The Dialogicality of Dasein:
Conversation and Encounter with/in Heidegger's *Being and Time*

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ABSTRACT

The project is to unfold the dialogical aspects of human subjectivity as expressed through the existential phenomenology of Heidegger's *Being and Time*. The investigation is divided into three parts.

Part I offers an interpretation of Heidegger's concept of subjectivity with emphasis on the movement from inauthenticity to authenticity. In order to mediate the more traditionally existentialist reading of Dasein's authenticity, I situate *Being and Time* within Heidegger's larger phenomenological project. This opens up the possibility of thinking about Being-in-the-world and Being-towards-death in terms of a lived intentionality in which Dasein has its own Being as its object. Although Dasein in its everydayness generally only comports toward its own Being in the manner characteristic of empty intentionality, this intention can be fulfilled. This fulfillment constitutes Dasein's authenticity.

Part II poses the question: What is dialogue? I illustrate that there are two figures of dialogue — conversation and encounter. Conversation is an exchange between participants which maintains a particular flow and thematic unity, and is based on the structure of question and response. Its possibility rests in the otherness of the participants with respect to one another and in their ability to mediate this difference through some shared basis of meaning. Encounter, on the other hand, is an event of meeting between participants in which the alterity of the other is thrown into high relief by the challenge which it poses to the self, thereby throwing into question both the self and the meaning in which it dwells. Nevertheless, both conversation and encounter can be shown to be dialogical relative to a constellation of concepts. Dialogue is an engagement with *alterity* marked by a simultaneous *continuity* and *discontinuity* with the other. This engagement bears a relation to *meaning* and is the ground of *responsibility* and *questionability*.

In Part III, this notion of dialogue is used to interpret Dasein's subjectivity and its becoming authentic. I argue that Dasein's everydayness can be understood as a conversationality in the third person which is transformed into the first-person conversationality of authentic historizing through an encounter with radical alterity in anxious Being-towards-death.

RÉSUMÉ

Ce projet a comme but l'exploration des aspects dialogiques de la subjectivité selon la phénoménologie existentielle de Heidegger dans *L'être et le temps*.

La première partie offre une interpretation du concept de la subjectivité chez Heidegger et met de l'emphase sur le mouvement de l'inauthenticité vers l'authenticité. En contestant l'interpretation traditionnelle existentialiste, le texte se situe dans le projet phénoménologique plus étendu de Heidegger. Donc il est possible de penser à l'être-au-monde et à l'être-à-la-mort en termes d'une intentionalité vécue où Dasein a son propre être comme objet. Bien que Dasein dans sa quotidienneté se porte habituellement vers son propre être dans la manière d'une intentionalité vide, cette intention peut être remplie. Ce remplissage constitue l'authenticité de Dasein.

La deuxième partie pose la question: qu'est-ce que le dialogue? Je démontre qu'il y a deux modes de dialogue — la conversation et la rencontre. La conversation est un échange entre deux participants qui se caractérise par une certaine fluidité, l'unité d'un thème, ainsi qu'une structure de question et de réponse. Sa possibilité demeure dans l'alterité mutuelle des participants et leur capacité de reconcilier cette différence par une base de signifiance partagée. La rencontre cependant est un évenement entre deux participants où l'alterité de l'autre devient plus évident par le défi qu'elle pose au soi. Ce défi met le soi, et la signifiance dans laquelle il habite, en question. Néanmoins la conversation et la rencontre sont tous les deux dialogiques et on peut le démontrer par une constellation de concepts. Le dialogue est une interaction avec *l'alterité* qui se caractérise par une *continuité* et une *discontinuité* simultanée avec l'autre. Cette relation se porte vers la *signifiance* et elle est la base de la *responsabilité* et de la *contestabilité*.

Dans la troisième partie, cette idée de dialogue sert à interpreter la subjectivité de Dasein et son devenir authentique. On peut comprendre la quotidienneté de Dasein comme une "conversationalité" en troisième personne qui se transforme à une conversationalité en première personne (l'historicité authentique) par une rencontre avec son alterité radicale dans l'être-à-la-mort angoissé.

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List of Abbreviations

SZ	*Sein und Zeit* (*Being and Time*)
HCT	*The History of the Concept of Time*
IT	*I and Thou*
O	*The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Buber*
TI	*Totality and Infinity*

Note on citation:

In general references will be given in footnotes. In the case of the works listed above, which are cited frequently throughout the text, the first reference will appear in a footnote. All subsequent references to these works will take parenthetical form.

Note on Gender Neutral Language:

In numerous passages, engagement with a single human other is discussed. In many cases, it would have been extremely awkward and unwieldy to employ locutions which encompass both genders, such as "she or he", "him- or herself" and "his or her." Instead, each example refers to a single gender, but genders are alternated from one example to the next to preserve gender neutrality.

Introduction

This dissertation explores the concept of dialogical subjectivity through an engagement with the work of Martin Heidegger. The motivations which underlie such an investigation are multiple.

It is time to ask again the question of subjectivity. It expresses some of the most fundamental philosophical questions we can ask. Who am I? How do I become myself? What does it mean to be here? Such questions recur throughout the history of philosophy, although they assume various forms. They are deeply compelling — our very existence itself challenges us to respond to them.

Recently the notion of subjectivity has fallen out of favor, criticized as a distinctly modern notion which must be overcome. Typically, subjectivity is taken to refer to the knowing subject of epistemology and metaphysics which has been of prime philosophical concern since the Enlightenment. This subject is portrayed as essentially constituted independently of its relation to others and the world; it is autonomous, rational, unconditioned by anything outside itself. The subject's autonomy and independence are the basis of its agency and its responsibility. This notion of the radically individuated subject has come under virulent attack, most recently by postmodern critics. They maintain that the subject simply is not autonomous and radically individuated in this way; to posit it as such is mistaken and further, validates epistemological models which are ego-centric, anthropocentric, and dominating of the other. Rejecting the traditional notion of subjectivity, postmodernists instead proclaim 'the death of the subject'.

I am extremely sympathetic to these postmodern critiques; there is something deeply problematic with the notion of subjectivity which they so rightly criticize. However I am reluctant to infer that we must abandon the notion of subjectivity altogether. The postmodern critiques show us that a particular conception of the subject and subjectivity is problematic — not that a meaningful understanding of subjectivity cannot be uncovered. Now that the dust has begun to settle, the time is right to reclaim the term 'subjectivity' and to apply it to something distinct from the Cartesian or Kantian subject — something more dialogical.

Uncertainty, doubt, and anxiety as to who we are — which prompt us to ask the question of subjectivity — have never been more acute. Although the subject may be "dead" in certain domains of philosophical discourse, it still enjoys wide currency in our popular culture. The radically individuated subject is the construct which underlies our social, economic, and political institutions; to the degree that we are shaped by these, we become that subject. If that subject is impoverished, we become impoverished. On the brink of the twenty-first century, in an atmosphere of mass consumer culture and the growing hegemony of corporate, governmental, and economic institutions and interests, we struggle with a sense of disempowerment, impoverishment, and frustration. We must ask the question of subjectivity again, because it is crucial to thematize and retrieve what otherwise remains hidden and overlooked in our institutionalized and sedimented representations of ourselves.

What this investigation will disclose is the dialogicality of human subjectivity — that it is not radical individuality that constitutes us as who we are, but rather connection to the other. Through intercourse with the other, subjectivity is enacted and meaning is created, including the meaning which becomes associated with the self.

In re-thematizing subjectivity, it is necessary to locate those places in the philosophical tradition which allow us the possibility of re-thinking subjectivity in a dialogical way. I have found such an ally in Heidegger. Heidegger offers an account of subjectivity centered around two defining features — existentiality and mineness. In emphasizing existentiality, Heidegger takes the subject out of its privileged position outside of space and time, re-contextualizing it as particular, mortal, historical, dynamic, engaged in the world and with others. In emphasizing mineness, he revolutionizes this subjectivity even further. The Being of the subject can no longer be expressed by an *I* which is identical with itself — an atomistic monad — nor as an *I* which is transparent to itself in self-consciousness. Rather, subjectivity is now to be thought of as something which is mine, something which is *other* than me but towards which I bear a special relation. For Heidegger, the self does not constitute itself, but is instead constituted through its relation to the other. This is an important starting point for thinking about dialogue.

But Heidegger is also important because this project concerns itself not only with the relationship between subjectivity and dialogue, but also with authenticity. Authenticity involves disclosing one's essential relatedness to the other, and participating and engaging in that relation in the *first person*, in a direct and personal way. Rather than associate dialogue with authenticity and non-dialogical engagement with inauthenticity, I argue that dialogical subjectivity lies at the basis of both authenticity and inauthenticity. Both are modes of subjectivity; inauthenticity is empty relative to authenticity, but both possess a dialogicality, albeit one expressed in different ways. A strength of Heidegger's account is that it is sufficiently complex to give expression to different modes of subjectivity. Because he understands the self as a relation, Heidegger can account for varying degrees of proximity to and distance from oneself — the key to the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity.

Heidegger's discussion of authenticity and inauthenticity centers around issues of disclosure and concealment of self, lostness and re-location. It should be stressed, however, that his primary concern is to demonstrate that the horizon for any understanding of Being — and the horizon for understanding human subjectivity — is time. Consequently, the emptiness and fulfillment of self characteristic of inauthenticity and authenticity, respectively, can only be understood relative to a subjectivity which is temporal. Temporality is responsible for the dynamism and movement which enable being to show itself as a becoming.

The movement of subjectivity manifests itself as dialogue. Participants in a dialogue approach and withdraw from one another in their interaction; they are oriented relative to one another in a situation which is meaningful. Through their interaction, this meaning can be affirmed and sustained, extended, eroded, or forgotten because the disclosures which occur through dialogue are always accompanied by concealment. The double movement of dialogue is part of subjectivity and determines that the search for ourselves — the search for answers to the questions: who am I? how do I become myself? what does it mean to be here? — will never be finished. Our very existence challenges us with these questions, and we remake ourselves in the fundamental practice of asking and responding to them.

* * *

Subjectivity is the Being of the subject where the subject is an entity engaged in a relationship to its world and aware of that relationship. In this sense self-consciousness alone is not a sufficient condition of subjectivity. To be a subject one must also exist concretely in a context, and one must be aware of that situatedness. Although one might say that subjectivity lies in activity, I prefer to stress that it lies in the *Being* of the subject, for not all Being is activity as it is traditionally construed. Subjectivity is not reducible to agency; the subject is not a subject only in so far as she is an actor in the world. A subject is also receptive, open, even passive, and thus these features belong to subjectivity as well.

In Part I, I argue that a subjectivity of this type is what Heidegger describes in *Being and Time* (SZ) as belonging to Dasein. This becomes more readily apparent when we consider carefully the Dasein analytic in terms of Heidegger's phenomenological project. Dasein is the entity for whom phenomena manifest themselves. This disclosure occurs in a middle-voiced manner in which activity and passivity become blurred. Dasein not only projects meaning into the world, it is also open to the meaning which the world discloses itself as already having; thus Dasein's involvement in the world entails a Being-open to the world. Further, Dasein's engagement with other entities in the world — indeed its very subjectivity — presupposes and implicitly expresses an understanding of its own Being as well. It is therefore appropriate to say that Dasein's Being-in-the-world expresses an intentional relation to its own Being.

Intentional relations to objects, however, can exhibit varying degrees of fulfillment. Unlike fulfilled intentions which more immediately grasp their object, empty intentions are relatively lacking in intuitive content; they are comparatively empty subjective expressions. This difference between empty and fulfilled intentions also applies to the intentional relatedness which Dasein bears to its own Being. I argue that the existentiell modification represented by the shift from everydayness to authenticity is analogous to the shift from an empty intention to a fulfilled one. In authenticity, Dasein apprehends its Being in an immediate manner; Dasein receives intuitive content which affirms what is only emptily expressed in its everyday Being-in-the-world — namely its openness to the world and its Being as possibility. Dasein's fundamental openness and receptivity to the world imply an openness to the other — the key to an understanding of Dasein's subjectivity as dialogical.

However, if we are to pursue this thought further, we must come to a deeper understanding of dialogue. In Part II, I examine two primary figures of dialogue — conversation and encounter. Conversation corresponds most closely to our everyday ideas about dialogue. It is an exchange between participants which communicates meaning and establishes some mutual understanding. The participants' engagement with one another is reciprocal, in that each responds to the other. This reciprocity generates continuity and cohesiveness in the interaction. The idea of conversation generally emphasizes the sharing which occurs between participants. Encounter, on the other hand, involves an interaction in which one is drawn much further into a simultaneity of presence with the other; one shatters oneself against the other. The alterity of the other is far more apparent in encounter than in conversation. This alterity manifests itself at once as a limit which rebuffs and as a secret or mystery which entices.

Closer examination of the dialogic *situation* involved in each case will reveal that encounter can be understood as a compression, and thus an intensification, of conversation. Any engagement with the other is situated, and so both conversation and encounter must occur within space and time. But if we have learned anything from Heidegger, we also know that we are always situated relative to networks of signification — in short, meaning. Thus, every dialogic situation has *spatial*, *temporal*, and *significative* features; and the participants, who are oriented towards each other in the situation, are so oriented along *axes* of spatiality, temporality, and significance. I argue that these features manifest themselves differently in conversation and encounter, such that the spatiality, temporality, and significance involved in encounter appear as an intensification or even a surpassing of these same features in conversation. Whereas conversation generally occurs in language, encounter is often silent. Whereas conversation has temporal duration, encounter is generally momentary and fleeting. Conversation preserves a distance between participants who remain aware of their surroundings; encounter collapses the space between participants, and the world around them fades away.

In exploring the idea of conversation, I uncover a constellation of concepts implicated in our understanding of the dialogicality of conversation. However, closer examination of the phenomenon of encounter reveals the same concepts also at work. I demonstrate that dialogue is an engagement with *alterity*, an alterity which is both *continuous* with me — to the extent that I share something with the other and can understand it — and *discontinuous* with me — to the extent that the other remains *other* to me and can never be fully understood. Dialogic engagement bears a relation to *meaning* both because it uses meaning as a medium for interaction and because it, of itself, produces meaning. Finally, dialogue involves an openness and engagement with the other which generates the *responsibility* and *questionability* of the participants relative to one another — features which ground any notion of moral answerability. Both conversation and encounter display these features.

Having articulated an understanding of dialogue at some length in Part II, in Part III I return to Heidegger's text to more explicitly illustrate how Dasein's subjectivity can be expressed in dialogical terms. I show that Dasein's everydayness can be understood as a conversationality in the *third person*. However, the call of conscience which elicits Dasein's anxious Being-towards-death is an encounter which appeals to Dasein in the *first person*. This effects a transformation of the conversationality of Dasein's everydayness from the third to the first person, thus signalling Dasein's authentic historizing.

The difference between first- and third-person modes of interaction lies in the degree of specificity with which participants address one another and in the breadth of the horizon within which they disclose one another. In third-person interaction, the participants are interchangeable with others because they are situated against a fairly narrow horizon, so narrow in fact that contextual specificity is obscured. To the extent that Dasein's everyday self is a *Manselbst*, Dasein *is* in the mode of the third person — everyone can stand in for everyone else. In first-person interaction participants are addressed in their specificity because they are disclosed against a broader horizon within which a richer sense of their particularity becomes apparent. In Heideggerian terms, Dasein's *there* is disclosed and so is its mineness. Although Dasein's Being is always its own, it only becomes its *I* through being called to it in the encounter with its own radical alterity in anxious Being-towards-death. In coming face-to-face before its Being, Dasein's empty intention of its Being — which is expressed in its everyday Being-in-the-world — is fulfilled.

* * *

Subjectivity can manifest itself as dialogical because the subject is both finite and temporal: it has limits, and the other lies beyond those limits. Yet temporality infuses a dynamism into this subject such that it can move beyond its borders and surpass itself toward the other, and the other can draw near to the subject by crossing those borders as well. The dynamic nature of dialogue lies in this approach and withdrawal.

The horizons within which Dasein dwells mark out a realm of significance. This domain is perpetually vulnerable to being called into question by the other who appears on the horizon and elicits Dasein's responsibility. Meaning is fashioned in the play which occurs at the limits, always with an attention to these limits and with an implicit recognition that meaning must be justified to the other. What it means to be a self — indeed what it means to be at all — is always developed out of the relation to the other; meaning is only possible because of this relation to the other and also seems to be necessitated by it.

Part I

Dasein and Intentionality: A Phenomenological Rendering of Everydayness and Authenticity

Introduction

The reader who attempts a hermeneutic understanding of Heidegger's *Being and Time*[1] (SZ) has traditionally faced two notable challenges. The first is that SZ is an incomplete text; the two published divisions represent approximately one third of the overall work as it is projected in Heidegger's introduction (SZ 39-40). The second challenge is that Heidegger published very little in the years preceding the appearance of SZ. The primary barometer of his thinking during this period is found in the manuscripts of his lecture courses and in his students' notes; since much of this material has only been published in the last fifteen years, access to this work has historically been limited.

These lacunae have made it difficult to situate SZ both within the context of Heidegger's early thought, and relative to the question which guides his entire philosophical endeavor — namely the *Seinsfrage* or the question of the meaning of Being. This is the question with which Heidegger begins his investigation in SZ (SZ 2-19), and it is meant to frame the discussion in the extant two divisions dealing with the Being of Dasein. Due to the incomplete nature of the text, however, that this discussion of Dasein is to be understood against the horizon of the *Seinsfrage* is easy to overlook. Moreover, in the absence of further evidence of Heidegger's thinking leading up to this point, there is little to remind the reader of Heidegger's concern with the *Seinsfrage* during this period of his philosophical development.

These factors have fostered two general tendencies in traditional Heidegger interpretation. First, the observation is often made that Heidegger's early work is concerned with the Being of Dasein while his later work deals with Being in a broader sense; this view de-emphasizes the continuity in Heidegger's early and later thought.[2]

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[1] Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1961); *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962); *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996). All page references are to the German edition. I have primarily used the Macquarrie and Robinson translation and where I have checked the Stambaugh translation, I have so indicated.

[2] The idea of Heidegger I versus Heidegger II is introduced by Father William Richardson. In the preface to Richardson's work, Heidegger accepts this distinction only with qualification. See, William Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 3rd ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).

The recent publication of Heidegger's early lecture courses indicates, however, that Being was an early philosophical preoccupation, thus making this view increasingly untenable.[3] The lack of attention to the importance of the *Seinsfrage* in Heidegger's early work contributes to a second tendency, namely a decontextualization of SZ relative to this question. That is, the two published divisions are often interpreted independent of the inquiry into the *Seinsfrage* which frames them. The result of such a move is that SZ is often interpreted as a text of existentialism — a position which has serious implications for how Heidegger's concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity come to be understood. It is with these concepts and their relationship to Dasein's subjectivity that I am primarily concerned.

In recent years, with the publication of an increasing number of the lecture courses from the 1920s and early 1930s, the larger context of Heidegger's philosophical endeavor during this period is becoming more apparent. Important work on these early texts is being done which illustrates not only the unity of Heidegger's thought, but also the enormous impact that the thinkers most influential for him at the time — including Aristotle, Dilthey, Husserl and Augustine — have had on his work.[4] This more recent scholarship not only tends to undermine the position which would strongly separate the early Heidegger from the later Heidegger, it also provides a richer context for understanding SZ itself. Nevertheless, the textual specificity of SZ has not been re-examined in the light of the new material we now have at our disposal. It is this task which belongs to the first part of this work.

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[3] See Martin Heidegger, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, ed. F. W. von Herrman (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975); *The Basic Problems in Phenomenology*, trans. Alfred Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982) (BPP). Martin Heidegger, *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, ed. Petra Jaeger (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979); *The History of the Concept of Time*, trans. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985) (HCT).

[4] Particularly helpful here are Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's "Being and Time"* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993) and Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren, eds., *Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994). This last volume contains many good essays on this topic. See also Theodore Kisiel, "On the Way to *Being and Time*: Introduction to the Translation of Heidegger's *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*," *Research in Phenomenology* 15 (1985): 193-226; Theodore Kisiel, "The Genesis of *Being and Time*," *Man and World* 25 (1992): 21-37; Rudolf A. Makreel, "The Genesis of Heidegger's Phenomenological Hermeneutics and the Rediscovered 'Aristotle Introduction' of 1922," *Man and World* 23 (1990): 305-20; John van Buren, "The Young Heidegger and Phenomenology," *Man and World* 23 (1990): 239-72.

In the next three chapters, I will suggest a way of rethinking the concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity in relation to Dasein's subjectivity in light of Heidegger's critical engagement with Husserl's phenomenology, as documented in his 1925 lecture course, *The History of the Concept of Time* (HCT). To this end, I have structured Part I as follows. The remainder of this introduction outlines the traditional existentialist interpretation of authenticity and inauthenticity, and its more sophisticated contemporary counterpart, the voluntarist interpretation. Chapter 1 considers Heidegger's analysis of the contributions of phenomenology as represented in HCT, the significance of the *Seinsfrage*, and the importance of HCT for our understanding of SZ and, in particular, the concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity. Chapters 2 and 3 provide a detailed analysis of SZ within the interpretive framework of empty and full intentionality established in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 focuses on the Division I discussion of Dasein in its everydayness. Chapter 3 deals with Dasein's authenticity and the issue of temporality as the sense of Being with which Dasein always already operates, as discussed in Division II. By the close of Part I, I hope to have elaborated a conception of Dasein's subjectivity which, by taking serious consideration of the way in which Heidegger's phenomenological method affects the content of his analysis, significantly surpasses more traditional interpretations.

* * *

The first two divisions of SZ are commonly referred to as the 'Dasein analytic' or 'existential analytic' because they inquire into the Being of the entity called Dasein. Dasein is distinct from other entities in that its Being is an issue for it [*geht um*]; that is, it bears a relationship to its Being, and this comportment toward its own Being is constitutive of what it is to be Dasein (SZ 12). This gives rise to two features which are ontologically distinctive of Dasein. Firstly, Dasein's essence lies in its existence; secondly, its Being is characterized by 'mineness' [*Jemeinigkeit*] (SZ 42). The first feature indicates that the essence of the entity Dasein does not lie outside of or prior to its existence but is in fact constituted by that existence. The relationship to its Being which is constitutive of Dasein can only be enacted existentially — Dasein's existence constitutes its Being. The second feature indicates that Dasein is not indifferent to its

Being but rather views its Being as belonging to it; thus Dasein's Being is something personal.[5] The term 'Dasein' literally means '*Da-sein*', a Being-there, signifying that in its Being, Dasein is always already situated. This is why Dasein's Being is known as a **Being-in-the-world.**[6] This situatedness pertains to the two ontologically constitutive features just described. To say that Dasein's essence lies in its existence is to say that its existence in a concrete situation (its *there*) is constitutive. To say that this Being is always mine is to say that it always belongs to someone — to a concrete, identifiable, existing entity. Although the term 'Dasein' is also used to designate a *particular* entity, it is more appropriate to say that 'Dasein' names the Being which belongs to that entity and which never *is* except in that entity.

In the first division, Heidegger discusses Dasein in its everydayness, often understood as its inauthenticity.[7] In the second he discusses Dasein's becoming authentic where inauthenticity is Dasein's Being in the mode of not-Being itself and authenticity is its Being in the mode of Being itself. This paradoxical formulation is not exclusive to Heidegger but is shared with traditional philosophical reflections on alienation and its overcoming, as well as on the differences between the modes of being which pertain to potentiality or possibility and actuality.[8] How one understands authenticity and inauthenticity in more concrete terms, however, depends a great deal upon how one understands this self which Dasein can both be and not-be.

The existentialist reading picks up on Heidegger's use of the language of existentialism and largely interprets the text through a theoretical framework defined by the catchphrase 'existence precedes essence'.[9] This slogan expresses the existentialist view that human beings exist first, and only out of this existence do they construct their essence. Thus, the fact that they exist is contingent and something for which they are not responsible, but who or what they are is something they create themselves. This is in opposition to other philosophical positions which maintain that essence is prior to material existence. So, the existentialist reads the two constitutive features of Dasein in the following terms: that Dasein's essence lies in its existence is understood to mean that Dasein creates its essence through its existence, that it is the author of its Being; that Dasein's Being is in every case mine is taken to mean that since this Being which I create is mine, I am the author of it and so am responsible for it. In this view, inauthenticity amounts to avoiding responsibility for one's own self-creation, to renouncing authorship and allowing others to assume that role. The classic example is that of unreflectively allowing social norms and practices to dictate one's behavior and activity. Authenticity, on the other hand, would involve renouncing the domination of others and assuming responsibility for oneself. The existentialist understanding of Dasein is implicit in those interpretations which maintain that, in inauthenticity, Dasein is dominated by others (*das Man*) and that to achieve authenticity Dasein must pull itself away from *das Man* and take charge of its existence. That Dasein alone can be responsible for its existence is said to be revealed to it in its Being-towards-death, which reveals its finitude and the fact that only Dasein can live its life.[10]

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[5] "Because Dasein has in *each case mineness [Jemeinigkeit]*, one must always use a *personal* pronoun when one addresses it: 'I am', 'you are'" (SZ 42).

[6] The sense of this situatedness will be discussed at length in Chapter 2. It should not be understood primarily in terms of geometrical space, but with respect to contexts of significance.

[7] There is some discussion as to whether everydayness is actually inauthentic or just an undifferentiated mode between authenticity and inauthenticity. See for example, Robert Dostal, "The Problem of '*Indifferenz*' in *Sein und Zeit*," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 43.1 (Sept. 1982): 43-58.

[8] That Heidegger shares this with such traditions does not, however, imply that it is appropriate to understand authenticity and inauthenticity in terms of such reflections. Heidegger does not think Dasein is somehow 'more' itself in authenticity (SZ 43). He also does not think that there is some originary self which is lost in inauthenticity and which is to be regained through authenticity; Dasein's foundationlessness is precisely the basis of its existential guilt (SZ 280-89).

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[9] This language is largely borrowed from Kierkegaard. Kisiel documents that Kierkegaard's works were quite popular in Germany at the time and notes that Heidegger seems to have resisted this vocabulary for some time, as it does not appear in the earlier drafts of the text (*Genesis of Heidegger's "Being and Time"* 316, 394-95, 397, 419 and 489). For a much more detailed discussion of the evolution of the language in Heidegger's work in the 1920s, see Theodore Kisiel, "'Existenz' in Incubation: Underway Toward *Being and Time*," *From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy and Desire*, ed. Babette Babich (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995) 89-114. However, it is undeniable that there are many similarities between Heidegger's concepts of *das Man* and Being-towards-death and Kierkegaard's discussion in such works as *The Present Age*, *The Sickness unto Death* and *The Concept of Dread*. See for example Harrison Hall, "Love and Death: Kierkegaard and Heidegger on Authentic and Inauthentic Existence," *Inquiry* 27 (July 1984): 179-97.

The central point in the existentialist interpretation which I find particularly problematic is the association of inauthenticity with Dasein's Being-with others (*Mitsein*), and the overcoming of this inauthentic dependence with a radical individuation and appropriation of Dasein's mineness in Being-towards-death. This view somewhat overstates the tension between *Mitsein* and Being-towards-death,[11] and does not adequately take into consideration the role of Dasein's historicality in authenticity. More recent scholarship has argued against this existentialist reading largely on textual grounds, claiming that the complexity of the relationship between authenticity and inauthenticity has not been appropriately understood and that the role of Dasein's Being-with others as an essential existential structure has been blurred.[12] The existentialist position reverses the traditional priority of essence and existence, and in reading Heidegger through this rubric, maintains that Dasein is responsible for creating its Being or essence. However, Heidegger does not share this view. He maintains that Dasein's essence *is* its existence. Rather than reversing the priority of essence over existence, he collapses the distinction. Dasein does not *create* its essence; its essence is its Being-Dasein, and this essence is something which it cannot choose; rather Dasein is burdened with it. Once having come into existence, Dasein must take over the task of that existence and become responsible for its Being, but it is never absolutely responsible for it. In becoming authentic, Dasein does not disentangle itself from its history and from others in order to become its own foundation. Rather, it makes its existence its own by *allowing* itself to be appropriated by that which conditions it. The existentialist reading ascribes to Dasein a capacity to create its own foundations — which Heidegger is at pains to demonstrate it does not have — and consequently characterizes authenticity in terms which are somewhat misleading. The result is a failure to capture the extent to which Dasein's subjectivity differs from the theories of subjectivity which precede it and from which Heidegger strives to differentiate himself (SZ 114-17, 317-23).

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[10] For a good discussion of the existentialist reading and its shortcomings, see Lawrence Vogel, *The Fragile "We": Ethical Implications of Heidegger's "Being and Time"* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1994) 28-48.

[11] This tendency to associate inauthenticity with Being-with others crops up in such texts as Michael Theunissen's *Der Andere: Studien zur Sozialontologie der Gegenwart* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1977); *The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Buber*, trans. Christopher Macann (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984) (O) and Richard Wolin's *The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

[12] See for example, Jay A. Ciaffa, "Toward an Understanding of Heidegger's Conception of the Interrelation between Authentic and Inauthentic Existence," *Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology* 18.1 (Jan. 1987): 49-59; Charles Guignon, "Heidegger's 'Authenticity' Revisited," *Review of Metaphysics* 38 (Dec. 1984): 321-39; Abraham Mansbach, "Heidegger on the Self, Authenticity and Inauthenticity," *Iyyun* 40 (Jan. 1991): 65-91; Norman K. Swazo, "Heidegger on Being-with Others," *Dialogue (Milwaukee)* 30 (Oct. 1987): 1-9.

A similar difficulty is to be found in another, more nuanced approach to Heidegger's text which I will call the "voluntarist reading". Unlike the existentialist reading, the voluntarist position acknowledges that there are aspects of Dasein's existence which condition it and determine its essence as Dasein, and it grants that Dasein cannot be self-founding in the way that the existentialists maintain. In this sense, the voluntarist reading reflects a more careful understanding of Heidegger's text. The central claim of the voluntarist position is that authenticity is achieved through an act of the will, which is located in Dasein's resolution to be open to appropriating its Being and becoming its foundation in its 'wanting to have a conscience' (SZ 295-301). The most notable proponent of this view is Michael Zimmerman, who identifies this moment of voluntarism in Heidegger's text in order to support the claim that Heidegger's early work remains imbedded in a fairly traditional conception of the subject as agent, albeit a situated and conditioned one. He maintains that this conception of the subject is only overcome in the later work.[13]

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[13] See Michael E. Zimmerman, *The Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1981). See especially pp. 41, 54, 76, 98. Although, for Zimmerman, Dasein is "said to *exist* because [it] hold[s] open the temporal horizons in which beings can be manifest" (33), the issue for him is still ultimately one of choice. "We can choose to be this temporal-historical openness in an authentic or inauthentic way" (33). Although Zimmerman is always careful in his analysis to draw attention to those aspects of Heidegger's text which seem to provide evidence against the allegation of voluntarism, he never explains why these do not dissuade him from his ultimate conclusion. His overall point is to show that the voluntarist overtones and moments of Heidegger's early work are residue from a metaphysical subjectivism which is left behind as Heidegger's concept of authenticity matures. Zimmerman pursues this point in a somewhat more moderate form in a later article. He maintains that the voluntarist overtones of SZ give it its 'existentialist flavor', but that they are overcome in the later work (although he admits that Heidegger was already looking for alternative ways of expressing his thought in the

Since the voluntarist interpretation reads Dasein's self primarily in terms of agency and the exercise of the will, it views the ontologically constitutive features of Dasein's Being in similar terms. That Dasein's essence lies in its existence is understood in terms of activity; Dasein's essence lies in its willing. Furthermore, its mineness is to be associated with the fact that who it is, is to be determined by what it wills. This understanding of subjectivity stresses the same self-creation which characterizes the existentialist reading. Both readings emphasize a subjectivity in which authentic activity originates in the subject and is directed outward towards objects. Inauthenticity, by contrast, would be characterized by a certain passivity or inactivity.

The existentialist and voluntarist readings, then, share a particular view of subjectivity as *agency* which is enacted through the subject's exercising his *will.* In attributing such a subjectivity to Dasein, both readings commit the same mistake. Dasein achieves authenticity through its openness to being appropriated by its possibilities and to being drawn into a situation; only once it is drawn into the situation can Dasein authentically take action. Thus, Dasein's authentic subjectivity does not begin with an act of the will.[14] In my view these misunderstandings could be avoided through increased attention to Heidegger's work as a phenomenological project and the importance of this project to understanding Dasein's subjectivity.

The inquiry of SZ must be situated within a broader philosophical context, specifically that of Heidegger's engagement with Husserl's phenomenology. The key to Heidegger's critique of Husserl lies in his thematization of the *Seinsfrage.* When we come to understand why this question is so important for Heidegger, as well as the nature

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1920s). According to Zimmerman, the voluntarist aspect is the distinguishing feature between early and later Heidegger. See Michael Zimmerman, "Heidegger's 'Existentialism' Revisited," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 24 (Sept. 1984): 219-36 and Michael Zimmerman, "Heidegger's New Concept of Authentic Selfhood," *The Personalist* 57 (Spring 1979): 198-212. This linking of Heidegger's work with voluntarism also occurs in Wolin (35-40). A similar spin is given to authenticity in Roy Martinez, "An 'Authentic' Problem in Heidegger's *Being and Time*," *Auslegung* 15.1 (1989): 1-20. For an argument against Zimmerman, see Guignon and Mansbach.

[14] One might maintain, as Zimmerman does, that being open means willing to hold oneself open. However, Dasein's very Being is one of openness, of possibility; it always already *is* open. And to the extent that it "remains" open in resoluteness, it does so almost despite itself in so far as it is called to do so by conscience.

of its relation to the Dasein analytic, we come closer to understanding the subjectivity which belongs to Dasein, both in its authenticity and in its inauthenticity. We will come to understand Dasein's Being in terms of intentionality.

Chapter 1

The *Seinsfrage* and the Horizon of Phenomenology

Heidegger begins SZ with the following words:

> Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word 'being'? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew *the question of the meaning of Being*. But are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the expression 'Being'? Not at all. So first of all we must reawaken an understanding for the meaning of this question. Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of *Being* and to do so concretely. Our provisional aim is the Interpretation of *time* as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being. (SZ 1)

In this passage and in the text which follows, Heidegger stresses that the *Seinsfrage* is *the* question with which he is concerned, yet he says remarkably little about its significance.[1] In order to properly illuminate what Heidegger means by this question, we must broaden our scope beyond SZ itself. Heidegger develops the *Seinsfrage* as part of a critique of the philosophical tradition, and although this critique is by no means directed solely at Husserl, the question receives its clearest formulation in his critical discussion of Husserl's phenomenology. Heidegger is also very much influenced by Husserl's work, and thus relies heavily on phenomenological method and principles. This reliance enables him to formulate the *Seinsfrage* with such clarity and also to recognize the ontological difference between Being [*Sein*] and beings [*Seiendes*].

Heidegger's complex relationship to Husserl is most explicitly articulated in HCT, the 1925 lecture course in which Heidegger directly addresses Husserl and the phenomenological tradition. In this text, the *Seinsfrage* is introduced against the background of a more extended discussion of the contributions and shortcomings of phenomenology. In particular, Heidegger is concerned with the necessity of submitting intentionality to phenomenological analysis. The sections of HCT where he pursues this closely resemble large sections of SZ, and indeed, HCT is generally seen as a draft of

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[1] For a discussion of the *Seinsfrage* in Heidegger's work see Dorothea Frede, "The Question of Being: Heidegger's Project," *Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, ed. Charles B. Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 42-69. For a discussion (with different emphasis than this one) of the relationship between the task of fundamental ontology and the existential analytic, see Murray Miles, "Fundamental Ontology and Existential Analysis in Heidegger's *Being and Time*," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 34.3 (Sept. 1994): 349-59.

SZ.[2] For this reason, the text provides a useful point of mediation between the language of phenomenology and intentionality, and the more specifically Heideggerian language of SZ.

i. Heidegger's reading of Husserl[3]

Husserl is concerned with the problem of knowledge which traditionally focuses on the correlation between real things in the world and our ideas of them. In such a schema, truth lies in a correspondence between reality, or the physical world, and what we know, or the psychic domain. In so far as our knowledge of external reality is mediated through the senses, the problem of Cartesian doubt arises: how can I be sure that my perceptions reflect reality? Kant maintains that we cannot have knowledge of the things in themselves, but only as they appear to consciousness, only in so far as they are *phenomena.* While Husserl agrees that we can only have knowledge of phenomena, he further insists that the only meaningful understanding of 'the thing itself' *is* the phenomenon in the first place. Hence, he is not particularly worried about the inaccessibility of the noumenon. Husserl also disagrees with Kant's view that the categories through which the understanding grasps objects are projected or brought to bear by consciousness. Rather he maintains that phenomena already show themselves in terms of these categories, as confirmed by our experience in apprehending objects. Moreover, Husserl's phenomenology challenges the notion that Being pertains to the noumenal realm, not the phenomenal. Phenomenology understands the phenomenon as "a *mode of encounter of entities in themselves in such a way that they show themselves*"

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[2] See Kisiel, *Genesis of Heidegger's "Being and Time."* Kisiel traces the development of Heidegger's thought from the *Kriegsnotsemester* (KNS) 1919 through its various stages until it reaches the formulation that appears in SZ. Kisiel discusses Heidegger's reading of phenomenology, the Scholastics, Christian mystics, and Aristotle — among others — and offers a treatment of the three drafts of SZ. The first draft appeared as an introduction to a text on Aristotle which was never published; the second was the lecture course HCT; the final draft is the extant version of SZ itself.

[3] Caputo offers another account of Heidegger's relationship to Husserl using BPP as a basis for discussion. See John Caputo, "The Question of Being and Transcendental Phenomenology: Reflections on Heidegger's Relationship to Husserl," *Research in Phenomenology* 7 (1977): 84-105. It should perhaps be noted that, at the time of Caputo's article, *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* had not yet been published.

(HCT 81).[4] That is, entities show themselves as being what they are; Being belongs to the phenomenal realm, not to the noumenal.

In Heidegger's view, phenomenology has made three important philosophical contributions: intentionality, categorial intuition, and a particular understanding of the *a priori*. **Intentionality** is always a directedness towards an intentional object, and this 'directedness towards' is the structure of lived experience; it is immediate (HCT 30). The intentional object is not a physical object 'out there' in the world which the subject must apprehend and bring within its interiority as knowledge; rather, the intentional object is a phenomenon. It shows itself as what it is in its Being; it *gives* meaning. What I experience in lived reality are not brute objects, but objects that have significance. Intentionality is my comportment toward these objects relative to their significance and meaning.

In the sixth investigation, Husserl asks about meaning: where does it lie? how is it given?[5] He identifies two general groups of acts — expressive acts and intuitive acts — and determines that meaning lies in neither the one nor the other, but in the unity of both. Expressive acts (such as judgments) refer to some meaning; they are referential or signifying, a projection from the subject toward an object. Intuitive acts are acts of apprehension in which the object gives some sort of meaning to the subject. The directionality of the intuitive act is opposite to that of the expressive act. Both types of acts, however, bear a relationship to meaning: both give meaning [*sinngebend*].

Most of the acts with which we typically associate meaning are expressive acts. Taken on their own, however, these acts are merely empty intentions because they refer to objects without those objects necessarily being intuitively, and therefore immediately, given. Heidegger's example is a conversational reference to some object — a bridge in Marburg. In so far as one merely refers to the bridge without an explicit intuitive apprehension of it, the intention remains empty. However, the meaning expressed in the empty intention can be confirmed through an intuitive act. Such an attestation fulfills the intention by providing evidence for it in a more immediate way. The intuitive act, in giving more immediately what is presumed in the expressive act, demonstrates the truth of the expression (HCT 49).[6] One way in which this empty intention of the bridge can be fulfilled is by conjuring up a mental image of the bridge; still another way is by actually standing before the bridge and perceiving it. In the first case, the bridge is self-given, given in its Being. In the second, it is bodily given as well as self-given (HCT 41). There are many different kinds of intentions; each contains a particular tendency toward fulfillment which is related to the nature of the intention: i.e. perception is fulfilled through perception, feeling through feeling, and so on. (HCT 44). It is important to emphasize that Heidegger views intentionality as the structure of *lived experience*; thus, when intentions are fulfilled — that is, when evidence is provided for them through an act of intuition — this fulfillment is experienced as lived (HCT 48-50).

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[4] 'Mode' seems an odd choice of words, but Heidegger is emphasizing the fact that phenomena only occur in intentionality.

[5] Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, trans. J.N. Findlay (London: Routledge, 1970).

The intuition which fulfills the empty intention of an expressive act is **categorial intuition**, a form of "seeing" that belongs to intentionality but which should not be confused with simple perception. Simple perception is associated with sensory input, and categorial intuition is a "second order" intuition because it is founded upon simple perception.[7] Since expressive acts express the meaning or Being of an object, an intuition which fulfills such an act must be an intuition of meaning or Being. But simple perception cannot perceive meaning or Being because neither is accessible to mere sensation. Consequently, an intuition capable of fulfilling such an intention must be something more than simple perception: this is categorial intuition.[8] That Being is intuitively given, as opposed to subjectively projected, importantly establishes the objectivity of Being despite the fact that it is not accessible to simple perception.[9]

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[6] Intentions can also admit of varying degrees of fulfillment.

[7] This implies that categorial intuition cannot operate in the absence of some perceptual intuition — past, present or imagined. So in the example just described, the empty intention of the bridge can be fulfilled through a mental image of it in the absence of any perception of the bridge only because it (or a representation of it) was at one time perceived.

[8] On the 'more' in which Being consists vis-à-vis simple perception, see Richard Kearney, "Surplus Being: The Kantian Legacy," *From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy and Desire*, ed. Babette Babich (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995) 71-87.

The problem categorial intuition is intended to resolve might be made clearer by way of example. Normally we maintain that the truth of a particular assertion can be verified by 'checking the evidence' given through perception. So, the statement, "the chair is yellow" is verified by looking to see if, in fact, the chair is yellow. But the statement "the chair is yellow" asserts the *Being-yellow* of the chair, whereas sensory perception does not perceive the Being-yellow, but only the yellow. Technically then, perception cannot provide the evidence necessary to prove the truth of the assertion. So where does one find the evidence for the Being-yellow? Is it merely something that we subjectively project onto the object? No. Both Husserl and Heidegger maintain that just because the Being-yellow of the chair cannot be verified by the senses does not mean that Being-yellow is merely a subjective quality. The Being-yellow of the chair has an objectivity, which is provided through categorial intuition founded upon simple perception.

Through categorial intuition, objects are given as meaningful wholes; these meaningful wholes provide evidence for the various acts of signification that we perform.[10] Philosophy has traditionally characterized the distinction between simple perception and categorial intuition by means of the standard differentiation between sense and understanding, or matter and form. According to Heidegger, these characterizations miss the point of categorial intuition as *intuition*. Categories are precisely not added on to sense perceptions by the subject but are intuited, given by the objects themselves (HCT 70-71): that is, the categories in terms of which objects of intuitive acts appear, are given in intuition. They need not be directly and explicitly accessible, however. They may only become apparent as categories through a series of phenomenological reductions which strip away the intuitive content of the act to leave behind the ideative structure.[11]

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[9] For a very good discussion of this topic, see Jiro Watanabe, "Categorial Intuition and the Understanding of Being in Husserl and Heidegger," *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, ed. John Sallis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993) 109-17.

[10] Though the example here pertains to assertorial judgments, this is only one type of intention.

In so far as these categories shape the meaning which is intuitively given in any particular apprehension, they are still ***a priori*** and objective. Traditionally, the *a priori* which pertains to the categories has been understood as prior to all experience — and thus absolute in some sense or located in pure subjectivity or consciousness independent of objective, empirical experience. As we have seen, however, categorial intuition shifts the location of the categories from something provided by the understanding to something given by the object through intuition. However, it is important to note that categories are not to be found in the object as given through simple perception. In so far as what is given in an act of categorial intuition can be taken as evidence for various expressive acts or acts of signification, this implies that acts of categorial intuition occur in terms which correspond to those of acts of expression. In fact, Heidegger maintains that we tend to "see" and understand things as they have already been "seen", expressed, and understood (HCT 56). Although the categories implied in categorial intuition are prior to any given experience, they are not absolutely prior (HCT 72-75).[12]

Despite the contributions of phenomenology with respect to intentionality, categorial intuition, and the *a priori*, Heidegger maintains that it has failed to submit the Being of intentionality to analysis. Specifically, phenomenology has not sought to lay bare its own possibility — the Being of phenomena at all, the Being of intentionality which makes phenomena possible, or the Being of the entity who is intentional. Husserl's approach is to exact a series of reductions in which successive facets of lived experience are bracketed in order to reach the essence of the intentional object.[13] The purpose of this bracketing is to make the entity show itself in its Being (HCT 99); this occurs in two reductive moments. The first is the transcendental reduction in which my immersion in the stream of life experiences is bracketed so that I can now attend to the structure of those experiences. The second is the eidetic reduction in which the concretia of experiences are bracketed, stripping away that which makes them individual and particular, to leave only their ideative structure (HCT 100). What is left is the pure field of consciousness (HCT 100).

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[11] It is through phenomenological reduction that the inessential is bracketed, permitting the disclosure of the essential structure which usually remains concealed.

[12] This point is critical because if the categories are prior, but not absolutely prior, it implies that they are historically constituted. This is an important link not only with the idea of time as the horizon of Being, but also with the entire project of hermeneutics.

[13] Part of Heidegger's criticism, as I have just noted, is that this process has not been directed at intentionality or Dasein, but has focused primarily on other entities. However, Husserl's project presupposes an entity like Dasein.

Heidegger's question to Husserl's phenomenology is: Does the concept of the pure field of consciousness address the question of the Being of consciousness at all? Heidegger thinks it does not. According to Heidegger, Husserl never submits consciousness to phenomenological scrutiny, although the Being of consciousness is presupposed by all of his investigations. The result is that his phenomenology is not properly grounded (HCT 108). For Heidegger, some of Husserl's reductions are problematic because they bracket aspects of the phenomenon of consciousness which are actually essential to it.

> In the reduction we disregard precisely the reality of the consciousness given in the natural attitude in the factual human being. The real experience is suspended as real in order to arrive at the pure absolute experience. The sense of the reduction is precisely to make no use of the reality of the intentional; it is not posited and experienced as real. We start from the real consciousness in the factually existing human, but this takes place only in order finally to disregard it and to dismiss the reality of consciousness as such. In its methodological sense as a disregarding, then, the reduction is in principle inappropriate for determining the being of consciousness positively. The sense of the reduction involves precisely giving up the ground upon which alone the question of the being of the intentional could be based (admittedly with the aim of then determining the sense of this reality from the region now secured). (HCT 109)

Husserl's reductions remove the immediacy of intentional experience, most importantly with respect to its mineness (HCT 109). In abstracting away all that individuates experience, one is left with intentional acts only in terms of their 'what'-content; the *way* intentional acts are in terms of being the structure of lived experience is thus overlooked.[14] That which makes the experience *lived* — namely the existence of an intentional comportment on the part of some existing entity toward some specific object — is precisely what is taken out of account (HCT 110). Yet Husserl emphasizes this starting point in lived experience in maintaining that the intentional does not pertain to a relation between psychic and physical reality.

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[14] "It disregards the fact that the acts are mine or those of any other individual human being and regards them only in their *what.* It regards the what, the structure of the acts, but as a result does not thematize their *way to be*, their being an act as such. It is solely concerned with the what-contents of the structures, the structure of the intentional as the basic structure of the psychic, the what-contents of the constitution of this structure,

Heidegger concludes that phenomenology to date has neglected two important questions: first, the question of the Being of intentionality; and second, the question of the meaning [*Sinn*] of Being itself (HCT 115). The first asks what it is to be intentional. Intentionality only occurs in the entity which is intentional, namely Dasein. Thus, if we want to understand intentionality as the structure of lived experience, we must examine Dasein and the structures of its lived experience — what Heidegger in SZ will term its *existentiality*.[15] The second question involves the meaning or sense of Being. What do we mean when we talk about Being? In what sense do we understand it?[16] According to Heidegger, the pursuit of the question of the meaning of Being requires a phenomenological inquiry into the Being of the entity to whom Being becomes manifest; this entity is Dasein. Furthermore, it requires an inquiry into this entity with particular attention to those structures through which Being becomes manifest; this is Dasein's intentionality. Thus, the answer to the second question is to be sought in the answer to the first.

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the essence of the what of comportments, the variations of their self-directedness and the what-content of their constructional relationships, but not the essence of their being" (HCT 109). In SZ Heidegger is very critical of the philosophical tradition's treatment of Being in terms of present-at-hand 'what'-contents.

[15] On intentionality in SZ see Harrison Hall, "Intentionality and World: Division I of *Being and Time*," *Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, ed. Charles B. Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 122-40.

[16] That this is indeed what Heidegger means by this question can be confirmed by examining his discussion of the *Seinsfrage* in the opening of SZ (SZ 2-4). See also, HCT 114-15. Being does not consist in the disclosure of phenomena, it only shows itself in the manifesting of phenomena. Consequently, Being does not depend upon the intentional entity, but it does require intentionality in order to manifest itself. Heidegger would maintain that, in phenomenological terms, the Being of something is what is attested when evidence is given through an act of categorial intuition which shows the truth of an expressive act. The truth of the expressive act does not lie in the act of intuition, but is shown through what is given therein. The thing shows itself as being what it is in the fulfillment of the intention which expresses it. Being, then, is intimately connected with Being-true, and Being-true is in turn intimately connected with the phenomenon of intentionality. Given Heidegger's criticism of the tradition's understanding of Being as presence-at-hand, we should be wary of understanding Being as *what* is disclosed in the disclosure.

ii. Application to *Sein und Zeit*

In SZ and in HCT, Heidegger hopes to develop a more radical way of characterizing intentionality. This is crucially related to the development of a more refined sense of the *a priori* and the ideation associated with it, namely in terms of *interpretation* as opposed to apprehension (HCT 140).[17] In order to appreciate what this means, it is important to understand the sense in which Heidegger's project is one of phenomenological hermeneutics.

In SZ Heidegger explains that the method he will use in his project of fundamental ontology is phenomenological. But what does this mean? A phenomenon is "that which shows itself in itself" (SZ 28).[18] This is in contrast to semblance in which something shows itself as something other than what it is. The phenomenon is not merely the outward appearance of something behind which the real object lies. Reality does not lie in the noumenon, but in the phenomenon. The phenomenon is the thing in its Being.

The *logos* aspect of phenomenology is not to be understood simply as 'the science of' phenomena, but as the means by which phenomena show themselves; this occurs discursively. Discourse is what lets something be seen: "That is, it lets us see something from the very thing which the discourse is about. In discourse, so far as it is genuine, *what* is said is drawn *from* what the talk is about; so that discursive communication, in what it says, makes manifest what it is talking about, and thus makes this accessible to the other party" (SZ 32). Heidegger clarifies that the structure of pointing something out to another (assertion or proposition) is only one way of discursively making something manifest. Another way involves 'requesting' (SZ 32). The point I particularly wish to emphasize is that things come to manifest themselves, in one way or another, through discourse — through language broadly construed. Phenomenology, then, is the discourse which allows entities to manifest themselves *as they are* in themselves. It is through discourse that Being is made manifest.[19] Thus, the project of fundamental ontology can only be phenomenological (SZ 37).

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[17] Kisiel notes that this new sense of the *a priori* is the facticity of historical meaning (*Genesis of Heidegger's "Being and Time"* 35).

[18] And it is important to remember here that Heidegger specifically notes that this reflects a middle-voiced form of showing (SZ 28).

But it is also important to recognize that this phenomenology is also hermeneutic: the method of phenomenological description lies in interpretation (SZ 37). Interpretation, for Heidegger, is a more explicit rendering of that which Dasein already understands in its proto-ontological understanding of Being. Phenomenology as interpretation is a discursive laying-bare of that understanding, of that sense or meaning of Being. But a disclosure of this understanding of Being also requires an interpretation of Dasein, the entity which can understand Being, can understand the Being of other entities, and can understand its own Being. These understandings and the ability to bring them into the open through interpretation are a function of Dasein's existentiality; thus, phenomenology must not only be hermeneutic, it must also take its point of departure from a hermeneutic of Dasein (SZ 38). This must be kept in mind as we return to the question of the relation of the *Seinsfrage* to the Dasein analytic.

It is clear that in Heidegger's view an analysis of Dasein's Being is necessary in order to get at the meaning of Being. But why? Heidegger maintains that an implicit understanding of Being is operative in intentional comportment: it is presumed in every encounter, in every assertion, in every expression, in every use of the 'is'. Dasein understands Being much in the same way that empty intentions refer to the meanings which they express: it understands Being without grasping Being. And since intentionality is the structure of lived experience, this proto-understanding of Being is operative in Dasein's existence; indeed it is an integral part of it. Heidegger believes an examination of Dasein's Being, and the structures of its existence, will be instructive in illuminating the meaning of Being because he believes that he can expose the understanding of Being with which Dasein always already operates through a fulfillment of Dasein's empty intention of its own Being.

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[19] We can see here the connection with Heidegger's earlier remark that entities are understood (manifest themselves to the understanding) in the terms in which they have been previously understood and expressed. These terms are those which constitute discourse.

Heidegger's point will be that Dasein understands its own Being, not in terms of substance, but in terms of temporality. Dasein understands itself as finite, finite in the sense of being mortal, of being limited with respect to *time*. Upon establishing this, Heidegger will examine Dasein's everyday way of understanding itself in order to demonstrate that it is actually temporal in origin. He will also go to lengths to demonstrate that the very sense of Being as substance, as **presence-at-hand**, is also derivative of temporality — specifically of the temporal mode of the *present*. Heidegger will argue that the sense of Being which underlies Dasein's understanding of its own Being and the Being of objects is not space but time. To prove this, Heidegger must pursue an analysis of Dasein's Being. He must show how Dasein understands its own Being, not only in everydayness — where Dasein only emptily intends its Being — but also in authenticity where what is only indeterminately understood in everydayness is more fully grasped. My suggestion is that the first two divisions of SZ aim to accomplish this task.

If Dasein is an entity whose Being is an issue for it, then it always comports toward its Being in one way or another; its Being is always an intentional object for it. In everydayness, Dasein comports towards its own Being in the manner of an empty intention; it refers to itself purely expressively. To experience the truth of its Being, Dasein would require evidence of that truth. Such evidence could only be given in an intuitive act. Such an intuitive act occurs when Dasein's Being is brought before it and apprehended in its anxious Being-towards-death. Here, Dasein experiences its Being in the most immediate fashion, the empty intentionality which characterizes Dasein's everydayness is fulfilled, and Dasein becomes authentic. In SZ Heidegger goes to lengths to show that Dasein's inauthenticity is always a privative mode of its authentic Being-in-the-world and to illustrate that every 'fallen' way of Being-Dasein is actually a way of Being-Dasein but only in the mode of not-Being it. These demonstrations substantiate my claim that both authenticity and inauthenticity have the same intentional object — namely Dasein's Being — but that in authenticity that intention is full (Dasein *is* its Being), while in inauthenticity it is empty (Dasein is in the mode of not-Being it).[20]

Since the language of intentionality found in HCT is not particularly apparent in SZ, how can we substantiate this view? Heidegger does not begin the opening passages of SZ with the claim that Dasein is the entity which is intentional, but rather that Dasein is the entity who questions (SZ 7). He further states that all questioning has the following structure: there is always something asked about, someone asked, and something one hopes to find out by asking (SZ 5). In the case of the *Seinsfrage*, the entity who asks the question is the same as the entity queried, namely Dasein, because it is Dasein who has an indeterminate understanding of Being as part of its Being.[21]

The whole discussion at the opening of SZ, which occurs in terms of questioning, closely resembles those sections in HCT in which Heidegger offers an analysis of the structure of the question and its relationship to "the questioning entity (Dasein)" (HCT 144-48). In HCT these passages follow Heidegger's discussion of phenomenology's neglect of the *Seinsfrage* and the Being of intentionality. The concern with questioning, then, is not isolated to SZ, but is bound up with issues raised in HCT, issues which are articulated in the language of intentionality.

More importantly, Heidegger maintains in HCT that the entity who is intentional has an indeterminate understanding of Being which is presumed in every intentional comportment in which it understands the Being of its intentional object; this understanding is given in an indeterminate way in questioning.[22] Heidegger repeats this idea in SZ when he claims that all questions contain within them an indeterminate understanding of that about which they ask (SZ 5-6). Such an understanding is necessary in order to even formulate the question, to seek anything at all. The understanding must be indeterminate, however, otherwise it would not be necessary to ask the question; one would already have the answer. Questions, then, reflect a proto-understanding of that about which they ask, which resembles the indeterminate 'comprehension' of the intentional object exhibited by an empty intention.

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[20] This aids us in understanding Heidegger's claim that authenticity and inauthenticity are modes of Dasein's mineness (SZ 53).

[21] "It is peculiar to this entity [Dasein] that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it. *Understanding of Being is itself a determination of Being [eine Seinsbestimmtheit] of Dasein*" (SZ 12). Note that Macquarrie and Robinson translate '*Seinsbestimmtheit*' as 'a definite character'; Stambaugh also translates the term as 'determination of Being'.

[22] "We thus have a very distinctive questioning inasmuch as in the content of the question, in what is asked for, what is asked for is itself what the questioning itself is. What is asked for in it, the sense of being, is thereby given in all indeterminacy, as indeterminate as only what is sought can be" (HCT 147).

Questions, we may say, are fulfilled, not simply by any response whatsoever, but by the response which conforms in a particular way to the question which elicits it. Some responses answer the question; others do not; the potential of a particular response to be an answer lies in the question to which it responds. Indeed, it is the proto-understanding of that about which the question asks that allows the questioner to have a sense of whether or not the question has been answered. The relationship between question and response is not unlike that already noted between empty and fulfilled intentions. The empty intention points at something which is given through the intuitive act which fulfills it; only when this evidence is given can the truth of the expressive act be seen in a positive light. Moreover, the original expressive act contains within it the possibility of its fulfillment, in the sense that it sets the parameters for the particular intuitions which may fulfill it. Although Heidegger does not explicitly refer to the response which Dasein receives to its questioning, one can understand the attestation provided by what is given in the call of conscience as evidence to support this view (SZ 267-301). Indeed, the phenomenon of conscience can be seen as proof of the fact that Dasein is always questioning itself, even if only implicitly. The call of conscience brings Dasein before itself in its anxious Being-towards-death; it thus represents a fulfillment of the intention which constitutes Dasein's everydayness. It is important to recognize here that this fulfillment does not imply completion, since Dasein's Being is one of openness and possibility. A fulfillment of its intention of itself exposes Dasein to this openness in an immediate fashion. Such a fulfillment is Dasein's authenticity. This point will be discussed at length in Chapter 3.

Dasein is the entity for whom its Being is an issue. It bears a relationship to its Being, which means that its Being is an intentional object for it, and this manifests itself in the very structures of Dasein's existentiality. But that Dasein's Being is an issue for it also implies that Dasein is concerned with its existence; its existence matters to it which is why it asks about it. To say that Dasein's essence lies in its existence is to say that this concern with its Being, this asking about it, is worked out in its very existing. Dasein's existence and the structures thereof demonstrate this concern with its Being. To say that Dasein's Being is always characterized by mineness — that it is always in every case mine — means that every factical entity whose Being is Dasein is concerned with its Being, with its existence, and that the factical specificity of this concern and the questioning which produces it are essential. As we have seen above, Heidegger appears to be responding directly to Husserl, who reduced intentional acts to a level of abstraction which obscured the fact that intentionality is experienced personally in the immediacy of lived experience. If Dasein's self is intentional according to the structures of its existentiality, then authenticity and inauthenticity must pertain to ways of Being this intentional self in modes of Being and not-Being it, respectively. As I have already noted, in inauthenticity Dasein is its intentionality in the mode of not-Being it, namely in an empty and merely referential fashion. In authenticity, Dasein is its intentionality in the mode of Being it, in the way of a fulfilled intention.

In the existentialist view the self creates its essence through the process of its existing; it is the author of its essence. Inauthenticity would be giving this responsibility over to another; authenticity would be to assume it oneself. The voluntarist view is similar, except that it focuses on the exercising of the will. In both cases, what distinguishes authenticity from inauthenticity is something which comes from the self, the subject, and which projects outward onto the world, appropriating it in some way or another. But the directionality associated with the intentional self is somewhat different. The act of expression or signification, which is outward in its orientation, is a feature of both authenticity and inauthenticity. In authenticity evidence is provided for the intentional "object" through intuition; the intentional emptiness of subjective expression is fulfilled by the intuited object. Intuition, understood phenomenologically, does not have the same uni-directionality as the projection associated with agency in the existentialist-voluntarist accounts. Categorial intuition, as we have stressed above, is not a function of subjectivity projecting something onto the object. It is the objective giving itself of the object; it is founded upon simple perception. Consequently, the intention is fulfilled (and authenticity achieved) not through a subjective act of the will, but through a more passive reception of the object as it gives itself to categorial intuition. What fulfills the intention comes not from the self, but from the other. This holds true in the paradigm of questioning as well, where the response which fulfills the question comes from the other.[23]

If Dasein is defined as the entity for whom its Being is an issue, this definition must apply to Dasein in any of its modes. Dasein is concerned with and asks about its Being in both authenticity and inauthenticity. What differentiates them is whether the response that is given really answers the question, whether it really provides that which the question seeks. We must remember that the understanding of what one is asking about — which guides the questioning — is rather indeterminate and vague. Often a sense of clarity regarding the question is only apparent after the question has been answered; the sense that a particular response is adequate often sheds a great deal of light on what the question was really about. The questioning in which Dasein is engaged in its existence shares in this characteristic; that Dasein questions is often apparent only in the sense of fulfillment which accompanies the receiving of an adequate response. This sense of fulfillment is the feature which definitively distinguishes authenticity and inauthenticity and is the overall thought which guides the analysis in Part I.

iii. The question of the sense of Being

The central issue for Heidegger in both SZ and HCT is the *Seinsfrage*, and hence it is worth pausing to reflect on this very question. It is one thing to understand the Dasein analytic formally relative to the question which lies behind it, but we should also consider it in terms of its significance. Heidegger maintains that the philosophical tradition by and large has failed to question Being qua Being. Because the tradition has tended to understand Being exclusively in terms of beings, or entities, Being is not viewed as an issue worthy of questioning; it simply has not appeared questionable.

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[23] Though the other which calls Dasein in the call of conscience is Dasein's self, it is Dasein's self in its alterity. Even in the case where one asks oneself a question, there is a sense in which the self who asks is 'other' than the self who answers, otherwise there would be no need for the question in the first place.

What this implies is that we have not found ourselves to be questioned by Being; it has not shown itself (explicitly at least) as an enigma, as something whose meaning is in question. The questionableness of something throws itself back on the one to whom it appears questionable, thereby challenging her to ask the question and to seek an answer. The experience of being challenged points to the openness of that entity, Dasein, to being questioned and to being able to question. Dasein is the only entity for whom the *Seinsfrage* is a possibility because it is the only entity which bears a relationship to its Being. In this sense, it has priority over other entities.[24] The *Seinsfrage* itself has a certain priority relative to other questions: ontologically, because of its importance with respect to other types of inquiry; and ontically, because of its importance in Dasein's existence.[25]

The *Seinsfrage* asks about the sense of Being which Dasein always already has: it is a fundamentally ontological question. Therefore, Heidegger's method of investigation must be phenomenological for, as we have seen, phenomenology is the method most appropriate to ontology as disclosure of Being. However, we have seen also that this is a hermeneutic analysis because the understanding of Being which we hope to make more explicit is one which Dasein *already has*.

Because of Dasein's ontic and ontological priority, its Being is a point of access into the question of the meaning of Being; fundamental ontology must be sought through the existential analytic of Dasein (SZ 13). Dasein asks itself about its Being in order to find out the meaning of that Being. That Dasein asks the question implies both that it already has a relation to that Being, and that this relation implies a particular — though indeterminate — understanding. That Dasein asks *itself* the question implies that, in a sense, it already has an answer to the question, albeit an obscured one. In asking itself about its own Being, Dasein hopes to bring to light the meaning of Being overall.

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[24] It has priority at the ontic level because it is the only entity who *exists* (i.e., comports itself toward Being) and at the ontological level because this existence is ontologically constitutive of this entity (SZ 8-15).

[25] The question of the meaning of Being shows up ontically for Dasein as the question of the meaning of Dasein's Being. What is the meaning of existence in the face of that which questions it, namely death?

Heidegger aims to show that the horizon against which Being can appear as a phenomenon is time. Given this, we can understand the existential analytic as follows. The first division, which deals with Dasein in its average everydayness, discloses Dasein as the entity which has a pre-ontological understanding of Being. Heidegger must demonstrate both who Dasein is such that asking the *Seinsfrage* is a possibility of its Being, and that Dasein does indeed have anything like an understanding of Being, albeit a mostly empty one. The first division maps out the formal indications with respect to Dasein which must be confirmed in the second division, where Heidegger must show how Dasein's empty intention of its own Being can be fulfilled. He must demonstrate how Dasein's Being can be disclosed to it in a way that gives evidence for what it emptily intends in everydayness. This disclosure must occur through a type of phenomenological reduction in which Dasein's Being is uncovered and becomes more explicitly an issue for it. It occurs when the meaning of Dasein's own Being is thrown into question against the horizon of its own death.[26] Being-towards-death is what phenomenologically reveals Dasein's Being to it as such. The meaning of Dasein's Being is mortality, which derives its sense from a more general understanding of Being in terms of temporality.[27]

The interpretive task in which Heidegger is engaged could be construed as violent. It involves the 'breaking up' or 'destroying' of those everyday ways in which Dasein understands its Being, in order to illustrate how these ways conceal (yet reveal in their concealment) a more primordial understanding of Dasein's own Being. This same interpretive project drives Heidegger's 'destruction of the history of ontology'. Our usual, traditional ways of approaching and understanding Being have concealed a more primordial understanding; however, as in the case of Dasein's Being, the history of ontology reveals a more primordial understanding of Being than it explicitly expresses. It is this presumed understanding which Heidegger hopes to expose through his "destruction".

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[26] The issue of questionability is very important, not just in terms of questioning, but also in terms of being able to be questioned. We shall see below that possibilities are disclosed to Dasein in terms of these 'abilities', all of which are ultimately rooted in Dasein's *Seinkönnen*. That something appears as questionable means that Dasein has assigned itself to the possibility of questioning such that something can appear as question-able, standing in question. That Dasein's *self* can appear as questionable discloses its being open to being questioned.

[27] "Our analysis of Dasein [in the first division], however is not only incomplete; it is also, in the first instance, *provisional*. It merely brings out the Being of this entity, without interpreting its meaning. It is rather a preparatory procedure by which the horizon for the most primordial way of interpreting Being may be laid bare. Once we have arrived at that horizon, this preparatory analytic of Dasein will have to be repeated on a higher and authentically ontological basis" (SZ 17).

Chapter 2

Division I: Dasein in its Everydayness

Division I consists of a preparatory analysis into the Being of the entity that asks the *Seinsfrage* and of whom it is asked. Heidegger's objective in this division is to describe and analyze the Being of this entity, Dasein, in its everydayness, in order to disclose the structural elements which constitute Dasein's intentional orientation toward its own Being. Since Dasein is related to its Being in everydayness primarily in the way of an empty intention, Heidegger aims to demonstrate how Dasein's Being — although not explicitly grasped in everydayness — is nevertheless presumed by it, revealed in its concealment.

In this chapter, I am primarily concerned with illuminating the subjectivity which characterizes this entity — the subjectivity of Dasein as Being-in-the-world — through a hermeneutic reading of Heidegger's text. My reading attempts to understand the trajectory of his thought in relation to the *Seinsfrage* and to his overall phenomenological method. What will become clear is that Being-in-the-world is a kind of intentionality through which entities (the ready-to-hand, others, and Dasein itself) are disclosed phenomenologically by various means (primarily through *Befindlichkeit*, understanding, and discourse).

Heidegger identifies two distinctive features of Dasein. Firstly, its essence lies in its existence, which indicates that its essence is constituted by its existence. This position rejects the traditional distinction between essence and existence. In HCT Heidegger maintains that in bracketing out existence in the transcendental and eidetic reductions, Husserl brackets out something essential (HCT 108-14). However, his quarrel is not merely with Husserl, but with an entire philosophical tradition that segregates essence from existence and subsequently fails to properly grasp the relationship between Being and beings.[1] One implication of this segregation is that existence comes to be understood in terms of simple extantness, *Daß-sein* or presence-at-hand, and existence in terms of its *Da-sein* is overlooked. *Da-sein* is the understanding of existence that Heidegger will pursue in the Dasein analytic.

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[1] This position is evident throughout the later work, but appears also in Heidegger's critical treatment of the essence/existence problematic in BPP, a lecture course delivered in SS 1927 immediately following the appearance of SZ. Heidegger's discussion of Kant's distinction between apperception and apprehension is

The second feature is that Dasein's Being is always characterized by 'mineness' [*Jemeinigkeit*][2]; this highlights the fact that Dasein bears a relationship to its Being, that it is not indifferent to it, and that it is appropriate to use the personal pronoun with respect to it (SZ 42). Both features stem from the fact that Dasein's Being is an issue for it and that Dasein comports itself toward its Being. Thus, Dasein's Being is its own 'to be' in one way or another, as Dasein "has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it [Dasein] is in each case" (SZ 42) its own. This implies that Dasein's Being is its *ownmost possibility* [*eigenste Möglichkeit*], and that Dasein always comports toward its Being as such in one way or another: "In determining itself as an entity, Dasein always does so in the light of a possibility which it *is* itself and which, in its very Being, it somehow understands. This is the formal meaning of Dasein's existential constitution" (SZ 43). Dasein always operates with a prior understanding of its own Being, and the relation Dasein bears to its own Being underlies its intentional subjectivity. The understanding of its own Being which Dasein always already has presumes an implicit understanding of Being in general; this provides the horizon against which entities can emerge as 'having' Being. It is this prior understanding of Being that the *Seinsfrage* asks about.

Dasein's understanding of Being in general is presupposed in its existence, in its comportment toward entities overall. To access this understanding, we must investigate Dasein's existence and the existential structures which underlie it. We must disclose first

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particularly interesting in the context of the present project. According to Heidegger's interpretation, apperception is the assembling of a manifold in understanding which allows the subject to develop a concept. Only afterwards is it then possible for the subject to apprehend objects as resembling that concept. Heidegger understands apperception as something like a disclosure of the Being of entities against a background understanding of Being, and apprehension as the subsequent unveiling of entities through which they are cognitively understood or explicitly grasped. These two movements are presumably precursors of the phenomenological notion of categorial intuition.

[2] This is in direct response to Husserl. See Chapter 1.

Dasein's understanding of its own Being, and then the understanding of Being in general which underlies it. In pursuing this task, it is particularly important to disclose these structures through the largely undifferentiated manner of existing in which Dasein usually dwells, namely average everydayness. Heidegger insists that the understanding of Being within which we operate is quite immediate and, thus, ontically close, though perhaps ontologically quite distant. In everydayness Dasein's Being shows itself primarily in its concealment — Dasein *is* its Being in the mode of not-Being it. In Division I, Heidegger employs the techniques of phenomenological description to articulate the existential structures evident within Dasein's everydayness. Heidegger takes this task to be distinct from that of philosophical anthropology or any of the other sciences which take the human being as their object of investigation. Indeed, it is foundational for any of these disciplines.

Heidegger must disclose Dasein in the existentiality of its existence; he must illuminate Dasein's Being as Being-in-the-world, which he is careful to distinguish from anything which might have present-at-hand connotations. 'In' has an existential significance here, and so should not be understood in any spatial sense derived from geometry. In emphasizing the etymological connections between the verb '*sein*' and the preposition '*bei*', Heidegger suggests that Being-in contains a sense of dwelling, familiarity, and involvement. These are the loci of the pre-reflective understanding of Being which is the horizon within which intentionality operates. Traditional ontology, in failing to carefully thematize subjectivity, has thus overlooked the degree to which the subject is ontologically distinct from things present-at-hand. It has tended to interpret Being-in-the-world in terms which are largely ontologically inappropriate or at the very least impoverished. The phenomenon of Being-in-the-world is bound up with Dasein's care, namely the fact that its Being is an issue for it, that it is involved with its Being.[3] Heidegger denies that Being-in-the-world is simply an attempt to situate the human being in an environment:

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[3] The *meaning* of Dasein's Being-in-the-world is care. That is, the fact that Dasein's Being is an issue for it means that it cares about its Being.

> Nowadays there is much talk about 'man's having an environment'; but this says nothing ontologically as long as this 'having' is left indefinite. In its very possibility this 'having' is founded upon the existential state of Being-in. Because Dasein is essentially an entity with Being-in, it can explicitly discover those entities which it encounters environmentally, it can know them, it can avail itself of them, it can *have* the 'world'. (SZ 57-58)

Typically, Being-in-the-world is understood philosophically as 'knowing the world'. It is explicated in terms of a subject-object relation in which the central problematic is how the subject is able to transcend its interiority and reach over toward exterior objects in order to gain knowledge of them. We have already seen in Chapter 1 how phenomenology challenges this view with the notion of intentionality. In specifically Heideggerian terms, standard epistemological models overlook the significance of *Being-in*-the-world, missing the fact that we are already "out there" among entities in the world. The distance which is established between subject and object, Heidegger argues, only occurs through a bracketing or disruption of our ordinary engagement, involvement, and fascination with the world.

Knowing is a possibility grounded in Dasein's way of Being as Being-in-the-world, and must be understood as such (SZ 59-62).[4] This gives us further reason to pursue a discussion of the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world in greater depth. Heidegger does this in three main movements, wherein he discusses particular aspects of Being-in-the-world which must be taken together and understood to be part of what is essentially a *unitary* phenomenon [*einheitliches Phänomen*] (SZ 53). These three aspects are: the 'in-the-world', the entity who is Being-in-the-world, and the Being-in itself.[5]

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[4] This critique of traditional notions of subjectivity which either overlook or misunderstand intentionality as the structure of lived experience occurs repeatedly throughout Heidegger's text, most directly in the sections on reality and truth, for which Being-in-the-world has shattering implications.

