Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter

A Publication of the Howard and Edna Hong Kierkegaard Library

St. Olaf College Northfield, Minnesota

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CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENT

The Hong Kierkegaard Library will hold its fourth international conference from June 9-13, 2001 at St. Olaf College. The themes of the conference will be: Kierkegaard and Hermeneutics and Kierkegaard and Communication. Professor Alastair Hannay of the University of Oslo will offer the keynote address. Papers are to have a reading length, which will be strictly applied, of 20 minutes.

We are also planning to hold a dissertation panel discussion in which scholars who are in the process of writing or who have just completed their dissertations will summarize their research.

The Seminario Ibero-americano: Escritos de Søren Kierkegaard (Spanish Translation Seminar) will once again meet during the conference. Discussion of aspects relevant to the translation of the second and third published volumes of *Escritos, O bien o bien I* and *II,* and also of issues concerning the content of these works will be the focus of the Seminar. (Both volumes are expected to be available in Spring 2001.)

More detailed registration information will be sent out in a special mailing in October 2000, however at this point in time we expect that the total costs for attending the conference (not including any transportation costs) to be no more than $250. (Room and board charges for one night/3 meals for a single person in a single air-conditioned room are about $50.) Please watch for later information regarding details of conference costs and registration. The final registration deadline for the conference is likely to be May 15, 2001 but advance notice of your interest would be appreciated.

To submit a paper or dissertation discussion proposal please send two copies of either the complete paper or a detailed abstract by February 15, 2001. (Note this is a month earlier than the deadline printed in the last issue of the newsletter.) Complete papers must be submitted by April 1, 2001. Anyone interested in acting as a commentator should also let me know.

Gordon Marino - Curator
Howard and Edna Hong Kierkegaard Library
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NEWS FROM THE HONG KIERKEGAARD LIBRARY

Submitted by Cynthia Wales Lund, Assistant Curator. Email: lundc@stolaf.edu. Tel. 507-646-3846, Fax 507-646-3858.

SCHOLARS PROGRAM 2000

Jyrki Kivela (University of Helsinki, Finland), Andrew Burgess (University of New Mexico) and Anthony Rudd (University of Hertfordshire, England) were visiting scholars in the Library this past spring. Vidar Lande (Summer Fellow 1984) returned to the Library for a visit in March from Fessheim, Norway.

The Library is welcoming 18 scholars between June and October as participants in our Summer Fellowship Program. Fellows for 2000 are: Juan De Pascuale (Kenyon College), Myron Penner (University of Edinburgh,Scotland and Liberty University), Brian Barlow (Brenau University), Sean Blenkinsop (Harvard University), Javier Galan Octavio de Toledo (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain), Adam English (Baylor University), Rebecca Jiggens (University of Hertfordshire, England), Karel Eisses (Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht, The Netherlands), Oscar Parcero Oubiña (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, Spain), Manuel Fraga (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal), Lisa Hess (Princeton Theological Seminary), Dolors Perarnau Vidal (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain), Beate Kramer (Bielefeld, Germany), Michael Bielmeier (Silver Lake College), Sean Mickelson (University of Waterloo, Canada), Wayne Mayhall (Bethel Seminary, St. Paul), Joe Holt (Bethel Seminary, St. Paul).

THE KIERKEGAARD LIBRARY FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM, 2001

Summer fellowships for research in residence are offered to scholars for use of the collection between June 1 and November 15. The awards include campus housing and a $250.00 per month stipend.

To apply for a fellowship, send a letter outlining your proposed research project and reasons for wanting to use the collection, along with a vitae or other description of qualifications. Two academic letters of recommendation are also requested. The application deadline is March 15, 2001. To apply, send materials and letter to:

Gordon Marino, Curator
Howard and Edna Hong Kierkegaard Library
St. Olaf College
1510 St. Olaf Avenue
Northfield, MN 55057-1097

SPECIAL EVENTS

The Kierkegaard Library, together with the Philosophy Department and the Boldt Chair in the Humanities at St. Olaf College, sponsored a lecture by Paul Holmer entitled "C.S. Lewis and the Grammar of Life" on Wednesday, February 9, 2000. This lecture was given in honor of Professor Emeritus William H.K. Narum. This event also marked the beginning of a special C.S. Lewis collection within the Kierkegaard Library with initial contributions given by Paul Holmer, William H.K. Narum, and Sherman Johnsrud.

Bill Narum died on Tuesday, May 23, 2000 after a long struggle with cancer. He was 78 years of age. Professor Narum began teaching in the Department of Philosophy at St. Olaf in 1947 and continued teaching even after his retirement. He was instrumental in the founding of the Kierkegaard Library and served on the Kierkegaard Library Committee. He also played an important role in the establishment of the Paracollege at St. Olaf and in the curricular change of the 1990's among many other efforts. A service in remembrance of the life of William H.K. Narum took place at St. John's Lutheran Church in Northfield on June 1, 2000. Bill Narum was a great friend of the Hong/Kierkegaard Library and we will miss him dearly.

NEW ACQUISITIONS

Aproximately 250 new titles were acquired since January 2000.

We would like to thank the following scholars and friends for their contributions to the Library: Andrew Burgess, Michael Bielmeier, Hans Aaen, Hugh Pyper, Leo Stan, Ricardo Gouvea, Valborg Mohn, The Norwegian-American Historical Society, Narum family, Howard Hong, Gordon Marino, Begonya Saez Tajafuerce, Rafael Larreñeta, Karel Eisses, Mrs. J. Berends-van Bolhuis, Peter Vogelsang and Rolvaag Memorial Library. The Hong Kierkegaard Library strongly encourages

the donation of books and articles on Kierkegaard and related thinkers to add to its collections and to share with other libraries and scholars. Gift books are so indicated with a special donor bookplate.

The Kierkegaard Library gratefully acknowledges the generous gift of the Narum family of volumes from Bill Narum's personal libray to its collections. Notable new acquisitions include Romanian editions of E.M. Cioran; Hungarian editions of Gyorgy Lukacs and Agnes Heller; further titles by Simone Weil, Walter Benjamin, D.Z. Phillips, and Paul Tillich. An additional first edition of Kierkegaard and several titles listed in the Rohde guide to Kierkegaard's Library were also acquired as well as additional copies of volumes of *The International Kierkegaard Commentary*. A substantial collection of Danish newspaper articles was donated by Hans Aaen for addition to our newspaper article file.

PROGRESS IN THE ARCHIVES, THE CATALOG, AND COLLECTION PRESERVATION

Organization of our newspaper article file has been completed making it easier to process and organize newly donated clippings. This collection offers valuable insight into the public reception and understanding of Kierkegaard over time. At present, the majority of articles are from Danish newspapers. Additions welcome in all languages.

Establishment of the Archives progresses slowly. Donations of documentary materials related to the Kierkegaard Library or Kierkegaard studies worldwide are welcome including manuscripts, pictorial materials, proceedings of societies, biographical materials about Kierkegaard scholars, etc.

PUBLICATIONS

The Library sponsors the publication of an undergraduate journal of existential thought, *The Reed*. This journal, which is now in its fourth year of publication, includes scholarly essays, short stories, and poetry. Those interested in either submitting to this journal or in receiving a copy should contact Gordon Marino.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Completion of *Kierkegaard's Writings:* Anthology Published

Howard Hong announced the completion of *Kierkegaard's Writings*, published by Princeton University Press, on May 27, 2000 in the Kierkegaard Library having received that week his copy of Volume 26, *Cumulative Index*. The first volume of *KW* to be published was *Kierkegaard: Letters and Documents* in 1978. The publication of 25 volumes of *KW* was celebrated at the Danish Embassy in Washington, D.C. in May of 1998.

The Essential Kierkegaard, an anthology of significant entries from *Kierkegaard's Writings*, complied by Edna and Howard Hong, was received by the Library during the first week of June, 2000.

To order any of the volumes of *Kierkegaard's Writings* or *The Essential Kierkegaard,* contact Princeton University Press at orders@cpfs.pupress.princeton.edu. For further information consult their website at http://www.pup.princeton.edu.

Publications of the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, Copenhagen

Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter

Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Director of the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, Copenhagen, reports that the first volume with texts from Kierkegaard's journals will be published as Volume 17 in *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter* on November 10, 2000. This volume will contain the early journals marked by SK as AA, BB, CC and DD from the period 1833-1830. (AA contains the famous Gilleleje entries).

Volume 17A will be published with volume 17 at the same time. In addition to descriptions of the manuscripts, including discussion of dating of the journals, these volumes will offer 2700 commentaries related to the texts presented.

Volume 18, which will include the journals EE, FF, GG, HH, JJ, and KK, from the period 1839-1846, is expected to be published in the spring of 2001.

To obtain volumes of the *Skrifter*, contact G.E.C. Gad Publishers at sekr@gads-forlag.dk or check their website at http://www.gads-forlag.dk.

Kierkegaard Studies: Yearbook

Yearbook 2000 will be out in August of this year. This yearbook is specifically dedicated to the edifying discourses from 1834-1844 and *Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions.* It features articles from leading international scholars on various aspects of these discourses, which are explored from literary, philosophical, and theological perspectives.

