besides two great flat stones and I'll crush you to bits, body and bones."

That is what the Big Billy Goat said, and that is what the Big Billy Goat did, and after that he went up the hillside.

The billy goats got so fat they could hardly walk home again. And if the fat hasn't fallen off them, why they're still fat . . .

As Bourdieu notes, part of the training of the bodily habitus entails training of the mouth. In this particular event, "*We* read" (McHoul, 1991), and this reading entails the aforementioned collectivisation not only of the body, but of eyes, mouth and body; "we" see, we move and we mouthe. The 'reading' is boisterous, and led by the (louder) teacher's voice and gestures which set cadence, stress, intonation and pitch. Notably, even those boys who had trouble sitting (and dissociating) participate here. They strain their bodies upward and open their mouths widely. The teacher's volume and pitch stresses the alliterative passage, "bits, bodies, and bones", shouted by all, and punctuated by many of the boys with bodies stretching upwards towards the teacher and text. The girls, by contrast, tend to sit more shrunkenly, their hands at their sides and in their laps.

Multiple levels of inscription are occurring here, not the least of which is bodily. Certainly the ideational content of the text constitutes one form of 'writing' of the subject, a selective introduction to particular ways of speaking, acting, and being. On its lexicogrammatical surface, the culture represented is indeed masculinist and violent, constructing ideological "subject positions" (Kress, 1985) and "classification schemes" (Fairclough, 1989). But perhaps what is significant is not the "content" of the technology per se, but rather how it shapes and constructs its subjects. In the following event, group and individual reading are interleaved in a way which foregrounds those very workings of this technology of the self:

Transcript 3: Mr. Singh's Garden

[10 children, ages 5–6 sit on the rug area around the teacher. Again, she is poised next to an enlarged print book mounted on an easel. She sits on a chair above the children and has a pointer in her hand.]:

1	T:	On your bottoms please, so that we can all see. [gestures to the text, begins tracking lines in text with her hand]
2	Students and Teacher:	In Mr. Singh's garden, there was a red rose. "Ah," said the caterpiller, "I see a red rose."
3	S1:	Nah, Kylie [shouts]
4	T:	Shhss, Kylie, we don't need help. Be quiet. Evelyn, you read the next page [turns page].
5	S2:	"Ah," said the bird, "I see the caterpiller."
6	T:	Brendan, you read the next page [turns page].
7	S3:	"Ah," said a cat, "I see a bird."
8	T:	All together now, I'll pick some nice children out for individual reading [turns page].
9	Students and Teacher:	"Ah," said the dog, "I see a cat." "I see a dog," said Mr. Singh, "and it's in my garden."
10	T:	Good girl Emma, for reading "Mr. Singh." I read "Mrs. Singh" by mistake.
11	S4:	Mister.

Prohibitions on the body are central here. One not only must sound like a reader to an authoritative ear, but one is enjoined to adopt the correct bodily habitus for participation in reading: "on your bottoms please, so that we can all see" (Turn 1).

Collective reading (Turns 2 & 9) is alternated with individual reading (Turns 5 & 7). In this manner, the very exchange structure of the lesson fuses together for its participants, individual and group subjectivities, transposing the "I" into a collective "we". Those "nice children" who are picked out for solo performance are those who are seen to have internalised the discipline of collective readership. These children are mapped differently than those who are disciplined on behalf of the collectivity (Turn 4: "*we* don't need help").

In Turn 10, Emma is singled out from the collective reading and praised for showing signs of having assumed the gaze. She apparently has internalised the procedure sufficiently to correct the teacher's misreading. Here the relationship is reversed, and the teacher confesses to having misread. What is interesting is that Emma has taken on the authorised 'voice' of the teacher; the technology of the self is in place. Her performance stands in direct contrast to the male speaker in Turn 3, who, like the boys in Transcript 1, shows no (bodily or linguistic) sign of internal discipline: he yells out. But here he succeeds in calling attention to the undiscipline of the girl next to him, who becomes the object of a technology of power, the reprimand, albeit on behalf of the collective "we" (Turn 4).

The patterns of inscription described here are gendered. In the above lessons, as throughout the lesson corpus, the technologies of power are predominantly asserted on boy participants (Walkerdine, 1981). In the events examined above,

the girls tended to be more willing participants, and, like Emma in the latter transcript, their compliant bodily schemas signalled that their willing participation and the technology of the self are at work.

If the foregoing analyses of classroom events were done using the templates of psychology – whether Skinnerian, Chomskian, Vygotskian, or Piagetian – if they were operating from normative definitions of literacy and the optimal means for its instruction, the events and sites described would take on a very different appearance. Depending on which psychology was called into play, they would appear appropriate or inappropriate, efficient or inefficient at achieving 'learning' and 'reading'. Yet the suspension of a priori acceptance of the legitimacy of 'true' educational discourses, whether those revealed in the surveys of these and other teachers, or in educational texts, enables what Foucault (1977) termed a "genealogical" reading of what is accomplished in the regimes of practice.

A very different diagram emerges, one which foregrounds the training and building of a literate habitus. Particular postures, silences, gestures, and visible signs of 'being in' the lesson and the collective body are on display. Proximics, the organisation and delimitation of space and time in the classroom are encompassing aspects of the gaze: from "sitting on one's bottom" to "sitting up straight," awaiting one's turn to speak. These are monitored for by the teacher who, with her or his discourse templates and metaphors for 'reading' and the 'child', scans and maps bodies on (psychological/humanist) grids of specification, accordingly issuing prohibitions "to 'watch one's tongue', to 'mind one's p's and q's', to pursue correctness through constant self-corrections" (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 656). His or her age, size, position, and official status as leader of the event – his or her displays of superior knowledge and power with both 'reading' and 'teaching' – grants his or her eyes, ears and mouth moral authority. They come to stand as embodied sources of power (Kroker & Cook, 1986, pp. 79–87), at times mirroring, at times filtering, at times marking and punctuating. But beyond this authoritative reading by the teacher of the physical and semiotic, a material 'seeing' and 'hearing' is marked on the canvas of student body. Throughout, students take on directional gaze towards the text, the pronunciation, cadences and intonation patterns of the teacher's voice (e.g., "bits, bodies and bones"), and the hearing of the text, alternating group and individual performance. Subjectivity is reestablished in terms of a collective identity, and possession of this identity is marked on and by the body – moving and still, seeing and hearing, speaking and silent.

(Re)Membering the Body

I have here offered a poststructuralist discourse analysis of early literacy training. It does not target for criticism a particular approach to literacy instruction or its participants. Rather it tables a different map for reading classroom literacy events, one which views the truth claims of pedagogy and research themselves as discourse constructions with tangible, political consequences. It also sets out to [illegible] in the material culture of classroom events as bodily

transcription and to show how that culture constitutes the morally regulated, literate subject. In this way, the theory-driven analysis undertaken here moves towards Foucault's project of "genealogical" analysis of the body inscribed by history and "traced" by language. I conclude with comments on the implications of this model for theorizing and studying literacy events, and for reframing the sociocultural consequences of literacy instruction.

The model of literacy training presented here can be used to reread data from social histories of literacy and cross cultural ethnographies of communication. Reconsider, for instance, the rote acquisition of Quranic literacy among the Vai:

> children . . . bend over their individual boards with passages from the Quran written on them. For 2 hours or more the singsong of their chanting can be heard, accompanied occasionally by the admonishment from the teacher, or the snap of a small whip landing on the backside of an errant student (Scribner & Cole, 1981, p. 30).

Here the body and voice are subject to the instructional technology, a technology tied directly to the discipline, in Foucault's sense, of the Quran. These nonsecular ceremonies, moreover, have their parallels in Western settings: for instance, in the choral repetition, rote memorisation and veneration of the Book taught to fundamentalist children in southern-US Sunday schools (Zinsser, 1986). We find parallel examples in 19th century British and Canadian pedagogy, where standardised bodily stances were to be assumed for oral recitation, slatewriting, pensmanship, and other literate practices (deCastell & Luke, 1986). There too, pedagogy entailed the construction and discipline of a bodily and linguistic habitus. Furthermore, this bodily aspect of literacy training has clear precedents in some oral cultures' initiations into archetypal texts. Describing the recitation of the Bagre among the LoDagaa, Goody (1988, p. 171) notes the focal role of the shea nut, "needed (verbally at least) to make the 'oil' (in fact, whitewash) that is used to mark the bodies of the new members."

Setting the tenor for the last decade of research in the ethnography of literacy, Heath (1981, p. 27) maintained that reading and writing, "like other systems of communication" are "organised . . . in culture-specific ways and according to certain norms of interpretation" and that the events of literacy training assemble, enact and rehearse "methods of learning these norms and having them reinforced." But despite the proliferation of ethnographic and interactional analysis of literacy events in schools, the body has not been viewed as a constitutive or focal object of study. While we see the body in descriptions of tribal culture like Goody's, and occasionally in descriptions of community life like Heath's, it disappears when we turn to the modernist school, the very site of the cross-generational representation and reproduction of the Cartesian mind/body dualism. As several theorists of popular culture have noted, the discourses, "styles" and practices of schooling exclude and rationalise bodily pleasure and desire (e.g., Hebdige, 1979). By stressing the heard (voice), the seen (text), and the unseen (mind), by readily explaining ethnographic and linguistic evidence

via psychological metanarrative, much interactionist classroom research has participated, however tacitly, in that exclusion. The reconceptualisation of literacy training proposed here is an attempt to reinstate the body as a political object of literacy and linguistic research.

The inscription of children in literacy training has taken on differing configurations in various cultural and historical settings. The "Great Debate" over literacy education in English-speaking countries continues apace, and most recently has featured reforms which stress more child-centred, holistic approaches. The "shared book" instructional events described here have come to be associated with reform movements in New Zealand and Australia. Advocates argue for the replacement of individuated "skill and drill" activities with what teachers in this study described as "natural learning" approaches, some of which reframe classroom events as "social contexts." But as part of an interactionist tradition, they typically stop short of an analysis of classroom events which reconnects with a broader political theorisation of the consequences of the distribution of discourse and literacy. The analyses I offer here may lead us to query whether such 'child-centred' instructional events are indeed (more or less) "natural," or whether they signal a shift in emphasised discursive technology, a reshaping of moral regulation and with it, patterns of social reproduction.

Such progressive approaches and their apparent opposite numbers, traditional skills and classicist approaches, may act as equivalent and oscillating "armatures of [governmental] power" (Hunter, 1989; McHoul, 1991). But they also signal differences in pedagogical technologies, supplanting what I have called here technologies of power with more subtle technologies of the self. Certainly, in the events discussed here 'reading' is remade into collective activity, harkening back to the forms of choral and oral reading predominant before the early 20th century prescription of silent reading (Luke, 1988). In this regard, they suggest a discipline similar to that noted by Davis (1987, p. 221) in her description of literacy learning in 16th century France: "the protestant method for guaranteeing orthodoxy was in the last instance censorship and punishment; but in the first instance it was *the combination of reading with listening to a trained teacher.*" In the protestant literacy training described by Davis and the progressive training analysed here, the premium placed on membership in a collective engaged in 'learning by doing', on noncoercive participation – however 'kinder and gentler' – still marks out a form of political and moral construction of the literate habitus, what Foucault (1979) calls a "means of correct training."

Of course, in local sites such approaches never occur in the 'pure' forms prescribed in the 'truths' of educational discourse. Disciplinary power is neither unitary nor total, but rather diffuse and site specific. The 'progressive' teaching examined here exemplifies how a single boundaried lesson may be the site for multiple pedagogical technologies aimed at single bodies, alternating strategies designed to collapse them into a unitary, collective entity of the literate subjectivity, whether the "natural learner" or the "decoder." Implements of technologies of signs (e.g., the enlarged print book, the blackboard, the pointer), move in concert with those of technologies of power (e.g., the reprimand, the injunction), and those of technologies of the self (the internalised gaze). In this light, perhaps

what differentiates contending models in the great debate over literacy teaching (e.g., "skills," "cultural literacy," "great books," "whole language") is more fundamental than overt difference in ideology and content. Drawing from a full historical arsenal, each centres on differing technologies for shaping and regulating bodies.

To return to the literacy/reproduction nexus posited by Bourdieu et al.: Such technologies no doubt have concrete sociocultural parts to play in the representation and reproduction of classed and gendered textual labour. The ritualised oral reading procedures here could be seen to mirror particular home practices (e.g., the bedtime story) and various secular and nonsecular practices in the community and polity (e.g., church responsive reading; singing of a national anthem). Curiously, though, however well the body may remember, the language games mapped here do not appear to have direct correlates to reading-at-work or reading-at-home. I would argue that the forms of "cultural capital" garnered here (e.g., oral reading, intonation patterns, correct posture) are not taken out directly for credit on the "linguistic market." Rather, their capitalisation would seem to be in acquiring the bodily habitus for student reading and thereby ensuing discipline and promotion within the institution. If this is the case, the mode of inscription described here is a closed text, one sourced in, characteristic of, and servicing the disciplinary regime of the school.

The imprint is in part a matter of, as Graff (1981) so eloquently puts it, training in being trained. Of course, the effect may indeed be the inscription of particular values, beliefs, and attitudes. Particularly focal in children's texts and interaction are the interlocking possible worlds of class, gender and ethnicity presented: the Billy Goat narrative is but one exemplar of textual ideology at work. But I have tried here to draw attention to the normalisation of the body as pedagogic strategy and practice. The key is in what Foucault (1988, pp. 16–17) calls "the prohibition and strong incitation to speak" as a means of turning the gaze on oneself, of "telling the abbot everything he had in mind," and thereby monitoring oneself in the confessional. And what more effective way of extending the body politic to its members.

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Notes

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2. We could read these reformulations – like debates among deconstructionists (Fraser, 1989, pp. 69–92) – as quite deliberate attempts at a post-1968 politics for academic critique and strategic intervention in response to neo-conservatism, the celebration of narcissism, political reconfiguration in Eastern Europe, and late capitalist political economy (cf. Laclau & Mouffe, 1985).
3. Also collected in 1989 by the author as part of the survey noted herein.

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48

You Know, It Depends

Ronald Macaulay

She was a modern, you know.
He, you know, dealt in land.
They maintained, you know, several gardens.
You know, when the wind blows, their flowers **are famous.**

William Stafford "The Big House"

1. Introduction

Quantitative studies of variation in the use of discourse features are still quite rare (Macaulay, to appear), for obvious reasons. It does not usually make sense to count tokens in samples of speech that have been collected under very different circumstances, unless the aim is to explore the effect of different situations. Where samples have been collected by systematic procedures, as in sociolinguistic interviews, usually only a few variables, mainly phonological but occasionally morphological (and even more rarely syntactic) have been extracted for analysis. The quantitative analysis of discourse features requires that the total sample of speech be transcribed because raw numbers are misleading unless the total amount of speech is reported. The only way in which quantitative measures of discourse markers can provide evidence of differential use is when the relative frequency of occurrence is reported. This can be done only when the complete (or an extended) sample of speech is transcribed and a total word count provided.

This paper deals with the feature *you know*, which has received considerable attention (e.g., Bernstein, 1962; Erman, 1992; Holmes, 1986; Huspek, 1989; Östman, 1981; Schiffrin, 1987; Schourup, 1985). The aim of most of these studies

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has been to counter the negative view of *you know*, to show that it has a function, and that it is not simply 'verbal garbage' (Schourup, 1985: 94) or a weak feature of 'women's language' (Holmes, 1986). In general, these scholars start from the premise that the use of *you know* as a discourse marker is consistent with the basic meaning of the words and there is often a reference to 'shared knowledge.' One of the conclusions of the present paper is that this does not account for the use of the expression as a discourse marker. The recordings on which this claim will be based were not collected for the specific purpose of exploring the use of *you know*, so there was no preliminary hypothesis, but enough examples occurred in the transcripts to make an investigation of their distribution worth conducting.

2. The Sample

The paper is based on two corpora of speech recorded in Scotland under very different conditions. The first is a set of 12 interviews with adult speakers carried out by a single interviewer in the town of Ayr 1978–1979 (Macaulay, 1991), providing a corpus of just over 120,000 words. The sample was balanced in terms of social class, with 6 speakers each identified as middle-class or lower-class, but was unbalanced as regards gender, with only three women. The second corpus consists of 17 sessions of same-sex dyads recorded in Glasgow in 1997 (Stuart-Smith, 1999), providing a corpus of over 125,000 words.[1] The speakers were drawn from two areas of the city, representing broadly urban working-class and suburban middle-class areas. The sample consists of two age-groups: adolescents (13–14) and adults (40 +), with equal numbers of males and females.[2] For each session one speaker was selected and asked to choose someone they would feel comfortable talking to in the presence of a tape-recorder for about half an hour. The participants were free to talk about anything they wished. The figures for the two corpora are given in Table 1.

Table 1: Combined word totals recorded in Ayr and Glasgow by social class

	Ayr	Glasgow
Adults		
Middle-class	50,898	34,309
Working-class	69,771	50,307
All	120,669	84,616
Adolescents		
Middle-class		21,953
Working-class		21,093
All		43,046
All speakers	120,669	127,662

Table 2 gives the distribution by gender.

The proportion of narratives in the two corpora is roughly similar, about 25% in the Ayr interviews and 33% in the Glasgow conversations, but in both

Table 2: Combined word totals by gender

	Ayr	Glasgow
Males	97,997	51,724 (incl. 18,947 by boys)
Females	22,672	75,938 (incl. 24,099 by girls)

cases there is great individual variation among the speakers. The gender imbalance in the Ayr sample is unfortunate but there is enough speech recorded from the three women to provide some provisional information. All the speakers in the two corpora would be recognisable as Scots from their speech but there are clear differences between the social class groups (Macaulay, 1991; Stuart-Smith, 1999).

3. The Variable

Although there have been several studies of *you know* as a discourse marker (e.g., Holmes, 1986; Östman, 1981; Schiffrin, 1987; Schourup, 1985), most provide limited information on the frequency of use. The present paper examines gender, social class, and age differences, both quantitative and qualitative, in the use of *you know*.

It is first necessary to identify the variable. The examples in (1) all contain the words *you* and *know* in that order but they are not examples of the discourse marker *you know*.

(1) (Examples from the Ayr interviews)
   a. well *you know* how we're di– we're different
   b. if *you know* somebody who's there *you know* if you're going to stay
   c. whether *you know* it or not
   d. *you know* Jim Sellars the M.P.
   e. not what *you know* who you knew

In all these cases, the construction *you know* forms part of the syntax of the clause and could not be omitted. In the examples in (2) this constraint does not hold.

(2) (Examples from the Ayr interviews)
   a. you didnae offer her money *you know*
   b. I could see *you know* the hunted look on his face
   c. than I would be if I was actually *you know* out
   d. than if I was *you know* working nine till three
   e. I maybe always *you know* didnae back the winner

The examples (2b–e) are the clearest illustrations of *you know* as a discourse marker since, far from being part of the syntax of the clause, they actually separate constituents that are usually contiguous. There are, however, examples that

are potentially ambiguous in that it would be possible to claim that there is a syntactic role for the construction, as in the examples in (3).

(3) (Examples from the Glasgow adult sessions)
   a. *you know* I didn't have to think about it
   b. *you know* it just so happened
   c. but *you know* we had – we had a very good gym teacher
   d. but I know that the time will come *you know* that they're going to get to that point
   e. "Oh *you know* I'm really sorry honey"

If the examples in (3) were examples of informal written language, taken out of context, it might seem plausible (though highly unlikely) that they were instances of *that*-deletion following the verb; but on the tapes, it is clear from prosodic features that *you know* is not a verb with a following complement but a discourse marker with a very different function. *You know* in examples such as these is generally uttered as a single unit with a falling intonation and often at a slightly lower pitch and volume than the surrounding speech. For the purposes of the present comparison, occurrences of *you know* are treated as examples of discourse markers if they are not crucially part of the syntax of the clause and/or they are marked prosodically as separate units. In practice, it is usually not difficult to identify *you know* in its role as a discourse marker.

4. The Results

There is a total of 846 tokens of *you know* as a discourse marker in the combined corpora, with a frequency of 3.41 per thousand words. The total would appear to be sufficient to allow a plausible investigation of the use of this discourse marker. The first factor that appears to be influential is the context of recording. In the interviews conducted in Ayr the number of instances is 261 with a frequency of 2.16. In the Glasgow sessions the number of instances is 585 with a frequency of 4.58. These figures suggest that *you know* is more likely to occur in conversations between peers who know each other than in interviews with a stranger.

The second difference in the use of *you know* is shown by a comparison of the figures for the adolescents and the adults in Glasgow. The adults have a total of 548 instances with a frequency of 6.84 per thousand words; the adolescents have 37 instances, with a frequency of 0.86.[3] Whatever it is that leads to the use of *you know* in peer conversations of this kind it does not seem to be well established at the age of fourteen. Consequently, if only the adult conversations in Glasgow are compared with the Ayr interviews, it can be seen that *you know* is more than three times as frequent (6.48 *vs.* 2.16) in the conversational data. However, there may be an additional factor. Holmes (1986: 14) and Erman (1992: 228) found a greater use of *you know* in same-sex interactions than in

There are also gender differences. Of the total 846 instances 57% (485) are produced by females and 43% (361) by males. Since in the total sample there are more males, the difference is better expressed in frequencies. The females use *you know* with a frequency of 4.92 per thousand words and the males with a frequency of 2.41. This is consistent with results reported by Fishman (1978, 1980) and Östman (1981), but not with Holmes (1986), who found no gender differences in her sample, or with Erman (1992), who found that men used *you know* more frequently than women.[4]

The final extralinguistic variable is social class. In the total sample the working-class speakers produced 493 tokens for a frequency of 3.49 per thousand words and the middle-class speakers 353 tokens for a frequency of 3.29.[5] This small difference is consistent in both the Ayr and Glasgow samples, but much less than Bernstein (1962) suggests.[6] Social class is much less of a determinant than age, gender, or recording situation. The gender distinction is consistent across class, as can be seen in Table 3.

Table 3: Social class and gender differences

	Ayr freq.(#)		Glasgow freq. (#)	
Middle-class women	4.11	(21)	8.34	(156)
Middle-class men	1.88	(86)	4.36	(68)
Working-class women	2.33	(41)	8.33	(276)
Working-class men	2.16	(113)	4.59	(79)
Middle-class girls			1.73	(18)
Middle-class boys			0.35	(4)
Working-class girls			0.66	(9)
Working-class boys			0.81	(6)

The only category in which males used *you know* with greater frequency than females is among the working-class adolescents, and the difference is small and there are few tokens.

There are, however, social class differences in the function of *you know*. In Macaulay (1991), I pointed out the positions where *you know* occurs in the clause:

> "*You know* can occur in initial position in the clause..., in medial position..., or in final position in the clause. By *initial position* is meant either the first position in the clause or immediately following a coordinating conjunction or a discourse marker such as *well;* by *medial position* is meant any position preceded and followed by any constituent other than a coordinating conjunction or a discourse marker; and by *final position* is meant a position followed by no constituent other than a terminal tag such as *and that.*" (Macaulay, 1991: 156)

In the Ayr interviews there was a preference for final position in both groups, but it is stronger in the lower-class group.[7] The middle-class speakers are more

Table 4: Distribution of *you know* in Ayr

	Initial	Medial	Final
Lower-class	16%	19%	64%
Middle-class	25%	34%	41%

[From Table 10.11 in Macaulay, 1991: 156]

The figures from the Glasgow sessions show even more marked differences, as shown in Table 5.

Table 5: Distribution of *you know* in Glasgow

	Initial	Medial	Final
Working-class	25%	10%	65%
Middle-class	18%	50%	32%

Most accounts of *you know* attempt to explain its use in terms of shared knowledge, given the basic meaning of the sequence in its normal syntactic function (as illustrated in (1) above). My own view, based on the Ayr and Glasgow examples, is that *you know* has become grammaticalized much in the same way as *lets*, for example, (Hopper and Traugott, 1993) or certain uses of *like* (Romaine and Lange, 1991), in which most of the basic meaning has been bleached out.[8] There are examples where *you know* occurs in close proximity to the verb *know* (shown in bold) in its basic function, as in (4). (The examples in (4–14) are all taken from the Glasgow conversations.)

(4) a. but I **know** that the time will come *you know* that they're going to get to that point
b. sort of *you know* not **knowing** what an A.G.M. would be like at a golf-course
c. but *you know* I think that's the sort of thing that maybe you do when you're eighteen *you know* er I don't **know**
d. *you know* you **knew** at some point
e. Do you **know** *you know* that's what I would have had with me

Such examples do not prove that the basic meaning has been bleached out of *you know*, but they suggest that the speakers are not anxious about the conflict of homonyms.

It is also the case that a speaker will use *you know* when the addressee does not know what the speaker is about to say or has already said (Östman, 1981: 17). This was illustrated in Macaulay (1991: 157–8) showing one speaker who used *as you know* to refer to mutual knowledge and *you know* in connection with something that the interviewer could not have known. In initial and final position, *you know* is frequently used before or after statements that clearly do not represent shared knowledge, as illustrated in (5) and (6):

(5) a. *you know* I had mentioned the fact that I had taught for a few years (*reporting on a conversation that the addressee had not heard and could not have known that the speaker had mentioned this*)
b. and *you know* if they got the ball out to her (*referring to a women's rugby match that the addressee had not seen*)
c. *you know* we were playing is it a Stapleford? (*referring to a golf competition that the addressee had not participated in*)
d. I remember seeing a– a John Cleese video a few years ago on golfing etiquette *you know* he rolls into the car-park (*since the addressee had not seen the video he could not have known this*)
e. *you know* I think they probably will a few times (*the addressee presumably does not already know what the speaker thinks*)
f. *you know* there was a violent thunderstorm (*the addressee has already said that she did not know about the time when the system crashed because of lightning*)

(6) a. and I'd said I'd go up and meet them *you know*
b. we just all went down the road thegither *you know*
c. and I was just saying to her "Don't leave it until it's too late" *you know*
d. saying "No I think that's better on the top and that and that that that" *you know*
e. and he said "You didn't tell me you were going out" and I said "Yes I did" "No you didn't" *you know* so the next morning he was going out to work and he said "Well will I see you for tea tonight?" *you know* "Will you be at home?" *you know*
f. and Hilary walloped her one *you know* (*All examples of new information being provided as part of a narrative*)

There are, of course, occasions when *you know* is used in initial or final position in relation to a statement that could be shared knowledge, but the examples in (5) and (6) show that the use of *you know* cannot be predicated on the assumption of shared knowledge.[9] To start from that assumption often requires interpreting the new information either as part of general knowledge or as taking the speakers to be saying, in effect, 'You can imagine what the situation was.' Such an approach risks overinterpreting the data. If an explanation can be found without any assumption of shared knowledge, there is no need to make such subjective interpretations.

Nor is initial *you know* used in the Ayr interviews or Glasgow conversations to claim the floor by introducing a new topic (Fishman, 1978, 1980). The dynamics of turn-taking are different in the interviews and same-sex dyads from those in multiparty conversations. Initial *you know* is sometimes used to introduce backgrounded information contained in a subordinate clause or prepositional phrase, as in the examples in (7).

(7) a. But *you know* when you're working away
b. *you know* if you come out of the St Enoch's car park
c. *you know* if you're going to stay with somebody
d. and *you know* if they got the ball out to her
e. so *you know* instead of digging and digging rock you were just–

In final position *you know* can be interpreted as what Sacks et al. (1974) call a 'transition relevance place' since it usually marks the end of a syntactic unit, but generally in the Ayr interviews and Glasgow conversations the listener does not take advantage of this opportunity to take over the floor, except to contribute feedback in the form of a minimal response such as *uhuh* or *mhm*. This is not surprising since *you know* usually does not signal a desire or intention to yield the floor.

(8) a. 13L: and the kids were aw drapped off at my mother's *you know*
13R: uhuh
13L: and went fae school to my mammy's
b. 13L: then I had tae get a job roond Kirstie being at nursery and then get it roond Kirstie being at school *you know* cause I'd nae baby-sitters near
c. 10R: I mean they've got one of these old stone terraced houses in Prestwick which have got really
10L: mmhm
10R: high ceilings *you know* and I was saying you could really do a deep se– colour on the ceiling
d. 10R: cause he's the one that sits up late and watches j– garbage on
e. 10R: I'd got caught on a phone by somebody who was asking for help *you know* and I came out
10L: mmhm
10R: thinking "This is ridiculous" *you know* "she's wanting help and yet my child's the one who's being left at home" *you know* the television *you know* and you have to hassle and say "G–please go to bed"

Example (8e) illustrates a common use of final *you know* to mark the end of a section of quoted dialogue (see also 6e above). Other examples can be seen in (9).

(9) a. and Alison said to her "Well the holiday I'm meant to be having" *you know*
b. and I'm saying "Oh I– I'm so sorry Philip" and "Mummy just got caught up" *you know* and everything
c. and I thought "I'm no telling them" *you know*
d. and I says "Cause I want to gie something to it" *you know* cause I was one of the ones that done all the running aboot
e. he says "Nanny" and it's "Nanny nanny nanny" *you know*

Since *you know* can occur within the quoted speech, it is sometimes difficult to decide whether *you know* belongs inside the quoted speech or not.

(10) a. and I was just saying to her "Don't leave it until it's too late *you know* don't hassle and don't worry about it overly"
b. and you say "Well *you know* just tell him or don't argue about it"
c. I had to stop at Maryhill Shopping Centre at ten past three and phone the school and say "I'm sorry *you know* ha I'm here. Could you please take my child?" *you know*
d. I says "I'm trying to work them oot because wi the wean *you know*" I mean I says "but if the other granny watches her *you know* I'll just– I can go any time in August"

e. And I just says "Frank I'm– I'll be a bit later but I'll just come alang the road and get–and get you just stay in there *you know* I'll come alang and get you"

Examples such as those in (10) are problematic for those who wish to emphasize the interpersonal function of *you know*, since it is not clear whose face is being addressed.

The most interesting uses of *you know*, however, are those that occur medially, that is, potentially within a constituent. It is necessary to include the notion of potential constituents because one of the common uses of *you know*, particularly in the middle-class interviews and conversations, is before self-repairs, as in (11).

(11) a. and yet it's a shame because they – *you know* they do need they need a holiday but
b. I mean I'm– *you know* a– I– I having gone through it earlier em with Mum and Dad
c. certainly one for the formal situation and one f– *you know* for the more sort of relaxed situation
d. er but em you know Christine was a– *you know* was a good player really
e. and even then you wouldn't se– *you know* you wouldn't er compare him with the- the current back-row forwards.

This use of *you know* is what would be described by Brown (1977: 107) as a "verbal filler" and Edmondson (1981: 153) as a "fumble" in that it allows the speaker time to find the desired expression. Schourup points out that these repairs are often "clause internal 'restarts'" (1985: 137).[10] Similarly, *you know* is often used with hedges such as *sort of* and *kind of* as in (12).

(12) a. I think that's the sort of feeling that the feeling of guilt that you have *you know* when you're– *you know* you– you kind of chuck your children round
b. and she's a very *you know* neat em kind of gentle person
c. so there'll be a kind of *you know* they 'll avoid em Hilary em
d. it took me a while to *you know* sort of master it *you know*
e. and– and you– you just– *you know* you sort of semi-scramble down to the bay

However, not all medial uses of *you know* are in connection with repairs or hedges. *You know* is often used when the speaker apparently wishes to emphasize a constituent or to use a less expected expression. Obviously, identifying such a use requires a projection on the part of the analyst. Some examples are given in (13).

(13) a. I'm sometimes actually ending up doing more out and about than I would be if I was actually *you know* out
b. and they demand things and they *you know* stomp out
c. so I mean it's not as though they're *you know* completely on their own
d. whether they're *you know* into boys or into make-up or into pop or into what or whatever

In examples such as those in (13) it is as if the speaker wished to draw attention to the constituent that follows *you know*. In other cases, such as those in (14), the speaker is elaborating a preceding item.

(14) a. It's just horrendous *you know* absolute madness
b. there's a lot of pressure *you know* power stuff in the pack
c. I wondered actually if what we're seeing over the last couple of weeks is end of term *you know* celebrating end of term
d. because you– you met everybody *you know* all varieties of people
e. I mean it was all the old-fashioned stuff *you know* the– *you know* the Brown system

5. Discussion

It has been common in analyzing the use of *you know* to place the emphasis on shared knowledge (e.g., Schiffrin, 1987; Quirk et al. 1985; Crystal and Davy, 1975; Holmes, 1986) or on the effect on the addressee (e.g., Östman, 1981; Crystal and Davy, 1975; Schourup, 1985). This may be appropriate in multi-person conversations or among speakers in the US or New Zealand, but it does not seem to be the right way to categorize the pattern of use in the Ayr interviews or the Glasgow conversations. There does not appear to be any strong evidence that either *you* or *know* retains its basic meaning and function. Eble (2000), following Wales (1996: 78–82), comments on the increase in the use of 'indefinite *you*' as a general agent, distinct from its use as a second-person addressee form. She cites examples such as those in (15) (my italics):

(15) 1. "It's scary how Hollywood treats *you* like this completely different person when *you*'re thin." (Jennifer Anniston, *McCall's*, June 2000)
2. "*You* dream about it. *You* fantasize about it," [Matt] Doherty said of coaching the Tar Heels. ([Raleigh] *News and Observer*, 12 July 2000)
3. "*You*'ve got three million Palestinian refugees." (Martha Raddatz, *Washington Week in Review*, 21 July 2000)

It is likely that *you* in *you know* is an indefinite pronoun, like in the examples in (15), more often than it is a reference to the addressee as an individual. The examples in (4) showed that there was little sense of awkward repetition in the use of *you know* in close proximity to the use of *know* as a verb in its basic sense, suggesting that its meaning had been at least partly bleached out. Vincent and Sankoff (1992) examine a set of discourse markers that they call 'punctors' in 12 interviews sampled from the Sankoff–Cedergren corpus (Sankoff and Sankoff, 1973) of French speakers in Montréal. Among the ten punctors are the forms *tu sais* and *vous savez*, which correspond to *you know*. Vincent and Sankoff (1992: 206) comment that "Punctors have lost all or most of their original meaning or

function; we can say that they are to a large extent desemanticized." The same seems to be the case with *you know* in the Ayr and Glasgow materials.

If this view is correct it may be premature to make claims of the following kind based on a study in New Zealand:

> "Pragmatic devices, such as... *you know*, which are primarily addressee-oriented, tend to emphasize solidarity and implicit shared understanding, and it is therefore not surprising to find such discourse features in the present sample to be more closely associated with working-class speakers and less formal speech contexts." (Stubbe and Holmes, 1995: 85)

If *you know* is NOT "primarily addressee-oriented," then it may not "emphasize solidarity" and it is perhaps not surprising that it is found as frequently in the middle-class conversations in Glasgow as it is in the working-class ones. To say this is not to dispute the New Zealand findings but to warn against enthusiastic extrapolation. If we are to make serious claims about the use of discourse features, we need more and better data. Perhaps because discourse analysis is such a new technique there may be a temptation to over-interpret the data in order to justify the approach. Some of the work in gender differences suggests this as a real danger (Macaulay, to appear). As regards social class differences, the work of Basil Bernstein serves as a cautionary example of the dangers of extrapolating from meagre data, despite the acuteness of many of his insights. Until we have adequate data on which to make generalizations about social groups, it may be prudent to follow Johnstone's (1996) advice and also pay attention to how individuals use certain discourse features.

In the Scottish materials, *you know* sometimes appears to be an idiosyncratic feature of the speaker's speech style. This can be seen most clearly in the use of *you know* in final position, as in the examples in (8) and (9). As was shown in Tables 4 and 5, two-thirds of the working-class examples of *you know* in both Ayr and Glasgow are in final position. This usage is often stigmatized as indicating incoherent speech (e.g., Francis, 1983). However, one function is to provide a form of rhythmic pattern in a fluent narrative, or act as a kind of oral punctuation marker, what Jefferson has called "an utterance lengthener" (1973: 69). Far from indicating hesitancy it can be used quite effectively by fluent speakers.

This can be illustrated by an example of a discourse marker functioning to segment a narrative. In Ayr (though not in Glasgow) *ken* (presumably a shortened version of *you ken*) is often used in this role, as in this story by Willie Rae, a coal miner, interviewed as part of the Ayr investigation:

(16)

623 oh but this I dae remember
624 the pits were privately owned
625 and aw the miners stood at the **corner *ken***
626 they backed their wee lines

627 the bookie was staunding there and aw
628 sixpenny doubles and one thing and another *ken*
629 here this day I wondered
630 what was wrang
631 aw the auld yins took their caps off *ken*
632 because it was the pit owner
633 that was going by *ken*
634 for respect *ken*
635 an auld auld man he was *ken*
636 come by in a chauffeur-driven motor *ken*
637 the old yins daffing the cap
638 in oor days they'd be chucking stanes at that motor[11]

Rae's use of *ken* in the above example is not because he was searching for words or in any way hesitant, but because it is part of his narrative style. There are 157 examples of (*you*) *ken* in WR's interview, 93% are the reduced form *ken*, and 90% occur in final position. It can be seen that in this narrative, he uses *ken* as a way of separating out sections of his story:

(17) (A) oh but this I dae remember the pits were privately owned and aw the miners stood at the corner *ken*
(B) they backed their wee lines the bookie was staunding there and aw sixpenny doubles and one thing and another *ken*
(C) here this day I wondered what was wrang aw the auld yins took their caps off *ken*
(D) because it was the pit owner that was going by *ken*
(E) for respect *ken*
(F) an auld auld man he was *ken*
(G) come by in a chauffeur-driven motor *ken*
(H) the old yins daffing the cap in oor days they'd be chucking stanes at that motor

"(A) introduces the critical factor of the private ownership of the mines and sets the scene with the miners standing on the corner of the street. (B) explains why they were standing there. (C), introduced by the deictic discourse marker *here* (Macaulay, 1991: 169), which often indicates surprise, presents the central event of the miners taking off their caps. (D) gives the first explanation, that it was the pit owner going past. (E) explains the significance of the action. (F) and (G) add further background information. (H) both indicates the conclusion of the story and draws a contrast between the present and the past. Although the discourse marker *ken* makes no semantic contribution to the story, it helps to give it structure." (Macaulay, 1997: 155–156)

There are no such extended examples of *you know* used like this in the Glasgow conversations, perhaps because the narratives there are not of this anecdotal

kind, and none as marked as this even in the Ayr interviews, but there are sequences of *you know*, as in (18).

(18) (Glasgow session #18, working-class men)
L: and all the women would go "Oh we got a murder" *you know*
R: aye aye
L: and they– they eh em they'd buy the paper *you know*
R: aye aye aye
L: oh it was amazing nowadays it's eh *you know*
R: it's commonplace
L: murder it's commonplace *you know*
R: aye aye
L: you get a snippet of it on the back page of the Evening Times or something like that *you know*

You know in this usage is somewhat similar to the use of terminal tags by some of the working-class speakers in Ayr (Macaulay, 1985, 1991).[12]

If the use of *you know* is not to get "the addressee to cooperate and/or to accept the propositional content of his utterance as mutual background knowledge" (Östman, 1981: 17), "to allude specifically to the relevant knowledge of the addressee in the context of utterance" (Holmes, 1986: 16), to check "Are we together on this?" (Bernstein, 1962: 235/1971: 111), or to show a presumption about "some shared ground between the private world and other worlds with respect to what is in the shared world" (Schourup, 1985: 109), what is it that motivates the speaker to use it? If the answer is not to lie in the meaning of *you know*, the answer must lie in the nature of the signal itself.

Like *I mean*, *you see*, and *of course*, *you know* has an iambic structure, so it is perhaps not surprising that all four should occur frequently as discourse markers, since the iambic foot is such common part of English rhythm.[13] In the Ayr interviews, 66.85% of the medial and final occurrences of *you know* come after stressed syllables, suggesting that rhythm plays a role in its occurrence. *You know* also has a simple CVCV structure with two sonorant consonants and two vowels that are high in sonority. In this, it contrasts with its obvious competitor *you see* with its fricative/s/ and high front vowel.[14] Erman, (1992: 228) found *you see* to be less frequent than *you know* and in Ayr the middle-class speakers (with one exception) show a preference for *you know* (Macaulay, 1991: 144). (There are very few examples of *you see* in the Glasgow conversations.)

There is also considerable individual variation in the frequency with which discourse markers of this kind are used. In Ayr, the frequency with which individual speakers use *I mean* ranges from zero to 8.74 per thousand words; in the Glasgow adult conversations from zero to 6.91 per thousand words. In Ayr, the frequency of *you see* ranges from zero to 7.63 per thousand words. There is great individual variation as can be seen in the figures for the adult speakers' use of *you know* in both corpora. The range is shown in Tables 6 and 7.

Table 6: Range of frequency of *you know* by social class and gender Ayr

Working-class				Middle-class			
		#	Frequency			#	Frequency
WR	(m)	2	0.39	DN	(m)	12	0.79
HG	(m)	4	0.41	WG	(m)	7	0.82
EL	(f)	11	0.83	JM	(m)	7	0.91
AS	(m)	48	2.27	AM	(m)	27	2.77
WL	(m)	59	3.63	NM	(f)	21	4.11
MR	(f)	30	6.86	IM	(m)	33	7.22
All		154	2.21	All		107	2.1

Table 7: Range of frequency of *you know* by social class and gender Glasgow

Working-class				Middle-class			
		#	Frequency			#	Frequency
17R	(m)	1	0.16	16R	(m)	0	0.0
17L	(m)	1	0.53	10L	(b)	8	1.75
14L	(b)	5	1.16	11L	(m)	13	2.5
13L	(b)	14	3.41	16L	(m)	18	3.84
18R	(m)	21	4.77	12L	(b)	18	4.1
14R	(b)	53	6.74	10R	(b)	93	12.8
13R	(b)	47	9.1	12R	(b)	32	12.84
15R	(f)	45	10.45	11R	(m)	42	15.67
15L	(f)	81	10.99				
18L	(m)	56	12.09				
All		324	6.44	All		224	6.53

There are a number of observations to be made about the figures in Tables 6 and 7. The first is that there is a wide range in the frequency with which speakers use *you know*, from zero to over 15 instances per thousand words.[15] The second point is that this variation is not constrained by either social class or gender. The third point is that with the exception of two conversations (17 and 15), the use of *you know* is not equally frequent by the two speakers. Usually, one speaker uses this form much more frequently than the other. Note also that while generally the women use *you know* more frequently, for three of the groups the speaker with the highest frequency is a man. This is a warning not to generalize too quickly from group scores to predictions about individuals, particularly where gender is involved. Finally, one speaker was recorded in two sessions. The speakers identified as 13R and 14R are the same woman. The similarity in the frequency with which she uses *you know* (9.1 *vs.* 6.74) with different interlocutors (her two scores are ranked consecutively in the order of frequency in Table 7) suggests that this may be a consistent feature of her speech in such situations.

6. Conclusion

Quantitative studies of discourse features are still at a very preliminary stage. No doubt, improved methods of creating machine-readable corpora of speech recorded under a variety of circumstances (Sinclair, 1995) will provide more accurate information on many aspects of discourse. In the meantime, small-scale projects such as the Ayr interviews and the Glasgow conversations, while they cannot provide evidence on which to make unchallengeable claims, can perhaps provide pointers for future research. From the figures presented above, some tentative conclusions can be drawn, though their significance may not extend beyond the boundaries of Scotland.

(1) The use of *you know* varies among individuals from similar backgrounds. Some rarely use it, if at all, while others use it quite frequently.
(2) Speakers are more likely to use *you know* in conversations with an acquaintance than in interviews with a stranger.
(3) Women are more likely to use *you know* than men.
(4) Adolescents have not yet developed the use of *you know* as a characteristic of their discourse style.
(5) The use of *you know* is not more common in one social class than the other. However, middle-class speakers are more likely to use *you know* medially in an utterance for purposes of self-repair or elaboration, while working-class speakers mainly use *you know* at the end of an utterance.
(6) The use of *you know* does not appear to be primarily based on assumptions of shared knowledge, but rather to form part of the speaker's discourse style and the rhythmic organization of utterances, particularly when it is used at the end of an utterance.
(7) Some insight into the function of *you know* may be gained by looking in detail at how individuals use it, rather than depending solely upon group scores.

Notes in Press

This paper was written before I had seen Erman's recent functional analysis of *you know*, which explains the lack of any reference to that work in my paper. It may be helpful to point out that my paper deals only with the category that Erman calls 'textual monitors' (2001:1342–1345). Her other two categories include examples where *you know* is in syntactic construction with other elements in the utterance. As illustrated in by the examples I gave in (1) at the beginning of the paper, these constructions were excluded from my analysis. Apart from that, Erman's observations that 'discourse markers functioning at the textual level are not primarily concerned with the addressee's decoding of the message, but rather with the organization of the discourse' (2001: 1343) is consistent with the view I have tried to present above.

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Notes

1. My thanks obviously in the first place to Jane Stuart-Smith who organized the whole project, and then to her assiduous assistants who transcribed the tapes: Cerwyss Ower, Claire Timmins, Kathryn Allen, Lesley Eadie, and Susan Bannatyne, especially the first two.
2. For technical reasons three sessions were recorded with working-class women; one speaker was recorded twice with different interlocutors. As a result the number of participants in each social class/age/gender category is not totally consistent, but since the results are presented in terms of frequencies, the difference in absolute numbers need not materially affect any conclusions. The raw figures for working-class women, however, cannot be used in direct comparison with those of the other groups.
3. The frequency for the Glasgow adults is almost identical to that found by Holmes (1986: 13) for informal contexts, namely 6.9 per thousand words. Although Holmes' corpus is much smaller (30,000), the similarity of frequency is interesting.
4. This is what Erman (1992: 228) claims and she gives figures to show that more examples of *you know* were produced by males (198) than by females (148), but she does not give figures on the actual amount of speech produced by males and females. If, in fact, as is quite possible, the males spoke more than the females, then these figures could be misleading.
5. The Ayr lower-class speakers also use a form *(you) ken* in this function with a frequency of 2.9, but this figure is distorted by the fact that one speaker (WR) is responsible for 78% of the examples in a relatively short interview. WR uses *(you) ken* with a frequency of 31.4. One other speaker (WL) is responsible for 17% of the examples, with a frequency of 2.15. The other four lower-class speakers have only 9 examples among them. If all the tokens of *(you) ken* are added to those of *you know*, the frequency of the combined forms for the working-class men in Ayr is 6.01 per thousand words, but without WL's exceptional use of *(you) ken* the combined frequency for the other working-class speakers is only 3.31, so the use of *(you) ken* does not greatly affect the overall picture. The form *(you) ken* does not occur in the Glasgow conversations. WL's use of *ken* will be illustrated later in the paper.
6. Bernstein does not give figures for *you know* alone but groups it in its terminal use with other items under the category 'sympathetic circularity' (SC) sequences. The other items include *isn't it, ain't it,* and *wouldn't he.* Bernstein was reporting on a very small corpus of about 8,000 words and gives the the figures of 8 SC sequences for the middle-class boys and 67 for the working-class boys. These convert to frequencies of 2.53 for the middle-class boys and 14.14 for the working-class boys. Bernstein interpreted these results as symptomatic of the 'restricted code' used by the working-class boys: "The meanings signalled in this code tend to be implicit and so condensed, with the result that there is less redundancy. A greater strain is placed upon the listener which is relieved by the range of identification which the speakers share. The S.C. sequences may be transmitted as a response of the speaker to the condensation of his own meanings. The speaker requires assurance that the message has

been received and the listener requires an opportunity to indicate the contrary. It is as if the speaker is saying 'Check– are we together on this?'. On the whole the speaker expects affirmation. At the same time, by inviting agreement, the S.C. sequences test the range of identifications which the speakers have in common." (1962: 235/1971: 111) This is a very clear statement of the notion of 'shared knowledge' that underlies many of the interpretations of the use of *you know.*

7. These figures are similar to those Huspek (1989: 666) found in a sample of 10 working-class speakers. He found 43.3% of *you know* in final position and 23.9% in initial position. His figures are not strictly comparable since he gives his results in terms of sentences, a measure that reduces the proportions in comparison with clauses.
8. Jefferson (1973: 95) argues that overlapped tag-positioned address terms in closing sequences "are not motivated by 'personal' considerations, although they can become resources for interactants to do 'being personal'". In a similar line of argument, I suggest that the use of *you know* is not necessarily motivated by interpersonal intentions though it may be so used.
9. Marcia Macaulay (1990), in her comparison of oral and written speech across genres, analyzes a section from a lecture *The Politics of Love* given by Leo Buscaglia, comparing it with a section from his book *Loving Each Other.* She points out that Buscaglia uses *you know* in 'speaking to an audience of thousands" (p. 92). He uses it in instances where there is no possibility that his audience could share the knowledge, e.g., a story in which he says "... and there was this man pushing everybody aside with his poor wife on his arm *you know* he's pulling her through..." (p. 196, italics added). The reference to *this man* makes it clear that this is new information to the audience. In the extract from his speech printed in the appendix to the volume there are 19 examples of *you know,* giving a frequency of 13.25 instances per thousand words. This is a higher frequency than in any of the Glasgow conversations, yet Buscaglia can have no direct knowledge of what such a large audience knows or does not know.
10. Schourup, however, points out that *you know* "cannot very appropriately be used in cases where the repair involves radical changes" (1985: 122). He gives the example:

    ?*I got a dog– you know cat for my birthday*
    which seems very unlikely, whereas the same utterance with
    I mean sounds quite normal: *I got a dog– I mean cat for my birthday.*

11. *dae* 'do,' *aw* 'all,' *wee lines* 'bets on horses,' *bookie* 'bookmaker,' *staunding* 'standing,' *sixpenny doubles* 'bets,' *wrang* 'wrong,' *auld yins* 'old ones,' *daffing* 'doffing,' *oor* 'our,' *chucking stanes* 'throwing stones.'
12. In the lower-class Ayr interviews terminal tags such as *and that* and *and one thing and another* occur with a frequency of 4.93 per thousand words, but this is mainly due to one speaker (AS) who produced 85% of these examples (a frequency of 13.84). The speakers often use these tags at the end of clauses:

    a. if I had her cleaned up *and that*
    b. aye but it– it was a cheap holiday *and that*
    c. I didn't feel it tight *and that*
    d. when he died *and that*

    As the last example clearly shows, these tags need not have a set-marking function (Dines, 1980). As the last example clearly shows, these tags need not have a set-marking function (Dines, 1980).
13. It is interesting that of these four discourse markers only *of course* is common in written language.

14. It also contrasts very strongly with the focuser *like*, so popular among younger speakers in the US (Dailey O'Cain, 2000; Schourup 1985; Romaine and Lange, 1991; Underhill, 1988). *Like*, with its final voiceless stop consonant imparts a staccato effect to the user's speech. My guess is that *like* and *you know* are probably in complementary distribution for the contexts in which they could both occur.
15. Vincent and Sankoff (1992: 207) show a similar range in the use of punctors in their sample. Huspek (1989: 665) also shows a range of use of *you know* among his working-class speakers, with one speaker using *you know* almost five times as frequently as the least frequent user. Since Huspek gives his frequencies in terms of sentences, it is not possible to compare them with the Scottish results.

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49

Analysing Self-Constituting Discourses

Dominique Maingueneau

In this article I specify my conception of discourse analysis, before dealing with a research field that I would like to promote: that of 'self-constituting discourses'.

1. Discourse Linguistics and Discourse Analysis

Most discourse analysts are satisfied with a 'minimalist' definition of discourse analysis, which they only consider as the study of texts in context, of communicative events. Actually, the notion of 'discourse' is more problematized than that of 'discourse analysis'. This oversimplification can be explained easily: in the beginning the scholars who worked on discourse had to legitimate their research, to establish a new conceptual and methodological area at once against a narrow conception of linguistics or semantics and against traditional approaches to texts. Their attention was naturally drawn more to the boundaries of what they were opposed to than to those of their own discipline. Now that the legitimacy of discourse studies is established, to the extent that throughout the world people work in this area, I think that we must reflect more on the boundaries of 'discourse analysis'.

Some people consider that demarcating the territory of discourse analysis is a quite uninteresting question and that the scholars who specialize in this area must work without any restraint; for them 'discourse analysis' is a mere label given to a wide range of studies on texts; it does not need to receive a definite content. I am nevertheless convinced that working without any reference point is very difficult. Even those who say that they do not worry about the boundaries of their research and who refuse to register in a given discipline submit in fact to paradigms they are not conscious of.

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Instead of asking whether limits *can* be set to discourse analysis, some sceptical analysts could ask whether one *must* do it: if we clear up the vagueness, don't we run the risk of destroying what we intended to clarify – the risk of discovering that there is nothing firm in the area of the so-called 'discourse analysis'? It is a fact that many people consider discourse analysis a trifling activity, which fluctuates between useless sophistication and confusion, mixing in an uncontrolled way linguistic analysis with second-hand psychological or sociological views.

The instability of discourse analysis is steadily increasing, for more and more researchers throughout the world are exchanging ideas about discourse study, and, thanks to modern information technologies, more and more quickly. An aggravating circumstance is that discourse analysis is practised by two types of people, whose preoccupations are very different: on the one hand those who are mainly interested in discourse properties, and on the other hand those who use discourse analysis for dealing with historical, sociological, psychological or other problems. The former worry much more about concepts and methods than the latter, who wish to get immediate results, and who consider discourse analysis as a mere instrument for interpreting social or psychological data. Nevertheless discourse analysis cannnot be a mere auxiliary discipline, like statistics for sociology: the disciplines that may use discourse analysis as an instrument must not forget that they are also discourse, and may therefore turn into an object for discourse analysis. Likewise discourse analysis may turn into an object for sociology, psychology, etc.

It cannot be denied that nowadays any study of texts may be called 'discourse analysis'. Maybe such a situation results from the inertia of academic institutions: as contemporary research in social sciences cannot be easily channeled within the limits of traditional disciplines, many people say that they practise discourse analysis in order to legitimize studies that could be seen, from a traditional viewpoint, as 'marginal'. But if we take a long-term view, discourse analysis may be devalued by that ambiguity.

As a consequence, many definitions of 'discourse analysis' are very tolerant, or, on the contrary, extremely restrictive.

According to tolerant definitions all studies that claim to belong to discourse analysis have to be considered as discourse analysis. Such tolerance may be connected with a sceptical conception of scientific activity, according to which disciplines could only be defined by sociological criteria, not by their content.

Restrictive definitions are mostly given by scholars who do not take into account the diversity of the actual works in this area. Such an attitude may be adopted for two different reasons:

- Some call 'discourse analysis' their own research and expel other trends from that discipline. This is a rather common occurrence in social sciences, where people must give a definition of their discipline that is compatible with the way they work.
- Others draw up a definition of discourse analysis that is too narrow because they want to use clear-cut denominations. They decide therefore to name 'discourse analysis' a very small part of the studies that claim to be

discourse analysis. They do not do so because they are sectarian, but because they want to give precise definitions. In the *Nouveau dictionnaire des sciences du langage*, for example, 'discourse analysis' is restricted to the distributionalist method of Z. S. Harris in the 1950s (Ducrot and Schaeffer, 1995: 404); such a definition ignores the diversity of research in the field. We could mention too the interesting distinction made by S. Levinson in his handbook *Pragmatics* (1983): according to him, discourse analysis is one of the two main trends in the study of oral interactions. To that trend, focused on speech acts theory and hierarchical analysis of conversation, belong J. Sinclair and M. Coulthard (1975) or E. Roulet's school in Geneva (1985). Yet another trend proceeds from ethnomethodology. Such a distinction is very pertinent from a theoretical viewpoint, but it is only a matter of terminology. This distinction does not correspond to actual research: it can hardly be denied that for most of specialists discourse analysis is a much wider field.

If we want to take into consideration the full diversity of discourse analysis we are obliged to give very vague definitions. K. Ehlich, for example, in his presentation of the trends of discourse analysis in Europe (Ehlich, 1994: 9–10) uses expressions such as study of 'the reality of verbal action in its multiplicity and its complexity', or study 'based on facts of real communication'.

I think we would do better not to conceive of the relationship between 'discourse' and 'discourse analysis' as analogous to the relationship between any empirical object and the discipline which studies that object. Assuming that an empirical area commonly named 'discourse', interpreted as verbal activity in context, exists, it is postulated that discourse analysis is *the* discipline that takes charge of that area. But it can be challenged that discourse must be analysed by *one* discipline. Why not consider that discourse allows the construction of various objects, corresponding to various viewpoints, various approaches? Only God could apprehend discourse from one viewpoint. So, it seems necessary to introduce a distinction between *discourse linguistics* and *discourse analysis*. Various disciplines (rhetoric, sociolinguistics, discourse analysis, conversational analysis, etc.) assume the study of discourse; as a whole they constitute 'discourse linguistics'.[1] According to that viewpoint, discourse analysis is only one of the disciplines belonging to discourse linguistics. Each of those disciplines is ruled by a specific *interest* in discourse.

The specific interest of discourse analysis is apprehending discourse as articulating text and social places. Consequently, its object is not textual organization nor communicative situation, but what knots them through a certain genre of utterance. The notion of 'social place' must not be considered from a literal viewpoint: this 'place' may be a position in a symbolic field (political, religious, etc.).

Discourse analysis, logically, gives a key role, to discourse genres. These 'genres' are not to be considered as text classes, in a taxonomical way, but as

communication devices, at once social and linguistic, in a word: discursive. From this viewpoint, a dissertation, a TV programme, a conversation or a lecture are genres, but not categories such as description, polemic, etc., which cross manifold genres. Since the focus of discourse analysis is communication devices – genres – which are at once textual and social, it borders on text linguistics and social representations study. Considered as 'discursive institution' (Maingueneau, 1991), a genre implies roles and tacit contracts for the partners, specific medium, pertinent localization in time and space, prototypical text organizations, etc.

2. Discourse Analysis

Such a conception of discourse analysis is not very far from that of Brown and Yule's *Discourse Analysis*, where it is presented as 'committed to an investigation of what language is used for' (1983: 1). Another book, written from a similar functionalist viewpoint, is more explicit: 'All linguists – from the phonetician, through the grammarian, to the discourse analyst – are concerned with identifying regularities and patterns in language. However, in the case of the discourse analyst, the ultimate aim of this analytical work is both to show and to interpret the relationship between these regularities and the meanings and purposes expressed through discourse' (Nunan, 1993: 7). It seems to me that both formulations focus on the same idea, although it is not clear whether discourse analysis is the only discipline assuming discourse study.

As a result, discourse analysis has no data of its own: it can analyse the same data as other discourse disciplines, but by its own approach. Besides, in the same investigation the analyst can change disciplines, adopting various viewpoints on the data. In analysing a TV debate, for example, the analyst can take the viewpoint of conversational analysis, of rhetoric, of sociolinguistics or of discourse analysis and focus his or her attention on corresponding aspects of the data. If the analyst adopts the viewpoint of conversational analysis, he or she will privilege the study of interpersonal relations, turn-taking, cooperation and negotiation, physical attitudes, etc. The specialist of rhetoric will privilege other dimensions of discourse, in particular the connection and the nature of the arguments. The analyst of discourse will reflect on the communication device, on the articulation of public space and the way the text is organized. Naturally, each discipline may, and must, take into account the results of the others, but subordinating them to its own interest. It often happens that investigations with a descriptive approach to data cannot be referred precisely to a discipline. That does not entail that those disciplines do not exist.

Though data are not the property of a given discipline (oral interaction is not reserved solely for conversational analysis, nor is advertising for rhetoric, etc.), there is no denying that each discipline studies preferential data. It can be easily understood that discourse analysts are a priori less interested in everyday conversations than in newspapers, specialists of conversation less interested in advertising discourse than specialists of rhetoric.

Even if the viewpoint about discourse analysis outlined earlier is assumed, it is clear that this discipline does not appear at all homogeneous. Various interdependent factors contribute to its diversification:

- *Heterogeneity of scientific and intellectual traditions*: in England, for example, empiricism dominates the conception of scientific activity, the notion of 'discourse' is tightly tied to oral communication and to anthropolinguistic studies. In France discourse analysis is deeply influenced by the 'French school' of the 1960s and by Michel Foucault's work.
- *Diversity of reference disciplines:* as discourse analysis is always in contact with all social sciences, it varies according to the nature of the disciplines that exert influence upon it. The role of sociology and anthropology is much bigger in American discourse analysis than in Europe, where linguistics is more influential.[2]
- *Diversity of schools, trends.* Generally, these are associated with a charismatic leader who gives to the group the key concepts and the methodological paradigms of research.
- *Diversity of the data.* Two cases can be distinguished:
  - Some analysts may be particularly interested in certain types of discourse, which are well adapted to their conception of discourse analysis; and
  - Some groups may decide to work on certain types of texts (political, scientific, administrative); a large variety of theoretical options can be tolerated since their members are only united by the data that they study.
- *Aspect of discursive activity taken into account.* Some analysts study especially discourse production, others discourse circulation, others reception modes, etc.
- *Applied or not applied finality of the analysis.* By nature, discourse analysis is in close contact with social demand in many sectors (therapeutic, educational, political, economical). It is actually impossible to draw a clear-cut line between applied and theoretical research, but there is no denying that opting for an applied perspective has deep consequences on the way one works.
- *The academic identity of analysts.* By 'academic identity' I mean the field to which one claims to belong. If you are an historian, a sociologist, a psychoanalyst, etc. you will be more tempted to consider discourse analysis as a mere instrument for interpreting. I am not saying that discourse can really be studied for its own sake: we always look at discourse through philosophical, sociological, or political preoccupations. But having a philosophical preoccupation for discourse differs from studying discourse as a philosopher.

Although discourse analysis, by its very nature, is at a crossroads of social sciences, although discourse analysts concern themselves with discourse for philosophical, or sociological reasons, I think that discourse analysis must keep in

privileged contact with linguistics. If it does not do so, it can hardly be distinguished from the traditional 'content analysis' (Berelson, 1952) of empirical sociology. This is an important point. When we study discourse for militant motives, we are sometimes inclined to neglect linguistic phenomena, in order to have quicker access to representations, inclined to 'go across' language to arrive at interpretations that are independent of the way language is used in a given genre. We may also be inclined to study some details independently of the text as a whole and of the communication device. For this reason, it is worth maintaining discourse analysis in the field of language sciences. Let us remember that texts can be studied out of language sciences: many specialists of literature, politics, philosophy or advertising analyse texts in their own way, which is quite impressionistic but, according to them, well adapted to their aim. Discourse analysis demands more: its methods depend on scientific knowledge about language.

As a recent discipline, discourse analysis is exposed to various risks. In particular:

- Speculating about subjectivity, ideology, language, etc. without being connected with empirical phenomena.
- Describing data without any organizing viewpoint. Virtually, the territory of discourse analysis is unlimited: any linguistic utterance may be taken into account, split into elements, or commented: but what for? For syntax or morphology, descriptive works are very useful, indeed indispensable, as a basis for building linguistic models, but in discourse analysis, descriptions may easily prove to be useless, although they look quite exact and serious. A way to protect oneself against this risk is to address methodological problems, dealing more accurately with the relationship between the specificity of the data and the aim of the investigation.
- Uncontrolled hermeneutics, by which any discursive phenomenon would be analysed according a pre-established interpretation. That is a reproach often addressed to psychoanalysis, but it is valid for any hermeneutic practice.

Discourse analysis is doomed to take part in social and ideological conflicts, to intervene in political debates, directly or indirectly. Not all analysts concern themselves with social problems, but it is a permanent dimension of discourse analysis. The 'French school' of the 1960s planned, with marxist assumptions, to work out a theory of ideology. Two decades later, 'critical discourse analysis', as socio-political analysis of discourse, purports to study the various forms of power in relations between sexes, races, social classes (Van Dijk, 1990, 1993). Such a project is based on a conception of ideology as a set of socio-cognitive systems of representation that control attitudes and prejudices. That trend develops in a theoretical frame quite different from that of French school, but they both illustrate the same attitude towards the role that discourse analysis is called to play in political and social conflicts.

This critical attitude is a dimension of discourse analysis, but, of course, according to its promoters, it cannot be the whole of discourse analysis, which also studies places and modes of speaking independently of militant projects. Even when it is not openly interested in criticizing ideology, discourse analysis, radically, is a critical activity: it affects some basic illusions of speakers – the illusion of saying what they mean, the illusion that the places from which they speak are not constitutive of signification.

3. French Tendencies

I would now like to introduce the analysis of 'self-constituting discourses'. This type of analysis is in keeping with a trend of discourse analysis that I have proposed to call 'French tendencies' (Maingueneau, 1991: 24), although the word 'French' is not quite suitable: many discourse analysts outside of France share basic assumptions of this trend, and within France many analysts work with quite different assumptions. But I have not found a more appropriate name. These 'French tendencies' have their roots in the philology of the last century, in various practices (particularly the stylistic analysis of literary texts) and 'continental' philosophical traditions. By speaking of 'French tendencies' I only point to a certain style of discourse analysis, generally characterized by the reference to 'enunciation' theories, the preference given to 'constrained' discourses apprehended from a macrosociological perspective, an interest in discursive subjectivity and heterogeneity (polyphony, dialogism), the emphasis put on linguistic 'materiality', the assertion of the primacy of interdiscourse. I do not mean to imply that all the scholars who participate in this sort of analysis share all the same assumptions.

Let us emphasize some points:

- *The study of 'constrained' discourses* contrasts with (by no means 'is opposed to') the analysis of conversations. 'Constrained' discourses refers to oral or written discourses that imply a strong control, from a social and a textual point of view, and that may be stocked, commented. Such discourses are not more or less interesting than everyday oral interactions: discourse is always circulating from one pole to the other, from 'fleeting' utterances to 'authoritative' utterances.

Roughly speaking, three modalities of discourse genres in a society can be distinguished:

- *Author genres:* when they assign genres such as 'tragedy', 'meditation' or 'elegy' to their works (of philosophy, literature, etc.), authors enrol them in a 'genealogical class' (Schaeffer, 1989), i.e. in a class of texts associated to a prototypical text or set of texts; for example, Greek tragedies for tragedy, Plato's work for philosophical dialogues, Montaigne's *Essays* for essay, etc.
- *Routine genres* are the most common. They have no author, they stabiliz-

purpose: buying something, lecturing, campaigning for a candidate . . . To such genres are assigned specific roles, speech contracts, text macro-structures, etc.

- *Conversation genres* are much less constrained. Interpersonal relations override roles, their finality is not always clear and stable, their text organization may be very fuzzy.

What I call 'constrained' discourses refers especially to author and routine genres.

- *Putting emphasis on language 'materiality'* means turning one's attention to linguistic forms. Taking directly into account the psychological or social effects of a linguistic element, or of a linguistic structure is not enough. Language is not a mere instrument for speakers: they have to negotiate with what language materiality imposes to them. Discourse tries to resolve conflicts but across a language that limits movements and triggers uncontrolled effects.
- *Linguistic theories of 'enunciation'*,[3] developed by linguists such as C. Bally (1932), E. Benveniste (1966; 1974), R. Jakobson (1963) and A. Culioli (1990) play a very important part in many of those discourse studies. They deal with phenomena such as nominal determination, deictic elements, tense, polyphony, thematization. Enunciation theories may be considered as a component of pragmatics trends, but they are above all an analysis of *language* structure, not a theory of communication. Furthermore, they are very concerned with intersubjectivity: the enunciation subject, who articulates text and communication setting, cannot be reduced to a social subject nor to linguistic forms ('I', 'we'), which are only traces of it. Enunciation theories are therefore precious to discourse analysis, which is very anxious to avoid opposing social and linguistic dimensions of subjectivity.
- *Primacy of interdiscourse* is hard to define, for it may be interpreted in various ways. Such a principle decentres discourse analysis. It does not mean that analysis ought to compare texts with each other, instead of studying isolated texts: it means more: the identity of a discourse is constituted and maintained through other discourses, speaking is always speaking with, against or across other discourses, other voices. So, the relation of a text to itself and its relation to others, that is 'intradiscourse' and 'interdiscourse', cannot be dissociated.

Many phenomena in texts can be referred to this primacy of interdiscourse: presupposition, negation, quotations, mood and tense, irony, parody, etc.

4. Self-Constituting Discourses

The analysis of 'self-constituting discourses' is not a well-stabilized territory, but it gives the possibility of asking exciting questions about some important types of discourse. For quite some time I have been studying a wide range of texts,

that if we disregard superficial differences, many descriptive concepts could be transferred easily from one to the others. So I came naturally to the assumption that in the discursive production of a society a specific area could be delimited: that of 'self-constituting discourses'. Of course, religious discourse or literature, for example, have been steadily studied for centuries by hundreds of thousands of people, but bringing those discourses together in a new discursive unit may open an interesting research programme.

To clarify the notion of 'self-constituting discourses', one can start from a commonplace observation. Philosophers or scientists are not supposed to appeal to the authority of journalists when they deal with philosophy or science; on the contrary, when a debate is organized in the mass media about important problems, particularly ethical problems, journalists request the intervention of priests, scientists, philosophers or writers. These people are perceived as delivering not just any message, but one authorized by their privileged acquaintance with 'ultimate' discourses: discourses upon which others are based – that have a particular relationship with the foundations of society and with the signification of human destiny. This asymmetry proceeds from the particular status of 'self-constituting discourses': discourse like others, they are also discourses which claim to be above any other type of discourse. Discourses bordering on unspeakable meanings, they must negotiate the paradoxes that such a status implies. To found other discourses without being founded by them, they must set themselves up as intimately bound with a legitimizing Source and show that they are in accordance with it, owing to the operations by which they structure their texts and legitimate their own context, the way they emerge and develop. Analysts have no access to the world beyond limits of speech, but they can analyse the textual operations by which self-constituting discourses manage their self-foundation. Self-constituting discourses take charge of what could be called the *archeion* of discursive production in a given society. This Greek word, the origin of Latin *archivum*, has, from our viewpoint, an interesting polysemy: derived from *arch* ('source', 'principle', 'order', 'power'), the *archeion* is the centre where authorities sits, a group of magistrates, and public archives too. So, this notion of *archeion* binds tightly *founding* operations in and by discourse, the determination of a *place* for legitimate speakers and addressees, and the management of *memory*.

'Self-constituting discourse' does not define a category whose typological status is familiar. Usually discourse analysts handle typologies based on various criteria:

- *Linguistic* typologies, independent of the content and of the purpose of discourse, bring together texts that share significative properties. Those who work with concepts of 'enunciation' theories often use the basic distinction of Emile Benveniste between 'discours' and 'histoire' (Benveniste, 1966: 237): texts in relation to their enunciation situation, that is to say texts with deictic elements, are opposed to texts devoid of any relation to their enunciation situation, therefore devoid of deictic elements.
- *Functional* typologies class discourses according to their purpose. Such classifications handle very abstract functions, generally communicational

functions, for instance those of Roman Jakobson's famous typology (Jakobson, 1963), or functions based on sociological criteria (play function, mythical function, etc.).

- *Situational* typologies classify discourses according to diversified criteria: the places where they are produced (discourse in hospital, in the army, in classrooms), the identity of their speakers (the young, women), their genres (sermons, handbooks, papers), their ideological position (communist discourse, racist discourse, etc.).

What about self-constituting discourses? From a typological viewpoint, they can be considered a functional category as well as a situational category, for they imply criteria at the same time functional and situational: they play a specific part in ideological production (founding and not being founded) and they also correspond to specific places in communication areas of society.

Referring particularly to Foucault (1969), I think that actually we must focus on an approach to self-constituting discourses that connects their textual properties with their status in interdiscourse, with the institutions that legitimate their speakers, with the way they circulate or they handle other discourses, the way they are transformed, stocked, and so forth.

For centuries those discourses, at least certain genres belonging to these discourses, have been intensively analysed and commented on, because they were prestigious. Everyday genres, in contrast, were ignored, because they were considered unstructured or devoid of interesting content. Nowadays the situation is quite different: in the whole world 'ordinary' uses of language are privileged data for scientific investigation: for the first time in history *any* discursive production may be worth being integrated in a scientific research. But that revaluation of ordinary interactions must not institute them as privileged forms of discourse, to which all forms of discourse ought to be referred. Of course, discourse is by nature interactive, but interactivity cannot be reduced to immediate, face-to-face interaction: the basic interactivity of language is distributed in a large variety of types of communication. We are always tempted to consider that a certain type of discourse is more important than others because it is supposed to give access to the ideological kernel of a society. This privilege has been attributed variously, to literature, to everyday conversation, to political discourse, or to mass media discourse. I think that we had better renounce the belief that there is such a privileged discourse area, a centre that could give access to the hard core of ideological processes: what matters actually is the multitude of connections between all discursive areas, the diversity of discourse.

The analysis of self-constituting discourses has to avoid two dangers. First, it must not be submitted directly to applied perspective. Scientific discourse, particularly, is mainly analysed for practical purposes, such as documentation or technical writing. When approached as self-constituting, a discourse has to be considered from a wider viewpoint: not only as a type of text that has specific properties, but also as a type of discourse that has a specific status in interdiscourse. Second, it is better not to apprehend each self-constituting discourse

separately, as traditional specialists do. On the contrary, those discourses must be decompartmentalized: systematic connections must be established between them, as well as between self-constituting discourses and other discourse areas.

By nature, self-constituting discourses claim to found others and not to be founded. This property permits a definition of their status in interdiscourse, but it does not correspond necessarily to the personal convictions of their speakers. Such discourses are at once *self-* and *heteroconstituents*, two inseparable aspects: only a discourse that constitutes itself can found others. Therefore the name 'self-constituting discourses' must not be misconstrued: ideally, we should write '(self) constituting discourses', with 'self' in parentheses. That does not mean that other forms of discourse do not act on them; on the contrary, self-constituting discourses and other areas are always interacting, but in the case of self-constituting discourses, that interaction is ruled by specific principles, which are different for each type of discourse.

It is not easy to establish a list of self-constituting discourses, even if we only consider our type of society, for such discourses are defined by their status in interdiscourse, not by clear-cut frontiers in social activities. Each type of society has its own self-constituting discourses or its specific way of connecting them. Speaking 'anachronistically', one could say that mythical discourse in traditional societies is both 'philosophical', 'scientifical and 'religious'. Experimental psychology is self-constituting in that it belongs to scientific discourse, but the status of psychoanalytic discourse is more fuzzy: at least in continental Europe, it behaves like a specific self-constituting discourse, similar to philosophy or religion. Unlike psychoanalytic discourse, political discourse does not seem to be a self-constituting discourse; there is no denying that it is a very powerful ideological frame, but it leans on scientific, religious, literary and other discourses; it is not really autonomous. Technocratic discourse, for example, leans mainly on economics, fundamentalist discourse on religion, and other discourses. I would rather say that political discourse is a privileged contact zone between self-constituting discourses and other areas.

In modern societies, as in classical Greece, *various* self-constituting discourses exist at the same time, thus competing with each other. This variety is irreductible: self-constituting discourses' life is made of it. During many centuries philosophical discourse claimed to be prevalent: it attributed to itself the privilege of assigning boundaries to the others. Theological discourse also did so, and so did scientific discourse later . . . The common-sense belief is that each self-constituting discourse is autonomous and has contingent relations with others; actually their relation to others is a part of their core identity; they must manage that impossible coexistence and the way they manage it *is* their very identity.

The Three Dimensions of 'Constitution'

We have still not justified the use of the expression 'self-constituting discourses'. The reason is that 'constituting' connects two interesting values:

- 'Constituting' as action of establishing legally, of giving legal form to some juridical entity: self-constituting discourses emerge by instituting themselves as legitimated to utter as they utter.
- 'Constituting' as forming a whole, an organization: self-constituting discourses are sets of texts whose structuration modes must be legitimized by discourse itself.

Those two values converge to the derivative name 'constitution' as a body of fundamental principles according to which a State is governed, and people receive rights and duties: self-constituting discourses produce texts dedicated to embodying norms, to guaranteeing behaviours of a collectivity, to drawing the frontiers of good and evil, false and true, etc.

As the analysis of self-constituting discourses is discourse analysis, it aims at showing the connectedness of textuality and action, of 'intradiscursive' and 'extradiscursive' dimensions. Discourse as text and discourse as activity are tightly knotted in discursive institutions, where groups of men and text genres are articulated. Text production delimits a space inside social space but configurates that space too. Therefore, the analysis of self-constituting discourses implies keeping a 'rhetorical' conception at a distance: in fact, content and textual organization are not independent of the discursive scene which takes charge of them and through which they appear.

Position and Discursive Community

Self-constituting discourses interact with each other and demarcate each other. Thus they are not compact blocks, but form *discursive fields* (Maingueneau, 1984) in which various *positions* compete: in modern societies ideological frames are steadily discussed and 'discursive fields' are the space where the diversity of those 'positions' is structured.

Positions are the product of an act of 'positioning', in the commercial meaning of the word. The content of this notion of 'position' (doctrine, school, party) is very poor: it only implies that no position can occupy the whole space of a given self-constituting discourse, that the identity of each position emerges and is kept up through the interaction, often conflicting, with the others. That is a motto of many discourse analysis works: the pertinent object is not discourse in itself, but the system of relations with other discourses. Of course, most of the producers of such discourses claim that their message proceeds directly from a true apprehension of God, Man, Science, Beauty, Reality, Reason, etc. but in order to understand how such discourses really work, we must refer positions to the place they hold in their field.

A position is not only a more or less systematic set of ideas, it associates a certain textual configuration and a certain way of life for a group of people. The various philosophical schools in ancient Greece, or the various groups in contemporary social sciences, are not only theoretical positions, they imply the existence of groups, of *discursive communities* (Maingueneau, 1987) which may be organized

in many ways. Inventing a new way of having dealings with other people and producing new discourses are two dimensions of the same phenomenon. Those communities are structured by the discourses they produce and put into circulation. So, discursive communities are paradoxically united by the texts they produce: the texts are both their product and the condition of their existence.

The key role given to such communities converges with many studies, particularly about scientific discourse (Hagstrom, 1965; Swales, 1990). The way people make science, practise philosophy or religion, or lead an artistic life, is inseparable from the way they produce discourse (De Certeau, 1975; Debray, 1983, 1991; Maingueneau, 1984, 1993). But that principle must be diversified according to the type of discourse taken into consideration: communities do not behave in the same way when they belong to scientific field or to theological field; moreover, theology does not imply the same type of community as devotion, though both produce religious texts.

It may happen that some positions refuse any form of group. For instance, many writers claim to live in the desert; Pyrrhonian sceptics in ancient Greece refused to belong to a school, as to do so was incompatible with the principles of their scepticism. But they cannot escape from philosophical or literary fields for all that if they produce discourse: their loneliness is integrated in their work as a condition of its textual identity.

The questions of discursive communities of self-constituting discourses is tightly bound with that of mediation. When we work on texts belonging to self-constituting discourses, we deal with highly structured discourses that speak of man, society, rationality, beauty, good and evil, that have a large scope, *global* aims. But those discourses are produced *locally*, by few people set in a small sector of society. Psychoanalytic discourse, for instance, is diffused in the mass media, or in many therapeutic practices, but it is shaped in very limited circles belonging to a specific field.

The Hierarchy of Genres

Self-constituting discourses are not a genre; they form a network of genres, which are situated in a hierarchy. It is a basic property of self-constituting discourses that some texts or genres are considered to be more prestigious because they are supposed to be nearer to their Source.

More exactly, two hierarchies must be distinguished. The first one opposes 'archetexts' and 'ordinary texts'; the other hierarchizes genres. These two hierarchies do not coincide with each other, but are tightly associated.

Archetexts are singular texts that are reputed to have a privileged relation to the 'archeion'. Plato's *Dialogues* or Descartes's *Meditations* for philosophical discourse, Newton's *Principia* for physics, The Gospel for Christians, Homer's *Odyssey* for literature, etc. embody, in a sense, the basic values of the discourse they partake of. But the notion of 'archetext' varies according to self-constituting discourses. Religious discourse is organized around prior archetexts, whereas scientific discourse only considers archetexts as exemplary; in literature archetexts are 'chefs-d'œuvre'. In religious discourse archetexts embody the Source

of truth; in scientific discourses such as physics or chemistry archetexts exemplify the norms of scientific activity; but in psychoanalysis, archetexts in some respects look a little like religious archetexts.

Although it seems contrary to common sense, it must be admitted that these archetexts that must be commented, and the texts that comment on them presuppose each other. Archetexts, when taking place in what could be called an 'hermeneutic frame', receive a pragmatic status that turns them into texts worthy of interpretation and attributes to them a certain way of circulating in interdiscourse. Sometimes the very form of the archetext depends on this status: the Gospel was not written and later commented, it was shaped through the commentaries that turned to it.

The meaning of a text that happens to be in an hermeneutic frame is supposed to exceed the abilities of its interpreters. If interpreters fail to understand it, it is not because the text is deficient, but because interpreters are deficient. This failure is the consequence of their 'hyperprotected' pragmatic status (Pratt, 1977). An hyperprotected text may transgress conversational maxims without losing authority. It is a 'monument' (from Latin *monere*, to remind), whose memory lives and whose interpreters die. Rather than obscure or ambiguous, it is enigmatic. If a text is no longer interpreted, it stops being enigmatic, therefore worthy of interpretation: the more interpretations it gives rise to, the more enigmatic it appears.

Interpretation cannot be considered independently of the legitimization of interpreters. Who is authorized to interpret? That depends at once on the discourses and on the positions in the discursive field. On discourses, because the interpretation of scientific texts, for instance, is reserved to specialists, whereas the interpretation of literary texts is claimed by scholars and by lovers of literature. That depends on positions too, because each position defines, explicitly or implicitly, who is authorized to read and interpret: some philosophers claim to write only for philosophers, others claim to write for ordinary people.

Two sorts of archetexts can be distinguished. Those that are *general*, which are acknowledged as archetexts by all people, and those that are only *local* archetexts, acknowledged by a part of the people of a given discursive field. In fact, this distinction is not clear-cut; for instance, 'general' archetexts may be given variable values: from the viewpoint of Moslems, the Bible is indirectly an archetext, as announcing the Koran; for all philosophers Hume, Kant or Husserl's greatest works are general archetexts, but all philosophical positions do not attribute the same value to each of them. The definition of archetexts is always controversial: each position has its own archetexts, its proper textual pantheon, setting its own identity by modifying prevailing hierarchies. Saussure's *Cours de linguistique générale*, for instance, was an archetext for most of structuralist linguists, but not for generativist linguists, who consider Chomsky's *Syntactic Structures* as an archetext, the foundation of a new age of linguistics. Surrealist writers in the 1920s showed that they were practising a new literature by changing archetexts: classical works were despised and others, which had been rejected, for example Lautreamont's or Sade's works, became archetexts.

There may exist hierarchies of archetexts, guaranteed by institutions: handbooks of literature oppose 'great' writers to others, the Catholic Church has drawn up a sophisticated scale of textual authorities.

As a rule, archetexts are considered as founders. However, that notion is ambiguous: some texts claim to found a new way of speaking of God, for instance, or practising psychoanalysis or literature; others do not. It often happens that posterity considers texts that did not claim to be founders as actually founders, and, on the contrary, that texts that claimed to be founders as not having introduced anything new. These two viewpoints are distinct and complementary.

The second hierarchy is more traditional: it opposes *top* and *secondary genres*. This distinction founds the possibility of popularization: on the one hand are texts that are supposed to be dominated by no other text; on the other hand one finds texts that clarify, simplify or diffuse doctrines already established. Thus the top genres of theology or basic science, for instance, are disseminated through secondary genres, such as predication in churches or TV programmes about medicine, diets, beauty. Between these boundaries (top genres and mass TV programmes) various genres may take place, such as handbooks for teachers or students and magazines dedicated to popularize science.

Those two hierarchies (archetexts vs ordinary texts, top vs secondary texts) have complex relations. Archetexts are singular texts, but they may belong to manifold genres such as autobiography, prophecy, or commentary. A theological commentary of the Gospel addressed to theologians is a *top* text, because the genre it belongs to is at the top of genres hierarchy, but it is an *ordinary* text in the hierarchy that distinguishes archetexts and ordinary texts. The analysis of self-constituting discourses analysis must not focus only on archetexts and top genres of texts, it must take as its object *the interaction of genres*, from the top to the base: self-constituting discourses are basically heterogeneous and that heterogeneity must be the centre of analysis. Genres and texts of high theology or great literature are always accompanied by other genres, less prestigious, which are also necessary to the 'archeion' of a society.

Generally, top genres texts are *closed*. By 'closed' genres, as opposed to *open* genres, I mean genres whose addressees are or may be producers of discourses of the same genre. On the contrary, in 'open' genres the addressees, who are regularly more numerous than the producers, belong to another sphere. The first case can be exemplified by texts of hard-core science: only potential or actual writers of articles of neurobiology are expected to read neurobiology journals. The second case can be exemplified by mass-distribution newspapers, whose diffusion is very large and whose audience is not made up of journalists.

The opposition closed – open deals with genres rules, not with reality: if millions of people happen to read a scientific article, that occurrence is independent of genre.

However, this distinction cannot be used too strictly:

- Some discourses, such as physics or mathematics, by their own nature are destined to be closed. Others are in a much more unstable situation:

history and sociology, for instance, even if they are directed to small communities of scholars, are regularly read by many other people.

- In philosophy, for example, some authors choose to write open texts, addressed to a large audience (Hume's *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* [1748], Descartes's *Discourse on Method* [1637]). The way they expose their doctrine and publish their book shows clearly their intention, which is an aspect of their philosophy. Others claim to write closed texts but actually are read by a large audience. These two circumstances must not be confounded. In the case of Descartes's work, he himself makes a distinction between his intellectual autobiography, the *Discourse on Method*, written in French for ordinary people, and his much more abstract *Meditations*, written in Latin for specialists.

Inscription and Medium

By nature, self-constituting discourses have to do with 'authority': their authors claim to deal with important matters, they speak according to strict and transcendent principles. In a word, they do not speak for themselves, they are on the track of some Other. Writing a scientific article, giving a sermon or writing a poem is more than expressing personal ideas, it is taking part in a rite, speaking under the control of something transcendent, such as Tradition, Reason, Truth. Many of those texts belong to a prestigious corpus, a textual heritage, which must be preserved from corruption, stored, copied, updated. So, rather than simple texts they are *inscriptions*. An 'inscription' may be oral, written or recorded, depending on the society. In traditional societies oral 'literature' or proverbs are inscriptions; nowadays many inscriptions are recorded.

Inscriptions are situated in a series: resting on words already said, they are, in their turn, virtual supports for other inscriptions. The genres of self-constituting discourses determine precisely the ways texts may take their place in interdiscourse: scientific references are not religious quotations.

This notion of 'inscription' implies further consideration of the 'mediological' dimension of utterances (Debray, 1991), i.e. the modalities of their material existence, which governs the way they circulate. Self-constituting discourses, which are ideologically dense, are highly bound with communication facilities, which is one more reason for giving a key role to genres, considered as socio-discursive devices. On that count, discourse analysis must not work with these traditional oppositions (action/representation, text/context, production/reception) which pragmatic trends have for a long time criticized. Meaning is not locked up in a text like in a box, it implies a set of communicational conditions. The 'content' of a text cannot be apprehended independently of these conditions: mediological conditions of a discourse are a dimension of its identity. It is well known that philosophical discourse could not appear in a society devoid of literacy, or that the textual organization of epic depends on the material conditions of oral performances. Modifications in the way scientific texts circulate transform scientific activity. Discursive activity ties a manner of saying and a manner of transporting texts, both associated with the way specific communities live.

5. Scenography, Linguistic Code, Ethos

Scenography

The meaning of an utterance cannot be separated from its pragmatic frame: even a doctrine must stage its own discourse. But a distinction must be made between *generic scene* and *scenography* (Maingueneau, 1998). To each genre of discourse is associated a 'generic scene', which attributes parts to actors, prescribes the place and the moment, the medium, textual macrostructures – all conditions necessary to felicity (Austin) of a given macrospeech act. But for many genres of self-constituting discourses another type of scene is implied: 'scenography', which proceeds from the choice of discourse producers.

Roughly speaking, generic scene is part of the context, it is the very scene that the genre prescribes, whereas scenography is produced by the text. So, two texts belonging to the same generic scene may stage different scenographies. A preaching in a church, for instance, can be staged through a prophetic scenography, a conversational scenography, and so forth. In the former case the speaker will speak in the way prophets do in the Bible and will give the corresponding role to the addressees; in the latter case he or she will speak in a friendly way to the audience. As a result, addressees interpret discourses through the association of two scenes, two contexts: one (generic scene) is imposed by the genre, the other (scenography) depends on particular discourses. Not all texts turn to scenography. As a rule, administrative genres, for instance, merely obey to the norms of their generic scenes. In contrast, adverts have to choose scenographies according to marketing strategies: adverts for cars can use a very wide range of scenographies: a woman in her bedroom phoning a girlfriend, an engineer explaining the technical advantages of a motor, a man describing his new car to a colleague, etc.

Here 'scenography' is not used in its usual way:

- It adds to the theatrical dimension of 'scene' the dimension of 'graphy', of legitimizing inscription, for scenography gives authority to discourse, it has persuasive effects on addressees.
- Scenography is not a frame, a scenery, as if discourse occurred inside of a place that is already fixed, independently of discourse. On the contrary, discourse puts progressively into place its own communicational device. So, *-graphy* must be apprehended simultaneously as frame and process.

Scenographies are determined according to the content of discourse: speaking through a prophetic scenography implies that only prophetic speech is convenient for the very world that the particular discourse is referring to. Discourse implies a given scenography (a speaker and an addressee, a place and a moment, a given use of language) through which a certain world is shaped, and the world must validate the scenography through which it is shaped. This paradoxical movement is the very movement of discourse. Scenography is both what discourse comes from and what discourse generates; it legitimizes a text that, in

return, must show that *this* scenography from which speech is proceeding is the pertinent scene for speaking of what it is speaking of.

In a scenography are associated a certain representation of the speaker responsible for that discourse, a certain representation of the addressee, of the place (*topography*) and of the moment (*chronography*) of discourse. Those elements are tightly bound. For instance, in a contemporary religious sect a preacher may show through his speech that he is a prophet in a desert addressing the ancient Hebrews; the biblical period and the desert, as a place far from urban corruption, a place for fast and repentance, are essential elements of that scenography, which, by mixing two discursive scenes (the empirical one and the mythical one) give authority to discourse.

Scenographies are selected according to ideological options of positions: Protestants give more authority to biblical scenes than do Catholics. Scenographies may be singular communicative events (for example, the Sermon on the Mount) or prototypical discourse genres (friendly conversation, sermon, lecturing, etc.).

So, in self-constituting discourses scenographies must not be considered as mere rhetorical strategies, as is the case in advertising campaigns: they are cosubstantial with ideological positions. When preachers, through their discourse, show themselves as prophetical figures, people who speak directly, roughly, who denounce sinners and demand intense repentance, they define implicitly what legitimate religious discourse has to be and, correlatively, the nature of illegitimate religious discourse: they are reaffirming their own act of positioning their identity inside the field.

In Descartes' *Discourse on Method* (1637) too, philosophical contents and scenography are two aspects of meaning: the scenography is not a contingent strategy, it modifies the very status of philosophy. The figure of a subject presented as simply capable of reasoning, outside of any institution, and telling his life to ordinary people shows in a performative way the superiority of the Cartesian 'method'. The *Discourse* legitimizes itself by giving to common sense ('bon sens'), independently of tradition, the part of ultimate referee, by going beyond the boundaries usually attributed to philosophical speech:

> *ceux qui ne se servent que de leur raison naturelle toute pure jugeront mieux de mes opinions que ceux qui ne croient qu'aux livres anciens* (Descartes, 1988: t. 649)
> [those who make use of their unprejudiced natural reason will be better judges of my opinions than those who give heed to the writings of the ancients]

Scenographies can be set up only in monological discourses; if there is direct interaction or debate, the speaker cannot really develop discursive scenes of his or her own but must only assume the rules of the genre in which he or she is involved. If Plato were discussing with another philosopher he could not express his thought through his own scenography as he does in his *Dialogues*.

Linguistic Code

Self-constituting discourses, mainly in top texts and archetexts, cannot have a simple relationship with linguistic diversity. When you deal with the absolute, when you are close to the frontier of the unspeakable, you cannot consider that all languages (English, Chinese, Latin, pidgin) are equivalent. Discourses that have such a particular status are always raising questions about the identity of the language(s) in which they invest their energy.

Therefore, for a given position language is not a mere instrument that carries information, it also has the status of a specific *linguistic code*, which is determined from *interlanguage*. By 'interlanguage' we mean the space of linguistic varieties to which one can have access from a certain place. Those varieties may be internal (registers, dialects) or external (foreign languages). But the distinction internal/external is superficial: it cannot be said out of context whether a language is 'foreign' or not. For instance, for cultured people in Europe during the last century, Latin was not really a 'foreign' language.

We do not use 'linguistic code' like structuralist linguists, who used that term as an equivalent to 'linguistic system'. 'Linguistic code' in our meaning is at once a communicational notion (it permits transmission of sense by conventional associations between sounds and interpretations) and in a sense a juridical notion (discourse uses the resources of interlanguage that it *must* use, in consideration of the ideological world that its own position attempts to validate).

The Gospel was written in Greek, which was not Jesus's mother tongue nor his teaching language. Using a common language such as Greek instead of Hebrew or Aramaic is not independent of the Gospel's doctrine. It indicates a breaking with the Jewish religion, implies a different diffusion area, a different practice of texts. A mass in Latin and a mass in vernacular language are not the same mass. In the case of the *Discourse on Method*, choosing French instead of Latin has to do with Cartesian doctrine: writing in French, challenging traditional teaching and appealing to the common sense of readers who do not belong to academic institutions are closely connected. It is clearly said in Descartes's quotation, whose complete form is:

> *Et si j'écris en français, qui est la langue de mon pays, plutôt qu'en latin qui est celle de mes précepteurs, c'est à cause que j'espère que ceux qui ne se servent que de leur raison naturelle toute pure jugeront mieux de mes opinions que ceux qui ne croient qu'aux livres anciens.* (1988: 1, 649)
> [And if I write in French, which is the language of my country, in preference to Latin, which is that of my preceptors, it is because I expect that those who make use of their unprejudiced natural reason will be better judges of my opinions than those who give heed to the writings of the ancients]

Besides, French in the 17th century was involved in the same ideological process as Descartes's thought. It was the moment when the French Academy [illegible] (1635), according to its ideology of clarity, French language, which

fits to the supposed natural order of reason, had to be 'purified'. Therefore Descartes's theory of 'clear and distinct ideas' invests a French language that in fact is already invested by a convergent linguistic policy. Those two movements support each other.

Now let us consider scientific discourse, for instance this very review *Discourse Studies*, or others of the same type. Writing in English (in fact, articles are not really published in 'English', but in that particular 'dialect', academic English, most of whose speakers have not English as their mother tongue) is not merely convenient, a means to facilitate the diffusion of ideas. Such a linguistic code implies various norms, not only about the way of quoting, of choosing references, of organizing texts, but also of considering scientific activity in that field, of dealing with language (a worldwide audience excludes connivance, play on words). The very fact of publishing papers coming from any country and destined to any country in the world implies the possibility of bringing together texts in the same space. We could speak of a pragmatic presupposition that a worldwide field exists: scientific productions are supposed to belong to the same universe, scientists supposed to belong to the same community, independently of their ethnic or cultural origin.

Ethos

Texts are not made to be contemplated, they are traces of discourses which try to convince subjects, to make them adhere to their universe. That adhesion is not only intellectual, in a sense it is 'physical' too. One cannot study prophetic, medical or popular speech and disregard the 'tone', the style of voice, the gestures associated with such characters. Discourse influence proceeds partly from that 'incarnation' of speakers. Here we meet the notion of *ethos*, which comes from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (Aristotle, 1967: 1377b). By 'ethos' Aristotle means the representation of the speaker that the addressee constructs across the production of discourse: therefore it is a representation produced by discourse, it is not what the speaker says explicitly about himself, nor the representation of the speaker that the addressee may have independently of discourse. Using pragmatic terms, it could be said that ethos is 'implied' in discourse.

In traditional rhetoric ethos is reserved to oral discourse. I proposed (Maingueneau, 1984, 1993) to use it for written texts too: even written discourse is referred to a source, it implies a 'voice' that has a specific *tone*. Through that determination of voice the addressee can construct a moving representation of the body of the speaker (not, of course, a representation of the real producer of discourse). Through reading process (from heterogeneous indices given by the text) readers shape a more or less definite figure of the speaker's body that corresponds to such a text. Let us name *guarantor* such a figure. By a constitutive paradox, it is through the very text that the guarantor must legitimate his or her way of speaking.

Actually, as discourses that give sense to all social practices, self-constituting discourses, even if they deny that dimension, appeal to exemplary schematizations of body. One of the reasons why discourse can persuade is that it gets

addressees to identify themselves with the behaviour of a body that is invested by historically specified values. People who adhere to the position staged by a discourse adhere also to the imaginary investment of body that such a discourse implies. 'Ideas' appear through a manner of *speaking* that is also a manner of *behaving*, which depends on norms and representations of body in a given collectivity. Self-constituting discourses, like advertising, unite the people who adhere to them by showing a specific *ethos*, a manner of inhabiting one's body. Ethos emphasizes the 'analogical' dimension of utterance (Watzlavick et al., 1967). Owing to ethos, the speaker sets himself or herself up as the *guarantor* of what he or she is saying. The figure of this guarantor depends naturally on the discourse scene he or she is involved in. For ethos is a dimension of scenography.

I think that such an extension of the scope of ethos is fairly consistent with the Aristotelian notion, which (like its Latin equivalent, *mores*) covers not only vocal dimension of discourse, but also the psychological and physical characteristics of the orator. In a written text, the entity that I have called the 'guarantor' is not immediately perceptible, like an actor on stage, it must be constructed by readers, who assign to it a *temper* and what could be called a *corporality*. 'Temper' is a set of more or less precise psychological features; as for 'corporality', it is not only a corporal complexion but also a way of dressing and behaving. Of course, temper and corporality are two aspects of the same personality; they are not real properties of real persons but positive social stereotypes on which discourse rests and that, in its turn, it contributes to reinforce. Such stereotypes circulate in diversified registers of semiotic production; nowadays they are mainly carried by cinema and advertising, but in other periods theatre, painting and novels played a much more important part in this respect.

In one of the most famous piety books in the 17th century, *Introduction à la vie dévote* (*Introduction to Devout Life*) by François de Sales (1609), the tight relationship between doctrine, scenography and ethos can be clearly observed. The scenography of this book is quite simple: a priest, a spiritual adviser, speaks in a friendly way to a woman named 'Philothée', who belongs to the gentry, explaining to her how she can lead a devout life without renouncing the common way of life of her social class. This doctrine, which refuses rigorous devoutness and particularly Calvinist discipline, is in a sense embodied in the ethos of François de Sales' discourse: the soft, sweet tone of the speaker makes actual the sweetness of the religious attitude that the addressee is incited to adopt. In the beginning of the book, the author stages a representation of good devoutness's body, which is opposed to that of bad devoutness, represented by the stereotype of a melancholic character:

> *Le monde, ma chère Philothée, diffame tant qu'il peut la sainte dévotion, dépeignant les personnes dévotes avec un visage fâcheux, triste et chagrin, et publiant que la dévotion donne des humeurs mélancoliques et insupportables.* (1969: 34)
> [The people, dear Philothée, defame as much as possible holy devoutness. depicting devout persons with an unpleasant, sad and peevish face, and publishing that devoutness gives melancholic and insufferable humours]

This fragment evokes a sort of 'anti-guarantor', who indirectly legitimates the guarantor of the discourse: the person who speaks so softly and in such a friendly manner is the very person who lacks a 'peevish face' and 'insufferable humours'. According to the traditional medical categorization of the 17th century, this melancholic temper is opposed to the sanguine temper of the speaker.

Through ethos, by a circular process, the addressee adheres progressively to the ideological universe presented by the discourse he is reading: the way the text describes good devoutness demands the very ethos of that description. Besides, the representation of nature, society, man and God given by the texts belonging to that religious trend is consistent with that ethos. In a sense, the reader, by reading, is already in the world whose values the text is promoting.

As ethos rests on historically determined stereotypes, an important change in culture implies important changes in the valuation of ethic representations. For instance, when occidental literature passed from the classical to the romantic regime, other types of temper and corporality were valorized: being pale and lean, looking sick, speaking in a faint voice were no longer considered negative characteristics. *Poetic Meditations* (1820) by the French romantic poet Alphonse de Lamartine imply a murmuring voice, as if the speaker were only addressing to himself. The addressee perceives the voice of a speaker at death's door and the text evokes a pale and tired man, who is wandering about the countryside or sitting, weighed down, under a tree. Such a voice is opposed to the classical ideal of 'honest' conversation. One of the reasons why such poems were so successfull throughout Europe is the harmony between a way of speaking and a way of behaving. Here the poet's morbidity (actually that of the figure of the poet that those poems imply) is not an individual fact, it depends on a global transformation of culture and, particularly, of the modes of legitimization of literary discourse.

That question of ethos, the relationship between a manner of saying and a manner of being, crosses some preoccupations of Pierre Bourdieu's sociology. Bourdieu states that the use of speech is also 'a body technique' and that 'linguistic competence, and especially phonetic competence, is a dimension of corporal hexis in which the whole relation with social world is expressed'. According to him, 'the articulatory style of popular classes', for example, is 'inseparable from a whole relation with body dominated by the refuse of affected or overpolite people and the valorization of manhood' (Bourdieu, 1977: 31). The body makes possible a participation in social meanings: 'The body believes in what he is playing . . . it does not represent what he is playing, it does not memorize past, he acts past . . . What is learned by body is not something that one owns (. . .) but something that one is' (Bourdieu, 1980: 123).

These tightly articulated concepts of scenography, linguistic code and ethos must contribute to a better understanding of the efficiency of discourse and of the part it plays in ideological processes. Discourse does not only persuade by the ideas it delivers: it sets the addressee in a speech scene that partakes of the semantic characteristics of the ideological universe that discourse aims to

promote. But such concepts are not reserved for self-constituting discourses; they are actually pertinent far beyond self-constituting discourses, for many sorts of texts.

6. Conclusion

This article could not deal with all the exciting problems raised by self-constituting discourses. We only wanted to evoke a research field that is still very unsteady, but complementary of much more active fields such as mass media or conversation analysis. Until now, discourse analysis was mainly concerned with applied research or with data that traditional academic institutions had ignored. It is highly important for discourse analysis to show it can approach with specific means texts that for long have been studied separately and with traditional viewpoints.

The essential property of self-constituting discourses is their status inside interdiscourse: whereas 'ordinary' discourses lean against them, they must lean directly against transcendent principles, against what was named 'archeion'. Those discourses belong to conflicting discursive fields; they are basically hierarchical, according to their closeness to their Source; they are produced in small communities, although they deal with basic problems of society as a whole; they are defined by a specific way of circulating in interdiscourse (conservation, commentary, quotation, etc.); what they say ('ideas', 'doctrine') cannot be separated from the discourse scene through which they are produced and that gives them authority.

For it is only by their way of organizing their own discourse that they can show and attest their legitimacy – their conformity with the criteria of Truth. In commonplace uses of discourse, we mainly follow routines, in the hard core of self-constituting discourses speakers cannot ignore basic questions about who is authorized to be a speaker or an addressee, where and when it may be spoken, how texts must be organized, etc. Of course, such questions are implicit in any utterance, as was demonstrated by pragmatic trends, but in the case of self-constituting discourses, people are deeply committed: the answer to such questions has root consequences for their identity, their destiny and those of other people.

Unfortunately the notion of self-constituting discourse is hard to handle. Actually we are accustomed to work with texts that are brought together because they have the same function and share obviously some linguistic properties. Studies of discourse for specific purposes deal with such phenomena, which are very important for applied linguistics. But what self-constituting discourses share is not obvious, it does not appear superficially. To see what a novel, a scientific article, or a sermon have in common, you need to handle very abstract operations.

Studying self-constitution discourses raises a question that cannot be dodged: the relationship between analysis and its object. For self-constituting discourses analysis is a slave to a paradox: as a scientific analysis, it belongs to

self-constituting discourses, but at the same time it claims to overhang any self-constituting discourse. That paradox cannot be resolved. If discourse analysis claims to dominate self-constituting discourses, it actually assumes the old dogmatic claim of philosophy or religion, attributing to themselves the power of ruling all human discourses. Discourse analysis, on the contrary, must accept participation in a generalized interaction with other scientific disciplines and with self-constituting discourses. Discourse analysis, for instance, may question philosophical discourse, which, from its own viewpoint, may also question discourse analysis. And so on.

Notes

1. We could name them 'discourse studies' too, but it can be argued that 'discourse studies' does not mention the privileged relationship of discourse studies with linguistics.
2. Of course, there are significant exceptions, such as T. Givon's or S. Thompson's works, but from my viewpoint they belong more to text linguistics than to discourse analysis.
3. It's difficult to translate into English or German this concept of 'enunciation'. French, like other romance languages, oppose two forms derived from the verb 'énoncer': 'énoncé' 'énonciation'; the 'énoncé' is the product, the trace of the act of 'enunciation'. Unfortunately, the notion of 'utterance' is ambiguous. T. van Dijk suggests to me opposing 'discourse production' (enonciation) and 'utterance' (énoncé).

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Grace: The Logogenesis of Freedom

J.R. Martin

1. The Text

By way of concluding his autobiography, *Long Walk to Freedom*, Nelson Mandela (1995, 1996) retells the story of his life and how it has reshaped his understanding of freedom. For many readers it is a moving and inspirational text, confirming the grace and wisdom of a man who changed his world and looks back over his achievements with great humility. For discourse analysts, the challenge lies in showing how this is achieved – both with respect to theory and analysis, and with respect to what we want our theory to do for us, especially where we want to use it to intervene in social processes (as advocated by critical discourse analysts; see Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard, 1996; Janks and Ivanic, 1992; Kress, 1996). I take up a little of this challenge here, drawing on systemic functional linguistics to explore the text in relation to the generalized system of meanings it instantiates. In addition I consider the roles of text and image in a multimodal version of the text (as framed by two photographs and margin notes in Mandela, 1996).

The text in question comprises the final six paragraphs of Mandela (1995), which follow a section break. Here I interpret the text generically as a recount, and divide it into major phases, Orientation ^ Record of Events ^ Reorientation (for discussion of the recount genre see Martin 1985, 1992, 1997; Martin and Plum, 1997). In addition I have highlighted in small caps the meanings that move the recount forward from one stage to another in Mandela's life (see Appendix for guide to other style features).[1]

Example 1
[Orientation]
I was not born with a hunger to be free. I WAS BORN free – free in every way that I could know. Free to run in the fields near my mother's hut, free to swim in the clear stream

that ran through my village, free to roast mealies under the stars and ride the bared backs of slow-moving bulls. As long as I obeyed my father and abided by the customs of my tribe, I was not troubled by the laws of man or God.

[Record of Events]

It was only when I began to learn that my boyhood freedom was an illusion, when I discovered as a young man that my freedom had already been taken from me, that I began to hunger for it. AT FIRST, AS A STUDENT, I wanted freedom only for myself, the transitory freedoms of being able to stay out at night, read what I pleased and live where I chose. LATER, AS A YOUNG MAN in Johannesburg, I yearned for the basic and honourable freedoms of achieving my potential, of earning my keep, of marrying and having a family – the freedom not to be obstructed in a lawful life.

BUT THEN I slowly saw that not only was I not free, but my brothers and sisters were not free. I saw that it was not just my freedom that was curtailed, but the freedom of everyone who looked like I did. That is WHEN I JOINED THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, and that is when the hunger for my own freedom became the greater hunger for the freedom of my people. It was this desire for the freedom of my people to live their lives with dignity and self-respect that animated my life, that transformed a frightened young man into a bold one, that drove a law-abiding attorney to become a criminal, that turned a family-loving husband into a man without a home, that forced a life-loving man to live like a monk. I am no more virtuous or self-sacrificing than the next man, but I found that I could not even enjoy the poor and limited freedoms I was allowed when I knew my people were not free. Freedom is indivisible; the chains on any one of my people were the chains on all of them, the chains on all of my people were the chains on me.

It was DURING THOSE LONG AND LONELY YEARS that my hunger for the freedom of my own people became a hunger for the freedom of all people, white and black. I knew as well as I knew anything that the oppressor must be liberated just as surely as the oppressed. A man who takes away another man's freedom is a prisoner of hatred, he is locked behind the bars of prejudice and narrow-mindedness. I am not truly free if I am taking away someone else's freedom, just as surely as I am not free when my freedom is taken from me. The oppressed and the oppressor alike are robbed of their humanity.

WHEN I WALKED OUT OF PRISON, that was my mission, to liberate the oppressed and the oppressor both. Some say that has now been achieved. But I know that this is not the case. The truth is that we are not yet free; we have merely achieved the freedom to be free, the right not to be oppressed. We have not taken the final step of our journey, but the first step on a longer and even more difficult road. For to be free is not merely to cast off one's chains, but to live in a way that respects and enhances the freedom of others. The true test of our devotion to freedom is just beginning.

[Reorientation]

I HAVE WALKED THAT LONG ROAD TO FREEDOM. I have tried not to falter; I have made missteps along the way. But I have discovered the secret that after climbing a great hill, one only finds that there are many more hills to climb. I have taken a moment here to rest, to steal a view of the glorious vista that surrounds me, to look back on the distance I have come. But I can only rest for a moment, for with freedom come responsibilities, and I dare not linger, FOR MY LONG WALK IS NOT YET ENDED. (Mandela 1995: 750–1)

Informally speaking, the Orientation phase sets the story in time and place, introducing its main character and the habitual behaviours of his early days.

Then the time line begins to unfold as we transition through the Record of Events chronicling Mandela's life. Finally, as the events culminate, we move to a retrospective Reorientation which both summarizes the chronicle and bridges from 'present' to 'future' concerns.

In calling this text a recount, we are placing it among the genres available for the reconstruction and evaluation of experience. By way of exploring its social function, Mandela's recount can be usefully compared to other story genres, such as the following personal recount recorded by Guenter Plum (1988):

Example 2
[Orientation]
Well I've always wanted one [old English sheepdog; GP].

[Record of Events]
And I made enquiries for about 12 months, prior. And I was able to get a young bitch, nine weeks old, from a friend. No, it wasn't a friend then; I didn't know her then but it turned out to be a good friend, Harriet U. up at Winston Hills. She had this young bitch that she was going to keep herself and she decided that she'd let it go. So we got her. That was our Sophie. And so we started to show her of course. I think her first show was the day she turned 3 months old. She was eligible for it and I think she won her class. And, yes, she did win her class that day; it happened to be our championship show, the old English sheepdog championship show.

[Reorientation]
And we just took it from there. Every weekend we brushed her . . . off to dog shows, you know, joined the rat race. No, I thoroughly enjoy it.

Compared with Example 2, Mandela's text reads more like history than narrative, since it deals with a much longer time line and is especially concerned with its interpretation (the meaning of freedom).

Another useful point of comparison would be historical recounts of institutional experience, in the following example:

Example 3
. . . By the mid twenties, big changes took place to meet the needs of the fishing industry and government fisheries managers. The Board began to employ full-time scientific staff, and Technological Stations were established in Halifax, Nova Scotia, and Prince Rupert, British Columbia. The staff quickly became multi-disciplinary. At the Biological Stations physics and chemistry were added to zoology in recognition of the importance of understanding fish habitat. At the Technological Stations zoologists did some initial work on refrigeration of fish, but chemists, bacteriologists, and engineers soon took over responsibility for industrial research and development.

During the depression years the fisheries research and development program was maintained despite constrained budgets. Facilities for volunteer investigators could only be provided to those with independent financing, and the small permanent staff endured a ten-percent reduction of salaries. During the World-War-II years that followed, there was the additional setback of loss of some staff to war service . . . (W.R. Martin, 1991)

Compared with Example 3, Mandela's text is more personal, focussing on the individual life of the writer; note that there are no individuals named in Example 3, whose main protagonist is the Fisheries Research Board of Canada.

We might also compare Mandela's recount with a text from secondary school geography dealing with the destruction of habitats:

Example 4

Man has been making animals rare and even extinct for thousands of years, and one of the main ways man has achieved this is BY THE DESTRUCTION of their habitat. The destruction of a habitat MEANS THAT the vital balance between an animal and its environment is disturbed. In ancient times the destruction of habitat and the extinction of animals was quite small. Since then it has rapidly increased. People began to make more use of machines and industrialisation occurred bringing with it changes which would destroy the face of the earth's environment forever. As the demands grew wood and later coal, supplied the resources needed, this in turn RESULTED IN THE DESTRUCTION of forests and habitats. At the same time that industrialisation was taking place humans were settling in new parts of the world. Whenever they settled, nests were cut down and farms established. This destroyed the habitat of many animals.

THE EFFECTS OF INDUSTRIALISATION and the need of more land DUE TO THE GROWTH OF POPULATION seriously AFFECTED WILDLIFE and still is today already half the world's tropical rainforests have already been destroyed or irreversibly damaged. This reckless ravaging of some of the most amazing habitats on earth MEANS THAT by the year 2000 the destruction will be complete and the world will be without these areas.

Compared with Example 4, Mandela's text is more story than explanation, since it unfolds largely through setting in time rather than explicit causal connections between one event and another (note the explicit causality highlighted small caps in the preceding Example).

We could continue positioning Mandela's recount in this way for some time (see Martin, 1997; Martin and Plum, 1997; Rothery and Stenglin, 1997 story genres; and Coffin, 1997; Veel and Coffin, 1996, on the genres of history). Cutting short the discussion, we can place Example 1 generically as autobiographical recount, as opposed to personal recount (Example 2), historical recount (Example 3), historical account (Example 4) and a range of affine but not closely related narrative and expository genres (see Martin, 1985, 1993, 1997 in press, for discussion). Unlike the rest of Mandela's autobiography, however, the text reconstrues and interprets a great deal of time in just seven paragraphs and in this respect it is more like the chronicles of history than the narratives of everyday life. How does Mandela manage so much time and value in so little time?

2. Abstracting Freedom

Mandela begins his story using relatively concrete language. Participants (people, places and things) are realized as nouns; qualities (descriptive and attitudinal) are realized as adjectives; processes (doings and happenings) are realized as verbs; assessments of epistemic and deontic modality are realized as modal

verbs; and logical connections are realized as conjunctions. Some examples follow, illustrating the choices Mandela uses to construct his childhood, and symbolizing[1] perhaps in their directness the untroubled nature of his life (labelling from Halliday, 1994; see also Halliday, 1989 [1985], on spoken and written language).

participant as Thing (noun)
I, fields, hut, stream, village, mealies, stars, bulls, father. . .

quality as Epithet (adjective)
free, clear, broad

process as Process (verb)
was born, to run, to swim, to roast, rise, obeyed . . .

assessment as Finite (modal verb)
could

logical relation as Textual Theme (conjunction)
as long as

As the recount continues, however, the relation of meaning to wording becomes much more indirect (Martin, 1993). Alongside participants realized as nouns, we find processes, qualities and modal assessments realized as nouns as well (contrast the direct realizations in small caps alongside each example):

process as a Thing (noun)	
this desire	I DESIRED freedom
hatred	They HATED the prisoner
quality as a Thing (noun)	
a hunger to be free	I was HUNGRY to be free
dignity	They were DIGNIFIED
narrow-mindedness	They were NARROW-MINDED
inhumanity	They were INHUMANE
assessment as a Thing (noun)	
achieving my potential	I achieved what I COULD
truth	It wasn't TRUE
responsibilities	I MUST act

And as part of this pattern of abstraction, causal relations that might otherwise have been realized as connections between clauses are realized inside the clause as nominalized Agents which act on other nominalizations and initiate events. Note here the agentive role of *this desire for the freedom of my people* . . . in relation to *my life* and four pivotal transformations:

logical relation as Agency (inside the clause)
It was this desire for the freedom of my people to live their lives with dignity and self-respect that animated my life, that transformed a frightened young man into a bold one, that drove a law-abiding attorney to become a criminal, that turned a family-loving husband into a man without a home, that forced a life-loving man to live like a monk

Language of this kind is a long way from language in which people act and do things to other people and things. We've entered a world of abstraction which typifies the writing of uncommon sense discourse across institutions and disciplines and which a trained lawyer and politician like Mandela has learned to control (Halliday, 1989 [1985], 1994, 1998, refers to language of this kind as involving grammatical metaphor). The advantage of this language for Mandela is the range of meanings it makes available to him to interpret his life, meanings not available in the relatively straightforward language of his Orientation.

This range of meaning can be explored in three steps, with reference to Halliday's experiential,[2] interpersonal and textual metafunctions – focussing on the notion of freedom. Experientially, as we have noted, the text opens by construing freedom as a quality, technically an Attribute realized by an adjective - the kind of realization we associate with spoken language in informal registers and with child language in our culture:

'free' as descriptive Attribute
I was not born with a hunger to be *free.*
I was born *free* – *free* in every way. . .
free to run . . .
free to swim . . .
free to roast mealies . . .

Subsequently, freedom is generally realized as an entity, and once nominalized it can take on a wide range of participant roles. We have already taken note of freedom as an Agent of change (*It was this desire for freedom . . . that transformed . . .*). In addition, in action processes it becomes a commodity that can be exchanged:

freedom as abstract commodity (Goal)
when I discovered . . . that my *freedom* had already been taken from me,
. . . it was not just my *freedom* that was curtailed, but the freedom of . . .
A man who takes away another man's *freedom* is a prisoner of hatred . . .
if I am taking away someone else's *freedom*
when my *freedom* is taken from me.

In mental processes it functions as an object of desire:

'freedom' as abstract Phenomenon
that I began to hunger for it (*freedom*).
At first, as a student, I wanted *freedom* . . .
Later, . . ., I yearned for the basic and honourable *freedoms* of . . .
. . . that I could not even enjoy the poor and limited *freedoms* I was allowed

As an entity in relational processes it is subject to classification and transformation.

'freedom' as abstract Carrier or classifying Attribute
It was only when I began to learn that my boyhood *freedom* was an illusion,
Freedom is indivisible . . .

. . . that my hunger for the *freedom* of my own people became a hunger for the *freedom* of all people, white and black.

'freedom' as abstract Token or Value
. . . that is when the hunger for my own *freedom* became the greater hunger for the *freedom* of my people.

Once nominalized it can also function circumstantially, as an abstract destination, and even as an abstract companion along the way.

'freedom' as abstract circumstance of Location
I have walked that long road to *freedom*.

'freedom' as abstract circumstance of Accompaniment
But I can only rest for a moment, for with *freedom* come responsibilities . . .

Nominalization, in other words, puts virtually the entire transitivity system of English at Mandela's disposal as far as talking about freedom is concerned. We'll return to the question of just how he marshals this potential later in this article. Note at this point that it is the circumstantial realization (*long road to freedom*) that establishes the extended lexical metaphor that consolidates Mandela's interpretation of his life:

EXTENDED LEXICAL METAPHOR
When I walked out of prison . . . We have not taken the final step of our journey, but the first step on a longer and even more difficult road . . . I have walked *that long road to freedom*. I have tried not to falter; I have made missteps along the way. But I have discovered the secret that after climbing a great hill, one only finds that there are many more hills to climb. I have taken a moment here to rest, to steal a view of the glorious vista that surrounds me, to look back on the distance I have come. But I can only rest for a moment, for with freedom come responsibilities, and I dare not linger, for my long walk is not yet ended.

This lexical metaphor is of course a familiar one in our culture; and Mandela elaborates it in his own terms towards and during his Reorientation phase. The relevant lexical strings, based on hyponymy and co-hyponymy, are *journey, road, road, way, walked, taken the final step/the first step, tried not to falter, made missteps, climbing, climb, my long walk*; and *to rest, rest, dare not linger* – working up the phrasing that provides the title of his book.

Interpersonally, it is the freedom as commodity motif that is of most interest since it is as a commodity that freedom is objectified as something that can be taken away – and this gives rise to the question of who to blame. The key passages follow:

when i discovered as a young man that ***my freedom*** *had already been taken from me*

I saw that it was not just ***my freedom that*** *was curtailed*, but **the freedom of everyone who looked like I did . . .**

. . . *A man who takes away* ***another man's freedom*** is a prisoner of hatred, he is locked behind the bars of prejudice and narrow-mindedness. I am not truly free if *I am*

taking away ***someone else's freedom***, just as surely as I am not free *when* ***my freedom*** *taken from me.*

Mandela selects the passive three times, taking up the experiential option of leaving out the Agent implicated. The result interpersonally is a clause in which 'freedom' functions as Subject, as part of what Halliday calls the Mood element. For Halliday it is the Mood function which governs the nature of a proposition's arguability – as reflected in tags and elliptical responses such as those suggested here (Martin, 1992, 1995a).

Mood	**ResidueMood tag**	
my freedom had already – Had it?	been taken from me,	hadn't it?
(my freedom) that was – Was it?	curtailed,	wasn't it?
my freedom is – Is it?	taken from me,	isn't it?

So alongside not specifying who is taking freedom away (an experiential option), Mandela structures the argument interpersonally as having to do with freedom, not oppressors. Oppressors are also backgrounded in the two active clauses, where they do function as Subject. In one, Mandela talks generally about what happens when a non-specific man (*a man*) takes away another's freedom; in the other, it is Mandela himself, in a hypothetical clause, who is modally responsible (Table 1). The effect of these selections is to eschew blame and once again it is the grammatically metaphorical language that enables semantic drift (contrast the congruent *they put me in jail* with the metaphorical *my freedom was taken away*).

Table 1: Modal responsibility and freedom

Mood (Subject ^ Finite)	Residue
my freedom had already[3]	been taken from me
(my freedom . . .) that was	curtailed
(A man) who takes . . .[4]	. . . takes away another man's freedom
(if) I am	taking away someone else's freedom
(when) my freedom is	taken from me

Textually the dominant pattern involving freedom has Mandela as Theme and freedom as New. This happens 17 times in the text, overwhelming other patterns of information flow. If following Fries (1981; and see Martin 1992, 1995a) we take the pattern of Themes as constructing a text's method of development and the pattern of News constructing its point, then what we have here is a favoured pattern in which Mandela is point of departure for the message and changing conceptions of freedom are what he's on about. We can sum up this

drift in texture as Mandela's angle on freedom. Some of the examples are shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Theme is to new as Mandela is to freedom (exemplified)

Theme	Transition	New[5]
I	was born	free
I	yearned for	the basic and honourable freedoms . . .
that I	could not even enjoy	the poor and limited freedoms . . .
my people	were not	free
I	am not	truly free
If I	am taking away	someone else's freedom
just as surely as I	am not	free
we	have merely achieved	the freedom to be free
I	have walked	that long road to freedom

Much less often, freedom plays a complementary role as Theme, often where the New is what Mandela learns freedom to be.

> **my boyhood freedom** was an illusion.
> **the hunger for my own freedom** became the greater hunger for the freedom of my people.
> **Freedom** is indivisible; (the chains on any one of my people were the chains on all of them, the chains on all of my people were the chains on me.)

Strikingly, at three pivotal moments in Mandela's career, theme predication is used to foreground freedom as both Theme and New.

> [having left home]
> It was only when I began to learn that **my boyhood freedom** was an illusion, when I discovered as a young man that **my freedom** had already been taken from me, that I began to hunger for it.
>
> [on joining the ANC]
> . . . I saw that it was not just **my freedom** that was curtailed, but **the freedom of everyone who looked like I did.** [That is when I joined the African National Congress . . .[
>
> [living outside the rule of law]
> It was **this desire for the freedom of my people to live their lives with dignity and self-respect** that animated my life, that transformed a frightened young man into a bold one, that drove a law-abiding attorney to become a criminal, that turned a family-loving husband into a man without a home, that forced a life-loving man to live like a monk.

Again, it is the grammatically metaphorical language that facilitates the texture; in simple terms, the noun *freedom* is a lot more grammatically mobile than the adjective *free*.

3. Enlightenment

In the previous section we surveyed the range of meanings which an abstract construal of freedom made available to Mandela. Equally important is the way in which these meanings interact with each other as the text unfolds (their logogenesis; Halliday, 1993a). The impact of the text lies very much in the contingency of meanings, and in general terms what shapes this texture is the way in which two stories are mapped onto each other: the story of Mandela's day-to-day experience as he moves through space and time, alongside the story of his political development as his understanding of freedom transforms. His journey, in other words, is more than a physical one; it is a metaphysical journey as well – a spiritual quest, towards enlightenment. How exactly does this unfold?

The text is a recount; it moves through time. Temporal linearity is managed grammatically through linkers (*at first, later, then, when, when, during, when* – as highlighted in Example 1) and tense (generally past – Orientation *I was born* . . . then past in present, as the recount joins the present – Reorientation: *I have walked* . . .). This is reinforced through the lexis that names stages in a cycle of life: e.g. *born, boyhood, young man, husband, family* and the lexis that phases us through the steps along the way, both verbal *when I began to learn, I began to hunger for it, achieving my potential, has now been achieved, achieved the freedom to be free, is just beginning, is not yet ended* and nominal *the final step of our journey, the first step on a longer* and *even more difficult road.*

This movement through time is reconstrued by Mandela as movement through space – the extended journey metaphor I have outlined. And through the grammatical metaphor, the journey is not just a journey through physical space, but a walk towards an abstraction – to freedom. Through these steps movement in space/time acquires the possibility of depth; the text develops from two-dimensional to three-dimensional progression.

To construe depth Mandela constructs his walk to freedom as a mental quest. Life is about learning:

- free in every way that I could know
- when I began to learn that my boyhood freedom was an illusion
- when I discovered as a young man that my freedom had already been taken from me
- But then I slowly saw that not only was I not free
- I saw that it was not just my freedom that was curtailed
- but I found that I could not even enjoy the poor and limited freedoms I was allowed
- when I knew my people were not free
- I knew as well as I knew anything that the oppressor must be liberated
- But I know that this is not the case
- But I have discovered the secret that after climbing a great hill
- one only finds that there are many more hills to climb

And life is about change:

- the hunger for my own freedom became the greater hunger for the freedom of my people
- It was this desire for the freedom of my people to live their lives with dignity and self-respect that animated my life, that transformed a frightened young man into a bold one, that drove a law-abiding attorney to become a criminal, that turned a family-loving husband into a man without a home, that forced a life-loving man to live like a monk.
- It was during those long and lonely years that my hunger for the freedom of my own people became a hunger for the freedom of all people, white and black.

What the learning and transformation achieve is a steadily unfolding conception of freedom, throughout the text from beginning to end. Ideationally speaking we can recognize seven phases of understanding, corresponding to seven stages of Mandela's life.

(i) 'boyhood freedom'
- Free to run . . . free to swim . . . free to roast mealies under the stars and ride the broad backs of slow-moving bulls

(ii) 'as a student'
- the transitory freedoms of being able to stay out at night, read what I pleased and go where I chose

(iii) 'as a young man'
- the basic and honourable freedoms of achieving my potential, of earning my keep, of marrying and having a family – the freedom not to be obstructed in a lawful life

(iv) 'joined the African National Congress'
- the hunger for my own freedom became the greater hunger for the freedom of my people . . . to live their lives with dignity and self-respect

(v) 'during those long and lonely years' [in prison]
- my hunger for the freedom of my own people became a hunger for the freedom of all people, white and black

(vi) 'when I walked out of prison'
- to be free is not merely to cast off one's chains, but to live in a way that respects and enhances the freedom of others

(vii) [as President]
- . . . But I can only rest for a moment, for with freedom come responsibilities, and I dare not linger, for my long walk is not yet ended.

In the first three phases Mandela is oriented to himself, as he moves through stages of life.

[stages of life . . . freedom to]	
• childhood freedom	'to play'
• adolescent freedom	'to be independent'
• mature freedom	'to support a family'

In the next two phases Mandela re-orients himself to the needs of his own people, and then of his entire community (including his oppressors). Individual freedom ***to*** do things transforms into communal freedom ***from*** oppression.

• factional freedom	'for my people'
• communal freedom	'for all people'

Finally Mandela develops his more abstract appreciation of freedom as freedom to respect and enhance the freedom of others and to get on with things freedom positions him as responsible ***to*** do.

• democratic freedom	'to respect/enhance freedom of others'
• institutional freedom	'with freedom come responsibilities'

Overall, enlightenment is organized as three waves of recontextualization - first, three stages of Mandela's life, which taken together constitute the first stage of his reorientation to the needs of his people and then his country as a whole, which taken together constitute the first stage of his move from personal liberty to the freedom to respect freedom and finally freedom with responsibilities.

(1)	personal freedom		
	[I]	individual freedom	
		(i) childhood freedom	'to play'
		(ii) adolescent freedom	'to be independent'
		(iii) mature freedom	'to support a family'
	[II]	factional freedom	'for my people'
	[III]	communal freedom	'for all people'
(2)	democratic freedom		'to respect/enhance freedom of others'
(3)	institutional freedom		'with freedom come responsibilities'

The texture of these phases, in terms of global information flow is also significant. In the paragraphs, we find a consistent pattern with an introductory hyper-Theme (or 'topic sentence'; Martin, 1992, 1993) followed by its elaboration.

The first hyper-Theme introduces boyhood freedom, the second introduces adolescent and mature freedom, the third freedom for black Africans and the fourth communal freedom for both oppressor and oppressed:

I was not born with a hunger to be free. I was born free – free in every way that I could know.
=...

It was only when I began to learn that my boyhood freedom was an illusion, when I discovered as a young man that my freedom had already been taken from me, that I began to hunger for it.
=...

But then I slowly saw that not only was I not free, but my brothers and sisters were not free.
=...

It was during those long and lonely years that my hunger for the freedom of my own people became a hunger for the freedom of all people, white and black.
=...

With the move to abstract freedom the hyper-Theme introduces the following paragraph, but does not specify the new phase of understanding:

When I walked out of prison, that was my mission, to liberate the oppressed and the oppressor both. Some say that has now been achieved. But I know that this is not the case:
=...

That is saved for a later, penultimate sentence in the paragraph (a more newsworthy position):

For to be free is not merely to cast off one's chains, but to live in a way that respects and enhances the freedom of others.

Similarly in the final paragraph of the recount, the hyper-Theme introduces its elaborating clauses:

I have walked that long road to freedom.
=...

But the final phase of freedom, institutional freedom, is reserved for the concluding sentence of the book.

for with freedom come responsibilities . . .

Globally then, Mandela's understanding of personal freedom as liberty (freedom to act and freedom from oppression) is treated as a kind of retrospective – his angle on his life, as given by the volume as a whole. However, once we move to the present[7] (*has now been achieved, have walked*), Mandela's ultimate conception of freedom (freedom to respect freedom, freedom with responsibilities) is positioned late in the paragraphs as news, prefaced in each case with the conclusive conjunction *for*, consummating our journey.

The newsworthiness of Mandela's ultimate conception of freedom is further enhanced by the summative nature of the recount's final paragraph in relation to the first five paragraphs, and of the recount itself as a synopsis of the autobiography as a whole. Thus final position in the clause, the paragraph, the genre (our text) and the macro-genre (the book) harmonizes to foreground the responsibility of respecting freedom as the point of this story of Mandela's life (Fries, 1981; Martin, 1995b).

4. Engagement

Henderson (1996: 293), in his review of Mandela's autobiography, comments that 'it is as much a spiritual as a political work'. We have dealt in some measure with the spiritual dimension of the text, as far as enlightenment is concerned. What about its politics? Because the journey to freedom is not simply one that Mandela has invited us to observe; it is a trip he takes us on – an engaging quest. How does Mandela involve us as he moves along his way?

One striking pattern throughout the text is in Mandela's sense of audience – the resources he uses to take account of readers' beliefs and expectations and realign them with his own. For example, the text contains no fewer than 21 negative clauses, each concerned with explicitly denying something someone might have thought. These are listed here by paragraph:

I was not born with a hunger to be free.
I was not troubled by the laws of man or God.

I began to learn that my boyhood freedom was an illusion
the freedom not to be obstructed in a lawful life.

But then I slowly saw that not only was I not free
but my brothers and sisters were not free
I saw that it was not just my freedom that was curtailed
I am no more virtuous or self-sacrificing than the next man
I found that I could not even enjoy the poor and limited freedoms I was allowed
when I knew my people were not free.

I am not truly free if I am taking away someone else's freedom
just as surely as I am not free when my freedom is taken from me

But I know that this is not the case
The truth is that we are not yet free
the right not to be oppressed
We have not taken the final step of our journey
For to be free is not merely to cast off one's chains

I have tried not to falter
I have made missteps along the way
and I dare not linger,
for my long walk is not yet ended.

On five occasions Mandela replaces mistaken beliefs:

> I was not born with a hunger to be free.
> I was born free . . .
>
> Some say that has now been achieved.
> But I know that this is not the case.
>
> The truth is that we are not yet free;
> we have merely achieved the freedom to be free, the right not to be oppressed.
>
> We have not taken the final step of our journey,
> but the first step on a longer and even more difficult road.
>
> For to be free is not merely to cast off one's chains,
> but to live in a way that respects and enhances the freedom of others.

Alongside countering mistaken ideas, Mandela deals throughout the text with mistaken expectations. This 'in spite of something, something else' motif is outlined here:

> At first, as a student, I wanted freedom ONLY for myself, the transitory freedoms of being able to stay out at night, read what I pleased and go where I chose. Later, as a young man in Johannesburg, I yearned for the basic and honourable freedoms of achieving my potential, of earning my keep, of marrying and having a family – the freedom not to be obstructed in a lawful life. But then I slowly saw that not only was I not free.
>
> But then I slowly saw that NOT ONLY was I not free, but my brothers and sisters were not free.
>
> I saw that it was NOT JUST my freedom that was curtailed, but the freedom of everyone who looked like I did.
>
> I am no more virtuous or self-sacrificing than the next man, but I found that I could not even enjoy the poor and limited freedoms I was allowed when I knew my people were not free.
>
> I have tried not to falter; I have made missteps along the way. But I have discovered the secret that after climbing a great hill, one only finds that there are many more hills to climb.
>
> I have taken a moment here to rest, to steal a view of the glorious vista that surrounds me, to look back on the distance I have come. But I can only rest for a moment, for with freedom come responsibilities, and I dare not linger, for my long walk is not yet ended.

In the first three of the preceding examples, concession is reinforced by continuity markers (*only, just*; Martin, 1992) which enhance the counterexpectation. In all, Mandela uses 14 of these markers to adjust his remarks to readers who might have expected more or less than he means.

[adjusting]

- It was only when I began to learn that my boyhood freedom was an illusion
- I wanted freedom only for myself
- not only was I not free, but
- it was not just my freedom that was curtailed, but
- I could not even enjoy the poor and limited freedoms I was allowed
- we have merely achieved the freedom to be free
- the first step on a longer and even more difficult road
- For to be free is not merely to cast off one's
- The true test of our devotion to freedom is just beginning
- one only finds that there are many more hills to climb
- I can only rest for a moment

[aspectual]

- when I discovered as a young man that my freedom had already been taken from
- we are not yet free
- my long walk is not yet ended.

Some of these mistaken beliefs and expectations Mandela explicitly acknowledges as his own:

- but I found that I could not even enjoy the poor and limited freedoms I was allowed
- when I discovered as a young man that my freedom had already been taken from me

Others, such as *I was not born with a hunger to be free*, seem to be aimed at readers. In any case, our naiveté is not the issue; Mandela does not explicitly source mistaken beliefs and expectations to anyone other than himself. Rather, the unfolding text involves us in a journey during which errant suppositions are both acknowledged and refined. We are not just watching. We are taken along on the ride.

Alongside this pattern of alignment, we find a constellation of features which continually clarify and reinforce Mandela's position, lest there be any doubt about what is being asserted. One aspect of this involves what Halliday (1994) refers to as 'elaboration' (rewording meaning from one group/phrase, clause or sentence to the next; cf. the discussion of paragraph hyper-themes involving elaboration above):

GROUP/PHRASE ELABORATIONS

I was born free
= free in every way that I could know.

At first, as a student, I wanted freedom only for myself,
= the transitory freedoms of being able to stay out at night, read what I pleased and go where I chose.

Later, as a young man in Johannesburg, I yearned for the basic and honourable freedoms of achieving my potential, of earning my keep, of marrying and having a family –
= the freedom not to be obstructed in a lawful life.

that was my mission.
= to liberate the oppressed and the oppressor both

= we have merely achieved the freedom to be free,
= the right not to be oppressed.

CLAUSE ELABORATIONS
It was only when I began to learn that my boyhood freedom was an illusion,
= when I discovered as a young man that my freedom had already been taken from

Freedom is indivisible;
= the chains on any one of my people were the chains on all of them, the chains on all of my people were the chains on me.

A man who takes away another man's freedom is a prisoner of hatred,
= he is locked behind the bars of prejudice and narrow-mindedness.

The truth is that we are not yet free;
= we have merely achieved the freedom to be free,

SENTENCE ELABORATIONS
I was born free – free in every way that I could know.
= Free to run in the fields near my mother's hut, free to swim in the clear stream that ran through my village, free to roast mealies under the stars and ride the broad backs of slow-moving bulls.
= As long as I obeyed my father and abided by the customs of my tribe, I was not troubled by the laws of man or God.

A man who takes away another man's freedom is a prisoner of hatred, he is locked behind the bars of prejudice and narrow-mindedness.
= I am not truly free if I am taking away someone else's freedom, just as surely as I am not free when my freedom is taken from me.
= The oppressed and the oppressor alike are robbed of their humanity.

The truth is that we are not yet free; we have merely achieved the freedom to be free, the right not to be oppressed.
= We have not taken the final step of our journey, but the first step on a longer and even more difficult road.

For to be free is not merely to cast off one's chains, but to live in a way that respects and enhances the freedom of others.
= The true test of our devotion to freedom is just beginning.

In addition Mandela makes frequent use of extension (Halliday, 1994) to accumulate meaning, in series of two, three and even five coordinated clauses:

That is when I joined the African National Congress,
+ and that is when the hunger for my own freedom became the greater hunger for the freedom of my people.

the chains on any one of my people were the chains on all of them,
+ the chains on all of my people were the chains on me.

Free to run in the fields near my mother's hut,
+ free to swim in the clear stream that ran through my village,
+ free to roast mealies under the stars and ride the broad backs of slow-moving bulls.

the transitory freedoms of being able to stay out at night,
+ read what I pleased
+ and go where I chose.

the basic and honourable freedoms of achieving my potential,
+ of earning my keep,
+ of marrying and having a family

It was this desire for the freedom of my people to live their lives with dignity and self-respect that animated my life,
+ that transformed a frightened young man into a bold one,
+ that drove a law-abiding attorney to become a criminal,
+ that turned a family-loving husband into a man without a home,
+ that forced a life-loving man to live like a monk.

I would argue that both patterns, realignment and reinforcement, reflect a rhetoric more strongly associated with speaking than writing (Gee, 1990; Olson, 1994; Ong, 1982). This is hardly surprising since Mandela was groomed, like his father before him, to counsel the rulers of his Thembu people. These skills he learned by observing tribal meetings in which all men were free to voice their opinions, but at which the opinions of councillors carried great weight.

> I noticed how some speakers rambled and never seemed to get to the point. I grasped how others came to the matter at hand directly, and who made a set of arguments succinctly and cogently. I observed how some speakers used emotion and dramatic language, and tried to move the audience with such techniques, while others were sober and even and shunned emotion. (Mandela, 1995: 25)

Of course we have no extant record of precisely what Mandela heard. But the influence of the publicly spoken discourse he studied is more than a parent, if we draw parallels to related orality around the world (Hymes, 19 Whitaker and Sienaert, 1986). Consider, for example, the following speech from Australia, given by Vincent Lingiari on the occasion of the handover of a lease of 1250 square miles, formerly part of Wave Hill Station, by the (the Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, and Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, Les Johnson to the Mura Mulla Gurindji Company on 16 August 1975 (Lingiari, 1986) – translated by Patrick McConvell.

> The important White men are giving us this land ceremonially, ceremonially they are giving it to us.

It belonged to the Whites, but today it is in the hands of us Aboriginals all around here.

Let us live happily together as mates, let us not make it hard for each other.

–

The important White men have come here, and they are giving our country back to us now.

They will give us cattle, they will give us horses, then we will be happy.

They came from different places away, we do not know them, but they are glad for us.

We want to live in a better way together, Aboriginals and White men, let us not fight over anything, let us be mates.

–

He [the Prime Minister] will give us cattle and horses ceremonially; we have not seen them yet: they will give us bores, axes, wire, all that sort of thing.

These important White men have come here to our ceremonial ground and they are welcome, because they have not come for any other reasons, just for this [handover].

We will be mates. White and Black, you [Gurindji] must keep this land safe for yourselves, it does not belong to any different 'welfare' man.

–

They took our country away from us, now they have brought it back ceremonially.

Space precludes a detailed analysis here; but the audience-oriented patterns of realignment and reinforcement are readily apparent, even in translation from the original Gurindji. The text unfolds in cycles (as presented here), returning four times to the point the White men took away Gurindji land, but are now giving it back – including a gracious[9] message of reconciliation as far as living together as mates is concerned. Local realignment and reinforcement thus harmonizes with global text structure here, much as it does in Mandela's recount. The major difference between the texts is that Mandela also draws on the resources of written language (i.e. grammatical metaphor), to map orality (cycles) onto linearity (temporal unfolding) – a mapping which gives rise to a spiral texture through which our understanding of freedom deepens as we are carried along. Reasoning along these lines, we might suggest that Mandela has reworked the autobiographical recount genre, blending features of western literacy with aspects of Thembu orality – in order to fashion the new meanings that interpreting his life demands.

Before closing this section, it is perhaps worth noting that Mandela's rhetoric of engagement makes us feel included rather than instructed. He doesn't tell us what to think: rather, taking our misconceptions into account, he lets us in on what he has learned. In this respect his rhetoric reflects his understanding of leadership, which he learned as a child, in the court of the Thembu regent:

As a leader, I have always followed the principles I first saw demonstrated by the regent at the Great Palace. I have always endeavoured to listen to

what each and every person in a discussion had to say before venturing my own opinion. Oftentimes, my own opinion will simply represent a consensus of what I heard in the discussion. I always remember the regent's axiom: a leader, he said, is like a shepherd. He stays behind the flock, letting the most nimble go on ahead, whereupon the others follow, not realising that all along they are being directed from behind. (Mandela, 1995: 25–6)

5. Recontextualization

So far I have explored Mandela's recount with respect to system – especially transitivity, mood, theme, grammatical metaphor, lexical relations, conjunction, tense, phase, process type, hierarchy of periodicity, polarity, continuity and elaboration. In this regard I have dealt with intertextuality implicitly, with reference to the climate of meaning immanent in our culture (as outlined in Halliday, 1994; Martin, 1992; Matthiessen, 1995). I have also explored some local weather, where it seemed important to deal concretely with intertextuality – Examples 2–4 to situate the genre; the two quotes from elsewhere in the autobiography and Vincent Lingiari's speech to highlight the orality of Mandela's recount. Along both time scales of analysis, my approach has been selective, reflecting my reading of the text. As analyses accumulate and results converge, my reading, I expect, aligns with the reading position naturalized by the recount. How might this be confirmed?

One tack is to consider closely related texts, and for the recount under consideration here we have the recontextualization published in *The Illustrated Long Walk to Freedom* (Mandela, 1996). The last two pages of this edition of the autobiography position an elided[10] version of the recount in relation to two images and margin notes, as outlined in Figure 1. Following Kress and Van Leeuwen (1996), this multimodal presentation consists in broad outline of two multimodal triptychs. Down the left-hand margin of page 202 (Mandela, 1996) we have the triptych formed by an image of a young boy and the following notes:

[above photo of young boy] On the day of the inauguration I was overwhelmed with a sense of history. In the first decade of the twentieth century, a few years after the bitter Anglo-Boer war and before my own birth, the white-skinned peoples of South Africa patched up their differences and erected a system of racial domination against the dark-skinned peoples of their own land, [below photo of young boy] The structure they created formed the basis of one of the harshest, most inhuman, societies the world has ever known. Now, in the last decade of the twentieth century, and my own eighth decade as a man, that system had been overturned forever and replaced by one that recognised the rights and freedoms of all peoples regardless of the colour of their skin. (Mandela, 1996: 202)[11]




Figure 1: Outline of the illustrated recount (Mandela, 1996)

Across the pages we have the image/verbiage triptych formed by the abridged recount, with the photo of the young boy to the left, and a bigger photo (which takes up all of page 203 and spreads over a fifth of page 202) taken from the back of the crowd at Mandela's presidential inauguration, featuring the South African flag. Space precludes a detailed analysis of the two images here. In brief, the smaller photo, in naturalistic colour, features the head and upper torso of a primary school-aged African boy (medium shot). He is in the foreground, facing us, at eye-level, but focussing on something out of frame to our left. His right arm is raised in a clenched fist salute which forms a vector at a 45° angle to the triptych, reinforced by a parallel stripe on his sleeve and the fact that he is leaning to our right. The boy is wearing an orange shirt with white horizontal stripes on its body, four of which form a vector at 90° to his salute. Behind him is a crowd of what appear to be other school children, out of focus, some of whom are also saluting.

The larger photo, in naturalistic colour, is dominated by a large South African flag (medium shot). It is being held, at a 45° angle, by someone in a large crowd; the vectors formed by the flag's design are at 90° to the flagstaff, towards the lower right-hand corner of the image. The flag is at eye-level (since we are standing higher up, a few rows back). The crowd is overwhelmingly African; we see only the backs of their heads, out of focus in the immediate foreground, in focus around the flag, and increasingly out of focus towards the stage. Their gaze forms an unresolved vector towards the centre of the stage, which is outside the frame of the photo in the distance to our left.

Read in relation to one another, the images involve both similarity and contrast. As for similarities, the crowds are African; and the gatherings are constructed as political by the two symbols (the clenched fist salute and the flag). In both images the vectors formed by gaze are to our left and unresolved. The vectors formed by the boy's salute and striped shirt point in the same directions

as those formed by the flagstaff and the flag's design. Beyond this, the bold black typeface above and below the boy's image, along with his orange shirt and white stripes corresponds strikingly with the colour and design vectors of the South African flag. The relationship between the images is further enhanced by contrasts – the young boy vs the mature crowd; the boy facing us vs the spectators' backs; the boy gesturing with his arm vs the flag waving in a crowd. I take these parallels and differences as evidence that we are meant to read one image in relation to the other, mediated by the recounted text, as the triptych presentation implies.

Kress and Van Leeuwen (1996) suggest a reading of polarized images in which the left is glossed as Given and the right as New and this seems to fit the left–right triptych under discussion here. To the left, as Given, we have a young individual, gesturing with his arm; to the right, as New, we have a symbol of nationhood, aloft in a crowd of mature spectators. Mediating this relation in the triptych we have Mandela's recount, in which a boy becomes the president of the republic, and through which the freedom to play evolves into the freedom to govern (with responsibilities). Such is the nature of the photographic modality that the two images tend to linearize as Given and New the spiral texture of the recount; but, as noted, the colours and vectors of the left-hand triptych resonate so strongly with the flag that a spiral movement from youthful solidarity[12] to mature nationhood is implied. Note as well that we observe the boy, and his peers, and are in this sense excluded from the politics constructed by his salute (which might even be read as protesting against us, though we are not addressed by his gaze); with the image of the flag, however, we are included in the crowd, and aligned with their celebration of Mandela's inauguration. Thus the triptych reinforces both the enlightenment and engagement motifs of the original monomodal recount, with the recount mediating the transition from personal to institutional values.

The top–down triptych is also polarized; Kress and Van Leeuwen (1996) suggest the terms Ideal and Real for the top-to-bottom opposition, characterizing the Ideal as the generalized essence of the information, the Real as more specific, down-to-earth or practical information. In this triptych the semantic contrast seems to be between systems of government and their consequences. Above the photo Mandela deals with both the inauguration of a new republic and erection of the former apartheid regime; below, Mandela notes the effect on people of first the old regime (harsh and inhumane) and then the new (respect for the rights and freedoms of all peoples regardless of the colour of their skin). Linking these messages is the hybrid image of the boy, who can be read either as a protesting victim of old, or a celebrating champion of the new; the ambiguity of the clenched first salute (protest or celebration) thus mediates both facets of the triptych's Ideal and Real, with youthful zeal translating system into practice (see Figure 2).

Alongside enhancing the meaning of Mandela's recount, the interlocking multimodal triptychs also extend it. The key meaning here is the boy's salute, which seems at first blush to contradict Mandela's Orientation: 'I was not born with a hunger to be free'. Recall, however, that it was this salute which mediated




Figure 2: Mediating ideal and real in the left-hand triptych

Ideal with Real, through its ambiguity in the left-hand triptych, and which resonated strongly with the flag in the right-to-left one. The very meaning which is hard to reconcile with Mandela's recount is in fact foregrounded as the apex of the semiotic vortex constructed by the multimodal text.

I suspect that the new meaning here has to do with regeneration. The margin notes recontextualize Mandela's recount with respect to the wider context of South African history (*in the first decade of the twentieth century . . . now, in the last decade of the twentieth century*). Another aspect of this recontextualization is the absence of Mandela himself from the images here, though his presence is implied by the unresolved gaze of the inauguration crowd, by his 'rebirth' in the photo of the boy, and perhaps even by the unresolved gaze of the boy, since to his right we have the previous page and the rest of the book, throughout which Mandela's image figures prominently.[13] In each case, the virtual Mandela is realized to the left, as Given, in relation to a range of News (i.e. the flag, the president, the politicized youth, respectively). Arnheim's reading of the meaning of diagonal vectors reinforces these points. For Arnheim (1982: 107) diagonal vectors such as those formed by the salute and flagstaff are characterized as 'releasing', while those formed by the shirt stripes and flag are 'holding'. In these terms, the salute and flagstaff point forward to future accomplishments, supported by the shirt stripes and flag of the youth and nation that will get the work done.

As Mandela comments in his margin notes, the apartheid system had been 'overturned forever'; in this sense Mandela's journey has ended. The interlocking triptychs construct his legacy – one nation, united, underpinned by a generation of empowered youth for whom the freedom to respect and enhance the freedom of others is point of departure. By the time Mandela published the 1996 edition, the long walk has almost ended; the triptychs make way for others to carry on.

6. Grace

In this article I have tried, from my own specific reading position, to analyse this instance of discourse in relation to the meanings I have been trained to decode. If allowed a reaction, the term that comes to mind is *grace*, in every meaning of the word. The gracefulness with which the recount unfolds, the charm of its rhetoric, the goodwill to all peoples . . . I cannot help admiring the texture, and the Mandela it construes for me. In this kind of reaction I am not alone. Consider

for example the evaluative terms used promotionally on the covers of the 1995 edition: *anger, sorrow, love, joy, grace, elegance, riveting, brilliantly, emotive, compelling, uplifting, exhilarating, epic, hardship, resilience, triumph, clarity, eloquence, burns with the luminosity of faith, invincible, hope, dignity, enthralling, great, indispensable, unique, truly stunning, extraordinary, vivid, unusual, courage, persistence, tolerance, forgiveness, extraordinary, well worth, greatness, epic, struggle, idealism, inspired, cynicism, compulsory.* What is the appeal?

I suspect we are examining here Mandela's ability to naturalize radical values in terms that disarm rather than confront. Both the recount and its multimodal recontextualization promote a politics of freedom that involves respecting and enhancing the freedom of others. Put into practice, this involves more than an end to apartheid and reconciliation with its perpetrators. Ultimately it involves the reconfiguration of a global economic order which distributes resources so unevenly that it has to be propped up by all manner of unbearable regimes. In a sense then, Mandela is promoting socialism in the name of freedom; he naturalizes a comfortable reading position for those who might oppose his aims, and at the same time gives his sympathizers an inspirational shot in the arm. If discourse analysts are serious about wanting to use their work to enact social change, then they will have to broaden their coverage to include discourse of this kind – discourse that inspires, encourages, heartens; discourse we like, that cheers us along. We need, in other words, more positive discourse analysis (PDA?) alongside our critique; and this means dealing with texts we admire, alongside those we dislike and try to expose (Wodak, 1996).

Let me close with two more comments. The first is that discourse analysis inevitably involves multimodal analysis, even if we begin with language. Traditionally, the extra-linguistic has been glossed as context and (i) ignored; (ii) discussed in common-sense terms; or (iii) analysed on an interdisciplinary basis with apparatus borrowed from another discipline (psychology, sociology, philosophy, cultural studies and the like). The alternative explored here is to construe context as a social semiotic, model it as a system of meanings and treat it as additional texture. Kress and Van Leeuwen's (1996) pioneering work in this transdisciplinary project[14] was drawn on earlier in order to unpack the multi-modal discourse in Mandela (1996). Whether we adopt an interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary perspective on discourse analysis is an important variable. I expect that modelling context as meaning is the more promising tack for sign-oriented linguists, since it encourages them to explore new ground and renovate their discipline in ways that are perhaps long overdue.

The final point I would make is that specific instances of meaning do matter, alongside our studies of generalized instances, of corpora, and of systems as a whole. In part, this issue is simply a matter of perspective: the more variables we are interested in, the fewer texts we can analyse. So the challenge lies in developing frameworks in which system can be brought into focus without losing contact with text, and text can be explored in detail without losing contact with system.[15] In this article I have leaned towards the instance, in order to focus on

the contingency of meanings as they unfold from one step to another in a single text (Halliday, 1987, 1993c; Martin, 1995a). This local contingency is critical to understanding the social impact a text may have, on political developments in South Africa, for example, or on linguistic changes to the recount genre. In both connections it is important not to lose sight of grace in discourse, as outlined here.

We have taken a short stroll through meaning – in order to value an instance of semiotic weather in relation to a climate of political change. As socially engaged discourse analysts, however, our journeys have just begun. No doubt this new journal will guide us on our way.

Author's Note

Other style features in this article: bold type is used for highlighting; italics for citations in running text; small caps for realization of counterexpectation through continuity; underlining for through conjunction; equals sign for elaboration (Halliday, 1994).

Notes

My thanks to Malcolm Coulthard and his colleagues at the University of Birmingham for the opportunity to present an early version of this article in September 1997, and for their insights during and following the presentation; and to Anne Cranny-Francis, Rick Iedema, Teun van Dijk and Theo van Leeuwen for their guidance on revisions.

1. Cf. Halliday (1971) who explores the role of grammar symbolizing consciousness in Golding's *The Inheritors*.
2. Halliday's ideational metafunction has two subcomponents, the experiential and the logical; we are focussing on the experiential here.
3. The Mood adjunct *already* is part of Mood; it has not been separately labelled here.
4. For Halliday Finite and Predicator conflate in the simple present; so *takes* appears as both Mood and Residue.
5. I am adopting a minimalist position here, simply taking the last group or phrase of the clause as New, based on an unmarked reading of the clause with the tonic falling on its last salient syllable; parts of what I have called transition could arguably be taken as New in a carefully reasoned clause by clause analysis.
6. Or, undoing the nominalization, *I was deluded*.
7. Following Halliday (1994), the tense choice is [past in present], the 'what happened still matters now' option.
8. Semantically, if not grammatically negative: *an illusion* = 'not real'.
9. Paul Kelly (1991) comments on his song celebrating Vincent Lingiari's achievements as follows: "'From Little Things Big Things Grow" is dedicated to Vincent Lingiarri, the Gurindji stockmen and their families who walked off Lord Vestey's cattle station in 1966 thus initiating a land claim that lasted 8 years. The Whitlam government handed back much of the Gurindji country in 1974, Gough Whitlam himself pouring dirt into Vincent Lingiarri's cupped hands in a ceremony symbolizing the legal restoration of their lands. From this simple action of walking off in 1966 many consequences flowed'.

10. The elisions are presented in the Appendix; the larger cuts are to paragraphs 3 and 4. Paragraphs 4 and 5 from 1995 (communal and democratic freedom) are collapsed in the 1996 version.
11. This text is taken from pages 747–8 of the 1995 autobiography, a couple of pages before the end of the book.
12. Neither triptych resolves the question of whether the boy's salute is to be read as is a sign of protest or of celebration.
13. The previous pages feature images with a photo of Mandela and his daughter on stage during the inauguration, on top of smaller photos of visiting dignitaries – Fidel Castro, Benazir Bhutto, Yasar Arafat, the Duke of Edinburgh and four unnamed Arabs (in royal Saudi Arabian dress).
14. See also Kress (1997), O'Toole (1994).
15. For discussion see Halliday (1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 1993a, 1993b), Halliday and Matthiessen (forthcoming), Nesbitt and Plum (1988).

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Appendix

Wordings from Mandela (1995: 750–1) which are elided from Mandela (1996: 202), by paragraph:

[free in every way that I could know.] . . . [near my mother's hut] . . . [and ride the broad backs of slow-moving bulls]

. . . [as a student] . . . [freedom only for myself.] . . . [as a young man in Johannesburg,] . . . [and honourable] . . . [– the freedom not to be obstructed in a lawful life].

. . . [not only was I not free, but my brothers and sisters were not free. I saw that] . . . [I am no more virtuous or self-sacrificing than the next man, but I found that I could not even enjoy the poor and limited freedoms I was allowed when I knew my people were not free. Freedom is indivisible; the chains on any one of my people were the chains on all of them, the chains on all of my people were the chains on me.]

. . . [as well as I knew anything] . . . [A man who takes away another man's freedom is a prisoner of hatred, he is locked behind the bars of prejudice and narrow-mindedness.

I am not truly free if I am taking away someone else's freedom, just as surely as I am not free when my freedom is taken from me. The oppressed and the oppressor alike are robbed of their humanity.] . . .

[Some say that has now been achieved. But I know that this is not the case.]

. . . [I have tried not to falter; I have made missteps along the way.]

51

Division and Rejection: From the Personification of the Gulf Conflict to the Demonization of Saddam Hussein

Luisa Martín Rojo

> Le discours, en apparence, a beau être bien peu de chose, les interdits qui le frappent révèlent très tôt, très vite, son lien avec le désir et avec le pouvoir. (Foucault, 1971: 12)

The analysis I present in this paper is basically of a 'critical' nature, in Foucault's terms. It aims to discover and delimit the means of exclusion and appropriation which work within discourse, and then reveal the motivation behind them by means of analysis. Discourses emerge from society and have effects on it as well: they contribute to building up social networks and conceptual frameworks. It is these social and political effects that I want to analyse.

This critical view is closely linked with Foucault's conception of discourse. Discourses are practices which follow rules.[1] Discourse production is controlled and structured by a cluster of procedures that function as a means to avoid external threats and power.[2] These procedures make discourse opaque. Foucault invites us to 'read' the effects of a variety of discourse forms and verify how they come to be a 'representation'. This 'representation' exists because, from the very beginning, every piece of discourse is an interpretation, and not a reflection of a state of affairs.[3]

Foucault and 'critical linguistics' (Fowler, 1991: 231; Hodge and Kress, 1992: 161; for a critical approach in discourse analysis, see also van Dijk, 1988 and 1993) are interested in the same type of discourse: anonymous discourse, a discourse of a kind which is produced in those situations where power relations

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are most evident – rules within mental hospitals or prisons, for instance, or, in the case of critical linguistics, the analysis of language in the news. This paper deals with the latter, in particular with the type of discourse that the press produced on the Gulf War, an event that has been considered as one of the most outstanding examples of appropriation of discourse. However, I focus on what might be called the process of 'demonization of Saddam Hussein', especially the period just before the war, when this demonization was necessary in order to turn a western ally (against Iran) – or, at least, an 'unknown quantity' – into an enemy, and in this way justify the attacks. The change in the perception and presentation of Saddam Hussein was especially relevant in Spain, where the war was, from the very beginning, unpopular. The controversy which surrounded it reminds one of the polemic over Spain joining NATO. On both occasions, the Spanish position was presented as a chance to join the developed countries and overcome the country's traditional isolation.[4] This process implies, first of all, an inclusion procedure, which ensures that the Spanish position does not simply respond to US demands, but is an ideological option in which all Europe is involved and, of course, some Arab countries. Nevertheless, what makes the inclusion process possible is an exclusion procedure which establishes an ideological *us*, opposed to Saddam Hussein.

In this paper I study both processes – inclusion and exclusion – and try to delimit the role played by the latter in the achievement of the former. Both are realized through discourse and they are carried out by means of different linguistic and argumentative resources and strategies. The exclusion is articulated on two axes: DIVIDING, that is, establishing the categories which will be opposed in the conflict – *us*, with several different referents, vs *them*, or, nearly always, *him*; and REJECTING, that is, segregating, marginalizing, creating a negative image. The creation of an enemy, *them* or *him*, makes it possible to establish, as the opponent, an inclusive subject, *we*, which is defined simply by opposition. In the same way, the construction of a negative image of the enemy, using the fact that he flouts a series of established values and is given negative features like irrationality or madness, provides the inclusive *we*, by opposition, with a positive image. The result is a *we* which is indefinite but which evokes a set of shared values that remain implicit. Both the subject and the values are thus underdefined, but despite this the reader absorbs them and becomes part of them. By contrast, in the enemy camp there appears a concrete rival who embodies all the anti-values, all the crimes. Discourse brings about a process of categorization, of ordering and normalizing, which generates knowledge about ourselves, and about the events we are living. In this case, a vision of the war is created, transmitted and consolidated. All this fits into what Lakoff (1992) has referred to as 'the fairy tale of the just war'. This plot brings together all the metaphors Lakoff has examined, and illuminates the mechanisms and strategies I have found in the analysis. In this paper I refer to these three processes: the establishing of subjects, the clarifying of values and the transmission of a specific vision of the events.

I have taken as my corpus the so-called 'objective' press and, in particular, chosen from it one of the most prestigious Spanish newspapers: *El País*. The style of 'objectivity', by means of moderate, emotionally controlled language,

close to the standard register, seems to be a neutral style and to represent 'the ideology of consensus' (see Fowler, 1991; Norton, 1983; Sandell, 1977; Sherer and Giles, 1979 for different insights on formal style). I have chosen to examine the 'objective' press because my aim is to expose the more sophisticated and less explicit mechanisms used to control and bias the information given. To this effect, this analysis goes hand in hand with van Dijk's (1991) work on 'elite' or inhibited racism. I will try to show that, apart from some unique linguistic strategies and resources, exclusion procedures that appear in what we might call the 'elite press' do not essentially differ from those uncovered in the British tabloid newspaper the *Sun* or elsewhere by other researchers (see Imbert and Vidal Beneyto, 1986, for similar conclusions).

Foucault and Exclusion Procedures

Through discourse, according to Michel Foucault, the new rituals of power are exercised. These include the definition of what is usual, habitual and expected, as opposed to what constitutes a deviation, an exception. This type of power creates subjects and self-knowledge. Self-regulation, normalization, is produced when 'external' forces bring 'interior' self-discipline. In this case, it is seen both in the construction of a homogeneous *us* and in the exclusion of Saddam Hussein by means of this construction of what it means to be human.

The exclusion procedures permit, as we shall see, the cognitive categorization of individuals into groups, which is a way of ordering perception and judgement, a way of making sense of social processes. The means of these categories, their function and their social and psychological significance is established inside the discourse context, and changes when the context changes. This means that the categories are not constructed in the mind from a process of perception, and only later receive a linguistic label, but, rather, they are built in and by discourse 'as part of a collective domain of negotiation, debate, argumentative and ideological struggle' (Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 77).

Michel Foucault analyses three different external exclusion procedures in his book *L'Ordre du discours* (1971), and these can also be seen in the way information on the Gulf War was presented.

Prohibition. All through the Gulf War there was a prohibition, given that there was press censorship. The fact that it was the military who controlled and filtered the information on the war explains partially how pieces of news were selected and events were omitted.

Division and rejection. The example of these combined activities of dividing and rejecting that Foucault studied most is the opposition between reason and madness. This opposition appears in discourses dealing with the Gulf War, and is accompanied by others like 'ours vs theirs', 'order vs brutality' and, ultimately, 'good vs evil'. 'Division' means establishing an inclusive *us* and an exclusive *them*; in this case, them was just *him*, because the conflict was embodied in Saddam Hussein. Beneath this dual vision lies a model of society based on the idea of consensus (Fowler, 1991: 16–24, 49–54). In the foreground there are two

opposing groups: those who share the accepted values and behaviour, and those who flout them. This dual vision entails a personalization of the conflict.

Personalization is one of the essential factors formulated by Johann Galtung and Mari Ruge in their analysis of socially constructed values in news (1973: 62–72). Its functions, as Fowler proposes and as our analysis shows, are 'to promote straightforward feelings of identification, empathy or disapproval and to effect a metonymic simplification of complex historical and institutional processes' (1991: 15).

Once the two camps are established, the field of conflict (*them*) and that of consensus (*us*), 'the ideology of consensus' and ethnic prejudices are used to reinforce exclusion or 'rejection'. When they are invoked, an image of Saddam Hussein is constructed in which he plays the stranger, the irrational being, the madman, the beast, and in this way he, ultimately, personifies evil. These are the villain's attributes within the fairy tale Lakoff (1992) discusses. Rejection allows us not only to identify the enemy, but to give him an answer as well.[5]

As a result of an implicit or explicit contrast, somebody else's madness makes us rational, civilized human beings. It is by opposition that each one's characteristics can be delimited and typological differences can be established. Identity is, then, relative, since it is constructed by means of contrasts with an external otherness. It is a matter not only of fixing limits – which seems to be a constant in bourgeois mentality (Subirats, 1977) – but also of the projection of our fear, of our own irrationality. In the case in question, the exclusion of the 'other' gives direction to the reaction, and, more importantly, justifies the war: the madman is dangerous, he must be eliminated – if not, he may impose his irrationality on the world. This paper focuses on this particular procedure.

The opposition 'true vs false'. El País knows that the assumption that objectivity is possible is deeply rooted. Discourse tends to be considered as a reflection and not as an interpretation of the state of affairs. It also knows that it is highly valued. Consequently, *El País* gives the impression of being an objective newspaper, a journal which seeks for 'truth'. This pretence produces a style in which mitigation, implicitness and inferencing play a major role. My analysis highlights this; the process by which Saddam Hussein is demonized is specially efficient when a discourse is not considered to be an interpretation, made by a particular ideology, but is taken to be true. As van Dijk points out, the perlocutionary or persuasive dimension in news lies 'in the formulation of meanings in such a way that they are not merely understood but also accepted as the truth or at least as a possible truth' (1988: 83). Rhetorical structure accompanying assertive speech acts enhances beliefs assigned to the asserted propositions in the text. If we do not believe what the other says, we can hardly be expected to change our opinions. Any acceptance is a complex process which presupposes a minimal degree of coherence of the new propositions with the knowledge and beliefs we already have. Otherwise we do not discard fundamental beliefs built up during years of understanding, experience and action (van Dijk, 1988: 83). In this sense, the demonization of Saddam Hussein becomes convenient and necessary to overcome the ideological opposition to the war: establishing an individual agent of aggressive actions, the collective representations of abnormality, irrationality

and madness are evoked. These representations act as principles of organization, structuring the social experience, in this case the perception of the conflict (see REJECTION).

From now on, I develop my analysis of the linguistic and argumentative procedures of division and rejection.

Division: The Personalization of the Conflict

Among the procedures used to divide which I illustrate in this paper are: (1) the discourse strategy of *intertextuality*, which makes it possible to reproduce the ideology of consensus, personalize and affirm the existence of two conflicting groups, avoiding any responsibility for the newspaper in the discourse; (2) *cognitive models*, which underlie the discourse quoted and that of the paper itself, and which permit the construction of the two camps: among them are categorization, metaphor and metonymy; (3) finally, *the contrast* between actions and agents, which organizes the opposition *us* vs *them* on the lexical, syntactic and discourse levels, and gives coherence to the discourse. This discourse strategy delimits with clarity both subjects (*us* and *him*), and strengthens the process of division and demarcation.

Intertextuality and the Establishment of the Rival Groups

The persuasive content of news requires organizing, as van Dijk shows, 'in order to be understood, represented, memorized, and finally believed and integrated' (1988: 84; see also 96–100 and 114–19). Van Dijk points out that one means of increasing the appearance of truth in news is to resort to evidence from other reliable sources (authorities, respectable people, professionals).

In this way, *El País* systematically quoted authorities in the period just before the war. These quotations were often presented as the topic of the news, appearing in headlines and leads (categories which summarize the content of the text and express the semantic macrostructure). Nevertheless, as van Dijk claims, and as we will see below, the social hierarchy is reproduced in the rhetorical hierarchy of reliability assumed by the newspaper.

I call this argumentative resource *intertexuality*. Its study is based on the theories of Bakhtine (1981), Kristeva (1986a, 1986b) and Ducrot (1984) (see also Fairclough 1992, for an appraisal of works by Bakhtine and Kristeva). For Bakhtine, any utterance is made up of multiple voices, it is built up of fragments of other utterances which are more or less explicit and complete. The speaker may give the floor momentarily to one of the characters; in the case in question, *El País* shows its preference for George Bush and James Baker. In this way, the discourse becomes part of history and of society – from the moment that the text updates, responds to or reworks previous texts. Consequently, it contributes to making history and bringing about more transcendental changes. At the same time, the discourse lets history and society into it – since the text absorbs and is made up of previous or contemporaneous texts (see Kristeva, 1986a, and

Fairclough, 1992: Ch. 4). All the examples found respond to the field Foucault (1969) calls 'presence' – that is, they evoke fragments of discourse outside the text, either to show agreement with them, because they are considered transcendental, or to criticize them or to discredit them.

This resource entails a personification of the conflict, which produces two different results: (1) the construction of the other; (2) the construction of *us*.

The construction of the other: SADDAM HUSSEIN IS IRAQ. From the very beginning, *El País* put the blame on Saddam Hussein for the invasion and subsequent crisis. In the days before the war started, this accusation was made most frequently by means of quoting George Bush's statements or discourses. This technique cannot be understood by means of the alleged 'register of truth' the newspaper claims to have, because it allows readers to involve and share a particular conception, without apparently stating it explicitly. As a result, by including multiple voices, by means of an explicit polyphony, the most radical views can be articulated while maintaining the style of objectivity (moral ambivalence):

(1) 'Si *Sadam no abandona Kuwait* incondicionalmente *se arriesga* a sufrir unas consecuencias devastadoras para el país.' (5.1.1991: 3)
(1) [Quoting James Baker 'If *Saddam does not leave Kuwait* unconditionally, *he will expose* his country to devastating consequences.' (5.1.1991: 3)

Saddam Hussein appears in the semantic roles of agent of the invasion and the beneficiary of the retaliations. In this way the first term in the opposition is established. George Bush and James Baker are the main agents here.

In all these examples of intertextuality (see also (7), (10), (11)), *the paper does not paraphrase the discourse – the speakers are all quoted directly.* They are not mentioned with the purpose of criticizing them, but, rather, the words of these two politicians seem to constitute in themselves the information, and there are no linguistic signals to show that the author of the article ('locuteur', in Ducrot's terms [1984: Ch. 8]) does not share the vision of the events transmitted by these discourses (that is, with the point of view of the 'enunciateur', in Ducrot's terms).

By using preformulated information, the journalist presents a coded version of a situation model, which may include, as in this case, 'opinions, attitudes, perspective, and other information about the model of the speaker, as well as specific meanings, hierarchies (topics, schemata), and stylistic and rhetorical forms' (van Dijk 1988: 115). In this sense, the fact that several headlines focus on George Bush's declarations (for example: 'Bush recommends Saddam to opt for peace', 'Bush declares ...', 'Bush claims ...', 6.1.1991) shows a preference for this source and for a particular model of the event. Through George Bush's and James Baker's words, the personification of the war is achieved and a hierarchy of participants is established. Quotations reproduce the different lexical procedures (see, for instance, taxemes, in example (7)), syntactic procedures (contrast expressed through agents and actions, as in examples (10) and (11)), and pragmatic devices (see, for instance, the maintenance of the illocutionary force in (12)), used by American diplomacy. All these resources seek to emphasize the

differences in power, status and possibilities of control, and reproduce a particular model of the situation. By contrast, and as a consequence of the hierarchy of sources and the different degrees of reliability assumed by the newspaper, *El País* reproduces neither Saddam Hussein's conceptualization of the conflict nor his rhetorical procedures.

The presentation of Saddam Hussein's vision of the conflict could have made clear how much simplification was done in order to make him the only person responsible for the conflict, and the only agent in it. Nevertheless, in accordance with the exclusion process, Saddam Hussein's words are very rarely quoted and, if they are, they are often paraphrased, framed and so discredited – either by extension (2) or explicitly (3).

(2) Las fuerzas armadas están preparadas para una larga batalla', *según el presidente iraquí.* (7.1.1991: 3; titular pequeño)
(3) *Estas soflamas propagandísticas* se subrayaron con las. . . . (5.1.1991: 2)
(2) 'The armed forces are prepared for a long battle', *according to the Iraqi president.* (7.1.1991: 3; small headline)
(3) *These inflammatory speeches* were emphasized by. . . . (5.1.1991: 2)

In (2), although the words of the President are quoted, the presence of the discourse marker 'according to' points to the distance the paper ('locuteur', in Ducrot's terms) wants to establish, and the fact that it does not identify with the opinion quoted – that is, with the point of view of Saddam Hussein ('enunciateur'). The use of 'according to' relativizes his vision, so that it does not appear as the words of authority (as in (1), (7), (10), (11)), but as an utterance which is questioned by the journalist, and only Saddam himself is responsible for it. In (3) we see how Saddam Hussein's words are discredited by lexical means: the distinction between 'objective discourse' and 'inflammatory speeches' is called up and Saddam Hussein's words are classified as 'propaganda'. This distinction is based on an objectivist conception of knowledge and language, which has deep roots in our culture. Only on one occasion, on 7 January, was a sentence quoted from Saddam Hussein's speech that made it possible to guess his vision of the conflict:

(4) . . . la lucha contra 'la *corrupción*, la *hegemonía* [extranjera] y *la injusticia económica* a escala del mundo y regional.' (7.1.1991: 3)
(4) . . . the struggle against '*corruption*, [foreign] *hegemony* and *economic injustice* at a regional and global scale.' (7.1.1991: 3)

In opposition to the personalization of the conflict (everyone against Saddam) which we find in the declarations of George Bush and James Baker and in the discourse of the newspaper itself, Saddam Hussein in (4) uses abstract nouns referring to processes, to actions which take on the category of states. Thus, he presents the war as an act of rebellion against the established order, an order which prevails thanks to a participant which is not mentioned. Examples (4) and (5) do not give us enough data to know the sort of discourse used by Saddam Hussein on the conflict, though they do share a preference for the presentation [illegible] and ideological motivation, rather than personalization.

The road which takes us from personalization to other more complex motives based on economics, politics and ideology is, as we shall see, longer. Personalization is a simplification and makes it possible to leave the 'real' causes for the conflict unmentioned.

In (2), (3), (4) and (5), the words of Saddam Hussein appeared among a list of details that reduced their credibility: for example, the fact that his speech lasted 30 minutes whereas George Bush's – delivered the same day – was only 6 minutes long, or the fact that in his speech Saddam Hussein repeatedly used words such as 'battle', 'fight', etc. All these details reinforce the categorization of Saddam Hussein's discourse as propaganda. Such a presentation prevents the contrast between the opposing points of view and makes Saddam Hussein's rationale appear irrational.

(5) '. . . la batalla es entre Dios y Satán.' (31.1.1991: 6)
(5) [Quoting Saddam Hussein] '. . . this is a battle between God and Satan.' (31.1.1991: 6)

By quoting the speeches of George Bush and Saddam Hussein, delivered the same day (7.1.1991), *El País* not only increases the appearance of truth but also produces an effect of factuality and dramatization: a dialogue between the two leaders. Nevertheless, by treating both discourses in a different way, the paper confers superiority to one interlocutor over another, which results in an asymmetrical dialogue.

In editorials, where quotations are not used, and in some columns as well, it is the newspaper itself that contributes to the process of personalizing and establishing the two camps *them/him* vs *us*, assigning Saddam Hussein the agent role in the case of negatively valued actions and the beneficiary role in the case of retaliations. The mechanism becomes more pervasive as the conflict intensifies. This increases exclusion and produces a background of 'absolute otherness', by which Saddam Hussein is presented as the negative image of *us*:

(6) Los incendios de pozos de petróleo en Kuwait y, posteriormente, los vertidos al golfo Pérsico refuerzan desgraciadamente los argumentos de quienes consideraron que *Sadam recurriría a una política de tierra quemada* antes de soltar *su* presa . . . (1.2.1991: 16; editorial)
(6) Oil wells being burnt and oil being poured in the Gulf afterwards unfortunately are new arguments for those who thought that *Saddam would follow a scorched earth policy* before letting *his* prey go . . . . (2.1.1991: 16; editorial)

Identity: the construction of us. Facing Saddam Hussein there was an inclusive *us* which was often called up by means of quoting the words of James Baker, that is, using the same discourse strategy: intertexuality.

(7) '*Sadam sigue reforzando sus posiciones defensivas* en Kuwait, y cuanto más esperamos más alto será el riego que corremos, más alto será el riego que correrán *nuestros* soldados.' (6.1.1991: 3)
(7) *Saddam continues building up his defensive works* in Kuwait and the longer *we* wait, the more *we* expose ourselves, the more *our* soldiers expose themselves.' (6.6.1991: 3)

The first-person plural creates groups of people, but it may refer, in fact, to different groups (see, for example, Guespin, 1985). Among the values of *us* which have been pointed out is the national *us*, found in the quotations of Bush and Baker (as in (7)). However, what is most characteristic of this strategy is the fact that its value lies in designating a collective which has one name but varies as to content and functions (see Geffroy, 1985). The paper's reproduction of the *us* of political discourses and the progressive use of other co-referential terms – like the UN, the West, the civilized world, the whole world – shows that it widened its reference, as the war went on, to a transnational group. This group is presented as sharing ideological values which are never made explicit – we must not forget who made up the 'anti-Saddam coalition', in which it would be difficult to find common values. Thus the referent is no longer national but ideological.

In this way, by dividing – segregating through its discourse – the paper not only allows a set of categories to be established, but it also strengthens the illusion of a consensus. As Fowler says, 'the *we* of consensus narrows and hardens into a population which sees its interest as culturally and economically valid, but as threatened by a *them* comprising a motley of antagonistic sectional groups' (1990: 53). The construction of *us* implies, then, a simplification, differences are smoothed over, and in this case it made it possible for *El País* and the Government to announce that Spain belonged to the West as one of the most developed countries, and shared the structure of values attributed to this group.

However, this process of identification and construction of *us* took place slowly in *El País*, and was made up of two stages.

Stage One. At the beginning of the war, *El País* did not use the generalizing *us* in its own discourse. Above all, it was George Bush and the US who faced Saddam Hussein. The newspaper was against the war and supported diplomacy. The encompassing *us* was then made up of those who condemned the invasion and wanted a peaceful agreement. George Bush, in the other group, wanted war. Examples (8) and (9) illustrate this stage. In (9) what is at stake is a questioning of US leadership.

(8) *El presidente George Bush* – no sin fuerte oposición interior . . . – ha dejado claro que *está dispuesto a emplear la fuerza* . . ., Sin embargo, existe un *anhelo casi unánime en la opinión pública mundial* . . ., de que se evite le guerra . . . . (12.1.1991: 10; editorial)

(9) *This is not an issue between the United States and Iraq* . . ., but one that puts the UN, almost every country in the world, against the government which has seized Kuwait, so violating international law. (12.1.1991: 10; editorial)

(8) *President George Bush* – not without strong domestic opposition . . . – has unambiguously said that *he is prepared to use force* . . . . However, there is an *almost unanimous outcry within world public opinion* . . . asking for war to be avoided . . . .

(9) *This is not an issue between the United States and Iraq* . . ., but one that puts the UN, almost every country in the world, against with the government which has seized Kuwait, so violating international law. (12.1.1991: 10; editorial)

Examples (8) and (9) show that divergences and opposed attitudes are related to the search for the most appropriate solution (diplomacy vs war), but do not affect the conceptualization of the conflict. *El País* assigned to Saddam Hussein

the agent role in it and employed the identical argumentative and linguistic resources for creating a negative image of him. The only difference is that during this first stage *El País* did not resort to an inclusive *us*, which was, however, always implied by the use of intertexuality.

Stage Two: As soon as the allies attacked Iraq, *El País* changed its attitude and started to support the dominant discourse: Saddam Hussein's madness has blocked an agreement and has inevitably led to war. From that moment on, this idea pervaded editorials and news reports, and was argued both by reinforcing exclusion, stressing the rejection and the negative image of Saddam Hussein – that is, by showing that he was an irrational beast – and by inclusion – by presenting a united *us* that encompassed the whole world. Geffroy (1985: 87) has shown how war forces society to form a single group, with a unique principle, *us*, whose definition and delimitation comes from what Poliakov (1980) calls 'devil-dialectic' (see Howlett, 1982: 15). In this way, the reader feels appealed to, and absorbed into a unique and all-embracing *we*, in which references are superimposed and change throughout the discourse, or even in a single sentence.

What the existence of two different stages shows is how the divergences over the potential solution of the conflict disappear, how the newspaper's identification with the dominant discourse – represented by declarations of George Bush and James Baker – becomes complete. This identification entails the decrease of the use of intertextuality, and, as a consequence, the use of the first-person plural pronoun, *we*, becomes less frequent. Despite the similarities in the two discourses, *El País* prefers the use of collective subjects, such as 'the international community', 'the UN', 'Europe', or 'the civilized world', in which the existence of a united *us* remains implicit. This tendency is more evident in reports about aggressive actions at the beginning of the war (especially in headlines from 17.1.1991: 'US bombs Baghdad'; 'Bush is certain of victory').

At the same time as the subjects which made up *us* were left inexplicit, an acceptable picture of the conflict which faced them was drawn. Both personalization and setting the conflict within a global background (the 'civilized world against Saddam') were priorities for American diplomacy. This was a result of strategic aims and was linked with face management, but there was an even more important motive behind it all, to suppress the economic and geopolitical dimension of the conflict and to situate it in a new context: on the boundary between reason and madness, an opposition which brings together all the discourses made by the West on the Gulf War. These boundaries, as well as the conflict itself, only allowed for two options: either you enter the game or you are out.

Cognitive Models

In the previous section, I have shown how *El País*, by means of explicit intertextuality, contributed to sorting people into categories; later (see the discussion of the contrast between agents and actions below), we will see how different values are put on each of them. However, the personalization of the conflict, with the establishment of two opposing camps, that of the 'ideological *we*' and that of the enemy, embodied in Saddam, would have been impossible even

without having recourse to cognitive models built as metaphors and metonymies (Lakoff, 1987). Despite the existence of some divergences related to the solution of the crisis, *El País* conceptualized the conflict by using the same examples of metaphors and metonymies present in dominant discourse, and in particular in George Bush's discourse.

George Lakoff argues that there exists a series of relatively fixed and extended conceptual metaphors and metonymies which organize our thoughts. If a concept is created by a metaphor or a metonym, some aspects of it are emphasized and others which are inconsistent with them concealed. In the cases I examine, using these procedures makes any other interpretation of the facts impossible and works as a means to justify the war (Lakoff, 1992).

I review, first of all, procedures which highlight Saddam Hussein and contribute considerably to the division process:

THE STATE AS A PERSON METAPHOR

> A state is conceptualized as a person engaging in social relations within a world community. Its landmass is its home. It lives in a neighborhood, and has neighbors, friends and enemies. States are seen as having inherent dispositions: they can be peaceful or aggressive, responsible or irresponsible, industrious or lazy. (Lakoff, 1992: 465)

This metaphor helps sustain unanimous judgements on the state as a whole because it conceals differences between social classes or groups, nationalities, religions or concerns. In news and editorials on the Gulf War the same metaphor is used for the two contenders (9). I have noticed, however, that it is not used in the same way for both. Given this metaphor, the US, and even the mixed 'anti-Saddam coalition' or the West or the so-called 'international community', are pictured as a united block in which concerns, attributes, values, norms and ideology are shared. In the case of Iraq, this metaphor combines what is really a conglomerate of ethnic groups and religions and unifies their behaviour, so that, since they are represented in the figure of a single man, they can be made responsible and easily condemned. Iraq is seen as a person who, from the start, is also an enemy who may attack us, hurt us, maybe destroy us; so we have got to face him, set up targets, ask for support against him. The metaphor discovers the enemy, creates him and points to the expected response: confrontation on the field – that is, war.

THE RULER STANDS FOR THE STATE METONYM. This metonym is systematically used by *El País* when Saddam Hussein is involved ((1), (6) and (7)), but much less frequently if George Bush is mentioned (8). It has different readings depending on the case. In the case of Iraq, editorials and columns do not talk about any abstract entity, but explicitly isolate Saddam Hussein as the agent responsible for the whole conflict as well (see (1): 'If *Saddam does not leave Kuwait* unconditionally, . . .'). Among the consequences of this procedure there is the selection and justification of the actions undertaken against him (against Iraq), which are viewed as an unavoidable response because of some particular features of his personality. These have been carefully chosen and highlighted, or even invented, through the use

of the underlying metaphor and metonym and become attributes of this state. Under these circumstances, the process of demonization becomes much easier. Responses are explicitly portrayed as collective responses against an individual. Saddam Hussein seems to be the *beneficiary*, when there is in fact an embargo and an attack going on ((1) and (12)). The metonym comes then to: SADDAM HUSSEIN IS IRAQ.

By means of this metonym a particular sort of violence is evoked: the one which is exercised by individuals and not by groups or states. This kind of violence is linked to the social imagery of irrationality and madness (Pintos de Cea-Naharro, 1994). This metonym acts as an argumentative resource, as a persuasive device, which makes acceptable the rationalizations by which the dominant discourse tends to be legitimized (under REJECTION, we will see the role played by the imaginary dimension in the conceptualization of the war as a fairy tale, with a hero, a villain and a victim – that is, its role as a principle of organization of perception and social experience).

Within the acts of dividing and rejecting, the concept of *us* is not constructed in the same way as *them* or *him* is. In the first case, we have a process of encompassing, whereas in the second we single somebody out. This stresses Saddam Hussein's isolation, his irrational and impossible stand. The move emphasizes the contrast between the two sides and efficiently triggers patriotism. The RULER STANDS FOR THE STATE METONYM is in the case of George Bush far less pervasive. Instead of it, we find collective subjects. They are 'the international community', the UN, or 'the civilized world' and are also personified. They are given values, attributes and made responsible for actions, all of which contrast with, and often are even the direct opposite of, those assigned to Saddam Hussein (see below the discussion of contrast expressed through agents and actions). The pronoun *we* refers to a set of values and the content of the consensual assumption could be spelt out as a long series of propositions about social, political, economic and cultural world order. The apparent homogeneity strengthens the use of *we* and supports what is merely a vision of the events which harmonizes with the interests of some governments and powerful groups. This vision grows from the 'ideology of consensus' and, in its turn, articulates this ideology (see Fowler, 1991: 49–53; Hall, 1973; Hartley, 1982: 1–3).

'Our' ideology implies the assumption that the whole population – in this case, the international community – shares the same interests and beliefs. The use of *we* and collective subjects produces, then, an over-simplification rather like that of THE STATE AS PERSON METAPHOR. This process combines a conglomerate of ethnic groups, interests, cultures and religions and unifies their behaviours.[6] Thus it presents the interests and values of the dominant groups as universal. Fowler uses the expression 'homocentrism' for this overgeneralization: 'a preoccupation with countries, societies and individuals perceived to be like oneself; with boundaries; with defining groups felt to be unlike oneself, alien, threatening' 1991: 16).

I now present some examples showing this metaphor (THE STATE AS PERSON METAPHOR) and metonym (THE RULER STANDS FOR THE STATE METONYM) at work and how the contrast strengthens the dichotomy and, as a consequence, division.

The Rivals: Contrast Expressed through Agents and Actions

The act of dividing leads to contrast. Exclusion is the establishment of a borderline between two camps: 'our camp' (inside), where 'our' allies and friends are included; and 'their camp' (outside), where 'others', 'our enemies' are excluded. This establishment implies the definition of 'our' and 'their' land. Thus, contrast will give sense to words like *us* or *him*. Contrast has an effect not only on the agents, but also on their behaviour and attributes. Saddam Hussein acts as 'our enemy' – that is, as the agent of aggressive actions, and as the subject/agent in transitive or intransitive sentences endowed with negative values (see examples (6), (7), (10), (11), (20) and (26)): *'to offend'*, *'to threaten'*, *'to invade'*, *'to attack'*, *'to build up defensive works'*, *'to bomb'*, etc. The US and the international community are presented, however, as agents of actions such as *'to present a peace proposal'*, *'to defend Kuwait'*, *'to defend international order'*, *'to order a ceasefire'*, etc. [see, for instance, 'peace offering' and 'pray for peace', in (10) and (11)].

Different methods are used to build up this contrast (see (10) and (11)):

Lexical procedures. Lexical categorization. As regards the *agents*, the contrast I have referred to is made between: (a) all-encompassing agents (like 'the world' and 'the international community' – in (10) and (11) – or 'civilized world' (26)) vs very concrete agents ('Saddam Hussein', or 'him' – in (10) and 'Iraq' – in (26)); (b) a united and ideological *we* (7) vs a concrete agent, him (and (11) or 'Saddam' (7); (c) two concrete agents, 'Bush' (several headlines focus on George Bush's declarations, for example 'Bush recommends Saddam to opt for peace', 'Bush declares . . .'. 'Bush claims . . .', 6.1.1991) vs 'Saddam' ('Saddam intends to keep Kuwait and liberate Palestine', 7.1.1991). The second term of the contrast is always *him*, which implies the presentation of Saddam Hussein as the unequivocal agent of the following actions.

Vocabulary establishes a division between peaceful *actions* and aggressive actions ((10) and (11)). In this sense, euphemisms are used to present aggressive actions as legitimate, peaceful and moderate ('defend Kuwait' vs 'attack', 'peace offering' and 'pray for peace' in (10) and (11), at a moment when Americans were preparing for war – in fact already sending troops over). The contrast is more evident once war was declared, and, as different analyses have shown (see Fowler, 1991; Hodge and Kress, 1992) is a very common strategy in western newspapers. During the period studied in this paper (that is, just before the war), this procedure presented Saddam Hussein as an antagonist and his actions as refusals, to 'peace offerings'.

The main results of this procedure are first to link Saddam Hussein with the use of violence. This evocation – by using THE RULER STANDS FOR THE STATE METONYM – of a particular kind of violence, exercised by an individual, plays, as we will see, an essential role in the rejection move. The second main result is to show that there could not be a common 'rhetorical ground' and hence there could not be a diplomatic solution to the conflict. The use of force is justified.

Syntactic procedures. By these procedures, the role played by participants in different actions is emphasized or hidden.

Syntactic transformations of the clause. This is achieved by blurring the focus on agents, or suppressing them by means of impersonal structures, passive verbs, nominalizations, etc. In examples like: 'Waves of bombs fell on selected objectives in the Iraqi capital' or 'Black clouds go up from Baghdad' (both 17.1.1991), the deletion of the agent is complete. The use of this procedure, studied by 'critical linguistics' (see Fowler, 1991; Hodge and Kress, 1992), increases remarkably from 17 January on – that is, once war was declared and attacks began to be reported. When the agents of 'our' actions are mentioned, *El País* shows its preference for other forms of detachment: the use of some concrete agents like the US and the 'allies', from which Spain seems to be excluded: 'Los aliados dicen haber destruido . . .' ('Their allies claim . . .').

In this way, a friendly image is created through *parallel structures* and antonyms, especially those related with their respective behaviours and attributes (Hodge and Kress, 1992), which are used to reinforce the contrast as in the following examples:

(10) '*Mientras el mundo* esperaba', dijo, '*Sadam Husein respondió* a cada *gesto de paz* por parte de la comunidad internacional, con un *desafío*.'
(11) '*Mientras el mundo rezaba por la paz, él se preparaba para la guerra*.' (16.1.1991: 1)
(10) Quoting George Bush '*While the world waited, Saddam Hussein responded* to any *peace offering* made by the international community with a *challenge*.'
(11) '*While the world was praying for peace, he was preparing war*.' (16.1.1991: 1)

El País reproduces in examples (10) and (11) the rhetorical devices employed by George Bush: *parallel structures* (While + all-encompassing agents + peaceful action/concrete agent (he) + aggressive actions) articulate and reinforce the contrast between agents and actions.

This contrast articulates the text and makes it coherent in news reports, and even more so in editorials. Moreover it is efficient in creating a positive face for *us* and a negative one for *them* or *him*. I now focus on this point – the second move of the exclusion process: REJECTION. In this case, the main strategy is the evocation of the imaginary dimension, as a means to structure the social experience and the perception of the conflict. The 'script' of the event activated by the newspaper seems to be what Lakoff (1992) calls 'the fairy tale of the just war'. The aim of most of the linguistic and argumentative resources used by *El País* could be seen as an attempt to force the main characters and their actions to respond to this script.

Rejection: The Demonization of Saddam Hussein

In this section, I focus on the role of the imaginary dimension in the organization of perception and social experience. The concept of the imaginary dimension, developed by sociologists like Duvignaud, Balandier and Rochberg-Halton, is based on Durkheim's concept of 'shared representations' (see, for instance, Leduit, 1987: 45; Rochberg-Halton, 1986: 299). This dimension cannot be

identified with ideologies. It is considered as a principle of organization, whose main function is to make ideologies reliable and acceptable. As this analysis shows, *El País*, resorting to social imagery, looks for a particular interpretation of the events. The reader is asked to understand the Gulf War, recalling and updating an old model, which, as Lakoff claims, is like a fairy tale. (See van Dijk, 1993: 92–134; and van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983 for a theoretical framework which features the 'sociocognitive interface' of both personal mental models and socially shared mental representations.)

George Lakoff gives an account of the process by which Saddam Hussein becomes a demon through the conceptualization of the war in terms of a fairy tale. The main characters of the story are the villain, the victim and the hero. This plot is reduced to an offence committed by the villain on an innocent victim. The crime is rooted in an imbalance of power and leads to a moral imbalance. The hero must have a hard time and fight the villain in order to rescue the victim. His victory restores morality, and he himself, because of his unselfish actions, is glorified. Contrast and asymmetry between hero and villain are essential components in the tale: the hero's morality is perfect whereas the villain is immoral; the hero is valiant and rational; the villain is an irrational being, though he might be very cunning and calculating; under these circumstances, there is no way a deal can be made with him: he has to be challenged (Lakoff, 1992).

I will now make clear how the different linguistic and argumentative resources contribute both to the conceptualization of the war following this script and to the presentation of the political authorities and their actions in terms of the main characters of the story and their stereotypical behaviour. My analysis focuses on Saddam Hussein and on the social imagery of irrationality and madness – that is, on the creation of the villain.

A metaphor emerges from the tale – THE ENEMY AS A DEMON METAPHOR – which lies behind whatever descriptions, qualities and behaviours are attributed to Saddam Hussein. Amongst the villain's alleged attributes, Lakoff points to irrationality. We may wonder why this is the most outstanding and distinctive feature assigned to the villain when an event is conceptualized in terms of 'the fairy tale of the just war'.

The opposition between sanity and madness is linked, so Foucault thinks, with power:

> The realm of light is opposed to that of darkness in a way that reminds us of the way the world of the powerful is opposed to that of the weak. Light is only owned by official powers, whereas darkness belongs to the demonized classes. (Alvárez-Uría, 1983: 21–4).[7]

The image of a dissident is, Foucault says, the result of a series of conceptualizations made up by the law and ruling classes upon practices that violate the social norm (see Foucault, 1964; and Alvárez-Uría, 1983, for analyses of this process in Spain). That is to say, if you want to establish a norm, a power domain either in a particular country or at an international level – and maintain it, you [illegible] force against those who do not obey it. If such forms

domination are not accepted by both sides – the dominant and the dominated – as a 'natural order', aggression becomes the most common way to keep and reinforce the established order. (See Pintos de Cea-Naharro, 1995: 41, for the mental operations which are at the base of violent events: exclusion, discrimination, domination and aggression.) The evocation of a kind of violence, which is exercised by one individual (instead of groups or states), presents the rebellion of the dominated as an isolated gesture of greed and as the effect of irrationality and madness. As a consequence, punishment is justified.

The Gulf War takes place at the very moment when the old world order and traditional values are changing. These changes are often received with anguish. Within this context, Saddam Hussein does not react according to his status; his logic is insurrectionary. Due to the shrinking of the planet, the product of this logic becomes threats on our very doorstep. The features of the presentation of the Gulf War were a paradigmatic example of how the media can take us instantly into the farthest corner of the world. Images, information, goods, now have freedom of movement far beyond all national frontiers, which produces a feeling of there being too much space, so that we have the impression that everything that happens affects us directly and immediately (Augé, 1993: 25). The reports of the Gulf War constitute a perfect example of how the mass media 'project us in seconds into the farthest corners of the earth' and how the 'far other' who incarnates all our fears (aggressiveness, cruelty, inhumanity, madness) appears as an immediate menace (Augé, 1993: 25ff.).[8]

El País – and some other newspapers in the West as well – does not describe the conflict as a result of a new world order which is harmful to some of its members. This picture is in fact drawn by the Iraqi press and by that of other Arab countries, like Jordan. *El País* describes it, however, as a gesture of greed, as a threat to 'our interests'. The global solution to the conflicts in the Middle East desired by Iraq is never contextualized, is never linked with the non-acceptance of those borders imposed by Western Empires which split the 'Arab nations' between rich and poor. Following this logic, any proposal made by Iraq is turned into nonsense and the Gulf Crisis is understood not as a conflict of interests, but as a challenge to a new world order, ruled through reason, peace and justice; however the extent to which this order benefits us is never made explicit. Globalization must be accomplished in our own image and likeness, and in agreement with our interests. All dissidents must be expelled from the realm of humankind. What the West sets up as 'normal' must be 'universal', and this vision draws its legitimacy from concepts such as 'world order', 'reason', 'justice', 'balance' and 'peace' (Gillaume, 1993: 45ff.).

The fact that the news is focused on Saddam Hussein, George Bush, Iraq, the US, the West or the international community is irrelevant. Given that madness implies a separation between rationality and irrationality, what matters is that this contrast, either implicitly or explicitly, is always there: you have to choose one side or the other, you have 'to be within the group or remain out of it' (Foucault, 1964: 260). In this sense, emphasizing some features and not others, attributing some particular actions or behaviours to the 'other', implies the absence of these features and forms of behaviour in one's own group. We have

then ended up with a kind of mirror image: now the qualities and actions attributed to Saddam Hussein do not make up an illogical or chaotic list, but reproduce the idea we have of madness, and, ultimately, draw the image of evil.

In this section, we will look at two sorts of processes: (1) discrediting by means of differences in power; (2) the construction of the 'absolute other'. The personalization of the conflict and the division move makes both methods possible.

While the concept *us* is based upon the solidarity axis, that of *him* relies on the power axis. Only from the point of view of a homogeneous group which is identified as the voice of reason can the stranger be excluded; for that purpose, the group will have to ensure its hegemony, will have to construct and underline asymmetries.

In editorials and in the news, different linguistic items are used that may be interpreted as taxemes (Kerbrat-Orechioni, 1987); they outline the differences in power that exist between the two rivals:

(12) *El presidente de EEUU* advierte a *Sadam* sobre 'terribles consecuencias' si continúa en Kuwait. (6.1.1991: 3; titular)

(12) *The President* of the US draws *Saddam's attention* to the 'terrible consequences' if he does not leave Kuwait. (6.1.1991: 3; headline)

The pervasive imbalance we find in the way that forms of address are used for both contenders legitimizes the threats made by the 'President' of the United States. Euphemisms are used to refer to those threats ('initiatives', 'talk offers'), but syntax and taxemes show what they really are: directive acts (for example, 'Bush recommends Saddam to opt for peace'). Thus, *El País*, in its own discourse and in the discourse quoted, assumes that what is at stake is a process of domination, in which Saddam Hussein plays the deserved role of the dominated. However – and more importantly – this imbalance delegitimizes Saddam Hussein, within the background of the ideology of consensus. This ideology says a president represents his country; he has, we suppose, been elected and should respect the public's will. On the other hand, an individual who is being addressed by his first name only (Saddam) represents himself alone. In the picture drawn of the two leaders on 17 January the contrast becomes self-evident. The column on Saddam Hussein (see (17)) starts by saying: 'Saddam Hussein is 53 years old. He is a well-built man, almost 1.90 metres tall', etc. (i.e. a list of his physical characteristics). On the other hand, the portrait of George Bush goes like this: 'George Herbert Walker Bush, 41st President of the United States and Commander in Chief of its armed forces', etc. And so we end up with the 'in-group' being glorified and the 'other' being isolated, degraded and delegitimized. His rebellion is not legitimate whereas the use of force against him is justified.

Participants are categorized through the use of language in the discourse. As we shall see in the following examples, and as Fowler points out, besides different styles of naming, conventionally associated with different social values, 'those who are disfavoured and discriminated against are likely to be associated with pejorative or at least low-status verbs and adjectives' (see Fowler, 1991: Ch. 6).

By analysing the discourse, it is possible to identify what is considered negative, both socially and by certain groups in power. This is why the appearance of ethnic prejudice as a way of discrediting Saddam Hussein is important.

Implicit Judgements: The Selection and Omission Principle

Rejecting is reinforced in *El País* basically through the insertion of details which are associated with strong feelings and individual and cultural imagery that bear, above all, on the break of the ideology of consensus and on ethnic prejudices. Thus, we obtain a *symbolic descriptive illustration* which conveys an implicit meaning and leads the reader towards particular judgements, even though the newspaper is not expressing them explicitly. Implicitness and inferencing are two important characteristics in the text and in the reader. Meanings are frequently conveyed without being explicitly stated. The strategy is to supply a sequence of details which evoke the imagery of violence. These shared representations are supported by the ideology of consensus and ethnic prejudices, but at the same time make both reliable and acceptable. Details usually appear in embedded clauses or sequences of prepositional phrases and their function is the specification of the information in the main clause. Because of the particular local organization of news, 'the reader must unscramble bits and pieces throughout the text and fit them into the appropriate topics and schematical categories' (van Dijk, 1988: 65). In this sense, the role played by all these, apparently irrelevant, details in the disqualification of Saddam Hussein is crucial. As we will see, they serve to evoke the imaginary dimension and to activate the ideology of consensus as well as ethnic prejudices, by means of which Saddam Hussein will be judged.

The prejudiced use of the imaginary dimension is always present in the reports, but increases remarkably from 17 January on – that is, once war was declared. This was a crucial day also for editorials in which explicit judgements started appearing and becoming more and more negative as time went by. In both cases, the purpose was to portray Saddam Hussein as a ruler whose madness made it impossible to agree with him. In the columns, the reader was pointed in the direction of that conclusion, whereas, in the editorials, it was expressed explicitly. This produced a cumulative effect by which the reader started extracting data from various news reports and making judgements that were later confirmed by the background voice of editorials. Rhetoric and persuasion worked together in harmony – that is, the rhetoric of editorials appealed to prejudice and to social imagination, as did the connotations, metaphors and small details featured in news reports. By contrast, this harmony was absent from the *Sun*, where the accumulation of figures of speech that insisted on the brutalization of Saddam Hussein and other devices that appealed to prejudice was so obvious that there seemed to be no place left for rhetoric, only for repulsion.