[5] At this point one could note that a shift in focus seems to have occurred. We began our discussion with an emphasis on the fact that Dasein bears a relation to its own Being, that its Being is its own intentional object. But now we seem to be taking the object of Dasein's intention to be the world or entities in the world. Although it may look as though Heidegger has changed the topic, he has not. His strategy is to examine the way in which Dasein primarily understands itself in everydayness in order to disclose that this presumes an understanding of its own Being. Dasein explicitly understands itself as a subject in a world (as in traditional philosophical views), but what Heidegger shows is that such an understanding is derivative of a more primordial understanding of itself as Being-in-the-world.

i. The world

If we are to understand what it means to be 'in-the-world', we must understand what the world is. However the meaning of world does not lie in the *entities* which populate the world, but rather in the *worldhood* of the world. How are we to access this structural characteristic of existence, this existentiale? To assist in this regard, Heidegger provides four senses of the term 'world', beginning with a meaning which is fairly common and progressing in ever-increasing rarity of usage and obscurity of meaning to the worldhood in which he is ultimately interested. It is Heidegger's intention to access this last meaning by progressing through a sequence of senses of the term 'world', until finally worldhood itself is laid bare. The four senses are:

> 1. 'world' as an ontical concept which signifies the totality of entities present-at-hand in the world;
> 2. 'world' as an ontological concept signifying the *Being* of the entities in (1);
> 3. 'world' understood ontically as the 'wherein' of both Dasein and the entities in (1); this would be the ontic situation in which these entities are "located";
> 4. 'world' in the ontological sense of 'worldhood' which we are seeking, namely the Being of the situation in (3). (SZ 64-65)

Heidegger must show "why the kind of Being with which Dasein knows the world is such that it passes over the phenomenon of worldhood both ontically and ontologically" (SZ 65-66), and he must illuminate world in its worldhood using average everydayness as his point of departure. That is, Heidegger must show why Dasein does not thematize its understanding of world, while everydayness nevertheless presumes such an understanding. For this reason Heidegger chooses to begin the discussion with a consideration of the environment [*Umwelt*].

Heidegger observes that, in the first sense of 'world' above, Dasein finds itself amidst objects, but not objects understood as "things" in the way that a theoretical, scientific viewpoint might suggest. Quite to the contrary, the objects which surround Dasein are objects that are *for* something, or as Heidegger would say, they display an *in-order-to* [*um ... zu*]. We use them for things, in order to accomplish various things; they are purposeful and functional. Heidegger calls these things **equipment** [*Zeuge*]. Equipment always refers beyond itself both to that for which it is, and to other equipment. Thus, pots refer to pans, lids, spoons, stoves, etc. In fact, equipment belongs to a whole equipmental context or referential whole (the kitchen) in which such tools are used to work upon leaves, roots, fruits, flesh, etc. — that is, bits of nature which are here disclosed as *materials* (food) — in order to produce a *product* (a meal) which is *for* someone (me) or some other purpose (a sacrificial offering, a creative experiment, food styling for a photo shoot).

The Being of the entities which are encountered within this equipmental context (the kitchen) is **readiness-to-hand**. That is, these entities (the equipment) are not primarily there for Dasein in and of themselves, but are there as handy or useful for obtaining something else; they always point beyond themselves. Thus, they are not there for Dasein as primarily present-at-hand. The pot which sits in my cupboard is not only there in a simply extant way; it is there to be used for something or other. In my intentional directedness toward the pot, I am already immediately engaged with it, immersed in a project which involves the pot. In exposing the readiness-to-hand of the entities which "populate" the world, it seems that we have moved beyond the first sense of 'world' above, to the second. The task now is to get beyond these entities to the world that lies underneath or behind them. This third sense of world expresses the situation in which entities manifest themselves. It is the referential whole which is presumed in our comportment in the world, but of which we are not typically conscious. It simply lies in the background, allowing equipment to show up as useful. The question is, how can a phenomenological reduction be effected such that the world, which we always already implicitly understand, is brought into high relief? How can the horizon within which equipment appears itself be disclosed?

The usual usage of the phenomenological term 'horizon' is that of 'the horizon within which' something is to be understood. 'Horizon' in this sense marks a boundary of significance which delimits the context within which something makes sense. However, it is also an important feature of these horizons that they typically lie in the background; the role they play in situating that which lies in the foreground goes largely unnoticed. But sometimes the horizons themselves become conspicuous; through a kind of Gestalt shift the background is brought into view more immediately and what was previously in the foreground shows up in a different, starker way.[6] To apply this to the present case: equipment always appears within a horizon which establishes its meaning. In order for this horizon itself to be disclosed as a horizon (as opposed to just being the backdrop for the equipment), our engagement with equipment must be bracketed. Since our engagement with equipment is always practical, this bracketing takes the form of a practical disruption of our unreflective involvement with the ready-to-hand. This technique of disclosure of horizons — through a phenomenologically reductive disruption of the everyday presumption of those horizons — is frequently employed in SZ.

Heidegger first asks whether Dasein has "in the range of its concernful absorption in equipment ready-to-hand, a possibility of Being in which the worldhood of those entities within-the-world with which it is concerned is, in a certain way, lit up for it, *along with* those entities themselves" (SZ 72). Heidegger discovers such a possibility in the cases where the referentiality of equipment ready-to-hand breaks down or is disrupted in some way. This can happen when a tool presents itself as unusable, or when it is missing, or when it presents itself as an obstacle to the task at hand. For example, when I am making pancakes, I rather unreflectively use a pancake flipper to turn them over. Without even thinking about it, I reach for the implement and wield it. One day it breaks, and since I do not use it that often, I keep forgetting to replace it. But every time I find myself making pancakes and reach for the pancake flipper, I realize that it is *missing*. Moreover, in my search for a suitable substitute, I realize that a wooden spoon or a fork simply does not work very well. In order to flip a pancake, it is best to have an implement which is flat and slightly offset for sliding underneath it. In such a case, the readiness-to-hand of equipment in general is revealed through the un-readiness-to-hand of a particular object, and the hidden referential totality which underlies the whole Being of equipment is in some sense disclosed along with it. When particular references are disturbed — that is, when equipment does not disclose itself as bearing a possibility for use — our attention lingers on it and the original reference or assignment becomes explicit (in the conspicuousness of its absence) (SZ 74-75). This particular referential context is the 'world' in the third sense above. However, we are still focused primarily on entities and the limited referential networks that are disclosed when particular entities become obtrusive. We remain within an ontical understanding of worldhood. To push beyond toward an ontological understanding of this phenomenon, we must more explicitly and deliberately explore the referential whole with which Dasein is usually familiar (SZ 76).

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[6] I will use the locution 'the horizon against which' something shows up when I want to emphasize this second aspect of horizon, which is not the one generally emphasized in traditional phenomenological discourse.

In order to understand the fourth sense of 'world', above — the *worldhood of the world* — we need to understand or disclose, not just specific referential wholes, but the Being of those wholes. This Being is their *referentiality*. It depends upon the peculiar "ability" of the entities disclosed within those wholes to refer or point beyond themselves. Heidegger terms this phenomenon **reference** or **assignment** [*Verweisung*].

Traditionally we would refuse the idea that assignment or reference belong to any entity other than the sign. The function of the sign is precisely to indicate the world and make it explicit. As Heidegger says, the sign "raises a totality of equipment into our circumspection so that together with it the worldly character of the ready-to-hand announces itself" (SZ 80). The sign draws our attention to the equipmental totality in which we find ourselves, demanding as a result that we orient ourselves in the world in a particular way. But Heidegger insists that referentiality is not peculiar to the Being of the sign, but belongs to all entities ready-to-hand. The sign is a specific case of an entity ready-to-hand, the function of which is to refer *explicitly*. Most things ready-to-hand do not directly draw attention to the referential totality of which they are a part. Thus, the reference of the sign is something *more* explicit than the reference involved in the standard ready-to-hand. The structure of reference which belongs to the ready-to-hand in general, is a precondition for the possibility of the sign at all. Moreover, the readiness-to-hand of an entity lies in its referentiality (SZ 83). But what does this mean?

"To say that the Being of the ready-to-hand has the structure of assignment or reference means that it has in itself the character of *having been assigned or referred*"

(SZ 83-84). The ready-to-hand entity has in itself the character of *Bewandtnis*,[7] of leaning or tending, of 'revolving' itself in a particular direction. The entity is disclosed as exhibiting *Bewandtnis* because its disclosure both occurs through and is an expression of the way it has previously been expressed and understood. When we encounter an entity as ready-to-hand through categorial intuition, we free it for that assignment towards which it tends and which is given *a priori*; we 'let it be' (SZ 85). This *Bewandtnis* is not something which the physical object "has" as a property, but something which shows up due to the referential context in which it is situated, which, as we will see, is illuminated relative to a particular possibility of Dasein's Being. Thus, within the referential totality associated with the kitchen, the pancake flipper lends itself to flipping pancakes or hamburgers or taking cookies off a cookie sheet. In another context it could be used to scrape paint or perhaps swat flies.

Ultimately the readiness-to-hand of equipment and the totality of significations in terms of which it can *be* as such are linked back to Dasein's Being and the fact that Dasein's Being is an issue for it. The series of references which make up the totality includes a series of *towards-which*'s [*Wozu*] (pancakes, breakfast) which ultimately ends in a *for-the-sake-of-which* [*Worumwillen*] (satisfying hunger), which refers to Dasein and its possibilities. Dasein frees a particular entity in its *Bewandtnis* by freeing it for a totality of involvements: that is, by illuminating its 'possibility' relative to some equipmental context. This illumination requires an antecedent disclosure of that equipmental context which is constituted by Dasein's understanding of the world. Although this understanding is merely implicit, it is signalled every time Dasein assigns itself to some possibility. Because Dasein's Being is an issue for it, it bears a relationship to its Being (its existence); this relationship primarily presents itself in terms of possibility. That is, Dasein has already referred itself beyond itself toward a particular possibility; it has already *assigned* itself to a *towards-which*, which refers back to a *for-*

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[7] This concept of *Bewenden/Bewandtnis* is particularly difficult to translate. Macquarrie & Robinson translate it as 'involvement', but somehow this seems unsatisfactory, as they themselves are quite ready to admit. Stambaugh translates it as 'relevance' which seems more problematic to me. Perhaps the best expression would be 'in-volvement', with emphasis on the sense of 'turning'.

the-sake-of-which, and in so doing, illuminates a whole network of involvements.[8]

Dasein's projecting upon a possibility implies an antecedent understanding of the world wherein these involvements play out. So, for example, taking a break from my work, I wander into the kitchen to fix a cup of tea. The equipment that I reach for — kettle, tea bag, mug — is illuminated for me as a constellation of things that hang together in the project of making a cup of tea. They all refer to one another. That towards which I project is the impending cup of tea. In order to achieve that end, I employ various pieces of equipment (kettle, stove) which can be used for this purpose. The *for-the-sake-of-which* in this case could be that I simply want a cup of tea, or it could be bound up in a broader project: wanting to procrastinate or needing to clear my head. The understanding of Being which precedes any particular activity of Dasein is always one of familiarity with the world. Thus, it seems that Dasein assigns itself or submits itself (SZ 87) to the world in its understanding of the world. The totality of references which this illuminates is called **significance** [*Bedeutsamkeit*], which is that wherein the worldhood of the world lies.

Heidegger contrasts this understanding of the world with that which comes to us from the Cartesian tradition. The determinative feature here is that the Being of an entity is taken to be its *substantiality*, the most basic attribute of which is *extension* (SZ 89-90). That the Being of an entity lies in its substantiality also implies that Being is linked to what is durable and unchanging, that which persists or remains constant, that which maintains itself within itself without depending upon another entity (SZ 91-92). Moreover, it suggests that the Being of an entity lies in its being physically present-at-hand. Under such an approach to entities, the world is nothing more than a simple collection of objects. This gives rise to an understanding of spatiality primarily in terms of extension and physical distance of the kind that can be measured quantitatively. Within this traditional conceptual formulation of objects, the world cannot be disclosed in its worldhood because entities cannot be disclosed in their readiness-to-hand.[9] Moreover, the particular spatiality of Dasein, which takes its point of departure from the nearness or distance of things in terms of the significations which relate them, cannot be disclosed. So, for instance, in an equipmental context, the readiness-to-hand of a tool implies its closeness, and everything has 'its place' — a place where it belongs — within that equipmental totality. But it is Dasein's particular way of drawing near to things or removing itself from things, as well as orienting itself relative to things, that grounds the spatiality peculiar to worldhood. Moreover, letting entities 'be involved' means 'making space' or 'creating room' to allow them to do so. Spatiality is dependent upon worldhood, not the other way around; the world is not dependent upon there being a space for it to be located.

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[8] "In understanding a context of relations such as we have mentioned, Dasein has assigned itself to an 'in-order-to', and it has done so in terms of a potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which it itself is — one which it may have seized upon either explicitly or tacitly, and which may be either authentic or inauthentic. This 'in-order-to' prescribes a 'towards-this' as a possible 'in-which' for letting something be involved; and the structure of letting it be involved implies that this an is involvement which something *has* — an involvement which is *with* something. Dasein always assigns itself from a 'for-the-sake-of-which' to the 'with-which' of an involvement; that is to say, to the extent that it is it always lets entities be encountered as ready-to-hand. *That wherein* Dasein understands itself beforehand in the mode of assigning itself is *that for which* it has let entities be encountered beforehand. *The 'wherein' of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to involvements; and this 'wherein' is the phenomenon of the world.* And the structure of that to which Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the *worldhood* of the world" (SZ 86).

In this way, Heidegger fleshes out his notion of the world, using Dasein's everydayness as the point of access. He has focused primarily on the ready-to-hand because that is what characterizes Dasein's usual engagement with things in the world. In everydayness, we are typically already absorbed in various projects, circumspectively concerned with the ready-to-hand, which presumes a certain implicit understanding of the world. We can say that Dasein's intentional relatedness to objects in the world is in fact generally characterized by **concern**. That this is a practical involvement is consistent with Heidegger's view that intentionality is the structure of lived experience. Objects are able to disclose themselves primarily as ready-to-hand and not merely present-at-hand because of categorial intuition; that we usually do not explicitly grasp this readiness-to-hand is evidence of the relative emptiness of our intentional comportment toward objects.

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[9] It should be noted that Heidegger has not, as yet, clarified how the worldhood of the world is explicitly disclosed to Dasein. This will not become apparent until we discuss anxiety.

The foregoing analysis demonstrates that entities in the world are not disclosed as radically separate from Dasein nor as brute objects, but that they are disclosed as being ready-to-hand. They are always already imbedded in a network of significations with which Dasein is always already familiar in its concernful engagement in the world. Thus, Dasein's intentional relatedness to entities in the world always presupposes this background. We must now explore what this means for the way Dasein encounters entities which share its own Being, namely other Dasein. In so doing we will shed greater light on Dasein's Being itself.

ii. Dasein

Earlier it was said that Dasein is that entity which I myself always am. Dasein's Being is always mine. So, is it not then obvious that the *who* of Dasein is this *I*? Heidegger is concerned that, although it may seem ontically obvious that the *I* refers to Dasein, it is not at all obvious what this means ontologically: the *I* remains extremely obscure. Just as the Being of entities in the world remains largely concealed in their readiness-to-hand, so does everydayness conceal what is closest in this case, namely the Being of this *I* and the Being of others. Quite often the *I* is understood as something essentially separated from the world and from others. The characterization of Dasein's Being as Being-in-the-world challenges this understanding. Just as we always find ourselves alongside things in the world, so do we always find ourselves among others. But so far Heidegger has only discussed Dasein's intentional relatedness toward entities ready-to-hand; he has yet to discuss intentionality relative to others. He must do this first, and explain its implications for Dasein's Being, before he proceeds to defining who Dasein is in its everydayness.

In embarking upon this discussion, it is useful to note the similarities between the method Heidegger employs here and in the case of the ready-to-hand, above. These similarities should not, however, be taken to mean that Dasein only encounters others in terms of the ready-to-hand, or only derivatively and secondarily to the ready-to-hand. Rather, Heidegger is trying to explain how both entities ready-to-hand and others as Dasein-with can be encountered as such through our concernful engagement in and manoeuvering around the world. It is important to stress again that we are taking everydayness as our point of departure.

In hearkening back to the discussion of equipmental totalities in Chapter 3 of SZ, Heidegger observes that he has perhaps over-emphasized the point that the entities which are encountered in the world are those that are not of Dasein's Being (SZ 118). Of course, this is not exclusively the case. Even in a purely equipmental context, others are disclosed, for example, as those for whom products are produced. However, we never encounter others in the way that *things* are disclosed; others are never encountered as part of equipment. Others are encountered as being 'there too', with Dasein. They share Dasein's kind of Being, and this is what makes them others. Although these others are those "from whom, for the most part, one does *not* distinguish oneself" (SZ 118), the very fact that Dasein refers to them as 'others' indicates that it has some implicit understanding of its own mineness. Nevertheless, in everydayness others primarily disclose themselves to us in their familiarity, not in their alterity (SZ 118-19). In pushing the parallel analysis with the ready-to-hand, Heidegger notes that in its concernful dealings in its environment, Dasein can free others for their Being as Dasein-with. That is to say, Dasein can let others *be* their Dasein-with just as it can let entities ready-to-hand tend toward their particular involvements; only because Dasein does this is it possible for an other to be missing or away, just as in the case of equipment above.

Dasein's intentional comportment toward others differs from that toward equipment in that others are not primarily disclosed as 'for' something or other. The possibility for which they are freed is that of Being-Dasein.[10] In its lived experience,

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[10] Later, when we deal more directly with the idea that Dasein's Being is one of possibility, we will see another difference emerge. Entities ready-to-hand 'have' possibilities because *Dasein* has possibilities; in assigning itself to some particular possibility, Dasein discloses the various entities ready-to-hand that it encounters as 'having' particular possibilities relative to its own possibility. It is not ruled out that others can be disclosed relative to specific projects that Dasein might have, but even in that case, they are usually disclosed in their Being as Dasein (freed for their possibility as Dasein). I usually recognize that the other is not there*for my use*, but that the other may be able to do something for me which will assist me in the achievement of my goal. My disclosure of the other relative to my possibilities does not give her possibilities in the same way that it might an object ready-to-hand. A hammer cannot refuse my using it (unless it breaks, and it cannot do so willfully), but my colleague can willfully refuse to be cooperative. We usually recognize that others are, so to speak, free agents, which is an implicit recognition that they have possibilities much as I do.

Dasein *is with* others in a way that simply is not the case with ready-to-hand objects. Thus, Dasein's Being-towards-others is termed Being-with [*Mitsein*]. The term is appropriate not only because others are disclosed as with me — as being there too — but also because intentionality (Being-towards) is the structure of lived experience, and is immediate in transporting Dasein 'ahead of itself'. Dasein's Being carries it away toward others, much as it does in the case of equipment, except that in the former case that toward which Dasein is thrust has the same essential possibility of Being.

Mitsein is an existential structure of Dasein's Being; the ontical comportment through which *Mitsein* manifests itself is known as **solicitude**. In solicitude Dasein relates to those entities which share its Being, whereas in concern, Dasein relates to entities ready-to-hand. There are multiple forms of solicitude, which reflect multiple ways of intending others. The most common are the indifferent or deficient modes typical of everydayness, such as "being for, against, or without one another, passing one another by, not 'mattering' to one another" (SZ 121). In these cases the Being of others as Dasein-with remains as disguised as does the Being of the ready-to-hand in everydayness.[11] We only emptily intend others in everydayness, talking about them or merely standing in relation to them without *immediately apprehending* their Being qua Dasein-with.

There are also more positive modes, so called because of a more active role on the part of the solicitous Dasein. These are *leaping in* [*einspringen*] and *leaping ahead* [*vorausspringen*]. In *leaping in*, one

> takes over for the Other that with which he is to concern himself. The Other is thereby thrown out of his position; he steps back in order to take over afterwards the thing attended to as something finished and available, or to relieve himself completely from it. In such solicitude the Other can become dependent and dominated; this domination may also be a tacit one and it may remain hidden from him. This solicitude, which leaps in and takes away 'care', is to a large extent determinative for Being with one another, and *pertains for the most part to concern with the ready-to-hand.* (SZ 122) (emphasis added)

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[11] "These modes of Being show again the characteristics of inconspicuousness and obviousness which belong just as much to the everyday Dasein-with of Others within-the-world as to the readiness-to-hand of the equipment with which one is daily concerned. These Indifferent modes of Being-with-one-another may easily mislead ontological Interpretation into interpreting this kind of Being, in the first instance, as the mere Being-present-at-hand of several subjects" (SZ 121).

To take care away from the other involves comporting toward the other in such a way that it is not freed for its Being as care; in my comportment toward the other, I overlook or deny that the other's Being is indeed an issue for it. This might best be illuminated by an example. Suppose that I am a math tutor and a student comes to me seeking help with an assignment. My comportment toward the student would be one of *leaping in* if I did the assignment myself or gave the student the answers. That seems clear from Heidegger's description, but why? Presumably I have failed to disclose this other as an entity with care as its Being because I have, in a sense, disburdened this student of her occupation with her Being. Heidegger suggests that such comportment "pertains for the most part to concern with the ready-to-hand" (SZ 122). This means that I have taken up as my own that with which the other, illuminated through its own projection of its Being, should concern itself. In taking up its own possibility as my own, I have ignored the other's *Seinkönnen* — its ability to be which is constitutive of the Being of any Dasein and is the origin of all possibility.[12] In *leaping in* I do not free the other for its possibility. This is not because I disclose the other as ready-to-hand instead of as Dasein, nor because I understand the other as a means to an end instead of as an end in itself; rather, by taking up the possibility of the other, I take away its mineness rather than freeing the other for it. In this way, the other becomes dominated and dependent. When I comport myself toward another in a way which does not free it for its Being, I hinder its ability to disclose its own *Seinkönnen*.[13]

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[12] Both Macquarrie and Robinson, and Stambaugh translate *Seinkönnen* as 'potentiality-of-Being'. I will retain the German term because 'potentiality' suggests something far less immediate and more abstract than Heidegger intends.

[13] Some have pointed out that the description of *leaping in* paints a rather uncharitable view of 'welfare work'. However I would draw attention to the following passage:

> For example, 'welfare work', as a factical social arrangement is grounded in Dasein's state of Being as Being-with. Its factical urgency gets its motivation in that Dasein maintains itself proximally and for the most part in the deficient modes of solicitude. (SZ 121)

This passage suggests that it is because Dasein maintains itself in inauthentic modes of solicitude that 'welfare work' becomes necessary in the first place, evoking the proverb that you can give a person a fish and he can eat today, but teach him how to fish and he can feed himself for a lifetime. See Pierre Bourdieu, *The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger*, trans. Peter Collier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991). Bourdieu thinks that this is typical of the conservative intellectual climate in Germany at the time which generally

In contrast to *leaping in*, Heidegger describes the phenomenon of *leaping ahead*. In this case, one

> leap[s] ahead of [the Other] in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his 'care' but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time. This solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care — that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a 'what' with which he is concerned; it helps the Other to become transparent to himself *in* his care and to become *free for* it. (SZ 122)

In this case, one discloses the other in its Being as care, and in comporting toward it accordingly, helps it disclose its own Being as possibility. This passage gives us somewhat fewer clues as to what *leaping ahead* would be like than the earlier passage on *leaping in*, but it is safe to say that whereas *leaping in* involves taking over for the other to some degree, *leaping ahead* does not. *Leaping ahead* involves Dasein's comporting toward the other in a way which assists the other in disclosing its Being as care. Possible examples include mentoring or pedagogical and parental relationships, and perhaps also relations between friends. What is at play is the holding open of a space for the other to explore its possibilities, and perhaps also challenging the other in such a way that the demand to respond to the challenge awakens the other to those possibilities.[14]

Leaping ahead then suggests that one can take an interest in the Being of another in a way that goes beyond its material or physical well-being. However not all freeing comportment has this active character; it can also involve a slightly different kind of "making space" which occurs when Dasein works side-by-side with the other.

> When they devote themselves to the same affair in common, their doing so is determined by the manner in which their Dasein, each in its own way, has been taken hold of. They thus become *authentically* bound together and this makes possible the right kind of objectivity, which frees the Other in his freedom for himself. (SZ 122)

This 'boundedness' is generally understood as Heidegger's version of the *we*.[15] United in

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disdained those who benefited from social programs and received handouts for nothing, rather than working and earning their way.

[14] Hass maintains that Heidegger's notion of intersubjectivity is limited to the *Mitsein* of 'Being-there-too' on the one hand and of *das Man* on the other and that this is rather impoverished. As a corrective he suggests developing the idea of being-questioned. See Lawrence Hass, "Dasein and Others: Heidegger's Ontology of Intersubjectivity," *Auslegung* 15.1 (Winter 1989): 81-93. I fully endorse this idea, although I would maintain, contra Hass, that this is already at play to varying degrees in the phenomena of *leaping in* and *leaping ahead*.

[15] Levinas certainly views it this way. See the introduction to Part III.

our projecting toward a possibility, and understanding that the *for-the-sake-of-which* towards which we project is held in common, we disclose one another as Dasein-with. This authentic *we* is revealed when we are not working at cross purposes with one another, ignoring one another, or competing with one another. When we are not bound together in the authentic we, we tend to measure ourselves relative to one other — a phenomenon Heidegger terms distantiality [*Abständigkeit*] (SZ 126).[16] One might say that Dasein *is* its Dasein-with most fully when it is thoroughly absorbed in its engagement in the world and least notices the Dasein-with of others, much in the way that we comport toward equipment as ready-to-hand most immediately when we use it, when it is least obtrusive in its readiness-to-hand.

The important point is that just as Dasein's engagement in the world presupposes an understanding of the Being of entities ready-to-hand, so does it have an understanding of others as Dasein-with on the basis of its particular Being as Being-with (SZ 123). In this sense, the world in its worldhood — as a totality of significations, as a meaningful whole — provides the horizon within which both the ready-to-hand and others manifest themselves in their Being. But just as in the case of the ready-to-hand, in everydayness we remain largely unconscious both that we have this understanding and what this understanding is. That we overlook or fail to see the ontological significance of Being-with is largely due to the obscurity within which Dasein's Being and Dasein's self remain shrouded.[17]

In order to more fully clarify the parallel which I see between Heidegger's analyses of the ready-to-hand and of others, it is worth explicitly drawing attention to a few points. In his discussion of world, Heidegger moved through four senses of 'world' through which he phenomenologically discloses the Being of the world (the world in its worldhood). He began with entities in the world and then considered the Being of those entities (readiness-to-hand). This was accomplished by allowing the entities to show themselves in themselves, free from any prior theoretical framework (of presence-at-hand). Heidegger then turned to the 'wherein' of these entities (a referential structure), which could be understood as a situating of the phenomena against the horizon in terms of which their Being manifests itself. Finally, he disclosed the worldhood of that 'wherein', which would involve allowing the horizon to show itself in its Being. Although this step has not been fully completed, it would disclose Dasein's Being (as Being-in-the-world), particularly with regard to the way in which Dasein opens up a totality of significations by assigning itself to some project.

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[16] Distantiality results in a less positive, yet more common, phenomenon: "A Being-with-one-another which arises from one's doing the same thing as someone else, not only keeps for the most part within the outer limits, but enters the mode of distance and reserve. The Being-with-one-another of those who are hired for the same affair, often thrives only on mistrust" (SZ 122).

[17] In Heidegger's view, efforts to explain sociality in terms of empathy or alter egos reflect this basic lack of understanding of the primordiality of Dasein's understanding of others — its *Mitsein* — which is its very Being.

Although Heidegger's movement through these four domains is less pronounced in the case of other Dasein, a similar pattern can be discerned, echoing the more extensive work laid out in Chapter 3 of SZ. First, he begins his discussion with the identification and description of entities (others). Second, he discloses these entities in their Being as Dasein-with. In the third step, Heidegger identifies the world — the wherein (or horizon) of these entities — as a with-world (SZ 118) which is marked by its own spatiality (SZ 119),[18] thereby expanding the earlier characterization of 'world'. Finally, the worldhood of the world is shown to be constituted not just by Dasein's *isolated* projection upon possibilities, but by its projection upon its possibilities as Being-with. In Chapter 3, Heidegger argues that the significance which lies within the referential structure of the world is derived relative to something which does not refer beyond itself, but is rather its own *towards-which*, namely something that is *for-the-sake-of-which*.[19] However, Dasein's Being is a Being-with, which implies that the Being which is an issue for Dasein is not only its own particular (my) Being, but also the Being of others. Thus, others are bound up in the *for-the-sake-of-which* which forms the basis of Dasein's original assignment of itself to a possibility, in terms of which significance is illuminated and various involvements unfold. This establishes that the world is fundamentally significant *with* others, *for the sake of* others, etc. In this way, Dasein's Being as Being-with is related to the worldhood of the world.[20]

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[18] It is here that Heidegger brings up Humboldt's observation of the relationship between personal pronouns and locative adverbs, which he (Heidegger) wants to link back to Dasein's spatiality as opposed to a more present-at-hand notion of space. Though this remains a relatively undeveloped part of the text, it should not be overlooked.

[19] "In Dasein's Being, the context of references or assignments which significance implies is tied up with Dasein's ownmost Being — a Being which essentially can have no involvements, but which is rather that Being *for the sake of which* Dasein itself is as it is" (SZ 123).

But how does this Being-with show up in everydayness? And, in particular, how does that everyday Being-with constitute a covering up of *Mitsein*? In other words, how does Dasein emptily intend its *Mitsein*? How is *Mitsein* presumed in Dasein's everyday lived experience? The answers lie in the existentiale of *das Man*. Before discussing Heidegger's use of *das Man* as a technical term, we must understand the word in its common usage. '*Das Man*' roughly corresponds to the English 'one' and the French '*on*'. Although '*das Man*' is not perhaps used in all the instances that '*on*' is, it is used at least as frequently in everyday talk, far more than 'one'.[21] The use of '*man*' as a grammatical subject avoids the passive voice. In using the '*man*'-construction, one conjugates the verb in the active voice, implying that there is a subject of the verb (which is expendable in the passive voice). However, the subject is really a dummy subject; '*man*' refers to no one. Thus, *no one* commits the action; *no one* is its author; *no one* is responsible. *Das Man* is an impersonal, indefinite third person.

Heidegger refers to Dasein's everyday self as *das Man-selbst*. That is to say, Dasein, in its everydayness, is in the way of *das Man*. It is in the way of an impersonal third person. Yet, we know that Dasein is in every case mine. That is, Dasein's Being is *to be I, to be in the first person*. As *Man-selbst*, Dasein obscures the mineness of its Being and, arguably, also distances itself from the immediacy of its lived experience. This has numerable implications and repercussions. It means that Dasein does not disclose possibilities in the world relative to its ownmost *Seinkönnen*, but instead discloses them as 'one does', thereby permitting what it is able to do to be illuminated through the possibilities appropriate to *das Man.* It also serves to relieve Dasein of answerability for its Being, in a certain sense, since Dasein is no longer the subject of its own existence. As *Man-selbst,* Dasein is disburdened of its Being (SZ 127). Heidegger describes Dasein as being dominated by *das Man.*

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[20] See discourse, below.

[21] Indeed, in English, we use 'they' or 'you' or 'we' more often, but none of these quite capture the impersonality of '*man*'.

How is this possible? We saw above that when the other is dominated in *leaping in,* this occurs because the other's care is taken away. That is, the other is freed neither for its Being as care by Dasein, nor through its own projection. Thus *das Man* dominates Dasein by taking away its care, disburdening Dasein of its Being by determining in advance those possibilities upon which it should project, and thus obscuring its ownmost *Seinkönnen.* But *das Man* is not an other, standing there with a big stick, forcing Dasein in this way. *Das Man,* as the impersonal third person, is really no one in particular. And since *das Man* is no *One*, no one is an agent or is responsible. So how is this domination enacted? It occurs through distantiality, in which Dasein measures itself against the behavior of others, taking its cues for what it can do and how it can be from others whom it takes to be representative of *das Man.* In this way Dasein gives *das Man* power over it and subjects itself to *das Man.*

It is important to keep in mind that these others *are not das Man.*[22] No one is *das Man*. Others are entities which have Dasein's Being and are also characterized by '*there*-ness'. *Das Man* has no *there*: it is not any-where; it isn't any-thing; it is not any-one, concretely speaking. *Das Man* is an abstraction. In a way, when Dasein *is* as *Man-selbst,* Dasein too is only an abstraction, obscuring both its own Being and also the Being of others, in so far as they are disclosed as representatives of *das Man* and not primarily in their own Dasein-with. Since we are so obsessed with *what one does*, we are always looking to *das Man* to find our standards of behavior. But since *das Man* is no one, we look to concrete others, presume them to be representatives of *das Man,* and compare ourselves with or model ourselves after them. The ultimate result is that "the Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of 'the Others', in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more" (SZ 126). This leads to the phenomenon of 'publicness' in which others become interchangeable (as riders of public transportation, consumers, the unemployed, etc.) (SZ 127). The phenomenon of *das Man* is possible only on the ground of Dasein's Being-with; it is thus an existentiale. But it is a particular type of *Mitsein* which, in a sense, also denies *Mitsein*: as *Man-selbst*, Dasein typically identifies *das Man* with others and then denies being part of *das Man* itself.[23]

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[22] This is a point of textual interpretation where I would disagree with those who reduce others to *das Man,* thereby concluding that if authenticity involves an escape from *das Man,* then it must also involve an escape from *Mitsein.* For a good summary of those interpretations which understand Dasein and its authenticity individualistically or egoistically (and a critique of these) see Fred Dallmayr, "Heideggerian Intersubjectivity," *Human Studies* 3 (July 1980): 221-46.

Consequently, the 'who' of Dasein in everydayness is the *Man-selbst* which discloses its *Mitsein* in a privative way in terms of *das Man*. As a result, Dasein does not fully intend either its own Being-with or the Dasein-with of others. It is in this section of Heidegger's text that he first speaks at any length regarding authenticity and inauthenticity and then only with particular reference to *Mitsein* and *das Man*.[24] Authenticity takes on a much more central position in the discussion in the second division. For this reason, I will postpone an extended treatment of the topic until then. However, a few preliminary comments are in order.

If we heed the reading of HCT with which we began our discussion, we can see that a parallel is developing between Heidegger's discussion of empty intentions and their fulfillment, and the 'emptiness' of Dasein's everydayness which carries at its heart various presumptions about the structure of Dasein's existence. We can anticipate that authenticity will involve fulfilling the 'emptiness' with which Dasein grasps its Being in everydayness. This fulfillment will occur through a phenomenological disclosure of the structures of that Being which are presumed in everydayness. But since intentionality is the structure of lived experience, the disclosure which constitutes the fulfillment of Dasein's intentional relation to itself must share in the immediacy appropriate to lived experience. We can make sense of Heidegger's statement that "*authentic Being-one's-Self ... is ... an existentiell modification of the 'they' — of the 'they' as an essential existentiale*" (SZ 130) in terms of this interpretive framework. It is an *existentiell* modification because Dasein's Being is disclosed in inauthenticity, but in a hidden way. Dasein's *Seinkönnen* is disclosed precisely through its being denied.[25]

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[23] "One belongs to the Others oneself and enhances their power. 'The Others' whom one thus designates in order to cover up the fact of one's belonging to them essentially oneself, are those who proximally and for the most part '*are there*' in everyday Being-with-one-another" (SZ 126).

[24] Some of the confusion surrounding the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity seems to stem from the ambiguity regarding the status of *das Man* and Dasein's *Mitsein* in authenticity, especially given Dasein's *Jemeinigkeit* which is sometimes seen to be in conflict with Dasein's *Mitsein*. For example see Martinez and Daniel Berthold-Bond, "A Kierkegaardian Critique of Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity," *Man and World* 24 (1991): 119-42. This problem relates to a reading of the text which fails to grasp the complexity of the relationship between *Mitsein* and *das Man* and suffers from an impoverished understanding of what Heidegger means by Dasein's Being. *Das Man* can no more be repudiated than *Mitsein* can, and in no way are *Mitsein* and *das Man* the same thing, nor is Dasein's *Jemeinigkeit* inconsistent with its *Mitsein*. This point is taken up by Birmingham who argues that there is, indeed, authentic Being-with Others. See Peg Birmingham, "*Logos* and the Place of the Other," *Research in Phenomenology* 20 (1991): 34-54.

iii. Being-in

Why is it necessary to investigate something like Being-in? Is it not sufficient to have said something about the entity which is 'in' and about that wherein it is? What more remains to be said? In Heidegger's view there is a great deal more, and we should not limit ourselves to a phenomenon which is conceived as a "*commercium* which is present-at-hand *between* a subject present-at-hand and an Object present-at-hand" (SZ 132).[26] Moreover,

> such an interpretation would come closer to the phenomenal content if we were to say that *Dasein is the Being* of this 'between'. Yet to take our orientation from this 'between' would still be misleading. For with such an orientation we would also be covertly assuming the entities between which this "between", as such, 'is', and we would be doing so in a way which is ontologically vague. The "between" is already conceived as the result of the *convenientia* of two things that are present-at-hand. But to assume these beforehand always *splits* the phenomenon asunder, and there is no prospect of putting it together again from the fragments. Not only do we lack the 'cement'; even the 'schema' in accordance with which this joining-together is to be accomplished, has been split

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[25] This is analogous to the way in which Dasein's *Mitsein* is disclosed through its being denied and the readiness-to-hand of equipment is disclosed through its un-readiness-to-hand. Dasein's intentional comportment (either empty or fulfilled) presumes an intentional comportment toward (an understanding of) its own Being.

[26] In fact, the phenomenon that Heidegger is trying to get at through Being-in-the-world is an intentionality which goes beyond the "act, object and relation" contours of the subject-object relation. Kisiel quotes Heidegger from *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie* (GA 56/57): "The living and lived of experience are as such not like entitative objects stuck together" (Kisiel, *Genesis of Heidegger's "Being and Time"* 43-44).

> asunder, or never as yet unveiled. What is decisive for ontology is to prevent the splitting of the phenomenon — in other words, to hold its positive phenomenal content secure. (SZ 132)

Here Heidegger explicitly expresses his concern that the *between* be thought of in a way which preserves the unity of the phenomenon of intentional subjectivity, averting the tendency to conceive of intentionality in terms of a subject which stands over and against an object.

Being-in is this *between*, but it should not be understood as a space (in the present-at-hand sense) between Dasein and the world. Rather, the *between* envelops both and orients them relative to one another, and does so in terms of significance. In a preliminary fashion, Heidegger indicates that this Being-in is **disclosedness** [*Erschlossenheit*], which he defines as 'the character of having been laid open' (or opened up, unlocked) while 'to disclose' means 'to lay open' (or open up, unlock) (SZ 75). Disclosedness pertains to Dasein's Being in that "this entity [Dasein] carries in its ownmost Being the character of not being closed off" (SZ 132), that is, of Being disclosed. This 'being open' or 'not being closed off' contains a certain ambiguity. It implies the activity of opening oneself up, the passivity of being opened up by the world or others, and being open to others in the sense of being receptive and awaiting. This kind of ambiguity is characteristic of the middle voice, which was noted in Chapter 1 as a distinctive feature of intentional comportment toward phenomena and the way in which they are disclosed.

The middle voice particularly emphasizes the verbality of phenomenological disclosure as an event of enactment.[27] The passive and active dimensions of the

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[27] Scott stresses that the middle voice is characterized by an ambiguity between activity and passivity which, though approximated by a certain self-reflexivity, is not entirely captured by it. See Charles E. Scott, "The Middle Voice in *Being and Time*," *The Collegium Phaenomenologicum*, ed. John Sallis (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988) 159-173; and "The Middle Voice of Metaphysics," *Review of Metaphysics* 42 (June 1989): 743-64. In the latter text, Scott writes:

> The middle voice suggests something excessive regarding subject-object formations. It is able to articulate nonreflexive enactments that are not 'for' themselves or 'for' something else. As a formation it does not need to suggest intention outside of its movement toward an other. It does not suggest action by which the subject becomes other to itself. It does not oppose active and passive formations, but is other than they are in the contexts of action and

disclosure of any given phenomenon are not to be understood as contradictory. Heidegger's strategy in drawing attention to these is to highlight a type of disclosedness in terms of which both active and passive formulations make sense and are possible. This technique is employed frequently throughout the text and is echoed in the language of the clearing in the following passage:

> To say that it [Dasein] is 'illuminated' means that *as* Being-in-the-world it is cleared in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it *is* itself the clearing. Only for an entity which is existentially cleared in this way does that which is present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark. (SZ 133)

Here it is evident that Dasein — in its disclosedness — clears, is cleared, and is the clearing in which and through which the world is illuminated. Terminologically, the 'clearing' is also ambiguous. On the one hand, it is an event in which clearing happens: on the other, it is also a place where a clearing has already occurred, a 'where' because of the event which establishes it. In a sense, then, the *Da* of Dasein's Being is this clearing; it is where Dasein dwells.[28] What we need to understand is this *there*, given that we have already indicated that Dasein's spatiality does not pertain to things present-at-hand. What is the disclosure that happens in the clearing? How is the *there* disclosed? In considering what Heidegger says regarding the various existentiales involved in Being-in, we should keep in mind that it is through this disclosedness (in its middle-voicedness) that phenomena reveal themselves to Dasein in their Being. These phenomena include not only entities ready-to-hand and other Dasein, but also Dasein's own Being; all of these presume an understanding of Dasein's Being-in-the-world, to which a more primordial understanding of Being in general belongs. We are primarily interested for now in how Dasein discloses its own Being to itself.

> passivity. It is the voice of something's taking place through its own enactment .... We have seen that in the middle voice a certain immediacy of presence can be expressed, but we have also seen that the presence of a complex, ambiguous verb or event, by virtue of its ambiguity and countervalences, may in its middle voice express not only the immediacy of simple presence, but transition, ambiguity and dissolution of presence. (752)

[28] This is an important point. Dasein's spatiality, its 'in', is the result of its Being, its dwelling, not the antecedent condition for it.

One way in which disclosure occurs is through ***Befindlichkeit***,[29] which includes all manner of moods, emotions, feelings, and being-affected. We simply find ourselves to be in a certain mood or to feel a certain way about things. *Befindlichkeit* is extremely immediate in that I am already experiencing it before I become truly cognizant of what I am experiencing or why. *Befindlichkeit* always discloses Dasein's thrownness [*Geworfenheit*], its being delivered over to its Being, which it has no choice but to be. But this tends to happen obliquely, in that *Befindlichkeit* also positions and orients us relative to our very thrownness:

> The way in which the mood discloses is not one in which we look at thrownness, but one in which we turn towards or turn away. For the most part the mood does not turn towards the burdensome character of Dasein which is manifest in it, and least of all does it do so in the mood of elation when this burden has been alleviated. It is always by way of a state-of-mind that this turning-away is what it is. (SZ 135)

In Heidegger's view, *Befindlichkeit* often obscures an actual disclosure of our thrownness, although some modes turn us toward it, as we shall see below. *Befindlichkeit* affects *how we are open to the world* and the entities therein (SZ 136).

Heidegger identifies three main features of *Befindlichkeit*: that it discloses thrownness (the burdensome character of existence); that it discloses Being-in-the-world, generally by situating us; and that it is connected with circumspective concern through which entities within the world are encountered. However, it is important to note that *Befindlichkeit* discloses these aspects largely implicitly. To illustrate this, let us take a mundane example — nervousness. I am scheduled to make an important presentation in the near future, upon which a great deal depends, and I find myself nervous before this impending event. My *Befindlichkeit* discloses my thrownness — my being thrown into a particular situation with no choice but to deal with it. My nervousness attunes me to my situation in such a way that certain possibilities present themselves: I can try to repress my nervousness and ignore it; I can cancel the presentation; I can be very diligent in preparing for it so that nothing will go wrong; I can seek out positive support and feedback from my friends and colleagues in order to allay my nerves. My "state of mind" affects my circumspective concern and solicitude, influencing the way in which I encounter other entities, the way in which I am open to them. I might avoid certain people and seek out others. The text of my presentation might inspire in me feelings of self-doubt. My computer might become my enemy. The ring of the telephone might represent either welcome relief or an annoying interruption. The fact that things can affect us in this way implies that they matter to us, and they matter to us differently depending upon the way in which they are disclosed. *Befindlichkeit*, as part of Dasein's disclosedness, shapes the way in which Dasein is open to the world; hence the way in which Dasein has already assigned itself to the world is implicated in the way in which it discloses it (and itself) (SZ 137-38).

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[29] The Macquarrie and Robinson translation is 'state-of-mind'. This suggests something conscious, which is deeply misplaced when speaking of *Befindlichkeit*, which pertains much more to 'how one finds oneself'. 'Mood' conveys the idea much better, and although Heidegger often uses it in the text to refer to *Befindlichkeit*, it is technically only a specific form of *Befindlichkeit*. Stambaugh uses 'attunement'. I will generally use the German term and occasionally the term 'mood', which should be understood in a broad sense.

Equiprimordial with *Befindlichkeit* is **understanding** [*Verstehen*]. Understanding is the disclosedness of existing Being-in-the-world relative to the *for-the-sake-of-which* (SZ 143). It was just stated that *Befindlichkeit* influences the way in which entities are encountered. These entities are disclosed as having certain involvements — as tending towards certain assignments which refer beyond themselves. Understanding views these involvements as possibilities. Thus, things appear as use*able*, profit*able*; they are there in order to accomplish something, for the sake of something. But of course these possibilities do not actually reside within the objects as properties; they are only disclosed as possibilities through Dasein's circumspective concern, which takes its initial assignment of itself to its own Being as a point of departure. Things show up as having possibilities because *Dasein* has possibilities. However, in everydayness, this relation mostly remains concealed to Dasein. As a feature of its existentiality, Dasein does not bear a distance to its possibilities. Rather than seeing them as laid out before it, Dasein is thrown into its Being-possible, and so it tends to *be* its possibilities. This phenomenon is called **projection** [*Entwerfen*].[30] Possibility always already belongs to Dasein's Being, and Heidegger refers to this as Dasein's *Seinkönnen*. In understanding, Dasein always understands this *Seinkönnen*, resulting in a certain competence vis-à-vis the task of existing, as well as a basic familiarity with the world and its significance, and with possibility in general (Being-possible). In the example described above, simultaneous with my finding myself thrown into a particular situation, I find that I have various possibilities within that context, which implies an awareness of my *Seinkönnen*. I am able to do something,[31] and various possibilities show up relative to this *for-the-sake-of-which*. The extent to which Dasein's Being-possible is transparent to itself varies greatly and depends upon the degree to which it has disclosed its Being in such a way that it is freed for its ownmost *Seinkönnen*; it depends upon how Dasein intends its own Being. Just as Dasein's disclosedness frees objects for their readiness-to-hand and other Dasein for their Dasein-with, so does it free *Dasein* for its Being, which is not an *in-order-to* but a *for-the-sake-of-which*. Thus Dasein *is* (because it is thrown) "the possibility of Being-free for its ownmost *Seinkönnen*" (SZ 144).

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[30] Note the etymological connection to thrownness [*Geworfenheit*].

The understanding of possibilities which we have is mostly implicit, but it can be made explicit through interpretation (SZ 148-49). Interpretation breaks down the circumspective concern within which we generally operate and reveals its structure of *in-order-to*'s. This is what Heidegger refers to as the disclosure of the as-structure. I can understand the various objects that I encounter as means, as things which can be used in order to accomplish something which will satisfy the *for-the-sake-of-which*. When we make this explicit, we also make explicit the fore-structures which belong to understanding.[32]

These fore-structures are three-fold. The fore-having captures what we have in advance, namely that totality of involvements wherein we are engaged. The fore-sight is the way in which we are antecedently oriented toward taking a view on what lies in the fore-having. The fore-conception is the way in which we have grasped in advance the fore-having through fore-sight. All of these highlight the sense in which interpretation occurs subsequent to an antecedent understanding of the world; that is, the world is always disclosed in its significance, as meaningful. Meaning, Heidegger tells us, is that wherein the intelligibility of something lies. That is, our ability to understand something depends upon its "having" meaning or being meaningful. But meaning resides no more in entities in the world than possibilities do. That we see entities as "having" meaning is analogous to the fact that we see them as "having" possibilities. Actually, an entity's intelligibility is derived from the totality of significations in which it is situated. "Meaning is the 'upon-which' of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something; it gets its structure from a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception" (SZ 151). The suggestion is that in my intentional directedness toward entities, I orient myself primarily with respect to their meaning and significance. But this meaning is as much something which I find given to me, as it is something upon which I project or which I illuminate through an assignment to a particular possibility. This is consistent with the idea that intentionality is a relatedness toward entities primarily in terms of meaning or Being. According to phenomenology, meaning is not that which a subject ascribes to an object through an expressive act, but something given through both expressive and intuitive acts.

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[31] This is true even when there does not appear to be anything that I can do.

[32] This must be *Verständnis* and not *Verstehen* in so far as interpretation must be a making explicit of the disclosedness of a situation in general and not just of what is disclosed through *Verstehen*. We shall see that disclosedness is composed of three parts — *Befindlichkeit*, understanding, and discourse — each of which seems to correlate with a fore-structure (SZ 150-51).

Returning to SZ, we can see that the meaning which is understood through the modes of disclosedness is brought forward and 'laid out' in **interpretation** [*Auslegung*]. Meaning, then, precedes interpretation, and more importantly, precedes assertion — that particular form of interpretation which philosophy traditionally takes to be the locus of meaning. Assertion is simply the articulation and expression of an interpretation; this presumes meaning and a relationship to it. Heidegger suggests that assertion — because it gives a more determinate form to what was previously more indeterminate — is generally taken to be more objective and, thus, more valid. As such, assertion becomes the locus of truth and logic, of rational discourse (SZ 156-57). However, Heidegger maintains that an assertion objectifies the entity about which it is expressive. Assertion removes the entity from the network of significations within which it has meaning, thereby stripping it of its Being as ready-to-hand and reducing it to something merely present-at-hand. To use Heidegger's example, if I am engaged in a project and reach for a hammer, but then decide it is too heavy, this is an interpretation. What I understand through the fore-structures is that I am in a particular situation with a particular task to accomplish; certain tools are at my disposal, and some are better suited than others. In rejecting this hammer, I interpret it as being too heavy for what I need to do with it. It is Heidegger's claim that the restriction of interpretation to the realm of assertion disengages the interpretation (and the thing interpreted) from the source of its meaning; thus the interpretation is no longer making explicit what Dasein understands in the situation. This assists us in making sense of Heidegger's remarks in HCT which associate assertions with empty intentions in that assertions allow us to intend something in a way which obscures its Being (HCT 87). The prominent place given to assertions in the philosophical tradition has been pivotal in shaping the development of western thought and has, among other things, resulted in a rather narrow view of the 'discourse' which is to fall within the purview of *logos* (SZ 158-60).

In challenging this view, Heidegger offers a broader understanding of discourse [*Rede*]. He identifies it as equiprimordial with understanding and *Befindlichkeit*, and as one of the ways in which Dasein's disclosedness is constituted. It is important to keep in mind that discourse is not the same thing as language. Discourse is 'talking', but we must understand this talk in a rather broad, metaphorical way, as when we speak of 'western discourse' or 'shop talk'. Discourse is the articulation of intelligibility (which is where meaning maintains itself); it both gives shape to intelligibility and expresses the shape of intelligibility. Furthermore, "the intelligibility of something has always been articulated, even before there is any appropriative interpretation of it" (SZ 161). What this implies is that discourse is not an articulation of meaning in the way in which interpretation is a making explicit of what the understanding understands. Discourse, it seems, helps to make things intelligible by providing the terms within which they may be understood. Interpretation does not perform this function. Here we can see how discourse actually plays an important role in the phenomenological disclosure of the Being of entities, because as we saw earlier, it is through *logos* — discourse — that phenomena manifest themselves in themselves. Linking this to the discussion in HCT, we can say that discourse is intimately connected with categorial intuition in that entities are intuited *in the terms in which they have been previously understood and expressed.*

Although Heidegger says comparatively little about discourse, we should not underestimate the role it plays. Discourse, in so far as it is already existing, makes communication possible; communication is central to Dasein's sociality and to the maintenance of the with-world. But Heidegger also seems to understand discourse not merely as an existing body of signs which mediates our interaction, but as the act of communicating itself. This view is apparent in the four features which he identifies as constitutive of discourse. These are: what the discourse is about; what is said in the talk; the communication; and the making known (SZ 162). What the discourse is about is its topic or theme. What is said in the talk is what is said or expressed about the theme. The communication [*Mitteilung*] is understood in a broad sense as that through which something comes to be shared between the participants. The making known is the disclosive expression which occurs through this talking — the way of speaking. Dasein's participation in discourse is really a discursive participation with the other. Moreover, discourse involves much more than simply the words which are exchanged; it includes the pragmatic dimensions of force and intonation which result in shared understanding. Indeed in this

> more general kind of communication, the Articulation of Being with one another understandingly is constituted. Through it a co-state-of-mind gets 'shared', and so does the understanding of Being-with .... In discourse Being-with becomes 'explicitly' *shared*; that is to say, it *is* already, but it is unshared as something that has not been taken hold of and appropriated. (SZ 162)

Discourse is obviously of crucial importance in the expression of Dasein's sociality, and correspondingly, in the creation and maintenance of the totality of significations which constitutes the world and which is shared among Dasein.[33]

In the following passage, Heidegger places a great deal of emphasis on hearing and listening:

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[33] On the relationship between discourse and *Mitsein* in Heidegger, see Udo Tietz, "Dasein — Mitsein — Sprache: Heideggers Auffassung über das 'Wesen der Sprache' in *Sein und Zeit*," *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 73 (Dec. 1990): 1152-1160.

> Hearing is constitutive for discourse. And just as linguistic utterance is based on discourse, so is acoustic perception on hearing. Listening to ... is Dasein's existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others. Indeed, hearing constitutes the primary and authentic way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being — as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it. Dasein hears because it understands. As a Being-in-the-world with Others, a Being which understands, Dasein is 'in thrall' to Dasein-with and to itself; and in this thraldom it 'belongs' to these. Being-with develops in listening to one another. (SZ 163)

This emphasis on hearing is significant because of the kind of openness it stresses in characterizing Dasein's Being-in-the-world. It represents a shift from the more traditional visual metaphor for how it is that we know the other and share the world with others to an auditory and oral metaphor. Furthermore, it is interesting that discourse discloses in multiple ways. The one who speaks discloses *to* the other, but is also disclosed *for* the other and *by* the other who listens. This multiplicity is largely due to the ambiguity between active and passive senses in the auditory metaphor. Hearing is generally understood as passive, but listening — which is essential to real hearing — is also active. To hear the other, one must be both active and passive — or attentive in a way which surpasses both. The ambiguity of the middle voice surfaces again, echoing the language of clearing and openness already noted; this ambiguity also appears in the discursive modes of hearkening and keeping silent (SZ 163-65).

The systematic connection of the four forms of disclosedness — *Befindlichkeit*, understanding, interpretation, and discourse — is somewhat ambiguous. *Befindlichkeit* and understanding are equiprimordial, simultaneous. Although Heidegger also maintains that discourse is equiprimordial with *Befindlichkeit* and understanding, it is less clear whether he means that all three are equiprimordial[34] or that discourse is equiprimordial with the double disclosedness of *Befindlichkeit* and understanding.[35] The second reading seems more plausible primarily because Heidegger associates discourse with disclosedness in general in his discussion of the temporality of discourse in Division II (SZ 349-50).

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[34] This would suggest that there are three primary modes of disclosedness. Evidence for this lies in Heidegger's predilection for grouping things in three's. Care is composed of three aspects (thrownness, projection, and falling); temporality is the past, present, and future; there are three fore-structures, three modes of fallen Being-in (idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity), and three elements to authentic disclosure (anxiety, anticipation, and reticence). One cannot help but wonder whether these are not all meant to be correlated through a tri-partite structure of disclosedness. Indeed Heidegger explicitly draws connections between thrownness, *Befindlichkeit*, and the past on the one hand, and projection, understanding, and the future on the other. This would suggest that discourse is to be associated with falling and the present. One problem with this interpretation is that Heidegger explicitly associates discourse with temporality in general and does not assign it to the temporal mode of the present. This makes it questionable whether discourse should be associated with falling, which he does link to the present.

We must still address another difficulty — the position which interpretation assumes within this schema. It is said that discourse is the articulation of intelligibility, where intelligibility is the basis of meaning. We also know that something can be articulated in discourse without having been explicitly appropriated through interpretation. Yet interpretation is a making explicit of what is understood in understanding (*Verständnis* not *Verstehen*). What is the difference between 'making explicit' and 'articulating'? What is the difference between 'meaning' and 'what is understood in understanding'?

Interpretation is the development of the understanding (SZ 148); as such, it works out "the possibilities projected in understanding" (SZ 149), bringing the *in-order-to* and as-structures explicitly into "sight". Discourse, as an articulation of meaning, involves giving shape to the significance of the world. Understanding understands *significance*, which means that understanding grasps implicitly the assignments or references of entities. Interpretation interprets significance by bringing these assignments or references more explicitly into view (laying them out). Discourse articulates significance by giving these references a form which is *expressible*. Interpretation, as an intensification of significant expression, depends upon discourse. Phenomena are first named and shaped through discourse; discourse provides the terms or categories according to which objects disclose themselves meaningfully. Interpretation is more explicit than discourse in that it *appropriates* the significance which discourse often only implicitly articulates. For example, etymological or textual analysis is interpretive; it aims to further disclose the meaning which is articulated in the discourse, though by no means explicitly appropriated.

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[35] Evidence for the second view lies in Heidegger's emphasis on thrown-projection, which would suggest that we are to think the equiprimordiality of *Befindlichkeit* and understanding first, and then see this two-part whole as equiprimordial with discourse. Thus, *Befindlichkeit* would primarily disclose thrownness, understanding would primarily disclose projection, and discourse would primarily disclose thrown-projection.

In considering interpretation, it may help to recall that Heidegger wants to demonstrate, in his own phenomenology of intentionality, that what others have called 'knowledge' is really better understood as 'interpretation'. Thus, Dasein interprets its world against a background of disclosedness which is constituted by *Befindlichkeit*, understanding, and discourse, and it is by means of these that Dasein discloses its Being-in-the-world. For Heidegger Being-in constitutes a sort of *between* in so far as it is meant to capture Dasein's intentional relatedness. However, Being-in is not a relation which merely lies between subject and object; it orients and positions them significantly with respect to one another. Being-in is an engagement and involvement in which things matter to us; we are affected by them, understand them, talk about them, interpret them. The significance or meaning which things have for us — and our understanding of that meaning — allows us to approach objects or to distance ourselves from them. It also allows objects to draw near to us or to withdraw. This orientation along lines of significance grounds spatiality, the *there* of Being-in-the-world. It is through Being-in-the-world and importantly also *Mitsein* — through our lived experience of engagement with other entities relative to a network of meaning which is always already there for factical Dasein — that the fabric of meaning within which we dwell is created, sustained, altered, shared.[36]

Heidegger will argue in Division II that Dasein's temporality is foundational for Being-in-the-world. Traditional ontologies, which take space as their horizon and which focus on Being as substance, are unable to express or account for the dynamism which characterizes Dasein's Being. This dynamism shows itself in Dasein's existentiality, Dasein's projecting upon possibilities, Dasein's movement "through" time. Dasein's

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[36] Dasein in its everydayness only privatively orients itself within this Being-in. Heidegger identifies three 'fallen' forms of Being-in, all of which disclose disclosedness by turning away from it. They are: idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. Although Heidegger does not explicitly connect them to the three fore-structures of understanding, there does seem to be a correlation. The fore-having, the fore-sight, and the fore-conception are intended to express that which any understanding (*Verständnis*) has in advance when it understands something; and what seems to mark idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity is a certain emptiness with respect to the content of these structures. This would imply that nothing is really understood or disclosed in these cases.

Being is ecstatic, and this can only be disclosed when time is taken as a horizon. This will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 3.

In the course of Chapters 3-5 of SZ, Heidegger has sought to illuminate the structure of Dasein's lived experience, its intentionality. Through his analysis of the world, he makes it clear that intentional objects are never mere things present-at-hand. Through his discussion of the 'who' of Dasein he demonstrates that the intentional subject is never isolated or cut off from the world and others. And through his treatment of Being-in, Heidegger shows that what lies between the intentional object and the subject is no mere relation between two entities which have been stuck together, but rather a rich, immediate, pre-reflective absorption and engagement in the world, a dwelling within a realm of significance which is always already understood. That this dwelling is *always already* understood is extremely important, for Heidegger's point is that we understand this dwelling only implicitly, yet all of our ways of Being (even in everydayness) *presume* this understanding. This presumption is what he wants to unpack. How can Dasein's empty intending of its Being-in-the-world be brought to fulfillment? What evidence can be brought to bear which will attest to the truth of Dasein's presumption?

iv. Care

Heidegger is offering an interpretation, in his own technical sense of the word, of Dasein's Being *as* Being-in-the-world. Remember that, in this technical sense, every interpretation is a development of the understanding and a making explicit of what is already understood in understanding. Understanding of Being-in-the-world is something Dasein always has. Heidegger must demonstrate how Dasein understands itself — though not explicitly — as Being-in-the-world in its average everydayness. His interpretation aims to make this as-structure explicit; to do so Dasein must possess, as a possibility, a way of making this Being-in-the-world explicit to itself as a unitary phenomenon. Thus, Heidegger is interested in showing the means by which Dasein can achieve this; it will happen through anxiety, a mode of *Befindlichkeit*. In this way, evidence is brought to bear which confirms the understanding of Being presumed in

Dasein's Being-in-the-world, and thereby illustrates its truth. Heidegger clarifies and justifies this phenomenological notion of truth by arguing that traditional notions of truth and reality are actually derived from the more primordial truth of disclosedness, and the latter is more appropriate to Dasein's particular ontology.

Heidegger must show how Dasein can, from out of its fallenness in which its ownmost *Seinkönnen* remains concealed, come to a disclosure of its Being-in-the-world. He begins by suggesting that Dasein's fallenness is tantamount to a 'fleeing in the face of itself', a turning away from itself (SZ 184). This turning away constitutes a covering over of oneself. But 'covering over' implies that what is covered was first dis-covered (or dis-closed). Thus, the fleeing involved in falling entails a particular kind of disclosure of Dasein's Being, although certainly not one which is held onto (SZ 184-85).[37]

What is the mode of disclosedness which belongs to fleeing? One form of fleeing occurs when we are frightened or feel threatened and shrink back from something in the world.[38] Fear phenomenologically discloses something as fearsome; it implies that through circumspective concern we have disclosed something as threatening to a *for-the-sake-of-which* (either our own or someone else's). One has fears about something; one fears some entity in the world; one fears for oneself or for another. But in falling, one flees oneself. Why? Why does Dasein turn away from *itself*? And where does it turn in turning away?[39] Heidegger suggests that Dasein must shrink from itself because it finds *itself* threatening. But one cannot actually be afraid of oneself; one can only be *anxious before oneself*. In fear, there is an entity which is perceived to be threatening: one is afraid of something particular or definite (even if it is not factically there). Similarly, the object of fear is located somewhere in relation to oneself (around the corner, under the bed, in the closet).

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[37] This is not unlike the disclosure which occurs through the denial or turning away described above.

[38] Here Heidegger refers back to an earlier analysis of fear which I have refrained from discussing until now.

[39] In describing *Befindlichkeit* in section 29, Heidegger says that "the way in which the mood discloses is not one in which we look at thrownness, but one in which we turn towards or turn away. For the most part the mood does not turn towards the burdensome character of Dasein which is manifest in it ... it is always by way of a state of mind [*Befindlichkeit*] that this turning-away is what it is" (SZ 135).

In anxiety, however, what makes one anxious is much less definite. First of all, it is not an entity: it is no-thing. Secondly, not being an entity, it does not have a location: it is no-where (SZ 186-87).[40] These two features are quite significant to the *Unheimlichkeit*[41] one experiences in anxiety. In the everydayness in which we primarily dwell, we encounter entities in our world as having definite locations. In fact, we are so habituated to dealing with them in this fashion that we tend to overlook the phenomenon of world in which all such interactions are grounded. Furthermore, we tend to understand ourselves and the world in terms of the entities encountered in the world, and we typically think that meaning lies in these entities. In anxiety, particular entities lose their significance and fade into the background, leaving us with the world itself. Since the familiar ways that we have of understanding things become threatened, arbitrary, or even meaningless, we are robbed of our commonplace understanding of the world. Thus, we are left face-to-face with the world itself; it is in this way that the world is disclosed as a phenomenon.

Anxious Dasein is anxious not only before Being-in-the-world but also before its *Seinkönnen*, which is disclosed in its flight. In everydayness we tend to comport toward entities as though they possessed possibility as properties. We typically do not disclose to ourselves that it is actually our relationship to these entities, and our assignment of *ourselves* to a particular possibility, which illuminates these entities as having possibility. Anxiety discloses this Being-possible of Dasein, thereby disclosing the burden of

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[40] This no-thing and no-where are related in a very particular way to the no-one and no-where that characterize *das Man* and fallen Being-in. In everydayness, Dasein explicitly understands its self and its *there* in terms through which the no-one and no-where appear precisely as some-one and some-where. We may construe anxiety as an uncloaking of this obscurity. The no-thing and no-where experienced in anxiety point to the particular indeterminacy which arises once the determinacy of the entities in terms of which we typically understand ourselves has been disrupted. Thus, the worldhood of the world which manifests itself as no-thing and no-where does so *in contrast to* the seeming some-thing and some-where of everydayness, despite the fact that those supposedly determinate entities might actually be rather indeterminate (as with *das Man*, idle talk, etc.).

[41] *Unheimlichkeit* is a 'not-at-home-ness'; Macquarrie and Robinson translate it as 'uncanniness'. While 'not-at-home-ness' may certainly be uncanny, I will retain the German because of its important connotations of unrootedness and being displaced from one's dwelling.

Dasein's existence and the responsibility the non-transferable task of Being-possible represents. In the same phenomenon of anxiety, the worldhood of the world and Dasein's Being in that world — both as Being thrown into the world and as thrown towards its ownmost *Seinkönnen* — as well as Dasein's Being-free-for are disclosed in a unitary fashion (SZ 188).

This disclosure is *unheimlich*; it shakes Dasein out of the prevalent mode of Being-in (everydayness) with which it is familiar and wherein it usually dwells. (Recall the connection drawn above between the 'in' of Being-in and 'dwelling'.) Dasein is no longer at home, either *in* the world or *with* itself. As a result, it flees back to what is familiar, throwing itself into the world, absorbing itself with entities, occupying itself so as to forget anxiety and what is disclosed in it.

Heidegger says little about what induces anxiety, no doubt to avoid confusing it with its ontic, psychological correlate. My view is that anxiety may arise any time Dasein's usual routine is disrupted, challenged, questioned, or otherwise brought to a pause, not unlike the disruption that Heidegger describes in terms of our involvement with the ready-to-hand.[42] There Heidegger points out that things often only appear to us as phenomena when something goes wrong, disturbing our usual unreflective involvement with them. So, for instance, in tool use, I wield the tool in such a way that it is an extension of my body. I do not think about how I manipulate it; the readiness-to-hand of the tool is only obtrusive when it ceases to function smoothly. Only then does the readiness-to-hand which was always already there becomes disclosed to me phenomenologically. This is similar to what occurs in the case of anxiety. Our Being-in-the-world is disclosed to us phenomenologically when the automatic routine of our everyday involvement is disrupted in some way. The nature of this disruption cannot perhaps be ontically described in a general fashion. However, it does occur. The involvements in terms of which we typically understand ourselves are sometimes experienced as alienating and meaningless. In such instances, we do not quite know how to go on because the meanings which have always been there to guide our activities are absent or cease to be compelling. We simply find ourselves to be there, without reason or motive. Our Being is disclosed to us as thrown Being-in-the-world.

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[42] A good example of what I am describing here is offered in the *Myth of Sisyphus* in a passage where Camus speaks of the absurd:

> At certain moments of lucidity, the mechanical aspect of their gestures, their meaningless pantomime makes silly everything that surrounds them. A man is talking on the telephone behind a glass partition; you cannot hear him, but you see his incomprehensible dumb show; you wonder why he is alive. This discomfort in the face of man's own inhumanity, this incalculable tumble before the image of what we are, this 'nausea', as a writer of today calls it, is also the absurd. Likewise the stranger who at certain seconds comes to meet us in a mirror, the familiar and yet alarming brother we encounter in our own photographs is also the absurd. (11)

Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York: Vintage Books, 1955).

Is anxiety adequate as a means of revealing Dasein's ontological structure as a whole? It is. Dasein is anxious in the face of its thrown Being-in-the-world. Dasein is anxious about its *Seinkönnen* in the world (its *in-der-Welt-Seinkönnen*) (SZ 191). The "sources" of Dasein's anxiety reveal both the possibility and the abandonment which belong to Dasein and to which it belongs. Dasein's Being is disclosed in an articulated form as 'Being ahead of itself already in the world alongside entities'. This is the structure of care, the *meaning* of Dasein's Being as Being-in-the-world which Heidegger's interpretation aims to reveal. In maintaining that care is the structure that underlies anything like willing or wishing, Heidegger argues that care is the structure of all intentional comportment whatsoever (SZ 194).[43]

If care is the meaning of Dasein's Being, then it is care that Dasein understands when it understands itself. That is, Dasein understands itself as 'Being ahead of itself already in the world and alongside entities', and this expresses Dasein's existentiality as thrown-projection. Heidegger will go on to demonstrate in Division II that Dasein's Being is care *because* it is Being-towards-death — because it is both thrown toward and projecting toward its death as the possibility of its impossibility. This establishes a relationship between care and Dasein's mortality which Heidegger foreshadows in his citation of the fable of the *cura* (SZ 197-98). In the fable, Care fashions a figure from a piece of clay and asks Jupiter to give it spirit. A dispute arises as to whose name should be bestowed upon the creature, with Jupiter, Care, and Earth each laying claims. Saturn is selected as arbiter and resolves the conflict with the following pronouncement: "'Since you, Jupiter, have given its spirit, you shall receive that spirit at its death; and since you, Earth, have given its body, you shall receive its body. But since 'Care' first shaped this creature, she shall possess it as long as it lives. And because there is now a dispute among you as to its name, let it be called '*homo*' for it is made out of *humus* (earth)'" (SZ 198). Dasein is possessed by care, then, as long as it lives, for it is Care that gave Dasein its Being as possibility. As long as Dasein exists, it has possibility; at its death, the fragile combination of matter and spirit which allows it to be a Being-possible will dissolve. The 'Being ahead of itself already in the world and alongside entities' is possible because of the merging of spirit and matter which can only endure for a finite period. The anxiety that Dasein experiences occurs because it cares about its existence; its existence is an issue for it, and this is disclosed as such in the anxiety over its own mortality. The importance of Dasein's mortality receives greater attention in the next chapter.

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[43] "If willing is to be possible ontologically, the following items are constitutive for it: (1) the prior disclosedness of the 'for-the-sake-of-which' in general (Being-ahead-of-itself); (2) the disclosedness of something with which one can concern oneself (the world as the 'wherein' of Being-already); (3) Dasein's projection of itself understandingly upon a potentiality-for-Being towards a possibility of the entity 'willed'" (SZ 194).

That care is the structure of all intentional comportment can be more fully comprehended when we understand it in terms of the issues with which phenomenology is concerned, as discussed in Chapter 1. The characterization of Dasein's Being as care allows us to avoid the skeptical problem — what Heidegger calls the problem of reality. Traditionally this problem is put forward in the following terms: how can I know reality — objects — in themselves? The formulation of such a problem depends upon an understanding of the subject as cut off from objects in the world, and the question which follows is how the subject can transcend its interiority toward the exterior wherein objects lie. How can I ever have knowledge of objects as they are in-themselves? How can I achieve a correspondence between psychical and physical reality? Heidegger thinks this question is misguided, and the error rests in the fact that the Being of Dasein has not been made definite enough (SZ 205). Dasein never has to prove the reality of the world because Dasein in its very Being always has an understanding of the world; Dasein is always ‘ahead of itself already in the world alongside entities’. The concealment of this aspect of Dasein’s Being is due to its falling. Moreover, "reality" as traditionally interpreted is primarily concerned with entities in the world in terms of their presence-at-hand; yet, as we have seen, this view does not grasp their Being in its primordiality. Reality, which pertains to the Being of entities in the world, is what is phenomenologically disclosed through intentionality: thus, reality is rooted in Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. This in no way implies that *what* is real is dependent upon Dasein, it simply means that reality (Being) is rooted in Dasein’s Being (SZ 212).

This understanding of reality has repercussions for the concept of truth as well. Traditionally truth is conceived as a correspondence or agreement between a judgment in the form of an assertion and the object about which the judgment is made. Truth is understood as an agreement between knowledge and reality. But since we have modified our understanding of reality, we must accordingly adjust our notion of truth. Heidegger asks: when are we confident in saying that something is true? His response: when knowledge demonstrates its truth. In other words, we say that an assertion is true when it uncovers the entity. But this uncovering is only possible on the basis of Being-in-the-world. Assertion is a particular mode of interpretation which is in turn an explication of something uncovered in understanding. Understanding uncovers an entity in its Being; this is the reality of the entity. Assertion, then, in order to be adequate, must uncover the entity in a similar way. But Heidegger pushes the point further, maintaining that the correspondence notion of truth makes the same error as the present-at-hand notion of reality just discussed (SZ 225). It compares the assertion as a thing present-at-hand with "reality" taken as present-at-hand; both obscure the Being of the entity under consideration. The crux of the matter is that truth is revealed when evidence is given which affirms some judgment, expression, or supposition. A statement is true when it uncovers some entity in its Being. For this reason truth is a Being-uncovering (SZ 220), and this uncovering is something that pertains to phenomena which are disclosed through intentionality. Truth as disclosedness is bound up with Dasein’s Being as Being-in-the-world. There is another sense of truth — that of Being-uncovered — which results from the Being-uncovering in the event of truth. Once something is uncovered, it is vulnerable to becoming obscured because Dasein is also always falling, and so covering over what it has disclosed. Dasein is, paradoxically, both truth and untruth.

What Heidegger has established then, by the end of the first division, is that Dasein's Being, as a Being-in-the-world, is a form of intentional subjectivity that challenges traditional notions of the subject and the epistemological models based upon these notions. Dasein is, in a sense, a phenomenological being; intentionality is the structure of Dasein's lived experience. Dasein's Being is always experienced as mine and as immediate. That is, in lived experience one always already finds oneself in particular situations, understanding particular possibilities, always having to do with things in one way or another. One is always ahead of oneself, beyond oneself, more than oneself. One comports towards entities largely implicitly and unreflectively. One dwells within a realm of meaning which is not simply projected by a subject, but is also always experienced as given, cloaking everything, binding everything into constellations of meaning. We dwell in a world where things make sense. The realm of meaning within which Dasein finds itself is always one in which disclosure happens in the ambiguity of the middle voice, neither active nor passive, but somehow more than both. The picture of subjectivity which emerges through the characterization of Dasein as care and Being-in-the-world is at once one of the subject as power and possibility, and of a subject who is subjected to the world and its thrownness.

