HEGEL AND MARX

SPRING TERM 2010

[All footnotes in this Study Pack are mine unless otherwise mentioned – AC]

1. Fichte, Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre)
1794
Source: J.G. Fichte, *The Science of Knowledge*, ed. and trans. P. Heath and J. Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 97-99
Full title: *Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge*

[Fichte's notes omitted. – AC]

Part 1 Fundamental principles of the entire science of knowledge
§1 First, absolutely unconditioned principle

[In paras. 1-5 Fichte begins with the proposition 'A is A' (or 'A = A') and argues that in order to assert even this basic truth I must already assert that I exist. – AC]

6. We return to the point from which we started.

a) The proposition 'A = A' constitutes a *judgment.* But all judgment, so empirical consciousness tells us, is an activity of the human mind; for in empirical self-consciousness it has all the conditions of activity which must be presupposed as known and established for purposes of reflection.

b) Now this activity is based on something that rests on no more ultimate ground, namely X = I am.

c) Hence what is *absolutely posited,* and *founded on itself,* is the ground of *one particular* activity (and, as the whole Science of Knowledge will show, of *all* activity) of the human mind, and thus of its pure character; the pure character of activity as such, in abstraction from its specific empirical conditions.

The self's[1] own positing of itself is thus its own pure activity. The *self posits itself,* and by virtue of this mere self-assertion it *exists*; and conversely, the self *exists* and *posits* its own existence by virtue of merely existing. It is at once the agent and the product of action; the active, and what the activity brings about; action and deed are one and the same, and hence the 'I am' expresses an Act, and the only one possible, as will inevitably appear from the Science of Knowledge as a whole.

7. Now let us consider once more the proposition *'I am I'.*

[1] *das Ich* (the I). Heath and Lachs always translate this as 'the self'.

a) The I is posited absolutely. Let it be assumed that what is *absolutely posited* is the I occupying the place of formal subject in the above proposition; while that in the predicate position represents that which *exists*;[2] hence, the absolutely valid judgment that [98] both are completely identical, states, or absolutely asserts, that the *self* exists *because* it has posited itself.

b) The self in the first sense, and that in the second, are supposed to be absolutely equivalent. Hence one can also reverse the above proposition and say: the self posits itself simply *because* it exists. It *posits* itself by merely existing and *exists* by merely being posited.

And this now makes it perfectly clear in what sense we are using the word 'I' in this context, and leads us to an exact account of the self as absolute subject. *That whose being or essence consists simply in the fact that it posits itself as existing,* is the self as absolute subject. As it *posits* itself, so it *is*; and as it *is,* so it *posits* itself; and hence the self is absolute and necessary for the self. What does not exist for itself is not a self.

(To explain: one certainly hears the question proposed: *What* was I, then, before I came to self-consciousness? The natural reply is: *I* did not exist at all; for I was not a self. The self exists only insofar as it is conscious of itself. The possibility of this question is based on a confusion between the self as *subject,* and the self as *object* of reflection for an absolute subject, and is in itself utterly improper. The self presents itself to itself, to that extent imposes on itself the form of a presentation, and is now for the first time a *something,* namely an object; in this form consciousness acquires a substrate, which *exists,* even though without real consciousness, and thought of, moreover, in bodily form. People conceive of some such situation as this, and ask: *What* was the self at that time, i.e., what is the substrate of consciousness? But in so doing they think unawares of the *absolute subject as well*, as contemplating this substrate; and thus they unwittingly subjoin in thought the very thing from which they have allegedly abstracted, and contradict themselves. You cannot think at all without subjoining in thought your self, as conscious of itself; from your self-consciousness you can never abstract; hence all questions of the above type call for no answer, for a real understanding of oneself would preclude their being asked.)

[2] Fichte is referring to the proposition 'I am I', in which 'I' is both the grammatical subject (or 'formal subject') and the predicate.

8. If the self exists only insofar as it posits itself, then it exists only *for* that which posits, and posits only for that which exists. [99] *The self exists for the self – but* if it posits itself absolutely, as it is, then it posits itself as necessary, and is necessary for the self. *I exist only for myself*; *but for myself I am necessary* (in saying *'for myself',* I already posit my existence).

9. *To posit oneself* and *to be* are, as applied to the self, perfectly identical. Thus the proposition, 'I am, because I have posited myself' can also be stated as: *'I am absolutely, because I am'*.

Furthermore, the self-positing self and the existing self are perfectly identical, one and the same. The self is that *which* it posits itself to be; and it posits itself as *that* which it is. Hence *I am absolutely what I am.*

2. Fichte, Some Lectures Concerning the Scholar's Vocation
1794
Source: *Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings*, ed. Daniel Breazeale (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988)

[Fichte's and editor's notes omitted – AC]

First Lecture
Concerning the Vocation of Man as Such

You are already somewhat acquainted with the purpose of the series of lectures which I am beginning today. I would like to answer – or rather, I would like to prompt you to answer – the following questions: What is the scholar's vocation?[1] What is his relationship to mankind as a <146> whole, as well as to the individual classes of men? What are his surest means of fulfilling his lofty vocation?

The scholar is a scholar only insofar as he is distinguished from other men who are not scholars. The concept of the scholar arises by comparison and by reference to society (by which is understood here not merely the state, but any aggregate whatsoever of rational men, living alongside each other and thus joined in mutual relations).

It follows that the scholar's vocation is conceivable only within society. The answer to the question What is the scholar's vocation? thus presupposes an answer to another question: What is the vocation of man within society?

The answer to this latter question presupposes, in turn, an answer to yet another, higher one: What is the vocation of man as such? That is to say, what is the vocation of man considered simply qua man, merely according to the concept of man as such – man isolated and considered apart from all the associations which are not necessarily included in the concept of man?*

If I may assert something without proof, something which has undoubtably already been demonstrated to many of you for a long time and something which others among you feel obscurely, but no less strongly on that account: All philosophy, all human thinking and teaching, all of your studies, and, in particular, everything which I will ever be able to present to you can have no purpose other than answering the questions just raised, and especially the last and highest question: What is the vocation of man as such, and what are his surest means for fulfilling it?<147>

For a clear, distinct, and complete insight into this vocation (though not, of course, for a feeling of it), philosophy in its entirety – and moreover a well-grounded and exhaustive philosophy – is presupposed. Yet the vocation of man as such is the subject of my lecture for today. You can see that, unless I intend to treat philosophy in its entirety within this hour, I will be unable to deduce what I have to say on this topic completely and from its foundations. What I can do is to build upon your feelings. At the same time you can see that the *last* task of all philosophical inquiry is to answer that question which I wish to answer in these public lectures: What is the vocation of the scholar? or (which amounts to the same thing, as will become evident later), What is the vocation of the highest and truest man? And you can see as well that the *first* task of all philosophical inquiry is to answer the question What is the vocation of man as such? I intend to establish the answer to this latter question in my private lectures.[2] All I wish to do today is to indicate briefly the answer to this question – to which I now turn.

The question concerning what the genuinely spiritual element in man, the pure I, might be like, considered simply in itself, isolated and apart from any relation to anything outside of itself, is an unanswerable question, and taken precisely it includes a self-contradiction. It is certainly not true that the pure I is a product of the not-I (which is my name for everything which is thought to exist outside of the I, everything which is distinguished from the I and opposed to it). The assertion that the pure I is a product of the not-I expresses a transcendental materialism which is completely contrary to reason. However, it certainly is true (and, at the

[1] *Gelehrter* (scholar) can also be translated as 'academic'. *Bestimmung* (vocation) literally means 'determination' and can also be translated as 'specific nature'.

[2] Probably a reference to the 1794 lectures published later that year as *The Science of Knowledge*.

appropriate place, will be strictly demonstrated) that the I is never conscious of itself nor able to become conscious of itself, except as something empirically determined – which necessarily presupposes something outside of the I. Even a person's body (which he calls "his" body) is something apart from the I. Yet apart from this connection with a body he would not be a person at all, but would be something quite inconceivable (if one can still refer to a thing which is not even conceivable as "something"). Thus neither here nor anywhere else does the expression "man considered in himself and in isolation" mean man considered as a pure I and apart from all relationship to anything at all apart from his pure I. Instead, this expression means merely man conceived of apart from all relationship to rational beings like himself.

What is man's vocation when he is conceived of in this manner? What is there in the concept of man which pertains to him but not to the nonhumans among those beings with which we are acquainted? What <148> distinguishes man from all those beings with which we are acquainted but which we do not designate as human?

I must begin with something positive, and since I cannot here begin with what is absolutely positive, that is, with the proposition "I am," I will have to propose a hypothetical proposition, one which is indelibly etched in human feeling – a proposition which is at the same time the result of all philosophy, a proposition which can be strictly demonstrated and which will be demonstrated in my private lectures. The proposition in question is the following: Just as certainly as man is rational, he is his own end, that is, he does not exist because something else should exist. Rather, he exists simply because *he* should exist. His mere existence is the ultimate purpose of his existence, or (which amounts to the same thing) it is contradictory to inquire concerning the purpose of man's existence: he is *because* he is. This quality of absolute being, of being for his own sake, is the characteristic feature, the determination or vocation of man, insofar as he is considered merely and solely as a rational being.

But absolute being, being purely and simply, is not all that pertains to man. Various particular determinations of this absolute being also pertain to him. It is not simply that *he is; he also is something.* He does not say merely "I am"; he adds, "I am this or that." He is a rational being insofar as he exists at all. But what is he insofar as he is something or other? This is the question we have to answer now.

To begin with, it is not because *one* exists that one is *what* one is; rather, one is what one is because *something else exists in addition to oneself.* As we have already said above and will demonstrate in the proper place, empirical self-consciousness, that is, the consciousness of any specific determination or vocation within ourselves at all, is impossible apart from the presupposition of a not-I. This not-I must affect man's passive faculty, which we call "sensibility." Thus, to the extent that man is something [definite] he is a sensuous being. But according to what we have already said, man is a rational being at the same time, and his reason should not be canceled by his sensibility. Reason and sensibility are supposed to coexist alongside each other. In this context the proposition "man is because he is" is transformed into the following: *man ought to be what he is simply because he is.* In other words, all that a person is ought to be related to his pure I, his mere being as an I. He ought to be all that he is simply because he is an I, and what he cannot be because he is an I, he ought not to be at all. This formula, which remains obscure, will become clear at once.

The pure I can be represented only negatively, as the opposite of the not-I. The characteristic feature of the latter is multiplicity, and thus the <149> characteristic feature of the former is complete and absolute unity. The pure I is always one and the same and is never anything different. Thus we may express the above formula as follows: Man is always supposed to be at one with himself; he should never contradict himself. Now the pure I cannot contradict itself, since it contains no diversity but is instead always one and the same. However, the empirical I, which is determined and determinable by external things, can contradict itself. And if the empirical I contradicts itself, this is a sure sign that it is not determined in accordance with the form of the pure I, and thus that it is not determined by itself but rather by external things. But this should not be, since man is his own end. A person ought to determine himself and not permit himself to be determined by something foreign. He ought to be what he is because this is what he wills to be and what he ought to will to be. The empirical I ought to be determined in a manner in which it could be eternally determined. Therefore, I would express the principle of morality in the formula (which I mention only in passing and for the purpose of illustration): "Act so that you could consider the maxims of your willing to be eternal laws for yourself."

The ultimate characteristic feature of all rational beings is, accordingly, absolute unity, constant self-identity, complete agreement with oneself. This absolute identity is the form of the pure I and is its only true form; or rather, in the

conceivability of identity we *recognize* the expression of the pure form of the I. Any determination which can be conceived to endure forever is in accordance with the pure form of the I. This should not be understood only halfway and one-sidedly. It is not simply that the will ought always to be one with itself (though this is all that moral theory is concerned with), but rather that all of man's powers, which in themselves constitute but one power and are distinguished from each other merely in their application to different objects, should coincide in a complete identity and should harmonize with each other. At least for the most part, however, the empirical determinations of our I do not depend upon us, but upon something external to us. The will is of course free within its own domain, that is, in the realm of objects to which, once man has become acquainted with them, it can be related. This will be demonstrated at the proper time. But feeling, as well as representation (which presupposes feeling), is not something free, but depends instead upon things external to the I – things whose characteristic feature is not identity at all, but rather multiplicity. If the I nevertheless ought always to be at one with itself in this respect too, then it must strive to act directly upon those very things upon which human feeling and representation depend. Man must try to modify these things. He must attempt to bring them into harmony with the pure form of the I, in order that the representation of these things, to the extent that this depends upon the properties of the things, may harmonize with <150> the form of the pure I. But it is not possible purely by means of the will alone to modify things in accordance with our necessary concepts of how they should be. A certain skill is also needed, a skill acquired and sharpened by practice.

Furthermore, and even more important, the unhindered influence of things upon the empirically determinable I, an influence to which we naturally entrust ourselves so long as our reason has not yet been awakened, gives a particular bent to our empirically determinable I. And since this bent is derived from things outside of us, it is impossible for it to be in harmony with the form of our pure I. Mere will is not sufficient for removing these distortions and restoring the original pure shape of our I; we require, in addition, that skill which we acquire and sharpen through practice.

The skill in question is in part the skill to suppress and eradicate those erroneous inclinations which originate in us prior to the awakening of our reason and the sense of our own spontaneity, and in part it is the skill to modify and alter external things in accordance with our concepts. The acquisition of this skill is called "culture,"[3] as is the particular degree of this skill which is acquired. Culture differs only in degree, but is susceptible of infinitely many gradations. Insofar as man is considered as a rational, sensuous creature, then culture is the ultimate and highest means to his final goal: complete harmony with himself. Insofar as man is considered merely as a sensuous creature, then culture is itself his ultimate goal. Sensibility ought to be cultivated: that is the highest and ultimate thing which one can propose to do with it.

The net result of all that has been said is the following: Man's ultimate and supreme goal is complete harmony with himself and – so that he can be in harmony with himself – the harmony of all external things with his own necessary, practical concepts of them (i.e., with those concepts which determine how things ought to be). Employing the terminology of the Critical Philosophy, this agreement is what Kant calls "the highest good."*[4] From what has already been said it follows that this "highest <151> good" by no means consists of two parts, but is completely unitary: the highest good is the *complete harmony of a rational being with himself.* In the case of a rational being dependent upon things outside of himself, the highest good may be conceived as twofold: as harmony between *the willing* [of such a being] and the idea of an eternally valid willing (i.e., as *ethical goodness),* or as the harmony of our willing (it should go without saying that I am here speaking of our rational willing) with *external things (i.e.,* as *happiness).* And thus we may note in passing that it is not true that the desire for happiness destines man for ethical goodness. It is rather the case that the concept of happiness itself and the desire for happiness first arise from man's moral nature. Not *what makes us happy is good,* but rather, *only what is good makes us happy.* No happiness is possible apart from morality. Of course, feelings of *pleasure* are possible without morality and even in opposition to it, and in the proper place we will see why <152> this is so. But pleasurable feelings are not happiness; indeed, they often even contradict happiness.

Man's final end is to subordinate to himself all that is irrational, to master it freely and according to his own laws. This is a final end which is completely inachievable and must always remain so – so long, that is, as man is to remain man and is not supposed to become God. It is part of the concept of man that his ultimate goal be

[3] *Kultur* (culture) can also be translated as 'civilization'.

[4] By 'the Critical Philosophy' Fichte means Kant's philosophy. Kant says that the highest good is virtue combined with the happiness that virtue deserves.

unobtainable and that his path thereto be infinitely long. Thus it is not man's vocation to reach this goal. But he can and he should draw nearer to it, and his true vocation qua man, that is, insofar as he is a rational but finite, a sensuous but free being, lies in *endless approximation toward this goal.* Now if, as we surely can, we call this total harmony with oneself "perfection," in the highest sense of the word, then *perfection* is man's highest and unattainable goal. His vocation, however, is to *perfect himself without end.* He exists in order to become constantly better in an ethical sense, in order to make all that surrounds him better *sensuously* and – insofar as we consider him in relation to society – *ethically* as well, and thereby to make himself ever happier.

Such is man's vocation insofar as we consider him in isolation, that is, apart from any relation to rational beings like himself. We do not, however, exist in isolation; though I cannot turn today to a consideration of the general connection between rational beings, I must, nevertheless, cast a glance upon that particular association with you which I enter upon today. What I would like to help many aspiring young men to grasp clearly is that lofty vocation which I have indicated briefly to you today. It is this vocation which I would like for you to make the most deliberate aim and the most constant guide of your lives – you young men who are in turn destined to affect mankind in the strongest manner, and whose destiny it is, through teaching, action, or both – in narrower or wider circles – to pass on that education which you have received and on every side to raise our fellowmen to a higher level of culture. When I teach something to you, I am most probably teaching unborn millions. Some among you may be well enough disposed toward me to imagine that I sense the dignity of my own special vocation, that the highest aim of my reflections and my teaching will be to contribute toward advancing culture and elevating humanity in you and in all those with whom you come into contact, and that I consider all philosophy and science which do not aim at this goal to be worthless. If this is how you judge me, then allow me to say that you are right about my intentions. Whether or not I have the power to live up to this wish is not entirely up to me. It depends in part on circumstances beyond our control; it depends in part upon you as well – upon your attentiveness, which I hereby request; upon your own efforts, which I cheerfully count upon with <153> complete confidence; and upon your confidence in me, to which I commend myself and will seek by my actions to commend to you.

Second Lecture
Concerning Man's Vocation within Society

Before it can become a science and a *Wissenschaftslehre,* philosophy must answer a number of questions, questions the dogmatists, who have made up their minds about everything, have forgotten to ask, and which the skeptics have dared to raise only at the risk of being accused of irrationality or wickedness – or both at once.

I have no desire to be superficial and to treat shallowly a subject concerning which I believe myself to possess better-founded knowledge. Nor do I wish to conceal and pass over in silence difficulties which I see clearly. Yet it remains my fate in these public lectures to have to touch upon several of these still almost entirely untouched questions and to touch upon them without being able to treat them in an exhaustive manner. At the risk of being misunderstood or misinterpreted I will be able to provide nothing but *hints* for further reflection and *directions* toward further information concerning matters I would prefer to have treated fundamentally and exhaustively. If I suspected that among you there were many of those "popular philosophers" who resolve every difficulty easily and without any effort or reflection, merely with the aid of what they call their own "healthy common sense" – if this is what I thought, then I would seldom stand here before you without quailing.

Among the questions which philosophy has to answer we find the following two in particular, which have to be answered before, among other things, a well-founded theory of natural rights is possible. First of all, by what right does a man call a particular portion of the physical world *"his* body"? How does he come to consider this to be his body, something which belongs to his I, since it is nevertheless something completely opposed to his I? And then the second question: How does a man come to assume that there are rational beings like himself apart from him? And how does he come to recognize them, since they are certainly not immediately present to his pure self-consciousness?*

What I have to do today is to establish what the vocation of man within society is, and before this task can be achieved the preceding questions have to be answered. By "society" I mean the relationship in which <154> rational beings stand to each other. The concept of society presupposes that there actually are rational beings apart from oneself. It also presupposes the existence of some characteristic features which permit us to distinguish these beings from all of those who are not rational and thus are not members of society. How do we arrive at this presupposition, and what are these characteristic features of rational beings? This is the initial question which I have to answer.

Persons still unaccustomed to strict philosophical inquiry might well answer my question as follows: "Our knowledge that rational beings like ourselves exist apart from us and our knowledge of the signs which distinguish rational beings from nonrational ones have both been derived from experience." But such an answer would be superficial and unsatisfying. It would be no answer at all to *our* question, but would pertain to an altogether different one. Egoists[5] also have these experiences to which appeal is being made, and they have still not been thoroughly refuted on that account. All that experience teaches us is that our consciousness contains *the representation* of rational beings outside of ourselves. No one disputes this and no egoist has ever denied it. What is in question is whether there is anything *beyond this representation* which corresponds to it, that is, whether rational beings exist independently of our representations of them and would exist even if we had no such representations. And in regard to this question we can learn nothing from experience, just as certainly as experience is experience, that is, the system of our representations.

The most that experience can teach is that there are effects which resemble the effects of rational causes. It cannot, however, teach us that the causes in question actually exist as rational beings in themselves. For a being in itself is no object of experience.

We ourselves first introduce such beings into experience. It is *we* who explain certain experiences by appealing to the existence of rational beings outside of ourselves. But *with what right* do we offer this explanation? The *justification* needs to be better demonstrated before we can use this explanation, for its validity depends upon such a justification and cannot be based simply upon the fact that we actually make use of such explanations. Our investigation would not be advanced a single step thereby. We are left facing the question previously raised: How do we come to assume that there are rational beings outside of us, and how do we recognize them?

The thorough investigations of the Critical philosophers have unquestionably exhausted the theoretical realm of philosophy. All remaining questions must be answered on the basis of practical principles (a point which I mention merely for its historical interest). We must now see whether the proposed question can actually be answered from practical principles.<155>

According to our last lecture, man's highest drive is the drive toward identity, toward complete harmony with himself, and – as a means for staying constantly in harmony with himself – toward the harmony of all external things with his own necessary concepts of them. It is not enough that his concepts *not* be *contradicted* (in which case he could be indifferent to the existence or nonexistence of objects *corresponding* to his concepts); rather [in order to achieve the harmony desired] there really ought to be something which corresponds to these concepts. All of the concepts found within the I should have an expression or counterpart in the not-I. This is the specific character of man's drive.

Man also possesses the concepts of reason and of rational action and thought. He necessarily wills, not merely to realize these concepts within himself, but to see them realized outside of him as well. One of the things that man requires is that rational beings like himself should exist outside of him.

Man cannot bring any such beings into existence, yet the concept of such beings underlies his observation of the not-I, and he expects to encounter something corresponding to this concept. The first, though merely negative, distinguishing characteristic of rationality, or at least the first one that suggests itself, is efficacy governed by concepts, that is, purposeful activity. What bears the distinguishing features of purposefulness may have a rational author, whereas that to which the concept of purposefulness is entirely inapplicable surely has no rational author. Yet this feature is ambiguous. The distinguishing characteristic of purposefulness is the harmony of multiplicity in a unity. But many types of such harmony are explicable merely by natural laws – not *mechanical* laws, but *organic* ones certainly. In order, therefore, to be able to infer convincingly from a particular experience to its rational cause we require some feature in addition [to purposefulness]. Even in those cases where it operates purposefully, nature operates in accordance with *necessary laws.* Reason always operates *freely.* The freely achieved harmony of multiplicity in a unity would thus be a certain and nondeceptive distinguishing feature of rationality within appearances. The only question is how one can tell the difference between an effect one has experienced which occurs necessarily and one which occurs freely.

I can by no means be directly conscious of a free being outside of myself. I cannot even become conscious of freedom within me, that is, I cannot become conscious

[5] Fichte means solipsists. A solipsist denies that the existence of any mind other than her own.

of my own freedom. For freedom in itself is the ultimate explanatory basis for all consciousness, and thus freedom itself cannot belong to the realm of consciousness. What I can become conscious of, however, is that I am conscious of no cause for a certain voluntary determination of my empirical I other than my will itself. As long as one has explained oneself properly in advance, one might well say that this very lack of any consciousness of a cause is itself a <156> consciousness of freedom – and we wish to call it such here. *In this sense* then, one can be conscious of one's own free action.

Suppose now that the manner of behavior of that substance which is presented to us through appearance is altered, altered by *our* free action (of which we are conscious in the sense just indicated), and altered so that it no longer remains explicable by *that* law in accordance with which it operated previously, but can only be explained by that law upon which *we* have based *our own* free action – a law which is quite opposed to the previous law. The only way in which we could account for the alteration in this case is by assuming that the cause of the effect in question was also rational and free. Thus there arises, to use the Kantian terminology, an *interaction governed by concepts,* a purposeful community. And this is what I mean by "society" – the concept of which is now completely determined.

One of man's fundamental drives is to be permitted to assume that rational beings like himself exist outside of him. He can assume this only on the condition that he enter into society (in the sense just specified) with these beings. Consequently, the social drive is one of man's fundamental drives. It is man's *destiny* to live in society; he *ought to* live in society. One who lives in isolation is not a complete human being. He contradicts his own self.

You can see how important it is not to confuse society as such with that particular, empirically conditioned type of society which we call "the state." Despite what a very great man has said, life in the state is not one of man's absolute aims.[6] The state is, instead, only a *means for establishing a perfect society,* a means which exists only under specific circumstances. Like all those human institutions which are mere means, the state aims at abolishing itself. *The goal of all government is to make government superfluous.* Though the time has certainly not yet come, nor do I know how many myriads or myriads of myriads of years it may take (here we are not at all concerned with applicability in life, but only with justifying a speculative proposition), there will certainly be a point in the a priori foreordained career of the human species when all civic bonds will become superfluous. This is that point when reason, rather than strength or cunning, <157> will be universally recognized as the highest court of appeal. I say "be recognized" because even then men will still make mistakes and injure their fellowmen thereby. All they will then require is the goodwill to allow themselves to be convinced that they have erred* and, when they are convinced of this, to recant their errors and make amends for the damages. Until we have reached this point we are, speaking quite generally, not even true men.

According to what we have said, the positive distinguishing feature of society is *free interaction.* This interaction is its own end, and it operates *purely and simply* in order to operate. But when we maintain that society is its own end, we are not by any means denying that the manner in which it operates might be governed by an additional, more specific law, which establishes a more specific goal for the operation of society.

The fundamental drive was the drive to discover rational beings like ourselves, that is, *men.* The concept of man is an idealistic concept, because man's end qua man is something unachievable. Every individual has his own particular ideal of man as such. Though all of these ideals have the same content, they nevertheless differ in degree. Everyone uses his own ideal to judge those whom he recognizes as men. Owing to the fundamental human drive, everyone wishes to find that everyone else resembles this ideal. We experiment and observe the other person from every side, and when we discover him to lie *below* our ideal of man, we try to raise him to this ideal. The winner in this spiritual struggle is always the one who is the higher and the better man. Thus the *improvement of the species* has its origin within society, and thus at the same time we have discovered the vocation of all society as such. Should it appear as if the higher and better person has no influence upon the lower and uneducated person, this is partly because our own judgment deceives us. For <158> we frequently expect fruit at once, before the seed has been able to germinate and develop. And perhaps it is partly because the better person stands upon a level which is so much higher than that of the uneducated person that the two do not have enough points of mutual contact and are unable to have sufficient effect upon each other – a situation which retards culture unbelievably and the remedy for which will be indicated at the proper time. But on the whole the better person will certainly be victorious, and this is a source of reassurance and solace for the friend of mankind and truth when he witnesses the open war between light

[6] Perhaps a reference to Aristotle.

and darkness. The light will certainly win in the end. Admittedly, we cannot say how long this will take, but when darkness is forced to engage in public battle this is already a guarantee of impending victory. For darkness loves obscurity. When it is forced to reveal itself it has already lost.

Thus the following is the result of all of our deliberations so far: Man is destined for society. *Sociability* is one of those skills which man ought to perfect within himself in accordance with his vocation as a man, as this was developed in the previous lecture.

However much man's vocation for society as such may originate from the innermost and purest part of his nature, it is, nevertheless, merely a drive, and as such it is subordinate to the supreme law of self-harmony, that is, the ethical law. Thus the social drive must be further determined by the ethical law and brought under a fixed rule. By discovering what this rule is we discover what *man's* vocation within *society* is – which is the object of our present inquiry and of all our reflections so far.

To begin with, the law of absolute self-harmony determines the social drive *negatively:* this drive must not contradict itself. The social drive aims at *interaction, reciprocal* influence, *mutual* give and take, *mutual* passivity and activity. It does not aim at mere causality, at the sort of mere activity to which the other person would have to be related merely passively. It strives to discover *free, rational* beings outside of ourselves and to enter into community with them. It does not strive for the *subordination* characteristic of the physical world, but rather for *coordination.* If one does not permit the rational beings he seeks outside of himself to be free, then he is taking into account only their *theoretical ability,* but not their free practical rationality. Such a person does not wish to enter into society with these other free beings, but rather to *master* them as one masters talented beasts, and thus he places his social drive into contradiction with itself. Indeed, rather than saying that such a person places his social drive into contradiction with itself, it is far more true to say that he does not possess such a higher drive at all, that mankind has not yet developed that far in him, that it is he himself who still stands on the lower level of the half human, the level of slavery. He is not yet mature <159> enough to have developed his own sense of freedom and spontaneity, for if he had then he would necessarily have to wish to be surrounded by other free beings like himself. Such a person is a slave and wishes to have slaves. Rousseau has said that many a person who considers himself to be the master of others is actually more of a slave than they are.[7] He might have said, with even more accuracy, that anyone who considers himself to be a master of others is himself a slave. If such a person is not a slave in fact, it is still certain that he has a slavish soul and that he will grovel on his knees before the first strong man who subjugates him. The only person who is himself free is that person who wishes to liberate everyone around him and who – by means of a certain influence whose cause has not always been remarked – really does so. We breathe more freely under the eyes of such a person. We feel that nothing constrains, restrains, or confines us, and we feel an unaccustomed inclination to be and to do everything which is not forbidden by our own self-respect.

Man may employ mindless things as means for his ends, but not rational beings. One may not even employ rational beings as means for their own ends. One may not work upon them as one works upon dead matter or animals, that is, using them simply as a means for accomplishing one's ends without taking their freedom into account. One may not make any rational being virtuous, wise, or happy against his own will. Quite apart from the fact that the attempt to do so would be in vain and that no one can become virtuous, wise, or happy except through his own labor and effort – even apart from this fact, one ought not even wish to do this, even if it were possible or if one believed that it were; for it is wrong, and it places one into contradiction with oneself.

The law of complete, formal self-harmony also determines the social drive *positively,* and from this we obtain the actual vocation of man within society. All of the individuals who belong to the human race differ among themselves. There is only one thing in which they are in complete agreement: their ultimate goal – perfection. Perfection is determined in only one respect: it is totally self-identical. If all men could be perfect, if they could all achieve their highest and final goal, then they would be totally equal to each other. They would constitute but one single subject. In society, however, everyone strives to improve the others (at least according to his own concept) and to raise them to the ideal which he has formed of man. Accordingly, the ultimate and highest goal of society is the complete unity and unanimity of all of its members. But the achievement of this goal presupposes the achievement of the vocation of man as such, the achievement of absolute perfection. The former, therefore, is just as inachievable as the latter, and it remains inachievable so long as <160> man is not supposed to cease to be man and to

[7] *The Social Contract* 1.1.

become God. The *final goal* of man within society is thus the complete unity of all individuals, but this is not the *vocation* of man within society.

Man can and should approximate endlessly to this goal. Such approximation to total unity and unanimity may be termed "unification." The true vocation of man within society is, accordingly, unification, a unification which constantly gains in internal strength and expands its perimeter. But since the only thing on which men are or can be in agreement is their ultimate vocation, this unification is possible only through the search for perfection. We could, therefore, just as well say that our social vocation consists in the process of communal perfection, that is, perfecting ourselves by freely making use of the effect which others have on us and perfecting others by acting in turn upon them as upon free beings.

In order to fulfill this vocation and to do so ever more adequately, we require a skill that is acquired and increased only through culture. This skill has two aspects: the skill of *giving,* or affecting others as free beings, and the capacity for *receiving,* or for making the most of the effect which others have upon us. We will specifically discuss both of these skills at the proper place. One must make a particular effort to maintain the latter skill alongside a high degree of the former, for otherwise one remains stationary and thus regresses. Rarely is anyone so perfect that he cannot be further educated in some respect by almost anyone – perhaps concerning something that seems unimportant to him or that he has overlooked.

I am acquainted with few ideas more lofty than this idea of the way the human species works upon itself – this ceaseless living and striving, this lively give and take which is the noblest thing in which man can participate, this universal intermeshing of countless wheels whose common driving force is freedom, and the beautiful harmony which grows from this. Everyone can say: "Whoever you may be, because you bear a human face, you are still a member of this great community. No matter how countlessly many intermediaries may be involved in the transmission, I nevertheless have an effect upon you, and you have an effect upon me. No one whose face bears the stamp of reason, no matter how crude, exists for me in vain. But I am unacquainted with you, as you are with me! Still, just as it is certain that we share a common calling – to be good and to become better and better – it is equally certain that there will come a time (it may take millions or trillions of years – what is time!) when I will draw you into my sphere of influence, a time when I will benefit you too and receive benefit from you, a time when my heart will <161> be joined with yours by the loveliest bond of all – the bond of free, mutual give and take.

3. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind
1817 (3rd ed. 1830)
Source: G.W.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, tr. W. Wallace and A.V. Miller, revised M. Inwood (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007)

[The main text including the 'remarks' was published by Hegel in 1830. The 'additions' are from transcriptions of Hegel's lectures made by students at his courses on the philosophy of spirit/mind in the 1820s. – AC]

Introduction

§377

The knowledge of mind[1] is the most concrete knowledge, and thus the highest and most difficult. *Know thyself*. The meaning of this absolute command – whether in itself or in the historical circumstances of its first pronouncement – is not only *self-knowledge* in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the individual. The knowledge it commands is knowledge of man's genuine reality[2], as well as of genuine reality in and for itself[3] – of the very *essence*[4] as mind. Equally, the philosophy of mind too does not have the meaning of so-called *understanding of human nature,* an understanding that likewise endeavours to explore the *particularities,* passions, and foibles of other men, those so-called recesses of the human heart. For one thing, understanding of this sort makes sense only if we presuppose knowledge of the *universal,* man *as such* and thus essentially mind. And for another, it concerns itself with contingent, insignificant, and *untrue* existences of the mental[5], but does not penetrate to what is *substantial,* the mind itself.

Zusatz.[6] The difficulty of the philosophical cognition of mind consists in the fact that here we are no longer dealing with the comparatively abstract, simple logical Idea, but with the most concrete, most developed form achieved by the Idea in its self-actualization.[7] Even finite or subjective mind, not only absolute mind[8], must be grasped as an actualization of the Idea. The treatment of mind is only truly philosophical when it cognizes the concept of mind in its living development and actualization, i.e. just when it comprehends the mind as a copy of the eternal Idea. But it belongs to the nature of mind to cognize its concept. Consequently, the summons to self-knowledge, issued to the Greeks by the Delphic Apollo, does not have the sense of a command externally addressed to the human mind by an alien power; on the contrary, the god who impels to self-knowledge is none other than the mind's own absolute law. All activity of the mind is, therefore, only an apprehension of itself, and the aim of all genuine science[9] is just this, that mind shall recognize[10] itself in everything in heaven and on earth. There is simply no out-and-out Other for the mind. Even the oriental does not wholly lose himself in the object of his worship. But the Greeks were the first to grasp expressly as mind that which they opposed to themselves as the Divine, though even they did not attain, either in philosophy or in religion, to knowledge of the absolute infinity of mind; therefore with the Greeks the relationship of the human mind to the Divine is still not one of absolute freedom. It was Christianity, by the doctrine of the incarnation of God and the presence of the Holy Spirit in the community of believers, that first gave to human consciousness a perfectly free relation to the infinite and thereby made possible the conceptual knowledge of mind in its absolute infinity.

§377A

Zusatz. The difficulty of the philosophical cognition of mind consists in the fact that here we are no longer dealing with the comparatively abstract, simple logical

[1] *Geist* (spirit or mind). Wallace and Miller always translate this as 'mind'.

[2] *des Wahrhaften des Menschen* (of what is true/real in man).

[3] *an und für sich*. Hegel often uses this to mean 'per se'.

[4] I.e. the essence of reality as a whole.

[5] *geistig*.

[6] Addition.

[7] By 'the logical Idea' or 'the eternal Idea' Hegel means the fundamental system of categories in his *Logic*, which he sees (like Plato's ideas or forms) as underlying the physical universe as a whole. By 'the Idea' he usually means these categories together with their realisation or 'actualisation' in the world.

[8] By absolute spirit/mind Hegel means spirit/mind that has become fully conscious of its own nature and the nature of reality as a whole.

[9] *Wissenschaft*. The German word refers to any body of systematic knowledge, not only to the natural sciences. When Hegel uses it 'science' he usually means his own philosophical account of the whole of reality.

[10] *erkenne* (know).

Idea, but with the most concrete, most developed form achieved by the Idea in its self-actualization. Even finite or subjective mind, not only absolute mind, must be grasped as an actualization of the Idea. The treatment of mind is only truly philosophical when it cognizes the concept of mind in its living development and actualization, i.e. just when it comprehends the mind as a copy of the eternal Idea. But it belongs to the nature of mind to cognize its concept. Consequently, the summons to self-knowledge, issued to the Greeks by the Delphic Apollo, does not have the sense of a command externally addressed to the human mind by an alien power; on the contrary, the god who impels to self-knowledge is none other than the mind's own absolute law. All activity of the mind is, therefore, only an apprehension of itself, and the aim of all genuine science is just this, that mind shall recognize itself in everything in heaven and on earth. There is simply no out-and-out Other for the mind. Even the oriental does not wholly lose himself in the object of his worship. But the Greeks were the first to grasp expressly as mind that which they opposed to themselves as the Divine, though even they did not attain, either in philosophy or in religion, to knowledge of the absolute infinity of mind; therefore with the Greeks the relationship of the human mind to the Divine is still not one of absolute freedom. It was Christianity, by the doctrine of the incarnation of God and the presence of the Holy Spirit in the community of believers, that first gave to human consciousness a perfectly free relation to the infinite and thereby made possible the conceptual knowledge of mind in its absolute infinity.

Henceforth, such a knowledge alone merits the name of a philosophical treatment. *Self-knowledge* in the usual trivial sense of an inquiry into the individual's own foibles and faults has interest and importance only for the individual, not for philosophy; but even in relation to the individual, the less it deals with knowledge of the universal intellectual and moral nature of man, and the more it degenerates – disregarding duties, the genuine content of the will – into a self-satisfied absorption of the individual in the idiosyncrasies dear to him, the less value that self-knowledge has. The same is true of the so-called *understanding of human nature* which is likewise directed to the peculiarities of individual minds. For life this understanding is, of course, useful and necessary, especially in bad political conditions where the obstinacy, caprice and wilfulness of individuals reign, not right and ethics, – in the field of intrigues where characters do not rely on the nature of the cause but hold their own by smartly exploiting the peculiarity of others and seek by this means to attain their contingent ends. For philosophy, however, this understanding of human nature is a matter of indifference to the extent that it is incapable of rising above the consideration of contingent details to the apprehension of great human characters, by which the genuine nature of man is presented to our vision in undimmed purity. But this understanding of human nature can even become harmful for science if, as happened in the so-called pragmatic treatment of history, through failure to appreciate the substantial character of world-historical individuals and to see that great things can only be accomplished through great characters, it makes the supposedly ingenious attempt to derive the greatest events of history from the contingent peculiarity of those heroes, from their presumed petty intentions, inclinations and passions. In such a procedure history, which is ruled by divine Providence, is reduced to a play of pointless activity and contingent occurrences.

§378

Pneumatology or the so-called *rational psychology* has already been mentioned in the Introduction as an abstract metaphysic of the intellect.' *Empirical psychology* has as its object the *concrete* mind and, after the revival of the sciences, when observation and experience had become the principal foundation for knowledge of concrete reality, such psychology was pursued in the same way. Consequently the metaphysical element was kept outside this empirical science, and so prevented from getting any concrete determination or content, while the empirical science clung to the conventional intellectual metaphysics of forces, various activities, etc., and banished the speculative approach.

Aristotle's books *on the soul,* along with his essays on particular aspects and states of the soul, are for this reason still the most admirable, perhaps even the sole, work of speculative interest on this topic. The essential aim of a philosophy of mind can only be to introduce the concept again into the knowledge of mind, and so also to disclose once more the sense of those Aristotelian books.

Zusatz. Genuinely speculative philosophy, which excludes the approach discussed in the previous Paragraph which is directed to the unessential, individual, empirical appearances of mind, also excludes the directly opposite approach of so-called *rational psychology* or pneumatology, which deals only with abstractly universal determinations, with the essence supposedly beneath appearances, the in-itself of mind. For speculative philosophy may not take its objects, as something given, from representation, nor may it determine its objects by mere categories of the intellect, as rational psychology did when it posed the question whether the mind or the soul is simple, immaterial, a substance. In these questions mind was treated as a thing; for these categories were here regarded, in the general manner of the

intellect, as inert, fixed; thus they are incapable of expressing the nature of mind. Mind is not an inert entity but is rather what is absolutely restless, pure activity, the negating or the ideality of every fixed determination of the intellect, – not abstractly simple but, in its simplicity, at the same time a distinguishing-of-itself-from-itself, – not an essence that is already complete before its appearing, keeping to itself behind the mountain of appearances, but truly actual only through the determinate forms of its necessary self-revelation, – and not (as that psychology supposed) a soul-thing only externally related to the body, but inwardly bound to the body through the unity of the concept.

In the middle, between observation directed to the contingent individuality of mind and pneumatology concerned only with mind's essence behind appearances, stands *empirical psychology* intent on the observation and description of the particular faculties of mind. But this too does not get to the genuine unification of the individual and the universal, to knowledge of the concretely universal nature or the concept of mind, and therefore it, too, has no claim to the name of genuinely speculative philosophy. Empirical psychology takes not only the mind in general, but also the particular faculties into which it analyses it, from representation as givens, without deriving these particularities from the concept of mind and so proving the necessity that in mind there are just these faculties and no others. – With this defect of form there is necessarily linked the despiritualization of the content. If in the two modes of treatment already described, the individual on the one hand, and the universal on the other, was taken as something fixed by itself, empirical psychology too holds the particular forms into which it dissects the mind to be fixed in their limitation, so that the mind becomes a mere aggregate of independent forces, each of which only interacts with the others, hence is only externally related to them. For though this psychology also demands the production of a harmonious interconnexion between the various mental forces – an oft-recurring catch-phrase on this topic, but one which is just as indefinite as 'perfection' used to be – this expresses only a unity of mind which ought to be, not the original unity of mind, and still less does it recognize the particularization to which the concept of mind, the unity of mind that is in itself, progresses, as a necessary and rational particularization. This harmonious interconnexion remains, therefore, a vacuous idea which expresses itself in high-sounding but empty phrases and remains powerless in face of the mental forces presupposed as independent.

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The self-feeling of the mind's *living* unity spontaneously resists the fragmentation of the mind into different *faculties, forces,* or, what comes to the same thing, *activities,* represented as independent of each other.' But the need for *comprehension* here is stimulated even more by the oppositions, which at once present themselves, between the mind's freedom and the mind's *determinism,* of the free agency of the soul in contrast to the bodiliness external to it, and again the intimate connection between the two. In experience too the phenomena of *animal magnetism* in particular have given, in recent times, a visible illustration of the *substantial unity* of the soul, and of the power of its ideality. Before these phenomena, the rigid distinctions of the intellect are thrown into disarray; and the necessity of a speculative examination for the dissolution of the contradictions is displayed more directly.

Zusatz. All those finite conceptions of mind outlined in the two previous Paragraphs have been ousted, partly by the vast transformation undergone by philosophy in general in recent years, and partly, from the empirical side itself, by the phenomena of animal magnetism which are a stumbling-block to finite thinking. As regards the former, philosophy has left behind the finite viewpoint of merely reflective thinking which, since Wolff, had become universal, and also the Fichtean standstill at the so-called facts of consciousness, and risen to the conception of mind as the self-knowing, actual Idea, to the concept of the living mind which, in a necessary manner, differentiates itself within itself and returns out of its differences to unity with itself. But in doing this, philosophy has not only overcome the abstractions prevalent in those finite conceptions of mind, the merely individual, merely particular, and merely universal, reducing them to moments of the concept which is their truth; it has also, instead of externally describing the material it finds, vindicated as the only scientific method the rigorous form of the necessary self-development of the content. In contrast to the empirical sciences, where the material as given by experience is taken up from outside and ordered by an already established universal rule and brought into external interconnexion, speculative thinking has to demonstrate each of its objects and the development of them in their absolute necessity. This happens when each particular concept is derived from the self-producing and self-actualizing universal concept or the logical Idea. Philosophy must therefore comprehend mind as a necessary development of the eternal Idea and must let what constitutes the particular parts of the science of mind evolve purely from the concept of mind. Just as in the living creature generally, everything is already contained, in an ideal manner, in the germ and is brought forth by the germ itself, not by an alien power, so too must all

particular forms of the living mind grow out of its concept as from their germ. Our thinking, which is propelled by the concept, here remains entirely immanent in the object, which is likewise propelled by the concept; we merely look on, as it were, at the object's own development, not altering it by importing our subjective ideas and notions. The concept needs no external stimulus for its actualization; its own nature involves the contradiction of simplicity and difference, and therefore restlessly impels it to actualize itself, to unfold into actuality the difference which, in the concept itself, is present only in an ideal manner, i.e., in the contradictory form of undifferentiatedness, and by this sublation of its simplicity as a defect, a one-sidedness, to make itself actually the whole, of which initially it contains only the possibility.

But the concept is just as independent of our wilfulness in the conclusion of its development as it is in the beginning and in the course of it. In a merely ratiocinative approach the conclusion certainly appears more or less arbitrary; in philosophical science, by contrast, the concept itself sets a limit to its self-development by giving itself an actuality that completely corresponds to it. Even in the living thing we see this self-limitation of the concept. The germ of the plant, this sensuously present concept, closes its development with an actuality like itself, with production of the seed. The same is true of mind; its development, too, has achieved its goal when the concept of mind has completely actualized itself or, what is the same thing, when mind has attained to complete consciousness of its concept. But this self-contraction-into-one of the beginning with the end, this coming-to-itself of the concept in its actualization, appears in mind in a still more complete form than in the merely living thing; for whereas in the latter the seed produced is not identical with the seed that produced it, in self-knowing mind the product is one and the same as that which produces it.

Only when we consider mind in this process of the self-actualization of its concept, do we know it in its truth (for truth just means agreement of the concept with its actuality). In its immediacy, mind is not yet true, has not yet made its concept an object for itself, has not yet transformed what is present in it in an immediate way, into something posited by itself, has not yet converted its actuality into an actuality appropriate to its concept. The entire development of mind is nothing but its self-elevation to its truth, and the so-called soul-forces have no other meaning than to be the stages of this elevation. By this self-differentiation, by this self-transformation, and by the restoration of its differences to the unity of its concept, mind, as it is something true, is also something living, organic, systematic; and only by knowing this its nature is the science of mind likewise true, living, organic, systematic, – predicates that cannot be awarded either to rational or to empirical psychology, for the former makes mind into a dead essence divorced from its actualization, while the latter kills the living mind by tearing it asunder into a manifold of independent forces which is neither produced by the concept nor held together by it.

As already remarked, animal magnetism has played a part in ousting the untrue, finite, merely intellectual conception of mind. That remarkable state has had this effect especially with regard to the treatment of the natural aspect of the mind. If the other states and natural determinations of mind, as well as its conscious activities, can be understood, at least externally, by the intellect, and if the intellect is able to grasp the external connection of cause and effect obtaining both within itself and in finite things, the so-called natural course of things, yet, on the other hand, intellect shows itself incapable of even just believing in the phenomena of animal magnetism, because in these the bondage of mind to place and time – which in the opinion of the intellect is thoroughly fixed – and to the intellectual interconnexion of cause and effect, loses its meaning, and the elevation of mind above asunderness and above its external connexions, which to the intellect remains an unbelievable miracle, comes to light within sensory reality itself. Now although it would be very foolish to see in the phenomena of animal magnetism an elevation of mind above even its conceptual reason, and to expect from this state higher disclosures about the eternal than those granted by philosophy, although the magnetic state must be declared a disease and a decline of mind itself below ordinary consciousness, in so far as in that state the mind surrenders its thinking, the thinking that proceeds in determinate distinctions and contrasts itself with nature, yet, on the other hand, in the visible liberation of mind in those magnetic phenomena from the limitations of space and time and from all finite connexions, there is something that has an affinity to philosophy, something that, with all the brutality of an established fact, defies the scepticism of the intellect and so necessitates the advance from ordinary psychology to the conceptual cognition of speculative philosophy, for which alone animal magnetism is not an incomprehensible miracle.

§380

The *concrete* nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficulty that the particular stages and determinations of the development of its concept do not also remain behind as particular existences in contrast to its deeper formations. It is

otherwise in external nature. There, matter and movement have a free existence of their own in the solar system; the determinations of the *senses* also have a retrospective existence as properties of *bodies,* and still more freely as the elements, etc. The determinations and stages of the mind, by contrast, are essentially only moments, states, determinations in the higher stages of development.' As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract determination of the mind reveals the presence in it, even empirically, of a higher phase. In sensation, for example, we can find all the higher phases of the mind as its content or determinacy. And so sensation, which is just an abstract form, may to the superficial glance seem to be the essential seat and even the root of that higher content, the religious, the ethical, and so on; and it may seem necessary to consider the determinations of this content as particular species of sensation. But all the same, when lower stages are under consideration, it becomes necessary, in order to draw attention to them in their empirical existence, to refer to higher stages in which they are present only as forms. In this way we need at times to introduce, by anticipation, a content which presents itself only later in the development (e.g. in dealing with natural waking from sleep we speak, by anticipation, of consciousness, in dealing with mental derangement we speak of intellect, etc.).

Concept of Mind

§381

For us mind has *nature* as its *presupposition,* though mind is the *truth* of nature, and is thus *absolutely first* with respect to it.' In this truth nature has vanished, and mind has emerged as the Idea that has reached its being-for-self. The *object* of the Idea as well as the *subject is the concept.* This identity is *absolute negativity,* since in nature the concept has its complete, external objectivity, but this externalization[11] of the concept has been sublated and the concept has, in this externalization, become identical with itself. And so the concept is this identity only so far as it is at the same time a return out of nature.

Zusatz. We have already indicated, in the *Zusatz* to §379, the concept of mind, saying that the mind is the self-knowing, actual Idea. Philosophy has to demonstrate the necessity of this concept, as of all its other concepts, which means that philosophy has to cognize it as the result of the development of the universal concept or of the logical Idea. But in this development, mind is preceded not only by the logical Idea but also by external nature. For the *cognition* already contained in the simple *logical* Idea is only the concept of cognition thought by us, not cognition existing for itself, not actual mind but merely its possibility. Actual mind, which in the science of mind is our only object, has external nature for its immediate presupposition and the logical Idea as its first presupposition. Philosophy of nature, and indirectly logic, must therefore have as its final result the proof of the necessity of the concept of mind. The science of mind, on its part, has to authenticate this concept by developing and actualizing it. Accordingly, what we say here assertively about mind at the beginning of our treatment of it, can only be scientifically proved by philosophy in its entirety. All we can do initially is to elucidate the concept of mind for representation.

In order to establish what this concept is, we must indicate the determinacy by which the Idea takes the form of mind. But every determinacy is a determinacy only in contrast to another determinacy; the determinacy of mind in general stands in contrast initially to the determinacy of nature; the former is, therefore, to be grasped only together with the latter. As the distinguishing determinacy of the concept of mind we must designate *ideality,* that is, the sublation of the otherness of the Idea, the Idea's returning, and its having returned, into itself from its Other; whereas the distinctive feature of the logical Idea is immediate, *simple being-within-itself,* while for nature it is the *self-externality* of the Idea. A more detailed development of what was said in passing in the *Zusatz* to §379 about the logical Idea, would involve too wide a digression here; more necessary at this point is an elucidation of what has been indicated as the characteristic of external nature, for it is to nature, as already remarked, that mind has its immediate relation.

External nature too, like mind, is rational, divine, a presentation of the Idea. But in nature the Idea appears in the element of asunderness, is external not only to mind but also to itself, precisely because it is external to the inwardness that is in and for itself and which constitutes the essence of mind. This concept of nature, already enunciated by the Greeks and entirely familiar to them, is in complete agreement with our ordinary idea of nature. We know that what is natural is spatial and temporal, that in nature this stands next to that, this follows after that, in brief, that everything natural is mutually external, ad infinitum; further, that matter, this universal foundation of all formations to be found in nature, not only offers resistance to us, subsists outside our mind, but holds itself asunder against its own self, divides itself into concrete points, into material atoms, of which it is

[11] *Entäusserung*. This is the word which is translated as 'alienation' in the standard English translations of Marx's early writings.

composed. The differences into which the concept of nature unfolds are more or less mutually independent existences; of course, through their original unity they stand in mutual relation, so that none can be comprehended without the others; but this relation is in a greater or less degree external to them. We rightly say, therefore, that not freedom but necessity reigns in nature; for necessity in its strictest meaning is precisely the merely internal, and for that reason also merely external, relation of mutually independent existences. Thus, for example, light and the elements appear as mutually independent; similarly the planets, though attracted by the sun and despite this relationship to their centre, have the semblance of independence with respect to it and to one another, this contradiction is displayed by the motion of the planet round the sun. – In the living creature, of course, there emerges a higher necessity than that which holds sway in lifeless things. Even in the plant, we see a centre which has overflowed into the periphery, a concentration of the differences, a self-development-from-within-outwards, a unity that differentiates itself and from its differences produces itself in the bud, something, therefore, to which we attribute an urge; but this unity remains incomplete because the plant's process of articulating itself is a coming-forth-from-self of the vegetable subject, each part is the whole plant, a repetition of it, and consequently the members are not held in complete subjection to the unity of the subject. – An even more complete overcoming of externality is exhibited in the animal organism; in this not only does each member generate the other, is its cause and effect, means and end, so that it is at the same time its Other, but the whole is so pervaded by its unity that nothing in it appears as independent, every determinacy is at once an ideal determinacy, the animal remaining in every determinacy the same single universal, so that in the animal body the complete untruth of asunderness is exposed. Through this being-together-with-itself in the determinacy, through this immediate reflectedness into itself in and out of its externality, the animal is subjectivity that is for itself and has sensation; sensation is just this omnipresence of the unity of the animal in all its members, which immediately communicate every impression to the single whole which, in the animal, is beginning to become for itself. It is because of this subjective inwardness, that the animal is determined through itself, from within outwards, not merely from outside, that is to say, it has urge and instinct. The subjectivity of the animal contains a contradiction and the urge to preserve itself by sublating this contradiction; this self-preservation is the privilege of the living thing and, in a still higher degree, of mind. The sentient creature is determinate, has a content, and thus a differentiation within itself; this difference is initially still a wholly ideal difference, simple, sublated in the unity of sensation; the sublated difference subsisting in the unity is a contradiction which is sublated by the fact that the difference posits itself *as* difference. The animal is, therefore, driven out of its simple self-relation into opposition to external nature. By this opposition the animal falls into a new contradiction, for the difference is now posited in a way that contradicts the unity of the concept; accordingly this difference too must be sublated, like the initial undifferentiated unity. This sublation of the difference comes about owing to the animal's consuming what is determined for it in external nature and preserving itself by what it consumes. Thus by the annihilation of the Other confronting the animal, the original simple relation to itself and the contradiction contained in it is posited once more. For a genuine resolution of this contradiction the Other, with which the animal enters into relationship, needs to be similar to the animal. This occurs in the *sexual relationship;* here, each of the two sexes senses in the Other not an alien externality but its own self, or the genus common to them both. The sexual relationship is, therefore, the highest point of living nature; at this stage, nature is exempt in the fullest measure from external necessity, since the distinct existences related to each other are no longer external to each other but have the sensation of their unity. Yet the animal soul is still not free, for it always appears as one with the determinacy of the sensation or excitation, as bound to *one* determinacy; it is only in the form of individuality that the genus is for the animal. The animal only senses the genus, it is not aware of it; in the animal, the soul is not yet for the soul, the universal as such is not for the universal. By the sublation of the particularity of the sexes which occurs in the genus-process, the animal does not attain to the production of the genus; what is produced by this process is again only an individual. Thus nature, even at the highest point of its elevation above finitude, always falls back into it again and in this way exhibits a perpetual cycle. *Death* necessarily results from the contradiction between individuality and the genus, but since it is not the preserving sublation of individuality, only the empty, annihilating negation of it, itself appearing in the form of immediate individuality, death likewise does not produce the universality that is in and for itself, or the individuality that is universal in and for itself, the subjectivity that has itself as its object. Therefore, even in the most perfect form to which nature raises itself, in animal life, the concept does not attain to an actuality resembling its soulful essence, to the complete overcoming of the externality and finitude of its embodied reality. This first happens in the *mind,* which, precisely by this overcoming accomplished in it, distinguishes itself from nature, so that this distinguishing is not merely the doing of an external reflection on the essence of mind.

This sublation of externality belonging to the concept of mind, is what we have called the *ideality* of mind. All activities of mind are nothing but various ways of reducing what is external to the inwardness which mind itself is, and it is only by this reduction, by this idealization or assimilation of the external that mind becomes and is mind. – If we consider mind more closely, we find that the first and simplest determination of it is that it is I. I is something perfectly simple, universal. When we say *I,* we indeed mean an individual; but since everyone is I, we thereby say only something entirely universal. The universality of the I enables it to abstract from everything, even from its life. But the mind is not merely this abstractly simple counterpart to light, which is how it was regarded when they talked about the simplicity of the soul in contrast to the complexity of the body; on the contrary, in spite of its simplicity the mind is differentiated within itself, for I posits itself over against itself, makes itself its own object and returns from this difference, which is, of course, at first abstract, not yet concrete difference, to unity with itself. This being-together-with-itself of the I in its differentiation is the infinity or ideality of the I. But this ideality authenticates itself only in the relation of the I to the infinitely manifold material confronting it. When the I grasps it, this material is at once poisoned and transfigured by the universality of the I, loses its individualized, independent subsistence and receives a spiritual reality. The mind is therefore far from being forced out of its simplicity, its being-together-with-itself, by the infinite multiplicity of its representations, into a spatial asunderness; on the contrary, its simple self, in undimmed clarity, pervades this multiplicity through and through and does not let it reach an independent subsistence.

But mind is not content to remain *finite* mind, transposing things by its representational activity into the space of its inwardness and thus stripping them of their externality in a manner that is itself still external; on the contrary, as *religious* consciousness, it pierces through the seemingly absolute independence of things to the one, infinite power of God at work in their interior and holding everything together; and as *philosophical* thinking, it completes this idealization of things by cognizing the determinate way in which the eternal Idea forming their common principle displays itself in them. Through this cognition, the idealistic nature of mind which is already operative in finite mind, attains its completed, most concrete shape, mind makes itself into the actual Idea that perfectly apprehends itself and hence into absolute mind.' Already in finite mind, ideality has the meaning of a movement returning to its beginning; by this movement the mind, advancing from its undifferentiatedness, as the first position, to an Other, to the negation of that position, and by means of the negation of this negation returning to itself, proves to be absolute negativity, infinite self-affirmation; and *we* have to consider finite mind, conformably to this its nature, first, in its immediate unity with nature, then in its opposition to nature, and lastly, in its unity with nature, a unity which contains within itself that opposition as a sublated opposition and is mediated by it. Thus conceived, finite mind is recognised as totality, as Idea, and in fact *as* the actual Idea which is for itself, which returns to itself out of that opposition. But in finite mind there is only the beginning of this return; it is completed only in absolute mind; for only in absolute mind does the Idea apprehend itself, not merely in the one-sided form of the concept or subjectivity, nor merely in the equally one-sided form of objectivity or actuality, but in the perfect unity of these its distinct moments, that is, in its absolute truth.

What we have said above about the nature of mind is something which philosophy alone can and does demonstrate; it does not need to be confirmed by our ordinary consciousness. But in so far as our non-philosophical thinking, on its part, needs the developed concept of mind to be made accessible to representation, we can point out that Christian theology, too, conceives God, i.e. the truth, as mind and regards mind not as something quiescent, remaining in empty uniformity, but as something which necessarily enters into the process of distinguishing itself from itself, of positing its Other, and which comes to itself only through this Other, and by the preserving sublation of this Other – not by abandoning it. Theology, as we know, expresses this process in the manner of representation by saying that God the Father (this simple universal, being-within-itself), giving up his solitude, creates nature (the self-external, being-outside-itself), begets a son (his other I), but by virtue of his infinite love beholds himself in this Other, recognizes his image therein and in it returns to unity with himself; this unity is no longer abstract, immediate unity, but a concrete unity mediated by difference; it is the Holy Spirit which proceeds from the Father and from the Son, reaching its complete actuality and truth in the Christian community; God must be known as the Holy Spirit if he is to be conceived in his absolute truth, conceived as the Idea that is actual in and for itself, and not just in the form of the mere concept, of abstract being-within-self, nor in the equally untrue form of an individual actuality in disagreement with the universality of its concept, but in the full agreement of his concept and his actuality.

So much for the distinctive determinacies of external nature and of mind in general. The development of the difference has at the same time indicated the relation in which nature and mind stand to each other. Since this relation is often

misunderstood, this is the appropriate place for an elucidation of it. We have said that mind negates the externality of nature, assimilates nature to itself and thereby idealizes it. In finite mind, which posits nature outside itself, this idealization has a one-sided form; here the activity of our willing, as of our thinking, is confronted by an external material which is indifferent to the alteration we carry out on it and undergoes the idealization conferred on it with complete passivity. But a different relationship obtains in the case of the mind that produces world history. Here, there no longer stands, on the one side, an activity external to the object, and on the other side, a merely passive object; the spiritual activity is directed towards an object which is active within itself, an object that has itself worked its way up to the result to be brought about by that activity, so that in the activity and in the object one and the same content is present. Thus, for example, the people and the time on which the activity of Alexander and Caesar operated as their object, had by their own efforts become capable of the work to be accomplished by those individuals; the time created these men for itself just as much as it was created by them; they were as much the instruments of the spirit of their time and their people, as conversely their people served these heroes as an instrument for the accomplishment of their deeds. – Similar to the relationship just outlined is the way in which the philosophizing mind approaches external nature. That is to say, philosophical thinking knows that nature is idealized not merely by us, that nature's asunderness is not an entirely insuperable limitation for nature itself, for its concept, but that the eternal Idea immanent in nature or, what is the same thing, the implicit mind at work in the interior of nature itself effects the idealization, the sublation of asunderness, because this form of mind's realization stands in contradiction with the inwardness of its essence. Therefore philosophy has, as it were, only to watch and see how nature itself sublates its externality, how it takes back what is self-external into the centre of the Idea, or lets this centre emerge in the external, how it liberates the concept concealed in nature from the covering of externality and thereby overcomes external necessity. This transition from necessity to freedom is not a simple transition but a gradual progression of many moments, whose exposition constitutes the philosophy of nature. At the highest stage of this sublation of asunderness, in sensation, the implicit mind held captive in nature reaches the beginning of being-for-self and thus of freedom. By this being-for-self which is itself still burdened with the form of individuality and externality, consequently also with unfreedom, nature is driven onwards beyond itself to mind as such, that is, to the mind which, by thinking, is for itself in the form of universality and actually free.

But it is already evident from our discussion so far that the emergence of mind from nature must not be conceived as if nature were the absolutely immediate, the first, the original positing agent, while mind, by contrast, were only something posited by nature; it is rather nature that is posited by mind, and mind is what is absolutely first. Mind that is in and for itself is not the mere result of nature, but is in truth its own result; it brings itself forth from the presuppositions that it makes for itself, from the logical Idea and external nature, and is the truth of the logical Idea as well as of nature, i.e. the true shape of the mind that is only within itself, and of the mind that is only outside itself. The semblance of mind's being mediated by an Other is sublated by mind itself, since mind has, so to speak, the sovereign ingratitude of sublating, of mediatizing, that by which it seems to be mediated, of reducing it to something subsisting only through mind and in this way making itself completely independent. – What we have said already implies that the transition of nature to mind is not a transition to an out-and-out Other, but is only a coming-to-itself of the mind that is outside itself in nature. But equally, the determinate difference of nature and mind is not sublated by this transition; for mind does not emerge in a natural manner from nature. When we said in §222 that the death of the merely immediate, individual form of life is the emergence of mind, this emergence is not in the flesh but spiritual, it is not to be understood as a natural emergence but as a development of the concept, the concept that sublates the one-sidedness of the genus which does not reach adequate actualization, proving in death to be rather the negative power opposed to that actuality, and also sublates the opposite one-sidedness of the animal reality bound to individuality; both one-sidednesses are sublated in the individuality which is in and for itself universal or, what is the same thing, in the universal which is for itself in a universal manner, the universal that is mind.

Nature as such in its self-internalizing does not attain to this being-for-self, to the consciousness of itself; the animal, the most complete form of this internalization, exhibits only the spiritless dialectic of transition from one individual sensation filling up its whole soul to another individual sensation which equally exclusively dominates it; it is man who first raises himself above the individuality of sensation to the universality of thought, to awareness of himself, to the grasp of his subjectivity, of his I – in a word, it is only man who is thinking mind and by this, and by this alone, is essentially distinguished from nature. What belongs to nature as such lies behind the mind; it is true that mind has within itself the entire content of nature, but the determinations of nature are in the mind in a radically different way from that in which they are in external nature.

§382

For this reason formally the *essence* of mind is freedom, the concept's absolute negativity as identity with itself. In accordance with this formal determination, the mind *can* abstract from everything external and from its own externality, from its very life; it can endure the negation of its individual immediacy, infinite *pain,* i.e. it can maintain itself affirmatively in this negativity and be identical for itself. This possibility is its intrinsic abstract universality, a universality that is for itself.

Zusatz. The substance of mind is freedom, i.e. not being dependent on an Other, the relating of itself to itself. Mind is the actualized concept which is for itself and has itself for its object. Its truth and its freedom alike consist in this unity of concept and objectivity present in it. The truth, as Christ has already said, makes mind free; freedom makes it true. But the freedom of mind is not merely an independence of the Other won outside the Other, but won within the Other; it attains actuality not by fleeing from the Other but by overcoming it. Mind can step out of its abstract universality, a universality that is for itself, out of its simple self-relation, can posit within itself a determinate, actual difference, something other than the simple I, and hence a negative; and this relation to the Other is, for mind, not merely possible but necessary, because it is through the Other and by sublation of it, that mind comes to authenticate itself as, and in fact comes to be, what it ought to be according to its concept, namely, the ideality of the external, the Idea that returns to itself out of its otherness, or, expressed more abstractly, the self-differentiating universal which in its difference is together with itself and for itself. The Other, the negative, contradiction, rupture, thus belongs to the nature of mind. In this rupture lies the possibility of *pain.* Pain has therefore not come to the mind from outside, as people imagined when they posed the question about the way in which pain came into the world. Nor does *evil,* the negative of the infinite mind that is in and for itself, come to the mind from outside, any more than pain does; on the contrary, evil is nothing other than the mind taking its stand at the summit of its individuality. Therefore, even in this its extreme rupture, in this breaking loose from the root of its implicitly ethical nature, in this uttermost contradiction with itself, the mind yet remains identical with itself and therefore free. What belongs to external nature is destroyed by contradiction; if, for example, gold were given a different specific gravity from what it has, it would have to perish as gold. But mind has the power to preserve itself in contradiction and, therefore, in pain (pain aroused by evil, as well as by the disagreeable). Ordinary logic is, therefore, in error in supposing that mind is something that completely excludes contradiction from itself. On the contrary, all consciousness contains a unity and a separation, hence a contradiction. Thus, for example, the representation of house is something completely contradictory to my I and yet endured by it. But contradiction is endured by mind, because mind contains no determination that it does not recognize as a determination posited by itself and consequently as a determination that it can also sublate again. This power over all the content present in it forms the basis of the freedom of mind. But in its immediacy, mind is free only implicitly, in concept or possibility, not yet in actuality; actual freedom is thus not something that is immediately in the mind but something to be produced by mind's activity. So in science we have to regard mind as the producer of its freedom. The entire development of the concept of mind displays only mind's freeing of itself from all the forms of its reality which do not correspond to its concept: a liberation which comes about by the transformation of these forms into an actuality perfectly adequate to the concept of mind.

§383

This universality is also its *reality.* As it is for itself, the universal is self-particularizing, while still remaining self-identity. Therefore the determinacy of mind is *manifestation.* The mind is not some one determinacy or content whose expression or externality is only a form distinct from the mind itself. Hence it does not reveal *something;* its determinacy and content is this very revelation. Its possibility is therefore immediately infinite, absolute *actuality.*

Zusatz. Earlier, we posited the distinctive determinacy of mind in *ideality,* in sublation of the otherness of the Idea. If now, in §383 above, 'manifestation' is given as the determinacy of mind, this is not a new, not a second, determination of mind, but only a development of the determination discussed earlier. For by sublation of its otherness, the logical Idea, or the mind that is in itself, becomes for itself, in other words, revealed to itself. Mind which is for itself, or mind as such – in contrast to mind which is in itself, unknown to itself, revealed only to us, poured out into the asunderness of nature – is, therefore, that which reveals itself not merely to an Other but to itself, or, what amounts to the same thing, that which accomplishes its revelation in its own element, not in an alien material. This determination pertains to mind as such; it holds true therefore of mind not only in so far as mind relates itself simply to itself, is an I having itself as object, but also in so far as mind steps out of its abstract universality, the universality that is for itself, and posits within itself a determinate distinction, something other than itself; for the mind does not lose itself in this Other, but, on the contrary, preserves and actualizes itself in it, impresses on it the mind's own interior, makes the Other into

a reality corresponding to mind, and so by this sublation of the Other, of the determinate, actual difference, comes to concrete being-for-self, to determinate revelation to itself. In the Other, therefore, mind reveals only itself, its own nature; but its nature consists in self-revelation. The revelation of itself to itself is therefore the very content of mind and not, as it were, only a form externally added to its content; consequently mind, by its revelation, does not reveal a content different from its form, but reveals its form, the form expressing the entire content of mind, namely, its self-revelation. In mind, therefore, form and content are identical with each other. Of course, revelation is usually represented as an empty form which still requires the addition a content from outside; and by content is understood a being-within-itself, something keeping-within-itself, and by form, on the other hand, the external manner of the relation of the content to an Other. But in speculative logic it is demonstrated that, in truth, the content is not merely a being-within-itself, but something which spontaneously enters into relation with an Other; just as, conversely, in truth, the form must be grasped not merely as something dependent, external to the content, but rather as that which makes the content into the content, into a being-within-itself, into something distinct from an Other. The genuine content contains, therefore, form within itself, and the genuine form is its own content. But we have to get to know mind as this genuine content and as this genuine form. – In order to explain for representation this unity of form and content present in mind, the unity of revelation and what is revealed, we can refer to the teaching of the Christian religion. Christianity says: God has revealed himself through Christ, his only begotten Son. Representation initially takes this statement to mean that Christ is only the instrument of this revelation, that what is revealed in this manner is something other than what reveals it. But, in truth, the statement rather has *this* sense: God has revealed that his nature consists in having a Son, i.e. in differentiating himself, making himself finite, but in his difference remaining together with himself, beholding himself and revealing himself in the Son, and by this unity with the Son, by this being-for-himself in the Other, he is absolute mind, so that the Son is not the mere instrument of the revelation but is himself the content of the revelation.

Just as mind displays the unity of form and content, it is also the unity of possibility and actuality. By the possible in general we understand what is still inward, what has not yet come to expression, to revelation. But now we have seen that mind as such only is, in so far as it reveals itself to itself. Actuality, which consists just in mind's revelation, therefore belongs to its concept. In finite mind the concept of mind does not, of course, yet reach its absolute actualization; but absolute mind is the absolute unity of the actuality of mind and the concept or possibility of mind.

§384

Revelation, as the revelation of the *abstract* Idea, is the unmediated transition, the *becoming,* of nature. As the revelation of mind, which is free, it is the *positing* of nature as *its* world; but because this positing is reflection, it is at the same time the *presupposition* of the world as independent nature. Revelation in the concept is creation of nature as its being, in which the mind procures the *affirmation* and *truth* of its freedom.

[Remark] *The absolute is mind.* This is the highest definition of the absolute. To find this definition and to comprehend its meaning and content was, we may say, the absolute tendency of all culture and philosophy; it was the point towards which all religion and science pressed on; only this impetus enables us to comprehend the history of the world. – The word 'mind', and the *representation* of mind, were found early on, and the content of the Christian religion is to make God known as mind. It is the task of philosophy to grasp in its own element, the concept, what is here *given* to representation and what is *in itself* the essence. That problem is not genuinely and immanently solved until freedom and the concept become the object and the soul of philosophy.

Zusatz. Self-revelation is a determination pertaining to mind in general; but it has *three* distinct forms. The *first* way in which mind that is in itself, or the logical Idea, reveals itself, consists in the transformation of the Idea into the immediacy of external and individualized reality. This transformation is the coming-to-be of nature. Nature, too, is something posited; but its positedness has the form of immediacy, of being outside the Idea. This form contradicts the inwardness of the self-positing Idea which brings itself forth from its presuppositions. The Idea, or mind that is in itself, slumbering in nature, sublates, therefore, the externality, individualization, and immediacy of nature, creates for itself a reality conformable to its inwardness and universality and thereby becomes mind that is reflected into itself and is for itself, self-conscious and awakened mind or mind as such. – This gives the *second* form of mind's revelation. At this stage mind, no longer poured out into the asunderness of nature, sets itself, as what is for itself, revealed to itself, in opposition to unconscious nature, which conceals mind as much as reveals it. Mind makes nature into its object, reflects on it, takes back the externality of nature into its own inwardness, idealizes nature and thus in its object becomes for itself. But this first being-for-self of mind is itself still an immediate, abstract, not an

absolute being-for-self; the self-externality of mind is not absolutely sublated by it. The awakening mind does not yet recognize here its unity with the mind that is in itself, hidden in nature, it stands, therefore, in external relation to nature, it does not appear as all in all, but only as one side of the relationship; it is true that in its relationship to the Other it is also reflected into itself and so is self-consciousness, but it lets this unity of consciousness and self-consciousness still subsist as a unity that is so external, empty and superficial that at the same time self-consciousness and consciousness still fall asunder, and mind, despite its being-together-with-itself, is at the same time together not with itself but with an Other, and its unity with the mind that is in itself and active within the Other does not as yet become for mind. Here, mind posits nature as something reflected-into-itself, as its world, strips nature of its form of an Other confronting it and makes the Other opposing it into something posited by mind itself; but, at the same time, this Other still remains independent of mind, something immediately present, not posited but only presupposed by mind, something, therefore, the positing of which precedes reflective thinking. Hence at this standpoint the positedness of nature by mind is not yet absolute but comes about only in reflective consciousness; nature is, therefore, not yet comprehended as subsisting only through infinite mind, as its creation. Here, consequently, mind still has in nature a limitation and by this very limitation is finite mind. – Now this limitation is sublated by absolute knowledge, which is the *third* and highest revelation of mind. At this stage the dualism disappears, of, on the one hand, a self-subsistent nature or mind poured out into asunderness, and, on the other hand, the mind that is first beginning to become for itself but does not yet comprehend its unity with the mind in nature. Absolute mind recognises itself as positing being itself, as itself producing its Other, nature and finite mind, so that this Other loses all semblance of independence in face of mind, ceases altogether to be a limitation for mind and appears only as the means by which mind attains to absolute being-for-itself, to the absolute unity of its being-in-itself and its being-for-itself, of its concept and its actuality.

The highest definition of the Absolute is this: it is not merely mind in general, it is mind absolutely revealed to itself, self-conscious, infinitely creative mind, which we have just characterized as the third form of its revelation. Just as in science we progress from the imperfect forms of mind's revelation delineated above to the highest form of its revelation, so, too, world-history exhibits a series of conceptions of the eternal, only at the conclusion of which does the concept of absolute mind emerge. Oriental religions, and the Judaic religion too, stop short at the still abstract concept of God and of mind, as is done even by the Enlightenment which wants to know only of God the Father; for God the Father, by himself, is the self-enclosed, the abstract, therefore not yet the spiritual God, not yet the genuine God. In Greek religion God did, of course, begin to be revealed in a determinate manner. The portrayal of the Greek gods had beauty for its law, nature raised to the level of mind. The beautiful does not remain something abstractly ideal, but in its ideality it is at once perfectly determinate, individualized. The Greek gods are, however, initially only displayed for sensory intuition or for representation, they are not yet grasped in thought. But the sensory medium can only exhibit the totality of mind as an asunderness, as a circle of individual spiritual shapes; the unity embracing all these shapes remains, therefore, a wholly indeterminate, alien power over against the gods. The one nature of God, differentiated within itself, the totality of the divine mind in the form of unity, has first been revealed by the Christian religion. This content, given in the mode of representation, has to be raised by philosophy into the form of the concept or of absolute knowledge, which, as we have said, is the highest revelation of that content.

