THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY

EDMUND HUSSERL

COLLECTED WORKS

EDITOR:
RUDOLF BERNET

VOLUME XII

THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY

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THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY

From the Lectures, Winter Semester, 1910–1911

From the German "Aus den Vorlesungen, Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Wintersemester 1910/1911" in *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*, *Husserliana XIII*, edited by Iso Kern

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TRANSLATORS' PREFACE

I. *Historical place and content of this text*

Iso Kern, in the *Editor's Introduction* of *Husserliana* Vol. XIII (pp. XXXIII–XL), shows us how important for Husserl were the lectures, officially titled, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1910–1911)*, along with the 1910 *Preparatory Notes* (given here as Appendix I). Kern documents his claim that, apart from various references in Husserl's published works, in his *Nachlass* "he probably refers to no other lecture so often as this one." He refers to it by various ways besides its official title as "Lecture on Intersubjectivity," "Lecture on Empathy and Expanded Reduction," "On the Phenomenological Reduction and Transcendental Theory of Empathy," or simply "Empathy." Although the formulations of these themes were of decisive importance for launching the direction of Husserl's reflections, they are not treated in these lectures with the amplitude they eventually received. Kern reports that what is here translated (Number 6 in *Husserliana XIII,* along with related appendices) does not give in its entirety the two-hour per week lectures held during the semester, but only the first part. After Christmas, Husserl began intensively preparing for *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science* that was published in *Logos* in 1911. The second part of the course, the contents of which we do not know, took the form of class discussions. This *Translators' Preface* will supplement Kern's excellent introductory remarks.

By reason of its scope and size, these lectures are one of the best introductions to Husserl's phenomenology. We must await the publication of all the *Nachlass* to decide which one of the many "introductions" is the best for beginners. Husserl himself used parts of these lectures for courses he entitled *Introduction to Phenomenology*.

Here, in a brief space, the classical touchstones of Husserl's philosophy are presented, some for the very first time: the eidetic and phenomenological analysis and how eidetic analysis is not yet phenomenological analysis; the natural attitude and the phenomenological attitude; the phenomenological reduction; the intersubjective reduction; the distinction between nature or being in itself and nature or being displayed; empty and filled intentions; the interplay of presence and absence; the interplay of transcendence and immanence; manifestation through intentionality and the non-intentional pre-reflexive manifestation; the various senses of "I" depending on the position of the phenomenological observer; the "halo" or horizon of experience; world as the full concrete positivity of experience; the incommensurability of the properties of mind and display with the properties of displayed physical objects; body-thing versus lived body; knowledge of other minds through empathy; the unique intentionality of empathy; the phenomenology of communicative acts; temporality and time-consciousness; the consciousness of the time-consciousness of others; universal monadology; the nature of transcendental-phenomenological philosophy vis-à-vis science and other forms of philosophy, etc.

These lectures also are a good source for getting clear on how transcendental phenomenology is different from "pure psychology," "eidetic psychology," "eidetics of the spirit," etc., and in what respects transcendental psychology is transcendental phenomenology. What is crucial, of course, for determining transcendental phenomenology is whether the transcendental reduction is in play. But in order that the reader is not misled, it must be said that, as is typical with Husserl, little consideration is given to the fact that most of the young university listeners were novices. Nevertheless, because the issues are emerging for Husserl with an original freshness, they often make what is at stake more accessible than, e.g., the very dense *Cartesian Meditations*. Moreover, in some respects, these lectures speak to the novice better in part because they cast a wider net in regard to both readers and themes than do the texts comprising *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. Clearly, the lectures are aimed at bright novices as well as the more seasoned students of phenomenology, who, at that time, included some of the gifted young people who later were to be called "The Göttingen-Munich"

or "realist" phenomenologists. The lectures were given two years before the programmatic *Ideas I*, and at least 10 years after Husserl discovered the correlation between being and manifestation, or, more precisely, between what appears, its appearings, and the acts by which the appearings of what appears appear. And they occur about three years after the decisive discovery of the "reduction" (if one assumes that occurred around 1907) as the way to secure the philosophical attitude that opens up the field for philosophy as the field of what appears in its appearings correlated to the agency and agent of manifestation.

It must be stressed that the Appendices and most of the footnotes are integral to the text. These texts, which stem mostly from the 1920s, are further intriguing because they enable the reader to enter into dialogue with Husserl in a lively way by permitting the reader to be a witness to Husserl's responses to the puzzlement of students or his own dialogue with himself. Furthermore, although the Appendices re-present and work over discussions in the body of the text, they are, by no means, mere repetitions because they bring clarification, new developments, and new insights. Moreover, throughout the footnotes and Appendices, there are fine pithy formulations that give the gist of complex issues.

II. *The problem of absolute being*

In these lectures as elsewhere, Descartes is heralded as the forerunner of the reduction. Husserl here (§16) uses the phrase that also characterizes the famous second section of *Ideas I,* "the fundamental consideration," to point to Descartes' *cogito* as what "inaugurates the entire course of development of modern philosophy (. . .), the beginning of all authentic scientific philosophy, and the point of origin of all genuine philosophical problems" which is nothing other than "the staging of a phenomenological reduction." Yet Descartes suffered shipwreck because he did not grasp the sense of an absolute science. Nevertheless, his discovery of a sphere in which doubt made no sense, indeed, of a realm which cannot be put into brackets and which must be affirmed absolutely, is celebrated. In this connection, Husserl here is busy with the senses, on the one hand, of the being of what is objective or what is for absolute consciousness and from which we can doxastically disengage and, on the other

hand, absolute consciousness itself as that from which we *cannot* doxastically disengage. A few years later in *Ideas I* he called the former relative being and the latter absolute being. In later writings, he was to refer to the latter as *meon* (non-being) and the opposite (*Gegenstück*) of all being. (See *Husserliana XXIII*, 277–278 and *Nachlass* MSS C 2 1, 1 ff.) Here in §32, as well as elsewhere in Husserl's writings, in discussions that adumbrate recent emphases in phenomenology spurred by Michel Henry, the absolute being is named something apart from "nature" or "world" because it is neither itself-appearing (in a filled intention), nor does it have a share in such being through an indirect co-positing of nature. And of its core, the phenomenological present, we hear that it "is not appearing presence (*Gegenwart*), but self-presence in an absolute sense." Here, we have what is manifest not as an appearing of . . . , a "genitive of appearing," but the self-appearing of that to which what appears appears, i.e., the self-appearing of the "dative of appearing." This dative itself is self-present but not through an appearing of itself to itself, not an appearing of . . . . to. In Appendix III (XXII) (the second set of roman numerals refer to the original designation in *Husserliana XIII*), Husserl touches upon this basic difficulty of a pre-reflective, non-intentional, non-objective form of manifestation when he asks whether and in what sense there is to be found in that which is found as an object the consciousness with its I that finds the object.

Surely of great interest today, as it was then, is the mind–body relationship. In §13, Husserl speaks of this as *The Distinctio Phaenomenologica*. Here, he not only offers arguments against any kind of reductionism or eliminativism, but also shows the constructive, speculative, and non-eidetic status of any theory of panpsychism. Of great interest here also is the kind of phenomenological parallelism that Husserl presents between the mental and physical or rather, and inseparably, the distinction and relationship between the phenomenological realm and the world as described by the natural sciences. This theme runs throughout the beginning lectures and is picked up again in Appendix I (No. 5), Appendix VI (XXV), and Appendix XII (XVII of No. 5), where it focuses the basic tension within the modern university, i.e., the nature of the relationship between the humanities and the natural sciences. A pressing question at the beginning of the 21st century,

whether and in what sense knowledge of nature is itself a fact of nature, is nicely addressed by Husserl.

III. *Propositional reflection versus transcendental-phenomenological reduction*

Of special interest also is Husserl's attempt, in §17, at making explicit a distinction overlooked by some interpreters, but one that Robert Sokolowski has insisted on the last 25 years, i.e., between propositional reflection and phenomenological reflection, between reflection on propositions and the phenomenological reduction.[1] A way of thinking about the reduction is to think of how we might entertain a claim or proposition without prejudice and on its own merits, and thereby disengage our own immediate doxastic inclinations or allegiances. This unprejudiced reflection on a proposition is related to, but not identical with, the reduction. The reflection on the merits of a claim, on the supposed as supposed, is no longer a naïve assertion of the objective state of affairs, nor is it a turn within to our judgment as if it were waiting to be reflected on. Rather it is taking the state of affairs with which we were formerly engaged in a naïve way *as proposed*. This beginning concern with the truth of what is being asserted is coincident with the opening up of the apophantic realm. Yet it is not a move into the transcendental dimension; it does not yet entertain the whole comprising the acts of manifestation along with the manifested; rather the propositional reflection is still bound doxastically to what is being claimed and has not taken an interest in the acts through which it appears the way it does. This is because propositional reflection still takes the supposed state of affairs as real and does not yet disengage this doxastic allegiance because its *telos* is the truth of what is being asserted. Phenomenology's *telos* is not the truth of what we experience, judge, and declare to be true, the truth of the appearing being, but the truthfulness of being, being in

[1] There are other places where Husserl makes this distinction. See, e.g., his *Inaugural Freiburg Lecture* in *Husserliana XXV*, 76; trans. in *Husserl: Shorter Works*, ed. Peter McCormick and Frederick A. Elliston (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Univ. Press), 15. See also *Formal and Transcendental Logic (Husserliana XVII),* Section 44a-β. In §69 of *Experience and Judgment* propositional reflection is briefly discussed and it is clear that it is *not* to be identified with the phenomenological reflection.

its appearing, in its display, and therefore truth as it is inseparable from the revealing life of consciousness. It presupposes the work of the truth of experience and judgment in the natural attitude; it presupposes the uncovering of the apophantic by way of reflection on the given state of affairs as supposed; and it, in turn, focuses on the display by experience and judgment of this truth, of the difference between the naïvely given state of affairs and the emergence of this state of affairs when taken as supposed, i.e., as a proposition, and the way the state of affairs again appears when it is confirmed in a filled intention and not merely as supposed and not merely as naïvely given.

IV. *The apodicticity of the field of phenomenological philosophy*

Aspects of this theme are continued in Appendix IV (XXIII). According to Husserl, in the reduction I have "positive" truth, i.e., straightforwardly and naïvely posited truth, precisely as it is had by the positively directed I. The *epoché* enables the thematization of the positing along with the posited or its proposition, as something so positively posited. This is not contradicted by Husserl's remark that for phenomenology the positive truth as such is never a theme. In the natural attitude, the positivity as such remains hidden. (For the unreflective and naïve attitude, what is given is not given as posited in a naïve straightforward, non-reflective, way; seeing the natural attitude as such is not integral to the natural attitude.) In the transcendental reflection on the natural attitude's obliviousness to its positivity, we can say that "positive truth as such" is the equivalent of: without disengagement of doxastic allegiance. Only the *epoché* enables the overcoming of this naiveté, and, in this different sense, the disclosure of "the positive truth as such."

In Appendix IV (XXIII), there also is an especially good discussion of the problematic relationships between the realms of positivity (which are equated with the ontic) and the transcendental, e.g., in terms of the logical dependence or independence of one on the other, the nature of the synthesis of the two realms by the one same I, the nature of the transition from the naïve enworldment to the transcendental engagement and back again. One clear conclusion is that the truth or falsity of the ontic, positive realm, e.g., the truth about the states of affairs of science or common sense, does not affect the truth or falsity

of the phenomenological realm, being the realm that displays the presentation by common sense and science of the ontic or positive realms. Further, the truth as such of the positive and ontic realm, its being made manifest as such, is dependent on and inconceivable without the phenomenological truth that brings this display to light, even though the truths that are uncovered in the positive, ontic realm are never as such a theme for phenomenology. Thus, e.g., phenomenology is not interested in the truth or falsity of NASA's claim that there is ice on Mars or a sociologist's claim that America's quest for empire is due to the influence of the Christian Right; but both these claims as ways of articulating the truth of the world are of interest to phenomenology.

Toward the end of Appendix IV (XXIII), Husserl then discusses the possibility of a transcendental theoretical habitus that has validity even though the I ineluctably must attend to the demands of the world and its positivities. Thus, the transcendental phenomenologist in her engagement in the exigencies of life does not simply revert to naiveté but necessarily has a second-naiveté or a transformed positivity. Husserl does not here address whether this second-naiveté or retained detachment is possible for the phenomenological philosopher with regard to all of life's exigencies and importunities. In any case, we have reason to believe, from the later writings, that this "transformed positivity" was to be an enrichment of subsequent ethical-cultural life.

Husserl notes at §23, the beginning of Chapter IV, that here the idea of an "apodictic critique of phenomenological experience" makes its first entrance. In §24, he wrestles with basic issues in such a way that shows the inseparability of the appearings of things from acts. A recurrent question Husserl's phenomenology faces is in what sense acts are indeed "given" in their disclosure of beings through aspects, or in what sense the acts are phenomena themselves. Some philosophers have denied that acts are phenomena, i.e., are given in any way. Rather only the phenomena or aspects, profiles, perspectives, etc., of intentional objects are given, but the acts are inferred as the non-experienced source of the agency that is responsible for the phenomena or aspects of things. In these lectures, without always being perfectly clear, Husserl works with the conviction not only that phenomena as aspects are inseparable from acts, but also that acts themselves may be given, indeed he calls them, not without causing some

difficulties of interpretation for the student, empirical givennesses. "Empirical" in these sections seems to refer to what is available to perception *or* reflection apart from the reduction. The same perception therefore can appear as "empirical" and then as "phenomenological," i.e., reduced by reason of the disengaging of the doxastic allegiance.

In a fresh manner, as if Husserl were thinking out loud, the lectures raise difficult questions about the extent to which the reduction is a realm of apodicticity of pure immanence. To this end he nicely spells out senses of "immanence" and "transcendence." (See §§29–30.) For example, Husserl argues that the phenomenological philosopher is compelled to acknowledge that a reduction to absolutely pure immanence is impossible because the transcendence of retention (and what it retains) necessarily remains within the apodictic immanent realm of the reduction; if we do not acknowledge this transcendence in immanence, we have to *per impossibile* get rid of the absolute Now itself because it is always a retention of a just-past Now, as well as a protention of a not-yet Now.

Further, if it is necessary that retentions be part of the reduced realm, and if they necessarily transcend the absolute Now, does phenomenology require a commitment to the infallibility of retention and memory? (See §25.) To what extent does the transcendence that necessarily is within the absolute sphere threaten its claims to apodicticity? How can a science be absolute when only the ephemeral pre-reflexive realm of the Now is absolutely given? In this connection, it is interesting to note that Husserl (at the beginning of Appendix XI (XXX)) speaks of a primal or original right to trust the givens of memory and the being of past transcendental consciousness.

What Husserl later would call "the phenomenology of phenomenology" is already an adumbrated theme in these discussions here. Of special interest is the effort (at §32 ff.) to separate the properly phenomenological data (the text uses the Latinized German word *Data* but also "givenness" (*Gegebenheit*)) and to show in what sense the phenomenological reflective viewing is separable from the reduced object's appearing. Is the absolute phenomenon the reduced phenomenological object, or is it the neutralized phenomenological act, or is it the phenomenological viewing of the neutralized act and its

reduced object? Is it all three? Is it the reduced "stream" of *cogitata* and the "stream" of *cogitationes*, or is it the "stream" of the phenomenological viewing or *cogitatio* that brings the first-order, enworlded, *cogitatio* to light?

V. *World and ontology*

In §9, Husserl gives a broad intriguing sketch of eidetic disciplines within the context of a discussion of the natural sciences, i.e., the sciences of factual existence. Iso Kern informs us that Husserl struck out these pages. I think we may assume that this was done not because he disagreed with the doctrine here discussed but because the presentation was repetitious and lacked some precision. Here, he argues that the ideas or regional frameworks that make up natural science may be studied purely, i.e., apart from the doxastic allegiance that characterizes our spontaneous relation to nature. Thus, the essential, eidetic study of the ideas of space, time, motion, thing, etc., would make up an ontology of nature. The natural sciences make use of these *a priori* ideas and necessities, but in an unthematic way.

Furthermore, there are other eidetic disciplines that the natural sciences make use of but do not thematically attend to, e.g., pure arithmetic, pure number, and pure probability. Likewise, there is the discipline of formal logic that has to do with not merely the number *one* of arithmetic but anything whatsoever, insofar as it becomes part of a proposition, which is its articulation through syntax, quantification, etc. Formal logic studies the necessary and contingent relations of propositions to one another. Ontology is related to formal logic because it is the formal eidetic science that studies the thought of being as such.

We may here also call attention to brief but tantalizing remarks on the ontology of the individuality of I-monads (which are also called "essentialities" and "substances"); this is followed with a meditation on a theme that accompanies Husserl to his last days, namely whether a plurality of I's is essentially necessary or whether there is a sense in which there can be only *one* I. In any case, the actual plurality of these essentially and radically distinct individuals or monads found the possible communalization through empathy and this plurality cannot

be dissolved in any higher-order communalization, however, profound it might be. (See Appendix XI (XXX))

These lectures adumbrate later discussions of the "life-world" and the ontology of world. In §10, Husserl points out how there is a sense of the surrounding or world as the intentional correlate of the indubitable phenomenological field, found always already in advance of the natural and eidetic sciences. Here, a sense of being is given which serves as the basis for what the various ontologies that comprise the eidetic pure disciplines yield. This consideration is inseparable from the discovery of the fundamental sense of experience or the "natural-world thesis," i.e., the target of the basic doxastic allegiance of the natural attitude. This basic sense of ontology he calls "ontology of the real" or "real ontology."

He then shows how nothing that may change within culture, history, nature, human development, etc., i.e., nothing that changes in the world, can affect the essential sense of the world because these facts make no sense without the presupposition of this basic sense of the world or being of the real. These early adumbrations of the "life-world" are one of the places for thinking about Husserl's contribution to the contemporary discussions of "possible worlds."

VI. *Avenarius' positivism and realontology*

In §10 and Appendix III (XXII), Husserl enters into a tantalizing conversation with Richard Avenarius and perhaps also, to a lesser extent, with Ernst Mach.[2] This "world of pure experience" (a theme also of the later William James) is what is *vorgefunden*, given, found, but also given or found in advance, in the natural attitude. It, as the *concretum* that comes to light in the natural attitude, gets broken up into parts (object, object-horizon, act, egological bearer of the act, etc.) through the reflection inaugurated by the reduction.

It is almost certain that among the gifted students who visited these lectures was Hedwig Conrad-Martius. On the basis of her work

[2] For an excellent discussion of Mach and Avenarius within the context of Husserlian phenomenology, see Manfred Sommer, *Husserl und der frühe Positivismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1985); for Mach alone see also his *Evidenz im Augenblick: eine Phänomenologie der reinen Empfindung* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987).

with Husserl, she completed, in 1912, a fundamental treatise, *The Epistemological Bases of Positivism.*[3] This work delighted Husserl and was awarded a university prize, but she did not receive a doctorate for the work because Göttingen did not confer doctorates on women. It would be instructive to compare the lectures translated in this volume with this work as well as its enlarged reworking, *On the Ontology and Theory of Appearing of the Real External World: Together with a Critique of Positivist Theories*[4] not only in terms of the obvious connection with the empiricist–positivist tradition of Avenarius, Mach *et alii*, but also for the other themes of great interest to Husserl, e.g., the distinctive forms of self-presentation of what is touched, smelled, heard, and seen, as well as the precise sense of the "given" and in what sense the *Umgebungsbewusstsein* (the awareness of the surrounding) belongs to the "given."

Of special interest also is that Husserl uses a formulation that captures a theme in Conrad-Martius' "realontology" (*Realontologie*)[5] and ontology of appearing, i.e., that for the phenomenologist the being of the phenomenon shows itself to be "self-presenting outwards as self-present" (§32). Husserl himself touches upon this theme of "realontology" in §10. At issue here are such matters as: What makes for the real as real? What is the most obvious taken-for-granted that is the target of the primal theses of the world or "nature?" How is it to be distinguished from ideal, fictional objects, etc., not merely in terms of the different kinds of intentionality, e.g., signitive or perceptual, empty or filled, but in terms of the thing's "in the flesh" (*leibhaftig*) self-presentation as having "itselfness" or "self-presence?" Husserl brushes against these issues here, perhaps enough to provoke Conrad-Martius to undertake a noematic eidetics or ontology of the real and really real. Typically for Husserl (see Appendix IV (XXIII)) the really real is discussed in terms of the universal accord of my/our experience,

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[3] *Die erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus* (Bergzabern: Heinrich Müller, 1920).

[4] *Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Aussenwelt. Verbunden mit einer Kritik positivistischer Theorien* (Halle: Niemeyer, 1916) in Husserl's *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, III, 345–542.

[5] See Hedwig Conrad-Martius, *Realontologie,* in Husserl's *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, VI (Halle: Niemeyer, 1923).

and the necessity of the harmony of the manifolds of experience. Yet, we also know that for Husserl (see, e.g., §30 and §32) the deeper ontological issue is the unique mode of self-presentation of absolute consciousness that exemplarily presents itself as in-itself and as having a self-rooted self-ness or ipseity. This stands in contrast to the *Leibhaftigkeit* of objects given in a filled intention. For example, the sense of what it is of which one is aware in the self-awareness of an I, whether one's own in the first-person or that of another in the second- or third-person, is that which "is in itself and for itself and what is conceived through its own essence." (See Appendix XI (XXX) and our discussion above of absolute being.) Consider also the well-known formulation from *Husserliana VIII,* 412: "The being of the I is continuously being-for-itself, is continuously being and being-for-itself through self-manifestation, through absolute manifestation wherein what is manifested necessarily is." These are the kind of formulations that Conrad-Martius uses as a springboard for her eidetics of "the real" and "the really real."

VII. *Is the life-world opinion-laden or theory-laden?*

In these lectures, Husserl, perhaps under Avenarius' influence, often uses forms of the verb *vorfinden*. What is this *Vorfinden* before, in advance of, or prior to? Sometimes the term seems to refer to the great fund of implicit awareness in the natural attitude prior to reflection and explicit categorial and syntactical thematization. In Appendix III (XXII), its sense is placed explicitly in connection with the concept of the world as developed by Richard Avenarius. Avenarius discovered the world and the correlation to the I's as what were found in advance, but he did not appreciate the difference it makes when this finding-in-advance is approached from the phenomenological attitude.

What is found in advance is what is prior to theory and, of course, what is prior to theory may be thick with what is unthematic and implicit. World here approximates what Husserl later will call the "life-world" wherein we are confronted with an original sense and immediate givenness prior to all "theory." It seems that *das Vorgefundene*, which is found in advance, is not for Husserl "theory-laden" as one says today, but "opinion-laden." Of course, this claim makes

sense only if we reserve a special sense to theory because surely the world comes to us in advance saturated with religious, metaphysical, scientific, etc., opinions and/or "theories." Some of the opinions were once someone's, perhaps our own, theory, but they are not functioning now strictly speaking as theory proper, i.e., as my articulation of what is given in advance.

What precisely is the difference between opinion and theory here for Husserl? (See Appendix III (XXII).) Proper theory is the work of *thoughtful* experiencing (*Erfahrungsdenken*) that builds on and explicates "that experience which is found (in advance)," which surely is soaked with opinions, many of which might well have been the result of acts of theory. But it would seem that here Husserl excludes a certain kind of theory from *das Vorgefundene* as well as from the actual thoughtful experiencing, namely the theory which would make impossible phenomenology as the ultimate and fundamental philosophical science or discipline. Thus, there would be excluded from the actuality of that which is found (in advance) or the life-world any theory that would *a priori* deny any ontological sense to what appears. Such would be the theory of, e.g., forms of scientific realism, naturalism, eliminativism, and psychologism. It would exclude any theory, as he has it in the *Prolegomena* to the *Logical Investigations* (§32), that makes theory, especially the *theorein* of phenomenological viewing, impossible. The obstinacy of such theories poses an enormous but now familiar challenge for teachers attempting an introduction to phenomenology. The basic pedagogical move is to *show* that these theories must deny what they ineluctably presuppose, i.e., the appearing of what appears. For example, they deny the appearing of lived experience in favor of the physical reality, e.g., in favor of the stimulated neural fibers, as if this consideration could dispense with the lived experiencing of the appearing stimulated neural fibers.

Thus, what is "already found (in advance)," as an immediate and original givenness of sense, is what can and must be described. But a true and acceptable theory, true thoughtful experiencing, is such that it does not injure the general sense of the original givenness. Thus, a criterion of this acceptable theory seems to be that it is manifestly a continuation of this original givenness. Yet it is not simply identical with the description of the original given sense because it

is also "a broader encompassing description." (Appendix III (XXII)) There must be a kind of identity synthesis between what is found and the theory's broader encompassing description. Beyond this there is nothing for philosophy to do: "To seek for more has no meaning." This basic "positivism" and "immanentism" of phenomenology means that all theory is tied to what appears and all transcendence is tucked within, immanent to, this world that is always there prior to theories about this world that are discontinuous with it as it is lived.

VIII. *Empathy and the intersubjective reduction*

The frequently appearing *Einfühlung* we have simply translated as "empathy." Husserl's technical meaning, i.e., the act by which we presence another and therefore another self-awareness on the basis of its bodily presence-in-the world, is as foreign to the German sense of the word as it is to the English. (See Appendix XI (XXX) where Husserl confesses that "empathy" is a poor choice and that "empathizing perception" would be better.)

For Husserl, "empathy" is a unique kind of intentionality that discloses the "other" I. What is manifest is a being that is conscious and possibly a who. When such a being appears as a human, empathy makes present a being that is self-aware, enjoying a first-person perspective, and is capable of referring to herself as "I." Thus, empathy reveals for essential reasons what forever eludes me because I can make the other person present as you, she or he, never as "I," as she is "I" for herself only. In empathy, the "self," being immediately present to the other in her first-person experience, is made present at a distance and in a comparatively empty way.

Further, in the reduction, the other person, like everything else, becomes an "index" in the sense that what is made present, points in an empty way (which may or may not be filled in by phenomenological reflection and analysis) to the network comprised of the manifold intentional achievements of the one phenomenologizing.