As part of its Being, Dasein understands its Being, although it typically does so only implicitly. But that Dasein intends its Being only emptily in no way proves that it does not understand its Being. Heidegger has shown that even in Dasein's everydayness, an understanding of its Being can be shown to underlie its very denial of that Being. If this understanding of its own Being can be brought out, if Dasein's intention can be fulfilled, then a clearer sense of what Being means overall can be achieved. For this reason, it is important that Heidegger demonstrate how Dasein may disclose its Being-in-the-world to itself. The starting point for this disclosure is the phenomenologically reductive and disruptive moment of anxiety, which reveals Dasein's Being-in-the-world as thrown and as *Seinkönnen*. What is understood most explicitly in that moment is that Dasein *cares* about its Being, and that this care permeates its entire comportment.

Chapter 3

Division II: Authenticity and Temporality

At the end of the first division, Heidegger asks whether or not care represents Dasein's structural whole and whether or not anxiety can adequately disclose Dasein's Being as a whole. The concern to bring Dasein's Being as a 'whole' into view receives greater attention at the beginning of Division II. Here Heidegger chooses to discuss this issue in the language of his own analysis of interpretation. Every interpretation brings out what is in the fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception of the understanding which underlies it, and this must hold for Heidegger's interpretation of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. If his interpretation is to satisfy claims to primordiality, the fore-structures which it explicates must grasp Dasein's Being as a whole. If the interpretation is to be primordial, it must be an explication of an understanding which is also primordial or most complete; it must be one in which Dasein's Being is made manifest phenomenologically in its Being (not in its semblance). But Heidegger's analysis has so far dealt primarily with Dasein's everydayness and its inauthenticity, and we know that inauthenticity is generally the mode of Dasein's Being in which it *is not* its Being. For this reason, Heidegger maintains that his analysis up to this point is inadequate for a disclosure of Dasein's Being as a whole. The understanding of Dasein which forms the basis of a primordial interpretation must be one that grasps Dasein in the mode in which it *is* its Being — namely, in authenticity. Only in a discussion of authenticity will the phenomenon which Heidegger wants to examine (namely Dasein's Being) be properly revealed, for only in authenticity is this Being fully intended. What he must show is that the meaning of Dasein's Being as care is rooted deeply in everydayness, as well as in what underlies and is presumed in that everydayness.

Heidegger's concern with wholeness is crucially related to his project as one of hermeneutics. To understand the 'parts', one must understand both the 'whole' and how those parts relate to one another in forming that whole. Yet the whole cannot properly be grasped without an understanding of the parts which constitute it. Any hermeneutic interpretation, then, requires that one go 'back and forth', as it were, between the parts and the whole; any interpretation must be somewhat circular. Heidegger has given a preliminary interpretation of Dasein's 'parts' in Division I; now he is attempting an analysis of Dasein as a whole so he can return to re-interpret those parts.

We can, however, also understand this strategy in more specifically phenomenological terms. In a certain sense, our preliminary analysis grasped Dasein's Being as a whole because it disclosed Dasein's structural whole as care and recognized Dasein's Being-in-the-world as a unitary phenomenon. But this 'whole' has only been disclosed in a formal fashion, largely because Division I aims to articulate the understanding of Dasein's Being that Dasein has *in everydayness* where its Being is disclosed to it in a privative way — where it only emptily intends its Being-in-the-world. To disclose it more concretely, we must more explicitly thematize Dasein's Being as a whole. The presumed understanding of itself as Being-in-the-world which underlies all of Dasein's everyday worldly comportments needs to be more fully disclosed through a fulfillment of Dasein's intention of its own Being. This fulfillment occurs when Dasein's Being shows itself in itself: that is, when it manifests itself phenomenologically to Dasein. We have seen in Chapter 2 that this occurs in the phenomenologically reductive moment of anxiety. Heidegger will develop that notion in Division II, and it will receive greater elaboration below. However it is extremely important to keep in mind that this fulfillment of Dasein's empty intention of itself is not a *completion* of itself. Dasein's Being is one of possibility and openness, and it implicitly understands this in its everydayness. In grasping itself as a whole, Dasein does not close itself off as finished and complete, but discloses its openness and possibility to itself more immediately. In a sense, then, Dasein's grasping of itself as a whole is a grasping of itself as essentially incomplete.

Referring back to Husserl's discussion of intentionality, we saw that intentions are fulfilled when an expressive act and an intuitive act which give the same meaning are conjoined. Bringing this to bear on our present discussion, we might say that Dasein's everyday Being-in-the-world is expressive of the meaning of its Being (its care), but does not involve a corresponding intuitive apprehension of that Being. This intuitive component, then, will be important in demarcating authenticity from inauthenticity. We will see that, in anxiety, Dasein discloses its Being and understands that Being as a Being-towards-death — an understanding which is implicitly assumed in all of Dasein's comportments in the world. The truth of this disclosure will be attested by what is articulated in the call of conscience; Dasein, then, can *be* its Being (intend its own Being) in a fuller way. Heidegger will argue that the disclosure of Dasein's Being as a Being-towards-death illustrates that Dasein understands itself relative to temporality.

With this, then, as our general understanding of the trajectory of the text, I will consider Heidegger's path of thinking in the second division in terms of the following movements: his illumination of the possibility of authenticity for Dasein — both ontologically and in its ontic manifestation; the interpretative explication of Dasein's understanding of its Being in terms of temporality; and the hermeneutic manifestation of this understanding of temporality in terms of Dasein's own understanding of itself as historical. The ultimate aim of this chapter is to illustrate how Dasein's authenticity may be understood as a fulfillment of Dasein's intentional comportment of itself, where that comportment is generally expressed in its Being-in-the-world. It is particularly important here that the intuitive evidence which fulfills Dasein's intention of itself is *given* to it; the evidence comes from outside of Dasein's self in its everydayness.

i. Death and wholeness

The problem Heidegger faces at this point is to properly bring Dasein as a whole into the analysis. This suggests that Dasein's Being is something that can be characterized as a totality, and that can be completely disclosed and grasped as such. However, we should be wary of such a reading, for it is not clear that anything can ever be entirely disclosed in the sense that nothing would remain concealed. Considering the methodological strategy which Heidegger maps out in HCT, it seems plausible to suppose that bringing Dasein 'into view as a whole' relates to explaining how Dasein's Being can be fully intended, given that it is mostly emptily intended in everydayness. But in thinking about this, it is important to keep in mind that it is Dasein's Being which is intended, not Dasein qua entity. Being, as we have seen, is intimately connected with meaning, so 'grasping Dasein's Being as a whole' means 'grasping the meaning of

Dasein's Being as a whole' — or fully intending the *meaning* of Dasein's Being. This meaning has been characterized in a preliminary way as care. But the horizon within which care is most richly understood, and its full significance made manifest, is temporal — we must consider care with reference to Dasein's mortality. The suggestion, then, is that in its everydayness, Dasein emptily intends itself as being mortal, and it is this intentional comportment which must be fulfilled in authenticity.

That something like wholeness pertains to Dasein's Being perhaps seems somewhat counter-intuitive. There is, after all, a sense in which Dasein never *is* whole, in so far as it is always ahead of itself as thrown projection. Thus, it does not seem possible for Dasein to be grasped as a whole. It is nevertheless the case that this 'ahead of itself' disappears at death, which is where Dasein meets its end. So Heidegger begins with the suggestion that perhaps Dasein achieves wholeness in relation to death. But in what sense is this so, and how does it assist us in uncovering the possibility in which Dasein can grasp its Being as a whole? If I am a whole only in death, then it seems clear that I can never grasp myself as a whole; my own death entails the annihilation of my consciousness, and hence the elimination of my ability to grasp anything at all, much less my own Being as a whole. I can never experience my own end. While I have knowledge of the deaths of others, and experience these deaths in one way or another, I never experience them in the same way that I would my own death. The problem is that although there are many comportments in the world wherein we are interchangeable and can stand in for or represent one another, death is not one of them (SZ 239). Death is always mine; thus, it is through the grasping of one's death that Dasein's mineness and existence are revealed. The non-representability of death implies that I cannot grasp death as my own possibility through the deaths of others: I have to be able to disclose my *own* end. But in order to explain how this can occur, it must be clarified what is meant by this end.

Death represents the end of Dasein and also bears a relation to the possibility of Dasein's wholeness. But death is an end which is ***not-yet***. How are we to understand this *not-yet*? Is it something outstanding in the sense of a debt, i.e. something that belongs to someone but has not yet been delivered (SZ 242)? No. This sense of 'outstanding' implies a 'being-missing' suggestive of an un-readiness-to-hand, which is not a primordial way of characterizing Dasein's Being. Moreover, unlike the case of the repayment of a debt, when Dasein 'receives' the death that belongs to it, not only does the *not-yet* disappear, but Dasein itself ceases to exist.[1] Is it outstanding in the sense of the not-yet-Being-together of *parts* which belong together as a whole, as with the phases of the moon (SZ 243)? Not really, because this suggests that there is some 'piece' that is missing which will be added to complete the whole. Such a view relies too heavily on an understanding of Being as presence-at-hand. But "our problem does not pertain to *getting into* our grasp the 'not-yet' which is of the character of Dasein; it pertains to the possible *Being* or *not-Being* of this 'not-yet'. Dasein must, as itself, *become* — that is to say, *be* — what it is not yet" (SZ 243).[2] Dasein's *not-yet* is not something that stands outside of it and must somehow be incorporated into it or seen to be part of it. The *not-yet* which belongs to Dasein is more intimate to Dasein's Being; it is a possibility. Does this possibility perhaps belong to Dasein in the way that ripeness belongs to an unripe fruit? The becoming ripe of the fruit belongs to the fruit; it lies within the fruit in its unripeness, as a sort of perfection toward which it develops. The fruit *becomes* that which it is *not-yet* out of itself.

Although this is certainly headed in the right direction as far as Heidegger is concerned, it still is not quite right. Ripeness in the fruit is a sort of teleological fulfillment [*Vollenden*] of the Being of the fruit, a feature that is not really part of Dasein's Being (SZ 244). The sense of fulfillment implied in the case of the fruit suggests an ending in terms of being finished, but Dasein is never really *finished* when it ends.[3] So in what way does Dasein contain within it the possibility of becoming its *not-yet*, which does not have this sense of fulfillment? If becoming its *not-yet* is a possibility and Dasein always *is* its possibilities, then there is a sense in which Dasein *is* its *not-yet* (just as with the fruit). But Dasein is its *not-yet* in that it already *is* its end. This is not to say that Dasein is *at* its end — because it surely is not — but that Dasein is a *Being towards the end* (SZ 245). Dasein does not become a whole in dying; it is a whole in so far as it is mortal, finite, and grasps its limits in its Being towards the end — which is a Being-towards-death.

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[1] Although Heidegger does not address this scenario, one could suggest that perhaps the *not-yet* is not something which Dasein is owed, but something that it owes. Thus, it pays off its debt when it dies. But, typically, paying off a debt does not involve self-annihilation, although I suppose that in particular instances it could. The point is that there is nothing essential to the notion of a debt and its repayment that suggests the erasure of anything apart from the debt upon its repayment.

[2] This is one of the key passages in which Heidegger makes it clear that viewing Dasein's Being as a whole should not be understood in the totalizing terms in which it is sometimes cast. Authentic disclosure does not involve somehow bringing to appearance something that is hidden, but that somehow still exists as such in that hiddenness in the way of the moon example above. The disclosing of Dasein's death is not so much a revelation of my future death as a *Being towards that death*.

Heidegger is clear that he is not primarily interested in discussing death in terms of the perishing [*Verenden*] of a living thing. Clearly this happens to Dasein, but not *qua* Dasein. Dasein can either die authentically [*Sterben*] or simply 'demise' in an inauthentic dying [*Ableben*].[4] Dasein is able to grasp itself as a *whole* through its Being-towards-death; it is the only entity which is mortal, and this mortality defines its Being. Heidegger's claim is that an understanding of this Being-mortal implicitly underlies Dasein's Being-in-the-world and Dasein's care for its Being.

Being towards the end is a standing before a possibility which is impending [*bevorstehend*] in a distinctive way. This "event" which stands before me is not like other things which might stand before me.[5] Death is particular — it is unlike any other possibility. Firstly, death is a possibility which cannot be surpassed or overtaken

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[3] Nor, it seems, is an empty intention 'finished' when it is fulfilled. The fruit, in becoming its *not-yet*, becomes what it is; it is somehow *less* what it is when unripe than when ripe. This is not the case with Dasein. Dasein is not somehow *more* what it is in death (or in authenticity); in becoming its *not-yet* Dasein becomes what it already is.

[4] 'Demise' is Dasein's everyday way of comporting toward its death or understanding its death as something that simply befalls it and which eventually happens to everyone. This is to be distinguished from authentic dying in that, in *Sterben*, Dasein grasps its Being towards this death as the possibility of its impossibility, as that which is essential to its very Being as Dasein. For particularly insightful discussions of Heidegger's Being-towards-death see Emmanuel Levinas, "La Mort et le Temps," *L'Herne* 60 (1991): 21-76 and Jacques Derrida, *Aporias*, trans. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993). Derrida in particular focuses on the aporetic aspect of death. In this regard, see also Jean-Yves Lacoste, "L'esprit dans l'aporie du temps: esquisse," *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* 85 (Feb. 1987): 22-79.

[5] I put this term in scare quotes because we are not supposed to understand death in authenticity as something which *happens* to Dasein. (See note 4.)

[*unüberholbar*]; unlike other possibilities, death is a *certainty*. Secondly, death is a possibility which is *non-relational*, in that no one else can represent me or stand in for me with respect to this possibility. No one else can die my death for me; my death is mine and mine alone.[6] In this regard death is my *ownmost* [*eigenste*] possibility, and it is related (in a way that will become clearer as we proceed) to my *ownmost Seinkönnen*. It is this very *Seinkönnen* which is at stake. Thus death, as the possibility of no longer being able to be there — or more properly *my* death as *my* possibility of *my* no longer being able to be there — is able to phenomenologically reveal my ownmost ability to be by functioning as a horizon against which this ability shows itself. In Being-towards-death, I comport towards this possibility in such a way that my entire Being has been assigned to it. This is reminiscent of the idea that Dasein assigns itself to specific possibilities within the world. Because Dasein assigns itself to a particular *for-the-sake-of-which*, entities within the world are illuminated as having possibilities which serve that *for-the-sake-of-which*. A similar movement occurs in Being-towards-death, with the difference that it is Dasein's *assignment of itself* to its ownmost possibility (its death) which illuminates the world, not just with respect to some particular project, but as a whole. This is why Being-towards-death is the most primordial possibility: it is that which grounds all other possibilities. Thus, death is distinctively impending because it is a possibility which is "*one's ownmost, which is non-relational* and which is not to be outstripped" (SZ 250-51). Dasein's end is *not-yet*, because it is not a possibility which merely lies in the future, but something that Dasein already *is* because Dasein is its possibilities. The possibility of death is the possibility of Dasein's Being overall, and thus the horizon for all of Dasein's other particular possibilities.

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[6] Heidegger notes that in Being-towards-death, my relations to others are undone (SZ 250). Although this is often interpreted to mean that in authenticity, Dasein's ties to others are severed, I would hesitate to interpret this passage in this way. First of all, I would not reduce authenticity to Being-towards-death so characterized; such a reading has not taken account of the relationship between authenticity and historicality. Moreover, given the context of the passage, I would argue that Heidegger is emphasizing the extent to which this particular possibility is non-representable where representability is something that characterizes Dasein's *Man-selbst*. Being-towards-death has the effect of shaking Dasein out of its *Man-selbst*, but it is not clear that this implies relinquishing all *Mitsein*, nor is it clear that this would even be possible given that *Mitsein* is one of Dasein's existential structures.

What must now be clarified is how Being towards this end, Being-towards-death, would constitute a disclosure of Dasein's Being as a whole. In Division I, Heidegger argued that Dasein's existential structure can be characterized in terms of thrownness, projection, and falling,[7] and that care is the meaning of this 'Being ahead of itself already in the world and alongside entities'. If Heidegger can show that Being-towards-death is disclosive of these same features, then he will have effectively shown that it discloses Dasein's structural whole. Moreover, he will have shown that both Being-in-the-world and Being-towards-death disclose the same thing, namely the meaning of Dasein's Being as care. However, in so far as Being-towards-death is both Dasein's ownmost possibility and the basis for all of Dasein's everyday comportments toward any possibilities whatsoever, Heidegger will have demonstrated the primordiality of Dasein's Being-towards-death — that Dasein's Being-towards-death is what underlies and is presumed in Dasein's everydayness.

In Being-towards-death, Dasein is towards its end; that is, Dasein has disclosed itself as 'ahead of itself', projecting toward that end. But Dasein also finds itself already thrown towards this end, abandoned to this possibility. Dasein's typical response to these disclosures is to flee or turn away from this possibility, thereby covering it up in falling. In Being-towards-death, we find a disclosedness of Dasein's Being to itself in which that Being is made manifest in terms of its projection, thrownness, and falling.[8] In so far as these same three features define Dasein's existential structure as care, Being-towards-death is adequate to disclose Dasein's Being *as* existence, revealing what is essential in it (SZ 258). But Dasein's Being as care is the meaning which underlies everyday Being-in-the-world; to properly show the primordiality of Being-towards-death, Heidegger must illustrate how Dasein *is* toward death in the concealment typical of everydayness, and how it can *disclose* this possibility authentically in *Sterben.*

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[7] In Division II, Heidegger refers to these features as "existence, facticity, and falling" (SZ 250). This is confusing, as I understand 'facticity' and 'existence' to be broader terms than either 'thrownness' or 'projection' taken alone. As such, I will always refer to the elements of the care structure as 'thrownness, projection, and falling' and will reserve 'existence' and 'facticity' for more general characterizations of Dasein's Being.

[8] It is not just that all aspects of the care structure are represented, but that they are all represented relative to Dasein's ownmost possibility, its death.

In inauthenticity Dasein comports towards its death in a way that conceals its ownmost character. As *Man-selbst* it is easy to say that 'one dies' without really comprehending the fact that *I* will die. Death happens to everybody, and thus to nobody. Death is presented as an event which is not yet at hand as a possibility; at most it simply lies beyond me although it will eventually befall me. The *not-yet* of death is typically understood in present-at-hand terms and not as a possibility of Dasein's Being that is distinctively impending. That is, Dasein does not disclose death as a possibility rooted in its own Being, and does not disclose its Being as a Being-possible. Dasein's *Man-selbst* discloses death in an ambiguous way, at once revealing and concealing it. The anxiety which one would experience before death is transformed into fear of a future event. This fallen disclosure of death is a form of fleeing, and although fleeing always discloses, it always does so privatively.

Heidegger pushes further by inquiring into a particular aspect of the ambiguous way in which *das Man* understands the possibility of death. Death is said to be certain; no one doubts that she will die (SZ 255). But in what does this certainty consist? Heidegger points out that, in general, certainty is related to truth; certainty is a holding of something as true. Given the relationship established earlier between truth and uncoveredness, certainty then implies a particular kind of uncoveredness for Dasein. Certainty, then, is Dasein's Being-certain. When something is only privatively disclosed, it remains largely concealed to Dasein; thus, what Dasein holds as certain with respect to this something is not necessarily what is most essential. In the everyday understanding of death, one is not only certain *that* one will die,[9] but that one will not die right now.[10] This, however, is precisely where the error lies, for death is indefinite with respect to when it will happen. Thus, one thing that is certain about death is the uncertainty as to when it will occur. This uncertainty is covered up in everydayness, which implies that Dasein's *Man-selbst* is also *un*-certain about death's uncertainty. Those aspects of death which distinguish it from mere demise and which make it a distinctively impending possibility for Dasein have not been uncovered; Dasein is only certain about its end in the sense of a demise. The *Man-selbst* covers up the ownmost character of death as a possibility which is both certain and indefinite (SZ 258).

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[9] But not that *I* will die.

[10] But not that I could die at any time.

Having demonstrated this, Heidegger can now flesh out his conception of death more fully: "*death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein's ownmost possibility — non-relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped. Death is*, as *Dasein's* end, in the Being of this entity *towards* its end" (SZ 258-59). That is, death is not some event which happens to me in the future; death is my comportment towards that end. In directing myself toward that end, I *am* that end. We might say that although the impossibility of my Being is what is *not-yet*, the possibility of that impossibility always already *is* because Dasein always is its possibilities.

This possibility must be understood in a way consistent with the peculiar sense of the *not-yet* which belongs to it. The Being-towards which characterizes death cannot be understood in terms of actualization because in Being-towards-death Dasein does not seek to *bring about* its end (SZ 261). We might say that Dasein, in so far as it *expects* its death, allows that possibility to draw close. This is, however, a deficient characterization, for in expectation one draws near to something which is possible in terms of that something's *actuality*, its becoming actual. When I expect the arrival of a friend, I am expecting — indeed waiting for — something which will be actualized and so taken out of its possibility. What we seek is a way for Dasein to draw close to death as its ownmost possibility, that preserves the aspect of a comportment toward the *possible*, a way which allows death to remain disclosed in its possibility. This is accomplished through what Heidegger refers to as **anticipation** [*Vorlaufen*] (SZ 262).

In anticipation, Dasein's ownmost *Seinkönnen* — its Being able to be — is disclosed to it against the horizon of its death — its no longer Being able to be — in terms of non-relationality, certainty, and indefiniteness. In the disclosure of its *Seinkönnen*, its ability (possibility) to be, Dasein becomes freed for its possibility, much like the disclosure of the usability of an object ready-to-hand frees that object for the possibility of its use. Dasein, freed for its Being as possibility, can project itself authentically upon factical possibilities.

Dasein's *Seinkönnen* is disclosed in Being-towards-death as *non-relational*, in that the mineness of its *Seinkönnen* is disclosed. My existence is a burden which only I can assume, and the inescapability of death discloses this possibility. The disclosure of this possibility frees Dasein for it, thereby allowing Dasein to take over that Being-towards-death to which it has already been assigned, rather than evade it; therein lies the disclosure of Dasein's inability to overtake or outstrip its death (and also its *Seinkönnen*). In this disclosure Dasein understands that it must give itself up [*sich selbst aufgeben*] — in the sense of giving up its inauthentic self — in order to be free for its ownmost self, the self which is most proper to it (SZ 264). In disclosing its thrownness towards death — its impossibility — Dasein discloses its Being as possibility. Since Dasein's *Seinkönnen* is disclosed as such, Dasein is *certain* of its *Seinkönnen*, its Being-in-the-world and its Being-towards-death (SZ 264-65). The *indefiniteness* of this possibility is disclosed in that "Dasein opens itself to a constant threat arising out of its own 'there'" (SZ 265). In Being-towards-death, Dasein understands the *possibility* of its death; it understands that it is always already towards its death, the moment and circumstances of which are not determined in advance. This indeterminacy relates to the indefiniteness typical of anxiety. In anxiety, Dasein is anxious before no-thing which is no-where, and the indefiniteness of that about which and before which Dasein is anxious is also the very indefiniteness which characterizes its ownmost possibility.

Being-towards-death is the comportment in which Dasein intends its own Being, and this comportment underlies Dasein's everyday Being-in-the-world. Death, as the end — the impossibility — of Dasein, is a mark of Dasein's finitude. Dasein's understanding of itself as Being-towards-death is indicated, not only in the care that Dasein has regarding its existence, but also in Dasein's understanding of possibility. Dasein's Being could not be one of possibility if that Being did not occur within a horizon of impossibility; Dasein's recognition of possibility indicates an implicit understanding of its Being-towards-death, towards the possibility of its own impossibility.

Likewise, Dasein could not be free if it were not Being-possible. Ironically, however, this possibility is grounded on an impossibility; Dasein is free because it is thrown into the world and towards its death, a thrownness that Dasein has not freely chosen. In this sense, Dasein is not wholly self-constituting; it does not condition its own Being. But this too is part of what it means to be finite. As such, Dasein's understanding of its finitude in anxious Being-towards-death is not just an understanding of its temporal limitation, but also reflects Dasein's understanding that it is conditioned by something which lies 'beyond' it (death) and which establishes the horizons within which Dasein can exercise its freedom.

Being-towards-death, then, is the existential structure which captures Dasein's intentional directedness towards its own Being as a whole, and the authentic modality of this Being-towards-death is anticipation. Heidegger must now demonstrate how Dasein's *Seinkönnen* is ontically disclosed in such a way that Dasein experiences its Being as *requiring* it to project upon certain possibilities. This ontic attestation amounts to a moment in which Dasein more immediately intuits what it intends or expresses in both its everyday Being-in-the-world and its anxious Being-towards-death. In this sense, the ontic attestation fulfills Dasein's intention of its Being and discloses its Being more fully. Dasein experiences the truth of this disclosure in the call of conscience. Heidegger's strategy is to first investigate how Dasein demands anything like a sort of authenticity of itself. This investigation will illustrate that Dasein experiences some disclosures as constitutively true and experiences itself as being responsible to these disclosures. Then Heidegger will show the connection between the ontic experience of truth and the specific possibility of Being-towards-death as outlined above (SZ 267); this will establish that the call of conscience resembles an intuitive act through which the meaning of Dasein's Being is disclosed in a way that confirms the meaning implicitly given in Dasein's everyday Being-in-the-wold. This disclosure fulfills Dasein's everyday, empty intention of its own Being, resulting in an ontic experience of truth.

ii. Conscience and resoluteness

We know from Heidegger's discussion in Division I that anxiety primarily discloses Dasein's Being-in-the-world (and so also its Being-towards-death) in a privative fashion through Dasein's fleeing, through its turning away from its Being in falling. Authenticity would require that Dasein not flee in the face of itself. How can Dasein exact this of itself? How does Dasein demand authenticity of itself? How can Dasein be brought to *anticipate* its death? All this will occur through that other form of disclosure which we have not yet discussed in relation to death, discourse — specifically through the call of conscience.[11] Through conscience, the truth of the disclosure of Dasein's Being in anxiety is revealed; this experience of truth places demands upon Dasein to take up its Being-possible and to recognize that its existence has already assigned it to this Being-possible, that it must *be* it. This disclosure affirms what Dasein, in effect, already knew in its everydayness; in this sense, it fulfills Dasein's empty intention of its own Being.

Heidegger's concept of conscience is not unlike our usual sense of the term. In casual usage, we say that our conscience pricks us when we are doing something that we know we ought not to do, something that we know is wrong. Our conscience bothers us, refusing to leave us alone until we "do the right thing" and thereby appease it. In Heidegger's case, conscience is equipped with a voice through which it communicates to us. It seeks to draw us out of our lostness in *das Man* and make us take up our *Seinkönnen*; this goal is reflected in the interplay between definiteness and indefiniteness, determinacy and indeterminacy, which is at work here. So far, we have seen that in everydayness Dasein's Being, which is held as though it were definite, is nevertheless characterized by a certain indeterminacy — Dasein's Being remains largely obscured. Thus, Dasein's self in its everydayness is the *Man-selbst* who is no-one and no-where but is taken to be some-one, some-where. The discourse which primarily pertains to everydayness is idle talk in which the no-thing which gets said is taken to be some-thing. Finally, there is even a sense in which Dasein confuses the things in the world with the world's worldhood and so fails to see the no-thingness of the world. In general, what is held for certain in everydayness is something which remains largely uncovered, and so is uncertain.

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[11] On the concept of conscience in Heidegger, see Michael J. Hyde, "The Call of Conscience: Heidegger and the Question of Rhetoric," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 27.4 (1994): 374-96; Jane Kelley Rodehoffer, "The Call of Conscience and the Call of Language: Reflections on a Movement in Heidegger's Thinking," *Crises in Continental Thought*, eds. Arleen B. Dallery and Charles E. Scott (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990) 127-34; and Frank Schalow, "The Topography of Heidegger's Concept of Conscience," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 69.2 (Spring 1995): 255-73.

The move to authenticity, by contrast, involves exacting a sort of Gestalt shift against which these apparent some-things are disclosed as no-things. The seeming determinacy of everydayness is exchanged for an indeterminacy — hence the no-thing, no-where, no-one experience of anxiety. However, this indeterminacy is not an indeterminacy overall; it is simply an objective indeterminacy, an indeterminacy relative to things present-at-hand. It is not an essential indeterminacy. What is disclosed is not simply no-thing, just no-thing definite. This theme resurfaces in Heidegger's discussion of conscience.

Conscience belongs to the mode of disclosedness of discourse. Through conscience, the significance of what is disclosed in anxiety is *articulated*.[12] As a mode of discourse, conscience is marked by the four features which characterize all discourse: what the discourse is about; what is said in the talk; the communication; and the making known (SZ 162).

Conscience functions as a call; it makes an appeal to Dasein, and so summons Dasein to its ownmost *Seinkönnen* which is disclosed as a *Selbstseinkönnen*. Thus, what the discourse is about is Dasein's self, particularly with respect to its mineness and its Being-possible. The call urges Dasein to be the self which it is only privatively as *Man-selbst*. It is important to understand that Heidegger is not speaking of the self as some substantial thing which has been lost. Rather the self is a way of Being — namely Being-in-the-world and Being-towards-death — which Dasein always is, even in *das Man*. This is why it is even possible for Dasein to be its *Man-selbst*. However, as *Man-selbst*, Dasein is its self in the mode of not being it, in so far as its mineness and thus also its Being-possible remain concealed from it. The call of conscience appeals to the self which underlies the *Man-selbst* and which is, in a sense, the very condition of its possibility. This is what Heidegger means when he says that the *Man-selbst* is 'passed over' by the call (SZ 273).

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[12] Recall that in categorial intuition, phenomena disclose themselves in the terms in which they have already been understood and expressed, i.e. through discourse.

Although there is a certain determinacy regarding what the call is about, what is actually "said" remains indefinite because the call is silent. This silence is consistent with the indeterminacy which surrounds the anxious disclosure of Being-in-the-world in terms of its no-whereness and no-thingness. While the determinacy which surrounds linguistic expression (particularly assertion) may be vulnerable to devolving into the emptiness characteristic of idle talk, such a degeneration cannot occur in the silence of the call. As a result, nothing is lost with respect to the meaning that is conveyed; indeed, the meaning is conveyed more immediately and fully because of it. What is *not* indefinite, however, is to whom the appeal is made; unquestionably it is Dasein who is called. This definiteness is in contrast to everydayness, where Dasein's self as *Man-selbst* is precisely what is indefinite and where there is a great deal of ambiguity regarding what the talk is about despite the rather determinate form given to what is said (as idle talk). Since discourse in everydayness occurs predominantly in the voice of *das Man*, the identity of the others with whom Dasein discourses in its mode as *Man-selbst* remains fairly indeterminate as well, although Dasein generally fails to recognize this, associating *das Man* with the concrete others who dwell with it. A somewhat different indeterminacy cloaks the origin of the voice of conscience. The caller, the one who makes the appeal, remains shrouded in indefiniteness with respect to its 'what' (just as does the 'what' of the appeal itself) (SZ 274). But the caller *is not* no one; it is just no one who can be located or identified by Dasein as its *Man-selbst.* Heidegger maintains that the caller is Dasein's self. Again, this echoes our lay understanding of conscience in which my conscience is a little voice inside me which, although *other* than me, is still in some sense me.

In explaining that Dasein's self is the caller, Heidegger notes that the *otherness* of this voice lies in its being other with respect to Dasein's everyday self, having been concealed in Dasein's everyday way of comporting. The caller is Dasein's self, disclosed in anxiety but obscured again in Dasein's fleeing. The no-one-ness, no-thingness, and no-whereness of the caller are related to the no-thingness and no-whereness disclosed in anxious Being-in-the-world. Anxiety is characterized by an indefiniteness with respect to the where and the what of that about which Dasein is anxious; conscience is characterized by an indefiniteness with respect to the where and the what of the caller. But that about which Dasein is anxious is the same as the caller: it is Dasein's Being. Because of the indefiniteness and obscurity which shroud Dasein's Being in everydayness, this Being is experienced as other, alien — something which cannot be located in the present-at-hand way Dasein is used to being able to situate things. The caller is Dasein's self which lies beyond the familiarity of the world. For this reason, the caller can express nothing definite, for it is beyond the realm of definition. That is why the call can only disclose Dasein's *Seinkönnen* (SZ 277).

Although the call is silent, that should not indicate that no communication occurs. According to Heidegger, only someone who has something to say can be silent, and this silence is reticence. In so far as this silence is itself meaningful, it communicates something to the one who is sensitive enough to hear it, the one who is open to hearing its call. That this communication occurs despite the call's extra-linguistic nature can perhaps be better clarified relative to that which the call expresses and which is disclosed to Dasein upon hearing the call.

The call of conscience is the call of care through which Dasein's Being is disclosed. This is, at least in part, possible because the caller is Dasein's self, and in calling, it discloses itself. Part of what is disclosed in the call is the thrown individuation from which the call issues. According to what has been said so far, "the call points *forward to* Dasein's potentiality-for-Being [*Seinkönnen*], and it does this as a call which comes *from* uncanniness" (SZ 280). If Dasein's self as anxious thrown Being-in-the-world did not call, this 'whence' would not be disclosed. The call calls Dasein towards its *Seinkönnen* in the sense of calling Dasein back to its Being as thrown (SZ 280). The call to resume a possibility to which Dasein is thrown, but which it has effectively neglected, is essentially a pronouncement of guilt.

Indeed, Heidegger observes that conscience is always an expression of guilt. He notes that we typically understand guilt in terms of an obligation or responsibility to someone which has not been honored, satisfied, or lived up to. I feel guilt because I am responsible for the other's not having something which I owe it; I am responsible for the other's *lack*; I am the *reason* for that lack. Thus, Heidegger describes existential guilt as 'Being the basis for a lack in another' (Being-the-ground of a nullity, *Grundsein einer Nichtigkeit*). But we must be careful not to understand the 'lack' or 'not' in present-at-hand terms.[13] Dasein's guilt is Being the basis of a not-ness [*Nichtigkeit*] (SZ 283) because, as thrown, Dasein is *not* the basis of its Being — the fact that Dasein exists is not something for which it is responsible. Yet that very thrownness *is* Dasein's basis; it is the ground of Dasein's existence. By *Being* this thrownness (or thrown projection) Dasein *is* its basis (existentially) although it is *not* its basis in another sense. As projection, Dasein is also always *not* those possibilities which it has not chosen. Moreover as fallen, Dasein generally is *not* its self. Thus, this *not*, which is the basis of Dasein's guilt, permeates the entire care structure. Because Dasein always is what it is not and is not what it is, Dasein is always guilty; this Being-guilty is what makes conscience possible as a phenomenon (SZ 283-86).

An important feature of the call of conscience is that it does not disclose anything to Dasein which Dasein does not already in some sense understand. In our normal usage of the term, conscience makes us feel guilty because it reminds us of a responsibility that we know we have, but which we have turned away from and have failed to assume. This occurs at the ontological level as well. Here, Dasein is burdened with the responsibility of being its Being, existing as its own thrown projection, its own Being-possible. Dasein can only experience guilt at not having assumed this responsibility if it has already antecedently disclosed that responsibility to itself, but in a manner in which it has turned away from that responsibility. We have seen that this type of disclosure occurs in anxiety, where Dasein discloses its Being in a privative fashion through fleeing it. Conscience, then, calls Dasein back to what it has privatively disclosed in anxiety, and calls Dasein forward to the possibility of Being which is disclosed therein.

Because Dasein has already disclosed its Being to itself in anxiety, and because it already implicitly understands its Being in its everyday Being-in-the-world, Dasein can recognize the veracity of what conscience discloses to it. If this were not so, the call of conscience could not be experienced by Dasein as a pronouncement of its guilt. The call provides evidence which confirms the truth of what Dasein had only emptily intended before, namely its existential responsibility.[14]

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[13] Note the resemblance between the *not* which is implicated in this concept of guilt and the *not* which Heidegger identifies earlier with reference to the *not-yet* of death. This connection is extremely important and will be discussed at greater length below (I.3.iii and III.7.i).

Dasein's guilt is not absolvable: the *not* cannot be removed. Dasein can only *be* this guilt in one way or another — namely, authentically or inauthentically. Being-guilty authentically means *allowing* oneself to be called back to one's thrownness, back to Being-in-the-world as *Seinkönnen*, which is disclosed through conscience.[15] Letting oneself be called back — heeding the call — implies having heard the call, and this, Heidegger maintains, marks a being ready to hear it, an openness to it. "Hearing" the call and not heeding it is precisely not to have heard it, for the call carries within it a command. That is, one has only heard the call if one has understood that it is an appeal and that its being an appeal means that it has laid claim to Dasein in its individuality, singling it out and demanding a response.[16] Thus, the evidence which is given to verify that the call has been heard is the heeding of it, and one will only heed it if one is open to it. The hearing of the call is a disclosedness which depends upon finding oneself called, as well as understanding that one is called. The ambiguity of activity and passivity which we noted earlier with respect to the disclosedness of discourse in terms of hearing and listening is also evident here in the passive and active dimensions which require an attentiveness to the other, as well as a holding back or being open to the other. This middle-voiced disclosedness in which the appeal is understood is what Heidegger refers to as 'wanting to have a conscience' (SZ 288).[17] In wanting to have a conscience, Dasein "lets itself take action" [*in sich handeln*] (SZ 288, 295) and projects itself toward its ownmost *Seinkönnen* in terms of an existentiell possibility through which that *Seinkönnen* is disclosed. In so doing, Dasein shows that it has understood the appeal and its Being-guilty; the discursive disclosedness which belongs to this understanding is the reticence of the call described above. The *Unheimlichkeit* which surrounds the call is the same *Unheimlichkeit* which is disclosed in anxiety. Anxiety, then, is the mode of *Befindlichkeit* which belongs to wanting to have a conscience, explaining why it can be characterized as a 'readiness for anxiety'. The overall disclosedness of Dasein which belongs to wanting to have a conscience is "constituted by anxiety as *Befindlichkeit*, by understanding as a projection of oneself upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, and by discourse as reticence" (SZ 296); Heidegger terms this **resoluteness** [*Entschlossenheit*].

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[14] We will see below (I.3.iii) that this responsibility is in fact the same responsibility which has been discussed with reference to Being-towards-death. The call, then, attests Dasein's Being-possible by disclosing in a more intuitive manner what is expressed in Dasein's Being-in-the-world, namely its Being-towards-death and the existential responsibility of Being-possible which this implies. On the relationship between guilt, conscience, and responsibility, see István Fehér, "Eigentlichkeit, Gewissen und Schuld in Heideggers *Sein und Zeit*: Eine Interpretation mit Ausblicken auf seine späteren Denkweg," *Man and World* 23 (1990): 25-62.

[15] Ciaffa, too, recognizes that thrownness remains a part of Dasein's authenticity, leading him to claim that authenticity and inauthenticity are interwoven through an authentic falling. Although I would not describe this in the negative terms that he uses, I would support his point that authenticity and inauthenticity are existentiell modifications of Dasein's existence and so must be constituted by all three parts of the care structure.

[16] It is difficult to understand Heidegger's claims that authenticity is not intended to be an ethical notion and that no ethical imperative is being articulated. It seems clear that some greater value is being ascribed to authenticity over inauthenticity. However, Heidegger's position does differ from a typical ethics in two important respects. First, no specific content is being given to the call, which makes it different from a classic moral imperative. Second, the role of the will here is ambiguous. According to Heidegger, one does not choose to heed the call upon hearing it. If one heeds it, then one has heard it. If not, then one simply did not really hear it. As such, the kind of agency usually required for an ethics is not being enacted at this stage. What does seem clear, however, is that the ontology of Dasein that Heidegger is developing is one which explains how ethics can be a possibility of Dasein's Being, indeed why ethics is something Dasein must have as part of its Being. What this ethics would specifically entail is left indeterminate, and no doubt Heidegger would not see this as part of the domain of fundamental ontology. While Heidegger may place ontology prior to ethics, it is not clear that ontology itself does not include a meta-ethics. See Vogel.

Resoluteness is Dasein's authentic Being-one's-self. But resoluteness only phenomenologically appears in a resolution, which is always something factical, a particular ontic possibility upon which Dasein can project. Such possibilities are always connected in some way with our thrownness in the world and with the way in which the world lets possibilities show up. In resoluteness Dasein projects upon and appropriates a possibility into and toward which it is already thrown.[18] It is resoluteness which permits something like a **situation** to emerge for Dasein, a *there* which discloses itself as immediately orienting Dasein toward various possibilities through which Dasein *is* (SZ 299-300).[19] The disclosure of its thrown individuation both situates Dasein factically in its world — impressing upon it the burden of its existence — and discloses Dasein's ownmost *Seinkönnen* in an existentiell manner.

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[17] It is important to clear up any possible confusion about 'wanting to have a conscience' in terms of the choice which it seems to suggest. "This [wanting to have a conscience] does not mean that one wants to have a 'good conscience', *still less that one cultivates the call voluntarily*, it means solely that one is ready to be appealed to. Wanting to have a conscience is just as far from seeking one's factical indebtedness as it is from the tendency to *liberation* from guilt in the sense of the essential 'guilty'" (SZ 288, emphasis added).

In the call, Dasein's self, disclosed in an oblique way in the fleeing which occurs in anxiety but covered over again by that fleeing, calls out from the no-whereness in which it finds itself abandoned to its existence. From out of this abandonment, Dasein's self calls to its *Man-selbst*, appealing to it in another form of abandonment, namely a lostness in *das Man*. It calls Dasein forward in order to take Dasein *back* to a more proper thrownness, a thrown individuation. The phenomenon through which the call happens is conscience, in which Dasein's guilt is pronounced. This guilt is not moral or judicial, but is founded on something more primordial, namely that Dasein *is* the basis of its own not-ness. Dasein's Being as *thrown* projection suggests that Dasein is not, and never can be, the basis of its Being. Dasein is simply thrown to its Being. Yet Dasein must *be* this thrownness. This thrownness is both otherness and selfhood. Thus, in a paradoxical way, Dasein *is* its basis. This paradoxical not-ness is disclosed to Dasein through the appeal made by Dasein's anxious self. In holding itself open for the call, Dasein awaits (we might even say anticipates) being drawn into the situation which will orient it relative to various possibilities upon which it can project in taking action. In resoluteness Dasein's *Seinkönnen* is disclosed in the concreteness of Dasein's thrownness.

In this way, Dasein is able to exact something like authenticity of itself; its responsibility can be disclosed to it — Dasein is guilty and it must act. Authenticity, then, is not to be understood in the romantic sense of recovering a substantial self that has been lost. Dasein's self is a *way of Being*, the Being of Dasein. Thus, authenticity means *Being* Dasein in whatever ontic form that may assume. Dasein's Being is always characterized by mineness: its Being belongs to it, and it belongs to its Being. This element is what typically remains concealed in everydayness, where the first-person character of Dasein's Being is concealed in the impersonal third-person subjectivity of *das Man*. Authenticity implies re-appropriating Dasein's Being-possible and making it one's own — in a sense, saying *I* again, allowing oneself in one's ownness to be drawn into the situation and to take action there. Because Dasein's Being is always already its own, Dasein is always already responsible, but Dasein disburdens itself of the responsibility for its existence in the mode of *Man-selbst*. In authenticity this responsibility is resumed. This resumption of responsibility and re-appropriation of Dasein's Being comes about through a mode of discourse in which Dasein is addressed and called to take up its Being. The call singles out Dasein, addressing it in the first person and demanding a first-person response from it. Only because Dasein always already is responsible can it become responsible in responding to the call.

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[18] "Resolution does not withdraw itself from 'actuality', but discovers first what is factically possible; and it does so by seizing upon it in whatever way is possible for it as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being in the 'they'" (SZ 299).

[19] In this regard, recall Heidegger's earlier comment that *Befindlichkeit* discloses Being-in-the-world by situating us (SZ 137-38).

It is worth noting the role that *listening* plays here. Lostness in *das Man* is bound up in listening to the idle talk of *das Man* (SZ 270-71). Because Dasein listens to its *Man-selbst*, it fails to hear its own conscience. Whether in authenticity or inauthenticity, the possibilities upon which Dasein can project are disclosed *discursively* either through the chatter of *das Man* or the reticence of the voice of conscience; Dasein in turn discloses these possibilities through listening to what is disclosed in the discourse. Although one might be inclined to say that Dasein's *Mitsein* only comes into play in inauthentic situations, where Dasein listens *away* from itself toward others as represented by *das Man*, it is more accurate to say that *Mitsein* is involved in *any discursive disclosure whatsoever*. "Being-with belongs to Being-in-the-world, which in every case maintains itself in some definite way of concernful Being-with-one-another. Such Being-with-one-another is discursive as assenting or refusing, as demanding or warning, as pronouncing, consulting, or interceding, as 'making assertions', and as talking in the way of 'giving a talk'" (SZ 161). Discourse is talking, and as such is always an *expression* of something for and to someone; it provides the terms in which phenomena show themselves. This suggests that *Mitsein* may be no less important for conscience than it is for idle talk.

Heidegger has shown, in Chapter 2 of Division II, that conscience discloses Dasein's existential guilt, thereby also disclosing Dasein's existential responsibility and its ability to respond to the situation in which it is thrown by projecting upon possibilities. In this way, Dasein's Being is disclosed as a Being-possible, and this occurs through *Befindlichkeit* in the mode of anxiety, in the understanding of Being-guilty pronounced in the appeal, and in the discourse of the call. The call of conscience discloses Dasein's *Seinkönnen* in a concrete fashion by means of guilt. To experience guilt, one must have an antecedent understanding of that which conscience reveals. For this reason, the call acts as an ontic attestation of Dasein's *Seinkönnen*; conscience attests the truth of something that Dasein has implicitly known all along — namely that its Being is a Being-possible. What Heidegger must now show is the connection between the resoluteness in which Dasein's ontic possibility of authenticity is disclosed, and its ontological possibility of Being-towards-death.

iii. Anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein's self, and temporality

We saw earlier that Heidegger began Division II with the concern that, for his interpretation of Dasein to have primordiality, it must grasp Dasein's Being *as a whole*, and he argued that Dasein's Being is comprehended as a whole in Being-towards-death. An authentic Being-towards-death — one which has disclosed the possibility of death as *distinctively impending* in the way described above — is called anticipation. The question now is how to bring anticipation and resoluteness together. How can the disclosure of Dasein's Being as a whole to itself in Being-towards-death be held and concretized at the ontic level in the manner characteristic of resoluteness? How can Dasein existentially enact what it is ontologically?

Heidegger will bring anticipation and resoluteness together into an **anticipatory resoluteness** by showing that both involve a disclosure of Dasein's Being-possible. He will argue that resoluteness brings "itself into its authenticity only when it projects itself not upon any random possibilities which just lie closest, but upon that uttermost possibility which lies ahead of every factical potentiality-for-Being of Dasein" (SZ 302). Only in this case could what is intuitively given through conscience in any way fulfill what is intended in Dasein's Being-in-the-world and Being-towards-death. After demonstrating that when Dasein fully intends its own Being, it does so with an understanding of itself as a *finite temporality*, Heidegger can go on to argue that the horizon within which Being overall can be understood is time. To support this view, Heidegger must explain how his analysis of Dasein's Being in everydayness can be characterized in terms of temporality.

We saw in Chapter 2 that in everydayness Dasein tends to understand possibility as something that lies within objects as a *property*, and so fails to recognize that its *own* assignment to a particular project is what actually allows objects to show up as having possibilities. In everydayness, Dasein waits for possibilities to befall it. But a Dasein who has properly grasped its Being as one of possibility can *anticipate* possibilities rather than wait for them. The ability to project upon ontical possibilities in this way depends upon a disclosure of one's ownmost *Seinkönnen*.

This kind of anticipation of ontic possibilities is what is involved in resoluteness,[20] through Dasein's being drawn into a situation through the disclosure of its Being-guilty. Resoluteness has been characterized "as a way of reticently projecting oneself upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, and exacting anxiety of oneself" (SZ 305). This Being-guilty belongs to Dasein's Being and cannot be absolved — it pertains to the ineradicable not-ness of Dasein's Being. In resoluteness Dasein opens itself up to its Being-guilty by allowing itself to be called back to its thrownness. Dasein *resolves to be guilty*, to project upon its possibility of *Being*-guilty. That Dasein recognizes the constancy of this Being-guilty — that it has disclosed itself as always guilty, as guilty through and through — can only come through a disclosure of Dasein's Being *as a whole* (SZ 305). Through anxious Being-towards-death and anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein is

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[20] "What if it is only in the *anticipation* of death that all the factical '*anticipatoriness*' of resolving would be authentically understood" (SZ 302).

open to its Being as one of possibility, and hence also open to the world in a way which allows the situation to emerge.[21]

Heidegger's point is that resoluteness is only resoluteness in anticipation because only if Dasein's Being as a whole has been disclosed to it — only if Dasein has disclosed its Being-towards-death in an anticipatory way — can Dasein really be resolute. The understanding of Dasein's Being-guilty implied in resoluteness can only be achieved through an understanding of its Being-towards-death (SZ 306). Dasein can only properly understand its *Being*-guilty if it understands its *Seinkönnen*, its Being-possible; this is what an authentic Being-towards-death discloses. This meaning is given in both anticipation and resoluteness, signifying that conscience provides the intuitive evidence which fulfills the intention belonging to Being-in-the-world and Being-towards-death.

The connection between Being-towards-death and conscience, drawn through Dasein's Being-possible, can be further explicated in terms of the nullities or *not*'s which figure prominently in both discussions, and which are foundational for the establishment of Dasein's Being as one of possibility. In anticipation, Dasein's *not-yet* is disclosed in its Being-towards-death. Death is disclosed as the possibility of Dasein's *im*possibility, both in the sense that Dasein is thrown toward its impossibility, and that this thrownness is the ground upon which the possibility of this impossibility is founded. This shows, firstly, that death — Dasein's impossibility — is the horizon within which all of Dasein's possibilities whatsoever can appear. Secondly, it points out that Dasein's Being is grounded in something which it is *not*. Death, which represents the end of all possibility for Dasein, is — at the same time — that without which Dasein would have no possibilities at all. Death is, in this sense, a power which lies outside Dasein, conditioning its Being as one of possibility within certain limits. Thus, Dasein's Being is shown to be constituted by something *other* than it.

This *not-yet* of death is related to the not-ness which Heidegger identifies in Dasein's Being-guilty. Dasein's existential guilt indicates that Dasein is not the basis of its Being (because it is thrown), yet it is *this very fact* that makes Dasein the basis of its Being (as existing). The horizon within which Dasein must *be* its Being is its thrownness; Dasein's thrownness is the *not* which grounds it. Dasein's guilt allows ontical possibilities to reveal that Dasein's thrownness is something which Dasein does not condition, and which can thus be seen to constitute Dasein. Dasein's Being-possible, as disclosed both through its Being-towards-death and through its Being-guilty, is determined relative to a certain not-ness which is foundational for Dasein's Being.

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[21] This openness of resoluteness is usually overlooked or downplayed by those who argue that resoluteness is the locus of Dasein's voluntarism. On resoluteness as openness, see Frank Schalow, "Beyond Decisionism and Anarchy: The Task of Re-Thinking Resolve," *Man and World* 28.4 (Oct. 1995): 359-76.

Bringing the anticipation of Being-towards-death into connection with the resoluteness of wanting to have a conscience "individualizes Dasein down to its potentiality-for-Being-guilty, and exacts of it that it should be this potentiality authentically" (SZ 307). Resoluteness discloses possibilities as exacting demands of us, singling us out, drawing us into a situation wherein we must take action. But these possibilities cannot be disclosed as challenges rooted in Dasein's *not* unless Dasein's Being as *not-yet* has been disclosed as a whole. Resoluteness, which embraces the possibility of Being-guilty, only happens in anticipation; it provides us with an attestation of Dasein's anticipation. In anticipatory resoluteness Dasein can disclose its ownmost Being-guilty as non-relational, not to be outstripped, certain yet indefinite, by having disclosed its Being as a whole, by grasping its mortality (SZ 307-309). Anticipatory resoluteness "frees for death the possibility of acquiring *power* over Dasein's *existence*" (SZ 310). Dasein's Being can be an issue for Dasein because Dasein's Being is Being-towards-death; this is manifested in Dasein's existential guilt and in the responsibility that Dasein experiences in the pronouncement of its guilt.

Heidegger maintains that Dasein's Being as a whole has now been brought within the scope of the fore-having, and that an interpretation of the meaning of care — based on the authentic possibility of Dasein's Being which has been disclosed — is now appropriate. An interpretation makes explicit the significance which is understood in an understanding: in this case, the understanding of Dasein's Being which is grasped in anticipatory resoluteness as a Being-possible within the horizon of death. Heidegger wants to interpret the meaning of this Being-possible in terms of temporality. Dasein's understanding of itself as *mortal* is an understanding of finitude which refers to temporality over spatiality. It is Dasein's *temporal* finitude which inspires Dasein's care for its Being. But this must be explored more rigorously, and Heidegger must also explain how our more usual theoretical understanding of Being — in terms of substantiality and presence-at-hand — is actually grounded in a particular, albeit concealed, understanding of Being relative to a particular temporal mode, namely the present.

One of Heidegger's more prominent criticisms of the tradition is the extent to which it fails to recognize the *ontological* difference, the difference between Being and beings. The tradition tends to understand Being as an entity because it interprets Being against the horizon of spatiality, not temporality. The constancy or essence of beings is traditionally attributed to a substantiality construed in terms of spatiality. This interpretation is rooted in an understanding that fails to grasp the Being of Dasein in terms of its Being-in-the-world. For Descartes, the constancy and the unity of the self lies in the *I* (SZ 114). Kant, too, exhibits this understanding in maintaining that it is the 'I think' which holds together the manifold of apperception. In so far as this 'I think' is simply *added on* to every representation, it is part of a structure of consciousness, and thus merely the 'form' of representation (SZ 319). Although Kant recognizes the inappropriateness of reducing the *I* to a substance, he fails to surpass a characterization of the *I* in present-at-hand terms, because he construes it as something that is always 'present' in every representation (SZ 320).[22] In Heidegger's view, Kant does not rigorously pursue the 'I think' structure to its fullest extent. While recognizing that the 'I think' is always an 'I think something', Kant sees this 'something' as fairly contingent and empirical (SZ 321). This leads him to overlook the importance of 'thinking' as a relation between subject and object — in particular, the intentionality which envelops both poles of that relation and situates them (Being-in-the-world) (SZ 321). Heidegger maintains that saying *I* is an expression of one's self as Being-in-the-world, although this tends to be covered up because of our tendency in everydayness to mistake Dasein's Being for something present-at-hand. In focusing on the *constancy* of Dasein's self in present-at-hand terms, we overlook that in which the real constancy of the self lies — namely, its *Seinkönnen* and its Being-toward possibilities (SZ 322).

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[22] As Heidegger states it, this is a somewhat cryptic reading of Kant — a philosopher who strongly influenced Heidegger and whose impact is greatly evident in SZ. A more charitable reading of Kant through Heidegger's eyes would be that Kant comes very close to recognizing that Being lies in temporality in so far as he recognizes that objects of intuition have constancy because they endure for the inner sense, for time. It would seem, then, that the Being of objects of intuition for Kant is at least related to temporality. However, to the extent that Kant does not push this observation further and ask more about the 'thinking' which thinks those objects, he commits the same error as Husserl and fails to ask about intentionality and the subjectivity of the subject. The *I* becomes a mere placeholder and comes to be understood in present-at-hand terms.

In anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein assigns itself to the possibility of being its own Being. Through this assignment, the meaning of Dasein's Being as care is disclosed in its being drawn into an active engagement in its world. The meaningful context into which Dasein is drawn in resoluteness orients it relative to various ontical possibilities in the manner of care: that is, of a 'Being ahead of itself already in the world and alongside entities'. This may be understood temporally in connection with the modes of disclosedness of Being-in through which Dasein's care is revealed and understood. **Understanding** may be interpreted temporally in terms of the future, in terms of the 'ahead of itself' which pertains to Dasein's understanding of possibilities and of itself as Being-possible. Dasein always understands its possibilities as being ahead of itself in the future. The way in which Dasein comports futurally toward those possibilities determines the way in which they and Dasein approach one another. In authentic resoluteness, Dasein **anticipates** its possibilities through a disclosure of its ownmost *Seinkönnen* which allows it to draw near to itself. In inauthenticity Dasein also draws near to itself in understanding but in a concealed way. In inauthenticity Dasein **awaits** itself, in that it looks to the world with which it is concerned for disclosure of its possibilities, rather than locating its ownmost possibility in its *Seinkönnen* (SZ 337). Both orientations are futural.

The past is the temporal mode which Heidegger associates with ***Befindlichkeit*** and it is characterized in an undifferentiated way as a 'having been'.[23] This 'having been' is the way in which Dasein already is in the world; it influences how Dasein is open to its world. As such, *Befindlichkeit* always bring Dasein back to something — presumably to itself — in a way which discloses how it has been (SZ 340). To illustrate how this shows itself in inauthenticity, Heidegger considers the case of fear. Despite all the reasons one might think that fear should be understood in a futural way (as fear of some misfortune which has not yet happened), Heidegger insists on the contrary. He maintains that fear *brings us back* to ourselves as threatened, thereby disclosing how Dasein is open to the world through the way in which its Being has been disclosed to *itself*, namely as something which some evil can befall. In fear, Dasein has not disclosed its ownmost *Seinkönnen*, but sees possibilities as existing 'out there' in things and as approaching it *of their own accord*. This sort of understanding typifies the awaiting discussed above. Such a comportment constitutes a particular **forgetfulness** on Dasein's part regarding its Being. Anxiety, on the other hand, brings Dasein back to itself as its thrown *Seinkönnen*. Disclosing that Dasein must *be* this thrown *Seinkönnen*, anxiety brings Dasein back to its "thrownness as something *possible* which *can be repeated*" (SZ 343). This **repetition**[24] [*Wiederholung*] is the reappropriation of thrownness, described above in terms of the call and the way in which the call calls Dasein back to itself. This is the authentic temporalization of the 'having been' — as a past subsumed into the futural sense of repetition.

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[23] 'Undifferentiated' in so far as it is neither authentic nor inauthentic.

Finally, **falling** is to be associated with the present because in falling, Dasein discloses itself as alongside entities, as being contemporaneous with them. In inauthenticity, Dasein primarily temporalizes in the way of **making present**; it projects itself upon entities, disclosing them only to make them appear, without tarrying alongside of them long enough to actually understand them (SZ 346-47). This is primarily what happens in curiosity; it is also evident in fear. When Dasein is afraid, it jumps around from one possibility to the next without actually taking hold of any of them; this sort of panic can be characterized as another mode of forgetfulness of Dasein's Being (SZ 341-42). The result is that Dasein never really dwells anywhere, because it never properly discloses the *there* wherein it dwells. In awaiting a possibility, Dasein becomes impatient and moves on to something else. In 'making present', a series of possibilities is disclosed, yet Dasein does not project upon them with a view to itself as Being-possible, for it has not authentically disclosed its ownmost *Seinkönnen* (SZ 346-47). In contrast to this, the authentic temporalizing of the present occurs in the **moment of vision** [*Augenblick*] which "brings existence into the Situation and discloses the authentic 'there'" (SZ 347).[25] This situation is the same one to which Heidegger refers in his discussion of resoluteness. It is a moment of clarity in which Dasein's Being alongside entities in the world is most fully and immediately disclosed.

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[24] I am not wholly comfortable with the term 'repetition'. It implies reiteration of the same thing over and over again, which is not entirely accurate. 'Re-viewing' might be better, but 'view' suggests a kinship with the 'sight' words which Heidegger associates with understanding. Stambaugh translates '*Wiederholung*' as 'retrieval'. The idea is that of again taking up something which one has already done in order to re-familiarize oneself with it.

As aspects of the disclosedness of Dasein's Being-in, *Befindlichkeit*, understanding, and falling can be associated with the temporal modes of the past, future, and present, respectively. Since *Befindlichkeit* and understanding correlate so strongly with thrownness and projection, it seems clear that these, too, are to be associated with the past and future, respectively.[26] We can clarify this with respect to anticipatory resoluteness, wherein Dasein finds itself situated by an engagement with the distinctive possibility of its death. In an authentic Being-towards-death, Dasein projects upon the possibility of its Being qua *Seinkönnen*, and in so doing, allows the possibility of its impossibility to draw near to it. This is "the primordial phenomenon of the *future as coming towards*" (SZ 325). But this anticipation of death in Being-towards-death also discloses Dasein's Being as thrown, as already having been abandoned to its death. This is a drawing close of the past in terms of this future death. Finally, anticipatory resoluteness discloses and draws Dasein into a situation wherein it must take action. Dasein's becoming so situated pertains to the way in which its future and its past draw close to it and 'fix' it for an instant, orienting it relative to possibilities and the entities that are alongside it in the world. This is the authentic present characterized as a moment of vision.

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[25] Both the German term '*Augenblick*' and, even more so, the English translation, 'moment of vision', suggest an instant wherein Dasein suddenly 'sees' something — a moment of disclosure or perhaps inspiration. Stambaugh renders this term as simply 'moment'.

[26] Discourse occupies a peculiar place in all of this. It does not primarily temporalize itself in any particular ecstasis. Rather, it seems to do so through all of them fairly equitably. This is no doubt related to the fact that discourse articulates disclosedness in general, not disclosedness as it is associated with a particular aspect of Being-in (SZ 349-50).

What emerges here is a certain 'hanging together' of the temporal modes which parallels the unitary structure of care, Dasein's disclosedness, and its Being-in-the-world in general. Heidegger describes this 'hanging together' as "the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been" (SZ 326): this is temporality. Due to the importance of Being-towards-death as the means by which Dasein discloses itself as a whole and the obvious futural sense implied in such a structure, authentic temporalizing always occurs out of the future.

It seems clear that Heidegger is trying to overcome a linear notion of time both in the sense of Dasein remaining stationary while time flows by, and in the sense of Dasein moving through a 'stationary' time. Heidegger argues that it is Dasein's Being which permits the movement that we attribute to time, and that it does so because of the way in which Dasein allows things to draw near to it, to approach it, or to withdraw from it in terms of significance and meaning. Dasein's ability to do this rests in its Being as possibility, because the meaning (Being) of things is related to the way they show up in the world, the way in which they are disclosed relative to possibilities. In a sense, then, Dasein is able to fabricate a temporal matrix through its intentional (and hence significative) comportment toward other things in the world, other Dasein, and itself.

Dasein's Being is intentional and so has the structure of a Being-towards which Heidegger has characterized as Being-in-the-world. In its Being-in-the-world, Dasein comports towards a variety of entities which are other than it, and also towards possibilities which — in so far as they are *possibilities* — are also other than it. When Dasein comports towards itself, it does so in terms of possibility, and even here it may be said that Dasein relates to itself as an other. Yet in another sense, Dasein *is* its possibilities. Much in the way that Dasein both is and is not its basis vis-à-vis its thrownness, Dasein is always not what it is and is what it is not in terms of its possibilities as a result of its temporalizing. In its Being, Dasein is constantly and immediately immersed in an involvement with what it is not yet and what it is no longer. The possibility for such a comportment lies in the finite nature of Dasein's existence and in its Being-towards-death. From this particular aspect of Dasein's Being — that it is *always ahead of itself* or *not* itself — Heidegger derives the notion of temporal ecstases. The ecstases are modes which characterize temporality as "the primordial 'outside of itself' in and for itself" (SZ 329).[27] To say that Dasein's temporality is *ecstatic* is to say that this temporality always carries Dasein beyond a static or substantial, present-at-hand sense of itself. It is Dasein's ecstatic temporality which injects Dasein's essence with movement and gives it a dynamic character.[28] Dasein's temporal movements are not randomly ecstatic, but are coordinated with one another so that they form a temporal whole. From the ecstatical unity of temporality is derived the unity of significance which makes up Dasein's *there* (SZ 365). In circumspective concern Dasein understands a totality of involvements based upon a series of *in-order-to*'s, *towards-which*'s, *towards-this*'s, and *for-the-sake-of-which*'s which constitute the significance of the world. This totality is able to hang together as a whole because of the way in which the temporal ecstases are coordinated. They do not carry Dasein away in an indeterminate direction. Dasein is always carried away *somewhere*; each ecstasis has a particular horizon which helps contextualize Dasein's ontic possibility, and each horizon is associated with a different aspect of circumspective involvement. In the ecstasis of the future, Dasein is carried away to its *for-the-sake-of-which*, that toward which its possibility is directed. The ecstasis of the past transports Dasein toward that in the face of which it has been thrown and to which it has been abandoned. The horizon of the present is the *in-order-to*; it brings that to which Dasein has been abandoned and its *for-the-sake-of-which* together and mediates the space between them (SZ 365). When these are taken together in accordance with the unity of temporality, the result is something which hangs together like a world — Dasein's *there*.

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[27] In describing Dasein's Being in terms of temporality, Heidegger also recasts most of the locative prepositional phrases which have been used in conjunction with Dasein's Being — such as 'toward', 'back', 'alongside', etc. — in terms of temporal orientation. This reinforces his ecstatic view of temporality, as well as giving him a way to explain Dasein's spatiality in temporal terms.

[28] This dynamism is reflected in the care structure of 'Being ahead of itself already in the world and alongside entities', as well as in the characterization of existence in terms of thrownness, projection and falling.

Anticipating its future in its Being-towards-death, Dasein must take up its Being-guilty in an authentic repetition of possibility. In being carried away from itself ecstatically towards its future and past horizons, Dasein is brought back to itself in the moment of vision. Even in the authentic present, ecstasis is at work, and Dasein is carried beyond itself as *Man-selbst*. As Heidegger explains:

> this term [moment of vision] must be understood in the active sense as an ecstasis. It means the resolute rapture with which Dasein is carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in the Situation as possible objects of concern. (SZ 338)

The moment of vision borders on ecstasy, but it too has a horizon; it does not carry Dasein away from itself entirely, for the rapture of the moment of vision is one "which is *held* in resoluteness" (SZ 338).[29] Thus, a disclosedness of Dasein's Being is maintained therein.

Dasein is always reckoning with time, always understanding and interpreting itself relative to when's and then's. It is always on time or running late. Dasein 'has time', 'takes time', 'needs time'. All of this pertains to the phenomenon of *public* time in which Dasein for the most part operates in circumspective concern. The world too is understood in terms of time; when 'it is time' for something is determined relative to the world. The way in which time is world-related is obscured by the objective way in which we treat time as something measurable in terms of hours and dates. We ask what time it is, not because the objective time actually matters, but because we want to know whether we have time for something, whether we are 'running out' of time. The significance of objective time is always related to the temporalizing of the world and Dasein's Being.

Heidegger's point is that Dasein's Being can only be appropriately grasped in terms of time. Even in its everydayness, Dasein's Being displays the dynamism of an existentiality which cannot be explained in terms of substantiality. This position can be further expressed in a number of different ways which, when taken together, provide a richer sense of what Heidegger means by this claim. First, in so far as Dasein understands itself as a Being-towards-death, as a Being-mortal, it understands itself as being temporally limited. Dasein understands its *own* Being within the horizon of time, and so its understanding of Being *in general* emerges against this same horizon. At the very least, Dasein does not understand its own Being (and so not all Being) in terms of substance. A second way of getting at this relationship between Being and time can be brought forward by considering Dasein's Being-possible. The *not-yet* which belongs to possibility is a temporal notion because it contains the sense of a *Being-towards*; Dasein *is* its Being-towards-death because it *is* its possibilities — because it *is* towards them. A substantial, present-at-hand understanding of the *not-yet* of possibility could only understand it as an absence. Possibilities, in this sense, would be what Dasein *is not.* Dasein's Being-towards-death and its Being-possible only make sense within the horizon of time.

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[29] The moment of vision is importantly distinguished from inauthentic 'making present' by this 'being-held'.

iv. Historicality

Dasein's Being-possible is never understood solely futurally as an empty, open, infinite possibility, because Dasein is also always already thrown. Possibilities always disclose themselves within specific contexts; these contexts have parameters that determine what can show up as possible. Dasein's Being-possible is not exclusively futural, but occurs within a context which has already been given (the 'having been'); and the simultaneity of the thrown projection of Dasein's 'Being ahead of itself already in a world' brings Dasein concretely 'alongside entities' in a meaningful way, allowing them to present themselves. The temporal horizon within which Being is to be understood, then, can be characterized as Dasein's temporalizing: it is Dasein's comportment toward possibilities — as rooted in it ownmost possibility — which allows the world to hang together as a meaningful whole, which allows things to approach and withdraw meaningfully relative to Dasein's *for-the-sake-of-which*, and which generates the dynamism and movement usually associated with time.

Taken alone this view of temporality may seem somewhat counter-intuitive, but it becomes much clearer if we consider Dasein's temporal understanding of itself in terms of history. In understanding ourselves as historical, we in fact grasp our thrownness, and our possibilities appear within the context of that thrownness. This dimension is the focus of Heidegger's analysis of historicality. He is sensitive to the possible objection that the connection he has elaborated between anticipatory resoluteness and temporality may seem somewhat arbitrary or ahistorical because of its almost exclusive focus on Dasein's death. Perhaps the unity of Dasein's Being does not lie in anything as abstract as Dasein's Being-possible, its temporality or its care, but simply in the connection between Dasein's birth and death; as Dasein stretches itself between these two points, Dasein's story unfolds, and is made whole only in death, in passing into history.

Heidegger understands Dasein's history relative to what has come before in his interpretation, a treatment which establishes temporality as the ground for historicality [*Geschichtlichkeit*], and this discussion of historicality enriches our understanding of authenticity (SZ 372-73). In particular, it gives us a much clearer understanding of what it means for Dasein to be called back to its thrownness by the call, and what it must mean to take up that thrownness again in *Wiederholung*. In considering Heidegger's treatment of Dasein's historicality — in which the primary temporal ecstasis is the past — we must pay special attention to the way in which the other temporal ectases are also brought to bear, so that we can bring a more integrated and unified understanding of historicality into relation with Being-towards-death. Being-towards-death must be liberated to some degree from its almost exclusive orientation toward the future. Mortality is a Being-towards-death in which one also appraises one's past and acts in the present. It is because my time is limited that I am not indifferent to how my time is spent. In a sense, the appraisal and assessment of what one has done is history; but history is not only about the past, it is also about making history, doing something worthy with one's time.

Heidegger's analysis will show that the *unity* of Dasein's temporality manifests itself in Dasein's *historizing*. To take action authentically in the moment of vision, one must be drawn into the situation and take up those possibilities to which one is thrown as they are disclosed. But these possibilities can only be authentically disclosed with an authentic disclosure of one's *Seinkönnen*. It is this disclosure which draws Dasein into its *there*.

First, we must understand what is meant by Dasein's historicality; it is clearly inadequate to characterize it in terms of a sequence of 'nows' which are strung together chronologically. Dasein does not move *through* its existence; Dasein *is* the very stretching along of that existence itself:

> As long as Dasein factically exists, both the 'ends' [its birth and its death] and their 'between' *are*, and they *are* in the only way which is possible on the basis of Dasein's Being as *care*. Thrownness and that Being towards death in which one either flees it or anticipates it, form a unity; and in this unity birth and death are 'connected' in a manner characteristic of Dasein. As care, Dasein *is* the 'between'. (SZ 374)

Heidegger has used the term *the between* previously in relation to Dasein's Being-in, which is the disclosedness which constitutes Being-in-the-world. Heidegger wants to maintain that the unity of Dasein's Being as Being-in-the-world and care establishes the connectedness of Dasein's existence. In so far as care derives its unity from temporality, the historizing [*Geschehen*] of Dasein's existence — namely the way Dasein stretches itself along between its birth and death — will also derive its unity from temporality (SZ 375).[30]

Heidegger notes that despite the various ways in which we usually understand the notion of history, Dasein is always understood as the 'subject' of history, and history is always understood to pertain to a 'past' Being-with-one-another which is handed down to the present and continues to have an effect (SZ 378-79). Objects do not derive their historical character or meaning by virtue of belonging to a past which is objective and no longer present-at-hand. Rather, they are historical and mean something to Dasein because they belong to *Dasein's* past, to Dasein's *having been* (SZ 380-81). They take their meaning relative to Dasein's world and relative to Dasein's Being-in-the-world. In a sense, this is no different than the way in which any 'non-historical' object might have meaning within the context of Dasein's world. But in this case, the historical object derives this additional dimension of its significance because of the way in which Dasein's *having been* is integrated into the temporal and significative unity which is Dasein's Being-in-the-world.

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[30] Heidegger is weaving an interesting conceptual web through the terms he has selected. '*Geschehen*' in more common usage means 'to happen'. Thus, Dasein's historizing is also its happening. There is a middle-voice echo here — a happening which lacks subject or object and more closely resembles an event. This suggests a connection with *Ereignis* (which itself conjures up connections with '*eignen*' and '*eigen*'), an appropriation which is most proper or through which one becomes one's own, and here the echo returns to the *Eigentlichkeit* which is associated with *Geschehen*.

The connection between Dasein's historicality and the network of signification which makes up the world and in terms of which entities are disclosed can be clarified by considering the relationship between the temporalizing which was disclosed in authentic Being-towards-death — namely anticipatory resoluteness — and this historizing. The disclosure of Dasein's ownmost *Seinkönnen* through anticipation brings Dasein back to its thrownness, so that it can be authentically alongside entities in the world. The call of conscience calls Dasein back to its thrownness, thereby drawing Dasein into a situation. But so far, relatively little has been said about this thrownness to which Dasein is brought back and its importance vis-à-vis Dasein's actual circumspective concern. Anticipation of death in its futural, forward dimension alone does not disclose any factical possibilities upon which Dasein can project; it only discloses Dasein's *Seinkönnen*, its Being-able. Being-towards-death also discloses Dasein's thrownness as such, but it is from this thrownness that factical possibilities emerge upon which Dasein can project. Thus, in resoluteness, one takes over one's factical *there* and resolves upon the situation which is disclosed (SZ 382-83). Authentic comportment toward thrownness — and thus toward the past — is for Heidegger a *taking over* of one's thrownness in the manner of a heritage, handing that heritage down to oneself. This is fate [*Schicksal*] (SZ 383-84).[31] Objects are historical partly because they are given to Dasein along with its thrownness and so belong to its past, but also because Dasein takes up these objects again as meaningful in accepting its fate. Objects can only have historical meaning or value because of the way in which Dasein appropriates its past and understands itself as generating a future out of the possibilities bestowed upon it by the past.

The authenticity of Dasein's comportment to the past depends upon Being-towards-death: only when Dasein's ownmost *Seinkönnen* has been disclosed is Dasein brought back to its thrownness in such a way that it will actually be able to disclose possibilities which are appropriately generated out of its Being, as opposed to simply being 'out there' ready for the taking.[32]

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[31] This supplies an additional dimension to Heidegger's comment, which I have noted already, that intentional objects often show themselves through categorial intuition in terms of the way they have already been understood and expressed. This suggests the importance of discourse in historicality and the essential role it plays in allowing Dasein to return to its thrownness and take it up in an authentic way. Thus, discourse and the *Mitsein* which is implied by it are important in Dasein's authenticity in more ways than in the call alone.

> *Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially* ***futural*** *so that it is free for its death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factical 'there' by shattering itself against death — that is to say, only an entity which, as futural, is equiprimordially in the process of* ***having-been****, can, by handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over its own thrownness and be* ***in the moment of vision*** *for 'its time'. Only authentic temporality which is at the same time finite, makes possible something like fate — that is to say, authentic historicality. (SZ 385)*

This authentic historizing amounts to *Wiederholung*, the authentic comportment toward the past.