Subdivision

§385

The development of mind is as follows:

I. In the form of *relation to its own self :* it has the *ideal* totality of the Idea arise within it, i.e. what its concept is comes before it and its being is to be together with itself, i.e. free. This is *subjective mind.*

II. In the form of *reality,* as a *world* produced and to be produced by it; in this world freedom is present as necessity. This is *objective mind.*

III. In the *unity* of the objectivity of mind and of its ideality or concept, a unity that *is in and for itself* eternally produces itself, mind in its absolute truth. This is *absolute mind.'*

Zusatz. Mind is always Idea; but initially it is only the *concept* of the Idea, or the Idea in its indeterminacy, in the most abstract mode of reality, i.e. in the mode of being. In the beginning we have only the wholly universal, undeveloped determination of mind, not yet its particularity; this we obtain only when we pass from one thing to something else, for the particular contains a One and an Other; but it *is* just at the beginning that we have not yet made this transition. The reality of mind is, therefore, initially still a wholly universal, not particularized reality; the

development of this reality will be completed only by the entire philosophy of mind. The still entirely abstract, immediate reality is, however, the natural, the unspiritual. For this reason the child is still caught up in naturalness, has only natural urges, is a spiritual human being not yet in actuality but only in potentiality or the concept. Accordingly, we must characterize the first reality of the concept of mind as the most inappropriate for mind, simply because it is still an abstract, immediate reality belonging to naturalness; but the genuine reality must be determined as the totality of the developed moments of the concept, the concept that remains the soul, the unity of these moments. The concept of mind necessarily advances to this development of its reality, for the form of immediacy, of indeterminacy, which its reality initially has, is a form in contradiction with the concept; what seems to be immediately present in the mind is not anything genuinely immediate, but is in itself something posited, mediated. Mind is impelled by this contradiction to sublate the immediate, the Other, the form, that is, in which it presupposes itself. By this sublation it first comes to itself, first emerges *as* mind. Consequently, we cannot begin with mind as such, but must start from its most inappropriate reality. Mind, it is true, *is* already mind at the beginning, but it does not yet know that it is. It is not mind itself that, at the beginning, has already grasped its concept: it is only we, we who contemplate it, who know its concept. That mind comes to a knowledge of what it is, this constitutes its realization. Mind is essentially only what it knows itself to be. Initially, it is only mind in itself; its becoming-for-itself forms its actualization. But it becomes for itself only by particularizing, determining itself, or making itself into its presupposition, into the Other of itself, initially relating itself to this Other as to its immediacy, but sublating it as Other. As long as mind stands in relation to itself as to an Other, it is only *subjective* mind, coming from nature and itself initially natural mind. But the entire activity of subjective mind is directed to grasping itself as itself, to proving itself to be the ideality of its immediate reality. When it has attained to being-for-itself, then it is no longer merely subjective, but *objective* mind. Whereas subjective mind, owing its relation to an Other, is still unfree or, what is the same thing, is free only *in itself,* in objective mind freedom, mind's knowledge of itself as free, comes to realization. Objective mind is a person, and as such has a reality of its freedom in property; for in property the thing is posited as what it is, namely, as something lacking independence and as something that essentially has only the meaning of being the reality of the free will of a person and, for that reason, of being for any other person something inviolable. Here we see a subjective entity that is aware of itself as free, and, at the same time, an external reality of this freedom; here, therefore, mind attains to being-for-itself, the objectivity of mind receives its due. Thus mind has emerged from the form of mere subjectivity. But the full actualization of this freedom which in property is still incomplete, still formal, the completion of the realization of the concept of objective mind is achieved only in the political state, in which mind develops its freedom into a world posited by mind, into the ethical world. Yet mind must pass beyond this stage too. The defect of this objectivity of mind consists in its being only a posited objectivity. Mind must again freely let go the world, what mind has posited must at the same time be grasped as having an immediate being. This happens at the *third* stage of mind, at the standpoint of *absolute* mind, i.e. of art, religion, and philosophy.

§386

The first two parts of the *doctrine of mind* deal with the *finite* mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concept and the reality – but with the qualification that it is the semblance within the mind, – a semblance which the mind implicitly sets up as a limitation to itself, in order, by sublating the limitation, *explicitly* to have and be aware of freedom as *its* essence, i.e. to be fully *manifested.'* The various stages of this activity, which, with their semblance, it is the destiny of the finite mind to linger on and to pass through, are stages in its liberation. In the absolute truth of this liberation the three stages – finding a world *before* it as a presupposed world, *generating* a world as posited by itself, and gaining freedom from it and in it – are one and the same. To the infinite form of this truth the semblance purifies itself to become knowledge of it.

[Remark] The determination of *finitude* is applied with especial rigidity by the *intellect* in relation to mind and *reason:* it is held not just a matter of the intellect, but also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the *standpoint* of finitude as *ultimate,* and the wish to go beyond it counts as audacity, even as derangement, of thought. Whereas in fact such a *modesty* of thought, which treats the finite as something altogether fixed and *absolute,* is the worst of virtues; and to stick to what does not have its ground in itself is the shallowest sort of knowledge. The determination of *finitude* was a long way back elucidated and explained in its place, in the Logic. Logic then goes on to show in the case of the more determinate though still simple thought-forms of finitude, what the rest of philosophy shows for the concrete forms of finitude, just this: that the finite *is* not, i.e. is not what is true, but *is* simply a *transition* and a *passage beyond itself.* This finitude of the previous spheres is the dialectic in which it meets its end at the hands of an *Other* and in an Other; but mind, the concept and what is *in itself* eternal, is itself the

accomplishment within itself of the nullification of the null and the reduction of the vain to vanity. The above-mentioned modesty is attachment to this vanity, the finite, in opposition to the true; it is itself therefore vanity. This vanity will emerge in the development of the mind itself as the mind's extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its innermost contradiction and thus its turning point, as *evil*.

Zusatz. Subjective and objective mind are still finite. But it is necessary to know what sense the finitude of mind has. This is usually represented as an absolute limitation, as a fixed quality, by the removal of which the mind would cease to be mind; just as the essence of natural things is tied to a determinate quality, as, for example, gold cannot be separated from its specific gravity, this or that animal cannot be without claws, incisors, etc. But in truth, the finitude of mind must not be regarded as a fixed determination, but must be recognized as a mere moment; for as we have already said, mind is essentially the Idea in the form of ideality, i.e. in the form of the negatedness of the finite. In mind, therefore, the finite has only the meaning of something sublated, not of a being. Accordingly, the authentic quality of the mind is rather genuine infinity, that is, the infinity which does not one-sidedly stand over against the finite but contains the finite within itself as a moment. It is, therefore, an empty expression, if one says: 'There are finite minds.' Mind as mind *is* not finite, it *has* finitude within itself, but only as a finitude which is to be, and has been, sublated. The genuine definition of finitude – this is not the place for a more detailed discussion of it – must be stated thus: the finite is a reality that is not adequate to its concept. Thus the sun is a finite entity, for it cannot be thought without an Other, since the reality of its concept comprises not merely the sun itself but the entire solar system. Indeed, the whole solar system is a finite entity, because every heavenly body in it has the semblance of independence of the others; consequently this whole reality does not as yet correspond to its concept, does not yet exhibit the same ideality which is the essence of the concept. It is only the reality of *mind* that is itself ideality, only in mind therefore does absolute unity of concept and reality occur, and hence genuine infinity. The very fact that we are aware of a limitation is proof that we are beyond it, proof of our unlimitedness. Natural things are finite simply because their limitation is not present for the things themselves, but only for us who compare them with one another. We make ourselves into a finite entity by receiving an Other into our consciousness. But by our very awareness of this Other we are beyond this limitation. Only he who does not know is limited, for he is not aware of his limitation; whereas he who knows the limitation is aware of it not as a limitation of his knowing, but as something known, as something belonging to his knowledge. Only the unknown would be a limitation of knowledge; the known limitation, on the contrary, is no limitation of it; therefore to know of one's limitation means knowing of one's unlimitedness. But when we pronounce mind to be unlimited, genuinely infinite, we do not mean to say that there is no limitation whatsoever in the mind; on the contrary, we have to recognize that mind must determine itself and so make itself finite, limit itself. But the intellect is wrong to treat this finitude as a rigid finitude, – to regard the distinction between the limitation and infinity as an absolutely fixed distinction, and accordingly to maintain that mind is *either* limited *or* unlimited. Finitude, properly conceived, is, as we have said, contained in infinity, limitation in the unlimited. Mind is therefore *both* infinite *and* finite, and *neither* only the one *nor* only the other; in making itself finite it remains infinite, for it sublates finitude within itself; nothing in the mind is a fixture, a being, rather everything is only something ideal, only appearing. Thus God, because he is mind, must determine himself, posit finitude within himself (otherwise he would be only a dead, empty abstraction); but since the reality he assumes by his self-determining is a reality perfectly conformable to him, God does not thereby become a finite entity. Therefore, limitation *is* not in God and in mind: it is only posited by mind in order to be sublated. Only momentarily can mind seem to remain in a finitude; by its ideality it is raised above it, it knows that the limitation is not a fixed limitation. It therefore transcends it, frees itself from it, and this is not, as the intellect supposes, a liberation never completed, only ever striven for endlessly; on the contrary, mind wrests itself out of this progression to infinity, frees itself absolutely from the limitation, from its Other, and so attains to absolute being-for-itself, makes itself genuinely infinite.

[…]

(b) Self-Consciousness

§424

The truth of consciousness[12] is *self-consciousness* and the latter is the ground of the former, so that in existence all consciousness of another object is self-consciousness; I am aware of the object as mine (it is my representation), thus in it

[12] *Bewusstsein*. By 'consciousness' Hegel means a conceptualisation of oneself and the objects of one's knowledge as quite separate from each other. 'The standpoint of consciousness […] knows objects in their antithesis to itself, and itself in antithesis to them'(*Phenomenology of Spirit*, §26).

I am aware of me. – The expression of self-consciousness is I = I – *abstract freedom,* pure ideality. – In this way it is without reality, for the I itself, which is the *object* of itself, is not such an object, because there is no distinction between itself and the object.

Zusatz. In the expression, I = I, is enunciated the principle of absolute *reason* and *freedom.* Freedom and reason consist in this: I raise myself to the form of I = I, I recognize[13] everything as *mine,* as *I,* I grasp every object as a member in the system of what I myself am, – in short, they consist in this: I have in *one and the same* consciousness *I* and the *world,* in the world I find myself again and, conversely, in my consciousness I have what *is,* what has *objectivity.* This unity of the I and the object constituting the principle of mind is, however, at first only present in an *abstract* way in *immediate*[14] self-consciousness, and is known only by *us,* the onlookers, not yet by self-consciousness itself. Immediate self-consciousness does not yet have for its object the I = I, but only the I; therefore, it is free only for [153] *us,* not *for itself* is not yet aware of its freedom, and has only the *basis* of freedom within itself, but not yet genuinely *actual* freedom.

§425

Abstract[15] self-consciousness is the *first* negation of consciousness, therefore also burdened with an external object, formally with the negation of itself; thus it is at the same time the preceding stage, consciousness, and is the contradiction between itself as self-consciousness and itself as consciousness. Consciousness and the negation in general are already implicitly sublated in the I = I; so as this certainty of itself in contrast to the object, it is the *urge* to posit what it is implicitly, – i.e. to give content and objectivity to the abstract awareness of itself, and conversely to free itself from its sensoriness, to sublate[16] the objectivity that is given and to posit it as identical to itself. The two things are one and the same, the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness.

[13] *erkenne* (know).

[14] *unvermittelt* (not developed out of or 'mediated by' anything else).

[15] By 'abstract' Hegel usually means 'separated off in some way'.

[16] *aufheben*. This can mean either 'preserve', 'destroy', or 'raise up'. Hegel often uses it to combine all these meanings. The normal translation is 'supersede' but Wallace and Miller translate it as 'sublate.'

Zusatz. The defect of *abstract self-consciousness* lies in this: it and consciousness are still *two different things* confronting each other, they have not yet achieved a reciprocal equilibrium. In consciousness, we see the tremendous *difference,* on the one side, of the *I,* this wholly *simple* entity, and on the other side, of the infinite *variety of the world.* This opposition of the I and the world, which does not yet come to genuine mediation here, constitutes the *finitude* of consciousness. *Self-consciousness,* by contrast, has its finitude in its still wholly *abstract identity with its own self.* What is present in the I = I of immediate self-consciousness is only a difference that *ought to be,* not yet *a posited,* not yet an *actual* difference.

This rift between self-consciousness and consciousness forms an *inner* contradiction of *self-consciousness* with itself, because self-consciousness is also the stage directly preceding it, *consciousness,* and consequently is the opposite of itself. That is to say, since abstract self-consciousness is only the *first,* hence still *conditioned,* negation of the immediacy of consciousness, and not already *absolute* negativity, i.e., the negation of that negation, *infinite affirmation,* it has itself still the form of a *being,* of an *immediate,* of something that, in spite of, or rather just because of, its *differenceless inwardness,* is still filled by *externality.* Therefore, it contains negation not merely *within itself but* also *outside itself* as an *external* object, as a *non-I,* and it is just this that makes it *consciousness.*

The contradiction here outlined must be resolved, and the way in which this happens is that self-consciousness, which has itself as consciousness, as I, for its object, develops the *simple ideality* of the I into a *real difference,* and thus by sublating its *one-sided subjectivity* gives itself *objectivity*; this process is identical with the converse, by which the *object* is at the same time posited *subjectively* by the I, is immersed in the inwardness of the self, and thus the dependence, present in consciousness, of the I on an external reality is annihilated. Self-consciousness thus gets to the point where it does not have consciousness *alongside* it, is not *externally* [154] combined with consciousness, but genuinely pervades it and contains it dissolved within its own self.

To reach this goal, self-consciousness has to traverse three developmental stages.

α) The first of these stages displays to us the *individual*[17] *self-consciousness* that is immediate, simply identical with itself, and at the same time, in contradiction with this, related to an external object. Thus determined, self-consciousness is the

[17] *einzelne* (singular).

certainty of itself as the being in face of which the object has the determination of something only seemingly independent, but is in fact a nullity. This is *desiring self-consciousness.*

ß) At the second stage, the objective I acquires the determination of *another I,* and hence arises the relationship of *one self-consciousness* to *another self-consciousness,* and between these two the *process of recognition*[18]. Here, self-consciousness is no longer merely *individual* self-consciousness, but in it there already begins a unification of *individuality* and *universality*.

γ) Furthermore, when the *otherness* of the selves confronting each other sublates itself and these, in their independence, nevertheless become identical with each other, the third stage emerges, – *universal self-consciousness.*

(α) Desire

§426

Self-consciousness, in its immediacy, is an *individual* and *desire* – the contradiction of its abstraction which is supposed to be objective, or of its immediacy, which has the shape of an external object and is supposed to be subjective. For the certainty of itself that has emerged from the sublation of consciousness, the object is determined as a nullity, and for the relation of self-consciousness to the object its abstract ideality is likewise determined as a nullity.

Zusatz. As we have already remarked in the *Zusatz* to the previous Paragraph, *desire* is the form in which self-consciousness appears at the first stage of its development. Here in the second main part of the theory of subjective mind, desire has as yet no further determination than that of *urge,* in so far as urge, without being determined by *thinking,* is directed on an *external* object in which it seeks to satisfy itself. But the necessity for the urge so determined to exist in self-consciousness, lies in this: self-consciousness (as we likewise already brought to notice in the *Zusatz* to the previous Paragraph) is also the stage immediately preceding it, namely consciousness, and is aware of this inner contradiction. Where something identical with itself bears within itself a contradiction and is filled with the feeling of its implicit identity with itself as well as with the opposite feeling of its inner contradiction, then there necessarily emerges the *urge* to sublate this contradiction. The non-living entity has no urge because it is incapable of enduring contradiction; it perishes when the Other of itself forces its way [155] into it. By contrast, the ensouled creature and the mind necessarily have urge, since neither the soul nor the mind can be, without having contradiction within themselves and either feeling it or being aware of it. But, as indicated above, in the *immediate* and therefore *natural, individual, exclusive* self-consciousness, the shape assumed by contradiction is that self-consciousness (whose concept consists in being in relationship *to its own self*; in being I = I) still enters, on the contrary, into relationship to an *immediate* Other not posited ideally, to an *external* object, to a *non-I,* and is *external to its own self* since although *in it self it* is a totality, a unity of the subjective and the objective, it nevertheless exists initially as a one-sided, as a merely subjective thing, which only gets to be a totality *in and for itself* by the satisfaction of desire. Despite this inner contradiction, however, self-consciousness remains absolutely certain of itself because it is aware that the immediate, external object has no genuine reality but is, on the contrary, a nullity in comparison to the subject, with merely seeming independence, and is, in fact, something that does not deserve and is not able to subsist for itself, but must perish by the real power of the subject.

§427

Self-consciousness, therefore, is aware of itself implicitly in the object, which in this relation is conformable to the urge. In the negation of the two one-sided moments[19] as the I's own activity, this identity comes to be *for* the I. To this activity the object, which in itself and for self-consciousness is the selfless, can offer no resistance; the dialectic of self-sublation, which is the object's nature, exists here as this activity of the I. In this process the given object is posited subjectively, just as subjectivity divests itself[20] of its one-sidedness and becomes objective to itself.

Zusatz. The self-conscious subject is aware of itself as *in itself*[21] *identical* with the external object, aware that the object contains the *possibility* of satisfying the desire, that the object is, therefore, *conformable* to the desire and that just for this reason desire is aroused by the object. Relation to the object is therefore necessary to the subject. In the object, the subject beholds its *own lack,* its own one-sidedness,

[18] *Anerkennung*. This means 'recognition' in the sense of 'acknowledgement of something as having a certain status' (as in 'I do not recognise this court').

[19] *Momente* (components).

[20] *sich entäussert* ((literally 'externalises itself').

[21] *An sich*. Hegel often uses this phrase to mean 'potentially' or 'implicitly'.

sees in the object something belonging to its own essence and yet missing from it. Self-consciousness is in a position to sublate this contradiction since it is not just being, but absolute activity; and it sublates the contradiction by taking possession of the object whose independence is, so to speak, only a pretence, satisfies itself by consuming it and, since it is an end in itself, maintains itself in this process. Here the object must perish; for here both of them, the subject and the object, are immediate, and the only way in which they can be in a unity is by the negation of the immediacy, and *first of all,* of the immediacy of the selfless object. By the satisfaction of desire, the implicit identity of the subject and the object is posited, the one-sidedness of subjectivity and the seeming independence of the object are sublated. But in being annihilated by the desiring self-consciousness the object may seem to succumb to a completely alien power. [156]

This is, however, only a semblance. For the immediate object must, by its *own* nature, by its *concept*, sublate itself. since in its *individuality* it does not correspond to the *universality* of its concept. Self-consciousness is the *appearing* concept of the object itself. In the annihilation of the object by self-consciousness, the object perishes, therefore, by the power of its own concept which is only internal to it and, just because of that, seems to come to it *only from outside*. The object is thus posited subjectively. But by this sublation of the object the subject, as we have already remarked, sublates its own lack, its disintegration into a distinctionless I = I and an I related to an external object, and it gives its subjectivity objectivity just as much as it makes its object subjective.

§428

The product of this process is that I joins together with itself, and is thereby satisfied *for itself,* actualized. On the external side it remains, in this return, determined initially as an *individual,* and has maintained itself as such, because its relation to the selfless object is only negative, hence the object is only consumed. So desire in its satisfaction is in general *destructive,* as it is in its content *self-centred,* and since the satisfaction has only happened in the individual case, and this is transitory, the desire reproduces itself again in the satisfaction.'

Zusatz. The relationship of desire to the object is still completely one of self-centred *destruction,* not one of *fashioning.* In so far as self-consciousness relates as *fashioning* activity to the object, the object gets only the *form* of the subjective, a form acquiring a *subsistence* in it, while in its matter the object is preserved. By contrast, the satisfaction of self-consciousness caught up in desire, since this self-consciousness does not yet possess the power to endure the Other as an independent entity, destroys the independence of the object, so that the form of the subjective does not attain any subsistence in the object.2

Like the object of desire and desire itself, the *satisfaction* of desire, too, is necessarily something *individual, transient*, yielding to the incessant renewal of desire. It is an objectification constantly remaining in contradiction with the *universality* of the subject, and yet all the same stimulated again and again by the felt deficiency of immediate subjectivity, an objectification which never absolutely attains its goal but only gives rise to the *progression ad infinitum*.

§429

But the self-feeling which the I gets in the satisfaction does not, on the inner side or *in itself* remain in abstract *being-for-self* or in its individuality; as the negation of immediacy and of individuality the result involves the determination of *universality* and of the *identity* of self-consciousness with its object. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is the consciousness of a *free* object, in which I has awareness of itself as I, but which is also still outside it. [157]

Zusatz. On the *external* side, as we remarked in the *Zusatz* to the previous Paragraph, immediate self-consciousness remains caught up in the tedious alternation, continuing to infinity, of desire and its satisfaction, in subjectivity relapsing into itself again and again from its objectification. On the *inner* side, by contrast, or in accordance with the *concept,* self-consciousness has, by sublation of its subjectivity and of the external object, negated its own immediacy, the standpoint of desire, has posited itself with the determination of otherness towards its own self, has filled the *Other* with the *I,* has changed it from something *selfless* into a *free,* into a *selfish* object, into *another* I. It has in this way brought itself as a *distinct I* face to face with its own self, but in doing so has raised itself above the self-centredness of merely destructive desire.

(ß) Recognizant Self-consciousness

§430

There is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness, at first *immediately*, as one thing for *another*. In the other as I, I immediately behold my own self, but I also behold in it an immediately real object, another I absolutely independent in face of myself. The sublation of the *individuality* of self-consciousness was the *first*

sublation; self-consciousness is thereby determined only as *particular*. – This contradiction supplies the urge to show itself as a free self, and to be *there* as a free self for the other, – the process of *recognition*.

Zusatz. The second stage in the development of self-consciousness, indicated in the heading of the above Paragraph, initially still has the determination of *immediacy* in common with the self-consciousness of the first stage of development, which is caught up in *desire.* In this determination lies the massive contradiction that, since the I is what is wholly *universal,* absolutely *pervasive, interrupted* by *no limit,* the *essence common* to *all* men, the two selves here relating to each other constitute *one* identity, so to speak *one* light, and yet they are also *two* selves, which subsist in complete *rigidity* and *inflexibility* towards each other, each as a *reflection-into-self,* absolutely *distinct* from and *impenetrable* by the other.

§431

The process is a *combat*; for I cannot be aware of myself as myself in the other, in so far as the other is an immediate other reality for me; I am consequently bent on the sublation of this immediacy of his. Equally I cannot be recognized as an immediate entity, but only in so far as I sublate the immediacy in myself, and thereby give reality to my freedom. But this immediacy is at the same time the bodiliness of self-consciousness, in which, as in its sign and tool, self-consciousness has its own *self-feeling,* as well as its being *for others* and its relation that mediates between itself and them. [158]

Zusatz. The more precise shape of the contradiction indicated in the *Zusatz* to the previous Paragraph is this. The two self-conscious subjects in relationship to each other, since they have an immediate reality, are *natural, bodily,* thus exist in the manner of a *thing* subjected to *alien power,* and they approach each other as such; yet at the same time they are quite *free* and may not be treated by each other as only *immediate realities,* as merely *natural* entities[22]. To overcome this contradiction, it is necessary that the two selves opposing each other should, in their *reality,* in their *being-for-another,* posit themselves as and recognize themselves as what they are *in themselves* or by their concept, namely, not merely natural but free beings. Only in this does *true* freedom come about; for since this consists in the identity of myself with the other, I am only genuinely free when the other is also free and is recognized by me as free. This freedom of the *one* in the *other* unites men in an internal manner, whereas *need* and *necessity* bring them together only externally. Therefore, men must will to find themselves again in one another. But this cannot happen as long as they are caught up in their immediacy, in their naturalness; for it is just this that excludes them from one another and prevents them from being free for one another. Freedom demands, therefore, that the self-conscious subject neither let his own naturalness persist nor tolerate the naturalness of others; on the contrary, indifferent towards reality, he should in individual, immediate contest put his own and the other's life at stake to win freedom. Only through *combat,* therefore, can freedom be won; the assurance of being free is not enough for that; at this standpoint man demonstrates his capacity for freedom only by exposing himself, and others, to the *danger of death.*

§432

The combat of recognition is thus a life and death struggle; each of the two self-consciousnesses puts the other's life in *danger,* and exposes itself to it – but only *in danger,* for each is equally bent on maintaining his life, since it is the embodiment of his freedom. The death of one, which dissolves the contradiction in one respect by the abstract, therefore crude, negation of immediacy, is thus in the essential respect, the reality of recognition which is sublated together with the death, a new contradiction and a higher one than the first.

Zusatz. The *absolute* proof of freedom in the fight for recognition is *death.* The combatants, even by exposing themselves to the risk of death, posit the natural being of both of them as a negative, they prove that they regard it as a nullity. But by death, naturalness is negated in fact and in this way its contradiction with the spiritual, with the I, is at the same time resolved. This resolution is, however, only quite *abstract,* only of a *negative,* not a *positive* kind. For even if only one of two combatants fighting for mutual recognition perishes, then no recognition comes about, for the survivor exists with recognition no more than the dead. Consequently, death gives rise to the new and greater contradiction, that those [159] who by fighting have proved their inner freedom, have nevertheless not attained to a recognized reality of their freedom.

To prevent possible misunderstandings with regard to the standpoint just outlined, we must here add the remark that the fight for recognition in the extreme form here indicated can only occur in the *state of nature,* where men live only as *individuals*; by contrast it is absent from civil society and the political state because what constitutes the result of this combat, namely recognition, is already present there.

[22] *Wesen* (this means normally means 'essence' but sometimes 'a being' or 'an entity').

For although the state may *arise by force,* it does not rest on force; force, in producing the state, has brought into existence only what is justified in and for itself, the laws, the constitution. What predominates in the state is the spirit of the people, custom, and law. There man is recognized and treated as a *rational* being, as *free,* as a person; and the individual, on his side, makes himself worthy of this recognition by overcoming the naturalness of his self-consciousness and obeying a *universal,* the *will that is in and for itself* the *law*; he thus behaves towards others in a manner that is *universally valid,* recognizing them – as he wishes others to regard him – as free, as persons. In the state, the citizen derives his honour from the post he fills, from the trade he follows, and from his working activity of any other kind. In this way his honour has a content that is substantial, universal, objective, and no longer dependent on empty subjectivity; honour of this kind is still lacking in the state of nature where individuals, whatever they may be and whatever they may do, want to compel others to recognize them.

But it is clear from what has just been said that *duelling* must definitely not be confused with the fight for recognition that constitutes a necessary moment in the development of the human mind. Unlike this fight, duelling does not belong to the natural state of men, but to a more or less developed form of civil society and the state. Duelling has its strictly world-historical place in the feudal system which was supposed to be a lawful condition, but was so only to a very small degree. There the knight, no matter what he might have done, wanted to be esteemed as not having lost face, as being completely spotless. This is what the duel was supposed to prove. Although the law of the jungle was elaborated into certain forms, yet its absolute basis was egotism. Consequently, its practice was not a proof of rational freedom and genuinely civic honour, but rather a proof of brutality and often of the shamelessness of a mentality claiming outward honour, despite its depravity. Duelling is not met with among the peoples of antiquity, for the formalism of empty subjectivity, the subject's wish to be esteemed in his immediate individuality, was completely alien to them. They had their honour only in their solid unity with that ethical relationship which is the state. But in our modern states duelling can hardly be said to be anything else but a *contrived* return to the brutality of the Middle Ages. At best, duelling in the former military was able to have a tolerably rational sense, namely, that the individual wished to prove that he had another and higher aim than to get himself killed for a pittance. [160]

§433

Because life is as essential as freedom, the combat ends initially as *one-sided* negation with an asymmetry: one of the combatants prefers life, maintains himself as individual self-consciousness, but surrenders his chance of recognition, while the other holds fast to his relation to himself and is recognized by the first in his subjugation: the *relationship of mastery and bondage.*[23]

[Remark] The combat of recognition and the subjugation under a master is the *appearance* in which man's social life, the beginning of *states,* emerged. *Force,* which is the basis in this appearance, is not on that account the basis of *right,* though it is the *necessary* and *legitimate* moment in the passage of the *condition* of self-consciousness engrossed in desire and individuality into the condition of universal self-consciousness. This moment is the external beginning of states, their *beginning as it appears,* not their *substantial principle.*

Zusatz. The relationship of master and bondsman contains only a *relative* sublation of the contradiction between the *particularity reflected into itself* of the distinct self-conscious subjects and their *mutual identity.* For in this relationship the immediacy of particular self-consciousness is, initially, sublated only on the side of the bondsman, but on the master's side it is preserved. While the naturalness of life on both these sides persists, the self-will of the bondsman surrenders itself to the will of the master, receives for its content the purpose of the lord who, on his part, receives into his self-consciousness, not the bondsman's will, but only care for the support of the bondsman's natural vitality; in such a manner that in this relationship the *posited* identity of the self-consciousness of the subjects related to each other comes about only in a *one-sided* way.

As regards the historicity of the relationship under discussion, it can be remarked that the ancient peoples, the Greeks and Romans, had not yet risen to the concept of *absolute* freedom, since they did not know that *man as such,* as this *universal* I, as *rational* self-consciousness, is entitled to freedom. On the contrary, with them man was held to be free only if he was *born* as a free man. With them, therefore, freedom still had the determination of *naturalness.* That is why there was slavery in their free states and bloody wars arose among the Romans in which the slaves tried to free themselves, to obtain recognition of their eternal human rights.

§434

On the one hand, this relationship is a *community* of need and of care for its satis-

[23] *Herrschaft und Knechtschaft* (mastery and servitude).

faction, since the means of mastery, the bondsman, must likewise be maintained in his life. In place of the brute destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition, preservation, and formation of it, as the intermediary in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence join together; – the form [161] of universality in satisfaction of need is a *permanent* means and a provision that takes care of and secures the future.

§435

Secondly, in line with the distinction between them, the master has in the bondsman and his service the intuition of the validity of his *individual* being-for-self and he has it by means of the sublation[24] of immediate being-for-self, a sublation, however, which occurs in another. – But this other, the bondsman, works off his individual will and self-will in the service of the master, sublates the inner immediacy of desire and in this alienation[25] and in the fear of the master he makes a beginning of wisdom – the transition to *universal self-consciousness.*

Zusatz. Since the bondsman works for the master and therefore not in the exclusive interest of his own individuality, his desire acquires the *breadth* of being not only the desire of a *particular* individual but containing within itself the desire of *another.* Accordingly, the bondsman rises above the selfish individuality of his natural will, and to that extent stands higher, as regards his worth, than the master who, caught up in his egotism, beholds in the bondsman only his immediate will and is recognized by an unfree consciousness in a formal way. This subjugation of the bondsman's egotism forms the *beginning* of genuine human freedom. This quaking of the individuality of the will, the feeling of the nullity of egotism, the habit of obedience, is a necessary moment in the education of every man. Without having experienced the discipline that breaks self-will, no one becomes free, rational, and capable of command. To become free, to acquire the capacity for self-government, all peoples must therefore undergo the severe discipline of subjection to a master. It was necessary, for example, that after *Solon* had given the Athenians democratic free laws, *Pisistratus* gained a power by which he compelled the Athenians to obey those laws. Only when this obedience had taken root did the mastery of the Pisistratids become superfluous. Thus *Rome,* too, had to live through the strict government of the kings before, by the breaking of natural egotism, that marvellous Roman virtue could arise, a patriotism ready for any sacrifice. Bondage and tyranny are, therefore, in the history of peoples a necessary stage and hence something *relatively* justified. Those who remain bondsmen suffer no absolute injustice; for he who has not the courage to risk his life to win freedom, deserves to be a slave; and if by contrast a people does not merely imagine that it wants to be free but actually has the vigorous will to freedom, then no human power will be able hold it back in the bondage of merely being governed passively.

As we have said, this servile obedience forms only the *beginning* of freedom, because that to which the natural individuality of self-consciousness submits is not the genuinely *universal,* rational will that *is in and for itself* but the *individual, contingent* will of *another* subject. Here, then, only *one* moment of freedom [162] emerges, the *negativity* of egotistic individuality; whereas the *positive* side of freedom attains actuality only when, on the one hand, the servile self-consciousness, liberating itself both from the individuality of the master and from its own individuality, grasps what is *in and for itself rational* in its *universality,* independent of the particularity of the subjects; and when, on the other hand, the master's self-consciousness is brought, by the *community* of need and the concern for its satisfaction obtaining between him and the bondsman, and also by beholding the sublation of the immediate individual will objectified for him in the bondsman, to recognize this sublation as the truth in regard to himself too, and therefore to submit his own selfish will to the law of the will that is in and for itself.

(γ) Universal Self-consciousness

§436

Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of oneself in the other self. Each self as free individuality has *absolute independence,* but in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or desire it does not distinguish itself from the other; it is universal and objective; and it has real universality in the form of reciprocity, in that it is aware of its recognition in the free other, and is aware of this in so far as it recognizes the other and is aware that it is free.

[Remark] This universal mirroring of self-consciousness, the concept that is aware of itself in its objectivity as subjectivity identical with itself and therefore universal,

[24] *Aufhebung*. Wallace and Miller always translate this as 'sublation' rather than 'supersession'

[25] *Entäusserung*. Literally 'externalisation'. The word also means 'alienation' in sense of transferring a right or selling a thing to someone else, and this is how Hegel uses it in the *Philosophy of Right* §73, but here he is using the word in a more philosophical sense.

is the form of consciousness of the *substance* of every essential spirituality – of the family, the fatherland, the state, as well as of all virtues, of love, friendship, courage, of honour, of fame. But this *appearance* of the substantial may also be separated from the substantial, and be maintained for itself in baseless honour, hollow fame, etc.

Zusatz. The result of the struggle for recognition, brought about by the concept of mind, is *universal self-consciousness,* which forms the third stage in this sphere, i.e. that free self-consciousness for which its object, the other self-consciousness, is no longer, as in the second stage, an *unfree* but an *equally independent* self-consciousness. At this standpoint, therefore, the mutually related self-conscious subjects, by sublation of their unequal[26] *particular individuality,* have risen to the consciousness of their *real universality,* of *their freedom* befitting *all,* and hence to the intuition of their *determinate identity with each other.* The master confronting the bondsman was not yet genuinely free, for he was still far from intuiting his own self in the other. Consequently, it is only by the liberation of the bondsman that the master, too, becomes completely free. In this condition of universal freedom, in being reflected into *myself,* I am immediately reflected into the *other,* and, conversely, in relating myself to the *other* I immediately relate to *my own self*. Here, therefore, we have the tremendous diremption[27] of mind into different selves which are, both in and for themselves and for one another, completely free, [163] independent, absolutely obdurate, resistant, and yet at the same time identical with one another, hence not self-subsistent, not impenetrable, but, as it were, merged together.[28] This relationship is thoroughly *speculative*[29] in kind; and if one supposes that the speculative is something remote and inconceivable, one need only consider the content of this relationship to convince oneself of the groundlessness of this opinion. The speculative, or rational, and true consists in the unity of the concept, or the subjective, and the objective. This unity is obviously present at the standpoint in question. It forms the substance of ethical life, especially of the family, of sexual love (there the unity has the form of particularity), of patriotism, this willing of the universal aims and interests of the state, of love towards God, of bravery too, when this is staking one's life on a universal cause, and lastly, also of honour, provided that this has for its content not the indifferent singularity of the individual but something substantial, genuinely universal.

§437

This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness involves in the first place the individuals as shining into each other. But in this identity the distinction between them is a wholly indeterminate diversity or rather a distinction which is no distinction. Hence their truth is the universality and objectivity of self-consciousness which are in and for themselves – *reason*.

[Remark] Reason as the *Idea* (§213) appears here in the following determination: the general opposition between concept and reality, which are unified in the Idea, has here taken the specific form of the concept existing for itself, of consciousness and, confronting it, the externally present object.

Zusatz. What we have called in the previous Paragraph *universal self-consciousness,* is in its truth the concept of *reason,* the *concept* in so far as it exists not merely as the logical Idea, but as the Idea developed into self-consciousness. For as we know from the Logic, the Idea consists in the unity of the subjective, or the concept, and objectivity. But universal self-consciousness has shown itself to us as such a unity, for we have seen that, in its absolute difference from its Other, it is yet at the same time absolutely identical with its Other. It is precisely this identity of subjectivity and objectivity that constitutes the *universality* now attained by self-consciousness, a universality which overarches these two sides or *particularities* and into which they dissolve. But self-consciousness, in attaining this universality, ceases to be self-consciousness in the strict or narrower sense of the word, since it is just this adherence to the particularity of the self that belongs to self-consciousness as such. By relinquishing this particularity, self-consciousness becomes reason. In this context the name 'reason' only has the sense of the initially still *abstract* or *formal* unity of self-consciousness with its object. This unity establishes what must be called, in determinate contrast to the *truthful,* the merely *correct.* My representation is *correct* by mere *agreement* with the object, even when the object only remotely corresponds to its concept [164] and thus has hardly any truth at all. Only when the *truthful* content becomes an object for me does my intelligence acquire the significance of *reason* in a *concrete* sense. Reason in this

[26] *ungleiches* (i.e. not-identical, distinct).

[27] I.e. division.

[28] See also Hegel's definition of spirit/mind in the *Phenomenology*: 'what Spirit is – this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I'' (§177).

[29] Hegel uses 'speculative' and 'speculation' to refer to his own philosophy.

sense will have to be considered at the close of the development of theoretical mind (§467), where, emerging from an opposition of the subjective and objective developed further than it has been so far, we shall cognize reason as the *contentful* unity of this opposition.

(c) Reason

§438

Reason is the truth that is in and for itself, and this is the simple *identity* of the *subjectivity* of the concept with its *objectivity* and universality. The universality of reason, therefore, signifies the *object,* which in consciousness qua consciousness was only given, but is now itself *universal,* permeating and encompassing the I. Equally it signifies the pure *I,* the pure form overarching the object and encompassing it within itself.

§439

Self-consciousness is thus the certainty that its determinations are objective, are determinations of the essence of things, just as much as they are its own thoughts. Hence it is reason, which, since it is this identity, is not only the absolute *substance,* but the *truth* as awareness. For truth here has, as its peculiar *determinacy,* as its immanent form, the pure concept existing for itself, I, the certainty of itself as infinite universality. This truth that is aware is the *mind.*

[In the next sections Hegel goes on to that spirit (mind) must confirm its ‘certainty’ that the determinations of its own thinking are also the determinations of the essence of things first by grasping the determinations of things intellectually (this what he calls intelligence or theoretical spirit) and second by externalising the determinations of its thinking in a world outside itself (this is what he calls will or practical spirit). His account of will in the *Philosophy of Mind* is equivalent to the one in the Introduction to the *Philosophy of Right*. – AC]

4. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction
1822-31
Source: G.W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction. Reason in History*, tr. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975).

[The italicised text is Hegel's own lecture notes from 1830. The rest of the text is from transcriptions of Hegel's lectures made by students at his courses on the philosophy of history between 1822 and 1831. – AC]

[NB A shorter version of this introduction, rearranged by Hegel's son Charles Hegel, is published as the first part of *Philosophy of History* (tr. J. Sibree), as *Introduction to the Philosophy of History* (tr. L. Rauch), and as *Reason in History* (tr. R.S. Hartman). This is the version available online at http://marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hi/lectures.htm. – AC]

A [Its general concept][1]

The first thing I wish to say concerning our provisional concept of world history is this. As already remarked the main objection levelled at philosophy is that it imports its own thoughts into history and considers the latter in the light of the former. But the only thought which philosophy brings with it is the simple idea of ***reason*** *– the idea that reason governs the world, and that world history is therefore a rational process. From the point of view of history as such, this conviction and insight is a* ***presupposition****. Within philosophy itself, however, it is not a presupposition; for it is proved in philosophy by speculative cognition that reason – and we can adopt this expression for the moment without a detailed discussion of its relationship to God – is* ***substance*** *and* ***infinite power****; it is itself the* ***infinite material*** *of all natural and spiritual lift, and the infinite form which activates this material content. It is* ***substance****, i.e. that through which and in which all reality has its being and subsistence; it is infinite* ***power****, for reason is sufficiently powerful to be able to create something more than just an ideal, an obligation which supposedly exists in some unknown region beyond reality (or, as is more likely, only as a particular idea in the heads of a few individuals); and it is the infinite* ***content****, the essence and truth of everything, itself constituting the material on which it operates through its own activity. Unlike finite actions, it does not require an external material as a condition of its operation, or outside resources from which to derive its sustenance and the objects of its activity; it is self-supporting, and is itself the material of its own operations. On the one hand, it is its own sole precondition, and its end is the absolute and ultimate end of everything; and on the other, it is itself the agent which implements and realises this end, translating it from potentiality into actuality both in the natural universe and in the spiritual world –* [28] *that is, in world history. That this Idea is true, eternal, and omnipotent, that it reveals itself in the world, and that nothing is revealed except the Idea in all its honour and majesty – this, as I have said, is what philosophy has proved, and we can therefore posit it as demonstrated for our present purposes.*

[…]

I only wish to mention two points concerning the general conviction that reason has ruled and continues to rule the world and hence also world [34] *history; for these should give us an opportunity to examine more closely the main difficulty which confronts us, and to touch provisionally on matters which will have to be discussed later.*

The first point is as follows. As history tells us, the Greek Anaxagoras was the first to declare that the world is governed by a 'nous', i.e. by reason or understanding in general. This does not signify an intelligence in the sense of a self-conscious reason or a spirit as such, and the two must not be confused. The movement of the solar system is governed by unalterable laws; these laws are its inherent reason. But neither the sun nor the planets which revolve around it in accordance with these laws are conscious of them. It is man who abstracts the laws from empirical reality and acquires knowledge of them. An idea of this kind, that there is reason in nature or that it is governed by unalterable general laws, does not strike us as in any way strange, and Anaxagoras had as yet applied it only to nature. We are

[1] I.e. the general concept of world history.

accustomed to such ideas, and do not find them at all extraordinary. One of the reasons why I mentioned this historical fact at all was to show how we can learn from history that what may now seem trivial was once unknown to the world, and that such ideas were in fact of epoch-making significance in the history of the human spirit. Aristotle says of Anaxagoras, as the originator of this idea, that he stood out like a sober man in a company of drunkards.

[…]

The time has now surely come for us to comprehend even so rich a product of creative reason as world history. The aim of human cognition is to understand that the intentions of eternal wisdom are accomplished not only in the natural world, but also in the realm of the [spirit] which is actively present in the world. From this point of view, our investigation can be seen as a theodicy, a justification of the ways of God (such as Leibniz attempted in his own metaphysical manner, but using categories which were as yet abstract and indeterminate). It should enable us to comprehend all the ills of the world, including the existence of evil, so that the thinking spirit may be reconciled [43] *with the negative aspects of existence; and it is in world history that we encounter the sum total of concrete evil. (Indeed, there is no department of knowledge in which such a reconciliation is more urgently required than in world history, and we shall accordingly pause for a moment to consider this question further.)*

A reconciliation of the kind just described can only be achieved through a knowledge of the affirmative side of history, in which the negative is reduced to a subordinate position and transcended altogether. In other words, we must first of all know what the ultimate design of the world really is, and secondly, we must see that this design has been realised and that evil has not been able to maintain a position of equality beside it.

In order to justify the course of history, we must try to understand the role of evil in the light of the absolute sovereignty of reason. We are dealing here with the category of the negative, as already mentioned, and we cannot fail to notice how all that is finest and noblest in the history of the world is immolated upon its altar. Reason cannot stop to consider the injuries sustained by single individuals, for particular ends are submerged in the universal end. In the rise and fall of all things it discerns an enterprise at which the entire human race has laboured, an enterprise which has a real existence in the world to which we belong. Phenomena have become real independently of our efforts, and all that we need to understand them is consciousness, or more precisely, a thinking consciousness. For the affirmative element is not to be found merely in emotional enjoyment or in the imagination, but is something which belongs to reality and to us, or to which we ourselves belong.

Reason, it has been said, rules the world. But 'reason' is just as indefinite a word as 'providence'. People continually speak of reason, without being able to define it correctly, to specify its content, or to supply a criterion by which we might judge whether something is rational or irrational. Reason in its ***determinate*** *form is the true* ***substance****; and the rest – if we confine ourselves to reason in general – is mere words. With this information before us, we may proceed to the second point which, as earlier remarked, has to be considered in this introduction.* [44]

B [The realisation[2] of spirit in history]

To try to define reason in itself – if we consider reason in relation to the world – amounts to asking what the ultimate end of the world is; and we cannot speak of an ultimate end without implying that this end is destined to be accomplished or realised. We therefore have two points to consider: firstly, the content of the ultimate end itself – i.e. its definition as such – and secondly, its realisation.

We must first of all note that the object we have before us, i.e. world history, belongs to the ***realm of the spirit****. The world as a whole comprehends both physical and spiritual nature. Physical nature also plays a part in world history, and we shall certainly include some initial remarks on the basic outlines of this natural influence. But the spirit and the course of its development are the true substance of history. We do not have to consider nature here as a rational system in its own right – although it is indeed a rational system, operating in its own distinct element – but only in relation to spirit.*

After the creation of the natural universe, man appears on the scene as the antithesis of nature; he is the being who raises himself up into a second world. The general consciousness of man includes two distinct provinces, that of nature and that of the spirit. The province of the spirit is created by man himself; and whatever ideas we may form of the kingdom of God, it must always remain a spiritual kingdom which is realised in man and which man is expected to translate into

[2] *Verwirklichung*. Nisbet always translates this as 'realisation' rather than 'actualisation'

actuality.

The spiritual sphere is all-embracing; it encompasses everything that has concerned mankind down to the present day. Man is active within it; and whatever he does, the spirit is also active within him. Thus it may be of interest to examine spiritual nature in its real existence – that is, spirit in combination with nature, or human nature itself. The expression 'human nature' is usually taken to represent something fixed and constant. Descriptions of human nature are meant to apply to all men, past and present. The general pattern is capable of infinite modifications, but, however much it may vary, it nevertheless remains essentially the same. Reflective thought must disregard the differences and isolate the common factor which can be expected to behave in the same way and to show itself in the same light under all circumstances. It is possible to detect the general type even in those examples which seem to diverge most widely from it, and we can recognise human nature even in the most distorted of forms. [45] We can derive a kind of comfort and reassurance from the knowledge that such forms still retain a vestige of humanity. Those who look at history from this point of view will tend to emphasise that men are still the same as they always were, and that vices and virtues have remained constant despite changing circumstances. One might fittingly add with Solomon that there is nothing new under the sun.

For example, if we see someone kneeling in prayer before an idol, and the content of his prayer is contemptible in the eyes of reason, we can still respect the feelings which animate it and acknowledge that they are just as valuable as those of the Christian who worships truth in symbolic form, or of the philosopher who immerses himself in eternal truth through rational thought. Only the objects of such feelings are different; but the feelings themselves are one and the same. If we call to mind the history of the Assassins, and their relationship with their ruler, the Old Man of the Mountains, we find that they sacrificed themselves for him in order to perpetrate his crimes. In a subjective sense, this sacrifice is no different from that of Curtius, who leaped into the abyss to save his fatherland. Once we have accepted this, we might even say that there is no need to refer to the great theatre of world history at all. According to the well known anecdote, Caesar found in a small municipality the same ambitions and activities he had encountered in the wider context of Rome. The same motives and aspirations can be found in a small town as in the great theatre of world events. It is obvious that this way of looking at history abstracts from the content and aims of human activity. Such sovereign disregard of the objective situation is particularly common among French and English writers, who describe their works as 'philosophical history'. Nevertheless, no fully formed intellect can fail to distinguish between impulses and inclinations which operate in a restricted sphere and those which are active in the conflict of interests of world history. This objective interest, which affects us both through the general design and through the individual who implements it, is what makes history attractive. Such designs and individuals are the ones whose downfall and destruction we most lament. When we contemplate the struggle of the Greeks against the Persians, or the momentous reign of Alexander, we are fully aware of where our interests lie: we wish to see the Greeks liberated from the barbarians, and feel concern for the preservation of the Greek state and for the ruler who subjugated Asia at the head of a Greek army. Let us imagine for a moment how we would feel if Alexander had failed in his [46] enterprise. We would certainly have no sense of loss if we were interested only in human passions, for we would still not have been denied the spectacle of passions in action. But this would not have satisfied us: for we are interested in the material itself, in the objective situation.

But what, we may ask, is the nature of the substantial end in which the spirit acquires its essential content? Our interest is of a substantial and determinate kind, and its object is some determinate religion, knowledge, or art. But how does the spirit acquire such a content, and where does this content come from? The empirical answer is simple. Each individual, at any given moment, finds himself committed to some essential interest of this kind; he exists in a particular country with a particular religion, and in a particular constellation of knowledge and attitudes concerning what is right and ethically acceptable. All that is left for him to do is to select particular aspects of it with which he wishes to identify himself. But when we realise that whole nations are occupied with such objects and immersed in such interests, we are once again faced with the problem of world history, whose content we are trying to define. The empirical approach is not adequate for our purposes, and we must pass on to the more specific question of how the spirit – i.e. the spirit as such, whether it is present in ourselves, in other individuals, or in nations as a whole – acquires such a content. We must define the content solely in terms of specific concepts. What has been discussed hitherto is part of our ordinary consciousness. But the concept to which we now turn is of a completely different order (although this is not the place for us to analyse it systematically). Philosophy is by no means ignorant of the popular conception, but has its own reasons for departing from it.

Our business here is to consider world history in relation to its ultimate end; this

ultimate end is the intention which underlies the world. We know that God is the most perfect being; he is therefore able to will only himself and that which is of the same nature as himself. God and the nature of the divine will are one and the same thing; it is what we call in philosophy the Idea. Thus it is the Idea in general which we have to consider, and particularly its operation within the medium of the human spirit; in more specific terms, it is the Idea of human freedom. The Idea reveals itself in its purest form in thought, and it is from this angle that logic approaches it. It expresses itself in another form in physical nature, and the third form which it assumes is that of spirit in the absolute sense.

But in the theatre in which we are about to witness its operations – i.e. the theatre of world history – the spirit attains its most concrete reality. [47] *Despite this – or rather precisely so that we may comprehend the general characteristics of the spirit in its concrete reality – we must begin with a few abstract definitions of its nature. I must also point out that these remarks cannot claim to be anything more than simple assertions, for this is not the time or place for a speculative exposition of the Idea of the spirit. It is more important that these deliberations should be presented in such a way as to suit the level of education and outlook which can be expected among the present audience. For anything that is said in an introduction should, as already remarked, be seen as purely historical, as a provisional assumption which has either been explained and demonstrated elsewhere, or which will at least be confirmed at a later stage in the course of the treatise itself*

a. [The determination[3] of spirit]

The first thing we must do is to define ***the abstract determination of spirit****. It must, however, be pointed out* that the spirit is not in itself abstract, for it is not an abstraction invented by man; on the contrary, it is entirely individual, active, and absolutely alive: it is consciousness, but it is also the object of consciousness – for it is in the nature[4] of the spirit to have itself as its object. The spirit, then, is capable of thought, and its thought is that of a being which itself exists, and which thinks that it exists and how it exists. It possesses knowledge: but knowledge is consciousness of a rational object. Besides, the spirit only has consciousness in so far as it is conscious of itself; in other words, I only know an object in so far as I know myself and my own determination through it, for whatever I am is also an object of my consciousness, and I am not just this, that or the other, but only what I know myself to be. I know my object, and I know myself; the two are inseparable. Thus the spirit forms a definite conception of itself and of its essential nature. It can only have a spiritual content; and its sole content and interest are spiritual. This, then, is how the spirit acquires a content: it does not find its content outside itself, but makes itself its own object and its own content. Knowledge is its form and function, but its content is the spiritual itself. Thus the spirit is by nature self-sufficient[5] or free.

The nature of spirit can best be understood if we contrast it with its direct opposite, which is matter. Just as gravity is the substance of matter, so also can it be said that freedom is the substance of spirit. It is immediately obvious to everyone that freedom is one of the various attributes of spirit; but philosophy teaches us that all the attributes of spirit exist [48] only by virtue of freedom, that all are merely means of attaining freedom, and that the sole object which they all seek and to whose realisation they all contribute is freedom. Speculative philosophy has shown that freedom is the one authentic property of spirit. Matter possesses gravity in so far as it is impelled to move towards a central point; it is essentially composite, and consists entirely of discrete parts which all tend towards a centre; thus matter has no unity. It is made up of separate elements and aspires to a condition of unity; it thus endeavours to overcome itself and seeks its own opposite. If it were to succeed, it would no longer be matter, but would have ceased to exist as such; it strives towards ideality, for unity is its ideal existence. Spirit, on the other hand, is such that its centre is within itself; it too strives towards its centre, but it has its centre within itself. Its unity is not something external; it always finds it within itself, and exists in itself and with itself. Matter has its substance outside itself; spirit, on the other hand, is self-sufficient being,[6] which is the same thing as freedom. For if I am dependent, I am beholden to something other than myself, and cannot exist without this external point of reference. If, however, I am self-sufficient,[7] I am also free.

When the spirit strives towards its centre, it strives to perfect its own freedom; and

[3] *Bestimmung*. This can also be translated as ‘definition’ or sometimes as ‘vocation’.

[4] *Dasein* (existence).

[5] *bei sich selbst*. Literally ‘with itself’, but Hegel uses the phrases *bei sich* or *bei sich selbst* to mean ‘relating only to oneself’.

[6] *Beisichselbstsein* (being with itself).

[7] *bei mir selbst* (with myself).

this striving is fundamental to its nature. To say that spirit exists would at first seem to imply that it is a completed entity. On the contrary, it is by nature active, and activity is its essence; it is its own product, and is therefore its own beginning and its own end. Its freedom does not consist in static being, but in a constant negation of all that threatens to destroy[8] freedom. The business of spirit is to produce itself, to make itself its own object, and to gain knowledge of itself; in this way, it exists for itself. Natural objects do not exist for themselves; for this reason, they are not free. The spirit produces and realises itself in the light of its knowledge of itself; it acts in such a way that all its knowledge of itself is also realised. Thus everything depends on the spirit's self-awareness; if the spirit knows that it is free, it is altogether different from what it would be without this knowledge. For if it does not know that it is free, it is in the position of a slave who is content with his slavery and does not know that his condition is an improper one. It is the sensation of freedom alone which makes the spirit free, although it is in fact always free in and for itself.

The most immediate knowledge spirit can have of itself when it assumes the shape of a human individual is that it is capable of feeling. It does [49] not as yet have an object, and the individual simply feels himself determined in some particular way. He then tries to distinguish between himself and this determinate quality, and sets about creating an internal division within himself. Thus, my feelings are split up into an external and an internal world. My determinate nature thereby enters a new phase, in that I have a feeling of deficiency or negativity; I encounter a contradiction within myself which threatens to destroy me. But I nevertheless my exist; this much I know, and I balance this knowledge against my feeling of negation or deficiency. I survive and seek to overcome[9] the deficiency, so that I am at the same time an impulse. The object towards which my impulse is directed is accordingly the means by which I can attain satisfaction and the restoration of my unity. All living things are endowed with impulses. We are therefore natural beings, and all our impulses are of a sensuous character. Objects, in so far as I am drawn to them by impulse, are means of integration, and this is the entire basis of theory and practice alike. But in our intuitions of the objects to which our impulses are drawn, we are dealing directly with externals and are ourselves external. Our intuitions are discrete units of a sensuous nature, and so also are our impulses, irrespective of their content. By this definition, man would be no different from the animals; for impulses are not conscious of themselves. But man has knowledge of himself, and this distinguishes him from the animals. He is a thinking being. Thought, however, is knowledge of universals, and it simplifies the content of experience, so that man too is simplified by it so as to become something inward and ideal. Or, to be more precise, this inwardness and simplicity is inherent in man, and the content of our experience only becomes universal and ideal if we proceed to simplify it.

What man is in reality, he must also be in ideality. Since he possesses ideal knowledge of reality, he ceases to be merely a natural being at the mercy of immediate intuitions and impulses which he must satisfy and perpetuate. This knowledge leads him to control his impulses; he places the ideal, the realm of thought, between the demands of the impulse and their satisfaction. In the animal, the two coincide; it cannot sever their connection by its own efforts – only pain or fear can do so. In man, the impulse is present before it is satisfied and independently of its satisfaction; in controlling or giving rein to his impulses, man acts in accordance with ends and determines himself in the light of a general principle. It is up to him to decide what end to follow; he can even make his end a completely universal one. In so doing, he is determined by whatever [50] conceptions he has formed of his own nature and volitions. It is this which constitutes man's independence: for he knows what it is that determines him. Thus he can take a simple concept as his end – for example, that of his own positive freedom. The conceptions of the animal are not ideal and have no true reality; it therefore lacks this inner independence. As a living creature, the animal too has its source of movement within itself. But it can only respond to those external stimuli to which it is already inwardly susceptible; anything that does not match its inner being simply does not exist for it. The animal is divided from itself and within itself. It cannot interpose anything between its impulse and the satisfaction of its impulse; it has no will, and cannot even attempt to control itself. Its activating impulses come from within itself, and their operation presupposes that they contain the means of their own fulfilment. Man, however, is not independent because he is the initiator of his own movement, but because he can restrain this movement and thereby master his spontaneity and natural constitution.

The fundamental characteristic of human nature is that man can think of himself as an ego. As a spirit, man does not have an immediate existence but is essentially turned in upon himself. This function of mediation is an essential moment of the spirit. Its activity consists in transcending and negating its immediate existence so

[8] *aufheben* (supersede).

[9] *aufzuheben* (to supersede).

as to turn in again upon itself; it has therefore made itself what it is by means of its own activity. Only if it is turned in upon itself can a subject have true reality. Spirit exists only as its own product. The example of the seed may help to illustrate this point. The plant begins with the seed, but the seed is also the product of the plant's entire life, for it develops only in order to produce the seed. We can see from this how impotent life is, for the seed is both the origin and the product of the individual; as the starting point and the end result, it is different and yet the same, the product of one individual and the beginning of another. Its two sides fall asunder like the simple form within the grain and the whole course of the plant's development.

Every individual has an example even closer to hand in the shape of his own person. Man can only fulfil himself through education and discipline; his immediate existence contains merely the possibility of self-realisation (i.e. of becoming rational and free) and simply imposes on him a vocation and obligation which he must himself fulfil. The animal's education is soon complete; but this should not be seen as a blessing bestowed on the animal by nature. Its growth is merely a quantitative increase in strength. Man, on the other hand, must realise his potential through his own efforts, and must first acquire everything for himself, [51] precisely because he is a spiritual being; in short, he must throw off all that is natural in him. Spirit, therefore, is the product of itself.

The most sublime example is to be found in the nature of God himself; strictly speaking, this is not a genuine example in the sense of one casual instance among others, but rather the universal truth itself, of which all other things are examples. It is true that the older religions also referred to God as a spirit; but this was no more than a name which could as yet contribute nothing towards explaining the nature of spirit. In the Jewish religion too, the spirit was at first conceived only in general terms. Christianity, however, contains a revelation of God's spiritual nature. In the first place, he is the Father, a power which is universal but as yet enclosed within itself. Secondly, he is his own object, another version of himself, dividing himself into two so as to produce the Son. But this other version is just as immediate an expression of him as he is himself; he knows himself and contemplates himself in it – and it is this self-knowledge and self-contemplation which constitutes the third element, the Spirit as such. In other words, the Spirit is the whole, and not just one or other of the elements in isolation. Or, to put it in terms of feeling, God is eternal love, whose nature is to treat the other as its own. It is this doctrine of the Trinity which raises Christianity above the other religions. If it did not have this doctrine, the other religions might well provide more material for thought than it does. The Trinity is the speculative part of Christianity, and it is through it that philosophy can discover the Idea of reason in the Christian religion too.

The essence of spirit, then, is self-consciousness. Let us now proceed to examine it more closely, and not just as it expresses itself in the individual human being. The spirit is essentially individual, but in the field of world history, we are not concerned with particulars and need not confine ourselves to individual instances or attempt to trace everything back to them. The spirit in history is an individual which is both universal in nature and at the same time determinate: in short, it is the nation in general, and the spirit we are concerned with is the spirit of the nation. But the spirits of nations differ in their own conceptions of themselves, in the relative superficiality or profundity with which they have comprehended and penetrated the nature of spirit. The right which governs the ethical existence of nations is the spirit's consciousness of itself; the nations are the concepts which the spirit has formed of itself. Thus it is the conception of the spirit which is realised in history. The [52] national consciousness varies according to the extent to which the spirit knows itself; and the ultimate phase of its consciousness, on which everything depends, is the recognition that man is free. The spirit's own consciousness must realise itself in the world; the material or soil in which it is realised is none other than the general consciousness, the consciousness of the nation. This consciousness encompasses and guides all the aims and interests of the nation, and it is on it that the nation's rights, customs, and religion depend. It is the substance which underlies the spirit of the nation, even if individual human beings are unaware of it and simply take its existence for granted. It is a form of necessity, for the individual is brought up within its atmosphere and does not know anything else. But it is not to be identified with education or with the results ‘ of education; for this consciousness emanates from the individual himself and is not instilled into him by others: the individual exists within this substance. This universal substance is not of a worldly nature and no worldly agency can successfully oppose it. No individual can transcend it, and although the individual may be able to distinguish between himself and others of his kind, he can make no such distinction between himself and the spirit of the nation. He may surpass many others in resourcefulness, but he cannot surpass the spirit of the nation. Only those who know the spirit of the nation and shape their actions in accordance with it can be described as truly resourceful.[10] They are the great ones of the nation; they lead it in accordance with

[10] *geistreich* (literally ‘rich in spirit’)

the dictates of the universal spirit. Thus, individuality falls outside our province, except in the case of those individuals who translate the will of the national spirit into reality. If we wish to treat history philosophically, we must avoid such expressions as this state would not have collapsed if there had been someone who...' etc. Individuals fade into insignificance beside the universal substance, and it creates for itself the individuals it requires to carry out its ends. But no individuals can prevent the preordained from happening.

On the one hand, the spirit of the nation is in essence particular, yet on the other, it is identical with the absolute universal spirit – for the latter is One. The world spirit is the spirit of the world as it reveals itself through the human consciousness; the relationship of men to it is that of single parts to the whole which is their substance. And this world spirit corresponds to the divine spirit, which is the absolute spirit. Since God is omnipresent, he is present in everyone and appears in everyone's [53] consciousness; and this is the world spirit. The particular spirit of a particular nation may perish; but it is a link in the chain of the world spirit's development, and this universal spirit cannot perish. The spirit of the nation is therefore the universal spirit in a particular form; the world spirit transcends this particular form, but it must assume it in so far as it exists, for it takes on a particular aspect as soon as it has actual being or existence. The particular character of the national spirit varies according to the kind of awareness of spirit it has attained. In everyday parlance, we say: 'This nation had such and such a conception of God, such and such a religion or system of justice, and such and such views on ethics.' We treat all these things as if they were external objects which a nation had in its possession. But we can tell even at a superficial glance that they are of a spiritual nature, so that the only kind of reality they can have is a spiritual one, i.e. through the spirit's consciousness of spirit.

But this, as already mentioned, is equivalent to self-consciousness, which can easily give rise to a misunderstanding, for I may wrongly imagine that, in the act of self-consciousness, it is my temporal individuality that I am conscious of. One of the difficulties of philosophy is that most people think it deals only with the particular and empirical existence of the individual. But spirit, in its consciousness of itself, is free; in this realisation, it has overcome the limits of temporal existence and enters into relationship with pure being, which is also its own being. If the divine being were not the essence of man and nature, it would not in fact be a being at all. Self-consciousness, then, is a philosophical concept, which can only attain its full determinate character in philosophical discourse. It we take this as established, we may further conclude that the determinate national consciousness is the nation's consciousness of its own being. The spirit is primarily its own object; but as long as it is this only in our eyes, and has not yet recognised itself in its object, it is not yet its own object in the true sense. Its ultimate aim, however, is the attainment of knowledge; for the sole endeavour of spirit is to know what it is in and for itself, and to reveal itself to itself in its true form. It seeks to create a spiritual world in accordance with its own concept, to fulfil and realise its own true nature, and to produce religion and the state in such a way that it will conform to its own concept and be truly itself or become its own Idea. (The Idea is the reality of the concept, of which it is merely a reflection or expression.) This, then, is the universal goal of the spirit and of history; and just as the seed bears within it the whole nature of the tree and the taste and form of its fruits, so also do the first glimmerings of spirit contain virtually the whole of history. [54]

Given this abstract definition, we can say that world history is the record of the spirit's efforts to attain knowledge of what it is in itself. The Orientals do not know that the spirit or man as such are free in themselves. And because they do not know this, they are not themselves free. They only know that One is free; but for this very reason, such freedom is mere arbitrariness, savagery, and brutal passion, or a milder and tamer version of this which is itself only an accident of nature, and equally arbitrary. This One is therefore merely a despot, not a free man and a human being. The consciousness of freedom first awoke among the Greeks, and they were accordingly free; but, like the Romans, they only knew that Some, and not all men as such, are free. Plato and Aristotle did not know this either; thus the Greeks not only had slaves, on which their life and the continued existence of their estimable freedom depended, but their very freedom itself was on the one hand only a fortuitous, undeveloped, transient, and limited efflorescence, and, on the other, a harsh servitude of all that is humane and proper to man. The Germanic nations, with the rise of Christianity, were the first to realise that man is by nature free, and that freedom of the spirit is his very essence. This consciousness first dawned in religion, in the innermost region of the spirit; but to incorporate the same principle into secular existence was a further problem, whose solution and application require long and arduous cultural exertions. For example, slavery did not immediately [come to an end] with the adoption of Christianity; still less did freedom at once predominate in states, or governments and constitutions become rationally organised and founded upon the principle of freedom. This application of the principle to secular affairs, the penetration and transformation of secular life by the principle of freedom, is the long process of which history itself [is made up].

I have already drawn attention to this distinction between the principle as such and its application – i.e. its introduction and execution in the actual world of the spirit and of life – and we shall return to it again shortly. It is one of the basic articles of philosophical science, and its vital importance must not be overlooked. The same distinction applies not only to the Christian principle of the self-consciousness of freedom which I have mentioned provisionally here, it applies just as essentially to the principle of freedom in general. World history is the progress of the consciousness of freedom – a progress whose necessity it is our business to comprehend.

These general remarks on the different degrees of knowledge of freedom – firstly, that of the Orientals, who knew only that One is free, then that of the Greek and Roman world, which knew that Some are free, and finally, our own knowledge that All men as such are free, and that man is by [55] *nature free – supply us with the divisions we shall observe in our survey of world history and which will help us to organise our discussion of it. But these are only provisional remarks thrown out in passing; several other concepts must first be explained.*

The spirit's consciousness of its freedom (which is the precondition of the reality[11] of this **freedom**) has been defined as spiritual reason in its determinate form, hence as the destiny of the spiritual world, and – since the latter is the substantial world and the physical world [is] subordinated to it (or, in speculative terminology, has no truth in comparison with it) – as the ultimate end of the world in general. But that this freedom, as defined above, still remains an indefinite term which is capable of infinite interpretations, and that, since it is the highest concept of all, it is open to an infinite number of misunderstandings, confusions, and errors and covers every possible kind of extravagance – all this has never been known and experienced so fully as in the present age; but we must make do for the moment with this general definition. We have also stressed the importance of the infinite difference between the principle – i.e. that which exists only in itself – and its realisation. For freedom in itself carries with it the infinite necessity of attaining consciousness – for freedom, by definition, is self-knowledge – and hence of realising itself: it is itself the end of its own operations, and the sole end of the spirit.

The substance of the spirit is freedom. From this, we can infer that its end in the historical process is the freedom of the subject to follow its own conscience and morality, and to pursue and implement its own universal ends; it also implies that the subject has infinite value and that it must become conscious of its supremacy. The end of the world spirit is realised in substance through the freedom of each individual.

The spirits of the nations are the links in the process whereby the spirit arrives at free recognition of itself. Nations, however, exist for themselves – for we are not concerned here with spirit in itself – and as such, they have a natural existence. In so far as they are nations, their principles are natural ones; and since their principles differ, the nations themselves are also naturally different. Each has its own principle which it seeks to realise as its end; if it has attained this end, it has no further task to perform in the world.

The spirit of a nation should thus be seen as the development of a principle; this principle is at first bound up with an indistinct impulse which gradually works its way out and seeks to attain objective reality. A natural spirit of this kind is a determinate spirit, a concrete whole; it must gain recognition in its determinate form. Since it is a spirit, it can [56] only be understood in spiritual terms, by means of thought, and it is we who understand it in this way; the next step is for the national spirit to understand itself in turn by the same means. We must therefore examine the determinate concept or principle of the spirit in question. This principle is extremely rich in content, and it assumes many forms in the course of its development; for the spirit is living and active, and is concerned only with its own productions. The spirit, as it advances towards its realisation, towards self-satisfaction and self-knowledge, is the sole motive force behind all the deeds and aspirations of the nation. Religion, knowledge, the arts, and the destinies and events of history are all aspects of its evolution. This, and not the natural influences at work upon it (as the derivation of the word *natio* from *nasci* might suggest), determines the nation's character. In its active operations, the national spirit at first knows only the ends of its determinate reality, but not its own nature. But it is nevertheless endowed with an impulse to formulate its thoughts. Its supreme activity is thought, so that when it reaches the height of its powers, its aim is to comprehend itself. The ultimate aim of the spirit is to know itself, and to comprehend itself not merely intuitively but also in terms of thought. It must and will succeed in its task; but this very success is also its downfall, and this in turn heralds the emergence of a new phase and a new spirit. The individual national spirit fulfils itself by merging with the principle of another nation, so that we can observe a progression, growth and succession from one national principle to

[11] *Wirklichkeit* (actuality).

another. The task of philosophical world history is to discover the continuity within this movement.

The abstract mode of the development of the national spirit consists simply in the temporal process as perceived by the senses, which is the primary activity of the spirit; the more concrete process, however, is that of its spiritual activity. A nation makes internal advances; it develops further and is ultimately destroyed. The appropriate categories here are those of cultural development,[12] over-refinement, and degeneration; the latter can be either the product or the cause of the nation's downfall. But the word 'culture' tells us nothing definite about the substantial content of the national spirit; it is a formal category, and is always construed in terms of universal properties. A cultured man is one who [57] knows how to impress the stamp of universality upon all his actions, who has renounced his particularity, and who acts in accordance with universal principles. Culture is the form of our thinking; it owes its existence to man's ability to control himself, and to the fact that he does not merely follow his desires and inclinations but subjects himself to a discipline. – He thereby grants his object a position of independence, and habitually adopts a theoretical attitude. He is also in the habit of treating the various aspects of his object separately, of analysing the situation before him, of isolating individual aspects of it and abstracting from them, thereby directly conferring the imprint of universality upon them all. The cultured individual recognises the different facets of objects; all of them are present to him, and his fully developed powers of reflection have invested them with the form of universality. In his behaviour, too, he takes them all into account. The uncultured individual, on the other hand, may grasp the main point and at the same time inadvertently do violence to half a dozen others. But the cultured man takes in all the different aspects, and thus acts in a concrete manner; he is accustomed to act in the light of universal perspectives and ends. Culture can therefore be defined quite simply as the imposition of a universal quality upon a given content.

Since the development of spirit is the process which gives rise to culture, it must now be explained in more concrete terms. The universal property of spirit is that it actualises those determinants which it possesses in itself. This can also be interpreted in a subjective sense, in which case we call what the spirit is in itself its disposition; and when this disposition has been actualised, we speak instead of its qualities or abilities. In the latter case, the end product itself is also understood in a subjective sense. In history, however, it assumes the form of an object, deed, or work produced by the spirit. The national spirit is knowledge, and thought acts upon the reality of the national spirit in such a way that it knows its own work as something objective, and no longer merely as something subjective. We should note in connection with these determinations of the spirit that a distinction is often made between man's inner nature and his deeds. This does not apply in history; the man himself is the sum total of his deeds. One might imagine a case in which a person's intentions were excellent even though his actual deeds were worthless. And individual instances can certainly occur in which people conceal their real attitudes; but this is not the whole picture. The truth is that there is no difference between the inner and the outer. In history especially, there is no need to waste time puzzling over temporary differences [58] between them. The character of the nation is that of its deeds, for the deeds represent the end it pursues.

The spirit's acts are of an essential nature; it makes itself in reality what it already is in itself, and is therefore its own deed or creation. In this way, it becomes its own object, and has its own existence before it. And it is the same with the spirit of a nation; its activity consists in making itself into an actual world which also has an existence in space. Its religion, ritual, ethics, customs, art, constitution, and political laws – indeed the whole range of its institutions, events, and deeds – all this is its own creation, and it is this which makes the nation what it is. Every nation feels this to be so. And then the individual finds his nation already in being, as a complete and firmly established world to which he must become assimilated. He must take over its substantial being as his own, so that his outlook and abilities are in accord with it, in order that he may himself become something in turn. The product is already there, and it is up to the individuals to adapt themselves to it and conform to it. If we examine a nation in its formative period, we find that its actions are calculated to further the end of its spirit; we describe it as moral, virtuous, and vigorous, because its actions are governed by the inner will of its spirit and it is also prepared, in its struggle to objectivise itself, to defend its achievements against external aggression. At this stage, the individuals are not yet separated from the whole, for this separation does not take place until later, when the period of reflection begins. Once the nation has created itself, the dichotomy between its essence (or what it is in itself) and its real existence is overcome, and it has attained satisfaction: it has created its own world out of its inner essence. The spirit now indulges itself in the world it has created.

The next stage begins after the spirit has attained its object. It is no longer aroused

[12] 'Cultural development' here translates *Bildung* (formation, education).

to activity, and its substantial soul is inactive. Its actions are now only remotely connected with its highest interests. I am interested in something only in so far as it is still out of my reach, or is necessary to some purpose which I have not yet fulfilled. Thus when a nation is fully developed and has attained its end, its profounder interests evaporate. The national spirit is a natural individual, and as such, it blossoms, grows strong, then fades away and dies. It lies in the nature of finite things that any limited spirit is ephemeral. Since it is a living thing, its business is to bring forth, to produce, and to realise itself. This involves an opposition in so far as reality does not match its concept, or in so far as its inner concept has not yet become conscious of itself. But as soon as the spirit has given itself an objective life, or as soon as it has fully worked out its [59] concept and put it into practice completely, it reaches a stage of self-indulgence which is no longer activity but an unrestrained self-abandon. The period in which the spirit is still active is that of the nation's youth, the finest stage in its development; during this period, individuals feel impelled to preserve their fatherland and to implement their nation's end. When this is accomplished, life becomes a thing of habit; and just as man languishes through routine existence, so also does the national spirit through self-indulgence. When the spirit of the nation has fulfilled its function, its agility and interest flag; the nation lives on the borderline between manhood and old age, and enjoys the fruits of its efforts. Measures have been taken to satisfy the needs and wants of the past, and these have now ceased to exist. Then the measures themselves can be dispensed with in turn, and the present has no further needs left to satisfy. It may also be that the nation has relinquished certain aspects of its end and contented itself with more limited aims. Even if its imagination transcended these limits, it nevertheless abandoned its wider objectives if no opportunity of realising them presented itself, and restricted itself to what reality permitted. It then lives on with the satisfaction of having achieved its end, falls into fixed habits which are now devoid of life, and thus moves gradually on towards its natural death. It may still have much to do in war and in peace, and in internal and external affairs, for it may continue to vegetate over a long period. It still has movement; but this movement is only occasioned by the particular interests of individuals, and no longer by the interest of the nation itself. Its greatest and highest interest has vanished out of its life; for no interest is possible without some kind of opposition.

The natural death of the national spirit may take the form of political stagnation, or of what we call habit. The clock is wound up and runs on automatically. Habit is an activity with nothing to oppose it; it retains only the formal property of temporal continuity, and the depth and richness of its end need no longer be expressed. It is, so to speak, a superficial and sensuous kind of existence whose profounder significance has been forgotten. Thus both individuals and nations die a natural death. And even if the latter live on, their existence is devoid of life and interest; their institutions have become superfluous, because the needs which created them have been satisfied, and nothing remains but political stagnation and boredom. The negative element no longer assumes the form of dissension and conflict; this was the case with the old German Imperial Cities, for example, which lost their independence through no fault of their own and without realising what had befallen them. In a moribund [60] state such as this, a nation may even prosper, although it no longer participates in the life of the Idea. It then serves as material for a higher principle, and becomes the province of another nation in which a higher principle is active. But the principle with which a nation is endowed has a real existence; even if it dies through habit, it still retains its spiritual nature and thus cannot be extinguished altogether, but moves on into a higher existence. The transience of everything may well distress us, but in a profounder sense, we realise that it is necessary in relation to the higher Idea of the spirit. For the spirit is such that it has to employ means of this kind to fulfil its absolute end, and this knowledge must reconcile us to the transient side of its existence.

The individual national spirit is subject to transience. It perishes, loses its world-historical significance, and ceases to be the bearer of the highest concept the spirit has formed of itself. For the nation whose concept of the spirit is highest is in tune with the times and rules over the others. It may well be that nations whose concepts are less advanced survive, but they exist only on the periphery of world history.

But since the nation is a universal, a collective, a further determinant comes into play. As a collective, the national spirit exists for itself; this also means that the universal aspect of its existence may assume a role of opposition. Its negative side manifests itself; thought rises above the nation's immediate functions. And thus its natural death also appears as a kind of suicide. Thus we see on the one hand how the national spirit brings about its own downfall. The phenomenon of national degeneration in fact takes on various forms. It may break out from within as appetites are unleashed, with individuals pursuing their own satisfaction to the detriment of the substantial spirit, which consequently disintegrates. Individual interests seize control of the powers and resources which were formerly dedicated to the whole. In this case, the negative side manifests itself as an internal degeneration, as a tendency towards particularism. It is usually associated with some external force which deprives the nation of its sovereignty, so that it ceases to

exist as such. But this external force belongs only to the phenomenal world; no destructive force can prevail against the national spirit or within it unless it is already internally lifeless or dead.

But there is a further category beyond that of transience, for death is followed by new life. One might think in this context of life in the natural world, in which buds wither and fall and new ones take their place. But this is not the case in the spiritual world. The tree lives perennially, puts forth shoots, leaves, and blossoms, and produces fruit, and thus always [61] starts again from the beginning. The annual plant does not survive its fruition, and although the tree can live for many decades, it too eventually dies. The reawakening of nature is merely the repetition of one and the same process; it is a tedious chronicle in which the same cycle recurs again and again. There is nothing new under the sun. But this is not so with the sun of the spirit. Its movement and progression do not repeat themselves, for the changing aspect of the spirit as it passes through endlessly varying forms is essentially progress. This progress is evident even when the national spirit destroys itself by the negativity of its thought, because its knowledge, its thinking apprehension of being, is the source and matrix from which a new form – and indeed a higher form, whose principle both conserves and transfigures it – emerges. For thought is of a universal and collective nature, so that it cannot die, but always retains its identity. Each determinate form which the spirit assumes does not simply fade away naturally with the passage of time, but is preserved[13] in the self-determining, self-conscious activity of the self-consciousness. Since this preservation is an activity of thought, it is both a conservation and a transfiguration. Thus while the spirit on the one hand preserves the reality and continuity of its own nature, it is at the same time enriched by the essence, the thought, the universal aspect of what was formerly its mere existence. Its principle is no longer the immediate content and end of its former existence, but their underlying essence.