Husserl teaches that we can also perform the *epoché* with regard to the empathized other consciousness. When this happens, reality or nature is not only an index for *my* system of possible experiences, but it is also at the same time an index for corresponding systems

of experience of certain relevant other I's or possibly all other I's (i.e., being is now displayed as being "for us all," i.e., the monadic community). (See §39 and also Appendix IX (XXVIII)) This does not mean, *per impossibile*, that I act on your behalf and disconnect your doxastic allegiance, but rather in addition to the phenomenon of the world as what appears to me, and in addition to you or all the others as appearing to me, there now is effected: the world as-it-appears-for-you, and/or for the others, and the world-as-for-us-all. World is now reduced for me to an index pointing to the manifold temporal strands of the background of my and the other streams of consciousness.

There is no direct channel leading from my empathizing stream of consciousness to the stream of consciousness of the others. Thus, the reduction of the others' world to the others' streams of consciousness or streaming presencing (through this second reduction) cannot mean that the others' streams of presencing belong to mine or mine to theirs. Nevertheless, there is a coincidence of Now in my empathizing and the empathized given Now of the others' stream of consciousness, even though the empathized Now is not the lived Now of my empathizing. What remains after this reduction is that the world in its publicity, being the same for us all, appears to me as an index for the indefinite manifold of streams of consciousness of mine and all the others with whom I stand connected through their being present explicitly or implicitly in my presencing of things in the world. This consideration enables Husserl to say: "Considered absolutely there is only the ego and its life (. . .). Considered absolutely there is nothing besides mind and there is no other bond than that of mind." (Appendix XI (XXX)) (See also Appendices VII–IX, which contain rich discussions of the time-consciousness of empathy and the senses in which there is and is not a temporal unity of the empathizing stream of consciousness with the empathized stream of consciousness.) In §40, Husserl cautions that he has not said that, having exercised the epoché, "nature is nothing but" this interaction and constitution of monads. Nature, after all, has been merely bracketed; its being posited and displayed is presupposed by transcendental reflection. Yet it still is a fact that the complete philosophy of transcendental phenomenology is a monadology and the interaction and bonding of monads is philosophically more basic than notions of nature and natural relations derived from the natural attitude.

IX. *Lived body and mind*

In the later writings, it seems that Husserl makes a clear distinction between *Leib*, which we have usually translated as "lived body," and *Körper*, which we have usually translated as "body," "physical body," or "body-thing." However, in the texts presented in this volume, Husserl sometimes uses *Leib* for one's objective physical body and not for the lived zero-point of orientation wherein one's sensations, feelings, kinaestheses, and volitions manifestly function. (See, e.g., §§12–14 and the first paragraphs of Appendix X (XXIX).) This leads to the anomaly of the possibility of there being a bodiless I (*leibloses Ich*) for whom the perceptual world is the same as for the embodied I. Because for Husserl the perception of physical objects in space essentially requires the correlative functioning of the kinaestheses, etc., of the lived body, of *Leib* in this sense, there seems to be a contradiction in Husserl's discussions. In Appendix X (XXIX), second paragraph, Husserl makes a clear distinction between *Leib* as physical body and Leib in the proper sense of *Erlebnisse* or lived experiences of effort, kinaestheses, will, etc. Husserl believes that, as such, these latter lived experiences, even though they are the experiences of the *Leib*, as the zero-point of orientation and the lived non-objective system of affections or lived experiences that correlate with the world of bodies in motion, are conceivable without a physical body. The reason is that an *Erlebnis* has the kind of being whose integrity would hold even if all spatial–temporal things, e.g., bodies in space, proved to be "a meaningless phantasy." (See §14.) Yet when Husserl entertains the possibility of perceiving the world in the same way as the embodied person, even though this time the I is without *Leib*, he is clearly referring to *Leib* as some physical thing in space and time, even though this experiencing of the world would not be possible without *Leib* as the lived correlative system of kinaesthesis, sense of effort, will, etc. Because of these problems in the translation we have let the contexts determine the translation of both *Leib* and *Körper*.

In this same Appendix X, Husserl raises the question of the possibility of an agreement in the perception of the world between a bodiless ghostly spirit or mind and one embodied, even though this agreement could only be *communicated* if there were embodied minds. That is to say, in some way mind must have its "outside" or it must be able to externalize itself or disclose itself in a medium participated in by

others; otherwise empathy, which is the basis for communication, because it achieves the indication of the presence of other minds, is not possible. Husserl returns to this topic in a more elaborate way in *Husserliana XIV*, 324–340.

In §§13–14 as well as in Appendix VI (XXV), we have a provocative discussion of the relation of spirit or mind to body-thing or matter. The result of phenomenological eidetics is the dualism of mind and physical bodiliness. The properties of the one are not commensurate with the properties of the other. It is not only the case that it is not necessary that a bodily thing be a feeling or conscious thing, but furthermore (§13) it belongs to the essence of the life of the mind, the life of feeling, perceiving, desiring, questioning, etc., that there not be an essential real connection to a physical, material thing in the world. There is surely a connection, but it is a factual contingent one. (As we have just seen, if, however, there is to be actual communication between monads or minds, it is a matter of necessity that there be this connection.)

Husserl further holds that there is possible an eidetic knowledge of the psycho-physical, i.e., the realm wherein the mind and material (or non-mental) meet, without the investigating mind necessarily standing in an essential dependence on the physical. Even in the third-person Husserl sees only factual necessities of correlation, not eidetic ones. But here Husserl does not seem to be saying, as some thinkers today propose, that in principle the relation of mind with "C," his term for the psycho-physical connection or "where" consciousness is bound to the physical realm (cf. *Ideen II*, p. 29, *Husserliana IV*; see also §63 of the same volume for more on "psycho-physics"), cannot be known. For such contemporary thinkers, the relation of consciousness to C remains *essentially* elusive or recessive and the human investigator is consigned necessarily to ignorance on this matter. Husserl, rather, emphasizes that the actual relation is a non-necessary one. In this sense, the psycho-physical is not necessary for the knowledge of the psycho-physical.

A clear reason for why Husserl cannot be characterized as holding a mentalist monist view is that the deliverances of the natural attitude are never denied absolutely; rather they are maintained as indexes for the transcendental attitude's display of being. Indeed, the natural attitude is the point of departure and also in some sense the *telos* of the transcendental attitude. In one respect, the transcendental

I is an abstract moment of the *concretum* of our being monads with windows, i.e., persons in the world with others. Thus, it is utterly misguided to think that Husserl would say that transcendent being itself is merely an index for transcendental agency of manifestation! Nevertheless for Husserl there is a privileging of the mental realm and much depends on how we understand this. A challenge to dualism or monism of either a mental or material kind is to be found in the phenomenological description of intentionality. On the one hand, intentionality, intentional acts, and the "I," etc., do not show themselves to have properties that objective physical things have. On the other hand, in the full description of intentional agency, e.g., in the forms of empathy or perception, or in volition, there is *necessarily* included a relation to the material, physical world by the essentially distinct intending mind. The very sense of perception, empathy, or the *fiat* of the decision, e.g., to "write the letter," involves the inclusion of the physical-material world.

But for Husserl the matter does not simply rest here. One may recall his older teaching that intentionality essentially is a relation that is not existence-dependent on what it is related to. Here, in this 1910–1911 text, the emphasis is that, of course, for the eidetic reflection or even empirical reflection there is necessarily connected to the sense of the intentional act the apperceived real physical thing. In addition, there is necessarily connected to it the physical bodiliness of the lived body, which serves as the foundation of my empathic perception of you; similarly, the apperception of my own physical bodiliness is connected to any and every act of self-reference. But can I not disengage the doxastic allegiance of these apperceptions? And does this not give to me a field of mind or experience "in itself" such that there is evident an integrity of this realm even if the apperceived posited real world — being integral to the sense of this intentionality prior to the reduction — were in fact to be annihilated, e.g., by a geological catastrophe?

The basic issue then is in what sense the features of "absolute being" opened up by the reduction can be introduced into the resolution of the regional-ontological as well as larger metaphysical questions regarding the ultimate status of spirit, nature, materiality, monads, and their relations. On occasion for Husserl, it seems that the features of absolute being were decisive because of the *ontological* privileging

(cf. §14) of the realm of the I's own self-experience or self-awareness over that which is manifest in the world. Everything depends for Husserl on how we define this advantage. Clearly, it is epistemological; but is it only or merely that? Upon the answer to this question hangs the ultimate merit of transcendental-phenomenological idealism. In any case, even if "mind" (*Geist*) is for Husserl the privileged "category," it is not mind understood simply as a category or region of being, e.g., juxtaposed to "nature" or "soul" or "animalia" or "physical thing." The transcendental-phenomenological sense of mind, although surely standing in an identity synthesis with the regional-ontological notion of mind, is not simply the equivalent of it. The sense of mind as ultimate transcendental I, e.g., would not be described simply as a being disclosed and individuated in space and time, begun and ending, embodied, an act-center, etc.; and the ontological regional "mind," e.g., would not be described simply and as such as the transcendental I is, e.g., as *meon* or the opposite to anything posited (as, e.g., in *Husserliana XXIII,* 275–278), that is, as the agent and dative of being's display, etc.

X. *Phenomenological sociology and theology*

What we have presented as Appendices I (No. 5) and XII (XVII) partially develop Husserl's phenomenological sociology and social philosophy. The here translated texts are but a taste of these issues that Husserl develops throughout *Husserliana XIII–XV* and elsewhere, and perhaps talked about in a free way in the actual spoken lectures of *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1910–1911).* Appendix XII (XVII) is of special interest for presenting a strong case for the *Geisteswissenschaften*, which can be translated both as "sciences of spirit" as well as "humanities" (in contrast to the natural or "hard" sciences), as a distinctive research field. Inseparable from these sciences of spirit or humanities is the central concept of "motivation." In this volume, motivation as the distinctive sense of "causality" within the transcendental egological and intersubjective realm is nicely sketched. For Husserl, phenomenological sociology and indeed all of the humanities study the unique causality of motivation, as it is born by groups and individuals both as unique single individuals as well as individuals as members of groups. Thus, Appendix XII concisely indicates some of

the basic features of intersubjective dynamics and shows how monads "work upon" or "effect" one another. A key form of interaction is "social-communicative acts" that are often presented under the rubric of "the I–You relation." Husserl's analysis of "social" or "communicative" acts (cf. also the work of Husserl's student, Adolf Reinach, on social acts) has affinities with later notions of "speech acts" (as found in, e.g., John Austin and John Searle). In particular in the late 20th century, the work of Paul Grice on "utterer's intention" invites the drawing of parallels.[6]

Finally, what we have translated as Appendix XIII (which is Appendix IV to the *Number 1* of *Husserliana XIII*) is a 1908 text very much connected with the basic theme of the unity of consciousness that pervades the lectures, particularly in §37. Recall that Husserl found himself compelled to claim that: "Considered absolutely there is only the ego and its life." (Appendix XI (XXX)) This theme is enriched and complicated by the introduction of intersubjectivity, a transcendental monadology, and then by a theological meditation on a possible divine "I" that knows the world through a synthesis and transcendence of the radically individual, distinct, and potentially conflicting absolute I's which it somehow bears within its ownmost sphere.

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XI. *Final notes on the translation*

All the numbered section titles have been provided by the Editor, not Husserl. We have placed the original pagination in the margins.

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[6] Paul Grice, *Studies in the Way of Words* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 86 ff. See the nice analysis in *Husserliana XIV,* 166 ff. that enriches the thin sketch in this volume in Appendix XII. See also the rich development in Adolf Reinach, *Zur Phänomenologie des Rechts* (Munich: Kösel, 1953/1916), 37 ff. This aspect of Husserl's thought has spawned a contemporary wing of phenomenology with which one may associate the names of Barry Smith, Kevin Mulligan, Karl Schuhmann *et alii*.

Usually, we have not attempted to render Husserl in gender-neutral language. For the sake of convenience and probable historical accuracy, we have generally used the older English conventions, which favor the masculine form. What follows is an account of translation choices we have made in regard to some key terms, most often with a sense of trepidation and dissatisfaction.

One of Husserl's key terms, perhaps developed in response to Avenarius' theory of the "world" that we *find before* all theory, is the verb *vorfinden* and various nominalizations of it, such as *das Vorgefundene*, *die Vorgefundenheiten*, *die Vorfindlichkeiten*, etc. To translate *vorfinden* as "to find" is too weak and bland, for the German term denotes a spatial or temporal *dimension* in which things are found, as things being found *around*, *before*, or *ahead* of ourselves. The things that I find before or around me are already there; they are pre-given. Accordingly, we have translated *vorfinden* by using phrases such as "to find before oneself," etc. Depending on context, we have translated *das Vorgefundene* or *die Vorfindlichkeit* by "that which is found around us" or "things found in advance," etc.

For the German noun *Erscheinung*, we have sometimes avoided the common rendering with "appearance" because of the baggage of "mere appearance" in contrast to the matter's veridical display. Instead, we have used the gerund "appearing" which seems less burdened with this baggage. Generally, however, "appearance" does not ever mean "mere appearance."

For the frequent word *Zusammenhang* and its modifications in the plural, as well as its adjectival forms, etc., we have generally used "context" or "cohesion," or "connection" and their modifications, depending on the context. Sometimes the context seems to require one of these, but other times it seems to require all of the senses at once. In §28, Husserl himself thematizes the rich senses of *Zusammenhang*.

For *Vergegenwärtigung*, Husserl's general term for an intention of what is not immediately present in a filling way and therefore not present as an immediate perceptual given, being rather a rendering present of what is in some respect perceptually absent, we have reluctantly, for the most part, stayed with the canonical American barbarism, "presentification." In the text, Husserl frequently makes clear how this term is to be understood.

For *Erlebnis*, we have also followed the American tradition and have rendered it as "lived experience," except in some cases where it seemed the more general "experience" served better.

For *Vollzug*, *Vollziehen*, etc., we have usually translated "performance," as it has to do with the bringing about and actuation of the life of the mind through, especially, intentional acts. The obvious shortcoming is that in English there is a deliberateness and publicity attached to "performance;" the actuation of the life of the mind through acts is often neither deliberate nor public. Yet, we find occasion to speak of, e.g., the non-public and non-deliberative performance of a machine, racehorse, or athlete: it or she is performing well or badly, e.g., running or playing well or poorly. On occasion, we have used "achievement," the chief disadvantage of which is that it sounds as if the act has special qualities of excellence meriting recognition and applause. Such connotations, of course, mislead.

For *Vorstellung*, we have tried to avoid the Humean baggage of "idea" or "notion." Similarly, "representation" also conjures up something in between what the mind presents and the presented. Thus most often we simply used "presentation" or, depending on the context, "making present."

For the most part, we have stuck to the convention of translating *Wiedererinnerung* as "recollection" or "recollecting" and *Erinnerung* as "memory" or "remembering."

Since Husserl puts so much emphasis on the "experiential" aspects of the "experiential sciences," we have translated his term *Erfahrungswissenschaften* by the term "experiential sciences," rather than by the commonly used term "empirical sciences." For Husserl's concern is not so much directed at the methodological exactitude in the sciences in question than their saturation in experience. However, we have used the standard translation "natural sciences" for Husserl's term *Naturwissenschaften*, although his concept does not merely refer to the exact natural sciences, as we understand them today. Rather, for Husserl they include all sciences that thematize nature as nature.

For *schlechthin*, we have generally used the Latin expression *simpliciter*. However, "pure and simple" and "absolutely" would also be accurate. In particular, judgments *simpliciter* are typically judgements of positivity that occur in the natural attitude where the positing is taken up with the posited as absolute, i.e., not correlated with the

positing. The posited is, in this sense, regarded "dogmatically." For transcendental phenomenology, judgments *simpliciter* are legitimate only in the reduced ("pure") sphere of consciousness.

For *Geisteswissenschaften*, we have used the modern English translation "the humanities," although it must be kept in mind that for Husserl they fall under the theoretical and hence scientific disciplines in general, i.e., they belong to the corpus of *Wissenschaften* or sciences in the broad sense. *Geist* and *geistig* we translated as "mind" and "of the mind," respectively, although on some occasions we did use the term "intellectual" for the latter. There simply are no good equivalents for the terms *Geist* and *geistig* in English. *Spirit* and *spiritual* have too much metaphysical baggage, whereas *intellect* and *intellectual* seem to miss the philosophical and transcendental significance altogether that Husserl sees in *Geist*. Under these circumstances, it usually seems best to translate *Geist* and *geistig* as "mind" and "of the mind," respectively, provided one keeps at bay all reductionist connotations which neglect intentionality and take "the mental" as a brain state, etc. The German expression "*Leben der Seele*" we have translated as "inner life."

In general, we have translated *Wissenschaften* as "sciences" or "scientific disciplines," taking these terms in the broad sense where they denote any systematic, theoretical endeavor to articulate truths about a given subject matter. In this sense, mathematics, linguistics, physics, and history are all examples of *Wissenschaften* or sciences.

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Except for the added Appendix XIII, this edition gives the reader the same material that one may find in the German edition, published by Meiner as *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1910–1911)* that merely excerpts from *Husserliana XIII*, and in the French translation by Jacques English, and in the Spanish translation by Xavier San Martin. We have benefited from the work of these translators and thank them for their prior labors. We especially wish to thank Professor San Martin for sending a copy of his translation. We also wish to thank Dr. Robin Rollinger at the Husserl Archives for looking at an earlier draft of the translation. We have incorporated many of his

insightful suggestions. Many thanks go to Professor Ullrich Melle for helpful comments on the *Translators' Preface*. In addition, we wish to thank Ingrid Lombaerts of the Husserl Archives for the kindness of checking the text, Elizabeth Behnke for helping with a couple of difficult passages, and Brian Burkhart for reading an early translation of the text out loud to James Hart. Last but not least, we wish to thank Kristia Kesler for her expert advice on some difficult passages.

From the Lectures on [111]
The Basic Problems of Phenomenology[1]
(*Winter Semester 1910–1911*)

Chapter 1

THE NATURAL ATTITUDE AND THE "NATURAL CONCEPT OF THE WORLD"

§1. *The I in the natural attitude*

In this semester we want to busy ourselves with the basic problems of a general phenomenology of consciousness. We want to study the basic constitution of consciousness as such in its chief features.

The investigations that we want to conduct require a completely [112] different attitude than the natural one within which natural-scientific and psychological knowledge is attained. Phenomenology is by no

[1] What we have here are only pages of the lectures of the *first weeks* (October, November in 1910), which were followed by discussions. Later I lectured without any notes.

Table of Contents: Starting from the natural concept of world. The natural concept of world as starting point of a theory of knowledge. The possibility of a phenomenology. "Phenomenology" is here not from the outset regarded as a phenomenological theory concerned with *essence* but rather the attempt is made to consider whether an experiential phenomenology is possible, which is not a theory concerned with essence.

The evidence of the *ego cogito* in respect to the evidence of the unity of the stream of consciousness, hence the givenness of the phenomenological field. The transcendence in immanence and the different concepts of transcendence. The legitimacy of the transcendent positing in immanence. The right of remembering and expectation. Especially important is the right of intentional relations, of the intentions of expectations, which yield the transformation of an empirical transcendent positing into systematic connections of consciousness. Objectivity as *index* for transcendental subjectivity and the right of "empirical" knowledge within the sphere of consciousness. The phenomenological (not eidetic) reduction thereby yields the possibility, within the subjective (transcendental-subjective) sphere, to go beyond what is actually impressional. The same position is applied to *empathy*. The initial considerations about this theme. Transcendental reduction (the disengagement of physical nature) yields in addition to the *ego* the other *ego* as well and its stream. The theory of monads. The bonding of monads. Recollection actually gives (*gibt*) the it*self* ! Empathic presentification (*einfühlende Vergegenwärtigung*), remembering of a present (*Gegenwartserinnerung*) does not actually give (*gibt nicht*) the itself.

Especially important: essence of the unified phenomenological I: how my stream of consciousness is closed off phenomenologically from every other one. Principle of Unity. — Husserl's note.

means psychology. It is found in a new dimension and demands an essentially different attitude from that of psychology as well as of any science of spatial–temporal existence. In order to show this, an introduction is necessary.

I begin with a description of the different attitudes in which experience and knowledge can occur. First of all, there is the *natural* attitude, in which we all live and from which we thus start when we bring about the philosophical transformation of our viewpoint. We do this by describing in a general fashion what this attitude finds before itself as pre-given things (*Vorfindlichkeiten*).

Each of us says "*I*" and knows himself speaking in this way as an I. It is as such that he *finds* himself, and he finds himself at all times as a center of a *surrounding* (*Umgebung*). "I" signifies for each of us something different, for each a very determinate person who has a definite proper name, who experiences his perceptions, memories, expectations, phantasies, feelings, wishes, and volitions, who is in various states, who achieves his acts, and who further has his dispositions, innate propensities, his acquired capabilities and skills, etc. Of these things, each I has his own, and there belongs, of course, to this field the very finding itself, in which the respective I finds this and that, which is what is under discussion here in a general way.

The same holds for statements. On the basis of an immediate finding of the so-called experience and on the basis of convictions, opinions, and suppositions, which, regardless of their origin, are lived experiences for the I, the I asserts that he is the person designated in such and such a way, the one who *has* these personal properties, such and such actual experiences, opinions, aims, etc. The having varies here in each case in accordance with what is had: a pain is suffered, a judgment is made, the ability to cope with life, loyalty, and integrity are had as "personal" properties, etc.

Although the I finds itself as the one having, in various ways, all those stated predicates, *the I does not find itself as of the same kind as that which is had*. The I itself is not an experience, but the one experiencing, not an act but that which performs the act, not a character-trait but the one having the character-trait as a property, etc. Further, the I finds itself and its I-experiences and dispositions *in time*. And thereby it knows itself, not only as a being at the present time which has this and that, but also as having memories, and it finds itself in remembering as the same one which "just before" and at an earlier time [113]

had such and such determinate experiences. Everything had and what had been had as well occupies its temporal place, and the I itself is something identical in time and has a determinate place in time.[2]

§2. *The lived body and the spatial–temporal surrounding*

Let us now look at the *body* (*Leib*) and at the spatial–temporal dimension enveloping the lived body. Every I finds itself as having an organic lived body. The body, for its part, is not an I, but rather a spatial–temporal "thing," around which is arranged a surrounding of things that reaches outward without limits. In each case, the I has a limited spatial–temporal surrounding, which it immediately perceives, or, as the case may be, which it remembers in immediate, retentional memory. But each I "knows," is certain, that the surrounding that is posited as existing in the manner of immediate intuition is only the intuited piece of a total surrounding and that things continue on further in endless (Euclidian)[3] space. Likewise, the I knows that the currently remembered temporal piece of what exists is only a piece of the endless chain of what exists; a chain that stretches back into the endless past and reaches out into the endless future as well. The I knows both that the things exist not merely when they are being perceived and that they existed not merely when they were being perceived. Things that are there exist *in themselves*, and were in themselves, and will be in themselves, even if they are not directly present in the actual experiential surrounding, and were not and will not be in it through remembering. And that holds of things with respect to all their thing-properties, with respect to their rest and motion, their qualitatively changed and unchanged situations, etc.

We are describing, as should be noted, only what each I as such finds around itself, what it directly sees or what it indirectly intends with certainty, where this certainty is to be such that each I can transform [114]

[2] The claim that the I is something identical and determinate *in* time requires that we assume that here Husserl is referring in the natural attitude to the "empirical I" or to oneself as a person. See discussions below, e.g., §15, where it is clear that in the phenomenological reduction the I is not taken as something in space and objective time; cf. also §12. — Translators' note.

[3] "(Euclidian)" later deleted. — Editor's note.

it into absolute[4] evidence. Each I knows that it can err in each single case; whereas the general meaning, as expressed in statements of the aforementioned kind, is evident to it or can become so. We ourselves, as the ones making the description, do not take the trouble to determine the definitive truth of all this. On the other hand, this is anything but an expression of doubt about these matters.

To be strictly accurate, preceding this, I should have mentioned the following: Each I not only perceives, has not only experiences that posit intuitive existence, but also it has a more or less clear or confused knowledge; it thinks, it predicates and, as a scientific person, each I does science. Thereby, the I knows itself as one which sometimes judges correctly, one which sometimes falls into error, as one which occasionally succumbs to doubts and confusions, and also as one which occasionally presses on to clear conviction. But the I knows also, or is certain, in spite of all this, that the world is and that it, the I itself, is in the middle of this world, etc., just as we have thoroughly described it earlier.

Furthermore, one might elaborate the matter in this way. The thing which each I comes upon as "*its body*" is precisely distinguished from all other things as the lived body it owns. It is always and ineluctably there in the actual sphere of perceptions. And it is perceived in its own manner, which we can describe with greater detail, and it is the central member of the apprehension of the thingly surrounding. Everything, which is not lived body, appears to be related to this lived body. And further, everything that is not the lived body has, in relation to the lived body, a certain spatial orientation for the I of which the I is constantly conscious: as right and left, in front or in back, etc. Similarly in regard to the temporal orientation: as now, earlier, later, etc.

§3. *The localization of lived experiences in the lived body*

In addition, everyone relates his I-experiences and, in general, his specific I-possessions to the lived body. Thus, he *localizes* them [115] in the body, sometimes on the basis of direct[5] "experience," in an

[4] "Absolute" later deleted. — Editor's note.
[5] In 1924 or later added: "psycho-physical." — Editor's note.

immediate[6] intuition, sometimes in the mode of an indirect experiential or analogizing knowing. This localization is completely *sui generis*; it is completely different from that kind of localization that intuitively given parts and moments of a thing have with respect to that thing, whether it be a case of sense-intuitive or theoretical physical determinations. Joy and sorrow are not in the heart as blood is in the heart. Sensations of touch are not in the skin as pieces of organic tissue are. Thus it is according to the original meaning-giving presentation of localization of the psychical, that is, according to what direct or indirect experience teaches about these matters. This does not preclude that once in a while the original sense is disregarded. But we need not dwell on this here.