The axes on which the process of Saddam Hussein's demonization is founded are basically dual: the alleged break in the ideology of consensus and the invocation of ethnic prejudices. The projection of both axes presented the reader with an unequivocal example of what Marc Augé (1993) calls 'absolute otherness':

'*If necessity arises*, all those defects one denies having oneself can be attributed to the foreigner. Towards that foreigner outside our borders are projected, from time to time, the ghosts of ferocity, cannibalism, and inhumanity' (Augé, 1993: 18). Not only did the beginning of the war reinforce the exclusion and inclusion processes, but it also involved a change of attitude and behaviour towards the other. No longer would Saddam Hussein be appealed to to give up his policy and his behaviour and to adapt to 'normality'. On the contrary, the emphasis would fall on the irreducible character of the differences separating him from the rest of the world and the subsequent need to make him disappear. The discourse became emotional, impassioned, even in the editorials of a so-called 'impartial' newspaper such as *El País* (in particular, on 17.1.1991).

The break in the ideology of consensus. For Fowler, 'articulating the ideology of consensus is a crucial practice in the Press's management of its relations with government and capital, on the one hand, and with readers on the other' (1991: 49). The ideology of consensus appears as a set of shared beliefs (everyone thinks that . . .). There is no suggestion that they might be useful to certain interests, since society is not considered to be a place of conflict. The press contributes, transmitting this idea persuasively. However, this is, in fact, a linguistic practice, which has not been studied much yet. Of course, this does not mean that the journalist is clearly conscious of the values and beliefs he or she is using, or that the readers are helpless, and necessarily persuaded by the vision they are given of the events.

The first-person plural pronoun *we*, with its multiple reference, is used in political discourse and in the press to create the illusion of the existence of a community which is ideologically one. Thus, the existence of differing interests and opposing ideology among the population is hidden. However, in the case of the Gulf War, what exactly this consensus consists of is never made explicit. This happens not only because it might turn out to be controversial, but also because of cultural, religious and ideological differences – as well as those of power and status, which clearly existed in the allied group, the group referred to as *us*.

In spite of this, the ideology of consensus is the cognitive base on which the categorization of subjects and actions takes place (styles of naming: Saddam vs the President; the words of Bush vs the propaganda of Saddam Hussein; the invasion of Kuwait vs its liberation, etc.). It explains the choices of details and the foundations for certain value judgements in the process of discrediting the President of Iraq. By slipping into the reports different details not really relevant to a particular piece of news (the clothes Saddam Hussein was wearing, for example), journalists were able to evoke the ideology of consensus, and force readers to use it to interpret the text. There were two aims hidden under this use: on the one hand, to make it clear that Saddam Hussein does not share this ideology, which leaves him outside the group; on the other, to consolidate the unity of *we*, and project a positive image of the group. Readers infer, using the framework of contrast which has been built up, that the values which are shown as negative are not accepted by the allied group.

As regards the break in the ideology of consensus, Saddam Hussein's conceptualization runs along the following lines. He is presented as: (1) a soldier and a dictator; (2) the man who is manipulating information; (3) the man who is manipulating religious fanaticism; and (4) an instigator of terrorism. All these characteristics are attributed to him through the selection of details, the insertion of convenient comments and through omissions, such as forgetting, for instance, that all these transgressions were also taking place within the so called 'anti-Saddam coalition'. Examples of this phenomenon are extracts (13), (14), (15) and (16) below. These examples show ways of attributing to Saddam Hussein values which from the point of view of the ideology of consensus are considered negative and are rejected. They are nearly all on the list published by Chibnall in 1977. Among the linguistic strategies are: the insertion into the text of details which call up the transgression of the ideology of consensus; the inclusion of negative judgments; and significant choices from the lexicon, especially of adjectives and verbs.

The soldier and the dictator. El País insists on the fact that Saddam Hussein is a soldier by continuously mentioning the titles which link him with the army, through the use of possessives that make it clear that the Iraqi army is Saddam's this linguistic resource is linked with the underlying metonym: THE RULER STANDS FOR THE STATE, and also through the selection of apparently pointless details, such as his clothing):

(13) Sadam *con una gorra verde y traje de faena*, se dirigió al país para rendir tributo a *su ejército* de *un millón de hombres*. (7.1.1991: 3)

(13) Saddam, *in a green cap and battledress, addressed the country honouring his one million army*. (7.1.1991: 3)

In (13) and (14) we find examples of ways in which journalists include items of information attached to the main proposition, with the apparent aim of describing or presenting Hussein and his actions. These are expressed by means of sequences of prepositional phrases and subordinate clauses (for this procedure, see van Dijk, 1988: 66ff.). In this sense, what is relevant in (13) and (14) – as in most of the following examples – is how explicit descriptions ((13): '*in a green cap and battledress*'; 'honouring *his one million army*'; (14): 'who *hardly ever delegates*') are, in fact, implicit qualifications. By choosing to mention all these apparently irrelevant details, the writer is evoking the imagery of violence and, as a consequence, activating a set of tacit assumptions and beliefs – in this case the ideology of consensus, which serves to condemn Saddam Hussein. As in other examples, the moral ambivalence of the newspaper is revealed.

The imagery of violence, linked to the villain of the tale, is evoked here by pointing out his clothing and the proportions of the army. Furthermore, it is precisely this imaginary dimension that explains the selections of details and refers to the ideology which gives coherence to the text. The emphasis on the orientation towards all things military presented Saddam Hussein implicitly as

a dictator, helped by ghosts of World War II and of Latin American dictatorships. However, explicit judgements could also be found in the newspaper:

(14) La última palabra está en manos del *líder supremo*, Sadam Husein, que *rara vez delega*; todo lo más consulta con su círculo de íntimos. (10.1.1991: 4)
(14) The last word always comes from the *supreme leader*, Saddam Hussein, who *hardly ever delegates*; if anything he asks his closed circle of intimates. (10.1.1991: 4)

Monopolizing power, illegality and violence are here the negative values. It is easy to infer, given the constant contrast by means of which the reports and leading articles are structured, that the opposites, freedom of choice, legality and desires of peace, are present in the anti-Saddam coalition, and that the purpose of the conflict is defence of these values.

The manipulator of information. Dogmatism, intolerance, biased reporting, monopolizing of information are crimes of Saddam Hussein. The opposites here would be compromise, tolerance, impartiality and freedom of choice.

(15) *Le prensa de Sadam* es triunfalista, porque así lo *exige la omnipresente propaganda.* (16.6.1991: 4).
(15) *Saddam Hussein's press* is triumphalist because *that is what is required by the omnipresent propaganda system.* (16.6.1991: 4)

In (15), linguistic procedures used are: possessives (see example (14)) and lexical categorization (see example (3)). Here, the subordinated clause, presented as an explanation (though it is not clear why anything needs to be explained), is in fact a way of establishing the equivalence between the Iraqi press and a propaganda machine.

The manipulator of religious fanaticism: Allusion to God and religion, as well as to the spirit of evil, were frequent in Saddam Hussein's speeches as in George Bush's. However, they were treated very differently in both cases. In Saddam Hussein's case, they were disqualified by invoking ethnic prejudices and by resorting to linguistic devices that deprived them of credibility. In (16), since Saddam Hussein was presented as agent of *to raise to the rank of*, the implication for the reader is that the war lacked that *position.* There were numerous details in news reports that contributed to creating this impression. For example, Saddam Hussein's religious faith was described as 'sudden' (10.1.1991: 4) and implicitly presented as bogus and essentially manipulative.

(16) *Como ya viene siendo habitual* desde el comienzo de la crisis, *Sadam elevó al rango de yihad* (*guerra Santa*) el combate que podría librarse en la región. (7.1.1991: 3)
(16) *As had become customary* from the beginning of the crisis, *Saddam has raised* the war that may take place in the region *to the rank of holy war* (*jihad*). (7.1.1991: 3)

An instigator of terrorism. Besides warning against Iraq's military strength, *El País* asserted, in the days before the war, that the true front line would be in Europe. in a deliberate overestimating of Saddam Hussein's power to spread terror in the West. However, the direct participation of Saddam Hussein is always kep

implicit. The negative values attributed indirectly to him are: extremism, chaos, violence, as opposed to moderation, order and the desire for peace. In this sense, news about apparently peripheral events (like Europeans beginning to store food [16.1.1991] or police action against 'false pacifists' [16.1.1991]) plays a role in the evocation of the imagery of violence.

Ethnic prejudices. While the fact of breaking the ideology of consensus presents Saddam Hussein as an antagonist, it is the use of ethnic prejudice which plays the strongest role in transforming him into the 'absolute other'. Such prejudices work in the same way as the ideology of consensus – that is, as a sort of backdrop, as a cognitive base, which is not made explicit, but which explains the choice of details included in the news. Readers must have recourse to these prejudices in order to interpret the text. They are needed to give it its coherence (see (10)).

Ethnic prejudices are invoked by means of selecting minor details which are inserted here and there in different reports. The basic lines for this invocation are the following oppositions: civilization vs barbarism; rationality vs irrationality, including the image of the beast; and, ultimately, good vs evil. The portrait of Saddam Hussein in *El País* on 17 January (in examples (17) and (18)) contains all these ingredients. The detailed description of his appearance clearly shows ethnic features and cultural differences: colour, his penetrating gaze and so on. Nothing is mentioned about the positive or negative aspects of having olive skin, or a penetrating gaze. However, for readers to find any reason for their inclusion in the text, they have to activate knowledge, which the writers present as shared, and which links these sorts of physical characteristics with certain sets of values.

On the other hand, George Bush's picture on the same page begins by enumerating his titles and merits. The implicit contrast turns them into a body versus mind opposition: ours against *theirs*.

(17) Sadam Husein tiene 53 años. Es de complexión atlética, de casi 1, 90 mētros de estatura, *cabello muy negro y piel aceitunada. Sus ojos son verde claros y su mirada intensa.*

(18) ... casado con ST, *prima suya*, su primogénito, Udai, mató a golpes y en público, a uno de los guardaespaldas de su padre. Juzgado y condenado, masas enfervorecidas recorrieron las calles de Bagdad pidiendo la clemencia paterna. La tuvo. Sadam, *licenciado en Derecho por la Universidad de Bagdad*, no mostró nunca, *en cambio* clemencia con sus rivales y adversarios. *Centenares de ellos* desfilaron ante la horca o los pelotones de fusilamiento.

(19) Licenciado en Económicas por la Universidad de Yale, que ha llegado a la presidencia con una experiencia política nacional e internacional poco habitual. Diputado por Tejas en dos legislaturas, Presidente del Comité Nacional de Partido Republicano, embajador ante la ONU, primer jefe de misión en Pekín, director de la Agencia Central de Inteligencia (CIA) y vicepresidente durante ocho años. (17.1.1991: 6)

(17) Saddam Hussein is 53 years old. He is a well-built man, almost 1.90 metres tall. *He's got very black hair and is olive-skinned. His eyes are green and he has a penetrating gaze.*

(18) ... he married Sadija Talfá, *a cousin of his*, and his elder son, Udai, beat, in a *public place*, one of his father's bodyguards to death. He was tried and found

guilty, but, arousing the masses, walked the streets of Baghdad asking for paternal benevolence. He got it. Saddam, who has a degree *in Law from the University of Baghdad*, was never merciful, however, with his rivals and opponents. *Hundreds of them* were hanged or shot dead.

(19) He graduated in Economics in Yale University and has become president after acquiring unusual political expertise, both national and international. He has been a Congressman for Texas for two terms, President of the National Committee of the Republican Party, ambassador to the UN, first ambassador in Peking, director of the CIA and vice-president for eight years. (17.1.1991: 6)

What is obvious in these examples is the way the selection and omission principle works. In the case of George Bush (19), titles come first; Hussein's are just mentioned to discredit him (18). The reference to Saddam Hussein's physical characteristics (17) and his family relationships (18) is relevant. It is interesting that this sort of detail is hardly ever included in reports about men. Instead, it is usual to include information about profession and qualifications. In (18), such details call up the imagery of incest, and point to negative characteristics of the regime, like arbitrary decisions, illegality and corruption. With regard to text coherence, what allows specific sentences to be connected into a coherent sequence – such as 'He married Sadija Talfá, a cousin of his, *and* his elder son. Udai, beat, in a public place, one of his father's bodyguards to death' in (18) – is the resort to some shared knowledge about different ethnic groups, and in particular some ethnic prejudices, which underlie the opposition 'civilization vs barbarism'. The function of the propositions included in 'He married Sadija Talfá, a cousin of his', in (18), is to provide an explanation or at least to support the final judgement, 'was never merciful, however, with his rivals and opponents. Hundreds of them were hanged or shot dead', by which the paradigm of individual violence and the image of the beast are again evoked.

The *Sun* newspaper published a portrait of the two leaders on 17 January 1991. In this case, the description/evaluation was carried out by a psychologist who selected features that coincided with those highlighted by *El País*. However, besides giving these details, the psychologist diagnosed Saddam Hussein as: a megalomaniac, due to his monopolizing of power; a 'charmer', since he could persuade his people to die for him; a psychotic and paranoid schizophrenic. The *Sun* concluded that his extreme mental disorders, together with his power as a dictator, made him a lethal figure.

The image of *the beast* was based upon two features which were always stressed: his fondness of weapons and violence, and his errors of judgement. With respect to the former, I have found numerous examples; but outstanding among them are those featured in the portrait in (20) because they lead readers to infer that this aspect of his personality was responsible for the position Saddam Hussein occupies today.

(20) Ha sido siempre un hombre de acción. *Amante de las armas y buen tirador de revólver, atentó* contra el General Abdel Karim Kasem, en 1959. Fue herido, pero huyó. . . . Desde 1963, *su carrera hacia la cúspide ha sido meteórica.* (17.1.1991: 6)

(20) He has always been a man of action. *He loves guns and is a good shot. He attempted to assassinate* General Abdel Karim Kasem in 1959. He was wounded but managed to escape. . . . Since 1963 *his career has been a meteoric climb to the top.* (17.1.1991: 6)

The function of the accumulation of details ('*He loves guns and is a good shot. He attempted to assassinate*') seems to be the explanation for what is affirmed in the last sentence: '*his career has been a meteoric climb to the top*'. Implicitly, a relationship of causality is established between facts denoted by propositions. This argumentative flow produced the required effect, as can be seen by the accumulation of negative information and animalizing metaphors. The following are examples of this latter strategy: there was speculation that Saddam Hussein would follow a scorched earth policy before 'letting his prey go' (see (2): the biography published on 31.1.1991 was entitled 'A wolf among gazelles'. However, *El País* was more cautious than the *Sun* when it came to using images that evoke violence. This may have been due to the fact that, despite their persuasive effect – for they reinforce Saddam Hussein's negative image with strong convincing strokes – they went too far into the realm of emotion and therefore did not suit the rhetoric of *El País*.

With respect to *irrationality and errors of judgement*, Saddam Hussein does not fit into metaphors like WAR AS POLITICS, POLITICS AS BUSINESS (Lakoff, 1992), and the analysis of war as a cost and benefits balance: 'defining beneficial "objectives", tallying the "costs", and deciding whether achieving the objectives is "worth" the costs' (Lakoff, 1992: 464). This is the reason why at the beginning there was talk about Saddam Hussein's bluff, whereas later on it was referred to as madness, for he was defying a power he would be unable to defeat.[9]

(21) 'Sadam cree que Bush está bromeando . . . pero está equivocado.' (5.1.1991: 3)
(22) 'Nuestro temor es que, *en su habitual estilo*, [Sadam] *calcule mal* dónde se halla el límite.' (12.1.1991: 5).
(23) *Sadam* triunfalista y *convencido* de ganar la guerra. (12.1.1991: 2; titular)
(24) *Sadam volvió a insistir* en la capacidad de *sus* fuerzas armadas para una 'larga batalla'. (7.1.1991: 3)
(21) [Quoting James Baker] 'Saddam believes that Bush is joking . . . but he is wrong.' (5.1.1991: 3)
(22) [Quoting James Baker] 'We fear that, *as he normally does*, [Saddam] *will miscalculate* where his limits are.' (12.1.1991: 5)
(23) *Saddam* smug and *convinced* he can win the war. (12.1.1991: 2; headline)
(24) *Saddam insisted again* that *his* armed forces are able to fight a long battle'. (7.1.1991: 3)

The use of 'convinced', 'insisted again' and, in other examples, the use of verbs of speech, such as 'said' and 'asserted' underline the subjective character of Saddam Hussein's opinions. These are modality markers, used to present the writer's position as regards the proposition. The readers, who knew about the capacity of the American war machine, inferred that Saddam Hussein was falling into an error of perception. After all, he was just Saddam, a man with no titles and no authority. As the conflict

opinions that described Saddam Hussein as a madman, but in its editorials, in particular in those that argued that war was unavoidable, presented him as such. The process of *symbolic descriptive illustration* became *explicit judgements* or *meta-discursive illustration*:

(25) Respecto a la responsabilidad última de este conflicto, la historia pedirá cuentas al *dictador* iraquí, cuya *locura e intransigencia* han lanzado al mundo a una aventura de consecuencias imprevisibles. (17.1.1991: 18; editorial)
(25) As for the ultimate responsibility for this conflict, History will ask the Iraqi *dictator* whose *madness and intransigence* have sent the world on a course of unpredictable consequences. (17.1.1991: 18; editorial)

Both devices contributed to construct a portrait of Saddam Hussein as an unjust man, cruel, impious and wild. As his portrait became more and more despicable, his adversary's became more and more magnificent. George Bush was described as just, humanitarian, pious and civilized. George Bush himself often formulated explicitly the content of this contrast:

(26) 'En los últimos cinco años, Sadam Husein ha demostrado su desprecio por las normas de comportamiento civilizado. En los próximos días, Irak llega a la fech a límite que *colma la paciencia del mundo civilizado.*' (9.1.1991: 3)
(26) 'In the last five years Saddam Hussein has showed his contempt towards civilized norms of behaviour. In the next few days Iraq will reach the deadline when the *civilized world's patience will run out.*' (9.1.1991: 3)

From the moment *El País* stopped asking Saddam Hussein to change his mind and adopted the strategy of emphasizing the contrast – that is, adopting George Bush's position – communication and mutual understanding were no longer possible, there could not be a common 'rhetorical ground', and hence there could not be a diplomatic solution to the conflict. Both the editorials, which labelled Saddam Hussein as a madman, and the news reports, by appealing to emotion through invocation, implicitness and inference, presented an 'absolute otherness' to which the only possible response was its exclusion, rejection and destruction.

However, underneath the metaphor of the stranger, the irrational madman, lies the image of evil and its incarnation. This is the key point that shows how, in westerners' views, evil encompasses all the features mentioned above: Saddam Hussein 'has become the angel of war who prefers desolation to life' (1.1.1991: 16).

Conclusions

A system of rhetoric that aims to create and maintain the enemy is not only based on exclusion, it also *produces knowledge*: the menacing presence of the enemy creates the conditions for a permanent discourse that provides coherence for the system itself. Thus, Saddam Hussein becomes convenient and necessary

The image constructed by the press of Saddam Hussein, incarnating the enemy and incorporating features such as injustice, pitilessness, irrationality and wildness, gave the illusion that this world, which is becoming more homogeneous, is ruled by the principles of reason, justice and respect for nations. This means that the UN were able to play their role in accordance with these same principles. This illusion palliated the 'crisis of space' (Augé, 1993) which appears associated with the continual extending of geographical space: increased facilities for the movement of goods, information and people seem to work against the understanding and control of space, and this, in turn, against the understanding and organization of social groups. Mixing of cultures and individualizing of conscience are for Augé the signs of an age in which the image of the other is more diffuse and unstable than ever before, since the other can no longer be associated with a particular place (emigration has broken the links between the other and a place of origin).

The Gulf War produced an absolute other, which the mass media made seem close, but which continued to incarnate all our nightmarish fears (bestiality, madness, evil). Saddam Hussein, therefore, contributed to reducing the blurring of signs of identity brought about by globalization, at the same time as his image reinforced our collective references.

This study has aimed to reveal new rituals of power, including the concept of normalization, and to see how normalization creates subjects and self-knowledge. I have been especially interested in personification and its effect. It is the personification of the conflict which allows the conceptualization of the protagonists as the main characters of the tale: the villain and the hero. But it is also personification which permits the appearance and consolidation of a sole but all-embracing *we*, which is used to cover the way its referents change as a piece of discourse unfolds. As readers, we are spoken to, included in and absorbed by a unique concept of *us*, which turns into an 'ideological *us*'. The aim of all this is to strengthen the ideology of consensus and make it possible to recreate the illusion that it is these positive principles which unite the world against Saddam Hussein, and that it is in the defence of the ideology of consensus that the war is being waged. Thanks to the role played by Saddam Hussein, and which he was forced to play, for a time the world was freed from irrationality, contradictions, divisions, conflict, economic and political injustice, and, of course, from the difference which was embodied in him.

Now the dream is over, what remains is the discourse built on ethnic and cultural difference. *El País* took two positions: that of calling Saddam Hussein to 'become like us', and, later on, that of exclusion, showing the unyielding character of the differences separating both positions and advocating the destruction of the other. His otherness was radical, almost unthinkable in a world which considers itself more and more homogeneous, and that is why it could only be incarnated by an individual. Once the war began, *El País* changed its discourse, since, then, its opposition could be understood as treason. As Luis Martín Santos said. 'defencelessness incapable of resisting the seduction of power is much more serious at times of crisis, when we let fear overcome us and we are afraid

to reveal our true selves' (Martín Santos, 1988: 21). The *Sun* and other representatives of the British press opted from the very beginning for a discourse of exclusion.

These two type of discourses are to be found, more and more often, in the treatment of immigration (Landowski, 1993). The first one is partly due to universalism and the second one is a consequence of a tendentious interpretation of relativism. Other potential discourses seem to have disappeared: that of respect towards differences, the idea of the cultural melting-pot or that proposed by Balandier: 'considering differences to the point when they stop being separating factors and become multiple manifestations of the "unity of man"; a unity *gradually discovered*, not postulated, which is what the philosophies of the Universal do' (1993: 36).

Exclusion is a response to the desire for particularization, a force opposed to globalization, at least when we are not certain that this is going to be according to our model. It is not coincidental that it became activated at this time, since anti-Arab racism is the least inhibited of all racisms. Maybe it is here where the dream turns into a nightmare.

Our journey has taken us from the human body to human territory: from the metaphors and metonym which make it possible for states to be conceived as people with human attributes, defects and virtues, to the anthropological space 'in which we try to find points of reference for our identity, our relations, our history' (Augé, 1993: 21). It is this real space, geographically far, but made close by the work of the mass media, which is defended by means of the appropriation of discourses. The same thing happens with the imaginary space, in which the image of the beast, of 'absolute otherness', so useful to some, incarnates all those qualities and by its mere existence frees us from them.

By allowing us a tamed taste for fear, the Gulf War made possible a generalized discourse. But the fate of words and images can be changed. If we really want to, we can recover them and continue their work. 'The word which has been marked by power can be dealienated by our opposition, and this will go further ... find new forms, new words, new images, that is, new meanings which renew those words which have been alienated' (Martín Santos, 1988: 220). This is, in essence, what I have tried to do in this paper. What I really wanted to do was go beyond the statement that discourse is not transparent, that it is possible to take it over and make it opaque. We need not leave matters here – in 'their' hands. As readers, we should react, questioning the existence and relevance of that 'united us'. We should oppose the expulsion of irrationality and the illusion which not only transformed *us* into heroes but made the world we live in into the incarnation of good (see Naïr, 1994, for a very similar proposal).

Notes

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The English translations in all the extracts are translations from Spanish rather than the original wording.

1. '[Discourse] surfaces as an asset – a finite, limited, desirable, useful one – that has its own rules of appearance, but also its conditions on appropriation and use; an asset that, consequently, brings out, from its very existence (and not only in its "practical applications") the issue of power; an asset which is, by nature, an object of struggle, of political struggle' (Foucault, 1969: 58; see also Gabilondo, 1990; 89–106).
2. In French in the original: 'dans toute societé, la production du discours et à la fois contrôlée, sélectionée, organisée et redistribuée par un certain nombre de procédures qui ont pour rôle d'en conjurer les pouvoirs et les dangers, d'en maîtriser l'évenement aléatoire, d'en esquiver la lourde, la redoutable matérialtié' (Foucault, 1971: 11).
3. This simply means that there is nothing to be interpreted. There is nothing primary to interpret, because, essentially, everything is already an interpretation. Each sign is in itself not the object offered to be interpreted but the interpretation of other signs' (Foucault, 1967: 35–6).
4. As *El País* (17.1.1991; editorial) said: 'In the midst of that confusion, the Spanish government's response from the beginning of the invasion has tried to be coherent with the country's new responsibilities as a member of the European Community and of the West European Union, as well as with the resolutions of the UN.' ('En medio de ese desconcierto, la respuesta dada por el gobierno español desde el comienzo de la invasión ha pretendido ser coherente con las nuevas responsabilidades de nuestro país como miembro de la Comunidad Europea y de la Unión Europea Occidental, así como con los mandatos de las Naciones Unidas'.)
5. 'In order to act, we need at least to identify' (Canguilhem, 1966: 63).
6. See Blommaert and Verschueren (1994) for a similar process of overgeneralization in the conceptualization of the relationships with migrants and in the justification of discriminatory politics and behaviours.
7. 'I, Lucifer, mighty and independent emperor, free and absolute lord of the whole of the "Sulano" kingdom, despotic lord in all my formidable jurisdiction, forbidding and very noble, under whose orders everything moves, arbiter of all fortunes and all certainties' (Barreiro, 1973: 283–4).
8. 'With respect to these researchers sometimes bring up the idea of a crisis of identity. But, if such a crisis exists, in my opinion, it is nothing more than the natural consequence of two previous crises: that of space (how can I imagine, at one and the same time, the planet as if it were a canton, and my canton as if it were a complete world?) and that of otherness. The stability of the other was what made it possible to conceive of and identify her/him with ease. When it was a question of a faraway other, there was no problem: one only saw her/him if one travelled or, at least, if one went to visit the Colonial Exhibition' (Augé, 1993: 33).
9. It is worth observing the features in common with the definition of madness in the *Encyclopédie*: 'To get away from reason without knowing it, because one lacks ideas, is to be an imbecile. To get away from reason knowingly because one is enslaved by a violent passion is to be weak. However, to get away from it confidently and being convinced that one is following it, that is my view what is called madness' (*Encyclopédie*, entry 'Madness', quoted by Foucault, 1964).

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Multimodal Resources for Turn-Taking: Pointing and the Emergence of Possible Next Speakers

Lorenza Mondada

Introduction

In this paper[1], I study a specific gestural practice through which a recipient gradually establishes her or himself as next speaker in talk-in-interaction: by using a pointing gesture, while current speaker's turn is still going on and has not yet reached its completion. Thus, pointing gestures will be studied here not as a resource primarily devoted to the accomplishment of referential or deictic actions but as a resource locally mobilized for self-selecting and for organizing the emergent character of a « transition space » (Schegloff, 1996, 96). This practice and resource will be explored in its orderly and systematic character in a specific setting, an informal work session where participants – a multidisciplinary team of agronomists and computer scientists – are involved in a discussion around a table, whilst writing notes and looking at maps.

Over the last years, the « turn-taking machinery » introduced by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) has been extensively studied, both in its turn-constructional component, allowing the identification of relevant spaces for turn transition, and in its turn-allocational component, constituted by selection techniques by which either current speaker selects next or next speaker self-selects.

Explorations of the *turn-allocational component* have highlighted various practices for selection (such as turn-sharing and other choral performances, Lerner 2002; various methods for addressing the next speakear, Lerner, 2003) and their eventual specialization and diversification in conversation, institutional and professional contexts (namely in talk at work, Drew & Heritage, 1992).

Source: (Translated in English) *Cahiers de Linguistique Francaise* vol. 26, 2004, pp. 269-292.

The consideration of various settings has implied a diversification of the resources studied (verbal and vocal resources for telephone conversations, multimodal resources for face-to-face interactions, artefacts and technologies for mediated interactions, etc.).

Explorations of the *turn-constructional components* have been carried out with the collaboration of linguists over the last years (within interactional linguistics: see Ochs, Schegloff, Thompson, 1996, Selting & Couper-Kuhlen, 2001, Ford, Fox & Thompson, 2002, Hakulinen & Selting, 2005): they made possible the identification of Turn-Constructional Units (TCUs) as interactive organizational units formatted by exploiting linguistic resources in ways that are both shaped by the contingencies of the step-by-step incremental organization of interaction and by the constraints and possibilities of grammar, one being reflexively structured by the other. TCUs are a specific kind of unit, praxeologically defined by the local achievements of the participants, interactively negotiated, emerging within the temporal moment-by-moment unfolding of talk as it is joinly, situatedly, contingently produced by the participants. Opportunities to co-participate to and interactively produce emerging TCUs are centrally provided by their projective potential, responsible for the predictible features of a turn's emergent construction. Projectability (Sacks, 1992, II, 40; Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson, 1974: 702; Schegloff, 1984: 267) is a central feature that provides for next speakers the possibility not only to identify turn completion but also to predict it before it occurs, to anticipate transition-relevance points and to locate the upcoming place where to begin to speak (see Ford, Fox & Thompson, 1996; Selting 2000; Tanaka 2001, Auer, 2005 for a description of linguistic resources for projectability):

> The sentence is a great packaging technique for a series of reasons [...]. It has a structure which can at all points be seen as to whether it is possibly complete or not possibly complete, and people are able to deal with it in such a way as to see, on its occurence that it's possibly complete. And also, from its beginning it can be looked at to see what it will take to complete it. (Sacks, 1992, II, 40)
>
> Sentential constructions are capable of being analysed in the course of their production by a party/hearer able to use such analyses to project their possible directions or completion loci. (Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson, 1974, 709)

These features are responsible for the flexible, moment-by-moment, dynamic, revisable and expandable definition of turns by the participants; in this sense, turns and TCUs are « interactively determined » units (cf. Ford, 2005 emphasizing this praxeological and interactive aspect):

> The turn-unit is f a sort which a) employs a specification of minimal sizes, but b) provides for expansion within a unit, c) is stoppable (though not a any point), and d) has transition places discretely recurring with it, e) which can themselves be expanded or contracted; all of these features except the first are locii of interactional determination. By virtue of this character, it is misconceived to treat turns as units characterized by a division of labor in which the speaker determines the unit and its boundaries, with other parties having as their task the recognition of them. Rather, the turn is a unit whose constitution and boundaries involve such a distribution of

> tasks as we have noted: that a speaker can talk in such a way as to permit projection of possible completion to be made from his talk, from its start, allowing others to use its transition places to start talk, to pass up talk, to affect directions of talk, etc.; and that their starting to talk, if properly placed, can determine where he ought to stop talk. That is, the turn as a unit is interactively determined. (Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson, 1974: 726–727)

Therefore, a central task for conversation analysis has been to describe methods and resources by which recognizable units in action are interactively and reflexively produced and monitored. For example, previous research has shown how turns are interactively constructed (Goodwin, 1979, 1981), how TCUs can be extended beyond the initially projected completion allowing for the timely production of assessements by the other party within the unit's boundaries (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987); how they can have a « semi-permeable » character and their second part can be predicted for the production of collaborative sentences (Lerner, 1991, 1996). The dates of these studies show that the importance of multimodal resources for these collaborative and reflexive practices has long been recognised (see also Hayashi, 2005, Schmitt, 2005).

Analyses of the methods involved in projection and in the online incremental construction of TCUs were first focussed on linguistic resources, but were soon expanded in order to take into consideration gestures, gazes and bodily postures.

Linguistic resources considered have been primarily syntactic (Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson, 1974; Sacks, 1992, I, 642 referred to « sentences », « clauses », etc. although pointing to the practical and emic character of these units, not corresponding to their definition in classical linguistics) and syntax is still considered as one important resource for the « packaging » of turns (see Schegloff, 1996 about syntactic materials characterizing initial, middle and terminal TCU positions; Auer, 2005 on the projective potentials of syntax). But its interplay with prosodic resources has been largely explored since (see already Sacks, 1992, I, 651; Auer, 1996, Couper-Kuhlen, 1996, 2001, 2004). Moreover, by the nineteen eighties, French & Local (1983), Local, Kelly, Wells (1986), Local & Kelly (1986) were showing the import of phonetic resources for turn projection. Instead of claiming the relevance of one unique dimension, studies focus more on the contributions of syntactic, prosodic, and pragmatic resources for achieving completion (Ford & Thompson 1996; Ford, Fox, Thompson, 1996 take into consideration gaze and body movements too). More recently, multimodal resources have been strongly taken into account, including gestures (Schegloff, 1984, Streeck & Hartge 1992; Ford, Fox, Thompson, 1996; Hayashi, Mori, Takagi 2002), gazes (Goodwin, 1981; Lerner, 2003, Rossano, 2005) and more generally the entire body (Goodwin, 2000).

Establishing Speakership as a Practical Accomplishment

Through the analysis of multimodal practices for establishing speakership in a corpus of video recordings of professional meetings, this paper aims at contributing to the growing literature on turn-taking on the following aspects:

- the orderly and systematic way in which *multimodal resources* are exploited for the organization of turn-taking and more particularly within practices for self-selecting contingently defining-and-exploiting transition spaces;
- the *reflexive* organization of turns-at-talk, relying both on the production of recognizable emergent structures by current speaker and on the local interpretation, monitoring and online analysis done by and implemented in recipients/next possible speakers actions. Multimodal practices contribute crucially to the visibility for participants – and for analysts alike – of public displays and recognitions of « in-course parsing of a turn in progress » (Jefferson, 1984: 14).
- the interactive organization, identification and exploitation of « pre beginnings », i.e. of actions taking place *before* the turn properly starts, in pre-initial turn positions, and projecting the beginning of a possible next turn: this position can be occupied by head movements, gaze redirections, onset of gestures, incipient facial expressions, in-breaths, « uh(m) » tokens (Schegloff, 1996, 92–93), i.e. actions that are not yet realized as a turn but which strongly project it. We will show that multimodal actions play a crucial role in this position, allowing for their simultaneous production with ongoing current-speaker's talk. Analysis of these actions expands our focus of study beyond the limited « transition-relevance point » to the more conceptually extensive « transition space », characterized by its shape, duration, import and limits (Schegloff, 1996: 96–97).
- the very notion of speakership, and other *talk-related categories* (« next speaker », « incipient speaker », « current speaker », etc.), as well as their rights and obligations, as products of emergent joint accomplishments: the dynamic, locally organized, contingent emergence of a « speaker » provides for the occasion to respecify this category as it is recognized and accomplished by participants themselves in the course of their interaction.
- the articulation between the *context-free* and the *context-sensitive* dimensions of turn-taking: although they recognized the situated order of turn-taking, Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson were more concerned with the abstraction of the machinery rather than the particularities of content, context or identity (1974: 699) and abstained from precisely defining « the scope of reference of 'context' that is relevant » (1974: 699 n 8). This paper will show how situated features of the material and spatial environment are methodically mobilized for achieving self-selection and in turn shed some light on more general practices for turn-taking.

Discovery of the Phenomenon

In what follows, we will analyze turn-taking practices observable in a particular corpus, dealt with as a « perspicuous setting » (Garfinkel & Wieder, 1992, 184), i.e. a setting that in its specificity and uniqueness allows us to highlight methodic and systematic features. This setting provides for specific multimodal resources, related to the spatial arrangement of the participants, to the artefacts, the

manipulate and to their peculiar activity. These resources are contingent, associated with the specificity of the activity; nevertheless, they are mobilized within systematic practices which can shed some light on other turn-taking and turn-transition practices.

The professional activity concerned is a series of work meetings (the corpus is composed of 6 sessions, for about 15h of video data) in which agronomists and computer scientists collaborate to develop a common cartographic language for modelling agricultural land. The agronomists collected a series of geographical and land-survey maps of several farms and created a new, more abstract, topological representation of these territories; the computer scientists were engaged in producing a further formalization, in the form of graphs. These activities involve several reformulations and re-descriptions of the initial map representation, as well as a number of controversial discussions about the descriptive categories each discipline is using (for detailed analysis of this « multimodal semantics in action » see Mondada, 2005a, 2005b). The maps and other visualizations lay on the work table, around which three or four participants are seated; their attention is focused on the documents that are discussed, described, pointed at, and even modified in the course of the talk. Thus, the activity considered is characterized by a specific ecology, where a limited work space full of artefacts mobilized by talk and gesture is at the centre of the collective attention. In contrast to other work settings where multi-activity occasions a constant dispersion of attention in fragmented spaces and where mutual attention has to be constantly re-achieved through intense interactional work (see Goodwin & Goodwin, 1992, Goodwin, 2003, Heath & Luff, 1992, Heath et alii, 2002 for examples), the activity studied here is characterized by a sustained focus of collective attention on the documents at the centre of the table. This peculiar ecology of action provides for specific resources for the organization of interaction, both in a indexical and systematic way.



Figure 1: Perspective view



Figure 2: Vertical view

The way in which this activity has been videotaped is reflexively sensitive to the features of action: a perspective view, allowing to see the upper part of the participants' bodies as well as their mutual orientations, is completed by a vertical view, allowing the detailed description of the material and spatial environment

involved, as well as participants' gestures (for a detailed analysis of recording choices as reflexively shaping analytical possibilities, see Mondada, 2006a).

Looking at the video recording of this activity, a recurrent action is noticeable: pointing gestures done by participants toward the maps and other documents on the table are highly frequent – either in the form of one person pointing or even in the form of various participants pointing at the same time to the same item.

Pointing gestures within talk have been mainly investigated in the literature in relationship with deictical reference (Hanks, 1992; Kendon, 2004; Kita, 2003): they are a pervasive resource for identifying and making recognizable an object (even if it is not visible for the participants, Haviland, 1996), within a referential practice which may or may not co-occur with other spoken resources, e.g. deixis. Studies of pointing-in-interaction (Goodwin, 2003; Hindmarsh & Heath, 2000, Mondada, 2005c) have shown that the articulation between deicticals and pointing gesture is not so simple as it might appear in previous accounts: pointing gestures are precisely timed, being synchronised with the moment-by-moment organization of talk-in-interaction, with recipient-oriented talk and bodily conducts, with appropriate arrangments of bodies and objects in space, with the progressive (re)disposition of the domain of scrutinity, with contingent demands of the activity, and with timely organized coordination.

Moreover, pointing gestures are not always and exclusively devoted to deictical reference. In our corpus, at the first sight, these gestures seem to be related to the descriptive practices characterizing this work activity, as well as to the common attention towards shared referents. However, detailed examination show that these gestures are not systematically associated with deictical forms and are much more frequent than referential expressions. Pointing gestures do not seem to have just a referential use. That prompts a closer analysis of the circumstances of their finely-timed unfolding in interaction.

This noticing has opened another perspective on the corpus, raising another kind of issue: speakers do point to the maps not only in order to refer to them but also to make visible their engagement and participation in interaction. The occurrence and temporality of pointing gestures is a key resource for the organization of turn-taking. Pointing practices and turn-taking practices are here deeply embedded, in a way that exploits the specificities of the situated action – such as the fact that it takes place around a table covered with artefacts, the fact that participants' attention is focused more on these objects rather than on co-participants, and the fact that topical activities are centred on visible materials. The specificity of the situation is thus locally exploited by the interactional practices, although their exploitation remains related to more general principles governing action and interaction.

Our analysis will be organized around two basic questions: the first concerns the sequential environment at which pointing *begins*, characterizing the context in which the recipient/possible next speaker is emerging and establishing as a speaker. The second concerns the sequential environment where pointing *ends*, showing that interestingly this does not always occour at the established speaker's turn completion. Thus, analysis will show a range of ordered sequential positions

at which pointing as a technique for self-selecting is used by participants, and will reflect upon the way in which this technique reflexively shapes sequentiality as it is practically managed by co-participants.

When does Pointing Begin?: Practices for Self-Selecting

In what follows, we will focus on the way in which pointing is exploited by participants as a practice for self-selecting and for projecting current speaker upcoming turn completion. This descriptive aim makes some strict demands of the data used (Mondada, 2006b): on the one hand, it requires videorecords that make relevant details accessible for the analyst: this is the reason why we will use multiple video sources. On the other hand, it requires transcripts that represent the finely tuned aspects of multimodal details as they sequentially unfold in interaction – making them available for analysis. A rough notation of gesture would erase the orderly organization of the very phenomena we try to study. In order to preserve them, we will adopt a specific notation system for gestures, complementing Jefferson's conventions used for talk. The system, inspired by Goodwin's gaze notation (1981) and by Schegloff's gesture notation (1984), aims at capturing the main phases of a gesture's trajectory and to synchronize them with talk: we will describe the preparation phase (represented by dots ....), the culmination or stroke, which can be held for a while (represented by dashes ----), and the retraction (represented by commas,,,,) (see the end of this paper for a full account of conventions used).

Turn-initial Pointings: Displaying Incipient Speakership

In the following excerpt, Pierre-Alain (PAL) is engaged in a long multi-unit turn about the way in which farmers use their land over the year. When it is brought to completion, Viviane (VIV) self-selects and relates Pierre-Alain's explanation to its cartographical representation. She is overlapped by a third speaker, Laura (LAU), asking for a confirmation about the object represented on the map.

(1) (e9/agro1-47.00)


1	PAL	**ben suivant le cas euh: ben on tra- (.) on est là que pour le**
		well in certain cases ehm well one wor- (.) one is there only for the
2		**champ, et puis à d'autres moments:, ben on va échouer, (0.3)**
		field, and at other times, well one ends up, (0.3)
3		**en pâturage. .h sur l'assemblage sans parcours. .h je pense**
		in pasture. .h on rough ground without any path. .h i think
4		**que dans le cas du gaec du pradou, .h c'est tout l'un,**
		that in the case of the ((region's name)), .h it's either one,
5		**tout l'autre.**
		or the other.
6	VIV	**+.hh# oui. # parce# que:i#m' *sem#+ble: ehi*- ici# c'était s::- ce**
		.hh yes. because it seems to me eh he- here it was w::- what
	fig	#fig.1#fig.2 #fig.3 #fig.4 #fig.5 #fig.6
		+.....+ppp w pen-->>

7 qui: **ce que ça voulait représenter,** [c' était
this wanted to represent, [was
8 LAU [*c'est les am*andes ça?
[are these almonds? ((=kind of field))
*.....*ppp w finger->>


Figure 1 .hh #


Figure 2 oui.#


Figure 3 parce#


Figure 4 que : i#



Figure 5 'm sem-#ble:


Figure 6 eh i- ici#

When Pierre-Alain has reached a recognizable turn completion (syntactically, prosodically, pragmatically), Viviane, line 6, self-selects: she begins her turn with two turn-entry-devices: with an in-breath (« .hh ») and with her arm beginning to stretch over the table (« .... »). A pointing gesture emerges from this stretching of her arm and her bending over the table, showing a direction with her pen extending the hand movement.

Excerpt (1) shows the occurrence of a second instance of turn-initial pointing: Laura self-selects overlapping Viviane (line 9) and begins to point at the beginning of the turn too. This occurrence of turn-initial pointing is done with the finger and not with a pen (the pen is being used by Laura writing notes).

Some remarks can be made at this stage:

- for the description of the gesture, the sequential placement of the beginning of its preparatory phase is crucial, and allows the identification of a relevant sequential environment for the phenomenon.
- the pointing gesture is not limited to the hand: it engages the whole body (the upper body bending over the table, the arm crossing the table). Moreover, the embeddedness of pointing in other activities and in the ecology of the ongoing action shapes the form and the resources of pointing: pointing with a pencil or pointing with a finger allow different kinds of movements, of ways of being precise, of parallel simultaneous activities.
- Viviane's pointing trajectory is not a mere individual isolated gesture but a finely coordinated one, synchronized with the format of the turn in progress and adjusted to other's actions·

(2) = (1) *line 6*

6 VIV **+.hh oui. parce que: im' *sem+ble: eh i*- ici**
+.....+ppp w pen----->>
lau *opens folder*

Viviane's turn is formatted in a way that delays (with the insertion of « i m'semble » and the self-repair of « i- ici » – which are thus not just hitches in her talk but resources for the production of a timed action) the position of the deictical « ici » until the point where the pointing gesture has reached its maximal extension (when she says « i m'semble »). This in turn is reflexively adjusted to Laura's action: Laura is holding a closed folder where the referent of Viviane's utterance is hidden and which therefore constitutes an obstacle for her referential action. Laura opens it as the pointing gesture reaches it. So, Viviane's gesture and turn on the one hand, and Laura's manipulation of the referred artefact on the other hand are finely adjusted and reflexively organized.

Pre-initial Turn Pointings: Projecting Self-selection, Claiming Speakership

The first case examined here, although it exhibits two occurrences of the same phenomenon – turn-initial pointing -, is relatively less frequent than another phenomenon: pre-initial turn pointing. In most of the cases observed in the corpus, pointing projects self-selection well before the completion of current speaker's turn and well before the beginning of next speaker's turn.

Here is an occurrence:

(3) (e3/agro1-16.48)

1 PAL **et donc on voit la logique, avec cet cet aménagement du: de**
and so one sees the logic, with this this settlement of: of
2 **l'espace, .hh qui revient à obtenir, (.) euh: des des de- des**
space, .hh which would make (.) ehm
3 **pâturages, (.) RElativement plus productives, qu'elles ne**
pasturelands, (.) RElatively more productive, than what they
4 **l'étaient avant, grâce notamment à la: (.) <la**
were before, thanks among other things to the (.) <the
5 **re*distribution des biens communs. ((decrescendo))>***
redistribution of common goods. ((decrescendo))>
la *.....*
6 LAU ***et donc le: ce qui est en (.) orange ici là, terre assolée***
and so the: what is coloured in (.) orange there, farmland
*ppp------>>
7 PAL **hum**
8 LAU **c'est, (.) des prairies,**
that's, (.) grassland,

In this case, Laura begins to point well before her turn beginning: the preparation of her gesture takes place before, but reaches its maximal extension exactly

in turn-initial position. If we consider the sequential position in which the preparation begins, we notice that it is reflexively adjusted to Pierre-Alain's ongoing turn production: his last utterance is syntactically quite complex, but could be syntactically complete with the end of the comparison (« qu'elles ne l'étaient avant » 3–4). Pierre-Alain adds another constituent (beginning with « grâce à » 4). This last add-on is characterized by some hitches (« à la: (.) la redistribution » 4–5) and by a decrescendo low voice until the end of the turn. Laura initiates the preparation of her pointing gesture just after the beginning of the descrescendo, projecting an imminent turn completion. Therefore, her movement anticipates the upcoming transition-relevance place and projects her as possible next speaker. Pointing begins properly at the same time as her establishment as self-selected current speaker.

This occurrence shows some more general points:

- pointing orients to transition-relevance points, even if it can occur much earlier (see below).
- pointing appears as a *method* for projecting self-selection, being part of an emergent movement for establishing upcoming speakership;[2]
- pointing makes visible for all participants a pre-beginning, taking the visual floor but not yet the vocal-spoken turn;
- this pre-beginning phase anticipates the possible completion of the current speaker's unit in progress: a) it exhibits the monitoring of the structure in progress by the possible next speaker, and more precisely his finely tuned online analysis for all practical purposes, b) it projects the next action i.e. the turn to be taken by the recipient/incipient speaker who is pointing.
- thus, pointing has more to do with the temporality of the interactive construction of TCUs in progress than with referential practices *per se* – since pointing begins well before deictics occur and even in absence of deictics, that is, well before the relevance to deictically indicate something. Nevertheless, if we observe where deictics are positioned in these utterances we can say that deictical reference in turn-initial position can be a resource for enhancing the legitimacy and accountability of pointing as a method for establishing speakership. Deployment of gesture at transition-place has been described by Streeck & Hartge (1992), who analyze two gestural techniques being used in this position as gestural turn-entry devices in Ilokano conversations: the [a]-face, preparing the articulation of [a], even when no sound is produced, making visible for all participants the speaker's gearing up to utter the vowel; and the « palm up » gesture employed not only for claiming the floor but also for providing co-participants with a preview of the type of projected talk, prefiguring a list. These cases confirm that gestures have a potential of anticipation: not only iconic gestures precede their speech-affiliates; more generally, gestures are oriented to the organization of interaction and project relevant sequential positions, such as transition-points. In our corpus, pointing gestures do not just precede their deictical affiliates, but are more generally exploited for

projecting self-selection (in another paper, Streeck, 1995 speaks of « action projectors »); they occur at transition places too, but more generally they tend to start even before. The aim of this paper is precisely to explore the kind of « projection space » (Schegloff, 1984) they open up.[3]

If we turn back to the first example, and reconsider it, as well as its transcript, we notice that although the preparation of the pointing gesture takes place at the beginning of the turn – that is, relatively late if compared to except (2) – VIV accomplishes other actions before she self-selects. They are represented in a second version of the transcript:

(4) = (1) lines 2–7

2 **PAL** **et puis à d'autres moments:,**
and at other moments,
3 **ben on va échouer, (.) en pâturage, .h**
well one ends up, (.) in pasture. .h
4 **+sur l'assemblage +sans parcours. .h +je pense que+**
on an rough ground without any path. .h i think that
viv +.....+moves paper------+
5 **+dans le cas du gaec du pr+adou, .h c'est tout l'un,**
in the case of the ((region's name)), .h it's either one,
viv +turns wrist, comes in----+
6 **tout l'autre.**
or the other.
7 **VIV** **+.hh oui. parce que: i'm'sem+ble: eh i- ici c'était**
.hh yes. because it seems to me eh he- here it was
+ .....+ppp w pen-->>

Viviane's movements exhibit a very sharp and timely understanding of Pierre-Alain's ongoing turn. The latter is characterizing one form and use of pasture: his TCU could be syntactically complete line 3 but prosodically, continuing intonation projects more to come, that is a prepositional syntagm (« sur l'assemblage sans parcours. » 4). Towards the end of this added-on constituent, Viviane begins to move, anticipating an upcoming transition-relevance place. But shortly after Viviane moved the paper on which they are working, what comes next is not her self-selection but a new TCU initiated by Pierre-Alain, continuing with an in-breath and a stance marker (« .h je pense que » 4). At that point, Viviane withdraws. The « Gestalt » of the new TCU has an argumentative binary form, stressed by a contrastive prosody, projecting clearly its upcoming completion. At its beginning, Viviane's hand comes closer again to the centre of the table, in a position that enables and facilitates the pointing gesture which follows. Thus, the initial-turn position of her pointing gesture has been prepared and projected by other actions before, showing her anticipatory ongoing understanding.

Recipients' predictions can have various scopes, and can exhibit a very early orientation to the next possible transition-relevance place:

(5) (agro 1 /19.26-19.56 = 20.15 persp)

1	PAL	**.h et donc elles rentrent en production à::m: c'est-à-dire elles**
		.h and so they go into production at m: that is to say they
2		**son- elles mettent bas, .h (.) à quatorze mois, c'est-à-**
		are- they give birth, .h (.) at fourteen months, that is to
3		***dire ou trei- oui qua*torze mois, c'est-à-dire deux mois après**
		say or thirt - yes forteen months, that is to say two months after
	lau	*.....*ppp-->
4		**les brebis, .h⊥ et donc, (.) pour arriver à cette performance**
		the ewes, .h and so, (.) in order to secure this performance
		⊥ppp--->
5		**c'est-à-dire être aptes à mi-*à etre mises à la reproduction**
		that is to say be able to re - to be put to reproduction
	lau	----->*suspends pointing--->
6		**.h à leur premier automne, .hh euh elles sont à un régime assez soigné,***
		.h for their first autumn, .hh ehm they are given a careful diet
	lau	----->*
7		***et elles sont notamment *hébergées là.**
		and they are specifically housed there.
	lau	*.....*ppp------>>
8	LAU	**c'est ça qui⊥ est r'présenté ici?**
		and that's what is represented here?
	pal	---->⊥,,,,
9	PAL	**voilà.**
		there it is.

Pierre-Alain is engaged in a long multi-unit turn about sheep reproduction. Laura begins to point at line 3, i.e. in a position where Pierre-Alain is reformulating the age at which sheep can be reproduced. Pierre-Alain's syntactical construction projects the age from line 1 on (with the preposition « à ») but before telling this information he inserts a reformulation of the process (introduced by « c'est-à-dire » 1); another reformulation, concerning the age, is inserted immediately after its mention (2). In this way, although various insertions and expansions are provided by Pierre-Alain, the syntactical construction of his turn is projected very early. Laura orients to this feature: she ends the preparation phase and begins to point properly during Pierre-Alain's reformulation of the sheep age (3). But at the end of this TCU, i.e. at a possible transition-relevance place, the current speaker initiates a new TCU (« .h et donc, » 4) and begins to point on the map. He projects a longer chunk to come, both by his pointing and his syntactical construction, which initiates a dependent clause (« pour arriver à cette production » 4) projecting a main clause, then delaying it by the insertion of a reformulation of the former (« c'est-à-dire être aptes » 5).

Laura exhibits her responsiveness to these delayed projections by suspending her pointing (1. 5); she also exhibits her anticipation of the completion at the end of the main clause by pointing again (1. 7) when Pierre-Alain adds a second paratactic clause. Thus, Laura's pointing gesture exhibits her syntactic online analysis of Pierre-Alain's turn, done for the practical purpose of looking for possible transition-relevance places. The suspension of her gesture shows her recognition not just of projection spaces but also of their spans: when the projected point is delayed, the gesture is relaxed and suspended; when the projected point comes nearer, the gesture is reactivated. This demonstrably shows that Laura is orienting to the relevance and legitimacy, in certain sequential positions, of her claims of speakership, as well as to the fact that, at other moments, these claims cannot be accountably sustained and have to be withdrawn or abandoned. The very fact that she suspends her gesture but leaves her hands ready for service at short distance, shows her readiness to pursue again the same gesture, projecting a future moment where this will be relevant again.

In this context, gesture, incremental syntax and rights and obligations related to speakership are deeply interwoven and made mutually visible, enacted through the unfolding of gestures in time.

Pre-initial Turn Pointings, Overlaps and Concurrent Claims of Speakership

Pre-initial pointings can be found in the very same sequential environments where next speakers/turn claimants produce serial starts of an incipient turn in overlap with current speaker/turn occupant (Jefferson, 2004: 46):

(6) (e7/ag1-22'50)

1	PAL	**devient une unité annexe, (.) qui: sert, (.) uniquement, (.) et en**
		becomes an annex unit, (.) which is used, (.) exclusively, (.) and
		>>ppp--->
2		**continu, (.) à la génération de renouvellement.**
		continuously, (.) for the new generation (of sheep).
3		***(0.5)**
	lau	*....-->
4	PAL	**[elles y restent [jusqu'à [*toussaint au moment de la: lutte.**
		[they (the sheep) stay [until [All Saints at the moment of the fight.
5	LAU	**[#et [#et [⊥#*ç-**
		[and [and, [th-
	pal	--->⊥,,,,,
		---------->*ppp w pen-->>
	fig	#fig. 1 #fig.2 #fig.3
6	LAU	**ça, # là. (.) y a une différence entre ça et ça?=**
		this, there. (.) is there a difference between this and this?=
	fig	#fig.4



Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3



Figure 4

At the end of line 2, Pierre-Alain has reached a completion point and has ended up his turn. The gap that follows (3) is interpreted by Pierre-Alain as an opportunity to talk not taken by his co-participants: he continues to speak (4), but at the same moment Laura begins her serial attempts to begin her turn. Laura sees the gap as an opportunity for self-selecting: this is exhibited by her hand approaching the map before to point (3). This projection of an imminent self-selection is materialized verbally a few moment later, within the serial start (« et » « et » « ç- » 5) overlapping Pierre-Alain. At the third try, Laura points with her pen, strengthening her position as incipient speaker.

Gestures – as fragments of incipient turns or as in-breaths – are multimodal resources which make pre-beginnings visible-and-audible. These resources are particularly interesting in a multi-party participation framework, where there is a pressure for current non-speakers who might self-select, to do it as soon as possible and at least at the first possible transition point (Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson, 1974, 712–713). Pre-beginnings are a technique for securing precise coordination of prior turn ending with next turn beginning, as well as for securing self-selection for would-be next speakers. Whereas verbal and other acoustic resources are vulnerable to overlaps in these early starts, pointing gestures are not and can be produced simultaneously with the terminal segment of the ongoing turn. This allows at the same time the opportunity to achieve an early self-selection and to display an orientation to the minimization of gap and overlap, i.e. to the

preservation of the « one party at a time » normative principle (see Schegloff, 1987 for a similar analysis of turn-beginning recycles). Nevertheless, it can be noticed that some of these gestural pre-beginnings are dealt with as having an « interruptive » potential or effect. So, even if gestures can be produced simultaneously with talk without overlapping it, pointing gestures as practices for claiming speakership and for imposing self-selection are oriented to as exhibiting concurrent practices of turn taking (cf. Jefferson who notes about overlapping laughter that « recipient/prior speaker appear to be attending to the 'premature' and turn-incursive character of their talk » 1984: 30). This may be consequential for the ongoing turn production by current speaker, as we will see below.

This situation is particularly clear in environments where concurrent pointings by several persons occur.

(7) (e9/ ag 1-47.52)

```
1  VIV  +puisque: ici on on est sur du du paca:ge, ⊥donc
        since here we we are on (sort of) park, so
        +ppp--->
   pal                                          ⊥head forth->
2       c'est c'est des bonnes euh c'e- s:- c'est des surfaces
        there are there are good ehm th- s- there are good areas
3       à *bon à bon potentiel,# donc *euh=
        with a good a good potential, so ehm=
   lau  *.....*ppp-->
   fig                  #fig.1
4  PAL  = ⊥*et c'est# ⊥clos#
              and it's closed
        ->⊥.....⊥ppp--->
   viv  ---------pppp---------->
   lau  ->*,,,,,suspends her pointing--->
   fig          #fig.2   #fig.3
5       (0.4)
6  VIV  et *c'est clos, et    [* (est-ce)# ⊥pa[s  be+soin de:
        and it's closed, and (there is) no need to;
7  LAU                       [*oui mais #(est-[ce que)+
                               yes but ((interrogative))
   viv  ----------------------------------ppp---------->+
   pal  ----------------------------------ppp-->⊥,,,,,,,,
   lau  ->*.....*ppp---------------------->>
   fig                                 #fig.4
8  PAL                                    [(à part)
                                          [(aside from)
9  LAU  iz y: i vont pas i vont pas dans l'champ après?=
        they they don't go they don't go in the field afterwards?=
        ----------ppp---------------------------------------------->>
10 PAL  =non.
        =no.
```



Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3



Figure 4

In this excerpt, we notice that two recipients attempt to self-select while Viviane is still speaking.

If we were to restrict our analysis to verbal conduct only, we would only see that Pierre-Alain's self-selection does not overlap with Viviane (4), and is presented as a collaborative completion of Viviane's turn, ratified by her. But, if we consider co-participants' gestures, we get another picture: we can notice that Laura comes in with her hand as early as line 3 (fig. 1), pointing before « euh » which concludes Viviane's turn (3). This projects a possible self-selection by Laura. However, after Viviane, it is Pierre-Alain who speaks first, beginning to point in turn-initial position (fig. 2). Pierre-Alain has bent his head over the table much earlier (line 1), at the end of Viviane's first TCU and before she continues with her first « donc ». Laura withdraws her pointing during Pierre-Alain's completion (fig. 3) – recognizing it as concurrent with, and a challenge to, her own claim of speakership – but prepares to point again as soon as Viviane repeats Pierre-Alain's collaborative item. Laura then fully points when she self-selects in overlap with Viviane (7).

Thus, here, three participants are pointing at the same moment (fig. 4): Viviane points during her turn, as current speaker; Pierre-Alain points when he engages in his turn, whereas Laura begins to point earlier, projecting and making visible her claim of incipient speakership. We can observe that pointing as a visible and public action projection can be initiated by various co-participants modifying their participation status as turns-at-talk unfold; they can manifest concurrent and mutually exclusive projections and claims of speakership.

As such, they are monitored by others as persisting or withdrawing claims, as related to yet-relevant or no-more-relevant contributions to the ongoing conversation. In this sense, publicly displayed pointings as practices for projecting imminent speakership are not only seen but oriented to and exploited by others, who can consequently adjust and modify their conducts. Thus, pointings reflexively shape the ongoing incremental productions by other participants, who mutually respond and adjust to them.

In the following excerpts, we will see that mutual and visible availability and recognition of participants' online interpretation of turns at talk is consequential for the emergent organization of their embodied conduct.

(8) (e8/ag1-23.50)

1	PAL	**⊥au cadastre il est carrément inscrit à leur nom.**
		on the land-survey map it ((=the field)) clearly belongs to them.
		⊥ppp---->
2		***(0.5)**
	lau	*....--->
3	LAU	**[oui. oui oui, *(.) oui oui]**
		[yes. yes yes (.) yes yes]
4	PAL	**[donc euh la sé] *curité de:⊥ du foncier, .h est nou⊥velle,** ⊥
		[so ehm the se]curity of of the property, .h is new,
		----->> looks at LAU⊥ looks at maps---------⊥at LAU⊥
	lau	--->*ppp--->
5		**⊥.h et * et p- certainement explique .h que on on défri:che, on**
		.h and and p- surely explains .h that one one clears the land, one
		⊥looks at maps------->1.11
	lau	*,,,,suspends her pen at close distance--->
6		**clôture, on aménage, et donc on .h [on ⊥REnd fonctionnelle**
		encloses, one settles, and so one .h [one makes functional
		ppp---> ⊥gesticulates-->
7	LAU	**[hum**
8	PAL	**cette sous-unité qui assure donc,* .h le renouvellement* du**
		this sub-unit which secures then .h the regeneration of
	lau	---------->*.....*ppp--->
9		**<du⊥ troupeau. ((lower voice))><.h alors c'⊥est ((faster))>**
		important,⊥
		<of the flock. ((lower voice))> <.h so it's ((faster))> important,
		->⊥ ⊥ppp at distance w pen-----⊥
10		**parce que *pour pour * donner un chiffre, .hh euh: on d- on**
		because in order in order to give an estimation, .hh ehm one h- one
	lau	-->*,,,,,,,,,, *chews pen---------->1. 15
11		**doit (1.1) on garde une agnelle pour: ⊥cinq brebis euh au-**
		has (1.1) one keeps one lamb for five ewes ehm at
		----⊥>looks at LAU--->
12		**au minimum quoi.⊥**
		at least ((particle)).
		--->⊥
13		**⊥(0.5)**
	pal	⊥looks at VIV -->

14	**PAL**	***.h donc⊥ [eu*h**
		.h so [ehm
		--->⊥
	lau	*.....*
	com	((VIV doesn't look at PAL))
15	**LAU**	**[euh* non mais c'est p- c'est**
		[ehm no but that's r- that's
		----->*ppp---->
16		**plutôt par rapport à: (0.5) tsk enfin à la légende.**
		rather with regard to (0.5) tsk well to the caption.

At the end of line 1, Pierre-Alain produces a first possible turn completion, followed by a silence (2). During this gap, Laura comes in pointing with her pen and produces an agreement (3) overlapping with Pierre-Alain who expands his turn (4) (cf. excerpt (6), lines 1–5). This TCU (4) begins with « donc » and can be interpreted as the conclusion of the previous one: this seems to be Laura's version, who holds her pointing. But Pierre-Alain does not just add some short conclusion: he projects a continuation (« et et » 5). Consequently, Laura, at the very beginning of this new TCU, suspends her gesture, although not returning to her home position but leaving her hand in place. Later, Laura points again in a peculiar sequential position within Pierre-Alain's turn: line 8, she anticipates the end of the relative clause as a possible turn completion. Line 9, Pierre-Alain deals with it as completed (namely by lowering his voice) but again adds a new TCU, initiated with an in-breath and louder voice. This initiation projects a longer argument (« alors c'est important, parce que... » 9–10), and is responded to by Laura suspending again her pointing and beginning to chew her pen – an action which not only visibly withdraws her gesture but also immobilizes her hand and occupies her mouth. Pierre-Alain completes his long argument after a long pause (11), which is not dealt with by Laura as a transition-relevance point. On this completion, he successively looks at Laura and then at Viviane: this technique for other-selection is vulnerable to the absence of gazes of the selected co-participants (Lerner, 2003). As a matter of fact, Viviane does not look at him and Laura comes back gesturally only on the terminal particle « quoi », beginning to speak as Pierre-Alain, after a gap where nobody speaks, tries to continue.

Thus, in this excerpt we see various attempts by Laura, implemented in an embodied way, to initiate turns. These attempts make visible for the analyst, on the basis of Laura's online analysis, the identification of turn-relevance points within Pierre-Alain's turn and her projection of possible self-selections. Gesture make visible and recognizable Laura's projections for other participants as well – namely for Pierre-Alain. Their public character has a reflexive effect on turn formatting: for instance, Pierre-Alain organises his turn in a way that minimizes transition-relevance points in order to continue to speak. This is namely the case of the transition-relevance point of line 9: Pierre-Alain accelerates his speech tempo at the very beginning of the TCU; moreover, at that moment, he does not glance at other participants but looks at the maps in front of him. This minimization is even clearer after several Laura's serial pointings. By contrast, he looks at Laura at the beginning of the excerpt, and at the end of his long multi-unit turn (line 11–12), in pre-completion positions, opening up the opportunity

Thus, pointing gestures as practices for projecting incipient speakership reflexively configure the other's conduct, who progressively integrates within his turn-format the emergent relevancies publicly manifested by gestures. This reflexive adjustment is responsible for the flexible, incremental, collective achievement of turn's units (cf. Goodwin, 1979, 1981). The public display of projections is particularly effective in cases of concurrent self-selections.

(9) (e2/ag2-16.18)

1 PAL **là là pour moi y- pour moi y avait de la surface (.) et donc**
there there for me th- for me there was some surface (.) and so
2 **je disais tiens, (.) le quartier, c'est un quartier,**
i said look, (.) the block, it's a block,
3 BRU **((coughts))**
4 PAL **(.) qui%: * c'est un %⊥k- qui* désigne un ensem%ble %**
(.) which: that's a k- which defines a set
⊥circular hand gesture-->
bru %pulls document% %takes%
towards him his pen
lau *.....*ppp--->
5 **%de surfaces⊥utilisé dans cer%ta[ins (.) domaines,**
of areas used in some (.) domains
--->⊥
bru %.....%touches and reads his docs->
6 LAU **[<ça y est ( ) ((lower))>**
<that's it ( ) ((lower))>
7 PAL **⊥cho:se qu'⊥ j'accepte complétement, (.) la la la* la*%=**
thing that I totally accept, (.) the the the the
⊥comes in palm up⊥
lau --->*,,,*
bru ----->%
8 BRU **=%mais attends * attends (.) j- je je reprends* ce tr-**
but wait wait I- I I want to take up this th-
%comes is w left H and opens it on his doc ----->
lau *moves left H----------*moves papers-->
9 **ce truc-là.% (.) [donc, (.) là, tu dis bon. (.)**
this thing there. (.) [so, (.) there you say well (.)
----->%ppp w left H and w pen-->>

Pierre-Alain is explaning the territorial organization of a farm (1–7). During this explanation, Bruno and Laura project their imminent self-selection. This is visible as far as Laura is concerned: she points from the moment where Pierre-Alain has initiated the definition of the « quarter » (4), by coming in with her pen, then by fully pointing. Laura withdraws her gesture when Pierre-Alain goes on with his argument (7). Nevertheless, as Pierre-Alain is in the middle of his TCU (with some hitches on the definite determiner) Bruno comes in and takes the turn (8).

Laura and Bruno use different methods and resources for self-selecting, implying different kind of public visibility. Line 4, at the beginning of Pierre-Alain's relative clause, Bruno pulls the central document in his direction; at the same

moment, Laura moves in, preparing to point. Thus, at the same sequential position, they both accomplish a gesture on the table, displaying their common orientation to the same relevances within the ongoing action. Immediately after, Bruno does not point to the central map, but points with his pen on his own document. When he begins to speak, he intrudes and suspends Pierre-Alain's turn with a specific discourse marker, « attends attends » (8), making explicit the interruption of his action. At the same time, he attracts collective attention towards his own document. Therefore, Bruno does not use the shared work space at the centre of shared attention, as do other participants, but uses his own documents, placed in front of him, driving the collective attention onto his personal work space. In a concurrent environment for grasping the turn, Florence's pointing gesture display very visibly her projections, make them recognizable and available for others – here Bruno – who adjust their own conduct and practices, e.g. for self-selecting before her. Bruno uses a verbal – rather than a gestural – turn-entry device, « attends attends » which achieves and topicalizes his stopping Pierre-Alain's turn.

Participants can mobilize various practices and resources for solving the practical problem of self-selecting and for organizing their possibly earlier start in competitive turn-taking environments: different embodied methods favours different resources, which have specific timings and trajectories, and which are differently identifiable, recognizable, and publicly visible. This visibility makes transparent the understanding of action by participants, not only for the analyst, but first of all for their co-participants. This in turn, allows the prediction and mutual adjustment of their actions, which are reflexively shaped by taking into account responsive actions produced online by others, either for aligning with or for preempting them. As excerpts 1–9 show, these practices for self-selecting are also a priviledged place to look at participant's emic, practical and situated definitions of the emerging status of « speakership ». They show that speakership is a status that has to be established through adequate interactional work. Gesture at pre-initial turn positions and at transition-relevance places make visible, witnessable and documentable the emergent trajectory of the progressive change of category of a « non current speaker » becoming a « would-be speaker », a « (possible) next speaker », and then an « incipient speaker ». These categories are established moment-by-moment in the unfolding of action and are oriented to by participants, who affiliate or not with them.[4]

When does Pointing End? Boundaries of Speakership

Speakership as an emergent phenomenon is observable within gestures in pre-initial turn position; symmetrically, once current speaker is established, it can be interesting to study where it ends, and how a participant ceases to be a speaker. In the remaining analyses, we will focus on the end of pointing gestures in order to question the limits of speakership. Since gestures are characteristic of speakers, we can expect that towards the end of the turn current speakers stop to gesticulate or to point, and that indeed pointing stops before the turn ends, projecting its completion.

Pointing Gestures Projecting or Ending at Turn Completion

In a certain number of cases, we can observe that pointing stops just before the turn is completed:

(10) (el/ag2-3.43)

1	VIV	**+% l:-la bergerie est aussi à côté de de l'exploitation,**
		th- the sheepfold is also near the the farm,
		+ppp---> 1.7
	bru	%H on his mouth---> 1.7
2		**donc c'est facile que les: que les brebis, .h qui so::nt mm::**
		so it's easy for the for the ewes, .h which are mm
3		**qu'on doit beaucoup surveiller, parce que: e- .h euh:: elles**
		which have to be watched over a lot, because th- .h ehm they
4		**ont leur: leurs agneaux, euh s-peuvent aller. sur (0.5) un**
		have their their lambs, ehm on- to be able to go, onto (0.5) a
5		**champ qui est proche,**
		field which is close,
6	BRU	**mh**
7	VIV	**et qui %en plus % est, + à for- à: : (0.4) +a beaucoup+**
		and which moreover is, of high- of (0.4) has a lot
		---->+comes back w pen--+ppp-------+
	bru	---->%pulls H down%puts H on paper-->
8		**+d'her+be pour faire manger les:**
		of grass to feed the
		+,,,,,+
9	BRU	**d'accord. % (0.2) % y a beaucoup plus d'informations**
		okay. (0.2) there is a lot more information ((on this map))
		-----><%.....%ppp--->>

As the excerpt begins, Viviane is producing an explanation and points to Bru paper. Bruno displays he is listening to her, looking at her, his hand on mouth. After Bruno's continuer, line 6, Viviane continues to speak but pro sively withdraws her pen, pointing again only in a limited way, when she repaired a problem of expression (7). So, she stops to point in a continuous from line 7 on, in a position where « qui en plus est » (7) initiates a last expan closing her turn. Interestingly, this projection of turn's closure is not unilat but comes just after Bruno has pulled his hand - which was held on his mouth until then – down on the table, thus making free his mouth for speaking and his hand for pointing. Actually Bruno puts his hand on his document and then points at the beginning of his turn. The end of Viviane's turn is thus an intera achievement, produced through the alignment of her projecting the co completion of her turn and her co-participant projecting his upcoming cat of « possible next speaker ».

Pointing Gestures Persisting after Turn Completion

Nevertheless, not all pointing gestures end with the turn they are affiliated in a precompletion position. Some gestures are held after turn completion:

post-completion *persistence seems to contradict the idea that gestures are a speaker's characteristic and thus delimit the rights and obligations of speakership.*

Detailed analysis shows that this is not the case, but that speakership is probably a phenomenon that is not strictly limited within turn (verbal) boundaries, but that is interactively shaped by complementary participants' relevancies and orientations. Here is a first occurrence of persisting pointing:

(11) (e9/ag 1-47.00) (= at the end of exc. 1)

1	VIV	**+.h oui. parce que: i'm'sem+ble: eh i- ici c'était s::- ce**
		.h yes. because it seems to me eh he- here it was wh- what
		–.....+ppp--> 1.6
2		**qui: ce que ça voulait représenter, (*c'était**
		this wanted to represent, [it was
3	LAU	**[*c'ést les am*andes ça?**
		[are these almonds?
	lau	*.....*ppp -- >
4	VIV	**(.) oh ça c'était (.) des amandes,* [c'était aussi l'idée que: une**
		(.) oh these were (.) almonds, [it was also the idea that: during
	lau	---------->*
5	LAU	**[°ouais°**
		[°yeah°
6	VIV	**journée,+(.) les: i- i restaient dans une en- une une**
		one day, (.) the: th- they stood within a wi- one one
		-->+iconic gestures----->>
7		**seu- une seule entité. ça suffisait pour la nourriture**
		onl- one only unit, this was enough for their food

In this excerpt, Viviane is trying to explain what she sees on the map (1–2). Laura asks a confirmation question in overlap (3), Viviane answers (4) and then continues her previous explanation.

If we look at the pointing gestures in this excerpt, we can first notice that Laura begins to point at the beginning of her question (3) and keeps pointing until the end of the answer (4), stopping just before her acknowledgment « ouais » 5. As far as Viviane is concerned, we can notice that she keeps pointing when the question is asked, when she gives a response and then continues her explanation. The continuity between fragments of her explanation (« ce que ça voulait représenter, c'était » 2), suspended by the question/answer adjacency pair, is secured through the recycling of « c'était » after the second pair part (4). Similarly, the fact that she maintains her gesture during the adjacency pair produces an online practical categorization of this sequence as being a « punctual insertion » or a « momentary suspension ».

By holding their pointing gestures, both participants are producing the intelligibility and accountability not only of the current turn organization but more generally of the current sequence organization. They are displaying their orientation to the way in which sequence is structured, to the sequential implicativeness of their turn and to the span of the ongoing sequential actions. Pointings show that Laura is orienting to the adjacency pair as the sequential unit relevant

for her action; whereas Viviane is orienting to the continuity of her explanatory action beyond the insertion of the pair.

The sequential scope considered by participants can be variable, as shown by the following excerpt:

(12) (e5/ag1-21.04)

1	PAL	**ça veut dire qu'on se déplace, (.) pour rentrer et**	
		this means that one has to travel, (.) in order to go back and	
2		**sortir les agnelles, (.) tou[s les jours, (.) mais**	
		to take out the lambs, (.) ever[y day, (.) but	
3	LAU	**[mhm**	
4	PAL	**ell[es sont effectiv-**	
		they are effectiv-	**pointing begins**
5	LAU	**[et: * et *elles restent pas sous* l'abri,***	**FPP 1 (Q)**
		[and and they don't stay under the shelter,	
		*left H comes in-*ppp w finger----------*,,,,,,,,*	
6	PAL	***(0.5) non non voilà elles sont abritées la**	**SPP 1 (A)**
		no no well they are protected during the	
	lau	*ppp w finger at distance---->	
7		**nuit, (.) [et elles sont dans le parc le jour. (.) et ça**	
		night, (.) [and they are in the paddock during the day. (.) and this	
8	LAU	**[oui**	
		[yes	
9	PAL	**veut di- elles sont pas en plein air intégral**	
		mean- they are not outdoor all the time	
10	LAU	**il est où l'parc?**	**FPP 2 (Q)**
		where is the paddock?	
11	PAL	**il est le* (.) le parc il est autour**	**SPP 2 (A)**
		it is the (.) the paddock is all around	
	lau	------->*	**pointing stops**
12	LAU	**°ah oui°**	
		°oh yes°	

Pierre-Alain is describing the temporal organization of the sheep farmer's work: Laura asks a first question (5), with a first start in overlap and then a second star in the clear (5), beginning to point just after the former. She is writing note with her right hand, and this constrains her movements (she comes back wit the hand holding her piece of paper, line 5, and continues to point at distanc holding the paper from line 6 to line 11). Thus, her pointing gesture ends n just after the first adjacency pair is closed, but at the end of the second one, in tiated by her with a second question. Both questions pick up a referential eleme in Pierre-Alain's previous turn and operate a « tying » with his turn by means a pronominal anaphora (« elles » 5, « il » 10 within a right dislocation, possib orienting to the fact that another pronominal reference has been used by Pier Alain after his mention of « le parc » 7).

By holding her pointing gesture, the speaker designs the span of her acti

pairs initiated by her.

These data suggest that participants, and more particularly speakers, organize the public accountability and visibility of the scope of their turns, covering not only the length of their turns at talk, but the sequence they initiate – typically, an adjacency pair – or more subsequent sequences. In this way, speakers' gestures suggest that rights and obligations characterizing speakership do not stop at turn boundaries but continue within the normative expectancies related to the sequence initiated by that turn. In this sense, the speaker remains « responsible » of the sequence she has initiated and she continues to control, namely by displaying if it has been completed or answered in an adequate way.

Pointing Gestures Persisting over Extended Sequences

This practical delimitation of the scope of the speaker's rights and obligations across the sequence can extend beyond adjacency pairs. This shows that participants do orient to the complex sequential organization of talk-and-embodied-conduct-in-interaction, taking into detailed consideration both the finest and the most complex aspects of this organization.[5]

(13) (e8/ag1-24.17) (end of exc. 8)

1		**⊥(0.5)**
	PAL	⊥looks at VIV-->
	com	((VIV is not looking at her co-participants))
2	**PAL**	***.h donc⊥ [eu*h**
		.h so ehm
		-->⊥
	lau	*.....*
3	**LAU**	**[euh* non mais c'est p- c'est plutôt par rapport**
		[ehm no but that's r- that's rather in relation
		*ppp------>
4		**à: (0.5) tsk enfin à la légende. (0.2) mais c'est p't-ét**
		with (0.5) tsk well with the caption. (0.2) but it's maybe
5		**Vivian*ne qui: (1.+2) *+euh[::**
		Viviane who: ehm[::
		-->*pushes paper tow. VIV*ppp-->1.20
	VIV	+shrinks H back+
6	**PAL**	**[°n⊥on° mais là des ⊥terres**
		[no but there some farmland
		⊥.....⊥ppp->1.17
7		**assolées,**
		with crop rotation,
8		**(0.5)**
9	**LAU**	**ouais**
		yeah
10	**PAL**	**donc euh on y fait une récolte ou on le réserve la pâture**
		so ehm either one does a harvest or one allots the pasture
11		**en particulier au mois d'juille:t, [les repousses on va**
		particularly in the month of July, the new growth will be

12	LAU	[ouais
		[yeah
13	PAL	éventuellement les donner aux [agnelles, [(.) .h et et le reste
		eventually given to the lambs .h and the remaining
14	LAU	[et [et là,
		[and [and there,
15	PAL	ça c'est du du parcours aménage. qui a été euh[:
		this is a an established path, which has been ehm[:
16	VIV	[amélioré\
		[improved
		com ((VIV does any gesture nor movement))
17	PAL	amé⊥lio[ré⊥
		improv[ed
		-->⊥,,,,,,⊥
18	LAU	[donc labouré et: resemé? [°ou non°
		[so cropped and: sowed again? °or not°
19	PAL	[dans l'temps oui. (.) oui oui
		[in the old times yes. (.) yes yes
20	LAU	ah oui* d'a[ccord*
		oh yes oka [y
		--->*,,,,,,,,,*

Line 3, Laura asks a question about the caption of the map, overlapping Pierre-Alain who is expanding a previous long multi-unit turn (see exc. 8).

Laura mentions Viviane as being the relevant speaker for that topic, but she uses the third person, referring to her more than addressing her. Laura does not glance at Viviane, although she pushes a relevant document towards her, while creating a long gap (5), giving her an opportunity to respond. On her side. Viviane is not glancing at her co-participants, and the only movement she does is slightly to pull back her hand during the long gap, displaying her unavailability for talk. In this case, we notice that pointing, pushing a document towards somebody, retracting a hand even minimally are movements that can radically reshape participation frameworks and mutual engagement displays.

In this context, Pierre-Alain answers to the question formulated by Laura (6–7). During the production of this second pair part, Pierre-Alain points. displaying his speakerhip. But Laura holds her pointing too. This continues to be the case through the except, even line 14, when Laura reorients Pierre-Alain's explanation with a complementary question.

Interestingly, when Pierre-Alain produces a word-search, line 15 (« qui a été euh: »), Viviane promptly proposes a candidate (« amélioré » 16) which is repeated by the him (18). During this short collaborative completion of Pierre-Alain's turn, Viviane makes no movement or gesture: she displays that she is speaking *for* her co-participant – *animating* him – but she is not assuming properly a speakership position – of *author.*

When ratifying the item closing the word search, Pierre-Alain withdraws his pointing (17), projecting his turn completion. He holds this position, even if Laura asks a last confirmatory question (18), which gets a short answer (19).

Laura withdraws only after she closes the whole stretch of interaction (« ah oui d'accord « 20). Closure with an agreement and a change-of-state-token (« ah » in French, corresponding to the « oh » studied by Heritage, 1984) – displaying the completion of the sequence from both an interactional and an informational perspective –, together with the withdrawal of a gesture held for a long period, exhibits the boundaries of an extended segment of talk as practically and incrementally defined by the pointing participant who initiated the sequence and projected a space for its completion.

Conclusions

The cases we studied in this paper outline a systematic use of pointing as a method for projecting self-selection, designing a transition space, and more generally defining speakership within a range of sequential positions.

Pointing as a practice for turn taking can be initiated either before the actual completion of current speaker's turn, (thereby projecting its end), or at the beginning of the incipient speaker's turn. In both cases, pointing displays a participation shift, the pointer initiating, often before even saying a word, her transition from the category of « non current speaker » to the category of « incipient speaker », through the category of « possible next speaker »: in this sense, pointing gestures manifest the temporal, situated, embodied emergent process of the establishment of speakership. Moreover, this process shows publicly and visibly the way in which a « recipient » scrutinizes, for all practical purposes, an ongoing turn and produces an online parsing of this turn in TCUs. In this way, not only a local understanding of the ongoing TCUs is exhibited, but also its embodied use oriented to the turn-taking machinery. In turn, this public manifestation of an online analysis is visible for other participants, who reflexively adjust their own turn design and conduct to what is made recognizable by the pointer – e.g. in concurrential turn at talk.

Pointing can end either in a pre-completion position or at the end of the turn. But it can also end much later in the sequence: at the end of one or more adjacency pairs initiated by the pointing speaker, as well as at the end of an extended sequence controlled by her. The latter case shows an extension of the local display of speakership: speakers hold their posture across turns, manifesting an extension of their rights and obligations beyond the turn and beyond their talk. In this way, pointing across sequences shows the situated online sequential interpretation and production by participants, displaying the span of their actions and of their sequential implicativeness.

Thus, pointing as it has been analyzed in this particular corpus highlights very general features of turn-taking and sequential organization. At the same time, it is interesting to notice that this methodical and systematic practice exploits the context sensitive specificities of the ecology of action. Pointing as a practice for projecting turns and organizing sequences is not available in every setting: in the case studied, pointing gesture is a resource made available by the peculiar spatial and material environment of the interaction, constituted by a table covered

with documents, maps and other visualizations, massively used within an activity focused on reading, writing and correcting cartographic representations. In this particular setting, interaction is not primarily organized as a face-to-face exchange of talks and glances but rather as a side-by-side common focalization of attention on objects. In this sense, pointing gesture have a prominence and a salience that is locally achieved through the very activity participants are involved in.

Moreover, pointing gestures as resources for interactional practices are made available by the high focus on referential and deictic activities going on in this praxeological setting. The referential dimension of pointing works here as a resource at the service of the interactional organization: deicticals at turn-beginnings are a resource which can enhance the accountability and legitimacy of pointing gestures for taking the turn. In this sense, both represent not exclusive but rather complementary uses of the same resource.

The efficiency of singular pointing gestures is reflexively shaped by their embededdness in this peculiar activity: pointing with a pen or pointing with a finger not only have different accuracies, but offer different opportunities for their integration within activities. For example, pointing with a pen excludes other uses of the pen, such as taking notes; pointing with the left hand allows one to write with the right hand. Chewing the pen *versus* placing the hand holding the pen close to the centre of the table constitute two *home positions* which enable different preparation phases and rely on different kinds of reactivity and temporality for pointing. In this sense, pointing involves an arrangement of the material environment as well as a disposition of bodies, all eventually preparing and projecting an upcoming-speaker position.

Therefore pointing is here the indexical resource at hand, made available by a specific ecology of action. In similar ecologies, the same resource can be mobilized. In other settings, pointing may be used in the same way, but it is also possible that other multimodal resources, best suited to the specificities of the local context and material environment, may be used instead, although nevertheless respecting the same sequential and interactional constraints. In summary, then, this paper aims to be a contribution to the description of both systematic and indexical features of multimodal turn and sequence organization.

Transcript Conventions

Data have been transcribed according to conventions developed by Gail Jefferson.

A indicative translation is provided line per line.

Multimodal details have been transcribed according to the following conventions:

* *	delimitate Laura's gestures and actions descriptions.
+ +	delimitate Viviane's gestures and actions descriptions.
⊥ ⊥	delimitate Pierre-Alain's gestures and actions descriptions.

Glances are described by the same conventions, but in a light-coloured character.

* --->	gesture or action described continue across subsequent lines.
* -->>	gesture or action described continue until and after excerpt's end.
--->*	gesture or action described continue until the same symbol is reached.
>>--	gesture or action described begins before the excerpt's beginning.
....	gesture's preparation.
----	gesture's apex is reached and maintained.
,,,,,	gesture's retraction.
lau	participant doing gesture is identifyied when (s)he is not the speaker.
fig	the exact point where screen shot (figures) has been taken is indicated,
#	with a specific sign showing its position within turn at talk.
com	commentary
ppp	pointing gesture
w	with (pen/finger)
H	hand

Notes

1. This paper has been presented and discussed at The Nijmegen Gesture Centre Lecture Series on April 8, 2005, and at the 9e Colloque de Pragmatique de Genève on May 26-28, 2004 and has benefited from comments of the participants. I am most grateful to Charles Antaki for revising my English text.
2. Thus, this gesture done by a current non-speaker seems only apparently contradicting the idea that « hand gesturing is largely, if not entirely, a speaker's phenomenon » (Schegloff, 1984, 271): Schegloff notes that an exception, which is itself in keeping with this general principle, is provided by the fact that « current non-speakers who initiate a hand gesture may show themselves thereby to be intending, and incipient, speakers, and the gestures may thus be used as a way of making a move for a turn at talk next » (1984, 271). It is precisely this exception that is explored in this paper.
3. « The notion of a 'projection space' is concerned with both the span in which some element of talk is 'in play' before being produced, and with the evidence of that which a speaker's turn may make available to its recipient. For example, it appears central to the organization of tightly coordinated turn-transfer from one speaker to a next that aspects of some current turn are projected, and are available to analysis by a recipient/potential-next-speaker before their actual occurrence » (Schegloff, 1984, 267).
4. The continuous transformation and negotiation of the participant's categories have been pointed out by Goodwin & Goodwin (2004) revisiting and criticizing the goffmanian notion of « participation ». Narratives in interaction have been studied from the perspective of the progressive establishment of « teller » as well as « co-tellers » (Goodwin, 1984, 1987; Hayashi, Mori & Takagi 2002). But more generally this movement is observable within every next turn. It is interesting to look at the categories used for dealing with « not yet speakers » within the current literature: in her analysis of systematic positionings of overlaps, Jefferson (1984) speaks of « recipient/next speaker », as well as, in concurrent overlaps, of Turn Occupant vs Turn Claimant, showing that these two categories are not always easy to differentiate (2004, 49). When analyzing pre-beginnings, Schegloff (1996, 97) uses the category

« current-recipient-of some talk/potential-next-speaker » showing through this complex label the transitional dynamic character of the category.

5. This is consistent with the analyses provided by Fox (1987) on long distance anaphoras, manifesting the way in which speakers deal for all practical purposes with long stretches of talk as being homogeneous and continuous from a praxeological and a topical point of view.

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The Political Function of Narrative in Organizations

Dennis K. Mumby

Under the rubric of interpretive theory, a great deal of current research in organizational communication has focused on the sense-making practices of organization members, as manifested in their use of organizational symbolism. Such research is motivated by the belief that organization members, as social *actors*, actively participate in the construction of organizational reality through organizational discourse (Frost et al., 1985; Pondy et al., 1983; Putnam & Pacanowsky, 1983; Smircich, 1983). This "organizational culture" approach recognizes the emergent, ongoing, and sometimes precarious nature of organizational reality, and thus represents a significant shift away from the static, more functionalist approaches of traditional organizational theory.

My purpose in this paper is to extend these recent developments by demonstrating that cultural theory, despite its significant contributions to organizational research, articulates a rather limited and theoretically naive view of the relationship between organizational symbolism and organizational reality. While such research adequately describes organizational sense-making at a surface level, it does little to explicate the *deep structure* process through which certain organizational realities come to hold sway over competing world-views.

This article redresses this imbalance by focusing on narrative (as one form of organizational symbolism) and addressing its role as a legitimating device in formal organizations. Narratives provide members with accounts of the process of organizing. Such accounts potentially legitimate dominant forms of organizational reality, and lead to discursive closure in the sense of restricting the interpretations and meanings that can be attached to organizational activity. Closure frames discourse in a distortive fashion, and often misrepresents the interests of particular groups within organizations (Deetz & Mumby, 1985).

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The notion of narrative closure within organizations is unpacked by laying out the complex and interdependent relationship that exists between narrative, power, and ideology in organizations. From this perspective, narratives not only evolve as a product of certain power structures, but also function ideologically to produce, maintain, and reproduce those power structures. Because of their embeddedness in the everyday practices of organizations, narratives are not easily perceived as legitimating devices – they often articulate an organizational reality that is accepted as "the natural order of things." By adopting a political reading of narrative, however, it is possible to demonstrate that story-telling is not a simple representing of a pre-existing reality, but is rather a politically motivated production of a certain way of perceiving the world which privileges certain interests over others.

The fundamental premise for this article is based on Jameson's edict that argues for

> . . . the priority of the political interpretation of literary texts. It conceives of the political perspective not as some supplementary method, not as an optional auxiliary to other interpretive methods current today – the psychoanalytic or the myth-critical, the stylistic, the ethical, the structural – but rather as the absolute horizon of all reading and all interpretation. (1981, p. 17)

Such a position confronts narrative politically, as an ideological force that articulates a system of meaning which privileges certain interests over others. A political reading of narrative draws attention to the relationship between narrative structure and the process of interpretation and, as such, focuses on the process by which dominant meaning systems arise. Narratives "address" readers/listeners by creating a "fit" between the narrative and the individual's world-as-experienced. Such a fit is by no means perfect, however; otherwise, the individual would be completely subjugated to the narrative's ideologically constructed "reality." As Nakagawa (1983, p. 16) points out, this margin of difference between narrative and reader/listener translates into a tension between what is highlighted (present) and what is hidden (absent). It is this difference that a political reading of narrative exploits, seeking to create a disjuncture between the privileged (dominant, ideological) reading and that constructed by the reader/listener.

In a very real sense it is this disjuncture that this paper exploits, for it is clear that the issue of legitimation is a double-edged sword. Although it is argued that narratives in organizations can function as an ideological device to legitimate the meaning systems of dominant groups, narratives can also potentially *delegitimate* dominant meaning systems. In this context, power becomes more than a phenomenon that is imposed on subordinate groups; it involves a "dialectic of control" (Giddens, 1979, p. 72) in which even the ostensibly powerless can utilize organizational structure to their advantage. This dialectic will become clearer in the analysis of narrative in the final section of the paper.

The balance of this paper will therefore address the following issues: power and its relationship to organizing; ideology and organizational structuring; and the relationship between narrative and the social construction of organizational reality.

Power in Organizations

The issue of power maintains a somewhat tenuous status in organizational research. On the one hand, organizations themselves have a vested interest in presenting an image which emphasizes efficiency, productivity, and a concern for the well-being of personnel. Power does not fit very comfortably into this image. In addition, managerial lore relies heavily on the "myth of rationality" (Conrad, 1985; Weick, 1979), i.e., the belief that organizations operate on the basis of decisions made through the objective assessment of available information and the setting of appropriate, carefully selected goals. To suggest – at least publicly – that decisions in organizations are made on any other bases (power and political expediency, for example) is heretical to many organization managers.

On the other hand, organizational researchers have clearly established "power" as an important phenomenon in organizations, although it is hard to find a consistent articulation of its nature (Pfeffer, 1981). Much of the early research on organizational power is strongly influenced by Weber's (1947) seminal work. In particular, his distinction between power (*Macht*) and authority (*Herrschaft*) has been largely co-opted by more traditional theorists in a way that legitimates organizational hierarchy and domination. Dahrendorf (1959, p. 166) clearly articulates this distinction: "The important difference between power and authority consists in the fact that whereas power is essentially tied to the personality of individuals, authority is always associated with social positions or roles." Within organizations, the exercising of authority is viewed as the rational extension of a social actor's legitimate role, i.e., as legitimate power.

More recently, however, traditional conceptions of organizational power have been challenged in order to debunk the management bias that has characterized much organizational research. In particular Clegg's (1975; 1981; Clegg & Dunkerley, 1980) work has shown how Weber's concept of power and bureaucracy can be utilized to provide a more radical interpretation of organizational power. Clegg (1975, p. 59) reinterprets *Herrschaft* as "rule" to demonstrate the interpretative work that people engage in, when they make sense of the world. All authority, he suggests, is dependent upon this conception of rule-governed behavior because rules orient people toward structuring their behavior in a certain way. Different rule systems therefore provide different structures for orienting behavior. Domination involves getting people to organize their behavior around a particular rule system.

In this context, "power is about the outcomes of issues enabled by the rule of a substantive rationality which is temporally and institutionally located" (1981, p. 77). Power, then, is achieved by establishing an organization's mode of rationality through controlling the deep structure rules of organizations. It is not simply a possession of individuals within organizations. By adopting this concept

framework, Clegg is able to show how structures of domination can become "naturally" and "rationally" integrated into organizations. Power, in this sense, is legitimate only because a particular "mode of rationality" deems it to be so; the group that maintains this mode of rationality (the organizational rule system) therefore controls the organization's system of power.

Several authors have sought to question the legitimacy of organizational models based on the notion that organizations are intrinsically rational in their modus operandi. These authors often characterize organizations as complex, ambiguity-ridden structures whose members engage in a constant struggle to reduce the equivocal nature of the communication environment that they inhabit. Most notably, Cohen, March and Olsen's (1972; March & Olsen, 1976) "garbage can" model of organizing has done much to undermine traditional perspectives based on rational decision-making.

> An organization is a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work. (1972, p. 2)

Building on this theme, Weick (1979) points out that organizational activity is often made sense of, i.e., made to *seem* rational, only in retrospect; there is frequently only a limited and incomplete antecedently existing rationale which governs and directs organizational behavior. Thus "organizations are often reluctant to admit that a good deal of their activity consists of reconstructing plausible histories after-the-fact to explain where they are now, even though no such history got them to precisely this place" (Weick, 1979, p. 5).

If we tie together the notions of power and ambiguity, then, we can say that power is exercised when ambiguous or equivocal information is interpreted in a way that favors the interests of a particular organizational group; or, alternatively, when organizational ambiguity is utilized and amplified to disguise the exercise of power. Such a conception means that power can be exercised both intentionally and unintentionally, but most importantly by virtue of its integration into organizational structure. Power is therefore conceived not as a possession of individuals, nor as a relation among individuals (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; Dahl, 1957, 1961), but rather as both a medium and product of organizational structuring and thus – following Clegg – as a potential means of control.

Such a conception of power is implicit in Lukes' statement that power is sustained by "the *socially structured* and culturally patterned behavior of groups, and practices of institutions" (1974, p. 22, emphasis added). Lukes focuses on the issue of interests, suggesting that power is often exercised not in an overtly behavioral manner, but rather by shaping the interests of individuals. Thus the existence of consensually derived values and beliefs in an organization, for example, does not necessarily mean that power is absent.

Lukes' conception of power is radical because he recognizes that power does not operate merely in the relation between individuals; rather, it is also a structural aspect of institutions which mediates in the socialization of actors in organizational settings. The behavioral aspect of the exercise of power can only

function within this deeper, more fundamental structuring. It is fundamentally misleading, however, to separate organizational structure and interaction. Social relations do not simply exist *within* organizational structure, but are actually inseparable from (and constitutive of) that structure. From this perspective, the exercise of power is interdependent with the structure within which it occurs.

In an important article, Ranson, Hinings and Greenwood (1980) provide an excellent analysis of the way in which organizational structuration (Giddens, 1976, 1979, 1981) is an integral part of the dispersion of power in organizations. From this perspective, "structure [is] a complex medium of control which is continually produced and recreated in interaction and yet shapes that interaction: structures are constituted and constituting" (1980, p. 3). This quality of organizing is crucial to the vested interests of different groups within organizations. If we view organizations as being made up of different and competing values and belief systems that embody the interests of different groups, then the groups with the most power will be those that are best able to integrate their sectional claims into the very structuring of the organization.

Thus a group's interests will be best served if those interests become a part of the taken-for-granted meaning formations that structure organizational life. Once these interests become part of the organizational structure, then that structure reflexively mediates in, and reproduces, those interests. Organizational structure is therefore both the *medium* and the *outcome* of members' social practices (Giddens, 1979, 1981; Poole & McPhee, 1983; Riley, 1983), and is therefore an integral part of organizational power. Thus "the structural framework is not an abstract chart but one of the crucial instruments by which groups perpetuate their power and control in organizations: groups struggle to constitute structures in order that they may become constituting" (Ranson et al., 1980, p. 8). At the same time it is important that power should not be conceived as a monolithic entity which is *imposed* on organization members; rather, a dialectical relationship exists between the two. In other words, social actors are constrained by organizational power structures, but at the same time these constraints provide the medium through which social actors can act strategically in organizations (Conrad, 1985).

This relationship between agency (the social actor as *actor*) and power becomes clear in Giddens' aforementioned theory of structuration, embodied in his concept of the duality of structure: "the structural properties of social systems are both the medium and outcome of the practices that constitute those systems" (1979, p. 69). In this context power becomes double-edged in the sense that it serves not only as a means *for* domination, but also as the vehicle through which social actors can potentially liberate themselves from domination. Giddens (1979, p. 51) articulates the duality of power thus: "at the heart of both domination and power lies the *transformative capacity* of human action, the origin of all that is liberating and productive in social life as well as all that is repressive and destructive." Simply to be a human agent means to have power. Even those in the most subordinate positions can "carve out 'spaces of control' in respect of their day-to-day lives and in respect of the activities of the most powerful" (1981, pp. 197–98). This "dialectic of control" recognizes that a reciprocal relationship

exists between agency and power, and that power relations are chronically reproduced in the structures of social systems.

The question that remains, however, involves the means by which groups are able to secure their vested interests within the organizational structure. It seems apparent that structuring is a privilege of only *some* organizational members: not everyone can have equal access to the resources necessary to produce and reproduce certain relations of power. Indeed, the control of such resources is part and parcel of these power relations. In the next section this question is addressed by developing the concept of ideology as the vehicle through which an organization's "mode of rationality" becomes structured.

Ideology and Organizational Structuring

While there is considerable variation in the treatment of the concept of ideology, the issue of the production and domination of consciousness, or subjectivity, is a central element in most contemporary theories. Neo-Marxist theorists are concerned with explicating the ways in which ideology functions to construct consciousness in such a way as to articulate and legitimate certain forms of social reality. In many theories, ideology is conceived as an intrinsic part of the process by which social actors are integrated into extant power structures (Althusser, 1970, 1971; Coward & Ellis, 1977; Giddens, 1979; Gramsci, 1971; Hall, 1985; Larrain, 1979, 1983).

Therborn (1980), for example, suggests that ideology performs the double function of subjection and qualification. That is, ideology simultaneously subjects social actors to a particular social order, *and* qualifies them for the roles that the reproduction of this social order demands. In this sense, "ideology operates as discourse, addressing . . . human beings as subjects" (1980, p. 15). This process of addressing, or interpellation, is accomplished through the tripartite articulation of social reality: Human actors are made to recognize (1) what exists, i.e., what is "real"; (2) what is good, i.e., what is "normal," "beautiful," etc.; and (3) what is possible, i.e., our sense of what is changeable (Therborn, 1980, p. 18). Ideology addresses and qualifies subjects by giving them an overall sense of the limits and possibilities of the social world – ideology provides a sense of what it *means* to be a social actor.

The notion of ideology addressing social-actors-as-subjects is central to this paper in that it provides a direct link between narrative and ideology. In this context, narrative can be conceived as more than simply a vehicle for diffusing information in an organization; it becomes a material social practice by means of which ideological meaning formations are produced, maintained, and reproduced. Thus in examining the structure of narrative from an ideological perspective, the principal concern is one of assessing "how structures of signification are mobilized to legitimate the sectional interests of hegemonic groups" (Giddens, 1979, p. 191). That is, narrative in its capacity as a signifying system can function to articulate a form of social reality that is accepted by all organizational groups, regardless of their position in the organizational hierarchy.

Narrative – as one mode of symbolic structuring – is a material instantiation of ideology. It is an everyday organizational practice that structures "lived experience" in a particular way for organization members. Narrative functions ideologically to structure the very notion of "organizational practice" for social actors, privileging certain practices over others.

The relationship between narrative and the ideological structuring of meaning systems can be explicated in terms of the functions of ideology. These functions are outlined below, and in the final section of this paper organizational narrative is analyzed according to these functions.

According to Giddens (1979, pp. 193–96) there are three principal ideological functions: (1) the representation of sectional interests as universal; (2) the denial or transmutation of contradictions; (3) the naturalization of the present through reification. The first is a key function in the sense that an interest must be seen as more than sectional, i.e., specific to a particular group, if it is to be accepted as anything more than one interest among many competing interests. In organizational cultures, for example, the dominant group is that which can structure meaning formations for the organizational totality from their own paradigmatic framework (Brown, 1978).

The second function of ideology refers to the way in which fundamental system contradictions are reformulated more superficially as simple social conflict. The primary contradiction in capitalist society, that between private appropriation and socialized production, is legitimated by the ideological bifurcation of the political and economic spheres. Political strategies are thus not seen as acceptable in the workplace, while the legitimate political sphere is conceived in terms of the relationship between the individual and the state, embodied in the power to vote (Mason, 1982; Pateman, 1970). This strict separation of the political and economic spheres allows the technical interest to predominate in the workplace (Habermas, 1971). As such, organization managers can argue that power does not play a significant role in the structuring of organizations because decisions are made "rationally." The fact that one group is seen as more influential than another is explicable in terms of their importance for the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the organization.

The third ideological function, reification (Lukács, 1971), deals with the degree to which humanly constructed social relations and meaning formations come to be perceived as "objective" and independent from those who created them. In this way what is "real" becomes fixed and immutable, i.e., "the way things are." In organizational cultures the reification of day-to-day experience limits the possibility of conceiving of alternative social realities or, if the alternatives are articulated, they might be considered strange or lacking in sense. For example, the issue of decision-making is normally understood to be contingent on organizational hierarchy (the more important a decision the higher the level at which it will be made). The concept of hierarchy, however, is an inherently political construct which gives power to a small percentage of organization members. Organizational culture can reify hierarchy, making it appear as a tangible, physically existing structure characterized by the formal organization plan, office size, number of secretaries, thickness of carpet, and so on.

Finally, in addition to Giddens' three functions of ideology, a fourth can be added, namely, the function of ideology as a means of control. This seems implicit in the notion of the representation of sectional interests as universal, but it requires a little unpacking. The concept of ideology as control is best expressed through Gramsci's (1971) notion of hegemony. As Mouffe (1981) points out, hegemony is frequently misconceived as the ideological domination of one class or group by another. This position views ideological struggle as a confrontation between two already elaborated, closed world-views. More accurately, hegemony involves "the ability of one class to articulate the interests of other social groups to its own" (Mouffe, 1981, p. 183). In this sense, a "collective will" is produced through "intellectual and moral reform" (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 12, 60–61). Ideological hegemony therefore involves "effective *self identification* with the hegemonic forms" (Williams, 1977, p. 18). Thus ideology functions as control through active consent rather than through passive acceptance of pre-given social formations.

To summarize this section, it is argued that ideology is materially grounded in the organized practices of social actors. Ideology constitutes subjectivity (consciousness) through its ordering of these practices into a coherent lived-world for the individual. Ideology and power are inextricably tied together insofar as ideology articulates social reality in terms of the interests of the dominant social group(s). In the context of organizations, power is most successfully exercised by those who can structure their interests into the organizational framework itself. Ideology therefore acts to support these interests by continually reproducing the structure of social practices that best serves them. In this sense, power and ideology are not purely structural phenomena, separate from the interaction of social actors: they are both the medium and outcome of that interaction, embodied in the "systems of signification" of the organization.

In the final section of this paper the above theoretical framework is applied to a specific organizational narrative, examining it in terms of its ideological functioning. The analysis will throw light on the implicit connection between organizational discourse and organizational control. Narrative will be shown to function as one of the principal means by which an organization's mode of rationality is maintained and reproduced.

Narrative and the Process of Legitimation

The current interest in the symbolic aspects of organizing demonstrates the intrinsic connection between communication and organizational cultures. Research in this area demonstrates that organizational reality is fundamentally symbolic in nature (Daft & Wiginton, 1979; Frost et al., 1985; Martin et al., 1983; Pondy et al., 1983). Organization members inhabit a symbolic environment in which they create the rules, norms and values that frame the process of organizing.

While many studies have focused on the role that organizational symbolism plays in expressing communal values, articulating shared rule systems, and so forth, few have focused on the symbolic aspects of organizational power, or on

the role of symbolism in the process of legitimation of organizational interests. In this section I want to build on the work of authors like Riley (1983), Conrad (1983), Frost (in press) and Rosen (1985), each of whom attempts to make explicit the connection between organizational symbolism and the creation and distribution of organizational power. The focus of the analysis is organizational narrative, both because stories are a pervasive form of organizational communication, and because the very structure of narrative is interesting in itself.

The story analyzed below is taken from Martin, Feldman, Hatch, and Sitkin's (1983) study of organizational storytelling. As such, the analysis is by no means an exhaustive examination of the relationship between a specific set of narratives and power; rather, it is intended to function as an exemplar of the way in which the connection between the two concepts might be fruitfully explored.

Organizational Narrative: An Exemplar

Martin et al. (1983) explore the role that stories play in demonstrating the unique qualities of organizations. Organization members tell stories to other members or outsiders to show how their organization is different from any other. Such stories can illustrate both positive and negative qualities of organizations. Martin et al. discovered, however, that "an [organizational] culture's claim to uniqueness is expressed through cultural manifestations that are not in fact unique" (1983, p. 439). In other words, stories that lay claim to organizational uniqueness occur in virtually identical forms across many organizations. Martin et al. use script theory to show that such stories generally contain common themes that address concerns that are pervasive in most organizations. Such concerns/themes include "What do I do when a higher status person breaks a rule?"; "Is the big boss human?"; "Can the little person rise to the top?"; "How will the boss react to mistakes?"; and so forth.

Martin et al. suggest that these thematic stories become an integral part of the organizational culture because they help to resolve the dualities that arise from the conflict between individual values and goals, and organizational exigencies. A duality is defined as "an issue that cannot easily be resolved because contradictory aspects of the issue are inevitably present and are simultaneously desirable and undesirable" (1983, p. 447). Thus, for example, a story about an employee chastising a higher status rule-breaker expresses the duality of equality versus inequality. Here, the contradiction between the basic societal value of equality and the inequality of organizational hierarchy is at least partially resolved by showing that such equality is possible within the organization.

The story analyzed below extends Martin et al.'s analysis by examining the ways in which narrative functions to reproduce the deep structure aspects of organizational power and rationality. Martin et al. (1983, pp. 439–40) document a story in which Thomas Watson, Jr., the chairman of the board of IBM, is challenged by a supervisor,

> a twenty-two-year-old bride weighing ninety pounds whose husband had been sent overseas and who, in consequence, had been given a job until

his return . . . . The young woman, Lucille Burger, was obliged to make certain that people entering security areas wore the correct clear identification.

Surrounded by his usual entourage of white-shirted men, Watson approached the doorway to an area where she was on guard, wearing an orange badge acceptable elsewhere in the plant, but not a green badge, which alone permitted entrance at her door. "I was trembling in my uniform, which was far too big," she recalled. "It hid my shakes, but not my voice. 'I'm sorry,' I said to him. I knew who he was alright. 'You cannot enter. Your admittance is not recognized.' That's what we were supposed to say."

The men accompanying Watson were stricken; the moment held unpredictable possibilities. "Don't you know who he is?" someone hissed. Watson raised his hand for silence, while one of the party strode off and returned with the appropriate badge.

Martin et al. suggest that the moral of this story for higher status organization members is "even Watson observes the rules, so you certainly should," while for lower status employees the moral is "uphold the rules no matter who is disobeying" (1983, p. 440). The implication is that while other corporate heads may flaunt regulations, Watson is unique in the example that he sets to all his employees.

While this interpretation provides insight into the story, it can be developed more significantly in terms of the way that the story functions to produce, maintain, and reproduce a particular meaning formation. The story can be more fruitfully analyzed from an explicitly political perspective, using the functions of ideology laid out in the previous section. While Martin et al.'s analysis of the story is largely descriptive – presenting it as a simple reflection of the organization's value system – the analysis below makes explicit the link between organizational symbolism on the one hand, and legitimation and ideological domination on the other.

The first function of ideology – the representation of sectional interests as universal – is clearly present in the story. Recall that this function enables social practices that further the interests of a particular group to be perceived as the interests of *all* groups. In the context of this story, the issue of sectional versus universal interests manifests itself in the question of adherence to rules. In terms of universal interests, the story tacitly suggests that the corporation's rules are laid down for the benefit of all employees. The fact that Watson is required to take orders from a low-status employee has the effect of temporarily suspending the corporate hierarchy, in which sectional interests are grounded. Rules, as such, appear to transcend sectional interests; all employees, of whatever rank, are required to follow the rules.

What the story obscures, however, is the fact that the formal system of rules is created *by* the corporate elite (of which Watson is the head) to protect their own interests. IBM is a profit-making organization, one goal of which is to maintain as large a share of its market as possible. Part of this involves employment of strict security to protect corporate secrets. Staying ahead of its competition in

the area of technology ensures the competitiveness of IBM products. The corporate rules that the story deals with, then, are in place for the benefit of people like Watson, and not for people like Lucille Burger.

The issue of rule-breaking becomes clearer in looking at the role of the story in denying or transmuting contradictions. In a sense, the story as a whole is a contradiction. The moral it conveys demonstrates that no one at IBM is "above the law." However, the mere fact that the story has become part of organization lore indicates that it is exceptional in some way. If Watson *was* subject to corporate rules in the same way as other employees, then this story would have little significance. The story is further contradictory in the sense that it depicts Watson simultaneously as an "ordinary human being" who can be spoken to by an employee, and as a larger-than-life figure about whom fables are told. Thus the story comments on itself: On one level it is a straightforward narrative that tells the listener/reader something about the way IBM operates; on a second, meta level, the story operates reflexively, building a particular image of Watson by saying "this is a story about the (in)famous chairman of IBM." The contradiction between Watson the individual and Watson the powerful corporate executive is obscured by the story's focusing on his interaction with an employee, to whom he ultimately defers.

The material reality of Watson's corporate position is effectively obscured by placing the narrative in an interpersonal context, and yet it only has impact because of the huge divide that separates the protagonists on the corporate hierarchy. In this sense, the effectiveness of the story depends on a tension between disparate elements: the story tells us that position on the corporate ladder means little when it comes to following rules (rules are for the good of everyone), but at the same time the listener/reader must appreciate Watson as a highly charismatic figure who commands the respect of everyone.

The story perhaps best serves an ideological function through the process reification. Simply by virtue of its narrative structure, the story form lends itself to an infinite number of recountings. As Martin and Powers (1983) point out, an organizational story is easier to recall than a set of statistics containing the same information. Stories, of course, occur in all cultural settings, and one of their aims is to present the listener with a "slice of life" that exemplifies and animates some aspect of the culture in which the story is set. Through the ongoing process of retelling, events in a story become taken-for-granted by members of the culture. Even in the case of apocryphal tales, the division between fiction and reality is blurred to the point where a narrative event becomes "real" if it is retold enough times.

Of course, the effectiveness of a story depends at least partially on the quality of its telling. In the case of the example used here, there is no way of knowing how this story might be related in the organizational context. No doubt the basic structure remains fairly constant, while the embellishments will differ with each recounting. However, there is enough detail in the example given to demonstrate the process of reification in operation. First, there is a sharp contrast in the way that the two principal characters are described in the story. In fact, little

or nothing is said about Watson himself, except that he was "surrounded by his usual entourage of white-shirted men." The description of Burger, on the other hand, is detailed by comparison. She is "a twenty-two-year-old bride weighing ninety pounds whose husband has been sent overseas." We are told that she is wearing a uniform that is "far too big" for her, and that she is very nervous at the prospect of her confrontation with Watson.

This relatively detailed description of Burger serves to accentuate the status difference between her and Watson. In this context, the story draws heavily on traditional sex-role stereotypes. For example, Burger is not simply a woman, but a "bride," suggesting both the traditional role of homemaker, and a strong sense of naivete: she has suddenly found herself, through circumstances beyond her control, in a position to which she is ill-suited. This is confirmed and accentuated by the ill-fitting uniform, which suggests an incongruence between her and the role she is required to perform. The term "bride" thus suggests an innocence and dependence which contrasts sharply with the cynicism of the "real" corporate world. Furthermore, her weight implies lack of physical stature which, in most Western cultures at least, is associated with lack of authority. Again, this serves to throw into sharp relief the status difference between the two protagonists.

The lack of detail provided for Watson serves to enhance his status as an almost mythical character. The term "entourage," used to describe the men accompanying him, is a word normally applied to those who attend royal figures. In addition, Watson at no time speaks during the course of the story. At one point someone even speaks for him ("Don't you know who he is?"). Even at a moment where he might have spoken, he simply raises his hand to gain the attention of those around him. All of these details, although not central to the ostensible theme of the story, serve to juxtapose Watson sharply with Burger. What the listener/reader gets is not a picture of an ordinary organization member, but a figure of heroic proportions. The story thus serves to reify Watson-as-hero by demonstrating his effect on the day-to-day life of the organization.

In addition, and perhaps most importantly, the story serves to reify ideologically the organizational rule system itself. Organizational rules are humanly constructed systems of norms which provide members with an organizational grammar through which action is framed and contextualized. Rules provide direction for organizational structuration, both enabling and constraining the behavior of organization members. In contrast, the IBM story negates the human element inherent in organizational rules by stripping them of their enabling/constraining grammatical function. Lucille Burger's single-minded adherence to the rules reflects not so much a heightened sense of corporate loyalty, but rather an enforcing of rules *because they exist.*

In a sense, the story demonstrates rules as having an importance all their own, independent of the function that they perform within the organization. Placed in this context, the rule system and the process of organizing are bifurcated, existing in an almost antithetical relationship. Such an antithesis is often experienced by people who work in large, bureaucratic institutions. Frequently the overwhelming feeling is that the bureaucratic structure quite happily perpetuates itself via an elaborate and impenetrable system of rules (exemplified

by the ubiquitous triplicate forms), and continuously works against the accomplishment of the organization's ostensible goals. As a result of this reification process organizational activity "takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a 'phantom objectivity,' an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people" (Lukács, 1971, p. 83).

Finally, the narrative performs the ideological function of control by providing an example of "intellectual and moral leadership" for organization members. As Gramsci (1971) has indicated, the process of hegemony works most effectively when the world-view articulated by the ruling elite is actively taken up and pursued by subordinate groups. In the case of the IBM story, we have a striking example of a situation in which organization rules are rigorously reinforced by subordinate members. The story has all the more impact insofar as those rules are enforced from the bottom up, rather than from the top down. In this context, the story conveys the legitimacy and appropriateness of IBM's organizational structure. It suggests that employees are prepared to go to extreme lengths to protect that structure, even to the point of incurring the wrath of superiors. Commitment to the system is therefore identified and equated with its legitimacy.

The above analysis thus provides a reading of the ideological function of the IBM story, demonstrating ways in which it is possible for narrative, as a social practice, to reproduce the dominant meaning formations of a particular social structure. Does this mean, therefore, that *all* narratives produced in this context will be subject to and reproduce the dominant ideology? Hall appears to answer this question in the affirmative: "Every social practice is constituted within the interplay of meaning and representation and can itself be represented. In other words, there is no social practice outside of ideology." However, "it does not follow that because all practices are *in* ideology, or inscribed by ideology, all practices are *nothing but* ideology" (1985, p. 103).

If ideologies are conceived as "systems of representation" (Althusser, 1971; Hall, 1985), that is, as systems of meaning by which we are able to identify our relationships to the world and others, then ideology becomes an essentially discursive phenomenon. However, there is no *necessary* correspondence between discourse and ideology. All discourse does not simply reproduce the dominant ideological meaning system in which it is located. As indicated earlier, all discourse, as ideology, is potentially transformative in the sense that it can create a disjuncture between its interpretation and the world-as-experienced. All discourse, while often functioning as a "strategy of containment" (Jameson, 1981, p. 53 et passim), i.e., as a constraint on thought and action, can also function simultaneously as a means of enablement, as a vehicle through which social actors can radically transform the way they conceive of a particular social structure.

Placed in this context, concern about ideological versus nonideological discursive practices is misplaced. As Hall states above, all discourse may take place within ideology, but this does not make discourse identical *with* ideology. The key issue is not, therefore, what a nonideological narrative might be like, but

rather how a particular narrative, or cluster of narratives, might function to enable or constrain behavior within the context of certain ideological meaning formations. The degree to which a story demonstrates a transformative or emancipatory capacity suggests its relationship to dominant ideologies. Thus the analysis of the IBM story is potentially transformative in the sense that it calls into question the "received" interpretation of the story; in other words, a disjuncture is created between the organization-as-experienced and the reading of the ideological themes in the story. This alternative interpretation provides "discursive penetration" into the meaning formations that constitute the social practices of IBM, allowing the possibility for new ways of understanding those practices.

A final point relates to the choice of story. It is obvious that the analysis of a single narrative in no way constitutes an in-depth examination of the ideological meaning formations in operation at IBM. The purpose here was simply to use this story to demonstrate how such an analysis might be accomplished. Indeed, to even talk about *a* story representing *an* ideology does little justice to the complexity of social structures in general. Hall (1985, p. 104) presents the complex relationship between ideology and discourse thus:

> Ideologies do not operate through single ideas; they operate, in discursive chains, in clusters, in semantic fields, in discursive formations. As you enter an ideological field and pick out any one nodal representation or idea, you immediately trigger off a whole chain of connotative associations. Ideological representations connote – summon – one another. So a variety of ideological systems or logics are available in any social formation. The notion of *the* dominant ideology and *the* subordinated ideology is an inadequate way of representing the complex interplay of different ideological discourses and formations in any developed society.

Further research into organizational narrative must carefully explore the "clusters" of narrative that constitute the complex and interdependent meaning systems of organizational structuration. There is no simple correspondence between power, ideology, and narrative. It is too simplistic, for example, to assume that a particular narrative cluster asserts a consistent, monolithic organizational reality; such an analysis must regard the cluster in the context of other clusters, relevant organizational practices, conflicting sub-cultures, economic conditions, and so forth. The power structure in an organization is by no means unitary, and its ongoing structuring is dependent on this complex system of discursive formations that continually creates and recreates the interdependent and interlocked ideological meaning formations in an organization.

Conclusion

The everyday use of narrative in organizations is one of the means by which the power structure of an organization is produced and reproduced. In the context

of this article, power has been conceived in terms of the underlying, deep structure rule system (the "mode of rationality") which frames organizational behavior and determines appropriate and inappropriate social practices. The ideology of an organization refers to the ways in which members, as social subjects, become qualified to participate in and create the organizational reality (mode of rationality) that is represented to them. This process of representation occurs through the discursive practices of the organization.

Pateman (1980, p. 16) states that "every act reproduces or subverts a social institution . . . . If every social institution is an organization of power . . . then every act is political for it either sustains or subverts a given organization of power." Organizational narrative can therefore be viewed as political in that it can potentially both sustain and subvert the underlying logic of an organization's power structure. Narratives can reaffirm or call into question the rationality of organizational practices.

Organizational narratives thus exist as an instantiation of the deep structure power relations in an organization to the extent that they help to determine the way that organizational practices are interpreted. The narrative form is a particularly powerful means of accomplishing this in the sense that it provides organization members with an easily identifiable exemplar of organizational "reality." Contrary to most research on organizational symbolism, narratives do not simply *inform* organization members about the values, practices, and traditions to which their organization is committed. Rather, they help to *constitute* the organizational consciousness of social actors by articulating and embodying a particular reality, and subordinating or devaluing other modes of "organization rationality."

The analysis of the IBM story negates the pervasive tendency to treat all narrative forms as non-political unless they take up an overtly political topic. On the contrary, stories are narrative devices which do not exist independently of the ideological meaning formations and power relations within which they are structured. They are produced by and reproduce these relations, helping to position subjects within the historical and institutional context of the material conditions of existence. A politically informed interpretation of institutional narrative must therefore explicitly take up this duality of structure, and uncover its "strategies of containment."

Narratives are not generated in a socio-economic vacuum but are an expression of the material conditions that a particular mode of production generates. The process of narrative helps to reproduce these material conditions by articulating an internally coherent sense of itself and the world that it describes. In other words, narratives punctuate and sequence events in such a way as to privilege a certain reading of the world. They impose an order on "reality" that belies the fact that such a reading is a largely ideological construction that privileges certain interests over others. Further research must therefore take up the possibilities that a political reading of narrative provides for the analysis of organizational cultures. I have merely provided some pointers in that direction. The theoretical framework laid out here constitutes a foundation upon which narratives gathered in actual organizational settings can be analyzed.

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Talking to Children in Western Samoa

Elinor Ochs

Child Language: Where Culture Fits In

Child language has been and continues to be primarily the province of cognitive psychologists. If one is looking for a paraphrastic term for "child language," one often selects "developmental psycholinguistics." Child language has largely been seen as the assessment of how cognitive and linguistic processes influence one another. Psychologists and linguists alike have been particularly keen to examine the developmental sequencing of language to discover perceptual and conceptual preferences that may underlie and partially account for linguistic structures dominating the world's language (cf. research related to word order preferences in child and adult language: Bates 1976; Bever 1970; Bloom 1970; Bowerman 1973; Braine 1963; Radulovic 1975; Slobin 1973; for example).

Recently, language development has become a major focus of interest among sociologists and anthropologists (cf., for example, the contributions in Ervin-Tripp & Mitchell-Kernan 1977). This interest stems from several directions. There has long existed an interest in childhood and socialization, particularly among anthropologists (e.g., Hogbin 1943; Kluckhohn 1947; Mead 1928, 1930; Opler 1946; Raum 1940). But the attention on child *language* as a major focus has been, in part, a consequence of John Gumperz's and Dell Hymes's encouragement of ethnographies of communication (Gumperz & Hymes 1964, 1972; Hymes 1961, 1973, 1974). Guides motivated by this framework have stressed the importance of studying how a child is socialized through language, as a way which adult norms of language use can be uncovered (Sherzer & Darnell 1972; Slobin 1967). Another major influence on sociological and anthropological researches into child language has been from studies of ethnically

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socioeconomically diverse children in formal classroom settings (cf. Bernstein 1971; Cazden 1972; Gallimore et al. 1974; Philips 1970). The failure of our educational institutions to communicate effectively with these children has led several leading funding sources to support research into sociolinguistic dimensions of child language. (These researches have tended to focus on the older child, i.e., school age.)

The goals of what may be called "developmental sociolinguistic" studies have been twofold: On the one hand, there is the desire to integrate patterns of child language behavior with local patterns of social organization, and with members' values and beliefs (both collective and diverse). On the other hand, there is the desire to present the cognitive psychologist with these data, to point out that what has been assumed to be "normal" development is culturally restricted. There are many ways to develop language "normally," and any theory of child language or child development must consider variation in means and modes of communicating across developmental time.

My own research on Western Samoan child language is an attempt to meet both of these goals. I propose that how a Samoan child speaks – both form and content – is strongly influenced by social norms for using language in Samoan households and by certain attitudes and beliefs concerning individuality, knowledge, and human competence. My intention is to use this material to engage in a dialogue with developmental psycholinguistics; in particular, to indicate those aspects of child language development that society influences and those it does not.

For example, social norms within traditional Samoan communities influence the acquisition of *case marking* by Samoan children. Samoan children productively acquire ergative case marking late in their language development (after 4 years of age). This finding contrasts with that of Schieffelin (1979), who found that Kaluli children (Papua New Guinea) acquire ergative case marking quite early. The most important source for this difference in acquisition is sociological. For Kaluli speakers, this case marking is always used (given certain grammatical constraints). For Samoan speakers, this is not the case. Ergative case marking is sociologically *variable* within Western Samoan village communities. It rarely appears in speech of family members within households. It is more common in "speaking out" settings (i.e., between nonfamily members). This type of case marking is also more characteristic of mens' than womens' speech. This sociological distribution affects the acquisition of ergative case marking. Samoan children do not acquire this marking early largely because they are not exposed to it in their social environment, the household setting, where women and other family members are primary socializing agents.

This analysis has consequences for the study of how a child acquires morphemes. Previously, all attention has been turned to perceptual and conceptual sources for when children acquired particular morphemes (cf. Brown 1973; Slobin 1973). Researchers have not examined the spontaneous use of these morphemes in the speech of adults in the community to see if sociolinguistic variation could be an influence on the acquisition of particular morphemes.

Social Status, Cultural Beliefs, and Child-Caregiver Verbal Interaction

The present discussion will not focus on the relation between social norms and morphological aspects of child language, but rather on *the relation between social norms and the organization of verbal interactions between very young Samoan children and their caregivers.* Caregiver responses to the talk of young children will be related to Samoan norms of caregiving, in particular to behaviors associated with particular statuses of caregiver. In this discussion, I will compare Samoan norms and caregiver responses with those described in the psychological literature for Western middle-class caregivers.

In addition to discussing the effect of caregiver social status on verbal interaction, I will examine the *influence of Samoan concepts of human nature on verbal interactions between caregivers and young children.* Again, here I will compare traditional Samoan caregiver attitudes with those described by psychologists for Western middle-class caregivers.

What I do not want to do is to simply compare behaviors of these two sets of caregivers, to say that Western middle-class Anglo mothers respond in one way but Samoan mothers respond in another way. My intent is not to provide a catalogue of comparisons. Rather, it is to indicate one or two strikingly different responses to young children and to use those differences as the basis of understanding the *cultural sources* of these behaviors. We will see that in using language a particular way, caregivers are acting on certain assumptions concerning the capacities of human infants and young children, and concerning the nature of the caregiver role, the behaviors expected of those providing care. It is in the understanding of these assumptions that we can, in turn, understand the process of socialization through language. A caregiver, in using language a particular way, not only acts on assumptions, but conveys those assumptions to the child as well. The caregiver provides the child not only with linguistic input, but with cultural input as well; for example, a set of procedures for interpreting situations, for indicating the appropriate behavior expected of the child and others within and across situations.

The Data Base: Data Collection Methodology

While this study draws on ethnographies of American and Western Samoan societies (Mead 1928; Shore 1977) and on the earlier work of Samoan child language by Keith Kernan (1969), it is primarily grounded on a year's observation (1978–1979) of young children and adults within a traditional Western Samoan village. The study was carried out by Alessandro Duranti and Martha Platt, in addition to myself. The village is located on the island of Upolu, approximately 18 miles east of the capital, Apia. Our study focused on young children at the early stages of language development. We recorded through audio and video taping 6 children from 6 different households, who were between 19 and 35 months

at the onset of the study. As will be discussed below, these children participated in extended households, and 17 other children under the age of 6 were recorded as well. Recordings were made every 5 weeks, lasting 3 to 5 hours each period. Three households were recorded over 10 months, two over 9 months, and one over 7 months. A total of 128 hours of household interaction was audiotaped and 20 hours were videotaped, producing approximately 18,000 pages of transcript. Transcriptions were made by members of the households or by neighbors who were acquainted with the families in the study. Each transcriber was trained by a member of the research project. Each tape was transcribed initially by the native speaker and then checked by a researcher. In many cases, tapes and transcripts were checked a second time with those caregivers who participated in the specific interactions recorded. In addition to these materials, 6 hours of audio and 1 hour of video recording in formal classroom settings were transcribed. The present discussion will rely, however, primarily on the household interactions observed and recorded.

Social Status and Child-Caregiver Verbal Interaction

Social Distribution of Caregiving

As has been described by Mead (1928) and Kernan (1969), caregiving in traditional Samoan communities is distributed over several family members and over several generations. While mothers are the primary caregivers during the early months of life, assistance is provided by siblings of the mother, by male and female members of both the mother's and father's family (their generation and generations above), and older siblings of a young child. As several related families often reside together in a single compound, there is typically a large pool of caregivers available. Fathers are typically not available for caregiving, with the exception of occasional fondling of very young infants. They tend to spend the daylight hours outside of the house, either working in the plantation or in the capital, or, if they are titled men, meeting formally or informally with other household heads (chiefs or orator status) elsewhere in the village.

The role of the mother as caregiver changes over developmental time. During early infancy, the mother spends long periods of time with her child, but usually she is not alone; she is accompanied by some school-age child who will carry out some caregiving responsibilities. As the infant matures, the mother spends less time with the child, and a sibling caregiver is given greater caregiving responsibilities. It is often the case that several siblings cooperatively provide care for one or even several young child(ren).

As Kernan noted, as the young child becomes more competent, approaching the age of three, he/she will tend to spend less time with caregivers and more time with peers of approximately the same age. These peers form little groups, called *aukegi*. These aukegi remain strong throughout one's life cycle, and provide support for members on numerous occasions.

Caregiver Status and Comportment

High/low status comportment. In traditional Samoan communities, status is based on such attributes as relative age, generation, whether or not one is titled (a chief or orator), rank of title (chief over orator, high over low chiefs), rank in church organization (e.g., pastor), whether one has a government position, and its rank. Although there are specific behaviors expected of particular positions in the village, there are nonetheless certain characteristic manners that all those of relatively high status display. Two of these high status characteristics are of interest in this discussion: (1) low activity, and (2) minimal awareness of and involvement in activities of others in the immediate environment.

Low activity. Relative status is highly contextbound (Shore 1977). One assesses one's rank with respect to others who are co-present. Thus, for example, an orator will have higher rank than untitled men who may be present, but will have lower rank than a co-present chief. A chief who is of a higher generation or rank will have higher status than a younger or lower ranking chief. A host chief will take on the demeanor of a lower ranking person in the presence of his guest. Titled persons of all ranks will assume a lower status with respect to the leader of the church to which they belong (e.g., pastor, priest).

Once rank has been calculated, certain behaviors follow. One of the most salient is that the person of higher rank is expected to exert very little physical energy, to be relatively inactive (Shore 1977). For example, within a house, higher status persons tend to remain stationary. They sit on a mat and items are brought to them by lower status persons. In formal meetings, orators and chiefs do not move. If items (e.g., food in payment of a fine) are to be distributed, an untitled person or persons will carry out this task, while the titled members remain seated. In a family household, either an untitled woman or a child will serve food and fetch other items such as cigarettes for the titled household head. If a relatively high status person must go outside his/her house, he or she tends to move in the least unencumbered manner possible. For example, one usually observes high status persons walking with their hands free from objects, with the exception of an umbrella for protection from sun or rain. Younger, untitled persons will be asked to carry needed items to the destination of the higher status person. Actual movement itself is at a slow pace in the case of high status persons.

Minimal awareness and involvement. Additionally, high status persons tend not to evidence an awareness of or interest in the activities of lower status persons immediately around them. In Samoan houses there are traditionally no outside walls and no interior walls. Many different activities take place in the same vicinity and certainly within eyesight of many residents. Nonetheless, those of relatively high status will often behave as if they are unaware of these activities as if they were not in fact "present" while these activities are being performed. Thus, for example, if two women start arguing or a fight begins between two young men or a young child begins to fret, the high status party will act in such a way as to not acknowledge these situations, particularly in their initiation. The high status person will at first ignore what is happening, carrying on whatever [illegible] engaged in doing. If there is a situation to be resolved, I

higher status party lets others attempt to pursue this process. If no one else is present or if others cannot resolve the situation, the higher status person will then involve him- or herself in the event. Typically, in the latter case, a lower status villager or family member will report (*faitala*) to the superior the nature of the situation. Following this, the higher status party may direct the other to carry out some decision or in more serious cases will convey the decision directly to those involved. In the most serious cases, the high status person may find it necessary to move to the location of the activity in order to resolve the problem at hand. The persons involved would then likely be negatively sanctioned on an official level.

Status in caregiving. These two behavioral parameters distinguish statuses among caregivers within a household. We have mentioned that there is a wide pool of caregivers typically available within an extended family. These caregivers are ranked primarily in terms of age and generation. Where there is more than one caregiver present, the older caregiver occupies the higher or highest status. Thus, for example, if a mother and an older sibling of the young child are providing care, it is the mother who is given this status. If a 12-year-old and a 6-year-old sibling are providing care, it is the 12-year-old who assumes this status, and so on. Once again, status is determined in terms of who else is present who can take on caregiving responsibilities.

Just as with other persons of higher rank, "higher" level caregivers tend not (or try not) to move. If there is a lower status caregiver present, the higher status caregiver will try to remain seated on a mat, while the other fulfills various tasks requiring physical movement. This results in a distribution of caregiving labor in which the more active care is in the hands of the lower ranking personnel and the less active care is provided by the higher ranking person. The crucial distinction concerns the bounds of the seating mat. If at all possible, the higher ranking caregiver tries not to remove herself/himself from the mat. Captured on one of the videotapes is a scene in which a mother wishes to have a piece of wet clothing taken away from the immediate area but no assistance is available. She resolves this situation by taking a whisk broom lying beside her and using the broom to push the item a distance away. This involved some movement, in particular the raising of her bottom off of the mat, but at all times the woman kept her knees touching the mat, thus retaining a sitting-like position. Young caregivers, if present, are relied upon to be mobile. They are primarily the ones to change soiled clothes, wash, and provide food for the child. They also carry young infants to their mothers for breastfeeding and/or cuddling until the infant has learned to ambulate itself and is able to crawl directly to the mother. If a younger caregiver is present, higher status caregivers (e.g., mothers) will also strive not to involve themselves directly with the ongoing interactions among younger persons in the immediate surroundings or with spontaneous actions of a younger child. If, for example, an argument takes place, the higher status caregiver (e.g., mother) will at first leave it to the peers themselves to resolve it, and if it escalates, to an older sibling caregiver to handle. If it is unresolvable through these means, one or the other of the children will turn to the higher status caregiver and appeal to her to take some action. Another case of this reluctance to involve oneself

concerns attending to the actions of small children, actions which have not been motivated by some directive from the higher status caregiver. Ideally, if lower status caregivers are present, they will be the ones to watch that a young infant will not fall over the edge of the house or eat stones or touch a burning pot.

Verbal Interaction between Child and Caregiver

The social distribution of care is not only fascinating in its own right; it is directly relevant to understanding the organization of conversation in which young children are participants. Expectations that the young child comes to have concerning the nonverbal behaviors of different caregivers will be matched by expectations concerning the verbal behaviors of these household members.

To see what these expectations are, let us focus on one particular type of recurrent verbal sequence. In this sequence, the child expresses verbally that she/he is distressed and appeals to a high status caregiver to satisfy her/his needs. Very often these interactions proceed as follows: Child complains to mother, mother either ignores complaint or turns to a younger caregiver present to satisfy the child, and the younger caregiver proceeds to act on that directive. For example, in the following interaction, a young girl, Pesio, aged 2; 4 months, whines for a piece of sugarcane:

(1)

Pesio	*Others*
[whining to mother, Akoa]	
U ga la	
tns/ asp that	
ma ma ma ma ga/	
(*?*) *that/*	
	?: E, (?) [to P?]
	Hey! (?)
	Akoa: Lea ia ia [to sibling]
	Now here here
	amai,
	bring,
	ia amai
	here bring [*sugarcane*]
	ke au laga
	to me because
	kagi kama
	cries child
	lea//(?).
	this//(?).
	(*Now bring here, bring it to me because this child cries.*)

In this interaction, Pesio is in effect begging for sugarcane. Her mother does not respond to Pesio directly but rather turns to a sibling of Pesio, approximately 6 years old, and directs the sibling to bring the food item to the mother h


A more elaborate sequence in which the mother initially ignores the child is evident in the next example. Here Pesio, in the same recording session, has urinated in her pants. She turns to her mother, Akoa, sitting next to her to ask her for assistance:

(2)

Pesio	*Others*
Koa/	
Akoa/	
di*/ (*=si'i)	
carry (me)/	
pe*/ (*=se)	
now/	
mo pa pi igo/	
(?) burst pee(?)/	
maua// pi /	Akoa: // E lē [to Elenoa]
got //pee/	*tns/asp not*
	maua ni
	have any
papa pī/	vao faapea//nei
burst pee/	*grass like here*
	i ō
	over there
	a Elenoa?
	right Elinor?
	(America doesn't have grass like here, right Elinor?)
	Elenoa: Ummm? [to Akoa]
ua pa// pī/	Akoa// E leai se [to Elenoa]
tns/asp burst pee/	*tns/asp not any*
	vao faapea
	grass like here
	i ō
	over there.
	(There isn't any grass like here over there.)
	[Akoa & Elenoa talk for 25 more turns.]
[whining to Akoa]	
pe* pa pi (*se)	
now burst pee/	
[whining to Akoa]	
a pi li /	
(?) pee here/	Akoa: kago avaese* [to sibling]
	touch takeaway
	le pī! (*ave ese)
	the pee
	(Get and remove the pee!)

In this example, the mother chooses to ignore Pesio's predicament initially. Rather, she turns to me and strikes up a new topic. It is only after repeated appeals by Pesio and a total of twenty-eight turns exchanged between Akoa and myself that Akoa eventually acknowledges the situation at hand. Notice that this behavior is entirely in keeping with that described of high status persons generally in traditional Samoan social life. Also, as in example (1), the mother does not directly respond to the child, but turns rather irritatedly to a 16-year-old sibling who is present, directing her to alleviate the distress of Pesio.

The child-caregiver verbal interaction in such sequences can be represented as follows:



If the child secures the attention of the high status caregiver, the sequence moves from child to high caregiver to low caregiver to child (ABCA sequence).

Samoan and Anglo Child-Caregiver Verbal Interactions

The young Samoan child learns to participate in verbal interactions with adults and older siblings in ways that are strikingly different from those described of middle-class Anglo children. The developmental literature has provided numerous generalizations concerning the role of the caregiver in the development of communicative abilities of the child. All of this literature dwells on one child interacting with one other party, typically the mother. All of this literature treats two-party interaction as the mechanism through which verbal and nonverbal conventions are transmitted. The dialogue is the endpoint of communicative competence and it is given a detailed developmental history. Initially, there is the two-party exchange of "turns" between mother and child, for example mother talks-child breastfeeds (Jaffe & Feldstein 1970), child smiles-mother smiles (Stern 1974, 1977), child gestures-mother gives verbal response (Trevarthen 1977). The development of communication is seen as the gradual employment of conventional symbols (e.g., language) and conventional procedures for engaging in dialogic interaction.

There is a question as to whether or not this literature represents most middle-class Anglo family interaction. Putting this aside, we can see that *the assumptions about "normal" caregiver-child interaction (verbal and nonverbal) simply do not represent the Samoan child's social life.* The literature describes situations over developmental time in which child exhibits some behavior or expresses some state or idea and the caregiver responds directly back to the child (approving, disapproving

querying, making topic-relevant remark, shifting topic, etc.). This interaction produces dyadic exchanges of the ABABAB . . . type. While we do not want to say that young Samoan children and their caregivers do not engage in this type of verbal/nonverbal interaction, it is simply not the case that this type of interaction is the *primary* one in which the Samoan child is expected to participate. Whereas middle-class European households very often contain one child interacting with one caregiver, traditional Samoan households rarely have so few family members co-present. The spatial organization of family households together in a single compound, the high number of children per family (average number: six), the absence of interior walls that allow members to interact in isolation or small groups – all these factors create a more populated social environment for the Samoan child. Samoan children learn to interact with several family members, not just one, very early in their lives. They learn specific norms concerning verbal overtures to caregivers and appropriate caregiver responses. Unlike the middle-class Anglo child described so often in the literature, the Samoan child does not come to expect a direct response to most of his/her overtures, rather; usually the overture will be socially redirected and the response assigned to the appropriate family member.

Samoan Epistemology and Caregiver Language: Why Samoan Caregivers do not "Expand" Children's Utterances

What is an "Expansion"?

One of the most striking characteristics of Samoan caregiver language (both that of sibling and adult caregivers, high- and low-status caregivers) is the *absence of expansions*. It is striking in that this feature has been taken as a key marker of language addressed to young children (cf. Brown et al. 1973; Cazden 1965; Cross 1977; Newport 1976; Snow 1972). An expansion is an utterance of a caregiver that follows an utterance (or a series of utterances) of a child in which the child's utterance (or utterance series) is recouched in more appropriate, that is, adult, grammatical form. Examples of expansions are:

(3)

Child (Brenda)	*Mother*
lei	
fae	Hm?
(Brenda is looking at electric fan.)	
fae	bathroom?
fani	
fae	Fan! Yeah.
khu	
	Cool, yeah. Fan makes you cool.

(Scollon 1976:108)

(4)

Mother (+ context)	*Child (Allison)*
(A tries to turn top on jar in M's hand.)	
	Mama/Mama/ə wídèt/
Open it up?	
	up/
Open it? O.K.	
(M opens it; tries to get stick.)	
	(Bloom 1973:170)

In (3), the mother produces several expansions: She repeats Brenda's utterances in their correct phonological form, "fan" and "cool." She then takes the series of utterances produced by Brenda and rephrases them in the single utterance "Fan makes you cool." In (4), Allison's mother rephrases Allison's utterances with a questioning intonation.

This description of an expansion is *formal.* To understand what an expansion is, however, we must consider its *functions* in verbal interactions between young children and caregivers. In considering its function, most child language research has concentrated on its communicative and linguistic functions. The literature entertains a discussion as to the "pedagogical" use and effect of such expansions on the learning of language. Cazden (1965) as well as Newport et al. (1977) argue that such responses, compared with other topic-relevant responses, are not more language-facilitating. Brown (1977) and Cross (1977) argue that such expansions serve as communication checks and facilitate the exchange of information between caregiver and child. Caregivers use expansions as a means of assessing whether or not they have correctly understood what a child is expressing.

This explanation, however, does not shed light on why one society would make use of expansions and another not. It does not shed light, because it is not a full explanation of an expansion. In using expansions, caregivers within a society are doing more than verifying the communication. They are, through language, responding to situations in a culturally appropriate manner. They respond in this way because of their own enculturation, and, again through language, they are transmitting this cultural knowledge to the child or children with whom they are interacting.

Cultural Assumptions and Procedures Underlying Expansions

When a middle-class Anglo caregiver expands the utterance or utterances of a child, she or he is:

1. assuming or acting as if the child has performed an *intentional* social act, i.e., as if the child directs his action towards a social goal;
2. providing an interpretation of an *unclear* intention (i.e., making a hypothesis); and
3. adopting, in part, the perspective of the child (*decentering*), so that the child's intent may be assessed; in so doing, the caregiver adjusts to the child's *egocentrism.* (cf. Braunwald 1977).

These dimensions reflect a particular set of cultural values and beliefs. Western Samoan caregivers living in traditional villages do not share these values and beliefs; thus, they do not respond to infants and young children in the same way as middle-class Western caregivers do. Let us consider each of these dimensions separately and provide more detailed differences in the two cultural systems.

Assumptions concerning a child's capacity to act intentionally and socially. One of the most distinctive characteristics of middle-class Anglo caregivers is their willingness to engage in communicative exchanges with the smallest of infants. Even in the first few days of life, these caregivers have been observed holding the infant in a face-to-face position (vis-à-vis the caregiver) and verbally and nonverbally responding to the infant. In these days and in the coming months, the caregiver acts as if the young child has the capacity to act intentionally, in a directed, goal-oriented manner (Shorter 1978). Nonverbal behaviors and vocalizations are treated as if they were motivated, purposeful. A smile, a vocalization is treated as a greeting (Stern 1977), arm gestures are treated as reaches, rejections, attention-getting devices (Bates et al. 1979; Stern 1977; Trevarthen 1979). Long before the child has actually produced its first word, it is treated as if it in fact does have something to "say." This perspective is brilliantly captured in the observations of Trevarthen and his colleagues of British mothers with their infants:

> As a rule, prespeech with gesture is watched and replied to by exclamations of pleasure or surprise like "Oh, my my!", "Good heavens!", "Oh, what a big smile!", "Ha! That's a big one!" (meaning a story), questioning replies like, "Are you telling me a story?", "Oh really?", or even agreement by nodding "Yes" or saying "I'm sure you're right".... A mother evidently perceives her baby to be a person like herself. Mothers interpret baby behavior as not only intended to be communicative, but as verbal and meaningful. (Trevarthen 1979: 340)

When young children actually begin producing words, this set of assumptions by the caregiver continues. The caregiver, typically the mother, considers the young child to be expressing somewhat imperfectly a communicative intention. When the caregiver rephrases the child's utterance as an expansion, the caregiver is indicating to the child just what she (or he) takes that intention to be.

This assumption about the capacity of infants and young children to control and direct their behaviors to social ends is not shared by traditional Western Samoan adult and sibling caregivers. While infants and caregivers have considerable physical and social contact with one another, they do not engage in the communicative-like interactions to the extent described by Trevarthen and others. Infants are sung to and cooed over to distract them from their hunger or to put them asleep or simply to amuse them; they are not "greeted" (Stern 1974, 1977) nor are their vocalizations or gestures typically treated as social acts.

To understand these differences in Anglo and traditional Samoan caregiving, it is useful to turn to Samoan concepts of human nature in general and the nature of children in particular. Here I will be drawing on the ethnographic

observations of Mead (1928) and Shore (1977), as well as on primary observations of the members of our research group.

From a Samoan perspective, people have little control over their actions. Persons are not conceptualized as integrated beings; they do not have a central control mechanism that organizes and directs human actions and states. Bodily actions and functions are associated with particular body parts and not with a focal governing source. Thus, Samoans tend to say "Legs walk" (*ua savali vae*. "The hand writes" (*ua kusi le lima*), "The head (is) dizzy" (*ua niniva le ulu*, rather than "I/you/he, etc., walks, writes, (is) dizzy." Rather than persons generating states of being, these states are often seen as situationally or externally caused. The term for "sad" is *fa' anoanoa*, which literally means "makes sad." Members are seen as being in or falling into certain states. The term *musu* could be translated as "to refuse" but the usual Samoan interpretation is that of "being in an obdurate or unwilling state." Similarly, the terms *fia 'ai* and *fia inu* could be translated as "want eat" and "want drink," but are typically interpreted as the states of being "hungry" and "thirsty." There is no vocabulary item for "individual," for "personality," for "self." Syntactically, the de-emphasis on individual, centralized control is manifest in the fact that there is no true reflexive construction in the language (although a forced paraphrasing is possible). Thus, Samoans do not naturally produce a construction such as "He cut himself"; rather, one would tend to associate the cutting or the state of being cut or wounded with the specific body part affected, as in *ua lavea le lima* ("The hand is cut/wounded.").

All of these linguistic facts suggest a concept of person that is fragmented and not strongly in control of actions and states. This concept is further supported by two basic notions in traditional life – the notion of *amio* (natural behavior) and *aga* (socially appropriate conduct). These two concepts have been discussed in depth in a brilliant analysis by Shore (1977). While amio can sometimes refer to "good" ways of behaving, it is most often used to refer to natural drives that lead persons to act in socially destructive ways. One's amio is a strong force and can dominate a person in particular situations. For example, one's amio is likely to emerge when one drinks too much beer. In a state of drunkenness, what little control one has diminishes and natural impulses lead one to cause trouble (*misi*), for example, to fight or say angry words.

When amio leads to socially offensive behaviors, the actor is held responsible in the sense that some form of negative sanction will be imposed. However, the action itself will not be seen as an outcome of the actor's own control or direction (a product of his *intention*). Intention is not an issue. *Only the social consequences of the action are at issue.* It is one's amio rather than one's own directed thinking that is the source of the violation.

When the social group imposes a negative sanction, the sanction is seen as a means of controlling the emergence of such behaviors. Members would not be able to control their amio, it is felt, without the vigilance of the group. Indeed, the group not only assists in containing amio, it assists in the maintenance of socially appropriate conduct, what is known as *aga* (cf. Shore 1977). Publicly acceptable behavior is enforced in casual and noncasual contexts through public

pressure, expectation, and demands. The process of socialization is seen as the transmission of aga from caregiver to child.

How do these concepts of human capacity relate to Samoan childhood and the nature of caregiver–child interaction in traditional settings? While adults are considered to have little control in suppressing amio and maintaining aga, children are considered to have even less control. Infants and toddlers are initially seen as incapable of responding to social instruction and sanctions. Mead (1928) describes the attitude of helplessness that sibling caregivers express in curtailing the behaviors of their charges. Very young children are felt to resist control and be highly independent. From a Western point of view, these young children appear to be indulged by other members of their social environment, allowed to carry out behaviors that otherwise (in the case of the older member) would be severely sanctioned.

From the Samoan point of view, the small child is heavily under the influence of amio. Infants and small children carry out such outrageous behaviors as running and shouting during a church service or formal chiefly council meeting, throwing stones at caregivers, hitting siblings and the like, because they are incapable of displaying aga and of suppressing amio. As discussed by Shore (1977), the term for "bad." *leaga*, literally means "without aga." And this term, leaga, is used frequently to characterize the actions of young children.

Nowhere is this association of young children and amio-generated behavior more explicit than in the Samoan child's first word. Every mother interviewed within our study told us with some embarrassment that the first word of each of their children was the same – *tae*, meaning "shit." Its first use is not considered strictly referential, but rather as a curse or malediction. It is understood as implying *'Ai tae*, "Eat Shit!" This term and social act is overtly antisocial and would be negatively sanctioned if used by socially responsible members in public settings. When we asked why young children produced tae as their very first Samoan word, we were told that very young children *palauvale* ("use bad or indecent language") or *ulavale* ("make a nuisance of oneself, make trouble") (Milner 1966). In other words, this is the nature of children.

The circularity of this argument is evident. Children are at the mercy of amio because they have no aga. They have no aga, because they are not capable of responding positively to social instruction by others and to negative sanctions imposed by others. They are incapable, because, well, they are without aga and guided by strong, antisocial impulses.

What is the relevance of this epistemology to the use of expansions? Expansions are interpretations of children's intentions and reflect middle-class Anglo caregivers' assumptions that children can and do control and guide their actions towards some goal. Further, they manifest middle-class caregivers' perceptions of very small children as *social* persons. This group of caregivers acts as if a young child's utterance is socially directed and requires some response or acknowledgement (i.e., that the child is eliciting acknowledgement). In many cases, the young child may not actually be directing his/her utterance towards another person; the caregiver simply transforms it into a social act (Keenan & Schieffelin 1976).

As described above, traditional Samoan caregivers do not share all of these assumptions. Infants and very young children are generally not treated (1) as socially responsive beings (cooperative); and (2) as being in control of their actions. The actions and vocalizations of infants are treated more as natural reflexes of physiological states (e.g., hunger, discomfort, pleasure) than as intentional, spontaneous acts. The actions and utterances of toddler-age children are often treated as unalterable through social response (resistant). These assumptions would not lead adult and sibling caregivers to repeat what a young child has spontaneously expressed in the form of an expansion.

Expansions as hypotheses. Let us consider now another dimension of the use of expansions in verbal interactions between caregivers and young children. This dimension concerns the expansion as an *act of interpretation* itself. One of the things we want to distinguish is the difference between an expansion and other responses to children's verbal and nonverbal behaviors. First, we want to distinguish between expansions, and caregiver responses that otherwise address the child's utterance in a topic-relevant manner – agreements, disagreements, extensions of topic, and so on. The major difference between these two types of response is that the latter presupposes the communicative intent of the child's utterance, whereas the expansion usually does not. When a caregiver agrees, disagrees, and the like, she or he takes for granted what the child has communicated. When a caregiver provides an expansion, this is usually not the case. The expansion as a resaying is a separate assertion. The content is not presupposed; rather its content may be evaluated as accurate or inaccurate. The caregiver, in producing an expansion, takes the child's utterance(s) as a separate focus in itself.

But expansions can be more than "re-assertions." They can be *hypotheses* concerning the nature of the child's communicative intent and the utterance that expresses that intent. Expansions are typically produced by caregivers when the child's verbal act is *unclear* (cf. Cross 1977). They express the caregiver's interpretation or hypothesis concerning what the child is doing and/or saying. For example, in example (3), the caregiver takes into consideration the series of prior utterances produced by Brenda and interprets them as "Fan makes you cool." In example (4), the caregiver makes a guess that Allison is trying to say "Open it up." The extent to which a caregiver is certain of an interpretation is often reflected prosodically. Uncertainty may be expressed through the use of rising intonation in producing the expansion, as in example (4). In such cases the caregiver leaves the interpretation open for the child to verify. Allison, in example (4) appears to carry out this task in her partial repetition of the expansion.

It is this use of the expansion as a guess or an hypothesis that is culturally grounded and culturally variable. Caregivers offer tentative, partially certain accounts, because these acts are part and parcel of what is expected of members of their community. Competence within their cultural system involves first, acknowledging certain situations as ambiguous or not immediately clear and second, responding to these situations with conjectures about what is taking place. This knowledge certainly underlies cultural concepts of scientific enterprise. It also underlies literary criticism (i.e., "What is the author telling us?"). And as well, all sorts of mundane situations are acknowledged as problems

and provoke guesses: a troubled look on the face of a friend, the contents of a sauce tasted in a restaurant, the nature of a particular odor, the organization of a miniature golf course, the meaning of certain elevator buttons, and so on. It is only by placing expansions in a network of other cultural procedures can we begin to understand what caregivers are doing and why. Expansions are not universally natural; they are natural relative to particular cultural expectations. In middleclass American society, it is "natural" to acknowledge unclarity and make conjectures. After all, it is a fundamental aspect of gossip in this society.

But gossip is not the same in all societies. Not all societies build on conjecture as a basis of this genre of activity. In traditional Western Samoan communities, gossip (*fa:tala*) is based primarily on witnessed reports. Gossipers usually speak of what they or others have actually seen. Participants may argue about the report where there are conflicting claims. This does not mean, however, that the claims are understood as conjectures. Rather, the arguments mainly centered around whether or not the "witness" was telling the truth or lying, that is, whether the witness is reporting what he/she actually knows to be the case. In other words, it is assumed that the witness has certain knowledge, but there is an issue as to whether his/her accounting is valid.

Members of traditional Samoan communities tend to assume they know what is happening in a particular situation, or they assume they do not know at all what is happening. When they assume they do know, they will respond in some relevant manner. When they assume they do not know, typically they themselves will not conjecture. Caregivers in traditional Western Samoan communities do not typically conjecture what a child's unclear utterance could be expressing. If they find the child's utterance intelligible, they will respond to it in one of the ways described earlier in this paper (cf. *Verbal interaction between child and caregiver* section). If the child's utterance is not intelligible, the caregiver will not usually attempt a possible interpretation.

Caregivers in the two communities under consideration here actually "see" unclear utterances differently. The middle-class Anglo caregiver sees such an utterance as an imperfect version of adult speech; the expansion is a more perfect rendition of the utterance. The Samoan caregiver, on the other hand, sees the unclear utterance as nothing like adult language. The child speaking unclearly will sometimes be compared to an animal, a nonhuman. Or, more frequently, such utterances will be regarded as *not Samoan language.* A typical response to "unintelligibility" is to refer to the child as having *guku Saiga* ("Chinese mouth"). In other words, the child is not speaking Samoan as an adult native would speak but is speaking like a Chinese speaker. [It is unclear to me whether this means "like a Chinese speaks Samoan" or "like a Chinese speaks Chinese." In both cases, the language is a subject of ridicule and both are considered unintelligible.] The association of an unclear language with speaking a foreign language is explicit in Samoan. There is a single Samoan word, *nanu* which means both to "mispronounce" and to "speak a foreign language (usually English)" (Milner 1966).

Expansions and perspective-taking. The reluctance to make guesses on the part of traditional Samoan caregivers and the apparent acceptance to do so on the part of middle-class Anglo caregivers is a basic cultural difference. This difference

in caregiver response leads young Samoan children to have different expectations from middle-class Anglo children concerning how communication is achieved. Middle-class Anglo children will come to expect the caregiver to assist them in their communicative attempts; Samoan children in traditional setting do not share this expectation. If they are to communicate, they will have to depend more on their own skills.

This leads us to another basic distinction between Samoan caregivers and those so often described in the developmental literature. Part of the process of interpreting the child's utterance (i.e., producing expansions) involves the caregiver adopting the perspective of the child. The caregiver tries to assess what the child is expressing by entering the child's world. The caregiver assesses what the child is presently doing, what the child has been doing, how the child used this word or utterance in previous situations and so on. In other words, the interpretation of an unclear child's utterance can require a *decentering* on the part of the caregiver (Braunwald 1977).

The many observations of caregiver–child interaction indicate that caregiver decentering is highly frequent in middle-class Anglo households. The adoption of the child's perspective is one of several adaptations to a perceived incapacity of the child – his inability to perceive and produce what is needed to interact successfully with another individual. In other words, the caregiver's decentrism is an adaptation to (what the caregiver perceives as) the child's egocentrism. Braunwald and Brislin (in press) point out that certain caregivers use finely tuned interpretative procedures to determine the intention of the child. Over time they come to "learn" the child's world and code and this becomes part of the caregiver's communicative repertoire:

> It is in this sense that the listener's knowledge can be described as analogous to bilingualism and biculturalism. In fact, the listener responds as if utterances such as these were prompts or signals that activate a search through a store of child-specific information that might be relevant to the context. For instance, Cheryl's mother knows from previous experience that her daughter prefers soda pop to water and that "wawa" can refer to water, soda pop, and many other liquids. She exchanges the liquids in the cups, and Cheryl is satisfied . . . . (The child's) language may be neither explicit nor conventional, and yet succeed as communication so long as it is directed to listeners who can compensate for these inadequacies (10).

In traditional Samoan life, on the other hand, high status persons, including caregivers, are not expected to adjust their perspective to that of a lower status (e.g., younger) person. Indeed, if any decentering is to be done, it is the lower status participant in a situation who is to carry out this task. For example, it is the responsibility of lower ranking titled persons in a council meeting to lay out the topic(s) of discussion for the higher ranking titled persons. Untitled persons, including children, are normally messengers and expected to relay crucial information from one household to another. The form of decentering expected of them involves not

only meeting informational needs of their audiences but the social/appropriateness needs as well. They are expected to use particular registers of Samoan appropriate to topic and addressee, for example, use of respect vocabulary appropriate to titled persons and/or formal situations. In contrast, egocentrism is a privilege; it is permitted of those of high status rather than of those with low status. For example, orators are allowed to say things that are not well understood by others; they may even be praised for this behavior (Shore 1977). If we extend egocentrism to include talk about oneself, we can align this attribute with status as well. Higher ranking persons are more likely to express their personal opinions and reactions than are lower ranking persons. This is witnessed in formal village council meetings (Duranti 1979), where the highest ranking titled persons can articulate their own perspectives, whereas lower ranking persons are expected to express traditional (collective) positions and values.

The relative absence of expansions in the speech of Samoan adult and sibling caregivers is related to these cultural attitudes concerning decentering. In traditional Samoan households, a caregiver is not expected to take the perspective of a young child, particularly when the child has spontaneously produced an utterance. The caregiver is not expected to fill in the gaps and assist the communication by relying on the idiosyncratic background of the child. As noted earlier, caregivers tend to ignore egocentric articulation, considering it as not part of the language. This attitude holds less in early infancy, where caregivers take the perspective of the infant to the extent that the infant's physiological needs are acknowledged. Once the infant passes into toddlerhood and single word utterances are expressed, however, this orientation diminishes. At this point, the process of conscious social instruction begins in earnest. This instruction consists largely of making the young child aware of those around him/her. As the child begins to produce single words and sometimes even before, the child is instructed to notice others passing on the road or sitting in the house. One of the earliest topics of instruction concerns the names of family members. Children are asked to imitate the caregiver, who pronounces each name separately, or to independently supply the name, as in example (5) below:

(5) Kalavini, 1;10 months
(A few weeks beforehand, K's mother, Sauiluma, gave birth to a baby girl, Rossana. K, his mother, his father (Fa'atauoloa), and his new sister are clustered around the steps to their house. S and F ask K to say the name of his sister):

Kalavini	*Others*
	F: O ai le igoa. *prt who art name* (*What is the name?*)
Sana/ Losana/	
	?: (*Kalavini*).
( ) Sana?	
	S: O ai le igoa? *prt who art name*

pepe/
baby

S: O ai le igoa?
prt who art name
(*What is the name?*)

Rozana/
Lo//sana/

S: //(?)
S: ia lelei.
prt good
(*Yes, good.*)
F: O ai lesi igoa
prt who other name
le teine?
art girl
(*What is the other name of the girl?*)
[*soft*]

e a /
huh?

F: O ai le igoa
prt who art name
le keige)
art girl
(*What is the name of the girl?*)

pepe/
baby

S: le igoa?
art name
(*The name?*)
F: Igoa?
(*Name?*)

RO( ) sana/
[*turns to his cousin, Valasi.*]
Vaā si/
Valasi!
Valasi/
Valasi!

V: Ho/
Mmm

Ro*sana/*

S: [*laughs*]

Valasi!/
Valasi!/
Rosana/

F: Sh. (?).
[Calls to someone]

[turns to F.]
Toloa/
Fa'atauoloa!
Rosana/

F: O ai?
prt who
(Who?)

Rosana/

F: Rosana.

Rosana/

F: Losa- Rosana/

Rosana/

F: Ro-,

a Ro:sana/
Lo:*sana/*
[turns to Alesana]
Asana/
Alesana!
Vaesaga/
Alesana!
[kissing Rosana]
o/o/ o/o/
Oh!Oh! Oh!Oh!

[pause]
S: Ua lava.
tns/asp enough
(Enough.)

Often the names are embedded in a speech act other than reference itself. For example, the child is asked to *vala'au* ("call out") for a particular person. This act may be directed when a person is passing by. An example of elicited imitation of such a summons is illustrated in (6) below:

(6) Pesio, 2;3 months
Pesio, her peer group including Maselino 3;4, and Maselino's mother, Iuliana, are in the house. They see Alesana [researcher-member of research project] in front of the trade store across the street. Iuliana directs the children to notice Alesana.)

Pesio | *Others*

Iuliana: Va'ai Alesana.
Look (at) Alesana!

a?/
Huh?

Iuliana: ┌Alesana.
Maselino: └Alesaga/

ai Alesaga/
Look (at) Alesana

Iuliana: Vala'au Alesana
Call (to) Alesana.

[very high, loud]
SAGA!/
Alesana!

[high, soft]
Iuliana: Mālō.
(Greeting)

[loud]
ALŌ!/
(Greeting)

Iuliana: (Fai) o Elegoa lea.
(Say) prt Elenoa here.
(Say "Elenoa [is] here.")

Sego lea/
Elenoa here
(Elenoa [is] here.)

Caregivers will also instruct the child to imitate questions about others: Where is so-and-so? What is he doing? How is he feeling? and so on. These questions are addressed to others in the course of ongoing social interaction. The caregiver prompts the child in the production of socially appropriate conversational contributions. The major socialization message is that the child is not to draw attention to himself/herself (not to talk about ego) but rather to focus on properties and actions of others.

We should emphasize here that the process of learning to decenter is accomplished not only through topic biases (talk about others) on the part of Samoan caregivers. *It is accomplished through the process of elicited imitation itself.* In demanding a repetition, the caregiver is directing the child's attention to what the caregiver is expressing. To accomplish the imitation, the child must engage in a rudimentary form of decentering. *Elicited imitation in at least one way is the reverse process of caregiver expansion.* In expanding, the caregiver attempts to repeat what the child has expressed. In elicited imitation, the child attempts to repeat what the caregiver has expressed. In expansions, the caregiver engages in some degree of decentering. In imitations, the child engages in limited decentering. We find in traditional Samoan society, a heavy reliance on the latter and minimization of the former.

Expansion as a cultural procedure: Summary. In the preceding pages, several points have been considered. The most important thesis put forward is that the expansion is best understood as a cultural procedure rather than strictly as a linguistic procedure. Each time that a caregiver uses an expansion, he or she is demonstrating to the child how a particular situation is to be handled. The child comes to learn that certain situations are unclear, not fully understandable. He learns that certain situations may have several possible interpretations or meanings. An expansion expresses *one* such possible interpretation. Further, the child comes to learn that interpretation may be a trial and error process, involving one's conversational partner. When a caregiver expresses an expansion with a rising intonation, he or she is involving the child in just this process. The caregiver socializes the child into *negotiating* meanings of utterances.

Another point discussed in some detail is that in using expansions, the caregiver focuses the interaction on speakers' or actors' *intentions.* The process of interpretation involves assessment of the intention behind the verbal or nonverbal behavior. In terms of transmission of culture, the caregiver is demonstrating that intentions are important. They are important not only in interpreting meanings but in judging behavior as well. For Anglo-American culture, it is important to know if a behavior was intentional or unintentional, and if intentional, the extent to which the intention was formulated before the behavior was carried out. The importance of intentionality in this culture is reflected in how sanctions are applied. If a socially disapproved

behavior is assessed as unintentional, minimal (if any) sanctions are imposed. If a behavior is consciously carried out, more severe sanctions are brought to bear. Thus, if a child breaks a valued object accidentally, a caregiver is likely to admonish him/her lightly or not at all. If the child breaks the object "on purpose," then the caregiver will likely increase the severity of the negative sanction. This set of responses by the caregiver is part of a larger set of responses that can be found across different situations in American society, for example, legal litigation.

The concern with intentionality is not matched in traditional Samoan society. In assessing a behavior, it is far less likely that a Samoan caregiver (or other member of the society) will consider the intention behind the behavior. If a child breaks a valued object, it is irrelevant whether he/she did so inadvertently or consciously. What counts is the *consequences* of the behavior. In the case of the valued object, the consequence is loss of this object, and the child will be admonished on this basis. In formal court proceedings within the village, socially disapproved acts are discussed and assessed, but the talk does not attend to the actor's motives or awareness of what took place. Fines will be imposed on the basis of injury caused to other members of the community.

A third point of importance concerns ways in which *expansions reflect and express the social status of child and caregiver.* Throughout this discussion, we have emphasized that major differences exist in Samoan and middle-class Anglo-American concepts of the child. The latter treat the young child as if he were capable of participating in conversation and willing to cooperate in sustaining the social interaction. The Samoan traditional view of the young child sees him as socially uncooperative, resistant to appropriate social norms for engaging in interaction. Social status can be assessed as well in terms of control of intentionality. We have seen that middle-class Anglo-American caregivers let their children assume quite a bit of this control. Relative to other responses, the expansion provides greater opportunities for the child to shape the way in which his utterance is understood. If the child's utterance is ignored, or if it is presupposed in the caregiver's subsequent utterance, the child has much less of an opportunity to alter the caregiver's knowledge.

Constraints on Caregiver Speech

In the past fifteen years, there has been a considerable amount of research that focuses on language addressed to young children. Indeed, in the past few years it would seem that more attention has been given to the language of the caregiver than to the productive language of the child. This focus is a product of several sources, the most salient being the concern with the role of social environment in the process of acquiring language. The literature is heavily oriented towards determining if and to what extent caregiver speech facilitates language development of young children. To this end, features of caregiver speech that serve this function have been isolated, for example, features that simplify and clarify (Brown et al. 1973; Cazden 1972; Cross 1975, 1976, 1977; Ferguson 1964 1977; Sachs 1977; Snow 1972, 1977). Several studies have examined verbal interactions

between caregivers and young children and have noted interactional strategies of caregivers that promote communication. Several studies (for example, Atkinson 1979; Bruner 1977; Greenfield & Smith 1976; Keenan & Schieffelin 1976; Scollon 1976) have isolated ways in which caregivers contribute to the child's expression of a proposition. Caregiver and child cooperatively articulate utterances. These cooperative efforts have been analyzed as precursors to grammatical constructions that emerge subsequently in the child's language.

When I looked at the transcripts of Samoan household interaction, I was initially stunned by the relative absence of many features that have been described as caregiver register. While a more thorough investigation remains to be conducted, it is nonetheless evident at this point in our observations that Samoan caregivers do not use baby talk lexicon, special morphological modifications (diminutives, etc.), simpler syntactic constructions or constructions of reduced length, in talking with young children. Similarly, they do not expand children's utterances and there is a minimum of cooperative utterance-building between caregiver and charge. Features such as self-repetition and paraphrase do appear in caregiver speech, but they are not exclusive to caregiver–charge interaction. Self-repetition and paraphrase abound in talk, both informal and formal, between adults in traditional Samoan society. Similarly, the topics entertained between caregiver and child tend to focus on the immediate past (e.g., accusations and reports of misdeeds), immediate present, and immediate future (e.g., directives to carry out acts); but these topics characterize household talk in general and are part of a register used by familiars and intimates (Ochs 1980).

These observations raise certain questions with respect to the nature of input and caregiver register. On the one hand, it is apparent that caregiver speech may vary in important ways across societies. This variation takes the form of differential appearance of certain features and a wider social application of other features. *This difference brings out the importance of culture – the system of beliefs and values underlying social life – as a constraint on caregiver language use.* Many of the features that do or do not appear in Samoan caregiver speech, for example, can be accounted for by beliefs and expectations concerning the high and low status role behavior: The association of decentering with low status can account, in part, for the rarity of expansions and simplification processes in Samoan caregiver speech. The turn-taking pattern characteristic of many Samoan caregiver–child interactions in which child speaks to mother, mother speaks to child's older sibling, older sibling attends to child (ABCA), is a product of cultural expectations concerning the kind of activity appropriate to high and low status persons.

The point is that many of the features observed of caregiver speech are likely not *primarily* responses to linguistic/cognitive limitations of the infant or young child. In societies where caregivers do not see themselves as language teachers (cf. Schieffelin [1979] for an account of a society in which caregivers do not see themselves as taking on this role), the orientation of caregivers will be primarily towards transmission of culturally significant knowledge. More and more, this is being realized. Scollon and Scollon, for example, now see that the interactional cooperation of an Anglo caregiver and child in utterance construction expresses and transmits socially valued skills that are demanded in literate

for example, decontextualization of utterances (Scollon & Scollon 1979). Similarly, I have tried to demonstrate here that caregivers who use expansions are displaying and transmitting to their charges a valued framework for handling problematic situations (to consider motives and intentions, to hypothesize, to inquire, to negotiate) and a set of behaviors that are appropriate to the status of child and caregiver.

Ferguson (1977), Snow (1979), and Brown (1977) have noted that caregivers modify their speech largely because they wish to communicate with their children. Processes such as simplification and clarification are responses to this goal. What is needed at this point in child language research is to break down this global goal (communication) into finer, more specific ends, such as those discussed above. By specifying more precisely the concepts, skills, and strategies caregivers are displaying, we can see how and why particular features but not others emerge in the talk of caregivers with young children. A more fine-grained analysis of what caregivers are doing with their charges will provide a clearer account of variation and constancy across societies. Further, it will indicate the conditions under which certain registral features are likely to be selected by the same caregivers and the conditions under which other features will be selected. Most accounts of caregiver register tell us the statistical occurrence of particular features. A finer analysis of the contexts of caregiver speech will reveal how and when these features are employed and bring our research closer to a means–ends model, relating social environment to language acquisition.

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55

Nominal and Temporal Anaphora

Barbara H. Partee

I. Introduction

A number of parallels between temporal and nominal anaphora were noted in Partee (1973); there I tried to account for them by invoking explicit variables over times and treating the tense morphemes *Present* and *Past* as directly analogous to pronouns. I now believe that a much better explanation of the parallels is available as the result of recent work on the formal semantics and pragmatics of temporal discourse and of pronominal anaphora. One key ingredient is the incorporation of a version of Reichenbach's notion of 'reference time' into a formal semantic framework, as developed by Bäuerle (1977) and further extended by Hinrichs (1981). In these accounts reference time is at the heart of temporal anaphora, as has been argued in less formal accounts (e.g. Smith (1978)), and the similarity between tense morphemes and pronouns can be seen as a derivative phenomenon. A second crucial ingredient is the unified treatment of pronouns provided by the theory of discourse representations of Kamp (1981a) or the 'file-card' semantics of Heim (1982). The task of unifying these advances is carried out to a large extent in Hinrichs (1981); in this study I draw heavily on the work of Hinrichs and show how it can be extended to cases of temporal quantification and temporal analogs of 'donkey-pronouns'.[1]

Among the data to be accounted for, described more fully in Section II, are temporal analogs of deictic pronouns, anaphoric pronouns with definite and indefinite antecedents, 'bound-variable' pronouns, and 'donkey-sentence' pronouns. The unified treatment of all these uses of pronouns provided by the frameworks of Kamp and Heim is reviewed in Section III. In Section IV I describe and slightly modify Hinrichs' treatment of tenses, adverbs, and temporal anaphora in simple linear discourse and in sentences with *when*-, *before*-, and *after*-clauses. In Hinrichs' treatment, events, processes, and states are taken as

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primitives rather than instants or intervals of time, following Kamp (1979), (1980) (cf. also Bach (1980), (1981)); 'reference events' are added to take over the function of earlier authors' 'reference times'. Hinrichs' overall framework fits into Kamp's theory of discourse representation structures, allowing 'discourse events' to be treated similarly to 'discourse entities'. Section V summarizes the explanation provided by these accounts for the parallels between temporal and nominal anaphora in the deictic case and the case of definite and indefinite antecedents. In Section VI I offer an extension of Hinrichs' treatment to cover temporal quantification as represented by *whenever*-clauses and the combination of a *when*-clause with an *always* in the main clause. This extension offers an immediate account of the temporal analogs of donkey-sentences as well, completing the account of the parallels described in Section II. The final section offers conclusions and some open problems for further research.

Insofar as the resulting explanation of the parallels between temporal and nominal anaphora is an improvement over previous accounts, it supports an important shift in perspective within the tradition of formal semantics as developed from Montague's work towards a point of view which has been independently argued for from outside that tradition, e.g. by W. S. Cooper (1978), Seuren (in press), and Bosch (1983), among others. This perspective, emphasized in Heim (1982), regards semantic interpretation as a dynamic process mapping partial models plus contexts onto new partial models plus contexts, as opposed to the classical logical view of semantic interpretation as a (static) specification of truth conditions relative to a given model and a given context.[2] This shift in perspective and accompanying enrichment of formal 'semantics-*cum*-pragmatics' should make it easier for linguists and other students of language from different traditions to draw profitably on each other's insights.

II. Parallels between Temporal and Nominal Anaphora

In this section we review the data from Partee (1973) that suggest that there is a parallel between temporal and nominal anaphora to be accounted for. (Some of the examples have been replaced, but all the types are still represented.)

A. Non-Linguistic 'Antecedents'

Partee (1973) noted that a past tense may be used to refer to an understood particular time not introduced by previous linguistic context, as in (1a) uttered while driving down the freeway; a similar use of a pronoun can be seen in (1b) uttered as the first sentence of a conversation.

(1) (a) I didn't turn off the stove.
(b) She left me.

Pronouns can be used without linguistic antecedents when their referent is understood to be salient to the hearer; there is no analog to salient physical presence

with past tenses, but a particular past time can well be presently salient while one is looking at vacation snapshots or watching family movies. (Comparable 'derivative' demonstrative uses of pronouns are also common with pictures.) The past tense in these uses is like a third person pronoun; a genuinely temporal present tense in a simple sentence is like a first person pronoun in that both are 'indexical' or 'token-reflexive', normally referring to the time of utterance and the utterer respectively (but see Kratzer (1978)).

B. Definite Anaphors with Definite Antecedents

In traditional treatments of anaphora, the paradigm case is that in which there is an antecedent noun phrase that refers to a particular individual, and a subsequent pronoun which refers to the same individual, as in (2a) below.

(2)(a) Sam is married. He has three children.

There are several potential analogs for such cases in the temporal domain, listed in (2b–d).

(2)(b) Sheila had a party last Friday and Sam got drunk.
(c) When John saw Mary, she crossed the street.
(d) At 3 p.m. June 21st, 1960, Mary had a brilliant idea.

In (2b) a time is specified in the first clause and the second clause is most naturally understood as referring to the same time. In (2c), we might view the *when*-clause as providing an antecedent for the past tense of the main clause. In (2d), a simple temporal adverb may be similarly viewed as the antecedent of the past tense. Postponing particulars of the analysis, it seems safe to say that in all of the temporal examples considered so far, the past tense can be viewed as an anaphoric element inasmuch as it is not understood as meaning 'at some time in the past', but as referring to some relatively definite past time, the specification of which is provided by a non-linguistic or linguistic antecedent.

C. Indefinite Antecedents

Considerable attention has been paid in recent studies of anaphora to cases in which the antecedent of a pronoun is indefinite as in (3a), from Kamp (1981a).

(3)(a) Pedro owns a donkey. He beats it.

We will say more about such cases in Section III, but for now note that the antecedent of a past tense may be similarly indefinite in the sense of not specifying a particular time, as in (3b).

(3)(b) Mary woke up sometime during the night. She turned on the light.

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There are several potential analogs for such cases in the temporal domain, listed in (2b–d).

(2)(b) Sheila had a party last Friday and Sam got drunk.
(c) When John saw Mary, she crossed the street.
(d) At 3 p.m. June 21st, 1960, Mary had a brilliant idea.

In (2b) a time is specified in the first clause and the second clause is most naturally understood as referring to the same time. In (2c), we might view the *when*-clause as providing an antecedent for the past tense of the main clause. In (2d), a simple temporal adverb may be similarly viewed as the antecedent of the past tense. Postponing particulars of the analysis, it seems safe to say that in all of the temporal examples considered so far, the past tense can be viewed as an anaphoric element inasmuch as it is not understood as meaning 'at some time in the past', but as referring to some relatively definite past time, the specification of which is provided by a non-linguistic or linguistic antecedent.

C. Indefinite Antecedents

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(3)(a) Pedro owns a donkey. He beats it.

We will say more about such cases in Section III, but for now note that the antecedent of a past tense may be similarly indefinite in the sense of not specifying a particular time, as in (3b).

(3)(b) Mary woke up sometime during the night. She turned on the light.

The first sentence of (3a) is presumably true if Pedro owns at least one donkey, and the first sentence of (3b) similarly true if Mary woke up at least once during the night. The problem is then to say how the 'it' of (3a) or the past tense of the second sentence of (3b) gets its reference when the antecedent is apparently not referential but existentially quantified. (Case (2b) of the previous section might be argued to belong here insofar as the antecedent does not specify *when* on Friday the party was.)

D. Bound Variables

Typical uses of pronouns as bound variables are illustrated in (4a–b); apparently comparable cases of temporal bound variable cases are given in (5a–d).

(4)(a) Every woman believes that she is happy.
(b) No woman fully appreciates her mother.

(5)(a) Whenever Mary telephoned, Sam was asleep.
(b) When Mary telephoned, Sam was always asleep.
(c) Whenever Mary wrote a letter, Sam answered it two days later.
(d) Whenever John got a letter, he answered it immediately.

E. 'Donkey-Sentences'

The famous "donkey-sentences" introduced by Geach (1962) are given (in the versions of Kamp (1981a) in (6a–b), along with possible temporal analogs in (6c–d); discussion of the problem raised and possible solutions to them is deferred to subsequent sections.

(6)(a) If Pedro owns a donkey, he beats it.
(b) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
(c) If Mary telephoned on a Friday, it was (always) Peter that answered.
(d) Whenever Mary telephoned on a Friday, Sam was asleep.

There is also an apparent parallel in negative data that we will account for:

(7)(a) *If every man owns a donkey, he beats it.
(b) *If Sheila always walks into the room, Peter wakes up.
(cf. (b') If Sheila walks into the room, Peter always wakes up.)

All of the data above are at this point only suggestive; we have not yet offered any arguments for giving similar analyses of nominal and temporal anaphora and there are clearly many differences between them. In the remaining sections of the paper, we show how Kamp's 'discourse representation' approach, which offers a unified treatment of nominal anaphora, if taken together with an approach to tense, aspect, and time adverbials which takes 'eventualities' rather than (or possibly in addition to) times as basic and incorporates the notion of reference time, provides a framework in which the parallels observed above receive a natural explanation.

III. Discourse Representations

In this section we sketch the key features of Kamp's theory of discourse representations (Kamp. 1981a) as it applies to nominal anaphora. (A theory of anaphora which shares many properties with Kamp's approach is developed in Heim 1982 and 1983); we are presenting Kamp's version in part because it is more widely accessible and in part because Kamp and Hinrichs have made substantial progress in extending that framework to deal with temporal anaphora, but we believe that the same kind of account is in principle equally compatible with Heim's framework.) The reader familiar with Kamp (1981a) can skip this section.

Kamp's approach makes crucial use of an intermediate level of representation, 'discourse representation structures', mediating between syntax and model-theoretic interpretation. In rough terms, a discourse representation can be thought of in the simplest cases as a description of a partial model. A simple discourse representation counts as true with respect to a complete model if it is *embeddable* into the model; embeddability is a technical notion in Kamp's system which plays a role somewhat analogous to satisfaction conditions in standard semantics for predicate logic. (I will not give the definition – see Kamp (1981a) – but I will illustrate it with examples shortly.) In more complex cases, the discourse representation structure consists of a structured set of discourse representations, and the embeddability conditions for the entire structure are recursively defined in terms of the embeddability of the substructures.

The fragment of English treated in Kamp (1981a), which is sufficient for our purposes in this section, includes simple sentences with transitive and intransitive verbs, proper nouns, third-person singular pronouns, and noun phrases introduced by *a* and *every*, with and without relative clauses; it also includes *if-then* sentences.[1] A *discourse* is simply a finite sequence of sentences. The simplest cases are those discourses in which none of the sentences contains an *if-then* or an *every*, as an example we give the discourse representation (DR) of the two-sentence discourse (3a), repeated here as (8):

(8) Pedro owns a donkey. He beats it.

The first sentence of (8) induces the following DR (Kamp, 1981a, p. 287):

DR$_1$(8)

u v
. .
Pedro owns a donkey
u = Pedro
u owns a donkey
donkey (v)
u owns v

The representation is constructed by processing the first sentence top-down in accordance with the syntax-driven construction rules. When the noun phrase *Pedro* is processed, three things happen: the 'discourse entity' u is added to the DR, and the conditions u = *Pedro* and *u owns a donkey* are introduced.[2] The

is further processable: the discourse entity v is introduced, and the conditions *donkey* (v) and u *owns* v are added to the DR. In general, each occurrence of a proper name or an indefinite noun phrase will lead to the introduction of a new discourse entity in the DR; by contrast, pronouns must be interpreted as referring to discourse entities already contained in a DR. (The assimilation of deictic uses of pronouns to this treatment will be discussed at the end of this section.) The complete DR for (8) is then the following (Kamp, p. 287):

DR(8)

u v
. .
Pedro owns a donkey
u = Pedro
u owns a donkey
donkey (v)
u owns v
He beats it
u beats it
u beats v

(In fact, we could just as well omit from the final DR all those intermediate steps which are further processed within the same DR, but we will retain them to show the order of steps of DR-construction.)

The discourse (8) will be true in a model M with respect to DR(8) just in case there is a way of embedding DR(8) into M, i.e. a mapping of u and v onto individuals in M such that all of the conditions in DR(8) are satisfied. (This assumes that we already have a mapping of the proper names, common nouns, etc. into corresponding individuals, sets (or perhaps properties) and relations in M.)

Note that the existential quantifier in the embeddability condition ('there is a way of embedding . . .') has the effect of giving the discourse entity v corresponding to *a donkey* an existentially quantified interpretation, but with scope extending over the whole discourse. Thus the truth conditions assigned to (8) in Kamp's system are the same as those for the first-order sentence (8′), or equivalently (8″):

(8′) $(\exists u)(\exists v)(u = p \;\&\; \text{donkey}(v) \wedge \text{own}(u, v) \wedge \text{beat}(u, v))$.
(8″) $(\exists v)(\text{donkey}(v) \wedge \text{own}(p, v) \wedge \text{beat}(p, v))$.

The idea that indefinite noun phrases introduce what amount to free variables, which only get 'bound' in the passage from discourse representation structure to truth-conditions via embeddability, is part of what allows Kamp (and likewise Heim) to provide a unified treatment of pronouns with definite and indefinite antecedents. All pronouns are treated identically at the discourse representation level: any pronoun may be replaced at the appropriate construction step by any discourse entity accessible to it in the discourse representation.[6] The relation of the 'discourse entities', such as u and v in DR(8), to actual entities in the model is not in general a simple correspondence, because of the implicit existential quantifier in the embeddability condition.[7]

Any discourse which consists of just such simple sentences, without conditional sentences or universal quantifiers, gives rise to a single discourse representation

like that for 8), with each subsequent sentence leading to expansion of the information in the representation; new discourse entities are added with each new proper name or indefinite noun phrase, and a pronoun can be assigned to any suitable entity that has been introduced into the representation by the time that pronoun is processed.[8]

Universal quantifiers and conditional sentences give rise to more complex discourse representation structures with special embedding conditions which are relevant to (so-called) bound variable anaphora[9] and the treatment of donkey-sentences. We illustrate this first with the conditional sentence (6a), repeated here as (9).

(9) If Pedro owns a donkey, he beats it.

The first step in constructing a discourse representation structure (DRS) for (9) is, as usual, to build a DR containing just the whole sentence:

$DR_0(9)$ | If Pedro owns a donkey, he beats it |

Since the *if-then* rule was the last rule applied in the construction of the sentence, the corresponding DRS construction rule is the first to be applied. That rule creates two additional DR's, $DR_1(9)$ and $DR_2(9)$, with $DR_1(9)$ containing the antecedent clause and $DR_2(9)$ the consequent, and with the stipulation[10] that DR_1 is subordinate to DR_0 and DR_2 is subordinate to DR_1. (The subordination relation that holds among DR's does not correspond directly to the syntactic notion of subordination; it does play a crucial role in determining the accessibility of discourse entities for pronoun assignment.) Each of the two DR's is then processed in the usual way, antecedent first, with the following proviso: when a discourse entity is introduced for a proper noun, it and its identity condition are placed in the top DR of the whole current DRS (making it available for assignment to any subsequently processed pronoun), but when an indefinite noun phrase is processed, the newly introduced entity is placed in the DR being processed (and therefore accessible to pronouns only in the same or subordinate DR's). The complete DRS for (9) is then as follows (from Kamp (1981a, p. 315); I have added arrows marking the subordination relation); numbers in parentheses indicate steps in the processing sequence.

DRS(9):

$DR_0(9)$

(2) u

(0) If Pedro owns a donkey, he beats it
(2) u = Pedro

$DR_1(9)$

(3) v

(1) Pedro owns a donkey
(2) u owns a donkey
(3) donkey (u)
(4) u owns ...

$\longrightarrow$

$DR_2(9)$

(1) he beats it
(4) u beats it
(5) u beats v


In steps (4) and (5) we are able to assign the entities *u* and *v* to the pronouns because DR_2 is subordinate to both DR_1 and DR_0.

The embeddability condition for DRS's resulting from the *if-then* construction rule is roughly as follows (see Kamp (1981a) for full details of this and other rules): DRS(9) is embeddable in M if there is a mapping which satisfies the atomic conditions in DR_0 (i.e. which assigns *u* to Pedro) such that every extension of it which satisfies DR_1 also satisfies (or can be extended to satisfy) DR_2.

Before discussing the example further, let us introduce the final new rule of discourse representation construction, the rule for noun phrases introduced by *every*. When such a noun phrase is processed, two new DR's are introduced, with subordination structure exactly like that of conditional structures. To the 'antecedent' are added a new discourse entity and conditions on it corresponding to the content of the common noun (and relative clause, if any). To the 'consequent' part is added a condition corresponding to the remainder of the sentence, with the new discourse entity in place of the original noun phrase. This is illustrated in the DRS for (6b), repeated here as (10), with parenthesized numbers again showing the order of construction.

(10) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.

DRS(10):



The embeddability condition for *every*-constructions is the same as that for *if-then* sentences: every embedding that satisfies DR_1 must be extendable to an embedding that satisfies DR_2. I will refer to such DRS configurations henceforth as universal/conditional structures.

Note that while the construction of DRS's is determined (up to the choice of antecedents for pronouns) by the syntactic rules, syntactically similar sentences or discourses may receive quite different DRS's, particularly because of the difference between the rule for *every* and the rule for *a*. (Sentence conjunction with *and* could be treated much like concatenation of sentences, while *or* should probably lead to the introduction of multiple DR's.) Thus while donkey-sentences like (9) and (10) receive a natural interpretation in this system,[12] syntactically similar sentences with *every* in place of *a* fail, correctly, to get a reading in which the pronoun is linked to the *every*-phrase.

(11) If Pedro owns every donkey, he beats it.

Every donkey beats it.

In both (11) and (12), the pronoun *it* is in a DR which is not subordinate to the DR which contains the discourse entity introduced by the *every*-rule, and thus that entity is not available for assignment to the pronoun.

An instance of what has usually been viewed as an ordinary bound variable pronoun is that in (13), which is also handled naturally in Kamp's system (see Kamp (1981a., p. 299).

(13) Every farmer courts a widow who admires him.

Thus we see that all of the types of uses of pronouns mentioned at the outset except the deictic use are treated uniformly in this system; deictic uses can be treated by the same pronoun rule as well if we add the hypothesis that the mechanisms that make entities in the non-linguistic context available for pronominal reference have the effect of adding corresponding discourse entities to DR's. We will assume there is such a mechanism.[13]

This unification of what otherwise appear to be very different pronoun uses is an important achievement in its own right. In the next sections we show that the system has the added advantage of being directly applicable to the treatment of tenses and adverbs in such a way that the parallels observed in the previous section fall out as direct consequences.

IV. The Temporal System

For our treatment of tenses and adverbs, we draw on the work of Bach (1980, 1981) and Kamp (1979), who have argued for taking what Bach calls 'eventualities' (events and processes, and perhaps states) and relations of precedence and overlap between them as primitive, rather than starting from moments or intervals of time as primitive. (Kamp (1979) shows how moments and intervals can then be reconstructed by a technique that traces back to Russell and to Wiener.) Hinrichs (1981) has worked out a detailed treatment of a substantial fragment of English in the framework of Kamp's discourse representation structures, focussing on the temporal structure of the past tense narrative discourse. Since Hinrichs' fragment contains much of what we need, we will use it as a starting point, describing its essentials in this section and then in Section VI showing how it could be extended to include bound variable cases and temporal analogs of donkey-sentences. As a simplifying assumption which we will follow, Hinrichs takes whole tenseless clauses as atomic, classified as activities, states, achievements, and accomplishments.[14] (These are respectively processes, states, instantaneous events, and extended events in the terminology of Bach (1981), which we will follow here. Our examples will just involve states and events.) He treats progressive as a sentence operator which applies to a process-sentence or an extended-event sentence and gives a new category of progressive sentence (which patterns with process-sentences and state-sentences in his rules). Past and past perfect are sentence operators which apply to any of the other five kinds, giving 'past-sentences' and 'past perfect sentences' as a result. (A more complete treatment

would require paying more attention to the internal structure of verb phrases and probably treating tense and aspect as verb phrase operators (Bach, 1980). Hinrichs' fragment also includes 'frame adverbials' (Bennett and Partee (1978) like 'on Tuesday' and 'last week' and *when*-, *before*-, and *after*-clauses.

To illustrate the general approach with an example, consider the following stretch of narrative.

(14) John got up, went to the window, and raised the blind.
e_1 e_2 e_3
It was light out. He pulled the blind down and went back to bed.
s_1 e_4 e_5
He wasn't ready to face the day. He was too depressed.
s_2 s_3

The clauses labelled e_1–e_5 describe events, while s_1–s_3 describe states. In narratives with a simple linear structure and all clauses in the simple past tense, it has been observed that the event sentences move the action forward in time, while the state sentences do not, but rather describe how things are at the time of the last-mentioned event.[15]

We can represent this in a DR for (14) as follows, using '<' for the relation of complete precedence between events, '0' for overlaps and r_s for the speech time. 'John get up (e_1)' is to be understood as what signals the condition that in a proper embedding of DR(14) into a model, e_1 must be an event of John's getting up.[16]

DR(14)

e_1 e_2 e_3 e_4 e_5 s_1 s_2 s_3 r_s
. . . .
$e_1 < e_2 < e_3 < e_4 < e_5 < r_s$
John get up (e_1)
⋮
John go back to bed (e_5)
s_1 0 e_3
s_2 0 e_5
s_3 0 e_5
It be light out (s_1)
⋮
John be too depressed (s_3)

The main oversimplification we have made in this example is in ignoring Hinrichs' use of 'reference time' (Reichenbach (1947)). For one thing, the first sentence of the discourse is not interpretable without some understood past reference time (Partee (1973), Bäuerle (1979), Hinrichs (1981)), so we need to assume that there is a past reference time r_p specified at the start of the discourse, and that the introduction of new event sentences moves the reference time forward.[17] Furthermore, Hinrichs has noted that the states and processes introduced need not always be understood as overlapping the last-mentioned event, as illustrated in (15) below (Hinrichs' example (108), p. 66).

(15) Jameson entered the room, shut the door carefully,
e_1 e_2
and switched off the light. It was pitch dark around him,
e_3 s_1
because the Venetian blinds were closed.
s_2

Hinrichs proposes that each new past-tense event sentence is specified to occur within the then-current reference time, and it subsequently causes the reference time to be shifted to a new reference time which *follows* the just-introduced event. States and processes are required to include the current reference time but need not overlap the event that led to the introduction of that reference time. Intuitively, the reference time introduced by an event-sentence is located 'just after' that event; we will discuss this requirement further and make it more explicit in connection with later examples. Below we give an approximate representation of DR(15) as a first illustration of the introduction of reference times; in subsequent examples we will be more explicit about the order of construction steps, particularly about the dynamics of the shifting 'current reference time'. The notation in DR(15) combines elements from Kamp and Hinrichs; '$\subseteq$' stands for the relation of temporal inclusion, which is definable in terms of $<$ and O(verlap), and the specification of the events and states by means of DR-boxes follows Kamp (1981b) and can be read as 'e_1 is an event-token of the event-type given in the box following.' (In subsequent examples we will carry out the internal processing of such boxes.) We assume that we start with a given past reference time r_0 and present reference time r_s; the other reference times r_1, r_2, and r_3 are introduced during the construction.

DR(15)

r_0 e_1 r_1 e_2 r_2 e_3 r_3 s_1 s_2 r_s
. . . .
$e_1 \subseteq r_0$
$e_1 < r_1 < r_s$
$e_2 \subseteq r_1$
$e_2 < r_2 < r_s$
$e_3 \subseteq r_2$
$e_3 < r_3 < r_s$
$r_1 \subseteq s_1$
$r_3 \subseteq s_2$
e_1 Jameson enter the room
...
e_2: ....
....

From the fact that there are conditions requiring reference times to include events ($e_1 \subseteq r_1$, etc.) and to be included within states, i.e. within some period for which a given state holds ($r_3 \subseteq s_1$, etc.) it follows that reference times must be construed as protracted events or bounded intervals. Hinrichs construes them as events with no descriptive content stipulated, but as far as I can see we could

just as well think of them as intervals for present purposes, given Kamp's way of reconstructing instant and interval structures from event structures. In any case, the embedding conditions for DR(15) will simply require that there be *some* events (or intervals) r_1, r_2, r_3 which satisfy the specified ordering relations. The net effect of the ordering specifications in DR(15) is that $e_1 < e_2 < e_3 < r_3$, and s_1 and s_2 must both overlap some time 'just after' e_3; they may but need not overlap e_3 itself. The content of (15) would tend to make it likely that s_1 does not overlap e_3, and that s_2 overlaps all of e_1, e_2, and e_3, but none of this is required by DR(15).* The conditions represented formally at this level include only those constraints deemed to follow from the structure (including the event/state distinction) independently of particular content. Whether the particular conditions given are the correct ones is of course open to debate.[19]

Reference times thus play a crucial role in temporal anaphora. A simple sentence with a past tense is interpreted with respect to a reference time; if it is a state or process sentence, the corresponding state or process must hold or go on at the current reference time, while if it is an event sentence, the event must occur within that reference time, and a new reference time following the event is introduced. (As Hinrichs notes, not all past tense discourses follow such a neat linear sequence. If two successive event sentences have different subjects, the events may well be understood as simultaneous or overlapping. And a sentence describing a 'big' event may well be followed by sentences describing some of its subevents as in our earlier example (2b).) The proposal of Partee (1973) that past tenses be taken as directly analogous to pronouns, referring to the time specified by a preceding clause or adverb, is incompatible with the moving forward of time in successive event sentences (it would be as if pronouns referred to the *father* of the last mentioned individual!)[20] I still believe it is reasonable to characterize tenses as anaphoric, or more broadly as context-dependent, but I would no longer suggest that this requires them to be viewed as 'referring' to times as pronouns 'refer' to entities, or to treat times as arguments of pred

To complete the relevant background, we need to consider the int of temporal adverbials and tense. This is an issue which raises a host known problems for any attempt to relate semantic interpretation systematically and explicitly to syntactic form (see Dowty (1979) and Bäuerle (1979) for good discussions of some of the principal problems). We will not address all of those problems here; but I believe that the use of reference times is helpful in this respect as well, as argued by Bäuerle (1977, 1979), Kratzer (1978), and Hinrichs (1981). I will use Hinrichs' treatment as a basis for the generalizations to quantificational temporal adverbs to be made in Section VI. In the remainder of this section I will describe his treatment of sentences containing *when-*, *before-*, and *after*-clauses. As before, we are limiting our attention to sentences in narratives in which only simple past tenses occur, with clauses describing either events or states (thereby bypassing a number of issues that would be important for a more comprehensive treatment).

One of the main problems in accounting for the interaction of tenses and adverbs is the fact that a past tense seems redundant if there is an explicit adverb but not redundant when there isn't;[22] how can this be accounted for with a

uniform interpretation for the past tense? If we try to let the past tense be a sentence operator meaning 'at some time in the past' and say that an adverb like 'yesterday' or 'two days later' is simply a more specific operator, we run into problems with either possible scope of applying such operators (Dowty (1979)), It is possible by judicious use of lambda's to achieve the effect of putting both operators on in parallel rather than in series, so to speak (Parsons (1980), Bach (1980)). But given the arguments in Partee (1973) and Bäuerle (1979) for treating a simple past tense sentence without adverbs as anchored to a reference time rather than as existentially quantifying over past times, we will not pursue the 'conjoined operator' approach here.

Hinrichs' approach can be characterized as follows. A simple past tense clause must be interpreted relative to a current 'past reference time', which may have been provided by non-linguistic context or by preceding discourse. If a sentence begins with a past adverb[23] (or just a possibly past adverb if we are in the context of a past tense narrative), that adverb is processed before the main clause and serves to update the current reference time. Thus it's optional that there be an adverb, but if there is one it overrides the prior context. The main clause is interpreted by the same rules in either case, in terms of current reference time. The adverb itself, whether phrasal or clausal, provides a descriptive characterization of the new reference time; it may identify it completely ('at 3 o'clock on June 12') or simply put bounds on it, as with 'frame adverbials' like 'in June'. (Cf. the treatment of the context-dependence of modals in Kratzer (1978) and the role of *if*-clauses in augmenting the relevant context.)

Besides providing for a uniform treatment of main clauses with and without adverbs, Hinrichs' treatment accounts neatly for the asymmetry of function of main and subordinate clauses. Traditional treatments of sentences with *when*-, *before*-, and *after*-clauses have tended to simply yield truth-conditions that treat the two clauses on a par (much as the standard semantics of relative clauses makes no distinction between 'A man who loves Mary hates Susan' and 'A man who hates Susan loves Mary'). Hinrichs' treatment is compatible with the traditional truth conditions, but distinguishes the role of main and subordinate clauses with respect to the dynamics of reference time. The main clause, as we have noted, is interpreted with respect to a reference time descriptively characterized by the subordinate clause; and by the usual rules, if the main clause is an event-clause, the last step in its processing is the resetting of the reference time to a time 'just after' the main clause event. Thus the reference time in effect after the complete sentence is processed depends on which clause was the main clause; this corresponds with the informal observation that it is main clauses that carry the main story line along in a narrative. We will show this asymmetry with examples involving *before* and *after* further below, and first consider Hinrichs' basic treatment of *when*-clauses.

Suppose we are interpreting a simple past tense narrative, our most recently established past reference time is r_1, and the next sentence begins with a *when*-clause. The *when*-clause triggers the updating of the reference time to a new value, let's say r_2, and the content of the *when*-clause puts conditions on r_2. (It is also required that r_2 follows r_1, a stipulation that we will try to justify and generalize

later.) The main clause is then interpreted with respect to r_2 just as it would have been if it were a simple sentence with the reference time r_2 provided by previous context. For illustration consider the little narrative (16), which includes example (2c) from Section II as a subpart.

(16) Mary turned the corner. When John saw her, she crossed the street.

The following discourse representation, DRS(16), incorporates Hinrichs' treatment into a Kamp-style diagram, with parenthesized numbers showing the order of construction steps. Because Hinrichs' rules refer to 'the current reference time r_p', which changes in the course of the construction, I have used square brackets to enclose the conditions which update the reference time ('$r_p := r_0$', '$r_p := r_1$', etc.); only the most recent of them is in effect at any given point in the construction of the representation.[24] The DRS construction rules which depend on reference time make reference only to 'r_p', i.e. to whatever is the current reference time. In showing the effects of applying the construction rules I have filled in the values, r_0, r_1, etc., according to what the current reference time was at the corresponding point in the construction. The (past) reference time at the beginning of the processing is r_0; the reference times r_1, r_2, and r_3 are introduced in the course of processing. The resulting DRS is in a sense then a dynamic representation rather than a static one; in the long run we clearly need a more systematic representation of how the relevant context-parameters, of which reference time is just one, change in the process of interpretation.

In this and subsequent DRS's, I have used 'now' rather than 'r_t' for the present reference time, simply for mnemonic convenience.