As we trace the passage of one national spirit into the other, we should note that the universal spirit as such does not die; it dies only in its capacity as a national spirit. As a national spirit, it belongs to world history, and its task is to attain knowledge of its own function and to comprehend itself by means of thought. This thought or reflection eventually ceases to respect its immediate existence, for it realises that the principle behind it is a particular one; and as a result, the subjective spirit becomes divorced from the universal spirit. Individuals withdraw into themselves and pursue their own ends, and this, as already remarked, is the nation's undoing: each individual sets himself his own ends as his passions dictate. But as the spirit withdraws into itself, thought emerges as a reality in its own right, and the learned disciplines flourish. Thus learning and the degeneration or downfall of a nation always go hand in hand.

But at the same time, a new and higher principle emerges. Division contains and carries with it the need for unification, because the spirit is [62] itself one. It is a living thing, and is powerful enough to create the unity it requires. The opposition or contradiction between the spirit and the lower principle gives rise to a higher factor. For example, when their culture was at its height, the Greeks, for all the untroubled serenity of their manners, had no concept of universal freedom; they did have their *kathekon* their idea of propriety, but they had no real morality or conscience. Morality, which rests on a reflexive movement of the spirit, a turning in of the spirit upon itself, did not yet exist; it dates only from the time of **Socrates**. But as soon as reflection supervened and individuals withdrew into themselves and dissociated themselves from established custom to live their own lives according to their own wishes, degeneration and contradiction arose. But the spirit cannot remain in a state of opposition. It seeks unification, and in this unification lies the higher principle. History is the process whereby the spirit discovers itself and its own concept. Thus division contains within it the higher principle of consciousness; but this higher principle also has another side to it which does not enter the consciousness at all. For there can be no consciousness of opposition until the principle of personal freedom is already present.

The result of this process is therefore that the spirit, as it objectivises itself and becomes aware of its objective being, destroys the determinate aspect of its being on the one hand and comprehends its universal aspect on the other, thereby giving its principle a new determination. This means that the substantial determination of the national spirit has altered, or to put it differently, that its principle has been absorbed into another and higher principle.

If we seek to understand history and to comprehend it by means of philosophy, the most important and distinctive feature of the whole undertaking – indeed its very essence – is that we should discover and recognise this idea of transition. The individual goes through various stages of development as a single unit and retains his individual identity; so too does the nation, at least up to the point at which its spirit enters its universal phase. We can see in this the inner or conceptual necessity by which such changes are governed. But, as already mentioned, the impotence of

[13] (Here and below) *aufgehoben*, i.e. superseded.

life is evident from the fact that its beginning and its end do not coincide. And this applies both to the life of individuals and to that of nations. The determinate national spirit is but a single individual in the course of world history. The life of the nation brings a fruit to maturity, for its activity is directed towards the fulfilment of its principle. This fruit does not, however, fall back into the womb from which it emerged; the nation itself is not permitted to enjoy it, but must taste it instead in the [63] form of a bitter draught. It cannot refuse to drink it, for it has an infinite thirst for it, but the price of its satisfaction is its own annihilation (although it also heralds the birth of a new principle). The fruit again becomes the seed, but the seed of another nation, which it brings to maturity in turn.

The spirit is essentially the product of its own activity, and its activity consists in transcending and negating its immediacy and turning in upon itself.

The spirit is free; and the aim of the world spirit in world history is to realise its essence and to obtain the prerogative of freedom. Its activity is that of knowing and recognising itself, but it accomplishes this in gradual stages rather than at a single step. Each new individual national spirit represents a new stage in the conquering march of the world spirit as it wins its way to consciousness and freedom. The death of a national spirit is a transition to new life, but not as in nature, where the death of one individual gives life to another individual of the same kind. On the contrary, the world spirit progresses from lower determinations to higher principles and concepts of its own nature, to more fully developed expressions of its Idea.

The question at issue is therefore the ultimate end of mankind, the end which the spirit sets itself in the world, and which it is driven to realise incessantly and with irresistible power. The more specific implications of this ultimate end follow on from what has already been said with regard to the national spirit. We have seen that the spirit cannot be concerned with anything other than itself. Nothing is higher than the spirit, and nothing is more worthy of being its object. It cannot rest or occupy itself with anything else until it knows its own nature. This thought, which we have specified as the highest and only interest of the spirit, is, of course, of a general and abstract nature, and there is a wide gulf between it and that which constitutes the interests of nations and individuals as we observe them in history. On the empirical level, we see specific ends and particular interests with which nations have been occupied for centuries. We need only think, for example, of the antagonism between Rome and Carthage. And knowing these empirical phenomena is a far cry from recognising in them that process of thought which, as already said, constitutes their essential interest. We shall not discuss until later the opposition between the immediately obvious interests of the spirit and its absolute interest as specified above. At least it is not difficult to grasp the general significance of the idea that the relationship of the free spirit to itself is a necessary one, precisely because it is a free spirit; otherwise it [64] would not be free at all but dependent. We have defined the goal of history as consisting in the spirit's development towards self-consciousness, or in its making the world conform to itself (for the two are identical). It might equally be said that the spirit produces its concept out of itself, objectivises it, and thus becomes the being of its own concept; it becomes conscious of itself in the objective world so that it may attain its salvation: for as soon as the objective world conforms to its internal requirements, it has realised its freedom.[14]When it has determined its own end in this way, its progress takes on a more definite character in that it no longer consists of a mere increase in quantity. It may also be added that, even on the evidence of our own ordinary consciousness, we must acknowledge that the consciousness must undergo various stages of development before it becomes aware of its own essential nature.

The aim of world history, therefore, is that the spirit should attain knowledge of its own true nature, that it should objectivise this knowledge and transform it into a real world, and give itself an objective existence. The essential point to note is that this aim is itself a product of the spirit. The spirit is not a natural entity like an animal, for the animal is no more than its immediate existence. The spirit is such that it produces itself and makes itself what it is. Thus the first form it assumes in its real existence is the outcome of its own activity. Its essential being is actuosity, not static existence, for it has produced itself, it has come to exist for itself, and made itself what it is by its own agency. It can only be said to have a true existence if it has produced itself, and its essential being is process in the absolute sense. This process, in which it mediates itself with itself by its own unaided efforts, has various distinct moments; it is full of movement and change, and is determined in different ways at different times. It consists essentially of a series of separate stages, and world history is the expression of the divine process which is a graduated progression in which the spirit comes to know and realise itself and its own truth. Its various stages are stages in the self-recognition of the spirit; and the essence of the spirit, its supreme imperative, is that it should recognise, know, and realise itself for what it is. It accomplishes this end in the history of the world; it produces itself in a series of determinate forms, and these forms are the nations of world history. Each of them represents a particular stage of development, so that

[14] *da eben is Freiheit* (even there is freedom).

they correspond to epochs in the history of the world. Or on a more fundamental level, they are the principles in which the spirit has discovered itself, and which it is impelled to realise. There is therefore an essential connection between them in which the nature of the spirit alone is expressed. [65]

World history is the expression of the divine and absolute process of the spirit in its highest forms, of the progression whereby it discovers its true nature and becomes conscious of itself. The specific forms it assumes at each of these stages are the national spirits of world history, with all the determinate characteristics of their life, their constitutions, their art, their religion, and their knowledge. The world spirit has an infinite urge and an irresistible impulse to realise these stages of its development; for this sequence and its realisation are its true concept. World history merely shows how the spirit gradually attains consciousness and the will to truth; it progresses from its early glimmerings to major discoveries and finally to a state of complete consciousness. We have already discussed the ultimate end of this process. The principles of the national spirits in their necessary progression are themselves only moments of the one universal spirit, which ascends through them in the course of history to its consummation in an all-embracing **totality**.

[…]

> [Section (b) 'The means of its realisation' (omitted) is on the 'means' that Spirit uses realise its own freedom and rationality. The gist of the section is that these means are human individuals, who act so as to gradually realise freedom and rationality in the world because at root they are motivated by a (mainly unconscious) urge towards this freedom and rationality. – AC]

c. [The material of its realisation]

The third point to be considered is the nature of the end to be realised by these means, in other words, the form it assumes in reality. We have spoken hitherto of means, but in the realisation of a subjective and finite end we must also take account of the material which is available or which has to be procured in order that the end may be realised. The question we must answer is accordingly this: what is the material in which the ultimate end of reason is realised?

The changes in historical existence presuppose a medium within which such changes occur. But as we have seen, it is the subjective will which implements them. Thus, in this case too, the first part of our answer is once again the subject itself, the needs of men, and the realm of subjectivity in general. The rational attains existence within the medium of human knowledge and volition. We have seen how the subjective will has an end which represents the truth of a reality (in so far as it embodies some great passion of world-historical significance). When its passions are limited, however, the subjective will is dependent, and it can only satisfy its particular ends within this position of dependence. But as already pointed out, it too has a substantial life, a reality in which it moves as in its essential being, and which constitutes the aim of its existence. This essential being, the unity of the subjective will and the universal, is the ethical whole; its concrete manifestation is the state. The state is the reality within which the individual has and enjoys his freedom, but only in so far as he knows, believes in, and wills the universal. This, then, is the focal point of all the other concrete aspects of the spirit such as justice, art, ethics, and the amenities of existence. Within the state, freedom becomes its own object and achieves its positive realisation. But this does not mean that the subjective will of the individual is implemented and satisfied through the universal will, and that the latter is merely a means to the end of the former. Nor is the universal will merely a community of human beings within which the freedom of all individuals [94] has to be limited. To imagine that freedom is such that the individual subject, in its co-existence with other subjects, must limit its freedom in such a way that this collective restriction, the mutual constraint of all, leaves everyone a limited area in which to act as he pleases, is to interpret freedom in purely negative terms; on the contrary, justice, ethical life , and the state, and these alone, are the positive realisation and satisfaction of freedom. The random inclinations of individuals are not the same thing as freedom. That kind of freedom on which restrictions are imposed is mere arbitrariness, which exists solely in relation to particular needs.

Only in the state does man have a rational existence. The aim of all education is to ensure that the individual does not remain purely subjective but attains an objective existence within the state. The individual can certainly make the state into a means of attaining this or that end. But the truth is realised only in so far as each individual wills the universal cause itself and has discarded all that is inessential. Man owes his entire existence to the state, and has his being within it alone. Whatever worth and spiritual reality he possesses are his solely by virtue of the state. For as a knowing being, he has spiritual reality only in so far as his being, i.e. the rational itself, is his object and possesses objective and immediate existence for him; only as such does he possess consciousness and exist in an ethical world, within the legal and ethical life of the state. For the truth is the unity of the universal and the subjective will, and the universal is present within the state, in its

laws and in its universal and rational properties.

The subjective will – or passion – is the activating and realising principle; the Idea is the inner essence, and the state is the reality of ethical life in the present. For the state is the unity of the universal, essential will and the will of-the-subject, and it is this which constitutes ethical-life. The individual who lives within this unity has an ethical

existence, and his value consists solely in this substantiality. Sophocles' Antigone says: ' The divine commands are not of yesterday, nor of today; no, they live eternally, and no one could say whence they came.' The laws of ethics are not contingent, for they are the rational itself. The aim of the state is that the substance which underlies the real activity and dispositions of men should be recognised and made manifest, and that it should ensure its own continuity. The absolute interest of reason requires that this ethical whole should be present; and it is from this interest of reason that the justification and merit of those heroes who have founded states – however primitive the latter may have been – are derived. The state does not exist for the sake of the citizens; it might rather be said [95] that the state is the end, and the citizens are its instruments. But this relation of end and means is not at all appropriate in the present context. For the state is not an abstraction which stands in opposition to the citizens; on the contrary, they are distinct moments like those of organic life, in which no one member is either a means or an end. The divine principle in the state is the Idea made manifest on earth.

The essence of the state is ethical life. This consists in the unity of the universal and the subjective will. The will is activity, and within the subjective will, it encounters its opposite in the external world. The principle of the will is that of being for itself; but this entails exclusivity and limitation. It is often said that man is unlimited in his will and limited in his thought, although quite the reverse is true. But if we take the will in its essential being in and for itself, we must conceive of it as liberated from its opposition to the external world, and as completely universal in this respect too. Thus, the will is a power in its own right and the essence of universal power in both nature and the spirit. We may choose to think of this essential being as 'the Lord', the Lord of nature and of the spirit. The Lord as a subject, however, is merely one entity as against other entities. But the absolute power is not Lord over other things, but Lord over itself, reflection within itself, or personality. This inward reflection is simple self-relatedness with an existence of its own; for power, thus internally reflected, is immediate reality. But this is equivalent to knowledge, or, more precisely, to the bearer of knowledge – in other words, to human individuality. The universal spirit is essentially present as human consciousness. Knowledge attains existence and being for itself in man. The spirit knows itself and exists for itself as a subject, and its nature is to posit itself as immediate existence: as such, it is equivalent to human consciousness.

It is customary to act in accordance with the universal will and to make one's aim a universal one which is recognised within the state. Even in primitive states the will is subordinated to another will, although this does not mean that the individual has no will of his own, but only that his particular will has no authority. The whims and fancies of individuals are not taken into account; even in primitive political conditions, the particular aspects of the will are disregarded, and the universal will is alone essential. The particular will is at least suppressed, and it accordingly turns in upon itself. This is the first necessary moment in the existence of the universal – the element of knowledge and thought which emerges at this point within the state. Only in this environment, i.e. within the state, can art and religion exist. The nations we are concerned with here have [96] acquired a rational internal organisation, and world history takes account only of those nations which have formed themselves into states. But we must not imagine that this can occur on a desert island or in a completely isolated community. It is certainly true that all great men have developed in solitude, but they have done so only by assimilating to their own ends what the state had already created. The universal must be more than just the opinions of individuals. It must have an existence of its own, and as such, it is to be found in the state itself in the shape of all that is generally recognised. In the state, the internal becomes reality. Reality, of course, is outwardly varied, but in this case, we are considering its universal qualities.

The universal Idea attains phenomenal reality in the state. As regards the expression phenomenal, it should be noted that its meaning in the present context is not the same as in everyday thinking. In everyday usage, we distinguish between forces and phenomena, as if the former were essential and the latter inessential and external. But even the category of force does not contain a concrete determination. In the case of the spirit or concrete concept, however, the phenomenon itself is the essential. The differentiation of spirit is the work of the spirit itself, and it is the product of its own activity. Man, too, is his own product; he is the sum total of his own deeds, and has made himself what he is. Spirit, therefore, is essentially, energy, so that it is impossible in this case to abstract from the phenomenon itself. The phenomenal aspect of the spirit is its self-determination, which is the element of its concrete nature: the spirit which does not determine itself is merely an

abstraction of the understanding.[15] The self-determination of the spirit is its phenomenal aspect, which we have to consider here in the shape of states and individuals.

The spiritual individual, the nation – in so far as it is internally differentiated so as to form an organic whole – is what we call the state. This term is ambiguous, however, for the state and the laws of the state, as distinct from religion, science, and art, usually have purely political associations. But in this context, the word 'state' is used in a more comprehensive sense, just as we use the word 'realm' to describe spiritual phenomena. A nation should therefore be regarded as a spiritual individual, and it is not primarily its external side that will be emphasised here, but rather what we have previously called the spirit of the nation, i.e. its self-consciousness in relation to its own truth and being, and what it recognises as truth in the absolute sense – in short, those spiritual powers which live within the nation and rule over it. The universal which emerges and becomes conscious within the state, the form to which everything [97] in it is assimilated, is what we call in general the nation's culture. But the determinate content which this universal form acquires and which is contained in the concrete reality which constitutes the state is the national spirit itself. The real state is animated by this spirit in all its particular transactions, wars, institutions, etc. This spiritual content is a firm and solid nucleus which is completely removed from the world of arbitrariness, particularities, caprices, individuality, and contingency; whatever is subject to the latter is not part of the nation's character: it is like the dust which blows over a town or a field or hangs above it without changing it in any essential way. Besides, this spiritual content is the essential being of each individual, as well as constituting the spirit of the nation. It is the sacred bond which links men and spirits together. It remains one and the same life, one great object, one great end, and one great content, on which all private happiness and all private volition depend.

Thus, the state is the more specific object of world history in general, in which freedom attains its objectivity and enjoys the fruits of this objectivity. For the law is the objectivity of the spirit, and the will in its true expression; and only that will which obeys the law is free: for it obeys itself and is self-sufficient[16] and therefore free. When the state or fatherland constitutes a community of existence, and when the subjective will of men subordinates itself to laws, the opposition between freedom and necessity disappears. The rational, as the substance of things, is necessary, and we are free in so far as we recognise it as law and follow it as the substance of our own being; the objective and the subjective will are then reconciled, forming a single, undivided whole. For the ethical character of the state is not that of individual morality, which is a product of reflection and subject to personal conviction; reflective morality is more accessible to the modern world, whereas the true ethics of antiquity are rooted in the fact that everyone adhered to his prescribed duty. An Athenian citizen did virtually by instinct what was expected of him; if I reflect on the object of my activity, however, I must be conscious that my will has assented to it. But ethical-life is duty, the substantial right, or second nature (as it has justly been called); for man's first nature is his immediate animal existence.

The nature of the state has now been described. We have also seen that, in present-day theories, various misconceptions concerning the state are prevalent. These have acquired the status of established truths, and have become fixed prejudices. We will cite only a few of them here, with particular reference to those which have some relationship to the aim of our study of history. [98]

The first fallacy we encounter stands in direct contradiction to our conception of the state as the realisation of freedom. According to the view in question, man is by nature free, but in society and the state – which he must of necessity enter – he must limit this natural freedom. That man is by nature free is perfectly true in the sense that he is free by the inherent concept of his nature,[17] *but only in relation to his destiny*[18]*, i.e. to what he is in himself; for it must be acknowledged that the nature*[19] *of an object is equivalent to its inherent concept*[20]*. But the above proposition is also supposed to provide information regarding man's natural and immediate mode of existence. In this way, a state of nature is postulated in which man is allegedly in full possession of his natural rights, with unrestricted exercise*

[15] *des Verstands*. By *der Verstand* (the understanding) Hegel means a way of thinking that analyses everything into fixed and isolated units, and so cannot grasp the nature of an organic whole. He calls the kind of thinking which can do that *die Vernunft* (reason).

[16] *bei sich selbst*.

[17] *seinem Begriff* (with regard to his concept)

[18] *Bestimmung* (determination).

[19] *Natur*.

[20] Here and in the next paragraph 'inherent concept' is used to translate *Begriff* (concept).

and enjoyment of his freedom. This assumption does not exactly claim the status of historical fact – and if it did seriously make such pretensions, it would be difficult to show that such a condition actually existed either in the present or at any time in the past. States of savagery can certainly be encountered, but they are obviously associated with brutal passions and deeds of violence; and no matter how primitive they are, they are also accompanied by social institutions which – to use the common expression – impose restrictions on freedom. This assumption is one of those nebulous constructions which theory produces as a necessary consequence of its operations, and to which it then attributes a real existence without seeking any historical justification for doing so.

It is customary to present history as beginning with a state of nature or state of innocence. But according to our present conception of the spirit, its initial condition is not a state of freedom at all but a state in which the spirit as such has no reality[21]. The opposite view is based on a misunderstanding. If the word ' nature' denotes the being[22] or concept of a thing, then the state of nature or the law of nature[23] is that state or law which is appropriate to man by virtue of his inherent concept and of the inherent concept of spirit. But this must not be confused with what the spirit is in its natural condition; for the latter is a condition of servitude in which man lives by the intuitions of his senses: *Exeundum est e statu naturae*[24] (Spinoza). We shall therefore not begin with those traditions which tell of man's original condition (the Mosaic tradition, for example), but will touch on them only at that point of time at which the prophecies they embodied were fulfilled. For only then do the latter have a historical existence; before that time, they had not yet become part of their national cultures.

States of nature as we encounter them in empirical existence do indeed conform to the concept of a purely natural state. Freedom as the ideal condition of what is as yet purely immediate and natural does not itself possess an [99] *immediate and natural existence. It still has to be earned and won through the endless mediation of discipline acting upon the powers of cognition and will. For this reason, the state of nature is rather a state of injustice, of violence, of uncontrolled natural impulses, and of inhuman deeds and emotions. It does involve some restrictions imposed by society and the state, but such restrictions are imposed only on those brutal emotions and crude impulses already referred to, on reflected inclinations, on the needs which arise with the progress of culture, and on arbitrariness and passion. Restrictions of this kind are part of that process of mediation whereby the consciousness of freedom and the will to realise it in its true (i.e. rational and essential) form are engendered. The concept of freedom is such that justice and ethical life are inseparable from it, and these are universal essences, objects, and aims which exist in and for themselves, which can be discovered only through the activity of thought (as it distinguishes itself from the realm of the senses and develops itself in opposition to the latter), and which must in turn be assimilated and incorporated into the (primarily sensuous) will in defiance of its own inclinations. To regard freedom in a purely formal and subjective sense, abstracted from its absolutely essential objects and aims, is a perennial misunderstanding; for it means that impulses, desires, and passions which pertain by their nature exclusively to the particular individual – and arbitrariness and random-inclinations are identified with freedom, and that any restrictions imposed upon these are seen as restrictions on freedom itself. On the contrary, such restrictions are the indispensable conditions of liberation;*[25] *and society and the state are the only situations in which freedom can be realised.*

[…]

d. [Its reality[26]]

[…]

The essential determination of the constitution amidst all the various aspects of political life can be expressed in the following proposition: the best state is that in which the greatest degree of freedom prevails. But this raises the question of what constitutes the reality of freedom. Freedom is usually thought of as a state in which the subjective will of all individuals is involved in the most important affairs of the state. In this case, the subjective will is regarded as the ultimate and decisive factor. But the nature of the state is the unity of the objective and the universal will, and the subjective will is raised to the point at which it renounces its particularity. The

[21] *nicht wirklich ist* (is not actual).

[22] *Wesen* (essence).

[23] *Naturrecht* (natural law).

[24] 'One must leave the state of nature'

[25] *aus welche die Freiheit vorgeht* (for freedom to advance).

[26] *Wirklichkeit* (actuality).

common conception of the state tends to make a division between the government on the one hand and the people on the other, so that the former is equated with the concentrated activity of the universal and the latter with the many subjective wills of the individual citizens. Thus, the government and people are treated as separate entities. It is thought that a good constitution is one in which the two elements – the government in its universal function and the people in its subjective will – are secured against one another; the two are thus expected to impose mutual restraints on one another. This form of constitution does indeed have its place in history; but the opposition it contains is overcome[27] in the concept of the state. There is something perverse about such contrasts between the people and the government, a malicious artifice designed to imply that the people, divorced from the government, themselves constitute the whole. So long as such ideas are countenanced, it cannot be said that the state – which is the unity of the universal and the particular will – is really present. On the contrary, the state still has to be created. The rational concept of the state has left such abstract antitheses behind it; and those who treat them as if they were necessary know nothing of the nature of the state. For the state has this unity as its basis, and it is this which constitutes its being and its substance.

But this does not mean that its substance is fully developed within itself. For as such, it is a system of organs, of distinct spheres, of particular [120] universalities which are intrinsically independent but whose function is to create the whole and thereby to annul[28] their own independence. In the organic world, there can be no question of any such opposition between particular independent functions; in animal life, for example, the universal property of life is present in every smallest particle, and when it is removed, only inorganic matter remains. The constitutions of states, however, vary according to the form which the totality assumes. The state is rationality made manifest in the world, and the various constitutions accordingly succeed one another, each with its distinct principle; and it invariably happens that the earlier forms are superseded[29] by those which follow them.

The state is the spiritual Idea externalised in the human will and its freedom. All historical change is therefore essentially dependent upon the state, and the successive moments of the Idea appear within it as distinct constitutional principles. The constitutions under which the world-historical nations have blossomed are peculiar to them, and should not therefore be seen as universally applicable. Their differences do not simply consist in the particular way in which they have elaborated and developed a common basis, but in the distinct nature of the principles which underlie them. No lessons can therefore be drawn from history for the framing of constitutions in the present. For the latest constitutional principle, the principle of our own times, is not to be found in the constitutions of the world-historical nations of the past. In knowledge and art, however, it is altogether different. For, in their case, the earlier principles are the absolute foundation of all that follows; for example, the philosophy of antiquity is so fundamental to modern philosophy that it is necessarily contained within the latter and constitutes its entire basis. The relation here is one of unbroken development within one and the same edifice, whose foundation stone, walls, and roof have always remained the same. In art, it might even be said that the art of the Greeks, in its original form, remains the supreme model. But with political constitutions, it is quite different; for ancient and modern constitutions have no essential principle in common. Abstract determinations and doctrines of just government to the effect that wisdom and virtue should rule supreme are of course common to both. But it is quite mistaken to look to the Greeks, Romans, or Orientals for models of how constitutions ought to be organised in our own times. The Orient affords us fine spectacles of the patriarchal system, of paternal government, and of [121] popular devotion, and the Greeks and Romans furnish us with accounts of popular freedom. For in Greece and Rome the concept of a free constitution was so construed that all citizens were expected to participate in discussions and decisions concerning the affairs and laws of the state. In our own times, this still remains the general opinion, but with the qualification that, since our states are so large and the number of citizens so vast, the latter should not give their assent directly to decisions on matters of public concern, but through the indirect method of representation; in short, for the purposes of legislation in general, the people should be represented by deputies. The so-called representative constitution is the form with which we associate the idea of a free constitution, so much so that this has become a hardened prejudice. But the most important point is that freedom, if it is determined by the concept itself, does not have as its principle the subjective will and its arbitrary inclinations, but the insights of the universal will; and the system of freedom consists in the free development of its various moments. The subjective will is a purely formal determination which does not tell us what it is that is willed. The rational will alone is the universal principle which determines and develops itself independently and unfolds its successive moments as organic members. But the last

[27] *aufgehoben* (superseded).

[28] *aufzuheben*.

[29] *aufgehoben*.

phase of all is that of rational freedom, a Gothic edifice whose substance is the universal. Of such Gothic cathedral building the Ancients knew nothing, for it is an achievement of the Christian era. An infinite dichotomy has arisen, and it is only resolved when individuals recognise that their freedom, independence, and essential being reside in their unity with the underlying substance, and when the latter coincides with the form of their activity – for everything depends on this last phase in the development of the substance. This is the higher sense in which nations and their constitutions differ from one another.

Seen in the light of this higher principle, what is usually taken to be the most important factor in a constitution – i.e. whether the individual citizens have given their subjective assent to it or not – appears as a distinction of subordinate significance. It must first be established whether the individuals are regarded as persons in their own right, and whether the substance is present as spirit, as that essential being of which the individuals are conscious. Among the Chinese, for example, no form of individual assent whatsoever is required; if they were taken to task for this as a deficiency in their constitution, they would consider it just as absurd as if children of all ages were asked to participate in a family council. The Chinese are not yet conscious of their own nature as free [122] subjectivity; they do not yet realise that the essential property of ethicality and justice is contained within the latter, which is not yet present to them as their end, their product, and their object. With the Turks, on the other hand, we see the subjective will expressing itself in a completely uncontrolled manner. The Janissaries, for example, have their independent will and exercise it; it is a savage will which is determined in part by religion but at the same time unrestrained in its desires. It is wrongly imagined that their personal will is therefore free, although it is not in fact integrated into the rational and concrete will. It knows nothing of the latter, which is neither its object, its interest, nor its motivating principle, and when it does impinge on a universal, this universal is not something organic, but merely an abstraction of a purely fanatical nature; it is destructive of all organisation, ethical existence, and justice of every kind. In European states, the position is different again, for here, on the whole, discernment is universal. Systematic education and the pursuit of universal ends and principles are the property of everyone; they are shared by the citizens with the government, and by the government with the citizens (in so far as all branches of the administration are included within the concept). In such circumstances, the consent of each particular individual is again more or less superfluous, for individuals in general cannot contribute any particular wisdom to the common cause, but have in fact less to offer than those who are expressly concerned with political matters. Nor would their particular interests bring favourable consequences with them either; for the decisive factor is that there is a common weal to which all individual interests must yield. If freedom is defined as a state to which all individuals must give their assent, it is easily seen that no law can be upheld unless everyone agrees to it. This in turn gives rise to the principle that the minority must yield to the majority, so that the majority in fact makes the decisions. But as J. J. Rousseau has already observed, this can no longer be described as freedom, for the will of the minority is no longer respected. In the Polish diet, every individual had to give his assent to all decisions, and it was this very freedom which led to the downfall of the state. Besides, it is a dangerous and mistaken assumption that the people alone possess reason and discernment and know what is right and proper; for every popular faction can set itself up as representing the people as a whole. What constitutes the state is in fact the business of those who possess education and knowledge, and not that of the people at large.

The differences between political constitutions concern the form in which the totality of political life is manifested. The first form is that in [123] which this totality is not yet clearly defined and in which its various particular spheres have not yet attained an independent existence; the second is that in which these particular spheres – and hence the individual citizens – have gained a greater degree of freedom; and the third and last form is that in which they have attained independence and at the same time function in such a way as to create the universal. We can see how every country and the history of the world as a whole go through each of these phases in turn. At first, we find in every state a kind of patriarchal kingdom, either peacefully or belligerently inclined. During this first phase in its evolution, the state is imperious and ruled by instinct. But even obedience and force and fear of a ruler involve a relation of the will. At the next stage, the particular becomes dominant; aristocrats, distinct spheres of interest, democrats, and individuals hold sway. From among these individuals, a fortuitous aristocracy is precipitated, and this in turn gives way to a new kingdom or monarchy. The final stage is accordingly that at which the particular is subordinated to a power whose nature is necessarily such that the particular spheres can exist independently outside it – in other words, a monarchy. We must therefore distinguish between primary and secondary varieties of monarchy. This, then, is the abstract but necessary process whereby states develop towards true independence; and in every case, we encounter a definite constitution which is not a matter of free choice but invariably accords with the national spirit at a given stage of its development.

All constitutions will depend on the internal development of the rational (i.e. political) condition of the state in question, on the liberation of the successive moments within the concept. The particular powers within the state become differentiated and complete within themselves, but at the same time they freely collaborate towards the realisation of a single purpose by which they are all sustained: in short, they form an organic whole. Thus, the nature of the state is rational freedom which knows itself objectively and exists for itself. For freedom only attains an objective existence when its moments are present not just ideally but in their own peculiar mode of reality, and when they become absolutely effective in relation to reality itself; and as a result, the totality, the soul, the individual unity, is created.

[…]

C The course of world history

[...]

An achievement is only objective in so far as it is an object of knowledge. It contains the determination of universality or thought in its very element; without thought, it has no objectivity, for thought is its basis. The nation must know the universal on which its ethical life is based and before which the particular vanishes away, and it must therefore know the determinations which underlie its justice and religion. The spirit cannot rest content with the mere existence of an order or cult; its will is rather to attain this knowledge of its own determinations. Only in this way can it succeed in uniting its subjectivity with the universal of its objectivity. Admittedly, its world is also composed of distinct elements to which it [146] responds through the medium of external intuition, etc., but the unity of its innermost nature with this external world must also be present to it. This is its supreme liberation, since thought is its innermost nature. The highest point in the development of the nation is reached when it has understood its life and condition by means of thought, and acquired a systematic knowledge of its laws, justice, and ethical life; for in this achievement lies the closest possible unity which the spirit can attain with itself. The aim of its endeavours is for it to have itself as its own object; but it cannot have itself as its object in its true essentiality unless it thinks itself. At this point, then, the spirit knows its own principles, the universal aspect of its real world. Thus, if we wish to know what Greece really was, we find the answer in Sophocles and Aristophanes, Thucydides and Plato; in them, we find the historical expression of what Greek life actually was. For in these individuals, the Greek spirit comprehended itself through representation and thought.

This spiritual self-consciousness is the nation's supreme achievement; but we must remember in the first place that it is also only ideal. In this achievement of thought lies the profounder kind of satisfaction which the nation can attain; but since it is of a universal nature, it is also ideal, and accordingly different in form from the real activity, the real work and life which made such an achievement possible. The nation now has both a seal and an ideal existence. At such a time, we shall therefore find that the nation derives satisfaction from the idea of virtue and from discussion of it – discussion which may either coexist with virtue itself or become a substitute for it. All this is the work of the spirit, which knows how to bring the unreflected – i.e. the merely factual – to the point of reflecting upon itself. It thereby becomes conscious to some degree of the limitation of such determinate things as belief, trust, and custom, so that the consciousness now has reasons for renouncing the latter and the laws which they impose. This is indeed the inevitable result of any search for reasons; and when no such reasons – i.e. no completely abstract universal principles – can be found as the basis of the laws in question, men's ideas of virtue begin to waver, and the absolute is no longer regarded as valid in its own right, but only in so far as it has reasons to justify it. At the same time, individuals gradually became isolated from one another and from the whole, selfishness and vanity intervene, and men seek to obtain their own advantage and satisfaction at the expense of the whole. For the consciousness is subjective in nature, and subjectivity carries with it the need to particularise itself. Vanity and selfishness accordingly make their appearance, and passions and personal interests emerge unchecked and [147] in a destructive form. This is not, however, the natural death of the national spirit, but merely a state of internal division.

And thus Zeus, who set limits to the depredations of time and suspended its constant flux, had no sooner established something inherently enduring than he was himself devoured along with his whole empire. He was devoured by the principle of thought itself, the progenitor of knowledge, of reasoning, of insight based on rational grounds, and of the search for such grounds. Time is the negative element in the world of the senses; thought is equally negative, but it is at the same time that innermost and infinite form into which all existence – and in the first place finite being or determinate form – is dissolved. Time, then, is indeed the corrosive aspect of negativity; but spirit likewise has the property of dissolving every determinate content it encounters. For it is the universal, unlimited, innermost and infinite form itself, and it overcomes all that is limited. Even if the objective element does not

appear finite and limited in content, it does at least appear as something given, immediate, and authoritative in nature, so that it is not in a position to impose restrictions on thought or to set itself up as a permanent obstacle to the thinking subject and to infinite internal reflection.

This dissolving activity of thought also inevitably gives rise to a new principle. Thought, in so far as it is universal in character, has the effect of dissolving every determinate content; but in this very dissolution, the preceding principle is in fact preserved, with the sole difference that it no longer possesses its original determination. The universal essence is preserved, but its universality as such has been brought out into relief. The preceding principle has been transfigured by universality; its present mode must be considered as different from the preceding one, for in the latter, the present mode existed only implicitly and had an external existence only through a complex series of manifold relationships. What formerly existed only in concrete particulars now has the form of universality conferred upon it; but a new element, another further determination, is also present. The spirit, in its new inward determination, has new interests and ends beyond those which it formerly possessed. This change in the principle's form also brings with it new and additional determinations of content. Everyone knows that a cultured[30] man has quite different expectations from those of his uncultured fellow-countryman, although the latter lives within the same religion and ethical community and his substantial condition is precisely, the same. Culture would at first seem [148] to be purely formal in character, but it does also give rise to differences in content. The cultured and the uncultured Christian appear completely identical in one respect, but their needs are nevertheless completely different. And it is precisely the same with property relations. Even the serf has property, but it is coupled with obligations which render another person the joint owner of it. If, however, we define property in terms of thought, it of course follows that only one man can be the owner. For thought brings out the universal aspect, thereby creating a different interest and different needs.

The determinate nature of the transition which takes place in all such changes is therefore as follows: what at present exists becomes an object of thought, and it is thereby elevated into universality. The nature of the spirit is to comprehend the universal, i.e. that which is essential. Universality, in its truest sense, is the substance, the essence, that which truly exists. In the case of the slave, for example, the appropriate universal is that of the human being; for it is at this point that particularity passes over into universality. If, therefore, particularity is transcended in a given nation – for example, in that of Athens – by means of thought, and if thought develops to the point where the particular principle of the nation in question is no longer essential, that nation cannot continue to exist; for another principle has meanwhile emerged. World history then passes over to another nation. Such principles are present in world history in the shape of national spirits; but the latter also have a natural existence. The particular stage which the spirit has reached is present as the natural principle of the people in question or as the nation. According to the different ways in which it manifests itself in this determinate natural element, the spirit appears in various forms. Thus, although its new and higher determination within a particular national spirit does appear as the negation or destruction of the preceding one, its positive side also emerges in the shape of a new nation. A nation cannot pass through several successive stages in world history or make its mark in it more than once. If it were possible for genuinely new interests to arise within a nation, the national spirit would have to be in a position to will something new – but where could this new element come from? It could only take the shape of a higher and more universal conception of itself, a progression beyond its own principle, or a quest for a more universal principle – but this would mean that a further determinate principle, i.e. a new spirit, was already present. In world history, a nation can be dominant only once, because it can only have one task to perform within the spiritual process. [149] This advance or progression appears to be a process of infinite duration, in keeping with the notion of perfectibility – a constant progress which must always remain distant from its goal. But even if, in the advance towards a new principle, the content of the preceding one is comprehended in a more universal sense than before, it is at least certain that the new form which emerges will again be a determinate one. Furthermore, history has to do with reality, in which the universal must in any case assume a determinate form. And no limited form can establish itself permanently in face of thought or the concept. If there were something which the concept could not digest or resolve, it would certainly represent the highest degree of fragmentation and unhappiness. But if something of the kind did exist, it could be nothing other than thought itself in its function of self-comprehension. For thought alone is inherently unlimited, and all reality is determined within it. In consequence, the fragmentation would cease to exist, and thought would be satisfied within itself. This, then, would be the ultimate purpose of the world. Reason recognises that which is truthful, that which exists in and for itself, and which is not subject to any limitations. The concept of the spirit involves a return upon itself, whereby it

[30] *gebildet* (formed, educated).

makes itself its own object; progress, therefore, is not an indeterminate advance ad infinitum, for it has a definite aim – namely that of returning upon itself. Thus, it also involves a kind of cyclic movement as the spirit attempts to discover itself.

5. Hegel, Passages on freedom
1817-30

1. Man is free, this is certainly the substantial nature of man; and not only is this freedom not relinquished in the state, but it is actually in the state that it is first constituted. The freedom of nature, the disposition for freedom, is not actual freedom; the state is the first realisation of freedom. (*Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 3: 402)

2. Kant began to ground right upon freedom, and Fichte likewise makes freedom the principle in his *Rights of Nature*; but, as was the case with Rousseau, it is freedom in the form of the isolated individual. This is a great commencement, but in order to arrive at the particular, they have to accept certain hypotheses. The universal is not the spirit, the substance of the whole, but an external, negative power of the finite understanding directed against individuals. The state is not apprehended in its essence, but only as representing a condition of justice and law, *i.e.* as an external relation of finite to finite. There are various individuals; the whole constitution of the state is thus in the main characterized by the fact that the freedom of individuals must be limited by means of the freedom of the whole [...] instead of the state being regarded as representing the realization of freedom. (*Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 3: 504)

3. [F]or that is just what freedom is: being at home with oneself in one's other, depending on oneself, and being one's own determinant. (*Encyclopedia Logic* §24 Addition 2)

4. A freedom involving no necessity, and mere necessity without freedom, are abstract and in this way untrue formulae of thought. Freedom is no blank indeterminateness: essentially concrete, and unvaryingly self-determinate, it is so far at the same time necessary. Necessity, again, in the ordinary acceptation of the term in popular philosophy, means determination from without only – as in finite mechanics, where a body moves only when it is struck by another body, and moves in the direction communicated to it by the impact. This however is a merely external necessity, not the real inward necessity which is identical with freedom. (*Encyclopedia Logic* §34A)

5. [F]or freedom consists precisely in my not having any absolute other over against me, but in me being dependent on a content that is just myself. (*Encyclopedia Logic* §38 Addition)

6. The will that is genuinely free, and contains freedom of choice superseded within itself, is conscious of its content as something steadfast in and for itself; and at the same time it knows the content to be utterly its own. (*Encyclopedia Logic* §146 Addition)

7. From this we can also gather how absurd it is to regard freedom and necessity as mutually exclusive. To be sure, necessity as such is not yet freedom; but freedom presupposes necessity and contains it superseded within itself. The ethical person is conscious of the content of his action as something necessary, something that is valid in and for itself; and this consciousness is so far from diminishing his freedom, that, on the contrary, it is only through this consciousness that his abstract freedom becomes a freedom, that is actual and rich in content, as distinct from arbitrary choice, a freedom that still lacks content and is merely possible […] Generally speaking, the highest independence of man is to know himself as totally determined by the absolute Idea (*Encyclopedia Logic* §158 Addition)

8. Freedom in action issues […] from the fact that the rationality of the will wins actualization. This rationality the will actualizes in the life of the state. In a state which is really articulated rationally all the laws and organizations are nothing but a realization of freedom in its essential characteristics. When this is the case, the individual's reason finds in these institutions only the actuality of his own essence, and if he obeys these laws, he coincides, not with something alien to himself, but simply with what is his own. Caprice[1], of course, is often equally called 'freedom'; but caprice is only non-rational freedom, choice and self-determination issuing not from the rationality of the will but from fortuitous impulses and their dependence on sense and the external world. (*Lectures on Aesthetics*, p. 96)

[1] *Willkür*. Also often translated as 'arbitrary will'.

6. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity
1841
Source: http://marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/essence/index.htm
Introduction from Zawar Hanfi (ed.) *The Fiery Brook*, 1972; remainder from Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, tr. George Eliot, 1854.

[Feuerbach's footnotes omitted. – AC]

Introduction: §1 The Being[1] of Man in General

Religion has its genesis in the *essential difference* between man and the animal – the animals have no religion. Although it is true that the old uncritical zoographers attributed to the elephant, among other laudable qualities, the virtue of religiousness, the fact is that such a thing as the religion of elephants belongs to the realm of fable. Cuvier, one of the greatest authorities on the animal world, concludes from the evidence provided by his own investigations that the elephant possesses no higher degree of intelligence than the dog.

But what constitutes the essential difference between man and the animal? The most simple, general, and also the most widely held answer to this question is *consciousness.* Consciousness, however, is to be taken here in the strict sense, for consciousness in the sense of the feeling of self, in the sense of the ability to distinguish one sensuous object from another, to perceive – even judge – external things according to definite sensuous characteristics emanating from them, consciousness in this sense cannot be denied of the animal. Strictly speaking, consciousness is given only in the case of a being to whom his *species, his mode of being* is an object of thought. Although the animal experiences itself as an individual – this is what is meant by saying that it has a feeling of itself – it does not do so as a species. It is in this sense that the animal lacks consciousness, for consciousness deserves to be called by that name only because of its link with *knowledge.* Where there is consciousness in this sense, there is also the capacity to produce systematic knowledge or science. Science is the *consciousness of species.* In life we are concerned with individuals, but in science, with species. Only a being to whom his own species, his characteristic mode of being, is an object of thought can make the essential nature of other things and beings an object of thought.

[1] *Wesen*. Feuerbach's translators sometimes translate *Wesen* as 'essence' and sometimes as 'being' or 'a being'.

Thus understood, the animal has a simple, but man a twofold, life. In the case of the animal the inner life is one with the outer, whereas in the case of man there is an inner *and* an outer life. The inner life of man is constituted by the fact that man relates himself to his species, to his mode of being. Man thinks, that is to say, he converses, enters into a dialogue *with himself.* The animal, on the other hand, cannot perform the function characteristic to its species without the existence of another individual external to itself. But man can perform the *functions characteristic to his species – thought* and speech – in isolation from another individual. Man is in himself both 'I' and 'You'; he can put himself in the place of another precisely because his species, his essential mode of being – not only his individuality – is an object of thought to him.

The characteristic human mode of being, as distinct from that of the animal, is not only the basis, but also the object of religion. But religion is the consciousness of the infinite; hence it is, and cannot be anything other than, man's consciousness of *his* own essential nature, understood not as a finite or limited, but as an infinite nature. A really finite being has not even the slightest inkling, let alone consciousness, of what an infinite being is, for the mode of consciousness is limited by the mode of being. The consciousness of the caterpillar, whose life is confined to a particular species of plant, does not extend beyond this limited sphere; it is, of course, able to distinguish this plant from other plants, but that is the entire extent of its knowledge. In a case where consciousness is so limited but where, precisely because of this limitation, it is also infallible and unerring, we speak of instinct rather than consciousness. Consciousness in the strict sense, or consciousness properly speaking, and consciousness of the infinite cannot be separated from each other; a limited consciousness is no consciousness; consciousness is essentially infinite and all-encompassing. The consciousness of the infinite is nothing else than the consciousness of the infinity of consciousness. To put it in other words, in its consciousness of infinity, the conscious being is conscious of the infinity of its own being.

But what is the being of man of which he is conscious, or what is that which constitutes in him his species, his humanity proper? Reason, Will, and Heart. To a complete man belongs the power of thought, the power of will, and the power of heart. The power of thought is the light of knowledge, the power of will is the energy of character, the power of heart is love. Reason, love, and power of will are perfections of man; they are his highest powers, his absolute essence in so far as he is man, the purpose of his existence. Man exists in order to think, love, and will.

What is the end of reason? Reason. Of love? Love. Of will? The freedom to will. We pursue knowledge in order to know; love in order to love; will in order to will, that is, in order to be free. Truly to be is to be able to think, love, and will. Only that which exists for its own sake is true, perfect, and divine. But such is love, such is reason, and such is will. The divine trinity in man, but transcending the individual man, is the unity of reason, love, and will. Reason (imagination, fantasy, conception, opinion), will, and love or heart are powers that man does not possess, although he is nothing without them but is what he is through them. As elements constituting his essence which he neither possesses nor makes, they are the very powers that animate, determine, and govern him – divine, absolute powers that he is powerless to resist.

Is it at all possible for the feeling man to resist feeling, for the loving man to resist love, for the rational man to resist reason? Who has not experienced the irresistible power of musical sounds? And what else is this power if not the power of feeling? Music is the language of feeling – a musical note is sonorous feeling or feeling communicating itself. Who has not experienced the power of love, or at least not heard of it? Each is the stronger – love or the individual man? Does man possess love, or is it rather love that possesses man? When, impelled by love, a man gladly sacrifices his life for his beloved, is this his own strength that makes him overcome death, or is it rather the power of love? And who has not experienced the silent power of thought, given that he has truly experienced the activity of thinking? When, submerged in deep reflection, you forget both yourself and your surroundings, is it you who controls reason, or is it rather reason that controls and absorbs you? Does not reason celebrate its greatest triumph over you in your enthusiasm for science? Is not the drive for knowledge simply an irresistible and all-conquering power? And when you suppress a passion, give up a habit, in short, when you win a victory over yourself, is this victorious power your own personal power existing, so to speak, in isolation, or is it rather the energy of will, the power of morality which imposes its rule over you and fills you with indignation of yourself and your individual weaknesses?

Man is nothing without the objects that express his being. The truth of this proposition is borne out by great men whose lives we emulate in so far as they reveal the essence of man. They had only one basic and dominant passion – the realisation of the goal which constituted the essential object of their activity. But the object to which a subject essentially and necessarily relates himself is nothing except the subject's own objective being. If an object is common to several individuals belonging to the same species, but differing in terms of their characteristics, it is still, at least in so far as it is an object to each of them according to their respective differences, their own objective being.

In this sense the sun is the common object of the planets, but it is not an object for the Earth in the same way as it is for Mercury, Venus, Saturn, or Uranus. Each planet has its own sun. The sun which lights and warms Uranus – and the way it does so – has no physical (only an astronomic or scientific) existence for the Earth. Not only does the sun appear different, but it really is another sun on Uranus than on the Earth. Hence, Earth's relationship to the sun is at the same time the Earth's relationship to itself, to its own being, for the measure of the magnitude and intensity of light which is decisive as to the way the sun is an object for the earth is also the measure of the Earth's distance from the sun, that is, the measure that determines the nature of the Earth. The sun is therefore the mirror in which the being of each planet is reflected.

Thus, man becomes conscious of himself through the object that reflects his being; man's self-consciousness is his consciousness of the object. One knows the man by the object that reflects his being; the object lets his being appear to you; the object is his manifest being, his true, objective ego. This is true not only of intellectual but also of sensuous objects. Even those objects which are farthest removed from man are manifestations of his own specific mode of being because, and in so far as, they are objects for him. Even the moon, the sun, the stars say to man: *Gnothi seautou* – know thyself. That he sees them, that he sees them the way he does, bears witness to his own nature. The animal is moved only by the rays of light, which are essential for its life, but man is also moved by the rays from the remotest star, which are indifferent to his life. Only man knows pure, intellectual, disinterested joys and emotions; only man celebrates the theoretical feasts of vision. The eye that looks into the starry heavens, that contemplates the light that bears neither use nor harm, that has nothing in common with the earth and its needs, this eye contemplates its own nature, its own origin in that light. The eye is heavenly in its nature. Hence, it is only through the eye that man rises above the earth; hence theory begins only when man directs his gaze towards the heavens. The first philosophers were astronomers. The heavens remind man of his destination, remind him that he is destined not merely to act, but also to contemplate.

What man calls Absolute Being, his God, is his own being. The power of the object over him is therefore the power of his own being. Thus, the power of the object of feeling is the power of feeling itself; the power of the object of reason is the power

of reason itself; and the power of the object of will is the power of the will itself. The man whose being is determined by sound is governed by feeling, at least by a feeling that finds its corresponding element in sound. But only the sound that is charged with content, meaning, and feeling possesses power over feeling – not sound as such. Feeling is determined only by that which is charged with feeling, that is, only by itself, by its own being. The same is true of the will, and the same of reason. Therefore, whatever the object of which we become conscious, we always become conscious of our own being; we cannot set anything in motion without setting ourselves in motion. And since willing, feeling, and thinking are perfections, essences, and realities, it is impossible that while indulging in them we experience reason, feeling, and will as limited or finite; namely, as worthless. Finiteness and nothingness are identical; finiteness is only a euphemism for nothingness. Finiteness is a metaphysical, a theoretical expression, while nothingness is a pathological, a practical one. That which is finite to the intellect is nothing to the heart. But it is impossible to be conscious of will, feeling, and reason, only as finite powers, because every perfection, every power, every being is the immediate verification and confirmation of itself. One cannot love, will, or think without experiencing these activities as perfections; one cannot perceive oneself to be a loving, willing, and thinking being without experiencing an infinite joy in being so. Consciousness is given when a being is its own object; consequently, it is nothing by itself and as distinct from the being that is conscious. How else could it be conscious of itself? Therefore it is impossible to be conscious of a perfection as an imperfection; impossible to experience feeling as limited; impossible to experience thought as limited.

Consciousness is self-sustained activity, self-affirmation, and self-love – it is joy in one's own perfection. Consciousness is the characteristic mark of a perfect being; consciousness exists only in a plenitudinous, accomplished being. Even human vanity confirms this truth. A man sees himself in the mirror; he is pleased with his form. This feeling of pleasure is a necessary, involuntary consequence of the perfect beauty of his form. A beautiful form is perfect in itself; it is, in view of its perfection, necessarily pleased with itself – hence the necessary urge to behold itself in its own mirror. A man is self-complacent when he is enamoured of his own looks, but not when he admires the human form in himself. Indeed, he must even admire this form, for he simply cannot imagine any other form that is more beautiful, more noble than the human form. Naturally, every being loves itself, loves the way it is – and this is how it should be. Being is a good. 'Anything ' , says Bacon, 'that deserves to be, also deserves to be known.' Everything that exists is of value, is a being possessing a distinction; that is why it affirms and asserts itself. But the highest form of self-affirmation, the form that is itself a matter of distinction, a bliss, a good – that form is consciousness.

Every limitation of reason, or of human nature in general, rests on a delusion, an error. To be sure, the human individual can, even must, feel and know himself to be limited – and this is what distinguishes him from the animal – but he can become conscious of his limits, his finiteness, only because he can make the perfection and infinity of his species the object either of his feeling, conscience, or thought. But if his limitations appear to him as emanating from the species, this can only be due to his delusion that he is identical with the species, a delusion intimately linked with the individual's love of case, lethargy, vanity, and selfishness; for a limit which I know to be mine alone, humiliates, shames, and disquiets me. Hence, in order to free myself of this feeling of shame, this uneasiness, I make the limits of my individuality the limits of man's being itself. What is incomprehensible to me is incomprehensible to others; why should this worry me at all? It is not due to any fault of mine or of my understanding; the cause lies in the understanding of the species itself. But it is a folly, a ludicrous and frivolous folly to designate that which constitutes the nature of man and the absolute nature of the individual, the essence of the species, as finite and limited. Every being is sufficient to itself. No being can deny itself, its own nature; no being is intrinsically limited. Rather, every being is in itself infinite; it carries its God – that which is the highest being to it – within itself. Every limit of a being is a limit only for another being that is outside and above it. The life of the ephemera is extraordinarily short as compared with animals whose life span is longer; and yet this short span of life is just as long for them as a life of many years for others. The leaf on which the caterpillar lives is for it a world, an infinite space.

That which makes a being what it is, is its talent, its power, its wealth, and its adornment. How can it possibly regard its being as nothing, its abundance as lack, or its talent as incapacity? If plants could see, taste, and judge, each would claim its own blossom to be the most beautiful; for its understanding and taste would be limited by the productive power of its being. What the productive power of a plant has brought forth as its highest achievement, that must be confirmed and recognised as the highest also by its taste, its power of judgment. What the nature of a being affirms, that cannot be denied by its understanding, taste, and judgment; otherwise this intellect, this power of judgment would not be that belonging to this particular being, but rather to some other being. The measure of being is also the

measure of the understanding. If the being concerned is limited, its feeling and understanding would be limited, too. But, to a limited being, its limited understanding is not a limitation. On the contrary, it is perfectly happy and satisfied with it; it experiences, praises, and values it as a glorious, divine power; and the limited understanding praises, in its turn, the limited being to whom it belongs. Both harmonise so completely that the question of any discord between them does not arise. The understanding of a being is its horizon. The horizon of your being is limited by what you can see, just as what you can see is limited by the horizon of your being. The eye of the animal does not see beyond what it needs. And so far as the power of your being, so far as your unlimited feeling of self reaches – so far are you God. The conflict in human consciousness between understanding and being, between the power of thought and the power to produce, is only an individual conflict having no general significance; but it is a conflict only in appearance. He who has written a bad poem and knows it to be bad, is in his knowledge – and hence in his being – not so limited as he who, having written a bad poem, thinks it is good.

In keeping with this, if you therefore think the infinite, you think and confirm the infinity of the power of thought; if you feel the infinite, you feel and confirm the infinity of the power of feeling. The object of reason is reason as its own object; the object of feeling is feeling as its own object. If you have no sensibility, no feeling for music, you perceive in the most beautiful music nothing more than what you perceive in the wind that whistles past your cars or in the brook that rushes past your feet. What is it in the sound that grips you? What do you perceive in it? What else if not the voice of your own heart? Hence, feeling addresses itself to feeling; hence, feeling is comprehensible only to feeling, that is, to itself – because the object of feeling is feeling itself. Music is a monologue of feeling. But even the dialogue of philosophy is in reality a monologue of reason – thought speaking to thought. The colourful splendour of crystals ravishes the senses, but only the laws of crystallonomy interest reason. The rational alone is the object of reason.

Hence, all that has, in the sense of superhuman speculation and theology, the significance only of the derivative, the subjective, the means, or the organ, has in truth the significance of the original, of the divine, of the essential being, and of the object itself. If, for example, feeling is the essential organ of religion, the essence of God expresses nothing else than the essence of feeling. The true, albeit hidden, sense of the saying ‘Feeling is the organ of the divine’ is that feeling is the noblest, the most excellent, i.e., the divine, in man. How could you perceive the divine through feeling if feeling itself were not divine? The divine can be known only through that which is itself divine – ‘God can be known only through himself.’ The Divine Being perceived by feeling is in reality nothing but the being of feeling itself which is enraptured and fascinated by itself – feeling that is blissful in itself, intoxicated with joy.

This goes to explain that where feeling is made the organ of the infinite, the subjective essence of religion, the object of religion loses its objective value. Hence, it is understandable that ever since feeling became the mainstay of religion, the otherwise sacred content of Christian belief fell to indifference. If, from the standpoint of feeling, some value is still conceded to the content of Christianity, the fact remains that this value owes itself to feeling which is perhaps only accidentally connected with the object of religion; if some other object would excite the same feelings, it would be just as welcome. But the object of feeling is reduced to indifference precisely because feeling is proclaimed to be the subjective essence of religion only where it is also in actual fact its objective essence, even if it is not – at least not directly – expressed as such. I say directly, for indirectly this is certainly admitted when feeling, as such, is declared to be religious, that is, when the difference between what are characteristically religious and what are irreligious – or at least non-religious – feelings is eliminated – a consequence necessitated by the standpoint which holds feeling alone to be the organ of the divine. For what other reason do you have to regard feeling as the organ of the infinite, of the divine, if not because of the essential nature of feeling? But is not the nature of feeling in general also the nature of every special feeling, whatever its IF object? The question therefore is: What makes feeling religious? Perhaps its specific object? Not at all, for this object is a religious one only if it is not an object of cold intellect or memory, but of feeling. What then? The answer is: The nature of feeling of which every feeling, whatever be its object, partakes. Feeling has thus been declared sacred simply on the ground that it is feeling; the ground of the religiousness of feeling is its nature and lies in itself. But is not feeling itself thereby pronounced to be the absolute, the divine? If it is only through itself that feeling is good or religious, i.e., sacred or divine, does it then not have its god within itself?

But if you want, on the one hand, to give feeling an unequivocal object, and, on the other, to interpret what your feeling truly is without letting any foreign element interfere with your reflection, what else can you do except make a *distinction* between your *individual feelings* and the *universal essence and nature of feeling*;

what else can you do except separate the essence of feeling from the disturbing and contaminating influences with which feeling is bound up in you as a particular individual? Hence, what you can alone have as an object of thought, express as the infinite, determine as the essential nature of the infinite is merely the nature of feeling. You have no other determination of God here than the following one: God is pure, unlimited, free feeling. Every other God, whom you posited here, would be a God imposed upon your feeling from outside. From the point of view of the orthodox form of belief, which is decisive as to the manner in which religion relates itself to an external object, feeling is atheistic; it denies an objective God – it is its own God. *From the standpoint of feeling, the denial of feeling is only the denial of God*. You are either only too cowardly or too limited to admit in words what your feeling tacitly affirms. Bound to external considerations and unable to grasp the inner sublimeness of feeling, you recoil from acknowledging the religious atheism of your heart, thus destroying the unity of your feeling with itself by perpetrating on yourself the delusion of an objective being separate from feeling. This act of self-delusion throws you back to the old questions and doubts: Is there a God or not? The questions and doubts vanish – they are, indeed, impossible – when feeling is defined as the essence of religion. Feeling is your innermost power, and yet it is a power that is separate from and independent of you; existing inside you, it is above you; it is your very own being, yet it seizes hold of you as another being. In short, it is your God. How can it therefore be possible for you to distinguish from this being in you another objective being? How can you get beyond your feeling?

But feeling has been taken here only as an example. The same holds true of every other power, faculty, potentiality, reality, or activity – the name is of no consequence – which one determines as the essential organ of an object. Whatever has the significance of being subjective or from the side of man has for that very reason the significance of being also objective or from the side of the object. It is simply impossible for man to get beyond the true horizon of his being. It is true that he can imagine individuals of a different, and allegedly higher, kind, but he cannot conceive of himself in abstraction from his species, from his mode of being. *The essential determinations he attributes to those other individuals must always be determinations emanating from his own being* – determinations in which he in truth only *projects himself*, which only represent his *self-objectifications*. It may certainly be true that thinking beings exist also on other planets; but by assuming their existence, we do not change our standpoint, we only enrich it quantitatively not qualitatively; for just as the same laws of motion apply on other planets as they do here, so also the same laws of feeling and thought apply there as here. In fact, the reason why we project life on other planets is not that there are beings different from ourselves there, but that there may be more beings there identical with or similar to our being.

Introduction: §2 The Essence[2] of Religion in General

What we have so far maintained concerning the general relationship between man and his object, and between man and sensuous objects, is particularly true of man's relationship to the religious object.

In view of its relation to the objects of the senses, the consciousness of the object can be distinguished from self-consciousness; but, in the case of the religious object, consciousness and self-consciousness directly coincide. A sensuous object exists apart from man, but the religious object exists within him – it is itself an inner, intimate object, indeed, the closest object, and hence an object which forsakes him as little as his self-consciousness or conscience. 'God,' says. Augustine, for example, 'is nearer, more closely related to us and therefore more easily known by us than sensuous and physical things.' Strictly speaking, the object of the, senses is in itself indifferent, having no relevance to our disposition and judgment. But the object of religion is a distinguished object – the most excellent, the first, the highest being. It essentially presupposes a critical judgment – the discrimination between the divine and the non-divine, between that which is worthy of adoration and that which is not. It is in this context, therefore, that the following statement is unconditionally true: The object of man is nothing else than his objective being itself. As man thinks, as is his understanding of things, so is his God; so much worth as a man has, so much and no more has his God. The consciousness of God is the self-consciousness of man; the knowledge of God is the self-knowledge of man. Man's notion of himself is his notion of God, just as his notion of God is his notion of himself – the two are identical. What is God to man, that is man's own spirit, man's own soul; what is man's spirit, soul, and heart – that is his God. God is the manifestation of man's inner nature, his expressed self; religion is the solemn unveiling of man's hidden treasures, the avowal of his innermost thoughts, the open confession of the secrets of his love.

But if religion, i.e., the consciousness of God, is characterised as the self-consciousness of man, this does not mean that the religious man is directly aware

[2] *Wesen*.

that his consciousness of God is his self-consciousness, for it is precisely the absence of such an awareness that is responsible for the peculiar nature of religion. Hence, in order to eliminate this misunderstanding, it would be better to say that religion is the first, but indirect, self-consciousness of man. That is why religion precedes philosophy everywhere, in the history of mankind as well as in the history of the individual. Man transposes his essential being outside himself before he finds it within himself. His own being becomes the object of his thought first as another being. Religion is the essential being of man in his infancy; but the child sees his essential being, namely, man outside himself, as a child; a man is object to himself as another man. Hence, the historical development occurring within religions takes the following course: What an earlier religion regarded as objective, is now recognised as subjective; i.e., what was regarded and worshiped as God, is now recognised as something human. From the standpoint of a later religion, the earlier religion turns out to be idolatry: Man is seen to have worshiped his own essence. Man has objectified himself, but he has not yet recognised the object as his own essential being – a step taken by later religion. Every progress in religion means therefore, a deepening of man's knowledge of himself. But every religion, while designating older religions as idolatrous, looks upon itself as exempted from their fate. It does so necessarily, for otherwise it would no longer be religion; it sees only in other religions what is the fault – if a fault it can be called – of religion as such. Because its object, its content, is a different one, because it has superseded the content of earlier religions, it presumes to be exalted above the necessary and eternal laws that constitute the essence of religion; it gives itself to the illusion that its object, its content, is superhuman. However, the hidden nature of religion, which remains opaque to religion itself, is transparent to the thinker who makes it the object of his thought. And our task consists precisely in showing that the antithesis of the divine and human is illusory; that is, that it is nothing other than the antithesis between the essential being of man and his individual being, and that consequently the object and the content of the Christian religion are altogether human.

Religion, at least the Christian religion, is the expression of how man relates to himself, or more correctly, to his essential being; but he relates to his essential being as to another being. The Divine Being is nothing other than the being of man himself, or rather, the being of man abstracted from the limits of the individual man or the real, corporeal man, and objectified, i.e., contemplated and worshiped as another being, as a being distinguished from his own. All determinations of the Divine Being are, therefore, determinations of the being of man.

In relation to the predicates – attributes or determinations – of God, this is admitted without hesitation, but by no means admitted in relation to the subject of these predicates, in relation to the being in which they are grounded. The negation of the subject is taken to mean the negation of religion, atheism, but not the negation of the predicates. That which has no determinations, also has no effect upon me; that which has no effect upon me, also does not exist for me. To eliminate all determinations of a being is the same as to eliminate that being itself. A being without determinations is a being that cannot be an object of thought; it is a nonentity. Where man removes all determinations from God, God is reduced to a negative being, to a being that is not a being. To a truly religious man, however, God is not a being without determinations, because he is a definite, real being to him. Hence, the view that God is without determinations, that he cannot be known, is a product of the modern era, of modern unbelief.

Just as reason can be, and is, determined as finite only where man regards sensual enjoyment, religious feeling, aesthetic contemplation, or moral sentiment as the absolute, the true, so the view as to the unknowability or indeterminateness of God can be fixed as a dogma only where this object commands no interest for cognition, where reality alone claims the interest of man or where the real alone has for him the significance of being an essential, absolute, divine object, but where at the same time this purely worldly tendency is contradicted by a still-existing remnant of old religiosity. By positing God as unknowable, man excuses himself to what is still left of his religious conscience for his oblivion of God, his surrender to the world. He negates God in practice – his mind and his senses have been absorbed by the world – but he does not negate him in theory. He does not attack his existence; he leaves it intact. But this existence neither affects nor incommodes him, for it is only a negative existence, an existence without existence; it is an existence that contradicts itself – a being that, in view of its effects, is indistinguishable from non-being. The negation of determinate, positive predicates of the Divine Being is nothing else than the negation of religion, but one which still has an appearance of religion, so that it is not recognised as a negation – it is nothing but a subtle, sly atheism. The alleged religious horror of limiting God by determinate predicates is only the irreligious wish to forget all about God, to banish him from the mind. He who is afraid to be finite is afraid to exist. All real existence, that is, all existence that really is existence, is qualitative, determinate existence. He who seriously, truly believes in the existence of God is not disturbed even by grossly sensuous qualities attributed to God. He who regards the fact of his existence as an insult, he who recoils from that which is gross, may just as well give up existing. A God to

whom his determinateness is an insult lacks the courage and strength to exist. Determinateness is the fire, the oxygen, the salt of existence. An existence in general, an existence without qualities, is an insipid and preposterous existence. But there is nothing more, and nothing less, in God than what religion puts in him. Only when man loses his taste for religion, that is, when religion itself becomes insipid, does God become an insipid existence.

Moreover, there is yet a milder way of denying the divine predicates than the direct one just described. One admits that the predicates of the Divine Being are finite and, more particularly, human determinations, but one rejects the idea of rejecting them. One even defends them on the ground that they are necessary for man; that being man, he cannot conceive God in any way other than human. One argues that although these determinations have no meaning in relation to God, the fact is that God, i f he is to exist for man, can appear to man in no other way than he does, namely, as a being with human attributes. However, this distinction between what God is in himself and what he is for man destroys the peace of religion as well as being an unfeasible and unfounded distinction. It is not at all possible for me to know whether God as he is in and for himself is something different from what he is for me. The manner in which he exists for me is also the totality of his existence for me. The determinations in terms of which he exists for me contain also the 'in-itself-ness' of his being, his essential nature itself; he exists for me in a way in which he can exist for me alone. The religious man is completely satisfied with how he sees God in relation to himself – and he knows nothing of any other relation – for God is to him what he can be to man at all. In the distinction made above, man transgresses the boundaries of himself, his being and its absolute measure, but this transcending is only an illusion. For I can make the distinction between the object as it is in itself and the object as it is for me only where an object can really appear different from what it actually appears to me. I cannot make such a distinction where the object appears to me as it does according to my absolute measure; that is, as it must appear to me. It is true that my conception can be subjective; that is, one which is not bound by the essential constitution of my species. However, if my conception corresponds to the measure of my species, the distinction between what something is in itself and what it is for me ceases; for in that case this conception is itself an absolute one. The measure of the species is the absolute measure, law, and criterion of man. Yet religion has the conviction that its conceptions and determinations of God are such as every man ought to have if he is to have true conceptions, that these are conceptions necessitated by human nature, that they are indeed objective, conforming to the nature of God. To every religion, the gods of other religions are only conceptions of God; but its own conception of God is itself its God – God as it conceives him to be, God genuinely and truly so, God as he is in himself. Religion is satisfied only with a complete and total God – it will not have merely an appearance of God, it can be ,satisfied with nothing less than God himself, God in person. Religion abandons itself if it abandons God in his essential being; it is no longer true if it renounces its possession of the true God. Scepticism is the archenemy of religion. But the distinction between object and concept, between God as he is in himself and as he is for me, is a sceptical, that is, irreligious distinction.

That which is subsumed by man under the concept of 'being-in-itself,' that which he regards as the most supreme being or as the being of which he can conceive none higher, that is the Divine Being. How can he therefore still ask, what this being is in itself? If God were an object to the bird, he would be an object to it only as a winged being – the bird knows nothing higher, nothing more blissful than the state of being winged. How ludicrous would it be if this bird commented: 'God appears to me as a bird, but 1 do not know what he is in himself.' The highest being to the bird is the 'bird-being.' Take from it its conception of 'bird-being,' and you take from it its conception of the highest being. How, therefore, could the bird ask whether God in himself were winged? To ask whether God is in himself what he is for me, is to ask whether God is God; it is to raise oneself above God and to rebel against him.

Given, therefore, the situation in which man is seized by the awareness that religious predicates are mere anthropomorphisms, his faith has also come under the sway of doubt and unbelief. And if this awareness does not lead him to the formal negation of the predicates and thence to the negation of the being in which they are grounded, it is only due to an inconsistency for which his faint-heartedness and irresolute intellect are responsible. If you doubt the objective truth of the predicates, you must also doubt the objective truth of the subject to which they belong. If your predicates are anthropomorphisms, their subject, too, is an anthropomorphism. If love, goodness, and personality are human determinations, the being which constitutes their source and, according to you, their presupposition is also an anthropomorphism; so is the existence of God; so is the belief that there is a God – in short, all presuppositions that are purely human. What tells you that the belief in a God at all is not an indication of the limitedness of man's mode of conception? Higher beings – and you assume that such beings exist – are perhaps so blissful in themselves, so at unity with themselves that they are not exposed to a

tension between themselves and a higher being. To know God and not to be God, to know blissfulness and not to enjoy it, is to be in conflict with oneself, is to be delivered up to unhappiness.

You believe in love as a divine attribute because you yourself love, and believe that God is a wise and benevolent being because you know nothing better in yourself than wisdom and benevolence. You believe that God exists, that therefore he is a subject or an essence – whatever exists is also an essence, whether it is defined as a substance, a person, or in any other way – because you yourself exist, are yourself an essence. You know no higher human good than to love, to be wise and good. Equally, you know no other happiness than to exist, to be a being, for your consciousness of good and happiness derives itself from your consciousness of being and existing yourself. God to you exists, is a being for the same reason that he is to you a wise, blissful, and benevolent being. The distinction between the divine attributes and the divine essence is only this. To you the essence, the existence does not appear as an anthropomorphism, because the fact of your own being brings with it the necessity of conceiving the existence of God, whereas the attributes appear to you as anthropomorphisms, because their necessity – the necessity that God is wise, good, just, etc. – is not an immediate necessity identical with the being of man, but is mediated by his self-consciousness, by the activity of his thought. I may be wise or unwise, good or bad, but I am a being – I exist. Man's existence is to him the first datum, the sustaining ground of his conceptions, the presupposition of all his predicates. Hence, man is prepared to concede that the predicates of God are anthropomorphic, but not the existence of God; to him it is a settled, inviolable, absolutely certain, and objective truth. And yet, this distinction is only an apparent one. The necessity of the subject lies only in the necessity of the predicate. Your being is the being of man; the certainty and reality of your existence lie in the certainty and reality of your human attributes. What the subject is – its being – lies only in the predicate; the predicate is the truth of the subject; the subject is only the personified, existing predicate. The distinction between subject and object corresponds to the distinction between existence and essence. The negation of the predicate is therefore the negation of the subject. What remains of the being of man if you take away its attributes? Even in the language of ordinary life one speaks of the divine not in terms of its essence, but in terms of its attributes – providence, wisdom, omnipotence.

The certainty of the existence of God, which has been held by man to be more certain than even his own existence, depends therefore on the certainty of the attributes of God – it does not have the character of immediate certainty. To the Christian, only the existence of a Christian God is a certainty, just as to the pagan only that of a pagan god is certain. The pagan did not doubt the existence of Jupiter, because Jupiter as a divine being was not repulsive to him., He could not conceive of a god with any other attributes, because these attributes were to him a certainty, a divine truth. The truth of the predicate alone ensures the existence of the subject.

That which man conceives to be true is also that which he immediately conceives to be real because, originally, only the real is true to him – true in opposition to that which is merely conceived, dreamed, or imagined. The concept of being, of existence, is the original concept of truth. In other words, man originally makes truth dependent on existence, but only later existence dependent on truth. Now God is the essence of man, regarded by him as the highest truth. But God, or religion – both are the same – varies according to the determination in terms of which man comprehends his essence, in terms of which he regards it as the highest being. This determination, which is decisive for man's idea of God, is to him the truth and, precisely for that reason, also the highest existence, or existence itself. For, strictly speaking, only the highest existence is existence, and deserves this name. Therefore, God is a really existing being for the same reason that he is this particular being. The attribute or determination of God is nothing else than the essential attribute of man himself, and the thus – determined man is what he is, has his existence, his reality, in his determinateness. You cannot take away from a Greek the quality of being a Greek without taking away his existence. Hence, it is of course true that for a particular religion – that is, relatively – the certainty of the existence of God is immediate; for just as arbitrarily or necessarily the Greek was Greek, so necessarily were his gods Greek beings, so necessarily were they really existing beings. In view of its understanding of the world and man, religion is identical with the essence of man. However, it is not man who stands above the conceptions essential to his being; rather, it is these conceptions that stand above him. They animate, determine, and govern him. This goes to show that the necessity to prove, and the possibility to doubt, how and whether existence is related to being or quality is abolished. That which I sever from my being can only be doubtful. How could I therefore doubt God who is my essence? To doubt God would be to doubt myself. Only when God is conceived abstractly, when his predicates are arrived at through philosophical abstraction, does the distinction or separation arise between subject and predicate, existence and essence – only then does the illusion arise that the existence or the subject is something different from

the predicate, something immediate, indubitable, or distinct from the predicate which is subject to doubt. But this is only an illusion. A God whose predicates are abstract also has an abstract existence. Existence, being, is as varied as the qualities predicated of it.

The identity of subject and predicate is borne out clearly by the course taken by religion in its development, a course which is identical with that taken by human culture. As long as man is a mere natural being, his God is a mere natural deity. Mere man lives in houses, he encloses his gods in temples. A temple expresses the value which man attaches to beautiful buildings. Temples in honour of religion are in truth temples in honour of architecture. With man's progress to culture from a state of primitive savagery, with the distinction between what is proper and what is improper for man, there also arises the distinction between what is proper and what is improper for God. God expresses man's notion of majesty, highest dignity, religious sentiment, and highest feeling of propriety. Only at a later stage did the culturally more advanced artists of Greece embody in their statues of gods the concepts of dignity, spiritual grandeur, rest without movement, and serenity. But why did they regard these qualities as divine attributes? Because they held these attributes in themselves to be divine. Why did they exclude all repulsive and low emotions? Because they regarded these emotions as something improper, undignified, unhuman, and, consequently, ungodlike. The Homeric gods eat and drink – this means that eating and drinking are divine pleasures. Physical strength is a quality of the Homeric gods – Zeus is the strongest of all gods. Why? Because physical strength in itself was something glorious and divine to the Greeks. The highest virtue to ancient Germans was the virtue of the warrior; that is why their highest god was the god of war – Odin; that is why war to them was 'the primeval or the oldest law.' The first, true divine being is not the quality of divinity, but the divinity or the deity of quality. In other words, that which theology and philosophy have so far regarded as God, as the absolute and essential, is not God; but that which they did not regard as God, is precisely God – quality, determination, and reality par excellence. A true atheist, that is, an atheist in the ordinary sense, is therefore he alone to whom the predicates of the Divine Being – for example, love, wisdom, and justice – are nothing, not he to whom only the subject of these predicates is nothing. And the negation of the subject is by no means also necessarily the negation of the, predicates as they are in themselves. The predicates have a reality of their own, have an independent significance; the force of what they contain compels man to recognise them. They prove their truth to man directly through themselves. They are their own proof and evidence. Goodness, justice, and wisdom do not become chimeras if the existence of God is a chimera, nor do they become truths simply because the existence of God is a truth. The concept of God depends on the concept of justice, kindness, and wisdom – a God who is not kind, not just, and not wise is no God. But these concepts do not depend on the concept of God. That a quality is possessed by God does not make it divine; God possesses it, because it is in itself divine, because without it God would be a defective being. Justice, wisdom, and, in fact, every determination which constitutes the divinity of God, is determined and known through itself; but God is known and determined by the predicates. Only in the case where I think that God and justice are identical, that God is immediately the reality of the idea of justice or of any other quality, do I think of God as self-determined. But if God, the subject, is that which is determined, and the quality or the predicate is that which determines him, then the predicate, and not the subject, in truth deserves the primacy of being, the status of divinity.

Only when it happens that a number of contradictory qualities are combined into one being, which is then conceived in the form of a person, that is, when personality is particularly emphasised, does one forget the origin of religion, does one forget that that which reflective thought looks upon as the predicate distinguishable or separable from the subject was originally the true subject. Thus, the Greeks and the Romans deified the accidents as substances; virtues, mental states, and emotions, were as independent beings. Man, particularly the religious man, is the measure of all things, of all reality. Whatever impresses man, whatever makes a particular impression on his mind – and it may be merely some strange, inexplicable sound or note – he hypostatises into a particular deity. Religion encompasses all the objects of the world; think of anything existing, and you will find that it has been the object of religious veneration. Nothing is to be found in the essence and consciousness of religion that is not there in the being of man, that is not there in his consciousness of himself and the world. Religion has no particular content of its own. Even the emotions of fear and dread had their temples in Rome. The Christians, too, hypostatised their mental states into beings and qualities of things, their dominant emotions into powers dominating the world. In short, they hypostatised the qualities of their being – whether known or unknown to them – into self-subsisting beings. Devils, goblins, witches, ghosts, angels, etc., continued to be sacred truths as long as the religious disposition held its uninterrupted sway over mankind.