We further maintain that, on the basis of experiences (which every I has and which determines its judgment), the I-experiences are recognized as being to a certain, not more precisely, determined extent *dependent* on the body, its bodily states, and processes.[7]

§4. *Empathy and the other I*

Every I finds in its surrounding, and more often in its surrounding of immediate interest, things which it regards as lived bodies but which it sharply contrasts to its "own" lived body as *other lived bodies*. It does this in such a way that to each such lived body there belongs again an I, but a different, other I. (It regards the lived bodies as "bearers" of I-subjects. But it "sees" the other I's not in the sense that it sees itself or experientially finds itself. Rather it posits them in the manner of "empathy;"[8] hence other lived experiences and other character dispositions are "found" too; but they are not given or had in the sense of one's own.) Thus, the I finds an I that likewise has its "soul,"[9] its actual [116]

[6] In 1924 or later changed to: "as in a kind of immediate." — Editor's note.

[7] The last sentence was changed by Husserl in 1924 or later in this way: "We further maintain that the I-experiences are experienced by the I itself as being in some way, albeit, for the most part, not in a more precisely determined manner, dependent on its own body, on its bodily states and processes." — Editor's note.

[8] In 1924 or later added: "perception of the other and experience of the other." — Editor's note.

[9] "(Has) its 'soul' " in 1924 or later changed to "is the 'soul' of its lived body." — Editor's note.

consciousness, its dispositions, its character traits, and which likewise comes upon its own thingly surrounding, including its own body as its own. And the surrounding found by the other I, who stands vis-à-vis us in a quasi-perceptual presentation, would be,[10] for the most part, the same as our surrounding; and the lived body, which we apprehend in our surrounding as his body, would be[11] the same as that which the other I apprehends in his surrounding as his own body. And what holds for the actual surroundings of the I's, who reciprocally find themselves as present and reciprocally arrange themselves in their surroundings, holds also for the entire world. All I's apprehend themselves as relative middle points[12] of one and the same spatial–temporal world that in its indeterminate infinity is the total surrounding of each I. For each I the other I's are not the middle points but surrounding points.[13] They have relative to their lived bodies a distinctive spatial place and temporal place in one and the same universal-space (*Allraum*), or in one and the same world-time (*Weltzeit*).

§5. *The phenomenon of space and the correspondence of the appearances for diverse subjects in their normal state*

Each I finds itself[14] as a middle point, so to speak a zero-point of a system of coordinates,[15] in reference to which the I considers, arranges, and cognizes all things of the world, the already known or the unknown. But each I apprehends this middle point as something relative. For example, the I changes bodily its place in space, and while it continues to say "here" it knows that "here" in each case is

[10] "Would be" in 1924 or later changed and expanded to "is in the sense of the perception of the other." — Editor's note.
[11] "Would be" in 1924 or later changed to "is." — Editor's note.
[12] "Middle points" in 1924 or later supplemented with "middle points of orientation." — Editor's note.
[13] "For each I the other I's are not middle points but surrounding points" changed in 1924 or later to: "for each I the other I's are not originatingly (*originär*) given as middle points, but as surrounding points." — Editor's note.
[14] In 1924 or later "originatingly" (*originär*) added. — Editor's note.
[15] In 1924 or later added: "(it is the *primal*-system of coordinates through which all systems of coordinates receive their sense)." — Editor's note.

spatially different. Each I distinguishes objective space as a system [117]
of objective spatial locations (places) from the phenomenon of space as the kind of space that appears with "here and there," "in front and in back," "right and left." Similarly, when we think of time.

The same holds for *things*. Each person has around himself the same world and perhaps several see the same *thing*, the same segment of the world. But each has his thing-appearance: The *same* thing appears for each in a different way in accordance with the different place in space. The thing has its front and back, above and below. And what is my front of the thing is for the other perhaps its back, and so on. But it is the same thing with the same properties.

Each thing can switch its momentary spatial location (its place) with every other one in the infinite objective space, but only through continuous locomotion. Different things cannot occupy the same spatial location, nor can different parts do this; but they can exchange with one another their different spatial locations through continuous locomotion.

That holds true also for the lived body. When a lived body switches its objective spatial spot with another, the appearings that the relevant I's have of their experienced things change continuously. And this is done in such a way that, in an ideal case, subsequent to the lived bodies switching their places, their respective appearings have been switched around too. There prevails here a certain ideal possibility under the rubric of a (merely ideal) *normality*. This means that if two normal individuals change places or imagine their places changed, and if their lived bodies are in an ideal normal state, then each individual will find the same appearings in his consciousness that were earlier realized in the other's consciousness. If I and the other have "normal" eyes, then we see the same, provided the same unchanged things present themselves to us at the same objective spatial spot which we can occupy one after another. And each of us would have had the same appearings if he had looked from the same spot as the other; and, further, each would have had the same appearings if not only all spatial relations of the eye positions were the same but also the eyes and the whole body were in a similar "normal condition." This is all talk about ideal matters. In general, each person assumes an approximate correspondence of his appearings with those had by others and treats

deviations under the title of illness and the like; and thus, he regards these as an exception, but in any case as possible. [118]

And the I's come to an understanding about this or, as we say, among themselves, humans come to an understanding of such matters. Each has his experiences in relation to things that sometimes appear this way and sometimes that way; and each passes judgment on the basis of these appearings and exchanges these judgments with others in the course of mutual understanding. When he does not have occasion to reflect on the appearings, when in experience he is *straight away* turned to the object, then he does not judge about the appearings but about the things. If he describes a thing, then the thing is for him one and the same, as it were, the unchanged thing endowed with unchanging qualities. And he makes statements about it as such, whereas the whole time he is moving his head and body in space, and thereby has continuously different appearances, at one time an appearance of distance, then one of proximity; at one time the appearance of the front, and then of the back, etc.

§6. *Recapitulation of the preceding discussions*

In the last lecture, we began describing the natural attitude and we did this in such a way that we tried to describe in a general way what, being in the natural attitude, we find around us as pre-given things. It would be good here to *recapitulate* all this thoroughly.

Each of us knows himself as an I. Now, being in that attitude where each of us finds himself present as an I, what does each of us find present in himself and in connection with himself? We began thus with a description of the kind that everyone had to say "I," and it was to this that everything else was tied. It is best to speak here in the singular first person and to continue thus: I posit[16] myself as being and as being this here, as being with this and that determinate content. I posit me as experiencing this and that; I have such and such dispositions and acts. But I do not posit me[17] as a disposition or an act; I do not come upon me as a disposition or an act.

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[16] In 1924 or later "posit" changed to "find . . . present." — Editor's note.
[17] In 1924 or later "do not posit me" deleted. — Editor's note.

Further, I posit me and find me not only present as an experiencing subject but also as a subject of personal properties, as a person with a certain character, as having certain intellectual and moral dispositions, etc. This I find to be present, of course, in a completely different way [119] than I find my experiences to be present.

Further, I find me and what is mine as having duration in time, as changing or not changing during their duration, and I distinguish the flowing Now and the still given "just past" in retention. Further, in recollection I come upon myself as being the very same one who existed earlier, as still perduring now, as the one who perdured earlier on, who experienced such and such things in succession, etc.

Further, I have, as I find this, a *lived body*; and the lived body is a thing among other things that I likewise come upon. I also find *this* in time: In the Now, the existing lived body as my body; in the just past, the lived body which has just been; in recollection, the recollected body — the lived body belongs to me at all times.

And at every temporal moment, which I come upon as my time, as the time belonging to me, I find some kind of changing thingly surrounding or other. Partly, it is an immediate surrounding, namely that which is given and was given by an immediately positing intuition; and partly, it is a mediated surrounding, namely being co-posited together with the genuinely intuited immediate surrounding prior to any inferential thinking. In the fashion of what is co-posited, the surrounding is a so-called infinite one; it is an indeterminately posited world of things (*Dinglichkeit*) in the endlessly continuing space and in the endlessly continuing time. Such a co-positing I make clear for myself by way of symbolic and analogizing intuition, and I myself posit it analogically (so long as it does not lead to a remembered surrounding), namely, as a continuing, indeterminate, possible surrounding of things (*dingliche Umgebung*), according to the maxim: "Roughly in this manner it is going to go on and on."

We then suggested the beginnings of a description of the things of the surroundings *as things*, according to the general sense that in each case they are to be found in the surrounding of our I's. And similarly, we described the distinction in kind that that which at all times shows itself as "my lived body" has in contrast to all other things.

Further, we described the sense of things we find under the rubric of other lived body, being bearers of other I's, which, together with

their experiences and personal properties, are "found" in a completely different way from one's own I, i.e., not through "self-perception" and "self-remembering," but rather through empathy.

Similarly, we described distinctions in the perspective in which all [120] things, also the lived body, appear to the I: How at each spatial place of the I, to which the current spatial place of the lived body belongs in a certain presentation, there belong thing-appearings in which the thing and the space of things present themselves in such and such a way from this particular subjective spatial spot. And similarly, we were able to speak of the difference between time and the appearing of time.

We also addressed that by way of empathy all that which we have here discussed can be attributed to other I's; that under normal conditions the perspectives, which vary from one I to another I, stand in a certain correspondence, being in accordance with the necessarily different spatial spots, which the different I's find as their respective places. Normally, the change of relative spatial places of the I's also leads to the change of their perspectives and thus their thingly appearances. I called attention to the consideration that an *idea* underlies this way of grasping the matter, and with respect to which, under the rubric of "normal and anomalous perceiving," deviations are possible. But this was connected to the different ways in which the lived body functions.

§7. *The natural attitude as the attitude of experience. The problem of the evidence of judgments from experience*

What was signified under the rubric of "finding" (*vorfinden*) and what is prior to all the inferential, let alone scientific, thinking is nothing other than what, in the pregnant sense of the word, is called *experiencing* (*erfahren*). The natural attitude is therefore the attitude of experience. The I experiences itself and has experience of things, of lived bodies, and of other I's. This attitude of experience is the natural one, in as much as it is exclusively that of the animals and pre-scientific man.

Of course, when I describe what is experienced or simply found I make judgments. But these purely descriptive judgments are, as such,

mere expressions of the experiences, of what has been found, and are, as such, in a certain sense absolutely evident, namely, evident precisely as mere expressions, just as the description of a fiction, if it is faithful, clearly has this evidence. If the I describes that which is found or experienced in its particular determinateness or indefinite [121] generality,[18] then all this is posited as *being*, and, notwithstanding the evidence belonging to the correctness of the expression, which may be a perfect one, the judgment comes with the evidence of *the thesis of experience*, which, to be sure, is an evidence, but, speaking generally, is an imperfect evidence nevertheless. Everyone knows that "experience can deceive." Everyone knows, indeed, everyone has the right, upon pursuing the evidence, to assert what is experienced. Nevertheless, everyone knows that what is experienced "may not really be the case."

On the other hand, the statements that we have made in describing the givenness of the attitude of experience do make the claim to absolute evidence. It is undoubtedly true that we find such a thing. With indubitable, absolute truth I assert and understand that I *find myself* as the *one having* such and such things, as the one who is the center-point of a surrounding, etc. And that is undoubtedly true as much as when I state that, *hic et nunc*, I am experiencing this determinate thing, as when I, indefinitely and in all generality, state that I perceive and have perceived things in a surrounding of things, etc.[19] One further evidence is that I am not only certain to come upon precisely such and such a thing but also that "I am" and that a world is,[20] and that those pre-given matters of the sort already described are given according to their general type in connection with the I — even though doubt and error are possible with regard to a particular individual matter. Here, we do not wish to decide the nature of this evidence.[21]

In general, we firmly maintain that experience has its legitimacy; more precisely, that the judgment in the natural attitude, "on the basis of experience," has its legitimacy as a matter of course; namely, on the most basic level, the sheer descriptive judgment, and then also,

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[18] "Or indefinite generality" later deleted. — Editor's note.

[19] Of course, but that is the evidence of the pure *cogito* with the pure I. — Husserl's note.

[20] "That a world is" later marked as questionable. — Editor's note.

[21] Clearly it is a matter of empirical evidence. — Husserl's note.

on a higher level, the inductive scientific judgment in the descriptive sciences; and, finally, the judgment in the exact, objective sciences, which, in going beyond what is immediately experienced, arrives at conclusions about what is not experienced, but which, in doing just that, always relies on its ultimate legitimating ground, i.e., the immediate experiential givens.

§8. *The experiential sciences (Die Erfahrungswissenschaften): Physical natural science and psychology. The natural concept of the world* [122]

Insofar as man not only describes what is experienced but also recognizes it scientifically, he is engaged in experiential science. This is the science of the natural attitude.

a) The scientific research into[22] things, those special givens of the natural attitude, is the subject matter of *physical natural science*. Its objects are therefore things precisely in that sense in which they are givens of experience, and they are given to us as existing things in themselves, having their determinate place and extension in objective space, their determinate position and continuance in objective duration, and they either undergo change in such and such a way or they do not change, etc. Here, one should note that things (*Dinge*) are not appearances (*Erscheinungen*), but rather that which is the Identical (*das Identische*), i.e., that which appears to me or some other I's in a manifold of appearings, now this way, now that way, in accordance with the subjective position of these I's and their normal or non-normal bodily constitution, etc. The region of things (*das Dingliche*) comprises only a piece of the total givenness.

b) Human beings, we saw earlier, have experiences of themselves, of their fellow men, or of other experiencing organic beings that are designated as animals or else as other ensouled beings. Through empathy and empathic understanding of expressions human beings enter not only into practical reciprocity, but they also observe one another for the sake of gaining knowledge, and they attain so-called psychological knowledge, namely in the form of self-perception and

[22] In 1924 or later added: "merely physical." — Editor's note.

self-remembering, as well as in the form of empathic experience and the theorizing based upon it. And similarly, there is the knowledge of the psycho-physical kind, which has to do with the relations of the dependency of the psychical realm (one's own or others) on the body.

Just as[23] the natural sciences of the physical things describe and explain them in accordance with laws of causality (things with their objective properties, transformations, and states, which appear in the physical appearances, but not the physical appearings — the [123] experiences — themselves), so *psychology* describes and explains in terms of laws of causality the human personalities with their changing states and acts and alternating dispositions (character tendencies, etc.), but not the appearings in which, under such and such varying forms, they appear to themselves and others, in which case, of course, the word appearing is to be understood in a fitting way.[24]

Only that the matter at hand here is different, because in a certain sense *all* appearings, the physical appearings, as well as the self-appearings, and the other appearings of what pertains to the souls of others are included in the realm of psychology. For although the description, in each case, of the manner in which another person may appear *to me*, or how *another person* himself appears to me, or, finally, how I appear to myself is something different from the description of myself or the description of the other person himself, etc., nevertheless, the consciousness in which I am an object to myself, just as every consciousness, is an I-experience, just as the consciousness in which another person stands over against me is an I-experience. And again: The thing is not a thing-appearing. The thing is what it is, whether I perceive it or do not perceive it, i.e., whether I have the relevant perceptual appearance or not. The thing is something physical, not psychical. But the having of the perceptual appearing, just as the thinking about the thing founded on the perceptual appearing, is something falling within the framework of psychology. Even if it should turn out on closer examination that there is a distinction to be made between the having of the appearing of what appears, as in the

[23] Preceding the beginning of this paragraph, the following was inserted later, probably in 1921: "one would like to say." — Editor's note.

[24] "In which case, of course, the word appearing is to be understood in a fitting way" later deleted. — Editor's note.

form of the perception of the thing, and the appearing itself (which is had in so-called consciousness), the appearing, insofar as it is an appearing which is had, would nevertheless fall under the realm of psychology; after all, the "having" distinguishes itself only through this content.[25]

And all of this falls within the framework of psychology in the sense that it is apprehended within the already described natural attitude's manner of apprehending. The psychological I belongs to objective time, the same time to which the spatial world belongs, to the time that is measured by clocks and other chronometers. And this I is connected to, in a spatial–temporal way, the lived body, upon whose functioning the psychical states and acts (which, once again, [124] are ordered within objective time) are dependent, dependent in their objective, i.e., their spatial–temporal existence and condition (*Dasein und Sosein*). Everything psychical[26] is spatial–temporal. Even if one holds it to be an absurdity, and perhaps justifiably[27] so, that the psychical I itself (along with its experiences) has extension and place, it does have an existence in space, namely as the I of the respective lived body, which has its objective place in space. And therefore each person says naturally and rightly: I am now here and later there. And the exact same thing holds for time. Perhaps, it is no less absurd to integrate the[28] I and its experiences *as such* into *the* time which is made determinate through the earth's movement and which is measured by means of some physical apparatus. But each person says naturally and correctly: I am now, and in the same Now the earth has such and such a position along its course, etc.

Accordingly, one can understand the designation of psychology and psycho-physics, which latter is inextricably bound up with the former (provided that we wish to mark a separation to begin with, which, in any case, is at most a practical one), as natural sciences.[29] Every science of factual existence in the one space and the one time

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[25] But see *Logical Investigations*, V, §14, where this seemingly Natorpian position is criticized; also *Husserliana VII*, 110; for a rich discussion see Iso Kern, *Husserl und Kant* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964), 356 ff. — Translators' note.

[26] Inserted in 1924 or later: "in the natural sense." — Editor's note.

[27] "And perhaps justifiably" later crossed out. — Editor's note.

[28] Added in 1924 or later: "purely psychic." — Editor's note.

[29] Added later: "world sciences." — Editor's note.

is a natural science. And the unified quintessential concept is nature, or rather, as it becomes manifest on closer consideration, the law-governed unified whole of all spatial–temporal existence, hence of all that which has place and extension in the one space and which has position or duration in the one time. This whole we call the *world* or *all-nature*. In this world, there are not two separate worlds, called things and souls. Experience knows only one world, insofar as souls are souls of lived bodies, and insofar as the world is the world of experience, which, as such, refers back to I's, which in turn, like all other I's, experientially fit into the world.

Here, we break off. Clearly, these initial descriptions could be continued according to the given delineations and could be much enriched by new lines of thought. It also could be shown that philosophical [125] interests of the highest dignity require a complete and encompassing description of the so-called *natural concept of the world*, i.e., that concept of the world of the natural attitude. On the other hand, it also could be shown that an exact and profound description of this kind is in no way something that can be accomplished easily but rather requires extraordinarily difficult reflections. However, here, we will not speak of such philosophical interests, even though our own project in these lectures is in tune with these same philosophical interests. For our immediate goals, these raw beginnings that we have given will suffice. We just wanted to indicate what the natural attitude is; and we described it through a general and brief characterization of what is found in advance by being in this attitude, i.e., the world in the natural sense. And we saw that the world is nothing other than that infinite object of the natural and psychological sciences, and, of course, of those sciences that pursue an exact description, as well as those that pursue theory, and those that engage in causal explanation.

§9. *The empirical or natural attitude and the a priori attitude. Ontology of nature and formal ontology*

What kind of new attitude is now possible with regard to the just described natural apprehension of the world where nature or world becomes a visible and knowable field? Does not nature encompass all real being (*wirkliche Sein*)? Certainly that is true, if we understand by

"real" that which exists in space and time. It is not true, however, if we consider that correct judging and insightful knowing aim at objects which have no such existence.

Thus, pure geometry speaks[30] of geometric figures; pure arithmetic speaks of numbers, etc. The figures of pure geometry, as possible formations of pure space, the numbers of arithmetic, as the pure numbers of numerical series, are not things and are not in any sense facts of nature.[31]

Accordingly, one may say: In contraposition to nature, to the world of factual spatial–temporal existence, to the "empirical" world, there [126] are, as one says, *ideal* worlds, worlds of ideas, which are non-spatial, non-temporal, and unreal. And yet, they exist indeed, as for example, numbers in a series exist. Moreover, they are the subject matter of valid scientific statements, just as much as the things of nature are. One must consequently distinguish, on the one hand, between the natural or empirical attitude and, on the other hand, the nonempirical, *a priori* attitude. In the one attitude, objectivities of existence (*Daseinsgegenständlichkeiten*) come to givenness, in the other, objectivities of essence (*Wesensgegenständlichkeiten*); in the one, nature comes to givenness, in the other, ideas.

Surely, there is nothing to object here. It clearly is a different attitude when, on the one hand, we have given to us, through perception or memory, a color as a moment of a thing and *take* the color in this *meaning*, in the perceiving or remembering, and when, on the other hand, we apply ourselves differently, as it were, and grasp only the idea of this color, the corresponding species of the color as a pure givenness. It is one thing to perceive a single note of the quality *c*, as the note of the violin just now beginning to sound, and another thing to form, in a changed attitude, yet on the basis of the appearing of this exemplary note, the *idea* of the quality *c*, which is *sui generis* within the ideal and singular scale of tone qualities. Likewise, it is one thing to look at four dashes, and it is quite another thing, while seeing the four dashes, not to pay attention to them, but rather to focus on the idea alone, the number 4, which here is instantiated in an intuition in an exemplary fashion, etc.

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[30] What follows until the end of §9 later crossed out. — Editor's note.
[31] Eidetic attitude. — Husserl's note.

Such ideas now function as *objects* and, at the same time, they facilitate statements with the character of unconditional universality about particular things thought in indeterminate generality, being merely thought and not posited as existing. Such are, for example, the statements of arithmetic. After all, every idea, as such, has the property that there corresponds to it a so-called extension, which, however, is a pure extension of particulars; particulars in relation to which no positing of existence is performed. Accordingly, pure arithmetic, pure geometry, pure phoronomy,[32] and pure harmonics, etc. contain no statement about real existence. Whether or not there are real beings, the propositions of these disciplines are valid. They are valid as pure propositions.

To be sure, another step or a resolve is required in order to see and take hold of the *purity* of the *a priori*, which consists in its freedom from existence. Natural scientists and mathematicians take delight in giving mathematical propositions an empirical sense. However, [127] *if* they judge and justify these propositions in light of the idea that the units of counting, being kept indeterminate, represent actually existing realities, existing things, existing processes, etc., albeit in terms of that indeterminate generality of thought, which encompasses any empirical existence whatsoever, *then* mathematics, *nota bene*, as they advocate it, belongs from the start to the sphere of nature (as is true for every similarly taken science). For the natural empirical attitude, it would be the last thing to even consider the notion of a pure idea and, what is connected with this, the notion of a pure, completely unconditional universality. What is needed in opposition to such an interpretation of the mathematical, is, first of all, the excision of any, including the unspecified, *positing of existence*, in order to grasp the *a priori* and the ideal beings, purified of existence, and thus to grasp the trans-empirical, non-spatial and non-temporal idea.

But this is actually an imprecise way of putting it. Whoever has looked at the ideal realm in its purity, whoever has made judgments in "rigorous" universality does not need the starting point from the empirical universality and a special act of excision of empirical existence. One grasps the idea and the pure universality precisely in an attitude of its own, in a separate, differently directed looking and

[32] *Phoronomy*: study of the laws of motion; kinematics. — Translators' note.

intending. On the other hand, one must also note that it is one thing to have, to grasp, and to intend the *a priori*, and another thing subsequently to reflect on the sense of that which is grasped and stated, and correctly to interpret it, to take it as it presents itself. The mathematician can and will very well make judgments in strict universality; and yet afterward empiricist prejudices lead him to interpret that which was grasped in its purity in an empirical way. To conclude, by our being in the *a priori* attitude, we grasp ideas, essences.

This includes the idea of space and the ideas of spatial figures, as well as the ideas *about* spatialities, which ideas themselves are not spatial. In real space, in nature, there is no idea of space, no idea of a triangle, etc. And likewise, in real time there is no idea of "time," which itself is rather a non-temporal being, that is, precisely an idea. The essence-attitude, ultimately that of *intuitive* ideation, brings a new *existence-free* sphere to givenness; and in a certain sense it may indeed be characterized as the philosophical attitude. [128]

Surely, the transition from the impure *a priori* of the narrow, empirically minded mathematics to the strict *a priori* of pure mathematics is of great philosophical significance and an indispensable step toward establishing genuine philosophy. He who has not made this step can never climb to the heights of true philosophy.

However, if the matter came to rest with this new attitude, we would have no more than, on the one hand, the natural sciences and, on the other hand, the mathematical and other *a priori* sciences apprehended in their purity, or rather only *those a priori* sciences, which the starting point from the natural sciences would call for, and which initially constitute themselves only as instruments of natural-scientific research. We can organize them in this way: nature as Fact we contrast to nature as Idea. The natural sciences, in the usual empirical sense, are related to nature as Fact; the pure natural sciences are related to nature as Idea. This yields the sciences of the ideas, which are constitutive of the idea of nature: geometry, pure theory of time, pure theory of motions and possible deformations of what is of the nature of things (*im Dinglichen*) as such — this latter would correspond to *Kant's* idea of pure natural science. Let us classify these disciplines that correspond to the idea of nature under the title of *ontology of nature*.

There is another group of *a priori* disciplines that has a completely different character. Oftentimes, the natural sciences have to make use

of the truths of these disciplines. Here, I am referring to the pure logic of propositions, the pure theory of probability, pure arithmetic, and, finally, the pure theory of manifolds. These sciences do not belong to the idea of nature; they do not expound the *a priori*, which constitutes the idea of nature. Arithmetic's freedom from existence includes not only any actual positing of real existence but also every positing of the idea of nature, every employment of the idea of things, of properties, etc. The one (*die Eins*) in arithmetic is something whatever in general, and under this does not merely fall the thingly (*Dingliches*), the spatial–temporal (*Räumlich-Zeitliches*), but, rather, precisely the something whatsoever in general (*Etwas überhaupt*), be it an idea, be it even a number itself. To the extent that formal logic addresses the truth of propositions, the very idea of a proposition, taken in its unconditional universality, contains not only any propositions you like, [129] which have a natural-scientific thought-content, but also propositions that have any thought-content whatever, for instance, pure arithmetic. And it can be shown that the designated group of disciplines can also be interpreted as a universal, *a priori* ontology, an ontology that refers to intended *being in general*.[33]

The pure science of nature or, to put it better, the ontology of nature would then be a title for all disciplines that belong to the idea of nature or to the ideas that are constitutive of the idea of nature. Here are relevant the ideas of space and time, i.e., pure theory of space (geometry), pure theory of time, pure kinetics, and the pure disciplines of the possible deformations of the spatial formations. Moreover, connected to the idea of the thing, which not only has its duration and its geometric shape, but which also has *real properties*, *real changed situations*, which stand in *causal* connections, there are *a priori* laws, which, however, do not relate to the facticity of existing things but, rather, pertain to the idea of thingliness as such. Here, we come upon the Kantian "pure science of nature" which, as is well known, is distinguished by him from geometry, pure chronometry, and the previously mentioned disciplines.