The idea that history is somehow the creation of a unity out of what is essentially a scattered and incoherent set of facts and experiences is derived from the inauthenticity of Dasein's everydayness wherein Dasein is similarly scattered and dispersed, having covered over its unity. It is possible to "create" a historical unity because Dasein itself is already unified through temporality and is already historical in the way it stretches itself along (SZ 390). Although Heidegger does not specifically emphasize this, the crafting of the unity of Dasein's history is related to the way the meaningful whole of the world is created through Dasein's temporalizing and the 'whithers' to which Dasein is transported through the ecstatic movement of that temporalizing. These 'whithers' are the horizons of the temporal ecstases, and this ecstatic movement is related to the movement in terms of significance which is evident in Dasein's involvement in its world. The ecstatic movement of the future carries Dasein ahead of itself toward the horizon of its *for-the-sake-of-which*. The horizon of the past is that realm of significance into which Dasein finds itself already thrown and which is to be retained. The horizon of the present is the *in-order-to* in terms of which Dasein is alongside entities and which allows Dasein to "connect" its thrownness with its *for-the-sake-of-which*. This connection lies at the root of both Dasein's historicality and its understanding of itself as historical. The whole of significance that is created through this movement is Dasein's history; this whole can only be created around a possibility which is Dasein's *for-the-sake-of-which* — at the most general level, Dasein's *Seinkönnen*. Dasein takes up its past in a way that makes sense of or fits with its particular *Seinkönnen*; in this way Dasein shapes its fate. But this does not mean that Dasein willfully or arbitrarily interprets its past in the most beneficial way. Dasein also is conditioned by its past; what is possible for Dasein is shaped by that past. The future and the past — the *for-the-sake-of-which* and that into which one is already thrown — mutually condition one another. By bringing these two often opposing ecstases into a harmony of tension, Dasein is drawn into the situation. When coupled with the concreteness of that into which Dasein is thrown, Dasein's *Seinkönnen* takes on a concrete form as well, and in the moment of vision, Dasein sees what is ontically possible in the situation and can authentically take action.

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[32] "If Dasein, by anticipation, lets death become powerful in itself, then, as free for death, Dasein understands itself in its own *superior power*, the power of its finite freedom, so that in this freedom, which 'is' only in its having chosen to make such a choice, it can take over the *powerlessness* of abandonment to its having done so, and can thus come to have a clear vision for the accidents of the Situation that has been disclosed" (SZ 384).

Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's historicality is important to his overall argument. He argues that the finitude which discloses itself in Dasein's Being-towards-death is not just a finitude understood in terms of mortality, but also in terms of historicality. Only because Dasein is finite can it have a history. Part of the significance of Dasein's finitude is that its past conditions and operates as another horizon within which it must exist and disclose itself. And importantly, as ways of characterizing Dasein's Being, both historicality and mortality take their point of departure from an understanding of Being in terms of time.

When Dasein is its Being in the mode of being it, it is authentic. That means that, in authenticity, Dasein intends its Being — *is towards* — its Being, fully: Dasein is fully assigned to itself. Since Dasein assigns itself to *possibilities*, 'being assigned to itself' means being assigned to itself as a possibility, which requires a disclosure of its *Seinkönnen*. We have seen that this assignment to its *Seinkönnen* is disclosed in resoluteness. We have also seen that a genuine disclosure of Dasein's *Seinkönnen* only occurs through a Being-towards-death which is anticipatory. Dasein's authenticity, then, occurs in anticipatory resoluteness. But Heidegger's discussion of historicality implies that anticipatory resoluteness is historical; or more exactly, that Dasein's Being-historical is enacted through its anticipatory resoluteness, since it is the latter that draws Dasein concretely into the situation wherein ontic possibilities are authentically disclosed and

Dasein takes action. This makes sense if we consider that Dasein's essence lies in its existence; Dasein *is* that essence most fully when it is immediately engaged in its existing, when it acts in the situation with a view to the mineness of its *Seinkönnen* and the responsibility implied in its disclosure as Being-towards-death attested in the call of conscience. The point, then, is that Dasein's authenticity is not only a Being-towards-death, nor only a Being-historical, but both — they imply and are rooted in one another.

If we think back to the characterization of Heidegger's project as a phenomenological ontology, Dasein's historicality takes on broader significance in his overall investigation. Ontology takes as its object the Being of entities. Heidegger maintains that Being only shows itself phenomenologically. Thus, any ontology must also be a phenomenology. But phenomena disclose themselves in terms of categories which are already given; they show themselves in the terms in *which they have already been understood and expressed.* This 'already' is important, for it is the same 'already' which characterizes Dasein's thrownness. The meaning which something already has is maintained discursively in the background against which objects show themselves (their horizon of significance), but it is also given in the manifesting of the object itself. In so far as meaning is *already there*, it is prior to any specific intentional comportment. It is *a priori*. This is the particular sense of the *a priori* which Heidegger thought was an important contribution of phenomenology.

What this allows us to see is that Dasein understands what it encounters (and also itself) in the way that things **have been** understood. The *a priori* comes from Dasein's *having been.* This relates to the *Seinsfrage* in an important way, because in asking this question, Heidegger is interested in disclosing that understanding of Being which we always have *a priori*. That we already have it signifies that it belongs to our thrownness, to our history. Uncovering what our understanding of Being is and whence it is derived involves both an examination of the history of our thinking about Being and an understanding of our *historicality.* Thus we can disclose how it is that we comport to this past, and the different ways in which we may take it up and disclose possibilities within it.

How we are to have anything like an *a priori* understanding pertains to our temporality as the condition for the possibility of the 'earlier' implied in that understanding (SZ 419). Only against the horizon of a temporality — which is always given beforehand, always understood beforehand, and always that in which Dasein is already immersed — is any understanding of Being possible. The existential analytic helps to clarify the horizon within which the question of the meaning of Being can be formulated and answered (SZ 437); namely within Dasein's existence. Dasein is the entity who asks the question because Dasein is the only entity whose Being is an issue for it. Dasein asks about Being because Being is something worthy of being questioned: Being is question-able. Being is question-able because it is rendered questionable by the finitude of Dasein's existence.

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The treatment of SZ in Part I has been guided by an overarching interest in exploring Heidegger's understanding of subjectivity and the inauthenticity and authenticity which belong to it. The picture which has emerged is that of a complex subjectivity constituted by intentionality, and marked by the immediacy of lived experience. Dasein is always beyond itself, always ahead of itself, always comporting itself meaningfully towards entities which it encounters as emerging significantly from its world. Dasein understands both itself and the entities it encounters from out of the disclosedness which constitutes its Being-in-the-world. This understanding is generally implicit and immediate.

In framing this discussion, I have stressed the importance of understanding the existential analytic within the context of the larger inquiry into the *Seinsfrage*. This is important for two reasons. First, it sets a wider horizon for situating and interpreting the analytic; and second, the relationship between the *Seinsfrage* itself and Dasein as the entity who asks it contributes substantially to our understanding of the subjectivity that characterizes Dasein.

It is important to attend to Heidegger's discussion of the *Seinsfrage* because it frames the analysis of the first two divisions of SZ and helps us to achieve a clearer understanding of what Heidegger hopes to accomplish through this analysis, and how he hopes to do it. The question of the meaning of Being arises within the context of a critical discussion of phenomenology. Heidegger maintains that traditional phenomenology investigates the Being of entities as it manifests itself phenomenologically, without inquiring into the very possibility of this manifesting, without asking about the Being of intentionality. In SZ, Heidegger is concerned with this neglected line of inquiry; he asks about the entity who is intentional (Dasein) and for whom that intentionality is the very structure of lived experience. Once Dasein's understanding of its own Being is disclosed, then its understanding of Being in general can be disclosed, and the relationship between Being and Dasein's Being as the structure of disclosedness can be explored. Attention to the *Seinsfrage* allows us to see the aim of Heidegger's existential analytic in a somewhat different light — as crucially concerned with disclosedness and disclosure of Being through intentional comportment (Being-in-the-world).

Let us recall the most basic constitutive features of Dasein: first, its own Being is an issue for it; second, it is the entity who asks the *Seinsfrage*. In order to formulate this question, Dasein must — says Heidegger — have an implicit understanding of Being as part of its Being. Dasein bears a relationship to its Being; it implicitly understands its own Being and the Being of entities encountered in the world generally — it has an implicit understanding of Being in general. Dasein understands itself in this implicit way in everydayness, where it intends its own Being in an empty fashion. Although everything Dasein does presumes this understanding, the understanding is not explicitly grasped, but remains largely concealed. Authenticity, by contrast, is a mode of Dasein's Being in which Dasein intends its own Being *fully*. The meaning of Dasein's Being — implied yet concealed in everydayness — is more fully disclosed in authenticity.

In stressing that Dasein is the entity who asks the *Seinsfrage*, who asks about the meaning of Being, Heidegger makes the crucial point that Dasein has enough of an understanding of being to be able to formulate such a question. But, nevertheless, Dasein does not know the answer; it does not know that it understands. More importantly, however, Dasein *wants to understand*, otherwise it would not ask. The *Seinsfrage*, indeed all questions, are generated out of a sense that something is unclear, uncertain, questionable, and *that this matters*, that this uncertainty needs to be cleared up. If Dasein asks about the meaning of Being, it is because Dasein does not find that meaning obvious or certain. Why is this so? Because Dasein's Being is both truth and untruth, a revealing and concealing; its Being is constituted by finite disclosedness. The very dynamism and movement of Dasein's existentiality and temporality are what keep this dialectic of concealment and disclosure in constant motion.

All of this relates to Dasein's finitude in a particularly poignant way. Both Dasein's mortality and its historicality can throw into question the whole meaning of its existence. In the face of inevitable death, Dasein can question the purpose of its existence; in the face of the burden of its history, Dasein can succumb to fatalism and question the meaning of an existence in which it does not feel free to control its destiny. These questions are not merely abstract and philosophical; they are existentially grounded and motivated. Dasein's finitude, as that which makes its Being-in-the-world possible in giving Dasein a *Seinkönnen*, is at the same time that which threatens it. In the course of its existence, Dasein is constantly questioned and challenged, called upon to forge some kind of significant whole in the face of that which threatens to dissolve it into nothingness.

In a sense, then, it is Dasein's Being which questions Dasein, and thus, it can be said that Dasein questions itself. The *Seinsfrage* is born out of this existential questioning. Dasein is both the entity which asks the *Seinsfrage* and the entity which is queried. But in neither case should we understand this questioning relationship to oneself as evidence of simple identity. Being thrown into question would not be possible and questioning 'oneself' in response to this challenge would not be necessary if this were the case. *The self which questions is other than the self which is queried.* Dasein's self as anxious Being-towards-death is other than its *Man-selbst*. This is what allows Dasein's Being to throw Dasein into question, prompting it to formulate the *Seinsfrage* and thereby explicitly question its existence.

The questioning and questionableness of things is most dramatically rooted in Dasein's finitude, although it appears in much of our worldly engagement. Dasein's general interrogation of its world implies a similar structure, wherein things become questionable for us; we ask questions, seek responses, and so on. This kind of commerce between Dasein and other entities in the world occurs against a background of meaning, while at the same time creating and modifying that meaning. The background of meaning is constituted by discourse and sustained by *Mitsein*; to the degree that this enables entities not of Dasein's Being to 'give meaning', they too participate in this commerce.

This kind of exchange between Dasein and the entities in its world, which takes the structure of a question and response, which occurs within a context of meaning, and which is aimed at reaching greater understanding — is this not *dialogical*? Are we not to understand that Dasein's Being-in-the-world is dialogical? To resolve this question, we must ask: what is dialogue?

Part II

Dialogue

Introduction

The question which guides the inquiry in this section is: what is dialogue? It seems like a clear question, to which there ought to be a simple enough answer. My objective in this introduction, however, is to demonstrate that the question of dialogue is more complicated than one might think, and demands deeper investigation. I will first critically discuss what I take to be the 'common sense' view of dialogue. After demonstrating the deficiencies of this view, I will turn to a brief discussion of four thinkers of dialogue with the goal of developing a more adequate understanding of the notion. During the course of this investigation, two strains of dialogical thought will emerge. These will be given a more definitive shape in the third section, in order to prepare for the more in-depth analyses in Chapters 4 through 6.

i. The 'common sense' view

Most of us have a rough sense of what 'dialogue' means. Usually we use the term to refer to a particularly meaningful exchange with someone else. We speak of having been 'in dialogue' with someone or of having arrived at some understanding 'through dialogue'. We also say things like 'we had a real dialogue going' which is taken to mean that we were *really* talking with one another, *really* engaged with one another, and not just talking *to* or *past* each other. These usages suggest that we usually think of 'dialogue' as denoting not just *any* conversation, but one in which the exchange is *particularly* significant, substantive, productive, and meaningful. Using this description as our point of departure, let us distinguish five claims that it implies.

We can begin by noting that the paradigm at work here is that of a conversation. This generates the first two features of the common sense view: dialogue occurs between people, it is limited to the realm of the interhuman; dialogue occurs through language.

The third feature is a distinction between dialogue and "mere" communication.[1]

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[1] This distinction resembles that between 'communicating X to Y' and 'being in communication with' elaborated by Ruth Saw in her paper, "Conversation and Communication," *Thinking* 2 (May 1980): 55-64.

Mere communication, we might say, is simply the transfer of information from one person to another. In this sense, it is purely functional. The speaker has some thought in mind which is expressed through language to another who hears it. The communication is successful when the hearer has the same thought in mind as the speaker did at the outset. As an exchange of meaning, this mere communication is not taken to be particularly significant, presumably because it is not thought to be *productive* of meaning in the way that dialogue is. In dialogue, something is produced through the conversation which is meaningful and which establishes a bond between the participants.

The notion that dialogue is productive of meaning whereas mere communication is not relates to the fourth feature: dialogue is characterized by *positive*, affirmative, social interaction; it is constructive and requires an openness to the other. Merely functional communication, it might be said, does not require such an openness because it is primarily aimed at transferring some information to the other. No real response from the other is desired or elicited in such communication, whereas in dialogue one seeks to draw the other out and engage the other in a meaningful exchange. The participants in dialogue have a common aim and they work together in order to reach some shared goal or understanding; in this sense dialogue is productive of meaning. This feature is absent not only in mere communication, but also in interaction which is adversarial, combative, or destructive. Such adversarial engagement, it could be argued, is not open to the other and does not seek to produce something through a positive relation to the other, but instead seeks to dominate and vanquish the other. Dialogue thus seems to imply an inherent affirmation or positivity.

This constructive, positive aspect appears to be necessary for the production of meaning in terms of which interaction may be deemed dialogical. Part of this constructive engagement, we might say, is a symmetrical mutuality in the participation. This kind of participation is the fifth feature: all participants must be engaged equally; they must be open to one another; and all must contribute. Hierarchical differences between participants presumably act as a hindrance to dialogue because they get in the way of a free and equal exchange. Differentials in power disrupt and threaten dialogue.

I call this the 'common sense' view of dialogue. Since most of us hold this view in some form or another, we think that the answer to the question 'what is dialogue' must be straightforward. I would argue, however, that it is not; our common sense perspective is problematic in many respects. The common sense perspective rests upon the five assumptions I have just described, all of which are open to serious doubt.

Perhaps the most important feature of the common sense view is the strong distinction it draws between mere communication and dialogue. This distinction hinges on the notion that dialogue is meaningful in a way that mere communication is not, although what this notion amounts to is not wholly clear. In describing the view above, I have suggested that mere communication involves conveying information or meaning from one participant to another for functional purposes. Mere communication is a means to an end. Dialogue, on the other hand, is meaningful in itself, perhaps because it seems to be productive of meaning in a way that outstrips the shallow meaningfulness of mere communication.

Let us examine this point more closely. In mere communication, participants communicate with each other through utterances which make sense to each other. If they make sense to one other, this means that the listener understands what the speaker means in each case. In this sense, the utterances are meaningful. However, dialogue also involves the exchange of meaningful utterances. Thus, if we are to preserve the notion that dialogue is distinct from mere communication, we must locate the particular meaningfulness of dialogue elsewhere.

One possibility is that mere communication is really only a means to an end, whereas dialogue is its own end; it is for its own sake. In this view, dialogue would be meaningful because it has intrinsic value, whereas mere communication would only have instrumental value, deriving its meaning from the end toward which it is directed. Initially, this seems highly plausible. But how, then, are we to reconcile this with the fourth feature outlined above, the positive, constructive aspect of dialogue? There it seemed that an exchange aimed at sharing perspectives and broadening understanding would be considered constructive and dialogical. This shared understanding, then, is produced through dialogue; dialogue is the means through which shared understanding occurs. Arguably, the meaningfulness and value which we attribute to this sharing of perspectives underlies the value we ascribe to the exchange through which it issues. Consequently, it seems less promising to describe the difference in meaning between mere communication and dialogue in terms of a distinction between instrumental and intrinsic value.

We can, however, hold that the special significance of dialogue lies precisely in what comes to be shared by the participants through their exchange. In this sense, dialogue is meaningful because meaning is *produced* through the exchange, as opposed to merely *transmitted*. The production of meaning, then, will depend upon the exchange of meaning; mere communication is a condition for dialogue. The possibility of maintaining the distinction between dialogue and mere communication rests upon the claim that not all communication is productive of meaning: when it is not productive of meaning, it is mere communication; when it is, it is dialogue.

But if the meaning that is produced through dialogue is the sharing of perspectives and broadening of understanding effected through the exchange, it seems doubtful that we can continue to maintain a distinction between mere communication and dialogue. I doubt that there is any communication, no matter how banal, which does not involve some sharing of perspectives. Any successful exchange of meaning is productive of at least some minimal shared understanding between speaker and listener. The question is where do we draw the line to distinguish between those shared understandings which are extensive enough to be considered "meaningful" and those which are not? I do not deny that there may be some qualitative difference between mere communication and dialogue such that the latter is an intensification of the former, but it is very difficult to capture this difference.

This difficulty throws a number of the other assumptions of the common sense view into question. For instance, it is no longer clear why an asymmetrical communicative exchange could not be considered dialogical. Despite the fact that participation is not equal, such an exchange could be productive of a common understanding and this perhaps would be enough to make it meaningful in the relevant sense.

The concern regarding symmetry in dialogue rests implicitly upon the idea that the one who speaks has power and dominates, while the one who listens is powerless and passive. This kind of asymmetry would be antithetical to dialogue. However several questions may be raised here. First, it is not strictly accurate to portray the listener as purely passive — the listener is actively involved *in listening* in dialogue — and the speaker, if he wants to be understood, must be attentive to the listener as well. Second, it has been suggested that the one who asks a question — and so is predominantly silent in the course of an exchange — is actually in a position of increased power relative to the respondent because, through the very questioning, that participant challenges and holds the other accountable.[2] This suggests that equality of 'active' participation is not necessary for equality of power. Furthermore, dialogue depends upon a certain asymmetry as represented by the alterity of the participants with respect to one another. The other is *not* the same as me; thus, if I want her to know something, I must express myself to her so that our understanding comes to be shared.

It is similarly unclear why a dialogic exchange need necessarily be considered constructive or positive. We tend to think of things that are meaningful as being "good," but this seems to unnecessarily restrict the scope of the meaningful. If we are committed to the view that an exchange is dialogue — as opposed to mere communication — because that exchange produces meaning and effects a sharing of perspectives, there seems little reason to assume that this must be a "positive" thing. The bond which is established could be hate just as easily as love or friendship. An adversarial or combative interaction can be productive of animosity or hostility; these — though perhaps not "good" — are certainly meaningful. Even if we were to stipulate that the meaning produced must be achieved through joint effort,[3] I am not sure we could sidestep this consequence. After all, an argument is certainly a joint effort. The assumption that dialogue is always constructive (or that being constructive cannot also be destructive) seems rather questionable.

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[2] See Per Linnel, "The power of dialogue and dynamics," *The Dynamics of Dialogue*, eds. Ivana Markovà and Klaus Foppa (New York: Springer Verlag, 1990) 147-77. This idea seems consistent with Levinas as well.

[3] In order to preserve the distinction between mere communication and dialogue, one might argue that in mere communication, any meaning produced does not occur through joint effort because of the passivity of the listener. However, this assumes that listening involves no effort, that it is truly passive, and I have already challenged this assumption. The communication of meaning that a speaker seeks to effect through making an utterance will only occur with the cooperation of the listener.

Also questionable is the notion that merely functional communication or adversarial interaction fails to involve an openness to the other. Even in the most banal exchanges, one formulates one's utterances so as to be understood, and one does seek a response in such communication, otherwise one would not bother communicating. Similarly, in a combative situation, one is open to the approaches of the other and, in responding to them, is quite attentive to counter-responses. Consequently, although it may at first seem somewhat counter-intuitive, these sorts of exchanges do involve an openness to the other.

This suggests that a fist-fight may be as dialogical as an erotic encounter: both involve the exchange of meaningful gestures which contribute to the production of a meaningful bond (be it hatred or love) between the participants. If these can be considered dialogical according to the foregoing discussion, then perhaps dialogue is not limited to the realm of language. This seems reasonable in so far as meaning can be exchanged through signs that are extra-linguistic. But if that is so, then perhaps dialogue need not be limited to entities who possess linguistic expression as a possibility. Might it be possible for there to be exchanges which are productive of meaning with works of art or divinities or nature? It does not seem that we are justified in ruling this out. So, dialogue is perhaps not limited to the realm of the interhuman either.

This illustrates that the basic assumptions implied by the 'common sense' view of dialogue become considerably less plausible when held up to scrutiny. It is not clear what precisely we mean by 'dialogue'; thus, we must push beyond this 'common sense' view. To assist in furthering our investigation, we can examine the work of those who have already reflected on dialogue, namely those who are considered to be philosophers of dialogue.

ii. Philosophers of dialogue

There is a growing body of philosophical literature on dialogue. In an effort to expand our understanding of what is meant by the concept of dialogue, I will briefly summarize the views offered by four of the more prominent philosophers in the discourse: Buber, Bakhtin, Gadamer, and Levinas. This is by no means a comprehensive list of philosophers of dialogue, nor do I intend my brief synopses of these four thinkers' views of dialogue to be exhaustive. My goal is to highlight the diversity of views within the discourse with the intent of mapping out the lines along which similarities can be seen.[4]

The view of dialogue which Martin Buber develops in his influential work *I and Thou* (IT)[5] depends upon a distinction he makes between two different ways of relating to the other. The first is the *I-It* in which one comports toward the other in an impersonal manner which entails an objectification of the other. By approaching the other as an object of knowledge which is graspable, knowable, and analyzable, one not only fails to intuit the alterity of the other, but one also impoverishes one's engagement with the other. In this narrow and confined way of relating, the *I* takes priority over the other. In the *I-Thou*, by contrast, the *I-It* is transcended, and one addresses the other in a way which does not commit this violence. Instead one approaches the other with an openness which allows the other to be encountered in the wholeness of its being and on its own terms. As Buber describes it, the *I-Thou* is something like an encounter with the mystery of the other, which our *I-It* ways of engaging with others shield us from experiencing. The mystery embodied in each particular *Thou* is related to that of the eternal *Thou* (God). We can say, then, that Buber's concept of dialogue (which correlates with his *I-Thou* relation) is something like an encounter with divinity. Although the *I-Thou* is often understood in somewhat mystical terms, Buber maintains that dialogue is not a mystical event, but something quite concrete.[6] Dialogue is a turning towards the other in which we realize that the other addresses us and, in so doing, requires us to respond. These others are not limited to human others, but include nature and what Buber calls spiritual entities — works of art, intellectual constructs, literature. Although the difference between the *I-It* and the *I-Thou* could be understood primarily in terms of language, Buber's point is that the linguistic difference in mode of address is reflective of a more primordial kind of address. This address often occurs in silence.

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[4] The multiplicity of views here is evidenced by Eugeniusz Czaplejewicz's reference to at least eight different theories of dialogue (formal, formalist, thematic, semantic, neoidealistic, ideological, functional and pragmatic), each of which understands 'dialogue' in a slightly different way. All of these theories, however, refer to what I would call a 'conversational' figure of dialogue. See E. Czaplejewicz, "Dialogics and the Pragmatic Theory of Dialogue," *Dialectics and Humanism* 5 (Winter 1978): 151-59.

[5] Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958) (IT).

[6] See Martin Buber, "Dialogue," *Between Man and Man*, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Collins, 1961) 17-59. See especially p. 21. In that text, Buber attempts to clarify the view of dialogue introduced in IT.

Mikhail Bakhtin's interest in linguistics and literary criticism involves him primarily in issues of aesthetics and language, and most of his work deals in one way or another with the question of dialogue.[7] Central to his position is the idea that language is essential to human existence. Human existence finds expression in discourse and is given meaning through discourse; we construct ourselves through linguistic expression. But language is also a social phenomenon. Not only do we communicate to one another through language or by means of language, but each specific linguistic expression or utterance is a reflection of an already existing discourse and derives its meaning in relation to that discourse. There is no such thing as a 'private' language because language always contains within it the voice of others; it refers to others. The implication of this is that human existence is essentially social; its significance is constructed and enacted dialogically.

Bakhtin's idea that specific utterances can incorporate more than one voice due to their relationship to other spheres of discourse underlies his exploration of intertextuality in the novel. Intertextuality, sometimes also referred to as dialogism, is the phenomenon in which various discourses become nested within and reflected in one another through their being echoed (ironically or otherwise) in the exchanges which occur between various characters and in their psychological development.[8] This development is often expressed, at least in the novels that interest Bakhtin the most, through the character's extended conversation with himself — in short, a monologue. Yet Bakhtin believes that all utterances are meaningful because of their reference to another discourse, and that all utterances, therefore, contain references to the other. As a result, he also maintains that such monologues are best characterized as *interior* dialogues.[9] On one level, then, the distinction between monologue and dialogue does not hold for Bakhtin. Yet there are other instances where he clearly maintains the distinction, indicating that monologue involves no significant consciousness of the other in contrast to the recognition of the other in dialogue.[10] The picture which unfolds begins to get rather complex. On the one hand, language is dialogical because of intertextuality; if language is essential to human existence, then this implies that human existence is dialogical. On the other hand, it seems that this dialogicality may be enacted in a monological way if one is not aware of the fundamental nature of the relation to the other which is involved in self-constitution.[11]

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[7] For more on Bakhtin and dialogue, see Hwa Yol Jung, "Mikhail Bakhtin's Body Politic: A Phenomenological Dialogics," *Man and World* 23.1 (Jan. 1990): 85-99; Tzvetan Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle*, trans. Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); Vivienne Brown, "The Moral Self and Ethical Dialogism: Three Genres," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 28.4 (1995): 276-99; David Patterson, "Mikhail Bakhtin and the Dialogical Dimensions of the Novel," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 44 (Winter 1985): 131-39.

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[8] See Mikhail Bakhtin, *The Problem of Dostoevski's Poetics*, ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984). These ideas are particularly influential to an entire branch of the current discourse on dialogue. See Ivana Markovà and Klaus Foppa, eds., *The Dynamics of Dialogue* (New York: Springer Verlag, 1990) and *Asymmetries in Dialogue* (Savage, MD: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).

[9] See Bakhtin, *Problems* 74-75, 213-15, 254-56 and 278-79.

[10] Bakhtin, *Problems* 79-80, 292-93.

[11] The view that dialogue is an exchange of utterances which not only are aimed at an other but derive their meaning through their reference to the other is the figure of dialogue which is perhaps most commonly associated with Bakhtin. However, it is not the only one evident in his work. Bakhtin is not only interested in the way dialogue plays itself out in the multiplicity of voices that can be found in the literary text, especially the novel; he also concerns himself with the process of artistic creation, in particular with the relationship between the author of the novel and the hero that she creates. In order for the character to develop in a way which is distinct from the author's own self, there must be a certain distance between author and hero which allows the hero to become an other for the author. This distance allows the author to understand the hero as an aesthetic whole, permitting the character to unfold itself in a fullness and independence which would not otherwise be possible. Although Bakhtin does not use the term 'dialogue' to describe this relationship, it does nonetheless seem appropriate to apply it here for it implies a way of relating to another which is sensitive to the alterity of the other. See, Mikhail Bakhtin, *Art and Answerability*, ed. Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov, trans. Vadim Liapunov (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990).

Yet another view of dialogue is put forward by Hans-Georg Gadamer.[12] The key to his concept of dialogue lies in his interest in hermeneutics, which can be seen as a development on some of the insights of phenomenology.[13] In phenomenology, the object is said to have a horizon which acts as its background, allowing it to appear as it is, situated within a domain of meaning. Hermeneutics expands upon this idea by focusing on situations as opposed to objects. As a result, multiple horizons become involved which extend beyond what is present-at-hand within the situation itself. Through a fusion of these horizons, a background of significance is created in terms of which the situation is understood.

This idea has interesting implications for dialogue because it suggests that understanding between two dialogical partners occurs through a similar fusion of horizons, effected through an exchange between participants which has the structure of a question and response. Through this dialectic, an understanding comes to be shared between the participants.[14] Although this suggests that dialogue has a primarily conversational structure, Gadamer is clear that we are to understand this in a figurative sense as well. We are to understand history, or historical consciousness, as a conversation in which we respond to the questions that the past poses for us; this historical conversation is the horizon within which we are to situate and understand the texts which we interpret. In order to understand the meaning of a text, we must understand it as a response to a question, and we must unpack what this question is. But this unpacking can only be effected through a dialogic engagement with the text itself, through questioning it and allowing ourselves to be questioned by it. The question to which the text is a response can only be uncovered through our own re-cognition of that question; this re-cognition arises out of the experience of questionableness that takes place in the encounter with the text.[15]

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[12] See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum Press, 1989).

[13] For a discussion of dialogue in relation to Gadamer's work, see, Jean Grondin, "L'universalisation de l'hermeneutique chez Hans-Georg Gadamer," *Archives de Philosophie* 53 (Oct.-Dec. 1990): 531-45; Dieter Misgeld, "Poetry, Dialogue, and Negotiation: Liberal Culture and Conservative Politics in Hans-Georg Gadamer's Thought," *Festivals of Interpretation*, ed. Kathleen Wright (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990) 161-81; Diane P. Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer, eds., *Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989).

[14] Gadamer 367-69.

The 'back-and-forth' movement of the question-and-response structure of the conversation gives rise to another important concept that Gadamer uses to characterize dialogue, namely play. However, Gadamer wants to consider play apart from the player's subjective reflection on it, for play is an experience which changes the one who experiences it. Playing is a closed world; participation in that world requires a suspension of one's relations to what lies outside of it. Play is most authentic when one is absorbed in it; the *subject* of play is not the player, but actually the game, the play. The play challenges and tests the player. Gadamer argues that play is an activity which lacks a goal which would bring it to an end; it is movement which can go on indefinitely.

Presumably this is true within the closed world of the play, but limits may be arbitrarily imposed from outside that realm. Play only goes on indefinitely if it is not brought to a halt by something beyond; this always occurs. In this regard, play is not without risk, for something must be accomplished before that limit is reached, specifically the self-presencing of the players through the play.[16] In Gadamer's thought, dialogue is also a kind of play in which the participants become absorbed in their interaction with one another; through their participation, they *present* themselves.

The concept of dialogue put forward by Emmanuel Levinas is somewhat different and reflects the primacy of his concern with ethics. In particular he is critical of the way in which the metaphysical tradition conceptualizes the other.[17] In his view, the tradition posits the other primarily in negative terms by defining it as the antithesis of the same. When taken together, the polar opposites of the same and the other neutralize one another and form a totality. According to Levinas, this understanding of the other completely fails to acknowledge the alterity of the other and, in fact, commits a violence to the other by assimilating it to the same. This becomes particularly problematic when we consider that, traditionally, ethics is grounded in metaphysics. If a traditional metaphysics deals with the other in a dominating and violent way, it cannot provide an adequate basis for ethics because it will reinscribe that violence in the ethical domain.

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[15] Gadamer 369-79. Interestingly, Gadamer does compare the hermeneutic experience of historical tradition with an experience of the *Thou* (Gadamer 358-62). Engagement with historical tradition is like the dialogue of *I-Thou*, although perhaps not in Buber's sense.

[16] Gadamer 101-10.

[17] In my discussion of Levinas both here and below, I follow the translator's decision to use 'other' to refer to '*l'Autre*' and 'Other' to refer to '*l'Autrui*', the concrete human Other.

This situation can be rectified by, firstly, maintaining the priority of ethics over ontology, and secondly, by approaching the other in a way that acknowledges its alterity. We must come to understand the other, not as it appears in logic — through negation — but as it manifests itself ethically, in the face to face encounter with a concrete Other. This notion of the face to face is Levinas' concept of dialogue, although he does not use the term 'dialogue' himself. In the encounter, I experience the Other in its vulnerability. This vulnerability challenges me to an ethical responsibility not to harm that Other: I am held accountable. In this sense, the Other wields tremendous power over me, rupturing the solitude of my solipsistic *I* and disclosing the *I* as existing in a primarily ethical relation to the Other. The Other is able to elicit this responsibility from me because of the way it withdraws from my epistemological grasp. The Other is not reducible to its appearance, to what explicitly presents itself to me. That there is more to the Other than its appearance — that the Other always remains an enigma and a mystery — shows itself most clearly through the face and in the face to face encounter. In looking into the face of the Other, I see the depth of the Other. Although I cannot see into those depths, I am made aware of them and am compelled to respect them.[18]

Another way of characterizing the same idea is to say that the interdependence between self and other is ill-expressed by the notion of a relation of dependence. Such a characterization establishes that the relationship between self and other is one of *need*; the self suffers from a lack which the other can fill. In fulfilling this need, the other is assimilated to the same, and a totality is formed. This assimilation can only be prevented by conceiving of the self as complete — not lacking the other, but rather *desiring* the other. This desire is a movement, not of drawing the other in and absorbing it, but of surpassing oneself towards the other in a movement of jubilant overflowing and excess. This movement is inspired by the other and is similar to the movement of responsibility. Both can be seen to characterize the relationship to the Other as it is disclosed in the face to face encounter, and both can be considered dialogical.

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[18] See especially Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1979) (TI).

iii. Two figures of dialogue

The brief treatment of the work of these four key thinkers should impress one with the diversity of views on dialogue. Firstly, we have Buber who describes the dialogical relation as an *I-Thou* mode of address in which a union with the being of the other is forged, and in which *I* and *Thou* find themselves standing in a relation of mutuality, neither subordinate to the other. Secondly, we have Bakhtin whose primary model of dialogue is that of a conversation in which the utterances always echo the discourse of the other; the other is always present in the linguistic exchange through which the self is constructed. Thirdly, we have Gadamer for whom dialogue is also a conversation but is most importantly a play of questions and responses. Whereas for Bakhtin dialogue pertains to a type of intertextuality which shows itself in linguistic exchange and literary works, Gadamer is much more concerned with the dialogical character of interpretation of texts and engagement with historical, cultural discourse. Finally, Levinas turns away from the notion of dialogue as conversation and focuses instead on a relationship to the other which is one of desire — as opposed to need — and which manifests itself in the face to face encounter.[19]

Taking a clue from Gadamer, we can perhaps say that the different guises in which dialogue appears in the thought of each writer can be traced back to the question to which that thought represents a response. Consequently, the different forms these views assume may be due, at least in part, to their expression in terms of the discourse in which they are engaged: theology for Buber; literary criticism and linguistics for Bakhtin; historical hermeneutics for Gadamer; ethics and ontology for Levinas. The common thread running through them is concern with the relation to the other. However, within this rubric we can make a finer distinction. It is interesting that both Bakhtin and Gadamer choose conversation as their metaphor for dialogue. Both are concerned with a relation to the other which is enacted through the give-and-take of conversation; both are interested in the meaning which is conveyed, and the shared understanding which is forged and exhibited through this kind of exchange.[20] Buber and Levinas, on the other hand, do not particularly emphasize a relation which takes the form of an exchange, a give-and-take.[21] They speak much more of a simultaneity of presence between self and other which might be referred to as an encounter. Both, in fact, contrast this type of relation to the other with another, impoverished form. For Buber it is the *I-It*; for Levinas it is the same-other.

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[19] It should be noted as well that there are a number of dissimilarities between these views and the 'common sense' view outlined earlier. For instance Gadamer does not seem to recognize a distinction between mere communication and dialogue, and Bakhtin seems to be ambivalent on this same point. Buber does not think dialogue is restricted to the interhuman or to language. Levinas does not emphasize the kind of reciprocity that one would typically ascribe to dialogue in the 'common sense' view.

I would like to suggest that which of these two figures[22] of dialogue — conversation or encounter — emerges depends upon the kind of question one asks. Both Bakhtin and Gadamer are interested in the communication — the exchange — of meaning between oneself and the other; thus, they focus on conversation as the way in which this exchange is effected. But both also recognize that the possibility of understanding the meaning which is communicated depends upon some antecedent familiarity with the discourse to which that meaning refers. Discourse is always socially enacted; we are initiated into it and familiarized with it through social interaction. Language and meaning are social. This implies that our ability to understand the other in a particular instance is grounded in a more general relatedness to the other, mediated by a shared background of meaning. If that prior relatedness to the other were not there, no possibility of communication and shared understanding would ensue. In so far as communication occurs, a prior relation must be present. The self is essentially related to others (through language).[23]

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[20] The two anthologies compiled by Markovà and Foppa consist of studies which analyze dialogue as conversation.

[21] I make this point with some qualification. Buber does refer to a give-and-take at one point. See IT 102-103 and my discussion in Chapter 5 below. Also, Levinas does think expression and language are important in the relation with the Other, yet he does not emphasize anything like the reciprocity of give-and-take.

[22] I will refer to conversation and encounter as figures or modes of dialogue because I want to emphasize that both are manifestations of a more general phenomenon.

Such a position maintains a view of the self opposed to a notion of the self as essentially independent of others and only related to them *subsequently* and *accidentally*. This latter view of the self is the more traditional one, often characterized as a **monological** view of the self. It is generally opposed by what is referred to as a **dialogical** view of the self: a self *essentially* in conversation with its world, whose selfhood is constituted through its participation in the dialogue. It is important to see the relationship between the conception of self formulated by Bakhtin and Gadamer, and the issue highlighted in the monologue/dialogue distinction. This relationship is primarily suggested by their choice of conversation as the conceptual metaphor for dialogue.

The similarities between Buber and Levinas are somewhat closer. Both are less worried about whether the self is essentially related to the other, and more concerned with distinguishing *how* it is related to the other, in particular whether or not that relation respects the alterity of the other. The issue of meaning and the transmission or communication of meaning between self and other is not highlighted to the same extent in their work. What is much more important is encountering the other in a way which does not commit violence to that other, either literally through immoral behavior and violation, or figuratively through epistemological appropriation and dismemberment.

The contrast between the two different ways of approaching and encountering the other which both Buber and Levinas discuss might be described as a difference between **intentional** and **dialogical** modes of comportment.[24] The intentional view resembles the subject-object relation of traditional epistemology in which the object (other) is subordinated to the subject (self), and so appropriated by or pried open to view before the knowing/investigating *I*.[25] By contrast, a mode of encounter in which the self does not approach the other as a thing to be appropriated and assimilated as an object of knowledge would be dialogical.

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[23] For instance, Janusz Kuczynski considers dialogue to consist of a type of relationality of being. See "The Metaphilosophy of Dialogue," *Dialectics and Humanism* 16 (Summer-Autumn 1989): 147-62.

[24] This distinction is adapted from Theunissen's distinction between the transcendental and the dialogical as developed in his book *The Other*. See Chapter 5. Theunissen explicitly argues that Buber's view of dialogue is to be understood in this way. Michael Theunissen, *The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl,*

What begins to emerge here is a two-pronged discourse on dialogue.[26] On one prong are those who are primarily interested in the nature of the self and whether or not it is essentially related to others. Those who argue for such a relation generally do so with reference to the distinction between monologue and dialogue, and the figure of dialogue which is evoked is typically that of conversation. On the second prong are those who are primarily interested in making evaluative distinctions among relations to the other. They are interested in the 'how' of these relations, often arguing that one kind of relating is 'better' than another by appealing to a distinction between intentional and dialogical relations to the other. The figure of dialogue which generally appears here is that of encounter.

In the next three chapters I will argue that distinctions between monologue and dialogue on the one hand, and intentionality and dialogicality on the other, cannot suffice as articulations of a concept of dialogue because such distinctions rely primarily on a definition of dialogue relative to what it is not. To overcome this difficulty, I propose pursuing a phenomenological investigation of the two figures of dialogue towards which

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Heidegger, Sartre and Buber, trans. Christopher Macann (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984) (O). This text is a shortened version of Theunissen's original German work, *Der Andere: Studien zur Sozialontologie der Gegenwart* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1965).

[25] In so far as this intentional self might also be seen to exist independently of its object, it might also be characterized as monological; indeed there may be some overlap in these two positions. What distinguishes them here is the point of emphasis highlighted by the critique and represented in the figure of dialogue which is offered in response. Buber, for instance, does sometimes use the monologue/dialogue distinction to characterize what I am here referring to as the intentionality/dialogicality distinction. See Buber, "Dialogue" 37-52.

[26] There are, of course, many similarities between these two figures of dialogue, otherwise they could not both be considered 'dialogue'. This will be discussed at length in Chapter 6. For a discussion of the similarities between Bakhtin and Levinas on dialogue, see Augusto Ponzio, *Signs, Dialogue and Ideology*, trans. Susan Petrilli (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 1993) 107-26.

our discussion of Buber, Bakhtin, Gadamer and Levinas has led us — namely conversation and encounter. By exploring these notions through an essentially phenomenological analysis, we can unpack what these thinkers presume to be distinctive about dialogue. And we can avoid recourse to negative definitions by grappling with the phenomena themselves. However, once we have done this, it will be necessary to explore the relationship between conversation and encounter.[27]

Toward this end, I have structured Part II as follows. Chapter 4 argues against the monologue/dialogue distinction, conducts a phenomenology of dialogue as conversation, and attempts to articulate the concept of conversation as fully as possible. In Chapters 5 and 6, I will be concerned with the figure of dialogue as encounter. Since this tradition is perhaps less familiar, I will dedicate Chapter 5 to charting its development through the work of Buber, Theunissen, and Levinas, before turning to my critical assessment of it in Chapter 6. I will begin with a treatment of Buber's distinction between the *I-It* and the *I-Thou*, focusing in particular on his critique of intentionality as it appears in the *I-It*. I will then consider Michael Theunissen's work, which draws out and develops the intentionality/dialogicality bipolarity in the spirit of Buber. However, Theunissen ultimately maintains (and significantly so for my purposes) that Buber fails to offer a theory of dialogicality which is independent of a theory of intentionality. In fact, Theunissen is skeptical about the possibility — and even the desirability — of articulating such a theory, suggesting that an intermediate position between the two would be most promising. This is important for my articulation of an encounter model of dialogue, for it suggests that intentionality and dialogicality are not mutually exclusive, but are in fact dependent upon one another in some way. In discussing Levinas' work, I will draw upon his insights regarding the relationship between intentionality and sensation in order to further weaken the distinction between intentionality and dialogue. This aim will also be advanced through a treatment of his distinction between need and desire. Finally, Levinas' concept of the face to face will add considerably to our understanding of encounter.

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[27] The connection is not only conceptual, but historical as well. Theunissen explores the terrain of the philosophy of dialogue as it occurred in Germany in the 1920s. Buber is a primary figure in this movement, but certainly not the only one. Theunissen attributes the coherence of the dialogical movement of that period to a criticism of a particular type of transcendentalism. This critique of transcendentalism was not new, but echoed criticisms raised by thinkers in the early to mid-19th century against Hegelianism and other forms of idealism. Feuerbach, whose *Principles for a Philosophy of the Future* is cited by a number of thinkers of dialogue as being particularly influential, was especially virulent in this regard and, in criticizing Hegel, insisted upon the need for a return to the existential perspective of *I* and *Thou*. See O 266-69; Karl Löwith, *Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschens* (München: Drei Masken Verlag, 1928) 5-13, 56-58; Martin Buber, "Zur Geschichte des dialogischen Prinzips," *Werke*, 3 vols. (München: Kösel-Verlag, 1962) 1: 291-305; Todorov 30-31 [fn 1, 2], 98 [fn 1]; Ludwig Feuerbach, *The Principles of a Philosophy of the Future*, trans. Manfred H. Vogel (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1966) 51-73; and Shmuel Hugo Bergman, *Dialogical Philosophy from Kierkegaard to Buber*, trans. Arnold A. Gerstein (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991) 145-70.

In Chapter 6 I will argue that not only is the intentionality/dialogicality distinction untenable, but that intentionality is actually dialogical in terms of conversation. What Buber and Theunissen refer to as 'dialogue' is more properly construed as encounter. This naturally raises the question: in terms of what can both conversation and encounter be characterized as dialogue? I will argue that they are related through a cluster of dialogical concepts which a phenomenological analysis of both reveals — namely, alterity, responsibility and questionability, continuity and discontinuity, and meaning. In addition, the dialogic situation is always constituted by an orientation towards the other which occurs along axes of spatiality, temporality, and significance. Dialogue is a phenomenon which manifests itself in a multiplicity of ways, depending upon the intensity with which each feature shows itself, and upon the partner with whom we are engaged.

It is important to emphasize that because this investigation is phenomenological, it is also ontological. I am interested in disclosing dialogue in its Being. One should also remember that, in speaking of dialogue as a phenomenon, it should not be construed as an object which is separate and distinct from the subject. My claim is that human subjectivity is dialogical; it is enacted through dialogue and experienced dialogically. The study of dialogue is also a study of human subjectivity; thus, the distinction between the subject who does the investigating, and the subject whose experience is investigated, becomes blurred. At times, I will describe dialogue from the perspective of an observer, but I will also draw upon the insights and experience of a participant in dialogue, in order to interpret or expand upon the meaning I have illuminated from the perspective of an observer. The analysis moves back and forth between these two perspectives, both woven together to provide as rich an account of dialogue as possible, with emphasis on how it is experienced from the perspective of the engaged subject. It is ultimately my view that subjectivity is *experienced* dialogically, whether we are explicitly conscious of it or not.

Chapter 4

Dialogue as Conversation

In the course of this chapter, I will articulate the conversational figure of dialogue, and my method will be phenomenological. I will begin by considering the philosophical distinction between monologue and dialogue outlined in the introduction to Part II. I will argue that the understanding of monologue which underlies the concept of the monological self is impoverished, thus undermining the distinction itself and the function it performs in terms of providing a definition of dialogue. In response, I aim to offer a phenomenology of dialogue that will contribute to the fuller articulation of dialogue as conversation.

i. Monologue and dialogue

Dialogue is philosophically significant because of what it suggests about selfhood and subjectivity. I distinguish these terms in the following way. 'Subjectivity' pertains to the Being of a subject where that Being is understood to be something enacted, a dynamic interplay of activity and passivity. 'Subjectivity' is characterized by *verbality* as opposed to stasis. 'Selfhood' is the Being of the self, where the self is a product of that verbality of subjectivizing, as well as the starting point for future "activity" of this kind. In order to distinguish between these two senses of 'self', I will use 'self' to refer to the ego pole and 'Self' to refer to what is produced through subjectivity.

The distinction between dialogue and monologue can be understood on two levels. The first is the perspective of linguistics or philosophy of language which understands monologue and dialogue as forms of face-to-face interaction. At this level, the viability of the distinction between the two is unclear, as monologue is often held to have the structure of interior dialogue.[1] The second perspective is more broadly epistemological and emphasizes the role of language in knowledge and in subjectivity.

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[1] See Ivana Markovà, introduction, *The Dynamics of Dialogue*, eds. Ivana Markovà and Klaus Foppa 9-10, and Bakhtin, *Problems* 74-75, 213-15, 254-56 and 278-79.

Here no difficulty is perceived in drawing a distinction between monologue and dialogue which, following Bakhtin, are sometimes referred to as monologism and dialogism. "Monologism takes as its starting point language as a ready-made, normative and static system of signs."[2] The claim is that the speaker has at his disposal, prior to any interaction, all the tools necessary for communication and also for knowing. Basically, at the root of monologism is a concept of the self as individualistic and static. This is the 'monological self' described earlier. Bakhtin clearly articulates the position as follows:

> Monologism, at its extreme, denies the existence outside itself of another consciousness with equal rights and equal responsibilities, another *I* with equal rights (*thou*). With a monologic approach (in its extreme or pure form) *another person* remains wholly and merely an *object* of consciousness, and not another consciousness. No response is expected from it that could change everything in the world of my consciousness. Monologue is finalized and deaf to the other's response, does not expect it and does not acknowledge in it any *decisive* force. Monologue manages without the other, and therefore to some degree materializes all reality. Monologue pretends to be the *ultimate word*. It closes down the represented world and represented persons.[3]

Dialogism, by contrast, criticizes the static notion of language which underlies monologism and the individualistic concept of self which it generates. Dialogism maintains that "language and speech originate and develop *through* social interaction and communication."[4] If language is essential to the human being, then sociality and relations to others are also essential to the human being. We saw this thesis articulated earlier in our preliminary discussion of Bakhtin's work.

What I find puzzling is the admission, on the one hand, that monologue and dialogue are not clearly distinguishable, combined with the assertion, on the other hand, of a clear distinction between monologism and dialogism. Monologue and dialogue are supposed to be narrowly understood as face-to-face interaction, and monologism and dialogism are extensions of these ideas into a broader epistemological realm. The terms 'monologism' and 'dialogism' are adopted simply to allow us to distinguish between what are essentially two different senses of monologue and dialogue. Can these senses be so distinct from one another that it is possible to distinguish monologism and dialogism, but not monologue and dialogue? One would think that a sharp distinction between monologism and dialogism would necessarily rest on a sharp distinction between monologue and dialogue. What *does* distinguish monologism from dialogism, if not their resemblance to monologue and dialogue? Is it not misleading to refer to monologism and dialogism as such, if the distinction upon which they rest really lies elsewhere?

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[2] Markovà, introduction 5.

[3] Bakhtin, *Problems* 292-93. See also 78-85.

[4] Markovà, introduction 4.

I suspect that the distinction between monologism and dialogism is in fact rooted in a distinction between monologue and dialogue, a distinction which is made possible by conceptions of monologue and dialogue which are *over-characterizations* of the features exhibited in these phenomena. I will argue that dialogism is defined negatively relative to monologism by means of such a distinction. That distinction, I will argue, is weak because it is phenomenologically inadequate, which would suggest that the distinction between monologism and dialogism (which I will refer to henceforth as monologue and dialogue for the sake of simplicity) is also shaky. But if dialogue is defined relative to this distinction, then the weakness of that distinction undermines our understanding of dialogue.

The important difference between the monological and dialogical self concerns the role of others in the constitution of the self. This point is drawn from what is taken to be the distinguishing feature of a monologue, namely that there is a single speaker and that the discourse produced by that speaker stands without the participation or contribution of the other.[5] Extended to notions of selfhood, this suggests that the self is essentially constituted independent of its engagement or interaction with the world or others. Hence, any relations in which the self might engage are entirely incidental to what it means to be a self; they are simply added on later to the self and are not essential to it. Such a radically individualized notion of the self downplays the importance of the other in relation to the self; moreover, it tends to deemphasize the significance of situatedness and context. This understanding of self is deemed monological in that the self is not considered to be constituted or constructed out of any exchange with others, but is viewed as essentially existing in its selfhood prior to all such interaction.

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[5] On the dialogue/monologue distinction, see also Jan Mukarovsky, "Two Studies of Dialogue," *The Word and Verbal Art*, trans. and eds. John Burbank and Peter Steiner (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977) 81-115.

This monological self is typically contrasted with a dialogical notion of self in which the essential feature is relationality — the self is constituted in relation to alterity and is born out of its relations to what is other.[6] Self, then, only has meaning in relation to otherness and it is constituted by its interaction with the world and others. The notion of self as independent, autonomous, and 'self'-sufficient is superseded by that of a self which is essentially engaged with others who contribute significantly[7] to the definition of Self. This implies a subjectivity which is in constant motion, simultaneously active and passive, constantly evolving and changing. Moreover, the others with whom and with which one is constantly engaged matter in the interaction: i.e. *which* others they are plays a significant role in the shaping of Self. Hence the particularity of the other becomes an important feature, as does our openness to this particularity.

The contrast between dialogical and monological selves just articulated is troublesome in at least two respects. First of all, the dialogical self has primarily been conceptualized negatively relative to the monological self and so has not been adequately characterized in positive terms. This is not a particularly strong way to define a concept. Secondly, while the contrast between monologue and dialogue seems quite tidy, such a differentiation does not really do monologue justice, as this monologism depends upon a notion of monologue which is phenomenologically inadequate. Through giving a fuller phenomenology of monologue, it will become clear that monologue is actually dialogical. Once this point is established, it will no longer be sufficient to contrast dialogue with monologue. We will be forced to engage in a phenomenology of dialogue which develops, in positive terms, a conversational figure of dialogue.

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[6] See Bakhtin, *Problems* 293 and Markovà, introduction 1-22. See also Marek J. Siemek, "Sozialphilosophische Aspekte der Übersetzbarkeit," *Epistemology and History*, ed. Anna Ziedler-Janiszewska (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996) 441-48, and Charles Taylor, "The Dialogical Self," *Rethinking Knowledge*, ed. Robert J. Goodman (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995) 57-66.

[7] 'Significant' refers both to something that is meaningful and to something which is important, no doubt because it is meaningful. We give something significance by giving it a meaning in terms of which it becomes important. I intend both of these senses in my use of the term 'significant' and its variants.

The monological self described previously rests upon an understanding of monologue which takes the following form: we begin with the observation that, in a dramatic context, a monologue is an oration performed by one speaker toward an audience which is generally not expected to respond in any direct way to what has been said in the monologue. In the dramatic monologue, a speaker presents her thoughts to a listener who remains silent,[8] and one 'participant' has complete control over the monologue — over what is said, the course of its development, and so on. The speaker never assumes the role of listener. Any exchange is entirely one-sided, positioning a single speaker against a listener who is neither called upon to respond to the monologue, nor asked to contribute in any way to the development of the content of the monologue. The exchange which transpires in monologue is one of uni-directional communication in which the speaker — who "has" or "possesses" some knowledge or information — articulates this knowledge or information to another (who is understood not to have it). The success of the communication is judged according to the degree to which the listener ends up with the same object "in mind" subsequent to the utterance.[9] Monologue does not permit the other to speak, and thus is neither questionable nor answerable; it is not open to threat, challenge, or response. Moreover, monologue involves a show of self which asks and demands nothing of the other, or does so only rhetorically. The other is only there in an abstract sense.

The meaning which is conveyed through the monologue originates in the self in isolation from its relations to others. As such, the meaning is viewed as complete and is delivered over to the listener, the other, as a finished product for him to dispose of as he chooses. The other's approval is never sought, nor is his participation solicited in the creation of the meaning which the speaker conveys. The connection between such a view of monologue and the monological self described earlier is that the listener really plays no role whatsoever and might as well not even be there. Thus, we arrive at the notion of a monological self which exists independently of and prior to any relation to others.

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[8] This is confirmed in Mukarovsky's essay. See also Markovà, introduction 9.

[9] Bakhtin, *Problems* 81.

This over-characterization of monologue resembles in some ways the "mere" communication which was described earlier in our discussion of 'common sense' dialogue. In mere communication, the listener is thought to be passive, as in monologue. In neither case is the listener thought to participate in any *real* sense; there is a striking asymmetry between speaker and listener which would seem to render the interaction undialogical. The distinction between mere communication and dialogue which appears in the 'common sense' view may be related to the distinction between monologue and dialogue. If we can cast doubt on the first, then we can certainly be suspicious of the second.

Let us recognize that the view of the monological self just articulated depends upon an exaggerated understanding of monologue. In the dramatic context, a monologue is an oration performed by one speaker toward an audience; this audience, it is true, is not generally expected to respond to the speaker *directly.* In a monologue the speaker presents her thoughts. The organization of these thoughts into a monologue often represents a working out of those ideas for the benefit of the speaker herself, thus permitting the audience to be privy to the psychological or mental development or status of the speaker. But we should note the importance of the audience in the dramatic context. The monologue is written and performed *for* the audience; it is designed to be heard, and to elicit a response. The audience matters. Whether or not the audience is intended to actually respond verbally by engaging the performer is ultimately of little consequence. That the response elicited is not directly and immediately verbal does not mean that no response is required by the speaker. The speaker speaks because she has something she wants the other to hear. It is for this reason that she speaks in the first place. If the speaker wants the other to hear, that also means that she wants to be understood — the speaker will have to speak in such a way so as to be understood, not only clearly and loudly enough, but also in language that will be understood by the listener. All of this requires an attentiveness to the other.

This becomes more obvious when we consider monological situations which lie outside of the narrowly dramatic context. Lectures and public addresses are monological in so far as one person speaks before an audience which is largely expected to listen. In a lecture, the teacher is guided in his presentation of the material by the educational level of the students; if he wants to be understood, he has to make the lecture accessible to those in the audience. The same is true in the public address, but here it is even clearer that the monologue of the speaker must be shaped so as to reach the audience. In such cases, the speech is designed not only to be understood by the audience, but to present issues in a way which seems relevant to that particular audience, so that they will respond to the speaker positively. This illustrates how the speaker's wanting to be understood requires an attentiveness to the other and an understanding of what the conditions for comprehension would be, even if only implicitly. Furthermore, the understanding which results depends as much upon the activity of the listener as that of the speaker. Although the monological model portrays the listener as maintaining a purely passive stance relative to the activity of the speaker, in fact listening itself is an activity involving attention, interpretation, and understanding.

Even monologues which do not appear to have an audience can be said to have a dialogical structure. Consider the case of a monologue with oneself (more often than not we would probably be inclined to say 'a dialogue with oneself'). In such a case, we say that we are talking to ourselves, usually for the purpose of thinking something through. Typically we will adopt different viewpoints — each representing a different perspective on the matter — and will put these different perspectives 'into dialogue' with one another until some sort of consensus is reached. Moreover, the language which I use to think and to express myself — whether to others or to myself — is not one of my own creation; it is shared. The other lies at the very heart of language itself.

I am led to conclude, then, that monologue is not monological in the sense outlined at the beginning of the chapter. If monologue is not monological, then this term — so crucial to the definition of dialogue with which we began — has been undermined, and our concept of dialogue along with it. We must begin anew with a phenomenology of dialogue.

ii. The phenomenology of dialogue (as conversation)

Often by 'dialogue' we refer to a style of writing which is exemplified by an exchange of utterances between different players, as in a play. Typically two or more speakers are involved who are understood to be speaking to one another. That is, each directs what she says toward the other and responds to what the other has said in the preceding utterance. Both participate actively in the dialogue. This participation has a two-fold character in that each speaks to the other in a way which evokes a response from the other, and each utterance is evoked by the utterance which precedes it. This implies that both speakers are not only speaking, but are also listening; only by listening can they formulate their utterances so they will cohere with the remarks that precede them. This is not to say that there cannot be or will not be moments of discontinuity in any given conversation — for instance when a particular topic has been exhausted, or when one or the other of the parties chooses to 'change the subject' for whatever reason.[10] But there must be some coherence or correspondence among some of the utterances, otherwise there would be no sense in which the individuals could be talking to one another about something. I refer to this feature as the **flow** of the exchange, and it depends upon a **reciprocity** between participants, a sort of turn-taking.

The notion of 'talking about something' is important and suggests that something is disclosed through the flow of the dialogue. For instance, in the theatrical setting, a dramatist uses the dialogue of the various characters to unveil a situation or a story. The story is the larger whole which is conveyed to the audience or reader through the communicative exchange. The utterances of the players not only respond to one another and are directed to one another, but they also mutually disclose the theme or subject matter of the conversation. I will refer to this feature as the **thematic unity** of dialogue which, in a peculiar way, 'transcends' the engagement of the participants.[11]

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[10] Moreover, the possibility of discontinuity always presents itself in the form of the refusal of the other to respond, which could result in the termination of the dialogue.

[11] I use this word 'transcends' hesitantly for the connotations it has vis-à-vis transcendentalism. However, none of those connotations are intended here. I simply mean that the thematic unity is the 'third thing' around which the dialogue turns and which is created through the dialogue. It is not reducible to the specific

However, it is important to highlight that the subject of the conversation is not generally one that *precedes* the conversation, but rather develops *out of* the mutual exchange. It does not properly exist prior to the exchange.[12] No single participant maintains control over the development of the dialogue — it is an exchange between interlocutors. The course that a conversation may take is somewhat unpredictable, for even though one can try to anticipate the kinds of responses that the other might give, one can never do so with complete certainty. This is the feature of **openness** of dialogue, both in the sense that the participants must be open to unexpected responses from the other, and in the sense that the direction of the dialogue cannot be predetermined.

These features reveal something about the structure of the dialogical situation and the orientation of participants within it.[13] I would suggest that their participation has a three-fold character: it has a spatial feature, a temporal feature, and a meaningful feature. I refer to these features as axes of orientation (or orientational axes) which structure the way in which participants are attuned to or open to one another in the dialogic situation. Flow and reciprocity imply movement back and forth which has temporal duration, but they also suggest the traversing of distance between participants, thus introducing a spatial dimension as well. The thematic unity which is produced through the conversation implies an orientation in terms of meaning or significance: that is, the participants are able to communicate with one another in such a way that a unity develops through their exchange. The feature of openness does not pertain to a particular axis, but suggests a more general attitude of receptivity towards the other which appears

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utterances expressed.

[12] This may sound odd, for surely there are many conversations that are motivated by a need or desire to talk about some particular issue. However, it is important to distinguish the topic of a conversation from its thematic unity. The former, in very general terms, can exist beforehand, but one could never say what the gist of such a conversation would be beforehand. In a very real sense what a conversation is about can only ever be said afterwards.

[13] For an interesting discussion of this topic with particular reference to the importance of corporeality in relation to the dialogical situation, see Algis Mickunas, "The Dialogical Region," *Interpersonal Communication: Essays in Phenomenology and Hermeneutics*, ed. Joseph J. Pilotta (Washington DC: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America, 1982) 55-68. Mickunas, too, refers to the blurring of activity and passivity, question and response, in the dialogical situation.

in all axes and which is necessary for any dialogue at all.

This phenomenology of dialogue reveals the structure of a communicative exchange or interaction. The orientation of the participants toward one another permits the development of a conversation displaying a particular topic, mood, and thematic unity.[14] First, there must be a certain amount of flow from one utterance to the next. There must be a sense in which each comment is both responsive to the one which precedes it and in some way elicits another response, lest the *sense* of the exchange collapse. This requires, secondly, a reciprocity between the participants. Thirdly, there must be a thematic unity which is developed through the exchange of utterances. Finally, the participants must be open to one another: that is, not only do they have to be receptive to one another, but they must also attempt to reach out to the other in their utterances, even if only implicitly. The exchange must be conducted so as to seek contact with the other, but that contact cannot be achieved without the willingness of the other to be contacted, without an openness to being reached.

Having articulated this notion of dialogue, we can see that monologue is dialogical according to the four criteria. First, there is a flow and a continuity in the train of thought developed through the monologue. Second, there is a reciprocity which rests in the ability of the speaker to adjust himself to the audience and in the 'back and forth' which exists in the very development of the monologue itself, as in interior dialogue. Thirdly, the thematic unity is, in the dramatic context, the meaning established between speaker and audience and, in the individual context, between the different perspectives which are engaged.[15] Lastly, the speaker is open to the other, whether in the form of the audience or in the form of the inner other who responds when we engage in conversation with ourselves. The dialogicality of monologue does not depend on its incorporation into a dramatic production or some other context where an audience might be present (as in the teaching and public address scenarios cited above); it is just as much a feature of interior thought.

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[14] The interaction is not just limited to signs (linguistic or otherwise) but also includes vibes, emotional intensities, and so on. What is important is not just what is said and to whom, but how it is said (i.e. in anger, gently, quietly, with sarcasm, ironically, etc.). Moreover, this 'how' is bi-directional in that it is not reducible to how we say what we say, but includes how we hold ourselves towards the other in listening to her.

[15] It is interesting to note the way in which the play between participants in the unfolding of a drama changes when that interaction is shifted into an actual dramatic production. As Gadamer notes in *Truth and Method*, the play shifts location. It no longer occurs between the players, who are now re-presenting their roles, but now lies between the players and the audience (101-10).

The figure of dialogue emerging here is **conversational**. Let us consider just what this image evokes. Conversations are not random exchanges of words; they are definitely topical discussions. In a conversation, people talk with one another about a common theme. The centrality of the thematic unity requires that the participants be open and attentive to each other. This requires the active participation of everyone, where listening is as important as speaking. It also requires that each direct her contributions in order to respond to those of the other. Moreover, one expects a response from the other based upon what one has said; that is, one expects to be responded to and to be held accountable for what one has said. We know in a conversation that we are being listened to and that the other will have the opportunity to challenge us. We lay ourselves open to being affirmed or denied by the response of the other.[16] Conversation involves querying, listening, and responding.

Consider an adversarial interaction between two fighters. In this case, we have two participants who are engaged with one another quite attentively; the actions of each are responses to the prior actions of the other, and each expects his actions to be responded to by the other. There is a certain flow and reciprocity to the sequence of actions. There is presumably also a thematic unity, for the fight must be about or over something, and as the fight continues, the animosity between the participants may increase or it may give way to a respect for a worthy adversary. Moreover, the actions in combat also anticipate and parry future actions of the other; in awaiting the other's response to one's actions, one tries to anticipate this response in order to better defend oneself. This exemplifies a sort of openness.

This example is instructive for a number of reasons. First, it challenges the notion that dialogue cannot be destructive or negative. Second, it illustrates the conversationality of an exchange which need not have any explicitly linguistic component. Third, the only feature which seems to distinguish the warrior example from a sport like boxing is that one is perceived to be a game while the other is "serious". But as Gadamer has pointed out, games — which he thinks are dialogical for the play they involve — are marked by their own kind of seriousness. In this sense, hostile interaction is just as playful as combat for sport, and can therefore presumably be dialogical too. This would seem to hold for an argument as well (essentially a verbal fist-fight).

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[16] Consider the importance of recognition from others in the dialogical context. See Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition"* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

The notion of the dialogical self is captured fairly well in the image of a subject which is in conversation with its world. In order to participate in and sustain this conversation, the subject needs to respond to the world and to query it, to react to it and make demands of it, to be open to it, and to remain active and engaged with it. To delve deeper into this idea of conversation as dialogue, let us consider conversation as a means through which communication happens. In the most general sense, communication is conceived as a transfer or conveying of information or of a thought from one person to another. We will often say, as we did in the case of mere communication above, that communication has been successful when the listener has the same thing "in mind" as the speaker originally intended to convey. What this points to, of course, is the fact that the person to whom I speak is *other* than me. If she was not other, communication would not be necessary and miscommunication would not be possible. Successful communication depends upon the other understanding what I mean when I say something. In order for that to happen, there must be some minimal sharing of meaning.[17] This common ground must be sufficient to permit an understanding of the parts that are not shared, of the parts that are particular to one participant or another — the parts that are *other* from the perspective of one participant. Since the possibility of miscommunication always exists, we are careful about how we say things because we want to be understood; we want the other to understand.[18] Here the openness to the other surfaces again. What underlies the connection conversation establishes relative to the other is the **alterity** of the other. In a conversation, we are oriented towards the other and we implicitly understand his alterity. We express ourselves to the other because it is other. But we also generally expect a response from the other, and although we may be able to anticipate what that response will be, we can never know it in advance. The other, in its alterity, withdraws itself; there is always something impenetrable or secret about it.

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[17] This need not be limited to a common language but could include a shared system of values or beliefs.

The alterity of the other, then, pertains to our **discontinuity** with one another. We are physically discontinuous but also psychically discontinuous. If this were not so, I would be able to understand the other in the way that she understands herself. My consciousness of her would be no different from her own self-consciousness. Of course, this is not the case. We do not have identical psychic perspectives. This is not to say, however, that our perspectives are so radically alien to one another that we have no possibility of touching or overlapping. The extent to which we already share something that enables us to communicate is the extent to which we are continuous; our relation is simultaneously marked by a **continuity**.[19] In conversation we are at once discontinuous and continuous with the other: this is the dual ground of dialogue. Our discontinuity is what necessitates dialogue and so, in a sense, makes it possible. Our continuity, which comprises the framework of meaning that we mutually share, is also a ground for dialogue; without it we would have no common basis from which to begin. As the dialogue unfolds and the thematic unity which characterizes it is strengthened, our shared realm of meaning can grow and further bind us, extending our continuity. This positive aspect is often emphasized in analysis of dialogue as conversation. Nevertheless, it is important to see that it is actually the tension between the continuity and discontinuity of self and other which both necessitates dialogue and makes it possible.[20]

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[18] Again, it seems appropriate to mention Gadamer here. Communication reveals a desire to reach an understanding in common with the other, and this is accomplished through a fusion of horizons.

[19] My use of the terms 'continuity' and 'discontinuity' resembles Bataille's. See Georges Bataille, *Erotism: Death and Sensuality*, trans. Mary Dalwood (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1986) 11-25.

Because we implicitly recognize our discontinuity with the other, we know that the other may not understand what we mean when we express ourselves. Because it matters to us that we are understood, we will often ask the other if he understands. Even more commonly, the other will ask questions in order to verify that he has understood, seeking confirmation through the response which he assumes he will receive. This wanting to be understood and wanting to understand generates a question/response structure which is important in establishing the consensus or agreement — the fusion of horizons — which is ultimately achieved (or at least anticipated) and through which meaning becomes shared. That conversation is marked by question and response is not to say that conversations are constituted only by questions and responses. Rather, this notion is intended to highlight the degree to which any given utterance.both elicits a response from the other and is in itself a response to the utterance which precedes it. It is because of this aspect that flow, the back-and-forth of the exchange of dialogue, is able to show itself as a characteristic.

The structure of question and response establishes the basis for the concepts of **answerability** and **responsibility**.[21] Taken literally, these indicate that we are able to answer for what we do, and that we are able to respond to a query from the other (answer-able, response-able). This implies, among other things, my situatedness and the situatedness of my actions. Everything that I do occurs within a context and within the space of an ongoing interaction. My actions cannot be properly characterized merely as the self-willed acts of a voluntaristic self. They are also partly responses, conditioned by my being affected. Similarly, my actions affect others beyond myself, and I can be asked to explain them; I am responsible. In expressing myself to the other, I open myself to the challenge which may come with the response of the other, the challenge through which I am held responsible by the other. I cannot be responsible, morally or otherwise, unless I can be open to being held accountable *by* the other and *to* the other.[22] Responsibility and answerability are really dialogical notions and presuppose dialogical interaction between self and other which is constituted by action, response, and response to the response. The thematic unity of dialogue and the sense in which it maintains a certain continuity of utterances and actions testify to our responsibility. If we did not *respond* to one another, no thematic unity would develop; there would only be a string of random utterances. That I am able to respond implies that I must have, as a possibility of Being, an openness to the other which permits me to be able to respond to whatever challenge she presents me. It is only because such a possibility exists for me that I can be obligated to respond to the other, to justify myself to her, to answer.

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[20] Waldenfels notes something similar when he maintains that dialogue is marked by a fundamental ambiguity in that it both unites the participants and differentiates them from one another. See Bernhard Waldenfels, "Dialogue and Discourse," *Writing the Politics of Difference*, ed. Hugh Silverman (Albany: SUNY Press,1991) 165-75.

[21] On the importance of this kind of structure and the responsibility it elicits for dialogue, see Pierre-Jean Labarrière, "La 'réciprocité interlocutive' ou 'la canonique du dialogue'," *Archives de Philosophie* 51 (1988): 431-40.

All too often theories of the subject overemphasize the subject as actor, suggesting that the subject's position is best characterized as one of power — to act is to be powerful, to exercise will. Although this is certainly an aspect of subjectivity, to maintain that it is primary takes the actor out of context. The agent always acts within a context with others in which he can be held responsible by the other. Because the agent can be held responsible, by acting he places himself in a position of vulnerability with respect to the other, laying himself open to a challenge by the other. Thus, an act is not solely an exercise of power, but a relinquishing of it as well. The other can choose to exercise its prerogative regarding whether or not to hold me answerable or responsible, but in any case, I always already am. And in so far as every action is also always already a response, it is also a response to the way in which I have already been laid open or challenged by the other.

Hand-in-hand with the idea of responsibility comes that of **questionability**. That

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[22] That is, I am not merely responsible *for* what I do. This is interesting because of the way it blends together in a single concept both passive and active dimensions. This is echoed in the 'other side' of subjectivity, generally overlooked by philosophical treatment of the concept. The subject is often discussed in terms of power, autonomy, and agency. But there is also a sense in which being a subject implies being subordinated to the power and authority of others. One is *subjected to* a law or an abuse, or one is the *subject of* a monarch.

I find myself challenged in a way that demands a response implies that I find myself questioned. I can be questioned; this question always comes from the other, the one who is discontinuous, even if only the 'other within'. The other is discontinuous with me, and so must ask questions. If mutual understanding is to be reached, I must respond to those questions. But the fact that the other questions me in such a way that I can understand the question — understand what is being asked of me — implies that we already share a basis of understanding. This shared understanding points to the continuity between self and other. Questionability pertains not only to my ability to be questioned but also to my ability to question. I am also an other for others; I too can question others when I do not understand, in order to elicit a response. In this way I can challenge the other to a responsibility through my own expression.

The challenge which comes from the other can be further related to the concepts of continuity and discontinuity when we consider the effect that such a challenge can have on our own self-understanding, or on the understanding that one has had with the other up to that point. Through my interaction with an other, a certain shared understanding develops which becomes part of the background and the basis for future interactions. Although this background is often taken for granted — masking the discontinuity between myself and the other — it can be thrown into question at any time, quickly disclosing that discontinuity. All it takes is a challenge from the other, a disruption in the continuity established with the other. A similar rupture can occur with respect to my own self-understanding when a challenge from the other throws into question who I am. In such a case, my self-continuity, which I typically take for granted, is interrupted or disrupted. This is possible because, as temporal beings who grow, change, and have self-consciousness, we are at once continuous and discontinuous with ourselves. The challenge of the other can make me aware of this discontinuity; it can make me self-conscious in a way that is *self-othering*.

There is another, less dramatic kind of self-othering in the play of dialogue. Conversation is marked by an open-endedness; there is a flexibility in the turns which a conversation might take depending upon what sorts of questions and responses arise. This is part of what makes conversation playful in Gadamer's sense of the term. Play implies a certain amount of flexibility, within certain parameters, as when we speak of the play in a rope. It also implies a certain amount of othering of oneself, both in the context of playing or assuming a role and in the context of playing a game. In play, we lose ourselves and become absorbed by the activity, and this occurs through a loosening of the rigidity of roles and boundaries. This relaxing of self-consciousness is related to an increased openness to otherness which facilitates the encounter with the other. In the conversational context, this 'othering of oneself' occurs in the self-forgetfulness which accompanies absorption in a conversation, and in the un-premeditated way in which conversation always to some degree unfolds. The othering of dialogue, then, is a relative phenomenon and can be used to describe both the absorption of the participants in the dialogue and the disruption of that absorption.