Kierkegaard Studies: Monograph Series

Two new volumes will come out in August 2000: Volume 4 by Ulrich Lincoln Äusserung entitled *Studien zum Handlungsbegriff in Søren Kierkegaards Die Taten der Liebe,* and Volume 5 by Niels Nymann Eriksen entitled *Kierkegaard's Category of Repetition: A Reconstruction.*

For information on these series, consult DeGruyter's website at http://www.degruyter.com.

From *International Kierkegaard Commentary* Editor

All correspondence for the series should now be addressed to: Robert L. Perkins, 225 South Boundary Avenue, DeLand, FL 32370 USA. The phone number is 904-734-6457. Email remains the same: rperkins@stetson.edu. Fax remains the same: 904-822-7582.

> *For Self-Examination* and *Judge for Yourself!* The papers for this volume are due January 2001. Persons planning to submit papers for consideration should write to the editor as soon as possible. Two papers have already arrived.
>
> *The Concept of Irony.* Papers for this volume are currently under review by the Advisory Board and the editor.
>
> *Stages on Life's Way.* Galleys of the selected articles are being proofread by the authors and editor. They are also compiling the index.

Readers of the *Newsletter* are requested to check to insure that their institutional libraries subscribe to the *International Kierkegaard Commentary.*

Publication of *Escritos de Søren Kierkegaard (ESK)*

"Kierkegaard en España," Seminario Internacional, was held on March 27, 2000 at the Facultad de Filosofía, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, co-sponsored by Ed. Trotta S.A., to mark the publication of the first volume of the planned publication of the complete works of Kierkegaard in Spanish: *Escritos de Søren Kierkegaard (ESK).* This volume includes *De los papeles de alguien que todavía vive* (From the Papers of One Still Living), translated by Begonya Saez Tajafuerce, and *Sobre el concepto de ironía* (On the Concept of Irony), translated by Darío González. Both translations are the first publications of these works in Spanish.

The Seminar included a welcome by Juan Manuel Navarro Cordón, Dean of the Philosophy Faculty, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, and a presentation by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Director of the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre in Cøpenhagen, entitled *"Kierkegaard's Writings* in Denmark." Comments were also offered by the translators: "Aventuras y desventuras de Kierkegaard en España" by Rafael Larreñeta (Universidad Complutense de Madrid); "Kierkegaard o de cómo escribir *Papeles* by Begonya Saez Tajafuerce (Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona); and "Kierkegaard y la ironia socrática" by Darío González (Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, Copenhagen). Alejandro Sierra, director of Ed. Trotta, and John Bernhard, the Danish ambassador to Spain, closed the seminar.

Voumes 2 and 3 of *ESK* are expected to be published in Spring 2001 with the titles *O bien o bien I* and *O bien o bien II.* To obtain these publications, contact Ed. Trotta at trotta@infornet.es or consult their website at http://www.trotta.es.

Hong Kierkegaard Library 1997 Conference Papers Published

Anthropology and Authority: Essays on Søren Kierkegaard (Edited by Poul Houe, Gordon D. Marino and Sven Hakon Rossel), was published in 2000 as volume 44 in the series Internationale Forschungen zur Allgemeinen und Vergleichenden Literaturwissenschaften. Revisions of 19 papers presented in 1997 at the Kierkegaard Library's International Kierkegaard Conference are included in this collection. For further information consult Editions Rodopi at their webpage http://www.rodopi.nl.

Kierkegaard Cabinet in Budapest

The library and study center in Budapest, Hungary is expected to open in the fall of 2000. a joint effort of the Department of Aesthetics at the University ELTE of Budapest and the Danish Cultural Institute in Kecskemet. To request information about the Kierkegaard Cabinet or to offer books, articles, databases, etc. for scholars, students, and translators in the region please contact Andras Nagy at andrasnagy@matavnet.hu.

KIERKEGAARDIANA NEWS

KIERKEGAARDIANA 20 is expected to be published Fall 2000.

KIERKEGAARDIANA 21; CALL FOR PAPERS

Kierkegaardiana continues to be devoted to international and highly qualified debate in the fields of philosophy, theology, and literature. However, the linguistic and cultural boundaries of the current discussion will be expanded, and contributions in Danish and Spanish will also be welcomed beginning with volume 21. Please submit materials for volume #21 by 1 April, 2001.

Please, send your contributions to:

Pia Søltoft
The Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre
Store Kannikestræde 15
DK-1169 København K.
DENMARK

SØREN KIERKEGAARD SOCIETY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM: CONFERENCE

The second international conference, Kierkegaard: Between Ethics and Religion, of the Søren Kierkegaard Society of the United Kingdom will be held at the University of Leeds on Thursday, July 5 through Sunday, July 8, 2001.

Speakers scheduled include: John D. Caputo (Villanova), C. Stephen Evans (Calvin College), M. Jamie Ferreira (Virginia), Joakim Garff (Copenhagen), Daphne Hampson (St. Andrews), András Nagy (Budapest), George Pattison (Cambridge), Roger Poole (Nottingham), Merold Westphal (Fordham).

Kierkegaard now rivals Nietzsche in terms of the wide diversity of hermeneutical traditions which have claimed him as their own. This conference aims to bring together representatives of some of these different traditions to explore dimensions of the ethical and religious significance, and contemporary relevance, of Kierkegaard's thought. As well as plenary sessions, it is planned to hold several symposia on connections between Kierkegaard and other thinkers, and possibly on aspects of particular texts within the Kierkegaardian corpus. In particular, submissions for symposia on the following topics are welcome: the 'leap'; the sublime; humour; Kierkegaard and Bakhtin; Kierkegaard and Levinas; Kierkegaard and Nietzsche; Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein; Kierkegaard and atheology; Kierkegaard after postmodernism; Kierkegaard in Eastern Europe and Russia.

So as to allow plenty of time for discussion, papers should last approximately 30 minutes, contributions to symposia approximately 20 minutes. (Contributors initially offering material for one kind of forum may be requested to adapt it for another.)

Send abstracts of 300 words (three copies) by September 15, 2000 to:

Dr. John Lippitt, Secretary,
Søren Kierkegaard Society of the U.K.
Philosophy Group
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Anyone interested in a later submission date please contact John Lippitt.

REVIEWS

Kierkegaard: The Self in Society. Edited by George Pattison and Steven Shakespeare. London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1998 [and New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1998]. 225 p. $55.00

Noel S. Adams
University of Wisconsin - Madison

The occasion for the majority of the essays in this book was a conference held in 1995 at Lancaster University entitled "Kierkegaard: Person and Polis 'After Modernism.'" The editors offer this collection of essays as a contribution to "the long history of debate as to the nature and extent of Kierkegaard's social and political concerns" (p.1). As they point out in their introduction, "[t]he area addressed in these essays is one in which it is more than tempting to read our own concerns and commitments into Kierkegaard's texts, making of him a modern democrat or a radical individualist, according to taste" (p. 19). Upon reading this collection of essays, the reader sees the relevance of this comment: the points of view from which the essays take their point of departure are far-ranging and the methodologies employed in them are far from uniform. The articles vary from those which have carefully defined arguments that rarely stray from Kierkegaard's texts, to those which import the influence of Kierkegaard on the Frankfurt School, to those which extend Kierkegaard's hand to Derrida's. Bruce Kirmmse's article is particularly illuminating in its exploration of Kierkegaard's views found in his *Papirer*, and the articles by M. G. Piety and Robert L. Perkins are welcome additions, even as reincarnations of their earlier versions in *International Kierkegaard Commentary: Concluding Unscientific Postscript.*

There are some these days who seem to employ the assumption that work needs to be done in order to make the study of Kierkegaard's writings relevant for the contemporary age, and it appears that some of the contributors to this book think that this assumption is true. The editors describe Kierkegaard as "a controversial as well as a defining figure in the history of modern thought," and they suggest that his relevance consists in "sharpen[ing] the focus on some of the key issues of modernity (and now postmodernity) as few less extreme thinkers have done" (p. 20). The editors' introductory essay is quite informative in its own right, as it points the reader to a variety of sources for further reading on the different ways that Kierkegaard has been received and understood. They are quite right in

maintaining that there is little agreement on the extent to which Kierkegaard's writings contribute to the discussion of the nature of the relationship between the self and society; but, of course, there is little agreement regarding *any* aspect of Kierkegaard's thought in the scholarly literature that takes him seriously. To write about Kierkegaard is to write about that which tends toward controversy, and where there is controversy, disagreement abounds.

The contributors to this collection came from a variety of disciplines, including history, psychology, philosophy, and theology. This interdisciplinary approach makes the book attractive to the reader who sees Kierkegaard as not needing to be "updated" in order to be made relevant for serious consideration. Whether or not there is ever agreement over Kierkegaard's relevance is not really of concern to the philosophically minded; instead, what matters most is the argument behind the view in question. In so far as there are several interesting arguments made in this book, it can be recommended for precisely that reason.

To order George Pattison and Steven Shakespeare's book, Contact: ST MARTIN'S PRESS, Scholarly & Reference Div., Attn: Customer Service, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, Tel. 800-221-7945.