However, in respect to this discipline, it must be said that, as a matter of fact, it did not realize the functions that one was to expect.

[33] The following paragraphs until §10 repeat more elaborately the preceding two paragraphs. — Translators' note.

Historically speaking, it was not developed and applied as an *a priori* auxiliary discipline (as it were, a mathematics of thingliness) of the natural sciences. Actually, it has remained a *desideratum* and has not advanced beyond rather paltry starts. Only isolated propositions belonging to it have served the natural sciences, as they presently exist, as for example, the proposition of the impenetrability of material things, or that a thing can only change its position when it moves, i.e., that it can change its place only by a continuous change of places; further, the causal law according to which each change of a property can proceed only in accord with empirical natural laws. Of course, there is much debate about the latter principle and the other principles as well; especially insofar as there is, on the one hand, an inclination to speak of these principles (which would belong to the Kantian pure science of nature) as empirical laws, which view, on the [130] other hand, is vigorously contested by others. Of course, if a person has learned to submit to complete intellectual honesty and has once comprehended what is seen in the essence-attitude and has learned, through reflection, to assert this as givenness, even in the face of all erroneous misunderstandings and fashionable theories, then he will, in this case, react in just the same way as is appropriate in the matter of the previously mentioned mathematical disciplines, which happen to be related in an ideal manner to pure space, pure time, pure motion, etc., and which must be recognized as so related.

Yet here, we must also note a group of disciplines of an essentially different kind, being, in part, also designated as mathematical disciplines, and which in the past century, or, in full measure, in the most recent times only, have blossomed and come into their genuine form, and which have likewise played a part as instruments for the sciences of what factually exists (*Daseinswissenschaften*). To begin with the first, I have here in mind the pure and formal logic of assertoric propositions and the completely purely conceived theory of probabilities or possibilities. As to the former discipline, this brief illustration will have to suffice here, namely that a part of it is the entire theory of syllogistics, which, under the guidance of mathematicians in recent times, has likewise taken on a mathematical form. As to the pure theory of probability, it remains tied up with existential restrictions; very few today uphold the idea of a theory of probability completely free of any existential positing. Further, I must not forget to mention

pure arithmetic and the pure theory of manifolds, which are closely related to syllogistic logic.

All of these disciplines, unlike geometry, do not inherently belong to the idea of nature; they do not affect at all what constitutes the idea of nature in its specific essence. Arithmetic's freedom from existence, for example, does not only mean the abiding disengagement of any actual positing of real existence (whether it be physical or mental), but it also means that there is not even a hint of the specific essential content of the idea of nature, that is, no idea, even in an ideal manner, of the spatial, of the thingly, of the thingly property, etc.

The One (*Eins*) in arithmetic means something or other in general, and if there is still talk of yet another unity (*Einheit*), what is meant [131] alone is precisely some other something in general, being thought of, in an indeterminate general way, as different from the first something in general. It makes no difference whether it has to do with some physical or mental existent, be it even in terms of pure generality, or whether it has to do with ideas. Every and each thing can be counted, for example, also numbers (which, of course, are not anything thingly), and space and time too, as when I say: They (space and time) are two pure forms of every possible nature in general, and so forth.

The matter stands similarly with formal logic in the narrow sense. In as much as it deals with propositions as such, the subject matter is not especially related to nature or to other propositions connected to nature.

All the disciplines of the present group in question are closely connected in such a way that they all can be grouped under the idea of a *formal, absolutely universal ontology*. In contrast to this group, we have the much more limited, by reason of its being materially determined, idea of the *ontology of nature*, as an ontology of the physical and psychical.

With this group of *a priori* disciplines we do not yet have, as we already intimated, the higher and more proper level of the philosophical problematic. We must proceed at first to the question whether the philosophical disciplines, which we have come upon, are the only *a priori* disciplines.[34]

[34] A later remark by Husserl: "The humanities (*Geisteswissenschaften*), the scientific disciplines of the 'formations of the mind,' were not taken into account; but

§10. *The a priori of nature, the natural world-concept, and the natural sciences. Avenarius' "critique of pure experience"*

Before we proceed further we want to undertake an instructive *excursus*. Here I am tempted to venture a principled critique of the positivism of the school of Avenarius, which envisages the task of a theory and critique of pure experience[35] in terms of the elimination of all "metaphysical" traces in the world-concept and the restitution of the "natural" world-concept of pure experience. [132]

Now, it is of interest with regard to this ontology of nature, which is conceived in the broadest scope and dimensions, to consider that description of the natural world-concept with which we began.

Our description was a general one and, to a certain extent, an evident one. On the other hand, it was very much a description, and as such it presupposed the existence of what was being described. According to this description, everyone of us says: "I am and find myself in a spatial–temporal surrounding, between things and other humans; I have the appearings of all of them and find these appearings related to the distinguished thing of 'my lived-body,'" etc. These are facts, of course. Likewise, when I say on the basis of memory: "I was, and I was in a surrounding," etc., and again when I say: "Other lived-bodies are bound up with I's; they are related to the same surrounding as I am," etc. Whether in each case these single facts, which I consider here, do exist in reality can, one might well say, be doubtful. Is there any evidence left, evidence that we indeed invoked in relation to the description? Let us consider this matter without, of course, being able to deal with it in full detail and with the required thoroughness. It is surely evident, within the limits of an easily determined qualification, that I can say, respectively: I have such and

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see the appended pages." These appended pages are no longer in the folder of the manuscript of the Lectures. Perhaps they are the "Preparatory Notes for the Course of Lectures" (see below the text marked as Appendix I (Number 5)) or the W-pages (see *Husserliana XIII*, p. 77, note 3); or perhaps they constitute what we have assembled in the Appendices XVII and XVIII. — Editor's note. (Appendix XVII is given as Appendix XII below. — Translators' note.)

[35] According to Husserl's own pagination of the lecture manuscript there are missing here two pages, which the editor could not find in Husserl's *Nachlass*. But one may compare with this paragraph Appendix III (XXII): *Immanent Philosophy — Avenarius*. — Editor's note.

such perceptions, memories, convictions, etc.; I have self-perception and self-understanding of me as the person I know; I have perception of the surrounding, etc. And it is further evident that my judgments, provided that they, as we set them up, are pure expressions of the perceived as such, of the remembered as such, etc., will exclude any possible error, because they reflect then in the pure descriptive expressions the mere *sense* of the particular perceptions, memories, other experiential certitudes, etc. It may well be the case that I am deceived in thinking that the thing is there, but that I perceive, and that the [133] perception is a perception of a thing with a spatial surrounding, etc., that is indubitable.[36]

Now, we can further state: it is evident that if what in the natural attitude is posited does really exist, in other words, if the perceptions, memories, etc., are justifiable (that is, the objective sense, which they have, can be maintained in its objective validity), then what the sense as such and *a priori* requires must be objectively valid too. The general expressions, with which I, on the one hand, describe perception, memory, etc., as perception as such, memory as such, and correspondingly, on the other hand, the universal expressions which I use, in regard to what is perceived as such, etc., as when I speak of persons and things, experiences, dispositions, thing-properties, spatial extension, temporal duration, etc., signify a general sense to which any empirical truth is clearly bound. It may well be that occasionally I am deceived in believing that an object I think is vis-à-vis me is indeed there or exists in such a fashion as it appears to me. But it does appear, and before I entertain the question whether it truly is and how it is in reality, I know from the very outset that it can only be in accordance to *the* sense in which a thing with properties, etc., exists — for it is as this that it appears perceptually. And the question, *whether* what appears does really exist, becomes thus the *definite* question: does this *thing* exist?

We can put this idea also in this way: the fact gleaned from the description is that in general I am convinced not only that I apparently find this and that, and that I find myself in a spatial–temporal surrounding among other things and other psychic beings, but also that I am convinced that all this would be true, *generally speaking*,

[36] The description is evident, as long as it truly expresses the objective sense of the relevant *cogitationes*. — Husserl's note.

even though I might be deceived in a particular case in regard to details, which are assumed by me to exist within the world. For now, we leave undecided what questions of a philosophical character this thetic evidence, this general evidence of the fact of the world as such, [134] poses to us. Nevertheless, evidence it *is*. If we consider now that in the framework of this evidence one operates with particular empirical theses and that sometimes the particular things of experience are thus posited and, on this basis, experientially judged, as this is already done in ordinary life and no less so in the natural sciences, then there is absolutely no doubt that in general cases and no less in particular ones all possible experiential knowledge is bound to the *sense* with which these theses are achieved. Natural science is nothing else — and wants to be nothing else — than the science of nature. Therefore, prior to any closer methodological treatment of what is given in experience, it presupposes as valid what is prescribed for it in terms of the general sense of nature as a datum of experience. Certainly, this finds its common expression in the words employed by the description of the natural attitude and its content, i.e., the natural world as such, i.e., the words: thing, property, change, cause, effect, space, time; but also the words: person, experience, act, appearing, disposition, etc.[37]

But this means: every natural science, insofar as it presupposes the theses of the natural world-perspective and investigates Being in this framework and sense, *is a priori bound up with the ontology of the real* (*reale Ontologie*).[38]

If it is true, as the positivists and particularly Avenarius have always maintained, that natural science, as it factually exists, is completely pervaded and distorted by lop-sided interpretations, which clash with the natural world-perspective; and if indeed natural science is permeated by auxiliary concepts, which, although they serve useful

[37] What is missing here is the clarification of the sense in which *a priori* invariance is distinguished from empirical (typical, empirical type) invariance; also the reduction of empty intentions to full intentions of possible experience. — Husserl's note.

[38] One must understand this correctly: the permanent thesis of experience with its abiding sense continues its course in the framework of the enduring agreement of experience, and the evidence of the thesis is continuously an evidence of experience, which holds provisionally and remains necessarily provisional. That the idea of nature can find application to a given nature presupposes indeed a given nature; but there is continuously the reservation regarding whether nature is really there, whether it exists in reality. — Husserl's note.

functions within the natural-scientific method, are actually so defined and interpreted as to contain a surplus of thoughts that clash with the [135] basic schema of the natural world-perspective, then it is an important, indeed for the attainment of definitive knowledge of nature, an indispensable task to practice "critique." And this critique may quite correctly be called a "*Critique of Pure Experience.*" Pure experience would then be that experience and knowledge of experience which, to remain within the jargon of positivism, excludes all "metaphysics." From our perspective, which of course is not a positivist one, "metaphysics" here refers to nothing other than the suppositions that are not in accordance with the *fundamental sense*[39] of the natural world-thesis or the sense of "experience." "Experience" then means no more than the thesis of the natural attitude. Therefore, the task is to provide the much needed critique of the concepts of natural science. At the beginning, the task is to clearly analyze the general sense of the natural thesis, which underlies every natural science, in order to determine the normative measure of the critique. In this manner, and only in this manner, can a really consistent concrete world-concept be developed from out of the natural sciences; that is, only in this manner can actual natural science be transformed into a "pure" science of experience. There is no doubt about any of this, provided that everything is understood in the way that we have made it clear here. *The "ontology" of nature presents in its various disciplines the pure, formal–general sense of the natural thesis* or the givenness of the natural attitude as such. At the same time, the question how a[40] thesis of such a meaning is justified, just as the further particular question, how, in each case, the particular natural science is justified in advancing its particular thesis, lies outside the limits of this ontology.

It is important to note that talk of a natural world-concept does not and must not mean a world-concept that every human has strangely but factually brought into the world, for instance, as part of the legacy of the animal evolution over millions of years, as the result of the ever [136]

[39] What does "fundamental sense" of world-experience, of nature-experience, mean? All world-thinking, all thinking about the world, rests on "pure experience." If we abstract from all thoughts, without questioning whether they are correct or incorrect, and keep to the world purely as experienced, then we can circumscribe *originaliter* in general concepts the pure sense of experience, etc. — Husserl's note.

[40] Later added: "determinate." — Editor's note.

more perfect, ever more cognitive-economical (*denkökonomischeren*) adjustment to the conditions of nature on the part of the animals and, finally, man. Nor does it mean a world-concept, which historical humanity or even individual humans have empirically developed, and which, under changed anthropological, historical, and cultural conditions, could have and must have evolved differently, in which case this latter world-concept would have been the authoritative one.

Of course, and this is the way we judge in the natural attitude, every experience and every group of experiences that any human of this world may have belong themselves to this world, having come into existence by empirical necessity under the given circumstances, and in accordance with certain empirical laws. But by whatever way the actual experiences, in which humans have the world-concept as a unified content, may have come into existence, as long as we are talking about a world in which humans exist, who have consciousness of the world, who have experiences, and among them existence-positing perceptions, experiences, etc., that is, as long as this kind of talk remains intelligible, so long and to this extent *is the natural world-concept valid in an absolute and a priori sense*. This *a priori* feature does not mean that a thesis other than that of the natural world is impossible in any sense; it does not mean that other perceptions of individual unities and other experiences as such, which we call experiences of things, experiences of humans, and things like that, are absolutely unthinkable; about such matters we here rather refrain from all judgment. Rather it means: If we proceed from the fact of the natural attitude and from the fact of the thesis of nature, as it is graspable and generally characterizable through this thesis, and if we proceed from the fact that this thesis[41] has its indubitable legitimacy, then it is the case that every natural-scientific statement, as a statement which scientifically determines the particular content that is posited in this thesis, is meaningless, if it clashes with the sense of this thesis in terms of its general meaning and content.[42]

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[41] Later, perhaps in 1921, added: "with its concrete content tied to actual and possible series of perceptions, which can stretch out into infinite openness and can confirm themselves consistently in one another, thereby maintaining the uninterruptedness of the thesis." — Editor's note.

[42] Contained in this talk of the fact is the implication that we can think of it as going on *in infinitum*, that by way of anticipation, we can postulate that the thesis which

And consequently, it is meaningless to speak of the possibility that [137] humans in the course of their experiences or that higher animals in the course of their always more perfect adaptation to nature could have worked out for themselves, in a rational and justified way, another world-concept, as if for humans in nature or animals in nature the world-concept were something contingent, just like, for example, the particular and general facts of which the natural sciences deal in their textbooks. I hold that this is meaningless, for we have spoken of humans, and of nature, and of that which is possible in nature, that is, we have presupposed nature and humans, and thereby, presupposed what, in general, makes nature "possible," i.e., we have presupposed the sense of nature, which is to say, we have precisely presupposed the natural world-concept. There cannot be something in the world that destroys (*aufhebt*) the sense of the talk about the world because it presupposes the sense as sense (as essence).

Consequently, it is quite wrong to grasp the problem as *Avenarius* does, if I have followed him correctly, or, in any case, as it was meant in his school, namely: We can very much describe the world-concept, which we all have prior to scientific knowledge or which humanity has had prior to the sciences and, then, we can further raise the question: Has man, if he engages in natural science, *occasion*, that is, experiential occasion, to relinquish this world-concept? Such a way of posing the question is incorrect because it portrays it as possible that through experiences occasions can be brought forth to modify, *nota bene*, rationally, the natural world-concept. But our analysis has taught us that this purported possibility is an absurdity in the sharpest sense of the word.[43]

Although it is[44] nonsense to claim implicitly that a human being could find in the world rational justification for holding that another [138] world than this world was the real world, it is, on the other hand,

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we already have achieved, in each case and each for himself, will further persist in the concordance of experiences. But this anticipation is justified by the feature of the unity of world-experience itself. — Husserl's note.

[43] It is also noteworthy that the natural world-concept is not that concept which humans have formed for themselves prior to science; rather, it is the world-concept that comprises the sense of the natural attitude both before and after science. However, this sense must first be worked out in the basic concepts of ontology. — Husserl's note.

[44] The following paragraph was later crossed out. — Editor's note.

not nonsense to claim that perhaps another world could exist, indeed, that there could exist another world, perhaps disconnected from this world, that is, the world of the natural attitude or experience, that perhaps there is still another world of a totally different kind, having no Euclidian space, etc.; *nota bene*, not nonsense! For then, we do not claim what constitutes the nonsense in the first place, i.e., that humans or beings endowed with essentially the same lived-body, etc., could come upon such a world and could scientifically come to know it, or that natural science, the science founded on the basis of the natural world-concept, the science which, with its first words, so to speak, posits things, space, time, etc., would be forced to relinquish the natural world-concept through experience.

Here, we cannot address the great problems arising from the aforementioned meaningful possibility of other worlds nor the ultimate question of the facticity of this world and its natural thesis. But we draw near to this sublime sphere if we now go back to the question about attitudes that deviate from, yet possibly also combine with, the natural attitude.

Chapter 2

BASIC CONSIDERATION: THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION AS ACHIEVING THE ATTITUDE DIRECTED TOWARD PURE EXPERIENCE

§11. *The sphere of knowledge in the subjective sense and empirical and rational psychology*

The next question at hand is whether these a priori disciplines are the sum total of all the disciplines that present themselves to us in the essence-attitude, whether the range of the a priori is thus completely delimited by the already taken path. What we have seen so far with regard to what is singular as well as universal, and more closely, with regard to what is a priori, was determined by the departure taken from the natural attitude. In this attitude, we looked at the natural world, nature in the widest sense. This look *is* the natural attitude. This gave us the a priori of nature, displayed in the ontologies [139] of the real (*reale Ontologien*).[1] Further, we looked at the sciences in general (of nature and, potentially, at the sciences of a priori nature, like geometry, etc.) and reminded ourselves that in all expressed sentences something like a form is found, namely in the proposition, as it expresses the intended state of affairs as such. And similarly we find forms in the connections of propositions, as well as in the being of number, of combination, of the manifold, etc. We were thereby in a certain sense *directed at objects*; and we spoke also of formal ontology. The a priori had to do with a form of objectivity as the objectivity of scientific thinking as such, insofar as the form

[1] "In the ontologies of the real" later changed to "in the ontology of the real." — Editor's note.

is one which is varyingly cast in concepts, determinable through predication, theoretically posited as true or probable, etc.

Is thereby everything brought to a conclusion? Are there not other viewpoints? What about the reflection on thinking itself, as well as the reflection on all the experiences which, in the context of thinking, are significant for deciding the normative claims to legitimacy? For instance, there are the manifold changing perceptions we have of a thing, which may be the basis for a straightforward judgment of experience, where the judgment, by faithfully following these perceptions, attains its logical justification. What is there to say about the entire sphere of knowledge in the subjective sense, being different from what is intended in it, its objective sense, whose legitimacy we already have found reason to acknowledge? Of course, this question is to be asked with its broadest scope in mind, not only in reference to the empirical sphere, but also in reference to any sort of an a priori sphere.

Just now I have apparently given the answer, insofar as I spoke of knowledge in the subjective sense. Everything subjective belongs to the natural sphere, more precisely, to the sphere of *psychology*. As a fact of the respective empirical subject and, generally speaking, as a fact of the cognitive experiencing in the human world as such, it certainly is a part of psychology as a natural science. Does it not also lend itself to an a priori consideration? Certainly. Just as there is an a priori, an obvious a priori, of the physical thing, i.e., an a priori that refers to nothing else than that which belongs to the universal *sense* [140] of the empirical positing of a thing, so there is also a psychological a priori. It explicates what belongs to the essence or sense of the empirical positing of "souls," the positing of humans, the positing of experiences, as experiences of humans, and things like that. Given the crass empiricism, which has prevailed among psychologists for several decades, it will appear quite incredible to many that I venture to reawaken the long-buried idea of a *rational psychology*. Nevertheless, I have to do it. From the perspective of the issue at hand, which, if one has once seen it, it is absolutely evident that it cannot be put differently. It is directly self-evident that a pure psychology must run parallel to a pure natural science. In any case, there must be some sort of groupings of propositions that explicate the sense to be found in the I-experience, in the experience of the realm of the soul, where

the propositions draw their evidence from delving into the complete givenness of the relevant modes of the psychological.

Just as we make it clear to ourselves what the thing as such in its essence is by immersing ourselves in the perceptual contexts, in which a thing comes to ever more perfect givenness, while it continually maintains its identity; or just as we make clear to ourselves what causality as such is by putting ourselves into the contexts in which the interdependent relations of the changes in things show themselves, namely step by step and in a continued series of corroborations; in just the same way the essence of the character of the I has to manifest itself in certain contexts of experiences in which we intuitively put ourselves, for instance, in the imagined but thoroughly clear contexts of givenness, in which that which we call the character of a person would show itself and would bring itself to ever new confirmation, just as this is required by this kind of objectivity. Something similar holds when we want to demonstrate what belongs to the essence of experiences, insofar as they are experiences of experiencing persons, and insofar as they, as acts or states, belong to persons, having with them their objective temporal place, etc.

§12. *The problem of the disengagement of the empirical as well as the essential side of nature. The joining of the I to the body* [141]

Proceeding from the natural attitude, we always find around us, in terms of what is meant in experience and what possibly manifests itself in givenness, *empirical I's* or souls, namely as human personalities in time. We also find lived experiences, which are determined in an objectively temporal manner, and which are those of the empirical I's, who in turn belong to lived bodies. Among the lived experiences are appearances of things as the appearings that are had by this or that psychical individual at some specific time or other.[2]

[2] According to Husserl's pagination of the manuscript a page must be missing at this place. Yet the following paragraph links up smoothly without any interruption of the preceding text. Husserl took the manuscript pages from the next paragraph to page 43, line 33, out of the original context of the lecture we are dealing with and placed them in the lecture for the summer semester for 1912 which he called "Introduction to Phenomenology" and which served as the basis for discussions in *Ideas I*. Husserl

I ask now: Can we not attain an attitude of such a kind that the *empirical*, being the characteristic of the givenness of the natural attitude, remains completely disengaged, and indeed in such a way that *also its essence as essence of nature remains disengaged*, while, on the other hand, components that enter into the essence of nature or, to be more precise, that enter into nature itself *in individuo*, are maintained?

At first blush, an unintelligible question. But let us consider it more closely! In the natural attitude, the I is experienced as a member of nature, as an object within spatial–temporal existence, and it is so experienced by reason of its experiential connection with the thingly *lived body*. The I has lived experiences; however, the lived experiences are experienced as standing in relation to the lived body, namely according to a certain order of levels, which, of course, have to be more precisely described. First, the sensuous experiences as well as the thing perceptions (which include perceptions of the lived body) and their sensation components, sensations of color, of sound, etc., have a certain characteristic relation to the appearing thing that is one's own lived body. The same holds for the specific sensations of the lived body which belong to the eye movement, to the movement of the hand, [142] etc., and which are localized in the lived body and its parts. Likewise, the sensible feelings have such a connection with the lived body. And the higher psychic lived experiences are closely interconnected with them, indeed are founded on them. Related to the *lived body*, being posited as existing, is the whole arrangement of the allocation of the perceptual experiences, which the I has from the manifold of possible things in its surrounding, and this kind of allocation belongs in each case to *its* lived body. Yet to the other lived body and to the perceptual groupings, which empathy permits us to ascribe to it, belongs a corresponding but quite different arrangement of allocation, together with *other* groupings of perceptions. For the perceptions that one person has are not had by the other, and vice versa.

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dissolved this important lecture from 1912 into several pieces which now are to be found in the Husserl-Archives under different signatures: F I 4, B II 19, F I 16, M III 6, F IV 3, A IV 5. The following pages of our lecture stem from the Manuscript B II 19, which contains the most important piece of the 1912 lecture on the "Introduction to Phenomenology." Next to the following paragraph we find in Husserl's handwriting: "November 26, 1910." — Editor's note.

The elucidation and scientific description of these complicated connections is an extraordinarily important and difficult matter. Let us here record only that the manifold lived experiences have a perceptually appearing relationship to the lived body. But the lived body as a thing is primarily integrated in objective time and in objective space as well. The first objective time is the thing time (*Dingzeit*). For precisely that reason, the lived body and what is of the nature of the lived body have their position in time and, consequently, everything else that is attributed to the lived body and localized in it has a position in time too, albeit only in a secondary sense. And as a further consequence, in regard to the occurrence in time, that which in terms of higher psychic functions is appearing in one and the same present moment will then appear in one and the same past moment too.

§13. *The severability of the empirical connection between "res cogitans" and "res extensa." The "distinctio phaenomenologica"*

Now it is clear that what is adjoined to the lived body is something which can also be severed from it. For the lived body exists as a thing. And it does not belong to the essence of a thing that it is, as it were, a feeling thing, that when it is pricked, it reacts with pain, that when it is tickled, it itches, etc. And this feature of feeling also does not essentially belong to the essence of a particular shape of a thing, namely to that shape which makes for a lived body. It is *facticity* that a so appearing thing is a lived body; it is a matter of experience that it [143] is connected with the psychical. A thing that was not spatial, that had no real properties — that would be *nonsense*. But it would not be *nonsense*, if no thing whatsoever, not even the familiar human body, was a sensing thing. A thing, a *res extensa*, is factually a *res cogitans*, because in some way *cogitationes* are connected with it through experience. But *in itself* the *cogitare* does not have anything to do with any *res extensa*. The essence of the *cogitatio* and the essence of the *extensio* have, in principle, i.e., as essences, nothing to do with one another. Of course, we take "*extensio*" in terms of the total extension of what is of the nature of things (*des dinglichen Wesens*).

The same result holds when we proceed from the other side. There is no given relationship to a thing in the essence of a pain or a pleasure.

Again, *in the essence of sensation of color and sound, in the essence of lived experiences of perceiving, judging, desiring, questioning, etc., there is no essential relation*[3] *to a thing*, as if being joined to a thing was essentially necessary for the being of such *cogitationes*. However, if this is so, then we can cut through the empirical relation between *cogitatio* and *res* without thereby making an abstraction in the sense of Hume's *distinctio realis*,[4] i.e., in the sense of a distinction between essentially dependent and inseparable moments of a *concretum*.[5]

In a similar sense, we cannot only conceive but also intuitively imagine that, upon the occurrence of a cause, the relevant effect, which experientially belongs to it, does not take place. The connection is necessary in the empirical sense, but not a necessary one in an ideal sense: The being of the effecting thing is not a dependent being, as if it were necessarily connected to the being of the experientially accompanying effected thing. My listeners must not suppose that I am here contradicting myself because I have admitted that causality

[3] Later added: "real joining." — Editor's note.