DRS(16)

(0) r_0 (0) now (2) e_1 (2) r_1 (5) u (8) e_2 (8) r_2 (11) v (13) e_3 (13) r_3

[(0)$r_p := r_0$]

(1) Mary turned the corner

(2) $e_1 <$ now

(2) $e_1 \subseteq r_0$

(2) $e_1 < r_1$

(2) $r_1 <$ now

[(3)$r_p := r_1$]

(4) e_1:

- (6) w
- .
- (4) Mary turn the corner
- (5) u turn the corner
- (6) w = the corner
- (6) u turn w

(5) u = Mary

(7) When John saw her, she crossed the street

(8) $e_2 <$ now

(8) $r_2 <$ now

(8) $r_1 < r_2$
[(9) $r_3 = r_2$]
(10) $e_2 \subseteq r_2$
(10) e_2: [(10) John see her
(11) v see her
(12) v see u]
(11) u = John
(13) $e_3 <$ now
(13) $r_3 <$ now
(13) $e_3 \subseteq r_3$
(13) $e_2 < r_3$
[(14) $r_3 = r_3$]
(15) e_3: [(17) z
.
(15) she cross the street
(16) u cross the street
(17) z = the street
(17) u cross z]

We can extract the relevant temporal conditions from DRS (16) and summarize them as follows, omitting the condition "before now", which applies to all the introduced events and reference times.

(17) r_0
$e_1 < r_1 < r_2$
$e_2, e_3 < r_3$

According to (17), both e_2 and e_3 follow e_1, but no constraints are imposed on the relation between e_2 and e_3; all that is required is that both occur within the reference time r_2. The final reference time r_3 follows e_3, but e_2 could in principle follow both e_1 and r_1, since r_3 is not required to follow r_2.

I think we can improve this picture somewhat if we add some auxiliary premises relating to the idea of 'linear narrative'. First of all, we can suppose that in construing a piece of narrative as linear, we assume that the successively introduced reference time strictly follow one another. (Hinrichs' conditions permit r_3 to overlap or include r_1, r_2, and r_3, and r_2 to overlap or include r_3.) This would give the conditions pictured in (17′), where circles now represent inclusion.

(17′) r_0 r_2
$e_1 < r_1 < (e_2, e_3) < r_3 <$ now

Secondly, we can question Hinrichs' decision not to impose any relative ordering between e_2 and e_3, the events of the *when*-clause and main clause of the second sentence. Hinrichs gives examples (as have others) that show that the event in the main

clause does not always have to follow the event in the *when*-clause when both are in the simple past.

The *when*-event can include the main-clause event, as in (18a), or even follow it, as is possible in (18b) (Hinrichs' examples, adjusted to keep the surface order of the two clauses constant).

(18)(a) When John wrecked the Pinto, he broke his arm.
(b) When the Smiths threw a party, they invited all their friends.

But we already know that such conditions can obtain between successive simple sentences as well; simple linear progression is just one mode of discourse organization. Let us assume then that 'simple linear progression' is one possible value, probably the unmarked one, of a higher-order parameter of discourse structure (a parameter which can have different values for different subparts of a discourse), and that when it is in effect, it applies to *when*-clause constructions as well as to concatenations of sentences.[26] We can then generalize the idea that in the simple linear case an event-clause moves the narrative forward by bringing in a new reference time that is 'just after' the given event, and characterize the reference time introduced by a *when*-clause in that way as well:[27] a (preposed) *when*-clause in a linear narrative triggers the introduction of a new reference time located 'just after' the event described in the *when*-clause.

We then obtain the following picture (17''), where $\preccurlyeq$ now represents 'just after' and $<$ represents precedence with no assumption of proximity.

(17'') r_0 r_2
$e_1 \preccurlyeq r_1 < e_2 \preccurlyeq e_3 \preccurlyeq r_3 <$ now

The overt marking of 'just after' as distinct from simple precedence is a departure from Hinrichs' treatment, but one which I believe is consistent with the spirit of his analysis. The analyses differ on just *how* a *when*-clause characterizes the new reference time it introduces. Hinrichs lets the *when*-clause be either stative or eventive and puts the reference time within or surrounding it respectively. I require the *when*-clause to be eventive (if superficially stative, then interpreted as inchoative), and put the reference time just after it. Without 'just after', the reference time would not be sufficiently constrained by the *when*-clause and I would be treating *when* as if it meant *after*.[28]

The two proposals now cover slightly different ranges of data: Hinrichs' analysis covers more of the data, my suggested modification of it gives a more unified account of the introduction of reference times in the linear case. Further comparison and evaluation would require trying to embed both variants in more comprehensive theories.

The modifications I have suggested would entail some slight revisions to DRS(16) with respect to the conditions surrounding the introduction of r_i by the *when*-clause; rather than redraw the whole diagram, I will mention the revisions in a note[29] and follow the modified system in subsequent examples. The resulting picture (17'') is consistent with the idea that the primary function of a

when-clause in simple linear narrative is to provide a new reference time for the associated main clause. Even in a simple linear narrative under the assumptions made above, an event described in a *when*-clause differs from one in a simple sentence in that it is not constrained to occur within the then-current reference time, but rather serves to provide a descriptive anchor for the next-introduced reference time. Compare the anomalous discourse (19) with the normal (20).

(19) People began to leave. The room was empty. The janitors came in.
(20) People began to leave. When the room was empty, the janitors came in.

Discourse (19) is anomalous, presumably because we don't expect the state of the room being empty to hold 'just after' people begin to leave, but state-expressing sentences cannot by themselves move the action forward. The *when*-clause of (20), on the other hand, signals the introduction of a new, later, reference time; we interpret 'the janitors came in' with respect to a time which is after people began to leave and just after the room became empty.[30] The asymmetry between main and subordinate clause is even clearer in the case of *before* and *after*. Sentences with *before*- or *after*-clauses also make it particularly clear that the account of temporal anaphora cannot be directly in terms of the tense morphemes in the main and subordinate clauses, as proposed in Partee (1973). Truth-conditionally, 'after *A*, *B*' and 'before *B*, *A*' are equivalent (except possibly for the non-factivity of *before*-clauses, which we will return to below), but in simple linear narratives they can be seen to have different effects on the establishment of reference time and hence on the temporal interpretation of the discourse as a whole. To appreciate the difference, we need a three-sentence discourse. We begin by extending (16) to (21) as a basis for comparison with (22) and (23).

(21) Mary turned the corner. When John saw her, she crossed the street. She hurried into a store.
(22) Mary turned the corner. Before John saw her, she crossed the street. She hurried into a store.
(23) Mary turned the corner. After she crossed the street, John saw her. She hurried into a store.

We will not construct complete DRS's for these examples, but consider just the sketches of the resulting temporal conditions in the manner of (17′). Here again I am departing from Hinrichs in not putting the subordinate-clause event *within* any reference time of its own; to dispense with the additional reference time that he uses for *before*- and *after*-clauses, I have to claim that what is within the *before* or *after* clause cannot be a state or process. I believe that is correct, and that apparent state or process descriptions in such clauses have to be interpreted as events – again usually inchoatively, sometimes, especially with *after*, 'terminatively'.[31] See also Bach (1981). In all other respects I believe the sketches below, (21′)–(23′), conform to Hinrichs' analysis. The events have been given mnemonic names instead of numbers. In the actual processing rules the subordinate clause is always processed before the main clause and introduces the reference time with respect to which the main clause is interpreted. In each case, presumably as a result of the simple linear progression mode, the reference time r introduced

by the subordinate clause comes after the previous reference time r_1, regardless of which subordinating conjunction introduces the clause. If we break the subordinating clause into its conjunction (*before, after, or when*, which I'll abbreviate collectively as BAW) and its clause, we can say that the clause characterizes an event type and BAW tells where the new reference time r_2 is located relative to some event of that type.

(21') $r_0 \quad r_2 \quad r_3$
$e_{turn} < r_1 < e_{see} < e_{cross} < e_{hurry} < r_4$

(22') $r_0 \quad r_2 \quad r_3$
$e_{turn} < r_1 < e_{cross} < e_{hurry} < r_4$
$< e_{see}$

(23') $r_0 \quad r_2 \quad r_3$
$e_{turn} < r_1 < e_{cross} < e_{see} < e_{hurry} < r_4$

The striking difference between the *before*-clause case and the others is that the event in the *before*-clause does not end up in the linear order at all; it helps to describe the temporal location of r_2 and hence of the crossing event, but is not otherwise connected, even in the context of a simple linear narrative. This seems to be a natural reflection of two factors, iconicity of order in simple linear narratives and the dynamics of successive introduction of reference times in the interpretation process.[32]

Why does the *before*-clause event not end up linearly ordered with the other events of the discourse, while the events of the *when*-clause and the *after*-clause do? If we process just the first two sentences of each discourse and leave out the reference time r_3 introduced in the final steps of that part, we have the following structures, all linear.

(21') $r_0 \quad r_2$
$e_{turn} < r_1 < e_{see} < e_{cross}$

(22') $r_0 \quad r_2$
$e_{turn} < r_1 < e_{cross} < e_{see}$

(23') $r_0 \quad r_2$
$e_{turn} < r_1 < e_{cross} < e_{see}$

The difference arises because the next reference time, r_3, is introduced in the processing of the *main clause* of the second sentence; in each case r_3 is required to be after r_2. For (21) and (23), this continues the linear order, since the main clause event was the last event so far. But for (22), this leaves us with r_3 and e_{see} both following r_2 and no specified relation between them. Subsequent reference times follow r_3, since it is the reference times that move the narrative linearly forward, and e_{see} is left 'dangling'.

While Hinrichs does not claim to have an account of non-factive *before* (cf. Heinemaki (1974)), the isolation of the *before*-clause event from the linear structure in even this simple case accords well with the ease with which we construe such events as not part of the 'real' event structure at all.

One could question the simple linearity of the *after*-structure, (23'), as well. It is a matter of stipulation in Hinrichs' original work and even more so in the

modification I have suggested that the event in the *after*-clause must strictly follow the last current reference time (r_1). (If I try to make it follow by strengthening my claim about the general effect of the linear progression mode to require that not only all reference times but all *events* in such a discourse be linearly ordered, I would have to retract the previous remark about the *before*-case.) Mats Rooth (personal communication) has provided examples like (24) that suggest that the event in the *after*-clause can overlap the previous event; what's hard to decide is whether such cases fall within the linear order mode or amount to a shift to a different mode (e.g. 'adding details').

(24) Mary crossed the street. After she reached the middle of the street, John saw her.

I would like to think that in the simple linear mode, such cases 'really' want a past perfect in the *after*-clause, and can occur in simple past only because past perfect is hardly ever obligatory in ordinary English. Otherwise they would present a problem, since at the point at which the *after*-clause is processed, the current reference time (see (23′)) is r_1, not r_0, so there is no nice way to state a condition which would let the event in the *after*-clause overlap the previous event without letting it reach arbitrarily far into the past, which I don't think it can.

Leaving further details and open questions aside, the most important point about the parts of Hinrichs' analysis that we have reviewed here is that the phenomena of temporal anaphora which I tried in Partee (1973) to account for by treating the tense morpheme itself as a pronoun-like variable over times appear to be much more elegantly handled through the intermediary reference times, as argued by Bäuerle (1979). Reference times are not directly *denoted* by any part of the sentence; they are more like a part of the necessary context for interpreting tensed sentences (Kratzer, 1978), akin to the kind of locative frame of reference needed to interpret *left* and *right* and other locative expressions. And like the locative case, they are not bound to the actual context of the utterance but can be 'constructed' and shifted in the course of interpretation. Although Kamp's and Hinrichs' proposals and those they build on are certainly just first steps toward the construction of a formal framework integrating such contextual frame features with a model-theoretic semantics, their work can be neatly combined and extended to account for temporal analogs of bound variable and 'donkey' pronouns as well.

Before turning to these extensions in section VI, we should pause to take stock of how much of the explanation of the parallels noted in Section II is already available.

V. The First Three Parallels Explained

The first three of the five parallels discussed in Section II were pronominal and temporal anaphors with (A) non-linguistic antecedents, (B) definite antecedents,

and (C) indefinite antecedents. Both in Kamp's and Heim's treatment of pronouns and in Hinrichs' treatment of temporal anaphora there is no special distinction between cases (B) and (C) – that distinction mainly reflects the fact that in earlier treatments (B) seemed straightforward and (C) was a problem. In this section we review the account of the parallels that can be provided from the proposals discussed so far.

A. Non-Linguistic 'Antecedents'

The pronominal 'deictic' case was discussed briefly at the end of Section II. Kamp speaks in unpublished work of 'anchored' discourse referents; the notion of 'anchoring' is also found in the work of Barwise and Perry. Whatever the exact mechanism, it is apparent that personal pronouns can get their values from the non-linguistic context. As Heim (1982) puts it, it is a precondition on the interpretation of a sentence containing a non-anaphoric pronoun that the context provides an appropriate value for the pronoun. Hinrichs similarly requires that the context already provide a past reference time in order to interpret a simple past sentence (without temporal adverbs; with an adverb like 'in May', the context must already provide a year, but need not specify a more particular reference time). The discourse representation level (or Heim's 'file card' semantics) helps to unify this case with the anaphoric cases by providing a level in which contributions from context can be represented overtly (whether introduced spontaneously or via a process of accomodation in Lewis's sense) without having to arise as translations of actual constituents of the sentences of the discourse. Treating pronouns as variables has some plausibility and a considerable tradition but 'reference time', which appears to lie at the heart of temporal anaphora, does not correspond uniformly to any single constituent of the sentence, so there does not seem to be any reasonable way to introduce it systematically into a direct model-theoretic interpretation of the syntax.

B. Definite Anaphors with Definite Antecedents

The pronominal case was illustrated with proper name antecedents in Section I. In the temporal cases discussed in Section IV, the 'definite antecedent' was a reference time introduced in the processing of the previous sentence or clause. This is more like the case of a definite description antecedent (see Heim (198- than a proper noun antecedent; a closer analog to the latter would be a sentence like (25).

(25) At 3 p.m. June 21st, 1960, Mary had a brilliant idea.

Hinrichs treats the adverb in such cases as serving to fix the reference time (replacing any previously current reference time) with respect to which the rest of the sentence is interpreted; the adverb thus functions much like a proper noun antecedent for a pronoun, although in the temporal case we do not have a common syntactic category of expressions denoting the antecedent and

C. *Indefinite Antecedents*

The treatment of pronouns with indefinite antecedents was one of the main innovations in Kamp's and Heim's proposals. In the temporal case the contrast between definite and indefinite is not always clearly marked; a newly introduced reference time might be thought of as definite in those cases where its introduction is accompanied by a condition that it be 'just after' some uniquely specified event, and indefinite in those cases where it is introduced with conditions that merely constrain it to be before, after, or within some given event or interval, or 'just after' an event whose description is not uniquely specifying. But the distinction is not marked by any obligatory grammatical signals (at least in English); our temporal system is in that respect more like the nominal system of languages that lack the definite and indefinite article, and Kamp's and Heim's unified treatment of these cases (see especially Heim's work on this point) therefore makes it much easier to account for the parallels between nominal and temporal anaphora in English as well as for the existence of article-less languages.

The examples with *before* and *after* in Section IV were in effect cases of indefinite antecedents, since the conditions on the reference times introduced by such clauses amounted to 'at some time (after the previous reference time and) before/after such-and-such.' An indefinite antecedent can also be introduced via an indefinite adverb, as in (3b), repeated here as (26).

(26) Mary woke up sometime during the night. She turned on the light.

We show below a DRS for (26) which conforms to Hinrichs' construction. Hinrichs does not treat the specific locution 'sometime during the night' but does give explicit rules for other 'frame adverbs' like 'on Friday', 'in 1976', and the permissible complex adverbs that can be built up by combining appropriately nestable simple ones. We assume that 'sometime during the night' would work similarly, yielding the condition $r_1 \subseteq i_1$ in DRS(26), and we also leave definite NP's like 'the night' and 'the light' unanalyzed. We have parenthesized the initial past reference time r_0 and the conditions that pertain to it; following the observations of Smith (1978), Hinrichs provides both for frame adverbs like *two days later* which can only be interpreted in a context which includes a current r_p and ones like *in June 1970* which do not require such a context. The present example requires contextual support for the expression *the night*, but that could in principle come either from having the night available as an entity already introduced or from a reference time which specified a given period only containing one night. A similar example with 'the night of June 21st 1960' would not require any r_0 present in the context, so there would be otherwise parallel DRS's with and without the parts parenthesized in DRS(26). I introduce an interval-variable i_1 for 'the night', but perhaps it could just as well be viewed as a protracted event (cf. 'during the fight'). In DRS(26) it is the reference time r_1 that plays the role of 'indefinite antecedent'. The parallels to Kamp's treatment of pronouns with indefinite antecedents should be clear: the role of r_1 in the subsequent processing of the two clauses is exactly the same as it would have been if it had been specified 'definitely'

as the role of a discourse entity is the same for the interpretation of subsequent pronouns regardless of whether that entity is characterized by a definite condition like 'u = Pedro' or an indefinite one like 'farmer (u)'.

To complete the account of the parallels between temporal and nominal anaphora, we need to extend Hinrichs' treatment to cover temporal quantification, to which we now turn. The treatment of 'donkey-tenses' will fall out as a direct consequence of the treatments of quantified cases and indefinite antecedent cases, just as it did in the pronominal case for Kamp and Heim.

DRS(26)

(0) now ((0)r_0) (2) i_1 (2) r_1 (4) e_1 (4) r_2 (6) u (9) e_2 (9) r_3

([(0)r_p: = r_0])
(1) Mary woke up sometime during the night.
(2) i_1 = the night
((2) $i_1 \subseteq r_0$)
(2) $r_1 \subseteq i_1$
[(3) r_p: = r_1]
(4) $e_1 <$ now
(4) $e_1 \subseteq r_1$
(4) $e_1 \prec r_2$
(4) $r_2 <$ now
(5) e_1: (5) Mary wake up; (6) u wake up
(6) u = Mary
[(7) r_p: = r_2]
(8) She turned on the light
(9) $e_2 <$ now
(9) $e_2 \subseteq r_2$
(9) $r_3 <$ NOW
(9) $e_2 \prec r_3$
(10) e_2: (12) $\overset{v}{\cdot}$; (10) she turn on the light; (11) u turn on the light; (12) v = the light; (12) u turn on v
[(13) r_p: = r_3]

VI. Generalizing to Quantification over Events

David Lewis, in his paper 'Adverbs of Quantification' (Lewis, 1975), noted that frequency adverbs like *always, sometimes, usually,* etc. are used not only for temporal quantification but more generally for quantifying over cases (as in 'The sum of two odd numbers is always even'). Kamp's treatment of ordinary quantifiers like *every* yields structures which are naturally construed as quantification over

cases, so it is not surprising that his approach is readily generalizable to temporal (and other) kinds of quantification. We will limit our treatment here to simple event and state clauses in constructions with (temporal) *whenever*, *always*, etc.


There are at least two ways to express universal quantification over eventualities, either by using *whenever* to introduce the subordinate clause or by using a plain *when* (or *before*, *after*, etc.) and putting *always* in the main clause. Even with a simple *when*-clause and no adverb in the main clause a sentence may be interpreted universally (or more likely generically); this is probably to be attributed to implicit modalization in the main clause rather than to an ambiguity in *when*, since (a) a main clause alone can have a similarly generic or habitual reading, and (b) the same phenomenon occurs with *before*, *after*, etc., which have no counterparts with *-ever* and for which there is no independent reason to posit ambiguity. Heim (1982) includes extensive discussion of the 'unselective quantifier' force of various main adverbs, modals, and other sentence operators, and shows the parallels between her treatment of quantification and Kratzer's explanation of the interaction of *if*-clauses with main clause modals (the parallels extend in relevant respects to Kamp's treatment). Kamp and Heim both treat *every* and *if*-clauses in a unified manner, as we illustrated for Kamp in Section III, and very differently from *a* or *the*. Following their lead, and without providing rules for an explicit fragment, we will assume that both a *whenever*-clause. and a main-clause *always* trigger the same sort of DRS-splitting as an *if*-clause or an *every*. In both cases, the content of the 'antecedent' box in the DRS (using Kamp's version) has the same internal form as in a simple indefinite case; the universal quantification arises in the statement of the embeddability conditions for the whole DRS conditional/universal substructure.

To see how we can put the ideas of Sections III and IV together, let's consider an example. Example (5a) from Section II is repeated below as (27).

(27) Whenever Mary telephoned, Sam was asleep.

The basic idea of the construction is to end up with a DRS roughly of the form (27') analogous to DRS(9) for the conditional example in Section III.

(27')




(Here s_1 is a discourse state.) One new factor we have to deal with is that although we are still considering an example with simple past tenses in both clauses, we are not dealing with a simple linear narrative anymore. The antecedent clause cannot be anchored to a single specific reference time as it was [illegible]

when-clause cases, yet the whole sentence does presumably have to be interpreted relative to some (sufficiently large) reference period. (The whole sentence should be characterized as describing a state, and the DRS should perhaps have a big box around it labelling the whole thing as a state (Gennaro Chierchia, personal communication), but I will ignore that factor here.) We can handle that by assuming that there is a reference time r_0 already current in the top box and that the discourse event e_1 in the antecedent box is introduced with a condition that it fall *within* the current reference time. (That has to be part of what happens in the initial box-splitting step triggered by *whenever*, since the clause that follows *whenever* is internally just like any other subordinate clause, and should therefore be processed within its box by the normal rules.)

The embedding conditions for the whole configuration will be just like those for the *if*-clause and the *every* construction: the whole sentence is true just in case every proper embedding of the antecedent part can be extended to a proper embedding of the combination of the antecedent part and the consequent part. The main thing missing from the rough sketch in (27′) is the indication of temporal connectedness between the antecedent and the consequent. When I discussed such sentences in Partee (1973), I didn't see any way to capture such 'bound variable' temporal cases without an explicit variable over times in the representation. But the abstract notion of reference time (or reference event or situation) together with the general embeddability conditions just described can do the job just as well, as we will now show.[33]

Here is a more complete picture of the DRS for (27), with parenthesized numbers showing the order of construction. Asterisks signal the application of the one new rule needed for this construction: the new rule is a straightforward adaptation of Kamp's rule for universal/conditional sentences. The remaining steps follow the rules of Kamp and/or Hinrichs (continuing with the modification of Hinrichs' treatment introduced with (17″) in Section IV).[34]

DRS(27)



It is important to recall at this point that the representation of the consequent box $DR_2(27)$ is an abbreviation for a fuller representation which incorporates all of the contents of the antecedent box, $DR_1(27)$ and adds the new material to that. This is particularly crucial for step (6), which follows the same rule that applies to all simple past state-describing clauses, namely that the state described overlaps the current reference time r_p. In step (5) r_p was set to r_1, and it is therefore that reference time that is current at step (6). The embeddability conditions for the whole conditional structure thus require, as desired, that for every choice of an event e_1 of Mary's telephoning and reference time r_1 'just after' it, there is a state of Sam's being asleep that surrounds r_1 (and hence may overlap or surround e_1).[15] The treatment of this case thus comes out exactly parallel to the treatment of *if*-clauses in Kamp's system.

Extending the parallel, we can design a rule that is sensitive to the conjoint presence of *always* and a *when*-clause (just as Kamp's *every*-rule takes a relative clause into account at the same time) to produce exactly the same DRS for sentence (5b), repeated here as (28).

(28) When Mary telephoned, Sam was always asleep.

ugh this may look suspicious because the *when*-clause and the *always* do rm a surface constituent, I believe that there are sufficient arguments in (1981) and Kratzer (1981) for viewing similar cases of clausal sentential junctions as modifying main clause sentence operators; neither of their treatments akes the same form as Kamp's and the different approaches deserve careful mparison, but the similarities seem sufficient to justify treating the *when*-clause nd the adverb *always* as in construction with each other (perhaps indirectly hrough the use of lambdas, if one wants to maintain a surface-syntax compositional treatment).

The construction as described also extends straightforwardly to the rest of the 'bound variable' cases described in Section II, including cases where the main clause describes an event rather than a state and/or contains anaphoric adverbial like 'two days later' or 'immediately'. Again we don't need to introduce invisible time-variables into such expressions, but can simply treat them as interpretable only relative to a given reference time; the interpretation proceeds just the same whether such a clause is used in isolation with a contextually supplied reference time or whether it follows a *whenever*-clause. with the reference time introduced as in DRS(27). That takes care of sentences like (29) and (30).

(29) Whenever Mary wrote a letter, Sam answered it two days later.
(30) Whenever John got a letter, he answered it immediately.

The construction does *not* extend straightforwardly, however, to cases like (3
If we adapted Hinrichs' rules for *before-* (and *after-*) sentences to the

(31) Before John makes a phone call, he always lights up a cigarette.

quantified case in the same way we have done for *when*-sentences, we would end up with the erroneous interpretation that John is lighting a cigarette at *all* times preceding each phone call, rather than that he lights a cigarette *sometime* before each phone call.[36] The meaning of the sentence is approximately the same as that of (32); we seem to need to insure somehow that the condition setting the reference time to a time

(32) When John makes a phone call, he always lights up a cigarette beforehand

before the (each) phone call ends up in the consequent box, not the antecedent box.


Sentence (32) itself does not fit into the pattern of linear sequencing we have been dealing with, suggesting that the problem of accomodating cases like (31) would be better dealt with in the context of discourse segments in which one clause introduces an event (or more generally a topic) and subsequent clauses fill in details. (And these examples further illustrate the need for a clearer articulation of what it is to quantify over 'cases'.)

The treatment of donkey-sentences on Kamp's approach is a direct consequence of his treatment of indefinite antecedent cases together with his treatment of *every* and *if*. Similarly, the treatment of the temporal analogs of donkey sentences follows directly from Hinrichs' treatment of the indefinite antecedent cases together with our extension of his analysis to sentences *with whenever* or *always*. We illustrate by constructing a DRS for sentence (6d), repeated here as (33), which differs from sentence (27) only by the addition of the indefinite temporal adverb 'on a Friday' in

(33) Whenever Mary telephoned on a Friday, Sam was asleep.

the antecedent. As in the nominal case, the net effect of the embedding rules operating on DRS (33) explains the apparent 'wide scope universal' reading of the indefinite adverb as well as the apparent 'binding' of the time in the consequent clause to the times on Fridays when Mary called.

DRS(33)



In comparing DRS (27) and DRS (33), note that the apparently different conditions on the state s_1 in DR_2, namely that it contain r_1 in the former case and r_1 in the latter, result from applying the same rule, namely that the state contains the current reference time r_p; the current reference time in both cases is whatever is in force at the end of processing the antecedent box DR_1.

I also promised in Section II an account of the negative data (7a, b), repeated here.

(7)(a) #If every man owns a donkey, he beats it.
(b) #If Sheila always walks into the room, Peter wakes up.

In Kamp's account of (7a) the occurrence of *every* in the antecedent will trigger (as always) the introduction of a pair of DRS's, subordinate in this case to the DR for the *if*-clause. Because of the subordination structure, the discourse entity corresponding to 'every man' will not be an accessible value for the *he* in the main clause. (See also the discussion of examples (11) and (12) in Section III.) A similar account for (7b) can be given, since the *always* in the antecedent will trigger a similar DR-split, with the new DR's subordinate to the *if*-clause DR,

and the *always* absorbed into their embeddability conditions, so to speak. On a reference time introduced at the level of the *if*-clause as a whole will be accessible for the main clause interpretation; the 'variable' reference time corresponding to *always* will not be.

We thus see that the proposals of Kamp (and Heim) and Hinrichs generalize straighforwardly to an account of quantified temporal anaphora. It should be reemphasized that the distinction between 'bound variable' cases and 'donkey sentence' cases, like that between cases of definite and indefinite antecedents, has no theoretical status in this approach but merely reflects the earlier descriptive classification of Partee (1973). This unification is particularly welcome in the temporal case, where the distinctions in question are quite artificial.

VII. Conclusions and Open Problems

This completes our account of the parallels between temporal and nominal anaphora. I consider this a much more satisfying account than the one offered in Partee (1973), which in retrospect can be seen to have suffered from two inadequacies: (i) the lack of a unified treatment of pronominal anaphora, which did not become available until the work of Kamp and Heim; and (ii) the claim that tenses themselves acted like pronouns and the consequent belief that they therefore had to correspond to explicit time variables in a logical representation. Intuitively, noun phrases 'refer' and tenses don't; nominal anaphora can be viewed as involving a generalization and explication of the notion inaccurately but intuitively labelled 'coreference'. Temporal anaphora is more subtle because of the categorial variety of the expressions involved – tenses, adverbs, adverbial clauses, and main clauses (including the aspectual classification of the clauses themselves into event-like and state-like). It is still fair to say that tenses like pronouns, are anaphoric, and like pronouns can be construed with either linguistic or non-linguistic antecedents; but it doesn't follow that they 'refer' to times to the degree that pronouns 'refer' to individuals.

Two general points deserve mention here.[37] Kamp motivated the level of DRS's with two separate sets of phenomena: the behavior of pronouns (in the non-temporal domain) and the interpretation of aspectual matters in the temporal domain (Kamp 1979, Kamp and Rohrer 1983). The fact that these two uses of DRS's can be so neatly combined to explain the parallels between temporal and nominal anaphora without having to treat 'tenses as pronouns' provides further support for such an approach.

The other general point relates to the integration of Reichenbach's and Prior's treatments of the past tense operator. On Prior's treatment, which has become standard tense logic, *Past* ϕ is true at time t iff ϕ is true at some $t' < t$: the past operator thus amounts to 'at *some* time in the past'. On Reichenbach's treatment a sentence *Past* ϕ is only interpretable with respect to a given past reference time R, and is true iff ϕ is true at R ('event time = reference time'); the past operator thus amounts to 'at *that* time (in the past)'. In effect, Hinrichs' analysis and those

of Kratzer and Bäuerle before him incorporate aspects of both analyses. In a simple past tense event sentence, the event is not required to coincide with the past reference time, as in Reichenbach, but to occur within it (a distinction that only became available with the advent of interval semantics). Thus the existential quantifier over past times is still explicitly there, but restricted to times within the past reference period. In narrative discourse of the sort considered by Hinrichs, reference intervals are typically quite small, since the focus is on the succession of individual events. In other sorts of discourse, reference intervals may be small and specific ('I didn't turn off the stove'), or large, vague, and possibly even irrelevant ('Who killed Julius Caesar?' – I don't have to know when it happened to know who did it, given that it could only have happened once if it happened at all). In the latter kind of case, the reference time could potentially be the whole of the past, leaving only 'at some time before now' as the consequence of the condition '$e \subseteq r_p$'. The Reichenbachian and Priorian past tenses can then both be seen as special cases of the Kratzer-Bäuerle-Hinrichs account: The Reichenbachian one results if both reference time and event time are instants, the Priorian if the reference time is all of the past.

The account given here suffices to explain the parallels with which we began, but is still very crude. Part of this is just the result of my over-simplified presentation of Hinrichs' system,[38] but it is also clear that there are many major open questions in this area that need to be explored. I will close by mentioning several that seem particularly pressing.

i) In the DRS's for temporal anaphora cases, we put 'discourse events' for events described by tensed clauses into the representation on a par with discourse entities for individuals; but then what's the difference between an event-describing clause like 'Mary telephoned John' and a nominalization like 'Mary's telephoning John', which has more claim to referring to an event. Would the strategy followed here require us to posit a discourse referent for the whole proposition expressed by a sentence to account for the 'sentence-pronoun' *it* if the next sentence is 'But John doesn't know it'? Where would that discourse referent go? Presumably not within the DRS for the sentence (proposition) it refers to on pain of circularity. Clearly a general treatment of anaphora has to involve both things (including events, situations, propositions, etc.) directly expressed or referred to in a discourse and things that become salient as a result of the occurrence and interpretation of the discourse; but it is not so clear that everything potentially relevant should be entered into a DRS in the same way, especially given the fact that there are 'pure anaphors' which can only have linguistically expressed antecedents and 'pure deictics' which can only have contextually supplied values, as well as cases like the pronouns and tenses which can have either. (Both Kamp and Heim are aware of these problems, but as far as I know neither they nor anyone else has a general solution to offer.) The questions that need to be answered here concern both ontology and levels of representation.

ii) Another pressing need is for a better articulated theory of context and its interaction with semantic interpretation. 'Reference times' probably belong to

context rather than to semantic content, but if Hinrichs' treatment of tempora anaphora and my extension of it are on the right track, we can only move refer ence time to a separate context dimension if we have a framework in whic context both affects and is affected by the process of semantic interpretatio which in turn seems to have to be viewed in some sense dynamically rathe than statically (cf. the crucial role of the 'updating' of the past reference tim r_p in the account of temporal anaphora).[39] Just as we can now see that we don need variables over times in the object language to account for temporal anaphor and temporal quantification, it is to be hoped that with a better theory of conte we will not have to put reference times into DRS's on a par with other discour referents to capture their involvement in the parallels between nominal an temporal anaphora.

(iii) Another major issue, already mentioned, is how to generalize furth to quantification and anaphora involving 'cases' in the sense of Lewis (197 *Whenever*-clauses are not always literally temporal, nor are *wherever*-clauses alwa locative; how do we tell what we are quantifying over? The problem not earlier in this section about constructions with a *before* or *after* clause accompani by an *always* is the main clause is one example of a much broader problem determining what belongs in the 'antecedent box' in a conditional/univers DRS. Closely connected with this is a problem of interpreting the embeddi condition for conditional DRS's, namely how to individuate proper embeddin of the antecedent part. This problem is perhaps best illustrated by the problem that arises in trying to extend Kamp's treatment to *most* or *almost every*, noted b Heim (1982). Whereas (34) and (35) have the same truth-conditions (at least i the respects relevant here), (36) and (37) seem not to: (37), but not (36), seems t be falsified by a situation in which just one donkey-owner fails to beat any of hi donkeys but he owns most of the donkeys.

(34) Every man who owns a donkey beats it.

(35) { Always, / In all cases }, if a man owns a donkey, he beats it.

(36) Almost every man who owns a donkey beats it.

(37) { Almost always / In almost every case }, if a man owns a donkey, he beats it.

Intuitions seem to be sharper with event-clauses (perhaps since it's not so clea what a 'case' of a state holding is). The difference in truth-conditions between (38) and (39) seems more certain than that between (36) and (37) (although still c ceivably disputable).

(38) Almost every man who swam the channel took more than 12 hours.

(39) In almost every case, if a man swam the channel, he took more than 12 h

The difference evidently arises because in the case where the quantifier is c bined with *man* we have to count men, and in the other case we have to c cases of channel swimmings and the same man may be involved in many swim mings. As Scha (1983) argues, when we have to deal with quantification w

complicated and possibly uncertain underlying ontology, we need to specify a 'sort' (for the quantifier to 'live on' in the sense of Barwise and Cooper (1981)) separately from whatever further restrictions we want to add (perhaps in terms of 'cases') about which instances of the sort we are quantifying over. In terms of Kamp's framework this means that we have to worry not only about what belongs in the antecedent box but also how to distinguish a substructure within it that plays the role of sortal (the head noun in the NP case).

This in turn relates to the syncategorematicity of *every* in Kamp's treatment and the corresponding treatment of *always* in this paper. How, for instance, can *almost* modify *always* or *every* if they are not part of the semantic representation? I suspect that many of the ingredients for a better articulation of how the meanings of the various parts combine in these cases could be gotten out of a combination of the proposals in Stump (1981) for the treatment of free adjuncts in combination with frequency adverbs, Kratzer (1978) for the treatment of *if*-clauses and modals, Heim (1982) for a more Kratzer-like treatment of the quantifier cases, and the ideas of Kamp and Hinrichs presented here. But it is important to recognize that the source of these problems for the Kamp and Heim frameworks is their abandonment of Montague's unified treatment of noun phrases as generalized quantifiers, in which determiners can be assigned a uniform semantic type and modifiers of determiners could be added straightforwardly.

I don't see how to incorporate Montague's elegant treatment of compositionality into the framework followed in this paper, nor do I see how to reporduce within Montague's theory the unified and explanatory account of nominal and temporal anaphora provided by these extensions of Kamp's, Heim's, and Hinrichs' work. So the next task is to try to construct a theoretical framework which incorporates the insights of both approaches.[40]

Acknowledgements

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I gratefully acknowledge the following support for the period in which the paper actually got written: a fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the hospitality of the Max-Planck-Institute for Psycholinguistics in Nijmegen, and a sabbatical leave from the University of Massachusetts.

Notes

1. All references to Hinrichs' work in this paper are based on Hinrichs (1981); Hinrichs has now written a paper in English on this topic, Hinrichs (1982), which I have not seen.
2. Among other approaches which have emphasized a dynamic view of semantic interpretation are Hintikka's game-theoretical semantics and procedural semantics (Isard 1975); attention to dynamic aspects of context has been standard in studies of the semantics of programming languages.
3. There are acceptable sentences of the form (7b), such as (i) below, from Emmon Bach,

   (i) If Sheila always worked late, Peter got angry.

   But the *always* in the antecedent is then interpreted with 'narrow scope' and does not 'bind' the time of the main clause; we could paraphrase (i) as (ii):

   (ii) If Sheila always worked late over a period of time, Peter got angry during that period.

   This corresponds to the fact that *if*-clauses containing *every* are perfectly all right as long as the scope of the *every* remains within the *if*-clause.
4. Kamp does not treat *the*; Heim (1982) treats it extensively. Van Eijck (1982) offers an extension of Kamp's work treating *the*.
5. Kamp (1981a) uses the term 'discourse referent' which traces back to Karttunen (1976); in some later unpublished work he uses 'reference marker'. I use 'discourse entity' for parallelism with 'discourse event' and 'discourse state' (also Kamp's terms).

   One might ask why *Pedro* is entered via a 'variable' discourse entity rather than directly as a 'named' element. I don't know Kamp's answer, but one answer might be that it leaves the way open to abstract over that 'variable' in extending the fragment to handle VP-deletion, focus phenomena, etc.
6. For simple cases, 'accessible' just means 'already in the DR'; more complex cases will be discussed below and the notion of accessibility correspondingly sharpened. See also Note 8.
7. See Webber (1978) for an earlier statement of a similar appraoch in a computational framework, and Karttunen (1976) for a still earlier introduction of the idea of 'discourse referents'.
8. We ignore here issues of 'suitableness' (e.g. gender agreement), as well as the issues of disjoint reference and of reflexive pronouns. These are, of course, important issues for a complete treatment, but I believe they are independent of the concerns of this paper.
9. I have a terminology problem in the rest of this paper because of the 'paradigm shift' that comes from Kamp's and Heim's work. Henceforth, when I use expressions like 'bound variable anaphora', even without scare quotes or caveats, I mean 'cases of anaphora which were classified as bound variable cases in earlier treatments'.
10. Eventually one will want to find general principles governing both the introduction of additional DR's and the subordination relations among them. Since the function of both is clearly semantic, it will be interesting to see how far one can get with the assumption that the rules which introduce them are sensitive only to syntactic structure and the presence of particular (closed-class) lexical items like *if* and *if*

11. It has long been observed that there is an intimate connection between *every* and *if* and between *a* and *and*. In transformational grammar it was sometimes proposed that relative clauses be derived from conjunctions or *if*-clauses depending on the determiner of the head noun (although that very dependence weakened the attractiveness of the proposals from a syntactic perspective). In PTQ Montague built an *if* into the meaning of *every* and an *and* into that of *a*, so to speak. But Kamp and Heim seem to have been the first to have the idea that *if* brings with it an implicit *every* just as much as *every* contains an implicit *if*. (Kratzer's work on conditionals and modals (Kratzer (1978, 1981) can be viewed as an important forerunner of such an idea; her work also suggests that the quantifier implicitly associated with an *if*-clause may not always be universal. See discussion of the problem of *most* in the last section of this paper.)
12. The truth conditions assigned to (9) and (10) amount to giving the embedded *a* a wide scope universal reading. This is not uncontroversial; an apparent counterexample is (i):

    (i) If you have a credit card, you should use it here instead of cash.

    But (i) might be construable as having a wide-scope universal reading for 'a credit card' if we paraphrase it with *any* rather than *every*.

    In an earlier proposal for a unified treatment of pronouns, Cooper (1979a) treated them all as context-dependent definite descriptions. Cooper's treatment has the advantage of extending naturally to 'paycheck' sentences, but would predict anomalousness for Heim's 'sage plant' example (ii), for which Kamp and Heim correctly predict a wide-scope universal reading.

    (ii) Every customer who bought a sage plant bought eight others with it.

    See Heim (1982) for a good discussion of these and related issues.
13. Kamp (in unpublished work) and Heim (1982), both make proposals along these lines. Not all problematic cases of pronouns are covered by the mechanisms discussed here; but this covers all of the kinds of nominal anaphora that were compared to temporal anaphora in Partee (1973), and all the types discussed in Kamp (1981a), so we will not try to speculate on further extensions to cover e.g. Karttunen's 'paycheck' pronouns (Karttunen (1969)). Crit Cremers (personal communication) suggested to me that these may have temporal analogs as well. Possible examples might be (i) and (ii).

    (i) When John got married, he had a good job and money in the bank. Bill had no job and a pile of debts.
    (ii) Some people, when they got a divorce, remarry within a few months. Other people don't remarry until years later.

    I thank the anonymous referee for the following:

    (iii) The man who left town when he was fired was wiser than the man who sued the management.
14. I received a copy of Dowty (1982) just as I was putting the finishing touches on this paper. Dowty challenges Kamp's discourse representation approach and Hinrichs' application of it on just this point: the classification of sentences into aspectual types

plays a crucial role in discourse representation construction rules but would itself be determined by the compositional semantic interpretation of the parts of the sentence in a fuller treatment, since much more than the aspectual type of the main verb plays a role. Unless all the relevant factors are encoded in the syntax, as in Verkuyl (1972), there is then a conflict, Dowty argues, between the use of DRS's as intermediate constructs between syntax and model-theoretic interpretation and the role of the model-theoretic interpretation in determining properties of the sentence on which DRS construction rules depend. I believe this is indeed a serious problem, possibly a representative of a large family of such problems. I shall, however, proceed without either solving the problem or revising the paper in the belief that the proposals about anaphora that are central here are robust enough to survive whatever theoretical changes may be needed. See also Note 19.

15. This is an oversimplification which will be rectified shortly.
16. We will say more about both the construction and the interpretation of such DR's as we proceed. See also Kamp (1981b), Kamp and Rohrer (1983).
17. As with other kinds of contextual preconditions or presuppositions, it is not literally required that a past reference time is *already* available to the hearer – one will be added or assumed via the general process of accommodation if doing so does not create any conflicts with the prior context.
18. The reader may wonder (as one referee did) why I haven't added a helpful graphic display of the resulting structure with little circles along a time line, as in some examples in Kamp and Rohrer (1983). The reason is that Kamp's and Hinrichs' rules in general provide only partial information about precedence and inclusion among the introduced events and states, and it is in many cases difficult or impossible to draw a graphic display that contains *only* the information provided in the DRS. In the case of DR(15) it is the information about s_1 and s_2 that is hard to draw.

    The relation between DRS's and graphic representations of ordered event structures has not been addressed explicitly in any work that I know of: the question is potentially important for theories of language comprehension. Discussion of related issues in other domains, e.g. discourse about spatial relations, can be found in Johnson-Laird (1983). Johnson-Laird has conducted experiments to study differences in comprehension strategy for discourses like (i), which can be mapped into a determinate partial model and those like (ii) which cannot.

    (i) *A* is to the right of *B*. *C* is to the right of *A*.
    (ii) *A* is to the right of *B*. *C* is to the right of *B*.

19. In particular, Dowty's arguments described in Note 14 challenge the inclusion at this level of any conditions that depend on aspectual distinctions (here simplified to the event/state dichotomy). I believe that a potential resolution may lie in a clearer articulation of the dynamic aspects of DRS-construction and the corresponding dynamic aspects of context change as it both affects and is affected by interpretation. To make this more concrete, note that there are just two points in Hinrichs' DRS construction rules where the event/state dichotomy makes a difference: (i) in the choice between the conditions "$e_i \subseteq r_p$" and "$r_p \subseteq s_i$" relating a given event/state description to the current reference time, and (ii) in whether a new reference time is introduced or not at the end of processing a simple clause. For the first, we could let the syntax-driven DRS construction rules introduce a free context-dependent variable over temporal relations, whose value will be determined as '$\subseteq$' or '$\supseteq$' from the context

after the clause has been interpreted; for the second, the syntax-driven rules could in effect just say 'reset r_p' at the end of each simple clause, deferring until further interpretation of the clause in context the decision as to whether the reference time has moved forward or not. I am not at all sure of the best way to articulate the implement such suggestions, however.

20. See the chapters on 'egocentric logic' in Prior and Fine (1977) for discussion of a totally different logically possible (but linguistically implausible) way of assimilating pronouns to tenses, treating both as operators.
21. Another principal shortcoming of the proposal of Partee (1973), not to mention its inexplicitness about the mapping from syntax to semantics, was its failure to extend from *when*-clauses to *before*- and *after*-clauses, a direct consequence of the attempt, in effect, to make direct anaphoric connection to 'event times' without the intermediary of 'reference times'. It also failed to account for a number of uses of past perfect; Hinrichs includes extensive treatment of past perfect, which I am ignoring here for simplicity.
22. See Cooper (1979b) for discussion of both this problem and a similar problem concerning subject-agreement markers in languages where the subject is only optionally present, so that the agreement marker may be redundant or not. Cooper notes that such phenomena may be particularly numerous in polysynthetic languages; his suggested solution for such cases invokes the notion of 'rule clusters' and requires in the temporal case that the past tense operator and the time adverb be added by a single syntactic rule when both are present, and thus differs from the approach of Bach and Parsons discussed below and that of Hinrichs.
23. Hinrichs treats postposed and proposed temporal adverbs alike; I would rather restrict this account to preposed adverbs and leave internal and final adverbs out of consideration in this paper. See Note 32.
24. I am following a suggestion of Ewan Klein in making the form of the 'update' statements purposely resemble variable assignment statements used in programming languages.
25. A referee suggested that a clearer example of main-clause events preceding the *when*-clause event might be (i):

    (i) When Smith spoke, Jones introduced him.

    Actually, it seems to me that in both (18b) and (i), there is a strong tendency to interpret the *when*-clause event description broadly so that the main-clause event occurs within it, throwing a party can include planning and sending invitations, and the introduction of the speaker can be counted as part of a speaking event. The fact that we automatically construe *spoke* in (i) as 'making a speech' supports this idea.
26. I recognize that this is a controversial assumption, one that will probably have to be replaced by a more elaborate theory of the interaction among content, context, inference, and implicatures. Perhaps all that the grammar determines in the initial stages of DRS construction is a free relation variable connecting the eventuality-referent with the newly introduced reference time, and the setting of specific values like 'just after' is the result of subsequent processes involved in integrating the information in the DRS with background knowledge and contextual information. In any case, I believe that the 'just after' condition will turn out to be parallel in the *when*-clause constructions and strings of simple sentences.

27. To make this change, we must claim that sentence-initial *when*-clauses within discourses in the linear progression mode must be event-clauses and not state-clauses, since we could not otherwise characterize the introduced reference time as 'just after' the *when*-clause event. We will argue for this claim below in connection with examples (19) and (20).
28. Ewan Klein has suggested the following formal characterization of my notion of 'just after', which I accept: e' is *just after* e iff e' is after e and there is no contextually relevant e'' between e' and e. See also Note 35.
29. The only changes in DRS (16) to yield the ordering shown in (17″) are the replacement of the three conditions numbered (8) by the condition(s) '$r_1 < e_1 \leq r_2 <$ now' and the deletion of the condition '$e_2 \subseteq r_2$' in step (10).
30. Both Hinrichs' original treatment and my modification of it account for the difference between (19) and (20). Closer inspection of (20) shows one of my reasons for the modification: on Hinrichs' account, since 'the room was empty' describes a state, that state should surround the event of the janitors coming in, which it cannot. I believe we have to reinterpret states as inchoatives to fit them into *when*-clauses (at least preposed ones in linear narrative); then on my account the reference time is characterized as a time just after the room emptied, which seems correct.
31. The ontological status of states remains unclear, but I can try to elucidate what I have in mind. States can be temporally unbounded, but with those which are bounded on at least one end one could associate a corresponding event of beginning-to-hold (inchoative) or ending (terminative). With those which are bounded on both ends one can in principle associate a corresponding event temporally coinciding with the state ('holistic'). 'After Mary was in the hospital', for instance, is ambiguous: it can mean after she began to be in the hospital (inchoative), or after her whole hospital stay (which could be analyzed as either terminative or holistic). *When*-clauses in general can contain state and process descriptions, but not (I am claiming) in linear narrative. There, as in (20), it seems that an inchoative reading is always imposed. I leave as open problems the best way to characterize these effects and the existence of 'terminative' and/or 'holistic' readings; the existence of inchoative readings is already widely accepted.
32. As noted earlier, Hinrichs always processes the subordinate clause first, even when it follows the main clause. I have limited my examples to cases where the subordinate clause comes first, because I don't believe the order of the clauses is irrelevant. There is more relevant literature than I care to try to cite – but one would have to consider issues of real-time processing, within-sentence temporal iconicity, topic-focus structure, backwards anaphora, S- versus VP-attachment of temporal adverbial clauses, and restrictive versus non-restrictive adverbial clauses. I believe that sentence-internal adverbs can help characterize event types; see Bach (1980). Some preposed temporal adverbs are probably topicalized VP-adverbs; I leave them out of consideration here.
33. And in fact if we didn't have independent reasons to invoke the notion of reference time we could also achieve an appropriate linking with a condition '$e_1 \subseteq s_1$' in the consequent box, since e_1 and s_1, like discourse entities, can also end up having either particular or 'variable' referents depending on the embedding condition of the DRS's in which they occur.
34. The requirement that e_1 precede 'now' is in this case redundant, given the condition '$e_1 \subseteq r_0$' and the specification of r_0 as a past reference time, but is included since it is automatically generated by the rules processing the first clause.

35. Since r_1 is in the antecedent, it is important to require that it be 'just after' e_1 or else the resulting truth conditions will be too weak, requiring only that Sam be asleep sometime after Mary telephoned, and that could be true if he only slept after the last of her phone calls. The notion of 'just after' needs to be explicated; it must clearly be a vague notion with its values constrained by context. If we tried to dispense with the reference times and require that s_1 surround or overlap e_1 directly, we would meet the argument from discourse (15) again in the shape of sentences like (i) and (ii)

(i) Whenever John turned off the light, it was pitch dark in the room.
(ii) Whenever John took all he wanted, there was nothing (left) for the rest of us.

Remko Scha (personal communication) suggests that the introduced reference time is typically understood as including the *end of* the given event (and the beginning of the associated 'resultant state' if there is one). This suggestion would appear to generalize nicely to a treatment of shifting 'reference location' for locative anaphora, where the resultant reference location at the end of processing a motion sentence is typically the end location ('goal') of the mover ('theme').

36. The only difference between the *when*-rule and the rules of *before*- and *after*-clauses is the relation between the introduced reference time and the event described by the clause; where DR_1 (27) has $e_1 \prec r_1$, an analogous DR_1 for (31) would have $r_1 < e_1$, and the one for *after* would have $e_1 < r_1$. The embedding conditions for universal/conditional DRS's universally quantify over the discourse events and reference times in the antecedent box. In the *when* case, each instantiation of e_1 effectively determines a corresponding time r_1 (just after it), but in the *before* and *after* cases, there would be many possible values of r_1 for each instantiation of e_1, and the embedding conditions would quantify over all of them. 'Just before' or 'ten minutes before' would work fine, since then there would be a determinate r_1 for each instantiation of e_1; but 'sometime before' wouldn't work, and I don't see any basis for arguing that 'before' means 'just before' rather than 'sometime before' in sentences like (31).
I am indebted to Johan van Benthem for the first of these points and for raising the question which is discussed in the second.

38. In particular I have completely omitted the parts of Hinrichs' system designed to account for discourses and multi-clause sentences containing mixtures of past and past perfect, and I have not seriously investigated the question of whether my suggested modifications of his system are compatible with those parts of it.

39. Hinrichs himself does keep reference time apart as part of a 'conversational scoreboard' in the sense of Lewis (1979). But I could not see how to extend his treatment of the quantificational and 'donkey-sentence' case without including the reference times explicitly within the DRS representation.

40. During the final stages of revision, I received a copy of Chierchia and Rooth (to appear), which addresses the issue of whether the configurational stipulation of subordination on which anaphoric accessibility in DRS's depends is really essential. The paper argues convincingly that it is not, and that the same results can be derived from the recursive definition of proper embeddability. Chierchia and Rooth show how the language of DRS's can be reformulated to more closely resemble the language of first-order predicate logic, bringing out parallels between discourse entities and variables and showing how 'accessibility' for pronouns follows from the semantics just as it follows from the semantics of first-order logic which variables are bound by which quantifiers. They discuss the present paper as well and show that their results can be carried over to this treatment of discourse events and reference times.

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The Organization of Ideological Diversity in Discourse: Modern and Neotraditional Visions of the Tongan State

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Today, various intellectual developments converge and intertwine in directing anthropologists' attention to intrasocietal diversity in interpretive perspectives. Most recently, postmodernism has affected a range of disciplines, including our own, by heightening awareness of the way people around the world are bombarded by multiple social realities (Harvey 1990; Lyotard 1984). In many parts of the island Pacific, multiple, recognizably distinct representations of nation-states are produced by those involved in political processes. In this article I examine the organization of "neotraditional" and "modern" nation-constituting discourses in Tonga and other Pacific island nations, and I ask how we can draw on contemporary anthropological ideas about ideological diversity to make sense of the configuration of these political ideas.

Attention first focuses on the organization of ideological diversity in the Tonga Magistrate's Courts. I argue that in the courts crimes are framed in both modern legal terms and distinctly Tongan moral, neo-traditional terms. Here I conceptualize the legal domain as an important locus of nation-state-authorized representations of the nation. Discussion then turns to other domains of Tongan political life, in which one does not find the same accommodative configuration of traditional and modern nationalisms. Instead, very local and different ways of representing the nation coexist within the one country of Tonga. Finally, I compare the nature and organization of diversity in traditional and modern nationalist discourses in Tonga with those of other Pacific nations, to identify factors that contribute to similarities and differences in the nature and order of such discourses. I argue that some anthropological treatments of culture that have been influenced by postmodernism and Marxism make impor-

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contributions to furthering understanding of both movement and structure in the play of ideological diversity. But it is also useful to think of ideas as being organized through discourse structure into ecological relationships, or to envision an ecology of ideas.

Anthropological Approaches to Ideological Diversity

The postmodern condition has been characterized as lacking a master narrative, a coherent interpretive framework from within which the world is lived (Harvey 1990; Lyotard 1984). Instead, people are confronted with fragments from a variety of master narratives so that we experience multiple realities.

The cause of this multiplication of interpretive perspectives is globalization, more specifically global capitalism, technological change, and rapid information transmission. Twentieth-century scholars have attributed the alienation of the modern period to this same fragmenting of reality (e.g., Burger and Luckmann 1967). But associated with postmodernism is the idea that the process of being bombarded with large numbers of interpretive perspectives has been intensified and sped up by recent capitalist global economic processes. Rapid movement of culture, then, is considered characteristic of the present period.

Arjun Appadurai (1996) envisions culture as moving across national boundaries. This is an idea that destabilizes the naturalness of nation-states and that questions their present and future relevance in the world. The culture that moves across national boundaries takes many forms. Appadurai's work is associated with the movement of commodities as well as of people. For many anthropologists, his work brings to mind immigrants who are drawn from economic peripheries to economic centers, where they provide cheap labor and from which they send money home. Michael Fischer (1999) sees the movement of culture in mediated communication: newspapers, radio, television, and the Internet. But always, I suggest, ideas are in these forms of movement of culture.

Ulf Hannerz (1992, 1996) views the predominant direction of the flow of culture across national boundaries as going from economic centers to economic peripheries. Nations considered to be on the economic periphery in global capitalism buy commodities and receive television programs from the centers. The assumption that movement of culture is from centers to peripheries is strong in anthropology, despite the attention that has been given to the movement of people from peripheries to centers.

Images drawn from the behavior of water or liquid to characterize cultural movement have been attractive to many anthropologists. Appadurai (1996) and Hannerz (1996) use the term "*flow*." Joseph Errington (1998) speaks of "saturation" in describing the movement of Indonesian state culture from centers to peripheries. These images suggest that culture moves over landscape in rivers and waves and that it is formless.

At any given point in time, however, there is also structure in the flow of culture. Marx-influenced anthropological accounts of cultural diversity have made important contributions to scholarly thinking about how multiple

ideological positions within a given society are related, both in and through time. These accounts, like the key ideas associated with postmodernism, have also laid some of the groundwork for the interest in multiple cultural perspectives in analysis of globalization processes. In Marxist traditions, ideological perspectives have been given a boundedness and a discreteness that is not favored in the recent anthropological thinking that emphasizes the movement of culture. Central to the Marxist accounts of ideological diversity is the recognition that any two ideologies or ideological stances are structured vis-à-vis one another in a relationship of domination and subordination. This relationship is characterized by resistance of the subordinate against the dominant and by opposition and struggle between competing ideologies.

Studies of intrasocietal diversity in gender ideology (e.g., Abu-Lughod 1986; Kennedy and Davis 1993; Sanday and Goodenough 1990) were among the first to apply Marxist visions of class struggle, like that of Paul Willis (1977), to other sectional interests, specifically to male domination and female resistance (Philips 2001, 2003). In analyses of colonial contacts, authors such as Ann Stoler (1989), John Kelly (1991), and Lata Mani (1998) not only distinguish between the perspectives of the colonizer and the colonized, but they also distinguish within or among groups of colonizers and colonized. These works, as well as some less focused on colonialism per se (e.g., Dominguez 1986) also pursue the historically contingent nature of ideological positions.

Most relevant to this article are studies of the culture of nationalism that identify different kinds and sources of representation of the nation, both within individual nations and from country to country. Multiple representations of the nation that come from different sources are often described as being structured in relations of competition, contestation, and struggle for dominance (Dominguez and Wu 1998; Foster 1995a; Moore 1993). Some of these representations are produced by the state and some are not. Legal representations are among those conceived of as produced by contemporary states (Gramsci 1971). Legal representations of nations have been held necessary to the creation and legitimization of states since at least the 18th century, when a modern concept of law as the basis for the authority of states became widely established (Fitzpatrick 1992). Within law itself, visions of the nation are multiple (Tigar and Levy 1977), and it is with such multiple legal visions that this article is substantively concerned.

Several major sources of social differentiation have been identified as key bases for oppositional representations of the nation. Because of a long-standing European preoccupation with the idea that, to be maximally stable politically, a nation should ideally be culturally homogeneous and therefore made up of one ethnic group, researchers are well aware that different ethnic groups within a nation's boundaries may have different visions of the nation. And where one ethnic group is politically dominant, the ethnicized nationalism of the state will reflect that dominance (e.g., Blommaert and Verschueren 1998). State and civil society (Gramsci 1971) or the state and the people over which it rules (Herzfeld 1997) are sometimes represented as having different visions of the nation. And colonial and indigenous visions of the nation are also contrasted, especially as independence is achieved (Foster 1995b; Otto and Thomas 1997b). As I describe

below, in the Pacific, neotraditional visions of the nation-state are opposed not only to those of the colonial era but also to democracy and modernism. Slippage and overlap in meaning also occur between the Western alternatives to traditionalism – of colonialism, democracy, and modernism – so that in some situations these terms for Western forms are used interchangeably and influence one another's meanings.

One problem with Marxist representations of relations between different ideological positions is that usually they posit only one ideological opposition for any given society and assume homogeneity and coherence within each perspective. Here I describe how the configuration of multiple ideologies varies in Tonga, depending on the political domain being examined. The Marxist tradition is also problematic in that it invariably conceptualizes ideological multiplicity as involving relations of domination and subordination and struggle. As I show, in Tonga, multiple ideologies can be configured in other ways.

The strength of transnational visions of cultural diversity lies in their emphasis on cultural movement, whereas the strength of Marxist visions of cultural diversity lies in their attention to structure. Both perspectives would benefit from a greater commitment to the examination of ideologies as manifest in on-the-ground social practices. A discourse-analytic perspective can be useful to this end.

The ethnography of communication is a foundational source for linguistic anthropological visions of the organization of ideological diversity in discourse.[1] Central here is the idea that speech events, speech genres, and specific oral texts have internal sequential structures. Thus, a church service as a speech event can be conceptualized as involving a sequential ordering of speech genres that constitute the largest units of discourse in that event – speech genres including hymn, prayer, sermon, and offering. Or a trial can be seen as consisting of a fixed sequence beginning with opening statements, followed by testimony, and ending with closing statements. Each of these trial units also has an internal sequential structure that orders the opposition between prosecution and defense.

An event like a church service or a trial can be said to be ideologically coherent in some respects. A church service may, for example, reflect a religious denominational perspective, say a Catholic or a Methodist perspective, through and through. Similarly, a court trial is constrained throughout by a single body of evidence law. At the same time, a sequence of discourse units may also entail shifts in interpretive perspective of one kind or another as the activity moves from one unit of discourse to the next. The oppositional perspectives of prosecution and defense, which are repeatedly alternated in trials, provide a well-known example of such shifts in perspective.

I am concerned here with routine and predictable shifts in cultural interpretive frames that are built into the global structures of forms of discourse. But this work builds on several approaches within linguistic anthropology that have been concerned with the analysis of linguistic devices used to signal more locally managed emergent shifts in interpretive perspective. These approaches include John Gumperz's (1982) work on contextualization cues, Erving Goffman's (1974, 1981)

analysis of framing (see also Tannen 1993), and Mikhail Bakhtin's (1981) concept of voices (see also Hill 1995).

The internal sequential structure of discourse, then, organizes ideological diversity at the level of face-to-face interaction, or practice. I argue in this article that it is useful to think of the structure of ideological diversity in discourse as entailing an ecology of ideas. In this context metaphorical images involving plants may prove more apt than those involving water for capturing both the movement and the structuring of ideas. For I suggest here that just as plants enter into ecological relationships with other plants as they colonize new environments, so, too, do ideas enter into particular configurations as they colonize discourse. And some environments are more hospitable to certain ideas than others are.

In the discussion to follow I show how, in Tongan criminal proceedings, magistrates who represent the Tongan state regularly and predictably alternate between more British-influenced legal framings of crimes and more Tongan-based moral framings of crimes in the sequential structure of courtroom discourse. They reproduce a Tongan nation that is both modern and traditional as they do so. The particular ideological configuration I document I then consider as one of many microstructurings of multiple ideologies in Tonga and in other Pacific societies.

Background

As a nation of approximately 100,000 people, Tonga would be considered a microstate in contemporary terms, but it is also home to one of the larger Polynesian populations that is not part of a culturally European nation. Tonga is a constitutional monarchy, ruled by a king. Tonga's Magistrate's Courts are lower-level national courts in a two-tier system. The Supreme Court is the higher-level court, and it is a court of general jurisdiction, which means that it is both a trial court and a court of appeal for the Magistrate's Courts. Magistrate's Courts, in principle, are limited by law to the hearing of criminal misdemeanors and small civil claims, although, at the discretion of the Supreme Court judges, they also sometimes hear more serious cases. All of the court personnel in the Magistrate's Courts are Tongan – the magistrates, the police prosecutors, the defense lawyers, the clerks, and the police officers. The procedures are all conducted in the Tongan language. In contrast, the judges in the higher-level Supreme Court are British, and the procedures are bilingual in Tongan and English.

Magistrate's Courts have been in existence since the 1840s, when Tāufa'āhau, who later became the first king of Tonga, produced his first code of laws, the Vava'u Code of 1839. In doing so, he followed the suggestion of Wesleyan missionaries. They advised him that if he wanted to maintain independence for Tonga, it was desirable for Tonga to closely resemble a European nation, which meant, among other things, instituting rule by law. Creating a set of laws for the islands of Tonga was thus a crucial step in making Tonga resemble European nations. Sione Lātukefū (1974) sees Tāufa'āhau's creation of his own magistrates

through the Vava'u Code as an important political move that took away from chiefs the authority to resolve disputes and reserved that authority to Tāufa'āhau as future king and to the emerging Tongan state.

Since that first move, Tongan law and Tongan courts have been involved in a continual process of modernization and Westernization. Despite Tongans' efforts to present evidence to the outside world, particularly the British outside world, that their local polity resembled a European nation, Great Britain made Tonga a protectorate in 1900, a status Tonga retained until receiving independence in 1970. Tonga itself was not so much of interest to the British as it was perceived to be within the geographical sphere around Fiji, which the British needed to control to establish and maintain sugar cane plantations in Fiji using East Indian labor (Scarr 1967). Elizabeth Wood-Ellem (1999) documents some of the struggles between Queen Sālote and the British chief justices of the Tongan Supreme Court during the early middle part of the 20th century. Today the constant transformation of the Tongan legal system continues, in part through the influence of the British judges of the Supreme Court.

Law, then, has long been and continues to be an important site for an imagining of the Tongan nation-state that articulates Tonga with the rest of the world.

The Sequential Structure of the Tongan Criminal Proceeding

Tongan criminal misdemeanor cases have what I refer to as a "global discourse structure." This term comes from Gregory Matoesian's (1993) analysis of rape trials. It refers to an underlying or abstract sequential structure of units of discourse that make up a larger unit. Matoesian used the concept to distinguish between the "global" structure of a trial (which would be made up of such sequentially ordered units as jury selection, opening statements, prosecution case, defense case, and closing statements) and its moment-by-moment "local" management.

The global structure of the criminal misdemeanor procedure in the Tongan Magistrate's Courts is familiar, in that it is similar to what one would see in U.S. courts. As I have already noted, however, the procedure takes place entirely in Tongan, and Tongans consider all of what goes on in Tongan legal activity to be Tongan. The familiarity of the procedure is due primarily to U.S. and Tongan shared legal heritage as former British colonies and to transnational processes of legal change that, as I indicated earlier, go on continuously. Figure 1 is a summary representation of this global structure. As shown in this figure, the procedure has seven separate and distinguishable sections, topics, or discourse units. But this representation of the global structure of the procedure also shows that these seven topics can be grouped into three parts: a beginning, a middle, and an end.

The basic point to be made about these three parts, which I elaborate in later sections of this article, is that the beginning and end parts draw on British legal ideology, whereas the middle part draws ideologically on traditional Tongan morality.

Data Base

The data to be analyzed here come from 18 hours of transcribed and translated tape recordings of Magistrate's Court proceedings in two jurisdictions, a regional rural court and a town court, on the main island of Tongatapu. This body of data represents approximately half of the data actually tape-recorded in such courts during the period 1987–89.

Beginning	**Legal Outer Framing**
Call of the Case Charge Plea	
Middle	Moral Inner Core
Factual/Moral Basis for Charge Testimony Counseling	
End	Legal Outer Framing
Sentencing	

Figure 1: Sequential structure of Tongan criminal misdemeanor procedure

Table 1 provides a breakdown of the kinds of cases that were completely resolved during those 18 hours of proceedings, as opposed to the far more numerous cases that were only partially heard and were continued or postponed to a later time. Approximately one-third of the 86 cases, or 31, involved vehicle violations, most commonly, failure to have obtained quarterly vehicle licenses (yes, one had to purchase them four times a year) or nonfunctioning taillights and lights over license plates. Another third of the cases, or 28, came from the arrests of people who were drunk in public places, usually along the roads where people walked, but also in hotels and at weekend dances held in village halls all over the island.

Misdemeanor crimes in those two high-frequency categories are considered less serious than crimes in the remaining two categories: verbal and physical aggression (18 cases), consisting of charges of "bad language" and of assault, and property violations, including theft and property damage (9 cases). Together these two categories comprise the remaining third of the completed cases. The greater seriousness of these cases was reflected both in more severe sentences or higher fines given to those found guilty and in the more frequent and lengthier moralizing about the badness of the acts involved. I use cases of bad language, assault, and theft in the following section to illustrate the contrast between the modern legal external framing in the beginning and ending of court proceedings and the Tongan traditional moral evaluation of cases in the middle, or center, of proceedings.

Table 1: Criminal charges disposed of in magistrate's court

Criminal charge	Number of cases
Drunk in public place	28
Aggression	
Bad language	6
Assault	12
Property violations	
Theft	5
Property destruction	2
Trespass	2
Vehicle violations	31
Total	86

Note: Based on 18 hours of transcribed tape recordings of magistrate's court procedures (approximately half of the taped magistrate's court data base) in two jurisdictions presided over by four magistrates in ten court sessions, 1987–89.

The number of charges rather than the number of defendants or hearings/cases is counted. A few were charged with more than one crime. A few hearings/cases involving more than one defendant in the same event were heard together. Magistrates found defendants guilty on all charges but one, regardless of plea. Includes only completed cases with disposition and does not include the more numerous cases that were cancelled or postponed, often after partial hearing.

Traditional and Modern Representations of the Nation in the Tongan Magistrate's Courts

The discourse structure of the Tongan criminal procedure organizes ideas ideologically into an outer frame derived from modern law shared by all nations and an inner core that interprets bad acts in ways marked as distinctly Tongan and traditional. Tonga is projected both as a modern nation among nations, like other nations, and as a distinctly Tongan nation with roots in and authority from a precontact historic past.

The legal framing identifies Tonga as a nation ruled by law, like other nations around the world. It reproduces the courts and the roles of judge, policeman, defendant, victim, and witness that exist in all nations. The legal framing is evident in discourse units, such as the call of the case and the taking of a plea, that one can find reproduced on any day of the week in U.S. courts. Through the legal activity a permanent written record of the crime is created, to be controlled by the Tongan government in a perpetual surveillance of its citizens. The legal framing also links the defendant to the violation of specific written laws. These laws, in turn, constitute a Tongan nation-state that is committed to the "rule of law."

The legal framing offers a universalistic rhetoric in which any person who violates the law can be found guilty. Written statutes actually specify that the

law is violated by "any person" who engages in particular actions (e.g., Law of Tonga 1966:315) This means that a defendant's social identities are not relevant to the evaluation of what he or she is alleged to have done. The idea that people of a nation are "equal under the law" is important ideologically in global democratic rhetoric.

A legal rationale that applies equally to all citizens of the nation-state is part of what makes Tonga a "modern" nation-state. Many Tongans value Tonga's modernness as intrinsically worthy (e.g., Helu 1992). It is also in Tongans' interest that their state be perceived by outsider Europeans as modern and up-to-date in its laws and legal system. This perception helps Tonga maintain the same "plausibility" as a nation, and, therefore, the same autonomy, for which Tongans were striving in the middle of the 19th century, when they produced their first law code to prove to Westerners that they could govern themselves.

The Tongan moral framing that prevails in the center of the criminal proceeding differs from that of the external legal framing. It identifies the Tongan nation-state as distinctly Tongan and appeals in its authority to the loyalty of a specific ethnic identity, that of Tongans. Here one finds the magistrate and the police prosecutor, and sometimes other players, using a strong moralizing tone, lecturing and reproaching the defendant. One finds apologizing and counseling of the types common in everyday Tongan discourses, not to mention those of other Pacific societies.

One also finds explicit invocation of *anga faka-Tonga*, 'the Tongan way,' in the center of the criminal proceeding, and reference is made to the way in which bad acts defined as criminal go against the Tongan way.[2] Invocation of the Tongan way is a key expression of the ideas of tradition and custom in the middle of the legal procedure. Reference to anga faka-Tonga connects the Tongan pre-European-contact past with present-day Tonga and Tongan ways of doing things. What Tongans consider anga faka-Tonga today would be considered neotraditional by anthropologists. To the outside, the Tongan way would also be seen as incorporating much that is recognizably Western European. Yet it is still distinctly Tongan ideology in practice, as I demonstrate below.

A final important way that the moral center of the procedure is different from its outer legal framing lies in the way that parties to the proceedings imagine the defendant, victim, and witnesses. These roles are imagined as existing in particular kinds of relationships involving aspects of social identity that are central to Tongan life. The magistrate and the police prosecutor evaluate the bad act of the defendant in light of expectations of those social roles. For example, a chronic thief, a person who has pulled plants out of the growing gardens of others, will be asked if he is a farmer or a landowner. If he is a landowner, why is he not a farmer? Why does he not grow his own food instead of taking that of others?

Often, something about the position of the defendant is imagined in a way that gives him more than average responsibility or duty, which he has failed to fulfill, and calls for restraint of some kind that he has lacked. Thus, the man who has his own land or is a farmer yet who steals the crops of others should be particularly ashamed.

So, whereas the framing rhetoric of law is universalistic, the Tongan moralizing in the middle of the procedure is not. It deals with roles and role relationships central to the way Tongans make sense of social action, and what those roles are shifts from case to case.

I now look more closely at the legal external framing and the moral center of Tongan Magistrate's Court criminal proceedings, drawing on cases of assault, theft, and bad language, the most serious kinds of charges in the data base, to illustrate their qualities.

The Legal Framing

The "beginning" of the procedure comprises the call of the case, the charge, and the plea. The call of the case consists of a clerk calling the defendant's name and case number to summon the defendant forward. The case number tied to the defendant's name is a fundamental feature of the government's written record keeping of activities in the court system.

The charge, read to the defendant by the magistrate, is a formulaic but factual description of the crime the defendant is charged with and includes the date and place where the act was committed and identification of the statute under which the defendant is being charged. Literally all of these same elements are present in the beginning of U.S. guilty plea procedures (Philips 1998). Through these elements in the individual defendant's procedure, the specifics of the defendant's case are linked indexically to the general and abstract written law that governs the nation.

The following transcript excerpt illustrates the form of the charge.[3]

Transcript excerpt 1

Ko e me'a 'i he faka'ilo
The thing reported

mai kiate au, 'a e me'a
to me, the thing

ko ia na'a ke fai 'i he
that thing you did on the

taha ono
nineteenth

Septima taha hiva valu fitu
September, 1987,

'i Houma. Na'a ke leakovi'i
in Houma. You swore

'i he hala pule'anga 'o e
on the government road in the

loto kolo 'o Houma . . .
center of Houma . . .

Maumau ai e kupu tolu,
Breaking Section 3,

Palakalafi ono, vahe ua ono
Paragraph 6, Chapter 26

Lao 'o Tonga.
Law of Tonga.

In this instance, the charge is one of swearing, or using bad language in a public place. Note the reference to *hala pule'anga*, 'government road,' and to *loto kolo*, 'village center.' Both are public places. The key and core phrase is *leakovi'i*, 'You swore." Every charge contains such a formulaic accusation in verb form, as in "Na'a ke tā," "You hit," in assault charges, and "Na'a ke kaiha'a," "You stole," in theft charges.

Transcript excerpts 2 and 3 illustrate the parallel construction in instances of these charges:

Transcript excerpt 2

Na'a ke tā,
You hit,

maumau ai 'e kupu 104a
breaking Section 104a

'o e Lao 'o Tonga
of the Law of Tonga

ki he ngaahi hia.
for all crimes.

Transcript excerpt 3

Na'a ke kaiha'a
You stole

maumau'i ai 'e kupu 133a
breaking section 133a

'o e Lao 'o Tonga
of the Law of Tonga

ki he ngaahi hia ia.
for all crimes.

In the first part of the procedure, the defendant is also asked by the magistrate to plead guilty or innocent. Overwhelmingly, defendants plead guilty. But in contrast to U.S. criminal procedure, in which those who plead guilty and those who plead not guilty are treated very differently, the global structure of the Tongan criminal procedure remains similar following the formal plea itself, both for those who plead guilty and for those who plead innocent.

The "end" of the procedure consists of the sentencing, in which the magistrate tells the defendant what his sentence is. Here is the sentence in the bad language case:

Transcript excerpt 4

Na'a fai 'i he feitu'u fakapule'anga,
It was done in a public place,

ko e hia ia 'oku mamafa (ange). [#5]
this crime is expensive. [#5]

Mo'ua pa'anga fitu, ē?
Fined seven dollars, eh?

The sentence is usually a fine; failure to pay the fine results in time in prison. Two dollars is the lowest fine, so a seven-dollar fine, as in the bad language case, is relatively high, particularly in a society where few people have a cash income. The sentencing is always the external ending boundary of the procedure.

Both the beginning and the end of the procedure are abbreviated and highly routinized. Anyone in any nation could be treated this way in court. The same information is given by the magistrate and received by the defendant in each case. One learns little to nothing about the defendant, usually a male, or what he did from these framing sections. In some less serious cases – the automobile violations and the public drunkenness cases – these beginnings and endings often constitute the entire procedure.

The Moral Center

In the "middle" of the procedure, the magistrate first turns the floor over to the police prosecutor, who offers what I refer to in Figure 1 as a factual basis for the charge. Here the policeman describes in greater detail to the magistrate just what it is that the defendant did. He also tells the magistrate whether the defendant has a criminal record and, if so, what it contains. He usually also offers the first moral evaluation of the defendant's action in Tongan cultural terms. This evaluation entails both emotionally laden words of condemnation and explanations of why what the defendant did was bad. To call this part of the procedure the moral basis rather than the factual basis for the criminal charge in the Tongan court might be more appropriate.

In the testimony that often follows the statement of factual basis, the magistrate takes back control of the floor and invites statements from and asks questions of the defendant and of any victims or witnesses who might be present. But testimony does not always occur. If it does, it occurs at this juncture, in cases of both guilty pleas and not guilty pleas. In this unit of discourse, people not only testify as to what happened but also offer moral evaluations of the events they describe, as the police prosecutor has done before them.

Defendants often offer apologies to victims, and victims often express their forgiveness to defendants. But apology is not always followed by forgiveness, and forgiveness is not always preceded by apology. As I noted earlier, ritualized public apology in conflict resolution is held by Pacific anthropologists to be an areal cultural trait for conflict resolution in Polynesia (e.g., Rensel and Howard 1995),

although its occurrence is also well documented for Fiji (Arno 1993; Hickson 1975). Apologizing and forgiving can be thought of as Tongan speech genres that are inserted into the middle of a recognizably Western European legal procedure.

'Counseling' follows testimony and closes the middle of the procedure. The quote marks around the term indicate that it is a gloss for the Tongan word *'akonaki*. 'Akonaki is a Tongan genre of discourse. Persons in authority counsel those under their authority who have been involved in conflict, and counseling usually takes place in relatively private situations. Parents do it with children, and ministers do it with members of their congregation. Counseling is also well documented for Polynesia and parts of Melanesia (Boggs and Chun 1990; Watson-Gegeo and Gegeo 1990).

In court, the magistrate directs his attention to the defendant and talks to him about why what he did was a bad thing to do and how he should stop this bad behavior. Every kind of case I have mentioned received moral evaluation from police prosecutors and magistrates, including evaluations oriented around features of the parties' social identities. For example, those drunk on the road were told that they could either be killed or cause an accident because of their behavior (usually depicted by police prosecutors as a staggering and weaving walk), and older men were reproached for being old enough to know better and for leading younger men into trouble. But not every *instance* of each kind of case received a moral evaluation. Only in the cases of bad language, assault, and harm to property did virtually every instance entail elaborate moralizing, which was predictably tailored to the crime in some way as well as to the identities of the parties involved.

What is more, each type of case – assault, bad language, and theft – associated with a predictable kind of moralizing and an evocation of particular kinds of social identities, if they are even remotely relevant.

Assault

For example, in assault cases, the relative ages of the defendant and the victim are regularly a focus of the magistrate's attention. Most of the assault cases stem from conflicts between young men that took place in public contexts. Relative age is brought up explicitly in the moral evaluation of every assault case in which the defendant is older than the victim, which was true in most of the assault cases.

Transcript excerpts 4, 5, and 6 are all derived from one assault case and show how the magistrate repeatedly returns to the age issue:

Transcript excerpt 5

Sione, 'oku ke ta'u uo **ua**.
Sione, you are 22.

Lau ta'u 'e fitu
Count seven years

Pea toki 'au ki he tokotaha launga.
before the complainant reaches you.

Transcript excerpt 6

'Oku kei si'i . . .
He is still young

Transcript excerpt 7

Ka neongo ia kuo fakamolemole'i
Although this young

koe 'e he ki'i tokotaha ko 'eni
person has forgiven you,

mahalo 'oku 'ilifia pē
maybe he is just afraid

. . . he 'oku ke fu'u lahi koe.
. . . because you are older.

Implicit in such moral evaluations is the idea that the older person should not hit the younger person, in part because the older person should have more self-restraint and should set a good example. Defendants in these cases, however, sometimes explained that they felt they were owed but had not been shown respect by their younger victims. They offered this information as a mitigating factor in the evaluation of their behavior.

Relative age was also pertinent in other kinds of cases, but less regularly so. Specifically, in male youth group cases, such as group theft, group stoning of a vehicle, and group making of home brew, older defendants in the group being charged with the crime were singled out for greater legal attention. They were given longer lectures and stiffer fines than younger defendants for having led others in crime and for having acted as bad examples.

Magistrates often asked young defendants what their birth-order position was within the family. Several times when the defendant was very far down the birth order, for instance, the tenth or later child, I heard magistrates express the opinion that he probably was not getting enough attention from his parents.

Birth order matters generally because, interacting with gender, it helps determine the relative rank of a child within his or her sibling group, according to Tongan normative ideas about these things. The family is the crucible in which children learn how to negotiate relative rank. Tongans carry their family experiences of rank with them through life and apply those experiences by analogy to other relationships. The senior–junior relationship, then, is more generally what seems to be at issue in court proceedings.

Some senior–junior rankings raised in the court are clearly of a modern nature. For example, in one case of assault, the older defendant was an insurance agent, whereas the younger victim drove a van for a hotel. The defendant suggested that his greater status as an insurance agent called for but did not elicit respect from the victim. Such instances are relatively recent mappings of enduring Tongan ways of thinking about the junior–senior relationship. Arguably, the defendant in this case was trying to make his interpretation part of a neotraditional concept of the junior–senior relationship. But in my data the defendants' efforts to argue that their own rank was disrespected were never

The senior–junior relationship is also one of those elaborated in traditional Tongan culture. For example, all kava ceremonies involve a ranked order of kava drinkers, with relative position determined by the participants' associations with ranked chiefly lines. These same lines are incorporated selectively into the Tongan state in the form of noble titles. The noble titles are ranked as well, and titles are also grouped into *ha'a*, fictive kin groups, each of which has senior and junior chiefly lines within it.

Their imagining of the defendant and the victim in a senior–junior relationship in assault cases, then, is an example of how magistrates highlight aspects of social identity important to Tongans as they condemn certain acts as bad.

Theft

Theft and property damage cases also are associated with a conventionalized Tongan morality. Specifically, in such cases, the term *fonua*, 'country,' is used in a way that suggests the defendant is not doing good for the nation. *Fonua* also means 'land.' In theft and property damage cases, magistrates urge defendants to "*nofo fakafonua*," which Tongans translated as 'be a good citizen.' To me, the phrase expresses something more like 'stay, keep with, or continue on doing for the country.' Magistrates also urged defendants in these cases to "*fai e me'a ma'a e fonua*," 'do good things for the country/village/people.' The focus of the moralizing in these cases, then, is on a harm done to a collective social body rather than, say, to an individual victim.

The prototypical case of theft is of crops or pigs. Root crop theft from gardens in the bush is so common that many victims do not bother to take it to court, but they let their awareness of the theft be widely known locally. I noted earlier that defendants who have access to land for farming are particularly chastised for stealing crops. When theft is from shops, the moralizing shifts to a focus on the defendant's getting a job or being a paid worker so that he can buy rather than steal, as in excerpt 8.

Transcript excerpt 8

Ko e mo'ui, Tomasi,
Life, Tomasi,

kuo pau ke te 'alu 'o ngaue
must be to go and work

ke ma'u 'e fa'ahinga me'a
to get the sort of thing

'oku te loto ki ai.
one desires from it.

'Oua te te 'alu kita
Don't go

fakapopula'i **e kakai**
and enslave **the people**

'o e fonua.
of the village/country.

'Oku fiema'u
If you want something

pea 'o ngāue totongi
then get a job

'o ma'u ai ki'i sēniti.
to get a little money.

The term *fonua* has strong traditional connotations that link past and present concepts of the Tongan political entity. It is a rich, multifaceted, and productive concept, often used metaphorically. For example, in the film Kava Kuo Heka: Royal Kava Ceremony of Tonga (1998), Eric Shumway discusses how the narcotic drink kava is referred to as "fonua" in royal kava ceremonies. The king's matāpule, or 'talking chief,' says to the noble on whom a title is being bestowed, and who has just been served the first cup of kava, "There (in your hands) is the country." In this context the precontact Tongan political entity composed of a Tui'i Tonga, chiefly title holders, and commoners is identified with the contemporary nation-state of constitutionally authorized king, nobles, and commoners through the use of the term *fonua*.

Whereas Shumway's example of the use of *fonua* has decidedly chiefly connotations, the invocation of fonua in the court cases connotes a commoner role. A chief may hold the land in his hands, metaphorically, but a commoner is expected to cultivate the soil, to provide labor. This obligation includes labor for the king and for the noble, as when messages are sent out to the villages to provide a certain number of *pola*, or 'feast trays' piled with food, for a given kingly or noble event involving a feast.

Theft cases thus activate the identity of Tongan citizen to reprimand the thief. The good Tongan citizen works for what he or she gets and does not simply take from the people (although some would argue this is exactly what nobles do). The image is one of a distinctly Tongan kind of citizenship, rooted in the role of the precontact commoner who labored on the land.

Bad Language

The majority of cases of *lea kovi*, or 'bad language,' are brought by young unmarried women against men. These cases involve situations in which men have spoken in anger to women in what is defined as a 'public place,' *feitu'u fakapule'anga*. Angry speech can involve swearing, threats, or imply insulting speech, usually shouted out. Elsewhere (Philips 2000), I discuss these cases in detail.

The particular traditional Tongan role relationship the magistrate imagines to be relevant in these cases is that between *tuonga'ane*, 'brother,' and *tuofefine*, 'sister,' the terms used in the cross-gender sibling relationship. These terms are also extended to cross-gender relations with more distant relatives, particularly cousins in the same generation. The brother–sister relationship is one calling for mutual respect, but especially for respect from the brother to the sister. The sister is ritually superior to or above the brother, and sisters have some authority

over brothers. Certain kinds of speech, particularly sexual joking and references to the body, are forbidden between brothers and sisters and forbidden to others when they are in the presence of men and women in a brother–sister relationship.

The brother–sister relationship is invoked in bad language cases when real relatives are involved, when brothers and sisters are present and overhear the angry speech, and even when a brother and sister may have heard about the event.

Among several key dyads, the brother–sister relationship is, ideologically, the most explicitly elaborated gender dyad at all levels of Tongan society. It figures prominently in historical accounts of the traditional Tongan polity (e.g. Māhina 1986) and in contemporary elaborations of Tongan nationalist discourses, particularly in newspaper, radio, and television accounts of the activities of the present king's daughter, Princess Pilolevu, who outranks her brothers, one of whom will be king someday.

In cases of bad language, magistrates regularly make reference to the brother–sister relationship. It is common for them to say something like, "No one knows if you might be related." In excerpt 9 below, the magistrate tells a defendant, "You don't know if they were your relatives," referring to the two young women at whom the defendant had sworn.

Transcript excerpt 9

Ko e 'ulungaanga palakū
That was a disgusting thing

na'a ke fai.
you did.

Na'a ō kinaua,
They two went,

ko si'i ongo faifekau
the two little missionaries

ke fakamafola
to spread the gospel

'e fu'u kape mai.
and you swore repeatedly.

'Ikai ke 'ilo na'a
You didn't know

ko **homou kāinga.**
if they were **your relatives.**

It is also common for magistrates to exhort the defendant, "*Nofo feua*," 'Stay mutually respectful.' This exhortation takes a form similar to that of exhortation given to thieves discussed in the previous section, "*Nofo fakafo*" 'Keep doing good for the country.' For Tongans, this exhortation to stay mutually respectful conjures up the image of a large public gathering where people not necessarily know one another. It is specifically the brother–sister relation-

and maintaining the mutual respectfulness associated with that relationship that are of prototypical concern when envisioning such a scenario.

In practice, then, the brother–sister relationship is the model for cross-gender conduct in Tongan public life that is generally offered in the bad language cases. In invoking this relationship, magistrates link present to past political orders and promulgate on behalf of the Tongan government a gendered nation-state for which the key trope is the family sibling dyad, the brother–sister relationship.

So far I have described how, in the middle of the criminal proceeding, magistrates offer a distinctively Tongan moral framing of the more serious criminal misdemeanors of assault, theft, and bad language. In each type of case, the defendant is imagined as involved in a particular kind of relationship with the victim and with others – the senior–junior relationship, the comember of village and nation relationship, and the brother-sister relationship.

Not all invocations of imagined identities, however, are tied to specific kinds of cases. The identity of Christian religious person, for example, is activated in a wide range of cases, and often this identity is activated by victim, witness, and defendant, as well as by prosecutor and magistrate.

Christians

For example, in Transcript excerpt 9, just discussed, the magistrate refers to the two young women who were sworn at as "ko e si'i ongo faifekau," which is understood in English as 'the two little Mormon missionaries.' This is mentioned, along with their possibly being "sisters" to the defendant, as a reason why the bad language is especially bad. The women themselves were the ones who had originally raised their religious identity in this case, suggesting they had been the target of religious persecution by the defendant. But the magistrate also chooses to follow up on their focus.

A second example of activation of religious identity comes from the assault case quoted earlier, in which the senior–junior relationship was emphasized. Here the police prosecutor was the one to raise the defendant's identity as a Christian:

Transcript excerpt 10

Ko e tangata ia
This man

'oku ne tauhi
is a caretaker

hangehangē ko ha pisope nai.
Acting like a bishop perhaps.

The defendant is a caretaker of and has janitorial responsibility for a Mormon chapel, and he assaulted the victim in the chapel. When the police prosecutor says that the caretaker is acting like a bishop, he is referring to the person with ministerial responsibilities, the person with the highest authority within the chapel. He is suggesting that the defendant acted like he was of higher status in the church hierarchy than was actually the case.

My final example of the use of religious identity is related to a charge of driving without a driver's license. The defendant offers religious pursuits as his reason for driving without a license, in his effort to mitigate what he has done:

Transcript excerpt 11

Kole atu pē 'eiki sea,
May I request your honorable chair,

ko e me'alele na'a ku hanga 'o ngaue 'aki
the vehicle I proceeded to use

ne u 'alu pē mo haku kaunga tangata pē
I only went with just my friends

ki Liahona ki he temipale.
to Liahona to the temple.

Ko e homau siasi.
It's our church.

In counseling the defendant, the magistrate responds to this explanation:

Transcript excerpt 12

Pea ko 'ete 'alu koe ki he temipale,
And as you go to the temple,

te fai lelei, fai totonu
do what is good and honest

pea ke toki hū ki he fale ko ia.
and then go into that house.

Kae 'oua te 'alu ta'e laiseni
But don't go without a license

he 'oku 'ikai ke tali 'e Sisu
because Jesus does not welcome

'a e lotu 'a e kau
the prayer of those who

'alu ta'e laiseni.
go without a license.

I have argued so far that when court personnel raise particular identities and apply them to parties involved in a crime, they are indicating that what is bad about the crime is the violation of expectations of behavior associated with those identities. Court personnel sometimes suggest that a crime is worse because the victims are Christians, as in the bad language case, indicating that Christians and their activities call for special respect. They also suggest that a crime is worse when the defendant is acting in a Christian role, as in the other examples, because the defendant is not behaving in a manner consistent with a Christian persona when he commits a crime.

Although Christianity may, on the surface, appear to be an ideological and organizational complex without precontact roots, its dominant forms in Tonga have been wedded to what are viewed by Tongans as traditional precontact Tongan ways of doing things. Here Christianity is aligned with a neotraditional order, as is common in Pacific societies. In Tonga, the dominant religious group, the 'Free Wesleyan Church,' or Siasi Uesiliana Tau'atāina, the king's church, produces much discourse that links it to a traditional political and cultural order. For example, kava ceremonies are held for the male leaders of the congregation before Sunday church services. During church services, repeated mention is made in greetings and prayers of the noble who controls the land where the village and the church are located. The beautiful and honorific forms of language used to talk about God and Jesus in church are also identified with the nobles and the king and are used to talk about them in other nonreligious contexts. At Sia'atoutai, the Free Wesleyan Church seminary for the nation, students are instructed in traditional ways of conversing around the kava bowl.

Tonga is an aggressively and ideologically overtly Christian nation in its political practices. The cross on the nation's flag is often referred to in political discourse as identifying Tonga as a Christian nation. Although the Free Wesleyan Church is ideologically dominant in Tonga, religious tolerance is extended by the government to other Christian denominations, like the Mormonism that appears in the examples in this article. This tolerance holds true even when those denominations are seen as failing to maintain traditional Tongan culture in their religious practices in the way that the Free Wesleyans do. This commitment to religious tolerance goes back to the early-19th-century period of missionization when Catholics and Methodists competed for converts. That same tolerance is not extended to non-Christian forms of organized religion.

The more general point here, once again, is that Tongan moralizing strategies in the courtroom activate particular social identities that are important in Tongan culture and that mark the Tongan nation-state as distinctly Tongan.

In a variety of ways, then, the center, or heart, of the Tongan legal proceeding asserts a Tongan morality in which a bad act is not just intrinsically bad, or bad in a universal way for all who do it, but bad because of the particular kinds of social relationships in which it is embedded. This morality contrasts with the legal framing of the court procedure, in which an act is a crime regardless of who commits it. The modern legal discourse is a universalizing discourse, whereas the traditional Tongan moral discourse is a socially differentiated discourse.

Local Configurations of Traditional and Modern Nationalist Ideologies

So far I have looked at one configuration of Tongan modern and neotraditional enactments of the state in the Magistrate's Courts in Tonga. I now consider how this configuration compares with the multiple representations of the nation-state that appear in other discourse environments in Tonga and elsewhere in the Pacific.

The Magistrate's Courts

In the preceding section I described the way legal and moral representations of crimes provide both Western and Tongan visions of the Tongan nation-state in one legal context, the Magistrate's Courts. The outer legal framing displays a nation guided by the rule of law, which applies to all persons, to all citizens of Tonga. The inner moral framing displays a distinctively Tongan national culture in which citizens are socially differentiated according to identities central to the ways in which Tongans make sense of their lives. The outer framing is routinized and tailored to a specific crime. The inner framing is productive and variable strategically tailored to social identities thought to be specific to the defendant and victims in individual cases yet still constrained by the nature of the legally defined criminal act of which a defendant has been accused.

Rather than a single overriding interpretation of events, one finds dual legitimization of the acts of the courts through multiple ideologies. The authority of the Tongan courts is not coherent ideologically but deliberately multisourced.

This ideological diversity can be conceptualized as a consequence of the movement of legal ideas from Western European economic centers. Western legal and Tongan moral ideas have been co-present in Tonga since the early 1800s. Pressure on the Tongan nation-state from the West to become more Western in its legal practices has been part of Tongan development since that time. Although this pressure has come primarily from Great Britain, it also comes from Britain's common-law English-speaking former colonies such as New Zealand, Australia, and the United States.

The legal and moral framings of crimes in the Magistrate's Court are kept separate and, yet, are configured in relation to each other in courtroom discourse. In this context, these discrete ideologies are tailored to be compatible with one another and supportive of the same case dispositions. They are not opposed to one another and are not pitted against one another in struggle, as in Marxist representations.

Nor do the modern and neotraditional framings of crime exist in a dominant/subordinate relationship in this context. The Western inclination may be to think of the introductory framing of a piece of discourse as its overriding frame and, therefore, to think of law as the dominant frame here. A case, however, can also be made for the middle of the procedure as the ideologically dominant part of the procedure. Thinking of a discourse event as having a center and a periphery in characterizing the locations of the legal and moral representations of crime identifies a key place for the center (Arnheim 1988) in a way that is not true when the focus is on the boundedness of an interactional encounter.

There is abundant evidence of the importance of the concept of "the center" in Tongan culture. The Tongan word for 'center' is *loto*. *Loto* can also mean 'middle,' as in *loto kolo*, 'the middle of the village.' It also means 'the inside,' as in *loto 'api*, 'inside the house.' These meanings suggest the presence of many people and high levels of human interaction. When applied to the individual, *loto* means 'heart,' 'emotions,' and 'will' – what is inside the individual and dominates consciousness. All of these meanings suggest the power of the center for Tongans

What is outside the moral center, for example, the bush, where cultivation takes place, is often conceptualized as wild, dangerous, and the potential locus of supernatural threat.

Both the outer framing and the inner heart of the Tongan Magistrate's Court procedure, then, can be understood to carry great potential interpretive importance. Other Tongan domains, however, reveal different configurations of traditional and modern ideologies of the nation-state.

Other Tongan Political Domains

For example, in the Tongan Supreme Court, the trial court of general jurisdiction that deals with felonies rather than with misdemeanors, Western legal framings of crimes are hegemonic. There is no systematic place for a framing of crimes as violations of a specifically Tongan morality. The activities of the Supreme Court are presided over by a British judge and are fully bilingual in English and Tongan. Lawyers and judges who work in the Supreme Court overtly express a concern to be modern and to constantly modernize.

To a surprising degree the cases heard in this court involve economic and other organizational structures with a presence in other countries such as New Zealand and the United States. In one case, for example, the defendant was an employee of the Bank of Tonga and had stolen money from the bank, which at that time was partly owned by interests in New Zealand. Another case involved kickbacks accepted by employees of the Tongan Commodities Board, which regulates agricultural trade with other countries. A third case involved a charge of contract violation, in which the ultimate employer was the Mormon Church, which is based in the United States.

The procedures in the Tongan Supreme Court appear to be designed to persuade both outsiders and Tongans alike that in Tonga transnational commercial activities can be conducted in a way that is consistent with European expectations.

Nevertheless, in the domain of the Tongan Supreme Court, Tongan tradition or specifically Tongan culture was often potentially relevant. For example, in the case of the Bank of Tonga employee, the theft from the bank involved both deception of relatives from whose account money was taken and theft on behalf of a relative. Yet in the trial discourse there was no overt or explicit orienting to the particular duties owed by Tongans to family members of the sort I have documented for the Magistrate's Courts. Those in the courtroom, including the British judge, the Tongan lawyers, and the Tongan jurors, were aware of the kinship relationships involved and may have been mindful of these kin ties in some aspects of their handling of the case. These understandings, however, were left implicit.

If one compares the configuration of traditional and modern ideological representations of the Tongan nation in the Magistrate's Courts and in the Supreme Court, important differences emerge. First, in the Supreme Court, there is no overtly ideological multiplicity to be configured and, therefore, no systematic ideological opposition or struggle and no accommodation or appeal to multiple

sources of authority. Modern Western legal interpretations are completely dominant. The systematic orienting to neotraditional Tongan ways of doing things that one finds in the Magistrate's Courts is erased. This is because the Supreme Court is, almost by definition, the place in which Tonga displays to the outside its willingness and ability as a nation-state to deal with Western European nations through legal practices that derive from those nations. Westerners view the decisions made in the Supreme Court as more serious and important than those made in the Magistrate's Courts. Neotraditional interpretations of crimes are incompatible with these concerns.

This functional differentiation of higher and lower trial courts is historically continuous with a similar functional differentiation under British colonial administration as part of the British policy of indirect rule. In the court system widely imposed by the British as part of the introduction of their concept of "rule of law," lower-level trial courts were left in the hands of local populations. Higher-level trial courts were controlled by the British, who also allocated legal matters they considered most important, such as the right to impose the sentence of punishment by death, to the courts they controlled.

Although modern legal rhetoric dominated Supreme Court discourse, a public and conflictful ideological opposition between modern and neotraditional visions of the Tongan nation was associated with the emergence of the Pro-Democracy Movement during the same period of time that I was studying the Tongan courts (1985–90). At the heart of the Pro-Democracy Movement was the key position that commoners deserved greater representation relative to nobles in the national Legislative Assembly, the Fale Alea, than was the case at that time.

The Tongan Constitution dictates that commoners and nobles, or titled chiefs, separately elect the same number of representatives to the Fale Alea. Commoners and nobles use separate voting rolls, and each group elects representatives from among its own. As I show in the next section, this system of elected representation bears a strong similarity to the systems in Samoa and Fiji, in part because of a shared colonial heritage.

Presently, nine nobles represent 29 nobles, and nine commoners represent approximately 90,000 commoners in the national legislature. The Tongan Constitution also provides that the king's 12 appointed cabinet ministers be voting members of the Fale Alea. In practice, the commoner representatives can never outvote the combination of the noble representatives and the cabinet members on any issue where the latter groups are aligned against them, which frequently occurs.

The Pro-Democracy Movement pursued the idea that a more democratic system would give greater representation to the commoners. This position was opposed by the nobles and those with whom they are aligned. The nobles argue that the continued political dominance of the traditional hereditary class of chiefs is more culturally appropriate for Tonga. Thus, they offered a neotraditional position in opposition to the democratic position. So far, the neotraditional position has held, and the commoners continue to be weakly represented in the Fale Alea.

The Pro-Democracy Movement and the opposition it generated produced intense political debate that changed rapidly over the years and moved across

wide range of political activities in the public sphere. Debate in the Fale Alea was tape-recorded and played on the radio on Friday nights, and people all over the country listened to it over gatherings around the kava bowl and in their homes. New magazines and newspapers and new organizations started up specifically to expand the range of public fora for discussion of the issues raised in political debate. Sunday church sermons and feasts were eventually penetrated by the political discourse, as prominent members of the Free Wesleyan Church became active in the democratic movement.

This political debate was not evident in the Magistrate's Courts in any way. But people actively involved in the political conflict tried to use the Supreme Court to control their political opponents by filing suits involving libel and defamation of character, as well as other issues. It appeared that the Supreme Court judges made an effort over the years to limit the court's involvement in the political conflict, but litigants eventually succeeded in getting the debate into that court in specific cases.

The Pro-Democracy Movement has been cast as one involving opposition between traditional and democratic concepts of nation-state government (e.g., Lawson 1996). It is also seen by Tongans as a conflict opposing the traditional and the modern (Helu 1992), recalling the slippage and overlap in meaning between the "democratic" and the "modern." F. Helu (1992) discusses the positive associations Tongans have with political concepts considered modern or not part of traditional Tongan political ideologies. It is clear that in the realm of national political debate, as in the Tongan courts, the concept of "modernism" is locally alive. If one compares the configuration of traditional and modern representations of the nation-state in the Magistrate's Courts with that of the Supreme Court and of the Pro-Democracy Movement, important differences emerge. In the Magistrate's Courts, there is an accommodation between modern and neotraditional frameworks, and both are produced by the same state representatives. Neither vision dominates the other. In the Pro-Democracy Movement, neotraditional and modern representations exist in opposition, not accommodation. Their goals are mutually incompatible, not compatible as in the Magistrate's Courts. In the political debate generated by the Pro-Democracy Movement, the neotraditional forces have largely prevailed. In the Supreme Court, in contrast, there is neither accommodation nor opposition of traditional and modern visions of the state but, rather, dominance of modern law and erasure of neotraditional interpretations of crime.

The Pro-Democracy Movement has had a fluid quality to it, in its rapid change and movement across social domains of discourse, and it has been shaped by globalization processes, most immediately, those of rapid transmission of information through print and radio. Although less dynamic by comparison, court discourses are not lacking in the potential for change. For example, defendants in the Magistrate's Court pushed to have misdemeanors they committed while they were engaged in religious activity excused or pardoned in some way, although they were not successful in their efforts. Defendants in assault cases argued, again without success, that their own senior status relative to their victims should be a mitigating factor in the court's consideration of their actions. It would not take

major shifts in court discourse, however, for such factors to be accommodated. Even so, there was clearly an excitement associated with newness and change in the Pro-Democracy Movement that one did not find in the courts.

Other Pacific Nations

The Pacific was the last part of the world to be decolonized. Most contemporary Pacific nations received formal independence from colonial powers in the 1970s. Concepts of "tradition" are central to Pacific nations' claims to the national distinctiveness that is thought to warrant national sovereignty. And the use of tradition as an ideological resource and source of authority in contexts of political innovation in the Pacific is well documented (e.g., Borofsky 1987; Jolly 1992; Linnekin 1991; White and Lindstrom 1997).

Recent discussions of Pacific national imagining in which tradition figures have taken place within a rhetoric of multiplicity, contestation, competition, tenuousness, and ambivalence (Foster 1995b; Kelly and Kaplan 2001; Lawson 1996; Otto and Thomas 1997b). For Melanesian countries such as Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, and Papua New Guinea, discourses opposing the colonial and the traditional, in which the colonial was rejected and the traditional drawn on as the basis for national identity, were salient in early years of independence. This opposition is still of great importance. Other local sources of multiple representations of the nation are also now important (Otto and Thomas 1997a).

Some recent anthropological analysis of ideological multiplicity in Melanesian nation imagining expresses concern that the idea of the nation itself is only weakly developed, particularly in rural areas of these countries. Local appropriations of and oppositions to national imagery and authority threaten the nation (Clark 1997; Foster 1995b; Jacobsen 1995; Otto and Thomas 1997b). Here, ideological diversity in the imagining of the nation-state comes across as harmful to national stability. In Fiji, ideological contestation between traditional indigenous visions of the nation and the democratic visions of Fijian Indians and others has played a role in the repeated political coups that have occurred there since 1987. The idea that multiple ideologies can be compatible is treated as imaginable in Melanesia (e.g., Kaplan 1995; Sokomanu 1992), but not actual.

In Tonga, the idea of the nation is pervasive. Political sovereignty is highly valued (Morton 2001).[4] There is very little anticolonial rhetoric, in part because official nationalist discourses deny that Tonga was ever colonized in the first place. Although Tonga was granted independence from Great Britain in 1970, Tongans do not think of Tonga as a new nation. They trace the formation of their nation back to the mid-1800s, as I did at the beginning of this article. To counter the view that they were colonized with a range of arguments, including the fine-grained distinction attributed to Queen Sālote (Wood-Ellem 1999) that Tonga was never a British protectorate but was, rather, a "protected state." From the Tongan point of view, their legal system is Tongan, not British. There is more than one way to be modern, and there can be a Tongan way. The weakness of association between the modern and the colonial in Tongan political discourse is part of what makes it possible for the traditional and the modern to be

compatible as well as in oppositional relationships in Tonga. It may be more difficult to develop a local concept of a modern nation in Pacific countries where "modern" is understood to mean "colonial." On the other hand, in Melanesia as well as in Tonga, there may be substantive compatible relationships among traditional and nontraditional nationalist ideologies in some domains and discourses. But such relationships have not been a focus of research in Melanesia.

Tonga arguably stands in contrast to some countries in Melanesia in its particular configuration of nationalist ideologies. But it does share part of its prodemocracy oppositional discourse with some nations, specifically Samoa (formerly Western Samoa) and Fiji. Since the coups in Fiji in 1987, all three countries have had public, internationally reported debates concerning the institutionalization of chiefly privilege at the national governmental level. In Fiji, the greater salience of the opposition between Indians and Fijians has obscured the ideological differences between chiefly and commoner positions to some extent. The constitutions in all three of these countries build chiefly privilege into the legal basis for elected representation in the national legislatures. In each country titled chiefs have significantly greater representation than commoners do in the national legislative process. In each country commoners have made efforts in the past two decades to enhance their representation (Franco 1997; Helu 1992; James 1997; Lal 1992; Le Tagaloa 1992; Macpherson 1997; Morton 2001; Powles 1979; Rutz 1995). And in writing about these movements, some observers have conceptualized the chiefly prerogative as traditional and the commoner movements as modern or democratic (e.g., Lawson 1996), although the usefulness of the concept of "modern" also has been questioned (Kelly and Kaplan 2001). In each nation, chiefly privilege has held, albeit with some changes in Samoa's system of representation (Le Tagaloa 1992).

Even though these movements have been experienced as nation specific and have been written about as such, they should also be seen as a regional transnational discourse. The prehistories and colonial histories of Tonga, Samoa, and Fiji are strongly connected. From the early 1800s on, missionaries and European governmental representatives throughout this area and in Tahiti and Hawaii, as well, exchanged drafts of law codes that encoded chiefly privilege (Ellis 1829; Lātūkefu 1974; Powles 1979), so the regional transnational nature of this chiefly–commoner opposition is not new.

It is clear from comparison that Tongan ideologies of nation-state share with those of other Pacific nations the invocation of tradition and the opposition of tradition to something Western, be it a modern vision, a colonial vision, or a democratic vision. And, as I have already suggested, there is some slippage and sharing of meaning among these terms and interchange in their usage. Accounts of traditional and modern ideologies of nation-state making in other parts of the Pacific, however, foreground situations in which these kinds of ideologies occur in opposition. Tonga has oppositional discourses, too, but it also has examples of accommodation and erasure of ideologies, as in the Tongan courts, that are difficult to find in accounts of other Pacific nations.

Several factors help explain this difference between Tonga and other Pacific nations. First, colonial histories throughout the Pacific are quite different. It is

also clear that local people in different Pacific nations conceptualize their colonial histories very differently, in ways that cannot be completely explained by their experiences. Finally, it is likely that where accommodations of traditional and modern ideologies of the nation-state occur in other Pacific nations, they do not receive the attention that the more oppositional discourses receive because they are not as worrisome or threatening.

In general, then, the configuration of traditional and modern nationalist ideologies varies within Tonga and among Pacific nations. The particular accommodation of ideologies found in the Tongan Magistrate's Courts cannot be generalized to Tongan society as a whole. But that such an accommodation exists at all is significant and characteristic of Tongans and of their willingness to claim the modern as their own.

Discussion and Conclusion

I now turn to discussion of how anthropological representations of ideological diversity discussed early in this article help make sense of the ideological multiplicity described here, and I consider how the image of an ecology of ideas can address concerns that have not been developed in these theoretical traditions.

Both traditional and modern representations of the nation-state are widespread in the Pacific island nations. This prevalence is consistent with the postmodern idea that global capitalism and revolutions in information transmission have caused a loss of a master narrative, or an all-encompassing, authoritative, and taken-for-granted worldview. In Tonga and elsewhere, local tradition and Western modernism are both sources of authority that can be invoked in support of particular representations of the nation, so the sources of authority are multiple.

Moreover, it is possible to see the various political ideologies that have been described here as modern, Western, colonial, and democratic, as having come into the Pacific as a consequence of the globalization of capitalism, consistent with a postmodern perspective. It is usually not easy, however, to identify a postmodern era during which certain specific processes played a role in configuring specific ideologies. Both the Tongan Magistrate's Courts and the Supreme Court of today draw on neotraditional and modern ideas about the Tongan legal system that go back to contact between Tongans and Western Europeans in the early 1800s. Pro-democracy movements in Tonga and elsewhere have likewise been shaped by colonial establishment of the legal categories of chief and commoner in laws from the same period. At the same time, this political movement has definitely been strongly shaped by discourse in print and radio media of the kind held to be influential in postmodern theory. The Tongan Pro-Democracy Movement also has the quality of fluid, rapid movement, or flow, of culture across national boundaries and nationally internal institutional boundaries of the kind thought by some to be characteristic of culture in the present day.

Further, as expected from such a perspective, it is clear that legal culture and political culture have been moving from economic centers of capitalism

economic peripheries. There are also regional processes of cultural movement, however, that are not particularly well attended to in anthropological thinking on the movement of culture. Notably, here, the opposition between local "tradition" and some version of the modern, democratic, or colonial, is widespread in Pacific microstates' envisioning of their own nation-states. That opposition is one regional phenomenon. On a smaller scale, the common discourse on chiefly versus commoner representation in the national legislature shared by the cultural triangle of Tonga, Samoa, and Fiji is also a regional transnational phenomenon that does not just involve center and periphery.

One may ask how useful it is to think of the cultural processes documented here in terms of the image of "flow" that characterizes anthropological imagining of movement of culture. Yes, the movement of culture is fluid, both at the microlevel of social organization, as words in face-to-face communication flow out of people's mouths, and at the macrolevel, in which one is encouraged to envision rivers of goods and people moving across national borders. But there is also structure in the moment, at any given moment in time, and that structure is often repeated over and over, as in the Magistrate's Courts. Ideas are configured in relation to each other and kept bounded and discrete through the structure of discourse. There are also various kinds of constraints on flow. Culture on the move cannot and does not go anywhere and everywhere. Here I have focused on the compatibility of traditional and modern ideologies as a factor that shapes when, where, and how such ideologies can appear together or in some kind of relationship.

Characterizations of globalization and transnationalism, then, encourage thought about how ideas move – where they come from, where they are going, and how they can get there. Such characterizations are less helpful for seeing the structure of ideological diversity in the moment, in cultural practice.

Marx-influenced representations of culture, in contrast, offer useful starting points for talking about how ideologies are structured in discourse. In Marx-influenced characterizations, ideologies are bounded, multiple, and exist in relationships with one another. The relationship between any two ideologies is inevitably shaped by a power struggle between dominant and subordinate sectional interests, characterized by opposition, conflict, and the resistance of the subordinated.

I have argued here that whereas such an oppositional framework applies to the pro-democracy movements in Tonga and elsewhere, other configurations are possible in situations of multiple representations of the nation-state besides oppositional configurations. In the Tongan Magistrate's Courts, modern and neotraditional framings of crimes coexist and provide a dual legitimation for court decisions, with few signs of struggle or domination and subordination. In the Supreme Court the neotraditional is erased so that the modern legal framing of crimes is dominant.

Marx-influenced representations of ideological multiplicity commonly posit a single oppositional relation for a given society or group studied. The variation in configurations of ideological diversity from situation to situation that I have described for Tonga points to problems with this vision. The organization of

ideological diversity is inevitably more complex than the Marxist model i practice. A related Marxist assumption is that the consequence of an ideologic dialectic is a new synthesis that itself is whole and coherent. Ideological chang is more piecemeal and layered than that assumption implies. This is evide when one considers the connections between the colonial period and the prese in the nature and ordering of modern and neotraditional nationalist discours in Tonga and elsewhere.

Recent anthropological visions of ideological diversity contribute a gre deal to an understanding of contemporary configurations of modern an neotraditional visions of the nation-state in the Pacific and elsewhere. The streng of ideas derived from discussions of globalization and transnationalism lies their emphasis on cultural process and change, particularly in their empha on the movement of culture, so that forms of culture come together in ne ways. The strength of Marx-influenced approaches lies in their emphasis on the boundedness and structuring of ideological multiplicity.

An image of the ecology of ideas can be useful for bringing cultural structu and the movement of culture together. Ideas live in discourse and are order relative to one another through discourse structure. Discourse domains interactional spheres are the different environments into which ideas enter, ta hold, and have a life. Ideologies are like plant species, entering into and inhabit different discourse environments.

Multiple species can coexist in the same environment. They accommod one another and are part of each other's environment. When plant species mo into a new environment and try to colonize it, they encounter other plants t are already part of that environment. Those other plant species can mak easy or difficult for new plants to gain a foothold. New species of plants ma may not displace those species already present. So, too, with ideas. When n ideas enter a discourse environment, their fates vary, depending in part on nature of their relationship with ideas already present in that environment. Id may be compatible or incompatible to varying degrees, and their relationsh may change over time, generally transforming how ideologies are configure discourse and creating a historical layering of different varieties of ideolog multiplicities, in the present case, varieties of the neotraditional and the mod in nation-state imagining.

These issues of compatibility are evident in the examples of configurat of ideological diversity in Pacific nation-state making that I have discussed h In the Tongan Magistrate's Courts there was an accommodation between mod and neotraditional representations of a Tongan nation-state. But the Supr Court was not an environment friendly to neotraditional discourses. Tor neotraditional ideas about the duties associated with particular social ident were as relevant in that setting for making sense of crimes as they were in Magistrate's Courts. But the use of the Supreme Court to link Tonga to the o side world and the attendant need to display Western law to gain credibility Western nations have made the Supreme Court a context in which neotraditi discourses have not thrived as they do in the Magistrate's Courts.

In the Tongan Pro-Democracy Movement, ideas moved rapidly across discourse environments, looking for a home and finding many, some only temporarily. The neotraditional discourse that maintains the power of nobles or chiefs over commoners was activated in opposition to the Pro-Democracy Movement, and this neotraditional discourse has so far prevailed. The modern discourse of the Pro-Democracy Movement and the neotraditional discourse of the nobles and their supporters have been incompatible and have not found mutual accommodation in the Fale Alea, Tonga's National Assembly.

As noted earlier, the same struggle over political representation in national legislatures has gone on in Fiji and Samoa, with similar maintenance of chiefly power. That these struggles have gone on during the same period in several small Pacific island nations in close proximity is not simply coincidental. In Tonga the Pro-Democracy Movement was largely experienced as a specifically Tongan phenomenon. Similarly, the political conflicts over representation in national legislatures in Fiji and Samoa are usually described as nation specific. But the oppositional discourse over representation in national legislatures was truly a transnational phenomenon. These countries responded similarly to similar ideas not only because they are in close communication but also because the political environments into which these ideas moved were similar. This environmental similarity was due to a common heritage of colonial law that made the legal categories of chief and commoner foundational to electoral representation as well as to a good deal else. Thus Tonga, Fiji, and Samoa have similar political environments that, in some respects, have made those countries receptive to a particular configuration of modern and neotraditional political images of the nation.

But whereas Tonga embraces and actively develops ideas associated with a "modern" nation-state in legal and other political domains, this has not been the case in many parts of Melanesia, most notably New Guinea. There, as others have described, an opposition exists in nationalist rhetoric between traditional and colonial ways of conceptualizing political power rather than an opposition between traditional and modern ways of doing things, as in Tonga. In decolonizing Melanesian contexts, in which the ongoing effort has been to replace the colonial with the neotraditional, there does not seem to be much place for or receptivity to a concept of "the modern" because of its associations with colonialism.

In the various discourse environments I have considered, then, the specific nature of the traditional and modern ideologies one encounters in a given environment plays an important role in how those ideologies can be configured in relation to each other.

Ideas do not float in the air, and they do not exist only in the heads of individuals. Ideas live in discourse. They are configured by the social organization of face-to-face interaction and by the sequential structure of discourse. Analysis of the ecology of ideas in discourse practices contributes to an understanding of why and how cultural constructs not only change but also endure, how they shrink and expand, how they are restricted and elaborated across discourse environments, and how nondominant ideas get preserved over time. Ideas find

a compatible locale and colonize it. They do not so much flow across social terrains and saturate them like water, as they are like plants moving into new ecological niches, some of which are more hospitable than others at a given moment in time. It is at the level of discourse structure that new ideas push their way into the conscious life of a society.

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Notes

1. In his writing and teaching, Dell Hymes drew a parallel between Anthony Wallace's (1961) idea of culture as the organization of individuals' diverse forms of knowledge and a speech community as consisting of the socially systematic organization of speakers' diverse forms of communicative competence. A community, then, was fundamentally characterized not only by shared norms for socially appropriate behavior but also by internal differentiation (Hymes 1968). And this was true not just of urban, modern communities but of all communities of every scale from the village to the nation for which some shared norms existed for appropriate speech usage. Hymes envisioned for all communities a plurality of codes, speech events, and speech genres.
2. Throughout this article, conforming to standard linguistic practice, English glosses of Tongan words and phrases are enclosed by single quotation marks.
3. Line divisions in Tongan transcript excerpts 1 and 2 are based on intonational units; in the other excerpts on grammatical units. The orthography and word endings and beginnings are based on contemporary written conventions in Tongan newspapers and magazines. Numbers in square brackets preceded by the pound sign indicate pauses of greater than two-seconds length, for example, [#5]. Where material has been omitted from excerpts, three dots are used to indicate the location of the omission. Words in bold direct the reader's attention to aspects of the excerpts that are the focus of analysis in the discussion.
4. Aiono Le Tagaloa (1992) indicates that sovereignty is greatly appreciated in Samoa as well. Political sovereignty is also valued by Maori and Hawaiians, who do not have it because they are constituted and self-constituting as ethnic minorities within the nation-states of New Zealand and the United States, respectively (Linnekin 1990). The idea of the independent nation as highly desirable may generally have penetrated Polynesian populations to a greater degree than it has Melanesian populations.

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Argumentation Studies and Discourse Analysis: The French Situation and Global Perspectives

Christian Plantin

Formulated in the 1960s and 1970s, the earliest French discourse analytic programmes initiated by Foucault or Pêcheux were seldom argumentation oriented; nonetheless, argumentation studies now appears to be a popular branch of discourse analysis, at least in France. The reasons for this evolution are rather complex; some are closely linked to the specificity of the French situation, others are more general.

This article analyses the development of the complex relations between argumentation studies and discourse analysis as follows:

(1) In order to clarify the definition of the word 'argument' in French and American English, some divergent meanings are examined.

(2) This section argues that the discourse-analytic programme has specific 'conditions of production' of its own, that is, historically situated. The historical decline of rhetoric, expelled from the curriculum at the turn of the century, is part of the context. Until the late 1980s and the Perelman revival, the prevailing intellectual and academic background had been characterized by ignorance and a distrust of rhetorical argumentation.

(3) Grize's 'natural logic' (1982, 1990, 1996) and Anscombre and Ducrot's 'argumentation within language' (AwL) theory (Anscombre, 1995; Ducrot, 1972, 1973, 1984, 1988; Ducrot and Anscombre, 1986; Ducrot et al., 1980) are briefly discussed from the discourse analysis point of view. These programmes have restored the study of argumentation to

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favour in France, where it is currently the research paradigm most referred to in recent work.

(4) This section examines the present situation in France which is characterized by a strong new interest in argumentation in all disciplines. This is fuelling a tendency towards the use of argumentation theories – classical or modern – for practical, short-term (some might say, short-sighted) analytic purposes, focusing on the corpora under analysis. Complex models integrating insights from interaction theory and enunciation theory are needed.

(5) A proposal is made for a better integration of argumentation studies in the discipline of discourse analysis, based on the conception of argumentation as opposite points of view, either in face-to-face confrontation or in written arguments sometimes lasting for several centuries.

This article is based on the premise that research into the history of rhetoric and argumentation, as well as in specific discourse analytic trends that emerged in France during the 1970s, has some permanent value in that a better understanding of a discpline's historical development can be a good introduction to its current problems.

1. Pre-Theoretical Lexical Research

There is a significant difference in meaning between the lexico-semantic fields associated with the word *argumentation* in French (F) and in American English (AE). Whereas *argumentation* (F) is indeed a good counterpart of *argumentation* (AE), the words *argument, argumenter* (F)/*argument, to argue* (AE) are *faux amis*, false friends; in most of their occurrences, *an argument* (AE) is not *un argument* (F), and *to argue* (AE) doesn't translate as *argumenter* (F). In other words, the obvious morphological parallel between the following two series of words can be semantically and theoretically misleading in some major aspects:

American English (AE):	an argument, to argue, argumentation, argumentative, argumentativity
French (F):	un argument, argumenter, arguer, argumentation, argumentatif, argumentativité.

To Argue, (an) Argument

In a basic study, O'Keefe (1977) suggests 'two meanings of *argument* and *argue*' along the following lines:

- *to argue* (1) = 'to give reasons' (Webster); following this definition, *to argue* can be constructed with a singular or plural subject, and is followed by a 'that' clause. *To argue that P* is a monological activity.
- *to argue* (2) = 'to have a disagreement; quarrel; dispute' (Webster); following this definition, *to argue* is constructed with the preposition *about*, and refer

to a vast domain of interactions ranging from normal discussion to verbal and paraverbal fights. *Arguing with X about P* is a dialogical activity.

These definitions demonstrate how these two distinct lexico-semantic fields can be distinguished in American English.

In French, the verb *argumenter* is an excellent equivalent of *to argue* (1) = 'to give reasons', but a very poor translation of *to argue* (2) which corresponds to '*discuter (de manière agressive)*' (F); *argumenter* (F) never means 'to quarrel'. All the words belonging to its lexico-semantic field have this monosemic meaning: *un argument* (F) is always a logical argument, never 'a quarrel', etc. Therefore, the use of the French set of words is more restricted than the use of the seemingly parallel American English set of words; the French set of words denotes a logico-linguistic activity, without any interactional, potentially aggressive, connotation.

In the following examples, neither *argument* (F) nor *argumentation* (F) can be used to translate *argument* (AE):

Alice, who was always ready for a little argument = *une bonne discussion*

Alice didn't want to begin another argument = *recommencer à se disputer*

If you lose an argument... = *si vous n'avez pas le dessus dans une discussion*

Two further points:

- *un argument* (F) can designate through synecdoche (in which a part represents the whole), the complete discourse 'good reasons + point of view', just like 'an argument' (1) (AE).
- the meaning of the (not very usual) French verb *arguer (de)* differs from *argumenter* (F) in a curious way. In the sentence '*Pierre argue de P*', the speaker mentions Pierre's position or argument, without identifying himself with his position. Therefore, *arguer de P* (F) is typically used to report the opponent's argument or to distance oneself from an argument. By saying '*M. Le Pen argue de...*' the speaker mentions Le Pen's argument and distances himself or herself from the discourse of the extreme right-wing leader.

Argumentative, Argumentativity (AE)

The problem becomes acute with *argumentative* (F) vs *argumentative* (AE); *argumentatif* (F) is derived from *argument*, and only carries a meaning related to 'building up a good logical argument'. However, *argumentative* (AE) is more likely to mean *argue with X:* thus, an argumentative character (AE) = *une personne querelleuse* (F).

All this demonstrates that there is a risk of misunderstanding French expressions like *l'orientation argumentative d'un énoncé*, which are basic to Anscombre and Ducrot's theory of argumentation, whose semantic thesis implies that 'any sentence conveys as (part of) its meaning an orientation towards a conclusion.' The (practically unavoidable) word-for-word translation 'the argumentative orientation of an utterance' should not be taken to refer to or evoke any form of

verbal aggression; the production of argumentatively oriented utterances does not denote an aggressive personality.

The conclusion therefore is that the lexical field of *argumenter* (F) is semantically homogeneous and always denotes a verbal–intellectual activity consisting of 'giving good reasons', i.e. 'constructing an argument'. Therefore, a practical rule could be to think solely of *argumentation* (F/AE) when dealing with French words like *argument, argumenter, argumentative* and *argumentativité.* Table 1 sums up these analogies and differences.

Table 1: Analogies and differences in American English (AE) and French (F) for basic forms of the word 'argument'

American English (AE)	French (F)
argumentation	argumentation
to argue (1) (to argue that –)	argumenter
to argue (2) (to argue with –/ about –)	discuter, se disputer
an argument (1)	un argument
an argument (2)	une discussion, une dispute
argumentative (1)	argumentatif, -ive
argumentative (2)	ergoteur, raisonneur (Collins), querelleur
argumentativity (1)	argumentativité
argumentativity (2)	l'agressivité verbale

Note: Argumentative (1) (AE) and argumentativity (1) (AE) have been introduced as a development of the argumentation, argue (1) line.

Thus, from a theoretical point of view, we can conclude that the field of argumentation studies corresponds very well to the field of the *études de l'argumentation*; however, the study of argument covers a broader field, of a more fiery nature, i.e. the field of 'conflict studies'. I come back to this point later in this article.

2. The Legacy

It could be argued that discourse analysis has a past: rhetoric. According to its classical definition, rhetoric is the theoretical and practical science of public speaking with a heterogeneous audience, including resolute opponents, enthusiastic supporters and sceptical, scrupulous or stubborn 'don't knows'. Through (more or less carefully planned) discourse, speakers choose specific words to represent their views and opinions and convert their audience towards their preferred line of action. This rhetorical procedure can be applied to all public discourse – judicial, political, religious and ceremonial.

In the US, contemporary rhetoric is a traditional component of speech studies. This situation contrasts strongly with the prevailing situation in France, where the brilliant development of the history of rhetoric can be contrasted with the scarcity of practical rhetorical analysis of contemporary (non-literary) material. This may parallel the development of discourse analysis; for example, it could

be unwise to oppose rhetoric without practice and examine discourse analysis without studying its history. Maybe this only adds to the controversial relationship between discourse analysis and rhetorical analysis: are they separated by an 'epistemological abyss' or simply by a series of historical accidents and academic routines? The indisputable fact is that the analysis of contemporary discourse is carried out quite independently of the conceptual framework of rhetorical analysis; a major part of this very conceptual framework has come under the apparently more acceptable term of 'argumentation studies'. The discourse of discourse analysis has been built up on the implicit rejection (or neglect, or absence) of rhetoric. in keeping with a century-long historical trend, that needs to be at least outlined here.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, rhetoric was excluded from the universities and logic became a formal discipline. Some aspects of the present situation of argumentation studies in France can be considered to be a consequence of this historical trend. At that time, argumentation studies was certainly not a specific field. In order to get an initial idea of what happened then, this article now examines argumentation's closest relatives: logic and rhetoric.

Argumentation Studies in Relation to Rhetoric

As a basic part of rhetorical creativity, argumentation studies were affected by the disappearance of rhetoric from the new-born Republican university's syllabus at the end of the 19th century. Rhetoric was criticized and eliminated as a non-scientific. therefore illegitimate, study. In France, practical rhetoric has never recovered from this type casting; only the history of rhetoric is considered a suitable subject for the academic field.

In order to understand what happened to rhetoric at that time, one has to keep in mind the historical and political background, that is, the 1870 defeat of France by Germany and the necessity for a new start in politics as well as in intellectual life. Politically, this new start was the Third Republic.

In intellectual life, this was a period of intense political and ideological activity, of the re-conception of knowledge and, consequently, re-definition of the basic tasks of the university and reformation of the curriculum. This general remodelling was promoted by the Third Republic, on the basis of both a secular and a positivist view of science, culture and society.

The impulse for these transformations was a new conception of knowledge: 'positive knowledge'. History was the rising star, the prototypical positive method able to deliver scientific knowledge in the field of the humanities. Positive knowledge was seen as contradictory to 'formal knowledge', the best example of which was rhetorical 'know how'. No considerations of consensus, opinion, topoi, doxa, amplification or eloquence could be defended when confronted with the positive findings of historical research.

Thus, rhetorical knowledge is no knowledge at all. Moreover, two aggravating circumstances reinforced the case against rhetoric: (i) the predominance of Jesuit education in a period of intense contest between the church and the state (which ended with the 1905 separation of church and state); and (ii) owing to its use in

Jesuit colleges, the fact that rhetoric was linked to Latin, with all rhetorical exercises being practised in that language. This period marked a peak in the never-ending quarrel over the place of Latin in literary studies, similar to the modern movement for an emancipation of French from Latin. A secular state would thus strive to eliminate rhetoric from the educational curriculum as it was synonymous with one-sided religious education.

Consequently, the new curriculum in French studies was re-shaped as an historical approach to literature, as opposed to a rhetorical one: new forms of academic expression (French composition, literary history, commentary on literary texts) appeared in high schools (*lycées*). All these new forms explicitly excluded rhetoric, even if the classical rhetorical forms and devices remained in practice throughout this period, as well as in our own – how could it be otherwise?

Therefore, it was not surprising that, owing to its link to an earlier conception of education, rhetoric became the obvious symbol of an out-dated religious education compared to the positive knowledge promoted by the modern Republican university. This is the basis for rhetoric's continuing status of illegitimacy in France. A symbolic measure was taken in 1885, when the 12th grade in high school was renamed: formerly the 'rhetoric class' (*classe de rhétorique*), it now became anonymously known as 'the last year' (*la classe de terminale*); see Collinot and Mazière, 1987; Compagnon, 1983; Douay-Soublin, 1992; Fumaroli, 1980, 1999.

Since the discipline of argumentation studies was closely associated with rhetorical studies, it was clearly on the wrong side. But how far? To my knowledge, this question has never received an appropriate answer. However, it should be emphasized that the rhetoric that was excluded from the syllabus – Jesuit rhetoric – was not focused on argumentation but on *praelectio*, that is to say, text explanation and amplification: a form of oratory not intended to convince by proof and debate, but to subjugate by verbal power.

Argumentation Studies as Logical Studies: Neo-Thomism

Thus, it would be an over-simplification to conclude that the exclusion of rhetoric would inevitably bring about a decline in argumentation studies. Other considerations concerning logic must come into play. These are well known. They correspond to the new status of logic as a branch of mathematics. The publication of the *Begriffschrift* by Gottlob Frege in 1879 marked the turning point from which logic was no longer seen as the 'art of thinking'. In France, two major works testify to this long drawn-out evolution: (i) Arnauld and Nicole's *Logique* in 1662 (the full title is *La Logique ou l'art de penser contenant outre les règles communes plusieurs observations nouvelles propres à former le jugement* (Logic or the art of thinking, containing as well as the common rules, some new observations on forming judgements); and (ii) works such as Condillac's *Traité de l'art de raisonner* (Treatise on the art of reasoning) in 1796. In the latter the 'art of reasoning' is the art of studying mathematics.

Logic became that 'formal' discipline against which 'natural logic', 'informal logic' and 'substantial logic' were to rebel one century later. In 1888, Anthelme Chaignet published *La rhétorique et son histoire* (Rhetoric and its history), the first introductory book to Aristotle's argumentation theory – and a very good one

Is it possible to conclude that, along with rhetoric and traditional logic, argumentation studies were finally abandoned at the turn of the century? This conclusion would require further investigation. A conceivable hypothesis is that the interest in argumentation lived on but in the restricted domain of religious education, as a part of neo-thomist philosophy.

In 1879, Pope Leo XIII published the encyclical *Aeterni Patris*, which established Thomas Aquinas as a quasi official philosopher for the catholic church. There is certainly a connection between this publication and the fact that important developments relating to traditional logic, as well as valuable examinations of different kinds of arguments can be found in philosophical handbooks such as Abbé Henri Colin's, *Manuel de philosophie thomiste* (Manual of thomist philosophy) (1926) dedicated to higher religious education. Important treatises like Maritain's (1966) *Eléments de philosophie II –L'ordre des concepts – Petite logique (logique formelle)* (Elements of philosophy II: Order of concepts – Minor logic [formal logic) could also be considered proof of a permanent interest in logic as a philosophy of natural cognition in a neo-thomist framework.

A second point needing more investigation concerns argumentation as a practice. As mentioned earlier, this period was highly polemical in religious, political and scientific matters. It might be suspected that, in some way, well-intentioned passionate religious polemists resorted to the age-old argumentation techniques to contest the best-established scientific results – particularly in the field of history, anthropology and geology – on topics such as the age of the earth or the date of the first appearance of human beings.[1] There was clearly a clash between argumentative discourse and the reality of scientific proof. Stepping outside their field of validity, argumentative practices were prey to devastating refutations of the conclusions they delivered and, further, at risk of being invalidated as a potentially interesting method of investigation in any field.

To sum up: at the turn of the century, rhetoric was associated with a group characterized by its religious fervour and anti-Republicanism and was thus excluded from the state education curriculum; logic had turned into a branch of mathematics, whereas argumentation studies were restricted to neo-thomist philosophy and religious education. Finally, argumentation practices were discredited by irrelevant interventions in the most advanced scientific fields. This situation was to remain unchanged until at least the 1970s.

The 1960s and 1970s: The New Rhetoric without Influence

The 1950s saw the revival of well-known and much celebrated argumentation studies such as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1976[1958]) and Toulmin (1993[1958]) as well as Curtius (1948), Lausberg (1960) and Ong (1958). A small book published by Jean-Marie Domenach, *La propagande politique* (Political Propaganda) (1950) should be added to this brilliant set. Domenach's definition of the aims of propaganda is quite similar to Perelman's definition of argument, except in one respect: Domenach emphasizes the fact that beliefs are created and reinforced not only by discursive means but also – and maybe above all – by voice and gesture accompanying discourse, as well as a whole set of semiotic

signs such as music and pictures, in addition to forms of organized public action (for example, demonstrations).

The classical topos of the 'renaissance', or revival, of rhetorical argumentation should be considered in the light of the background sketched in the preceding section; rhetoric and argumentation studies had to win a new legitimacy. In this connection, two works are generally mentioned. Roland Barthes' (1970) essay *L'ancienne rhétorique – aide mémoire* (The Ancient Art of Rhetoric – A Memo) was a short reminder of the classical structure of rhetorical theory. The same year, Groupe Mu (Dubois et al., 1970) published *Rhétorique générale* (General rhetoric). This fascinating book analyses figures of speech from a linguistic point of view, following the general approach of structuralism applied to semantics. Although conducted in Liège, Belgium, this research mentions Perelman only in a footnote. It looks like proof of the divergence between the two areas of research. To a certain extent, the structuralist programme of rhetoric could be designated a 'Rhetoric within language' approach, to borrow the title of Ducrot's AwL programme.

However, none of these works stimulated any research that would bring about a practical revival of rhetorical argumentation, neither in education, nor as a social, discourse-theoretic discipline.

We now need to consider the reception of Perelman's book in France. It seems that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's *Treatise* was not practised in the 1960s and 1970s, if it was read at all; his book was therefore not very influential at that time. This claim must be qualified on two counts. First, Perelman's work has always been well known in the specialist circle of philosophers of law. Second, the new rhetoric appears to be a central theme of reflection for the Neuchâtel school, formed by Jean-Blaise Grize (1982, 1990, 1996), as shown by the topics of the very first issues of the journal *Travaux du centre de recherches sémiologiques* (CdRS) during the early 1970s: for example, Vignaux (1969–70), Borel (1969–70; Borel et al., 1983) and Grize (1971: see Appendix).

Nonetheless, the general trend seems clear. In Belgium, rhetorical argumentation was flourishing around Perelman's circle, natural logic was developing in Switzerland: however, in France at that time, it seems that nothing significant was happening in the field of rhetorical analysis applied to discourse – development of a new rhetoric. Perelman was not a 'cultural leader' (especially since his work had absolutely no influence on education). To account for this fact we must consider the prevailing intellectual atmosphere of the period. Roughly speaking, the leaders of intellectual life were such brilliant personalities as Louis Althusser, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan and Michel Pêcheux. The general intellectual atmosphere and the prevailing ideological orientation favoured views of discourse and speech in radical opposition to the general programme of argumentation studies. The main areas of conflict were as follows:

- The new rhetoric could be criticized for its insufficient theorizing. From a structuralist point of view, the arguments proposed by the new rhetoric were incohesive. Nonetheless, the restriction of argumentation to discourse was quite in tune with the then predominant structuralist method

or ideology, advocating a strictly literal approach to the text, ignoring any pragmatic considerations.

- According to rhetorical argumentation, speakers plan and structure their discourse around certain 'conscious' goals. During the 1960s and 1970s, criticism was levelled against the concept of 'author' or 'intentionality' in favour of socio-psychological determinations of discourse. This can be seen in the discourse analysis programme advocated by Pêcheux whereby discourse analysis aims to bring discourse back to its 'conditions of production'. This would seem to imply that discourse cannot be 'accounted for' by its internal structure and avowed meaning and function, but only by the external, material conditions in which it was produced – that is, the social conditions of its occurrence and the social standing of its source (the speaker) from a Marxist point of view, as well as the psychoanalytic constraints on his or her speech. For such an investigative programme, rhetorical argumentation could only be denounced as a form of illusion, an illusory attempt made by the subject to control his or her discourse.
- Finally, opposition was evident on socio-political grounds. These fields of study base their research on contestation and the radicalization of conflict, which is in marked contrast to the policy of negotiation and rational mediation generally associated with argumentation studies.

This is the situation that prevailed more or less until the end of the 1980s. Subsequently, a new period began with the return of Perelman's *New Rhetoric* (1976[1958]), which is now quite widely read, along with Ducrot and Grize. But traces of this century-long distrust of argumentation can be easily found – for example, the fact that major works in English, such as Hamblin's (1970) *Fallacies* are still generally unknown.

3. The Turning Point of the 1970s: Argumentation Reinstated

In the 1970s, the works of Ducrot and Grize were influential in the re-introduction of the concept of argumentation into the field of human sciences and discourse analysis. Both have contributed to the re-definition of the usual meaning of the term.

Natural Logic

Since the 1970s, Jean-Blaise Grize, Denis Apothéloz, Marie-Jeanne Borel and Denis Miéville have developed the concept of 'natural logic' at the Centre de Recherches Sémiologiques at Neuchâtel University; particular attention was always paid to the linguistic, psychological and sociological implications. As mentioned earlier, the works of Perelman and Ducrot were well-known and regularly discussed at Neuchâtel; in contrast, the Neuchâtel Centre's work was not acknowledged by Perelman and Ducrot. The Neuchâtel Centre's research is regularly written up in books and in the Centre's journal, *Travaux du centre de*

Recherches Sémiologiques de Neuchâtel, which is probably the only journal in French to be published over the last 30 years, focusing on argumentation from a logico-epistemic perspective. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the natural logic programme in detail (see Van Eemeren et al., 1996) but attention is now drawn to some significant points.

The 'natural logic' programme can be seen as part of the general trend developed in the 1970s in which formal logic was criticized as unsubstantial. The term 'natural' applies to a logic of dialogue and a logic of objects. It is a logic of dialogue only in a restricted sense of the word: the dialogue usually consists of a speaker or writer addressing an utterance (or text) to a listener (or reader). This is very similar to the classical rhetorical situation, where orators try to modify or change their audience's opinions without the benefit of any positive feedback. This contrasts sharply with the 'formal dialectic' programme.

The concept of 'logic of objects' is at the very core of the natural logic programme. The theory deals with 'objects of thought', 'images' or 'representations'. The aim of natural logic is to investigate the thought processes at work in the production or reception of a text. The text is considered important only in that it provides clues to the reconstruction of the underlying thought process; the theory is not a linguistic, but rather a cognitive, theory of argumentation. Though processes mirror linguistic processes (a full understanding of these processes would require a good knowledge of Culioli's theory of language). At first sight these processes can be grouped together as: (i) 'mental operations': formation concept of an object and of a predicate – these concepts are taken from the domain of 'pre-notions'; and (ii) judging, that is predicating and asserting. The result of these processes is a representation or schematization, expressed by an utterance. Grize's basic position is that all these processes have an argumentative value. If we consider only the linguistic counterparts of these processes, this theory might be called an AwL theory that differs from that of Ducrot. The argumentative value of an utterance comes from its global structure, resulting from a coherent series of operations (or choices). This representation is dialogical in that it contains not only a representation of a state of affairs but also an image of the listener, audience and the situation, combined with the self-representation of the speaker.

Schematization (the representation of subject, predicate, speech act and thematic elements) shows the content under a certain light (*éclairage*), or point of view; in other words, it adds to the semantic content by providing listeners with an orientation towards a certain conclusion, or insight. Following this approach, arguing involves 'schematizing', building up a schematization and presenting it to the audience or listeners, who have the option of accepting or rejecting it. The argumentative strength of a schematization comes from the fact that it mirrors reality. The general task of argumentation studies is to study the hidden mechanisms (or mental operations) behind the superficially acceptable appearance of a schematization. Arguing is a hidden process. The best argument is silence. Grize states: if you can't provide the facts, build the most acceptable schematization you can. The resulting conception leads to a better consideration of the self-denying, non-Popperian, character of everyday argument.

It should be pointed out that no mention has been made so far of the classical argumentative relationship between argument and conclusion. An image of 'scaffolding' (*étayage*) most aptly represents this relationship: the argument 'props up' or 'backs up' the conclusion. A specific argumentative text expresses what Grize calls a 'reasoned organization'. Its argumentative value is the combined result of the schematization and propping-up procedures.

The way an object is introduced into a discourse, its subsequent transformations, the way it is connected with other objects or beings, etc., plays a central role in the dynamics of schematization. This is a very important technical point, very easily transferred to the study of argumentation in dialogue or interactions. The centrality of categorizing or classifying procedures in the arguing process is certainly one of the many stimulating ideas one can find in Grize's natural logic.

The 'Argumentation within Language' [Argumentation dans la Langue] Theory

Oswald Ducrot introduced the concept of argumentation in a 1973 paper entitled 'Les échelles argumentatives'. His programme is generally known as 'the theory of argumentation within language', following the title of a 1983 book co-authored with Jean-Claude Anscombre, *L'argumentation dans la langue* (see Van Eemeren et al., 1996). The focus in this section is on one theoretical point: Ducrot's theory of argumentation is a theory of meaning.

Argumentation is introduced as a very specific technical concept functioning in the field of linguistic semantics. The specificity of this use of the concept of argument is frequently acknowledged by Jean-Claude Anscombre, who speaks of *l'argumentation dans notre sens* (our concept of argument). Of course, this remark does not imply any criticism of the concept, but it does imply that its relation with the classical concept of argument is problematic, and that its application to the classical field of argumentation studies cannot be taken for granted. The best-known results of the theory (the analysis of connectives, operators, of polyphony – not to mention a new concept of topos) which are now taken as basic instruments of general discourse analysis, are only manifestations of a deeper insight into the nature of linguistic meaning. Let us consider Ducrot's favourite example, the utterance 'the weather is fine' (P1). What is the meaning of P1? According to Ducrot, it should not be conceived as a description of a certain state of affairs. To understand the meaning of P1 is to understand what the speaker is aiming at when he or she utters it; for example, an invitation to go to the beach. Uttering a sentence is pointing to something else, a possible continuation 'beyond the sentence', a second utterance 'let's go to the beach' (P2). However, this concept of meaning is certainly not free from paradox. It is certainly a significant insight, and an excellent tool for analysing argumentation in speech and discourse (*parole*). A metaphor can help. A proverb – Chinese of course – says that when the wise man points to the stars, the fool looks at the finger. Here the finger is P1; the star – out of reach – is P2, and the fool is the one who tries to find 'in' P1 the meaning of P1; P1 has no other meaning than pointing to P2.

The same thesis on meaning can be found in other fields, in history for example. An historian would say that the meaning of an historical fact cannot be understood either when or where it occurs. An event has no meaning as such: its historical significance can only be understood in relation to subsequent events – to its consequences rather than its causes. An analogy can also be found in ethics, where it is acknowledged that to confer value on an act, one must consider its consequences. In other words, the value of the means is the value of the end; or, the meaning of an utterance is linked to its set of consequences. To a certain extent, the AwL theory of meaning can be seen as a kind of systematic *ad consequentiam* theory of meaning. Interpreted in an Aristotelian framework, this theory states that the meaning of a sentence is the final outcome of the sentence, i.e. its desired conclusion. Last, but not least, this coheres with the well-known fact that conclusions often come first and arguments are sought afterwards. By definition, for a lawyer, his or her client must be proved not guilty (P2, conclusion). How can he or she prove it? By finding something to say, i.e. an argument P1. Later the lawyer utters P1 with the meaning P2; that is, it (the sentence, spoken by the lawyer) will aim at the conclusion P2 'My client is innocent'. In other words, when the lawyer says 'P1!', if his or her opponent reacts by saying: 'What does that mean? That she is innocent?', this opponent is using a concept of meaning that perfectly demonstrates Ducrot's theory. This is because, according to Ducrot's theory, there is an equivalence between 'P1 is an argument for P2' and 'P2 is the meaning of P1'. This equivalence can be suggested as follows:

P1 is an argument for P2

P1 is a good reason to do, believe, admire, etc. P2

P1, therefore P2

P2 is a consequence of P1

in or by saying P1, the speaker wants to prove P2

the speaker says P1, because his or her goal is to prove, suggest, etc. P2

when the speaker says P1, he or she means P2

P2 is the meaning of P1

Ducrot's concept of meaning is a theory of meaning 'in language' [*en langue*], not a theory of meaning in context. P2 is seen as a conclusion aimed at by P1 (i.e. the meaning of P1) according to strictly linguistic criteria; in other words, the grammatical acceptability of the discourse P1 + P2.[3]

Some consequences of this theory must be considered. First, in the expression *argumentation dans la langue*, the word *langue* must be taken in its strict Saussurian sense, as opposed to *parole*, 'speech or discourse'. An explicit translation would be something like 'argumentation depends on linguistic competence'. This statement should sound surprising. However, the fact that this concept of argument was accepted without discussion can be considered as a symptom of the total absence of any classical or Perelmanian concept of argument in the intellectual field at that time. All classical theories see argumentation as a discursive

phenomenon, and the capacity to argue as definitely not a characteristic of linguistic competence, but a specific discursive (interactional) competence, that can be improved by teaching and practice. Language as such cannot be argumentative any more than it is always clear; it is the discourse and speakers who make it so.

Other disturbing – or exciting – consequences must be faced as well. The verb corresponding to *argumentation* in the AwL theory is certainly *arguing that* . . . *To argue that P* is combining a set of utterances and deriving a conclusion from a set of premises. If *arguing that P* is the equivalent of practising linguistic competence, that means that as soon as you speak, you argue. If we accept this conclusion, how can we explain the numerous speech acts we are used to studying? All speech act theory would have to be revised. Another consequence must be emphasized: if argumentation is 'within language', it cannot be good or bad; argumentative discourse can only be grammatically correct or incorrect. Again, I'm not suggesting that these consequences cannot be defended, only that they cannot be accepted without discussion.

The AwL theory is only concerned with the linguistic aspects of sentence connection. It approaches and explains our discourse on the basis of linguistic competence, as demonstrated by the practice of integrating pragmatics within language [*pragmatique intégrée*]. There is no autonomy of discourse in Ducrot's approach, discursive phenomena are explained in terms of an underlying linguistic competence. Consequently, the most puzzling aspect of the AwL theory might be that it has been immediately considered a major contribution to discourse analysis, along with theories of narration or description (whereas they are not compatible). It seems that the old discursive magic of the word 'argumentation' remains alive and well in the new linguistic re-definition of the word.

Grize and Ducrot's approaches to argumentation are central to the understanding of what is going on in today's research in France. Although very different at first sight, they share a number of theses. Both are generalized theories of argument: there is no sentence without a certain '*éclairage*' (Grize) and no sentence without an orientation (Ducrot). As a consequence, neither theory includes a 'critical component'. There is not much that you can do to oppose a schematization or an orientation. That's why the idea of a 'criticism of argument', of a fallacy theory, sounds very strange in this context; and the recent Perelmanian vogue will certainly not change the situation very much.

4. An Overview of Argumentation Research and Applications

Arguing is a rhetorical activity. However, in France at present, the concept of rhetoric is undergoing a post-modern drift of its own. In contrast, under the leadership of Marc Fumaroli, the development of the history of rhetoric (particularly in the fields of education and literature) is quite remarkable (Fumaroli, 1990). In my opinion, the possibility of a revival of a practical rhetoric – a rhetoric that embraces its historical evolution as well as the new machinery of modern communication – is quite limited (Reboul, 1991). The main reason for

this is that the new disciplines of communication, interaction studies and discourse analysis have definitely taken over the analytical and practical functions of rhetoric in these fields.

At the moment, broadly speaking, the most diverse academic fields are taking a strong (and relatively sudden) interest in argumentation, so that it is now more or less considered as a discourse analytic discipline. Therefore, one could argue that argumentation studies in France are in a desperate state of fragmentation; or that they are omnipresent, acting as a powerful 'fertilizer' for human and social sciences, even extending to hard sciences. From a philosophical point of view, the popularity of the concept could be commented on in several ways - for example, as the result of a fresh appraisal of the necessity for arbitration between people with incompatible values in specific cases (this should not sound new to Perelmanian ears). Political theorists have now become more conscious of the basically uncertain and controversial character of socio-political decisions, and tend to judge the legitimacy of a decision not by its conformity to a pre-existing law or rule, but according to the unique criteria that it must be the outcome of debate. In general, social cohesion is not grounded in a social contract or in mutual sympathy, but in the quality of debate promoted by the group. Of course, this does not preclude but, on the contrary, stimulates the socio-political manipulations of debate, particularly in the media.

There are no journals or book series exclusively dedicated to argumentation studies. Articles on argument are only to be found scattered randomly in academic journals or confined to special issues.[4]

Argumentation studies do not constitute a unified discipline; yet, considering the fact that arguing is basically a form of contextualized speech behaviour, could find a basic and comfortable home in the field of discourse analysis. R research is developing throughout the human and social sciences: law (Mc 1995); sociology (Boudon, 1991; Bouvier, 1994, 1999; Passeron, 1991); po science; psychology; linguistics (see section 3: in the field of discourse an Doury, 1996; Eggs, 1994; Plantin, 1990, 1996, 1998; Plantin et al., philosophy (Cossutta, 1996; Meyer, 1986; Meyer and Lempereur, 1990); literature (Amossy, 1991; Declerq, 1992); communication (Breton, 1996); cogni n and linguistics (see section 3: Baker, 1996, 1999; Vignaux, 1976, 1981, 1 , firs and second language acquisition, etc. The most common theoretical fra work are interactionism, cognitivism and linguistics, or discourse analysis. F earc extends via cognition studies and didactic disciplines to hard sciences ysics mathematics, etc.), where arguing merges with explaining, demonstra g and reasoning. Each discipline maintains a line of research in relation to ar ment ation studies, deeply influenced by the problematic and research sty of the field. For instance, philosophical problems concerning the ethics of com unica tion are developed in communication studies. The question of fallacy hich not considered a legitimate component of a linguistic approach, cou play role in the analysis of the reasoning process; in fact, the most exciting per pective are developing in more holistic directions.

In education, pioneering work on argumentation was carried out in profe sional education, in practical courses devoted to 'Expression and communica

techniques' [*Techniques d'expression et de communication*]. In general education, a kind of 'argumentative turn' was taken in 1996, when a practical exercise on argumentation was introduced as part of the *baccalauréat*.[5] Typically enough, this exercise is part of the test in French language and literature. Recent proposals (2000) have been made to introduce an explicit argumentative line into the *baccalauréat*'s philosophy syllabus. Given the symbolic and practical importance of the *baccalauréat* in the French education system, this could be considered as a kind of consecration for argumentation studies as a discourse-analytic discipline; however, all these academic exercises are based mainly on very classical literary materials, leaving no room for actual debates in interaction. All these innovations are hotly discussed. Publications in this field are flourishing (see the Pratiques articles listed in the Appendix).[6]

Weaknesses must also be acknowledged. Argumentation studies (historical approaches included) in France are 'ethnocentric', that is, entirely centred on Greco–Latin approaches. There is no living theoretical dialogue with our neighbouring Mediterranean traditions, i.e. Arabic and Jewish practices and thought on debate, rhetoric and argument.

The link to research in English is erratic; the general trend is completely at odds with one of its most influential paradigms – logic-oriented research on fallacy. There are exceptions, however, such as pragma-dialectic and, generally speaking, argumentation as a special kind of formal dialog.[7] The question of different types of arguments, often considered as basic, is never discussed as such in French research. There are not many contributions on, for example, *ad hominem* or *ad misericordiam* or *ad populum*. When these categories are mentioned (mainly in PhD dissertations), they are loosely used as labels, as convenient tools in the task at hand. On the other hand, the concepts of topos, doxa and stereotypes are often considered as basic. These two observations are of course related.

Research on connectives, originating in Ducrot's work as a consequence of his basic views on the semantics of discourse, is well developed. At one time, it was unduly popularized as the very core of argumentation processes or techniques, particularly in education. However, a well-documented and illustrated lexicon of connectives in French is still lacking.

Some essays, papers and dissertations in argumentation are developing in separate and specific paradigms, for example as 'theory-driven' contributions to the 'argumentation in language' theory. But, on the whole, research is 'data driven', i.e. based on large corpora in a variety of settings, the objective being to give the most accurate description of the data. This kind of research is generally eclectic in its resources. Depending on the level of description, it utilizes methods and concepts originating in different theoretical frameworks, argumentation in language, natural logic, neo-classical rhetoric, pragma-dialectic – and, occasionally, a faint hint of rhetoric. Though highly polysemic, the concept of argumentation is thus frequently considered as a global convenient 'resource concept' to be used liberally as a one-off application when analysing a discourse. But Ducrot's argumentation is not that of Grize, which is not that of Perelman, which is not – to mention just one – that of Woods and Walton (1992). The present situation could be characterized by a flight from theory, which is certainly not the best

way to react to alleged theoretical excesses of other ages. Constructive argument between the main trends in argumentation research are still needed.

The central weakness comes from the fact that the new interest taken in argumentation and the unquestionable development of research has not brought about a parallel development of education in argumentation theories and practices at the higher education level. Here lies certainly the most serious lacuna. At high-school level, teachers are supposed to teach argumentation competence; however, it appears that they have to rely mainly on self-training with some basic books and one-day crash courses. At university level, the situation is the same. The theory of argumentation, analysing argumentative discourse and interactions needs expertise. The contradiction is that nowadays, in France, there is no systematic academic teaching on these points. What is at stake here is certainly the future of argumentation studies. If nothing is done, if only to give a basic foundation to one concept of argument, or at least to articulate the current concepts, the word 'argumentation' could become just an interdisciplinary password, a kind of joker one can allude to at will in any scientific discipline or situation for an opportunistic remark.

5. Outline of a Discourse Analytic Framework for Argumentation Studies

This section outlines a programme encompassing argumentation studies within the field of discourse analysis. Ethnical considerations as to what could be typically French or un-French in this approach are not discussed.

Definition: Argumentation as Discursive Confrontation

The following discourse-analytic programme in argumentation diverges from the semantic or cognitive programmes inasmuch as it does not consider argumentation as a simple logico-semantic or cognitive capacity. Arguing is considered as a discursive activity, anthropologically grounded in a specific discursive situation.

The typical object of argumentation studies is as a specific form of discourse in interaction, characterized by conflicting points of views. This is compatible with the classical view that argumentation studies should emerge as a confrontation of assertions in classical judicial settings (rhetoric) or in a philosophic-scientific perspective (dialectic), as well as in contemporary views of argument in pragma-dialectics (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1996). As Schiffrin (1994) states: 'argumentation seems to be a mode of discourse which is neither purely monologic nor dialogic . . . [a] discourse through which speakers support disputable positions' (pp. 17–18).

Discourse analysis is generally characterized by the nature of its data (naturally occurring sets of utterances) and its method (a functional approach based on a set of speech acts) (Schiffrin, 1994) in contrast to a structural paradigm, characteristic of classical grammar and operating with constructed data, drawn

from the analyst's competence, considered as typical of the general (or 'ideal') speaker–hearer.

It could be argued that, as far as theory is concerned – even functional theory – structural aspects come into play. In other words, one undisputable view is that there are linguistic constraints on the link between argument and conclusion. A second view is that no connector in French can be considered as having only an argumentative function, even *parce que* (because) or *donc* (so, therefore). The functional concept 'being an argument for such-and-such conclusion' can be ascertained only on a contextual basis; that is, the fact that the truth of a sentence or the approval of a line of action is uncertain or disputed.

According to the classical approaches of argumentation, argumentation consists of a recognizable pattern of (oral or written) utterances, each of which is functionally linked to the whole set. Consider, for example, the famous Toulmin example about Harry being a British subject since he was born in Bermuda. The utterance: 'Harry is a British subject, he was born in Bermuda' could either be an informative discourse about who Harry is, or a statement settling an argument: 'Harry was born in Bermuda, he's a British subject'. The reading of this discourse as an argument is contextually bound, the crucial contextual feature being that the current discourse is about the possible nationality of Harry. The introduction of the connective, 'so' excludes the informative reading; the introduction of the modal 'probably' does not necessarily imply an argumentative interpretation. The intonation pattern could also play a role in this choice. Thus, strictly linguistic–structural phenomena as well as contextual clues play a role in determining the argumentative interpretation of a string of utterances.

Argumentation cannot be defined as a genre of discourse: disputes can be staged in a play as well as in a novel or in a poem; they occur in highly institutionalized situations (in court, in houses of parliament), as well as in spontaneous everyday situations (family arguments), as vile propaganda as well as in the most noble educational or scientific activities.

From this point of view, argumentative discourse is very similar to narrative or descriptive discourse and the temptation here is to define a set of basic devices (argumentation, narration, description, etc.) which could be considered as the basic components of discourse which, when combined, could account for any form of discourse. But it is well established that narration and description can be argumentatively oriented (this could be built into a reason for considering argumentativity as a basic feature of discourse). It could be maintained that the 'fairiest' of fairy tales 'argues' for some conclusion about the world. Here the 'counterdiscourse' pragmatic criteria come into play: the fact that this story does not confront an adverse story is considered a good reason to speak of 'pure' narration or description.

Data: Texts and Interactions

Classical approaches to argumentation examined restricted types of discourses: syllogistic (or quasi-syllogistic) discourse for the logically oriented theories of

fallacy, short paragraphs for the new rhetoric and two-sentence discourses in the AwL theory. Only monological discourses are considered, and used mainly as examples. Natural texts are considered expansions (sometimes by increased length) of such core arguments.

As a discourse-analytic discipline, argumentation analysis must confront the problem of corpora at the outset. Although the basic data of argumentation studies are defined on the basis of discursive confrontation, they are not limited to data emanating from face-to-face interactions. Argumentative activity is best characterized by a perpetual to-and-fro between expression (*énonciation*) and interaction, a 'self'-centred moment, an 'other'-centred moment. Positions can be confronted through both written and oral discourse, occurring in a large variety of (institutional or private) settings. This heterogeneity must be taken into account in the constitution of corpora for argumentation analysis. From this point of view, theory must deal not only with constructed examples used for the sake of theory-building or illustration but also face complex data, coming from a variety of social or intellectual fields for interdisciplinary case analysis.

Two different kinds of corpora can be considered as eligible for the study of argumentation. First, the analysis of specific, face-to-face argumentative encounters in dialogue or polylogues, as in negotiation sessions, for example. At this point, argumentation studies has to add a socio-psychological dimension in group studies, and to take conflict studies into consideration. As noted at the beginning of this article, the American English lexical data point to an interesting theoretical question on the relationship between the study of the *arguing that* and *arguing with* process, that is, the relationship between argumentation studies and interpersonal conflict studies. To check how far these two fields are interconnected, we might take a look at *Conflict Talk*, a collection of essays edited by Allen D. Grimshaw (1990a), subtitled *Sociolinguistic Investigations on Arguments in Conversation*. In his substantial presentation and conclusion, Grimshaw never refers to 'argumentation studies', and never uses the word *argumentation* (1990b, 1990c). Two papers use the word *argument* to refer to their object, Goodwin and Goodwin (1990) 'Interstitial Argument' and Schiffrin (1990) 'The Management of a Cooperative Self during Argument: The Role of Opinions and Stories'. If I have checked correctly, they never use the word *argumentation*. The conclusion seems to be that the study of *arguing with* develops independently from the study of *arguing that*: no explicit relations are posited between these fields.

Second, argumentation analysis has, as a specific task, to build up discipline-specific corpora. Such corpora are constituted by the large set of interventions around a (more or less specific) argumentative question, not obligatorily of the loftiest order. Such an everyday problem could be, for example 'Should we build a new school or just repair the existing one?'. This kind of corpus is characterized by its heterogeneity. It will gather oral (prepared or spontaneous) interventions and written interventions; oral interventions will allude to written ones and written interventions will be grounded in oral ones. A variety of settings will come into play: private discussions at home, more formal ones in semi-institutional settings (parents' associations), leaflets, official public encounters at the town hall, not to mention the inevitable meetings of professionals. If things go wrong,

articles will appear in local newspapers, followed by letters to the editor, television reports, the courts might get involved, etc.

Tools and Concepts

Argumentation studies should not be too concerned about achieving autonomy or being a 'fundamental' discipline, either from a linguistic or a logical point of view. When analysing face-to-face argumentative interactions, argumentation analysis normally uses the basic tools of grammar and linguistics, interaction theory, discourse analysis, plus a set of specific concepts. From this perspective, analysing argumentation needs more than a simple set of elementary notions, not just the logical theory of the syllogism, nor the usual rules for adjusting discourse to one's partner, or for building up a coherent discourse.

In argumentative situations, concepts of interaction theory undergo a transformation. For example, preference for agreement turns into a preference for disagreement (that is, the answer of one's opponent is not expected to be in agreement with the first turn); politeness rules are modified. The tenant is not impolite when he or she appeals to his or her landlord: 'You have no right to raise my rent to such an extent!'; it's quite normal for the landlord to praise his or her apartment in order to justify the increase in the rent, although in friendly encounters, politeness principles prohibit trespassing on the other's territory or praising one's own property.

Subject and meaning: two controversial notions Classical discourse analysis[8] was characterized by the systematic and coherent denial of a set of notions (traditionally considered as simple and self-evident, which is certainly far from true), among which are the following propositions from Maldidier (1990):

> *Le sujet individuel et collectif. la communication intersubjective* (p. 50)
>
> The individual and collective subject, intersubjective communication
>
> *Les mots communiquent un sens, il y a des personnes et il y a des choses, du subjectif et de l'objectif. de l'émotionnel (rhétorique) et du cognitif (logique).* (p. 37)
>
> Words communicate a meaning, there are people and things, subjective and objective, emotions (rhetoric) and cognition (logic).

Meaning, subject, interdiscourse (*interdiscours*): three conceptual puzzles play a major role in classical discourse analysis, the positive emphasis put on the role of interdiscourse, a strong criticism of a set of notions around the concept of subject, and the will to build up a new concept of discursive meaning.

As far as argumentation studies are concerned, the most sophisticated concept of meaning developed in relation to argumentation theories is certainly Ducrot's concept of discursive meaning mentioned earlier. On the burning question of the subject, a certain vision of the rhetorical subject (maybe a classroom vision) seems to be the target of Foucault's (1969) criticism in the following passage:

> Discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject

> and his discontinuity with himself may be determined . . . it is neither by recourse to a transcendental subject nor by recourse to a psychological subjectivity that the regulation of its enunciation should be defined, (p. 74. quoted in Williams, 1999: 84)

This dispersion and discontinuity can be interpreted (some would say distorted and defaced) in terms of the interplay of several sets of roles. First, *linguistic roles* (Austin's phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts); second, the *pragmatic–interactional roles*, including the dispersion and discontinuities on the part of the audience, as well as *generic roles*; third, *social roles* come into play, as well as *institutional roles* defining a specific encounter in a specific setting. Argumentative interaction, seen as a three-way interaction – a particular kind of trilogue, adds three specific roles to the interactional set: proponent, opponent and third party. In a specific interaction, these three roles can be enacted by specific persons or groups; they can also be enacted by the same person, at different stages of a monologue. Three discursive positions are correlated with these three roles: the proponent engages in a discourse of proposition; the opponent, in a counterdiscourse, or discourse of opposition; the third party takes responsibility for the topic of the argument. The argumentative roles relate to the *narrateur/narrataire* (narrator/listener) roles in narration, or the expert/non-expert roles in explanation. All work towards defining the foundation of the argument.[10]

The concept of interdiscourse which relates to a rather structuralist view of discourse meaning, could also be seen as a major discourse-analytic contribution. Incorporating a specific discourse into interdiscourse has a special significance for argumentation studies in large corpora, gathered around a specific argument. It can show how a certain class of argumentative forms have been used for many centuries. For example, during the 1997 debate on immigration and French nationality, the following argument was expounded:

> *On n'est pas Français parce qu'on est né à Roissy* [Paris airport]
>
> Just because you are born in Roissy does not mean to say you are French

This argument echoes an earlier argument set out in the drafts of the Napoleonic Civil Code during the 1800s:

> *Un enfant naît en France de parents étrangers: ceux-ci venaient d'arriver. Peu de jours après ils retournent dans leur pays: leur enfant les suit. Lui-même n'y reparaîtra peut-être de sa vie. On demande à quel titre un tel individu peut être Français.* (Weil, 1997: 15)
>
> A child was born in France to foreign parents who had just arrived. A few days later they went back to their country. Their child followed them, maybe he will never reappear in France for the rest of his or her life. How can he or she claim to be French?

Establishing such long-term argumentative stabilities can be argumentation analysis's contribution to the non-linear decoding advocated by general discourse analysis in opposition to the 'obviousness of a series of sentences' [*l'evidence des enchaînements*] (Maldidier, 1990: 16). But the value of linear analysis must not be underrated: the task of coherently attaching a system of labels characteristic of

the different argumentative operations is in no way an easy and trivial one, when dealing with long interactions involving several active participants.

Conclusion

Seen a generation later, the 1960s and 1970s criticism of the concepts of communication, subject and referential meaning curiously echoes the century-old criticism of the rhetorical approach to intersubjective communication with its all-too human array of moral, logical and emotional proof; only the paradigms backing th. criticism have changed. This programme has tried to establish a field of research on the epistemic, political and psychoanalytic components of discourse. These components were considered to be mainly unconscious and out of the speakers' control (individuals do not always fully comprehend what they are saying), but considered accessible to the analyst under certain theoretical conditions (analysis makes the meaning of the discourse clear). This position creates an abyss between ordinary and expert practices. Argumentation analysis shares neither this desperate view of the speakers, nor this esoteric view of the theory. After all, discourse analysis is a discourse that has proved as docile to its general conditions of production as any lay discourse can be, and the changes in these conditions have so far produced some changes in theoretical styles. Maybe all the concepts formerly criticized (and sometimes demonized) can be discovered. reshaped, in contemporary discourse analysis and in argumentation studies. This might be considered to be treason with regard to the original foundations of discourse analysis or, alternatively, the price theory has to pay to be true to its basic programme – the study of speech in context.

Notes

1. Copious examples of this fallacy of 'irrelevant and untimely argumentation' can be found. for example, in Jaugey (1960) or Moigno (1881). A prototypical example can be found in an argument of Chateaubriand (1877):

> Nous touchons à la dernière objection sur l'origine moderne du globe. On dit: "La terre est une vieille dont tout annonce la caducité. Examinez ses fossiles, ses marbres, ses granits, ses laves, et vous y lisez ces années innombrables. . . . Cette difficulté a été cent fois résolue par cette réponse: *Dieu a dûcréer et a sans doute créé le monde avec toutes les marques de vétusté et de complément que nous lui voyons.*
>
> We reach the last objection on the contemporary origin of the earth. One says: 'The Earth is old, everything denotes its obsolescence. Examine its fossils, its marbles. its granite, its lava, and you will read in them these innumerable years . . . This difficulty has been solved a hundred times with this answer: *God must have, and certainly has, created the world with all the marks of decay and additions that we see today.*

2. See Wenzel's bitter comments in Van Eemeren et al. (1987: 103).

3. In French this opposition is expressed in terms of '*sens*' vs '*signification*'; however some authors use '*sens*' for the linguistic meaning and '*signification*' for the meaning in context, and other authors vice versa.
4. The following – non-exhaustive – list gives an idea of the variety of these journals set out as follows: title of special issue, journal references and journal's academic field:

   La rhétorique aujourd'hui, *Mesure* 3 (1990). Paris: José Corti (literature, philosophy, education).

   Rhétorique et sciences du langage, *Verbum* (1993) 1–2–3. Nancy (linguistics).

   Argumentation et rhétorique, *Hermès* (1995) 15, 16. Paris: CNRS editions (cognition, communication, politics).

   Argumentation et sciences sociales, *L'année sociologique* (1994) 44, 45. Paris: PUF (sociology).

   L'argumentation en dialogues, *Langue française*, Garcia-Deban (ed.) (1990) (linguistics).

   Enseigner l'argumentation, *Pratiques* (1997), *Pratiques* 97. Metz (French studies, pedagogy).

5. Twelfth grade exam, taken on leaving high school.
6. As a second important point concerning research in education, it must be mentioned that a new program of the INRP (*Institut National de la Recherche Pédagogique*/National Institute for Pedagogical Research) focuses on argumentation in all high-school disciplines.
7. The ISSA Amsterdam Conference is playing a major role in improving this situation.
8. A distinction should be drawn between the second discourse analysis of the 19[illegible] and the original, or 'classical' perspective, developed by and around Foucault and Pêcheux in the 1970 or discourse analysis *stricto sensu*.
9. In *Forms of Talk*, Goffman (1981) identifies two complex structures: the reception format, *ratified participants* (*addressed* or *unaddressed*) as opposed to *bystanders* (*overhearers* or *eavesdroppers*); and the production format, *animator, author, figure* and *principal* (pp. 154ff., 173ff.). 'In short, the animator produces talk, the author creates talk, the figure is portrayed through talk, and the principal is responsible for talk' (Schiffrin 1990: 241). Ducrot et al. (1980) distinguishes between the complex set '*sujet parlant/locuteur/énonciateur*' on the production side and the 'auditeur/allocutaire/destinataire' set on the reception side (pp. 35–8).
10. It might be interesting to confront this notion in Goffman, and the parallel notion 'position' as defined in Foucault (1969), his chapters on 'La formation des modalités énonciatives' and 'La fonction énonciative'.

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Appendix: Special Issues of Journals

Travaux du centre de recherches sémiologiques (CdRS), Université de Neuchâtel

Vignaux, G. (1969–70) 'La nouvelle rhétorique: Revue critique et perspectives d'application'. *CdRS* 1.
Borel, M.-J. (1969–70) 'Pour définir l'argumentation', *CdRS* 3.
Grize, J.-B. (ed.) (1971) 'Logique de l'argumentation et discours argumentatifs', *CdRS* 7.
Wülser, C. (ed.) (1982) 'Actes de langage explicatifs', *CdRS* 40.
Wülser, C. (ed.) (1992) 'Les organisations raisonnées – Analyse de l'articulation de séquences discursives', *CdRS* 60.
Miéville, D. (ed.) (1993) 'Relations formelles et non formelles', *CdRS* 61.
Miéville, D. (ed.) (1995) 'Raisonnement et calcul', *CdRS* 63.

Langue française

'Argumentation et discours scientifique', *Langue française* 42.
'Argumentation et énonciation', *Langue française* 50.
'L'argumentation en dialogues', *Langue française* 112.

Pratiques

'L'argumentation écrite'. *Pratiques* 73.
'Argumentation et langue', *Pratiques* 84.
'Enseigner l'argumentation', *Pratiques* 96.

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Extreme Case Formulations: A Way of Legitimizing Claims

Anita Pomerantz

Introduction

How do we convince others to buy a product, to believe in an idea, or to support a project? When we sell, convince, argue, defend, justify, accuse, complain, etc., we are attempting to have our fellow interactants arrive at certain conclusions. A major resource for doing this are the practices of description. A state of affairs is portrayed as believeable, obvious, compelling, unreasonable, illogical, etc. in the way a description of it is formed.

One practice used in legitimizing claims involves describing with Extreme Case formulations. Some examples of Extreme Case formulations are:

'brand new'
'completely innocent'
'he was driving perfectly'
'he didn't say a word'
'I really don't know who he is'
'no time'
'forever'
'every time'
'everyone'

This paper analyzes how Extreme Case formulations work in complaining, accusing, justifying, and defending. Within these activities, three uses of Extreme Case formulations have been isolated for analysis. They are:

(1) to defend against or to counter challenges to the legitimacy of complaints, accusations, justifications, and defenses;

Source: *Human Studies* vol. 9, no. 2/3, 1986, pp. 219–229.

(2) to propose a phenomenon is 'in the object' or objective rather than a product of the interaction or the circumstances;
(3) to propose that some behavior is not wrong, or is right, by virtue of its status as frequently occurring or commonly done.

Analysis

Instance 1: An Adversarial or Defensive Stance

Excerpt 1-A. The datum in Excerpt A comes from a telephone exchange between Bill and Ann who are strangers to one another. Bill phoned to speak with George, whom he does not know, in connection with an organization to which they both belong. George is not home; his wife, Ann, gets on the phone and tells Bill about George's involvement with another woman.

Ann does not articulate her assessment of George but rather describes incidents so as to have Bill reach the desired assessment. She describes incidents to portray how badly he has been to her.

[JG:1:21]

A: And so when he went away on Mother's Day and ·hh he went away on Saturday evening of (0.3) Mother's Day ·hh he spent the night (.) with her and all day Sunday and came home around about nine o'clock Sunday night ·hhh uh he didn't say u – one word he jus' came in put his pajamas o:n ·hhh a:n:d uh sat on th – couch f'r about five minutes and the'e went in: to 'is bedroom an went to bed . . .

Ann describes this incident in such a way as to have Bill see George's culpability. She describes the circumstances and actions that are constitutive of his 'wrongdoings.' In saying 'And so when he went away on Mother's Day,' Ann provides for the *timing* of George's action to be seen as part of his culpability. In identifying the day as 'Mother's Day,' she is trading on the common knowledge that Mother's Day traditionally is the day for honoring mothers.[1]

Ann next gives a correction of when he went away ('he went away on Saturday evening of (0.3) Mother's Day') that allows her to further detail his wrongdoings. In being more 'accurate', Ann adds that George slept with the other woman on the evening before Mother's Day and then spent all of Mother's Day with her.

'All day Sunday' is a description of the amount of time he spent with the other woman on Mother's Day. It gives the amount of time as a proportion of the unit, 'Mother's Day.' It specifies that the amount of time was all of it, the whole unit, the maximum possible. It is a description of an amount of time given as a proportion of a unit, i.e. the proportion 'all' of the unit 'Mother's Day.'

As well as indicating an amount of time, 'all day Sunday' operates to provide a sense for what that amount of time is for the matter in question. 'Just a day,' 'only a day,' 'all day,' and 'the whole day' are examples of sense-giving' formulations. The sense provided by 'all day Sunday', a Maximum Case formulation,

is that the amount of time is very long, too long, unacceptably long. 'All day Sunday' proposedly was an unreasonable and unacceptable amount of time to spend with the other woman on Mother's Day.[2]

Part of how a complaint is formed is to provide for the recognizability of the offender's wrongdoings. By describing the amount of time that he was with the other woman as the maximum case of Mother's Day, she claims this instance as a full and clear case of the wrongdoing that she described. In specifying 'all day Sunday,' she seems to be orienting to a non-sympathetic audience, an audience who might hear, 'he went away on Mother's Day' as a description of, for example, 'at some point during Mother's Day, he went away for a while.' She is orienting to an audience who might be looking for the illegitimacy of her complaints. She is speaking as someone who cannot assume sympathetic hearings.

An unsympathetic hearing is one in which a hearer reconstructs a circumstance that could be referenced by the description offered but that supports a position contrary to the original one. 'At some point during Mother's Day, he went away for a while' would be a non-sympathetic hearing of 'He went away on Mother's Day.' It describes a circumstance which is not constitutive of wrongdoings and hence would undermine the legitimacy of Ann's complaints against George. By specifying the Extreme Case of how long he was away, she is countering other possible reconstructions of lesser or no wrongdoings having occurred

Excerpt 1-B. Excerpts 1-B and 1-C (and the excerpt in note 2) are taken from a hearing in a Small Claims Court in England. The plaintiff is claiming damages from a firm that dry cleaned her dress. In the opening of the case, the adjudicator reviews the plaintiff's statement.

Adj: And, you state that- the dress (.) was new
Pla: It was brand new.

'Brand new' is an Extreme Case of 'new' – it is as new as can be. From the ensuing testimony, it is quite clear that the plaintiff has had the dress at least a number of months. Furthermore, she is not claiming that it was the first time that she wore it. In the literal sense, then, the dress is not brand new.

In confirming the adjudicator's statement, the plaintiff is not satisfied with the description, 'The dress is new.' She gives, instead, as the appropriate description 'brand new.' In specifying 'brand new,' she treats 'new' as a description that is not good enough to describe the newness of the dress. She seems to be oriented to the possibility of hearing 'new' as referencing possibilities that are different from the one she means to portray.

Interactants use Extreme Case formulations when they anticipate or expect their co-interactants to undermine their claims and when they are in adversarial situations. In being prepared for others to scale down her alleged losses, the plaintiff formulates them as maximum cases.

Excerpt 1-C. In the same case as Excerpt 1-B, the plaintiff later refers to the newness of the dress that has been damaged.

Pla: I mean it's <u>not</u> a question I'm making up stories or I want to come <u>along</u> here [illegible] why should I pay (out) for a brand new dress.

The plaintiff is accounting for why she brought the case to court. After dismissing the possibilities of her fabricating her account and wanting to go to court, she poses the rhetorical question, 'Why should I pay out for a brand new dress.' With it, she portrays as the alternative to going to court, 'paying out for a brand new dress.' She justifies taking the case to court by portraying the alternative to her taking this action as unfair and unacceptable. In describing her loss ('a brand new dress') with an Extreme Case formulation, she claims it as a large loss, unacceptably large. Undeservedly suffering a large loss is *prima facie* unfair and hence unacceptable. As such, remedial action was in order.

The plaintiff is successful in her justification if the precipitating circumstance, as she formulates it ('paying out for a brand new dress,') 'calls for' or 'demands' her taking the case to court. (See Excerpt 2-A for further discussion of justifying).

Instance 2: Attribution of Cause to the Object

Excerpt 2-A. In the following instance, C justifies her decision to sell halves of fruitcakes instead of the whole ones they were given to sell.

C : Anyway I'm u ha – uh what I'm having to do to people I know is cut them up and sell them ·hhhh uh a pound and a half for a dollar sixty five.
M: Oh you're doing that,
C : ·hhhhhh Well I'm doing it to the few people that I know because ever'time I say three twenty five they look at me like ·hh (.) you must be nuts woman,

In giving a reason for selling halves of fruitcakes, C describes a situation that precipitated her action. The precipitating situation was that prospective customers reacted to the price of the fruitcake as excessive. She describes the precipitating situation in terms of a proportional measure of frequency, 'every time.' The Maximum Case proportional measure, 'every time,' is a device that proposes regular, frequent, or patterned occurrences as opposed to odd, idiosyncratic or random occurrences. The import of the status of 'regularly occurring' versus 'odd' cases is that the former kind of case should be taken into consideration whereas the later kind of cases may or ought to be dismissed. 'Every time' is a device for indicating how something should be regarded, namely, as not dismissable.

In describing the customer's reaction as an 'every time' reaction, C builds for a cause to be attributed to other than the personalities or characteristics of the people reacting. By formulating it as an 'everytime' occurrence, the characteristics and personalities of any of the individual actors become unimportant. 'Everytime' proposes that regardless of who the prospective customer was, the reaction to the fruitcake was the same. The prospective customers become a collection of 'anyone in the circumstance.' By describing their reaction as an 'every time' occurrence, C suggests that the every time reaction is attributable to a quality of the object, i.e. the price of the fruitcake.

C does not offer her own assessment of whether the price of the fruitcake is too high. She has, though, lowered the selling cost by selling halves. In reporting

that the customers reacted every time to the price as excessive, C suggests that the price is excessive without asserting it on her own behalf.[3] The warrant or authority that she cites is 'every time'.

C is explaining why she sells halves of fruitcakes. The explanation consists of a portrayal of a precipitating situation, one that provides for her selling halves of fruitcakes to be the reasonable and/or necessary consequence. The precipitating situation that she describes is a problem situation: prospective customers react to the price of the fruitcake as excessive. For her action of selling halves to be recognized as reasonable or necessary, C makes a case for the customers' negative reaction as general and widespread. She makes the case by using a Maximum Case proportional measure, 'every time.' Most directly, with her use of 'every time,' she claims their reaction is general and widespread and, hence, one that cannot be ignored if the selling project is to be successful. Indirectly, she suggests, without committing herself, that the cause of the customers' reacting 'every time' to the price as excessive may lie in the fact that the price is excessive.

Excerpt 2-B. In the following datum, C is talking to his wife about a week at work during which time a co-manager was away.

> C: We got so much done (.) and more than that but everyone had this feeling that we were ·hhhh c-complishing things, you know we all felt real progress going on, ·hhhh it's just (.) so amazing, whenever he's around (.) he's utterly disparaging of our efforts, (.) and (.) and he's c-completely disruptive.

With this description of 'everyone' and 'we all', C is portraying the 'general' reaction to the co-manager's being away. It is a reaction that belongs to no one in particular in that it is formulated as a reaction of 'everyone.' 'Everyone' is a device for attributing the cause of the problem to the object. In using it, C proposes that the problems in the office are a consequence of the co-manager's personality, behavior, etc. Whereas C starts by describing everyone's reaction, he ends this segment describing attributes of the co-manager.

C has a history of difficult interactions with the co-manager. In this segment, C describes a circumstance that would constitute evidence for his maintaining that *he* is not even partially responsible for the troubles that he has with the co-manager. The lay-logic is something like: if others react the same way to the co-manager, then the co-manager is responsible for the difficulties.[4]

Excerpt 2-C. In the following excerpt, S is telling A about a friend of his.

> S: You'd like him. Everybody who meets him likes him.

Making a prediction about what another would or would not like is a way of displaying one's knowledge of the other. With 'You'd like him,' S predicts A's liking of his friend. In making this prediction, C normally would be presumed to know the sort of people that A likes.

With the addition, 'Everyone who meets him likes him,' S provides a clarification or shift in interpretation of 'you'd like him.' In formulating the category of those who like his friend as 'everyone who meets him,' C proposes that the

personality and characteristics of the subjects are irrelevant to the phenomenon. The cause of 'everybody who meets him likes him' is the object. He is a likeable fellow. In order to be heard to be talking about his friend's attributes and not about A, S uses 'everyone' as the subject, thus attributing the liking to his friend. (S then went on to talk about how his friend is just a real likeable person.)

Instance 3: Frequency of Occurrences Speaking for Rightness/Wrongness

Excerpt 3-A. The following is an excerpt of a call to a Suicide Prevention Center.

Desk : Do you have a gun at home?
(0.6)
Caller: A forty fi:ve,
Desk : You do have a forty fi:ve.
Caller: Mm hm, it's loaded.
Desk : What is it doing there,hh Whose is it.
Caller: It's sitting there.
Desk : Is it you:rs?
(1.0)
Caller: It's Da:ve's.
Desk : It's your husband's hu:h?=
Caller: =I know how to shoot it,
(0.4)
Desk : He isn't a police officer:r,
Caller: No:.
Desk : He just ha:s one.
Caller: Mm hm, It – u – Everyone doe:s don't they?
[Taken from Sacks Lecture: Fall 1964 Lecture 3]

The Desk is attempting to get the Caller to account for the gun in her house. After a series of attempts, he offers to the Caller an explanation that gives no explanation. 'He just ha:s one.' The Caller confirms, adding 'Everyone does don't they?'

'Everyone does' is a description of the prevalence of the practice. It formulates the prevalence as a proportion – it is the whole, the complete, or the total set. As such it is an Extreme Case formulation.

In saying 'Everyone does,' the Caller proposes that keeping a gun in the house is a normal and accepted practice rather than a special practice needing explanation.

In reporting the prevalence of a practice as a Maximum Case, a speaker is using prevalence to speak for the rightness of the practice.[5] What 'everyone does' is the way the 'right' way to behave and is not accountable.

A recipient may indeed want to challenge that claim that having a gun at home is normal, right, and unaccountable. One way to challenge its status as a normal and accepted practice is to challenge the Extreme Case formulation as a valid or accurate measure of the prevalence of the practice.

In the continuation of Excerpt 3-A, the Desk challenges the caller's assertion.

Caller: Mm hm, It – u – Everyone doe:s don't they?
(1.7)
Desk : Yah ee– e: – ah::: ih You have a forty fi:ve and it's loaded.
Caller: Mm:mm,
Desk : A:nd uh (0.4) I suppose maybe everyone in:hh evrywuh– in Burnside Park has one I don't know:w,
(0.7)
Caller: Well no: but I mean- (0.2) a lot of people have guns
Desk : Oh su:[re,
Caller: [I mean it's not– (.) [unusual.
Desk : [I s::– I: see.

The Desk challenges the Extreme Case proportional measure by specifying an area limitation and including doubt markers. He grants the possibility of its validity ('I suppose maybe' and 'I don't know') in her particular neighborhood ('in Burnside Park'). In naming a particular area, he has limited the population that 'everyone' would reference to an area about which she is entitled to know. In treating her assertion as 'possible,' he has taken a position of doubt vis-à-vis her certain assertion and turns it back to her for reconsideration.

The Desk has challenged the Caller's 'Everyone does' as a valid description of a population. To do so, he reshapes it as more credible by limiting the population to the caller's neighborhood, and then marking it as a possibility.

The challenge calls the Extreme Case formulation to task as a valid and accurate description of the prevalence of people owning guns. In response, the Caller reformulates the description, describing the practice as prevalent with a non-extreme formulation, 'a lot of people have guns.' She holds onto the status of owning a gun as normal and accepted by adding, 'I mean it's not unusual.' Disclaiming the contrastive status ('not unusual') seems to be a weaker claim for it being an accepted practice than 'everyone does.'

Excerpt 3-B. In the following excerpt, D and T are talking about T's being charged with the offense of accepting bribes.

D : You didn't do anything else– anything wrong o– other than what: everybody else on the police force did at that time. At Christmas time, we accepted =
T : = Oh man! Christmas time, it was like– I remember the days, Christmas time used to be like =
D : = Damn right. Christmas time, everybody accepted money.

In describing accepting money as what 'everyone' did, D proposes that it was a normal practice and hence an acceptable practice. In proposing it was a normal practice, D argues that T should not be charged with the offense.

Excerpt 3-C. A patient went to the doctor's office to get lab results. Upon checking, the receptionist saw that the patient's file was not back yet. The receptionist told the patient to phone the next day for the results.

Patient : That's not a problem?
Receptionist: No. People do it all the time.

The patient's question intends to check out whether phoning for the results would or would not be seen as an irregular or special request. In reporting, 'People do it all the time.' the receptionist proposes that patients' calling the office for lab results is normal and acceptable. The Extreme Case formulation, 'all the time', proposes that the patient's calling for lab results would not be viewed as irregular or a special request but as routine, acceptable patient behavior.

Conclusion

This paper has described three uses of Extreme Case formulations:

1) to assert the strongest case in anticipation of non-sympathetic hearings,
2) to propose the cause of a phenomenon,
3) to speak for the rightness (wrongness) of a practice.

The interactants in the illustrations were engaged in several types of activities, among which were complaining, accusing, justifying, and defending. As concluding remarks, a few comments will be made about why participants use Extreme Case formulations in these activities.

Part of the business of complaining involves portraying a situation as a legitimate complainable. This may take the form of portraying the offense committed and/or the suffering endured in a way such that it would not be dismissed as minor. So as to legitimize a complaint and portray the complainable situation as worthy of the complaint, a speaker may portray the offense and/or the suffering with Extreme Case formulations. In both accusing and defending, participants often present their strongest cases, including specifying Extreme Cases of their claims.

Part of justifying a course of action may involve portraying the precipitating circumstance as necessitating the action. The precipitating circumstance may be a problem circumstance which is portrayed as unfair, immoral, embarrassing, uncomfortable, or in some other way undesirable and/or intolerable. There is a shared assumption that the worse the problem, the more necessary it is to do something about it. In justifying, speakers use Extreme Case formulations to portray the circumstances that precipitated their actions as demanding their actions.

A problem that participants have when engaged in, or reflecting on, conflicts, complaints, criticisms, compliments, praise, etc. is to attribute the cause of the phenomenon. Who or what is responsible for the conflictual, complainable, praiseworthy state of affairs? One method that is used to determine what or who is responsible, i.e. to make an attribution, involves comparing the case in question to other similar cases. Through this procedure, persons determine that they are (are not) responsible for the state of affairs in question. Extreme Case proportional formulations ('everyone,' 'all,' 'every time') are used to indicate that any individual member of that category is not responsible for the state of affairs; that responsibility is to be attributed elsewhere.

The social order essentially is a moral order (Garfinkel, 1967). One of the ways of knowing what is acceptable and right is by finding out how people behave. There often is a shared assumption operating (one that is called into question on occasion): how people behave tells us what is the right way to behave. Proportional measures reporting the frequency or prevalence of practices are used to propose and substantiate the rightness and wrongness of those practices. Extreme Case formulations ('all the time,' 'everybody,' 'no one') propose behaviors are acceptable and right or unacceptable and wrong.

Notes

1. If the day were not part of the offensiveness of the occasion, it might have been referred to with a Relational term, e.g. 'So the next time he went away . . .' Relational identifications are commonly used to provide coherence in narratives. For a discussion of Relational identifications, see Pomerantz (forthcoming).
2. The use of 'all day' to provide the sense of an amount of time as 'unreasonably long' can be seen in the following complaint as well.

   Plaintiff: . . . 'n he said I'll clean it (.) for four o'clock ·hh 'n I walked round all day long if: (.) in an overall which was a three quarter length overall so how do I feel, . . .

   The plaintiff is portraying having suffered a great deal of discomfort. The discomfort includes wearing strange looking overalls at work while her dress was being dry cleaned. In portraying the discomfort, she describes the amount of time with an Extreme Case formulation 'all day long.' It conveys the sense of the amount of time as unreasonably long.
3. For a description of speakers' making limited claims on their own behalf when performing sensitive actions, see Pomerantz (1984).
4. The author's hypothesis is that given a problematic situation, it may take as little as one or two cases similar to one's own case to warrant attributing blame to the other and to formulate the phenomenon as 'he does it to "everyone".'
5. Speakers endorse (or show neutrality regarding) the rightness/wrongness of a proposal by the proportions that they report, e.g. 'all,' 'most,' 'some,' 'none.' In a role play experiment in which students negotiated a grade determination, a student described the plan that he endorsed as what 'most' professors do. When he was maintaining a course of action as a choice but not endorsing it he described it as what 'some professors' do. In stating a position against giving a B grade, he used the Extreme Case 'I don't think any professor would just give a person a B . . .'.

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Discursive Social Psychology: From Attitudes to Evaluative Practices

Jonathan Potter

The aim of this chapter is to introduce a discursive approach to social psychology to people who are more familiar with the mainstream experimental social cognition tradition. After making some preliminary remarks about the history, aims and theory of discursive social psychology I will focus on what would traditionally be called the social psychology of attitudes. This topic has the virtue of being at the heart of social psychology for much of the century, and thus provides a familiar startpoint for anyone wishing to understand what is distinctive about the discursive approach, and how radical its respecification of traditional notions will be.

Discursive Social Psychology

Discursive social psychology is the application of ideas from discourse analysis to issues in social psychology. Its publication record goes back over a decade. The first analytic article published in a social psychological journal was in 1985 (Litton & Potter, 1985) and one of the major stimuli for the development of the approach was the book *Discourse and Social Psychology* (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). This parallels the development of a rhetorical approach to social psychology, whose first analytic article was published in 1985 (Billig, 1985) and whose major theoretical introduction, Billig's *Arguing and Thinking*, was also published in 1987 (now Billig, 1996). Since the end of the 1980s these two approaches have blurred together, and there has been a related interest in drawing on ideas from the perspective of conversation analysis (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984; Sacks, 1992) and applying them to social and cognitive psychological issues (Edwards, 1991, 1997;

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Edwards & Potter, 1993; Antaki, 1994). In this chapter, unless I explicitly claim otherwise, I am using the phrase "discursive social psychology" to refer to a set of ideas and developments from discourse analysis, conversation analysis and rhetoric.

Work of this kind has mushroomed in the last few years across a wide range of disciplines and analytic topics. It has been concentrated particularly in the UK, but notable developments have taken place in Australia, Canada, Italy, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Scandinavia and Spain. In this chapter, the focus will be specifically social psychological, and I will ignore developments and debates in sociology and linguistics, as well as the issues which distinguish the form of discourse analysis discussed here from variants which evolved in linguistics (Brown & Yule, 1983), sociolinguistics (Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975), post-structuralism (Foucault, 1971) and cognitive psychology (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). Some of the differences between these approaches are summarized briefly in Potter (1996a) and explored in detail in Schiffrin (1994) and van Dijk (1996).

Theoretical and Meta-theoretical Characteristics of Discursive Social Psychology

Although the development of discursive social psychology was facilitated by the "climate of problematization" (Curt, 1994) engendered by the so called "crisis in social psychology" in the 1970s (Parker, 1989), and the intellectual space cleared by the work of Gergen (1973), Harré and Secord (1972) and Shotter (1977), its direct theoretical and analytic antecedents were developments in sociology of scientific knowledge (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984), ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (Garfinkel, 1967; Sacks, 1992) and a range of notions from post-structuralism and particularly the work of Foucault and Barthes. Discursive social psychology is a broadly constructionist perspective and is commonly, although not always, associated with a relativist meta-theory rather than the realist, positivist metatheory that is still commonplace in experimental social psychology (Edwards, Ashmore, & Potter, 1995; Gergen, 1994).

Discursive social psychology is constructionist in two senses. On the one hand, it takes people to be constructing their worlds through their accounts and descriptions. That is, "reality" enters human practices by way of the categories and descriptions that are parts of those practices. The world is not already categorized by God or nature in a way that must be passively accepted; rather, it is constituted in one way or another as people talk it, write it, argue it and undermine it. On the other hand, discursive social psychology stresses that these descriptions and accounts that people use to constitute their worlds are *themselves* constructed; that is, fabricated in occasions of talk, or in specific texts, from words, metaphors and a range of discursive resources. This twin sense of construction marks out part of the subject matter of discursive social psychology: it researches the *practices* that are sustained by particular constructions of the world (accounts, descriptions); and it researches how those descriptions are built, how they are fitted to their context of use, and the resources they draw on (Potter, 1996b).

Discursive social psychology's constructionism is closely related to its relativist meta-theory. The emphasis on accounts and descriptions being built as parts of human practices has encouraged discourse analysts to consider the practices through which scientific "findings" are produced and the texts in which those findings are represented and warranted. That is, they have emphasized the requirement and virtue of reflexively considering the implications of research for science in general, and for scientific and social scientific texts, including social science texts such as this very one I am writing now (Ashmore, 1989; Mulkay, 1985). Some of the consequences and issues raised by relativist work, and its relation to broader themes in postmodernism, are discussed in Gergen (1991, 1994), Potter (1996b, 1998a) and Shotter (1993a,b). It is important to note, however, that not all researchers combine a discursive approach to social psychology with a relativist meta-theory (Billig, 1991; Gill, 1995; Harré, 1992; Parker, 1992).

For some years social psychologists have looked increasingly to social cognition for explanatory phenomena; the paraphernalia of scripts, schemas, heuristics, attitudes, beliefs, social representations, memory stores, categories, prototypes and so on (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). These become the players in a more general story that casts people as information processors, sifting and computing input and generating a range of outputs. In contrast, the central theoretical thrust of discursive social psychology is *anti*-cognitivist. This does not mean that nothing is assumed to be going on under people's skulls. Rather, discursive social psychology is moving *both* the *analytic* and *explanatory* focus from cognitive processes and entities to discursive practices and the resources they draw on (Edwards, 1997) That is, it studies activity itself – rather than the outcomes of activity or reports of activity, as is more common in mainstream social psychology. For example, rather than taking a measure of "opinion shift" before and after a group discussion, or getting participants to rate the conversation on a series of scales, the discussion *itself* will be studied in the form of a video/audio tape and transcript (McKinlay, 1988).

Discursive social psychologists have overwhelmingly worked with two kinds of materials. For much of the 1980s their primary focus was on open-ended interviews. More recently, they have increasingly worked on records of natural interaction of natural texts: newspaper reports, relationship counselling sessions, police interviews, social workers' talk with clients, transcripts of everyday talk, and so on. However, the contrast between interviews and records of natural interaction is not as great as might appear: for interviews are not being treated as a neutral machinery for harvesting psychologically interesting responses but as arenas of interaction in their own right, where the interviewer and interviewee's contributions are equally important (Potter & Mulkay, 1985; Widdicombe & Wooffitt 1995). The point to emphasize is that discursive social psychology studies interaction done through talk and texts and considers how that interaction is done, what resources it draws on, and how these things relate to broader questions in social psychology.

Relating Theoretical and Methodological Characteristics of Discursive Social Psychology

It is important to emphasize at the outset that discursive social psychology has a strongly empirical locus. It is not attempting to replace empiricism with theory or speculation or politics. Rather, the emphasis is on producing a rigorous analytic programme of mainly qualitative research where theoretical claims are closely related to systematic research studies. Nevertheless, it is hard to overestimate how different the analytic approach is from mainstream social psychology. This difference in method is closely related to distinctive theoretical elements in discursive social psychology. Let me give three examples to illustrate this.

First, discursive social psychology has not adopted the factors and outcomes notions that are closely bound up with traditional social psychological research and its use of experiments and questionnaires. Rather than viewing social life as a consequence of an interplay of factors which have more or less regular patterns and determinate outcomes, discursive social psychology conceptualizes social life as both *normative* and *rhetorical*.

Norms are treated as *orientated to* rather than *governing* action, so that we would expect to find regular deviations, although such deviations may themselves be marked by a range of accounts and sanctions and will therefore be inferentially rich (Heritage, 1984, 1988; Sacks, 1992; Wooffitt, 1990). Take the example of greeting. People have the expectation that a greeting will be returned: "Hello" will be responded to by "oh hi" – this is the *normal* thing to do. However, this does not mean that when a greeting is not returned people start to doubt the norms mative basis of greeting. Instead they are likely to engage in a range of inferences about the person or the context: they are rude, hard of hearing, sulking whatever, which will be displayed in their response to the non-returned greeting.

Rhetoric is treated in discursive social psychology as *orientated to* persuasion. The point of describing it like this is to emphasize that however good the rhetoric there is no guarantee that persuasion takes place. For example, a rhetorical move can have a range of rhetorical counter-moves. In an argument about race, a categorization, say, can be countered by particularization (Billig, 1985); or in a relationship counselling dispute a man criticized for pathological jealousy may turn the negative potential of that description around and argue that his partner is insensitive to his jealousy problem (Edwards, 1995).

The analytic point that flows from this is that it is not sufficient to identify a norm, or some rhetoric, *independently of the practices that they are part of*. This is why discursive social psychologists have focused on practices, whether it is the conversational interaction found in interviews, talk in a range of everyday or institutional settings, or texts such as newspaper articles or literary narratives.

The second point is closely related to the first. The goal of discursive social psychology is not to look beyond the apparent messiness of interaction to discover general patterns and laws lying beyond it; rather, it is focused on the specific *detail* of interaction and how that detail is precisely related to the activities that are being performed. The conversation analyst Sacks (1992) suggested that the of the detail of interaction, whether it be pauses and repairs, the selection

particular words, or the placement of interruption and overlaps, should be assumed to be *irrelevant* to interaction. The negative construction here is quite deliberate. The argument is not that a sniff, say, must always be related to the business of the current interaction rather than being a consequence of having a runny nose; it is that we should not assume that a sniff does *not* have the potential for doing interactional business, such as indirectly displaying disagreement (Roffe, 1997).

Discursive social psychologists, then, work at a level of analysis where much of the concern is with the specifics of what was said, the co-ordination of actions, the design of undercutting accounts and so on. However, this does not mean that their concern is merely with more "micro" features of interaction, at least as that notion has traditionally been understood in social science. For it is often at the level of specific arguments or detailed conversational patterns that "micro" issues of ideology, social structure and social setting become important (e.g. Billig *et al.*, 1988; Boden, 1994; Heath, 1992). Indeed, there has recently been dynamic debate reconceptualizing issues of talk, interaction and social structure (Boden & Zimmerman, 1991; Drew & Heritage, 1992).

The third point of difference from traditional research is that discursive social psychologists place less value on hypothetico-deductivism. The quality of discursive research is not taken to depend on the prior formulation of a specific question or a precisely specified hypothesis. Instead it has often been productive to collect and explore a set of materials without being constrained by a specific hypothesis. Part of the reason for this is that close attention to a video and transcript often reveal phenomena that were both previously unnoticed and unexpected. Starting with the materials rather than prior hypotheses is a way of allowing such phenomena into the analysis.

This is not to endorse naive inductionism, however. Such materials will be analysed against a backdrop of general theoretical concerns as well as specific research themes; a concern with racism say, or the use of descriptions in relationship counselling. Neither is it to reject hypothetico-deductivism in toto. At times, the process of analysing discourse can involve following up and checking hypotheses about the role and nature of particular constructions or forms of interaction.

One way of conceiving the general methodological orientation of discursive social psychology is by analogy with the disciplines of ethology and astronomy. Both are observational rather than experimental sciences. Both are fields where careful and systematic description provides a foundation for broader theoretical claims. And both are fields where the documentation of specific individual phenomena – tactical deception in a primate, perturbations in a planet's orbit – can be crucial for assessing the adequacy of general claims and theoretical systems.