Becoming a Self: A Reading of Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript. **By Merold Westphal. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1996. 261 p. $38.95.**

John Lippitt
University of Hertfordshire
United Kingdom

Written in the engaging style which one has come to expect from Merold Westphal, this highly lucid and enjoyable study will benefit readers of Kierkegaard at every level from undergraduates upwards. *Becoming a Self* eschews the dangers of biting off more Kierkegaardian text than one can hope adequately to chew between the covers of one book, and limits itself to detailed commentary on the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. Westphal's approach, announced at the outset, is to focus on Johannes Climacus's connections with postmodern thinkers, as well as his confrontation with Hegel. The result is a running dialogue with such figures as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida and Levinas, as well as Hegel. Amongst the themes which Westphal stresses is the essentially relational nature of the self, and that Kierkegaard's alleged 'irrationalism' is in fact a protest against 'exorbitant claims made on behalf of *human* thought that wishes to deify itself' (p. ix). While these claims are hardly new, the case for them is argued clearly and well, and it is worth making given that 'individualism' and irrationalism' are charges upon which Kierkegaard so often finds himself in the dock. This book is part of the Purdue University Press Series in the History of Philosophy, the expressed aim of which is to offer 'well-edited basic texts to be used in courses and seminars and for teachers looking for a succinct exposition of the results of recent research'. In this respect, for the most part Westphal's work succeeds admirably. Students will find him a helpful guide both to central themes of the *Postscript*, and to its place in, and in relation to, the pseudonymous authorship as a whole. The latter theme is set up by the first three chapters, which locate the *Postscript* in relation to Kierkegaard's biography (Chapter 1), the pseudonymous authorship (Chapter 2) and the existence-spheres (Chapter 3). There then follows a detailed commentary on successive sections of the text (Chapters 4 to 13), chapter headings being keyed into the Hongs' translation. Finally, we get a concluding Chapter 14 which suggests how Kierkegaard, in texts such as *Works of Love*, goes 'beyond' Climacus's Religiousness A and B to a 'Religiousness C' which expands his focus on the self's relation to God to the importance of relations to the neighbour, thus supporting Westphal's own text, the book concludes with a huge chunk of the *Postscript* itself (the chapter on 'Subjective Truth, Inwardness; Truth is Subjectivity'). This strikes me as unfortunate. While the reason for its inclusion is presumably that this is one of the most commonly 'taught' sections of the *Postscript*, the experienced reader of that text knows – and the intelligent student reader of Westphal will soon discover – that each section of the labyrinthine *Postscript* sheds light on all the others. Thus immediately to flag one part as being more important than another – which, whether intended or not, will be the result of the inclusion of this 'Part 3' – seems a questionable move.

Becoming a Self has many virtues. The chapter on

pseudonymity, for instance, will be very useful to readers approaching this issue for the first time, and the links between Kierkegaard and Hegel, on the one hand, and postmodernism, on the other, are very illuminating. But inevitably, there are points with which one might want to take issue. One key matter which some recent work on the *Postscript* has made much of is the peculiar *structure* of the book. Westphal is alive to this, and he is often illuminating on the authorial strategies of various sections. However, I suggest that his focus on the book's structure does not go as far as it might, and in particular, Climacus's status as a humorist – and what effect that might have on what he tells us about his ostensible subject – is not fully probed. Of Climacus's revocation of the text, Westphal remarks: 'since we have no reason to think that he places them [the ideas of *Postscript*] before us ironically, we can assume that he wants to place them before us at face value.' (p. 193). But there is a long tradition of giving reasons for reading the *Postscript* 'ironically,' of which perhaps Henry E. Allison[1] is the grandfather and James Conant the most influential recent exponent.[2] The two external appendices – Climacus's 'An Understanding with the Reader' and Kierkegaard's 'A First and Last Explanation' – together with the internal appendix, 'A Glance at a Contemporary Effort in Danish Literature', are the pivot around which Conant's reading revolves. Westphal treats these structurally crucial sections too briefly. For instance, despite acknowledging the 'Glance' as important, he spends barely more than a page on it. Moreover, just before this, the 'graveyard scene' in which Climacus tells how he came to his 'task' of aiming to 'find out where the misunderstanding between speculative thought and Christianity lies' (CUP 241) is described in parentheses as 'a story that speaks for itself and needs no commentary' (p. 129). Really? At least one commentatory in the Allison-Conant tradition, Stephen Mulhall, considers this scene to be of singular importance. It is, for Mulhall, the 'give-away' which is intended finally to reveal to us what we may have come to suspect: that Climacus's project is not what it seems; that he is prey to the same philosophical confusions about the religious that he warns us against, and therefore becomes (deliberately, according to Mulhall) as comical a figure as the Hegelians he caricatures.[3] I do not myself in the end side with this interpretative tradition, but it is one that deserves to be considered, not least because it usefully draws our attention to just how important the stylistic and structural dimensions of the *Postscript* are, and just how much might hinge on Climacus's being a humorist. Climacus's problematic sense of himself could go far deeper than Westphal's reading allows.

Another point that made me uneasy is that there seems to be a tension in Westphal's account of the Climacean leap. I think he is right to want to resist the caricature of a leap that is 'blind,' and also to resist – along with commentators such as C. Stephen Evans and M. Jamie Ferreira – direct volitionalist interpretations. Yet in doing so, he at one point claims that 'one leaps in the full knowledge of both the leap itself *and its hope for destination*' (p. 78, my emphasis). This last phrase puzzles me, and it does not seem to sit happily with Westphal's overall account in this section. Westphal acknowledges that in the case of Christianity 'the landing site is held to resist conceptual mastery by virtue of its paradoxical character', but points out that Climacus does 'everything [he] can to make the paradox as conspicuous as possible' (p. 78). But pointing up the paradoxicality of a destination can hardly be conflated with having 'full knowledge' of it. Suppose we find persuasive the idea that the existential destination of the leap might only fully be available to one after the leap has been made or – as Ferreira suggests – that it is 'not a case of seeing before you leap, or leaping before you see [but rather that] the new seeing *is* the leap in understanding.'[4] Such readings seem more plausible: could a *full* existential 'understanding' of a Chirsitian worldview be available to someone not oriented to a Christian way of being-in-the-world? It seems to me crucial to understanding the *Postscript* to see that there are aspects of religious – especially Christian – existence that remain an enigma to Climacus.

Nevertheless, even if these criticisms are fair, they should not be allowed to detract from a fine, detailed and in places genuinely witty commentary, which admirably manages to provide something for readers from college level up to specialist researcher. Westphal's book should be highly commended.

[1] Henry E. Allison, 'Christianity and Nonsense', *Review of Metaphysics,* Vol. 20 (1967), pp. 432-460.

[2] James Conant 'Must We Show What We Cannot Say?' in R. Fleming and M. Payne (eds), *The Senses of Stanley Cavell* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1989), 'Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein and Nonsense' in Ted Cohen, Paul Guyer and Hilary Putnam (eds) *Pursuits of Reason* (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 1993), and 'Putting Two and Two Together: Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein and the Point of View for Their Work as Authors' in Timothy Tessin and Mario von der Ruhr (eds), *Philosophy and the Grammar of Religious Belief* (Basingstoke: Macmillian, 1995).

[3] See Stephen Mulhall, *Faith and Reason* (London: Duckworth, 1994), Chapter 3, especially pp. 51-2.

[4] M. Jamie Ferreira, *Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 111.

Ind i Verdens Vrimmel: Søren Kierkegaards Ukendte Bror. By Flemming Chr. Nielsen. Holkenfeldt, 1998, 191 p.

Stacey Elizabeth Ake
Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre
Copenhagen, Denmark

The title of this book, *Ind i Verdens Vrimmel,* takes as its name a play on the Danish translation of Thomas Hardy's *Far From the Madding Crowd,* namely *Fjernt fra Verdens Vrimmel.* Nielsen's book is not, however, about a tragic and pathetic love story. It is instead about Søren Kierkegaard's lesser known elder brother. Tragic and melancholy love stories, it seems, were to be left as the exclusive purview of the younger sibling.

The book is, essentially, a mystery – but of the more academic kind. It falls under the rubric of what Joakim Garff calls "Documenta(fic)tion" or what Umberto Eco might consider a novel. By using the scant evidence at his disposal, mostly in the form of personal letters, Nielsen constructs a story – a series of hypotheses, in fact – of what might have been the reasons and events leading Niels Andreas Kierkegaard, the poor soul sandwiched between Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard's two stellar surviving sons, Peter Christian and Søren Aabye, to flee Denmark for the New World in late August of 1832. He would eventually die there a little over a year later in September of 1833, having ventured everything and gained nothing.

As a collection of documents substantiating Niels Andreas' life and activities it is indispensable. As a novel, it lacks some luster due to the presentation of new hypotheses in a rather desultory fashion more akin to journalism than literature. By comparison, it can be said that it shares this fault with a similar book out now in English: namely, Simon Winchester's *The Professor and the Madman: A Tale of Murder, Insanity, and The Making of Oxford English Dictionary* (HaperCollins, 1998, 242 pp.) In both cases, the journalist-detective's enthusiasm for mystery outpaces the literary novelist's need to create tension and advance a plot. And yet like all diamonds in the rough, there are moments that shine, as on p. 105 where Nielsen writes *"Det er uhygge at få brev fra en præst, når man venter ét fra sin søn."* It is awful to get a letter from a priest when you're expecting one from your son. As indeed it must have been for Michael Pedersen and Anne Sørensdatter the day a strange letter from a strange priest in a strange language arrived at their door.