In order not to acknowledge the identity of the divine and human predicates, and

hence of the divine and human essence, one takes recourse to the idea that God, as an infinite being, has an infinite plenitude of various predicates, of which we know only some in this world, and indeed, those that are similar or analogous to our own; but the others, by virtue of which God is a totally different being from the being of man or from anything similar to it, we shall only know in the future – in the world hereafter. However, an infinite plenitude or multitude of predicates which are truly different – and so different that the knowledge of the one does not immediately posit and lead to the knowledge of the other – realises its truth only in an infinite plenitude or multitude of different beings or individuals. Thus, the being of man is infinitely rich in different kinds of predicates, but precisely for that reason it is infinitely rich in different kinds of individuals. Each new man is, so to say, a new predicate, a new talent added to mankind. Mankind possesses as many qualities, as many powers, as the number of its members. Although the individual partakes of the same power that is inherent in all men, it is so constituted in him that it appears to be a new and unique power. The secret of the inexhaustible plenitude of the divine determinations is, therefore, nothing else than the secret of the being of man which is infinitely diverse, infinitely determinable, and – precisely for these reasons – sensuous. Only in sensuousness, only in space and time, does an infinite being – a being that is really infinite and plentiful in predicates – exist. Where there are truly different predicates, there are truly different times. One man is an excellent musician, an excellent writer, and an excellent physician; but he cannot make music, write, and cure at one and the same time. Time, and not the Hegelian dialectic, is the power by means of which antitheses and contradictions are united in one and the same being. However, the infinite plurality of different predicates must remain an unreal conception if it is seen in conjunction with the concept of God, but in disjunction with the being of man. Thus, it must remain a fantasy – a conception of sensuousness, lacking the essence and truth of sensuousness. Thus, it must remain a conception that stands in direct contradiction with the Divine Being as an intellectual – that is, abstract, simple, and unique being – for the predicates of God are of such a nature that possessing one implies possessing all the others, because there is no real difference between them. If, therefore, the present predicates do not involve the future ones, the present God does not involve the future God, then the future God does not involve the present – they are two different beings. But this distinction contradicts the unity, uniqueness, and simplicity of God. Why is a certain predicate a predicate of God? Because it is of divine nature, that is, because it expresses no limitation, no defect. Why are other predicates so? Because, however different they may be among themselves, they concur in this: They equally express perfection and unlimitedness. Hence, I can imagine innumerable predicates of God, because they must all concur in the abstract concept of the Godhead, because they must have in common that which makes every single predicate into a divine attribute or predicate. This is the case with Spinoza. He speaks of an infinite plurality of the attributes of the divine substance, but he does not name any besides thought and extension, Why? Because it is a matter of complete indifference to know them; because they are, indeed, in themselves indifferent and superfluous; because despite these innumerable predicates, I would still be saying the same as with the two predicates of thought and extension. Why is thought an attribute of substance? Because according to Spinoza, it is comprehended through itself, because it is something that cannot be divided, that is, perfect and infinite. Why extension or matter? Because they express the same thing in relation to themselves. That means that substance can have an indefinite number of predicates, because it is not their determinateness, their difference, but their non-difference, their sameness, which makes them attributes of substance. Or rather, substance has such an infinite number of predicates, only because – and this is, indeed, strange – it has really no predicate, no definite, real predicate. The indeterminate One existing in thought is supplemented by the indeterminate, manifoldness existing in the imagination. Because the predicate is not *multum,* it is *multa.* In truth, the positive predicates are thought and extension. With these two, infinitely more is said than with nameless innumerable predicates; for they say something definite; they enable me to know something. But substance is too indifferent, too passionless to be enthusiastic about, or be on the side of, something; in order to be something, it prefers to be nothing.

Now, if it is accepted that whatever the subject or being involves lies solely in its determinations – in other words, the predicate is the true subject – it is also clear that if the divine predicates are determinations of the being of man, their subject, too, is the being of man. The divine predicates are general, on the one hand, but personal, on the other. The general ones are metaphysical, but they provide religion with ultimate points of reference, with a foundation; they are not the characteristic determinations of religion. It is the personal predicates alone on which the essence of religion is grounded, in which the divine nature of religion is objectified. Such personal predicates are, for example, that God is a Person, that he is the moral Lawgiver, the Father of men, the Holy One, the Just, the Merciful. It is obvious from these and other determinations – or at least it will be clear later – that as personal determinations these predicates are purely human determinations, and that, consequently, man’s relationship to God in religion is his relationship to his

own being. For these predicates are to religion not man's conceptions or images of God distinct from God as he is in himself, but truths and realities. Religion knows nothing of anthropomorphisms – anthropomorphisms are not anthropomorphisms to it. The essence of religion is precisely that it regards the attributes of God as the being of God. That these attributes are images is shown only by the intellect, which reflects on religion and, while defending them, denies them before its own tribunal. But in the view of religion, God is a real Father, real Love, real Mercy; for it takes him to be a real, living, personal attribute. Indeed, these and corresponding determinations are precisely those that are most offensive to the intellect, and which it denies in its reflection on religion. Subjectively, religion is emotion; objectively also, emotion is to it an attribute of the Divine Being. It regards even anger as not unworthy of God, provided that nothing evil is associated with it.

But it is important to note here – and the phenomenon in question is an extremely remarkable one, characterising the innermost essence of religion – that the more human the being of God is, the greater is the apparent difference between God and man; that is, the more is the identity of the human and the Divine Being denied by theology or the self-reflection of religion, and the more is the human – taken in the sense in which it is as such the object of man's consciousness – depreciated. The reason for this is to be found in the following: Because the positive and essential basis of the conception or determination of God can only be human, the conception of man as an object of consciousness can only be negative, that is, hostile to man. In order to enrich God, man must become poor; that God may be all, man must be nothing. But he also does not need to be anything for himself, because everything for himself, everything he takes from himself, is not lost, but preserved in God. Since man has his being in God, why then should he have it in and for himself? Why should it be necessary to posit and have the same thing twice? What man withdraws from himself, what he lacks in himself, he only enjoys in an incomparably higher and richer measure in God.

As a consequence of their vow of chastity, the monks repressed sexual love in themselves; but, for that matter, they had in the Virgin Mary the image of woman; in God, in heaven, the image of love. The more an ideal, imagined woman was the object of their real love, the more easily could they dispense with woman in flesh and blood. The greater the significance they attached to the annihilation of sensuality, the greater was for them the significance of the heavenly Virgin: She occupied in their mind a place even more prominent than that of Christ or God. The more the sensuous is denied, the more sensuous is the God to whom it is sacrificed. Whatever is sacrificed to God is something particularly cherished, but also something that is particularly pleasing to God. That which is the highest to man is also the highest to his God; that which pleases man pleases God also. The Hebrews did not sacrifice to Jehovah unclean, loathsome animals, but those they valued most; those they ate themselves were also the food of God. Where, therefore, the denial of sensuousness leads to its hypostatisation as a certain being, or to its transformation into an offering pleasing to God, there the highest value is attached to sensuousness; there the renounced sensuousness is restored precisely through the fact that God takes the place of the sensuous being that has been renounced. The nun weds herself to God; she has a heavenly bridegroom, and the monk, a heavenly bride. But the heavenly virgin is obviously the form in which a general truth concerning the essence of religion appears. Man affirms in God what he denies in himself. Religion abstracts from man, from the world. But it can abstract only from defects and limits, whether real or imaginary; it can abstract only from the illusory but not from the real, positive being of the world and man. Hence, it must reincorporate into its negation and abstraction that wherefrom it abstracts, or believes to abstract. And thus, in fact, religion unconsciously places in God all that it consciously denies, provided, of course, that the negated is something essential, true, and, consequently, something that cannot be negated. Thus, in religion man negates his reason – he knows nothing of God through his own reason; his thoughts are only earthly; he can only believe in what God reveals. But, for that matter, the thoughts of God are human and earthly; like man, he has plans in his head – he makes allowance for the circumstances and intellectual powers of man, like a teacher for his pupils' capacity to understand; he calculates exactly the effect of his gifts and revelations; he keeps an eye on man in all his doings; he knows everything – even the most earthly, the meanest, or the worst. In short, man denies his knowledge, his thought, that he may place them in God. Man renounces himself as a person only to discover God, the omnipotent and the infinite, as a personal being; he denies human honour, the human ego, only to have a God that is selfish, egoistic, who seeks in everything only himself, his honour, his advantage, only to have a God whose sole concern is the gratification of his own selfishness, the enjoyment of his own ego. Religion further denies goodness as a quality of man's being; man is wicked, corrupt, and incapable of good; but, in contrast, God is only good – the good being. It is demanded of man to conceive the good as God, but does this not make goodness an essential determination of man? If I am absolutely, i.e., by nature wicked and unholy, how can holiness and goodness be the objects of my thought – no matter whether these objects are given to me internally or externally? If my heart is wicked, my understanding corrupt, how can I perceive

and feel the holy to be holy, the good to be good? How can I perceive a beautiful painting as beautiful if my soul is by nature ugly, and hence incapable of perceiving aesthetic beauty? Even if I am not a painter and do not have the power to produce something beautiful out of myself, my feeling and understanding are aesthetic since 1 perceive beauty in the world outside. Either the good does not exist for man, or if it does, it reveals the holiness and goodness of the being of man. That which is absolutely against my nature, with which 1 have nothing in common, I also cannot think or feel. Holiness stands in contrast to me as an individual, but in unity with my human essence The holy is a reproach to my sinfulness; in it I recognise myself as a sinner, but in my idea of holiness I also know that I am not, and I reproach myself for not being what I ought to be, what I can be according to my nature. An ought without the possibility of conforming to it is a ludicrous chimera which cannot take hold of the mind. But in so far as I acknowledge goodness as my essential determination, as my law, I acknowledge it, consciously or unconsciously, as my own nature. A being other than mine, and differing from me according to its nature, does not concern me. I can perceive sin as sin only if I perceive it as involving me in a contradiction with myself; that is' as a contradiction between my personality and essence As a contradiction of the divine; that is, of a being other than mine, the feeling of sin is inexplicable, meaningless.

The distinction between Augustinianism and Pelagianism[3] consists only of this: What the former expresses in the form characteristic to religion, the latter expresses in the form characteristic to rationalism. Both say the same thing, both see the good as belonging to man; but Pelagianism does it directly, in a rationalistic, moral form, whereas Augustinianism does it indirectly, in a mystical, that is, religious form. That which is ascribed to the God of man is in truth ascribed to man himself; that which man predicates of God, he in truth predicates of himself. Augustinianism would only then be true – and true, indeed, in a sense opposed to Pelagianism – if the devil were the God of man, if man, aware that be was himself a devil, worshiped and celebrated the devil as the highest expression of his own being. But as long as man worships a good being as God, that long does he behold his own goodness in God.

The doctrine of the fundamental corruption of man's nature and the doctrine that man is incapable of good are identical, and concur in the view that, in truth, man is unable to do anything by himself and through his own power. The denial of human power and activity would be true only if man also denied the existence of moral activity in God; that is, if he were to say with the Oriental nihilist or pantheist: The Divine Being is absolutely without will, inactive, indifferent, and ignorant of the distinction between good and evil. But he who defines God as an active being – and, indeed, as morally active, as a moral and critical being, as a being that loves, works, and rewards good, and punishes, rejects, and condemns evil – he who so defines God only apparently denies human activity. In actual fact, he regards it as the highest, the most real activity. He who attributes action to man declares human activity to be divine. He says: A God who does not act, that is, does not act morally or humanly, is no God. He therefore makes the notion of God dependent on the notion of activity, or rather human activity, for he knows of none higher.

Man – and this is the secret of religion – objectifies his being, and then again makes himself the object of this objectified being, transformed into a subject, a person. He thinks of himself as an object, but as an object of an object, as an object to another being. Thus, here man is an object to God. That man is good or evil is not indifferent to God. No! God is keenly and deeply concerned whether man is good; he wants him to be good and blissful – and both necessarily belong together. The reduction of human activity to nothingness is thus retracted by the religious man through the fact that he turns his sentiments and actions into an object of God, man into a purpose of God – that which is an object in mind is a purpose in action – and the divine activity into a means of man's salvation. God acts, that man may be good and felicitous. Thus, while in appearance the greatest humiliation is inflicted upon man, in truth he is exalted to the highest. Thus, in and through God, the aim of man is man himself. It is true that the aim of man is God, but the aim of God is nothing except the moral and eternal salvation of man; that means that the aim of man is man himself. The divine activity does not distinguish itself from the human.

How could the divine activity work on me as its object, indeed, work in me, if it were essentially foreign to me? How could it have a human aim, the aim to make man better and happy, if it were not itself human? Does not the, aim determine the act? When man makes it his goal to morally improve himself, his resolutions and projects are divine; but, equally, when God has in view the salvation of man, both his aims and his corresponding activity are human. Thus, in God man confronts his own activity as an object. But because he regards his own activity as existing objectively and as distinct from himself, he necessarily receives the impulse, the urge, to act not from himself, but from this object. He looks upon his being as

[3] Pelagianism was a Christian school of thought that denied the idea of original sin, in opposition to the orthodox Augustinian view.

existing outside himself, and he looks upon it as the good; hence it is self-evident, a tautology, that he receives the impulse to good from where he deposits it.

God is the most subjective, the very own being of man, but set apart from himself. That means that he cannot derive his actions purely out of himself, or that all good comes from God. The more subjective, the more human God is the more man exteriorises[4] his subjectivity, his humanity, because God is in reality the exteriorised[5] self of man which he, however, reappropriates. As the activity of the arteries drives the blood into the extremities, and the action of the veins leads it back again, as life basically consists in a constant systole and diastole, so is it also in religion. In the religious systole man's being departs from itself into an outward projection; man disowns, rejects himself; in the religious diastole his heart again embraces his rejected being. God alone is the being whose actions originate within himself, whose activity flows out of himself – thus operates the repelling force in religion; God is the being who acts in me, with me, through me, upon me, and for me; he is the principle of my salvation, of my good sentiments and actions, and hence my own good principle and essence – thus operates the attracting force in religion.

The course of religious development, as delineated in general above, consists more specifically in this, that man progressively appropriates to himself what he had attributed to God. In the beginning, man posits his essence completely and without distinction outside himself. This is illustrated particularly by his belief in revelation. That which to a later epoch or to a culturally advanced people is revealed by reason or nature is, revealed to an earlier epoch, or to a culturally backward people, by God. All human urges, however natural – even the urge for cleanliness – were conceived by the Israelites as positive divine commandments. This example again shows us that man's image of God is the more debased and the more commonly human the more man denies himself. Can the degradation, the self-abnegation of man sink to lower depths than when he denies himself even the power and ability to fulfil by himself, out of his own resources, the requirements of ordinary decency? In comparison, the Christian religion distinguished the urges and emotions of man according to their character and content. It made only the good emotions, only the good sentiments, and only the good thoughts the revelations and workings of God, that is, his sentiments, emotions, and thoughts; for what God reveals is a determination of God himself; that which fills the heart overflows the lips; the nature of the effect reveals the nature of the cause; the character of the revelation points to the character of the being that reveals itself. A God who reveals himself only in good sentiments is himself a God whose essential quality is only moral goodness. The Christian religion separated inward moral purity from external physical purity; the Israelite religion identified the two. In contrast to the Israelite, the Christian religion is the religion of criticism and freedom. The Israelite recoiled from doing anything that was not commanded by God; even in external things he was without will; even his food fell within the jurisdiction of religious authority. On the other hand, the Christian religion left all these external things to the autonomy of man, that is, it posited in man what the Israelite posited outside himself – in God. Israel is the most perfect embodiment of religion's positivism; that is, of the type of religion that posits the essential being of man outside man. As compared with the Israelite, the Christian is an *esprit fort,* a free spirit. That is how things change. What yesterday still passed for religion, has ceased to be so today; and what is regarded as atheism today will be religion tomorrow.

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From Chapter XVI. The Distinction between Christianity and Heathenism

But the idea of deity coincides with the idea of humanity. All divine attributes, all the attributes which make God God, are attributes of the species – attributes which in the individual are limited, but the limits of which are abolished in the essence of the species, and even in its existence, in so far as it has its complete existence only in all men taken together. My knowledge, my will, is limited; but my limit is not the limit of another man, to say nothing of mankind; what is difficult to me is easy to another; what is impossible, inconceivable, to one age, is to the coming ace conceivable and possible. My life is bound to a limited time. not so the life of humanity. The history of mankind consists of nothing else than a continuous and progressive conquest of limits, which at a given time pass for the limits of humanity, and therefore for absolute insurmountable limits. But the future always unveils the fact that the alleged limits of the species were only limits of individuals. The most striking, proofs of this are presented by the history of philosophy and of physical science. It would be highly interesting and instructive to write a history of the sciences entirely from this point of view, in order to exhibit in all its vanity the presumptuous notion of the individual than he can set limits to his race. Thus the species is unlimited; the individual alone limited.

[4] *entäussert* (externalises).

[5] *entäusserte* (externalised).

But the sense of limitation is painful, and hence the individual frees himself from it by the contemplation of the perfect Being; in this contemplation he possesses what otherwise is wanting to him. With the Christians God is nothing else than the immediate unity of species and individuality, of the universal and individual being. God is the idea of the species as an individual – the idea or essence of the species, which as a species, as universal being, as the totality of all perfections, of all attributes or realities, freed from all the limits which exist in the consciousness and feeling of the individual, is at the same time again an individual, personal being. *Ipse suum esse est*[6]. Essence and existence are in God identical; which means nothing else than that he is the idea, the essence of the species, conceived immediately as an existence, an individual. The highest idea on the standpoint of religion is: God does not love, he is himself love; he does not live, he is life; he is not just, but justice itself; not a person, but personality itself, the species, the idea, as immediately a concrete existence. Because of this immediate unity of the species with individuality, this concentration of all that is universal and real in one personal being, God is a deeply moving object, enrapturing to the imagination; whereas, the idea of humanity has little power over the feelings, because humanity is only an abstraction; and the reality which presents itself to us in distinction from this abstraction is the multitude of separate, limited individuals. In God, on the contrary, feeling, has immediate satisfaction, because here all is embraced in one, i.e., because here the species has an immediate existence, – is an individuality. God is love, is justice, as itself a subject; he is the perfect universal being as one being, the infinite extension of the species as an all-comprehending unity. But God is only man's intuition of his own nature; thus the Christians are distinguished from the heathens in this, that they immediately identify the individual with the species – that with them the individual has the significance of the species, the individual by himself is held to be the perfect representative of the species – that they deify the human individual, make him the absolute being.

Especially characteristic is the difference between Christianity and heathenism concerning the relation of the individual to the intelligence, to the understanding, to the *nous*. The Christians individualised the understanding the heathens made it a universal essence. To the heathens, the understanding, the intelligence, was the essence of man; to the Christians, it was only a part of themselves. To the heathens therefore only the intelligence, the species, to the Christians, the individual, was immortal, i.e., divine. Hence follows the further difference between heathen and Christian philosophy.

The most unequivocal expression, the characteristic symbol of this immediate identity of the species and individuality in Christianity is Christ, the real God of the Christians. Christ is the ideal of humanity become existent, the compendium of all moral and divine perfections to the exclusion of all that is negative; pure, heavenly, sinless man, the typical man, the Adam Kadmon; not regarded as the totality of the species, of mankind, but immediately as one individual, one person. Christ, i.e., the Christian, religious Christ, is therefore not the central, but the terminal point of history. The Christians expected the end of the world, the close of history. In the Bible, Christ himself, in spite of all the falsities and sophisms of our exegetists, clearly prophesies the speedy end of the world. History rests only on the distinction of the individual from the race. Where this distinction ceases ' history ceases; the very soul of history is extinct. Nothing remains to man but the contemplation and appropriation of this realised Ideal, and the spirit of proselytism, which seeks to extend the prevalence of a fixed belief, – the preaching that God has appeared, and that the end of the world is at hand.

Since the immediate identity of the species and the individual oversteps the limits of reason and Nature, it followed of course that this universal, ideal individual was declared to be a transcendent, supernatural, heavenly being. It is therefore a perversity to attempt to deduce from reason the immediate identity of the species and individual, for it is only the imagination which effects this identity, the imagination to which nothing is impossible, and which is also the creator of miracles; for the greatest of miracles is the being who, while he is an individual, is at the same time the ideal, the species, humanity in the fullness of its perfection and infinity, i.e., the Godhead. Hence it is also a perversity to adhere to the biblical or dogmatic Christ, and yet to thrust aside miracles. If the principle be retained, wherefore deny its necessary consequences?

Chapter XXIII. The Contradiction in the Speculative Doctrine of God

The personality of God is thus the means by which man converts the qualities of his own nature into the qualities of another being, – of a being, external to himself. The personality of God is nothing else than the projected [7] personality of man.

[6] He is himself his own being.

[7] *entäusserte, vergegenständlichte* (externalised, objectified).

On this process of projecting self outwards[8] rests also the Hegelian speculative doctrine, according to which man's consciousness of God is the self-consciousness of God. God is thought, cognised by us. According to speculation, God, in being thought by us, thinks himself or is conscious of himself; speculation identifies the two sides which religion separates. In this it is far deeper than religion, for the fact of God being thought is not like the fact of an external object being thought. God is an inward, spiritual being; thinking, consciousness, is an inward, spiritual act; to think God is therefore to affirm what God is, to establish the being of God as an act. That God is thought, cognised, is essential; that this tree is thought, is to the tree accidental, unessential. God is an indispensable thought, a necessity of thought. But how is it possible that this necessity should simply express the subjective, and not the objective also? – how is it possible that God – if he is to exist for us, to be an object to us – must necessarily be thought, if he is in himself like a block, indifferent whether he be thought, cognised or not? No! it is not possible. We are necessitated to regard the fact of God being thought by us, as his thinking himself, or his self-consciousness.[9]

Religious objectivism has two passives, two modes in which God is thought. On the one hand, God is thought by us, on the other, he is thought by himself. God thinks himself, independently of his being thought by us: he has a self-consciousness distinct from, independent of, our consciousness. This is certainly consistent when once God is conceived as a real personality; for the real human person thinks himself, and is thought by another; my thinking of him is to him an indifferent, external fact. This is the last degree of anthropopathism. In order to make God free and independent of all that is human, he is regarded as a formal, real person, his thinking is confined within himself, and the fact of his being thought is excluded from him, and is represented as occurring in another being. This indifference or independence with respect to us, to our thought, is the attestation of a self-subsistent, i.e., external, personal existence. It is true that religion also makes the fact of God being thought into the self-thinking of God; but because this process goes forward behind its consciousness, since God is immediately presupposed as a self-existent personal being the religious consciousness only embraces the indifference of the two facts.

Even religion, however, does not abide by this indifference of the two sides. God creates in order to reveal himself creation is the revelation of God. But for stones, plants, and animals there is no God, but only for man; so that Nature exists for the sake of man, and man purely for the sake of God. God glorifies himself in man: man is the pride of God. God indeed knows himself even without man; but so long as there is no other me, so long is he only a possible, conceptional person. First when a difference from God, a non-divine is posited, is God conscious of himself; first when he knows what is not God, does he know what it is to be God, does he know the bliss of his Godhead. First in the positing of what is other than himself, of the world, does God posit himself as God. Is God almighty without creation? No! Omnipotence first realises, proves itself in creation. What is a power, a property, which does not exhibit, attest itself? What is a force which affects nothing? a light that does not illuminate? a wisdom which knows nothing, i.e., nothing, real? And what is omnipotence, what all other divine attributes, if man does not exist? Man is nothing without God; but also, God is nothing without man; for only in man is God an object as God; only in man is he God. The various qualities of man first give difference, which is the ground of reality in God. The physical qualities of man make God a physical being – God the Father, who is the creator of Nature, i.e., the personified, anthropomorphised essence of Nature; the intellectual qualities of man make God an intellectual being, the moral, a moral being. Human misery is the triumph of divine compassion; sorrow for sin is the delight of the divine holiness. Life, fire, emotion comes into God only through man. With the stubborn sinner God is angry; over the repentant sinner he rejoices. Man is the revealed God: in man the divine essence first realises and unfolds itself. In the creation of Nature God goes out of himself, he has relation to what is other than himself, but in man he returns into himself: – man knows God, because in him God finds and knows himself, feels himself as God. Where there is no pressure, no want, there is no feeling; – and feeling is alone real knowledge. Who can know compassion without having felt the want of it? justice without the experience of injustice? happiness without the experience of distress? Thou must feel what a thing is; otherwise thou wilt never learn to know it. It is in man that the divine properties first become feeling, i.e., man is the self-feeling of God; – and the feeling of God is the real God; for the qualities of God are indeed only real qualities, realities, as felt by man, – as feelings. If the experience of human misery were outside of God, in a being personally separate from him, compassion also would not be in God, and we should hence have again the Being destitute of qualities, or more correctly the nothing, which God was before man or without man. For example: – Whether I be a good or sympathetic being – for that alone is good which gives, imparts itself, *bonum est*

[8] *Selbstentäusserung* (self-externalisation).

[9] 'or his self-consciousness' is added by the translator.

communicativum sui[10], – is unknown to me before the opportunity presents itself of showing goodness to another being. Only in the act of imparting do I experience the happiness of beneficence, the joy of generosity, of liberality. But is this joy apart from the joy of the recipient? No; I rejoice because he rejoices. I feel the wretchedness of another, I suffer with him; in alleviating his wretchedness, I alleviate my own; – sympathy with suffering is itself suffering. The joyful feeling of the giver is only the reflex, the self-consciousness of the joy in the receiver. Their joy is a common feeling which accordingly makes itself visible in the union of ban of lips. So it is here. Just as the feeling of human misery is human, so the feeling of divine compassion is human. It is only a sense of the poverty of finiteness that gives a sense of the bliss of infiniteness. Where the one is not, the other is not. The two are inseparable, – inseparable the feeling of God as God, and the feeling of man as man, inseparable the knowledge of man and the self-knowledge of God. God is a Self only in the human self, – only in the human power of discrimination, in the principle of difference that lies in the human being. Thus compassion is only felt as a me, a self, a force, i.e., as something special, through its opposite. The opposite of God gives qualities to God, realises him, makes him a Self. God is God, only through that which is not God. Herein we have also the mystery of Jacob Boehme's doctrine. It must only be borne in mind that Jacob Boehme, as a mystic and theologian, places outside of man the feelings in which the divine being first realises himself, passes from nothing to something, to a qualitative being apart from the feelings of man (at least in imagination), – and that he makes them objective in the form of natural qualities, but in such a way that these qualities still only represent the impressions made on his feelings. It will then be obvious that what the empirical religious consciousness first posits with the real creation of Nature and of man, the mystical consciousness places before the creation in the premundane God, in doing which, however, it does away with the reality of the creation. For if God has what is not-God, already in himself, he has no need first to create what is not-God in order to be God. The creation of the world is here a pure superfluity, or rather an impossibility; this God for very reality does not come to reality; he is already in himself the full and restless world. This is especially true of Schelling's doctrine of God, who though made up of innumerable potencies is yet thoroughly impotent. Far more reasonable, therefore, is the empirical religious consciousness, which makes God reveal, i.e., realise himself in real man, real nature, and according to which man is created purely for the praise and glory of God. That is to say, man is the mouth of God, which articulates and accentuates the divine qualities as human feelings. God wills that he be honoured, praised. Why? because the passion of man for God is the self-consciousness of God. Nevertheless, the religious consciousness separates these two properly inseparable sides, since by means of the idea of personality it makes God and man independent existences. Now the Hegelian speculation identifies the two sides, but so as to leave the old contradiction still at the foundation. – it is therefore only the consistent carrying out, the completion of a religious truth. The learned mob was so blind in its hatred towards Hegel as not to perceive that his doctrine, at least in this relation, does not in fact contradict religion. – that it contradicts it only in the same way as, in general, a developed, consequent process of thought contradicts an undeveloped, inconsequent, but nevertheless radically identical conception.

But if it is only in human feelings and wants that the divine "nothing" becomes something obtains qualities, then the being of man is alone the real being of God, – man is the real God. And if in the consciousness which man has of God first arises the self-consciousness of God, then the human consciousness is, *per se,* the divine consciousness. Why then dost thou alienate[11] man's consciousness from him, and make it the self-consciousness of a being distinct from man, of that which is an object to him? Why dost thou vindicate existence to God, to man only the consciousness of that existence? God has his consciousness in man, and man his being in God? Man's knowledge of God is God's knowledge of himself? What a divorcing and contradiction! The true statement is this: man's knowledge of God is man's knowledge of himself, of his own nature. Only the unity of being, and consciousness is truth. Where the consciousness of God is, there is the being of God, – in man, therefore; in the being of God it is only thy own being which is an object to thee, and what presents itself *before* thy consciousness is simply what lies *behind* it. If the divine qualities are human, the human qualities are divine.

Only when we abandon a philosophy of religion, or a theology, which is distinct from psychology and anthropology, and recognise anthropology as itself theology, do we attain to a true, self-satisfying identity of the divine and human being, the identity of the human being with itself. In every theory of the identity of the divine and human which is not true identity, unity of the human nature with itself, there still lies at the foundation a division, a separation into two, since the identity is immediately abolished, or rather is supposed to be abolished. Every theory of this

[10] 'The good is that which communicates itself' (Aquinas).

[11] *entfremdest* (you estrange).

kind is in contradiction with itself and with the understanding, – is a half measure – a thing of the imagination – a perversion, a distortion; which, however, the more perverted and false it is, all the more *appears* to be profound.

7. Feuerbach, Principles of the Philosophy of the Future
1843
Source:
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/future/index.htm
From: Z. Hanfi (ed.) *The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach.* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1972)

§53

It is by no means only through thinking that man is distinguished from the animal. Rather, his *whole being* constitutes his distinction from the animal. It is true that he who does not think is not a man; but this is so not because thinking is the cause, but only because it is a *necessary consequence and quality* of man's being.

Hence, here too we need not go beyond the realm of sensuousness in order to recognise man as a being superior to animals. Man is not a particular being like the animal; rather, he is a *universal* being; he is therefore not a limited and unfree but an unlimited and free being, for universality, being without limit, and freedom are inseparable. And this freedom is not the property of just one *special* faculty, say, the will, nor does this universality reside in a special faculty of thinking called reason; this freedom, this universality applies to the *whole* being of man. The senses of the animal are certainly keener than those of man, but they are so only in relation to certain things that are necessarily linked with the needs of the animal; and they are keener precisely because of the determination that they are limited by being exclusively directed towards some definite objects. Man does not possess the sense of smell of a hunting dog or a raven, but because his sense of smell encompasses all kinds of smell, it is free and also indifferent to particular smells. But where a sense is elevated above the limits of particularity and above being tied down to needs, it is elevated to an *independent,* to a *theoretical* significance and dignity – universal sense is *intellect,* and universal sensuousness is *intellectuality.* Even the lowest senses – smell and taste – are elevated in man to intellectual and scientific activities. The smell and taste of things are objects of natural science. Indeed, even the *stomach* of man, no matter how contemptuously we look down upon it, is something human and not animal because it is universal; that is, not limited to certain kinds of food. That is why man is free from that ferocious voracity with which the animal hurls itself on its prey. Leave a man his head, but give him the stomach of a lion or a horse, and he Will certainly cease to be a man. A limited stomach is compatible only with a limited, that is, animal sense. Man's moral and rational relationship to his stomach consists therefore in his according it a human and not a beastly treatment. He who thinks that what is important to mankind is stomach, and that stomach is something animal, also authorises man to be bestial in his eating.

§54

The new philosophy makes *man, together with nature* as the basis of man, the *exclusive, universal, and highest* object of philosophy; it makes *anthropology*, together with *physiology*, the universal science.

§55

Art, religion, philosophy, and science are only expressions or manifestations of the *true being of man.* A man is truly and perfectly man only when he possesses an *aesthetic or artistic, religious or moral, philosophical* or *scientific* sense. And only he who *excludes from himself* nothing that is *essentially human* is, strictly speaking, man. *Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto*[1] – this sentence, taken in its *universal and highest meaning,* is the *motto* of the *new philosophy.*

§56

The philosophy of Absolute Identity has completely mislocated the standpoint of truth. The *natural standpoint* of man, the standpoint of the *distinction between* "I" and "You," between *subject and object* is the *true*, the absolute standpoint and, hence, also the *standpoint of philosophy.*

§57

The *true unity of head and heart* does not consist in wiping out or covering up their difference, but rather in the recognition that *the essential object of the heart* is also *the essential object of the head,* or in the identity of the *object.* The new philosophy, which makes the essential and highest object of the heart – man – also the essential and highest object of the intellect, lays the foundation of a rational unity of head and heart, of thought and life.

§58

Truth does not exist in thought, nor in cognition confined to itself. *Truth is only the totality of man's life and being.*

[1] 'I am a man, I consider nothing human alien to me' (Terence).

§59

The single man *in isolation* possesses in himself the *essence* of man neither as a *moral* nor as a *thinking* being. *The essence* of man is contained only in the community, in the *unity of man with man – a* unity, however, that rests on the *reality* of the *distinction* between "I" and "You".

§60

Solitude means being *finite and limited, community* means being *free and infinite. For himself* alone, man is just man (in the ordinary sense); but *man with man* – the unity of "I" and "You" – that is *God.*

§61

The absolute philosopher said, or at least thought of himself – naturally as a *thinker* and not as a man – "*vérité c'est moi*,"[2] in a way analogous to the absolute monarch claiming, "*L'État c'est moi*,"[3] or the absolute God claiming, *"L'être c'est moi*."[4] The human philosopher, on the other hand, says: Even in thought, even as a philosopher, *I am a man in togetherness with men.*

§62

The *true* dialectic is not a *monologue of the solitary thinker with himself.* It is a *dialogue between "I" and "You".*

§63

The *Trinity* was the *highest mystery*, the central point of the *absolute philosophy and religion.* But the secret of the Trinity, as demonstrated historically and philosophically in the *Essence of Christianity,* is the secret of *communal and social life – the* secret of the *necessity* of a *"You" for an "I".* It is the truth that *no being whatsoever,* be it man or God and be it called "spirit" or "I", can be a *true, Perfect, and absolute being in isolation,* that the *truth* and *perfection* are only the *union and unity* of beings that are similar in essence. Hence, the highest and ultimate principle of philosophy is *the unity of man with man.* All essential relationships – the principles of various sciences – are only *different kinds and modes of this unity.*

[2] 'I am truth'.

[3] 'I am the state'.

[4] 'I am being'.

8. Marx, Rheinische Zeitung articles
1842
Source: http://marxists.org/archive/marx/works/cw/volume01/index.htm
Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 1

From Debates on Freedom of the Press (May 1842)

(p. 155) Freedom is so much the essence of man that even its opponents implement it while combating its reality; they want to appropriate for, themselves as a most precious ornament what they have rejected as an ornament of human nature.

(pp. 162-3) The press law[1], therefore, is far from being a repressive measure against freedom of the press, a mere means of preventing the repetition of a crime through fear of punishment. On the contrary, the *absence of press legislation* must be regarded as an exclusion of freedom of the press from the sphere of legal[2] freedom, for legally recognised freedom exists in the state[3] as law. Laws are in no way repressive measures against freedom, any more than the law of gravity is a repressive measure against motion, because while, as the law of gravitation, it governs the eternal motions of the celestial bodies, as the law of falling it kills me if I violate it and want to dance in the air. Laws are rather the positive, clear, universal norms in which freedom has acquired an impersonal, theoretical existence independent of the arbitrariness of the individual. A statute-book is a people's bible of freedom.

Therefore the *press law* is *the legal recognition of freedom of the press.* It constitutes *right*[4], because it is the positive existence of freedom. It must therefore exist, even if it is never put into application, as in North America, whereas censorship, like slavery, can never become lawful[5], even if it exists a thousand times over as a law.

There are no actual preventive laws. Law prevents only as a *command*. It only becomes *effective* law when it is infringed, for it is *true* law only when in it the unconscious natural law of freedom has become conscious state law. Where the law is real law, i.e., a form of existence of freedom, it is the real existence of freedom for man. Laws therefore, cannot prevent a man's actions, for they are indeed the inner laws of life of his action itself, the conscious reflections of his life. Hence law withdraws into the background in the face of man's life as a life of freedom, and only when his actual behaviour has shown that he has ceased to obey the natural law of freedom does law in the form of state law compel him to be free, just as the laws of physics confront me as something alien only when my life has ceased to be the life of these laws, when it has been struck *by illness.* Hence a *preventive law* is a *meaningless contradiction*.

(pp. 164-5) The free press is the ubiquitous vigilant eye of a people's soul, the embodiment of a people's faith in itself, the eloquent link that connects the individual with the state and the world, the embodied culture that transforms material struggles into intellectual[6] struggles and idealises their crude material form. It is a people's frank confession to itself, and the redeeming power of confession is well known. It is the spiritual[7] mirror in which a people can see itself, and self-examination is the first condition of wisdom. It is the spirit of the state, which can be delivered into every cottage, cheaper than coal gas. It is all-sided, ubiquitous, omniscient. It is the ideal world which always wells up out of the real world and flows back into it with ever greater spiritual riches and renews its soul.

From The Leading Article in no. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung (Jul 1842)

(p. 193) The true "public" education carried out by the state lies in the rational and public existence of the state; the state itself educates its members by making them its members, by converting the aims of the individual into general aims, crude instinct into moral inclination, natural independence into spiritual freedom, by the individual finding his good in the life of the whole, and the whole in the frame of mind of the individual.

(pp. 200-202) There exists a dilemma in the face of which "common" sense is powerless.

[1] (here and below) *Gesetz*.

[2] *rechtliche*.

[3] *Staat*. In 1842 Marx means by the state the politically united community as a whole, rather than just its central governing apparatus.

[4] *Recht*.

[5] *gesetzlich*.

[6] *geistige*.

[7] (Here and below) *geistige*.

Either the Christian state corresponds to the concept of the state as the realisation[8] of rational freedom, and then the state only needs to be a rational state in order to he a Christian state and it suffices to derive the state from the rational character[9] of human relations, a task which philosophy accomplishes; or the state of rational freedom cannot be derived from Christianity, and then you yourself will admit that this derivation is not intended by Christianity, since it does not want a bad state, and a state that is not the realisation of rational freedom is a bad state.

You may solve this dilemma in whatever way you like, you will have to admit that the state must be built on the basis of free reason, and not of religion. Only the crassest ignorance could assert that this theory, the. conversion of the concept of the state into an independent concept, is a passing whim of recent philosophers.

In the political sphere, philosophy has done nothing that physics, mathematics, medicine, and every science, have not done in their respective spheres. Bacon of Verulam said that theological physics was a virgin dedicated to God and barren, he emancipated physics from theology and it became fertile. just as you do not ask the physician whether he is a believer, you have no reason to ask the politician either. Immediately before and after the time of Copernicus' great discovery of the true solar system, the law of gravitation of the state was discovered, its own gravity was found in the state itself. The various European governments tried, in the superficial way of first practical attempts, to apply this result in order to establish a system of equilibrium of states. Earlier, however, Machiavelli and Campanella, and later Hobbes, Spinoza, Hugo Grotius, right down to Rousseau, Fichte and Hegel, began to regard the state through human eyes and to deduce its natural laws from reason and experience, and not from theology. In so doing, they were as little deterred as Copernicus was by the fact that Joshua bade the sun stand still over Gideon and the moon in the valley of Ajalon. Recent philosophy has only continued the work begun by Heraclitus and Aristotle. You wage a polemic, therefore, not against the rational character of recent philosophy, but against the ever new philosophy of reason. Of course, the ignorance. which perhaps only yesterday or the day before yesterday discovered for the first time age-old ideas about the state in the *Rheinische* or the *Königsberger Zeitung*, regards these ideas of history as having suddenly occurred to certain individuals overnight, because they are new to it and reached it only overnight; it forgets that it itself is assuming the old role of the doctor of the Sorbonne who considered it his duty to accuse Montesquieu publicly of being so frivolous as to declare that the supreme merit of the state was political, not ecclesiastical, virtue. It forgets that it is assuming the role of Joachim Lange, who denounced Wolff on the ground that his doctrine of predestination would lead to desertion by the soldiers and thus the weakening of military discipline, and in the long run the collapse of the state. Finally, it forgets that Prussian Law was derived from the philosophical school of precisely "this Wolff", and that the French Napoleonic Code was derived not from the Old Testament, but from the school of ideas of Voltaire, Rousseau, Condorcet, Mirabeau, and Montesquieu, and from the French revolution. Ignorance is a demon, we fear that it will yet be the cause of many a tragedy; the greatest Greek poets rightly depicted it as tragic fate in the soul-shattering dramas of the royal houses of Mycenae and Thebes.

Whereas the earlier philosophers of constitutional law proceeded in their account of the formation of the state from the instincts, either of ambition or gregariousness, or even from reason, though not social reason, but the reason of the individual, the more ideal and profound view of recent philosophy proceeds from the idea of the whole. It looks on the state as the great organism, in which legal, moral, and political freedom must be realised, and in which the individual citizen in obeying the laws of the state only obeys the natural laws of his own reason, of human reason. *Sapienti sat*.[10]

From Communism and the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung (Oct 1842)

(p. 216) That Sieyes' prophecy has come true and that the *tiers etat* ["Third Estate"] has become everything and wants to be everything[11] – all this is recognized with the most sorrowful indignation by Bulow-Cummerow, by the former *Berliner Politische Wochenblatt* [Berlin Political Weekly], by Dr. Kosegarten, and by all the feudalistic writers. That the class that today possesses nothing demands to share in the wealth of the middle class is a fact that, without the Strasbourg speeches and the silence of the Augsburg paper, is clearly

[8] *Verwirklichung* (actualisation).

[9] *von der Vernunft*. Literally 'from the reason'.

[10] Shortening of *verbum sapienti sat est*, 'a word is enough for the wise'.

[11] Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès was leading figure in the French Revolution. In his 1789 pamphlet *What is the Third Estate?* he famously wrote: 'What is the Third State? Everything. What has it been until now in the political order? Nothing. What does it want to be? Something.' In pre-revolutionary France the first estate was the aristocracy, the second was the clergy and the third was the rest of the people.

recognized in the streets of Manchester, Paris, and Lyon. Does the Augsburger really believe that indignation and silence refute the facts of the time? The Augsburger is impertinent in fleeing. The Augsburg paper runs away from captious issues and believes that the dust it stirs up, and the nervous invectives it mutters in its flight, will blind and confuse the uncomfortable issue as well as the comfortable reader.

Or is the Augsburger angry at our correspondent's expectation that the undeniable collision will be solved in a "peaceful way"? Or does the Augsburger reproach us for not having given immediately a good prescription and not having put into the surprised reader's pocket a report as clear as daylight on the solution of the enormous problem? We do not possess the art of mastering problems which two nations are working on with one phrase.

(p. 220) The *Rheinische Zeitung*, which cannot concede the theoretical reality of communist ideas even in their present form, and can even less wish or consider possible their practical realization, will submit these ideas to a thorough criticism. If the Augsburg paper demanded and wanted more than slick phrases, it would see that writings such as those of Leroux, Considerant, and above all Proudhon's penetrating work, can be criticized, not through superficial notions of the moment, but only after long and deep study. We consider such "theoretical" works the more seriously as we do not agree with the Augsburg paper, which finds the "reality" of communist ideas not in Plato but in some obscure acquaintance who, not without some merit in some branches of scientific research, gave up the entire fortune that was at his disposal at the time and polished his confederates' dishes and boots, according to the will of Father Enfantin. We are firmly convinced that it is not the *practical attempt*, but rather the *theoretical application* of communist ideas, that constitutes the real *danger*; for practical attempts, even those on a large scale, can be answered with cannon as soon as they become dangerous, but ideas, which conquer our intelligence, which overcome the outlook that reason has riveted to our conscience, are chains from which we cannot tear ourselves away without tearing our hearts; they are demons that man can overcome only by submitting to them.

From Debates on the Law on Thefts of Wood (Oct 1842)

(pp. 230-1) The so-called customs of the privileged classes are understood to mean *customs contrary to the law*[12]. Their origin dates to the period in which human history was part of *natural history*, and in which, according to Egyptian legend, all gods concealed themselves in the shape of animals. Mankind appeared to fall into definite species of animals which were connected not by equality, but by inequality, an inequality fixed by laws. The world condition of unfreedom required laws expressing this unfreedom, for whereas human law is the mode of existence of freedom, this animal law is the mode of existence of unfreedom. *Feudalism* in the broadest sense is the *spiritual animal kingdom*, the world of divided mankind, in contrast to the human world that creates its own distinctions and whose inequality is nothing but a refracted form of equality. In the countries of naive feudalism, in the countries of the caste system, where in the literal sense of the word people are put in separate boxes, and the noble, freely interchanging members of the great sacred body, the holy Humanus, are sawn and cleft asunder, forcibly torn apart, we find therefore also the *worship of animals*, animal religion in its primitive form, for man always regards as his highest being[13] that which is his true being. The sole equality to be found in the actual life of animals is the equality between one animal and other animals of the same species[14]; it is the equality of the given species with itself, but not the equality of the genus[15]. The animal genus itself is seen only in the hostile behaviour of the different animal species, which assert their particular *distinctive* characteristics one against another. In the *stomach of the beast of prey*, nature has provided the battlefield of union, the crucible of closest fusion, the organ connecting the various animal species.

Similarly, under feudalism one species feeds at the expense of another, right down to the species which, like the polyp, grows on the ground and has only numerous arms with which to pluck the fruits of the earth for higher races while it itself eats dust for whereas in the natural animal kingdom the worker bees kill the drones, in the spiritual animal kingdom the drones kill the worker bees, and precisely by labour.

From On the Commissions of the Estates[16] in Prussia (Dec 1842)

[12] *Recht*.

[13] *Wesen*.

[14] *Art*.

[15] *Gattung*.

[16] *Stände*. Traditionally German society was divided into various estates: nobility, burghers (townsmen), and country-dwellers. When Marx was writing each province of Prussia had an Assembly of Estates, with members elected from each of these estates,

(pp. 295-6) At the same time, however, one would have to demand of the author[17] that he should make a more thorough study of nature and rise from the first sensuous perception of the various elements to a rational perception of the organic life of nature. Instead of the spectre of a chaotic unity, he would become aware of the spirit of a living unity. Even the elements do not persist in inert separation. They are continually being transformed into one another and this transforming alone forms the first stage of the physical life of the earth, the meteorological process. In the living organism, all trace of the different elements as such has disappeared. The difference no longer consists in the separate existence of the various elements, but in the living movement of distinct functions, which are all inspired by one and the same life, so that the very difference between them does not exist ready-made prior to this life but, on the contrary, continually arises out of this life itself and as continually vanishes within it and becomes paralysed, just as nature does not confine itself to the elements already present, but even at the lowest stage of its life proves that this diversity is a mere sensuous phenomenon that has no spiritual truth, so also the state, this natural realm of the spirit, must not and cannot seek and find its true essence in a fact apparent to the senses. The author, therefore, has provided only a superficial basis for the "divine order of the world" by confining himself to the difference between the estates as its final and definitive result.

But, in the author's opinion, "care must be taken that the people is not set in motion as a *crude, inorganic mass*". Therefore, there can be "no question as to whether in general *estates* ought to *exist*, but only the question of establishing to what extent and in what proportion the *existing estates* are called upon to take part in political activity".

The question that arises here, of course, is not to what extent the estates exist, but to what extent they ought to continue their existence right up to the highest sphere of state life. If it would be unfitting to set the people in motion as a crude, inorganic mass, it would be just as much impossible to achieve an organised movement of the people if it were resolved mechanically into rigid and abstract constituents, and an independent movement, which could only he a convulsive one, were demanded of these inorganic, forcibly established parts. The author starts out from the view that in the actual *state* the people exists as a crude, inorganic mass, apart from some arbitrarily seized on differences of estate. Hence he knows no organism of the state's life itself, but only a juxtaposition of heterogeneous parts which are encompassed superficially and mechanically by the state.

(pp. 305-6) The provincial assemblies, owing to their specific composition, are nothing but an association of particular interests which are privileged to assert their *particular limits* against the state. They are therefore a legitimised self-constituted body of non-state elements in the state. Hence by their very *essence* they are *hostile* towards the state, for the particular in its isolated activity is always the enemy of the whole, since precisely this whole makes it feel its *insignificance* by making it feel its limitations.

If this granting of political independence to particular interests were a necessity for the state, it would be merely the external sign of an internal sickness of the state, just as an unhealthy body must break out in boils according to natural laws. One would have to decide between two views: either that the particular interests, assuming the upper hand and becoming alien to the political spirit of the state, seek to impose limits on the state, or that the state becomes concentrated solely in *government* and as compensation concedes to the restricted spirit of the people merely a field for airing its particular interests. Finally, the two views could he combined. If, therefore, the demand for representation of intellect[18] is to have any meaning, we must expound it as the demand for conscious representation of the intelligence of the people, a representation which does not seek to assert individual needs against the state, but one whose supreme need is to assert the state itself, and indeed as its own achievement, as its own state. In general, to be represented is something passive; only what is material, spiritless, unable to rely on itself, imperilled, requires to be represented; but no element of the state should be material, spiritless, unable to rely on itself, imperilled. Representation must not be conceived as the representation of something that is not the people itself. It must be conceived only as the people's *self-representation*, as a state action which, not being its sole, exceptional state action, is distinguished from other expressions of

which had jurisdiction over some areas of local government. In 1842 the central government established a system of 'commissions' or delegations elected by the various Assemblies of Estates which would form a single national body to advise the king.

[17] (of the article that Marx is criticising here, which had supported the idea of the commissions).

[18] The idea that the learned section of society (perhaps priests and academics) should have its own representatives in Assemblies of Estates.

its state life merely by the universality of its content. Representation must not be regarded as a concession to defenceless weakness, to impotence, but rather as the self-reliant vitality of the supreme force. In a true state there is no landed property, no industry, no material thing, which as a crude element of this kind could make a bargain with the state; in it there are only *spiritual forces,* and only in their state form of resurrection, in their political rebirth, are these natural forces entitled to a voice in the state. The state pervades the whole of nature with spiritual nerves, and at every point it must be apparent that what is dominant is not matter, but form, not nature without the state, but the nature of the state, not the *unfree object* but the *free human being.*

From The Divorce Bill (Dec 1842)

(pp. 308-9) When we ask *these* opponents[19] (who are not opponents of the church conception and of the other shortcomings we have indicated) on what they base their arguments, they always speak to us about the unfortunate position of the husband and wife tied together against their will. They adopt a eudemonic standpoint, they think only of the two individuals and forget about the *family*. They forget that almost every divorce is the break-up of a family and that even from the purely juridical standpoint the children and their property cannot be made to depend on arbitrary will and its whims. If marriage were not the basis of the family, it would no more be the subject of legislation than, for example, friendship is. Thus, the above-mentioned opponents take into account *only* the individual will or, more correctly, the *arbitrary desire* of the married couple, but pay no attention to the *will of marriage*, the moral substance of this relationship. The legislator, however, should regard himself as a naturalist. He does not *make* the laws, he does not invent them, he only formulates them, expressing in conscious, positive laws the inner laws of spiritual relations. Just as one would have to reproach the legislator for the most unbridled arbitrary behaviour if he replaced the essence of the matter by his own notions, so also the legislator is certainly no less entitled to regard it as the most unbridled arbitrariness if private persons seek to enforce their caprices in opposition to the essence of the matter. No one is forced to contract marriage, but everyone who has done so must be compelled to obey the laws of marriage. A person who contracts marriage does not *create* marriage, does not *invent* it, any more than a swimmer creates or invents the nature and laws of water and gravity. Hence marriage cannot be subordinated to his arbitrary wishes; on the contrary, his arbitrary wishes must be subordinated to marriage. Anyone who arbitrarily breaks a marriage thereby asserts that arbitrariness, *lawlessness, is the law of marriage*, for no rational person will have the presumption to consider his actions as privileged, as concerning *him alone*; on the contrary, he will maintain that his actions are legitimate, that they *concern everybody*. But what do you oppose? You oppose the legislation of arbitrariness, but surely you do not want to raise arbitrariness to the level of a law at the very moment when you are accusing the legislator of arbitrariness.

Hegel says: *In itself*, according to the concept, marriage is indissoluble, but only in itself, i.e., *only* according to the concept. his says nothing *specific* about marriage. All moral relations are indissoluble according to *the concept,* as is easily realised if their *truth* is presupposed. A *true* state, a true marriage, a true friendship are indissoluble, but no state, no marriage, no friendship corresponds fully to its concept, and like real friendship, even in the family, like the real state in world history, so, too, real marriage in the state is *dissoluble.* No moral *existence* corresponds to its *essence* or, at least, it does not *have* to correspond to it. Just as in nature decay and death appear of themselves where an existence has totally ceased to correspond to its function, just as world history decides whether a state has so greatly departed from the idea of the state that it no longer deserves to exist, so, too, the state decides in what circumstances an existing marriage has ceased to be a marriage. Divorce is nothing but the statement of the fact that the marriage in question is a *dead* marriage, the existence of which is mere semblance and deception. It is obvious that neither the arbitrary decision of the legislator, nor the arbitrary desire of private persons, but only the *essence of the matter* can decide whether a marriage is dead or not, for it is well known that the *statement* that *death has occurred* depends on the facts, and not on the *desires* of the parties involved. But if, in the case of *physical* death, precise, irrefutable proof is required, is it not clear that the legislator should be allowed to register the fact of a *moral* death only on the basis of the most indubitable symptoms, since preserving the life of moral relationships is not only his right, but also his duty, the duty of his self-preservation!

Certainty that the *conditions* under which the *existence* of a moral relationship no longer corresponds to its *essence* are correctly registered, without preconceived opinions, in accordance with the level attained by science and with the generally accepted views – this certainty, of course, can only exist if the law is the conscious expression of the popular will, and therefore originates with it and is created by it.

[19] (of the newly published Divorce Bill which would make divorce much harder).

9. Marx and Engels, The Holy Family
1844
Source: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/holy-family/index.htm
From Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, Volume 4, pp. 35-37

From Chapter 4 Section 4 'Proudhon'
(by Marx)

Proletariat and wealth are opposites; as such they form a single whole. They are both creations of the world of private property. The question is exactly what place each occupies in the antithesis. It is not sufficient to declare them two sides of a single whole.

Private property as private property, as wealth, is compelled to maintain *itself*, and thereby its opposite, the proletariat, in *existence*. That is the *positive* side of the antithesis, self-satisfied private property.

The proletariat, on the contrary, is compelled as proletariat to abolish itself and thereby its opposite, private property, which determines its existence, and which makes it proletariat. It is the *negative* side of the antithesis, its restlessness within its very self, dissolved and self-dissolving private property.

The propertied class and the class of the proletariat present the same human self-estrangement. But the former class feels at ease and strengthened in this self-estrangement, it recognizes estrangement as *its own power* and has in it the *semblance* of a human existence. The class of the proletariat feels annihilated in estrangement; it sees in it its own powerlessness and the reality of an inhuman existence. It is, to use an expression of Hegel, in its abasement the indignation at that abasement, an *indignation* to which it is necessarily driven by the contradiction between its human *nature* and its condition of life, which is the outright, resolute and comprehensive negation of that nature.

Within this antithesis the private property-owner is therefore the *conservative* side, the proletarian the *destructive* side. From the former arises the action of preserving the antithesis, from the latter the action of annihilating it.

Indeed private property drives itself in its economic movement towards its own dissolution, but only through a development which does not depend on it, which is unconscious and which takes place against the will of private property by the very nature of things, only inasmuch as it produces the proletariat as proletariat, poverty which is conscious of its spiritual and physical poverty, dehumanization which is conscious of its dehumanization, and therefore self-abolishing. The proletariat executes the sentence that private property pronounces on itself by producing the proletariat, just as it executes the sentence that wage-labour pronounces on itself by producing wealth for others and poverty for itself. When the proletariat is victorious, it by no means becomes the absolute side of society, for it is victorious only by abolishing itself and its opposite. Then the proletariat disappears as well as the opposite which determines it, private property.

When socialist writers ascribe this world-historic role to the proletariat, it is not at all, as Critical Criticism pretends to believe, because they regard the proletarians as *gods*. Rather the contrary. Since in the fully-formed proletariat the abstraction of all humanity, even of the *semblance* of humanity, is practically complete; since the conditions of life of the proletariat sum up all the conditions of life of society today in their most inhuman form; since man has lost himself in the proletariat, yet at the same time has not only gained theoretical consciousness of that loss, but through urgent, no longer removable, no longer disguisable, absolutely imperative *need* – the practical expression of *necessity* – is driven directly to revolt against this inhumanity, it follows that the proletariat can and must emancipate itself. But it cannot emancipate itself without abolishing the conditions of its own life. It cannot abolish the conditions of its own life without abolishing all the inhuman conditions of life of society today which are summed up in its own situation. Not in vain does it go through the stern but steeling school of *labour*. It is not a question of what this or that proletarian, or even the whole proletariat, at the moment *regards* as its aim. It is a question of *what the proletariat is*, and what, in accordance with this *being*, it will historically be compelled to do. Its aim and historical action is visibly and irrevocably foreshadowed in its own life situation as well as in the whole organization of bourgeois society[1] today. There is no need to explain here that a large part of the English and French proletariat is already *conscious* of its historic task and is constantly working to develop that consciousness into complete clarity.

[1] *bürgliche Gesellschaft*. In Hegel and in Marx's early writings this is standardly translated as 'civil society' but in Marx's later writings often as 'bourgeois society'.

10. Marx, Theses on Feuerbach
1845
Source: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/index.htm

1

The main defect of all hitherto-existing materialism — that of Feuerbach included — is that the Object [*der Gegenstand*], actuality, sensuousness, are conceived only in the form of the object [*Objekts*], or of contemplation [*Anschauung*], but not as human sensuous activity, practice [*Praxis*], not subjectively. Hence it happened that the active side, in opposition to materialism, was developed by idealism — but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects [*Objekte*], differentiated from thought-objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective [*gegenständliche*] activity. In *The Essence of Christianity* [*Das Wesen des Christenthums*], he therefore regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and defined only in its dirty-Jewish form of appearance [*Erscheinungsform*]. [1]Hence he does not grasp the significance of 'revolutionary', of 'practical-critical', activity.

2

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, *i.e.*, the reality and power, the this-sidedness [*Diesseitigkeit*] of his thinking, in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.

3

The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of changed circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change [*Selbstveränderung*] can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice.

4

Feuerbach starts off from the fact of religious self-estrangement [*Selbstentfremdung*], of the duplication of the world into a religious, imaginary world, and a secular [*weltliche*] one. His work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular basis. He overlooks the fact that after completing this work, the chief thing still remains to be done. For the fact that the secular basis lifts off from itself and establishes itself in the clouds as an independent realm can only be explained by the inner strife and intrinsic contradictoriness of this secular basis. The latter must itself be understood in its contradiction and then, by the removal of the contradiction, revolutionised. Thus, for instance, once the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the former must itself be annihilated [*vernichtet*] theoretically and practically.

5

Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract thinking, wants sensuous contemplation [*Anschauung*]; but he does not conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous activity.

6

Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of man [*menschliche Wesen*]. But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations. Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence is hence obliged:

1. To abstract from the historical process and to define the religious sentiment regarded by itself, and to presuppose an abstract — isolated - human individual.

2. The essence therefore can by him only be regarded as 'species', as an inner 'dumb' generality which unites many individuals only in a natural way.

7

Feuerbach consequently does not see that the 'religious sentiment' is itself a social product, and that the abstract individual that he analyses belongs in reality to a

[1] "Dirty-Jewish" — according to Marhsall Berman, this is an allusion to the Jewish God of the Old Testament, who had to 'get his hands dirty' making the world, tied up with a symbolic contrast between the Christian God of the Word, and the God of the Deed, symbolising practical life. See The Significance of the Creation in Judaism, Essence of Christianity 1841. (Note by Cyril Smith)

particular social form.

8

All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.

9

The highest point reached by contemplative [*anschauende*] materialism, that is, materialism which does not comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is the contemplation of single individuals and of civil society [*bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*].

10

The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the standpoint of the new is transcendental

11. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology
1845-46
Source: http://marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01.htm
From Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology* (Progress Publishers, 1968)

[Part 1 of the *German Ideology* is not a finished chapter but four separate sets of pages which were separated out from the rest of the manuscript, numbered consecutively and given the title 'Feuerbach' by Engels. The first two sets of pages are drafts for an introductory chapter to the whole book. I have numbered the four set of pages as sections I to IV. The editors have rearranged some of the materials within the sections. – AC]

[All insertions in square brackets are by the editors. – AC]

Chapter 1. Feuerbach

[I]

[The Illusions of German Ideology]

As we hear from German ideologists, Germany has in the last few years gone through an unparalleled revolution. The decomposition of the Hegelian philosophy, which began with Strauss, has developed into a universal ferment into which all the "powers of the past" are swept. In the general chaos mighty empires have arisen only to meet with immediate doom, heroes have emerged momentarily only to be hurled back into obscurity by bolder and stronger rivals. It was a revolution beside which the French Revolution was child's play, a world struggle beside which the struggles of the Diadochi [successors of Alexander the Great] appear insignificant. Principles ousted one another, heroes of the mind overthrew each other with unheard-of rapidity, and in the three years 1842-45 more of the past was swept away in Germany than at other times in three centuries.

All this is supposed to have taken place in the realm of pure thought.

Certainly it is an interesting event we are dealing with: the putrescence of the absolute spirit. When the last spark of its life had failed, the various components of this *caput mortuum*[1] began to decompose, entered into new combinations and formed new substances. The industrialists of philosophy, who till then had lived on the exploitation of the absolute spirit, now seized upon the new combinations. Each with all possible zeal set about retailing his apportioned share. This naturally gave rise to competition, which, to start with, was carried on in moderately staid bourgeois fashion. Later when the German market was glutted, and the commodity in spite of all efforts found no response in the world market, the business was spoiled in the usual German manner by fabricated and fictitious production, deterioration in quality, adulteration of the raw materials, falsification of labels, fictitious purchases, bill-jobbing and a credit system devoid of any real basis. The competition turned into a bitter struggle, which is now being extolled and interpreted to us as a revolution of world significance, the begetter of the most prodigious results and achievements.

If we wish to rate at its true value this philosophic charlatanry, which awakens even in the breast of the honest German citizen a glow of national pride, if we wish to bring out clearly the pettiness, the parochial narrowness of this whole Young-Hegelian movement and in particular the tragicomic contrast between the illusions of these heroes about their achievements and the actual achievements themselves, we must look at the whole spectacle from a standpoint beyond the frontiers of Germany.

Ideology in General, German Ideology in Particular[2]

German criticism has, right up to its latest efforts, never quitted the realm of philosophy. Far from examining its general philosophic premises, the whole body of its inquiries has actually sprung from the soil of a definite philosophical system, that of Hegel. Not only in their answers but in their very questions there was a mystification. This dependence on Hegel is the reason why not one of these modern critics has even attempted a comprehensive criticism of the Hegelian system, however much each professes to have advanced beyond Hegel. Their polemics against Hegel and against one another are confined to this – each extracts one side of the Hegelian system and turns this against the whole system as well as against the sides extracted by the others. To begin with they extracted pure unfalsified Hegelian categories such as "substance" and "self-consciousness," later they desecrated these categories with more secular names such as species "the Unique," "Man," etc.

[1] Literally 'dead head'. Term for a useless substance left over from a chemical operation.

[2] This is the only heading in Marx and Engels' own text; the others have all been added by editors.

The entire body of German philosophical criticism from Strauss to Stirner is confined to criticism of religious conceptions. The critics started from real religion and actual theology. What religious consciousness and a religious conception really meant was determined variously as they went along. Their advance consisted in subsuming the allegedly dominant metaphysical, political, juridical, moral and other conceptions under the class of religious or theological conceptions; and similarly in pronouncing political, juridical, moral consciousness as religious or theological, and the political, juridical, moral man – "man" in the last resort – as religious. The dominance of religion was taken for granted. Gradually every dominant relationship was pronounced a religious relationship and transformed into a cult, a cult of law, a cult of the State, etc. On all sides it was only a question of dogmas and belief in dogmas. The world was sanctified to an ever-increasing extent till at last our venerable Saint Max was able to canonise it *en bloc* and thus dispose of it once for all.

The Old Hegelians had comprehended everything as soon as it was reduced to an Hegelian logical category. The Young Hegelians criticised everything by attributing to it religious conceptions or by pronouncing it a theological matter. The Young Hegelians are in agreement with the Old Hegelians in their belief in the rule of religion, of concepts, of a universal principle in the existing world. Only, the one party attacks this dominion as usurpation. while the other extols it as legitimate.

Since the Young Hegelians consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the products of consciousness, to which they attribute an independent existence, as the real chains of men (just as the Old Hegelians declared them the true bonds of human society) it is evident that the Young Hegelians have to fight only against these illusions of consciousness. Since, according to their fantasy, the relationships of men, all their doings, their chains and their limitations are products of their consciousness, the Young Hegelians logically put to men the moral postulate of exchanging their present consciousness for human, critical or egoistic consciousness, and thus of removing their limitations. This demand to change consciousness amounts to a demand to interpret reality in another way, i.e. to recognise it by means of another interpretation. The Young-Hegelian ideologists, in spite of their allegedly "world-shattering" statements, are the staunchest conservatives. The most recent of them have found the correct expression for their activity when they declare they are only fighting against "phrases." They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world. The only results which this philosophic criticism could achieve were a few (and at that thoroughly one-sided) elucidations of Christianity from the point of view of religious history; all the rest of their assertions are only further embellishments of their claim to have furnished, in these unimportant elucidations, discoveries of universal importance.

It has not occurred to any one of these philosophers to inquire into the connection of German philosophy with German reality, the relation of their criticism to their own material[3] surroundings.

[First Premises of Materialist Method]

The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way.

The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature. Of course, we cannot here go either into the actual physical nature of man, or into the natural conditions in which man finds himself – geological, hydrographical, climatic and so on. The writing of history must always set out from these natural bases and their modification in the course of history through the action of men.

Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organisation. By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life.

The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of subsistence they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the production of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and

[3] *materiellen*.

with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production.

This production only makes its appearance with the increase of population. In its turn this presupposes the intercourse [*Verkehr*] of individuals with one another. The form of this intercourse is again determined by production.

[Production and Intercourse. Division of Labour and Forms of Property – Tribal, ancient, feudal]

The relations of different nations among themselves depend upon the extent to which each has developed its productive forces[4], the division of labour and internal intercourse. This statement is generally recognised. But not only the relation of one nation to others, but also the whole internal structure of the nation itself depends on the stage of development reached by its production and its internal and external intercourse. How far the productive forces of a nation are developed is shown most manifestly by the degree to which the division of labour has been carried. Each new productive force, insofar as it is not merely a quantitative extension of productive forces already known (for instance the bringing into cultivation of fresh land), causes a further development of the division of labour.

The division of labour inside a nation leads at first to the separation of industrial and commercial from agricultural labour, and hence to the separation of town and country and to the conflict of their interests. Its further development leads to the separation of commercial from industrial labour. At the same time through the division of labour inside these various branches there develop various divisions among the individuals co-operating in definite kinds of labour. The relative position of these individual groups is determined by the methods employed in agriculture, industry and commerce (patriarchalism, slavery, estates, classes). These same conditions are to be seen (given a more developed intercourse) in the relations of different nations to one another.

The various stages of development in the division of labour are just so many different forms of ownership, i.e. the existing stage in the division of labour determines also the relations of individuals to one another with reference to the material, instrument, and product of labour.

The first form of ownership is tribal ownership [*Stammeigentum*]. It corresponds to the undeveloped stage of production, at which a people lives by hunting and fishing, by the rearing of beasts or, in the highest stage, agriculture. In the latter case it presupposes a great mass of uncultivated stretches of land. The division of labour is at this stage still very elementary and is confined to a further extension of the natural division of labour existing in the family. The social structure is, therefore, limited to an extension of the family; patriarchal family chieftains, below them the members of the tribe, finally slaves. The slavery latent in the family only develops gradually with the increase of population, the growth of wants, and with the extension of external relations, both of war and of barter.

The second form is the ancient communal and State ownership which proceeds especially from the union of several tribes into a city by agreement or by conquest, and which is still accompanied by slavery. Beside communal ownership we already find movable, and later also immovable, private property developing, but as an abnormal form subordinate to communal ownership. The citizens hold power over their labouring slaves only in their community, and on this account alone, therefore, they are bound to the form of communal ownership. It is the communal private property which compels the active citizens to remain in this spontaneously derived form of association over against their slaves. For this reason the whole structure of society based on this communal ownership, and with it the power of the people, decays in the same measure as, in particular, immovable private property evolves. The division of labour is already more developed. We already find the antagonism of town and country; later the antagonism between those states which represent town interests and those which represent country interests, and inside the towns themselves the antagonism between industry and maritime commerce. The class relation between citizens and slaves is now completely developed.

With the development of private property, we find here for the first time the same conditions which we shall find again, only on a more extensive scale, with modern private property. On the one hand, the concentration of private property, which began very early in Rome (as the Licinian agrarian law proves) and proceeded very rapidly from the time of the civil wars and especially under the Emperors; on the other hand, coupled with this, the transformation of the plebeian small peasantry into a proletariat, which, however, owing to its intermediate position between propertied citizens and slaves, never achieved an independent development.

The third form of ownership is feudal or estate property. If antiquity started out from the town and its little territory, the Middle Ages started out from the country.

[4] *Producktivkräfte* (productive powers).

This different starting-point was determined by the sparseness of the population at that time, which was scattered over a large area and which received no large increase from the conquerors. In contrast to Greece and Rome, feudal development at the outset, therefore, extends over a much wider territory, prepared by the Roman conquests and the spread of agriculture at first associated with it. The last centuries of the declining Roman Empire and its conquest by the barbarians destroyed a number of productive forces; agriculture had declined, industry had decayed for want of a market, trade had died out or been violently suspended, the rural and urban population had decreased. From these conditions and the mode of organisation of the conquest determined by them, feudal property developed under the influence of the Germanic military constitution. Like tribal and communal ownership, it is based again on a community; but the directly producing class standing over against it is not, as in the case of the ancient community, the slaves, but the enserfed small peasantry. As soon as feudalism is fully developed, there also arises antagonism to the towns. The hierarchical structure of land ownership, and the armed bodies of retainers associated with it, gave the nobility power over the serfs. This feudal organisation was, just as much as the ancient communal ownership, an association against a subjected producing class; but the form of association and the relation to the direct producers were different because of the different conditions of production.

This feudal system of land ownership had its counterpart in the *towns* in the shape of corporative property, the feudal organisation of trades. Here property consisted chiefly in the labour of each individual person. The necessity for association against the organised robber-nobility, the need for communal covered markets in an age when the industrialist was at the same time a merchant, the growing competition of the escaped serfs swarming into the rising towns, the feudal structure of the whole country: these combined to bring about the guilds. The gradually accumulated small capital of individual craftsmen and their stable numbers, as against the growing population, evolved the relation of journeyman and apprentice, which brought into being in the towns a hierarchy similar to that in the country.

Thus the chief form of property during the feudal epoch consisted on the one hand of landed property with serf labour chained to it, and on the other of the labour of the individual with small capital commanding the labour of journeymen. The organisation of both was determined by the restricted conditions of production – the small-scale and primitive cultivation of the land, and the craft type of industry. There was little division of labour in the heyday of feudalism. Each country bore in itself the antithesis of town and country; the division into estates was certainly strongly marked; but apart from the differentiation of princes, nobility, clergy and peasants in the country, and masters, journeymen, apprentices and soon also the rabble of casual labourers in the towns, no division of importance took place. In agriculture it was rendered difficult by the strip-system, beside which the cottage industry of the peasants themselves emerged. In industry there was no division of labour at all in the individual trades themselves, and very little between them. The separation of industry and commerce was found already in existence in older towns; in the newer it only developed later, when the towns entered into mutual relations.

The grouping of larger territories into feudal kingdoms was a necessity for the landed nobility as for the towns. The organisation of the ruling class, the nobility, had, therefore, everywhere a monarch at its head.

[The Essence of the Materialist Conception of History. Social Being and Social Consciousness]

The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into these definite social and political relations. Empirical observation must in each separate instance bring out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation, the connection of the social and political structure with production. The social structure and the State are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals, but of individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people’s imagination, but as they really are; i.e. as they operate, produce materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will.

The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. – real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a *camera obscura*, this phenomenon arises

just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.

In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. In the first method of approach the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual; in the second method, which conforms to real life, it is the real living individuals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness.

This method of approach is not devoid of premises. It starts out from the real premises and does not abandon them for a moment. Its premises are men, not in any fantastic isolation and rigidity, but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions. As soon as this active life-process is described, history ceases to be a collection of dead facts as it is with the empiricists (themselves still abstract), or an imagined activity of imagined subjects, as with the idealists.

Where speculation ends – in real life – there real, positive science begins: the representation of the practical activity, of the practical process of development of men. Empty talk about consciousness ceases, and real knowledge has to take its place. When reality is depicted, philosophy as an independent branch of knowledge loses its medium of existence. At the best its place can only be taken by a summing-up of the most general results, abstractions which arise from the observation of the historical development of men. Viewed apart from real history, these abstractions have in themselves no value whatsoever. They can only serve to facilitate the arrangement of historical material, to indicate the sequence of its separate strata. But they by no means afford a recipe or schema, as does philosophy, for neatly trimming the epochs of history. On the contrary, our difficulties begin only when we set about the observation and the arrangement – the real depiction – of our historical material, whether of a past epoch or of the present. The removal of these difficulties is governed by premises which it is quite impossible to state here, but which only the study of the actual life-process and the activity of the individuals of each epoch will make evident. We shall select here some of these abstractions, which we use in contradistinction to the ideologists, and shall illustrate them by historical examples.

[II]

[History: Fundamental Conditions]

Since we are dealing with the Germans, who are devoid of premises, we must begin by stating the first premise of all human existence and, therefore, of all history, the premise, namely, that men must be in a position to live in order to be able to "make history." But life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself. And indeed this is an historical act, a fundamental condition of all history, which today, as thousands of years ago, must daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life. Even when the sensuous world is reduced to a minimum, to a stick as with Saint Bruno [Bruno Bauer[5]], it presupposes the action of producing the stick. Therefore in any interpretation of history one has first of all to observe this fundamental fact in all its significance and all its implications and to accord it its due importance. It is well known that the Germans have never done this, and they have never, therefore, had an earthly basis for history and consequently never an historian. The French and the English, even if they have conceived the relation of this fact with so-called history only in an extremely one-sided fashion, particularly as long as they remained in the toils of political ideology, have nevertheless made the first attempts to give the writing of history a materialistic basis by being the first to write histories of civil society, of commerce and industry.

The second point is that the satisfaction of the first need (the action of satisfying, and the instrument of satisfaction which has been acquired) leads to new needs; and this production of new needs is the first historical act. Here we recognise immediately the spiritual ancestry of the great historical wisdom of the Germans

[5] One of the Young Hegelians, formerly Marx's mentor.

who, when they run out of positive material and when they can serve up neither theological nor political nor literary rubbish, assert that this is not history at all, but the "prehistoric era." They do not, however, enlighten us as to how we proceed from this nonsensical "prehistory" to history proper; although, on the other hand, in their historical speculation they seize upon this "prehistory" with especial eagerness because they imagine themselves safe there from interference on the part of "crude facts," and, at the same time, because there they can give full rein to their speculative impulse and set up and knock down hypotheses by the thousand.

The third circumstance which, from the very outset, enters into historical development, is that men, who daily remake their own life, begin to make other men, to propagate their kind: the relation between man and woman, parents and children, the family. The family, which to begin with is the only social relationship, becomes later, when increased needs create new social relations and the increased population new needs, a subordinate one (except in Germany), and must then be treated and analysed according to the existing empirical data, not according to "the concept of the family," as is the custom in Germany. These three aspects of social activity are not of course to be taken as three different stages, but just as three aspects or, to make it clear to the Germans, three "moments," which have existed simultaneously since the dawn of history and the first men, and which still assert themselves in history today.

* [Marginal note:] The building of houses. With savages each family has as a matter of course its own cave or hut like the separate family tent of the nomads. This separate domestic economy is made only the more necessary by the further development of private property. With the agricultural peoples a communal domestic economy is just as impossible as a communal cultivation of the soil. A great advance was the building of towns. In all previous periods, however, the abolition of individual economy, which is inseparable from the abolition of private property, was impossible for the simple reason that the material conditions governing it were not present. The setting-up of a communal domestic economy presupposes the development of machinery, of the use of natural forces and of many other productive forces – e.g. of water-supplies, of gas-lighting, steam-heating, etc., the removal [of the antagonism] of town and country. Without these conditions a communal economy would not in itself form a new productive force; lacking any material basis and resting on a purely theoretical foundation, it would be a mere freak and would end in nothing more than a monastic economy – What was possible can be seen in the towns brought about by condensation and the erection of communal buildings for various definite purposes (prisons, barracks, etc.). That the abolition of individual economy is inseparable from the abolition of the family is self-evident.

The production of life, both of one's own in labour and of fresh life in procreation, now appears as a double relationship: on the one hand as a natural, on the other as a social relationship. By social we understand the co-operation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end. It follows from this that a certain mode of production, or industrial stage, is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or social stage, and this mode of co-operation is itself a "productive force." Further, that the multitude of productive forces accessible to men determines the nature of society, hence, that the "history of humanity" must always be studied and treated in relation to the history of industry and exchange. But it is also clear how in Germany it is impossible to write this sort of history, because the Germans lack not only the necessary power of comprehension and the material but also the "evidence of their senses," for across the Rhine you cannot have any experience of these things since history has stopped happening. Thus it is quite obvious from the start that there exists a materialistic connection of men with one another, which is determined by their needs and their mode of production, and which is as old as men themselves. This connection is ever taking on new forms, and thus presents a "history" independently of the existence of any political or religious nonsense which in addition may hold men together.