Issues of continuity and discontinuity also pertain to **meaning**, and the degree to which it is shared. The continuity or discontinuity between self and other is related to the opacity of the other relative to the self. This opacity is not solely characterized by an "objective", physical difference or dislocation, but more importantly, by an absence of understanding, of a shared background of meaning. We might say that our connection with, continuity with, or understanding of the other is determined relative to some domain of meaning which lies between us and which mediates our engagement.[23] These connections are created and sustained through dialogue.

To illustrate this, consider our involvement in the world. When we encounter objects in the world, we encounter them as endowed with meaning. The object gives us a meaning by virtue of its being as a phenomenon. The meaning which is given is established with reference to the world in which it is disclosed. The meanings which are manifest in the world are established through dialogue with others. Imagine that I encounter some unfamiliar object. It is unfamiliar because I do not know where to place it in the world; I cannot identify it in any way. The object gives no meaning to me; it remains a puzzle. But the fact that this object presents itself to me as a mystery implies that I comport myself toward it with the expectation that it should mean something to me. When this expectation is not fulfilled, I receive no meaning from the object. So I speculate about what it might signify; I try to ascertain where it is to be situated with respect to my existing network of meaning. I posit some sort of signification for the object and then I offer that signification to the other. The other either affirms or rejects that signification. The more an initial signification is validated by others, the more confident we will be that we have 'found' the meaning of the object. If there is dissonance in this regard, if others do not affirm or agree on the signification, we become less convinced of the 'truth' of the meaning which we have ascribed to the object.

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[23] It is for this reason that I will sometimes use the somewhat awkward locution 'shared meaning'. What this refers to is a domain of meaning which is shared in that it is understood in common.

A similar phenomenon occurs with respect to our actions (or the actions of others). We may interpret someone's action in a particular way, ascribe a certain meaning to it, and subsequently question that interpretation or become more convinced of its truth depending upon the views offered to us by others. This pertains not only to assessments of "matters of fact", but with respect to more evaluative situations as well. In deliberating what to do, when we are not sure how to proceed, we often turn to others for advice. We seldom, however, have no thoughts at all as to what course of action we should take. Often we are simply looking for the approval and affirmation of others to support us in the feeling that we are choosing rightly. We want to feel that our chosen course of action has some inherent value, and this value is indicated if the other agrees with us regarding its appropriateness.[24] Nevertheless, that course of action only takes on this objective meaning through the combined acts of signification of oneself and the other. What I am describing here is the way in which meaning is granted objective worth and independent validity by being constructed and confirmed intersubjectively. Once new meanings have been established in this way, within the context of a particular self-other relationship, they can be invoked repeatedly in the future. It is in this way that worlds - spheres of meaning - are *intersubjectively created.*

Two points are significant here. First is the fact that I initially approach the other with the expectation of understanding. We approach the other expecting continuity with it, and only when it fails to meet this expectation is its otherness disclosed. Secondly, the meaning which is ascribed to an object is not simply the result of my giving it a meaning, but is made fast only through its being affirmed through a similar understanding and usage by others. This implies that meaning is social and makes possible the continuity between self and other which allows communities to develop. In this sense it can be said that *meaning is the subject of dialogue*; meaning is the thematic unity around which all dialogue turns, and which is created and sustained through dialogue.

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[24] Or in cases where we are genuinely indecisive, the valuation of the other and the reasons given to support this might be sufficient to sway us out of that indecision.

But meaning is also the *medium* of dialogue, in that participants use the meaning that has been antecedently established through other or earlier dialogues in order to engage in new dialogues. The basis of shared meaning is the medium through which the dialogue is conducted and which makes possible the development of new meaning. Consider the initial act of signification of a strange object described above. Such an act is an attempt to give meaning to the object in a way that brings it within an existing sphere of meaning. We do not ascribe a random meaning to things, for this would destroy meaning itself; we try to incorporate them into existing structures of meaning, so that there is a coherence to those meanings. Objective structures of signification are established and disclosed through dialogue with others, providing both the foundation for the signifying act and the background against which it occurs. In this way, we can see that engagement with objects resembles, in a sense, our interaction with others. We routinely approach others with an openness and an expectation that they have something to say and that it would be inappropriate to project our own constructions upon them. Generally, we give the other the opportunity to articulate herself to us, to address us, to present us with a meaning to understand.[25] That meaning is the *medium* of dialogue hints at the continuity which resides between self and other; that meaning is also the *product* of dialogue points to the degree to which self and other are discontinuous and thus must forge that continuity between them. Relating this to the concept of question and response, we can see that, in order for the question to be understood as such and to generate a response, there must be some degree of shared meaning. And to the degree that the question is answered to the satisfaction of the questioner, we can say that meaning has been forged and that there is understanding between the participants.

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[25] My claim is that this is not that much different from the way we approach objects. It is just that in our usual way of dealing with things, we tend to overlook the opacity of the object while continuing to recognize the phenomenal opacity of others. This ultimately informs the traditional philosophical problem of other minds; how do we know that others have minds given that they remain opaque to us? But this is precisely to confuse the issue. The problem is not how something absent in the other manages to present itself to us. The problem is that we overlook the extent to which what is absent in the object presents itself to us. It is simply a fact that we deal with present absences all the time in our routine engagement in the world.

This notion of dialogue as a conversation may be expanded metaphorically, beyond the realm of the interhuman, to include all aspects of human existence. The image is of a subject in conversation with its world. Both partners in the dialogue need not be persons; they can be artifacts, texts, works of art, and ideas as well.[26] Although this perhaps sounds counter-intuitive, it should be remembered that I am interested in exploring the way in which subjectivity experiences itself and its engagement with the world, even if only implicitly. This entails attending to the way in which objects disclose themselves as meaningful. The unknown object is able to disclose itself as meaningless to me because no meaning is communicated. But this implies that when objects *are* encountered as meaningful (as they are, by and large), they in fact communicate their meaning. I am suggesting that we should consider such engagements with objects to be dialogical.

To further demonstrate this point, I will consider several examples. In discussing these, I will use the experience of responsibility as a point of departure because dialogical relations are existentially disclosed through responsibility. 'Responsibility' here does not mean moral responsibility, but the broader sense which we highlighted above. My claim is that I find myself *responding* to entities in the world all the time, and this holds just as much for inanimate objects as it does for animate others.

In what way can an object elicit responsibility? That this seems strange to us is largely due to our tendency to view objects in an impoverished way. We in fact respond to objects and the meanings they give us all the time. When I notice dirty dishes piling up, I wash them; when a light bulb burns out, I replace it; when the grass gets long, I mow it; when I observe that the windows are rather dirty, I decide that I can live with dirty windows. In all of these cases (and I have deliberately avoided cases like alarm clocks and doorbells that are explicitly intended as signs or signals) the object gives me something to understand which orients me in my behavior in some way, inviting or prompting me to do something or not to do something. I respond to these promptings. That I respond implies that I am respons*ible*; I am able to respond.

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[26] This aspect is captured quite well in Gadamer's thinking regarding entering into dialogue with a text, putting texts into dialogue with one another, and historical hermeneutics generally. It is also an important part of Buber's thought concerning the *I-Thou*.

However, these are all use-objects. Perhaps I am not actually responding to the object, but only looking out for my interest. I wash the dishes, not because the dishes demand that they be washed, but because if I do not, there will not be any clean dishes later. To a degree this is true; perhaps the dishes do present themselves as needing to be washed because in order for them to maintain their usability as dishes — whose ultimate *for-the-sake-of-which* points back to me — they need to be clean. But all that this illustrates is the fact that the dishes stand within the context of a network of significance in terms of which their usability — or lack thereof — is determined, and relative to which I orient myself. It does not change the fact that the dishes present themselves to me as dirty and elicit a response to their dirtiness. We might further add that how we respond to dirty dishes depends upon how we feel ourselves to be addressed by them. Thus, if I am at a friend's house and confront a pile of dirty dishes, I may not experience the demand that they be washed as addressed to me. In my own home, this might be different, though perhaps it still would not be a demand that I perceive as being particularly urgent — not as urgent, say, as the glorious weather that beckons me outside. If I were employed as a dishwasher in a restaurant, I would do well to find these dishes demanding my immediate attention.

Consider a case that does not involve a use-object — perhaps a painting. Although we could experience the painting as something we use to fill a blank spot on the wall, that would clearly be an impoverished understanding. Let us rather deal with it properly as a work of art. In this case, it is much more difficult to pin down just what it is that the painting gives me to understand. That the painting gives something, or yearns to give something, is undeniable. I am affected by the painting. Through the colors, forms, and textures on the canvas, something is given to me. I experience something upon gazing at the work — peace, disquiet, anger, awe, inspiration. These psychological, emotive states are all responses to the work. The way in which I am affected by the work is my response to it. This also applies to works in other media, such as the performance of a musical or theatrical piece, or the reading of poetry or prose. In engaging with such works, something is given to us to understand, and we are confronted by it. In responding to it, we show our responsibility. Moreover, the way in which a work of art affects me is largely personal. That is to say, a work of art does not have the same effect on everyone; the significance of a work of art varies a great deal and depends upon many factors. Indeed, it is not uncommon for us to say that a particular work 'speaks to me'. In such cases, the work carries a particular significance for me; I feel addressed by it in a way that I may not feel with respect to other works. It provokes (and thus challenges) me in a particular way.

In both cases (and most strongly in the case of the work of art), I experience a response in the face of an object which points simultaneously to my responsibility and questionability, and to my openness to the other and the demands which the other can place upon me. In both cases, some meaning has been communicated to me by the other. It is important to emphasize that the significance which these objects have — and which they convey in this engagement — is something which they can have only because of the larger network of significations in which they are imbedded, and which provides the background against which they appear and within which they are encountered. The dirtiness of the dishes gives me to understand that they should be washed because this practice is part of our world. A work of art can give what it gives partly because I recognize it as a work of art and approach it accordingly. I also bring my own experiences to my engagement with it, but that too is the product of an environment and context, and is expressive of that context.

Meaning is a social phenomenon, and although it is constructed primarily intersubjectively, it can also present itself through non-human entities. Objects come to mean things because we allow them to mean things. Once objects have a meaning, they are able to express that meaning with relative independence. That is why dialogue or conversation can be extended beyond the realm of the interhuman, but it is nevertheless rooted in the interhuman.

It is true that the engagement with objects that I have just described could be construed as encounter rather than conversation. The primary reason for this is that the disclosures described here are relatively momentary, lacking the temporal duration usually associated with conversation. This in turn is due to the asymmetry of the participation. Although I may be open to the other, it is not in this case open to me and thus cannot respond to my response to it. This would seem to threaten the possibility of reciprocity here. However, while the object may not be able to respond to me, I experience the object as giving me something to understand on more than one occasion, and due to my own growing and changing, I may find myself responding to it or understanding it differently each time. In this way a chain of encounters is created which approximates the structure of question and response; for this reason I would characterize such engagements as conversations. Although it may sound odd to speak of an ongoing conversation with dirty dishes, this is only because of the banality of dirty dishes. It sounds much less strange with reference to a piece of music or to a book, where it is clear that one's understanding of and relationship to the work changes over time.

The analysis in this section has sought to accomplish the following. First, to argue against the definition of dialogue negatively relative to monologue through a focus on what this distinction implies, namely the idea of dialogue as conversation. Second, to elaborate four features of the dialogic situation of conversation — flow, reciprocity, thematic unity, and openness — which reveal the axes along which the dialogical participants are oriented toward one another. Third, to disclose a constellation of dialogical concepts at the heart of conversation: alterity, continuity and discontinuity, responsibility and questionability, and meaning, and to constitute them as a *constellation* so as to emphasize their *non-hierarchical interrelatedness*. And finally, to demonstrate the applicability of the concept of conversation beyond the realm of the interhuman.

Dialogue can continue indefinitely because of the perpetual otherness of the other and one's own mutability. In so far as I am a temporal being, I am constantly becoming other than myself, not only because I am a physical entity "passing through time," but because I am continually conditioned by the dialogues in which I engage; they contribute to my own self-understanding, and this holds for the other as well. Thus, the participants in a dialogue, in so far as they are temporally constituted, are never constant or static; they are constantly developing and becoming new others for one another in their various dialogues. Thus, new meanings are always being dialogically forged, while old meanings decay or become obsolete. The continuity which is established dialogically can be construed as the knitting together of a spatio-temporal, contextual fabric in which the moments and fragments of otherness are meaningfully integrated. Due to the perpetual resurgence of otherness, that fabric is also always unraveling.

These last remarks have led us to the second figure of dialogue which I would like to investigate in Part II — the encounter. Like conversation, encounter is often characterized relative to a distinction which is supposed to define it. In this case, that distinction is between intentionality and dialogue. I will chart the development of this distinction through the work of Buber, Theunissen, and Levinas in Chapter 5, before turning to a more critical discussion of the distinction and a positive phenomenological elaboration of encounter in Chapter 6.

Chapter 5

Dialogue contra Intentionality: Buber, Theunissen, and Levinas

In the introduction to Part II, it was indicated that theories of dialogue take on different guises depending upon the question which they take themselves to be asking. It was also observed that generally these questions can be divided into two groups. The first group asks about human subjectivity; it asks whether or not that subjectivity is constituted by its relations to others. In answering 'ycs' to this question, this group argues that human beings are dialogical and not monological. The figure of dialogue used to capture the image of a self constituted through its engagement with others is that of **conversation**. It was demonstrated in Chapter 4 that the contrast between monologue and dialogue does not substantially assist us in understanding the concept of conversation; the latter can be more fruitfully achieved through a phenomenology of 'dialogue' in which our primary focus was the idea of conversation itself, without reference to monologue.

Although conversation is the notion of dialogue that is probably most familiar to those in the North American context, it is not the only approach. Another treatment of the concept of dialogue differs from the conversational mode in the kind of question it asks. It takes as given that the self is essentially constituted by and related to what is other, and instead inquires into the *ways* this self relates to these others, and whether some ways of relating to the other are not more authentic or 'essential'. In exploring this question, a distinction is usually drawn between intentional and dialogical ways of relating to the other, where the latter — often characterized in terms of an **encounter** — is considered to be more authentic.

I will argue, much as I did in the case of the monologue/dialogue distinction, that the intentionality/dialogicality distinction is not ultimately very helpful in elucidating the concept of dialogue as encounter. We must consider encounter independent of this bipolarity if we are to understand it adequately. But before this task can be undertaken (in Chapter 6), it is necessary to explain more thoroughly the strand of thought which pits intentionality against dialogue. This explanation is necessitated partly by the more controversial nature of the point to which I will enlist this analysis, namely that intentionality is actually dialogical in the way of a conversation.

In this chapter, I will discuss the work of Buber, Theunissen, and Levinas with the aim of charting the development of the concept of dialogue as encounter, and the dichotomy between intentionality and dialogicality. This dichotomy first emerges in the distinction Buber draws between the *I-It* and the *I-Thou*, where the latter is characterized as an 'essential relation'. The dichotomy comes to be understood explicitly in Theunissen's work as one between intentional and dialogical relations to the other, and Theunissen does much to emphasize the stark contrast between the two. Levinas returns in more positive terms to the notion of an encounter with the other which differs in certain important respects from Buber's. Through the more nuanced understanding of intentionality that Levinas also provides, we will be positioned for a fuller critique of the distinction in Chapter 6.

i. Martin Buber: *I-It* and *I-Thou*

A significant number of theorists of dialogue have drawn upon the important insights of Martin Buber and his ground-breaking work on the subject of dialogue.[1] Buber's contribution to this domain resides largely in the distinction he articulates between the *I-It* and the *I-Thou*. In this section I will focus on articulating this fundamental distinction in Buber. My purpose is to indicate how this distinction can be understood in terms of intentionality and dialogue, and also how Buber's understanding of dialogue is a first step toward the idea of dialogue as encounter. In pursuing this point, I will look primarily at Buber's text IT, which will lay the foundation for our treatment of Theunissen's work in the next section.

The *I-It* is a mode of comportment toward the other which is characterized in terms of experience and which functions within epistemology. Buber's criticism is that philosophy has not only tended to give priority to the *I-It* over the *I-Thou*, but in many cases has overlooked completely the mode of the *I-Thou*. The *I-Thou* is the dialogical mode in which the other is not encountered as a use-object or an object of experience, but as *Thou*, as an other which is essentially related to the self. Buber contends that this mode is actually primary. Given his description of the *I-It* and the *I-Thou*, these two modes of comportment have come to represent intentional and dialogical modes of interaction, respectively.

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[1] On Buber and dialogue, see for example Stanislaw Kowalczyk, "Buber's Dialogic Personalism," *Dialogue and Humanism* 3.1 (1993): 115-26.

> To man the world is twofold, in accordance with his twofold attitude.
>
> The attitude of man is twofold, in accordance with the twofold nature of the primary words which he speaks.
>
> The primary words are not isolated words, but combined words.
>
> The one primary word is the combination *I-Thou*.
>
> The other primary word is the combination *I-It*; wherein, without a change in the primary word, one of the words *He* and *She* can replace *It*.
>
> Hence the *I* of man is also twofold.
>
> For the *I* of the primary word *I-Thou* is a different *I* from that of the primary word *I-It*. (IT 3)

With these words, Buber begins his evocative reflections on the two modes of engagement, *I-It* and *I-Thou*. Several preliminary observations can be made at the outset. First, Buber limits our modes of comportment to two, and they appear to be mutually exclusive of one another. Second, the *It* in the *I-It* can be substituted by *He* or *She*; the *I-It* is construed as a *third-person* mode of interaction, whereas the *I-Thou* is a *first-person* mode. This is particularly significant in the German language where a distinction is made between formal and informal modes of addressing an other. The *Thou* (*du*) is more informal than the *You* (*Sie*) which, we are to understand, would fall under the rubric of the *I-It*. Third, "the *I* of man is also twofold," meaning that the *I* of the *I-It* is distinct from the *I* of the *I-Thou*, just as *It* and *Thou* are distinct. The difference lies in the mode of address, for this is how a shift between *I-It* and *I-Thou* occurs. Whether I address the other as *It* or *Thou* depends in part upon whether we already comport to each other in the *I-It* or the *I-Thou*, but that comportment itself depends upon how we have already addressed one another. The way in which I address the other is also partly conditioned by the way in which the other addresses me, the way in which the other evokes my being. This suggests a rather complex situation in which the mode of address shapes my comportment and vice versa. All of this has an impact on the way in which I understand myself; my *I* is evoked differently depending upon the mode of comportment in which I am engaged. Finally, it is significant that the *I-It* and the *I-Thou* are characterized as *words*. This suggests a connection between the comportment one bears to the other and language. Here we must think of language in fairly broad terms, not necessarily limited to linguistic utterance.

The *I-It* is a mode of comportment characterized by *experiencing* and *using*. In approaching the other in this mode, I focus on its aspects, qualities, and characteristics, taking the other as an instantiation or concrete manifestation of some class of things. I approach the other as 'such and such', not in its entirety as other.[2] The *I-It* exists in the realm of transitive verbs where the subject is related to an other which is the object of the verb (IT 4). As an *It*, the other remains essentially passive relative to the *I* that uncovers it. The *It* is experienced by the *I* but does not participate in that experience: it remains an object (IT 5). The *It* is disclosed as bounded by others: that is, it is disclosed mediately through its meaningful connection to other things, in terms of other things, not immediately or directly (IT 4). Moreover, in our engagement with the *It*, we approach it as though it were essentially knowable in its entirety, "a secrecy without a secret" (IT 5). That the *It* is as yet unknown is not taken to be an indication of its unknowability. Because the *It* is bound by other things — located in a schema, immovable and passive — its time is *the past*, where the being that was once present has now been objectified and fixed (IT 12-13). This objectification occurs through a disengagement between *I* and *It*, which Buber describes as a natural separation (IT 24).

By contrast, the *I-Thou* is described as a relation in which the *I* encounters the other in a fuller, more mutual way. Buber's point is that our involvement with the world is not exclusively or even primarily captured in terms of the *I-It*, despite the fact that philosophically, at any rate, we tend to describe our involvement in the world in *I-It* terms. The *I-It*, he argues, is a degradation of the more primordial *I-Thou*, which captures our natural connection to the world and the entities encountered therein.

Buber defines the relation of the *I-Thou* largely in negative terms relative to the *I-*

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[2] Note that this question of wholeness is qualified in the case of the *I-Thou* in that the other presents itself as a mystery: i.e. not as a whole where there is nothing further to be discovered, but as a whole that is not broken down into components and analyzed.

It. We are told that the *Thou* is *not* experienced; it is not bounded by others nor do I comport towards it as a thing. In the mode of the *I-Thou*, the other which I encounter is present in all of its aspects as a single whole (IT 8); the relation which is established between myself and the other is mutual in a way which is not true of the *I-It*. The subordination and passivity which characterize the *I-It* are absent. My encounter with the *Thou* not only involves the other in its whole being, but elicits my *I* in a similar way. Thus, there is great risk involved, for I must say *Thou* with my whole being (IT 10).[3] This means that I offer myself up to the *Thou* in my entirety. I withhold nothing, and this 'bodying forth' which Buber identifies occurs as though commanded by the *Thou.* The *Thou* challenges me, demands a response from me, and then reserves the right to judge me (IT 10). Buber even says that I affect the *Thou* as it affects me — hence the mutuality of the relation (IT 15). Since the *Thou* is not subordinate to the *I*, the encounter with it cannot be willed by the *I* alone. The *Thou* meets me through grace. But importantly, the *I-Thou* is not simply a reversal of the *I-It* such that I am now the passive object for someone else's subject; the *I-Thou* "means being chosen and choosing, suffering and action in one" (IT 11).

Unlike the *I-It* relation where the other is experienced as bounded by things and is largely understood *through* (with reference to) those other things, the encounter with the *Thou* is *direct*: "No system of ideas, no foreknowledge, and no fancy intervene between *I* and *Thou*" (IT 11). This directness is commensurate with a shift in the temporality of the relation. In the *I-It*, I comport toward the *It* as closed off and marked by the past; the *I-Thou* bears the stamp of the present, the *moment* which is also open toward the future (IT 12-13). The directness and presence of the *I-Thou*, Buber claims, are necessary preconditions for the possibility of the more estranged comportment of the *I-It*.

The *Thou* is precisely what falls beyond the scope of our standard epistemological models. But that does not mean the *Thou* is not there and that we do not know or at least understand in some way that it is there.

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[3] On this 'wholeness' of the *I* in Buber's thought, see Elliot Wolfson, "The Problem of Unity in the Thought of Martin Buber," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 27 (1989): 423-44.

> — What, then, do we experience of *Thou*?
> — Just nothing. For we do not experience it.
> — What, then, do we know of *Thou*?
> — Just everything. For we know nothing isolated about it any more. (IT 11)

Buber sets up a theory of dialogical interaction in contrast to what he perceives to be an impoverished epistemological model, namely intentionality. Moreover, these modes are not equiprimordial. The *I-Thou* has a definite priority; it is the ontological ground for the possibility of the *I-It*. Yet, there is also a sense in Buber that the *I-It* — while in many respects a falling away from the *I-Thou* — is not actually a derivative mode of the *I-Thou* in the way that Being-alone is a derivative mode of *Mitsein* for Heidegger. The structures of the *I-It* and the *I-Thou* are distinct.

I-Thou relations are possible in three spheres, corresponding to three "classes" of entities:

> First, our life with nature. There the relation sways in gloom, beneath the level of speech. Creatures live and move over against us, but cannot come to us, and when we address them as *Thou*, our words cling to the threshold of speech.
>
> Second, our life with men. There the relation is open and in the form of speech. We can give and accept the *Thou*.
>
> Third, our life with spiritual beings. There the relation is clouded, yet it discloses itself; it does not use speech, yet begets it. We perceive no *Thou*, but none the less we feel we are addressed and we answer — forming, thinking, acting. We speak the primary word with our being, though we cannot utter *Thou* with our lips. (IT 6)

I draw attention to this passage for several reasons. First, dialogue for Buber is not limited to relations between people: a dialogical partner can be an animal, a tree, a painting, a text. This point challenges a basic tenet of the 'common sense' view of dialogue outlined earlier. Secondly, we should note the further reference to language which occurs here, particularly with respect to the role that it plays in the phenomena of addressing, being-addressed, and responding. We saw earlier that the *I-It* and the *I-Thou* are *primary words*, distinguished by the way in which the other is addressed, and the way in which the other addresses me. Hitherto it has been assumed that this address is entirely linguistic, but Buber refines and expands this assumption. Only the *I-Thou* at the interhuman level takes the form of speech; the other two cases bear a relation to speech, yet do not occur through speech. This suggests that the address through which the *Thou* is invoked need not be a speech act or linguistic utterance, but must be interpreted more broadly. The connection with the other which occurs in the encounter is meaningful or significant *even if it does not achieve a fully linguistic manifestation* in interhuman dialogue. The address is, in a sense, a surging of one's being toward the other and a being met by that other in a similar fashion.

Buber echoes this reference to language in a later passage, supplementing it with the following statement:

> **Form's silent asking, man's loving speech, the mute proclamation of the creature, are all gates leading into the presence of the Word.**
>
> But when the full and complete meeting is to take place, the gates are united in one gateway of real life, and you no longer know through which you have entered. (IT 102, emphasis added)

The three realms of the *I-Thou* — of dialogue — all lead to "the presence of the Word", an unmistakable reference to God, the eternal *Thou* which presents itself through each particular *Thou*. However, Buber goes on to indicate that the primary access to the Word, to the eternal *Thou*, lies in dialogical engagement with other persons; the reason for this would appear to be language. He notes that our involvement with such others takes the form of dialogue, as typically understood in conversational terms:

> Here language is consummated as a sequence, in speech and counter-speech. Here alone does the word that is formed in language meet its response. Only here does the primary word go backwards and forwards in the same form, the word of address and the word of response live in the one language, ***I* and *Thou* take their stand not merely in relation, but also in the solid give-and-take of talk. The moments of relation are here, and only here, bound together by means of the element of the speech in which they are immersed.** Here what confronts us has blossomed into **the full reality of the *Thou*.** Here alone, then, as reality that cannot be lost, are gazing and being gazed upon, knowing and being known, loving and being loved. (IT 102-103, emphasis added)

Buber says that the "full reality of the *Thou*" blossoms before us. Does this mean that the *Thou* blossoms only in social dialogue, or simply that we can see the *Thou* more easily in social dialogue? Why emphasize interhuman dialogue if the *I-Thou* can occur with other entities as well, and if all ultimately lead to the presence of the Word? I do not think that Buber could actually be granting any kind of serious priority to social dialogue. He emphasizes that the moments of relation are not constituted by the speech, they are merely immersed in it. The *I-Thou* relation is most obvious at the level of the interhuman because the address involved often leads to a linguistic exchange in which it is more articulated and concretized. But the *address* of the *I-Thou* and the relation it involves must lie outside of language, because they are what *inspire* "the solid give-and-take of talk."

It is curious that Buber specifically tries to establish a connection between speech, on the one hand, and the silent or mute *I-Thou* relations with nature and spiritual entities, on the other. The latter are the two "side-gates," while the former — the *I-Thou* with another person — is the "main portal, into whose opening the two side-gates lead, and in which they are included" (IT 103). In what sense are these two spheres "included" in the other? Perhaps Buber means that the *I-Thou* is characterized by a primordial surging of one's being towards the being of the other. This is the address which belongs to the *I-Thou*, and it finds its fullest exteriorization in the addressing of the human other in language. But the surging and addressing which inspire communication — the reaching out to the other through language — are similarly present in our relation to nature and spiritual entities. The *I-Thou* of the former occurs "at the threshold of speech" and the *I-Thou* of the latter occurs "without speech yet begets it." In all cases, something inspires a desire to speak: that something is the *I-Thou* relation.

It seems fairly intuitive that the *I-Thou* in the case of nature (at least with respect to animals) is at the threshold of speech. Interaction with animals is not that uncommon. One can, and often does, exchange glances with animals; they seek physical contact and attention; they make demands. Such contact is not limited to domesticated animals: a mouse can look at you in terror; a squirrel can approach inquisitively; a deer can eye you warily; a lion can survey a situation with a calm and ruling eye, inspiring caution in those who approach.

Nature in its other forms is somewhat less interactive, but still clearly inspiring in this regard. For instance, we tend to be fascinated with things that grow; plants live and die just as we do. What impresses us about nature is that it is alive and creative. Nature is not dead matter — dumb and silent; it is forceful, energetic, powerful, and immense. Nature demands our respect. Who can stand on the shore of an ocean and not be impressed by its sheer otherness, its vastness, its strength? In the midst of a forest or jungle, atop a mountain, in the middle of a prairie or desert — one is surrounded by nature in its immensity, seemingly enduring and timeless. Nature was here before I was here; it will be here long after I am gone. It bears the wisdom of the ages and is indifferent to me. If I am abandoned to it, I will have to be very resourceful to survive. In a situation where the otherness of nature is brought into high-relief, I am undoubtedly addressed by it; I also address it, asking it to share its strength and its secrets with me. Our relation lies just below the threshold of speech.

How does a spiritual being — such as a work of art — which does not explicitly speak, nevertheless beget speech? In this regard it is instructive to consider Buber's discussion of the encounter with a work of art, where the *Thou* is subjectively experienced as issuing a command to which we must respond (IT 9-10). We do clearly have the experience of works of art 'speaking to us'; works of art can be provocative and inspirational. But for this to happen, I must connect with the work in the mode of the *I-Thou*. The encounter "causes" the work to speak to me; as a result, I may turn to other people to share my experience and to discuss it. Perhaps this is how the sphere of spiritual encounter "begets speech," while not itself taking the form of speech; it, too, remains a side-gate. It seems that the primary words of *I-It* and *I-Thou* are still most commonly revealed through modes of address which achieve a spoken form.

The *desire* to communicate with the other is inspired by the *Thou*, but this communication will only reach linguistic expression where the *Thou* itself has the possibility of responding linguistically. Speech is crucial for Buber because through it we gain access to the Word, namely the word of God. The Word is revealed not through vision — the sense perception which dominates epistemology and thus, in Buber's view, intentionality (the *I-It*) — but through hearing and listening, the sensory perception of dialogue. This view is confirmed by Buber's claim that "the relation with man is the real simile of the relation with God; in it true address receives true response; except that in God's response everything, the universe, is made manifest as language" (IT 103). God is presumably addressed through prayer, which is typically an *asking*. The response is presumably revelation. This passage suggests that revelation not only occurs through or in language (construed broadly), but actually *is* language. Truth is intimately connected with language.

I have raised these points respecting language in the different spheres of the *I-Thou* in order to emphasize that, for Buber, dialogue is not restricted to the realm of the interhuman, nor is it dependent upon language. The relation of the *I-Thou* inspires speech when the other who is addressed and who addresses me has speech as a possibility; the relation is made most manifest in, but is by no means restricted to, these instances. In fact, many *I-Thou* relations, even in the interhuman sphere, occur in silence.

The phenomenon of address is a key feature of the encounter model of dialogue that Buber articulates. Addressing the other as *Thou* or being addressed by the other as *Thou* is an *event* which effects a direct engagement with the other, as opposed to the more mediated way of addressing the other in the *I-It*. Although Buber does not make an explicit connection between the *I-It* and intentionality, it seems clear that this is what he has in mind. The strong distinction between intentionality and dialogue receives more explicit critical attention in Theunissen's work.

ii. Theunissen: The intentional *I-It* and the dialogical *I-Thou*

In *The Other*, Michael Theunissen undertakes an analysis of ambitious proportions in which he explores the critical relationship between transcendental philosophy and the philosophy of dialogue. Taking Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre as representatives of transcendental philosophy, Theunissen illustrates how their work may be characterized in such terms, ultimately showing that each relies upon the intentional model. Theories of dialogue, of which he takes Buber to be the primary representative — though ample reference is made to other, principally German, thinkers of the same period — are characterized by their critique of transcendental philosophy. Theunissen's objective is to critically assess the philosophical success of this critique. He ultimately concludes that dialogue cannot achieve or justify the claims to originality that it strives to maintain. Thus, Theunissen proposes that a position which mediates the two theoretical poles might be a fruitful approach to explore, although he himself does not undertake this task in his text.

My discussion of Theunissen has a twofold purpose. Firstly, I will examine Theunissen's explicit interpretation of Buber's *I-It/I-Thou* distinction as a distinction between intentionality and dialogicality, and I will also consider his characterization of

Buber's theory of dialogue as destructive of transcendental philosophy. Secondly, I will consider Theunissen's criticisms of Buber's work and his reservations regarding the possibility of developing a theory of dialogue distinct from a theory of intentionality. If Theunissen is correct, then the possibility of sharply distinguishing between intentionality and dialogicality — through a negative definition of one with respect to the other — becomes questionable. This is the first step in challenging the viability of this distinction. Along the way, we will see that Theunissen makes a number of important contributions to a clarification of the notion of encounter.

The philosophy of dialogue which Theunissen discusses emerged as the "new thought" on the intellectual scene in Europe in the early part of the twentieth century and positioned itself relative to the "old" thought, which was taken to be of two types. The first type was idealism and the philosophy of the universal subject or of universal consciousness. This doctrine was criticized for its failure to take the facticity of the subject seriously. Thus, theories of dialogue always place a great deal of emphasis on the factical *I*. However it is important to note that those theories which Theunissen terms 'modern transcendentalism' were themselves critical of idealism on the same grounds. As such, the real source of tension between transcendentalist thought and dialogue lies in the second critical attitude, adopted by theorists of dialogue, toward transcendental philosophy understood as "the doctrine of the constitution of the world out of subjectivity" (O 259). The main difficulty here — according to the thinkers of dialogue that Theunissen considers — is that, in its emphasis on the world-constituting power of the subject, such a doctrine does nothing to break the essential solitude of the *I*. Transcendentalism ultimately traces everything back to the self, with the result that all experience of the other comes to be understood in terms of the self. This is unacceptable to thinkers of dialogue (O 259-65).

Theunissen identifies three defining features of a transcendental theory. The first is a general self-centeredness which follows from the priority of the subject and the privilege of the subject to constitute the world. This establishes the second characteristic — a subordination of the object relative to the subject. The object, being strictly constituted by the subject and not participating in the constitution of the world, is construed purely passively. Thirdly, the fact that the subject constitutes the world implies that objects are always understood mediately through the intentions which subjects direct at them. As a result, objects are never experienced as *other* in any meaningful sense. This radically subjectivistic intentional model of understanding is at the heart of Theunissen's depiction of transcendentalism, and it is this model of relationality which receives the most criticism (O 271-77).

Theories of dialogue are characterized by three traits which oppose the three features of transcendental intentionality outlined above. The first and most fundamental is the notion of *the between*. *The between* is the relation between *I* and *Thou* in terms of which they are properly *I* and *Thou*; this relation is born of an *encounter*, the coming together of two participants. The important point of comparison with respect to transcendental/intentional theories is that neither pole of the relation is given priority.[4] The dialogical model points to the "space" between the two poles, thereby emphasizing their equiprimordiality and their connection. The perspectivalism of the ego is presumably overcome. The second important feature, not unrelated to the first, involves the reciprocity or mutuality of the relation between *I* and *Thou*. This reciprocity is meant to contrast with the subordination of the object in the intentional model. In the dialogical case, neither pole of the relation is passive or stationary; neither can be subordinated to the other. The relation is not uni-directional from the subject toward the object but is a mutual coming together. Thirdly, theories of dialogue highlight the immediacy of the dialogical relation. Since the relation between self and other is no longer mediated through a world projected and constituted by the subject, the other can be encountered in his otherness, unfettered and unrefracted by a subjectivized perspective. One would say that, in the dialogical relation, one "experiences" the other "coming over to one" (O 260, 271-77).

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[4] According to the standard view, one begins with a subject who only subsequently intends the object. However this cannot be said of more sophisticated theories of intentionality where subjectivity consists in the intentional relation to the other: the subject never exists in the absence of an object. Intentionality, as it appears in Heidegger's work, is one of these more sophisticated positions. Theunissen's point must be that, in the intentional model, the subject remains the ego-pole and the center of all the intentional relations which emanate from it; in this sense the subject would retain a priority.

On this basis, we can reiterate that Buber's *I-It* corresponds to the intentional, and the *I-Thou* to the dialogical. However, Theunissen wants to further demonstrate that Buber's theory of dialogue is ultimately unsuccessful in its attempt to destroy the intentional model due to Buber's reliance upon intentionality in the discussion of *I-Thou*.[5] To support this claim, Theunissen observes that for Buber it is possible to encounter an other — be it a tree, a person or a text — as either an *It* or a *Thou*. This suggests that what determines how I encounter a particular other is not the actual constitution of the other, but rather my comportment towards it. That is, my projection towards the other determines how the other shows up. This puts Buber squarely within the intentional model, where the *I* still takes precedence over the *Thou*.[6]

Nevertheless, Theunissen's reading of Buber is as sympathetic as possible, in order to illustrate how Buber attempts a destruction of the intentional model. Theunissen's discussion has three principle movements: first, he maps out the region where the *I-Thou* happens, namely language; second, he shows how Buber attempts to subvert the intentional object; and third, how Buber threatens the notion of the intentional act itself.[7] Throughout, Theunissen continually returns to the point that Buber is ultimately unsuccessful.

According to Theunissen, Buber's definition of *I-It* and *I-Thou* as basic words indicates that we are dealing with the realm of language. Theunissen therefore wants to explore the relationship between the *I-Thou* and language in Buber's thought. Given that the *I-It* is a third-person mode of interaction and the *I-Thou* is a first-person form, Theunissen maintains that the difference — at the level of language — must be in how

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[5] Moreover, dialogue in Buber is largely defined simply in opposition to intentionality, rather than positively developed in its own terms.

[6] Buber could perhaps be defended on this point. What determines how I encounter the other is the *primary word* which mediates our encounter, namely *I-It* or *I-Thou*. How we relate to one another has as much to do with how I address the other as with how I am addressed by the other. Theunissen does not say anything about this. Perhaps he does not think it is coherent to say that I can be addressed by a tree or a work of art, and therefore my addressing it would be determinative. Buber, however, does not appear to be committed to this view.

[7] This is Theunissen's reconstruction of Buber; this destructive structure is not explicit in Buber's work.

(or whether) the other is addressed in the speaking of the primary word. This reflects his view that my addressing the other as *It* or *Thou* determines the nature of the relation. He identifies the realm of the *I-It* as the realm of *talking about* and the realm of *I-Thou* as that of *talking to*. Through a phenomenological treatment of these two notions, Theunissen illustrates that *talking to* — in so far as it involves an addressing of the other — is immediate and signals a call for a response from the other, whereas *talking about* is purely discursive and mediated. *Talking about* deals with the other as a topic of conversation but does not address the other *per se*. Theunissen argues that although *talking to* is perhaps more direct than *talking about*, it still focuses on the perspective of the *I* that talks, reflecting the priority and originality of that *I*. *Talking to* is still encumbered with subjective intention. It may be for this reason that Buber sometimes says that the *I-Thou* is fulfilled in silence, where the intentionality of *talking to* has been surpassed (O 294-300).

However, as Theunissen points out, Buber does not always say this; sometimes he says that the *I-Thou* is fulfilled in discourse (O 300-304).[8] Theunissen attempts to make sense of this potential contradiction by indicating that articulate discourse in the form of *talking to* is the means for the initial fulfillment of the *I-Thou*, in that the *Thou* is disclosed as such through the comportment implied in *talking to*. But, as Theunissen notes, the *Thou* becomes ever more present as that *about which* we talk — the fact that we are talking *to* each other — recedes from the forefront of consciousness until I am ultimately left with the *Thou* before me in silence. In this way, the *I-Thou* finds completion in silence — although it must *begin* in *talking to* — and the intentional model is overcome in the breakdown or surpassing of language (O 304-305).

Theunissen, however, maintains that Buber is not appropriately aware of this because he persists in maintaining the priority of articulate discourse, and therefore, of

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[8] What is meant by this language of fulfillment? Does this bear any relation to the fulfillment of an intention? These questions cannot be adequately addressed here. It seems clear that Buber/Theunissen cannot mean by 'fulfillment' anything which specifically pertains to Husserl's theory of intentionality, for this is allegedly what is surpassed in the *I-Thou*. By 'fulfilled' is no doubt meant something far more general — an achieving or expressing of the *I-Thou* at its fullest. A different thought on the relation between *I-Thou* and intentional fulfillment will be explored at greater length in Part III.

talking to. This is most evident in his emphasis on the interhuman sphere, where the give-and-take of the dialogic exchange is taken to be most fully realized:

> Only here does the primary word go backwards and forwards in the same form, the word of address and the word of response live in the one language, *I* and *Thou* take their stand not merely in relation, but also in the solid give-and-take of talk. (IT 102-103)

Theunissen claims that Buber's concern in this passage is with the reciprocity involved in such an exchange, and not primarily with language and silence (O 302). Because of this, Buber misses the avenue towards the overcoming of intentionality which the latter represent (O 307). In discussing this same passage in the previous section, I argued that the mode of address involved in the *I-Thou* gives rise to speech but need not occur only in speech. Speech is important for Buber because it binds together the moments of relation and seems to allow them to continue. To this extent, I would agree with Theunissen that language and silence as ways of overcoming intentionality are not Buber's primary concern (although I am not convinced that overcoming and destroying intentionality is Buber's objective). Buber seems to be pointing out that linguistic exchange only achieves its fulfillment in the dialogue of *I-Thou* because only there are authentic reciprocity and address manifest. This does not, however, imply that the *I-Thou* reaches *its* fulfillment in language: the address of the *I-Thou* is extra-linguistic. In so far as Theunissen seems to be suggesting that Buber holds a different position, I would disagree with him.

The second movement of Theunissen's discussion is the destruction of the intentional object. This is accomplished by distinguishing the *It* from the *Thou* in such a way that the *Thou* cannot be construed as an intentional object. This distinction lies primarily in the temporality of the *It* as opposed to that of the *Thou*. As an object of knowledge, the *It* is in the past — closed off, complete, graspable in its entirety. It belongs to the past in so far as it is re-presented to consciousness. The *Thou*, on the other hand, is not grasped as an object of knowledge, but emerges into presence. It presents itself to the *I* as unfinished, incomplete, extending into the future. Although the temporality of the *Thou* is the present, this is not presence as a closed off 'now' which — in the form of a re-presentation — hearkens back to what was; it is a present with a future orientation, a present in motion (O 307-15).

The differences in the temporal features of the *It* and the *Thou* have repercussions for the way in which they are "grasped". The *It*, because it is re-presented, is taken as grasped in its entirety. It shows up as a thing which bears various predicates; it is the sum of a number of knowable properties. The *Thou*, given the openness with which it presents itself, defies representation as a thing. It cannot be grasped with the finality necessary for such a characterization. Thus, it is no-thing (O 315-21).[9] This distinction is reflected also in Theunissen's distinction between *talking to* and *talking about*. When one talks about something, one can only do so in terms of its predicates; one talks about the properties or qualities of a thing. But *talking to* is always an addressing of the *Thou*, and an awaiting — indeed, an expectation — of a response. This awaiting also belongs to the openness of the *I-Thou*. As a point of clarification, the no-thingness which characterizes the *Thou* is not so much an absence or void of being, as the emergence of a non-present-at-hand, non-substantial type of being.

Since the *Thou* resists characterization as a thing and eludes confinement to a temporal 'now' which is really a re-presentation of the past, it similarly cannot be pinpointed in a determinate spatial location, which is a limitation of thingly things. The point Theunissen seems to be highlighting is that the *It* is characterized by being limited or bounded by the ordered world within which it has been imbedded and in terms of which it is understood and given meaning. Every *It* has its place. Since the *Thou* transcends the world which is constituted in the *I-It*, the *Thou* is 'displaced' or 'unplaced'. Thus, the encounter with the *Thou* does not occur within the ordered structure of the world, but happens beyond it: the encounter is discontinuous with the world. This is not to say that the *Thou* is encountered *in absentia* from the world, but rather that the world merely provides the background out of which the *Thou* emerges in the encounter. The world does not limit, or de-limit, the *Thou* as it does in the case of the *It* (O 321-26).

Because of the *Thou*'s no-thingness and its discontinuity relative to the spatial, worldly order, the *Thou* is also impermanent. Because the *Thou* is not fixed, it lacks solidity, durability, and certainty, which injects an instability and fleetingness into its temporality (O 326-29). This instability and transience are reflected in the idea that the *Thou* only presents itself in the moment or event of being addressed.

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[9] See IT 11, quoted in the previous section, which reflects this.

Taken together, all of these features contribute to a volatilization of the intentional object with respect to its substantiality, spatiality, temporality, and durability, leading us toward the destruction of the intentional act itself. This destruction is, in part, effected through the destruction of the object. Without an object to act upon, the action becomes what Theunissen calls a pure act: "the Thou becomes that which is illuminated solely in the actuality of the pure act" (O 329). Because there is no longer any object, the *I* reaches out toward the *Thou* in the act of address or *talking to*, then sinks back into itself, and the *Thou* accordingly recedes or withdraws. This, too, reflects the impermanence of the *Thou*. But more importantly, the pure act is a suspension of the intentional act, but not, however, in the sense that it

> suspend[s] that consummation of the act that is implied by the loss of the object. Rather, it is carried out through and through, and by way of, this consummation. More exactly: the act can only be brought to completion in that it is suspended as act. (O 331)

The suspension of the act occurs in the suspension of the activity associated with the intentional act. In the realm of the *I-It*, the intentional activity of the *I* is revealed through the passivity of the *It*. But in the realm of the *I-Thou*, the *Thou* is no longer passive, and the *I*'s activity is no longer apparent. Only relative to the passivity of the *It* can the *I*'s action be termed active. With the elimination of that passivity, the activity of the *I* also disappears. One might think that Theunissen does not actually mean that the activity of the act disappears with the disappearance of the passivity of the object, but that the act-character of the activity of the *I* disappears with the removal of the intentional object. Without an object, a thing to act upon, how can activity manifest itself as an act? One would simply have activity with no object. However, this would result from merely removing the intentional object, and Theunissen is quite clear that he is thinking of a further alteration (O 331-32).

The pure act associated with the *I-Thou* cannot be described by way of an opposition of activity and passivity. Rather it must be described through the unity of these, which becomes an expression of the consummation of the pure act (O 331-33).

Theunissen maintains that here Buber gestures at, but is unable to articulate, "a region which lies on the other side of the difference between action and passion" (O 332). This is the region of the pure act of the *I-Thou*. However, Buber is unable to say much about this, contenting himself with a description in terms of a *unity* of activity and passivity. He does not transcend this terminology, and his formulation remains within the realm of what is unthinkable and contradictory (O 332-33).

In order to go beyond this contradictory formulation and to demonstrate how the activity of intention might be suspended in the pure act, Theunissen returns to the example of addressing. Whereas an intentional act finds completion in the passivity of the object, the 'action' in address finds completion in the passivity of the *I*, where every act of addressing always already expects a reply; if it did not, the act would not occur in the first place. Questions expect responses, and 'communication' (and here I think Theunissen means assertive utterances) expect agreement.[10] These acts only are what they are, only become fulfilled as what they are, when the actor falls silent, awaiting the agreement or response which she expects the other to give (O 333-36).[11]

Although the concrete phenomenon of addressing or *talking to* the other seems to hold promise for a destruction of the intentional model, Theunissen remains worried that Buber does not completely extricate himself from the tangles of that model. He describes the *I-Thou* in largely negative terms and — even in Theunissen's sympathetic interpretation — still does not succeed in overcoming the priority of the *I*-perspective as it appears in the intentional structure of *talking to*. Theunissen contends that if the theory is to be philosophically adequate, it must begin from the phenomenon of *being spoken to*:

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[10] "Communication has the being-sense 'communication' only in that it is intent upon agreement and question has the being-sense 'question' only in that it wants to have an answer" (O 333).

[11] Once again, the language of fulfillment enters. However, it is interesting to note that Theunissen does not maintain that questions are fulfilled in the responses to them, as I suggested with respect to Heidegger in Chapter 1. In that case, a question implicitly intends a response which, when given, fulfills that intention. Theunissen is making a different point. He is saying that the activity of questioning fulfills itself in the passivity of awaiting a response. He is not at all interested in the 'object' of the question; indeed he could not be because he is talking about a pure act which is not supposed to have an object.

> In the meeting, the active moment cannot be one-sidedly attributed to me or to the Other. Rather, our acts reach into one another in such a way that that which I do is, at the same time, done to me. Therefore the initiative lies neither with me nor with the Other. The meeting is, in other words, originally neither simply my speaking to nor my being spoken to. Consequently, the originality of the between in the concrete experience of meeting manifests itself as the precedence of being spoken to over speaking to. As the facticity of meeting, I, accordingly, experience dialogical facticity primarily in being spoken to. (O 339)

In the encounter there is a simultaneity of experience in which *I* and *Thou* find themselves addressed by one another. In granting a priority to the experience of my *being spoken to* over my *speaking to*, Theunissen must mean that my awaiting a response (wherein my addressing the other is fulfilled) is only revealed in my *being spoken to*, in my hearing the other. Buber does not thematize the facticity of this being addressed; it cannot be captured simply in terms of *speaking to*. In fairness to Buber, I wonder to what extent Theunissen's criticism is not primarily dependent upon the *talking about/talking to* distinction which is, in the end, his own. Buber does, after all, discuss the idea of the *Thou* meeting the *I* through grace; further reflection on this notion of grace might more effectively reveal the phenomenon of being addressed, which is supported by Buber's references to encounters with spiritual entities. But it may be the case that Buber is relying here more on religious imagery to convey his thought rather than adequately explicating it in philosophical terms — which, I suppose, is ultimately Theunissen's point.

These criticisms of Buber in the main text of *The Other* lead Theunissen, in his Postscript, to express a more general skepticism regarding the possibility of a pure theory of dialogue independent of intentionality. The source of the difficulty lies in conflicting claims to originality: the most radical expression of the dialogical principle is that "the event of the meeting, or the 'between', is earlier than those meeting each other" (O 365); theories of intentionality ostensibly assert the priority of the poles of the relation (subject and object) over the relation itself. Both claims cannot be primary. This conflict may be circumvented by adopting a more moderate form of the dialogical principle expressed by other thinkers of dialogue, which Theunissen calls the 'reduced standpoint'. It consists in the view that "the meeting presupposes that the ones meeting each other exist upon a particular being level and [it] concede[s] to the between solely the power to transform the poles that impinge upon one another" (O 366). Working with this moderate statement of the dialogical thesis, Theunissen suggests that a view intermediate between intentionality and the radical dialogical standpoint is perhaps the most promising. He proposes that dialogue be construed as the self-becoming of the individual *I*, where the *I* would be explained and discussed within the context of a transcendental theory. This would permit us

> to grant to transcendental philosophy the originality of the beginning and to the philosophy of dialogue the originality of the goal, of the complete end. The beginning would be my individual I, the goal the self that proceeds from the meeting. (O 367)

This intermediate view would enable us to accommodate both mediated and immediate encounters with others. It would allow us to construe the other as both the one who alienates me and the one who brings me back to myself (O 371).[12]

Theunissen's work is interesting and important to my investigation for several reasons. First, the main body of the text does a great deal to clarify the opposition between intentionality and dialogue which is at work in Buber's concept of dialogue. Second, in expanding upon Buber's position to demonstrate the ways in which it is supposed to be destructive of intentionality, Theunissen reveals a great deal about the encounter. In particular, we learn that the encounter of the *I-Thou* is a surpassing of the *I-It*, as well as a shattering of the *I-It*'s spatiality, temporality, and communication. This is extremely useful in enriching our understanding of encounter. Third, Theunissen's Postscript assists in the critical project to be undertaken in Chapter 6. The Postscript qualifies the stark opposition between intentionality and dialogicality he pursues in the main body of the text, and his skepticism regarding this dichotomy is encouraging because it suggests a deeper connection between these two positions than Buber (or Theunissen's interpretation of Buber) permits. Moreover, Theunissen's analysis shows that the dialogicality of Buber's dialogue implicitly depends upon the non-dialogicality of intentionality as well as the non-intentionality of dialogue. That is to say, dialogue for Buber is defined primarily negatively relative to intentionality. If the boundary between dialogicality and intentionality is eroded or thrown into question, then the meaning of that dialogicality becomes unclear. This indicates that a discussion of the dialogic encounter must be undertaken in positive terms, and its relationship to intentionality must be established, also in positive terms.

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[12] Theunissen specifically mentions Heidegger's fundamental ontology as one of the theories that could serve as an appropriate beginning point. Albeit somewhat reluctantly, he says, "to be sure, *Being and Time* does not describe a self-becoming of the I but only a becoming-I of the self, that is, of that *Dasein* structured like a self. But this *Dasein* falls under a concept of subjectivity that is only inadequately determined through the expressions 'I' and 'individual'. From Heidegger's own standpoint, dialogical self-becoming would then be presented as a transformation of that *Dasein* structured like a self into an authentic self-being whereby the dialogically constituted self would be distinguished from the authentic self, in the sense of *Being and Time*, precisely in that it is dialogically constituted" (O 367).

iii. Levinas: The encounter as face to face

Levinas' work is striking for its complexity, its originality, and its erudition.[13] Perhaps more than any other thinker, Levinas has taken up the question of alterity and made it central to his life's thought. In reading his work, the influence of certain thinkers is startlingly evident; he is firmly grounded in the phenomenological tradition, having been a student of both Husserl and Heidegger in the 1920s, and he is clearly influenced by Buber's critique of epistemology and intentionality. His voice, then, should play a distinctive role in our investigation.

In examining Levinas' work I have three primary aims: first, to understand how a dichotomy between intentionality and dialogue may be functioning in his thinking of the other; second, to unpack his understanding of intentionality in order to render this dichotomy even more ambiguous; and third, to enrich the understanding of encounter that we have so far developed by exploring his notion of the face to face.[14]

Like Buber and Theunissen, Levinas is concerned with the primordiality of the relation to the Other. Buber and Theunissen are critical of intentionality because it is 'self-centered' and does not adequately capture our fundamental connection to the other.

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[13] The discussion of Levinas in this section is drawn primarily from TI and supplemented in places by *Existence and Existents*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1978), *Time and the Other*, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987) and *En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1967).

[14] A good discussion of the basic themes of Levinas' work as they pertain to this issue can be found in David Jopling, "Levinas on Desire, Dialogue and the Other," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 65 (1991): 405-27.

In many ways Levinas could be seen to be continuing the same thought. He is concerned that philosophy traditionally does not think of the other in its alterity, but rather understands the other as the counterpart to the same — the *not-I* which completes the *I*. *I* and *not-I* together form a totality, and thus the relation between *I* and *not-I* is a nostalgic yearning for wholeness and completion. Such a relation is one which aims at assimilating the other to the same. For Levinas, this is a movement of domination. The other, when approached in its alterity, represents the idea of the infinite, and the infinite cannot be assimilated or incorporated. The movement toward the infinite, then, is not one aimed at dominating the other and thereby completing the *I*. Levinas' philosophical worry is motivated here largely by ethical concerns, for ethics can only move in the space that infinitude opens up. A thought which understands our ethical relations to Others in terms of the *I* and *not-I* of logic is incapable of encountering the alterity of the Other and of properly experiencing ethical responsibility before that Other. Thus, Levinas urges that ethics must take priority over ontology. Our relation to the Other must be understood as it is disclosed in the face to face of the ethical relation.

The difference between the relation to the other which is paired with the same and the relation to the other which is a movement towards infinity is often characterized by Levinas as a difference between need and desire. A need is a lack which is, in principle, satiable; it may be satisfied when what is needed is supplied, thereby filling what is missing. Here what is other is viewed as something which can be assimilated to the same in order to complete it. That other has no identity or meaning beyond its function or possibility as something which can satisfy a need. Since these needs are mine, the other is viewed in terms of me — defined in terms of my needs and seen as a means for me to achieve my end (TI 115-17, 127-30).

Desire, on the other hand, is distinctly different; it is experienced by a self which is already complete. As complete, the self has no void to fill; nothing is missing; it *needs* nothing. The movement toward the other which occurs under such circumstances cannot, then, be motivated out of need; it cannot satisfy a lack; it cannot assimilate the other to the same; it cannot use the other as a means to an end. In short, it can commit none of the violence to the other that marks the relation of need. Desire is, in principle, insatiable, partly for the reason just mentioned, and partly because the other, in its alterity, cannot be assimilated. The other is infinite and so elusive. Where need seeks to draw the other into oneself and consume it, desire leaps out towards the other, surging exuberantly to meet it. The alterity of the other — that which is infinite in the other — is what pulls the *I* out of itself in desire, drawing it toward a mystery that it cannot know, that always withdraws from its grasp. This secrecy of the other is what inspires desire; desire is awakened in me by the other. In need, my reach for the other is motivated by an absence in me (TI 35-40).[15]

This distinction resembles that between the *I-It* and *I-Thou*, between intentionality and dialogue, in several respects. Need is governed by a self-centeredness which corresponds to the *I-It* and intentionality. In such cases, the other is reduced to what can be incorporated into the meaning structures of the same, into a totality. Desire, on the other hand, allows the infinite in the other to manifest itself. In this case, the *I* does not analyze, calculate, or otherwise assimilate the other. Moreover, the movement in desire, as Levinas describes it, is from the other to me, much like Theunissen's *being-spoken-to.*

However, it would be hasty to conclude on the basis of these similarities that the need/desire distinction can be mapped directly onto the distinctions that Buber and Theunissen draw. There are two things that we must understand better: we must understand this notion of need more completely; and we must understand its relation to the ipseity of the *I* which is involved in desire.

In TI Levinas discusses Husserl's concept of transcendental intentionality, criticizing it for focusing almost exclusively on relations which would be characterized in terms of need (TI 122-27). In pursuing his objection, Levinas does not introduce desire as a counter-concept, but instead expands upon the concept of need, introducing the terms nourishment and enjoyment. Nourishment highlights the extent to which we *live from* our relations to the world. While nourishment is certainly a relation which involves the assimilation of what is other into me, it is nevertheless the case that what nourishes me sustains me (TI 110-13). I am, in a very important respect, dependent upon the other. This is, to be sure, also true in need. But Levinas' point is that traditional notions of intentionality characterize our primary relations to the world in terms of *representation*, and this is what he would like to challenge. We are corporeal beings who are nourished by the world and live from it *before* we represent it (TI 122-27). I need the world to survive, but this does not mean that I am enslaved to the world; I enjoy it (TI 114). Levinas thinks it is a mistake to characterize our relation to the world exclusively in terms of *in-order-to*'s which all ultimately refer back to the self for whose sake they are. Enjoyment involves a projection toward an object which does not refer beyond that object but is instead limited by it. Enjoyment is an engagement which is for its own sake; it involves a lingering before the other which allows the other to become exotic, mysterious, beautiful.

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[15] On the need/desire distinction see, for example, Adriaan T. Peperzak, "Transcendence," *Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, Literature and Religion*, ed. Adriaan T. Peperzak (New York: Routledge, 1995) 185-92. See especially pp. 189-92.

Although Levinas offers his analyses of enjoyment and nourishment as criticisms of the intentionality of representation, he nevertheless understands these to be intentional relations themselves (TI 127-30). Intentionality has an affective content provided by sensation, not perception (TI 187). Levinas' perspective on this seems to be largely informed by his background in phenomenology:

> Phenomenology is intentionality. What does that mean? Refusal of a sensualism that would identify consciousness with sensual objects? Certainly. But the sensible plays an important role in phenomenology, and intentionality rehabilitates the sensible. Necessary correlation between subject and object? Without doubt. But we have not attended to Husserl to protest against the idea of a subject separated from an object. If intentionality signified only that consciousness 'leaps' towards the object and that we are immediately close to things, there would never have been phenomenology.[16]

In the same essay, Levinas goes on to distinguish the relation implied by intentionality from the standard subject-object relation, saying "on the contrary intentionality carries with it the innumerable horizons of its involvements and thinks of infinitely more 'things' than of the object towards which it is directed."[17] Thus, in intentionality, the object always appears within a horizon; the object emerges within a field that provides it with a context such that one thinks more than the mere object which is explicitly grasped by the thought.[18] It is through phenomenology that the hegemony of representation is destroyed: "it [phenomenology] brings us outside of the categories subject-object and destroys the sovereignty of representation. Subject and object are merely the poles of this intentional life."[19] In "Intentionality and Metaphysics" Levinas comments on the role sensation plays in confirming or disproving the intentions with which an object is approached.[20] This observation is taken to be evidence that an intentionality of the sensible requires an openness to the object.[21] Levinas confirms the point illustrated in Part I that intentions are fulfilled through intuition.[22]

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[16] "La phénoménologie, c'est l'intentionalité. Qu'est-ce à dire? Refus d'un sensualisme que identifiait la conscience aux sensations-choses? Certes. Mais le sensible joue un rôle important en phénoménologie et l'intentionalité réhabilite le sensible. Corrélation nécessaire entre sujet et objet? Sans doute. Mais on n'a pas attendu Husserl pour protester contre l'idée d'un sujet séparé de l'objet. Si l'intentionalité signifiait uniquement qui la conscience 's'éclate' vers l'objet et que nous sommes immédiatement auprès des choses il n'y aurait jamais eu de phénoménologie" (127). E. Levinas, "La ruine de la représentation," *En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1967) 125-35. The English translations of passages taken from essays in this volume are my own.

Intentionality in the phenomenological sense poses a challenge to representational theories of experience because of the important role that sensation plays. Levinas illustrates this by demonstrating that the intentionality of representation is not exhaustive, or even primordial, because it does not take account of the intentionality of enjoyment and nourishment as relations that are prior to representation. This point is significant for our purposes, as it represents an implicit critique of what Buber and Theunissen have been characterizing as intentionality *tout court*. That is, the criticisms which Buber and

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[17] "par contre, l'intentionalité porte en elle les horizons innombrables de ses implications et pense à infiniment plus de 'choses' qu'à l'objet où elle se fixe" (Levinas, "Ruine" 130).

[18] Levinas, "Ruine" 131.

[19] "elle [la phénoménologie] nous mène hors des catégories sujet-objet et ruine la souveraineté de la représentation. Sujet et objet ne sont que les pôles de cette vie intentionnelle" (Levinas, "Ruine" 133-34).

[20] E. Levinas, "Intentionalité et metaphysique," *En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1967) 137-44.

[21] Levinas, "Intentionalité" 139-40.

[22] See Andrew Tallon, "Nonintentional Affectivity, Affective Intentionality, and the Ethical in Levinas' Philosophy," *Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, Literature and Religion*, ed. Adriaan T. Peperzak (New York: Routledge, 1995) 107-21.

Theunissen direct at intentionality seem to be primarily directed at what Levinas calls an intentionality of representation. They do not seem to be directed at the intentionality of enjoyment. If the theories of dialogue which Buber and Theunissen promote are defined primarily negatively against what we may now characterize as an intentionality of representation, then they have yet to demonstrate that dialogue also excludes the intentionality of enjoyment. All of this, then, throws into question the validity of the intentionality/dialogicality distinction, at least as Buber and Theunissen have articulated it.

One of the most striking aspects of Levinas' discussion of enjoyment and nourishment is that it suggests a reversal of the priority of subject over object which characterizes representational theories of intentionality. The subject, though not a slave to the object, is still dependent upon it and enthralled by it. The emphasis on the role that sensation plays in these relations highlights a movement in the relation that is absent in Buber and Theunissen's account of intentionality. There, the primary movement is from the subject to the object, a projection of meaning onto the object. Levinas emphasizes the opposite movement, that of the subject being affected by the object. This shift in the characterization of intentionality is extremely important and involves features that, according to Buber and Theunissen, are dialogical.

Where does that leave us with respect to Levinas and the need/desire distinction? Enjoyment is to be included among those relations which Levinas describes as need. Despite the features that would seem to make enjoyment somewhat dialogical, Levinas does not view it as desire. In a sense then, the need/desire distinction is still an intentional/dialogical distinction, although Levinas understands that distinction somewhat differently. This may be made clearer if we consider more closely why enjoyment remains need for Levinas. The key, I believe, lies in the solitude of the *I* implied in enjoyment. If enjoyment and nourishment are primordial, then the relations that make up existence are not directed solely at bare subsistence and survival, but also at happiness. Happiness is egoistic:

> Happiness is accomplishment: it exists in a soul satisfied and not in a soul that has extirpated its needs, a castrated soul. And because life is happiness, it is personal. The personality of the person, the ipseity of the I, which is more than the particularity of the

> atom and of the individual, is the particularity of the happiness of enjoyment. Enjoyment accomplishes the atheistic separation; it deformalizes the notion of separation, which is not a cleavage made in the abstract, but the existence at home with itself of an autochthonous I. (TI 115)

The possibility of establishing a separate *I* lies in its capacity to enjoy, its ability to savor the world — to be touched, affected, moved by it. This capacity is an *affectivity* or *sensibility*; "sensibility enacts the very separation of being — separated and independent" (TI 138).

When we are happy, we are contented. We see no need to surpass ourselves, to go beyond, to seek out the infinite. Even though enjoyment seems to carry the *I* beyond itself toward an other with which it is fascinated and where its attention comes to rest, the *I* still remains within the realm of intentionality — the world of light and knowledge. That which I enjoy, although not referring beyond itself as a means to an end — as an *in-order-to* — is still disclosed as that which is enjoyable *to me*, and thus ultimately refers back to the *I*, preserving the solitude of the *I*. For this reason, enjoyment does not qualify as desire and thus Levinas would not consider it to be dialogical.

The key to the need/desire distinction, as the title of Levinas' book suggests, lies in the difference between totality and infinity. Where the intentionality/dialogicality distinction turns on overcoming the centrality and superiority of the *I* in the relation with the other, Levinas focuses on whether or not the relation to the other is a totalizing, assimilating one. Consequently, despite a number of similarities in the relational features identified in each case, Levinas effects a subtle but significant shift in the point of differentiation.

For Levinas, then, need (and enjoyment) are totalizing relations which assimilate the other and result in the solitude and separateness of the *I*. In contrast, desire is a surpassing and overflowing towards the other. However, the solitude of the *I* should not necessarily be condemned, for only if the *I* is solitary and happy (i.e. if its needs are fulfilled so that it is complete) can it then be ready to engage in a relation of desire. The contentment and solitude of the *I* are manifestations of the interiority of the *I*, the *I* that dwells within itself. This dwelling or habitation, in a curious way, involves a relation of familiarity with the Other. In the domesticity of the 'private sphere', the *I* is nurtured and made whole through its relation to the feminine Other; this is Levinas' version of the *I-Thou*. But Levinas crucially differentiates his position from that of Buber:

> Inhabitation and the intimacy of the dwelling which make the separation of the human being possible thus imply a first revelation of the Other. Thus the idea of infinity, revealed in the face, does not only *require* a separated being; the light of the face is necessary for separation. (TI 151)

Although the *I-Thou* (*je-tu*) which characterizes the relation of familiarity with the feminine Other involves, in some way, the face of the Other, it is not for Levinas a genuine dialogical relation because it remains within the domain of need and is not exclusively limited to desire.[23] The relation with the feminine Other is a relation to the other which completes the *I* and remains within its interiority. The realm of dialogue must involve the exteriority of the *I*; it must belong to the public domain of the *I-You* (*je-vous*) where there is ethical responsibility (TI 154-55).

The solitude and ipseity of the *I* is only broken through the face to face encounter with the Other. The face is "the way in which the Other presents himself, exceeding *the idea of the other in me*" (TI 50). In this way the face of the Other surpasses the idea of the other which belongs to the same. The face is expressive because through it the Other presents itself; in so doing, the Other breaks through the forms which the *I* and knowledge might superimpose on it to determine its content (TI 51, 64).[24] In expressing itself as a living presence, the face of the Other signifies itself and has meaning. This is not to say that it gives meaning, as though that meaning were already there and it were merely transmitting it; rather the face of the Other *produces* meaning through its very expression (TI 66). This spontaneous creation of meaning through expression is exclusive to the economy of desire:

> Significance does not arise because the same has needs, because he lacks something, and hence all that is susceptible of filling this lack takes on meaning. Signification is in the absolute surplus of the other with respect to the same who desires him, who desires what he does not lack, who welcomes the other across themes which the other proposes to him or receives from him, without absenting himself from the signs thus given .... The signification of beings is manifested not in the perspective of finality, but in that of

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[23] This may seem somewhat counter-intuitive; I will return to this point below.

[24] "The existent breaks through all the envelopings and generalities of Being to spread out in its 'form' the totality of its 'content', finally abolishing the distinction between form and content" (TI 51).

> language. A relation between terms that resist totalization, that absolve themselves from the relation or that specify it, is possible only as language. (TI 97)

The expression of the infinite — the alterity of the Other — must occur in language because this is the only medium adequate to such a creative signification. It is only when the Other expresses herself to me that I realize that the Other exceeds my idea of her, and it is then that my ipseity is ruptured and I am put into question (TI 195).

The interlocutor puts me into question through the meaning which she expresses. In realizing that the Other may not coincide with my idea of her, I am at once receptive to the meaning which the Other expresses (in that I have received it), and my own freedom to understand the Other as I choose is limited.

> Every recourse to words presupposes the comprehension of the primary signification, but this comprehension, before being interpreted as a 'consciousness of,' is society and obligation ... the Other faces me and puts me in question and *obliges* me by his essence qua Infinity. (TI 206-207)

The Other obliges me by disclosing my ethical responsibility not to reduce her to my idea of her. These ideas are things that I possess in my solitude; the face to face puts into question the idea of the Other that I have in my solitude, as well as that solitude itself. That the Other can put me into question in this way and call me to a responsibility suggests that the Other enjoys a certain superiority over me.[25] This is not the *I-Thou* relation characterized by intimacy and familiarity; this is a far more 'public' relation, mediated by language and justice (TI 213). The face presents the Other as vulnerable, but also as an equal, who calls me to the responsibility which I must take up before her and before society.

> The presence of the face, the infinity of the Other, is a destituteness, a presence of the third party (that is, of the whole of humanity which looks at us), and a command that commands commanding. This is why the relation with the Other, discourse, is not only the putting in question of my freedom, the appeal coming from the Other to call me to responsibility, is not only the speech by which I divest myself of the possession that encircles me by setting forth an objective and common world, but is also sermon, exhortation, the prophetic word. (TI 213)

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[25] On responsibility in Levinas, see Bernhard Waldenfels, "Response and Responsibility in Levinas," *Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, Literature and Religion*, ed. Adriaan T. Peperzak (New York: Routledge, 1995) 39-55, and César A. Moreno Marquez, "The Curvature of Intersubjective Space: Sociality and Responsibility in the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," *Morality within the Life- and Social World*, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1987) 343-52.

Through the face, a call to justice is expressed which establishes this vulnerable and destitute Other in a position of superior power and height. This Other is one who judges me, who accuses me, and who breaks into my solitude and holds me accountable (TI 215-16). This mastery of the Other derives from her exteriority, an exteriority which is not part of the *Thou* but of the *You*. This mastery is irreversible (TI 101).

The notion of encounter which Levinas develops in the idea of the face to face differs in a number of important respects from the idea of encounter that has been articulated so far. Firstly, Levinas strives to distance himself from Buber's *I-Thou*, emphasizing instead the dynamic of the *je-vous*. The *I-Thou* for Levinas remains a relation which completes the *I*. By referring to the Other in the formal and not the familiar, a distance is inserted between self and Other which is meant to accord respect to that Other. This formal address also transports the relation to the Other out of a domain of intimacy and preference to a level of universality. Not everyone can be a *Thou* to my *I*, but everyone can be a *You*. Ethics is supposed to be universal. This is why Levinas argues for the *je-vous* over the *je-tu*.[26]

Secondly, while the idea of encounter developed so far emphasizes the connection and the unity with the other, Levinas focuses much more on rupture, discontinuity, even threat and asymmetry. Levinas' thought here is far less romantic than Buber's. This is due to the differences in the key distinctions with which each works. Given that Buber distinguishes the *I-It* and the *I-Thou* on the basis of the primacy of the *I* over the primacy of the relation, it is not surprising that his thought of the *I-Thou* (and hence of dialogue) is dominated by ideas of connection and harmony. But Levinas focuses on need versus desire, on the difference between totalizing the alterity of the other versus respecting the infinitude of the other. The infinitude of the other discloses itself in the Other's breaking through my ideas of it and rupturing the continuity I establish with it by projecting a meaning upon it.[27]

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[26] On Levinas' critique of Buber, see Robert Bernasconi, "Failure of Communication as a Surplus: Dialogue and Lack of Dialogue Between Buber and Levinas," *The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other*, eds. Robert Bernasconi and David Wood (New York: Routledge, 1988) 100-35, and Philip N. Lawton, Jr., "Love and Justice: Levinas' Reading of Buber," *Philosophy Today* 20 (Spring 1976) 77-83. See also, Emmanuel Levinas, "Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge," *The Levinas Reader*, ed. Seán Hand (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1989) 59-74.

Despite these differences, Levinas' and Buber's notions of encounter display some similarities. Both aim at a relation with the other which surpasses the relation of epistemology, thus allowing the other to present itself. In this sense, both are primarily concerned with respect for the alterity of the other. Both are interested in a moment of contact between self and other: for Buber, the address; for Levinas, the expression of the face. Both see this encounter as bearing a relationship to language.

Levinas does at times refer to the face to face as a conversation, and he always refers to the importance of language. Why, then, do I consider him a thinker of encounter and not of conversation? This will become clearer once we are able to examine the notion of encounter in contrast to conversation more thoroughly in Chapter 6. For now we can say that most thinkers of conversation are interested in a reciprocity between interlocutors and a mutuality of participation which generally occurs in the form of a communicative exchange. Despite Levinas' references to conversation, the face to face seems primarily to take the form of a one-sided command from the Other toward me. It is modelled on divine command; receptivity and obeyance appear as the only response. The religious metaphor is also extremely important in Buber, but in this case the more mystical tendencies of his thought seem to prevail, which is perhaps why he conceives of the relation to God as one of intimacy and interiority (to use Levinas' term) rather than exteriority.

This brings us to another interesting disparity between Buber and Levinas. While it seems clear that Buber would include love and eroticism among dialogic encounters, Levinas seems to want to exclude these on the grounds that they display a mixture of need and desire. This may seem highly counter-intuitive to some; for many people love is the quintessential example of a dialogic relation. If we want to remain open to the possibility that love and erotic encounter are dialogical, then Levinas has in fact illustrated something very important in his analysis. In demonstrating how both desire and need (as enjoyment) are involved, he has shown that love involves intentionality. Anyone, then, who wants to maintain the dialogicality of eroticism and love cannot also maintain a distinction between dialogicality and intentionality. This casts further shadow on this distinction, and we do not need to accept Levinas' conclusion that love is undialogical in order to profit from this point.