[4] There would seem to be a problem with Husserl's reference here. *Distinctio realis* is familiar in philosophy and derives from the scholastics but does not seem to be a distinctively Humean doctrine or term. For the scholastics, *distinctio realis major* refers to the distinction between two things that exist or can exist separately from one another; *distinctio realis minor* approximates Hume's own and famous "*distinctio rationis*," as the distinction of something and its modes, as the finger and its inflexion. Here, it would seem that Husserl means Hume's *distinctio rationis*. See Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part I, Section VII, where a distinction such as between the figure and the body figured has to do with what "in reality" is neither different nor separated, nor separable. Cf. Husserl, *Logical Investigations* V, §36. For Hume, such a distinction comes about by a contingent association of "resemblance" that is the work of fancy and/or habit. Cf. the scholastics who sometimes meant by the term *distinctio rationis* the distinction the mind brings about of dependent and inseparable moments of a *concretum* that could have a *fundamentum in re* and not be a result of convention or be a mere fiction of the imagination. See Nuntio Signoriello, *Lexicon Peripateticum philosophico-theologicum in quo scholasticorum distinctiones et effata praecipua explicantur* (Rome: Fred. Pustet, 1931), 150–151. Husserl here clearly wants a distinction that is other than one of convention or fancy. Yet the distinction between the real body-thing and the experience, as it is drawn here in the body of the text, clearly is not a distinction between necessary moments of a *concretum* to one another or to the whole *concretum*. Clearly, experience and the real body to which it is adjoined, just like, within the natural attitude, experience and what is experienced, comprise a phenomenological whole, but it is a whole of pieces, not moments. — Translators' note.

[5] This, of course, is a reference to *Logical Investigations*, III, §17. — Translators' note.

of changes belongs to the essence of every thing. To the essence of the experience of the thing, I repeat, to its *essence*, belongs that every thingly change stands under causal laws. However, that does not mean that the *essence* of an experienced change is such that precisely the [144] experientially given cause belongs to this change. In the realm of experience, not all necessity is thus the necessity of essence — for otherwise all natural sciences would be a priori. Thus, we may also say: The connection between the experience and the human being having the experience is "contingent."

Therefore, we can without contradiction cut through, as it were, the empirical connection between the experience and all thingly existence. We thereby achieve a kind of *distinctio phaenomenologica*. But what does that mean? What kind of cutting through is that? Is it not true that experiences are experiences of experiencing humans and, hence, that they have a relationship to a body and an insertion in nature? Can I change anything about that? To be sure, it just so happens to be that way. But[6] we can indeed consider[7] the experiences in and for themselves, without considering[8] them in their empirical relation. We can disengage each natural positing (positing of the existence of nature) in the sense that we undertake scientific considerations, in which we make no use at all of any positing of nature and where, accordingly,[9] these considerations keep their validity, whether or not nature or an intellectual-embodied world (*geistig-leibliche Welt*) exists as such.

§14. *The ontological privilege of experience over the natural object. Empirical (transcendent) perception and perception of pure lived experiences*

Indeed, a lived experience has its being (*Sein*) in itself; concerning it we can say, it is what it is, even if talk of a spatial–temporal nature with bodies and minds were a meaningless phantasy. More precisely, the

[6] The following text (up to page 37, line 31) later marked with zeroes in the margin. — Editor's note.
[7] Later added: "and posit." — Editor's note.
[8] "Considering" later corrected to "positing." — Editor's note.
[9] "Accordingly" later crossed out. — Editor's note.

being of experience in itself has in this respect an enormous privilege over the existence of a natural object.

Let us consider this more closely! Let us try to bring to clearest understanding the opposition between empirical Being and phenomenological Being and, correspondingly, empirical perception and [145] phenomenological perception, as the acts that prescribe the sense to the one Being as well as to the other Being. In relation to things, we speak of a being-in-itself vis-à-vis cognition and consciousness, and we do this with an evident right. Things are immediately given in experience; they are thought about and determined in thoughtful experiencing. But if the thing exists, then it is what it is, even if the experience, which would experience it, did not exist, and even if the thoughtful thinking did not exist, which would determine it in an objectively valid way. When all humans sleep, or when a geological upheaval kills all human and living beings, then there is no one on earth to think about and determine the revolving earth and all its objects. Nevertheless, with all these determinations, the earth is what it is.

Speaking from the natural-scientific standpoint, this is correct. On the other hand, the knowledge of the thing-world (*der Dinglichkeit*) has an insurmountable disadvantage: Granted that a thing is experienced as existing for whatever good reasons, and that in the course of further experience it has its existence confirmed and is made further determinate through scientific experiences, for cognition it always remains, as it were, a *mere presumption of existence*. However good the grounds of legitimation, in the course of experience they may prove to be insufficient and outweighed by more legitimate considerations.

All of this[10] belongs to the essence of appearing, i.e., to the sense of an object of experience as such. We only need to immerse ourselves in an experience and to consider the sense in which the experienced presents itself as a being, and we have the evidence that

[10] The sentences from "All of this . . . " to "And yet it is *in principle* . . . " replace the following earlier draft: "To the sense of each empirical object, as object of experience, there belongs this Being-In-Itself: Each experience is a consciousness, whose sense is comprised by intending a being, whose *esse* is not dissolved into a *percipi*. The 'This is the thing' (experience is a thesis, hence it states in so many words, This is the thing) never states at the same time: There is a human or an animal or whichever it is that it posits and cognizes. We see this with evidence, insofar as we consider and predicatively analyze the sense in which the thing is posited." From the Editor's critical textual notes (*Husserliana XIII*, p. 512). — Translators' note.

experienceable being in principle is not exhausted by a *percipi*, but rather, in opposition to it, is an In-itself. And this In-itself comes to givenness. And yet it is *in principle never given in an absolute way*. Its meaning is always only an opinion in the sense that it always stands in need of evidence that can never be given definitively. And consequently, the Being-In-Itself of a thing is, in regard to knowledge, also *always a presumption*, insofar as we never really get rid of the experiential consciousness. At all times, it depends on the further process of experiencing whether the once achieved thesis of experience can be legitimately maintained. In thoughtful experiencing, something is posited for which the being-experienced is in itself contingent; and yet, as soon as we cut off all further being-experienced, the positing [146] of the In-Itself through experience hangs in mid-air, because it has not conclusively become manifest, and cannot become manifest in principle. But this is connected to the consideration that experience, according to its sense, posits *transcendence*.

The thing is given in experiences, and yet, it is not given; that is to say, the experience of it is givenness through *presentations*, through "*appearings*." Each particular experience and similarly each connected, eventually closed sequence of experiences gives the experienced object in an essentially incomplete appearing, which is one-sided, many-sided, yet not all-sided, in accordance with everything that the thing "is." Complete experience is something infinite. To require a complete experience of an object through an eventually closed act or, what amounts to the same thing, an eventually closed sequence of perceptions, which would intend the thing in a complete, definitive, and conclusive way is an absurdity; it is to require something which the essence of experience excludes. Of course, this is here an assertion only, the full justification of which we cannot give here, although[11] you can see it, if only you immerse yourselves in the sense of the thing-perception.

Quite different from the straightforward[12] experience and, in the first place, the empirical perception, is the case of those perceptions of pure lived experiences that cut off all empirical apprehension of these experiences and take them *according to their pure sense*.

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[11] This sentence later crossed out up to this point. — Editor's note.
[12] "Straightforward" later changed to "natural." — Editor's note.

For instance, let us turn our attention to a feeling that we are right now experiencing and let us grasp it purely in itself! In grasping it, we do not include the "empirical apperception," i.e., we do not take hold of the feeling as a feeling-state in which we find ourselves, being these empirical persons under these momentary psycho-physical circumstances. We do not project anything of nature into the feeling, that is, we refrain from dragging it into psycho-physical nature, and we refrain from positing altogether the feeling as being dependent on our bodily states and as occupying a place in objective time, i.e., the time determined by clocks. We leave aside all these matters. Nevertheless, [147] what is left is not nothing; rather, what remains is the feeling in itself, which is in itself what it is, whether the whole of nature exists or not, and which will be unaffected, even if we imagined the whole of nature annulled.

One could ask: What is this peculiar desire to eliminate the empirical apperception, which, after all, is there and will always be there? If I look at the feeling, if I perform a reflection in the Lockean sense, the feeling is there as *my* feeling, as the pleasure which *I* feel, as the pain that *hurts me*.

To this we could respond: Certainly, the empirical apprehension is there and is a constitutive piece of the reflection. But now let us direct our gaze, on the one hand, to the feeling in itself and, on the other hand, to the apprehension in itself interwoven with it. It is clearly one thing to realize the empirical apprehension, to live in it, thus to intend the feeling in this or that relation to me, the empirical person with this lived body, etc., and it is quite another thing, to grasp and intend the feeling in itself and also to grasp the apprehension itself, which is interwoven with the feeling, and to intend it with all that which it is in itself, all that comprises it. This apprehension implies the I-apprehension; I find myself as this human who stands at the lectern in this lecture hall, and so forth, and I find myself in a respective feeling-state. This apprehension of the perception is, of course, a being that I can grasp and posit in and for itself, and this being is different from that other being, the positing of which is the function of the perceptual apprehension, namely as perception of this thing, which is an I, of this I-person in the lecture hall, and so forth.

Let us imagine that what the empirical perception of the I and the surrounding posits be false: I would not be the one as who I posited

myself; this body would not exist, or not as the one just posited; the surrounding would not exist in truth, and so forth. *Now, this re-evaluation of the perception alters nothing at all with regard to its own being, which in the reflecting gaze I take and posit as a being in itself.*

Thus, I can grasp and posit the feeling in itself and for itself. And if I find, united with it, an apprehension and positing that relates it as a [148] psychic state to the human being, taken as a natural object, and thereby inserts it in nature, then I will seize and posit this apprehension and positing in itself in a new act. But "in itself" means that I now make the empirical apprehension an object in and for itself, but I do not go along with it. By that is meant that I now refrain from further positing what the *apprehension* posited or refrain from making any use of that which the *apprehension* posited as reality.

§15. *The phenomenological attitude: Differentiating the phenomenological intuition or perception of pure lived experience from the inner perception of psychic experience*

In this manner, we now can proceed with regard to all experiences. We can assume for ourselves a *new kind of attitude* that disengages every empirical transcendent attitude. Thus, from now on we accept no object which is posited in the empirical attitude as reality; we do not allow ourselves to be presented with any object given in the empirical attitude. We no longer "realize" any empirical attitude; we realize no natural, naïve positing of things, of nature in the widest sense. We put in *brackets*, as it were, every empirical act, which may rush forward, so to speak, or which we enacted a short while ago. In no way do we accept what any empirical act presents to us as being. Instead of living in its achievement, and instead of clinging naïvely to its positing with its sense after its achievement, we rather turn to the act itself and make it itself, plus what in it may present itself to us, an object. This object is not at all natural, and it no longer contains any positing of nature. *In this way*, we appropriate all experiences. Rather than pursuing experience and, living in the experiences, pass judgments and devise experiential theories and sciences, we receive, in terms of their *pure* being, into our realm, which itself is of *pure*

being, every act of experience, every judgment of experience, and every complete or incomplete experiential knowledge. Entirely ruled out is any co-positing of that existence which experience presumes to posit on its own accord.

The attitude we have described here is called, in opposition to the natural attitude, the *phenomenological attitude*. If "experience" in the first attitude is a title which brings the objectivities of the natural attitude to givenness, hence a title for every presenting consciousness of the natural attitude, then *phenomenological seeing* or *viewing* may be the title that captures the presenting acts of the phenomenological attitude. I need not state that the realm of the phenomenological objectivities is one that is completely separate from the realm of nature. Indeed, "natural object" says as much as experienceable and being determinable on the basis of experience. [149]

It is not yet opportune to discuss how the phenomenological realm may be more precisely organized. We are still busy with bringing to full clarity the character of the phenomenological attitude. First, a comment to the effect that the phenomenological viewing and, more precisely, the perceptual grasping of those phenomenological objectivities, which we designated by examples, must not be lumped together with Lockean reflection or, as it is customarily expressed in German, inner experience (*innere Wahrnehmung*) or self-perception (*Selbstwahrnehmung*). By this one understands the perception of one's own psychical experiences, according to their own composition. But it is clear that this perception is an empirical perception and remains an empirical perception as long as every empirical positing is not disengaged. Consequently, it is not only the case that every positing of whatever else there is of nature with the things in space and time, including the positing of one's own body and the psycho-physical relations of the experiences to it, must remain inoperative, but it is also the case that the positing of the empirical I, conceived as a person joined to the body, must remain inoperative, and this is not only true for all other I's, but also for one's own empirical I. It is not until one consistently and completely carries out the *phenomenological reduction* and in the immanent description of the psychical experience no longer grasps and posits the latter as a state, as "experience" of the experiencing I and as an entity in objective time, that one obtains *pure*

lived experience, as the object of the phenomenological perception, and, for the first time, achieves genuine phenomenological perception [150] in its radical distinctiveness from empirical perception.

§16. *Descartes' fundamental consideration and the phenomenological reduction*

The first philosopher who achieved a phenomenological reduction was *Descartes*. However, he achieved it only to relinquish it immediately. It is a most noteworthy fact that the *fundamental consideration* that inaugurates the entire course of the development of modern philosophy was nothing other than the staging of a phenomenological reduction. It is noteworthy because here indeed is the beginning of all authentic scientific philosophy and the operative point of all genuine philosophical problems. The correlate of the phenomenological perception is the *cogitatio* in the Cartesian sense, for which we can say instead: the pure, in contradistinction to the empirical consciousness. A *cogitatio*, a consciousness, is every kind of sensing, presenting, perceiving, remembering, expecting, and every kind of judging, inferring, and every kind of feeling, desiring, willing, and so forth. These are generally known things, comprising all that which every person immediately sees, "in himself," as he says, seeing it in such a way that he cannot doubt it at all. By contrast, everything the empirical psychologist lays claim to as psychic experience of the human and animal I-consciousness respectively becomes only a *cogitatio* in the absolute sense, in the sense of a pure phenomenological givenness, by way of the phenomenological reduction, and only then is the givenness pure and absolute in the sense that the straightforward positing of a this, of a being, leaves open no possible doubt whatsoever, i.e., would render doubt meaningless indeed. This is precisely what was important for Descartes, whereas for us it is not the main thing. The aim of a reform of all sciences, which would make possible their formation as absolutely valid sciences and which would exclude any deceptive appearance and any inauguration of pseudo-sciences, is, of course, significant enough. In the last analysis, philosophy is surely nothing other than an intention directed at absolute knowledge. But

whether and how knowledge in the phenomenological attitude can serve to justify absolute knowledge in general as well as absolute knowledge in the sphere of experience cannot be settled from the outset, let alone be fully comprehended. And Descartes' procedure itself foundered because he believed he could risk a founding of absolute science without an investigation into the sense of absolute science and without establishing a systematic phenomenology, the existence of which he had no inkling. [151]

What interests us here is not the absolute universal science (*absolute Universalwissenschaft*), but rather science (*die Wissenschaft*) within the phenomenological attitude. We leave it to other discussions to determine whether and to what extent knowledge in such an attitude may be called "absolute" and, in what way, besides this, absolute knowledge is possible or not.

§17. *Independence of the phenomenological judgment from the natural judgment*

The greatest difficulty is the discovery of the essence of the phenomenological attitude itself and the prevention of all false delimitation of it. If I now perceive this room with these persons present, what does the phenomenological attitude yield in this case? I do perceive these things; while I perceive them, they stand in front of me and a spatial whole encompasses them and my lived body, to which I relate my I, this familiar I. And about all these things I have now made assertions, I have made perceptual judgments, and I constantly make new ones. That is the natural attitude. Now I change, as it were, my viewpoint. I achieve a new attitude. These humans, these benches, etc., "are still standing there." That they are still standing is not the basis for my judgment. I do not make any statements about these things and do not investigate what might be valid for them. Just now I myself have judged and, from time to time, I may accomplish anew the judgment, "These benches are standing there, etc." But I disengage this judgment. I do not acknowledge what it presents as true among the truths that I admit in the new attitude. However, to my sphere does belong the judgment itself, as a "this" having properties of its own,

namely, that it judges about benches in "this room," about things in space, in nature, and so forth. However, in all this I merely describe [152] what this judgment judges, what it posits as true, but I myself do not take what is thus posited as true for truth.

What for me now counts as having being is exclusively that which I posit in my judgments that I do recognize now, but not what I have posited or perhaps will again posit in judgments I do not recognize now. By this I do not mean to say that I take this to be non-existent, nor even that I doubt such being, or somehow find it suspect. Rather, I abstain from every position-taking in this matter. That the judgment is a judgment about these or those benches can be seen to have this meaning: I do not thereby make the slightest claim that these or those benches *exist*, that the judgment is right or wrong in its positing.

Moreover, we behave in quite a similar fashion when someone doubts one of our judgments or when we ourselves sense the need for critical reflection and, in any case, wish to re-examine our judgment "without prejudice." "Without prejudice!" does not mean that we ourselves have come to vacillate about it or that we have relinquished our judgment. We are perhaps quite firmly convinced; we judge subsequently as before. *And yet*, we examine it without prejudice. And in this case too, it means: For our re-consideration, we disengage the judgment: What has been judged we do not accept as true in the re-consideration, we make no use at all of that which was claimed to be true. If we forget that if we accidentally or by means of some verbal phrase fall back into the original attitude; and if we make total or partial use of the content of the original assertion during the critical reflection and process of justification, then we will fall into the familiar mistake of the *circulus vitiosus*. Therefore, the critical attitude is, indeed, akin to the phenomenological one. In the case where it has to be re-examined whether or not the presumed being could count as the actual being, the presumed being stands in question, and we must not take it for real or true. If we hold it for the presumed being, we must disconnect or bracket this holding-it-for-real.

It is evident that judgments of which I make no use or, to put it better, that propositions, which, in principle, I do not regard as findings of a scientific field, and which I take as premises, have in turn no impact upon such findings. It is therefore absolutely certain that my findings

remain undisturbed in their truth, whether those judgments hold or [153]
do not hold.[13]

Thus if I, as a phenomenologist, suspend all empirical judgments in the usual sense, my phenomenological statements will remain

[13] Here is a later critical supplement, probably from 1921, to both of the preceding sentences: "One cannot put it this way. Indeed, one could object: If I make use of certain propositions in one area of geometry and do not judge about the other propositional areas, this does not mean that the former and latter propositions, as truths (real or hypothetical), are independent of one another. The first question to ask, therefore, is to what extent phenomenological judging and ontological judging are independent; or, what does the independence legitimately signify and what can it signify. Of course, there are certain dependencies. If I suppose that a thing exists, or generally speaking, if I suppose the possible existence of a thing as such, then this delineates for each I a rule for its possible experiences in consciousness. However, I can conceive for myself a connection of concordant experiences in relation to an object of which I have now an actual experience, but which I treat purely as an intentional object; I can construe this context as perfectly concordant; I can describe it systematically, make judgments about it, put forward with evident truth a total system of judgments, without in the least judging about the thing *simpliciter*. Similarly, I can consider eidetically 'a thing in general' purely as an intentional possibility of a possible and concordant manner of experiencing, and I can construct the possible concordant systems of experience without in the least judging ontologically about the possibilities of the things in general, about that which belongs to the proper essence of thingliness in general. And vice versa, I can engage in ontology, and in the purely ontological attitude I will never, in principle, encounter a phenomenological judgment.

It is also possible that I judge falsely ontologically and correctly phenomenologically, and vice versa. But independence of the *truths* themselves does not exist because of the link of essential correlations. The independence of the act of judging, of the aiming at truth, of knowledge itself — this independence does not mean independence of the relevant judgments as truths or as presumed, hypothetical truths; it does not mean independence of states of affairs, of the relations of judgments. Similarly, in the sphere of objects: I am independent in the knowledge of each self-contained object-realm, as in arithmetic, etc. Whenever I achieve an explanation, a proof, I am independent in terms of knowledge.

Now what alone is here important is that I can make purely phenomenological judgments and that I can gain phenomenological evident truths without taking an ontological position on the matter. And as to the reality of nature, it is important to see that eidetic judging alone does not presuppose the existence of the world. In contrast to empiricism (here that means objectivistic empiricism which recognizes only 'positive,' objective, experiential sciences), it is worthwhile to show that there is pure consciousness and that pure consciousness, even if modified, remains as my *ego cogito*, even if the world did not exist. I then see that I cannot erase my *ego*, but that both the realm of ontological possibilities as well as that of pure eidetic phenomenology are independent of the existence of the objective world." A rewriting of this note is given below as Appendix IV (XXIII). — Editor's note.

unaffected by this, even if I, as a natural thinking human being, will again make empirical judgments, lend credence to natural science, and so forth. But my phenomenological statements will also remain undisturbed if I, as a grim skeptic, doubt the truth of empirical judgments, indeed if I reject them, whether justifiably or not. From the [154] standpoint of phenomenology, these are private matters being of no interest to it, precisely because it has disengaged them. And thereby is disengaged also every judgment that explicitly or implicitly posits the existence of the phenomenologist himself as a member of nature.[14]

[14] In 1924 or latter inserted: "(World)." — Editor's note.

Chapter 3

PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE AIM OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION

§18. *The objection concerning solipsism*

Is phenomenological research solipsistic research? Does it restrict the research to the individual I and, more precisely, to the area of its individual psychic phenomena? It is anything but this. *Solus ipse* — that would mean I alone exist or I disengage everything remaining of the world, excepting only myself and my psychic states and acts. On the contrary, as a phenomenologist, I disengage myself just as I disengage everyone else and the entire world, and no less my psychic states and acts, which, as *my*[1] states and acts, are precisely nature. One may say that the nonsensical epistemology of solipsism emerges when, being ignorant of the radical principle of the phenomenological reduction, yet similarly intent on suspending all transcendence, one confuses the psychological and the psychologistic immanence with the genuine phenomenological immanence.[2] However, one can also say that a misunderstanding of the proper sense of *transcendence* and its disconnection leads to the confusion of psychological immanence (which is precisely the solipsistic version) with phenomenological immanence. But here we leave aside all epistemology.

[1] In 1924 or later inserted: "of this human person." — Editor's note.

[2] The part of the sentence "yet similarly intent on suspending all transcendence, one confuses the psychological and the psychologistic immanence with the genuine phenomenological immanence" was changed in 1924 to: "yet similarly intent on disengaging all worldly transcendence, one confuses the psychological immanence with the genuine phenomenological immanence." — Editor's note.

§19. *The objection to the phenomenological possibility of the disengagement of the I* [155]

One may object: The phenomenological reduction, which wants to disengage one's own I, is something unthinkable. It is supposed to be a reduction to the mere *cogitatio* in itself, to the "pure consciousness." But *whose cogitatio*, *whose* pure consciousness? The relation to the I is essential to the *cogitatio* and, therefore, what is absolutely given is indeed, as Descartes would have it, the *cogito*.

To this we must of course respond: The possibility of disengaging all empirical[3] transcendence, taken in the aforementioned sense, of putting within brackets the existence of all of nature, is incontestable, as is, consequently, the bracketing of the existence of one's own empirical I, about which in the framework of phenomenology no judgment is made and of which no use is made.

The objection can therefore only mean that, as it were, over against the empirical I, one must still assume a *pure I*, as something inseparable from the *cogitationes*. We do not have to decide this matter here. We need only say that phenomenological research can and must speak of all that which it finds within its attitude. And if this attitude finds[4] that the natural world with its things and persons along with world-space and world-time stands in brackets and, consequently, is not there as existing for it, and that something like a pure I as[5] pure time and whatever is given and is to be posited, well, then that is something phenomenological.

§20. *Objections to the absolute character of the phenomenologically given and to the possibility of a phenomenological science and the phenomenological founding of natural science*

One will also be able to raise serious doubts about phenomenological knowledge. One will say something like this: The givens of experience are disengaged and with them all judgments of experience,[6] because although experience is a presenting act, it is, in [156]

[3] In 1924 or later inserted: "worldly." — Editor's note.
[4] In 1924 or later added: "which in truth is the case." — Editor's note.
[5] In 1924 or later "as" changed to "or." — Editor's note.
[6] Later inserted: "therefore." — Editor's note.

principle, not one which presents definitively.[7] Such givenness includes essentially the possibility that the given would exist, would not exist, or would exist differently. The phenomenological intuition is supposed to be free of this deficiency. What it presents is not mere appearance but being itself. But can that really be maintained? Can one ever reach absolute givenness? Even if the phenomenological givenness could claim its absolute character,[8] against which we will soon express well-founded doubts, how could that be of much help to us? For Descartes too, the indubitable being of the *cogitatio* did not do much good. It is not clear how a science is to be established here, and indeed a natural science.[9] After all, nature[10] is indeed our ubiquitous interest. Is the aspiration, then, to reach *nature* on a purely phenomenological basis and by way of fancy inferences, in order to be able to gain a higher, absolute[11] knowledge of nature vis-à-vis the bracketed experiential knowledge of nature? This is to be rejected as a contradiction from the start. According to its essence, nature is knowable *only* through the path of experience. Nature and empirical knowledge are correlatives. Every conclusion, which ends with an assertion about the objectivities of nature, requires, if it is a rational one, premises that ultimately are founded in experience.

§21. *The absence of motivation for the phenomenological reduction*

Before we inquire into the grounds for the doubt about the absolute character of the phenomenological viewing (*Erschauung*),[12] we would like to respond to what was hypothetically stated. O*ne need*

[7] Experience = objective-natural experience; the empirical (*Empirie*) = objective experience. — Husserl's note.

[8] In 1924 or later "absolute character" changed to: "right to absolute evidence." — Editor's note.

[9] In 1924 or later "and indeed a natural science" changed to: "and how indeed thereby a natural science is to be founded on the sources of absolute evidence." — Editor's note.

[10] In 1924 or later inserted: "the universe." — Editor's note.

[11] In 1924 or later inserted: "absolutely evident." — Editor's note.