And it is moments such as these that lead me to believe that we have the wrong Thomas. It is not Thomas Hardy's madding crowd but rather that of his predecessor, Thomas Gray, that the title refers to. The madding crowd found in the "Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard," And, yes, ironies would, it seems, abound. For consider how the epitaph at the end of the elegy begins:

> *Here rests his head upon the lap of Earth*
> *A Youth to Fortune and to Fame unknown.*
> *Fair Science frown'd not on his humble birth,*
> *And Melancholy mark'd him for her own.*

If it was Nielsen's intention with his book to bring to the public's attention that even Niels Andreas Kierkegaard was not without that melancholy that befits a true Kierkegaard, then he has succeeded.

ARTICLES

The Politics of Statehood vs. A Politics of Exodus: *A Critique of Levinas's Reading of Kierkegaard*

Mark Dooley

Newman Scholar of Theology
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(This paper was initially written in response to an invitation to address the Kierkegaard Society of Great Britain on November 13, 1999. I am grateful to John Lippitt for his help in arranging my visit to Cambridge, and also to my friends Roger Poole and George Pattison for their instructive and incisive comments and criticisms. Indeed, I wish to thank all of those who were in attendance for their helpful interventions.)

This article argues that Levinas's acerbic reading of Kierkegaard in "Existence and Ethics," is predicated upon the erroneous assumption that when Johannes de Silentio called for a suspension of the ethical, he was inaugurating a violent tradition of philosophizing with a hammer, one which culminated in Heidegger's collusion with Nazism. In the first half, I argue in favor of Levinas's contention that Heidegger's predilection for National Socialism stemmed from his disregard of the Judeo-Christian, or biblical, tradition of mercy and justice. In the second half, I try to show that what separates Kierkegaard from the likes of Nietzsche and Heidegger (philosophers of 'the hammer'), is the fact that he was the first thinker to tap the resources of the biblical tradition of openness to the other – the very tradition which Levinas himself commends. I end by suggesting why I think Kierkegaard is a more useful thinker, in both an ethical and political sense, than Levinas.

I.

These days, with rare exception, most publications on Martin Heidegger are dedicated to the project of ascertaining the extent to which his philosophy was instructed by the ideology of National Socialism. A debate rages between those who argue that a clear demarcation must be made between the *man* and the *philosopher*, on the one hand, and those who believe that such a demarcation is indefensible on the other. While I have a certain sympathy with the former, in as much as I do not wish to see some of the most important philosophical insights of this century being buried beneath manifold layers of historical data, I find myself nevertheless firmly ensconced amongst those for whom Heidegger's Nazi past says a lot about certain undesirable elements of his thought.

Let me be more specific. I admire Division One of *Being and Time,*[1] as I do the early lectures on the theme of phenomenology in a hermeneutic direction, a move which I perceive as being the most philosophically efficacious of our time; I am less enamoured, however, of Division Two of his *magnum opus*, as I am of *An Introduction to Metaphysics*,[2] and most of the later writings, with the possible exception of his essay on *Gelassenheit.*[3] In Division Two of *Being and Time*, and more patently in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, we see a masterful merging of Heidegger's politics with his philosophy, one which was never to be formally renounced or repudiated up to the time of his death in 1976. No one, especially in the light of Hugo Ott's stark findings, will convince me that if I read between the lines of these texts I will inevitably stumble upon some form of proto- or crypto-ethics. For even when he appears to be writing in an ethical vein, Heidegger is usually more concerned with the well-being of trees and things than with the welfare of his fellow man.

Long before Ott began to shed light on Heidegger's dubious past, Emmanuel Levinas had already identified a pernicious side to this thinker, a side which championed the Teutonic spirit as that which would bring to a glorious climax the destiny of mankind. Anything which was alien to such a spirit had no place in the story of Being. The

history of Being, as told by Heidegger, was thus predicated upon an excision of everything non-German, except, of course, her direct spiritual antecedents, the Greeks. It can be argued without much difficulty, that *Totality and Infinity*[4] was written as a response to this side of Heidegger; while Levinas has placed on the record his admiration for this thinker's concretizing of Husserlian phenomenology, he nevertheless recognizes the deleterious consequences of Heidegger's Greco-German vocabulary of *Sein*. He is unable, that is, to read Heidegger's statement in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, to the effect that Germany "is the most metaphysical of nations" (IM, p. 31), one which "must move itself and thereby the history of the West beyond the centre of their future 'happening' and into the primordial realm of the powers of being" (ibid., p. 32), as nothing short of a dangerous totalitarian pronouncement. Furthermore, he interprets Heidegger's talk of Germany's "historical mission" (ibid., p. 41), and his contention that "along with German the Greek language is...at once the most powerful and spiritual of all languages" (ibid., p. 47), as concrete proof of this *Seinsdenker's* preference for Greco-German supremacy and hegemony.

Levinas's critique of Heidegger is founded upon his belief that there is an alternative to the latter's contention that "[t]he interhuman relationship emerges with our history, with our being-in-the-world as intelligibility and presence." "The interhuman realm," argues Levinas "can also be considered from another perspective – the ethical or biblical perspective which transcends the Greek language of intelligibility – as a theme of justice and concern for the other as other, as a theme of love and desire which carries us beyond the finite Being of the world as presence" (EI, p. 56). Against Heidegger, Levinas maintains "that philosophy can be ethical as well as ontological, can be at once Greek and non-Greek in its inspiration" (ibid., p. 57). To appropriate Derrida's felicitous phrase, one taken up and used to optimum effect by Jack Caputo,[5] Levinas's thought serves to expose the Greek, and hense the German language of presence, to the "jewgreek" language of justice. In so doing, he is concerned to demonstrate, *pace* Heidegger, that while philosophy is "essentially Greek, it is not exclusively so" (ibid., p. 55), and that "[w]hat we term the Judeo-Christian tradition...proposed an alternative approach to meaning," one which refuses to consider truth as something "which is present or co-present" or "which can be gathered or synchronized into a totality which we would call the world or *cosmos*" (ibid., p. 55).

For Levinas, philosophy needs to be exposed to its other, to what the Greco-German tradition has elided in its quest to privilege presence. The need for such exposure comes from the fact that this tradition has lost its ethical sensibility, its responsiveness to the call of everything which is non-Greek or non-German. The upshot of this claim is simply that if Heidegger had retained his fidelity to the Judeo-Christian tradition in which he was acculturated, the disastrous coalition with the Nazis might never have occurred. In Heidegger's case, the elision of all things Judeo-Christian was not just a philosophical menoeuvre *stricto sensu*, but one which led to an actual expulsion of Jews, to an eradication of everything which impeded the progress of Germany's historical mission. Levinas's *modus vivendi* took the form of a quest to deconstruct the history of being, to thwart the progress of the great historical mission of which Heidegger spoke, by showing that the so-called Greek tradition is always already contaminated by the Jew and the Christian, and by attesting to the fact that the cries of the prophets will continue to resound come what may. For him, the borders separating Jerusalem and Athens had begun to crumble and disintegrate long before Heidegger set out to retrieve the great Greek *arche*.

Heidegger's longing for purity, his tall tale of being's historical mission, and his belief that German and Greek languages are the most profoundly spiritual, echoes in many ways Hegel's longing for pure identity, his grand narrative of world-historical becoming, and his tendency to deify the German state above all others. The most striking comparison between the two men, however, is their mutual disdain for, what Lyotard calls, *les juifs*,[6] or, the jews. In the sense in which it is employed by Lyotard, *les juifs* symbolizes all those, irrespective of religion or race, who have been silenced, brutalized, marginalized, or displaced. As Jack Caputo, John Van Buren and Theordore Kisiel[7] have each shown, the young Heidegger's appreciation of the New Testament was predicated upon his belief that the biblical world was one in which struggle and difficulty prevailed. The tough lesson of the New Testament, according to this reading, was that we must take up our crosses and forge ahead in the face of life's inexorable hurdles. As such, the ethics of love for the least among us was considered, in good Nietzschean fashion, to be for the weak alone. In other words, even before Heidegger had renounced his Catholicism, or even before any talk of the nation's destiny and historical mission had made its way into his lexicon, he had, as Caputo tells us, "managed to read the New Testament from one end to the other with his eye set on the categories of care and difficulty and never to have noticed the lepers and the lame, the blind and the beggars, the widows and the withered hands, the healings and the hungry crowds."[8] What Heidegger was blind to was the social gospel of the New Testament, its plea on behalf of the deprived and dispossessed. His early appreciation of scripture, thus, stems from his admiration of Jesus as friend of the poor, of what John Dominick Crossan calls "the nuisances and nobodies," [9] but from his admiration of Jesus's gallant struggle in the

face of temporal adversity. The cross symbolizes valor, strength, and bravery. While Paul Tillich managed to show how Heideggerian ontology could be rendered socially useful, Heidegger himself had no such ambition in mind. Consequently, while *Being and Time*, especially Division II, is punctuated by classical Christian categories, such as "fallenness," "guilt" etc., it is singularly devoid of the most essential elements in the ministry of Jesus, the marginal Jew.