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[27] For an interesting discussion of the relationship between Buber and Levinas on the specific issue of intentional relations with reference to dialogue, see Andrew Tallon, "Intentionality, Intersubjectivity and the Between: Buber and Levinas on Affectivity and the Dialogical Principle," *Thought* 53.210 (Sept. 1978): 292-309. Tallon argues that the passivity of the self in relation to the other which Levinas describes should be understood within the context of something like Buber's *between*.

In this chapter, I have traced the development of the notion of the dialogic encounter from Buber's *I-Thou*, through Theunissen's interpretation, to Levinas' notion of the face to face. I have also demonstrated how the concept of dialogue has been articulated relative to a distinction between intentionality and dialogue. The insights we have gained in this chapter will be brought to bear in the argument in Chapter 6.

Chapter 6

Dialogue as Encounter

The figure of dialogue as encounter emerges from the analyses of Buber, Theunissen, and Levinas in the previous chapter. We saw that this idea is captured in Buber's *I-Thou*, a mystical relation to an other marked by a reciprocity and fullness absent in the more impoverished comportment of the *I-It* with which it is contrasted. Continuing in this direction, Theunissen interprets the *I-It/I-Thou* distinction as one between intentional and dialogical modes of comportment. He adds to our understanding of the dialogic encounter by highlighting the ways in which it surpasses or transcends the *I-It*. But Theunissen ultimately is skeptical of the possibility of avoiding an interdependence between intentionality and dialogicality, and begins to question the very distinction upon which Buber's theory of dialogue seems to rest.

Levinas' work contributes to this effort in two distinct ways. First, his discussion of intentionality and his analysis of enjoyment reveal the somewhat overly reductive characterization of intentionality employed by both Buber and Theunissen. This weakens the original distinction between intentionality and dialogicality. Second, the operative distinction which Levinas uses to ground his concept of the face to face — namely the distinction between need and desire — focuses on a slightly different point than the intentionality/dialogicality distinction. Where the latter focuses on the centrality of the *I*, the former stresses the totalizing nature of the relation of need. Although there are some similarities in the problems which each account highlights, the underlying source is understood differently, thus furthering the point that a notion of the dialogic encounter does not need to be founded on a distinction between intentionality and dialogue. But Levinas' contribution here is not only destructive; his own thought of the dialogic encounter, particularly with respect to how it could be (or should be) developed beyond Buber's *I-Thou*, is also important. The idea of encounter that I will develop in this chapter must be able to accommodate the insights of both thinkers.

This chapter will consist of three primary movements. First, I will further critique the intentionality/dialogicality distinction by demonstrating that intentionality displays some dialogical aspects, and I will argue that its dialogicality may be understood in terms of conversation. Having established this, it will be necessary to develop a notion of the dialogical encounter independent of intentionality. This will be accomplished in a phenomenology of the encounter. And finally, I will consider the relationship between conversation and encounter.

i. Intentionality as conversational dialogue

Intentionality is most succinctly and directly contrasted with dialogue in *The Other*, where Theunissen isolates its three defining characteristics. Because the other always shows up as the object of an intentional act of the subject, the subject's relation to the other is always *mediated.* The object is not properly conceived as other and thus is only encountered within the confines and parameters of what is subjectively possible. Consequently, the other is placed in a position of *subordination* relative to the subject. The other 'gives' nothing in the relation; it does not participate. Although the other may 'be given' to consciousness, it does not give itself; it remains essentially passive in relation to the subject. Moreover the priority of the subject results in a *perspectivalism* centered around the *I* which devalues the importance of the relation to the other.

Theunissen contrasts this with the dialogical model, which he distinguishes in the following ways. Firstly, the other is encountered *as such.* That is to say, the other is encountered in its entirety as an other. It is not assimilated into the epistemological structures of the encountering self; it is not reduced to an object of experience. Its otherness is preserved. Moreover the other's integrity is preserved in so far as it is encountered in the wholeness of its being qua other. This is what is meant by saying that the other is encountered *immediately*; its otherness is not assimilated to the meaning structures of the encountering self. The immediate encounter with the other allows us to encounter it in the wholeness of its presence.

This encounter with the other is *mutual and reciprocal* in the sense that the encounter is not something willed by the self. The self can attempt to remain open to the other, but part of the dialogicality of the encounter resides in the experience of the other 'coming over' to the self. In the encounter, one is approached by the other. The participation of the other is significant, as is the readiness, willingness, and openness of the self to being approached. This is what Buber refers to as the union of grace and will.

Finally, the perspectives of both self and other are given up in favor of *the between*. *The between* is more originary than either self or other taken separately. *The between* is the unity from whence our sense of each of them singly is derived. Thus, any priority of the *I* over the *Thou* is renounced and supplanted with the notion that the *I* only really exists in relation to the *Thou*.

This is an **encounter** notion of dialogue, so called because of its emphasis on the encounter between self and other out of which each arises as separate. However, it would be misleading to maintain that any other model of relationality is consequently undialogical.[1] In Chapter 4, I elaborated a conversational mode of dialogue which, although distinct from this notion of encounter, appears nonetheless to be dialogical. I will argue that, in fact, intentionality can be characterized as dialogue *in terms of conversation*. By doing so, I will demonstrate that intentionality is not actually undialogical in any absolute sense, it only appears undialogical if encounter is taken to be the sole figure that dialogue can assume.

As I noted in the section on Levinas in Chapter 5, in order to heighten the contrast with the dialogic encounter, Theunissen and Buber give a somewhat exaggerated characterization of intentionality. Levinas distinguishes between two kinds of intentionality: a more traditional and reductive intentionality of representation, and a phenomenological intentionality which includes sensation. By means of this distinction, it becomes clear that Buber and Theunissen are criticizing the former. The primary feature of the representational model — which focuses on perception at the expense of sensation (or perhaps conflates the two) — is the centrality of the subject. This centrality results in both a subordination of the other and a relation to the other which is not immediate. Buber and Theunissen object to these two features. However, perception and sensation are distinct; unlike representational theories, phenomenological intentionality attends to this difference. Perception primarily suggests that the object rests passively in a position over and against the subject who actively apprehends it, and the features described above follow from this assumption. However, sensation emphasizes the extent to which the subject is affected by the object. In sensation, the movement which is experienced comes from the object towards the subject. The subordination of the other and the centrality of the *I* are blurred here. It is via sensation that the object gives itself to the subject as meaningful, and not just meaningful as an *in-order-to*, but also meaningful in the sense of being enjoyable and fulfilling.

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[1] Such a claim seems to be implied by Buber's and Theunissen's positions.

Levinas' discussion of the intentionality of enjoyment demonstrates the importance of sensation, but we should not understand this as his own peculiar understanding of intentionality. Heidegger's discussion of intentionality, which I examined at some length in Part I, also emphasizes sensation. He stresses the importance of categorial intuition and of the *a priori* which are operative in intentionality. Although Heidegger does not use the term 'sensation' himself, he clearly believes that objects have meaning not solely because of what the subject projects upon them; objects *appear* as *already* meaningful. Heidegger insists that phenomena *manifest themselves* in their Being; their meaning is experienced as objectively given, not subjectively superimposed upon them. This objectivity is central to Heidegger's phenomenological position; thus his understanding of intentionality also evades Buber's and Theunissen's critique.

Let us review the terms of conversation as discussed in Chapter 4. A conversation is an exchange between participants in which some meaning is communicated. There is a reciprocity, in that each participant communicates something to the other in response to what has previously been given; this reciprocity generates a flow of meaning between the participants. Meaning not only 'goes back and forth' between them, but through the exchange a thematic unity emerges. The thematic unity is the subject of the exchange and acts as a third term around which the participants orient themselves. Finally, in order for this kind of interaction to be possible, the participants must be open and receptive to that which is communicated to them. It is important to keep in mind throughout our discussion that sensation and being-affected belong to intentionality; they play a role in how meaning is communicated to the subject from the object. Sensation and being affected are part of the experience of intentional subjectivity; on these grounds, we can expand the notion of conversation beyond a purely linguistic, interhuman domain to provide a dialogical understanding of intentionality in general.

The intentional self is essentially related to its intentional object; subjectivity lies in this intentional relatedness. Even though the other may be an object for the subject, it still brings something to the relation. The other is never a mere object. By virtue of its being as a phenomenon, the object discloses itself to us as endowed with meaning; this meaning is established with reference to the world in which the object is disclosed. It is inappropriate to characterize the subject as purely active and the object as purely passive. The object's 'giving' itself — and our receiving of what is given through sensation — establishes the engagement with the object as reciprocal, although perhaps still asymmetrical.[2] This traffic of meaning between subject and object is a flow which, over time, generally results in a consistency and continuity of the object's disclosure, and hence, of my apprehension of the object. The meaning which I understand the object to have, based upon this consistency and continuity, constitutes the thematic unity of the intentional interaction. All of this depends upon the openness of the subject to the object, the subject's ability to be affected by the object, to receive the meaning that the object gives.[3]

It is also important to see how the constellation of dialogical concepts figures here. Firstly, the relation to the object is a relation to an other. Our everyday comportment at once recognizes and overlooks this otherness. I recognize it in the trivial sense in that I know that the object is distinct from and discontinuous with me, but in so far as I understand the meaning which the object gives, I tend to overlook this discontinuity and alterity and instead comport toward the object in its familiarity. This.

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[2] On the compatibility of reciprocity and mutuality with asymmetry see Markovà and Foppa, eds.. *Asymmetries in Dialogue.*

[3] I am not suggesting a reversal of the traditional association of activity with the subject and passivity with the object. Of course, the disclosure of intentional objects is also partly related to the activity of the subject. but I am trying to emphasize that subjectivity is distinctively marked by a certain passivity as well which is not opposed to it, but part of it.

in effect, represents a focusing of attention on my continuity with the object which derives from the fact that I understand its meaning. However, whenever I do not understand the object's meaning, or when the object presents itself as recalcitrant and opaque, its alterity and my discontinuity with it are brought out more sharply. In so far as I receive the meaning which the object gives and orient myself accordingly, I respond to the object; this illustrates my responsibility. This responsibility points to a questionability, which lies in the fact that the object presents itself to me in such a way that I must take heed of it and orient myself relative to it. In particular if we consider Levinas' concept of enjoyment and nourishment, we can see the sense in which I receive as much from the object as I actively take, and being able to receive implies an openness and a flow between the two participants.

The constellation of dialogical concepts present in intentionality is easier to see when we substitute a human other for the object other in the object pole of the relation. One can clearly have a conversation with someone which does not display the features of the encounter model, but which would still qualify as dialogical. Even in impoverished conversations, in which I am talking *to* someone as opposed to talking *with* someone, I must be attentive to my listener in my utterances so that I can be understood.[4]

If it is possible to construe intentionality in dialogical terms, particularly those associated with conversation, then we must clarify the sense in which the dialogicality generally contrasted with intentionality can be called dialogical. I propose that the dialogue which Theunissen and Buber, in particular, contrast with intentionality is really only one mode of dialogicality, the encounter mode.

ii. The phenomenology of the encounter

In order to liberate our notion of encounter from an ill-conceived contrast with intentionality, we need to recast it in original terms. What is an encounter? If we consider the three forms that the *I-Thou* can take in Buber, it is evident that he is trying to describe what could be characterized as an aesthetic, erotic, or spiritual encounter.[5] Although I do not want to bias our discussion by considering only these, it is worth reflecting upon such cases in some detail in order to help describe the phenomenon with which we are dealing in all of its richness. Let us begin with an aesthetic encounter, or what we would perhaps more commonly call the aesthetic experience. The aesthetic engagement with a work surpasses merely viewing visual art or listening to something that belongs to an aural medium. In an aesthetic experience, one is absorbed into the work, surrounded by it, transported elsewhere. One is affected by the work in such a way that one's confrontation with it provokes a certain loss of self in the communion with it. This meeting, the aesthetic encounter, is deeply significant; indeed, it is what we refer to when we say that a work 'speaks to me'. But it is difficult to express what the work gives us to understand: it goes beyond language. Similarly, the significance of the work outstrips the actual material of the work — the paint, the wood, the notes. Thus, in a peculiar way, the work is more than what it is; it is this somewhat ineffable 'more' to which we are drawn and which captivates us.

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[4] Recall the case of monologue (which would be the most extreme case) discussed in Chapter 4.

This is similar in the case of the erotic encounter. As Levinas has quite astutely pointed out, what makes something erotic is the extent to which that something presents itself as a mystery. It is precisely in that mystery that the allure lies. That which is hidden and withdraws, yet shows itself in that withdrawal, is what fascinates and entices. The erotic encounter — which I will here assume occurs between two people, although it need not — is marked by a heightened sensibility and absorption which amounts to a relinquishing of self, a self-abandonment that gives rise to a particular affective, emotive immediacy with respect to one's being-there and being-with this other. Although in an erotic encounter one is generally spatially close to the other, the intimacy involved is not merely spatial, but involves sensibility and affectivity; it is sensuous and passionate. One becomes absorbed in the other, in the form and the surfaces of the other which conceal the personality, the spirit, the being of the person which we know is somehow concealed within, inaccessible to touch, hidden. The withdrawal of the other draws attention to the strangeness of the body — the medium of the interaction — and also to the paradoxical distance of the other. In eroticism, I give myself up to the encounter with the other, I am enveloped in an almost timeless intimacy and proximity. But this intimacy is still always marked by a hint of tragedy, a distance which can never be overcome, a union of spirit that is impossible, a desire that is insatiable.

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[5] For an insightful discussion of the relationship between eroticism and spirituality see Bataille, *Erotism*.

Many of the same features can also be identified in the spiritual or mystical encounter. In this case, what fascinates us and draws us out of ourselves is the mystery of the *wholly* other, which can be characterized as God, Being, the universe, spirit, nature, or even death. What envelops us is an awe and wonder at the who, what, or why which lies beyond all that surrounds us, and shows itself in its withdrawal through those surroundings. This mystery is one to which we can draw near in a mystical spirituality, but which can never entirely be disclosed — again, a distance that can never be overcome. The paradox of proximity and distance is here reiterated. In the spiritual encounter, I am transported beyond myself in the beholding of the mystery, but that beholding also floods me, giving rise to an affective immediacy of experience with respect to my situatedness. This experience can give rise to a fascination with the world (let us say the natural world) akin to the fascination with the body in the erotic encounter. Such a fascination could amount to a type of pantheism that would resemble Buber's description of the encounter with nature in the *I-Thou*. In a more religious context, one might say that one beholds the divine in its withdrawal in the ethereal, hypnotic strains of chanting, in the beauty of light streaming through a stained-glass window to penetrate the cavernous half-light of a Gothic cathedral, or in the massiveness of the stone temple which brings together sky and earth. There is something about the hush which surrounds holy places or religious sites which is an explicit concealing of mystery in silence. It is with this hush, this form of concealment, that we can also become fascinated. The awe-ful contemplation of these phenomena gives rise to a transportation beyond the self, an approaching of the divine, but of course, never a fusion with it.

What is particularly striking about the spiritual encounter is the sheer absence of the presence with which one is confronted. A similar presence is intimated in the aesthetic and erotic encounters as well, but in those cases the other retains a materiality which at once reveals and conceals. In the spiritual encounter, this material component is generally absent, accentuating the supersensuous aspect of the heightened affectivity and sensibility involved in all three cases.

If there is one word to characterize all of these types of encounter, it is **ecstasy**.[6] In ecstasy — be it aesthetic, erotic, or spiritual — one is carried outside of oneself, beyond one's self towards that other which entices in its withdrawal. Ecstasy is ec-static; it is a shattering of the stasis, solidity, and solipsistic unity of the self. The boundaries of the self are ruptured; one is flooded by the other while also surging outward to meet it. Ecstatic intimacy is highly ambivalent with respect to proximity to and distance from the other. On the one hand, the ecstatic convergence with the other gives rise to an immediacy and intimacy with respect to the other which constitutes a sort of continuity. We become intimately absorbed in the dynamism of our engagement with the other and with our own existence (which might itself be characterized as an ongoing relation to what is other). On the other hand, unity with the other is never achieved; the other always remains other, hidden, withdrawn; it intimates itself in our very intimacy. In so far as the gap between self and other is never definitively traversed, the yearning remains a longing for the other and thus marks our discontinuity with that other. Significantly, this discontinuity does not imply that the other is absent. The other is there, close, yet separated by an insurmountable distance: therein lies the tragedy and the unquenchability of the desire.

The previous discussion may seem to have a greater resemblance to Buber's thought of encounter than to that of Levinas, but this is not the case. The ecstasy described is precisely the kind of movement which belongs to metaphysical desire; the withdrawal of the Other is exactly what Levinas refers to when he speaks of the infinity of the Other. If Levinas stresses the rupturing of the solitude of the self in the face to face, this should not be understood as contrary to ecstasy, but rather as an important component of it. Although ecstasy is most commonly described as a joyful, exuberant transporting of oneself beyond oneself toward the Other, this very surging forward is a breaking with the surpassed self; it involves violence and destruction, or at the very least, a disruption of the stasis of the self. It is agony. Such is the very meaning of the ec-static.[7] It would be inappropriate to limit the realm of ecstatic, dialogic encounter to friendly or amorous encounters. There is a confrontational and destructive strain in ecstasy as well, and thus hostile encounters should also be included.

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[6] On ecstasy, see John Sallis, *Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, trans. Clifton P. Fadiman (New York: Dover, 1995); David Farrell Krell, *Intimations of Mortality: Time, Truth and Finitude in Heidegger's Thinking of Being* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986) 54-58; and Bataille, *Erotism* im passim.

The encounter has the double sense of being both a meeting and a countering,[8] which is related to the double sense of ecstasy as exuberant joining and tragic rending. As a meeting, the encounter is the mutual coming together of two participants who recognize one another significantly; they do not simply pass each other without one or the other noticing; there is a moment wherein their very presences touch or address one another. This address contains a specificity, in that we find ourselves to be addressed directly, singled out, chosen. In the encounter, then, one finds oneself 'face-to-face', as it were, with the other. From this feature we derive the sense of encounter as a countering. To be countered is to find oneself arrested in motion by something that presents itself as a limit, even an obstacle, something which cannot merely be circumvented but which must be reckoned with; it presents a challenge to us and demands a response.

How is this double sense of encounter related to ecstasy or ecstatic movement? It pertains to the dimensions of continuity and discontinuity which characterize ecstasy. The encounter is the point of convergence/divergence wherein one both meets the other, and falls away from it in the recoil of the countering. In ecstatic movement, one similarly surges out to meet the other — to become continuous with the other — but also always falls back, rebuffed by the barrier of impenetrability which preserves the discontinuity between self and other. The moment of encounter is in the hanging or lingering between these movements. Both ecstasy and encounter share this fundamental ambiguity of proximity and distance, and thus are closely connected.

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[7] This idea is developed by Freud in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* in relation to the death drive and the drive for pleasure, and also in Bataille's insight that erotic ecstasy involves a desire for self-annihilation. See Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1961); Bataille, *Erotism*.

[8] This is also captured nicely in the German '*Begegnung*', which means a meeting but also contains the root '*gegen*' — 'against'.

The encounter is always an *event* of meeting between participants or a countering of participants, as opposed to a static relationship. One experiences this event as a transportation beyond oneself into the realm of immediacy. In the event, the participants find themselves 'countered' by one another, face-to-face. That is to say, the other appears on my horizon and presents itself to me as the figure behind which something unknowable recedes. The face of the other is a limit, resistant, opaque, and impenetrable. It is in this way that the other is encountered in its alterity. Moreover, in meeting the other I feel myself intercepted on my trajectory, brought to a pause; we might even say captivated. The encounter has the peculiar feature of a **simultaneity** of presence of self and other which manifests itself as this face to face: we are both *there*. This simultaneity is effected through a mutual **coming together**: our paths cross and the encounter occurs at the point where they intersect, where we are 'present' to one another. This being 'present' to one another is the event. However, in so far as we are resistant to one another (in our irresistibility!), we are impenetrable to each other. Thus, we rest close to each other, unable to assimilate ourselves to one another. Nothing lies between us to separate us, yet we are distinct. Nothing prevents us from merging except our very difference. This no-thingness which separates us, yet binds us in a proximity of deep connection, is ***the between***. It is highly meaningful, although it eludes expression. The encounter depends upon an **openness** in the face of the resistance, opacity, and impenetrability presented by the other. Our openness is revealed in that we find ourselves carried away, overwhelmed, flooded over by the other, absorbed in a fascination with it. It is an openness to what withdraws, to what resists us. In this sense, it is also an openness to being challenged, to embracing that resistance and lingering before it, to not turning away because our will has been thwarted but remaining face-to-face with the other. It is an openness to retaining that proximity, allowing ourselves to offer resistance back to the other and to participate in the encounter.[9]

The orientation between self and other which characterizes the encounter, then, consists of these features of simultaneity, coming together, *the between*, and openness. These mark the orientational axes of temporality, spatiality, and significance in terms of which the encounter occurs, much in the way that reciprocity, flow, thematic unity, and openness do for conversation. The features of simultaneity and coming together imply a spatio-temporal suddenness; there is an instant in which both participants are there, engaged with one another. While simultaneity emphasizes this sense along more temporal lines, the coming together stresses it in more spatial terms. *The between* is the "space" between the participants which binds them in a closeness. It orients them relative to one another, places them face-to-face with one another, but also is re-established and re-created through their interaction. Finally, just as with openness in the case of conversation, openness in encounter points to a general attitude of not being closed off to the other.[10]

Although the orientational lines reveal some formal connection between conversation and encounter, what is most striking so far is their difference. In what way, then, does encounter resemble conversation such that it too can be considered dialogical? This can be shown with reference to the constellation of dialogical concepts articulated earlier. In an encounter I meet the other but also experience the resistance of the other. This resistance pertains to the other's independence and its inassimilability; the other does not succumb to my appropriating grasp. The recalcitrance of the other lies not so much in the will of the other as in its sheer **alterity**. This is what Buber means when he says that the other becomes present in 'the wholeness of its Being'. He does not mean to suggest that the other emerges completely into presence and is grasped in its totality, so that nothing remains that recedes, withdraws, or remains hidden or mysterious. Rather, Buber means that the other emerges in a holistic way, as having an integrity, or exhibiting a harmony. Despite this (or perhaps because of this) the other still remains inaccessible, silent, and mysterious. Something remains concealed. Therein lies the profundity of its alterity.

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[9] Thus, one aspect of openness is not fleeing in the face of the encounter, not fleeing in the face of the challenge. However, it should not be thought that if fleeing does occur it indicates a closedness. The openness noted in the first instance is still operative. We could not flee in the face of a challenge unless we were antecedently open to the challenge in the first place, which allowed us to experience 'being-challenged'.

[10] These axes of orientation, though correlated with these structural features of dialogic engagement, are not exhausted by them. I will discuss these axes in greater detail below (II.6.iii).

I experience the otherness of the other and its inassimilability as a limit which marks my **discontinuity** with the other. There is something about the other which withdraws behind what it presents to me; this is the infinity of the other. The other is beyond my reach, exterior to me. When I find myself countered by the other and experience the gap between us, I also experience myself as limited, as subjected to something beyond myself.

Discontinuity with the other is precisely what fascinates me and draws me toward it. In ecstasy, a **continuity** with the other is sought in the surpassing of oneself. In striving to overcome this discontinuity, I struggle to achieve a greater immediacy and intimacy with the other. However, it is impossible to merge with the other in a true union; I must instead settle for the brief moment of continuity which lies in the moment of contact in the encounter, the moment where I find myself both meeting and countering/being countered by the other. The resistance which I face is not an indeterminate thing which might be an obstacle for anyone; it is specifically for me. The other emerges out of the world and imposes itself in my path, addressing me, challenging me, requiring my hesitation and attention. The other meets *me*. The specificity of the encounter establishes a peculiar bond between us in which the continuity between self and other seems to be heightened.

This immediacy between myself and the other in which our tragic continuity resides (tragic because of the ineradicable discontinuity which marks it) is deeply significant and is important to the meaning which binds us and in terms of which my responsibility to the other can be understood. In so far as the alterity which counters me has specifically addressed me and singled me out, I am specifically called upon to respond to it, to respond to the challenge which it presents. In this way, I am called into an engagement with the other, called into the lingering which prolongs the encounter.

My openness to such a challenge constitutes my **responsibility**. This responsibility can also be ethical: in challenging me, the other can call me to account, to justify myself before humanity. But the call does not have to be harsh, and my responsibility does not have to be in the face of a threat. It can also be the responsibility to protect the other in the face of its vulnerability. Or it can be an ability to respond to the welcome and allure of the other, to respond to the call that the other issues and which draws me hither, enticing me. My ability to respond to the appeal of the other is my responsibility.

My responsibility simultaneously reveals my **questionability**, for I can only feel compelled to respond if I feel that I have in some way been questioned, challenged, or appealed to. When the other challenges me through countering me, it discloses my own vulnerability and puts my own being into question. In the face of this, I must respond. It is because of our mutual discontinuity that I can be questioned: there would be no need for the other to question me if we were transparent to one another. In this sense, the challenge which comes from the other may well be invoked by my own questionability, by the fact that I too present myself to the other (in this case the human other) as a mystery. Through the other's questioning, my own questionability is revealed to me.

The questionability and responsibility that the challenge of the other discloses reveal at once our continuity and discontinuity with each other. Our discontinuity grounds the questioning which necessitates the response; but I would not understand the question that the countering presence of the other asks me, nor would I feel compelled to respond to it, if a certain continuity did not exist between us. The challenge of the other also introduces a discontinuity into myself, through the rupture of self which it provokes. In challenging me, the other throws my being into question, and, in effect, disrupts the continuity of that being. The question of the other can change or challenge my self-understanding, which can result in a certain self-othering. This demonstrates the extent to which my sense of who I am is bolstered through the approval or affirmation of the other and how disorienting a challenge from the other can be. In aspiring to a continuity with the other, one becomes discontinuous with oneself. In the absorption and fascination with the other, one loses oneself. This forgetfulness of self occurs when one is overwhelmed and carried away by the rapture of the encounter. Although this particular self-othering seems to involve a loss of meaning, the introduction of a discontinuity with one's 'everyday' self actually opens up the space for another kind of meaning — one which lies in the immediacy of the bond permitted by the ecstatic rupture.

Were we not discontinuous with the other, we would not find the moment of continuity in the encounter to be so significant. It is here that we find *the between*, that feature of the encounter which is associated with **meaning**. *The between* is the meaningful bond which is born of the encounter and which defines the participants relative to one another. *The between* unites the participants in their difference. The *I-Thou*, for example, is the relation which gives shape to the *I* and *Thou* as distinct, for they could not be *I* or *Thou* independent of their relation to one another. This relation — although primary — does not collapse the distinction between *I* and *Thou*, but rather preserves their difference. In the encounter, then, this primary relation is forged in that ecstatic moment where continuity is so ephemerally achieved; it is this relation which is seen as meaningful and which subsequently discloses the significance of the participants as they stand in relation to one another.

The significance of the encounter usually outstrips linguistic expression, occurring in silence. But this silence is not meaningless; it is meaningful because of its very immediacy, because of the profundity and intimacy of giving oneself over to the other, and the tragedy of the insurmountable gap between self and other. Meaning lies in the very lingering before the withdrawal, hiddenness, and mystery of the other. This kind of meaning belongs to secrecy, never uttered, but deeply cherished, and it is the meaning born of the encounter. It brings us and holds us in a proximity with an ineffable other. Both *the between* and the significance it holds for those it envelops are produced through the dialogic encounter.

In the communication, or better communion, which belongs to the dialogic encounter, something is given to me to understand; this is partly the challenge and appeal which the other presents to me. In order for me to understand that the presentation of the other is directed at me, we must possess some shared background of meaning. The alterity and discontinuity of the other who withdraws and recedes from my grasp is also meaningfully conveyed to me. The medium through which it is conveyed is generally extra-linguistic. The expression of the other manifests itself through an exteriority which conceals a hidden interiority. This is most obvious in the realm of the interhuman where we find ourselves in the realm of meaningful glances and gazes, caresses, touching, holding, beholding, and so on. Such gestures toward the other are extremely meaningful, significant, and often, far more powerful than words; they would lose much of their potency if they were mediated by language. As expressions of feeling, emotion, and mood, the gestures of encounter are not reducible to rational-linguistic discourse. The gestures between participants do not mean anything apart from what they are.

To ask what a caress means is already to fail to understand its significance. Moreover, these gestures — these 'pure' expressions — contribute to the passion which exists between the participants which also, in a sense, cannot be expressed linguistically. This can also be said to be true in the case of the aesthetic encounter. Through the physicality of the work, something is conveyed that transcends the work as thing. The work's exteriority expresses something which withdraws or recedes behind its materiality. A similar case could no doubt be made for the spiritual encounter: the mystery of radical alterity must show itself through something, and the medium of its manifestation is one which conceals, as much as it reveals, the other. The meaning of the other, expressed extra-linguistically, lies not in any analyzable content of the expression (as in conversation), but inheres in the very act of expressing.[11] These expressions and gestures are the silent or symbolic manifestations of meaning, communicated in the encounter such that the intimacy and immediacy of *the between* — and the meaning that lies therein — are established.

Buber's notion of encounter highlights the continuity, immediacy, and proximity with the other as being deeply meaningful and important for an appreciation of the alterity of the other. In contrast, Levinas emphasizes aspects of discontinuity, separation, and distance as being necessary for a true respect for the other. I have tried to incorporate both aspects through the double sense of encounter and ecstasy because I believe both are necessary for the dynamics which are constitutive of dialogical engagement.

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[11] This is not unlike Levinas' notion of expression in TI or his distinction between the saying and the said. See Emmanuel Levinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981).

iii. Thinking conversation and encounter together

The foregoing analysis has illustrated that encounter involves the interplay of the same dialogical concepts manifested in conversation. Dialogue, regardless of the form, involves a relation to **alterity** which presents itself as *that which withdraws*. Concrete others are never reducible to the figure they present to us. The point of interaction between us is this figure, or facade, through which an absence expresses itself to us. The surface of the other is what is present, but there is always a sense in which we realize that something lies beyond that surface, an absence which is made present by it, an alterity that withdraws behind it. This is not only characteristic of encounter, but also underlies conversational dialogue. In conversation our implicit recognition of the alterity of the other shows itself in our very communicating. If the other *were not other*, we would not need to communicate, and miscommunication would not be possible. The alterity of the other marks our mutual **discontinuity** with one another. It is this discontinuity which necessitates and draws us into an interaction with the other in both conversation and encounter; it shows itself whenever the opacity or resistance of the other is disclosed, often announcing itself through a challenge or appeal which singles me out in the manner of a personal address.

This challenge, the alterity of the other and its resistance to being assimilated to the same, give rise to our **responsibility** and answerability. In conversation I find that I cannot ignore a direct question: I cannot ignore my being addressed and I find it necessary to reply. I find myself similarly challenged in the encounter, captured in the web of the other and required to respond or explain myself. That I find myself responding reveals my **questionability**, my ability to be questioned by the other in conversation or to have my Being thrown into question by the resistance of the other in encounter. Although my discussion of responsibility and questionability has so far tended to focus on the way in which I am able to respond to the questions which the other poses, we must not forget the reciprocality of this ability. That is, the other questions me, but I too am able to question the other, to ask it to clarify something that it has elusively given to understand or partially disclosed. Consequently, the challenges and appeals involved in dialogue do not always or even primarily take the form of accusations from the other in the face of which I must defend myself. The very questionability of the other can necessitate that — in response to something the other has given me to understand — I pose a question which challenges the other. Sometimes my responsibility entails not only justifying myself, but also holding the other accountable.[12]

The features of responsibility and questionability, which are possible on the basis of my discontinuity with the other, also point to our **continuity**. There must be a relation between us and a shared background of understanding — however minimal — for us to be able to respond to and question one another, and to feel the need to do so. That I pursue this relation with the other suggests that I seek a continuity with the other; I reach out to the other in order to try to overcome the discontinuity through which my being becomes questionable and through which misunderstanding becomes a possibility. This gap, however, can never be entirely closed. Part of what binds me to the other — and what I seek through dialogic engagement with the other, be it conversation or encounter — is **meaning**. Meaning is the cement that holds us together. It is both the medium and the product of dialogue, and it is that upon which our continuity is based. But the continuity grounded in a meaning shared between participants is not only sustained through dialogue, but also eroded or destroyed by it. This occurs when our mutual discontinuity resurfaces and ruptures the plane of what is shared in dialogue.

Dialogue, whether as conversation or encounter, is a relation to the other through which meaning is founded — even if that meaning is the destruction of some previous meaning. The other is discontinuous with me because it is other, yet in so far as I bear a relation to it, it is brought into a proximity with me. This proximity takes on meaning and so establishes a continuity, albeit one which is never complete or final. The play between proximity and distance which derives from our paradoxical continuity and discontinuity underlies the approach and withdrawal of the questionability and responsibility I have discussed here.

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[12] This is an aspect of responsibility which is absent in Levinas' discussion.

In general, conversation is associated with continuity and shared meaning, while encounter is associated with alterity and responsibility. But I have argued that both notions rely upon the same basic dialogical concepts; and although they may seem quite different from one another, at a foundational level they bear significant resemblance to one another. If that is so, how can the differences in the structural/orientational features of their respective situations be explained? I will demonstrate that the orientational axes of spatiality, temporality, and significance — as well as the more general attitude of openness — are the key to understanding the relationship between these two figures of dialogue.

Let us recall briefly that the features of dialogue as conversation are: the **flow** of the exchange; the **reciprocity** between the participants; a **thematic unity** which binds those participants and which is the subject of the dialogue; and an **openness** in both the direction and development of the dialogue, and on the part of the participants toward one another. Dialogue as encounter is characterized by a slightly different set of features: a **coming together** of the participants; a **simultaneity** of the presence of the participants; ***the between*** which binds them together; and an **openness** or receptivity to the otherness of the other.

In conversation, the participation is reciprocal; it manifests itself as 'turn-taking'. Each participant is speaker and listener by turns, and each reciprocates the participation of the other, responding to what came before and expecting that response to be responded to in turn. It is in this way that the participants are involved with one another. In encounter, the participation is simultaneous. Rather than taking turns, the participants act *at the same moment*; this brings them before one another, face-to-face. Because both have acted simultaneously, the roles of speaker and listener remain unclear. Both challenge one another at the same time, and so, there is a hesitation ... who should respond first? Who has challenged first? There is a moment where activity is suspended. Because dialogue is always an interaction with alterity, it is never reducible to one voice;

there is always more than one voice participating.[13] The reciprocity of conversation and the simultaneity of encounter, then, both refer to the involvement and **participation** of those who engage in the dialogue.

What primarily distinguishes these is the temporality of participation — whether these voices follow one another in succession, or whether they occur in an instant, simultaneously. Because there is a succession of voices in conversation, this figure of dialogue has temporal duration: thus we would say that it 'takes time' or occurs 'in time'. Yet, although the dialogue has a certain linearity, it also transcends that linearity. Within the context of the conversational interaction itself, references can be made to events which are past or future, and these then figure meaningfully in the dialogue. In the encounter, however, the participation is simultaneous, compressed into a moment which is fleeting and lacks duration. However, the dialogic encounter is often also experienced by the participants as having a certain timelessness. In the absorption with the other, one loses one's sense of time passing. Perhaps the most striking aspect of the temporality of the encounter is the sense in which encounter seems to transcend time altogether and partake of eternity. Time consciousness is lost in the encounter; one could say that it is almost as though time stands still; the encounter is a suspension of time. It may thus be appropriate to speak of the encounter as being transcendent of ordinary time-consciousness; as such, the temporality of encounter implies a bracketing or suspending of the temporality of conversation.

In the exchange of conversation, the reciprocity of participation is a give-and-take, a back-and-forth, which takes the structure of question and response. This is the feature of flow — something moves between participants, something is transmitted. In encounter, there is simultaneous participation which results in a coming together. In the ecstatic surging forward, one is met, limited, or countered by the other. In both cases, what is at issue is the type of **movement** suggested by the participation. The dynamism of the interaction is constituted by a metaphorical approaching and withdrawing of participants with respect to each other, which may manifest itself in intentional directedness, sensation, utterance, or physical rapprochement. This dynamic interaction is possible because of the way in which the participants are able to transcend (or 'other') themselves in surging toward the other, and to challenge and resist one another. In the flow of conversation, the movement resembles a ball in a tennis game. In encounter, the movement is a collision in which the participants come together and linger in the moment of meeting — movement is then in fact temporarily suspended.

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[13] Although each voice need not refer to a distinct physical body (as in monologue).

Movement certainly has a spatial component, and the idea that participation in dialogue involves the movement or transmission of meaning between oneself and another suggests spatial locatedness. This locatedness is both one of proximity — in the sense that these participants are both there, spatially oriented toward one another in a situation — and one of distance — in that there is some distance to be traversed, some contact to be sought, through their interaction. Proximity and distance are related to the continuity and discontinuity which characterize dialogue. What distinguishes conversation and encounter is partly the way in which the temporality of the engagement either elongates or compresses the interaction such that the movement between participants manifests itself as either a reciprocity or a simultaneity. But conversation and encounter are also distinguished by how the distances are traversed. In the flow of conversation, a certain distance is preserved between the participants; with each expression that one or the other makes, that distance must be traversed. This is why the movement is a flow back and forth. In the encounter, the distance seems to be overcome in so far as the engagement brings the participants together into an immediacy and intimacy, a greater proximity, a simultaneity of presence. They meet one another in more than just the mediated way suggested by the flow of conversation. In this sense, then, the coming together represents a collapse of the distance which is maintained in the flow. The coming together may be construed as a surpassing or transcending of that distance in the ecstatic movement of the encounter.

It is important to see that spatiality is an important aspect of the dialogic situation; without it, there would be no place for dialogue to unfold. The participants must be oriented spatially with respect to one another, face-to-face. They must also be somewhat similarly situated: that is, their locatedness in a common situation provides the point of departure for their interaction, and at least part of this common baseline must be spatial. All dialogic engagement has an environment, a context. Spatiality, perhaps more than temporality, acts primarily as a background for the interaction. The more intense the interaction, the more one's attention is absorbed by the participation — as opposed to the space wherein it occurs — to the point that one can lose awareness of one's surroundings in much the way that one loses awareness of the passage of time. It is perhaps when the awareness of distance is bracketed that the immediacy of the coming together can be effected.

The thematic unity is what a conversation is about. It is the 'third thing' around which the dialogue turns and which is produced through the contributions of the participants. It guides their involvement but is also guided by them. The analogous feature in encounter is *the between* which envelops both participants, drawing them together. It is both the bond and that which strengthens the bond. It is an affective intimacy which is the product of the encounter and sustains the relation with the other, and it is always deeply significant. Both the thematic unity and *the between* can be understood as the *in-between*, that region which lies between the participants and which binds them. The *in-between* is the product of dialogue, the shared understanding of meaning which is generated by the dialogue and which envelops and orients the participants in it. As a structural feature of dialogue overall, the *in-between* pertains to the simultaneous continuity and discontinuity of self and other; it is what brings them together and serves as the ground upon which continuity is sought, as well as what maintains them in their orientation relative to one another as self and other, thus preserving their discontinuity.

The *in-between* reflects an orientation between participants relative to meaning and significance. In conversation, the participants communicate with each other by drawing upon a shared background of meaning. Because it is independent of their particular interaction, this background of meaning has a somewhat objective and determinate character; it is largely because of this objectivity that the participants are able to understand one another. The terms in which the expression of the participants occurs influences the terms in which the thematic unity emerges, and thus its meaning will share in this objectivity. For this reason, the thematic unity of conversation is able, in a sense, to persist beyond that particular interaction; it can become part of the background, it can be communicated to others. This kind of objectivity is not typically a feature of the meaningfulness of *the between* of the encounter. In this case what lies between the participants does not derive its meaning from a shared, objective background. Instead its meaningfulness lies in the particularity of the expression to the other through which a bond is established and sustained. These expressions are significant in themselves without reference to some larger objective realm of meaning which helps to mediate the interaction of the participants. The meaningfulness of *the between* in encounter eludes expression in the terms which suffice for capturing the meaningfulness of thematic unity in conversation. In this sense, then, the meaning which is produced in the encounter could be said to be a meaning beyond objective meaning.

The *in-between* is an indication of what may be a somewhat broader orientation on the part of the participants relative to significance and meaning. Specifically, the *in-between* refers to the 'product' of dialogue, the significance which results from the interaction and around which the participants orient themselves in the course of the interaction. But, for this interaction to be possible, there must also be some antecedent orientation toward one another along lines of significance. There must be some minimally shared background of meaning (objective or otherwise), and there must be some desire to engage with the other. That is, there must be some common orientation toward one another and toward the interaction itself.

Participation, movement, and the *in-between* highlight distinct features of the orientation which participants must bear toward one another in the dialogic situation. Their situatedness relative to one another manifests itself along lines of temporality, spatiality, and significance. But there is also a fourth feature — a general **openness** in the disposition and attitude of the participants toward each other. In both conversation and encounter, the participants are receptive to the approach of the other, as evidenced by the responsibility and questionability which are apparent in both modes. This attitude of openness on the part of the participants contributes to the open-endedness of the engagement. This is most clearly seen in conversation where the interaction can continue almost indefinitely, as long as the participants continue to be open to one another. There is a similar open-endedness in the encounter in that an encounter is much like a pregnant moment of lingering; this moment can be stretched and it is unclear when it will be broken. It is, however, the openness and receptivity of the participants which is most important here.

This analysis illustrates that we can reconcile the differences between the structural features of the situations of conversation and encounter through the orientational axes of temporality, spatiality, and significance, and the general attitude of openness. Conversation and encounter, although distinct in certain ways, are nonetheless both dialogical. However, there is a sense in which the encounter explodes beyond the boundaries and limits of conversation, bracketing conversation off and becoming other relative to it; this occurs along the orientational axes just enumerated. The transcendence of the encounter — the way in which it is a sort of othering of our everydayness[14] — must be rooted in the particular ability of the dialogical participants (particularly of the human existing participants, of which there must be at least one) to effect this othering. This self-othering is ecstatic and must belong to the being of the participant(s) as a possibility. In the encounter, one leaves behind or surpasses everyday consciousness of time, imbeddedness in a concrete situation, and communication in objective language for a time, space, and meaning that are extra-ordinary. In this sense, the encounter resembles a poetic ideal which lies below the surface of the more usual conversational form of dialogue and manifests itself more directly in erotic, spiritual, and aesthetic encounter. But although the conversational form of dialogue is perhaps founded upon the encounter form, it is important to recognize the interdependence of the two: only if we are already engaged in conversation can it momentarily be bracketed or transcended in the ecstatic surging towards the other which characterizes encounter.

However, this bracketing does not mean conversation and encounter are separate (nor are they homogeneous within themselves). Taking a clue from Theunissen, we note that the features which define conversation seem to intensify as one moves toward encounter; for this reason we should not view the bracketing of conversation in encounter as a negation of conversation. Theunissen would say that encounter constitutes a sort of fulfillment: the relation with alterity which conversation to a large extent presupposes reaches its fullest expression in the immediacy of the experience of the encounter at its height. We must also note that there are some conversations (though certainly not all) in which one becomes so absorbed that one loses track of time, forgets where one is, and so on. In these cases, a bracketing of some of the orientational features occurs which resembles the suspension characteristic of encounter. This illustrates the degree to which conversation, too, can be ecstatic. Earlier I discussed the relationship between ecstasy and the encounter. However, from the discussion of the orientational axes of spatiality, temporality, and significance, it should be clear that ec-static movement — a moving beyond oneself toward the other — is an element of conversation as well. Only if this is so can there be rapprochement and withdrawal from the other along these axes; only in this way can the interplay of proximity and distance, continuity and discontinuity, unfold. This ecstatic movement is perhaps more pronounced in encounter than in conversation, but it is nevertheless present in both, as the specific case of absorbed conversation just noted attests. Although dialogue largely manifests itself according to two paradigms — conversation and encounter — we are dealing with a continuum of dialogic engagement: there can be specific engagements in which the two forms are blurred.

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[14] This surpassing is not unlike the transcendence of intentionality which Theunissen ascribes to the *I-Thou*. See (II.5.ii).

Both conversation and encounter are ecstatic, which speaks to the ecstatic nature of dialogical subjectivity. Such a subjectivity is always open to the other and surging toward the other, largely because of its temporal finitude. As ecstatic, finite beings, we are always surpassing ourselves temporally. We are constantly othering ourselves, changing, growing, and this also plays a role in the open-endedness of our dialogues. We are never closed off because we are never finished.

The suggestion, then, is that dialogic interaction occurs with many different entities in many different forms at different times. There are multiple levels of dialogue; we engage in any number of them across all levels simultaneously. The various levels of dialogue reverberate within one another, and so multiple voices are heard in one's life.

The understanding of myself that I develop in dialogue with a particular individual or community shapes and influences the way in which I am open to interaction with different others in different dialogues at other levels. These engagements will in turn affect my self-understanding in various ways that will echo back through my other dialogic relations. The image which comes to mind is that of a vibration which begins somewhere (although precisely where is really unimportant) and then transfers to other relations, setting them in motion and then feeding back into the original wave, amplifying it, muting it, distorting it, until finally the whole is humming in a pulsing, organic fashion.

The picture which we have been developing so far is rather complex. It cannot be otherwise, for dialogue is an event which constitutes the subjectivizing of the subject. We can say that dialogue *is* subjectivity: it expresses the very structure of our lived experience, encompassing moments of discontinuity and rupture as much as those of continuity, connection, and understanding. The tension between the continuity and discontinuity which characterizes my experience of the other prepares the ground for dialogue; both continuity and discontinuity are necessary to the approaching and distancing characteristic of dialogue. Discontinuity provides the horizon against which continuity can be disclosed and vice versa. Both are always already in play. And both are united in the phenomena of responsibility and questionability: only if I am other than the other (discontinuous) can I be in a position to be questioned and required or invited to respond; only if I am familiar to the other (continuous) can I be able to do so.

Part III

The Dialogicality of Dasein

Introduction

Part I offered an interpretation of SZ in terms of Heidegger's 1925 lecture course on phenomenology, HCT. The purpose of such a reading was to facilitate an understanding of Heidegger's text through increased insight into both his phenomenological method and the focus of his inquiry, namely the *Seinsfrage*. Heidegger asks about the sense of Being, which he maintains that we always already have in our engagement in the world. In fact, it is part of our very Being qua Dasein to have such an understanding of Being. The strategy of his text, then, is to show how Dasein understands its own Being and what this then implies for its understanding of Being overall. Ultimately Heidegger contends that Dasein's Being is one of possibility, and this is disclosed against the horizon of its temporal finitude. This implies that Dasein's understanding of Being in general occurs within the horizon of time. To demonstrate this, Heidegger must show how Dasein's Being becomes a phenomenon for itself within the context of its existence. He argues that the everyday understanding which Dasein has of its Being amounts to an empty intention of that Being. This empty intention can be rendered full through an attestation of the presuppositions which underlie it. The evidence which affirms the intention occurs through anxious Being-towards-death, wherein Dasein's temporal finitude is disclosed. Since this is the possibility of Dasein's no longer Being able to be — that is, of Dasein's impossibility — the disclosure of Dasein's Being-towards-death also discloses Dasein's Being-possible. In so far as intentionality is the structure of *lived* experience, phenomenological disclosure is not constituted by a cognitive revelation of this intention, but rather by a more immediate living of intention. Fulfillment is not so much a completion of Dasein's Being, as it is an immediate experience of the openness of that Being: this is what is meant by Dasein's Being as possibility. If intentionality is the structure of lived experience, and this is shown to be Dasein's Being-in-the-world, then the fulfillment of Dasein's empty intention of its Being in everydayness must involve being this Being-in-the-world in an immediate way. This is Dasein's authenticity.

Part II pursued a critical phenomenology of dialogue which articulated two figures of dialogue — conversation and encounter. These were shown to be related through a constellation of dialogical concepts: responsibility and questionability, alterity, continuity and discontinuity, and meaning. It has been further argued that in both cases the dialogical situation shares certain features of movement, participation, the *in-between*, and openness. These correlate with the axes of spatiality, temporality, and significance in terms of which the participants are oriented relative to one another. Moreover, the relationship between encounter and conversation has been clarified through characterizing the former largely as a bracketing or suspending — but not a negation — of the latter. The suggestion is that the encounter is a sort of compression and intensification of conversation.

The objective in Part III is to bring Parts I and II together in order to offer a dialogical reading of Dasein's subjectivity — in both its authenticity and inauthenticity. From certain perspectives, this may seem ill-advised. Indeed, a number of the thinkers appealed to in developing the dialogical moments of conversation and encounter in Part II have been rather critical of Heidegger in this vein. Before proceeding any further, it is important to acknowledge these challenges. My intention is not, however, to launch a full argument against these views; my remarks are meant to be primarily introductory. They aim to clarify the positions that my reading of Heidegger's text questions and to illustrate that the debate is by no means closed. One may understand these matters differently, as will be made clear in the following chapters.

i. Concerns on the grounds of intentionality and *Mitsein*

The obvious place to begin is with Theunissen, whose position is oriented around the claim that intentionality and dialogicality are opposed to one another. Since Heidegger is operating explicitly within an intentional framework, how can he possibly be a dialogical thinker? Theunissen fleshes out his position, as we saw earlier in Chapter 5, by contrasting the three constitutive features of his view of dialogue — immediacy, mutuality and reciprocity between self and other, and the priority of *the between* over either of the participants — with the corresponding features of intentionality — mediated relations, the self-centeredness of the relation, and the priority of the ego over the other.

Theunissen's position is that, in so far as Dasein is characterized by a Being-in-the-world, Dasein relates to others through the world, which Theunissen understands as Dasein's own projection. This implies that relations to the other are never immediate; they always take Dasein's self as their point of reference, thus giving priority to Dasein's self over the other. From this Theunissen concludes that the subjectivity elaborated in SZ cannot be dialogical on the grounds that it is intentional.[1] I have argued in Chapter 6 that intentionality does not exclude dialogicality; intentionality is conversational, and both conversation and encounter are dialogical.[2]

As we have already noted, a criterion of a theory of dialogue for Theunissen is that the *I-Thou* has a certain priority, and he maintains that Heidegger cannot hope to achieve this priority within the context of SZ. But we have also seen that Theunissen himself is somewhat doubtful of the possible priority of the *I-Thou* and so is willing to consider the development of a 'mixed' theory. In a 'mixed' theory one would begin with the intentional self and show how this self reaches fulfillment in the dialogic self as elaborated by Buber. Nevertheless, Theunissen does not judge that this 'mixed' theory develops in SZ. This is partly due to Theunissen's limitation of his study of dialogue to the interhuman, which leads him to overlook the dialogical possibilities of Being-towards-death and conscience.[3] Also at issue is the way in which his understanding of intentionality and of Dasein's Being-in-the-world influences his view of solicitude. Since Theunissen understands the world to be a projection of Dasein's self and, therefore, self-centered, he determines that Dasein's relations with others (in both concern and solicitude) can only ever be characterized by subordination, where Dasein's self is the active subject and the entities encountered are passive objects. Solicitude, then, is the phenomenon of an active subject caring for a passive object. Theunissen infers that the relation between self and other can never be more than formal and indirect even in authenticity. He understands authenticity as a liberation from *das Man* through a shift in the way Dasein understands the possibilities disclosed by its world-projection. In authenticity, Dasein no longer sees these possibilities as belonging to others but disassociates them from others and understands them as its own possibilities. Dasein disentangles itself from others, frees itself from them, and in so doing, frees the others from itself. In this sense, the authentic solicitude of *leaping ahead* is only indirect.[4] Dasein does not positively, actively free the other; it only frees the other in so far as it frees itself from the other (O 187-93).

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[1] Olson takes Theunissen to task for failing to adequately distinguish Dasein from Husserl's version of the intentional subject. She offers, instead, an interpretation of Dasein which is not overly individualistic and which takes *Mitsein* into account. See Margareta Olson, "A Defense of Heidegger's *Mitsein* Analysis," *Dialogue (PST)* 30.2-3 (Apr. 1988): 48-56.

[2] Although Levinas does not explicitly charge Heidegger with being undialogical because of the intentional relatedness which characterizes Dasein, there is an element of his critique which resembles Theunissen's. We can understand Levinas' charge that Heidegger's thought of the other is totalizing (which does seem to characterize at least some types of intentional relations) as being a charge that Heidegger is undialogical. In so far as Levinas would agree with Theunissen on this point, he could be subject to the same arguments against the limitation of the concept of dialogue to the exclusive domain of encounter.

[3] These will be discussed at length in Chapter 7.

I am concerned that Theunissen's reading tends to obscure the distinction between *das Man* and others because it describes authenticity as an extrication from *das Man*, which is in turn understood as a disentanglement from others. However, as I have explained in Chapter 2, not only is it important to appreciate the distinction between *das Man* and others, it is an oversimplification to view authenticity as a gaining of independence from *das Man*. It also seems that Theunissen is operating with a different understanding of 'freeing for possibilities' than Heidegger is. Heidegger speaks of freeing equipment ready-to-hand for its possibilities, as well as freeing Dasein for its possibilities. My understanding is that Dasein 'frees' entities for their possibilities by disclosing them within a context of significance in which they figure as having certain possibilities. This is clearly related to the fact that possibility is related to Being; an entity is freed for the possibilities that belong to its Being when it is disclosed in that Being. In this sense, Theunissen's use of the term 'freeing others' is misleading, because it suggests that Dasein frees or inhibits others through its actions. On the basis of the way Heidegger uses the term, it isn't clear at all that this is the sense of 'freeing' he has in mind. Being-free has as much to do with being freed by Being as it does with being freed through Dasein's disclosure.

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[4] This is further illustrated by the fact that Dasein can never directly take away (or give back) the care of another. In so far as this is an effect of *leaping ahead*, it must be an indirect one.

Buber, too, is critical of Heidegger's concept of solicitude, although for slightly different reasons. He maintains that solicitude is not an 'essential relation', meaning that it is not an *I-Thou* relation. The reason he provides is that the solicitous relation "does not set a man's life in direct relation with the life of another, but only one man's solicitous help in relation with another man's lack and need of it."[5] Moreover, in solicitude,

> he makes his assistance, not his self, accessible to the other; nor does he expect any real mutuality, in fact he probably shuns it; he is 'concerned with the other', but he is not anxious for the other to be concerned with him.[6]

The primary issue here is that one is not required to offer oneself up to the other in solicitude. If solicitude is an issue of need satisfaction, then it is only necessary to supply the other with what he needs. One does not have to expose oneself as a whole; no risk is involved.[7] In a sense, then, one remains only tangentially involved with the other; one does not seek the concern of the other. This asymmetry in the relation indicates an absence of real mutuality, which presumably renders solicitude undialogical for Buber.

Buber's criticism is no doubt intended to target *leaping ahead*. However, his description more closely resembles *leaping in*, in which Dasein comports itself toward the other as though the other were something ready-to-hand, dominating it and depriving it of its *Seinkönnen*. *Leaping ahead*, on the other hand, is much less focused on need satisfaction. It is a comportment toward the other in which Dasein awakens the other to its possibility to be itself, awakening the other to its Being as care and thereby freeing it for its possibilities (SZ 122). This suggests a nurturing, educative attitude with respect to the other which might also be construed as pedagogical or parental. Yet Buber does have a point: *leaping ahead* displays an asymmetry in that it focuses on Dasein freeing the other for its possibilities, making no mention of the other freeing Dasein. However, it is questionable whether this asymmetry is sufficient to disqualify it from being an *I-Thou* relation in Buber's own terms.[8] Although he draws a sharp contrast in IT between the realm of the *I-It* and that of the *I-Thou*, suggesting that dialogue takes one form — full blown, mutual, immediate encounter — the starkness of this position is eroded somewhat upon examination of some of his later thought. In the postscript to IT, he indicates that "there are some *I-Thou* relationships which in their nature may not unfold to full mutuality if they are to persist in that nature" (IT 131).[9] Such a case is the pedagogical relationship.

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[5] Martin Buber, "What is Man?" *Between Man and Man*, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Collins, 1947) 148-247. Citation is taken from 206.

[6] Buber, "What Is Man?" 207.

[7] This issue is reminiscent of Levinas' discussion of need and desire. See Chapter 5 and (ii) below.

This example is developed at greater length in the essay "Education", in which Buber contrasts two dialogical relations.[10] The first is the fully mutual encounter described in IT; the second is the more one-sided experience of the pedagogical relation.[11] The two are distinguished by the occurrence of a phenomenon called **inclusion**. Inclusion is constituted by a two-fold experience in an encounter, wherein I experience the encounter from my perspective, but am also attentive to the other's experience of the encounter.[12] In the context of a pedagogical relation, the teacher experiences this inclusion because she is attentive to the experience of the student. However, this inclusion is not experienced by the student. If the student is attentive to the teacher's experience of the encounter, then the student has, in some way, stepped beyond the role of student. It is for this reason that the pedagogical relation cannot be fully mutual without itself undergoing a change in its nature. In a fully mutual encounter, both parties experience inclusion. Nevertheless Buber characterizes both types of relations as dialogical.

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[8] The noted asymmetry may cease to be apparent if one observes a relationship over a period of time. That is, the one who leaps ahead in this instance may be leapt ahead of by the other in another case (or perhaps even simultaneously). As such, it may be inadvisable to interpret this asymmetry or lack of mutuality too strictly.

[9] Note that the Postscript was written for the 1958 edition, many years after the original text was published.

[10] Martin Buber, "Education," *Between Man and Man*, trans, Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Collins, 1947) 109-31. See especially pp. 126-27. On this topic, see Donald S. Seckinger, "Martin Buber on the One-Sided Dialogical Relation," *Journal of Thought* 8 (1973): 295-300; and Brian Hendley, "Martin Buber on the Teacher-Student Relationship: A Critical Appraisal," *Journal of the Philosophy of Education* 12 (1978): 141-48.

[11] Buber actually describes three forms of dialogical relation in this essay. The first, which does not concern us here, is characterized as an abstract intellectual encounter in which the two parties mutually appreciate one another's otherness at a purely spiritual and abstract level, without taking into account the full and concrete reality of the other's alterity. The second is the concrete but one-sided experience of inclusion, and the third is friendship which is a concrete and mutual inclusion (Buber, "Education" 126-28).

[12] IT 132, and Buber, "Education" 124.

The model of the educator resurfaces in Buber's essay "Elements of the Interhuman", in which he describes the phenomenon of **imposition**.[13] In imposition one seeks to manipulate or force one's way of thinking on another. Such relations are part of the realm of the merely social and are a threat to the genuinely interhuman (dialogical). He contrasts this with **unfolding** in which one seeks to affect the other through the encounter in such a way that the other is opened up in his potentiality. In unfolding each recognizes the other as an individual and a person, and thus the relation is conducive to dialogue. A similar desire to influence the other is mentioned in "Distance and Relation" where Buber contrasts the manipulation exemplified by the impositional model with "the effort to let that which is recognized as right, as just, as true ... through one's influence take seed and grow in the form suited to individuation."[14] When this comportment toward the other only occurs on the part of one party to the relation, the result is presumably a relationship resembling that of the educator or parent. When it is matched by both parties, the result is a fully mutual encounter. Nevertheless, both instances are considered to be dialogical. This one-sided type of inclusion or unfolding is strikingly similar to Heidegger's authentic solicitude,[15] and since Buber considers such relations to be dialogical, this suggests that any asymmetry in *leaping ahead* may not preclude its dialogicality on Buber's own terms.

From this discussion, we can conclude that Buber's claims regarding the inessentiality of the relation involved in solicitude are of questionable significance given what Buber himself is willing to allow as a dialogical relation within the context of his own thought. In order for one to persist in drawing the conclusion that authentic solicitude cannot be dialogical *a priori*, one would have to make this case upon the antecedent claim that dialogicality and intentionality are mutually exclusive. I have already demonstrated that this claim is problematic.[16]

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[13] Martin Buber, "Elements of the Interhuman," *The Knowledge of Man*, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith, ed. Maurice Friedman (New York: Harper and Row, 1965) 72-88. See especially pp. 82-85.

[14] Martin Buber, "Distance and Relation," *The Knowledge of Man*, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith, ed. Maurice Friedman (New York: Harper & Row, 1965) 59-71. Citation taken from 69.

[15] Vogel makes a similar observation. See Vogel 76.

ii. Concerns on the grounds of totality

Earlier I noted that Buber introduces the notion of need into his critique of Heidegger's solicitude, maintaining that this sort of care for another pertains only to satisfying the needs of another. Levinas makes a similar criticism, although broader in its application, when he charges that Heidegger's notion of care fails to take into consideration anything like what Levinas terms metaphysical desire. Levinas maintains that the philosophical tradition (including Heidegger) tends to understand alterity in terms of the *not-I*, as opposed to what is genuinely other and not definable relative to the *I*. The pairing of the *I* and the *not-I* leads to a unity or totality in difference which loses the idea of the infinite. The infinite is always the excess, the more, which surpasses this totality and resists assimilation to it. If Heidegger fails to conceive of the other in its alterity, then the engagements with the other reflected in concern and solicitude can only be modes of comportment toward the *not-I*. Consequently, any concept Heidegger has of a relation to alterity can only be characterized as a movement toward totality and not a movement toward the infinite. If the only dialogical movement is the latter, then Heidegger cannot be a dialogical thinker.

This point helps us make sense of Levinas' claim that Heidegger's *Mitsein* does not include anything like the face to face of the dialogic encounter. Levinas maintains that Heidegger's authentic *Mitsein* is a *we* (authentic community):

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[16] It could perhaps be maintained that relations of authentic solicitude are not immediate but are mediated by the networks of signification which make up the world and, on these grounds, could be determined to be undialogical. However, if this is a problem for authentic solicitude then it is also a problem for Buber, because even within his pedagogical dialogue, the interaction of student and teacher is mediated by their respective roles. Nevertheless, this mediated aspect does not prevent Buber from characterizing this as a dialogical relation, nor does it prevent the inclusion on the part of the teacher. Arguably, it also does not prevent the possibility of the student's stepping out of his role and 'including' the teacher. This would amount to a bracketing of the roles governing the relationship in order to participate in the fuller form of dialogue.

> It [*Mitsein*] is thus an association of side by side, around something, around a common term, and more precisely, for Heidegger, around the truth. It is not the face to face relationship, where each contributes everything, except the private fact of one's existence. I hope to show, for my part, that it is not the preposition *mit* that should describe the original relationship with the other.[17]

In ordinary social relations, much like those Heidegger describes, the alterity of the other is veiled, which suggests that we largely do not differentiate ourselves from the other.[18] Levinas' point is that we tend to see the other as similar to ourselves, as an alter ego (an *I* which is *not-I*). This is a comportment to the other through the same; it is essentially an assimilation to the same which fails to preserve the alterity of the other.[19] This alterity is disclosed for Levinas only in the *I-You* of the face to face. Levinas may be correct to say that there is little space for a genuine relation to the other within the context of the *we*. However, we should question whether all of Dasein's relations to alterity are totalizing ones. Exceptions which come to mind are the authentic solicitude of *leaping ahead*, and the relation to alterity represented by Dasein's Being-towards-death.

Part of Levinas' concern may be that all of Dasein's encounters with others — even *leaping ahead* — are grounded in a prior *Mitsein*. If this is so, then Heidegger grounds the condition for the possibility of engagement with the other in the ontological feature of Dasein's *Mitsein*. Ontology, then, takes a priority to ethics. But according to Levinas, ethics is rooted in the responsibility to and for the other, which is exposed in the face to face. A sociality based solely on community cannot be truly ethical without a conceptualization of the face to face.

Perhaps a more basic source of tension between Heidegger and Levinas lies in the distinction that Levinas draws between need and desire, which roughly parallels the distinction between relations of totality versus relations of infinity. As was discussed in

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[17] Levinas, *Time* 41. Levinas makes a number of references to the fact that the sociality of *Mitsein* involves an association with the other around a 'third term' (*Existence* 41, 94-95; *Time* 93-94).

[18] In fact this is a formulation Heidegger explicitly uses at one point (SZ 118).

[19] Levinas, *Time* 82-83.

Chapter 5, need is distinguished from desire in that desire is a movement toward the other which cannot reach fulfillment, whereas need can, in principle, be satisfied (TI 115-17). Need is a relation of dependence between self and other in which the other only shows up in relation to the self as something needed to satisfy a lack in the self; the other does not appear on its own terms, but takes the place of the *not-I* which completes the *I* (TI 127-30). In contrast the other which figures in the relation of desire is not part of a totality, but exceeds it. The other belongs to the infinite; desire is the surging forward toward this infinite other, rather than the drawing of the other into the domain of the same (TI 35-40). In order to liberate the relation to the other from the dynamic of need, the self must not be characterized by a lack which the other can fill. The self must be understood as separate and self-sufficient (TI 79-81, 102-104). However, this separation should not be viewed as an absence of relation to the other; the separated individual must be *separated from* something in order to be separate. This is in itself a relation (TI 102-104). Since the separate ego does not need the other for its completion, its relation to the other is one of pure excess. Where there is no need to be satisfied, there can be no satiation. Thus this desire is unquenchable and belongs to a completely different order than the sorts of 'desires' to which we typically refer, and which Levinas would categorize as varieties of need. Levinas maintains that Heidegger has left desire out of his analysis: Dasein's engagement with its world, as characterized by care, is exclusively located within the domain of need. This is evident in the fact that Heidegger's work gives priority to relations to the other which generate a *we* through assimilating the other to the same.[20]

It is, I think, undeniable that for Heidegger the with-world forms the background for encounters with individual others. However, why this necessarily means that all encounters with others fall within the *I/not-I* dialectic would need to be further explained. Furthermore, we might well ask whether or not Dasein's relation to alterity as expressed in its Being-towards-death can be characterized in terms of need. If Dasein relates to the alterity of its death in a 'needful' way, then death is a *not-I* which renders Dasein whole when Dasein assimilates it. Although there is a sense in which death is the *not-I* to Dasein's *I*, it is not clear what kind of totality would result from the union of the *I* and the *not-I* when Dasein "receives" its death. Heidegger is emphatic that the kind of *not-yet* that death represents does not resemble a lack which needs to be filled by something which is still outstanding. This seems to throw into question the notion of Being-towards-death as a type of need. Could Being-towards-death be a movement of metaphysical desire?

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[20] On the general critical relationship between Heidegger and Levinas, see Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) 79-103; David Boothroyd, "Responding to Levinas," *The Provocation of Levinas*, ed. Robert Bernasconi and David Wood (New York: Routledge, 1988) 15-31; Robert John Sheffer Manning, *Interpreting Otherwise than Heidegger* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1993). For a good discussion of their differing understandings of death, see Tina Chanter, "The Question of Death: The Time of the I and the Time of the Other," *Irish Philosophical Journal* 4 (1987): 94-119.

In thinking about this, it is helpful to consider anxiety, the facet of Being-towards-death in which Dasein experiences something that could be construed as either a need or a desire. Dasein is anxious about its Being as possibility because, I would argue, Dasein is uncomfortable with the open-endedness of its Being. Dasein would prefer its Being to be secure, certain, and predictable, but its Being as possibility defies this; thus, Dasein is anxious. The question is whether the need/desire which shows itself in anxiety is somehow satisfied in authenticity. If it is, then it is most definitely a need; only needs are satisfiable. If not, then perhaps it is a desire.

Anxiety is a recurring phenomenon. This suggests that whatever underlies anxiety is never absolutely satisfied. However, we cannot conclude from this that anxiety is a desire: there are other needs, such as hunger, which display this same feature. Levinas maintains that the mark of desire is that it cannot be satisfied *in principle*. This does not mean that the one who desires has finite capacities, and is thus incapable of grasping that which would satisfy it; this would still be need for Levinas. Desire is insatiable because the thing desired is in principle ungraspable; it is itself infinite. Levinas' position vis-à-vis Heidegger must be that anxiety falls into the category of recurring needs, such as hunger. Dasein's experience of "infinitude," then, stems from its experience of its own limits,[21] implying that infinitude is then understood only as something which Dasein lacks, as something other than the finitude which characterizes its existentiality. This is problematic for Levinas, not only because there is no positive 'experience' of the infinite, but because there is nothing about the alterity to which Dasein is related that cannot in principle be assimilated and known. The infinite only shows itself as unknowable due to Dasein's limited capacities. This is why Dasein remains restricted to the realm of need. Although Dasein may experience 'desires' which are not factically satisfied, this is due only to its own inadequacies and not due to the essential elusiveness of the other. It must be for this reason, then, that Levinas maintains that Heidegger's understanding of the other remains at the level of the *not-I*, and so does not think the genuine other.

If Levinas is correct, then Dasein's anxiety is an ambiguity before its Being which is characterized not by desire but by need, because what Dasein craves — namely certainty with respect to its Being as possibility — is unattainable due to Dasein's finite capacities, and not due to any inherent elusiveness of the other. Pursuing this line of thought, we could say that the yearning for certainty (understood as a need) is satisfied in one way through Dasein's inauthentic immersion in its everyday Being-in-the-world, and satisfied in another through its authentic Being-towards-death. However, closer examination shows this to be otherwise. Longing for certainty about its Being and unable to get it, in anxious fleeing Dasein flings itself into that about which it can be certain, attempting to substitute one kind of certainty for another. In this way, Dasein is able to dissipate but not resolve its anxiety. The longing for certainty is not any more fulfilled in authentic Being-towards-death. In inauthentic fleeing, anxiety is forgotten because Dasein tricks itself into thinking that it has received what it lacks. In contrast, authentic Being-towards-death *remains anxious*; it remains aware of its *desire* for certainty and aware that this desire is unfulfilled. Dasein's craving for certainty with respect to itself is a craving for finality, a finality which it cannot have so long as it lives. The only 'finality' Dasein can have is that it is not final, that its Being is one of possibility and thus is always constituted by an openness. This finality is ungraspable — not because of Dasein's finitude in the sense of its finite capacities of comprehension — but because its very Being is that of openness. Dasein's Being lacks the finality necessary for it to be graspable; since it cannot be grasped, one cannot be certain of it. So, the movement toward certainty goes unsatisfied due to the elusiveness of what Dasein yearns to grasp. The fact of this elusiveness, and a certainty with respect to this fact, are what Dasein comprehends in anxious Being-towards-death.

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[21] There are presumably a variety of ways in which one can experience limits, not all of which are problematic for Levinas. After all, in the face to face encounter, the other presents itself as a limit on the freedom of the self, and this presentation of the limit discloses that freedom for the first time. Levinas' point of criticism seems to be that Dasein discloses its limits first, and only then infers the other as that which lies beyond those limits, rather than disclosing its limits in its disclosure of the other.

Indeed, this is why Being-towards-death remains anxious; it is marked by a desire which is not fulfilled. This desire for certainty is not resolvable. If authenticity entailed resolution of this sort, then Being-towards-death in which Dasein becomes certain of its Being as one of possibility — would involve the satisfaction of the longing and anxiety would disappear. But this is precisely what does not happen. Authenticity is a positive modification of the unsatisfiability of the desire manifested through despair and inauthenticity, as opposed to its satisfaction.

Need and its satisfaction, in the terms in which Levinas discusses them, pertain to the present-at-hand. As lacks, needs are satisfied through the addition of what is missing in its presence-at-hand. Yet, Heidegger argues that such terms are inappropriate for an ontological characterization of Dasein's Being, and he specifically renounces this sense of the *not-yet* or lack which belongs to Dasein's Being and in particular to its Being-towards-death. This *not-yet* of Dasein — which is its death — is that wherein Dasein achieves its finality, but also that which represents its impossibility; the end of its existentiality. Death is a finality which implies the closing off of that which is essentially characterized by openness.[22] Dasein's Being cannot be grasped in principle with the kind of certainty that belongs to the present-at-hand. This desire for certainty and finality is closely related to Dasein's desire for a unity or fixity of meaning. But such a desire can never be sated in the way that a need can.

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[22] This marks an important point of divergence in thought between Heidegger and Levinas. For Levinas, desire is related to a self which is complete and so cannot comport toward the other as something which can complement it. For Heidegger, the self is incomplete and although it relates to the other in its Being incomplete, it does not do so as something which complements it, but more in the manner of relating to an unknown and unknowable origin.

Nevertheless Levinas maintains that Heidegger continues to think the alterity of death within the confines of a relation of need. In characterizing death as the possibility of impossibility, Heidegger names death the *not-I* relative to Dasein's Being of possibility. In contrast to this, Levinas refers to death as the impossibility of possibility.[23] The alterity which death represents is not assimilable to Dasein's Being as possibility and thus retains its character as an impossibility. Construed in this way, death can be desired for the freedom and release from the burden of existence that it represents. Yet this release is not a possibility within existence. Consequently, I stand alone before death as evidence of my abandonment to existence, or thrownness. For Levinas, this relation to death is not liberating because it is disclosed through the impossibility of being delivered from existence through death. If death is an impossibility which cannot be assimilated, then it is also a mystery which lies outside the realm of light and knowledge.[24] In this sense it would seem to resemble the alterity which presents itself in the face to face. Levinas, however, resists this:

> It is not with the nothingness of death, of which we precisely know nothing, that the analysis must begin, but with the situation where something absolutely unknowable appears. Absolutely unknowable means foreign to all light, rendering every assumption of possibility impossible, but where we ourselves are seized.[25]

The issue is perhaps that death is only experienced in its alterity in dying; any other relation to it is one of possibility and so falls within the realm of the *not-I*. The relation to death, then, does not rupture the solitude of the *I* in the way that the face to face encounter with the Other does. The question for Levinas is perhaps not so much whether death is truly an alterity in the proper sense, but whether it can be encountered in that alterity. To be consistent, Levinas must maintain that the impossibility of encountering death is not due to Dasein's own finite capacities to encounter death, but due to the fact that death does not have a face through which to present its alterity — that death never shows itself *as* impossibility, but only as *the possibility* of impossibility. That is, death never shows itself in itself; it is only disclosed through Being-towards-death. I will discuss the issue of how Being-towards-death may be construed as an encounter with alterity in Chapter 7.[26]

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[23] For an interesting reading of the 'impossibility of possibility' and the 'possibility of impossibility', see Derrida's *Aporias*.

[24] Levinas, *Time* 40-41, 69-70.

[25] Levinas, *Time* 71.

iii. A re-appraisal

I cannot here undertake an exhaustive argument against the positions just raised. My objective has been to reveal the criticisms and the points of interpretation which are their basis. What I intend to articulate in the next three chapters is a different way of reading Heidegger's text.