[12] "Viewing" is here an expression for a reduced perception. Here, "phenomenology" is thought of as an empirical science on the basis of the phenomenological reduction; therefore, it is not thought of as eidetic phenomenology, and without questioning into "apodictic" justification. — Husserl's note.

not assign any motives as to why phenomenology disengages the positing of experience. As phenomenology, it has no such motives. The respective phenomenologist may have such motives, but that is a private matter.[13] Phenomenology suspends the empirical positing, restricting itself to what remains. The only question then is whether there is something to research, whether there remains space for a science.[14] One must not say that our sole interest is nature.[15] The natural scientist may say this, but it is his private viewpoint. The phenomenologist's interest is precisely not nature, as it is posited as reality in experience and in the universal experiential sciences. Whether and how phenomenological research can be significant or not for knowledge of nature itself[16] is, of course, not a question preceding the establishing of phenomenology. [157]

§22. *Preliminary thoughts for the discussion of objections to the absoluteness of phenomenological knowledge*

The following needs to be said prior to discussing the possible objections to the absoluteness of phenomenological knowledge.[17] The natural scientist's heart lies in the knowledge of nature: He recognizes that experience has its indubitable right and that, on the basis of experience, undoubtedly valuable findings of endless abundance are attainable. The indubitable right of the knowledge of experience does not mean that it is absolute knowledge. Even the natural scientist himself does not think that. He knows very well that each of his assertions, regardless of how methodologically exact each is, can be considerably modified through future experience. But perhaps it is the case that the phenomenological knowing, the knowledge which [158]

[13] Or, there are sciences to which phenomenology can be of service. But then these are interests of these sciences. But phenomenology can stand by and for itself. It can begin with the epoché and need not inquire after further motives. — Husserl's note.
[14] In 1924 or later "whether there remains space for a science" changed to "whether a field opens up for an autonomous science." — Editor's note.
[15] Nature means always the same as objective world. — Husserl's note.
[16] In 1924 or later inserted: "and especially for the psychological." — Editor's note.
[17] In 1924 or later "absoluteness of phenomenological knowledge" changed to "absoluteness of the evidence of phenomenological knowledge." — Editor's note.

disengages everything[18] empirical, is knowledge in a genuine sense too. Perhaps phenomenological knowledge has its indubitable right too, and perhaps it is also a sphere of rich scientific insights. If that is so, there need be no further proof for establishing phenomenology.[19] But even if absolute indubitability is an idea which is not fully realizable in any actual science, not even in the phenomenological science, and even if phenomenological assertions could deceive or could turn out, in light of future findings, to be overhasty and in need of modifications, nevertheless, phenomenology, like natural science, will keep its value, provided it is evident that, in principle, phenomenological givenness is actual givenness and phenomenological method is real method. And perhaps it is the case that phenomenological givenness can be vindicated as absolute givenness, while, on the other hand, phenomenology's scientific articulation, like any theorizing, e.g., the fixation in a proper linguistic form, comes with its own wellspring of deceptions. In which case, phenomenological research would nevertheless stand nearer to the idea of absolute science than any other science; namely on this ground alone that the legitimacy of each methodic step in genuine science[20] must be verifiable, and can only be verifiable, in immediate givenness, that is, precisely in the phenomenological sphere.

Perhaps matters stand somewhat differently. Perhaps within the phenomenological reduction itself one must distinguish again between different modes of givenness. And among these we must distinguish those that are absolutely indubitable from those that are not. And perhaps the title phenomenology is more a title of a method than of a discipline. Perhaps there are several phenomenological disciplines, some related to absolute givennesses, and others to "incomplete" givennesses.[21]

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[18] In 1924 or later inserted: "objective." — Editor's note.

[19] Always in the here defined sense. — Husserl's note.

[20] In 1924 or later inserted: "of the experiencing and theoretical achievements and of the achievement-formations constituting themselves therein." — Editor's note.

[21] In 1924 or later the two preceding sentences were changed in the following way and marked with deletion signs: "And perhaps the title phenomenology is as much a title of a method as of a discipline, and perhaps there are different phenomenological disciplines, some eidetic and tied to absolutely evident givennesses, the others empirical and tied to 'incomplete' givennesses." — Editor's note.

Chapter 4 [159]

PHENOMENOLOGY'S MOVE BEYOND THE REALM OF THE ABSOLUTE GIVEN[1]

§23. *The problem of the absolute character of phenomenological givenness*

What are the objections that are raised against the absolute character of phenomenological givenness? Let us pursue them a little. That will prove useful because we can cast a few glances in the direction of the modes of such givenness. In fact, it will become evident that the phenomenological reduction leads us, for the first time, to absolute givenness, which we provisionally called phenomenological viewing, i.e., to phenomenological *perception*, whose absolute and thereby indubitable character can surely be defended. But somehow interwoven with it are other modes of givenness (always within the phenomenological attitude) whose absolute character is not defensible in the same way (namely as indubitability). In this regard, we will have to expand the concept of phenomenological viewing so that it runs parallel to empirical experience; so that it becomes, as it were, phenomenological experience: phenomenological presenting and presentification (*phänomenologische Gegenwärtigung und Vergegenwärtigung*).

[1] Here appears for the first time the idea of an *apodictic critique* of phenomenological experience according to its basic forms: perception, retention, memory, etc. In Chapter 4 is shown, step by step, how the phenomenological reduction is practiced on a perception (according to its intentional structure) and how a phenomenologically pure perception is attained. Likewise in free retention, remembering, and expectation: At first, the pure phenomenological experience must be won at all; and only then can an apodictic critique be practiced. — Husserl's note (see Appendix V (XXIV)).

§24. *The absolute givenness of the phenomenologically perceived. The meaninglessness of a disengagement within the phenomenological perception*

I perceive and disengage the existence of the perceived realm of things and hold on to the perception itself and in itself as a This. But [160] the perception is an enduring being (*Sein*); it has duration in that it has just been and still is, and in that the Now also transforms itself into a Just-Past and puts in place a new Now.[2] *What has absolute givenness got to do with this*? The past of the perception is, of course, no longer given.[3] If one says, it was given, it can be asked whether this "was" is given. In the Now, it is supposed to be given as a "was," as having been given. But perhaps that is a mistake. After all, memory often misleads. Perhaps I mean: It was given, and it begins only in the Now. "In the Now:" But as soon as I want to seize what I have thus actually given as now, through my finding and judging this, it has already passed by. The Now has become a new Now, and what I wanted to find appears in it as gone by. The past transcends the Now. And I must disengage it analogously to the way I disengage what is empirically transcendent. *But now the entire project of disengaging loses its meaning*.[4] Because for the discriminating research we wanted to disengage what is not given, in order to get in exchange for it a given of a more rigorous sense for the sphere of judgment. But we get nothing whatsoever for this sphere. The disengagement has become so radical that we find nothing more to pass judgment on.

However, let us not be put off by this! When in our phenomenological attitude we are focused on a perception, we apprehend it as a completely immediate This! And we apprehend it as a unity of some duration; and if we do not do anything further to it and purely accept the positing which is achieved with this This!, and if we accept this

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[2] This means: The perception has a flowing point of original self-presence and has over and above this a horizon of "retentional" givenness as Just-Past. And likewise, on the other hand, it has an immediate futural horizon of protentional givenness. When a perception has gone by, there has come into its place a mere retention, which for a while has the form of a progressive "sinking away," until eventually it is completely submerged. — Husserl's note.

[3] In 1924 or later inserted: "now." — Editor's note.

[4] Inserted later: "if the epistemological interest is the determining one." — Editor's note.

perception purely as this abiding This Here, then any doubt loses its [161]
meaning. If we doubt whether something only appears to have being or whether it really exists, it clearly means: We doubt whether the respective "appearing-to-be" (*zu sein Scheinen*), i.e., the appearing in the manner of a perception, memory, or indication, the "appearing-to-be" in the manner of a judgment and suchlike is valid or not; we are considering whether perhaps in truth nothing corresponds to it. Yet, precisely thereupon, this appearing, this perceiving, remembering, judging, and so forth, are presupposed as given, just as they are indeed given. (More accurately put, we may say: One must distinguish the appearing as such, the perceived, the remembered, or thought about, etc., in a word, "the mere meaning" (*Meinung*) and, in case that it is valid, the corresponding *being* (*Sein*).) In any case, the doubt presupposes the givenness, the indubitable givenness of the meaning (*Meinung*) that is posited in the doubt. *Consequently, this perception, this phenomenon of an abiding empirical givenness, is given in its own genuine being and in its duration, and is given absolutely*.

§25. *The implied retention in the phenomenological perception as "transcendence" within the phenomenological attitude*

Departing from here, one will find the correct attitude toward the *just past perception*, which is included in the givenness of the abiding perception. *This* "what has been" is a[5] given. It is a This, but as just having been and as a given past phase of the given abiding perception. It is in precisely this way, and in no other way that we must take it, and with no other content at all than that with which it gives itself each time. A different question, however, is its description, its analysis, especially the comparative analysis and description of this just-having-been and this now-phase. But in any case, the phenomenological viewing and grasping is the basis for a judgment, opening up a ground upon which thinking can establish itself. However, what such thinking can seriously achieve, indeed, whether it can deliver scientific knowledge (*Wissenschaft*) is not settled at this point. [162]
That is something we will have to tackle seriously.

[5] In 1924 or later inserted: "absolute." — Editor's note.

Above all, we must ask: how expansively is the framework to be drawn?

It can be seen that within the attitude of the phenomenological reduction, we come upon some things that can no longer be claimed to be "absolutely given" in the same sense as the aforementioned things.[6]

We could not surrender to the *inclination* to grant validity to only the Now of perception (of the phenomenological viewing). It would not be feasible to maintain, "the Now is the eternally flowing limit point between past and future," let alone that the point is of this nature, if we wanted to disengage the *retention*. *Consequently, we have acknowledged "transcendence" within the phenomenological attitude*, namely insofar as we not only admit the retention itself as phenomenological being, but also admit that *of which* it is a retention. Each Now of retention is retention of a not-now, of something having-been a short while ago; and this having been, we said, is given. We could easily make it clear to ourselves that to mistrust such a givenness is tantamount to surrendering to the forces of absolute skepticism. It is also clear that such retentional evidence is presupposed in empirical perception too, and that, in any case, the natural scientist who builds on empirical perception and, consequently, also every philosopher who trusts in knowledge of nature cannot suddenly play the part of the hypercritic when it comes to dealing with phenomenology.

What holds of the retention within the abiding perception naturally will also hold in the case of the, as it were, free retention which immediately follows upon the perception that has completely run its course.

§26. *Phenomenological recollection and its possibility of deception. Transformation of empirical memory into phenomenological memory*

What are we to say of recollection, starting with the recollection that runs its course within retention? That which is phenomenologically reduced sinks back into the phenomenological having-been and, while [163]

[6] *Eidetic* reduction is not practiced here. The investigation looks at the phenomenologically reduced consciousness in its individual flow. — Husserl's note.

there is still awareness of it as sinking, there occurs a consciousness of the repetition, of the restoration of the elapsed passage and of that which one has been conscious of, namely, in the form of recollection. Is the recollected, i.e., that which passes by as repetition, truly the same as what has passed away? And all the more so, in the case of a recollection, which is not united with the consciousness of the retention?

Let us assume that I yesterday saw an event and then directly reflected on this perception. I now remember this perception. And while doing so I perform the phenomenological reduction: I do not make a claim to the fact that yesterday in the reality of nature such a psychical process occurred, that it occurred yesterday at such and such an objectively determinable time. Rather, I only put forward, first, the claim that there is the consciousness of recollection and, second, that the remembered perception in it (of such and such an event) has in fact occurred, and is again apprehended at this moment.

Here, we would have *new "transcendent things" in phenomenological immanence*. But are such recollections justified? Are they justified as absolutely indubitable? Everyone will object: Certainly not indubitable! Memory deceives, regardless whether it is empirical or phenomenological memory. Indeed, one can demonstrate the possibility of the deception of phenomenological recollection by way of empirical recollection. For in a certain way one can, while still being in empirical memory, reflect and, so to speak, produce in it a phenomenological memory.

Consider that an empirical memory tells me two events were simultaneous. Afterwards I have a new recollection, one that through a richer context of memory is far superior in power, and it tells me, the two events had been apart from each other by such and such clearly recollected events. I perform the phenomenological reduction; the existence of the[7] events, like all of nature, is put into brackets. And just as the existence of what is perceived is put into brackets, so are the recollected natural events. What is the result of this for the phenomenological data? Clearly, the reduction of the first recollection [164] yields a phenomenological simultaneity of the two perceptions of the events, while the second recollection yields a phenomenological

[7] In 1924 or later added: "objective." — Editor's note.

non-simultaneity of the same two perceptions of the events. Here, the simultaneity may not be understood in isolation, just as the perceptions are not to be taken in isolation. In any case, this discussion should suffice to make clear the possibility of deception also for phenomenological recollection.

We see immediately that each unified recollection in the empirical sense, insofar as it brings together a manifold of antecedent experiences in an empirical consciousness, yields a unified phenomenological recollection by means of the phenomenological reduction. This phenomenological recollection joins together the phenomenological manifold in a phenomenologically reduced recalling consciousness (*Wiederbewusstsein*): In the first place, memory means: this or that *has been*. But it also makes possible a reflection, which says: This or that *has been perceived*; or a perception of this or that has been. To the presumed simultaneity of the perceived corresponds a simultaneity of the perceiving; and one becomes aware again (*wiederbewusst*) of this perceiving, which thus becomes an object in the phenomenological reflection. Every empirical deception, which emerges in subjective intuition, results in a consciousness of deception for the phenomenologically reduced recollection (the same of course could be shown for the realm of psychological experience of oneself, which I do not want to address here).

§27. *The possibility of the phenomenological, but not absolute, appropriation of the entire region of the empirical. On expectation*

And now we notice that through the phenomenological reduction we can likewise appropriate the entire region of the empirical, i.e., the positing of every kind of experience, though admittedly with the same effect.

For instance, let us consider *expectation*. To each empirical expectation corresponds the phenomenological expectation, which is [165] a result of the phenomenological reduction. For example, my gaze takes in a delightful pair of bullfinches. The tiny male follows the tiny female that flies from tree to tree. Now the female flies over into the neighbor's garden. I expect that the male will follow. If we perform the phenomenological reduction, then what belongs to nature is

bracketed. Is it then not clear that every such empirical expectation contains, as it were, in itself a phenomenological expectation? Does not the seeing of the tiny female's flying involve the expectation of a seeing with such and such determinate contents of the subsequent flight of the tiny male? To be sure, we are turned *de facto* to the things, to nature. But is it not evident that we, instead of being taken up with the things that we experience, could have been focused on the experiencing of things and thus focused on how now this or that experience "must" follow? And we can assume such an attitude from the outset and, instead of living in the experience and realizing its naïve positing, thereby "acknowledging being as being," we could turn toward the experiencing and bracket its positing. Present experiencing then motivates future experiencing. But the purity of the phenomenological motivation in no way helps to confer on this motivation[8] absolute givenness. For example, while I observe the event, a gnat flies in my nose and I must sneeze. Nothing will come of the expected seeing now.

§28. *The phenomenological experience. Its "transcendence in immanence" and the possibility of deception. Empathy and experience of oneself*

Upon more careful consideration, we find that the stock of phenomenological motivations[9] is infinitely richer than the few and somewhat vague titles of perception, retention, recollection, and expectation may suggest. Also, one must very much take notice of the empirical, objective domain itself, as it is experienced through perception or some other way. The phenomenological reduction always gives a surprising abundance of intuitive connections; to be [166] precise, connections which are not intuitively grasped in line with the phenomenological perception, but which are intuitively grasped, as it were, in various other ways of *phenomenological experience*. And if they are not intuitively grasped, and if they are not connected

[8] In 1924 or later inserted: "the proper forms of experience (anticipation, expectation)." — Editor's note.
[9] In 1924 or later inserted: "(modes of experience)." — Editor's note.

with regard to meaning and positing, it nevertheless makes sense that, in each case, such connections, albeit unmeant,[10] are somehow apprehended and intended and, moreover, that the possibility of such a regard to meaning as well as the possibility for the constitution of real phenomenological experience is secured. At the same time, there is "*transcendence in phenomenological immanence*" everywhere, and everywhere the possibility of deception.

As an example may serve any perception of a constant or changing thing, as for instance, a cigar box standing in front of us, in regard to its shape, color, and physical-causal properties, insofar as these are actually perceivable. The thing stands there, and we see it and stay focused on the seen as such, keeping at bay all thought. And we see the spatial form, e.g., that of the cigar box. The gaze wanders here and there, follows now this, now that line of the box, jumps from one part of the grain of the wood to another, etc. All of that we can conceive as being transformed into something like a phenomenological series of expectations, namely by way of the phenomenological reduction and by a change in our viewpoint. And if the expectation is not actually established,[11] still there are the series of motivations that, in accordance with their essence, are transformable into such actual series of expectations. Now these phenomenological motivations have their definite syntaxes, their form and rule, regardless of how capriciously the gaze may slide over the object. And to every definite spatial form corresponds a definite syntax; and to every perspective of one's gaze belongs a system of complicated possibilities, and every objective change corresponds to precisely these and precisely so structured series of modifications in the phenomena. And all of this is to be thought of in the phenomenological reduction. The position and the change of the gaze are then reduced to certain phenomena of sensation and apprehension. After all, after the phenomenological [167] reduction, the eyes, the head, and everything else forfeit their existence. And the same could be said for the manifolds of sensations and apprehensions that belong to the coloring of the box and, especially, to the coloring of such and such a side of the box. And so forth. Here, we could also draw on that special form of experience that is called

[10] In 1924 or later added: "unthematic." — Editor's note.
[11] Later added: "as an act-intention achieved by the I." — Editor's Note.

empathy with the inner life of others (*fremdes Seelenleben*) and, prior to this, of course, the empirical I-experience. And this would lead us again to the contexts of motivations of reduced phenomena and, according to form and kind, we would be led to totally determinate reduced phenomena. But the knowledge of the contexts of motivation is no knowledge of phenomenological *perception*; it is not that intuiting of absolute self-givenness to which the evidence of the *cogitatio* leads in the first place. And that holds everywhere.

§29. *Going beyond the realm of absolute givenness as a necessary condition for the possibility of a phenomenological science*

The question whether with respect to the givenness, which is ascertainable by way of the phenomenological method, a science is possible, will depend, first of all, on how we interpret the value of these modes of givenness, which we meet here as "phenomenological experience," as transcendent phenomenological reflection of various kinds.

But I want to express myself more precisely. If a person wanted to restrict himself to the givenness of the *cogitatio* as absolutely doubtlessly given, i.e., as a givenness of perception, as springing forth from the phenomenological reduction and reflection during the performance of the perduring *cogitatio*, we would only be able to constantly say: "This." Yet how this was to produce scientific knowledge would be difficult to fathom. However, as it turns out, it is the case that with retention, memory, expectation and, in particular, with the phenomenological reduction of all inner and exterior natural experience, and by drawing upon the manifold contents of that experience, an infinite fullness of phenomenological givenness flows toward us. (For example, in the case of recollection, not only is there possible *one* reflection and reduction, which turns the recollection itself, as a lived experience, into an object for an absolute self-presenting phe- [168]
nomenological perception, but also a second reflection and reduction is possible, which, as it were, runs its course *within* the recollection and which brings a recollected lived experience, as a phenomenological past, to givenness, albeit no longer to absolute givenness excluding every doubt. And likewise in all other cases.) All these objectivities,

which we call phenomenological, are thought of as singular, individual objectivities; each phenomenon is thought of as the individual This-Here, as absolute singularity.

The[12] psychologist will say: Well, all these are psychical phenomena; they are present or past psychical phenomena, my own or, when I assume them on the basis of empathy, those of the other person. Now surely, the psychologist legitimately invokes all that which we have here marked off as a field of objectivities of a special kind, namely, if it is not considered purely in the phenomenological reduction, but grasped as lived experiences of the I,[13] as phenomena of an empirical I. Of course, the psychologist has no inkling how great the difficulties are that this naturalistic interpretation of lived experiences, the concept of psychological experiences, brings in its train. All the same, so far everything is all right. Yet *we* insist on disengaging the empirical subject as well, and in that case the phenomenological-singular being is of course no psychological lived experience. If one wants to speak of the "psychical," one would have to speak of a *transcendental-psychical* in contrast to the *empirical-psychical*.

Now what about the answer to the earlier question? May one admit those kinds of phenomenological experiences that do not have absolute character?[14] You surely guess what the answer is. No one requires of the natural scientist that the modes of givenness upon which he builds are absolute modes of givenness. Not only because to require this would be foolish, indeed nonsensical, but also because it is not necessary for the establishing of rigorous science,[15] as natural science shows itself. Therefore, nothing at all stands in the way of attempting [169] a transcendental psychology,[16] a science[17] of the lived experiences in the phenomenological reduction. Although phenomenological experience[18] may often times not be better than empirical experience, it

[12] The following section later lightly crossed out in pencil. — Editor's note.
[13] Later, probably 1921, inserted: "in the world." — Editor's note.
[14] Later inserted: "the character of givenness *in the flesh* (*leibhafter Gegebenheit*), and not a givenness through mere presentification." — Editor's note.
[15] In 1924 inserted: "in the usual sense." — Editor's note.
[16] Phenomenology as transcendental psychology. — Husserl's note.
[17] In 1924 or later "science" changed to "experiential science." — Editor's note.
[18] Later "phenomenological experience" was put into quotation marks and the following comment added: "'phenomenological' experience = singular individual investigation of consciousness within the phenomenological epoché." — Editor's note.

is, in any case, not worse either. So why should it not be possible to have a phenomenological science of experience vis-à-vis a naturalist science of experience! At least for the time being, one would like to think just that, taking it for granted that to every kind of experience (*Erfahrung*) a science of experience (*Erfahrungswissenschaft*) must be able to correspond.

§30. *Immanence and transcendence. The polysemous nature of these terms and the sense of immanence and transcendence in the field of phenomenology*

Here, we must note that this science would have to deal with objects which, although they are occasionally "*transcendent*" relative to experience, for instance, if they are remembered or expected, are nevertheless, in a different and more important sense,[19] *immanent*, namely in that, according to their own nature,[20] they can be absolutely given and given as themselves. In principle, they are absolutely perceivable and, accordingly, absolutely intuitable in recollection;[21] they are not objectivities by way of appearing, by way of mere presentation.

For it is the characteristic feature of *nature* and everything that falls under this title that it transcends experience not only in the sense that it is not absolutely given, but also in the sense that, in principle, it *can*not be absolutely given, because it is *necessarily* given through presentations, through profiles,[22] and the profiling presentation, in principle, cannot be a reduplication of that which is itself presented.[23] [170]

You may have noticed that talk about immanence and transcendence

[19] Inserted later, probably 1924: "original" (*originär*). — Editor's note.
[20] Later inserted: "in the flesh." — Editor's note.
[21] But here the language is quite misleading. Immanent data are present, past, or future, whether they are perceived or retentionally apprehended or presentified; the past immanent data are present as past, then past as having been, etc. But they are *objects* only as abiding unities of manifold actual and possible reproductions, and so forth. — Husserl's note.
[22] Inserted later: "which are relative to the here and now." — Editor's note.
[23] And whereas the external transcendent objects are repeatedly perceivable, immanent objects are not repeatedly perceivable, but only unities of repeated remembering and, in general, presentification. — Husserl's note.

involves many meanings; hence, it may be understandable that latterly I have repeatedly spoken about immanence and transcendence.

One can speak of transcendence in a variety of ways:

1) In the completely general sense that the object of knowledge itself is not present in the act of knowledge (and is not present at all in the consciousness of which it is the object). It belongs to the essence of the intentional relation (being just the relation between consciousness and the object of consciousness) that consciousness, i.e., the respective *cogitatio*, is consciousness about something that is what it is not. And that holds even in the case of the phenomenological intuiting. Even that which is intuited phenomenologically is not in the proper sense within the act.[24] But in this respect one does not speak of transcendence, because then the opposite of immanence would lose its meaning.

2) It is a completely different case when one places on the one side that which is, in the strictest sense, present in the flesh to consciousness (always understood as a determinate act)[25] and, on the other side, its negative, i.e., that which is meant without such self-presence. This strictest sense occurs when consciousness is a seeing which, in regard to what it sees, has, touches, and grasps the matter itself, as when a seeing, which is directed at a *cogitatio*, which is now vitally present, has it in the seeing itself, as it were. As reflection makes clear, these two constitute a unity of the present. The vitally present seeing is one with the vitally present seen.

That is the one form of the opposition of immanence and transcendence. On the side of immanence is only that which is seen (and, at the most, one could also say that the seeable of this kind is so united with the actual seen that a change in the reflective stance could lead from the one to the other), whereas on the side of transcendence would be everything else, foremost everything non-present, albeit as an object of consciousness. Even if a phenomenologically reduced recollection [171] or even a retention reproduces something which had been seen, this remembered would be transcendent to the remembering consciousness.

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[24] The preceding sentences ("It belongs to the essence . . . ") later marked with wavy lines, i.e., critically. — Editor's note.

[25] "(always understood as a determinate act)" later crossed out. — Editor's note.

3) Another concept of immanence and transcendence results when we regard it as a classification of objects, in particular of individual objects. According to this, individual objects break down into those which could be given intuitively in absolute self-presence and those which can only appear as self-present, i.e., which can be given only through appearings, only through presentations.[26] In this case, every phenomenological consciousness is related to immanence; the immanent is the field of phenomenology, provided that we understand phenomenology as a possible science of individual objects brought to immanence through the total disengagement of nature. For nature[27] is precisely a title that embraces the totality of objectivities presenting themselves through appearings. *Hence phenomenology does not want to disconnect transcendence in every sense*. After all, from the outset it was defined through the disengagement of nature, of transcendence in a particular sense, of transcendence in the sense of what appears.

[26] But whereas there are those which can only be given once in their original becoming, others can be given repeatedly. The former could have existed only as having been perceived and, accordingly, they can be potentially recalled, the latter could have existed before all perception, etc. — Husserl's note.

[27] Inserted later, probably 1921: "the 'objective world.' " — Editor's note.