In the case of Hegel the situation is somewhat different, but no less regrettable. Unlike Heidegger, Hegel never renounced his Christianity, neither did he endeavor to downplay its importance in the world-historical drama. His tragic mistake was to have seen to it that the cunning of reason nullified what were perceived by him to be the most offensive features of Jesus's Jewish lineage. As mediator (*Der Mitte*), Jesus's purpose was to dialectically negate the alienation symptomatic of the Jewish faith, and, in so doing, bring to fruition and harmony the one true Christian religion. As with Heidegger, Hegel's negation of the figure of the Jew served only to take the sting out of Jesus's message of social justice. For Hegel, Jesus does indeed preach love and forgiveness, but this is love, neither for the outsider nor for those least like us, but for our brothers and sisters within the Christian community or within the Christian state. Jesus, on this reading, is more Greek than Jew, more spiritual than revolutionary, more in the shadow of Plato than in that of Abraham.

What is underscored by this comparison between Heidegger and Hegel, is that when the figure of the victim or the outsider is either ignored or erased, there are unfortunate ethical and political consequences. In both Heidegger's Greco-Germanic tale of the nation's historical mission and Hegel's story of world history, there is not a single paragraph reserved for the voiceless victims, for what Paul Ricoeur calls "the anonymous forces of history."[10] Both are stories of how a state or a people became great, either because it had Being on its side, or, as with Hegel, because it held a privileged place in a divine design. Once the cut of the Jew gave way to Greek harmony and integrity, or once the Judeo-Christian tradition, which emphasized "justice and concern for the other as other," was incorporated into the Greco-German tradition of presence and intelligibility, hope for *les juifs* soon faded.

The reason why Levinas is so important in this regard is because he constantly reminds us that philosophy does not have a single lineage running from the Greeks to the Germans. It has many different strains, not least of which is the Judeo-Christian heritage. In the midst of Teutonic bombast, Levinas urges us to recover the biblical tradition of philosophizing, that which emphasises responsibility to widows, orphans, and strangers, to the call of the afflicted and the wretched, those for whom no paragraph has been reserved in Hegel's system, or those who have yet to hear the call of Being. He looks to Heidegger's notion of "gathering" (*Versammelung*), and to Hegel's domesticizing of God into the fabric and laws of the state, as proof positive of what happens when one radically denies "the rupture between the ontological and the ethical" (EI, p. 66).

I

It is a wonder then, given his jewgreek sensitivities and the nature of his hyper-ethical critique of ontology and metaphysics, that Levinas should read Kierkegaard as he does. For is it not a fact that Kierkegaard was the first thinker in the histories of both theology and philosophy, to notice the ethical impoverishment of metaphysical system-building and of grand ontological schemes? Was he not the first to privilege singularity above universality, or "the poor existing individual" above the established order? Moreover, did he not prefigure and anticipate Levinas's own excavation of the Judeo-Christian roots of Greco-German philosophizing? Kierkegaard was, above all else, an ethico-religious thinker, one for whom the blood, sweat, and tears of everyday "factical" life was paramount. His upbraiding of Hegel was a consequence of what he perceived as the risible attempt to develop a world history without affording a single page to any particular existing individual. Unlike Hegel and Heidegger, Kierkegaard does not consider the New Testament to be any less relevant to our self-understanding than the works of the Greeks or his German contemporaries. For him, indeed, the New Testament is no less ethically instructive than Aristotle's *Ethics* or Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*. In fact, it is even more suggestive given its grounding in the world of concrete practical affairs. This is why Kierkegaard endeavors to rescue religion, and especially the Christ-figure, from the labor of the negative in Hegel's speculative account of consciousness; his belief is that philosophy will become genuinely useful only after its supposed superiority over religion is discredited. His objective is to allow philosophy and religion to bleed into one another so as to ensure that singularity is never consumed by universality, or, and this amounts to the same thing, that ethics keeps metaphysics in check. For these reasons, Kierkegaard must surely rank as the first significant jewgreek, the first thinker whose work was a hymn sung in the name of those without a name.[11]

These similarities notwithstanding, Levinas still considers Kierkegaard more Greek than Jew. He sees value in Kierkegaard's work only in so far as it emphasizes the ineradicable nature of existence in the face of "totalizing thought," the concrete manifestation of which would take the form of "political totalitarianism in which we would cease to be the source of our own language and

become mere reflections of an impersonal *logos*...".[12] He follows this up, however, by inquiring as to "whether this return to a subjectivity which holds itself aloof from thought, that is to say from truth in perpetual victory...could not itself give rise to further acts of violence?" (EE, p. 28). Now, when Levinas employs this word "violence" with respect to Kierkegaard, he does not mean some form of intellectual violence, but violence *stricto sensu*; instead of interpreting Kierkegaard's passion for subjectivity as a truly jewgreek gesture, one which has profound ethical, religious, and political consequences, he sees it as an egoistic drive for blissful isolation. When Kierkegaard says that "truth is subjectivity," he adjures, according to Levinas, "relations to exteriority" in favor of "inward dramas." Such a "suffering truth does not open us out to others, but to God in isolation" (ibid., p. 30). Once the struggle for inwardness is given priority over one's relations with others "it participates in the violence of the modern world, with its cult of Passion and Fury" (ibid.). This is why, on Levinas's reading, Kierkegaard adopts an "impulsive and violent style, reckless of scandal and destruction," one which, even before Nietzsche, gave free rein to those who would philosophize with a hammer. As such, it "aspired to permanent provocation, and the total rejection of everything...". Moreover, Kierkegaard's writings anticipated and presaged the "verbal violences" of National Socialism, and also "the various ideas which it promoted."

It is truly difficult to understand why a thinker like Emmanuel Levinas would so vehemently accuse such an obvious fellow-traveller of fuelling the fires of National Socialism. How he came to believe that Kierkegaard's ironic, subtle, sensitive, and humorous work "brought irresponsibility in its wake and a ferment of disintegration" (ibid., p. 30), is a matter of immense speculation. I think perhaps the most likely reason is the fact that Kierkegaard was, for much of this century, considered by many, including Levinas himself, to be Heidegger's spiritual forefather. Such a view still persists in many respectable quarters. My belief is that in many ways Levinas blamed Kierkegaard for unleashing the demons in Heidegger's head, demons which would eventually force him down the road of moral turpitude. Levinas's intransigent and trenchant opposition to Kierkegaard can only be adequately explained against this background. For in Kierkegaard's thought Levinas identifies the same will-to-presence as evidenced in *Being and Time*; the essential selfishness of Dasein as "a being which is concerned for [only] its own being" (EI, p. 62), as a being whose fundamental desire for "mineness" (*Jemeinigkeit*), derives, according to Levinas, from Heidegger's formative study of Kierkegaard's notion of "a subjectivity in tension over itself, and existence as concern for one's own existence, as a torment over oneself" (EE, p. 34). Such narcissism, such love of one's self, derives from Kierkegaard's objection to the ethical as that which is "essentially general," as a set of universal rules which would lead to the dissipation of the self's individuality, of the self's secret (ibid., p. 34). Consequently, he disavows being-with-others in favor of realizing one's ownmost possibilities with authentic Dasein, as one for whom being-with-others is merely a distraction from the ultimate aim of coming to self-presence, as the fault of Kierkegaard and his wanton abandonment of the ethical. Had Heidegger not been seduced by Kierkegaardian thought, with its "intransigent vehemence and its taste for scandal" (ibid., p. 31), the dire rapprochement with the dark forces might well have been averted. Having been so seduced, however, Kierkegaard's "hard and aggressive style of thinking," warns Levinas, "could now be taken seriously as a kind of justification for violence and terror" (ibid.).

What Kierkegaard, and consequently Heidegger, failed to notice was that "being a Self means not to be able to hide from responsibility" (ibid., p. 32), from the solicitation of Others. The face of the Other, for Levinas, stymies the will-to-presence by calling the self into question. For the Other is "poor and destitute, and nothing that touches this Stranger can be indifferent to the Self" (ibid., p. 33). Indeed, to be chosen by an Other "involves the most radical commitment conceivable: *total altruism*"; such responsibility is that "through which the Self is emptied of all imperialism and egoism – including the egoism of salvation..." (ibid.). The ethical, thus, is far from being a generality which would dissolve subjectivity. Rather, the self is confirmed by virtue of the fact that the Other requires the self for its support. It is, therefore, "promoted to a special position on which everything else depends" (ibid., p. 32).

The import of Levinas's critique of Kierkegaard should not be underestimated. Even commentators usually considered sympathetic have, at times, reinforced the main points of Levinas's tirade. Jack Caputo, for example, a thinker who has an abiding passion for all things Kierkegaardian, has placed on the record his belief that Heidegger's early Freiburg period, the period during which most of the groundwork for *Being and Time* was put into place, was "held captive by the spiritual militancy of Paul, Luther, Kierkegaard" (*Theologia Crucis*, p. 1). This is, to be sure, an inadvertent reference to Levinas's negative appraisal of Kierkegaard's thinking as being "hard and aggressive." What interpretations of this form make clear is that in many respected quarters Levinas's unfortunate reading of Kierkegaard has regrettably caught on.

For my money, however, Levinas missed what is most essential in Kierkegaard – his jewgreek ethics of singularity. The common comparison made between Kierkegaard and Heidegger, a comparison which I have

argued guided Levinas's take on the former, has always seemed more than a little dubious to me. For one thing, Kierkegaard's philosophy is heavily punctuated by a Christian ethics of love, something which, given Heidegger's admiration for Nietzsche, is starkly absent from Heidegger's work. Secondly, Kierkegaard's antidote to, what he termed, "despair", was life lived in imitation of Christ. There is no such ideal standard to save Heideggerian Dasein from the desperate plight of "fallenness" – Heidegger's synonym for "despair". Thirdly, and most importantly, Kierkegaard's self is not one which is in agony over its own self, or one which sacrifices the exterior world so as to rest in splendid isolation with God. Quite to the contrary, the self is one which is constantly putting itself into question in an effort to engender more concrete relations with one's neighbors.