Methodological Procedures in Discursive Social Psychology

There are a range of published accounts of different methodological and analytic aspects of discursive social psychology (Billig, 1987; Coyle, 1995; Gill, 1996; Potter, 1996c, 1997, 1998b; Potter & Wetherell, 1987, 1994, 1995; Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Wooffitt, 1990, 1993; Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995). It is important

to remember at this point that discursive social psychology is a new approach with a range of different strands to it. Although the references cited here show broad agreement, there is also methodological writing from a more Foucaultian perspective (Parker, 1992) and a more conversation-analytic perspective (Drew, 1995) which offers rather different methodological precepts.

The aim in this current chapter is not to duplicate this work but to highlight some of the features that are common in discursive social psychology to highlight its differences from work in the more familiar experimental tradition. To simplify discussion I will focus on three elements of the work: (a) research materials; (b) analysis; and (c) validation procedures.

Research Materials

Traditional social psychologists have been reluctant to deal with actual interaction, preferring to model it experimentally or reconstruct it via scales and questionnaires. Part of the reason for this has been the prevalent cognitive assumptions which have directed the research focus away from interaction and on to generative mechanisms within the person. In contrast to this approach, discursive social psychologists have emphasized the primacy of practices themselves, and have therefore focused on conversational interaction in interviews or natural settings, or documents of various kinds.

Where interaction is the focus, it is taped, either on audio or video, and transcribed. As discursive social psychology has developed the need for high quality transcription has become more fully recognized. The best and most widely used system was developed by the conversation analyst Gail Jefferson and uses symbols that convey features of vocal delivery that have been shown to be interactionally important to participants. A summary of the system is reproduced in the Appendix – a fuller description can be found in Ochs, Schegloff and Thompson (1996).

Analysis

There is no single simple recipe for analysing discourse. However, most analysis involves a period of coding which is principally designed to make the task of analysis simpler by sifting relevant materials from a larger body of transcript or documents and copying them into an archive. Such coding is inclusive and cyclical. It is not meant to prejudge analytic conclusions by eliminating potential instances prior to analysis. The process of analysis will often lead the researcher back to the original corpus as a better understanding of relevant phenomena suggests new examples. Preliminary coding of this kind differs from traditional content analysis (Krippendorf, 1980), where coding, and statistical manipulations, constitute the analysis itself.

Discourse analysis is a craft which is developed with varying degrees of skill. One useful way of conceptualizing analysis is as dependent on the development of an analytic mentality which is sensitive to a range of features of discourse. Elements that have been found to be revealing include; variability in and between different texts and stretches of talk; the detail of hesitations, repair, lexical choice

and so on; the rhetorical organization of discourse (how it is constructed to counter alternatives); and its accountability. Most analysis, whatever its overall goal, benefits from a good understanding of features of mundane conversational organization such as turn taking, adjacency pairs, repair, and preference organization (Levinson, 1983; Nofsinger, 1991; Schegloff, 1997).

Validation Procedures

Discourse researchers typically draw on some combination of four considerations to justify the validity of analytic claims. First, they make use of *participants' own understandings* as they are displayed in interaction. One of the features of a conversation is that any turn of talk is orientated to what came before and what comes next, and that orientation typically displays the sense that the participant makes of the prior turn. Thus, at its simplest, when someone provides an answer they thereby display the prior turn as a question, and so on. Close attention to this turn-by-turn display of understanding provides one important check on analytic interpretations (see Heritage, 1988). Some of the same considerations can be drawn on when dealing with single narratives or with texts (Edwards & Potter, 1992a: Wooffitt, 1992).

Second, researchers may find (seemingly) *deviant cases* most useful in assessing the adequacy of a claim. Deviant cases may generate problems for a claimed generalization, and lead the researcher to abandon it; but they may also display in their detailed organization precisely the reason why a standard pattern should take the form that it does (Heritage, 1995). For example, the claim that participants in television and radio news interviews normally avoid treating interviewers as accountable for views expressed in questions can be supported through detailed analysis of deviant cases where considerable trouble is produced by an interviewee treating his/her interviewer as expressing his/her own views (Heritage & Greatbatch, 1991; Potter, 1996b).

Third, a study may be assessed in part by how far it is *coherent* with previous discourse studies. A study that builds coherently on past research is more plausible than one that is more anomalous. For example, work on fact construction builds on the insights about accountability from earlier studies, and its success provides a further confirmation of the validity of those studies (Edwards & Potter, 1993). There is a sense, then, that each new study provides a check on the adequacy of previous studies that are drawn on. Those studies which capture something about interaction can be built on, those that do not are likely to become ignored.

Fourth, and most important, are *readers' evaluations*. One of the distinctive features of discourse research is its presentation of rich and extended materials in a way that allows the reader to make his/her own judgements about interpretations that are placed alongside of them. This form of validation contrasts with much traditional experimental and content-analytic work where it is rare for "raw" data to be included or more than one or two illustrative codings to be reproduced.

Whether they appear singly or together in a discourse study, none of these procedures *guarantee* the validity of an analysis. However, work in philosophy and sociology of science over the past 30 years has cast doubt on the possibility

of such bottom-line guarantees in science, whether provided by observation, replication or experimentation (Chalmers, 1992; Collins, 1985; Woolgar, 1988).

Discourse and Attitudes

One of the features of discursive social psychology is that it provides a root and branch respecification of a broad range of social psychological notions (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). By starting with the notion of attitudes it would be easy to give the impression that there are pre-existing objects – attitudes – which are understood in one way, or one set of ways, in mainstream social cognition work, and then understood in another way in discursive social psychology. However, this would understate the degree to which the attitude notion is constituted out of social psychological theory, and the extent to which the notion is dissolved in discursive social psychology into a range of other considerations.

Before going on to describe various strands of research that underpin this dissolution, it is important to note three things. First, compared with the mountain of mainstream work on attitudes, there is only a small amount of discursive work which relates to the topic. Second, as I noted above, the criteria for what counts as good research in this area are rather different from those in mainstream social psychology. Third, there is a strong emphasis on theoretical and conceptual development in this area; the balance between theorizing and researching is tipped rather more in the direction of theory than is common in mainstream work.

My discussion will follow six themes. First, it will provide a general account of the way discursive social psychology would deal with phenomena traditionally collected under the notion of attitudes. Second, it will review work on attitude variability and the problems it raises for standard notions of attitudes. Third, it will describe some research from a conversation-analytic perspective that has considered some of the practices through which evaluations are expressed in everyday settings and in political speeches. Fourth, it will overview some research which shows the way evaluations are bound up with broader systems of discourse or interpretative repertoires. Fifth, it will discuss the relation between making assessments and the construction of factual accounts. Sixth, and finally, it will consider how a number of the notions and variables that have been emphasized in recent and classic attitude research are respecified in discursive social psychology. This will focus in particular on function, consistency, vested interest and emotion.

Discourse and Evaluation

A discursive approach to evaluation will involve a number of key moves. In the first place, it will shift from considering attitudes as underlying mental constructs to focusing on people's practices of evaluation in particular settings. The term "practice" here is crucial; for the stress in discursive social psychology is on what is *done* with evaluations – their practical *use*, explicit or indirect – rather than their potential as an index of individual differences or as a predictor of

later actions. Discursive social psychology treats action as fundamental or, as Schegloff (1995) puts it, omnirelevant. So if you want to understand evaluations you need to consider carefully what people are doing with them in their "home" environments, rather than in the more arcane contexts of filling in attitude scales.

The second move is closely related to the first, and involves considering evaluations as they are constructed and understood by participants, rather than attempting to produce a technical definition which will improve on participants' understandings. Using the anthropological distinction, traditional attitude social psychology is an *etic* approach, where the analytic categories are refined with the aim of giving an increasingly precise and consistent psychologists' account of how attitudes should be understood. In contrast, discursive social psychology is an *emic* approach, where the topic is how evaluation is constituted in varied ways in participants practices. The aim is not to *improve* on participants' practices and understandings but to *explicate* their nature. That is, it is not designed to provide a more precise and unambiguous style of evaluation, but to understand how everyday evaluations with all their contradictions and ambiguities are used.

The third move is to develop an approach which accommodates to a wide range of different practices involving evaluation (some using the familiar language of attitudes and opinions, some not). Rather than assume that there is a single underlying logic, discursive social psychology will treat this heterogeneity as a potentially consequential and constitutive feature of such practices. The significance of this move can be illustrated by considering the manner in which attitudes are measured in recent social psychological research.

One commonplace technique of attitude measurement, particularly in the tradition associated with Fishbein and Azjen (1975; Azjen, 1988) uses semantic differential scales. These vary in number, point size, and content according to the study. Some haphazardly collected examples include; enjoyable–unenjoyable, good–bad, foolish–wise, harmful–beneficial, pleasant–unpleasant (Sparks, Hedderley, & Shepherd. 1992), good-bad, desirable–undesirable, positive–negative, beneficial–harmful (Prislin, 1996). worrying–reassuring, unpleasant–pleasant, punishing–rewarding, unenjoyable–enjoyable, useless–useful (Norman & Smith, 1995) and extremely good–extremely bad, like extremely–dislike extremely (Berger, 1992). Note that, apart from the three occurrences of good–bad. these words are all different. Nevertheless, they are taken to be measuring one thing; the person's underlying attitude to eating biscuits, exercise, legalized abortion, a new chocolate bar or whatever the relevant attitude object was.

From the perspective of discursive social psychology, the issue is not whether people are *able* to perform the task of filling in semantic differential scales related to a particular object; clearly they can make enough sense of it to provide scores for the researcher. Rather it is the theory of language, mind and action underlying this approach. Instead of assuming that there is a single underlying evaluation that can be expressed by scales attached to a number of different words, it suggests that we consider the *specifics* of the words used in these scales and their practical use.

Take, for example, the simplest of attitude measures (used by Berger, 1992) which involves just two scales; extremely good–extremely bad; and like

extremely–dislike extremely. These seem straightforward enough and it is not a surprise that Berger obtains a score of internal consistency (α) of 0.92 for judgements about a new chocolate bar. However, this does not mean that the words "good" and "like" are interchangeable in ordinary discourse. It is not hard to imagine uses in which the two conflict: "*Independence Day* was a bad movie, but I liked it" is a perfectly coherent thing to say; the word "bad" picks out the film's intrinsic merit, while "like" indexes something about the person. One way of thinking about this is that "good" is a word which involves public, shared or at least defensible criteria, while "like" is a personal claim that can be explicated, but does not require justification in the same way. This can be seen if we consider a disagreement in each case. It is perfectly sensible to disagree with someone who has claimed that *Independence Day* is a bad film, and various reasons could be offered for and against. However, it would be rather peculiar to claim that the person who said they liked it is *wrong*, that really they disliked it. Liking is typically treated as something a person has privileged knowledge of; if liking is denied this would not be to suggest that the person was mistaken but to suggest that they were lying (to ingratiate themselves, perhaps).

I am not wanting to suggest that discursive social psychology should perform abstract conceptual analysis of terms such as these. Such analyses can be revealing (Mulhausler & Harré, 1990: Sabini & Silver, 1982); yet they can easily underestimate the complexity and rhetorical flexibility of everyday discourse, as Edwards (1997) argues in the case of emotion. The point I am making is that traditional attitude measurement blurs potentially consequential distinctions. Indeed, this example suggests that the very term "good" can fall outside the commonplace social psychological focus on individual preferences. Some of the business that participants can do with the distinction between "liked" and "good" will be discussed shortly.

Variability of Attitude Expression

So far I have indicated some of the general features of a discursive social psychological approach to evaluation. As discursive social psychology developed, one of the main lines of criticism of traditional work on attitudes revolved around the identification of variability in the use of evaluative expressions (Billig, 1989; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell, Stiven, & Potter, 1987). At its simplest the argument is as follows.

When evaluative expressions are looked at carefully and systematically, variability has been found that is theoretically consequential. The same individual can be found offering different evaluations on different occasions, or even during different parts of a single conversation. Generally such variability has either been missed or suppressed or ignored when more traditional techniques of attitude measurement are used. Such variability is an embarrassment to theories which hope to explain behaviour as a product of consistent, underlying, cognitively represented evaluative positions. In contrast, variability of this kind is expected within discursive social psychology, which has studied the way evaluations are flexibly constructed to mesh with specific ongoing practices. Variation is expected

as people perform different actions with their talk; for example, as they respond to assessments, align themselves with friends and differentiate themselves from enemies, and as they construct locally coherent versions of the social and moral world.

What is being suggested about variability can be illustrated by a recent and simple study by Burningham (1995). She examined accounts produced in the context of a "social impact assessment" designed to assess people's attitudes to a proposed road scheme. She demonstrated variability in the interview talk of single individuals. For example, one individual produced negative evaluations of road schemes because they destroy the countryside, but elsewhere in the interview produced positive evaluations of road schemes because they can be produced without damaging the environment. Without going into the detail of Burningham's study, its argument is that variations of this kind are produced because people are performing different tasks while talking about environmental damage, and these tasks are best performed through producing accounts involving differing evaluations.

Note that this account is not in terms of impression management. The suggestion is not that people have an actual attitude, whose expression they modify in accordance with social constraints of various kinds. Rather, the argument is that people engage in a family of evaluative practices. Some of these may implicate, for participants, issues of face: others may implicate, again for participants, issues of consistency. Yet neither theories of impression management nor traditional attitude theory make adequate sense of the organization of those practices in different situations.

There is now a range of studies which reveal variability in a wide range of different settings, including the talk and letters of research scientists (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; McKinlay & Potter, 1987; Mulkay & Gilbert, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985; Potter, 1984, 1987, 1988); talk about race and racism (Potter & Wetherell, 1988, 1989, 1995; McCreanor, 1989; Nairn & McCreanor, 1990, 1991; Shi-xu, 1996; Wetherell & Potter, 1992); accounts of government communicators (e Molder, 1996); talk about gender, careers and inequality (Campbell, 1995; Gill, 1991, 1993; Marshall & Wetherell, 1989; Wetherell, Stivea, & Potter, 1987); talk about the Royal Family (Billig, 1991, 1992); claims in parliamentary discourse and newspaper articles related to a political dispute (Edwards & Potter, 1992a,b; Potter & Edwards, 1990, 1994); talk in work settings such as education and medicine (Billig *et al.*, 1988); talk about health and dieting (Lupton & Chapman, 1995; Wetherell, forthcoming) and social work (Roffe, 1996). The majority of these studies do not take "attitude variability" as their topic as, for the most part, discursive social psychologists have avoided presupposing a notion of attitudes and related theoretical apparatus; however, they are all studies of the construction of talk and texts which either includes variability in direct assessments or in talk closely related to the production of assessments.

It might be objected that this research on variability is inadequate, particularly given the huge investment in time and effort in traditional attitude studies, because it does not provide reliable and quantified measures of variability. The response to this would be that the aim of this research has not been primarily to

assess the extent of variability but to document its existence as a pathway to further analysis.

Moreover, variability is precisely the kind of phenomenon that can be obscured by the kinds of counting and coding prevalent in traditional attitude work, which can easily overestimate homogeneity at the expense of variability (see Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Potter & Litton, 1985). Such homogenizing is a consequence of using coding practices that take instances that may be superficially similar, but may display a range of differences that discursive social psychologists would treat as interestingly variable, and placing them in the same category. Without access to the original materials the reader is faced only with counts that appear homogeneous. As I noted above, one of the methodological virtues of some discourse research is the presentation of extended passages of the original materials that allow the analytic interpretations to be assessed by the reader. (It could be argued that inter-rater reliability would eliminate this problem – however, this just pushes the problem back to the training of raters; if they are inattentive to phenomena that discourse researchers would expect to be consequential, they will achieve high reliability scores regardless.)

Recently some studies have attempted to include measures of "attitude variability" along with other variables (e.g. Norman & Smith, 1995; Prislin, 1996; Sparks, Hedderley, & Shepherd, 1992). These studies can illustrate the sorts of reservations that discursive social psychologists have with the way variability is operationalized.

Take a study of attitudes to exercise by Norman and Smith (1995). They measure variability by items such as: "My feelings about taking exercise are sometimes favourable and sometimes unfavourable". There are a number of difficulties with this approach. First, it assumes that variability is "attitude variability". That is, it assumes that people have some inner position – the attitude – but that it varies over time. Discursive social psychologists have not started with the assumption that people must have consistent personally held evaluations that are carried from one context to another. The variability they are interested in is not a temporal fluctuation like changes in the weather, cloudy for a few days and then sun. Rather it is a discrete and specific variation tied to the nature of the action that is being performed. The point again is that evaluations are not treated as something that are carried around ready-made by participants but are worked up in a way that is suitable for what is being done. In discursive social psychology attitudes are *performed* rather than *preformed*.

The second problem is that it treats people as "honest souls" who can and will provide comprehensive, honest and reliable information about their actions and mental states. The irony here, of course, is that it is traditional social psychologists who criticized the "honest souls doctrine" of new social psychological approaches such as Harré's ethogenics in the 1970s (Harré & Secord, 1972). The apparatus of traditional attitude measurement relies much more centrally on people being honest souls than its discursive alternative does.

The third problem is closely related to the second. For all intents and purposes it treats as irrelevant the fact that "responding" to an attitude scale is an activity. What people may be doing with their words in these settings is not made a topic

of study; instead the words are treated as a pathway to the speaker's inner world. For example, it is possible to imagine that people might find it a much more accountable matter to answer that attitudes are highly variable for some topics – voting intentions, say – rather than others – the choice of a brand of biscuits, perhaps. Indeed, it is possible to imagine searching a corpus of conversations for situations where people describe their views as changed or changing, and to consider the kinds of interactions that such claims are a part of. This would start to consider what people are doing with such avowals, rather than treating them as transparent pathways to mental facts.

One discursive study which has focused in detail on the expression of strong views was conducted by Billig (1989). Billig's general suggestion (e.g. 1988a,b) was that evaluations are rhetorical. That is, people produce evaluations where there is at least the possibility of argument, and expressing an evaluation *for* something is often simultaneously the expression of an evaluation *against* something else. People tend not to argue the virtues of gravitational force, as it is taken to be something that simply exists; however, they argue the virtues of a federal Europe, and in doing so may be treated as arguing against particular forms of nationalism (Billig, 1995).

This suggests that it will be fruitful to study evaluations in their home environment of argument. And where Billig does this, with the case study of an individual who professes elaborately and frequently that they have strong views on the British Royal Family, his study documented considerable variation in those views. Indeed, Billig concludes:

> The metaphor of "holding" strong views is somewhat misleading, if it implies the possession of a pre-formed and unchanging mental object. Instead the business of holding strong views is an unfinished business, for the discourse of views involves creating new elaborations and qualifications. As their views are held, so they are formulated (1991, p. 191).

The "views" in this study are modified and finessed in the course of arguments with different people and as new rhetorical oppositions were built up.

In the end, the identification of variability in itself does no more than ask some searching questions about the workings of attitude theories. Variability can always be dismissed as the consequence of various "social influences" on attitude expression or as a product of examining situations where the attitude in question has not been made salient (although too many arguments of this kind can turn into an *ad hoc* list of modifications to sustain the existence of the object in the face of counter-evidence). The more important move in discursive social psychology is to use this variability as a resource for analysing the actions that people perform and the resources that they draw on to perform those actions.

Organizations of Evaluation

The previous section highlights the negative challenge that discursive social psychology presents to traditional attitude theory. In this section I will start to

illustrate the more positive contribution that can be made to a social psychology of evaluation. It will focus particularly on two areas of study where conversation analysis have highlighted features of interaction involving evaluation that have been passed over by attitude theorists (for a useful introduction to conversation analysis, see Nofsinger, 1991; for a discussion of its relation to discursive social psychology, see Potter, 1996c).

The first of these areas of study concentrates on the manner through which evaluations are made in mundane conversation. In a deceptively simple study, Pomerantz (1984) took a large number of careful transcripts of everyday conversation and went through them looking for places where a speaker made an evaluative *assessment* of something; that is, described something as good or bad. She was not concerned with traditional attitude issues – i.e. did this assessment reflect a stable underlying disposition?; would it correlate with something the participant said or did in another setting? – rather, she was interested in how assessments are part of interaction, and in particular in what happened immediately after one speaker had made an assessment.

Pomerantz found that there was a very strong regularity in what happens after assessments. Overwhelmingly, after one person has made an assessment the person they are speaking to follows it with one of his/her own:

J T's-it's a beautiful day out isn't it?
L Yeh it's just gorgeous . .

A (It) was too depre ssing
B [Ooooh it is terrible

The strength of the pattern is shown by the fact that people can elicit a view from another person simply by offering a view of their own, and also by the fact that silence after an assessment is often interpreted as a disagreement.

Pomerantz further noted some subtle, but again very regular differences between the patterning of a second speaker's assessment, according to whether he/she is offering agreement or disagreement. The two examples above are typical agreements. The second assessment follows with a minimum of delay, the agreement is made clear early in the turn, and the agreement is "upgraded". Thus, in the first case above, there is no delay before L starts to speak, the turn is started with the agreement ("Yeah") and the assessment is upgraded ("beautiful" is strengthened to "just gorgeous").

Disagreeing assessments follow a rather different pattern. There is typically some delay before the second turn, the disagreeing component is softened or qualified, and the disagreement appears later in the turn. Indeed, disagreements are often prefaced by agreements. The following examples illustrate some of these features (see Appendix for conventions used):

A . . . You've really both basically honestly gone your own ways
B Essentially except we've hadda good relationship at home

B . . . well a sense of humor, I think is something yer born with Bea.
A yea. Or it's c- I have the- eh yes, I think a lotta people are, but then I think it can be developed, too.

(All from Pomerantz, 1984: transcription slightly simp

Pomerantz (1978) extended this line of research to identify some of the regular features of compliments and self-deprecations. In the case of self-deprecations the standard patterning is reversed, with disagreements being performed immediately and with upgrade, while agreements are delayed and softened. Compliments are more complicated still, as the standard pattern of immediate agreement conflicts with social norms against explicit expressions of self-praise (boasting). Pomerantz identifies a range of different ways in which people manage these conflicting demands, including downgrading the praise, reassigning it to another person or object, or returning it to the speaker.

The important point, then, is that Pomerantz's research shows in the case of simple everyday assessments that they have a regular organization which depends on their specific position in an interaction. This influences both the strength of the evaluative expression and its organization. Now it could be argued that these are merely trivial evaluations made in mundane talk and that the apparatus of attitude measurement with its Likert and Osgood scales bypasses this to something more solid. In contrast to this, conversation analysts have argued that such mundane conversation is the home environment of many features of interaction. Participants learn about the nature and role of evaluation in these settings, and this knowledge is a backdrop to, and gives sense to, their actions when faced with, say, an Osgood semantic differential scale. Indeed, Myers (1996) has developed the implications of this work for reinterpreting what takes place in focus groups (see also Suchman & Jordan, 1990, on survey research; Antaki & Rapley, 1996; on quality of life measures). Far from being a trivial irrelevance, then, these sorts of everyday taken-for-granted practices of evaluation may be the foundation of more technical social science practices of evaluation.

The foundational role of studies of evaluations in everyday settings can be illustrated by showing the way they have helped to throw light on what at first sight seems a rather separate and conventionally more significant topic; the interaction of an orator with an audience. The conversation-analytic approach to oratory has been very different from that of traditional social psychology. It has shown that political oratory is in important respects like a conversation between a speaker and audience. Pomerantz showed that in everyday conversation, when a speaker makes an assessment, the person being talked to generally provides his/her own assessment. Now at a political rally, or the hall of a political conference, the audience cannot simply talk back; they cannot say, "Yes, the Labour policy on employment is disastrous", or, "Absolutely, we have got law and order cracked". However, there are conventional and effective ways of producing evaluations in these contexts; people applaud, cheer, boo or. more rarely, heckle.

Researchers into oratory have found that applause regularly follows parts of speeches where the speaker is making an assessment: a claim of the form, "Our party is brilliant", "Our policy is great", "Their party is awful" and so on (usually more subtly). Just as in an everyday conversation, then, when the speaker produces an assessment the audience will generally respond to it with their own assessment. However, the successful elicitation of clapping does not depend simply on making assessments in the course of speaking. Another feature of oratory is like everyday talk; and that is that people make extremely finely-tuned predictions about the

completion of prior turns. There is often no perceptible gap at all between one speaker finishing his/her turn of talk and the next speaker starting. This shows that people are not responding to turn endings, but are predicting when turns will end so they can synchronize their own contribution (Levinson, 1983; Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974). This phenomenon of predicting completions is particularly important in public speaking where the close co-ordination of possibly several thousand people is required in a setting where many of them may have a poor view of the speaker and degraded sound quality may mean they miss many of the subtleties of speech production.

Studies of oratory suggest this difficult problem of co-ordination is solved by the use of a range of rhetorical formats (Atkinson, 1984a, b; Heritage & Greatbatch, 1986). These are ways of constructing talk so that completions can be easily predicted. For example, in a study of almost the entire set of speeches from the 1981 party conferences in Britain, Heritage and Greatbatch (1986) identify six basic rhetorical formats; contrasts, lists, puzzle-solutions, headline-punchline, position taking and pursuit. All these formats provide information for the audience concerning precisely *when* applause is due. For example, with contrast structures - which are the most common formal – the audience is readied to applaud in good time by the onset of the first part and are thus well prepared by the completion of the second. The following example illustrates the standard pattern (see Appendix for conventions used):

Morris Governments will argue: (0.8) that resources are not available: (0.4) to help disabled people (1.3)
A→ The fact is that too much is spent on the munitions of war::,
B→ and too little is spent (0.2) on the munitions of peace
Audience Applause (9.2 seconds)
(Heritage & Greatbatch, 1986, p. 123)

In their study, Heritage and Greatbatch found that two-thirds of 1588 sets of applause followed one or more of these rhetorical formats. Put another way, if an evaluative claim is couched in one of these rhetorical formats it is at least twice as likely to get applause and in some situations may be nearly ten times as likely. Of course that is not all there is to it either. Speakers can use contrasts or lists in a confused way, downgrading their effectiveness, or they can enhance their effectiveness by combining formats or co-ordinating spoken oratory with suitable gestures (Atkinson, 1984a; Clayman, 1993; Grady & Potter, 1985).

The general point is that the study of assessments in mundane conversation has started to provide insights in areas where social psychologists have traditionally been concerned with a range of communicator "variables" such as attractiveness, credibility, similarity and status (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, for recent discussion). It has moved the focus away from events and processes in the heads of individuals and on to the sorts of practices that go on when people are using evaluations in social contexts. Pomeranz's study allows us to compare making an assessment with other actions such as giving an invitation, say, or making an accusation. Heritage and Greatbatch's study shows

the way that assessments are a central part of political oratory, and that their "success" depends on subtle discursive organizations.

Evaluative Practices and Ideological Discourse

Another way in which discursive social psychologists have moved away from traditional notions of attitudes is that they have started to analyse the production of assessments as part of broader activities which are dependent on a range of symbolic resources, some discrete and some broadly patterned. In some ways the argument is similar to that made by social representations researchers, who have downgraded the importance of attitudes in favour of understanding the socially shared representations that people hold which underpin their attitudes (Moscovici, 1984). In the case of discursive social psychologists, the concern has been with the interpretative repertoires and rhetorical commonplaces that are used to make particular evaluations coherent and accountable. This line of work is most developed in three book-length studies; Billig (1992) on talk about the Royal Family; Billig *et al.* (1988) on the organization of everyday ideology; and Wetherell and Potter (1992) on discourse and racism; however, it is easiest to introduce the work by way of a relatively simple and small-scale early study (Wetherell, Stiven, & Potter, 1987).

Wetherell, Stiven, and Potter (1987) focused on men's talk about women's career opportunities in open-ended interviews. It did not attempt to ask these participants what their attitude was to women's career advancement; rather, the interviews gave them the opportunity to provide extended descriptions, explanations and judgements as they dealt with a range of questions and comments from the interviewer. Close analysis of the interviews found a regular pattern. On the one hand, the men supported the *principle* of women's career opportunities and attacked discrimination based on gender. On the other hand, the men offered a wide range of *practical* reasons for the failure of women to reach full employment equality, including references to such concerns as childcare, tradition, and emotional unsuitability to stressful work. Note the significance of this pattern. These men have the ability to affirm *both* support for women's employment equality (in principle) *and* support for continued inequality (because of important practical concerns). They can be what the authors dubbed "unequal egalitarians" who support a status quo of inequality while displaying themselves as non-sexist through their abstract support of egalitarian principles.

It is important to be clear about the implications of this study. In the first case, it suggests that using a traditional technique such as an attitude questionnaire, combined with attitude theory's notion of unitary individual preferences, will not be adequate to understand how these people construct evaluations about gender and employment. In a sense, they have contradictory views, positive and negative. But this is why an attitude approach is inadequate to capture what is going on here.

The second point to emphasize is that this interview talk may well underestimate the variation in such evaluations and the way in which they are used in practical contexts. For example, Gill's (1993) study of radio controllers' accounts

for the low representation of female DJs repeats the general pattern of support for principles of equality combined with practical reasons for failures to appoint more women. However, the specifics of the accounts are rather different, as the controllers are describing and justifying their own recruiting practice. It is notable that they construct accounts to present the lack of recruitment as a product of external factors rather than their own desires; for example, few women apply, or listeners do not like women's "shrill" voices.

An attitude researcher might counter at this point that these studies merely document the sorts of mismatch between "attitudes" and "behaviour" that result from the range of social constraints on "behaviour" that interfere with its smooth connection to "attitudes". However, this would be to miss precisely what discursive social psychologists have emphasized, which is the way talk is orientated to action. For in presenting their views as egalitarian, but their practice as constrained, they can counter potential criticisms from a liberal-seeming and female social researcher while explaining and justifying an unequal practice. Traditional attitude measurement and theory pays almost no attention to what is done by attitude talk, let alone what is done by different descriptions of behaviour.

Where traditional attitude theory has looked to the intrapsychic world of cognitive psychology for its explanations, discourse research has looked instead to conversational pragmatics, and more broadly to social and ideological conflicts. This line of thinking is developed in Billig *et al.*'s (1988) work on "ideological dilemmas". Their argument is that the common sense of everyday talking and arguing is organized around dilemmas which are often ideological in the sense that they relate to broader societal concerns with authority, legitimation and social organization. For example, they discuss the way classroom teaching is organized around a dilemma between student self-discovery and teacher control over learning outcomes (for a more developed study of education in this way, see Edwards & Mercer, 1987). The important point they make is that these dilemmas are not a problem that has to be resolved; rather, their tensions structure social settings and provide contradictory sets of resources that sustain current practices. In the case of Gill's (1993) radio controllers, for example, the contradictions between egalitarian values and discriminatory practice are not a problem for the stability of the institution; quite the reverse, they can help sustain its current status quo.

At this point it might seem that a monopolar attitude theory has been placed by a bipolar theory of dilemmas. I will take one more example to show the possibilities in a more complex situation. One of the studies reported in Wetherell and Potter (1992) considered Aotearoa (New Zealand) White majority group members' accounts of controversial topics related to ethnic relations: land rights, Maori language teaching, and affirmative action programmes. Across the corpus of 81 interviewees, along with materials from newspaper articles and records of parliamentary debates, a small number of what Billig (1987) calls "rhetorical commonplaces" were identified. These were brief arguments, often using the same phrases which were generally treated as clinching, or as invoking, principles that were beyond question. Some examples (from Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 177) are:

- Nobody should be compelled.
- Everyone should be treated equally.
- You cannot turn the clock backwards.
- Present generations cannot be blamed for the mistakes of past generations.
- Injustices should be righted.

Note that these commonplaces do not fall neatly into categories as values or empirical generalizations or ideological observations. In most cases they could be built as features of morality, or politics, or treated as empirical according to their use. This again illustrates the emic nature of discursive social psychology – the aim is not to impose an abstract coherence on to participants' discourse by treating it as generated by unitary individual attitudes or singular political ideologies. Instead, the aim is to appreciate the fragmentary organization of political evaluations, and to show that what might appear on the face of it vague or ambiguous actually has a fine organization.

One of the immediately obvious features of this list of commonplaces is that it does not fit easily together; righting injustices can conflict with not turning the clock backwards: and more generally, some of the commonplaces invoke individual rights while others stress practical considerations. Following Billig *et al.*, Wetherell and Potter argued that the contradictory nature of this discourse permits a very wide rhetorical flexibility which is shown when the participants argued against the courts dealing with Maori land disputes or schools teaching Maori to Pakeha (White) pupils. In broader terms, Wetherell and Potter argued that to understand the organization of racism and ethnic relations in New Zealand, notions of prejudiced attitudes were not adequate. Instead it was necessary to understand both how these innocuous and broadly liberal argumentative resources were used in practice to undermine political changes promoting the position of Maori and Polynesian groups, and how they are broad resources that have been established in the specific history of New Zealand culture and its political and social discourses. In general, the work described in this section has moved away from the study of individual preferences to attempting to understand how evaluations are bound up with practical and ideological questions.

Facts and Neutrality

One of the notable features of attitude research is that there is a negligible amount of work on neutrality or not holding an attitude. Moreover, while researchers have focused on evaluations, description hardly figures as a topic. People who tick "don't know" on attitude or opinion questionnaires are typically treated as uninteresting or a methodological problem to be managed. However, recent work in discursive social psychology has focused specifically on descriptions and factual accounts (Edwards, 1994, 1995; Edwards & Potter, 1993; Potter, 1995, 1996b; Potter & Edwards, 1990; Potter & Wetherell, 1988; Potter, Edwards, & Wetherall, 1993) and conversation analysts have explored the way neutrality is managed interactionally in particular settings (Clayman, 1992; Heritage & Greatbatch, 1991). I will discuss the conversation-analytic work first.

Heritage and Greatbatch (1991) studied interaction in broadcast news interviews. They found that, in contrast to everyday talk, the interviewees did not treat the interviewers as accountable for views and claims expressed in questions by the interviewer. Instead they treated them as animating the views of others or as producing abstract points for the sake of clarifying issues. It is rare for news interviewees to treat interviewers as expressing their own attitudes, and when this does happen it can lead to tricky interactional problems (Heritage & Greatbatch, 1991; Nofsinger, 1991; Potter, 1996b). In a complementary study. Clayman (1992) studied a specific technique that news interviewers used to construct their own neutrality. Typically, when they produce questions involving a contentious description of some state of affairs they construct it as a quote from a particular speaker, or they may treat it as what people in general have claimed. By doing this they construct their discourse as not motivated by their own attitudes or biases but merely reporting what other relevant parties have said. They are constructing themselves as without attitude.

It is important to stress that Clayman and Heritage and Greatbatch are not treating neutrality as a technical notion, but are treating it as an issue for participants. To claim that news interviewers are *displaying* neutrality through their discourse practices is not to claim that they are *actually* neutral according to some cognitive, political or sociological criterion. This move to consider the way stake, attitude and neutrality are managed by participants in practical settings is mirrored by work in discursive social psychology.

Edwards and Potter (1992a, 1993; Potter, Edwards & Wetherell, 1993) have argued that when people perform sensitive actions (such as making requests, turning down invitations, criticizing others) they often do so by way of descriptions. Take the following simple example, discussed in detail by Wooffitt (1992):

1	**A**	So tha:-:t
2	**B**	-k-khhh
3	**A**	Yihknow I really don't have a place **tuh sta:y.**
4	**B**	hh Oh: : : : .h
5	**A**	(0.2)
6	**B**	.hhh So yih not g'nna go up this weeken?
7	**A**	(0.2)
8	**B**	Nu : : h I don't think so.
9	**A**	How about the following weekend.
10	**B**	.hh Dat's the vacation isn't it?
11	**A**	.hhhhh Oh:. .hh ALright so: - no ha:ssle

Without going into details here we can note the way, in line 10, B turns down A's invitation. He registers inability to go on the trip without an explicit rejection, but by a (contrastive) description, "Dat's the vacation". Drew (1984) has claimed such inability accounts are pervasive when performing actions such as refusals, disagreements and rejections. The point to emphasize for the current discussion is what actions and accounts of this kind are not doing, which is making reference

to personal preferences; desires, wishes, attitudes. When was the last time you heard an invitation turned down by the speaker saying, "I won't come" because "I don't feel like it", or "I don't like you"? These are not activities where the language of attitudes is generally considered appropriate.

This phenomenon is not restricted to what might be thought of as rather trivial practices such as invitations and refusals. The same pattern can be seen in talk about race and ethnic relations, Potter and Wetherell (1988; see also Wetherell & Potter, 1992) performed a detailed analysis of a single case where the interviewee was making a range of derogatory and racist claims about members of minority groups. In the following extract the interviewee has been discussing the topic of crime:

Wetherell Yeah. Yeah, so it's partly sort of immigration, it's related to immigration?
Jones Umm. Yeah, we don't, seeing them coming through off the aircraft at night, half of them can't speak English, um, (.) If they can't speak English they're not going to be able to get a job, they're going to go and be in their little communities and (.) they're not going to contribute anything to the country. And they're going to get frustrated and they're going to get bored. And they're gonna, you know, there's nothing for them to do so the kids are going to start hanging around in the streets. At home Mum and Dad can't speak English and so the kids can't speak English. They go to school and suddenly they are confronted with English – "We can't speak that, and so what do we do?" – nothing. And so by the time they get to fifteen they just drop out, they have had it up to here with school and it's not the school's fault. They have brilliant lives, they have brilliant lives back in, family lives back in the Islands, that's where they should be.

The feature of this material I want to emphasize here is that the speaker is not constructing his talk in the language of attitudes. That is, he is not talking of his preferences for particular minority groups; indeed, he is not giving any direct formulations of his own psychological states. Instead, he is constructing versions of minority groups and their characteristics and actions from which evaluations could be inferred. Put simply, the negativity is constructed as lying out there in the world rather than being a feature of his own psychology. The upshot of this type of construction is that the speaker should not be held accountable for holding negative attitudes, rather the minority groups members should be held accountable for their problematic behaviour.

The upshot of this line of work is that situations where people are constructing descriptions are just as interesting, just as significant in social psychological terms, as those in which people are espousing attitudes. Moreover, it brings to the fore a set of concerns and questions which have not been tackled by social psychologists up to now. For example, if descriptions are as important as this work suggests for performing sensitive actions, then the study of how descriptions are constructed *so as* to perform actions becomes important, as does the question of how descriptions are constructed us *factual* and *independent* of the speaker.

Note, for example, the way independence from the speaker is constructed and value is made a feature of the world rather than the speaker in the following extract:

> **Jones** There have been a lot of ideas put out, what is it, that the majority of rapes are committed by Islanders or Mäoris and . .

Here the extremely negative description about rape is produced as an "idea put out" – that is, not an idea the speaker himself has produced. Furthermore, the phrase "what is it" acts a display of searching for a formulation that is not quite remembered. It works him up as not the kind of (racist, hostile) person who actively notes down negative items about minority groups, let alone produces them himself. The topics of action via description and fact construction are explored at length in Potter (1996b).

Respecification of Attitude Concepts

In this final section I will briefly review some of the theoretical notions that have been important in attitude research; function, consistency, vested interest. The aim is to show how these concepts can be translated from a cognitive to a discursive framework.

Function

The traditional view of function in attitude research focuses on the role holding an attitude might have for an individual. Probably the best-known scheme (Katz, 1960) has one function for each of the available theoretical systems for the time: the *utilitarian* function of an attitude is to maximize rewards (behaviourist); the *ego-defensive* function is to protect the self from unwelcome inner impulses (psychoanalytic); the *knowledge* function organizes coherence (cognitive); the *value-expressive* function expresses core values (humanistic). Whether these functions can be coherently specified and researched is outside the scope of this current discussion. The important point to emphasize here is that discursive social psychology is, at least arguably, working with a much more straightforward notion of function when it takes as its topic evaluative practices; that is, what people are *doing* by making evaluations (or displaying a lack of evaluation) in particular settings.

Some of the confusions that can arise with the traditional view of function can be seen in research using this view. Take Maio and Olson (1994), who studied attitude functions in relation to "attitude–value–behaviour relations" in the context of student non-smoking areas. Attitude functions were measured using Shavit's (1990) "thought-coding scheme", which the authors describe as a "method for directly measuring attitude function". Participants were asked to "list all of their thoughts that were relevant to" attending a dance to highlight a campaign for non-smoking areas. Then these "thoughts" were coded as either *value-expressive* or *utilitarian*. The problem from a discursive perspective is not just with the notion that thoughts are the kinds of objects that can be simply listed in linguistic form like the printout from a word processor, although this is certainly a major

problem, it is with the untheorized manner in which statements are assigned to a particular function. For example, they give as a paradigm example of a value-expressive thought:

> Smokers should not be permitted to smoke anywhere.
>
> Smoking is an unhealthy act.

The difficulty highlighted by the sort of discourse work on evaluative practices and ideological dilemmas discussed above is that isolated phrases of this kind can be used in a wide range of different ways. It is not hard to imagine "smoking is an unhealthy act" used as the account element in a practical, *utilitarian* request for a neighbour to stop smoking. For discourse workers, function needs to be identified through studies of talk in settings rather than through assigning decontextualized materials to categories by analytic fiat.

Consistency

Consistency has been one of the most fundamental theoretical notions in attitude work ranging from Heider's balance theory, Festinger's cognitive dissonance, to more recent social cognition approaches (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Consistency is also treated as important in discursive work. However, there is a major difference, which is that in discursive social psychology consistency is not treated as a logical relation than can be assessed by the researcher. Instead, it is treated as a participants' concern. This highlights two features that have not been traditionally emphasized.

First, consistency can be managed across settings; studies of evaluative talk show the way different explanatory and evaluative repertories can be drawn on in different passages of talk, or in different settings (Billig, 1991; Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Second, and more significantly, consistency is not something that is merely, factually, the case or not. Detailed studies of discourse show the way consistency can be constructed and undermined using a range of different rhetorical devices (Potter, 1996b). Again, the logic of this is to start from a study of the way consistency is managed in practice rather than making prior analytic judgements which may be at odds with some or all participants and may reflect a range of untheorized prejudices.

Vested Interest

Some researchers have recently emphasized the importance of "vested interest" as having an important role in mediating the consistency of attitudes and behaviour (e.g. Crano & Prislin, 1995). The argument is that behaviour is likely to follow attitudes where there is a vested interest, but not where such an interest is absent. There are already discourse-analytic cautions on the notions of "attitude" and "behaviour". "Vested interest" has been a topic in discourse research. However, just as with consistency, the focus has been on how vested interest is constructed and managed in particular accounts and settings. For example, several studies have emphasized the way the vested interest of other

built up as a procedure for discounting their claims or actions (Edwards & Potter. 1992a, 1993; Potter, Edwards, & Wetherell, 1993) and Potter (1996b) has argued that vested interest of one kind or another is pervasively attended to when descriptions are constructed as factual. Traditional research on vested interest and attitudes has systematically underplayed the constructive and rhetorical work done with vested interests in natural settings through using a range of methodological techniques. For example, Crano and Prislin (1995) use vignettes where vested interest is predefined rather than being something that has to be worked up, played down, and made relevant or irrelevant.

Emotion

It is worth ending with a brief comment on emotion, as it has been a commonplace feature of a range of attitude theories to treat attitudes as having a cognitive and an affective component. In Zanna and Rempel's (1988) influential definition for example, attitudes are evaluative categorizations depending on information about cognition, past behaviour and *emotion*. Indeed, emotions have often been treated as a background motivator, something essentially separate from, and underlying, the rational information-processing world of cognition. Without going into detail here, discursive social psychologists have recently been developing a rather different approach which considers the way emotion displays and emotion talk figure in interaction (Buttny, 1993; Edwards, 1997, forthcoming; Harré, 1986).

For example, Edwards explores some of the roles of emotion descriptions in relationship counselling sessions, noting how they can play important parts in narratives that construct moral identities for the parties and warrant particular outcomes. He emphasizes in particular the importance of the multifaceted nature of emotion talk, and the ways it can be rhetorically worked up as rational vs. irrational, cognitively grounded vs. cognitively consequential, event-driven vs. dispositional, or even cognitive vs. emotional. It is this very flexibility that allows it to be a powerful resource in interaction. In terms of a discursive social psychology of evaluation, the linking of attitudes and emotions makes sense when suitably translated into a study of evaluative practices where displaying strong views or opinions may well involve psychological constructions that would previously have fallen into psychology's rather loosely theorized category of emotion.

Conclusions

The aim of this paper has been to introduce discursive social psychology by discussing how it has respecified, and how it could further respecify, the problematics of attitude research. The basic move is away from an in-the-head notion that has people carrying around the mental equivalent of ready filled-in Likert scales for the attitude objects in their lives, and towards a notion of heterogeneous evaluative practices which are used in different settings for different purposes. Alongside this respecification comes an emphasis on the symbolic systems (categories, commonplaces, interpretative repertoires) which are resources for

constructing evaluations, and the way evaluations are rhetorically worked up by participants as located within individuals in some settings while being separated from individuals and made features of the world in others.

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Appendix: Brief Transcription Notation

Um::	Colons represent lengthening of the preceding sound; the more colons, the greater the lengthening.
I've-	A hyphen represents the cut-off of the preceding sound, often by a stop.
↑Already	Up and down arrows represent sharp upward and downward pitch shifts in the following sounds. Underlining represents stress, usually by volume; the more underlining the greater the stress.
hhh hh .hh	"h" Represents aspiration, sometimes simply hearable breathing, sometimes laughter, etc.; when preceded by a superimposed dot, it marks in-breath; in parenthesis inside a word it represents laugh infiltration.
hhh [hh .hh] [I just]	Left brackets represent point of overlap onset; right brackets represent point of overlap resolution.
.,?	Punctuation marks intonation, not grammar; period, comma and "question mark" indicate downward, "continuative", and upward contours respectively.
( )	Single parentheses mark problematic or uncertain hearings; two parentheses separated by an oblique represent alternative hearings.
(0.2) (.)	Numbers in parentheses represent silence in tenths of a second; a dot in parentheses represents a micro-pause, less than two tenths of a second.
°Hm mmm°	The degree signs enclose significantly lowered volume.

Slightly modified from Schegloff, 1997, pp. 184–5.

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Were You Ever in a Situation Where You Were in Serious Danger of Being Killed? Narrator–Listener Interaction in Labov and Waletzky's Narratives

Uta M. Quasthoff

It is one of the characteristics of a "classic" that everyone in the field – and many more readers outside of it – think they know it by heart. Only, when the work is reread for some special reason, it turns out that it contains aspects that had not been noticed in the course of previous readings. In the conviction that my own theoretical perspective on narrative has remarkably changed over the past 30 years, and assuming that Labov and Waletzky (1967/this issue: henceforth L&W) is indeed a "classic," I will reread the original article for the purposes of this article, looking for hints that can be taken as an early fundament of an interactive concept of narrating (see Quasthoff, 1990, 1997, for a more detailed description of this interactive approach).

Narrator–Listener Interaction in L&W

The descriptive format presented in L&W is a structural one in the classical linguistic sense. This means that each linguistic unit to be described must be attributed to one speaker, because a structural concept including more than one participant was not available (and not asked for) in the linguistic methodology of the 60s. Once the reader's attention is focussed on the interactive quality of narrating, however, a variety of traces hinting at the narrator–listener cooperation can be discovered in the article. For reasons of space I only follow up on one.

Source: *Journal of Narrative and Life History* vol. 7, no. 1–4, 1997, pp. 121–128.

which concerns an empirical feature of the narratives documented by L&W as a result of their elicitation technique.

The Danger-of-Death Question

When the subject is asked if he were ever in serious danger of being killed, and he says "Yes," he is then asked, "What happened?" He finds himself in a position where he must demonstrate to the listener that he really was in danger. The more vivid and real the danger appears, the more effective the narrative. (L&W, this issue)

In many of the narratives given in L&W (this issue), I noticed precisely the same kind of cooperation between listener and narrator in the opening of the story that we found in our developmental data (Hausendorf & Quasthoff, 1992, 1996), with the reservation that this pattern was limited in our data to the interaction of adult listeners with 5-year-old narrators (as opposed to 7-, 10- or 14-year-olds):

Example 1

[1] (Were you ever in a situation where you thought you were in serious danger of getting killed?) I talked a man out of – Old Doc Simon I talked him out of pulling the trigger. (What happened?) (L&W, Narrative 1; similar in Narratives 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9. 10, 11, 14)

Example 2

Adult:	Hast du das mitgekriegt	Did you notice that
	Da war doch plötzlich n	there was suddenly
	Krach da ne?	a bang huh?
Child:	Ja ich habs mitgekriecht	Yeh, I saw what happened
Adult:	Mensch erzähl mir mal	Man, tell me
	wat warn da los?	what happened?

(Hausendorf & Quasthoff, 1992, p. 248; 1996, p. 212)

Of course, this does not imply that the narrative skills of the adults or adolescents in L&W operate at the same level as 5-year-olds. Rather, the structural similarity might be related to the orderedness of narrator–listener interaction in general and the contextualizing power of specific patterns of this interaction, which results in the constitution of different kinds of (social) context (Quasthoff, 1994). In particular, I therefore scrutinize these structural patterns of narrative interaction in the next section.

Structural Descriptions of Narrative Interaction

Unlike the classic structural orientation in narrative analysis, the interactive orientation requires a level of structural description that is interindividual, representing the interactive achievement, which is more than the addition of single speaker- or listener-bound units. We solved this problem of how to describe this

level by condensing a sequential model of narrative interaction from empirical analyses. The basic idea of this model of narrative production is a three-fold analysis of *jobs* (or *tasks*), *devices*, and *forms* in the reconstruction of the interactive process. The descriptive level of the jobs covers the global tasks to be fulfilled jointly by both participants in dyadic conversation. Consequently, this descriptive level does not yet allow the differentiation into narrator and listener.

The tasks are structural in nature and sequentially ordered. They are assumed to be generally applicable to all instances of the realization of the respective discourse unit and are thus context-free: If a narrative was successfully told, the organizational jobs must have been done, no matter how and no matter by whom. Methodologically, the jobs are the *tertium comparationis* (the common third) for developmental or sociolinguistic comparison – aside from their providing the structural concept for the dyad's achievement.

The devices, on the other hand, are formulated narrator- and listener-specific. They are sequentially ordered on the basis of local implicativeness: If someone realizes Move A, then a move of the Type B (or C) is to be expected on the basis of local "conditional relevances," which are framed globally. In other words, these conditional relevances operate on a local as well as on a global basis. They constitute the sequential implications, which in turn constitute the predictions of our empirical model in that they form an ordered sequence of local turns as moves in the respective fulfillment of global tasks.

These sequential dependencies form the specific interactive patterns that are typical of adult–child interaction or other situational frames – such as the one documented in L&W. In our developmental data, it is essentially the adult's use of the global and local constraints on the child's successive activities that could be reconstructed as developmental mechanism.

The forms refer to the linguistic surface realizations of the semantic-pragmatic units of the devices. Only at this level of description do language- or code-specific structures come into play. Forms as well as devices have been found to be not only different for the narrator and listener, but also for children of different age groups (as opposed to adults) and even for adults in interaction with children of different age levels.

Figure 1 shows an illustration of the organizational jobs required by the conversational realization of a narrative discourse unit.




Figure 1: Organizational tasks of a narrative discourse unit in conversation

Narrative discourse units have to be prepared by the display of thematic relevance with respect to the narrative's content (or the display of formal relevance with respect to narrating as an activity). In other words, the turn-by-turn talk has to provide a contextual condition for the sequential placement of a narrative; it has to reach (or to be driven to) a point where topicalizing of a narrative is at least a possible next turn in the interaction.

In noninterviewlike, ordinary conversation, a context thematically relevant to the danger-of-death stories could be talk about danger or fights or killings in big cities. These topics would make the narrative-topicalizing question "Were you ever in a situation . . ." a possible next turn. This question represents a listener device structurally oriented towards some nonspecific but reportable event, thus governing the narrator into his or her topicalization device, which often has the form of an *abstract* (Labov, 1972):

Example 3
I talked a man out of – Old Doc Simon I talked him out of pulling the trigger (L&W, 1967/this issue, p. 5).

Example 4
My brother put a knife in my head (L&W, 1967/this issue, p. 7)

The contingent topicalization of a reportable event by narrator and listener represents the structurally decisive point in narrative interaction, which has to be followed by a global next turn – a narrative discourse unit. If such a unit is withheld after topicalization, there must be an account (cf. narrative No. 5 in L&W, this issue, which is our Example 5, following).

On the basis of this structural description we can reconstruct more precisely the type of opening represented previously in Example 1:

Interviewer: topicalization: question/reportability in a nonspecific sense (*situation where you thought you were in serious danger ...*)
Narrator: topicalization: answer/reportability in a specific sense (abstract: *I talked a man out of – Old Doc Simon I talked him out of pulling the trigger*)
Interviewer: topicalization: question/elaboration (*What happened?*)
Narrator: answer/beginning of elaboration (orientation: *Well, in the business I was associated at that time, the Doc ...*)

The structural description shows how the interviewer, by use of the local device of adjacency pairs (yes-no question, wh-question), establishes global conditional relevances step by step. The (future) narrator's first answer, which still can be heard locally, receives its global nature – becomes an abstract – due to the interviewer's succeeding question: "What happened?"

When this kind of opening is compared to a prototypical self-initiated story, in which the narrator ties the abstract directly to the topically coherent context, one can see that L&W's elicitation technique expands topicalization by localizing this structural juncture, which is the same technique adult listeners intuitively use

to ensure narrative communication with children, whose mastery of global-structural demands is limited (Hausendorf & Quasthoff, 1992, 1996; Quasthoff, 1997).

In the next section I discuss possible reasons for this structural similarity in different kinds of narrative interaction.

Comparison to Ontogenetic Data

If we compare the interaction with a 5-year-old child in Example 2 with the elicitation of a narrative told by a 72-year-old speaker in Example 1 more explicitly, we find the following structural similarities: In both cases the listener starts with a yes–no question that – if affirmatively answered – puts the narrator under the obligation to tell a story according to the global conditional relevances shared by socialized members of the respective discourse culture. This is the way L&W describe the general procedure in the quotation given previously. Consequently, the structural analogy so far can be easily explained by the fact that it seems to be an effective elicitation technique, used in both settings by listeners who are interested in steering their interactive partner into storytelling.

At first glance, the structural analogy seems to exclude the narrators' devices: Due to a lack of global competence, the child seemingly explicitly acknowledges the structural obligation ("Yeh, I saw what happened"), but still does not proceed to follow up on it before the adult makes the structural obligation explicit ("tell me what happened"). The adult narrator in the L&W example (Example 1), however, does not explicitly answer the yes–no question, but immediately produces what can be heard as an abstract. What makes the comparison so irritating, however, is the fact that the 72-year-old speaker, just as the child, does not open the narrative proper immediately after the abstract, but seems to wait for his listener's elaborating question: "What happened?"

Having reached this degree of analytic sensitivity in relation to the phenomenon, we find a number of narratives in the L&W data in which the narrator in fact does answer the yes–no question explicitly:

Example 5
[5] (Were you ever in a situation where you thought you were in serious danger of being killed?) Yes. (What happened?) I don't really like to talk about it. (L&W, 1967/this issue, p. 8)

Example 6
[9] (Did you ever have a feeling, or a premonition, that something was gonna happen and it did happen?) Yes, I did. (Tell me about it.) (1967/this issue, p. 9)

Example 6 in particular is in total analogy to Example 2, including the explication of the global conditional relevance into narrating ("Tell me about it").

In our ontogenetic study, we analyzed not only the developmental progress of narrative skills in children but also the intuitive variation of adult listeners'

devices and forms in adjustment to the child's age. As was mentioned previously, we found the described pattern of narrative topicalization only in the interaction between adult and 5-year-old narrators. In informal interaction with 7-, 10-, and 14-year-old children, listeners reduced the described two steps to one compact interactive move by simply displaying a lack of knowledge regarding the event in question. That is, they neither localized nor explicated global narrative constraints. Rather, they implied the global relevance of their activities simply by establishing the eventability and reportability of a specific event. This pattern is illustrated in Example 7, showing a fragment of a conversation with a 7-year-old child.

Example 7

Wat warn da unten	"What kind of bang was that
fürn Krach	down there
wer hat da so rumgeschrien?	who was shouting?
n Erwachsener und ganz böse	an adult and very angrily
hab ich schreien gehört	I heard shouting
bis oben ins Erzieherzimmer	all the way up in the teacher's lounge
hab ich das gehört	I heard that
wat warn da los?"	what happened there?"

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The fact that in interaction with 7-year-olds in our data, adults did not use this localizing and explicating elicitation technique and that the children did not rely on it anymore clearly excludes an analysis in terms of competence. It rather leads to the assumption that the interactants mutually display a particular relationship towards each other that includes a certain unwillingness on the part of the interviewees to tell even highly reportable stories: Although 5-year-olds, who wait for a request to elaborate a topicalized story, display a lack of structural competence, fully competent speakers, who do the same, appear to be reluctant to tell the story. Remembering L&W's remark that the data stem either from face-to-face interviews or group situations in which the interviewer did not necessarily play the central role (1967/this issue, p. 4), we are steered into an ethnographic issue: The mutual display and thus the interactive establishment of an outside or inside relationship. Obviously, the different types of narrative topicalizations produced and mutually displayed the issue of a (sub)cultural boundary between narrator and listener to different degrees. The use of a localizing pattern by listener and narrator, resulting in the display of a low degree of readiness to tell a personal experience, (re)produces a frame (Goffman, 1974) of cultural distance.

By looking for traces of narrating as an interactive process in L&W, we have not only found these traces but also indications of the "interactive" function of narratives (Quasthoff, 1980): Situational contexts are established via narrative interaction. Thus, L&W has been proven to be a real "classic" – ahead of its time in many aspects.

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The Inference-Making Machine: Notes on Observability

Harvey Sacks

Lectures

One of the basic things I want to be able to give you is an esthetic for social life. By that I mean, in part, that you should have some sense of where it is deep and to be able to see and to pose problems. I'll try to do somewhat more than that. I'll also try to develop a variety of notions of what kind of business sociology is, what its problems look like, what the form of the solutions to those problems are, and perhaps, to some extent, some of those solutions.

The kinds of phenomena we are going to be dealing with are always transcriptions of actual occurrences in their actual sequence. And I take it our business is to try to construct the machinery that would produce those occurrences. That is, we will find and name some objects and find and name some rules for using those objects, where the rules for using those objects will produce those occurrences.

We'll start off with a transcribed segment of conversation. It comes at about the fifth interchange into a first telephone conversation, where A is a staff member of a social agency that B has called. B was told to call this agency because of some marital troubles he's having. A doesn't know anything about B's marital troubles except what B tells him.

1 A: Yeah, then what happened?
2 B: Okay, in the meantime she [wife of B] says, "Don't ask the child nothing." Well, she stepped between me and the child, and I got up to walk out the door. When she stepped between me and the child, I went to move her out

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of the way. And then about that time her sister had called the police. I don't know how she . . . what she . . .

3 A: Didn't you smack her one?
4 B: No.
5 A: You're not telling me the story, Mr. B.
6 B: Well, you see when you say "smack" you mean "hit."
7 A: Yeah, you shoved her. Is that it?
8 B: Yeah, I shoved her.

Now apart from the four or five previous interchanges, these persons do not know each other; they've never met. And I could put it that – though it's not exactly correct to say it this way – we find that nonetheless, given essentially statement 2, A is able to have some notion of what it is that has happened – in a story that he has only heard part of. Without knowing B at all, A can say *Did you smack her one?*

And there is more than that, too. Because it would be one thing if A had some expectation about what the sequence of events was that brought on the coming of the police, where A would use that expectation to make a guess, but if it turns out that he's told it's not so, then, so far as he knows, it's not so. But apparently A has a stronger grasp of the situation already, in the sense that it's not merely that he can have a guess, but that he takes it that – perhaps without regard to what B tells him – his guess is correct.

And we can notice that the fact that A has a guess here is not anything very extraordinary for B. He doesn't say, as a person sometimes says, *What makes you say that?* He says *No.* And when it's proposed that his *No* is not correct, he doesn't say, *Look, I'm telling the story. How the hell would you know?* (Parenthetically. when I say *He doesn't say . . .*, that is a rhetorical device on my part for loosening you up. I don't mean it in a serious sense. I am not making a statement that is intendedly descriptive. To propose seriously, descriptively, "A doesn't say x" is another order of proposition). But B takes it that A does know, and B corrects himself.

Furthermore, A is able to see, as well, that B "isn't telling the story." And I want to briefly focus on that kind of thing – seeing lies. I want mainly to focus on it because it seems that adult intuition may be misleading in trying to see what the problem is that seeing lies poses.

In one of the early classics of psychoanalysis, a paper entitled "On the Origin of the Influencing Machine in Schizophrenia," Tausk (1933) reports on one of his patients. The patient was a young schizophrenic girl, and one of her symptoms he found in the following way. He often questioned her, and one time when he was questioning her she started laughing at him. He asked, *What are you laughing at?* She said, *Why do you always ask me questions? After all, you know what I'm thinking.*

And Tausk worked at this symptom – that schizophrenics think other persons know their thoughts. Now the problem had been posed: How is it that schizophrenics come to think that others know their thoughts? And he tried to solve this problem.

Now Freud's comments upon the presentation of the paper are included in the journal. He says that's not the problem at all. After all, when you learn (at least your first) language, you learn it from your parents, from adults. And children must take it that adults, having given them the concepts, know how they're being used, know how the child is using them. So the problem is not how is it that people come to think that others know their thoughts, but how is it that people come to think so deeply that others don't know their thoughts?

And now, in a characteristic type of observation, Freud says that the crucial event is the first successful lie. That event must be traumatic. The kid must have to say, *My God, they don't know what's going on!*

Whether that's so or not, I certainly don't know. But intuitively I take it that most adults don't see things that way, and that it's certainly not an inconceivable formulation. And the segment of conversation we're looking at has a form which is very characteristic in adult–child interchange; that is, the mother says to the child, *What were you doing?* The child gives some answer, and the mother, who wasn't there, says, *No you weren't;* the child then corrects himself. And it isn't the case that persons proposing that one is lying, or "not telling the story," are treated as doing something quite extraordinary.

Now let's try to begin to consider what our task is if we're going to build a machine that could in the first place produce the conclusion 3 with the information presented in 2.

A first rule of procedure in doing analysis, a rule that you absolutely must use or you can't do the work, is this: In setting up what it is that seems to have happened, preparatory to solving the problem, do not let your notion of what could conceivably happen decide for you what must have happened.

So, for example, when we get this kind of conclusion drawn at 3, you might say to yourself, "how in the world could anybody think so fast?" Because this just comes off. There is no pause more than three seconds between 2 and 3. You're going to say, "How? People aren't that smart." And therefore what happened must be something very simple, something that will require only a simple solution.

And that leads to our second rule. There is no necessary fit between the complexity or simplicity of the apparatus you need to construct some object and the face-value complexity or simplicity of the object.

These are things that you have to come to terms with, given the fact that this has, indeed, occurred. And people walk around, insofar as they're doing lay affairs, with the notion that if somebody does something pretty simply, pretty quickly, or pretty routinely, then it must not be much of a problem to explain what they've done.

There is no reason to suppose that is so. I'll give you an analogical observation. In a recent review of a book attempting to describe the production of sentences in the English language – a grammar, in short – the reviewer observes that the grammar is not terribly successful, though it's not bad, and it remains a fact that those sentences which any six-year-old is able to produce routinely have not yet been adequately described by some persons who are obviously enormously brilliant scientists.

Of course the activities that molecules are able to engage in quickly, routinely, have not been described by enormously brilliant scientists. So don't worry about the brains that these persons couldn't have but which the objects seem to require. Our task is, in this sense, to build their brains.

Now, what features do we need to build into this machine? The first thing, of course, is that it is an inference-making machine. That is to say, it can deal with and categorize and make statements about an event it has not seen.

And the first thing about the sort of events it can handle is that the events are sequential. In the segment we're looking at, if we keep things very simple, what we see is that if we have *a, b, . . . d,* then if we suppose in speaking about A that he's a user of the machine we're going to have to build, he can find what c is.

He is not merely in a position to make a guess about c, but there are stronger features to this machine. When we normally think of an inference-making machine, we might imagine he gets *a, h,* and *d,* he's invited to guess what c is, he guesses something, is told *No,* he says *Okay.* That doesn't happen. For him, there is some fit operating between *a, h, c,* and *d,* such that the fact that he's told that what he proposes as c has not occurred does not constrain him from continuing to insist that his version of c occurred.

You can quickly contrast that to the situation of a riddle. I ask you a riddle and invite you to give an answer. You give an answer and I say *No, the answer is . . .* something else. And by definition that's the answer. When people do riddles you don't get an insistence, *No,* I'm *right.* The inference-making machine we are building can handle riddles, but riddles set up a simpler task than those which this machine is capable of handling.

Now let's begin to examine, in a rather informal way, how it is that the machine user, A, seems to make conclusion 3 and then 5. You're invited to use the information you have as a member of the same society that these two people are in.

What you have is something like this, roughly: A knows that the scene is a family problem. So, *a* is the family quarrel, *b* is the guy moving to the door, *d* is the police coming. And c is the grounds for the police to have come. That is, apparently on some piece of information the police have come, and that piece of information is the thing that A has guessed at. A apparently knows, then, what good grounds are for the police to be called to a scene. And he's able to use those grounds, first to make a guess, and then to assess the correctness of the answer to that guess.

We can note as well that it's not simply the case that A and B don't know each other, but we have a set of other persons who are being talked about, and A is listening to this. Whatever A knows about B, he certainly knows less about these others. A knows essentially only the set of terms that B uses to name them: that there is something called a sister, something called a wife, something called a child.

It seems to me that the information that is being used by A is held in terms of collections of these categories, categories like "wife", "sister", "child". For one, you can easily enough come to see that for any population of persons present there are available alternative sets of categories that can be used. Someone referred to as a "sister" can also be referred to as a "bus driver", a "Democrat", a

"readhead", and so on. That, then, poses for us an utterly central task in our descriptions: to have some way of providing which set of categories operate in some scene – in the reporting of that scene or in its treatment as it is occurring.

We might get a rather finer sense of the gearing of inferences to these categories by just shuffling one category around a little. For example, would the same inference be made if it were "my sister," not "her sister," who had called the police? The rules with respect to who owes what to whom, and who takes care of whom may be so formulated that those things matter a great deal. The inference in this case might then be not that the husband had produced some activity which served as good grounds for calling the police, but that the wife had done so.

And that is extremely important because it is an awesome machine if one needs to know only that it is "my wife" and "her sister." And you can do this because it holds for every like unit in society that you don't need to explore the particulars of any given situation; for example, *Well, tell me some more about your wife's sister. Is she prone to hysterics?* (where such information would be absolutely essential in psychology).

If what I've been saying is even somewhat so, then it is not merely that the notion that you need to know a great deal about somebody before you can say this or that about them may be a lot of nonsense. What is of interest is that it is the way that society goes about building people that makes such a notion a lot of nonsense. That is, a task of socialization is to produce somebody who so behaves that those categories are enough to know something about him.

One thing I want to watch for is what we can call "order of depth" in dealing with various kinds of occurrences. So, for example, considering A, suppose there is a list of good grounds for police to be called to a scene and that list is built into A's brain, as a mature member of the society, and he can, when told of some scene where the police come, throw out an item from that list as a guess (and perhaps furthermore insist on it being correct). That would be one order of depth.

But one of the things we're going to be watching for is how simple or how complex this animal is. "And one of the ways to approach that issue might be by asking, for example, if it is the case that we need, for dealing with "the police arriving", a machine – a set of rules, that is, and a set of objects that those rules handle – which is altogether distinct, such that if something else happens we need another machine for making another kind of inference. Or is it the case that we'll find that this use of an inference from the police situation is absolutely similar to the way in which some other event is found? In the latter case, "police" becomes one category of a general machine that handles a whole set of things. If that is so, then the task of describing how this animal operates will be tremendously simplified. And the work of the animal itself is, of course, tremendously simplified.

One thing that's interesting about such a machine is the following. It is clearly the case – A knows it and B knows it – that the police don't only come for the good grounds that police come for. Cranks call up the police all the time, and police answer calls that turn out not to be based on good grounds. But apparently

that fact has a special status. In general it seems that the proper ways that police come to a house are available to members and may be used, for example, to decide what happened at that house. And if you see somebody being led away by the police, you may feel that you know what's up with him – at least generically; that is, that he's done something wrong.

That suggests two things: First, the fact that some procedure which has a correct way of getting done gets done correctly – independent of any issue of people getting harassed or misunderstood – may be quite crucial in permitting persons to find the sense of an event which happened by reference to that procedure. Second – and here we're going to pose one of the central dilemmas of Western civilization – a person who stands in the position of having some procedure that has a correct basis for use applied to him stands in the position of having that procedure presumptively correctly applied. And we can give that problem a name: Job's problem.

Job, the rich, good man, had lost all his wealth, his children, his possessions. His friends come to him, and there are series of long discussions. What his friends propose is, "Look, you take it that God punishes the wicked and rewards the good. We take it the same way. Your situation is understandable only if you're guilty. So confess." And for Job the problem is, "I don't know that I'm guilty. I'm convinced that I'm not guilty. But then how could this have happened to me?"

A central dilemma, then, is that some procedure that has a proper way of operating may not so operate. Kafka is dealing with the same kind of issue. And our Mr. B is in the same boat. What A suspects may, indeed, have happened. Or B may have just felt "What can I say? After all, A knows how those things happen, and how am I going to insist that it's not so?" That is, a problem that people in a range of circumstances can be faced with is: Is there a way available to provide for some event to have happened apart from the normal and proper way these things happen?

Now we are talking about something quite general here. When we talk about it by reference to the police, we are not talking about a procedure set up by and for the police. Rather, it may be the case that in order for the police to operate successfully they have to be able to produce their activities so that these ways that members have of looking at activities can be applied to the police.

Likewise, when I talk about Job I'm not engaging in a bit of literary criticism. Job's problem focuses on a central problem of the way that persons go about orienting to the occurrence of events, and that is that it is somehow extremely important that the inferences they do make can be taken as correct – and thereby that those persons who produce those activities described by these sequences so behave as to provide for the fact that these sequences do describe them.

In that regard it is interesting to note that the phenomenon of presumptively correct descriptions, and behavior produced to fit those descriptions, can be found by reference to illegitimate as well as legitimate activities. So, for example, in his book *Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa,* in the chapter "The Reasonable Man in Barotse Law," Gluckman offers us the "reasonable wrongdoer".

> The last case suggests that the Barotse have a picture not only of reasonable and customary right ways of behaving, but also a picture of the reasonable wrongdoer – the reasonable thief, adulterer, slanderer, and so forth.
>
> By this paradox – the reasonable wrongdoer – I sum up the fact that wrongdoers in any society also behave in customary ways which are socially stereotyped.
>
> There is the "criminal slouch" as against the "scholarly stoop", the spiv's clothes and hairstyle, the whole manner of loitering with intent to commit a criminal action.
>
> When there is only circumstantial evidence, these sorts of actions build up before the judges until they conclude that . . . the total picture is that of a reasonable wrongdoer – as we say, a person guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
>
> And I have heard cases which indicate that these customary ways of doing wrong in fact influence adulterers and thieves, so that they give themselves away in circumstances in which they could have acted so as to cover up their misdeeds. (1963, p. 190)

Our task, then, is not simply to be building a machine that can make inferences and make them in the strong way that I've proposed. A problem for a sociology interested in describing socialization will consist in large part of how it is that a human gets built who will produce his activities such that they're graspable in this way. That is to say, how it is that he'll so behave that these sequencing machines can be used to find out what he's up to.

Now, what I have been proposing could be restated as follows: For members, activities are observables. They see activities. They see persons doing intimacy, they see persons lying, and so on. It has been wrongly proposed that people do not see, for example, "my mother", but what they really see is light, dark, shadows, an object in the distance. But persons do see things like "my mother", and things like activities. And that poses for us the task of being behaviorists in this sense: Finding how it is that people can produce sets of actions that provide that others can see such things.

Earlier I observed that one way that persons go about seeing activities is by reference to some procedures that they take it properly occur as the activities occur. That is, it can be seen that Mr. B smacked his wife by virtue of the fact that the police came – by virtue of the fact that the police come when people smack their wives. While in many of its aspects the use of procedures to find the sense of some set of observables, the phenomenon to which I gave the name Job's problem, is utterly central, this fact of observability of actions is much more generic.

We can be led, then, to investigate, for example, how it is that persons learn that the activities they have gone through are observable by virtue of their appearances. where, again, this observability is not specific to each activity but is learned as a general phenomenon.

We could suppose that the following report might be the sort of thing we could use to find out how this learning takes place and to see where those things may or may not be difficult. It is a quotation from *One Boy's Day* by Barker and Wright (1951, p. 23). What they did was to have a bunch of people follow a kid

around all day, writing down everything he did that they could. They worked in half-hour shifts, and they compiled a record of his day.

> 7:20
> Raymond got up from his chair. He went directly out of the kitchen and into the bathroom.
> Coming from the bathroom, he returned to the kitchen. His mother asked pleasantly, "Did you wash your teeth?" Mr. Birch looked at him and laughed saying, "My gosh son, you have tooth powder all over your cheeks." Then both parents laughed heartily.
> Raymond turned instantly and went straight to the bathroom. He smiled as though he were not upset by his parents' comments.
> He stayed in the bathroom just a few seconds.
> He came back rubbing his face with his hands. The tooth powder was no longer visible.

Presumably Raymond can learn, through things like this, that his parents can tell that he washed his teeth by virtue of the appearance on his face of tooth powder. That fact sets up the phenomenon that I'll call, generically, "subversion".

With this example in hand, you can think of the way that children can learn subversion, having learned that the procedure is applied to them. For example, they will wash those aspects of their body that are at a glance observable so that when they appear it seems that they have washed. And the fact that this adaptation goes on provides, then, the sense in which they orient to this way that their activities are grasped.

In watching these obviously trivial things that children might do, it is conceivable that one may have analyzed matters that are treated as being of larger moment. So, for example, the segment I just gave you, in which Raymond's having brushed his teeth was seen in his face covered with some white powder, is in its character extremely central and deserves the name "generic". Simply enough, the first human event in Judaic-Christian mythology consists of man's discovery that his moral character is observable. We might call it Adam's problem.

> And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat and gave also unto her husband with her; and he did eat.
> And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons.
> And they heard the voice of the Lord God walking in the garden in the cool of the day: and Adam and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the Lord God amongst the trees of the garden.
> And the Lord God called unto Adam, and said unto him, where art thou?
> And he said, I heard Thy voice in the garden and I was afraid because I was naked; and I hid myself.
> And He said, who told thee that thou wast naked? Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat?
> And the man said, the woman whom Thou gavest to be with me, she gave me of the tree, and I did eat. (Ch. 3.6–12 *Genesis,* King James Version)

And Adam learns, like Raymond learns, that one has to come to terms with the fact that from one's appearances the activities one has engaged in are observable.

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Confirming Allusions: Toward an Empirical Account of Action

Emanuel A. Schegloff

Introduction

The primary goal of this article is to provide an account of a previously undescribed action that parties to talk-in-interaction may do. Ideally, it would begin by launching directly into an account of this action, but, perhaps more than is ordinarily the case, it is first necessary to set the undertaking into a theoretical context relevant to sociologists. The kind of introduction that turns out to be in point for the project – one relevant to its presentation rather than its conception and execution – is informative about both the topic and about sociology's development and current situation as a discipline.

This article is conversation-analytic in orientation. In common with many such papers, it invites reading not primarily for its bearing on so-called sociolinguistic themes but as a contribution to both basic sociological theory and appropriate methods for developing it. Past preoccupations have put the economy and the polity, religion or culture, or personality, character and "human nature" (as in theorizing inspired by Freud) at the center and foundation of social and sociological theory. In spite of a recurrently expressed recognition by sociologists from Durkheim and Mauss to Bourdieu (to cite only the French lineage – the German one might be from Simmel to Habermas, the American one, from Mead or Parsons to Goffman or Garfinkel) that language figures centrally in the organization of social life, it has remained peripheral to the main thrusts of the discipline. Several strands of contemporary theorizing (most notably those associated with the names of Bourdieu and Habermas) have sought to put language, communication, and "practice" in a position of comparable theoretical "gravity"; still, none has yet provided a clear depiction and exemplar of how

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the prima facie, observable embodiment of sociality – action, activity, and conduct in interaction – as effectuated through the deployment of language and the body can be put at the center of theorizing about the social and can be grounded and elaborated in detailed, empirical analysis of that conduct.

The need to establish the relevance of "describing a previously undescribed action" as a sociological undertaking reflects the absence from sociology's past of a phase of naturalistic observation – one given over to the accumulation of accounts of the basic inventory or repertoire of social actions and forms of social conduct which constitute the primary observable referents of the sociality of this social species (the cognate for interaction to the database supplied to comparative-historical inquiry by the work of historians, to demographers and other quantitative students of social structure by the gathering of official social statistics, etc.).[1] Perhaps it is because sociology never went through such a phase as a discipline that it did not quite know what to do with Erving Goffman who, more than any other sociologist, tried to draw the discipline's attention to aspects of this raw material and its relevance to the discipline, though I will suggest below that his effort in this regard was itself problematic (see also Schegloff 1988*a*).

Goffman had better luck with anthropologists. In part this was because anthropologists had had good reason over the course of the development of their discipline to wonder what some "natives" were "doing" by conducting themselves in a certain way, for example, by talking in a certain way. Both linguistic obstacles and so-called "cultural differences" could pose quite sharply the problem of "recognizing actions," and then the analytic problems of describing what those actions were and how they were done or accomplished. Aside from the encounter with actions that had no cognate in their own culture, there were also "indigenous" ways of doing actions that *did* (appear to) have a place in the field-worker's culture but whose enactment was different (see, e.g., Frake 1964). Both the practical exigencies of fieldwork in an "exotic" setting and anthropology's principled disciplinary commitment to explicate the detailed diversity and specificity of human culture funneled attention to "the different." By the mid-1960s to early 1970s anthropologists converged from different routes (some of which subsequently diverged again) on an orientation to "culture" as the *ways of doing things* – whether as linguistic or cognitive procedures (as in Goodenough 1957, 1964), ways of meaning (Geertz 1973) or ways of communicating (Gumperz and Hymes 1964) – under rubrics such as "ethnoscience," "componential analysis," "ethnosemantics," "ethnography of communication," and/or simply "cultural anthropology."

When my late colleague Harvey Sacks offered an undergraduate class in social science in 1965, his characterization of a culture as "an apparatus for generating *recognizable* actions" (1992, 1:226), this was not out of keeping with the theoretical zeitgeist of the anthropology of the time. And when he proposed as an analytic task that we provide an account for how "describing" was done (1972, p. 332; see also the transcript of a lecture in the spring of 1966 [Sacks 1992, 1:236–37]), this could be understood as a confluence between ethnomethodology's interest in practical theorizing and commonsense interpretation

on the one hand (Garfinkel 1967), and, on the other, a then-current anthropological interest in describing how actions are done, albeit in this case actions from one's own culture.

But as the persistent, bemused popularity of Horace Miner's classic paper (1956) "Body Ritual among the Nacirema" shows, the same sort of attention to, and description of, actions in one's own culture never had quite the same resonance, even in anthropology. The actions were "transparent" to comembers of the culture; even naming them by action names might appear a bit arch and scholastic. Even more so was this treatment accorded accounts of the practices, rules, or mechanisms by which these actions were done. They just "were" invitations, requests, promises, insults, and so on. For mainstream sociology, and even for most of its new tributaries of the time, this sort of orientation to this society's actions apparently constituted an unassimilable – or uninteresting – proposal and undertaking.

Perhaps the development of a serious cultural sociology can change that, if by "cultural sociology" we understand something that includes not only high and popular culture, and not only that "anthropological" sense of culture that features values, beliefs, taste, fashion, and so on, but one that focuses on the "repertoire" of actions and practices out of which the quotidian life of the members of a social species is fashioned. To the degree that this ambition can be realized, cultural sociology serves simply as a key part of a serious general sociology, and not just theoretically (as it was in Parsonian theory) but empirically. It is this ambition that this article pursues.

After a brief précis of largely *conceptual* modalities of addressing "action" within sociology and without, the article reviews several *empirical* accounts of the practices for doing particular actions, as background to the present undertaking, which is to describe a new type of action and the mode of inquiry by which it was come upon.

Action and Actions

With all the commitment of major segments of the social science community, and sociology in particular, to "action" as a pivotal component of social life and its disciplined study, actual action – and particular action*s* – have been curiously absent from sociological inquiry and discourse.[2] At times they appear to be virtually epiphenomenal expressions of "underlying" factors, processes, and variables – norms, rationality, conformity, power, system functions, and the like, but important largely as the public face, the accessible display and indicator, of those underlying forces. Nowhere has the contrast between conceptual centrality and empirical dismissal been more marked than in the Parsonian "theory of action," which played so prominent a role in the sociology of the middle decades of this century. The "action" that figured so centrally for Parsons was a conceptual or analytic unit – the "unit act," with theoretically conjectured components such as the inescapable facets of action – actor, goals, means and conditions, and so forth (Parsons 1937). Actual actions were "merely" concrete

and empirical and of interest only insofar as they could be analytically decomposed into the then-current terms of theorizing (cf. Heritage 1984*b*, pp. 103–34).

Paradoxically, the main alternative has been to presume actions *central*, only then to look elsewhere for the "unofficial" – and therefore more "real" – agenda, as in much of Goffman's writing. Goffman, whose microethnography might have been thought to cast him as the most likely observer and analyst of social actions, more often took the tack that whatever else ordinary actors might in the first instance appear to be doing – walking, calling the doctor, offering medication, sanctioning rule violations, expressing intimacy by holding hands, serving a meal, waiting, and so on – what was sociologically key was that they were managing impressions and information (Goffman 1959, 1963*b*), attending to considerations of face (Goffman 1955, 1967), organizing the allocation of attention and involvement (Goffman 1963*a*), and so forth. First-order actions here are cast as the official or ostensible version of what is going on, a veil whose penetration and revelation is the true calling of the sophisticated, perspicuous sociologist or anthropologist.[3] But in these quarters no more attention was given than elsewhere to whatever persons might be thought – or observed – *in the first instance* to be doing. Ordinary social actions have thus fallen between the several sociological cracks; they are not to be found in action theory, in the microethnography of everyday interaction, or in the study of the underlying organizing social processes that drive social life.

Different as they may appear, these "approaches" come to the materials of everyday life with a theoretical filter that separates the sociological wheat from the chaff, the gold from the dross, the important from the trivial, the real from the apparent, the enduring from the transient. Generally this has resulted in accounts that formulate the actions being characterized not by reference to the projects of the actors who enacted them and were their recipients, but only by reference to the terms of the theory that was "processing" them, the only terms by reference to which they were taken to matter – as in Bales's (1950) reduction of all actions to 12 characterizations, formulated by reference to the then-current stage of Parsonian action theory. With all the differences between the various sociological treatments, actual, empirical, naturally occurring garden-variety actions have been found wanting in their own terms, from whatever direction the approaches approached (cf. Drew and Heritage [1992, pp. 10–16], who find virtually no writing by sociologists on the actions done by talk).

Aside from the theoretically motivated or presuppositionally grounded sources of this treatment of ordinary actions, there was a likely methodological source as well. Methodologically no one fully exploited the use of recording technology (audio or video) to provide the opportunity for freezing the object of inquiry – the stream of conduct of which social settings are composed – for the repeated detailed examination that might allow the analyst to shed, at least partially, the relentless interference of vernacular familiarity in the analytic depiction of actions. For example, although much of Bales's data was recorded on audiotape after the challenge of coding the stream of behavior in real time

was recognized as problematic, the audiotape was erased for reuse as soon as the "acts" had been coded. The results of the coding were taken to be "the data," leaving actual, recorded conduct as a kind of scientific detritus.

Vernacular familiarity was very likely one obstacle to the passage of the problem of recognizable action from anthropology to sociology. By contrast with work in "strange" settings, the action-import of usages in one's native or well-assimilated language or culture may fade into invisibility by virtue of its very familiarity. The same commonsense knowledge of the culture, and the semiotics, pragmatics, and discourse structure of a language that helps to constitute our cultural and linguistic competence blinds us and impedes our capacity to get at the constitution of action *technically*. Indeed, the combination of native knowledge and the absence of recorded specimens of the quotidian can obscure for us that there is a distinctive project to be undertaken here. We need to exploit the newly available technologies not only to do better – more "precisely" or compellingly – what has previously been done by observation in real time or through ethnographic elicitation; we need to ask what new analytic possibilities are made available by this new technology, and these may follow on the new observational possibilities. The increasingly sophisticated recording technologies of the last three decades may thus be to this area of inquiry what the microscope was to the life sciences earlier.

This is by no means a new idea. To realize its possible benefits, however, we need to press inquiries into what speakers can do – *do* do – with language and the other resources deployed in interaction. And we need to press those inquiries especially with materials to which we bring native competence and cultural membership. If this undertaking falls to any discipline in the current map of the social sciences, it falls to sociology. The prospect is the development of an account of action in interaction grounded in the observable details of conduct in naturally occurring social settings, which can be juxtaposed to the abstract and theoretical accounts of past and current work, accounts which were grounded in conceptual and normative considerations and invoking the common culture's stipulated understanding of typical courses of human conduct that are taken to be shared by the writers and readers of this professional literature.

Some years ago, Sacks (1992, 2:419–20) began a course of lectures by underscoring the troubles of studying talk-in-interaction with imagined or typified data, but his point extends to other nonnaturally occurring data as well.

> What I want to argue is that if a researcher uses hypotheticalized or hypotheticalized-typicalized versions of the world, then, however rich his imagination is, he is constrained by reference to what an audience, an audience of professionals, can accept as reasonable. . . . One is then debarred from using these kinds of materials [hypotheticals which are not credible to an audience]. And that debarring of lots of things that actually occur, at least presumably affects the character of social science very strongly.

By contrast, Sacks continued,

> a base for using close looking at the world for theorizing about it is that from close looking at the world you can find things that we couldn't, by imagination, assert were there: One wouldn't know that they were typical, one might not know that they ever happened, and even if one supposed that they did one couldn't say it because an audience wouldn't believe it. Where, then, if we can add to the stock of things that can be theorized about we will have done something more or less important – if the things that we've added have any import to them.

Thirty years later, this remains a robust ideal and a useful measure of many research projects. Indeed, one point of this article is of just this sort. It is to explore something that speakers of language in interaction do observably do with it, and to add thereby to an inventory of sorts, a catalog of recognizable social actions in this culture, in this case one which language is used to accomplish in interaction. The aim is to find it and provide an account of it empirically and precisely, not imaginatively or typically or hypothetically or conjecturally or experimentally, and to use actual, situated occurrences of it in naturally occurring social settings to control its description. Whatever the value of previous philosophical, conceptual, and text-based theories of action may turn out to have been, there is a separate and distinct place for an empirical theory or account of action, or action. What might it look like? How might we arrive at it? For an empirically grounded account, we need to deal with the latter question first, and the first step in addressing it is to assemble at least a moderate set of descriptions of particular actions – a corpus to which an empirical theory of action can be answerable and by which it can be constrained.

Describing Actions

But what does a description of an action look like? Before proceeding with the account of the action that is the focus of this analysis it may be useful to sketch a few accounts of actions and the practices for accomplishing them produced in past work.[4]

Even quite elementary procedural accounts of the practice(s) for doing some action ("elementary" both in the sense of "simple" and in the sense of "explicating the elements"), grounded as they are in the empirical detail and specificity of actual instances, open the door to empirical examination and, where appropriate, critique and modification. For example, once Sacks ([1964–65] 1992, 1:97) had proposed that greetings are done by putting some greeting term in first position in a conversation (". . . something is a 'greeting' only if it's a 'greeting item' in a 'greeting place'"), it was possible to examine the "hello" with which most American "private" telephone conversations begin to assess whether it is the action "greeting" that these "greeting items in greeting places" are employed to accomplish, and are taken to accomplish by their recipients, as the basis for subsequen

action. This was not a conceptual undertaking and critique but an empirical one (Schegloff 1967, 1968, 1986), and it yielded the proposal that at least *these* apparent greeting items in first position in a conversation were understood by parties to the incipient conversation to be doing *not* greeting, but answering the summons embodied in the phone's ring (with consequences such as the subsequent occurrence of an exchange of greeting terms which *were* doing greeting).

So one form that an account of an action can take is a characterization of some form or practice of talking and some characterization of the place or location in which that practice is employed – as in articulating a greeting term in an initial slot or exchange in a conversation. Relatively few actions have their procedural basis exhausted by an account of this sort, and in accounts of this sort relatively few can invoke the availability of a limited set of "dedicated" linguistic resources such as "greeting terms." But "greeting" is not the only action we can explicate in this way. In an exchange with an "artificial intelligence" computer scientist at a conference in which "compliments" were being discussed, I asked for an account of how a computer might be programmed to "do" a compliment and, very likely taking this as a request for a "speech-act" type of account, my colleague declined even to try. But one can begin with something as simple as "Select a positive assessment term for some feature of the recipient/interlocutor or interlocutor's just prior conduct." Although more is clearly necessary (as is a specification of even this much), a simple account of the constructional elements and their positioning is often a good start on an at least partial account.

One important consequence of undertaking such an account is that it can yield empirically grounded results at variance with our commonsense intuitions about how some action is accomplished or what action some utterance is to be understood to have accomplished. For example, in her account of assessments in conversation, Pomerantz (1984) focuses on responses to assessments, specifically on agreements and disagreements with them. The "position" component of her account is specified as the turn following an initial assessment, and one question she entertains is how "agreeing" and "disagreeing," respectively, are done in response to the initial assessment. Commonsense intuition might suggest that offering in the next turn an assessment of the same object that has just been assessed and offering an assessment of the same class or valence (i.e., positive if the prior assessment was positive, negative if it was negative) would go a long way toward describing "agreeing with an assessment." Consider the following exchanges (taken from Pomerantz [1984, pp. 68–69]):

Excerpt a (GJ:1)
A: She's a fox!
L: → Yeh, she's a pretty girl.

Excerpt b (NB:VII:2)
E: e-that Pa:t isn'she a do:[:ll?
M: → [iYeh isn't she pretty,

Excerpt c (AP:1)
G: That's fantastic.
B: → Isn't that good.

As readers may already have gathered from the framing with which I presented these fragments, the responses in these exchanges are of the "same sort" (in these cases all positive); but they contrast with instances such as the following (Pomerantz 1984, p. 65):

Excerpt d (JS:II:28)
J: T's- tsuh beautiful day out, isn't it?
L: → Yeh it's just gorgeous . . .

Excerpt e (MC:1)
A: Isn't he cute
B: → O::h he::s a::DORable

These "same sort" assessments are "upgraded," (Pomerantz 1984, p. 65) and do indeed accomplish agreement. But the second assessments in excerpts a–c are "downgraded" (p. 68), and although they are of the "same sort," they are taken as disagreements by the first speaker and are followed by reassertions of a "higher" assessment (pp. 68–69):

Excerpt a (GJ:1)
A: She's a fox!
L: Yeh, she's a pretty girl.
A: → Oh, she's gorgeous!

Excerpt b (NB:VII:2)
E: e-that Pa:t isn'she a do:[:ll?
M: [iYeh isn't she pretty,
(.)
E: → Oh: she's a beautiful girl.

Excerpt c (AP:1)
G: That's fantastic.
B: Isn't that good.
G: → That's marvelous

So the description of the action of agreeing with an assessment turns out to involve more than "same object, same valence in next turn," but must include (because the data show that the *parties do* it that way) practices of upgrading, downgrading and the like. Pomerantz goes on to describe other practices in the talk that are elements of the accomplishment of agreeing and disagreeing with assessments as well, ones that would almost certainly elude an "untechnical" examination, one not informed by repeated and detailed examination of actual occurrences. (The centrality of action itself aside, sociologists may register that other key features of a social order are implicated in such exchanges – assessments being one key locus of social and cultural norms regarding "the good, the true, and the beautiful," and agreement/disagreement being one interactional locus of consensus and conflict. These little exchanges are, then, the mundane sites in which the grand, macrotheoretical themes about norms and values and cultural capital are played out.)

Another form which accounts of actions can take shows them to be the outcome of specifiable practices of talking, or classes of such practices. One class of such practices may be termed "formulating," and a number of formulating practices have been shown to serve as ways of accomplishing determinate actions. For example, Sacks (from a lecture given in the spring of 1966 [1992, 1:300–305]; and another in the fall of 1968 [1992, 2:71–83]) shows how the practices of formulating for a new arrival to a conversation what was being talked about before his arrival ("We were in an automobile discussion") can serve as a possible invitation for the person to join in or not, as the case may be. Pomerantz (1980) shows how speakers' formulations of their own "limited access" to a setting or occurrence as a way of talking about it ("Your line's been busy," "I saw you drive by last night," "You were in room 252 a long time this afternoon," etc.) can serve to solicit their interlocutors' account of that setting or occurrence without explicitly requesting it. Elsewhere (Schegloff 1988*a*, pp. 120–28) I link "negative observations" or the formulation of an occurrence as an absence ("You didn't get an ice cream sandwich") to the doing of complaining. And so forth.

Another type of finding shows how alternative vehicles for implementing a facet of the talk – for example, doing it with or without delay (cf. Pomerantz 1984; Sacks [1973] 1987; Schegloff 1988*b*) – serve to accomplish additional actions as well, such as aligning with or against, agreeing or disagreeing, encouraging or discouraging.

The upshot of this discussion is that the description of an action and how it is done can extend in many, not necessarily anticipatable directions. The stance toward their object that formulations in the talk embody, the timing and delivery of the talk, the selection of implementing linguistic and body-behavioral resources – all have entered into past accounts. And what can count as "actions" in the first place has also involved a mixture of the familiar and unfamiliar. Jefferson (1984, [1983] 1993) shows that choice of interpolation by a current recipient of the talk (e.g., as between "uh huh" and "yeah") can display either projected continuing recipientship on their part or an incipient move to assume speakership, possibly with a change in topic. Heritage and Sorjonen (1994) show that starting a question with "and" can do the activity of making the question-to-follow sustain an already ongoing activity rather than constituting a new departure in the talk. I too have shown that some apparently paradoxical utterances ("Can I ask you a question?") can serve to mark what directly follows as a "parenthetical" preliminary to something else that will follow *it* (Schegloff 1980).

Virtually all of these results emerge from an "unmotivated" examination of naturally occurring interactional materials – that is, an examination not prompted by prespecified analytic goals (not even that it be the characterization of an action), but by "noticings" of initially unremarkable features of the talk or of other conduct. The trajectory of such analyses may begin with a noticing of the action being done and be pursued by specifying what about the talk or other conduct – in its context – serves as the practice for accomplishing that action. Or it may begin (as did the research reported below) with the noticing of some feature of the talk and be pursued by asking what – if anything – such a practice of talking has as its outcome.

Whatever trajectory of inquiry is followed, to support an empirically grounded account of action at least three distinct elements ought ideally to enter into an account of the action that some utterance implements.

1. First, the account requires a formulation of what action or actions are being accomplished, with compelling exemplifications in displays of data and analysis, including ways of "testing" the claim via confrontation of problematic instances and apparent "deviant cases," if possible. (The next six sections below are in various ways addressed to this task.)

2. Second, there must be a grounding of this formulation in the "reality" of the participants. Here the investigator undertakes to establish that the formulation is not an academically analytic imposition on conduct that may have been quite differently understood and experienced by the participants. This requires some demonstration that the interlocutors in the data being examined have understood the utterances (or other conduct) in question to be possibly doing the proposed action(s) or that they are oriented to that possibility – a demonstration ordinarily grounded in the interlocutors' subsequent talk or conduct (see Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson [1974, pp. 728–29] on proof procedures; also Heritage 1984*b*, pp. 254–60). This immediately subsequent talk, being appropriate to – or even responsive to – what preceded it, ordinarily displays an understanding of what that preceding talk was "doing." (This issue is addressed intermittently in three sections below, from "A Candidate Solution" through "Evidence from Avoidance and Nonoccurrence.")

3. A third element of a proper account of an action is an explication and analysis of what it is about the observed talk or other conduct or the practices embodied in it, which makes the enactment of that talk/conduct possibly an instance of the proposed action, and makes it analyzable by the coparticipants as an instance of that action, that is, why or how that practice can yield that action. It is not enough to show that some utterance was understood by its recipient to implement a particular action (and, indeed, sometimes this is not possible because it was not so understood, though it "might have been"). In order to provide analytically the grounds for the possibility of such an understanding, an account must be offered of what about the production of that talk/conduct provided for its recognizability as such an action; that is, what were the methodical, or procedural, or "practice-d" grounds of its production. Once explicated and established, this serves as part of the account of the utterance/action, *whether or not it was so understood by its recipient on any particular occasion.*[5] If the account of action in which we are interested is to be understood as informing the deployment and uptake of particular acts by participants in singular contexts in real time, then it must include a specification of the methodic basis for the construction, deployment, and recognition of this action. (This matter is addressed below in "The Fit between the Practice and the Action.")

Although not each of these elements can always be provided in full and compelling form, whether for analytical or editorial reasons, these three elements ought to provide the minimum points of reference for a minimally satisfactory analysis. The ensuing sections of this article offer, instead of further discursive

or programmatic elaboration, possible exemplars of what such a grounding for an empirical account of action might look like.

To revert, then, to where we began, the primary goal of this article is to describe a previously undescribed action that parties to talk-in-interaction may do and something of its provenance and uses. It is a contribution to addressing a lacuna in what should be a central area of inquiry for sociological theory and analysis – the database without which there cannot be an empirically grounded theory of action(s). In this regard, I am reporting on what might merit the term "discovery" in this corner of the world of inquiry into the foundations of sociality – I want to describe a possible discovery of an action and something of how that came about.

I will proceed developmentally, from (1) some initial observations and a puzzle that they posed to (2) the collection of a set of potentially relevant materials and the isolation within it of a core collection of fragments of talk bearing on the initiating observations to (3) an initial statement of a candidate solution to the originating puzzle – the phenomenon I mean to be introducing. That phenomenon is then further elaborated with respect to underlying practice and provenance.

Initial Noticings and a Puzzle

In the course of examining with a seminar (whose contribution I hereby acknowledge) a telephone conversation between two sisters-in-law in their 60s, the two fragments of talk shown in excerpts 1 and 2 were encountered several minutes and topic shifts apart. (The notational conventions most important for reading the transcribed data in this article may be found in the appendix. I cannot urge strongly enough that the reader examine the data excerpts closely, and not "read around them." It is not possible to understand the claims and arguments of the text properly without doing so.)

Excerpt 1 (Berkeley II: 103–114; simplified)
Evelyn has been called to the phone.

1	Evelyn:		= Hi: Rita
2	Rita:		Hi: Evelyn:. How [are y'
3	Evelyn:		[I hadda come **in another room.**
4	Rita:		Oh:. Uh huh. =
5	Evelyn:		= I fee:l a bi:ssel verschickert.
6			(0.2)
7	Rita:		W-why's 'a:t,
8			(0.4)
9	Rita:	→	uh you've had sump'n t' dr^ink. =
10	Evelyn:	⇉	= I had sump'n t' dri:nk.
11	Rita:		Uh huh.

Excerpt 2 (Berkeley II: 157–168; simplified)

1	Rita:	. . . y'know we: went to the mo:vies. =
2		= We went to: uh:m. uh to: (m) u(h):
3		What's *the name of ( ) ((off-line))

4	Evelyn:		(Sh'beau)?
5	Rita:		(** **) (Millbrae) ((off-line))
6			Millbrae. which is over past Burlingame.
7			(0.2)
8	Evelyn:	→	Yeah th[at's 'n far away.
9	Rita:		[(and-)
10	Rita:	⇉	That's far away. And- there were two good movies . . .

The initial observations concerned the arrowed turns in each of these excerpts. Two aspects of these turns invite attention and together prompt a puzzle. First, their speakers appear to be doing some sort of agreement; indeed, for reasons that remain to be explicated later, they appear to be doing the particular species of agreement that we ordinarily term "confirmation." Second, they do this confirmation by repeating that which is being agreed with.

The initial puzzle was, Is something special going on here? What are these repeats doing? Or, more precisely, what (if anything) are these repeats being distinctively used to do when employed as the means for agreeing or confirming?

One of the ingredients of this puzzle is that, while some sort of agreement or confirmation seems to be involved in these fragments, the most familiar forms for doing it are not being used, namely, (*a*) agreement tokens such as "yeah," "uh huh," and the like, (*b*) pro-termed versions of the talk being agreed with, such as "I did," or "It is," or upgraded or intensified versions of these, such as "It certainly is," or (*c*) forms that can be more specifically used and heard as ones for *confirmation*, forms such as "that's right," as in excerpt 3. Here a teacher confirms a child's observation (at the single-headed arrow) with a change-of-state token "Oh" (Heritage 1984*a*), a confirmation form ("that's right"), and an intensified or underscored reassertion of what is being confirmed.

Excerpt 3 (Philadelphia preschool)

Jason is reporting the mispositioning of a felt marker, which indicates the presence or absence of each child.

1	Jason:		Somebody put mine right there.
2			((gap))
3	Jason:		There.
4			((gap))
5	Jason:		I didn'.
6	Teacher:		I can't imagine why that ha:ppened Jason.
7			((gap))
8	Teacher:		But I'm really glad that you're here. = ·hhh
9			Check and see if there's any down on the
10			bottom that people forgot to hang up.
11	Girl 1:	→	That was Alison's job.
12	Teacher:	⇉	Oh that's right. It is Alison's job.
13	Girl 1:		A: l i s o n ! ((calling out for her))
14	Girl 2:		Ma:rk is absent.

Whatever their actual relative frequencies, the question remains whether selection among these forms is a locus of order and constitutes a set of practices for differentially implementing particular actions.[6] And, if so, exactly what might someone be doing by confirming in *this* way – that is, by repeating, and (to make explicit another feature of these two instances, excerpts 1 and 2) by repeating *in the next turn*, that which is being agreed with or confirmed?

Assembling a Database

One way of proceeding is to assemble a collection of fragments of talk-in-interaction in which "repeats" are employed, in order to enrich the set of exemplars of whatever it is we are investigating (if, indeed, it is an "it" at all – something not known at the outset of the inquiry). We assemble the collection of repeats "generously," that is, with an ample and inclusive net, including types of repeats which prima facie appear *different* from our target instances. This will allow us – indeed *force* us – later on, when we discard these instances, to make explicit just what it is which makes them different from our targets, and thereby potentially to specify progressively just what (if anything) is distinctively going on in the fragments which set us off. As a by-product, we may also be led to encounter other orderly forms, uses, and positionings of repeats – some of them familiar, some of them pointing to other new projects to be pursued.

There is not the space here to elaborate the major initial differentiations that discriminate the sorts of occurrences with which we began – the kernel of the "core collection" – from the several other varieties of repeats that an initial canvass of the data revealed. But in seeking initially to decide only *which* other occurrences of repeats belong with our initial two instances, we are led to make the following discriminations – there will be seven of them – which I will only list and briefly explicate, but not exemplify or explore in any detail.

First, repeats may be done either by the speaker of the first saying or by some recipient of the first saying. Either sort of party may use repeats for a range of different uses, but those ranges of uses are different for the two classes of "repeater." Our core collection contains only repeats by someone *other* than the initial sayer of the repeated utterance.

Second, as noted in passing earlier, the repeat can be in the turn after the first saying or in any subsequent turn. The repeats that we are tracking are in next turn after the first saying. (The reader will by now have noticed from the first three data excerpts that initial sayings are marked by single-headed arrows, and the turns in which they are repeated – or could have been – are marked by double-headed arrows.)

Third, repeats by a recipient in the turn after the first saying can occupy or enact at least three different types of sequential position. (1) a repeat may be used *to initiate a sequence*, most commonly (but not invariably, cf. Jefferson [1972]) a repair sequence addressed to some problem of hearing or understanding (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1977), as in excerpt 4.[7]

Excerpt 4 (Shiffman:378)

1	S:		Did you work for somebody before you worked for Zappa?
2	O:		Yeh many many
3			(3.0)
4	O:		Canned heat for a year
5	S:		Didya?
6	O:		Poco for a year
7	T:		Ooh when they were good?
8	O:	→	Bangor-Flunt Madura fer a y- couple years
9	T:	⇉	Bangor Flunt Madura?
10	O:		Bangor Flying Circus
11	J:		O:h yeh I [remember Bangor Flying Circus
12	L:		[Ye::ah
13	J:		Played at Creation
14	L:		Yeh

(2) a repeat may be used *responsively, in second position in a sequence*, either in a complementary relationship to the prior utterance, for example, as an answer to a question (as in excerpt 5), or in a reciprocal or exchange relationship to the prior utterance, as in exchanges of such ritual tokens as greetings or farewells (e.g., the exchange of "bye bye"s in excerpt (6).

Excerpt 5 (BB gun)

1	Bonnie:		C'd yuh bring it to the meeting?
2			(0.4)
3	Bonnie:		the lo:ngest one you [hav]e.
4	Jim:		S[ure.]
5			(0.4)
6	Bonnie:		[An]
7	Jim:	→	[The] longest one?
8	Bonnie:	⇉	The longest one.

Excerpt 6 (Pink book)

1	B:		Okay Vaness. I'm (·) gonna get going.
2	V:		Okay.
3	B:		Alright?
4	V:		Alright.
5	B:		See you this evening.
6	V:	→	Okay bye bye. =
7	B:	⇉	= Bye bye.

Or, (3), and finally for now, a *repeat may be in, or may embody, a sequentially third position, where it may serve to receive or register* an utterance that was produced in second position as a response to some first position utterance (as in excerpt 7

Excerpt 7 (Upholstery shop)

1	Mike:		W'll what are yer religious beliefs.
2	Vic:	→	Uh, (0.7) S'preme being.
3	Mike:	⇉	Supreme being.

Of the three positions I have mentioned, the repeats in our core collection occur mostly in the second position – that is, as responses of some sort, a few in the third, but not as sequence initiators.

A fourth discrimination made in assembling the core collection of the target repeats is between "identical" and modified resayings of the prior utterance. Now what counts as "identical" turns on how the criteria are drawn; there will almost always be differences of prosody or intonation, for example, between initial and subsequent sayings. For our purposes, we will distinguish between those repeats which, on the one hand, resay *all*, rather than part, of the prior turn-constructional-unit or clause (often the whole of prior turn), and say it using *the same words* (except for transformations to satisfy the constraints of speaker-change and deixis),[8] and those, on the other hand, that modify the diction of the turn on its resaying. With respect then to lexical composition, the instances included in our core collection are *identical repeats* (with deictic and speaker-change adjustments), rather than transformations or paraphrases of the first saying.

Fifth, the repeats of prior turn can be all that occurs in the next turn or they can be combined with other talk. Even the two instances from the core collection with which we began show that either of these may be the case. However, if there *is* talk of another sort in the turn in addition to the repeat, it turns out that it *follows* the repeat.

A sixth, and related, feature of those repeats in sequentially second and third position that appear to be doing some form of agreement with prior utterance is that the turn in which the repeat is done may include *other forms of agreement besides the repeat* or may not, and if there *are* other forms of agreement, these may precede the repeat or follow it. Of the 60 or so instances in the core collection of what has emerged as the target phenomenon here, the vast majority have no other forms of agreement in the turn. Virtually all those that *do* include agreement tokens have them *after* the repeat and not before it. The significance of this (and of the preceding paragraph) is that the first such component of a turn can occasion the relevance of turn transfer (Sacks et al. 1974, p. 704) that, if acted upon, can block further components of the turn from being effectively produced. The highly regular initial positioning of these repeats within their turns displays an orientation to getting *them* said in their speakers' turns, even if nothing else gets said there.

From a quite broad collection of repeated utterances, we have progressively focused our attention to those that are repeated, *virtually identically*, in *next turn*, *by recipients of the first saying*, with the repeat embodying a *second or third position* in its sequence. We are looking at repeats that are doing agreement. The repeats either are *all* of what is in the turn *or are the first thing* in the turn.

Recall that we have been trying to circumscribe the sort of practice instantiated by our initial instances. It is not that other values on each of the variables I have described do not occur; many of them do. But each of those combinations invites its own inquiry: for each we must inquire whether it defines a natural class of cases, a class of practices of talk, a particular way of doing some action(s). We cannot pursue those inquiries here; we are in search of what is getting done by the practice whose features we have been specifying.

A further, seventh, characteristic of the instances with which we began is useful in discriminating between other repeats meeting the specifications so far adduced that belong in our core collection and those that do not. This characterization makes reference not to the repeat itself, but to the initial saying of the utterance involved – the one indicated by the single-headed arrow in excerpts 1 and 2. The feature is that the speaker of the initial saying, in saying it, is offering a candidate observation, interpretation, or understanding of the *recipient's* circumstances, current or past.[9] And it is that recipient who repeats the utterance in next turn. It is *this* feature that lends the specific aspect of "confirmation" to what would otherwise be more broadly characterized as "agreements." It being *their* circumstances that are formulated by the first saying of the utterance in question, they are presumed to be authoritatively informed about those circumstances, and their agreements are thus "confirmatory."

Now it may appear, especially with this last quite substantial constraint, that the class of forms that was the target has been exhaustively specified, if not virtually defined. But note that, even with all of these features or constraints, a participant in an occasion of talk-in-interaction who means to respond affirmatively to some interlocutor's proffered understanding of their circumstances can still do so with a common agreement token (yes), as will be seen later in extracts (15) and (16) below.

What we have done so far, then, is *not* the provision of an account of what this practice of talk-in-interaction in particular is doing or is being used to do. The specification of these seven features has served to define a domain of occurrences – a universe of data to which an account of this practice (if it *is* a practice) should be adequate and against which it can be assessed. What remains is to develop and assess such an account: What (if anything) *is* someone doing by agreeing with such a prior utterance – confirming it – by the use of a repeat of that utterance?

A Candidate Solution: Confirming Allusions

Let me offer an initial account, which I will then explicate on excerpt 2. In the instances in our core collection, we can note that the sense of what is being confirmed can be seen to have been "planted" (so to speak), or conveyed, in the preceding talk, but to have not been said "in so many words," or in *any* words "explicitly." The other participant, the one whose utterance is being repeated – the "first sayer," so to speak – has, by that utterance, formulated explicitly an understanding of what the recipient had conveyed without saying. By repeating that "explication," the "confirming party" not only confirms the *sense* that the utterance proposes is to be made of what preceded. In addition, the confirmer confirms that that sense *had* been "alluded to," *had* been conveyed without being said. The repeat confirms the allusion, and confirms it *as* an allusion.

I use the term "allusion" here very broadly, including diverse usages from "hinting" to such "nonliteral" tropes as metaphor, metonomy, and analogy. There seems little point in discriminating which literary usage some vernacular

expression might be taken to exemplify. Nor is it the case that "allusions" can only be to other texts, though this is a very common form of literary allusion.

With respect to the notion of a nonliteral trope, I understand the current view held by some that no clear distinction can be drawn between the literal and the nonliteral. Although semiotically speaking it may well be that anything can mean anything, it is striking that in ordinary uses of the vernacular, participants do not behave that way. They use the talk, and certain resources in it, to do just these things, and they understand it as doing just these things. They wrest the ordinary from the indefinitely many possibilities and from the possibilities of indefiniteness. That includes the literal and not, the direct and not.

How then do these repeats confirm allusions? In excerpt 2, for example, Rita reports that she and her husband went to the movies in a town whose name she first searches for and then consults her husband to retrieve (thereby marking it as possibly unfamiliar). She then provides a possible basis for the "difficulty" of the reference, by characterizing the town as "over past Burlingame."

Excerpt 2 (Berkeley II: 157–168; simplified)

1	Rita:		. . . y'know we: went to the mo:vies. =
2			= We went to: uh:m. uh to: (m)u(h):
3			What's* the name of ( ) ((off-line))
4	Evelyn:		(Sh'beau)?
5	Rita:		(** **) (Millbrae) ((off-line))
6			Millbrae. which is over past Burlingame.
7			(0.2)
8	Evelyn:	→	Yeah th[at's 'n far away.
9	Rita:		[(and-)
10	Rita:	⇉	That's far away. And- there were two good movies . . .

Now there are various ways to "locate" a place geographically in talk-in-interaction, various ways to formulate where it is (Schegloff 1972). Even among place references that formulate location by reference to some landmark, a place that is "past X" can ordinarily also be "this side of Y." By characterizing Millbrae as "over past Burlingame," Rita can be heard to be characterizing it as a place "far away." (And indeed she later explains that she had wanted to see the movie in question when it was in Berkeley where she lives, but that "it was gone. so I knew it was the only place we could go to see it.") But she does not explicitly *say* "far away"; she *does* "formulating it as 'far away.'"

Evelyn shows her understanding of what is going on here in the next turn by characterizing the place that Rita has referred to as "far away." Rita's repeat of that, in contrast to "yeah" or "that's right," shows not only agreement with the proposition that Millbrae is in fact "far away," but that *that* is what she had been doing – conveying "far awayness" – by the practice that she had employed in her preceding talk. She thereby also underscores that it is not that *she* is agreeing with *Evelyn's* characterization of the distance; but that *Evelyn* was agreeing with her depiction of the distance, conveyed by the form or practice of her locational formulation. This matter of who is agreeing with whom may seem petty, but parties to conversation *do* care about it, and it *can* be interactionally quite consequential, as we will see before we are done.[10]

In excerpt 8, this operation of the repeat is underscored by the confirmer's subsequent remark:

Excerpt 8 (Shreve: 2)
Interview with Susan Shreve on National Public Radio concerning her recent novel.

1	Edwards:		Why do you write juvenile books.
2			(0.5)
3	Edwards:		[’s that- b- (0.?) [hav]ing [children?]
4	Shreve:		[Because I love child[ren]. [I really do:] =
5			= ·hh I enjoy children:, ·hh I started writing: (·)
6			juvenile books fer entirely pra:ctical reasons, ·hh
7			(·)
8	Shreve:		[u- u-
9	Edwards:	→	[Making money::.
10	Shreve:	⇉	Making [money
11	Edwards:		[yes ((+laughter))
12	Shreve:	⇉	that- that practical reason hhh
13			(·)
14	Shreve:		I’ve been writing juvenile books for a lo:ng. .

The interviewer has understood "entirely practical reasons" as an allusion to the need for earning money, and he formulates that as his understanding in the next turn. In *repeating* his formulation to confirm it, Shreve confirms as well the status of "practical reasons" as an allusion to making money (perhaps a more "tasteful" allusion to it). Her follow-up remark – "*that* practical reason" – is addressed just to making this tie back to "practical reasons" as the allusive reference source quite clear, and a bit of laughing together marks their coimplication in introducing the "grubby" subject into a discussion of the arts (see Jefferson, Sacks and Schegloff 1987).

This fragment, then, should serve not only as another instance in which veiled or allusive reference, or a conveyed but not explicated sense or meaning, is brought "into the open." It also shows this process itself being overtly recognized and marked by the participants.

However, neither "self-conscious design" nor "intentional" deployment (whatever those terms are understood to mean) is criterial to this analysis. In offering as alternative formulations that something had been "planted," "alluded to," "conveyed without being said," I mean to circumlocute the issue of intentionality or design. "Planted," "hinted at," and "alluded to" appear virtually inescapable to carry that implication in their vernacular usage, and I will accordingly limit their use in favor of "conveyed without being said." This fundamentally commonsense (and in some views culturally specific; see Duranti 1988; Ochs 1988) usage of "intentionality" is of equivocal analytic relevance or use here and in any case is subject to a continuum of experience that belies bold contrasts.[11] The following exchange may embody a limiting case – and an informative one. An "assistant professor type" is observed entering his department's main office, to be greeted by a staff member:

Excerpt 9 (EAS:FN)

1	She:	↑Hey there!	((Highly animated))
2	He:	↑Hey there!	((Echoed intonation))
3	She: →	You're back in town?	
4	He: ⇉	I'm back in town.	

One's physical presence is hardly an allusion; it is a palpable embodiment of presence. But it is nonetheless inexplicit – conveyed without being said. One's presence has been presented, so to speak, but not formulated explicitly. So it is inexplicit conveyance that is being confirmed in this exchange, not any specific trope, whether literary or vernacular. Were the term "allusion" employed here, it would be as a term of convenience, to serve as an occasional relief from the more cumbersome "inexplicit conveyance."

Although *agreeing* with another's explication of an inexplicit "message" may not always indicate a prior orientation to conveying it, *agreeing by repeating* may be a practice that does just that. That, at least, is the proposal being explored here. That proposal is that the repeat is designed to *indicate* a prior orientation to convey, but that may stand in an indeterminate relation to the orientation that informed the prior talk. The most proximate exchange in which the confirmatory repeat figures, then, can be a contingent part of the larger sequence in which it occurs and *doing* something in it, and not just an objective indicator of what happened earlier.

Exploring the Practice in Diverse Contexts

It will be useful to linger a bit with a number of additional fragments from the core collection assembled to explore this "candidate phenomenon"; they readily lend themselves to explication along the lines already suggested and give a sense of the robustness of this usage. They allow us to explore some of the forms of inexplicitness that get explicated in these episodes, and, relatedly, the uses parties to conversation may have for talking allusively or indirectly in the first place.

In excerpt 10, a separated couple are discussing the return of their teenaged son to his father after having had a visit in another city with his mother. The father has called to find out when the son should be expected to arrive via car, only to be informed of a change of plan by the mother:

Excerpt 10 (MDE:MTRAC: 60–1:2)

1	Marsha:	= He's flying.	
		(0.2)	
2	Marsha:	En Ilene is going to meet im:, Becuz the to:p wz ripped	
3		off'v iz car which is tih ssay someb'ddy helped th'mselfs.	
	Tony: →	Stolen.	
		(0.4)	
	Marsha: ⇉	Stolen. Right out in front of my house.	

Marsha's initial account for the shift to "flying" is that "the top was ripped off'v his car" (the "top" involved is apparently a cloth top to a convertible model). Marsha herself catches the ambiguity potentially hearable in "ripped off," between the idiom for "robbery" and the physical act of tearing, and extends her turn in order to disambiguate it. The form she chooses is, however, still "nonliteral," a kind of irony – "somebody helped themselves." The sense of what has happened has, then, been *conveyed* without being given its "common name." When Tony offers "stolen" as literally what happened, Marsha not only confirms that that is what has happened, but does so with a form that confirms as well that that is what she was conveying in her prior talk (Schegloff 1988*b*, 1992*b*).

With this instance in hand (and the orientation it shows parties to have to idiomatic usages), we can return to excerpt 1 and understand it also to involve an ambiguity.

Excerpt 1 (Berkeley II: 103–114; simplified)
Evelyn has been called to the phone.

1	Evelyn:		= Hi: Rita
2	Rita:		Hi: Evelyn:. How[are y'
3	Evelyn:		[I hadda come **in another room.**
4	Rita:		Oh:. Uh huh. =
5	Evelyn:		= I fee:l a bi:ssel verschickert.
6			(0.2)
7	Rita:		W-why's 'a:t,
8			(0.4)
9	Rita:	→	uh you've had sump'n t' dr^ink. =
10	Evelyn:	⇉	I had sump'n t' dri:nk.
11	Rita:		Uh huh.

The ambiguity here turns on the Yiddish word *verschickert.* It can be used to refer both to mild intoxication roughly translatable as "tipsy," or to refer to a cognate state (if I may put it that way) arrived at without benefit of alcohol, roughly translatable as "punchy" or "groggy." ("A bissel," by the way, means "a little.") Rita apparently understands it in the second sense (possibly because Evelyn says, not that she *is* "a bissel verschickert," but that she *feels* that way). Offered as an answer to the question "How are you?" such a response invites the inquirer to pursue the matter and inquire after the causes of the reported state (Sacks 1975; Jefferson 1980; Schegloff 1986), typically via a "what happened" to produce that state. And this is what Rita does ("Why's that?"). But when an answer with an account is delayed, she appears to have reanalyzed the prior response as intending the first of the senses suggested earlier ("tipsy" being the one actually more literally related to the root of the word, which means "drunk"), and she offers that as her understanding ("You've had something to drink"). In confirming with a repeat, Evelyn not only verifies the supposition as to how she came to be in the state she is in, but invokes the presence of that meaning in her own immediately prior talk.

The locus of inexplicitness, and the focus of explication, need not be concentrated in a specific expression, word or phrase. It can somewhat more

diffusely inform a discursive unit such as a narrative. In excerpt (11), Vera is engaged in reporting on the visit of her children and grandchildren, one consequence of which is making audiotape copies of various of her music records for them. (If this one "reads" differently, it may be because it is taken from British data, as are other excerpts whose identifying number is marked with an asterisk.)

Excerpt 11* (Rahman B:2:JV[14]2; #12)

1	Vera:		Any rate ehv eh ah'm tapin' fuh Bill no:w:
2			etheh little devils with the ta:pes you kno:w
3	Jenny:		Oh: they pull the tap [es (puhhaps do they)]
4	Vera:		[A h : n d e m :]
5	Jenny:		Mhm, =
6	Vera:		= Jean said oh I didn't knew- (·) know you had the
7			Tapestry reco:rd. of Carol King's which is a Luvly
8			reco[:rd Jenny]
9	Jenny:		[Ah: she li]kes[thaht does she
10	Vera:		[So-
11	Jenny:		Mm,
12	Vera:		I: s'd why:: so: she s'd oo ahr James: broke it.
13			(0.3)
14	Vera:		So ah s'd oh well ah'll do y'anothuh
15			one. yihkno[w, ahn also they wa:nt eh:m (·) =
16	Jenny:		[Mm:,
17	Vera:		= Neil Diamond, Bill listen'to it heahr 'n'e sid oh thaht's
18			smashin, =
19	Jenny:		= A[h t h e y:[like [the Neil [Diamond,]
20	Vera:		['n ah sai [d ah-[.hh [ah'll tape] it
21			[fohr you] =
22	Jenny:		[Y e : s.]
23	Vera:		= en John Denver they want doing · yih [know,]
24	Jenny:		[ehhhh] =
25		→	heh so yuh busy at it [again.]
26	Vera:	⇉	[So: ah]'m busy at it
27			agay: [n. yih[nuhhh
28	Jenny:		[·hhhhh[hu:h · uh

Initially Vera just reports that she is taping, but then she begins a series of brief stories, in each of which an indirect indication by her daughter or her son-in-law elicits an offer by Vera to make a tape. Note that Vera reports Jean's remarking on her having a certain record (lines 6–7), which Vera shows herself to have treated as a "hint" of some sort by responding with "why" (line 12). And Bill calls another record "smashin" (lines 17–18), which prompts a separate offer to tape. Then there is a third artist that "they want doing" (line 23), and the sense is conveyed of the cumulative burdensomeness of the undertaking. This sense is extracted and crystallized by Jenny ("so yuh busy at it again") after the third of the "assignments" has been mentioned, when they have become more than occasional – and is confirmed by Vera, both as to content and as to prior implication.

Excerpt 11 allows us to see clearly that some telling may be constructed by its teller, and/or be taken by its recipient, to embody and/or

that the teller is taking to the tale, some stance being taken up, or some action being done. When a recipient makes that explicit in the uptake, the teller can confirm both the particulars of the uptake, its "propositional content" so to speak, and that he or she was engaged in such a "project." But note that by doing it in this manner, Vera can avoid any actual, explicit complaining and still have her burden registered and appreciated. There can be, then, grounds for talking allusively and for practices that deal with such talk. (So also in excerpt 10 above is there a specific basis for talking allusively; that is a common practice for organizing the delivery of bad news, a theme discussed in Schegloff 1988*b*.)

Excerpt 12 offers another environment in which there are systematic grounds for allusive talk and accordingly systematic grounds for usages that are addressed to allusive talk.

Excerpt 12 (Brun-Cottan [1989, chap. 5, p. 2])
M is returning F's call; first several utterances not recorded.

1	M:		. . . you:::
2	F:		I'm well: thank you.
3	M:		·hh(d) you sound like you have a jo:b hh
4	F:		No I do:n(hh) (hh)'t. ·hh
5	M:	→	Oh you're not tha:t wel[l.
6	F:	⇉	[I'm not that well, ·hh
7	M:		Oh: goodness::.
8	F:		I- before we get into anything else. . .

The women in this episode are part of a mutual-help network of women all looking for work as assistant producers in the Hollywood movie industry. Note that M is returning the call, which is to say that F called her in the first instance. F may, then, have had a "reason for the call," one important such warrant being "news to tell." When F responds to a "howaryou" with an emphatic "I'm well" (line 2), M hears in it a possible allusion to the occurrence of something that would make F emphatically well – a job.[12]

As noted in the discussion of excerpt 1 above, this is a sequentially strategic place for such an occurrence. Answers to "howaryou"s in the openings of telephone conversations are specifically a position for preemptively launching first topics (Schegloff 1986), and particularly for first topics that announce good or bad news. Raising first topics of these sorts preemptively can be a way of avoiding awkward conjunctions of the good and bad news of the respective parties. *Alluding* to the news is a strategic way of proceeding in that it allows a recipient who has claimably higher priority news – either good or bad, but especially of the opposite type than otherwise seems about to be told – to decline to pursue the matter and initiate their own first topic instead.

But in the episode from which excerpt 12 is drawn, M does pursue the matter, and does so in a characteristic way – she offers (line 3) a candidate understanding of what she takes it the other may have meant to convey. As it happens she's wrong, and F tells her so (line 4) by denying the formulation of her possible news. M then offers another candidate understanding (line 5), this one designed to register a more careful calibration of the well-being that F's initial response

to the inquiry conveyed and displaying that it was that utterance and its articulation that was the (inexplicit) source of her prior candidate understanding. Now F means not only to confirm the degree of well-ness that M has ventured, but also that this is what her "I'm well" had been designed to convey. Rather than doing the confirmation by a form, such as, for example, "No, I'm afraid not," she does the confirmation by repeating the proposed explication of what she had conveyed allusively earlier, "I'm not that well."

Less Transparent Instances

With some clear instances in hand, we can examine occurrences that may initially appear problematic. These, it turns out, are better examined not forward in time (from the inexplicit conveying to the explication) but in retrospect, starting with the repeat's suggestion that an inexplicit message had been conveyed and then seeking it out in the earlier talk.

As excerpt 13 shows, the line between what was said and what was conveyed, between the "explicit" and the "implied," can be drawn very finely indeed.

Excerpt 13* (Drew: Student [A:I:7:10–11])

1	B:		but e- I mean he was in a terr:ible state, because they- W ( )
2			they took away the roof of his mouth an' his cheek bone an'
3			all the inside of his nose.
4			(0.8)
5	B:		an' his one eye they've sewed^up.
6			(0.5)
7	P:		^e::h::::
8			(0.5)
9	B:		((cough)) (0.4) yeah and th[en-
10	P:		[so he's in quite a state
11			[reall [y*is he.*
12	B:		[Oh he[is, an' of course he can't eat: you see,
13			or swallow so he's just having these fluids and things,
14			(0.9)
15	P:		^oo::h[:
16	B:		[he's so thin that I think 'tis really (·) quite
17			unbelievable you know that anybody could be so thin.
18	P:		O::^h:[:^
19	B:		[and still sort of (0.3) sit u(h)p if (h) you kn(hh)ow
20			what I mean.
21	P:		^o::h:: ^God[:]:
22	B:		['tem]
23			(·)
24	P:	→	He can't eat any solid food at all [; then?
25	B:	⇉	['e can't
26		⇉	eat any solid food at all at the moment.
27	P:		o^o::h^my:-

Initial examination of this episode can use the exchange at the arrows to provide prima facie grounds for treating this as an instance of the phenomenon we have been trying to describe. P has offered a candidate understanding of the situation of the patient being described in gory detail by B, and B has confirmed with a repeat. On the account so far offered of such repeats, we are invited to see that B had earlier alluded to, or somehow otherwise inexplicitly conveyed, just the understanding that P here proffers.

When we try to do this, it may appear that excerpt 13 is not a good instance of the phenomenon, is perhaps counterevidence, or an exemplification of some other use of the confirmation-by-repeat practice. For it appears that B had not conveyed this sense *in*explicitly earlier, but had said "can't eat" in so many words (lines 12–13). But we should then note that what B had said earlier was that he (the patient) "can't eat . . . or swallow . . . so he's just having these fluids." This could be taken literally, to mean that he cannot *ingest orally*, and "having fluids" then refers to IVs, or intravenous feeding. Alternatively, "eat" could be taken more narrowly, as a contrast to "drink," with "having fluids" then referring to that ability to drink and implying that "can't eat" refers only to "food"; note that in this hearing it is an *implication* that "can't eat" refers only to food. P's eventual candidate understanding is that he "can't eat *any solid food at all*," which makes *explicit* one understanding of what the reference to "having fluids" now turns out to have done *inexplicitly* earlier, which B's repeat confirms.

There are two points to be registered and stressed here. First, we must recognize that, for understanding the production of the talk, the relevant senses of "explicit" and "implicit" or "inexplicit" are *not* those of the professional student of logic, semantics, pragmatics, or rhetoric, but those of the participants themselves; and the level of detail worth working out is given by the concerns of the participants' lives, not those of professional students. (It is *their* mutual acquaintance they are talking about, and the extent of *his* permanent disfigurement and incapacity.) We are here getting at the *members' then-relevant* sense and practice of explicitness.

Second, looking at the data in this way (i.e., back from the confirmatory repeat to the preceding talk to search out what is now being claimed to have been made allusively available earlier) can provide "professional" analysts a methodological resource for the analysis of a class of especially challenging occurrences – those in which speakers design their talk, at least in part, to mask what they are doing from coparticipants. To the degree to which they succeed, they challenge analysis and compelling explication by professional analysts as well. Among these special challenges to analysis are deception, lying, pretense, simulation or covering up. When done fully adequately, they will in the nature of the case appear to defy analysis for what they are (cf., e.g., Jefferson 1986).

Allusion provides a milder version of the same phenomenon. With it speakers do indeed avoid explicit saying or doing. At the same time, however, speakers do introduce the import of what they are about into the interactional occasion (as in Vera's story in excerpt 11 above). But professional analysis does not settle for implicit "senses" of what another has introduced, as "lay analysis" by interactional coparticipants may; it seeks explicit statement of what has occurred

and how, and it is just this which an alluder, an inexplicit conveyor, has *not* done, has on occasion *specifically not* done. It is useful then to find a post hoc form of talk which appears to provide a sort of internal grounding for such analysis. For, if it *is* the case that confirmation-repeats can do what I have proposed they do, they can serve for the occasions in which they occur as data-internal verification that inexplicit conveyance had been oriented to by the participants. The study of allusion and inexplicitness can thereby be rescued from allusiveness and inexplicitness of its own and can be grounded in a corpus of in situ participant-attested occurrences.

Evidence from Avoidance and Nonoccurrence

I want to offer one last sort of evidence and display of the practice of agreeing-by-repeating for confirming allusions that builds from its nondeployment rather than from its deployment. One is exemplified in avoidance – an observable withholding of the practice; the other is an analytically grounded claim of relevant nonoccurrence.

Avoidance

One often compelling sort of evidence for a claimed practice, orientation, or organization in talk-in-interaction is the *eventfulness of its absence*, or *an orientation to avoiding it* as well as achieving it. If some practice of talking is used to do some action, then there will be occasions on which a participant will undertake to avoid that action, and that will involve avoiding that practice of talking.

Excerpt 14 offers a possible instance of such an occurrence. Two student couples are having dinner together. Vivian and Shane have just told about a cheap lobster lunch that Shane had eaten that day, which he had not mentioned to his "friend" Michael. Michael goes on to recount (ironically, or half so) another incident of less than generous conduct on Shane's part.

Excerpt 14 (CD:II:23–25)
The possible selfishness of Shane has just been (perhaps ironically) alluded to

1	Michael:	Shane thinks he's doin'me a big favor'm riding th'bike'ee
2		siz'ey I'm unnuh gitta durink.
3		(0.9)
4	Nancy:	m-(h) mn Oh(h) o [N-hn
5	Shane:	[heh heh
6		(·)
7	Michael:	I give yih ha[hhlf yihknow? I mea[n
8	( ):	[eh^heh [[
9	Shane:	[·huhhh u [hh
10	Nancy:	[*mm-hm-
11		m-hm hm ^hm h[m*
12	Michael:	[^Su: h^'ere ee am ah'm (·)
13		bikin' [a half hour] [('n evrything) 'nI] =

14	Shane:		[·hahhh heh] [h u h h u h h u h]
15	Michael:		= git awv'm thristier'n shit,
16			(1.2)
17	(Shane):		[(*hheh ih huh*)
18	Michael:		[Spect this big mo:njo drink [tih come yih] =
19	Shane:		[·hhh ^hu] =
20	Michael:		=[know,]
21	Shane:		=[h u]h
22	Nancy:		Mm-h[m:
23	Shane:		[·hhh
24			(0.7)
25	Michael:		Fuckin dixie cu[p.
26	Shane:		[·huhh·huh [·huhh·hu]
27	Michael:		(This) [bi:g·yi] [h na:h?
28	Nancy:		[nuhh
29			(0.8)
30	Nancy:		Sha(h)a(h)[:ne.
31	Shane:		[·hahh hhu-uh ·hhh(h) 'At's w'd'ee put (it in)
32			I(h) said wait a minute. Vi:c. (nh·hh(·)/(0.6)]I said (ziss
33			is) f'r d'two peo:ple.
34			(1.7)
35	Shane:		An (·) he s'd (we:y) muh man at's w'tche ge::t,
36	Nancy:		mm hm hm
37			(0.8)
38	Michael:	→	Eez gitt'n li'l cheap there·ha:[h.
39	Shane:	⇉	[Y:ah. I
40		⇉	think he's gett'n a li'l bit uh ti:ght. wid is eh::p
41			(1.4)
42	Shane:		B't I had the big glass . . .

In Michael's story, he and Shane were exercising when Shane left to get something to drink, promising half to Michael on his return. Michael then reports exercising vigorously in anticipation of a substantial drink, only to have Shane reappear with a tiny cup of potable. At this point, Michael's companion, Nancy, chimes in with an admonishing tone (line 30).

In his response, Shane takes the tack of reporting "just the facts" (Pomerantz 1978, 1987). He offers no characterization of the parties or the events, attributes no blame, offers no assessments or excuses. He reports what the service person, Vic, served him, what he said to the service person on behalf of a larger serving, and the rebuff he received in return (lines 31–35). When, in response to this account, Michael says of Vic the service person (line 38), "He's getting a little cheap there," this is *Michael's* (the complainant's) blame attribution.

Were such a characterization offered by Shane, it could be seen as self-exculpating and self-serving. Its production by Michael is precisely a redirection of the blame – which he had appeared to be directing at *Shane* – now to *Vic* (the service person). This redirection of blame away from Shane as an action of Michael's would be subverted if Shane were understood to have himself planted this sense of Vic having been at fault for the episode, with Michael merely making

it explicit, which is what a repeat-confirmation by Shane of Michael's characterization could be heard to claim.

Note then that Shane appears *specifically to avoid* the repetition that would implement that practice. His turn repeats the frame from Michael's turn, "He's getting a little . . .," but just where the descriptor "cheap" would go, there is first the insertion of the word "bit," then there is a moment of hesitation with a display of a bit of a search ("uh"), and finally the selection of a sense-retaining *alternative* to "cheap," namely "tight." Shane has come to the very verge of a possible allusion-confirmation before veering away.

There is little doubt that Shane's construction of his account is indeed built to provide for an analysis of Vic as cheap and as the culprit of the tale – most obviously by the "no quarter given" response that he attributes to Vic. And very likely this is reflected in his (Shane's) initiation of an utterance form that would confirm that Michael had picked up just what he – Shane – had meant to convey. But there are good grounds for the diversion of this utterance form before it is brought to fruition. The overt blaming of Vic is left as something that *Michael* has done and Shane has agreed with, not as something that Shane has planted for Michael to pick up. Here then is one way in which an issue mentioned much earlier in this account – the apparently petty "*who* is agreeing with *whom*" – *can* and *does* matter. And the talk is adjusted midcourse to achieve a particular stance on just that issue by avoiding an already-in-progress allusion confirmation (see also Mandelbaum 1993).

Nonoccurrence

In other episodes, we find sequential and interactional contexts with the features that elsewhere are found to occasion allusion-confirmations (arguably "environments of relevant possible occurrence"; see Schegloff 1993), but in which no such confirming repeats are produced. In such instances, there has been some inexplicit conveying or allusion, the recipients of which subsequently make explicit their understanding of what had been conveyed. In the turn following that candidate understanding, the stage is set for a repeat that would confirm both the sense and the prior indirect conveyance of what is being checked. But in these exchanges the prior conveyor eschews the confirming repeat and employs some other ("single-barreled" so to speak) form of agreement/confirmation.

These instances might initially be taken as another version of the test-by-avoidance, explored in excerpt 14, but they are different and somewhat weaker in analytic warrant. In excerpt 14, a confirmatory repeat was apparently underway and was then suppressed at the last moment. There, one is warranted in speaking of its absence or avoidance in the strongest sense, because its relevance has already been introduced by the participants – by their very launching of its deployment. But the practice of confirming allusions by repetition of their explication has not yet been shown to have that order of relevance for parties to talk-in-interaction that would make it relevantly, eventfully absent if not done at all. Still, in excerpts 15 and 16 below we can see that the conditions for embodying this practice were present by juxtaposing them to other, analytically

comparable episodes in which confirmatory repeats *were* employed (a sort of "paired comparison"). We can then ask if there is any interpretive or analytic relevance to the practice *not* having been invoked though "eligible," and we can ask whether this "eligibility" would have been available as an interpretive resource to the *participants* and thereby have made available to *them* as a noticeable absence – and therefore an interpretable and consequential one – the nonactivation of the practice of a confirmatory repeat.

In excerpt 15 two women are discussing B's recent trip.

Excerpt 15 (SBL 2:3:2; Sacks [1992, vol. 2, p. 140])

1	A:		Didje have a nice time?
2	B:		Oh, wonderful.
3	A:		Goo::d, [good.
4	B:		[just wonder[ful.
5	A:		[Where'dju go::.
6			(0.6)
7	B:		We were in northern California, up- (0.2)
8			weh (hhh)- (0.4) way up in the mountains too.
9			(0.4)
10	A:		Oh well we wen' up there oh:: about thr- .hh
11			I'd say about three weeks ago we was up at
12			Maripo:sa, .hh[hh
13	B:		[Uh huh
14	A:		an'up in the Mother Lode country en we
15			[wen' all through those ghost tow:ns.
16	B:		[( )-
17	B:		Oh:: I see, Well we were up uh. .hh intuh Red
18			(0.5) Red Blu:ff?
19			(0.4)
20	A:		Oh::.
21	B:		([ )
22	A:	→	[You wen' up further then.
23	B:	⇉	Yes.
24	A:		Uh [huh,
25	B:		[Uh huh,

In response to A's inquiry about where she went, B responds by locating the general area ("northern California"), and then with a formulation that "does" referring to extended penetration into the mountains – "way up in the mountains" (lines 7–8). Keying on the reference to northern California, A then counters with her own recent trip to the area. Her references, however, display an orientation less to nature and the mountains than to conventional tourist destinations ("the Mother Lode country," "those ghost towns," lines 14–15). As A has used B's account as the occasion for her own, the comparability of the account and their events has been potentially activated and A's trip is taken as offering a version of "way up in the mountains." To this, B then counterposes the extent of her own trip, offering as the point of comparison the name of the place defining the area she reached (lines 17–18). Note about it that it is offered as possibly less

readily recognizable (and hence, perhaps, remote) – there is a pause and a bit of a search before it is articulated, the name itself is not delivered fluently, and when delivered it is packaged with an upward intonation, as if to ask whether A recognizes it or knows where it is (in an operation not unlike the "try-marking" discussed in Sacks and Schegloff [1979]). At the same time, it is offered for its tacit display that she (B) had traveled higher up into the mountains than had A (and that "up into the mountains" was the relevant orientation of her trip).

In many respects, then, this episode is similar to excerpt 2, in which one of the participants also characterizes a place with a practice that "does formulating it as far." In excerpt 2, it may be recalled, the recipient responds by extracting the point as "That's far away"; here in excerpt 15 the recipient does something similar – she extracts the upshot (if I may put it that way), "You went up further then." In excerpt 2, this was confirmed with a repeat, employing the practice already explicated. In 15, in an arguably comparable sequential environment, and with confirming agreement also being done, the action is implemented with agreement tokens – "Yes, uh huh." B does not confirm, then, (Dare we say that she declines to confirm?) that her earlier formulation had been designed to convey indirectly the comparative reach of their respective trips, and she avoids thereby the "one-upsmanship" that this might have been heard to embody.

But there can be other grounds for not employing a confirming repeat in an environment apparently primed for it. In excerpt 16 a request is turned away by recounting a tale that conveys the difficulties the request entails without saying no in so many words. When the requester makes the upshot explicit, the possibility for a confirmatory repeat presents itself.

In excerpt 16 Madeline has called a second time asking to talk to her friend Gina and is told by Gina's mother, Marcia, that Gina will not be back home until later.

Excerpt 16 (Madeline 2, 1:9–38; simplified)

1	Madeline:	okay. = I was just wundering y'know ·hhh (0.3) could
2		(·) d'you think you might (·) wannt rent (·) you know
3		like the bottom part a yer: (·) g'ra::ge like to
4		me: fer a whi:le, °a sump'm like that.°
5		(0.3)
6	Marsha:	wul[l-
7	Madeline:	[(I think [ )]
8	Marsha:	[oh-you mean for] **living in:madeline?**
9	Madeline:	ye:ah
10		(0.3)
11	Marsha:	·hh It's just
12		(1.0)
13	Madeline:	no:t possible. =h[uh?
14	Marsha:	[ye:ah we- gi:natri:ed that at one
15		ti: [me. = b't-]
16	Madeline:	[I: re]member. = she was doin that o[nce.
17	Marsha:	[·hhh we
18		could not get it uh:: (0.4) clo::sed.
19		(0.3)

20	Madeline:		oh::(y') couldn't <u>c</u>lose it?
21	Marsha:		<u>y</u>e: ah.
22	Madeline:		oh: =
23	Marsha:		and it jus' (wz) <u>free</u>:zing. = 'n then we bought
24			a <u>h</u>eater:. = 'n it was <u>s</u>till freezing. = we bought
25			an<u>o</u>ther heater ['n it was] <u>s</u>till freezing. ·hh[h
26	Madeline:	→	[(o(h)h(h))] [no::
27		→	it didn't work ou:t <u>d</u>id it.
28			(0.7)
29	Marsha:	⇉	no::. an- = an:d uh hh (·) in the mean time I'm a<u>fraid</u>
30			that the <u>i</u>nsect lif:e has moved ba:ck. =

If we continue to exploit paired comparisons between instances, as we did in juxtaposing excerpt 15 with excerpt 2, then excerpt 16 invites juxtaposition with excerpts 11 and 14. In excerpt 11 Vera could be understood to have built into her telling of a tale a stance, a point of view, that her interlocutor could extract and offer for confirmation; when offered by Jenny, that stance was confirmed by Vera with a form that confirmed that it had indeed been conveyed by the telling. In excerpt 14 Shane recounted the tale of getting something to drink in a fashion that conveyed the unyielding stinginess of the service person and barely escaped confirming that he had conveyed this in the telling. Similarly in excerpt 16, Marsha's telling (lines 14–18, 23–25) is designed to convey the nonviability of Madeline's proposal by reporting its nonviability in the past. (Note that the telling is launched in response to Madeline's anticipation of a rejection, "It's just not possible, huh?" at line 13.) Indeed, it is so overbuilt to convey this that a confirmation by repeating Madeline's proposed gist, "It didn't work out, did it" (line 27) might well have been hearable as a dry, cutting sarcasm. Instead, Marsha confirms with an agreement token and goes on to add to the account additional difficulties as grounds for not accommodating the request.

Excerpt 16 provides an occasion for taking up briefly another ingredient of this "confirmation venue" and this confirmation practice. Confirming repeats can convey a range of affective stances toward the other and toward the matters being addressed in the talk. They can convey satisfaction, congratulation, mockery, and the like – even perhaps discovery, as when the upshot proposed by the interlocutor reveals to the teller a tack they had taken of which they were unaware. In the excerpts examined earlier in this article, for example, a note of resignation is conveyed in excerpts 2 ("far away") and 12 ("not that well"). Just as Shane in extract 14 veered away from doing a confirmatory repeat and thereby avoided the appearance of having himself deflected blame for the incident being discussed, so can we entertain the possibility (though no comparable analytical basis has been developed for it here) that Marsha in excerpt 16 eschews a confirming repeat by reference to the cutting sarcasm it could represent after as broadly conveyed a stance as she had portrayed.

There is a suggestion here, then, of yet another level of action, of practice, and of analysis that can be relevant to the phenomenon being examined. Confirming by repeating is a practice, I have argued, for confirming that the candidate understanding distilled by the other had indeed been previously conveyed inexplicitly

Now we are noting that the doing of *this* action can itself become the vehicle for another, in a fashion even more tightly woven into the fabric of the local context. If the inexplicit conveying had been subtle, sophisticated, challenging *for this recipient*, then a confirmatory repeat can appreciate the other's perspicacity. If in the face of a broad and heavy-handed "indirection" a recipient still undertakes to check it out, a confirmatory repeat can come off as sardonic and patronizing. But aside from its relationship to the preceding inexplicit conveying, other resources can be involved in achieving these effects, notably those of prosody and intonation, whose practices at the present time still elude compelling analytic specification. For now this additional layer can itself only be broadly indicated, but cannot be explored with any empirical or analytic detail. On the horizon, however, appears yet another lamination that an empirical account of action must be able to deal with.

Finally, it seems cogent to remark that in excerpts 15 and 16 it is virtually certain that nothing of interest would have been seen at all were we not already familiar with the practice of confirming allusions and its environments of possible occurrence. Here then we may have some of the most distinctive fruits of inquiry in rendering what would otherwise be invisible visible in its very absence.

The Fit between the Practice and the Action: A Sketch

How are we to understand the fit between this practice – repeating more or less identically the candidate understanding of one's prior talk or other circumstances proposed by another – and the action which it appears to accomplish – confirming both the candidate understanding and that its gist had been previously conveyed inexplicitly by the one who now confirms it? What suits this practice for doing this action? How does it work? There is space here for only a sketch.

Such an account begins with the observation that parties to talk-in-interaction may also apply the practice of identical repeats to their own prior talk.[13] For example, they may do this when the start of their turn becomes implicated in overlap with other talk – whether a simultaneous start by another incipient speaker or an extension of the preceding talk by the prior speaker. As that overlap is resolved, the speaker of the "surviving" turn may "recycle" the beginning of their turn, now in the clear, as does Kathy at the arrowed turn in excerpt 17.

Excerpt 17 (KC-4:07; taken from Schegloff [(1973) 1987])

1	Rubin:		Well thee uhm (·) (a paz) they must have grown **a culture.**
2			(0.5)
3	Rubin:		You know, (·) they must've I mean how lo- he's
4			been in the hospital for a few day:s, right?
5			{(1.0)/·hhh}
6	Rubin:		Takes a [bout a week to grow a culture,]
7	Kathy:	→	[I don think they grow a] I don think
8		→	they grow a culture to do a biopsy.
9	Rubin:		No::. (·) They did the biopsy while he was on the table.

One import of this practice is a display or claim by the speaker that what they are saying now is what they were saying before (in the overlap), rather than (for example) addressing responsively what the other party was saying *during* the overlap. Note that the resources of language make it possible to say the same thing (or do the same thing) in *different* words (see, e.g., Schegloff [1976] 1984, pp. 40–41); saying the *same* words appears designed specifically to underscore that what is being said now is the very thing that was being said before.

Resaying in the same words to show/claim that what is being said now is the same thing that was being said before is not limited to use by the "victor" in the environment of emergence from overlapping talk. It can be used by the apparent "loser" after the victor has completed the turn they were producing. In excerpt 18, Kathy and her husband, Dave, are commenting on a weaving of Kathy's which their guest, Rubin, has admired.

Excerpt 18 (KC-4:36–7)

1	Kathy:		So once I'd set up the warp, i' w's very simple to
2			jus' keep- jus' to weave it.
3			((pause))
4	Kathy:		You know [( )
5	Dave:	→	[(But listen tuh how long)]
6	Rubin:		[In other words, you gotta string up thee]
7			you gotta string up thee colors, is that it =
8	Kathy:		= [Right]
9	Rubin:		= [in thee] in thee [warp.]
10	Kathy:		[right] right.
11	Dave:	⇉	(But listen) tuh [how long it took to put in the] =
12	Kathy:	→	[A n d t h e n each weft-]
13	Dave:		= the the warps [(though)
14	Kathy:	⇉	[And then each weft y'know then I did
15			I s- my warp was . . .

Note Dave's reuse of the same words at line 11 after "losing" to Rubin in the overlap at lines 5–6. More striking still is Kathy's reentry at line 14 after losing to Dave at lines 11–12. She begins her reentry by reusing the same words ("And then each weft") to establish that what is being said now is the same thing that was being said before . . . and then, having accomplished that, she *drops that* ... *of talking in favor of another.*

Nor is this practice of repeating one's own prior words limited to proximate environments of overlap and its resolution. Across *various* spans of talk and *various* routes by which a speaker's talk comes (in their view) not to have been addressed, they may use a repeat of their own earlier words to reintroduce the earlier contribution into the talk, and to do so in a manner that claims that they are doing just that – doing/saying again what they did/said before, and that they (and it) are not being responsive to what may have transpired in the interaction since the previous saying.

If repeating one's own prior words is a way of doing "what I'm saying now is what I was saying before," why is that practice not employed in the context examined in this article? That is, why does the speaker whose prior talk

has been formulated by its recipient in a candidate understanding not repeat that prior talk as a way of showing that they are saying now what they said before? In the turn after a proffered candidate understanding, a repeat of the *previously* articulated saying (the inexplicit saying) would be declining to confirm when confirmation had been solicited. It would, in effect, reject the candidate understanding proffered by the recipient and reassert the adequacy, indeed insist on the necessity, of the way in which it had been said before.

In excerpt 19, for example, Colonel Lehroff, the director of civil defense, is calling the home of the manager of the municipal truck yard – one "Phil."

Excerpt 19 (CDHQ, 15; Openings, 299; from Schegloff, 1992b, p. 1322)

1	Phil:		Hello?
2	Lehroff:		Phil!
3	Phil:		Yeh.
4	Lehroff:		Josh Lehroff.
5	Phil:		Yeh.
6	Lehroff:		Ah:: what've you gotten so far. Any requests to
7			dispatch any trucks in any areas,
8	Phil:	→	Oh you want my daddy.
9	Lehroff:	⇉	Yeah, Phi [l,
10	Phil:		[Well he's outta town at a convention.

As it happens, the phone has been answered by the truck manager's son, whose name is also Phil and who, upon hearing the caller's identification (line 2), understands himself to have been identified and ratifies the "recognition" (line 3). The mutual identifications being completed, the caller proceeds to the first topic, a topic recipient-designed for the answerer whom the caller thinks he has identified and recognized and whom he had called to raise this very topic. But raising that topic reveals to Phil that his understanding of Lehroff's first turn was wrong, and he offers (line 8) his now-transformed understanding of it. When Lehroff responds (line 9), he first confirms the candidate understanding with an agreement token and then repeats his own earlier turn whose understanding he has just confirmed. But in this sequential context, that repetition has the effect of confirming the prior saying with a protestation of sorts. Its effect is to underscore that he had said just the right thing in the *first* instance, one which should not have been a source of trouble. So, although the repeat of his own prior talk *does* the work of saying here what was said there, when done in the face of a differently formulated and articulated account, it *insists* on the form of the prior saying and does not simply confirm the proffered understanding of it. The latter is done by a simple agreement token.

In an environment in which there has been an allusion or inexplicit conveying in the prior talk of which the recipient has proposed an explicit upshot, an identical repeat of the prior saying by its speaker amounts to an insistence on that mode of saying in the face of a proposed alternative, and thus a possible rejection of the alternative – the explication. But the earlier point remains: a way of identifying a later saying with an earlier one is to use the same words. Doing an identical repeat, *but of the explication*, confirms the understanding that it proposes and does

so with a practice otherwise employed for marking the thing being now said as the thing previously said.

Provenance

Virtually all of the instances so far presented of the phenomenon and practice of which we have been developing an account come from occasions of interaction that could be vernacularly characterized as between intimates – between members of a family, long-standing friends, and so on. And the occurrences could be plausibly understood as contextually specific along these lines; for example, it is to the intimately related (it might be proposed) that speakers undertake to convey something inexplicitly and confirm such undertakings when it becomes relevant to do so; it might even be taken as a mark or indicator of intimacy, or as a move to invoke or establish such a relationship.

This turns out not to be the case. It is striking that the practice described here and the action that it implements are found across a range of settings and social relationships from quite intimate ones to rather formal and public ones, and across variation in other variables (such as class, gender, culture, power, etc.) conventionally understood to embody facets of the decisive relevance of context for interaction. In addition to the earlier exemplars (e.g., excerpt 8, which is drawn from the mass media setting of the news interview with the novelist), only a few are displayed here to provide a sense of the ways in which the practice appears in this diverse range of social settings – from a teaching case conference in a major university medical school hospital (excerpt 20 below), to an editorial conference at a major metropolitan newspaper (excerpt 21 below), to a criminal courtroom in session (excerpt 22 below), and a commercial transaction at an outdoor farmers' market (excerpt 23 below). If the analyses of the several segments discussed here (and others not displayed in order to conserve space) are on target then this practice of confirming allusions has been successfully employed in each instance by the participants in that occasion, in that setting, in that relationship, and were so understood by the other participants, across variations in the parameters of context and participation. Consider then:

Excerpt 20 is taken from a case conference in a major university medical school and hospital. About 45–50 staff members are in attendance, including senior faculty, residents, interns, and so on. A resident in pediatrics ("Pr" in the transcript) has been called upon to launch the presentation of a report on a recent case of great interest. She has been reporting the presenting symptoms and the previous treatment history. Just before the beginning of the excerpt, she has inadvertently juxtaposed two incongruous observations that have elicited an outburst of laughter, and she is searching the room for her supervising hemotologist ("M2" in the transcript). He has just arrived (late) at the conference, and responds to being spotted by Pr with "Don't blame me" (line 5).

Excerpt 20 (Boyd, leukemia case conference, 1:29–2:14)

1	Pr:	<u>Hey</u> I'm doing this all by myself. Where's my- <u>Oh</u>.
2		There he is. (·) Ha hah.

3	Grp:		Ha ha ha ha huh huh huh.
4	Pr:		Ha hah hah hah hah <u>hah</u>:
5	M2:		(Don't blame me for it.)
6	Pr:		So. (·)U:m(·)
7	M2:		J [a-] (Jackie) [Stop there =
8	Pr:		[No.] [Oh.
9	M2:		= There's almost an <u>in</u>finite number of things tuh
10			dis- discuss on- on this case between thuh new
11			technique of di<u>a</u>lysis we use an' a helluva lot of
12			other things. You presented thee: I'm sorry tuh be
13			late I wz uh (·)( ).
14	Pr:		N- I j's presented thuh presenting histry'n I
15			haven't gone into his subsequent course. =
16			= I wi [ll quickly go into °that=°
17	M2:		[That's fine.
18	M2:		= No. I'd like tuh talk about where we are.
19		→	You talked abou'what happened at thee other hospital?
20	Pr:	⇉	I talked about what happened at thee other hospital.
21			He did git one (0.2)
22	??:		(right)
23	Pr:		do- he got one course of- they started him on:
24			uh: protocol, (·) an' he got (·) h wz started on
25			unchemo .hh thuh day before 'n <u>that</u>'s whin he
26			subsequently had an <u>acute</u> deterioration . . .

When Pr is about to resume her account, M2 intervenes in the case presentation. In the utterance at lines 9–13, which he self-interrupts with his apology for coming late, he had begun to formulate what Pr had already presented, and at lines 14–16 she delivers her account of her presentation to that point, "I just presented the presenting history," and how she proposes to continue. M2 then undertakes to redirect the case presentation, but asks Pr whether she had discussed what treatment the patient had received at the other hospital, something one might have thought would have been included under "the presenting history" and which therefore Pr has already suggested has been conveyed. To this inquiry she responds (line 20) with a confirming repeat, "I talked about what happened at the other hospital," an allusion confirmation here delivered in a manner (intonationally) that carries overtones of testiness (conveying "Of course I talked . . .").

Excerpt 21 is taken from the daily editorial news conference of a major metropolitan newspaper, at which the stories to be carried, their placement in the paper, and so on, are determined.[14] Some 15 participants contribute vocally to the proceedings, including – in the excerpt to follow – the business editor (BE), the managing editor (ME), and the city editor (CE), the last of whom puts forward a candidate story for the consideration of the others.

Excerpt 21 (Clayman: editorial conference, 7/24/89:12–13)

1	CE:	This story is cute.
2	?F:	hhh! (0.8)hhh
3	CE:	Kid yesterday w- uh <u>S</u>unday goes out to the p<u>a</u>rk with

4			his parents, (0.4) [really liked the park.
5	?F:		[((whispering))
6			(0.5)
7	CE:		So what happens?
8	?F:		*(This is)*
9	CE:		He wakes up in the middle of the night, (·) Sunday-
10			(·) Sunday night, (0.3) decides that he is gonna get
11			outta the house, this is in Logan Squa:re, and go back
12			to the park. (1.0) This is a three year old kid.
13	??:		hhh
14	CE:		Gets lost on the way, (0.2) police- somebody calls the
15			cops at about three a'clock in the morning and says
16			hey there's a kid on the street. (0.2) Cops come out,
17			pick the kid up, (0.3) take him to the station, .hh he
18			goes through hamburgers, he goes through all kinds of
19			uh junk food, (1.0) finally the cops: give up. = I mean
20			the- uh little- the little kid can't remember his
21			name or isn't telling it, (0.5) can't remember his
22			address, (0.4) uh: cops take him out on the street
23			just for a- a walk along tour of the neighborhood
24			hoping that you know maybe if the kid will remember
25			something, .hh kid spots his cat (0.8) follow the cat
26			into this apartment building he's follow the cat-
27			follow the cat into an apartment building (·) knock on
28			the door (0.7) Mommy comes- comes out 'nd says WHAT
29			THE HECK ARE YOU DOING OUTTA HERE. (0.4) As
30			it turns out she's always hated the cat until this morning.
31			(1.0)
32	ME:		(She) loves the [cat now ((laughter))
33	BE:	→	[She didn't realize her son was missing?
34	CE:	⇉	Didn't realize her son was missing.
35			(0.6)
36	GE:		Sleeping at three in the morning I'd think I'd
37	BE:		> Oh what time was h- you know what time he was
38			brought home?
39	CE:		Uh::early today.
40	BE:		Oh
41			(3.0)

The story is recounted in a manner that requires its hearers to "solve it" for its interest as (presumably) a "human interest story." In particular, the final components of the telling are left for "working up" by its recipients, and the telling is directly followed by such interpretive upshots. First the final component of the story has its implied contrast made explicit; "hated the cat until this morning" (line 30) being contrasted with "loves the cat now" (line 32), while leaving the basis for this turnaround still unexplicated. Then the penultimate component of the telling, which had been delivered as a stripped-down direct quotation of the mother's utterance upon opening the door and seeing the child outside ("What the heck are you doing out here?" lines 28–29), has its import formulated by a

recipient for confirmation by the teller ("She didn't realize her son was missing"). The teller both confirms the understanding that it makes explicit and confirms that the telling had been designed to convey it without saying it in so many words – perhaps achieving thereby a demonstration of its potential solvability by readers as well and, accordingly, its worthy candidacy as a publishable human interest story.

In excerpt 22 we are afforded not only a direct representation of an episode of confirming an allusion but a journalistic account of it as well, in which this understanding is embodied at several levels. The exchange occurred in a court of law, during the early legal maneuverings in the O. J. Simpson case, in which a popular celebrity was accused of murdering his ex-wife and a friend of hers, an event whose aftermath was given extensive and prolonged exposure in the news media.

Excerpt 22 *(New York Times*, national edition, June 23, 1994, p. A12)

As a grand jury looking into the murder of Mrs. Simpson and Mr. Goldman continued to hear evidence today, Mr. Simpson's lawyer, Robert L. Shapiro, appeared with the defendant in Municipal Court and demanded that prosecutors speed their release to him of the evidence they are presenting to the grand jurors . . .

Mr. Shapiro went out of his way to point to the discrepancies between many details that have been reported by local and national news organizations and the small number of details publicly confirmed.

"I've been hearing reports of all this evidence that's been found, and the material we have doesn't show any of it," the lawyer told Judge Patty Jo McKay, referring to documents turned over to him by the District Attorney's office. He specifically mentioned a bloody ski mask that, according to some press reports, was found in Mr. Simpson's home after the killings.

When Ms. Clark, the prosecutor, replied that the papers given Mr. Shapiro listed all the evidence in the District Attorney's possession, Judge McKay interrupted and asked

→ directly, "So you are saying there is no ski mask?" The

⇉ prosecutor replied, "There is no ski mask." [end of story]

Note several points about the account in excerpt 22: First, the journalist takes it that the judge has heard the prosecutor to be conveying something indirectly, which the judge then addresses by "ask[ing] directly" (lines 18–19). Second, the prosecutor's reply confirms the judge's supposition of what she was saying and confirms that she *was* conveying it indirectly; the reply thereby suggests that the prosecutor also (like the journalist) understood the judge to have heard that she (the prosecutor) was conveying something indirectly, answered in a way that addresses that possible hearing, and confirms it. Third, this was for the journalist, and the editorial oversight agent, a pointed – and apparently satisfactory – way of ending the story. (On the journalistic practices involved here, especially concerning the journalist's incorporation of the question in reporting the information delivered in the answer, see Clayman [1990].)

Finally, in excerpt 23, Liz, a purveyor of "air plants" at an outdoor farmers' market, is approached by a customer who had previously purchased plants from her.

Excerpt 23 (Menzies, farmers' market: the air plant merchant)

1	Liz:		Hi::	
2	Cust:		I want to ask you something.	
3	Liz:		Sure	
4	Cust:		I bought three of those uh you	((points to a
5			know like ( ).	tray of plants))
6			One of them died out.	
7			((gap))	
8	Cust:		Uhh	
9	Liz:		It did,	
10	Cust:		Yeah	
11	Liz:	→	The other ones are doing well,	
12	Cust:	⇉	The other ones are doing well.	
13	Liz:	→	They were all in the same area,	
14	Cust:	⇉	Same thing, yeah.	
15	Liz:		Ohh.	
16	Cust:		Yeah	
17	Liz:		They were'n the little shells,	
18	Cust		Yeah, in the little shells, yeah.	

This episode allows us again to refocus on the central action with which we have been concerned – confirming allusions – by juxtaposing in contrast the practices for confirmation of other suppositions with the confirmation of a supposition grounded in a prior inexplicit conveyance. Note, then, that the specificity of an assertion ("One of them died out"; line 6) may be taken to convey that other than the specified referent is not implicated in the utterance. When Liz undertakes to make that explicit (line 11), her inference is met with a confirming repeat (line 12). By contrast, other inquiries by Liz about the plants in question, which are also confirmed by the questioner, were *not* previously conveyed indirectly, and these confirmations (lines 13–14, 17–18) are *not* done by repeats of that which is being confirmed. (But note the equivocality of the exchange at lines 17–18, which may reflect the equivocality of the pointing at lines 4–5.)

These episodes from work settings, ranging from the informality of an outdoor market to the formality of a court of law in session, underscore the robustness of the practice of confirming allusions across social and interactional contexts and across compositional features of the participants. Here, at least, the interactional phenomenon does not appear to vary across, "contexts" as conventionally understood. It appears then that not everything must.

Concluding Considerations

So that is the little phenomenon I have meant to introduce: a practice of talk-in-interaction used to implement a distinctive action – an agreeing repeat used

do "confirming an allusion." Not one of the apparently major actions that compose the fabric of the everyday life of the society, whether dramatic or mundane . . . any more than *E. coli* or *Drosophila* were apparently important organisms in the larger biological scheme of things. Not, then, like requests and offers and their acceptances and declines, by which goods and services get moved around a society. Not, then, like askings and tellings and the like, by which information gets circulated around a society. But it is one of the actions that compose the culture's repertoire, and from it there may be something to be learned about actions as an object of inquiry (as was the case with other, apparently "limited" actions [Schegloff 1986]). As compared to the grosser types of action involved in the sequences we have examined – which we could formulate as "confirmation" and "disconfirmation," one or the other of which is virtually *mandated* by an interlocutor's offering of a candidate understanding to a speaker of what the speaker has just said – the form that the confirmation takes appears to be what might be called an "*optional* action." Confirming by repeating the proposed upshot as a way of ratifying its prior inexplicit conveyance is, then, a relatively minor hue in the cultural, discursive, and behavioral palette of commonplace inter action. The breadth of its provenance (in spite of its relative infrequency) should indicate that the fabric of ordinary sociality may be more finely woven and more subtly shaded than has been generally entertained, and that this is so across the conventional differentiations of social categories that professional social science and vernacular opinion are both inclined to believe fundamental to social organization. Yet it *is* socially organized and socially deployed, and accessible to systematic, empirical inquiry.

Perhaps the "minor" status of our object of inquiry should be appreciated from another perspective. The preoccupation of the present report is but a corner of a much larger domain omnipresent in talk (and arguably in any use of language) in which talk is laced through and through with inexplicitness and indexicality and, in the nature of the case, requires "solving" by hearers. In the episodes examined in this inquiry we peek at a corner of this domain, in which hearers make their understandings – their solutions – explicit, seek confirmation of them, and get that confirmation in a particular form. But for talk (or other forms of conduct, for that matter) to go on and – through it – interaction (and all "practical action," as was argued by Garfinkel [1967]), such inexplicitness is being "solved" all the time. Its results are displayed (even when not formulated) in the ensuing talk and action and are subject to repair there if found problematic (Schegloff 1992*b*). The arguable omnipresence of inexplicitness and indexicality is not incompatible with its differential importance and treatment across the ranges of social settings. The text of this report suggests types of interactional "moments" for which inexplicitness is specially relevant. On a different – socio-political – canvas, the study of political discourse has long been familiar with the ways in which repressive social and political organization can put a premium on the exploitation of inexplicitness in discourse – as, for example, in Leo Strauss's (1952) account of the exoteric and esoteric traditions of writing in the discourse of political theorizing and the interpretive possibilities thereby opened up. So the "downplaying" of the import of our topic needs to be properly

understood. It is not that the *domain* involved here is minor; it is rather that this particular action is of relatively modulated import when compared to some other types of action and when assessed relative to the larger domain of the working of language in interaction of which it taps one type of development.

One last observation. Until I grappled with a collection of actual, naturally occurring repeats, and with the assembling of this core collection in particular, I had not the slightest idea that there *was* such a function, such an action, such a practice in talk as "confirming that something had been conveyed inexplicitly," – confirming both *the* allusion and *that it had been* an allusion. This is not the sort of action that is part of the articulable vernacular culture (what Giddens [1984] terms "discursive culture"); there is no speech act term for it; it is not readily accessible to intuition, although without a native's cultural knowledge it might not be detectable in an examination of interactional materials. (The bearing of this point on the possibility of a universal, rational, aprioristic pragmatics of the sort projected by Habermas cannot be explored here, but should be weighed by those committed to such a project. The Habermasian view presumes that we know, or *can* know, preanalytically and preempirically what persons actually do and how, and this may well *not* be so.)

At a time when the possibility of genuine discovery grounded in careful examination of empirical material is often taken to be compromised by the particular cultural commitments of inquirers or of their culture, or to be arguably nothing more than a function of the presuppositions of (the) inquiry *per se* (and all this especially relevant where the cultural is involved), it may be salutary to weigh the evidence of the present inquiry. Surely the presuppositions of the enterprise are germane to the formulation of the problem – concerned with what action some form of talk is doing – as well as to the conception of what an answer might look like. But arguably these presuppositions serve not to *subvert* the claims of the inquiry but to *underwrite* them; for it seems clear that a pervasive, if not omnirelevant, orientation and concern of parties to interaction about any utterance of an interlocutor is "Why that now?" (Schegloff and Sacks 1973, p. 299), and a prime candidate solution generically is, "What is the speaker doing thereby?" – that is, what action is that utterance doing or being used to do? The presuppositions of this academic inquiry, then, are themselves meant to be grounded in the generic relevancies of ordinary actors in the quotidian activities out of which their lives in interaction are composed.

If the proposals of this article are on target, then, it reports the finding of something that was not presupposed, was not even imagined. It *is* possible to find new things, things that could not have been conceived before the inquiry, though if inquirers presume otherwise and act accordingly, they will guarantee the reaffirmation of their presumption. This has direct consequences for how one does one's work. With materials of the sort being examined here, one cannot simply go through the stream of conduct seeking to identify which previously known action, phenomenon, practice, and so on, a given "bit" exemplifies. ("Confirming an allusion" would not have been an available analysis of an utterance in conversation before this inquiry, and confirming repeats would have been

left unanalyzed, or worse, given an ad hoc – and most probably a vernacular – interpretation.) One needs to ask about each new object of examination what it could be possibly doing, and ask, as well, what could constitute an object of examination to which this question could be put, that had not been so considered before.

With such a study policy applied to the raw material of the society's life, how many other such unknown jobs, functions, actions, practices – such as confirming allusions – might there turn out to be? Hundreds? Thousands? Yet these make up the cultural inventory of the society, elements of which the parties assemble and parse in the moment-to-moment constituting of its quotidian embodiment, and that serve as the prima facie rationale for the deployment of language. It is about these that a theory of action is presumably theorizing. Without knowing them, there is the prospect that we lack articulate, theoretically informed access to a substantial bulk of our culture, and rely on our vernacular understanding of typicalized courses of action – designed *for the working of the society* and not *for the working of its disciplined study* – to process much of the basic material of our inquiry. We lack the social equivalent of the presumed 90% of the physical matter of the universe now unaccounted for and termed "dark matter." Without bringing this inexplicit part of our culture and of the basic repertoire of practical conduct under empirically grounded analytic control, we are unlikely to grasp at the deepest level how either language or action or sociality work.

Appendix: Transcription Conventions

A brief guide to a few of the conventions employed in the transcripts may help the reader in what may appear to be a formidable undertaking. It is apparent from the excerpts printed in this article that some effort is made to have the spelling of the words roughly indicate the manner of their production, and there is often, therefore, a departure from standard orthography. Otherwise:

→	Arrows in the margin point to the lines of transcript relevant to the point being made in the text.
( )	Empty parentheses indicate talk too obscure to transcribe. Letters inside such parentheses indicate the transcriber's best estimate of what is being said.
hhh	The letter "h" is used to indicate hearable aspiration, its length roughly proportional to the number of "h"s. If preceded by a dot, the aspiration is in-breath. Aspiration internal to a word is enclosed in parentheses. Otherwise "h"s may indicate anything from ordinary breathing to sighing to laughing, etc.
[	Left-side brackets indicate where overlapping talk begins.
]	Right-side brackets indicate where overlapping talk ends, or marks alignments within a continuing stream of overlapping talk.
((points))	Words in double parentheses indicate transcriber's comments, not transcriptions.
(0.8)	Numbers in parentheses indicate periods of silence, in tenths of a second.

(·)	A dot in parentheses indicates silence of less than two tenths of a second.
:::	Colons indicate a lengthening of the sound just preceding them, proportional to the number of colons.
becau-	A hyphen indicates an abrupt cut-off or self-interruption of the sound in progress indicated by the preceding letter(s) (the example here represents a self-interrupted "because").
He says	Underlining indicates stress or emphasis.
dr^ink	A "hat" or circumflex accent symbol indicates a marked pitch rise.
=	Equal signs (ordinarily at the end of one line and the start of an ensuing one) indicates a "latched" relationship – no silence at all between them.
°Then°	Material between degree marks is markedly quieter than surrounding talk.

Fuller glossaries may be found in Sacks et al. (1974, pp. 731–34) and in Atkinson and Heritage (1984, pp. ix–xvi).

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Notes

1. When George Homans (1961) undertook to offer a synthetic account of "Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms," it was not actions that he described. I should note that I use here a different sense of "naturalistic" than the one that informs the discussion in Matza (1969), which, e.g., includes ethnography – both participatory and interview based – within naturalism, whereas I would treat ethnography as an alternative.
2. As will become obvious in the ensuing text, the "action" or "social action" under discussion here is not "political action" or "social action" in the interests of social change. These have, of course, figured centrally in a wide range of sociological undertakings over the historical career of sociology as a discipline, and with special intensity in the last 35 years or so. The focus here is rather on the "action" composing the moment-to-moment flow of daily life in – and outside – interaction.
3. They may also have figured for Goffman – like the allocation of opportunities to participate, resources to assure mutual understanding or remedy its breakdown, etc. – as a kind of underlying set of "system requirements," a proper object of attention for

"communications engineering" (or perhaps, in this case, social engineering), but set in contrast to the real social science interest in interaction, which addressed itself to "ritual requirements" (see Goffman 1976, pp. 265–70). For a fuller discussion, see Schegloff (1988*a*, pp. 93–100).

4. Space limitations preclude an account of what the description of an action looks like in the main academic enterprise in this domain – speech act theory, especially of the sort introduced by Austin (1962, 1970) and developed in a distinctive direction by Searle (1965, 1969, 1976). Speech act theory might be of special interest to (some) sociologists because it has been adopted as a theoretically central element of Habermas's theoretical project from the early stages (1970) until its recent major statements (1984–87), in spite of its atomistic, asocial, ahistorical, and decontexted character. For a discussion contrasting speech act theory with conversation-analytic approaches to describing actions, see Schegloff (1992*a*, pp. xxiv–xxvii). For some obstacles to applying speech act theory to actual utterances, see Schegloff (1988*c*). Efforts to develop a more empirical form of speech act theory grounded, e.g., in linguistics (see, e.g., Labov and Fanshel 1977) have met with only qualified success and have not proven generative of further work (see the critical discussion in Levinson [1983, pp. 226–83]).

5. This paragraph should make apparent the misunderstanding embodied in some "interpretivist" and "constructionist" treatments, according to which a recipient's understanding of some utterance is definitive of its import and the utterance itself has no "objective" import. This view (and its attribution to conversation analysis) is mistaken on many counts, not least of which is its total subversion of the possibility of analytically specifiable "misunderstanding"; for if a recipient's understanding is definitive, what leverage is there for claiming it to be a *mis*understanding? What basis is there for the claim that a recipient *failed to understand* the import of an utterance? Care must be taken, then, to distinguish between, on the one hand, the *professional analyst's* undertaking to establish the understanding of some utterance in some interaction – which should indeed seek to ground itself in the recipient's displayed understanding, if possible, and on the other hand *the recipient's* undertaking to understand the import of some utterance, which clearly cannot be so grounded, for that would presume its own outcome. The recipient's conduct requires engagement with the methods or practices that inform the production of the talk being "analyzed," and the professional analyst's undertaking must make reference to these as well if it is to address both the speaker's and the recipient's parts in bringing off an accomplished, recognizable action. These considerations are critical to an empirical account of action.

6. There are grounds in earlier work for considering such a possibility, e.g., the aforementioned argument by Jefferson (1984, 1993) that "yeah" and "uh huh" interpolated into another speaker's talk can do contrasting actions, or Schegloff's proposal (1986, pp. 1245, 1434) that "Did I wake you?" and "Are you awake?" asked by a caller just after the start of a telephone conversation, implement quite different actions in spite of their apparently identical (topical) content – the former a preapology, the latter a preannouncement of bad news.

7. Note that excerpts 4–7 are intended to exemplify the sequential positions being discussed in the text, not the phenomenon being tracked in the inquiry or alternatives to it.

8. This may involve as well changes in verb tense, epistemic marking (such as adding a frame such as "I think" to an otherwise identical repeat), etc. What is excluded is that use of the term "repeat," which includes such transformations as paraphrase, as in Tannen (1987*a*, 1987*b*, 1989) and others (e.g., Norrick [1987] and other contributors

to Johnstone [1987]) who employ this looser usage. From the point of view of practices of speaking, it would appear that paraphrase is specifically an *alternative* to repetition (and to quotation) and involves very different uses for, and procedures of, constructing an utterance. An appreciation of just such differences underlies Elinor Ochs Keenan's (1977) treatment of repetition among children and Heritage's (1985) treatment of news interviewer conduct. See also Gonzales (1995). Running paraphrase and repetition together risks underspecifying both practices and vitiates claims about their functions and uses.

9. There is an element here of what the linguist William Labov described some years ago as "the rule of confirmation," namely "If A makes a statement about B events, then it is heard as a request for confirmation," where "B events" refers to "known to B [hearer], but not to A [speaker]"; see Labov and Fanshel (1977, p. 100). A complementary practice is described in Pomerantz (1980).
10. See the discussion of excerpt 14 below. See also Lerner (1987, pp. 125–26 nn. 4, 5, and p. 212).
11. Although taken from written discourse, the following characterization offered by the journalist Lance Morrow may well also be relevant to talk-in-interaction, *mutatis mutandis*: "I only realized I was making the allusions afterward. . . . It wasn't entirely advertent. But then I said, what the hell, leave them in'" (quoted in Safire 1991).
12. It is true, as a number of people have commented, that individuals may differ in their deployments of the conventional responses to this inquiry. Still, personal styles appear to be grounded in their relationship to the common usages in which "fine," "okay," and/or "good" are the "no news" mild positive responses, with superlatives and disaster on either side. One may know about a particular other that, when they say "fine," they are "great," or they are "terrible," but the distinctiveness of this knowledge is based on the otherwise operative understandings of that response term. In any case, in excerpt 12, M shows that she hears F's response to be an "upper" by the terms of her pursuit of it, even though that hearing turns out to be incorrect.
13. See the first specification of the domain being explored in this article, at p. 401 above.
14. I am indebted to Steve Clayman for sharing this material.

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63

Narrative as Self-Portrait: Sociolinguistic Constructions of Identity

Deborah Schiffrin

The stories that we tell about our own and others' lives are a pervasive form of text through which we construct, interpret, and share experience: "we dream in narrative, daydream in narrative, remember, anticipate, hope, despair, believe, doubt, plan, revise, criticize, gossip, learn, hate and love by narrative" (Hardy 1968:5). So wide and diverse a distribution of stories make it unsurprising that narrative form, meaning, and use have been the object of scholarly attention in fields ranging from developmental psychology (e.g. J. Bruner 1986, 1990, Bamberg 1987, Nelson 1989), social psychology (Harré 1987, Gergen & Gergen 1988), and clinical psychology (Polkinghorne 1988), to literary theory (Bal 1990, Prince 1990), folklore (Bauman 1986), sociology (Riessman 1993), and sociolinguistics (Labov 1972b, Labov & Waletzky 1967, Jefferson 1978).

In contrast to some of the fields just mentioned, sociolinguistic studies have focused largely on oral narratives that recount personal experience. Labov (1972b, Labov & Waletzky 1967) has described such narratives as discourse units which have a fairly regular textual structure. After being prefaced by an *abstract* (a statement of the general theme or point of the story), a narrative is continued with an *orientation*: a background description of where, when, & by whom the events were performed. The events themselves ("what happened") are recounted in temporal order (in the *complicating action*); and *evaluation* of those events, i.e. their significance to the speaker and for the point of the story, is linguistically embedded within narrative clauses, as well as stated in separate clauses. An optional *coda* provides a temporal and topical transition from the world of the story to the interaction in which it was told.

As analysts of narrative and discourse processes have shown (e.g. Chafe 1990, 1994), an important process underlying the sorts of textual structures

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identified by Labov is *verbalization*: the way we symbolize, transform, and displace a stretch of experience from our past – what we have done, and what has happened to us – into linguistically represented episodes, events, processes, and states. Prior research also tells us that this process of transforming personal experience into verbal performance is interwoven with the way stories are socially and culturally situated. When we verbalize an experience, we situate that experience *globally*: by drawing on our cultural knowledge and expectations about typical courses of action in recurrent situations, we construct story topics, themes, and points (Propp 1958, Polanyi 1985, Chafe 1990, Bamberg & Marchman 1991). We also situate that experience *locally*: we verbally place our past experiences in, and make them relevant to, a particular "here" and "now," a particular audience, and a particular set of interactional concerns and interpersonal issues (Jefferson 1978, Ryave 1978, Schiffrin 1984b).

My interest in this article is how the ability of narrative to verbalize and situate experience as text provides a resource for the display of self and identity. I develop this interest by focusing on two stories, told by Jewish-American women about troublesome issues in their families, that reveal aspects of the storytellers' selves and social identities. After briefly discussing how prior work on narrative, self, and identity motivates my study, I analyze the two stories. In each story, a mother reports interactions in which a younger woman in her family (a daughter, a daughter-in-law) did something that conflicted with family expectations. Both speakers use their stories to construct positions that pivot between solidarity and distance, between the provision of autonomy and the exercise of power. The conclusion summarizes my analyses in more general methodological and theoretical terms, and briefly compares the view of identity offered here with another perspective in sociolinguistics.

Narrative, Self, and Identity

A great deal of scholarship suggests that narrative language contributes to the construction and display of our sense of who we are – our own personal being as an integrated whole, with properties of stability and continuity over time. Thus Polkinghorne 1988 suggests that narrative structure is a way to arrive at an understanding of the self as a whole; our actions and experiences gain meaning through their relationship to one another, as well as their relationship to general themes or plots. J. Bruner argues (1987:15) that we eventually "*become* the autobiographical narratives by which we tell about our lives" [emphasis in original]. One reason that narrative can have this self-transforming role is that narrative language provides a process of subjunctivization: it reveals our presuppositions (our implicit meanings), permits multiple perspectives (different prisms through which we can view the world), and allows subjectification (reality can be filtered "through the consciousness of protagonists in the story"; Bruner, 25). Kerby suggests (1991: 52–53) that a pre-narrative social matrix of plots acts as the basic material from which "our more explicit self-reflections are formed along their narrative threads, both retrospectively and prospectively." The human

self is not "behind the [narrative] acts, visible and fully formed at their inception; the self is rather a result of actions, something that actions imply" (Kerby, 56). Linde 1993 suggests that narratives form an integral part of the overall coherence of our life story, and of our presentation of self as a moral person. Like the other authors noted, Linde suggests that this process is facilitated by linguistic properties of the narrative genre – the use of language to convey temporal continuity, a self/other distinction, and reflexivity of the self (see also Carr 1986).

Other scholars (e.g. Gergen 1987, Harré 1987) believe that the discursive display of the self through narrative is but one instance of a more general and compelling process by which the self is constructed through virtually all discourse. Thus Taylor 1991 states that the self neither pre-exists all conversation nor arises just from interlocutors' responses; rather it arises within conversation – dialogical action that, by its very nature, marks a place for the new locutor who is being inducted into it. Harré 1991 locates the emergence of the self not just in dialogical action, but in the particular discursive practices – e.g. accounts and avowals – associated with occasions of talk (see also Edwards & Potter 1992). Harré & Gillett (1994, Chap. 7) develop the idea that we actively structure our discursive activities in light of prescriptive norms and validations of self. Not only do we respond in anticipation of how we wish to be understood, but we verbally locate ourselves (and position ourselves, Davies & Harré 1990) in relation to discourse contexts, thereby defining ourselves through what we say, how we say it, and to whom we say it.

It is also well established that stories are resources not just for the development and presentation of a self as a psychological entity, but as someone located within a social and cultural world. Thus J. Bruner (1990:52) locates the emergent narrative self at the nexus of the social and cultural world: narrative deals with "the stuff of human action and human intentionality . . . [mediating] between the canonical world of culture and the more idiosyncratic world of beliefs, desires and hopes." In other words, telling a story allows us to create a "story world" in which we can represent ourselves against a backdrop of cultural expectations about a typical course of action; our identities as social beings emerge as we construct our own individual experiences as a way to position ourselves in relation to social and cultural expectations (see also Chafe 1994 on story schemas). When our socio-cultural expectations change, so too do our perceptions of identities. Thus E. Bruner 1986 shows that Native American ethnographies (which he thinks of as "narratives," see also Kerby 1991) have changed from themes of "assimilation," whose main characters are "victims," to themes of "resistance," whose main characters are "heroes."

The way we tell our stories also reveals a self that exists within a cultural matrix of meanings, beliefs, and normative practices. Research from a variety of traditions reveals that both the style and substance of stories are sensitive parameters of ethnicity (Michaels 1981, Gee 1991, Minami & McCabe 1991. Blum-Kulka 1993); social class (van Dijk 1992); gender (Riessman 1990, Attanucci 1993); age (Cohler 1982, Coupland & Nussbaum 1993); and region (Bauman 1986, Johnstone 1990). Still other research links story-telling style and substance to social roles and contexts at both interactional and institutional levels.

Thus Heath 1983 and Ochs & Schieffelin 1989 show how story-telling facilitates socialization into family roles, and how the acquisition of literacy skills during family story-telling provides an important scaffolding for the social roles and behaviors appropriate to school. The form of our stories (their textual structure), the content of our stories (what we tell about), and our story-telling behavior (how we tell our stories) are all sensitive indices not just of our personal selves, but also of our social and cultural identities.

Although all studies of personal narrative can further our knowledge of how narrative displays our self and identity, stories about women in families offer a particularly interesting site for such analyses. The family provides our first set of social relationships (and is thus said to provide a semiotic background for virtually all of our stories, Jonnes 1990); it also remains a traditional nexus of social life and cultural meaning for many women.

One particular relationship within the family, the mother/daughter relationship, is fraught with an ambivalence that is well documented in our culture both through literary works – e.g. Amy Tan's *The Joy Luck Club* (1989), *The Kitchen God's wife* (1991) – and through scholarly studies that stress the social and psychological sources, and consequences, of such ambivalence (Wodak 1986, Walters 1992, Kaplan 1993). Some popular authors blame daughters' ambivalence toward their mothers on a fear of becoming like their mothers. Thus Nancy Friday's *My mother, my self* (1977) describes emotional parallels between mothers and daughters that are difficult for daughters to resolve. In *The mother puzzle*, Judith Schwartz (1994) wonders whether she can become a mother without becoming *her* mother. Other authors offer advice to mothers who are confronted by their daughters' ambivalence. Thus Evelyn Bassoff, *Mothers and daughters* (1989), tries to help mothers maintain connections with their daughters, while also allowing them to form independent identities during adolescence.

Our cultural beliefs about mother/daughter relationships suggest several sociolinguistic reasons why mother/daughter stories offer especially good opportunities to examine the way narrative displays self and identity. First, stories are often told to justify one's own actions, not only during overt conflict, but also during subtle disputes over rights and obligations – exactly the kind of interactional tensions that arise from ambivalent relationships like those characteristic of mothers and daughters. Second, the narrated recounting and resolution of such tensions can highlight the different expectations and obligations associated with social identities, as well as the way we react to the normative practices expected of us. Third, the management of interpersonal conflict within a story world often requires story characters to use language in ways that are said to be related to gender (a key aspect of both "mother" and "daughter" identities). Various authors (e.g. Brown 1980, Maltz & Borker 1982, Goodwin 1990, Tannen 1990, Sheldon 1993) suggest that women avoid direct confrontation when they are trying to convince other people to pursue a course of action or adopt a belief. The study of narrative actions in mothers' stories thus provides an opportunity to discover womens' own perceptions and their enactments of particular interactional strategies to settle (or avoid) conflict. Finally, "mother" and "daughter" identities are themselves multifaceted: although gender is shared, age is not

The combination of these attributes may lead to a relationship built upon the two potentially conflicting dimensions of solidarity (based on same gender) and distance (because of different ages and power relationships in the family).

In sum, prior scholarship suggests that narrative is a powerful textual resource through which we manage our selves and identities. Although the study of all personal narrative provides a rich site in which to locate analyses of various identities, I focus in the next section on two stories told by mothers, both concerning conflict with younger women in their families.

Analysis of Stories

This section presents my analysis of two stories, "That cured her!" and "It's only a name!". Each story reports trouble with a younger female family member whose action defies normative expectations in the family, and thus threatens family solidarity: dating someone unacceptable to the family, or not using the term of address expected by the family. The general cultural theme of each story is thus similar – the integration of outsiders, who are unfamiliar and whose norms and practices may differ, into the nuclear family. My analysis attends primarily to the language used in the stories (the form and meaning at both sentence and text levels) and to how that language is used to both reveal and resolve the family trouble. I also make use of socio-linguistic knowledge about the performance of social actions through the use of words, as well as social and cultural knowledge about families and family roles. Although I compare the two stories when relevant during their analysis, I reserve more abstract comparisons for the end, when I am more specific about how the stories situate and verbalize experience, and how I locate "self," "position," and "identity" in the texts.

"That Cured Her!"

This is a story told during a section of a sociolinguistic interview in which Jan and Ira (a middle-aged, middle-class Jewish-American couple) are discussing intermarriage. Such intermarriage is defined primarily among American Jews as marriage outside of one's religion, i.e. between Jews and Gentiles, rather than as marriage with someone of a different race. In sociolinguistic interviews carried out in the late 1970s with three Jewish families, I found that their sentiments toward intermarriage ranged from tolerance to disapproval. These sentiments seem to match the diversity of opinion found in the Jewish community at large. Articles on intermarriage in Jewish publications reveal roughly two views: some advocate welcoming those in interfaith marriages into the community (to encourage the continuation of a tradition among their children); others advocate excluding those in interfaith marriages from the community (to send the message that such marriages are not acceptable). Regardless of the solution put forth, the increasing rate of such marriages – and the assimilation that they both reflect and engender – is seen as a threat to the continuation of a thriving

The story that I discuss here is about a date that Jan's daughter has with someone who is not Jewish, *a Gentile boy* (29). Jan's story creates and builds an opposition between "us" (Jewish people) and "them" (Gentile people), thus supporting a larger social structural opposition between different religions. More central to my purposes here, the story also reveals how Jan challenges her daughter's claim to competence in a particular domain of life: choosing friends and relationships. Teenagers face an inherent status contradiction within their families. Because "child" is a family status that is structurally subordinate to "parent," children are expected to yield to parental perceptions of inequity in power and status, in short to do what parents want. But as children make a gradual transition to adulthood, it is also expected that they will learn to take responsibility for their own decisions. A key part of the tension between teenagers and parents thus rests on striking a balance between subordination and equality, dependence and independence. Choosing friends and going out on dates crystallizes this tension: both are activities that might lead to relationships whose closeness can not only supplement, but compete with, the rights and obligations underlying the bond between parent and child. It is thus not surprising that Jan, as a parent, would want to maintain some control over whom her daughter dates. But neither is it surprising, from the daughter's point of view, that such an effort to maintain control would challenge the daughter's claim to self-sufficiency and independence.

Before Jan tells her story, Ira and Jan are describing their son during a more general discussion of intermarriage.

1 Ira: Yeh well I'll– I'll tell y– y'see when kids are [away=
2 Jan: [they
come into contact with everybody.
3 Ira: =kids are away from home and– and–
4 for example uh . . .
5 Jan: What about Craig?
6 He's gone out with girls that are Indian::
7 Ira: Oh yeh.
8 He's very liberal, but [eh
9 Jan: [He sees no difference.
10 Ira: he– he don't see any difference whatsoever.
11 He says that eh we're old fashioned.
12 If he– if [he's [if he likes somebody=
13 Jan: [If he likes some [body he's gonna go out.
14 Ira: =he's gonna go out with 'em.
15 Well?

The excerpt begins during a discussion of intermarriage. After a general explanation of why their own sense of appropriate social boundaries is being violated by *kids* (1–3), Jan and Ira describe the behavior of their son Craig (5–14). Although the daughter is not yet mentioned in this section, it provides an important local context for the upcoming introduction of the daughter, as well as for Jan's upcoming story about the daughter.

The beliefs and behavior reported in this section are presented in a par-

me, as well as (or instead of) each other. Initially, Ira and Jan share both authorial and animator roles (Goffman 1981): each is responsible for the content of their own talk and the presentation of their own words. Thus Ira begins to make a generalization in 1 (*Yéh well I'll- I'll tell y- y'see when kids are away*), but is overlapped by Jan before he reaches a turn transition place (during *away*). Although he briefly accedes the floor to Jan – who proposes a completion of Ira's sentence with 2 (*they come into contact with everybody*) – he returns to his prior generalization in 3 (*kids are away from home and– and–*), without attending topically to Jan's proposed completion. Thus, although Jan completes an utterance that Ira had initiated, Ira also returns to his own utterances; Jan does not actually remove Ira from the floor.

Ira's authorial role is reduced, however, during their next joint presentation.[1] Although Ira does complete his own utterance, either after Jan's contribution (in 10) or during it (in 12), his role in building a topic has diminished. Rather than using his own words to complete his utterance, Ira's 10 (*he– he don't see any difference whatsoever*) adds only minimally to Jan's 9 (*He sees no difference*). Similarly, Ira's *if he likes somebody . . . he's gonna go out with 'em* (12, 14) repeats, with only a minimal addition, Jan's 13 (*if he likes somebody, he's gonna go out*). Because Ira is using Jan's words as the basis for completing his utterance, he is reducing his role as author of the jointly presented belief about intermarriage.

Thus far, Jan and Ira are involved in making essentially the same point to me: they are contrasting their own view of intermarriage with their son's view. Their divergence from their son's belief is conveyed by Ira's 11 (*he says that we're eh . . . old fashioned*) and their sense of futility over their son's behavior is conveyed by Ira's 15 (*Well?*, cf. Schiffrin 1987, Chap. 5).

Ira then shifts the topic of talk from Craig's behavior to that of their daughter:

16 Ira: Now my daughter went out with eh– she went out with a couple Gentile kids,
17 and she said that=
18 Jan: she wouldn't go out with them [again.
19 Ira: = [she
wouldn't go out with them [again.
20 Jan: [She said they're too different.
21 Ira: She said that uh they're just eh–[th-=
22 Jan: [they're different.
23 Ira: =they're different.
24 Jan: She says, "It's not what I'm used to."
25 Ira: So em . . .

Ira's use of *now* introduces the daughter in a way that compares her to the son (Schiffrin 1987:230–40). The participation framework established thus far then continues: Jan completes Ira's utterances (18, 22), while Ira's repetitions and elaborations of those completions (19, 23) maintain Jan's status as author. Note that two key points are produced by Jan and repeated by Ira in 18–19 (*she wouldn't go out with them again*) and 22–23 (*they're different*). Both points use lexical repetition to build a contrast between the son and the daughter: whereas the son *sees no difference* (9), the daughter finds that *they're different* (20, 22–23); the son will *go*

out with 'em (14), but the daughter will not *go out with them* (18–19). Also contrasting the behavior and values of son and daughter is reported speech. Jan and Ira both use indirectly reported speech (in *she said that* (17, 21), to present their daughter as one who herself has certain sentiments and is committed to certain beliefs. By making their daughter both the author and principal (Goffman 1981) of beliefs that they themselves hold, Jan and Ira need not openly testify to their own views about intermarriage (cf. Wodak 1992). Jan also uses directly reported speech to allow her daughter to present her own values in 24 (*She says, "It's not what I'm used to"*). By representing her daughter's beliefs through speech attributed directly to the daughter, Jan assigns her daughter still more agency and responsibility for a belief – simultaneously removing herself from an open commitment to that view (i.e., she is not speaking as a principal) and from acknowledgment of any responsibility for bringing about that belief.

We have concentrated so far on how Ira and Jan co-produce a consensual opinion about intermarriage, and on how they contrast the beliefs of their two children. We have said little about the story that Jan will tell – partially because there is little in what Ira and Jan have thus far said that necessarily indicates that a story is coming. Ira, in fact, prepares to close the son/daughter comparison after Jan's 24 (*She says, "It's not what I'm used to"*) with the turn-transitional *So em* . . . (25). But Jan goes on to recontextualize the three aspects of the daughter's point of view noted in 18 (*she wouldn't go out with them again*), 22 (*they're different*), and 24 (*It's not what I'm used to*), in a narrative about her daughter's date with *a Gentile boy* (28):

26	Jan:	One was a– his father was a friend of my husband's.
27		And when I heard she was goin' out with him,
28		I said, "You're goin' out with a Gentile boy?"
29		She says, "Well Daddy knows his father."
30		I said, "I don't care."
31		So she introduced him,
32		and they went out,
33		and she came home early,
34		and I said, "Well, y'goin' out with him again?"
35		She says, "Nope."
36		I said, "Did he get fresh?"
37		She said, "No!"
38		She says, "But he's different!"
39		She says, "I'm not used t'Gentile boys."
40		That cured her!
41		She'd never go out with one again.

Two very different perspectives on the daughter's behavior are presented during Jan's story, one in the complicating action (27–39), one in the evaluation (40).

The complicating action in Jan's story is comprised largely of constructed dialog (Tannen 1989, Chap. 4) that performs actions directed to, and in response to, Jan's daughter. The first interchange precedes the daughter's actual date, in 27–30. Jan's first verbal action in 28 (*"You're goin' out with a Gentile boy?"*) follows

an off-record politeness strategy (Brown & Levinson 1987), whereby two different speech acts or intentions can be attributed to a single utterance. Since this strategy allows a speaker to deny either intention (e.g., one can say, "But I didn't mean that . . ."), it can be used to reduce the degree to which the illocutionary force of a particular speech act imposes upon another (i.e. upon a hearer's negative face).

"*You're goin' out with a Gentile boy?*" can be interpreted as either a question or a challenge. Although "*You're goin' out with a Gentile boy*?" is syntactically a declarative statement, it is presented with final rising intonation – an intonation that often provides a declarative statement with functional status as a question (Quirk et al. 1972:386, Stenstrom 1984, Selting 1992, Schiffrin 1994a:66–69). But note that the information status underlying "*You're goin' out with a Gentile boy*?" is *not* typical of questions. The preparatory condition of questions requires that the speaker does not know "the answer," e.g. does not know if a proposition is true (Searle 1969:66), in the sense that it is an "answer" which the speaker is attempting to elicit. Since Jan has already told us that she *heard* (the daughter) *was goin' out with him* (27), what she states in "*You're goin' out with a Gentile boy*?" is a proposition whose truth value is already known to both parties. In addition to violating the speech act conditions for questions, asking a question whose answer is already known to both parties violates a Gricean maxim of quantity: if a question seeks information that is already available, it is more informative than is required for the current purposes of the exchange. This suggests that Jan's "*You're goin' out with a Gentile boy*?" has a meaning and function in the exchange beyond seeking information about the truth of a proposition.

A good way to check an interpretation of an utterance as a speech action, especially when that utterance allows more than one interpretation, is to see how interlocutors themselves seem to interpret the action. Such interpretations are available through interlocutors' response to the action. Note, then, that the response appropriate to a *yes–no* question – to confirm or deny the proposition – is not what Jan's daughter provides. Rather, the daughter's response in 29 ("*Well Daddy knows his father*") recategorizes the social membership of the date, defining him as someone whose father is known by her own father. Like Jan's own introduction of the date in 26 (*his father was a friend of my husband's*), the response "*Well Daddy knows his father*" places an outsider (*a Gentile boy*) in a familiar realm of people within Jan's personal domain (people *Daddy knows*). By reducing the social and personal distance between Jews and Gentiles, "*Well Daddy knows his father*" justifies the daughter's plan to go out with a Gentile boy.

Justifying one's own behavior is not the kind of action that typically follows questions. Rather, justifications (and defensive moves in general) typically follow a challenge. Labov & Fanshel suggest (1977:97) that challenges assert or imply "a state of affairs that, if true, would weaken a person's claim to be competent in filling the role associated with a valued status." Under this interpretation, *goin' out with a Gentile boy* is an act that would weaken the daughter's claim to competence in the role of incipient adult, one who is able to choose her own friends and relationships. Because challenges make the status of the listener so problematic (Labov & Fanshel, 124), they are often followed by remarks that redress a perceived imbalance, and that seek to re-establish a claim of competence in a

particular role. Thus the daughter's "*Well Daddy knows his father*" redresses the imbalance in status implied by her date with *a Gentile boy*, by recategorizing him as someone whose identity is defined not by religion, but by personal relationship.

Note now that Jan's "*You're goin' out with a Gentile boy*?" seems confrontational simply because it is followed by a justification of the date – a defensive move. However, since conflict talk requires at least three moves, e.g. assertion/challenge/defense (Schiffrin 1984a, Vuchinich 1990), the actions in the story world are not actually embedded in conflict talk. In fact, Jan's next move (*I said, "I don't care"*) explicitly denies the confrontational gloss that "*Well Daddy knows his father*" had attributed to "*You're goin' out with a Gentile boy*?" The stress and intonation of "*I don't care*" is critical to this communicative force. The contrastive stress on *I* and the low-high-mid intonation contour (with each level on one of the three syllables) convey a lack of emotional involvement with the daughter's date, and/or with Ira's acquaintance with the date's father. (By contrast, level intonation with equal stress on each syllable *would* be confrontational, since it would convey a rejection of the daughter's justification.) Jan's lack of involvement is critical both for the redefinition of prior action and for the delimitation of a next action: if Jan doesn't care that her daughter is *goin' out with a Gentile boy*, there is no interactional need for the daughter to defend herself. Thus "*I don't care*" transfers responsibility for the daughter's action to the daughter herself: whatever justification the daughter wants to provide for her own behavior results from her *own* moral sense of right or wrong.

In the next interchange (31–41), Jan continues to portray her daughter as someone responsible for her own actions. The first few complicating action clauses in this section provide a good example of how the process of verbalization – transforming an experience into a linguistically encoded series of events – intersects with the theme and point of a story.

Note, first, that the first three events are reported from Jan's perspective as a parent at home: the daughter *introduced him* (31) to Jan, she left the home (*went out*, 32) and then she returned (*came home*, 33). These three events are conjoined, without terminal intonational break, with a fourth event in 34 (*and I said, "Well, y'goin' out with him again*?") that follows the daughter's return home. Thus, despite the distinct temporal juncture between events preceding the date (31–32) and those following the date (33–34), these four events are verbalized as one syntactic and intonational unit. Presenting these events together, despite their more objective temporal parameters, suggests that they form a single, subjectively defined episode in the story. This same subjective boundary is also suggested by the changed size and intonational and syntactic shapes of the next events: the questions and answers following the date (35–39) are presented as single sentences with parallel syntactic structures and asyndetic connections (i.e. no *and*).

The process of verbalization just noted intersects with the theme and point of Jan's story: the episode (in 35–39) that is differentiated syntactically and intonationally from the prior episode is the interchange in which Jan recontextualizes her earlier presentation of her daughter's beliefs. After the daughter's response in 35 (*"Nope"*) to the question about another date (34), Jan asks a second question in 36 (*"Did he get fresh*?", i.e. make unwanted physical contact) as a

possible account for the daughter's negative "*Nope.*" The daughter rejects this account in 37 ("*No!*"), and then *volunteers* her own reasons: "*But he's different!*" (38), "*I'm not used t'Gentile boys*" (39). It is during this interaction that Jan recontextualizes her earlier report of her daughter's position: *she wouldn't go out with them again* (18), *they're different* (22), *She says, "It's not what I'm used to"* (24). Each general statement from Jan's earlier presentation is textually tied to a specific story event through repetition of key predicates (*go out with, be different, be used to*) and through presentation in the same order in the text. The pronominal switch from *them* and *they* (18, 22) to *him* and *he* (34, 36) also recontextualizes the general beliefs previously presented by Jan as specific reactions to one date. (The specific reactions are then reframed back to a generalization about *Gentile boys*, 39). Note also that the importance of what the daughter says for Jan's story is highlighted through the use of the historical present tense (Schiffrin 1981), with the quotative verb (*says*) prefacing just those responses to Jan's questions ("*Nope,*" 35; "*But he's different!*", 38; "*I'm not used t'Gentile boys,*" 39) that recontextualize her earlier statements. Observe, finally, that the daughter's responsible (agentive) role is iconically captured through the use of directly reported speech: just as the daughter is portrayed as an agent in the world who can take responsibility for her own actions, so too she is animated as a character in the story world who speaks for herself.