Chapter 5

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL UNCOVERING OF THE WHOLE, UNIFIED, CONNECTED STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS

§31. *The background of the phenomenological object and the identity of the phenomenological object in diverse acts of consciousness. The phenomenological consciousness of time*

After this digression let us now return to the main direction of our considerations. Is phenomenology possible in the sense we have in [172] mind? Is a science possible on the basis of "phenomenological experience?" Is this science already secured by what has been achieved up to this point? Just as the empirical or, if you prefer, naturalist experience has in all its modes its legitimacy and bears its evidence in itself, even though it is not an absolutely indubitable self-presenting act, so has the phenomenological experience with its parallel modes its own legitimacy. In this respect nothing is missing. The field of scientific discovery is in both cases infinite. In the one case, there is the sum total of objects which we call nature; in the other, there is the sum total of objects which we call consciousness, *cogitatio*, and phenomenological datum.

Let us inspect this sphere more closely. The objectivities are individual particulars, which come to us through phenomenological reduction and, in particular, through phenomenological perception, namely as absolutely self-given things. On the other hand, they also come to us through phenomenological retention, recollection, expectation, and empathy.

The circumstances of the acts are, however, much more entangled than it appears. *For each phenomenological object has its objective background*, which for perception is a background of what is present as co-apprehended (*mitbewusst*) but not co-intended (*mitgemeint*).

The background can, through subsequent reflection and memory, be realized as an intended objectivity, as something "having been present," but having not been intended in the earlier perception. And so it is for every experience. I have now a recollection of an object. I reflect and find a background that has the character of "having been present" exactly like the recollected object. This background, which reflection subsequently grasps, is recognized as the background that in the preceding recollection was present as co-apprehended but was not the intended background in the recollection. And so it is everywhere.

Within the diversity of such phenomenological experiences, we are potentially conscious of the same phenomenological datum: The same thing is first expected, then perceived, then remembered, then recollected. In this regard, empathy is no exception. For the empathically posited datum can be a meant datum, or a background datum of an empathized *phenomenological* perception, or a datum of some other experience. [173] And in so far as empathy itself is an experience, the datum is thereby posited as givenness of a perception or some other experience. The identity of the phenomenological datum in diverse acts of consciousness (in diverse *cogitationes*) is not an extra-phenomenological fact, but itself something phenomenologically given, hence a fact of phenomenological experience.

Admittedly, the concept of this experience is here extended in a way which naturally suggests itself. Accordingly, that the respective datum is the same is given, namely in an intuitive consciousness of identity which, from its side, is founded in a series of memories. Not only do we now have an expectation of the datum, then a perception of it, then a memory as retention, then a recollection, then a repeated recollection, but these series of acts also stand as series before our consciousness in the recollecting reflection. And we say, exactly expressing what is given, that these acts, coming one after another, form a temporal series, and that *in* them ever again the same phenomenological datum is expected at first, then perceived, then apprehended retentionally, then recollected,[1] etc. And we say this on the basis of an encompassing identity consciousness.

[1] Husserl here and elsewhere is presupposing the distinction developed in his earlier lectures in *Husserliana X*. See *On the Phenomenology of Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917)*, translated by John Barnett Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991).

Here we notice various relations having to do with the phenomenological time-consciousness (which is not to be confused with the empirical time-consciousness). Expectation precedes perception, perception precedes recollection, first recollection precedes the second, etc.; and it is necessarily so, given the same phenomenological content, whereas other relations hold in the case of a difference in contents, as you can easily see for yourselves.

§32. *Recapitulation and new presentation: The phenomenological reduction to pure consciousness as an individual being and the problems of the scope of the reduced world of consciousness and the possibility of phenomenological science*[2]

I will repeat the main thoughts, which I had in mind in my last lectures, and which I have not fully carried out yet.

As we begin our reflection, we find ourselves in the attitude of the [174] natural consideration of the world, as humans in a certain surrounding, performing numerous and, in each case, determinate psychic acts: perceiving, phantasizing, judging, etc. Now we carry out an all-encompassing phenomenological reduction, and we disengage all transcendence in the sense of the natural positing of existence. In our judgments, we want to make use of no notion of existence that comes to *natural* givenness with us, and we do this without doubting it or finding it somehow suspect. For our present investigation we exclude, in principle, every empirically founded judgment as a premise and a theoretical finding.

Understood in the usual manner of speaking, the last sentence would mean that from now on we wanted to judge in an *a priori* fashion. But that was in no way the contrast we had in mind. For the genuine a priori, being that which in the judgment is supposed to carry

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Especially see, e.g., §14 *et passim* where primary remembering or retention is described as a comet's tail that attaches itself passively and ineluctably to the perception of the moment, and secondary remembering or recollection is described as a discrete act of re-presentation, not immediately continuous with the perceptual present, but as a having of the past present as past. — Translators' note.

[2] A new presentation because of the difficulties my listeners found in the earlier one. — Husserl's note.

with it necessity and unconditional universality, has nothing to do with individual facts. A priori judgments are universally valid. A posteriori judgments are individually valid; they posit, even when they are universal, individual being. And via the all-inclusive phenomenological reduction we are left with a world of individual being, the world of phenomenological data, and the world of pure consciousness.

To be sure,[3] the natural world spans all individual being, namely, in so far as everything can be integrated into it and, in the natural attitude, is integrated into it. But a part of this world, called consciousness, has the peculiarity that it is phenomenologically reducible;[4] that is, if we take out of action or disengage in our judgment all the natural positings of existence, as they are achieved in consciousness and interconnected with it, consciousness itself remains as a purely immanent being, as something that in this positing is not nature, because it is neither the being of that which itself appears, the mere being of what presents itself, nor has it a share in such a being by way of an indirect co-positing of nature. Such a co-positing is achieved, for example, if consciousness is apperceived as something that is causally connected to the natural thing that is posited as a lived body.

Let us now attempt to make clear how far this reduced world of consciousness reaches, that is, which are the modes of givenness we possess of it in the phenomenological reduction. Further, what kind of knowledge does it facilitate, and to what extent can something like science be established on it. In terms of modes of givenness we have, first, the phenomenological perception, also called phenomenological seeing. Every reduced phenomenon presents itself as an abiding being and, indeed, as abiding self-presence. The object of an empirical thing-perception also presents itself as a self-present existing being, yet it is given merely through an appearing. The phenomenological presence is not a presence through appearing but a self-presence in an absolute sense. Thus, for example, the being of the *appearing* of a perception, the being of the phenomenon of presenting-itself-outwardly-as-self-present, is an absolutely given immanent being. This mode of givenness of immanent being implies many things: The abiding [175]

[3] The following paragraph was later crossed out. — Editor's note.
[4] Can one say this? — Husserl's note.

being is being in duration, and this duration is a filled duration with a flowing Now-point and a continuity of flowing points of the past. And correspondingly, to each phenomenological perception belongs a point of Now-perception, and to the same Now belongs a continuity of retentional memory, being in a constant flow. This perception is an absolute positing of a Now, the Now of a definite not-Now, coming in the form of a continuous gradation.

Further we reviewed as modes of givenness the free retention and, especially, recollection. Likewise, we reviewed expectation and, finally, empathy.

§33. *The extension of the phenomenological experience over the entire unified stream of consciousness*

If we perform one phenomenological perception after another, that is, if in pure seeing we are directed at *cogitationes*, then each of them is given as[5] self-present, just as long as it perdures. If the *cogitatio* has run its course, a trace of it remains behind in living retention, which ultimately flows away into the dark background. Retention can also happen in such a manner that a lingering consciousness holds on to [176] the elapsed and no-longer intuited *cogitatio*, connecting it to a new *cogitatio*, in which case we have a consciousness of the succession of the *cogitationes*. However, it is also possible that recollections of such individual *cogitationes* as well as whole series of *cogitationes* come to the surface. Once again we live through, as it were, the seeing of each of the *cogitationes*, once again each one of them begins and perdures, with its flowing Now and its retinue of fading past phases. But only "as it were." This "being given again, as it were" is the character of the recollection, and a uniformly synthesizing consciousness can unify a series of such recollections into a group. This consciousness of a past succession is, as a consciousness of groups, perhaps established only afterward. For example, there are ongoing tone-appearings, and we pay attention to one tone-appearing, while the others do not interest us. We do not achieve a consciousness that marks off groups, as

[5] Later inserted: "in the flesh and." — Editor's note.

for instance, a pair of tones, or a whole series. By contrast, in the recollection we attend to the temporal background of the recollected tone and now fashion in the recollection a separate consciousness *sui generis* of groups and series that joins together the remembered tone-appearings. Those tone-appearings that earlier in the perception were not noticed become noticed in memory; those that earlier were not grouped become grouped together in memory.

As each *cogitatio* has an unintended temporal background of succession, so also does it have one of simultaneity, and it, too, can become noted *in* the recollection.

Together with the operations possible in them, retention and recollection constitute a phenomenological experiential consciousness, provided that we make no use of any positing of nature. Whereas phenomenological perception, with a suitable qualification, can claim absolute indubitability, this does *not* hold, as we saw earlier, for these new forms of the phenomenological experience. Yet experience is experience; as such it has its value.

If we suppose that a similar sketch can be made of expectation, then it becomes really evident that phenomenological experience does not depend on isolated *cogitationes* that are presences (*Gegenwärtigkeiten*) noticed now, but, rather,[6] phenomenological experience extends over the whole *stream of consciousness*, as a unique [177] temporal context which, however, in its total breadth and length does not fall under the light of intuition.

Or, to put it differently: If we remain in the phenomenological reduction, there is an infinite unity of consciousness or, as it is fittingly expressed with a picture, an endlessly unified stream of consciousness. We can practice phenomenological experience ever again; ever again we can make into an object an earlier had *cogitatio* by means of the remembering of a recollecting consciousness; ever again we can bring into the ambit of an intuitive and intentional gaze the temporal background, which earlier on was either partially noted or unnoticed; we can enter into the contexts of simultaneity or we can pursue the contexts of succession and can see, in the unity of temporal

[6] A subsequent insertion from 1924 or later: "through continued unfolding of the horizons upon the accomplishment of the phenomenological reduction from each place." — Editor's note.

consciousness, how the phenomena are connected, how they are continually one, how they make up *one* stream. Of course, retentions and recollections are often unclear and indeterminate, which is all the more true of the recollected backgrounds of phenomena. But where memory is unclear, there "it" can become clear; to the first memory, a second, richer, clearer memory may be connected; one may succeed in turning separate, disjointed memories into the unity of a clear memory, namely by awakening continuously connected clear memories, and thus raise the experiential strength and value of each of the individual memories. Trailing the experiences are judgments of experience, which faithfully express and analyze the former. Thus, taken in its phenomenological purity, the stream of consciousness becomes an experiential field of its own, a region of theoretical discovery.

§34. *The overcoming of an artificial limitation. The uncovering of the phenomenological stream of consciousness, taking as a starting point the natural reflection on the stream of consciousness and the doubled phenomenological reduction*

In the considerations up until now we have, however, employed an artificial limitation that we must now set aside. What we have said [178] so far will only receive its proper value, will only obtain any validity at all, if, for one thing, we take the stream of consciousness, as it presents itself to us in the first, the *natural* reflection and only *then* perform the phenomenological reduction. We took our departure from the already developed phenomenological seeing or from several acts of such seeing and then practiced retention, recollection, expectation, etc. But these are cases of artificial exceptions only. Let us take the stream of consciousness as it is, i.e., let us, from within the natural attitude, in which after all we find ourselves, cast a glance at the I-experiences and perform on them and in them the phenomenological reduction: that is, we perform the phenomenological reduction on the perceptions, retentions, memories, expectations, and on all the inner and outer experiences, through which we bring before us to natural intuitive givenness the external nature as well as our own lived experiences, the phenomena of psychical nature.

The most remarkable thing turned out to be that *every experience admits a doubled phenomenological reduction*: On the one hand, the reduction that renders the experience *itself* to pure immanent seeing; and on the other hand, the reduction that is exercised *on the experience's intentional content and object*. Thus there is a phenomenological reduction that is exercised on the intentional content and object of recollection. That is, just as in recollecting "afterwards" we can attend to the remembered object's background, which in the original perception was unnoticed perceptual background, so we can *in* the recollection exercise a phenomenological reduction on the foreground and background, which was not achieved in the original perception and which, therefore, is not a recollection of an earlier reduction.

Considered in themselves, the phenomena of reflections *in* memory or in the presentification of any kind are of greatest interest. And their exact description and analysis are a fundamental piece of all phenomenology. Of course, up until now no one has so much as even noticed them. Here they are considered for the sake of a certain, most amazing achievement that they make possible: the all-inclusive turnabout (*allumfassenden Wendung*) of *all* natural experience, that is, not only with respect to what in it is *cogitatio*, but also with respect [179] to what is to be *found in it of the intentional*.

§35. *The transcendent unities of natural experience as indices of actual and possible pure contexts of consciousness. The transposition (Umwendung) of all natural experiences and all sciences into the phenomenological experience*

We can characterize the result of this phenomenological reduction or transposition in this way: If the natural experience posits a *transcendent unity*, an existing real thing, a real constellation, a real alteration, namely in the present, past, or future, then this existence (*Dasein*) in these things is put between parentheses; but this positing serves as an *index* of certain, pure contexts of consciousness, which become manifest in these experiential positings by way of the phenomenological reduction, in particular, in the form of acts of phenomenological experience.

However, let us proceed from the natural attitude and nature as it stands before our eyes in the simple straightforward experience. We look around; we go back in memory to what was earlier perceived; we go forward and backward in the intuitive experience and have before the experiencing eye the intuitive connection of appearing nature with its manifold things, events, people, etc. If we perform *on* and *in* all these experiences the reductions in question,[7] then there corresponds to every experience — in so far as it is, for example, the experience of this table, which, in this factical experience, presents itself in just this fashion in this appearance, and is posited and intended in just this way, i.e., with this front and back, and this shape and material — a certain manifold of possibilities of experiences, which are motivated real possibilities, which in turn potentially pass over into actual experiences, which then, as motivated experiences, upon the respective orientation of the meaning act, become, and must become expected experiences. The disengagement of nature means that we now do not make the experienced thing the object of our assertoric judgments, [180] but, rather, the experiences of the thing, the actual and possible ones, taken in pure immanence. And the assertions pertaining to this experience now belong to our sphere. And it is a discovery of enormous importance *that each natural experience, taken as immanent being, motivates a manifold of other natural experiences and a manifold of real possibilities of natural experiences, and that we can explicate these motivational contexts, which are contexts of pure consciousness, and direct our gaze at them*. And this gaze has the character of the phenomenological experience. If for our present attitude we thus disengage the existence of nature, and if in this present sphere of findings we in no way pass judgment *on* nature, there remains for us the enormous and, in each case, definite field of actual and possible experiences of nature, in virtue of which alone we gain the field of the pure stream of consciousness which, of course, contains nothing of nature but only the experience of nature plus all the other acts of presenting, feeling, desiring, and willing, which are interwoven with it.

[7] And not only that. Looking at the thing, we can also always think or imagine what it would look like, if we turned our heads in some direction or other, or drew the thing near to or away from us. — Husserl's note.

The first seeds of this peculiar reduction are to be found in *Hume* and, more precisely carried out, in the extreme empiricist *Mill*, namely in his teaching of the permanent possibilities of sensation to which the existence of external things is to be reduced. Essentially, the same thing is proposed in the sensation-monism of *Mach*, who likewise substitutes connecting groups of sensation for the thing.

If for now we leave aside all metaphysical–epistemological thoughts, then we can exercise on each perception of a thing a phenomenological reduction in such a manner that we make this perception in itself an object; and, in general, we can turn into an object everything that we can find as present by disengaging the thing's existence, posited by the perception of it, and by disengaging all other natural existence as well.

We then find sensation-contents, presenting themselves in such and such a way, and hanging together in such and such a way. But not only that. The sensation-contents enter into the appearings of things as total presentations of things; furthermore there is a sphere of co-meaning[8] [181] (*Mitmeinung*). A complete exposition is not the issue here. This may suffice.

And what is here established concerns not only the momentary Now but also the entire elapsed perception or, stated more clearly, the stretch of retention, according to which we preserve the sensation that has been, and the appearing that has been, etc. We can achieve the exact same thing in recollection, in the remembering of the earlier perceived thing, of the earlier perceived process; and then we find recollected sensation, recollected appearing, recollected co-meaning, recollected consciousness of the present, etc.

But it is characteristic of perception that if the thing, as we are wont to express ourselves, presents itself now directly from this side, with this content of appearing, and with this co-meaning, it *could* also present itself from the other side, in another way of appearing. And that is not an empty, but a real, i.e., motivated possibility. This

[8] "-meaning" later deleted. — Editor's note. Throughout this section, *Meinung* and *Mitmeinung* are translated as "meaning" and "co-meaning." Although *Meinung* is a noun, Husserl's choice can be understood either or both in its verbal and nominal senses, i.e., "meaning" as "to mean" or the act of intending (or marginally co-intending) and "meaning" as what is meant (or co-meant) in such an act. — Translators' note.

means, for example: If I turn my head, if the groups of determinate sensations subsumed under the title "turning the head" run their course in a voluntary or involuntary act, then such and such determinate, continuous changes must occur in the thing-appearance, and the stock of sensations and the stock of appearings are changed in such and such a way. And so it is that the first perception, being the one that belongs to the original body and head posture, motivates a manifold of possible perceptions together with other pertinent head positions, body postures, etc.

The disengagement of nature yields here completely determinate phenomenological data, i.e., contents of sensation, apprehensions, co-apprehensions, voluntary acts, kinaesthetic series running their course in a tendency-laden way, etc., and actual acts and, in regard to their possibility, motivated acts. The motivation is mostly such that it does not sketch out the possibilities of appearing in a fully determinate way; but then it harbors in itself an index of indeterminateness, which is to say: of determinability in a determinate sphere.

These motivated possibilities pass over into motivated positings of what is coming, that is, of expectations, if within the network of what is motivating and what is motivated, on the side of the motivating appearings, factual changes take their course, which in accordance with consciousness require a corresponding course of changes in what is motivated. If I really turn my head, then I expect changes in the manner the thing or the event is presented. [182]

All of this applies in the case where in the series of memories we practice the *inner* reduction on the objectivities of the past. That is, instead of directing our gaze to the past thing or to the past natural reality of any kind, we rather direct our gaze to the past perception of the appearance of the thing, to all that which belongs to the perception, including the perceptual background of the perception and what this yields in terms of sensation, content of appearance, co-meaning, etc. Proceeding from there, we can also direct our gaze to those contexts of motivation that take their departure from these phenomenological data, which are given in the transposed recollection. Furthermore, we can look at how these contexts are interconnected with other phenomenological data and, finally, we can also look at the possible motivations and regulations of a functional kind that connect the changes in the appearings here with changes in the appearings there.

Thus, we transpose all our natural experiences into phenomenological experiences; we make use of every kind of natural positing without making it a basis for any judgments about nature. It is clearly one thing to investigate nature, to describe and investigate things, causal changes in things, temporal orderings of thing-like objectivities, and it is something completely different to leave alone the whole of nature and, in lieu of it, to describe and investigate the *experiences of things in their immanence*, to describe and investigate what is found in them, how they hang together, how they are motivated, etc., and, especially, how they hang together with judgments, feelings, desires, etc., and how they motivate these — and all this under the auspices of a consistent disengagement of any judgment about the existence of nature. Now you will understand what it means to say that each experienced thing as such is an *index* for a certain normative ordering in consciousness as pure consciousness.

In particular, I may mention as a kind of preview that if we ascribe validity to the experience of a thing, and if we are thus of the opinion that it is correct to say that the thing exists, then it is possible to [183] convince oneself of the existence of the thing in ever again renewed confirmations, which narrow down and practically exclude the possibility that the thing does not exist or turns out to be an illusion. The true existence of the thing is then an index, first, for the completely definite and precisely describable appearance-contexts of the same thing and, second, for the thought processes, judgments, and justifications that may be connected to the appearance-contexts; just as the non-existence is an index for different kinds of contexts of consciousness that can be given definite descriptions too, and in which, as one says, the positing of existence is either evidently annulled or the non-existence comes to evidence.

Of course, in this way all content of the sciences may be transposed into the phenomenological content or, more precisely, all content of the sciences may be seen as an index for phenomenological contexts. We do not posit theories; we do not posit nature with the determinateness based on theories. Rather we go back to the contexts of judgments and the contexts of justifications, the meaning and validity of which are expressed in these theories. And we perform the phenomenological transposition and the reflection *in* the acts of such theorizing and pursue the interconnections of consciousness, which belong to them in a purely phenomenological manner.

Chapter 6

THE UNCOVERING OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MULTIPLICITY OF MONADS

§36. *The intersubjective context of consciousness. The question whether the phenomenological reduction means a restriction to individual consciousness*

But now an important further consideration is in order. The theoretical contents of a science, understood as the total content of valid propositions of a science, as well as nature are *intersubjective* wholes.[1] But in the last lecture, we have not yet spoken of the intersubjective [184] context of consciousness, i.e., we have not spoken of the *experience* running from the one I-consciousness to the other I-consciousness.

Does the phenomenological reduction signify a restriction to the contexts of pure consciousness which, in the empirical-psychological understanding, belong to an individual empirical I, in particular, mine, the phenomenologist's? *First of all, how is this pure consciousness, the pure I-consciousness, to be characterized*?

§37. *The principle of the construction of a unified stream of consciousness*

On the one hand, the empirical I has a lived body, and on the other hand, it has consciousness, clearly in a completely different sense. To the consciousness of the empirical I belongs each singular consciousness, namely in the sense of the *cogitatio* that the I has and which it experiences. But does this yield a whole in the phenomenological

[1] See Appendix VI (XXV). — Editor's note.

reduction? Well, we certainly spoke of *one stream of consciousness*. And indeed, the unity of the phenomenological stream of consciousness and the unity of consciousness that is exclusively the consciousness of a *singular* I, taken either in the empirical understanding or derived from it by phenomenological reduction, are *one and the same*.

Let us consider the following: As we recently expressed it in a general proposition, each *cogitatio* has its temporally ordered background. None is isolated; each is, as it were, meant from out of a surrounding of more or less closely connected phenomenological *givens* (*Daten*). I would better say "*giveables*" (*Dabilien*); for what is first required is the turning of the intending gaze,[2] in order to make them into actual givens, to make them into intended things and givennesses. That holds for every *cogitatio* that comes to phenomenological givenness for us; and this holds like a law, regardless of whether this givenness is a perceptual givenness or some other givenness of experience. As a matter of course, we attribute to *one* phenomenological I everything that such a background contains in terms of what is present and simultaneous in the present time, or what it harbors [185] in terms of the past or the future, just as, in an empirical manner of apprehending, all this belongs to an empirical I-consciousness. Moreover, this background may be clear at one time, at another time dark, yet insofar as the memory becomes clear, it can elevate the formerly dark background to clarity and determinateness. And similarly with regard to the remembering-in-advance (*Vorerinnerung*), i.e., expectation, which in general may be quite indeterminate. But what is absolutely certain is that a *temporal halo* (*zeitlicher Hof*) is always there and must be there, and if it is indeterminate, it is not arbitrarily and freely variable but determinable. Even if the memory is quite vague, empty, and without any intuitively graspable and analyzable content, a clear memory is *possible*, being one that legitimately belongs to the unclear memory, namely as clarifying it and providing the determinate past content for it. Once again, this is a wonderful nexus of motivation and a rule for consciousness.

But how[3] is it when we have two memories, each having its own memory-halo, while no intuitive bond of memory exists to relate the

[2] Later inserted: "and penetration into the dark horizons." — Editor's note.

[3] For the following, cf. Appendix VII (XXVI). — Editor's note. (See also Appendix XIII (IV of No. 1) below. — Translators' note.)

content of the one to the other memory? Could it not be that there are isolated memories? More clearly: Every memory posits (suitably reduced) a past perceptual consciousness with a halo of the temporal surrounding belonging to it, thus it posits a piece of the earlier stream of consciousness. Could it not be that two streams of consciousness, posited by memories, are disconnected? Must they, with their time-backgrounds, fit into the unity of a stream of consciousness which, however, is not[4] given at all?[5] We cannot, after all, wait and see whether a chain of clear memory will bring the two memories into a unity? Once again, to this question a law of consciousness (these are all matters of essence-analyses and essence-laws) gives a determinate and absolutely evident answer: Two memories each, which belong to the unity of a present moment of consciousness that joins them together, combine to form a unity of memory, i.e., a unity of time-consciousness, albeit one that is not intuitively filled, [186] in which the remembered of the one memory and the remembered of the other memory unite in the *one* remembered, *in one time*, and thus, in accordance with this unitary consciousness, they are necessarily intuitable, being either simultaneous or in succession. It may be the case that the temporal order is indistinctly apprehended, such that for this time-consciousness it remains an open question, which is the earlier, which the later, or whether they are not contemporaneous. But then it is an indeterminateness that harbors within itself determinability in the sense of one of the three possible cases, provided that the memory is at all maintainable as valid (yet one must note that every memory is either valid or invalid). Consequently, it must be "possible" to clearly and completely awaken a memory-series and to run through it such that it connects the one memory to the other in such a way that it really brings about the continuous temporal connection in the stream of consciousness. Of course, that is a motivated possibility. But this is not to say that we *actually* have this memory-series at our disposal.

More generally speaking, it is true that two experiences, which fit together under the unity of an encompassing, synthetic consciousness,

[4] Inserted in 1924 or later: "in advance." — Editor's note.

[5] Subsequently, 1924 or later, Husserl formulated the preceding sentences in the following way: "What would it be like if we were to gain two memory-continua, each of which having always its disclosable temporal horizon, without it being the case that in the process of disclosing we would pass over from the one temporal horizon into the other?" — Editor's note.

combine to form a unity of one experience; and that the unity of an experience goes hand in hand with the temporal unity of what is experienced. This is true for the essence of experience as such, particularly phenomenological experience. *Consequently, with this is found the principle, and the only definitive principle, that constructs the unity of the stream of consciousness*. In other words, here we have the principle which settles whether several *cogitationes* belong to the unity of one phenomenological I, and which, as it were, shows what it takes to determine that several *cogitationes* that are given, in whatever manner, in the phenomenological experience must belong to one stream of consciousness.[6] On the other hand, the principle also vindicates the view that *one* stream must exist that holds these *cogitationes* in itself — always presupposing that these *cogitationes* exist at all, that the experiences giving them are valid indeed.