As I suggested above, Kierkegaard was just as troubled as Levinas by those philosophical systems which privileged the Greek will-to-presence over the Judeo-Christian effort to realize justice and concern for the other. His critique of Hegel was driven by an ethico-religious scruple, a critique which was stimulated by the systematician's denigration of the alienated Jew and the negation of the Christ-figure. What Levinas failed to notice was that Kierkegaard's biting appraisal of Hegel could easily have been applied to Heidegger with equal force and efficacy. That is, Levinas was blind to the fact that what most frightened Kierkegaard was any attempt to deify or divinize the state, the established order, or what he calls in *The Concept of Irony*, the "given actuality." Talk of the "historical mission" of a state, or of the *Geist* of world history, was bound to send shivers up his stooped spine. For in either its secular or religious variations, a divinized state implies terror.

The reason why Kierkegaard called for a "teleological suspension of the ethical" is not, as Levinas contends, because he intended to offer a justification for violence and terror, but because "the ethical" in this context refers to Hegel's *Sittlichkeit*, or social morality. Kierkegaard states this quite clearly in the opening pages of *Fear and Trembling*. For Hegel, as I argued above, the ideal state was one in which church and established order had become dialectically harmonized in the mediation of God and his people through the intercession of the Holy Spirit (*Geist*). What deeply disturbed Kierkegaard about this was that it conferred divine legitimacy on the powers that be. If, as Hegel says, the laws of the state are the material manifestation of God's divine design on earth, then they simply cannot be challenged or modified except on the basis of a divine intervention. Moreover, if God is woven so fundamentally into the fabric of the state it may be legitimately assumed that he must prefer one set of people to another, he must, that is, be given to nationalistic fervor. No wonder then, as Jim Marsh poignantly reminds us, that George Bush called on the churches of the land to sound their bells when victory was had in the Gulf war, or that presidents and monarchs regularly summon their subjects to go and fight and kill for both "God and country."[13]

The idea that God is on the side of the powers that be was what most offended Kierkegaard about Hegelian philosophy. It also helped explain why Hegel had little to say in a positive sense about outsiders, displaced persons, the downtrodden–those to whom the established order usually turns a blind eye. I do not think it simply a coincidence that the figure of the Jewish Abraham, one for whom Hegel reserves his most unbridled invective, is the anti-hero of *Fear and Trembling*. For what Kierkegaard sought to teach through the use of the Mount Moriah narrative of sacrifice was not, as Levinas and many others tend to suggest, a lesson in religious fundamentalism, but rather a lesson in what is required if the dangers of the politics of statehood are to be avoided. For Abraham on this reading, is sundering the logic of *Sittlichkeit* in the name of a singular other; he is attempting, that is, to *temporarily* suspend the laws of the universal, of the state, so as to respond adequately to the singular other who summons him from beyond its walls. If read from this perspective, it becomes clear that Kierkegaard is far from being *against* the ethical, but is looking for a way in which the ethical can become self-critical.

For Levinas though, Kierkegaard is simply intent on wantonly suspending the ethical. I should have thought, however, that what ought to be emphasized here is not the word "suspension," but rather "teleological." The self for Kierkegaard, and once more *pace* Levinas, is always already embedded with others in a sociopolitical matrix. This is why he defines it as a relation of the necessary and the possible. To attempt to extricate oneself from one's sociopolitical situation would simply intensify despair, for one would be surrendering oneself to possibility at the expense of necessity. So it is never a question of being able to abdicate from one's social *milieu* in an effort either to agonize over one's own being or self, or to achieve a one on one with God in isolation. One can, however, as Anti-Climacus instructs, "relate oneself to oneself," which means that one has the capacity to take a critical distance from the self which one has become through birth, acculturation, etc. One can, that is, on the basis of one's ability to imagine otherwise (Kierkegaard designates the imagination as the faculty *instar omnium*), envision possibilities which may change one's world for the better. This is why I said earlier that for Kierkegaard the self is something which is constantly putting itself into question. For there must always be, on this account, a proper synthesis between the actual and the possible, between what *is* and what *may be.* Consequently, one is never at liberty to suspend the

ethical, but only to *telelogically* suspend it. This implies coming to a realization that the state and its laws are provisional, that they did not fall from the sky, and that they can become the object of a critical imagination.

III

On this reading, therefore, Kierkegaard's is not a "politics of statehood," but, what I have chosen to call, a "politics of exodus," in the sense that it challenges the dominant political, ethical, religious, and metaphysical paradigms governing reality, in the name of those whose welfare they do not serve, those poor existing individuals who have not made it as far as Hegel's *Encyclopaedia*, or into the grand narrative of Being. I use "exodus" not only in the pedestrian sense, but also because of its religious connotations. For it must not be forgotten, as it is by many these days, that Kierkegaard teleologically suspends the ethical, *qua Sittlichkeit*, in favor of the religious. The most pernicious consequence of Christianity being confused with Christendom, for Kierkegaard, was that it would take the sting out of the liberating impulses of religion. By this he meant that the only form of religion which could keep a critical check on the state power, was one which underscored what was most offensive to the ears of the established orthodoxy. Kierkegaardian religion is one which is practiced on the margins of the state or of the ethical. For it is there amongst *les juifs* that it finds its true vocation.

In liberating the Christ-figure from the bondage of the state, and in thus reviving the Judeo-Christian thematics of justice and mercy in a philosophical cum theological setting, Kierkegaard overturned all our best laid ethical plans. For the scandal of the God-man as ethical goal and criterion is not, as Levinas is wont to contend, that it encourages personal salvation, but that it makes the Other, especially those who are least like us, the criterion by which we ourselves shall be judged. When Anti-Climacus says that in relating itself to itself, and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that created it, he means that when the actual embedded self strives to imagine his state of affairs otherwise, or when he endeavors to *teleologically* suspend the ethical, *qua* given actuality, he ought to use the Christ-figure as a standard against which to judge the efficacy of the possibilities envisioned. In so doing, one is not led out of exteriority into some interior space, but to the world of the New Testament, a world in which singularity and difference hold sway, a world populated by outcasts and victims, migrants and tax collectors. This is all by way of saying that to imitate the God-man for Kierkegaard, amounts to standing in solidarity with, as he says, "the most wretched."

Kierkegaard's politics of exodus suggests that the most effective way to keep political structures from freezing over is to keep an eye on those whose singular tales of woe are bound to offend the policy makers and guardians of the law. Lifting the laws of the home or the state long enough to afford mercy to those who show up at "Immigration" at the Welfare Office, or at the church gate, is, from Kierkegaard's point of view, a genuine work of love. Love of this type, he opines, is the means by which the law is fulfilled.

Levinas's reading of Kierkegaard, as one who contributed in no small measure to "the violence of the modern world," and to "the amoralism of recent philosophies" (EE, pp. 30-31), is, in the final analysis, I submit, not only regrettable, but also quite inexcusable. Long before Levinas, Kierkegaard had identified the dangers posed by philosophical and political totalities which are insufficiently critical of their own myths and origins. His preference for the Judeo-Christian approach to questions of truth and justice made him suspicious of state politics. This did not prevent him, however, from giving his thinking a political edge. It is precisely by virtue of this that I believe Kierkegaard is ultimately a more useful thinker than Levinas. I say this because for Kierkegaard, unlike Levinas, it is never simply a choice between totality or infinity. Neither is it a question of trying to step outside political totalities so as to become, as Levinas suggests time and again, a hostage of the Other to the point of substitution. For Kierkegaard, the self's objective is to keep the borders separating oneself from the Other as flexible as possible, not, however, to dissolve them. For it is never possible to deny the self to the point of obliteration. As we have learned from Derrida, there must always be a circle of reappropriation between self and other for love to be possible. Levinas's contention that politics is war leads him to demand of us the impossible: total altruism.

Indeed, isn't it an irony that it was Levinas of all people who reprimanded Kierkegaard for not underlining the fact that God stayed Abraham's hand over Isaac, so that he would not "commit a human sacrifice" (EE, p. 34), when it was Levinas himself who argued that the ethical consists in becoming a hostage to the Other unto *death*? I only wish Levinas had pondered on such a question before uttering those ominously unforgettable words: "What shocks me about Kierkegaard is his violence."

[1] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time,* trans. Macquarrie & Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962).

[2] Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics,* trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Anchor Books, 1961). Hereafter 'IM'.

[3] Martin Heidegger, *Discourse on Thinking,* trans. John M. Anderson & Hans Freund (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966).

[4] Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne

University Press, 1961).

[5] John D. Caputo, *Demythologizing Heidegger* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993). Caputo's objective in this extraordinary book is to confound those who still cling to the belief that Heidegger's philosophy has little to do with his politics. This paper owes much to Caputo's inquiries in this regard.

[6] Jean Francois Lyotard, *Heidegger and "the jews,"* trans. Andreas Michel and Mark Roberts (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990).

[7] See John D. Caputo, *Demythologizing Heidegger*; John Van Buren, *The Young Heidegger* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's* Being and Time (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

[8] John D. Caputo, *Demythologizing Heidegger*, p. 57.