In addition to the processes of verbalization just described, the content of the complicating action is also crucial to the point of Jan's story. So far, nothing in the complicating action of the story has revealed Jan's criticism of intermarriage. Rather, it is an evaluation clause in 40 (*That cured her!*), at the end of her complicating action, that starkly conveys exactly what her story world has not revealed. Jan's negative attitude toward intermarriage is conveyed through a metaphorical view (indicated by the verb *cure*) of human behavior and relationships as an organism that can be diseased. Through this metaphor, *That cured her!* conveys a criticism of intermarriage (disease is undesired) as well as a desire to end intermarriage (disease is something that people seek to end). *That cured her!* thus clearly reveals something quite different than Jan's actions in the story.

Following her evaluation, Jan closes the story with a narrative coda (*She'd never go out with one again*, 41) that restates the point of the story – previously stated in the abstract (18) and as specific events (34–35) as the general outcome of the date. Note important changes in the referring terms that evoke the daughter's date. A specific individual (*a Gentile boy*, 28) has become a general representative of a group (a general indefinite *one*) in the coda (*She'd never go out with one again*, 41). Not only does this reproduce the daughter's own generalization in 39 (*She says, "I'm not used t'Gentile boys"*), but it also returns the story from an earlier level of specificity in 34 (*"Well, y'goin'out with him again?"*), within the story world, to the level of generality from the narrative abstract: *she wouldn't go out with them again* (18). Thus 41 moves away from specific narrative events to a general evaluative coda of those events.

We have seen that what happens in the story world continues the portrayal of the mother/daughter relationship hinted at earlier: Jan's daughter is someone who takes responsibility for her own beliefs and actions; Jan does not have to openly endorse the daughter's beliefs or enforce her actions. Jan then presents

a second story, conjoined with *and* to continue – **and evaluate – the first** story (Schiffrin 1987, Chap. 6)

42 Jan: And when she met my son-in-law,
43 she thought he wasn't Jewish.
44 So she says, "I don't think I'm gonna go out with you because my mother would object."
45 I said, "Why did you say me, I didn't even know you were gon– met him."
46 She said, "Well, I didn't think he was Jewish. And I didn't want t'go out with him."
47 But it turned out he was Jewishhhhhh=
48 Ira: hhhhhhyeh.
49 Jan: =And then they got married.

Jan's report of her daughter's initial encounter with the man she later married (*my son-in-law*, 42) replays the point of her earlier story, but with a slightly different set of characters and events.[2] This time Jan says nothing at all about the daughter's plans (cf. "*You're goin' out with a Gentile boy*?", 28) or reaction ("*Did he get fresh*?", 36). Rather, it is the daughter herself who aborts a date, and volunteers her own reason for doing so in 44 (*she says, "I don't think I'm gonna go out with you because my mother would object"*). It is interesting that Jan is said to be the one responsible for the daughter's behavior; this is consistent with the earlier story in which Jan's "*You're goin' out with a Gentile boy*?" was interpreted by her daughter as indicative of a negative attitude toward interfaith marriage. Just as Jan denied this agentive role in her earlier story (with "*I don't care*," 30), so too, she denies it again in 45 ("*Why did you say me, I didn't even know you were gon– met him*"). As the next reported move reveals, however, the daughter is actually using Jan to animate a belief for which she herself is principal: *She said, "Well, I didn't think he was Jewish. And I didn't want t'go out with him*" (46). Thus, not only has the daughter internalized Jan's attitude about intermarriage – again behaving the way her parents want her to, without having been told to do so – but the daughter is also replicating Jan's interactional strategy: just as Jan avoided open confrontation with the daughter about *goin'out with a Gentile boy*, so too the daughter avoids openly telling someone that she *didn't want t'go out with him.*

Jan's story presents her daughter as someone who acts the way her parents want her to, even when she is not told to do so, by recontextualizing in the complicating action, through the daughter's own words, three points that Jan and Ira had jointly presented prior to the story: *she wouldn't go out with them again, they're different, It's not what I'm used to.* Thus the story shows that it is the daughter herself who stops doing the action that had threatened family solidarity: she does not date anyone whose religion would make marriage unacceptable to her parents.

Before turning to the next story, it is important to note that what is critical to Jan's story and her display of self is not just presentation of her *own* actions, but of her daughter's actions, as well as the interaction between them. Jan's portrayal of her daughter during their interaction is what shows her to be taking responsibility for her own actions. The consistency of these actions with her parents' beliefs further portrays her as someone who is situated well within the family

norms and practices. It is for these reasons that Jan can convey a neutral (rather than disapproving or critical) attitude toward her daughter's interfaith date, and to act permissive (rather than controlling) toward her daughter; in brief, she constructs a position of mother/daughter solidarity and closeness. However, the metaphor in Jan's story evaluation (*That cured her!*) displayed Jan as critical of her daughter's date – an attitude at odds with her neutral and tolerant stance in the story world. Such an attitude is more consistent with a position that denies autonomy to the daughter, and distances mother and daughter from one another by emphasizing the asymmetry of their relationship. Thus the actions and interaction in Jan's story world displayed a mother/daughter relationship quite different from that displayed by Jan's story evaluation.

"It's Only a Name!"

This is a story told by Zelda (like Jan, a middle-aged, middle-class Jewish-American woman) about a different family trouble: her daughter-in-law's inability to call her by an address term normative for Zelda's family, either "Mom" or first name. Address terms are a source of potential conflict in American discourse: what we call each other symbolizes the social relationship between addresser and addressee, often in terms of power and solidarity (Fasold 1990, Chap. 1). The use of kinship terms for direct address has an additional meaning simply because such terms label the social relationship binding the addressor (e.g. a child) and addressee (e.g. a parent). Thus the symbolic meaning of address terms makes the daughter-in-law's inability to use either a kinship term ("Mom") or first name ("Zelda") a threat to the solidarity of Zelda's family.

Although the topic of "It's only a name!" differs from that of "That cured her!", the general cultural theme of the two stories is similar. Both stories center around the need to integrate outsiders into the nuclear family; an individual who deviates from family norms poses a threat to that integration. Whereas Jan's story was about the threat of marriage with an "outsider" (and thus a potential need to incorporate an in-law of a different faith into the family), Zelda's story is about the threat posed by someone who has already become an "insider" (her daughter-in-law) but refuses to act like one. Interestingly, the symbolic meaning of the daughter-in-law's solution to the naming problem, namely using "nothing," replicates the central cultural dilemma underlying Zelda's story: being called "nothing" implies a lack of familiarity and/or certainty, exactly what has to be overcome if outsiders are to be integrated into one's family.

In contrast to Jan's story, which began as Jan developed her husband's comparison between daughter and son during a discussion of intermarriage, Zelda's story is told in response to a direct question that I ask during a discussion of address terms. (CA here marks complicating action clauses, E marks evaluation clauses.)

1 Debby: What does your uh daughter-in-law call you?
2 Zelda: Well, that's a sore ⌐spot.
Debby: ⌊hhhh
3 Zelda: My <u>older</u> daughter-in-law does call me Mom.=

	4	Zelda:	=My younger daughter-in-law right now is up to nothing.
CA	5		She [had said–
		Debby:	[Oh
E	6	Zelda:	We had quite a discussion about it.
E	7		We did bring it out in the open.
CA	8		She said that um . . . that she– just– right now, she's:– it'll take her time.
E	9		Now they're marrie:d, it's gonna be uh . . . I think eh . . . five years, =
		Debby:	Um hmm.
	10	Zelda:	=that they'll be married.
CA	11		And she said that eh it was very hard t's:– call someone else Mom beside her mother.
CA	12		So I had said to her, "That's okay!"
CA	13		I said, "If you– if you can't say Mom, just call me by my first name!
		Debby:	[Umhm
E	14	Zelda:	So, we had quite a discussion about it.
E	15		It was a little heated [[at one time. =
		Debby:	[Yeh]
	16	Zelda:	She said, "All right," she'll call me Zelda.
CA	17		But she still can't bring herself to say Zelda,
CA	18		so she calls me nothing!

Although Zelda's story is situated in prior discourse that is very different than Jan's, the story is similar in several ways. First, like Jan, Zelda recontextualizes a point *prior* to her story in 4 (*My younger daughter-in-law right now is up to nothing*) within the events of her story (*so she calls me nothing*!, 18). Second, Zelda also presents herself in her story world as accepting and permissive, with criticism more reserved for her evaluation. The complicating action clauses in Zelda's story are also relatively free of criticism; the evaluation clauses reveal a more critical view of the daughter-in-law's behavior. These aspects of Zelda's self-presentation help construct a dual position, pivoting between solidarity and distance, similar to that constructed by Jan. Despite these similarities, the specific textual construction of Zelda's dual position differs from Jan's story: whereas Jan's story textually segregates her neutral from her critical stance, Zelda consistently weaves the two sides of her dual position together in her story and her post-story evaluations.

So pervasive is Zelda's intertwining of solidarity and distance toward her daughter-in-law that a duality appears as soon as she begins to answer my question *What does your uh daughter-in-law call you*? (1). Since Zelda has two daughters-in-law, who address her differently, she cannot felicitously answer my question without mentioning both. But rather than begin by repairing, and then providing, the information I had requested, Zelda begins with the general evaluation *Well, that's a sore spot* (2), based on the same metaphorical view of behavior and relationships as Jan's. Since "a sore spot" is a small but ongoing irritation in an otherwise healthy system, *that's a sore spot* conveys that there is some small, ongoing trouble in the use of address terms.

When Zelda does goes on to repair and present the information that I had requested, she provides a hint as to what is causing the *sore spot*. Her repair of *a* daughter-in-law is based on the comparative *my older daughter-in-law* (9)

comparative indicates two members of that family category. Zelda uses *do* to report that this daughter-in-law calls her *Mom* (3). Both negatives and *do* can be contrastive in discourse. However, whereas the use of negatives reveals that an event does *not* fill an expectation, the use of *do* can convey that an event *does* fill an expectation. Thus *My older daughter-in-law does call me Mom* (3) conveys an expectation of being called "Mom."

Zelda's answer is informationally completed by *My younger daughter-in-law right now is up to nothing* (4). Yet, like the other parts of her answer thus far, this too reveals trouble. *Up to* is an aspectual and evaluative verbal particle that can convey not only progression past a baseline (e.g., a temperature can *go up to 104*, Clark 1974) but also progression toward a desired goal or endpoint (e.g. we can be *up to the last chapter in a book*, or *only up to Chapter 2*). By saying that her daughter-in-law *right now is up to nothing*, Zelda presents her as moving along a trajectory of some kind. But as we find out later, when Zelda says *But call them something* (36), *nothing* is opposite to the desired endpoint. In combining an aspectual particle that conveys accomplishment (approaching a goal) with an action (call her *nothing*) which is viewed not as an accomplishment, but as an undesirable goal, she conveys a negative attitude (cf. the expression *up to no good*) or a sense of irony or sarcasm – another hint of the trouble to come in the story.

Although the complicating action clauses of Zelda's story are relatively free of criticism, evaluation devices throughout the story continue to reveal trouble. Thus Zelda begins the story events with *She had said* (5), but self-interrupts to gloss the interaction as *quite a discussion* (6). Like *a sore spot*, this is a mitigated report of trouble. Prior disagreement with the daughter-in-law is conveyed by intensifying (with *quite a*) the description of the speech event *discussion*. But *discussion* conveys a less intense disagreement than other metacommunicative terms such as *fight* or *argument*. In 7, *We did bring it out in the open* also affirms the value of having a discussion (not only through use of *do*, but through the evaluative deixis *bring it out*).

The complicating action reports an interaction between Zelda and her daughter-in-law in which both are portrayed as reasonable people who do not engage in verbal conflict. The first full story event is the daughter-in-law's account for why she does not call Zelda "Mom": *She said that um . . . that she– just– right now, she's:– it'll take her time* (8). Rather than respond to (accept or reject) her daughter-in-law's account in a story event, Zelda uses embedded orientation clauses to reveal her rejection of the account. In 9–10, *they're marrie:d, it's gonna be uh . . . I think eh . . . five years that they'll be married* juxtaposes the daughter-in-law's plea for more time with mention of the substantial period of time that has already passed (*five years*), thus implying that the account is not acceptable.

The daughter-in-law provides a second account for her failure to call Zelda "Mom": *And she said that eh it was very hard t's:– call someone else Mom beside her mother* (11). Note that addressing a mother-in-law as "Mom" creates a symbolic parallel between a relationship created through marriage (in-law relationship) and one that is typically created biologically (parent/child relationship). It is this symbolic alignment – addressing someone *beside her mother* with a term previously reserved for her mother – that the daughter-in-law finds *very hard* to create.

After accepting the second account in 12 (*So I had said to her, "That's okay*!", Zelda presents an alternative: *I said, "If you– if you can't say Mom, just call me by my first name*!" (13). The structure and function of this move is a central part of Zelda's presentation as a cooperative person who accommodates her daughter-in-law's needs; it also helps reveal why *so she calls me nothing*! (18) is a sequentially inappropriate and face-threatening move in the interchange.

Note first that, although *That's okay* is a transitional move (because of *okay*; Merritt 1984, Beach 1993), it does not specify which party should take responsibility for the next move. However, the conditional structure of 13 transfers responsibility for the next move to the daughter-in-law; and as we see in a moment, it makes it difficult for her not to comply. *Just call me by my first name*! is presented as a consequence that follows from an antecedent *if*-clause (*if you can't say Mom*), whose shared information status (Haiman 1978, Akatsuka 1986, Ford & Thompson 1986, Schiffrin 1992) had been guaranteed by the daughter-in-law herself in 11 (*she said that eh it was very hard t's:– call someone else Mom beside her mother*). In addition to basing her alternative on supposed common ground, Zelda adopts a view of the problem that parallels the account provided by the daughter-in-law herself. Recall that *Just call me by my first name!* is presented as a consequence of what the daughter-in-law *can't* do (*if you can't say Mom*), i.e. a consequence of an inability (i.e. the basic meaning of *can*). Being unable to do something is semantically compatible with finding that act *very hard.* Finally Zelda minimizes the difficulty of adopting her alternative *call me by my first name with just.* Thus "*If you– if you can't say Mom, just call me by my first name!*" does a great deal of work for Zelda. By basing the alternative being offered on the daughter-in-law's own account, grounding it in shared information, and minimizing its degree of imposition, it not only transfers responsibility for the next move to the daughter-in-law, and tries to guarantee its cooperative nature, but it also helps construct a position of solidarity with the daughter-in-law.

However, a speech act analysis of "*If you– if you can't say Mom, just call me by my first name!*" suggests that the solidarity being constructed by these moves is somewhat fragile. On one level of analysis, "*If you– if you can't say Mom, just call me by my first name!*" is a directive. *Call me by my first name* is an imperative (a syntactic form often associated with directives) that clearly fills the felicity conditions for directives – e.g. the sincerity condition that S wants H to do A, the essential condition that it counts as an attempt to get H to do A (Searle 1969). On a sequential level of analysis, however, "*If you– if you can't say Mom, just call me by my first name*!" functions as a compromise: it replaces a previously unfulfilled act (call me "Mom") that S wanted, with an act (call me "first name") that S is willing to accept because it is assumed to be more within the realm of H's ability, desires, or beliefs (a preparatory condition). Since compromises adjust what S wants so that it is more in line with what H is presumed to want, compromises share a crucial characteristic with commissive speech acts (which focus more on H's wants than S's), such as offers. Indeed, we typically say that we *offer* (not *request*) a compromise.[3]

Defining "*If you– if you can't say Mom, just call me by my first name!*" as an offer helps explain why the outcome of the interaction is so unsatisfying to Zelda.

Offers can be face-threatening acts – an interactional meaning that makes their rejection a delicate matter for both speakers and hearers. As I discuss elsewhere (Schiffrin 1994a: 112–13), offers are face-threatening to both S and H because they are predicated on two kinds of "wants." The first want inheres in an assumption, made by S, that H might want the goods or service being made available. Because S has no guarantee that A is what H does want, S must guess what H wants. But since guessing another's desires means making assumptions about another's internal state, an offer can threaten H's negative face, i.e. the desire that one's own needs and wants be unimpeded and unintruded upon (Brown & Levinson 1987). The second want inherent in offers can be viewed as a sincerity condition (Searle 1969): S wants to do something for H. But this too has a hidden cost: if H rejects an offer, H is in effect saying that H does not want what S wants. This can be a threat to S's positive face, i.e. the desire that others want the same thing that self wants (cf. Brown & Levinson).

As noted earlier, Zelda's offer of a compromise (*just call me by my first name!*) was based on the daughter-in-law's own account – an evocation of common ground that should guarantee its successful outcome. But as we have just noted, a wrong guess about what H wants (leading H to reject an offer) can display a failed presumption of familiarity, (i.e., S does not know H well enough to make an accurate guess about what H wants), and thus can create a threat to S's positive face. This makes rejected offers potentially threatening not only to the self/other relationship ("I don't know you well enough to guess what you want"), but also to the self ("you don't want what I want").

Note now that the daughter-in-law does agree to Zelda's alternative in 16 (*She said, "All right," she'll call me Zelda*). As presupposed by the implicative verb in 17 (*she can't bring herself*), the daughter-in-law has also tried to say "Zelda." Nevertheless, the interchange concludes when the daughter-in-law rejects Zelda's offer and does not comply with her request: *so she calls me nothing!* (18). The fact that the daughter-in-law does not provide an account is all the more troubling. Accounts mitigate precisely the face threats noted earlier: accounts can provide a reason independent of the self/other relationship as to why H does not want what S thinks H wants. By calling Zelda *nothing*, without explaining why, the daughter-in-law is threatening Zelda's positive face: she doesn't want what Zelda wants, and Zelda does not know her well enough to guess what *she* wants. This face threat actually mirrors the symbolic problem created by the use of "nothing" as an address term: both imply an uncertain, unfamiliar relationship. The sequence of acts in the story world thus displays, on a local level, the same symbolic problem created by using "nothing" as an address term. These in turn manifest the social and cultural dilemma underlying Zelda's story: how to bring a person who is unfamiliar, and whose practices are unpredictable, into the familiarity and certainty of one's family.

Although I reserve most comparisons between Zelda's and Jan's stories for later, some brief comparisons are relevant here. In the earlier discussion of Jan's story, we noted that Jan remained neutral and permissive in her story world. Zelda's self-presentation in her story world is similar: she is cooperative and face-saving. Except for the final affront in 18 (*so she calls me nothing.!*), the daughter-in-law

also behaves cooperatively; i.e., she offers accounts for her non-compliance in 8 (*it'll take her time*) and 11 (*it was very hard t's:– call someone else Mom beside her mother*), and it is presupposed that she tries to *say Zelda* (17). Thus the actions in the story worlds of both stories portray people who do not engage in open verbal conflict.

Another similarity between the two stories is the use of narrative evaluation for criticism: neither Jan nor Zelda use story events to reveal the family problem with which they are confronted. Our earlier analysis showed that Jan's criticism of her daughter was reserved for an external evaluation clause. Zelda's criticism is in evaluation clauses that are interwoven with her story events. We have already noted how embedded orientation clauses in 9–10 (*Now they're marrie:d, it's gonna be uh . . . I think eh . . . five years that they'll be married*), rather than narrative events, reject the daughter-in-law's account. Note also that Zelda repeats her earlier gloss (*So, we had quite a discussion about it*, 14) and is explicit about its emotional tone (*It was a little heated, at one time*, 15) within the sequence of moves that themselves are cooperative. However, consistent with Zelda's ongoing construction of a dual position, even these criticisms are mitigated: the term *discussion* (14) does not necessarily convey confrontation; the intensity of the anger metaphor *heated* (Lakoff & Johnson 1980) is reduced with *a little.*

Note finally that both Jan and Zelda populate their story worlds with story characters whose speaking behavior parallels their agentive roles in their families. Jan's daughter took responsibility for her own actions: she was also presented as a story character who animated her own beliefs, enacting them through directly reported speech. But Zelda's daughter-in-law does not take a responsible, agentive role in the family: she does not follow through with a behavior to which she had agreed; even worse, her lack of compliance (calling Zelda *nothing*) results in the absence of verbal behavior. It is only when the daughter-in-law does act agentively – when she accepts the compromise "*All right*" (16) – that Zelda allows her to speak for herself. In all other uses of constructed dialog, Zelda uses indirectly reported speech (in 8, *She said that um . . . that she– just– right now, she's:– it'll take her time*, and in 11, *And she said that eh it was very hard t's– call someone else Mom beside her mother*), or switches to indirect speech (*She said . . . she'll call me Zelda*, 16). Thus, just as the agentive family role of Jan's daughter was iconically conveyed in her story world construction of the daughter as someone who speaks for herself, the non-agentive family role of Zelda's daughter-in-law was iconically conveyed in her construction of her story world character as someone who does not animate her own words.

Earlier we saw that the symbolic meaning of address terms makes the daughter-in-law's inability to use a kinship term or first name *a sore spot*; saying *nothing* creates a symbolic vacuum in her relationship with Zelda, marking it as uncertain and open to negotiation. Despite this symbolic problem, Zelda minimizes the consequences of being called *nothing* immediately after her restatement of the problematic behavior in 18 (*so she calls me nothing!*) – thus, like Jan, replaying and elaborating the point of the story after its resolution. Rather than tell another story, however, Zelda uses several *lists* as evaluative devices (a list is a discourse structure in which similar items are clustered together; Schiffrin 1994b).

The first list provides four items whose positive value contrasts with the negative behavior just reported, thereby helping to construct a position of solidarity between Zelda and her daughter-in-law:

19 She do– but we're very cl– we're on very good terms,]=
Debby: [Yeh.
20 Zelda: =she's a very sweet girl
21 and I like her very much
22 and uh: we don't have any differences.

Zelda's display of acceptance begins with *but* as a marker of contrast (Schiffrin 1987, Chap. 6) and a statement of her closeness with her daughter-in-law (*very good terms*, 19). Next is a positive attribution (*she's a very sweet girl*); and Zelda's feelings about the daughter-in-law (*and I like her very much*). In 22, *And uh: we don't have any differences* summarizes (through paraphrase of 19) the lack of dissension in the relationship. Both the repeated use of the modifier *very* (19, 20, 21) and the list-like presentation of good qualities (with no terminal intonational break between them) enhance their evaluative function for the story; i.e., each quality adds to the others to build a cumulative picture of a generally good relationship (Schiffrin 1994b). Zelda thus disengages a verbal behavior (*calls me nothing*) from its symbolic meaning: even though the behavior is problematic, it is not a threat to family solidarity.

However, after minimizing the problematic consequences of her daughter-in-law's behavior, Zelda reinforces her complaint by bringing up her son's use of *first names for her mother and father*. The shift in position is again initiated with *but*:

23 But, that's the eh: just the– y'know the point that eh–
24 her– eh my son calls her mother and father by their first names.
25 Which is fine!
26 That's all right!

By mentioning that her *son calls her mother and father by their first names* (24), Zelda reinforces the acceptability of the alternative address term that she had suggested – showing, also, that she is a reasonable person who accepts diversity in her family. But Zelda's mention of her son also reveals a lack of family symmetry, a non-reciprocity, that can itself be seen as troubling. Although her son shows appropriate respect for his in-laws, her daughter-in-law (his wife) does not reciprocate. Furthermore, although Zelda was able to teach her son the right thing to do, her in-laws did not do so with their daughter. Thus the offense has repercussions potentially wider than the relationship between Zelda and her daughter-in-law.

My comments to Zelda partially sustain the dual position being created through Zelda's story:

Debby: Yeh I think so.
Zelda: Yeh.
Debby: What does she call your husband? The same problem?

Zelda: Eh:yeh. I don't think she says anything [yet.
Debby: [Yeh. It's hard I imagine.
Zelda: I imagine it [is:
Debby: [Yeh.

During our interchange, I first define the daughter-in-law's behavior as a problem when I prompt Zelda's answer to my question *What does she call your husband?* with *The same problem?* After Zelda's answer (*yeh. I don't think she says anything yet*), I adopt the daughter-in-law's perspective with *Yeh. It's hard I imagine.* Zelda's repetition (*I imagine it is*) also helps to mitigate the problematic status of the daughter-in-law's behavior.

We noted earlier that, in contrast to the cooperative and face-saving nature of the story events, Zelda's narrative evaluations reveal criticism as well as acceptance of her daughter-in-law. The next part of Zelda's post-story evaluation – a list of family members who use the appropriate address terms – continues to show the same pattern. However, Zelda also becomes more critical of her daughter-in-law in this section. Thus, although Zelda's story implicitly rejects the daughter-in-law's account in 8 (*it'll take her time*) to say "Mom", she explicitly denies the validity of that account through her list. The list opens with a general rule about using address terms that prescribes behavior exactly opposite to that preferred by the daughter-in-law:

27 And you *have* to start in the beginning.

The force of Zelda's rule is here conveyed not just through stress on the modal *have* (conveying both obligation and contrast), but through the list of people who have followed the rule, and therefore provide evidence for its validity. First is the older daughter-in-law (mentioned earlier in 3):

28 Now my daughter-in-law did.
29 My older daughter-in-law from the very beginning she said Mom,
30 so she's used to it.=[
Debby: [Yeh
31 Zelda: =Mom and Dad.

The older daughter-in-law *did* [follow the rule] in 28 (note the stress again): she *said Mom* from *the very beginning* (29) and therefore got *used to it* (30).

Before mentioning the second person who evinces her rule, Zelda becomes more openly critical in another way. She embeds an evaluative gloss in her list that reveals the stark asymmetry between herself and her daughter-in-law:

32 See it doesn't ma– it's only a name!

Warranted by the older daughter-in-law's behavior (28–31) is a conclusion about the symbolic non-importance of terms of address: *it doesn't matter* (interrupted) and *it's only a name!* The formulaic phrase *it's only a name!* reveals the asymmetry

between Zelda and her daughter-in-law. If "Mom" truly is *only a name*, then Zelda should be able to accept not being called "Mom," or even being called "nothing." However, since we know that Zelda wants to be called *something* (36), Zelda is, in effect, saying that names lack symbolic meaning only for the addressor (the daughter-in-law) and not the addressee (Zelda). Put another way, "Mom" clearly has a perlocutionary effect on the hearer (Zelda), but it should have no intended illocutionary force for the speaker (the daughter-in-law). Thus *it's only a name!* clearly conveys a symbolic asymmetry and distance between Zelda and her daughter-in-law: a verbal practice which is rich with meaning for Zelda should be devoid of symbolic meaning for the daughter-in-law.

Zelda continues her list of people who follow the rule (*in the beginning*, 34) with her son:

33 And Ron– we told Ronny too,
34 in the beginning,
35 you call– if you can't say Mom and Dad, call them by their name.

Note that Zelda explicitly offers her son the same alternative (*if you can't say Mom and Dad, call them by their name*, 35) that she offered to her younger daughter-in-law (*I said, "If you– if you can't say Mom, just call me by my first name!*, 13).

Zelda then makes more explicit her preference for "first name" over "nothing" (36–37); and after imitating the way one calls someone "nothing" (an imitation that I build upon), the turn continuers *yeh* and *right* (Schegloff 1981) allow her to maintain the general floor to rebuild the earlier list (19–22) of her daughter-in-law's good qualities and to embed it into the current list of people who follow the general rule:

36 But call them something.
37 Not "uh::::"
Debby: Yeh [hh and wait for them to [hear "uh::"
Zelda: [yeh [Right.
38 And she's an intelligent girl
39 and she's a nice girl.
40 She gives us the biggest respect.
41 And she's really nice.
42 I like her very much.
43 It's just that she can't say it.

Each positive quality counters a potentially negative implication of using "nothing" or being called "nothing": the behavior does not reflect intelligence (38), personality (39, 41), or lack of respect (40); it has not affected Zelda's feelings (42). In contrast to this overall good relationship, conveyed with superlatives (*biggest*) and intensifiers (*nice, really, very*), is the problematic behavior: *It's just that she can't say it* (43).

The last person in Zelda's list of family members who follows the rule is Zelda herself:

44 Now I remember when I first got married,
45 and I was in that situation.
46 And eh the first– like the first ... few times, I didn't say anything.
47 And my husband said to me, "Now look. It isn't hard. Just say 'Mom'."
48 He says, "And I want you to do it."
49 And I did it.
50 And I got used to it.

Like her daughter-in-law, Zelda had trouble saying "Mom" when she *first got married* (44), and she *didn't say anything* (46). But when her husband stated his preference through a variety of directive forms, including an imperative (*Just say "Mom,"* 47) and a "want" statement (*"And I want you to do it,"* 48), Zelda complied with her husband's wishes (*And I did it,* 49) overcoming her initial discomfort (*And I got used to it,* 50). Thus, although Zelda's own experience is partially like that of her younger daughter-in-law, it diverges at a crucial point: Zelda does what she is told to do.

As we have seen in this section, Zelda continues to display a dual position of both solidarity toward and distance from her daughter-in-law. Although she reinforces her positive feelings about her daughter-in-law, she is also more openly critical of her behavior, rejecting her earlier account and revealing a stark asymmetry as to the symbolic importance of address terms. In addition, because the behavior of each person mentioned in the list conforms to Zelda's rule, its cumulative effect is to justify Zelda's view of her daughter-in-law's behavior as problematic. Thus, like Zelda's story and its embedded evaluations, Zelda's post-story evaluation also helps construct a dual position.

To summarize: calling a mother-in-law "Mom" or by her first name has different symbolic meanings. "Mom" reinforces the family relationship: it creates an analogy between a relationship created through marriage (the in-law relationship) and a parent/child relationship. Although first names can display an asymmetric power relationship (i.e., the one with more power uses a first name to address the one with less power), they can also display a relationship of solidarity and equal status, thus maintaining some of the intimacy and camaraderie associated with families.

Being called "nothing" leaves a symbolic vacuum in the relationship between Zelda and her daughter-in-law; it marks their relationship as uncertain and still open to negotiation. Not only can such instability create an impression of family trouble, but it replicates the central cultural dilemma underlying Zelda's story: unfamiliarity and/or uncertainty is exactly what has to be overcome if outsiders are to be integrated into one's family. Zelda uses different forms of evaluation to combat the impression of trouble and to resolve the general dilemma. She minimizes the trouble through the metaphor *sore spot*; she glosses the interaction as a *discussion* that was *a little heated*; she describes her daughter-in-law and their relationship in positive terms; she mentions people who do follow the expected norms. Thus Zelda disengages a linguistic practice – the use of an address term – from the social relationship and more general social problem that it can symbolize: she complains about her daughter-in-law's behavior, but denies the symbolic meaning of that behavior.

In discussing Jan's story "That cured her!", we noted that Jan presented herself in two different ways: she was neutral and permissive in the story world, but critical and controlling in her story evaluation. A similar disjunction appears in Zelda's story, resulting in a dual position that also pivots between solidarity and distance, and between the provision of autonomy and the exercise of power. However, the textual construction of Zelda's position differed from Jan's in several ways. Whereas Jan's dual position was apparent in the story only through a single evaluation clause, isolated from the complicating action, Zelda's dual position was woven into the story through external evaluation clauses and other evaluative devices. Whereas Jan's evaluation revealed only a negative view of her daughter's behavior, Zelda's evaluation was both negative and positive; i.e., her evaluation balanced criticism of her daughter-in-law with praise. Although both women evaluated their stories after completion, Jan used a second story to do so, while Zelda used lists. In what follows I further compare the two stories in the context of more general methodological and theoretical conclusions concerning narrative language, self, and identity.

Conclusion: Narrative Language, Self, and Identity

Despite a rich and varied research tradition focusing on this topic, there are surprisingly few linguistically detailed analyses of how particular stories display their tellers' sense of who they are. One outcome of this is that there is no set of general sociolinguistic tools through which to analyze how narrative language reveals self and identity. In this section, I discuss my analyses in more general methodological and theoretical terms in relation to verbalizing and situating experience, discursive representations of self and identity, and sociolinguistic perspectives on identity.

Verbalizing and Situating the Stories

I suggested earlier that the way we verbalize and situate our experience as text (both locally and globally) provides a resource for the representation of personal and social identity. My analysis tried to capture these processes by focusing on the language used before, during, and after the stories themselves. Here I mention some of the ways that Jan and Zelda verbalized and situated their stories in relation to their displays of identity.

Both stories were locally situated in ongoing discourse on several different discourse planes simultaneously. Jan's story began as part of a general discussion of intermarriage. Although Jan and Ira were describing their son's dating behavior together, and it was Ira who initiated a comparison with their daughter, Jan gained authorial status and the turn-taking rights to recontextualize the daughter's position on intermarriage within a story. Thus Jan's story was locally situated within a more general discourse topic (intermarriage), within which she claimed specific rights to develop a particular subtopic (her daughter's position) through a story. Jan's story tied the subtopic to the more general topic by paraphrasing

general formulations from prior talk as constructed dialog that was particular to one specific interchange. Each general statement from Jan's earlier presentation was referentially tied to a specific story event through repetition of key predicates; through presentation in the same linear order; and through pronominal switches from the general *them*, to the specific *him* and *he*, and then back to the general *Gentile boys*. The daughter's position was replayed yet again in post-story talk, when Jan told another brief story about her daughter. Thus Jan's story was situated both referentially, in terms of general discourse topic and specific discourse entities, and evaluatively, in that the same point is built in relation to both pre- and post-story talk.

Although Zelda's story was situated in a question/answer exchange, it too was locally situated on different planes of discourse simultaneously. Zelda's story began as part of a discussion of family naming practices. Because my question asked about Zelda's *daughter-in-law*, Zelda repaired the referential domain to two daughters-in-law when she mentioned her *older daughter-in-law*. Although Zelda's repair could have had a purely informational or referential function in relation to prior discourse (establishing the correct domain of our discourse topic), it also had evaluative functions: what was predicated of the older daughter-in-law (*does call me Mom*) revealed Zelda's expectation about what she would like to be called, prefigured the point to be developed in her story, and defined a practice whose distribution in Zelda's family provided a later source of evaluation in the list of family members who use appropriate address terms.

In addition to being referentially and evaluatively tied into pre-story talk, Zelda's story was also linked with her post-story talk. For example, the list of the daughter-in-law's positive qualities, first presented immediately after Zelda's story (19–22), was also embedded in Zelda's later list of family members who use the appropriate address terms (38–42). The list of family members also added a new layer of evaluative information relevant to Zelda's story. By providing evidence for the validity of Zelda's rule (*you have to start in the beginning*, 27) the list clearly revealed Zelda's rejection of the daughter-in-law's account for not calling Zelda "Mom" (an account only implicitly rejected in Zelda's story). Still another link between Zelda's story and post-story list was through discourse referents and the referring terms used to evoke them. The main referent in Zelda's story (her younger daughter-in-law) remained a main referent in Zelda's list (or accessible topic, in the terms of Ariel 1990). Evidence for this was Zelda's use of the pronoun *she* to evoke the younger daughter-in-law in an environment that often *dis*favors the use of pronouns as next-mentions of prior referents. Specifically, Zelda evoked the younger daughter-in-law through *she* in *And she's an intelligent girl* (38), even though the most recent, semantically compatible antecedent in the text was the older daughter-in-law (*Now my daughter-in-law did*, 28). (Note that this referent was itself pronominally continued as *she* in 29–30, and therefore also had status as an accessible topic.)

Both stories were also globally situated in relation to a similar cultural theme: how to integrate outsiders, whose beliefs and practices may differ from one's own, into one's family. That such integration may create difficulties was revealed through the same metaphor in both stories

relationships as an organism. This metaphor pervades both our public and private discourse (e.g., we complain about *social ills*, an *unhealthy society*, we try to *cure* social problems). Thus its use as evaluation of the reported encounters situates the story topics – intermarriage, terms of address – in culturally salient and socially familiar terms. Both stories also told about a threat to family integration by re-creating particular encounters, during which that threat was interpersonally negotiated through routinized and face-saving sequences of speech acts. The stories thus instantiated the belief that face-to-face interactions can help solve more general social and cultural dilemmas (a sentiment captured in Zelda's *We did bring it out in the open*). Like the "society as organism" metaphor, the belief that talk can help solve problems is widespread and pervasive (e.g., psychotherapy is viewed as a "talking cure").

The way that the two experiences were verbalized as narrative also shows some similarities. Both stories crystallized what was probably an ongoing family issue into brief verbal interchanges in which familiar sequences of speech acts, realized through relatively conventional linguistic strategies, were used to reveal family trouble and its resolution. But because the stories did not include the third move necessary to our definitions of conflict talk, the speech acts themselves could not be defined as conflictual. Even the act initially responsible for each particular interchange was absent from the stories. Thus, although Ira announced the source of family trouble prior to Jan's story (*my daughter went out with a couple Gentile kids*), the date that actually led to the interchange was not reported as an event in the story, but only presupposed by Jan's adverbial *when* clause (*when I heard she was goin' out with him*).

The process of verbalizing an experience was reflected not only in the contents of the stories (what was said or not said), but also in how syntactic form, information status, and contextualization cues were used to convey pragmatic meanings central to the themes of the stories. The syntactic contrast between directly and indirectly reported speech, for example, had a role in the construction of story characters: the way Jan's daughter accepted responsibility was enacted through direct speech; the way Zelda's daughter-in-law avoided responsibility was enacted through indirect speech. Another example of the pragmatic role of syntax was in Zelda's offer of a compromise in "*if you can't say Mom, just call me by my first name!*" What made this move accommodating was its verbalization as a conditional sentence with a preposed (rather than postposed) *if*-clause, whose information status as shared knowledge had been textually grounded. A final example is the use of intonation as a contextualization cue. Both Jan and Zelda disengaged themselves from controversy through reported speech (*I don't care!, That's okay!*) whose communicative force was conveyed not only lexically, but intonationally: both used a low-high-mid intonation contour (with each level falling on one of the three syllables in their utterances) that seems to conventionally indicate a lack of emotional involvement.

By situating and verbalizing a specific experience in the ways just described, Jan's and Zelda's stories allowed them to display different aspects of self, to construct a position in relation to a family member, and to present themselves in a "mother" identity. Note that I have been using the terms *self*, *position*, and *identity*

as if their definitions, relation to one another, and means of identification in text were always clear. But just as it was important to summarize the processes by which the stories verbalized and situated experience, it is also important to relate the constructs of self, position, and identity to one another, as well as to sociolinguistic analysis of narrative.

Narrative Displays of Self, Position, and Role

Narrative is a means by which to arrive at an understanding of the self as emergent from actions and experiences, both in relation to general themes or plots and as located in a cultural matrix of meanings, beliefs, and practices. The form, content, and performance of narrative thus all provide sensitive indices of our personal selves and our social and cultural identities. In this section, I am more explicit about how I related the concepts upon which I depended (e.g. self, position, identity) and how I located them in the narratives.

My analyses showed that both Jan and Zelda displayed themselves in two different ways, i.e. as relatively accepting and as critical. The way these two displays of self were linguistically differentiated in the stories coincides with J. Bruner's distinction (1990) between epistemic and agentive selves.[4] He suggests that we present ourselves epistemically when we state our beliefs, feelings, and wants; agentive aspects of self are revealed when we report actions directed toward goals, including actions that have an effect on others. Jan and Zelda both presented themselves as figures taking actions (primarily verbal actions such as saying *I don't care!, That's okay!*) that were part of cooperative interactions. These presentations were displays of agentive selves. But far from permitting and accepting practices not in keeping with family norms, the evaluations of both speakers viewed such practices metaphorically as disease that could either be *cured* or remain *a sore spot.* These beliefs, and their indication of family trouble, were displays of epistemic selves. Thus the evaluations in both narratives presented epistemic selves that were at odds with the agentive selves displayed in the complicating actions.

Although it may seem that agentive selves would be naturally housed in complicating actions, and epistemic selves in evaluation clauses, the actual correlation between self and text was not quite so neat. Not only were epistemic selves not restricted to external evaluation clauses, but they did not appear solely through the linguistic forms in which we might expect them (e.g. as first person epistemic factives like *realize, know,* or emotive factives like *be glad*). As in most analyses of oral narrative, I found that speakers convey their attitudes, feelings, and beliefs – the very stuff of the epistemic self and of narrative evaluation – in a variety of ways.

Event clauses in the complicating actions of both stories, for example, had epistemic functions simply because the actions performed were conventionally associated with certain speaker intentions and/or attitudes. To be more specific, since making a request is a felicitous speech act only if the speaker wants the hearer to do a particular act, the performance of a request displays a particular attitudinal state – in Searle's words (1969), a sincerity condition.

Thus, when Zelda requested that her daughter-in-law just call her by her first name, we can assume that this was something that Zelda wanted, and thus was a display of an epistemic self.

Just as the linguistic display of an epistemic self was not restricted to a single section of text, neither was it confined to a single predicate type. Thus the third person attribution *she's a very sweet girl* was conjoined (with no intonational break) to the first person statement *I like her very much* in Zelda's list (a text structure in which similar items are clustered together). Since both seemed to reveal Zelda's positive attitude toward her daughter-in-law, both displayed an epistemic self. Negative attitudes toward social conduct were also inferable in a variety of ways, including action clauses that had evaluative functions. For example, Zelda depended on reported actions as evaluation during her list of family members who behaved appropriately – a list that included her own reported actions (e.g., *I did it, I got used to it*). Finally, even the clearest presentations of Jan's and Zelda's criticism were not direct statements of attitude, e.g., "I didn't like what she did." Rather, both speakers relied on metaphors (*That cured her!, Well, that's a sore spot*) to convey their feelings about non-normative practices in their family.

In addition to widening the range of ways in which we can display an epistemic self, my analysis also moved the linguistic display of self from a clause level to a text level. This allowed us to see that presentations of self may contradict (as well as reinforce) one another; in addition it showed that we present ourselves through the forms and meanings of textual patterns that cannot always be anticipated until we do a detailed examination of particular ways of speaking, and the interpretation of the social and cultural meanings of what is said. Thus the use of syntactic and textual forms as varied as constructed dialog, lists, and repetition – and a consideration of how these (and other) forms were sequentially and socially situated – worked together to display different aspects of self.

Moving the display of agentive and epistemic self to a textual level (and even more, to the way texts reconstruct interactions) also helps to build a connection between our linguistic displays of self and the construction of positions (Davies & Harré 1990). Many of the actions and attitudes that we represent through speech are interactional in nature: when we perform an action through speech, we are acting *toward* another person with some possible effect on that person. We have beliefs and attitudes not only about situations and events in the world, but about other people, as well as their role in situations and events. Thus the agentive and epistemic selves that we display linguistically, through reported actions and beliefs in a story world, provide a sensitive index to our ongoing relationships with others in that story world. It is this indexical relationship – between agentive and epistemic selves, on the one hand, and ongoing relationships, on the other – that I have tried to capture through the term *position*. To take a concrete example from my analysis, Zelda's *If you can't say Mom, just call me by my first name!* can be seen as an agentive display that indexed a position of solidarity with her daughter-in-law. Thus the way we use language to display epistemic and agentive aspects of self, during our stories, positions us in relation to the characters in those stories: what we say we do and believe within a story world continually reflects, and has consequences for, the way we construct our social relationships within those worlds.

So far I have reviewed the way that I have expanded the range of linguistic resources for the display of self; I have located those displays in texts, and suggested that such displays interactionally position speakers within a story world. Implicit in my analysis was that our story-world positions help reveal the social roles that we are occupying within a story. Traditional sociological frameworks view role as the typical activity engaged in by an occupant of a particular social status (with status viewed as a position in a system of positions; see Goffman 1964 and references therein). But roles are not viewed as properties of individuals alone: our roles and statuses are bound together by sets of reciprocal expectations and obligations about what to do, and about how and when to do it. To take a simple example, when I am teaching, I am expected to act in a certain way: to speak with some authority, raise topics for discussion, and give instructions. But such conduct will "work" only if others engage in the practices expected of them by taking up the reciprocal status of "students," e.g. allowing me an extended floor of talk, building on my topics, and following my instructions. We sustain our roles and statuses, then, in the face-to-face interactions and the everyday practices through which we reveal and negotiate reciprocal expectations about how to act and what to believe (Goffman 1967, 1971, Cicourel 1972). Put differently, who we are is sustained by our ongoing interactions with others, and the way we position ourselves in relation to those others. Likewise, when we report interactions through which to construct positions in narrative, we offer our audience a glimpse of ourselves as an occupant of a social status engaged in role-relevant behavior – but one who is located in a time, place, and situation quite different from that of the interaction in which our story is told.

The story-world role displayed by Jan and Zelda in the two narratives was the role of "mother." Although I propose that their "mother" role was partially established by their story-world positions (which balanced solidarity with distance, autonomy with control), it is helpful first to review more obvious indicators that a "mother" role is being enacted in both stories. The most obvious indicator that Jan and Zelda were speaking as mothers is the way they referred to their story-world interlocutors: Jan spoke of her *daughter* (rather than use her first name); Zelda spoke of her *daughter-in-law* (rather than first name or *my son's wife*). Another obvious indicator is that evaluative comparisons remained within the realm of the family: Jan compared her daughter to her son, while Zelda compared her two daughters-in-law, her son, and herself as a daughter-in-law. Note finally that one of Zelda's complaints in her story, that she is not called "Mom," specifically defined a symbolic domain for Zelda as a mother.

Other indicators that Jan and Zelda were speaking as mothers in their stories are less obvious, depending more on social and cultural expectations for occupants of a "mother" role. First, both Jan and Zelda constructed representations of self through their responses to another woman's deviation from expectation – a deviation that threatened family solidarity. Their reported efforts to remedy the deviation, to maintain family standards and control threats to family relationships, displayed relatively traditional aspects of the role of "mother" in American middle-class society, conforming with the role of "mother" as one

whose focus is the domestic world of home and family. Second, by telling me their stories, Jan and Zelda were engaged in what Goffman 1959 calls impression management. However, the impressions that they managed, through both the events and evaluations of their stories, were not just impressions about self, but also about family. This conforms with the role of "mother" as one centered on the expressive/symbolic domain of family life more than the instrumental/material domain.

Finally, the dual positions discussed in this article – positions that pivot between solidarity and distance, between the provision of autonomy and the exercise of power – also seem to define Jan and Zelda as mothers, although perhaps in a more specialized capacity and relationship as mothers of adolescents or adults. The actions and reactions of both Jan and Zelda struck a delicate balance between acceptance and rejection of a non-normative practice. This balance not only underlies the dual positions just noted; it also epitomizes the conflict between closeness and distance noted by many authors to characterize mother/daughter relationships. The linguistic construction of dual positions in both stories thus allowed Jan and Zelda to present pictures of self in relation to another woman in their families, pictures that preserve their closeness with that woman at the same time that they permit some distance.

The need to balance closeness with distance, and autonomy with control, is of course not unique to either parent/adult child or mother/daughter relationships. Creating such balance in all social relationships is often facilitated through linguistic strategies of indirectness. The dual positions displayed by Jan and Zelda in their roles as mothers both relied on indirectness. Besides not directly telling another person how to act, both womens' strategies depended on an intricate disengagement of the literal and more conventional meanings of what is said from situated inferences about what is meant. Thus one of Jan's central actions in "That cured her!" was "*You're goin' out with a Gentile boy?*" Jan's daughter interpreted this question as a challenge, but Jan relied on its literal function, as an information-seeking question, to display a lack of involvement in her daughter's decisions. Zelda's reliance on indirectness was somewhat more complicated. Zelda disengaged a linguistic practice, the use of an address term, from the social relationship that it can symbolize. By listing valued attributes of her daughter-in-law and describing the closeness in her family, Zelda implicated that the conventional meaning of being called "nothing" did not apply to her specific relationship with her daughter-in-law. Thus Jan and Zelda both created dual positions by disengaging the general and conventional meanings of words from the individual and particular inferences that words can evoke.

I have reviewed the ways that I relate self, position, and role, and how I locate these concepts in sociolinguistic analyses of narrative. I have suggested that the agentive and epistemic selves displayed by Jan and Zelda helped construct dual positions that indexed them in the social role of "mother." Finally, I will briefly compare the view of social identity that has emerged from this analysis with another view in sociolinguistics.

Sociolinguistic Constructions of Identity

This article has used a detailed analysis of two stories to show how the language used in narrative creates a story world in which both agentive and epistemic displays of self can position a story teller in a matrix of actions and beliefs that together display a social identity. The analysis suggested that social identity is locally situated: who we are is, at least partially, a product of where we are and who we are with, both in interactional and story worlds.

To use a visual analogy, we can say that telling a story provides a self-portrait: a linguistic lens through which to discover peoples' own (somewhat idealized) views of themselves as situated in a social structure. The verbalization and textual structure of a story (analogous to the creation of form and composition in a portrait) combines with its content, and with its local and global contexts of production, to provide a view of self that can be either challenged or validated by an audience. Blum-Kulka's distinction (1993:363–65) among three different aspects of narrativity provides another way of capturing this analogy: just as a self-portrait displays oneself (the artist) through both the contents and means of production of an image (e.g. the use of color, the composition), so too a story displays oneself (the teller) through both a tale and the telling of an experience.

Of course it is hardly surprising to say that language displays social identity and relationships. This is a common assumption of sociolinguistics and other contextual approaches to language, and the view that identity is locally situated is well established in interactional and conversation-analytic approaches to discourse (Schiffrin 1994a). But my suggestion that identity is locally situated does differ somewhat from the view of identity assumed by some sociolinguistic analyses, especially those that focus on levels of language structure other than the textual. Sociolinguistic studies of variation, for example, often assume that identities are like fixed attributes that are permanent properties of speakers. It is this assumption that underlies the variationist practice of coding identity as a categorical variable, remaining constant despite contextual changes. Thus speakers like Jan and Zelda would be coded as White, middle-class, middle-aged Jewish women. They would be assumed to maintain that very same identity, with the same constellation of features, regardless of the activity or interaction in which they were engaged. The view offered here suggests that identity is neither categorical nor fixed: we may act more or less middle-class, more or less female, and so on, depending on what we are doing and with whom. This view forces us to attend to speech activities, and to the interactions in which they are situated, as a frame in which our social roles are realized and our identities are displayed – and even further, as a potential resource for the display (and possible creation) of identity. Our transformation of experience into stories, and the way we carry it out, is thus a way to show our interlocutors the salience of particular aspects of our identities.

This view of social identity need not conflict with the methodological and theoretical interests of those sociolinguists seeking to identify and explain communitywide variation in language use (cf. Eckert & McConnell-Ginet 1992, Rickford & McNair-Knox 1993). In fact, variationists can build on this view of

identity in two ways. First, on a very practical methodological level, variationists can modify the way identity is coded as a factor or constraint. Just as variationists already build into coding procedures the belief that there are no single-style speakers (Labov 1972a), so too they can incorporate the notion that identity is dynamic, i.e. that there are no single-identity speakers. In coding the identities displayed during the two stories discussed here, for example, one might emphasize gender and/or family role – a role that might be downplayed in other sections of the interaction. Second, on a more conceptual level, variationists can rethink their view of social identity. The identities that we display and that others act upon during sociolinguistic interviews, and during the narratives told during such interviews, are no less situated than those whose relevance emerges during other activities. We are continually locating and relocating ourselves, defining and redefining ourselves and our worlds: telling a story about a personal experience is merely another example of a process that pervades our ways of speaking, acting, and being in the world. Perhaps integrating an understanding of this process into all areas of sociolinguistics will help us explain how both social and linguistic heterogeneity are not only community products, but also locally situated interactional processes.

Notes

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1. Although I do not discuss it here, there are further indications of Ira's shift in participation status, e.g. Ira's unfilled search for an example in 4, Jan's offer of *Craig* as an example in 5, and Ira's *but . . . eh* as a turn-transition device in 8.
2. The reference to *my son-in-law* is a striking shift in deictic center (use of a referring term appropriate to speaking time, rather than narrative time). Perhaps it is used to prefigure the outcome of the story.
3. Schiffrin (1994a: 72–76) discusses the relationship between offers and requests.
4. Although I speak of agentive and epistemic selves, this is for convenience only: I view both as *aspects* of self, not distinct "acting" vs. "feeling" selves.

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64

The Discourses of Food in the World System: Toward a Nexus Analysis of a World Problem

Ron Scollon

> "We are the flour in your bread, the wheat in your noodles, the salt on your fries. We are the corn in your tortillas, the chocolate in your dessert, the sweetener in your soft drink. We are the oil in your salad dressing and the beef, pork or chicken you eat for dinner. We are the cotton in your clothing, the backing on your carpet and the fertilizer in your field." Cargill corporate brochure 2001, cited in du Bois (2005: 19).

Corporate Control of the World's Food Supply

In its commodities marketing brochure the Cargill corporation boasts that if you eat at all, you are likely to be eating a Cargill food product. Bob Kohlmeyer, a former manager at Cargill, comments,

> "For people who want to buy corn, there really isn't much choice but to come to us." (du Bois 2005: 13).

The world's food supply is rapidly being corporatized and corporate control of food is being monopolized. The consequences of this are disastrous both for those who can afford these industrialized foods in the developed nations and for those who cannot afford the foods themselves but are forced by economic conditions in the world system to work in the fields as their producers.

Source: *Journal of Language and Politics* vol. 4, no. 3, 2005, pp. 467–489.

According to a new report by ActionAid International (du Bois 2005), one third of the processed food in the world is produced by just 30 companies. For example, just three companies own 85 percent of the world trade in tea. In Mexico, one company – Wal-mart – now accounts for 40 percent of the retail food market. If also we consider staple foods such as grain and seed, so crucial in daily nutrition everywhere in the world, international trade in grain is 90 percent under the control of five corporations, and just one company, Monsanto, controls 91 per cent of the world's genetically modified seed.

For those who shop in the increasingly gargantuan, cost-cutting stores of which Wal-mart is only the most successful example among many, perhaps this means some reduction in the cost of living. For those with income levels that allow them to invest in these transnational food corporations, corporatization and monopolization are good developments which provide them with higher returns on their investments. The destruction of small-scale food producers from farmers to local grocery stores and the massive impoverization of Third World laborers and whole communities, however, is the cost of a cheaper cup of tea or loaf of bread. As one tea worker in Tamil Nadu, India puts it,

> "Earlier we used to buy fish or meat once or twice a week. Now that has stopped completely. We can't even think of it on wage day. We've stopped buying vegetables. Before we used to buy vegetables on credit and pay on wage day. Now we can't manage that. Can't cut down on rice because it fills everyone's stomachs, but we can't afford vegetables and dal anymore." (du Bois 2005: 11)

There are devastating consequences of the current and rapid restructuring of food production in the world system (Wallerstein 1983). There are, of course, many analyses of the rapidly globalizing world system. Wallerstein, however, is generally credited with originating the term 'globalization'. His work over three decades has been to elucidate the political and economic restructuring of the economies of nationalism into one of a world system. While, sadly, the work of Wallerstein is not yet well known among linguists and discourse analysis, Blommaert (2005) is an example of a linguistic anthropologist who has also used the concept of the world system to good effect as a theoretical construct upon which to ground his discourse analyses. Here, through reference, I wish to signal that the approach I am taking in this paper and in current work is to seek to focus on the persistent and difficult issue of what is also referred to as the globalization discourse of neo-liberal, neo-capitalist, or new capitalism (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Fairclough 2003).

What my approach attempts to do, however, is to seek out and to analyze rather minute and concrete moments in the daily lives of social actors in which these very broad discourses of the world system are made real in the actions of common people. While socio-political discourse analysis contributes much to our understanding of the world system and the social issues which arise from globalization, we are often left with little purchase on moments of action in common daily lives where these world processes are grounded. My goal is this

paper is the rather modest one of sketching out the role of discourse analysis in addressing an issue of world consequence through in such concrete moments of action. I argue, as have other critical discourse analysts (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Wodak 2001; Fairclough 2003), that discourse analysis has much to contribute as part of our analytical approach. Overall I would neither claim that discourse analysis (in any variety) can really solve such problems nor would I want to let discourse analysis be pushed aside as not being relevant to them. Or to put this yet another way, I want to suggest a way in which discourse analysis can be an integral part of a more complex network of analysis that crosses disciplines, situations, time frames, and the very difficult gap between academic analysis and action in the world. The comprehensive term I would like to use for this kind of analysis is 'nexus analysis'. A nexus analysis consists of focal points or nexus which are mediated actions through which circulate cycles of discourse (Scollon and Scollon 2004a).

What does It Mean?

I will begin with the label on a common can of tomatoes (Figure 1, Tomato Label).

A can of tomatoes encompasses a complex world of discourse. In the text-image box we read,

> "HEALTHWISE:
> Development of cancer depends on many factors. Eating a diet low in fat and high in fruits and vegetables, foods that are low in fat and may contain




Figure 1: Tomato label

vitamin A, vitamin C and dietary fiber, may reduce your risk of some cancers. Tomato, a food low in fat, provide vitamins A and C.

ENVIRONMENT WISE:
Steel Recycles."

This appears to the right of the larger text box of FDA required 'Nutrition Facts'. Together with the bar code box, the list of ingredients, and the identification of the company which made the product these make up the back panel of the label.

The front panel consists of the company name, the main ingredient – tomatoes, whole, peeled – and the net weight which are all superimposed on a photo of tomatoes. The flash star says, "Tomatoes provide vitamins A and C," below which it says, "See Back Panel for Nutrition Information".

Taken all together this forms a semiotic aggregate (Scollon and Scollon 2003) of at least eight texts and images. As an entry to the need for discourse analysis in understanding corporate responsibility in our daily nutrition we can ask: Does this text box tell us that eating this can of tomatoes will help to prevent cancer? First, we can observe that this is rather strongly hedged: "depends on many factors," "may contain vitamin A, Vitamin C and dietary fiber," "may reduce your risk of some cancers". The designers have focused the attention on "cancer," "reduce risk," "tomato," and "vitamin A and C". This focusing is accomplished through multimodal semiotics (Kress and van Leeuwen 1996, 2001; Scollon and Scollon 2003). The flash star suggests, but does not claim, that all we need to know is that tomatoes provide vitamins A and C. Further clarification is displaced to the back label. This is an important manipulative strategy to separate crucial information into different discursive spaces, whether that be on the front and back of the same can as in this case or into different times and media as when the label makes a claim which can only be substantiated by going to a website and engaging in prolonged email or telephone discussions with customer service (Scollon 2005).

The label implies or suggests but does not directly claim that these tomatoes will prevent cancer. To analyze this subtle claim further requires us to step back from these texts themselves to investigate the historical–institutional trajectories that have led to their presence on the label in the first place. The nutrition facts are required by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), but it remains a question for analysis whether these nutrition facts have any pragmatic function at all beyond keeping the producer legal with the FDA? The website of the ADM company – one of that small number of companies noted by the ActionAid statistics given above (du Bois 2005) – notes:

"ADM provides an extensive range of regular and specialty flours, fats and oils, sweeteners, cocoa and chocolate. In fact, ADM is your one-source supplier for virtually all the baking ingredients you'll ever need: dough conditioners, release agents, starches and gums, glutens, food acids, fillings and icings, complete bakery mixes – even ingredients that can add valuable nutrition claims to your product's label" (http://www.admworld.com/naen/food, accessed January 31, 2005, 11:44am AKT)

It is clear that ADM believes that there is market value not only in the foods one sells but in the nutrition claims made on product labels.

In the United Kingdom as well as in the United States there is an active discussion going on in the news about whether or not such products as chocolate bars should be given a health warning. They already have nutrition facts posted but it seems that people do not read them because apparently that is not keeping people from eating so many that their health is in danger. Who has time to read the nutrition facts and warnings? Debby Oakley, whom *The Guardian* describes as a 46-year-old mother of three who works as a secretary in Bristol, finds herself buying junk food when the children clamor for it. She says,

> "If you've got young children and you work, you can't read the labelling because you haven't got time. If they package it clearly, then I don't mind, but if it has small print, then I don't have time to read the labels" (Revill and Ahmed 2003).

The Managing Director of Cadbury's, a company known for its candy and chocolates, takes a different and predictable rhetorical position. Andrew Cosslett objects to placing health warnings on their candy by saying, "I don't think a Curly-Wurly is a dangerous thing." (Cozens 2003). But we can see that the linkage between public health and personal health is mediated by texts of particular genres – nutrition facts labels and this "W-I-S-E-" text box or the health warnings now on tobacco, drugs, and alcohol products. We can also see that these texts open up a large number of questions for discourse analysis about how people read texts in the flow of daily life.

Mediated Discourse Analysis

The cycles of discourse within which such labeling and the claims made circulate are often wide and complex. They include not only the immediate texts we confront, but also the designers and their designs, government regulators and their regulations, producers of the products we consume, the retailers who sell the products and, finally, the consumers who buy the can of tomatoes, open it, and use it in their cooking.

In what follows I first suggest that for an engaged discourse analysis the most useful focus of our attention is human action rather than language or texts.[1] A close focus on language leads to important insights about language but tends to lead away from engagement with the social issues which we are trying to address. We have called this approach mediated discourse analysis (R Scollon 2001a, 2001b; S Scollon 2001, 2002). As a form of discourse analysis this approach shares much with and relies heavily upon the work of others in critical discourse analysis, interactional sociolinguistics, sociocultural psychology, and anthropological linguistics. To the extent that mediated discourse analysis takes a different stance it is in its focus on the mediated action (Wertsch 1991, 1998) rather than discourse itself.

In this case, for example, we might focus on the action of the person who takes the can from the grocery shelf and decides to buy it. Our initial concern is not with such things as the analysis of implicature relations between images and texts in advertising, *per se*, though such an analysis is also essential in our focus on action. Our interest is in how such implicatures are used by people in taking actions which involve that can and those texts. We want to know how someone in a particular case actually uses the combination of text and image genres on the tomato can. It may well be that once the can is identified as containing whole tomatoes, the rest is noise or background image. The analysis of those texts may, in fact, be irrelevant to the common actions of buying, opening, and cooking the tomatoes. Does this cook, or actually purchaser, use or need to use the whole complex of linguistic and semiotic tools provided on the label or is the picture of the bowl of cooked tomatoes enough? Or the words, "Tomatoes, WHOLE PEELED" placed in the *ideal* position above the photo of the bowl of tomatoes in the *real* position (Kress and van Leeuwen 1996)? In each case it is an empirical question to be examined whether or not linguistic, semiotic, or discourse analysis is useful for that analysis.

Further, this focus on human action is complex, because action itself is complex, both in the moment of occurrence and in the historical trajectories which give rise to action. Mediated discourse analysis, therefore, examines the mediated action as it occurs within a nexus of practice. Any action is enabled by the historical bodies (habitus) of the social actors who take the action, the interaction order or social relationships which are currently ratified among them, and the aggregate of discourses in that place which are available to mediate the action. In this way an action occurs at a nexus of practice which is defined by the cycles of discourse which circulate through that moment of action (Scollon and Scollon 2003, 2004a, 2005).

Again, if we focus on the action of selecting this can of tomatoes from the grocery shelf we can quickly identify several discourses which are enabling of this action. The purchaser may habitually buy this brand of tomatoes for making spaghetti sauce and so the action entails little more than seeing a familiar color label. She or he may regularly buy this brand but is now shopping in a different store and so needs to rely on aisle identifications to locate what she is looking for. She or he may make reference to a scribbled shopping list. We have referred to these as the 'discourses in place'. They would include product, aisle, and store brands, labels, and layout and designs. They would also include shopping lists, a question to a store manager about where the canned tomatoes are. Whatever discourses are present in that site of engagement which mediate the action.

We would also want to include the social interaction order as this action takes place. The purchaser might be shopping alone in the afternoon with few limits on her or his time and so can consult the labels of several competing cans and make an informed decision about what to buy. On the other hand, as the woman quoted in *The Guardian* story has commented, if you are shopping with children you may have almost no time free of monitoring their activities in which to attend to the discourses present on the labels. Actions may or may not be collective

in the moment of action but in any case the interaction order among participant is a crucial aspect of how any discourse(s) present may be taken up in accom plishing the action.

The third crucial element has already been mentioned, that is the historica bodies (or habitus) of the social actors who are taking the action. We have pre ferred to use Nishida's (1958) term 'historical body' over 'habitus' as used by Bourdieu (1977) both because it is the prior term in our own usage and becaus(of the greater clarity in Nishida's work of the biological individuality of th(historical body as well as the theoretical tie to what he calls 'action-intuition (Scollon and Scollon 2005).

A man who always buys the same kind of tomatoes goes about the task o purchasing them in a way that is very different from that of another man whc has been sent out to get "a can of tomatoes" but who has no history with this action. Two women shopping together may find that one of them has a well-established practice of reading the labels carefully while the other buys recognized products quickly on the basis of the package design. Each will select the product differently with a different sub-set of actions and, if they are together these differences in historical body, i.e., established practices, will cause needed adjustments to accommodate the other as they are linked together within the interaction order of two people shopping together. These three elements are shown in Figure 2, Three Elements of a Nexus Analysis.




Figure 2: Three elements of a nexus analysis

As we have expanded the circumference of our analysis from the close focus on the mediated action, these three analytical perspectives are the organizing framework of a nexus analysis: the discourses in place, the interaction order, and the historical bodies of the social actors. One further concept needs to be developed here to understand the term 'cycles of discourse' or 'discourse cycle' (Figure 3). This is the concept of resemiotization (Iedema 2003). Bernstein (1990) has used the term 'recontextualization' Silverstein and Urban (1996)




Figure 3: Discourse cycle

'entextualization' and Vygotskians generally would speak of 'internalization' (Scollon and Scollon 2004a). Iedema relies on the earlier ideas of Latour (1996) and Mehan (1993).

Put simply, a resemiotization is the transformation of a meaning from one semiotic form into another.

The shopping list that our shopper carries can give a simple example of the concept of resemiotization. Perhaps there is a bit of conversation at home about what to cook for dinner. This establishes that a spaghetti sauce needs to be made. That, in turns, leads to a survey of the pantry where no canned tomatoes are found. That leads to putting 'tomatoes' or 'canned tomatoes' on the shopping list. In the store reading that word leads to the action of going down the appropriate aisle and selecting the can from the shelf. A fragment of a conversation becomes an action of looking in the pantry, writing a word or two on a piece of paper, reading those words and then taking the subsequent action of selecting the can.

We have thought of these successive changes of meaning on analogy with the water cycle in which water may solidify into ice or evaporate into water vapor, but throughout the cycle retain some core molecular identity as H_2O. This is only an analogy and we should not be too fixed in its application. It would be impossible to establish the essential form of meaning which is transformed in these successive resemiotizations. What is important to capture, however, is that discourse may relate to discourse via non-discursive semiotic means. Talk is transformed as physical action, physical action becomes the written word, physical mental action of reading becomes the physical action of handling a can. The tomato can in the shopping cart transforms this prior cycle into a material object which in some way 'freezes' the cycle into a decision (Norris 2004).

To recapitulate, then, mediated discourse analysis takes the moment of an action as the focal unit of analysis. This mediated action is the site in which three analytical entities coalesce: the historical body of the participants, the interaction order within which they are socially organized, and the discourses which circulate




Figure 4: Nexus analysis

through this moment of action. These 'discourses' circulate, as I have suggeste through processes of resemiotization such that they may be present as talk, te image, material objects, and the thoughts and actions of the participants in tl action. A nexus analysis, in consequence, is not only the analysis of the action the focal point but also of the discourses (objects, historical bodies) which circula through a moment of action.

We could schematically represent this nexus with the diagram in Figure A Nexus Analysis. It is important in reading this to think of the loops as cycl of discourse, not as the circles of a Venn diagram. For example, the 'shoppir list' loop suggests the cycle of conversation, searching the pantry, making a li and reading it in the store. The 'dinner menu plan' represents a conversatic about inviting guests to dinner, contacting them, putting together a menu an so forth. Each of these different cycles comes together at the moment of selectir the can for purchase though to be sure each has a different significance an degree of importance in this action, and this may not be the only moment action where the cycles converge.

Action and Discourse: Nexus Analysis

While it may seem paradoxical on first glance, the shift in focus from languag or text to human action actually entails an increased role for discourse analysi This is because our study of action is itself predicated on discursive constructio of action; to study action boils down to studying how people represent action. I short, we cannot study action without somehow representing action and as soo as we do, we are involved in this representational action at a more global leve

This is not just the familiar observer's paradox which has been with us least since Heisenberg (1958). Of course we cannot observe an action with

somehow being involved in that action, either directly through our presence or indirectly through the presence of our observational devices from cameras and tape recorders to the formal instruments of survey research. What I am getting at is something Kenneth Burke called our attention to fifty years ago (Burke 1969 [1945]) in his book *The Grammar of Motives.* Any action – all actions – may be construed in several different ways. Burke proposed a pentad of five major motives that may be configured in our descriptions. And because any action may be construed in several ways, *how* an action is construed is a value expression on the part of whoever makes the construal. This is a point elaborated by critical discourse analysts as well, of course (e.g. Fairclough 1992; Chilton 2004), as well as in positioning theory or discursive psychology (e.g. Harré and Moghaddam 2003).

Burke's pentad of motives are 'scene', 'purpose', 'agent', 'agency', and 'act', and it might take us a bit too far afield to go into a careful elaboration of his meaning. A simple example, however, will help to clarify. We might say a person is buying the can of tomatoes with which I began in order to make a tomato sauce for dinner. This description of the action places the motive for the action in the domain Burke calls *purpose.* She does X in order to accomplish Y.

But we might also have set up this description as any one of several 'scenic' motives, that is, motives that derive from the social scene or situation or the world outside of the individual social actors taking the action. Quite broadly I might have said that she bought the can of tomatoes because the world-wide system for the distribution of foods brought that can into the store at a lower price than any of the competitors.

Burke would also argue that this act could be construed from an agentive perspective. That is, it could be construed as an action arising from the motive of caring for her own health. As distanced observers we cannot know which of these motives might be the one(s) construed by the social actors in an action; as engaged observers we must ask what are the consequences of our own construals as well as those of the participants in the action.

To move to a different kind of example, a website for a natural foods company exploits these multiple accountings for action to enlarge its market audience.

> "At nSpired we specialize in making the best tasting, all natural (and/or organic) healthy food alternatives possible for individuals who are on restricted diets – be they self-imposed reasons (organic, Kosher, vegan, weight management, etc.) or because of allergies or ingredient avoidance needs (wheat/gluten, diabetes, lactose intolerance, heart health, etc.). Each of our brands caters to the special needs of these very special people." (nSpired Natural Foods 2003).

Note the agentive motives ("self-imposed reasons") which are given: "organic, Kosher, vegan, weight management, etc." In contrast to these are "allergies or ingredient avoidance needs". These motives, by implication, are not agentive or self-imposed reasons for food avoidance. They are somehow external to the agency of the person. These include "wheat/gluten, diabetes, lactose intolerance, heart health, etc." There are many positions to investigate in this example.

Perhaps "weight management" is not, after all, self-imposed, but mandated by the doctor. Perhaps wheat/gluten avoidance is self-imposed. These categories imply, if nothing else, that we choose to do some things like eat organic food but some other things just happen to us like food allergies.

Even the contrast that is set up between "self-imposed reasons" and "avoidance needs" is important to examine. In this ontology-epistemology of human action one arrives at doing some things by rational reasoning processes and then acts accordingly; other things come to us from the world around us and about all the agency we have in the matter is ducking them somehow if we can. These discursive choices of motives are laden with determinations of guilt and innocence, of choice and victimization. And, of course, whether you have chosen to eat nSpired Natural Foods or been cornered into that position by external forces such as your doctor, your children, or your spouse, it is clear from the mention of your "special needs" and the third person reference to "these very special people" that you, the consumer, are rather out of it. 'Normal', 'non-special people' just eat, never mind the motives. A trope of 'motiveless' behavior by contrast produces the user of these nSpired Natural Foods as someone needing special attention.

Using this line of analysis we can see the role of anticipatory discourse (de Saint-Georges 2004, in press) in setting up conditions for subsequent actions. The *nSipred* website sets some actions within a motive framework of agentive actions and others within a scenic motive. Things may just happen to a person.

At the outset I characterized the corporatization and monopolization of the world food system as a problem, a social problem which merits the engagement of discourse analysts. I have also noted that for those with the resources to invest in this system of food production this is not a social problem but a source of income. We could see the purchase of the can of tomatoes as a reasonable action of a consumer within a particular scene (it was a good price), more agentively as having an interest in promoting one's health (tomatoes may contribute to lowering the risk of cancer). In the same way the 'same action' might be set within one set of cycles of discourse as a source of income for the retailer, the distributor, the producer, the corporate grower, and any investors in these corporate entities, or we could see it as an action that further impoverishes the agricultural workers. Within a nexus analysis framework the statement of the issue is already an ideological commitment to a discursive line of argumentation.

I am arguing that there is no analysis of any action that is not embedded in a complex nexus of descriptions of motives. Those differing motives are often in a dialectic of change in which participants seek to achieve hegemony for their own characterization of the action. The discourse analyst is either in the game as one who ratines the existing hegemonic meanings through acquiescence or she or he may intervene in the action by offering up alternative discursive characterizations. Either way, the discourse analyst is an activist because our activities result in descriptions – research reports, conference papers, journal publications, and books which seek to provide a hegemonic description or at least a contestation of what *really is going on.*

While there is no way out of this engagement, as I see it, still such an engagement is also never unilateral; it is always a negotiation. For me the crucial move is to address the question of how we can make our engagements in social issues count for something in the world of issues we confront daily. From this point of view there is no typical or required subject matter for a discourse analyst; what is important is to take up issues where our analytical voices can make a useful contribution. To do this we might start anywhere, including in the domains in which we already have a solid footing. What I want to do is to open up the circumference of our analyses, to borrow another term from Burke, to see how and why and where alternative analyses can make a difference. We have called this opening of the circumference of our work 'nexus analysis' (Scollon and Scollon 2004a).

The Discourses of Food in the World System

In what follows, then, I will put forward a rough sketch of one area in which we ourselves are beginning to work under the broad project title: The Discourses of Food in the World System.[2] And here the 'we' I am using refers to my colleague Suzie Scollon and myself along with a growing group of people with common interests. In this project we are seeking to outline a set of discursive links between action at the momentary level of individual social actors and the very broadest cycles of exchange across the world system (Wallerstein 1983).

It is a crucial element of mediated discourse analysis that theorizing must be tied to the concrete, real-world, material actions of humans. While social problems are abundant, we have chosen to focus on the discourses of food in the world system. This gives us a very broad issue to address but at the same time an issue which is ours personally with each mouthful of lunch, with each sip of café mocha, and with each can of tomatoes we use in making soup. We ourselves are inextricably part of this discourse and so, while many issues might have been identified, this is one we cannot escape.

I will introduce this project with an example. A pre-adolescent girl is allergic to corn which makes her nervous and hyperactive. On the advice of an allergenist her parents carefully screen food products which come into their meals to avoid her allergic reactions. One day after a meal including a common baked product they regularly eat without reaction she becomes agitated and hyperactive. They then notice that the food package has a bright yellow sunburst graphic image with the word "new". Further examination of the list of ingredients compared with an old package shows that the baking company has added corn to its formula in making this formerly corn-free product. The parents then place this food on their no-buy list of foods.

A social change takes place along a complex cyclic trajectory which includes, in this case, an individual's allergic reaction to a specific food (corn), a family's practices of avoidance (reading product labels, purchases, cooking and serving meals), a baking company's product branding and labeling (a brand which once

meant 'no corn' now must be re-interpreted to mean 'corn'), that same company's production formulas (the changing cost of ingredients, competition with other similar product's formulas, corn producers' production and marketing strategies directed at intermediate consumers rather than end-consumers), Food and Drug Administration policies concerning labeling, and medical advice and practices concerning allergies. This complex cycle of discourse includes multiple transformations from text to material object to social practice; corn is represented by a baking formula, a 'new' sunburst graphic, words on a list of ingredients, an allergenic reaction, and, for the family, a new but null practice – the avoidance of further purchase and consumption of this brand of consumer product.

Social actors and their mediated actions are located throughout this cycle of discourse at many strategic points: a research chemist developing new, more economical strains of corn; a marketer seeking increased market share for the company's product; a baker developing new techniques for baking a re-formulated product, an allergenist treating a pre-adolescent patient or that girl's parents trying to carry out the treatment; a nutritionist preparing a policy for the Food and Drug Administration concerning mandatory labeling of food ingredients; or a girl who now cannot eat a product she had come very much to enjoy. A full nexus analysis of these cycles includes the historical bodies of very different social actors, the material objects (corn, corn flour, cardboard packaging with a graphic image and ingredients list), and the interaction order (allergenist, parents, and child), but also the large human, social, and material entities involved from corn farmers and agricultural research companies to national government agencies and associations of medical practitioners.

The discourse analyst may enter such a cycle of discourse at any one of many points: the analysis of product labeling, the study of face-to-face medical interviewing, the study of the internalization of product meanings into practice, the transformation of a marketing policy to sell more corn by-products into a new formula for a more traditional baked food, or the public hearings and other information gathering processes of a governmental agency in preparing its policy statements. And I should emphasize that discourse analysts have already conducted studies very much like these in several cases (Wodak 2001). Cook's (2004) important research in this area has focused directly on the marketing of genetically modified foods.

The Discourses of Food in the World System project extends such existing analytical processes. We are seeking to develop a comprehensive strategy for linking multiple projects into a network as a nexus analysis (Scollon and Scollon 2004). Our goal is to systematically make visible through our analyses the multiple ways in which discourse connects such phenomena as a girl's breakfast and a research chemist's laboratory analyses, a farmer's price/per/bushel for corn, the formula of a baked commercial product, and a graphic designer's yellow sunburst 'new' on the package.

We are organizing our project around a constellation of three separate projects which are linked in this nexus of the world system of food production, distribution, and consumption. Each one of these sub-projects investigates in some

detail a particular theme of central importance to our understanding of the discourses of food in the world system. These projects are:

- *Prandial practices: Eating from the market to the disposal*
- *Corn, tea, and intellectual property: The industrialization of food in the world system*
- *Mad cows, scallions, and global climate change: Food in personal and public health*

The first project, the *Prandial practices* project, begins at the focal nexus of actions which constitute our daily nutritional practices. Each time we buy food in the market, eat at a restaurant, or dispose of our garbage we produce nodes on a system of food production, distribution, and consumption. This project brings to light the array of food practices that are deeply embedded in our experience both as individuals and as members of particular social and cultural groups. We shop at the village market or at the discount food center; we pay with the negotiated number of coins as buyer and seller or with digital credit transactions that involve world financial institutions; we cook in private home kitchens or communal canteens; we eat convivially with much conversation or alone in the privacy of silence; we carefully compost the remains of our food or we chuck it down the disposal to join the effluent flow into the river.

Each of the myriad practices of consumption links us to other people who share those practices and divides us from those who do not. Our prandial practices link us to social worlds and to economic cycles that go far beyond our own gardens, markets, kitchens, and tables into the food production and distribution demands of the world system. This project begins with the common meal and reaches outward to discover the links to food in the world system through the close study of practices of shopping or restaurant selection, cooking, eating, disposal, and social interactions that center on food.

This latter interest in social interaction addresses the many ways in which the ingestion of substances from common foods to health supplements and pharmaceutical treatment affect behavioral and psychological activities of their users. A meeting slows to a dull pace; a coffee break is taken in which the participants enjoy an array of grain and sugar-packed snacks and a strong dose of caffeine and when the meeting reconvenes we find that simultaneous talk, overlapping, or agitated responses at a rapid pace become the interactional norms. Here we focus on the alterations that occur in the interaction order, participation frameworks, and styles of social interaction that occur because of changes in the behaviors and states of participants who have consumed food or drugs as part of a routine prandial practice (a coffee break, lunch, snack, dinner) or as part of a scheduled medication regime. Our interest is in the ways in which discourse as social interaction is entrained to the consumption of foods.

The second project, *Corn, tea, and intellectual property,* opens up the circumference of our observations and analysis to those world systems which produce and distribute our daily foods. This project directs attention to the industrial production of food and an extended range of food products with a special focus on such internationally significant foods as corn, soy, and tea. Corn takes the highly salient and recognizable form of yellow kernels on the cob at one extreme, but

at the other very opaque end of this spectrum it is the powder base maltodextrin in stamp and envelope glue. As a kind of neo-Whorfian hypothesis question we ask: When is corn 'corn' and when it is linguistically redistributed as 'glucose', 'fructose', 'sorbitol', or 'maltodextrin' in products often not imagined as food products at all such as envelopes and postage stamps. The first concern of this project is to map the cycles of industrial transformation from a common food plant in the farmer's field to a food additive or an industrial product sold on the world market. We are particularly interested in conducting a critical (Burkean) motive analysis of the linguistic ways in which foods become re-labeled or resemiotized as they move away from their more commonly recognizable forms, as they stop being food and become, as ADM puts it:

> "ingredients that can add valuable nutrition claims to your product's label" (http://www.admworld.com/naen/food, accessed January 31, 2005, 11:44am AKT)

If we take up the question of corn for a moment we can look at the problem of the mother who needs to avoid corn in the family diet because of her children's allergies. Where is she likely to find corn? The list presented by the National Corn Growers' Association (www.ncga.com) gives twenty-two main categories including adhesives and binders, paper-making supplies, pharmaceuticals, building materials, and cleaning products. Each of the categories has many subcategories. The NCGA estimates some 3,500 commercial and industrial products are made of corn.

The Great Smokies Medical Center of Asheville, NC (www.gsmcweb.com) provides a website to assist people with allergies in finding and avoiding corn. This website gives a comparably extended list of corn products. As dietary sources of corn they list over 60 foods from infant formula which contains a very high percentage of corn to wine, from bourbon to chewing gum, from vinegar to table salt. Non-dietary sources include aspirin, chalk, paper cups, toothpaste, and laundry starch.

While on the one hand allergenists advise those with a corn allergy to simply avoid corn, the industry is working assiduously to make certain that this avoidance is virtually impossible. As Cargill has said,

> "We are the flour in your bread, the wheat in your noodles, the salt on your fries. We are the corn in your tortillas, the chocolate in your dessert, the sweetener in your soft drink. We are the oil in your salad dressing and the beef, port or chicken you eat for dinner. We are the cotton in your clothing, the backing on your carpet and the fertilizer in your field" (Cargill corporate brochure 2001, cited in du Bois 2005: 19).

If we then imagine the mother of this girl who is trying to take the action of avoiding purchasing (and cooking and serving) corn, we realize that a significant piece of linguistic analysis will have to go into each product selection. Reading the ingredients list may not in itself be sufficient. Corn is frequently packaged as an ingredient under a large array of names. It travels as dextrose, glucose, dextrin

maltodextrin, lecithin, fructose, high fructose, vegetable starch, thickeners, sweeteners, syrup, vegetable oil, alcohol, maize, and sorbitol among many other non-'corn' names.

It is not a minor linguistic task for an individual consumer to cope with this very complex array of names and products, and it is one that seems to me is worth our consideration. This is one way in which the common consumer is cornered into making an impromptu linguistic analysis that goes considerably beyond the ordinary practical competence of the lay person. To put this in another way, it is one way in which corporate interests are able to exert their hegemony over the world food system by using a language and a discourse that is largely opaque and inaccessible to the people who need the information in order to undertake important actions. As I have argued elsewhere (Scollon 2005), it is an important strategy for such interests to displace the crucial information discursively into other media (websites, email exchanges, telephone calls to customer service, or written correspondence), spaces, and times which lie outside the crucial moment of the mediated action.

A second and important aspect of this sub-project is focused on the fact that corn, like soy, is now for all intents and purposes an intellectual property, not simply a food because of the nearly complete genetic modification of the entire panoply of US corn production. Intellectual property is an entirely discursive form of property: Its value is as discourse (codes, texts, symbols, formulas, images, designs, genetic codes) not material objects (CDs, books, photos, ears of corn or their seeds) – the author owns the text or genetic code, the consumer owns only the physical object, the book or ear of corn – and it is protected through discourse such as policies, laws, and contracts.

Until very recently food in virtually all of its forms was a material object that could be owned like any physical object. It could be bought and sold, grown, cooked, and eaten. As we now alter the genetic codes of foods and register those codes as intellectual property, we transfer those foods from material commodities to discursive ones. You may own the ear of corn but you may not save and replant the seed to grow more corn as you had been able to do for all the centuries of mankind (Cook 2004). Our main interest in this part of the project is to examine the consequences for sociopolitical and economic relations within the world system of this transformation from material object to discursive object through the study of genetically modified food organisms, principally corn and soy. As ActionAid International (du Bois 2005) has pointed out, there is a highly complex but tightly linked nexus of economic relations among world powers, industrial production, national economies, and the common day-to-day social, behavior, and medical problem of a mother seeking to avoid allergens in the foods she prepares for her children.

Finally, the third project, *Mad cows, scallions, and global climate change*, focuses directly on the consequences for both public health and personal health of these systems of production, distribution, and consumption of food. The project begins by examining the health problems which increasingly arise from the transportation of foods around the earth. Over 500 people in Pennsylvania are sickened, a few die from Hepatitus A, and the cause is thought to be scallions grown in Mexico. People in Hong Kong and Toronto fall ill from a deadly flu-like infection

that is believed to have been transmitted first from Chinese chickens to humans and then by humans around the globe. The beef industry of Great Britain is destroyed by the infection of cattle being fed on the remains of other diseased animals. Thus scallions are removed from ethnic Mexican cuisine, chicken from Chinese meals, and beef from the dinner tables of a nation of beefeaters.

The US and the UK elevate obesity to the highest levels of public health risk and Cadbury's managing director, Andrew Cosslett objects to the government suggestion that candy bars should be labeled as dangerous saying, "I don't think a Curly-Wurly is a dangerous thing." And a recent Pentagon report adds to the fright by saying that global warming could, by the year 2020 – just sixteen years from the time in which I am writing – result in massive famines, redistributions of the world population and food production centers, and as a consequence in wars and armed conflicts over food resources. Two recent reports on climate change which more fully develop these points are Hassol (2004) and US Climate Change Science Program (2004).

From infected animals to common confections there is an increased concern over personal health throughout the First World. At the same time that frightening public health scenarios such as BSE ('Mad cow disease') develop around the world, it becomes clear just how easily they might be manufactured by political enemies and so the US has passed a Bioterrorism Act to require all foreign sources of food to register with the FDA before importation of foods to the US. Thus discourse enters into the policing of the global flows of food in forms which range from registrations and certificates of imported foods to government requirements for nutrition labeling or health warnings.

Discourse analysis enters into this in two ways: First, we are interested in the increasing use of documentation as an instrument of social and political surveillance. This surveillance works both at the borders of nations across which foods are imported or exported and at the level of individual consumers through marketing surveys. But we are also interested in how knowledge about public and personal health is disseminated to and throughout the public. When a health warning is added to a product which already has a printed listing of nutrition facts, do we infer that the nutrition facts listing has lost its communicative meaning? How do the government and food producers communicate information about foods to the public and how does the public learn to take up this information in a way that is significant for personal health?

So now to summarize how these three projects are linked together, the *Prandial practices* project is linked to *Corn, tea, and intellectual property* in its examination of the ways in which world-wide food production comes into the sphere of daily life through practices of consumption. It is also linked to the *Mad cows, scallions, and global climate change* project as an ethnographic project which examines how public health issues from Hepatitis A and obesity to global climate are taken up as private health questions at the moments of significant action, that is at moments of consumption. The first focuses on the practices of daily food consumption, the second on the world-wide industrialization of food production and consumption, and the third on the consequences of this world food system for public and personal health.

Corn, Mad Cows, and Mad Linguistics: Is This Discourse Analysis?

We have set out the theoretical – methodological framework we are using for these projects under the term nexus analysis (Scollon and Scollon 2004a). While there is little that is new in the framework – researchers in a variety of fields have addressed many of the problems in which we are interested – perhaps two things are distinctive: First, we consider discourse (and therefore linguistic analysis) to be a major component of the circulation of the social problem under analysis. We share this crucial point with researchers working in critical discourse analysis. But, secondly, we consider the actions of social actors to be the most useful theoretical unit of analysis, not texts or language or discourse alone. To define a nexus analysis as succinctly as I can at this stage of development I can say that a nexus analysis takes as its central focus the action of a human social actor acting with mediational means. This it owes to activity/practice theory. A bite of a hamburger is the sort of thing we have in mind here. Where it extends activity theory is to then seek the trajectories of persons, objects, and discourses through this moment of human action. In this, nexus analysis is fundamentally ethnographic when it focuses on human actions, on the one hand, and historical when it focuses on the texts and other material objects which circulate through moments of action on the other.

Is this discourse analysis? My answer is both "yes" and "no". It is "yes" in the sense that discourse analysts have much to bring to the table in this kind of analysis. It is "no" in the sense that an exclusive focus on language and discourse will not be sufficient to engage the full range of knowledge that we need to deal with social problems of major human import. This is a form of discourse analysis that is linked in a nexus with other disciplines where our contribution is to address social problems through our analysis of discourse.

Notes

1. This is not simply taking linguistic action as the prime as has been done in speech act theory or more broadly in pragmatics or natural language philosophy. Within mediated discourse analysis action which has no linguistic component at all is treated theoretically on a par with action which is mediated through language (Scollon 2001a).
2. For another discussion of this project see Scollon and Scollon (2004b). A network of web-essays on The Discourses of Food in the World System is available at: http://www.aptalaska.net/~ron/FOOD%2005/DOFweb/index.htm.

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A Discourse-Centered Approach to Language and Culture

Joel Sherzer

My intention here is to delve into an ancient topic in the history of linguistics and anthropology, the relationship between language and culture. This topic is both so ancient and so basic to these disciplines and yet so thorny that, like other ancient and thorny questions (for example, the origin of language), it is a given of the disciplines, not talked about much in general terms, and even considered by many to be either tabu or else too old-fashioned to speculate about. But, and in some ways like the question of the origin of language, certain developments in anthropology and linguistics make it possible to talk about the relationship of language and culture in new and interesting ways. The development I have particularly in mind is the analysis of discourse that is rooted in social and cultural contexts of language use and considers questions of speech play and verbal art to be central.

Concern with the language-culture relationship finds its best-known modern expression in the writings of Franz Boas, Edward Sapir, and Benjamin Whorf. Boas insisted on the study of language and languages as essential to training and research in anthropology. Part of his reasoning, as expressed in the introduction to the *Handbook of American Indian Languages* (1911), is that language patterns are unconscious and provide access to unconscious cultural patterning otherwise inaccessible to researchers. This position leads rather naturally to what has come to be called the Whorf or the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, namely that language (that is, grammar) constitutes the means with which individuals think and therefore, especially as stated in its strongest form, language (that is, grammar) conditions or determines cultural thought, perception, and world view.[1]

Since my aim here is to recast the relationship among language, culture, and society, it is necessary to begin with some brief definitions. For the purposes of

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my argument here and in keeping with conceptions of culture from Sapir to Geertz and Schneider, I view culture as symbolic behavior, patterned organizations of, perceptions of, and beliefs about the world in symbolic terms. According to this definition, the locus of cultural behavior can be a single individual. It is more typically manifested in or shared by groups of individuals. Society is the organization of individuals into groups of various kinds, groups that share rules for the production and interpretation of cultural behavior and typically overlap and intersect in various ways. Language is both cultural and social. It is cultural in that it is one form of symbolic organization of the world. It is social in that it reflects and expresses group memberships and relationships. Language includes grammar, but goes beyond grammar. As a sign system, language has the interesting property of being both unmotivated and arbitrary (purely symbolic in semiotic terms) and motivated (iconic and indexical in semiotic terms).[2] It is unmotivated and arbitrary from the point of view of its properties as a formal, abstract system. It is motivated from the point of view of the meaningfulness and appropriateness that individuals feel about their language as it is used in actual social and cultural contexts. This takes us to discourse.

Like culture, society, and language, different people define discourse in different ways. In my view, discourse is a level or component of language use, related to but distinct from grammar. It can be oral or written and can be approached in textual or sociocultural and social-interactional terms. And it can be brief like a greeting and thus smaller than a single sentence or lengthy like a novel or narration of personal experience and thus larger than a sentence and constructed out of sentences or sentence-like utterances. My definition of discourse is purposely vague. This is because discourse is an elusive area, an imprecise and constantly emerging and emergent interface between language and culture, created by actual instances of language in use and best defined specifically in terms of such instances.

Notice that according to my conception, discourse includes and relates both textual patterning (including such properties as coherence and disjunction) and a situating of language in natural contexts of use. Context is to be understood in two senses here: first the social and cultural backdrop, the ground rules and assumptions of language usage; and second, the immediate, ongoing, and emerging actualities of speech events. Obviously the textuality of a brief greeting is slim, the essence of its structure being the sociocultural and interactional matters lurking behind it. On the other hand the textual structure of a three-hour myth narration will be quite intricate and complicated. Nonetheless it too intimately involves sociocultural and interactional features and these must be attended to analytically.

The Boasian tradition within American anthropology and linguistics did not ignore discourse. Quite the contrary. Boas and Sapir and their students insisted on the collection and publication of texts as part of a three-fold investigation of language, which consisted of grammar-texts-dictionary. But while texts were collected and published, they were not analyzed as discourse per se. They rather served the function of providing both linguistic and ethnological data. Furthermore, this tradition conceives of texts as fixed, inscribed objects and not in terms of text-context, language-in-use relationships.

Taking a discourse-centered approach to the language-culture relationshi enables us to reconceptualize the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Instead of asking suc questions as does grammar reflect culture or is culture determined by gramma or are there isomorphisms between grammar and culture, we rather start wit discourse. which is the nexus, the actual and concrete expression of the languag culture-society relationship. It is discourse which creates, recreates, modifie and fine tunes both culture and language and their intersection, and it is especiall in verbally artistic discourse such as poetry, magic, verbal dueling, and politica rhetoric that the potentials and resources provided by grammar, as well as cultura meanings and symbols, are exploited to the fullest and the essence of language culture relationships becomes salient.

The perspective I argue for here has illustrious predecessors, Sapir and Whor themselves primary among them. Sapir, in his book *Language*, and elsewhere views language as a resource for social and expressive usages and notices th poetic potential inherent in grammar. He compares language to a "dynamo cap able of generating enough power to run an elevator" but operating "almost ex clusively to feed an electric doorbell" (1921:14). Roman Jakobson insists in many places (e.g., 1968) on the intimate association of grammar and poetry. It is in verbally playful and artistic discourse that we find language turned on to its fulles potential and power, possibilities inherent in grammar made salient, potentials actualized. It is where, I believe, we should look for the language-culture-though intersection. Whorf's concept of "fashions of speaking" goes beyond grammar to include style and some of his examples (e.g., 1956:148–156) include forms o discourse (see Hymes 1961, 1974 for discussions of Whorf). Nonetheless, Whorf like Sapir and Boas, and in spite of their commitment to the collection and publication of texts, lacks a consistently systematic distinction between language structure and language use.

Dell Hymes's concept of cognitive style moves the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis beyond purely grammatical concerns into the area of verbal style, and his recent work in Native American narrative (1981) focuses on language-culture intersections as manifested in discourse. Paul Friedrich (1979, 1986) reformulates the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, placing what he calls the "poetic imagination" at its heart. Dennis Tedlock (1983:324) chides anthropologists for dealing with culture as if there were no discourse, as if the natives never speak. The natives Tedlock describes do speak and the narratives they speak are highly poetic.

Erving Goffman (1974) conceives of language, culture, and society as providing resources which take on meaning and structure by means of the communicative frames that activate them. Investigators of such everyday and institutional verbal behavior as face-to-face and telephone conversations, negotiations, interviews. gatekeeping, therapy, and court cases, while not focusing or insisting on verbal art or speech play per se, are very much concerned with the ways in which language-culture-society relationships emerge as pragmatically and strategically salient in discourse (see Erickson 1981; Gumperz 1982; Labov and Fanshel 1977; and Schegloff 1981).

Increasingly, contemporary research in linguistic anthropology takes discourse as its starting point, theoretically and methodologically, for linguistic

and cultural analysis. As distinct from viewing texts as metaphors (in the sense of Geertz 1973), an increasing number of researchers, each in quite different ways, analyzes discourse, large and small, written and oral, permanent and fleeting, as not only worthy of investigation in its own right, but as an embodiment of the essence of culture and as constitutive of what the language-culture-society relationship is all about.[3]

My discussion so far has been general. Now to some illustrative examples. My first has to do with the way a grammatical category is used in poetic, magical, and political discourse. Grammatical categories, especially optional grammatical categories, were the focus of much of the discussion in the Sapir-Whorf tradition. Sapir, Whorf, and adherents to the hypothesis associated with them often focused on grammatical categories which are not found in Indo-European languages and are in this sense exotic. These grammatical categories reflect a different way of expressing meaning from "our" ways, and, perhaps, a different unconscious patterning of thought.

It is because grammatical categories are economical and efficient ways of expressing meaning, particularly when compared with the cumbersome translation that rendering in other languages, such as English, requires, that they often have a poetic feel to them and seem to touch at the heart of the genius of a language and especially the language-culture-thought relationship. This is no doubt part of what Sapir meant when he compared Algonquian words to tiny imagist poems. Optional grammatical categories provide speakers with conscious or unconscious decisions, choices, ways of expressing meaning, which, I would say, are actualized in discourse.

This example comes from the language of the Kuna Indians of Panama. It is a grammatical category used to express body position in relation to action. This category, which indicates ongoing action as well as body position, is encoded in a set of four verbal suffixes: *-kwici* (standing, in a vertical position); *-mai* (lying, in a horizontal position); *-sii* (sitting); *-nai* (perched, in a hanging position). Several aspects of this grammatical category are worth noting, as they contribute to or serve as a backdrop to its use in discourse. First, it is an optional category. That is, any verb can be used without necessarily marking it for position. Second, many verbs are associated with one of the set of positionals as the most normal, ordinary, natural, or unmarked usage. Thus:

sunmak-kwici (talking-standing)
kam-mai (sleeping-lying)
maskun-sii (eating-sitting)
ua so-nai (fishing-perched)

Since this category is optional, its use in a particular context is salient, that is noticeable. It becomes all the more salient when it is either used in a marked way (e.g., *kap-sii* "sleeping-sitting," for someone who falls asleep on a bench in the public gathering house) or contrasted with other possibilities in a verbally playful or artistic way, as in the two illustrative cases I will now provide.

The first is a magical chant which is addressed to the spirit of a dangerous snake and is used to raise the actual snake in the air (see J. Sherzer 1991).

The magical power of the chant works in the following way. The spirit, on hearing the chant addressed to it in its special language, immediately does what the narrative of the chant describes and, at the same time, the real, actual snake does so as well. As in all Kuna magical and curing chants, this one is literally teeming with and organized in terms of mosaics of grammatically and semantically parallel lines. Parallel lines are often identical except for a difference in a single word or morpheme. The lines that concern us here occur at the climax of the chant, the moment at which the chanter tells the snake he is raising it in the air. This occurs as follows. The snake is first described as dragging and turning over, in the *-mai* (horizontal) position, that is free on the ground, in two grammatically parallel lines.[4]

kali mokimakkemaiye
kali piknimakkekwamaiye
The vine (euphemism for snake) is dragging *-mai* (in horizontal position).
The vine is turning over *-mai* (in horizontal position).

Then there is a magical formula:

"*unni na pe onakko' anti sokekwiciye*"
"Simply indeed I raise you' I am saying."

during which the snake is raised in the air. Then it is again described as dragging and turning over, but this time in a *-nai* (hanging) position, in two lines which are identical to the two I quoted above except for the change to the suffix *-nai*. They are thus parallel to one another and constitute a couplet parallel to the earlier one.

kaliti mokimakkenaiye
kali piknimakkenaikusaye
The vine is dragging *-nai* (in hanging position).
The vine is turning over *-nai* (in hanging position).

The text never explicitly and specifically states its most important meaning, that the specialist has actually succeeded in grabbing and raising the snake. Rather, this is expressed economically and laconically, by means of the simple shift from one verbal suffix of position to another, within a parallel line framework.

There are several points to be made here. First, the *mai/nai* opposition is a basic element in the general poetic structuring of this text. By occurring regularly throughout the text, followed by the suffix *-ye*, the positional suffixes contribute, in conjunction with pauses and musical melody, to the marking of lines within the text, an important aspect of their poetry. These suffixes also enter into and contribute to the parallelistic structure of the text. And the *mai/nai* alteration is, in the terms used by Roman Jakobson, a projection of the paradigmatic axis onto the syntagmatic axis, precisely Jakobson's definition of poetry. Here we have then a good example of what I call the *poeticization of grammar* – the grammatical function of a grammatical element or category is backgrounded, or combined with a poetic one. But in addition, the shift from *-mai* to *-nai* at the climactic

moment of the text, has a very powerful semantic effect crucial to the magic of the chant. When the snake is in the *-mai* position, in the first two lines quoted, it is still on the ground. But when it is in the *-nai* position, in the two later lines, it is "hanging" or "perched" in the air, that is, the chanter has performed the magical action of raising it, precisely through the magic involved in shifting from *-mai* to *-nai*, from horizontal position to hanging position. Through this mini-max solution (Labov 1972:349), this packing of a maximum of meaning into a minimum of form, grammar becomes poetry and poetry becomes magic. Notice that the difficulty, really impossibility, of translating into English these poetic/magical lines which constitute the most heightened moment of the text is an argument for my point that discourse, especially verbally artistic discourse, is the expression of the essence of the relationship, often unconscious, between language and culture.

A completely different usage of the grammatical category of position occurs in the figurative, symbolic language characteristic of Kuna politics, centered in the Kuna gathering house, the meeting place for political leaders together with members of their communities. The particular discourse form I draw on here is the speech performed as an inauguration for a new chief (see Howe 1977 and J. Sherzer 1983:96–97). These speeches are typically bristling with intersecting and overlapping metaphors and other figures – for chiefs and other political leaders – which speakers creatively draw on, manipulate, and create narratives out of. In one speech I have recorded and analyzed, the speaker uses the positional suffixes metonymically, in conjunction with a complex of metaphors. largely drawn from the Kuna plant and animal world, in order to represent Kuna political structure. Chiefs are *-nai* (hanging) because they are perched in their hammocks in the center of the gathering house when they chant myths in public performances, or *-mai* (lying) because they rest or even sleep in these same hammocks while other chiefs are chanting or at various times during the day. Chiefs' spokesmen are *-kwici* (standing) because they stand when making speeches in the gathering house or *-sii* (sitting) because they sit on special benches surrounding the chiefs. And ordinary villagers are *-sii* (sitting) because they sit on ordinary benches behind both chiefs and spokesmen.

Here the metaphor of chiefs as *-mai* (lying) is combined with the metaphor of chiefs as poles[5]:

walakan mamait, tayleku pel ipya kwinnitik.
The poles who are lying here, it seems all have their eyes alert.

Just as poles rot, chiefs become bad:

immar nunkumai, pe takke tayleku, suar icakkwasaar tayleku nunkumai.
Something is lying rotting, you see it seems, a bad pole it seems is lying rotting.

Here the metaphor of chiefs as *-nai* (perched) is combined with the metaphor of chiefs as animals, again, in this case, in a negative sense, symbolizing chiefs who have turned bad:

usis tulakan taylee simuryapa namaynai pe ittoto pittosursin.
You will hear the *usis* bug people it seems chanting-perched within the knot hole don't you hear.
akkwaser namaynai pe ittotappo.
You will hear the spider chanting-perched there.
iskwir namaynai pe ittotappo takken soke.
You will hear the cockroach chanting-perched there see I say.
tior tayleku tior tatakwat namaynai.
The scorpion it seems Grandfather Scorpion will be chanting-perched.

In this example, the grammatical category of position is poeticized, not by functioning in the creation of line structure and parallelism as in the magical snake-raising chant, but by entering into the figurative complex basic to the poetic rhetoric of Kuna political discourse.

Taken together, these two examples demonstrate the ways in which the grammatical category of position is exploited and actualized in the verbally artistic discourse of the Kuna. My point here is not that the Kuna, because of their language, are more aware of position or more capable of perceiving position than are speakers of European languages, as the best-known interpretation of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis would have it. Heightened awareness, conscious or unconscious, emerges from the multiple inputs provided by language-culture relationships. The grammatical category of position is a resource, a potential, a way of conceiving and perceiving the world which the Kuna language offers and which is made salient by entering into a web and network of associations actualized in discourse, especially verbally artistic discourse. This is Sapir's dynamo. The resulting depth, thickness, and intricacy is what Clifford Geertz finds characteristic of culture.

The Kuna grammatical category of position, especially as manifested in the snake-raising chant, reveals aspects of grammatical and semantic relations and relations between language and culture rarely studied by anthropologists and linguists, precisely because they can only be discovered through attention to actual instances of discourse. Traditional and conventional methods would not reveal the full meaning and potential of this grammatical category. Notice in particular that the shift from *-mai* to *-nai*, from the horizontal to the hanging position, in the crucial, climactic lines of the snake-raising chant, depends on the possibility, in this particular context, of ranking or ordering the suffixes semantically with regard to one another. That is, *-nai* is stronger, more powerful than *-mai* and it is on this fact that both the poetry and the magical power of the text depend. This kind of economical shift to a stronger or more powerful form within a set of grammatical or semantic relations is an instance of a phenomenon widespread in the world, the exploitation of sets of alternatives in discourse. It is often a crucial feature in a set of related forms of dialogic discourse – comebacks, verbal dueling, and bargaining. This takes me to my next extended example.

I draw this example from a short article by K. M. Tiwary dealing with a grammatical process widespread in India and beyond, known as the echo-word

construction (Tiwary 1968). The language Tiwary describes is Bhojpuri, spoken in northern India. The echoword construction is a form of reduplication in which a word is repeated without its initial consonant, sometimes with a vowel change. Thus the word *dudh* (milk) is reduplicated as *dudh-udh.* It is the kinds of meanings this grammatical process takes on and its use in discourse that interests me here. According to Tiwary, the echo-word construction serves as a label for the semantic field in which the base word occurs. Thus *dudh-udh* means "milk and the like" or "dairy products." Notice then that any member of the set of dairy products can be "echoed" to produce a word which can potentially be used as a label for the whole set. For example, *dehi* (curd) or *maTha* (butter-milk). But in actual discourse the selection is by no means neutral, in several ways and for several reasons. First, semantic fields are not absolute givens that are merely reflected in language use. Rather it is language use which creates and develops semantic fields. This is an illustration of what I mean when I say that language does not reflect culture but that language use in discourse creates, recreates, and modifies culture. Meaning, which is at the heart of the symbols-oriented conception of culture I am operating with here is on the one hand a mental construct; but it is a mental construct that is influenced by, as well as it influences, actual language use. Tiwary points out that the echo-word construction can be used as a secret-language of concealment. For example, a child, in the presence of his parents. from whom he wants to conceal the fact that he smokes, can ask someone, for example, a servant, to buy cigarettes for him in the market by overtly asking him to buy *deslai-oslai* (a box of matches and the like). The parents do not know. but the speaker and addressee do, that the semantic field of matches includes in this case cigarettes and that it is really cigarettes that the speaker wants.

Second, the choice of echo-word label for a semantic field is not neutral because the members of the field are often ranked hierarchically in one or another way. Returning to dairy products, the ranking of them depends on social and economic differences between the speaker and the addressee. If the addressee is of the lower income class, it is appropriate to select *maTha-oTha* (buttermilk and the like), since buttermilk is used by those who cannot afford other dairy products. On the other hand, forms such as *dudh-udh* (milk and the like) or *dehi-ohi* (curd and the like) are appropriate for individuals of means, who can afford these items.

It is in bargaining, and the verbal dueling which is at the core of the kind of elaborate bargaining that occurs in India, that we see this grammatical process operating to the fullest. If I am a buyer in a market and want to purchase goods for the lowest possible price, I will call dairy products *maTha-oTha,* thereby indicating that I am the kind of person who uses buttermilk and therefore cannot pay high prices. If on the other hand I am a seller and want to maximize both the politeness I demonstrate to a potential buyer and his or her ability to pay a high price, I will use *dudh-udh* or *dehi-ohi,* thereby showing respect for the buyer as a social person and also expressing my expectations that he or she can pay high prices. Ultimately there is a negotiation of both the linguistic form to be used and the price. With regard to the echo-word construction, Tiwary notes.

as I have for the Kuna category of position, that it is impossible to uncover its full meaning without studying naturally occurring discourse in actual social and cultural contexts.

In different parts of Asia such verbal-dueling bargaining occurs in different ways. In Bali, market bargainers use the lexical sets that reflect social caste and social rank, for example, the five or six different ways of expressing the meaning "eat." Sellers will often select forms that are relatively high socially, showing polite respect for potential buyers, but also an expectation of receiving a high price. As in India, buyer and seller verbally duel and negotiate both appropriate linguistic form and price of goods.

In the following example seller (S) and buyer (B) jokingly duel about the price of an item eventually purchased, both of them switching language levels as part of the give and take of language play and barter. Under each word of Balinese I have indicated its level as "a" (relatively high: *alus*) or "b" (relatively low or ordinary: *biasa*).[6] In one utterance, a speaker uses Indonesian, the national language of Indonesia; I have indicated this with "I."

S: *napi pindang?*
(a) (b)
How about some salted fish?
B: *ji kuda niki?*
(b) (b) (a)
What's the price?
S: *niki, anak pindang bes ageng jié.*
(a) (b) (b) (b) (a) (b)
This one, is a very big fish.
B: *inggih!*
(a)
(Yes)!
S: *kala nak ji tigang atus, cingakan dumun, kéné nyangluhné, to to.*
(b) (b) (b) (a) (b) (a) (a) (b) (b) (b) (b)
But the price is 300 [rupiahs], look at this, this is tasty.
B: *tiga ratus! bengu jié boné ah.*
(I) (I) (b) (b) (b) (b)
Three hundred! It smells very rotten.
S: *kangge?*
(a)
Do you want it?
B: *tak éket nggih?*
(b) (b) (a)
250 OK?
S: *tak telung benang nggih. mamané bé ni angkelé uug basangné, bé*
(b) (b) (b) (a) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b)
grago uluh-uluhe. siki?
(b) (b) (a)
270 OK. The fish got a broken stomach, because it had a small meal. You want only one?

B: *polih tak éket?*
(a) (b) (b)
Is 250 enough?
S: *siki siki?*
(a) (a)
Just one just one?
B: *kalih-kalih.*
(a) (a)
Two-two.
S: *aéng mokoh-mokohné, nasné pempen?*
(b) (b) (b) (b)
These are big, do you want the head in the **bag***?*
B: *baang apa?*
(b) (b)
To give to what?
S: *baang kucit, baang méng.*
(b) (b) (b) (b)
To give to a pig, to give to a cat.

Notice that after the price has been determined, all the forms used by buyer and seller are relatively low (b).

Tiwary, in his discussion of the Bhojpuri echo-word construction, provides an interpretation that assumes that language is a mirror reflection of culture and society. "This construction reflects certain set expectancies of a society in which the economic distinctions are glaring, quite old, and widely accepted for them to be congealed into linguistic constructions" (1968:36). I do not deny the economic and social distinctions. In both India and Bali they are old and indeed glaringly omnipresent. But I want to offer an alternative interpretation for both the Indian and the Balinese cases, one that sees discourse as the mediation between language and culture. The verbal dueling that is the centerpiece of economic bargaining negotiates status and role as it does price. It functions as if interlocuters either do not know one another's caste and socioeconomic status or else that such status is fluid, to be determined in actual verbal interaction. Both of these propositions are of course false, but nonetheless constitute the assumptions of verbal dueling and bargaining. This informal, colloquial, popular. and fleeting discourse form then is a verbal counterpoint played against the backdrop of the quite real Indian and Balinese social, economic, and verbal worlds, that of sharply defined and expressed caste and status distinctions. Verbal dueling, in its own playful way, also reinforces these distinctions. This is most serious and deep verbal play. In this example, as in the Kuna forms of ritual discourse, we see not an isomorphic matching up of grammar and culture, but rather discourse as a rich, intricate, and dynamic expression of, mediator of, and indeed creator and recreator of the language-culture-society-individual nexus.[7]

One final illustration concerns our own culture and society and the notion of cultural logic, as reflected in narrative. One of Whorf's favorite and best-known examples contrasts Hopi and Indo-European tense-aspect systems. Whorf argued that Hopi grammar is more attentive to verbal aspect than to tense, while Indo-European languages are just the opposite. He suggested that this makes Hopi a

more appropriate language, for example, in which to talk about contemporary physics. This was more of a rhetorical stance I feel than an actual belief on Whorf's part, but it makes its point. But again, where is discourse in all of this? Nowhere, or at least surely not prominent in Whorf's discussions.

Whorf's view of Hopi grammar has been challenged recently by Ekkehart Malotki (1983), who provides a massive set of sample sentences in which Hopis talk about tense and time in very concrete terms. But the Whorf-Malotki argument is about grammar, not about the actualization of grammar, in this case, tense and aspect, in discourse. This conflation of grammar and discourse, on the part of both Whorf and Malotki, confuses the issue. If we look, not at grammar, but at discourse, then a deeper correctness of Whorf's insight, namely that it is possible for a language to pay more attention to aspect than to temporality, emerges.

One quite appropriate place to examine tense-aspect systems is in narratives, which are reformulations of previous events. Narratives in English, and indeed in all European languages, whether written or spoken, formal or informal, are essentially a replay of a series of events in temporal sequence. That is, the organizing principle of Western narrative is time (see Genette 1972; Labov and Waletzky 1967; Mitchell 1981; Prince 1973). Notice that I did not say past tense, since the present tense (sometimes called the historical present in such cases) can be used as well to reflect temporal sequences in the past. And in colloquial, spoken narratives, such words and particles as "well," "so," "then," "OK," and "and" are used to move descriptions along in temporal sequence.

Here is a rather typical example of an American English oral narrative, a portion of a hunting-related story told in central Texas about the exploits of a coyote and deer.[8]

But that little ol', little ol' yearlin', up there, man he threw up that tail 'n' went runnin' off round up through, round the edge of the hill.
An' uh, when he did, then, the ol' coyote time he creeped on up where the deer was.
An' he's standin' there, sniffin' the ground, sniffin' the ground. I was watchin' through the binoculars. He's out about a hundred 'n' fifty yards.
Man all of a sudden, that rascal jus' tore loose a-runnin'. I mean jus' diggin' it like this. He wasn't he didn't start off you know sumthin' that turned round and looked like this 'n' then run. He just took off to runnin'.
And ah. I was watchin' him run, cause he's runnin' up this sendero.
About, oh two hundred 'n' fifty yards up there before we got to brush.
'N' then what do you think run in run up in them glasses with him while I was watchin' him run goin' this away?
Whadda you think run in there with 'im?
That ol' doe.
That ol' doe run right in there with him an' she could run up close enough to 'im, to where his tail was was between her front legs like this, went running.
But she had to skip one step to get at 'im with that foot.
And when she'd skip one step, then he'd gain, he'd gain a step.
Then she couldn't reach 'im.
And an' then, then she'd catch up with 'im again, an' when she tried to catch that next step like that, she couldn't git 'im.
Then ah, she was runnin' 'im like that an' then here them two little ol yearlin's they come runnin' off out here right on the edge o' the sendero watchin' mama run the

The temporal ordering of events in this narration is identical to their original, actual ordering, or at least as we as listeners are supposed to imagine them as having occurred. Given the temporal organization of most narratives told in European languages, it is not surprising that narrative theorists, often without knowledge of non-European narrative traditions, define narrative universally in terms of temporal sequence. But this is not necessarily so in other languages, cultures, and narrative traditions. Instead of Hopi, let me return to the Kuna, whose narratives I am much more familiar with. Kuna grammar offers much more elaboration in aspect than tense. And Kuna narratives, while they do reflect temporal order, focus much more on aspectual matters, the location, direction, and ways actions are performed, so much so that Western readers have difficulty following translations.

Here is a passage that is particularly difficult for English readers, who tend to find it temporally illogical; but it was not for the Kuna audience that heard it.[7]

tek ipakwen maskuttasunnoe.
"maskunnar" sokele punorka sokkartasunto sus kepe "muuu tikkarpa kep ainiarsun" sake a.
(visiting chief: *etto so.*)
"ainiarto tiylesat nappa askin ainiarto immar mattutikki ainiar" soke.
(visiting chief: *eee.*)
tey tunkutanisun mu taytisunna i-pi-wa.
(visiting chief: *ipi ainiali?*)
eye.
tey pinna nakkwe ainitani ainitani ainitani tey turpamakkarsunto.
(visiting chief: *ee.*)
tey turpamakkarku e san nakuar takkarku kaa.
(visiting chief: *kaa.*)
mm, "ka" takken soke.
(visiting chief: *ee.*)
tey muu ka, akkwemasunna mukatka kusparsunto kate a. ka ai ok-kin-no-te (voice vibrates) *ka kuarku.*
weparte e macikwa purkwisatteka, maskunnalile, sokkartasunto mimmi punorka.
(visiting chief: *ee.*)
"punorye we mu maitse pe anka ka wis ekisna takkenye kapa maskunpiye a."
(visiting chief: *ee.*)
kal ekisnattasunto.
(visiting chief: *ee.*)
tey wepa muka soytapsunnoe "pe ka wis apeye."
(visiting chief: *ee.*)
mu "napir" soke mu kar ka kwannattasunna.
(visiting chief: *ee.*)
ka, kwane tek mu kuti.
tek ipakwenkine, maskunnetkinpali, ekisnatparsunna.
(visiting chief: *ee.*)
wep punoloka soysunna "ka pe kwanna takkenye."
(visiting chief: comment.)
"teki ka kwannapsun" soke.
(visiting chief: *eee muse,* comment.)
teki, muse kwannattasunto, mu ka ipetka kusparsunna.

tek e punoloka na kaa kwannai tule sunmakkarsun nappa yapa.
visiting chief: *aaa.*)

Well one day always as they were going to eat.
"While they were beginning to eat" it is said the boy always said to his sister "near the grandmother's house then there is something growing" he says ah.
visiting chief: So it is.)
"It was growing on top of the ground something very small was growing" he says.
visiting chief: Yes.)
Well the grandmother saw that it was getting bigger what-was-it?
visiting chief: what was growing?)
Yes.
Well slowly it rises it keeps growing up keeps growing up keeps growing up indeed it produced fruit.
visiting chief: Yes.)
Well when it produced fruit its flesh got ripe in fact it was pepper.
visiting chief: Pepper.)
Mm, "pepper," see it is said.
visiting chief: Yes.)
Well the grandmother is taking care of, a pepper plant and the pepper plant belonged to the grandmother ah.
visiting chief: aah.)
The pepper my friend got-ripe (voice vibrates) that is what happened to the pepper.
And as for the boy who had died, while he was beginning to eat, he always said to his baby sister.
visiting chief: Yes.)
"Sister go to that grandmother who is there and ask for some pepper for me see I want to eat with pepper ah."
visiting chief: Yes.)
She would always go to ask her.
visiting chief: Yes.)
Well she went there and said to the grandmother "I want some of your pepper."
visiting chief: Yes.)
The grandmother says "all right" and the grandmother would always go to gather pepper for her.
visiting chief: Yes.)
pepper. gather well the grandmother was there.
Well one day, while eating again, she went to ask again.
visiting chief: Yes.)
And she (the grandmother) says to the girl "you go and gather the pepper see."
visiting chief: Comment.)
"Well she went to gather the pepper" it is said.
Yes to the grandmother's place. Comment.)
Well, she always went to the grandmother's place to gather it, the grandmother is the owner of the pepper plant.
Well a person began to speak from inside the ground to the girl who was gathering pepper.
(visiting chief: aaah.)

In this passage the narrator constantly jumps back and forth from place to place, from the home of the brother and the sister to the home of the grandmother

to the grandmother's garden, and in time, from when the brother was alive to when he had died and was buried under the pepper plant, always being quite precise about the movement and direction of actions and the ways in which actions are performed. One feature of this narration that non-Kuna find particularly strange is the fact that the pepper plant is growing before the boy dies and that the boy is later found buried under the plant, as if his burial had caused the plant to grow.

There is no doubt that this passage is illogical for a Western European or North American audience or readership. But what we are talking about here is cultural logic, as expressed in discourse. Contemporary, postmodern novelists, in Europe and North and South America, consciously break with Indo-European temporal logic, in order to achieve avant-garde effects, producing texts quite similar in some ways to Kuna narratives (see Dina Sherzer 1986).

Here is a passage from a novel by the most recent nobel prize winning author, Claude Simon (1981:21)[10]:

> He is fifty years old. He is general-in-chief of the artillery of the army in Italy. He lives in Milan. He wears a tunic with a collar and breastplate embroidered in gold. He is sixty years old. He oversees the completion of the terrace of his castle. He is shivering, wrapped up in an old military greatcoat. He sees black spots. At night he will be dead. He is thirty years old. He is a captain. He goes to the opera. He wears a three-cornered hat, a blue tunic tight at the waist, and a drawing-room sword.

Notice how difficult it is to follow temporal progression in this text. But as distinct from Simon's text, which is felt to be avant garde by its intended readers, Kuna narratives are not avant garde for the Kuna. Quite the contrary. They are steeped in Kuna tradition and represent a natural and logical intersection between Kuna language and culture. The degree to which the seeming logic of our own narrative structure is also an expression of the intersection of language and culture is best appreciated through comparison with such radically different possibilities as Kuna. And it is important to recognize that this cultural logic is not a result of or an isomorphic reflection of a particular tense-aspect system. Rather, discourse, in this case narrative, draws on tense-aspect, as it draws on other features of the grammar and the lexicon, in the creation of temporal and spatial cultural logical systems.

Both linguists and anthropologists have traditionally treated discourse as an invisible glass through which the researcher perceives the reality of grammar, social relations, ecological practices, and belief systems. But the glass itself, discourse and its structure, the actual medium through which knowledge (linguistic and cultural) is produced, conceived, transmitted, and acquired, by members of societies and by researchers, is given little attention. My stance here is quite different from the traditional one, and reflects a growing interest in discourse in many disciplines. I view language, culture, society, and the individual as all providing resources in a creative process which is actualized in discourse. In my discourse-centered approach, discourse is the broadest and most comprehensive

level of linguistic form, content, and use. This is what I mean by saying that discourse and especially the process of discourse structuring is the locus of the language-culture relationship. Furthermore, it is in certain kinds of discourse, in which speech play and verbal art are heightened, as central moments in poetry, magic, politics, religion, respect, insult, and bargaining, that the language-culture-discourse relationship comes into sharpest focus and the organizing role of discourse in this relationship is highlighted.

This is a theoretical position. But it has methodological implications as well, for both anthropologists and linguists. Since discourse is an embodiment, a filter, a creator and recreator, and a transmitter of culture, then in order to study culture we must study the actual forms of discourse produced and performed by societies and individuals, the myths, legends, stories, verbal duels, and conversations that constitute a society's verbal life. But discourse is also an embodiment of language. Grammar provides a set of potentials. Since these potentials are actualized in discourse they can only be studied in discourse.

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Notes

1. It is important to recognize that Boas, Sapir, and Whorf were clearly each struggling with the question of the relationships between grammar, thought, and culture. Thus seemingly contradictory positions can be found within their own writing on these questions. In particular, the strictly and strongly causal view that language determines thought or culture, often attributed to Whorf, can be found nowhere explicitly in the writings of Boas, Sapir, or Whorf.
2. A point nicely expressed by Emile Benveniste in 1939. See also Friedrich (1979:1–61).
3. Among others, see Ellen Basso 1985; Keith Basso 1979; Bauman 1986; Feld 1982; Gossen 1974; Hanks 1986; Heath 1983; McLendon 1981; Philips 1983; Scollon and Scollon 1979; Tedlock 1985; Urban 1986; and Woodbury 1985.
4. From *The Way of the Snake*, performed by Pranki Pilos of Mulatuppu, San Blas, Panama. For transcription of Kuna discourse, see Sherzer (1983:41–42).
5. From a speech performed by Muristo Pérez of Mulatuppu, San Blas, Panama.
6. The binary *alus/biasa* distinction is a common way of talking about language levels in Bali. The actual situation is often more complicated and some of the words in the example provided here enter into lexical sets with more than two members (see Kersten 1984; Ward 1973; and Zurbuchen 1981). Notice that the language of the market is not a random mixing of languages and levels, a reflection of speakers' lack of knowledge of their own languages and appropriate language use. Quite the contrary.

It is a sophisticated manipulation of the resources provided by the complex Balinese sociolinguistic situation, a manipulation involving economic strategies, politeness, play, and humor.

7. Long and ritualized forms of verbal dueling are extremely common in the world, found among urban Blacks in the United States, Mexican Indians, Mestizo populations in South America, Turkish adolescents, and probably many other places. The basic principle of verbal dueling is for each speaker to provide a comeback which "tops" its predecessor by being maximally semantically more powerful with a minimal economy of formal effort, as defined within an underlying framework of grammatical and semantic relations (see Bricker 1976; Dundes, Leach, and Özkök 1970; Gossen 1976; and Labov 1972). The relationship between verbal dueling and bargaining is an intriguing one, worthy of further exploration.
8. Told by G. H. of Austin, Texas. In this transcription, I use English orthography together with the symbol', following conventional means of rendering English oral speech in print. In the representation, performance lines begin flush left. They are determined by a long pause coupled with noticeable falling pitch. Within lines, short pauses without noticeable falling pitch are indicated with a comma; short pauses with falling pitch, with a period. A long pause without falling pitch is represented as a long space within a line.
9. From *The Hot Pepper Story*, performed by Mastayans of Mulatuppu, San Blas, Panama. In this transcription and translation, each performance line, determined by pause and intonation patterns, is represented by a line of written text. Pauses within lines are represented by spaces. Stretched out speech is represented by dashes between syllables. The performance is in the form of a dialogue between Mastayans and a visiting chief, whose comments are also represented here (see Sherzer 1987).
10. Translated by Joel Sherzer.

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66

Linguistics as Metaphor: Analysing the Discursive Ontology of the Object of Linguistic Inquiry

Shi-Xu

1. Introduction

One of the most lively and important developments in the contemporary scene of the social and human sciences has been 'the turn to language' as is often called (or 'linguistic/rhetorical turn'). In this move many a scholar have shifted their attention from the 'object' of enquiry to the language of enquiry. There is already a deluge of articles and books critically reflecting upon the language of economics (e.g. McCloskey, 1986), anthropology (e.g. Clifford, 1988; Pratt, 1986), sociology (e.g. Weigert, 1970; Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984), psychology (e.g. Soyland, 1994; Danziger, 1997), history, (e.g. White, 1973), philosophy (e.g. De Man, 1978; Rorty, 1978) and science (e.g. Latour, 1987; Bazerman, 2000); see also Simons' *Rhetoric in the Human Sciences* (1989). All this work fundamentally questions the role of language in representing human and social realities. For example, it is argued that Freud's discourse of the human mind as a set of hidden layers to which ordinary people have no access serves to enrol and encourage them to seek further information about themselves (Soyland, 1994; cf. Vološinov, 1987).

The science of language itself – modern Western linguistics, however, has seemed slow and reluctant in responding to this discourse–reflective move. Its own discourse continues to get short shrift. By and large, linguistics remains preoccupied with its perennial concerns – linguistic theories and analysis and so on; even alternative and opposing approaches are more often than not concerned with offering more valid and more reliable accounts. The marginalisation of the

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discourse-of-linguistics project is best attested to by the continued success of linguistic formalism and functionalism – the two most important, competing ways of thinking and talking about language.

Is linguistic science independent of discourse and rhetoric that have been found to be part of the same activity in the sister disciplines? Or is it indeed a more rigorous and superior form of representation among the human sciences, as has been imagined since the inception of modern Western linguistics? I think rather that the general lack of interest in the language of linguistics has to do with a deep-rooted and widespread credo in the field: namely, language, whether from a formal or functional point of view, is a pre-given object or thing, on the one hand, and, on the other, there is a transparent, objective, scientific language to represent that thing, at least possibly (cf. Grace, 1987; Tyler, 1995). Therefore, the scientific discourse of linguistics is unproblematic for, perhaps even irrelevant to, the linguistic enquiry itself. The clear manifestation of this attitude is that it is generally not discussed, but taken for granted (for exceptions see below).

In this study I put these beliefs in abeyance and take up the language of linguistics as the focus of attention; here 'language' refers to language use in the social context or 'discourse' for short. Specifically, I shall be looking at how, in both formal and functional linguistic theorising, the foundational notion of 'language' is related to the use of metaphors. My primary aim is to show that properties of discourse, such as metaphor, persuasion, self- and other-presentation, are not peripheral, but central and intrinsic to the presumption and conceptualisation of the object of linguistic research. In other words, I shall try to demonstrate that the very stuff called 'language' or 'the linguistic system' and the like, which have preoccupied western linguistics for much of the century, are in part a product of particular ways of speaking and writing.

The empirical data for the present thesis are selected from the writings by Chomsky (i.e. 1957, 1979 and 1981) and Halliday (1973, 1978, 1985/1994), the leading exponents of linguistic formalism and functionalism, respectively. I use data from both the formalist and functional paradigms, because I am concerned with modern Western linguistics *as a whole*. I have chosen Chomsky and Halliday for case study not just because of their celebrated scientific accomplishments, but also because of their tremendous *influence*, through text and talk, upon the linguistics community and beyond.

Through analysis of discourse, it will be seen, first, that in delimiting and defining the presumed object for linguistic investigation – 'language' Chomsky and Halliday draw on a few metaphors regularly so that these specific metaphors penetrate the object itself. The purported object then becomes immanently and intrinsically metaphorical. Secondly, and more importantly, it will be observed that those figurative devices are also used 'literally', that is, as real grounds, in other parts of theory-building and argumentation. There is therefore a deeper sense in which linguistics is constituted out of elements of discourse. In addition, it will be noted that the tropologically originated concepts of language serve *rhetorical and social purposes*: they help to justify one's own research practice (e.g. idealisation of linguistics; writing of grammar), hence to persuade readers and enlist researchers, and dismiss or refute other, alternative approaches. Thus, what

will be witnessed is that 'language' 'exists' and 'has' this or that property not because it really does, but because certain metaphors were there to enable it, and because some individual and social business has to be done.

Before I turn to a theoretical and analytical discussion of discourse and science, some caveats are in order. Firstly, pointing to the interest of the discourse of linguistics is of course not to deny the intellectual worth of linguistics. There is nothing inherently wrong with, say, pursuing mathematical representation or grammaticalisation of human language. But my hope is that the linguistics discourse project will advance our thinking on the nature of linguistics and its object of research. For one thing, explorations in the status of discourse in linguistic enquiry may enhance our awareness of the reflexivity of our own 'representational' means. For another, highlighting the rhetorical, metaphorical dimensions of linguistic enquiry as I do may lead to insights into the discursive nature of the object that linguists try to describe and explain.

Secondly, in pointing to the metaphors used in linguistics, I do not mean to suggest that linguists may not be aware of the fact that they do use metaphors. My interest is rather examining how the metaphors have been used *in effect*, e.g. in the presumption and conceptualisation of the object of enquiry and the subsequent methodological approach. Thus, in making transparent the functions of the metaphors, I shall try to reveal what Burke calls the 'paradox of substance' (Burke, 1962, p. 56). It will be seen that, although describing the properties of one category metaphorically in terms of those of another concedes that they are not really the same phenomenon, Chomsky and Halliday use certain metaphors as *rational argument* in linguistic deliberation. So, here, let me state emphatically that my point is not that metaphors are used in linguistics writing nor that they are used for purposes of clarification as is commonly believed; rather they have been become the defining, organising and penetrating features of linguistics, including its presumed object of research.

Thirdly, in claiming that linguistics, including its object of study (not just theoretical-writing!), is imbued with metaphorical substance, I do not want to suggest that it should not be. As will be explained in the next section, a constraining assumption of mine is that discourse is an inextricable part of socialscientific research (and human reality more generally) and that therefore there is no such thing as 'perfect' and 'pure' social science divorced from discourse. Admittedly, my own writing here is rhetorical, at times metaphorical, too, and therefore subject to critical discourse analysis. But it is crucial to note here that this theoretical circularity does not have to be vicious in effect: rather, I wish to call attention to this discursive dimension of (linguistic) science and to suggest that criteria should be developed in the academic (linguistic) community with which we can distinguish acceptable kinds of discourse from others – say, using metaphors as rational argument; I shall return to this point in the final section.

Finally, it should be mentioned that already there are important metadiscursive studies of linguistics, with special reference to history (e.g. Sampson, 1980; Harris, 1993; Huck and Goldsmith, 1995), politics (e.g. Newmeyer, 1986; cf. Schegloff et al., 1996), philosophy (e.g. Derrida, 1976, 1981; Harris, 1981; Taylor, 1992) and speech acts (e.g. De Beaugrande, 1992). However

have such attempts been disproportionately few in number, but there are many areas still unexplored as well, such as the relationship between discourse and the basic ideas in linguistics and the role of discourse in affecting methodological choices. The present study focuses attention on the effects and consequences of metaphors on the conceptualisation of the object of linguistics and on the choice of approaches to it. (Shi-xu, 1996, 2000)

2. A Social-Constructionist-Linguistics Framework

2.1. Definition and Nature of Discourse

The theoretical framework underlying the present study is Social Constructionist Linguistics (SCL). This is a research programme that I am developing and which is inspired by many critical insights in the social and human sciences (e.g. Fairclough, 1989, 1995; Gumperz and Levinson, 1996; Tyler, 1995; Van Dijk, 1993; Shweder, 1990; Wertsch, 1991; Gergen, 1994; Billig, 1987; Harré and Gillett, 1994; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Antaki, 1994, to name but a few). In this programme on human language, it is reasoned that the object of research should be (defined as) *primarily linguistic-symbolic activity in real-life contexts* ('discourse' for short), and discourse is viewed as co-constitutive of our social experience (actions and events 'around' us) and our individual experience (thoughts and feelings 'inside' us), constitutive, that is, through concepts, categories and other meaning-making processes of our discourse. In connection with this view of discourse, furthermore, the discourse researcher is regarded as having an active role to play in both the phenomena s/he investigates and the conclusions s/he draws and therefore should take academic and societal responsibilities (see also Shi-xu, 1997, chap. 1 and 2). For lack of space, I shall only briefly describe this concept of discourse.

2.1.1. Discourse as Constructive

Discourse is not a mirror or representation of reality. Rather, discourse is dynamic and creative: it offers a version of reality, thereby imposing a particular structure on it. For example, international news media have recently portrayed the 'same' past history of Hong Kong in different ways, e.g. as a glorious transformation from a fishing village into an international economic power and as infamous colonial oppression and exploitation.

2.1.2. Discourse as Dynamic Interplay between the Individual and Linguistic, Social-Interactional and Cultural Rules and Structures

Discourse is an emergent phenomenon in which individuals draw upon, employ and transform, linguistic resources – structures (e.g. words), processes (e.g. metaphor) and rules (e.g. grammar), in both production and interpretation. Similarly, they orient their discourse towards the social Other, be it the second, third or generalised person (i.e. 'you', 's/he/they', a potential interactant). Moreover,

in producing and interpreting discourse they also make use of, maintain and develop cultural ways of thinking and acting.

2.1.3. Discourse as Co-Constitutive of the Social Human Reality

Discourse is not a form of linguistic activity that is merely ('descriptive') about the social and private worlds. Rather, discourse partakes of or makes up the private world 'inside' us and the social–cultural world 'around' us. When greetings are uttered or pleasantries exchanged, for example, a certain social bond is established or maintained thereby; what specific content or form the discourse takes is only a trivial if not irrelevant matter.

2.2. Social Science as Discourse

Having outlined a view of discourse, I shall proceed to sketching out a theoretical notion of the specific 'discourse of the social and human sciences', for backing up subsequent empirical analysis. As alluded to at the outset, detailed analysis of the discourse of both natural and human sciences has indisputably dismantled the boundaries of scientific knowledge and practice and revealed the penetration of ordinary discourse and rhetoric (e.g. Latour, 1987, Simons, 1989, Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). In the words of Simons (1989, p. 5), 'In the new metalanguage of the human sciences, behaviours, cultures, entire historical epochs might be viewed as texts, scientific data as symbolic constructions, scientific descriptions and theories as narratives, mathematical proofs as rhetorical tropes, the ongoing activities of scientific communities as conversations.' Given this contra-Popperian view of scientific knowledge (cf. Popper, 1959), we should better speak of *scientific discourse* (SD) instead of science. Furthermore, the distinction between natural and social sciences has also been de-constructed as subject to discursive-rhetorical work (Gieryn, 1995). (The irony is, though, as Swales points out (Swales, 1990, p. 176), 'social scientists are engaged in a cognitive and rhetorical upgrade of Method at a time when their mentors in the hard sciences are beginning, rhetorically at least, to downgrade its importance.') Since I am primarily concerned with the modern social and human sciences as a form of discourse – call it 'social scientific discourse' (SSD), in the following I shall devote my attention only to the latter, side-stepping the complications of argumentation. Building upon the observations made in the field which I just referred to, I shall touch upon three interrelated aspects of SSD which I think will lead to productive discourse analysis, though of course still other features may be observed.

A first basic feature of SSD is that it is not independent of the speaking/writing-individual. As part of the discursive activity, the scientist has personal merits as well as limitations which obviously will be reflected in the research process and product, i.e. SSD. S/he is also rhetorical in that s/he is concerned to enrol audience and enlist followers, often in a concealed manner (see Soyland, 1994), not least because discoveries that fail to be persuasive or cogent will not find an outlet in the first place. One of the common manifestations of the personal touch of SSD is the presentation of the academic Other in our

light, as may have become part of the received genre of academic writing. In addition, another example of the personal element of SSD is the influence of scholarly predecessors and authorities.

Secondly, SSD creates and constitutes its own objects of enquiry, a point that Foucault has made abundantly clear (Foucault, 1970). From a different perspective, there is a dynamic, essential relationship of the scientific enterprise to its subject matter. Man, society, mind, and indeed, language, are not pre-given things in the world, such that social and human sciences are then devised to study them. Power interests or ideologies play an important role in creating and recreating such disciplinary objects and the disciplines themselves through the meaning-making resources of discourse, e.g. concepts, presumptions, metaphors (cf. Martin, 1998, pp. 10–11). This may be especially true of modern Western linguistics, in which the notion of 'natural science' as a superior paradigm of (gaining) knowledge has been used as a key device for creating its object – language, hence 'linguistic science'. One needs only to recall Saussure, Bloomfield, Hjelmslev or Chomsky as examples.

Thirdly, because social scientific theories and practices are constructed out of the structures and processes of discourse, there is no clear demarcation line between SSD and discourse more generally (cf. Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Grace, 1987, p. 3; Pearce, 1995; Stewart, 1995). Consequently, the content of SSD is not stable but evolving and emerging and its boundaries are blurred (cf. Bazerman, 1998, p. 16). Effectively there will be no cut and dried distinction to be drawn between social science and common sense, nor between scientific discourse and conversation (e.g. variability and flexibility). It has been well documented that scientific discourse also involves self-presentation, social enlistment, alliances and power, for example through rhetorical alignments of citation and reference (Latour, 1987), through offering value, significance and promise (Bazerman, 2000), and through 'the long-standing [. . .] and widespread use of "hedges"' (Swales, 1990, p. 175).

Immediately I must add that saying that it is hard to distinguish in practice SSD from (lay) discourse does not mean that it is impossible in principle. On the contrary, I believe that there are norms or criteria to be found, to be observed, and to be developed, for critically evaluating SSD; I shall deal with such questions when we look at empirical instances in the analytical section (see also Conclusions). However, a discussion of the normative issue in SSD falls outside the scope of the present study.

2.3. Metaphor

In the present study, I shall focus on one particular process of discourse: metaphor. The Western literature on metaphor dates back at least to Aristotle; it is large and varied. Generally, it may be said that traditional approaches have been mainly either literary (e.g. Aristotle's *Poetics*) or philosophical (Richards, 1936; cf. Soyland, 1994, p. 199), in which a metaphor is seen as a linguistic process which is given a novel meaning/use as opposed to the previous or usual meaning/use of a term or expression (e.g. 'Language is a weapon') or something

abstract or unspecified is given a concrete meaning (e.g. 'Language is an instrument/cognitive structure'). In either case, the notion of the 'literal' meaning of a word is decisive for distinguishing the 'metaphorical'. However, calling a piece of discourse 'metaphorical' on grounds that one can find a 'primary', 'original' or 'usual' meaning for it in the history of the language is largely a philosophical or semantic exercise. Such observations are interesting, but they leave out the meanings of discourse in the actual context.

In the present SCL framework, a theory of metaphor is subsumed under the theory of discourse as outlined above. That is, metaphor is a special process of discourse (other kinds being argumentation, explanation, narration). Thus, metaphor and the metaphorical process of meaning-making are not seen as primarily opposed to 'literary' meaning in a idealised or de-contextualised sense, but rather as a discursive practice (see below). Following Goatly (1997), I define 'metaphor' as a *comparative* discursive process, i.e. using the property or properties of one category to characterise another category. The present notion of metaphor involves a broad comparison that includes such processes as simile, analogy, metonymy, synecdoche as well as the conventionally classified 'metaphor'. As such, metaphor is a particularly useful device for linguistics, as we shall see below, because 'language' (such as 'the linguistic system', 'cognitive device', 'meaning potential') as envisaged in formal and functional approaches respectively is neither available for observation nor actual in life.

Here it is important to emphasise that there is a sense in which metaphor is a matter of participants' or speakers' own discursive practice; that is, it is something that language users themselves offer and accept as such. Such metaphorical meaning is often accomplished through *meta-discursive* strategies such as 'like', 'similarly', 'in a sense', 'just as . . . so', 'the same', 'can be viewed as' and the like. Of course the same meaning can be achieved by implicit, indirect or extra-linguistic means, e.g. contextual, mutual presuppositions, or worn-out metaphorical expressions like 'tree diagram of linguistic structure' or 'instrument of communication of experience'. To preserve the clarity of the present argument, I shall present data of the former – explicit – kind.

3. Formalist and Functionalist Foundations as Metaphor

In the following the citations may sometimes be long but the reason for that is to give the reader as much contextual information as possible in the space available. The bold type in all the quoted examples below is added by me for emphasis, unless otherwise indicated.

3.1. Chomsky: Language as Cognitive Device

That Chomsky's notion of human language as a cognitive device is a decontextualised, fictive and therefore useless idea is not the argument I want to pursue here. My task is rather to show that Chomsky's understanding of language, in his own expository discourse, is literally *premised upon* a couple of specific

metaphors which he regularly employs that such metaphors have guided his methodological approach and furthermore that they have been motivated at the same time to belittle or demean alternative ways of thinking about and doing linguistics.

3.1.1. Physical-Science Metaphor

Following the founding father of modern Western linguistic science, Saussure (1966), Chomsky assumes a notion of human language as something not directly available for observation. Consequently, imaginary ways of thinking and speaking about it become imperative. What Chomsky chooses to do is to think and talk about it *in terms of something else* – hence metaphor. To illustrate:

> [1] Syntactic investigation of a given language has as its goal the construction of a grammar that **can be viewed as a device of some sort** for producing the sentences of the language under analysis. (Chomsky, 1957, p. 11)

More specifically, Chomsky prefers to use the metaphor of natural, physical, hard science in his characterisation of, and, more importantly, prescription for, linguistics. He suggests that, in theorising about the object of linguistics and linguistic research, we should follow the natural-science paradigm by picturing some hidden, sophisticated phenomenon ('cognitive device' as he calls it) and then speculating about its laws ('grammar') by empirical falsification. In this sense, Chomsky is not using the object of science and its research methodology merely as a metaphorical means to clarify for us or enlighten us upon the object of linguistics and the way to go about doing linguistics. Rather, the substance of that metaphor has actually been equated with the presumed object of linguistics and linguistic research. It has got into linguistics, as it were. More generally, this practice of using metaphor as justification shows that the distinction between 'transitive objects of science' and 'intransitive objects of science' (as in Bhaskar, 1975) and, indeed, boundaries between sciences are co-created by discursive work (cf. Gieryn, 1995). Such work may be exemplified by the following quotation:

> [2] **Any** scientific theory is based on a finite number of observations, and it seeks to relate the observed phenomena and to predict new phenomena by constructing **general laws** in terms of hypothetical constructs such as (in **physics**, for example) "mass" and "electron". **Similarly**, a grammar of English is based on a finite corpus of utterances (**observations**), and it will contain certain grammatical rules (**laws**) stated in terms of the particular phonemes, phrases, etc., of English (**hypothetical constructs**). These rules express structural relations among the sentences of the corpus and the indefinite number of sentences generated by the grammar beyond the corpus (**predictions**). (Chomsky, 1957, p. 49)

In this fragment, it can be observed, to start with, that the objects of linguistic investigation (such as 'grammar', 'grammatical rules') are not described in their

own terms, but rather in terms of something else. Specifically, characteristics of the physical world and natural sciences are adopted by Chomsky as the comparative vehicle, viz. simile (N.B. 'Similarly'), to define the object and procedure of linguistic research. That is, although language is not available for observation, we can imagine it to be something like 'mass' and 'electron'. When this way of thinking is adopted, other possibilities of characterisation are excluded thereby.

As indicated above, language has been presumed to be an object unavailable for observation. Through the currently preferred, figurative process of mapping the properties from the different domain of the physical world onto the domain of 'language' in question, however, an otherwise unobservable 'object' is written into being. Note in addition that, since for Chomsky language is a psychological entity (Chomsky, 1979), the science metaphor here creates a psychological object simultaneously. (Later on I will show how Chomsky uses this preferred science metaphor to his own advantage.)

More importantly, there is a sense in which the science metaphor has penetrated Chomsky's purported object of linguistics and research into it. For, despite the explicit metaphorical process, Chomsky also insists that linguistics conform to the paradigm of physical science. Observe that, according to him, 'any scientific theory' should have the format of physics – that is the norm for all sciences. Therefore, linguistics should do the same. Observe also that the brackets have been used as equations and accordingly grammatical rules *are* law. Thus, paradoxically, *this* simile is not simply a simile but has become the very rationale for his prescribed linguistics. It is not surprising then that this metaphorically engendered view is consistent with essentialistic presumptions about language in other parts of his writings (Chomsky, 1957, p. 13), 'The grammar of L **will thus be** a device that generates all of the grammatical sentences of L and none of the ungrammatical ones'; similarly (p. 18), 'Assuming the set of grammatical sentences of English to be given, **we now ask what sort of device** can produce this set (equivalently, what sort of theory gives an adequate account of the structure of this set of utterances)'.

There is still another kind of reason for asserting that specifically chosen metaphor has co-constituted Chomsky's linguistics. Namely, not only does not he draw upon the science metaphor, but he does so regularly and persistently to the extent that, denied its use, he would have little to go by for his linguistics. To put it another way, if we took away his science metaphor, there would be little left in his concept of language and linguistics. Let me quote just a few instances to give a sense of his pattern of thinking and talking:

> [3] **Once that system is identified [in science generally], one can try to determine its nature, to investigate theories concerning its structure.** To the extent that such a theory can be formulated, it is possible to ask on what basis the system is acquired, what are the analogues in it to universal grammar, its biologically given principles. **Similarly,** study of performance presupposes an understanding of the nature of the cognitive system that is put to use. Given some level of theoretical understanding of some cognitive system, we may hope to study in a productive

way how the cognitive system is used, and how it enters into interaction with other cognitive systems. **Something like that should be the paradigm for psychology, I think.** Of course, this is an oversimplification. One cannot legislate the "order of discovery". **But** this paradigm seems **to me basically correct.** (Chomsky, 1979, p. 49)

[4] I am personally interested in the possibility of **testing** linguistic **hypotheses.** Certain questions cannot be resolved by sole reliance on the customary methods of linguistics. [. . .] Linguistics can hope to characterize the class of possible grammars, that is, establish the abstract properties which every language must satisfy. Similarly, study of a particular language can at best specify abstract properties of its grammar. It is **something like the study of algebra:** every abstract algebra can be realized by many different real systems. **The theory of groups** can be realized by the number system, or by the rotation of objects. **In a similar way** the formal systems of the linguists can correspond to different real systems [. . .]. (Chomsky, 1979, p. 48)

[5] Certainly one must preserve the experimental sophistication of behaviourist psychology, but in order to employ it rationally. **The same thing is true in physics:** perhaps there are more sophisticated experimental techniques than those devised by physicists to answer interesting questions, but which have no relevance to questions of scientific interest. It would then be senseless to define **physics** in terms of this technology of experimentation. In itself this technology has no interest, apart from its possible relevance to significant questions. **In the same way,** psychological experiments have no interest, unless they can be put to use to sharpen our understanding of significant theories that can be developed concerning **some significant object of study.** (Chomsky, 1979, p. 47)

In these fragments, again, 'psychology', 'universal grammar/possible grammars', 'abstract properties', 'cognitive system', 'the formal systems/real systems', etc. are described in terms from science, like algebra, the theory of groups, physics. Beyond this metaphorical process, we also notice that he gives his personal injunction as a rational authority on the model of the science metaphor: 'should be the paradigm for psychology', 'basically correct' (for Chomsky's expression of rationality as social act see De Beaugrande, 1998).

3.1.2. Promissory Notes

Derrida once said (Derrida, 1976, p. 145), 'Writing always leads to more writing, and more and still more'. To this, one might add that such extended writings form a scheme of arguments and help reflexively to reinforce the preferred writing. This is the kind of phenomenon we shall see in this sub-section. That is, I want to suggest that the conception of linguistics based on the science metaphor has affected other (and subsequent) parts of Chomsky's writing and linguistic theorising and that, conversely, these parts have helped sustain the original conceptual assumption.

The specific data evidence I shall present here is what Soyland (1994) has called 'promissory notes', in which promises are made about the *eventual* discovery of 'internal' linguistic realities (cf. the 'promissory notes' Soyland finds in psychology; see also 'the truth will out' in Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). Such promissory discourse is not just consistent with, but also logically follows from, the metaphorical conception of language as a hidden rule-system. Since the concealed phenomenon is already presumed, it is only natural to talk of taking Time to reveal it. Consequently, promissory writing, along with the language-as-hidden discourse, rhetorically encourages students to join the 'discovery' expedition. I shall come back to the persuasive aspect of Chomsky's theorising in the next sub-section. Thus, on account of this extended Time-metaphor, it may again be asserted that the idea of language as a thing-to-be-discovered is a metaphorical accomplishment. Look at some of Chomsky's promises:

> [6] What **seems to me particularly exciting about the present period** in linguistic research is that we can **begin to see the glimmerings** of what such a theory might be like. **For the first time**, there are several theories of UG that seem to have the right general properties over an interesting domain of fairly complex linguistic phenomena that is expanding **as inquiry into these systems proceeds.** (Chomsky, 1981, p. 4)

> [7] To be sure, it is **too early** to hope for definitive answers from such experiments ['click' experiments to establish cognitive structure of the sentence]. **But the logic** of the situation is **sufficiently clear.** It is **possible** that significant relationships between perception and sentence structure **will** be experimentally demonstrated. (Chomsky, 1979, p. 45)

> [8] [I]t is only through the detailed investigation of these particular systems that we have any hope of advancing towards a grasp of the abstract structures, conditions and properties that **should, some day,** constitute the subject matter of general linguistic theory [universal grammar]. **The goal may be remote, but** it is well to keep it in mind [. . .].
>
> [. . .] I think that we are, in fact, **beginning to approach a grasp of** certain basic principles of grammar at what may be the appropriate level of abstraction [of UG]. (Chomsky, 1981, p. 2)

> [9] While it is, needless to say, **much too** early to hope for a realistic proposal of this sort in the case of UG, **nevertheless** it is perhaps useful to take note of some of the conditions that such a theory should satisfy. (Chomsky, 1981, p. 10)

In these fragments several kinds of promissory ploy relating to Time can be found which entail the true and objective existence of linguistic realities. Among these are assurance of discovery by 'logic' (e.g. 'the logic [. . .] is sufficiently clear', 'should'), affirmation of possibility of discovery (e.g. 'is possible', 'will be [. . .] demonstrated'), specifying the amount of time, space or work needed for

discovery (e.g. 'too early', 'remote', 'as inquiry [. . .] proceeds'), the beginning of discovery – the device of 'seeing light at the end of tunnel' (e.g. 'beginning to approach a grasp of [. . .]', 'begin to see the glimmerings of [. . .]', 'for the first time') and – 'untypical' of scientific discourse – expressing the personal elation of discovery ('seems to me particularly exciting about the present period').

3.1.3. Justifying Own Approach and Undermining Alternatives

Just as Chomsky's science metaphor has enabled his promises about linguistic truths, this same discursive mechanism has also been carried over into Chomksy's linguistic argumentation as the very basis of rationality and validity. That is, Chomsky's chosen science-metaphor has been employed as the ground for defending his own approach and refuting alternative ones. In such discourse, metaphor again acquires the status of 'real' argument; linguistic argumentation becomes entangled with properties of ordinary discourse. More importantly, in such cases, we see that the metaphor informing Chomksy's notion of language and linguistics is motivated socially and ideologically as well: it serves to justify his own theory and practice and to reject or exclude other rival approaches. Just a few examples will illustrate the point.

> [10] Phenomena that are complicated enough to be worth studying generally involve the interaction of several systems. **Therefore** you *must* [italics original] **abstract some object** of study, you **must eliminate** those factors which are not pertinent [. . .] **In the natural sciences** this isn't **even** discussed, it is self-evident. In the human sciences, people continue to question it. **That is unfortunate.** (Chomsky, 1979, p. 57)

Here the nature of language is implicitly taken to be *the same* as the nature of an object in the natural sciences (NB. 'That is unfortunate', the presupposition of which makes it apparent that they *are* the same). In this way, the metaphorical origin of the notion of language we saw earlier is obscured. But the point I want to make here is that collapsing the distinction between the human and natural sciences and deploying the latter as the standard for the former is not a disinterested course of action; rather, they do two good turns for Chomsky. First, it should be noticed that the recourse to the natural sciences here occurs in a particular context, when, as anyone familiar with the linguistics literature would know, his practice of isolating and idealising linguistic objects is being loudly and often ungenerously criticised. Erasing the metaphorical origin and turning the linguistic object into a natural-science object, along with the corresponding methodological approach, serve rhetorically to shield himself from the attacks and, moreover, to justify his practice. In terms of Chomsky's own implicit argumentation: since the object of linguistic research is connected with other things but since it can be isolated from them, just as in natural science, abstraction and idealisation are only a logical imperative. This leads to my next point.

Second, Chomsky's recourse to natural science in the conceptualisation of language serves to undermine and exclude other approaches. Specifically, this

social effect is accomplished through: (1) presuming the paradigm of natural science to be the sole approach to scientific knowledge on the one hand and at the same time; (2) emphasising the difference or deviance of other approaches from this paradigm. This discursive strategy is at times implicit and at times explicit in his interview text/talk:

> [11] In my opinion, many psychologists have a **curious** definition of their discipline. A definition that is **destructive, suicidal. A dead end.** They want to confine themselves solely to the study of performance – behaviour – yet, as I've said, it **makes no sense** to construct a discipline that studies the manner in which a system is acquired or utilized, but refuses to consider the nature of the system. In my opinion, in order to do good psychology one **must** start by identifying a cognitive domain – vision, for example – that is to say, a domain which can be considered as a system, or a mental organ, that is more or less integrated. (Chomsky, 1979, p. 49)

> [12] M.R. [interviewer, in the context of talking about sociolinguistics]: Aren't sociologists seeking to preserve the methods they use at present, their interviews, surveys, statistics, and so on, which take the place of scientific practice?
>
> N.C. [Chomsky]: Again, in itself this type of approach is neither good nor bad. **The question is** whether it leads to the discovery of principles that are significant. We are back to the **difference** between natural history and **natural science**. In natural history, whatever you do is fine. If you like to **collect stones**, you can classify them according to their colour, their shape, and so forth. Everything is of equal value, **because you are not looking for principles. You are amusing yourself**, and nobody can object to that. **But in the natural sciences**, it is **altogether different.** There the search is for the discovery of intelligible structure and for explanatory principles. **In the natural sciences**, the facts have no interest in themselves, but only to the degree to which they have bearing on explanatory principles or on hidden structures that have some intellectual interest. [. . .] **Natural science**, as **distinct from** natural history, is **not** concerned with the phenomena in themselves, but with the principles and the explanations that they have some bearing on. There [sic] are **simply two entirely different things.** (Chomsky, 1979, pp. 58–59)

> [13] **No discipline can** concern itself in a productive way with the acquisition or utilization of a form of knowledge, **without** being concerned with the *nature* (italics original) of **that system of knowledge.** [. . .] If psychology were to limit itself to the study of models of learning or perception or speech while **excluding from its field of investigation the system itself** that is thus acquired or utilized, it would **condemn itself to sterility.** That kind of delimitation of psychology would be quite **pointless.** At this point, **linguistics understood as the study of the system**

> **of language seems to fill a conceptual gap** in the manner in which psychology is often conceived. (Chomsky, 1979, pp. 43–44)

In these instances, the criterion of scientific research is spelt out following the model of *natural science* – as depending on whether one starts with a presumption of some hidden phenomenon and then goes on to look for the laws underlying it. That this is the *only* standard for *all* scientific activity is implied through modal expressions like 'should', 'must', 'properly', '[n]o discipline can [. . .] without [. . .]'. Next to this standard, other approaches (e.g. sociolinguistics, process-oriented psychology) are singled out as deviating from that standard – by negation ('you are not looking for principles') and by contrast (e.g. 'altogether different', 'simply two entirely different things'). Effectively, they are banished from science. Worse still, the current metaphorical process renders the alternatives as of no intellectual value. Thus borrowing from natural science is but a guise, in a way, for justifying his own, much attacked practice of idealisation on the one side and for defeating rival ways of doing psychology and linguistics on the other. In this way, too, his talk of sociolinguistics as 'stone collecting', 'amusing oneself', and of process-oriented psychology as 'suicidal', 'dead end', 'pointless', etc. becomes only neutral, or, indeed, natural-ised. As an aside, it may also be pointed out here that it is apparent that in such instances Chomsky opposes the kind of psychology that does not conceptualise its object of investigation in the *natural-science* way as he does. But this effectively also undermines and excludes any non-Chomskyan type of linguistics, because he has categorised language and linguistics as part of psychology (Chomksy, 1979).

3.2. Halliday: Language as (Instrumental) System

Similar to the science metaphor in Chomsky's linguistic writing, there are metaphors built into the theoretical and methodological foundations of Halliday's systemic linguistics. (So placing the case of Halliday here is not meant to contrast with that of Chomsky. They are not discussed together, however, because different kinds of metaphor are at stake.) Just as Chomsky presupposes language as a hidden cognitive device, entirely consistent with Saussure's argument for conceiving language as unobservable *langue*, so Halliday makes comparable assumptions about what he terms 'the meaning potential', 'instrument', 'language/linguistic system', '(lexico)grammar', 'code', or 'unconscious', etc. That is, the real starting-point of Halliday's research programme is something *potential*, as opposed to the actual (language use). What I shall pay special attention to below is, likewise, how metaphors have gone into the formation of this 'something potential' and how they have consequently become the foundations or justifications for the systemic-functional approach.

3.2.1. Language as Language Development

To start with, it may be noted that, in Halliday's systemic-functional view of language (1973, 1978, 1985), the basic characteristic of language is 'functional', in the sense that its interior is assumed to have been shaped by and therefore reflects the external social environment and human needs (in addition to other

senses of the term). This extra-linguistic object is described by Halliday (1978, p. 2) as 'both "good to think" and "good to eat"'. The question I want to ask in this study is how the 'functional' nature of language itself is defined and defended and subsequently deployed. There is no external evidence for the functional organisation of language, as Halliday states (1973, p. 23). Therefore, (in addition to trying to find evidence from within a language) Halliday turns to comparative or metaphorical means, which I find to be three in kind, viz. language as (1) child language development; (2) cultural and human evolution, and (3) the unconscious. In this subsection, I shall focus on Halliday's reliance on Malinowski's observation of language *development of the child* and, in close connection with that, Malinowski's thesis that *ontogeny provides an analogue for* phylogeny:

> [14] It was in **the language of young children** that **Malinowski** saw most clearly the functional origins of the language system. [. . .] **Similarly** all uses of language [. . .] were to be explained in terms of certain very elementary functions. It **may be true** that **the developing language system of the child in some sense traverses, or at least provides an analogy for**, the stages through which language itself has evolved. (Halliday, 1973, p. 23)

> [15] To say this is in effect to claim, **with Malinowski**, that **ontogeny does in some respect provide a model for** phylogeny. **We cannot examine the origins of language.** (Halliday, 1973, p. 34; see also p. 44)

> [16] The social functions which language is serving in the life of the child determine both the options which he creates for himself and their realizations in structure. **We see this clearly in the language of young children**, once we begin to think of language development as the development of the social functions of language and of a meaning potential associated with them. **However**, although this connection between the functions of language and the linguistic system is clearest in the case of the language of very young children, **it is essentially, I think**, a feature of language as a whole. The internal organization of natural language can **best** be explained in the light of the social functions which language has evolved to serve. (Halliday, 1973, pp. 33–34)

In these statements it can be seen, first of all, that Halliday, following Malinowski, makes speculations about the functional structure of language by explicitly drawing upon its similarity with language development (N.B. 'Similarly', [14]), analogy with language development ('provides an analogy for', [14]), the model of language development (N.B. 'provide a model for', [15]), the inference from language development (N.B. 'We see this clearly in', 'is the clearest in the case of', [16]), and even 'substance' of language development (N.B. 'traverse', [14]). In other words, the characteristics of the child language development are mapped onto the adult language. At this point, it may be noted that there is a further sense in which a metaphorical process is involved in the characterisation of the functional nature

of language. That is, some of the comparative processes are extrapolative or uncertain (N.B. 'It may be true', [14] and 'in some sense', [14]). Elsewhere Halliday (1973, p. 24) declares that Malinowski's functional thesis on the child language is merely conjectural: 'Malinowski's ideas were *rather ahead of his time*, and they were *not yet backed up by adequate investigations of language development*' [emphasis mine].

However, despite the fact that Halliday makes explicit use of comparative processes, it can be argued, paradoxically, that such ploys are not merely heuristic or pedagogical; rather, they are defining, constraining and penetrating in the presumption of the functional character of language. In other words, they constitute the description itself. For one thing, we have to view such metaphorical uses in the wider argumentative context of modern Western linguistics, where and when the 'functional' is being countered with the 'formal', as represented for example by Chomsky's approach. For another, the metaphor of the child language development, though only tentative in Halliday's wording, has been used as a potential *argument* for the preferred functional understanding.

Let us take the last quote [16] for example. As anyone familiar with Halliday's systemic-functional linguistics would recognise, the first statement is its basic theoretical conception of language. This is being warranted by the case of 'the language of young children' because it is offered as what might be called evidential ground; N.B. 'We see this clearly in [. . .]'. On top of that, as if that piece of evidence were not solid enough, an appeal to personal rationality is offered; N.B. 'it is [. . .] I think, a feature of language as a whole' in the ensuing sentence. More crucially for our thesis here, the foregoing suggestive characteristic of the child language has been turned into something essentialistic in the same appeal to individual authority: it has become 'is essentially [. . .]'. Still another signal for reading this metaphor as argumentative is that in the final sentence there is an attempt to exclude other alternative (e.g. formal) ways of explaining language by the use of 'best'; otherwise, the sentence roughly echoes the initial statement. Given these strands of evidence we may assert that at the base of Halliday's notion of language is a discursive metaphor of the child language development.

3.2.2. Language as Evolution

Closely related to the metaphorical notion of language as language development is the construction of language as an evolutionary system in Halliday's writing. That is, the functional organisation of language is built upon a parallel argument from a different plane, viz. cultural and linguistic evolution. Specifically, it is presumed that the adaptive process of language over hundreds and thousands of years gives language a functional character. In the words of Halliday (1973, p. 22):

> [17] [. . .] another question, no less significant, is that of the relation between the functions of language and language itself. If language has evolved in the service of certain functions, that may in the broadest sense be called 'social' functions, has this **left its mark**? Has the character of language been shaped and determined by what we use it for? **There are a number of reasons for suggesting that it has** [. . .]. (Halliday, 1973, p. 22)

Two points need to be highlighted here. First, Halliday posits here two separate issues, evolution of language on the one hand and 'language itself' on the other. Second, the evolutionary concept in question is to be traced, outside linguistics, through Malinowski, Darwin, back to Aristotle, where structure, biological or behavioural, is seen as derived from and adaptive to human needs and social environment. In addition, it is apparent that there is no evidence for the alleged 'evolution' of language, as Halliday himself admits (1973, p. 23), 'There are no living specimens of its [i.e. language's] ancestral types' and (1973, p. 34) '[w]e cannot examine the origins of language'.

What Halliday is trying to suggest here however is that a process – cultural and linguistic evolution – has shaped the product – the linguistic system; n.b. 'left its mark' and 'There are a number of reasons for suggesting that it has'. Because two separate domains are involved here and because there is an inferential process between the two, whose very basis is doubtful, we may claim that the recourse to the evolutionary idea is argumentative and that the functional nature of language is premised on this metaphorically originated argument. To further illustrate this point, let us look at another example:

> [18] [I]t is the uses of language that, **over tens of thousands of generations, have shaped** the system. Language has **evolved to satisfy** human needs; and the way it is organized **is functional with respect to these needs – it is not arbitrary.** (Halliday, 1985, p. xiii)

Here the notion of the functional system of language may again be seen as grounded in a metaphorical argument – inferring from matters of a different domain, viz. cultural and linguistic evolution (see also Halliday, 1973, p. 23, for uses of 'all stages of cultural evolution' and 'level of linguistic evolution'). I have already alluded to the wider argumentative context enshrouding the functional and formal explanations of language. Here I need only to point out two textual features as evidence for the potentially contentious nature of the presumed functional organisation of language. One is the description 'and the way it is organized is functional [. . .]'; it is consistent with the foregoing factual statements as a 'logical' consequence (despite the vague conjunction 'and'). Another is the negation of the opposite of being functional – 'not arbitrary'. From these moves it may be seen that recourse to the metaphors of 'cultural evolution' and 'linguistic evolution' is argumentatively motivated, in spite of Halliday's realisation/admission that there is no evidence for them (Halliday, 1973, p. 23). Further, it may be argued that the metaphorical basis of Halliday's linguistic construction is embedded in a degree of reflexivity in his functional explanation of language, as implicit in the current excerpt: Language is explained in terms of 'human needs' and yet at the same time the latter are assumed to be reflected in the former (N.B. 'functional with respect to these needs').

3.2.3. Language as Unconscious

Still another metaphorical notion that Halliday draws upon in defining the nature of language is 'the unconscious'. Since 'the unconscious' comes in via the ...

of speech in Halliday's linguistic theorising, we might as well begin with that. Following Saussure, Halliday maintains that the language system is best captured from the spoken mode (rather than the written). The reason why speech is more suitable is, according to Halliday (1985, pp. xxiii–xxiv), that it contains richer information about language: 'Why is speech important? [. . .] potential of the system is more richly developed, and more fully revealed, in speech. [. . .] It is in spontaneous, operational speech that the grammatical system of a language is most fully exploited [. . .]. This is why we have to look to spoken discourse for at least some of the evidence on which to base our theory of the language' (cf. Halliday, 1985, p. xxv).

If Halliday wants to base linguistic theory on (the grammar of) speech, then what is his basic conception of it? The key term for it that Halliday uses is 'unconscious' as in:

> [19] There are perhaps two main reasons for this [why speech is important for theorising grammar], underlying both of which is **the same general principle, that of the *unconscious*** [italics original] **nature** of spoken language. [. . .]. Lying beyond both the points raised above is **the unconscious nature of spontaneous** speech [. . .]. (Halliday, 1985, pp. xxiv–xxv)

But what does he mean by 'the unconscious'?

> [20] The complexity of spoken language is **more like that of dance**; it is not static and dense but mobile and intricate, **like,**
> [an extended spoken sample]. (Halliday, 1985, p. xxiv)

> [21] In spoken language, we perform without thinking. Talking is **like walking** (and **developmentally the two go together**; protolanguage goes with crawling, language with walking): if you think about it, **you stumble (which is a metaphor we often use)**. (Halliday, 1985, p. xxv)

> [22] So far as I know, no-one who is tone deaf speaks his language on a monotone, or with an intonation that is in any way disordered; **such people merely have trouble in bringing it to consciousness**, and therefore in analysing that of their own language or learning that of a foreign one. **In the same way**, those who are 'grammar deaf' make all the same subtle semantic distinctions as other speakers of the language; yet they fail to recognize them when they are pointed out; and will even deny that they are possible. (I know of no **quick cure for this condition. But a good dose of analysis of spontaneous speech can help.**) (Halliday, 1985, p. xxvi)

So here, we do not have to go back to Freud's or Jung's psychoanalysis of 'the unconscious' to understand what 'the unconscious' of human language constitutes. These passages on the unconscious of language are rich in metaphors. 'The conscious' that Halliday speaks is predicated of further metaphors, such as

'walking', 'dancing', '(pathological) condition'. Therefore it may be said that the complex system of language that Halliday pursues is defined by a layer-upon-layer and one-after-another metaphor: language-as-the-unconscious-as-walking/dancing/ condition. Such heavy, exclusive reliance on properties of other chosen categories in functionalist theory reflects not just the difficulty of conceptualising and defining the object of research in its own terms and, indeed, in any other ways, but also the thorough-going discursive, metaphorical mediation, and saturation, of what is taken for granted in linguistic enquiry.

More interestingly and more importantly, there may be certain attempts observed here that are made at the same time to justify, and thereby naturalise, those metaphors employed. The two brackets in [21] are a case in point. Following the explicit use of the notion of 'walking' as metaphor, there is, paradoxically, a first bracketed allusion to 'development' when speaking and walking take place simultaneously. The bracketing move at this juncture, despite its potential meaning of playing down relevance, accomplishes in effect the argumentative role of rationalising and naturalising the concept of speaking as walking. In addition of this justification through (developmental) time, there is the implicit resort to *common sense* for warranting the preferred metaphor: When Halliday reminds us that the metaphor of stumbling is something we 'often use', we are invited to take his words to mean 'therefore that metaphor is not really metaphorical but true'.

In example [22], we can find yet another way of defending the notion of grammatical unconsciousness. Here the unconscious is paralleled with the capacity of tone-deaf people to make tone distinctions in practice. It is not that ordinary laypeople do not have the grammatical unconscious, according to Halliday, it is merely that they have a 'pathological condition' in that respect, and that what they need for it is a large 'dose' of spoken grammar. In this way, one metaphorical process is reinforced and effectively naturalised by another kind of metaphor.

3.2.4. Justification for Writing Grammar

Using metaphors to shape and define the object of linguistic research is entirely consistent with the Saussurean notion of *langue* as an arcane phenomenon for linguistic science. Saying that the human language system is really like child language, a possible product of unspecified linguistic and cultural evolution, and that it exists at the level of the unconscious (as dance does) serves to create an intellectual interest in demystifying it. Moreover, since grammar is viewed as the 'central processing unit' of a language and discourse (Halliday, 1985, p. xxii and pp. xxxiv–xxxv), a need to spell it out arises naturally as well. Hence Halliday declares the pursuit of the 'internal' organisation of language to be the primary goal of functional linguistics (Halliday, 1973, p. 45). In this subsection, we shall see that the chosen metaphors that we witnessed earlier serve fittingly to warrant the subsequent practice of writing (functional) grammar.

> [23] This [talking is like walking] means that the categories of our language represent unconscious rather than conscious slices of meaning; and this **is one of the main problems for a grammatical theory.** (Halliday, 1985, pp. xxiv–xxv)

[24] The meaning is built into our unconscious. [. . .].
This book [*Introduction to Functional Grammar*] **is** [. . .] **an interpretation of** the English code. (Halliday, 1985, p. xxvi)

[25] **[A] grammar is an attempt to crack** the code. (Halliday, 1985, p. xxxi)

[26] In order to understand how language works, **therefore, we have to engage with the grammar.** (Halliday, 1985, pp. xxxiv–xxxv)

In these fragments it may be seen that there is a tacit assumption of an obscured, sophisticated and controlling system. Such a phenomenon is implicit in or invoked by such constructions as 'one of the main problems for a grammatical theory', 'the English code', 'to crack the code', 'to understand how language works [. . .] we have to engage with the grammar'.

It may also be noted that in these excerpts the taken-for-granted hidden code is in fact used as the argument or rationale for the enterprise of grammatical theory. For, the presumed particular nature of the linguistic system, or indeed 'the conscious', effectively suggests the necessity of deciphering work, hence grammar-writing. In fact, Halliday explicitly tells us the need for and importance of the job of working on grammar (e.g. 'The meaning is built into our unconscious', 'we have to engage with the grammar').

Earlier we saw that language is viewed as having the nature of child language development, as being evolved, and as unconscious (as in walking and dancing). With respect to the present notion of 'code' or 'grammar', these metaphorically charged conceptions are perfectly consistent; only they are presupposed here. Thus, looking back on the metaphorical mediations in the background, one may realise that the present job of writing the grammar is indeed justified and highly valuable. And reading the grammar will enlighten us on ourselves. In this sense we may assert that the choice and use of specific metaphors have a constraining and penetrating effect on the (subsequent) linguistic practice (in this case, writing the grammar). Another way of saying this is that the justification for the job of writing grammar is facilitated by positing a central processing system that is evolved and unconscious.

4. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I attempted a re-orientation of linguistics. Instead of proceeding from the traditional premises and pursuing the conventional aims, I took the discourse of linguistics as the topic of research and examined in some detail the ways in which the basic, taken-for-granted 'real' object of modern Western linguistics is presumed, discussed and utilised, with special reference to the use of metaphor.

Through discourse analysis in the SCL perspective, we found that the foundational presumptions of 'language' in both Chomsky's and Halliday's linguistic

theories are in fact grounded in and penetrated by preferred and recursive metaphors. In other words, the very stuff named 'language', 'the cognitive device', or 'the linguistic system', is not simply a thing that is pre-given, pre-existing, out there in the human world, something that linguists only have to theoretically model and empirically specify. It has been rendered present and real by linguistics-writers through metaphorical and rhetorical devices.

Not only have metaphors been used to make present, define and fashion the object of linguistic enquiry, but we also saw that they have affected linguistic theory formation and argumentation by functioning as rational arguments and by facilitating other assumptions about language. For instance, they are used to form the basis for dismissing or refuting alternative approaches and theories of language on the one hand and for justifying one's own practices or accounts on the other. In this sense, the way that the object of enquiry is presumed and conceptualised is also oriented to ideological interests. From these metaphorical, rhetorical and social perspectives, I may assert more generally that there is a profound kinship of 'the object of linguistic enquiry' with ordinary, commonsensical discourse – to adapt Foucault's turn of phrase: 'the profound kinship of language with the world' (Foucault, 1970, p. 43).

Findings and observations of the kinds that we have made here may be utilised to help open up possibilities of changing existing linguistic discourse and thinking. For example, we can start re-formulating questions so that integration of disciplines, say linguistics, discourse analysis and social theory, becomes possible. Since discourse is a constituent part of linguistics, we can also try to positively act upon the object of study, e.g. by creating helpful (versions of) linguistic reality, say 'language used in real circumstances' for examining its effects on people's lives. Further, given the current case findings, it should now be realised that norms of linguistics discourse should be developed, such as avoidance of argumentative use of metaphors, especially when justifying one's own approach and refuting others'.

Clearly, the present case study is but a preamble to a more inclusive examination of other parts of linguistic theory writing and to a wider-ranging study of the discourse of linguistics writing as a whole. Here I have concentrated only on a few metaphorical and rhetorical aspects of the foundational notions (of language) in a few (though most influential) works of a couple of leading linguists. I am convinced that more data analysis will show for instance that there may be other kinds of metaphorical basis, say geological or arboreal. There may be marked variations and inconsistencies in linguistics writing (say between theoretical ideals and practical analysis). And there may be dominant ideologies in particular theoretical formulations to exclude the social-academic Other. In fact, I hope that what we have seen in this study will serve to signal the benefit of reconsidering the discourse of linguistics as a whole.

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67

The Writing of Research Article Introductions

John Swales and Hazem Najjar

Research on Introductions to Research Articles

Introductions to research articles or papers have become in the last few years an important proving ground for our current capacity to understand the process and product of specialized academic writing. The extensive case studies of Latour and Woolgar (1979), Knorr-Cetina (1981), and Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) provide solid evidence for the complexity of the compositional process at the introduction stage. All three studies show that writing an introduction to a research article is not simply a wrestling with words to fit the facts, but is also strongly modulated by perceptions of the anticipated reactions of peer-colleagues. Knorr-Cetina's analysis of the evolving drafts of a single paper is particularly revealing. She is able to show how the first draft's bold announcement of a new method ultimately becomes the reporting of a comparative analysis, how the early exuberance of the primary researchers turns into the careful understatement of a wider group.

Bazerman's studies of disciplinary variations in introductions, particularly Bazerman (1981), have also made a significant contribution to our understanding. According to Bazerman, in the "harder" sciences, author and intended readership are likely to share criteria for the judging of a new knowledge claim. In contrast, the social science researcher or humanities scholar may well address a situation in which there is little consensus – given the greater likelihood that the potential readership will approach the text with widely varying schemata and from diverse methodological and ideological viewpoints. In these areas, therefore, authors embarking upon introductions "have it all to do." They are wise to make the most of the opportunity the introduction provides to create a plausible context for the ensuing findings so that as many readers as possible are attracted to their perspective.

Source: *Written Communication* vol. 4, no. 2, 1987, pp. 175–190.

Introductions have also been a major context for debate about research methodology. Issues of the value of "subject specialist informants," their selection and their integration into a hermeneutical cycle have been sited in discussion of research article introductions (Huckin & Olsen, 1984; Selinker, 1979). This type of text has also figured prominently in the quest for the identity and boundary criteria required to establish textual subdivisions of a discoursal or rhetorical character (Bley-Vroman & Selinker, 1984; Crookes, 1986; Swales, 1981). In addition, certain studies of particular linguistic features of research writing have either concentrated on introductions or compared the function and distribution of selected features across introduction, method, result, and discussion sections. In the former case, there have been investigations into the in-text creation of complex noun phrases (Dubois, 1982) and of tense and citational form and function (Oster, 1981; Swales, 1983); in the latter case, of *that*-nominals (West, 1980), tense (Heslot, 1982), first person pronoun versus the passive (Tarone, Dwyer, Gillette, & Icke, 1981), and authorial comment (Adams Smith, 1984).

The nature of the preferred types of informational and rhetorical structure in research article introductions and of the best ways of characterizing that structure are also lively contemporary issues. A common approach is to opt for some version of a problem-solution model (Hoey, 1979). Zappen (1983) will serve as an illustration of this type of analysis – and Zappen's analysis of his first text can be seen in Figure 1. Zappen argues, following Toulmin (1972), that the researcher continuously needs to address the context of the intellectual discipline wherein he or she is located; or to put it another way, research writing needs to be audience sensitive. More specifically, "The researcher addresses the goals, current capacities, problems, and criteria of evaluation that derive from and operate within that discipline" (Zappen, 1983, p. 130). And, as we might expect, Zappen's analysis follows this series of subcontexts: *goal* in the first paragraph, *current capacity* (the best we can do at the moment), *problem* (However, . .), *solution* (In the present work, . .), and *criteria for evaluation.* However, this type of analysis runs into a number of problems. In general terms, it runs counter to the broadly held perception that there is neither a simple nor a close relationship between discovery as a cognitive and experimental activity and the formal "empiricist" statement of how that discovery came about. More directly relevant is a sense that the Toulmin-Zappen model with its emphasis on a disciplinary audience, on the researcher addressing the *external world,* fails to account sufficiently for the authors' rhetoric as it pertains simultaneously to research *content* and to the authors' *own* research career. For example, one striking feature of the introduction Zappen discusses is that it is firmly embedded within the highly localized field of the researchers' own previous work. All the four references in the opening paragraph are to Neelakantaswamy, and only one reference overall (8) is to the work of others. Further, there is a fair amount of comment that (with one exception) evaluates positively the authors' work and less positively the work of others. For instance, the text opens with a broad claim that the authors have developed not "a number" or "a series" but "*a class*" of microwave radiators. These are "compact," "simple," and have "practical utility"; indeed they are

COAL	In the recent past, Neelakantaswamy et al. (1-4) developed a class of microwave radiators termed as "Gaussian-beam launcheru" to produce a focused exposure field in biological experiments for partial-body irradiations. These compact and simple structures with their ability to focus the microwave energy in a very small region indicate their practical utility, in the areas of biological researches and medical applications of microwaves, such as for selective heating of diseased/cancerous tissues. These launchers can also be used in noninvasive beam-wave reflectometric and spectrometric instrumentations for measuring complex permittivity of biological material at microwave frequencies, as indicated by Neelakantaswamy elsewhere (5-7)
CURRENT CAPACITY	When compared to the microwave beam-launching system described in (8), which consists of a plane-wave irradiated dielectric sphere (lens), the launcher formed by combining a scalar horn and dielectric sphere (1) is a more practical sources of microwave Gaussian beam. However, the use of a dielectric
PROBLEM	sphere as the focusing lens results in significant amount of spherical aberrations in the focal field, as indicated by Neelakantaswamy et al.in (9) ....
SOLUTION	In the present work, a Gaussian-beam launcher is formed by placing a dielectric hemisphere (instead of a full sphere) at the aperture end of corrugated circular waveguide (scalar horn). This enables a reduction in the path length of the ray in the lens-
CRITERIA OF EVALUATION	medium, and hence the spherical aberration effects are relatively minimized. Further, by using a hemisphere in the place of a full sphere, the launcher structure becomes less massive and smaller.

Source: Neelakantaswamy & Hong (1979). Reprinted from Zappen, J. P. (1983). A rhetoric for research in sciences and technologies. In P. V. Anderson, R. J. Brockman, & C. R. Miller (Eds.), *New essays in technical and scientific communication.* Farmingdale, NY: Baywood. Used by permission.

Figure 1: A problem-solution model of article introductions (Zappen, 1983)

"more practical" than other types. Toward the close, one of their apparent defects is said to be "relatively minimised." The exception to the positive evaluation of their own work lies in the *problem* section, where the authors need both to motivate their present work and to justify its publication by showing that their contribution to the discipline, while previously established as significant and reference worthy, is as yet incomplete. Therefore, even in Zappen's own example, there seems to be more "going on" than an audience-sensitive problem-solution model can easily admit – and one of those things is a quasi-contingent account of the relevant research history.

An alternative to problem-solution models is the create-a-research space model, which attempts to capture rather more of "the dark side" (Swales, 1981, 1984). At the outset, the writer of an introduction has the option of trying to establish that his or her particular area of research is of some significance. This is most commonly done by claiming that the area is nonperipheral; authors may claim that there is interest in it, or that it is important or relevant, or that it has been widely investigated, or that standard procedures have evolved (Move 1). This done, Move 2 summarizes selectively the relevant previous research. The rhetorical role of Move 3 is to show that the reported previous research is not complete. This is principally achieved by indicating a gap in the previous work, by raising a question or by indicating that a new explanation is needed.

Sometimes the onset of Move 3 will be marked by a contrastive connector like *however*, and often Move 3 will contain some negative element. Sometimes negation will occur at the thematic sentence-initial position and be expressed through quantification (*little, no, none of, few*), and sometimes it will be realized through choice of verbs like *fail, neglect, lack, been restricted to*, and the like. Finally, in Move 4 the *gap* is turned into the research space for the present article, or an offer is made to answer the question raised in Move 3. This is commonly realized by a purpose statement ("The aim of the present paper is to give . . .") or by simple description ("In the present work, a Gaussian-beam launcher is formed by . . ."). On occasion, Move 4 is also signaled by a switch from the impersonal style used in Moves 1–3 to the use of *we*. And inevitably, the smaller the research space (the less evident the existence of an unfilled ecological niche in the research area), the greater the rhetorical *work* needed.

We have thus reached a position where it would seem reasonable to assume that a research article introduction typically closes with a promissory statement, variously indentifiable as an offer of a solution, as a clarification of research purpose, or as an advance notice of what is to come.[1] However, it is much less clear whether the close will also contain a summary announcement of the principal findings. Although we know that the principal findings (PFs) will normally be summarized in the second half of the "informative" abstract and will be reported and discussed at some length in the results and discussion sections, there seems to have been little attention given to the question of whether announcements of principal findings (APFs) are also inserted at an introduction's close (as was indeed the case in the Neelakantaswamy and Hong extract analyzed by Zappen). The only study known to us is a preliminary unpublished investigation by Kinay, Muloshi, Musakabantu, and Swales (1983). In a sample of 50 introductions drawn more or less at random from a range of fields and journals, all but 5 contained clear Move 4 promissory statements. However, only ten of the remaining 45 (22%) also included an APF. Kinay et al. also looked for a possible relationship between the absence of a homotopic abstract and the presence of an APF in the introduction. Of the eight papers without abstracts four also had no bottom line, and so kept their readers in suspense about their findings until the results section, thus suggesting, on very limited evidence, that the correlation may be weak.

The present article reports on a localized case study of the APF apsect of article introductions in two contrasting fields (physical science and psychology) and over time – to ascertain whether there have been any changes in writing practice over the last few decades. To that end we have examined introductions from the *Physical Review* of 1943, 1963, and 1983 and from the *Journal of Educational Psychology* in 1963 and 1983. A major motivation for undertaking this research derived from our observations that handbooks, manuals, and style sheets for prospective authors of research papers appeared to ignore the issue, disagreed amongst themselves, or seemed to be offering prescriptions not in accord with the actual practice of many successful authors ("successful" in the operational sense of succeeding in getting their manuscripts published).

Announcing Findings in Introductions: A Survey of Manuals

There is no discussion of the APF question in several of the works surveyed, such as Peterson (1961), Jones (1971), O'Connor and Woodford (1976), and Michaelson (1982). Where it is discussed, the overall weight of advice is to include APFs in introductions. Thus the Royal Society, in its *General Notes on the Preparation of Scientific Papers* (1965, p. 6), advises that

> the introduction should state the reasons for the work (with brief reference to previous work on the subject), the object of the work, *and the main achievements.* (our emphasis)

Calnan and Barabas (1973, p. 86) give six functions for the introduction, of which the fifth is:

> to record the most significant finding so that the reader is alerted early and can assess the evidence for it as he reads.

Similarly, Dudley (1977, p. 12), in a volume entitled *The Presentation of Original Work in Medicine and Biology*, observes:

> A sentence or even a short paragraph at the end of the introduction *which says what the work has or has not achieved* as well as what it set out to achieve may catch the reader's attention and invite him to test for himself by further reading whether or not he agrees with the contentions expressed. (our emphasis)

The most trenchant version of this advice is contained in the well-known volume by Day (1983) on *How to Write and Publish a Scientific Paper.* The fourth and final suggested rule for a good introduction is as follows:

> It should state the principal results of the investigation. Do not keep the reader is suspense; let the reader follow the development of the evidence. An O'Henry surprise ending might make good literature, but it hardly fits the mold that we like to call the scientific method. (Day, 1983, p. 31)

In contrast, recommendations to dispense with an APF in introductions are rarer and more muted. For instance, the IEEE style guide (as cited by Mitchell, 1968, p. 161) demurs by implication:

> The *Introduction* orients the reader with respect to the problem and should include the following:
>
> (1) The nature of the problem
> (2) The background of previous work

(3) The purpose and significance of the paper
(4) The method by which the problem will be attacked
(5) The organization of the material in the paper

In fact, we have traced only one manual writer who unequivocally recommends dispensing with an APF, and that is Huth (1982, p. 53):

> Some authors close the Introduction with a short statement of the research findings. This practice has been justified as a device to hold the reader's attention: it has been criticized as moving the conclusion from its logical place in the sequence of the argument. One reason for keeping the conclusion at the end of the paper is that many journals now publish full summaries or abstracts on their title pages. Why give the answer twice at the beginning of the paper?

Within the specific contexts of the two journals analyzed in the following section, the survey so far has considered general or secondary sources of advice. The primary sources will naturally be the relevant style guide for the two journals. For the *Physical Review* the primary document is the American Institute of Physics *Style Manual* (1978). In fact, the APF issue is not directly addressed, the closest approximation being the following section on "purpose" (1978, p. 54):

> Every legitimate scientific paper has a purpose that distinguishes it from other papers on the same general subject. Make clear in the introduction just what this purpose is. In other words, orient the reader with respect to the point of view and emphasis of the paper, and *indicate what in particular the paper will accomplish.* (our emphasis)

The phrase "the paper will accomplish" is possibly ambiguous, perhaps deliberately so, but it is clearly less explicit about the necessity for an APF than an injunction to indicate what the paper "has accomplished." Thus it would seem that prospective contributors to the *Physical Review* are not externally constrained to close their introductions with an announcement of principal findings, even if the overall trend in general advice would suggest they would be well-advised to do so.

Mullins's (1977) *A Guide to Writing and Publishing in the Social and Behavioral Sciences* follows the American Psychological Association guidelines, which are in turn adopted by the *Journal of Educational Psychology.* The relevant section is (Mullins, 1977, p. 21):

> In the final paragraph of the problem statement (of article introductions) briefly and clearly present:
> - The article's single focus
> - The central hypothesis
> - The research method
> - The major findings (optional but common)

It would therefore seem that educational psychologists are encouraged more directly than their counterparts in physics to follow an APF policy in their submissions to one of the leading journals in the field. In the next section we will present our findings as to what actually happens, as opposed to what might be expected to happen, following prescription, recommendation, and commentary.

Types of Introduction Close in Two Journals

The corpus consists of 110 article introductions selected from two journals, both of which require homotopic abstracts:

A. 66 articles from the *Physical Review (PR)*

(1) 22 from Second Series, 1943 (volume 63, Nos. 1–6)
(2) 22 from Second Series, 1963 (volume 129, No. 1)
(3) 22 from *Physical Review A: General Physics* Third Series, 1983 (volume 27, No. 1)

B. 44 articles from the *Journal of Educational Psychology (JEP)*

(1) 22 from 1963, volume 54, Nos. 1–3
(2) 22 from 1983, volume 75, Nos. 1–2

All the articles had clear introduction sections, either self-announced as in the case of the *Physical Review* or followed by a section entitled *Method* as in *JEP*. All the articles in the corpus were also immediately preceded by abstracts. However, the format of the *JEP* changed somewhat in the period between 1943 and 1963, and it was eventually decided to exclude 1943 *JEP* articles for this reason.

The introductions were placed into one of five categories according to the following scheme:

Class A – The introduction contained not Move 4-type statement introducing the present research and no announcement of principal findings (APF).
Class B – The introduction contained a Move 4-type statement but no APF.
Class C – The introduction contained no Move 4 but an APF.
Class D – The introduction contained both a Move 4 and an APF.
Class E – The analysis of the introduction is too uncertain and doubtful to permit categorization.

The corpus provided a single incontrovertible example of Class A:

(1) In general, the substances most favorable to inelastic scattering (of protons) are light elements with high (p.n.) thresholds. (end of introduction) (*PR*, 43)

However, there were several others that seemed intermediate between Class A and Class B (our emphases):

(2) Their well conceived experiments *suggested to us the desirability of repeating* this work with the mass spectrometer as a detector of ionization. (end of introduction) (*PR*, 43)

(3) Consequently, *it was expected* that infra-red studies of antimony *would* contribute toward unravelling its band structure. (end of introduction) (*PR*, 63)

The first has a surface realization of the switch to first person (a typical marker for the onset of Move 4), while in the second the underlying agent of the passive verb can be presumed to be the present experimenters and not previous researchers, and thus would have been realized as "by us" in surface structure. Nonetheless, reference to present work remains implicit and reconstructable rather than manifest in the actual text; for that reason, we have categorized such cases as Class A.

In contrast, the typical Class B introduction ends with an explicit promissory statement, most frequently signaled by *this*/the *present*, but also marked by first person usage or by *here*, *now*, or *reported* (with or without other signals). Thus we find:

(4) The main purpose of the experiment reported here was to . . .
(5) The study reported herein was designed to . . .
(6) The purpose of this study was to explore . . .
(7) In this paper we give preliminary results of . . .
(8) It is one of the aims of this paper to determine . . .

However, in Class B, the actual findings or results are not specified in any detail, and certainly in less specific and less usable form than even in the homotopic abstract. Class B introductions are concerned with what will be done, not with what has been found.

There were only two cases of Class C. The shorter is given below:

(9) Therefore, it is of interest to examine the validity of the approximation of neglecting the field connections to the dielectric constant. The error introduced by this approximation will be explicitly calculated and shown to be small or negligible under most circumstances. (*PR*, 63)

The first sentence is classified as Move 3 (hypothesis raising) partly because of its intrinsic rhetorical function and partly because of the arguments we have presented for not assigning Move 4 status to citations like (2) and (3) above. The second sentence, taken as a whole, would seem to be an APF given the conclusion that the error is shown to be "small or negligible." A suitable illustration of a Class D introduction (a statement on the present research plus an APF) is the Zappen text shown in Figure 1, which closes with an outline of the changes made in the launcher. Space does not permit any consideration of the relatively small number of introductions that we have been unable to categorize.[2]

Table 1 shows the results of the classification scheme as it applies to the two samples from the journals. Class B and Class D are the two types of introduction that contain an explicit announcement of either the purpose or the topic of the present research. The fact that these two classes predominate (83%) in the *Physical Review* sample provides useful support for the appropriateness of existing models of article introduction information structure. In 29 of our 55 cases, *Physical Review*

Table 1: Types of introduction in two journal samples

	A. The *Physical Review*			B. The *Journal of Educational Psychology*			
Year	Class A	Class B	Class C	Class D	Class E	Totals	% with bottom line (C & D)
A – 1943	3	10	0	8	1	22	36%
A – 1963	2	9	1	9	1	22	44%
A – 1983	0	7	0	12	3	22	55%
Totals	5	26	1	29	5	66	45%
B – 1963	1	17	1	1	2	22	9.0%
B – 1983	0	17	0	1	4	22	4.5%
Totals	1	34	1	2	6	44	6.8%

authors then went on to indicate their principal findings, and in 1 case (Class C) did so directly without bridging previous research and present findings via a Move 4 statement (see example 9 above). Table 1 also shows that statements of results/findings have slowly but steadily become more common over the last forty years, reaching 55% in 1983. However, the relatively small sample size would suggest that further investigations will be needed before we can reach any firm conclusions about such a trend.

The figures for the *Journal of Educational Psychology* are highly contrasting, for there were only three APFs (a disclosure rate of 6.8% as opposed to 45%), and one of these is of a highly generalized nature:

(10) Thus, the present study corrects many of the methodological and interpretive pitfalls of previous studies of cross-racial ability patterns. (end of introduction) (*JEP*, 83)

In fact, many of the introductions are quite long, especially in the 1983 sample, and there is consequently much cyclic working through of Move 2–3–4 sequences. Nevertheless, the manifold opportunities to announce results are consistently declined. On occasion, this has given rise to the rhetorically curious situation of the authors referring to their results as if they had been given, when in fact they have not been indicated:

(11) The major objective of the study was to develop and test the effects of a brief curriculum of special preparation for the analytical portion of the GRE Aptitude Test to assess the susceptibility of three analytical item types to short-term intervention designed to improve performance on the item types. The results were intended to aid decisions about the composition of the analytical section of the test when it becomes fully operational. (end of introduction) (*JEP*, 83)

It is customary to classify abstracts as either indicative or informative. *Indicative abstracts* are commonly defined as those containing information on purpose, scope, and methodology, but not on results or conclusions. *Informative abstracts*

the other hand, are expected to include those final two elements (Cremmins, 1982). The psychologists in the sample we have examined seem to have a decided preference for *indicative* introductions.

Discussion

The corpus study described in the previous section raises a number of issues. An obvious one is the apparent mismatch between advice in the appropriate manuals and actual practice. The guide for physics researchers makes no mention of either the necessity or the suitability of indicating results at introduction close, and yet it would seem to be an increasingly common practice for *Physical Review* articles to contain such indications. On the other hand, Mullins's claims that in the social and behavioral sciences indicating main findings is "optional but common." Our study of the *Journal of Educational Psychology* shows that an APF is certainly optional but equally certainly is by no means common (with three occurrences out of a possible total of 44). In fact, Mullins's observation about "optional but common" would seem to fit the physic's data well, but not the data from Mullins's designated area. It might therefore be concluded that many of the style manuals are descriptively inaccurate in terms of the rhetorical feature discussed in this article. As applied linguists we would certainly wish to advocate the continual interaction of description and prescription, for without ongoing descriptive analysis of rhetorical trends, prescriptions can become otiose and obsolete. The authority that accrues to generalizations derived from the study of actual texts might in turn lend sufficient credence to style guides for them to be "honored more in the observance than in the breach" by authors and their editorial gatekeepers.

A second issue concerns the disparity between the two sets of data and its possible causes. The two journal samples clearly differ in the degree of APFs in introductions; and, given that this difference is equally clearly not a direct consequence of the instructions given to the authors, then, in the absence of contrary evidence, it is at least possible that the difference is also one of discipline. Why should this be? Why should half the physicists opt for a third mention of principal findings (abstract, results, *and* introduction) while virtually none of the psychologists did so? It is conceivable that the physicists' succinct, verbal announcements are not seen, within that discourse community, as actually constituting results, given the highly quantitative nature of physics. On the other hand, the psychologists may feel that the nature of their results makes it rhetorically unwise to give their readers early access to them. Some evidence for this kind of interpretation derives from the fact that many of the educational psychology introductions followed the promissory statement – typically of the hypothesis to be investigated – with an introduction final sentence or sentences that dealt not with results but with *method*. However, a text-based study such as this has interpretive limitations once the discourse analysis and the comparison between description and prescription has been completed. A fuller explanation of the phenomena reported would seem to require some seeking out of the beliefs and judgmental processes of those concerned with the research writing process – authors, editors, *and* manual writers.

Notes

1. The point we wish to emphasize at this juncture is that these two models remain in fairly close agreement with regard to the number and boundaries of rhetorical subsections or "moves" required to account for a typical type of short research article introduction (longer introductions are usually more rhetorically complex and often contain cyclic iterations of subsection sequences). The difference essentially resides in the evaluation and interpretation of subsections, which then becomes manifest in a difference between the attached glosses and labels. Although a resolution of this disagreement lies outside the scope of this article, it is worth observing that we may need both kinds of metaphorical caricature in order to capture the general movement of the arduously crafted introductory sections of research articles. We may need to account for both description and persuasion, for both reportage and promotion, for cool, logical textual surfaces as well as ego- and group-centric subtexts. Indeed, it is likely that this dual approach will be useful irrespective of whether the investigator is a sociologist of knowledge, a discourse analyst, a rhetorician, or – as many of the authors already cited – an individual in some way concerned with the teaching of technical and research communication to either native or nonnative speakers of English.
2. However, it is now necessary to point out that 10 out of the 110 introductions opened with a Move 4-type "introducing present research" statement. Although *prima facie* this finding might seem to disconfirm the viability of the Zappen and Swales models, we would argue that an anomaly percentage of under 10% is perfectly acceptable in discoursal and textual studies. Even more than syntax, discourse is a study of propensities and predilections. Discourse "rules" are generalizations that are permeable to exceptions, rather than laws falsified by a single counterinstance. If in Sapir's famous phrase, "all grammars leak," so all the more should we expect to find leakage, deviance, and creativity in the information structures of discourse, even when the analysis is restricted to conventionalized and well-established genres. Initially we noted that *fronted* fourth moves were somewhat more common in *JEP* than PR (6 out of 10 in 40% of the corpus). Subsequently, we investigated the possibility that authors might opt to introduce their own research at the beginning if the introductory section was to be lengthy and complex in an effort to provide a focus for a discursive survey both of previous research and of various kinds of issues. To some extent this is true, at least in the sense that 4 of the 6 *JEP* "4-fronted" introductions are more than 800 words long. However, one of these 6 introductions is but 130 words in length. On the other hand, the positioning of Move 4 does not bear directly on the topic of this article for it is clear that the researcher has ultimately the same opportunity for inserting an announcement of principal findings, irrespective of whether he or she opens the introduction by referring to the present research or (pre)closes it in this way.

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The Relativity of Linguistic Strategies: Rethinking Power and Solidarity in Gender and Dominance

Deborah Tannen

Introduction

In analyzing discourse, many researchers operate on the unstated assumption that all speakers proceed along similar lines of interpretation, so a particular example of discourse can be taken to represent how discourse works for all speakers. For some aspects of discourse, this is undoubtedly true. Yet a large body of sociolinguistic literature makes clear that, for many aspects of discourse, this is so only to the extent that cultural background is shared. To the extent that cultural backgrounds differ, lines of interpretation and habitual use of many linguistic strategies are likely to diverge. One thinks immediately and minimally of the work of Gumperz (1982), Erickson and Shultz (1982), Scollon and Scollon (1981), and Philips (1983). My own research shows that cultural difference is not limited to the gross and apparent levels of country of origin and native language, but also exists at the subcultural levels of ethnic heritage, class, geographic region, age, and gender. My earlier work (Tannen 1984, 1986) focuses on ethnic and regional style; my most recent work (Tannen 1990) focuses on gender-related stylistic variation. I draw on this work here to demonstrate that specific linguistic strategies have widely divergent potential meanings.[1]

This insight is particularly significant for research on language and gender, much of which has sought to describe the linguistic means by which men dominate women in interaction. That men dominate women is not in question; what I am problematizing is the source and workings of domination and other interpersonal intentions and effects. I will show that one cannot locate the source of

Source: Deborah Tannen, *Gender and Discourse*, 1994, pp. 19–52.

domination, or of any interpersonal intention or effect, in linguistic strategies such as interruption, volubility, silence, and topic raising, as has been claimed. Similarly, one cannot locate the source of women's powerlessness in such linguistic strategies as indirectness, taciturnity, silence, and tag questions, as has also been claimed. The reason one cannot do this is that the same linguistic means can be used for different, even opposite, purposes and can have different, even opposite, effects in different contexts. Thus, a strategy that seems, or is, intended to dominate may in another context or in the mouth of another speaker be intended or used to establish connection. Similarly, a strategy that seems, or is, intended to create connection can in another context or in the mouth of another speaker be intended or used to establish dominance.

Put another way, the "true" intention or motive of any utterance cannot be determined from examination of linguistic form alone. For one thing, intentions and effects are not identical. For another, as the sociolinguistic literature has dramatized repeatedly (see especially McDermott and Tylbor 1983; Schegloff 1982, 1988; Erickson 1986; Duranti and Brenneis 1986), human interaction is a "joint production": everything that occurs results from the interaction of all participants. The source of the ambiguity and polysemy of linguistic strategies that I will explore here is the paradoxical relationship between the dynamics of power and solidarity.

Overview of the Chapter

In this chapter I first briefly explain the theoretical paradigm of power and solidarity. Then I show that linguistic strategies are potentially ambiguous (they could "mean" either power or solidarity) and polysemous (they could "mean" both). Third, I reexamine and expand the power and solidarity framework in light of cross-cultural research. Finally, I demonstrate the relativity of five linguistic strategies: indirectness, interruption, silence versus volubility, topic raising, and adversativeness (that is, verbal conflict).