Only now, after having considered four moments, four aspects of the primary historical relationships, do we find that man also possesses "consciousness," but, even so, not inherent, not "pure" consciousness. From the start the "spirit" is afflicted with the curse of being "burdened" with matter, which here makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short, of language. Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness that exists also for other men, and for that reason alone it really exists for me personally as well; language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men. Where there exists a relationship, it exists for me: the animal does not enter into "relations" with anything, it does not enter into any relation at all. For the animal, its relation to others does not exist as a relation. Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all. Consciousness is at first, of course, merely consciousness concerning the immediate sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with other persons and things outside the individual who

is growing self-conscious. At the same time it is consciousness of nature, which first appears to men as a completely alien, all-powerful and unassailable force, with which men's relations are purely animal and by which they are overawed like beasts; it is thus a purely animal consciousness of nature (natural religion) just because nature is as yet hardly modified historically. (We see here immediately: this natural religion or this particular relation of men to nature is determined by the form of society and vice versa. Here, as everywhere, the identity of nature and man appears in such a way that the restricted relation of men to nature determines their restricted relation to one another, and their restricted relation to one another determines men's restricted relation to nature.) On the other hand, man's consciousness of the necessity of associating with the individuals around him is the beginning of the consciousness that he is living in society at all. This beginning is as animal as social life itself at this stage. It is mere herd-consciousness, and at this point man is only distinguished from sheep by the fact that with him consciousness takes the place of instinct or that his instinct is a conscious one. This sheep-like or tribal consciousness receives its further development and extension through increased productivity, the increase of needs, and, what is fundamental to both of these, the increase of population. With these there develops the division of labour, which was originally nothing but the division of labour in the sexual act, then that division of labour which develops spontaneously or "naturally" by virtue of natural predisposition (e.g. physical strength), needs, accidents, etc. etc. Division of labour only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material and mental labour appears. (The first form of ideologists, priests, is concurrent.) From this moment onwards consciousness can really flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it really represents something without representing something real; from now on consciousness is in a position to emancipate itself from the world and to proceed to the formation of "pure" theory, theology, philosophy, ethics, etc. But even if this theory, theology, philosophy, ethics, etc. comes into contradiction with the existing relations, this can only occur because existing social relations have come into contradiction with existing forces of production; this, moreover, can also occur in a particular national sphere of relations through the appearance of the contradiction, not within the national orbit, but between this national consciousness and the practice of other nations, i.e. between the national and the general consciousness of a nation (as we see it now in Germany).

Moreover, it is quite immaterial what consciousness starts to do on its own: out of all such muck we get only the one inference that these three moments, the forces of production, the state of society, and consciousness, can and must come into contradiction with one another, because the division of labour implies the possibility, nay the fact that intellectual[6] and material activity – enjoyment and labour, production and consumption – devolve on different individuals, and that the only possibility of their not coming into contradiction lies in the negation in its turn of the division of labour. It is self-evident, moreover, that "spectres," "bonds," "the higher being," "concept," "scruple," are merely the idealistic, spiritual expression, the conception apparently of the isolated individual, the image of very empirical fetters and limitations, within which the mode of production of life and the form of intercourse coupled with it move.

[Private Property and Communism]

With the division of labour, in which all these contradictions are implicit, and which in its turn is based on the natural division of labour in the family and the separation of society into individual families opposed to one another, is given simultaneously the distribution, and indeed the unequal distribution, both quantitative and qualitative, of labour and its products, hence property: the nucleus, the first form, of which lies in the family, where wife and children are the slaves of the husband. This latent slavery in the family, though still very crude, is the first property, but even at this early stage it corresponds perfectly to the definition of modern economists who call it the power of disposing of the labour-power of others. Division of labour and private property are, moreover, identical expressions: in the one the same thing is affirmed with reference to activity as is affirmed in the other with reference to the product of the activity.

Further, the division of labour implies the contradiction between the interest of the separate individual or the individual family and the communal[7] interest of all individuals who have intercourse with one another. And indeed, this communal interest does not exist merely in the imagination[8], as the "general[9] interest," but first of all in reality, as the mutual interdependence of the individuals among whom the labour is divided.*

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[6] *geistige*.

[7] (here and below) *gemeinschaftlichen*.

[8] *Vorstellung* (representation, conception).

[9] (here and below) *Allgemeines*. This means either 'universal' or 'general'.

* [Marginal note:] And out of this very contradiction between the interest of the individual and that of the community[10] the latter takes an independent form as the *State*, divorced from the real interests of individual and community, and at the same time as an illusory communal life[11], always based, however, on the real ties existing in every family and tribal conglomeration – such as flesh and blood, language, division of labour on a larger scale, and other interests – and especially, as we shall enlarge upon later, on the classes, already determined by the division of labour, which in every such mass of men separate out, and of which one dominates all the others. It follows from this that all struggles within the State, the struggle between democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, the struggle for the franchise, etc., etc., are merely the illusory forms in which the real struggles of the different classes are fought out among one another (of this the German theoreticians have not the faintest inkling, although they have received a sufficient introduction to the subject in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* and *Die heilige Familie*). Further, it follows that every class which is struggling for mastery, even when its domination, as is the case with the proletariat, postulates the abolition of the old form of society in its entirety and of domination itself, must first conquer for itself political power in order to represent its interest in turn as the general interest, which in the first moment it is forced to do.

Just because individuals seek only their particular interest, which for them does not coincide with their communal[12] interest (in fact[13] the general is the illusory form of communal life), the latter will be imposed on them as an interest "alien" to them, and "independent" of them as in its turn a particular, peculiar "general" interest; or they themselves must remain within this discord, as in democracy. On the other hand, too, the practical struggle of these particular interests, which constantly really run counter to the communal and illusory communal interests, makes practical intervention and control necessary through the illusory "general" interest in the form of the State.

And finally, the division of labour offers us the first example of how, as long as man remains in natural society, that is, as long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long, therefore, as activity is not voluntarily, but naturally, divided, man's own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him. For as soon as the distribution of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; while in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic. This fixation of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective[14] power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up till now.

The social power, i.e., the multiplied productive force, which arises through the co-operation of different individuals as it is determined by the division of labour, appears to these individuals, since their co-operation is not voluntary but has come about naturally, not as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin and goal of which they are ignorant, which they thus cannot control, which on the contrary passes through a peculiar series of phases and stages independent of the will and the action of man, nay even being the prime governor of these.

How otherwise could for instance property have had a history at all, have taken on different forms, and landed property, for example, according to the different premises given, have proceeded in France from parcellation to centralisation in the hands of a few, in England from centralisation in the hands of a few to parcellation, as is actually the case today? Or how does it happen that trade, which after all is nothing more than the exchange of products of various individuals and countries, rules the whole world through the relation of supply and demand – a relation

[10] *des besondern und gemeinschaftlichen Interesses* (between the particular and communal interests)

[11] *Gemeinschaftlichkeit* (communality).

[12] *gemeinschaftlichen* .

[13] *überhaupt* (in general)

[14] *sachlichen* (thinglike).

which, as an English economist says, hovers over the earth like the fate of the ancients, and with invisible hand allots fortune and misfortune to men, sets up empires and overthrows empires, causes nations to rise and to disappear – while with the abolition of the basis of private property, with the communistic regulation of production (and, implicit in this, the destruction of the alien relation between men and what they themselves produce), the power of the relation of supply and demand is dissolved into nothing, and men get exchange, production, the mode of their mutual relation, under their own control again?

[History as a Continuous Process]

In history up to the present it is certainly an empirical fact that separate individuals have, with the broadening of their activity into world-historical activity, become more and more enslaved under a power alien to them (a pressure which they have conceived of as a dirty trick on the part of the so-called universal spirit, etc.), a power which has become more and more enormous and, in the last instance, turns out to be the world market. But it is just as empirically established that, by the overthrow of the existing state of society by the communist revolution (of which more below) and the abolition of private property which is identical with it, this power, which so baffles the German theoreticians, will be dissolved; and that then the liberation of each single individual will be accomplished in the measure in which history becomes transformed into world history. From the above it is clear that the real intellectual[15] wealth of the individual depends entirely on the wealth of his real connections. Only then will the separate individuals be liberated from the various national and local barriers, be brought into practical connection with the material and intellectual production of the whole world and be put in a position to acquire the capacity to enjoy this all-sided production of the whole earth (the creations of man). *All-round* dependence, this natural form of the world-historical co-operation of individuals, will be transformed by this communist revolution into the control and conscious mastery of these powers, which, born of the action of men on one another, have till now overawed and governed men as powers completely alien to them. Now this view can be expressed again in speculative-idealistic, i.e. fantastic, terms as "self-generation of the species" ("society as the subject"), and thereby the consecutive series of interrelated individuals connected with each other can be conceived as a single individual, which accomplishes the mystery of generating itself. It is clear here that individuals certainly make one another, physically and mentally, but do not make themselves.

[Development of the Productive Forces as a Material Premise of Communism]

This "alienation"[16] (to use a term which will be comprehensible to the philosophers) can, of course, only be abolished given two practical premises. For it to become an "intolerable" power, i.e. a power against which men make a revolution, it must necessarily have rendered the great mass of humanity "propertyless," and produced, at the same time, the contradiction of an existing world of wealth and culture, both of which conditions presuppose a great increase in productive power, a high degree of its development. And, on the other hand, this development of productive forces (which itself implies the actual empirical existence of men in their world-historical, instead of local, being) is an absolutely necessary practical premise because without it want is merely made general, and with destitution the struggle for necessities and all the old filthy business would necessarily be reproduced; and furthermore, because only with this universal development of productive forces is a universal intercourse between men established, which produces in all nations simultaneously the phenomenon of the "propertyless" mass (universal competition), makes each nation dependent on the revolutions of the others, and finally has put world-historical, empirically universal individuals in place of local ones. Without this, (1) communism could only exist as a local event; (2) the forces of intercourse themselves could not have developed as universal, hence intolerable powers: they would have remained home-bred conditions surrounded by superstition; and (3) each extension of intercourse would abolish local communism. Empirically, communism is only possible as the act of the dominant peoples "all at once" and simultaneously, which presupposes the universal development of productive forces and the world intercourse bound up with communism. Moreover, the mass of propertyless workers – the utterly precarious position of labour – power on a mass scale cut off from capital or from even a limited satisfaction and, therefore, no longer merely temporarily deprived of work itself as a secure source of life – presupposes the world market through competition. The proletariat can thus only exist *world-historically*, just as communism, its activity, can only have a "world-historical" existence. World-historical existence of individuals means existence of individuals which is directly linked up with world history.

Communism is for us not a *state of affairs* which is to be established, an *ideal* to

[15] (here and below) *geistige*.

[16] *Entfremdung* (estrangement)

which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the *real* movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence.

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In the main we have so far considered only one aspect of human activity, the *reshaping* of nature by men. The other aspect, the *reshaping* of men by men .... [Intercourse and productive power]

[Civil Society and the Conception of History]

The form of intercourse determined by the existing productive forces at all previous historical stages, and in its turn determining these, is civil society. The latter, as is clear from what we have said above, has as its premises and basis the simple family and the multiple, the so-called tribe, the more precise determinants of this society are enumerated in our remarks above. Already here we see how this civil society is the true source and theatre of all history, and how absurd is the conception of history held hitherto, which neglects the real relationships and confines itself to high-sounding dramas of princes and states.

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Civil society embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within a definite stage of the development of productive forces. It embraces the whole commercial and industrial life of a given stage and, insofar, transcends the State and the nation, though, on the other hand again, it must assert itself in its foreign relations as nationality, and inwardly must organise itself as State. The word "civil society" [*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*] emerged in the eighteenth century, when property relationships had already extricated themselves from the ancient and medieval communal society. Civil society as such only develops with the bourgeoisie; the social organisation evolving directly out of production and commerce, which in all ages forms the basis of the State and of the rest of the idealistic superstructure, has, however, always been designated by the same name.

[Conclusions from the Materialist Conception of History]

History is nothing but the succession of the separate generations, each of which exploits the materials, the capital funds, the productive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations, and thus, on the one hand, continues the traditional activity in completely changed circumstances and, on the other, modifies the old circumstances with a completely changed activity. This can be speculatively distorted so that later history is made the goal of earlier history, e.g. the goal ascribed to the discovery of America is to further the eruption of the French Revolution. Thereby history receives its own special aims and becomes "a person rating with other persons" (to wit: "Self-Consciousness, Criticism, the Unique," etc.), while what is designated with the words "destiny," "goal," "germ," or "idea" of earlier history is nothing more than an abstraction formed from later history, from the active influence which earlier history exercises on later history.

The further the separate spheres, which interact on one another, extend in the course of this development, the more the original isolation of the separate nationalities is destroyed by the developed mode of production and intercourse and the division of labour between various nations naturally brought forth by these, the more history becomes world history. Thus, for instance, if in England a machine is invented, which deprives countless workers of bread in India and China, and overturns the whole form of existence of these empires, this invention becomes a world-historical fact. Or again, take the case of sugar and coffee which have proved their world-historical importance in the nineteenth century by the fact that the lack of these products, occasioned by the Napoleonic Continental System, caused the Germans to rise against Napoleon, and thus became the real basis of the glorious Wars of liberation of 1813. From this it follows that this transformation of history into world history is not indeed a mere abstract act on the part of the "self-consciousness," the world spirit, or of any other metaphysical spectre, but a quite material, empirically verifiable act, an act the proof of which every individual furnishes as he comes and goes, eats, drinks and clothes himself.

[Summary of the Materialist Conception of History]

This conception of history depends on our ability to expound the real process of production, starting out from the material production of life itself, and to comprehend the form of intercourse connected with this and created by this mode of production (i.e. civil society in its various stages), as the basis of all history; and to show it in its action as State, to explain all the different theoretical products and forms of consciousness, religion, philosophy, ethics, etc. etc. and trace their origins and growth from that basis; by which means, of course, the whole thing can be depicted in its totality (and therefore, too, the reciprocal action of these various sides on one another). It has not, like the idealistic view of history, in every period to look for a category, but remains constantly on the real ground of history; it does not explain practice from the idea but explains the formation of ideas from material

practice; and accordingly it comes to the conclusion that all forms and products of consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental criticism, by resolution into "self-consciousness" or transformation into "apparitions," "spectres," "fancies," etc. but only by the practical overthrow of the actual social relations which gave rise to this idealistic humbug; that not criticism but revolution is the driving force of history, also of religion, of philosophy and all other types of theory. It shows that history does not end by being resolved into "self-consciousness as spirit of the spirit," but that in it at each stage there is found a material result: a sum of productive forces, an historically created relation of individuals to nature and to one another, which is handed down to each generation from its predecessor; a mass of productive forces, capital funds and conditions, which, on the one hand, is indeed modified by the new generation, but also on the other prescribes for it its conditions of life and gives it a definite development, a special character. It shows that circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances.

This sum of productive forces, capital funds and social forms of intercourse, which every individual and generation finds in existence as something given, is the real basis of what the philosophers have conceived as "substance" and "essence of man," and what they have deified and attacked; a real basis which is not in the least disturbed, in its effect and influence on the development of men, by the fact that these philosophers revolt against it as "self-consciousness" and the "Unique." These conditions of life, which different generations find in existence, decide also whether or not the periodically recurring revolutionary convulsion will be strong enough to overthrow the basis of the entire existing system. And if these material elements of a complete revolution are not present (namely, on the one hand the existing productive forces, on the other the formation of a revolutionary mass, which revolts not only against separate conditions of society up till then, but against the very "production of life" till then, the "total activity" on which it was based), then, as far as practical development is concerned, it is absolutely immaterial whether the idea of this revolution has been expressed a hundred times already, as the history of communism proves.

[The Inconsistency of the Idealist Conception of History in General, and of German Post-Hegelian Philosophy in Particular]

In the whole conception of history up to the present this real basis of history has either been totally neglected or else considered as a minor matter quite irrelevant to the course of history. History must, therefore, always be written according to an extraneous standard; the real production of life seems to be primeval history, while the truly historical appears to be separated from ordinary life, something extra-superterrestrial. With this the relation of man to nature is excluded from history and hence the antithesis of nature and history is created. The exponents of this conception of history have consequently only been able to see in history the political actions of princes and States, religious and all sorts of theoretical struggles, and in particular in each historical epoch have had to share the illusion of that epoch. For instance, if an epoch imagines itself to be actuated by purely "political" or "religious" motives, although "religion" and "politics" are only forms of its true motives, the historian accepts this opinion. The "idea," the "conception" of the people in question about their real practice, is transformed into the sole determining, active force, which controls and determines their practice. When the crude form in which the division of labour appears with the Indians and Egyptians calls forth the caste-system in their State and religion, the historian believes that the caste-system is the power which has produced this crude social form.

While the French and the English at least hold by the political illusion, which is moderately close to reality, the Germans move in the realm of the "pure spirit," and make religious illusion the driving force of history. The Hegelian philosophy of history is the last consequence, reduced to its "finest expression," of all this German historiography, for which it is not a question of real, nor even of political, interests, but of pure thoughts, which consequently must appear to Saint Bruno as a series of "thoughts" that devour one another and are finally swallowed up in "self-consciousness."* – and even more consistently the course of history must appear to Saint Max Stirner[17], who knows not a thing about real history, as a mere "tale of knights, robbers and ghosts," from whose visions he can, of course, only save himself by "unholiness". This conception is truly religious: it postulates religious man as the primitive man, the starting-point of history, and in its imagination puts the religious production of fancies in the place of the real production of the means of subsistence and of life itself.

> [Marginal note by Marx:] So-called *objective* historiography consisted precisely, in treating the historical relations separately from activity. Reactionary character.

This whole conception of history, together with its dissolution and the scruples and qualms resulting from it, is a purely national affair of the Germans and has merely local interest for Germany, as for instance the important question which has been

[17] Another Young Hegelian, subject of chatper 3 of *The German Ideology*.

under discussion in recent times: how exactly one "passes from the realm of God to the realm of Man" [Ludwig Feuerbach, *Ueber das Wesen des Christenthums*] – as if this "realm of God" had ever existed anywhere save in the imagination, and the learned gentlemen, without being aware of it, were not constantly living in the "realm of Man" to which they are now seeking the way; and as if the learned pastime (for it is nothing more) of explaining the mystery of this theoretical bubble-blowing did not on the contrary lie in demonstrating its origin in actual earthly relations. For these Germans, it is altogether simply a matter of resolving the ready-made nonsense they find into some other freak, i.e., of presupposing that all this nonsense has a special *sense* which can be discovered; while really it is only a question of explaining these theoretical phrases from the actual existing relations. The real, practical dissolution of these phrases, the removal of these notions from the consciousness of men, will, as we have already said, be effected by altered circumstances, not by theoretical deductions. For the mass of men, i.e., the proletariat, these theoretical notions do not exist and hence do not require to be dissolved, and if this mass ever had any theoretical notions, e.g., religion, these have now long been dissolved by circumstances.

The purely national character of these questions and solutions is moreover shown by the fact that these theorists believe in all seriousness that chimeras like "the God-Man," "Man," etc., have presided over individual epochs of history (Saint Bruno even goes so far as to assert that only "criticism and critics have made history," [Bruno Bauer, *Charakteristik Ludwig Feuerbachs*] and when they themselves construct historical systems, they skip over all earlier periods in the greatest haste and pass immediately from "Mongolism" [Max Stirner, *Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum*] to history "with meaningful content," that is to say, to the history, of the *Hallische and Deutsche Jahrbücher* and the dissolution of the Hegelian school into a general squabble. They forget all other nations, all real events, and the *theatrum mundi*[18] is confined to the Leipzig book fair and the mutual quarrels of "criticism," [Bruno Bauer] "man," [Ludwig Feuerbach] and "the unique". [Max Stirner] If for once these theorists treat really historical subjects, as for instance the eighteenth century, they merely give a history of ideas, separated from the facts and the practical development underlying them; and even that merely in order to represent that period as an imperfect preliminary stage, the as yet limited predecessor of the truly historical age, i.e., the period of the German philosophic struggle from 1840 to 1844. As might be expected when the history of an earlier period is written with the aim of accentuating the brilliance of an unhistoric person and his fantasies, all the really historic events, even the really historic interventions of politics in history, receive no mention. Instead we get a narrative based not on research but on arbitrary constructions and literary gossip, such as Saint Bruno provided in his now forgotten history of the eighteenth century. [Bruno Bauer, *Geschichte der Politik, Cultur und Aufklärung des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts*] These pompous and arrogant hucksters of ideas, who imagine themselves infinitely exalted above all national prejudices, are thus in practice far more national than the beer-swilling philistines who dream of a united Germany. They do not recognise the deeds of other nations as historical; they live in Germany, within Germany 1281 and for Germany; they turn the Rhine-song into a religious hymn and conquer Alsace and Lorraine by robbing French philosophy instead of the French state, by Germanising French ideas instead of French provinces. Herr Venedey is a cosmopolitan compared with the Saints Bruno and Max, who, in the universal dominance of theory, proclaim the universal dominance of Germany.

[18] theatre of the world.

[Feuerbach: Philosophic, and Real, Liberation]

[...] It is also clear from these arguments how grossly Feuerbach is deceiving himself when (Wigand's *Vierteljahrsschrift*, 1845, Band 2) by virtue of the qualification "common man" he declares himself a communist, transforms the latter into a predicate of "man," and thereby thinks it possible to change the word "communist," which in the real world means the follower of a definite revolutionary party, into a mere category. Feuerbach's whole deduction with regard to the relation of men to one another goes only so far as to prove that men need and always have needed each other. He wants to establish consciousness of this fact, that is to say, like the other theorists, merely to produce a correct consciousness about an existing fact; whereas for the real communist it is a question of overthrowing the existing state of things. We thoroughly appreciate, moreover, that Feuerbach, in endeavouring to produce consciousness of just this fact, is going as far as a theorist possibly can, without ceasing to be a theorist and philosopher...

As an example of Feuerbach's acceptance and at the same time misunderstanding of existing reality, which he still shares with our opponents, we recall the passage in the *Philosophie der Zukunft* where he develops the view that the existence of a thing or a man is at the same time its or his essence, that the conditions of existence, the mode of life and activity of an animal or human individual are those in which its "essence" feels itself satisfied. Here every exception is expressly

conceived as an unhappy chance, as an abnormality which cannot be altered. Thus if millions of proletarians feel by no means contented with their living conditions, if their "existence" does not in the least correspond to their "essence," then, according to the passage quoted, this is an unavoidable misfortune, which must be borne quietly. The millions of proletarians and communists, however, think differently and will prove this in time, when they bring their "existence" into harmony with their "essence" in a practical way, by means of a revolution. Feuerbach, therefore, never speaks of the world of man in such cases, but always takes refuge in external nature, and moreover in nature which has not yet been subdued by men. But every new invention, every advance made by industry, detaches another piece from this domain, so that the ground which produces examples illustrating such Feuerbachian propositions is steadily shrinking.

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The "essence" of the fish is its "being," water – to go no further than this one proposition. The "essence" of the freshwater fish is the water of a river. But the latter ceases to be the "essence" of the fish and is no longer a suitable medium of existence as soon as the river is made to serve industry, as soon as it is polluted by dyes and other waste products and navigated by steamboats, or as soon as its water is diverted into canals where simple drainage can deprive the fish of its medium of existence. The explanation that all such contradictions are inevitable abnormalities does not essentially differ from the consolation which Saint Max Stirner offers to the discontented, saving that this contradiction is their own contradiction and this predicament their own predicament, whereupon then, should either set their minds at ease, keep their disgust to themselves, or revolt against it in some fantastic way. It differs just as little from Saint Bruno's allegation that these unfortunate circumstances are due to the fact that those concerned are stuck in the muck of "substance," have not advanced to "absolute self-consciousness and do not realise that these adverse conditions are spirit of their spirit.

[Preconditions of the Real Liberation of Man]

[...] We shall, of course, not take the trouble to enlighten our wise philosophers by explaining to them that the "liberation" of man is not advanced a single step by reducing philosophy, theology, substance and all the trash to "self-consciousness" and by liberating man from the domination of these phrases, which have never held him in thrall. Nor will we explain to them that it is only possible to achieve real liberation in the real world and by employing real means, that slavery cannot be abolished without the steam-engine and the mule and spinning-jenny, serfdom cannot be abolished without improved agriculture, and that, in general, people cannot be liberated as long as they are unable to obtain food and drink, housing and clothing in adequate quality and quantity. "Liberation" is an historical and not a mental act, and it is brought about by historical conditions, the development of industry, commerce, agriculture, the conditions of intercourse...[There is here a gap in the manuscript]

In Germany, a country where only a trivial historical development is taking place, these mental developments, these glorified and ineffective trivialities, naturally serve as a substitute for the lack of historical development, and they take root and have to be combated. But this fight is of local importance.

[Feuerbach's Contemplative and Inconsistent Materialism]

In reality and for the practical materialist, i.e. the communist, it is a question of revolutionising the existing world, of practically attacking and changing existing things. When occasionally we find such views with Feuerbach, they are never more than isolated surmises and have much too little influence on his general outlook to be considered here as anything else than embryos capable of development. Feuerbach's conception of the sensuous world is confined on the one hand to mere contemplation of it, and on the other to mere feeling; he says "Man" instead of "real historical man." "Man" is really "the German." In the first case, the contemplation of the sensuous world, he necessarily lights on things which contradict his consciousness and feeling, which disturb the harmony he presupposes, the harmony of all parts of the sensuous world and especially of man and nature. To remove this disturbance, he must take refuge in a double perception, a profane one which only perceives the "flatly obvious" and a higher, philosophical, one which perceives the "true essence" of things. He does not see how the sensuous world around him is, not a thing given direct from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry and of the state of society; and, indeed, in the sense that it is an historical product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations, each standing on the shoulders of the preceding one, developing its industry and its intercourse, modifying its social system according to the changed needs. Even the objects of the simplest "sensuous certainty" are only given him through social development, industry and commercial intercourse. The cherry-tree, like almost all fruit-trees, was, as is well known, only a few centuries ago transplanted by commerce into our zone, and therefore only by this action of a definite society in a definite age it has become "sensuous certainty"

for Feuerbach.

Incidentally, when we conceive things thus, as they really are and happened, every profound philosophical problem is resolved, as will be seen even more clearly later, quite simply into an empirical fact. For instance, the important question of the relation of man to nature (Bruno [Bauer] goes so far as to speak of "the antitheses in nature and history" (p. 110), as though these were two separate "things" and man did not always have before him an historical nature and a natural history) out of which all the "unfathomably lofty works" on "substance" and "self-consciousness" were born, crumbles of itself when we understand that the celebrated "unity of man with nature" has always existed in industry and has existed in varying forms in every epoch according to the lesser or greater development of industry, just like the "struggle" of man with nature, right up to the development of his productive powers on a corresponding basis. Industry and commerce, production and the exchange of the necessities of life, themselves determine distribution, the structure of the different social classes and are, in turn, determined by it as to the mode in which they are carried on; and so it happens that in Manchester, for instance, Feuerbach sees only factories and machines, where a hundred years ago only spinning-wheels and weaving-rooms were to be seen, or in the Campagna of Rome he finds only pasture lands and swamps, where in the time of Augustus he would have found nothing but the vineyards and villas of Roman capitalists. Feuerbach speaks in particular of the perception of natural science; he mentions secrets which are disclosed only to the eye of the physicist and chemist; but where would natural science be without industry and commerce? Even this pure natural science is provided with an aim, as with its material, only through trade and industry, through the sensuous activity of men. So much is this activity, this unceasing sensuous labour and creation, this production, the basis of the whole sensuous world as it now exists, that, were it interrupted only for a year, Feuerbach would not only find an enormous change in the natural world, but would very soon find that the whole world of men and his own perceptive faculty, nay his own existence, were missing. Of course, in all this the priority of external nature remains unassailed, and all this has no application to the original men produced by *generatio aequivoca* [spontaneous generation]; but this differentiation has meaning only insofar as man is considered to be distinct from nature. For that matter, nature, the nature that preceded human history, is not by any means the nature in which Feuerbach lives, it is nature which today no longer exists anywhere (except perhaps on a few Australian coral-islands of recent origin) and which, therefore, does not exist for Feuerbach.

Certainly Feuerbach has a great advantage over the "pure" materialists in that he realises how man too is an "object of the senses." But apart from the fact that he only conceives him as an "object of the senses, not as sensuous activity," because he still remains in the realm of theory and conceives of men not in their given social connection, not under their existing conditions of life, which have made them *what* they are, he never arrives at the really existing active men, but stops at the abstraction "man," and gets no further than recognising "the true, individual, corporeal man," emotionally, i.e. he knows no other "human relationships" "of man to man" than love and friendship, and even then idealised. He gives no criticism of the present conditions of life. Thus he never manages to conceive the sensuous world as the total living sensuous *activity* of the individuals composing it; and therefore when, for example, he sees instead of healthy men a crowd of scrofulous, overworked and consumptive starvelings, he is compelled to take refuge in the "higher perception" and in the ideal "compensation in the species," and thus to relapse into idealism at the very point where the communist materialist sees the necessity, and at the same time the condition, of a transformation both of industry and of the social structure.

As far as Feuerbach is a materialist he does not deal with history, and as far as he considers history he is not a materialist. With him materialism and history diverge completely, a fact which incidentally is already obvious from what has been said.

[III]

[Ruling Class and Ruling Ideas]

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material[19] relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident

[19] *materiellen*.

that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an "eternal law."

The division of labour, which we already saw above as one of the chief forces of history up till now, manifests itself also in the ruling class as the division of mental and material labour, so that inside this class one part appears as the thinkers of the class (its active, conceptive ideologists, who make the perfecting of the illusion of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood), while the others' attitude to these ideas and illusions is more passive and receptive, because they are in reality the active members of this class and have less time to make up illusions and ideas about themselves. Within this class this cleavage can even develop into a certain opposition and hostility between the two parts, which, however, in the case of a practical collision, in which the class itself is endangered, automatically comes to nothing, in which case there also vanishes the semblance that the ruling ideas were not the ideas of the ruling class and had a power distinct from the power of this class. The existence of revolutionary ideas in a particular period presupposes the existence of a revolutionary class; about the premises for the latter sufficient has already been said above.

If now in considering the course of history we detach the ideas of the ruling class from the ruling class itself and attribute to them an independent existence, if we confine ourselves to saying that these or those ideas were dominant at a given time, without bothering ourselves about the conditions of production and the producers of these ideas, if we thus ignore the individuals and world conditions which are the source of the ideas, we can say, for instance, that during the time that the aristocracy was dominant, the concepts honour, loyalty, etc. were dominant, during the dominance of the bourgeoisie the concepts freedom, equality, etc. The ruling class itself on the whole imagines this to be so. This conception of history, which is common to all historians, particularly since the eighteenth century, will necessarily come up against the phenomenon that increasingly abstract ideas hold sway, i.e. ideas which increasingly take on the form of universality. For each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it, is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interest as the common[20] interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality[21], and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones. The class making a revolution appears from the very start, if only because it is opposed to a class, not as a class but as the representative of the whole of society; it appears as the whole mass of society confronting the one ruling class.

> [Marginal note by Marx:] Universality corresponds to (1) the class versus the estate, (2) the competition, world-wide intercourse, etc., (3) the great numerical strength of the ruling class, (4) the illusion of the common interests (in the beginning this illusion is true), (5) the delusion of the ideologists and the division of labour.

– It can do this because, to start with, its interest really is more connected with the common[22] interest of all other non-ruling classes, because under the pressure of hitherto existing conditions its interest has not yet been able to develop as the particular interest of a particular class. Its victory, therefore, benefits also many individuals of the other classes which are not winning a dominant position, but only insofar as it now puts these individuals in a position to raise themselves into the ruling class. When the French bourgeoisie overthrew the power of the aristocracy, it thereby made it possible for many proletarians to raise themselves above the proletariat, but only insofar as they become bourgeois. Every new class, therefore, achieves its hegemony[23] only on a broader basis than that of the class ruling previously, whereas the opposition of the non-ruling class against the new ruling class later develops all the more sharply and profoundly. Both these things determine the fact that the struggle to be waged against this new ruling class, in its turn, aims at a more decided and radical negation of the previous conditions of society than could all previous classes which sought to rule.

This whole semblance, that the rule of a certain class is only the rule of certain ideas, comes to a natural end, of course, as soon as class rule in general ceases to be the form in which society is organised, that is to say, as soon as it is no longer necessary to represent a particular interest as general or the "general interest" as ruling.

[20] (here and below) *gemeinschaftliche*, i.e. communal.

[21] *Allgemeinheit*.

[22] *gemeinschaftlichen* (communal).

[23] *Herrschaft* (mastery, domination).

Once the ruling ideas have been separated from the ruling individuals and, above all, from the relationships which result from a given stage of the mode of production, and in this way the conclusion has been reached that history is always under the sway of ideas, it is very easy to abstract from these various ideas "the idea," the notion, etc. as the dominant force in history, and thus to understand all these separate ideas and concepts as "forms of self-determination" on the part of the concept developing in history. It follows then naturally, too, that all the relationships of men can be derived from the concept of man, man as conceived, the essence of man, Man. This has been done by the speculative philosophers. Hegel himself confesses at the end of the *Geschichtsphilosophie*[24] that he "has considered the progress of the concept only" and has represented in history the "true theodicy." (p.446.) Now one can go back again to the producers of the "concept," to the theorists, ideologists and philosophers, and one comes then to the conclusion that the philosophers, the thinkers as such, have at all times been dominant in history: a conclusion, as we see[, already expressed by Hegel. The whole trick of proving the hegemony of the spirit in history (hierarchy Stirner calls it) is thus confined to the following three efforts.

No. 1. One must separate the ideas of those ruling for empirical reasons, under empirical conditions and as empirical individuals, from these actual rulers, and thus recognise the rule of ideas or illusions in history.

No. 2. One must bring an order into this rule of ideas, prove a mystical connection among the successive ruling ideas, which is managed by understanding them as "acts of self-determination on the part of the concept" (this is possible because by virtue of their empirical basis these ideas are really connected with one another and because, conceived as mere ideas, they become self-distinctions, distinctions made by thought).

No. 3. To remove the mystical appearance of this "self-determining concept" it is changed into a person – "Self-Consciousness" – or, to appear thoroughly materialistic, into a series of persons, who represent the "concept" in history, into the "thinkers," the "philosophers," the ideologists, who again are understood as the manufacturers of history, as the "council of guardians," as the rulers. Thus the whole body of materialistic elements has been removed from history and now full rein can be given to the speculative steed.

Whilst in ordinary life every shopkeeper is very well able to distinguish between what somebody professes to be and what he really is, our historians have not yet won even this trivial insight. They take every epoch at its word and believe that everything it says and imagines about itself is true.

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This historical method which reigned in Germany, and especially the reason why, must be understood from its connection with the illusion of ideologists in general, e.g. the illusions of the jurist, politicians (of the practical statesmen among them, too), from the dogmatic dreamings and distortions of these fellows; this is explained perfectly easily from their practical position in life, their job, and the division of labour.

[IV]

[A long historical section is omitted here. –AC]

[The Relation of State and Law to Property]

The first form of property, in the ancient world as in the Middle Ages, is tribal property, determined with the Romans chiefly by war, with the Germans by the rearing of cattle. In the case of the ancient peoples, since several tribes live together in one town, the tribal property appears as State property, and the right of the individual to it as mere "possession" which, however, like tribal property as a whole, is confined to landed property only. Real private property began with the ancients, as with modern nations, with movable property. – (Slavery and community) (*dominium ex jure Quiritium* [25]). In the case of the nations which grew out of the Middle Ages, tribal property evolved through various stages – feudal landed property, corporative movable property, capital invested in manufacture – to modern capital, determined by big industry and universal competition, i.e. pure private property, which has cast off all semblance of a communal institution and has shut out the State from any influence on the development of property. To this modern private property corresponds the modern State, which, purchased gradually by the owners of property by means of taxation, has fallen entirely into their hands through the national debt, and its existence has become wholly dependent on the commercial credit which the owners of property, the bourgeois, extend to it, as reflected in the rise and fall of State funds on the stock exchange. By the mere fact

[24] *Philosophy of History*.

[25] Term for legal ownership in Roman law.

that it is a class and no longer an estate, the bourgeoisie is forced to organise itself no longer locally, but nationally, and to give a general form to its mean average interest. Through the emancipation of private property from the community, the State has become a separate entity, beside and outside civil society; but it is nothing more than the form of organisation which the bourgeois necessarily adopt both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests. The independence of the State is only found nowadays in those countries where the estates have not yet completely developed into classes, where the estates, done away with in more advanced countries, still have a part to play, and where there exists a mixture; countries, that is to say, in which no one section of the population can achieve dominance over the others. This is the case particularly in Germany. The most perfect example of the modern State is North America. The modern French, English and American writers all express the opinion that the State exists only for the sake of private property, so that this fact has penetrated into the consciousness of the normal man.

Since the State is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interests, and in which the whole civil society of an epoch is epitomised, it follows that the State mediates in the formation of all common institutions and that the institutions receive a political form. Hence the illusion that law is based on the will, and indeed on the will divorced from its real basis – on free will. Similarly, justice is in its turn reduced to the actual laws.

Civil law develops simultaneously with private property out of the disintegration of the natural community. With the Romans the development of private property and civil law had no further industrial and commercial consequences, because their whole mode of production did not alter. (Usury!)

With modern peoples, where the feudal community was disintegrated by industry and trade, there began with the rise of private property and civil law a new phase, which was capable of further development. The very first town which carried on an extensive maritime trade in the Middle Ages, Amalfi, also developed maritime law. As soon as industry and trade developed private property further, first in Italy and later in other countries, the highly developed Roman civil law was immediately adopted again and raised, to authority. When later the bourgeoisie had acquired so much power that the princes took up its interests in order to overthrow the feudal nobility by means of the bourgeoisie, there began in all countries – in France in the sixteenth century – the real development of law, which in all countries except England proceeded on the basis of the Roman Codex. In England, too, Roman legal principles had to be introduced to further the development of civil law (especially in the case of movable property). (It must not be forgotten that law has just as little an independent history as religion.)

In civil law the existing property relationships are declared to be the result of the general will. The *jus utendi et abutendi*[26] itself asserts on the one hand the fact that private property has become entirely independent of the community, and on the other the illusion that private property itself is based solely on the private will, the arbitrary disposal of the thing. In practice, the *abuti* has very definite economic limitations for the owner of private property, if he does not wish to see his property and hence his jus abutendi pass into other hands, since actually the thing, considered merely with reference to his will, is not a thing at all, but only becomes a thing, true property in intercourse, and independently of the law (a relationship, which the philosophers call an idea). This juridical illusion, which reduces law to the mere will, necessarily leads, in the further development of property relationships, to the position that a man may have a legal title to a thing without really having the thing. If, for instance, the income from a piece of land is lost owing to competition, then the proprietor has certainly his legal title to it along with the *jus utendi et abutendi*. But he can do nothing with it: he owns nothing as a landed proprietor if in addition he has not enough capital to cultivate his ground. This illusion of the jurists also explains the fact that for them, as for every code, it is altogether fortuitous that individuals enter into relationships among themselves (e.g. contracts); it explains why they consider that these relationships [can] be entered into or not at will, and that their content rests purely on the individual [free] will of the contracting parties.

Whenever, through the development of industry and commerce, new forms of intercourse have been evolved (e.g. assurance companies, etc.), the law has always been compelled to admit them among the modes of acquiring property.

[Some rough notes by Marx follow, omitted here. – AC]

[Individuals, Class, and Community]

In the Middle Ages the citizens in each town were compelled to unite against the landed nobility to save their skins. The extension of trade, the establishment of communications, led the separate towns to get to know other towns, which had asserted the same interests in the struggle with the same antagonist. Out of the

[26] The right of use and abuse.

many local corporations of burghers there arose only gradually the burgher class. The conditions of life of the individual burghers became, on account of their contradiction to the existing relationships and of the mode of labour determined by these, conditions which were common to them all and independent of each individual. The burghers had created the conditions insofar as they had torn themselves free from feudal ties, and were created by them insofar as they were determined by their antagonism to the feudal system which they found in existence. When the individual towns began to enter into associations, these common conditions developed into class conditions. The same conditions, the same contradiction, the same interests necessarily called forth on the whole similar customs everywhere. The bourgeoisie itself with its conditions, develops only gradually, splits according to the division of labour into various fractions and finally absorbs all propertied classes it finds in existence* (while it develops the majority of the earlier propertyless and a part of the hitherto propertied classes into a new class, the proletariat) in the measure to which all property found in existence is transformed into industrial or commercial capital. The separate individuals form a class only insofar as they have to carry on a common battle against another class; otherwise they are on hostile terms with each other as competitors. On the other hand, the class in its turn achieves an independent existence over against the individuals, so that the latter find their conditions of existence predestined, and hence have their position in life and their personal development assigned to them by their class, become subsumed under it. This is the same phenomenon as the subjection of the separate individuals to the division of labour and can only be removed by the abolition of private property and of labour itself We have already indicated several times how this subsuming of individuals under the class brings with it their subjection to all kinds of ideas, etc.

* [Marginal note by Marx:] To begin with it absorbs the branches of labour directly belonging to the State and then all ±[more or less] ideological estates.

If from a philosophical point of view one considers this evolution of individuals in the common conditions of existence of estates and classes, which followed on one another, and in the accompanying general conceptions forced upon them, it is certainly very easy to imagine that in these individuals the species, or "Man", has evolved, or that they evolved "Man" – and in this way one can give history some hard clouts on the ear.* One can conceive these various estates and classes to be specific terms of the general expression, subordinate varieties of the species, or evolutionary phases of "Man".

* [Marginal note:] The Statement which frequently occurs with Saint Max that each is all that he is through the State is fundamentally the same as the statement that bourgeois is only a specimen of the bourgeois species; a statement which presupposes that the class of bourgeois existed before the individuals constituting it. [Further note by Marx to this sentence:] With the philosophers pre-existence of the class.

This subsuming of individuals under definite classes cannot be abolished until a class has taken shape, which has no longer any particular class interest to assert against the ruling class.

The transformation, through the division of labour, of personal powers (relationships) into material[27] powers, cannot be dispelled by dismissing the general idea of it from one's mind, but can only be abolished by the individuals again subjecting these material powers to themselves and abolishing the division of labour. This is not possible without the community[28]. Only in community [with others has each] individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; only in the community, therefore, is personal freedom possible. In the previous substitutes for the community, in the State, etc. personal freedom has existed only for the individuals who developed within the relationships of the ruling class, and only insofar as they were individuals of this class. The illusory community, in which individuals have up till now combined, always took on an independent existence[29] in relation to them, and was at the same time, since it was the combination of one class over against another, not only a completely illusory community, but a new fetter as well. In a real community[30] the individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association.

Individuals have always built on themselves, but naturally on themselves within their given historical conditions and relationships, not on the "pure" individual in the sense of the ideologists. But in the course of historical evolution, and precisely through the inevitable fact that within the division of labour social relationships take on an independent existence, there appears a division within the life of each individual, insofar as it is personal and insofar as it is determined by some branch

[27] (here and below) *sachlich*, i.e. thinglike.

[28] *Gemeinschaft*.

[29] *verselbständigte sich*. Literally, 'autonomised itself'.

[30] *Gemeinschaft*.

of labour and the conditions pertaining to it. (We do not mean it to be understood from this that, for example, the rentier, the capitalist, etc. cease to be persons; but their personality is conditioned and determined by quite definite class relationships, and the division appears only in their opposition to another class and, for themselves, only when they go bankrupt.) In the estate (and even more in the tribe) this is as yet concealed: for instance, a nobleman always remains a nobleman, a commoner always a commoner, apart from his other relationships, a quality inseparable from his individuality. The division between the personal and the class individual, the accidental nature of the conditions of life for the individual, appears only with the emergence of the class, which is itself a product of the bourgeoisie. This accidental character is only engendered and developed by competition and the struggle of individuals among themselves. Thus, in imagination, individuals seem freer under the dominance of the bourgeoisie than before, because their conditions of life seem accidental; in reality, of course, they are less free, because they are more subjected to the violence of things[31]. The difference from the estate comes out particularly in the antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. When the estate of the urban burghers, the corporations, etc. emerged in opposition to the landed nobility, their condition of existence – movable property and craft labour, which had already existed latently before their separation from the feudal ties – appeared as something positive, which was asserted against feudal landed property, and, therefore, in its own way at first took on a feudal form. Certainly the refugee serfs treated their previous servitude as something accidental to their personality. But here they only were doing what every class that is freeing itself from a fetter does; and they did not free themselves as a class but separately. Moreover, they did not rise above the system of estates, but only formed a new estate, retaining their previous mode of labour even in their new situation, and developing it further by freeing it from its earlier fetters, which no longer corresponded to the development already attained.

> [Marginal note:] N.B. – It must not he forgotten that the serf's very need of existing and the impossibility of a large-scale economy, which involved the distribution of the allotments among the serfs, very soon reduced the services of the serfs to their lord to an average of payments in kind and statute-labour. This made it possible for the serf to accumulate movable property and hence facilitated his escape out of the possession of his lord and gave him the prospect of making his way as an urban citizen; it also created gradations among the serfs, so that the runaway serfs were already half burghers. It is likewise obvious that the serfs who were masters of a craft had the best chance of acquiring movable property.

For the proletarians, on the other hand, the condition of their existence, labour, and with it all the conditions of existence governing modern society, have become something accidental, something over which they, as separate individuals, have no control, and over which no social organisation can give them control. The contradiction between the individuality of each separate proletarian and labour, the condition of life forced upon him, becomes evident to him himself, for he is sacrificed from youth upwards and, within his own class, has no chance of arriving at the conditions which would place him in the other class.

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Thus, while the refugee serfs only wished to be free to develop and assert those conditions of existence which were already there, and hence, in the end, only arrived at free labour, the proletarians, if they are to assert themselves as individuals, will have to abolish the very condition of their existence hitherto (which has, moreover, been that of all society up to the present), namely, labour. Thus they find themselves directly opposed to the form in which, hitherto, the individuals, of which society consists, have given themselves collective expression, that is, the State. In order, therefore, to assert themselves as individuals, they must overthrow the State.

It follows from all we have been saying up till now that the communal relationship into which the individuals of a class entered, and which was determined by their common interests over against a third party, was always a community to which these individuals belonged only as average individuals, only insofar as they lived within the conditions of existence of their class – a relationship in which they participated not as individuals but as members of a class. With the community of revolutionary proletarians, on the other hand, who take their conditions of existence and those of all members of society under their control, it is just the reverse; it is as individuals that the individuals participate in it. It is just this combination of individuals (assuming the advanced stage of modern productive forces, of course) which puts the conditions of the free development and movement of individuals under their control – conditions which were previously abandoned to chance and had won an independent existence over against the separate individuals just because of their separation as individuals, and because of the necessity of their

[31] *unter sachliche Gewalt subsumiert* (subsumed under a thinglike power).

combination which had been determined by the division of labour, and through their separation had become a bond alien to them. Combination up till now (by no means an arbitrary one, such as is expounded for example in the *Contrat social*, but a necessary one) was an agreement upon these conditions, within which the individuals were free to enjoy the freaks of fortune (compare, e.g., the formation of the North American State and the South American republics). This right to the undisturbed enjoyment, within certain conditions, of fortuity and chance has up till now been called personal freedom. These conditions of existence are, of course, only the productive forces and forms of intercourse at any particular time.

[Forms of Intercourse]

Communism differs from all previous movements in that it overturns the basis of all earlier relations of production and intercourse, and for the first time consciously treats all natural premises as the creatures of hitherto existing men, strips them of their natural character and subjugates them to the power of the united individuals. Its organisation is, therefore, essentially economic, the material production of the conditions of this unity; it turns existing conditions into conditions of unity. The reality, which communism is creating, is precisely the true basis for rendering it impossible that anything should exist independently of individuals, insofar as reality is only a product of the preceding intercourse of individuals themselves. Thus the communists in practice treat the conditions created up to now by production and intercourse as inorganic conditions, without, however, imagining that it was the plan or the destiny of previous generations to give them material, and without believing that these conditions were inorganic for the individuals creating them.

[Contradiction between individuals and their conditions of life as contradiction between productive forces and the form of intercourse]

The difference between the individual as a person and what is accidental to him, is not a conceptual difference but an historical fact. This distinction has a different significance at different times – e.g. the estate as something accidental to the individual in the eighteenth century, the family more or less too. It is not a distinction that we have to make for each age, but one which each age makes itself from among the different elements which it finds in existence, and indeed not according to any theory, but compelled by material collisions in life.

What appears accidental to the later age as opposed to the earlier – and this applies also to the elements handed down by an earlier age – is a form of intercourse which corresponded to a definite stage of development of the productive forces. The relation of the productive forces to the form of intercourse is the relation of the form of intercourse to the occupation or activity of the individuals. (The fundamental form of this activity is, of course, material, on which depend all other forms – mental, political, religious, etc. The various shaping of material life is, of course, in every case dependent on the needs which are already developed, and the production, as well as the satisfaction, of these needs is an historical process, which is not found in the case of a sheep or a dog (Stirner's refractory principal argument *adversus hominem*), although sheep and dogs in their present form certainly, but *malgré eux*[32], are products of an historical process.) The conditions under which individuals have intercourse with each other, so long as the above-mentioned contradiction is absent, are conditions appertaining to their individuality, in no way external to them; conditions under which these definite individuals, living under definite relationships, can alone produce their material life and what is connected with it, are thus the conditions of their self-activity and are produced by this self-activity. The definite condition under which they produce, thus corresponds, as long as the contradiction has not yet appeared, to the reality of their conditioned nature, their one-sided existence, the one-sidedness of which only becomes evident when the contradiction enters on the scene and thus exists for the later individuals. Then this condition appears as an accidental fetter, and the consciousness that it is a fetter is imputed to the earlier age as well.

These various conditions, which appear first as conditions of self-activity, later as fetters upon it, form in the whole evolution of history a coherent series of forms of intercourse, the coherence of which consists in this: in the place of an earlier form of intercourse, which has become a fetter, a new one is put, corresponding to the more developed productive forces and, hence, to the advanced mode of the self-activity of individuals – a form which in its turn becomes a fetter and is then replaced by another. Since these conditions correspond at every stage to the simultaneous development of the productive forces, their history is at the same time the history of the evolving productive forces taken over by each new generation, and is, therefore, the history of the development of the forces of the individuals themselves.

Since this evolution takes place naturally, i.e. is not subordinated to a general plan of freely combined individuals, it proceeds from various localities, tribes, nations,

[32] despite themselves.

branches of labour, etc. each of which to start with develops independently of the others and only gradually enters into relation with the others. Furthermore, it takes place only very slowly; the various stages and interests are never completely overcome, but only subordinated to the prevailing interest and trail along beside the latter for centuries afterwards. It follows from this that within a nation itself the individuals, even apart from their pecuniary circumstances, have quite different developments, and that an earlier interest, the peculiar form of intercourse of which has already been ousted by that belonging to a later interest, remains for a long time afterwards in possession of a traditional power in the illusory community (State, law), which has won an existence independent of the individuals; a power which in the last resort can only be broken by a revolution. This explains why, with reference to individual points which allow of a more general summing-up, consciousness can sometimes appear further advanced than the contemporary empirical relationships, so that in the struggles of a later epoch one can refer to earlier theoreticians as authorities.

On the other hand, in countries which, like North America, begin in an already advanced historical epoch, the development proceeds very rapidly. Such countries have no other natural premises than the individuals, who settled there and were led to do so because the forms of intercourse of the old countries did not correspond to their wants. Thus they begin with the most advanced individuals of the old countries, and, therefore, with the correspondingly most advanced form of intercourse, before this form of intercourse has been able to establish itself in the old countries. This is the case with all colonies, insofar as they are not mere military or trading stations. Carthage, the Greek colonies, and Iceland in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, provide examples of this. A similar relationship issues from conquest, when a form of intercourse which has evolved on another soil is brought over complete to the conquered country: whereas in its home it was still encumbered with interests and relationships left over from earlier periods, here it can and must be established completely and without hindrance, if only to assure the conquerors' lasting power. (England and Naples after the Norman conquest. when they received the most perfect form of feudal organisation.)

[The Contradiction Between the Productive Forces and the Form of Intercourse as the Basis for Social Revolution]

This contradiction between the productive forces and the form of intercourse, which, as we saw, has occurred several times in past history, without, however, endangering the basis, necessarily on each occasion burst out in a revolution, taking on at the same time various subsidiary forms, such as all-embracing collisions, collisions of various classes, contradiction of consciousness, battle of ideas, etc., political conflict, etc. From a narrow point of view one may isolate one of these subsidiary forms and consider it as the basis of these revolutions; and this is all the more easy as the individuals who started the revolutions had illusions about their own activity according to their degree of culture and the stage of historical development.

Thus all collisions in history have their origin, according to our view, in the contradiction between the productive forces and the form of intercourse. Incidentally, to lead to collisions in a country, this contradiction need not necessarily have reached its extreme limit in this particular country. The competition with industrially more advanced countries, brought about by the expansion of international intercourse, is sufficient to produce a similar contradiction in countries with a backward industry (e.g. the latent proletariat in Germany brought into view by view by the competition of English industry).

[Conquest]

This whole interpretation of history appears to be contradicted by the fact of conquest. Up till now violence, war, pillage, murder and robbery, etc. have been accepted as the driving force of history. Here we must limit ourselves to the chief points and take, therefore, only the most striking example – the destruction of an old civilisation by a barbarous people and the resulting formation of an entirely new organisation of society. (Rome and the barbarians; feudalism and Gaul; the Byzantine Empire and the Turks.)

With the conquering barbarian people war itself is still, as indicated above, a regular form of intercourse, which is the more eagerly exploited as the increase in population together with the traditional and, for it, the only possible, crude mode of production gives rise to the need for new means of production. In Italy, on the other hand, the concentration of landed property (caused not only by buying-up and indebtedness but also by inheritance, since loose living being rife and marriage rare, the old families gradually died out and their possessions fell into the hands of a few) and its conversion into grazing land (caused not only by the usual economic forces still operative today but by the importation of plundered and tribute-corn and the resultant lack of demand for Italian corn) brought about the almost total disappearance of the free population. The very slaves died out again and again, and had constantly to be replaced by new ones. Slavery remained the basis of the whole

productive system. The plebeians, midway between freemen and slaves, never succeeded in becoming more than a proletarian rabble. Rome indeed never became more than a city; its connection with the provinces was almost exclusively political and could, therefore, easily be broken again by political events.

Nothing is more common than the notion that in history up till now it has only been a question of taking. The barbarians take the Roman Empire, and this fact of taking is made to explain the transition from the old world to the feudal system. In this taking by barbarians, however, the question is, whether the nation which is conquered has evolved industrial productive forces, as is the case with modern peoples, or whether their productive forces are based for the most part merely on their association and on the community. Taking is further determined by the object taken. A banker's fortune, consisting of paper, cannot be taken at all, without the taker's submitting to the conditions of production and intercourse of the country taken. Similarly the total industrial capital of a modern industrial country. And finally, everywhere there is very soon an end to taking, and when there is nothing more to take, you have to set about producing. From this necessity of producing, which very soon asserts itself, it follows that the form of community adopted by the settling conquerors must correspond to the stage of development of the productive forces they find in existence; or, if this is not the case from the start, it must change according to the productive forces. By this, too, is explained the fact, which people profess to have noticed everywhere in the period following the migration of the peoples, namely, that the servant was master, and that the conquerors very soon took over language, culture and manners from the conquered. The feudal system was by no means brought complete from Germany, but had its origin, as far as the conquerors were concerned, in the martial organisation of the army during the actual conquest, and this only evolved after the conquest into the feudal system proper through the action of the productive forces found in the conquered countries. To what an extent this form was determined by the productive forces is shown by the abortive attempts to realise other forms derived from reminiscences of ancient Rome (Charlemagne, etc.).

[Contradictions of Big Industry: Revolution]

Our investigation hitherto started from the instruments of production, and it has already shown that private property was a necessity for certain industrial stages. In *industrie extractive* private property still coincides with labour; in small industry and all agriculture up till now property is the necessary consequence of the existing instruments of production; in big industry the contradiction between the instrument of production and private property appears from the first time and is the product of big industry; moreover, big industry must be highly developed to produce this contradiction. And thus only with big industry does the abolition of private property become possible.

[Contradiction between the Productive Forces and the Form of Intercourse]

In big industry and competition the whole mass of conditions of existence, limitations, biases of individuals, are fused together into the two simplest forms: private property and labour. With money every form of intercourse, and intercourse itself, is considered fortuitous for the individuals. Thus money implies that all previous intercourse was only intercourse of individuals under particular conditions, not of individuals as individuals. These conditions are reduced to two: accumulated labour or private property, and actual labour. If both or one of these ceases, then intercourse comes to a standstill. The modern economists themselves, e.g. Sismondi, Cherbuliez, etc., oppose "association of individuals" to "association of capital." On the other hand, the individuals themselves are entirely subordinated to the division of labour and hence are brought into the most complete dependence on one another. Private property, insofar as within labour itself it is opposed to labour, evolves out of the necessity of accumulation, and has still, to begin with, rather the form of the communality; but in its further development it approaches more and more the modern form of private property. The division of labour implies from the outset the division of the conditions of labour, of tools and materials, and thus the splitting-up of accumulated capital among different owners, and thus, also, the division between capital and labour, and the different forms of property itself. The more the division of labour develops and accumulation grows, the sharper are the forms that this process of differentiation assumes. Labour itself can only exist on the premise of this fragmentation.

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Thus two facts are here revealed. First the productive forces appear as a world for themselves, quite independent of and divorced from the individuals, alongside the individuals: the reason for this is that the individuals, whose forces they are, exist split up and in opposition to one another, whilst, on the other hand, these forces are only real forces in the intercourse and association of these individuals. Thus, on the one hand, we have a totality of productive forces, which have, as it were, taken on a material[33] form and are for the individuals no longer the forces of the individuals

[33] *sachliche* (thinglike).

but of private property, and hence of the individuals only insofar as they are owners of private property themselves. Never, in any earlier period, have the productive forces taken on a form so indifferent to the intercourse of individuals as individuals, because their intercourse itself was formerly a restricted one. On the other hand, standing over against these productive forces, we have the majority of the individuals from whom these forces have been wrested away, and who, robbed thus of all real life-content, have become abstract individuals, but who are, however, only by this fact put into a position to enter into relation with one another *as individuals*.

The only connection which still links them with the productive forces and with their own existence – labour – has lost all semblance of self-activity and only sustains their life by stunting it. While in the earlier periods self-activity and the production of material life were separated, in that they devolved on different persons, and while, on account of the narrowness of the individuals themselves, the production of material life was considered as a subordinate mode of self-activity, they now diverge to such an extent that altogether material life appears as the end, and what produces this material life, labour (which is now the only possible but, as we see, negative form of self-activity), as the means.

[The Necessity, Preconditions and Consequences of the Abolition of Private Property]

Thus things have now come to such a pass that the individuals must appropriate the existing totality of productive forces, not only to achieve self-activity, but, also, merely to safeguard their very existence. This appropriation is first determined by the object to be appropriated, the productive forces, which have been developed to a totality and which only exist within a universal intercourse. From this aspect alone, therefore, this appropriation must have a universal character corresponding to the productive forces and the intercourse.

The appropriation of these forces is itself nothing more than the development of the individual capacities corresponding to the material instruments of production. The appropriation of a totality of instruments of production is, for this very reason, the development of a totality of capacities in the individuals themselves.

This appropriation is further determined by the persons appropriating. Only the proletarians of the present day, who are completely shut off from all self-activity, are in a position to achieve a complete and no longer restricted self-activity, which consists in the appropriation of a totality of productive forces and in the thus postulated development of a totality of capacities. All earlier revolutionary appropriations were restricted; individuals, whose self-activity was restricted by a crude instrument of production and a limited intercourse, appropriated this crude instrument of production, and hence merely achieved a new state of limitation. Their instrument of production became their property, but they themselves remained subordinate to the division of labour and their own instrument of production. In all expropriations up to now, a mass of individuals remained subservient to a single instrument of production; in the appropriation by the proletarians, a mass of instruments of production must be made subject to each individual, and property to all. Modern universal intercourse can be controlled by individuals, therefore, only when controlled by all.

This appropriation is further determined by the manner in which it must be effected. It can only be effected through a union, which by the character of the proletariat itself can again only be a universal one, and through a revolution, in which, on the one hand, the power of the earlier mode of production and intercourse and social organisation is overthrown, and, on the other hand, there develops the universal character and the energy of the proletariat, without which the revolution cannot be accomplished; and in which, further, the proletariat rids itself of everything that still clings to it from its previous position in society.

Only at this stage does self-activity coincide with material life, which corresponds to the development of individuals into complete individuals and the casting-off of all natural limitations. The transformation of labour into self-activity corresponds to the transformation of the earlier limited intercourse into the intercourse of individuals as such. With the appropriation of the total productive forces through united individuals, private property comes to an end. Whilst previously in history a particular condition always appeared as accidental, now the isolation of individuals and the particular private gain of each man have themselves become accidental.

The individuals, who are no longer subject to the division of labour, have been conceived by the philosophers as an ideal, under the name “Man”. They have conceived the whole process which we have outlined as the evolutionary process of “Man,” so that at every historical stage “Man” was substituted for the individuals and shown as the motive force of history. The whole process was thus conceived as a process of the self-estrangement of “Man,” and this was essentially due to the fact that the average individual of the later stage was always foisted on to the earlier stage, and the consciousness of a later age on to the individuals of an earlier. Through this inversion, which from the first is an abstract image of the actual

conditions, it was possible to transform the whole of history into an evolutionary process of consciousness.

[The Necessity of the Communist Revolution][34]

Finally, from the conception of history we have sketched we obtain these further conclusions:

(1) In the development of productive forces there comes a stage when productive forces and means of intercourse are brought into being, which, under the existing relationships, only cause mischief, and are no longer productive but destructive forces (machinery and money); and connected with this a class is called forth, which has to bear all the burdens of society without enjoying its advantages, which, ousted from society, is forced into the most decided antagonism to all other classes; a class which forms the majority of all members of society, and from which emanates the consciousness of the necessity of a fundamental revolution, the communist consciousness, which may, of course, arise among the other classes too through the contemplation of the situation of this class.

(2) The conditions under which definite productive forces can be applied are the conditions of the rule of a definite class of society, whose social power, deriving from its property, has its practical-idealistic expression in each case in the form of the State; and, therefore, every revolutionary struggle is directed against a class, which till then has been in power.

> [Marginal note by Marx:] The people are interested in maintaining the present state of production.

(3) In all revolutions up till now the mode of activity always remained unscathed and it was only a question of a different distribution of this activity, a new distribution of labour to other persons, whilst the communist revolution is directed against the preceding mode of activity, does away with labour, and abolishes the rule of all classes with the classes themselves, because it is carried through by the class which no longer counts as a class in society, is not recognised as a class, and is in itself the expression of the dissolution of all classes, nationalities, etc. within present society; and

(4) Both for the production on a mass scale of this communist consciousness, and for the success of the cause itself, the alteration of men on a mass scale is, necessary, an alteration which can only take place in a practical movement, a revolution; this revolution is necessary, therefore, not only because the ruling class cannot be overthrown in any other way, but also because the class overthrowing it can only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of ages and become fitted to found society anew.

[34] This passage was taken from section I and placed here by the editors.

Excerpts from chapter 3 'Saint Max'

[This long chapter is devoted to attacking the Young Hegelian and individualist anarchist Max Stirner, whose book *The Ego and its Own* had just appeared. Marx and Engels use the nicknames 'Saint Max' and 'Sancho' for him. – AC]

[All headings in these excerpts are mine. –AC]

(1) p. 183-4 (On the idea of 'the essence of man')

We can now reveal why Saint Max gave the title "Man" to the whole of the first part of his book and made out his entire history of miracles, ghosts and knights to be the history of "man". The ideas and thoughts of people were, of course, ideas and thoughts about themselves and their relationships, their consciousness of themselves and of people in general – for it was the consciousness not merely of a single individual but of the individual in his interconnection with the whole of society and about the whole of the society in which they lived. The conditions, independent of them, in which they produced their life, the necessary forms of intercourse connected herewith, and the personal and social relations thereby given, had to take the form – insofar as they were expressed in thoughts – of ideal conditions and necessary relations, i.e., they had to be expressed in consciousness as determinations arising from the concept of man as such, from human essence, from the nature of man, from man as such. What people were, what their relations were, appeared in consciousness as ideas of man as such, of his modes of existence or of his immediate conceptual determinations. So, after the ideologists had assumed that ideas and thoughts had dominated history up to now, that the history of these ideas and thoughts constitutes all history up to now, after they had imagined that real conditions had conformed to man as such and his ideal conditions, i.e., to conceptual determinations, after they had made the history of people's consciousness of themselves the basis of their actual history, after all this, nothing was easier than to call the history of consciousness, of ideas, of the holy, of established concepts – the history of "man" and to put it in the place of real history.

(2) pp. 245-7 (On egoism and altruism)

He[35] discovers to his great displeasure that the two sides prominently appearing in history, the private interest of individuals and the so-called general interest, always accompany each other. As usual, he discovers this in a false form, in its holy form, from the aspect of ideal interests, of the holy, of illusion. He asks: how is it that the ordinary egoists, the representatives of personal interests, are at the same time dominated by general interests, by school-masters, by the hierarchy[36]? His reply to the question is to the effect that the bourgeois, etc., "seem to themselves too small", and he discovers a "sure sign" of this in the fact that they behave in a religious way, i.e., that their personality is divided into a temporal and an eternal one, that is to say, he explains their religious behaviour by their religious behaviour, after first transforming the struggle between general and personal interests into a mirror image of the struggle, into a simple reflection inside religious fantasy.

How the matter stands as regards the domination of the ideal, see above in the section on hierarchy.

If Sancho's question is translated from its high-flown form into everyday language, then "it now reads":

How is it that personal interests always develop, against the will of individuals, into class interests, into common interests which acquire independent existence in relation to the individual persons, and in their independence assume the form of *general*[37] interests? How is it that as such they come into contradiction with the actual individuals and in this contradiction, by which they are defined as *general* interests, they can be conceived by consciousness as *ideal* and even as religious, holy interests? How is it that in this process of private interests acquiring independent existence as class interests the personal behaviour of the individual is bound to be objectified [*sich versachlichen*[38]], estranged [*sich entfremden*], and at the same time exists as a power independent of him and without him, created by intercourse, and is transformed into social relations, into a series of powers which determine and subordinate the individual, and which, therefore, appear in the imagination as "holy" powers? Had Sancho understood the fact that within the framework of definite *modes of production*, which, of course, are not dependent on the will, alien [*fremde*] practical forces, which are independent not only of isolated individuals but even of all of them together, always come to stand above people – then he could be fairly indifferent as to whether this fact is presented in a religious form or distorted in the fancy of the egoist, above whom everything is placed in

[35] I.e. Stirner.

[36] I.e. the priesthood.

[37] *allgemeine* (universal).

[38] Literally 'made thinglike, reified'.

imagination, in such a way that he places nothing above himself. Sancho would then have descended from the realm of [246] speculation into the realm of reality, from what people fancy to what they actually are, from what they imagine to how they act and are bound to act in definite circumstances. What seems to him a product of *thought*, he would have understood to be a product of *life*. He would not then have arrived at the absurdity worthy of him – of explaining the division between personal and general interests by saying that people imagine this division *also* in a religious way and *seem* to themselves to be such and such, which is, however, only another word for "imagining".

Incidentally, even in the banal, petty-bourgeois German form in which Sancho perceives the contradiction of personal and general interests, he should have realised that individuals have always started out from themselves, and could not do otherwise, and that therefore the two aspects he noted are aspects of the personal development of individuals; both are equally engendered by the empirical conditions under which the individuals live, both are only expressions of *one and the same* personal development of people and are therefore only in *seeming* contradiction to each other. As regards the position – determined by the special circumstances of development and by division of labour – which falls to the lot of the given individual, whether he represents to a greater extent one or the other aspect of the antithesis, whether he appears more as an egoist or more as selfless – that was a quite subordinate question, which could only acquire any interest at all if it were raised in definite epochs of history in relation to definite individuals. Otherwise this question could only lead to morally false, charlatan phrases. But as a dogmatist Sancho falls into error here and finds no other way out than by declaring that the Sancho Panzas and Don Quixotes are born such, and that then the Don Quixotes stuff all kinds of nonsense into the heads of the Sanchos; as a dogmatist he seizes on one aspect, conceived in a school-masterly manner, declares it to be characteristic of individuals as such, and expresses his aversion to the other aspect. Therefore, too, as a dogmatist, the other aspect appears to him partly as a mere *state of mind, dévoûment*[39], partly as a mere "*principle*", and not as a relation necessarily arising from the preceding natural mode of life of individuals. One has, therefore, only to "get this principle out of one's head", although, according to Sancho's ideology, it creates all kinds of empirical things. Thus, for example, on page 180 ,social life, all sociability, all fraternity and all that ... was created by the life principles or social principle". It is better the other way round: life created the principle. [247]

Communism is quite incomprehensible to our saint because the communists do not oppose egoism to selflessness or selflessness to egoism, nor do they express this contradiction theoretically either in its sentimental or 'it its high-flown ideological form; they rather demonstrate its material source, with which it disappears of itself. The communists do not preach morality at all, as Stirner does so extensively. They do not put to people the moral demand: love one another, do not be egoists, etc.; on the contrary, they are very well aware that egoism, just as much as selflessness, is in definite circumstances a necessary form of the self-assertion of individuals. Hence, the communists by no means want, as Saint Max believes, and as his loyal Dottore Graziano (Arnold Ruge) repeats after him (for which Saint Max calls him "an unusually cunning and politic mind", Wigand, p. 192), to do away with the "private individual" for the sake of the "general", selfless man. That is a figment of the imagination concerning which both of them could already have found the necessary explanation in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*.[40] Communist theoreticians, the only communists who have time to devote to the study of history, are distinguished precisely by the fact that they alone have discovered that throughout history the "general interest" is created by individuals who are defined as "private persons". They know that this contradiction is only a seeming one because one side of it, what is called the "general interest", is constantly being produced by the other side, private interest, and in relation to the latter it is by no means an independent force with an independent history – so that this contradiction is in practice constantly destroyed and reproduced. Hence it is not a question of the Hegelian "negative unity" of two sides of a contradiction, but of the materially determined destruction of the preceding materially determined mode of life of individuals, with the disappearance of which this contradiction together with its unity also disappears.

(3) pp. 362-4 (On the source of property rights)

On page 332[41] we learn, besides the beautiful passage above, that property

"is unlimited power over something which I can dispose of as I please". But "power" is "not something existing of itself, but exists only in the powerful ego, in

[39] devotion.

[40] Probably a reference to Marx's 'On the Jewish Question' which was published there.

[41] (of Stirner's book)

me, the possessor of power" (p. 366). Hence property is not a "thing", "what is mine is not this tree, but my power over it, my ability to dispose of it" (p. 366). He only knows "things" or "egos". "The power" which is "separated from the ego", given independent existence, transformed into a "spectre", is "right". "This perpetuated power" (treatise on right of inheritance) "is not extinguished even when I die, but is passed on or inherited. Things now really belong not to me, but to right. On the other hand, this is nothing but a delusion, for the power of the individual becomes permanent, and becomes a right, only because other individuals combine their power with his. The delusion consists in their belief that they cannot take back their power" (pp. 366, 367). "A dog who sees a bone in the power of another dog stands aside only if it feels it is too weak. Man, however, respects the right of the other man to his bone.... And as here, so in general, it is called 'human' when something spiritual, in this case right, is seen in everything, i.e., when everything is made into a spectre and treated as a spectre.... It is human to regard the individual phenomenon not as an individual, but as a universal phenomenon" (pp. 368, 369).

Thus once again the whole mischief arises[42] from the faith of individuals in the conception of right, which they *ought* to get out of their heads. Saint Sancho only knows "things" and "egos", and as regards anything that does not come under these headings, as regards all relations, he knows only the abstract concepts of them, which for him, therefore, also become "spectres". "On the other hand", it does dawn on him at times that all this is "nothing but a delusion" and that the "power of the individual" very much depends on whether others combine their power with his. But in the final analysis everything is nevertheless reduced to the "illusion" that individuals "*believe* that they cannot take back their power". Once again the railways do not "actually" belong to the shareholders, but to the statutes. Sancho immediately puts forward the right of inheritance as a striking example. He explains it not from the necessity for accumulation and from the family which existed before right, but from the *juridical fiction* of the *prolongation of power* beyond [363]death. However, the more feudal society passes into bourgeois society[43], the more is this juridical fiction itself abandoned by the legislation of all countries. (Cf., for example, the *Code Napoléon*.) There is no need to show here that absolute paternal power and primogeniture – both natural feudal primogeniture and the later form – were based on very definite material relations. The same thing is to be found among ancient peoples in the epoch of the disintegration of the *community* in consequence of the development of *private* life (the best proof of this is the history of the Roman right of inheritance). In general, Sancho could not have chosen a more unfortunate example than the right of inheritance, which in the clearest possible way shows the dependence of right on the relations of production. Compare, for example, Roman and German right of inheritance. Certainly, no dog has ever made phosphorus, bone-meal or lime out of a bone, any more than it has ever "got into its head" anything about its "right" to a bone; equally, it has never "entered the head" of Saint Sancho to reflect whether the right to a bone which people, but not dogs, claim for themselves, is not connected with the way in which people, but not dogs, utilise this bone in production. In general, in this one example we have before us Sancho's whole method of criticism and his unshakeable faith in current illusions. The hitherto existing production relations of individuals are bound also to be expressed as political and legal[44] relations. (See above.[45]) Within the division of labour these relations are bound to acquire an independent existence over against the individuals. All relations can be expressed in language only in the form of concepts. That these general ideas and concepts are looked upon as mysterious forces is the necessary result of the fact that the real relations, of which they are the expression, have acquired independent existence. Besides this meaning in everyday consciousness, these general ideas are further elaborated and given a special significance by politicians and lawyers, who, as a result of the division of labour, are dependent on the cult of these concepts, and who see in them, and not in the relations of production, the true basis of all real property relations. Saint Sancho, who takes over this illusion [364] without examination, is thus enabled to declare that property by right is the basis of private property, and that the concept of right is the basis of property by right, after which he can restrict his whole criticism to declaring that the concept of right is a concept, a spectre. That is the end of the matter for Saint Sancho.

(4) p. 394 (On the abolition of the division of labour)

The exclusive concentration of artistic talent in particular individuals, and its suppression in the broad mass which is bound up with this, is a consequence of division of labour. Even if in certain social conditions, everyone were an excellent

[42] (according to Stirner)

[43] *bürgliche Gesellschaft*.

[44] *rechtliche*.

[45] Probably a reference to chapter 1.

painter, that would by no means exclude the possibility of each of them being also an original painter, so that here too the difference between “human” and “unique” labour amounts to sheer nonsense. In any case, with a communist organisation of society. there disappears the subordination of the artist to local and national narrowness, which arises entirely from division of labour, and also the subordination of the individual to some definite art, making him exclusively a painter, sculptor, etc.; the very name amply expresses the narrowness of his professional development and his dependence on division of labour. In a communist society there are no painters but only people who engage in painting among other activities.

(5) pp. 431-2 (On the idea of ‘human’ vs. ‘inhuman’)

In the form in which Sancho understands it, the question again becomes sheer nonsense. He imagines that people up to now have always formed a concept of man, and then won freedom for themselves to the extent that was necessary to realise this concept; that the measure of freedom that they achieved was determined each time by their idea of the ideal of man at the time; it was thus unavoidable that in each individual there remained a residue which did not correspond to this ideal and, hence, since it was “inhuman”, was either not set free or only freed malgré eux.

In reality, of course, what happened was that people won freedom for themselves each time to the extent that was dictated and permitted not by their ideal of man, but by the existing productive forces. All emancipation carried through hitherto has been based, however, on restricted productive forces. The production which these productive forces could provide was insufficient for the whole of society and made development possible only if some persons satisfied their needs at the expense of others, and therefore some – the minority – obtained the monopoly of development, while others – the majority – owing to the constant struggle to satisfy their most essential needs, were for the time being (i.e., until the creation of new revolutionary productive forces) excluded from any development. Thus, society has hitherto always developed within the framework of a contradiction – in antiquity the contradiction between free men and slaves, in the Middle Ages that between nobility and serfs, in modern times that between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This explains, on the one hand, the abnormal, “inhuman” way in which the oppressed class satisfies its needs, and, on the other hand, the narrow limits within which intercourse, and with it the whole ruling class, develops. Hence this restricted character of development consists not only in the exclusion of one class from development, but also in the narrow-mindedness of the excluding class, and the “inhuman” is to be found also within the ruling class. This so-called “inhuman” is just as much a product of present-day relations as the “human” is; it is their negative aspect, the rebellion – which is not based on any new revolutionary productive force – against the prevailing relations brought about by the existing productive forces, and against the way of satisfying needs that corresponds to these relations. The positive expression “human” corresponds to the definite relations predominant at a certain stage of production and to the way of satisfying needs determined by them, just as the negative expression “inhuman” corresponds to the attempt to negate these predominant relations and the way of satisfying needs prevailing under them without changing the existing mode of production, an attempt that this stage of production daily engenders afresh.