[9] John Dominick Crossan, *Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography* (San Francisco: Harper, 1994), Chapter Three.

[10] Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* Vol. III, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988), p. 205.

[11] I am sure that there are some who will contest this reading of Kierkegaard. They will, I suspect, point to the fact that he displayed royalist tendencies, and was ignorant, for the most part, of the plight of the common man. That is, of course, true of the early Kierkegaard. I believe, however, that the side of Kierkegaard I am trying to highlight, the Kierkegaard of *Works of Love, Sickness unto Death,* and *Practice in Christianity*, a side which argues in favor of a Christian ethics of sensitivity and a theology of the Cross, is the one which ultimately prevailed.

[12] Emmanuel Levinas, "Existence and Ethics," in Jonathon Ree and Jane Chamberlain eds., *Kierkegaard: A Critical Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 28. Hereafter 'EE'.

[13] James L. Marsh, "Kierkegaard and Critical Theory" in Merold Westphal and Martin J. Matustik eds., *Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp. 199-215. For a reading of Kierkegaard which is in many ways quite similar to the one I am advancing here, see Merold Westphal, *Kierkegaard's Critique of Reason and Society* (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1987).

Kierkegaard in the Italian Language

by Ettore Rocca

In this short essay I will offer a history and assessment of the translations of Kierkegaard's works into Italian. Not surprisingly, this history also reveals a great deal about Kierkegaard's reception in Italy.

Judged in terms of sheer quantity, Italian translations of Kierkegaard are impressive. Indeed, almost all of Kierkegaard writings have been rendered into Italian. Some works have been translated several times.[1] And Cornelio Fabro's edition of the *Journals* is as comprehensive as any edition save that of the Hongs. Unfortunately, however, the quality of Italian translations is not as impressive as the quantity.

Up until quite recently, most translations of Kierkegaard's works were translations of selections from one or another book. Worse yet, these renditions were often drawn from French, German, or English translations of Kierkegaard's writings. Even today, while a complete translation does exist of *Either-Or*, it is possible to purchase a volume entitled *Aut-Aut* in which only *Equilibrium between the Esthetic and the Ethical in the Development of the Personality* is translated and without any indication that this is a pseudonymous writing. For another example, when I decided to translate *The Lily in the Field*, I discovered that there were already three translations of this work, two of which dated from 1945. To my great surprise I then found that these three works were translations not of *The Lily in the Field* but rather of *Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits.* No one had noticed this before. And I continue to run into important Italian scholars who ask me: "Wasn't *The Lily in the Field* already translated in 1945?" This, however, is not to say that all Italian translations of Kierkegaard's works are of poor quality. Take, for example, the philological meticulousness of Alessandro Cortese's translation of and commentary on *Either-Or*, or the translation and critical edition of *Repetition* by Dario Borso.

As regards chronology, the first Italian translations appeared in the early 1900's. From 1907 to 1912 the following were translated: *The Unhappiest One* (the very first work to be translated), *Diapsalmata, The Seducer's Diary, The Esthetic Validity of Marriage, The Immediate Erotic Stages or the Musical Erotic, In Vino Veritas.* Once again, all of these early translations were published without a hint that they were pseudonymous works. As a result, the first impression that Italy gleaned of Kierkegaard was that of an aesthete. The first translation made of an entire work was, curiously enough, the collection of *Øieblikket.* Translated from the German, this book appeared in 1931 with the subtitle "Charges against Christianity in the Kingdom of Denmark."

At first glance the publication of *Øieblikket* might have been interpreted as an attack on Protestantism; however, the translation came forth from the inner circle of Italian Protestantism. It is important to remember that 1931 marked the middle of the fascist period in Italy. Furthermore, it was in 1929 that the Lateran Pact was signed allowing Italian Catholics to once again participate in politics. Thus, publishing a book which pointed an accusing finger at collusion between Church and state could easily have been interpreted as a gesture of oppostion to fascism and the Catholic Church. Incidentally Walter Lowrie, who was the rector of St. Paul's American Church in Rome from 1907 to 1930, played a part in Kierkegaard's reception in Italy. While he had nothing to do with Italian translations, Lowrie wrote an article in 1935 for the Italian magazine *Religio* in which he suggested that Kierkegaard was a potentially important source for reinvigorating Catholicism. Later, during the Second World War, the first two editions of *The Concept of Anxiety* appeared. The first of these was published in 1940; it was incomplete and had been translated from German. The second edition appeared in 1942.

In 1948 Cornelio Fabro's impressive work of translation got under way with the publication of over 1500 pages of from Kierkegaard's journals. At that time, this was the widest selection of the *Papirer A* to appear in any foreign language. Fabro accompanied his translation with a series of exegetical writings aimed at including Kierkegaard in the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition. In this way, Fabro sought to bring Kierkegaard closer to Catholic culture – one might say, almost to lay claim to him. Kierkegaard's own pietism made it easy for Fabro to connect Kierkegaard and Catholicism , for according to Fabro, pietism was a surrogate form of Catholicism.[2] Fabro failed, however, to win Catholic culture over to Kierkegaard. In 1952, the Vatican newspaper, *L'Osservatore Romano*, included a review of the diaries which pressed the question, Is it "worthwhile for a philosopher like Father Fabro to spend so much time and effort on a non-Catholic thinker, one who has been called the father of existentialism, which some consider to be a pseudo-philosophy, which others consider to be

irrationalism with negative foundations, and which Christian and Catholic theologians and philosophers view as the liquidation of essentialism and therefore anti-metaphysical, to the extent that it has earned an explicit reproach in the recent Enciclical *Humani Generis*". According to *L'Osservatore Romano*, Kierkegaard did not recognize the Church, denied the sacraments and distorted dogma.[4]

Italian existentialist and phenomenologists such as Enzo Paci, Remo Cantoni, Nicola Abbagnano gave Kierkegaard a much warmer reception than the Vatican. Paci had Kierkegaard in mind when he founded the philosophical review *Aut Aut* which remains the most widely read philosophical periodical in Italy today. Still, no new translations emanated from the camps of existentialism and phenomenology. After a period of stagnation in the 60's, which coincided with what, by now, was Cornelio Fabro's monopoly on Kierkegaard studies, the pace of translations resumed in the 70's with Alessandro Cortese's translation of *Either/Or*. And in the last decade of the century, Dario Borso translated *The Concept of Irony, Prefaces, A Literary Review,* and *Upbuilding Discourses* of 1843. None of these writings had hitherto been translated into Italian.

This new wave of translations has not, however, been accompanied by a similar effort at the critical level, even though there are clear signs that Italian culture is almost in need of Kierkegaard. Let us take for example a long review of *The Lily in the Field,* which recently appeared in *L'Osservatore Romano*: "In moments of intense reflection, when each of us feels how flimsy are all the artifices supporting the illusion of existence, it is then that we feel the pangs of nostalgia for truth, for wisdom, for words of authenticity. It is then, perhaps, that we seek out the company of the classics, of masters of the spirit who point out the arduous paths of virtue and the ideals of an authentic life."[5] The reviewer recommends that readers should take *The Lily in the Field* along with them on vacation and "meditate on it intensely". Wide excerpts of *The Lily in the Field* were also read over Vatican Radio. It is clear that we have progressed beyond the wholesale rejection or annexation that marked Kierkegaard's reception in Italy after World War II.

But it isn't only the Catholic reception of Kierkegaard that has changed. Secular thinkers are now beginning to ponder Kierkegaard's more overtly religious writings. *The Lily in the Field* was the first collection of religious writings published by a non-confessional publishing house. One of Italy's most important writers and scholars, Claudio Magris, recently called *The Lily in the Field* the most important book to appear in 1998. Magris concluded his review with the following words: "Perhaps today, even more so than 150 years ago, faith may be able to liberate the human being, restore strength, and pleasure to him and teach him not to worry about tomorrow".[6]

After the hegemony of neo-idealism, the Marxism of the nineteen sixties and seventies, and the supremacy of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Wittgenstein during the eighties and nineties, a genuine interest in Kierkegaard has begun to arise in Italy. I believe that this new and vibrant interest in Kierkegaard has taken form because Kierkegaard more than anyone else has given expression to the most pressing need of the present age-- the need for faith. Perhaps Kierkegaard's maieutic function is only now beginning.

[1] As many as five translations were done of *In vino veritas*, four of *The Concept of Anxiety* (even if not all of them were complete), *Repition* and *The Sickness unto Death* was translated three times.
[2] C. Fabro, *Introduzione* to S. Kierkegaard, *Diario*, Morcelliana, Brescia 1980, vol. I, p. 66.
[4] P. Parente, *Il vero volto di Kierkegaard*, "L'Osservatore Romano", n. 11, 1952, p. 3.
[5] P. Miccoli, *Il legame fra silenzio e ascolto della Voce*, "L'Osservatore Romano", n. 203, 4/9/1998.
[6] C. Magris, *La religione di Kierkegaard scritta con la mano destra*m "Corriere della Sera", 30/12/1998, p. 31.