I would like to begin by noting that a substantial portion of the literature on dialogue describes the dialogical relation as an *I-Thou* relation. The best example of this is, of course, Buber's *I-Thou*. But this terminology is not restricted to him nor to those who subscribe to what specifically appears to be an encounter form of dialogue. It also comes up in more conversational theories of dialogue.[27] The importance of the *I-Thou* is most clearly highlighted when one considers the other possible way of addressing a person, namely as *You* (*Sie*). *You* is always formal, but more than that, it is indirect. Addressing someone as *Thou* instead of *You* implies an intimacy and a familiarity that are not possible with the *You.* Philosophically, the significance of this has been taken up in terms of a contrast between first- and third-person forms of address, corresponding to the *Thou* and *You*, respectively.[28] It is often said that dialogue belongs to the realm of the first person because only there do the partners address one another in their specificity, only there are they open to one another and personally involved with one another.

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[26] Buber is also critical of Heidegger on the issue of Being-towards-death. He maintains that the monologicality of Dasein is revealed in its Being-towards-death because authenticity occurs with respect to Dasein's self and not with respect to another ("What Is Man?" 203-205, 208-12). This claim is related to the one voiced earlier regarding Dasein's lack of an essential relation. Anticipating objections from those who would cite the dialogical structure of the call of conscience, Buber argues that the alleged 'dialogical structure' of monologue — in the form of talking to oneself — is not really dialogical because the 'other' in this case is not an unconditioned other. As such it would be misleading to say that the role that the call of conscience plays in Dasein's authenticity is sufficient to make it dialogical. But it is not wholly clear what Buber means by an unconditioned other. I understand it as an other that does not have the possibility for its being grounded in the self. So, for instance, God would be an unconditioned other relative to humanity as Kierkegaard suggests in *The Sickness unto Death* in saying that the self is a synthesis between the infinite and the finite and is constituted by another. Though Heidegger does not conceive of the self as a synthesis, he does describe it as not being its own foundation. As a historical and factical Being, Dasein is always already thrown. It is not its own foundation, yet it must become its foundation through being its thrownness. See Soren Kierkegaard, *The Sickness Unto Death*, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944) 17-18.

[27] See Bakhtin, *Problems* 63 and 292-95; Gadamer 358-61; and Karl Löwith, *Individuum* 56-59, 131-35; and O im passim. A notable exception to this would be Levinas who explicitly criticizes the *I-Thou*. He understands it as a relation of intimacy and familiarity in which I am who I am only in relation to the other.

The distance and disengagement from the other which is associated with the third-person form of address accounts for its use in describing the standard subject-object relation. In this sense, then, the *You* is not just a *You*-formal but also an *It*. This is clearly indicated in the contrast that Buber makes between the *I-Thou* and the *I-It*. As we have seen, he and most of those working in his tradition equate the *I-Thou* with dialogue (which I have interpreted as encounter) and the *I-It* with an intentional comportment towards the other which is not dialogical. Such a distinction, of course, implicitly restricts dialogue to the encounter, which I have argued is inappropriate. While I would claim that third-person interaction also has a dialogical structure, it is still meaningful to recognize the distinction between first- and third-person modes of interaction.

Heidegger's text contains its own reference to a similar kind of distinction. Specifically, Heidegger distinguishes between the *Man-selbst* and Dasein's *ownmost* self. On the basis of his discussion, it is clear that the *Man-selbst* is to be understood as Dasein's being itself in the mode of not being it, which can be read as being itself in the mode of the third person. Dasein, of course, *is* not in the third person because its Being

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For this reason, this relation participates in the dialectic of need and so is not ethical. The ethical relation requires a distance from the Other which accords the Other respect, and this respect is meant to be granted universally. (See Chapter 5.) However, what Levinas relinquishes in making this claim is the attention to the particularity of the other which comes with the specificity of address of the *I-Thou*. This specificity is important not only for addressing the other in its particularity, but also for questions of authenticity where the address must specifically reach me in my specificity.

[28] I refer to the *I-Thou* as discourse in the first person (as opposed to the second) largely for reasons of simplicity.

is characterized by mineness. Dasein *is* in the first person, but in everydayness its Being in the first person is transmuted into a Being in the third person. Authenticity [*Eigentlichkeit*] is an *ownness*; in it Dasein makes itself its own. However, Dasein appropriates what it always already was, namely its mineness. In this way, we can understand Dasein's becoming authentic as a transmuting of its Being in the third person into a Being in the first person.

One cannot simply will to be in the first person. This is true as much for Heidegger's Dasein as it is for the theorists of dialogue who explicitly thematize the *I-Thou*. The *I* is the first-person *I* only in relation to the *Thou*, the other — specifically the other who addresses the *I* as *Thou*. In being addressed as *Thou* by another, the *I* becomes *I* in a different way; the *I* is drawn into a direct engagement with the other. In Heidegger's case, Dasein cannot will its authenticity; it must be *called* to it. This is performed in the call of conscience, where Dasein finds itself singled out by the one who calls. The caller is at once Dasein's self and its other because it is Dasein's ownmost self, the self which Dasein *is not* in its everydayness. In this sense, this self is other. Dasein is able to engage in an interior dialogue with itself because of its ecstatic character, which allows it to differentiate itself into different modes or voices which can engage one another. Dasein's Being in the first person calls to Dasein in its third-person mode, calling it forth to its first-person character and so also back to itself.

This thought will be extended in the next stage of our investigation. The aim of Part III is to bring the reflections developed in the course of Part II to bear on the interpretation and analysis of subjectivity and authenticity laid out in Part I. I will begin my inquiry by locating traces of the constellation of dialogical concepts in Heidegger's concept of authenticity. I will begin with **responsibility** which manifests itself most obviously in the call of conscience. In order for the call to be a call, there must be an other who calls; this other is Dasein's self, but specifically the no-thingness, no-whereness, and no-oneness of that self. This abyss [*Abgrund*] is Dasein's foundation, the self as radical alterity, the most radical other that Dasein can encounter because it is its self in its death. This not-ness [*Nichtigkeit*] which is Dasein's self *belongs* to Dasein's self; it pertains to Dasein's mineness and singles Dasein out in the first person. In this sense, this no-thingness is **continuous** with Dasein in that it is inescapable and unavoidable, always there. But in so far as this no-thingness is also Dasein's **alterity**, it is also **discontinuous** with Dasein. It is other than Dasein in its everydayness, but still nevertheless belongs to Dasein. The **meaning** which is generated through this encounter is Dasein's guilt, and in the moment where this is disclosed, the call of conscience challenges Dasein. Dasein's very Being is brought into question in its Being-towards-death, revealing Dasein's **questionability**.

The disclosive moment is a situation which can be described in terms of the orientational axes of temporality, spatiality, and significance, and through the corresponding features of participation, movement, the *in-between*, and openness. As we explore the ways in which these manifest themselves in the phenomenon of anxious Being-towards-death, we will see that they arise according to the pattern seen in the dialogical encounter. Thus, I will maintain that anxious Being-towards-death can be understood in terms of dialogue. Anxious Being-towards-death is the encounter with radical alterity which draws Dasein out of its Being in the third person and exposes it as Being in the first person. The ways in which anxious Being-towards-death involves a bracketing of everyday experience provide further evidence to support this view. This is consistent with what has been said regarding the relationship between the encounter and conversational modes of dialogue, namely that encounter is largely a bracketing out of certain aspects of conversation. If this is so, then the conversationality (in the third person) of Dasein's everydayness must be shown. But we would be overhasty to conclude that inauthenticity is to be equated with conversation and authenticity with encounter. Authenticity is an existentiell modification of Dasein's everydayness; thus, it must display the same features of conversational dialogue, but in the first person.

According to my reading of authenticity, the anxious Being-towards-death/encounter moment of authenticity ecstatically transports Dasein beyond itself, but also gives it nothing to understand apart from its impenetrability. It discloses Dasein's wanting to understand by not giving it any *thing* to understand. This is consistent with the double movement of ecstasy and encounter in which one surges forward toward the other but also falls back rebuffed. In this way, Dasein is thrown back upon itself and thrown back into the conversations in which it was engaged, but at a more intensified level of engagement. By once again looking for the various features of dialogue in Heidegger's understanding of Being-in-the-world — both in its everydayness and in the mode of authentic historizing — I will demonstrate the conversational dimensions of these notions.

Part III will be structured as follows. Chapter 7 will interpret the anxious Being-towards-death aspect of authenticity in terms of the encounter model of dialogue. Chapter 8 will consider the conversational aspects of Dasein's everydayness. And the conversationality of authentic historizing will be taken up in Chapter 9. These final chapters reflect what has emerged through my dialogical engagement with Heidegger's text. The thought expressed here results from my responding to the questions which the text poses for me, and from my challenging it to respond to the issues with which I present it.

Chapter 7

Anxious Being-towards-death as Encounter

Heidegger's discussion of the authenticity of Dasein's subjectivity receives extended treatment in the second division of SZ. In the course of the first division, he phenomenologically discloses the Being of this entity, Dasein, who has a particular understanding of its own Being, of its Being-in-the-world. The understanding Dasein has, although presumed in all of its worldly comportments, remains largely concealed from it. This implies that Dasein in its everydayness is its Being predominantly in the way of an empty intentionality. As I have discussed at some length in Part I, authenticity is constituted by a fulfillment of Dasein's intentional comportment toward its own Being, which it is emptily in its inauthenticity. Intentionality is the structure of lived experience; it remains empty so long as it is merely a formal orientation towards an object. However, when this orientation is supplemented with intuitive content through an act of intuition, the intention becomes fulfilled and the experience which Dasein has of its intentional object is rendered full and immediate. This filling out of an intention is related to Heidegger's understanding of truth as disclosedness in that the experience of truth occurs through the verification of a formal orientation through the evidence provided by intuition. In this sense, authenticity is related to truth through the disclosure of Dasein's Being to itself in an immediate way. One should remember, however, that this fulfillment does not resemble an absolute fulfillment or completion because Dasein's Being is one of possibility and openness. When Dasein's empty intention of its Being is fulfilled, Dasein experiences this possibility and openness in a most immediate way — Dasein experiences itself in its incompleteness, uncertainty, and foundationlessness.

The authentic disclosure of Dasein's Being to itself can be characterized in terms of two facets which, as emphasized in my discussion in Part I, we can analytically distinguish although perhaps not experientially disengage. The first facet is comprised of Dasein's anxious Being-towards-death, conscience, and guilt. It is the moment wherein Dasein experiences the call and experiences itself as questioned. It is here that evidence is provided which confirms what is presumed in Dasein's everydayness. The second aspect consists in Dasein's authentic historizing in which Dasein is drawn into its thrown situation, projecting in an authentic way upon the possibilities that are disclosed to it in its world. This is resoluteness, which can be construed as Dasein's responding to the call; we could say that here Dasein is its Being authentically. Again, although we are able to analytically or phenomenologically unpack and distinguish these moments, they are very much entwined, and there may well be instances where the gap that separates them is very narrow indeed.

Nevertheless, for the purposes of this discussion, I will separate them. In this chapter, I will discuss the first moment of authenticity — that which is associated with death, conscience, and guilt. My strategy will be to search for traces of our dialogical concepts in these phenomena, in order to reveal that there is indeed a dialogicality appropriate to anxious Being-towards-death. I will then consider the features of dialogical interaction and orientation which were elucidated in Part II in order to demonstrate that the dialogicality of Being-towards-death is best construed in terms of the encounter mode of dialogue rather than the conversational mode. In particular, I will explore the way in which anxious Being-towards-death resembles encounter in terms of its being a suspension of some antecedent type of engagement (conversation). This discussion will position us to address the conversational moments in Heidegger's text in Chapter 8.

i. The dialogical constellation in anxious Being-towards-death and the call

A key indicator in locating dialogue is the phenomenon of responsibility. Responsibility is a dialogical concept; it can only be experienced *in response* to a question or challenge from the other. For this reason, I will begin my analysis by reflecting on where responsibility appears in Heidegger's discussion of Dasein, or better, where — according to Heidegger — Dasein experiences responsibility. One notable place is in the phenomenon of conscience, in which responsibility is manifested primarily in two ways. In the first instance, conscience exhibits responsibility in the fairly banal sense that it is a response. By experiencing a prick of conscience (which is the only way that conscience reveals itself), I am responding, thus revealing that I am *able to respond* (my response-ability). What I respond to is whatever elicits the prick of conscience. To put this in more Heideggerian terms, conscience functions as an appeal or a call; the experiencing of the prick is the sign that one has heard the call. A call or appeal is never unfocused or undirected; it is always directed at someone; it is always meant to be heard.[1]

Consider the case of a distressed boater. The boater calls for help. Even if there is no one there to hear the call, or those on the beach are too far away to be able to hear it, the call is still directed at a listener. The caller calls in order to reach a listener. Such calls place a demand upon the listener. The specificity of the demand varies depending upon the situation. In the case where there are several people standing on the beach and the boater calls for help, it is understood that the call reaches and places demands upon all equally. Qua listeners, all are held equally responsible by the call. It singles no one out in her individual specificity. The case would be somewhat different if I were the only person on the beach. In such a case, the call would reach no one else and so would seem to be directed exclusively at me. It would target me in a greater degree of specificity because it calls to someone who is there, and I am the only one there. A similar scenario is one in which the boater calls my name. Here the degree of specificity is further intensified. In that case, it is clear that the call is directed at me specifically and lays a stronger claim upon me. The call elicits my responsibility to a greater degree because I feel that it has been particularly directed at me and me alone. That this is so can be easily seen if we consider the same scenario, but now with several people on the beach. The boater calling my name in such an instance does seem to narrow the scope of responsibility from all of us or any of us, to me in particular.[2]

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[1] Indeed we might say that the experience of conscience fulfills the call in much the same way that a response fulfills a question.

[2] An important feature of this example is the difference between first- and third-person modes of engagement, which I would prefer to postpone discussing until Chapter 9 where it can be treated at greater length. Being addressed by name is often, although not always, a first-person mode of address. First-person engagement is constituted by a mutual experience of being involved with one another in one another's specificity. This implies that not only must the one who addresses do so in the first person, but the other must also feel himself to have been approached in this way and respond in kind. It is in this way that the *I* can be brought forward through the call of the *Thou*, and it is through the response of the one who is called that the intention of the call is fulfilled.

This example illustrates not only that my responsibility is disclosed through a 'prick of conscience' in the banal sense that experiencing the prick is a response, but that the call involves a second type of responsibility: I experience the call as placing demands upon me and I feel obliged to respond to those demands by doing something to satisfy them. This is why one can have a bad conscience: one has failed to respond to the demand. This second facet of responsibility more closely resembles what we normally mean by the word in everyday usage — that is, not just that I am able to respond, but that I *should* do so. The call of conscience, then, as an appeal, lays claim on me by virtue of its being directed at me and its requiring a response of this second variety. Although all Dasein are vulnerable to the call of conscience, each call reaches only one Dasein. That is to say, the type of appeal which belongs to the call is not one which demands a response from any Dasein who happens to hear it — as in the case of several people hearing the same cry for help. Rather the call is specific, resembling most closely the instance where I am addressed by name.[3] In this way, the call can be said to single Dasein out; because it does so, it is able to disclose the mineness of Dasein's Being.[4]

It is through conscience, as Heidegger says, that Dasein experiences itself as owing something to another. Responsibility shows itself in relation to a demand that comes from another, from somewhere else. It is in this way that the **alterity** with which one is dialogically engaged is disclosed through the call. But this caller is rather peculiar because it is as though the call comes from no-one, from no-where. Moreover, the call — in so far as it is silent — says no-thing. Whenever Heidegger uses terms like these, he never means to refer to an absolute nothingness but rather to what appears to be no-thing or no-one or no-where from the perspective of the one to whom it is disclosed.[5] Thus, to

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[3] The reason for this specificity can be more fully elaborated below in the discussion of death.

[4] It is interesting to note the connection, at least in English and French, between the locution of 'I am called X' [*je m'appelle*] and the term 'the call' [*l'appel*]. What this suggests is a connection between the notion of a call which calls to someone and thereby picks that person out, and that of a name which also picks someone out.

[5] Levinas, for instance, reads anxiety as something which occurs in the face of death as nothingness. He is critical of this because he thinks it simply reinvokes a dialectic between Being and nothingness. To get around this, Levinas maintains that anxiety is instead experienced in the face of the no-thingness of the *there*

Dasein *in its everydayness*, the caller appears to be no-one calling from no-where and saying no-thing because the identity, location, and message of the caller remain largely indeterminate from the perspective of everydayness. This is precisely because the caller is not situated in everydayness, but beyond it. Heidegger maintains that it is Dasein's self which calls, namely the self which Dasein always already is, but which Dasein is only in the way of an empty intentionality in everydayness. In a peculiar way, then, this self which calls Dasein is *other* than Dasein's self. It is because this self is other that the call can take on this dialogical structure.

The indeterminacy surrounding the call is intimately connected with the indeterminacy which permeates anxiety. Anxiety is a mode of *Befindlichkeit* in which a threat is experienced that comes from no-where and is no-thing. This is in contrast to fear, the source of which is usually locatable and identifiable. Anxiety seems to have no source because its source lies outside of the world as it is understood in everydayness. In everydayness, the world is understood in terms of the entities that populate it; in this way the worldhood of the world itself is overlooked. The worldhood and its non-entity character are disclosed in anxiety; this 'non-entity-ness' is precisely what makes the world in its worldhood show itself as no-thing and no-where. Thus in anxiety the world is disclosed as meaningless — at least relative to the terms in which we usually understand it. We usually locate meaning in objects in the world; when these fade into the background, what remains is something (the worldhood of the world) which does not appear to have any meaning. These features taken together add up to the *Unheimlichkeit* that is associated with anxiety.

The no-thingness, no-whereness, and meaninglessness that Dasein experiences in anxiety are akin to the no-whereness and no-oneness of the caller and the no-thingness of the call itself. In fact, the call of conscience is what Heidegger refers to as the ontic

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is [*il y a*], which may only subsequently be interpreted as nothingness in the Heideggerian sense. As such, anxiety is not a fear of the possibility of no longer being, but of the impossibility of such a possibility. It is not that we fear death; we desire death for the freedom and the reprieve it represents. I disagree with Levinas' interpretation of the nothing in Heidegger. That which Dasein is anxious before is nothing definite and identifiable (unlike in fear where it is definite), and this is precisely why it is a no-thing; it is anxiety before Being-in-the-world itself in its no-thingness and no-whereness which is precisely an everywhereness.

attestation of Dasein's Being-towards-death. This means that conscience bears witness to Dasein's Being-towards-death and provides evidence for it. This is importantly related to the fulfillment of Dasein's empty intention of its own Being and the experience of truth. Dasein's Being is a Being-towards-death, even in everydayness where Dasein does not realize it. Dasein's Being-towards-death is expressed in its very Being-in-the-world. In the call of conscience, intuitive content is given which affirms this empty intentional orientation towards death, thereby fulfilling it. Dasein experiences this affirmation or attestation as truth. Understood phenomenologically, truth is revealed when evidence is given via categorial intuition for that which previously was only emptily expressed or grasped. The self which calls Dasein — yet is other than Dasein — is Dasein's anxious self thrown towards death. The call both discloses to Dasein its own not-ness, and summons Dasein to be this not-ness in a more immediate, lived way through its anxious Being-towards-death and its Being-guilty. The call of conscience discloses to Dasein that it is a Being-towards-death and that this Being-towards-death burdens it with a certain responsibility to assume the task of its existence. This burden cannot be foisted onto another because it is part of Dasein's existential guilt. Dasein is responsible before itself as the other which calls it through conscience, but Dasein is also responsible before its death due to the relationship to its death which signifies its mortality.[6] In both cases Dasein finds itself held responsible before an other that it cannot understand in the usual way, that outstrips Dasein's familiar realm of meaning. In this sense, what Dasein encounters presents itself as a radical alterity.[7] Because of the impenetrability of this other to Dasein in its everydayness, Dasein's relation to it retains the character of a **discontinuity**.

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[6] It is Dasein's Being-towards-death which allows death to assume this position where it can exact responsibility of Dasein. If Dasein were not Being-towards-death, death could not do this. This is why animals do not die; they merely demise. However, this Being-towards-death is not something Dasein chooses: it is something with which its existence burdens it. I am not the originator of my relation to death, and so I am not responsible for the hold it has on me, although once thrown to it, I am required to assume this task.

[7] This point is reinforced through the observation that Heidegger describes resoluteness as both a readiness for anxiety and a wanting to have a conscience, so an openness to being approached by the same other — Dasein's self in its radical alterity.

If the place wherein Dasein usually dwells — namely its everydayness — is understood to be the realm wherein things are possible, wherein things have meaning, and if this is the sphere wherein Dasein *lives*, then naturally the region of alterity will appear as beyond meaning, beyond possibility, beyond life and existence; hence, it is death. However, this death, this region which seems to be so radically discontinuous with Dasein, actually belongs to Dasein and Dasein to it. The call of conscience shows this very clearly. Conscience discloses Being-towards-death as belonging to Dasein because of the way the call singles out Dasein. In singling out Dasein, the call reveals the demand which Dasein's existence places upon it. This demand is not arbitrarily exacted by the call, but already has been placed upon Dasein because Dasein is an existing entity thrown towards its death. Conscience singles out Dasein for something for which death has already singled it out. Conscience reveals a responsibility to be its Being-towards-death, a responsibility with which Dasein's Being qua existing, finite, Being-in-the-world has already burdened it. Death is not simply impossibility; it is *Dasein's* impossibility; it is a possibility of Dasein's Being. Therefore, Dasein possesses but is also possessed by a possibility of its own impossibility, namely its death. In this way, a **continuity** is established between this death, this alterity, and Dasein, because death is Dasein's possibility and remains so from the moment Dasein enters existence until the moment it draws its last breath.

In anxious Being-towards-death, Dasein finds itself encountered by a radical alterity, which has singled it out and thereby belongs to it. This alterity threatens Dasein's existence, thereby throwing the meaning of that existence into question. Although Dasein's usual ways of understanding things may not assist it in understanding the alterity with which it is presented, this does not imply that Dasein does not understand what is expressed through the encounter. The call pronounces Dasein's guilt which is given to Dasein to understand through a disclosure of its not-ness [*Nichtigkeit*].[8] This is the **meaning** of the call. As we have seen on the basis of the discussion in

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[8] The fact that Dasein can understand this suggests a further way in which it may be construed as continuous with the caller.

Chapter 3, Heidegger phenomenologically discloses existential guilt by unpacking the roots of guilt as we understand it in everydayness. That is, Being-guilty means being responsible for some lack; it is Being the basis of a lack. Heidegger understands lack as the not-Being of something. In existential terms, then, guilt translates into Being the basis for the not-Being of something. What Heidegger means is that Dasein's existence determines it as not-Being what it is. As thrown Being-in-the-world, Dasein is not the basis of its own existence. Dasein is not responsible for the fact that it is thrown into the world; it has not chosen to be born; it has not chosen to be an entity whose nature it is to exist. Yet, Dasein's thrownness is the basis of its existence: if it were not thrown, it would not exist; and as existing, Dasein always exists as thrown. Since its Being *is* its existence, Dasein always *is* its basis, but in a different sense than the first. Because of the paradoxical way in which Dasein is the basis of its existence and thus responsible for it, but yet also is not the basis for its existence and hence unable to be responsible for it, Dasein always has a responsibility which it has somehow never been able to discharge or live up to; for this reason, Dasein is guilty.[9]

The sense in which Dasein both is what it is not and is not what it is, forms the kernel of the not-ness which Heidegger identifies, and is crucially related to Dasein's death. Death, also somewhat paradoxically, is the possibility of Dasein's own impossibility, but is also the ground of all possibility for Dasein. In so far as Dasein is possibility and death is impossibility, Dasein is not death; that is, Dasein is discontinuous with death. However, death is not just impossibility, but *Dasein's* possibility of impossibility; death belongs to Dasein, and Dasein belongs to it. In so far as Dasein always is its possibilities, it therefore also is its death. Here we can see that Dasein both is and is not its death. The call of conscience which pronounces Dasein's guilt is supposed to disclose Dasein's Being-towards-death. Consequently, the *not* disclosed relative to Dasein's Being its own basis in conscience is implicated with the *not* which is involved in Dasein's paradoxical relationship to its death. The *not* of Dasein's impossibility and the *not* of Dasein's guilt are the same.

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[9] This concept of guilt does, I think, contain the emphasis on the weightiness of existence and thrownness which Levinas thinks receives improper attention in Heidegger.

The disclosure of the not-ness which lies at the heart of Dasein's Being throws Dasein's existence into question and thereby discloses its **questionability** in a variety of ways. First, that Dasein's Being is disclosed as not being what it is raises doubts for Dasein about what its Being is at all. Second, and closely related to the first, the disclosure of Dasein's death in its anxious Being-towards-death also renders its Being — namely, existence — questionable in that the disclosure throws into question the whole meaning and purpose of that existence, as well as any kind of certainty with respect to the future of Dasein's factical existence. In the call of conscience, the questionability of Dasein's existence is similarly disclosed in terms of a challenge. The call has a certain urgency which demands a response, and in this way Dasein finds itself questioned, perhaps even threatened.

In summary, then, we have examined the phenomena of Dasein's anxious Being-towards-death and the call of conscience for traces of the constellation of dialogical concepts in order to ascertain whether these phenomena may be understood dialogically. Dialogue is understood as a relation to **alterity** marked by both **continuity and discontinuity**, in which a particular **responsibility and questionability** are disclosed, and which bears a relation to **meaning**. These concepts reveal themselves in the following way: Dasein's responsibility shows itself in the phenomenon of conscience in which Dasein finds itself called upon by an other to take up the task of its existence. This other — this alterity — is at one and the same time both Dasein's self and its own nothingness, its not-ness or *Nichtigkeit*, indeed its own death. In so far as this not-ness is other than Dasein, Dasein is discontinuous with it; in so far as this not-ness belongs to Dasein and vice versa, Dasein is continuous with it and cannot be separated from it. The call of conscience and the disclosure of Dasein's existence against the horizon of its death discloses Dasein's Being as questionable. The meaning which belongs to this disclosure is that of Dasein's guilt. We can see that the dialogical constellation is at work in this dimension of authenticity.

ii. Anxious Being-towards-death and the dialogic encounter

To enrich our understanding of the form that dialogue takes in anxious Being-towards-death and the call of conscience, we must take a closer look at the particular features of the situation itself. I will consider how movement, participation, the *in-between*, and openness show themselves in the situation of the participants relative to one another in this context. And I will consider the relationship between these features and the particular axes of spatiality, temporality, and significance to which they are related. My aim is to demonstrate that anxious Being-towards-death and its disclosure through conscience bear the character of a dialogic encounter.

Movement is the aspect which shows the spatial orientation of the participants relative to one another. Is any element of movement apparent in the phenomenon of anxious Being-towards-death? The predominant metaphor of movement throughout Heidegger's text can be found in his characterization of existence in terms of thrownness, projection, and falling. Dasein is thrown into its world, projects upon its possibilities, and is always falling back into inauthenticity or at least everydayness. In each case, it is Dasein who is in motion, and this motion is charted or measured relative to Dasein's possibilities in the world. In so far as the world can be seen to be constituted by these possibilities — which would, in a sense, not be incorrect to say — then Dasein's movement is always to be judged relative to the world. However, we should be careful in so characterizing movement not to attribute to the world a kind of spatiality, in terms of three-dimensional geometry, which Heidegger would explicitly renounce. The world is where Dasein dwells; in so far as we can describe this world as a *there* which has a *where*, a certain spatiality does pertain to it, but it is not the same as the one known to the physicist.

Ultimately, Heidegger's position is that Dasein's spatiality is derivative of its temporality. That is, the hanging together of space into a world — a *there* which has meaning — is due to the ecstatic movement of Dasein's temporalizing. For this reason, we must qualify what is meant in correlating movement with spatiality. The space wherein Dasein dwells is a situation which can be described with respect to the spatial, temporal, and significative matrices which give definition to that dwelling. For the purposes of my analysis, I will try to discuss each of these separately, but it is important to see that they remain closely bound up with one another.

The idea of movement is implied in Heidegger's application of the terminology of thrownness, projection, and falling to the phenomenon of Being-towards-death. In anxious Being-towards-death, Dasein is thrown towards its death; it projects towards the possibility of its death. Nevertheless, in so far as death singles out Dasein, disclosing Dasein's death as its ownmost possibility, this possibility throws Dasein back upon itself. The motion suggested here is rather like that of something (Dasein) running headlong into something (death) which resists it, causing the colliding object to bounce off. Upon first inspection, this seems somewhat different from what occurs in the ontic attestation of Being-towards-death through the call of conscience. In this phenomenon what is more explicitly thematized is the way in which this Being-towards-death is disclosed to Dasein, how Dasein experiences this call that is equiprimordial with its anxiety. To say that Dasein finds itself to be called is to say that Dasein feels itself summoned. This means that, in the first instance, Dasein experiences an approach by an other. Since this approaching is a summons, it calls Dasein forth: that is, it asks Dasein to draw near in response. Here the movement appears to be taking on the kind of reciprocity of participation that characterizes the flow of conversation. However, in being called forward, Dasein is also being called back to itself. This shows itself with particular clarity in so far as what is disclosed in the call is Dasein's guilt, its not-ness, and thus also its questionability. In this sense the calling forward which occurs through the call also results in Dasein being thrown back upon itself. So considered, we can see a resemblance with the movement identified in anxious Being-towards-death as a rebounding off a stationary surface. But as the discussion of the call illustrates, Dasein does not experience that surface as stationary; Dasein experiences the other as approaching it. This is no doubt largely due to the degree to which Dasein is mostly inattentive to the fact that it is itself hurtling toward that limit.

This illustrates that the movement suggested by anxious Being-towards-death and its disclosure through the call resembles the **coming together** which I described in Chapter 6 as being the movement which belongs to the dialogic encounter. This coming together could occur in one of two ways. Either Dasein collides with another moving entity — i.e. their individual trajectories meet at some point — or Dasein collides with something stationary.[10] This pertains to spatiality in that, in the first instance, two entities are seen to dwell in the same place, and in the second, the limits of that space itself are experienced. The latter most closely resembles the kind of situation to which we are referring in Being-towards-death; the former more closely resembles what Buber talks about in terms of the standard *I-Thou* encounter.

Two important features of the spatiality (and also temporality) involved here are revealed through the collision with the limit which Dasein's death and impossibility present to Dasein. Firstly, in running up against its limits, Dasein gains a better sense of the confines of its *there*. That is, the possibility of its impossibility discloses Dasein's Being as possibility in a way that Dasein could not previously appreciate. This limit experience discloses Dasein's finitude. Secondly, in this collision the distance between Dasein's self and its other is collapsed, and they suddenly find themselves face-to-face before one another. In the disclosive moment of anxiety, and in the moment where Dasein hears the call, Dasein finds itself presented with itself in its alterity. Dasein finds itself in a simultaneity of presence with that which it is not. In this ecstatic moment, the temporal distance which separates Dasein from itself is traversed: this is Dasein's anxious Being-towards-death. The other does not maintain itself at a respectful distance from Dasein, but penetrates to the core of Dasein's Being; the only way Dasein can regain some distance from the other and what it discloses is by fleeing it.

Closely related to the orientational aspect of movement and spatiality is participation, which I have noted tends to be either reciprocal or simultaneous, depending upon the mode of dialogue. Participation has a distinctly temporal sense to it which pertains to whether the interaction proceeds by turn-taking over a period of time, or whether it is compressed into a moment of simultaneity. The structure of the call suggests a reciprocity of participation between the called and the caller which seems to imply that the call belongs to the conversational variety of dialogue. However, a give-and-take between participants does not appear to be a feature of anxious Being-towards-death. Instead, Dasein bumps up against a limit; this resembles the convergence or collision of participants which I have said characterizes encounter. Dasein finds itself face-to-face with the possibility of its death, and in being brought into a **simultaneity** of presence with it, Dasein is momentarily paralyzed by anxiety. This moment of disruption shows itself in the call as well. All of a sudden Dasein finds itself called. This call interrupts Dasein's usual activity, arresting it: the call intercepts Dasein on its trajectory. In anxious Being-towards-death, Dasein comes before itself as thrown Being-in-the-world and thrown Being-towards-death. The *Unheimlichkeit* which accompanies this experience involves a falling away of the world which leaves Dasein hovering in an ambiguity between the possibilities of fleeing in the face of itself or embracing its Being-towards-death in resoluteness. This moment of ambiguity suggests a temporary suspension of action.

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[10] A third option would be the collision of a moving thing with a stationary Dasein, but that option is ruled out here because Dasein is taken to be non-stationary.

Another aspect of simultaneity pertains to the temporality of phenomenological disclosure and its manifestation in anxious Being-towards-death and the call of conscience. On a certain level, all such disclosures involve a simultaneity. This shows itself clearly in the way Heidegger describes events or moments of disclosure, particularly in the early part of Division II. For instance, the call of conscience is only disclosed in Dasein's having heard it. Dasein does not first hear it and then decide whether or not to respond; not responding is an indication that Dasein has not heard the call, for the call is an appeal and demands a response. There are a number of other phenomena that are similarly disclosed only in Dasein's response to them. Additional examples are: wanting to have a conscience, which discloses itself in Dasein's hearing the call; being ready for anxiety, which discloses itself in being anxious; and resoluteness, which discloses itself in a resolution. The significance of this is that moments which might ordinarily be thought to succeed one another or to give rise to a subsequent moment are compressed into a simultaneity in an event of disclosure. This is consistent with Heidegger's discussion in HCT of the experience of truth. Generally speaking, one experiences truth when evidence is given which provides the intuitive content which fulfills an intention. However, usually we do not experience the sequence of first having the intention and then receiving the intuitive content. Often we are not explicitly aware of these intentions and our attention is only drawn to them when they are fulfilled. This is why Dasein's readiness for anxiety only manifests itself in its being anxious. In being anxious, it is disclosed to Dasein that it was ready for anxiety. Phenomenological disclosure displays a distinctive middle-voice character, in which the strong distinction between the acts of signification which generate intentions, and the acts of intuition which fulfill them, become blurred; one is left with events of disclosure which can only later be analyzed in terms of particular acts.[11]

This middle-voice aspect marks an interesting similarity between the encounter in Buber's spirit of the *I-Thou* and certain aspects of Heidegger's text. In his discussion of the *I-Thou*, Buber talks about the encounter as a union of grace and will. In discussing Buber's work, Theunissen also emphasizes the extent to which Buber is looking for something which goes beyond the either/or of activity and passivity. Heidegger, too, is interested in a region beyond activity and passivity which is characterized by the ambiguity of the middle voice. Indeed the ambiguity between subjectivity and objectivity which surrounds Being-in-the-world is such a case. But the middle-voice phenomenon occurs in other places as well, most notably in the equiprimordial pairings Heidegger uses to describe Dasein's existence and its Being-in — specifically Dasein's thrown-projection and the co-disclosures of *Befindlichkeit* and understanding. In this regard it is worth recalling the language of the clearing: that Dasein clears, is cleared, and is indeed the location of the event itself. This ambiguity — what we might call the multi-voicedness of Dasein's disclosedness — lies not just in the pairing of active and passive dimensions of phenomenological disclosure, but also in the interplay between the static and active characterizations of the clearing as both the event of phenomenological disclosure and the place where it occurs. This ambiguity is heightened in anxious Being-towards-death and the call. In this case, disclosure, which consists in the middle-voice moments of being anxious and hearing the call, occurs through both active and passive comportments on the part of Dasein.

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[11] In this vein, see Scott's work.

As I mentioned, on a certain level, all phenomenological disclosures involve this ambiguity of the middle voice and a simultaneity of what is given in significative and intuitive acts. Generally, however, this simultaneity passes without notice.[12] However, there are certain cases where what is given intuitively is so arresting that one experiences the simultaneity in a far more intensified way (perhaps as a being approached). I would suggest that anxious Being-towards-death and the call of conscience are such cases. In everydayness, Dasein is its Being primarily in the mode of an empty intention, and so its Being remains largely other to it. In authenticity — the pinnacle of which is reached in the moment of vision — Dasein's empty intention of its Being is momentarily fulfilled when Dasein is brought before its own *not*. Through this simultaneity of presence, intuitive content is given which fulfills Dasein's intention. This is not a fulfillment which completes Dasein, but one which *rips Dasein apart*. The disclosure of Dasein's Being-towards-death exposes Dasein to its alterity and makes it vulnerable. The disclosure is shattering enough to draw attention to the simultaneity, resulting in a moment of suspension in which Dasein loses its momentum and is brought to a pause. The hesitation lasts but a moment and it resembles the suspension associated with the moment of vision, in which the various movements of Being-in-the-world — thrownness, projection, and falling — and the corresponding disclosive moments of *Befindlichkeit*, understanding, and discourse converge into a single moment. This convergence is at once the integration of the various ecstases of temporal existence (and thus a bringing together of moments that are other from within the perspective of existence) as well as a bringing together of Dasein with its own alterity.

In anxious Being-towards-death, Dasein and its other move toward each other into a simultaneity of presence. This engagement is full of significance. As described in Chapter 6, the *in-between* is always the region of meaning which exists between self and other and is sustained through their interaction. It envelops them and holds them in their orientation relative to one another. Anxious Being-towards-death has an ontological significance in that it says something about Dasein's Being. Here, self and other are Dasein and its alterity, as represented by its death. What binds them together and orients them is Dasein's Being-towards-death, in particular its anxious Being-towards-death. Being-towards-death is an intentional directedness for Heidegger. Indeed it is just another way of expressing the intentionality of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Although this intentional directedness is largely covered over and empty in everydayness, in anxiety it is fulfilled and experienced in a greater immediacy as an openness to the otherness and uncertainty of death, and to Dasein's Being as possibility. Moreover, we know that for Heidegger, intentionality is the structure of lived experience; thus, anxious Being-towards-death is characterized by an immediacy of lived experience which binds Dasein to its death and orients Dasein relative to it.

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[12] If all phenomenological disclosure features this simultaneity, then in what sense can engagement with objects ever be reciprocal and conversational, as I have maintained they can be in Chapter 4? There, I noted that a single exchange of meaning with an object does indeed resemble an encounter, but that the engagement takes on a certain reciprocity when extended temporally. Because I am constantly changing and because the networks of meaning against which the object appears is subject to alteration, what the object gives to understand can also change over time. In this sense, the engagement with objects that one encounters repeatedly can assume a conversational character, and the simultaneity involved in the disclosure is masked by the familiarity of the object.

The meaning of this intentional immediacy is given to Dasein through the call of conscience as Dasein's guilt, namely as its Being the basis for its own not-ness. This not-ness expresses Dasein's groundlessness — that Dasein has no absolute foundation or basis which justifies it and to which it can abdicate responsibility. In this sense, the alterity which Dasein encounters in anxious Being-towards-death gives Dasein nothing to understand and throws Dasein back upon itself. Dasein has no excuses; it has only its guilt. One might say that this guilt represents the thematic unity around which the dialogical structure of the call turns. But this would suggest that Dasein has a conversation with the caller about this guilt, which is not exactly accurate. Rather, the caller *pronounces* Dasein's guilt and thereby gives Dasein to understand that it is responsible for its existence, and that its existence places certain burdens and demands upon it.[13] The flow and reciprocity characteristic of conversation are absent here; guilt is disclosed in a singular momentary revelation which defines the relationship that exists between Dasein and its self in its alterity. In this way guilt is what binds Dasein to itself.

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[13] This suggests an interesting resemblance with Levinas' encounter of the *I-You* (*je-vous*). For Levinas, the Other (*You*) speaks to the *I* from a height and commands it. This is an asymmetrical relationship in which it does not appear that the *I* speaks to the *You*. Similarly, Dasein does not seem to speak to its caller, although

This is an important aspect of the *in-between* as it shows itself in *the between* of encounter. The *in-between* acts as a bond which both orients the participants relative to one another and preserves their difference. For example, in Buber's work the *I-Thou* relation is *the between* which defines the participants as *I* and *Thou*. A similar phenomenon manifests itself in the particular case of Dasein's Being-towards-death, in that this relation to death is that which *allows* Dasein to be mortal. Dasein is what it is because of its relation to its death, and this relation also allows it to be guilty, to both be what it is not and to not be what it is.

Moreover, the meaning that is given to the not-ness which is disclosed both in Dasein's anxious Being-towards-death and its ontic attestation in the call of conscience is expressed extra-linguistically and is left somewhat indeterminate. The pronouncement of guilt is handed down like a judgment, but it does not specify what Dasein is guilty of. Indeed, if it did, the guilt would be open to being misinterpreted as a judgment of some form of ontic guilt and so would lose its ontological significance. For this reason, the significance of Dasein's guilt lies primarily in its revelation. Only in the pronouncement itself is the meaning seen. This is largely due to the fact that the pronouncement occurs in silence. Language maintains meaning outside of the specific and particular individual

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it heeds the pronouncement of its own guilt. This may present us with a bit of a problem, for I have tried to characterize the encounter with death as an *I-Thou*, not an *I-You*. My primary reason for doing so is that it is important that the *I* be evoked in its particularity and specificity, otherwise the mineness of Dasein's Being which must be disclosed in authenticity cannot become manifest to it. The *I-Thou*, as opposed to the *I-It*, involves such an address. As I have noted earlier, in so far as the *I-You* is a third-person mode of address, it resembles the *I-It*. This suggests that the *You* cannot address Dasein in the specificity which belongs to the first person. However, Levinas seems to conceive of his *I-You* differently than Buber would. Part of the asymmetry of the relationship seems to be that the *You* addresses the *I* in its particularity (like an adult addressing a child), but the *I* is not accorded a similar privilege. Thus, if the call of conscience resembles Levinas' *I-You*, this does not imply that it falls within the range of the *I-It*. However, this leaves us with the problem of whether it is really an *I-Thou* or an *I-You* in this second sense. I would suggest that it is both, and that the ambiguity of the relation to the caller stems from the simultaneity of continuity and discontinuity with the other which characterizes that relation. In so far as the caller is a no-one calling from no-where saying no-thing, it is discontinuous with Dasein, and its call issues from a height. This characterizes Levinas' *I-You*. But in so far as the caller is Dasein's self, it is continuous with Dasein; it is an other which is familiar, close. It is a *Thou*.

contexts in which it is used, but a silence can only be meaningful in the specific instances in which it occurs. The point here is that the meaning is inaccessible to Dasein outside of the context of its revelation.[14] For this reason it more closely resembles the meaning associated with *the between* of the encounter than the thematic unity of a conversation (the meaningfulness of which seems to maintain a certain degree of independence relative to the actual utterances through which it is revealed).

Finally, it would not be possible for the participants to be oriented relative to one another if they were not open to one another. The **openness** characteristic of dialogue can be seen in Heidegger's formulations of Dasein's attitude with respect to the call, namely that Dasein is ready for anxiety, that it wants to hear the call, that it opens itself to a threat. What all of these expressions indicate is that Dasein would not experience anxiety, hear the call, or feel threatened by the questionability of its existence as disclosed against the horizon of death, unless it were open to the alterity with which its death presents it. The openness that belongs to the encounter is not significantly different from that associated with conversation, so my pointing out this openness only strengthens the position that the disclosure of anxious Being-towards-death in the call of conscience is dialogical, although it does not go any further towards specifying the mode in which it is dialogical. However, as I have demonstrated, the other features of movement, participation, and the *in-between* are evident in this phenomenon in a way which is more generally characteristic of the encounter than of conversation — despite the resemblance which the structure of the call of conscience bears (at least superficially) to conversation.

The extent to which the dialogicality which belongs to anxious Being-towards-death occurs as a bracketing of another mode of comportment strengthens the point that it is a type of encounter. In Part II, I argued that the dialogical encounter is in some ways a surpassing of a previous and ongoing engagement. That is, anxious Being-towards-death — as a bracketing of and thus a "transcendence" of everydayness — bears a resemblance to encounter's bracketing and "transcending" of conversation. For

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[14] This is quite similar to the point made earlier with respect to the call only revealing itself in the phenomenon of conscience.

Heidegger, this kind of transcendence originates in Dasein's ecstatic temporality.

The bracketing that occurs within the context of the encounter is, as noted in Chapter 6, primarily characterized by a transcending of our usual engagement with the other along the lines of spatiality, temporality, and significance which generally orient our interaction. One way in which this transcendence — this exploding beyond the boundaries of the everyday self — is experienced is through ecstasy. In ecstasy, the self reaches out beyond itself towards the other, leaving itself behind, metaphorically speaking, through a self-forgetfulness.[15] This ecstasy is both a fascination with the other and a disruption of the self in its usual state.

This sense of rupture with the self is evident in Heidegger's description of anxious Being-towards-death, in which the meaningfulness of the world and of Dasein's self as positioned within that world is thrown into question, disrupted, or broken. This is reflected in the *Unheimlichkeit* which is part of anxiety. Dasein is no longer at home with itself; it no longer dwells with itself; it has been othered. But Heidegger also, interestingly enough, characterizes this rupture with everydayness — which reaches its fulfillment in the moment of vision — as being one of ecstatic rapture.[16]

> This term [the moment of vision] must be understood in the active sense as an ecstasis. It means the resolute rapture with which Dasein is carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in the Situation as possible objects of concern, but a rapture which is *held* in resoluteness. (SZ 338)

Heidegger may not mean here the sense of ecstasy which would be associated with an erotic encounter, but it does seem that he is interested in a type of absorption which carries one beyond oneself. This is consistent with the sense of ecstasy that I have associated with the dialogical encounter. What is most important for the Heideggerian sense is the ec-static dimension of ecstasy. Heidegger emphasizes this as an essential part of existence, as evidenced not only by his later formulations of existence as an ek-sistence, but also in his use of the term ‘ecstasis’ in the context of the temporal moments of the future, present, and past.

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[15] This is a self-forgetfulness in the sense that in the moment of ecstasy, Dasein forgets its everyday self. This is not to be confused with the self-forgetfulness with which Heidegger often refers to everydayness which is a forgetfulness of Dasein's authentic self.

[16] On ecstasy in Heidegger, see Krell 58-59 and John Sallis, *Echoes: After Heidegger* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990) 190-205.

Dasein’s ecstatic temporalizing is what enables it to be towards the other, where that other can be understood as other objects, other Dasein, or other moments in Dasein’s own life. This allows Dasein to be other than or more than what it materially is in the physical world. In its ecstatic movement toward the other, Dasein is able to bring the other close, or allow the other to approach. As I have stressed throughout, this drawing near has spatial, temporal, and significative dimensions. But this ecstatic movement also allows Dasein to distance itself and move away from that with which it had a proximity. This distancing occurs along the same lines of orientation. The surpassing or bracketing which has been noted as a characteristic of encounter is this type of distancing. It is important to see, however, that the movement of approach and withdrawal, and the shifts in proximity and distance between self and other, are relative. Every drawing near to one other is a distancing from a different other. All of these movements are rooted in Dasein’s ecstasis. Dasein is oriented in its *there* according to the relations of nearness and distance which it bears to other entities which figure in the *there*. The set of relations within which Dasein ‘proximally dwells’ is the *there* of its everydayness. The distancing which occurs in encounter, when Dasein allows its death to draw near, constitutes the bracketing which I will investigate more closely here.

In the moment of vision, Dasein experiences an exploding beyond itself which involves the falling away of the meanings within which it usually dwells. This permits the fulfillment of the intentional comportment toward Dasein’s own Being as mortal Being-in-the-world which those other meanings obscure. This disclosure occurs in the first instance in anxiety, through the disclosure of the no-thingness of the world. In everydayness the locus of the meaningfulness of the world is taken to rest in entities themselves. When these entities become devoid of meaning and slip away, what remains is a no-thingness (the worldhood of the world) which defies Dasein’s ordinary way of understanding the world and, importantly, itself. It is in this last sense that Dasein’s *Nichtigkeit* is revealed. This is Dasein’s guilt, which is expressed not just in the mute recalcitrance of the world, but also in the silence of the call itself. The message that the call bears outstrips the powers of signification of our usual discourse. Discourse does not terminate in anxious Being-towards-death; Dasein does not remain locked within itself, as is clear from the emphasis on ecstasis, but has surpassed the usual medium of discourse (language). This is reflected in the way in which the indeterminacy surrounding the call (due to its extra-linguistic character) does not compromise the determinacy of the meaning of its message. What the call says, on the one hand, is indeterminate in so far as it occurs in silence and thus does not participate in the objective meaning associated with language. The call lacks a determinate form. Yet the content of the call, the meaning it conveys, is undeniable; indeed Dasein is left with no doubt in its mind as to the call's significance. In this sense, the call is extremely determinate. In its silence, the call transcends propositional assertorial structure (the structure which Heidegger associates in HCT with empty intentionality); with these trappings stripped away, Dasein can be certain of the call's immediate meaning.

The ecstatic rupture with everydayness also has a spatio-temporal dimension. This rupture carries Dasein beyond the world and places it face-to-face with the worldhood of the world as it is rooted in Dasein's Being. In this sense, Dasein's everyday spatial orientation in the world is disrupted; Dasein is transported into a no-where; it is displaced and uprooted. But since Dasein's understanding of the world and of the spatiality of the world is, for Heidegger, rooted in Dasein's temporality, the rupture with everydayness implies that Dasein transcends its everyday temporality. Heidegger maintains that, in everydayness, Dasein primarily temporalizes itself out of the present, in particular out of an impoverished understanding of the present as *Gegenwart* — a moment of 'now'. Accordingly, in everydayness the other temporal modes come to be understood in terms of the present: the future is a 'not-yet now'; the past is a 'now' that has gone by. Consequently, Dasein's temporality is understood as a series of points, indeed a line of points, that extends into the future and back into the past. This particular concept of temporality is largely entwined with an understanding of Dasein's Being in terms of the present-at-hand; this, from Heidegger's point of view, poses a problem.[17]

In contrast to this linear picture of time, which denotes the present as a particular point on a line, authentic temporality is meant to be more circular — or as some would say, kairological.[18] Dasein's temporalizing becomes an anticipation of the future and a repeating of the past, which are brought together in the instantaneous clarity of the moment of vision. It is this moment that Heidegger describes, as I have noted above, as being the ecstatic moment, and it renders everyday temporality other.[19] This moment resembles the transcendence of conversation involved in the encounter, partly because of its momentary character (which I noted was the way in which an outside observer would likely characterize the temporality of the encounter) and partly because of the sense in which it is "outside of" time. That Heidegger intends the moment of vision to be infused with a certain degree of eternity, and hence timelessness, is perhaps not very obvious on the basis of the text itself. However, his reference to Kierkegaard's conception of the *Augenblick* (as discussed by Jaspers) suggests he has this in mind.[20] In my view, although Heidegger takes issue with the terms in which Kierkegaard has defined the moment of vision and believes it must be explained in terms of a finite temporality, he does not hold that the moment of vision is experienced any differently than it has historically been described. Thus, the *Augenblick* as a moment wherein a finite being experiences infinity or eternity does not seem to be in dispute. For this reason, one can correctly state that the moment of vision is characterized by eternity; as I have noted, eternity is an important aspect of the temporality of the encounter. Thus, the temporality of anxious Being-towards-death, as represented by the moment of vision, consists in a particular bracketing of Dasein's everyday temporalizing.

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[17] Dasein's understanding of Being in terms of the temporal mode of the present leads it to understand the Being of entities in terms of the present as well, namely as presence-at-hand. This in turn affects Dasein's understanding of spatiality: it reduces our understanding of the *there* to something approaching the occurrence of substances in three-dimensional space.

[18] Kisiel, *Genesis of Heidegger's "Being and Time"* 421-24, 435-39.

[19] "The temporality of authentic historicality, as the moment of vision of anticipatory repetition, *deprives* the 'today' of its character *as present*, and weans one from the conventionalities of the 'they'" (SZ 391).

[20] Heidegger refers (SZ 338) to Karl Jasper's text, *Die Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* in which several pages are devoted to the concept of the *Augenblick* and how it has been treated historically by Kierkegaard and others. The *Augenblick*, according to Jaspers, is generally construed as a moment which partakes of eternity. It is somehow stamped with eternity, but is not itself eternity. It is also not to be conceived as an empty eternity, but a fulfilled eternity, an eternity paradoxically infused with facticity and finitude. See Jaspers, *Die Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, 4th ed. (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1954) 108-17.

In the call of conscience, Dasein's self as anxious Being-towards-death pronounces its guilt. It discloses to Dasein that, as thrown Dasein both is and is not its own foundation. The paradoxical ambiguity here is that Dasein's basis both is and is not other; Dasein both is and is not continuous with it. A similar ambiguity lies in the idea of anxious Being-towards-death as disclosed to Dasein through the call. As Being-towards-death, Dasein is its death, yet it is also *not-yet* its death. Drawn before itself as Being-towards-death, Dasein is ecstatically drawn out of the everydayness of its *there* towards the no-thingness and no-whereness of its Being in anxiety; Dasein encounters its own alterity, but is also countered by it, for that alterity is still what Dasein is not; it is still impossibility; it is still inassimilable.

The analysis in this chapter illustrates the way in which Dasein's anxious Being-towards-death and its disclosure through the call of conscience can be understood in dialogical terms, specifically in those terms which pertain most particularly to the dialogic encounter. This has been demonstrated by exploring the way the constellation of dialogical concepts appears here, as well as by examining the features of the dialogic situation which permit us to more closely associate it with encounter. Finally, considering that encounter can be regarded as a bracketing or surpassing of conversation, the degree to which anxious Being-towards-death partakes of such a bracketing seems to support the view that it can be appropriately characterized in terms of encounter. If this is so, however, it implies that there is a conversation which becomes bracketed through the happening of the encounter. That is, encounter always occurs on the basis of an existing conversation which has an ontical priority. Thus, if Dasein's anxious Being-towards-death is to be understood as an encounter, it must be possible to characterize that which is bracketed — namely everydayness — in terms of the conversational figure of dialogue. This is the task of the next chapter.

Chapter 8

Conversation and Dasein's Everyday Being-in-the-world

In the foregoing chapter, I illustrated the affinity between anxious Being-towards-death and the dialogic encounter. But in the discussion of encounter in Part II, I argued that encounter — although perhaps enjoying an ontological priority — is only factically possible on the basis of a conversational dialogue which is already underway and which is bracketed in the happening of the encounter. To strengthen the position, then, that anxious Being-towards-death has the character of an encounter, I must demonstrate how that which gets bracketed — namely Dasein's everydayness — can be characterized in terms of conversation.

I will illustrate this in the following fashion. Following the pattern established in Chapter 7, I will first consider the way in which everydayness can be understood as dialogical in terms of the constellation of dialogical concepts. Then I will demonstrate how this dialogicality can be characterized as conversational with reference to the particular features of flow, reciprocity, thematic unity, and openness. In this discussion, I will focus on everydayness as a general phenomenon. However, in order to sharpen our understanding, I will also consider a specific example of an everyday interaction in which greater attention can be given to specific exchanges between specific dialogic partners. Throughout, I will be attentive to how the conversationality of everydayness primarily occurs in the mode of the third person and as an empty intentionality. These issues will receive greater consideration in Chapter 9.

i. The dialogicality of everydayness

We should begin by briefly reconsidering the phenomenon we intend to analyze, that is, Dasein's Being-in-the-world in its everydayness. Being-in-the-world is the concept Heidegger uses to express Dasein's intentionality. Although I have already argued that intentionality is dialogical according to the mode of conversation, more should be said to demonstrate that Being-in-the-world in particular can be characterized as dialogue. We must examine this Being-in-the-world more closely. My strategy in this section will be to briefly consider, in Heidegger's own terms, Dasein's Being-in-the-world in general and with reference to a specific example. I will then analyze, first, the example, and second, Dasein's Being-in-the-world in general, with reference to the constellation of dialogical concepts.

Although intentionality is a Being-towards, this is not to be understood in the uni-directional sense it is often thought to imply. Dasein's Being-towards is a Being-in, where that Being-in is not intended to imply a spatial relation that pertains to three-dimensional, geometrical space. This 'in' pertains to a 'dwelling'[1] or perhaps we could say a *belonging*. For Heidegger, the world is not a random collection of entities but is always a meaningful context in terms of which entities can be seen to belong together in a particular way, to stand in certain relations with respect to one another. That Dasein is in such a world means that Dasein too is oriented toward these entities by virtue of this context. Dasein too belongs to the structure of meaningful relations that make up the world. Dasein not only understands that these entities hang together in a particular way, it understands *how* (by virtue of what) they hang together as they do. This is what it means to say that Dasein understands the totality of significations, the referential structure of the world, the world's meaning [*Sinn*].

The meaningful context of the world and Dasein's situatedness therein underlies the possibility of Dasein's understanding and being affected by the world in any way. As modes of disclosedness, *Befindlichkeit*, understanding, and discourse at once disclose Dasein as situated in a particular way within a particular meaningful context, and imply a particular understanding of this Being-in overall. That is, the disclosure of a particular situation as meaningful depends upon Dasein's antecedent understanding of its Being as a dwelling in a world, even though such an understanding is largely obscure to it.

This involvement in the world has both active and passive aspects, as suggested by the movement implicit in *Befindlichkeit* and understanding, in particular. Dasein's disclosedness means that Dasein's situatedness in a particular context is always disclosed in some way. This implies that Dasein is always aware not only that it has certain possibilities with respect to the entities which surround it, and that it can effect change in the world or be an actor in the world, but also that it is in turn affected by the world.

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[1] The idea that Heidegger emphasizes here is the difference between '*in*' and '*bei*', the second being what he wants to imply. Unfortunately, both terms translate to 'in' in English. '*Bei*' retains the sense of the French '*chez*' and includes the meaning of 'in' that we have when we say '*in* Heidegger's work' or '*in* the concept of Being-in-the-world'.

It is important to emphasize that the understanding of the world that Dasein exhibits in its Being-in-the-world is at the same time an understanding of itself relative to that world, an understanding of its own Being as Being-in-the-world. Implicit in all of this, as we know from our discussion in Part I, is an understanding of the sense [*Sinn*] of Being in general. It is with reference to this sense or meaning of Being that the world is able to hang together in a meaningful way, that the world *makes sense*. In our engagement with the world, we expect it to make sense, and we interpret specific phenomena in such a way that they fit in with the whole. It is important to emphasize the sense of meaning as *Sinn* in this context.

The point to be highlighted here is that Dasein experiences its Being-in-the-world as meaningful [*sinnvoll*] (even if that meaning is a certain meaninglessness). Dasein experiences this meaning through the modes of disclosedness. In *Befindlichkeit* Dasein finds itself disposed towards the world in one way or another; it discloses itself as already involved in some project which orients it toward entities in the world. The understanding which accompanies *Befindlichkeit* discloses possibilities from out of this involvement. How I find myself situated in the world pertains to the kinds of possibilities that understanding discloses. How I tend to be affected and how I tend to understand possibilities in the world is largely governed by discourse. Discourse provides the terms in which things have previously been understood and expressed, and the world and our specific situation usually disclose themselves to us in these terms. That is, because Being-in-the-world is a type of intentionality, the disclosure which occurs through this intentionality involves a type of categorial intuition. The categories through which the intuition occurs are possible on the basis of the discourse which establishes and maintains the terms that may be used to apprehend the Being of objects. The objectivity of categorial intuition depends upon the "independence" of discourse, on its being public. Its terms are widely used and shared, mediating the interaction of many.

In this way, the discourse takes on an objective character, lying outside of any particular subject, able to govern the way in which we understand the world and disclose possibilities.[2]

To further the point, let us imagine an everyday situation. Last week I received a birthday gift from my grandmother, and although I have written a short thank-you note, I have not gotten around to buying any stamps. The letter has been sitting on my desk sealed in an envelope for several days, and I still have not mailed it. Finally, I cannot procrastinate any longer; I take the letter to the post office, where I stand in line and, after a lengthy wait, reach the window. I ask the clerk for several stamps, pay with a $5 bill, and receive change. I put one of the stamps on my grandmother's letter, drop it in the mail box, and proceed down the street feeling that I have had a very productive morning.

Although this example is entirely banal — and we do things like this all the time without any reflection — it is a phenomenologically rich situation. We will begin by considering how this situation can be described in terms of Being-in-the-world. We immediately notice that there are several practices or networks of significance which are brought together in this one example: the practice of gift-giving, the practice of purchasing something, and the practice of mailing letters. Because it is unclear whether any of our engagements in the world are ever truly reducible to one practice, it is important to appreciate the way in which even the most mundane of our activities involves a complex interweaving of 'equipmental contexts' which refer back and forth to one another.

Let us consider the purchasing situation in terms of concern. Here we could say that the *for-the-sake-of-which* in terms of which everything is illuminated is the goal of sending this letter. I go to the post office *in order to* purchase the stamps *in order to* mail the letter. I stand in line at the post office *in order to* ask the clerk for the stamps, and I give her money *in order to* pay for them. Heidegger would say that the particular end that I have in mind illuminates a whole network of possibilities. The money, that had the rather vague *in-order-to* of being for buying things, now has a specific *in-order-to* — to buy the stamps I need. The mailbox, which previously had a rather vague possibility, now shows itself as being able to be used to mail *my* letter. The point is that my possibility, namely the possibility of mailing this letter, towards which I have projected myself, frees the various objects I encounter for certain possibilities relative to that *for-the-sake-of-which*.

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[2] This issue of objectivity was an important point of emphasis in Heidegger's discussion of categorial intuition in HCT. He was quite insistent that Being was *not* something projected over objects by the subject but that it had an objective character that was apprehended by categorial intuition, although not, admittedly, accessible to simple perception.

It is important to see that the *for-the-sake-of-which* which governs my particular action of buying stamps is itself something that is located in another context, from which it derives its significance and importance. The mailing of the letter itself has its own *for-the-sake-of-which* — which is to thank my grandmother — and that too takes its meaning from the practice that we have of thanking people when they give us gifts, which itself refers to the practice of recognizing birthdays by the giving of gifts and so on. My point is that these practices are intricately imbedded in and intertwined with one another. They refer in multiple ways to one another to such a degree that any sort of ontic analysis of the networks of signification at play would likely never reach completion.

This situation also involves Dasein's solicitude. I approach the postal clerk *as* a postal clerk, as someone who has the ability to sell me the stamps I need to send my letter. This is the possibility for which I free the clerk, and it takes its reference from the *for-the-sake-of-which* towards which I am oriented.[3] This is not limited to my interaction with the clerk, but extends to the way she approaches me. I am approached as a customer; I am freed for this possibility relative to the *for-the-sake-of-which* which belongs to the clerk, namely that of getting through this day at work. Thus, the clerk does not deal with me in my singularity any more than I deal with her in her singularity: we are both interchangeable, both easily represented by others. The important feature of the situation, from both of our perspectives, is the function we perform, the possibilities which we represent, the means to which we are each an end. This kind of interaction is interaction in the *third person*; we do not, by and large, address one another in our particularity. Our interaction is governed by particular rules of conduct which apply in such situations; we have certain expectations regarding how the other will behave and how we ought to behave, and we generally abide by these. But these rules are established by Dasein as *das Man*. Thus, when we conduct ourselves in a way which conforms with these established practices of interaction, *we approach both the other and ourselves* as being interchangeable in this regard; we act in the third person, as representatives of *das Man*.[4] In this way, we are both disclosed by the situation in accordance with the possibilities that can primarily be said to belong to *das Man*.

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[3] This kind of interaction is highly characteristic of *das Man*. "In that with which we concern ourselves environmentally the Others are encountered as what they are; they *are* what they do" (SZ 126).

It is also interesting to consider the way in which I comport toward the other people in the line. This is a perfect example of what Heidegger means when he says that others are those from whom one does not generally distinguish oneself, in that they are generally given as 'Being-there-too'. Indeed, I see the other people in the line as also being customers, also waiting in line in order to conduct some similar business at the post office. I see them as being there for reasons similar to my own. This demonstrates not only that I have disclosed them only relative to one particular possibility of their Being, but that I have also disclosed my own Being in terms of this same possibility, otherwise I would not have this sense of them 'Being-there-too, with me'. This is not true simply because I do not know these people, or do not know their names. Indeed, the fact that I have written a thank-you note to my grandmother in response to a gift that she has sent me is also governed by a set of practices in which it has been established that this is the appropriate response to such an act. Indeed, I send thank-you notes to anyone who sends me a gift. Even in this situation, there is a sense in which the situation discloses us in the third person.

The situation described here is governed by the publicness of *das Man*, which shows itself in the expectations that we have regarding the behavior of the other, and the norms which we follow in conducting ourselves. We behave as 'they' behave. Such behavior displays the features which Heidegger calls *distantiality*, in which Dasein measures itself against the behavior of others and modifies its comportment accordingly. I would not do anything while standing in the line which would draw attention to myself as anything more than a postal customer. Distantiality results in a certain averageness, for we all act according to the same model. This uniformity constitutes a levelling down of the possibilities of Being, not only for myself, but for the others involved in the situation. Because of this publicness and third-person character of the involvement, Dasein becomes disburdened of its Being as possibility, for it sees its possibilities as lying outside of it, given to it by *das Man*, and does not disclose to itself that possibility belongs to its Being. In this way, Dasein evades its existential responsibility.

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[4] This raises the rather involved question of what distinguishes first-person from third-person interaction and modes of address. This will be addressed at greater length in Chapter 9. Suffice it to say for now that it pertains to the specificity of interaction relative to the individuality of the participants.

Heidegger speaks of all of this in pejorative terms, but it is important to see that he is critical of this, not because it is immoral, but because it is empty and banal. There is nothing wrong with behaving this way while buying stamps. However, it is also important to see that what many of us would consider to be a morally appropriate thing to do — writing a thank-you note to one's grandmother — is largely governed by the same kind of publicness, and hence is often a ritual which is just as banal and empty. The *das Man* mode of comportment is a form of empty intentionality. This is true in part because of the way in which the interaction assumes, but does not grasp, the possibilities which the situation discloses, as well as Dasein's own Being qua *Seinkönnen*. It is also true in that this *das Man* type of comportment is directed at another without intuiting that other with any degree of specificity and immediacy. This is why the other appears as interchangeable, or simply refers to the end in view. It is in this sense that the lived experience involved in this kind of interaction can be construed as empty and lacking in intuitive fulfillment.

I have emphasized that it is **the situation**, rather than my projection of a possibility, which discloses. It might be valid to say that, in a particularly limited action, it is the projection of a particular possibility that orients the situation in a particular way and allows the structure of *in-order-to*'s to show up.[5] However, this is more difficult to maintain once we situate a particular act in the larger context in which it occurs, where the act can be seen as a response to something else. Thus, it is more appropriate to say that the situation is what discloses; the situation discloses me as having certain possibilities. This is what Heidegger's own discussion of Being-in suggests. If disclosedness rested primarily in Dasein's projection of its possibilities, then it would be constituted by understanding alone. But understanding is only one facet of disclosedness, along with *Befindlichkeit* and discourse. All three are associated with the disclosure of any situation.

We can see this in our particular example. *Befindlichkeit* is the mode of disclosure which is at work in my initial sense that my grandmother's having sent me a gift means that I should write her a letter, and also in my feeling that I ought to mail the letter the longer it sits on my desk. It shows itself in the annoyance that I feel at having to wait at the post office, and in the sense of accomplishment and good conscience that I experience upon having finally mailed the letter. My understanding of the situation shows itself in my knowing how to "make use" of the various objects, persons, and institutions in order to achieve my desired result: thus, I know what all these things are for. I know what stamps and mailboxes are used for, and I am able to negotiate my environment in relation to these. Understanding always pertains to the possibilities which 'belong to' things; it shows itself in our practical engagement with these things and in the "know-how" that we exhibit relative to them. These possibilities are always disclosed discursively. It is on the basis of discourse that I and the others who are disclosed in this situation are able to understand the various possibilities that belong to the situation *as* belonging to it. Because we understand phenomena in the terms in which they have previously been understood and expressed — as they have been represented in public discourse — our understanding is mediated through *das Man*. Public discourse also influences or shapes the way in which we can be affected by situations and our environment. Thus, it also plays a role in our *Befindlichkeit*. Indeed, discourse discloses the situation, and discloses us as oriented in a particular way in the situation, such that we understand or find ourselves in it in a particular way.

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[5] Indeed I have said this above, and Heidegger also frequently uses such language.

Although the foregoing has by no means been an exhaustive phenomenology of the example originally given, it has given us a picture of an everyday engagement in terms of Heidegger's understanding of concern, solicitude, and Being-in. We now need to establish the dialogicality of this Being-in-the-world. We will begin by considering the responsibility that shows itself, most obviously, in the way that I feel about the letter that lies on my desk. As the days go by, the presence of the letter gives me to understand — with ever increasing urgency — that it should be mailed. The letter demands that I mail it. That I feel this and respond in one way or another, either by putting it off for another day or by taking it down to the post office, shows my **responsibility**.[6] Moreover, that I find myself responding implies that I have found myself to be questioned; this indicates my **questionability**. The presence of the letter on my desk continually challenges me, reminding me that I need to mail it and querying me regarding when I will get around to doing so. This same responsibility and questionability are found in the way in which the gift I receive from my grandmother demands or asks for a response in the form of a thank-you note. Objects are able to give us something to understand in this way because a place has been found for them in a realm of meaning, a world, which is intersubjectively constructed and maintained. If the practice of sending thank-you notes did not exist, the letter would probably present itself to me with a different urgency. As the existential structure through which the meaningful whole of the world is created, *Mitsein* — and consequently others — lies behind the possibility of any particular object's giving meaning. Nevertheless my lived experience is that the gift and the letter as objects demand something of me.[7] This responsibility and questionability show themselves in a less striking way in the other facets of the example as well. For instance, when I see the line at the post office, I get into it; when I see the mailbox, I throw the letter in it. These are very simple responses to what is given to me to understand in terms of the possibilities which the situation discloses, and it is from these possibilities that I am asked by the situation to choose a course of action. In this way, my questionability is involved as well.

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[6] This two-tiered response (feeling that a demand has been made and then responding to it in some way) is similar to the two levels of responsibility noted with respect to the call of conscience.

[7] This raises the question of the role that the human others who stand behind the various objects with which we are involved play with respect to the dialogicality of those relations. We experience the letter or the gift as giving something to understand which challenges and demands a response. This is possible because of the

If a demand has been made, it must originate with something or someone other because one experiences a demand as a claim being made upon oneself that comes from somewhere else, somewhere outside of me. This shows the **alterity** of the other relative to me. In the first instance, this alterity lies in the letter itself, sitting on my desk. In its very physical persistence, it continues its silent demand and also its reproach. In the second instance, there is the alterity represented by my grandmother who lies "behind" the letter as it were, elsewhere in the network of significations but not immediately present, not immediately demanding anything of me.

The alterity of objects shows itself in everydayness in the way in which we typically tend to distinguish ourselves from them on the grounds that they are **discontinuous** with us. Our understanding of this discontinuity and alterity is generally reflected in our understanding of the physical distinctness of objects. But what is mostly emphasized in everydayness is our **continuity** with objects, which lies in the immediacy with which we understand the meaning they give, and in our ability to manipulate them as tools. This is possible on the basis of the overall context of meaning within which we are situated and which orients us relative to one another in a particular way. However, the real discontinuity of the object — the discontinuity which is most important from the

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way the situation discloses the letter. This means that ultimately, the meaning that the letter gives and the possibility which is disclosed to me in relation to it is given largely in terms of discourse, which is dependent upon *Mitsein*. Discourse is not an independent realm of meaning, but is created and sustained through the sharing of meaning which pertains to *Mitsein*. But the letter also has meaning by virtue of my relation to my grandmother. It is against this background, which has generated a particular discourse of its own over time, that the letter appears as having a certain meaning. Although we would more commonly say that the responsibility I feel to mail the letter is a responsibility to my grandmother, this does not attend to what I want to emphasize here — namely, that the object, the letter, is what reminds me of that responsibility by conveying that message to me and challenging me with its presence.

perspective of Being-in-the-world — lies primarily concealed in everydayness. This real discontinuity only shows itself in those moments in which our engagement with the object fails to function smoothly or is disrupted in some way, as when the object cannot be used for the purpose which we had intended and thus shows itself as recalcitrant, stubborn, resistant, an obstacle.

Our engagement with other people — those from whom we typically do not distinguish ourselves in everydayness — is similar. Because we are all co-disclosed as being in the same with-world, dwelling within the same network of significations, our everyday engagement emphasizes how much we have in common, how much we understand one another: in other words, our continuity. For example, my engagement with the postal clerk is governed by a whole set of pre-established rules and expectations concerning behavior, comportment, and interaction which — it is assumed — we both share. These pre-established rules and expectations typically do not show themselves, except in the instances in which a misunderstanding occurs. When our implicit expectations fail to be fulfilled, attention is drawn to them for the first time, thus disclosing them and revealing our discontinuity. In an interesting way, these moments of breakdown — which simultaneously disclose our discontinuity with the other and our desire for a continuity with the other — can also reveal our own finitude by disclosing our limits. These limits may be disclosed through frustrated involvements not only with other people but also with objects and institutions.[8] Our everyday comportment involves a complex system of implicit meaning and mutual understanding; nowhere is this clearer than when one finds oneself trying to function in a different cultural context. In such instances one is 'not at home' in a way which goes far beyond the obvious spatial dislocation.

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[8] For instance, it could be that I am frustrated in the project of mailing my letter because the post office is closed or because I do not have enough money. In these cases, I find myself powerless to achieve my *for-the-sake-of-which* because I am frustrated in my *in-order-to*. This kind of frustration and breakdown can give rise to the experience of anxiety, which always involves — at least to some degree — a disclosure of finitude. We are anxious before possibilities and our responsibility for those possibilities. Often the disclosure of one's Being-possible is only implicit here, and is not revealed in the more extensive way that Heidegger describes in his own discussion of anxiety. It is nonetheless evident.

Our continuity with the other, which is established through our shared meaning context, is most strongly emphasized in everydayness. However, our discontinuity always lies close to the surface. That we implicitly realize this is illustrated by the fact that we refer to these others *as others* in the first place. It also shows itself in our communication with the other: we communicate precisely because the other is other and thus is not privy to our thoughts and feelings unless we somehow make them known. Communication presupposes both alterity and discontinuity, even if it covers them up or does not explicitly recognize them.

Finally, what is established and sustained through the interaction with people and objects is **meaning**. When the unposted letter sitting on my desk presents itself to me as expressing a demand, what it gives me to understand is a meaning. It means something to me; in recognizing the demand that the letter expresses, I confirm or validate the meaning which it gives. Because this meaning derives its sense relative to an entire network of signification in which it is situated, my affirmation of the meaning that the letter gives is actually an affirmation of that whole network. Thus, in recognizing the demand which emanates from the letter, I affirm the practice of writing thank-you notes, because it is in terms of this practice that the letter voices its demand.

This is similarly true of my interaction with the postal clerk. In conducting ourselves in accordance with the established meanings which govern such interactions, we affirm and reinforce them. What largely remains under the surface in both instances is the extent to which meaning is produced through this dialogical interaction. That meaning is produced in such cases is not always obvious because we interact with one another largely on the basis of a shared realm of meaning which always already exists and which establishes our continuity. However, when the limits of that continuity are reached, our discontinuity is revealed. Using the background understanding which is shared between us, this discontinuity can be mediated, and the realm of meaningfulness can be extended as shared understanding is broadened. Only in so far as we are in dialogue with a shared realm of meaning does discourse evolve and change.