12. Marx, Letter to Annenkov
18 December 1846
Source: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1846/letters/46_12_28.htm
From Marx and Engels, *Collected Works* Volume 38, p. 95
Written in French by Marx

My dear Mr Annenkov,

[…]

What is society, irrespective of its form? The product of man's interaction upon man. Is man free to choose this or that form of society? By no means. If you assume a given state of development of man's productive faculties, you will have a corresponding form of commerce and consumption. If you assume given stages of development in production, commerce or consumption, you will have a corresponding form of social constitution, a corresponding organisation, whether of the family, of the estates or of the classes – in a word, a corresponding civil society. If you assume this or that civil society, you will have this or that political system, which is but the official expression of civil society. This is something Mr Proudhon will never understand, for he imagines he's doing something great when he appeals from the state to civil society, i. e. to official society from the official epitome of society.

Needless to say, man is not free to choose *his productive forces* – upon which his whole history is based – for every productive force is an acquired force, the product of previous activity. Thus the productive forces are the result of man's practical energy, but that energy is in turn circumscribed by the conditions in which man is placed by the productive forces already acquired, by the form of society which exists before him, which he does not create, which is the product of the preceding generation. The simple fact that every succeeding generation finds productive forces acquired by the preceding generation and which serve it as the raw material of further production, engenders a relatedness in the history of man, engenders a history of mankind, which is all the more a history of mankind as man's productive forces, and hence his social relations, have expanded. From this it can only be concluded that the social history of man is never anything else than the history of his individual development, whether he is conscious of this or not. His material relations form the basis of all his relations. These material relations are but the necessary forms in which his material and individual activity is realised.

Mr Proudhon confuses ideas and things. Man never renounces what he has gained, but this does not mean that he never renounces the form of society in which he has acquired certain productive forces. On the contrary. If he is not to be deprived of the results obtained or to forfeit the fruits of civilisation, man is compelled to change all his traditional social forms as soon as the mode of commerce ceases to correspond to the productive forces acquired. Here I use the word *commerce* in its widest sense – as we would say *Verkehr* in German. For instance, privilege, the institution of guilds and corporations, the regulatory system of the Middle Ages, were the only social relations that corresponded to the acquired productive forces and to the pre-existing social conditions from which those institutions had emerged. Protected by the corporative and regulatory system, capital had accumulated, maritime trade had expanded, colonies had been founded – and man would have lost the very fruits of all this had he wished to preserve the forms under whose protection those fruits had ripened. And, indeed, two thunderclaps occurred, the revolutions of 1640 and of 1688. In England, all the earlier economic forms, the social relations corresponding to them, and the political system which was the official expression of the old civil society, were destroyed. Thus, the economic forms in which man produces, consumes and exchanges are *transitory and historical.* With the acquisition of new productive faculties man changes his mode of production and with the mode of production he changes all the economic relations which were but the necessary relations of that particular mode of production.

[…]

Ever yours

Charles Marx

13. Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy
1847
Source: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/poverty-philosophy/index.htm
From Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, Volume 6, pp. 209-12
Written by Marx in French

From chapter 2 section 5 'Strikes and combinations of workers'

Economists and socialists[1] are in agreement on one point: the condemnation of *combinations.* Only they have different motives for their act of condemnation.

The economists say to the workers: Do not combine. By combination you hinder the regular progress of industry, you prevent manufacturers from carrying out their orders, you disturb trade and you precipitate the invasion of machines which, by rendering your labour in part useless, force you to accept a still lower wage. Besides, whatever you do, your wages will always be determined by the relation of hands demanded to hands supplied, and it is an effort as ridiculous as it is dangerous for you to revolt against the eternal laws of political economy.

The socialists say to the workers: Do not combine, because what will you gain by it anyway? A rise in wages? The economists will [210] prove to you quite clearly that the few ha'pence you may gain by it for a few moments if you succeed, will be followed by a permanent fall. Skilled calculators will prove to you that it would take you years merely to recover, through the increase in your wages, the expenses incurred for the organisation and upkeep of the combinations. And we, as socialists, tell you that, apart from the money question, you will continue nonetheless to be workers, and the masters will still continue to be the masters, just as before. So no combination! No politics! For is not entering into combination engaging in politics?

The economists want the workers to remain in society as it is constituted and as it has been signed and sealed by them in their manuals.

The socialists want the workers to leave the old society alone, the better to be able to enter the new society which they have prepared for them with so much foresight.

In spite of both of them, in spite of manuals and utopias, combination has not ceased for an instant to go forward and grow with the development and growth of modern industry. It has now reached such a stage, that the degree to which combination has developed in any country clearly marks the rank it occupies in the hierarchy of the world market. England, whose industry has attained the highest degree of development, has the biggest and best organised combinations.

In England they have not stopped at partial combinations which have no other objective than a passing strike, and which disappear with it. Permanent combinations have been formed, *trades unions,* which serve as bulwarks for the workers in their struggles with the employers. And at the present time all these local *trades unions* find a rallying point in the *National Association of United Trades,"* the central committee of which is in London, and which already numbers 80,000 members. The organisation of these strikes, combinations, and *trades unions* went on simultaneously with the political struggles of the workers, who now constitute a large political party, under the name of *Chartists.*

The first attempts of workers to *associate* among themselves always take place in the form of combinations.

Large-scale industry concentrates in one place a crowd of people unknown to one another. Competition divides their interests. But the maintenance of wages, this common interest which they have against their boss, unites them in a common thought of resistance – *combination*. Thus combination always has a double aim, that of stopping competition among the workers, so that they can carry on general competition with the capitalist. If the first aim of [211] resistance was merely the maintenance of wages, combinations, at first isolated, constitute themselves into groups as the capitalists in their turn unite for the purpose of repression, and in the face of always united capital, the maintenance of the association becomes more necessary to them than that of wages. This is so true that English economists are amazed to see the workers sacrifice a good part of their wages in favor of associations, which, in the eyes of these economists, are established solely in favor of wages. In this struggle – a veritable civil war – all the elements necessary for a coming battle unite and develop. Once it has reached this point, association takes on a political character.

Economic conditions had first transformed the mass of the people of the country into workers. The combination of capital has created for this mass a common situation, common interests. This mass is thus already a class as against capital, but not yet for itself. In the struggle, of which we have noted only a few phases, this

[1] Marx is probably referring to followers of Fourier and Owen.

mass becomes united, and constitutes itself as a class for itself. The interests it defends becomes class interests. But the struggle of class against class is a political struggle.

In the bourgeoisie we have two phases to distinguish: that in which it constituted itself as a class under the regime of feudalism and absolute monarchy, and that in which, already constituted as a class, it overthrew feudalism and monarchy to make society into a bourgeois society. The first of these phases was the longer and necessitated the greater efforts. This too began by partial combinations against the feudal lords.

Much research has been carried out to trace the different historical phases that the bourgeoisie has passed through, from the commune up to its constitution as a class.

But when it is a question of making a precise study of strikes, combinations and other forms in which the proletarians carry out before our eyes their organization as a class, some are seized with real fear and others display a *transcendental* disdain.

An oppressed class is the vital condition for every society founded on the antagonism of classes. The emancipation of the oppressed class thus implies necessarily the creation of a new society. For the oppressed class to be able to emancipate itself, it is necessary that the productive powers already acquired and the existing social relations should no longer be capable of existing side by side. Of all the instruments of production, the greatest productive power is the revolutionary class itself. The organization of revolutionary elements as a class supposes the existence of all the productive forces which could be engendered in the bosom of the old society. [212]

Does this mean that after the fall of the old society there will be a new class domination culminating in a new political power? No.

The condition for the emancipation of the working class is the abolition of every class, just as the condition for the liberation of the third estate, of the bourgeois order, was the abolition of all estates and all orders.

The working class, in the course of its development, will substitute for the old civil society an association which will exclude classes and their antagonism, and there will be no more political power properly so-called, since political power is precisely the official expression of antagonism in civil society.

Meanwhile the antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is a struggle of class against class, a struggle which carried to its highest expression is a total revolution. Indeed, is it at all surprising that a society founded on the opposition of classes should culminate in brutal *contradiction*, the shock of body against body, as its final *denouement*?

Do not say that social movement excludes political movement. There is never a political movement which is not at the same time social.

It is only in an order of things in which there are no more classes and class antagonisms that *social evolutions* will cease to be *political revolutions*. Till then, on the eve of every general reshuffling of society, the last word of social science will always be:

> “Le combat ou la mort; la lutte sanguinaire ou le neant. C’est ainsi que la question est invinciblement posée.”
>
> [“Combat or Death: bloody struggle or extinction. It is thus that the question is inexorably put.”]
>
> *George Sand*

14. Marx, Wage-Labour and Capital
1847
Source: http://marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/wage-labour/index.htm
From *Wage Labour and Capital* (1891 edition, translated by Engels)

2. By what is the price of a commodity determined?

By the competition between buyers and sellers, by the relation of the demand to the supply, of the call to the offer. The competition by which the price of a commodity is determined is threefold.

The same commodity is offered for sale by various sellers. Whoever sells commodities of the same quality most cheaply, is sure to drive the other sellers from the field and to secure the greatest market for himself. The sellers therefore fight among themselves for the sales, for the market. Each one of them wishes to sell, and to sell as much as possible, and if possible to sell alone, to the exclusion of all other sellers. Each one sells cheaper than the other. Thus there takes place a competition among the sellers which forces down the price of the commodities offered by them.

But there is also a competition among the buyers; this upon its side causes the price of the proffered commodities to rise.

Finally, there is competition between the buyers and the sellers: these wish to purchase as cheaply as possible, those to sell as dearly as possible. The result of this competition between buyers and sellers will depend upon the relations between the two above-mentioned camps of competitors – i.e., upon whether the competition in the army of sellers is stronger. Industry leads two great armies into the field against each other, and each of these again is engaged in a battle among its own troops in its own ranks. The army among whose troops there is less fighting, carries off the victory over the opposing host.

Let us suppose that there are 100 bales of cotton in the market and at the same time purchasers for 1,000 bales of cotton. In this case, the demand is 10 times greater than the supply. Competition among the buyers, then, will be very strong; each of them tries to get hold of one bale, if possible, of the whole 100 bales. This example is no arbitrary supposition. In the history of commerce we have experienced periods of scarcity of cotton, when some capitalists united together and sought to buy up not 100 bales, but the whole cotton supply of the world. In the given case, then, one buyer seeks to drive the others from the field by offering a relatively higher price for the bales of cotton. The cotton sellers, who perceive the troops of the enemy in the most violent contention among themselves, and who therefore are fully assured of the sale of their whole 100 bales, will beware of pulling one another's hair in order to force down the price of cotton at the very moment in which their opponents race with one another to screw it up high. So, all of a sudden, peace reigns in the army of sellers. They stand opposed to the buyers like one man, fold their arms in philosophic contentment and their claims would find no limit did not the offers of even the most importunate of buyers have a very definite limit.

If, then, the supply of a commodity is less than the demand for it, competition among the sellers is very slight, or there may be none at all among them. In the same proportion in which this competition decreases, the competition among the buyers increases. Result: a more or less considerable rise in the prices of commodities.

It is well known that the opposite case, with the opposite result, happens more frequently. Great excess of supply over demand; desperate competition among the sellers, and a lack of buyers; forced sales of commodities at ridiculously low prices.

But what is a rise, and what a fall of prices? What is a high and what a low price? A grain of sand is high when examined through a microscope, and a tower is low when compared with a mountain. And if the price is determined by the relation of supply and demand, by what is the relation of supply and demand determined?

Let us turn to the first worthy citizen we meet. He will not hesitate one moment, but, like Alexander the Great, will cut this metaphysical knot with his multiplication table. He will say to us: "If the production of the commodities which I sell has cost me 100 pounds, and out of the sale of these goods I make 110 pounds – within the year, you understand – that's an honest, sound, reasonable profit. But

if in the exchange I receive 120 or 130 pounds, that's a higher profit; and if I should get as much as 200 pounds, that would be an extraordinary, and enormous profit." What is it, then, that serves this citizen as the standard of his profit? The cost of the production of his commodities. If in exchange for these goods he receives a quantity of other goods whose production has cost less, he has lost. If he receives in exchange for his goods a quantity of other goods whose production has cost more, he has gained. And he reckons the falling or rising of the profit according to the degree at which the exchange value of his goods stands, whether above or below his zero – the cost of production.

We have seen how the changing relation of supply and demand causes now a rise, now a fall of prices; now high, now low prices. If the price of a commodity rises considerably owing to a failing supply or a disproportionately growing demand, then the price of some other commodity must have fallen in proportion; for of course the price of a commodity only expresses in money the proportion in which other commodities will be given in exchange for it. If, for example, the price of a yard of silk rises from two to three shillings, the price of silver has fallen in relation to the silk, and in the same way the prices of all other commodities whose prices have remained stationary have fallen in relation to the price of silk. A large quantity of them must be given in exchange in order to obtain the same amount of silk. Now, what will be the consequence of a rise in the price of a particular commodity? A mass of capital will be thrown into the prosperous branch of industry, and this immigration of capital into the provinces of the favored industry will continue until it yields no more than the customary profits, or, rather until the price of its products, owning to overproduction, sinks below the cost of production.

Conversely: if the price of a commodity falls below its cost of production, then capital will be withdrawn from the production of this commodity. Except in the case of a branch of industry which has become obsolete and is therefore doomed to disappear, the production of such a commodity (that is, its supply), will, owning to this flight of capital, continue to decrease until it corresponds to the demand, and the price of the commodity rises again to the level of its cost of production; or, rather, until the supply has fallen below the demand and its price has risen above its cost of production, for the current price of a commodity is always either above or below its cost of production.

We see how capital continually emigrates out of the province of one industry and immigrates into that of another. The high price produces an excessive immigration, and the low price an excessive emigration.

We could show, from another point of view, how not only the supply, but also the demand, is determined by the cost of production. But this would lead us too far away from our subject.

We have just seen how the fluctuation of supply and demand always bring the price of a commodity back to its cost of production. The actual price of a commodity, indeed, stands always above or below the cost of production; but the rise and fall reciprocally balance each other, so that, within a certain period of time, if the ebbs and flows of the industry are reckoned up together, the commodities will be exchanged for one another in accordance with their cost of production. Their price is thus determined by their cost of production.

The determination of price by the cost of production is not to be understood in the sense of the bourgeois economists. The economists say that the average price of commodities equals the cost of production: that is the law. The anarchic movement, in which the rise is compensated for by a fall and the fall by a rise, they regard as an accident. We might just as well consider the fluctuations as the law, and the determination of the price by cost of production as an accident – as is, in fact, done by certain other economists. But it is precisely these fluctuations which, viewed more closely, carry the most frightful devastation in their train, and, like an earthquake, cause bourgeois society[1] to shake to its very foundations – it is precisely these fluctuations that force the price to conform to the cost of production. In the totality of this disorderly movement is to be found its order. In the total course of this industrial anarchy, in this circular movement, competition balances, as it were, the one extravagance by the other.

We thus see that the price of a commodity is indeed determined by its cost of production, but in such a manner that the periods in which the price of these commodities rises above the costs of production are balanced by the periods in which it sinks below the cost of production, and vice versa. Of course this does not hold good for a single given product of an industry, but only for that branch of industry. So also it does not hold good for an individual manufacturer, but only for the whole class of manufacturers.

The determination of price by cost of production is tantamount to the determination of price by the labor-time requisite to the production of a commodity, for the cost of production consists, first of raw materials and wear and tear of tools, etc., i.e., of

[1] *bürgliche Gesellschaft*.

industrial products whose production has cost a certain number of work-days, which therefore represent a certain amount of labor-time, and, secondly, of direct labor, which is also measured by its duration.

[…]

4. The nature and growth of capital

Capital consists of raw materials, instruments of labor, and means of subsistence of all kinds, which are employed in producing new raw materials, new instruments, and new means of subsistence. All these components of capital are created by labor, products of labor, accumulated labor. Accumulated labor that serves as a means to new production is capital.

So says the economists.

What is a Negro slave? A man of the black race. The one explanation is worthy of the other.

A Negro is a Negro. Only under certain conditions does he become a slave. A cotton-spinning machine is a machine for spinning cotton. Only under certain conditions does it become capital. Torn away from these conditions, it is as little capital as gold is itself money, or sugar is the price of sugar.

In the process of production, human beings work not only upon nature, but also upon one another. They produce only by working together in a specified manner and reciprocally exchanging their activities. In order to produce, they enter into definite connections and relations to one another, and only within these social connections and relations does their influence upon nature operate – i.e., does production take place.

These social relations between the producers, and the conditions under which they exchange their activities and share in the total act of production, will naturally vary according to the character of the means of production. With the discover of a new instrument of warfare, the firearm, the whole internal organization of the army was necessarily altered, the relations within which individuals compose an army and can work as an army were transformed, and the relation of different armies to another was likewise changed.

We thus see that the social relations within which individuals produce, the social relations of production, are altered, transformed, with the change and development of the material means of production, of the forces of production. The relations of production in their totality constitute what is called the social relations, society, and, moreover, a society at a definite stage of historical development, a society with peculiar, distinctive characteristics. Ancient society, feudal society, bourgeois (or capitalist) society, are such totalities of relations of production, each of which denotes a particular stage of development in the history of mankind.

Capital also is a social relation of production. It is a bourgeois relation of production, a relation of production of bourgeois society[2]. The means of subsistence, the instruments of labor, the raw materials, of which capital consists – have they not been produced and accumulated under given social conditions, within definite special relations? Are they not employed for new production, under given special conditions, within definite social relations? And does not just the definite social character stamp the products which serve for new production as capital?

Capital consists not only of means of subsistence, instruments of labor, and raw materials, not only as material products; it consists just as much of exchange values. All products of which it consists are commodities. Capital, consequently, is not only a sum of material products, it is a sum of commodities, of exchange values, of social magnitudes. Capital remains the same whether we put cotton in the place of wool, rice in the place of wheat, steamships in the place of railroads, provided only that the cotton, the rice, the steamships – the body of capital – have the same exchange value, the same price, as the wool, the wheat, the railroads, in which it was previously embodied. The bodily form of capital may transform itself continually, while capital does not suffer the least alteration.

But though every capital is a sum of commodities – i.e., of exchange values – it does not follow that every sum of commodities, of exchange values, is capital.

Every sum of exchange values is an exchange value. Each particular exchange value is a sum of exchange values. For example: a house worth 1,000 pounds is an exchange value of 1,000 pounds: a piece of paper worth one penny is a sum of exchange values of 100 1/100ths of a penny. Products which are exchangeable for others are commodities. The definite proportion in which they are exchangeable forms their exchange value, or, expressed in money, their price. The quantity of these products can have no effect on their character as commodities, as representing an exchange value , as having a certain price. Whether a tree be large

[2] *bürgliche Gesellschaft*.

or small, it remains a tree. Whether we exchange iron in pennyweights or in hundredweights, for other products, does this alter its character: its being a commodity, or exchange value? According to the quantity, it is a commodity of greater or of lesser value, of higher or of lower price.

How then does a sum of commodities, of exchange values, become capital?

Thereby, that as an independent social power – i.e., as the power of a part of society – it preserves itself and multiplies by exchange with direct, living labor-power.

The existence of a class which possess nothing but the ability to work is a necessary presupposition of capital.

It is only the dominion of past, accumulated, materialized labor over immediate living labor that stamps the accumulated labor with the character of capital.

Capital does not consist in the fact that accumulated labor serves living labor as a means for new production. It consists in the fact that living labor serves accumulated labor as the means of preserving and multiplying its exchange value.

15. Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto
1848
Source: http://marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/index.htm
From Marx and Engels *Selected Works*, Volume One (Mocow: Progress Publishers, 1969), pp. 98-137

1. Bourgeois and Proletarians

A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of communism. All the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: Pope and Tsar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies.

Where is the party in opposition that has not been decried as communistic by its opponents in power? Where is the opposition that has not hurled back the branding reproach of communism, against the more advanced opposition parties, as well as against its reactionary adversaries?

Two things result from this fact:

I. Communism is already acknowledged by all European powers to be itself a power.

II. It is high time that Communists should openly, in the face of the whole world, publish their views, their aims, their tendencies, and meet this nursery tale of the Spectre of Communism with a manifesto of the party itself.

To this end, Communists of various nationalities have assembled in London and sketched the following manifesto, to be published in the English, French, German, Italian, Flemish and Danish languages.

The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.

In the earlier epochs of history, we find almost everywhere a complicated arrangement of society into various orders, a manifold gradation of social rank. In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights, plebeians, slaves; in the Middle Ages, feudal lords, vassals, guild-masters, journeymen, apprentices, serfs; in almost all of these classes, again, subordinate gradations.

The modern bourgeois society[1] that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones.

Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinct feature: it has simplified class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other – Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.

From the serfs of the Middle Ages sprang the chartered burghers of the earliest towns. From these burgesses the first elements of the bourgeoisie were developed.

The discovery of America, the rounding of the Cape, opened up fresh ground for the rising bourgeoisie. The East-Indian and Chinese markets, the colonisation of America, trade with the colonies, the increase in the means of exchange and in commodities generally, gave to commerce, to navigation, to industry, an impulse never before known, and thereby, to the revolutionary element in the tottering feudal society, a rapid development.

The feudal system of industry, in which industrial production was monopolised by closed guilds, now no longer sufficed for the growing wants of the new markets. The manufacturing system took its place. The guild-masters were pushed on one side by the manufacturing middle class; division of labour between the different corporate guilds vanished in the face of division of labour in each single workshop.

Meantime the markets kept ever growing, the demand ever rising. Even manufacturer no longer sufficed. Thereupon, steam and machinery revolutionised industrial production. The place of manufacture was taken by the giant, Modern

[1] (here and below) *bürgliche Gesellschaft.*

Industry; the place of the industrial middle class by industrial millionaires, the leaders of the whole industrial armies, the modern bourgeois.

Modern industry has established the world market, for which the discovery of America paved the way. This market has given an immense development to commerce, to navigation, to communication by land. This development has, in its turn, reacted on the extension of industry; and in proportion as industry, commerce, navigation, railways extended, in the same proportion the bourgeoisie developed, increased its capital, and pushed into the background every class handed down from the Middle Ages.

We see, therefore, how the modern bourgeoisie is itself the product of a long course of development, of a series of revolutions in the modes of production and of exchange.

Each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding political advance of that class. An oppressed class under the sway of the feudal nobility, an armed and self-governing association in the medieval commune:[2] here independent urban republic (as in Italy and Germany); there taxable "third estate" of the monarchy (as in France); afterwards, in the period of manufacturing proper, serving either the semi-feudal or the absolute monarchy as a counterpoise against the nobility, and, in fact, cornerstone of the great monarchies in general, the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of Modern Industry and of the world market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative State, exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.

The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part.

The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors", and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment". It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom – Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.

The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage labourers.

The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil, and has reduced the family relation to a mere money relation.

The bourgeoisie has disclosed how it came to pass that the brutal display of vigour in the Middle Ages, which reactionaries so much admire, found its fitting complement in the most slothful indolence. It has been the first to show what man's activity can bring about. It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that put in the shade all former Exoduses of nations and crusades.

The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere.

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of Reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries,

[2] [Note by Engels, 1890 edition:] This was the name given their urban communities by the townsmen of Italy and France, after they had purchased or conquered their initial rights of self-government from their feudal lords.

whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilised nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature.

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilisation. The cheap prices of commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.

The bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. It has created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural, and has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life. Just as it has made the country dependent on the towns, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilised ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West.

The bourgeoisie keeps more and more doing away with the scattered state of the population, of the means of production, and of property. It has agglomerated population, centralised the means of production, and has concentrated property in a few hands. The necessary consequence of this was political centralisation. Independent, or but loosely connected provinces, with separate interests, laws, governments, and systems of taxation, became lumped together into one nation, with one government, one code of laws, one national class-interest, one frontier, and one customs-tariff.

The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground – what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour?

We see then: the means of production and of exchange, on whose foundation the bourgeoisie built itself up, were generated in feudal society. At a certain stage in the development of these means of production and of exchange, the conditions under which feudal society produced and exchanged, the feudal organisation of agriculture and manufacturing industry, in one word, the feudal relations of property became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder.

Into their place stepped free competition, accompanied by a social and political constitution adapted in it, and the economic and political sway of the bourgeois class.

A similar movement is going on before our own eyes. Modern bourgeois society, with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells. For many a decade past the history of industry and commerce is but the history of the revolt of modern productive forces against modern conditions of production, against the property relations that are the conditions for the existence of the bourgeois and of its rule. It is enough to mention the commercial crises that by their periodical return put the existence of the entire bourgeois society on its trial, each time more threateningly. In these crises, a great part not only of the existing products, but also of the previously created productive forces, are periodically destroyed. In these crises, there breaks out an epidemic that, in all earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity – the epidemic of over-production. Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war of devastation, had cut off the supply of every means of subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be destroyed; and why? Because there is too much civilisation, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce. The productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend to further the development of the conditions of bourgeois property; on the contrary, they have become too powerful for these conditions, by

which they are fettered, and so soon as they overcome these fetters, they bring disorder into the whole of bourgeois society, endanger the existence of bourgeois property. The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them. And how does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and more destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented.

The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground are now turned against the bourgeoisie itself.

But not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons – the modern working class – the proletarians.

In proportion as the bourgeoisie, i.e., capital, is developed, in the same proportion is the proletariat, the modern working class, developed – a class of labourers, who live only so long as they find work, and who find work only so long as their labour increases capital. These labourers, who must sell themselves piecemeal, are a commodity, like every other article of commerce, and are consequently exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuations of the market.

Owing to the extensive use of machinery, and to the division of labour, the work of the proletarians has lost all individual character, and, consequently, all charm for the workman. He becomes an appendage of the machine, and it is only the most simple, most monotonous, and most easily acquired knack, that is required of him. Hence, the cost of production of a workman is restricted, almost entirely, to the means of subsistence that he requires for maintenance, and for the propagation of his race. But the price of a commodity, and therefore also of labour, is equal to its cost of production. In proportion, therefore, as the repulsiveness of the work increases, the wage decreases. Nay more, in proportion as the use of machinery and division of labour increases, in the same proportion the burden of toil also increases, whether by prolongation of the working hours, by the increase of the work exacted in a given time or by increased speed of machinery, etc.

Modern Industry has converted the little workshop of the patriarchal master into the great factory of the industrial capitalist. Masses of labourers, crowded into the factory, are organised like soldiers. As privates of the industrial army they are placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and sergeants. Not only are they slaves of the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois State; they are daily and hourly enslaved by the machine, by the overlooker, and, above all, by the individual bourgeois manufacturer himself. The more openly this despotism proclaims gain to be its end and aim, the more petty, the more hateful and the more embittering it is.

The less the skill and exertion of strength implied in manual labour, in other words, the more modern industry becomes developed, the more is the labour of men superseded by that of women. Differences of age and sex have no longer any distinctive social validity for the working class. All are instruments of labour, more or less expensive to use, according to their age and sex.

No sooner is the exploitation of the labourer by the manufacturer, so far, at an end, that he receives his wages in cash, than he is set upon by the other portions of the bourgeoisie, the landlord, the shopkeeper, the pawnbroker, etc.

The lower strata of the middle class – the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants – all these sink gradually into the proletariat, partly because their diminutive capital does not suffice for the scale on which Modern Industry is carried on, and is swamped in the competition with the large capitalists, partly because their specialised skill is rendered worthless by new methods of production. Thus the proletariat is recruited from all classes of the population.

The proletariat goes through various stages of development. With its birth begins its struggle with the bourgeoisie. At first the contest is carried on by individual labourers, then by the workpeople of a factory, then by the operative of one trade, in one locality, against the individual bourgeois who directly exploits them. They direct their attacks not against the bourgeois conditions of production, but against the instruments of production themselves; they destroy imported wares that compete with their labour, they smash to pieces machinery, they set factories ablaze, they seek to restore by force the vanished status of the workman of the Middle Ages.

At this stage, the labourers still form an incoherent mass scattered over the whole country, and broken up by their mutual competition. If anywhere they unite to form more compact bodies, this is not yet the consequence of their own active union, but of the union of the bourgeoisie, which class, in order to attain its own political ends, is compelled to set the whole proletariat in motion, and is moreover yet, for a time, able to do so. At this stage, therefore, the proletarians do not fight their

enemies, but the enemies of their enemies, the remnants of absolute monarchy, the landowners, the non-industrial bourgeois, the petty bourgeois. Thus, the whole historical movement is concentrated in the hands of the bourgeoisie; every victory so obtained is a victory for the bourgeoisie.

But with the development of industry, the proletariat not only increases in number; it becomes concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows, and it feels that strength more. The various interests and conditions of life within the ranks of the proletariat are more and more equalised, in proportion as machinery obliterates all distinctions of labour, and nearly everywhere reduces wages to the same low level. The growing competition among the bourgeois, and the resulting commercial crises, make the wages of the workers ever more fluctuating. The increasing improvement of machinery, ever more rapidly developing, makes their livelihood more and more precarious; the collisions between individual workmen and individual bourgeois take more and more the character of collisions between two classes. Thereupon, the workers begin to form combinations (Trades' Unions) against the bourgeois; they club together in order to keep up the rate of wages; they found permanent associations in order to make provision beforehand for these occasional revolts. Here and there, the contest breaks out into riots.

Now and then the workers are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of their battles lies, not in the immediate result, but in the ever expanding union of the workers. This union is helped on by the improved means of communication that are created by modern industry, and that place the workers of different localities in contact with one another. It was just this contact that was needed to centralise the numerous local struggles, all of the same character, into one national struggle between classes. But every class struggle is a political struggle. And that union, to attain which the burghers of the Middle Ages, with their miserable highways, required centuries, the modern proletarian, thanks to railways, achieve in a few years.

This organisation of the proletarians into a class, and, consequently into a political party, is continually being upset again by the competition between the workers themselves. But it ever rises up again, stronger, firmer, mightier. It compels legislative recognition of particular interests of the workers, by taking advantage of the divisions among the bourgeoisie itself. Thus, the ten-hours' bill in England was carried.

Altogether collisions between the classes of the old society further, in many ways, the course of development of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie finds itself involved in a constant battle. At first with the aristocracy; later on, with those portions of the bourgeoisie itself, whose interests have become antagonistic to the progress of industry; at all time with the bourgeoisie of foreign countries. In all these battles, it sees itself compelled to appeal to the proletariat, to ask for help, and thus, to drag it into the political arena. The bourgeoisie itself, therefore, supplies the proletariat with its own elements of political and general education, in other words, it furnishes the proletariat with weapons for fighting the bourgeoisie.

Further, as we have already seen, entire sections of the ruling class are, by the advance of industry, precipitated into the proletariat, or are at least threatened in their conditions of existence. These also supply the proletariat with fresh elements of enlightenment and progress.

Finally, in times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour, the progress of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of old society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands. Just as, therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole.

Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class. The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of Modern Industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product.

The lower middle class, the small manufacturer, the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class. They are therefore not revolutionary, but conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. If by chance, they are revolutionary, they are only so in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat; they thus defend not their present, but their future interests, they desert their own standpoint to place themselves at that of the proletariat.

The "dangerous class", [*lumpenproletariat*] the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of the old society, may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life,

however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.

In the condition of the proletariat, those of old society at large are already virtually swamped. The proletarian is without property; his relation to his wife and children has no longer anything in common with the bourgeois family relations; modern industry labour, modern subjection to capital, the same in England as in France, in America as in Germany, has stripped him of every trace of national character. Law, morality, religion, are to him so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests.

All the preceding classes that got the upper hand sought to fortify their already acquired status by subjecting society at large to their conditions of appropriation. The proletarians cannot become masters of the productive forces of society, except by abolishing their own previous mode of appropriation, and thereby also every other previous mode of appropriation. They have nothing of their own to secure and to fortify; their mission is to destroy all previous securities for, and insurances of, individual property.

All previous historical movements were movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority. The proletariat, the lowest stratum of our present society, cannot stir, cannot raise itself up, without the whole superincumbent strata of official society being sprung into the air.

Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie.

In depicting the most general phases of the development of the proletariat, we traced the more or less veiled civil war, raging within existing society, up to the point where that war breaks out into open revolution, and where the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie lays the foundation for the sway of the proletariat.

Hitherto, every form of society has been based, as we have already seen, on the antagonism of oppressing and oppressed classes. But in order to oppress a class, certain conditions must be assured to it under which it can, at least, continue its slavish existence. The serf, in the period of serfdom, raised himself to membership in the commune, just as the petty bourgeois, under the yoke of the feudal absolutism, managed to develop into a bourgeois. The modern labourer, on the contrary, instead of rising with the process of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class. He becomes a pauper, and pauperism develops more rapidly than population and wealth. And here it becomes evident, that the bourgeoisie is unfit any longer to be the ruling class in society, and to impose its conditions of existence upon society as an over-riding law. It is unfit to rule because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state, that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him. Society can no longer live under this bourgeoisie, in other words, its existence is no longer compatible with society.

The essential conditions for the existence and for the sway of the bourgeois class is the formation and augmentation of capital; the condition for capital is wage-labour. Wage-labour rests exclusively on competition between the labourers. The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the labourers, due to competition, by the revolutionary combination, due to association. The development of Modern Industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.

2. Proletarians and Communists

In what relation do the Communists stand to the proletarians as a whole?

The Communists do not form a separate party opposed to the other working-class parties.

They have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole.

They do not set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and mould the proletarian movement.

The Communists are distinguished from the other working-class parties by this only: 1. In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality. 2. In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole.

The Communists, therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties of every country, that section

which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.

The immediate aim of the Communists is the same as that of all other proletarian parties: formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the proletariat.

The theoretical conclusions of the Communists are in no way based on ideas or principles that have been invented, or discovered, by this or that would-be universal reformer.

They merely express, in general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes. The abolition of existing property relations is not at all a distinctive feature of communism.

All property relations in the past have continually been subject to historical change consequent upon the change in historical conditions.

The French Revolution, for example, abolished feudal property in favour of bourgeois property.

The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property. But modern bourgeois private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products, that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few.

In this sense, the theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.

We Communists have been reproached with the desire of abolishing the right of personally acquiring property as the fruit of a man's own labour, which property is alleged to be the groundwork of all personal freedom, activity and independence.

Hard-won, self-acquired, self-earned property! Do you mean the property of petty artisan and of the small peasant, a form of property that preceded the bourgeois form? There is no need to abolish that; the development of industry has to a great extent already destroyed it, and is still destroying it daily.

Or do you mean the modern bourgeois private property?

But does wage-labour create any property for the labourer? Not a bit. It creates capital, *i.e.*, that kind of property which exploits wage-labour, and which cannot increase except upon condition of begetting a new supply of wage-labour for fresh exploitation. Property, in its present form, is based on the antagonism of capital and wage labour. Let us examine both sides of this antagonism.

To be a capitalist, is to have not only a purely personal, but a social *status* in production. Capital is a collective product, and only by the united action of many members, nay, in the last resort, only by the united action of all members of society, can it be set in motion.

Capital is therefore not only personal; it is a social power.

When, therefore, capital is converted into common property, into the property of all members of society, personal property is not thereby transformed into social property. It is only the social character of the property that is changed. It loses its class character.

Let us now take wage-labour.

The average price of wage-labour is the minimum wage, *i.e.*, that quantum of the means of subsistence which is absolutely requisite to keep the labourer in bare existence as a labourer. What, therefore, the wage-labourer appropriates by means of his labour, merely suffices to prolong and reproduce a bare existence. We by no means intend to abolish this personal appropriation of the products of labour, an appropriation that is made for the maintenance and reproduction of human life, and that leaves no surplus wherewith to command the labour of others. All that we want to do away with is the miserable character of this appropriation, under which the labourer lives merely to increase capital, and is allowed to live only in so far as the interest of the ruling class requires it.

In bourgeois society, living labour is but a means to increase accumulated labour. In Communist society, accumulated labour is but a means to widen, to enrich, to promote the existence of the labourer.

In bourgeois society, therefore, the past dominates the present; in Communist society, the present dominates the past. In bourgeois society capital is independent and has individuality, while the living person is dependent and has no individuality.

And the abolition of this state of things is called by the bourgeois, abolition of individuality and freedom! And rightly so. The abolition of bourgeois individuality, bourgeois independence, and bourgeois freedom is undoubtedly aimed at.

By freedom is meant, under the present bourgeois conditions of production, free trade, free selling and buying.

But if selling and buying disappears, free selling and buying disappears also. This talk about free selling and buying, and all the other "brave words" of our bourgeois about freedom in general, have a meaning, if any, only in contrast with restricted selling and buying, with the fettered traders of the Middle Ages, but have no meaning when opposed to the Communistic abolition of buying and selling, of the bourgeois conditions of production, and of the bourgeoisie itself.

You are horrified at our intending to do away with private property. But in your existing society, private property is already done away with for nine-tenths of the population; its existence for the few is solely due to its non-existence in the hands of those nine-tenths. You reproach us, therefore, with intending to do away with a form of property, the necessary condition for whose existence is the non-existence of any property for the immense majority of society.

In one word, you reproach us with intending to do away with your property. Precisely so; that is just what we intend.

From the moment when labour can no longer be converted into capital, money, or rent, into a social power capable of being monopolised, *i.e.*, from the moment when individual property can no longer be transformed into bourgeois property, into capital, from that moment, you say, individuality vanishes.

You must, therefore, confess that by "individual" you mean no other person than the bourgeois, than the middle-class owner of property. This person must, indeed, be swept out of the way, and made impossible.

Communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society; all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the labour of others by means of such appropriations.

It has been objected that upon the abolition of private property, all work will cease, and universal laziness will overtake us.

According to this, bourgeois society ought long ago to have gone to the dogs through sheer idleness; for those of its members who work, acquire nothing, and those who acquire anything do not work. The whole of this objection is but another expression of the tautology: that there can no longer be any wage-labour when there is no longer any capital.

All objections urged against the Communistic mode of producing and appropriating material products, have, in the same way, been urged against the Communistic mode of producing and appropriating intellectual products. Just as, to the bourgeois, the disappearance of class property is the disappearance of production itself, so the disappearance of class culture is to him identical with the disappearance of all culture.

That culture, the loss of which he laments, is, for the enormous majority, a mere training to act as a machine.

But don't wrangle with us so long as you apply, to our intended abolition of bourgeois property, the standard of your bourgeois notions of freedom, culture, law, &c. Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois production and bourgeois property, just as your jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into a law for all, a will whose essential character and direction are determined by the economical conditions of existence of your class.

The selfish misconception that induces you to transform into eternal laws of nature and of reason, the social forms springing from your present mode of production and form of property – historical relations that rise and disappear in the progress of production – this misconception you share with every ruling class that has preceded you. What you see clearly in the case of ancient property, what you admit in the case of feudal property, you are of course forbidden to admit in the case of your own bourgeois form of property.

Abolition [*Aufhebung*] of the family! Even the most radical flare up at this infamous proposal of the Communists.

On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family, based? On capital, on private gain. In its completely developed form, this family exists only among the bourgeoisie. But this state of things finds its complement in the practical absence of the family among the proletarians, and in public prostitution.

The bourgeois family will vanish as a matter of course when its complement vanishes, and both will vanish with the vanishing of capital.

Do you charge us with wanting to stop the exploitation of children by their parents? To this crime we plead guilty.

But, you say, we destroy the most hallowed of relations, when we replace home education by social.

And your education! Is not that also social, and determined by the social conditions under which you educate, by the intervention direct or indirect, of society, by means of schools, &c.? The Communists have not invented the intervention of society in education; they do but seek to alter the character of that intervention, and to rescue education from the influence of the ruling class.

The bourgeois clap-trap about the family and education, about the hallowed co-relation of parents and child, becomes all the more disgusting, the more, by the action of Modern Industry, all the family ties among the proletarians are torn asunder, and their children transformed into simple articles of commerce and instruments of labour.

But you Communists would introduce community of women, screams the bourgeoisie in chorus.

The bourgeois sees his wife a mere instrument of production. He hears that the instruments of production are to be exploited in common, and, naturally, can come to no other conclusion that the lot of being common to all will likewise fall to the women.

He has not even a suspicion that the real point aimed at is to do away with the status of women as mere instruments of production.

For the rest, nothing is more ridiculous than the virtuous indignation of our bourgeois at the community of women which, they pretend, is to be openly and officially established by the Communists. The Communists have no need to introduce community of women; it has existed almost from time immemorial.

Our bourgeois, not content with having wives and daughters of their proletarians at their disposal, not to speak of common prostitutes, take the greatest pleasure in seducing each other’s wives.

Bourgeois marriage is, in reality, a system of wives in common and thus, at the most, what the Communists might possibly be reproached with is that they desire to introduce, in substitution for a hypocritically concealed, an openly legalised community of women. For the rest, it is self-evident that the abolition of the present system of production must bring with it the abolition of the community of women springing from that system, *i.e.*, of prostitution both public and private.

The Communists are further reproached with desiring to abolish countries and nationality.

The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself *the* nation, it is so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.

National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.

The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. United action, of the leading civilised countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat.

In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another will also be put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.

The charges against Communism made from a religious, a philosophical and, generally, from an ideological standpoint, are not deserving of serious examination.

Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man’s ideas, views, and conception, in one word, man’s consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations and in his social life?

What else does the history of ideas prove, than that intellectual production changes its character in proportion as material production is changed? The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class.

When people speak of the ideas that revolutionise society, they do but express that fact that within the old society the elements of a new one have been created, and that the dissolution of the old ideas keeps even pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence.

When the ancient world was in its last throes, the ancient religions were overcome by Christianity. When Christian ideas succumbed in the 18th century to rationalist ideas, feudal society fought its death battle with the then revolutionary bourgeoisie. The ideas of religious liberty and freedom of conscience merely gave expression to the sway of free competition within the domain of knowledge.

"Undoubtedly," it will be said, "religious, moral, philosophical, and juridical ideas have been modified in the course of historical development. But religion, morality, philosophy, political science, and law, constantly survived this change."

"There are, besides, eternal truths, such as Freedom, Justice, etc., that are common to all states of society. But Communism abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all religion, and all morality, instead of constituting them on a new basis; it therefore acts in contradiction to all past historical experience."

What does this accusation reduce itself to? The history of all past society has consisted in the development of class antagonisms, antagonisms that assumed different forms at different epochs.

But whatever form they may have taken, one fact is common to all past ages, *viz.*, the exploitation of one part of society by the other. No wonder, then, that the social consciousness of past ages, despite all the multiplicity and variety it displays, moves within certain common forms, or general ideas, which cannot completely vanish except with the total disappearance of class antagonisms.

The Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations; no wonder that its development involved the most radical rupture with traditional ideas.

But let us have done with the bourgeois objections to Communism.

We have seen above, that the first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class to win the battle of democracy.

The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degree, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State, *i.e.*, of the proletariat organised as the ruling class; and to increase the total productive forces as rapidly as possible.

Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order, and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionising the mode of production.

These measures will, of course, be different in different countries.

Nevertheless, in most advanced countries, the following will be pretty generally applicable.

1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to public purposes.

2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.

3. Abolition of all rights of inheritance.

4. Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels.

5. Centralisation of credit in the hands of the state, by means of a national bank with State capital and an exclusive monopoly.

6. Centralisation of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the State.

7. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the State; the bringing into cultivation of waste-lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan.

8. Equal liability of all to work. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.

9. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of all the distinction between town and country by a more equable distribution of the populace over the country.

10. Free education for all children in public schools. Abolition of children's factory labour in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, &c, &c.

When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly

so called, is merely the organised power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organise itself as a class, if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class.

In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.

3. Socialist and communist literature

[…]

C. German or "True" Socialism

The Socialist and Communist literature of France, a literature that originated under the pressure of a bourgeoisie in power, and that was the expressions of the struggle against this power, was introduced into Germany at a time when the bourgeoisie, in that country, had just begun its contest with feudal absolutism.

German philosophers, would-be philosophers, and *beaux esprits* (men of letters), eagerly seized on this literature, only forgetting, that when these writings immigrated from France into Germany, French social conditions had not immigrated along with them. In contact with German social conditions, this French literature lost all its immediate practical significance and assumed a purely literary aspect. Thus, to the German philosophers of the Eighteenth Century, the demands of the first French Revolution were nothing more than the demands of "Practical Reason" in general, and the utterance of the will of the revolutionary French bourgeoisie signified, in their eyes, the laws of pure Will, of Will as it was bound to be, of true human Will generally.

The work of the German *literati* consisted solely in bringing the new French ideas into harmony with their ancient philosophical conscience, or rather, in annexing the French ideas without deserting their own philosophic point of view.

This annexation took place in the same way in which a foreign language is appropriated, namely, by translation.

It is well known how the monks wrote silly lives of Catholic Saints *over* the manuscripts on which the classical works of ancient heathendom had been written. The German *literati* reversed this process with the profane French literature. They wrote their philosophical nonsense beneath the French original. For instance, beneath the French criticism of the economic functions of money, they wrote "Alienation of Humanity", and beneath the French criticism of the bourgeois state they wrote "Dethronement of the Category of the General", and so forth.

The introduction of these philosophical phrases at the back of the French historical criticisms, they dubbed "Philosophy of Action", "True Socialism", "German Science of Socialism", "Philosophical Foundation of Socialism", and so on.

The French Socialist and Communist literature was thus completely emasculated. And, since it ceased in the hands of the German to express the struggle of one class with the other, he felt conscious of having overcome "French one-sidedness" and of representing, not true requirements, but the requirements of Truth; not the interests of the proletariat, but the interests of Human Nature, of Man in general, who belongs to no class, has no reality, who exists only in the misty realm of philosophical fantasy.

This German socialism, which took its schoolboy task so seriously and solemnly, and extolled its poor stock-in-trade in such a mountebank fashion, meanwhile gradually lost its pedantic innocence.

The fight of the Germans, and especially of the Prussian bourgeoisie, against feudal aristocracy and absolute monarchy, in other words, the liberal movement, became more earnest.

By this, the long-wished for opportunity was offered to "True" Socialism of confronting the political movement with the Socialist demands, of hurling the traditional anathemas against liberalism, against representative government, against bourgeois competition, bourgeois freedom of the press, bourgeois legislation, bourgeois liberty and equality, and of preaching to the masses that they had nothing to gain, and everything to lose, by this bourgeois movement. German Socialism forgot, in the nick of time, that the French criticism, whose silly echo it was, presupposed the existence of modern bourgeois society, with its corresponding economic conditions of existence, and the political constitution adapted thereto, the very things those attainment was the object of the pending struggle in Germany.

To the absolute governments, with their following of parsons, professors, country

squires, and officials, it served as a welcome scarecrow against the threatening bourgeoisie.

It was a sweet finish, after the bitter pills of flogging and bullets, with which these same governments, just at that time, dosed the German working-class risings.

While this “True” Socialism thus served the government as a weapon for fighting the German bourgeoisie, it, at the same time, directly represented a reactionary interest, the interest of German Philistines. In Germany, the *petty-bourgeois* class, a relic of the sixteenth century, and since then constantly cropping up again under the various forms, is the real social basis of the existing state of things.

To preserve this class is to preserve the existing state of things in Germany. The industrial and political supremacy of the bourgeoisie threatens it with certain destruction — on the one hand, from the concentration of capital; on the other, from the rise of a revolutionary proletariat. “True” Socialism appeared to kill these two birds with one stone. It spread like an epidemic.

The robe of speculative cobwebs, embroidered with flowers of rhetoric, steeped in the dew of sickly sentiment, this transcendental robe in which the German Socialists wrapped their sorry “eternal truths”, all skin and bone, served to wonderfully increase the sale of their goods amongst such a public.

And on its part German Socialism recognised, more and more, its own calling as the bombastic representative of the petty-bourgeois Philistine.

It proclaimed the German nation to be the model nation, and the German petty Philistine to be the typical man. To every villainous meanness of this model man, it gave a hidden, higher, Socialistic interpretation, the exact contrary of its real character. It went to the extreme length of directly opposing the “brutally destructive” tendency of Communism, and of proclaiming its supreme and impartial contempt of all class struggles. With very few exceptions, all the so-called Socialist and Communist publications that now (1847) circulate in Germany belong to the domain of this foul and enervating literature.

16. Marx, Future Results of the British Rule in India
1853
Source: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1853/07/22.htm
From Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, Volume 12, p. 217
First published in *New-York Daily Tribune*, August 8, 1853

I propose in this letter to conclude my observations on India.

How came it that English supremacy was established in India? The paramount power of the Great Mogul was broken by the Mogul Viceroys. The power of the Viceroys was broken by the Mahrattas. The power of the Mahrattas was broken by the Afghans, and while all were struggling against all, the Briton rushed in and was enabled to subdue them all. A country not only divided between Mahommedan and Hindoo, but between tribe and tribe, between caste and caste; a society whose framework was based on a sort of equilibrium, resulting from a. general repulsion and constitutional exclusiveness between all its members. Such a country and such a society, were they not the predestined prey of conquest? If we knew nothing of the past history of Hindostan, would there not be the one great and incontestable fact, that even at this moment India is held in English thraldom by an Indian army maintained at the cost of India? India, then, could not escape the fate of being conquered, and the whole of her past history, if it be anything, is the history of the successive conquests she has undergone. Indian society has no history at all, at least no known history. What we call its history, is but the history of the successive intruders who founded their empires on the passive basis of that unresisting and unchanging society. The question, therefore, is not whether the English had a right to conquer India, but whether we are to prefer India conquered by the Turk, by the Persian, by the Russian, to India conquered by the Briton.

England has to fulfill a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerating the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the laying the material foundations of Western society in Asia.

Arabs, Turks, Tartars, Moguls, who had successively overrun India, soon became Hindooized, the barbarian conquerors being, by an eternal law of history, conquered themselves by the superior civilization of their subjects. The British were the first conquerors superior, and therefore, inaccessible to Hindoo civilization. They destroyed it by breaking up the native communities, by uprooting the native industry, and by levelling all that was great and elevated in the native society. The historic pages of their rule in India report hardly anything beyond that destruction. The work of regeneration hardly transpires through a heap of ruins. Nevertheless it has begun.

The political unity of India, more consolidated, and extending farther than it ever did under the Great Moguls, was the first condition of its regeneration. That unity, imposed by the British sword, will now be strengthened and perpetuated by the electric telegraph. The native army, organized and trained by the British drill-sergeant, was the sine qua non of Indian self-emancipation, and of India ceasing to be the prey of the first foreign intruder. The free press, introduced for the first time into Asiatic society, and managed principally by the common offspring of Hindoos and Europeans, is a new and powerful agent of reconstruction. The Zemindari and Ryotwar themselves, abominable as they are, involve two distinct forms of private property in land – the great desideratum of Asiatic society. From the Indian natives, reluctantly and sparingly educated at Calcutta, under English superintendence, a fresh class is springing up, endowed with the requirements for government and imbued with European science. Steam has brought India into regular and rapid communication with Europe, has connected its chief ports with those of the whole south-eastern ocean, and has revindicated it from the isolated position which was the prime law of its stagnation. The day is not far distant when, by a combination of railways and steam-vessels, the distance between England and India, measured by time, will be shortened to eight days, and when that once fabulous country will thus be actually annexed to the Western world.

The ruling classes of Great Britain have had, till now, but an accidental, transitory and exceptional interest in the progress of India. The aristocracy wanted to conquer it, the moneyocracy to plunder it, and the millocracy to undersell it. But now the tables are turned. The millocracy have discovered that the transformation of India into a reproductive country has become of vital importance to them, and that, to that end, it is necessary, above all, to gift her with means of irrigation and of internal communication. They intend now drawing a net of railroads over India. And they will do it. The results must be inappreciable.

It is notorious that the productive powers of India are paralysed by the utter want of means for conveying and exchanging its various produce. Nowhere, more than in India, do we meet with social destitution in the midst of natural plenty, for want of the means of exchange. It was proved before a Committee of the British House of Commons, which sat in 1848, that

> “when grain was selling from 6/- to 8/- a quarter at Khandesh, it was sold at

> 64/ to 70/- at Poona, where the people were dying in the streets of famine, without the possibility of gaining supplies from Khandesh, because the clay-roads were impracticable."

The introduction of railroads may be easily made to subserve agricultural purposes by the formation of tanks, where ground is required for embankment, and by the conveyance of water along the different lines. Thus irrigation, the sine qua non of farming in the East, might be greatly extended, and the frequently recurring local famines, arising from the want of water, would be averted. The general importance of railways, viewed under this head, must become evident, when we remember that irrigated lands, even in the districts near Ghauts, pay three times as much in taxes, afford ten or twelve times as much employment, and yield twelve or fifteen times as much profit, as the same area without irrigation.

Railways will afford the means of diminishing the amount and the cost of the military establishments. Col. Warren, Town Major of the Fort St. William, stated before a Select Committee of the House of Commons:

> "The practicability of receiving intelligence from distant parts of the country, in as many hours as at present it requires days and even weeks, and of sending instructions, with troops and stores, in the more brief period, are considerations which cannot be too highly estimated. Troops could be kept at more distant and healthier stations than at present, and much loss of life from sickness would by this means be spared. Stores could not to the same extent he required at the various depots, and. the loss by decay, and the destruction incidental to the climate, would also be avoided. The number of troops might be diminished in direct proportion to their effectiveness."

We know that the municipal organization and the economical basis of the village communities has been broken up, but their worst feature, the dissolution of society into stereotype and disconnected atoms, has survived their vitality. The village isolation produced the absence of roads in India, and the absence of roads perpetuated the village isolation. On this plan a community existed with a given scale of low conveniences, almost without intercourse with other villages, without the desires and efforts indispensable to social advance. The British having broken up this self-sufficient inertia of the villages, railways will provide the new want of communication and intercourse. Besides,

> "one of the effects of the railway system will he to bring into every village affected by it such knowledge of the contrivances and appliances of other countries, and such means of obtaining them, as will first put the hereditary and stipendiary village artisanship of India to full proof of its capabilities, and then supply its defects." (Chapman, *The Cotton and Commerce of India* [pp. 95-97].)

I know that the English millocracy intend to endow India with railways with the exclusive view of extracting at diminished expenses the cotton and other raw materials for their manufactures. But when you have once introduced machinery into the locomotion of a country, which possesses iron and coals, you are unable to withhold it from its fabrication. You cannot maintain a net of railways over an immense country without introducing all those industrial processes necessary to meet the immediate and current wants of railway locomotion, and out of which there must grow the application of machinery to those branches of industry not immediately connected with railways. The railway-system will therefore become, in India, truly the forerunner of modern industry. This is the more certain as the Hindoos are allowed by British authorities themselves to possess particular aptitude. for accommodating themselves to entirely new labor, and acquiring the requisite knowledge of machinery. Ample proof of this fact is afforded by the capacities and expertness of the native engineers in the Calcutta mint, where they have been for years employed in working the steam machinery, by the natives attached to the several steam engines in the Burdwan coal districts, and by other instances. Mr. Campbell himself, greatly influenced as he is by the prejudices of the East India Company, is obliged to avow

> "that the great mass of the Indian people possesses a great industrial energy, is well fitted to accumulate capital, and remarkable for a mathematical clearness of head and talent for figures and exact sciences." "Their intellects," he says, "are excellent."

Modern industry, resulting from the railway system, will dissolve the hereditary divisions of labor, upon which rest the Indian castes, those decisive impediments to Indian progress and Indian power.

All the English bourgeoisie may be forced to do will neither emancipate nor materially mend the social condition of the mass of the people, depending not only on the development of the productive powers, but on their appropriation by the people. But what they will not fail to do is to lay down the material premises for both. Has the bourgeoisie ever done more? Has it ever effected a progress without dragging individuals and people through blood and dirt, through misery and

degradation?

The Indians will not reap the fruits of the new elements of society scattered among them by the British bourgeoisie, till in Great Britain itself the now ruling classes shall have been supplanted by the industrial proletariat, or till the Hindoos themselves shall have grown strong enough to throw off the English yoke altogether. At all events, we may safely expect to see, at a more or less remote period, the regeneration of that great and interesting country, whose gentle natives are, to use the expression of Prince Soltykov, even in the most inferior classes, "*plus fins et plus adroits que les Italiens*" [more subtle and adroit than the Italians], a whose submission even is counterbalanced by a certain calm nobility, who, notwithstanding their natural langor, have astonished the British officers by their bravery, whose country has been the source of our languages, our religions, and who represent the type of the ancient German in the Jat, and the type of the ancient Greek in the Brahmin.

I cannot part with the subject of India without some concluding remarks.

The profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilization lies unveiled before our eyes, turning from its home, where it assumes respectable forms, to the colonies, where it goes naked. They are the defenders of property, but did any revolutionary party ever originate agrarian revolutions like those in Bengal, in Madras, and in Bombay? Did they not, in India, to borrow an expression of. that great robber, Lord Clive himself, resort to atrocious extortion, when simple corruption could not keep pace with their rapacity? While they prated in Europe about the inviolable sanctity of the national debt, did they not confiscate in India the dividends of the rajahs, 171 who had invested their private savings in the Company's own funds? While they combatted the French revolution under the pretext of defending "our holy religion," did they not forbid, at the same time, Christianity to be propagated in India, and did they not, in order to make money out of the pilgrims streaming to the temples of Orissa and Bengal, take up the trade in the murder and prostitution perpetrated in the temple of juggernaut? These are the men of "Property, Order, Family, and Religion."

The devastating effects of English industry, when contemplated with regard to India, a country as vast as Europe, and containing 150 millions of acres, are palpable and confounding. But we must not forget that they are only the organic results of the whole system of production as it is now constituted. That production rests on the supreme rule of capital. The centralization of capital is essential to the existence of capital as an independent power. The destructive influence of that centralization upon the markets of the world does but reveal, in the most gigantic dimensions, the inherent organic laws of political economy now at work in every civilized town. The bourgeois period of history has to create the material basis of the new world – on the one hand universal intercourse founded upon the mutual dependency of mankind, and the means of that intercourse; on the other hand the development of the productive powers of man and the transformation of material production into a scientific domination of natural agencies. Bourgeois industry and commerce create these material conditions of a new world in the same way as geological revolutions have created the surface of the earth. When a great social revolution shall have mastered the results of the bourgeois epoch, the market of the world and the modern powers of production, and subjected them to the common control of the most advanced peoples, then only will human progress cease to resemble that hideous, pagan idol, who would not drink the nectar but from the skulls of the slain.

17. Marx, Introduction to the Grundrisse
1857
Source: http://marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/index.htm
From Marx, *Grundrisse*, tr. M. Nicolaus (Penguin, 1973)
Full title: Introduction to the *Grundrisse*

(1) Production in general
(2) General relation between production, distribution, exchange and consumption
(3) The method of political economy
(4) Means (forces) of production and relations of production, relations of production and relations of circulation

(1) Production in General

The object before us, to begin with, *material production*.

Individuals producing in Society – hence socially determined individual production – is, of course, the point of departure. The individual and isolated hunter and fisherman, with whom Smith and Ricardo begin, belongs among the unimaginative conceits of the eighteenth-century Robinsonades,[1] which in no way express merely a reaction against over-sophistication and a return to a misunderstood natural life, as cultural historians imagine. As little as Rousseau's *contrat social*, which brings naturally independent, autonomous subjects into relation and connection by contract, rests on such naturalism. This is the semblance, the merely aesthetic semblance, of the Robinsonades, great and small. It is, rather, the anticipation of 'civil society', in preparation since the sixteenth century and making giant strides towards maturity in the eighteenth. In this society of free competition, the individual appears detached from the natural bonds etc. which in earlier historical periods make him the accessory of a definite and limited human conglomerate. Smith and Ricardo still stand with both feet on the shoulders of the eighteenth-century prophets, in whose imaginations this eighteenth-century individual – the product on one side of the dissolution of the feudal forms of society, on the other side of the new forces of production developed since the sixteenth century – appears as an ideal, whose existence they project into the past. Not as a historic result but as history's point of departure. As the Natural Individual appropriate to their notion of human nature, not arising historically, but posited by nature. This illusion has been common to each new epoch to this day. Steuart[2] avoided this simple-mindedness because as an aristocrat and in antithesis to the eighteenth century, he had in some respects a more historical footing.

The more deeply we go back into history, the more does the individual, and hence also the producing individual, appear as dependent, as belonging to a greater whole: in a still quite natural way in the family and in the family expanded into the clan [*Stamm*]; then later in the various forms of communal society arising out of the antitheses and fusions of the clan. Only in the eighteenth century, in 'civil society', do the various forms of social connectedness confront the individual as a mere means towards his private purposes, as external necessity. But the epoch which produces this standpoint, that of the isolated individual, is also precisely that of the hitherto most developed social (from this standpoint, general) relations. The human being is in the most literal sense a *zoon politikon*[3] not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society. Production by an isolated individual outside society – a rare exception which may well occur when a civilized person in whom the social forces are already dynamically present is cast by accident into the wilderness – is as much of an absurdity as is the development of language without individuals living *together* and talking to each other.

[…]

(3) The Method of Political Economy

When we consider a given country politico-economically, we begin with its population, its distribution among classes, town, country, the coast, the different branches of production, export and import, annual production and consumption, commodity prices etc.

It seems to be correct to begin with the real and the concrete, with the real precondition, thus to begin, in economics, with e.g. the population, which is the foundation and the subject of the entire social act of production. However, on closer examination this proves false. The population is an abstraction if I leave out, for example, the classes of which it is composed. These classes in turn are an empty phrase if I am not familiar with the elements on which they rest. E.g. wage

[1] I.e. novels like Robinson Crusoe.

[2] Sir James Steuart, a political economist who wrote shortly before Adam Smith.

[3] political animal.

labour, capital, etc. These latter in turn presuppose exchange, division of labour, prices, etc. For example, capital is nothing without wage labour, without value, money, price etc. Thus, if I were to begin with the population, this would be a chaotic conception [*Vorstellung*] of the whole, and I would then, by means of further determination, move analytically towards ever more simple concepts [*Begriff*], from the imagined concrete towards ever thinner abstractions until I had arrived at the simplest determinations. From there the journey would have to be retraced until I had finally arrived at the population again, but this time not as the chaotic conception of a whole, but as a rich totality of many determinations and relations. The former is the path historically followed by economics at the time of its origins. The economists of the seventeenth century, e.g., always begin with the living whole, with population, nation, state, several states, etc.; but they always conclude by discovering through analysis a small number of determinant, abstract, general relations such as division of labour, money, value, etc. As soon as these individual moments had been more or less firmly established and abstracted, there began the economic systems, which ascended from the simple relations, such as labour, division of labour, need, exchange value, to the level of the state, exchange between nations and the world market. The latter is obviously the scientifically correct method. The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse. It appears in the process of thinking, therefore, as a process of concentration, as a result, not as a point of departure, even though it is the point of departure in reality and hence also the point of departure for observation [*Anschauung*] and conception. Along the first path the full conception was evaporated to yield an abstract determination; along the second, the abstract determinations lead towards a reproduction of the concrete by way of thought. In this way Hegel fell into the illusion of conceiving the real as the product of thought concentrating itself, probing its own depths, and unfolding itself out of itself, by itself, whereas the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete is only the way in which thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the concrete in the mind. But this is by no means the process by which the concrete itself comes into being. For example, the simplest economic category, say e.g. exchange value, presupposes population, moreover a population producing in specific relations; as well as a certain kind of family, or commune, or state, etc. It can never exist other than as an abstract, one-sided relation within an already given, concrete, living whole. As a category, by contrast, exchange value leads an antediluvian existence. Therefore, to the kind of consciousness – and this is characteristic of the philosophical consciousness – for which conceptual thinking is the real human being, and for which the conceptual world as such is thus the only reality, the movement of the categories appears as the real act of production – which only, unfortunately, receives a jolt from the outside – whose product is the world; and – but this is again a tautology – this is correct in so far as the concrete totality is a totality of thoughts, concrete in thought, in fact a product of thinking and comprehending; but not in any way a product of the concept which thinks and generates itself outside or above observation and conception; a product, rather, of the working-up of observation and conception into concepts. The totality as it appears in the head, as a totality of thoughts, is a product of a thinking head, which appropriates the world in the only way it can, a way different from the artistic, religious, practical and mental appropriation of this world. The real subject retains its autonomous existence outside the head just as before; namely as long as the head's conduct is merely speculative, merely theoretical. Hence, in the theoretical method, too, the subject, society, must always be kept in mind as the presupposition.

But do not these simpler categories also have an independent historical or natural existence predating the more concrete ones? That depends. Hegel, for example, correctly begins the Philosophy of Right with possession, this being the subject's simplest juridical relation. But there is no possession preceding the family or master – servant relations, which are far more concrete relations. However, it would be correct to say that there are families or clan groups which still merely *possess,* but have no *property.* The simple category therefore appears in relation to property as a relation of simple families or clan groups. In the higher society it appears as the simpler relation of a developed organization. But the concrete substratum of which possession is a relation is always presupposed. One can imagine an individual savage as possessing something. But in that case possession is not a juridical relation. It is incorrect that possession develops historically into the family. Possession, rather, always presupposes this 'more concrete juridical category'. There would still always remain this much, however, namely that the simple categories are the expressions of relations within which the less developed concrete may have already realized itself before having posited the more many-sided connection or relation which is mentally expressed in the more concrete category; while the more developed concrete preserves the same category as a subordinate relation. Money may exist, and did exist historically, before capital existed, before banks existed, before wage labour existed, etc. Thus in this respect it may be said that the simpler category can express the dominant relations of a less developed whole, or else those subordinate relations of a more developed whole which already had a historic existence before this whole developed in the direction

expressed by a more concrete category. To that extent the path of abstract thought, rising from the simple to the combined, would correspond to the real historical process.

It may be said on the other hand that there are very developed but nevertheless historically less mature forms of society, in which the highest forms of economy, e.g. cooperation, a developed division of labour, etc., are found, even though there is no kind of money, e.g. Peru. Among the Slav communities also, money and the exchange which determines it play little or no role within the individual communities, but only on their boundaries, in traffic with others; it is simply wrong to place exchange at the center of communal society as the original, constituent element. It originally appears, rather, in the connection of the different communities with one another, not in the relations between the different members of a single community. Further, although money everywhere plays a role from very early on, it is nevertheless a predominant element, in antiquity, only within the confines of certain one-sidedly developed nations, trading nations. And even in the most advanced parts of the ancient world, among the Greeks and Romans, the full development of money, which is presupposed in modern bourgeois society, appears only in the period of their dissolution. This very simple category, then, makes a historic appearance in its full intensity only in the most developed conditions of society. By no means does it wade its way through all economic relations. For example, in the Roman Empire, at its highest point of development, the foundation remained taxes and payments in kind. The money system actually completely developed there only in the army. And it never took over the whole of labour. Thus, although the simpler category may have existed historically before the more concrete, it can achieve its full (intensive and extensive) development precisely in a combined form of society, while the more concrete category was more fully developed in a less developed form of society.

Labour seems a quite simple category. The conception of labour in this general form – as labour as such – is also immeasurably old. Nevertheless, when it is economically conceived in this simplicity, 'labour' is as modern a category as are the relations which create this simple abstraction. The Monetary System[4] for example, still locates wealth altogether objectively, as an external thing, in money. Compared with this standpoint, the commercial, or manufacture, system took a great step forward by locating the source of wealth not in the object but in a subjective activity – in commercial and manufacturing activity – even though it still always conceives this activity within narrow boundaries, as moneymaking. In contrast to this system, that of the Physiocrats posits a certain kind of labour – agriculture – as the creator of wealth, and the object itself no longer appears in a monetary disguise, but as the product in general, as the general result of labour. This product, as befits the narrowness of the activity, still always remains a naturally determined product – the product of agriculture, the product of the earth *par excellence.*

It was an immense step forward for Adam Smith to throw out every limiting specification of wealth-creating activity – not only manufacturing, or commercial or agricultural labour, but one as well as the others, labour in general. With the abstract universality of wealth-creating activity we now have the universality of the object defined as wealth, the product as such or again labour as such, but labour as past, objectified labour. How difficult and great was this transition may be seen from how Adam Smith himself from time to time still falls back into the Physiocratic system. Now, it might seem that all that had been achieved thereby was to discover the abstract expression for the simplest and most ancient relation in which human beings – in whatever form of society – play the role of producers. This is correct in one respect. Not in another. Indifference towards any specific kind of labour presupposes a very developed totality of real kinds of labour, of which no single one is any longer predominant. As a rule, the most general abstractions arise only in the midst of the richest possible concrete development, where one thing appears as common to many, to all. Then it ceases to be thinkable in a particular form alone. On the other side, this abstraction of labour as such is not merely the mental product of a concrete totality of labours. Indifference towards specific labours corresponds to a form of society in which individuals can with ease transfer from one labour to another, and where the specific kind is a matter of chance for them, hence of indifference. Not only the category, labour, but labour in reality has here become the means of creating wealth in general, and has ceased to be organically linked with particular individuals in any specific form. Such a state of affairs is at its most developed in the most modern form of existence of bourgeois society – in the United States. Here, then, for the first time, the point of departure of modern economics, namely the abstraction of the category 'labour', 'labour as such', labour pure and simple, becomes true in practice. The simplest abstraction, then, which modern economics places at the head of its discussions, and which expresses an immeasurably ancient relation valid in all forms of society, nevertheless achieves practical truth as an abstraction only as a category of the

[4] Marx means 16th-18th century economists prior to Adam Smith.

most modern society. One could say that this indifference towards particular kinds of labour, which is a historic product in the United States, appears e.g. among the Russians as a spontaneous inclination. But there is a devil of a difference between barbarians who are fit by nature to be used for anything, and civilized people who apply themselves to everything. And then in practice the Russian indifference to the specific character of labour corresponds to being embedded by tradition within a very specific kind of labour, from which only external influences can jar them loose.

This example of labour shows strikingly how even the most abstract categories, despite their validity – precisely because of their abstractness – for all epochs, are nevertheless, in the specific character of this abstraction, themselves likewise a product of historic relations, and possess their full validity only for and within these relations.

Bourgeois society is the most developed and the most complex historic organization of production. The categories which express its relations, the comprehension of its structure, thereby also allows insights into the structure and the relations of production of all the vanished social formations out of whose ruins and elements it built itself up, whose partly still unconquered remnants are carried along within it, whose mere nuances have developed explicit significance within it, etc. Human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape. The intimations of higher development among the subordinate animal species, however, can be understood only after the higher development is already known. The bourgeois economy thus supplies the key to the ancient, etc. But not at all in the manner of those economists who smudge over *all* historical differences and see bourgeois relations in all forms of society. One can understand tribute, tithe, etc., if one is acquainted with ground rent. But one must not identify them. Further, since bourgeois society is itself only a contradictory form of development, relations derived from earlier forms will often be found within it only in an entirely stunted form, or even travestied. For example, communal property. Although it is true, therefore, that the categories of bourgeois economics possess a truth for all other forms of society, this is to be taken only with a grain of salt. They can contain them in a developed, or stunted, or caricatured form etc., but always with an essential difference. The so-called historical presentation of development is founded, as a rule, on the fact that the latest form regards the previous ones as steps leading up to itself, and, since it is only rarely and only under quite specific conditions able to criticize itself – leaving aside, of course, the historical periods which appear to themselves as times of decadence – it always conceives them one-sidedly. The Christian religion was able to be of assistance in reaching an objective understanding of earlier mythologies only when its own self-criticism had been accomplished to a certain degree, so to speak. Likewise, bourgeois economics arrived at an understanding of feudal, ancient, oriental economics only after the self-criticism of bourgeois society had begun. In so far as the bourgeois economy did not mythologically identify itself altogether with the past, its critique of the previous economies, notably of feudalism, with which it was still engaged in direct struggle, resembled the critique which Christianity leveled against paganism, or also that of Protestantism against Catholicism.

In the succession of the economic categories, as in any other historical, social science, it must not be forgotten that their subject – here, modern bourgeois society – is always what is given, in the head as well as in reality, and that these categories therefore express the forms of being, the characteristics of existence, and often only individual sides of this specific society, this subject, and that therefore this society by no means begins only at the point where one can speak of it *as such*; this holds *for science as well.* This is to be kept in mind because it will shortly be decisive for the order and sequence of the categories. For example, nothing seems more natural than to begin with ground rent, with landed property, since this is bound up with the earth, the source of all production and of all being, and with the first form of production of all more or less settled societies – agriculture. But nothing would be more erroneous. In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their particularity. It is a particular ether which determines the specific gravity of every being which has materialized within it. For example, with pastoral peoples (mere hunting and fishing peoples lie outside the point where real development begins). Certain forms of tillage occur among them, sporadic ones. Landed property is determined by this. It is held in common, and retains this form to a greater or lesser degree according to the greater or lesser degree of attachment displayed by these peoples to their tradition, e.g. the communal property of the Slavs. Among peoples with a settled agriculture – this settling already a great step – where this predominates, as in antiquity and in the feudal order, even industry, together with its organization and the forms of property corresponding to it, has a more or less landed-proprietary character; is either completely dependent on it, as among the earlier Romans, or, as in the Middle Ages, imitates, within the city and its relations, the organization of the land. In the Middle Ages, capital itself – apart

from pure money-capital – in the form of the traditional artisans' tools etc., has this landed-proprietary character. In bourgeois society it is the opposite. Agriculture more and more becomes merely a branch of industry, and is entirely dominated by capital. Ground rent likewise. In all forms where landed property rules, the natural relation still predominant. In those where capital rules, the social, historically created element. Ground rent cannot be understood without capital. But capital can certainly be understood without ground rent. Capital is the all-dominating economic power of bourgeois society. It must form the starting-point as well as the finishing-point, and must be dealt with before landed property. After both have been examined in particular, their interrelation must be examined.

It would therefore be unfeasible and wrong to let the economic categories follow one another in the same sequence as that in which they were historically decisive. Their sequence is determined, rather, by their relation to one another in modern bourgeois society, which is precisely the opposite of that which seems to be their natural order or which corresponds to historical development. The point is not the historic position of the economic relations in the succession of different forms of society. Even less is it their sequence 'in the idea' (Proudhon) (a muddy notion of historic movement). Rather, their order within modern bourgeois society.

The purity (abstract specificity) in which the trading peoples – Phoenicians, Carthaginians – appear in the old world is determined precisely by the predominance of the agricultural peoples. Capital, as trading-capital or as money-capital, appears in this abstraction precisely where capital is not yet the predominant element of societies. Lombards, Jews take up the same position towards the agricultural societies of the Middle Ages.

As a further example of the divergent positions which the same category can occupy in different social stages: one of the latest forms of bourgeois society, *joint-stock companies*. These also appear, however, at its beginning, in the great, privileged monopoly trading companies.

The concept of national wealth creeps into the work of the economists of the seventeenth century – continuing partly with those of the eighteenth – in the form of the notion that wealth is created only to enrich the state, and that its power is proportionate to this wealth. This was the still unconsciously hypocritical form in which wealth and the production of wealth proclaimed themselves as the purpose of modern states, and regarded these states henceforth only as means for the production of wealth.

The order obviously has to be (1) the general, abstract determinants which obtain in more or less all forms of society, but in the above-explained sense. (2) The categories which make up the inner structure of bourgeois society and on which the fundamental classes rest. Capital, wage labour, landed property. Their interrelation. Town and country. The three great social classes. Exchange between them. Circulation. Credit system (private). (3) Concentration of bourgeois society in the form of the state. Viewed in relation to itself. The 'unproductive' classes. Taxes. State debt. Public credit. The population. The colonies. Emigration. (4) The international relation of production. International division of labour. International exchange. Export and import. Rate of exchange. (5) The world market and crises.

18. Marx, Grundrisse
1857-58
Source: http://marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/index.htm
From Marx, *Grundrisse*, tr. M. Nicolaus (Penguin, 1973)

[All headings are mine. – AC]

(1) pp. 145-151 (On commodities and money)

The process, then, is simply this: The product becomes a commodity, *i.e. a mere moment of exchange.* The commodity is transformed into exchange value. In order to equate it with itself as an exchange value, it is exchanged for a symbol which represents it as exchange value as such. As such a symbolized exchange value, it can then in turn be exchanged in definite relations for every other commodity. Because the product becomes a commodity, and the commodity becomes an exchange value, it obtains, at first only in the head, a double existence. This doubling in the idea proceeds (and must proceed) to the point where the commodity appears double in real exchange: as a natural product on one side, as exchange value on the other. I.e. the commodity's exchange value obtains a material existence separate from the commodity.

The definition of a product as exchange value thus necessarily implies that exchange value obtains a separate existence, in isolation from the product. The exchange value which is separated from commodities and exists alongside them as itself a commodity, this is – *money.* In the form of *money* all properties of the commodity as exchange value appear as an object distinct from it, as a form of social existence separated from the natural existence of the commodity. (This to be further shown by enumerating the usual properties of money.) (The material in which this symbol is expressed is by no means a matter of indifference, even though it manifests itself in many different historical forms. In the development of society, not only the symbol but likewise the material corresponding to the symbol are worked out – a material from which society later tries to disentangle itself; if a symbol is not to be arbitrary, certain conditions are demanded of the material in which it is represented. The symbols for words, for example the alphabet etc., have an analogous history.) Thus, the exchange value of a product creates money alongside the product. Now, just as it is impossible to suspend[1] the complications and contradictions which arise from the existence of money alongside the particular commodities merely by altering the form of money (although difficulties characteristic of a lower form of money may be avoided by moving to a higher form), so also is it impossible to abolish money itself as long as exchange value remains the social form of products. It is necessary to see this clearly in order to avoid setting impossible tasks, and in order to know the limits within which monetary reforms and transformations of circulation are able to [146] give a new shape to the relations of production and to the social relations which rest on the latter.

The properties of money as (1) measure of commodity exchange; (2) medium of exchange; (3) representative of commodities (hence object of contracts); (4) general commodity alongside the particular commodities, all simply follow from its character as exchange value separated from commodities themselves and objectified. (By virtue of its property as the general commodity m relation to all others, as the embodiment of the exchange value of the other commodities, money at the same time becomes the realized and always realizable form of capital; the form of capital's appearance which is always valid – a property which emerges in bullion drains; hence capital appears in history initially only in the money form; this explains, finally, the link between money and the rate of interest, and its influence on the latter.)