Theoretical Background

Power and Solidarity

Since Brown and Gilman's (1960) introduction of the concept and subsequent elaborations of it, especially those of Friedrich (1972) and Brown and Levinson ([1978]1987), the dynamics of power and solidarity have been fundamental to sociolinguistic theory. (Fasold [1990] provides an overview.) Brown and Gilman based their framework on analysis of the use of pronouns in European languages which have two forms of the second person pronoun, such as the French *tu* and *vous*. In English the closest parallel is to be found in forms of address: first name versus title–last name. In Brown and Gilman's system, power is associated with nonreciprocal use of pronouns; in English the parallel would be a situation

in which one speaker addresses the other by first name but is addressed by title – last name (for example, doctor and patient, teacher and student, boss and secretary, building resident and elevator operator). Solidarity is associated with reciprocal pronoun use or symmetrical forms of address: both speakers address each other by *tu* or by *vous* (in English, by title – last name or by first name). Power governs asymmetrical relationships where one is subordinate to another; solidarity governs symmetrical relationships characterized by social equality and similarity.

In my previous work exploring the relationship between power and solidarity as it emerges in conversational discourse (Tannen 1984, 1986), I note that power and solidarity are in paradoxical relation to each other. That is, although power and solidarity, closeness and distance, seem at first to be opposites, each also entails the other. Any show of solidarity necessarily entails power, in that the requirement of similarity and closeness limits freedom and independence. At the same time, any show of power entails solidarity by involving participants in relation to each other. This creates a closeness that can be contrasted with the distance of individuals who have no relation to each other at all.

In Brown and Gilman's paradigm, the key to power is asymmetry, but it is often thought to be formality. This is seen in the following anecdote. I once entitled a lecture "The Paradox of Power and Solidarity." The respondent to my talk appeared wearing a three-piece suit and a knapsack on his back. The audience was amused by the association of the suit with power, the knapsack with solidarity. There was something immediately recognizable in this semiotic. Indeed, a professor wearing a knapsack might well mark solidarity with students at, for example, a protest demonstration. And wearing a three-piece suit to the demonstration might mark power by differentiating the wearer from the demonstrators, perhaps even reminding them of his dominant position in the institutional hierarchy. But wearing a three-piece suit to the board meeting of a corporation would mark solidarity with other board members, whereas wearing a knapsack in that setting would connote not solidarity but disrespect, a move in the power dynamic.

The Ambiguity of Linguistic Strategies

As the preceding example shows, the same symbol – a three-piece suit – can signal either power or solidarity, depending on, at least, the setting (for example, a board meeting or student demonstration), the habitual dress style of the individual, and the comparison of his clothing with that worn by others in the interaction. (I say "his" intentionally; the range of meanings would be quite different if a man's three-piece suit were worn by a woman.) This provides an analogue to the ambiguity of linguistic strategies, which are signals in the semiotic system of language. As I have demonstrated at length in previous books (see especially Tannen 1984, 1986, 1990), all linguistic strategies are potentially ambiguous. The power–solidarity dynamic is one fundamental source of ambiguity. What appear as attempts to dominate a conversation (an exercise of power) may actually be intended to establish rapport (an exercise of solidarity). This occurs

because (as I have worded it elsewhere) power and solidarity are bought with the same currency: The same linguistic means can be used to create either or both.

This ambiguity can be seen in the following fleeting conversation. Two women were walking together from one building to another in order to attend a meeting. They were joined by a man they both knew who had just exited a third building on his way to the same meeting. One of the women greeted the man and remarked, "Where's your coat?" The man responded, "Thanks, Mom." His response framed the woman's remark as a gambit in a power exchange: a mother tells a child to put on his coat. Yet the woman might have intended the remark as showing friendly concern rather than parental caretaking. Was it power (condescending, on the model of parent to child) or solidarity (friendly, on the model of intimate peers)? Though the man's uptake is clear, the woman's intention in making the remark is not.

Another example comes from a letter written to me by a reader of *You Just Don't Understand: Women and Men in Conversation.* A woman was at home when her partner arrived and announced that his archrival had invited him to contribute a chapter to a book. The woman remarked cheerfully how nice it was that the rival was initiating a rapprochement by including her partner in his book. He told her she had got it wrong: because the rival would be the editor and he merely a contributor, the rival was actually trying to solidify his dominance. She interpreted the invitation in terms of solidarity. He interpreted it as an expression of power. Which was right? I don't know. The invitation was ambiguous; it could have "meant" either. I suspect it had elements of both. In other words, it was polysemous.

The Polysemy of Power and Solidarity

If ambiguity denotes meaning one thing *or* another, polysemy denotes meaning one thing *and* another – that is, having multiple meanings simultaneously. The question "Where's your coat?" shows friendly concern *and* suggests a parent–child constellation. The invitation to contribute a chapter to a book brings editor and contributor closer *and* suggests a hierarchical relationship.

One more example will illustrate the polysemy of strategies signaling power and solidarity. If you have a friend who repeatedly picks up the check when you dine together, is she being generous and sharing her wealth, or is she trying to flaunt her money and remind you that she has more of it than you? Although the intention may be to make you feel good by her generosity, her repeated generosity may nonetheless make you feel bad by reminding you that she has more money. Thus, both of you are caught in the web of the ambiguity of power and solidarity. It is impossible to determine which was her real motive, and whether it justifies your response. On the other hand, even if you believe her motive was purely generous, you may nonetheless feel denigrated by her generosity because the fact that she has this generous impulse is evidence that she has more money than you, and her expressing the impulse reminds you of it. In other words, both interpretations exist at once: solidarity (she is paying to be nice) and power (her being nice in this way reminds you that she is richer)

In this sense, the strategy is not just ambiguous with regard to power and solidarity but polysemous. This polysemy explains another observation that initially surprised me: Paules (1991) reports that waitresses in the restaurant where she did ethnographic field work were offended not only by tips that were too small, but also by tips that were too large. The customers' inordinate beneficence implies that the amount of money left is insignificant to the tipper but significant to the waitress.

Brown and Gilman are explicit in their assumption that power is associated with asymmetrical relationships in which the power is held by the person in the one-up position. This is stated in their definition:

> One person may be said to have power over another to the degree that he is able to control the behavior of the other. Power is a relationship between at least two persons, and it is non-reciprocal in the sense that both cannot have power in the same area of behavior. (255)

I have called attention, however, to the extent to which solidarity in itself can be a form of control. For example, a young woman complained about friends who "don't let you be different." If the friend says she has a particular problem and the woman says, "I don't have that problem," her friend is hurt and accuses her of putting her down, of acting superior. The assumption of similarity requires the friend to have a matching problem.[2]

Furthermore, although Brown and Gilman acknowledge that "power superiors may be solidary (parents, elder siblings)" and "power inferiors, similarly, may be as solidary as the old family retainer" (258), most Americans are inclined to assume that solidarity implies closeness, whereas power implies distance.[3] Thus Americans regard the sibling relationship as the ultimate in solidarity: "sister" or "brother" are often used metaphorically to indicate closeness and equality.[4] In contrast, it is often assumed that hierarchy precludes closeness: employers and employees cannot "really" be friends. But being linked in a hierarchy necessarily brings individuals closer. This is an assumption underlying Watanabe's (1993) observation, in comparing American and Japanese group discussions, that whereas the Americans in her study saw themselves as individuals participating in a joint activity, the Japanese saw themselves as members of a group united by hierarchy. When reading Watanabe, I was caught up short by the term "united." My inclination had been to assume that hierarchy is distancing, not uniting.

The anthropological literature includes numerous discussions of cultural contexts in which hierarchical relationships are seen as close and mutually, not unilaterally, empowering. For example, Beeman (1986) describes an Iranian interactional pattern he dubs "getting the lower hand." Taking the lower-status position enables an Iranian to invoke a protector schema by which the higher-status person is obligated to do things for him or her. Similarly, Yamada (1992) describes the Japanese relationship of *amae*, typified by the parent–child or employer–employee constellation. It binds two individuals in a hierarchical interdependence by which both have power in the form of obligations as well as rights vis-à-vis the other. Finally, Wolfowitz (1991) explains that respect/

power — solidarity
asymmetry — symmetry
hierarchy — equality
distance — closeness

Figure 1: Unidimensional model

deference is experienced by Suriname Javanese not as subservience but as an assertion of claims.

The Suriname Javanese example is particularly intriguing because it calls into question the association of asymmetry with power and distance. The style Wolfowitz calls respect politeness is characterized by both social closeness and negative politeness.[5] It is hierarchical insofar as it is directional and unequal; however, the criterion for directionality is not status but age. The prototypical relationship characterized by respect politeness is grandchild–grandparent: a relationship that is both highly unequal and very close. Moreover, according to Wolfowitz, the Javanese assume that familial relations are inherently hierarchical, including age-graded siblings. Equality, in contrast, is associated with formal relationships that are also marked by social distance.

We can display these dynamics in the following way. The model that reflects American assumptions conceptualizes power and solidarity as opposite ends of a single continuum simultaneously representing symmetry/asymmetry, hierarchy/equality, and distance/closeness. (See Figure 1.) In contrast, the cross-cultural perspective suggests a multidimensional grid of at least (and, potentially and probably, more) intersecting continua. The closeness/distance dimension can be placed on one axis and the hierarchy/equality one on another. (See Figure 2.)




Figure 2: Multidimensional model

Indeed, the intersection of these dimensions – that is, the co-incidence of hierarchy and closeness – may account, at least in part, for what I am calling the ambiguity and polysemy of power and solidarity.

Similarity/Difference

There is one more aspect of the dynamics of power and solidarity that bears discussion before I demonstrate the relativity of linguistic strategies. That is the similarity/difference continuum and its relation to the other dynamics discussed.

For Brown and Gilman, solidarity implies sameness, in contrast to power, about which they observe, "In general terms, the *V* form is linked with differences between persons" (256). This is explicit in their definition of "the solidarity semantic":

> Now we are concerned with a new set of relations which are symmetrical; for example, *attended the same school* or *have the same parents* or *practice the same profession.* If A has the same parents as B, B has the same parents as A. Solidarity is the name we give to the general relationship and solidarity is symmetrical. (257; italics in original)

The similarity/difference continuum calls to mind what I have discussed elsewhere (Tannen 1984, 1986) as the double bind of communication.[6] In some ways, we are all the same. But in other ways we are all different. Communication is a double bind in the sense that anything we say to honor our similarity violates our difference, and anything we say to honor our difference violates our sameness. Thus a complaint can be lodged: "Don't think I'm different." ("If you prick me, do I not bleed?" one might protest, like Shylock.) But a complaint can also be lodged: "Don't think I'm the same." (Thus, women who have primary responsibility for the care of small children may be effectively excluded from activities and events at which day care is not provided.) Becker (1982:125) expresses this double bind as "a matter of continual self-correction between exuberance (that is, friendliness: you are like me) and deficiency (that is, respect: you are not me)." All these formulations elaborate on the tension between similarity and difference, or what Becker and Oka (1974) call "the cline of person," a semantic dimension they suggest may be the one most basic to language; that is, one deals with the world and the objects and people in it in terms of how close (and, I would add, similar) they are to oneself.

As a result of these dynamics, similarity is a threat to hierarchy. This is dramatized in Harold Pinter's play *Mountain Language.* Composed of four brief scenes, the play is set in a political prison in the capital city of an unnamed country that is under dictatorial siege. In the second scene, an old mountain woman is finally allowed to visit her son across a table as a guard stands over them. But whenever she tries to speak to her son, the guard silences her, telling the prisoner to tell his mother that it is forbidden to speak their mountain language in the capital. Then he continues: (Spaced dots indicate omitted text; unspaced dots are a form of punctuation included in the original text.)

GUARD

. . . And I'll tell you another thing. I've got a wife and three kids. And you're all a pile of shit.
Silence.

PRISONER

I've got a wife and three kids.

GUARD

You've what?
Silence.
You've got what?
Silence.
What did you say to me? You've got what?
Silence.
You've got *what?*
He picks up the telephone and dials one digit.
Sergeant? I'm in the Blue Room . . . yes . . . I thought I should report, Sergeant . . . I think I've got a joker in here.

The Sergeant soon enters and asks, "What joker?" The stage darkens and the scene ends. The final scene opens on the same setting, with the prisoner bloody and shaking, his mother shocked into speechlessness.

The prisoner was beaten for saying, "I've got a wife and three kids." This quotidian statement, which would be unremarkable in casual conversation, was insubordinate in the hierarchical context of brutal oppression because the guard had just made the same statement. When the guard said, "I've got a wife and three kids. And you're a pile of shit," he was claiming, "I am different from you." One could further interpret his words to imply, "I'm human, and you're not. Therefore I have a right to dominate and abuse you." By repeating the guard's words verbatim, the prisoner was then saying, "I am the same as you."[7] By claiming *his* humanity and implicitly denying the guard's assertion that he is "a pile of shit," the prisoner challenged the guard's right to dominate him.[8] Similarity is antithetical to hierarchy.

The ambiguity of closeness, a spatial metaphor representing similarity or involvement, emerges in a nonverbal aspect of this scene. In the performance I saw, the guard moved steadily closer to the prisoner as he repeated the question "You've got what?" until he was bending over him, nose to nose. The guard's moving closer was a kinesic/proxemic analogue to the prisoner's statement, but with opposite effect: he was "closing in." The guard moved closer and brought his face into contact with the prisoner's not as a sign of affection (which such actions could signify in another context) but as a threat. Closeness, then, can mean aggression rather than affiliation in the context of a hierarchical rather than symmetrical relationship.

The Relativity of Linguistic Strategies

The potential ambiguity of linguistic strategies to mark both power and solidarity in face-to-face interaction has made mischief in language [illegible]

wherein it is tempting to assume that whatever women do results from, or creates, their powerlessness and whatever men do results from, or creates, their dominance. But all the linguistic strategies that have been taken by analysts as evidence of subordination can in some circumstances be instruments of affiliation. For the remainder of this chapter I demonstrate the relativity of linguistic strategies by considering each of the following strategies in turn: indirectness, interruption, silence versus volubility, topic raising, and adversativeness or verbal conflict. All of these strategies have been "found" by researchers to express or create dominance or subordination. I will demonstrate that they are ambiguous or polysemous with regard to dominance/subordination (that is, power) or distance/closeness (that is, solidarity). Once again, I am not arguing that these strategies *cannot* be used to create dominance or powerlessness, much less that dominance and powerlessness do not exist. Rather, my purpose is to demonstrate that the "meaning" of any linguistic strategy can vary, depending at least on context, the conversational styles of participants, and the interaction of participants' styles and strategies. Therefore the operation of specific linguistic strategies must be studied more closely to understand how dominance and powerlessness are expressed and created in interaction.

Indirectness

Lakoff (1975) identifies two benefits of indirectness: defensiveness and rapport. Defensiveness refers to a speaker's preference not to go on record with an idea in order to be able to disclaim, rescind, or modify it if it does not meet with a positive response. The rapport benefit of indirectness results from the pleasant experience of getting one's way not because one demanded it (power) but because the other person wanted the same thing (solidarity). Many researchers have focused on the defensive or power benefit of indirectness and ignored the payoff in rapport or solidarity.

The claim by Conley, O'Barr, and Lind (1979) that women's language is really powerless language has been particularly influential. In this view, women's tendency to be indirect is taken as evidence that women don't feel entitled to make demands. Surely there are cases in which this is true. Yet it can also be demonstrated that those who feel entitled to make demands may prefer not to, seeking the payoff in rapport. Furthermore, the ability to get one's demands met without expressing them directly can be a sign of power rather than of the lack of it. An example I have used elsewhere is the Greek father who answers, "If you want, you can go," to his daughter's inquiry about going to a party. Because of the lack of enthusiasm of his response, the Greek daughter understands that her father would prefer she not go and "chooses" not to go. (A "real" approval would have been "Yes, of course, you should go.") I argue that this father did not feel powerless to give his daughter orders. Rather, a communicative system was conventionalized by which he and she could both preserve the appearance, and possibly the belief, that she chose not to go rather than simply obeying his command.

Far from being powerless, this father felt so powerful that he did not need to give his daughter orders; he simply needed to let her know his preference, and she would accommodate to it. By this reasoning, indirectness is a prerogative of the powerful. By the same reasoning a master who says, "It's cold in here," may expect a servant to make a move to close a window, but a servant who says the same thing is not likely to see his employer rise to correct the situation and make him more comfortable. Indeed, a Frenchman who was raised in Brittany tells me that his family never gave bald commands to their servants but always communicated orders in indirect and highly polite form. This pattern renders less surprising the finding of Bellinger and Gleason (1982, reported in Gleason 1987) that fathers' speech to their young children had a higher incidence than mothers' of both direct imperatives (such as "Turn the bolt with the wrench") *and* implied indirect imperatives (for example, "The wheel is going to fall off").

The use of indirectness can hardly be understood without the cross-cultural perspective. Many Americans find it self-evident that directness is logical and aligned with power whereas indirectness is akin to dishonesty as well as subservience. But for speakers raised in most of the world's cultures, varieties of indirectness are the norm in communication. In Japanese interaction, for example, it is well known that saying "no" is considered too face-threatening to risk, so negative responses are phrased as positive ones: one never says "no," but listeners understand from the form of the "yes" whether it is truly a "yes" or a polite "no."

The American tendency to associate indirectness with female style is not culturally universal. The above description of typical Japanese style operates for men as well as women. My own research (Tannen 1981, 1984, 1986) suggests that Americans of some cultural and geographic backgrounds, female as well as male, are more likely than others to use relatively direct rather than indirect styles. In an early study I compared Greeks and Americans with regard to their tendency to interpret a question as an indirect means of making a request. I found that whereas American women were more likely to take an indirect interpretation of a sample conversation, Greek men were as likely as Greek women, and more likely than American men *or women*, to take an indirect interpretation. Greek men, of course, are not less powerful vis-à-vis women than American men.

Perhaps most striking is the finding of Keenan (1974) that in a Malagasy-speaking village on the island of Madagascar, women are seen as direct and men as indirect. But this in no way implies that the women are more powerful than men in this society. Quite the contrary, Malagasy men are socially dominant, and their indirect style is more highly valued. Keenan found that women were widely believed to debase the language with their artless directness, whereas men's elaborate indirectness was widely admired.

Indirectness, then, is not in itself a strategy of subordination. Rather, it can be used either by the powerful or the powerless. The interpretation of a given utterance, and the likely response to it, depends on the setting, on individuals' status and their relationship to each other, and also on the linguistic conventions that are ritualized in the cultural context.

Interruption

That interruption is a sign of dominance has been as widespread an assumption in research as in conventional wisdom. One rarely encounters an article on gender and language that does not make this claim. Most frequently cited is West and Zimmerman's (1983) finding that men dominate women by interrupting them in conversation. Tellingly, however, Deborah James and Sandra Clarke (1993), reviewing research on gender and interruption, do not find a clear pattern of males interrupting females. Especially significant is their observation that studies comparing amount of interruption in all-female versus all-male conversations find more interruption, not less, in all-female groups. Though initially surprising, this finding reinforces the need to distinguish linguistic strategies by their interactional purpose. Does the overlap show support for the speaker, or does it contradict or change the topic? I explore this phenomenon in detail in chapter 2 of *Gender and Discourse* (1994), but I will include a brief summary of the argument here.

The phenomenon commonly referred to as "interruption," but which is more accurately referred to as "overlap," is a paradigm case of the ambiguity of power and solidarity. This is clearly demonstrated with reference to a two-and-a-half-hour Thanksgiving dinner conversation that I analyzed at length (Tannen 1984). My analysis makes clear that some speakers consider talking along with another to be a show of enthusiastic participation in the conversation, of solidarity, creating connections; others, however, assume that only one voice should be heard at a time, so for them any overlap is an interruption, an attempt to wrest the floor, a power play. The result, in the conversation I analyzed, was that enthusiastic listeners who overlapped cooperatively, talking along to establish rapport, were perceived by overlap-resistant speakers as interrupting. This doubtless contributed to the impression reported by the overlap-resistant speakers that the cooperative overlappers had "dominated" the conversation. Indeed, the tape and transcript also give the impression that the cooperative overlappers had dominated, because the overlap-aversant participants tended to stop speaking as soon as another voice began.

It is worth emphasizing the role of symmetry, or balance, in determining whether an overlap becomes an interruption in the negative or power-laden sense. If one speaker repeatedly overlaps and another repeatedly gives way, the resulting communication is unbalanced, or asymmetrical, and the effect (though not necessarily the intent) is domination. But if both speakers avoid overlap, or if both speakers overlap each other and win out equally, there is symmetry and no domination, regardless of speakers' intentions. In an important sense, though – and this will be discussed in the last section under the rubric of adversativeness – the very engagement in a symmetrical struggle for the floor can be experienced as creating rapport, in the spirit of ritual opposition analogous to sports. Further, an imbalance can result from differences in the purpose for which overlap is used. If one speaker tends to talk along in order to show support, and the other chimes in to take the floor, the floor-taking overlapper will tend to dominate.

Thus, to understand whether an overlap is an interruption, one must consider the context (for example, cooperative overlapping is more likely to occur in casual conversation among friends than in a job interview), speakers' habitual styles (for example, overlaps are more likely not to be interruptions among those with a style I call "high involvement"), and the interaction of their styles (for example, an interruption is more likely to occur between speakers whose styles differ with regard to pausing and overlap). This is not to say that one cannot use interruption to dominate a conversation or a person, but only that it is not self-evident from the observation of overlap that an interruption has occurred, was intended, or was intended to dominate.

Silence versus Volubility

The excerpt from Pinter's *Mountain Language* dramatizes the assumption that powerful people do the talking and powerless people are silenced. This is the trope that underlies the play's title and its central theme: By outlawing their language, the oppressors silence the mountain people, robbing them of their ability to speak and hence of their humanity. In the same spirit, many scholars (for example, Spender 1980) have claimed that men dominate women by silencing them. There are obviously circumstances in which this is accurate. Coates (1986) notes numerous proverbs that instruct women, like children, to be silent.

Silence alone, however, is not a self-evident sign of powerlessness, nor volubility a self-evident sign of domination. A theme running through Komarovsky's (1962) classic study of *Blue-Collar Marriage* is that many of the wives interviewed said they talked more than their husbands: "He's tongue-tied," one woman said (13); "My husband has a great habit of not talking," said another (162); "He doesn't say much but he means what he says and the children mind him," said a third (353). Yet there is no question but that these husbands are dominant in their marriages, as the last of these quotes indicates.

Indeed, taciturnity itself can be an instrument of power. This is precisely the claim of Sattel (1983), who argues that men use silence to exercise power over women. Sattel illustrates with a scene from Erica Jong's novel *Fear of Flying*, only a brief part of which is presented here. The first line of dialogue is spoken by Isadora, the second by her husband, Bennett. (Spaced dots indicate omitted text; unspaced dots are a form of punctuation included in the original text.)

"Why do you turn on me? What did I do?"
Silence.
"What did I do?"
He looks at her as if her not knowing were another injury.
"Look, let's just go to sleep now. Let's just forget it."
"Forget what?"
He says nothing.

. . .

"It was something in the movie, wasn't it?"
"What, in the movie?"

". . . It was the funeral scene . . . . The little boy looking at his dead mother. Something got you there. That was when you got depressed."
Silence.
"Well, *wasn't* it?"
Silence.
"Oh come on, Bennett, you're making me *furious*. Please tell me. Please."

The painful scene continues in this vein until Bennett tries to leave the room and Isadora tries to detain him. The excerpt certainly seems to support Sattel's claim that Bennett's silence subjugates his wife, as the scene ends with her literally lowered to the floor, clinging to his pajama leg. But the reason his silence is an effective weapon is her insistence that he tell her what's wrong. If *she* receded into silence, leaving the room or refusing to talk to him, his silence would be disarmed. The devastation results not from his silence alone but from the interaction of his silence and her insistence on talking, in other words, the interaction of their differing styles.[9]

Researchers have counted numbers of words spoken or timed length of talk in order to demonstrate that men talk more than women and thereby dominate interactions. (See James and Drakich 1993 for a summary of research on amount of talk.) Undoubtedly there is truth to this observation in some settings. But the association of volubility with dominance does not hold for all settings and all cultures. Imagine, for example, an interrogation, in which the interrogator does little of the talking but holds all the power.

The relativity of the "meaning" of taciturnity and volubility is highlighted in Margaret Mead's (1977) discussion of "end linkage," a concept developed jointly by Mead, Gregory Bateson, and Geoffrey Gorer. The claim is that universal and biologically constructed relationships, such as parent–child, are linked to different behaviors in different cultures. One of their paradigm examples is the apportionment of spectatorship and exhibitionism. In middle-class American culture, children, who are obviously the weaker party in the constellation, are expected to exhibit while their more powerful parents are spectators. (Consider, for example, the American child who is prompted to demonstrate how well s/he can recite the alphabet for guests.) In contrast, in middle- and upper-class British culture, exhibition is associated with the parental role and spectatorship with children, who are expected to be seen and not heard.

Moreover, volubility and taciturnity, too, can result from style differences rather than speakers' intentions. As I (Tannen 1984, 1985) and others (Scollon and Scollon 1981, Scollon 1985) have discussed, there are cultural and subcultural differences in the length of pauses expected between and within speaking turns. In my study of the dinner conversation, those who expected shorter pauses between conversational turns began to feel an uncomfortable silence ensuing while their longer-pausing friends were simply waiting for what they regarded as the "normal" end-of-turn pause. The result was that the shorter pausers ended up doing most of the talking, another sign interpreted by their interlocutors as dominating the conversation. But their intentions had been to fill in what to

them were potentially uncomfortable silences, that is, to grease the conversational wheels and ensure the success of the conversation. In their view, the taciturn participants were uncooperative, failing to do their part to maintain the conversation.

Thus, silence and volubility cannot always be taken to "mean" power or powerlessness, domination or subjugation. Rather, both may imply either power or solidarity, depending on the dynamics discussed.

Topic Raising

Shuy (1982) is typical in assuming that the speaker who raises the most topics is dominating a conversation. However, in a study I conducted of videotaped conversations among friends of varying ages recorded by Dorval (1990), it emerged that the speaker who raised the most topics was not always dominant, as judged by other criteria (for example, who took the lead in addressing the investigator when he entered the room?). In a 20-minute conversation between a pair of sixth-grade girls who identified themselves as best friends, Shannon raised the topic of Julia's relationship with Mary by saying, "Too bad you and Mary are not good friends anymore." The conversation proceeded and continued to focus almost exclusively on Julia's troubled relationship with Mary.

Similarly, most of the conversation between two tenth-grade girls was about Nancy, but Sally raised the topic of Nancy's problems. In response to Nancy's question "Well, what do you want to talk about?" Sally said, "Your mama. Did you talk to your mama?" The ensuing conversation focuses on events involving Nancy's mother and boyfriend. Overall, Sally raised nine topics, Nancy seven. However, all but one of the topics Sally raised were questions focused on Nancy. If raising more topics is a sign of dominance, Sally controlled the conversation when she raised topics, although even this was subject to Nancy's collaboration by picking them up. It may or may not be the case that Sally controlled the conversation, but the nature of her dominance is surely other than what is normally assumed by that term if the topics she raised were all about Nancy.

Finally, the effect of raising topics may also be an effect of differences in pacing and pausing, as discussed above with regard to my study of dinner-table conversation. A speaker who thinks the other has no more to say on a given topic may try to contribute to the conversation by raising another topic. But a speaker who was intending to say more and was simply waiting for the appropriate turn-exchange pause will feel that the floor was taken away and the topic aggressively switched. Yet again, the impression of dominance might result from style differences.

Adversativeness: Conflict and Verbal Aggression

Research on gender and language has consistently found male speakers to be competitive and more likely to engage in conflict (for example, by arguing, issuing commands, and taking opposing stands) and females to be cooperative and more likely to avoid conflict (for example, by agreeing, supporting, and making suggestions rather than commands). (Maltz and Borker [1982] summarize some of this research.) Ong (1981:51) argues that "adversativeness" is universal

but "conspicuous or expressed adversativeness is a larger element in the lives of males than of females."

In my analysis of videotapes of male and female friends talking to each other, I have begun to investigate how male adversativeness and female cooperation are played out, complicated, and contradicted in conversational discourse. In analyzing videotapes of friends talking, for example, I found a sixth-grade boy saying to his best friend,

> Seems like, if there's a fight, me and you are automatically in it. And everyone else wants to go against you and everything. It's hard to agree without someone saying something to you.

In contrast, girls of the same age (and also of most other ages whose talk I examined) spent a great deal of time discussing the dangers of anger and contention. In affirming their own friendship, one girl told her friend,

> Me and you never get in fights hardly,

and

> I mean like if I try to talk to you, you'll say, 'Talk to me!' And if you try to talk to me, I'll talk to you.

These examples of gendered styles of interaction are illuminated by the insight that power and solidarity are mutually evocative. As seen in the statement of the sixth-grade boy, opposing other boys in teams entails affiliation within the team. The most dramatic instance of male affiliation resulting from conflict with others is bonding among soldiers, a phenomenon explored by Norman (1990).

By the same token, girls' efforts to support their friends necessarily entail exclusion of or opposition to other girls. This emerges in Hughes' (1988) study of girls playing a street game called foursquare, in which four players occupy one square each and bounce a ball into each other's squares. The object of the game is to eliminate players by hitting the ball into their square in such a way that they fail to hit it back. But this effort to "get people out" is at odds with the social injunction under which the girls operate, to be "nice" and not "mean." Hughes found that the girls resolved the conflict, and formed "incipient teams" composed of friends, by claiming that their motivation in eliminating some players was to enable others (their friends) to enter the game, since eliminated players are replaced by awaiting players. In the girls' terms, "getting someone out" was "nice-mean," because it was reframed as "getting someone [a friend] in." This dynamic is also supported by my analysis of the sixth-grade girls' conversation: Most of their talk was devoted to allying themselves with each other in opposition to another girl who was not present. So their cooperation (solidarity) also entails opposition (power).

For boys power entails solidarity not only by opposition to another team, but by opposition to each other. In the videotapes of friends talking, I found that all the conversations between young boys (and none between young girls)

had numerous examples of teasing and mock attack.[10] In examining preschool conversations transcribed and analyzed by Corsaro and Rizzo (1990:34), I was amazed to discover that a fight could initiate rather than preclude friendship. In the following episode, a little boy intrudes on two others and an angry fight ensues. This is the way Corsaro and Rizzo present the dialogue:

> *Two boys (Richard and Denny) have been playing with a slinky on the stairway leading to the upstairs playhouse in the school. During their play two other boys (Joseph and Martin) enter and stand near the bottom of the stairs.*
> Denny: Go!
> (*Martin now runs off, but Joseph remains and he eventually moves halfway up the stairs.*)
> Joseph: These are big shoes.
> Richard: I'll punch him right in the eye.
> Joseph: I'll punch you right in the nose.
> Denny: I'll punch him with my big fist.
> Joseph: I'll-I-I-
> Richard: And he'll be bumpety, bumpety and punched out all the way down the stairs.
> Joseph: I-I- I'll- I could poke your eyes out with my gun. I have a gun.
> Denny: A gun! I'll- I- I- even if-
> Richard: I have a gun too.
> Denny: And I have guns too and it's bigger than yours and it poo-poo down. That's poo-poo.
> (*All three boys laugh at Denny's reference to poo-poo.*)
> Richard: Now leave.
> Joseph: Un-uh. I gonna tell you to put on- on the gun on your hair and the poop will come right out on his face.
> Denny: Well.
> Richard: Slinky will snap right on your face too.
> Denny: And my gun will snap right-

Up until this point I had no difficulty interpreting the interaction: The boys were engaged in a fight occasioned by Joseph's intrusion into Richard and Denny's play. But what happened next surprised and, at first, perplexed me. Corsaro and Rizzo describe it this way:

> At this point a girl (Debbie) enters, says she is Batgirl, and asks if they have seen Robin. Joseph says he is Robin, but she says she is looking for a different Robin and then runs off. After Debbie leaves, Denny and Richard move into the playhouse and Joseph follows. From this point to the end of the episode the three boys play together.

At first I was incredulous that so soon after their seemingly hostile encounter, the boys played amicably together. I finally came to the conclusion that for Joseph picking a fight was a way to enter into interaction with the other boys, and engaging him in the fight was Richard and Denny's way of accepting him into their interaction – at least after he acquitted himself satisfactorily in the

fight. In this light, I could see that the reference to poo-poo, which occasioned general laughter, was the beginning of a reframing from fighting to playing.[11]

Folklore provides numerous stories in which fighting precipitates friendship among men. One such is attributed by Bly (1990:243–44) to Joseph Campbell's account of the Sumerian epic, *Gilgamesh.* In Bly's rendition, Gilgamesh, a young king, wants to befriend a wild man named Enkidu. When Enkidu is told of Gilgamesh,

> his heart grew light. He yearned for a friend. "Very well!" he said. "And I shall challenge him."

Bly paraphrases the continuation: "Enkidu then travels to the city and meets Gilgamesh; the two wrestle, Enkidu wins, and the two become inseparable friends."[12]

A modern-day academic equivalent to the bonding that results from opposition is to be found in the situation of fruitful collaborations that began when an audience member publicly challenged a speaker after his talk. Finally, Penelope Eckert (personal communication) informs me that in her research on high school students (Eckert 1990) she was told by boys, but never by girls, that their close friendships began by fighting.

These examples call into question the correlation of aggression and power on one hand, and cooperation and solidarity on the other. Again the cross-cultural perspective provides an invaluable corrective to the temptation to align aggression with power as distinguished from solidarity. Many cultures of the world see arguing as a pleasurable sign of intimacy. Schiffrin (1984) shows that among lower-middle-class men *and women* of East European Jewish background, friendly argument is a means of being sociable. Frank (1988) shows a Jewish couple who tend to polarize and take argumentative positions, but they are not fighting; they are staging a kind of public sparring, where both fighters are on the same team. Byrnes (1986) claims that Germans find American students uninformed and uncommitted because they are reluctant to argue politics with new acquaintances. For their part, Americans find German students belligerent because they provoke arguments about American foreign policy with Americans they have just met.

Greek conversation provides an example of a cultural style that places more positive value, for both women and men, on dynamic opposition. Kakava (1989) replicates Schiffrin's findings by showing how a Greek family enjoy opposing each other in dinner conversation. In another study of modern Greek conversation, Tannen and Kakava (1992) find speakers routinely disagreeing when they actually agree, and using diminutive name forms and other terms of endearment – markers of closeness – precisely when they are opposing each other.[13] These patterns can be seen in the following excerpt from a conversation that took place in Greece between an older Greek woman and myself. The woman, whom I call Ms. Stella, has just told me that she complained to the police about a construction crew that illegally continued drilling and pounding through the siesta hours, disturbing her nap:

Deborah: Echete dikio.
Stella: Ego echo dikio. Kopella mou, den xero an echo dikio i den echo dikio. Alla ego yperaspizomai ta symferonta mou kai ta dikaiomata mou.
Deborah: You're right.
Stella: I am right. My dear girl, I don't know if I'm right or I'm not right. But I am watching out for my interests and my rights.

My response to Ms. Stella's complaint is to support her by agreeing. But she disagrees with my agreement by reframing my statement in her own terms rather than simply accepting it by stopping after "I *am* right." She also marks her divergence from my frame with the endearment "kopella mou" (literally, "my girl," but idiomatically closer to "my dear girl").

The following conversation is also taken from Tannen and Kakava (1992). It is, according to Kakava, typical of her family's sociable argument. The younger sister has said that she cannot understand why the attractive young woman who is the prime minister Papandreou's girlfriend would have an affair with such an old man. The older sister, Christina, argues that the woman may have felt that in having an affair with the prime minister she was doing something notable. Her sister replied,

Poly megalo timima re Christinaki na pliroseis pantos.
It's a very high price to pay, Chrissie, anyway.

I use the English diminutive form "Chrissie" to reflect the Greek diminutive ending *-aki,* but the particle *re* cannot really be translated; it is simply a marker of closeness that is typically used when disagreeing, as in the ubiquitously heard expression "Ochi, re" ("No, *re*").

Conclusion

The intersection of language and gender provides a rich site for analyzing how power and solidarity are created in discourse. But prior research in this area evidences the danger of linking linguistic forms with interactional intentions such as dominance. In trying to understand how speakers use language, we must consider the context (in every sense, including at least textual, relational, and institutional constraints), speakers' conversational styles, and, most crucially, the interaction of their styles with each other.

Attempts to understand what goes on between women and men in conversation are muddled by the ambiguity and polysemy of power and solidarity. The same linguistic means can accomplish either, and every utterance combines elements of both. Scholars, however, like individuals in interaction, are likely to see only one and not the other, like the picture that cannot be seen for what it is – simultaneously a chalice and two faces – but can only be seen alternately as one or the other. In attempting the impossible task of keeping both images in

focus at once, we may at least succeed in switching from one to the other rapidly and regularly enough to deepen our understanding of the dynamics underlying interaction such as power and solidarity as well as gender and language use.

Notes

This chapter began as a paper entitled "Rethinking Power and Solidarity in Gender and Dominance," which was published in *Proceedings of the 16th Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society*, edited by Kira Hall, Jean-Pierre Koenig, Michael Meacham, Sondra Reinman, and Laurel A. Sutton, 519–29 (Berkeley: Linguistics Department, University of California, Berkeley, 1990). A significantly revised and expanded version appears in *Gender and Conversational Interaction*, a volume I edited, published by Oxford University Press in 1993. That rewriting was carried out while I was in residence at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey. Further revisions – improvements, I hope – which I made to the version that appears here (some in response to much-appreciated comments from Paul Friedrich) were carried out while I was a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Palo Alto, California. I have lifted the summary of this chapter directly from the overview that appears in the 1993 publication.

1. I use the term "strategy" in its standard sociolinguistic sense, to refer simply to a way of speaking. No implication is intended of deliberate planning, as is the case in the common parlance use of such expressions as "military strategy." Neither, however, as Gumperz (1982) observes, are linguistic strategies "unconscious." Rather, they are best thought of as "automatic." That is, people speak in a particular way without "consciously" thinking it through, but are aware, if questioned, of how they spoke and what they were trying to accomplish by talking in that way. This is in contrast to the "unconscious" motives of Freudian theory about which an individual would be unaware if questioned. (For example, most men would vigorously deny that they want to kill their fathers and marry their mothers, but a strict Freudian might claim that this wish is "unconscious.")
2. This example is taken from Tannen (1990).
3. I myself have made the observation that asymmetry is distancing whereas symmetry implies closeness, for example, with regard to the ritual of "troubles talk" and the way it often misfires between women and men (Tannen 1990). Many women talk about troubles as a way of feeling closer, but many men frequently interpret the description of troubles as a request for advice, which they kindly offer. I have observed that this not only cuts off the troubles talk, which was the real point of the discourse, but it also introduces asymmetry: If one person says she has a problem and another says she has the same problem, they are symmetrically arrayed and their similarity brings them closer. But if one person has a problem and the other has the solution, the one with the solution is one-up, and the asymmetry is distancing – just the opposite of what was sought by initiating the ritual.
4. This assumption is made explicit by Klagsbrun (1992), who, in a book about sibling relationships, writes, "Unlike the ties between parents and children, the connection among siblings is a horizontal one. That is, sibs exist on the same plane, as peers, more or less equals" (12). But Klagsbrun gives a pivotal example of how she was frustrated as a child (and continues to be hampered, as an adult) by always being

bested by her *older* brother. It is clear from the example that she and her brother were not equals because of the difference in their ages – and, one might argue, their genders.

5. Negative politeness, as discussed by Brown and Levinson ([1978]1987), entails honoring others' needs not to be imposed on.
6. Scollon (1982:344–45) explains that all communication is a double bind because one must serve, with every utterance, the conflicting needs to be left alone (negative face) and to be accepted as a member of society (positive face). The term "double bind" traces to Bateson (1972).
7. I have demonstrated at length (Tannen 1987, 1989) that repeating another's words creates rapport on a metalevel: It is a ratification of the other's words, evidence of participation in the same universe of discourse.
8. Following the oral presentation of this paper at the Berkeley Linguistics Society in 1989, both Gary Holland and Michael Chandler pointed out that the prisoner may be heard as implying the second part of the guard's statement: "and you're a pile of shit."
9. This scene illustrates what Bateson (1972) calls "complementary schismogenesis": Each person's style drives the other into increasingly exaggerated forms of the opposing behavior. The more he refuses to tell her what's wrong, the more desperate she becomes to break through his silence. The more she pressures him to tell her, the more adamant he becomes about refusing to do so.
10. Some examples are given in Tannen (1990). Whereas the boys made such gestures as shooting each other with invisible guns, the girls made such gestures as reaching out and adjusting a friend's headband.
11. Elsewhere (Tannen 1990:163–65) I discuss this example in more detail and note the contrast that the boys fight when they want to play, and the girl avoids disagreeing even when she in fact disagrees.
12. Another element of this epic, as Bly recounts it, is that Gilgamesh lures Enkidu away from the wild animals with which he had been happily living by sending a temple prostitute who throws off her clothes at the appropriate moment. She is simply the vehicle for the two men to get together. Much could be said about this aspect of the epic, but my purpose here is only to draw attention to the way the men use fighting as a means to friendship.
13. Sifianou (1992) independently observes the use of diminutives as solidarity markers in Greek conversation.

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69

Talk and Institution: A Reconsideration of the "Asymmetry" of Doctor–Patient Interaction

Paul ten Have

The idea that interaction between physicians and their patients is "asymmetrical" is widely shared among both participants and observers of medical encounters. It is assumed as a "social fact" that the roles of doctors and patients differ, and that this difference corresponds to that of leaders and followers. This "fact" has been explained in various ways by contributors to medical sociology, whether causally or functionally, but it is only during the past ten years or so that research has been directed to the details of the interaction that are masked by a gloss such as "asymmetry." The accumulated findings of this research, and further work along these lines, can contribute to a radical reassessment of conventional reasoning regarding institutional behavior. While traditionally the asymmetry of doctor–patient interaction was considered as an effect of institutional structures, rules or resources, it now becomes possible to think the other way around, in the manner developed over the years by ethnomethodology, and see how asymmetries are produced *in and through the details* of physicians' and patients' situated interactions. In this chapter, I will show some of the ways in which participants in medical encounters "talk an institution into being" (Heritage 1984a:290) and thereby accomplish "asymmetry".

Medical encounters are tightly organized events. At one level, they display a rather conventional organization in terms of phases devoted to specific consecutive tasks in the encounter, i.e. complaint presentation, verbal and physical examination, diagnosis, and treatment, prescription and/or advice (see also Heath 1986). But, on a more detailed level, this overall organization has to be realized

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through series of concerted activities that are sequentially organized. This chapter is focused at this more detailed level. It is there that "asymmetry" seems to be produced. But it will prove useful to reconsider the connections between these two levels of organization at various points in the argument that follows. I shall want to argue that locally organized sequential events contribute to the phased organization of the encounter as a whole, but that they are also framed by it.

In the discussion that follows I will explore and elaborate on general aspects of the constitution of asymmetry in doctor–patient interaction, drawing on two resources: (1) research findings of authors like Fisher, Frankel, Heath, Mishler, Todd and West, who have studied medical interactions in detail, and (2) my own work on general practice consultations in the Netherlands (ten Have 1987). To say that doctor–patient interaction is asymmetrical implies that two kinds of comparison are made. First, there is a comparison of what is done, and what may be done, by physicians and patients respectively during the encounter. Secondly, those asymmetries are compared with a model of symmetrical interaction assumed for informal conversation among peers. In other words, characterizations of medical interactions typically tend to contrast the action repertoire of doctors and patients and then contrast this pattern with ordinary conversation. While these comparisons may be analytically helpful, one should resist the temptation to accept these contrasts, especially when stated in absolute terms, as adequate empirical descriptions. In fact, both the differences in behavior between physicians and patients, and the differences between consultations and conversations are relative, changing from one occasion to another and from one moment to the next. It is only in their actual dealings with each other that participants in medical encounters "produce" asymmetry in various ways and to a variable extent. Institutional structures are not only external constraints on participants' actions; they are also actively used as a resource for those actions.

The contrasts mentioned are used primarily analytically and descriptively, but moral overtones are not always absent. It seems that a "morality of equality" is hard to avoid and more symmetrical or conversational forms of interaction are somehow preferred. On the other hand, it may be argued that making consultations more like conversations would either tend to be a hypocritical masking of unavoidable asymmetry or would actually destroy the consultation as such. While this is certainly an interesting debate,[1] for present purposes I will try to avoid it. Following a policy of "ethonomethodological indifference" (Garfinkel and Sacks 1970), no moral judgments are implied in my use of the contrasts, although some of the authors I discuss – especially Mishler – either implicitly or explicitly tend to introduce such judgments into their contrasts.

Aspects of Asymmetry

Basically, asymmetry in doctor–patient interaction is of two kinds. First, there is an asymmetry of topic: it is the patient's health condition that is under review, not the doctor's. Associated with this, there is a second kind of asymmetry: of tasks in the encounter.

Patients' tasks mainly involve reporting their symptoms, answering questions, and accepting physicians' decisions, while doctors are supposed to listen to complaints, to investigate the case, and to decide on a diagnosis and a treatment. Although the initiative for the encounter is primarily the patient's, this task distribution involves quite "natural" interactional dominance by the physician, enacted through questioning, investigating, and decision-making behavior, coupled with interactional submission by the patient, achieved through answering, accepting and generally complying with the doctor's orders and suggestions.

Recent research in the details of medical interaction, including my own work (ten Have 1987), would seem to support general conclusions such as the following:

1. Local initiatives that establish a conditional relevance for specific kinds of second actions, such as questions, orders and proposals, are mostly taken by physicians and seem to be "dispreferred" when taken by patients (Todd 1984; West 1984:71–96; Frankel 1990).
2. The interactional control that seems to follow from this is reinforced by restrictive ways in which these initiatives are often used, especially by questions that allow for only short factual answers (Frankel 1984, 1990; Mishler 1984:59–91).
3. Questions put by physicians come mostly in series, in such a way that answers by patients are enclosed in and framed by the doctor's contributions: that is to say, the preceding question and the acknowledgment that follows it, and/or a next question, that in many cases comes interruptively (Frankel 1984, 1990; Mishler 1984:59–91; Todd 1984; West 1984:53–64).
4. The questions themselves, together with their topical flow and topic changes, are generally not accounted for by physicians; in particular, motivation for physicians' questions is not provided, and topic changes – which may be initiated quite abruptly – are not marked as such (Mishler 1984:95–121). In this way the patient is not informed on the reasoning process that supposedly guides the doctor's actions.
5. A similar lack of information is engendered by physicians' use of the "third turn" in questioning sequences: items like "okay," "uhuh" and "yes," as well as summarizing formulations, do not display for the patient what the physician makes of the answer, but only mark whether or not further elaboration is needed (Atkinson 1982; Frankel 1984).
6. These tendencies often seem to be instrumental in a noted biomedical selectivity in that physicians tend to ignore those aspects of patients' utterances that report on subjective experience, personal circumstances and social conditions (Frankel 1984; Mishler 1984; Todd 1984). Elliot Mishler (1984:164) has called this a "context stripping" approach. An important exception to this tendency is found in those cases where the physician specifically focuses on context in an approach that stresses psychosomatic aspects of diagnosis and treatment (ten Have 1989).
7. Finally, the asymmetries mentioned will accumulatively, so to speak, result in a tendency for decisions that are mainly based on the doctor's

perspective on the case, guided by his questioning and relative lack of knowledge of the relevancies stemming from the patient's orientation to the problem (Paget 1983; Fisher 1984; Todd 1984). That is, in all the above instances, it takes specific efforts on the part of patients to counter tendencies leading to such a result, unless physicians take steps to provide them with occasions to influence the proceedings.

In essence, then, the literature reviewed suggests two major trends in the interactional style taken by physicians in their dealing with patients, one of monopolizing initiatives, and another of withholding information. Studies of medical interaction have, as their major focus, the phases of the consultation producing data, especially the physician's questioning of the patient. Questioning is analyzed as a series of two-part or three-part sequences: a question followed by an answer, with the optional addition of a "third turn component" by the questioner (cf. Frankel 1984). In the following sections, I discuss some aspects of the ways these sequential possibilities are used by the participants, that is how "asymmetry" is locally produced or circumvented. In so doing, I will not only consider cases that conform to the major trends, summarized above, but also instances that run counter to those trends.

Asymmetries of Initiative

Generally, as noted, patients take the initiative for the encounter as such: it is their decision to consult at this specific moment. Within the encounter, however, they seem to "lose" this initiative when the doctor's questioning takes over. It is this "takeover" that is of special interest in studying the accomplishment of "asymmetry."

While patients may decide if and when they come to their physician's consulting hour, it is the doctor who decides when they may enter his room. When inviting a patient to enter, a doctor acts like a host, inviting the patient to sit down and – possibly after some small talk – to provide the reason for his or her visit. In the initial invitation, the physician may refer to what he remembers or reads in his record concerning previous visits (cf. Heath 1981, 1982b). But, in the data for my study, typical invitations are quite direct: "Vertel het es," which amounts to "What's up?" or, more literally, "Tell me what it is." The "it" here appears to refer to the reason for the visit. In new cases, the patient will typically explain his or her[2] reason for coming by describing major complaints in one or two sentences, as in the following instances.[3]

1 ((D = Physician, P = Patient))

9 **D:** Vertel het es
10 **P:** Ja ik ben zo gewéldig aan **diarhée en 't** wil niet *o*ver gaan

9 **D:** What's up
10 **P:** Yes I have so **much diarrhóéa and it** won't go aw*ay*

As can be seen, such a statement does not formulate a request, it states a reason for coming to the doctor and provides him with material for his upcoming questioning. In this way it functions as a request for diagnosis and/or treatment. When specific request forms are used, they tend to implicate a specified check-up, as in the following instances.

2a

7 **P:** E:h kunt u kijken of ik zw*a*nger **ben**
8 (0.4)
9 **P:** (Ghh)

7 **P:** U:h can you check to see if I **am pr*e*gnant**
8 (0.4)
9 **P:** (Ghh)

2b

27 **P:** Ja daar *zi*tten we weer heh
28 **D:** Daar *zi*tten we weer ja
29 **P:** Ik heb t'r nog tw*ee* dingen bij dat e:h moet u dus even naar kijken
30 **D:** En dat is
31 **P:** (Eerst es) naar m'n k*ee*l (1.2) en naar d*e*ze kn*ie*

27 **P:** Yes here we *a*re again huh
28 **D:** Here we *a*re again yes
29 **P:** I have t*wo* more things that uh you have to take a look at for a moment
30 **D:** And that is
31 **P:** (First uh) at my thr*oa*t (1.2) and then at th*i*s kn*ee*

In responding to the doctor's invitation in this subdued way, patients defer to the professional to decide what should be done next, whether a diagnosis and/or treatment is necessary and/or possible. These first utterances of the complaint also specify the body region that deserves his attention. Thus, patients provide their doctors with material for questioning in their very first utterances and physicians get an opportunity to "take back" the initiative they gave their patient just one moment ago.

Both patients and physicians thus contribute to the start of an interaction format, namely questioning, that is oriented to the establishment of medically relevant facts. Within this format, the physician has the initiative and the patient is restricted to a responding role. In some cases, however, one can observe the emergence of a different format oriented to the history and the larger context of the complaint(s), rather than to just the facts. This format implies a more active role for the patient, as a teller of his or her own story. Extract 3 may be considered as an instance where such an alternative format is seen to emerge.

3

17	**D:**	Dat is een h*e*le:: hh 'h geschiedenis met jou
18		geweest in eh januari heh
19	**P:**	Ja ( )
20		(.)
21	**D:**	En dat is toen dat is (.) sindsdien g*oe*d gegaan?
22	**P:**	Ja
23		((interrumperend telefoongesprek))
24	**P:**	('t is namelijk zo) ik ben al een p*aa*r maanden
25		(.) verk*ou*wen en dan is 't weer over en dan is 't weer weg
26	**D:**	Ja
27	**P:**	En eh z*o*ndag kree'k in *ee*n keer eh (.) g h*oo*fdpijn
28	**D:**	Ja
29	**P:**	('k moest helema-) aan aan d*eze* kant helemaal
30	**D:**	Ja
31	**P:**	En zondag*a*vond kree 'k eh pijn in m'n borst hier
32	**D:**	Met h*oe*sten of zo of nou-

17	**D:**	That has been quite a history with you in uh
18		January huh
19	**P:**	Yes ( )
20		(.)
21	**D:**	And that has then that has been (.) going alr*igh*t in the meantime?
22	**P:**	Yes
23		((telephone call interruption))
24	**P:**	(it's just that) for a couple of months I
25		had (.) a *co*ld and then it was over and then it was gone
26	**D:**	Yes
27	**P:**	And S*un*day I suddenly got uh (.) a real headache
28	**D:**	Yes
29	**P:**	(I had it all-) all over th*is* side
30	**D:**	Yes
31	**P:**	And Sunday n*igh*t I got uh pain in my chest here
32	**D:**	With coughing or something or whatever-

We have entered the consultation at the moment the physician finishes reading the patient's record card. Presumably referring to the last entry, he displays an interest in the sequel to the "history" he finds recorded there (line 21). In other words, he provides for a story to be told. The patient, then, does tell a story of sorts (lines 24–31). It is a tightly organized "unit" (cf. Houtkoop and Mazeland 1985), especially in the sense that the earlier parts display their own incompleteness, that is, that the major point, what may be called the "pressing complaint," is yet to come. This is achieved in a number of related ways:

1 by starting earlier in time (line 24), thus suggesting that the very reason for the present visit has not yet been discussed;

2 by mentioning relatively permanent states (lines 24–5), this effect is strengthened,[4] suggesting its status as "background information";
3 by adding a second item (line 27) to a previous one (line 24), it is suggested that a "list" is being constructed, which again heightens the expectation of more to come, that is, a third item to the list (cf. Jefferson 1990 on lists in casual conversation, and Atkinson 1983, 1984, on lists in various other contexts).

While in this case interactive structuring by the physician and the patient seems to complement and facilitate the production of a fuller historical account, this need not always be the case. Physicians may suggest fuller accounts, while patients stick to "just the facts," as well as the other way around. In the latter instance, patients are observed to use devices, those mentioned above and others, to change their local interactional identity from that of a "respondent" into that of an "informant."[5]

What these observations indicate is that although patients generally play their submissive part in the established "asymmetrical" format, possibilities also exist for patients to extend their chances to bring in materials on their own, which are sometimes successfully used. We should note that the devices for doing so are quite ordinary ones, regularly deployed in casual conversations, as well as in various other settings. What is noteworthy, however, is their "covert" character: they seem to hide their action potential, the initiative their user is taking. In other words, patients seem to disguise their interactional initiative by refraining from formulating requests, by giving the initiative back to the physician rather quickly, or by using quite subtle and covert devices to hold off the doctor's questioning interventions.[6]

Questioning

Most researchers who have studied doctor–patient interaction in detail have given their primary attention to questioning sequences and consider the doctor's handling of these sequences as their primary instrument of interactional control. The central idea, summarized above, is that physicians have a privileged access to the first position in such sequences, which gives them control of what can coherently be said in the second position as an answer, and provides them with a possibility to come back after a minimally complete answer with a third position item, or a next question. In this way access to the first position is seen as a major entry into interactional control.

In this section, I will consider the concept of asymmetrical questioning *per se*, while in the next I will focus on some uses of the third position within it. The thesis of a dispreference for patient-initiated questions was, to my knowledge, originally developed by Frankel (1990). This concept was also used in a study by West in her analysis of 21 family practice consultations (1984; see also West 1983). West examined all questions that figure in this collection; most, 91 per cent of the total number asked, were initiated by the physicians, and these were also more successful (98 per cent versus 87 per cent answered). But West does not restrict herself to such an overall quantitative analysis. As she writes:

> Stronger evidence for the dispreferred status of patient questions is furnished by closer inspection of the form they take. In the course of this analysis, I assembled a collection of all patient-initiated questions from these exchanges. What is most striking in this collection is the presence of marked speech perturbations in the speech objects used by patients to construct their queries. . . . In fact, of the total of 68 questions posed by patients, 46 per cent (31) displayed some form of speech disturbance in the course of their production. Put simply, patients displayed considerable difficulty "spitting out" their questions. (1984:88–9)

She continues, later: "By and large . . . physicians' formulations of questions exhibited little evidence of speech disturbances" (West 1984:168).

Although I do not want to dispute the general thesis of a party-bound preference or dispreference for questions in consultations, I do have some difficulties with this research. Firstly, in my view, the analytic category of "question" is a difficult one. Although West (1984:73–80) deals briefly with some problems, I also see others. For instance, in my observation patients very frequently formulate their "ignorance" or "doubts" in various medical matters. These utterances do not have a question form and do not create a "conditional relevance" for an answer in the next slot. But they do display what the patient would like to know, or on which issues he or she would like to have an expert's opinion. Such utterances are often ignored by the physician, but sometimes they are taken up, possibly much later in the encounter, as in the next example:

4		(from the same consultation as 3)
51	**P:**	'hh ma- 'k ben gister expres
52		een beetje op bed gebleven ik denk 't zal wel
53		iets van kou zijn ik heb die- (.) die- in laten smeren met Dimedalgam heet dat=
54	**D:**	=Dimidalgam (.) ja dat is tegen spierpijn (en[zo)
55	**P:**	[Ja maar dat
56	**D:**	'h[h dat helpt n[iet
57	**P:**	[e:h [(helpt) weinig
		:
96	**D:**	Want ik hoor d'r niks aan (.) in je longen (.)
97		aan de binnekant is d'r niks (.) en eh je hoest ook niet
		:
126	**D:**	Ik denk dat het toch eh die dat 't iets is met
127		spieren[wat je daar hebt heh die pijn 'hh dat 't
128	**P:**	[(Merkwaardig)
129	**D:**	een soort e::h spierpijn is
51	**P:**	'hh but- yesterday I
52		especially stayed in bed a bit I think it is
53		something like a cold I have di-di- (.) di- smeared it with Dimedalgam it's called

54 **D:** Dim*i*dalgam (.) yes that is for muscular pain
[(and such)
55 **P:** [Yes but that
56 **D:** 'h[h that doesn't he[lp
57 **P:** [u:h [(help) much
:
96 **D:** Because I don't h*ea*r anything there (.) in your
97 lungs (.) there's n*o*thing inside (.) and
uh you also aren't c*ou*ghing
:
126 **D:** I do think that after all uh that that it's uh p*ai*n
127 something in your muscles[that what you have there
128 **P:** [(Strange)
129 **D:** 'hh that it's a kind of uh muscular pain

The physician, in this case, can be seen to check the two lay diagnoses that the patient reports to have considered earlier (lines 52–3), concluding that the first cannot be confirmed while the second is plausible.

In other words, it is difficult to set clear limits on the category of "question." Patients have a variety of ways in which they can make known to their physician their informational needs. Moreover, some of these more covert "questioning" approaches would be unlikely candidates for inclusion in West's analysis, although they may, in fact, be quite practical ways of getting physicians to provide desired information.

Secondly, while many questions put by physicians have a constraining effect on what *may* be coherently said as an answer to them, this is not *necessarily* the case. Although many questions provide for only yes/no or other kinds of short and factual answers, others specifically leave it to the patient to structure his or her report in the manner he or she sees fit:

5 (from different encounters)
13 **D:** Waar dacht je z*e*lf aan?
:
32 **D:** Waar kan dat nou vand*aa*n komen denkt u?
:
38 **D:** E:n hoe k*o*mt-tattan?
:
43 **D:** Wat is dat allemaal?
:
118 **D:** Hoe ging het v*e*rder met u de laatste tijd?
:
179 **D:** Hoe v*oe*lt u zich verder?

13 **D:** What are you thinking of yours*e*lf?
:
32 **D:** Where does that come fr*o*m do you think?
:
38 **D:** A:nd how does that c*o*me about?

43 **D:** What is that on the whole?

:

118 **D:** How have you been bes*ide* that lately?

:

179 **D:** How do you f*ee*l beside that?

In other words, West's analysis, by not differentiating as to the amount of control exercised by questions, runs the risk of overstating the interactional restrictions actually imposed by physicians.

Thirdly, also lacking in this type of research is a consideration of the sequential environment in which the objects under review are used. Specifically, I want to suggest that a dispreference for patient-initiated questions is most strongly present in the data-gathering phase at the beginning of the encounter. In that phase, a period of rapid and restrictive questioning – labelled "differential diagnosis" in the professional jargon of physicians – is often found. At other times during the consultation, however, and especially after the physician has stated his conclusions regarding diagnosis, treatment or advice, patient-initiated questions seem much less dispreferred or not at all. In fact, in my data, most patient questions posed in the environment of what I call the acceptance are uttered without any disturbance or other displays of a dispreferred orientation.[7]

In summary, I am proposing that while a questioning format is dominant in the data-producing phases of most medical encounters, and patient-initiated questions are largely dispreferred then and there, this should not be generalized to suggest that patients are automatically, so to speak, restricted in their possibilities to give and request new information throughout the encounter. Physicians can moreover frame their questions in ways that are less restrictive, and patients can use their answering slots to provide new information or suggest that they would like to be informed on specific points, as noted. Furthermore, the dispreference for patient-initiated questions seems to be phase specific. Patients have options to bring up their own points both before and after questioning, as part of their complaint(s) or as questions attached to the physician's decisions. West (1984:95–6) quotes Frankel saying: "It would be inappropriate to view the issues of control and responsibility in the medical encounter as properties of individuals," and she adds: "Instead, we are compelled to view such matters as micropolitical achievements, produced in and through actual turns at talk" (1984:95–6). Although in full agreement with these statements, I am suggesting that they be taken even more seriously than they have been until now. This is not to deny that physicians largely control the proceedings during medical encounters, but it is important to stress that this is not the automatic effect of institutional forms: rather it must be enacted by both parties and both of them have possibilities for less asymmetrical interaction.

Physicians' Uses of the Third Position: Assessments

Earlier, I summarized the literature on medical interaction as indicating two major trends in the style taken by physicians in their dealing with patients, one

of monopolizing initiatives and the other of withholding information, at least during questioning. Having discussed the first trend above, I now turn to a consideration of the second. Atkinson (1982), Frankel (1984) and Heritage (1984 a and b) variously suggest that physicians and other professionals use "third turns" in quite specific ways when dealing with clients (see also Mehan 1979). Specifically, they tend to refrain from commentary, utterances displaying alignment, or any indication of their own information processing. Thus physicians, as well as other professionals, use two kinds of strategies, one active and one passive, to achieve an ongoing asymmetric display of knowledge, feelings and functioning.

Atkinson (1982) has suggested that a variety of routine utterance types – such as second assessments, second stories and newsmarks – are generally absent in professionals' contributions to lay–professional interaction; Heritage (1984a, b) has also specifically noted the absence of "Oh" as a "change of state" marker in these settings. Both authors maintain that the specific character of "formal" or "institutional" interaction is especially, but not exclusively, observable in such third turn usage. Heritage calls this – referring to Garfinkel – one of the "identifying details" of such interactions (see also Zimmerman 1984).

Researchers who have given attention to physicians' use of the third position report a variety of turns such as acknowledgments, assessments, corrections and summaries (Fisher 1984; Frankel 1984; Todd 1984; Houtkoop 1986). Frankel, for instance, has analyzed over a thousand questioning sequences in the data-gathering phase of ambulatory care encounters. In over 60 per cent of them a third turn option was used. Dividing the utterances into two classes, acknowledgments and assessments, according to the absence or presence of contrast terms like good/bad, right/wrong, etc., he finds that assessments were almost never used by physicians, accounting for less than 3 per cent of his cases. Acknowledgments, on the other hand, were very frequent and were mostly given in short forms like "uhuh," "okay" and "I see." And he adds:

> One explanation for the large number of acknowledgements found in these data is that acknowledgements are used primarily to accomplish sequential as opposed to interpretive operations in discourse. Neutral third turn responses such as, "Mmh hmh," "okay," "I see," etc., operate without any obvious intrusion on the style or content of that which follows. Instead, their major effect is to invite speaker continuation by signalling receipt of prior information and nothing more. Assessments differ from acknowledgements functionally by introducing the speaker's reaction to, or interpretation of, the information supplied in an answer. (1984:157–8)

Generally, these tendencies roughly correspond to what I observe in my data from the Netherlands. Although perhaps to a lesser extent, Dutch physicians also seem to avoid assessments and newsmarks, for example. The fact that they do not always do so, however, offers the possibility of analyzing the exceptions. By investigating what may be done when such objects are in fact used, we may gain insight into what is accomplished by avoiding such use.

As a first approximation of such an analysis, I would like to propose a typification of episodes within medical encounters, as follows:

1. Episodes which have a marked "conversational" quality and in which non-medical topics are discussed, such as "small-talk."
2. Episodes which have a less marked "conversational" quality, which have more or less to do with medical topics, but are relatively marginal to the consultation's main "agenda."
3. Episodes in which the main medical agenda is being developed explicitly.

Quite often, in medical encounters, parties' talk does not continuously address the main topic(s) of the occasion, that is, the major complaint(s). In particular, immediately before or after dealing with their main business (type 3), parties tend to indulge in some non-medical small talk (type 1). This can also happen when the major activity does not require talking as such, for example during the physical examination (cf. Frankel 1983). Such occasions, especially toward the closing of encounters, can also be used by patients to elicit some minor medical advice, or to submit some medical idea of their own, even if it is not related to the major agenda (type 2). Elsewhere (ten Have 1987, 1989) I have tried to demonstrate that this variation in topic corresponds to a variation in interactional style. The style in type 3 tends to be the most formal, with type 1 the least formal in regard to such issues as the use of address terms, conversational restraints, and general asymmetry of interaction. In the following discussion we will observe a similar variation as regards the use of the third turn.

When objects like assessments and "Oh"-receipts are used in environments otherwise marked as belonging to type 1 or type 2, they may be seen to contribute to a process which we may gloss with a term like "informalizing." The following instances may serve as examples:

6a ((during an "inserted conversation"))

P: (Nou ja) die verhuizerij da's natuurlijk een
verv[elende (zaak)
D: [Da's een r*a*mp=
P: =*O*::h
P: (Well yes) that moving business that's of course
a ted[ious (affair)
D: [It's a dis*a*ster
P: *O*::h

6b ((during the writing out of the prescription the patient has suggested that his colds are caused by the airconditioning at his workplace: the physician reacts as follows))

223 **D:** E:hm (.) als-tie aldoor uit dezelfde h*oe*k waait
224 (.) 'hh als je st*aa*t (.) dus ik zal maar zeggen
t*e*gen die *ze*[re *zij* aan['hh dat zou h*ee*l best
225 **P:** [Hmm [hm
226 **D:** =kunnen ja (.) ik vind het altiid w*aa*rdeloos die

227 *air*-conditioning=
228 **P:** =Ik v:- ik heb ter een bl*oe*dhekel aan

223 **D:** U:hm (.) if it always blows from the same c*or*ner
224 (.) 'hh when you are standing (.) as it were
on the a[ching side ['hh that v*er*y well
225 **P:** [Hmm [hm
226 **D:** =could be it yes (.) I always think
227 it's useless that airconditioning=
228 **P:** =I th- I really h*a*te it

Many instances of physicians' assessments in environments of type 3 also seem to do a job of "informalizing." In the instance quoted next, a strong negative assessment (in line 8), related to a central complaint, seems to be "a tease," which signals that the physician does take the complaint rather lightly, as have others before him (cf. line 11).

7 ((O = Observer))

7 **P:** Ik heb me gebr*a*nd (.) zondag=
8 **D:** =St[om
9 **P:** [Ik dacht h*ee*l ev- *ja*[inderd] *aa*d (.) ik heb
10 **O:** [(huhhuhhuh)]
11 **P:** het eenenander*aa*n (ge) moeten horen (uhHUHhuh)
('K wou) t*o*ch maar even z*ie*:n=
12 **D:** =J*a*

7 **P:** I burned myself (.) S*u*nday=
8 **D:** =St[upid
9 **P:** [I thought for a mo- yes[indee]d (.) I've
10 **O:** [(huhhuhhuh)]
11 **P:** had to listen to something-or-*oth*er (uhHUHhuh)
(I would) see for a moment yet
12 **D:** Y*e*s

The next excerpt concerns a case of a patient who stumbles into the consulting room because of an ankle that should have healed by now but hasn't. Here the doctor's strong assessments of her condition seem to function to ward off her possible complaints about this lack of medical success.

8

1 **D:** Ja
2 **P:** Morgen[(uhm)
3 **D:** [*I*s het nog zo *e*rg
4 **P:** Jaha
5 **D:** O:h nee
6 **P:** Ja *ee*rlijk
7 **D:** Ja
((voorstellen observant))
9 **D:** N*ee* u bent verdorie aan

1 D: Yes
2 P: Morning[(uhm)
3 D: [*I*s it still so b*a*d
4 P: Yehes
5 D: O:h no
6 P: Yes *hon*estly
7 D: Yes
((introduction of observer))
9 D: *No* you are an invalid damn it when you do walk like that
10 P: Yes

The two cases to be considered next stem from an encounter where a "biomedical" questioning is followed up with an episode during which the biographical background of the medical complaints is discussed (cf. ten Have 1989). In both instances quoted, the physician assesses parts of the patient's report with "difficult" (lines 102, 216). This report concerns problems the patient experiences in her dealings with her 18-year-old son.

9

99 P: Ja en hij heeft dus om de haverklap geen werk
100 D: (Nja)
101 P: Dus nou ja dat vind ik dus wel eh: (3)
102 D: M*oe*ilijk heh
103 P: J*a*: vind ik w*el*
:
212 P: Jaha maar ja n*u* weet-ie natuurlijk dat ik
213 gew*ee*st ben (.) krijgt-ie te horen
214 D: *O*kee
215 P: (Huh)
216 D: Zeh- 't is *e*rg moeilijk een di*ee*tje (.) vie-
217 vier weekjes (.) d*e*ze poeders

99 P: Yes and so he is often out of work
100 D: (Nyeah)
101 P: So well yes I think that so well uh (3)
102 D: D*iff*icult huh
103 P: Y*e:s* that's what I *really* think
:
212 P: Yehes but n*ow* he knows naturally that I've
213 been there (.) he will hear about that
214 D: *O*kay
215 P: (Huh)
216 D: Say- it's v*ery* difficult a little d*i*et (.) fo-
217 four little weeks (.) these powders

The first instance fits in a strategy in which the physician focuses on the mother's feelings in order to be able to discuss them later as "part of the problem" (ten Have 1989). In the second instance, the assessment is delayed, comes after "okay" and "say," and creates the impression of an inserted afterthought. The doctor

has just suggested that she should keep in the background regarding details of her son's life, that she should avoid the impression that she is continually concerned about him. But now she mentions a complication to that, he will learn that she has been around at his place. By hastily inserting "it's very difficult" the physician accepts that it may be hard to follow his advice, while at the same time making it clear that he is not going to discuss these difficulties any further. His accepting assessment makes further detailing on her part superfluous. In fact, this assessment is part of a successful effort to initiate a closing of the encounter.

While the uses of assessments in the preceding cases seem to be tied to the specific occasions involved, some other instances are, in my view, examples of a more systematic application of assessments: in fact, they mostly come in series. In the following cases, and in others like them, such a string of assessments is used *vis-à-vis* children and seem to display a specific orientation to their identity *as* children. That is, uses of assessments here and elsewhere are part of a certain style of speaking to children that is not bound to a specific topic or occasion, but is chosen by some adults in any kind of talking to the children. Some aspects of this style are displayed in the transcripts quoted in 10. In the first example, for instance, the doctor uses "sir" as an address term to a six-year-old boy, while the "pseudo-curse" in line 7 has the same "jolly" unseriousness. In the second example we see that the assessments are given to both medical and social aspects of the little girl, while in line 16 the mother displays an understanding of the doctor's efforts as trying to engage the child in conversation.

10a

5 **D:** Zo (.) vert*e*l het es men*ee*r
6 **P:** Ik heb steeds h*oo*fdpijn
7 **D:** W*e*l (.) *po*tverd*o*rie hoe komt d[at
8 **P:** [En als ik gaat
9 ho*e*sten danna (.) ko- gaat het h*ie*r pijn doen en op m'n h*oo*fd
10 **D:** J[*a*?
11 **P:** [En als ik n*ie*st *oo*k
12 **D:** O:h (.) m*oe*t je veel **hoesten Peter**
13 **P:** Ja
14 **D:** Ja? (.) vervelend joh

5 **D:** So (.) what's up s*ir*
6 **P:** I have a h*ea*dache all the time
7 **D:** Well (.) by Jingo how c[ome
8 **P:** [And when I c*ou*gh
9 then-uh (.) co- it starts to hurt h*ere* and on my h*ea*d
10 **D:** Y[*es*?
11 **P:** [And when I sn*ee*ze *too*
12 **D:** O:h (.) And do you have to **cough a *lot* Peter**
13 **P:** Yes
14 **D:** Yes? (.) that's annoying lad

10b ((M = mother))

8 **M:** Maja heb zo'n last van maaien
9 (0.7)
10 **M:** H[eh?
11 **D:** [Da's lastig (.) kr*ie*belen ze Maja?
12 (0.4)
13 **D:** R*o*tdingen heh? heb je je dipl*o*ma gehaald? *ja* heh?
14 (0.5)
15 **D:** Sch*i*tterend zeg
16 **M:** Nou kun je praten
17 **P:** Jha

8 **M:** Maja is very much troubled by maggots
9 (0.7)
10 **M:** H[uh?
11 **D:** [That's annoying (.) do they *i*tch Maja?
12 (0.4)
13 **D:** T*err*ible things hm? Did you get your dipl*o*ma?
D: Yes huh?
14 (0.5)
15 **D:** Really splendid
16 **M:** Well can you talk
17 **P:** Yhes

So we may conclude that at least some physicians use a special "conversational" line of conduct when they deal with children, even when the main topic is being developed.

A similar "conversational" approach is sometimes discernable in the ways in which physicians deal with elderly patients. It may not be a mere coincidence that the patients who are "praised" for their "good behavior" in the next two examples are, to judge from their voices, elderly persons.

11a ((after the patient has told his physician that he hasn't been taking any medicine recently))

135 **D:** Helemaal niks (.)[D*a*'s knap
136 **P:** [( )
137 **P:** J*a*h j*a*h
138 **D:** Heh?

135 **D:** Nothing at all (.)[Well *d*one
136 **P:** [( )
137 **P:** Y*es* y*es*
138 **D:** Hey

11b

28 **P:** En ik ben op de w*ee*gschaal gaan staan en ik weeg
P: nou *a* [chtennegentig
29 **D:** [O::::h

30 D: dat zijn goeie
31 P: Jah
32 D: berichten

28 P: And I went to stand on the scales and I now weigh ni[nety eight
29 D: [O::::h
30 D: that is good
31 P: Yes
32 D: news

So, generally speaking, use of assessments in physicians' reactions to patients' answers, or other kinds of telling, displays an orientation to that telling that treats it lightly, as part of small talk, of marginal topics, or it is part of a wider "conversational" approach taken especially with persons with a non-adult status.

"Oh" in Physicians' Third Turn

As noted above, both Atkinson and Heritage maintain that "Oh" is one of the kinds of items that professionals rarely if ever use in their talk with clients, while it is quite commonly used in ordinary conversation. Heritage summarizes some of his findings in this latter area as follows:

> Through the use of the particle, informed, counterinformed, or questioning parties can assert that, whereas they were previously ignorant, misinformed or uninformed, they are now informed. Correspondingly, the informing, counterinforming, or answering party is reconfirmed as having been the informative, knowledgeable, or authoritative party in the exchange. By means of the particle, the alignment of the speakers in their sequence-specific roles is confirmed and validated. (1984b:315)

So through the use of "Oh," a preceding item is labelled as having been informative, and, at the same time, the respective roles of the parties *vis-à-vis* the informing process is displayed. While patients quite often mark what their physicians tell them as news by the use of "Oh," doctors rarely do the same with patients' informings.[8]

Thus, I have been looking for exceptions to this general tendency in my corpus, locating 30 instances in which a physician receives a patient utterance with "Oh." Using the same typology of episodes as I did earlier, I observe that ten cases were used in environments that can be characterized as non-medical (small talk, etc.: type 1). Another ten cases were found to occur in episodes that, although more or less medical as to the topic under discussion, could be seen as relatively marginal in relation to the main medical agenda (type 2).

An example of the first type may be seen in the following extract which occurs at the beginning of the physical examination, often a moment when the physician starts some kind of small talk (cf. Frankel 1983):

12 ((at the start of the physical examination))

72 **D:** (Hmhm) (.) In welke b*a*r werk je? in welke bar w*e*rk je?
73 **P:** Paradiso op de Markt
74 **D:** Ohh (.) 'h als je eventjes d*i*t uitdoet

72 **D:** (Hmhm) (.) Which b*a*r do you work **in? which** bar do you w*o*rk in?
73 **P:** Paradiso on the Market
74 **D:** Oh (.) 'h if you could take this off

An instance of the second type, below, is taken from an episode toward the end of a consultation in which the physician has asked the patient how her husband is doing. When she mentions a side-effect of tablets the physician prescribed, he receipts this with "Oh" (line 3).

13 ((near the end of the consultation, about patient's **husband**))

1 **P:** Ja: en 't is niet zo *e*rg maar nou die tabl*e*tten
2 die: e:h krijgt-ie 't van aan z'n m*aa*g
3 **D:** Oh (.) da's vervelend (.) moet ie ze met een beetje m*e*lk innemen
4 **P:** Beetje melk innemen
5 **D:** Ja (Da's beter)
6 **P:** Oh

1 **P:** Ye:s and it's not so bad but now those tablets
2 tho:se uh his stomach hurts from them
3 **D:** Oh (.) that's bad (.) he has to take them with a bit of m*i*lk
4 **P:** Bit of milk
5 **D:** Yes (That's better)
6 **P:** Oh

In relation to the collections from type 1, small-talk environments, and type 2, those marginal to the consultation, we might say that apparently physicians feel free to relax their professional habitus, since they are not being informed as a professional at these moments, at least not concerning the topic that is the major reason for the consultation. So we might conclude that the major discrepancy concerning the use of "Oh" is to be found in the type 3 data on the main business of the consultation. For this reason I will give most attention to this last set.

Before I do so, however, I will present a summary description of my findings concerning the type 1 and type 2 collections, as well as some suggestions from Heritage's essay on the use of "Oh" in ordinary conversation, in relation to these findings. In most cases from these collections, the information receipted with "Oh" is of a kind to which the teller has a privileged access, for instance, biographical details. In many cases, also, the information involved contradicts apparently existing expectations, either as displayed by the recipient or as set up by

previous information given by the teller. In some cases, "Oh" marks the moment at which the recipient understands a point the teller is trying to make, a moment of recognition.

These observations are mostly in line with the conclusions of Heritage, although the frequency with which Oh-receipted information has a biographical character may be specific for the types of situation considered in the present essay. An important point made in scattered remarks throughout Heritage's paper is that an important difference exists between "Oh"s followed by inquiries, assessments, or formulations, on the one hand, and what Heritage calls "freestanding" "Oh"s, on the other. The last type is often used in such a way that a further elaboration of the topic under discussion is not invited, or is even discouraged. As he writes: "Whereas 'oh' may propose a change of state in response to an informing, it is entirely opaque as to the quality or character of the change of state proposedly undergone by its producer" (1984b:325). For this reason, informers may wait for an "unpacking" of this opaque message, and when none is coming conclude that the recipient is unwilling to give one. At the same time, an oh-receipt makes it clear that the informing has had some effect, and that further informing may be superfluous. Because of these suggestions, "Oh" often has a sequence terminating effect. Heritage notes that freestanding "Oh"s are less common. In my data, I count one in the type 1 collection, four in the type 2, and three in the type 3. In the interest of space I will only discuss the latter examples.

In the ten cases that make up my type 3 collection, most of the general findings mentioned above are recognizably relevant. For example, biographical information is clearly involved in the next case,[9] which also illustrates a process of counterinforming.

14 ((woman about her menopause))

270 **D:** En tot die tijd heeft u g[ew*oo*n
271 **P:** [( )
272 ( )
273 **D:** regelm*a*tig gemenstrueerd
274 ( )
275 **D:** Ne[e?
276 **P:** [NOU niet regelm*a*[tig, =
277 **D:** [( )
278 **D:** =Oh 't was nooit regelm[atig
279 **P:** [Neu
280 (0.9)
281 **P:** Nee want ik ben (hier) 'n paar **jaar terug hier**
282 ook wel 's voor geweest

270 **D:** And up to that time you[just
271 **P:** [( )
272 ( )
273 **D:** menstruated r*e*gularly
274 ( )

275 **D:** N[o?
276 **P:** [Well not r*e*gular[ly
277 **D:** [( )
278 **D:** =Oh it was never regu[lar
279 **P:** [No
280 (0.9)
281 **P:** No because I was (here) a few years back
282 for this too

The specific aspect on which the physician is informed is clearly displayed by him in his "oh it was never regular" (line 278). In this way the topic is kept open for further elaboration.

A similar display of understanding is given in the next case,[10] where the information concerns another kind of private information, the location of pain in the body.

15

32 **D:** En waar z*i*t dat precies die kr*a*mp?=
33 **P:** =Hier is 't=
34 **D:** =Oh daar *e*cht in die kuit ja

32 **D:** And where is that cr*a*mp exactly?=
33 **P:** =It's here=
34 **D:** =Oh *righ*t there in that calf yes

In three other cases, "Oh" is also followed by a formulation of the produced understanding, although in these the formulations are not restricted to the "gist" of it, but also extend into an "upshot formulation" – to use the terminology developed by Heritage and Watson (1980). In all these cases an "oh" plus formulation displays confident recognition.

This leaves three remaining cases in which "Oh" is not followed by a formulation or something similar, and where the "Oh" is not part of some kind of "conversational" series, as in the cases quoted earlier. In the interests of space, I shall merely summarize my analyses of these three instances. These are "freestanding" occurrences of "Oh" where the "quality or character of the change of state" is left entirely "opaque" – as Heritage has formulated it – and where the physician initiates a topic shift or change soon afterwards. This condition has the effect of confronting the analyst, too, with an opaque action, allowing for only tentative interpretation at best. These oh-receipts occur in environments that can be seen as somehow awkward or delicate. In two of the three instances, the physicians seem to challenge the information provided, but when the patients confirm their previous stance, they subsequently acknowledge this with a freestanding "oh" and change topic soon thereafter. In this way they mark that they have noted the "opinions" expressed without offering any assessment of the information "noted" in this way.

These interpretations are far from definitive. The opaque and hinting quality of a freestanding "oh" and its tendency to contribute to a subsequent termination

of the current sequence makes it difficult to provide any interpretation from further sequential development.

My analysis of the 30 instances of "Oh" produced by physicians during consultations has suggested two generally valuable interpretations. On the one hand, the use of "Oh" may be a part of, and contribute to, a "conversational" quality an episode in which it occurs may have. And, on the other, it may indicate that the information so receipted may be seen as one to which the informer has some kind of privileged access. The latter may concern biographical information as well as private opinions and feelings. In some special instances this last marking was tentatively interpreted as part of a challenging episode, occurring when a patient stuck to a contested report on her feelings. In this way the "Oh" seemed to give an extra mark of "this is your private opinion." While such a use is not uncommon in informal conversation, its rarity in professional reactions to clients' informings could add to its impact.

Asymmetry Reconsidered

I have suggested throughout this chapter that "asymmetry," often conceived of as a given and constant feature of medical interaction, should instead be seen as an interactionally achieved and varying aspect of the interactional stream produced by doctors and patients. It is not my intention to deny that phenomena that can be glossed as "asymmetries" are massively present in medical encounters. But I should like to stress that the choices participants have to act more or less in accord with institutional expectation, that is, in a more or less "asymmetrical" or "formal" way, can be exploited by them to create specific kinds of episodes and to achieve analyzable interactional effects. More research is needed to specify what has only been suggested in broad terms here. The strategy pursued, to give specific attention to practices that depart from the routine, seems to be a promising one. The covert ways in which patients can try to influence the course of the consultation, alternatives to restrictive questioning, and alternatives to the third turn "uhuh," are all topics deserving more detailed exploration in the near future.

Consultations are sometimes almost like conversations. At other times they resemble interrogation. But mostly they are somewhere in between, zigzagging between the two poles in a way that is negotiated on a turn-by-turn basis by the participants themselves, whether they are Anglo-Saxons or Dutchmen.

Notes

Earlier versions of this paper were read at the Talk and Social Structure conference, and subsequently at the 11th World Congress of Sociology, Research Committee for Sociolinguistics, in New Delhi in August, 1986, and at the International Conference on Discourse in Institutions at the University of Dortmund in October 1986.

1. This debate could start with Atkinson's (1979a) observations concerning efforts to "humanize" judicial proceedings by making them less "formal" and more like "conversations." He suggests that such efforts tend to ignore the inherent functionality of many institutional arrangements, such as the achievement of "shared attentiveness."
2. Except for fragment 15, all physicians quoted are male; patients, however, are both male and female. I have adapted my use of pronouns to this circumstance.
3. The data extracts are presented in a simplified form (see appendix); the Dutch version will be followed by an English gloss, which is intended to capture the utterance as it was spoken, and not to provide fully colloquial English.
4. Harrie Mazeland pointed out to me that this can be done by using verbs like "to be" or "to have" for background items, as opposed to verbs like "to get" for the pressing complaints: compare, in 3, lines 24–5 with lines 27 and 31.
5. This contrast between "respondents" and "informants" as locally constituted identities is currently being developed by Harrie Mazeland in a conversation analytic study of sociological research interviews.
6. This discussion, being restricted to "talk" as its topic, does not consider non-vocal devices. Christian Heath (1986) makes it clear that movements of the body can be used very effectively as "covert initiatives."
7. These findings are partially similar to what Frankel (1990) reports. He also mentions that most of his patient-initiated questions were put forward towards the end of the consultation, specifically at "unit boundaries," but – contrary to my findings – his examples display many dispreference markings, such as pauses, token acknowledgments and announcements, preceding the questions, even at those locations.
8. Just how rare this is cannot at the moment be specified. As far as Heritage knows it is very rare indeed in English language material. In eight complete consultations from my corpus, however, where patients used "Oh" 31 times, I have found that physicians produced 14 cases of "Oh." My intuition is that this does not represent a "language" difference. "Oh" seems to function in a similar way in both languages. It may be an aspect of a more informal style practiced by Dutch physicians, especially by general practitioners who know their patients for years.
9. This excerpt is a simplified version of a transcription made by van Mierlo and Driessen.
10. This excerpt is taken from a transcript made by Kaag, Koffieberg and Vreeburg.

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The Construction of Conflicting Accounts in Public Participation TV

Joanna Thornborrow

This article examines the occurrence of the conversational historic present (CHP) tense in the institutional context of media discourse – specifically, its use as an interactional resource in the talk of "lay" speakers in public participation television. The study arises from a continuing research interest in lay speaker participation in media discourse (Livingstone & Lunt 1994), particularly in speakers' use of narratives in mediated contexts (Thornborrow 1997). In collecting recordings of a series of broadcasts involving different forms of audience participation (the transcripts are of naturally occurring talk from British and American talk shows, and from an American television court series), I began to notice that, when two participants were involved in telling their own version of the same story, there were significant differences between the ways in which the first and second stories got told. In second accounts, there seemed to be a fairly consistent shift occurring from past tense forms to the CHP in main event clauses. By contrast, the use of CHP in such clauses was practically absent from all first accounts. This recurring feature of second, conflicting accounts of previously told stories in the data warranted closer attention.

This analysis will explore two issues: first, the occurrence of CHP as a situated, interactional resource for telling conflicting stories; and second, the way that its use in this mediated context might be explained as a means of accomplishing a specific action – the construction of publicly accountable, alternative accounts.

Theoretical Background

The analysis in this article is broadly informed by interactional discourse analysis and by Goffman's notion (1981) of FOOTING and PARTICIPATION frameworks.

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It also draws on and develops previous work on the occurrence of CHP in narratives (Wolfson 1978, 1981, Schiffrin 1981, Johnstone 1987, Leith 1995). My aim is to examine the occurrence of this grammatical form as a discourse feature which contributes to a particular kind of action undertaken by speakers in the context of public participation TV: the situated production by co-present speakers of conflicting accounts of the same event, or sequence of events.

In Wolfson's account (1978) of tense alternation between the past and the CHP, she describes CHP as an interactional variable rather than a semantically marked verb form. As such, it is highly dependent on speaker–audience relationship, within a particular genre or speech event. While she acknowledges that CHP may function to structure experience from one speaker's point of view, and also to dramatize that experience, Wolfson maintains that it is the switch itself – from past tense forms to CHP, or vice versa, signaling a change from narration into PERFORMANCE – that is significant, rather than semantic content or value of actions narrated in either tense.

Wolfson also looked at the sociolinguistic variables of age, occupation, ethnicity, and status that might affect the likelihood of CHP's occurring in narrative speech events; in relation to these variables, she found that performance is likely to occur when speakers are sure that their stories will be understood and appreciated by their audience – i.e., when levels of similarity and empathy between participants are high. The degree of narrative performance can therefore be a discursive resource for constructing intimacy between speakers, since CHP is a variable that is sensitive to symmetrical social relations.

Schiffrin 1981, in a quantitative analysis of tense variation between past tense and CHP, argues that CHP is both (i) a stylistic device used by narrators to signal vividness and drama, and (ii) a discourse feature which organizes the narrative into chronological segments. In Schiffrin's analysis, the direction of the switch IS significant, and she finds that the switch back to past tense forms from CHP serves the function of separating distinct narrative events (1981:56). She also claims that CHP is a grammatical resource which foregrounds the speaker's experience (1981:46) and, in doing so, acts as an internal evaluation device through which narrators can present events as if they were happening there and then, from their particular point of view.

Schiffrin's account of the evaluative function of CHP could also be characterized in interactional terms as enhancing the degree of speakers' commitment to what is being said – i.e. to their version of the story at hand. To use Goffman's notion of "footing," which describes the structural relationship between speakers and their utterances, CHP may well be a grammatical device on which speakers systematically draw so as to foreground the "principal" of their story. In other words, speakers may switch to CHP in order to mark their level of commitment to their story, and the extent to which they are "the party to whose position the words attest" (Goffman 1981:226). The specific nature of the participation framework in my data – where the different accounts are being produced for a co-present, overhearing audience – may also contribute to a second narrator's use of CHP as a discursive device which can function to construct a more believable version of a story, once a first version has been heard.

In an analysis of two separate tellings of the same folktale by the same speaker, Leith 1995 found (a) that CHP was the norm in a performed narrative; (b) that in his data it frequently marked the onset of a complicating action; and (c) that it was highly likely to occur in contexts where dialog was being recounted, "as if the 'now' of dramatic speech creates a sense of present action" (1995:60). He notes, like Wolfson, the highlighting effect of the switch to CHP through the event of the switch itself; and like Schiffrin, he identifies its organizing function in the telling of different event sequences. Leith also argues that the use of CHP depends to a great extent on the relationship between the teller and the audience: The greater the degree of solidarity between the two, the greater the frequency of CHP. However, he suggests that the use of CHP is most often a performance variable which is determined by genre and which, in many cases, functions as a generic marker for the production of short comic narratives, jokes, and in his data, folktales.

Finally, Johnstone 1987 analyzes verb tense alternation in a category of verbs she calls "dialog introducers," such as *say* and *go*, in stories involving the teller's encounter with some form of authority figure. She found that, in reported dialog, the talk of the non-authority (the teller) and of the authority figure was distinguished by a switch in tense from past to CHP, and that this switch was systematic; the story teller's talk was always introduced in the past tense, while the talk of the authority figure was introduced in CHP (1987:39). Johnstone argues that story tellers draw on the evaluative function of CHP to mark relative social status; but like Leith, she suggests that patterns of tense choice in oral narrative also depend on a range of factors in individual rhetorical contexts.

Taking up this point in order to develop an account of when and why speakers shift into CHP, we must pay closer attention to the contextual, situated use of this form as an interactional resource. I noticed that, in every case in my data where two conflicting versions of the same events were produced by participants, the second teller (however briefly) shifted from using past tense forms in main event clauses to using CHP. Hence I want to examine how this shift may be understood as a rhetorical form that is interactionally relevant to the situated context of the talk.

Levinson 1988, in his discussion of Goffman's ideas about the production format of utterances, notes that there are clear grammaticalized forms in many languages for displaying a speaker's level of personal commitment to what is being said, as well as for distinguishing the role of relayer or transmitter of a story from its informational source. These forms, Jakobson's "evidentials" (1971), can be realized in some languages by the modality of an utterance. Levinson mentions the case of one American Indian language (Hidatsa) where there are "systematic patterns in relation of first tellings to second tellings" (1988:185). In others, evidentials are realized through systems of contrastive suffixes indicating authorship, or through the use of aspect markers, e.g. in the telling of myths and historical tales (1988:186). It may well be that a speaker who is producing a second telling of the same story, from a different viewpoint, can also grammatically mark this telling through an evidential form which indicates "principalship" rather than "authorship." The use of CHP may turn out to be one such device

and one that is particularly sensitive to what Schegloff 1981 terms "interactional contingency." In the context of public participation TV, the use of CHP in second, conflicting accounts appears to be a linguistic resource on which speakers routinely draw in order to mark their account as different from the preceding speaker's.

Data Sources

My data corpus is taken from TV broadcasts in Britain, from 1997 and 1998, which involve different kinds of public participation in talk shows and television "courts." The transcripts in this article are of talk from the following programs: *Esther* (BBC 1, August 1997); *Judge Judy* (Carlton, August 1997), and *Montel* (Channel 4, August) 1997). First, extracts of these programs were transcribed where there was evidence of narrative sequences in the talk of lay participants. I then looked for instances where the same story, or account of events, was told by two different participants. To use Blum-Kulka's (1997) framework of "telling, tale, and teller," I was looking for sequences of talk where the tale was constant (i.e. the same events are being recounted), while the teller and the telling changed within the relatively short space of a sequence of TV time. The telling – the way the tale gets to be told by different tellers – is the object of analysis here. I found that, although the contexts for these tellings are rather different, the same phenomenon occurs in all of them.

In the TV courtroom, the setting is the equivalent of a small claims court where members of the public can be awarded claims of up to $5,000. The host of this show, Judge Judy, is described in the opening voice-over as a "real judge," and plaintiffs and defendants are called up to the bench to put their cases to her. She then rules in favor of one or the other, and the judgments made are apparently legally binding. The talk shows – one British, hosted by Esther Rantzen, and one American, hosted by Montel Williams – consist respectively of discussions about jealousy, and about teenage girls who have been thrown out of their homes by their parents. In each show, selected participants are foregrounded as having particular stories to tell in relation to the program's theme. These people are separated from the rest of the studio audience and occupy their own studio space, either facing the audience, in the case of Esther, or in the case of Montel, seated in a row next to the host, facing the TV cameras with their backs to the audience.

Analysis

The context for this talk can be broadly characterized as institutional, mediated, and multi-party. For my purpose here, the relationships between speakers seem to be best accounted for in terms of Goffman's "ratified participation" frameworks, rather than according to more typical sociolinguistic categories of social status, gender, or ethnicity. It is the participant roles occupied by the speakers

that determine what kinds of actions they undertake in the talk, rather than their relative social status. Indeed, social status seems largely irrelevant in these contexts; and this will pose a problem for the claim that, quantitatively speaking, the use of CHP is more likely when there is a high degree either of familiarity or of symmetrical social status among participants.[1] Speakers' relation to the audience is complex and multi-layered; although they may be familiar with one or two members of the audience (e.g. when members of the same family are present), the majority of participants are non-familiars, and there is a high degree of asymmetry between the role of lay participant and the hosts of these shows.

Why do these stories come about, and how are they comparable? The main feature that they share is that they provide a conflicting version of a previous participant's account of some sequence of events. The two narratives are either from opposing claimants in the TV courtroom, or from two audience members, usually from the same family. Both tellers have an experience of the same event: They were present when the events occurred, so they have a legitimate right to tell the story as it happened to them. Returning to Goffman's analysis of footing, they are AUTHOR, ANIMATOR, and PRINCIPAL; they also "figure" centrally in the story they tell (it's about them). In the TV courtroom data, the litigants represent themselves, and much of their evidence is given in the form of what Conley & O'Barr (1990:178) have called "litigant narratives." Philips (1990:197) has described the format of courtroom discourse as "typically . . . one in which each of two sides presents its view of relevant events, and then fact finders, a jury or a judge, choose which of the two versions of reality they consider to be most plausible."

So there is quite a lot at stake for these tellers: They have to convince a third party, the judge, that their version is the more plausible one. In the talk show data, there is perhaps less at stake (no money changes hands). But there is nevertheless an element of credibility involved, in that speakers are engaged in putting a second version of events across as convincingly as possible, to an audience who have already heard a first version.

What changes take place between first telling and second telling? In other words, which linguistic and discursive resources do participants use to differentiate their second telling from the first telling?[2] I begin by looking at an instance of a switch to CHP in a non-mediated, ordinary conversational context. In a study of the way stories get retold in naturally occurring conversation, Norrick 1998 has analyzed the way speakers embed the same story into different contexts for different audiences – focusing on the ways in which a story may differ, and in which it remains constant on separate occasions. In collaborative retellings of a familiar story, he found that speakers both contest and confirm other speakers' versions of events; but he never really examines how these contestations are accomplished by participants. In an earlier article, Norrick 1997 examines the function of collaborative retelling of familiar stories in terms of ratifying group membership and reinforcing group values; but again, he does not address the issue of when conflicting accounts occur, or of how they are dealt with by speakers.

The first data extract below, taken from Norrick 1997, provides some evidence that, in the production of a second, conflicting version of a preceding story,

speakers are likely to use CHP. This particular extract is used by Norrick to illustrate shifting group dynamics between different family members, as each participant attempts to contribute to the story. However, I found it interesting because it contains a sequentially produced first and second account of the same event by two different speakers.

(1) "Poodle"//Norrick 1997. Participants: Annie & Lynn (sisters), **Jean (their cousin)**, Helen (Annie & Lynn's mother)

1.	Lynn:		Remember [when–]
2.	Jean:		[it was] terrible
3.	Lynn:		Jennifer, the first time Jennifer had a perm
4.			when she came home. It was the funniest thing.
5.	Jean:		She put something on her head, a bag or something?
6.	Lynn:		She wore her–
7.	Annie:		huh huh huh
8.	Lynn:		Well she wore her–
9.	Helen:		"Hair ball, hair ball" Yeah. Because she–
10.	Annie:		She just always had this hood on. And she ran
11.			right upstairs,
12.	Lynn:	→	No. First she threw her bag up the stairs, almost
13.			hit me.
14.	Annie:		Oh yeah
15.	Lynn:	→	Then "bang." The door slams. And I'm like– I was
16.			on the phone. I was like "Ah I don't know. My sister
17.			has just walked in. I think something's wrong."
18.			[then she ran up the stairs.]
19.	Annie:		[oh that's it.]"I look like a damn poodle."
20.			{general laughter}
21.	Lynn:		Like sobbing. "I look like a poodle."

Here Lynn (the younger sister) attempts to introduce a story about another sister, Jennifer. In 1:1, *Remember* is actually Lynn's second attempt to introduce this story; she has trouble establishing her role as story "teller," since the story is a familiar one which is known to all the participants. Jean (1:5), Helen (1:9) and Annie (1:10) all contribute to the telling, but at 1:12, Lynn explicitly contests Annie's account of Jennifer's actions: *No. First she threw her bag up the stairs, almost hit me.* Annie's *Oh yeah* (1:14) indicates her alignment with Lynn's version of events, and Lynn continues with a much more "performed" account of the story: *Then bang. The door slams. And I'm like– I was on the phone.*

It is here (1:15) that the switch to CHP occurs, once Lynn has gained the floor as principal teller. The switch is momentary, lasting through only two verb phrases; but according to Norrick's transcript, it clearly does occur. Following Wolfson, this occurrence could be accounted for as the speaker's switching into performance; and it is appropriate and predictable in this context because of the symmetrical relationship in play between the teller and her audience as members of the same family group, when the speaker is confident that her story will be understood and appreciated by the other participants. Following Schiffrin, the switch would have an evaluative function as well as a stylistic, dramatizing effect;

the speaker is foregrounding her own experience of the recounted events. I sug gest that there is also an element of believability at stake here. The use of CH at this point in the talk is a significant interactional resource for Lynn, in order t establish her story as the accurate version – and it also functions as a rebuttal sinc it is produced immediately after Annie's first account, the accuracy of which Lyn has contested. Furthermore, the shift to CHP in Lynn's version occurs in mai event clauses, not just in the dialog-introducing clauses identified by Johnston

Turning now to data from a talk show, we find that the host (Esther Rantzer has just summarized a problem experienced by Maria and Tony. She addresse Maria (2:1), who produces an account of a particular incident as evidence for he claim that *he's got worse* (2:2). A general claim about not being able to go out i followed (2:9) by a story of one particular occasion when her husband's jealous caused problems for the whole family.

(2) "The Party"//1//Esther 8/97

1.	Est:		do you– has he changed over the **years**
2.	Mar:		yeah he's got worse (.) actually
3.	Aud:		((laughter))
4.	Est:		[in what way]=
5.	Aud:		[((laughter))]
6.	Kel:		=((screechy laugh))
7.	Mar:		well we can't go (down)the pub (1.0) like we could
8.			never go to a night club (.) could never go in a pub
9.		→	(.hh) like we went to a party (.) and there was a bit
10.			of an incident (.hh) like Kelly (.)that's my daughter
11.			in the blonde hair (1.0)(.hh) a young chap(1.0) had
12.			fancied her n'asked for her telephone number (1.0)
13.			(.hh) n'it caused a bit of an argument over it Tony
14.			thought (.) that I was taking the young chap's
15.			telephone number (1.0) so it was quite embarrassing
16.			(.) n'we had to leave the party (.hh) (1.0) we didn't
17.			have a row at– we had a f-few disagreements at the
18.			party (.hh) but when we had come out (1.0)I was in
19.			tears n'Kelly was in tears (.) it caused so much
20.			disruptions at the party (1.0) that we had to
21.			leave =
22.	Est:		= was this a bit up [setting] for you
23.	Kel:		[((clears throat))]
24.	Est:		Kelly too
25.	Kel:		[yes] [yes]it was
26.	Mar:		[n'Kelly] missed out on the boy [friend]

The story shows the classic structure of a Labovian oral narrative, with an abstract (*we went to a party n'there was a bit of an incident*, (2:9), orientation sequences, a series of complicating actions and a resolution (*we had to leave the party*), some evaluation clauses (*it was quite embarrassing* and *it caused so much disruptions at the party*), and a coda (*Kelly missed out on the boyfriend*). It is told, however, entirely in the past tense, with no switch to CHP.

This is also the first account of a sequence of events, and it is contested a few moments later in a second account by Tony in ex. 3. The host turns to him (3:1) and asks him not for his version of the story, although that is what he ultimately produces; instead, she poses another question relating directly to the effects of his actions.

(3) "The Party"//2//Esther 8/97

1.	Est:		do you think this is making (2.0) everyone's lives
2.			a bit miserable (.) Tony
3.			(2.0)
4.	Ton:		yeah they say th'it does (1.0) makes my life miserable
5.			as well really (.hh) but like (.) other things th–
6.			at the party it was a different (.) situation there we
7.			was all just (.) sitting having a drink n'I was I was
8.			told why don't you go (.) to the bar (.) an'the
9.		→	minute I was at the bar n'I looked round she's talking
10.			to someone else an'straight away (.hh) the old
11.			jealousy comes in an' gets you n'I think what's going
12.			on then she come up and said get a pen get a pen (.hh)
13.			I gotta give that fella the number
14.			[n'I'm like what? it's not for me] it's for Kelly (.)
15.	Aud:		[((laughter ----------))]
16.	Ton:		so I went hold on n'I'm s–[march across the dance
17.	Mar:		[((laughs ----------
18.	Ton:		floor don'I]
19.	Mar:		----------]--- >))
20.	Ton:		an'Kelly's behind goin' no no no not me not me so
21.			straight away I'm thinking (.) [well what's] going on
22.	(Kel)		[((laughs))]
23.		→	(.hh) an'I (.) lose my temper from there on in
24.	Est:		so it wrecked the party from your point of view and
25.			indeed from your family's point of view
26.	Ton:		yeah
27.	Est:		is it wrecking your life all this (.) suspicion
28.			suspicion suspicion

Tony begins his account of events at the party with an embedded preface (3:6): *at the party it was a different situation.* In so doing he sets up his story as different, as an account which is going to conflict with Maria's. We now know not only that a story is coming up, but also that it will take issue with the events as they have been described by the preceding teller. At 3:9 the first switch into CHP occurs; and until the resolution (for Tony) in 3:23 (*so I lose my temper from there on in),* the majority of the narrative is told using CHP. Here not only the dialog is produced in CHP, but also most of the main event clauses:

she's talking to someone else
the old jealousy comes in an gets you
I think what's going on
get a pen get a pen

n'I'm like what
it's not for me it's for Kelly
I'm s– march across the dance floor **don'I**
n' Kelly's behind going no no
straight away I'm thinking
what's going on
I lose my temper

If we are to take the switch into CHP as an indication of level of narrative performance through the stylistic dramatization created by these present tense forms – not just in the dialog sequences, but in most of the main events in the story – then this second account is clearly "performed" to a much greater extent than the first. (I have taken *come* in 3:12, *then she come up and said*, to be a non-standard past tense form). What is interesting about this story, though, is that the occurrence of CHP here runs counter to both Wolfson and Schiffrin's claims. They propose that the switch into CHP can be seen as "an index of proffered commonality" (Wolfson 1978:236) and is therefore likely to occur when the speaker is of equal status and sure of the empathetic stance of the audience toward the story. But in ex. 3, the speaker is addressing a studio audience which for the most part is unfamiliar to him, and a host whose status as a media celebrity and controller of the show should be producing a relationship of social distance rather than familiarity. Nor does the switch function as an indicator of a generic shift into a different kind of discourse, e.g. a joke or funny anecdote, as Leith points out may sometimes be the case (1995:68). The story is nonetheless a performance in the sense that it is publicly produced from a front-stage position, on camera, to a studio audience. Why should this second, conflicting account contain a high-level use of CHP, when the first account does not? The answer to this question is possibly more likely to be found in this story's sequential position in relation to the preceding one – and in what the speaker is accomplishing by producing it – than in a simple switch into performance in relation to sociolinguistic variables of intimacy and symmetrical status.

To explore this idea further, we can turn to extracts 4 and 5 from the TV court series, *Judge Judy*. Here, because of the nature of the courtroom setting, the discourse is predictably more adversarial; the judge questions claimants and invites them to put their cases, essentially through providing their accounts of events. It is thus a discourse setting where conflicting accounts of the same sequence of events are highly likely to occur. However, unlike other forms of courtroom discourse (cf. Harris 1984, Philips 1990, Drew 1992), where the story is elicited principally through a highly preallocated system of turn-taking through counsel questioning, the participants in the TV courtroom answer directly to the judge. There is thus a much greater variation in participant interaction in evidence here: not just question/answer turns, but also disputes, opinions, and some degree of interaction between plaintiff and defendant.

The case I examine here concerns two roommates who are in dispute about a deposit on the lease of an apartment. In the transcribed sequence, the judge has called on Jennifer (the plaintiff) and Shannon (the defendant) to give an account of what was said in a telephone conversation between the two women

on the night that Jennifer was told to leave the apartment. Shannon goes first and tells her story of events (4:5–17). In her account, she uses CHP in quotation of direct speech as dialog, e.g. *I suggest you don't come home this evening* (4:5), and in a reporting verb, e.g. '*she goes*' (4:12). However, Schiffrin found in her data that the report of spoken interaction is the most frequent and likely context where CHP occurs, and that the use of *go* in particular is limited to prefacing only direct quotes in the present tense (1982:68). Occurrences of CHP in this type of clause can be seen at the arrowed lines below:

(4) "The Phone Call"//1//Judge Judy 18-08-97

1.	Jud:		let me– would you (.) tell me again (.) what you told
2.			her in that phone conversation [you had]
3.	Sha:		[(s'I recall)]
4.	Jud:		an argument
5.	Sha:	→	as I re (collect xxx) she said I suggest you don't
6.			come home this evening (.) I'd a friend that was
7.		→	there from ((–)) I said well I suggest (.) you go to
8.			Cindy's house the– the other girl who was at her
9.			apartment (.) uh our apartment (.h) had answered the
10.			phone when this whole verbal (.) dispute started (.hh)
11.		→	and erm (1.0) after (.) I said well I go I suggest you
12.		→	go to Cindy's (.) and she goes well you know (.) I– I
13.		→	don't know if she said I'll call the police or what
14.		→	happened and I said well (.) no I'll call the police
15.			myself and if they come (.) if it comes down to it (.)
16.			I have a copy of the lease (.) so what

The dialog sequences are produced in CHP here; but in every other event clause (apart from *goes* in 4:12), Shannon uses the past tense forms *told* and *said* to frame her report of the conversation between her and Jennifer. However, in Jennifer's account of the same telephone conversation, we find a pattern similar to Tony's use of CHP in ex. 3. Here is how Jennifer tells her story – marked, as Tony's was, with a preface signaling an upcoming contesting version of events (5:2).

(5) "The Phone Call"//2//Judge Judy 18-08-97

1.	Jud:	so then you moved out
2.	Jen:	yeah but that's not what I recall happening (.) what
3.		happened was that my friend Cindy came over she was
4.		staying over that night because (.) I was afraid to
5.		stay (.) alone in this apartment with her (.hh)
6.		and =
7.	Sha:	= I wasn't even home that evening n'you [and]she's
8.	Jen:	[right]
9.	Sha:	she's =
10.	Jen:	= I came home she wasn't home (.h)(.) [and she
11.	Jud:	[so your
12.	Jen:	called]
13.	Jud:	friend Cindy] was staying in the apartment

15. → calls (.) call me (.) every nasty name you could imagine
16. → accusing me of playing her messages (.) which I had
17. [no idea what she was talking about] yes =
18. Jud: [this was on the phone conversation] =this was the
19. phone conver[sation]
20. Jen: [and so](.) she was just screaming at me
21. → calling me terrible things she [hangs up]the phone
22. Sha: [(I don're–)]
23. Jen: → calls back I let the machine get it because I (.)
24. wasn't gonna talk to her under (.) y'know with her
25. talking like that (.hh) and (.) she left a message
26. saying (.) you better move out (.) or I'm having you
27. arrested (.) you don't have a copy of the lease (.hh)
28. [a few minutes] later–
29. Sha: [(what difference)] what difference does it
30. matter if you have a copy of the lease or not (1.0)
31. what difference does it make (.) can you =
32. Jud: =ok=
33. Sha: = is that
34. [is that it]
35. Jud: [so you believed] so you moved out
36. Jen: → right (.) a few minutes later the police arrive they
37. → get a call from Manhattan Beach (.) that there was a
38. burglary (.) in =
39. Jud: =so the police arrived =
40. Jen: =((that one))yes
41. (.) and they heard her message (.) and [that's wh–]
42. Jud: [you're not]
43. going to tell me about the pol– y'listen to me (.) you
44. can't tell me what the police heard (.) [but] the
45. Jen: [right]
46. Jud: police did arrive
47. Jen: yep they did
48. Jud: did you move out that night
49. Jen: yes [(that evening)]
50. Jud: [what are you] suing her for
51. Jen: I'm suing her because I (.) feel I'm entitled to my
52. deposit back [—]

In this second account of the events that night, it is not just the dialog sequences that are reported in CHP, but significantly, also some of the main event clauses in the narrative:

she calls me every nasty name you **could imagine**
accusing me of playing her messages
she hangs up the phone
calls back
I let the machine get it (this could be **either past or CHP**)
the police arrive

The degree of performance in this account is consequently much greater than that in the first account, where the story is constructed basically as a report of a conversation. CHP forms are limited to the representation of dialog in the first account, and all the reporting clauses in which Shannon recounts the main events occur in the past tense:

I told her
she said
I said
the other girl had answered the phone
I don't know if she said . . . what happened
I said well

Here we can see the same phenomenon recurring in a different TV context, but one where the speakers are engaged in doing the same kind of discursive work: producing a second version of events that have already been recounted by a first teller. Crucially, the second tellers are producing accounts which conflict with the first tellers' version; and in both data extracts discussed here so far, their accounts contain significant use of CHP, producing a level of performance which is absent from the first accounts.

Another sequence from the TV courtroom data shows the same pattern even more clearly, when three separate accounts are given of the same events. This case involves a dispute over repairs to a car which led to a fight between two men, Nathan and Dave. The first story of the fight is told by Nathan, the plaintiff:

(6) "The Fight"//1//Judge Judy 14-8-97

1.	Jud:	let's hear it now let's hear about the violence (2.0)
2.		'cos that's what your suing [for right]
3.	Nat:	[the first] violence
4.		occurred like I say was on Wednesday in his drive where
5.		he grabbed me by the throat and threatened that I could
6.		not back out of this deal that we're too far in to it
7.		and would cause me traumatic injury if I (.) insisted
8.		(.) he had me by the throat and ripped my shirt off
9.		n'punched me in the guts three times =
10.	Jud:	=did you do that
11.		sir
12.		(1.0)
13.	Nat:	his father [was]
14.	Jud:	[ju–] u– did you do that
15.	Dav:	oh no Ma'am

In this first account, there is no use of CHP. As we have seen in other first tellings so far, the main event clauses are all past tense clauses:

he grabbed me
threatened that I could not back out
he had me by the throat

ripped my shirt off
punched me in the guts

Next in the sequence is an account given by an eyewitness to the fight; although it is told from a different perspective, his version of events is similar to the first one, insofar as it is produced in support of the first teller's version.

(7) "The Fight"//2//Judge Judy 14-8-97

1.	Jud:		ok could you just take your hands out of your
2.			pockets [you're not] afraid of that right=
3.	Wit:		[yes ma'am] =no ma'am
4.	Jud:		alright (.) did you witness anything physical on that
5.			date between these two [people]
6.	Wit:		[yes I] did
7.	Jud:		tell me exactly what you [saw]
8.	Wit:		[well] I was sitting
9.			in the car as they were doing their conversation
10.			(.) Dave ended up taking a swing at Richard (1.0)
11.			and hit him in the side
12.	Jud:		Richard is this (.) person who (.) who was al- who I
13.			call Nathan 'cos that's [what's]in it =
14.	Wit:		[yes] =yes [Nathan]
15.	Jud:		[ok]
16.	Wit:		Richard didn't do nothing (.) Dave got irritable (.)
17.			grabbed him by the neck (.) threw him up against a
18.			door in a wall(1.0) then threw him to the ground (.) and
19.		→	then started hittin' to him (.hh) I jump over (1.0)
20.			opened up the door (.) said Nancy please call the
21.			police (.) I jumped on Dave's neck (1.0) and as I did
22.			that (.) he got off Richard (.) Nathan (.) and then we
23.			both rushed into the house
24.			(1.0)
25.	Jud:		ok (.) would you have a seat thank you

The narrative action clauses through which the witness recounts the key moments in the development of the fight as he saw it – from the opening orientation (7:8), *well I was sitting in the car*, through the complicating action clauses of the fight, and up to the resolution (7:23), *then we both rushed into the house* – are all in the past tense. The account does contain one occurrence of CHP, *I jump over* (7:19), and the witness's tense switch at this point seems to correspond to Schiffrin's finding that CHP occurs when a new episode in the story is being introduced. In effect, the clause *I jump in* marks the moment in the story when the current speaker becomes involved in the action. After that, he switches back to using past tense forms to finish his story.

However, when the defendant, Dave, is subsequently called to give HIS account of the fight, he uses CHP from the very beginning of his story, and he continues to use it throughout the sequence. This is the third time the story has been told; and in this account, the only occurrence of a past tense form is when he uses the reporting verb *said*.

(8) "The Fight"//3//Judge Judy 14-8-97

1.	Jud:	OK
2.	Dav:	I walk out (1.0) I'm very aggressive (.) I'm yelling
3.		(.) I'm cussin' at him (.) everything (1.0) I'm
4.		saying I want my car back (.) I'm saying I don't
5.		wanna deal with you any more (1.0) I'm not fixing the
6.		car you're not keeping my car you gotta get outa my
7.		life (.) all deals are off (.hh) he then looks at me
8.		(.) an he says well (.) that ain't gonna happen (.) I
9.		say (.) a little while ago you told me you're gonna
10.		bring my car back I'm at my house waiting for two
11.		hours I call you four times (.) you're hanging up on
12.		me (.) what's the deal you change your mind again I
13.		want my car back (.hh) I physically get in front of
14.		him before he go– goes in his house (1.0) I'm like
15.		this both hands up (.) Nathan (.) stop this (.) you
16.		don't wanna do this (.) so (.) next you know he
17.		physically grabs me (.) goes to push me out of the way
18.		(1.0) Nathan (1.0) he's pushin' [me]
19.	Jud:	[ssh] he's pushin' you
20.	Dav:	yeah (.) yeah he's not fighting with me (.) he's not
21.		striking me (.) he's pushin' me outa the way (.)
22.		he's just trying to get in his door
23.	??	(cool?)
24.	Dav:	I grab onto him problem is is his porch is slippery
25.		(1.0) I'm falling down he's pushin' me outa the way
26.		(.) I pull him around (.) spin him around (.) put him
27.		on ground I got my arm on his neck (1.0) an' I'm
28.		holding him
29.	Jud:	somebody said to me (.) somebody that I was
30.		having a verbal dispute with
31.	Dav:	alright [—]

In Dave's version of the fight with Nathan, the use of CHP contributes to the highly performed character of this story, in contrast to the two accounts that have just preceded it. In both previous accounts, it was Dave who allegedly started the fight; but in Dave's account, he claims (8:17) that it was Nathan who *physically grabs* him, thus putting him in a position of having to defend himself. Dave's use of CHP in this sequence seems to function on various levels: first, as a stylistic device to dramatize performance; second, as Schiffrin's "internal evaluation device," reproducing the fight as he experienced it from his perspective; and third, as an indicator of his level of commitment to this version of events, which foregrounds the principalship of his story. I suggest that its occurrence in this particular context, in an account which conflicts with the two preceding versions, is also significant in that it contributes to the third speaker's public bid for greater believability over the first two speakers' version of events. One way that speakers may accomplish this is by increasing the degree of the story's "performedness," and Dave indeed does this to a marked degree in his telling of a story that has been

In all the data discussed so far, the participant role of second (or in the last case, third) teller in these media contexts contains a further dimension which was lacking in the non-mediated example of ex. 1: a dimension of having already figured in a first teller's version. Consequently, Tony, Jennifer, and Dave are all in a position of having to produce an account which somehow will enable them to redress the situation in such a way that they will figure more favorably. In other words, they have to account for their actions to an audience which has already heard what they have done in a first teller's version. Schiffrin has claimed that, in the context of argument, "stories can be used to support a speaker's claim . . . because they lead the listener towards a sympathetic alignment with the position being argued" (1990:253). We are not dealing with argument as such here, but the issue of alignment seems relevant to the position of speakers involved in producing second, conflicting accounts of first stories. Since the story has already been heard by the studio audience and the courtroom participants, the problem facing the second tellers is to find a way of producing the same story again, but in a version which aligns the audience sympathetically with their position rather than with the position of the first teller. I suggest that the shift into CHP is a discursive resource available to producers of these second stories; it enables them to foreground their level of commitment to their story through a performed present version of past events as they experienced them – their principalship. It also enables them to produce a story where their actions are presented to an audience as justifiable and accountable. Both these actions seem crucial in sympathetically aligning the story recipients (judge, host, studio audience) to the second teller's position, and in producing a version of a story which functions as a rebuttal of the previous speaker's version.

In the extracts discussed so far, all the accounts have been produced by speakers within a relatively short interval, in terms of TV time. Tony's version of "The party" comes straight after Marie's; Jennifer's version of "The phone call" immediately follows Shannon's; and Dave is asked for his version of "The fight" immediately after Nathan and his witness have given their accounts of what they saw. In the next extract, taken from the Montel Williams Show, two versions of a story appear with a much greater interval. Montel is considering the case of three teenage girls who have been thrown out of home by their parents. He invites the girls to tell their stories in the first part of the show; then, after the break, he invites their parents to respond to their children in the second part. The second version of the story below, even after editing, occurs at a much later stage in the proceedings than the first version. Nevertheless, the second teller still briefly switches into CHP, while the first teller does not use it at all. Here is the first account, produced by Angel with some intervention from Montel, of what happened while her parents were away one weekend:

(9) "The Break-In"//1//Montel Williams 8-97.

1	MW:	What did your mother do to you
2	Ang:	.hhh well (.) she kicked me outa the house
3		because she took away my keys (.) n'so I had
4		to break in to get clothes out of my house (.)
5		while they were out of town .hhh =

7 and Dad were outa town (.) you broke in to their
8 house
9 Ang: [huh – wu– xxxxxxxxxxxxx)]
10 MW: [and to get some things and you said well]
11 so now I (already) broke up may as well have a
12 coupla friends over
13 Aud: ((laughter))
14 MW: so the friends came over had a little party (s)
15 Ang: (w)ell no (.) three friends I wou [ldn't call that]=
16 MW: [three friends]
17 Ang: =a party but
18 MW: little beer=
19 Ang: =they they acted like it was a party
20 y[eah]
21 MW: [little beer]
22 Ang: a little beer [yeah]
23 MW: [little] pizza
24 Ang: little pizza [yeah]
25 MW: [what] else did you do
26 Ang: erm nothin' we just watched movies (.) stayed there
27 for a little while (.) pizza man came an' (.)
28 went n' (.) snitched on us for not paying him
29 (.) a dollar that we owed him .hhhh [and–
30 MW: [then they called
31 back up and told your mother that
32 Ang: yeah (.) and she freaked out about it like always
33 (.)'cos (.) s'just how she is I guess she's a little
34 church lady
35 Aud: ((xxxx))
36 MW: and she pitched you outa the house
37 Ang: yeah

Angel's story is to a large extent co-narrated by Montel, who supplies some of the orientation and evaluation. The main events are told by Angel: Her parents had taken away her key, so she broke into the house to get some things (9:2–5); she watched movies with friends, ordered a pizza, and underpaid by a dollar (9:26–29); and finally, her mother found out and *freaked out* (9:32–34). However, she is not given the discursive space to produce her own story in her own words.[3] Montel even produces the coda (9:36): *and she pitched you outa the house.* Angel does produce some evaluative elements, e.g. *three friends I wouldn't call that a party* (9:15), *they acted like it was a party* (9:19), *s'just how she is I guess she's a little church lady* (9:33–34); but she does not switch to CHP at any point in her account of the events which led to her being thrown out of home. Later on in the program, however, her parents give their side of the story (without any intervention on the part of Montel). This is her mother, Karen's, account of what happened:

(10) "The Break-In"//2//Montel Williams 8-97
1 MW: okay but now we're at the point where where (.)
2 she's been thrown out why

3	Kar:		.hhh erm (.) it's been an ongoing problem for
4			the last few months (.) we've had occasion to
5			leave our home (.) and when we leave (.) I don't
6			feel (.) at sixteen seventeen that she should be
7			left on her own because I know she likes to party
8			'n those are things I don't want done in my house
9			.hh an'so we always tell her to find a place
10			she has friends whose parents welcome her to their
11			home (.) and this last weekend when this happened
12			(.) she packed her suitcase (.) I asked her do you
13			have everything you need (.) yes I said I don't want
14			you to come into the house we're locking it (.) stay
15			at your friend's house (.) I won't come in (.) we come
16		→	home from the weekend (.) she's been in the house
17			erm (.) had broken into the house broken a lock
18			between our garage and the kitchen to get into the
19			house (.) er my sister had come in to check on er (.)
20			the animals had found beer in the refrigerator
21			n'this type of thing (.) erm (.) a message on the
22			recorder from the pizza delivery place that they
23			had been– there had been a problem (.) I called there
24			(.) ah the pizza kid had been shorted money
25			he said that somebody in the house had kind'v (.)
26			bullied him (.) er that was his story erm (.) an'
27			we have asked her and asked her not to do this (.)
28			an'it was like it was the final straw what do you
29			do (.) we've talked to her we've we have gone to some
30			counseling I have asked her to go to counseling so
31			we can try to resolve our problems (.) she doesn't
32			want to because she doesn't think she has a problem
33	MW:		you're shaking your head no (.) why

In her account of the weekend's events, Karen uses CHP, predictably, in those sections of the story where she is reporting dialog between herself and her daughter (10:13–15). Then, in 10:15, she shifts into CHP at a key point in the narrative: *we come home from the weekend* which marks the transition between the parents' absence and their return. She continues with one more narrative clause in the present perfect, *she's been in the house*, before switching back into a past verb form *had broken into the house* (10:17). This sequence within Karen's narrative, although brief, again is evidence of a second teller's use of CHP in an alternative, conflicting version of a previously produced, first teller's account.

Conclusion

So far, I have discussed the use of CHP as a consistent and recurring feature in second tellings of stories within the mediated context of public participation TV. I have argued that it occurs particularly where speakers are producing a story for an audience (and in the TV courtroom data also for a judge).

it not just as an alternative version of previously recounted events, but as a version in which their actions are made accountable to the audience. I suggest that CHP is a linguistic resource which can enable speakers to realize levels of principalship and of performedness in these second tellings, which contribute to producing this accountability – and consequently to causing a potential realignment of the audience to the second speaker's version of events and a rebuttal of the first version. Before concluding this analysis, I will turn to two more data extracts, one of which contains an example of conflicting accounts which are realized in a non-narrative format; the other contains a single story with no conflicting version. In neither of these sequences do the participants use CHP, which in my data seems to be a characteristic feature of second, conflicting accounts.

In the following extract, the participants (two male partners) have been talking to Esther Rantzen about the jealousy in their relationship which had led to one of them making a suicide attempt. This is how the first man describes his feelings:

(11) "Suicide"//Esther 8-97

1.	Man1:	erm (1.0) I wanted to kill the other person (.)
2.		I really started to fantasize about killing the
3.		other person (.hh) I wanted to wreck his career
4.		(.hh) erm (.) I wanted to kill my partner (.) I
5.		wanted to kill myself (.) a::nd (.) I started
6.		making some suicide bids (.) II grabbed a knife
7.		and tried to slash my wrists in the kitchen =
8.	Man2:	=((mmm))
9.	Est:	did you know him then
10.	Man2:	yeah (.) this was in my kitchen

Here the man is directing his talk at the studio audience, who are the primary recipients of the story through the mediation of Esther Rantzen. However, a shift in the participation framework of the talk occurs as the sequence progresses, when the second man produces further evidence of his former partner's jealous behavior during a trip to Brighton (line 7):

(12) "Brighton"//Esther 8-97

1.	Est:		so it's the [ultimate revenge]
2.	Man1:		[and it's going to] trash his life
3.	Est:		yeah
4.	Man1:		it's the ultimate revenge
5.	Est:		but you didn't do these things
6.	Man1:		no=
7.	Man2:	→	=no but he done done other things (.) like (.)
8.			with my other partner (.) erm (.) he would then
9.			follow us (.) down to Brighton (.) to see where
10.			[we were going to see what we were doing]
11.	Man1:	→	[I didn't follow you we] we ended
12.			up in the same town I did not follow you =
13.	Man2:		=but your
14.			car was behind us almost *a*ll the w*ay* =
15.	Aud:		=((laughter))

This story is contested by the first man, but not in the form of a second account. In this instance, the conflicting point of view is realized by a direct denial of the preceding version of events (lines 11 and 12 in the transcript below), and more significantly, it is realized within a dispute sequence between the two speakers, who are directly addressing each other rather than the studio audience. The interaction between the two men becomes argumentative, with interruption and overlapping talk (lines 10–11), and with M1 repeating part of his overlapped utterance *I did not follow you.* At lines 13–14, M2 makes a counter-claim – *but your car was behind us almost all the way* – which provokes a response of laughter from the audience. Clearly, the first man's claim that he had just *ended up in the same town* was not a sustainably believable one at this point. So the participation framework here differs from that of the earlier part of the story in two respects. First, instead of referring to each other in the third person, as in ex. 11, they use second person pronouns as they begin to address each other directly (lines 11–14). Second, the talk shifts from the narrative mode of the suicide attempt story to a confrontational dispute between the two men concerned. Although they remain ratified participants in the speech event, in ex. 12 the studio audience is no longer being directly addressed as the primary recipient of a story as it is in ex. 11. The main point here, then, is that CHP seems to be used most typically in this context when a particular configuration of participancy holds: i.e. in the construction of second, conflicting accounts which are addressed to a third party (or parties, in the case of the wider studio audience).

There are many single-version stories told by one teller in my data from these shows which do not contain any instances of CHP. One example, again from "Esther," is the following extract where a participant is giving an account of his jealous reactions when out shopping with his girlfriend. He uses present tense forms in his story, not to recount a specific event, but to recount a typical scenario that occurs whenever they go shopping together (lines 11–14):

(13) "Tesco's"//Esther 8-97

1.	Est:		so it's insecurity is that right Simon =
2.	Sim:		=my biggest
3.			worry (.) in the whole world I think is
4.			losing her (.) I mean (.) we used to go to
5.			Tesco's (.) all the time to do our shopping like
6.			everybody else (.) but now we have to go sort
7.			of just before closing time
8.			[because] there's so much hassle=
9.	Est:		[(so)]
10.	Mar:		=((laughs))
11.	Sim:	→	like y'go I go to the (.) pick some strawberries and
12.			I turn around an' there's s– couple of blokes sort of
13.			going (( )) and I s– suddenly I just wanta (1.0)
14.			ram my trolley into them or=
15.	Aud:		=[((laughter))]
16.	(?):		=[((xxxxxxxx))]
17.	Sim:		or I make I make eye contact and (1.0)
18.	(?)		" "

19. Sim: I try to (.) I mean I (.) I haven't yet (1.0)
20. done anything physical but I have been =
21. Est: = so these
22. aren't people talking to [Amanda these] are people
23. Sim: [no not at all]
24. Est: just looking at [her]
25. Sim: [just] looking
26. Est: over the strawberries =
27. Sim: = just(.) or over
28. anything =[(xxxxxx)]
29. Aud: =[((laughs))]
30. Est: washing powder or anything [and you] cannot bear it
31. Sim: [anything]
32. Est: now [—]

So in the context of these shows, when there is only one version of a story, as in this last example, or when the conflicting version is produced within a different participatory framework, as in ex. 12 above, participants (in my data at least) do not appear to draw on CHP as a discursive resource to construct their narratives.[4]

To conclude, I have analyzed the use of CHP in the context of media narratives, particularly its use by second tellers in versions of events which conflict with previously told stories. I have found instances of speaker shifts into CHP which correspond to both Wolfson and Schiffrin's models of CHP occurrence; but I have argued, in support of Leith's point, that we must focus on the situated, rhetorical function of CHP if we are to determine why speakers use it in specific contexts. In the discursive framework of TV courtroom and talk show – where participants are engaged in producing personal experience narratives in which they have to present their actions to third parties as both believable and accountable, and particularly where these actions have already been presented by a previous participant from a different, often negative, perspective – the use of CHP is a particularly salient feature of their talk. Although not limited to these second, conflicting accounts, CHP is a recurring discursive device routinely used by participants in the data. It enables second tellers to mark their commitment as the principal of their utterances (in Goffman's terms) and not just to tell their version of the events, but to tell it differently and believably, and to work at redressing the way they figure in a story which renders their previously told actions justifiable and accountable.

Notes

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1. One instance where social status may be a factor in a speaker's non-use of CHP is in ex. 9, where the asymmetrical status between talk show host Montel Williams and teenage guest Angel is particularly marked as he participates in the telling and evaluation of her story.

2. The focus of this analysis is specifically on the relationship between tense shifts and speaker footings; although there are undoubtedly other ways in which second accounts differ from preceding ones, I do not have space to discuss those differences here.
3. It is worth noting here that Angel is manipulated into telling this story in part using Montel's version of events rather than her own, resulting in a story which is not singly animated and authored, in Goffman's terms.
4. I am not suggesting here that, in single-version stories in mediated contexts, speakers never switch to CHP; rather, its use is routinely salient in second speakers' versions.

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The Clause as a Locus of Grammar and Interaction

Sandra A. Thompson and Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen

1. Introduction

In this article, we are interested in how the study of language and the study of interaction can mutually inform one another. We focus especially on what the study of interaction can contribute to an understanding of linguistic 'structure', as part of an enterprise that is coming to be known as 'Interactional Linguistics'. But instead of taking 'linguistic structure' for granted, we wish to problematize it, to come closer to an understanding of what the nature of the orderliness that linguists call 'structure' is. We will show that the study of interaction has everything to do with the answer to this question.

At the heart of 'linguistic structure' is what linguists call 'grammar', by which we mean regular patterns at the level of sounds, words, and larger units such as phrases, clauses, and sentences. It is not an exaggeration to observe that many of the findings in Interactional Linguistics have contributed to a radical new understanding of the nature of 'grammar', in large part due to Duranti's Thesis 1 (this special issue), 'the primacy of interaction'. As Schegloff has pointed out (1996b), it is in interactional settings that we can see grammar 'at work', and can thus begin to appreciate what 'grammar' must be understood to be. Three major contributions to a new understanding of grammar have arisen from a focus on grammar at work.

The first contribution is the recognition that the routinized patterns that we call grammar exist because speakers need routinized ways to implement *actions*. In fact, the nature of the actions being implemented has been shown to have much to do with the grammatical shape that turn units take. Drawing on recent scholarship in Conversation Analysis, we find that certain kinds of action

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precipitate certain kinds of grammar. An obvious example would be the fact that certain types of questioning, as Heritage and Roth (1995) have shown, motivate non-interrogative syntax (see also Heritage, 2002; Schegloff, 1996b; Weber, 1993). The actions being implemented by grammar are also eminently *interactional*. This is because they are embedded in sequentially organized courses of action (Schegloff, 1995, 1996a, 1996b). These interactional dimensions can be seen to implicate grammatical choices at more subtle levels as well. For instance, the work of Fox (1986, 1987) has shown that the choice of a full Noun Phrase or a pronoun in English conversation is bound up with the display of the structure of conversational sequences.

A second, related, contribution to come from the analysis of grammar in interaction is the recognition that grammar is knowledge of how to *do* things (Bybee, 2002b) and how to do things *together* (Clark, 1992, 1996) – that is, it is *shared* knowledge in a very literal sense of the word. And since clauses are shaped in contingent situations of interaction, grammar is constantly being shaped and re-shaped, constantly undergoing revision and redesign as it is deployed in everyday talk. The work of Goodwin has shown that grammatical constructions as they emerge in conversation are sensitive on a moment-to-moment basis to aspects of verbal and non-verbal *recipiency* (Goodwin, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1989, 1995). Grammar thus cannot be a wholly fixed property of individual human brains. Instead it must be thought of as *socially distributed* (Fox, 1994; Ochs et al., 1996; Schegloff, 1991), *emergent* (Helasvuo, 2001a, 2001b; Hopper, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1998), *responsive to contingency* (Ford, 2004), and thoroughly *temporal* (Goodwin, 2002; Hopper, 1992). Duranti's Thesis 3 notes the problematic relation of our enterprise to established disciplines. We might add in this respect that there are numerous researchers working in the field of linguistics who do not yet embrace this emergent view of grammar.

A third contribution of analyses of interaction to our understanding of grammar is the recognition that if linguistics is to provide an account of the way people really use language, then its perspective on the nature of grammar must be both interactionally sensible and cognitively realistic. Duranti's Thesis 5, referring to 'units of analysis', brings us to the concept of *formats*, or *schemas*, as a valuable notion for the study of language in interaction. We've been struck by how strongly studies of conversational data support the position that speakers draw not only on lexical material, but also on formats which they use recurrently. These formats can be found at all levels of language organization: phonological, morphological, and syntactic. For example, one regular phonological format can be related to the generalization that English syllables often begin with the combination of sounds *sl-*, as in *slip, slide, sleep*, etc., or *sn-*, as in *snake, snap, snicker*, etc. With *b*, on the other hand, although words beginning with *bl-* are common, as in *black and blue*, there are no words beginning with *bn*. Phonological, morphological, and syntactic formats are widely studied within linguistics. It is these formats which are seen in an interactional linguistic perspective as resources or tools for contingently building turns at talk and implementing actions (see Ford, 2004, for valuable discussion).

Edelman (1992) suggests that the human brain is exquisitely adapted to re-

for solving everyday problems. With frequent repetition, as synapses become strengthened, these routines become crystallized as habits, what we call 'formats'. Grammar can thus most fruitfully be seen as *procedural* knowledge (Bybee, 2002b), as a collection of *crystallizations of linguistic routines* (Bybee, 2001a, 2001b, 2002a, 2002b; Bybee et al., 1994; Haiman, 1994, 1998; Hopper, 1987, 1988, 1998). In other words, grammar is best understood as what has been ritualized from interactions, as a very loosely organized set of richly and complexly categorized memories people have of how they and fellow speakers have resolved recurrent communicative problems. Once again, what is fascinating about these grammatical formats is the ways in which they are tied to certain types of social actions and specific sequential contexts.

When we talk about language in interaction, then, we are not so concerned with staking out a new 'subdiscipline' as we are with discovering the nature of grammar seen as social action and interaction. We are interested in learning more about *grammatical formats as interactional practices*,[1] as sedimented ways of resolving recurrent communicative problems. Being linguists, we are also concerned to investigate interactional grammar in as wide a variety of languages as possible. This is because we observe that the set of tools each language offers its speakers is different. Consequently, we find ourselves asking how the same communicative problems, assuming these to be more or less universal, shape different types of grammatical solutions. We ask this not only because we are curious (we are this too!), but also because we wish to explore and understand how grammar is *shaped* by interaction. How much variability is possible? What are the limits of variability? Conversely, we find ourselves asking to what extent the different grammars we observe in the languages of the world themselves shape interactional practices. Here too the ultimate question for students of language in interaction is, How is interaction shaped by grammar?

That is, taking a cue from Levinson (this special issue), we might liken the relationship between grammar and interaction to the reflexive relationship between kinship systems and interaction. Both grammatical systems and kinship systems are inherently contested and 'fuzzy'; both systems arise from interaction. But then they come to have an emergent, if loose, structure of their own which can in turn influence the way interactions crystallize into recurrent patterns. In the case of talk-in-interaction, this means that, for example, different patterns of turn and sequence organization, repair, overlap behavior, and turn extension emerge in different languages partly due to the systematic grammatical regularities in each language (DuBois, 1987, 2001; Hopper, 1987, 1988, 1998).

We would like to illustrate some of these points now by showing how they bear upon one kind of linguistic 'structure' found in interaction, the clause, using data from our own and others' research.

2. Interaction and the 'Clause'[2]

Perhaps the most central task facing people talking together is that of figuring out what actions the utterances of others are implementing. This question is crucially

dependent upon what counts as an utterance. Based on a lifetime of experience with a language, speakers come to be able to project the trajectory of an utterance in progress, what it will take for that utterance to come to completion (Goodwin, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1986, 1989, 1995), and thereby to project what action is being implemented by that utterance in the given context. One of the primary findings of studies of language in interaction is that *grammar* plays a major role, arguably *the* major role, in enabling this projection.[3]

Now, as Sacks et al. (1974) have pointed out, places where speakers routinely behave as though another's turn has ended are precisely 'the possible completion points of sentences, clauses, phrases, and one-word constructions' (p. 721).[4] That is, it turns out that no matter what language we look at, the stretches of talk which are routinely projected and treated as *complete* in talk-in-interaction are *grammatical formats*. And we observe that one of the most frequent types of grammatical format regularly taken to be complete in the languages we have looked at is a format consisting of particular predicates (in English these are verb complexes) and the phrases that 'go with' it. Linguists will recognize this unit of [predicate + phrases that accompany it] as the 'clause'. With Schegloff (1996a, 2001b (see note 1)), then, we are claiming that the favorite unit of linguists, the *clause*, is a unit of interaction, but, following Helasvuo (2001a, 2001b, [2003]), we wish to go one step further and claim that the clause is in fact the *locus* of interaction in everyday conversation.[5] In fact, no matter what language we consider, the clause is one of the most frequent formats which speakers orient to in projecting what actions are being done by the utterance of others, and in acting on these projections (Auer, 1992, forthcoming). So the clause can be thought of as a crystallization of solutions to the interactional problem of signaling and recognizing social actions.

Why and how does the clause represent a solution to this problem? We suggest that the answer may be that the *predicate*, the sine qua non of clause formats, is the element that enables recipients to know what social action is being carried out by a given utterance in a given sequential context. This means that the clause is precisely that unit which permits significant projectability. (Tanaka (1999) persuasively makes this argument for Japanese; we are extending her argument to suggest that the clause is a locus of significant projectability for all languages.) Indeed, what characterizes clause-size formats is the fact that their key element is a predicate. Knowing how to anticipate where a predicate is likely to occur, and sometimes even what the nature of that predicate is likely to be, is what allows for more or less predictable trajectories. Orienting to predicates, would be next speakers can monitor the course of an utterance in progress for its projectable completion and thus be in a position to recognize the social action it is implementing. *The clause, then, with its crucial predicate, appears to be a unit which facilitates the monitoring of talk for social actions.*[6]

Interestingly, however, the way in which clauses afford grammatical projectability varies significantly from language to language. In this article, we will only focus on English and Japanese, but we hope that our treatment of these two typologically different languages will suggest directions for future research with interactional data from many other languages.

2.1 The Clause in English

To take English as a first example (as Clark and colleagues (http://www-psych.stanford.edu/~herb/), Ford and Thompson, 1996, Helasvuo, 2001a, 2001b, and Ono and Thompson, 1995, 1996, have shown), conversational data are rich with evidence that speakers organize their interactions around the completion of clause formats. These formats tend to be alike: a 'subject' noun phrase ('NP') – most typically a pronoun (Du Bois, 1987, 2001; Givón, personal communication: Scheibman, 2002) – is followed by a verb complex and possibly other items that strongly tend to occur with that verb complex, such as an 'object' noun phrase, a prepositional phrase, adverb, or adverb phrase.

The extract in (1) illustrates common clause-size formats for English. Here Alice is complaining about how hard it is for her and her husband Ron to live with another couple. We include the entire sequence for discussion purposes, but lines 12–15 constitute the part we're interested in at the moment:

(1) A Tree's Life (59.02)[7]

[Transcription follows the conventions of Du Bois et al. (1993); see the Appendix for a summary. Each line represents an intonation unit.]

1		ALICE:	... god I still can't believe Tim bitching around and,
2			.. he lied too.
3			... he said that he talked to Ron,
4			and all this other shit?
5		MARY:	about what.
6		ALICE:	... about % ... the way ... they were feeling,
7			... of them being the only ones cleaning the **house**,
8			and all this other shit?
9			... (H) I mean what they don't realize,
10			is like,
11			... shit,
			Subj. NP / Verb (complex) / Prep. Phrase
12	→		when Ron / gets home / from wor=k,
			Subj. NP / Verb (complex) / Prep. Phrase
13	→		... I / wanna spend time / with Ro=n,
			Subj. NP
14	→		because Ron,
			Verb (complex) / Prep. Phrase
15	→		... usually doesn't get home till / (@)nine or ten.
16		MARY:	...yeah.
17		ALICE:	unlike Tim,
18			he has to w=ork,
19			for every little dime that he makes.
20			...You know?
21		MARY:	.. [Yeah=].

22 ALICE: [He doesn't] get any breaks.
23 MARY: ...Yeah%,
24 ...Tim is on salary=,
25 and he can take lea=ve,
26 and,
27 ALICE: Mhm,
28 ... and [he earns] lea=ve,
29 MARY: [he's] –
30 ALICE: ... he gets sick leave,
31 ... we don't get shit.
32 MARY: ... (TSK) I don't know.
33 ... (H) ... It is really hard living with another couple.

We note that most of the turn components in this extract are clause formats. But if we focus our attention just on the part of Alice's complaint in lines 12–15, we can see that this is a *compound* turn format, whose components are clauses, consisting of the Subject NP, then the verb complex, and then the NPs and prepositional phrases that go with it. The clause in line 13 is a potential turn unit in itself, but it is latched prosodically to the clause in lines 14–15, which provides a potential final component for this turn-in-progress, and indeed, by the time it ends, the complaint it is carrying is treated by both Alice and Mary as finished. Mary registers Alice's complaint with a minimal acknowledgement in line 16,[8] prompting Alice to extend her complaint in subsequent talk (which she does by adding further clauses). Our point here is to demonstrate the salient role that the clause format plays in turn design, and to observe that English clause formats have the characteristic shape shown in lines 12–15. This means that when an English speaker hears an NP near the beginning of a turn unit, s/he can predict that a verb complex is likely to follow, and upon hearing that verb complex, can narrow down the range of types of linguistic elements that it would take to complete the clause in context and thus to bring the turn unit to a point of possible completion.[9]

As this extract shows, in clausal English formats the predicate tends to occur relatively early, with NPs and other elements that it projects following it. It is based on this kind of recurrent orderliness that Schegloff (1987, 1996b) has proposed that the *beginning of the turn* in English is a key locus for projectability, and later research has confirmed this. In other words, we could say that the recurrently regular syntactic resources deployed by speakers of English tend to permit *early projection* of turn trajectories.

In addition to clause-size patterns, we also find recurrent types of words and phrases, which play a crucial role in projectability in English. Prosodic patterns combine with these lexical, phrasal and syntactic patterns to allow predictions about probable trajectories.[10]

2.2 The Clause in Japanese

When we turn to other languages, what we find is the same principle of projectability, but which may play itself out in formats revealing a quite different clausal

organization. In Japanese, for instance, we find the clause, understood as [predicate + phrases that accompany it], playing a major role in speakers' ability to project what the turn is doing, but the clause is built according to different principles.

The work of Fox et al. (1996), Hayashi (1999, 2001, 2003, 2004) and Tanaka (1999, 2000, 2001a) shows that Japanese speakers recurrently design turns such that NPs and adverbial elements – should they occur – are found *before* the predicate. In addition many referents are inferred rather than explicitly mentioned. So in Japanese there is little indication of where the clause is going until the predicate occurs. Instead, the turn unit is built up bit by bit in an incremental fashion, resulting in what these researchers have called, in contrast to English, '*delayed (or late) projectability*'.

On the other hand, Japanese has a set of *utterance-final elements*, particles and other morphemes, which are crucial for the interpretation of the epistemic/evaluative stance the speaker is taking towards the material, and which follow the predicate. Together with the predicate, these utterance-final elements mark the turn as complete and ready for speaker transition.[11] Turn completion in Japanese thus overwhelmingly coincides with grammatical, typically clausal, completion, that is the predicate together with the optional utterance-final elements (see Matsumoto, 1995, and Tanaka, 1999, for quantitative support).

As a representative example, let's consider extract (2) from Tanaka (1999: 40) (transcription as in original, where = = indicates latching of two turns with no intervening pause):

(2) (Telephone conversation)

1	→	Y:	>Getsuyoobi ni wa ikeru to omou – n n da yo=
			Monday P TOP can go QUOT ***think*** *– NZR COP FP*
			'((I)) **think** ((I)) can go on Monday'
2			=kokontokoro chotto sa [dearuiteta [mon de sa:-
			these days little bit FP going out VN since FP
			'but since ((I))'ve been running around a bit these days'
3		K:	['N ['N
			'Yeah'
4		Y:	nakanaka [yorenakute<]
			rather can't stop by
			'It's been rather difficult to stop by'
5		K:	[Warui ne]
			bad FP
			'Sorry for the trouble'
6		Y:	Uun
			'Not at all'

Focusing on line 1 of this example, Tanaka points out that the unit begins with a phrase *getsuyobi ni*' 'on Monday' marked by a topic marker (TOP), often found with expressions of time or location or other frame-setting expressions; next

comes the predicate *ikeru* 'can go' followed by a quotative marker *to* (QUOT), which tags the material preceding it as reported talk or thought. That is, the quotative marker *to,* in tagging the preceding material as a quote, projects a verb of saying or thinking to follow. Finally, in the event, comes the main predicate *omou* 'think'. The last three morphemes are particles which form a phrase with *omou* 'think', and can be considered together with it as indicating an epistemic or evaluative stance toward the earlier material, namely that the speaker is expressing a willingness to run the errand in question on Monday and is reassuring her interlocutor about this. As Tanaka notes (1999: 106–7), the positioning of *omou* 'think', together with its particles, reveals that the point at which the action of this turn, namely the display of a stance, is accomplished comes relatively late.[12] Compare this with the English translation where *think* comes early in the clausal unit.

This difference in the clausal grammar of these two speech communities has strong implications for other aspects of social interaction. Whereas English grammar typically allows early projection of the social action that might be being done by that turn, the grammatical organization of Japanese means that full import of the social action being 'carried' by that turn may not be projected or known until later in that turn. So we might expect to find interactional patterns or practices in these two speech communities reflecting this difference in projectability, and indeed, this is what we do find. As we shall show below, next-turn onset, co-construction, and turn-unit extension – to mention only three interactional phenomena – all are realized differently in Japanese as opposed to English.

3. Interactional Evidence for the Clause as a Locus of Interaction

So far we have claimed that the clause, understood as [predicate + phrases that accompany it], underlies recurrent practices in talk-in-interaction, but that these practices differ in ways that reflect the differences in clause grammar from one language to another. Our evidence for this claim comes from three practices which reveal speakers' *orientation* towards the clause. In other words, we aim to show that speakers regularly behave in certain ways that suggest they are orienting to turn gestalts that have clausal organization.

3.1 Next-Turn Onset

Strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that the clause is an interactionally relevant unit comes from the way would-be next speakers position legitimate incomings with respect to the turn underway. We find that orderly next-position incomings are routinely placed *at the completion* of a clause rather than anywhere *before* its completion.[13] This observation holds across the two typologically unrelated languages we are considering here, although what counts as a possibly complete clause in each case varies significantly. To see what this means for English, for instance, let us return to example (1) from above:

(1) A Tree's Life (59.02)

9		ALICE:	... (H) I mean what they don't realize,
10			is like,
11			... shit,
12	→		when Ron gets home from wor:k,
13	→		... I wanna spend time with Ro:n,
14	→		because Ron,
15	→		... usually doesn't get home till (@)nine or ten.
16		MARY:	... yeah:.

We observe that Mary's response (line 16) to Alice's complaint in lines 9–15 is positioned at the end of the clause *Ron, ... usually doesn't get home till nine or ten.* It is not positioned after *Ron* (line 14), although Alice's pause in line 15 might have provided Mary with an opportunity to come in. This, we suggest, can be related to the fact that on the occurrence of *Ron* the clausal unit is not yet complete. (The argument here is not that at the completion of every clause there will be a speaker transition, but only that when speaker transition does occur, it will routinely be placed respecting a clause boundary.) In order for the unit begun in line 14 to become possibly complete and therefore enable the listener to discern the social action it is performing, a predicate – and in the context of the predicate chosen for this situation, some further specification of that predicate – is due. Once the expected items have been produced, the complaint Alice is adumbrating becomes clear, and a next-turn response to it can, and does, legitimately set in.

In Japanese, on the other hand, as we have noted, clauses are organized rather differently, not only because their elements are positioned such that their main predicate comes late rather than early in the unit, but also because referents associated with the predicate – e.g. subjects and objects – can remain unexpressed. The following example demonstrates this:

(3) Tanaka (1999: 114) (unexpressed elements have been placed in double parentheses in the English gloss)

K and Y have been talking about some strawberry jam that K had previously made for Y.

1	→	K:	>tabeta?<=
			eat-Past
			'Did ((you)) eat ((it))?
2	→	Y:	=>tabeta<
			eat-Past
			'((I/we)) ate ((it))'
3	→		oishikatta yo=
			delicious-Past FP
			'((It)) was delicious'
4		K:	=Honto
			'Really?'

Following Tanaka, we notice here that following K's production in line 1 of the simple predicate *tabeta*, the past tense form of the verb 'eat' in Japanese, the floor shifts smoothly to Y. Although the action of eating clearly has an eater and something that is eaten, these entities do not need to be expressed in order for the unit to reach possible completion. Similarly, in line 3, it is sufficient for Y to say *oishikatta* 'was delicious'; she does not say what was delicious, and indeed, for many speakers, this would be the only natural expression in this context.[14] Her unit is therefore possibly complete once the predicate has been produced,[15] and K's response in line 4 is positioned accordingly. In other words, the next speaker (both Y in line 2 and K in line 4) waits for the predicate before responding but does not wait for further constituents to be produced: next-turn responses come *no sooner than* but also *no later than* the (final) predicate.

A comparison of the English and Japanese examples reveals that in each case next speakers are orienting to the clause, but that what contributes to a possible clausal format differs from language to language. A clause in both languages requires some kind of predicate, but whereas with certain English predicates speakers also expect certain arguments to be expressed (as a rule the subject before, and all other arguments after, the predicate), Japanese speakers do not necessarily expect clausal referents to be made explicit.[16] In both cases, however, speakers' orderly placement of next turns shows that they are orienting to possible *clausal* completion *in the current turn.*

This observation holds true even for those cases in which a current speaker goes on to append material after a point of possible clausal completion:[17] would-be next speakers routinely orient to the potential clause boundary by coming in at this point, although they may inadvertently find themselves in overlap with the current speaker. As Jefferson (1973) and others have pointed out, elements positioned *post*-possible completion are more vulnerable to overlap than, say, elements positioned *pre*-possible completion. And this appears to be a robust finding regardless of language. But once again the *type* of element which routinely gets post-positioned varies considerably from language to language. For English, for instance, Sacks et al. (1974) and Schegloff (1996b) have pointed to the prevalence of tag questions, address terms, politeness markers and the like in this position. Ford et al. (2002) point out that English increments typically involve adverbial constituents. We note that all of these elements – although they can in principle be placed within the clause – are more typically positioned at its edges. This reflects the fact that they are external to the clausal format. And they are frequently overlapped by an incoming next speaker. Here is an example from our data collection:

(4) Carsales 5 (Ono and Thompson, 1995: 248)

1 G: .. (H) the only thing you can do is be the best you can.
2 .. [right]?
3 D: [but definitely].

In this example, G comes to a point of possible completion at the end of his clause in line 1. It is just at this point that D concurs with *but definitely*, but inadvertently,

D's turn unit overlaps with the tag *right* (as shown by the brackets), which G has just appended at the same time to his possibly complete clause in line 1. Yet D's turn is exquisitely 'well-placed' in the sense that it comes just at the end of a clausal format with prosody suggesting completion of a turn. This is reflected in the fact that none of the characteristic speech perturbations found to accompany violative incomings are present here (French and Local, 1983; Schegloff, 1987).[18]

Japanese speakers are also observed to position elements after a clause which is potentially complete, i.e. after the production of a final predicate and optionally one or more utterance-final elements. However, the post-positioned elements typically instantiate syntactic constituent types which are rather different from those found in this position in English: according to Iwasaki and Ono (2001), they may be not only adverbials as in English, but also subjects and objects. Even though these post-positioned elements are not always set off by a prosodic break from the possibly complete clause itself, strikingly, next speakers regularly position their incoming with respect to the clause boundary – and not with respect to the post-positioned elements (Hayashi, 2003; Tanaka, 1999). Here is an example which illustrates this:[19]

(5) Tanaka (1999: 117f.) (orthography slightly modified)

(H is talking about a wedding reception he went to, which was attended by many people of high social standing, where he felt totally out of place)

1		H:	=hijooni:: (.) uitotta n desu kedo *extremely stood out N COP CONJ* '((I)) really stood out'
2	→		[watashi tte..hh e(h)e.hh *I ADVP* 'as for me .hh e(h)e .hh'
3	→	I:	[iya sonna koto nai n chau? *no such thing not N different* 'No, that couldn't be, could it?'

H's turn unit comes to a point of possible completion with the predicate *uitotta*, the past form of the verb 'stand out', and several utterance-final elements (line 1). Although H goes on to produce further post-positioned constituents *watashi tte* (line 2), in this case a previously unexpressed subject plus an adverbial particle, his interlocutor orients to the possible clausal completion at the end of line 1 by positioning a response immediately thereafter (line 3). Speaker I's incoming turn and speaker H's post-positioned constituents consequently end up being in overlap.

In sum, we have tried to make two points in this section. First, the positioning of legitimate incomings by next speakers in both English and Japanese shows an orientation to the clause as a possible turn constructional unit. Second, what counts as a possibly complete clause is significantly different in the two languages – and speakers' behavior in each language reflects these typologically different grammatical formats. Clausal formats in English require certain accompanying referents (such as subjects and objects) to be expressed: clauses in Japanese typically do not. Next speakers in both languages make legitimate incomings

when the *clausal exigencies* in each case have been met. We have focused on a single speaker's production of a minimally complete clausal unit in this section. In the following sections we turn to the joint production of (minimal) clausal units and to the extension of clausal turn units in the two languages.

3.2 Joint Utterance Completion

Another primary piece of evidence for viewing the clause as a locus of interaction comes from the well-known ability of participants to collaborate in completing the turns of others (Ford et al., 2003; Hayashi, 1999, 2001, 2003; Hayashi and Mori, 1998; Helasvuo, 2001b; Lerner, 1991, 1996, 2004; Lerner and Takagi, 1999; Mondada, 1998; Morita, 2002; Ono and Thompson, 1995; Szatrowski, 2002a, 2002b). From the examples and discussion of these authors, it is clear that speakers are strongly clause-oriented in jointly constructing utterances. That is, what second speakers tend to add to a first speaker's contribution is either (1) the second clausal component of a multi-clausal unit or (2) the last word or two of a mono-clausal unit. To be able to do this, speakers must rely on their knowledge of clausal formats (as derived from their extensive experience).

Extract (6) illustrates the collaborative construction of what Lerner calls a 'compound TCU format', consisting of a 'preliminary component' and a 'secondary component':

(6) Lerner (1991: 445) [here (.) indicates a very short pause]

1	→	R:	if you don't put things on yer calendar [preliminary component]
2			(.)
3	⇒	D:	yer outta luck. [secondary component]

Extract (7) illustrates so-called 'terminal item completion':

(7) (Garrison Keillor, DAT 012)

1		S:	and he said the only thing worse
2			than second hand smug-
3			God!
4			second hand smoke is (.)
5			<moral smugness>
6		J:	hah hah hah
7	→	S:	which is again really
8	⇒	J:	accurate
9		S:	yeah

We note that the grammatical formats which permit both kinds of joint turn production are profoundly clausal in nature:

(8)

	SubjNP	Verb complex	NP	Prep. Phrase
[clause 1]	if you	don't put	things	on yer calendar
	SubjNP	Verb complex		
[clause 2]	yer	outta luck.		

and

(9		SubjNP	Verb Complex
	[clause]	which	is again really accurate

In Japanese we also find speakers jointly producing a turn-at-talk, but as Hayashi (2003) shows, co-construction in this language is typically 'delayed'. If a compound TCU is in the process of emerging, a Japanese co-participant may supply the secondary component, but typically only following a noticeable pause and often accompanied by an acknowledgement token:

(10) Hayashi (2003: 83):

9	→	Kanji:	.hh anmari komakai chekku made shi[tetara: *too much detailed check even do:if* ".hh if ((they)) check in too much detail,"
10	⇒	Muneo:	[( )
11	⇒	Muneo:	u : : :n. "Uh huh."
12		Yurie:	[u : : : : :n. "Uh huh."
13		Kanji:	[nanka : : : "'like,"
14	⇒	Muneo:	gisugisu shi[chau shi ne.] *stiff do and FP* "((the relationship among the employees)) will become awkward, right?"
15		Kanji:	[u : : : : : : : : :n.] "Yeah"

In line 9 of this example, Kanji produces the first part of a conditional sentence format *anmari komakai chekku made shitetara*: 'if they check in too much detail', a 'preliminary component' of a 'compound TCU format' in Lerner's terms. Muneo provides minimal acknowledgements in lines 10 and 11 before proceeding to co-construct the format by providing a secondary component in line 14. This pattern stands in marked contrast to English co-constructions, where it has been remarked that speaker transitions in joint turn construction are, as a rule, seamless (Falk, 1980; Szczepek, 2003).

Much more frequently, however, Japanese co-participants who co-construct another's turn supply only the terminal element of an emerging mono-clausal unit:

(11) Hayashi (1999: 479):

1	H:	asoko o:: (0.2) tetetetto orite[itta]ra shoomen ni:.= *there O [mimetic] go.down:if front in* "If you go down there, in front of you,"
2	K:	[u:n] "Uh huh."

3		K:	=u:n. "Uh huh."
4		H:	denwa ga- ano mi[dori] no denwa ga:[:] *phone SB uhm green LK phone SB* "Phones, uhm, green phones"
5	→	K:	[aru] [a]ru aru *exist exist exist* "are there." "are there, are there."

In line 4, H says 'phones, uhm, green phones'. In line 5, K then produces a predicate (the verb *aru*) that grammatically completes the emerging clause and turn.

Thus, as Hayashi argues, although speakers of both languages engage in the joint production of clausally formatted turns, Japanese co-productions are 'delayed' in comparison to English ones, because secondary components of compound TCUs are regularly produced only after a pause and optionally after a continuer, and because terminal-item co-construction of monoclausal units typically involves only the terminal item, which is generally the predicate (Hayashi, 2003). Arguably 'delayed' co-construction in Japanese can be traced back to the 'delayed projectability' of its grammatical formats: it is simply not apparent until late in the turn what it will take for a clausal format underway to be complete.[20]

What these examples show, then, is that the grammar of a language constrains the types of formats available to speakers for resolving communicative and interactional problems. The recurrent patterns revealed by the data in co-construction reflect the kinds of grammatical formats available for speakers, and, as we have seen, these grammatical formats vary in terms of whether they facilitate early or late projection.

3.3 Turn Unit Extension

As a final piece of evidence for the interactional and cognitive relevance of the clause, we would like to consider the phenomenon of 'incrementing' or TCU continuation (Auer, 1996; Ford et al., 2002; Goodwin, 1981; Schegloff, 1996a, 2001a). What our cross-linguistic research is showing is that although all speakers, regardless of language, on occasion need to continue a possibly complete turn by extending it, the recurrent grammatical strategies they use to do so differ from one language to another. The way speakers do turn unit extension in all languages, however, tends to involve an orientation to clausal formats.[21]

Following Schegloff (1996a), we will define turn unit extension as syntactically dependent material placed after the possible end of a turn-constructional unit.[22]

In English, turn unit extensions or 'increments' strongly tend to involve a piece of language that has the structure of a recurrent phrase (or clause) in the language, and which in other contexts may appear in final position *within a single turn unit.*

Consider, for example, the increment in (12), which ensues when the speaker Guy asks a question in the service of a request, but does not get an immediate reply:

(12) Nbi-1[23]

1		Guy:	W'why don'I: uh (0.6) I'll call uh (.)
2			Have you got(.) uh: Seacliffs phone number?h
3			(1.1)
4	→	Guy:	by any chance?
5			(0.3)
6		Jon:	Yeeah?

The unit *by any chance* in line 4 is not produced here as part of the turn unit *Have you got Seacliff's phone number?* in line 2. Instead, once the longish pause of more than a second has made it clear that no answer is immediately forthcoming, it is 'tacked on' to the prior unit, perhaps to modulate the relative abruptness of the requesting action it was implementing (that is, relative to the offering action of line 1). This 'increment' provides another point of possible completion, which Jon, the next speaker, utilizes for his reply. We note that the expression *by any chance* is a recurrent phrase of English and one which appears within a single *clausal* turn unit in precisely this position on other occasions, as is shown by the extract in (13):

(13) Nbi-1

1	Guy:	Is Cliff dow:n by any chance?
2		=diyuh know?

In other languages, however, this kind of turn unit extension is much less common, if not unknown. In Japanese, for example, grammatical formats in which such phrases typically occur at the ends of clauses are rare.[24] Recall that in Japanese, clausal turn units are built up with adverbials and predicate-accompanying NPs occurring *early* and the predicate occurring *late.* In addition, as we have noted, the referents in a Japanese clause are regularly unexpressed (see example (3) earlier).

Given the fact that referents are generally not mentioned, it is not surprising that a frequent strategy for extending a turn unit in Japanese is to 'fill in' a Noun Phrase which could have appeared early but didn't. Example (14) is taken from our data (Couper-Kuhlen and Ono, forthcoming), *Akichan* being a female given name:

(14) Ryokoo 6

1		R:	soshitara @ oo- asoko$_i$ ikanakatta – n da tte.
			then Au- there go:not:PAST NZR COP I.hear
			'I hear (she) didn't go (to) Au- there then'
2	→	R:	**[oosutora]ria$_i$ akichan**
			Australia
			'Australia' 'Aki'
3		H:	[doko e]?
			where to
			'to where?'

In this example, speaker R constructs a clausal turn unit in line 1 which can be taken as grammatically, prosodically, and interactionally complete, although it does not specify who is not going, nor where they are not going. Speaker R, however, perhaps intimating a problem – and in overlap with H's initiation of repair (line 3) – continues his turn in line 2, 'filling in' the unexpressed referents in line 2. We note that these noun phrases are not marked for finality by the typical 'finality-marking' final particles (Tanaka, 1999): in fact, they would not be found in this position in single clausal turn units on other occasions. *Oosutoraria* 'Australia' specifies *asoko* 'there' in line 1, *Akichan* would be located where the @ symbol occurs in line 1. Both elements would *precede* the verb *ikanakattan* 'did not go' and the other utterance-final elements.[25]

In (14), then, the current speaker comes to a point of possible turn completion, ending with a typical set of utterance-final elements, and then goes on to add an extension. But in Japanese, unlike the typical situation in English, this extension is *not* an element that would be found in final position in a single clausal turn unit, because speakers would not have heard such an element in this position in a single turn unit. Rather it is a non-final element that was unspecified in the preceding turn unit. So, this (Japanese) way of using grammatical strategies as a resource for turn-unit extension is radically different from the way in which speakers of English typically do 'adding on'.[26] And we are suggesting that this difference has everything to do with the clausal formats that experience has shown have been the most successful in their respective communities. The differing strategies for turn unit extension reflect the differing way in which clausal turn units are built up in these respective languages. At the same time they underline the tight relationship between the available grammatical resources in a language and the regular responses to interactional demands that speakers find themselves making day in and day out.

4. Conclusion

In this article we hope to have shown what happens when we look at grammar as action and interaction. We find that grammar must be thought of as distributed and emergent, and that its units of analysis are *formats* – patterns or templates – which can be thought of as crystallizations of common solutions to communicative problems and interactional tasks.

We have singled out the most prominent of these format types – the clause – and have shown how it saliently serves as a resource for constructing turns at talk and for projecting possible completion. At the same time, by examining English and a typologically quite different language, Japanese, we have shown that exactly *how* the clause affords projectability is different from language to language. In fact, the type of projectability depends crucially on the nature of clausal grammatical formats which are available as resources: in some languages these allow early projection in the turn unit, in others they do not.

Variable projectability in the clause has repercussions on interactional practices. We have examined three situations where there is a noticeable difference:

next-turn onsets, co-construction, and turn-unit extension. In each case we have seen that the practices used are precisely the ones which clausal grammatical formats in the given language 'license' (to use a stylish word). In other words, addressing Duranti's Thesis 6, the need for explicit evaluative principles, our research shows that the (variably projecting) clausal formats are precisely the ones we find speakers operating with. This evidence suggests to us that *clauses* are interactionally warranted units.

Our more general point here is that conversational data give us valuable evidence that it not only makes sense to talk about grammar, or linguistic 'structure', but that understanding this structure must come from studying the regularities in the practices engaged in by people talking to each other. Another way to put it is that a model of linguistic 'structure' must be no more and no less than a model of the way *often-used formats* are acquired, stored, processed, and used as resources by speakers in the everyday business of communicating. What scholars of language in interaction are trying to do is to understand what kinds of formats speakers are operating with and the ways in which these formats work in everyday interactions.

Appendix 1: Transcription Conventions

.	final intonation unit
,	continuing intonation unit
?	appeal intonation unit
–	truncated intonation unit
.. or (.)	short pause
...	medium length pause
(x.x)	pause of x.x seconds
%	glottal catch
(H) or .hh	inhalation
=	lengthening (except where indicated)
[ ]	speech overlap
(TSK)	alveolar click
@ /hh/heh	laughter
><	faster rate
underlining	extra amplitude or intensity

Appendix 2: Glossing Conventions

ADVP	adverbial particle
FP	final particle
LK	linking morpheme
N	nominalizer
O	object marker
P	particle
QUOT	quotative particle

SB subject marker
VN verb nominalizer

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Notes

1. We are indebted to Schegloff for pointing out (e.g. 1996a, 2001b) that grammatical units must be understood to have emerged from the exigencies of talk-in-interaction: 'units such as the clause, sentence, turn, utterance, ... *all* are in principle *interactional* units' (emphasis original) (2001b: 235).
2. For us, and for most other empirical linguists working from usage data, 'clause' is understood as [predicate + phrases that accompany it], while 'sentence' is a term reserved for a unit that can consist of either a clause or a combination of clauses.
3. This article is thus a further effort in a series of interactional linguistic articles responding to the challenge launched by Sacks et al. (1974) when they wrote 'How projection of unit-types is accomplished ... is an important question on which linguists can make major contributions' (p. 703: n. 12). See also Auer (1996), Ford and Thompson (1996), Hayashi (1999, 2003, 2004), Kim (1999), Selting (1996, 2000), Steensig (2001), and Tanaka (1999, 2000, 2001a, 2001b).
4. This quote reflects the distinction we drew in note 2 between 'clause' and 'sentence': we observe, however, that this distinction is sometimes not made by other researchers in the analysis of conversation.
5. Helasvuo (2001a, 2001b) focuses on the 'clause core' (that is, the predicate and its 'core' arguments) as especially important for interaction in both Finnish and English, and we agree that there are ways in which the clause core functions significantly in interaction. However, since we are interested in projectability here, we will consider many aspects of clause organization, in addition to the 'core'/'non-core' distinction, which allow speakers to project turn gestalts.
6. It is well known that many turn units and turns do not consist of clauses in themselves. However, it is striking that most of these are constructed *with reference to* a nearby verb or predicate. A simple example would be a question–answer pair in which the answer is not itself a clause, but is understood with reference to a prior clause, as in this sequence from our materials:

   (i) Melissa: (H) what day is tomorrow?
   Brett: ... the twenty-ninth.

   Here, the turn which carries out the social action of responding to the question consists, obviously, of a Noun Phrase (NP), which constitutes the answer precisely because it is construed with reference to the immediately preceding clause, canonically constructed according to the English grammatical format involving a subject NP and a predicate nominal. We won't be able to pursue this any further here; we simply note that the prevalence of this type of turn strengthens our claim of the centrality of the 'clause' as an interactional unit.

7. Most of our English examples come from the Corpus of Spoken American English, Part I (Du Bois, 2000); for transcription conventions, see Appendix 1 and Du Bois et al. (1993).
8. If Alice's turn is a complaint about a non-present third party, it should make some co-complaining or expression of congruent affect on the part of her interlocutor relevant next (Günthner, 2000). What Mary does in line 16 is hardly this, however, which may be what prompts Alice to specify a further aspect of the situation which she finds complainable.
9. Once this clausal and actional projection has been made, the speaker need not wait until the actual unit end has been reached, but may opt to come in immediately, thus producing recognitional overlap with the ongoing (but predictable) completion of the unit (Goodwin and Goodwin, 1987, 1992; Jefferson, 1973). We return to this point below.
10. We note, however, that the prosodic issues are complex. What seems clear is that emerging prosodic contours are routinely judged by interlocutors as to whether they are possibly whole *gestalts* or not; what may not be so clear is at what exact point in an emerging contour prosody allows judgments about a speaker's intention to continue. See Szczepek Reed (2004) for discussion.
11. Although in Japanese recipients frequently provide continuers following the incremental bits being used to build a turn, substantive responses are typically reserved for (projected) turn completion (Hayashi, 2003; Tanaka, 1999).
12. We believe that this utterance could be analyzed as conveying more than one action, but we emphasize Tanaka's point that the stance-taking predicate, that is, the primary indicator of the way the utterance is to be taken, is reserved for final position.
13. We exclude for the moment so-called recognitional onsets, where a next speaker comes in as soon as the trajectory of a turn has been recognized (Jefferson, 1983), and concurrent displays of recipiency such as those Goodwin and Goodwin (1987, 1992) have described.
14. It is particularly striking that line 2 is grammatically identical to line 1, yet the two utterances are performing two quite distinct social actions. As Tanaka does, we take this to underscore the heavy reliance on inference in referring in Japanese.
15. In the case at hand its completion is also signaled by the final particle *yo*.
16. If the arguments were made explicit, they would tend to appear as a rule before the predicate (Tanaka, 1999).
17. This can occur with or without a prosodic break at the possible clause boundary.
18. See also the examples cited in Sacks et al. (1974: 704f.).
19. See Ono and Suzuki (1992) for further discussion of elements that can follow the predicate in Japanese conversation.
20. In addition, because Japanese is a postpositional language, markers of clausal 'subordination' appear in final position in the clause. This means that preliminary components are not identifiable as such until late in the clause, thus accounting for the delay encountered in co-constructing compound TCU formats.
21. As Schegloff notes, 85 percent of the increments he found are added to host turn units that are clauses (2001a: 9).
22. Schegloff's definition of 'increments' is: elements of talk added to the TCU and the turn which re-occasion possible completion; that is, which constitute extensions to the TCU or the turn ... and which themselves come to another possible completion of the TCU or turn (1996b: 90).

23. For extracts (12) and (13), the following transcription conventions hold:
    : lengthening
    (x.x) pause of x.x seconds
    (.) very short pause
24. See Couper-Kuhlen and Ono (forthcoming), Hayashi (2003), and Tanaka (1999) for further discussion of turn-unit extension in Japanese.
25. See Kim (forthcoming) for an enlightening discussion of a similar situation in Korean.
26. We do not wish to claim, however, that every turn extension in Japanese is of the type that would never occur in turn-final position. See Tanaka (1999) for further discussion.

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The O.J. Simpson Case as an Exercise in Narrative Analysis

Robin Tolmach Lakoff

The definitions of terms like "culture" and "society" are vexing problems for the social sciences. Still more complex are the deeper questions that underlie them. How do we form cultural identities and come to see our individual selves as members of a cohesive and coherent social group? What is the glue that makes a culture cohere – and, at least as important a question, what happens when that glue becomes ineffective?

Some aspects of cultural cohesion, and its opposite, are obvious and well-studied: speaking the same language; professing the same religion; dressing similarly; having similar manners. Others are more subtle, more part of members' innate grammars: sharing pragmatic systems and nonverbal expression modalities. But there is one component of culture that is both particularly crucial for the formation of cohesion, and yet less than fully explicit: the making and appreciation of shared narratives.

Language is intrinsic to the development of cultural identity. We say metaphorically that we "speak" (or "don't speak") "the same language," to mean that we are (or aren't) in sync, share (or do not) common values and purposes. Judging from discussions that permeate our media and reach into the highest levels of government, Americans are currently experiencing an agonizing questioning of the role and necessity of common linguistic identity in the making of national cohesion. We are publicly worried about forces that seem to be breaking the century-old "melting pot" apart: "special interests," "identity politics," "tribalism," "Balkanization," and "multiculturalism" are some of the terms bruited about, with connotations ranging from positive to negative. The existence of so many words, reminiscent of the profusion of terms for "snow" among the Eskimos,

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suggests the salience of the concept in current American discourse. Laws to reduce immigration (illegal and otherwise), and make English the official language of the United States, have strong grass-roots support. These bills are concrete representations of our fear of cultural diffusion. They have grounding in the *literal* fear of no longer understanding and being understood if all of us were to *speak different languages* in our public and private lives: the loss of our symbolic cultural coherency.

Language itself is a great creator of identity (cf. Gumperz, 1982; Hymes, 1972). But perhaps even more significant is what we do with language: our notions about appropriate speech acts, discourse types, narrative and other structures. Sharing these creates a sense of unity, actual and metaphorical, the *we*. *We*, the people of the United States, begins the preamble of our founding document, the Constitution, thereby beginning our shared narrative. Hence any signs that the knowledge or acceptance of these shared narratives is eroding are viewed with alarm and create widespread distress. Neoconservative alarm over "postmodern" doubt about historical truth, the erosion of the literary canon, and "situational ethics" finds a sympathetic audience in the general public.

Linguistics in Text Analysis

So the use that cultures make of the narratives their members construct and repeat can tell us something about the cultures themselves. But what sort of analytic tools and stance are required? That is, at the moment, a somewhat difficult question. Over the last few decades, many fields have made incursions into the analysis of larger linguistic structures, fields as disparate as communication, discourse analysis, text theory, and conversation analysis, as well as my own field, linguistics. These fields differ greatly in their histories, methods, and theoretical assumptions, even as they share a common focus of interest, the understanding of language.

Linguistics has perhaps the most complex origin of all. For one thing, it was in a sense created at least twice, once at the end of the eighteenth century, in Europe, as a historical field concerned with the origin and interrelationships among the Indo-European languages, which by the late nineteenth century had developed in France, under Saussure and his students, into French structural linguistics. In America at the start of the twentieth century, Boas and his students began to develop the field of anthropology as a science. They stressed that responsible researchers had to take a strictly objective and nonmentalistic position on their data and take pains to avoid bringing the preconceptions of their own Euro-American cultures to the analysis of the very different societies they were observing in the Americas and elsewhere.

Leonard Bloomfield, who had been trained as an anthropologist, in the 1920s began to codify the field of "American structural linguistics," its rules and presuppositions directly derived from Boasian anthropology. Saussurean and Bloomfieldian "structural linguistics" share little but their names and their foci of interest. Where Saussure's was heavily theoretical, abstract, universalistic,

and mentalistic, Bloomfield's emphasized the surface traits of individual languages, and insisted that analysts avoid making claims about meaning or function, as those would necessarily entail interpretation, or "mentalism." The Bloomfieldian viewpoint worked reasonably well for a generation or two of American scholars whose major concern was the description and cataloguing of a large number of "exotic" languages before they became extinct. Collecting word lists and determining phonological inventories often superseded any deep concern with syntactic structure or anything more complex or abstract. But eventually, some scholars trained in this school began to turn their attention to these deeper matters, especially as they became interested in English. And once they did so, Bloomfieldian methods failed. By the 1950s there was significant dissatisfaction. Normal science, as Kuhn might say, had ceased to operate.

Into the breach came Chomsky, himself a product of late Bloomfieldian linguistics combined with formal logic and the philosophy of language – an uneasy alliance, to be sure. Transformational generative grammar, the basis of which was laid out in Chomsky's (1956) *Syntactic Structures*, claimed to be a total rejection of American structuralism, although this is less true than his adherents tend to think. Chomsky's method was highly mentalistic, both in its aims (using language data as a "window to the mind," and moving from the superficially accessible forms of language to their deeper, intuitively discovered structures) and methods (use of data made up by the investigator; testing of that data by that investigator's own mental judgments). That mentalistic stance allowed syntax (and eventually semantics and pragmatics) to be done in a relatively precise and (at least theoretically) falsifiable way, but (as should be intuitively obvious but curiously was not to the transformational intuitionists), positively invited all sorts of corruption.

There were, and are, other problems with the transformationalist approach (in which I include many of its current avatars). The assumption was still made that the texts to be analyzed were to be taken from the oral repertoire. But they were not "natural" speech products, or even utterances elicited less than spontaneously from informants. They were sentences created in the analyst's mind, in a vacuum, unconnected to any other sentences, and therefore highly artificial. And since the "sentence" was the highest level of interest to transformational syntax, questions about the cohesion of larger texts went largely unasked. There was a small irony here: if language was worthy of study as a window to the mind, a highly significant aspect of human psychological functioning necessarily went unexplored. Also, transformational grammar's mentalism induced believers to see language as created autonomously in the minds of individual speakers, rather than as a collaborative exercise in making meaning and achieving communication (or avoiding it, as the case might be). The concept of language as "discourse," that is, a means of creating and reinforcing group cohesion and making group meaning, was not and could not have been a facet of transformational theory. See Lakoff (1989) for more discussion of this topic.

At least some of the other frameworks mentioned above take that larger view. But they tend to create incomplete analyses because of their own theoretical constraints. Conversation analysis (CA), for instance, is strongly antimentalistic,

and so cannot consider why speakers have chosen one or another way of completing their turns, or how those choices affect other participants or the flow of conversation. Nor can CA say much about the workings of texts that are not dyadic: since the "turn" is the basis of CA, discourse in which turns play a minimal role cannot be meaningfully studied.

Communication theory tends to look at larger texts from the top down, seeing the whole structure (the political speech or newspaper article) as the basic unit, and goes on to assess its effect on hearers or readers as a whole, as demonstrated by polls or focus groups, rather than through examination of the linguistic forms themselves. It examines the development and repetition of patterns (sound bites, slogans) as a step in the creation of a campaign or a societal decision (an election). But communication theorists are generally not trained to see these large units as composed of smaller segments; they do not, as linguists do, see language as (in Saussure's phrase) "a system in which everything holds together" (un système où tout se tient).

So current theories have problems when applied to the understanding of large units of language. What is needed is a combination, but territoriality combined with departmental structure have made that difficult.

I began my career as a transformational syntactician around thirty-five years ago. Since then, I have moved steadily (if not always consciously) away from many though not all of the assumptions of transformational generative grammar. I no longer believe that analysts of language can construct the data that will form the basis of their analyses. I don't think sentences can be studied in isolation, or that linguistic grammar can be fully understood without reference to the context in which forms are used. But I do think that, if we are careful and check our intuitions with others, we can still use those intuitions to gauge the effects, if not the intentions, of utterances. We *must*, or many of the most interesting and important things about language will forever remain unexaminable. I acknowledge the potential for corruption in intuitive methodology. But weighing the possibility of learning nothing at all against the possibility of making claims that later are disproved, I opt for the latter. Besides, even the most empirical approaches have misinterpreted data. I propose in the remainder of this paper to show how one renegade transformational syntactician turned pragmaticist turned discourse analyst approaches a current text. The "text" to be examined is, unusually, not one extended utterance by a single speaker, but a series of utterances, mostly in print, by a variety of writers, about a single event that achieved its meaning over a period of 1 1/2 years: the criminal trial of Orenthal James (O.J.) Simpson and its eventual verdict. I am suggesting that this composite, multiply composed text can be viewed as a cohesive unit that acquired different meanings for different participants in its making, and changed its meaning as time went on. Further, the way in which real-world events were discussed and understood by the media, and thus filtered through to their audience who then made their own meanings, both arose out of and contributed to the creation of the culture, and subcultures, in which they were located. Discourse creates culture and is created by it. It may bring about cultural cohesion, diffusion, or both.

The Simpson Case as an Example of Several Things

Readers may wonder about the text I have selected. Rather than a difficult or classical document of proven intellectual substance, my text is a form of discourse intellectuals hold in disrepute. Many of them spent the time between June, 1994 and October, 1995 in a state of open contempt for the proceedings, considering the public's insatiability for this material a sign of their proletarian minds and decadent tastes.[1] But I think this case and its sequelae tell us something important. I believe the nonintellectual public is a pretty good judge of the meaning of narratives (a term they would never be caught dead using, of course). Cultural arbiters grumble that ordinary people tune out of discussions of the economy, or foreign affairs, but are attentive to the O.J. story and similar titillations. Some of these cases do turn out to be trivial. But many receive attention because they force us all to confront our culture's deepest doubts and fears about itself and where it is headed. The Simpson case, coming as it does near the millennium, touches on almost every vexing and insoluble problem the United States as a society is currently grappling with: racism and the difficulty of achieving equality; sexism in its most noxious manifestations, public and private; fame and wealth, and their influence on behavior and treatment; the impossibility of discovering truth via the justice system; science as our new religion, or fail-safe discovery procedure. The telling and retelling of the Simpson narrative served a function – from crime to trial to verdict to aftermath, warts and all.

Moreover, even as my intellectual compeers groused about O.J. overkill and swore they paid no attention to the courtroom contretemps, they were very well informed. They knew about Judge Ito, the makeup and personalities of the "dream team," the predicted outcome of the trial, and almost as many of the significant details as the most hopeless O.J. addict tied to the TV.

I obviously had to be very selective in my choice of representative texts. The amount of data is almost literally infinite. There is no way one human being, or even a team, could sift through *everything* produced, in the U.S. and outside, in print and electronic media, over the more than two-year (thus far) duration of Simpsonmania. I have therefore chosen a sample in a highly unscientific way, but one that I feel is representative. I restricted my study to the print media, and used the following sources:

1. *The New York Times,* which covered Simpson at less length than many other journals, but often in depth. Further, the *Times* is the "paper of record" in America: what the *Times* covers is, historically, "the news," and the way the *Times* covers it is, retrospectively, the way Americans remember events of the past.
2. *The San Francisco Chronicle.* Aside from convenience (since I live in the Bay Area), the *Chron* functions as a sort of corrective to the *Times* in a study of popular culture. Where the *Times* is measured, distant and sober, the *Chron* is excitable and instantaneous; where the *Times* avoids full front-page headlines except under the gravest circumstances, they are business as usual in the *Chronicle.* Besides, the *Chron* is a California paper, and

Simpson is a California event: locals understand in a way New Yorkers, or other foreigners, can't possibly. (California, it is often and rightly said, is a state of mind.) On Sunday the *Chronicle* merges with its sister the *Examiner* to produce a single paper, so that some of my references are to the latter.

3. *Newsweek.* As a weekly newsmagazine, *Newsweek* sifts where dailies pour. It distills and summarizes the most important stories of the week. It also represents a more general American voice than either the elitist and eastern *Times* or the populist and western *Chronicle.*
4. *The New Yorker.* This magazine has (despite the ministrations of its new editor, Tina Brown) few pretensions to populism or generality: it has functioned for generations as the touchstone of cultural elitism, "not for the little old lady in Dubuque," as they like to say. So the stance the *New Yorker* takes toward current events tends to be analytical in ways that a journal, even one with weekly rather than daily deadlines cannot be. It can explore small and seemingly peripheral points at length, a luxury denied even weekly newsmagazines.

My aim in this analysis was to focus on how the selected print media created and reflected the Simpson phenomenon: what they reported, how they reported it, the prominence they gave to it or certain aspects of it, the tone in which they reported it. My concern is with the way language, in the form of large cohesive discourse units, that is, *texts* of various kinds, creates cultural cohesion or destroys it, and makes our daily reality. I am also interested in the way in which these smallish individual texts create a larger text or *metatext* – what we have come to know as "The O.J. story."

Culture Creation in the Simpson Case through Shared Narrative: Polynarrativity

The telling of stories itself is an active and creative process. As such it may serve individuals and the groups of which they are members in a defensive or psychologically protective function, through a defense mechanism referred to in psychoanalytic theory as "passive to active," a subcase of reversal (cf. Freud, 1957). An example of the working of this defense can be seen in a child who is taken to the doctor and suffers some pain – say, an injection. Then for the next few days the child reenacts the event again and again with her toys, or her friends, as patients, and herself as the doctor. By taking the active role, eventually the child makes the trauma psychologically tolerable. Analogously, adults who have been through trauma reenact it verbally, telling continuously reworked stories, until the terror abates. For example, after the Loma Prieta earthquake in the Bay Area in 1989, everyone felt the need for at least a month to tell their experiences during the quake to anyone who would listen.

By making narratives they brought plot (order, coherence, meaning, reason) to a formerly inexplicable experience, thereby imposing control over a world

that had become dangerous, chaotic, and unpredictable.[2] The Simpson case exposed numerous tears in the social fabric, things we weren't ready to face about ourselves and our society. So it was important to participate together as a group in the creation of the narrative: to watch, and make personal sense of, the car chase; to be able to discuss it endlessly, putting one's own (media-borrowed, to be sure) spin on it; to make it *our story*, one whose outcome we could (we felt) predict; and, once our prediction was borne out, we could (we hoped) come together again in recovery.

Members of a complex and fragmented society such as ours can seldom claim to truly share any experience in the sense of knowing, or even believing, that they were all together when it occurred, creating it as a group experience. To exist at all, shared stories must be media-mediated: there is no literal campfire we can all gather around. Over the last fifty years there have been a few such cases: the events surrounding the assassination of J.F. K. in 1963 (watched by an estimated 93% of the population); the Apollo moon landing in 1969 (96%); the first day of the Gulf War in 1990 (84.5%). We can add to these O.J. Simpson's low-speed car chase on June 17, 1994, watched by a very large percentage of the population, and the verdict in the Simpson trial (October 3, 1995), viewed as it was announced at 10 A.M. by an estimated 90%. (These figures are taken from the *San Francisco Chronicle* of October 4, 1995.)

It could be argued that these events do not represent collaboratively *made* narrative: the narratives themselves were provided by the media. But by watching with everyone else we became participants, and by reconstructing the story with one another at all our gatherings for weeks on end, by speculating about what really happened, what it all meant, and what the consequences would be, we became makers of the story and controllers (in some sense) of events.

From the start, the Simpson narrative did not behave in an orderly way. It assumed a life and coherence of its own. There was never one single narrative, but always numerous ones. But at least prior to the verdict, in the white community, there was a belief that the multiple narratives shared a central core, that *they were all about the same thing*: they were cohesive if multiple. We were engaged in *polynarrativity*, the weaving of narratives one over the other in the form of concentric circles. But the totality comprises a single document, a shared group understanding of what it was all about. All the circles surround a single point. Since we all experienced each of these circles, the totality contributes to our sense of group identity, collaboration in the making of meaning, and cohesion. The circles represent "our" single point of view; presuppose agreement on what "the" story is, and presuppose how "we" will be affected at the end, by whatever outcome emerges. Presupposed is the continued existence and functioning of "our" system; the possibility of points of view that are not "ours" is not acknowledged at all in this model. Each imaginary circle represents one level of the discourse.

LEVEL 1: the center, is outside the narrative proper and in fact unknowable. It is the "real truth," what actually happened.

LEVEL 2: is the story presented by the prosecution (and the alternate version offered by the defense, along with the deconstruction of the prosecution narrative by the defense). In an adversarial trial by jury, it is the task of the prosecution

to present to the jury a "most plausible" scenario: a narrative in which all the known facts ideally fit together to form a seamless whole in which the jury can believe, and which identifies the defendant as the only person who could have committed the crime, the prosecution story as the only way in which the crime could have taken place "beyond a reasonable doubt."

The defense's job, on the other hand, is to unravel and cast doubt on the prosecution's narrative. Popular courtroom fiction like *Perry Mason* and *Matlock* suggests that a good defense attorney (aided by his ingenious private investigator) will present an alternate, more plausible, scenario, exonerating his client. The Simpson defense team hinted at its intention to do so in its opening statement, in which it alleged that the murders were committed by drug dealers in revenge for unpaid drug debts (or something); and that the physical evidence against their client (the blood, the gloves, the hair and fibers ....) were planted by racist and venal police officers in order to frame Simpson. In normal trial procedure, the defense virtually never offers an alternate narrative. While the Simpson defense's opening statement promised such a narrative, it was never provided in the courtroom.

The problem at LEVEL 2 in this case was that the prosecution narrative was not totally satisfactory. The prosecution never fully explained how O.J. alone could have committed two elaborately brutal murders in the very short time allotted, nor did it prove motive to everyone's satisfaction. One dismissed juror remarked that testimony about incidents of spousal abuse seemed beside the point: everyone fights, not everyone murders. Jurors were unconvinced by the DNA evidence.

LEVEL 3: This is the narrative that the jurors, first separately and then as a group, must make of the LEVEL 2 narrative and its connection to LEVEL 1, as they see it (the jury as "trier of fact"). Normally the jury's job is to use the defense deconstruction as a guide to determining the airtightness of the prosecution narrative. Has the prosecution established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? They may, of course, adopt the prosecution theory in toto, or reject it in toto. They may, and often do, adopt parts of it in order to construct their own most-plausible narrative. If that narrative still places the defendant in the position of perpetrator, they will produce a "guilty" verdict, even though they arrive at that conclusion by a path different from that of the prosecution, or may, as a compromise, find the defendant guilty of a "lesser included offense," a less serious crime than he is charged with by the prosecution. Other things can happen. The jurors may disagree on whether any plausible narrative can be made of the data they have encountered at all, in which case the jury will hang: there will be no verdict. Or the jurors may dislike one another so intensely that they are unwilling or unable to collaborate during deliberations in the construction of the single narrative that is the requisite unanimous verdict, and again the result will be a mistrial. Or – as happened here – the jury may perceive its role in the story-making not as the *discoverer of truth*, but as the *sender of the message*. This is especially apt to happen when the "truth" is fuzzy, the "message" simple, and the interest of the outside world in the case exceptional. Both are narrative functions, but only the former is traditionally the role of the jury. The latter is legally called *nullification*, and, while legal, is heartily disliked by prosecutors and judges.[3]

In a normal trial, the conclusion of LEVEL 3, the verdict, is the final narrative. A guilty verdict may be appealed to a higher court. But an appellate court does not construct a narrative, but rather serves an interpretive function, the literary critic to the jury's/prosecution's storyteller. Its task is to determine whether the spinners of the tale utilized all the materials available in a legitimate way. The narrative normally ends at LEVEL 3, but not in this case.

LEVEL 4: is the level of media commentary. The media and their audience may see what the jury sees, or something more, or something else. With a sequestered jury, the media get both to experience and to create narrative to which the jury is not exposed. Indeed, the major purpose of sequestration is to keep the media narrative from influencing the jury. But the jury may be influenced by the very *absence* of input from media and acquaintances. In a world in which people are normally exposed incessantly to huge amounts of information, its sudden disappearance is an inducement to go off on various kinds of deep ends, to the point of paranoia (as seemed to happen on this jury, on the evidence of the stories of the jurors and ex-jurors themselves).

Moreover, the jury's impenetrability is not absolute. As long as the principal actors (attorneys and judge) are demonstrably influenced in their presentation of their cases and adjudication of them by media response, their attitudes will trickle down to the jury, however subtly. A sequestered jury is apt to be rendered overdependent on what they can glean from the judge and the attorneys by their isolation from other creators of meaning. (For discussion of jurors' dependence on judges' nonverbal signals even in nonsequestered trials, cf. Blanck, Rosenthal & Cordell, 1985.)

More seriously, the justification of sequestration is based on outmoded ideas about communication – namely, that silence equals noncommunication, and that the absence of utterance is a void. But we know better. We know that silence, where utterance would be expected, is eloquent. The absence of access to opinion does not create a vacuum.

Jurors are *supposed* to construct individual accounts of testimony (LEVEL 3), eventually to be compared with and related to the constructs of the other jurors during deliberations. The jury as a whole produces its own seamless narrative in response to what they have heard during the trial. But ordinarily what filters in from the world outside, illegally but invariably, provides checks and balances against the internal scenario the juror is constructing, based on the juror's life experiences, idiosyncratic cognitive structures, stereotypes, and prejudices. Without the external corrective (particularly in a jury that was sequestered for nearly a year), jurors' understandings of what is going on in court can become more and more distorted, their individual narratives increasingly idiosyncratic. I an ordinary trial (illegally but typically), jurors do discuss court events with on another, testing their individual perceptions against a group consensus. But wih jurors in this case closely monitored by court personnel and encouraged to report on one another, the sharing of narratives was less apt to occur, so that each juror's individually constructed scenario remained virginal, and grew increasingly bizarre.

At LEVEL 4, the media *report*, that is, reiterate what was said, and show on pictures of the trial events. But this involves some subjective interpretation.

What bits of the six-hour trial day should be put into the five-minute evening news segment? What pictures should be used to show which figures to advantage or disadvantage?

Beyond that, the Simpson criminal trial spawned an army of media commentators. Every network, every local TV station had its own legal analyst, sometimes several. Talk shows regularly scheduled these or other experts to summarize recent events and predict the future course of the trial. They assessed what each bit of evidence "meant," and whether it was good or bad for prosecution or defense. They interpreted the behavior of the principals: was Judge Ito controlling the attorneys? was Marcia Clark/Johnnie Cochran behaving in accordance with normal courtroom procedure? was their dress appropriate? They wrung meanings out of the Delphic mutterings of dismissed jurors: was race an issue in the jury? was spousal abuse seen as a predictor of murder? They tried to determine what it all meant: there would/would not be a verdict; O.J. would/would not testify; the defense would/would not present a case (cf. Carlsen, 1995; Chiang, 1995d; Davidson, 1995; Margolick, 1994a; Margolick, 1995a).

LEVEL 4 also made reference to the incessant polls of ordinary citizens and attorneys. These showed (among other things) a steady increase in belief in Simpson's guilt, but at a significantly lower level in the black (60%) than in the white (80%) community; a belief both among attorneys and the common folk that O.J. would not be convicted, with a somewhat higher percentage voting for a mistrial (due to either the dissolution of the jury before it could reach a verdict, or its inability to reach a verdict) than for outright acquittal; and a decrease from 63% in January of 1994 to 50% in June 1995 of public faith in the justice system (CBS Evening News poll, June 9, 1995).

There was speculation at this level too about what the defense would do: not make a case at all (but then, the jury would worry about the defense opening statement); whether or not they would put O.J. on the stand (if they did, the prosecution would get to grill him in cross examination; if they didn't, the jury would wonder why: cf. Chiang, 1995e; Margolick, 1995d). There was also puzzlement throughout the media about some of the ragged ends left in the prosecution's case: why no testimony about the low-speed car chase, the $10,000 and passport found in the glove compartment of the notorious Ford Bronco? why no testimony from A1 Cowlings? why not recall Kato Kaelin to the stand to see if he's really perjured himself? (Some of these questions may be answered, or at least reopened, at Simpson's civil trial, due to begin in the fall of 1996.)

LEVEL 5: is the media's gloss of their role at LEVEL 4. Here the media look at themselves and their influence. What was the role of cameras in the courtroom? the role of reportage on the behavior of the principals? the role of eventual celebrity on the jurors? They also raised deeper and broader questions about the fallout from the trial on American society generally. Was it accentuating our already dangerous racial polarization? imbuing us with cynicism about the justice system? causing us to reevaluate our love affair with fame? (cf. Chiang, 1995c; Estrich, 1995; Graham, 1995; Margolick, 1994a; Margolick, 1995b; Margolick, 1995c; Navarro, 1995; Rimer, 1995). Also discussed at this level were polls showing that the majority of the population were sick of O.J. and not

listening anymore. But these reports had to be considered along with other facts, such as the continued high ratings of shows with O.J. reportage, and the awareness that even those pollees who were most adamant in their denunciation of trial coverage seemed familiar with every detail in the unfolding drama.

LEVEL 6: is the post-verdict take on What It (LEVELS 1–5) All Meant: the verdict itself (of course); the reactions to it by all communities involved; the events of the trial; predictions about the role of the trial in future trials; changes in trial procedure as a result of the trial. Would it cause us to press for changes in the conduct of trials? Suggestions, encouraged if not originating with this trial, have been made: to permit non-unanimous verdicts in criminal cases; even to scrap the jury system completely in favor of an inquisitorial system (or anything rather than this!). Examples of this level are noted in the next section.

LEVEL 7: is the creation of cultural allusions about the trial, the recognition by the culture that it has become a significant cultural artifact: metaphors, jokes, allusions public and private (cf. the discussion below).

LEVEL 8: is the interpretation of all of the foregoing levels into the ultimate coherent narrative, or metanarrative (of which this paper is one attempt, the symposium mentioned in Footnote 1 another).

We all share these eight levels. Together they create a sense of *one* narrative, *our* narrative. In somewhat circular fashion, our original interest in the O.J. drama that arose because of his celebrity status created our desire to participate in that shared narrative; but then the awareness that we as a culture had actually achieved that rarest of moments, a shared experience, brought our interest up to the level of obsession and kept it there.

Cultural Disintegration through Non-Shared Post-Verdict Narratives: Multinarrativity

Multinarrativity is the existence and acknowledgement of *competing* or opposing narratives from several points of view, often contradictory. If prior to the verdict the Simpson case was an example of polynarrativity, that is, consensual narrative, multinarrativity took over from the moment of the verdict. Media analysis has since then focused on the multiple understandings of the crime and its aftermath. The explicit recognition of our differences, so sharply and unavoidably manifested in the verdict, became the story and reminded us with each retelling that we *are* diverse, we *do* speak different languages. Seriously problematic and possibly unresolvable is the fact that the verdict worked not so much as a vindication of O.J. Simpson as an indictment of our system of criminal justice: the "message" Johnnie Cochran asked the jury to send. And worst of all to the majority public is the fact that this indictment was delivered by members of a double minority community: black women. As jurors do, they gave the trial its ultimate meaning. But this was one of the first times in the world's history that a group so composed could make the meaning of an event important to the culture as a whole.

The verdict itself came down with a noticeable *thud.* As America sat and listened and watched, there was a moment of deep silence and incredulity.

And then, in an instant, consensus split irretrievably apart. Black viewers stood up and cheered; whites wailed, jeered, gaped in disbelieving silence. The media recording the event noted the dual response, and *that* quickly became the item. Thus the *Chronicle* on October 4 carried a full-page headline in the largest type the paper possesses: O.J. SET FREE. (Carlsen, Rojas & Walker, 1995.) The rest of page 1 was likewise occupied by O.J. stories. At the bottom left was the stunner: "Jury United, But Nation Remains Divided" (Garcia, 1995). Nearly the whole 14 page first section of the paper was occupied with Simpsoniana. The *Times*, of course, was more measured. Its headline covered only half the front page: "Jury Clears Simpson in Double Murder; Spellbound Nation Divides on Verdict" (Margolick, 1995e). A single article discussed both major facts, but a second article underneath (Gottlieb, 1995) emphasized the second: "Deep Split in Reactions to the Verdict." The *Times* had several pages of coverage within, as well as Op-Ed pieces by Turow (1995) and Rich (1995), and an unsigned editorial, "The Simpson Verdict."

Overall, the immediate press reactions read as attempts to regain some sort of grip or control. There was denial that the verdict *meant* anything. It was explained away as the result of prosecutorial blunders (Turow); police misbehavior (the *Times* editorial and Rich); an anomaly that neither explains anything nor requires explanation (all of the above). In the next several days, the print media moved to the second stage of trauma control: rationalization. Now attempts were made to make sense of the verdict as well as the divided public response to it. The *Times* ran another editorial "False Lessons of the Simpson Trial," moving toward a positive perspective: the trial and verdict show the need for reforms; rather than inveighing against Simpson's use of wealth in securing acquittal, consider making changes in the system to guarantee that indigent defendants get better representation. On the Op-Ed page the same day (October 5), Maureen Dowd weighed in with "O.J. as Metaphor," making reference to L.A. genre detective fiction like Raymond Chandler, Nathanael West's *The Day of the Locust*, Colin Powell, Anita Hill, and various other cultural icons. The effect was to background the verdict in a reflection on America itself. On its front page the *Times* reported on the interviews with the jurors (Egan, 1995), showing the reasoning behind the verdict – another attempt to deflect the fears engendered by the divisiveness of the response by showing the jurors themselves as individuals, not members of a racial bloc. The *Chron*'s page 1 article of October 5, on the other hand, kept up with the action: "O.J. Calls In While Jurors Speak Out" (Carlsen & Wildermuth, 1995). The effect of juxtaposing O.J. and the jurors is to stress the racial connection between them, as well as to suggest a sort of psychological linkage between them: two kinds of unmitigated gall.