The picture we have developed of Being-in-the-world is one of deep engagement and involvement. It is extremely immediate. However, precisely because we are so absorbed in our involvement in the world, we tend not to disclose the Being-in which is the ground of that involvement. This self-absorption is, in a certain sense, a self-forgetfulness in which one is drawn out of oneself or loses oneself in the engagement. In going forward into the interaction and toward the others who are also involved there, we are always responding to the interaction and engagement with the other, and the way in which it calls us out of ourselves. The interaction discloses a relation to **alterity** characterized by both **responsibility** and our **questionability**. Our participation and involvement in the world and with other entities indeed depends upon this kind of question/response structure. Responsibility and questionability refer also to our **continuity** and **discontinuity** with respect to the other. To the degree that we are drawn out of ourselves and absorbed in our engagement with the other, we establish a certain continuity with the other. In this continuity, in the interaction — the belonging to and engagement in the totality of significations — the **meaning** between us is established. But this drawing close to the other is also only possible on the basis of our mutual alterity, our difference with respect to one another, and thus our discontinuity.

One of the more striking features of everydayness is the degree to which the alterity of the entities with which Dasein engages, and Dasein's discontinuity with those entities, is masked by an emphasis on its continuity with them, typically expressed in terms of Dasein's ability to understand or meaningfully comport toward them. However, everyday interaction itself presumes the very discontinuity with and alterity of those entities which it denies; in this way, Dasein's everydayness can be understood as an empty intentionality.

There is also a sense in which the functionality of everyday interaction is thought to be meaningless or, at the very least, unproductive of meaning. However, this too is due to a masking of the role everyday interaction plays in sustaining meaning through repetition, or in undermining meaning by not affirming it. The network of significations within which we dwell is maintained through dialogue when these significations are recognized as meaningful, and repeated. But through the same dialogic interaction, the possibility exists for significations not to be repeated, resulting in an erosion of the existing network of meaning, or a shift or change in those meanings. In this way, even the most banal engagements can be said to produce meaning through the significations involved therein.

This discussion has illustrated that our everyday interaction does have a dialogical character, that we can identify within everyday interaction the constellation of concepts which are constitutive of dialogicality. Although certain dimensions or aspects of this dialogicality — particularly with respect to the alterity of the other, our mutual discontinuity, and the role of our interaction in the production of meaning — remain largely unnoticed in everydayness, this in no way detracts from its dialogicality: these features are presumed in everyday behavior. They are always present as assumptions, and the possibility always exists that a moment of breakdown might bring them into high relief. The next step in our discussion is to demonstrate that the dialogicality which characterizes everydayness is of the conversational variety.

ii. The conversationality of everydayness

The primary objective of this section is to illustrate how the dialogicality of Dasein's everydayness can be understood as a dialogicality of conversation. I will pursue this task by searching for traces of movement, participation, the *in-between* and openness in the orientation which characterizes everydayness, to see whether they correspond at all to the way in which these features manifest themselves in conversation — namely in terms of **flow**, **reciprocity**, **thematic unity**, and **openness**. In my investigation, I will try to limit my discussion to the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world in its generality, making specific reference to the detailed example given above only when it is useful for illustrating a point.

We begin with movement. We are not looking for movement as it pertains to the changing of physical location but rather, for a movement which is appropriate to the kind of spatiality that belongs to Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Such a movement is clearly evident in one of the formulations that I have used frequently, namely that of 'approaching objects' with an expectation of meaning or understanding. This approaching is not a physical approaching but an intentional one, and is expressed in the characterization of intentionality as a Being-*towards*. This *towards* is Dasein's movement in the direction of the others in its world, whether they are things ready-to-hand or other Dasein.

Movement can be identified in yet another frequently used locution: that the other 'gives Dasein something to understand'. The object gives something which Dasein receives. This is a movement from the object toward Dasein. These two movements combined characterize the way in which Dasein experiences its world: as an approaching and a being-approached. In this way things in the world can draw near or withdraw with respect to Dasein. This approaching and being-approached — through which meaning flows between participants — suggests the back-and-forth form of participation associated with **reciprocity**. My Being-towards the object frees it for certain possibilities; but that Being-towards is also a response to what the object has given me to understand on the basis of the discourse which mediates our interaction. So, the mailbox gives itself to me as a mailbox, as a place where I can post a letter; my Being-towards the mailbox with the *for-the-sake-of-which* of posting this letter frees it for the possibility of being a place where I can post *this* letter.

However, I argued that the unitary aspect of phenomenological disclosure is a kind of simultaneity. This seems to recommend against understanding these two movements as related to each other in the kind of sequential fashion which reciprocity would seem to require. I have already explained that a peculiar feature of phenomenological disclosure is the simultaneity of disclosive movements through which the subject/object locations become blurred, resulting in a middle-voiced phenomenon. In order to support the point that the participation involved in Being-in-the-world resembles reciprocity, we must take a closer look at the kind of movement involved in it. Dasein's ecstatic movement manifests itself not only as a movement outside of itself toward objects, but as a movement outside of itself toward the future in self-'transcendence'. For this reason, it is possible to say that Dasein moves "through" time; and indeed Dasein experiences its temporality in its everydayness in this way: as having a certain linearity in which the present is always being overcome as Dasein moves into the future. This characterization of Dasein's temporal movement,[9] when combined with the spatial movement just described, produces a phenomenon that resembles **flow**. As described in Chapter 4, flow expresses the connection between utterances in a conversation, particularly the degree to which they follow upon one another and refer to one another. This notion of flow can also be used to describe the connection between moments of disclosure as they occur in time. Dasein does not experience a random sequence of disclosive happenings — there is a certain continuity or sense to these which imbues Dasein's experience with coherence. This suggests that Dasein's Being-in-the-world happens as a series of approaches and counter-approaches which persist over a period of time, giving the interaction a structure which resembles question and response, a give-and-take between participants which has a certain continuity and cohesiveness. This kind of interactive structure requires a participation which resembles reciprocity more than simultaneity.

The continuity and connection required for flow and reciprocity to appear suggest that there must be something in terms of which Dasein's engagements make sense: there must be some way in which Dasein's engagements hang together in some kind of meaningful whole. Generally speaking, this meaningful whole is the network of significations which makes up the world, and which is disclosed in the situation. In the situation, we find the feature of the *in-between*. The *in-between* is what lies 'between' the participants: it is what binds them and orients them significatively with respect to one another. But the *in-between* is also a product of their dialogic interaction; the *in-between* both sustains and is sustained by dialogic interaction. In any specific involvement, the *in-between* is the situation — the world as it is disclosed relative to the particular possibilities and the *for-the-sake-of-which*'s that concern the participants at the time. If we consider the interaction with the postal clerk, we can see that certain norms concerning the practice of mailing letters are included within the network of significations in which we dwell, namely that one goes to the post office, buys stamps, puts them on the letter, and throws the letter in a mailbox. This practice sets certain sorts of expectations for how the people involved are to behave. That is, certain sorts of questions, requests, and actions are considered to be relevant to such an interaction. I am expected to know that I have to pay for the stamps; the clerk is expected to know how much postage I need. We would both be surprised if either of us asked questions that exceeded the parameters the world sets for such an exchange. We are always guided beforehand by an understanding of these rules, and this understanding always lies in the background, brought to bear whenever a specific project that I have requires me to draw upon it. The situation is not simply the world itself: it is the particular ontic configuration of persons and objects that has been illuminated in terms of the world through a particular *for-the-sake-of-which* which I currently have. Thus, the way in which the various aspects of the practice of mailing a letter hang together is not itself the situation. Rather the situation is the illumination of these aspects in terms of the concrete possibility of mailing this letter *which I am currently pursuing*. Because I have this project, the network of *in-order-to*'s is illuminated in a particular way to reveal the situation; and thus I become oriented relative to the other participants in terms of the situation and according to the norms which were antecedently part of the world. This is precisely what it means to say that my interaction with the other is mediated through the structures of the world, and in this case in particular, in a manner which pertains to *das Man*.

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[9] Although in everydayness Dasein may understand its temporality as linear, Heidegger insists that it is really more circular, as the ecstatic movement of surging forward and falling back suggests. Nevertheless, the temporal duration of Dasein's interaction in the world is the determinative feature here.

This is as true of objects as it is of other Dasein. The letter is able to give me to understand what it does on the basis of the antecedently established practice of writing thank-you notes. It is thus appropriate to say that our interaction is mediated by the world, and that what lies between us and orients us relative to one another in any given exchange is the situation. The distinction between world and situation is significant because whereas the world represents the network of meaning which we use as the means of dialogue, the situation is more specific to a particular interaction or event. They are, nevertheless, related. The network of meanings which makes up the world is sustained and preserved (or changed) through what happens in the situation. What happens between self and other is meaningful. To the extent that this meaning coincides with the existing received meaning that provided the initial orientation of significance in the situation, this event sustains or preserves the world. To the extent that this meaning does not coincide, it can undermine the existing structures of significance, opening up the possibility for the world to change or evolve. By responding to a gift with a thank-you note, I affirm that response as a meaningful one, as one that makes sense given the 'query' or 'challenge' which the gift represents. If I did not respond to the gift in this way, I would be denying that this response is appropriate. If we all stopped responding in this way, over time the practice would disintegrate and the receiving of a gift would no longer 'mean' that one ought to respond with a note.

The specific meaning that evolves in the situation is what is disclosed through the reciprocity of the interaction and the flow of the dialogue itself. Although the meaning that emerges is not exactly reducible to the meaningful expressions themselves, the expressions refer to this emergent meaning and make sense relative to it. This meaning is what the dialogue is about; it is its thematic unity. In our particular example, the meaning which unfolds in the situation is the *for-the-sake-of-which*'s of the two participants, namely the mailing of the letter.[10] In this case, the *for-the-sake-of-which* has been ascertained or established before the engagement itself. I go to the post office and engage with the clerk with the prior aim of mailing my letter; and the clerk goes to work and engages with me with the prior aim of getting paid for a day's work. The particular engagement between us then becomes the means to accomplish these ends. It is no doubt because the *for-the-sake-of-which* was previously ascertained that the situation is largely governed by the antecedently established network of significations, and is not changed or challenged by the specific interaction. But this could be otherwise; we can easily imagine situations in which the *for-the-sake-of-which* is not clearly established in advance but itself evolves through the dialogic engagement or else simply rests in the dialogic engagement itself.[11]

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[10] Do both the postal clerk and I share the same *for-the-sake-of-which*? In a sense, yes. With respect to our specific interaction, taken within a very narrow horizon, we both do what we do in order to get the letter mailed. Taken in a larger context, the *for-the-sake-of-which* may be, of course, different. The mailing of the letter figures differently in my scope than in the clerk's. I mail the letter in order to thank my grandmother; the clerk mails it to do her job. So whether or not we share the same *for-the-sake-of-which* is a matter of perspective.

In either case, what lies between the participants is a particular configuration of both the meaning which precedes the dialogue and orients the participants relative to one another by establishing the parameters of the dialogue, and the meaning which develops through the unfolding of the dialogue itself (what the dialogue is actually about). This *in-between* can be understood as the **thematic unity**. Although the *in-between* as it appears in both the encounter and conversation modes can be construed as an event between participants, the meaningfulness of *the between* of the encounter lies much more in the event itself. It is not influenced by the pre-existing network of meaning in the way that occurs in everyday Being-in-the-world.[12] For this reason, the *in-between* is understood most appropriately in this case in terms of the conversational feature of thematic unity.

Finally, the **openness** which belongs to this interaction is an openness to the meaning the other gives. This is shown in my interaction with the letter no less than in my interaction with the postal clerk. But openness has another sense as well. Although any specific interaction might have its own ending point — as my project of mailing the letter reaches fulfillment when I drop it in the mailbox — I always move on to other projects and possibilities. Since Dasein always *is* its possibilities, it is always already ahead of itself, pursuing another possibility; this series of involvements is, in principle, limitless. In this way, Dasein's engagement with its world can be said to have the openness which belongs to the direction and duration of a conversation.

I would conclude that the dialogicality which belongs to Dasein's everydayness can be best characterized in terms of conversation, on the basis of the flow and reciprocity which mark the patterns of movement and participation of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Moreover, Dasein's involvement with entities in the world is always about something that exhibits a thematic unity and always implies an openness. The conversationality of Being-in-the-world is echoed in the equiprimordiality of *Befindlichkeit* and understanding. In particular, our *Befindlichkeit* captures the extent to which we are open to being affected by the world, and thereby emphasizes our openness, our questionability, our vulnerability. Moreover, that we always find ourselves to be affected in a certain way, to be already thrown into a particular mood, illustrates the degree to which we have already been challenged; our dialogues are always already in progress, ongoing. Our understanding is our always already knowing how to get around in the world, our always approaching the world and the objects therein in terms of possibility. Understanding shows the degree to which we have always already responded to entities in the world, challenging and asking things of them and trying to affect the world. Our Being-in reflects that we have always already gone beyond ourselves towards the other; we are always already implicated in and affected by the other.

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[11] The *for-the-sake-of-which* orients the postal clerk and myself in our specific interaction. We could also say that the *for-the-sake-of-which*, taken within a fairly narrow horizon, only shows itself in our interaction. The clerk can only infer from my presence in the post office that I have some business to conduct there; that I specifically wish to purchase stamps, as opposed to picking up a package or sending a registered letter, is something that only emerges through our actual engagement.

[12] Indeed, one could say that this realm of meaning is largely bracketed in such a case.

Generally speaking, then, Dasein's everydayness can be construed in terms of conversational dialogue. Dasein's Being is a Being-in-the-world, where this Being-in-the-world is understood to be a particular type of intentionality: a Being-towards. This Being-towards is a Being towards another. Thus, as a Being-in-the-world, Dasein's Being is always a Being beyond itself toward another, which is evidenced in the extent to which the conversationality of dialogue is constitutive of Dasein's very self. This conversationality represents a relationship to alterity, which typically remains concealed in everydayness. The alterity of the other and our discontinuity with respect to one another — although presumed by our interaction — are not fully disclosed.

In what sense does this conversationality of Being-in-the-world constitute what is surpassed in the dialogic encounter of anxious Being-towards-death? As discussed in Part II, the bracketing which characterizes the intensification of conversation into encounter occurs with respect to spatiality, temporality, and significance. This bracketing occurs at two levels. The first level is the conversationality of Dasein's Being-in-the-world in general. A particular sort of spatiality, temporality, and significance belong to Dasein's Being-in-the-world. These axes of orientation are not derived from any absolute, but are related to the networks of significance which constitute the world, and to our comportments within that network. In the moment of Dasein's anxious Being-towards-death, Dasein's involvement in its Being-in-the-world is, as it were, arrested; Dasein is brought to the limit of its Being-in-the-world, and its orientation within its world is disrupted. The axes along which that orientation normally occurs are transformed. Dasein's spatiality collapses into a no-where. Dasein's temporality is compressed into an instant which is beyond time and partakes of eternity. Language, which has always been the realm of meaning, evaporates away into silence. The meaningfulness of the world fades into obscurity. In a sense, the distance between Dasein and its other — the distance that makes possible the kind of movement, participation, and *in-between* which can show themselves as flow, reciprocity, and thematic unity — collapses, leaving only a colliding, a simultaneity, and the silence of the bond of *the between*. In this way, Dasein's anxious Being-towards-death is a surpassing of its Being-in-the-world, in the way that the encounter is a surpassing of conversation.[13]

However, a bracketing of the conversationality of everydayness also occurs with respect to the "transcending" of a third-person mode of engagement towards a first-person mode. This bracketing of the third-person-ality of everydayness is not simply a bracketing of Dasein's conversationality, but a transformation of that conversationality into a first-person-ality via the dialogic encounter. This point will be developed at length in Chapter 9.

In anxious Being-towards-death, the relation to alterity that the conversationality of Dasein's everyday Being-in-the-world presumes, but only emptily intends, is rendered full. This fulfillment occurs through the bracketing of the specific conversation and comportment in the world in which Dasein is engaged, so that Dasein can experience its own Being as possibility in a more immediate way. However, the bracketing of conversation which occurs in the encounter of anxious Being-towards-death does not result in a negation of conversationality. The point is to *be* that conversationality more fully. For this reason, it would be inappropriate to limit authenticity to the phenomenon described as anxious Being-towards-death; this is but one moment of becoming authentic.

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[13] Anxious Being-towards-death is not, however, a surpassing in the sense that Dasein surpasses its conversationality with the world and others in favor of a dialogue with itself. This may seem counter-intuitive, since a dialogic engagement with itself seems to be precisely what is missing in Dasein's inauthenticity. However, one should remember that Dasein intends its own Being along with the Being of the world and other entities in *both* everydayness and authenticity. Dasein's Being-in-the-world is, at base, an intentional comportment toward its own Being, and so Dasein does participate in a conversation with its Being, even in everydayness where it is not explicit. Similarly, even when Dasein's intention of its own Being is fulfilled, Dasein's conversationality with the world and others is preserved in authentic historizing.

Chapter 9

Authentic Historizing and Conversation

I have noted that authenticity can be analytically distinguished by two dimensions or 'moments'. The first is the disclosure of Dasein's anxious Being-towards-death through the call of conscience. The second is the authentic historizing which is generated out of this anxious Being-towards-death as a result of the call summoning Dasein into the situation. Our understanding of authenticity would be incomplete if we defined it only in terms of Dasein's removal from its everyday world, as a being wrenched away from itself. If we are to make sense of Heidegger's claim that authenticity is an existentiell modification of *das Man*, then authenticity must be shown to be not a negation of everydayness, but a modification or othering of it which is made possible by the dislocation that occurs through Dasein's anxious Being-towards-death. However, to end our discussion of Dasein's authenticity here would still be to end too soon. In authenticity, Dasein is ultimately *drawn back* into the conversation that characterizes its Being-in-the-world; this is the meaning of Dasein's authentic historizing and of Heidegger's claim that the call calls Dasein forth in order to bring it back to itself.

If historizing is a modification of everydayness, this implies not only that it must display the essential features of dialogue which belong to everydayness, but that it must display them as being modified. I will argue that this modification consists of a shift from the third person to the first person. The specificity of address which occurs in anxious Being-towards-death has the effect of drawing Dasein out of the third-person-ality of its everydayness, and drawing it into its first-person-ality, the mode of its authentic historizing. This transformation is intimately connected with the relationship between Being and time. Heidegger maintains that the understanding of Being which underlies Dasein's understanding of the Being of entities takes its point of reference from time. He illustrates this by arguing that even in everydayness Dasein understands its own Being in terms of temporality — specifically the finite temporality of mortality — although it does not immediately grasp its Being in these terms. The disclosure through which evidence is given for this implicit understanding occurs in Dasein's anxious

Being-towards-death. For our purposes, the important feature is that this evidence is brought home to Dasein in its particularity. In understanding that its Being is a Being-towards-death, Dasein is revealed as constituted by temporal finitude. This disclosure occurs in the way death singles out Dasein, calling it from out of the slipperiness and interchangeability of its self as *Man-selbst* in everydayness, and pinning it down to a possibility that it cannot elude.

This is one way in which temporality is important to Dasein's Being in the first person. Another way lies in the role of Dasein's temporality in the formation of the *I*. According to Heidegger, the unity of Being which characterizes the *I* is generated out of the unity of the temporal ecstases, through the way in which they hang together as integrated: the *I* emerges as an integrated whole through temporalizing. Furthermore, in being drawn back into the situation, Dasein becomes re-integrated with the network of significations — the meaningful whole that constitutes the world. In a sense, then, the unity of Dasein's *I* lies also in the unity of its existence as Being-in-the-world. Authentic historizing combines the two dimensions that lend unity and wholeness to Dasein's Being, and through that historizing in which Dasein *becomes* its *I*, the first-person-ality disclosed in anxious Being-towards-death is preserved. For this reason, I will argue that the conversationality of authentic historizing can be understood as occurring in the first person.

To demonstrate this point, this chapter will proceed according to the following movements. First, I will address at some length the distinction between first- and third-person modes of interaction and address. Second, I will illustrate how, in these terms, one can characterize Dasein's everydayness as occurring in the mode of the third person and Dasein's anxious Being-towards-death as occurring in the mode of the first person. Thirdly, I will discuss Heidegger's understanding of authentic historizing and its relationship to temporality and Being-in-the-world. I will particularly focus on what makes this historizing authentic and generative of the *I* in terms of the first person. Finally, I will consider how the *I* is constructed in a dialogical manner through authentic historizing.

i. First- versus third-person modes of interaction

Within the literature on dialogue, most notably but not exclusively in the work of Martin Buber, a distinction is made between the mode of interaction known as the *I-Thou* and the more impersonal interaction which Buber characterizes as the *I-It*. This contrast derives most of its power not from the mere distinction between *Thou* and *It*, but from the observation that the difference between the *Thou* (*du*) and the formal *You* (*Sie*), is basically tantamount to the difference between *Thou* and *It*.[1] It is this distinction between the *Ich-Du* and *Ich-Sie*, that I refer to when I speak of the distinction between interaction in the first and third person.

This preserves some of the sense of Buber's distinction. I agree with Buber that there is a movement between these two forms, that the *I-Thou* can "degrade" into an *I-It/You* and that the *I-It/You* can be intensified into an *I-Thou*. I also agree with Buber that the *I* which is represented in each of these pairs is not the same, but takes its character from the other with which it is paired and from the mode of that engagement. By this I mean that the *I* which exists in the *I-It/You* is determined as an *I* through this mode of engagement, and so comports towards itself much in the way that it comports towards the other. In so far as it understands the other as *It/You*, it understands itself as *It/You*; this is partly due to the fact that the other understands the *I* similarly. In other words, in the *I-It/You* not only does the *I* address the other formally and indirectly, but the other also addresses the *I* this way. In this sense, the interaction is not simply unidirectionally in the third person, but is actually governed by a third-person type of interaction.[2] A parallel situation occurs in the case of the *I-Thou*. It is not just the *I* that addresses the other as *Thou*, but the other also addresses the *I* this way and by doing so elicits the *I* in a different way than in the *I-It/You*.

However, my distinction of the first- and third-person modes of interaction does not follow Buber's *I-Thou/I-It* distinction in the claim that only the former is dialogical while the latter is merely intentional. I have discussed my disagreement with Buber and Theunissen on this point at length above. There are many features of Buber's *I-Thou* that actually more aptly characterize my concept of encounter, such as the degree to which it tends to occur in silence and the way it is stamped with a certain kind of time-suspension or eternity. However, I would not maintain that the first- and third-person distinction maps directly onto the encounter/conversation distinction. This will become clearer as I demonstrate the first-person-ality of the conversational dialogue of Dasein's authentic historizing below.

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[1] See my note in Chapter 7 regarding Levinas as a possible exception to this situation.

[2] In this regard, my notion of the *I-It/You* differs substantially from that of Levinas who seems to suggest that the *You* can address the *I* in its specificity without the reverse being required or implied.

In what, then, does the first- and third-person distinction consist? Reflection upon the observation that the *Ich-Es* and *Ich-Sie* are basically instances of the same kind of interaction reveals that the third-person mode of interaction involves a generic quality, an impersonality which the first-person mode of address overcomes. Where the first-person mode of interaction involves people in their specificity and wholeness as individuals, the third-person mode of interaction involves people indifferently, as interchangeable or replaceable. In addressing the other as *replaceable*, I engage him in so far as he performs a particular role in relation to me in the course of my activity. To the extent that I only engage the other in this superficial way, I do not *actually address* him as a person. It is for this reason that I address him as *Sie* and not *du*. Addressing someone in the third person is a peculiar way of addressing someone by *not* addressing him — much in the way that the 'royal we' expresses a first-person perspective without actually expressing it. In addressing someone in the third person, I do not address *that* person because I do not address him in his specificity. This is the difference between addressing someone as *Sie* versus *du*. In addressing someone as *du*, I draw that person close to me in a familiarity and intimacy that is absent in the *Sie*. This is why addressing someone as *Sie* is a mark of politeness; the formal mode of address preserves a distance between oneself and the other which the *du* would breach, perhaps inappropriately.[3]

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[3] It is interesting to note Heidegger's comment regarding the relationship between personal pronouns and locative adverbs in certain languages as discussed by Humboldt (SZ 119). Although they disagree regarding which informs the other, both agree that there is an issue of distantiality in personal pronouns which is reflected in locative adverbs as well.

But does this mean that the difference between first- and third-person modes of interaction is reducible to the distinction between the way I treat friends versus strangers? I would like to avoid this suggestion because it oversimplifies a much more complicated issue. *Broadly speaking*, this may be true, but this is not an exhaustive clarification. We can certainly imagine many instances where one could experience a great deal of compassion for the situation of a complete stranger and therefore interact with that person in the first person. For this reason, we must understand these notions of specificity and replaceability more deeply. The key to the difference lies in the breadth and scope of the horizon within which one contextualizes the other. The basic assumption is that no one is identical with anyone else. There may be many ways in which we are similar to one another, but we are none of us the same: we are all distinct. The extent to which we appear to be the same, or share similarities, bears a direct relation to the breadth of the context in which those who observe us situate us. The narrower the context in which I am understood, the more like everyone else I will appear. The more like everyone else I appear, the more interchangeable and replaceable with those others I appear to be. The specificity of who I am gets covered over, and 'who' I am gets reduced to 'what I do', to the function I perform (because it is to this that the context in which the other situates me has been reduced). This is the domain of third-person interaction.[4] However, if one takes a broader perspective on me and situates me against a wider horizon, I appear in a richer context, and thus more fully in my specificity. I am not maintaining that in first-person interaction there is any kind of active situating of the other against a wider background in order to get a better sense of who one is. It seems to me that this is precisely the wrong approach. The other has to emerge against this wider horizon. I cannot will this emergence, I can only be receptive or open to it. I can only be open to it if I have not succumbed to the narrowing of the horizon which characterizes our usual interaction with people. Phenomena only show themselves as what they are against a horizon; similarly, only against a horizon do people show themselves in themselves.[5] The scope of the horizon within which they are disclosed is important to how they are understood. When I speak of specificity and replaceability or interchangeability as the definitive features in the distinction between first- and third-person modes of interaction, I am referring to the relative breadth of the horizon against which the entities involved in a situation are disclosed.[6]

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[4] Indeed, Heidegger describes interaction in *das Man* in similar terms (SZ 126).

ii. The first and third person in relation to everydayness and anxious Being-towards-death

Dasein's everydayness may be understood as an interaction in the third person in terms of the concept of replaceability or interchangeability just described. Our point of access for this view is derived from the insights that Dasein's everyday self is the *Man-selbst* and that Dasein's engagement with the world occurs in terms of *das Man*. '*Man*' is the impersonal third-person pronoun in German. To say that in everydayness Dasein's self is a *Man-selbst* is therefore to say that Dasein is its Being in an impersonal, third-person way. Yet Dasein is ontologically characterized by *Jemeinigkeit* which establishes that it is not impersonal, that it is personal in a first-person mode. Thus, Being in the way of the *Man-selbst* compromises Dasein's authenticity.

In everydayness Dasein is engaged in its world in the way that 'one' is engaged. Dasein comports toward others as *das Man* not only in that it understands others to be representatives of *das Man*, but also in so far as it understands itself in terms of *das Man* and comports itself accordingly. This implies that Dasein not only fails to address others in their specificity, but fails to understand *itself* in this way. For this reason, a phenomenon such as the distantiality which Heidegger describes can appear. Because Dasein sees others as representatives of *das Man*, it sees them as interchangeable: any specific, particular Dasein could easily stand in for any other. We saw this in Chapter 8 in our example of the postal clerk and the other people waiting in line at the post office. The people were disclosed relative to the rather generic possibilities for which the situation freed them (by virtue of the way in which *I* was open to the possibilities which the situation disclosed). The horizon within which they were understood was quite narrow; it was limited to the specific instance in which I interacted with them, largely guided and informed by the antecedent expectations and rules of behavior which shaped the situation and set the parameters of our interaction. This is not just true for the way in which we comport towards other Dasein, but also holds for the way in which other entities are disclosed. Objects are disclosed according to what they are usually used for, against a horizon which is not particularly broad. All mailboxes are the same relative to my *for-the-sake-of-which*; all stamps, as long as they provide sufficient postage, are adequate to meeting my end. All of these features recommend characterizing the everydayness of Dasein's Being-in-the-world in terms of a third-person interaction.

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[5] I am not advocating that this whole interaction is limited to the realm of the interhuman or social, rather it is simply the prototype which is extended to other domains.

[6] But could one not argue the exact opposite? Could one not say that people seem radically different from each other when taken entirely out of context, and that the more one contextualizes them, the more it becomes apparent that they really are all the same, that they all operate according to the same motives, that they all share in a common 'human nature'? We can appeal to Heidegger here. In our everyday engagement with people, we typically do not approach them as if they were all different. We approach people with various assumptions about how people behave, and we develop expectations regarding specific individuals relative to those assumptions. As we come to know someone better, we are able to develop expectations based upon their own specific patterns of behavior, and we come to judge them according to those. As such, the move to see similarity in people is a generalizing one which must strip away context in order to achieve its goal.

Dasein's anxious Being-towards-death, by contrast, is better understood in terms of a first-person interaction. The primary reason for this is the way in which the call of conscience singles out Dasein, disclosing that death has marked this particular Dasein. Dasein's understanding of the possibility of its death clearly undergoes a radical transformation. In everydayness Dasein understands its death as a possibility which happens to everyone, hence to no one, and certainly not to itself specifically. However, in anxious Being-towards-death, Dasein understands its death as its *ownmost* possibility, as revealed to it by the call of conscience. Dasein's *Jemeinigkeit* is disclosed to it. Dasein is called upon to take up this *Jemeinigkeit*, or more precisely, it is revealed that Dasein has no choice but to be this *Jemeinigkeit*. The call can be said to single out Dasein in that it calls Dasein individually and calls Dasein to a possibility which is not representable, and which cannot be taken up by another on Dasein's behalf. Despite the fact that death visits everyone equally, it is nonetheless something which is specific to each Dasein: no one dies my death but me; the call is not transferable.

In everydayness, Dasein understands itself in terms of *das Man*, and thus understands the possibility of its death in a general way as something which happens to everyone. Dasein's self is thus disclosed against this relatively narrow horizon. However, in anxious Being-towards-death, Dasein's self is disclosed against the broader horizon of its overall existentiality. Through this widened perspective, Dasein is able to recognize the way in which it *specifically* is assigned to its death by its existence, and by the *mineness* of that existence. The issue of narrowness and breadth of the horizon in which Dasein sees itself situated has a particularly temporal significance as well. In understanding itself largely in terms of the narrow horizon of the present, Dasein can simply say of its death that it is not 'now'. Taken against a wider temporal horizon, of course, Dasein must realize that its death is a definite, inescapable eventuality.

Dasein's anxious Being-towards-death is constituted by an encounter with the alterity of its death which is more appropriate to the first person than the third. This is readily seen by comparison with the way in which Dasein understands the possibility of its death in everydayness. Dasein is called out of the third-person-ality of everydayness through the call of conscience. The call of the other — which is Dasein's self as thrown towards death and thus other from the perspective of Dasein's everyday *Man-selbst* — acts as the *Thou* which elicits Dasein's Being in the first person and calls it from the region of a formal *Jemeinigkeit* into an *Eigentlichkeit*. As I discussed in Chapter 7, death is able to act as the *Thou* because of the way in which Dasein's Being-towards-death functions as the primary relation that orients Dasein and its death relative to one another, and allows them to take on the significance they have relative to each other. Being-towards-death allows death to come into relation with Dasein in such a way that death can single Dasein out, challenge it, and call it forth.

iii. Authentic historizing

Dasein is called to its Being in the first person through the call of conscience, but it maintains itself in this first-person mode in anticipatory resoluteness. In anticipatory resoluteness Dasein *holds* itself open to its Being as possibility and allows itself to be drawn into the situation — its *there* — where it becomes historical. The specificity of

Dasein's *I* is retained in authentic historizing. To understand this better, we need to understand how Dasein's *I* — as a Being-possible — is generated through the unities of both temporalizing and Being-in-the-world.

Heidegger argues that the meaning of Dasein's Being-in-the-world — that in terms of which it is intelligible — is temporality. Although implicitly presumed in all of Dasein's engagement in the world, Dasein's understanding of itself as temporal — as mortal and historical — nevertheless remains far from it. This understanding is brought close, however, in anxious Being-towards-death.

Temporality is ecstasis (ec-stasis). Ecstasis permits the entity who possesses it and is possessed by it to go beyond mere substantiality and physical presence. Ecstasis is always an already being *more* than what one is, an already being *beyond* what one is, an already being *other* than what one is. Ecstasis is what brings difference into sameness; it is what makes anything like the Being-toward of intentionality possible. Ecstasis is the primordial relation to alterity. Although Heidegger emphasizes ecstasis as a characteristic of Dasein's temporality, it is also definitive of Dasein's existence as Being-in-the-world. This can be seen in his description of existence with reference to ecstasis in terms of the care structures of thrownness and projection. In so far as Dasein is always simultaneously thrown projection, Dasein is always outside of itself *in* its world. This ecstatic dimension of Dasein's existence and of its temporality is its Being-possible, its *Seinkönnen*. In its Being-possible, Dasein is already ahead of itself, *towards* its possibilities as exhibited in at least two related ways. First, Dasein is always thrown towards the possibility of its death. Second, Dasein is always thrown towards the particular ontic possibilities which are disclosed in the particular situation wherein it finds itself. Dasein's Being-possible, then, is implicated both in its Being-towards-death and in its Being-in-the-world.

The ecstatic character of Dasein's existence and its temporality — which are reflected in its Being-possible — can only be phenomenologically disclosed against a horizon which allows it to stand out in high relief, namely the horizon of Dasein's impossibility. This horizon is Dasein's Being-towards-death, the possibility of its no longer existing, its no longer Being able to be. Dasein's Being is disclosed to it authentically through its anxious Being-towards-death.

In Heidegger's analysis, temporality is the ground of Dasein's possibility because possibility is a relation to what is not yet. Temporality must be conceived as ecstatic because that which is not yet is beyond oneself and other; a relation to this other can only be established through an ecstatic movement. Ecstatic temporality, then, is what allows death to become a possibility for Dasein; it is what allows Dasein to relate to its death and also to disclose death as the horizon of its Being-possible.

Death can become Dasein's *ownmost* possibility because of the role that temporality plays in establishing Dasein's *Jemeinigkeit*. The ecstases of temporality are not simply erratically ecstatic in random directions in a never-ending chain which goes nowhere and comes from nowhere. The ecstases are coordinated, and the point at which they hang together with respect to one another is what comes to be called the *I*. Thus, the disclosure of Dasein's temporality amounts to a disclosure of its *I*.[7] The *I* is the locus of Dasein's temporalizing; it is the place where the various ecstases of past, present, and future are coordinated into a temporal whole. In its ecstatic movement, Dasein is transported toward its past as 'having been' and its future as 'ahead of itself', and is brought back to its present. In this way, Dasein 'stretches itself along' between its birth and its death, creating coherence and continuity for itself out of the disparate and disunified moments that constitute its life. In this way Dasein gives its existence an overall shape and meaning. Dasein's ability to do this is grounded upon its temporality, and its ecstatic movement allows it to go beyond what it is at the moment to pull together its past and future. However, it should also be noted that through this same ecstatic movement, Dasein constantly surpasses these integrated and meaningful wholes which it has already fashioned for itself. The process of "unifying" itself into a whole is never complete.

The temporalizing involved in authentic historizing discloses Dasein's *I* in the first person because in anxious Being-towards-death, Dasein's Being is disclosed as a Being-possible against the horizon of its mortality, the possibility of its impossibility, of its no longer Being able to be there. Dasein understands this possibility to be its own when it immediately discloses this possibility as singling it out and eliciting its existential responsibility. This more explicit understanding of its own Being will affect the way in which it is drawn into the situation and the way it will be open to what is disclosed there.

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[7] Heidegger argues that temporality does not hang together because of the *I*, but rather that the unity of temporality is what makes it possible for there to be a unitary *I*. This sounds odd, but I suggest that he means that an existing entity, by virtue of its existing, is already temporal, and it is this phenomenon of an existing temporality which grounds the *I*.

Thus, it becomes particularly important to recognize that the ecstatic character of Dasein's existence not only transports it ahead of itself towards its death, but also beyond itself toward the world and the entities disclosed therein. Every time Dasein expresses itself using the pronoun 'I', it expresses its Being-in-the-world and Being-with Others (SZ 321). Dasein is always already involved in the world, immersed in a series of projects set against the background of a network of significations in terms of which various possibilities are disclosed. This, too, is part of Dasein's Being-possible: Dasein always *is* its possibilities. In being drawn back into the situation, Dasein is drawn back into this involvement, back into the meaningful whole that is the world.

The world is a whole of significance in which entities are disclosed as having meaning in relation to other entities and particular possibilities. Heidegger argues that the world is able to hang together as such a cohesive whole because of Dasein's ecstatic temporality and the coordination of the horizons towards which its ecstatic movement carries it. Dasein always understands itself as faced with some set of circumstances with which it must deal (past), as having certain possibilities towards which it can project (future) and as having various means at is disposal for achieving those ends (present). Through Dasein's ecstatic movement beyond itself towards other entities, these features hang together in a unity which constitutes Dasein's *there*. But this *there* is also Dasein's Being as Da-sein. We can say, then, that the unity of Dasein's *I* is partly derived from the unity of this *there* and the significance with which it is imbued. Moreover, when Dasein understands its Being, it understands its *there*. This understanding forms part of the horizon of significance within which whatever is disclosed in the situation is revealed. Consequently, Dasein's more authentic understanding of its own Being has a direct impact on the way it discloses other entities in Being-in-the-world and Being-with

Others.

This point might be clarified with reference to the post office example from Chapter 8. In everydayness Dasein primarily understands its situation within a fairly narrow horizon; we might say a horizon of the 'now'. The Being of things is understood as presence-at-hand. This might even be said of others as well, in so far as they are seen as 'there too with me' in a merely 'present' sense: we are all waiting in the line together, doing the same thing. This understandingis largely due to the degree to which Dasein has not grasped its Being as possibility. Dasein tends to understand possibility as belonging to objects much in the way that properties belong to objects; this implies that the possibilities an object is understood to have do not depend upon the situation. For this reason, objects can present Dasein with possibilities, but these possibilities are understood to befall Dasein and to be fairly independent of Dasein's Being. The implication is that possibilities exist for Dasein in its everydayness only within the rather narrow scope of Dasein's specific encounters with the entities which are thought to 'have' these possibilities or to avail themselves to Dasein. Dasein tends to understand the entities it encounters as being self-contained and closed off relative to other entities in the context wherein it is situated.

In authentic historizing, however, Dasein's ecstatic temporality carries Dasein beyond the 'now' of the situation in an explicit way, allowing it to see the horizons of that situation and of the entities encountered therein with greater breadth. Thus, the others who are in the line are not merely 'there too', but are people with lives that go beyond their being present in the line. This allows us to be together in the line in a more significant way, and is what Heidegger means by authentic bondedness. The broadening of the horizon of significance also allows me to see the mailing of this letter as something I should do, not by rote or out of habit, but because it will *mean* something to my grandmother and because I want to make that meaningful gesture towards her. In authentic temporalizing, the horizons within which entities and situations are disclosed — and within which we do what we do — are extended so that we have a greater sense of what being there means and why it is significant. This shift cannot be observed 'from the outside'; it is an inner modification.

Authentic historizing draws Dasein into the situation with a renewed understanding of its own Being. Objects are disclosed as having possibilities relative to the situation as a disclosive whole. The ability of the situation to hang together in this way (or to disclose itself as hanging together in this way) depends upon the unity of temporality. It is, in a sense, the temporalizing of temporality which allows something like a situation to emerge for Dasein. In responding to the possibilities which its situation discloses, Dasein temporalizes itself in a way that it does only obliquely in everydayness, where Dasein is focused less on the situation itself in terms of which possibilities are disclosed, and more on the possibilities themselves considered independently from the context which allows them to appear.

Understanding its Being now *as* possibility, Dasein enters the situation with a horizon that extends temporally, as well as significatively, far beyond the borders of the 'now'. In fact, this is why it makes sense to refer to this context as a 'situation', because it has now been *situated* against a wider background. This wider horizon locates Dasein within its particular context with a greater degree of specificity because the scope in which the event is understood is expanded; more information can be brought to bear to distinguish the situation and the entities involved therein from others. In everydayness the narrow horizon of disclosure tends to reveal entities as closed off. The broadening of the horizon in authentic historizing can be seen as an opening up of objects and others to the situations wherein they are disclosed. The expansion of the horizon along orientational axes of spatiality, temporality, and significance allows Dasein to see this particular engagement as fitting into a larger context, and to understand the possibilities disclosed there relative to this whole. These situations themselves can also be seen as open to the larger contexts in which they are imbedded. This *increase in contextualization* decreases the generic character of possibilities as they are disclosed in everydayness and reduces the indifferent or impersonal way in which Dasein pursues them. Dasein becomes more specifically engaged in the generating of possibilities — and so also of its Self — not so much in the sense that Dasein "makes" its own possibilities, but in that the situation wherein possibilities are disclosed takes on a richer and more particularized hue, involving Dasein in a more personal way.

The ontic possibilities disclosed in the situation can evoke Dasein's *I* in the first person and demand responsibility of it. When Dasein allows itself to be drawn into the situation in resoluteness, the first-person-ality of its Being-in-the-world manifests itself. Dasein's resolve to remain open to its Being as possibility opens it up to the situation, the particular possibilities disclosed within it, and the others who share that situation. Dasein develops a richer sense of its *there* and the meaning of the *there*. Dasein's openness to the situation and other entities heightens its receptivity to being drawn into authentic action, to being called, and to responding in the first person.

Authentic historizing is to be distinguished from historizing in general in that the intentionality involved in the former is rendered full. In so far as Dasein's Being is an issue for it, the object of Dasein's existential intention — and therefore also of its historizing taken at an ontological level — is its Being, its existence. The *I*-ness of this existence is disclosed in anxious Being-towards-death, when Dasein's Being as possibility — its *Seinkönnen* — is disclosed through the calling forth accomplished by the call. However, through the call Dasein is also called back to itself *as thrown Being-in-the-world*, in which it is always already involved in ongoing dialogic engagement with the world. Dasein is thrown back upon itself as possibility, not in an abstract way, but rather Dasein is thrown back upon those possibilities which its situation discloses. Authenticity is always a projecting upon possibilities which show up in the world. These possibilities are disclosed discursively. As such, discourse is not transcended in authenticity. Indeed the kind of continuity or coherence Heidegger describes as being a component of historizing would not be possible if a relationship to the past were not maintained, in particular to the way in which the past has been previously understood and expressed. It is largely by drawing upon these common terms and by situating oneself relative to some common sphere of meaning that this coherence can be established. Here we can see one aspect of the significance of *Mitsein* for Dasein's authenticity.

Through authentic historizing, Dasein is able to hand its heritage down to itself in an authentic repetition of its possibilities, an authentic taking up again of its possibilities. Only in taking up its factical possibilities is the intentionality which Dasein *is* emptily in everydayness rendered full; the ownmost possibility disclosed to Dasein in Being-towards-death is stamped with the concretion of ontic possibility in the world only with authentic historizing. Dasein's ontological openness as possibility is disclosed as an openness to *something in particular*, and Dasein's formal *Jemeinigkeit* is transformed into a proper *Eigentlichkeit*. This very language also suggests that the authenticity of Dasein's historizing involves an engagement in the mode of the first person.

We can understand historizing as the process of fashioning a whole out of disparate temporal moments; it is a way of making things make sense by giving them a coherence. The language of wholes and unity which Heidegger uses here can be easily misunderstood. Dasein's Being is marked by a structural whole which can be expressed in the existential structure of Being-in-the-world or Being-towards-death. When Dasein grasps itself 'as a whole', it discloses its structural wholeness or integrity, but this 'wholeness' should not be confused with completion. Completion suggests that the 'parts' which are brought together into the whole complement each other in such a way that any tension or conflict between them is resolved or neutralized in their coming together. The whole (completeness) that results is finished and closed off; this kind of completion is not a feature of Dasein's Being. The structural whole with which we are dealing here is more appropriately characterized as an integration of parts that remain in tension with one another. The ecstatic movements of Dasein's temporalizing and of its engagement in the world — as thrownness, projection, and falling — do not resolve one another; they resist one another. This resistance lends a certain dynamism to the structural wholes of temporality and significance which they form. In authentic historizing these two wholes interpenetrate and generate Dasein's *I* within a broader horizon which allows its Being as Being-possible to be disclosed more fully and to lay claim to Dasein in the first person.

My claim is that while everydayness is a third-person conversationality, authentic historizing is a conversationality in the first person. To avoid unnecessary repetition of what has already been addressed in Chapter 8, I will not pursue a lengthy discussion of the dialogicality and conversationality of authentic historizing. That it is meant to be an existentiell modification of everydayness, which I have already shown to be conversationally dialogical, should remove the need to do so. I have focused instead on the distinction between first- and third-person interaction because this is the most significant difference between everydayness and authentic historizing. However, I want to stress the idea that authentic historizing be understood as a dialogical constituting of Self. In so doing, it will become apparent how historizing displays the features of the conversational model of dialogue.

iv. The dialogical constitution of Self

In anticipatory resoluteness and authentic historizing, Dasein is drawn back into the conversationality of its Being-in-the-world in a first-person mode. In being drawn into the situation, Dasein becomes located in a context which has spatial, temporal, and significative features: Dasein's *there* is a dialogic situation as described in Part II. Dasein finds itself oriented towards other entities in an involvement that is already unfolding, with particular possibilities for further development which are related to the specific means available at the time. Dasein's disclosure of its Being against the broader horizon of its Being-towards-death and Being-in-the-world singles it out in the first person. Dasein's existence situates it relative to its death in such a way that it cannot evade it. Similarly, Dasein is situated within its context in its engagement with the world and others and towards its possibilities in such a way that it occupies a space which is unique, and in this way Dasein's situation and the other entities disclosed within it can single Dasein out and bestow upon it a special responsibility. Dasein's heightened grasp of its *there* involves an accentuated sense of its openness to the situation and what can unfold there. Dasein is more deeply involved in the situation, and in disclosing other entities against a wider horizon, Dasein becomes more engaged with them in their particularity.

There are two senses in which historizing entails a dialogical constitution of Dasein's Self, and these correlate with the wholes of temporality and significance just described. The first may be understood as a dialogue between different temporal moments through which a Self that has temporal unity can be forged. The second is the fashioning of Self through Dasein's engagement with other entities disclosed with it in the situation. Just as the wholes of temporality and significance become intertwined in historizing, so are the dialogic interactions which shape Dasein's *I* imbedded in one another.

It is important to note the middle-voicedness of Dasein's historizing. Dasein shatters itself against its death; in encountering its death, Dasein is thrown back into its factical *there*, back into the context in which it always already was, but which can now be understood as a situation. Dasein's Being-towards-death discloses Dasein's Being as possible, thus allowing the factical possibilities in Dasein's situation to manifest themselves as such. In repetition, Dasein seizes hold of some factical possibility in its anticipatory resoluteness. In this way, Dasein "*hands* itself *down* to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen" (SZ 384). This is Dasein's resolving upon its fate. The play between thrownness and projection in this situation implies a middle-voicedness.

However, it is important to distinguish the repetition of authentic historizing from a mechanical repeating or blind fatalism:

> ... when one has, by repetition, handed down to oneself a possibility that has been, the Dasein that has-been-there is not disclosed in order to be actualized over again. The repeating of that which is possible does not bring again something that is 'past', nor does it bind the 'Present' back to that which has already been 'outstripped'. Arising, as it does, from a resolute projection of oneself, repetition does not let itself be persuaded of something by what is 'past', just in order that this, as something which was formerly actual, may recur. Rather, the repetition makes a reciprocal rejoinder to the possibility of that existence which has-been-there. But when such a rejoinder is made to this possibility in a resolution, it is made *in a moment of vision; and as such* it is at the same time a *disavowal* of that which in the "today", is working itself out as the 'past'.[8] (SZ 386)

This repetition is as much against the past as it is with it; it is a response to the past, to the call of the past. Indeed it is a response to the appeal of the call of conscience.[9]

The call calls Dasein back to itself as thrown. In so far as Dasein heeds the call, it responds to it. This is disclosed through the taking up of the possibilities which are disclosed within the situation into which Dasein's temporality draws it. It is important to keep in mind, however, that Dasein's response to the call is only revealed through its Being-in-the-world in some way, namely through its taking up possibilities which are disclosed in the situation. Dasein's responding to the call amounts to its responding to its situation and the possibilities disclosed therein. It is significant that in authentic historizing, Dasein does not simply respond to possibilities in terms of a specific situation, but tries to do so in a way which helps it to fashion an integrated whole of its self and its involvement in the world. In its historizing, Dasein responds to others which are temporally other, to different moments in its life — indeed other selves, past selves, future selves. In forging some sort of continuous whole out of these, Dasein also responds to these others and the challenges which they give.

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[8] "Die Wiederholung *erwidert* vielmehr die Möglichkeit der dagewesenen Existenz. Die Erwiderung der Möglichkeit im Entschluß ist aber zugleich *als augenblickliche* der *Widerruf* dessen, was im Heute sich als "Vergangenheit" auswirkt" (SZ 386).

[9] The ambiguity of continuity and discontinuity, which we have noted is a feature of dialogue, is preserved in the notion of *Widerruf*.

The responsibility that Dasein shows with respect to the forging of a temporal whole reveals a certain questionability. Dasein clearly feels *challenged* to create some sort of unity for itself (otherwise it would not respond in the way that it does). This is no doubt due to the fact that the unity of its existence is repeatedly thrown into question by the ecstatic character of that existence. Because of Dasein's existential temporality, any wholeness it establishes is constantly being overcome and surpassed. In this way Dasein is challenged; Dasein's historizing is itself a response to that challenge.[10]

The extent to which temporality keeps rendering obsolete the wholes which Dasein shapes in the course of its historizing, thereby making them questionable, points to the degree to which these wholes are seen as meaningful. The dialogue in which Dasein engages in its historizing is one in which it gives meaning to itself through establishing some sort of unity or coherence from these 'disparate' moments. But this meaning is itself only created and maintained through the specific dialogical interactions that occur all the time in Being-in-the-world, in the engagement with entities in accordance with the way the situation discloses Dasein in relation to them. In this way, the meaning given at the very particular and specific level of any given disclosive situation is important in the fashioning of a larger meaning at a broader level. Because authentic historizing entails a sharpening of Dasein's attunement to its situation, the meaning given therein is understood to be much more specific to the interaction and the situation, much in the way that the possibilities to which Dasein responds in such a case are more specific to the interaction.

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[10] It is also worth noting that this constant changing and evolving — this almost obsolescence — of unity (and meaning) is not only something which occurs with respect to Dasein, but also with respect to other entities and the world overall. It is for this reason that they can become questionable themselves. This is the other side of questionability: that Dasein is not only able to be questioned, but is itself able to question. This is of particular significance if we consider the whole ontological priority that Dasein is said to have with respect to the *Seinsfrage*.

We have already noted that the ecstatic nature of temporality underlies the character of existence as thrown projection, but thrown projection is also linked to the tension between continuity and discontinuity. In finding itself thrown into the world, Dasein experiences its abandonment to what is other. This is an experience of alienation and discontinuity, both with respect to the world and with respect to itself. But Dasein is also always projecting beyond itself ecstatically towards the world and its self (in so far as it strives to become itself); this is a striving for continuity. This dynamic is evident in Dasein's historizing as well. As we have said, the ecstatic dimension of Dasein's Being which shows itself in its Being-in-the-world is founded upon this more primordial ecstasis of Dasein's temporality. An entity which is identical with itself can be neither continuous nor discontinuous with either itself or another: it simply *is* in its identity. Such identity is not a feature of Dasein's Being. Dasein, because of its Being-towards, is always beyond itself and thus more than/other than itself. This introduces an alterity into its Being, and it is this feature which allows us to speak of continuity and discontinuity relative to Dasein's Being in the first place. Dasein's Being as a historizing is the coordination of ecstatic moments into a certain integrity. Heidegger maintains that this kind of continuity could only be established out of the dispersed moments of Dasein's existence if there were some ontological structural whole (namely temporality as a whole) which made this possible. This suggests that the discontinuity which Dasein tries to overcome in its historizing — in its fashioning of a certain continuity — is not itself an absolute discontinuity, but is antecedently related to a lost ontological wholeness.[11] In this way, Dasein's historizing can be understood as a dialogical constituting (or reconstituting/recovery) of Self.[12]

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[11] There is a sense in which Dasein's continuity (identity) is grounded in the fact that its existence is characterized by mineness. But that its essence lies in its existence — and therefore is stretched out temporally and marked by finitude — is the aspect of Dasein's Being that is largely responsible for its

However, it must be remembered here that this structural whole, as the ground upon which Dasein is able to reintegrate itself out of discontinuous moments, is one of openness, and therefore is never complete. Dasein's Being-towards-death and its temporalizing are ecstatic; they consist in a relation to the other. This relatedness to the other (a discontinuity) paradoxically constitutes Dasein's continuity. Being-in-the-world is only possible on the basis of Dasein's temporality. That Dasein has such a temporality is what is largely concealed from it, and so the nature of its Being-in-the-world is largely misunderstood. When Dasein understands its temporality differently, however, it can be the Being-in-the-world which it always already is in a more immediate way. This is accomplished through Dasein's appropriation of its temporality and its submission to an appropriation by it. But what Dasein experiences is not only itself in its unity and identity; it is also itself in its disunity, in its relation to alterity, indeed in its own alterity.

This discussion so far has focused primarily on the dialogicality of Dasein's fashioning of a Self that has temporal unity. But we should draw more explicit attention to the way in which this Self is shaped through a dialogic engagement with the world and

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discontinuity. Dasein's Being is the combining of both of these aspects.

[12] The degree to which this can be seen as specifically conversational may be supported as follows. The play of movement which shows up in authentic historizing is multiple. On the one hand, Dasein is drawn into the situation, wherein possibilities are disclosed to it upon which it can project. In doing so, Dasein goes beyond itself ecstatically in the projecting, but in a way which also brings the past closer in so far as this projecting also consists in handing one's heritage down to oneself. This movement is shared with everydayness and involves Dasein's approaching possibilities and being approached by them. This is the reciprocity which belongs to this engagement. But the flow consists in the fact that these are not isolated incidents, but that Dasein in its temporalizing attempts to establish a continuity or coherence between the past and future. Because this continuity is constantly being surpassed due to Dasein's temporal ecstasis, it is perpetually being re-constituted. This adds to the phenomenon of flow, but also to that of reciprocity in that a 'back and forth' is established between the Dasein which tries to constitute itself and the other which erodes it. When considering the dialogicality of authentic historizing overall, the thematic unity is really the continuity of Dasein's self, the self which is constituted through the coordination of the various temporal moments. The unity is, in a sense, Dasein's very existence. Dasein's openness shows itself not just in its openness to the situation and the possibilities disclosed therein, but also, more specifically, in its vulnerability in the face of this continual surpassing of itself and indeed the disintegration of its wholeness which occurs due to its temporalizing.

others.

It is crucial to recognize that all meaning for Dasein is bound up with the network of significations which constitutes the world. Things mean something because they are related to other things in a particular way: they are configured together into meaningful wholes. Something takes on meaning with reference to these configurations and the particular contexts within which that thing appears. This is similarly true for Dasein's Self. Dasein is able to find meaning for itself through becoming integrated or establishing connection with the networks of signification which make up the world. Through its dialogic engagement with the world and others, Dasein finds its place within that whole, and it derives its meaning with reference to it.

When Dasein is drawn into the situation in resoluteness, it is thrown into its *there* and its engagement with others. As I have shown in Chapter 8, this engagement is conversational. Dasein finds itself oriented toward other entities along axes of spatiality, temporality, and significance. Dasein and the other entities are mutually disclosed as sharing a particular spatio-temporal location. They are also situated relative to a common background of meaning against which they emerge as meaningful and understandable. The dislocation, alienation, and meaninglessness which Dasein experiences in the falling away of the world in anxiety is overcome as Dasein finds itself reintroduced to the world. Meaning is re-established through a renewed connection with the world and others. The dislocation effected by anxious Being-towards-death functions as a phenomenological reduction which broadens the horizon against which other entities are disclosed; Dasein's relation to them is unconcealed against the horizon of Dasein's Being-in-the-world and Being-with Others.

Against this broader horizon, the entities with which Dasein is engaged and that very engagement itself manifest themselves in a greater specificity. They too show up in the first person and draw Dasein into the situation. Dasein is open to this approach in resoluteness, allowing its Being to be elicited in the first person, and it responds through taking action in the first person. Through the flow and reciprocity of this engagement, Dasein's Self is reconstituted. It is, in effect, part of the thematic unity which unfolds between the participants in the conversation.

The two instances of dialogical constitution of Self which I have described are dependent on one another. Neither occurs without the other. The *I* which is implicitly expressed in Dasein's everyday Being-in-the-world and Being-with Others and the temporalizing which belongs to them becomes more explicitly disclosed when Dasein allows itself to be appropriated by its Being. It accepts its responsibility to and for that Being — as a Being-in-the-world and a Being-with Others thrown towards death.

When Dasein encounters its own alterity in its anxious Being-towards-death, the conversational dialogue of Being-in-the-world in which it was engaged and which was only possible on the basis of this relation, is bracketed. However, the disclosure which occurs in anxious Being-towards-death does not remove Dasein from the world, it suspends Dasein's engagement therein for an instant. In this instant, Dasein recognizes its own Being-able-to-be against the horizon of its no longer Being-able-to-be; the barrier of its own impossibility turns it back upon itself as a thrown Being of possibility. In this way the encounter pulls Dasein back into the conversation with its world, its Being-in-the-world, but now in the manner of a first-person engagement. Dasein feels itself addressed by its possibilities and sees those possibilities as its own. It has moved into the mode of the first person.

* * *

Dasein is an entity which is ontologically constituted by two features: first, that its essence lies in its existence; and second, that that existence is its own, it is characterized by mineness. The first feature indicates *that Dasein is*, that Dasein is a concrete entity. As such, Dasein is finite. Because it is finite, it is limited; Dasein is not all. But we also know that for Heidegger, this existence is also an ek-sistence; it is a being out of itself *towards*; therefore, it is also an intentionality. The second feature indicates that this Being-towards is always *mine*: that is, it is experienced as *my* Being-towards.

Being-towards is always a Being-towards another, and so Dasein's lived experience is that of Being-towards the other. In a certain sense, what is other is understood by Dasein as possibility because it *is not* Dasein, but something which lies outside of Dasein and towards which Dasein comports. However, that what is other can be a possibility for Dasein lies in Dasein's own Being as a Being-towards. It is Dasein's own Being as intentionality that makes possibility possible for it. This in turn is rooted in Dasein's finitude, namely in the fact that it is limited. In particular, this limitation pertains to Dasein's temporal finitude, namely that it is mortal. Mortality represents the possibility of impossibility. Thus, it is Dasein's Being, as the possibility of impossibility, which is the ground for any of its possibilities; since this Being is always Dasein's own, it is Dasein's *ownmost* possibility.

Dasein's experience, then, is one of Being-towards possibilities, and it is in terms of these possibilities that the world is by and large illuminated. So Dasein's Being-in-the-world, which is the way in which Dasein's Being-toward is experienced, is also rooted in Dasein's temporal finitude. This Being-toward is the presupposition which underlies that Being-in-the-world, although it is mostly only emptily intended; that is, it is not immediately experienced. That Dasein's Being is a Being-towards what is other and which is its own is implicit in everydayness, where Dasein dwells in a world wherein it is co-disclosed with other entities as standing in a meaningful context. Dasein experiences this dwelling as a Being-in (a world) in which it always, in one way or another, finds itself to be already situated alongside entities, involved in various projects, and understanding its context. This Being-in-the-world is dialogical in the way of conversation between Dasein and other entities, in that the interaction is ongoing and coherent (flow), is characterized by a give-and-take between entities (reciprocity), is typically about something (thematic unity), and is indeterminate in its direction and duration (openness). The Being-in is the dialogue (the conversation) and the participants are those which that Being-in discloses as being oriented toward one another. To the degree that Dasein participates in this conversation of Being-in-the-world in its mode of *Man-selbst*, it is a conversationality in the third person.

As I have said, all of this implicitly rests upon a relation to alterity which is the ground of all possibility for Dasein. This relation to alterity is the ground for the meaningful context that we have called the world. This relation is more immediately experienced in anxious Being-towards-death, where it is made explicit to Dasein in the disclosure of its death as the possibility of its own impossibility. The implication is that

Dasein comes to experience, in an immediate way, the possibility of its impossibility, and experiences it as its own. This experience, which resembles the dialogical encounter, involves a bracketing of certain features of the conversationality of everydayness and transports Dasein into the realm of the first person because of the way in which the call singles it out.

Yet anxious Being-towards-death is not the only feature of authenticity. Authenticity is, for Heidegger, an existentiell mode; it is a modification of what goes on in everydayness, not a destruction or negation of it. In anxious Being-towards-death, Dasein discloses its Being-towards immediately; it experiences its own Being-towards the other, indeed its Being-possible. This occurs because in its Being-towards-death, Dasein runs up against an other which resists it, resists its understanding, and can only be understood in its un-understandability, as a possibility in terms of impossibility. This resistance throws Dasein back upon itself and represents the horizon against which Dasein's own Being as an understanding Being-towards, as a Being-possible, discloses itself. Furthermore, Dasein discloses its Being in its mineness, as something for which it must take responsibility. This disclosure occurs in a specific context in terms of specific possibilities. Dasein does not experience itself as empty or abstract possibility but as possibility to do something specific. That is, this disclosure draws Dasein into a situation with a more immediate attunedness to its own possibility. This understanding of its own Being is incorporated into the horizon of significance within which other entities in the situation become disclosed. In the situation, Dasein's conversation continues *in a different register*, in the mode of the first person.

In this way the two modes of dialogue — conversation and encounter — can be understood in the context of Heidegger's existential phenomenology in SZ. The central distinguishing feature between authenticity and inauthenticity is the immediacy of the experience of Dasein's Being, both in terms of its mineness and in terms of its being a relation to alterity. These two ontologically constitutive features are in tension with one another and mirror the distressed relationship between continuity and discontinuity which permeates dialogue. Because Dasein's essence lies in its existence, its essence is decentered, ecstatic. If we understand identity in terms of the substantiality of something present-at-hand which appears or *is* in the present moment, then Dasein is not identical with itself. The moments of existence are disparate, yet they hang together in terms of the mineness of that existence. The ground of this *I* is Dasein's temporality, as expressed in the unity of the temporal ecstases which is forged through Dasein's temporalizing and in the unity of the network of significations in which Dasein is immersed in its Being-in-the-world. Thus, Dasein's Being is marked by a continuity as well as a certain discontinuity. It never endures unchanged, but is always in motion, always altering, becoming other with respect to itself. All of these changes, these little ruptures between the self that it was and the self that it is becoming, all of these little discontinuities nonetheless admit of coordination under the rubric of the *I* in terms of Dasein's mineness.

This tension between continuity and discontinuity has its root for Heidegger in Dasein's temporality. As an existing entity Dasein will die; this death is radically other for Dasein and so represents what is most discontinuous with oneself. Yet this death also belongs to Dasein and singles it out. The mineness of this death establishes my continuity with it. Death is my alterity because it has called me and drawn me into a reckoning with it. This tension between the continuity and discontinuity which lies at the heart of Dasein's Being, its temporality, and its Being-in-the-world, remains obscure to Dasein in its everydayness. Dasein views itself, "objects", and others primarily in terms of persistence (self-continuity). Although Dasein tends to demarcate itself from these entities, in its everyday comportment it actually presumes a continuity with them in so far as it unreflectively orients itself toward them according to the structures of meaning that make up the world. Dasein always already understands and implicitly expects that understanding to continue. Our discontinuity with others — as marked by their alterity and opacity — is precisely what is *not* generally apparent in everydayness, and neither is the alterity which belongs to Dasein itself in its death. Even where death is recognized as the other, it is not recognized as Dasein's *own* other. The openness to the other and death, understood as a relation to the other, is what is neglected. In anxious Being-towards-death, this hidden discontinuity, and the connection between this discontinuity and Dasein, are the primary disclosures. Indeed, the historizing demanded by authenticity requires an engagement with that discontinuity. In this way Dasein is called upon to *be* the tension between its continuity and discontinuity.[13]

Because of the ecstatical nature of Dasein's temporality, Dasein is always going beyond whatever continuity it has succeeded in establishing, and thus ceasing to be continuous with itself. Any continuity which Dasein fashions is constantly vulnerable to erosion and must be perpetually maintained and won again. Here too, we see the tension between continuity and discontinuity in the maintenance of Dasein's sense of self. Every time this discontinuity is reintroduced, the effect is one of throwing pre-established continuity into question. Discontinuity is reintroduced not only with every temporally ecstatic surpassing, but also with every encounter with alterity, in every dialogic engagement where the alterity of the other which underlies that engagement becomes revealed.[14] Thus, the potential for the erosion of self-continuity is great indeed.

The tension between continuity and discontinuity is an essential component of the dialogical relation, and has not received the attention that it merits in the literature on dialogue. A great many thinkers of dialogue, and I would include among these Buber and Theunissen, tend to emphasize a certain continuity or connection with the other as being a particularly distinctive feature of the dialogical relation. Sometimes this is characterized in terms of an over-romanticized 'losing oneself in the other' in eroticism, while at other times the emphasis is on shared understanding. What these theories overlook is the extent to which one must be discontinuous with the other in order to seek continuity, that the ongoing search for continuity with the other implies the perpetual re-emergence of our discontinuity. Even fewer thinkers focus on the discontinuity between self and other as being a key feature in dialogue; one of these would be Levinas.

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[13] The relationship between this continuity and discontinuity repeats itself in the peculiar *Nichtigkeit* which lies at the heart of Dasein's Being. Dasein, qua thrown, is not the basis of its Being, yet its thrownness is the basis of its Being, and in so far as it is thrown it is its basis. Thus Dasein's thrownness, although not really foundational for Dasein's existence, nevertheless becomes its foundation once that existence is underway. Thus, perhaps it is best to say that continuity is founded on discontinuity, but discontinuity only has its meaning in terms of the continuity which is founded upon it.

[14] Note that many dialogic engagements occur in the mode where the alterity and discontinuity of the other persist in concealment, and these engagements are 'safe' because they are not perceived to be threatening.

However, he tends to stress discontinuity at the expense of continuity. His insights are crucial, in so far as they draw attention to the 'other side' of dialogue, but they do not, in my view, capture the entire phenomenon any more than the others. My criticism of both approaches is that they fail to appreciate the necessity of both continuity and discontinuity between self and other in the dialogical relation.

This double aspect of continuity and discontinuity is captured in the idea of ecstasy. In Part II I argued that ecstasy is most notably a feature of encounter, but can also be seen to be at work in conversation. The latter point is particularly affirmed by the conversationality which shows itself in Dasein's existentiality, and by Heidegger's linking of this to Dasein's ecstatic temporality. In ecstasy one surges out of oneself, beyond oneself towards the other, in an attempt to reach that other and merge with it. A continuity with the other is sought. Yet the discontinuity between self and other is preserved; one falls back from the other, rebuffed by its alterity. In the moment of ambiguity, in the hovering before falling back, the encounter occurs. Conversation can be understood as the *entirety* of the movement toward and back/away from the other. In this sense, ecstatic movement is involved in both, encompassing both continuity and discontinuity between self and other.

Many people read Heidegger as stressing continuity, understanding authenticity to be Dasein's grasping its Being as a whole on the basis of its temporalizing. However, aspects of discontinuity are equally present in Heidegger's phenomenological description of Dasein's Being and its becoming authentic. They lie at the very heart of his concepts of ecstatic temporality and of falling, and in his characterization of existence as thrown projection. The radical tension in Dasein's existentiality goes largely under-appreciated by critics and commentators.

Is the connection elaborated here between Dasein's existentiality and dialogue anything more than a fanciful concoction, the product of wishful thinking? I believe so. The root of the connection lies in ecstasis. Dasein's existentiality is ecstatic — an always being beyond itself (as projection), being outside of itself (as thrown), and being away from itself (as fallen). The dynamism of ecstasis is understood within the context of time. Heidegger maintains that Dasein comprehends the ecstatic character of its existentiality in terms of temporality.

Ecstasis is also an aspect of dialogue which is captured in the tension between continuity and discontinuity with the other. We are at once apart from the other, not identical with the other, and yet also beyond ourselves toward the other. We are always already outside of ourselves in the engagement with the other. This is clearly manifested in the orientational features of dialogue, in terms of movement and participation (spatio-temporal ecstasis), the between (ecstasis of signification), and the openness which is an aspect of all three.

It is through dialogue that meaning is created and sustained, but also destroyed, for it is through the agreement of the other that meaning gains validity. In the absence of validation from the other, meaning remains inherently questionable. The possibility of being challenged is always presented to us in dialogue, with an accompanying need to respond to that challenge. The ecstasis of dialogue also appears in the dialectic of question and response, and the role that the exchange plays in creating meaning, which never lies *in* entities, but *between* them. This Being-toward the other and Being-toward meaning in dialogue are ecstatic. Because of the dynamic character of dialogue, the meanings which are constructed through dialogue are always vulnerable to erosion.

The connection of dialogue to the ecstasis of temporality is particularly poignant, for it is Dasein's ecstatic temporality, understood as a Being-towards-death, which throws not just the meaning of specific things into question, but the meaning of Dasein's existence overall. In fact, it would no doubt be Heidegger's claim that Dasein's ecstatic temporality lies at the root of all questioning and all surpassing of established meaning, while at the same time constituting the openness for the modification, affirmation, and creation of meaning. Ecstasis is the condition of the possibility of both the creation and destruction of meaning. For Heidegger this ecstasis originates in Dasein's temporality. I prefer to think of it as lying in Dasein's *existentiality*. Heidegger interprets existentiality as a temporality, but it could also be interpreted as a dialogicality, as I have interpreted it here. Dasein does not merely understand itself as mortal; it finds itself questioned by that mortality, challenged to justify its existence in the face of a fate which renders that very existence null. Dasein responds to this challenge, not by dwelling on the seeming absurdity of existence, but by taking up that which challenges it, by embracing its ecstasis more fully in its own practice of questioning. It is from here that the *Seinsfrage* and all other philosophical questions depart; and from the dialogical roots of this questioning, they assume a renewed significance.

Epilogue

Dasein is the entity who questions. In questioning Dasein asks about something. On the one hand, Dasein does not know that about which it asks, otherwise it would not be necessary for it to ask. On the other hand, Dasein must have a sense of that about which it asks, otherwise it would not be able to formulate the question in the first place. This initial sense that Dasein has of that about which it asks sets the parameters for what would constitute a satisfactory response. When the response comes, it provides the content which, in a sense, fulfills the question.

In asking a question, Dasein holds itself open to the other. It awaits a response from the other to whom it has directed the question. The fulfillment that comes, then, comes from the other who responds. But the question itself is also inspired by the other (though it need not be the same other). Thus, the whole practice of questioning involves a relation to the other. This relation is ecstatic because it is a Being-towards the other. That Dasein is the entity who questions implies that Dasein not only asks questions, but is questioned. Dasein is toward the other; the other is toward Dasein. That is, Dasein's subjectivity is equally receptive and projective. Dasein is thoroughly involved and immersed in its world. Its Being-towards is a Being-in. Accordingly, we say that one is *in* ecstasy. Ecstasy is a movement, and also a dynamism and flux, *into which* we are thrown. Ecstasy, then, is a Being-towards which is a Being-in. In questioning the other we are also in question.

Dasein asks about Being and about its own Being, because it implicitly understands the possibility of not-Being, the possibility of its impossibility. Dasein's finitude gives it the possibility of questioning and lies behind its concern for Being. In encountering its not-ness in anxious Being-towards-death, Dasein encounters a radical alterity. What Dasein is given to understand is its own existence; it is thrown back upon its existence by the muteness and resistance of the other. This being thrown back upon myself singles me out, and thus addresses me specifically, in a non-transferable way. The muteness of the other challenges me and lays me open. It is to this challenge that I respond, and this is the responsibility experienced in guilt.

The encounter with radical alterity is not merely the cessation of a conversational dialogue although such a disruption may set the stage for the encounter, which is itself a positive phenomenon. Encounter involves a bracketing of 'everyday' space- and time-consciousness and meaning which represents the crossing of a border. In the event of encounter, I experience radical alterity in its otherness; I experience it crossing my borders, violating me, trespassing upon me, rendering me at once vulnerable and not alone. This experience is immediate; it is not mediated by language or other meaning; it occurs only when these have been disrupted. Moreover, this invasion is beyond my control. In crossing my borders, the other challenges me, and my sense of who I am is ruptured. The approach of the other puts those borders into question; after all, a border which can be crossed offers little protection.[1] The disclosure of my death challenges me in a way which requires a response. I am answerable to this otherness, and although I must struggle to respond in the wake of this challenge, I do not do so without also questioning that otherness.

The challenge has a two-fold character. That I encounter the other as unyielding to my understanding implies that I have approached it with a question to which I seek an answer. In so far as subjectivity is constituted by a dialogicality and is characterized by the structure of question and response, this should come as no surprise. In existing, I query entities, receive responses, and respond to the queries of others. This is the structure of our everyday existence. Thus, it is natural that I approach radical alterity in a questioning way, expecting a response. But it gives none, or none that I find suitable as an answer. The unanswered question gnaws at me, the urgency that it be answered ever growing. Here, existence has met its limit. The meaning that is given in response to my inquiry is there only in its impenetrability. We always ask after the radically other — about the divine, about death, about what comes after death. And since we cannot definitively get an answer to these questions, we are thrown back upon ourselves. This is the second part of the challenge. The muteness of the other challenges us to reckon with our Being as possibility — to flee it or to be open to it. On the one hand, this Being is a burden; it is heavy, filled with responsibility and guilt. Dasein has no foundation that it can assimilate, but neither can it foist its responsibility off on another. On the other hand, this Being is liberating. It opens us up to the world and to one another in a way that allows us to enjoy existence, to be adventurous, to be playful, and to be creative.

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[1] This is actually an interesting point to consider relative to Derrida's discussion of aporia. We set up an uncrossable border between ourselves and death, but we also discover that it is not a border behind which we can seek refuge. This discovery leaves us wondering where to go next.

* * *

I have tried to re-think the notion of subjectivity in a way that opens it up to the other, challenging those views which insist on the isolation of the subject. But in thinking subjectivity dialogically, I have also tried to loosen up our thinking about dialogue, by challenging the frameworks within which it is usually understood. This attempt does not trivialize the notion by allowing us to "see dialogue everywhere"; rather, it illustrates the potential for a richer understanding of ourselves, a greater openness to the other, and a fuller experience of our relations with the other.

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