To the degree that production is shaped in such a way that every producer becomes dependent on the exchange value of his commodity, i.e. as the product increasingly becomes an exchange value in reality, and exchange value becomes the immediate object of production – to the same degree must *money relations* develop, together with the contradictions immanent in the *money relation,* in the relation of the product to itself as money. The need for exchange and for the transformation of the product into a pure exchange value progresses in step with the division of labour, i.e. with the increasingly social character of production. But as the latter grows, so grows the power of *money,* i.e. the exchange relation establishes itself as a power external to and independent of the producers. What originally appeared as a means to promote production becomes a relation alien to the producers. As the producers become more dependent on exchange, exchange appears to become more independent of them, and the gap between the product as product and the product as exchange value appears to widen. Money does not create these antitheses and contradictions; it is, rather, the development of these contradictions and antitheses which creates the seemingly transcendental power of money. (To be further developed, the influence of the transformation of all relations into money relations:

[1] *aufheben*. Nicolaus generally translates this as 'suspend'.

taxes in kind into money taxes, rent in kind into money rent, military service into mercenary troops, all personal services in general into money services, of patriarchal, slave, serf and guild labour into pure wage labour.)

The product becomes a commodity; the commodity becomes [147] exchange value; the exchange value of the commodity is its immanent money-property; this, its money-property, separates itself from it in the form of money, and achieves a general social existence separated from all particular commodities and their natural mode of existence; the relation of the product to itself as exchange value becomes its relation to money, existing alongside it; or, becomes the relation of all products to money, external to them all. Just as the real exchange of products creates their exchange value, so does their exchange value create money.

The next question to confront us is this: are there not contradictions, inherent in this relation itself, which are wrapped up in the existence of money alongside commodities?

Firstly: The simple fact that the commodity exists doubly, in one aspect as a specific product whose natural form of existence ideally contains (latently contains) its exchange value, and in the other aspect as manifest exchange value (money), in which all connection with the natural form of the product is stripped away again – this double, *differentiated* existence must develop into a *difference*, and the difference into *antithesis* and *contradiction.* The same contradiction between the particular nature of the commodity as product and its general nature as exchange value, which created the necessity of positing it doubly, as this particular commodity on one side and as money on the other – this contradiction between the commodity's particular natural qualities and its general social qualities contains from the beginning the possibility that these two separated forms in which the commodity exists are not convertible into one another. The exchangeability of the commodity exists as a thing beside it, as money, as something different from the commodity, something no longer directly identical with it. As soon as money has become an external thing alongside the commodity, the exchangeability of the commodity for money becomes bound up with external conditions which may or may not be present; it is abandoned to the mercy of external conditions. The commodity is demanded in exchange because of its natural properties, because of the needs for which it is the desired object. Money, by contrast, is demanded only because of its exchange value, as exchange value. Hence, whether or not the commodity is transposable into money, whether or not it can be exchanged for money, whether its exchange value can be posited for it – this depends on circumstances which initially have nothing to do with it as exchange value and are independent of that. The transposability [148] of the commodity depends on the natural properties of the product; that of money coincides with its existence as symbolized exchange value. There thus arises the possibility that the commodity, in its specific form as product, can no longer be exchanged for, equated with, its general form as money.

By existing outside the commodity as money, the exchangeability of the commodity has become something different from and alien to the commodity, with which it first has to be brought into equation, to which it is therefore at the beginning unequal; while the equation itself becomes dependent on external conditions, hence a matter of chance.

Secondly: Just as the exchange value of the commodity leads a double existence, as the particular commodity and as money, so does the act of exchange split into two mutually independent acts: exchange of commodities for money, exchange of money for commodities; purchase and sale. Since these have now achieved a spatially and temporally separate and mutually indifferent form of existence, their immediate identity ceases. They may correspond or not; they may balance or not; they may enter into disproportion with one another. They will of course always attempt to equalize one another; but in the place of the earlier immediate equality there now stands the constant movement of equalization, which evidently presupposes constant non-equivalence. It is now entirely possible that consonance may be reached only by passing through the most extreme dissonance.

Thirdly: With the separation of purchase and sale, with the splitting of exchange into two spatially and temporally independent acts, there further emerges another, new relation.

Just as exchange itself splits apart into two mutually independent acts, so does the overall movement of exchange itself become separate from the exchangers, the producers of commodities. Exchange for the sake of exchange separates off from exchange for the sake of commodities. A mercantile estate [17] steps between the producers; an estate which only buys in order to sell and only sells so as to buy again, and whose aim in this operation is not the possession of commodities as products but merely the obtaining of exchange values as such, of money. (A mercantile estate can take shape even with mere barter. But since only the overflow of production on both sides is at its disposal, its influence on production, [149] and its importance as a whole, remain completely secondary.) The rise of exchange

(commerce) as an independent function torn away from the exchangers corresponds to the rise of exchange value as an independent entity, as money, torn away from products. Exchange value was the measure of commodity exchange; but its aim was the direct possession of the exchanged commodity, its consumption (regardless of whether this consumption consists of serving to satisfy needs directly, i.e. serving as product, or of serving in turn as a tool of production). The purpose of commerce is not consumption, directly, but the gaining of money, of exchange values. This doubling of exchange – exchange for the sake of consumption and exchange for exchange – gives rise to a new disproportion. In his exchange, the merchant is guided merely by the difference between the purchase and sale of commodities; but the consumer who buys a commodity must replace its exchange value once and for all. Circulation, i.e. exchange within the mercantile estate, and the point at which circulation ends, i.e. exchange between the mercantile estate and the consumers – as much as they must ultimately condition one another – are determined by quite different laws and motives, and can enter into the most acute contradiction with one another. The possibility of commercial crises is already contained in this separation. But since production works directly for commerce and only indirectly for consumption, it must not only create but also and equally be seized by this incongruency between commerce and exchange for consumption. (The relations of demand and supply become entirely inverted.) (The money business then in turn separates from commerce proper.)

Aphorisms. (All commodities are perishable money; money is the imperishable commodity. With the development of the division of labour, the immediate product ceases to be a medium of exchange. The need arises for a general medium of exchange, i.e. a medium of exchange independent of the specific production of each individual. Money implies the separation between the value of things and their substance. Money is originally the representative of all values; in practice this situation is inverted, and all real products and labours become the representatives of money. In direct barter, every article cannot be exchanged for every other; a specific activity can be exchanged only for certain specific products. Money can overcome the difficulties inherent in barter only by [150] generalizing them, making them universal. It is absolutely necessary that forcibly separated elements which essentially belong together manifest themselves by way of forcible eruption as the *separation* of things which belong together in essence. The unity is brought about *by force.* As soon as the antagonistic split leads to eruptions, the economists point to the *essential unity* and abstract from the alienation. Their apologetic wisdom consists in forgetting their own definitions at every decisive moment. The product as direct medium of exchange is (1) still directly bound to its natural quality, hence limited in every way by the latter; it can, for example, deteriorate etc.; (2) connected with the immediate need which another may have or not have at the time, or which he may have for his own product. When the product becomes subordinated to labour and labour to exchange, then a moment enters in which both are separated from their owner. Whether, after this separation, they return to him again in another shape becomes a matter of *chance*. When money enters into exchange, I am forced to exchange my product for exchange value in general or for the general capacity to exchange, hence my product becomes dependent on the state of general commerce and is torn out of its local, natural and individual boundaries. For exactly that reason it can cease to be a product.)

Fourthly: Just as exchange value, in the form of money, takes its place as the *general commodity* alongside all particular commodities, so does exchange value as money therefore at the same time take its place as a *particular commodity* (since it has a particular existence) alongside all other commodities. An incongruency arises not only because money, which exists only in exchange, confronts the particular exchangeability of commodities as their general exchangeability, and directly extinguishes it, while, nevertheless, the two are supposed to be always convertible into one another; but also because money comes into contradiction with itself and with its characteristic by virtue of being itself a *particular* commodity (even if only a symbol) and of being subject, therefore, to particular conditions of exchange in its exchange with other commodities, conditions which contradict its general unconditional exchangeability. (Not to speak of money as fixed in the substance of a particular product, etc.) Besides its existence in the commodity, exchange value achieved an existence of its own in money, was separated from its substance exactly because the natural [151] characteristic of this substance contradicted its general characteristic as exchange value. Every commodity is equal (and comparable) to every other as exchange value (*qualitatively*: each now merely represents a *quantitative* plus or minus of exchange value). For that reason, this equality, this unity of the commodity is distinct from its natural differentiation; and appears in money therefore as their common element as well as a third thing which confronts them both. But on one side, exchange value naturally remains at the same time an inherent quality of commodities while it simultaneously exists outside them; on the other side, when money no longer exists as a property of commodities, as a common element within them, but as an individual entity apart from them, then money itself becomes a *particular* commodity alongside the other commodities. (Determinable by demand and supply; splits into different kinds of money, etc.) It

becomes a commodity like other commodities, and at the same time it is not a commodity like other commodities. Despite its general character it is one exchangeable entity among other exchangeable entities. It is not only the general exchange value, but at the same time a particular exchange value alongside other particular exchange values. Here a new source of contradictions which make themselves felt in practice. (The particular nature of money emerges again in the separation of the money business from commerce proper.)

We see, then, how it is an inherent property of money to fulfill its purposes by simultaneously negating them; to achieve independence from commodities; to be a means which becomes an end; to realize the exchange value of commodities by separating them from it; to facilitate exchange by splitting it; to overcome the difficulties of the direct exchange of commodities by generalizing them; to make exchange independent of the producers in the same measure as the producers become dependent on exchange.

(It will be necessary later, before this question is dropped, to correct the idealist manner of the presentation, which makes it seem as if it were merely a matter of conceptual determinations and of the dialectic of these concepts. Above all in the case of the phrase: product (or activity) becomes commodity; commodity, exchange value; exchange value, money.)

(2) pp. 156-65 (On the autonomy of social relations and human development)

The dissolution of all products and activities into exchange values presupposes the dissolution of all fixed personal (historic) relations of dependence in production, as well as the all-sided dependence of the producers on one another. Each individual's production is dependent on the production of all others; and the transformation of his product into the necessaries of his own life is [similarly] dependent on the consumption of all others. Prices are old; exchange also; but the increasing determination of the former by costs of production, as well as the increasing dominance of the latter over all relations of production, only develop fully, and continue to develop ever more completely, in bourgeois society, the society of free competition. What Adam Smith, in the true eighteenth-century manner, puts in the prehistoric period, the period preceding history, is rather a product of history.

This reciprocal dependence is expressed in the constant necessity for exchange, and in exchange value as the all-sided mediation. The economists express this as follows: Each pursues his private interest and only his private interest; and thereby serves the private interests of all, the general interest, without willing or knowing it. The real point is not that each individual's pursuit of his private interest promotes the totality of private interests, the general interest. One could just as well deduce from this abstract phrase that each individual reciprocally blocks the assertion of the others' interests, so that, instead of a general affirmation this war of all against all produces a general negation. The point is rather that private interest is itself already a socially determined interest, which can be achieved only within the conditions laid down by society and with the means provided by society; hence it is bound to the reproduction of these conditions and means. It is the interest of private persons; but its content, as well as the form and means of its realization, is given by social conditions independent of all.

The reciprocal and all-sided dependence of individuals who are indifferent to one another forms their social connection. This social bond is expressed in *exchange value*, by means of which [157] alone each individual's own activity or his product becomes an activity and a product for him; he must produce a general product – *exchange value*, or, the latter isolated for itself and individualized, *money*. On the other side, the power which each individual exercises over the activity of others or over social wealth exists in him as the owner of *exchange values*, of *money*. The individual carries his social power, as well as his bond with society, in his pocket. Activity, regardless of its individual manifestation, and the product of activity, regardless of its particular make-up, are always *exchange value*, and exchange value is a generality, in which all individuality and peculiarity are negated and extinguished. This indeed is a condition very different from that in which the individual or the individual member of a family or clan (later, community) directly and naturally reproduces himself, or in which his productive activity and his share in production are bound to a specific form of labour and of product, which determine his relation to others in just that specific way.

The social character of activity, as well as the social form of the product, and the share of individuals in production here appear as something alien and objective, confronting the individuals, not as their relation to one another, but as their subordination to relations which subsist independently of them and which arise out of collisions between mutually indifferent individuals. The general exchange of activities and products, which has become a vital condition for each individual – their mutual interconnection here appears as something alien to them, autonomous, as a thing. In exchange value, the social connection between persons is transformed into a social relation between things; personal capacity into objective wealth. The less social power the medium of exchange possesses (and at this stage it is still

closely bound to the nature of the direct product of labour and the direct needs of the partners in exchange) the greater must be the power of the community which binds the individuals together, the patriarchal relation, the community of antiquity, feudalism and the guild system. (See my Notebook XII, 34 B.) Each individual possesses [158] social power in the form of a thing. Rob the thing of this social power and you must give it to persons to exercise over persons. Relations of personal dependence (entirely spontaneous at the outset) are the first social forms, in which human productive capacity develops only to a slight extent and at isolated points. Personal independence founded on *objective [sachlicher]* dependence is the second great form, in which a system of general social metabolism, of universal relations, of all-round needs and universal capacities is formed for the first time. Free individuality, based on the universal development of individuals and on their subordination of their communal, social productivity as their social wealth, is the third stage. The second stage creates the conditions for the third. Patriarchal as well as ancient conditions (feudal, also) thus disintegrate with the development of commerce, of luxury, of *money*, of *exchange value,* while modern society arises and grows in the same measure.

Exchange and division of labour reciprocally condition one another. Since everyone works for himself but his product is nothing for him, each must of course exchange, not only in order to take part in the general productive capacity but also in order to transform his own product into his own subsistence. Exchange, when mediated by exchange value and money, presupposes the all-round dependence of the producers on one another, together with the total isolation of their private interests from one another, as well as a division of social labour whose unity and mutual complementarity exist in the form of a natural relation, as it were, external to the individuals and independent of them. The pressure of general demand and supply on one another mediates the connection of mutually indifferent persons.

The very necessity of first transforming individual products or activities into *exchange value,* into *money,* so that they obtain and demonstrate their social *power* in this *objective [sachlichen]* form, proves two things: (1) That individuals now produce only for society and in society; (2) that production is not *directly* social, is not 'the offspring of association,' which distributes labour internally. Individuals are subsumed under social production; social production exists outside them as their fate; but social production is not subsumed under individuals, manageable by them as their common wealth. There can therefore be nothing more erroneous [159] and absurd than to postulate the control by the united individuals of their total production, on the basis of *exchange value*, of *money,* as was done above in the case of the time-chit bank. The *private exchange* of all products of labour, all activities and all wealth stands in antithesis not only to a distribution based on a natural or political super- and subordination of individuals to one another (to which *exchange* proper only runs parallel or, by and large, does not so much take a grip on the life of entire communities as, rather, insert itself between different communities; it by no means exercises general domination over all relations of production and distribution) (regardless of the character of this super- and subordination: patriarchal, ancient or feudal) but also to free exchange among individuals who are associated on the basis of common appropriation and control of the means of production. (The latter form of association is not arbitrary; it presupposes the development of material and cultural conditions which are not to be examined any further at this point.) Just as the division of labour creates agglomeration, combination, cooperation, the antithesis of private interests, class interests, competition, concentration of capital, monopoly, stock companies – so many antithetical forms of the unity which itself brings the antithesis to the fore – so does private exchange create world trade, private independence creates complete dependence on the so-called world market, and the fragmented acts of exchange create a banking and credit system whose books, at least keep a record of the balance between debit and credit in private exchange. Although the private interests within each nation divide it into as many nations as it has 'full-grown individuals,' and although the interests of exporters and of importers are antithetical here, etc, etc., national trade does obtain the *semblance* of existence in the form of the rate of exchange. Nobody will take this as a ground for believing that a *reform of the money market* can abolish the *foundations* of internal or external private trade. But within bourgeois society, the society that rests on *exchange value,* there arise relations of circulation as well as of production which are so many mines to explode it. (A mass of antithetical forms of the social unity, whose antithetical character can never be abolished through quiet metamorphosis. On the other hand, if we did not find concealed in society as it is the material conditions of production and the corresponding relations of exchange prerequisite for a classless society, then all attempts to explode it would be quixotic.) [160]

We have seen that, although exchange value is = to the relative labour time materialized in products, money, for its part, is = to the exchange value of commodities, separated from their substance; and that in this exchange value or money relation are contained the contradictions between commodities and their exchange value, between commodities as exchange values and money. We saw that

a bank which directly creates the mirror image of the commodity in the form of labour-money is a utopia. Thus, although money owes its existence only to the tendency of exchange value to separate itself from the substance of commodities and to take on a pure form, nevertheless commodities cannot be directly transformed into money; i.e. the authentic certificate of the amount of labour time realized in the commodity cannot serve the commodity as its price in the world of exchange values. How is this?

(In one of the forms of money – in so far as it is *medium* of exchange (not *measure* of exchange value) – it is clear to the economists that the existence of money presupposes the objectification [*Versachlichung*] of the social bond; in so far, that is, as money appears in the form of *collateral* which one individual must leave with another in order to obtain a commodity from him. Here the economists themselves say that people place in a thing (money) the faith which they do not place in each other. But why do they have faith in the thing? Obviously only because that thing is an *objectified relation* between persons; because it is objectified exchange value, and exchange value is nothing more than a mutual relation between people's productive activities. Every other collateral may serve the holder directly in that function: money serves him only as the 'dead pledge of society,' but it serves as such only because of its social (symbolic) property; and it can have a social property only because individuals have alienated their own social relationship from themselves so that it takes the form of a thing.)

In the *lists of current prices,* where all values are measured in money, it seems as though this independence from persons of the social character of things is, by the activity of commerce, on this basis of alienation where the relations of production and distribution stand opposed to the individual, to all individuals, at the same time subordinated to the individual again. Since,'if you please,' the autonomization of the world market (in which the activity of each individual is included), increases with the development of [161] monetary relations (exchange value) and vice versa, since the general bond and all-round interdependence in production and consumption increase together with the independence and indifference of the consumers and producers to one another; since this contradiction leads to crises, etc., hence, together with the development of this alienation, and on the same basis, efforts are made to overcome it: institutions emerge whereby each individual can acquire information about the activity of all others and attempt to adjust his own accordingly, e.g. lists of current prices, rates of exchange, interconnections between those active in commerce through the mails, telegraphs etc. (the means of communication of course grow at the same time). (This means that, although the total supply and demand are independent of the actions of each individual, everyone attempts to inform himself about them, and this knowledge then reacts back in practice on the total supply and demand. Although on the given standpoint, alienation is not overcome by these means, nevertheless relations and connections are introduced thereby which include the possibility of suspending the old standpoint.) (The possibility of general statistics, etc.) (This is to be developed, incidentally, under the categories *'Prices, Demand and Supply'*. To be further noted here only that a comprehensive view over the whole of commerce and production in so far as lists of current prices in fact provide it, furnishes indeed the best proof of the way in which their own exchange and their own production confront individuals as an *objective* relation which is *independent* of them. In the case of the *world market,* the connection of the *individual with all,* but at the same time also the *independence of this connection from the individual,* have developed to such a high level that the formation of the world market already at the same time contains the conditions for going beyond it.) *Comparison* in place of real communality and generality.

(It has been said and may be said that this is precisely the beauty and the greatness of it: this spontaneous interconnection, this material and mental metabolism which is independent of the knowing and willing of individuals, and which presupposes their reciprocal independence and indifference. And, certainly, this objective connection is preferable to the lack of any connection, or to a merely local connection resting on blood ties, or on primeval, natural or master-servant relations. Equally certain is it that individuals cannot gain mastery over their own social interconnections [162] before they have created them. But it is an insipid notion to conceive of this merely *objective bond* as a spontaneous, natural attribute inherent in individuals and inseparable from their nature (in antithesis to their conscious knowing and willing). This bond is their product. It is a historic product. It belongs to a specific phase of their development. The alien and independent character in which It presently exists *vis-à-vis* individuals proves only that the latter are still engaged in the creation of the conditions of their social life, and that have not yet begun, on the basis of these conditions, to live it. It is the bond natural to individuals within specific and limited relations of production. Universally developed individuals, whose social relations, as their own communal [*gemeinschaftlich*] relations, are hence also subordinated to their own communal control, are no product of nature, but of history. The degree and the universality of the development of wealth where *this* individuality becomes possible supposes

production on the basis of exchange values as a prior condition, whose universality produces not only the alienation of the individual from himself and from others, but also the universality and the comprehensiveness of his relations and capacities. In earlier stages of development the single individual seems to be developed more fully, because he has not yet worked out his relationships in their fullness, or erected them as independent social powers and relations opposite himself. It is as ridiculous to yearn for a return to that original fullness as it is to believe that with this complete emptiness history has come to a standstill. The bourgeois viewpoint has never advanced beyond this antithesis between itself and this romantic viewpoint, and therefore the latter will accompany it as legitimate antithesis up to its blessed end.)

(The relation of the individual to science may be taken as an example here.)

(To compare money with blood – the term circulation gave occasion for this – is about as correct as Menenius Agrippa's comparison between the patricians and the stomach.) (To compare money with language is not less erroneous. Language does not [163] transform ideas, so that the peculiarity of ideas is dissolved and their social character runs alongside them as a separate entity, like prices alongside commodities. Ideas do not exist separately from language. Ideas which have first to be translated out of their mother tongue into a foreign language in order to circulate, in order to become exchangeable, offer a somewhat better analogy; but the analogy then lies not in language, but in the foreignness of language.)

(The exchangeability of all products, activities and relations with a third, *objective* entity which can be re-exchanged for everything *without distinction* – that is, the development of exchange values (and of money relations) is identical with universal venality, corruption. Universal prostitution appears as a necessary phase in the development of the social character of personal talents, capacities, abilities, activities. More politely expressed: the universal relation of utility and use. The equation of the incompatible, as Shakespeare nicely defined money. Greed as such impossible without money; all other kinds of accumulation and of mania for accumulation appear as primitive, restricted by needs on the one hand and by the restricted nature of products on the other (*sacra auri fames*[2]).

(The development of the money system obviously presupposes other, prior developments.)

[2] 'that accursed hunger for gold' (Virgil).

When we look at social relations which create an undeveloped system of exchange, of exchange values and of money or which correspond to an undeveloped degree of these, then it is clear from the outset that the individuals in such a society, although their relations appear to be more personal, enter into connection with one another only as individuals imprisoned within a certain definition, as feudal lord and vassal, landlord and serf, etc., or as members of a caste etc. or as members of an estate etc. In the money relation, in the developed system of exchange (and this semblance seduces the democrats), the ties of personal dependence, of distinctions of blood, education, etc, are in fact exploded, ripped up (at least, personal ties all appear as *personal* relations); and individuals *seem* independent (this is an independence which is at bottom merely an illusion and it is more correctly called indifference), free to collide with one another and to engage in exchange [164] within this freedom; but they appear thus only for someone who abstracts from the *conditions*, the *conditions of existence* within which these individuals enter into contact (and these conditions, in turn, are independent of the individuals and, although created by society, appear as if they were *natural conditions,* not controllable by individuals). The definedness of individuals, which in the former case appears as a personal restriction of the individual by another, appears in the latter case as developed into an objective restriction of the individual by relations independent of him and sufficient unto themselves. (Since the single individual cannot strip away his personal definition, but may very well overcome and master external relations, his freedom *seems* to be greater in case 2. A closer examination of these external relations, these conditions, shows, however, that it is impossible for the individuals of a class etc. to overcome them *en masse* without destroying them. A particular individual may by chance get on top of these relations, but the mass of those under their rule cannot, since their mere existence expresses subordination, the necessary subordination of the mass of individuals.) These external relations are very far from being an abolition of 'relations of dependence'; they are rather the dissolution of these relations into a general form; they are merely the elaboration and emergence of the general *foundation* of the relations of personal dependence. Here also individuals come into connection with one another only in determined ways. These *objective* dependency relations also appear, in antithesis to those of *personal* dependence (the objective dependency relation is nothing more than social relations which have become independent and now enter into opposition to the seemingly independent individuals; i.e. the reciprocal relations of production separated from and autonomous of individuals) in such a way that individuals are now ruled by *abstractions,* whereas earlier they depended on one another. The abstraction, or idea, however, is nothing more than the theoretical expression of those material

relations which are their lord and master. Relations can be expressed, of course, only in ideas, and thus philosophers have determined the reign of ideas to be the peculiarity of the new age, and have identified the creation of free individuality with the overthrow of this reign. This error was all the more easily committed, from the ideological stand-point, as this reign exercised by the relations (this objective dependency, which, incidentally, turns into certain definite relations of personal dependency, but stripped [165] of all illusions) appears within the consciousness of individuals as the reign of ideas, and because the belief in the permanence of these ideas, i.e. of these objective relations of dependency, is of course consolidated, nourished and inculcated by the ruling classes by all means available.

(3) pp. 171-2 (On labour in communism)

The labour of the individual looked at in the act of production itself, is the money with which he directly buys the product, the object of his particular activity; but it is a *particular* money, which buys precisely only this *specific* product. In order to be *general money* directly, it would have to be not a *particular,* but *general* labour from the outset; i.e. it would have to be *posited* from the outset as a link in *general production.* But on this presupposition it would not be exchange which gave labour its general character; but rather its presupposed communal character would determine the distribution of products. The communal character of production would make the product into a communal, general product from the outset. The exchange which originally takes place in production – which would not be an exchange of exchange values but of activities, determined by communal needs and communal purposes – would from the outset include the participation of the individual in the communal world of products. On the basis of exchange values, labour is *posited* as general only through *exchange*. But on this foundation it would be *posited* as such before exchange; i.e. the exchange of products would in no way be the *medium* by which the participation of the individual in general production is mediated. Mediation must, of course, take place. In the first case, which proceeds from the independent production of individuals – no matter how much these independent productions [172] determine and modify each other *post festum* through their interrelations – mediation takes place through the exchange of commodities, through exchange value and through money; all these are expressions of one and the same relation. In the second case, the *presupposition is itself mediated*; i.e. a communal production, communality, is presupposed as the basis of production. The labour of the individual is posited from the outset as social labour. Thus, whatever the particular material form of the product he creates or helps to create, what he has bought with his labour is not a specific and particular product, but rather a specific share of the communal production. He therefore has no particular product to exchange. His product is not an *exchange value.* The product does not first have to be transposed into a particular form in order to attain a general character for the individual. Instead of a division of labour, such as is necessarily created with the exchange of exchange values, there would take place an organization of labour whose consequence would be the participation of the individual in communal consumption. In the first case the social character of production is *posited* only *post festum* with the elevation of products to exchange values and the exchange of these exchange values. In the second case the *social character of production* is presupposed, and participation in the world of products, in consumption, is not mediated by the exchange of mutually independent labours or products of labour. It is mediated, rather, by the social conditions of production within which the individual is active.

(4) pp. 239-47 (On money, equality and freedom)

The special difficulty in grasping money in its fully developed character as money – a difficulty which political economy attempts to evade by forgetting now one, now another aspect, and by appealing to one aspect when confronted with another – is that a social relation, a definite relation between individuals, here appears as a metal, a stone, as a purely physical, external thing which can be found, as such, in nature, and which is indistinguishable in form from its natural existence. Gold and silver, in and of themselves, are not money. Nature does not produce money, any more than it produces a rate of exchange or a banker. In Peru and Mexico gold and silver did not serve as money, although it does appear here as jeweler, and there is a developed system of production. To be money is not a natural attribute of gold and silver, and is therefore quite unknown to the physicist, chemist etc. as such. But money is directly gold and silver. Regarded as a measure, money still predominates in its formal quality; even more so as coin, where this appears externally on its face impression; but in its third aspect, i.e. in its perfection, where to be measure and coinage appear as functions of money alone, there all formal character has vanished, or directly coincides with its metallic existence. It is not at all apparent on its face that its character of being money is merely the result of social processes; it *is* money. This is all the more difficult since its immediate use value for the living individual stands in no relation whatever to this role, and because, in general, the memory of use value, distinct from exchange value, has [240] become entirely extinguished in this incarnation of pure exchange value. Thus the fundamental

contradiction contained in exchange value, and in the social mode of production corresponding to it, here emerges in all its purity. We have already criticized the attempts made to overcome this contradiction by depriving money of its metallic form, by positing it outwardly, as well, as something *posited* by society, as the expression of a social relation, whose ultimate form would be that of labour-money. It must by now have become entirely clear that this is a piece of foolishness as long as exchange value is retained as the basis, and that, moreover, the illusion that metallic money allegedly falsifies exchange arises out of total ignorance of its nature. It is equally clear, on the other side, that to the degree to which opposition against the ruling relations of production grows, and these latter themselves push ever more forcibly to cast off their old skin – to that degree, polemics are directed against metallic money or money in general, as the most striking, most contradictory and hardest phenomenon which is presented by the system in a palpable form. One or another kind of artful tinkering with money is then supposed to overcome the contradictions of which money is merely the perceptible appearance. Equally clear that some evolutionary operations can be performed with money, in so far as an attack on it seems to leave everything else as it was, and only to rectify it. Then one strikes a blow at the sack, intending the donkey. However, as long as the donkey does not feel the blows on the sack, one hits in fact only the sack and not the donkey. As soon as he feels it, one strikes the donkey and not the sack. As long as these operations are directed against money as such, they are merely an attack on consequences whose causes remain unaffected; i.e. disturbance of the productive process, whose solid basis then also has the power, by means of a more or less violent reaction, to define and to dominate these as mere passing disturbances.

On the other hand, it is in the character of the money relation – as far as it is developed in its purity to this point, and without regard to more highly developed relations of production – that all inherent contradictions of bourgeois society appear extinguished in money relations as conceived in a simple form; and bourgeois democracy even more than the bourgeois economists takes refuge in this aspect (the latter are at least consistent enough to regress to even simpler aspects of exchange value and exchange) in order to construct apologetics for the existing economic relations. [241] Indeed, in so far as the commodity or labour is conceived of only as exchange value, and the relation in which the various commodities are brought into connection with one another is conceived as the exchange of these exchange values with one another, as their equation, then the individuals, the subjects between whom this process goes on, are simply and only conceived of as exchangers. As far as the formal character is concerned, there is absolutely no distinction between them, and this is the economic character, the aspect in which they stand towards one another in the exchange relation; it is the indicator of their social function or social relation towards one another. Each of the subjects is an exchanger; i.e. each has the same social relation towards the other that the other has towards him. As subjects of exchange, their relation is therefore that of equality. It is impossible to find any trace of distinction, not to speak of contradiction, between them; not even a difference. Furthermore, the commodities which they exchange are, as exchange values, equivalent, or at least count as such (the most that could happen would be a subjective error in the reciprocal appraisal of values, and if one individual, say, cheated the other, this *would happen not because of the nature of the social function in which they confront one another,* for this is *the same*, in this they are *equal*; but only because of natural cleverness, persuasiveness etc., in short only the purely individual superiority of one individual over another. The difference would be one of natural origin, irrelevant to the nature of the relation as such, and it may be said in anticipation of further development, the difference is even lessened and robbed of its original force by competition etc.). As regards the pure form, the economic side of this relation – the content, outside this form, here still falls entirely outside economics, or is posited as a natural content distinct from the economic, a content about which it may be said that it is still entirely separated from the economic relation because it still directly coincides with it – then only three moments emerge as formally distinct: the subjects of the relation, *the exchangers* (posited in the same character); the objects of their exchange, exchange values, *equivalents*, which not only are equal but are expressly supposed to be equal, and are posited as equal; and finally the act of exchange itself, the mediation by which the subjects are posited as exchangers, equals, and their objects as equivalents, equal. The equivalents are the objectification [*Vergegenständlichung*] of one subject for another; i.e. they themselves [242] are of equal worth, and assert themselves in the act of exchange as equally worthy, and at the same time as mutually indifferent. The subjects in exchange exist for one another only through these equivalents, as of equal worth, and prove themselves to be such through the exchange of the objectivity in which the one exists for the other. Since they only exist for one another in exchange in this way, as equally worthy persons, possessors of equivalent things, who thereby prove their equivalence, they are, as equals, at the same time also indifferent to one another; whatever other individual distinction there may be does not concern them; they are indifferent to all their other individual peculiarities. Now, as regards the content outside the act of exchange (an act which constitutes the positing as well as the proving of the

exchange values and of the subjects as exchangers), this content, which falls outside the specifically economic form, can only be: (1) The natural particularity of the commodity being exchanged. (2) The particular natural need of the exchangers, or, both together, the different use values of the commodities being exchanged. The content of the exchange, which lies altogether outside its economic character, far from endangering the social equality of individuals, rather makes their natural difference into the basis of their social equality. If individual A had the same need as individual B, and if both had realized their labour in the same object, then no relation whatever would be present between them; considering only their production, they would not be different individuals at all. Both have the need to breathe; for both the air exists as atmosphere; this brings them into no social contact; as breathing individuals they relate to one another only as natural bodies, not as persons. Only the differences between their needs and between their production gives rise to exchange and to their social equation in exchange; these natural differences are therefore the precondition of their social equality in the act of exchange, and of this relation in general, in which they relate to one another as productive. Regarded from the standpoint of the natural difference between them, individual A exists as the owner of a use value for B, and B as owner of a use value for A. In this respect, their natural difference again puts them reciprocally into the relation of equality. In this respect, however, they are not indifferent to one another, but integrate with one another, have need of one another; so that individual B, as objectified in the commodity, is a need of individual A, and vice versa; so that they stand not only in an equal, [243] but also in a social, relation to one another. This is not all. The fact that this need on the part of one can be satisfied by the product of the other, and vice versa, and that the one is capable of producing the object of the need of the other, and that each confronts the other as owner of the object of the other's need, this proves that each of them reaches beyond his own particular need etc., as a *human being*, and that they relate to one another as human beings; that their common species-being [*Gattungswesen*] is acknowledged by all. It does not happen elsewhere – that elephants produce for tigers, or animals for other animals. For example. A hive of bees comprises at bottom only one bee, and they all produce the same thing. Further. In so far as these natural differences among individuals and among their commodities (products, labour etc. are not as yet different here, but exist only in the form of commodities, or, as Mr Bastiat prefers, following Say, *services*; Bastiat fancies that, by reducing the economic character of exchange value to its natural content, commodity or service, and thereby showing himself incapable of grasping the economic relation of exchange value as such, he has progressed a great step beyond the classical economists of the English school, who are capable of grasping the relations of production in their specificity, as such, in their pure form) form the motive for the integration of these individuals, for their social interrelation as exchangers, in which they are *stipulated* for each other as, and *prove* themselves to be, equals, there enters, in addition to the quality of equality, that of *freedom*. Although individual A feels a need for the commodity of individual B, he does not appropriate it by force, nor vice versa, but rather they recognize one another reciprocally as proprietors, as persons whose will penetrates their commodities. Accordingly, the juridical moment of the Person enters here, as well as that of freedom, in so far as it is contained in the former. No one seizes hold of another's property by force. Each divests himself of his property voluntarily. But this is not all: individual A serves the need of individual B by means of the commodity *a* only in so far as and because individual B serves the need of individual A by means of the commodity *b*, and vice versa. Each serves the other in order to serve himself; each makes use of the other, reciprocally, as his means. Now both things are contained in the consciousness of the two individuals: (1) that each arrives at his end only in so far as he serves the other as means; (2) that each becomes [244] means for the other (being for another) [*Sein für andres*] only as end in himself (being for self) [Sein für sich] [21]; (3) that the reciprocity in which each is at the same time means and end, and attains his end only in so far as he becomes a means, and becomes a means only in so far as he posits himself as end, that each thus posits himself as being for another, in so far as he is being for self, and the other as being for him, in so far as he is being for himself – that this reciprocity is a necessary fact, presupposed as natural precondition of exchange, but that, as such, it is irrelevant to each of the two subjects in exchange, and that this reciprocity interests him only in so far as it satisfies his interest to the exclusion of, without reference to, that of the other. That is, the common interest which appears as the motive of the act as a whole is recognized as a fact by both sides; but, as such, it is not the motive, but rather proceeds, as it were, behind the back of these self-reflected particular interests, behind the back of one individual's interest in opposition to that of the other. In this last respect, the individual can at most have the consoling awareness that the satisfaction of his antithetical individual interest is precisely the realization of the suspended antithesis, of the social, general interest. Out of the act of exchange itself, the individual, each one of them, is reflected in himself as its exclusive and dominant (determinant) subject. With that, then, the complete freedom of the individual is posited: voluntary transaction; no force on either side; positing of the self as means, or as serving, only as means, in order to posit the self as end in itself, as dominant and primary [*übergreifend*]; finally, the self-seeking interest which brings nothing of a higher order to

realization; the other is also recognized and acknowledged as one who likewise realizes his self-seeking interest, so that both know that the common interest exists only in the duality, many-sidedness, and autonomous development of the exchanges between self-seeking [245] interests. The general interest is precisely the generality of self-seeking interests. Therefore, when the economic form, exchange, posits the all-sided equality of its subjects, then the content, the individual as well as the objective material which drives towards the exchange, is *freedom*. Equality and freedom are thus not only respected in exchange based on exchange values but, also, the exchange of exchange values is the productive, real basis of all *equality* and *freedom.* As pure ideas they are merely the idealized expressions of this basis; as developed in juridical, political, social relations, they are merely this basis to a higher power. And so it has been in history. Equality and freedom as developed to this extent are exactly the opposite of the freedom and equality in the world of antiquity, where developed exchange value was not their basis, but where, rather, the development of that basis destroyed them. Equality and freedom presuppose relations of production as yet unrealized in the ancient world and in the Middle Ages. Direct forced labour is the foundation of the ancient world; the community rests on this as its foundation; labour itself as a 'privilege', as still particularized, not yet generally producing exchange values, is the basis of the world of the Middle Ages. Labour is neither forced labour; nor, as in the second case, does it take place with respect to a common, higher unit (the guild).

Now, it is admittedly correct that the [relation between those] engaged in exchange, in so far as their motives are concerned, i.e. as regards natural motives falling outside the economic process, does also rest on a certain compulsion; but this is, on one side, itself only the other's indifference to my need as such, to my natural individuality, hence his equality with me and his freedom, which are at the same time the precondition of my own; on the other side, if I am determined, forced, by my needs, it is only my own nature, this totality of needs and drives, which exerts a force upon me; it is nothing alien (or, my *interest* posited in a general, reflected form). But it is, after all, precisely in this way that I exercise compulsion ever the other and drive him into the exchange system.

In Roman law, the *servus*[3] is therefore correctly defined as one who may not enter into exchange for the purpose of acquiring anything for himself (see the *Institutes*).It is, consequently, equally clear that although this legal system corresponds to a social [246] state in which exchange was by no means developed, nevertheless, in so far as it was developed in a limited sphere, it was able to develop the attributes of the juridical person, precisely of the individual engaged in exchange, and thus anticipate (in its basic aspects) the legal relations of industrial society, and in particular the right which rising bourgeois society had necessarily to assert against medieval society. But the development of this right itself coincides completely with the dissolution of the Roman community.

Since money is only the realization of exchange value, and since the system of exchange values has realized itself only in a developed money system, or inversely, the money system can indeed only be the realization of this system of freedom and equality. As measure, money only gives the equivalent its specific expression, makes it into an equivalent in form, as well. A distinction of form does, it is true, arise within circulation: the two exchangers appear in the different roles of buyer and seller; exchange value appears once in its general form, in the form of money, then again in its particular form, in the natural commodity, now with a price; but, first of all, these forms alternate; circulation itself creates not a disequation, but only an equation, a suspension of the merely negated difference. The inequality is only a purely formal one. Finally, even equality now posits itself tangibly, in money as medium of circulation, where it appears now in one hand, now in another, and is indifferent to this appearance. Each appears towards the other as an owner of money, and, as regards the process of exchange, as money itself. Thus indifference and equal worthiness are expressly contained in the form of the thing. The particular natural difference which was contained in the commodity is extinguished, and constantly becomes extinguished by circulation. A worker who buys commodities for 3s. appears to the seller in the same function, in the same equality – in the form of 3s. – as the king who does the same. All distinction between them is extinguished. The seller *qua* seller appears only as owner of a commodity of the price of 3s., so that both are completely equal; only that the 3s. exist here in the form of silver, there again in the form of sugar, etc. In the third form of money, a distinguishing quality might seem to enter between the subjects of the process. But in so far as money here appears as the material, as the general commodity of contracts, all distinction between the contracting parties is, rather, extinguished. In so far as money, the general form of wealth, becomes the object of accumulation, the subject [247] here appears to withdraw it from circulation only to the extent that he does not withdraw commodities of an equal price from circulation. Thus, if one individual accumulates and the other does not, then none does it at the expense of the other. One enjoys real wealth, the other takes

[3] Slave.

possession of wealth in its general form. If one grows impoverished and the other grows wealthier, then this is of their own free will and does not in any way arise from the economic relation, the economic connection as such, in which they are placed in relation to one another. Even inheritance and similar legal relations, which perpetuate such inequalities, do not prejudice this natural freedom and equality. If individual A's relation is not in contradiction to this system originally, then such a contradiction can surely not arise from the fact that individual B steps into the place of individual A, thus perpetuating him. This is, rather, the perpetuation of the social relation beyond one man's natural lifespan: its reinforcement against the chance influences of nature, whose effects as such would in fact be a suspension of individual freedom. Moreover, since the individual in this relation is merely the individuation of money, therefore he is, as such, just as immortal as money, and his representation by heirs is the logical extension of this role.

(5) p. 324-5 (On capitalism and human development)

Surplus value in general is value in excess of the equivalent. The equivalent, by definition, is only the identity of value with itself. Hence surplus value can never sprout out of the equivalent; nor can it do so originally out of circulation; it has to arise from the production process of capital itself. The matter can also be expressed in this way: if the worker needs only half a working day in order to live a whole day, then, in order to keep alive as a worker, he needs to work only half a day. The second half of the labour day is forced labour; surplus-labour. What appears as surplus value on capital's side appears identically on the worker's side as surplus labour in excess of his requirements as worker, hence in excess of his immediate requirements for keeping himself [325] alive. The great historic quality of capital is to create this *surplus labour*, superfluous labour from the standpoint of mere use value, mere subsistence; and its historic destiny [*Bestimmung*] is fulfilled as soon as, on one side, there has been such a development of needs that surplus labour above and beyond necessity has itself become a general need arising out of individual needs themselves – and, on the other side, when the severe discipline of capital, acting on succeeding generations [*Geschlechter*], has developed general industriousness as the general property of the new species [*Geschlecht*] – and, finally, when the development of the productive powers of labour, which capital incessantly whips onward with its unlimited mania for wealth, and of the sole conditions in which this mania can be realized, have flourished to the stage where the possession and preservation of general wealth require a lesser labour time of society as a whole, and where the labouring society relates scientifically to the process of its progressive reproduction, its reproduction in a constantly greater abundance; hence where labour in which a human being does what a thing could do has ceased. Accordingly, capital and labour relate to each other here like money and commodity; the former is the general form of wealth, the other only the substance destined for immediate consumption. Capital's ceaseless striving towards the general form of wealth drives labour beyond the limits of its natural paltriness [*Naturbedürftigkeit*], and thus creates the material elements for the development of the rich individuality which is as all-sided in its production as in its consumption, and whose labour also therefore appears no longer as labour, but as the full development of activity itself, in which natural necessity in its direct form has disappeared; because a historically created need has taken the place of the natural one. This is why *capital is productive*; *i.e. an essential relation for the development of the social productive forces.* It ceases to exist as such only where the development of these productive forces themselves encounters its barrier in capital itself.

(6) pp. 408-10 (On capitalism and human development again)

On the other side, the production of *relative surplus value,* i.e. production of surplus value based on the increase and development of the productive forces, requires the production of new consumption; requires that the consuming circle within circulation expands as did the productive circle previously. Firstly quantitative expansion of existing consumption; secondly: creation of new needs by propagating existing ones in a wide circle; *thirdly:* production of *new* needs and discovery and creation of new use values. In other words, so that the surplus labour gained does not remain a merely quantitative surplus, but rather constantly increases the circle of qualitative differences within labour (hence of surplus labour), makes it more diverse, more internally differentiated. For example, if, through a doubling of productive force, a capital of 50 can now do what a capital of 100 did before, so that a capital of 50 and the necessary labour corresponding to it become free, then, for the capital and labour which have been [409] set free, a new, qualitatively different branch of production must be created, which satisfies and brings forth a new need. The value of the old industry is preserved by the creation of the fund for a new one in which the relation of capital and labour posits itself in a *new* form. Hence exploration of all of nature in order to discover new, useful qualities in things; universal exchange of the products of all alien climates and lands; new (artificial) preparation of natural objects, by which they are given new

use values. The exploration of the earth in all directions, to discover new things of use as well as new useful qualities of the old; such as new qualities of them as raw materials etc.; the development, hence, of the natural sciences to their highest point; likewise the discovery, creation and satisfaction of new needs arising from society itself; the cultivation of all the qualities of the social human being, production of the same in a form as rich as possible in needs, because rich in qualities and relations – production of this being as the most total and universal possible social product, for, in order to take gratification in a many-sided way, he must be capable of many pleasures [*genussfähig*], hence cultured to a high degree – is likewise a condition of production founded on capital. This creation of new branches of production, i.e. of qualitatively new surplus time, is not merely the division of labour, but is rather the creation, separate from a given production, of labour with a new use value; the development of a constantly expanding and more comprehensive system of different kinds of labour, different kinds of production, to which a constantly expanding and constantly enriched system of needs corresponds.

Thus, just as production founded on capital creates universal industriousness on one side – i.e. surplus labour, value-creating labour – so does it create on the other side a system of general exploitation of the natural and human qualities, a system of general utility, utilizing science itself just as much as all the physical and mental qualities, while there appears nothing *higher in itself,* nothing legitimate for itself, outside this circle of social production and exchange. Thus capital creates the bourgeois society, and the universal appropriation of nature as well as of the social bond itself by the members of society. Hence the great civilizing influence of capital; its production of a stage of society in comparison to which all earlier ones appear as mere *local* [410] *developments* of humanity and as *nature-idolatry.* For the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of utility; ceases to be recognized as a power for itself; and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to subjugate it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a means of production. In accord with this tendency, capital drives beyond national barriers and prejudices as much as beyond nature worship, as well as all traditional, confined, complacent, encrusted satisfactions of present needs, and reproductions of old ways of life. It is destructive towards all of this, and constantly revolutionizes it, tearing down all the barriers which hem in the development of the forces of production, the expansion of needs, the all-sided development of production, and the exploitation and exchange of natural and mental forces.

But from the fact that capital posits every such limit as a barrier and hence gets *ideally* beyond it, it does not by any means follow that it has *really* overcome it, and, since every such barrier contradicts its character, its production moves in contradictions which are constantly overcome but just as constantly posited. Furthermore. The universality towards which it irresistibly strives encounters barriers in its own nature, which will, at a certain stage of its development, allow it to be recognized as being itself the greatest barrier to this tendency, and hence will

(7) pp. 421-3 (On capital as producing underconsumption)

To begin with: capital forces the workers beyond necessary labour to surplus labour. Only in this way does it realize itself, and create surplus value. But on the other hand, it posits necessary labour only *to the extent* and *in so far as* it is surplus labour and the latter is *realizable* as *surplus value.* It posits surplus labour, then, as the condition of the necessary, and surplus value as the limit of objectified labour, of value as such. As soon as it cannot posit value, it does not posit necessary labour; and, given its foundation, it cannot be otherwise. It therefore restricts labour and the creation of value – by an artificial check, as the English express it – and it does so on the same grounds as and to the same extent that it posits surplus labour and surplus value. By its nature, therefore, it posits a *barrier* to labour and value-creation, in contradiction to its tendency to expand them boundlessly. And in as much as it both posits a barrier *specific* to itself, and on the other side equally drives over and beyond *every* barrier, it is the living contradiction.

(Since value forms the foundation of capital, and since it therefore necessarily exists only through exchange for *counter-value,* it thus necessarily repels itself from itself. A *universal capital,* one without alien capitals confronting it, with which it exchanges – and from the present standpoint, nothing confronts it but wage labourers or itself – is therefore a non-thing. The reciprocal repulsion between capitals is already contained in capital as realized exchange value.)

While capital thus, on one side, makes surplus labour and its *exchange* for *surplus labour* into the precondition of necessary [422] labour and hence of the positing of *labour capacity* [*Arbeitsvermögen*] as a centre of exchange – hence already narrows and attaches conditions to the sphere of exchange from this side – it is just as essential to it, on the other side, to restrict the worker's consumption to the amount necessary to reproduce his labour capacity – to make the value which expresses *necessary labour* the barrier to the realization of labour capacity and hence of the worker's *exchange capacity,* and to strive to reduce the relation of this

necessary labour to surplus labour to the minimum. [Thus we have] a new barrier to the sphere of exchange, which is, however, at the same time identical, as is the first, with the tendency of capital to relate to every limit on its self-realization[4] as to a barrier[5]. The boundless enlargement of its value – boundless creation of value – therefore absolutely identical here with the positing of barriers to the sphere of exchange, i.e. the possibility of realization – the realization of the value posited in the production process.

The same with the *productive force.* On the one hand, the necessary tendency of capital to raise it to the utmost, in order to increase relative *surplus time.* On the other hand, thereby decreases *necessary labour time,* hence the worker's exchange capacity. Further, as we have seen, relative *surplus value* rises much more slowly than the force of production, and moreover this proportion grows ever smaller as the magnitude reached by the productive forces is greater. *But the mass of products grows in a similar proportion* – if not, then new capital would be set free – as well as labour – which did not enter into circulation. But to the same degree as the mass of products grows, so grows the difficulty of realizing the labour time contained in them – because the demands made on consumption rise. (We are still concerned here only with the way in which the capital *realization process* is its *devaluation process.* Out of place here would be the question how, while it has the tendency to *heighten the productive forces boundlessly,* it *also and equally* makes one-sided, limits etc. the *main force of production, the human being himself,* and has the tendency in general to restrict the forces of production.)

Capital, then, posits *necessary labour time* as the barrier to the exchange value of living [423] labour capacity; *surplus labour time* as the barrier to necessary labour time; and *surplus value* as the barrier to surplus labour time; while at the same time it drives over and beyond all these barriers, to the extent that it posits *labour capacity* opposite itself as something simply engaged in exchange, as money, and surplus labour time as the only barrier, because creatrix of surplus value. (Or, from the first aspect, it posits the exchange of surplus values as the barrier to the exchange of the necessary values.)

In one and the same moment, it posits the *values on hand* in circulation – or, what is the same, the proportion of values posited by it to the values contained in it and *presupposed* in circulation – as the barrier, the necessary barrier to its value-creation; on the other hand, its productivity as the only barrier and creatrix of values. It therefore drives constantly on one side towards its own devaluation, on the other side towards the obstruction of the productive forces, and of labour which objectifies itself in values.

(8) pp. 450-55 (On capital as an autonomous power)

The new value, then, [is] itself posited as capital again, as objectified labour entering into the process of exchange with living labour, and hence dividing itself into a constant part – the objective conditions of labour, material and instrument – and the conditions for the subjective condition of labour, the existence of living labour capacity, the necessaries, subsistence goods for the worker. With this second entrance by capital in this form, some points appear clarified which were altogether unclear in its first occurrence – as money in transition from its role as value to its role as capital. Now they are solved through the process of realization and production itself. In the first encounter, the *presuppositions* themselves appeared to come in from the outside, out of circulation; as external presuppositions for the arising of capital; hence not emergent from its inner essence, and not explained by it. These *external* presuppositions will now appear as moments of the motion of capital itself, so that it has itself – regardless how they may arise historically – pre-posited them as its own moments.

Within the production process itself, surplus value, the surplus value procured through compulsion by capital, appeared as *surplus labour,* itself in the form of living labour, which, however, since it cannot create something out of nothing, finds its objective conditions laid out before it. Now this *surplus labour* appears in [451] objectified form as *surplus product,* and, in order to realize itself as capital, this surplus product divides into a double form: as *objective condition of labour* – material and instrument; as subjective – consumption goods for the living labour now to be put to work. *The* general form as value – objectified labour – and objectified labour coming out of circulation – is of course the general, self-evident presupposition. Further: the surplus product in its totality – which objectifies surplus labour in its totality – now appears as *surplus capital* (in contrast to the original capital, before it had undertaken this cycle), i.e. as independent exchange value, in which living labour capacity encounters its *specific use value.* All moments which confronted living labour capacity, and employed it as *alien, external* powers, and which consumed it under *certain conditions independent of*

[4] *Selbstverwertung* (self-valorisation). Nicolaus always translates this term as 'self-realization'. Marx uses it to mean the quantitative self-expansion of capital.

[5] i.e. as something that must be overcome.

itself, are now posited as *its own product and result.*

Firstly: surplus value or the surplus product are nothing but a specific sum of objectified living labour – the sum of surplus labour. This new *value* which confronts living labour as independent, as engaged in exchange with it, as capital, is the *product of labour.* It is itself nothing other than the *excess of labour as such above necessary labour* – in objective form and hence as *value.*

Secondly: the particular forms which this value must adopt in order to realize itself anew, i.e. to posit itself as capital – on one side as raw material and instrument, on the other as subsistence goods for labour during the act of production – are likewise, therefore, only *particular* forms of surplus labour itself. Raw material and instrument are produced by it in such relations – or, it is itself objectively posited in production as raw material and instrument in such a proportion – that a given sum of necessary labour – i.e. living labour which reproduces (the value of) the consumption goods – can objectify itself in it, and objectify itself in it continuously, i.e. can always begin anew the diremption into the objective and subjective conditions of its self-preservation and self-reproduction. In addition to this, living labour, in the process of reproducing its objective conditions, has at the same time posited raw material and instrument in such proportions that it can realize itself in them as *surplus labour, as labour beyond the necessary,* and can hence make them into material for the creation of *new* values. The objective conditions of *surplus labour* – which are restricted to the proportion of raw arterial and instrument beyond the requirements of necessary labour, whereas the objective conditions [452] of necessary labour divide within their objectivity into objective and subjective, into objective moments of labour as well as subjective (consumption goods for living labour) – therefore now appear, are therefore now posited, as the product, result, objective form, external existence of surplus labour itself. Originally, by contrast, the fact that instrument and necessaries were on hand in the amounts which made it possible for living labour to realize itself not only as *necessary,* but also as *surplus* labour – this appeared alien to living labour itself, appeared as an act of capital.

Thirdly: The independent, for-itself existence [*Fürsichsein*] of value *vis-à-vis* living labour capacity – hence its existence as capital – the objective, self-sufficient indifference, the *alien quality* [*Fremdheit*] of the objective conditions of labour *vis-a-vis* living labour capacity, which goes so far that these conditions confront the person of the worker in the person of the capitalist – as personification with its own will and interest – this absolute *divorce, separation* of property, i.e. of the objective conditions of labour from living labour capacity – that they confront him as *alien property,* as the reality of other juridical persons, as the absolute realm of *their* will – and that labour therefore, on the other side, appears as *alien labour* opposed to the value personified in the capitalist, or the conditions of labour – this absolute separation between property and labour, between living labour capacity and the conditions of its realization, between objectified and living labour, between value and value-creating activity – hence also the alien quality of the content of labour for the worker himself – this divorce now likewise appears as a product of labour itself, as objectification of its own moments. For, in the new act of production itself – which merely confirmed the exchange between capital and living labour which preceded it – surplus labour, and hence the surplus product, the total product of labour in general (of surplus labour as well as necessary labour), has now been posited as capital, as independent and indifferent towards living labour capacity, or as exchange value which confronts its mere use value. Labour capacity has appropriated for itself only the subjective conditions of necessary labour – the means of subsistence for actively producing labour capacity, i.e. for its reproduction as mere labour capacity separated from the conditions of its realization – and it has posited these conditions themselves as [453] *things, values,* which confront it in an alien, commanding personification. The worker emerges not only not richer, but emerges rather poorer from the process than he entered. For not only has he produced the conditions of necessary labour as conditions belonging to capital; but also the value-creating possibility, the realization [*Verwertung*] which lies as a possibility within him, now likewise exists as surplus value, surplus product, in a word as capital, as master over living labour capacity, as value endowed with its own might and will, confronting him in his abstract, objectless, purely subjective poverty. He has produced not only the alien wealth and his own poverty, but also the relation of this wealth as independent, self-sufficient wealth, relative to himself as the poverty which this wealth consumes, and from which wealth thereby draws new vital spirits into itself, and realizes itself anew. All this arose from the act of exchange, in which he exchanged his living labour capacity for an amount of objectified labour, except that this objectified labour – these external conditions of his being, and the independent externality [*Ausserihmsein*] (to him) of these objective conditions – now appear as posited by himself, as *his own product,* as his own self-objectification as well as the objectification of himself as a power independent of himself, which moreover rules over him, rules over him through his own actions.

In *surplus capital,* all moments are products of *alien labour – alien surplus labour*

transformed into capital; means of subsistence for necessary labour; the objective conditions – material and instrument – whereby necessary labour can reproduce the value exchanged for it in means of subsistence; finally the amount of material and instrument required so that new surplus labour can realize itself in them, or a new surplus value can be created.

It no longer seems here, as it still did in the first examination of the production process, as if capital, for its part, brought with it any value whatever from circulation. Rather, the objective conditions of labour now appear as labour's product – both to the extent that they are value in general, and as use values for production. But while capital thus appears as the product of labour, so does the product of labour likewise appear as capital – no longer as a simple product, nor as an exchangeable commodity, but as *capital*; objectified labour as mastery, command over living labour. The product of labour appears as *alien property,* as a mode of existence confronting living labour as independent, as [454] *value* in its being for itself; the product of labour, objectified labour, has been endowed by living labour with a soul of its own, and establishes itself opposite living labour as an *alien power:* both these situations are themselves the product of labour. Living labour therefore now appears from its own standpoint as acting within the production process in such a way that, as it realizes itself in the objective conditions, it simultaneously repulses this realization from itself as an alien reality, and hence posits itself as insubstantial, as mere penurious labour capacity in face of this reality alienated [*entfremdet*] from it, belonging not to it but to others; that it posits its own reality not as a being for it, but merely as a being for others, and hence also as mere other-being [*Anderssein*], or being of another opposite itself. This realization process is at the same time the de-realization process of labour. It posits itself objectively, but it posits this, its objectivity, as its own not-being or as the being of its not-being – of capital. It returns back into itself as the mere possibility of value-creation or realization [*Verwertung*]; because the whole of real wealth, the world of real value and likewise the real conditions of its own realization [*Verwirklichung*] are posited opposite it as independent existences. As a consequence of the production process, the possibilities resting in living labour's own womb exist outside it as realities – but as *realities alien* to it, which form wealth in opposition to it.

In so far as the surplus product is realized anew as surplus capital, enters anew into the process of production and self-realization, it divides into (1) means of subsistence for the workers, to be exchanged for living labour capacity; let this part of *capital* be designated as *labour fund*; this labour fund, the part allotted for the maintenance of living labour capacity – and for its progressive maintenance, since surplus capital constantly grows – now likewise appears as the product of *alien* labour, labour alien to *capital,* as well as (2) its other component parts – the material conditions for the reproduction of a value = to these means of subsistence + a surplus value. Further, if we consider this surplus capital, then the division of capital into a constant part – raw material and instrument with an antediluvian existence before labour – and a variable part, i.e. the necessary goods exchangeable for living labour capacity, appears as purely formal, in so far as both of them are equally [455] *posited* by labour and are equally posited by it as its own *presuppositions.* Now, however, this internal division of capital appears in such a way that labour's own product – objectified surplus labour – splits into two component parts – the objective conditions for new realization of labour (1), and a labour fund for maintaining the possibility of this living labour, i.e. of living labour capacity as alive (2), but in such a way that labour capacity can only re-appropriate that part of its own result – of its own being in objective form – which is designated as labour fund, can appropriate and extract this part from the form of the alien wealth which confronts it, only by reproducing not merely its own value, but by also realizing that part of the new capital which represents the objective conditions for the realization of new surplus labour and surplus production, or production of surplus values. Labour has itself created a new fund for the employment of new necessary labour, or, what is the same, a fund for the maintenance of new living labour capacities, of workers, but has created at the same time the condition that this fund can be employed only if new surplus labour is employed on the extra part of the surplus capital Thus, the production by labour of this surplus capital – surplus value – is at the same time the creation of the real necessity of new surplus labour, and thus surplus capital is itself at the same time the real possibility both of new surplus labour and of new surplus capital. It here becomes evident that labour itself progressively extends and gives an ever wider and fuller existence to the objective world of wealth as a power alien to labour, so that, relative to the values created or to the real conditions of value-creation, the penurious subjectivity of living labour capacity forms an ever more glaring contrast. The greater the extent to which labour objectifies itself, the greater becomes the objective world of values, which stands opposite it as alien – alien property. With the creation of surplus capital, labour places itself under the compulsion to create yet further surplus capital etc. etc.

(9) pp. 459-63 (On capital as self-reproducing, as alien property, the worker's

consciousness of this as improper)

While e.g. the flight of serfs to the cities is one of the *historic* conditions and presuppositions of urbanism, it is not a *condition,* not a moment of the reality of developed cities, but belongs rather to their *past* presuppositions, to the presuppositions of their becoming which are suspended in their being. The conditions and presuppositions of the *becoming,* of the *arising,* of capital presuppose precisely that it is not yet in being but merely in *becoming*; they therefore disappear as real capital arises, capital which itself, on the basis of its own reality, posits the conditions for its realization. Thus e.g. while the process in which money or value for-itself originally becomes capital presupposes on the part of the capitalist an accumulation – perhaps by means of savings garnered from products and values created by his own labour etc., which he has undertaken as a *not-capitalist,* i.e. while the presuppositions under which money becomes capital [460] appear as given, external *presuppositions* for the arising of capital-[nevertheless,] as soon as capital has become capital as such, it creates its own presuppositions, i.e. the possession of the real conditions of the creation of new values *without exchange* – by means of its own production process. These presuppositions, which originally appeared as conditions of its becoming – and hence could not spring from its *action as capital* – now appear as results of its own realization, reality, as *posited by it – not as conditions of its arising, but as results of its presence.* It no longer proceeds from presuppositions in order to become, but rather it is itself presupposed, and proceeds from itself to create the conditions of its maintenance and growth. Therefore, the conditions which preceded the creation of surplus capital I, or which express the becoming of capital, do not fall into the sphere of that mode of production for which capital serves as the presupposition; as the historic preludes of its becoming, they lie behind it, just as the processes by means of which the earth made the transition from a liquid sea of fire and vapour to its present form now lie beyond its life as finished earth. That is, individual capitals can continue to arise e.g. by means of hoarding. But the hoard is transformed into capital only by means of the exploitation of labour. The bourgeois economists who regard capital as an eternal and *natural* (not historical) form of production then attempt at the same time to legitimize it again by formulating the conditions of its becoming as the conditions of its contemporary realization; i.e. presenting the moments in which the capitalist still appropriates as not-capitalist – because he is still becoming – as the very conditions in which he appropriates *as capitalist.* These attempts at apologetics demonstrate a guilty conscience, as well as the inability to bring the mode of appropriation of capital as capital into harmony with the *general laws of property* proclaimed by capitalist society itself. On the other side, much more important for us is that our method indicates the points where historical investigation must enter in, or where bourgeois economy as a merely historical form of the production process points beyond itself to earlier historical modes of production. In order to develop the laws of bourgeois economy, therefore, it is not necessary to write the *real history of the relations of production.* But the correct observation and deduction of these laws, as having themselves become in history, always [461] leads to primary equations – like the empirical numbers e.g. in natural science – which point towards a past lying behind this system. These indications [*Andeutung*], together with a correct grasp of the present, then also offer the key to the understanding of the past – a work in its own right which, it is to be hoped, we shall be able to undertake as well. This correct view likewise leads at the same time to the points at which the suspension of the present form of production relations gives signs of its becoming – foreshadowings of the future. Just as, on one side the pre-bourgeois phases appear as *merely historical,* i.e. suspended presuppositions, so do the contemporary conditions of production likewise appear as engaged in *suspending themselves* and hence in positing the *historic presuppositions* for a new state of society.

Now, if we initially examine the relation such as it has become, value having become capital, and living labour confronting it as mere use value, so that living labour appears as a mere means to realize objectified, dead labour, to penetrate it with an animating soul while losing its own soul to it – and having produced, as the end-product, alien wealth on one side and [, on the other,] the penury which is living labour capacity's sole possession – then the matter is simply this, that the process itself, in and by itself, posits the real objective conditions of living labour (namely, material in which to realize itself, instrument with which to realize itself, and necessaries with which to stoke the flame of living labour capacity, to protect it from being extinguished, to supply its vital processes with the necessary fuels) and posits them as alien, independent existences – or as the mode of existence of an *alien person,* as self-sufficient values for-themselves, and hence as values which form wealth alien to an isolated and subjective labour capacity, wealth of and for the capitalist. The objective conditions of living labour appear as *separated, independent* [*verselbständigte*] values opposite living labour capacity as subjective being, which therefore appears to them only as a value of *another kind* (not as value, but different from them, as use [462] value). Once this separation is given, the production process can only produce it anew, reproduce it, and reproduce it on an expanded scale. How it does this, we have seen. The objective conditions of

living labour capacity are presupposed as having an existence independent of it, as the objectivity of a subject distinct from living labour capacity and standing independently over against it; the reproduction and *realization* [*Verwertung*], i.e. the expansion of these *objective conditions,* is therefore at the same time their own reproduction and new production as the wealth of an alien subject indifferently and independently standing over against labour capacity. What is reproduced and produced anew [*neuproduziert*] is not only the *presence* of these objective conditions of living labour, *but also their presence as independent values, i.e. values belonging to an alien subject, confronting this living labour capacity.* The objective conditions of labour attain a subjective existence *vis-à-vis* living labour capacity – capital turns into capitalist; on the other side, the merely subjective presence of the labour capacity confronted by its own conditions gives it a merely indifferent, objective form as against them – it is merely a *value* of a particular use value *alongside* the conditions of its own realization [*Verwertung*] as *values* of another use value. Instead of their being realized [*realisiert*] in the production process as the conditions of its realization [*Verwirklichung*], what happens is quite the opposite: it comes out of the process as mere condition for *their* realization [*Verwertung*] and preservation as values for-themselves opposite living labour capacity. The material on which it works is *alien* material; the instrument is likewise an *alien* instrument; its labour appears as a mere accessory to their substance and hence objectifies itself in things not *belonging to it.* Indeed, living labour itself appears as *alien vis-à-vis* living labour capacity, whose labour it is, whose own life's expression [*Lebensäusserung*] it is, for it has been surrendered to capital in exchange for objectified labour, for the product of labour itself. Labour capacity relates to its labour as to an alien, and if capital were willing,to pay it *without* making it labour it would enter the bargain with pleasure. Thus labour capacity's own labour is as alien to it – and it really is, as regards its direction etc. – as are material and instrument. Which is why the product then appears to it as a combination of alien material, alien instrument and alien labour – as *alien property,* and why, after production, it has become poorer by the life forces expended, but otherwise begins [463] the drudgery anew, existing as a mere subjective labour capacity separated from the conditions of its life. The recognition [*Erkennung*] of the products as its own, and the judgment that its separation from the conditions of its realization is improper – forcibly imposed – is an enormous [advance in] awareness [*Bewusstsein*], itself the product of the mode of production resting on capital, and as much the knell to its doom as, with the slave's awareness that he *cannot be the property of another,* with his consciousness of himself as a person, the existence of slavery becomes a merely artificial, vegetative existence, and ceases to be able to prevail as the basis of production.

(10) pp. 469-71 (On capital as an autonomous power again)

In order to express the relations into which capital and wage labour enter as *property relations* or *laws,* we need do no more than express the conduct of both sides in the *realization process* as an *appropriation process.* For example, the fact that surplus labour is posited as surplus value of capital means that the worker does [470] not appropriate the product of his own labour; that it appears to him as *alien property*; inversely, that *alien labour* appears as the property of capital. This second law of bourgeois property, the inversion of the first – which, through laws of inheritance etc., attains an existence independent of the accidental transitoriness of individual capitalists – becomes just as established in law as the first. The first is the identity of labour with property; the second, labour as negated property, or property as negation of the alien quality of alien labour. In fact, in the production process of capital, as will be seen more closely in its further development, labour is a totality – a combination of labours – whose individual component parts are alien to one another, so that the overall process as a totality is *not* the *work* of the individual worker, and is furthermore the work of the different workers together only to the extent that they are [forcibly] combined, and do not [voluntarily] enter into combination with one another. The combination of this labour appears just as subservient to and led by an alien will and an alien intelligence – having its *animating unity* elsewhere – as its material unity appears subordinate to the *objective unity* of the *machinery,* of fixed capital, which, as *animated monster,* objectifies the scientific idea, and is in fact the coordinator, does not in any way relate to the individual worker as his instrument; but rather he himself exists as an animated individual punctuation mark; as its living isolated accessory. Thus, combined labour is combination *in-itself* in a double way; not combination as a mutual relation among the individuals working together, nor as their predominance either over their particular or individual function or over the instrument of labour. Hence, just as the worker relates to the product of his labour as an alien thing, so does he relate to the combination of labour as an alien combination, as well as to his own labour as an expression of his life, which, although it belongs to him, is alien to him and coerced from him, and which A. Smith etc. therefore conceives is a *burden, sacrifice* etc. Labour itself, like its product, is *negated as the labour of the particular, isolated worker.* This isolated labour, negated, is now indeed communal or combined labour, posited. The *communal or combined labour* posited in this way – as activity and in the passive, objective form – is however at the same

time posited as an other towards the really existing individual labour – as an *alien objectivity* (alien property) as well as an *alien subjectivity* (of capital). Capital thus represents both labour and [471] its product as negated individualized labour and hence as the negated property of the individualized worker. Capital therefore is the existence of social labour – the combination of labour as subject as well as object – but this existence as itself existing independently opposite its real moments – hence itself a *particular* existence apart from them. For its part, capital therefore appears as the predominant subject and owner of *alien labour*, and its relation is itself as complete a contradiction as is that of wage labour.

(11) pp. 487-8 (On human limitlessness)

Do we never find in antiquity an inquiry into which form of landed property etc. is the most productive, creates the greatest wealth? Wealth does not appear as the aim of production, although Cato may well investigate which manner of cultivating a field brings the greatest rewards, and Brutus may even lend out his money at the best rates of interest. The question is always which mode of property creates the best citizens. Wealth appears as an end in itself only among the few commercial peoples – monopolists of the carrying trade – who live in the pores of the ancient world, like the Jews in medieval society. Now, wealth is on one side a thing, realized in things, material products, which a human being confronts as subject; on the other side, as value, wealth is merely command over alien labour not with the aim of ruling, but with the aim of private consumption etc. It appears in all forms in the shape of a thing, be it an object or be it a relation mediated through the object, which is external and accidental to the individual. Thus the old view, in which the human being appears as the aim of production, [488] regardless of his limited national, religious, political character, seems to be very lofty when contrasted to the modern world, where production appears as the aim of mankind and wealth as the aim of production. In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what is wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces etc., created through universal exchange? The full development of human mastery over the forces of nature, those of so-called nature as well as of humanity's own nature? The absolute working-out of his creative potentialities, with no presupposition other than the previous historic development, which makes this totality of development, i.e. the development of all human powers as such the end in itself, not as measured on a *predetermined yardstick?* Where he does not reproduce himself in one specificity, but produces his totality? Strives not to remain something he has become, but is in the absolute movement of becoming? In bourgeois economics – and in the epoch of production to which it corresponds – this complete working-out of the human content appears as a complete emptying-out, this universal objectification as total alienation, and the tearing-down of all limited, one-sided aims as sacrifice of the human end-in-itself to an entirely external end. This is why the childish world of antiquity appears on one side as loftier. On the other side, it really is loftier in all matters where closed shapes, forms and given limits are sought for. It is satisfaction from a limited standpoint; while the modern gives no satisfaction; or, where it appears satisfied with itself, it is *vulgar.*

(12) p. 515 (On capitalism as the precursor to communism)

It will be shown later that the *most extreme form of alienation,* wherein labour appears in the relation of capital and wage labour, and labour, productive activity appears in relation to its own conditions and its own product, is a necessary point of transition – and therefore already contains in *itself,* in a still only inverted form, turned on its head, the dissolution of all *limited presuppositions of production,* and moreover creates and produces the unconditional presuppositions of production, and therewith the full material conditions for the total, universal development of the productive forces of the individual.

(13) pp. 539-42 (On capital and human universality)

Circulation time thus appears as a barrier to the productivity of labour = an increase in necessary labour time = a decrease in surplus labour time = a decrease in surplus value = an obstruction, a barrier to the self-realization process [*Selbstverwertungsprozess*][6] of capital. Thus, while capital must on one side strive to tear down every spatial barrier to intercourse, i.e. to exchange, and conquer the whole earth for its market, it strives on the other side to annihilate this space with time, i.e. to reduce to a minimum the time spent in motion from one place to another. The more developed the capital, therefore, the more extensive the market over which it circulates, which forms the spatial orbit of its circulation, the more does it strive simultaneously for an even greater extension of the market and for greater annihilation of space by time. (If labour time is regarded not as the working day of the individual worker, but as the indefinite working day of an [540] indefinite number of workers, then all *relations of population* come in here; the basic doctrines of population are therefore just as much contained in this first

[6] self-valorisation process.

chapter on capital as are those of profit, price, credit etc.) There appears here the universalizing tendency of capital, which distinguishes it from all previous stages of production. Although limited by its very nature, it strives towards the universal development of the forces of production, and thus becomes the presupposition of a new mode of production, which is founded not on the development of the forces of production for the purpose of reproducing or at most expanding a given condition, but where the free, unobstructed, progressive and universal development of the forces of production is itself the presupposition of society and hence of its reproduction; where advance beyond the point of departure is the only presupposition. This tendency – which capital possesses, but which at the same time, since capital is a limited form of production, contradicts it and hence drives it towards dissolution – distinguishes capital from all earlier modes of production, and at the same time contains this element, that capital is posited as a mere point of transition. All previous forms of society – or, what is the same, of the forces of social production – foundered on the development of wealth. Those thinkers of antiquity who were possessed of consciousness therefore directly denounced wealth as the dissolution of the community. The feudal system, for its part, foundered on urban industry, trade, modern agriculture (even as a result of individual inventions like gunpowder and the printing press). With the development of wealth – and hence also new powers and expanded intercourse on the part of individuals – the economic conditions on which the community rested were dissolved, along with the political relations of the various constituents of the community which corresponded to those conditions: religion, in which it was viewed in idealized form (and both [religion and political relations] rested in turn on a given relation to nature, into which all productive force resolves itself); the character, outlook etc. of the individuals. The *development of science alone* – i.e. the most solid form of wealth, both its product and its producer – was sufficient to dissolve these communities. But the *development of science,* this ideal and at the same time practical wealth, is only one aspect, one form in which the *development of the human productive forces,* i.e. of wealth, appears. Considered *ideally,* the dissolution of a given form of consciousness [541] sufficed to kill a whole epoch. In reality, this barrier to consciousness corresponds to a *definite degree of development of the forces of material production* and hence of wealth. True, there was not only a development on the old basis, but also a *development of this basis itself.* The highest development of this *basis* itself (the flower into which it transforms itself; but it is always *this* basis, *this* plant as flower; hence wilting *after* the flowering and as consequence of the flowering) is the point at which it is itself worked out, developed, into the form in which it is compatible with the *highest development of the forces of production,* hence also the richest development of the individuals. As soon as this point is reached, the further development appears as decay, and the new development begins from a new basis. We saw earlier that property in the conditions of production was posited as identical with a limited, definite form of the community; hence of the individual with the characteristics – limited characteristics and limited development of his productive forces – required to form such a community. This presupposition was itself in turn the result of a limited historic stage of the development of the productive forces; of wealth as well as of the mode of creating it. The purpose of the community, of the individual – as well as the condition of production – [is] *the reproduction of these specific conditions of production* and of the individuals, both singly and in their social groupings and relations – as living carriers of these conditions. Capital posits the *production of wealth* itself and hence the universal development of the productive forces, the constant overthrow of its prevailing presuppositions, as the presupposition of its reproduction. Value excludes no use value; i.e. includes no particular kind of consumption etc., of intercourse etc. as absolute condition; and likewise every degree of the development of the social forces of production, of intercourse, of knowledge etc. appears to it only as a barrier which it strives to overpower. Its own presupposition – value – is posited as product, not as a loftier presupposition hovering over production. The barrier to *capital* is that this entire development proceeds in a contradictory way, and that the working-out of the productive forces, of general wealth etc., knowledge etc., appears in such a way that the working individual *alienates* himself [*sich entäussert*]; relates to the conditions brought out of him by his labour as those not of his *own* but of an *alien wealth* and of his own poverty. But this antithetical form is itself fleeting,[7] and produces the real conditions [542]of its own suspension. The result is: the tendentially and potentially general development of the forces of production – of wealth as such – as a basis; likewise, the universality of intercourse, hence the world market as a basis. The basis as the possibility of the universal development of the individual, and the real development of the individuals from this basis as a constant suspension of its *barrier,* which is recognized as a barrier, not taken for a *sacred limit.* Not an ideal or imagined universality of the individual, but the universality of his real and ideal relations. Hence also the grasping of his own history as a *process,* and the recognition of nature (equally present as practical power over nature) as his real body. The process of development itself posited and

[7] *verschwindend* (disappearing).

known as the presupposition of the same. For this, however, necessary above all that the full development of the forces of production has become the *condition of production*; and not that specific *conditions of production* are posited as a limit to the development of the productive forces. –

(14) pp. 585-7 (On formal and real subsumption of labour by capital)

Like all productive powers of labour, i.e. those which determine the degree of its intensity and hence of its extensive realization, the association of the workers – the cooperation and division of labour as fundamental conditions of the productivity of labour – appears as the *productive power of capital.* The collective power of labour, its character as social labour, is therefore the *collective power* of capital. Likewise *science.* Likewise the division of labour, as it appears as division of the occupations and of exchange corresponding to them. All social powers of production are productive powers of capital, and it appears as itself their subject. The association of the workers, as it appears in the factory, is therefore not posited by them but by capital. Their combination is not *their* being, but the *being* [*Dasein*] of capital. *Vis-à-vis* the individual worker, the combination appears accidental. He relates to his own combination and cooperation with other workers as *alien,* as modes of capital's effectiveness. Unless it appears in an inadequate form – e.g. small, self-employed capital – capital already, at a certain greater or lesser stage, presupposes concentration both in objective form, i.e. as concentration in one hand, which here still coincides with accumulation, of the necessaries of life, of raw material and instruments, or, in a word, of money as the general form of wealth; and on the other side, in subjective form, the accumulation of labour powers and their concentration at a single point under the command of the capitalist. There cannot be one capitalist for every worker, but rather there has to be a certain quantity of workers per capitalist, not like one or two journeymen per master. Productive capital, or the mode of production corresponding to capital, can be present in only two forms: manufacture and large-scale industry. In the former, the division of labour is predominant; in the second, the combination of labour powers (with a regular mode of work) and the employment of scientific power, where the combination and, so to speak, the communal spirit of labour is transferred to the machine etc. In the first situation the mass of (accumulated) workers must be large in relation to the amount of capital; in the second the fixed capital must be large in relation to the number of the many cooperating workers. But the concentration of many, and their distribution among the machinery as [586] so many cogs (why it is different in agriculture does not belong here), is, however, already presupposed here. Case II therefore does not need to be specially examined here, but only case I. The development proper to manufacture is the *division of labour.* But this presupposes the (preliminary) gathering-together of many workers under a single command, just as the *process through which money becomes capital presupposes the previous liberation of a certain amount of necessaries of life, raw materials and instruments of labour.* The division of labour is therefore also to be abstracted away here as a later moment. Certain branches of industry, e.g. mining, already presuppose cooperation from the beginning. Thus, so long as capital does not exist, this labour takes place as forced labour (serf or slave labour) under an overseer. Likewise road building etc. In order to take over these works, capital does not create but rather takes over the accumulation and concentration of workers. Nor is this in question. The simplest form, a form independent of the division of labour, is that capital employs different hand weavers, spinners etc. who live independently and are dispersed over the land. (This form still exists alongside industry.) *Here, then, the mode of production is not yet determined by capital, but rather found on hand by it.* The point of unity of all these scattered workers lies only in their mutual relation with capital, which accumulates the product of their production in its hands and, likewise, the surplus values which they created above and beyond their own revenue. The coordination of their work exists only *in itself,* in so far as each of them works for capital – hence possesses a centre in it – without working together. Their unification by capital is thus merely *formal,* and concerns only the product of labour, not labour itself. Instead of exchanging with many, they exchange only with the one capitalist. This is therefore a *concentration of exchanges* by capital. Capital engages in *exchange* not as an individual, but as representing the consumption and the needs of many. It *no longer exchanges* as individual exchanger, but rather, in the act of exchange, represents society. *Collective exchange* and *concentrative exchange* on the part of capital with the scattered working weavers etc., whose products are collected, united through this exchange, and whose labours are thereby also united, although they proceed independently of one another. The unification of their labours appears as a particular act, alongside which the independent fragmentation of their labours continues. This is the *first condition* necessary for *money* [587] to be exchanged as capital for free labour. The second is the suspension of the independent fragmentation of these many workers., so that the *individual capital* no longer appears towards them merely as *social collective power in the act of exchange,* uniting many exchanges, but rather gathers them in one spot under its command, into one manufactory, and no longer leaves them in the *mode of production found already in existence,* establishing its power on that basis, but rather creates a mode of production corresponding to itself, as its basis. It

posits the *concentration* of the workers in production, a unification which will occur initially only in a common location, under overseers, *regimentation, greater discipline, regularity and the* POSITED *dependence in production itself on capital.* Certain *faux frais de production* are thereby saved from the outset. (On this whole process compare Gaskell, where special regard is had to the development of large industry in England.) Now capital appears as the collective force of the workers, their social force, as well as that which ties them together, and hence as the unity which creates this force.