Paul-Henri Tisseau – Kierkegaard's French "Reader" and Translator

by

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(In the April 1996 issue of the newsletter I reviewed a recent English edition of Kierkegaard's Prayers which was not a translation from any original Danish source, but a translation of Paul-Henri Tisseau's 1937 *Prières et Fragments sur la Prière (Extraits du Journal)* – "Prayers and Writings about Prayer from the Journals." I noted then that Tisseau was not given the credit he deserved and from that time on I resolved to learn more about this pioneering French translator of Kierkegaard. A year spent as an exchange pastor with the French Reformed Church gave me some time to pursue my interest in Tisseau. Most importantly, being in France allowed me to meet twice with his daughter, Else-Marie Jacquet-Tisseau. The following is a very minor panegyric for Paul-Henri Tisseau, an un-sung "intellectual hero" whose life knew both tragedy and triumph.)

Paul-Henri Tisseau came from Vendée, that part of France just south of Brittany which is mostly known for the staunch (and bloody) resistance it mounted to the Revolution of 1789. But it is not as "royalists" that his family were known but as one of the few Protestants of the area. He was born on February 26, 1894 in the family house outside of Bazoges-en-Pareds, a village about 50 miles from the city of Nantes. His early years were rigorous and studious. He could boast that among his ancestors were Huguenots whose refusal to renounce their faith condemned them literally to being galley slaves in the navy of Louis XIV. Tisseau inherited stubborn Huguenot single-mindedness and their "tragic sense of life." From his Huguenot parents he also acquired a deep knowledge of the Bible.

Tisseau studied theology and philosophy at the University of Toulouse. He graduated in 1915 and promptly was called into the army. He was twenty-one years old and he had already lost a brother in the war. He served "for the duration," including two years at Verdun, that unimaginable battle site where more than a million men lost their lives. There he was seriously wounded in a gas attack, and there he was twice buried alive.

In 1919, somewhat recovered from his wounds, he went to Beirut, Lebanon where he taught in the school of the French military government. It was on his return to France in 1921 that he met his future wife, a young Dane named Gerda Christensen. They were both visiting the romantic ruins of Pompeii. Together they moved to Bucharest, Romania where he taught French for five years. Then, in 1926, in order for him to be a little closer to France and for Gerda to be closer to her family in Denmark, he took a post teaching French at the University of Lund in Sweden. There they remained for twelve years, and there Tisseau's natural curiosity led him to the works of Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard soon became, to use his own words, "the intellectual passion of my life."

Six years after his initial encounter with Kierkegaard, Tisseau published (*nota bene* at his own expense!) his first two translations. These were his 1933 editions of *Repetition* and the first part of *Stages on Life's Way* ("In Vino Veritas"). They were published but not greatly promoted by the Parisian publisher Félix Alcan.

Every summer from 1933 to 1937 Tisseau and his family would return to his native village in France and he would devote himself to translating. These productive years saw the publication of the second part of *Upbuilding Discourse in Various Spirits* ("What is to be learned from the lilies of the field and the birds of the air?"), *The Concept of Anxiety* (both in 1935 and again with the press of Félix Alcan) and *Fear and Trembling* (also in 1935, published by Aubier-Montaigne in Paris.)

But most importantly and significantly, these years also saw Tisseau issue his first translations under his own imprimatur! The designation on the title page of "Chez le traducteur" (literally "at the house of the translator"!) became a well-known mark for the labors of love that Tisseau devoted to Kierkegaard. The first of these "translator-financed" books was his 1934 edition of *Two Ethical-Religious Essays.* These were followed by *Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays* (1935), *For Self-Examination* (also 1935), *Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing* (again in 1935), *Practice in Christianity* (1936), "Prayers and Writings about Prayer from the

Journals" (1937), *The Gospel of Suffering* (1937) and "Christ – More Writings from the Journals" (also 1937).

Tisseau, who rarely wrote about himself, said this about his initial experience of publishing his own translations: "Bazoges-en-Pareds was my summer address, the home of my parents who in their retirement undertook the painstaking work of bookkeeping and the actual shipping. I can hardly express what a precious help it was for me to have my father fill out the pages of our order-book in his beautiful handwriting. And then he would pack up the orders and walk or bicycle the mile and a half to the village post-office. 'Kierkegaard published in a hamlet!' we said to ourselves, 'whoever would have imagined it?' Professor Jean Wahl wrote to me in response, 'It's completely Kierkegaardian'."

Tisseau went on to say, "My translations of those years sold up to a point, but not enough to permit me to publish any of the major works like *The Postscript*, all of *Stages*, or *Either/Or*. And to finance what I did publish, I had to undertake a great deal of extra assignments outside of my regular university work in Lund. I can say that behind each one of my Kierkegaard translations stands a translation of a Danish or Swedish work that I did anonymously from such disciplines as Medicine, Norse Mythology and History."

Paul-Henri Tisseau, like many others, saw the approaching storm of the Second World War even from the neutral Sweden. And at a professional sacrifice, he moved back to France and took a position teaching Latin in a high school in Nantes. This was in 1938. In the memorable summer of 1939, he bought a small, hand-fed printing press and began to print by himself his translation of *The Sickness unto Death* (not completed until 1942).

In the meantime, aided by a grant from the Rask-Orsted Foundation, he continued to use a printer in Nantes and elsewhere for other translations. In 1940 he published the second volume of *Either/Or* and in 1942 the second half of *Stages* ("Guilty?/Not Guilty?"). At the same time he published his translation of *The Point of View for my Work as an Author.*

The story of how he came to complete his *samizdat* edition of *The Sickness Unto Death* amid war-time shortages of paper deserves to be known as it too is "completely Kierkegaardian." Tisseau had nowhere near enough "coupons" for paper which was severely rationed. Then in the mail he received a large stack of coupon booklets from a reader of his translations – a bookbinder in the south of France named Louis Girard (not Hilarius!) Girard wrote that he himself had received the extra booklets "by a providential error of the Rationing Board."

This is how Tisseau described the printing of *The Sickness Unto Death*: "In the old lean-to next to our house where my grandmother used to bake her bread, Lucette the neighboring farmer's daughter participated with wonder in her eyes as I fed the blank pages to the press while she removed them as soon as they were covered with the 'signs' that she could not read herself."

In 1943 occurred an "act of war" that almost put an end to Tisseau's labors of love. On the 16th of September Allied bombers attacked Nantes in what was one of the heaviest raids up to that time. Tisseau's home in Nantes was completely destroyed. It contained the Kierkegaard library that he had laboriously assembled over the twelve years he lived in Sweden; it contained also all his manuscripts and notes, "as well as everything else that comprises a home, a foyer," he added.

He later wrote, "I realized that my French Protestant heritage had formed me for solitary struggle. I had seen too many similar scenes during the First War to keep me from feeling completely shipwrecked. And so, when I could have given up my fight on behalf of Kierkegaard, I was instead constrained to get right back to work. This was just like we did as soldiers in the First War when we used to say, "We can't go on any longer – but we're off to the Front because it's 'la mode'."

After September 16, 1943, the Tisseau family found lodging at a house of a friend in Nantes that had only been partially semi-destroyed. He would walk the five miles to school every day in his wooden shoes, his *sabots*. And shortly after the war, thanks to friends in Denmark, he was able to reconstruct somewhat his Kierkegaard library. Then another tragedy struck: while walking to school, he was hit by a car and he lost the sight of one eye.

Tisseau, however, rose to the challenge, and in 1948 appeared the first of his translations under the slightly different imprimatur of "Editions Tisseau." (This change was necessitated by changes in French publishing laws – laws that did not make things at all easier for Tisseau!) This first book was *The Instant.* It was followed in 1949 by his translation of *Forlovelsen* which he entitled simply, "Letters to Regine and Emile Boesen." And then two slim volumes containing "At a Graveside" (the third of *Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions*) and *Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays.* There were the last of his "self-published" translations.

In the early 1950s Tisseau retired from teaching. He continued to devote his energies to Kierkegaard. in 1952 he published through the (Swiss) firm of Delachaux et Niestelé his translation of *Christian Discourses.* He faced with courage the personal tragedy of going blind in

the mid-fifties. In 1963, just a year before his death, the Paris press Perrin issued the second edition of *Practice in Christianity*, which included the second edition of *The Point of View of my Work as an Author.*

Also in 1963 occurred a meeting that was to have far-reaching ramifications for Kierkegaard in French. Tisseau met with a wealthy French woman who had decided to fund the publication of "The Complete Works of Kierkegaard" in memory of a son who had died as a young man. The publisher of what was to become a twenty volume edition was the Paris firm of Orante.

Paul-Henri Tisseau died at the age of 70 on June 29, 1964. His work as a promoter and translator of Kierkegaard was carried on by his daughter, Else-Marie Jacquet-Tisseau who "revised and completed the work of her father." The first volume appeared in 1966 and the last in 1987.

In this last volume there is a wonderful "unscientific preface" that contains these words of thanks, "It is meet and right to thank from our hearts Else-Marie Jacquet-Tisseau for her indefatigable devotion to her father's work. She had been an early collaborator, especially after he had lost his sight. Bilingual herself, she also profited from the wisdom of her mother, Gerda Tisseau (née Christensen), right up to her mother's death in 1985."

In June 1994, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Paul-Henri Tisseau's birth, a small ceremony took place in front of his village house. There, in the presence of the Mayor of Bazoges-en-Pareds, of Else-Marie Jacquet-Tisseau and others from the compact world of Kierkegaard in France, a commemorative plaque was unveiled next to the front door. It reads simply, "Here Søren Kierkegaard found 'his reader'/Paul-Henri Tisseau 1894-1964, Translator."

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