Elsewhere in the paper is a turning away from the meaning of the trial to the verdict's possible aftermath: "Don't Expect Manhunt for Bundy Drive Killer" (Lieberman, 1995). Discussion in both papers turns to changes in the law that trial anomalies, evidence problems, and the verdict itself may bring (as with three *Times* Op-Ed pieces on October 6, one by A.M. Rosenthal, one by Bob Herbert, and one by Anthony Lewis. All see the verdict as a symptom of problems that need to be fixed: racial inequality for Herbert and Lewis, and runaway juries

for Rosenthal. Page 1 of the *Chronicle* of the same day considers the long-term implications of the trial and verdict for the black community: the verdict may create more problems than it immediately seems to solve (Moore, Walker & Minton, 1995). But the next day, in an editorial, the paper sees the case as "a legal aberration" that should not inspire immediate changes in the system ("The O.J. Simpson Case: A Legal Aberration"). Discussion in the *Chronicle* over the next several days alternates between worries about "race relations" (October 8) and "a plague of bad cops," i.e., Mark Fuhrman's role in the verdict (also October 8). *Newsweek*, in its first post-verdict issue (October 9) headlines its lead National Affairs story "Judgment Day," under a photo of a tearful O.J. Simpson receiving the verdict. The story concentrated on the jury as individuals and as a group (Reibstein, 1995). The following story (Cose, 1995) discusses Johnnie Cochran's playing of the "race card." Finally in this series, a last *Times* Op-Ed piece, this one by William Safire on October 12, contemplates the situation "After the Aftermath": Simpson is guilty of inciting the black jurors to create the atmosphere of racial divisiveness that is so distressing the country now. He is "guilty of ordering the exploitation of his race to the detriment of his race" (Safire, 1995). So *we* can ignore the "message" with impunity.

After this the discussion calms down. The media address themselves less to the trial and verdict and their interpretations, and more to day-to-day developments (Simpson's on-again, off-again TV interview in particular, and much later, Simpson's selling of his $29.95 video, gearing up for the civil trial, and the spate of post-trial books by most of the principals). But most of *Newsweek*'s October 16 issue was devoted to Simpson as a Special Report, subtitled "The Verdict: Whites vs. Blacks • Inside the Jury • O.J. and His Kids," thereby covering the field. Sections of the magazine covered "The Reaction"; "The Verdict"; "Looking Back"; and "The Impact," occupying 67 of the issue's 88 pages. And in *The New Yorker* of October 23, Jeffrey Toobin looked back at the trial as "A Horrible Human Event" (Toobin, 1995).

As rationalization died down, a desire to find scapegoats for the debâcle became important, as in some of the articles cited above, which variously blamed Simpson, the jurors, Cochran, the prosecutors, the justice system, and the media for the verdict and the distress at it. The aim was to deny that the divisiveness stirred up by the verdict had any real meaning, as it would if it *should* have happened. Since someone is to blame, it *should not* have happened, and therefore reasonable people did not have to pay attention. But the obsessiveness with which the blame game was played showed the futility of the effort.

More recently there have been attempts at a final stage in trauma management, reconciliation. We agree that these events have occurred, that they have meaning, and that the "message" was not in error – something must be done. There have been attempts to reduce the whole business to something more like an ordinary trial, so that we won't have to think about it any more. There has been some discussion in the press about what O.J. is "really" like, with reference to his approaching civil case (*Newsweek*, February 19, 1996). By showing him as a man leading a "charged, voracious life," the article deflects attention from the trial to its protagonist, making him in a sense more like an ordinary human figure,

less like a metaphorical symbol for all that ails us. An article in the *San Francisco Examiner* (Opatrny, 1996) discusses an offer by a group of "supersleuths" to help him find the killer, gratis. And an article in *Newsweek* on July 8 talks about the "party of the century" (a reference of course to the "trial of the century"), thrown by Simpson at his estate to benefit an organization that protects battered women. Articles like both of these demystify Simpson, making him look rather like a blunderer, an ordinary human being if one quite likely guilty of a heinous crime. But true reconciliation is slow in coming, if it is coming at all. The bitterness of the last several articles, many months post-verdict, suggests that anger at Simpson, both for the crime the majority continue to believe he committed, and for forcing so much unresolved societal business into our consciousness, continues unabated. The only way to diminish the pain is to demote Simpson from superhero-murderer to oafish lying blunderer.

Multinarrative occurred outside the media reports as well. It was a regular feature of the trial itself, contributing to the public's (and the media's) bewilderment at much of what was going on. From the start, the defense and the prosecution not only were telling different stories, or at least promising to (as would be expected), but appeared to be living under different narrative and discourse conventions. This became evident early on in discussions of jury selection; from reports of race-based dissension within the jury; and from Cochran's and others' discussion of their willingness to play "the race card." It showed up too in the styles of Cochran's and Darden's, final arguments.

Cochran's was a traditional black preaching style, after the rhetorical model of Martin Luther King Jr. and Jesse Jackson. The style conveyed many things to the predominantly black jury (and the black members of the viewing audience): a sense of shared community, a connection between Cochran and the jurors as a "we" who *speak the same language*, a language not "theirs"; a speech style traditionally used by the preacher, the most prestigious and trusted member of the community and hence automatically engendering trust. It is highly emotional, strongly persuasive rather than expository. It uses shared cultural allusions (especially Biblical references), as well as many mnemonic devices derived from its original use with a nonliterate audience, e.g. rhymes and jingles: "If the gloves don't fit, you must acquit."

Darden, on the other hand, was working under a double obstacle: as a black man, he was taking the white community's side, making *their* narrative. He did it using white man's legal argumentation style: intellectual, deliberately low-key and unemotional. It is no wonder that he didn't get much credence – or much affection – from the jury.

Cultural Reintegration via Metanarrative

Two final, perhaps paradoxical outcomes of the trial are an enrichment of the cultural narrative at all levels, and a reinforcement of some general beliefs and narrative strategies, permitting a reintegration or reaffirmation that *we* – all of us – share enough to justify our sense of ourselves as constituting a cohesive culture

This reintegration was facilitated by the use of several types of narratives: jokes and metaphors (frequent sources of societal cohesion); opinion polls (a newer way of summarizing and organizing ourselves); and, newest of all, a profusion of websites on the internet dedicated to the dispersal of Simpsoniana. The Simpson case provided huge amounts of all of these, creating a new cohesion through the liberal use of allusions that underscore how much we all share. Thus, for instance, we share expectations about *forms* jokes take – e.g., the good news/bad news format of several in the Simpson collection – even if we do not share the subtexts that make sense of the jokes themselves. Similarly, Americans share a love and respect for polls, even though those polls show deep divisions among us.

That high regard for polls, statistics and such arises out of and reinforces the predominant culture's belief in science and numbers as ways of understanding the world. Our interest in O.J. polls may indirectly reassert our cultural belief in the value of science, dealt a blow by the jury's cavalier dismissal of the DNA evidence. The fact that we *can* (apparently) quantify our agreements to disagree is a kind of magical reassurance to our frazzled selves: yes, there still *is* cohesion despite the appearance of the opposite.

The Simpson web sites covered everything – evidence that went beyond what could be found in the traditional media, on both sides; court transcripts; brief biographies of the major protagonists; as well as jokes. The web sites provided a more interactive framing of the O.J. discourse than was available in the traditional media, a way for all non-Luddites in the society to vent both individual and collective emotions.

Similarly, jokes and metaphors are woven into the cultural fabric, giving all of us texts we can share by which we can reach across dissension and create at least a brief semblance of mutual understanding. If Jay Leno can tell O.J. jokes to a (presumably) mixed audience and get laughter in response, we can feel, rightly or not, that there is still a *there* there, a cultural bedrock, and cohesion may yet be restored.

Conclusions

We (the culture under analysis) have come to see the O.J. Simpson drama as an exercise in postmodern doubt and indeterminacy. Its events and outcome are multiply ambiguous. It is no longer clear who has the right to make our meaning for us, or whether there is even an "us" for whom a meaning can be made. The trial and especially the verdict are, I think, best seen as being really about interpretation. Who determines the meaning of public events, and for whom?

And finally, we (the analysts of the culture via discourse) can see the foregoing discussion as an exemplification of theory and method. Language is the "window," here, not so much to the Chomskyan individual mind as to the culture's mindset: what is spoken and what presumed; what is expressed directly, what euphemized; what chaotic and fragmented events are collected together and organized to become the conventionalized narrative that we name "The O.J. Case," how

the ways we make language and use that language to shape our world-view define and identify us as members of a cohesive culture, those who "speak the same language."

Notes

1. Not all of them, though. An article in *The New York Times* of September 25, 1996, describes a conclave of "intellectuals" gathered in a New York meeting hall to discuss the ramifications of the case.
2. For a discussion of the role of plots in individual lives, cf. Aftel (1996). I would argue that groups rely on plots in ways analogous to the ways individuals do, to give meaning and coherence to their lives.
3. The verdict in this case has been called by some "nullification," a definition questioned by others. Nullification, going back to English common law, is a jury's refusal to stick to its legal role as the "trier of fact," vs. the judge, the "trier of law." At the end of a trial, the judge instructs the jury in the relevant legal definitions. The jury's job is to decide whether the claims alleged by the prosecution are true, or which ones are true; and on that basis, to determine which if any legal charge is appropriate. So if a jury were to decide that it believed that Simpson had killed Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman, its job would be to find that some form of homicide had taken place, depending on their assessment of the circumstances first or second degree murder, or voluntary or involuntary manslaughter.

   A jury nullifies when it decides that the law in question is unjust or inapplicable, and therefore acquits a defendant even though it is incontrovertible that the circumstances were as the prosecutor argued (e.g., they have heard a confession by the defendant). Nullification is a message of societal dissent, the common people criticizing the powerful.

   I think the Simpson verdict went beyond nullification in its normal sense: it criticized not a law by itself, but the underlying system by which the laws are made and enforced. We might call it "metanullification," a word as frightening as the concept it embodies.

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The Identity Work of Questioning in Intellectual Discussion

Karen Tracy and Julie Naughton

And so uh, the strategy then would be a sort of piling on, an accumulation, bit by bit until finally you were satisfied twenty years later that you were able to say what was going on in this study.

The above excerpt comes from a lengthy question addressed to a student presenter in a departmental colloquium. This question formulation, as is true of question formulations generally, does a number of different kinds of identity work. One kind it does is to imply how the speaker sees the recipient's scholarly work (and hence the recipient). In this paper we examine this kind of identity-work process; that is, we explore the ways in which one person's talk (questioning) can influence another person's situated intellectual identity.

The context in which we examine this question is intellectual discussion in the academy. We regard it as critical to study identity work in specific interactive situations. The meaning of conversational moves, we would argue, cannot be adequately understood unless account is taken of what is communicatively routine, possible, and believed desirable in a specific situation. Elsewhere (Tracy & Baratz, 1993) we detail why intellectual discussion as a type of talk occasion deserves careful scholarly attention. Suffice it to say that intellectual discussion is an important but understudied form of talk; in the university context, it is a central forum in which scholarly identities are shaped.

In examining the altercasting potential of questions, this study seeks to contribute to a larger project investigating intellectual discussion in the academy (Tracy & Baratz, 1993, 1994; Tracy & Carjuzáa, 1993; Tracy & Muller, in press). By "intellectual discussion" we mean interactive occasions in which talk about

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ideas is primary; colloquia, "brown bags," research seminars, reading groups, and professional or interdepartmental symposia are the names academics routinely use to describe this kind of occasion. We use a more abstract label than the ones academics spontaneously use to highlight how the talk occasion is a genre of academic discourse (Swales, 1990).

In this particular study, we consider how discussants' questioning practices create, support, and challenge some particular situated identities question-recipients could be expected to desire. Within much psychological (e.g., Graesser, 1990; Lehnert, 1978) and educational (e.g., Hunkins, 1989) theorizing, questions are treated as transparent devices to get information. That questions simultaneously propose/reflect identities of speakers and recipients has largely been ignored. For this reason, the study of questioning rather than more obviously identity-relevant speech actions (e.g., accounts, disclaimers, praise, criticism) seemed a particularly suitable focus. If there is no "time out" from identity work, which we believe to be the case, then we should be able to display identity-work processes not only in obvious speech actions but also in those that are regarded as relatively neutral and task-focused. After providing a more elaborated conception of identity and identity work, and showing what prior research has found about links to questioning, we describe the discourse data and the study's interpretive approach – a new method we label identity-implicative discourse analysis. The heart of the article describes three aspects of intellectual identity desired by participants in such discussion occasions and shows how distinct features of discussants' questioning practices can challenge these identities; the article's conclusion draws out theoretical and methodological implications.

Identity Work and Questioning

Identity

Scholars writing (or talking) about persons and communicative practices use three sets of ostensibly similar terms: (a) self and self-presentation (e.g., Baumeister, 1986; Tedeschi, 1990), (b) face and facework (e.g., Brown & Levinson, 1987), and (c) identity and identity work[1] (e.g., Shotter & Gergen, 1989). While superficially similar, the sets implicate very different views of the social world and assumptions about persons. We adopt the identity/identity work concepts because the terms are most consistent with our theoretical commitments.

First, we believe that a person's sense of who he or she is, is strongly rooted in situated communicative experiences. The concept "identity" captures this social grounding. Fitzgerald (1993), for instance, defines identity as who one is/how one acts in a given situation. Identity is *self in situation*, and central to this concept is the notion that self is constructed, maintained, and challenged by self's and interlocutor's communicative practices. In contrast, the concept "self" aligns persons primarily with the internal cognitive world: The self is an entity housed in a body and the repository of internal feelings, thoughts, and intentions (Geertz, 1984; Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

Second, identity and identity work highlight the way communication is implicative for both parties. Not only does communication involve presenting self, but it also involves altercasting the other. And, although any study may choose to focus on speakers' or recipients' identities – (as we do in this study) – to use identity as the theoretical lens is to make it less likely to forget that altercasting is occurring simultaneously.

Third, while both "face" and "identity" implicitly reject the internalized, decontexualized view of self, the concept "face" does so in a way that does not entirely escape a cynicism and sense of superficiality ("It's just a matter of face") (e.g., Folger & Poole, 1984). In contrast, identity gives a moral and emotional seriousness to the situated self, a view we think wise to cultivate.

A final reason we prefer the concept identity to face is to free our inquiry from the high level of abstraction present in Brown and Levinson's (1987) conceptions of positive face (desire to be appreciated and approved of by selected others) and negative face (desire to be free from impingement from others). While Brown and Levinson recognize that there will be cultural variations in how these wants are expressed, the concerns are formulated as universal ones that are relevant to all people in all situations. We do not see this claim as an unreasonable characterization of people's situational concerns; we do see it as unhelpful. People's situated identity concerns are more particular and contextualized than positive and negative face. Thus, our final reason for adopting the concept identity is because it encourages formulations of persons' concerns in situationally sensitive manners (e.g., Edwards & Potter, 1992).

Questioning as Identity Work

While questioning has been extensively researched (e.g., Goody, 1978; Graesser, Roberts, & Hackett-Renner, 1990; Hunkins, 1989; Kearsley, 1976; Walton, 1989), the number of studies examining how questioning does identity work or what kind of identity work gets done is considerably more limited. Much of the information must be pieced together from studies whose central purposes were not identity issues. For instance, Goody (1978) developed a two-dimensional model of questioning to capture the multiple task and social (identity) purposes operating across a range of everyday settings in Gonja society. At the identity level, Goody distinguished questions that gave deference from those whose primary function was to control another. Goody was interested in questions and identity in an opposite direction from the approach we take. That is, she began with established identities in the society and looked to see how question function varied by questioner's status. In contrast, we are interested in how question content and formulation can imply identities in situations like intellectual discussion. From within our identity framework, we would recast Goody's discussion as recognizing that questions can imply the status identity of parties.

That the content and form of questions, and even the right to ask them, will vary based on the status relationship between participants is perhaps the best established "fact" of the relationship between questioning practices and identity. Exactly how questioning practices are affected by status relationships is quite

complex and dependent on the nature of the situation. Interviews with a President of the United States (Orr, 1980) or high ranking government officials (Walton, 1989) will yield variation in questioning practices quite different than job interviews (Jablin & Miller, 1990), courtroom exchanges (Penman, 1990), and classroom teaching (Dillon, 1988a, 1988b).

In the courtroom there has been the most focused investigation of the identity work of questioning. Penman (1987, 1990) argues that the official game of courtrooms is to get information. Courtroom rules, she shows, are designed to insure that this purpose remains central. But at the same time that questioning is used to get information to enable informed decisions, identity work is getting done. Most prominently, attorneys use questions to display some witnesses as reasonable, honest people and others as deceptive, sleazy, or untrustworthy. Through the ways questions are formulated and sequenced (and witnesses answer them), a picture of a witness' character is offered to the judge and jury. Woodbury (1984) shows how attorneys draw upon the interactive presumptions entailed by the grammatical form of a question to build a positive or negative moral character for a witness. For instance, to ask a question in the negative ("You didn't go to the door?") conveys that the question-asker is surprised by what a person asserted. Surprise in everyday life is routinely exhibited when a person does not act in a way that is expected or reasonable. Thus, for a questioner to act surprised (which a negatively worded question conveys) can be used to portray a witness' action, and hence the witness, as unreasonable.

In intellectual discussion, it is also reasonable to expect participants to care that they are (and are seen as) a person of good character. But given the nature of the occasion, this concern is likely to be less focal. A focal concern for academics talking about ideas is likely to be their own intellectual competence (Tracy & Baratz, 1993). What does it mean to be intellectually competent during intellectual discussion in the academic setting? In particular, what kinds of variation exist in questioning practices, and how do they speak to intellectual identity?

Discourse Data and Interpretive Method

Discourse Data

The primary data upon which we draw are discussions that occurred in an academic department's weekly colloquia. The department was a Ph.D.-granting communication program at a large state-affiliated research university in the United States ("State U"). The departmental colloquium involved faculty and graduate students meeting for approximately 90 minutes in a seminar-type room. The room included a rectangular table that could seat 15, with additional chairs for another 15 around the outside of the room. A typical colloquium included 8 or 9 faculty and 7 to 15 graduate students. One of the departmental members, or occasionally a visitor from another department or university, would make a presentation; a 30–40 minute discussion would typically follow. Beginning in 1988 and extending over an 18-month time period, weekly colloquia were audiotaped.

Of these colloquia, discussion periods from 10 occasions, as well as selected excerpts from others, have been transcribed.[2]

In addition to the colloquium discourse from State U, we draw upon several other types of intellectual discussion materials. Included are: (a) interviews with graduate students and faculty at two universities,[3] (b) a short segment of a dissertation defense, and (c) an excerpt from a seminar held at a national communication association.

In transcribing discussion and interview exchanges, we recorded exact words, repetitions, partial formulations, and nonfluencies. We did not attempt to capture pronunciation peculiarities, timing, overlap, or intonational emphases. As several discourse theorists have noted (Coupland, 1988; Craig & Tracy, 1983) the appropriate level to transcribe is always dependent on a particular study's aims. Given our interest in examining identity strategies across lengthy segments of text, it seemed most reasonable to transcribe at this intermediate level of detail.[4]

Identity-Implicative Discourse Analysis

The interpretive discourse approach we are developing is influenced by two traditions. The primary tradition is the range of discourse–analytic approaches evidenced in the work of Potter and Wetherell (1987), Gumperz (1982), Tannen (1984), and Brown and Levinson (1987). A secondary tradition is the communicative research tradition that considers what message strategies people use to accomplish particular communicative goals (e.g., Cody & McLaughlin, 1990; Wilson & Putnam, 1990).

Similar to the discourse–analytic work of interactional sociolinguists (Gumperz, 1982; Tannen, 1984), identity-implicative analysis draws upon in-depth knowledge of the culture to arrive at proposed plausible meanings of strategies. We see this as critical in light of our presumption that identity concerns and identity work processes are highly situation-bound. Since much identity work is done implicitly through conversational comments directed to the task, it is essential to make visible community beliefs about routine and desirable behavior. For the intellectual discussion occasion, then, the discourse interpretations we propose draw upon information gathered from in-depth interviews and extended participant-observation as well as the actual text itself.

Similar to message–strategy approaches, identity-implicative discourse analysis seeks to describe likely relationships between conversational moves and outcomes. We recognize that any specific conversational action could have very different meanings (outcomes) than the ones described. For instance, the actual situated meaning of the conversational move could change if participants possessed a certain relational history, if the vocal intonation were atypical, or if unusual facial expressions were present. Since our analysis does not attend to all aspects of conversational action or every kind of contextual feature, we cannot, and do not, claim to capture what actually happened.

Like Brown and Levinson (1987), we are primarily interested in making visible *potential* likely meanings of conversational devices. Just as Brown and Levinson show how a whole set of conversational devices can be seen as positive

or negative politeness strategies, we too seek to show how certain conversational moves can plausibly implicate aspects of intellectual identity. Stated somewhat differently, we are not primarily making claims about what actually happened – what speakers in the particular instances intended and what recipients actually inferred. Instead, through close analysis of discourse instances, we seek to describe meanings of conversational actions that are plausible given the situation type of interest.

Assessments of the plausibility of the interpretations offered in the article can be made in several ways (see Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Tannen, 1984, for discussions of interpretation validity). For this type of discourse, we would especially highlight Tannen's "aha" factor. If the interpretations offered are plausible, then readers – most of whom could be expected to have experience with this kind of talk occasion – should exclaim aha! "Something they have intuitively sensed will have been made explicit" (Tannen, 1984, p. 38).[5]

Our analysis seeks to characterize the situated identity concerns to which participants orient and to describe the conversational moves that implicate these identities. The article's focus is on the altercasting potential of questions. But because discourse practices are implicative for both parties, we occasionally note a potential identity implication for a speaker.

Identity-implicative discourse analysis is accomplished in an iterative manner. With regard to intellectual discussion, this means that a plausible interpretation of the identity concerns operating is identified by asking of discourse expression: "What facet(s) of identity is made salient by talking in just this particular way?" Then the conversational practices that do this identity work are uncovered by asking: "What aspects of discourse, in particular and specifically, lead to these identity inferences?" Consider now how questioning practices do identity work.

Identity Implications of Questioning

From the interviews (Tracy & Baratz, 1993) we knew that participants at State U wanted to be seen as intellectually able. Using this knowledge of participants' likely identity concern as an initial analytic frame, we then studied the discourse to specify more precisely the best (i.e., most contextually relevant) ways to formulate this abstract and obviously multicomponent concern. Based on our analysis, we argue that three facets of question-recipients' intellectual identity are made visible through questioning practices: (a) whether the question recipient is appropriately knowledgeable, (b) to what degree the question-recipient is intellectually original, and (c) how intellectually sophisticated is a question-recipient.

For each identity concern we give evidence of its situational salience and provide an analysis of how features of questioning practices implicated it. We show how the use of marked and unmarked question forms implicate whether an academic is appropriately knowledgeable. Then, we display how time-oriented references and interest queries can be directly, or obliquely, embedded in questions to challenge another's originality. Finally, we explore how lexical choices unveil intellectual frameworks and, in so doing, challenge a recipient's intellectual sophistication.

Knowledgeability and Use of Marked/Unmarked Forms

In domains of life in which people are emotionally and/or economically invested, they typically seek to be, and be seen as, knowledgeable. In university settings where discussion is about ideas, to be knowledgeable is far from an easy task. Always, there are more authors to be read, technical information to be mastered, and ideas that require understanding and integration with other ideas. In this academic setting, knowledgeability can never be other than bounded and a matter of degree. No person can know everything. Hence, while being a highly knowledgeable person is a desired identity, there is simultaneously a recognition that not knowing, at least under certain circumstances, deserves to be recognized as reasonable.

The judgment of whether it is reasonable (or unreasonable) for a question-recipient to know particular information is built into question formulations. As Pomerantz (1988, p. 366) notes, "a speaker unavoidably builds into an information-seeking question an expectation that the recipient should know, may know, probably does not know, etc. the sought-after information." In other words, in the question formulation we see the speaker's assessment of the recipient's knowledgeability level. That this identity-relevant information is routinely present is especially visible when an initial formulation is repaired. Consider the significance in Excerpt 1 of a faculty member's (Roy) reformulation of a question to a graduate student presenter (Sue).

Excerpt I[6]

Roy: Uhm this is a kinda follow up, I guess on the perceptions thing. *Did you, are you aware, I would assume that,* that studies looking at self attributions and other attributions of competence generally show a pretty high correlation?
Sue: hmm mm
Roy: That, that is generally true? That that person's own self rating of competence correlates pretty highly with ratings of those surrounding?

Roy's question is attempting to get information about the relationships between self attribution and other attribution for judgments of interactive competence. Of note is the fact that he begins his question three times using different phrasings each time. From these repairs we can infer that he was dissatisfied in some way with his first two formulations. But what exactly is being repaired?

We would suggest that he is dissatisfied with what his initial formulations imply Sue should know. Each formulation implies a different knowledge expectation of Sue. By far the strongest formulation is displayed in the first formulation ("Did you"). It is typically the case that when a speaker begins an utterance, its ending can be projected. If Roy had continued with his initial formulation, it is likely he would have said something like "Did you look at the relationship. . . ." To ask someone if they did something, suggests it is an activity that could be expected. This is likely to be the case unless a speaker mitigates ("Did you by any chance") or reverses the presumption ("You didn't look at . . ., did you?"). Roy's immediate repair suggests that he does not want to imply that Sue should know what he is asking. His second formulation softens this expectation

("Are you aware"), making it more reasonable if Sue is not able to address the issue. This formulation nonetheless still conveys that what is being asked is a kind of information that well-informed others should know. Roy's last formulation ("I assume that studies looking at") conveys the weakest implication that Sue should know the information being asked. It turns the utterance into a statement focused on the question-asker's knowledge rather than a query directed toward the other. While it does ask her to confirm whether something is true, it sidesteps whether or not she is responsible to have this requested information. Roy's reformulation work, then, gives evidence that at least at some tacit level, speakers orient to the potential identity threat to a person's knowledgeability implied by a question's form.

Question formulations imply whether an asker has a strong or weak expectation that the recipient will be knowledgeable. But it is not the case that all expectations need to be marked; the unmarked form in such discussions is one where question formulations rather straightforwardly presume recipient knowledgeability about that which is being asked. This presumption is conveyed by the *absence* of mitigators and qualifiers oriented to the issue of knowing.

Excerpt 2
So did, did, in what you said then, does the Inquirer think of themselves as, as in an adversarial relationship with organized religion?
Excerpt 3
So what exactly is a computerized conference in your view?
Excerpt 4
What was it that he was using that, to establish his authority, to keep the authority relationship between him and his audience?

While Excerpts 2 ("in what you said then") and 3 ("in your view") do include conversational markers that make the question less demanding by dint of treating it as a question of opinion rather than fact, neither these two, nor the others, problematize whether the question-recipient will know what is being asked. This then is the invisible side of identity work. When presenters supply information to unmarked questions, question-recipients enact their role as the "expert" and knowledgeable person in the domain of talk. But should a recipient not know the answer to a question where knowledgeability is presumed, he or she will need to do conversational work to overturn a negative identity implication. If successful interactive work is not done, then an implication is left standing that the question-recipient has limited knowledge in an area where another expected fuller knowledge.

An exchange between a faculty presenter (Ed) and a faculty discussant (David) displays such conversational work. Ed has presented a study about religious-news coverage in the media. In the discussion period, embedded in a rather lengthy comment, David asks Ed's opinion about a particular scholarly literature. Given the absence of mitigators directed to likelihood of knowing, David's question can be seen as implying the reasonableness of expecting Ed to be knowledgeable and familiar with authors who write about this literature. But as Ed's answer unfolds, it becomes clear that this presumption is not accurate. Consider the exchange

Excerpt 5

David: I just am wondering uh how does this relate to [name of specific literature], for example, are those in your views, those are reflections of newspaper interests? . . .[7]

Ed: Uh, huh well I, you know it's not something that I've given a great deal of thought to because I, I myself have never been very taken with uh the, what you call [name of specific literature] . . . I haven't thought about this before now but now, being intrigued by the idea, perhaps making, say what kind of connection might be possible there. I mean I don't know. And, and I'd also have to say that that's a literature I tend not to read a great deal because I haven't found it ( ) I think I got involved in this study originally . . . I'm obviously not a journalist scholar . . . Okay, I'm sorry I mean I just that's sort of a, of a, of a, of an admission about it. It's not a literature that I have been taken with in the past and it just did not seem to be very fruitful, you know.

Ed is doing considerable work in his answer to justify and make reasonable his lack of familiarity with a literature that David had presumed related to what he was talking about. In his response, besides accepting responsibility for not knowing ("OK I'm sorry"), Ed also suggests that his lack of familiarity exists because of the quality of the literature ("never been very taken," "not seem to be very fruitful"). In characterizing the literature this way, he makes visible an alternative meaning for his not knowing – it's a set of ideas not worth knowing. Whether members of a discussion group treat a presenter's alternative framing as an acceptable reason not to know or discount it and judge the person to be poorly read will undoubtedly depend on individual discussants' personal relationships to and assessment of the ideas and authors under discussion.

In Excerpt 5, we showed how the presumption of knowledge built into a question's form threatened a recipient. One might conclude from this, that if speakers have doubts about whether a recipient knows the answer, it will always be less face-threatening if the question formulation presumes the reasonableness of not knowing. This, we contend is not the case. Just as a question may threaten another's identity by presuming he or she should know something he or she does not, so too can a question formulation threaten another's identity by assuming that the recipient is unlikely to know that which others regard as part of being competent. Consider the following question posed by a faculty member to a graduate–student presenter who has given a talk about the differences between face–to–face interaction and [situation X] type of interaction.

Excerpt 6

Uh, [Fred], you mentioned that uh the research on difference between face to face and [situation X type of interaction] is somewhat contradictory. I wonder if you have uh, well I put it, could you point to an example of a particular point on which research, uh it sort of seems to conflict? And uh, if you have thought at all about 'why, why it may seem to conflict? Or uh, if there's any explanation for why the research seems to be conflicting.

In formulating his question to Fred this way, the faculty member does considerable work to make it okay for Fred to not have a very well thought-out answer. Rather than straightforwardly asking for Fred to give an example, the faculty member asks him to "point to" one. The pointing formulation makes reasonable more vague, less detailed information than if a person was asked to "give" an example. Moreover, the example "pointed to" need illustrate no more than research that "sort of seems to conflict." In addition, in asking for an explanation of the conflict, he explicitly recognizes that Fred may not have previously thought about this ("if you have thought at all"). Thus, this question formulation does a lot of work to make it "OK" for the student responder to not have a good answer. The sheer amount of conversational work, in fact, calls attention to itself. Why, we might ask, is this faculty member doing so much work? To presume that a presenter would have difficulty giving an example of his central claim is not an identity-neutral claim. This is a competency to be expected of all community members including the most novice. Thus, while it seems plausible that the faculty member was working to avoid putting Fred on the spot, the amount of conversational work done to make reasonable an inadequate answer implicitly conveys to all who are present that a negative intellectual assessment is being made of Fred by the question-poser. Similar to Ed's situation (Excerpt 5), the situated assessment of Fred's knowledgeability will depend on his response. If rather than haltingly try to come up with an example, which is what Fred did, he had challenged the implication (e.g., "Of course I can supply an example, why wouldn't I? One place the research conflicts is . . ."), then Fred could have overturned the faculty member's implication that he had limited knowledge on something the community expected him to know.

In sum, through the presence of knowledgeability-limitation markers, or through their absence, question formulations imply whether the recipient is expected to know a particular piece of information. In conjunction with community beliefs about the requested information and the recipient's actual response, knowledgeability-limitation markers shape whether the question–recipient is seen to be appropriately knowledgeable. While this aspect of identity work is most visible when question-posers repair their question formulation or when a mismatch occurs between projected and actual knowledge levels, it is routinely available in question formulations.

Intellectual Originality, Time References, and Interest Queries

When novice researchers (graduate students) are taught how to do scholarly work, the task is typically conceived as one of helping students master technical skills and disciplinary-bound argumentative conventions. That an academic can routinely make reasonable claims that are well-evidenced is a sought-after intellectual identity. But this aspect of competence is only part of what most academics seek; they also wish to be seen as doing interesting, novel work. Academics desire to be judged original thinkers. Kaufer and Geisler (1989) argue

that for an idea to be labeled "new" it must show its ties to earlier ideas while displaying that the introduced idea is more than a tired repetition of what others, including self, have said before.

Within our framework, a failure to tie to past work evidences inappropriate knowledgeability. Originality assessments will be more strongly tied to an academic's ability to say something new. In addition, besides being new, an original idea must be interesting (Davis, 1971) – it must elicit an increased attentiveness from people.

In this kind of discussion forum, challenges to a presenter's originality are made in two ways. One way is to link a presenter's topic to other work done in a non-present time frame and either directly state or imply the similarity of the two kinds of work. The other is to directly query whether what a person is doing is interesting or through language loading imply that it is not.

Questions that directly described another as doing no more than what had been done in the past were not common but could be found. Consider the following question put by a faculty member to a graduate student.

Excerpt 7

I noticed that most of the literature you review is from the eighties (uh huh) and some of it goes back to the seventies but nothing goes back to the ancient period of the fifties (group laughter) . . . *Didn't we have a human relations model back in the fifties? . . . Well what's new here since Roethlisberger and Rogers? What's new in the way of these variables? We're hearing the same stuff.*

In Excerpt 7 the faculty member not only directly and straight-forwardly asks if there is anything new in what is being said ("What's new in the way of these variables?") but went on to explicitly label what the student is presenting as "the same old stuff." In tying the student's topic to the past in this manner, this faculty member conveys a strong assessment of the student's work (and hence the student) as unoriginal.

While Excerpt 7 is the only instance in the discussion discourse of an originality challenge made so directly, the academic interviews attest to their presence as well as memorability. Faculty member Joan recounted this kind of identity challenge in her graduate-school colloquia experiences.

Excerpt 8

It wasn't just that it was heated debate . . . it was that, uh personal affront was intended and was taken in the course of, of this discussion. And perverse human that I am, I liked it . . . I loved seeing mild-mannered people sort of take incredible barbs and uh, digs at one another and people who had to work together forevermore, uh say things like, uh "*how's this different from your dissertation twenty years ago*?"

But while originality often may not be challenged directly, it is there as an ongoing interactional sensitivity. Consider what is implied in the following comment-question made by an outside departmental faculty member (Roger) in the opening questioning of a Ph.D. dissertation defense.

Excerpt 9

There's really a lot of interesting things I'd like to talk about and I have to be strategic because I know that other people have a lot of the same questions. Um, I really liked reading it. It's really well written. It's really fascinating. I, I um, it gets me back into traditional sociology too, which I haven't done for a while. And it was so much fun to read and *realize that people continue to find this stuff interesting.* Um, I guess the first thing is, starting at a grand theoretical level, um it seemed to me that, you know I don't read in discourse analysis per se. You know well *I was trying to get a grasp on what's the really interesting question?* What's the contribution here, you know? And it seemed that here, the one thing that you said was that developing a notion that [concept X's] occur . . . *I guess it reminded me very much of when we used to read and always criticize Parsons, when I was first a graduate student,* the notion, you know that people are somewhat captured by their roles. . . . [345 more words] And so I see kind of, two general, not clearly related theoretical questions. And I just wanted you to comment on to what extent you're about those things.

Following his explicitly face-supportive comments (e.g., "It's well written. It's really fascinating"), Roger goes on to make a lengthy comment-question, the thrust of which is to ask the student to disambiguate between two potentially contradictory claims in the study. As such, the question primarily challenges the student's argumentative skillfulness, a broad-based and discipline-specific identity we do not consider here.

Embedded in this argumentative challenge, however, is an oblique challenge to the student's originality. Roger's question formulation challenges the student's originality in two ways. The first challenge is conveyed by time references embedded in this question. By characterizing the central issue in the student's work as the same as what occupied scholars more than a decade ago ("people continue to find this stuff interesting" and "it reminded me very much . . . of when I was first a graduate student"), Roger conveys that he sees the project as "dated" and doing no more than what has been done before.

Roger also challenges originality by marking the task of figuring out what is newsworthy and interesting as problematic. In describing himself as "trying to get a grasp on what's the really interesting question," Roger implies that figuring out what's interesting takes considerable work. And although he specifically mentions a reason that would account for the difficulty as potentially his fault ("I don't read in discourse analysis per se"), given his considerably higher levels of experience/status and the implicit structure of the utterance – a pro forma disclaimer (I don't read in X but it doesn't seem interesting), we are led to see it as a politeness move to soften a challenge rather than an account he is offering for a problem he has.

In the next excerpt (Excerpt 10) we see both a time-linkage and an interest-query challenge made. In contrast to Excerpt 9, however, rather than directly questioning how someone's work is interesting, the question-poser characterizes the recipient's work with language that implies the work is dull, plodding, and boring. In addition, the time linkage made is to the future rather than the past. Consider how these two moves operate together to challenge the presenter's originality.

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Excerpt 8

> It wasn't just that it was heated debate . . . it was that, uh personal affront was intended and was taken in the course of, of this discussion. And perverse human that I am, I liked it . . . I loved seeing mild-mannered people sort of take incredible barbs and uh, digs at one another and people who had to work together forevermore, uh say things like, uh "*how's this different from your dissertation twenty years ago*?"

But while originality often may not be challenged directly, it is there as an ongoing interactional sensitivity. Consider what is implied in the following comment-question made by an outside departmental faculty member (Roger) in the opening questioning of a Ph.D. dissertation defense.

Excerpt 9

There's really a lot of interesting things I'd like to talk about and I have to be strategic because I know that other people have a lot of the same questions. Um, I really liked reading it. It's really well written. It's really fascinating. I, I um, it gets me back into traditional sociology too, which I haven't done for a while. And it was so much fun to read and *realize that people continue to find this stuff interesting.* Um, I guess the first thing is, starting at a grand theoretical level, um it seemed to me that, you know I don't read in discourse analysis per se. You know well *I was trying to get a grasp on what's the really interesting question?* What's the contribution here, you know? And it seemed that here, the one thing that you said was that developing a notion that [concept X's] occur . . . *I guess it reminded me very much of when we used to read and always criticize Parsons, when I was first a graduate student,* the notion, you know that people are somewhat captured by their roles. . . . [345 more words] And so I see kind of, two general, not clearly related theoretical questions. And I just wanted you to comment on to what extent you're about those things.

Following his explicitly face-supportive comments (e.g., "It's well written. It's really fascinating"), Roger goes on to make a lengthy comment-question, the thrust of which is to ask the student to disambiguate between two potentially contradictory claims in the study. As such, the question primarily challenges the student's argumentative skillfulness, a broad-based and discipline-specific identity we do not consider here.

Embedded in this argumentative challenge, however, is an oblique challenge to the student's originality. Roger's question formulation challenges the student's originality in two ways. The first challenge is conveyed by time references embedded in this question. By characterizing the central issue in the student's work as the same as what occupied scholars more than a decade ago ("people continue to find this stuff interesting" and "it reminded me very much . . . of when I was first a graduate student"), Roger conveys that he sees the project as "dated" and doing no more than what has been done before.

Roger also challenges originality by marking the task of figuring out what is newsworthy and interesting as problematic. In describing himself as "trying to get a grasp on what's the really interesting question," Roger implies that figuring out what's interesting takes considerable work. And although he specifically mentions a reason that would account for the difficulty as potentially his fault ("I don't read in discourse analysis per se"), given his considerably higher levels of experience/status and the implicit structure of the utterance – a pro forma disclaimer (I don't read in X but it doesn't seem interesting), we are led to see it as a politeness move to soften a challenge rather than an account he is offering for a problem he has.

In the next excerpt (Excerpt 10) we see both a time-linkage and an interest-query challenge made. In contrast to Excerpt 9, however, rather than directly questioning how someone's work is interesting, the question-poser characterizes the recipient's work with language that implies the work is dull, plodding, and boring. In addition, the time linkage made is to the future rather than the past. Consider how these two moves operate together to challenge the presenter's originality.

Excerpt 10

Jim: I have one more question. It really strikes for me at the heart of the whole methodological question we've been talking about.

Jill: Uh huh

Jim: One scenario would be for you to spend the next 20 years of your life uh doing replications with similar stimulus materials but methodological variations. Like you could do MDS, you could do videotape, you could, if you want make sure you had similar stimulus materials because otherwise we might worry about whether or not you had comparability of results. And so uh, the strategy then would be a sort of piling on, an accumulation, bit by bit until finally you were satisfied twenty years later that you were able to say what was going on in this study of [X]. And uh, then another approach might be to uh, go for something much more dramatic and I'm not quite sure what that would be. It would be the kind of thing where we could all say YES, for sure, that's it, no question about it. Uh, as a philosophy of science is this accumulated approach one that you can justify in light of work in social psychology or communication, interpersonal communication?

Consider the "choice" Jim offers Jill regarding her future 20 years of research. She can either continue what she is doing extending her findings step by step. To do this is to engage in "piling on" and "bit by bit accumulation," or she could decide to do something "where we could all say YES, for sure, that's it, no question about it." Jim's language is loaded with negative evaluation toward where Jill seems to be going and positive evaluation toward what is labeled as the alternative possible path. His language implies that Jill's intended path is boring, pedestrian, and insignificant whereas the other is exciting, interesting, and valuable.

In addition, consider how Jim characterizes the net results of Jill's intellectual work in the future ("Spend the next 20 years of your life uh doing replications with similar stimulus materials but methodological variations"). Such a characterization creates a vivid picture of Jill doing virtually the same thing (not anything "new") for a lengthy time period. Furthermore, in using "20 years" as his future reference, Jim uses a unit of time that has particular cultural meaning. "Twenty years," we would argue, is a specific time unit used to reference a person's life work; it is a time marker that calls up assessment of the significance and value of what a person has been doing (or is planning.to do). Because all actions occur in time and are expected to take particular amounts of time, references to time can become implicit ways to criticize (or praise) another's decisions and projected actions. Thus, Jim's reference to "20 years" conveys a negative assessment of Jill's potential originality if she continues on her current trajectory. In sum, through linkages to time, as well as queries about a work's interest-value, question posers can raise challenges to recipients' intellectual originality.

Intellectual Sophistication and Framework Problematizing through Lexical Choices

In addition to knowledgeability and originality, the activity of questioning can reveal a recipient's level of intellectual sophistication. "Intellectual sophistication" is an attribution made of academics who display the ability in their talk (or writing) to recognize the intellectual tradition within which they work, to grant its

limitations while articulating its advantages, and to reveal awareness of what is entailed by and inconsistent with their framework.

That ideas are situated within intellectual traditions and involve particular assumptive frameworks is a belief so widely shared that it requires no defense. Theoretical traditions – what we label intellectual frameworks – include epistemological and methodological commitments as well as knowledge of particular authors regarded as seminal. Differences in frameworks are especially notable across disciplinary boundaries (Bazerman, 1988; Tracy, 1988), but they exist within all scholarly communities.

Theoretical frameworks are called up in the way scholars talk about their own research and question others about theirs. Each intellectual tradition uses a vocabulary of central terms. To the initiated, these terms serve as cues of a speaker's intellectual framework. Just as an experienced sailor can recognize a large underwater iceberg from a small piece of ice in the ocean, so too can lexical choices cue intellectual traditions. For example, among language and social interaction scholars, talk about the "accomplishment of everyday experience" cues ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967). References to speech communities and speech events bring forward the ethnography of communication (Hymes, 1974); mentions of "experimental control" and "manipulation check" cue an experimental paradigm. Thus, in the issuing of a question, a speaker dons the cloak of an intellectual tradition.

When question formulations operate within the tradition of the question–recipient, the intellectual framework is backgrounded; assumptions remain implicit, unspoken, and tacit. The discussion goes forward focusing on the substantive thrust of the question. But when a questioner's lexical choices highlight or problematize the framework *as a framework*, a question-recipient is well-advised to back up and justify his or her assumptions. At such a juncture, the issue of the choice of that particular framework versus some other becomes salient. If a question recipient does not recognize that a framework challenge has been made or inadequately defends his or her choice, the person displays self as having limited ability to move among intellectual worlds. In other words, the person displays a lack of intellectual sophistication. Consider, now, how this process works.

In Excerpt 11 Lee (a graduate student) asks Beth (a graduate student) about several specific choices she made. In her presentation Beth had described a experimental study where participants were presented written conversational materials and asked to make judgments about what a party said.

Excerpt 11

Lee: OK so there was one example of a [X] message if they were to get one at all?

Beth: There were three examples. There was one example of [X] in the high/low, one in the low/high and one example in the low/low . . . (33 more words)

Lee: Yeah I got that. Now was the particular [X] message of the same sort?

Beth: Not, not all. Those that varied across conversation so the [X] example from the [Jane] and [Sue] conversation might have been different from the [X] example in the [Jim] and [Todd] situation.

Lee: Do you think that would have caused any kind of differences?

Beth: Is the question as to whether the differences in the [X] strategy might have? It's also possible the differences in the situation might

Lee: So you

In this sequence, Lee's questions convey concerns about Beth's experimental choices. They do not, however, problematize Beth's starting framework. In exploring whether variation in the study's outcomes can be attributed to other factors than the ones manipulated, Lee participates in an experimental framework. In so doing, she tacitly supports Beth's starting assumptions. Contrast Lee's questions of Beth with those from faculty member Sam at a slightly later point in the same discussion.

Excerpt 12

Sam: Did you have any dilemmas of choice in terms of experimentation here? Did you, did you *sacrifice* uh uh external validity for *control* at any point?

Beth: Uh yeah the, well I, our readings, I mean when they, when they read the conversations or read the scenarios that, yeah that *sacrifices* external validity for the purpose of *control* and what I was interested in controlling were things like information and uh, that kind of thing, so yeah.

Sam: So how far would you be willing to generalize this in light of the *sacrificing* that you did do?

In his questioning, Sam, like Lee, asks Beth to reflect on her choice making as a researcher. In contrast, however, Sam's lexical choices subtlely mark Beth's intellectual framework as problematic. Evidence that Sam is querying the framework (experimental research) rather than operating within it is two-fold.

First, his initial formulation asks about categories of action ("dilemmas of choice in terms of experimentation") rather than any specific choice Beth made in the experimental study she is discussing. Not focusing on a particular conveys that the issue is bigger or more basic than the specific choice, a move that goes with framework challenges.

Second, the reformulation of his question, made in the same initial utterance, replaces a relatively neutral phrase ("dilemmas of choice") with a formulation that carries negative evaluation of the experimental frame ("sacrificing external validity for control"). Among social scientists an accepted belief, well-documented in introductory research methods textbooks (e.g., Anderson, 1987; Bowers & Courtright, 1984), is that a good study must attend to multiple criteria that often are seemingly at odds with each other. Good research is expected to optimize a balance between internal and external validity. But while good research attends to both, different traditions prioritize criteria differently. Thus it is generally accepted that good experiments satisfy internal validity better than other methods but do less well on external validity.

In asking Beth if she "sacrificed" something, Sam suggests that she has gone too far in the process of weighing competing criteria. Note, too, that Sam's question implies the direction in which Beth has gone too far: She sacrificed "external validity," the criterion nonexperimental traditions most often accuse experimental work of inadequately considering. Moreover, in using the word *control* rather than internal validity, Sam further tilts the comparison. Beth's decision is not cast as one between equally desirable goods (internal and external validity) but between a good (external validity) and the negative consequences of the means (control) used to achieve the other good (internal validity). *Control* as a

lexicial choice highlights that contrivance and a lack of naturalness have been opted for. Through this co-occurring set of lexical choices, Sam problematizes Beth's starting framework.[8]

Does Beth recognize this simple question as a framework challenge and hence a bid to display her intellectual sophistication? We think she does, although she is unable to address it well. That Beth is aware of a challenge is suggested by the high level of nonfluency in her answering comment. Her answer begins in four different ways ("uh yeah the," "well I," "our readings," "I mean when they") before she proceeds fluently. False starts give us information about the level of difficulty a speaker perceives in a question. Beth's unusually high number of false starts implies that she has recognized a difficulty.

The substance of her response, however, does not address the framework challenge. Her response, in fact, buys into Sam's negative characterization ("yeah that sacrifices external validity for the purpose of control"). We would suggest that to display herself as intellectually sophisticated, Beth needed to acknowledge her commitment to an experimental research tradition while arguing for its value compared to other approaches. To do this Beth needed to call into question what was presupposed by Sam's use of the word *sacrifice* as well as reframe her tradition using positively loaded language. For instance, if Beth had said, "I wouldn't use the word *sacrifice.* All research involves trade-offs between internal and external validity. My research is experimental and as such has stronger commitments to internal validity than more anecdotal approaches do," she would have displayed a higher level of intellectual sophistication than she did.

Besides implicitly criticizing an intellectual framework, a questioner's lexical choices can problematize whether a presenter is operating within the intellectual framework he or she has claimed. Excerpt 13 is from an all-day professional seminar among a group of established scholars who share an ethnographically based intellectual frame. In his presentation Larry has criticized the "flecks of positivism allegiances" evident in the work of others present at the seminar. In response to a first question, Larry argues for his interpretive approach to knowledge being better than the traditional positivistic ones. He characterizes the positivistic tradition with negatively loaded language ("it's very susceptible to being aligned with hegemonic forces, colonization, and so forth") and describes his stance positively. (His stance is "performative, processual, open, open to new insights, more voices, particularly minority voices can join the conversation.") Following this response, Thomas, another seminar participant notes the following.

Excerpt 13

Tom: As I listen to your answer to the question, I'm tempted to turn the tables on you some, particularly in terms of your language which I might turn around and talk about the arrogance of nonpositivism [[short simultaneous talk]] the use of the word "contradictions," the use of the word "polemic" [Larry: is loaded], suggest to me an either/or. And it seems to me particularly as I hear your earlier comment about pluralism, your comment now in reference to this question, that the real position is not either/or, it's both/and [Larry: yes] in a sense that . . . [187 more words]

> **Larry:** Yeah I, no quarrel there. And you are right to chasten me if anything that I said seems not to be embracing pluralism. You know I argue, I certainly argue with the positivists. But as I said earlier, not to displace that, not, to engage in a conversation. Now I'm committed not only to cultural pluralism but to methodological pluralism.

Tom's comment/question characterizes Larry as speaking in a way that is inconsistent with his intellectual framework. It suggests that an intellectual committed to pluralism would see value in many different perspectives and would not talk in disparaging or dismissive ways about views different from his/her own. In choosing the word *arrogant*, Tom implicitly accuses Larry of talking in a manner inconsistent with commitments of his intellectual frame.

Larry's response recognizes the validity of the framework challenge and seeks to address it. By making explicit the interactive thrust of Tom's comment as well as the reasoning on which it rested ("no quarrel there . . . you are right to chasten me if anything I said seems not to embrace pluralism"), Larry shows recognition of an entailment of his intellectual framework. At the same time he works to reframe the meaning of his conversational behavior (he's arguing with the positivists to engage in conversation not to put them down). In recognizing and granting the legitimacy of an entailment while showing how his actions should not be read as inconsistent with it, Larry displays intellectual sophistication.

In sum, how intellectually sophisticated an academic is, becomes salient when a question problematizes the person's intellectual framework. Such problematizing is accomplished through subtle lexical choices. That is, particular linguistic formulations cue intellectual traditions and in so doing may unveil what is typically tacit and hidden – that presenters' ideas are sensible only within particular assumptive structures. Relatedly, specific formulations can convey a questioner's doubts about a tradition or doubts that a person is operating within a claimed tradition. Thus, when a questioner's lexical choices make the presenter's framework problematic, the presenter's intellectual sophistication is challenged. Of note is the fact that the challenge can end up supporting the person's intellectual sophistication as was seen with Larry or can reveal its relative absence, as seen with Beth.[9]

Discussion and Conclusions

In this study we have shown how three aspects of questioning practices altercast question–recipients in terms of their level of knowledgeability, originality, and intellectual sophistication. Our analysis, admittedly, provides neither an exhaustive description of the conversational moves intellectual discussants use nor a comprehensive typology of situationally salient identities. What we have sought to do is provide a discourse-grounded view of several important pieces of the identity-shaping process in academic intellectual discussions.

We expect that conversational moves identified through this study will be found in other communicative contexts. For instance, the use of knowledgeability limitation markers would seem relevant in any interactive context where

a person's identity is tied up with being knowledgeable about a domain. Thus, we would expect to see variants of what was observed in this study in the courtroom, in classrooms, in negotiation sessions, and so on. In contrast to knowledgeability, intellectual originality and sophistication seem more context–specific identities. Yet even for these identities, we think some of the discourse moves will be found to occur in a range of everyday situations, although undoubtedly to accomplish somewhat different interactional purposes. For instance, we think the use of the "20 years" time reference, discussed in the originality analysis, will be found to be used in a wide range of interactive situations to criticize another's course of action ("Are you going to be doing this 20 years from now?") or defend one's own choice ("If I don't take this risk, 20 years from now I'll feel I blew my big opportunity").

A Distinctive Type of Discourse Analysis

In this study we illustrated a new kind of discourse analysis that we think can be a useful tool for researchers interested in better understanding communicative practice. Like its discourse-analytic neighbors, conversation analysis (e.g., Atkinson & Heritage, 1984) and interactional sociolinguistics (e.g., Gumperz, 1982), it shares a commitment to looking carefully at extended segments of naturally occurring talk. But this approach differs in significant ways from each of these neighbors.

In contrast to conversation analysis, which focuses on structures or organization of conversation or social action, identity-implicative analysis is centrally interested in the link between conversational practices and interpersonal outcomes. One result of this focus difference is that identity-implicative discourse analysis draws upon ethnographic background information in interpreting discourse texts. That is, identity-implicative discourse analysis seeks to go beyond what is visibly displayed to speak to issues of what may be routinely inferred. In so doing, it draws upon knowledge gained through participation in a community to make visible the community's most likely interpretive practices.

In addition, identity-implicative discourse analysis relies less heavily on sequential structure information than conversation analysis does. That is, conversation analysis uses the recipient's response to evidence the discourse interpretation offered; identity-implicative discourse analysis may use this information but does not necessarily do so. A reason less weight is given to sequential information is that there is no assumption that recipients' responses will show orientation to identity issues. Thus, extracting conversational moves from a longer utterance is seen as a way to focus an analysis and make a discourse claim clearer.

As noted before, identity-implicative discourse analysis is more similar to the interactional sociolinguistics of Gumperz (1982) and colleagues. Nonetheless, two important differences from this discourse analytic approach are noticeable. First, rather than being interested in culturally based identities (nationality, ethnicity, gender) as interactional sociolinguistics has been, identity-implicative discourse analysis is primarily interested in personality-level (being seen as reasonable, fair, smart, etc.) and occupational identities. Second, in contrast to the analytic emphasis given to paralinguistic cues in interactional sociolinguistics,

identity-implicative discourse analysis focuses upon conversational practices that are potentially more consciously controlled and strategically used – word and phrase choices, topical framings, doing/avoiding specific speech acts, and so on. As such, identity–implicative discourse analysis would seem to offer a way to be more textually and contextually sensitive while addressing the kinds of process-outcome research questions that have been central to communicative inquiry.

Implications for Research and Theory

We see three arenas for which this study has theoretical implications: (a) future questioning research, (b) Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness theory, and (c) the current metatheoretical debate about approaches to scholarly inquiry.

First, the study suggests that questioning research done from a content-analytic perspective could gain additional insights if attention were also given to actual discourse. For instance, Allwinn (1991) did a field experiment to investigate the effects of social and cognitive factors on question formulation. In the methodological section of the paper, he mentions how coding problems arose because of participant repairs (e.g., "I would . . . Could . . . I need to know how to play this game" [p. 175]). Allwinn's "problem" was that the three formulations produced different categorization conclusions. We would suggest that the content of repairs is not just error but can be used, as was displayed in the knowledge-ability analysis, to provide insights into the social and cognitive processes of interest to many researchers.

Relatedly, rather than seeking to develop a situationally abstracted theory of questioning (e.g., Allwinn, 1991; Goody, 1978), we think it will be more beneficial to study questions in the everyday situations in which they occur. Questions are tools to accomplish interpersonal purposes; to pursue a theory of "questions" essentializes them in ways that we think will be unproductive. For academic discussion, a valuable direction would be to better understand how questioning practices enact a questioner's intellectual identity. While we touched on this issue at several places in this analysis, and have considered it elsewhere with regard to participants' institutional identities (Tracy & Carjuzaa, 1993), it clearly warrants more systematic investigation.

Second, this analysis raises an issue for Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness theory. In particular, it points to a difficulty in their conceptions of face-threat and face-support. Politeness theory locates face-threat and face-support in different places. Face-threat is located in the speech act; speech acts possess certain inherent face threats. Requests, for instance, threaten a recipient's desire not to be imposed upon (negative face) while criticism threatens a recipient's desire to be approved of (positive face). Face-support, in their theory, is located in the selection and amount of conversational devices (positive and negative politeness strategies) that can accompany the performance of the speech act. Conversational devices are presumed to mitigate face threat.

Our analysis calls this locational divide into question. We found face-support and face-threat inextricably intertwined both for selection of speech acts and for the use of particular conversational devices. That is, while it is clearly the case

that a questioning of framework assumptions is a strong face-threat, a framework challenge was also a significant way for a questioner to support the discussant's intellectual sophistication. In challenging, a questioner could be providing an opportunity for the other to display a desired identity that is difficult to evidence. Thus, the performance of a "face-threatening act" could be an indirect means of face-support. Similarly, conversational devices were not always face-supportive. Knowledgeability limitation markers, for instance, were not only found to mitigate face-threat but, under certain circumstances, to intensify it further.

Finally, at a meta-level this study contributes to the interdisciplinary and ongoing debate about how study of the social world is best conducted. For our purposes we can describe the debate as the logical empiricist position (Chaffee & Berger, 1987) versus the interpretivist, social constructionist position (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Shotter, 1989). This study is an instantiation of social constructionist research through its focus on identity construction through discourse, its commitment to studying communication in naturally occurring contexts, its eschewal of universalizing claims, its discomfort with highly abstract categories, and its preference for situationally salient concepts. In choosing this framework rather than the logical empiricist one, we seek not only to promote the social constructionist view of inquiry but to illuminate a distinctive way to operate within the tradition to create insights into how communicative processes construct who we are, the world we live in, and what we consider as knowledge.

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Notes

1. *Identity* is a term gaining widespread use in the social sciences and humanities among scholars taking a social constructionist viewpoint (e.g., Hecht, 1993). *Identity work* is our term which flips the focus of the identity concept from the situated self to the communicative actions at the discourse level.
2. Discussions selected for transcription reflect all possible configurations of given identities – faculty and students in the department, and faculty and students outside the department. Within that broad constraint, selection of discussions was influenced by: (a) audio-tape quality: depending on the placement of the recorder and which participants were most talkative, tapes varied in their audibility. Better audibility tapes were selected; (b) perceived level of discussion involvement: based on participation-observation, discussions where more participants seemed involved were selected over those where fewer participants seemed involved; (c) our knowledgeability as authors about the broad-based approach to knowledge taken by a presenter (social scientific, humanistic) or a specific topic. We avoided discussions where the topic was overly foreign to us and/or one that we judged to require a particularly specialized kind of

3. Descriptions of the interview schedules are available in Tracy and Baratz (1993) and Tracy and Muller (in press).
4. We chose to include false starts and reformulations because such conversational devices can give evidence of how speakers are fine-tuning their intended message (Greene, Lindsey, & Hawn, 1990). Because we were not primarily interested in structural features of talk, we opted not to transcribe at the fine-grained level typically exhibited in conversation-analytic studies (e.g., Atkinson & Heritage, 1984).
5. The issue of how to assess qualitative claims is one about which many scholars have had something to say. Of note is the fact that this issue has been most salient in disciplines that have a quantitative tradition and a strong commitment to objectivity. Thus, researchers in sociology, communication, and education have worried more about the issue than cultural anthropoliogists where ethnography has been dominant and the role of the researcher as a subjective instrument is taken for granted. Discussions within these quantitatively influenced traditions often frame the issue of qualitative claim assessment drawing on the concepts of quantitative research – reliability and validity (e.g., Kirk & Miller, 1986; LeCompte & Goetz, 1982). We see these concepts as problematic when applied to interpretive work; the terms presume a research frame (objective representation) incompatible with the starting assumptions of interpretive research. Argument assessment is crucial, but adopting assessment criteria appropriate to a different kind of argument is not the answer. At present, the general criteria we (and other discourse analysts) use are: (a) argument plausibility and (b) argument interest–value. These are in need of methodological explication, a task which we plan to tackle in future work, but which is beyond the scope of this paper.
6. In the excerpts, all names of people and institutions have been changed. In addition, at certain points we have replaced specific topical comments with a characterization of the topic. We do both of these practices to minimize the likelihood of participants' identities being recognizable. This is a particular sensitivity in this research project since at least some of the readers of this paper are from the same academic community as the discussion participants being studied. The departmental colloquia studied inhabited an ambiguous space between public and private discourse. On the one hand they were open to the public; announcements of time and place were printed in the campus paper each week and any interested party was encouraged to attend. On the other hand, attendance was largely restricted to departmental members. Because of this, permission to tape was sought, and granted, in several different ways. First, the departmental group gave their informed consent to be audio-taped following a discussion of the project in which they had a unanimous vote. Although neither the group, nor the senior author, knew exactly what purposes the tapes would be used for, the departmental group did know the author was interested in issues of facework. Second, whenever a presenter was not a member of the departmental group, his or her explicit permission was obtained before taping.
7. This comment has two kinds of mitigators. The first ("in your view") frames the issue as a matter of opinion rather than fact. This framing gives the answerer more maneuvering room than if it were framed as a right/wrong answer. The second mitigator can be seen in the opening phrase "I just am wondering." We would suggest that in an unmarked question there is a presupposition that the question is serious and central to the issue of discussion. Prefacing a question with a "wondering" statement marks it as a spontaneous thought and not necessarily central to the topic at hand. This potentially does two kinds of facework. It marks the question-asker as aware that the [illegible] may be tangential, and it recognizes the possibility that the issue may not be

a central concern of the speaker. We would suggest that the inability to respond to a question about a marginal topic is less serious than an inability to respond to a central topic.

8. Judgments that lexical choices are intended by a speaker to problematize a framework are undoubtedly easier to make the better one knows a question poser's intellectual frame. When a questioner's starting framework is known to be different than the one a presenter takes, we expect framework challenges to be especially likely. In such a situation, wording choices that are negative in very subtle ways will often be taken as (and intended as) challenges. Sam had frequently expressed criticism of experimental research; for this reason we judge it highly unlikely that discussants did not hear Sam's question as a framework challenge.
9. It is to be expected that graduate students will display lower levels of intellectual sophistication than more experienced academics. This is the case because intellectual sophistication is developed by a person participating in discussion communities where framework challenges occur. For many academics this kind of challenge does not occur until they take academic positions in institutions different from the ones they were trained in.

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Discourse and the Denial of Racism

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Discourse and Racism

One of the crucial properties of contemporary racism is its denial, typically illustrated in such well-known disclaimers as 'I have nothing against blacks, but . . .'. This article examines the discursive strategies, as well as the cognitive and social functions, of such and other forms of denial in different genres of text and talk about ethnic or racial affairs.

The framework of this study is an interdisciplinary research programme at the University of Amsterdam that deals with the reproduction of racism through discourse and communication. In this research programme several projects have been carried out that analysed everyday conversations, textbooks, news in the press, parliamentary discourse and other forms of public and organizational communication (van Dijk, 1984, 1987a, 1987b, 1991).

The guiding idea behind this research is that ethnic and racial prejudices are prominently acquired and shared within the white dominant group through everyday conversation and institutional text and talk. Such discourse serves to express, convey, legitimate or indeed to conceal or deny such negative ethnic attitudes. Therefore, a systematic and subtle discourse analytical approach should be able to reconstruct such social cognitions about other groups.

It is further assumed in this research programme that talk and text about minorities, immigrants, refugees or, more generally, about people of colour or Third World peoples and nations, also have broader societal, political and cultural functions. Besides positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation, such discourse signals group membership, white ingroup allegiances and, more generally, the various conditions for the reproduction of the white group and their dominance in virtually all social, political and cultural domains.

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The theoretical framework that organizes this research programme is complex and multidisciplinary. Systematic descriptions of text and talk require an explicit theory of discourse. Relating such discourse structures to mental represenations such as models, attitudes and ideologies about ethnic events, groups and the ethnic organization of society and culture, presupposes a sophisticated psychology of social cognitions. And a study of the functions of discourse in the reproduction of white group dominance should take place within the broader perspective of a social and cultural theory of racism and ethnicism.

Such a multidisciplinary approach to the role of discourse and communication in the reproduction of racism first operates at the societal micro-level of everyday situated interactions, discourse and social cognitions of individual group members. Secondly, this micro-level 'reality' of racism 'implements' the overall structures and processes of dominance and inequality at the meso- and macro-levels of groups, social formations, neighbourhoods, institutions, organizations and even nations and whole world regions. At the same time, the study of the interdependency of the micro- and macro-structures of racism, also requires an analysis of the relations between cognition and action, that is, at the micro-level, between mental models of group members and their practices, and at the macro-level, between social group attitudes and ideologies, on the one hand, and societal structures, on the other hand.

Another important hypothesis that emerges from this earlier work is that political, media, academic, corporate and other elites play an important role in the reproduction of racism. They are the ones who control or have access to many types of public discourse, have the largest stake in maintaining white group dominance, and are usually also most proficient in persuasively formulating their ethnic opinions. Although there is of course a continuous interplay between elite and popular forms of racism, analysis of many forms of discourse suggests that the elites in many respects 'preformulate' the kind of ethnic beliefs of which, sometimes more blatant, versions may then get popular currency. Indeed, many of the more 'subtle', 'modern', 'everyday' or 'new' forms of cultural racism, or ethnicism, studied below, are taken from elite discourse (see van Dijk, 1987b, 1992, for detail). This hypothesis is not inconsistent with the possibility that (smaller, oppositional) elite groups also play a prominent role in the preformulation of anti-racist ideologies.

Within this complex theoretical framework, our earlier studies of text and talk examined, among other structures, dominant topics of discourse, text schemata, for instance those of story-telling and argumentation, as well as local semantic moves (such as the disclaimer mentioned above), style, rhetoric and specific properties of conversational interaction.

We suggested above that one of the results of this earlier work was that in text and talk about ethnic or racial minorities, many white people follow a double strategy of positive self-presentation, on the one hand, and a strategy of expressing subtle, indirect or sometimes more blatant forms of negative other-presentation, on the other hand. Indeed, especially in public discourse, outgroup derogation seldom takes place without expressions of ingroup favouritism or social face-keeping.

The Denial of Racism

The denial of racism is one of the moves that is part of the latter strategy of positive ingroup presentation. General norms and values, if not the law, prohibit (blatant) forms of ethnic prejudice and discrimination, and many if not most white group members are both aware of such social constraints and, up to a point, even share and acknowledge them (Billig, 1988). Therefore, even the most blatantly racist discourse in our data routinely features denials or at least mitigations of racism. Interestingly, we have found that precisely the more racist discourse tends to have disclaimers and other denials. This suggests that language users who say negative things about minorities are well aware of the fact that they may be understood as breaking the social norm of tolerance or acceptance.

Denials of racism, and similar forms of positive self-presentation, have both an *individual* and a *social* dimension. Not only do most white speakers individually resent being perceived as racists, also, and even more importantly, such strategies may at the same time aim at defending the ingroup as a whole: 'We are not racists', 'We are not a racist society'.

Whereas the first, individual, form of denial is characteristic of informal everyday conversations, the second is typical for public discourse, for instance in politics, the media, education, corporations and other organizations. Since public discourse potentially reaches a large audience, it is this latter, social form of denial that is most influential and, therefore, also most damaging: it is the social discourse of denial that persuasively helps construct the dominant white consensus. Few white group members would have reason or interest, to doubt let alone to oppose such a claim.

Face-keeping or positive self-presentation are well-known phenomena in social psychology, sociology and communication research, and are part of the overall strategy of impression management (Brewer, 1988; Brown and Levinson, 1987; Goffman, 1959; Schlenker, 1980; Tedeschi, 1981). In interaction, people try to act, and hence to speak, in such a way that their interlocutors construct an 'impression' of them that is as positive as possible, or at least speakers try to avoid a negative impression (Arkin, 1981).

Theoretically, impressions are person representations, that is, mental schemata that feature an organized set of categories by which people are judged, usually along several dimensions and with respect to several social norms, interests or criteria. Such judgements may be local or situational, and pertain to current actions or cognitions, but they may also be about more permanent, context independent, 'personality' characteristics of an individual.

It may be assumed that whereas people may want to avoid a negative impression in any situation, they are probably more anxious to avoid a general negative evaluation about their personality, than to avoid a negative judgement about one particular action in one specific situation. To be categorized as 'a racist' or even as being 'intolerant', presupposes a more enduring characteristic of people, and is therefore a judgement that is particularly face-threatening. Hence, when speakers emphasize that 'they have nothing against blacks' (or other minority groups), such disclaimers focus on a more permanent attitude, rather than on

the specific (negative) opinion now being expressed about some specific outgroup member or some specific ethnic or racial action or event.

What such disclaimers try to do, thus, is to block inferences from this particular instance to a more general impression. After all, a specific negative opinion about a particular ethnic group member or a particular act, may well be found to be justified, whereas a more general negative opinion about ethnic minorities might be seen as constitutive of a racist attitude.

In the latter case, a negative attitude may be found acceptable only when pertaining to a specific characteristic of a group, for instance when someone assumes that refugees often enter the country illegally, or when blacks are seen as insufficiently 'motivated' to get a good education or to get a job. In that case, the judgement may be warranted with references to (alleged) negative actions or attitudes of the outgroup. It is not surprising, therefore, that when such negative judgements are qualified as 'racist', racism is emphatically denied.

We see below that in such cases the charge is often reversed: the person who accuses the other as racist is in turn accused of inverted racism against whites, as oversensitive and exaggerating, as intolerant and generally as 'seeing racism where there is none', as Right-wing British newspapers like to put it (van Dijk, 1991). Accusations of racism, then, soon tend to be seen as more serious social infractions than racist attitudes or actions themselves, e.g. because they disrupt ingroup solidarity and smooth ingroup encounters: they are felt to ruin the 'good atmosphere' of interactions and situations. Moreover, such accusations are seen to impose taboos, prevent free speech and a 'true' or 'honest' assessment of the ethnic situation. In other words, denials of racism often turn into counter-accusations of intolerant and intolerable anti-racism.

Types of Denial

We see that denials come in many forms, each with its own cognitive, emotional, social, political and cultural functions. We have situational and general denials, personal ones and group-based ones. Although people who speak about other groups usually talk as ingroup members, there may well be a tension between individual opinions and those shared by the ingroup. Those who deny that they are racists usually imply that they comply with the general, official group norm that prohibits racism, and that, therefore, they are decent citizens. Such individual disclaimers often presuppose that the whole group is not racist.

On the other hand, there may be situations where individuals deny racist opinions or practices while acknowledging that the group as a whole, or at least some or many other group members, may not share such tolerance. Such combined denials/admissions are rare, however, since criticizing the ingroup may be a characteristic strategy of anti-racists (Taguieff, 1988), whereas denials of individual racism are often typical of racist opinions. On the other hand, individual denials of racism may strategically be made by comparison to 'others', e.g. one's neighbours or customers, and then takes the form of a *transfer* move:

'I have nothing against them, but you know my customers don't like to deal with black personnel. . . .'

The act of denial itself, thus, also comes in different guises. Generally, denials are part of a strategy of *defence*, presupposing explicit or implicit accusations. In that case, people may deny to have engaged in negative acts, to have broken the law or some social norm, or to have some negative, overall personality characteristic of which they are *actually* accused by an interlocutor. On the other hand, denials may also be pre-emptive, as is the case in positive self-presentation or face-keeping, that is, they may focus on *possible* inferences of the interlocutor.

Action is theoretically analysed as a combination of cognition (intention) and activity. One may admit having engaged in an action that may have been interpreted as negative, but at the same time deny the negative cognitive counterpart: 'I did not intend it that way.' That is, in strategies of defence, the crucial condition of responsibility for negative action lies in intentions: good intentions are seen as implementations of good attitudes, and hence as characteristic of good social membership or good citizenship.

This distinction between intention and activity also permeates many aspects of criminal law, and for instance distinguishes between murder and manslaughter. Intention, and especially long-term planning and willingly engaging in criminal offences are at least an aggravating condition of crime. On the other hand, accidents, incidents, 'on the spur of the moment', or emotionally defined acts, and similarly non-planned actions are partly excusable and hence less serious. This is, by definition, especially the case in spontaneous everyday interaction.

Note that intention denials, as we may call them, are strategically very effective, since the accuser has few ways to actually prove negative intentions. This is particularly also the case in discrimination trials, where it is often hard to prove that the negative action was not committed because of other, acceptable reasons. For instance, a newspaper may repeatedly and prominently publish reports about minority crime, but may at the same time defend such practices by claiming to publish 'the truth', and thus deny prejudiced opinions about minority crime and hence deny spreading such prejudices with the intention of discrediting minorities or inciting racial hatred. This is among the most classical cases of media racism (van Dijk, 1991).

On the other hand, although intentionally committed crimes are usually evaluated as more serious, people are assumed to have control over their activities, and hence also over their intentions. This may mean, for instance, that people are responsible for the *possible* consequences of their actions, even when such consequences may not have been the actual purpose of such actions. That is, if it can be shown that people could have known that their acts have negative consequences, then they are at least partially responsible for such consequences, especially if these would not have occurred without their actions. For instance, a politician who gives an interview that criticizes welfare cheating by minorities, knows that such allegations will be published, and that such a publication may further confirm negative prejudices among the media audience. Such a politician may deny discriminatory intent or purpose, and claim that he or she only wanted to 'tell the truth'.

In other words, we now have the following types of denials:

1. act-denial ('I did not do/say that at all');
2. control-denial ('I did not do/say that on purpose', 'It was an accident');
3. intention-denial ('I did not mean that', 'You got me wrong');
4. goal-denial ('I did not do/say that, in order to . . .').

In the last case, there is also a denial of responsibility: if there were negative consequences, I did not have control over them. We have already suggested that especially the media routinely deny responsibility for what the audience may do with media contents. Theoretically, legally and morally, these are the more difficult dimensions of the denial of racism. In most cases, one would need repeated acts/texts of the same kind, in different situations, and occasional expressions of plans, intentions or goals in order to 'prove' negative intentions or goals. It is not surprising, therefore, that also in discrimination lawsuits, intentions may sometimes be declared irrelevant, and that people are judged only by the direct or even indirect (statistical) consequences of their actions.

Another form of denial is the class of acts that may be categorized as *mitigations*, such as downtoning, minimizing or using euphemisms when describing one's negative actions: 'I did not threaten him, but gave him friendly advice', 'I did not insult her, but told her my honest opinion', etc. Mitigation strategies are particularly important in social situations where the relevant norms are rather strong. Thus, we may assume that the more stringent the norm against discrimination and racism, the more people will tend to have recourse to denials and hence also to mitigations.

Indeed, the very notion of 'racism' may become virtually taboo in accusatory contexts because of its strong negative connotations. If used at all in public discourse, for instance in the media, it will typically be enclosed by quotes or accompanied by doubt or distance markers such as 'alleged', signalling that this is a, possibly unwarranted if not preposterous, accusation, e.g. by minorities themselves or by (other) anti-racists. Acts in which racism is undeniable tend to be described in terms of 'discrimination', 'prejudice', 'stereotypes', 'bias', 'racial motivation', but not as 'racist'. Generally, the notions of 'racism' and 'racist' in European and US public discourse are reserved for *others*, for instance, extremist, right-wing, fringe groups and parties outside of the consensus. Also, the notion of 'racism' may be used to describe racism abroad or in the past, as is the case for apartheid in South Africa or the period of slavery, reconstruction and segregation in the USA. As a general term denoting a whole system of racial or ethnic inequality, exclusion or oppression in western societies, racism is used primarily by minority groups or other anti-racists. In other words, the use of euphemisms presupposes the denial of systemic racism of the ingroup or dominant society. This is also the case in much scholarly discourse about ethnic relations (Essed, 1987).

Note that this denial of racism should partly be attributed to the fact that the concept of racism is (still) largely understood in the classical, ideological sense, of seeing other ethnic or racial groups as being inferior, or as overt, official, institutional practices, as is the case for apartheid (Miles, 1989). The more

'modern', subtle and indirect forms of ethnic or racial inequality, and especially the 'racism', or rather 'ethnicism' based on constructions of cultural difference and incompatibility, is seldom characterized as 'racism', but at most as xenophobia, and more often than not, as legitimate cultural self-defence (Barker, 1981; Dovidio and Gaertner, 1986).

Besides denial proper, there are also a number of cognitive and social strategies that are more or less closely related to denials. The first is *justification*, as we already saw in the case of the newspaper justifying special attention for minority crime by referring to the 'truth' or the 'right to know' of its readers. Similarly, in everyday conversations, people may justify a negative act or discourse relative to a minority group member by justifying it as an act of legitimate defence, or by detailing that the other person was indeed guilty and, therefore, deserved a negative reaction. In other words, in this case, the act is not denied, but it is denied that it was negative, and explicitly asserted that it was justified (for details, see Antaki, 1988; Scott and Lyman, 1968; Tedeschi and Reiss, 1981).

Similarly, negative acts may be acknowledged as such, but at the same time *excused* (Cody and McLaughlin, 1988). In this case, at least part of the blame may be put on special circumstances, or rather on others. Owners of clubs may admit to having discriminated against blacks by not letting them in, but may make an appeal to the circumstance that already so many other blacks were in the club. The same is routinely the case in immigration debates at a higher political level: we do not let in more immigrants or refugees, in order to avoid aggravating the ethnic tensions in the inner cities. The latter case may in fact be presented as a justification and not as an excuse, because the act of refusing entry is not admitted to be a negative act, but as a constitutional privilege of states.

Stronger excuse strategies are alleging *provocation* and *blaming the victim*. Thus, the police may feel justified to act harshly against young black males, as is the case in many European and US cities, because of alleged provocations, drug offences, or other stereotypically assigned negative actions of young blacks. Government policies, again both in Europe and the US, routinely justify or excuse 'tough' measures against minorities by claiming that they are themselves to blame: lack of integration, failing to learn the language, lacking motivation to find a job and cultural deviance, are among the grounds for such blaming. Unemployment, lacking success in education, miserable housing and welfare dependence, among other things, are thus routinely attributed to negative characteristics of the 'victims' themselves. Note that such stronger strategies usually imply a denial of own failing policies.

Finally, the strongest form of denial is *reversal*: '*We* are not guilty of negative action, *they* are' and '*We* are not the racists, *they* are the *real* racists.' This kind of reversal is the stock-in-trade of the radical Right, although less extreme versions also occur in more moderate anti-antiracism (Murray, 1986). The British tabloids, as we see later, thus tend to accuse the anti-racists of being intolerant busybodies, and the real racists. Similarly, the French Front National typically accuses those who are not against immigration of non-Europeans as engaging in 'anti-French racism'. More generally, anti-racists tend to be represented as the ones who are intolerant, while lightly accusing innocent and well-meaning

citizens (i.e. us) of racism. We see that reversals are no longer forms of social defence, but part of a strategy of (counter-)attack.

Sociocultural and Political Functions

Although usually manifesting itself, at the micro-level of social organization, in everyday conversation and interpersonal communication, the denial of racism not only has individual functions. We have seen that people deny, mitigate, justify or excuse negative acts towards minorities in order to emphasize their compliance with the law or with norms and to stress their role as competent, decent citizens. That is, even in interpersonal situations, the moral dimension of denial has social presuppositions. It does not make sense to deny racist acts as a moral or legal transgression if the group or society as a whole agrees with you, as is/was the case during official apartheid policies in South Africa, or during the reconstruction and segregation period in US history. Indeed, more generally, it may be said that when racism ethnicism or ethnocentrism are openly advocated or legitimated by the elites and the leading institutions of society, the less we should find denials, let alone excuses of racist acts and discourse.

However, in present-day European and US societies, where discrimination and racism are officially banned, and norms have developed that do not tolerate blatant expressions of outgroup hate, denial takes a much more prominent role in discourse on ethnic affairs. We suggested that this is not only true at the personal level. Also groups, institutions or organizations as a whole, at a meso- or macro-level of social organization, may engage in such strategies of denial. In that case, denials may take the form of a shared opinion, as a consensus about the ethnic situation. For instance, since discrimination and racism are legally and morally prohibited, most western countries share the official belief that *therefore* discrimination and racism no longer exist as a structural characteristic of society or the state. If discrimination or prejudice still exist, it is treated as an incident, as a deviation, as something that should be attributed to, and punished at the individual level. In other words, institutional or systemic racism is denied.

Hence, positive self-presentation and face-keeping are not limited to individuals, but also, if not more strongly, characterizes the more public discourse of institutions and organizations. Universities in the USA routinely print on their letterhead that they are 'Equal Opportunity Employers', not only because such employment practices are the law, but also because this is good PR. Organizations, no more than individuals, do not want to be known as racist among their personnel, among their customers or among the public at large. Moreover, ethnic and racial tolerance, and even affirmative action, are symbols of social progress and modernity, which by association may be related to the quality of the products or services of an organization. This is of course most literally true when organizations employ highly talented members from minority groups who may enhance quality of products and especially services for a growing clientele of minorities. Self-interest in this case may well be consistent with ideologies of social policy.

However, social policies may conflict with organizational or business interests and ideologies, for instance in more consequential forms of affirmative action such as quota. In this case, other values, such as the freedom of enterprise, and especially economic competitiveness, are posed against the values that underly social policy. Refusing quotas, therefore, is most emphatically denied to be an expression of discrimination or racism, for instance, because it is seen as quality-degrading instead of equality-enhancing and to be an unacceptable form of group-favouring. Thus, ultimately, also in state or business organizations, the acceptance of affirmative action, will move within strict boundaries defined by the interests and the power of the (white) elites that control them.

The social functions of the institutional denial of racism are obvious. If liberal democracies in Europe and the US have increasingly adopted laws and norms that presuppose or guarantee equality, freedom, if not brother- or sisterhood, for all, the ethnic or racial inequalities implied by discrimination or racism would be inconsistent with official ideologies. Instead of recognizing such 'imperfection', it is more expedient to deny such fundamental inconsistency, or at least to explain it away as incidental and individual, to blame it on the victims, or to characterize it as a temporary phenomenon of transition, for instance for new immigrants.

If racism is defined as a system of racial or ethnic dominance, it is likely that the denial of racism also has a prominent role in the very reproduction of racism. This is indeed the case. Dominance and inequality provoke resistance. However, when the dominant consensus is that there is no racism, minority groups and their protests or other forms of resistance have a very hard time to be taken seriously (Essed, 1991). In systems of apartheid and officially sanctioned segregation, things are clear-cut, and the power difference so blatant that the enemy is well defined, and resistance well focused.

However, in modern, increasingly pluralist societies that have laws and even prevalent norms against (blatant) prejudice, discrimination and racism, this is much less the case. If tolerance is promoted as a national myth, as is the case for the Netherlands, it is much more difficult for minority groups to challenge remaining inequalities, to take unified action and to gain credibility and support among the (white) dominant group. Indeed, they may be seen as oversensitive, exaggerating or overdemanding. The more flexible the system of inequality, the more difficult it is to fight it.

The white consensus that denies the prevalence of racism thus is a very powerful element in its reproduction, especially since successful resistance requires public attention, media coverage and at least partial recognition of grievances. If leading politicians and the media refuse to acknowledge that there is a serious problem, there will be no public debate, no change of public opinion and hence no change in the system of power relations. Change in that case can only be put on the agenda by actively creating the kind of public 'problems' that can no longer be overlooked, such as demonstrations or even 'riots'. Other serious problems, such as high minority unemployment or educational 'underachievement', may well be recognized by the elites, but it is routine to deny that they have anything to do with racism. 'Occasional, unintentional discrimination' is merely taken as one, marginal element in such social problems.

We see that the social functions of the denial of racism are closely associated with the political ones. Decision-making, agenda-setting and public opinion management, both nationally and locally, favour a definition of the ethnic or racial situation in which the element of 'racism' is carefully eliminated, simply because it implies that *we* are the real problem, and not *they*. Immigration, employment, education or social policies, thus, need to be founded on an ideology that skilfully combines humanitarian values and self-interest.

By selectively attributing racism to the extreme Right, it is both denied as being a characteristic of the own ingroup of moderate white citizens, and at the same time better manageable, for instance by occasionally prosecuting the more overt right-wing racists. Recognizing that many subtle forms of everyday racism are rife throughout society would be lending support to a form of sociopolitical analysis that is no longer manageable: if it is true, how can it be changed? After all, we already have laws against discrimination, and if these do not work properly, what else can we do to change the 'mentality' of the people? The result of such complex underlying structures of political decision-making is that overall denial is flexibly coupled with incidental admissions of the more blatant 'exceptions' to the rule.

We see that the denial of racism is not only part of a strategy of personal, institutional or social impression management and ideological self-defence, it also is a form of sociopolitical management. It helps control resistance, and at the same time makes political problems of an ethnically or racially pluralist society more manageable. In sum, denial is a major management strategy.

Finally, we may ask whether the denial of racism also has more specific cultural functions. Obviously, since different groups and their respective cultures are involved, and racism also requires definition in terms of cultural hegemony, its denial should also have cultural dimensions. One such dimension is the combination of denying racism or ethnocentrism with the self-affirmation of tolerance as a feature of contemporary 'western' culture. In the same way as democracy, technology, Christianity and western values are thus, at least implicitly, presented in textbooks, political discourse and the media, as superior to other cultures, also western 'tolerance' is contrasted with, for example, intolerant cultures, at present especially with Muslim fundamentalism (Said, 1981).

Western discourse during the Rushdie affair is a clear case in point. Public debate during this affair focused not only on freedom of speech and the arts, but at the same time on stereotypes about the fundamentalist if not 'fanatical' elements of Muslim culture. That anti-Arab racism played a prominent role in this debate was emphatically denied, e.g. by claiming universality of western values. In other words, in the same way as white people may deny racism and at the same time present themselves as tolerant citizens, western culture as a whole may deny racism or ethnocentrism, and emphasize tolerance.

That such cultural claims are closely linked with the management of world politics, as was also shown during the Gulf War, hardly needs to be spelled out. The same is true, more generally, in the management of the relations between the North and the South, e.g. through strategies of denying neo-colonialism or imperialism, self-interest in international aid and by affirming the 'leading' role

of the western world. In sum, the western denial of racism and ethnocentrism, and its social, political and cultural implications, plays a role from the level of interpersonal relations, to the global level of intercultural and international relations. At all levels, such denial functions essentially to manage resistance, dissent and opposition and hence as a strategy in the reproduction of hegemony (Lauren, 1988).

Conversation

Everyday conversation is at the heart of social life. Whether in informal situations, with family members or friends, or on the job with colleagues or clients or within a multitude of institutions, informal talk constitutes a crucial mode of social interaction. At the same time, conversations are a major conduit of social 'information-processing', and provide the context for the expression and persuasive conveyance of shared knowledge and beliefs.

In ethnically mixed societies, minority groups and ethnic relations are a major topic of everyday conversation. Whether through direct personal experience, or indirectly through the mass media, white people in Europe and North America learn about minorities or immigrants, formulate their own opinions and thus informally reproduce – and occasionally challenge – the dominant consensus on ethnic affairs through informal everyday talk.

Our extensive discourse analytical research into the nature of such everyday talk about ethnic affairs, based on some 170 interviews conducted in the Netherlands and California, shows that such informal talk has a number of rather consistent properties (van Dijk, 1984, 1987a):

1. Topics are selected from a rather small range of subjects, and focus on sociocultural differences, deviance and competition. Most topics explicitly or implicitly deal with interpersonal, social, cultural or economic 'threats' of the dominant white group, society or culture.
2. Story-telling is not, as would be usual, focused on entertaining, but takes place within an argumentative framework. Stories serve as the strong, while personally experienced, premises of a generally negative conclusion, such as 'We are not used to that here', 'They should learn the language' or 'The government should do something about that.'
3. Style, rhetoric and conversational interaction generally denote critical distance, if not negative attitudes towards minorities or immigration. However, current norms of tolerance control expressions of evaluations in such a way that discourse with strangers (such as interviewers) is generally rather mitigated. Strong verbal aggression tends to be avoided.
4. Overall, speakers follow a double strategy of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation.

It is within this latter strategy also that disclaimers, such as 'I have nothing against Arabs, *but* . . .' have their specific functions (Scott and Lyman, 1968).

Such a denial may be called 'apparent', because the denial is not supported by evidence that the speaker does not have anything against 'them'. On the contrary, the denial often serves as the face-keeping move introducing a generally negative assertion, following the invariable *but*, sometimes stressed, as in the following example from a Dutch woman:

(1) uhh . . . how they are and that is mostly just fine, people have their own religion have their own way of life, and I have abso*lutely* nothing against that, *but*, it *is* a fact that if their way of life begins to differ from mine to an *extent* that . . . .

Talking about the main topic of cultural difference, the denial here focuses on relative tolerance for such cultural differences, which, however, is clearly constrained. The differences should not be too great. So, on the one hand, the woman follows the norm of tolerance, but on the other hand, she feels justified to reject others when they 'go too far'. In other words, the denial here presupposes a form of limited social acceptance.

Speakers who are more aware of discrimination and racism, as is the case in California, are even more explicit about the possible inferences of their talk:

(2) It sounds prejudiced, but I think if students only use English . . . .

The use of English, a prominent topic for 'ethnic' conversations in the USA, may be required for many practical reasons, but the speaker realizes that whatever the good arguments he or she may have, it may be heard as a form of prejudice against immigrants. Of course the use of 'It sounds' implies that the speaker does not think he is really prejudiced.

One major form of denial in everyday conversation is the denial of discrimination. Indeed, as also happens in the Right-wing media (see below), we also find reversal in this case: we are the real victims of immigration and minorities. Here are some of the ways people in Amsterdam formulate their denials:

(3) Yes, they have exploited them, that's what they say at least, you know, but well, I don't believe that either. . . .
(4) Big cars, they are better off than we are. If anybody is being discriminated against, our children are. That's what I make of it.
(5) And the only thing that came from her mouth was I am being discriminated against and the Dutch all have good housing, well it is a big lie, it is not true.
(6) And they say that they are being dismi discri discriminated against. That is not true.
(7) Listen, they always say that foreigners are being discriminated against here. No, *we* are being discriminated against. It is exactly the reverse.

In all these situations, the speakers talk about what they see as threats or lies by immigrants: a murder in (3), cheating on welfare in (4), a radio programme where a black woman says she is discriminated against in (5), and neighbourhood services in (6) and (7). In conversations such reversals may typically be heard in working-class neighbourhoods where crime is attributed to minorities, or where

alleged favouritism (e.g. in housing) is resented. Poor whites thus feel that they are victims of inadequate social and urban policies, but instead of blaming the authorities or the politicians, they tend to blame the newcomers who, in their eyes, are so closely related to the changing, i.e. deteriorating, life in the inner city. And if *they* are defined as those who are responsible, such a role is inconsistent with the claim that *they* are discriminated against (Phizacklea and Miles, 1979).

Note that this consensus is not universal. Negative behaviour may be observed, but without generalization and with relevant comparisons to Dutch youths:

(8) And that was also, well I am sorry, but they were foreigners, they were apparently Moroccans who did that. But God, all young people are aggressive, whether it is Turkish youth, or Dutch youth, or Surinamese youth, is aggressive. Particularly because of discrimination uhh that we have here . . .

Here discrimination is not reversed, and the young immigrants are represented as victims of discrimination, which is used to explain and hence to excuse some of their 'aggressiveness'. Such talk, however, is rather exceptional.

The Press

Many of the 'ethnic events' people talk about in everyday life are not known from personal experiences, but from the media. At least until recently, in many parts of Western Europe and even in some regions of North America, most white people had few face-to-face dealings with members of minority groups. Arguments in everyday talk, thus, may be about crime or cultural differences they read about in the press, and such reports are taken as 'proof' of the negative attitudes the speakers have about minorities.

Our analyses of thousands of reports in the press in Britain and the Netherlands (van Dijk, 1991), largely confirm the common-sense interpretations of the readers: a topical analysis shows that crime, cultural differences, violence ('riots'), social welfare and problematic immigration are among the major recurrent topics of ethnic affairs reporting. In other words, there are marked parallels between topics of talk and media topics.

Overall, with some changes over the last decade, the dominant picture of minorities and immigrants is that of *problems* (Hartmann and Husband, 1974). Thus the conservative and right-wing press tends to focus on the problems minorities and immigrants are seen to create (in housing, schooling, unemployment, crime, etc.), whereas the more liberal press (also) focuses on the problems minorities have (poverty, discrimination), but which *we* (white liberals) do something about. On the other hand, many topics that are routine in the coverage of white people, groups or institutions tend to be ignored, such as their contribution to the economy, political organization, culture and in general all topics that characterize the everyday lives of minorities, and their own, active contributions to the society as a whole. Thus, in many respects, except when involved in

Practices of newsgathering as well as patterns of quotation also show that minorities and their institutions have literally little to say in the press. First of all, especially in Europe, there are virtually no minority journalists, so that the perspective, inside knowledge and experience, prevailing attitudes and necessary sources of journalists tend to be all-white, as are also the government agencies, police and other institutions that are the main sources of news in the press (van Dijk, 1988a, 1988b). Even on ethnic events minority spokespersons are less quoted, less credibly quoted, and if they are quoted their opinions are often 'balanced' by the more 'neutral' comments of white spokespersons. Especially on delicate topics, such as discrimination, prejudice and racism, minority representatives or experts are very seldom heard in a credible, authoritative way. If at all, such quotes are often presented as unwarranted or even ridiculous accusations.

It is at this point where the overall strategy of denial has one of its discursive manifestations in press reports. Of course, as may be expected, there is a difference between liberal, conservative and right-wing newspapers in this respect. Note, however, that there are virtually no explicitly anti-racist newspapers in Europe and North America. The official norm, even on the Right, is that 'we are all against racism', and the overall message is, therefore, that serious accusations of racism are a figment of the imagination.

Liberal newspapers, however, do pay attention to stories of explicit discrimination, e.g. in employment (though *rarely* in their own newsrooms or news reports), whereas right-wing extremism is usually dealt with in critical terms, although such coverage may focus on violent or otherwise newsworthy incidents rather than on racist attitudes per se. By such means ethnic or racial inequality is redefined as marginal, that is, as individualized or outside the consensus. Thus, the Dutch liberal press extensively reports cases (accusations) of discrimination, and the same is true in the USA. In the right-wing press, discrimination is also covered, but from a different perspective. Here, it is usually covered as a preposterous accusation, preferably against 'ordinary' people, or embedded in explanations or excuses (the act was provoked).

Whereas discrimination gets rather wide attention in the press, racism does not. Indeed, discrimination is seldom qualified as a manifestation of racism. One of the reasons is that racism is still often understood as an ideology of white supremacy, or as the kind of practices of the extreme Right. Since the large majority of the press does not identify with the extreme Right, any qualification of everyday discriminatory practices as 'racism' is resolutely rejected.

For large sections of the press, only anti-racists see such everyday racism as racism, which results in the marginalization of anti-racists as a radical, 'loony' group. For much of the press, at least in Britain, the real enemies, therefore, are the anti-racists: they are intolerant, anti-British, busybodies, who see racism everywhere, even in 'innocent' children's books, and even in the press.

It is not surprising, therefore, that reports on general aspects of racism in one's own society or group tend to be rare, even in the liberal press. Anti-racist writers, researchers or action groups have less access to the media, and their activities or opinions tend to be more or less harshly scorned, if not ridiculed. For the right-wing press, moreover, they are the real [illegible]

attributed to a multicultural society, because they not only attack venerable institutions (such as the police, government or business), but also provide a competing but fully incompatible definition of the ethnic situation. It is this symbolic competition for the definition of the situation and the intellectual struggle over the definition of society's morals, that pitches the right-wing press against left-wing, anti-racist intellectuals, teachers, writers and action groups.

Let us examine in more detail how exactly the press engages in this denial of racism. Most of our examples are taken from the British press, but it would not be difficult to find similar examples in the Dutch, German and French press. Because of its long history of slavery and segregation, the notion of white racism is more broadly accepted in the USA, even when today's prevailing ideology is that, now minorities have equal rights, racism is largely a thing of the past.

Racism and the Press

The denial of racism in and by the press is of course most vehement when the press itself is the target of accusations. Reflecting similar reactions by other editors of Dutch newspapers to our own research on racism in the press, the Editor-in-Chief of a major elite weekly, *Intermediair*, catering especially for social scientists and the business community, writes the following in a letter:

(9) In particular, what you state about the coverage of minorities remains unproven and an unacceptable caricature of reality. Your thesis 'that the tendency of most reports is that ethnic minorities cause problems for us' is in my opinion not only not proven, but simply incorrect (*translated from the Dutch*).

This reaction was inspired by a brief summary of mostly international research on the representation of minorities in the press. The Editor's denial is not based on (other) research, but simply stated as a 'fact'. It is not surprising that the article, on recent news research, was not published despite my having been initially invited to write such a piece.

Other editors take an even more furious stand, and challenge the very academic credentials of the researcher and the university, as is the case by the Editor of the major conservative popular daily in the Netherlands, *De Telegraaf*, well known for its biased reporting on minorities, immigrants and refugees:

(10) Your so-called scientific research does not in any sense prove your slanderous insinuations regarding the contents of our newspaper, is completely irrelevant and raises doubt about the prevailing norms of scientific research and social prudence at the University of Amsterdam (*translated from the Dutch*).

We see that whatever 'proof' may be brought in one's painstaking analyses of news reports, the reaction is one of flat denial and counter-attack by discrediting the researcher. Examples like these may be multiplied at random. No newspaper, including (or especially) the more liberal ones, will accept even a moderate charge of being biased, while allegations of racism are rejected violently. Recall that these newspapers, especially in Europe, generally employ no, or only one

With such an editorial attitude towards racism, there is a general reluctance to identify racist events as such in society at large. Let us examine the principal modes of such denials in the press. Examples are taken from the British press coverage of ethnic affairs in 1985 (for analysis of other properties of these examples, see van Dijk, 1991). Brief summaries of the context of each fragment of news discourse are given between parentheses.

Positive Self-Presentation

The semantic basis of denial is 'truth' as the writer sees it. The denial of racism in the press, therefore, presupposes that the journalist or columnist believes that his or her own group or country is essentially 'tolerant' towards minorities or immigrants. Positive self-presentation, thus, is an important move in journalistic discourse, and should be seen as the argumentative denial of the accusations of anti-racists:

(11) [Handsworth] Contrary to much doctrine, and acknowledging a small malevolent fascist fringe, this is a remarkably tolerant society. But tolerance would be stretched were it to be seen that enforcement of law adopted the principle of reverse discrimination (*Daily Telegraph*, Editorial, 11 September).

(12) [Racial attacks and policing] If the ordinary British taste for decency and tolerance is to come through, it will need positive and unmistakable action (*Daily Telegraph*, Editorial, 13 August).

(13) [Racial attacks against Asians] . . . Britain's record for absorbing people from different backgrounds, peacefully and with tolerance, is second to none. The descendants of Irish and Jewish immigrants will testify to that. It would be tragic to see that splendid reputation tarnished now (*Sun*, Editorial, 14 August).

(14) [Immigration] Our traditions of fairness and tolerance are being exploited by every terrorist, crook, screwball and scrounger who wants a free ride at our expense. . . . Then there are the criminals who sneak in as political refugees or as family members visiting a distant relative (*Mail*, 28 November).

(15) We have racism too – and that is what is behind the plot. It is not white racism. It is black racism. . . . But who is there to protect the white majority? . . . Our tolerance is our strength, but we will not allow anyone to turn it into our weakness. (*Sun*, 24 October).

These examples not only assert or presuppose white British 'tolerance', but at the same time define its boundaries. Tolerance might be interpreted as a position of weakness and, therefore, it should not be 'stretched' too far, lest 'every terrorist', 'criminal' or other immigrant, takes advantage of it. Affirmative action or liberal immigration laws, thus, can only be seen as a form of reverse discrimination, and hence as a form of self-destruction of white Britain. Ironically, therefore, these examples are self-defeating because of their internal contradictions. It is not tolerance per se that is aimed at, but rather the limitations preventing its 'excesses'. Note that in example (15) positive self-presentation is at the same time combined with the well-known move of reversal. They are the real racists', 'We are the real victims' W[illegible]

Denial and Counter-Attack

Having constructed a positive self-image of white Britain, the conservative and tabloid press especially engages in attacks against those who hold a different view, at the same time defending those who agree with its position, as was the case during the notorious Honeyford affair (Honeyford was headmaster of a Bradford school who was suspended, then reinstated and finally let go with a golden handshake, after having written articles on multicultural education which most of the parents of his mostly Asian students found racist). The attacks on the anti-racists often embody denials of racism:

(16) [Reaction of 'race lobby' against Honeyford] Why is it that this lobby have chosen to persecute this man. . . . It is not because he is a racist; it is precisely because he is not a racist, yet has dared to challenge the attitudes, behaviour and approach of the ethnic minority professionals (*Daily Telegraph*, 6 September).

(17) [Honeyford and other cases] Nobody is less able to face the truth than the hysterical 'anti-racist' brigade. Their intolerance is such that they try to silence or sack anyone who doesn't toe their party-line (*Sun*, 23 October, column by John Vincent).

(18) [Honeyford] For speaking commonsense he's been vilified; for being courageous he's been damned, for refusing to concede defeat his enemies can't forgive him. . . . I have interviewed him and I am utterly convinced that he hasn't an ounce of racism in his entire being (*Mail*, 18 September, column by Lynda Lee-Potter).

(19) [Honeyford quits] Now we know who the true racists are (*Sun* Editorial, 30 November).

These examples illustrate several strategic moves in the press campaign against anti-racists. First, as we have seen above, denial is closely linked to the presupposition of 'truth': Honeyford is presented as defending the 'truth', namely the failure and the anti-British nature of multiculturalism. Secondly, consequent denials often lead to the strategic move of reversal: *we* are not the racists, *they* are the 'true racists'. This reversal also implies, thirdly, a reversal of the charges: Honeyford, and those who sympathize with him, are the victims, not his Asian students and their parents. Consequently, the anti-racists are the enemy: *they* are the ones who persecute innocent, ordinary British citizens, *they* are the ones who are intolerant. Therefore, victims who resist their attackers may be defined as folk heroes, who 'dare' the 'anti-racist brigade'.

Note also, in example (17), that the 'truth', as the supporters of Honeyford see it, is self-evident, and based on common sense. Truth and common sense are closely related notions in such counter-attacks, and reflect the power of the consensus, as well as the mobilization of popular support by 'ordinary' (white) British people. Apart from marginalizing Asian parents and other anti-racists by locating them outside of the consensus, and beyond the community of ordinary people like 'us', such appeals to common sense also have powerful ideological implications: self-evident truth is seen as 'natural', and hence the position of the

others as 'unnatural' or even as 'crazy'. The anti-racist Left, therefore, is often called 'crazy' or 'loony' in the right-wing British press.

Moral Blackmail

One element that was very prominent in the Honeyford affair, as well as in similar cases, was the pretence of censorship: the anti-racists not only ignore the 'truth' about multicultural society, they also prevent others (us) from telling the truth. Repeatedly, thus, journalists and columnists argue that this 'taboo' and this 'censorship' must be broken in order to be able to tell the 'truth', as was the case after the disturbances in Tottenham:

(20) [Tottenham] The time has come to state the truth without cant and without hypocrisy . . . the strength to face the facts without being silenced by the fear of being called racist (*Mail*, 9 October, column by Lynda Lee-Potter).

Such examples also show that the authors feel morally blackmailed, while at the same time realizing that to 'state the truth', meaning 'to say negative things about minorities', may well be against the prevalent norms of tolerance and understanding. Clamouring for the 'truth', thus, expresses a dilemma, even if the dilemma is only apparent: the apparent dilemma is a rhetorical strategy to accuse the opponent of censorship or blackmail, not the result of moral soul-searching and a difficult decision. After all, the same newspapers extensively *do* write negative things about young blacks, and never hesitate to write what they see as the 'truth'. Nobody 'silences' them, and the taboo is only imaginary. On the contrary, the right-wing press in Britain reaches many millions of readers.

Thus, this strategic play of denial and reversal at the same time involves the construction of social roles in the world of ethnic strife, such as allies and enemies, victims, heroes and oppressors. In many respects, such discourse mimics the discourse of anti-racists by simply reverting the major roles: victims become oppressors, those who are in power become victims.

Subtle Denials

Denials are not always explicit. There are many ways to express doubt, distance or non-acceptance of statements or accusations by others. When the official Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) in 1985 published a report on discrimination in the UK, outright denial of the facts would hardly be credible. Other discursive means, such as quotation marks, and the use of words like 'claim' or 'allege', presupposing doubt on the part of the writer, may be employed in accounting for the facts, as is the case in the following editorial from the *Daily Telegraph*:

(21) In its report which follows a detailed review of the operation of the 1976 Race Relations Act, the Commission claims that ethnic minorities continue to suffer high levels of discrimination and disadvantage (*Daily Telegraph*, 1 August).

Such linguistic tricks do not go unnoticed, as we may see in the following reaction to this passage in a letter from Peter Newsam, then Director of the CRE.

(22) Of the Commission you say 'it claims that ethnic minorities continue to suffer high levels of discrimination and disadvantage'. This is like saying that someone 'claims' that July was wet. It was. And it is also a fact supported by the weight of independent research evidence that discrimination on racsal grounds, in employment, housing and services, remains at a disconcertingly high level (*Daily Telegraph*, 7 August).

Denials, thus, may be subtly conveyed by expressing doubt or distance. Therefore, the very notion of 'racism' usually appears between quotation marks, especially also in the headlines. Such scare quotes are not merely a journalistic device of reporting opinions or controversial points of view. If that were the case, also the opinions with which the newspaper happens to agree would have to be put between quotes, which is not always the case. Rather, apart from signalling journalistic doubt and distance, the quotes also connote 'unfounded accusation'. The use of quotes around the notion of 'racism' has become so much routine, that even in cases where the police or the courts themselves established that racism was involved in a particular case, the conservative press may maintain the quotes out of sheer habit.

Mitigation

Our conceptual analysis of denial already showed that denial may also be implied by various forms of mitigation, such as downtoning, using euphemisms or other circumlocutions that minimize the act itself or the responsibility of the accused. In the same Editorial of the *Daily Telegraph* we quoted above, we find the following statement:

(23) [CRE report] No one would deny the fragile nature of race relations in Britain today or that there is misunderstanding and distrust between parts of the community (*Daily Telegraph*, Editorial, 1 August).

Thus, instead of inequality or racism, race relations are assumed to be 'fragile', whereas 'misunderstanding and distrust' is also characteristic of these relations. Interestingly, this passage also explicitly denies the prevalence of denials and, therefore, might be read as a concession: there *are* problems. However, the way this concession is rhetorically presented by way of various forms of mitigation, suggests, in the context of the rest of the same Editorial, that the concession is apparent. Such apparent concessions are another major form of disclaimer in discourse about ethnic relations, as we also have them in statements like: 'There are also intelligent blacks, but . . .', or 'I know that minorities sometimes have problems, but . . .'. Note also that in the example from the *Daily Telegraph* the mitigation not only appears in the use of euphemisms, but also in the *redistribution of responsibility*, and hence in the denial of blame. Not we (whites) are mainly responsible for the tensions between the communities, but everybody

is, as is suggested by the use of the impersonal existential phrase: '*There is* misunderstanding . . .'. Apparently, one effective move of denial is to either dispute responsible agency, or to conceal agency.

Defence and Offence

On the other hand, in its attacks against the anti-racists, the right-wing press is not always that subtle. On the contrary, they may engage precisely in the 'diatribes' they direct at their opponents:

(24) [Anti-fascist rally] The evening combined emotive reminders of the rise of Nazism with diatribes against racial discrimination and prejudice today (*Daily Telegraph*, 1 October).

(25) [Black sections] In the more ideologically-blinkered sections of his [Kinnock's] party . . . they seem to gain pleasure from identifying all difficulties experienced by immigrant groups, particularly Afro-Caribbeans, as the result of racism . . . (*Daily Telegraph*, Editorial, 14 September).

(26) [Worker accused of racism] . . . The really alarming thing is that some of these pocket Hitlers of local government are moving into national politics. It's time we set about exposing their antics while we can. Forewarned is forearmed (*Mail*, Editorial, 26 October).

These examples further illustrate that denial of discrimination, prejudice and racism is not merely a form of self-defence or positive self-presentation. Rather, it is at the same time an element of attack against what they define as 'ideologically blinkered' opponents, as we also have seen in the move of reversal in other examples. Anti-racism is associated with the 'loony left', and attacking it therefore also has important ideological and political implications, and not just moral ones.

'Difficultiees' of the Afro-Caribbean community may be presupposed, though not spelled out forcefully and in detail, but such presuppositions rather take the form of an apparent concession. That is, whatever the causes of these 'difficulties', as they are euphemistically called, they can not be the result of racism. Implicitly, by attributing 'pleasure' to those who explain the situation of the blacks, the newspaper also suggests that the Left has an interest in such explanations and, therefore, even welcomes racism. This strategy is familiar in many other attacks against anti-racists: 'If there were no racism, they would invent it'. It hardly needs to be spelled out that such a claim again implies a denial of racism.

The amalgamation of comparisons and metaphors used in these attacks is quite interesting. That is, in one example an ironic reference is made to the 'emotive reminders' of Nazism, and in another these same opponents of Nazism are qualified as 'pocket Hitlers'. Yet, this apparent inconsistency in sociopolitical labelling has a very precise function. By referring to their opponents in terms of 'pocket Hitlers' the newspapers obviously distance themselves from the fascist opinions and practices that are often part of the more radical accusations against the Right. At the same time, by way of the usual reversal, they categorize their opponents precisely in terms of their own accusations, and thus put them in a role these opponents most clearly would abhor.

Thus, the anti-racist Left is associated with fascist practices, ideological blinkers and antics. Apart from their anti-racist stance, it is, however, their (modest) political influence which particularly enrages the right-wing press – although virtually powerless at the national level, and even within their own (Labour) party, some of the anti-racists have made it into local councils, and therefore control (some) money, funding and other forms of political influence. That is, they have at least some counter-power, and it is this power and its underlying ideology that is challenged by a press which itself controls the news supply of millions of readers. What the denial of racism and the concomitant attacks against the anti-racists in education or politics is all about, therefore, is a struggle over the definition of the ethnic situation. Thus, their ideological and political opponents are seen as symbolic competitors in the realm of moral influence. Whether directed at a headmaster or against other ordinary white British or not, what the right-wing press is particularly concerned about is its own image: by attacking the anti-racists, it is in fact defending itself.

Parliamentary Discourse

In close symbiosis with the mass media, politics plays a prominent role in the definition of the ethnic situation. In Western Europe, decision-making by the administration and the bureaucracy, and parliamentary debates in the 1980s and 1990s increasingly deal with ethnic affairs, immigration and refugees. Persistent social inequalities, unemployment, affirmative action, educational 'disadvantage', popular resentment against immigration and the arrival of 'waves' of new refugees from the South, are among the major topics on the political agenda.

Our analysis of elite discourse, therefore, also needs to pay attention to parliamentary discourse, also because different ideologies, opinions and interests may openly clash there, especially also about 'delicate' issues such as minorities and immigration. Therefore, we examined some major debates on these topics in the parliaments of the UK, the Netherlands, France and Germany, as well as in the US Congress.

Note that such discourse, perhaps more than any other discourse, is 'for the record'. All speeches and even spontaneous interruptions are recorded and published, even if some countries allow later 'editing'. Speeches, therefore, are seldom spontaneous, and usually carefully prepared, written statements read out loud. For delicate topics such as ethnic affairs, we may expect that such discourse is heavily monitored, politically as well as morally. With the exception of some extremist right-wing parties, e.g. the Front National in France, blatantly racist talk is very rare in present day western parliaments.

However, as we have seen above, there are more indirect and subtle ways to express underlying opinions and attitudes, whether more liberal or more conservative ones. Despite the difference in style and function, we found that parliamentary discourse has some striking resemblances with other forms of talk about ethnic minorities, such as positive self-presentation, denial of racism and negative other-presentation. Therefore, let us examine, finally, what specific patterns the denial of racism takes in western parliaments.

Nationalist Self-Glorification

Parliament is the prime forum for nationalistic rhetoric. This is particularly true when international norms and values, such as democracy, equal rights and tolerance are involved. Accusations of racism in such a context, may easily be heard as a moral indictment of the nation as a whole, and are therefore permitted, though resented, only in partisan debates, in which one party accuses the other of racism. After all, racism is always *elsewhere*, and always a property of the *others*.

Against this background, it may be expected that any debate on ethnic affairs, and particularly those in which the rights of minorities or immigrants are at stake, nationalist positive self-presentation is an important strategic prelude to statements that precisely intend to limit such rights. Let us give some examples from each of these parliaments. All examples are taken from the parliamentary records of the respective countries, and from debates held between 1985 and 1990. The detailed context of the discussion is not given here, nor are the speakers or parties identified. For the purpose of this article we merely identify the countries involved, e.g. in order to show the similarity of such talk across national boundaries.

(27) Our debate today not only regards the refugees, but our whole society, and the responsibility of Europe and the Netherlands to maintain fundamental human rights in the world. The right of asylum is the national component of a consistent human rights policy (the Netherlands).

(28) I believe that we are a wonderfully fair country. We stick to the rules unlike some foreign governments (UK).

(29) Our country has long been open to foreigners, a tradition of hospitality going back, beyond the Revolution, to the *Ancien Régime* (France).

(30) France, which has shown the world the road to democracy and to human rights, France land of welcome and asylum, France present on five continents, could not yield to racial hate (France).

(31) I know of no other country on this earth that gives more prominence to the rights of resident foreigners than does this bill in our country (Germany).

(32) This is a nation whose values and traditions now excite the world, as we all know. I think we all have a deep pride in American views, American ideals, American government, American principles, which excite hundreds of millions of people around the world who struggle for freedom (USA).

(33) There are so many great things about our country, all the freedoms that we have, speech, religion, the right to vote and choose our leaders and of course our greatness lies in our mobility, the ability to each and every one of us, regardless of the circumstances of our birth, to rise in American society, to pursue our individual dreams (USA).

Although nationalist rhetoric may differ in different countries (it is usually more exuberant in France and in the USA, for instance), the basic strategy of positive self-presentation appears in all Houses: we are fair, respect human rights, have a long tradition of tolerance, etc. It is not uncommon to hear in *each* parliament, that at least some representatives think of their own country as the most liberal, freedom-loving, democratic, etc. in the world.

Fair, But . . .

Such self-glorification, especially when introducing a debate on minorities or immigration, has various functions in parliamentary discourse. For those groups or parties that oppose legislation in favour of minorities or immigrants, positive self-presentation often functions as a disclaimer, that is, as an introduction for a '*but*', followed by arguments in favour of special restrictions, as is also the case in the following fragment from a radio interview with Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers:

(34) In practice, we should come to opportunities and possibilities for them, but in practice we should also come to a less soft approach. There should be a line like: we also hold them responsible [literally: 'we address them'].

Elsewhere we find a nearly routine combination of fairness on the one hand, and firmness, realism, pragmatism, etc., on the other hand:

(35) National and international responsibility for people in emergency situations, combined with obligations that follow from agreements, are our policy principles. This should remain as it is. But of course we need to take measures, especially when it is clear that many improper, not bona fide, apparently unfounded applications for asylum are being made, and that in some cases also the problems people experience are being exploited for commercial ends (The Netherlands).

(36) It is fair to establish visa controls as long as there is mutual agreement about them between the countries involved. They are the best way to control immigration fairly, so that those who properly qualify to come here or to leave this country to visit other countries can do so. Such controls make sure that people have the right qualifications for travel (UK).

(37) If we are to work seriously for harmony, non-discrimination and equality of opportunity in our cities, that has to be accompanied by firm and fair immigration control (UK).

(38) The period of expansion of our country has been at an end for more than 15 years, and this population of foreigners lives in the midst of a French population that is deeply touched by recession and unemployment, a question we must deal with humanely but also reasonably, because I do not hesitate to say that after the time of illusions comes necessarily that of realism (France).

(39) It belongs to this fair balance of interests that the further immigration of foreigners must be limited, because for each society there are limits to the ability and the readiness to integrate (Germany).

(40) This substitute offers the House of Representatives an opportunity to enact a landmark civil rights bill that is both fair and pragmatic (USA).

This remarkably similar rhetoric of fairness ('fair, but strict', etc.) in the different countries also seeks to combine two opposed ideological or political aims, namely the humanitarian values of tolerance or hospitality on the one hand, and the common-sense values of 'realism' on the other. In other words, the humanitarian aims are recognized, but at the same time they are rejected as being too idealistic and, therefore, impractical in the business of everyday political

management and decision-making. The reference to fairness also serves as an element in a 'balance', namely in order to mitigate the negative implications of proposed legislation, such as limitations on further immigration in the European debates, and limitations on the 1990 Civil Rights Bill (eventually vetoed by President Bush) in the USA.

Positive presentation of such legislation, and of the parties or groups who support it, also involves strategic argumentative moves such as apparent altruism ('It is in their own best interests'), choice of the lesser evil ('Restriction of immigration prevents conflicts in the inner cities') and other moves that emphasize that the speaker or party has the national interest, the interests of their own (white) population, as well the interests of the minorities and the immigrants or refugees in mind. Such a 'predicament' is sketched by the Dutch Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr van den Broek:

(41) The government is confronted with a Dutch society which reacts dividedly to the increasing number of asylum applications. [Some people want a liberal admission policy.] On the other hand, there are more or less latent movements who consider the influx of aliens as a threat to Dutch society.

Interestingly, governments tend to listen especially to those citizens who agree with the attitudes such governments have helped to create in the first place, as was the case with the refugee scare in the Netherlands during the last few years. That is, there is no real predicament, only a semblance of balancing popular feelings and interests. By using the populist argument for immigration control, thus, the government is able to legitimate its own policies by claiming support it has manufactured itself. This is done by creating a panic about 'waves' of refugees entering the country, a definition of the situation that is largely adopted also by the press, so that it also reaches the public at large (van Dijk, 1988c).

Denial of Racism

In such a political context of public impression management, the denial of racism plays a prominent role. Whatever the political orientation or party involved, including the extremist Right, all parliamentarians, emphatically reject any accusation or suggestion of prejudice, discrimination or racism. Indeed, the more racist the opinions professed, the more insistent are the denials of racism, as may be apparent in the following quotes from representatives of the Front National in the French Assemblée Nationale:

(42) We are neither racist nor xenophobic. Our aim is only that, quite naturally, there be a hierarchy, because we are dealing with France, and France is the country of the French.

(43) No, the French are neither racist, nor antisemitic, nor xenophobic nor revisionist. They may be worried in the face of an immigration which is out of control, in the face of an Islam pure and hard that might cross the Mediterranean. But the French stay tolerant.

Note that in both cases, an explicit or implicit *but* follows the denial. In the first case, the speaker (the leader of the Front National, Le Pen) even claims that it is 'natural' to have a hierarchy between the own group, the French, and the immigrants. This assignment of a 'natural' right to a superior position, is at the heart of racist ideologies. The second example is more indirect, and focuses on the 'worries' of ordinary French people, faced with a different culture and a different religion. Besides the discursive and political strategy of populism, which is very prominent in such debates ('The people would resent it', 'You should listen to what ordinary French, English . . . people say'), we also find the element of euphemism: we are not racist, only worried. Here is a more sophisticated example of such a strategy:

(44) The French are not racist. But, facing this continuous increase of the foreign population in France, one has witnessed the development, in certain cities and neighbourhoods, of reactions that come close to xenophobia. In the eyes of the French unemployed man, for instance, the foreigner may easily become a rival, towards whom a sentiment of animosity may threaten to appear.

Following the usual *but*, we do not find, as in other disclaimers, a negative statement about immigrants, but rather an explanation of the reaction of the 'common man' (women are apparently not involved). Note that the way this explanation is formulated ('continuous increase', 'rival') suggests understanding, if not an excuse, as in the usual accounts of racism in terms of economic competition. The denial of racism itself is rather complex, however. It is a denial that holds for the French in general. It is followed by a partial concession, duly limited by heavy mitigation and hedging ('coming close to xenophobia', 'a sentiment of animosity may threaten to appear'), as well as limited in place ('in certain cities'). In other words, prejudice, discrimination and racism are local incidents, and should also be seen as being provoked by continuous immigration, arguments we also found in the right-wing British press.

When restrictive measures are being debated, those who support them feel impelled to remind their audience, and the public at large, that such political decisions have nothing to do with prejudice or racism:

(45) I hope that people outside, whether they are black or white and wherever they come from, will recognize that these are not major changes resulting from prejudice (UK).

(46) My Hon. Friend and I will continue to apply a strict but fair system of control, not because we are prejudiced or inhumane, but because we believe that control is needed if all the people who live in our cities are to live together in tolerance and decent harmony (UK).

Such denials need argumentative support. Saying only that the measures are 'fair' may be seen as too flimsy. Therefore, we find the moves we have found earlier, such as concern for the inner cities. Note that such arguments also imply a move of transfer: we are not racist, but the poor people in the inner cities are, and we should avoid exacerbating the mood of resentment among the population

at large. This argument is rather typical of what we have called 'elite racism', which consistently denies racism among the own elite group, but recognizes that others, especially poor, white people may fail to be as tolerant.

Denial and Reproach

In the analysis of the British press, we have found that denials of racism easily transform into attacks against anti-racists. Such a strategy may also be found in parliamentary discourse. Thus, conservative representatives will not accept accusations or even implicit suggestions that their stricter immigration or ethnic minority policies are categorized as racist by other politicians. Since the official norm is 'that we are all tolerant citizens', such allegations are declared unacceptable:

(47) Addressing myself to the people of the left, I repeat again that we are . . . I have noted in your words, my God, terms such as racism and xenophobia, that those who do not support your proposals would be judged with the same terms. It should be understood once and for all: we are not racists because we combat your text (France).

(48) You will allow me to tell you that in no circumstance this debate should be prejudged by insinuating that, on these benches, the only antiracists are over there, whereas we, by opposition, would be racists (France).

(49) Well, now can we also agree this afternoon that you can have different philosophies about how to achieve through law civil rights and equal opportunities for everybody without somehow being anti-civil-rights or being a racist or something like that (USA).

One interesting case may be found in a German debate on the new Aliens Bill. When one of the Green Party representatives qualifies the provisions of the Bill as 'racist', a term that is as unusual in official German discourse as it is in the Netherlands, conservative representatives are furious. Even the Speaker of the Bundestag intervenes:

(50) A chill ran down my back when our colleague . . . said that this bill was a form of institutionalized racism. Whereas the older ones among us had to live twelve years under institutionalized racism, Ladies and Gentlemen, I beg you, and in particular our younger colleagues, to show respect for these terrible experiences, and not to introduce such concepts to our everyday political business.

In other words, evaluations in terms of racism are limited only to the Nazi past, and are banned from official political discourse. At most, the term *Ausländerfeindlichkeit* (literally: animosity against foreigners) may be used. 'Racism' thus is by definition too strong, if only because the present situation cannot be compared to the monstrosities of the Nazis. A similar attitude exists in the Netherlands, where racism is also avoided as a term in public (political, media) discourse because it is understood only in terms of extremist, right-wing ideologies of racial superiority.

Reversal

Although moderate reproaches directed against anti-racist delegates are not uncommon in parliament, reversal is rather exceptional. However, it is quite typical for right-wing party representatives, such as those of the Front National in France. Being routinely accused, also explicitly, of racism, they go beyond mere denial, and reverse the charges. For them, this means that the others, and especially the socialists, allegedly letting in so many immigrants and granting them equal rights, are guilty of what they call 'anti-French racism':

(51) There exists a form of racism, my dear colleagues [interruptions] that is passed over silently, but of which the manifestations nowadays reach an insupportable level and a scope that should concern us: that is anti-French racism.

Another way of reversing the charges is to accuse the anti-racists of being themselves responsible for creating racism, if only by not listening to the people and by letting so many non-European immigrants enter the country:

(52) Well, France today, according to what those creatures of the world tell us who often have come to take refuge in our country . . . France is the least racist country that exists in the world. We can't tolerate hearing it said that France is a racist country. . . . In this respect, this law proposal, because of the debate that is taking place at this moment, secretes and fabricates racism!

These examples taken from several western parliaments show that although the debate may be couched in less extremist terms than in much of the right-wing or tabloid press, or in everyday conversations, rather similar strategies and moves are used to talk about ethnic affairs, Most characteristic of this kind of political discourse is not merely the nationalist self-praise, but also the strategic management of impression: whatever we decide, we are fair. Since, especially in Europe, ethnic minorities, let alone new immigrants and refugees, have virtually no political power, this 'balancing act' of presenting policies as 'firm but fair' is obviously addressed primarily to the dominant white public at large. When defined as humane without being too soft, thus, the government and its supporting parties may be acceptable as essentially reasonable: we take energetic measures, but we are not racist.

In other words, besides managing impressions, such political discourse also manages its own legitimation by manufacturing consent on ethnic policies, and at the same time manages the politics of ethnic affairs, immigration and international relations.

Conclusions

Whether in the streets of the inner city, in the press or in parliament, dominant group members are often engaged in discourse about 'them': ethnic minority

groups, immigrants or refugees, who have come to live in the country. Such discourses, as well as the social cognitions underlying them, are complex and full of contradictions. They may be inspired by general norms of tolerance and acceptance, but also, and sometimes at the same time, by feelings of distrust, resentment or frustration about those 'others'.

Topics, stories and argumentation may thus construct a largely negative picture of minorities or immigrants, e.g. in terms of cultural differences, deviance or competition, as a problem or as a threat to 'our' country, territory, space, housing, employment, education, norms, values, habits or language. Such talk and text, therefore, is not a form of individual discourse, but social, group discourse, and expresses not only individual opinions, but rather socially shared representations.

However, negative talk about minority groups or immigrants may be heard as biased, prejudiced or racist, and as inconsistent with general values of tolerance. This means that such discourse needs to be hedged, mitigated, excused, explained or otherwise managed in such a way that it will not 'count' against the speaker or writer. Face-keeping, positive self-presentation and impression management are the usual strategies that language users have recourse to in such a situation of possible 'loss of face': they have to make sure that they are not misunderstood and that no unwanted inferences are made from what they say.

One of the major strategic ways white speakers and writers engage in such a form of impression management is the denial of racism. They may simply claim they did not say anything negative, or focus on their intentions: it may have sounded negative, but was not intended that way. Similarly, they may mitigate their negative characterization of the others by using euphemisms, implications or vague allusions. They may make apparent concessions, on the one hand, and on the other hand support their negative discourse by arguments, stories or other supporting 'facts'.

Also, speakers and writers may abandon their position of positive self-presentation and self-defence and take a more active, aggressive counter-attack: the ones who levelled the accusations of racism are the real problem, if not the real racists. They are the ones who are intolerant, and they are against 'our' own people. We are the victims of immigration, and we are discriminated against.

It is interesting to note that despite the differences in style for different social groups, such discourse may be found at any social level, and in any social context. That is, both the 'ordinary' white citizens as well as the white elites need to protect their social self-image, and at the same time they have to manage the interpretation and the practices in an increasingly variegated social and cultural world. For the dominant group, this means that dominance relations must be reproduced, at the macro- as well as at the micro-level, both in action as well as in mind.

Negative representations of the dominated group are essential in such a reproduction process. However, such attitudes and ideologies are inconsistent with dominant democratic and humanitarian norms and ideals. This means that the dominant group must protect itself, cognitively and discursively, against the damaging charge of intolerance and racism. Cognitive balance may be restored only by actually being or becoming anti-racist, by accepting minorities and

immigrants as equals, or else by denying racism. It is this choice white groups in Europe and North America are facing. So far they have largely chosen the latter option.

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Strategic Maneuvering: Maintaining a Delicate Balance

Frans H. van Eemeren and Peter Houtlosser

1. Metatheoretical Starting-Points

"Quirites!" This is the infamous one-word speech by which Julius Caesar won his rebellious legions over to fight the republican army in North Africa, in 46 BC. After having fought a great number of battles under Caesar's command, the soldiers had refused to follow him again. Caesar's use of the word *quirites* as form of address had a devastating effect. According to the classical scholar Anton Leeman (1992), 'quirites' was the dignified word a Roman magistrate used to address an assembly. Caesar's use of this word to his soldiers made it clear to them that they had not only lost their privilege of being addressed as *commilitones*, or 'comrades,' but were even no longer entitled to a Roman general's normal form of address for his soldiers: *milites*. "We are *milites*!" they reportedly shouted when they all volunteered to follow Caesar once more into battle. Ceasar's use of the 'neutral' *quirites* as a qualification is an excellent illustration of how the communicative and interactional meaning of argumentative language use can only be grasped if the discourse is first put in a functional perspective in which its social context and the commitments assumed by the participants are duly taken into account.[1]

Argumentation theorists, however, are not just interested in the effectiveness of argumentation in convincing people of a certain viewpoint, but also in the standards argumentative discourse should comply with in order to be sound. For many, the *raison d'être* of the study of argumentation is even the critical analysis of argumentative discourse – i.e., the interpretation and evaluation of actual cases in the light of normative standards for argumentative conduct (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs, 1993, 37). Argumentative discourse is therefore

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a research subject with an empirical dimension as well as a critical dimension, and the study of argumentation can best be seen as part of the broader enterprise that van Eemeren (1990) dubbed 'normative pragmatics.' In the normative pragmatic approach we envisage, argumentative discourse is judged not only in terms of its success in gaining the audience's assent, but also in terms of its problem-solving capacity, i.e., its appropriateness for doing the job of resolving a difference of opinion.[2] Our 'pragma-dialectical' ideal for judging argumentative discourse is to check to what extent the defense of standpoints against critical reactions is in agreement with a procedure for testing the acceptability of standpoints that is 'problem-valid' as well as 'intersubjectively (or conventionally) valid.[3]

2. The Pragma-Dialectical Model of Critical Discussion

The model of 'critical discussion' is the theoretical device developed in pragma-dialectics to define a procedure for testing standpoints critically in the light of commitments assumed in the empirical reality of argumentative discourse (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984).[4] This model provides a description of what argumentative discourse would be like if it were optimally and solely aimed at methodically resolving a difference of opinion about the tenability of a standpoint.[5] It specifies the resolution process, the stages that can analytically be distinguished in this process, and the types of speech act that are instrumental in resolving the difference in each particular stage. In the *confrontation* stage, the difference of opinion is defined. In the *opening* stage, the various kinds of commitment are established that are the starting point of the discussion and serve as a frame of reference during the discussion. In the *argumentation* stage, arguments and critical reactions are exchanged. In the *concluding* stage, the result of the discussion is determined.

In real argumentative discourse, at every stage of the critical discussion projected in the discourse, specific obstacles may arise that can be an impediment to the resolution of the difference of opinion. These impediments are traditionally known as *fallacies*. The pragma-dialectical rules for critical discussion, which provide a procedural definition of the general principles of constructive argumentative discourse, are designed to prevent such obstacles from interfering or from being detected as interfering with the resolution process. Unlike the rules of formal dialectics, which are rules for generating rational arguments, the pragma-dialectical rules do not only pertain to argumentation proper; they aspire to cover all speech acts performed in all stages of a critical discussion. They are supposed to reflect all necessary conditions for resolving a difference by means of argumentative discourse.

The procedures for ensuring critical reasonableness developed in pragma-dialectics not only lay claim to problem-validity, but they are also, as they should be, in various ways based in argumentative reality. On a philosophical level, would-be arguers have a 'pragmatic' rationale for accepting these procedures as guiding principles. The acceptability of the procedures is not derived from any external source of authority or some metaphysical necessity, but depends on their

suitability for resolving a difference of opinion on the merits for which they are designed (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1988). Viewed philosophically, this rationale for judging intersubjective or conventional validity may be called *pragmatic* because pragmatists characteristically decide the value of any proposal on its contribution to solving the problem they are out to solve.[6]

The pragmatic basis of the pragma-dialectical procedures for maintaining critical reasonableness is also apparent from the way taken out of the *Münchhausentrilemma* (Albert, 1985). Ending up in 'infinite regress' or a 'logical circle' is to be avoided. The justifications given at the point in the resolution process where the argumentation starts by 'justificationists' of all makes, whether they favor a 'geometrical' or an 'anthropological' conception of reasonableness, always amount to some philosophical form of *Letzbegründung* that is dialectically arbitrary. More or less axiomatically, a certain starting point is then declared sacrosanct because its truth is evident on the grounds of intellectual intuition or empirical experience. With Barth and Krabbe (1982) and other critical rationalists, we prefer a pragmatic option that is neither final nor philosophically charged. We speak of reasonable argumentation only if the argumentation is backed by a 'concession' which is part of the starting point (explicitly or implicitly) recognized by the other party, irrespective of the kind of reason they may have for this recognition.[7] It is worth noting that this contextual approach, situating argumentation in the actual process of dispute resolution, is hermeneutically in perfect agreement with the 'logical propaedeutic' of the Erlangen school of dialogue logic, which resorts to a starting point that is already given – or, as these German scholars say, "immer schon da" (Kamlah & Lorenzen, 1984).[8]

3. Strategic Maneuvering in Resolving a Difference of Opinion

In a pragma-dialectical analysis, argumentative discourse is 'reconstructed' as an attempt to resolve a difference of opinion.[9] This reconstruction results in an *analytic overview* of the resolution process – a representation of the discourse in terms of a critical discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, 93–94). The analytic overview constitutes the basis for a critical evaluation. It clarifies the difference of opinion at issue and the positions of the participants. It identifies the procedural and substantive premises that serve as the starting point of the discussion. It surveys the arguments and criticisms that are – explicitly or implicitly – advanced, the argument schemes that are used, the argumentation structures that are developed. And it determines the conclusion that is reached. The model of critical discussion provides a survey of all speech acts and combinations of speech acts that operate in the various stages of the resolution process. It therefore serves as a heuristic and analytic tool for the reconstruction of the speech acts that are relevant to resolving a difference of opinion, but may remain implicit or opaque in the actual discourse (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs, 1993).

People engaged in argumentative discourse are characteristically oriented toward resolving a difference of opinion and may be regarded as committed to

norms instrumental in achieving this purpose – maintaining certain standards of reasonableness and expecting others to comply with the same critical standards.[10] This does not mean, however, that these people are not interested in resolving the difference *in their own favor.* Their argumentative speech acts may even be assumed to be designed to achieve precisely this effect.[11] In other words, there is not only a 'dialectical,' but also a 'rhetorical' aspect to argumentative discourse.[12] Initially, the pragma-dialectical method of analysis concentrated solely on the dialectical aspect. Meanwhile we have shown that the reconstruction of argumentative discourse can be strengthened considerably by incorporating rhetorical considerations in the analysis, and particularly in its justification (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1998, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2002).

The combination of rhetorical and dialectical lines of analysis we favor amounts to a systematic integration of rhetorical considerations in a dialectical framework of analysis.[13] In argumentative discourse, whether it takes place orally or in writing, it is generally not the arguers' sole aim to win the discussion, but also to conduct the discussion in a way that is considered reasonable. The arguers' rhetorical attempts to have things their way can therefore be regarded as being incorporated in their dialectical efforts to resolve the difference of opinion in accordance with the proper standards for a critical discussion. This means in practice that in every stage of the resolution process, irrespective of whether it is the confrontation stage, the opening stage, the argumentation stage or the concluding stage, the parties may, while being out for the optimal rhetorical result at that point in the discussion, be presumed to hold also to the dialectical objective of the of the discussion stage concerned. In their efforts to reconcile the simultaneous pursuit of these two different aims, which may at times even seem to go against each other, the arguers make use of what we have termed *strategic maneuvering.* This strategic maneuvering is directed at diminishing the potential tension between pursuing at the same time a 'dialectical' as well as a 'rhetorical' aim.

As we see it, a pragma-dialectical analysis benefits in at least three ways from using this conception of strategic maneuvering in reconstructing argumentative discourse. By getting a clearer view of the rhetorical aspects of the discourse, we get a better and more comprehensive grasp of what may rightly be called 'argumentative reality.' By achieving a more thorough and more subtle understanding of the rationale behind the specific instantiation of the various discussion moves, our analysis of the argumentative discourse becomes not only more profound but also more clearly justified. By gaining a more realistic insight in the strategic design of the discourse, we develop a more mature sense of the whys and wherefores of the various fallacious moves that occur in ordinary argumentative practice.

4. The Traditional Conceptions of Dialectic and Rhetoric

How does our position relate to the traditional conceptions of dialectic and rhetoric? As has been made clear abundantly in the earlier chapters of this volume, already since Aristotle there has been a distinct division between rhetoric and dialectic, in spite of their initial close connection. Plato viewed dialectic as a means of

finding the truth. Aristotle developed it in the *Topics* into a system of regulated dialogues for refuting a claim, starting from concessions of the other party. In the *Rhetoric* Aristotle provided the conceptual framework for the study of rhetoric by his 'argumentative' definition of rhetoric as an ability or capacity (*dynamis*) in each case to see the available means of persuasion. Beside the Aristotelian perspective, an Isocratian tradition developed that concentrated more on style and literary aspects. In Cicero's *De oratore* (Ed., 1942) these aspects are integrated in the Aristotelian framework and until the seventeenth century western history of the theory of rhetoric remained foremost Ciceronian, although after its rediscovery in the fifteenth century, Quintilian's *Institutio oratorio* became the major classical authority on rhetoric in education (Kennedy, 1994, 158, 181).[14]

In medieval times dialectic achieved an importance at the expense of rhetoric, which – after the study of *inventio* and *dispositio* was moved from rhetoric to dialectic – was reduced to a doctrine of *elocutio* and *actio*. With Ramus this development culminated in a strict separation between dialectic and rhetoric, with rhetoric being devoted exclusively to style, and dialectic incorporated into logic (Meerhoff, 1988).[15] Although there were these precursory symptoms of a widening gap between rhetoric and dialectic, according to Toulmin (2001), the division did not become 'ideologized' until after the 'Scientific Revolution.'[16] Then the division resulted in two separate and mutually isolated paradigms, each conforming to a different conception of argumentation, which were considered incompatible. Rhetoric has within the humanities become a field for scholars in communication, language and literature.[17] With the further formalization of logic in the nineteenth century, dialectic almost disappeared from sight.[18] Although in the twentieth century the dialectical approach to argumentation has been taken up again, there is still a yawning gap in conceptualisation as well as understanding among argumentation theorists between the theorists who opt for a dialectical approach and the protagonists of a rhetorical approach.[19]

On closer inspection there have nevertheless always been authors who saw a connection between rhetoric and dialectic (see van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1998). For Aristotle, rhetoric is the mirror image or counterpart (*antisptrophos*) of dialectic;[20] in the *Rhetoric*, he assimilates the opposing views of Plato and the sophists (Murphy and Katula, 1994, Ch. 2). According to Reboul, Aristotle wrote "que la rhéorique est le 'rejeton' de la dialectique, c'est à dire son application, un peu comme la médicine est une application de la biologie. Mais ensuite, il la qualifie comme une 'partie' de la dialectique" (1991, 46). For Cicero rhetoric is also *disputatio in utramque partem*, speaking on both sides of an issue. In late antiquity, Boethius subsumes rhetoric in *De topicis differentiis* under dialectic (Kennedy, 1994, 283). According to Mack, dialectic is for Boethius more important, "providing rhetoric with its basis" (1993, 8, n. 19). The development of humanism "provoked a reconsideration of the object of dialectic and a reform of the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic" (Mack, 1993, 15). In *De inventione dialectica libri tres* (1479/1967), a major contribution to humanist argumentation theory, the remarkable scholar Agricola builds on Cicero's view that dialectic and rhetoric cannot be separated and incorporates the two into one theory. Unlike Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), who much later bring elements from dialectic into rhetoric, Agricola merges elements from rhetoric into dialectic.[21]

To overcome the sharp and infertile ideological division between dialectic and rhetoric, dialectics is in pragma-dialectics – more or less in line with Agricola – viewed as a theory of argumentation in natural discourse and rhetorical insight is fitted in with a dialectical approach. Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson and Jacobs define dialectic as "a method of regimented opposition" in verbal communication and interaction "that amounts to the pragmatic application of logic, a collaborative method of putting logic into use so as to move from conjecture and opinion to more secure belief" (1997, 214).[22] By conceiving dialectic pragmatically as discourse dialectic, a conception of dialectic is promoted that differs in various ways from the conceptions favored in Aristotelian dialectic or formal dialectics. Rhetoric is in pragma-dialectics viewed as the theoretical study of the various kinds of practical persuasion techniques. There is no reason to assume that the rhetorical norm of artful persuasion is necessarily in contradiction with the ideal of reasonableness that lies at the heart of pragma-dialectics. Why would it be impossible to comply with critical standards for argumentative discourse when one attempts to shape one's case to one's own advantage? In fact, argumentative moves that are considered rhetorically strong by a critical audience will in practice almost certainly be in accordance with the dialectical norms applying to the discussion stage concerned.[23] Viewed from this perspective, there is a sound basis for overcoming the traditional division between dialectic and rhetoric by integrating the rhetorical dimension into the pragma-dialectical method of analysis.[24]

5. Maintaining a Delicate Balance

An understanding of the role of strategic maneuvering in resolving differences of opinion can be gained by examining how the opportunities available in a certain dialectical situation are used to handle that situation for a certain party in the most favorable way. Each of the four stages in the resolution process is characterized by a specific dialectical aim. Because the parties involved want to realize this aim to their best advantage, they can be expected to make the strategic moves that serve their interest best. In this way, the dialectical objective of a particular discussion stage always has a rhetorical analogue and the presumed rhetorical objectives of the participants must be specified according to stage: it depends on the dialectical stage one is in what kind of advantages can be gained.

In the confrontation stage, the dialectical objective of the parties is to achieve clarity concerning the specific issues that are at stake in the difference of opinion and the positions that each of the parties assumes. Viewed rhetorically, the parties will aim to direct the confrontation in the way that is the most beneficial from their own perspective. This means that each party will attempt to achieve a definition of the disagreement that favors the issues each of the parties wants to discuss and the positions each of them would like to assume.

The dialectical objective of the opening stage is to establish an unambiguous point of departure for the discussion. This point of departure consists of intersubjectively accepted procedural and material starting points – the mutual

'concessions' – and also includes an agreement about the division of the burden of proof. The rhetorical aim of each of the parties is to arrive at a point of departure that serves their own interest best. Each party's strategic maneuvering will be aimed at establishing the most workable starting points and the most opportune allocation of burden of proof.

In the argumentation stage, the dialectical objective is to test the tenability of the standpoints that have shaped the difference of opinion in the confrontation stage, starting from the point of departure established in the opening stage. Viewed from a rhetorical perspective, the parties will aim to make the strongest case and to launch the most effective attack.

The dialectical objective of the parties in the concluding stage is to establish the result of the critical testing procedure and to decide jointly whether the protagonist can maintain his standpoint in the light of the criticisms advanced by the antagonist or whether the antagonist can maintain his position of doubt even considering the arguments advanced by the protagonist. Viewed rhetorically, each party will attempt to claim victory and their strategic maneuvering will be designed accordingly.

In the view we developed, strategic maneuvering can take place in making an expedient choice from the options constituting the 'topical potential' associated with a particular discussion stage, in selecting a responsive adaptation to 'audience demand,' and in exploiting the appropriate 'presentational devices.' Both parties may be expected to select the material they can handle well, or that suits them best, develop the perspective most agreeable to their audience, and present their contributions in the most effective way. With respect to each of these three aspects of strategic maneuvering, both parties have an opportunity to influence the result of the discourse in their own favor.[25]

The *topical potential* associated with a particular dialectical stage can be regarded as the set of relevant alternatives available in that stage of the resolution process.[26] As Simons (1990) observes, the ancient Greeks and Romans were already aware that on any issue there is a range of 'stratagems' that can be called upon when discussing a case. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca rightly emphasize that from the very fact that certain elements are selected, "their importance and pertinence to the discussion are implied" (1969, 119).[27] Apart from endowing elements with a 'presence,' deliberate suppression of presence is also a noteworthy phenomenon of choice (1969, 116).[28]

As regards choosing from the topical potential, strategic maneuvering in the confrontation stage aims for the most effective choice among the potential issues for discussion – restricting the 'disagreement space' in such a way that the confrontation is defined in accordance with the party's preferences.[29] In the opening stage, strategic maneuvering attempts to create the most advantageous starting point, for instance by calling to mind, or eliciting, helpful 'concessions' from the other party. In the argumentation stage, starting from the list of 'status topes' associated with the type of standpoint at issue, a strategic line of defense is chosen that involves a selection from the available *loci* that best suits the speaker or writer. In the concluding stage, all efforts will be directed towards achieving the conclusion of the discourse desired by the party concerned, by pointing out, for instance, the consequences of accepting a certain complex of arguments.

For optimal rhetorical result, the moves that are made must in each stage of the discourse also in such a way be adapted to *audience demand* that they comply with the listeners' or readership's good sense and preferences. Argumentative moves that are entirely appropriate to some may be inappropriate to others. In general, adaptation to audience demand will consist in an attempt to create in each stage the required empathy or 'communion.' In the confrontation stage, this may, for example, be manifested by the avoidance of unnecessary or unsolvable contradictions. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, disagreement with respect to values is sometimes communicated as disagreement over facts, because that disagreement is easier to accommodate. As a rule, a speaker or writer's effort is directed to "assigning [...] the status enjoying the widest agreement to the elements on which he is basing his argument" (1969, 179). This explains why, in the opening stage, the status of a widely shared value judgement may be conferred on personal feelings and impressions, and the status of a fact on subjective values. In the argumentation stage, strategic adaptation to audience demand may be achieved by quoting arguments the listeners or readers agree with or by referring to argumentative principles they adhere to.

For optimally conveying rhetorical moves, the available *presentational devices* must be strategically put to good use. This means that discursively effective means should be sought to convey the various moves in the discourse. The phrasing and stylistic framing of the moves should be systematically attuned to their discursive effectiveness – exploiting the Gricean maxims of Manner in a specific and deliberate way.[30] In *De oratore*, Cicero (Ed., 1942) observes an unbreakable unity between expression and content – *verbum* and *res*. Anscombre and Ducrot identify expression with orientation: "Signifier, pour un énoncé, c'est orienter" (1983, i), or, as Anscombre puts it, "diriger le discours dans une certaine direction" (1994, 30). According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, all argumentative discourse presupposes "a choice consisting not only of the selection of elements to be used, but also of the technique for their presentation" (1969, 119).

Rhetorical figures are specific modes of expression that can be used as presentational devices; they are ways of presenting that make things present to the mind.[31] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca regard a figure as argumentative if it brings about a change of perspective (1969, 169).[32] Among the rhetorical figures that can serve argumentative purposes are, of course, classical ones such as rhetorical questions and *praeteritio* – drawing attention to something by saying that you will refrain from dealing with it. The success of a figure depends on the stage of the discourse in which it is employed. Figures such as *metalepsis* can, for instance, in the opening stage facilitate the transposition of values into facts, as in "remember our agreement" for "keep our agreement" (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, 181). And figures such as *conciliatio* – in one interpretation, adopting the opponent's premises to support one's own position – can be brought to bear to prepare the way for convincing the opponent in the argumentation stage.

Although the three aspects of strategic maneuvering, which run parallel with important classical areas of interest – topics, audience-orientation, and stylistics –, can be distinguished analytically, in actual practice they will usually work together.[33] We shall say that a fully-fledged 'argumentative strategy' is being

followed only if the speaker's or writer's strategic maneuverings in the discourse converge with respect to choosing from the topical potential, adapting to the audience demand, and the exploitation of presentational devices. Argumentative strategies in our sense are methodical designs of moves for influencing the result of a particular dialectical stage, or the discussion as a whole, to one's own advantage, which manifest themselves in a systematic, coordinated and simultaneous exploitation of the opportunities afforded by that stage. There are specific confrontation strategies, opening strategies, argumentation strategies and concluding strategies. Among the confrontation strategies used in defining the difference of opinion when choosing the issues that define the 'disagreement space' are evasion and 'humpty-dumpty ing.' There are also specific opening strategies, such as creating a broad zone of agreement or, the opposite, a 'smokescreen.' The argumentation strategies include spelling out desirable – or undesirable – consequences that are supposed to immediately convince – or intimidate – the opponent. A notorious concluding strategy is forcing the audience to 'bite the bullet.' The various rhetorical styles of argumentative discourse can be characterized in terms of a particular combination of such strategies. Clearly, the one strategy or style is more acceptable than the other is.

6. Fallacies as Derailments of Strategic Maneuvering

In pragma-dialectics, argumentative moves are only considered sound if they are in agreement with the rules for critical discussion. Any violation of any of these rules obstructs the aim of dispute resolution and the move concerned is then considered fallacious. Clear criteria are required to determine methodically for all the moves in all the stages of the resolution process whether or not it is a violation of a certain rule and may thus be regarded fallacious. Our concept of strategic maneuvering as an attempt to alleviate the potential tension between arguing perfectly reasonably and having things one's own way can be of help in clarifying the problems involved in identifying such criteria.

All the moves made in argumentative discourse can be regarded as designed both to uphold a reasonable discussion attitude and to further a party's case. This does not mean that these two objectives will always be in perfect balance. On the one hand, arguers may neglect their persuasive interests for fear of being perceived as unreasonable; on the other hand, in their assiduity to win the other party over to their side, they may neglect their commitment to the critical ideal. Neglect of persuasiveness comes down to bad strategy – or even to a blunder (Walton & Krabbe, 1995). It harms the arguer but not the adversary and is therefore not 'condemnable' in the sense of being fallacious. A party, however, whose strategic proceedings allow its commitment to a reasonable exchange of argumentative moves to be overruled by the aim of persuading the opponent, may victimize the other party. Then the strategic maneuvering has got 'derailed,' and is condemnable for being fallacious. All derailments of strategic maneuvering are fallacious and all fallacies can be regarded as derailments of strategic maneuvering.

This view of the fallacies explains why in actual argumentative practice fallacies are often not immediately *apparent* or *manifest*. A party that maneuvers strategically will normally pretend to uphold at all times a commitment to the rules of critical discussion. Thus, a standing presumption of reasonableness is conferred on every discussion move (see also Jackson, 1995). This presumption is operative even when a particular way of maneuvering violates a certain discussion rule and is thus fallacious. Echoing Aristotle's definition of a fallacy as cited by Hamblin (1970, 12), we may say that the maneuvering then still 'seems' to obey the rules of critical discussion, although in fact it does not.[34] If the rule violation is a deliberate violation, it is imperative for the party that is guilty of the violation to convey quite clearly that its commitment to reasonableness still stands, because if it were clear that this is not so, any persuasive effect of the move would be lost immediately. If the violation is unintentional – the move is simply a mistake – it is nevertheless still a fallacy in the pragma-dialectical sense: the move concerned may seem rhetorically strong as well as dialectically acceptable to the offender, but is in fact not reasonable. Such an unintended infringement is, of course, not irreversible. Once the other party has pointed out that an offense against reasonableness has been committed, this offense may be instantly repaired.

Our view of fallacies as derailments of strategic maneuvering can also be of help in developing criteria for identifying fallacious argumentative behavior. In our view, each form of strategic maneuvering has, as it were, its own continuum of sound and fallacious acting. Fallacy judgments are in the end always contextual judgments of specific instances of situated argumentative acting. Neither does this predicament mean, however, that that there must, of necessity, always remain a gray – or even dark – zone, nor that no clear criteria can be established in advance to determine whether a particular way of strategic maneuvering goes astray. Particular 'types' or 'categories' of strategic maneuvering can be identified, and for each of these types specific conditions can be formulated that need to be fulfilled if the maneuvering is to remain dialectically sound. Certain instances of strategic maneuvering can then be recognized as sound while other instances of strategic maneuvering can be pinned down as fallacious because the relevant conditions are not satisfied.

7. Argumentation *In Vivo*: 'Clear Thinking in Troubled Times'

We illustrate how integrating rhetorical considerations into a pragma-dialectical theoretical framework can be of help in achieving a satisfactory analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse by giving a reconstruction of an 'advertorial' published by Shell in the *Observer* of November 19, 1995. Although the argument remains partly hidden, this advertorial is a good example of argumentation *in vivo*. Having only just recovered from the damage suffered from the Brent Spar case, Shell responds to the massive, worldwide protests inflamed by the conviction and execution by the Nigerian regime of the writer, dissident critic and environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. In the process, the company maneuvers strategically to defend its economic and political involvement in Nigeria.

At first sight, the text appears to be pretty straightforward: Shell informs the public of the nature of its involvement in Nigeria. As soon as it is taken into account, however, that the advertisement was published at a time when Shell was accused of lending support to the dictatorial Nigerian regime, and it is assumed that Shell responds relevantly to the accusations, it becomes clear that the advertorial is not just a slightly colored piece of information, but rather a defense of Shell's actions and an attempt to convince the public of the superiority of Shell's policies in Nigeria.

CLEAR THINKING IN TROUBLED TIMES

In the great wave of understandable emotion over the death of Ken Saro-Wiwa, it's very easy for the facts to be swamped by anger and recriminations. But people have the right to the truth. Unvarnished. Even uncomfortable. But never subjugated to a cause, however noble or well-meaning. They have the right to clear thinking.

The situation in Nigeria has no easy solutions. Slogans, protests and boycotts don't offer answers. There are difficult
5 issues to consider.

First, did discreet diplomacy fail? Perhaps we should ask instead why the worldwide protests failed. Our experience suggests that quiet diplomacy offered the very best hope for Ken Saro-Wiwa. But as worldwide threats and protests increased, the Government position appeared to harden. As Wura Abiola, daughter of the imprisoned unofficial winner of the last Nigerian presidential election said on Newsnight "The regime does not react well to threats. I believe that this is
10 the way of showing that they will not listen to threats." Did the protesters understand the risk they were taking? Did the campaign become more important than the cause?

There have also been charges of environmental devastation. But the facts of the situation have often been distorted or ignored. The public – who rightly care deeply about these issues – have too often been manipulated and misled.

There are certainly environmental problems in the area, but as the World Bank Survey has confirmed, in addition to the
15 oil industry, population growth, deforestation, soil erosion and over-farming are also major environmental problems there.

In fact, Shell and its partners are spending US$100 million this year alone on environment-related projects, and US$20 million on roads, health clinics, schools, scholarships, water schemes and agricultural support projects to help the people of the region. And, recognising that solutions need to be based on facts, they are sponsoring a $4.5 million independent environmental survey of the Niger Delta.
20 But another problem is sabotage. In the Ogoni area – where Shell has not operated since January 1993 – over 60% of oil spills were caused by sabotage, usually linked to claims for compensation. And when contractors have tried to deal with these problems, they have been forcibly denied access.

It has also been suggested that Shell should pull out of Nigeria's Liquefied Natural Gas project. But if we do so now, the project will collapse. Maybe for ever. So let's be clear who gets hurt if the project is cancelled.
25 A cancellation would certainly hurt the thousands of Nigerians who will be working on the project, and the tens of thousands more benefiting in the local economy. The environment, too, would suffer, with the plant expected to cut greatly the need for gas flaring in the oil industry. The plant will take four years to build. Revenues won't start flowing until early next century. It's only the people and the

And what would happen if Shell pulled out of Nigeria altogether? The oil would certainly continue flowing. The
30 business would continue operating. The vast majority of employees would remain in place. But the sound and ethical business practices synonymous with Shell, the environmental investment, and the tens of millions of dollars spent on community programmes would all be lost. Again, it's the people of Nigeria that you would hurt.

It's easy enough to sit in our comfortable homes in the West, calling for sanctions and boycotts against a developing country. But you have to be sure that knee-jerk reactions won't do more harm than good.
35 Some campaigning groups say we should intervene in the political process in Nigeria. But even if we could, we must never do so. Politics is the business of governments and politicians. The world where companies use their economic influence to prop up or bring down governments would be a frightening and bleak one indeed.

Shell. We'll keep you in touch with the facts.

8. An Integrated Pragma-Dialectical Analysis

In our analysis we shall show for each discussion stage how Shell strategically uses the topical potential of the discussion situation, adapts its message strategically to the beliefs and preferences of the audience, and strategically exploits certain presentational devices.

Confrontation Stage

Shell's advertorial constitutes a response to accusations leveled against its involvement in Nigeria as well as a justification of its policies. Viewed rhetorically, the advertorial is therefore both an apologia and a policy statement.[35] Shell's claim in the apologetic part (lines 4–22) is that its involvement in Nigeria is not blameworthy. The main claim defended in the political part (lines 23–37) is that it should continue its involvement in Nigeria. Both claims are subsumed under the general position that Shell's presence in Nigeria is justified.

The object of the apologetic defense is 'juridical.' Shell addresses two issues: its involvement in the death of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the part it plays in environmental devastation. When dealing with the first issue (lines 6–11), Shell opts for the status of *qualitas:* the company has made serious attempts to help Saro-Wiwa, but the protesters, sloganeers and would-be boycotters frustrated these attempts. In addressing the second issue (lines 12–22), Shell assumes the status *coniecturalis*, shifting the issue to other causes of environmental devastation and thereby suggesting that its share in the devastation is negligible.

In its discussion of the main policy claim, Shell selects three issues to deal with: its participation in Nigeria's Liquified Natural Gas project (lines 23–28), its overall involvement in Nigeria (lines 29–34), and its non-intervention policy (lines 35–37). All three issues relate to the fundamental ('stock') issue of advantages and disadvantages: pulling out of the project and withdrawing from Nigeria altogether would have undesirable

Making use of the pragma-dialectical tools for reproducing the structure of argumentation, this analysis can be represented as follows:

Juridical: (1) Shell is not to be blamed

1.1a Shell is not to be blamed for the death of Ken Saro-Wiwa
- 1.1a.1a Shell has made efforts to help Saro-Wiwa
- 1.1a.1b These efforts were frustrated by the campaigners

1.1b Shell is not to be blamed for any environmental devastation
- 1.1b.1a There are other problems in the area
  - 1.1b.1a.1 The World Bank confirms this
- 1.1b.1b Shell is in fact contributing to saving the environment
  - 1.1b.1b.1a They are substantially subsidizing environment-related projects
  - 1.1b.1b.1b They are substantially subsidizing other 'good' projects
  - 1.1b.1b.1c They are substantially subsidizing an environment survey
- 1.1b.1c A substantial component of environmental devastation is not caused by Shell
- 1.1b.1c.1a In the Ogoni-area 60% of the environmental devastation is caused by sabotage
- 1.1b.1c.1b The contractors have been denied access when they tried to deal with these problems
- 1.1b.1c.2 Shell has not been operative in the Ogoni-area since 1993

Policy: (2) Shell's Involvement in Nigeria is justified

2.1a Shell should not pull out of the NLG-project
- 2.1a.1a The people would suffer
- 2.1a.1b The environment would suffer
- 2.1a.1c The future Nigerian government would suffer
  - 2.1a.1a–c.1 If Shell would pull out of the NLG-project, the project would collapse

2.1b Shell should not pull out of Nigeria
- 2.1b.1 The people of Nigeria would get hurt
  - 2.1b.1.1 All kinds of advantages for the Nigerian people would be lost

2.1c Shell should not intervene in Nigerian politics
- 2.1c.1a Politics is the business of politicians
- 2.1c.1b A world in which oil companies use their influence to prop up or bring down governments would be a frightening and bleak world

Figure 1: Dialectical analysis of the argumentation structure of Shell's advertorial

In this analysis Shell's strategic maneuvering is not yet fully taken into account. By leaving the main claims addressed in the confrontation stage implicit in its presentation, Shell is able to select from the available 'disagreement space' the issues that are easiest to cope with. One of the main accusations directed at Shell at the time was that it indirectly supported the regime. Shell was, of course, expected to address this difficult issue, but refrains from doing so. At least explicitly, for at the very end of the text Shell declares that the company will not intervene in Nigerian politics (lines 35–37) and adds (in line 37) that it rejects *propping up* a government as much as bringing it down – thus implicating

that, in addition to not intervening, it also does not support the regime. In this way, Shell accommodates to audience demand by addressing the issue of support without explicitly answering the accusation involved. It can do so by exploiting the fact that the text, at this stage, has changed from an apologia into a policy statement. This change makes it only natural that the last paragraph of the text reads as another justification of Shell's policy. Nevertheless, Shell is back to its apologetic endeavor: the issue is no longer whether Shell should adopt a certain policy, but whether the company is, politically and morally, *to blame* for its policy.

This disclosure of Shell's manipulation of the 'intervention' issue calls for a slightly different structural analysis:

Juridical: (1) Shell is not to be blamed

1.1a Shell is not to be blamed for the death of Ken Saro-Wiwa
1.1a.1a Shell has made efforts to help Saro-Wiwa
1.1a.1b These efforts were frustrated by the campaigners

1.1b Shell is not to be blamed for any environmental devastation
1.1b.1a There are other problems in the area
1.1b.1a.1 The World Bank confirms this
1.1b.1b Shell is in fact contributing to saving the environment
1.1b.1b.1a They are substantially subsidizing environment-related projects
1.1b.1b.1b They are substantially subsidizing other 'good' projects
1.1b.1b.1c They are substantially subsidizing an environment survey
1.1b.1c A substantial component of environmental devastation is not caused by Shell
1.1b.1c.1a In the Ogoni-area 60 % of the environmental devastation is caused by sabotage
1.1b.1c.1b The contractors have been denied access when they tried to deal with these problems
1.1b.1c.2 Shell has not been operative in the Ogoni-area since 1993

[1.1c' Shell is not propping up the Nigerian regime]
1.1c'.1 Shell should not intervene in Nigerian politics
1.1c'.1.1a Politics is the business of politicians
1.1 c'.1.1b A world in which oil companies use their influence to prop up or bring down governments would be a frightening and bleak world

Policy: (2) Shell's involvement in Nigeria is justified

2.1a Shell should not pull out of the NLG-project
2.1a.1a The people would suffer
2.1a.1b The environment would suffer
2.1a.1c The future Nigerian government would suffer
2.1a.1a–c.1 If Shell would pull out of the NLG-project, the project would collapse

2.1b Shell should not pull out of Nigeria
2.1b.1 The people of Nigeria would get hurt
2.1b.1.1 All kinds of advantages for the Nigerian people would be lost

Figure 2: Integrated pragma-dialectical analysis of the argumentation structure of Shell's advertorial

This amendment to the structural representation of the argumentation clearly illustrates that taking rhetorical considerations into account can have real consequences for the analysis.

Opening Stage

Taking account of Shell's strategic maneuvering in the opening stage of the projected discussion makes it clear that the company creates a solid starting point for its case. It does so in the first place by contrasting the factual basis of its views with the emotional basis of the opinions of its opponents.

> The company makes it clear that its position is only based on objective facts. Some facts are known due to the company's own experience (lines 6–7), some other facts are provided by authorities such as Wura Abiola – the daughter of the then imprisoned winner of the last election (lines 8–10) – or by the World Bank (lines 14–15). Shell even makes a few concessions to strengthen its image of objectivity. One of these is the undeniable fact that there are indeed environmental problems in the Nigeria region (line 14).

Shell further enhances its credibility as an objective, disinterested and rational protagonist, as well as its humanitarian ethos.

> Shell enhances its credibility by emphasizing its knowledge of Nigerian affairs (lines 6–7, 16–19, 25–28, 29–32), its reliance on genuine data and respect for the truth (lines 2–5, 12–15, 18–19, 33–34, 39). In its presentation, Shell sustains this image by labeling the issues as "difficult" (line 4), eluding "easy solutions" (line 4), and having to do with "unvarnished truth" (line 2) rather than being "subjugated to a cause" (line 3). To enhance its humanitarian ethos, Shell shifts the focus of attention from its own problems to a concern with the problems of Nigeria: SHELL HELPS! (lines 6–7, 16–19, 25–27, 30–32). This is the perspective it is going to exploit thoroughly in its argumentation, elaborating extensively on its "development aid."

In contradistinction to Shell, the public is portrayed as allowing its judgements to be clouded by emotions (lines 1–2) and being easily manipulated and misled (lines 12–13). The campaigners are even worse: they are people whose perceptions are suffused with anger and recriminations (line 2), who utter nothing but "slogans, protests and boycotts" (line 4) and for whom the campaign has become more important than the cause (lines 10–11).

Shell also maneuvers strategically with the positions of the parties in the discussion. Dialectically speaking we have here two opposing parties – Shell and the campaigners – and a third party – the public – that is supposedly neutral.[36] At the time, however, public opinion was against rather than in favor of Shell, and Shell was fully aware of this. Therefore, the rhetorical situation was so that

Shell was not only required to resolve a mixed dispute with the campaigners, but also with the public. Nevertheless, the company initially acts as if there was only a standard 'non-mixed' dispute, thus adjusting this situation to its own objectives. Shell even treats the public as a possible ally, ready to close ranks with Shell against the campaigners (lines 1–32).

> This definition of the positions in the dispute is reinforced by the way in which Shell adapts to its audience: it attempts to create a degree of communion that makes its starting point more easily acceptable. Goodwill is invoked by flattering the public at this stage: they are sensible people who are concerned about the same problems as Shell; they are entitled to clear thinking and can cope with the unvarnished truth (lines 2–3). Thus the public is dissociated from Shell's opponents in the conflict.

In addition, Shell appeals to the public's responsibility: because rights imply duties, it is the public's duty to think clearly and accept only what is objectively true, however unsettling the truth may be (lines 2–3,33–34,39).

> One of the presentational means used to strengthen Shell's communion with the public consists in addressing them in the way a father speaks to his children: although the emotions they feel are "understandable" (line 1), they should learn the truth; and although they "rightly care deeply" (line 13), they are easily "manipulated and misled" (line 13), especially when a cause seems "noble and well-meaning" (line 3).

But if they take sides with Shell, all will end well. On the other hand, if they don't, chances are that they end up in the same bad position as the campaigners: cloaked in a warning, the public is put on a par with those it was initially, together with Shell, supposed to ridicule (lines 33–34).

> Among the presentational devices Shell employs to widen the dissociation between the campaigners and the public, is the passive voice: "there have [...] been charges" (line 12), "the facts [have] been distorted" (line 12), "it has been suggested" (line 23), et cetera. In this way, the campaigners are portrayed as anonymous accusers. Shell's repeated use of antithesis serves to put more emphasis on the contrast between its own clear thinking and rational attitude and the irrational attitude and muddled thinking of the campaigners (and sometimes the public): it is "facts" versus "emotions" (lines 1–3), "discreet diplomacy" versus "threats and protests" (lines 6–10), "clear thinking" versus "troubled times" (title), et cetera.

Argumentation Stage

In the case of the juridical not-to-blame claim (1), Shell selects for its defense primarily factual arguments from authority; in the case of the policy claim (2), the arguments are causal and pragmatic. The first issue associated with the 'Shell

is not to blame' claim, Ken Saro-Wiwa's death (1.1a), invokes Shell's own authority (lines 6–7) and that of Wura Abiola (lines 8–10). The second blame-issue, environmental devastation (1.1b), calls in the authority of the World Bank (line 14–15) as well as Shell's own authority (lines 16–19). The policy issues – Shell's withdrawal from Nigeria's Liquified Natural Gas project (2.1a) and from Nigeria in general (2.1b) as well as Shell's intervention in Nigerian politics (which we reconstructed as a disguised argument for the not-to-blame claim) – are all dealt with by pointing at the supposedly catastrophic consequences (lines 23–28, 29–32, 35–37).

Shell's preference for factual arguments from authority and causal arguments is entirely in line with its recurrent emphasis on the factual status of its position. Factual and causal arguments are often regarded more conclusive kinds of support: facts cannot be doubted and a causal chain suggests, unlike an analogical relation, a tight and unbreakable connection.

> There is one exception to the factual and causal treatment: Shell's refutation of the accusation that it supports the Nigerian regime (lines 35–37). Although the advertorial appears to provide causal argumentation, it is clear that in this case a causal argument will not do. Because the inference from Shell's non-intervention statement to the implied claim that it does not support the Nigerian regime cannot be causally warranted, from necessity, a weaker – symptomatic – inference has to do the job.

When we look at the way in which Shell's argumentation is adapted to its audience, two types of maneuvering stand out. The first pertains to the issue of blame. In refuting any suggestion of guilt with regard to both Ken Saro-Wiwa's death and environmental devastation, Shell exploits the SHELL HELPS perspective earlier invoked. Shell has helped Saro-Wiwa by means of discreet diplomacy (lines 6–7); and Shell has helped to get environmental devastation under control by providing financial and material aid (lines 16–19, 25–27, 30–32). In both cases, Shell claims, the effects of its help were frustrated by the actions of others (lines 10–11, 20–22).

In the justification of Shell's policy standpoint, adaptation to the audience takes place by evoking a frightening perspective of catastrophe and collapse: if Shell pulls out, calamity awaits the people of Nigeria (lines 24, 28, and 32). By referring to "the people [...] that *you* would hurt" (our italics), the public is once more reminded of its responsibility (line 32). By also emphasizing that "the environment, too, would suffer" (line 26), Shell employs an argument based on the figure of *conciliatio*: Shell's opponents' supposed concern about the Nigerian people and the environment is turned against them. The perspective of calamity is contrasted with that of Shell's prolonged activities in Nigeria, when the "sound and ethical business practices" synonymous with Shell will continue to bear their blessed fruit (lines 30–32).

> As can be expected, in refuting the 'blame'-issues a businesslike style prevails. The facts are (in lines 6–10 and 14–22) supposed to speak for themselves. In its presentation of the arguments for the policy standpoint,

Shell hammers in the picture of calamity by asking suggestive rhetorical questions – "What would happen if Shell pulled out of Nigeria altogether?" (line 29) – and by issuing warnings – "So let's be clear who gets hurt if the project is cancelled" (line 24) and "Again, it's the people of Nigeria you would hurt" (line 32). At a certain stage (in lines 29–32), some concessions are presented in a staccato of short and unconnected sentences that suggest lack of coherent thinking. They are then followed by a long and carefully constructed sentence that suggests that Shell has the situation under control. There is again no lack of suggestive wording: "the oil would certainly continue *flowing*" (with connotations of 'uncontrolled' and 'idle'), "the business would continue *operating*" (*cui bono*?), and "the vast majority of employees would *remain in place*" (but will they work?) (lines 29–30, our italics).

Concluding Stage

By leaving the general conclusion of the discussion of its involvement in Nigeria implicit, Shell suggests that it has said all there is to say and that the conclusion is obvious. What else can the readers conclude than that Shell is neither to blame for the killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa nor for any environmental disaster? On the contrary, Shell is a great help to the people of Nigeria and should stay there to prolong its generous 'development aid.'

To ensure that the public reaches this favorable view, Shell again makes an appeal to the public's responsibility. Having paved the way by the repeated warnings that the fate of the Nigerian people is in their hands, Shell strikes the final blow at the end of the text, when it starts to lecture the people about their attitude. The public acts irresponsibly: their opinions of the Nigerian problems amount to empty slogans, and their response is nothing but a knee-jerk reaction that can only harm this poor developing country (lines 33–34). They do indeed need Shell to put them straight.

Shell's last move in the argumentation stage of the discussion was to invoke a straightforward image of doom and horror. This exploitation of the presentational device of a metaphor is aimed at eradicating any idea that the company could be doing a thing so evil as supporting the Nigerian regime (lines 36–37). The implication of this move for the concluding stage of the discussion is clear: if it is evident to all what horrific consequences supporting the Nigerian regime will have, Shell can only be accused of such misbehavior by those extreme malevolents whose sole aim is to destroy Shell's political and moral ethos.

The final words, "We'll keep you in touch with the facts" (line 39), are not just a slogan, but should reassure the public that Shell will prevent the menacing perspective of a frightening and bleak world from becoming a reality – clear thinking will prevail. These words, however, also convey a veiled counteraccusation: You, the public, are not capable of keeping in touch with the facts. This is why Shell will do it for you.

9. An Evaluation of Shell's Strategic Maneuvering

The Use of Conciliatio

We would like to elucidate the pragma-dialectical approach to evaluating argumentative discourse by first discussing a specific instance of strategic maneuvering: Shell's use of the figure of *conciliatio*. In a *conciliatio*, the proponent uses an argument of the opponent to support his own standpoint. In terms of strategic maneuvering, making use of a *conciliatio* amounts to making a selection from the available argumentative potential that is evidently expedient and clearly optimally adapted to the opponent's starting point. Certain presentational devices, such as the use of a rhetorical question, are well-suited to make it obvious that the argument the proponent is going to use is in fact already part of the opponent's commitments.

Because the opponent's adherence is secured in advance, this form of strategic maneuvering is rhetorically strong. Because the proponent proceeds by arguing *ex concessis*, it is also pre-eminently dialectical. The danger of derailment stems from the fact that the opponent may be assumed to agree with the *content* of the argument, but may *not* be assumed to agree with the way in which the argument is used to support precisely the opposite standpoint. According to the correctness conditions applying to the speech act of advancing argumentation, an argument only counts as a felicitous attempt to convince the opponent if both parties not only accept the propositional content of the argument but also accept this proposition as a potential justification of the standpoint at issue (see van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992). In the case of a *conciliatio*, the former is – typically – granted, but the latter is most unlikely – at any rate in the first instance.

This speech act analysis points to a condition that can be of help in evaluating actual manifestations of *conciliatio*: such manifestations can only be 'sound' if the proponent offers sufficient support for his view that the argument taken over from his opponent has an overriding justificatory potential with regard to his standpoint and leaves it eventually to the opponent to decide whether this is indeed the case.[37] The use of *conciliatio* can be said to be a 'derailment' if the proponent just presupposes that the adopted argument has an unquestioning justificatory potential for his standpoint and leaves the opponent no room to question this presupposition. If a *conciliatio* is in this way derailed, the proponent relies on a starting point that is not yet accepted by the opponent and commits the fallacy of *begging the question*. A good example of *conciliatio* is provided in John LeCarré's novel *A Perfect Spy*. The main character in the book is a boy who is raised by everyone but his father, a real, albeit amiable, charlatan. Now and again the father comes to visit the boy. Each time when he gets ready to leave again the boy starts to cry. The father wants to stop him from crying and tries to achieve this like this:

> Do you love your old man? Well then ...

The *conciliatio* works as follows. First, the father attributes to the boy the proposition that is to be taken over from him ("I love my old man") by means of

a rhetorical question. Then he implies, by adding "well then ...," that *if*, or *given that*, the boy adheres to the proposition that he loves his old man, he should also accept the – implicit – standpoint that he should stop crying. Because it is clear that the father does not add any further support for this implication and his wording suggests that this is all there is to be said, it can be concluded that his strategic maneuvering by means of *conciliatio* has got derailed.

In 'Clear thinking in troubled times,' Shell also makes use of a *conciliatio* when the company justifies its not pulling out of Nigeria's Liquified Natural Gas project by pointing out that not Shell but the Nigerian people and the environment would suffer if Shell pulled out (lines 25–26). These arguments are clearly derived from the opponents' professed concerns for the people and the environment: given their political preferences, Shell's opponents may be assumed to be in favor of a prospering native population and a non-polluted environment. At the propositional level, Shell can therefore be sure of acceptance. But how does the oil company proceed to ensure the opponents' acceptance of the justificatory potential of these two points for its standpoint that Shell should not pull out of the project? Shell does so by claiming that there is a causal relation between Shell's pulling out of the project and a deterioration of the human and environmental circumstances. In this way, Shell lends at least some support to the view that its opponents' arguments have an overriding justificatory potential for its standpoint. Although the insertion of "certainly" conveys a suggestion of obviousness, Shell does not actually deter the reader from questioning the supposed causal link. Therefore, no actual derailment of strategic maneu-vering with *conciliatio* has taken place and it is not appropriate to accuse Shell of question begging.

We shall now have a closer look at Shell's strategic maneuvering in the various stages of the discourse and point out some fallacies that are committed.

Confrontation Stage

Our first evaluative observation is that Shell slyly manipulates the issues of the discussion: the company addresses the crucial issue of its involvement in Nigeria only in an implicit way. As transpired in the analysis, Shell emphasizes that it is undesirable that companies use their economic influence to prop up or bring down governments to support its standpoint that the company should not intervene in Nigeria. In order to defend this standpoint, however, it suffices to argue that it is wrong for companies to use their economic influence *to bring down* governments. Adding that the company's influence may also never be used *to prop up* governments is only relevant if Shell implicitly also attempts to convey the idea that *it does not support the Nigerian regime.* This is, in fact, precisely the point Shell should get across because when the advertorial was published the primary accusation was that Shell kept the Nigerian regime going.[38] Shell is apparently unwilling to confront this accusation outright, but needs to deny it all the same. The company does this implicitly by providing an argument from which the denial can be deduced.

Shell thus engages in a confrontation strategy of circumvention. The company employs this strategy to evade the crucial issue in the diff-

According to the dialectical standards, one of the rules of critical discussion is that arguments should be relevant to the standpoint at issue. This rule is violated in Shell's argument for the reconstructed standpoint that Shell does not support the Nigerian regime: it is undesirable for companies to use their economic influence to prop up or bring down governments. Although this argument is analytically relevant to the standpoint – it is precisely because of this analytic relevance that the standpoint could be reconstructed – , it lacks any evaluative relevance:[39] that it is undesirable to use economic influence to prop up or bring down governments may lend support to the political standpoint that Shell should not intervene in Nigeria's political situation, but could never support the *factual* standpoint that Shell does not support the Nigerian regime.[40] In the process, Shell not only violates the relevance rule for critical discussion, but also the *language use rule*: given that what now only becomes apparent after a radical reconstruction would have been immediately clear if Shell had advanced the standpoint explicitly, Shell is guilty of being misleadingly vague.

By using a distorted arrow for the fallacious maneuver in the defense of Shell's standpoint that it does not support the Nigerian regime, we can give the following evaluative overview of the formal representation the structure of Shell's argumentation:




Figure 3: Partial pragma-dialectical evaluation of shell's advertorial as analyzed in Figure 2

Opening Stage

The dominant opening strategy is involving the readers as closely as possible in Shell's view. In the first instance, this is achieved by acting as if the public is not really in opposition to Shell, but has merely some doubts – resulting from ignorance rather than careful reflection. Shell thus presents the public as a possible ally rather than a potential opponent. In leading on the readers in this way, Shell chooses an opening strategy of inclusion. Near the end of the advertorial, when the public's comfortable position is suddenly made questionable, the final consequence of this strategy becomes apparent: a public that does not take sides with Shell should distance itself from this reasonable position and join the

campaigners – which has by then become a highly unattractive perspective. How is the use of this strategy to be evaluated? First, we should notice that at the end of the text Shell offers the public an unrealistic alternative when it confronts the public with the need of a choice. In times when the need of support is overwhelmingly urgent, forcing the public in a you-are-with-or-against-us situation could be acceptable in a policy speech. In an apology aimed at proving someone's innocence, however, this strategy is clearly inadmissible: establishing the facts is not a matter of making choices, let alone the choices presented by Shell. In this case, Shell is guilty of fallacious maneuvering: the company creates a *false dilemma.* Second, it should be noticed that the dilemma presented here can only have persuasive force because it is based on Shell's perpetual *ad hominem* attacks on the campaigners. Most of these attacks are abusive (the campaigners are unrealistic idealists, sloganeers who distort or ignore facts, irresponsible egocentrists who do not understand the risk they are taking), some are just circumstantial (the campaign became more important than the cause). Had the campaigners been portrayed as sensible people, the dilemma would not have existed. These *ad hominem* fallacies are thus a constitutive part of the fallacious maneuvering.

Argumentation Stage

The strategic maneuvering favored by Shell in the argumentation stage consists in founding its arguments on facts and authority and in suggesting that its actions are motivated by charity. This points to a combination of the argumentation strategies of certification and humanization. It is not so hard to see what could go dialectically wrong: derailments of the *ad verecundiam* type and ethical fallacies may occur. But do they occur? In the *ad verecundiam* case, the issue is whether making an appeal to authority is acceptable to the adversary and, if so, whether the authority appealed to is a genuine and relevant authority. The first question cannot really be answered in this monologal situation, but the last two questions can. The authorities Shell appeals to are Wura Abiola, the World Bank and Shell itself. Wura Abiola's authority is invoked to sustain a view concerning how the Nigerian regime tends to react when threatened. Her authority is supposedly based on the fact that she is the daughter of a former presidential candidate. The question is now: can she, just because of that background, indeed be regarded as an expert on the psychology of Nigerian politics? The fact that, apart from Shell, Newsnight too values her opinion on this issue may be seen as evidence that she can. This argument from authority is therefore probably not fallacious. This is also the case with the appeal to the authority of the World Bank to sustain certain data concerning environmental devastation. Although we have only Shell's word for it that the data that are mentioned are correct, the World Bank may indeed be expected to provide authoritative information that is also relevant. A remaining reservation can still be that Shell does not say whether the World Bank Survey puts the other environmental problems indeed on a par with the problems caused by Shell. It could well be the case that the latter problems outweigh the former by far.

A more definitive judgement can be given when we consider Shell's emphasis on its own authority as an expert on Nigerian affairs. This emphasis, which is present throughout the text but pre-eminently in Shells reference in line 6 to its own experience in dealing with the issue of Ken Saro-Wiwa's pending execution, exemplifies how strategic maneuvering cannot only derail but also be weak. The maneuvering derails because whether Shell knows best how to handle the situation in Nigeria is precisely the issue. It is also weak because neither Shell's opponents nor the public can be expected to accept Shell's authority at face value.

Shell's strategy of bestowing a pre-eminent status on factual reasoning connects well with its appeals to authority. It is, again, not too difficult to see what kind of fallacious maneuvering could take place. Are the "facts" presented by Shell indeed facts? And if so, are they relevant to the case? It is noticeable that Shell, in presenting its arguments against the accusation of environmental devastation, states the facts of the case in an unclear way. Who are the claimants in the sabotage cases? Who are the saboteurs? It is the elusive phrasing that prevents these questions from being answered. Again, Shell commits the fallacy of using misleadingly vague language. A similar fallacious strategy can be detected in Shell's argumentation against the accusations that it did nothing to prevent Ken Saro-Wiwa's execution. Shell suggests that the facts speak for themselves, but whether they do is another matter. A host of presuppositions is smuggled in that take an agreement for granted which probably not exists. Asking whether "discreet diplomacy" failed, for instance, presupposes that Shell has indeed made diplomatic efforts to save Ken Saro-Wiwa, that these efforts were rightly made in secret, et cetera. In all these instances, Shell can be accused of violating the *starting point rule* that allows arguments to be advanced only on the basis of a commonly accepted starting point. Apart from the dubious status of the facts, it is not transparent what relevance the facts are supposed to have. This maneuver connects in fact closely with Shell's recurrent reference to its charitable motives. It is, for instance, unclear how exactly combating environmental devastation relates to Shell's financing of roads and health clinics. Apparently the company does a lot of good, but should this automatically mean that it cannot be guilty of environmental devastation? Shell violates, again, the *relevance rule* of critical discussion.

Concluding Stage

Shell's concluding move is to use a strategy of termination. After having first implied that the public might end up on a par with the campaigners, the company concludes by invoking a catastrophic scenario that would become reality should the campaigners' wishes be fulfilled. The aim of this move clearly is to discourage the public to maintain any doubts concerning Shell's dealings in Nigeria. Instead of concluding that its standpoints are adequately defended by its own arguments, Shell thus suggests that its standpoints are acceptable because no doubts

can be raised against them. In this way, Shell makes a fallacious attempt to end the discussion.

10. Conclusion

The analysis of Shell's advertorial shows how in argumentative discourse the rhetorical opportunities offered by the dialectical situation can be used strategically in making a self-serving choice from the available topical potential, responding expediently to audience demand, and making a crafty use of presentational devices. The strategy of circumvention used by Shell in the confrontation stage consists in manipulating the difference of opinion, and changing its focus, by highlighting and addressing selectively only those issues that Shell can cope with and dealing only indirectly with the main issue it is expected to address. The strategy of inclusion, which is dominant in the opening stage, amounts to involving the public as closely as possible in Shell's view of the case by presenting them as a possible ally rather than an opponent and leading them in this way up the garden path. In the argumentation stage, Shell's strategic maneuvering combines the strategies of certification and humanization: while demeaning its opponents as not knowledgeable and irresponsible, Shell lends the prerogative to causal reasoning based on 'authorized' facts (restricted to those facts that can be put in a perspective that is attractive to the public) and establishes at the same time its own image as a social conscience company. Shell's concluding strategy of termination appeals to the public's common sense by impregnating them with responsibilities that are at variance with their present unrealistic attitude through rubbing in the facts. All told, Shell's defense cannot be evaluated so positively as its clever use of *conciliatio* may have suggested. Several of Shell's moves are derailments of strategic maneuvering that are fallacious because they violate a rule for critical discussion. Shell's advertorial is, in fact, a good illustration of how supposedly clever strategic maneuvering can become rhetorically inappropriate when it is dialectically not acceptable.

In this chapter we have shown that the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse benefits in several ways from using rhetorical insight in a pragma-dialectical reconstruction. It may also have become apparent that a satisfactory rhetorical reconstruction cannot be carried out either if dialectical considerations are not taken into account: the rhetorical function of a speech act can only be determined systematically if it is first put in a well-defined perspective of what is at stake in a certain stage of the discourse. Because the methodical enrichment we have obtained allows us to get a firmer grasp on the various aspects of strategic maneuvering, we achieve a deeper and more comprehensive view of what may be called 'argumentative reality.' Gaining a thorough understanding of the strategic rationale behind specific discussion moves made in argumentative discourse strengthens the analysis by making it not only more profound and more informed but also better-justified. Achieving a clear view of the strategic design of the

discourse also results in a more refined sense of when and why certain types of strategic maneuvering are to be considered fallacious in actual argumentative practice.

Notes

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1. For the principles of 'functionalization,' 'socialization' and 'externalization' involved in this approach, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 4–15).
2. For the 'dialectification' of the study of argumentative discourse that is, in our view, required in this endeavor, see van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 14–18).
3. Unlike in the 'geometrical' and 'anthropological' philosophies of argumentation distinguished by Toulmin (1976), argumentative discourse is thus inherently connected with conducting a 'critical discussion,' and reasonableness is neither reduced to instrumental rationality nor to achieving a cultural-determined mutual agreement. This critical philosophy of argumentation embodies a Popperian concept of reasonableness that does not restrict the possibility of arguing reasonably to a particular discipline say academic epistemology. Instead, in a critical rationalist vein, reasonable argumentation can occur in all spheres of life, inclusive of those in which value judgments may play a major part, such as political discourse and private deliberation.
4. Unlike formal dialectics, pragma-dialectics is a discourse dialectic, closely aligned with a pragmatic approach to communication and interaction. This, however, does not automatically mean that formalization is right away excluded. Because pragmadialectics involves the development of a model of regimented ways of resolving a difference of opinion, this approach to argumentation is formal in a procedural sense. Ultimately, it always depends on the stage of development a theoretical approach has reached what the possibilities for formalization are: in some instances formalization is premature and would spoil the view of the phenomena concerned while in other cases refraining from formalization prevents a theory from developing any further. In practice, it may be the case that the state of theorizing is such that only certain parts or aspects of the subject-matter are ready for formal treatment while others can only be formalized at the expense of harmful reductions.
5. It is important to realize that in a critical discussion also standpoints can be 'tested' whose acceptability is not a matter of truth. Coherence in the sense of the avoidance of pragmatic inconsistency is then, of course, required. See Putnam (2001, 23).
6. Although the quality of the pragma-dialectical rules depends on their problem-solving validity, the additional requirement of intersubjective validity creates a pressure to ascertain that people who aim to resolve their differences by means of argumentative discourse will maintain norms that are, at least for the most part, equivalent with the pragma-dialectical rules. To determine precisely to what extent the pragma-dialectical rules agree with the norms favored by ordinary language users, we test their inter-subjective validity by carrying out a prolonged series of empirical investigations. The results provide a general insight into ordinary arguers' reasonableness conceptions (see, e.g., van Eemeren, Meuffels & Verburg, 2000). At the University of Amsterdam,

indicators of moves that are relevant to resolving a difference of opinion. The scope of the inventory extends to indicators of counterarguments, 'argument schemes,' and structural relations between arguments, and also to indicators of moves in other stages of the resolution process, such as expressing antagonism, granting a concession, and adding a rebuttal (see, e.g., Snoeck Henkemans, 1995).

7. Toulmin calls such pragmatism "an honest foundation for knowledge" (2001, 174). This pragmatic approach is also important in distinguishing between 'real' and 'artificial' (or 'academic' or 'philosophical') doubt. The starting point for 'real' doubt lies in argumentative practice. Peirce once reminded us that having (real) doubt is not so easy as putting forward a lie. It is good to realize that 'fallabilism' does not mean that everything needs to be doubted, but only that doubt should be expressed if there is reason to express it. Putnam regards it as the most important insight achieved in American pragmatism that one can be 'fallibilistic' and 'anti-skeptical' at the same time (2001, 29–30).
8. Among rhetoricians there is a confusing tendency to call such a pragmatic basis of argumentation or discussion rules 'rhetorical.' We prefer to reserve the term *rhetorical* for references to (clear and distinct concepts from) rhetorical theory. For a recent and serious attempt to connect rhetoric and pragmatics theoretically, see Dascal and Gross (1999), who acknowledge "that it is a union with problems on both sides of the aisle" (p. 108).
9. It goes without saying that argumentative discourse, or any other kind of discourse, can also be analyzed from other perspectives, with other goals. As Kant already observed, the one analysis cannot necessarily be reduced to or translated into the other.
10. According to Putnam, we are governed by norms of rationality and reasonableness that have to us become values in their own right (2001, 76–77). See for some empirical confirmation of this claim van Eemeren, Meuffels and Verburg (2000).
11. Linguistic pragmatics suggests already a strong argument for this approach: Why perform a speech act, in particular that of advancing a standpoint, if it is not for gaining acceptance?
12. Using the label 'rhetorical' in this way does not necessarily imply a conception of rhetoric that equates rhetoric without any ado with 'winning,' let alone with 'winning at all cost' (or a similar goal). It does mean, however, that rhetoric, whatever safeguards are added, is in our view in the end always, and undeniably, associated with getting your point as intended across to the audience. According to Simons (1990), rhetoric is, most neutrally, the study and the practice of persuasion. Kienpointners (1995, 453) points out that many scholars see rhetoric as "a rather narrow subject dealing with the techniques of persuasion and/or stylistic devices," but others conceive of rhetoric as "a general theory of argumentation and communication" (while still others deny that it is a discipline at all).
13. We aim at integrating rhetorical insight into a dialectical framework, instead of the other way around, because our primary interest was and is the resolution of differences of opinion by putting standpoints to the (critical) test.
14. In later years, a distinction can be made between philosophically oriented persuasion rhetoric, inspired by Aristotle and Whately, and elocutionary, decorative, belletristic rhetoric. As Gaonkar (1990) explains, in the United States there is also a tradition stemming from Burke that expands the frontiers of rhetoric from 'persuasion' to 'identification'-as-an-explanation-for-social-cohesion. According to van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson and Jacobs (1997, 213), modern-day persuasion theories are "heavily oriented to analysis of attitude formation and change" and bear little resemblance to Aristotle's rhetoric.

15. According to Mack, with the foundation of the universities, from the thirteenth century onward dialectic became the "intellectually dominant part of the *trivium*, while rhetoric was left with the important practical task of teaching official letter-writing" (1993, 8).
16. Although the nature, speed and coherence of this 'Scientific Revolution' are questioned in recent studies in the history of science, such as Shapin (1996), Toulmin's general observation still stands, albeit more so in its subtler version expounded in Toulmin (2001) than in the cruder version Toulmin put forward in his Jefferson Lecture of 1997, where he identified the Peace of Westphalia (1648) as the breaking point.
17. According to Toulmin, rhetoric was until recently by many logicians seen as no more than "the deceptive peddling of falsehoods" (2001, 12).
18. A similar development has taken place in the history of juridical theorizing. See Hohmann, this volume.
19. Among the dialectical theories of argumentation with a formal character, apart from Barth and Krabbe (1982), are Hamblin (1970), Rescher (1977) and Woods and Walton's joint studies of the fallacies (1989). Influential modern rhetorical approaches are Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's (1969) 'new rhetoric' and some traditions in American speech communication (see van Eemeren et al., 1996, Ch. 7).
20. Reboul (1991, 46) observes that for *antistrophos* the translators "donnent [...] tantôt analogue,' tantôt'contrepartie.'" He adds: "*Antistrophos*: il est gênant qu'un livre commence avec un terme aussi obscur!"
21. Mack explains that Agricola's work is unlike any previous rhetoric or dialectic: "[He] has selected materials from the traditional contents of both subjects" (1993, 122). In Meerhoff's (1988, 273) view, "pour Agricola, [...] loin de réduire la dialectique à la seule recherche de la vérité rationelle, il entend parler de celle-ci en termes de *communication*."
22. We agree with Toulmin: "If we accept a pragmatic view of theorizing [such as Dewey's], it is not hard to escape from the imbalance in our ideals about Reason that we have inherited from Modernity" (2001, 172).
23. Other theoreticians, such as Reboul, also recognize that rhetorically strong argumentation should comply with dialectical criteria: "On doit tout faire pour gagner, mais non par n'importe quels moyens: il faut jouer [le jeu] respectant les règles" (1991, 42). See also Wenzel (1990).
24. For more far-reaching proposals, in which rhetoric is subordinated to dialectic, see, for example, Natanson (1955). See also Weaver (1953).
25. A party that utilizes the material available in the context concerned in the most expedient way, taking carefully into account the beliefs, preferences and expectations of the other party or audience, and verbalizing its contributions in the most appropriate way, can be said to *optimally adjust (to) the situation at hand* (cf. Jacobs, this volume).
26. In the way we use the term, there are *aggregates of topical potential* or 'topical systems' for all discussion stages, not just for the argumentation stage.
27. 'Presence' can, of course, also be accomplished by non-verbal means, such as pictures and tables. See Groarke (2002).
28. How suppression of presence can be used strategically, is clearly illustrated in Edward Kennedy's 'Chappaquidick speech.' See van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson and Jacobs (1993, vii–xi), and van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1998).
29. For the notion of 'disagreement space,' see van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson and Jacobs (1993, 95).
30. According to Dascal and Gross "style is both a level at which discourse is pitched ([...] a register) and a set of semantic, syntactic, and prosodic variants within that

register" (1999, 122). We agree, but would like to add a pragmatic element to the second meaning.

31. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca regard a rhetorical figure as "a discernible structure, independent of the content, [...] a form (which may [...] be syntactic, semantic or pragmatic) and a use that is different from the normal manner of expression, and, consequently, attracts attention" (1969, 168).
32. If the argumentative role of figures is disregarded, their study will," in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's opinion, "soon seem to be a useless [or literary] pastime" (1969, 167).
33. It is often wrongly assumed that audience adaptation is the overriding, if not the only, characteristic of rhetoric. Rhetoric is then without any further ado equalized with giving in to audience demand. There is also a tradition in which the use of presentational devices is taken to be the main characteristic of rhetoric. Rhetoric is then primarily viewed as stylistics. In fact, topical selection could just as well be seen as the general umbrella characteristic of rhetoric. In the latter case, rhetoric would be aptly described as the art of finding the appropriate loci of persuasion. In our view, none of these one-sided conceptions of rhetoric does justice to the intricate relationship inherent in any form of adequate strategic maneuvering.
34. This characterization can thus be of help in explaining the deceptive character of the fallacies.
35. See for the *apologia* as a text genre, e.g., Ware and Linkugel (1973) and Benoit and Lindsey (1987). For a characterization of policy statements, see Freeley (1993).
36. When two parties have contradictory standpoints, the dispute is *mixed*. When one party has a standpoint and the other party is neutral in the sense that it questions the standpoint but has no standpoint of its own, the dispute is *non-mixed* (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, 16–22).
37. Additional conditions are that the proposition concerned is really part of the opponent's commiments and that the proponent himself is prepared to live up to the commitments involved.
38. There were cries for intervention after Ken Saro-Wiwa had been sentenced to death and had not yet been executed, but no such cries were heard *after* the execution, i.e., at the time when Shell published its advertorial. By then, the only demand was that Shell should get out of Nigeria.
39. See for the distinction between analytic and evaluative relevance van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992).
40. Even for the standpoint that Shell should not intervene, this argument offers only very weak support, but because this explicit standpoint is much less controversial than the implicit standpoint, this support might suffice.

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The Representation of Social Actors

Theo van Leeuwen

1 Introduction

The question I shall attempt to answer in this chapter can be formulated simply: what are the ways in which social actors can be represented in English discourse? Which choices does the English language give us for referring to people? In addition I shall address another, more specific question: how are the relevant social actors represented in an instance of a particular kind of racist discourse – a discourse which represents immigration in a way that is founded on fear – the fear of loss of livelihood and the fear of loss of cultural identity as a result of the 'influx' of immigrants who are perceived as 'other', 'different' and 'threatening'.

The first of these two questions is a grammatical one, if, with Halliday, we take a grammar to be a 'meaning potential' ('what *can* be said') rather than a set of rules ('what *must* be said'). Yet, unlike many other linguistically oriented forms of Critical Discourse Analysis, I shall not start out from linguistic operations such as nominalisation and passive agent deletion, or from linguistic categories such as the categories of transitivity, but instead seek to draw up a *sociosemantic* inventory of the ways in which social actors can be represented, and to establish the sociological and critical relevance of my categories before I turn to the question of how they are realised linguistically.

There are two reasons for doing so. The first stems from the lack of bi-uniqueness of language. Agency, for instance, as a *sociological* concept, is of major and classic importance in Critical Discourse Analysis: in which contexts are which social actors represented as 'agents' and which as 'patients'? But sociological agency is not always realised by linguistic agency, by the grammatical role of 'Agent'; it can also be realised in many other ways, for instance by possessive pronouns

Source: Carmen Rosa Caldas-Coulthard and Malcolm Coulthard (eds), *Texts and Practices–Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*, 1996, pp. 32–70.

(as in 'our intake of migrants') or by a prepositional phrase with 'from', as in example 1.1, in which the grammatical Agent is sociologically 'patient':

1.1 People of Asian descent say they received a sudden cold-shoulder from neighbours and co-workers.

There is no neat fit between sociological and linguistic categories, and if Critical Discourse Analysis, in investigating for instance the representation of agency, ties itself in too closely to specific linguistic operations or categories, many relevant instances of agency might be overlooked. One cannot, it seems, have it both ways with language. Either theory and method are formally neat but semantically messy (as in the dictionary: one form, many meanings), or they are semantically neat but formally messy (as in the thesaurus: one concept, many possible realisations). Linguists tend towards preserving the unity of formal categories. I shall here attempt the opposite approach, hoping to provide a set of relevant categories for investigating the representation of social actors in discourse.

Halliday (1985: ch. 10) has approached the problem of the lack of bi-uniqueness in another way, through his theory of grammatical metaphor: certain linguistic realisations are 'literal' or 'congruent', others 'metaphorical' or 'incongruent'. But in Halliday's account 'congruent' would seem to mean 'congruent with the grammatical system', rather than 'congruent with reality', the kind of congruence which, in the end, underlies most definitions of metaphor. For Halliday a clause like 'The report confirms '. . .' would not be a metaphor, because it does not violate the criterion that verbal processes do not require a human 'Sayer' as their subject (cf. Halliday, 1985: 129). I would prefer to see 'the report confirms . . .' as just one of the ways in which we can refer to social actors in their role as 'Sayers', as metaphorical or unmetaphorical as any other way, but endowed with its own specific sociosemantic import and hence social distribution: it is likely to be found in contexts where the authority of utterances is bound up with the official status or role of 'Sayers' and/or the official status of genres. In the context of literature, on the other hand, it would be less likely to occur, because there the authority of utterances is bound up with the charismatic personality of the writer, so that we would expect 'Shakespeare says . . .' rather than 'the play says . . .', for instance. I would therefore prefer to ask: how can 'Sayers' be represented – impersonally or personally, individually or collectively, by reference to their person or their utterance, etc. – without privileging any of these choices as more 'literal' than others, and without thereby also privileging the context or contexts in which one or the other tends to occur as more normative than others.

The second reason is somewhat different, and follows from the assumption that meaning belongs to culture rather than to language and cannot be tied to any specific semiotic. Language can represent social actions impersonally, as in this headline:

1.2 Allied air activity over battlefield intensifies

but so can pictures – think of the difference between, on the one hand, 'personalised' pictures of bombardments, say in feature film sequences showing, in close up,

the faces of the crew as they drop the bombs, as well as the faces of the villagers down below as they are about to be bombed, and, on the other hand, diagrams of the same event, for instance maps with large arrows pointing at the targets and schematic drawings representing the explosions.

There is no space here to explore this point in detail (cf. van Leeuwen, 1987, for the representation of social actors in music; Kress and van Leeuwen, 1990, and van Leeuwen, 1993a, for parallels between language and images). Nevertheless, the categories I shall propose in this chapter should, in principle, be seen as pan-semiotic: a given culture (or a given context within a culture) has not only its own, specific array of ways of representing the social world, but also its own specific ways of mapping the different semiotics on to this array, of prescribing, with greater or lesser strictness, what can be realised verbally as well as visually, what only verbally, what only visually, and so on. And these arrangements will also be subject to historical change, sometimes even violent change, as in iconoclasms. The point is important for Critical Discourse Analysis, for, with the increasing use of visual representation in a wide range of contexts, it becomes more and more pressing to be able to ask the same critical questions with regard to both verbal and visual representations, indeed, with regard to representations in all the 'media' that form part of contemporary 'multimedia' texts.

Despite all this, this chapter still attempts to be grounded in linguistics. Each of the representational choices I shall propose will be tied to specific linguistic or rhetorical realisations. To return to my earlier examples, in the case of 'Shakespeare' the representational choice is that of 'nomination' and the realisation the use of a proper name, while in the case of 'the report confirms . . .' the representational choice is that of 'utterance autonomisation' (see section 11 below) and the realisation the substitution of the utterance for its Sayer, hence a form of metonymical reference. The difference is that my primary focus is on sociological categories ('nomination', 'agency', etc.) rather than on linguistic categories ('nominalisation', 'passive agent deletion', etc.) and that the system network, the 'array of choices', I shall present in section 13 will range over a variety of linguistic and rhetorical phenomena, and find its unity in the concept of 'social actor', rather than in a linguistic concept such as, for instance, 'the nominal group'.

Finally, the chapter is part of a larger project (see van Leeuwen, 1993a; 1993b) in which I am attempting in addition to map how other elements of social practices (the social activities that constitute them, the times when and the locations where they occur, the dress and body grooming that go with them, etc.) are represented, and how representations add further elements to this, for instance the purposes and legitimations of the social practices, and the sentiments that accompany them. In short, the question addressed in this chapter is part of a larger question: how are social practices transformed into discourses about social practices – and this both in the sense of what means we have for doing so, and in the sense of how we actually do it in specific institutional contexts which have specific relations with the social practices of which they produce representations.

2 'Our Race Odyssey'

Below I reproduce the first three sections of 'Our Race Odyssey', the text from which I shall draw most of my examples, and which I use to demonstrate how the categories I propose may be used in text analysis. It was published as the leading feature article in 'Spectrum', the Saturday supplement of the *Sydney Morning Herald*, a conservative broadsheet newspaper, on 12 May 1990.

The descriptive framework I shall present in the following sections was worked out with the aid of a much larger and generically diverse corpus of texts which included fictional narratives, comic strips, news stories, newspaper editorials, advertisements, textbooks and scholarly essays, all dealing, in some form or other, with the subject of schooling, and more specifically with the transition from home to school (van Leeuwen, 1993b). As one text can never provide instances of all the categories and modes of representation, I shall, throughout the chapter, also use examples from this corpus.