(15) pp. 610-14 (On labour as self-realisation)

A. Smith's view, [is] that *labour never changes its value,* in the sense that a *definite amount of labour* is always a definite *amount of labour for the worker,* i.e., with A. Smith, a sacrifice of the *same quantitative magnitude.* Whether I obtain much or little for an hour of work – which depends on its productivity and other circumstances – I have *worked* one hour. What I have had to pay for the result of my work, my wages, is always the same *hour of work,* let the result vary as it may. 'Equal quantities of labour must at all times and in all places have the same value for the worker. In his normal state of health, strength and activity, and with the common degree of skill and facility which he may possess, he must always give up the *identical portion of his tranquillity, his freedom,* and his [611] *happiness.* Whatever may be the quantity or composition of the commodities he obtains in reward of his work, the *price he pays* is always the same. Of course, this price may buy sometimes a lesser, sometimes a greater quantity of these commodities, but only because their value changes, not the value of the labour which buys them. Labour alone, therefore, never changes its own value. It is therefore the *real price* of commodities, money is only their nominal value.' (ed. by Garnier, Vol. I, pp. 64-6.) (Notebook, p. 7.) In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou labour! was Jehovah's curse on Adam. And this is labour for Smith, a curse. 'Tranquillity' appears as the adequate state, as identical with 'freedom' and 'happiness'. It seems quite far from Smith's mind that the individual, 'in his normal state of health, strength, activity, skill, facility', also needs a normal portion of work, and of the suspension of tranquillity. Certainly, labour obtains its measure from the outside, through the aim to be attained and the obstacles to be overcome in attaining it. But Smith has no inkling whatever that this overcoming of obstacles is in itself a liberating activity – and that, further, the external aims become stripped of the semblance of merely external natural urgencies, and become posited as aims which the individual himself posits – hence as self-realization, objectification of the subject, hence real freedom, whose action is, precisely, labour. He is right, of course, that, in its historic forms as slave-labour, serf-labour, and wage-labour, labour always appears as repulsive, always as *external forced labour*; and not-labour, by contrast, as 'freedom, and happiness'. This holds doubly: for this contradictory labour; and, relatedly, for labour which has not yet created the subjective and objective conditions for itself (or also, in contrast to the pastoral etc. state, which it has lost), in which labour becomes attractive work, the individual's self-realization, which in no way means that it becomes mere fun, mere amusement, as Fourier, with *grisette*-like[8] naiveté, conceives it. Really free working, e.g. composing, is at the same time precisely the most damned seriousness, the most intense exertion. The work of material production can [612] achieve this character only (1) when its social character is posited, (2) when it is of a scientific and at the same time general character, net merely human exertion as a specifically harnessed natural force, but exertion as subject, which appears in the production process not in a merely natural, spontaneous form, but as an activity regulating all the forces of nature. A. Smith, by the way, has only the slaves of capital in mind. For example, even the semi-artistic worker of the Middle Ages does not fit into his definition. *But* what we want *here initially* is not to go into his view on labour, his philosophical view, but into the economic moment. Labour regarded merely as a *sacrifice,* and hence value-positing, as a *price* paid for things and hence giving them price depending on whether they cost more or less labour, is a purely *negative* characterization. This is why Mr Senior, for example, was able to make capital into a source of production in the same sense as labour, a source *sui generis* of the production of *value,* because the capitalist too brings a *sacrifice,* the sacrifice of *abstinence,* in that he grows wealthy instead of eating up his product directly. Something that is merely negative creates nothing. If the worker should, e.g. enjoy his work – as the miser certainly enjoys Senior's *abstinence* – then the product does not lose any of its value. Labour *alone* produces; it is the only *substance* of products as *values.*[9] Its

[8] A *Grisette* meant a young working woman, especially a seamstress or shop assistant.

[9] [Note by Marx:] Proudhon's lack of understanding of this matter is evident from his axiom that every labour leaves a surplus. What he denies for capital, he transforms into a natural property of labour. The point is, rather, that the labour time necessary to meet absolute needs leaves *free* time (different at the different stages of the development of the productive forces), and that therefore a surplus product can be created if *surplus labour* is worked. The aim is to suspend the relation itself, so that the surplus product itself appears as necessary. Ultimately, material production leaves everyone surplus time for other activity. There is no longer anything mystical in this. Originally, the free

measure, labour time – presupposing equal intensity – is therefore the measure of values. The qualitative difference between workers, in so far as it is not natural, posited by sex, age, physical strength etc. – and thus basically expresses not the qualitative value of labour, but rather the division and differentiation [613] of labour – is itself only a product of history, and is in turn suspended for the great mass of labour, in that the latter is itself simple; while the qualitatively higher takes its economic measure from the simple. The statement that *labour time,* or the amount of labour, is the measure of values means nothing other than that the measure of labour is the measure of values. Two things are only commensurable if they are of the *same nature.* Products can be measured with the measure of labour – labour time – only because they are, by their nature, *labour.* They are objectified labour. As objects they assume forms in which their being as labour may certainly be apparent in their form (as a purposiveness posited in them from outside; however, this is not at all apparent with e.g. the ox, or with reproduced natural products generally), but in which this being has, apart from itself, no other features in common. They exist as equals as long as they exist as activity. The latter is measured by time, which therefore also becomes the measure of objectified labour. We will examine elsewhere to what extent this *measurement* is linked with exchange, not with organized social labour – a definite stage of the social production process. Use value is not concerned with human activity as the source of the product, with its having been posited by human activity, but with its being for mankind. In so far as the product has a measure for itself, it is its natural measure as natural object, mass, weight, length, volume etc. Measure of utility etc. But as effect, or as static presence of the force which created it, it is measured only by the measure of this force itself. The measure of labour is time. Only because products ARE labour can they be measured by the measure of labour, by labour time, the amount of labour consumed in them. The negation of tranquillity, as mere negation, ascetic sacrifice, creates nothing. *Someone may castigate and flagellate himself all day long like the monks etc., and this quantity of sacrifice he contributes will remain totally worthless.* The *natural price* of things is not the sacrifice made for them. This recalls, rather, the pre-industrial view which wants to achieve wealth by sacrificing to the gods. There has to be something besides sacrifice. The sacrifice of tranquillity can also be called the sacrifice of laziness, unfreedom, unhappiness, i.e. negation of a negative state.A. Smith considers labour psychologically, as to the fun or displeasure it holds for the individual. But it is something else, too, in addition to this *emotional* relation with his activity – firstly, for others, since A's mere sacrifice would be of no use for B; secondly, a [614] definite relation by his own self to the thing he works on, and to his own working capabilities. It is a *positive, creative activity.* The measure of labour – time – of course does not depend on labour's productivity; its measure is precisely nothing but a unit of which the proportional parts of labour express a certain multiple. It certainly does not follow from this that the *value* of labour is constant; or, follows only in so far as equal quantities of labour are of the same measured magnitude. It is then found upon further examination that the values of products are measured not by the labour employed in them, but by the labour necessary for their production. Hence not sacrifice, but labour as a condition of production. The equivalent expresses the condition of the products' reproduction, as given to them through exchange, i.e. the.possibility of repeating productive activity anew, as posited by its own product.

gift of nature abundant, or at least merely to be appropriated. From the outset, naturally arisen association (family) and the division of labour and cooperation corresponding to it. For needs are themselves scant at the *beginning*. They too develop only with the forces of production.

(16) pp. 746-50 (On the falling rate of profit and the end of capitalism)

The general laws developed previously here briefly summarized thus: The real surplus value is determined by the relation of surplus labour to necessary labour, or by the portion of the capital, the portion of objectified labour, which exchanges for living labour, relative to the portion of objectified labour by which it is replaced. But surplus value in the form of profit is measured by the total value of the capital presupposed to the production process. Presupposing the same surplus value, *the same surplus labour in proportion to necessary labour,* then, the *rate of profit* depends on the relation between the part of capital exchanged for living labour and the part existing in the form of raw material and means of production. Hence, the smaller the portion exchanged for living labour becomes, the smaller becomes the rate of profit. Thus, in the same proportion as capital takes up a larger place as capital in the production process relative to immediate labour, i.e. the more the relative surplus value grows – the value-creating power of capital – the more *does the rate of profit fall.* We have seen that the magnitude of the capital already presupposed, presupposed to reproduction, is specifically expressed in the growth of fixed capital, as the produced productive force, objectified labour endowed with apparent life. The total value of the producing capital will express itself in each of its portions as a diminished proportion of the capital exchanged for living labour relative to the part of capital existing as constant value. Take e.g. manufacturing

industry. In the same proportion as fixed capital grows here, machinery etc., the part of capital existing in raw materials must grow, while the part exchanged for living labour decreases. Hence, the rate of profit falls relative to the total value of the capital presupposed to production – and of the part of capital acting as capital in production. The wider the existence already achieved by capital, the narrower the relation of newly created value to presupposed value (reproduced value). *Presupposing equal surplus value, i.e. equal relation of surplus labour and necessary labour,* there can therefore be an unequal profit, and it must be unequal relative to the size of the capitals. The rate of profit can rise although real surplus value falls. Indeed, the capital can grow and the rate of profit can grow in the same relation if the relation of the part of capital presupposed as value and existing in the form of raw materials and fixed capital rises at an equal rate relative to the part of the capital exchanged for living labour. But this equality of rates presupposes growth of the capital without growth and development of the productive power of labour. One presupposition suspends the other. This contradicts [748] the law of the development of capital, and especially of the development of fixed capital. Such a progression can take place only at stages where the mode of production of capital is not yet adequate to it, or in spheres of production where it has assumed predominance only formally, e.g. in agriculture. Here, natural fertility of the soil can act like an increase of fixed capital – i.e. relative surplus labour can grow – without the amount of necessary labour diminishing. (E.g. in the *United States.)* The *gross profit,* i.e. the surplus value, regarded apart from its formal relation, not as a proportion but rather as a simple magnitude of value without connection with any other, will grow on the average *not as does the rate of profit, but as does the size of the capital.* Thus, while the rate of profit will be inversely related to the value of the capital, the *sum of profit* will be directly related to it. However, even this statement is true only for a restricted stage of the development of the productive power of capital or of labour. A capital of 100 with a profit of 10% yields a smaller sum of profit than a capital of 1,000 with a profit of 2%. In the first case the sum is 10, in the second 20, i.e. the gross profit of the larger capital is twice as large as that of the 10 times smaller capital, although the rate of the smaller capital's profit is 5 times greater than that of the larger. But if the larger capital's profit were only 1%, then the sum of its profit would be 10, like that for the 10 times smaller capital, because the rate of profit would have declined in the same relation as its size. If the rate of profit of the capital of 1,000 were only 1/2%, then the sum of its profit would be only half as large as that of the smaller capital, only 5, because the rate of profit would be 20 times smaller. Thus, expressed in general terms: if the rate of profit declines for the larger capital, but not in relation with its size, then the gross profit rises although the rate of profit declines. If the profit rate declines relative to its size, then the gross profit remains the same as that of the smaller capital; remains stationary. If the profit rate declines more than its size increases, then the gross profit of the larger capital decreases relative to the smaller one in proportion as its rate of profit declines. This is in every respect the most important law of modern political economy, and the most essential for understanding the most difficult relations. It is the most important law from the historical standpoint. It is a law which, despite its simplicity, has never before been grasped and, even less, consciously articulated. Since this decline in the rate of profit is [749] identical in meaning (1) with the productive power already produced, and the foundation formed by it for new production; this simultaneously presupposing an enormous development of scientific powers; (2) with the decline of the part of the capital already produced which must be exchanged for immediate labour, i.e. with the decline in the immediate labour required for the reproduction of an immense value, expressing itself in a great mass of products, great mass of products with low prices, because the total sum of prices is = to the reproduced capital + profit; (3) [with] the dimension of capital generally, including the portion of it which is not fixed capital; hence intercourse on a magnificent scale, immense sum of exchange operations, large size of the market and all-sidedness of simultaneous labour; means of communication etc., presence of the necessary consumption fund to undertake this gigantic process (workers' food, housing etc.); hence it is evident that the material productive power already present, already worked out, existing in the form of fixed capital, together with the population etc., in short all conditions of wealth, that the greatest conditions for the reproduction of wealth, i.e. the abundant development of the social individual – that the development of the productive forces brought about by the historical development of capital itself, when it reaches a certain point, suspends the self-realization of capital, instead of positing it. Beyond a certain point, the development of the powers of production becomes a barrier for capital; hence the capital relation a barrier for the development of the productive powers of labour. When it has reached this point, capital, i.e. wage labour, enters into the same relation towards the development of social wealth and of the forces of production as the guild system, serfdom, slavery, and is necessarily stripped off as a fetter. The last form of servitude assumed by human activity, that of wage labour on one side, capital on the other, is thereby cast off like a skin, and this casting-off itself is the result of the mode of production corresponding to capital; the material and mental conditions of the negation of wage labour and of capital, themselves already the negation of earlier forms of unfree social production, are themselves results of its production

process. The growing incompatibility between the productive development of society and its hitherto existing relations of production expresses itself in bitter contradictions, crises, spasms. The violent destruction of capital not by relations external to it, but rather as a condition of its self-preservation, [750] is the most striking form in which advice is given it to be gone and to give room to a higher state of social production. It is not only the growth of scientific power, but the measure in which it is already posited as fixed capital, the scope and width in which it is realized and has conquered the totality of production. It is, likewise, the development of the population etc., in short, of all moments of production; in that the productive power of labour, like the application of machinery, is related to the population; whose growth in and for itself already the presupposition as well as the result of the growth of the use values to be reproduced and hence also to be consumed. Since this decline of profit signifies the same as the decrease of immediate labour relative to the size of the objectified labour which it reproduces and newly posits, capital will attempt every means of checking the smallness of the relation of living labour to the size of the capital generally, hence also of the surplus value, if expressed as profit, relative to the presupposed capital, by reducing the allotment made to necessary labour and by still more expanding the quantity of surplus labour with regard to the whole labour employed. Hence the highest development of productive power together with the greatest expansion of existing wealth will coincide with depreciation of capital, degradation of the labourer, and a most straitened exhaustion of his vital powers. These contradictions, of course, lead to explosions, crises, in which momentary suspension of all labour and annihilation of a great part of the capital violently lead it back to the point where it is enabled [to go on] fully employing its productive powers without committing suicide.[10] Yet, these regularly recurring catastrophes lead to their repetition on a higher scale, and finally to its violent overthrow.

(17) pp. 831-2 (On alienated labour as a precursor to communism)

The fact that in the development of the productive powers of labour the objective conditions of labour, objectified labour, must grow relative to living labour – this is actually a tautological statement, for what else does growing productive power of labour mean than that less immediate labour is required to create a greater product, and that therefore social wealth expresses itself more and more in the conditions of labour created by labour itself? – this fact appears from the standpoint of capital not in such a way that one of the moments of social activity – objective labour – becomes the ever more powerful body of the other moment, of subjective, living labour, but rather – and this is important for wage labour – that the objective conditions of labour assume an ever more colossal independence, represented by its very extent, opposite living labour, and that social wealth confronts labour in more powerful portions as an alien and dominant power. The emphasis comes to be placed not on the state of being *objectified,* but on the state of being *alienated,* dispossessed, sold [Der Ton wird gelegt nicht auf das *Vergegenständlichtsein,* sondern das *Entfremdet-,* Entäussert-, Veräussertsein]; on the condition that the monstrous objective power which social labour itself erected opposite itself as one of its moments belongs not to the worker, but to the personified conditions of production, i.e. to capital. To the extent that, from the standpoint of capital and wage labour, the creation of the objective body of activity happens in antithesis to the immediate labour capacity – that this process of objectification in fact appears as a process of dispossession from the standpoint of labour or as appropriation of alien labour from the standpoint of capital – to that extent, this twisting and inversion [*Verdrehung und Verkehrung*] is a *real* [*phenomenon*], not a merely *supposed one* existing merely in the imagination of the workers and the capitalists. But obviously this process of inversion is a merely *historical* necessity, a necessity [832] for the development of the forces of production solely from a specific historic point of departure, or basis, but in no way an *absolute* necessity of production; rather, a vanishing one, and the result and the inherent purpose of this process is to suspend this basis itself, together with this form of the process. The bourgeois economists.are so much cooped up within the notions belonging to a specific historic stage of social development that the necessity of the *objectification* of the powers of social labour appears to them as inseparable from the necessity of their *alienation vis-à-vis* living labour. But with the suspension of the *immediate* character of living labour, as merely *individual,* or as general merely internally or merely externally, with the positing of the activity of individuals as immediately general or *social* activity, the objective moments of production are stripped of this form of alienation; they are thereby posited as property, as the organic social body within which the individuals reproduce themselves as individuals, but as social individuals. The conditions which allow them to exist in this way in the reproduction of their life, in their productive life's process, have been posited only by the historic economic process itself; both the objective and the subjective conditions, which are only the two distinct forms of the same conditions.

[10] Marx inserted an almost identical sentence in English immediately before this one in the manuscript.

19. Marx, 1859 Preface

1859

Source: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm

From Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Progress, 1977)

Full title: Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*

I examine the system of bourgeois economy in the following order: *capital, landed property, wage-labour; the State, foreign trade, world market.*

The economic conditions of existence of the three great classes into which modern bourgeois society is divided are analysed under the first three headings; the interconnection of the other three headings is self-evident. The first part of the first book, dealing with Capital, comprises the following chapters: 1. The commodity, 2. Money or simple circulation; 3. Capital in general. The present part consists of the first two chapters. The entire material lies before me in the form of monographs, which were written not for publication but for self-clarification at widely separated periods; their remoulding into an integrated whole according to the plan I have indicated will depend upon circumstances.

A general introduction, which I had drafted, is omitted, since on further consideration it seems to me confusing to anticipate results which still have to be substantiated, and the reader who really wishes to follow me will have to decide to advance from the particular to the general. A few brief remarks regarding the course of my study of political economy are appropriate here.

Although I studied jurisprudence, I pursued it as a subject subordinated to philosophy and history. In the year 1842-43, as editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung,* I first found myself in the embarrassing position of having to discuss what is known as material interests. The deliberations of the Rhenish Landtag on forest thefts and the division of landed property; the official polemic started by Herr von Schaper, then Oberprasident of the Rhine Province, against the *Rheinische Zeitung* about the condition of the Moselle peasantry, and finally the debates on free trade and protective tariffs caused me in the first instance to turn my attention to economic questions. On the other hand, at that time when good intentions "to push forward" often took the place of factual knowledge, an echo of French socialism and communism, slightly tinged by philosophy, was noticeable in the *Rheinische Zeitung.* I objected to this dilettantism, but at the same time frankly admitted in a controversy with the *Allgemeine Augsburger Zeitung* that my previous studies did not allow me to express any opinion on the content of the French theories. When the publishers of the *Rheinische Zeitung* conceived the illusion that by a more compliant policy on the part of the paper it might be possible to secure the abrogation of the death sentence passed upon it, I eagerly grasped the opportunity to withdraw from the public stage to my study.

The first work which I undertook to dispel the doubts assailing me was a critical re-examination of the Hegelian philosophy of law; the introduction to this work being published in the *Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbucher* issued in Paris in 1844. My inquiry led me to the conclusion that neither legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general development of the human mind, but that on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of life, the totality of which Hegel, following the example of English and French thinkers of the eighteenth century, embraces within the term "civil society"; that the anatomy of this civil society, however, has to be sought in political economy. The study of this, which I began in Paris, I continued in Brussels, where I moved owing to an expulsion order issued by M. Guizot. The general conclusion at which I arrived and which, once reached, became the guiding principle of my studies can be summarised as follows.

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or – this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms – with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.

In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be

determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production. No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.

Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation. In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic development of society. The bourgeois mode of production is the last antagonistic form of the social process of production – antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism but of an antagonism that emanates from the individuals' social conditions of existence – but the productive forces developing within bourgeois society create also the material conditions for a solution of this antagonism. The prehistory of human society accordingly closes with this social formation.

Frederick Engels, with whom I maintained a constant exchange of ideas by correspondence since the publication of his brilliant essay on the critique of economic categories (printed in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher,* arrived by another road (compare his *Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*) at the same result as I, and when in the spring of 1845 he too came to live in Brussels, we decided to set forth together our conception as opposed to the ideological one of German philosophy, in fact to settle accounts with our former philosophical conscience. The intention was carried out in the form of a critique of post-Hegelian philosophy. The manuscript [The German Ideology], two large octavo volumes, had long ago reached the publishers in Westphalia when we were informed that owing to changed circumstances it could not be printed. We abandoned the manuscript to the gnawing criticism of the mice all the more willingly since we had achieved our main purpose – self-clarification. Of the scattered works in which at that time we presented one or another aspect of our views to the public, I shall mention only the *Manifesto of the Communist Party,* jointly written by Engels and myself, and a *Discours sur le libre echange,* which I myself published. The salient points of our conception were first outlined in an academic, although polemical, form in my *Misere de la philosophie*..., this book which was aimed at Proudhon appeared in 1847. The publication of an essay on *Wage-Labour* [Wage-Labor and Capital] written in German in which I combined the lectures I had held on this subject at the German Workers' Association in Brussels, was interrupted by the February Revolution and my forcible removal from Belgium in consequence.

The publication of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* in 1848 and 1849 and subsequent events cut short my economic studies, which I could only resume in London in 1850. The enormous amount of material relating to the history of political economy assembled in the British Museum, the fact that London is a convenient vantage point for the observation of bourgeois society, and finally the new stage of development which this society seemed to have entered with the discovery of gold in California and Australia, induced me to start again from the very beginning and to work carefully through the new material. These studies led partly of their own accord to apparently quite remote subjects on which I had to spend a certain amount of time. But it was in particular the imperative necessity of earning my living which reduced the time at my disposal. My collaboration, continued now for eight years, with the *New York Tribune,* the leading Anglo-American newspaper, necessitated an excessive fragmentation of my studies, for I wrote only exceptionally newspaper correspondence in the strict sense. Since a considerable part of my contributions consisted of articles dealing with important economic events in Britain and on the continent, I was compelled to become conversant with practical detail which, strictly speaking, lie outside the sphere of political economy.

This sketch of the course of my studies in the domain of political economy is intended merely to show that my views – no matter how they may be judged and how little they conform to the interested prejudices of the ruling classes – are the outcome of conscientious research carried on over many years. At the entrance to science, as at the entrance to hell, the demand must be made:

Qui si convien lasciare ogni sospetto
Ogni vilta convien che qui sia morta.

[From Dante, Divina Commedia:
Here must all distrust be left;
All cowardice must here be dead.]

20. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy
1859
Source: http://marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/index
From: Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Moscow, Progess Publishers, 1970), pp. 27-28

Chapter 1 The Commodity

The wealth of bourgeois society, at first sight, presents itself as an immense accumulation of commodities, its unit being a single commodity. Every commodity, however, has a twofold aspect – *use-value and exchange-value.*[1]

To begin with, a commodity, in the language of the English economists, is "any thing necessary, useful or pleasant in life," an object of human wants, a means of existence in the widest sense of the term. Use-value as an aspect of the commodity coincides with the physical palpable existence of the commodity. Wheat, for example, is a distinct use-value differing from the use-values of cotton, glass, paper, etc. A use-value has value only in use, and is realized only in the process of consumption. One and the same use-value can be used in various ways. But the extent of its possible application is limited by its existence as an object with distinct properties. It is, moreover, determined not only qualitatively but also quantitatively. Different use-values have different measures appropriate to their physical characteristics; for example, a bushel of wheat, a quire of paper, a yard of linen.

Whatever its social form may be, wealth always consists of use-values, which in the first instance are not affected by [28] this form. From the taste of wheat it is not possible to tell who produced it, a Russian serf, a French peasant or an English capitalist. Although use-values serve social needs and therefore exist within the social framework, they do not express the social relations of production. For instance, let us take as a use-value a commodity such as a diamond. We cannot tell by looking at it that the diamond is a commodity. Where it serves as an aesthetic or mechanical use-value, on the neck of a courtesan or in the hand of a glass-cutter, it is a diamond and not a commodity. To be a use-value is evidently a necessary prerequisite of the commodity, but it is immaterial to the use-value whether it is a commodity. Use-value as such, since it is independent of the determinate economic form, lies outside the sphere of investigation of political economy. It belongs in this sphere only when it is itself a determinate form. Use-value is the immediate physical entity in which a definite economic relationship – exchange-value – is expressed.

[…]

[1] [Footnote by Marx:] Aristotle, *De Republica*, L.I, C. 9 "Of everything which we possess there are two uses:... one is the proper, and the other the improper or secondary use of it. For example, a shoe is used for wear, and is used for exchange; both are uses of the shoe. He who gives a shoe in exchange for money or food to him who wants one, does indeed use the shoe as a shoe, but this is not its proper or primary purpose, for a shoe is not made to be an object of barter. The same may be said of all possessions.... "

21. Marx, Capital volume 3, passage on the realm of freedom

1861-63

Source: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1894-c3/ch48.htm

From *Capital* Volume 3 (New York: International Publishers, [n.d.]), chapter 48

The actual wealth of society, and the possibility of constantly expanding its reproduction process, therefore, do not depend upon the duration of surplus-labour, but upon its productivity and the more or less copious conditions of production under which it is performed. In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production. Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, so must civilised man, and he must do so in all social formations and under all possible modes of production. With his development this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of his wants; but, at the same time, the forces of production which satisfy these wants also increase. Freedom in this field can only consist in socialised man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working-day is its basic prerequisite.

22. Marx, Letter to Kugelmann
11 July 1868
Source: http://marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1868/letters/68_07_11.htm
From Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, vol. 43, p. 67

Dear Friend,

[…]

As for the *Centralblatt,* the man is making the greatest concession possible by admitting that, if value means anything at all, then my conclusions must be conceded. The unfortunate fellow does not see that, even if there were no chapter on 'value' at all in my book, the analysis I give of the real relations would contain the proof and demonstration of the real value relation. The chatter about the need to prove the concept of value arises only from complete ignorance both of the subject under discussion and of the method of science. Every child knows that any nation that stopped working, not for a year, but let us say, just for a few weeks, would perish. And every child knows, too, that the amounts of products corresponding to the differing amounts of needs demand differing and quantitatively determined amounts of society's aggregate labour. It is self-evident that this *necessity* of the *distribution* of social labour in specific proportions is certainly not abolished by the *specific form* of social production; it can only change *its form of manifestation.* Natural laws cannot be abolished at all. The only thing that can change, under historically differing conditions, is the *form* in which those laws assert themselves. And the form in which this proportional distribution of labour asserts itself in a state of society in which the interconnection of social labour expresses itself as the *private exchange* of the individual products of labour, is precisely the *exchange value* of these products.

Where science comes in is to show *how* the law of value asserts itself. So, if one wanted to 'explain' from the outset all phenomena that apparently contradict the law, one would have to provide the science *before* the science. It is precisely Ricardo's mistake that in his first chapter, on value, all sorts of categories that still have to be arrived at are assumed as *given,* in order to prove their harmony with the law of value.

On the other hand, as you correctly believe, *the history of the theory* of course demonstrates that the understanding of the value relation has *always been the same,* clearer or less clear, hedged with illusions or scientifically more precise. Since the reasoning process itself arises from the existing conditions and is itself a *natural process,* really comprehending thinking can always only be the same, and can vary only gradually, in accordance with the maturity of development, hence also the maturity of the organ that does the thinking. Anything else is drivel.

The vulgar economist has not the slightest idea that the actual, everyday exchange relations and the value magnitudes *cannot be directly identical.* The point of bourgeois society is precisely that, *a priori,* no conscious social regulation of production takes place. What is reasonable and necessary by nature asserts itself only as a blindly operating average. The vulgar economist thinks he has made a great discovery when, faced with the disclosure of the intrinsic interconnection, he insists that things look different in appearance. In fact, he prides himself in his clinging to appearances and believing them to be the ultimate. Why then have science at all?

But there is also something else behind it. Once interconnection has been revealed, all theoretical belief in the perpetual necessity of the existing conditions collapses, even before the collapse takes place in practice. Here, therefore, it is completely in the interests of the ruling classes to perpetuate the unthinking confusion. And for what other reason are the sycophantic babblers paid who have no other scientific trump to play except that, in political economy, one may not think at all!

But *satis superque*.[1] In any case, it shows the depth of degradation reached by these priests of the bourgeoisie: while workers and even manufacturers and merchants have understood my book and made sense of it, these '*learned* scribes' (!) complain that I make excessive demands on their comprehension.

I would not advise reprinting Schweitzer's articles, though Schweitzer has made a good job of them for his paper.

You would oblige me if you sent me a few issues of the Staats-Anzeiger.

You should be able to get Schnacke's address by enquiring at the Elberfelder.

Best greetings to your wife and Fränzchen.

Yours
K. M.

[1] 'Enough and more than enough'.

23. Marx, The Civil War in France (first draft)
1871
Source: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1871/civil-war-france/drafts/
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The Character of the Commune

The centralized State machinery which, with its ubiquitous and complicated military, bureaucratic, clerical and judiciary organs, entoils (inmeshes) the living civil society like a boa constrictor, was first forged in the days of absolute monarchy as a weapon of nascent modern society in its struggle of emancipation from feudalism. The seignorial privileges of the medieval lords and cities and clergy were transformed into the attributes of a unitary State power, displacing the feudal dignitaries by salaried State functionaries, transferring the arms from medieval retainers of the landlords and the corporations of townish citizens to a standing army, substituting for the checkered (party-coloured) anarchy of conflicting medieval powers the regulated plan of a State power, with a systematic and hierarchic division of labour. The first French Revolution with its task to found national unity (to create a nation) had to break down all local, territorial, townish and provincial independence. It was, therefore, forced to develop, what absolute monarchy had commenced, the centralization and organization of State power, and to expand the circumference and the attributes of the State power, the number of its tools, its independence, and its supernaturalist sway of real society, which in fact took the place of the medieval supernaturalist heaven, with its saints. Every minor solitary interest engendered by the relations of social groups was separated from society itself, fixed and made independent of it and opposed to it in the form of State interest, administered by State priests with exactly determined hierarchical functions.

This parasitical [excrescence upon] civil society, pretending to be its ideal counterpart, grew to its full development under the sway of the first Bonaparte. The Restoration and the Monarchy of July added nothing to it but a greater division of labour, growing at the same measure in which the division of labour within civil society created new groups of interest, and, therefore, new material for State action. In their struggle against the Revolution of 1848, the Parliamentary Republic of France and the governments of all continental Europe, were forced to strengthen, with their measures of repression against the popular movement, the means of action and the centralization of that governmental power. All revolutions thus only perfected the State machinery instead of throwing off this deadening incubus. The fractions and parties of the ruling classes which alternately struggled for supremacy, considered the occupancy (control) (seizure) and the direction of this immense machinery of government as the main booty of the victor. It centred in the creation of immense standing armies, a host of State vermin, and huge national debts. During the time of the absolute monarchy it was a means of the struggle of modern society against feudalism, crowned by the French Revolution, and under the first Bonaparte it served not only to subjugate the Revolution and annihilate all popular liberties, it was an instrument of the French Revolution to strike abroad, to create for France on the Continent instead of feudal monarchies more or less States after the image of France. Under the Restoration and the Monarchy of July it became not only [a] means of the forcible class domination of the middle class, and [*read* but] a means of adding to the direct economic exploitation a second exploitation of the people by assuring to their [i.e., the middle class] families all the rich places of the State household. During the time of the revolutionary struggle of 1848 at last it served as a means of annihilating that Revolution and all aspirations at the emancipation of the popular masses. But the State parasite received only its last development during the Second Empire. The governmental power with its standing army, its all directing bureaucracy, its stultifying clergy and its servile tribunal hierarchy had grown so independent of society itself, that a grotesquely mediocre adventurer with a hungry band of desperadoes behind him sufficed to wield it. It did no longer want the pretext of an armed Coalition of old Europe against the modern world founded by the Revolution of 1789. It appeared no longer as a means of class domination, subordinate to its parliamentary ministry or legislature. Humbling under its sway even the interests of the ruling classes, whose parliamentary show work it supplanted by self-elected *Corps législatifs* and self-paid senates, sanctioned in its absolute sway by universal suffrage, the acknowledged necessity for keeping up “order,” that is the rule of the landowner and the capitalist over the producer, cloaking under the tatters of a masquerade of the past the orgies of the corruption of the present and the victory of the most parasite fraction, the financial swindler, the *debauchery* of all the reactionary influences of the past let loose – a pandemonium of infamies – the State power had received its last and supreme expression in the Second Empire. Apparently the final victory of this governmental power over society, it was in fact the orgy of all the corrupt elements of that society. To the eye of the uninitiated it appeared only as the victory of the Executive over the Legislative, of [*read* as] the final defeat of the form of class rule pretending to be the autocracy of society [by] its form pretending to be a superior power to society. But in fact it was only the last degraded and the

only possible form of that class ruling, as humiliating to those classes themselves as to the working classes which they kept fettered by it.

The 4th of September was only the revindication of the *République* against the grotesque adventurer that had assassinated it. The true antithesis to *the Empire itself* – that is, to the State power, the centralized executive, of which the Second Empire was only the exhausting formula – was *the Commune.* This State power forms in fact the creation of the middle class, first [as] a means to break down feudalism, then [as] a means to crush the emancipatory aspirations of the producers, of the working class. All reactions and all revolutions had only served to transfer that organized power – that organized force of the slavery of labour – from one hand to the other, from one fraction of the ruling classes to the other. It had served the ruling classes as a means of subjugation and of pelf. It had sucked new forces from every new change. It had served as the instrument of breaking down every popular rise[v] and served it to crush the working classes after they had fought and been ordered to secure its transfer from one part of its oppressors to the others. This was, therefore, a revolution not against this or that, legitimate, constitutional, republican or imperialist form of State power. It was a revolution against the State itself, of this supernaturalist abortion of society, a resumption by the people for the people of its own social life. It was not a revolution to transfer it from one fraction of the ruling classes to the other, but a revolution to break down this horrid machinery of class domination itself. It was not one of those dwarfish struggles between the executive and the parliamentary forms of class domination, but a revolt against both these forms, integrating each other, and of which the parliamentary form was only the deceitful bywork of the Executive. The Second Empire was the final form of this State usurpation. The Commune was its definite negation, and, therefore, the initiation of the Social Revolution of the 19th century. Whatever therefore its fate at Paris, it will make *le tour du monde* [a trip round the world]. It was at once acclaimed by the working class of Europe and the United States as the magic word of delivery. The glories and the antediluvian deeds of the Prussian conqueror seemed only hallucinations of a bygone past.

It was only the working class that could formulate by the word "Commune" and initiate by the fighting Commune of Paris – this new aspiration. Even the last expression of that State power in the Second Empire, although humbling for the pride of the ruling classes and casting to the winds their parliamentary pretensions of self-government, had been only the last possible form of their class rule. While politically dispossessing them, it was the orgy under which all the economic and social infamies of their *régime* got full sway. The middling bourgeoisie and the petty middle class were by their economical conditions of life excluded from initiating a new revolution and induced to follow in the track of the ruling classes or [to become] the followers of the working class. The peasants were the passive economical basis of the Second Empire, of that last triumph of a *State* separate of and independent from society. Only the proletarians, fired by a new social task to accomplish by them for all society, to do away with all classes and class rule, were the men to break the instrument of that class rule – the State, the centralized and organized governmental power usurping to be the master instead of the servant of society. In the active struggle against them by the ruling classes, supported by the passive adherence of the peasantry, the Second Empire, the last crowning at the same time as the most signal prostitution of the State – which had taken the place of the medieval Church – had been engendered. It had sprung into life against them. By them it was broken, not as a peculiar form of governmental (centralized) power, but as its most powerful expression, elaborated into seeming independence from society, and, therefore, also its most prostitute reality, covered by infamy from top to bottom, having centred in absolute corruption at home and absolute powerlessness abroad.

But this one form of class rule had only broken down to make the Executive, the governmental State machinery the great and single object of attack to the revolution.

Parliamentarism in France had come to an end. Its last term and fullest sway was the Parliamentary Republic from May 1848 to the *coup d'état.* The Empire that killed it, was its own creation. Under the Empire with its *Corps législatif* and its Senate – in this form it has been reproduced in the military monarchies of Prussia and Austria – it had been a mere farce, a mere bywork of despotism in its crudest form. Parliamentarism then was dead in France and the workmen's revolution certainly was not to awaken it from this death.

The *Commune* – the reabsorption of the State power by society as its own living forces instead of as forces controlling and subduing it, by the popular masses themselves, forming their own force instead of the organized force of their suppression – the political form of their social emancipation, instead of the artificial force (appropriated by their oppressors) (their own force opposed to and organized against them) of society wielded for their oppression by their enemies. The form was simple like all great things. The reaction of former revolutions – the time wanted for all historical developments, and in the past always lost in all

revolutions, in the very days of popular triumph, whenever it had rendered its victorious arms, to be turned against itself – first by displacing the army by the National Guard.

> "For the first time since the 4th September the Republic is liberated from the *government of its enemies.* ... [It gives] to the city a national militia that defends the citizens against the power (the government) *instead of a permanent army that defends the government* against the citizens." (*Proclamation* of Central Committee of 22 March.)[

(The people had only to organize this militia on a national scale, to have done away with the standing armies; [this is] the first economical *condition sine qua* [*non*] for all social improvements, discarding at once this source of taxes and State debt, and this constant danger to government usurpation of class rule – of the regular class rule or an adventurer pretending to save all classes); at the same time the safest guarantee against foreign aggression and making in fact the costly military apparatus impossible in all other States; the emancipation of the peasant from the blood-tax and [from being] the most fertile source of all State taxation and State debts. Here [is] already the point in which the Commune is a *luck for the peasant*, the first word of his emancipation. With the "independent police" abolished, and its ruffians supplanted by servants of the Commune. The general suffrage, till now abused either for the parliamentary sanction of the Holy State Power, or a play[1] in the hands of the ruling classes, only employed by the people to sanction (choose the instruments of) parliamentary class rule once in many years, [is] adapted to its real purposes, to choose by the Communes their own functionaries of administration and initiation. [Dispelled is] the delusion as if administration and political governing were mysteries, transcendent functions only to be trusted to the hands of a trained caste – State parasites, richly-paid sycophants and sinecurists in the higher posts, absorbing the intelligence of the masses and turning them against themselves in the lower places of the hierarchy. Doing away with the State hierarchy altogether and replacing the haughteous masters of the people into [*read* by] always removable servants, a mock responsibility by a real responsibility, as they act continuously under public supervision. Paid like skilled workmen, 12 pounds a month, the highest salary not exceeding £240 a year, a salary somewhat more than 1/5, according to a great scientific authority, Professor Huxley, to satisfy a clerk for the Metropolitan School Board. The whole sham of State mysteries and State pretensions was done away [with] by a Commune, mostly consisting of simple working men, organizing the defence of Paris, carrying war against the praetorians of Bonaparte, securing the *approvisionnement* [supply] of that immense town, filling all the posts hitherto divided between government, police, and prefecture, doing their work publicly, simply, under the most difficult and complicated circumstances, and doing it, as Milton did his *Paradise Lost*, for a few pounds, acting in bright daylight, with no pretensions to infallibility, not hiding itself behind circumlocution offices, not ashamed to confess blunders by correcting them. Making in one order the public functions – military, administrative, political – *real workmen's functions*, instead of the hidden attributes of a trained caste; (keeping order in the turbulence of civil war and revolution) (initiating measures of general regeneration). Whatever the merits of the single measures of the Commune, its greatest measure was its own organization, extemporized with the foreign enemy at one door, and the class enemy at the other, proving by its life its vitality, confirming its thesis by its action. Its appearance was a victory over the victors of France. Captive Paris resumed by one bold spring the leadership of Europe, not depending on brute force, but by taking the lead of the social movement, by giving body to the aspirations of the working class of all countries.

With all the great towns organized into Communes after the model of Paris, no government could repress the movement by the surprise of sudden reaction. Even by this preparatory step the time of incubation, the guarantee of the movement, came. All France [would be] organized into self-working and self-governing Communes, the standing army replaced by the popular militias, the army of State parasites removed, the clerical hierarchy displaced by the schoolmaster, the State judge transformed into Communal organs, the suffrage for the national representation not a matter of sleight of hand for an all-powerful government but the deliberate expression of organized Communes, the State functions reduced to a few functions for general national purposes.

Such is the *Commune – the political form of the social emancipation*, of the liberation of labour from the usurpations (slaveholding) of the monopolists of the means of labour, created by the labourers themselves or forming the gift of nature. As the State machinery and parliamentarism are not the real life of the ruling classes, but only the organized general organs of their dominion, the political guarantees and forms and expressions of the old order of things, so the Commune is not the social movement of the working class and therefore of a general regeneration of mankind, but the organized means of action. The Commune does

[1] Probably an error for 'plaything'.

not [do] away with the class struggles, through which the working classes strive to [*read* for] the abolition of all classes and, therefore, of all classes [class rule] (because it does not represent a peculiar interest, it represents the liberation of "labour," that is the fundamental and natural condition of individual and social life which only by usurpation, fraud, and artificial contrivances can be shifted from the few upon the many), but it affords the rational medium in which that class struggle can run through its different phases in the most rational and humane way. It could start violent reactions and as violent revolutions. It begins the *emancipation of labour* – its great goal – by doing away with the unproductive and mischievous work of the State parasites, by cutting away the springs which sacrifice an immense portion of the national produce to the feeding of the State monster on the one side, by doing, on the other, the real work of administration, local and national, for working men's wages. It begins therefore with an immense saving, with economical reform as well as political transformation.

The Communal organization once firmly established on a national scale, the catastrophes it might still have to undergo, would be sporadic slaveholders' insurrections, which, while for a moment interrupting the work of peaceful progress, would only accelerate the movement, by putting the sword into the hands of the Social Revolution.

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24. Marx, The Civil War in France (final version)
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5. [The Paris Commune]

On the dawn of March 18, Paris arose to the thunder-burst of "Vive la Commune!" What is the Commune, that sphinx so tantalizing to the bourgeois mind?

"The proletarians of Paris," said the Central Committee in its manifesto of March 18, "amidst the failures and treasons of the ruling classes, have understood that the hour has struck for them to save the situation by taking into their own hands the direction of public affairs.... They have understood that it is their imperious duty, and their absolute right, to render themselves masters of their own destinies, by seizing upon the governmental power."

But the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.

The centralized state power, with its ubiquitous organs of standing army, police, bureaucracy, clergy, and judicature – organs wrought after the plan of a systematic and hierarchic division of labor – originates from the days of absolute monarchy, serving nascent middle class society as a mighty weapon in its struggle against feudalism. Still, its development remained clogged by all manner of medieval rubbish, seignorial rights, local privileges, municipal and guild monopolies, and provincial constitutions. The gigantic broom of the French Revolution of the 18th century swept away all these relics of bygone times, thus clearing simultaneously the social soil of its last hinderances to the superstructure of the modern state edifice raised under the First Empire, itself the offspring of the coalition wars of old semi-feudal Europe against modern France.

During the subsequent regimes, the government, placed under parliamentary control – that is, under the direct control of the propertied classes – became not only a hotbed of huge national debts and crushing taxes; with its irresistible allurements of place, pelf, and patronage, it became not only the bone of contention between the rival factions and adventurers of the ruling classes; but its political character changed simultaneously with the economic changes of society. At the same pace at which the progress of modern industry developed, widened, intensified the class antagonism between capital and labor, the state power assumed more and more the character of the national power of capital over labor, of a public force organized for social enslavement, of an engine of class despotism.

After every revolution marking a progressive phase in the class struggle, the purely repressive character of the state power stands out in bolder and bolder relief. The Revolution of 1830, resulting in the transfer of government from the landlords to the capitalists, transferred it from the more remote to the more direct antagonists of the working men. The bourgeois republicans, who, in the name of the February Revolution, took the state power, used it for the June [1848] massacres, in order to convince the working class that "social" republic means the republic entrusting their social subjection, and in order to convince the royalist bulk of the bourgeois and landlord class that they might safely leave the cares and emoluments of government to the bourgeois "republicans."

However, after their one heroic exploit of June, the bourgeois republicans had, from the front, to fall back to the rear of the "Party of Order" – a combination formed by all the rival fractions and factions of the appropriating classes. The proper form of their joint-stock government was the parliamentary republic, with Louis Bonaparte for its president. Theirs was a regime of avowed class terrorism and deliberate insult towards the "vile multitude."

If the parliamentary republic, as M. Thiers[1] said, "divided them [the different fractions of the ruling class] least", it opened an abyss between that class and the whole body of society outside their spare ranks. The restraints by which their own divisions had under former regimes still checked the state power, were removed by their union; and in view of the threatening upheaval of the proletariat, they now used that state power mercilessly and ostentatiously as the national war engine of capital against labor.

In their uninterrupted crusade against the producing masses, they were, however,

[1] Adolphe Thiers, head of the French government at the time of the Paris Commune.

bound not only to invest the executive with continually increased powers of repression, but at the same time to divest their own parliamentary stronghold – the National Assembly – one by one, of all its own means of defence against the Executive. The Executive, in the person of Louis Bonaparte, turned them out. The natural offspring of the "Party of Order" republic was the Second Empire.

The empire, with the coup d'etat for its birth certificate, universal suffrage for its sanction, and the sword for its sceptre, professed to rest upon the peasantry, the large mass of producers not directly involved in the struggle of capital and labor. It professed to save the working class by breaking down parliamentarism, and, with it, the undisguised subserviency of government to the propertied classes. It professed to save the propertied classes by upholding their economic supremacy over the working class; and, finally, it professed to unite all classes by reviving for all the chimera of national glory.

In reality, it was the only form of government possible at a time when the bourgeoisie had already lost, and the working class had not yet acquired, the faculty of ruling the nation. It was acclaimed throughout the world as the savior of society. Under its sway, bourgeois society, freed from political cares, attained a development unexpected even by itself. Its industry and commerce expanded to colossal dimensions; financial swindling celebrated cosmopolitan orgies; the misery of the masses was set off by a shameless display of gorgeous, meretricious and debased luxury. The state power, apparently soaring high above society and the very hotbed of all its corruptions. Its own rottenness, and the rottenness of the society it had saved, were laid bare by the bayonet of Prussia, herself eagerly bent upon transferring the supreme seat of that regime from Paris to Berlin. Imperialism is, at the same time, the most prostitute and the ultimate form of the state power which nascent middle class society had commenced to elaborate as a means of its own emancipation from feudalism, and which full-grown bourgeois society had finally transformed into a means for the enslavement of labor by capital.

The direct antithesis to the empire was the Commune. The cry of "social republic," with which the February Revolution was ushered in by the Paris proletariat, did but express a vague aspiration after a republic that was not only to supercede the monarchical form of class rule, but class rule itself. The Commune was the positive form of that republic.

Paris, the central seat of the old governmental power, and, at the same time, the social stronghold of the French working class, had risen in arms against the attempt of Thiers and the Rurals to restore and perpetuate that old governmental power bequeathed to them by the empire. Paris could resist only because, in consequence of the siege, it had got rid of the army, and replaced it by a National Guard, the bulk of which consisted of working men. This fact was now to be transformed into an institution. The first decree of the Commune, therefore, was the suppression of the standing army, and the substitution for it of the armed people.

The Commune was formed of the municipal councillors, chosen by universal suffrage in the various wards of the town, responsible and revocable at short terms. The majority of its members were naturally working men, or acknowledged representatives of the working class. The Commune was to be a working, not a parliamentary body, executive and legislative at the same time.

Instead of continuing to be the agent of the Central Government, the police was at once stripped of its political attributes, and turned into the responsible, and at all times revocable, agent of the Commune. So were the officials of all other branches of the administration. From the members of the Commune downwards, the public service had to be done at *workman's wage*. The vested interests and the representation allowances of the high dignitaries of state disappeared along with the high dignitaries themselves. Public functions ceased to be the private property of the tools of the Central Government. Not only municipal administration, but the whole initiative hitherto exercised by the state was laid into the hands of the Commune.

Having once got rid of the standing army and the police – the physical force elements of the old government – the Commune was anxious to break the spiritual force of repression, the "parson-power", by the disestablishment and disendowment of all churches as proprietary bodies. The priests were sent back to the recesses of private life, there to feed upon the alms of the faithful in imitation of their predecessors, the apostles.

The whole of the educational institutions were opened to the people gratuitously, and at the same time cleared of all interference of church and state. Thus, not only was education made accessible to all, but science itself freed from the fetters which class prejudice and governmental force had imposed upon it.

The judicial functionaries were to be divested of that sham independence which had but served to mask their abject subserviency to all succeeding governments to which, in turn, they had taken, and broken, the oaths of allegiance. Like the rest of public servants, magistrates and judges were to be elective, responsible, and revocable.

The Paris Commune was, of course, to serve as a model to all the great industrial centres of France. The communal regime once established in Paris and the secondary centres, the old centralized government would in the provinces, too, have to give way to the self-government of the producers.

In a rough sketch of national organization, which the Commune had no time to develop, it states clearly that the Commune was to be the political form of even the smallest country hamlet, and that in the rural districts the standing army was to be replaced by a national militia, with an extremely short term of service. The rural communities of every district were to administer their common affairs by an assembly of delegates in the central town, and these district assemblies were again to send deputies to the National Delegation in Paris, each delegate to be at any time revocable and bound by the *mandat imperatif* (formal instructions) of his constituents. The few but important functions which would still remain for a central government were not to be suppressed, as has been intentionally misstated, but were to be discharged by Communal and thereafter responsible agents.

The unity of the nation was not to be broken, but, on the contrary, to be organized by Communal Constitution, and to become a reality by the destruction of the state power which claimed to be the embodiment of that unity independent of, and superior to, the nation itself, from which it was but a parasitic excresence.

While the merely repressive organs of the old governmental power were to be amputated, its legitimate functions were to be wrested from an authority usurping pre-eminence over society itself, and restored to the responsible agents of society. Instead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to misrepresent the people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people, constituted in Communes, as individual suffrage serves every other employer in the search for the workmen and managers in his business. And it is well-known that companies, like individuals, in matters of real business generally know how to put the right man in the right place, and, if they for once make a mistake, to redress it promptly. On the other hand, nothing could be more foreign to the spirit of the Commune than to supercede universal suffrage by hierarchical investiture.[2]

It is generally the fate of completely new historical creations to be mistaken for the counterparts of older, and even defunct, forms of social life, to which they may bear a certain likeness. Thus, this new Commune, which breaks with the modern state power, has been mistaken for a reproduction of the medieval Communes, which first preceded, and afterward became the substratum of, that very state power. The Communal Constitution has been mistaken for an attempt to break up into the federation of small states, as dreamt of by Montesquieu and the Girondins,[3] that unity of great nations which, if originally brought about by political force, has now become a powerful coefficient of social production. The antagonism of the Commune against the state power has been mistaken for an exaggerated form of the ancient struggle against over-centralization. Peculiar historical circumstances may have prevented the classical development, as in France, of the bourgeois form of government, and may have allowed, as in England, to complete the great central state organs by corrupt vestries, jobbing councillors, and ferocious poor-law guardians in the towns, and virtually hereditary magistrates in the counties.

The Communal Constitution would have restored to the social body all the forces hitherto absorbed by the state parasite feeding upon, and clogging the free movement of, society. By this one act, it would have initiated the regeneration of France.

The provincial French middle class saw in the Commune an attempt to restore the sway their order had held over the country under Louis Philippe, and which, under Louis Napoleon, was supplanted by the pretended rule of the country over the towns. In reality, the Communal Constitution brought the rural producers under the intellectual lead of the central towns of their districts, and there secured to them, in the working men, the natural trustees of their interests. The very existence of the Commune involved, as a matter of course, local municipal liberty, but no longer as a check upon the now superseded state power. It could only enter into the head of a Bismarck – who, when not engaged on his intrigues of blood and iron, always likes to resume his old trade, so befitting his mental calibre, of contributor to *Kladderadatsch* (the Berlin *Punch*)[4] – it could only enter into such a head to ascribe to the Paris Commune aspirations after the caricature of the old French municipal organization of 1791, the Prussian municipal constitution which degrades the town governments to mere secondary wheels in the police machinery of the Prussian state. The Commune made that catchword of bourgeois revolutions – cheap government – a reality by destroying the two greatest sources of

[2] A top-down system of appointing officials.

[3] A party during the French Revolution.

[4] A satirical magazine.

expenditure: the standing army and state functionarism. Its very existence presupposed the non-existence of monarchy, which, in Europe at least, is the normal incumbrance and indispensable cloak of class rule. It supplied the republic with the basis of really democratic institutions. But neither cheap government nor the "true republic" was its ultimate aim; they were its mere concomitants.

The multiplicity of interpretations to which the Commune has been subjected, and the multiplicity of interests which construed it in their favor, show that it was a thoroughly expansive political form, while all the previous forms of government had been emphatically repressive. Its true secret was this:

It was essentially a working class government, the product of the struggle of the producing against the appropriating class, the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economical emancipation of labor.[5]

Except on this last condition, the Communal Constitution would have been an impossibility and a delusion. The political rule of the producer cannot co-exist with the perpetuation of his social slavery. The Commune was therefore to serve as a lever for uprooting the economical foundation upon which rests the existence of classes, and therefore of class rule. With labor emancipated, every man becomes a working man, and productive labor ceases to be a class attribute.

It is a strange fact. In spite of all the tall talk and all the immense literature, for the last 60 years, about emancipation of labor, no sooner do the working men anywhere take the subject into their own hands with a will, than uprises at once all the apologetic phraseology of the mouthpieces of present society with its two poles of capital and wages-slavery (the landlord now is but the sleeping partner of the capitalist), as if the capitalist society was still in its purest state of virgin innocence, with its antagonisms still undeveloped, with its delusions still unexploded, with its prostitute realities not yet laid bare. The Commune, they exclaim, intends to abolish property, the basis of all civilization!

Yes, gentlemen, the Commune intended to abolish that class property which makes the labor of the many the wealth of the few. It aimed at the expropriation of the expropriators. It wanted to make individual property a truth by transforming the means of production, land, and capital, now chiefly the means of enslaving and exploiting labor, into mere instruments of free and associated labor. But this is communism, "impossible" communism! Why, those members of the ruling classes who are intelligent enough to perceive the impossibility of continuing the present system – and they are many – have become the obtrusive and full-mouthed apostles of co-operative production. If co-operative production is not to remain a sham and a snare; if it is to supersede the capitalist system; if united co-operative societies are to regulate national production upon common plan, thus taking it under their own control, and putting an end to the constant anarchy and periodical convulsions which are the fatality of capitalist production – what else, gentlemen, would it be but communism, "possible" communism?

The working class did not expect miracles from the Commune. They have no ready-made utopias to introduce *par decret du peuple*[6]. They know that in order to work out their own emancipation, and along with it that higher form to which present society is irresistably tending by its own economical agencies, they will have to pass through long struggles, through a series of historic processes, transforming circumstances and men. They have no ideals to realize, but to set free the elements of the new society with which old collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant. In the full consciousness of their historic mission, and with the heroic resolve to act up to it, the working class can afford to smile at the coarse invective of the gentlemen's gentlemen with pen and inkhorn, and at the didactic patronage of well-wishing bourgeois-doctrinaires, pouring forth their ignorant platitudes and sectarian crotchets in the oracular tone of scientific infallibility.

When the Paris Commune took the management of the revolution in its own hands; when plain working men for the first time dared to infringe upon the governmental privilege of their "natural superiors," and, under circumstances of unexampled difficulty, performed it at salaries the highest of which barely amounted to one-fifth what, according to high scientific authority, is the minimum required for a secretary to a certain metropolitan school-board – the old world writhed in convulsions of rage at the sight of the Red Flag, the symbol of the Republic of Labor, floating over the Hotel de Ville.

And yet, this was the first revolution in which the working class was openly acknowledged as the only class capable of social initiative, even by the great bulk

[5] In his 1891 Introduction to *The Civil War in France* Engels wrote: 'Of late, the Social-Democratic philistine has once more been filled with wholesome terror at the words: Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Well and good, gentlemen, do you want to know what this dictatorship looks like? Look at the Paris Commune. That was the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.'

[6] by the people's decree.

of the Paris middle class – shopkeepers, tradesmen, merchants – the wealthy capitalist alone excepted. The Commune had saved them by a sagacious settlement of that ever recurring cause of dispute among the middle class themselves – the debtor and creditor accounts.[7] The same portion of the middle class, after they had assisted in putting down the working men's insurrection of June 1848, had been at once unceremoniously sacrificed to their creditors by the then Constituent Assembly. But this was not their only motive for now rallying around the working class. They felt there was but one alternative – the Commune, or the empire – under whatever name it might reappear. The empire had ruined them economically by the havoc it made of public wealth, by the wholesale financial swindling it fostered, by the props it lent to the artificially accelerated centralization of capital, and the concomitant expropriation of their own ranks. It had suppressed them politically, it had shocked them morally by its orgies, it had insulted their Voltairianism by handing over the education of their children to the *fréres Ignorantins*,[8] it had revolted their national feeling as Frenchmen by precipitating them headlong into a war which left only one equivalent for the ruins it made – the disappearance of the empire. In fact, after the exodus from Paris of the high Bonapartist and capitalist *boheme*, the true middle class Party of Order came out in the shape of the "Union Republicaine", enrolling themselves under the colors of the Commune and defending it against the wilful misconstructions of Thiers. Whether the gratitude of this great body of the middle class will stand the present severe trial, time must show.

The Commune was perfectly right in telling the peasants that "its victory was their only hope". Of all the lies hatched at Versailles and re-echoed by the glorious European penny-a-liner, one of the most tremendous was that the Rurals represented the French peasantry. Think only of the love of the French peasant for the men to whom, after 1815, he had to pay the milliard indemnity.[9] In the eyes of the French peasant, the very existence of a great landed proprietor is in itself an encroachment on his conquests of 1789. The bourgeois, in 1848, had burdened his plot of land with the additional tax of 45 cents, in the franc; but then he did so in the name of the revolution; while now he had fomented a civil war against revolution, to shift on to the peasant's shoulders the chief load of the 5 milliards of indemnity to be paid to the Prussian. The Commune, on the other hand, in one of its first proclamations, declared that the true originators of the war would be made to pay its cost. The Commune would have delivered the peasant of the blood tax – would have given him a cheap government – transformed his present blood-suckers, the notary, advocate, executor, and other judicial vampires, into salaried communal agents, elected by, and responsible to, himself. It would have freed him of the tyranny of the *garde champetre*,[10] the gendarme, and the prefect; would have put enlightenment by the schoolmaster in the place of stultification by the priest. And the French peasant is, above all, a man of reckoning. He would find it extremely reasonable that the pay of the priest, instead of being extorted by the tax-gatherer, should only depend upon the spontaneous action of the parishioners' religious instinct. Such were the great immediate boons which the rule of the Commune – and that rule alone – held out to the French peasantry. It is, therefore, quite superfluous here to expatiate upon the more complicated but vital problems which the Commune alone was able, and at the same time compelled, to solve in favor of the peasant – viz., the hypothecary debt, lying like an incubus upon his parcel of soil, the *prolétariat foncier* (the rural proletariat), daily growing upon it, and his expropriation from it enforced, at a more and more rapid rate, by the very development of modern agriculture and the competition of capitalist farming.

The French peasant had elected Louis Bonaparte president of the Republic; but the Party of Order created the empire. What the French peasant really wants he commenced to show in 1849 and 1850, by opposing his *maire* to the government's prefect, his school-master to the government's priest, and himself to the government's gendarme. All the laws made by the Party of Order in January and February 1850 were avowed measures of repression against the peasant. The peasant was a Bonapartist, because the Great Revolution, with all its benefits to him, was, in his eyes, personified in Napoleon. This delusion, rapidly breaking down under the Second Empire (and in its very nature hostile to the Rurals), this prejudice of the past, how could it have withstood the appeal of the Commune to the living interests and urgent wants of the peasantry?

The Rurals – this was, in fact, their chief apprehension – knew that three months' free communication of Communal Paris with the provinces would bring about a

[7] The Paris Commune decreed that all debts should be paid off over three years and abolished interest on them.

[8] Nickname for a religious order that was supposedly dedicated to children's education.

[9] A law of 1825 requiring that landowners whose estates had been confiscated in the French Revolution be compensated.

[10] Rural policeman.

general rising of the peasants, and hence their anxiety to establish a police blockade around Paris, so as to stop the spread of the rinderpest [cattle pest].

If the Commune was thus the true representative of all the healthy elements of French society, and therefore the truly national government, it was, at the same time, as a working men's government, as the bold champion of the emancipation of labor, emphatically international. Within sight of that Prussian army, that had annexed to Germany two French provinces, the Commune annexed to France the working people all over the world.

The Second Empire had been the jubilee of cosmopolitan blackleggism, the rakes of all countries rushing in at its call for a share in its orgies and in the plunder of the French people. Even at this moment, the right hand of Thiers is Ganessco, the foul Wallachian, and his left hand is Markovsky, the Russian spy. The Commune admitted all foreigners to the honor of dying for an immortal cause. Between the foreign war lost by their treason, and the civil war fomented by their conspiracy with the foreign invader, the bourgeoisie had found the time to display their patriotism by organizing police hunts upon the Germans in France. The Commune made a German working man [Leo Frankel] its Minister of Labor. Thiers, the bourgeoisie, the Second Empire, had continually deluded Poland by loud professions of sympathy, while in reality betraying her to, and doing the dirty work of, Russia. The Commune honored the heroic sons of Poland [J. Dabrowski and W. Wróblewski] by placing them at the head of the defenders of Paris. And, to broadly mark the new era of history it was conscious of initiating, under the eyes of the conquering Prussians on one side, and the Bonapartist army, led by Bonapartist generals, on the other, the Commune pulled down that colossal symbol of martial glory, the Vendôme Column.[11]

The great social measure of the Commune was its own working existence. Its special measures could but betoken the tendency of a government of the people by the people. Such were the abolition of the nightwork of journeymen bakers; the prohibition, under penalty, of the employers' practice to reduce wages by levying upon their workpeople fines under manifold pretexts – a process in which the employer combines in his own person the parts of legislator, judge, and executor, and filches the money to boot. Another measure of this class was the surrender to associations of workmen, under reserve of compensation, of all closed workshops and factories, no matter whether the respective capitalists had absconded or preferred to strike work.

The financial measures of the Commune, remarkable for their sagacity and moderation, could only be such as were compatible with the state of a besieged town. Considering the colossal robberies committed upon the city of Paris by the great financial companies and contractors, under the protection of Haussman,[12] the Commune would have had an incomparably better title to confiscate their property than Louis Napoleon had against the Orleans family. The Hohenzollern and the English oligarchs, who both have derived a good deal of their estates from church plunders, were, of course, greatly shocked at the Commune clearing but 8,000f out of secularization.

[…]

Wonderful, indeed, was the change the Commune had wrought in Paris! No longer any trace of the meretricious Paris of the Second Empire! No longer was Paris the rendezvous of British landlords, Irish absentees,[13] American ex-slaveholders and shoddy men, Russian ex-serfowners, and Wallachian boyards. No more corpses at the morgue, no nocturnal burglaries, scarcely any robberies; in fact, for the first time since the days of February 1848, the streets of Paris were safe, and that without any police of any kind.

"We," said a member of the Commune, "hear no longer of assassination, theft, and personal assault; it seems indeed as if the police had dragged along with it to Versailles all its Conservative friends."

The *cocottes* had refound the scent of their protectors – the absconding men of family, religion, and, above all, of property. In their stead, the real women of Paris showed again at the surface – heroic, noble, and devoted, like the women of antiquity. Working, thinking fighting, bleeding Paris – almost forgetful, in its incubation of a new society, of the Cannibals at its gates – radiant in the enthusiasm of its historic initiative!

[…]

[11] The Vendôme Column built in honour of Napoleon's victories in 1806-10. It was pulled down by the Paris Commune.

[12] A former Prefect of one of the departments of Paris.

[13] I.e. absentee landlords.

25. Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme
1875
Source: http://marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/index.htm
From Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Volume Three (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1970), p. 13-30

Part 1 (excerpt)

3. "The emancipation of labor demands the promotion of the instruments of labor to the common property of society and the co-operative regulation of the total labor, with a fair distribution of the proceeds of labor.

"Promotion of the instruments of labor to the common property" ought obviously to read their "conversion into the common property"; but this is only passing.

What are the "proceeds of labor"? The product of labor, or its value? And in the latter case, is it the total value of the product, or only that part of the value which labor has newly added to the value of the means of production consumed?

"Proceeds of labor" is a loose notion which Lassalle has put in the place of definite economic conceptions.

What is "a fair distribution"?

Do not the bourgeois assert that the present-day distribution is "fair"? And is it not, in fact, the only "fair" distribution on the basis of the present-day mode of production? Are economic relations regulated by legal conceptions, or do not, on the contrary, legal relations arise out of economic ones? Have not also the socialist sectarians the most varied notions about "fair" distribution?

To understand what is implied in this connection by the phrase "fair distribution", we must take the first paragraph and this one together. The latter presupposes a society wherein the instruments of labor are common property and the total labor is co-operatively regulated, and from the first paragraph we learn that "the proceeds of labor belong undiminished with equal right to all members of society."

"To all members of society"? To those who do not work as well? What remains then of the "undiminished" proceeds of labor? Only to those members of society who work? What remains then of the "equal right" of all members of society?

But "all members of society" and "equal right" are obviously mere phrases. The kernel consists in this, that in this communist society every worker must receive the "undiminished" Lassallean "proceeds of labor".

Let us take, first of all, the words "proceeds of labor" in the sense of the product of labor; then the co-operative proceeds of labor are the *total social product*.

From this must now be deducted: *First*, cover for replacement of the means of production used up. *Second*, additional portion for expansion of production. *Third*, reserve or insurance funds to provide against accidents, dislocations caused by natural calamities, etc.

These deductions from the "undiminished" proceeds of labor are an economic necessity, and their magnitude is to be determined according to available means and forces, and partly by computation of probabilities, but they are in no way calculable by equity.

There remains the other part of the total product, intended to serve as means of consumption.

Before this is divided among the individuals, there has to be deducted again, from it: *First*, the general costs of administration not belonging to production. This part will, from the outset, be very considerably restricted in comparison with present-day society, and it diminishes in proportion as the new society develops. *Second*, that which is intended for the common satisfaction of needs, such as schools, health services, etc. From the outset, this part grows considerably in comparison with present-day society, and it grows in proportion as the new society develops. *Third*, funds for those unable to work, etc., in short, for what is included under so-called official poor relief today.

Only now do we come to the "distribution" which the program, under Lassallean influence, alone has in view in its narrow fashion – namely, to that part of the means of consumption which is divided among the individual producers of the co-operative society.

The "undiminished" proceeds of labor have already unnoticeably become converted into the "diminished" proceeds, although what the producer is deprived of in his capacity as a private individual benefits him directly or indirectly in his capacity as a member of society.

Just as the phrase of the "undiminished" proceeds of labor has disappeared, so now does the phrase of the "proceeds of labor" disappear altogether.

Within the co-operative society based on common ownership of the means of production, the producers do not exchange their products; just as little does the labor employed on the products appear here as the *value* of these products, as a material

quality possessed by them, since now, in contrast to capitalist society, individual labor no longer exists in an indirect fashion but directly as a component part of total labor. The phrase “proceeds of labor”, objectionable also today on account of its ambiguity, thus loses all meaning.

What we have to deal with here is a communist society, not as it has *developed* on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, just as it *emerges* from capitalist society; which is thus in every respect, economically, morally, and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges. Accordingly, the individual producer receives back from society – after the deductions have been made – exactly what he gives to it. What he has given to it is his individual quantum of labor. For example, the social working day consists of the sum of the individual hours of work; the individual labor time of the individual producer is the part of the social working day contributed by him, his share in it. He receives a certificate from society that he has furnished such-and-such an amount of labor (after deducting his labor for the common funds); and with this certificate, he draws from the social stock of means of consumption as much as the same amount of labor cost. The same amount of labor which he has given to society in one form, he receives back in another.

Here, obviously, the same principle prevails as that which regulates the exchange of commodities, as far as this is exchange of equal values. Content and form are changed, because under the altered circumstances no one can give anything except his labor, and because, on the other hand, nothing can pass to the ownership of individuals, except individual means of consumption. But as far as the distribution of the latter among the individual producers is concerned, the same principle prevails as in the exchange of commodity equivalents: a given amount of labor in one form is exchanged for an equal amount of labor in another form.

Hence, *equal right* here is still in principle – *bourgeois right*, although principle and practice are no longer at loggerheads, while the exchange of equivalents in commodity exchange exists only on the average and not in the individual case.

In spite of this advance, this equal right is still constantly stigmatized by a bourgeois limitation. The right of the producers is *proportional* to the labor they supply; the equality consists in the fact that measurement is made with an *equal standard*, labor.

But one man is superior to another physically, or mentally, and supplies more labor in the same time, or can labor for a longer time; and labor, to serve as a measure, must be defined by its duration or intensity, otherwise it ceases to be a standard of measurement. This *equal* right is an unequal right for unequal labor. It recognizes no class differences, because everyone is only a worker like everyone else; but it tacitly recognizes unequal individual endowment, and thus productive capacity, as a natural privilege. It is, therefore, a right of inequality, in its content, like every right. Right, by its very nature, can consist only in the application of an equal standard; but unequal individuals (and they would not be different individuals if they were not unequal) are measurable only by an equal standard insofar as they are brought under an equal point of view, are taken from one definite side only – for instance, in the present case, are regarded *only as workers* and nothing more is seen in them, everything else being ignored. Further, one worker is married, another is not; one has more children than another, and so on and so forth. Thus, with an equal performance of labor, and hence an equal in the social consumption fund, one will in fact receive more than another, one will be richer than another, and so on. To avoid all these defects, right, instead of being equal, would have to be unequal.

But these defects are inevitable in the first phase of communist society as it is when it has just emerged after prolonged birth pangs from capitalist society. Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and its cultural development conditioned thereby.

In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labor, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labor, has vanished; after labor has become not only a means of life but life’s prime want; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-around development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly – only then then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!

I have dealt more at length with the “undiminished” proceeds of labor, on the one hand, and with “equal right” and “fair distribution”, on the other, in order to show what a crime it is to attempt, on the one hand, to force on our Party again, as dogmas, ideas which in a certain period had some meaning but have now become obsolete verbal rubbish, while again perverting, on the other, the realistic outlook, which it cost so much effort to instill into the Party but which has now taken root in it, by means of ideological nonsense about right and other trash so common among the democrats and French socialists.

Quite apart from the analysis so far given, it was in general a mistake to make a fuss about so-called distribution and put the principal stress on it.

Any distribution whatever of the means of consumption is only a consequence of the distribution of the conditions of production themselves. The latter distribution, however, is a feature of the mode of production itself. The capitalist mode of production, for example, rests on the fact that the material conditions of production are in the hands of nonworkers in the form of property in capital and land, while the masses are only owners of the personal condition of production, of labor power. If the elements of production are so distributed, then the present-day distribution of the means of consumption results automatically. If the material conditions of production are the co-operative property of the workers themselves, then there likewise results a distribution of the means of consumption different from the present one. Vulgar socialism (and from it in turn a section of the democrats) has taken over from the bourgeois economists the consideration and treatment of distribution as independent of the mode of production and hence the presentation of socialism as turning principally on distribution. After the real relation has long been made clear, why retrogress again?

[…]

Part 4

I come now to the democratic section.

A. "The free basis of the state."

First of all, according to II, the German Workers' party strives for "the free state".

Free state – what is this?

It is by no means the aim of the workers, who have got rid of the narrow mentality of humble subjects, to set the state free. In the German Empire, the "state" is almost as "free" as in Russia. Freedom consists in converting the state from an organ superimposed upon society into one completely subordinate to it; and today, too, the forms of state are more free or less free to the extent that they restrict the "freedom of the state".

The German Workers' party – at least if it adopts the program – shows that its socialist ideas are not even skin-deep; in that, instead of treating existing society (and this holds good for any future one) as the *basis* of the existing state (or of the future state in the case of future society), it treats the state rather as an independent entity that possesses its own intellectual, ethical, and libertarian bases.

And what of the riotous misuse which the program makes of the words "present-day state", "present-day society", and of the still more riotous misconception it creates in regard to the state to which it addresses its demands?

"Present-day society" is capitalist society, which exists in all civilized countries, more or less free from medieval admixture, more or less modified by the particular historical development of each country, more or less developed. On the other hand, the "present-day state" changes with a country's frontier. It is different in the Prusso-German Empire from what it is in Switzerland, and different in England from what it is in the United States. The "present-day state" is therefore a fiction.

Nevertheless, the different states of the different civilized countries, in spite or their motley diversity of form, all have this in common: that they are based on modern bourgeois society, only one more or less capitalistically developed. They have, therefore, also certain essential characteristics in common. In this sense, it is possible to speak of the "present-day state" in contrast with the future, in which its present root, bourgeois society, will have died off.

The question then arises: What transformation will the state undergo in communist society? In other words, what social functions will remain in existence there that are analogous to present state functions? This question can only be answered scientifically, and one does not get a flea-hop nearer to the problem by a thousand-fold combination of the word 'people' with the word 'state'.

Between capitalist and communist society there lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but *the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat*.

Now the program does not deal with this nor with the future state of communist society.

Its political demands contain nothing beyond the old democratic litany familiar to all: universal suffrage, direct legislation, popular rights, a people's militia, etc. They are a mere echo of the bourgeois People's party, of the League of Peace and Freedom. They are all demands which, insofar as they are not exaggerated in fantastic presentation, have already been *realized*. Only the state to which they belong does not lie within the borders of the German Empire, but in Switzerland, the United States, etc. This sort of "state of the future" is a present-day state, although existing outside the "framework" of the German Empire.

[…]