1 2001: Our Race Odyssey.
2 This country will be vastly different next century if Australians feel they cannot voice legitimate fears about immigration without being branded racists, argues David Jenkins.
3 In Florence last month 80 young white thugs, many wearing costume masks and armed with iron bars, roamed the narrow cobbled streets attacking African street vendors.
4 In France, where non-European immigrants make up 6.5 per cent of the population, former president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing proposed a total halt to immigration.
5 In Japan, a nation with a strong tradition of keeping foreigners at arm's length, similar concerns are being expressed about a mere trickle of Third World immigrants.
6 Japan's National Police Agency had to apologise recently for circulating an internal memo to police stations claiming that Pakistanis working in Japan 'have a unique body odour', carry infectious skin diseases and tell lies 'under the name of Allah'.
7 The mayor of Kawaguchi has 'joked' that with so many dark-skinned foreigners in town, Japanese are having trouble seeing them at night.
8 In Peru, where the son of Japanese immigrants is a presidential front-runner, the situation is reversed.
9 A racist backlash against ethnic Asians has been unleashed by those who resent the prominence of centrist candidate Alberto Fujimori.
10 People of Asian descent say they have been insulted in the street, denied entry to elegant restaurants and received a sudden cold-shoulder from neighbours and co-workers.
11 In Canada, where the 250,000-strong Sikh community has pressed for the right to have Mounties in turbans and where 22,000 Hong Kong Chinese arrived last year, bringing bulging wallets to cities like Vancouver,

12 'Native Vancouverites will be made to feel like strangers in their own city as the influx of Asians and their capital freezes them out', wrote one reader of *The Province* newspaper in Vancouver.
13 If you were sitting in Canberra and doing no more than reading the daily newspapers you would be entitled to be a bit concerned by these developments.
14 They italicise the lesson that people, whatever their race, display their less attractive characteristics when they feel threatened and unable to cope with rapid change in the society around them.
15 They highlight the fact that racism is seldom far below the surface – whether it is in Western Europe, in Asia, in North or South America.
16 They may even call into question some aspects of Australia's immigration programme, which is now running at close to record levels, with annual net migration of about 150,000, including 60,000 migrants from Asia.
17 Is the Australian Government concerned?
18 Not a bit.
19 Prime Minister Bob Hawke says he is 'philosophically' a high-migration man.
20 He thinks our current intake is about right.
21 'I hope that as we go on,' he said recently, 'that we may be able to look at higher levels of immigration.'
22 Is the Prime Minister entitled to be quite so confident that we have got our immigration policy settings right?
23 Is he entitled to believe that this nation, which only recently shed the White Australia Policy, is somehow impervious to racist sentiment?
24 On the evidence to date there is some reason to suppose that he is.
25 We have had one of the most successful immigration programmes in the world.
26 Forty per cent of Australians were born overseas or have at least one parent who was born overseas; in Sydney, the figure is 49 per cent.
27 We have become one of the most diverse groups of people in the world.
28 We have achieved all this with remarkably little disharmony or dislocation.
29 We are entitled to be proud – not apologetic – about our immigration programme.
30 We are entitled to be resentful about the damaging distortions that are presented as fact by Bruce Ruxton, who spent the major part of his three-year military career as an army cook, when he marches into TV studios in Singapore and Hong Kong.
31 We have avoided most of the problems that bedevil Western Europe because few of our non-European migrants have been poor, black, unskilled, Muslim or illegal.
32 They have tended to be Asian and they tended to come, at least until recently, from an educated elite that was English-speaking and middle-class.

33 However, all that is changing.
34 Migration from traditional source countries like Italy and Greece has dried up.
35 Migration from the Third World, especially Asia and the Middle East, is becoming increasingly important.
36 And though many of the new migrants are educated high-achievers from places like Singapore and Hong Kong – 'uptown' people in American terminology – others are 'downtown' people from places like Vietnam, the Philippines and Lebanon.
37 The 'downtown' migrants tend to be unskilled or low-skilled, tend to have high unemployment rates – Lebanese, Turks and Vietnamese have unemployment rates three to four times the national average – and tend to be significant users of social welfare.
38 With these changes is coming a change in community attitudes.
39 Many Australians, the 1988 Fitzgerald Committee reported, were 'bewildered' by the changing face of Australia.
40 They did not feel they understood or could influence this change.
41 They felt 'besieged' by immigration.
42 They believed that the immigration program existed for the benefit of politicians, bureaucrats and the ethnic minorities, not for Australians as a whole.
43 This concern, the report noted, was reflected in surveys which showed that the level of support for stopping immigration altogether was at a postwar high.
44 If you stop for a moment and consider all this you will see that there is something very odd going on.
45 On the one hand we have a Prime Minister who says he is philosophically disposed to high migration, a Prime Minister who has been presiding over a near record intake of migrants.
46 On the other we have public support for immigration at an all-time low.
47 This suggests a yawning gap between what people think about immigration and what politicians and other community leaders feel they can or should say about immigration.
48 It is hardly surprising therefore that the immigration debate is building again.
49 Hardly surprising that there are calls for major cuts in the program.
50 Hardly surprising that a number of critics want to see our intake halved to 70,000 to 80,000, which would bring it into line with our postwar average.
51 Australia, these critics suggest, is being generous to a fault – and in danger of saddling itself with a lot of unwanted problems as a result.

3 Exclusion

The 'Race Odyssey' text draws on a representation of the social practice of immigration itself, as institutionalised in Australia, as well as on the representation

of other social practices, which serve to legitimise (or delegitimise) it: the practices of writing government-commissioned reports on immigration, or of conducting public opinion surveys about it, for instance. All these practices involve specific sets of social actors, but in a given representation, for instance that of the 'Race Odyssey' text, a feature article in a conservative middle-class newspaper, not all the social actors are included. Some are represented, for instance Prime Minister Bob Hawke, who 'presides over a near record intake of migrants', others excluded, for instance the people who 'brand as racist' those who 'voice legitimate fears about immigration'. Representations include or exclude social actors to suit their interests and purposes in relation to the readers for whom they are intended. Some of the exclusions may be 'innocent', details which readers are assumed to know already, or which are deemed irrelevant to them, others tie in close to the propaganda strategy of creating fear, and of setting up immigrants as enemies of 'our' interests.

Exclusion has rightly been an important aspect of Critical Discourse Analysis. To mention just one classic example, Tony Trew (1979: 97ff) showed how, in *The Times* and the *Rhodesian Herald* (*anno* 1975), the police were excluded in accounts of the 'riots' during which they had opened fire and killed demonstrators, because it was in the interest of these papers and their readers to attempt to 'justify white rule in Africa', and this required

> a suppression of the fact that the white regimes apply violence and intimidation, and suppression of the nature of the exploitation this makes possible. It requires that the regimes and their agents be put constantly in the role of promoters of progress, law and order, concerned to eliminate social evil and conflict, but never responsible for it.
>
> (Trew, 1979: 106)

Some exclusions leave no traces in the representation, excluding both the social actors and their activities. Such radical exclusion can play a role in a critical comparison of different representations of the same social practice, but not in an analysis of a single text, for the simple reason that it leaves no traces behind. In my study of the representation of schooling (van Leeuwen, 1993b), for instance, I found that fathers were radically excluded in texts addressing teachers, but included in many children's stories, even if often only briefly, during the breakfast preceding the first school day, or as givers of satchels, pencil cases and other school necessities. Children's stories aimed at a mass market sometimes included school support staff, but excluded the headmistress, while more 'up-market' children's stories included the headmistress but excluded people lower than teachers in the school hierarchy, in what is clearly a class-related pattern of inclusion and exclusion.

When the activities (e.g. the killing of demonstrators) are included, but some or all of the social actors involved in it (e.g. the police) are excluded, the exclusion does leave a trace. We can ask 'but who did the killing?' or 'but who was killed?', even though the text does not provide the answers. In this case a further distinction should perhaps be made, the distinction between *suppression* and *backgrounding*.

In the case of suppression, there is no reference to the social actor(s) in question anywhere in the text. Thus we learn, in the 'Race Odyssey' text, that someone or some institution surveyed the opinions of the public, but we do not find out which individual or company or other institution did it, which takes away at least one possible avenue of contesting the results of the 'surveys'. In the case of backgrounding, the exclusion is less radical: the excluded social actors may not be mentioned in relation to a given activity, but they are mentioned elsewhere in the text, and we can infer with reasonable (though never total) certainty who they are. They are not so much excluded as de-emphasised, pushed into the background.

How is suppression realised? First there is, of course, the classic realisation through passive agent deletion. Example 3.1 tells us that 'concerns are being expressed', but not who expresses them:

3.1 In Japan similar concerns are being expressed about a mere trickle of Third World immigrants.

Suppression can also be realised through non-finite clauses which function as a grammatical participant. In example 3.2 the infinitival clause 'to maintain this policy' is embedded to function as the Carrier of an attributive clause, and this allows the social actor(s) responsible for the 'maintenance' of the policy to be excluded – and they *could* have been included, for instance, as 'for local education authorities'. The downranking of the process ('maintain') makes the fact that exclusion has taken place a little less accessible, the trace a little less clear:

3.2 To maintain this policy is hard.

It is almost always possible to delete 'Beneficiaries', social actors who benefit from an activity. Example 3.3, for instance, does not include those to whom the 'National Police Agency' apologised (the Pakistanis who had been offended?):

3.3 Japan's National Police Agency had to apologise recently for circulating an internal memo to police stations claiming that Pakistanis working in Japan 'have a unique body odour', carry infectious skin diseases and tell lies 'under the name of Allah'.

Nominalisations and process nouns similarly allow the exclusion of social actors. 'Support' and 'stopping', in example 3.4, function as nominals, although they refer to activities. The same applies to 'immigration'. Again the excluded social actors *could* have been included, for instance through postmodifying phrases with *by, of, from*, etc., but they haven't been:

3.4 The level of support for stopping immigration altogether was at a postwar high.

Processes may also be realised as adjectives, as is the case with 'legitimate' in example 3.5. Who 'legitimises' the 'fear'? The writer? We cannot be sure. The fears simply *are* legitimate, according to this representation:

3.5 Australians feel they cannot voice legitimate fears about immigration.

The activity in example 3.6 involves a human actor, the teacher who opens the door. But coding the activity in middle voice (Halliday, 1985: 150–1) necessitates the exclusion of the agentive participant. The context may lead us to infer that the teacher was involved, but there can be no certainty – it might, for instance, have been the wind. The clause invites a reading in which the opening of the door, the intrusion of the teacher in the child's world of play, is given the force of a natural event.

3.6 The door of the playhouse opened and the teacher looked in.

It is often difficult to know whether suppressed social actors are or are not supposed to be retrievable by the reader, or, indeed, the writer. Example 3.4, for instance, does not tell us who is involved in the act of 'stopping immigration'. Is this because readers are assumed to know already, so that more detailed reference would be overcommunicative, or is it to block access to detailed knowledge of a practice which, if represented in detail, might arouse compassion for those who are 'stopped'? The point is that the practice is here represented as something not to be further examined or contested.

Backgrounding can result from simple ellipses in non-finite clauses with *-ing* and *-ed* participles, in infinitival clauses with *to*, and in paratactic clauses. In all these cases the excluded social actor is *in*cluded elsewhere in the same clause or clause complex. It can also be realised in the same way as suppression, but with respect to social actors who *are* included elsewhere in the text. The two realisations background social actors to different degrees, but both play a part in reducing the number of times specific social actors are explicitly referred to.

To discuss the pattern of inclusion and exclusion in the 'Race Odyssey' text, it is necessary to bring the various ways in which each category of social actor is represented under a common denominator. These common denominators do not, of course, form a more transparent or congruent way of referring to them. They merely serve as an anchor for the analysis, a kind of calibration. For the purposes of analysis, then, I shall call 'racists' those social actors who, actively or otherwise, oppose immigration and immigrants in countries other than Australia, and I shall refer to those who do the same in Australia as 'us'. Again, this is not to say that the latter are *not* racist, but merely to follow the distinction that underlies the way the author argues his case. I shall refer to the immigrants themselves as 'them', to the (Australian) Government as 'government', to the various experts invoked by the writer as 'experts', to the writer himself as 'writer', and to his readers, who are sometimes addressed directly, as 'addressees'. Bruce Ruxton, the 'racist' Australians love to hate, is a category on his own ('our racist'), and finally there are a few minor characters who appear only once, the 'anti-racists' who 'brand as racist' the 'legitimate fears of Australians', 'Allah', 'European Governments' and (Japanese) 'police stations'. Table 1 displays the patterns of inclusion and exclusion.

Table 1: Inclusion and exclusion in the 'Race Odyssey' text

	Included %	Backgrounded %	Suppressed %
'racists' (N=24)	67.25	20.25	12.5
'us' (N=46)	72	24	4
'them' (N=98)	61	38	1
'government' (N=32)	73	18	9

Although the differences are not dramatic, it is clear that the most frequently included social actors are the Australian Government and 'us', Australians, who voice 'legitimate fears', while the most frequently backgrounded or suppressed social actors are, on the one hand, the immigrants, and on the other hand those in other countries who commit such racist acts as 'insulting' and 'denying entry to elegant restaurants', and, indeed, people in general, as they are 'naturally inclined to racism' and will 'display unpleasant characteristics when they feel threatened'. In short, those who do not take part in the 'debate' between the Australian people and its government which the writer stages for us in his argument form to some extent a backdrop to this debate.

I do not want to make great claims for treating texts statistically. On the contrary, it is important to realise that the frequencies may shift with the stages in the writer's argument. In the first section of the text, where the writer discusses racism in other countries, migrants are backgrounded in 17 per cent of cases. As soon as the writer moves to his discussion of Australian immigration policy, this increases to 36 per cent. In other words, the migrants close to home are backgrounded more often. In any case, the pattern of inclusion and exclusion must be integrated with the *way in which* they are represented, which I shall discuss in the remainder of this chapter.

What, finally, remains most opaque in this text? First, the voice of the opposition – those who 'brand as racist' Australians 'who voice legitimate fears' are fully suppressed. Second, many of the 'racists' in other countries: we are not told who exactly is responsible for 'insulting people of Asian descent' or 'denying them entry to elegant restaurants', for example. Third, the voice of legitimation, which 'legitimises fears', and which 'entitles' Hawke and 'us' to the view which, by virtue of their sheer prominence in the text, the writer obliquely favours. And finally, those who have to do the dirty work of actually 'stopping' ('halting', 'cutting', etc.) the immigrants.

4 Role Allocation

I shall now consider the roles that social actors are given to play in representations, an aspect of representation which also plays a significant part in the work

of many critical linguists (e.g. Fairclough, 1989; Fowler, 1991; Fowler *et al.*, 1979; Kress and Hodge, 1979; van Dijk, 1991): who is represented as 'agent' ('Actor'), who as 'patient' ('Goal') with respect to a given action? This question remains important, for there need not be congruence between the roles that social actors actually play in social practices and the grammatical roles they are given in texts. Representations can reallocate roles, rearrange the social relations between the participants. Here is an example, from the field of television studies:

> *4.1 Children seek out aspects of commercial television as a consolidation and confirmation of their everyday lives.... The kids use it [television] subversively against the rule-bound culture and institution of the school.*
>
> (Curthoys and Docker, 1989: 68)

> *4.2 Television affects children's sex-role attitudes.... Furthermore, television has been shown to influence more subtle areas such as racial attitudes and cultural views.*
>
> (Tuchman *et al.*, 1978: 232)

Leaving aside aspects of the representation of social actors we have not yet discussed (objectivations such as 'television' and 'subtle areas'; abstractions such as 'aspects of commercial television') and the exclusions (e.g. in 'racial attitudes and cultural views'), the two major categories of social actor represented are 'children' and 'television'. In Example 4.1, 'children' and 'the kids' are, grammatically, Actor in relation to activities such as 'seeking out' and 'using' (and also, if one ignores the backgrounding, of 'consolidating' and 'confirming'), while 'television' ('aspects of commercial television' and 'it') is the Goal of both these processes. In 4.2, 'television' is Actor of 'affect' and 'influence', while 'children' ('children's sex-role attitudes'; 'subtle areas such as racial attitudes and cultural views') are Goal. In other words, in one of the representations (that of a populist, 'active audience' theory) the active role is given to children, the passive role to television, while in the other (that of the 'effects' or 'hypodermic needle' theory of mass communication) the active role is given to television and the passive role to children. The two examples deal, in the end, with the same reality, but which of them corresponds best to that reality is of course a problem text analysis cannot solve. What we *can* do, however, is investigate which options are chosen in which institutional and social contexts, and why these choices should have been taken up, what interests are served by them, and what purposes achieved.

I shall say, then, that representations can endow social actors with either active or passive roles. *Activation* occurs when social actors are represented as the active, dynamic forces in an activity, *passivation* when they are represented as 'undergoing' the activity, or as being 'at the receiving end of it'. This may be realised by grammatical participant roles, by transitivity structures in which activated social actors are coded as Actor in material processes, Behaver in behavioural processes, Senser in mental processes, Sayer in verbal processes or Assigner in relational processes (Halliday, 1985: ch. 5). In 4.3, for example,

In 4.4, on the other hand, 'young white thugs' are activated and 'African street vendors' passivated. In other words, while in other countries there may be active racists, in Australia the migrants play the active (and 'threatening') role, and 'we' are at best activated as 'Sensers' in relation to mental processes such as 'feeling'.

4.3 They felt 'besieged' by immigration.

4.4 80 young white thugs attacked African street vendors.

When, as in these cases, activation is realised by 'participation' (grammatical participant roles), the active role of the social actor in question is most clearly foregrounded; note how, in examples 4.1 and 4.2, active roles are realised by participation, passive roles in other, more highly transformed ways. But activation can also be realised in other ways, for example through 'circumstantialisation', that is by prepositional circumstantials with by or *from*, as with 'from neighbours and co-workers' in:

4.5 People of Asian descent suddenly received a cold-shoulder from neighbours and co-workers.

Premodification (e.g. 'public' in 'public support') or postmodification (e.g. 'of Asians' in 'the influx of Asians') of nominalisations or process nouns can also realise activation. A frequent form of this is 'possessivation', the use of a possessive pronoun to activate (e.g. 'our intake') or passivate (e.g. 'my teacher') a social actor. By comparison to participation this backgrounds agency, changing it into the 'possession' of a process which has itself been transformed into a 'thing'.

Passivation necessitates a further distinction: the passivated social actor can be *subjected* or *beneficialised*. Subjected social actors are treated as objects in the representation, for instance as objects of exchange (immigrants 'taken in' in return for the skill or the money they bring). Beneficialised social actors form a third party which, positively or negatively, benefits from it. In 4.6, for instance, 'about 70,000 migrants' are subjected to the activity of 'bringing in'; in 4.7 'cities like Vancouver' are beneficialised in relation to 'bringing':

4.6 Australia was bringing in about 70,000 migrants a year.

4.7 22,000 Hong Kong Chinese arrived last year, bringing bulging wallets to cities like Vancouver.

There is a cryptogrammatical criterion for considering both these roles passivations: Goals as well as Beneficiaries can become subjects in passive clauses. But there is of course also a grammatical criterion for distinguishing them: Beneficiaries can take a preposition (although they do not have to: see Halliday, 1985: 132ff), Goals cannot (with the exception of very few cases, such as 'What did John do with the dinner?').

Phenomenon in a mental process, or Carrier in an effective attributive process (Halliday, 1985: 143) – 'African street vendors' in 4.4 is an example. It can also be realised by 'circumstantialisation' through a prepositional phrase with, for instance, *against*, as in 4.8, where 'ethnic Asians' are passivated:

4.8 A racist backlash against ethnic Asians has been unleashed by those who resent the prominence of centrist candidate Alberto Fujimori.

And it can also be realised by 'possessivation', usually in the form of a prepositional phrase with of postmodifying a nominalisation or process noun, as with 'of some 54,000 skilled immigrants' in 4.9:

4.9 An intake of some 54,000 skilled immigrants is expected this year.

Finally, adjectival premodification can also passivate, as, for example, with 'racial' in 'racial tolerance', where (people of different) races are passivated; the example also *abstracts* the social actors represented.

Beneficialisation may be realised either by participation, in which case the beneficialised participant is Recipient or Client in relation to a material process, or Receiver in relation to a verbal process (Halliday, 1985: 132–3). Table 2 shows how the 'Race Odyssey' text allocates roles to the most frequently represented social actors.

It is clear that 'racists', 'government' and 'us' most often act upon the immigrants, be it materially or symbolically, and that the immigrants themselves are activated only, or almost only, in relation to one action, the act of immigrating ('influx', 'arriving', etc.), and this mostly in nominalised and deeply embedded form.

Table 2: Role allocation in the 'Race Odyssey' text

	Activated %	Subjected %	Beneficialised %
'racists' (N=21)	81	14	5
'us' (N=40)	85	12.5	2.5
'them' (N=66)	53	45	2
'government' (N=29)	86	7	7

5 Genericisation and Specification

The choice between generic and specific reference is another important factor in the representation of social actors; they can be represented as classes or as specific, identifiable individuals. Compare, for instance, the following two texts:

5.1 The reference is specific since we have in mind specific specimens of the class tiger.

5.2. Classification is an instrument of control in two directions: control over the flux of experience of physical and social reality . . . and society's control over conceptions of that reality.

(Kress and Hodge, 1979: 63)

The first example betrays a view of reality in which generalised essences, classes, constitute the real, and in which specific participants are 'specimens' of those classes. In the second example the real is constituted by the 'flux of experience', by a specific, concrete world, populated with specific, concrete people, places, things and actions, and 'classification' is seen as an operation upon this reality, which creates a kind of second order reality, a 'conception of reality'.

Sociologists have linked such concepts of reality to social class. For Bourdieu (1986) concrete reference to immediate experience is linked to the habitus of the working class, that is, to the principles that lie behind their appreciation of art, music and literature, behind their moral and political judgements and so on. 'Distance, height, the overview of the observer who places himself above the hurly-burly' (Bourdieu, 1986: 444), on the other hand, is linked to the habitus of the dominant class, the bourgeoisie, and Bourdieu approvingly quotes Virginia Woolf's dictum that 'general ideas are always Generals' ideas'. From this perspective, he says, specific reference is a 'blind, narrow, partial vision' (Bourdieu, 1986: 444). In a similar vein, Bernstein (e.g. 1971: 197) has argued that 'elaborated codes' give access to 'universalistic orders of meaning', while restricted codes give access to 'particularistic orders of meaning', and that access to these codes is class-determined.

The difference can be observed, for instance, in the way that social actors are represented by different sectors of the press. In middle-class oriented newspapers government agents and experts tend to be referred to specifically, and 'ordinary people' generically: the point of identification, the world in which one's specifics exist, is here, not the world of the governed, but the world of the governors, the 'generals'. In working-class oriented newspapers, on the other hand, 'ordinary people' are frequently referred to specifically. The following two examples illustrate the difference. They deal with the same topic and the articles from which they are taken appeared on the same day, their news value deriving from the same statement by Australia's Minister for Sport and Recreation. The first comes from the *Sydney Morning Herald*, a middle-class oriented newspaper, the second from the *Daily Telegraph*, a working-class oriented newspaper:

5.3 Australia has one of the highest childhood drowning rates in the world, with children under 5 making up a quarter of the toll, this is the grim news from Government studies of Australia's high incidence of drowning. The studies show over 500 people drown in Australia every year, with backyard swimming pools the biggest killers for children under 15. The Minister for Sport and Recreation, Mr Brown, said the childhood drowning rate was higher than developed countries such as Britain and the US and comparable with many Asian countries. He said children should be encouraged to swim and parents should learn resuscitation techniques.

5.4 The tragic drowning of a toddler in a backyard swimming pool has mystified his family. Matthew Harding, two, one of twin boys, had to climb over a one-metre 'child-proof' fence before he fell into the pool. Mrs Desley Harding found Matthew floating in the pool when she went to call the twins in for tea yesterday. 'I have got no idea how he got in the pool', said Mrs Harding at her home in Wentworthville South today.

Genericisation may be realised by the plural without article, as in 5.5:

5.5 Non-European immigrants make up 6.5 per cent of the population.

and it may also be realised by the singular with a definite article (5.6) or indefinite article (5.7):

5.6 Allow the child to cling to something familiar during times of distress.

5.7 Maybe a child senses that from her mother.

If mass nouns are used for generic reference to a group of participants, the article will be absent, but this form can also be used for specific reference: generic reference is clearly dependent on a complex of factors, including also tense, and 5.8 has been interpreted as specific mainly because of the absence of habitual or universal present tense:

5.8 Staff in both playgroups and nurseries expressed willingness to supply information if asked and regretted that their opinions were not valued more.

The presence of a Numerative, finally, has been interpreted as realising specific reference.

Even though one expects a certain amount of generic reference in a general argument, which is what the 'Race Odyssey' text purports to be, this does not mean that all categories of social actor are equally often genericised. 'Racists' in other countries, and 'them', the immigrants, are genericised most often (32 and 48 per cent respectively) and so symbolically removed from the readers' world of immediate experience, treated as distant 'others' rather than as people 'we' have to deal with in our everyday lives. The 'government' and 'us', on the other hand, are less often genericised (17 and 15 per cent respectively).

6 Assimilation

Social actors can be referred to as individuals, in which case I shall speak of *individualisation*, or as groups, in which case I shall speak of *assimilation*. Given the great value 'which is placed on individuality in many spheres of our society (and the value placed on conformity in others) these categories would have to be of primary significance in Critical Discourse Analysis. Examples 5.3 and 5.4

already showed that middle-class oriented newspapers tend to individualise elite persons and assimilate 'ordinary people', while working-class oriented newspapers quite often individualise 'ordinary people'. In my study of 'schooling texts' (van Leeuwen, 1993b) I analysed an item from the ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) radio programme 'Offspring', which deals with issues of interest to parents. One of the expert panellists in the programme made an explicit plea for individualisation, but – experts will be experts, and schools schools – individualisation was, itself, assimilated. The children, despite the emphasis on difference, were represented as groups:

6.1 However you manipulate the age of entry into school, you are always going to have the situation where you have children of different kinds of development and with different skills coming into a school programme. And the important thing is to make sure that the programme is adapted to meet the needs of all these children coming in.

I shall distinguish two major kinds of assimilation, *aggregation* and *collectivisation.* The former quantifies groups of participants, treating them as 'statistics', the latter does not. Aggregation plays a crucial role in many contexts. In our society the majority rules, not just in contexts in which formal democratic procedures are used to arrive at decisions, but also and especially in others, through mechanisms such as opinion polls, surveys, marketing research, etc. Even legislative reform is increasingly based on 'what most people consider legitimate'. For this reason aggregation is often used to regulate practice and to manufacture consensus opinion, even though it presents itself as merely recording facts. Example 6.2 can be seen as an instance of this use of aggregation:

6.2 This concern, the report noted, was reflected in surveys which showed that the level of support for stopping migration altogether was at a postwar high.

Individualisation is realised by singularity, and assimilation by plurality, as with 'Australians' and 'Muslims' in 6.3:

6.3 Australians tend to be sceptical about admitting 'Muslims'.

Alternatively, assimilation may be realised by a mass noun or a noun denoting a group of people, as, for instance, with 'this nation' in 6.4 and 'the community' in 6.5:

6.4 Is he [i.e. Prime Minister Hawke] entitled to believe that this nation, which only recently shed the White Australia Policy, is somehow impervious to racist sentiment?

6.5 The 250,000-strong Sikh community has pressed for the right to have Mounties in turbans.

Aggregation is realised by the presence of definite or indefinite quantifiers, which either function as the Numerative or as the Head of the nominal group, as with 'a number of critics' in 6.6 and 'forty per cent of Australians' in 6.7:

6.6 A number of critics want to see our intake halved to 70,000.

6.7 Forty per cent of Australians were born overseas.

The 'Race Odyssey' text individualises 'racists' and 'immigrants' only when they are also elite persons (Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the mayor of Kawaguchi, and the presidential candidate (son of immigrants) from Peru, the only 'immigrant' in this category). The individualisation of racism within Australia, in the person of Bruce Ruxton, 'our racist', shows that, in the press, notoriety confers as much elite status as does high office.

'We', the people of Australia, are of course mostly collectivised, not only through the first person plural, but also through terms like 'Australia', 'this nation', 'the community', etc. The government, on the other hand, is mostly individualised – the leader as a strong individual, the people as a homogeneous, consensual group.

'Experts' are collectivised ('the committee', 'surveys'), which helps to signal their agreement. In the remainder of the article, however, they are often individualised, which allows their titles, credentials and institutional affiliations to be showcased.

As indicated already, immigrants are most frequently aggregated, treated as 'statistics', and rather than that this is used to realise frequency modality (as in 'many Australians'), it makes them not only the object of 'rational' economic calculation, but also that large horde 'legitimately feared' by Australians.

7 Association and Dissociation

There is another way in which social actors can be represented as groups: *association*. Association, in the sense in which I shall use the term here, refers to groups formed by social actors and/or groups of social actors (either generically or specifically referred to) which are never labelled in the text (although the actors or groups who make up the association may of course themselves be named and/or categorised). The most common realisation of association is parataxis, as in this example:

7.1 They believed that the immigration program existed for the benefit of politicians, bureaucrats, and the ethnic minorities, not for Australians as a whole.

Here 'politicians, bureaucrats and ethnic minorities' are associated to form a group opposed to the interests of 'Australians as a whole'. But, rather than being

which exists only in relation to a specific activity or set of activities, in this case their beneficiary role in relation to immigration.

Association may also be realised by 'circumstances of accompaniment' (Halliday, 1985: 141), as in:

7.2 They played 'higher and higher' with the other children.

In this case the association is, perhaps, even more fleeting and unstable.

Possessive pronouns and possessive attributive clauses with verbs like 'have' and 'belong' can make an association explicit without naming the resulting social grouping. In this case, however, the association is represented as more stable and enduring, and, indeed, 'possessive', as in this example, where 'problems' is clearly an abstract reference to a specific kind of immigrant: with other kinds of immigrants an association may be formed, with this kind of immigrant it must be 'avoided':

7.3 We have avoided most of the problems that bedevil Western Europe because few of our non-European migrants have been poor, black, unskilled, Muslim or illegal.

In many texts associations are formed and unformed ('dissociation') as the text proceeds. In one children's story I studied, for instance, there existed, prior to entering school for the first time, an association between two children from the same neighbourhood. As they walked to school and shared their worries, they were always referred to as 'Mark and Mandy'. But the association was disbanded as soon as they entered the classroom. From that moment they were referred to either separately, or as part of the collective of the 'class'.

There are only a few associations in the 'Race Odyssey' text: the lines between the parties are sharply drawn. Two of the associations lump different ethnic origins together ('Asia and the Middle East', 'Lebanese, Turks and Vietnamese'), another associates the 'neighbours and co-workers' who give 'ethnic Asians' the cold-shoulder. The cases of 'our non-European migrants', 'politicians, bureaucrats and ethnic minorities' I have already mentioned.

8 Indetermination and Differentiation

Indetermination occurs when social actors are represented as unspecified, 'anonymous' individuals or groups, *determination* when their identity is, one way or another, specified. Indetermination is typically realised by indefinite pronouns ('somebody', 'someone', 'some', 'some people') used in nominal function, as in this example from a children's book, where a member of the school support staff is indeterminated:

8.1 Someone had put flowers on the teacher's desk.

Here indetermination *anonymises* a social actor. The writer treats his or her identity as irrelevant to the reader. Indetermination can also be realised by

exophoric reference, and in this case it endows social actors with a kind of impersonal authority, a sense of unseen, yet powerfully felt coercive force:

8.2 They won't let you go to school until you're five years old.

Indetermination can also be aggregated, as, for example, in: 'many believe . . .', 'some say . . .', etc.

Differentiation explicitly differentiates an individual social actor or group of social actors from a similar actor or group, creating the difference between the 'self' and the 'other', or between 'us' and 'them', as with 'others' in:

8.3 And though many of the new migrants are educated high-achievers from places like Singapore and Hong Kong – 'uptown' people in American terminology – others are 'downtown' people from places like Vietnam, the Philippines and Lebanon.

There are only two cases of this in the 'Race Odyssey' text, the one just quoted, and the 'other community leaders' (i.e. other than 'politicians and bureaucrats').

When I compared middle-class oriented and mass-market oriented children's stories about the 'first day at school' (van Leeuwen, 1993b), I found that differentiation plays an important role in the former, but does not occur much in the latter. Middle-class children are apparently encouraged to see themselves as individuals, different from 'the other children', and much of the trauma of 'the first day', as represented in these stories, consists in a kind of identity crisis, the child's discovery that she is not unique:

8.4 Mummy, did you know there is another Mary in my class?

The readers of the mass-market oriented stories, on the other hand, are encouraged to take pleasure in their ability to conform successfully.

9 Nomination and Categorisation

Social actors can be represented either in terms of their unique identity, by being *nominated*, or in terms of identities and functions they share with others (*categorisation*), and it is, again, always of interest to investigate which social actors are, in a given discourse, categorised and which nominated. In stories, for instance, nameless characters fulfil only passing, functional roles, and do not become points of identification for the reader or listener. In press 'stories' something similar occurs. We saw, for instance, how a middle-class newspaper nominated only a high-status person, a government minister, while a working-class oriented newspaper, in an article on the same topic, nominated 'ordinary people' (examples 5.3 and 5.4). The press, and not only the press, also tends to nominate men and women in different ways (cf. the types of nomination discussed below). The following sets of examples were taken from the same *Guardian* articles:

9.1 Dwight Harris, aged 32 . . . his wife Beverley, aged 33.

9.2 Carole Maychill, a 32-year-old captain . . . Colonel Robert Pepper.

Nomination is typically realised by proper nouns, which can be *formal* (surname only, with or without honorifics), *semi-formal* (given name and surname, as with 'Dwight Harris' in 9.1) or *informal* (given name only, as with 'Beverley' in 9.1). Occasionally what we might call 'name obscuration' occurs: letters or numbers replace names (e.g. 'Mr X') so that nomination can be signified while the name is, at the same time, withheld. All nominations can be used as vocatives and do not occur with a possessive pronoun, except in contexts of special endearment (e.g. 'My Cathy . . .') at least in English – in other languages the possessive pronoun does not necessarily suggest special endearment (cf. the French 'Mon Capitaine', 'Mon Général').

Items other than proper names may be used for nomination, especially when, in a given context, only one social actor occupies a certain rank or fulfils a certain function. Nominations of this kind in fact blur the dividing line between nomination and categorisation. They are common in stories for young children, with characters referred to as 'The Little Boy', 'The Giant', 'Rabbit', etc., even in vocatives:

9.3 Turkish Sultan, give me back my diamond button.

Nominations may be titulated, either in the form of honorification, the addition of standard titles, ranks, etc. as with 'Dr' in 9.4, or in the form of affiliations, the addition of a personal or kinship relation term, as with 'Auntie Barbara' in 9.5:

9.4 In 50 years, Dr Price says, 26 per cent of the Australian population will be Asian.

9.5 They started out, Auntie Barbara pushing Debbie in her pram.

Press journalists often use what Bell (1985: 98) has called 'pseudo titles', such as 'controversial cancer therapist Milan Brych'. As in standard titles, the definite article is absent in such pseudo titles, but otherwise categorisation and nomination are mixed here, or rather, categorisations are used as unique identities, much as in the children's stories quote above.

The 'Race Odyssey' text nominates heads of government (Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Prime Minister Bob Hawke), 'our racist' Bruce Ruxton, 'experts' (especially in the section that follows the excerpt in section 2 above, where four different experts are quoted extensively, all in favour of cutting back immigration, and all nominated and titulated), and the writer, who thereby places himself in high company. Not nominated (and absences are as significant in critical discourse analysis as presences) are 'racists' in other countries, 'us' Australians, and, of course, the immigrants, with the exception of that high-status immigrants' son, Alberto Fujimori, the Peruvian presidential candidate.

10 Functionalisation and Identification

I shall distinguish two key types of categorisation, *functionalisation* and *identification*. Functionalisation occurs when social actors are referred to in terms of an activity, in terms of something they do, for instance an occupation or role. It is typically realised in one of the following ways: first, by a noun, formed from a verb, through suffixes such as *-er, -ant, -ent, -ian, -ee, e.g.* 'interviewer', 'celebrant', 'correspondent', 'guardian', 'payee'; second, by a noun formed from another noun which denotes a place or tool closely associated with an activity (a noun which, in Halliday's terms (1985: 134ff) forms the 'Range' of that activity) through suffixes such as *-ist, -eer, e.g.* 'pianist', 'mountaineer'; third, by the compounding of nouns denoting places or tools closely associated with an activity and highly generalised categorisations such as 'man', 'woman', 'person', 'people' (occasionally functionalisations such as 'assistant'), as in 'cameraman', 'chairperson'.

Identification occurs when social actors are defined, not in terms of what they do, but in terms of what they, more or less permanently, or unavoidably, are. I have distinguished three types: *classification, relational identification* and *physical identification.*

In the case of classification, social actors are referred to in terms of the major categories by means of which a given society or institution differentiates between classes of people. In our society these include age, gender, provenance, class, wealth, race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and so on. But classification categories are historically and culturally variable. What in one period or culture is represented as 'doing', as a more or less impermanent role, may in another be represented as 'being', as a more or less fixed identity. Foucault (1981) has described how, in the late nineteenth century, the discourse of sexology introduced a new classification category, 'sexual orientation'. Social actors who previously were functionalised ('sodomites') were now, increasingly, classified:

> Homosexuality appeared as one of the forms of sexuality when it was transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphrodism of the soul. The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species.
>
> (Foucault, 1981: 42)

At present the category of 'belonging to a company or organisation' begins to play a more important role in identification (cf. 'a Warwick University scientist', 'a Hambro Countrywide Chain spokesman').

The extent to which functionalisation and classification are distinct is also historically and culturally variable. Sociological role theory goes a long way in blurring the two types of categorisation:

> Every role in society has attached to it a certain identity. As we have seen, some of these identities are trivial and temporary ones, as in some occupations that demand little modification in the being of their practitioners. It

> is not difficult to change from garbage collector to night watchman. It is considerably more difficult to change from clergyman to officer. It is very, very difficult to change from negro to white. And it is almost impossible to change from man to woman. These differences in the ease of role changing ought not to blind us to the fact that even identities we consider to be our essential selves have been socially assigned.
>
> (P. L. Berger, 1966: 115)

Psychological or psychologising discourses, on the other hand, stress the boundaries strongly, as in this question from interviewer Caroline Jones's series of Australian Broadcasting Commission radio programmes *The Search for Meaning*:

> So what would you want to say about that split we seem to have made in our habit of thinking between that which we are (our being) and how we value that; and our doing, all our performance, our work? There's a real split there, isn't there, in our society.
>
> (Jones, 1989: 136)

Do we have an identity beneath the many roles we play? Or is our identity the sum of the roles we have learnt to play? My concern here is not to solve this problem, but to point out that the English language allows us to make a choice between functionalisation and identification, and that the use of this choice in discourse is of critical importance for discourse analysis.

That the choice has a grammatical base, a base in the language itself, can be seen from the rank order of the two types of categorisation in nominal groups. Identifications can be, and frequently are, Classifiers in nominal groups, functionalisations only rarely. One can, for example, say 'the Asian teacher', 'the homosexual musician', 'the woman doctor', but not (or only in a derogatory sense) 'the teacher Asian', 'the musician homosexual', 'the doctor woman'. Only relational identifications (see below) occasionally allow functionalisations to become Classifiers, as, for example, in 'your teacher friend'. Also, classifications and physical identifications cannot be possessivated, except, again, in a derogatory sense (cf. my use of 'our racist'). Relational identifications, on the other hand, are almost always possessivated, But possessivation does not play the same role here as in functionalisation: possessivated functionalisations signify the activation (as in 'his victim') or subjection (as in 'my attacker') of the possessing participant, while possessivated relational identifications signify the 'belonging together', the 'relationality' of the possessivated and possessing social actors (as in 'my daughter' or 'my mother').

Relational identification represents social actors in terms of their personal, kinship or work relation to each other, and it is realised by a closed set of nouns denoting such relations: 'friend', 'aunt', 'colleague', etc. Typically they are possessivated, either by means of a possessive pronoun ('her friend'), or by means of a genitive ('the child's mother'), or postmodifying prepositional phrase with *of* ('a mother of five').

The role of relational identification is, in our society, less important than that of classification and functionalisation, especially where personal and kinship relations are concerned. The intrusion of such relations into the sphere of public activities may be branded as 'nepotism' or 'corruption' (unless you are a monarch). In other societies, however, it plays a key role. Von Sturmer (1981) has described how Australian Aborigines, when they first meet, introduce themselves primarily in terms of relational identification. They 'search for relations whom they share and then establish their relationship on that basis' (1981: 13). This differs from western introductions, where nomination and functionalisation ('What do you do?') are the key to establishing a relation, and where classification ('Where are you from?') comes in only when a social actor displays signs of differing from the social norm, for instance a foreign accent, or a dark skin. Not so among Aborigines:

Mareeba man: 'Where you from?'
Mickey: 'I'm Edward River man. Where you from?'
Mareeba man: 'I'm Lama Lama man . . . do you know X?'
Mickey: 'No. Do you know Y?'
Mareeba man: 'No. Do you know Z?'
Mickey: 'Yes, she's my auntie.'
Mareeba man: 'That old lady's my granny. I must call you daddy.'
Mickey: 'I must call you boy. You give me a cigarette.'
(von Sturmer, 1981: 13)

Where kinship relations continue to be functionally important in our society, as is the case especially with the relation between mothers and children, the relevant terms become polyvalent: 'mother' can be used as a functionalisation ('mothering' is not the act of bringing a child into the world, but the act of giving care to a child, while 'fathering' signifies only the act of begetting a child!), as a nomination ('Mother . . .') and as a relational identification ('my mother . . .'); similarly, 'child' can be a classification as well as a relational identification.

We might also note that, by the criteria developed here, terms like 'lover' and 'caregiver' (as synonym for 'parent') introduce a measure of functionalisation into the sphere of personal and kinship relations. Projections of the future development of personal and kinship relations in our society, such as those in Alvin Toffler's *Futureshock* (1970) do indeed predict increasing functionalisation, for example the institutionalisation of 'professional families', couples bringing up other people's children for money, to allow these children's parents to devote themselves to their careers.

Physical identification represents social actors in terms of physical characteristics which uniquely identify them in a given context. It can be realised by nouns denoting physical characteristics ('blonde', 'redhead', 'cripple', and so on) or by adjectives ('bearded', 'tall') or prepositional phrases with *with* or *without* postmodifying highly generalised classifications such as 'man', 'woman', etc.:

10.1 A little girl with a long, fair pigtail came and stood next to Mary Kate.

10.2 'What are you doing there?', shouted the man with the large moustache.

Physical identification occurs a good deal in stories, sometimes only when a character is introduced, as in 10.1, sometimes throughout, as in the story from which 10.2 is taken. It provides social actors with a unique identity in the temporary or permanent absence of nomination, and does so by means of a salient detail. But it also, and at the same time, focuses the reader or listener on the social actor's physical characteristics, and this may be done selectively, for instance on the basis of age or gender, as in these examples from the (Australian) *Daily Mirror*: 'stunning blonde singer Toby Bishop', 'chubby-cheeked Laura Vezey, 2'.

In contrast to nomination, physical identification is always overdetermined (see section 12): physical attributes tend to have connotations, and these can be used to obliquely classify or functionalise social actors. 'Large moustaches', for example (see example 10.2), derive, perhaps, from the moustaches of Prussian army officers, connoting a sense of rigid disciplinarianism, not only in armies and schools, but also in other contexts. The borderline between physical identification and classification is therefore far from clearcut, as is obvious from the use of skin colour for classification, or from the connotations that cling to such representations of women as 'blonde' or 'redhead'. However, even when used for the purposes of classification, the category of physical identification remains distinct, because of its obliqueness, its overdetermination, and its apparent 'empirical' innocence.

Finally, social actors can be referred to in interpersonal, rather than experiential terms. For these instances I use the term appraisement: social actors are appraised when they are referred to in terms which evaluate them, as good or bad, loved or hated, admired or pitied. This is realised by the set of nouns and idioms that denote such appraisal (and only such appraisal), as, for instance, 'the darling', 'the bastard', 'the wretch' – or 'thugs' in:

10.3 80 young white thugs attacked African street vendors.

It would appear, incidentally, that negative appraisements are more plentiful than positive ones, especially in some registers, such as that spoken by Miles Davis in his ghostwritten autobiography:

10.4 I told the motherfucker as he was going out of the door 'I told you not to go in there, stupid'.

(Davis, 1990: 13)

As can be expected, the 'Race Odyssey' text does not categorise the individuals and groups it represents to the same degree. 'Racists' and 'immigrants' are categorised a good deal more than are 'we', Australians. And when 'we' are categorised, it is in terms of our shared national identity ('Australians') – the single instance of functionalisation is 'critics'.

'Racists' are classified by provenance and ethnicity ('Japanese', 'native Vancouverites', etc.) and in one case by age and race (the case of the 'young white

thugs'). 'Immigrants' are classified by provenance or ethnicity in 50 per cent of cases, by class (e.g. the 'downtown' and 'uptown' immigrants) in 20 per cent of cases, by race ('dark-skinned', 'black') in 13 per cent of cases, by education or skilledness in 10 per cent of cases, and once each by wealth ('poor') and religion ('Muslim'). By and large their treatment in the representation is not all that different from that of the 'racists'. 'Racists' and 'immigrants' also are the only categories of social actor that are occasionally represented in terms of relational identity. Both constitute, in this discourse, the main 'others' for 'us', Australians, and therefore also the main object of classification.

High-status social actors, on the other hand, such as 'government' and 'experts', are always functionalised (the few instances of functionalisation of 'racists' and 'immigrants' also concern high-status persons, such as the 'mayor of Kawaguchi' and the Peruvian presidential candidate. It is a pattern which, I would think, is by no means specific to this text.

11 Personalisation and Impersonalisation

So far I have discussed representational choices which *personalise* social actors, represent them as human beings, as realised by personal or possessive pronouns, proper names or nouns (sometimes adjectives, as, for example, in 'maternal care') whose meaning includes the feature 'human'. But social actors can also be *impersonalised*, represented by other means, for instance by abstract nouns, or by concrete nouns whose meaning does not include the semantic feature 'human'. I shall distinguish two types of impersonalisation: abstraction and objectivation. Abstraction occurs when social actors are represented by means of a quality assigned to them by the representation. One example is the way in which 'poor, black, unskilled, Muslim or illegal' migrants are referred to by means of the term 'problems' in 11.1: they are being assigned the quality of being problematic, and this quality is then used to denote them. Another example is the substitution of 'the changing face of Australia' for 'the new migrants' in 11.2:

11.1 Australia is in danger of saddling itself up with a lot of unwanted problems.

11.2 Many Australians . . . were 'bewildered' by the changing face of Australia.

Objectivation occurs when social actors are represented by means of reference to a place or thing closely associated either with their person or with the activity they are represented as being engaged in. In other words, objectivation is realised by metonymical reference. A number of types of objectivation are particularly common: *spatialisation, utterance autonomisation, instrumentalisation and somatisation.*

Spatialisation is a form of objectivation in which social actors are represented by means of reference to a place with which they are, in the given context, closely associated. This happens, for instance, when 'Australians' are substituted by 'Australia', as in 11.3:

11.3 Australia was bringing in about 70,000 migrants a year

Utterance autonomisation is a form of objectivation in which social actors are represented by means of reference to their utterances. This is the case, for instance, with 'the report' and 'surveys' in 11.4, and because it lends a kind of impersonal authority to the utterances, it is often used in connection with the utterances of high-status and 'official' spokespeople:

11.4 This concern, the report noted, was reflected in surveys which showed that the level of support for stopping immigration altogether was at a postwar high.

Instrumentalisation is a form of objectivation in which social actors are represented by means of reference to the instrument with which they carry out the activity which they are represented as being engaged in:

11.5 A 120 mm mortar shell slammed into Sarajevo's marketplace.

Somatisation, finally, is a form of objectivation in which social actors are represented by means of reference to a part of their body, as in:

11.6 She put her hand on Mary Kate's shoulder.

The noun denoting the body part is almost always premodified by a possessive pronoun or genitive referring to the 'owner' of the body part, and perhaps we should, in such cases, speak of 'semi-objectivation'. Nevertheless, possessivated somatisation still adds a touch of alienation, of Mary Kate not being involved herself: not Mary Kate, but Mary Kate's *body* is being touched, in an unwanted and intimidating intrusion.

More generally, impersonalisation can have one or more of the following effects: it can background the identity and/or role of social actors; it can lend impersonal authority or force to an activity or quality of a social actor; and it can add positive or negative connotations to an activity or utterance of a social actor. When, for instance, 'Australia' is activated in relation to the activity of 'bringing in migrants' (example 11.3), the text does not tell the reader who is responsible for the activity, just as in the case of nominalisations and passive agent deletions. For this reason impersonalisation abounds in the language of bureaucracy, a form of the organisation of human activity which is constituted on the denial of responsibility, and governed by impersonal procedures which, once put in place, are wellnigh impermeable to human agency. Abstractions, finally, add connotative meanings: the qualities abstracted from their bearers serve, in part, to interpret and evaluate them.

The 'Race Odyssey' text impersonalises 'immigrants' often (eighteen times), most of the other categories of social actor only rarely – 'racists' are impersonalised once, 'us', Australians three times, the 'government' once, and 'experts' twice. The writer of the article, on the other hand, impersonalises himself every time he refers to his activities ('italicising', highlighting', 'calling into question', etc.) and the only personalised reference to him is the byline ('David Jenkins argues . . .').

Most of the impersonalisations of 'immigrants' are abstractions (83 per cent), and what is abstracted is, in eight out of fifteen cases, quantity: 'immigrants' are referred to as 'levels', 'settings', etc. The qualities of being 'problematic' (see 11.1), of 'changing Australia' (11.2) and of 'race' (as in 'racial tolerance') account for the other cases.

Utterance autonomisation occurs in relation to 'experts' and also in relation to the writer of the article, who represents himself every single time as though, through his person, 'the facts speak for themselves', as realised by the substitution of anaphoric reference to preceding sections of text for reference to his person:

11.7 They [i.e. these developments] highlight the fact that racism is seldom far below the surface.

12 Overdetermination

Overdetermination occurs when social actors are represented as participating, at the same time, in more than one social practice. One of the children's stories that I analysed, a Dutch story called *De Metro van Magnus* (van Leeuwen, 1981), features a character called 'The Unknown Soldier'. Magnus, the hero of the story, finds The Unknown Soldier (who is 'maybe 18 years old' but 'looks more like a boy than like a man') in the Unknown Soldier Square, where he sits, rather forlorn, at the foot of a huge abstract monument dedicated to The Unknown Soldier. As this monument bears little resemblance to a soldier, Magnus assumes that the 'man-boy' must be The Unknown Soldier. The latter, after some hesitation, agrees. He is glad to get a name, because he himself does not know who he is (he is 'unknown'). Magnus and The Unknown Soldier then go to a place 'rather like a school', where The Unknown Soldier fails miserably at answering the questions asked by 'the man with the large moustache' (already featured in example 10.2). Thus The Unknown Soldier is connected to at least two social practices, warfare and schooling, and comes to symbolise the subjected participant in both these practices, and indeed in all practices that produce victims and underdogs. Magnus's own name is also overdetermined, since he is both little, a child, and 'magnus': through his name he transcends the difference between 'what adults (can) do' and 'what children (can) do'.

I have distinguished four major categories of overdetermination: *inversion, symbolisation, connotation* and *distillation.*

Inversion is a form of overdetermination in which social actors are connected to two practices which are, in a sense, each other's opposites. This happens, for instance, in the well-known comic strip *The Flintstones.* The activities of the Flintstones are very much those of a twentieth-century American suburban family. The Flintstones themselves, however, are overdetermined: they *do* things twentieth-century families do, but they *look like,* and are nominated as, prehistoric cavedwellers. In other words, they have been transformed from [+ contemporary] to [– contemporary] – while still involved in contemporary activities. Reference

thus broadens to include prehistoric as well as contemporary practices, perhaps in order that the latter may be viewed as 'natural', as transcending history and culture: overdetermination is one of the ways in which texts can legitimise practices. The 'Magnus' example above is also a case of inversion: Magnus has been transformed from [+ child] to [– child], while still involved in childlike activities.

Symbolisation, as I use the term here, occurs when a 'fictional' social actor or group of social actors stands for actors or groups in non-fictional social practices. The 'fictional' actor often belongs to a mythical, distant past. This distance then allows the actors and the activities in which they engage to refer to several non-fictional actors and practices. Will Wright (1975), in a study of Westerns, has shown how the participants and activities in Westerns changed in the early 1960s towards a pattern which he calls the 'professional plot'. Characteristic of this kind of plot is the transition from individualisation (the lone gunfighter who arrives in town on his horse) to collectivisation, the team of fiercely independent men who work for money rather than for love, justice or honour, are technically competent and highly organised, and form a tightly knit elite with a strong code of solidarity within the group. Wright then shows how these 'professional heroes' and their exploits can be linked to a number of social practices and the social actors involved in them, noting, for instance, how in business the individual entrepreneur has made way for the executive team, in science the individual genius for the efficient research team, and so on, and how the values of such teams are very similar to the values of the heroes of 'professional Westerns': here, too, one finds high technical competence, work for financial rewards, group solidarity against outsiders, and so on. Thus the 'professional heroes' in Westerns can stand for a variety of social actors in actual social practices: doctors, scientists, politicians, business executives, etc. The township, the 'weak society' for which the 'professional heroes' work, can stand for such social actors as the doctor's patients, the corporation's consumers, the politician's voters, etc. In other words, the social actors, and, indeed, the other elements of 'professional Westerns' are overdetermined. Bruno Bettelheim (1979) has similarly mapped the social actors and activities in fairy tales on to contemporary and actual social practices, notably those of the modern middle-class family.


Connotation occurs when a unique determination (a nomination or physical identification) stands for a classification or functionalization. This definition essentially accords with the way Barthes (1967; 1970; 1977) defined 'myth' or 'connotation'. Connotations, said Barthes (1977: 50) are discontinuous', 'scattered traits', the knowledge of which is established by cultural tradition:

> A 'historical grammar' of iconographic connotation ought thus to look for its material in painting, theatre, associations of ideas, stock metaphors, that is to say, precisely, in 'culture'.
>
> (Barthes, 1977: 22)

We have already come across an example when we discussed the case of the 'man with the large moustache' (example 10.2): the reader's knowledge of popular

culture associates such moustaches with the Prussian military, and then projects into the 'man with the large moustache' all the dualities which the popular culture tradition associates with the Prussian military. Such knowledge is not necessarily conscious. It is 'mythical' knowledge. The signs 'are not understandable, but merely reminiscent of cultural lessons half-learnt' (J. Berger, 1972: 140) – perhaps most frequently learnt from the mass media, movies, comic strips, and so on.

Distillation realises overdetermination through a combination of generalisation and abstraction. It is perhaps best explained by means of an example. A section of a chapter from Ivan Illich's *Deschooling Society* 1971), which I have analysed in some detail elsewhere (van Leeuwen, 1993b), establishes, in the course of the text, the following taxonomy:



Three observations can be made about this taxonomy. First, while 'psychiatrist', and perhaps also 'guidance counsellor', can be seen as true hyponyms of 'therapist', the professions of 'schoolteacher', 'minister', 'job Counsellor' and 'lawyer' are not usually classified as therapeutic. Practitioners may adopt some of the values and manners of therapists, but therapy is not a central aspect of their activities. In other words, Illich has abstracted what would normally be regarded as peripheral qualities and then elevated them to the status of generalisations. This is borne out by the way he formulates the superordinate term: 'professional' can be regarded as a true generalisation of 'schoolteachers', 'ministers', etc., and it is this term which is used as Head of the nominal group.

Second, 'therapy' features only in the Qualifier of the nominal group. The term cannot, by itself, be used to refer to teachers. In other formulations Illich uses 'therapist' as Circumstance of Role ('the teacher-as-therapist') – again, 'therapist' is a circumstantial rather than a central feature. The same can be said for 'with captive audience' and 'without captive audience': in relation to 'schoolteacher', 'minister', etc. this is circumstantial, and hence an abstraction rather than a generalisation. One cannot say that schoolteachers are a kind of 'with captive audience'.

Third, and most importantly in the present context, the taxonomy is not exhaustive. It is not constructed in order to chart the field of therapy, but in order to de-legitimise the activities of teachers by means of a comparison (the intrusion of fields other than those that form the main topic of a text for the sake of comparison always has a legitimising or delegitimising function). Illich compares the activities of schoolteachers to the activities of ministers and priests. The church is an institution which, in the eyes of the 'radical' readers Illich is addressing, has already been de-legitimised long ago. The de-legitimation of

schools, on the other hand, is a more controversial matter. Through overdetermining teachers, through connecting them to both school and church, some of the already achieved de-legitimation of the church can be transferred to the school, to teachers and their activities: 'Children are protected by neither the First, nor the Fifth Amendment when they stand before that secular priest, the teacher' (Illich, 1971: 38).

Distillation, then, is a form of overdetermination which connects social actors to several social practices by abstracting the same feature from the social actors involved in these several practices.

Finally I shall briefly discuss the two most common forms of inversion, *anachronism* and *deviation*. Of the former we have already encountered an example, that of the Flintstones; science fiction can provide another example. Here social actors are projected into the future (and, perhaps on to another planet as well) – but their activities often bear a remarkable resemblance to contemporary practices. Anachronism is often used to say things that cannot be said straightforwardly, for instance to offer social and political criticism in circumstances where this is proscribed by official or commercial censorship, or to naturalise ideological discourses.

In the case of deviation social actors involved in certain activities are represented by means of reference to social actors who would not normally be eligible to engage in these activities. In children's stories about the first day at school, for instance, reference to children might be replaced by reference to animals, a transformation of the feature [+ human] into [– human]:

12.1 *The teacher wrote the name down in the register: NOIL.*
Then she finished calling the register.
'Betty Small', she said.
'Yes', said the little girl.
'Noil', said the teacher.
'Yes', said the lion. He sat next to the little girl, as good as gold.

This overdetermination fuses 'what children (can) do' and 'what animals (can) do', and so causes the child to be represented as, at the same time, human and animal, 'civilised' and 'uncivilised', and also as at the same time weak ('small', 'little') and strong. The deviation lies in the transgression of the rule that animals cannot go to school: more naturalistic stories about the first day at school invariably include the episode of the dog who wants to come to school too, but is not allowed to, and then feels sad and abandoned, while the child does not, or at least not initially, understand why his or her dog may not come to school. When, in a fantasy story like the one quoted in 12.1, animals transgress the eligibility rule and do go to school, they must necessarily fail. In the case of Noil, the lion, this does not happen, however, until after Noil has scared off the little boy who teases Betty Small in the playground.

Deviation almost always serves the purpose of legitimation: the failure of the deviant social actor confirms the norms. In the case of Noil and Betty Small it justifies the eligibility rule and so legitimises school as the necessary transition

from a state of being in which children 'are at one with the animals', to a state of being in which they 'rise above animals', a state of being in which paradoxically, they are represented as 'small', 'little', and timid, rather than confident and assertive in their new status.

The 'Race Odyssey' text features only one overdetermination, the title, which overdetermines a process, rather than the social actors involved in it, the process of 'coming home after a long journey', of finding 'our' ('racial') identity. If I had chosen to exemplify my account of the representation of the social actors involved in the immigration process with a fictional example, I would probably have had a greater number of instances of overdetermination to discuss.

13 Conclusion

Figure 1: summarises, in the form of a system network, my answer to the question with which I started out: what are the principal ways in which social actors can be represented in discourse. The square brackets in the diagram stand for either/or choices (e.g. social actors must be either 'activated' or 'passivated'), the curly brackets stand for simultaneous choices (e.g. social actors can be both 'activated' and 'personalised', or both 'passivated' and 'personalised' and so on). I hope that my discussion of the various categories in the network has made it clear that, in actual discursive practices, the choices need not always be rigidly 'either/or'. Boundaries can be blurred deliberately, for the purpose of achieving specific representational effects, and social actors can be, for instance, both classified and functionalised. In such cases the categories remain nevertheless useful for making explicit how the social actors are represented.

The network brings together what linguists tend to keep separate: it involves a number of distinct lexicogrammatical and discourse-level linguistic systems, transitivity, reference, the nominal group, rhetorical figures, and so on, because all these systems are involved in the realisation of representations of social actors. Nevertheless, there is some linguistic consistency in the network. Initially, it involves three of the major types of transformation, deletion (systems 1 and 2), rearrangement (systems 3–5) and substitution (systems 6–22). Each type of transformation involves distinct linguistic systems: deletion involves voice, and also nominalisation and adjectivalisation, rearrangement principally involves transitivity, while substitution is initially realised by aspects of the structure of the nominal group – the Deictic and Postdeictic, that is, the system of reference (systems 7, 8, 10 and 12), and the Numerative (system 9) (Halliday, 1985, ch. 6; Matthiessen, 1992, ch. 3.2) and then by lexis, different classes of noun, including aspects of morphological structure (systems 13–18). Systems 19–22, finally, involve various forms of metaphor and metonym. More globally, the three sections, 7–12, 13–18 and 19–22, involve, respectively, reference, lexis (the field of nouns referring to human beings) and metaphor.

I shall, finally, summarise my discussion of the 'Race Odyssey' text, which, of course, has restricted itself to the representation of social actors, and therefore not dealt with many other salient and critically relevant features of this text.




Figure 1: The representation of social actors in discourse: system network

Those who, in some way or other, are represented as being 'concerned about' or actually opposing immigration and immigrants in countries other than Australia, I have referred to as 'racists': in the article they are unfavourably compared to opponents of ('high') migration in Australia, who have 'reasonable' rather than 'racist' concerns about immigration. As we have seen, representation of these 'racists' is relatively often suppressed or backgrounded. This has to be offset against the fact that the exclusions follow very definite categorisations, such as '80 young white thugs'. It can be argued that the article invites us to interpret these vague or missing representations in the light of this initial categorisation, which has no equivalent in the representation of Australian opponents of immigration. 'Racists' are also often referred to generically, and they are individualised and nominated only when elite persons are concerned. On the other hand, they are frequently activated in relation to (passivated) immigrants, and this with respect to both material and verbal processes such as 'denying entry' and 'insulting' and mental processes such as 'being concerned'. When they are classified they are most frequently classified in much the same way as are immigrants, by 'where they are from', so that they have at least this in common with those other undesirables, the immigrants themselves. The only negative appraisement, finally, occurs in connection with this category of social actors, and it occurs the very first time they are referred to (again, the case of the '80 young white thugs').

Bruce Ruxton, the home-grown 'racist', is represented as equally undesirable. But, unlike 'racists' abroad, he is never backgrounded, and individualised as well as nominated. Like other 'racists', he is highly activated in relation to (passive) immigrants. In other words, at home one can easily single out the few deviant individuals who, unlike 'us', Australians, deserve the epithet 'racist', and then turn them into the notorious personifications of prejudice and bigotry which 'we' all (and especially the media) love to hate. Abroad, on the other hand, racism is much more pervasive.

Another group of social actors who oppose or worry about immigrants and immigration is formed by 'us', the Australian people 'as a whole'. This group is more sympathetically treated – less often backgrounded, less often referred to generically, and classified, if at all, only as 'Australians'. If they are activated, it is in relation to mental processes such as being 'bewildered' and 'not understanding', 'feeling unable to cope', and so on, rather than in relation to material and verbal processes, as in the case of the 'racists'. And finally, they form a collective, which underlines their supposed consensus about immigration issues.

The immigrants themselves I have referred to as 'them', and 'they' are relatively often backgrounded, and often referred to generically, which helps to distance the reader from them. They are either assimilated or aggregated, and the aggregations help to represent them as a large 'horde' about to invade 'us', and as the object of 'rational' calculation, rather than as fellow human beings. They are also represented abstractly, and this, again, frequently involves the abstraction of their number. More than any other category of social actors they are classified, by 'ethnic origin', class, race, level of education, wealth, and so on – differences which are not made in relation to 'us', Australians. And immigrants from different

ethnic origins are sometimes lumped together in what I have called 'associations', to create further categories of migrant. If they are activated, finally, it is almost always in relation to one activity, that of 'immigrating': in every other respect they are acted *upon* by others.

The government is rarely backgrounded or referred to generically, and often individualised and nominated, that is, personified in the person of the Prime Minister. It also transcends classification and is always functionalised and playing a highly active role in relation to the immigrants. The social actors who form the executive arm of the government, however, those who must actually 'stop' the immigrants, are suppressed: the article keeps the reality of 'cutting back immigration' at a comfortable distance from the reader.

'Experts' are represented in two ways. Either they are treated like elite persons (highly activated, functionalised, individualised, nominated and titulated) or their utterances are autonomised and/or collectivised, to imbue them with impersonal authority and a sense of consensus among experts.

The writer of the article also refers to himself, and to his readers. The latter are addressed directly, the former makes 'the facts' speak in his stead ('They [i.e. these developments] highlight the fact that racism is seldom below the surface'). Whether or not the writer is also the social actor who legitimates the 'fears' of 'us', Australians, and 'entitles' 'us' (and Prime Minister Hawke) to our feelings of pride, concern, etc., is not clear: although the legitimising social actor plays an important role in the process of immigration, reference to him or her is always suppressed. Perhaps we are not too far from the truth if we recognise here, through traces in the text itself, the active role of the media in this social process, despite the careful stance of neutrality suggested by the way in which most of the representation is attributed to sources other than the writer himself.

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Predicaments of Criticism

Jef Verschueren

Introduction

In *The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition*, Michael Tomasello (1999) argues that there is only one explanation for the fact that modern humans, in less than a quarter of a million years, developed the cognitive skills necessary 'to invent and maintain complex tool-use industries and technologies, complex forms of symbolic communication and representation, and complex social organizations and institutions' (1999: 2). The explanation is cumulative cultural learning, enabled by a single biological adaptation, the capacity to identify with conspecifics, to understand them as intentional and mental beings like the self. Central to the use of this capacity, which makes it possible to collaborate and to preserve cultural modifications over time, is discourse. As humans still share 99 percent of the genetic material of the great apes, however, moral growth has not necessarily gone hand in hand with cultural development, as 20th-century history amply illustrates. The ability to collaborate also implies more sophisticated abilities to dominate. And also in that process, discourse takes a central position. The study of discourse, therefore, is serious business, involving a responsibility to contribute to collaborative knowledge-gathering for the benefit of society, a responsibility to do so critically and a responsibility to engage in public debate. Many linguists and anthropologists understand this very well.

My main concern in this article is the empirical status, factually and potentially, of 'critical' claims made in socially relevant forms of linguistic research. Language is a formative agent in social, cultural and political processes, and the social world is really a world of communication, discourse and rhetoric. A solid understanding of communicative, discursive and linguistic practices is therefore mandatory for anyone interested in optimizing the quality of life in areas as diverse as the family, education, work contexts, business, news production and

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consumption, politics and the like. Hence the need for *critique*. But the very goal of optimization, i.e. that which makes the understanding in question socially relevant, hinges crucially upon the convincingness of the understanding. Without the power to convince others, any specialist understanding remains unproductive. Moreover, it is a fundamental right of the academic's target audience, however narrow or broad, to resist being persuaded. Scholarship differs from the mere voicing of opinions in that it has to be based on clear arguments, preferably underscored with empirically observable facts. It is particularly this empirical status that has to be achieved in order for research to be convincing, and hence relevant in a down-to-earth sense. Hence the need for *critical scrutiny of critique*. If critical approaches to language use in the context of social practices fail to be convincing as a result of a lack of theoretical and methodological rigour (e.g. by 'forgetting' contexts, as illustrated by Blommaert in this volume), they destroy their own *raison d'être* and make the task all the more difficult for anyone who does observe the basic rules of documentation, argumentation and explicit presentation. The following article is based on my own past and present frustrations in this regard, as related to some of the pertinent research traditions.

Though the quality of the work could vary dramatically, the heyday of so-called 'critical linguistics' in the 1970s and 1980s provided ample cause for frustration from this point of view. In a booklet on some aspects of international news reporting (Verschueren, 1985), therefore, I found it necessary to dissociate myself from common practices in a tradition in linguistics which I could fundamentally sympathize with but which I felt was subjecting the media, as well as other institutions, to a circus trial, playing fast and loose with the observable facts in order to support preconceived claims. Important things have changed since then. In particular, the social scientific as well as linguistic theoretical grounding of critical linguistic work has gained sophistication, for instance in the critical discourse analysis associated with the work of Norman Fairclough (Fairclough, 1989, 1992a, 1992b, 1995a, 1995b; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999) which, for that reason, will be my point of reference in the rest of this article. This point of reference will be exclusive (except in the second section, 'Predicaments of criticism', which deals with broader issues far beyond the tradition represented by Fairclough). There will be no attempts to make any claims that are supposed to hold for all the work that associates itself with the label 'critical discourse analysis' (a field which is too diverse, in normal circumstances, to fit into the reification implied in the acronym CDA; see Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000), let alone with other critical approaches such as the 'natural histories of discourse' approach (Silverstein and Urban, 1996) about which other articles in this collection (*COA* 21(1), 21 (2)) have relevant things to say. I will use the acronym CDA here with the explicit understanding that it bears only on the bounded corpus made up of Fairclough's writings, even if this could be considered a representative sample of the wider tradition about which I will avoid explicit generalized claims. Having clarified this I can summarize what follows as an attempt to show that, in spite of the gains, there is a dramatic need for quality control, a need to get back to basics, if we want socially relevant forms of linguistic research to have an impact. In other words, Fairclough's version of CDA, in my analysis of its research practice, has not managed to alleviate the frustrations.[1]

The Big Issue

I have already mentioned the fundamentally communicative or discursive nature of social life. All discourse or communication, furthermore, constitutes action embedded in a context and with real-world consequences. The big issue for any critical approach to language use is the fact that in this world of communication almost nothing is ever exactly what it looks like. The reason is simple: communication is basically about 'meaning', and meaning is an intangible phenomenon. The intangibility of meaning derives from two factors. First, it is impossible to interpret any piece of communication without taking full account of the action or activity type it belongs to with all the contextual ramifications this involves. Consider, as a recently emerging example, why the internet is such an unreliable source of information. The main reason is not that people are liars – though they can be that, too. The simple fact that the internet is an uncontrolled medium where everyone can communicate whatever he or she pleases results in a network of communicative fragments originating in very different settings, corresponding to very different goals and ambitions, and requiring very different forms of interpretation. Not everyone who posts a message wants to provide information. What is involved may simply be a form of self-expression or self-representation. There may also be jokes that are not easy to recognize as such. Or there may be hidden agendas. Commercial considerations may be involved. One function of internet messages may even be to infect other people's accounts with 'viruses'. And so on and so forth.

The second determinant of the intangibility of meaning is the impossibility of full explicitness. By definition, every piece of communication contains meaning that is not directly 'visible' or literally 'said'. The range extends from the simplest presuppositions to the most complex ideological frameworks (the latter being constructed with the help of the former).

CDA is rooted in such observations, which it shares entirely with theories of pragmatics (as in Verschueren, 1999c), and to which it adds its own specific focus on those intangibles that are related to the ideological side of the spectrum, defined as patterns of meaning which easily escape the language user's awareness but which firmly support established social relationships of dominance and inequality. Situating myself in a broadly conceived field of pragmatics as an interdisciplinary cognitive, social and cultural perspective on language use, and reading through Fairclough's *oeuvre*, I find myself agreeing with most of the premises of his work. For example, I am fully sympathetic to the following claims:

(i) that power relations in society are supported ideologically by naturalized ways of speaking about relevant issues, thus hiding or consenting to the patterns of domination, sometimes 'misconceiving' events and actions, and usually disregarding unmet needs;
(ii) that social changes are reflected in changes in discourse;
(iii) that awareness of this role of language should be promoted as an antidote to the docile acceptance of inequality and its consequences;

(iv) that all analysis has to take into account textual, interactional and contextual phenomena;
(v) that analysis should not be restricted to description, but that it should proceed to interpretation and explanation as well.

Furthermore, though I lack Fairclough's inclination towards the technicalities of systemic-functional linguistics or SFL (e.g. Halliday, 1994) as a linguistic reference point for his analyses, I recognize many of SFL's foundational theses, such as the multifunctionality of every stretch of speech. Also, a coherent theory of pragmatics must share with SFL the observation of linguistic choice-making as the basic process involved in language use, and the consequent acceptance of fundamental variability as the phenomenon underlying that process.

Briefly, I regard Fairclough's theory of society and the role of discourse as well as his theory of language as fundamentally well-founded. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that the picture changes drastically when looking at sample analyses which he introduces for purposes of illustration. I will point out two preliminary problems before saying a few words on the predicaments of criticism in general and before subjecting Fairclough's CDA to more detailed scrutiny.

First, much of the earlier work in 'critical linguistics' was not only disturbing because of the extent to which biases were allowed into the analysis, but also because it tended to present 'findings' that were entirely predictable on the basis of elementary insights into the pragmatics of language use. In particular, the observation that the media reflect the ideological status quo or preferred versions of events was offered over and again as a so-called research result. But as we all know, no communication is possible at all without a form of common ground (or whatever label one would want to give the world of inexplicit meaning which utterances have to be anchored in – remember what was already said about the impossibility of full explicitness). So why should a different dictum hold for the type of communication involved in, for instance, news reporting? At a higher level of sophistication, we find traces of the same pattern in Fairclough's work. From his first book in 1989 to the latest in 1999 he keeps stressing the hybridity of discourses in the (late) modern world. Thus he observes, for instance, that texts produced by educational institutions have adopted elements from the discourse of advertising. He links this phenomenon, quite correctly, to the economic pressures put on education in Britain. Again, this is presented as a major research 'finding'. Yet the hybridity in question was largely predictable from known contextual facts (even if those were constituted by recent political-historical processes induced by Thatcherism and neo-liberalism): if educational institutions are forced to sell themselves in order to survive, then selling themselves is what they will do, and they will adopt the available discursive means for doing so while adapting them to their own needs. Adaptability, after all, is another key notion for understanding the pragmatics of language. In both cases, the simpler and the more sophisticated, though continued documentation of the observations remains a useful exercse, the presentation of predictable patterns as 'findings' distracts from what ought to be the more interesting questions related to the way in which they contribute to the generation of meaning – an issue about which

nothing can be said until detailed analytical attention is focused on precisely that process. For instance, as long as the approach is merely symptom-oriented it is not possible to study whether and how parents' and students' actual interaction with schools is affected, whether and how the critical attitude supposedly taught in schools clashes with the non-critical self-promotion of schools, or whether and how forms of self-criticism are allowed into the advertising language as a way of strengthening its self-promotional impact.

A second problem should be pointed out in a preliminary fashion. Interpretative and explanatory claims in Fairclough's work usually involve judgements or forms of evaluation. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) stress the need for an evaluative stance: not all discourses are equally acceptable or beneficial or 'good'. I agree. But I cannot help finding most of the specific interpretative-evaluative claims in Fairclough's work suspect. Let me give just one example at this stage. In an illustrative analysis of a text soliciting support for a 'Christmas Appeal' launched by *The Big Issue*, a newspaper distributed by homeless people in Britain, Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 10–16) find fault with a phrasing of the following kind:

(1) a. 'The Big Issue exists to challenge stereotypes and to help homeless people reclaim their sense of self-worth and dignity by earning a living – all year round.
b. [. . .]
c. But we are committed to providing homeless people with the resources they need to break out from the damaging culture of long-term homelessness and find homes, jobs and better futures.'

They observe that this is 'the sort of language professional politicians use', because it mixes the vocabulary of academic social science (*challenge stereotypes, sense of self-worth, resources, culture of long-term homelessness*) and everyday life (*earning a living, find homes, jobs*). In particular they point to: the 'density of ' "nominalisations" ': *homelessness* and *self-worth* are said to 'abstract from the experiences and relationships of real life by the grammatical device of turning processes and relations involving particular people (for example, *I don't have a home, homeless people often don't think much of themselves*) into abstract nouns'.

On the basis of this they conclude:

> Although homeless people are socially marginalised, the text does not attempt to incorporate the voices or experiences of marginalisation, rather it uses a mainstream political language. (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999: 13)

I focus on this comment from a wider 'analysis' because it relates to a passage towards which the authors are positively inclined because it shows that the designers of the 'advertisement' are not willing to abandon the language of social engagement altogether in favour of the logic of commodities which underlies the form of the message (professional-looking advertisement vs. other possibilities

such as xeroxed letters). Thus the 'judgement' in the quoted interpretation-evaluation is one of the milder ones in relation to this example. Looking at the details, however, it shows insufficient regard for text as well as context. At the textual level, the above extract is immediately preceded by the following opening paragraph:

(2) 'You know the sort of thing. Photo of a wretched looking rough sleeper slumped in a doorway. Snow. Very cold. Contrast his suffering with the consumption and gaiety of Christmas. Throw in a few shocking statistics about the ill health and premature death of homeless people.
But we've decided not to do that. [(1)]'

This opening announces what the appeal will *not* do. As with any other form of negation, the negated meaning is nevertheless present. I would not go so far as to say that 'the voice of the marginalized' and their experience are clearly there. Even in the case of a more direct appeal, this would be an undue romanticization of 'the authentic', the voice of 'the people' or 'the dispossessed'. However, placing the text in a wider discourse context, the content and style of other appeals, relying more strongly on images of marginalization, is drawn into the message by invoking the contrast, however 'populist' and commercial the mode of delivery may be. Furthermore, the unacceptability of homelessness – related to its unbearability – is emphasized by explicitly taking a position against its acceptance as a permanent state. The catch phrase at the top could not be more unambiguous:

(3) 'Homeless this Christmas.
But not for life.'

This is an expression of hope, and there is no attempt to hide that this is somehow hope against hope, as emerges from the portion of text that Chouliaraki and Fairclough left out when commenting on (1), namely (1)b which says:

(4) '[(1)a.]
[(1)b.] But, we need your support. The obstacles homeless people like Carl face are huge and the way back from life on the streets is long and difficult. We won't pretend that it is easy.
[(1)c.]'

Nor is 'the voice of marginalisation' – using this term with the reservations hinted at above – left entirely abstract. Such a claim could only be made when abstracting linguistic features such as nominalizations from the overall message of the text in which other-than-linguistic means may also be used to counterbalance the effects of abstraction: there is reference to Carl, an individual rather than a category, whose young and appealing face (which definitely does what the text says, i.e. challenge stereotypes of homeless people which are pervasively present in discourse about them) is the central visual aspect of the message.

Briefly, what seems to be transpiring through the interpretative-explanatory

the result of a careful step-by-step analysis that reflexively questions its own observations and conclusions. It may be well worth the effort, therefore, to subject critical analyses to some criticism. This is a general directive which is by no means to be applied exclusively to CDA, but to any form of socially relevant research (linguistic or not), and which involves issues that go beyond the details of actual research practice. Before further expanding on the case of CDA (in the third section of the article, on Fairclough's version of CDA), therefore, let me say a few words about the predicaments of 'criticism' in general.[2]

Predicaments of Criticism

In the humanities and social sciences, we have witnessed over the last couple of decades the growth of a field called 'cultural studies'. The emergence of this field was the product of a critical reflex based on dissatisfaction with a state of affairs in which philosophy, linguistics, literary criticism, sociology, anthropology, psychology, history and the like, were leading institutionally separated lives of their own, characterized by self-perpetuating authoritative trends crystallized in educational curricula, and supported by grant-giving and job-selection mechanisms. The idea was that the critical awareness needed to make academic activities socially relevant was inevitably stifled by the institutional constraints imposed by the self-preservational priorities of separately existing academic disciplines. 'Cultural studies', profiled as necessarily interdisciplinary, was designed as an escape from this quagmire. It was profiled, in other words, as an essentially 'critical' enterprise transcending disciplinary boundaries, constraints and vested interests.

However, 'criticism' in this sense is vulnerable in at least three ways. First of all, it was not long before 'cultural studies' started to assume all the properties of a traditional discipline, even if it has affected academic life favourably and with lasting results along the way. It turned into an integral part of curriculum design. It showed up in job descriptions and, under the influence of active publishing policies by some publishing houses, as a section header in numerous bookstores. If these are not fully vested interests yet, we are certainly witnessing the vesting of interests. At some universities, there are now full-grown sections and/or programmes for 'comparative cultural studies'. In many ways, this is the end of criticism or the introduction of new dogma, since the intercultural dimension of human life is probably the least amenable to a 'comparative' approach. For one thing, cultural variability is such that it lends itself to rapid change. Further, when cultural paradigms are made to interact (whatever that may mean), this creates a new situation for the understanding of which a comparison of the paradigms concerned is of minimal importance. Moreover, observable differences between cultures are rarely fundamentally different from those between individuals, social classes, men and women.

Second, and directly related to the first weak spot, we can assume that the linkage between academic activities and social relevance, if adopted without sufficient critical awareness, does not guarantee a really 'critical' approach. Or,

> One might suspect that if every academic were really a politician . . . and were really subject to the political interactions of the nation-state, academics would be more vulnerable to state control and ideological orthodoxy. If politicization erases the boundary between the academy and public discourse, the result will not be a gain in relevance but a loss of the very ideal sought by politicization, the ideal of multiple cultural spaces all protected from invasion by each other or by the state. (1994: 118)

In other words, the delicate balance between scientific and social values requires that, though a pre-existent perspective, point of view or ideology cannot – and should not – be abstracted from when engaging in research activities, specific social and political commitments should be linked to scientific authority only if they follow from, not guide, the research. In order to safeguard the relevance of anchoring research in social and political reality, it must be possible for the research and its conclusions to receive the epithet 'critical' without their necessarily being conducted and formulated – as often seems to be the case now – by scholars with professed and well-defined political commitments. Or, reversing the perspective, 'one's morality as a specialist cannot be allowed to do duty for one's morality as a citizen' (Burke, 1969: 31). None of this means that scholars should take a vantage point detached from social reality. The balance we should be looking for allows for a view of 'research as a part of reality' that 'entails neither a rejection of scientific method nor a refusal to recognise ways in which it often differs from other forms of discourse' (Rampton, 1997: 19).

Third, the community-building processes that are the necessary prerequisites for the development of academic practices, whether 'critical' or not, involve risks that may undermine critical potential. Although the following remarks apply in much the same way to most traditions, i.e. also to a much wider and more vaguely defined one such as 'pragmatics' (see Verschueren, 1999b), let me try to illustrate this with reference to the case of CDA. For one thing, every effort is being made to establish CDA as a recognizable discipline. At the most trivial level this is reflected in the tendency to use capitals in the label (or evolving labels) for the tradition and, derivatively, in the flow of acronyms: CLS (for 'critical language study', the first general label offered by Fairclough to contrast his approach with earlier forms of critical linguistics), CLA (for 'critical language awareness', the label for what is identifiable as the main goal of the entire enterprise), CDA (for 'critical discourse analysis', the dominant label now), and TODA (for 'text-oriented discourse analysis', a label introduced to define the specificity of the approach in contrast to less text-oriented forms of discourse analysis in the French tradition, in particular Foucault). As in many other contexts, the acronyms not only serve as useful abbreviations, they also contribute significantly to the reification of what they stand for. By labelling 'critical discourse analysis' as CDA, the approach which is being advocated acquires existence as an entity in the realm of academia, an established tradition or discipline irrespective of the fluid status of 'critical', 'discourse' and 'analysis'. Similarly, the acronym TODA gives the impression of a stable and well-defined methodological angle. Less trivially, efforts are made to establish a community of critical discourse analysts. The result

is that mutual support seems to override mutual critique, resulting in a 'critical community' of like-minded scholars. The best expression of this tendency is probably to be found in Fairclough's article 'Discourse and Text' (1992c; reprinted as chapter 8 in Fairclough, 1995b) in which he comments on the 20 articles that appeared in the first four issues of the journal *Discourse & Society*. He argues that the analyses in some of the articles could have been stronger and more convincing if they had paid closer attention to textual analysis, others if they had paid more attention to intertextual properties. But the whole tone is one of support. The methodological concern seems to be inspired entirely by the idea that more evidence could be amassed to support specific conclusions. Although certain aspects of misorientation are pointed out in relation to one or two articles, none of the substantive conclusions or research 'findings' are challenged in any way. The entire exercise, therefore, looks like a community-building effort rather than a search for enhanced understanding.

The Case of Fairclough's Version of CDA

The Gap between Analyses and Conclusions

Let us return to what can be perceived as the major weakness of Fairclough's CDA, as illustrated with reference to *The Big Issue*: conclusions are rarely warranted by the textual analyses – nor does this seem to be a requirement. Fairclough posits a three-stage process for discourse analysis. The first stage is 'description', concerned with the formal properties of texts. The second is 'interpretation', situating the text as discourse, characterized by processes of production and interpretation, against a background of assumptions. The third is 'explanation', situating the discourse in relation to social processes at the institutional and societal level. Aware of methodological vulnerability, Fairclough presents practical guidelines for analysis on various occasions in the forms of questions to be asked by analysts (e.g. Fairclough, 1989: 110–11, 1992b: ch. 8, 1995a: ch. 10). Most of them are extremely useful for anyone developing a critical interest in texts, especially at the level of description, but also in relation to some elements of interpretation, especially those bearing on aspects of implicit meaning. However, already in the step from description to interpretation a methodological gap appears. Fairclough says that at the stage of interpretation, the analyst is basically engaged in the same sort of activity as the language users producing and interpreting, relying on the same kinds of 'members' resources':

> At this stage of the procedure, it is only really self-consciousness that distinguishes the analyst from the participants she is analysing. The analyst is doing the same as the participant interpreter, but unlike the participant interpreter the analyst is concerned to explicate *what* she is doing. (1989: 167)

Already at this stage, in other words, Fairclough seems to be giving up on the issue of empirical evidence. In response to challenges on this count, based

on the observation that – as it stands – Fairclough's analyst's interpretation can only be seen as one interpretation amongst many possible ones, without any sort of 'scientific' guarantee that it would be more 'accurate' or 'true' or 'valuable', Chouliaraki and Fairclough distinguish between 'understanding' and 'explanation' (originally the third stage) as two dimensions of the 'interpretative process'. They say:

> . . . CDA does not itself advocate a particular understanding of a text, though it may advocate a particular explanation. (1999: 67)

They thus eliminate claims about a privileged status for the analyst's understanding (or what in earlier versions would have been called the analyst's interpretation). In doing so, they also eliminate the need for any sort of methodological rigour to be applied in the search for an interpretation or understanding. In the same move quoted above, they try to salvage the notion of 'explanation', conceived as follows:

> The position of the analyst in explanation is more easily distinguishable from that of the participant in that the 'resources' the analyst draws upon here are derived from a social theory . . . (Fairclough, 1989: 167)
>
> An explanation re-describes properties of a text (including the range of understandings it gives rise to) by using a particular theoretical framework to locate the text in social practice. (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999: 67)

In other words, the only real requirement for explanation is a good social theory. Nothing is said about the empirical dimension that is required to link data and theory. The theory being preconceived, it is not surprising, therefore, that 'findings' tend to be predictable and that a gap emerges between textual analysis and conclusions – even for many of those who, like myself, share large portions of the theory – as soon as the question of evidence is asked. Texts are simply made into carriers, as it were, of what one already assumes to be the case. Rather than proceeding from description via explanation to positioning, with interpretation at the core of all stages of the investigation, positioning comes first and interpretation is marginalized.

The methodological weakness of CDA has been pointed out by many others already, most forcefully perhaps by Schegloff (1997). Schegloff warns that social-theoretical preoccupations may impose interpretations that have little to do with the analysed discourse. He argues that all analytical claims have to be justified by formal analysis. In particular, he rejects the use of elements of 'context' unless formal analysis shows that the discourse participants themselves orient towards those elements. While I believe that Schegloff's notion of context is far too narrow and his emphasis on formal analysis borders on the reintroduction of some of the constraints of structuralism which CDA, amongst many other present-day tendencies in pragmatically oriented linguistics, has fortunately managed

context which can be shown empirically to function in the meaning-generation processes involved in a particular discourse are, by definition, more relevant to an analysis than elements that cannot be shown to leave identifiable traces. The search, therefore, has to be as systematic as possible, guided by sound and rigorous linguistic methodology. *The minimal guideline should be that whatever can be detected on the basis of a 'formal' analysis* (broadly conceived, with a wider notion of context than Schegloff's),[3] *can never be ignored.*

Let me give one example to illustrate what I mean. The example concerns a report in the *Lancaster Guardian* (12 September 1986), commented upon by Fairclough (1989: 50–2, 124):

(5) '*Quarry loadshedding problem*

Unsheeted lorries from Middlebarrow Quarry were still causing problems by shedding stones on their journey through Warton village, members of the parish council heard at their September meeting.

The council's observations have been sent to the quarry management and members are hoping to see an improvement.'

Summarizing, Fairclough comments as follows:

(i) The central element of the title is a nominalization, which results in the fact that 'we don't know who or what is shedding loads or causing loads to be shed – causality is unspecified.'

(ii) The attribution of responsibility is avoided: 'the quarry management figure only in the second paragraph in this representation as in receipt of the council's *observations*, a term which again avoids attributing any responsibility (it might have been *complaints*).

(iii) This newspaper report serves the economic power-holders: 'The power being exercised here is the power to disguise power, i.e. to disguise the power of quarry owners and their ilk to behave antisocially with impunity.'

As to (i), who is 'we'? One has to be a relatively uncooperative reader in order not to know. In fact, causality is specified by the noun 'quarry' in the title: there is no real vagueness about the link between the quarry, and hence those in charge of the quarry operations, and the stones. An identification of individual agents, mentionable by name, might be beyond the means of the reporter, if not completely impossible, as well as beyond the level of what is relevant for most of the people concerned, let alone for the readers. Moreover, for many readers of the *Lancaster Guardian*, it is probably quite clear from reading the title exactly what the issue is about. We must assume that there is an intertextual link between this report and earlier ones, so that much of the text-internal vagueness disappears. This intertextuality is marked explicitly by means of the adverb *still* in the first sentence, which presupposes that similar events have entered the accessible discourse world before. As to (ii), the quarry management is in fact identified unambiguously as the responsible authority; otherwise, it would not make sense for the council to turn to them with the observations which

explicitly said to be meant to induce improvements. The indirectness involved in *observations* may be a fully accurate representation of the style of the council's letter, and there will be no mistake in the audience's mind as to their status as a *complaint*. As to (iii), because of the well-marked repetitiveness of the 'load-shedding problem', and because the locus of responsibility is clear, most readers can indeed be expected to be shaking their heads thinking over the impunity of the quarry management with regard to its neglecting to do anything at all to prevent the problem from recurring, something which is definitely assumed to be in their power.

No doubt the article could have been written differently, focusing on the extent to which the quarry management had been evading its responsibility. And, indeed, the fact that this is not done may be related to the structures of dominance and power which newspapers tend to be part of. Yet, there are too many additional, potential if not observable, dimensions involved in the communicative anchoring of this example to warrant grand conclusions. Minimally, an empirical attitude would force us to introduce nuances in the theory-induced judgement offered by Fairclough.

The Metapragmatic Framing of Analyses

Let me now address the issue of the way in which Fairclough's theoretical, methodological and terminological paradigm may impose a look at linguistic data that does not match the reality of communicative practice.[4] I will focus on Fairclough's analysis of two samples of doctor-patient interaction (Fairclough, 1992b: 138–49; results of this analysis are also referred to in most of his other books). The samples are (6) and (7) below; (6) was borrowed by Fairclough from Mishler (1984) and it represents an interview between a male doctor and a female patient recorded in the US; (7) also involves a male doctor and a female patient and was recorded in the UK.

(6) *Sample 1*

[Full stops mark silences, each representing one-tenth of a second; colons indicate prolonged sounds; square brackets mark overlaps; round brackets indicate unclear fragments.]

DOCTOR: Hm hm ... Now what do you mean by a sour stomach?
PATIENT: .....What's a sour stomach? A heartburn
like a heartburn or someth [ring.
D: [Does it burn over here?
5 P: Yea:h.
It li– I think– I think it like– If you take a needle
and stick [Ya right [.... there's a pain right here [..
D: [Hm hm [Hm Hm [Hm hm
P: and and then it goes from here on this side to this side.
10 D: Hm hm. Does it [go into the back?
P: [It's a:ll up here. No. It's all right
[up here in the front.

15 ..... Wel:l when I eat something wrong.
D: How– How soon after you eat it?
P: ..... Wel:l .... probably an hour .... maybe [less
20 D: [About an hour?
P: Maybe less ..... I've cheated and I've been drinking which I shouldn't have done.
D: .....
[Does drinking make it worse?
25 P: [(...) Ho ho uh ooh Yes. ... . Especially the carbonation and the alcohol.
D: .... Hm hm ..... How much do you drink?
P: ..... I don't know ... Enough to make me
30 go to sleep at night ..... and that's quite a bit.
D: One or two drinks a day?
P: O:h no no no humph it's (more like) ten. [... at night.
D: [How many drinks– a night.
35 P: At night.
D: ....
.... Whaddya ta– What type of drinks? ..... I [(...)–
P: [Oh vodka .. yeah vodka and ginger ale.
40 D: .....
..... How long have you been drinking that heavily?
P: ..... Since I've been married.
D: .....
... How long is that?
45 P: (giggle ..) Four years. (giggle)

(7) *Sample 2*

[Full stops mark short pauses; dashes indicate pauses; square brackets show overlap; unclear fragments are in round brackets.]

PATIENT: but she really has been very unfair to me . got [no
DOCTOR: [Hm
P: respect for me at [all and I think. that's one of the reasons
D: [hm
5 P: why I drank s [o much you [know– a [nd em
D: [hm [hm hm [hm are you you back are you back on it have you started drinking [again
P: [no
10 D: oh you haven't (unclear [...)
P: [no . but em one thing that the lady on the Tuesday said to me was that . if my mother did turn me out of the [house which she thinks she
D: [....

15 P: may do . coz . she doesn't like the way I've been she has turned me o [ut befo [re . and em . she said that.
D: [hm [hm
P: I could she thought that it might be possible to me for me to go to a council [flat
20 D: [right yes [yeah
P: [but she
Said it's a very em she wasn't [pushing it because . my
D: [hm
P: mother's got to sign a whole [lot of [things and
25 D: [hm [hm
P: e: . she said it's difficult [and em . there's no rush over
D: [hm
P: it. I I don't know whether . I mean one thing they say in AA is that you shouldn't change anything . for a year
30 D: hm
hm Yes I think I think that's wise . I think that's wise (5 second pause) well look I'd like to keep you know seeing you keep . you know hearing how things are going from time to time if that's possible

Fairclough provides an analysis against the background of a theory some of the core notions of which are captured as follows:

> In terms of . . . analytical categories . . . **interactional control** is a dimension of *text structure*, **modality** a dimension of *grammar* (though a conception of grammar which is very much oriented to meaning, such as that of Halliday 1985), and **politeness** an aspect of what I called '*force*'. **Ethos** transcends the categories, as I shall explain below, and is motivated by *the focus on the self.* (1992b: 138, bold and italics added)

The analysis itself is metapragmatically framed as in Table 1, where the first column simply numbers the points of comparison, the second column offering the descriptive and interpretative phrasings used for example (6), Fairclough's Sample 1, the third column for example (7), i.e. Fairclough's Sample 2 (bold and italics are always mine.)

Table 1: Metapragmatic framing of samples (6) and (7)

1.	"Sample 1: 'Standard' Medical Interview" (6)	"Sample 2: 'Alternative' Medical Interview" (7)
2.	"[. . .] the interaction is organized around **questions** from the *doctor*, which are **answered** by the *patient*. [. . .] nine **cycles**, each of which is initiated by the doctor. [. . .] In some cases (lines 10, 13, and 27) the doctor's question is proceeded [sic] by an element which overtly acknowledges or accepts the patient's previous	"The most striking difference between the two samples in terms of interactional control features is that **the question-response-assessment cycle** is missing from sample 2, which is structured around *a lengthy account* by the patient, with the doctor giving *a great deal of feedback* in the form of *minimum response tokens* [. . .]."

(*Table 1 continued*)

answer. I shall call it an **'acceptance'**. Even when this is absent, the fact that the doctor proceeds to the next question, rather than asking a follow-up question, may be taken as implicitly accepting the patient's previous answer." "The doctor, *then*, is closely **controlling** the basic organization of the interaction [. . .]."	"There is evidence of the **negotiated nature of turn distribution** in the doctor's question (11. 6–7), which is articulated rapidly and quietly as an aside, showing the doctor's sensitivity to the way he is 'intruding' onto the patient's 'floor'. [. . .] Further evidence is the **long pause** by the doctor in 1. 30 after his assessment, which appears *to be making the 'floor' available again* to the patient to continue her account if she wishes to, [. . .]."
3. "A further corollary of this basic organization is to do with **'topic control'**. It is mainly the doctor who introduces new topics through his questions, for example when he shifts in lines 1–13 from what is meant by 'sour stomach', to where 'it burns' to whether the pain 'goes into the back', to when the patient gets the pain. Notice, however, that *the patient does introduce a topic* in 11. 21–22 – drinking – which the doctor takes up in 1. 24. I return to **this exception** below."	"The mode of **topical development** is that of conversation and of the 'lifeworld': *the patient is 'talking topically' without sticking to a single topic*, but shifting across a series of *interconnected topics* [. . .]." "Yet one cannot simply conclude that the doctor is surrendering interactional control to the patient. [. . .], there remain manifest control features even here: *the fact that the doctor does ask* ***the medically important question*** *about the patient's drinking*, [. . .]."
"[. . .] the patient acknowledges having done wrong by drinking, but the doctor does not pursue this admission. He *seems concerned only with the effect of alcohol on the patient's medical condition.* [. . .] One has the sense of the doctor shifting and constraining topic in accordance with a **pre-set agenda**, which the patient is not being allowed to disturb." "Looked at from the patient's point of view, this routine can come across as *a series of disconnected and unpredictable questions*, which is perhaps why the patient's answers, in contrast to the doctor's questions in the first part of the extract, are preceded by **hesitations** (11. 15, 18, 29, and 42)."	"He does so, however, with a **reticence** which is *uncharacteristic of traditional medical practice* and traditional doctor-patient relations [. . .]."
4. "Modality concerns the extent to which producers commit themselves	"The assessment in 1. 29 has **an explicit 'subjective' modality marker** ('I think'),

(*Table 1 continued*)

(*Table 1 continued*)

to, or conversely distance themselves from, propositions: their degree of 'affinity' with the propositions. [. . .] *inseparable from the relationship (and 'affinity') between the producer and other participants in the discourse.* In 11. 2–3, for example, the patient defines a 'sour stomach' as 'a heartburn like a heartburn or something'. The patient first glosses it with a 'folk medicine' term, then distances herself from the gloss by demoting it into a simile ('like' a heartburn), and then further distances herself from it by hedging it [. . .] with 'or something'. This is **low affinity modality**. [. . .] does she select low modality because she is not sure how accurate the gloss is, or because she is reluctant to claim anything resembling medical knowledge in an interaction with a legitimized medical expert? Propositional truth and social relations, *knowledge and power, seem to be intricately linked in such cases.*"	which makes it clear that the assessment is *just the doctor's opinion*, and *tones down its authoritativeness* [. . .]: 'that's wise' on its own would imply access on the doctor's part to implicit, and mystified, sources of professional judgement."
5. "Let me turn to politeness. [. . .] she speaks at this point in a 'teasing', 'flirtatious' or 'childish' tone, which may be interpreted as a way of mitigating the threat to her self-esteem, her 'face' [. . .], of her admission. By contrast, *the doctor's questions about the patient's drinking are unmitigated, bald, and even rather brutal* (1. 41): [. . .]."	"The one question is [. . .] produced as an aside, and it consists of *a vague and disfluent initial formulation* ('are you you back on it') followed by a more explicit formulation ('have you started drinking again'). *These features of the question minimize its face-threatening potential* and in that sense heighten its **politeness**. The *suggestion of further interviews* is also **polite** in that sense. It is very *indirect*: [. . .]. And he hedges his suggestion twice with 'you know' and *hesitates* (keep . you know hearing'), again giving a sense of *disfluency*."
"The **absence of politeness** can be linked to the more general concept of **ethos** – [. . .]. Doctors in standard medical practice manifest what one might call **a scientific ethos** [. . .] which is variously realized in [. . . and] the absence of niceties of interpersonal meaning such as	"Whereas in sample 1, the doctor's style of speaking accords with **a scientific ethos**, in this sample the doctor's *reticence, tentativeness, and apparent disfluency* accord with **a lifeworld ethos**: doctors in this sort of medical interview appear to be rejecting the elitism, formality, and distance of the medical

(*Table 1 continued*)

politeness, which would suggest an orientation to *the patient as a person* rather than a scientific orientation to *the patient as a case.*	scientist figure in favour of a (frequently simulated) 'nice', 'ordinary' person, a 'good listener'. *This accords with general shifts in dominant cultural values in our society, which devalue professional elitism and set a high value on informality, naturalness, and normalness.*"
6. "[. . .] evidence of ***a mismatch*** *between the medical perspective and the perspective of ordinary experience* in the way in which the doctor filters out parts of the patient's turns which, for him, are off topic. Whereas the doctor consistently manifests the **'voice' of medicine**, the patient's contributions mix **the voice of 'the lifeworld'**, or ordinary experience [. . .]."	"Sample 2 also differs from sample 1 in terms of **intertextuality**. *There is nothing analogous to the dialectic of the voices of medicine and the lifeworld* that I noted in the latter. Rather, the doctor appears himself to be drawing upon the voice of the lifeworld – for example, in portraying future interviews in terms of 'hearing, how things are going' [. . .]."
"The voices of medicine (M) and the lifeworld (L) **interrupt one another** repeatedly: L interrupts M in 1.21 (from 'I've cheated'), M interrupts L in 1. 24 ('Does drinking make it worse?'), L interrupts M in 1. 29 ('Enough to make me go to sleep') and vice-versa in 1. 31 ('One or two drinks a day?'), L interrupts M in 1. 42 ('Since I've been married') and vice-versa in 44 ('How long is that?'). [. . .] M and L are in *contestation.* [. . .] the repeated incursions of L appear before the doctor's questions (11. 23–4, 27, 37, 41, and 44). *Whereas the doctor rarely draws upon L, the patient uses M extensively, and is far more accommodating to the doctor in that sense than vice-versa.*"	"[. . .] the doctor *does exercise control,* even if *in an uncharacteristic manner.* We can see this fact in terms of interdiscursivity (constitutive intertextuality), by postulating *a* ***convergence*** *of standard medical interview genre with other genres,* such that some of the interactional control features of the former are maintained, but realized in an indirect and mitigated form under the influence of the latter. *The* ***acts*** *themselves emanate from one genre, their* ***realization*** *from others.* What are these other genres? I have referred already to conversation, but **conversation** is present here as a constitutive element of another genre, **counselling**. [. . .] The search for models for counselling has not surprisingly led outside *institutional discourse* to *conversational discourse,* where such values (manifest here in the doctor's *reticence* and *mitigation*) are widely realized, for instance in the lifeworld figure of the 'good listener'." "He does so, however, with a **reticence** which is *uncharacteristic of traditional medical practice* and traditional doctor-patient relations [. . .]."

When reflecting upon the premises that are taken for granted in Fairclough's metapragmatic framing of discourse examples (6) and (7), the following observations can be made (where the numbers correspond to those in the first column of Table 1):

1. The contrastive labelling of the two samples as 'standard' vs. 'alternative' is not just descriptive, but it is evaluative, 'standard' meaning 'traditional' and predictably being viewed less favourably against the background of Fairclough's theory of society. (This ascription of evaluative intentions could not be made on the basis of the labelling of the two events alone; it is fully supported, however, by other clearly evaluative details of the contrastive descriptions provided, as commented on briefly below.)

2. In any ordinary sense of the term, the Sample 2 doctor gives very little feedback. The evidence adduced for the 'great deal of feedback' is to be found in the 'minimum response tokens' or, to use a different term, back-channel cues. Based on the transcriptions, there are indeed twice as many occurrences of such signals of listener behaviour in Sample 2 than in Sample 1. However, the frequency is no doubt structurally determined by the overall interactive pattern which is question-answer in Sample 1 and narrative in Sample 2. In order to follow Fairclough's assessment, then, we should be able to weigh the relative feedback value of asking questions (which the doctor in Sample 1 does a lot) vs. simply signalling that one is listening to a story.

Fairclough observes, quite correctly, the question-answer cycles in Sample 1, with the doctor doing the questioning. *Then*, however, he suddenly equates the asking of questions with interactional control. This equation ignores the fact that answers to questions may exert as much control over an interaction as questions. The least one can say is that in Sample 1 there is more interaction, and that more meaning negotiation is taking place. Yet the concept of 'negotiation' is applied exclusively to Sample 2, where style features of a question asked by the doctor, namely its rapid articulation and its quiet delivery as an aside, are adduced as evidence. Why does this show 'sensitivity to the way he is "intruding" onto the patient's "floor"', rather than a temperamental inclination to avoid assertiveness? And why does a long pause in the case of Sample 2 have to be interpreted as a yielding of the floor (described as a purposeful act), rather than a lack of anything to say, or even a lack of interest, or simply the desire to end the interview?

3. Why is the patient's topic-shifting in Sample 2 still described as a coherent form of behaviour, whereas the questions asked by the doctor in Sample 1 are said to be disconnected and unpredictable, even if they are supposed to be part of a pre-set agenda? Why is this pre-set agenda presented as irrelevant, even if all the questions relate directly to the medical topic brought up by the patient herself, namely drinking, whereas the Sample 2 doctor's asking about drinking is characterized as 'the medically important question'? Why does Fairclough maintain that the topic in Sample 1 is completely controlled by the doctor if the one topic that is brought up by the patient, drinking, fully determined the rest of the exchange? And why is the Sample 1 patient's introduction of this one topic described as an 'exception' if it has such a strong structuring influence?

Why are the patient's hesitations in Sample 1 supposed to result (even if modified by 'perhaps') from the so-called disconnectedness and unpredictability of the doctor's questions? An explanation that is at least as likely is that the sensitive topics addressed by the doctor call for a great deal of self-monitoring on the part of the patient.

In relation to Sample 2 the doctor's reticence is praised as a superior way of keeping some interactional control. Is it not simply the case that the doctor exerts control in a differently 'stylized' way? Should we not keep in mind that reticence (as in some psychiatric approaches) can be experienced by a patient as a truly extreme form of control?

4. Why this talk about 'low affinity' in relation to Sample 1? Is the patient not just trying to find the proper level of expression to communicate as well as possible? And if we want to use such terms, why doesn't Fairclough apply it to the doctor's behaviour in Sample 2? No doubt, 'toning down authoritativeness' sounds better. But isn't the doctor's expression simply non-committal – and hence characterized by low affinity?

5. Before condemning the doctor's questions in Sample 1 as 'unmitigated, bald, and even rather brutal', should we not take into account that the patient herself brought up the topic to which the questions relate? Furthermore, how does one observe an 'absence of politeness'? And why is the doctor in Sample 1 supposed to be treating the patient as a case only? Why, for that matter, is treating a patient as a case contrasted with treating a patient as a person? What happened to treating a patient as a patient, which would require a good combination of the two?

Why, on the other hand, is the doctor's suggestion in Sample 2 that there should be further interviews be seen as a form of politeness? Isn't this suggestion rather abrupt as well? Isn't it a nice and friendly way of shoving the patient out of the door?

6. Why are the 'voice of medicine' and the 'voice of the lifeworld' supposed to 'interrupt' each other and to be 'mismatched' in Sample 1? What happened to the possibility of observing their 'interaction'? And is there a real voice of medicine in Sample 1 to begin with? Why, on the other hand, are the medical interview genre and the conversational/counselling genre supposed to 'converge' harmoniously in Sample 2, rather than to clash and compete?

Briefly, the systematic introduction of desired forms of contrastiveness in the form of highlighting and metalinguistic categorization devices makes many points of comparison fade away. In other words, the analysis genuinely distorts some of the data. There are at least two basic principles of analysis that are ignored. First, some general *aspects of context* are fully neglected. Many of the differences between Sample 1 and Sample 2 are directly explicable on the basis of the fact that in Sample 1, (a) the patient comes to the doctor with a clear medical problem and (b) there is very little familiarity between doctor and patient (a fact which is manifested by the contents of some of the doctor's questions). In cases like this, Ockham's Razor should be applied – especially since it also allows us to stick more closely to what is empirically observable. A second mistake is the treatment of *form-function relationships* as stable

would reject such stability himself if asked explicitly. In the criticized analyses, the following kinds of relations are treated as stable:

asking questions = X ↔ reticence = Y
more dysfluency = more politeness
long pauses = making the floor available
etc.

The fundamental negotiability of language in the process of meaning generation (taking place with real language users in real contexts of use) should at all times be the basic guideline. And the central focus of an analysis should always be the empirically observable meaningful functioning of linguistic forms in their cognitive, social and cultural context.

Conclusion

Within the scope of this article, unfortunately, there is no space to spell out the ground rules for empirical ideology research (see, however, Verschueren, 1995, 1996, 1999a: ch. 8, for some preliminary guidelines). It should be clear, however, that in spite of the similarities between my criticisms and some earlier ones (e.g. as voiced by Stubbs, 1997), I would by no means draw the same conclusions (e.g. that – simplifying a little – whatever Fairclough or CDA in general can possibly say is speculation). There would be no point in my critical excercise in that case. The negative tone of the foregoing pages is meant to be fully constructive. There can be no improvement without an observation of flaws. In order to give Tomasello's 'cumulative cultural learning' a chance in a scholarly endeavour that really matters, linguists and anthropologists studying the social functioning of discourse should develop a culture of mutual criticism. After all, since all talk is embedded in the complexity of human life, the discourse we produce is as vulnerable as the discourse we analyse and may suffer from the same shortcomings. A *culture of mutual criticism* may be the only guarantee for unprejudiced observation and serious learning, even though it may *require* the risky kind of community-building that was identified as one of the predicaments of criticism in that it may itself *endanger* the perpetuation of such mutual criticism. However vulnerable this may make us, it may also be our best chance for being taken seriously – a not-so-unimportant goal in spite of its utilitarian overtones.

Notes

This paper was first presented during the 98th Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, Chicago, 20 November 1999 (session on 'The relevance of critique in discourse analysis'). Its present formulation has benefited from later discussions with or comments from Jan Blommaert, Paul Chilton, Jim Collins, Monica Heller, Luisa Martín Rojo, Ben Rampton, Stef Slembrouck, Karen Sykes, Rachel Whittaker.

1. Before getting down to business, let me point out that I am fully aware of the fact that any observant CDA audience may criticize the foregoing introduction on the basis of its heavily late-modern economy-inclined metaphorization: *optimizing, quality of life, news production and consumption, unproductive, target audience, quality control, impact, getting down to business.* They may refer to the *instrumentalization* and *commodification* of scientific work that is implied, and I may be blamed for subjecting academia to processes of *colonization* from the corner of society which embodies the main patterns of capitalist domination. Finally, my pointing this out at this stage may be characterized as a pre-emptive *appropriation* of criticism. Whatever the labels (useful in themselves though often used lightheartedly) may be, I don't mind as long as they capture the idea that, at the end of the day, the critical work undertaken by linguists should, in my view, make a difference. Never mind the contribution of the foregoing sentence to the *conversationalization* of a formal academic genre and to the production of a *hybrid* text – as long as I get my message across (though this is yet another unacceptable metaphor).
2. Part of the following section also occurs, in roughly the same words, in Verschueren (1999b), where a critical attitude to some major work in pragmatics is advocated. This should convince readers that the present article is not part of a sectarian struggle over hegemony between 'rival' traditions such as 'pragmatics' and 'CDA'.
3. My notion of context allows for the potential relevance, in linguistic analysis too, of any ingredient of a speech event that can be shown to contribute to meaning generation processes, while Schegloff's would require 'visibility' in the forms to be analysed. (See also Blommaert in this volume.)
4. On language ideologies, see Woolard and Schieffelin (1994), Schieffelin et al. (1998) and Blommaert (1999).

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Positioning and Interpretative Repertoires: Conversation Analysis and Post-Structuralism in Dialogue

Margaret Wetherell

As Teun van Dijk (1997) noted in a recent editorial for *Discourse & Society*, it is no simple matter to differentiate 'good' from 'bad' discourse analysis. Although it is not the case that 'anything goes' in discourse work, it seems unlikely that any single set of evaluative criteria will prove sufficient. This, however, does not preclude discourse analysts from attempting to advocate or legislate their own 'gold standard' for analysis (or editors from making evaluative judgements). And, indeed, in a recent article also published in *Discourse & Society*, the conversation analyst Emanuel Schegloff (1997) has tried to formulate just this kind of standard.

Schegloff takes to task various forms of (unspecified) critical discourse analysis and argues that such analyses should be grounded in what he describes as the 'technical' discipline of conversation analysis. Schegloff suggests that as a result of this technical exercise critical discourse analysts may find that the discursive phenomena of interest are quite other than they assumed. Conversation analysis is also offered as a corrective to what Schegloff presents as the grandiosity of critical discourse analysts. This grandiosity is evident, according to Schegloff, when analysts impose, in an act of intellectual hegemony, their own frames of reference on a world already interpreted and endogenously constructed by participants. Finally, Schegloff suggests that conversation analysis provides a principled method for reaching some form of closure in the face of the infinite regress of possible interpretations stressed by deconstructionist and postmodern perspectives.

The aim of this article is to comment on and explore Schegloff's proposals in relation to some data and in this way to contribute to the wider debate about

the criteria for the evaluation of discourse analysis. I argue that conversation analysis does indeed offer a useful discipline for discourse analyses conducted under a broadly 'critical' aegis but this discipline needs to be two way. Conversation analysis alone does not offer an adequate answer to its own classic question about some piece of discourse – why this utterance here? Rather, a complete or scholarly analysis (as opposed to a technical analysis) must range further than the limits Schegloff proposes.

This discussion is also relevant to and emerges from a particular disciplinary context – discourse analysis as it has been developing in social psychology. It has become common-place in social psychology in recent years to distinguish between two or more styles of discourse analysis (see Antaki, 1994; Burman and Parker, 1993; Parker, 1990; Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995). Typically, the boundary lines are drawn between styles of work which affiliate with ethnomethodological and conversation analytic traditions and analyses which follow post-structuralist or Foucauldian lines. Thus Widdicombe and Wooffitt distinguish between a discursive psychology offering a fine grain analysis of the action orientation of talk (e.g. Edwards, 1997; Edwards and Potter, 1992) and investigations concerned with the imbrication of discourse, power and subjectification which take their lead from the work of Foucault (e.g. Hollway, 1984; Marks, 1993).

In contrast to this division into 'molecular' and more 'molar' styles of analysis, or 'critical' versus 'non-critical' discourse analysis, this paper argues for a more synthetic approach in line with earlier attempts to weave a range of influences into a viable approach to discourse analysis for social psychological projects and topics (see Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Potter et al., 1990; Wetherell and Potter, 1992). I suggest that although the terms of engagement between post-structuralism and ethnomethodology/conversation analysis need revisiting, a stance which reads one in terms of the other continues to provide the most productive basis for discourse work in social psychology, in much the same way, for example, as cultural anthropologists and ethnographers of communication (see Duranti, 1992; Lindstrom, 1992; Maybin, 1997; Ochs, 1992) have found an eclectic approach to be the most effective. I first introduce the data at issue in this article, then review Schegloff's take on conversation analysis and some post-structuralist writings as two contrasting potential analytic frames, before returning to the data and an evaluation of the adequacy of what each offers.

'Four in One Night'

The stretch of discourse presented in the Appendix comes from a relatively large-scale project on the construction of masculine identities (Edley and Wetherell, 1995, 1996, 1997; Wetherell, 1994; Wetherell and Edley, 1998). Part of this project involved an intensive reflexive ethnography (Atkinson, 1989) conducted in and around the sixth form common room of a single sex boys' independent school in the United Kingdom and included interviews with small groups of white,

17–18-year-old male students. Each group of three was interviewed around eight times, meeting for an hour each week with the interviewer (Nigel Edley), for a period of approximately two to three months. The aim of this ethnography was to examine the construction of middle class masculine identities in one institutional site and the interviews covered aspects of the young men's daily lives, social relations within the common room, their anticipations of their future working and domestic lives, relationships with women and with male friends, sexuality, popular culture, feminism, homophobia, masculine stereotypes, and so on.

The material in the Appendix comes from the fifth session of one of these small group interviews (with Group C) around half-way into the session. The participants (Phil, Aaron and Paul) and the young women referred to in the conversation, but not the interviewer, have been given pseudonyms. This extract begins with the interviewer introducing a new topic of conversation, picking up on a previous but unexplicated allusion to some events involving Aaron during the weekend.

Extract One

1 Nigel: Okay yeah tell me about going with four people in one
2 night=

This formulation is heard as a request to Aaron for a description of the events which Phil eventually supplies with and on behalf of Aaron (lines 10–74). The description concerns Aaron's behaviour at a pub on the Friday night and at a party on the Saturday night and the nature of his involvement with four different young women. The discussion of this topic prompted by Nigel Edley (which in fact continues for many more turns than reproduced in Appendix One) moves on to consider the evaluation of the event (lines 76–93).

Extract Two

73 Phil: So that like took me aback somewhat (0.3) so that was
74 a good weekend for you
75 (.)
76 Nigel: Is that good?

After some discussion of the 'stick' or criticism Aaron received from his friends, Nigel intervenes once more to re-focus the discussion on the morality of Aaron's actions.

Extract Three

94 Nigel: =Yeah I mean I wasn't sort of saying is four in two
95 days good I mean it's impressive [you know]
96 Aaron: [hh [hhh] hh
97 Phil: [hhhhh] hhhh
98 Nigel: But I me::an like (.) it presumes that erm that's:: a
99 creditable thing (.) yeah? Is it?

After Phil and Aaron discuss Aaron's position on 'the moral low ground' the fourth participant in the discussion (Paul) is invited into the conversation and asked for his views.

Extract Four

116 Nigel: Right (.) okay (0.2) what do you think Paul?

Paul defers giving an immediate response and establishes his views instead through a kind of Socratic dialogue which prompts Aaron and Phil to reformulate again the nature and status of what happened (lines 116–76).

The interviewer's questions key into two very pervasive and inter-related discursive activities – describing events (formulating their nature) and accounting for and evaluating those events. There is, of course, an enormous amount of interest in these data for the discourse analyst, including, for instance, the delicate business of telling a story on behalf of someone else, the large amount of ventriloquizing and reported speech, its use and discursive functions in Aaron's accounts particularly, the role of laughter, Phil's double position as Aaron's supporter and 'tormentor' and the organization of the discourse within the frame of interview. The aspects I wish to select for further discussion include the construction of multiple versions of 'what happened', and the related construction of what I call 'troubled' and 'untroubled' identities.

Before examining these features, however, I first set up conversation analysis as a potential analytic frame for this material, focusing in particular on Schegloff's (1991, 1992, 1997) writings on method and context, and then some post-structuralist writings (Laclau, 1993; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 1987; Mouffe, 1992; Shapiro, 1992) as an alternative frame. How might each perspective understand discourse of this kind? What concepts are offered for analysing this talk?

Conversation Analysis

In traditional sociology, or in traditional social psychology for that matter, a satisfactory analysis of the kind of material found in the Appendix would relate the patterns found to some external social cause or some internal psychological motivation. The interest would be in Aaron's *actual* actions as these can be deduced from descriptions. In explanation it might be sufficient, for example, to say that Aaron's behaviour ('four in one night') is caused by his attitudes towards women and his internalization of gender ideologies or perhaps could be caused by his developmental stage as an adolescent experimenting with sexuality.

What distinguishes the analytic frame of ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts, of course, is their disinterest in this question of external social or natural causes, and their rejection of the side-step which takes the analyst immediately from the conversation to something seen as real and determining behind the conversation (Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 1984). For Schegloff, talk-in-interaction of the kind exemplified in the Appendix represents 'a' or even 'the' prime socio-cultural site. It is the place where culture and 'the social' happen.

And, what is of interest is what the conversation means for the participants as they intersubjectively build a social order.

Conversation analysts study the way in which social organization is accomplished in talk. According to Duranti and Goodwin (1992: 192), the study of conversation 'permits detailed analysis of how participants employ general, abstract procedures to build the local particulars of the events they are engaged in'. Such procedures, however, are seen as flexibly applied situated social practices rather than prescriptive, all-or-nothing, rules. Procedures might include, for instance, competence at turn-taking, recognition of sequential organization and conditional relevance such as that a question, for example, typically demands an answer (Schegloff, 1968).

Analysis proceeds from the general observation that in talk participants display to each other, as they perform their own contributions, their understanding of the setting and context, and their grasp of the emergent activities. Members of society display what they know – their practical reasoning skills and competencies. It is possible to see, for example, how utterances are designed to do tasks while the replies or turns of other participants demonstrate how those utterances are intersubjectively understood and are taken up (Sacks, 1992). The focus of conversation analysis is thus on the reflexive accomplishment of conversation. Conversation analysis attempts to provide a good description of conversational activities but is also an explanation of those activities in the limited sense that description depends on a particular view of the nature of social organization and social order.

Schegloff's (1991, 1992, 1997) writings on methodological principles are based on his analytic experience but also on this view of what conversation is and the relevance of this discovery for understanding social life. In his 1997 article, as noted earlier, his particular target is forms of critical discourse analysis which in developing accounts of topics such as gender and power relations become, as Schegloff sees it, loose and ungrounded and risk mistaking their object. Schegloff argues that although as members of society we (scholars and analysts) might know who is oppressed, who count as the 'good guys' (sic) and the 'bad guys' (sic), it is self-indulgent to import this knowledge a priori into analysis. Similarly, we should not impose our more scholarly and theoretical concerns, our preoccupations with topics such as the organization of ideological discourse, for example, upon lay members of society. He suggests that, paradoxically, a more satisfactory kind of critical/political analysis might result if critical analysts focused instead solely on the endogenous concerns and orientations of participants.

This plea for the foregrounding of participant orientations and the backgrounding of analysts' concerns and categories is linked to a further requirement that all analytic claims should be empirically grounded. It should be possible to 'point' to the data and make visible the moments when things happen. The analyst must be able to show that participants had the orientation claimed for them and should be able to demonstrate how participants' subsequent behaviour in the turn by turn organization of talk *displays* this understanding.

Schegloff (1992) argues that talk has many potentially relevant contexts including what he calls distal or external contexts (such as the class, ethnic, gender

composition of an interaction, the institutions and ecological, regional and cultural settings in which they occur) and proximate contextual variables (such as the sort of occasion participants take an interaction to be, the speaker/listener slots or roles available, and so on). The crucial thing, however, in the face of this omni-relevance and the infinitude of possible perspectives on what happened is what is relevant for the participants. Analysis, then, in this view, must be compatible with what Schegloff calls the internal sense of an interaction. It must take seriously the object of inquiry in its own terms and must recognize the hugely advantageous feature of studying talk-in-interaction that this is one socio-cultural site furnished internally with its own constitutive sense, with, as Schegloff (1997) states, a defeasible sense of its own reality.

Social Postmodernism

In many respects the analytic frame provided by Laclau and Mouffe and by Shapiro could not be more different. Laclau and Mouffe's work has been aligned with what Nicholson and Seidman (1995) call 'social postmodernism'. This designation reflects their aim of mobilizing post-structuralist perspectives on discourse, signification and the decentred subject to develop more effective socialist and radical democratic political projects. Whereas Schegloff focuses on talk-in-interaction, Laclau and Mouffe make 'discourse' their topic. Whereas Schegloff takes members' methods as the organizing principle for the material he studies, Laclau and Mouffe focus instead on the structuring effects of 'discursive articulations' and 'nodal points'. While Shapiro recommends a genealogical eye towards the 'proto-conversations' which constitute institutionalized forms of intelligibility.

Laclau and Mouffe's understanding of discourse is an inclusive one. Discourse is equated with the social or with human meaning making processes in general. Their definition of discourse includes both linguistic and non-linguistic elements. As an example of this combination, Laclau and Mouffe (1987) ask their readers to consider the activity of building a brick wall. The entire activity of building is made up of speech acts ('pass me that brick') and physical acts (placing brick on top of brick) yet both kinds of acts acquire their meaning in relation to each other and to the socially constructed and stabilized system of relations we recognize as 'building a brick wall'. They point out that not only is the 'being' of objects (such as bricks) established in this way, and therefore what these objects are for humans, but also the character, identity and the 'being' of social agents. Thus, again to use one of their examples, the 'discourse of football' establishes that a certain spherical object is a 'ball' while some bits of metal and netting become 'the goal'. Equally, any person who takes up a defined stance in relation to the spherical object and bits of wood becomes a 'player', or a 'goal-keeper'.

In other words, Laclau and Mouffe conceive the social space as a whole as discursive. Or, as Laclau (1993: 341) puts it, '(s)ociety can . . . be understood as a vast argumentative texture through which people construct their reality'. In line

constructed is both verbal and nonverbal. For Laclau and Mouffe it makes no sense to distinguish between the discursive and the extra-discursive or talk and the world – there is rather an unceasing human activity of making meanings (the horizon of discourse) from which social agents and objects, social institutions and social structures emerge configured in ever-changing patterns of relations.

As good post-structuralists, Laclau and Mouffe argue that signification (and thus the social) is an infinite play of differences. Meaning can never be finally fixed; it is always in flux, unstable and precarious. The being of objects and people can never be encapsulated, once and for all, in a closed system of differences. Laclau and Mouffe balance, however, this emphasis on openness and non-finalizability, the 'radical relationalism' of the social, with claims about a process of organization rather vaguely described as 'discursive articulation' or the forming of 'nodal points', 'discursive clumps' or 'ensembles'. Things recognized as people and objects and the relations between these entities are pulled together or emerge in stable forms which may last for quite long historical periods. Power is recognizable in the formation of these articulations and nodal points. Indeed power seems to be the capacity to 'articulate' and to make those articulations not only 'stick' but become hegemonic and pervasive. The influence of both Foucault and Gramsci on Laclau and Mouffe's formulations is evident here.

For Laclau and Mouffe, people or social agents are both passive and active. On the one hand, people seem to provide the energy required for meaning-making and articulation. On the other hand, as Mouffe argues, the individual subject becomes de-centred, not the author of his/her own discursive activity and not the origin point of discourse:

> We can . . . conceive the social agent as constituted by an ensemble of 'subject positions' that can never be totally fixed in a closed system of differences, constructed by a diversity of discourses, among which there is no necessary relation, but a constant movement of over-determination and displacement. The 'identity' of such a multiple and contradictory subject is therefore always contingent and precarious, temporarily fixed at the intersection of those subject positions and dependent on specific forms of identification. It is therefore impossible to speak of the social agent as if we were dealing with a unified, homogeneous entity. We have rather to approach it as a plurality, dependent on the various subject positions through which it is constituted within various discursive formations. (Mouffe, 1992: 372)

This position has important implications for traditional notions of ideology, false consciousness and objective group interests. The concept of false consciousness assumes that social agents have real or true identities (as members of the proletariat, for example) and real or true interests which go with those social identities which they may misperceive, simply not recognize or which can be obscured and invisible. Instead, Laclau and Mouffe (1987) argue that identity and interests do not operate in this way, in advance of social and discursive

independently of the consciousness of the agents who are their bearers', (p. 118). Interests emerge from discursive configurations and must be mobilized and made discursively available.

In Shapiro's writings it is possible to find an explication of Foucault's notion of genealogy which helps articulate the kind of analytic activity which might emerge from these formulations. Shapiro argues that '(i)ntelligible exchanges are always situated . . . the context–meaning relation subsumes a complex history of struggle in which one or more ways of establishing contexts and their related utterances has vanquished other competing possibilities' (1992: 38). The task of genealogy, then, and analysis, is to render strange usual or habitual ways of making sense, to locate these sense-making methods historically and to interrogate their relation to power.

I return now to the material in the Appendix. There are two claims I wish to make in relation to these data which bear on the analytic frames presented here. First, in contrast to post-structuralist accounts of the decentred subject, but commensurate with conversation analysis and ethnomethodology, I want to emphasize the highly occasioned and situated nature of subject positions and the importance of accountability rather than 'discourse' *per se* in fueling the take up of positions in talk. Detailed analysis of conversation allows a different view of 'constituted identities'.

Second, I argue that for a complete rather than merely 'technical' analysis of this material it is necessary to consider the forms of institutionalized intelligibility, to use Shapiro's term, which comprise members' methods. I will suggest that the way in which Schegloff marks the boundaries around conversation is unhelpful and unproductive. The more inclusive notion of discourse found in post-structuralist writing and exemplified in Laclau's notion of the argumentative texture of social life provides a better grounding for analysis. In developing both these points I draw on analytic concepts from social psychological discourse analyses such as variability (Potter and Wetherell, 1987), ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988) and interpretative repertoires (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell and Potter, 1988) which take a more integrated stance towards traditions such as conversation analysis and post-structuralism.

Troubled and Untroubled Subject Positions

Post-structuralist theorists, with their more global view, rarely have their noses pressed up against the exigencies of talk-in-interaction. Rarely, are they called on to explain how their perspective might apply to what is happening right now, on the ground, in this very conversation. Theoretical concepts emerge in abstract on the basis of often implicit assumptions about the nature of interaction, language or social life. The notion of subject position explicated by Mouffe (1992) is a good example, and its paucity becomes apparent if we consider in detail just some of the many positionings of Aaron in the material in the Appendix in relation to formulations of the nature of the event ('four in one night') and the way in

One useful way into such analysis (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) is to look for variability in accounts and formulations – tracking the emergence of different and often contradictory or inconsistent versions of people, their characters, motives, states of mind and events in the world – and asking why this (different) formulation at this point in the strip of talk? One early formulation or positioning for Aaron comes in line 9:

Extract Five

1	Nigel:	Okay yeah tell me about going **with four people in one**
2		night=
3	Phil:	[=All::right ((bangs table))]
4	Aaron:	[hhhhhhh hhhhhh hhhhhh h] hh no::=
5	Phil:	=Go on=
6	Paul:	On the record=
7	Phil:	=Was it was it this f .hh
8		(.)
9	Aaron:	I don't know I was a bit drunk=
10	Phil:	=I I'll tell he was drunk I'll tell you what I know
11		[because] I am never drunk
12	Nigel:	[Hm mm]
13	Phil:	Because I'm dead smug [erm:::]
14	Aaron:	[He's never] drunk it's true=

As conversation analysis reminds us, Aaron's positioning of himself as drunk is highly occasioned and needs to be seen in the context of the surrounding conversational activities. Nigel's request in line 1 for an account ('tell me') makes a description conditionally relevant as an appropriate next turn (Schegloff, 1968). Aaron, however, after registering what sounds like dismay at the emerging topic (line 4), and after some interventions from Phil and Paul, demurs ('I don't know I was a bit drunk'). Such 'dispreferred responses' (see Pomerantz, 1984) usually come supplied with an account for 'non-compliance' and in this case the drunkenness provides the grounds. Phil's next utterance (line 10) indicates that he also hears Aaron in this way since he uses his own sobriety as a credential (legitimated by Aaron) for why it might be appropriate for him to tell the story instead as a qualified witness. Indeed it turns out that this is one of those stories of prowess that may be better left to others to tell on one's behalf.

By now, however, several positions are already in play. Aaron's drunkenness has been laid on the table, while his laughter and 'no::' in line 4, Phil's urging ('go on') and Paul's insistence on the importance of being 'on the record' also establish a context and a range of positions for Aaron as well as an audience in relation to the as yet enigmatic event.

As Antaki et al. (1996) note in relation to the identity work in some data they analyse:

> Such bringings-to-bear are briefly over and done, of course, but their accumulated record is what gives a person their (portfolio of) identities.

> as instances of times when the person was (understood to be) a linguist, a Kennel Club member and so on. The speakers are doing three things at once: invoking social identities, negotiating what the features or boundaries of those identities are and accumulating a record of having those identities. They will be able in the next round of their interactional history, to draw on having all been exposed to this conversational display of identities. (p. 488)

Further examples of these activities of invoking social identities, negotiating their features and accumulating a record are evident in the following extracts, beginning with Extract Six. These examples illustrate the highly indexical nature of subject positions or the importance of the exact circumstances of the invoking for understanding what is invoked, just as it was necessary to look at the conversational circumstances surrounding Aaron's invocation of his drunkenness in Extract Five to fully comprehend this self-positioning. Extract Six begins with the conclusion of Phil's often interrupted narrative of Aaron's weekend:

Extract Six

67	Aaron:	=We were very lucky that day
68	Phil:	We were erm and we were walking back and he says
69		oh I went with Janesy on Friday and I went yeah you
70		went with three birds last night you went with one on
71		Friday this was in his good month
72	Nigel:	Hm mm
73	Phil:	So that like took me aback somewhat (0.3) so that was
74		a good weekend for you

The context for what happened now becomes formulated as being part of or illustrative of a 'good month' or a 'good weekend'. Such 'fortune' could, of course, either be presented as agentic and internally attributed (seen as a personal achievement) or externally attributed as 'luck'. As is typical in talk (Edwards and Potter, 1992), both these possible, and potentially inconsistent, positionings emerge in the following discussion with Aaron later returning to the 'lucky' theme (see line 160 in Extract Nine) having raised it initially in line 67 (Extract Six) and more directly owning his 'good fortune' in the conversation which follows Nigel's next intervention.

Extract Seven

76	Nigel:	Is that good?
77	Phil:	Well in his books yes you know=
78	Aaron:	=hhhh.h [yeah]
79	Phil:	[The thing] is you got so much stick for it
80	Aaron:	Well yeah I could take the stick because it was
81		almost like (0.2) a good ego trip when everyone was
82		taking the stick oh you got off with her ah ha ha
83		yep I did so what's your problem? [Oh, er, errr]

Aaron re-frames the criticism he received ('stick') as 'a good ego trip' and to demonstrate how he handled it he constructs a piece of hypothetical dialogue with an imagined interlocutor where the interlocutor challenges him ('Oh you got off with her'), Aaron responds in a forthright way ('Yep, I did, so what's your problem'), leaving the imagined challenger confused and at a loss ('oh er errr'). The context for the event as something Aaron can be personally proud of becomes more firmly established invoking an as yet untroubled identity. In Extract Eight, Nigel as interviewer then attempts, in a complex discursive act, to repair a potential misreading of his earlier question in line 76: 'is that good?' His question leads to further formulations of Aaron's position:

Extract Eight

94	Nigel:	=Yeah I mean I wasn't sort of saying is four in two
95		days good I mean it's impressive [you know]
96	Aaron:	[hh [hhh]hh
97	Phil:	[hhhhh] hhhh
98	Nigel:	But I me::an like (.) it presumes that erm that's:: a
99		creditable thing (.) yeah? Is it?
100		(0.2)
101	Phil:	No because you're on the moral low ground
102	Aaron:	But I don't mind being on the moral [low ground]
103	Phil:	[Oh no you don't]
104		mind I I it didn't fuss me at all you know and I wasn't I
105		thought it was quite (.) it was quite impressive you
106		know you're sort of thinking that's shocking because it
107		never happens to me um:: .h hhh
108	Aaron:	Hhhh
109		(0.3)
110	Phil:	But he was (.) by some people in the group he was li
111		(.) they were just taking the piss it wasn't serious no-
112		one it didn't really bother anyone at [all]
113	Nigel:	[Hm mm]
114	Phil:	It was like Aaron was on the moral low ground because
115		he was like (.) gigolo Casanova whatever

In lines 94–5 Nigel first distances himself from Aaron and Phil's formulation of 'good'. He then notes, however, that the possible description 'impressive' might apply. Aaron and Phil's laughter may suggest that this is heard as a joke, as ironic or as problematic in some way. This reading seems likely because 'impressive' as a description follows Nigel's repair of his own possible positioning as someone who might concur with the definition of 'good' emerging in previous turns. 'Good' framed as 'impressive prowess' has become a more troubled position especially when it is now put in line 99 in conjunction with 'creditable'.

In line 101 Phil (temporarily, as it turns out) concurs with Nigel's troubling of Aaron's position. He formulates Aaron's conduct as not creditable because he is 'on the moral low ground'. At this point Aaron has a number of choices – he could accept Phil's assessment in entirety, [illegible]

and evaluation of his behaviour. Interestingly, he accepts Phil's description but presents himself as someone who doesn't mind occupying that cultural slot. In the process, of course, the indexical nature of that social space 'the moral low ground' becomes evident. Aaron moves to untrouble or normalize this position. And Phil re-adjusts his own position accordingly (see lines 103–15), distancing himself from the identity of someone who might be 'fussed' by Aaron's behaviour. Having been initially disapproving and with a hearably strong moral line, Phil's criticism of Aaron becomes re-characterized as not serious. While the position of Aaron in combination with 'the moral low ground' become reworked to be in line with other recognizable characters in stories of male sexual performance: 'like gigolo, Casanova, whatever'.

The final part of the discussion where Paul enters more fully as a participant adds some new positionings for Aaron and reworks two positions already available.

Extract Nine

116	Nigel:	Right (.) okay (0.2) what do you think Paul?
117		(0.3)
118	Paul:	Did you=
119	Phil:	=Are you ap[palled?]
120	Paul:	[When you] .hh no (.)s [when you went out]
121	Nigel:	[Not appalled?]
122	Paul:	I jus I'll tell you in a minute when you went out
123	Nigel:	hh[hhh]
124	Unknown:	[hhhh]
125	Paul:	When you went out on that Friday (.) evening you were
126		out on the pull yeah?=
127	Aaron:	=No
128	Paul:	This (.) you were not?=
129	Aaron:	=Just out [as a group]
130	Phil:	[Just out] as a group of friends
131	Paul:	On the Saturday you were out on the pull?
132	Phil:	No
133	Aaron:	.hh [not really]
134	Phil:	[He was] drunk=
135	Aaron:	=I wasn't drunk [unconscious] (.) I was very merry I
136	Phil:	[((inaudible))]
137		was like (.) all erm (.) all like social guards were down
138	Paul:	Yeah (0.2) and (0.3) whe::n (.) so and (0.4) when you
139		got off with the first one [did you]
140	Aaron:	[hhhhhhh hhh]
141	Phil:	Who was first? Can you remember?
142	Paul:	On the Friday
143	Aaron:	Er::::m on the Friday that that was Janesy
144	Paul:	Did you have any sort of like intonation ((sic)) of
145		carrying the relationship further?
146	Aaron:	No
147	Phil:	((inaudible – sounds like one nighter))
148	Paul:	So so you basically went for as many pullings off as
149		you could get in a weekend?

150 Phil: No
151 Aaron: I didn't go for it it just
152 (.)
153 Paul: It just happened?
154 Aaron: Well yeah (.) it's not so much I thought right ((hits
155 the desk)) this weekend (.) keep your pecker up lad
156 you're away [it's] not like that it's just that I
157 Phil: [hhh]
158 (.)
159 Paul: With any of them [did you feel]
160 Aaron: [I get lucky very ((inaudible))]
161 Paul: that they'd be like a follow on?
162 Phil: He didn't know who half of them were do you .hh hh
163 Aaron: Ah er I didn't (.) I mean it wasn't (.) I mean it wasn't
164 like a right gitty thing to do it was like the other
165 half knew as well that it wasn't gonna be
166 (0.4)
167 Phil: Mm
168 Aaron: Erm (0.2) no it's it's you're getting it all wrong it's
169 it's (0.2) it wasn't (0.4) errr Aaron come up with the
170 phrase you want to say (.) it wasn't alright this kid's
171 gonna get off with me then we're gonna go out oh no
172 we're not gonna go out what a git it was (0.2) I'm
173 gonna get off with this lad and that's alright
174 Phil: Fancied a bit of rough you know
175 Aaron: Fancied a bit of rough
176 Phil: As and it was mutual I imagine

This is an enormous amount happening here which cannot be analysed in detail. What I wish to note is Paul's new description of Aaron's activities as 'out on the pull' (in line 126). This account seems to be heard as an uncalled for accusation in relation to the events of Friday night and Aaron and Phil issue denials and collaborate as a duet in attempting to reformulate and minimize the actions so described – 'just out as a group of friends'. Interestingly, when Paul moves the conversation to the events of Saturday night Aaron's denial at this point becomes weak ('not really', line 133). In line 134 Phil offers another re-characterization for Saturday night. He summons up and recalls another available identity in Aaron's 'portfolio' – Aaron was drunk. In lines 135–7 Aaron modifies and qualifies this potentially damaging identity to lay the stress on drunkenness and loss of inhibition.

In lines 144–5 Paul goes on to develop more of his accusation – he suggests that Aaron had no intention of carrying on the relationship and this helps instantiate what it means to be 'out on the pull'. The crux of the argument as Aaron subsequently interprets it seems to be about intention and responsibility. The pattern of responses suggests that Paul's rhetoric is persuasive and he has successfully created what seems to be a troubled identity for Aaron – the identity of being intentionally or callously promiscuous – going from one woman to another with no thought of a longer-term relationship. This formulation leads Aaron to first disavow the identity of a lad who deliberately goes out planning sexual

conquests (someone who thinks 'keep your pecker up', line 155), then to try and reinstate the identity of 'being lucky' (line 160). Finally, he produces his longest description so far (lines 168–73) as he attempts to resist Paul's characterization through a formulation of his own mental state, his own talk to himself and the mental state and self-talk of the young women involved. He characterizes himself as not intentionally 'going for it', and posits the young women as similarly motivated by a casual sexuality so that his motives and state of mind were mirrored by the motives and state of mind of 'the other half'. Phil then collaborates with this account suggesting the young women 'fancied a bit of rough' and thus the encounter was mutual.

To summarize, multiple and potentially inconsistent subject positions are in play in this stretch of discourse for Aaron: he is drunk, lucky, on the pull, having a good month, on the moral low ground, engaged in consensual sexual play with young women who fancied a bit of rough, not intentionally going for it, his conduct is impressive and so on – indeed, this list does not exhaust all the positions evident in the complete discussion in the interview. The flow of interaction variously troubles and untroubles these positions. As we have seen, one formulation leads to a counter-formulation which is in turn resisted. In fact the question of how to evaluate Aaron's actions, as often happens in social life, remains unresolved and ambiguous, and these various threads and Aaron's 'portfolio' of positions remain available to be carried forward to the other contexts and conversations making up the 'long conversation' (Maybin, 1994) which is the sixth form common room culture.

To evoke a further analytic concept from social psychology, some order can be placed on these various positions by noting that they fit within several recognizable broader interpretative repertoires available to the young men. The term interpretative repertoire is an attempt to capture the 'doxic' (Barthes, 1977) nature of discourse. An interpretative repertoire is a culturally familiar and habitual line of argument comprised of recognizable themes, common places and tropes (doxa) (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell and Potter, 1988, 1992; Wetherell et al., 1987). The repertoires in the quoted extracts include male sexuality as performance and achievement, a repertoire around alcohol and disinhibition, and an ethics of sexuality as legitimated by relationships and reciprocity (Hollway, 1984, calls this the 'have and hold' discourse). These interpretative repertoires comprise members' methods for making sense in this context – they are the common sense which organizes accountability and serves as a back-cloth for the realization of locally managed positions in actual interaction (which are always also indexical constructions and invocations) and from which, as we have seen, accusations and justifications can be launched. The whole argument does not need to be spelt out in detail. Rather, one fragment or phrase (e.g. 'on the pull', 'social guards were down') evokes for listeners the relevant context of argumentation – premises, claims and counter-claims.

Re-evaluating Subject Positions

What, then, is the significance of this analysis (carried out in line with the spirit of Schegloff's methodological principles if not with his concern for detail) for

Mouffe's post-structuralist account of subject positions? Mouffe (1992) presents subject positions as constructed in discourse, and the tenor of her account makes discourse the constituting agent. She argues that 'we can . . . conceive the social agent as constituted by an ensemble of "subject positions" that can never be totally fixed in a closed system of differences, constructed by a diversity of discourses, among which there is no necessary relation, but a constant movement of over-determination and displacement' (p. 372). Subject positions, and thus the identities of participants in social life, are determined by discourses and in this sense are prior, already constituted, and could be read off or predicted from knowledge of the relevant discourse.

Mapped on to the material in the Appendix, this view has some cogency in the sense that Aaron and Phil's choice to position Aaron within a repertoire of male sexuality as performance and proud achievement constructs for him and for others a context which may have ramifications beyond his control or intention. Aaron is certainly positioned; but it also seems a misdescription to make discourse the active agent here. What more clearly fuels positioning is accountability or participants' orientations to their setting and the emergent conversational activities. It is also very clearly the case that what a subject position comes to be is only partly the consequence of which discourse it can be assigned to. We saw, for instance, that the invocation of positions and thus their significance and connotation is indeed local, highly situated, and occasioned. In effect, as Schegloff argues, the sense of an interaction depends on what kind of thing it is for participants.

Such a perspective gives a more grounded view on what Mouffe (1992) goes on to describe as the contingent and precarious nature of identity, and on Laclau's (1993) notion of the 'radical relationalism' or openness of social discursive practices. It is not so much that these features arise due to the nature of signification per se but because of the reflexivity built into social interaction and the emergent and transformative properties of that interaction. Contingency, precariousness and openness arise in part because utterances are designed to do interactional tasks and do not thereby entail descriptive closure and cognitive consistency. The replies or turns of other participants demonstrate how those utterances have been intersubjectively understood as well as performing further actions. And all of this is contingent on the interactional moment.

I do not wish to suggest, however, that critical discourse analysis should thus become Schegloff's 'technical' analysis or that I see 'technical' analysis as an initial necessary discipline which should be carried out before any other statement about a piece of discourse could apply. As noted earlier, I see the 'discipline' as two-sided. A post-structuralist approach allows a perspective on talk which helps more thoroughly account for 'why this utterance here'.

Argumentative Threads

If the problem with post-structuralist analysts is that they rarely focus on actual social interaction, then the problem with conversational analysts is that they rarely raise thesir eyes from the next turn in the conversation, and, further, this

is not an entire conversation or sizeable slice of social life but usually a tiny fragment. Schegloff's methodological principles are fitted for the analysis of small pieces of conversation in detail. His recommendation that critical analysts first perform a 'technical analysis' is impractical – there may well be, for instance, thousands of interruptions which could be analysed in any social psychological or ethnographic study of discourse such as our work on masculinity. But, more crucially, Schegloff's suggestion rests on an unnecessarily restricted notion of analytic description and participants' orientation.

Schegloff argues that analysts should not import their own categories into participants' discourse but should focus instead on participant orientations. Further, analytic claims should be demonstrable. Schegloff's notion of analytic description uncontaminated by theorists' categories does not entail, however, that no analytic concepts whatsoever will be applied, as the example of his own analyses demonstrates. Rather, concepts such as conditional relevance, for example, or the notion of accountability, or preferred and dispreferred responses are used to identify patterns in talk and to create an ordered sense of what is going on. Presumably Schegloff would argue that this does not count as imposing theorists' categories on participants' orientations since such concepts are intensely empirical, grounded in analysis and built up from previous descriptive studies of talk. As already noted, the advantage for Schegloff of such an approach is that it gives scholarly criteria for correctness and grounds academic disputes, allowing appeals to the data, and it closes down the infinity of contexts which could be potentially relevant to something demonstrable – what the participants take as relevant.

It is not clear, however, when the concepts of more critical discourse analysts should be seen as crossing Schegloff's invisible boundary line from the acceptable deployment of concepts for the description of discursive materials to importing analyst's own preoccupations. Would a descriptive analysis, for example, guided by Foucault's concept of genealogy, of the 'institutionalized forms of intelligibility' organizing social relations in the sixth form common room of a boys' independent school and the interpretative repertoires and forms of common sense these make available to Aaron, Phil and Paul count as importing theorists' preoccupations? Would Schegloff's boundary line be breached if, as part of such an analysis of the available interpretative resources, we attempted to develop a feminist commentary on the social and cultural significance of the patterning and the tensions and contradictions in the use of these resources not to mention their crass and highly offensive nature?

The crucial issue here, for Schegloff, is the point at which analysis departs from evident participant orientations and one problem from a critical perspective is that Schegloff's sense of participant orientation may be unacceptably narrow. We have seen already that in practice for Schegloff participant orientation seems to mean only what is relevant for the participants in this particular conversational moment. Ironically, of course, it is the conversation analyst in selecting for analysis part of a conversation or continuing interaction who defines this relevance for the participant. In restricting the analyst's gaze to this fragment, previous conversations, even previous turns in the same continuing conversation become irrelevant

for the analyst but also, by dictat, for the participants. We do not seem to have escaped, therefore, from the imposition of theorists' categories and concerns.

Any piece of discourse analysis, of course, will involve restrictions on what is studied. Conversation analysis is not alone in this. If we adopt, however, Laclau and Mouffe's more inclusive notion of the 'argumentative texture' of the social and definition of discourse as the unceasing human activity of making meaning, a more productive sense of participant orientation and relevance is possible. Analysis works by carving out a piece of the argumentative social fabric for closer examination – a set of similar seeming conversational activities, say. Schegloff's approach demands that analysts then lose interest in the argumentative threads which run through this set as warp and woof connecting it in again with the broader cloth. The genealogical approach in contrast suggests that in analysing our always partial piece of the argumentative texture we look also to the broader forms of intelligibility running through the texture more generally. This is what Shapiro (1992) means by the concept of 'proto conversations' – the conversational or discursive history which makes this particular conversation possible.

With this tack, of course, we haven't solved Schegloff's problem of infinite relevance but, in practice, participants' orientations understood in this more inclusive way turn out to be manageable. As good ethnography of communication demonstrates (e.g. Cicourel, 1992; Lindstrom, 1992; Ochs, 1992) it is not necessary to say everything about the argumentative fabric of a society to say something, and something furthermore which is scholarly, complete, and insightful concerning participant orientations, and which takes those orientations as constructed by more than what is immediately relevant or set by the previous few turns in the conversation.

This point can be developed in another way. In effect, there are two approaches at stake to what counts as an adequate answer to the question – why this utterance here? For Schegloff, for example, the material in the Appendix is adequately analysed when we have described the principal conversational activities and shown how participants' utterances contribute to and are occasioned by those activities. From my perspective, however, this is not an adequate account. An adequate analysis would also trace through the argumentative threads displayed in participants' orientations and would interrogate the content or the nature of members' methods for sense-making in more depth.

Why, for instance, does Aaron respond to Paul's accusation that he is 'on the pull' with an argument which formulates the young women involved as also wanting casual sex (lines 163–73), thus attempting to make his own actions no longer 'a right gitty thing to do'? Why, in this community, among these members, might this possibly work as an adequate justification? Why is this assumed to be a possible 'good defence'? It is important and interesting from a feminist perspective that these young men only appeal to some notion of autonomous female sexuality at this point in their conversation. Indeed, why is Paul's intervention heard in the first place as a critique which deserves an answer? Why in this community does it seem to trouble identity to 'be on the pull' but multiple sexual encounters can be also successfully framed as 'good'?

We should also be interested in the 'heteronormativity' (Kitzinger, personal communication) evident throughout this discussion which supplies a further taken for granted discursive back-cloth organizing these young men's participant orientations and their members' methods for making sense. A more adequate analysis of 'why this utterance here' would also explore the silences and the absences in this material – the argumentative threads which are hearably not part of these participants' orientations and everyday sense-making. Crucially, it would be concerned with the ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988; see also Billig, 1987, 1991) evident in the struggle and collaboration over how to formulate Aaron and his actions. The movement of contextualization and the troubling of positions gives some insight into the contradictory and inconsistent organization of the broader interpretative resources these young men are actively working over as they try to negotiate both 'good' and 'gitty'. Surely a complete or scholarly analysis would try to clarify, interpret and discuss these resources.

Conclusion

In this article, I have tried to develop a critique of both post-structuralist writers on discourse and Schegloff's methodological prescriptions for analysts. I have argued that a focus on participants' orientations can be extremely revealing about the formation of subject positions. Such a perspective substantially changes our view of the subject constituted by discourse and his or her 'ensemble' of subject positions. I have also tried to suggest, however, that in accusing critical discourse analysts of intellectual hegemony, Schegloff is performing his own act of colonization in seeking to impose one narrow understanding of participants' orientations and relevance on the field as a whole. A further central aim was to intervene in the construction within social psychology of contrasting camps of discourse analysts and to suggest further reasons for preferring a more eclectic approach.

What role, then, do I see for Schegloff's technical analysis? Is it, as he proposes, a first step in the long process of genealogical analysis or other kinds of critical discourse analyses focused on socio-political issues? My aim was not to endorse this division of labour – conversation analysis then ethnomethodology then post-structuralist analysis or ethnography of communication or critical discourse analysis – but to suggest that for social psychological discursive projects a more synthetic approach is required focused on the development of analytic concepts which work across some of these domains such as, for instance, the notion of positioning, interpretative repertoires, ideological dilemmas, and so on.

More specifically, critical discursive social psychology is that discipline which focuses on the situated flow of discourse, which looks at the formation and negotiation of psychological states, identities and interactional and intersubjective events. It is concerned with members' methods and the logic of accountability while describing also the collective and social patterning of background normative conceptions (their forms of articulation and the social and psychological consequences). It is a discipline concerned with the practices which produce persons, notably discursive practices, but seeks to put these in a genealogical context.

It could be evaluated using Schegloff's 'gold standard' – empirical demonstrability – but other conventional criteria for evaluating scholarship are also relevant such as coherence, plausibility, validity, and insight – especially when analysts include, as I believe they should, investigation of the social and political consequences of discursive patterning.

Appendix: Transcript and Transcription Notes

1	Nigel:	Okay yeah tell me about going with four people in one
2		night=
3	Phil:	[=All::right ((bangs table))]
4	Aaron:	[hhhhhhh hhhhhh hhhhhh h] hh no::=
5	Phil:	=Go on=
6	Paul:	On the record=
7	Phil:	=Was it was it this f .hh
8		(.)
9	Aaron:	I don't know I was a bit drunk=
10	Phil:	=I I'll tell he was drunk I'll tell you what I know
11		[because] I am never drunk
12	Nigel:	[Hm mm]
13	Phil:	Because I'm dead smug [erm:::]
14	Aaron:	[He's never] drunk it's true=
15	Phil:	=Friday you went with Janesy on Friday?
16	Aaron:	I did yes:::
17	Phil:	Out down the pub I I missed this completely a
18		complete shock to me=
19	Aaron:	=.hhhh
20	Phil:	Erm (.) went out down the pub one night as we do (.)
21		erm I went home because I like live out of town er
22		these stopped later (0.2) I was not aware of anything
23		following night big party I mean there was like
24		200 people there I would have thought big field (.) you
25		know disco and all that shit (.) erm Aaron got
26		absolutely out of his face (.) I was going out with
27		someone she didn't turn up sh she rang me [and told me]
28	Nigel:	[Hm mm]
29	Phil:	She might not be going
30	Nigel:	Hm mm
31	Phil:	Um:::
32	Aaron:	It was Karen
33	Phil:	It was Ka Karen erm something wrong [with her] mum
34	Aaron:	[hhhhh hh]
35	Phil:	wasn't it or something I can't remember what it was=
36	Aaron:	=Ah that's a good excuse
37	Phil:	Anyway [(0.2) sorry yes Aaron]
38	Aaron:	[hhhhh hhh hhhh]
39	Phil:	Erm so Aaron got really drunk and he went with
40	Aaron:	hhhhhhhhhhh [hhhh hhhh]

42		Cathy Brewin=
43	Aaron:	=No it wasn't Cathy Brewin it was another Cathy=
44	Phil:	=Cathy Cathy someone
45	Aaron:	It wasn't Cathy Brewin=
46	Phil:	=And you don't know who the other one was do you?
47	Aaron:	No
48	Phil:	You forgot her name=
49	Aaron:	=Yeah=
50	Phil:	=Or didn't even find out=
51	Aaron:	=Right=
52	Phil:	=It was just you could see him at various points of the
53		evening with this girl like on the floor in this field (.)
54		and I knew it was Aaron but I didn't know who the girl
55		was because she kept changing
56	Nigel:	Hm mm
57	Phil:	And you lost someone's purse didn't you?
58	Aaron:	Yeah (0.2) .hh hh
59	Phil:	And um (0.2) then we walked
60	Aaron:	hhhh
61	Phil:	we decided to walk back from this party it was like
62		out past ((small village)) so we had to walk back to
63		((local town))
64	Nigel:	Hm mm
65	Aaron:	.hh good idea Aaron .hh=
66	Phil:	=Yeah=
67	Aaron:	=We were very lucky that day
68	Phil:	We were erm and we were walking back and he says
69		oh I went with Janesy on Friday and I went yeah you
70		went with three birds last night you went with one on
71		Friday this was in his good month
72	Nigel:	Hm mm
73	Phil:	So that like took me aback somewhat (0.3) so that was
74		a good weekend for you
75		(.)
76	Nigel:	Is that good?
77	Phil:	Well in his books yes you know=
78	Aaron:	=hhhh.h [yeah]
79	Phil:	[The thing] is you got so much stick for it
80	Aaron:	Well yeah I could take the stick because it was
81		almost like (0.2) a good ego trip when everyone was
82		taking the stick oh you got off with her ah ha ha
83		yep I did so what's your problem? [Oh, er, errr]
84	Nigel:	[Hm mm]
85	Aaron:	[Errr]
86	Phil:	[None of them] were particularly pikey so you were
87		alright really
88	Aaron:	No (.) they weren't .hh none of them were like majorly
89		pikey .hh (.) one or two perhaps could have like
90		(.)
91	Phil:	I don't know I don't know I think I know this Cathy

92		bird I know Jenny I know Cathy thing I don't know who
93		the other one was and neither do you so can't tell=
94	Nigel:	=Yeah I mean I wasn't sort of saying is four in two
95		days good I mean it's impressive [you know]
96	Aaron:	[hh [hhh] hh
97	Phil:	[hhhhh] hhhh
98	Nigel:	But I me::an like (.) it presumes that erm that's:: a
99		creditable thing (.) yeah? Is it?
100		(0.2)
101	Phil:	No because you're on the moral low ground
102	Aaron:	But I don't mind being on the moral [low ground]
103	Phil:	[Oh no you don't]
104		mind I I it didn't fuss me at all you know and I wasn't I
105		thought it was quite (.) it was quite impressive you
106		know you're sort of thinking that's shocking because it
107		never happens to me um:: .h hhh
108	Aaron:	Hhhh
109		(0.3)
110	Phil:	But he was (.) by some people in the group he was li
111		(.) they were just taking the piss it wasn't serious no-
112		one it didn't really bother anyone at [all]
113	Nigel:	[Hm mm]
114	Phil:	It was like Aaron was on the moral low ground because
115		he was like (.) gigolo Casanova whatever
116	Nigel:	Right (.) okay (0.2) what do you think Paul?
117		(0.3)
118	Paul:	Did you=
119	Phil:	=Are you ap[palled?]
120	Paul:	[When you] .hh no (.) s [when you went out]
121	Nigel:	[Not appalled?]
122	Paul:	I jus I'll tell you in a minute when you went out
123	Nigel:	hh[hhh]
124	Unknown:	[hhhh]
125	Paul:	When you went out on that Friday (.) evening you were
126		out on the pull yeah? =
127	Aaron:	=No
128	Paul:	This (.) you were not? =
129	Aaron:	=Just out [as a group]
130	Phil:	[Just out] as a group of friends
131	Paul:	On the Saturday you were out on the pull?
132	Phil:	No
133	Aaron:	.hh [not really]
134	Phil:	[He was] drunk=
135	Aaron:	=I wasn't drunk [unconscious] (.) I was *very* merry I
136	Phil:	[((inaudible))]
137	Aaron:	was like (.) all erm (.) all like social guards were down
138	Paul:	Yeah (0.2) and (0.3) whe::n (.) so and (0.4) when you got
139		off with the first one [did you]
140	Aaron:	[hhhhhhh hhh]

142	Paul:	On the Friday
143	Aaron:	Er::::m on the Friday that that was Janesy
144	Paul:	Did you have any sort of like intonation ((sic)) of
145		carrying the relationship further?
146	Aaron:	No
147	Phil:	((inaudible – sounds like one nighter))
148	Paul:	So so you basically went for as many pullings off as
149		you could get in a weekend?
150	Phil:	No
151	Aaron:	I didn't go for it it just
152		(.)
153	Paul:	It just happened?
154	Aaron:	Well yeah (.) it's not so much I thought right ((hits
155		the desk)) this weekend (.) keep your pecker up lad
156		you're away [it's] not like that it's just that I
157	Phil:	[hhh]
158		(.)
159	Paul:	With any of them [did you feel]
160	Aaron:	[I get lucky very ((inaudible))]
161	Paul:	that they'd be like a follow on?
162	Phil:	He didn't know who half of them were do you .hh hh
163	Aaron:	Ah er I didn't (.) I mean it wasn't (.) I mean it wasn't
164		like a right gitty thing to do it was like the other
165		half knew as well that it wasn't gonna be
166		(0.4)
167	Phil:	Mm
168	Aaron:	Erm (0.2) no it's it's you're getting it all wrong it's
169		it's (0.2) it wasn't (0.4) errr Aaron come up with the
170		phrase you want to say (.) it wasn't alright this kid's
171		gonna get off with me then we're gonna go out oh no
172		we're not gonna go out what a git it was (0.2) I'm
173		gonna get off with this lad and that's alright
174	Phil:	Fancied a bit of rough you know
175	Aaron:	Fancied a bit of rough
176	Phil:	As and it was mutual I imagine

Transcription Notation

The form of transcription notation used was modified from the system developed by Gail Jefferson.

One or more colons indicate the extension of the previous sound, e.g.: Tha::t

Laughter is marked by hh the number of hh is a rough marker of duration of laughter while .hh indicates an audible intake of breath.

A? is used to mark upward intonation characteristic of a question.

Underlining indicates stress placed on a word or part of a word.

Extended brackets mark overlap between speakers. The left bracket indicates the beginning of the overlap while the right bracket indicates the end, e.g.:
hh [hhh]
[hhhh]

Double parentheses indicate transcriber's descriptions.

Numbers in parentheses, e.g. (0.2), indicate pauses in tenths of a second while (.) indicates a micropause.

An equals sign = indicates the absence of a discernible gap between the end of one speaker's utterance and the beginning of another speaker's utterance.

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Turning the Tables: Antisemitic Discourse in Post-War Austria

Ruth Wodak

> It would be absurd to deny that many Austrians responded to some extent to the Nazis' racial propaganda; however, when they saw how antisemitism was actually put into practice, they were cured. One could safely say that sympathy for the persecuted Jews eradicated antisemitism in Austria. I do not believe that this issue will ever again assume even the slightest importance (Leopold Figl, the first elected Federal Chancellor of the Austrian Second Republic).[1]
>
> [The international press] is dominated by the World Jewish Congress. This is well-known (Kurt Waldheim).[2]

If it had been meant seriously, the Austrian Chancellor's optimism after 1945 was unfounded. In fact, Figl must have known better, since he had been present at meetings of the Council of Ministers immediately after 1945, where antisemitic sentiments were expressed by some other members of the government in conjunction with the debate about reparations payments to Austrian Jews who had survived the Shoa (see Knight, 1988). Figl's disingenuous remark can thus be regarded as but a further element designed to buttress Austria's positive image in the world.

Almost forty years later, public discourse about Jews in Austria in the course of the 'Waldheim affair' recalled earlier times and gave rise to a great deal of concern in the Jewish community organization (Gemeinde).[3] The immediate occasion for this was the criticism which Jewish organizations, among others, directed against Kurt Waldheim, then campaigning for the Austrian presidency, and his hitherto hidden past. The Waldheim affair has exposed the tenuousness of official Austria's post-war *Lebenslüge* about the widespread complicity of

Austrians in the Nazi abomination, and the attendant denials of the existence of antisemitic prejudice in the post-war period this entailed (see Gruber and de Cillia, 1989; Wodak 1989a, 1990a, b, c; Wodak and de Cillia, 1988).

On the one hand, after 1945 the open expression of anti-Jewish hostility is subject to a public political taboo. Instead, one enumerates the Jewish friends one has or praises those Jews who contributed so much to Austrian culture (the standard 'philo-Semitic' discourse; cf. Stern, 1989). On the other hand, one expresses despair at not being allowed to criticize individual Jews. These predominantly foreign Jews are described as 'dishonourable' or worse, and they stand as representatives for Jews as a whole.

Within the limited scope of this paper, it is impossible to consider all aspects of the question of who speaks or writes in an antisemitic way for or to whom in what form and to what effect.[4] I therefore begin with a brief sketch of the historical-sociological context of post-war antisemitism in Austria and indicate the register (both in terms of form and content) of antisemitic prejudice currently possible in contemporary Austria.

1. A New Antisemitism in Austria?

The Austrian sociologist Bernd Marin (Bunzl and Marin, 1983) has characterized antisemitism in Austria after 1945 as an 'antisemitism without Jews', since Jews constitute only .1 percent of the Austrian population (in Vienna, .5 percent). Moreover, antisemitism is stronger in those areas where Jews no longer live and where previously practically no Jews had lived, and among people who neither have had nor have any personal contact with Jews. In addition, according to Marin, it is an 'antisemitism without antisemites', since prejudice against Jews has been publicly forbidden and tabooed. Nevertheless, there is still 'antisemitism in politics'.

Whatever general validity Marin's thesis had prior to 1986, the results of our study suggest that Marin's findings are applicable to the period since then only with significant modifications.

The taboo against open expressions of explicitly antisemitic beliefs, for example, which Marin posited in an abstract form, has remained, but the means of circumventing it linguistically have extended its boundaries in such a way that the taboo itself appears to have lost some of its significance. Anti-Jewish prejudices which had remained hidden began to surface and were increasingly found in public settings. Quantitative sociological studies (Bunzl and Marin, 1983; Weiss, 1987; Kienzl and Gehmacher, 1987)[5] have continually confirmed that a relatively high percentage of the Austrian population is open to antisemitic resentment.

The persistence of antisemitic attitudes is then ascribed to a small group of right-wing radicals. The number of such (radical) antisemites can thus be carefully delimited, and their numbers be shown to be falling. 'Antisemitism' is also frequently identified with a purely racial variety of anti-Jewish prejudice, which is

excluding or minimizing other antisemitic traditions in Austria, such as the Christian or the Christian social traditions.

If one looks at the history of the political parties in the Austrian First Republic, for example, it is clear that the line dividing the different currents of antisemitism was indistinct. There has remained a reservoir of antisemitic prejudice from which, appropriately packaged, one could (and can) draw as occasion required. Since 1945, moreover, new motives for antisemitism have arisen. What the German Jewish author Henrik Broder said about the Germans is certainly applicable to the Austrians as well: they will never forgive the Jews for Auschwitz. The collapse of the Third Reich forced many, in Austria as in Germany, to confront the extent of the Nazi crimes. Doubts, guilt feelings, the need to justify or rationalize one's behaviour encouraged the development of strategies for 'dealing with the past': playing down the events themselves, denying all knowledge of them, transforming the victims into the causes of present woes (by not letting bygones be bygones, i.e. by simply continuing to exist). Moreover, since the Moscow Declaration[6] offered Allied support to Austria's claim to have been (collectively) the first 'victim' of Hitlerite aggression, such reversals could draw upon an especially potent legitimation.

This putative victim status made it also possible to deny any responsibility which went beyond individual crimes; the new search for identity could produce a stronger feeling of nationalism, which in turn reinforced a specific definition of insiders and outsiders, of 'us' and 'them'.

Since 1945, there have been intermittent scandals involving antisemitic prejudice. In 1967, for example, the openly antisemitic outpourings of Thaddeus Borodajkiewicz, economics professor in Vienna, led to protests by both his opponents and supporters. At one of these, one of Borodajkiewicz's opponents was killed by the economic professor's neo-Nazi supporters. This was the occasion for a bi-partisan demonstration against political violence, but no corresponding campaign against his views. Borodajkiewicz himself was forced into early retirement (see Welzig, 1985). In the 1970 national assembly electoral campaign, posters of the candidate of the Austrian's People's Party for chancellor, Josef Klaus, emphasized that he, unlike his opponent Bruno Kreisky, whose Jewish origins were only too well known, was 'a genuine Austrian' (see Wodak and de Cillia, 1988). Simon Wiesenthal's publication in 1975 of material about the leader of the Freedom Party,[7] Friedrich Peter, ostensibly linking him to massacres carried out by the SS-unit to which he had belonged, was the occasion for a spate of public invective against Wiesenthal led by Bruno Kreisky. Kreisky insinuated, for example, that Wiesenthal had been a Gestapo informer. Another Kreisky comment, in an interview with a foreign journalist, 'if the Jews are a people, they are a lousy [*mies*] people', moreover, could in this context only serve to provide Jewish 'cover' for hostilities against Wiesenthal by those less schooled in the dialectical complexities of Kreisky's views.[8] Against the wave of antisemitic hostilities unleashed by the events of 1986, however, those prior scandals appear as minor affairs indeed.

Antisemitism in post-war Austria must therefore be viewed chiefly in relation to the various ways employed in dealing with alleged or real guilt, with alleged

or actual accusations about the Nazi past. Both the large, traditional reservoir of antisemitic prejudice as well as a general, traditional discourse of collective experiences and attitudes provide discursive remedies, while several new topoi have been added. The forms of expression are very different, manifest or latent, explicit or very indirect. But each and every one appears to be a discourse of justification (or varieties of justification and defence).

2. Antisemitic Stereotypes (Prejudice Content)

Of the many clichés and contents of prejudice that are associated with Jews, we will only list the four that occurred most frequently in 1986. We cannot deal in detail with the historical underpinnings of these prejudices, but refer readers to the literature as a source for the unusual features and uniqueness of the 'antisemitic syndrome' (see, inter alia, Adorno, 1973; Allport, 1987; Heinsohn, 1988; Poliakov, 1987; Pulzer, 1966; Wodak, 1990).

2.1 Christian antisemitism. According to this prejudice, Jews are regarded as the murderers of Christ, as traitors, Christian antisemitism was found especially in the mass media in 1986 (in the press and also in the semi-public sphere). These prejudices have the longest and most consistent history in Austria, being deeply embedded in the collective experience and in the 'collective subconscious' (Erdheim, 1984).

2.2 The 'dishonest' or 'dishonourable' Jew, the 'tricky Jew'. This prejudice has its origins in Judas' betrayal of Christ. On the other hand, this view is also based on economic stereotypes: in the Middle Ages Jews were responsible for lending money at interest (they were excluded from most other occupations). This cliché was used repeatedly with reference to the World Jewish Congress (WJC) in the course of the Waldheim debate in 1986.

2.3 The Jewish conspiracy. The Jews in the world dominate or control the international press, the banks, political power and capital, and they are planning the world conspiracy, e.g. the 'campaign' against Waldheim or against Austria (see Mitten, 1991; Wodak, 1990a).[9]

2.4 Jews are privileged. This new prejudice relates directly to the Holocaust. The Jews who 'emigrated' and thereby were able to avoid a far worse fate have no reason to complain. Emigration is not especially terrible, and Jews who were not in concentration camps have no grounds to be angry in any case.

3. The 'Fear of Revenge'

The collapse of the Third Reich in 1945 gave rise to several additional reasons for fearing the wrath of the 'vengeful Jew'. One was the fear of the discovery of war crimes and the persecution and conviction of war criminals. Another was the fear that the stolen ('aryanized') property could be demanded back. Finally, there was fear that the exiles would merely wish to return to their homeland.

against their former persecutors, but they might become dominant and again 'over-judaize' certain professions.

Feelings of guilt can be easily transformed into aggression towards those whose mere presence is an implicit 'attack'. One reacts defensively or by turning the tables on the victims themselves.

4. Attack is the Best Defence: The Discourse of Justification

There are various possible ways of dealing with or reacting to such an attack, be it real or imagined. We have distinguished macro-strategies, i.e. basic (conscious or unconscious, planned or spontaneous, or irrational) alternatives in social behaviour from the micro-strategies dependent on them (linguistic realizations).[10]

One reaction to perceived criticism is actually to deal openly with it, to show regret or remorse, to reappraise one's actions and accept blame in certain cases or qualify one's responsibility in others. This, however, rarely occurs, for such arguments usually take place in situations that are rife with conflict and pent-up emotions. And it is in these that the strategies we discovered become the means for transporting prejudice. One can attempt to impede the discussion, for example, or to ignore the situation (i.e. 'let sleeping dogs lie').

If this strategy does not work, the controversial event can be trivialized. In this way the persons involved, i.e. the perpetrators of these acts, are rendered harmless (i.e. there were not many, one does not know them, etc.), or a euphemism is employed to describe the acts themselves, for example in the use of 'emigration' to describe 'expulsion'. Such a trivialization can manifest itself in different ways, either by rationalization (i.e. there are really objective reasons for antisemitism); by accusing someone else (i. e. someone else is guilty, too); by shifting the blame (i.e. it was someone else's fault), by personalizing it (i.e. only one individual is to blame); or by depersonalizing it altogether (i.e. somebody was to blame), or by making fun of the accusations (i.e. the attackers exaggerate and dramatize them in an unacceptable way). Guilt as such is not, in principle, denied, but rather rendered meaningless.

Apart from merely shifting responsibility for events on to named or unnamed persons, the disavowal of personal knowledge or involvement can also involve a mechanism of victim–victimizer reversal, or the designation of a scapegoat in the case of group conflict (the enemy from the outside). In an argument among individuals, the blame can by mutual agreement be placed on someone who is not present. The defamation and debasement of the opponent belongs to this group of micro-strategies, since this makes blaming the victim, i.e. the victim–victimizer reversal, especially easy. In this case, possible feelings of guilt are transformed into aggression and into a counter-attack. This mechanism explains, for example, how the 'Kreisky–Peter–Wiesenthal affair' eventually became merely the 'Wiesenthal affair' (see Wodak et al., 1990).

Yet another alternative is to deny the guilt in principle. Accusations and attacks are distorted or invented and ascribed to opponents who had not made

them, at least not in the form alleged. A systematic distortion of the facts takes place. One is thus justified in protecting oneself or planning counter-attacks against such 'infamous' attacks. In this way a second reality is constructed, a portrayal of an enemy against which every measure of defence is permissible.

5. Anti-Jewish (Antisemitic) Language Use: The Pervasiveness of Antisemitic Prejudice in Public Life in Austria

The degree of threat and hostility towards Jews expressed in language can vary greatly: different forms and different degrees of directness and boldness can be differentiated according to context and speaker. In analysing the material, four hierarchical levels of antisemitic statements were identified which correspond to the different individual strategies of justification. A connection can be seen between the content of prejudice, political context, setting, speaker and form of expression.

Level 1. Trivialization and relativization of antisemitism and the uniqueness of the Holocaust (putting the blame on someone else, generalizing). This occurred in totally formal and official contexts such as news broadcasts and informational programmes on Austrian radio and television. The issues of a world conspiracy and Christian issues dominate on this level.

Level 2. Statements with the content: 'antisemitism is the Jews' own fault' (victim–victimizer reversal). Such remarks are packaged differently (as direct accusations, as threats or as insinuations) and occur in many contexts, especially in semi-public ones (i.e. broadcast interviews or in TV discussions) and finally also in the memorial vigil (anonymous discussions on the street, in the centre of town, June 1987, due to a memorial vigil dedicated to the victims of World War II) (see Wodak, 1990a,b). Greed, dishonesty and vindictiveness constitute the contents of additional prejudice.

Level 3. All traditional antisemitic prejudices appear: (a) implicit (stories, allusions); or (b) explicit (generalizations). This requires either less formal contexts or especially protected (well-known) figures. This level corresponds to the third macro-strategy of justification discourse, the systematic distortion and the creation of a stereotyped image of one's opponent (*Feindbild*).

Level 4. Direct and open abuse of Jews. Such labels appeared – if at all – only in anonymous settings, in the memorial vigil, for example, or in complaint calls to the Austrian television network. Outside of such settings the perceived public sanctions against such statements would restrict their occurrence almost completely.

A qualitative text analysis, however, cannot restrict itself to the linguistic level alone. The way in which the types of content are presented and the patterns of argumentation which always appear are of equal significance. They contribute to the organization of the whole text and influence the use of certain linguistic devices. All macro-strategies fit into the patterns of justification identified above, from denial to reversal and counter-attack. Before we look at an example fo-

a formal situation, we would like to present several typical forms of antisemitic language behaviour from varying contexts, all of them from the Waldheim electoral campaign of 1986 (de Cillia et al., 1987; Mitten et al., 1989).

5.1 Predication and Assertion

Predication and assertion ascribe certain characteristics to people and groups of people. They are an important linguistic device for constructing a dichotomous world, which in turn functions to make judgments concerning 'insiders' and 'outsiders' or 'them' and 'us'. Predications can also assume the character of abuse, according to the context and explicitness of the four hierarchical levels. 'That whippersnapper, General Secretary Singer . . . the private club with that bombastic name, World Jewish Congress . . . the wheeling and dealing of the first president of the club, N. Goldmann, with the Arabs, the arch-enemy of the Jewish state' (*Neue Kronen Zeitung* (*NKZ*), 2 April 1986).

An excerpt quoted from a press conference of the Jewish Gemeinde in Vienna on 18 June 1986 is given below. It represents a collage of statements by spokespersons of the Austrian People's Party and serves as an example for the device of predication and the content of dishonesty:[11]

> Untrustworthy and dishonourable methods. Dishonourable members of the World Jewish Congress. Untrustworthy – dishonourable and full of hate. Lies – deception and breaking promises – having no culture and simplistic and unfounded hate. The crying of the puppets of the World Jewish Congress motivated by hate and the need for admiration. Assassins. Mafia of slanderers. The epitome of baseness. Bribed witnesses. Methods of the mafia. Astoundingly stupid. Dirty self-aggrandisement campaigns. The habitual slanderer Singer.

5.2 Allusions

Allusions can be manifested in very different ways, for example, by means of citations, formal text construction, word choice, vagueness. All forms of allusion, however, share the characteristic that the connection between two contents is established implicitly rather than explicitly, and assumes previous knowledge on the part of the audience. Consequently, the responsibility for the interpretation is shifted onto the readers, who are believed to know the background of the insinuation (for example, 'dishonourable lot' [*ehrlose Gesellen*]).

In a letter which Karl Hödl, then vice-mayor of Linz, wrote on 12 May 1987 to Edgar Bronfman, the president of the World Jewish Congress, we find Christian antisemitism transmitted in the form of allusions. The writer of the letter makes a comparison between Bronfman as a Jew and Hödl as an 'Austrian, Christian and trained jurist', who must 'defend himself' against 'infamous attacks' – thus as a representative for Waldheim and all Austrians. The letter also contains an analogy between Waldheim's persecution by the World Jewish Congress (WJC) and the

Jews' handing over of Jesus to the Romans. Finally, Hödl contrasts the revengeful Judaism of the Old Testament to a (forgiving) Christianity: 'An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth is not our European attitude. The basic Talmudic tendency to preach in the whole world is left up to them and theirs.' Similar analogies between the murder of Christ and the critique of Waldheim were found in a series of newspaper commentaries from 1986 and 1987 (e.g. Wodak et al., 1990; Wodak, 1990c, for example).

5.3 Quotations (Discourse Representation)

Quotations are an ever-recurring part of antisemitic language use. It is precisely this form of argumentation that has the appearance of being especially objective and rational. Quotations often enable a speaker or author to transport antisemitic prejudice without having to take responsibility for the statement. This is especially true of quotations by generally recognized authorities and, in the special case of antisemitic argumentation, of quotations by Jews, which are intended to reinforce the argument ('alibi Jews' such as Kreisky, Wiesenthal, etc.). In addition to deflecting authorial responsibility, quotations can be employed to cloak extreme antisemitism, while the quotations themselves can serve as allusions in the sense noted above. Decisive in this case is the specific way in which the statements of a third person are reported.

The term 'discourse representation' has been suggested for this basic aspect of media coverage (Hak, 1987). Not only the text that was actually expressed in the course of the coverage, but also the situation in the text at hand was almost always reported as well. Newspapers and the Austrian radio broadcasting company (ORF) made the most frequent use of this technique (cf. the example below), and the cases varied according to content and explicitness, and corresponded to the hierarchical levels 1–3.[12]

6. Case Studies

6.1 Scenes from a Noonday News Programme – A Case Study

The WJC held a press conference in New York on 25 March 1986. To a certain extent this constituted a turning-point in the Waldheim affair, especially because the entire country of Austria felt as if it had been attacked. Almost the entire programme (always a full hour from 12–1 o'clock every day except Sunday) was devoted to important aspects of the 'campaign' or to an alleged 'interference' in Austria's internal affairs and to commentaries on these subjects. In the evening news programme, a telephone interview with Waldheim was broadcast. A wide variety of views were obtained from important representatives of the political scene in Austria (Wodak, 1989b,c). The representatives of the WJC were the only ones who were not interviewed. A summary of press reports was read as was a commentary on a 'discussion about antisemitism', a formulation which is itself an euphemism.[13]

6.2 The Situation on 25 March 1986 – What Really Happened?

On 22 March 1986, the WJC published the CROWCASS listing (Central Registry of War Criminals and Security Suspects) which showed that after 1945 Waldheim had been sought by the US Army for alleged war crimes. This list also recorded (as it turned out mistakenly) that Waldheim had served in the counter-intelligence section (Abwehr) of Army Group E, which the press release of the WJC duly noted. At its press conference in New York three days later, 25 March, historian Robert Herzstein produced documents which showed that Waldheim had served in the military intelligence section (Ic) rather than the counter-intelligence section (Abwehr).[14]

At this latter press conference, neither Herzstein nor the WJC referred to Waldheim as 'an officer in the Abwehr', as the evidence Herzstein presented showed the CROWCASS listing to have been mistaken.

The reporting in the Austrian media on 25 March amalgamated these two press conferences (as well as an interview with WJC leaders which had been published on 24 March). The general tone was defensive, as though all Austrians had been implicated by the link between Waldheim and the Abwehr. This is the element that was focused on and distorted; the WJC, as well as Herzstein, were portrayed as having referred to Waldheim as an officer in the Abwehr (see also Mitten, 1991).

It thus became possible to defend oneself against an untrue accusation, and this in turn justified in advance any and all counter-attacks. At the same time, the 'accusations' and substantiated facts which the WJC or Herzstein actually raised were swept under the rug. With few exceptions, the Austrian media became passive supporters of the 'campaign with "the campaign"', i.e. the Waldheim propaganda line, merely by their (at least) sloppy handling of statements and documents.

6.3 What was Reported? – The Mittagsjournal *on 25 March 1986*

The news programme itself was introduced as follows:

> The discussion about the past of the ÖVP's presidential candidate, Kurt Waldheim, has reached a new climax since Sunday. The announcement by WJC representatives to present further serious accusations against the former UN General Secretary at a press conference which will take place this afternoon in New York has given a new twist to the discussion. It certainly has to do with claims about Waldheim's involvements, but the discussion is also already concerned with the extent to which the WJC is interfering in Austria's internal affairs. For the former chancellor, Kreisky, there are indications of this direction. In a *Morgenjournal* interview today, Kreisky expressed his disapproval of the WJC General Secretary's statements and also defended Kurt Waldheim against such accusations.

The introductory presentation itself reveals patterns of interpretation and argumentation. Nearly an entire new programme was devoted to a press

conference that *had not yet taken place and to a discussion of 'accusations'* which had not yet been made, providing Austrian politicians with the opportunity to exonerate themselves, as it were, pre-emptively. The moderator trivialized the 'discussion' and 'claims about Waldheim's involvement' in possibly being privy to information regarding war crimes in the Balkans, and with Kreisky's help he called listeners' attention to the change of 'interference in Austria's internal affairs' (we-discourse). The factitive portrayal of the WJC's ostensible (and arguably invented) 'accusations' accords it a certain status (discourse representation as a micro-strategy), while it is unclear what the WJC actually claimed (vagueness). In the broadcast, Waldheim was referred to by means of (positive) descriptive expressions (i.e. presidential candidate and especially former General Secretary of the UN) which tended to reflect the emphases of his campaign publicity. In contrast, the WJC was referred to by name three times in this short text, and these and other examples show how this name itself permits and can even trigger prejudiced associations such as world conspiracy, promoting the introduction of such strategies as black and white depiction or personalization and defamation.

The former Austrian chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, was the first Austrian politician to be quoted:

> *Kreisky*: First of all, I knew nothing about any of the things being asserted about Dr Waldheim as a person. However, if I had known, I would certainly not have withheld my recommendation in this case uh uh, because it all happened a long, long time ago. And he was a young man . . . But that is not what it is all about at all. The point is, that certain groups, albeit very small ones, are interfering in the Austrian campaign . . . with both candidates in an improper way in my opinion. I am not prepared to tolerate this. But these groups have been fighting me for decades. . . .
>
> *Interviewer*: Dr Kreisky, your party argues that, it is said, that to a certain extent he admits that he was there, that he did not say that from the beginning. How do you see this?
>
> *Kreisky*: Yes, well, that is none of my business. I don't want to have anything to do with it. Oh, it is all very unpleasant, and I don't want to have anything to do with it.

Kreisky justified and defended Waldheim as opposed to 'certain circles' [*gewisse Kreise*] by employing the strategies of rationalization and trivialization (both micro-strategies of the macro-strategy of mitigation) and also moved onto the next macro-strategy, i.e. 'making a clear break with the past'. On the other hand, Kreisky resorted to counter-attack, utilizing a group of macro-strategies in the discourse of justification: the disclosures have nothing to do with Waldheim's past – thus, every right to 'debate the past' is denied; the more important issue is that 'certain circles' (cliché), although small, have been persecuting Kreisky for years (contents of victim–victimizer reversal and world conspiracy, expressed as allusions and distortions). Kreisky thereby directed the WJC attacks to himself and to a certain extent then had to defend himself against them. Distortion and unwarranted inferences actively contribute to the *Feindbild* of the WJC. This discourse is not new, but is a way, typical of Austria, of dealing with the Nazi past, which Kreisky had previously used in connection with Friedrich Peter

Kreisky serves a three-fold purpose here: as the 'alibi Jew' (his words thus carry more weight), as former chancellor and socialist (even the opposition stands by Waldheim), and finally, as a worldly wise and world-travelled diplomat (he can certainly estimate Waldheim's worth). In responding to the journalist's unpleasant and persistent questions, Kreisky employs a further macro-strategy of justification, already mentioned above: he simply cuts off the discussion!

Ivan Hacker, president of the religious community, is interviewed next:

Moderator: . . . The Israelite religious community [Gemeinde] felt compelled last night to initiate a discussion, which amounted to taking a stand and expressing great concern and a warning about the sentiments that are being unleashed. [The idea] that the making public of documents [should] be characterized at once as slander and a smear campaign was disputed. . . .

Hacker: We reject any linguistic dictums that at once nullify the publication of documents about Dr Kurt Waldheim's past with labels such as slander and smear campaign. By showing contempt for the exposers and making the Jews the scapegoat. This personal appeal to suppressed emotions on the part of certain ÖVP functionaries is what we condemn the most. Because it gives the Brownshirts and antisemites a new claim to legitimacy and reveals shameful political calculations.

Interviewer: . . . Are you referring specifically to Dr Graff?

Hacker: Certainly, Graff. . . . But we condemn the tendency of individual SPÖ functionaries just as much for going along with this dismissal of the past and distancing themselves from disclosures about it. The same calculated thinking is employed here to get the same votes. We deeply regret the apparently widespread view in Austria that the appeal to Hitler–Germany and to doing one's duty [i.e. in the German Wehrmacht], as it is put, produces a stronger solidarity than does a declaration for a new democratic Austria. . . .

Interviewer: . . . Does this remark [i.e. doing one's duty] refer to Dr Waldheim?

Hacker: Him too. . . . I am referring to everyone who says that, not only Waldheim. . . .

Interviewer: . . . How do you view uh statements of individual WJC functionaries. . . . That can't be very pleasant for you as die president of the Israelite religious community in Austria?

Hacker: It's not at all pleasant. But the Jewish world organization is a totally . . . democratic, independent organization. Therefore, he [Israel Singer, general secretary of the WJC] must take responsibility for whatever he has said. . . .

Interviewer: In any case, you don't see it as the WJC interfering in the Austrian presidential election?

Hacker: Interference. One can view it in different ways. I see it as the WJC tracing the history of a certain General Secretary of the UN. . . .

Interviewer: . . . How can one stop this escalation of emotions?

Hacker: If I could answer this question, I would not be sitting here at this table, but would be one of the leading politicians in the world.

Thus, after Kreisky, a 'Jewish fellow citizen' [*jüdischer Mitbürger*] had a chance to speak. Hacker was upset and made a point of the 'sentiments of the Austrians'; he accused both parties of trivialization and of playing a dangerous game; he saw through this specific way of dealing with the past. The interviewer, however, did not pursue these extremely pointed statements or the opposing discourse,

are presented as interference in the Austrian election campaign. Both topic and level are changed, and Hacker is no longer able to find the generally held, analytic first level of argumentation.

This opposing view therefore remains isolated and personalized and mitigated by Kreisky in his role as 'alibi Jew'. Following Hacker, the programme quoted the view of one of the main architects of the 'campaign within the "campaign"', Michael Graff. It was introduced as follows:

> General Secretary of the ÖVP, Michael Graff, who, according to Hacker, had appealed personally to suppressed emotions, again stated his views regarding the discussion about Waldheim and the current state of the presidential election campaign. . . .

The presentation contained an interpretative pattern: the accusation against Graff is personalized. 'According to Hacker', there are latent threats – this mitigates the content and trivializes it. In reality, the discussion was less about Waldheim personally than about Waldheim's past and his way of dealing with it. This way of describing it alters and distorts the content of the debate.

Graff first attacked the SPÖ and suggested that lying behind the 'infamous slander campaign' are economic-political reasons and an attempt to distract voters' attention away from the governing party.

> The slander campaign, which has been sparked in the vicinity of the Chancellor and has naturally spread like wildfire, is out of the control of those who set it; it is on its way and the damage it will do to Austria both from the inside and the outside is unforeseeable.

Two things are noticeable here: first, the affective use of language and the abundance of metaphors, which paint an especially threatening picture. Second, the victim–victimizer reversal and we-discourse. Austria (in effect Waldheim and Waldheim supporters) is accordingly the victim of a 'slander campaign', and the instigators, whoever they may be, are accountable for any damage. On this occasion Graff still placed the original instigators in Austria. Then, however, he turned to attack the WJC, whose charges he describes as 'indescribable' and 'much exaggerated'.

> *Moderator*: He [Graff] is firmly convinced that Waldheim had nothing to do with war crimes. And the only purpose of the documents which are announced for this afternoon in New York is to contribute to the mud-slinging. Graff responded as follows to the Israelite Gemeinde's warning about antisemitic information, without knowing the details of their position.
>
> *Graff*: It is exactly this type of discussion that worries me so much. I said in my interview on the *Morgenjournal* that I am very concerned about the behaviour of individual representatives of the World Jewish Congress, because it is precisely such exaggerated attacks that can unleash emotions in this country, and no one wants

> this . . . Of course we must take the statements of our Jewish fellow citizens seriously. And I deeply regret that because of this unqualified campaign, which in the meantime uh uh has also been criticized by Kreisky, graves have been dug up. I uh find that the instigators of this campaign have themselves to blame for this. And they will have to live with this burden.

After this Graff called on the government to defend Waldheim and to investigate who had leaked the documents in this case.

Graff appeared to respond to Hacker's accusation, but merely repeated his statement, thereby getting the chance to justify himself and also to have the last word. Graffs reference to Kreisky, moreover, completely trivialized Hacker's statement. The affective use of language is especially noticeable in the labelling of the WJC and the alleged 'campaign', which could engender any number of possible associations.

The macro-strategy employed by Graff consists chiefly in ignoring the content of the accusations made by the WJC. Instead, he defended himself against accusations which the WJC had not made (war criminal, etc.) or against those which he could not have known about (distortion and preemptive justification). He could thus turn the tables: he was given free reign to attack the victims – who are themselves to blame for the emergence of antisemitic sentiments because of their exaggerated accusations, thus also to blame for the suffering of Austrian 'Jewish fellow-citizens' (differentiating between 'good' and 'bad' Jews). His remarks that Austria must defend itself against these attacks, and the government must protect the individual Waldheim, rest on the assumption that Austria as a whole has been attacked, but is made credible only by means of systematic distortions, manoeuvres of we-discourse and a scapegoat strategy. Indeed, the contents of the actual accusations and the debate about the past, etc., were intentionally distorted. Hacker's opposing discourse was weakened and the discourse of justification won out, as it was additionally strengthened by the presentation as well as by the time and placement allotted to it in the 'Journal'.

The next sequence in the programme is a summary of opinions on the matter in Austrian newspapers. Then Mario Ferrari-Brunnenfeld, an under-secretary in the ministry of health and member of the FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria), was asked for his views on the matter:

> In answer to the question of why the third parliamentary party has kept itself out of the debate surrounding Waldheim, the current Secretary of State said in the Ministry of Health. . . .
>
> *Ferrari-Brunnenfeld*: We will not interfere in the dispute about the presidential candidates in the future either. Although we very much regret the form this dispute has taken on. And that foreign countries are beginning to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria at this particular time, because of the awkward handling of the election campaign. Uh then I believe that uh that uh the problem that we have regarding this national uh presidential election, we do have one uh, that uh a presidential candidate does not own up to his past, has provided the starting-point of

In answer to the question of whether he also had misgivings about the possibility of antisemitism, Ferrari-Brunnenfeld replied:

> I think the Israelite Gemeinde would have been smarter to keep out of this discussion. And secondly, I don't believe that it's a racial issue, but rather that the Jewish organizations have themselves intervened in a discussion with the motto 'Stop thief!' suddenly entering the forum of public discussion, so to speak. I mean that as far as I know – and I do get around – there's no sign of anything like neo-antisemitism. But I believe that the Jewish organizations are sparing nothing to make it a point of discussion, and a lot of neutral citizens are naturally asking what's going on? Who asked them? Who asked for their opinion? It's purely an internal matter of Austria.
> *Interviewer*: What you're saying then is that the Jewish organizations themselves are to blame if there is a new discussion about antisemitism?
> *Ferrari-Brunnenfeld*: As grotesque as it sounds, that's how it looks to me. . . .

Ferrari-Brunnenfeld thus also defined the WJC's role as unjustified interference from 'abroad' in 'internal things of Austria' (we-discourse), but considered the main problem to be the way Waldheim had dealt with his past. He accused Waldheim of 'not owning up to' his career in the German Wehrmacht, a sentiment probably designed to address a specific constituency in his own party, the (German) 'national' wing.

When antisemitism was introduced, Ferrari-Brunnenfeld shifted into dominant 'campaign discourse' mode very smoothly. He first attempted to trivialize the problem, and then accused the 'Jewish organizations' of trying to make themselves look good. Then he reverts to the victim–victimizer reversal: the Jews are themselves to blame for their misfortune!

The press conference of the WJC took place as scheduled that afternoon (CET). At this conference no mention was made of Waldheim in connection with the Abwehr. On the evening news programme *Abendjournal* Waldheim was interviewed via telephone about the allegations the WJC had ostensibly made about him:

> *Interviewer*: You've heard the report from our New York correspondent about the press conference the World Jewish Congress gave today. Uh we can uh summarize uh these accusation approximately like this: it can be proven that you were a Nazi; you lied for forty years; you knew about and personally took part in partisan activities – all are accusations that are diametrically opposed to the positions you have previously held.
> *Waldheim*: Yes, I categorically deny these accusations. Uh, the former Chancellor Kreisky has also already explained that these accusations by the uh World Jewish Congress have to do with, and I quote, with 'monstrous baseness' [*ungeheure Niedertracht*].

Following this exchange, Waldheim offered a lengthy justification based on the themes of 'doing one's duty' and having served in the Wehrmacht, 'just like hundreds of thousands of other Austrians'. Kreisky thus serves as Waldheim's 'alibi' Jew, and by quoting Kreisky, Waldheim can shift the responsibility for

past is pursued by neither Waldheim nor any of the other politicians who were quoted. The description of Waldheim as an officer in the Abwehr (contained in the CROWCASS listing, and reported – once – by the WJC), is central to his justification. He can legitimately dismiss this one accusation; all others are thereby similarly dismissed or simply ignored. Towards the end of the interview Waldheim is asked:

> Dr Waldheim, would it be correct to summarize your statements in the following way: there is nothing correct, nothing true in what the World Jewish Congress publicized in New York today?
> *Waldheim*: I wouldn't say that. Well, the fact, that I was seen uh there and was present there, is true. . . .

After this vague and euphemistic explanation, Waldheim again very strongly denies accusations, especially those that were never made.

> One last question, Dr Waldheim: You continue to maintain that you knew nothing about the deportation of Jews, specifically about those from Thessaloniki?
> *Waldheim*: I continue to maintain this. There is no reason to change my statement.

The interviewer does not address the principal questions raised by the WJC, but is railroaded into discussing details considered (by Waldheim) to be relevant. In this way, Waldheim's justification is the absolute and uncontested conclusion for the official ORF news on this day.

7. Conclusions

All the politicians interviewed in these two radio news programmes employed similar strategies: trivializations, denial and finally cutting off the discussion when the discussion dealt with Austria's Nazi past; distortion, defamation and pre-emptive defence against charges still unknown when the discussion dealt with the WJC. The introductory passages and interviewers' questions reinforced this discourse. The order of speakers interviewed in the programme, i.e. Hacker's inconspicuous position between Kreisky and Graff, made the opposing arguments relatively ineffective. The diversion and avoidance strategies were successful: the discussion no longer had to do with Waldheim's past, but rather with Waldheim as Austria. It was not about post-war Austria and antisemitism, but about the WJC, their accusations which, in addition, had been systematically distorted.

The scapegoat strategy, 'Iudeus ex machina' (see Wodak, 1989a) and the construction of this *Feindbild* can be clearly seen in *actu* in this news broadcast. The premiss is we-discourse, which all the politicians without exception used. One defends oneself against foreign countries and their interference in Austria's internal affairs. In this way the criticism of Waldheim's dealings with his past was transformed into a plot against Austria contrived by vengeful Jews seeking admiration. When such a reality is constructed by influential politicians in a public

forum such as a news broadcast, it is not surprising that antisemitism is expressed much more explicitly in other contexts (such as the memorial vigil).

Did 1986 change anything? Has the antisemitic language use become more obvious? Antisemitic prejudices are ubiquitous in Austria. Since 1986, however, some taboos have fallen away in certain public realms, especially in the media. Although the more subtle expressions of prejudice are usual in such formal contexts, certain persons are entitled to employ cruder or more blatant forms in such contexts as well, conjuring up images of an enemy by reverting at the same time to a mystified past and to Austria's sham existence. The connection between justification and counter-attack, between guilt and the construction of a *Feindbild*, is ineluctable.

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Notes

1. Interview with the *Shanghai Echo*, quoted in *Der Neue Weg*, no. 10, the beginning of June 1947, p. 11.
2. 'Comment expliquez-vous que la presse internationale ait été aussi largement critique envers vous? (Il s'emporte.) Mais parce qu'elle est dominée par le Congrès juif mondial, c'est bien connu!' Interview with Claire Trean, *le Monde*, 3 May 1986.
3. In Austria, religions have institutions recognized in law which record the number of members. The 'Israelitische Kultusgemeinde' is the official representative of Austrian Jews. There is no Anglo-American equivalent, and the term 'Jewish Community' is conventionally not restricted to those who officially declare themselves Jews on religious grounds. For this paper, when this particular Jewish institution in Austria is meant, the German *Gemeinde* is employed.
4. Two case studies which were part of the project 'Sprache und Vorurteil' (Language and Prejudice) were able to shed some light on the Waldheim Affair and on an earlier dispute between Simon Wiesenthal, then Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, and the then head of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) Friedrich Peter. Both affairs were examined qualitatively in public and semi-formal settings. The whole register of the forms and contents of antisemitic prejudice could be identified in both. This register appears continuous: an appropriate prejudice is sought and found according to situation. The project report (Wodak et al., 1990; Projektteam 'Sprache und Vorurteil', 1989) includes all the data as well as the theoretical and methodological approaches employed in the study.
5. Questionnaires and standardized interviews, and telephone surveys even more so, have serious limitations in prejudice research, since especially in the area of taboos it

is almost impossible to obtain opinions and attitudes; therefore, the studies differ from each other. Hilde Weiss' questionnaire appears to be sophisticated and she reaches several important conclusions. Other opinion surveys already fail in their formulation of the questions (cf. in detail regarding this, Projektteam 'Sprache und Vorurteil', 1989).

6. The Moscow declaration, issued by the foreign ministers of the US, Great Britain and the Soviet Union in October, 1943, included the statement that Austria 'was the first victim of Hitler's typical policy of aggression'.
7. Between 1945 to 1949, former members of what were termed 'more incriminated' Nazi organizations were disenfranchized as a part of the de-Nazification policy. In the 1949 elections, the Union of Independents, which reorganized the (German) 'nationally inclined', captured 20 seats. The Freedom Party [*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*] was formed in 1954 out of the Union of Independents. Friedrich Peter was chairman of the FPÖ in 1975. For background on this 'affair' see van Amerongen (1977); Wodak et al. (1990).
8. Kreisky's own conception of nationhood derives from the Austrian Socialist theorist Otto Bauer. Bauer's criterion for a nation was that it be a 'community of fate' (*Schicksalsgemeinschaft*). Neither Bauer, who died in 1938, nor Kreisky would concede that the Jews are a nation. This in itself is a legitimate position to defend, and Kreisky's pejorative and contemptuous aside probably referred to the difficulty of the Jews conforming to his (unspecified) criteria of nationhood. This, however, in no way mitigates the charge of irresponsibility, and, in the context, would easily be seen as pandering to the anti-Wiesenthal hostilities of the FPÖ voters.
9. One example from our data illustrates this point. The then leader of the People's Party, Alois Mock, said the following in an interview on *Zeit im Bild*, a TV-news broadcast on 5 June 1986: 'That guy Singer travels around the world and, aided by the pressure of the international media, suddenly demands that one look at documents from the archives that have been available for forty years. Many say okay, we can take a look at them. We are not going to risk the pressure and the argument with the men who were even able to place the large international media at their disposal in an unprecedented manhunt [*Menschenhatz*]' (*Zeit im Bild*, 5 June 1986).
10. For the entire range of these, of which only a few representative samples can be offered here, see Projektteam (1989). Regarding the concept of 'strategy', see ibid., Ch. 7.2 (cf. also Lutz and Wodak, 1987).
11. The entire interview illustrates numerous strategies of justification (see Wodak et al., 1990).
12. For other examples of such linguistic realizations, especially from the semi-public and anonymous spheres, see Projektteam (1989). We have limited ourselves here to those patterns which are actually found in the example passage. The hierarchy of explicitness mentioned above contains the full range of possible antisemitic forms of expression.
13. The complete context, analysis and text can be found in Wodak et al. (1990). Here, the most important politicians are presented as well as the supplementary comments made by the moderator. The Austrian radio station is a state monopoly (ORF). This example shows better than most others how reality is distorted and how the *Feindbild Jud* was constructed.
14. For the purpose of this article it is sufficient to note his service. The Abwehr section of Army Group E could have brought Waldheim *ceteris paribus* closer to activities judged criminal by the Military Tribunal at Nuremberg than would have his duties in the military intelligence. For details on this point, see Kurz et al. (1988).
15. See Wodak et al. (1990).

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