If I proceed from any of my psychological inner or outer experiences and perform a phenomenological reduction on them, the resulting phenomenological data with all their contexts belong completely to a singular stream of consciousness, to a singular phenomenological I. And that holds true not only for the experiences in themselves, but also for what we might find therein, through the reduction, of motivational contexts. [187]

§38. *Empathy. The contrast of empathy with analogizing pictorial consciousness*

Do we ever arrive at an *other* phenomenological I? Can the phenomenological reduction ever arrive at the idea of several phenomenological I's? Obviously not via the present path. Yet up until now we have not taken into account *empathy* either, which is a special form of empirical experience. In empathy, the empathizing I experiences the inner life (*Seelenleben*) or, to be more precise, the consciousness of the other I. He experiences the other I, but no one will say he lives it and perceives it in inner perception, in a Lockean reflection, just

[6] "Which settles whether several *cogitationes*" until "must belong to one stream of consciousness" later put in brackets and marked with a deletion sign. — Editor's note.

like his own consciousness. And even more so, no one will say that he remembers it or expects it.

Should one say that it is a consciousness of a picture, that it is an analogizing[7] consciousness, rendering the other consciousness by means of one's own, similar, and simultaneous consciousness? Although I would not like to accept all that he says about empathy, I believe that *Lipps*[8] was insofar on the right path as he vigorously struggled against the usual, and in fact, pitiful psychology of empathy. I would like to say the following: Operative in an empirical pictorial consciousness (*empirischen Bildbewusstsein*) is the appearing of an object (a real or merely imaginative one), a picture-object (*Bildobjekt*), which is the bearer of the analogizing[9] relation to the "subject" ("S*ujet*") of the picture. In an immanent pictorial consciousness, a self-present consciousness would have to serve as the picture-object for another consciousness. Hence, one's own experience, one's own act, e.g., of anger, would have to function as an analogue[10] for [188] the other consciousness. Yet that is nonsense. For when I feel empathy with your anger, I am myself not angry, not at all. Just as I am not angry when I imagine anger or merely recall[11] it — unless, in the latter case, I become angry once again. Empathy is no more a consciousness of genuine picturedness than it is a re-remembering and a pre-remembering or any other kind of remembering. Rather, I hold that whereas empathy is akin to these acts, it is an act belonging to the largest group of *presentifications*.[12]

Of course, one could, in lieu of picturing in a present similar act, also think of another kind of analogizing, which takes place, for instance,

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[7] In 1924 or later "analogizing" changed to "likeness-presenting." — Editor's note.

[8] Theodor Lipps, of whom Husserl thought very highly, is discussed in *Husserliana XIII*, especially pp. 70 ff. Husserl based his often critical remarks on Theodor Lipps, *Leitfaden der Psychologie* (1903, and later editions). Husserl noted that Lipps also discusses *Einfühlung* in *Die ethischen Grundfragen, 1899 and 1905*, as well as in his two volume *Aesthetik* and in his *Psychologische Untersuchungen I* (1907); see *Husserliana XIII*, 76. — Translators' note.

[9] In 1924 or later "analogizing" changed to "copying" (*abbildlichen*). — Editor's note.

[10] In 1924 or later "analogue" changed to "picture." — Editor's note.

[11] Of course, it is a modification of anger, which as such is related to it as a remembering reproduction is to the impression. — Husserl's note.

[12] Each empty intention would then be a presentification. — Husserl's note.

when we make present something as an example in a fantasy-picture, as when we, after a description in fantasy, fashion for ourselves a picture of the described thing, being well aware that what we have made present is "a mere fantasy-picture." In this manner we also often picture to ourselves the other person's mood. But to interpret *every*[13] feeling of empathy in this way is problematic: For we intuitively ascribe to (*ein-schauen*) the other person his lived experiencing, and we do this completely without mediation and without consciousness of any impressional or imaginative picturing.[14] And if we merely make a picture of his lived experiencing, we feel that that is somewhat special. For this reason, I cannot decide in favor of making use of this second, so much better idea of analogizing for the purposes of empathy.[15]

§39. *The uncovering of other phenomenological I's through a doubled phenomenological reduction. Nature as an index of the coordination of a plurality of I-monads*

Empathy is, in any case, an experience we can *phenomenologically reduce*, like any other experience. And once again, we have *the twofold manner of the phenomenological reduction*: To begin with empathy in itself, to us it is intuitively present in phenomenological perception; it has its temporal background, like everything phenomenologically perceived; and it fits into the one single stream of consciousness, to which, proceeding from a given *cogitatio*, all phenomenological perception and all phenomenological presentification of the remembering kind belong. On the other hand, empathy is experience *about an empathized consciousness*, in regard to which we may practice the phenomenological reduction too. And the phenomenological datum thus attained has its temporal background too and is thus a datum of a phenomenological I. [189]

But there is the *law* that, in principle, an empathized datum and the empathizing experiencing belonging to it cannot belong to the same

[13] In 1924 or later "every" changed to "the." — Editor's note.

[14] Not always do we "intuitively ascribe" and, it seems to me, that necessarily an empty presentation precedes it, which perhaps passes into a reproductive intuition. — Husserl's note.

[15] For the preceding, see Appendix VI (XXV). — Editor's note.

stream of consciousness, that is, the same phenomenological I. There is no channel linking the empathized stream to the stream in which the empathizing itself belongs. A datum of the one or the other stream can never stand in such a relation that the one is the surrounding of the other. The surrounding! Does that not mean: the temporal surrounding? And does not our law state that the one and the other cannot both belong to *one* time-consciousness?

But what seems to contradict this[16] is that an act of empathy and the empathized act belong *to the same* time and they belong to the same time for *consciousness*. The act of empathizing posits the empathized as Now and posits it in the same Now as itself. However, here one must note the following: There also exists a presentified Now (which is not recollected), being a presentification that does identify the presentified Now with the actual Now, even though the former is only presentified. So it is, e.g., when I presentify the *Roons*.[17] Likewise, the empathized Now is presentified, and not intuited in itself, and thus the *simultaneity of the empathy and the empathized is not a simultaneity which is intuited in itself*. Further, the one does not belong to the surrounding [190] of the other, and vice versa. And there is no possible path of continuity from the one to the other, whereas there certainly is such a path leading from the presentified Now to the actual Now. The time posited in empathizing, when it is a case of empirical empathizing, is a Now that is empirically posited as the same objective time-point as the Now of one's own consciousness. The relation to the objective time of the *lived body* and the world of things *mediates* this identification. Also, my own feeling, thinking, perceiving, etc., and the Now belonging to them I identify with the Now of what is perceived in the world of things, and this receives its objective temporal determination. Of course, this is forfeited under the phenomenological reduction.[18]

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[16] The following discussion until the end of §39 was probably replaced with the text which we reproduce here as Appendix IX (XXVIII). — Editor's note.

[17] The *Roons* is a restaurant near Göttingen. — Editor's note.

[18] One can also say: Phenomenological empathy is a phenomenological experience of a phenomenological I that in it fundamentally experiences another such I as it is itself. This is no tautology, as when we express a similar sentence in reference to empirical empathy, i.e., that in it someone attains experience of another in terms of that person's inner life. For basically that is the definition of empirical empathy. — Husserl's note.

But what is left when we exercise this reduction and disengage the existence of things and lived bodies, just as we disengage the existence of the temporal form of the thing-world (*Dingwelt*)?

Then all phenomenological being is reduced, on the one hand, to *one (to "my") phenomenological I* that is distinguished as a perceiving, remembering, and empathizing I, being at the same time the phenomenologically reducing I, and, on the other hand, to *other I's*, posited in empathy, and posited as looking, remembering, and perhaps empathizing I's. Further, through the disengagement of their existence, the empirically experienced objects of nature are reduced for my I to *indices* for certain actual contexts of consciousness and pertinent motivated possibilities of consciousness.

However, by virtue of the natural empathy, the empathized I's are posited as belonging to their lived bodies, as center-points of the thingly surroundings, which surroundings expand towards the universe at large (*Allnatur*). This universe is the very same that exists for me, too, which I too perceive and also experientially posit. In the phenomenological reduction, every thing is also an index for the *empathized* I, an index of the experiential contexts and possibilities of experience belonging to it, and which are empathized in it by me — [191] and so it is for every I.

Thus nature is an index for an all-inclusive normativity, encompassing all streams of consciousness that stand in an experiential relation to one another through empathy. And of special importance is each objective time-point and each objectively grasped "at the same time," which transforms into a unity my present Now and the Now of each other I (and equally every past Now of my remembering with each past Now of the remembering of another I). I hold that each such objective time-point is an index for a completely definite law-like coordination that puts, so to speak, each *I-monad* in relation to each other, and it does this in regard to very specific, corresponding motivations of consciousness.

Chapter 7

CONCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE

§40. *The abstention from any judgment about the existence of nature in the phenomenological reduction*

All of this is valid, provided we perform what we called the phenomenological reduction, i.e., if we do not judge about the existence of nature but rather about the existence of the pure phenomenological contexts.[1] Please note, we have not judged in any way[2] about the existence of nature. We have not said, "in truth, nature is nothing other" than these normative rules that connect consciousness to consciousness. We have not said that consciousness is the only true being and nature is only, as it were, an imaginary picture that consciousness projects within itself, etc. All this could not sensibly be our view, pre- [192]
cisely because our whole investigation took place in the wake of the phenomenological reduction, and this reduction *ex definitione* means nothing other than refraining from any assertions about nature. On the other hand, theories, like the aforementioned, make *expressis verbis* just such assertions about nature. Consequently, they are not at all our business here.[3]

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[1] "If we do not judge about the existence of nature but rather about the existence of the pure phenomenological contexts" was changed in 1924 or later to "if we do not judge about the existence of nature, or better, if we do not *simpliciter* judge about nature "as such," but, rather, as phenomenologists, refraining from any co-performing of belief, judge only about the pure phenomenological contexts." — Editor's note.

[2] The preceding sentence was not included in the transcription by Ludwig Landgrebe in 1924; see the critical textual notes in *Husserliana XIII*, 509 ff. — Editor's note.

[3] The text in the preceding sentence from "precisely because our whole investigation" to "Consequently, they are not at all our business here" was crossed out by Husserl

§41. *The problem of the possibility of phenomenological science as a science of essence and science of fact*

If we undertake such considerations, i.e., if we see how the realm of phenomenological experience encompasses a plurality of phenomenological I's, of self-sufficient monads, being coordinated with one another by way of concordant norms, if one considers that these coordinations, in which nature gives expression to itself in consciousness, ought to be easy to describe in more detail, then it seems odd that the question about the possibility of a phenomenological science is still to be entertained. The pieces of knowledge, which we have already acquired in passing, are scientific indeed and manifestly very enlightening.

Nevertheless, not everything is clear. Above all, it must be said that we conceived phenomenology as a kind of parallel case to natural science, each science dealing with individual objectivities.[4] The one deals with the givens of the natural attitude, and the other with those of the phenomenological attitude. But in doing this, we have not at all considered *what role a priori knowledge plays in the phenomenological sphere. We have not considered to what extent ideations and ideal scientific knowledge are to be attained on the basis of phenomenological experience.* [193]

Concerning nature, we know there is something like pure natural science; there is an a priori of nature and, in addition, there are the pertinent a priori disciplines, like geometry, etc. But apart from this, there is the empirical science of nature, and it does not consist in applying the pure a priori of nature to the occurring single cases, to the givens of external experience. That would be an empty business without scientific value. A priori knowledge serves as a methodic

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in Landgrebe's 1924 transcription. In regard to these paragraphs, or at least in regard to the one in which the changed and crossed-out sentences are found, Husserl notes in the transcription of Landgrebe: "This raises difficulties and, in any case, is not clear." See the discussions directly relating to this in Appendix XI (XXX) (around 1921). — Editor's note.

[4] The preceding sentence was later, probably in 1921, changed in the following way: "Above all, it must be said that we conceived phenomenology as a kind of parallel case to natural science, in so far as they both deal with individual objectivities." — Editor's note.

instrument of empirical knowledge, but the latter delivers something completely new in the system of the empirical sciences.

Now, are we certain, first, whether what we have gained in terms of interesting insights into the phenomenological sphere does *basically* concern the pure knowledge of essence and, second, whether something like an experiential phenomenology is still thoroughly questionable, indeed perhaps[5] impossible? Indeed, should not what we said about the phenomenology of time-consciousness, the motivational contexts pertaining to the consciousness of the thing, and various other matters as well, at least for the most part, bear the stamp of a priori knowledge from the start?

But if we really record experience as experience, i.e., regard it as positing individual being, then, although we may be certain that the range of such positing is a very wide one, we cannot be so completely certain whether, on the basis of such experience, something like an experiential science, as a real *matter-of-fact*-science, can be founded.

§42. *The equivalence of the knowledge of nature to the knowledge of the correlative connections of consciousness. The application of a priori knowledge of consciousness to the phenomenological connections of empirical knowledge of nature. On psycho-physics*

What in this matter is striking is that all connections of consciousness, in which the being of nature, as it were, consciously expresses [194] itself, come to our experience without our asserting a judgment about nature and without our using the existence of nature even tacitly as a premise — and, on the other hand, that the knowledge of these contexts of consciousness is, in a certain way, equivalent to the knowledge of nature, and vice versa. At least, we can put the matter this way: The validity of experience and empirical experiential knowledge has its correlate in certain real and possible connections of the consciousness of experience and, conversely, if these connections are supposed to exist, then experiential knowledge has validity. Therefore, in this

[5] In 1924 or later added: "as rational-empirical science." — Editor's note.

region of phenomenology, we have nothing but a kind of transposition of the knowledge of nature into the phenomenological realm.

Should phenomenology be able to achieve for itself this knowledge without the preceding knowledge of nature? Or should it not, rather, be the case that a priori knowledge, which belongs to the essence of consciousness and which can be attained in a purely immanent investigation, be applied to the empirically developed knowledge of nature, namely in regard to its phenomenological contexts, and thus yield knowledge about contexts of *existence* of phenomenological data which, proceeding in another manner, namely directly from the individual data, could not have been attained?

Surely this doubt affects the whole realm of natural *reality* (*physis*). The matter of psycho-physical knowledge is more difficult, in as much as this knowledge of nature, properly understood, exists only by way of the interconnection with the proper, physical knowledge of nature (transcendent knowledge). At bottom, psycho-physical knowledge is an intermediary link between knowledge of nature and purely phenomenological knowledge.[6]

[6] Husserl later crossed out the last sentence. — Editor's note.

APPENDIX I (No. 5) [77]

PREPARATORY NOTES FOR THE COURSE OF LECTURES (1910–1911):[1] PURE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE HUMANITIES (*GEISTESWISSENSCHAFTEN*), HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY. PURE PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY — THE INTERSUBJECTIVE REDUCTION AS REDUCTION TO THE PSYCHOLOGICALLY PURE INTERSUBJECTIVITY[2] (BEGINNING OF OCTOBER, 1910)

In W page 2,[3] I have in passing designated the idea of a *pure psychology*, being an *a priori* as well as an empirical psychology. Let us pursue this idea. We have sense perceptions, we "see" things and relationships of things, we remember them, we posit them in vague empirical representations, etc. And in regard to them we judge: There is something like "nature." Likewise, we perform acts of empathy [78] in relation to "lived bodies" (*Leiber*), we posit minds and relate our

[1] This course of lectures (1910–1911) refers to the two-hour weekly lecture course, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, which Husserl held in Göttingen in the winter semester, 1910–1911. We make available the first part, which is all that Husserl finished in manuscript form, below in this volume as No. 6. — Editor's note. (No. 6 is the body of the text, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1910–1911)*, which begins this volume after the Translators' Introduction. — Translators' note.)

[2] A sketch of the chief ideas of the two-hour weekly lectures (lasting until about the middle of December) of the winter semester, 1910–1911, written down during the fall vacation (at the beginning of October, 1910) — in embryonic form, and only under the heading of "pure" psychology, ranging over *intersubjectivity* and encompassing the intentional correlates (culture). But basically that is already transcendental phenomenology; cf., e.g., p. 97. — Husserl's note.

[3] Husserl used the signature *W* to designate a manuscript that discusses the problems of the relationship between nature and spirit, natural science, and the humanities, the original core of which probably originated around 1910. Until the 1920s, Husserl continued to write addenda and appendices. Such appendices were partially incorporated into the manuscript W by Husserl's assistant, Edith Stein, during the years 1916–1918. The manuscript was also in part used by her for working out the third

own lived experiences to our lived body (posited in lived perceptual experiences). In a natural-scientific mode, we discern nature after the fashion of physics, i.e., natural science in the customary sense.

1) We discern dependencies, functional connections which do not only relate to nature considered in itself, but also relate to psycho-physical nature, i.e., we recognize functional connections between, on the one hand, physical things, lived bodies, and their physical processes in the first place and, on the other hand, consciousness; and this holds for every man and every animal.

2) On the other hand, we can follow the contexts in consciousness *itself* as "contexts of motivation," connections between perceptions, judgments, feelings, volitions, etc., all of which are lived experiences with such and such "contents." We can speak of singular lived experiences of which we are certain on the basis of memory. But we can also speak of other experiences, which we ascribe to other people on the basis of empathy, in which we perceive empirical lived bodies or posit them in representation or thought. And we find, on the basis of this positing, motives for the "injection" of something that has not been "internally" perceived by us, which falls under the title of other consciousness, other psychical lived experiences. This is what we do when we are in reciprocal relations (*Wechselverkehr*).

Now, two things have to be distinguished. On the one hand, there is the question concerning the psycho-physical connections in the sense that the objective properties (the physical and physiological ones) of things, of "dead" things and lived bodies (*Leiber*), are placed in an objective relationship to what is subjective, to consciousness, which itself is "tied" to lived bodies and is distributed among them in a certain objective way. And, *on the other hand*, we find that, without bothering about these connections, we do pursue the respective connections of the lived experiences as "facts of consciousness," where

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section of *Ideas II* (cf. *Husserliana IV*). An important part of the manuscript is published today in *Husserliana IV* as Appendices V and XIV. Other pieces today are to be found in the Husserl Archives in different packets of manuscripts with different signatures. Thus in the manuscripts A IV 17, A IV 18, A VI 10, D 13 I, E I 3 I, and F III 1. A part of these pieces is also published in the present volume (*Husserliana XIII*, see Appendices XVII, XVIII, and XIX). — Editor's note. (Of these three appendices only Appendix XVII has been translated and included as Appendix XII in this volume. — Translators' note.)

at any rate *the positing of nature is kept intact* as the link in the mediation of consciousness to consciousness and as the possibility of the reciprocal positing of consciousness through "empathy."

How is this to be understood? Well, perhaps in the following way.[4] When I perceive a thing (even if I never have heard anything about [79] physics and physiology), I posit a thing, and this positing implies, regardless of all physics and metaphysics, the possibility of passing from this thing-perception to another. Whatever the case may be concerning the thing's real existence in some philosophical scheme, I can say with good reason: This perception, as a one-sided thing-apprehension, contains possibilities for differently ordered perceptions having a different content, and these connections belong to the explorable essence of the positing of the thing, the possibility of which belongs inseparably to the valid positing of the thing. Regardless of how skeptically I proceed as a philosopher, and even if I want to deny the thing as an existent entity "in itself," these connections can be demonstrated. And even if I take issue with the sense of these possibilities, they are something that can be grasped and can be determined. And all of this has nothing to do with research into the thing according to its sense in physics. In this latter case, we have a completely different attitude.

However, in perception or any other sense-presentation we also posit *lived bodies* and grasp them as bearers of consciousness. This we can do without taking the features of the bearer in a psychophysical manner. Rather the positing of the thing, being achieved in the perception of the other "lived body," motivates the positing of the "other I-consciousness," namely by way of the not easy to describe mode of "empathy."

Just as prior to all empathy (or rather in disengagement from it) things are posited in one's own consciousness, while the attitude, which is turned to the consciousness, is not directed to the things, but rather to the perception (and other positings) of things and the contexts that can be explored and investigated in this sphere, so it is with empathy. Here one must note: *Findings about connections in one's "own consciousness" do not mean, or need in no way mean or imply, findings about facts of nature; and the same holds for findings about the contexts of the other consciousness and the relations between*

[4] Already here the intersubjective phenomenological reduction. — Husserl's note.

one's own and the other consciousness. This sounds paradoxical and it must be *carefully considered indeed.* [80]

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Disengagement of one's own I

To begin with "*one's own*" I-consciousness: Does it not refer to the consciousness that belongs to me, this definite person, which has this definite body, through which it has a position in space and a relation to other things of nature, and whose lived experiences stand in relation to its lived body and its sense organs, its brain, etc.? We would have to answer: Somehow, this is obviously the case. It is true that my consciousness is part of the psycho-physical nature. But let us not now go further into this; our "interest" is not to be directed at that.[5] However, there is yet another line of interest where one does not pass judgment on all these relationships. In such a case, I do *not* judge about the things of my experience, about the world, about my body, my sense organs, my nervous system, etc. I do *not* do physics, and I do not use anything deriving from physics or from biology or physiology in particular. Nor do I engage in that kind of psychology that is aptly called psycho-physics, which investigates and thematizes the so-called psychical in the context of[6] nature. I do not wish to claim that I do not acknowledge as actually existing the things, the world, nature, etc., and that I do not perceive and make judgments about them. For I do that time and again, just as I have done it up until now. And I do not want to practice at all the attitude of skepticism, of the epoché,[7] by *being doubtful* as to whether nature, etc., exists, and by refraining from any position-taking in that matter. This would mean to attach an index of[8] questionableness to all performed positings, and I do not in any way wish to do this.

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[5] The content of that interest is not to be a "theme" for us; it is not subject to any "thematic positing," hence no predicative judgment is to result. — Husserl's note.
[6] In 1924 or later inserted "thematically posited." — Editor's note.
[7] "Of skepticism, of the epoché" later changed to "skepticism and *its* epoché." — Editor's note.
[8] In 1924 or later inserted "skeptical or epistemological." — Editor's note.

What I want to do (within the consideration or attitude that is now to be brought about) is this: to invoke no judgment of the [81] natural-scientific sphere and, in general, no judgment of any sort in regard to nature, as if I wanted to make some sort of scientific claim about nature, as if nature, be it physical or even psycho-physical, were *my theme*. My exclusive theme is to be pure consciousness and, for the time being, my own consciousness. What is this thing, "my own consciousness," when in the[9] positing of its being I do not wish to have included any positing of nature?[10] What kind of title is that? What does it include and what can it include, if the positing of nature is supposed to remain unengaged?[11]

One may venture: One's own consciousness is that which a person, who makes judgments about it, lives through and experiences himself; which he himself sees directly in reflection (unsuitably called inner perception); of which he himself is aware in the unified continuity of remembering, which in turn is directly bound up with the respective present perception; and which through remembering is intuitively given directly as his own past consciousness. That is completely correct. But one might perhaps object: "The person who makes judgments!" There you see, we do indeed stand in the world; we ourselves are members of the world; we do indeed have a lived body with surrounding objects of the experience, etc.

However, we can easily disengage all that. Here we do not want to make statements about the body (*Leib*). Yet that the body is given to me, the one judging, is something I take into account. The ongoing perception of the lived body is an ingredient and one that is never absent from pure I-consciousness. Further, when I think about my position in the world and assign me a place, when I posit an infinite space or infinite time, also when I do physics and any other science of the world, then I take all of that into account, but I do this in terms of my thinking about the world, as my representing space, as asserting physical findings, etc. All this is my theme, that is, not physics, but statements about the physical are my theme; not nature, but the perception of nature, the thinking about nature, the justification of

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[9] In 1924 or later inserted "thematic." — Editor's note.

[10] In 1924 or later "any positing of nature" changed to "nothing thematic of nature." — Editor's note.

[11] Inserted in 1924 or later: "when nature as a theme is supposed to be subordinated to the thematic epoché." — Editor's note.

nature, namely in terms of what I am presented with as nature with such and such valid status. Of course, just as the perception of things in their contexts and, included therein, "my lived body," belongs to my theme, so does the reflection which I direct upon that perception, the consciousness of that consciousness as well, the consciousness about judging, the judgments about presentations, judgments, feelings, etc. [82]

The I about which I judge is therefore not the lived body (*Leib*) and not the I *as such*[12] as it is bound to the lived body; it is not that consciousness that exists in a psycho-physical connection with[13] nature. Rather the I is this absolutely given context (*Zusammenhang*) of perceptions, presentations of any kind, feelings, desires, and volitions, exactly as the context is found in the direct viewing of reflection, of the perceiving reflection, as well as in the reflection in remembering and in other forms of consciousness as well (and not only this context, but also what is given as taking shape within it, namely the *I*, *the person*).[14] It is about this context, this unified and in this sense "immanent" connection and stream[15] of consciousness, that I want to judge alone and ascertain what can be said in regard to it.

It must be emphasized that I do not have this context only in terms of what is given in immanent perception. I also have a context of memory and, on the other hand, an anticipatory and justified expectation that is motivated in the course of experience. For example, I have the perception of a moving thing; I expect a completely definite course of new perceptions (protention). Even "unconscious" lived experiences are integrated in the context, which itself is given by way of perception and the directly grasping consciousness, or else the context is [83]

[12] In 1924 or later added: "of course, directly and absolutely posited as existing." — Editor's note.

[13] In 1923 or later added: "absolutely posited." — Editor's note.

[14] The preceding text in parentheses "and not only this context . . . " was inserted in the text by Husserl at some later time, probably during the composition of the text itself, that is, in October, 1910. This insertion was later (certainly before 1924, but only a little after 1910) changed in the following way: "and not only this context, but also what is given in it as being itself active in it, the I that is always inseparable from it." In 1924, there was once again a change: "and not only the context of conscious life itself in it, but also the being that is active in it, the I that is inseparable from it, living within it." — Editor's note.

[15] Later inserted: "and its I." — Editor's note.

supplemented through such "unconscious" lived experiences.[16] I recognize that I am experiencing various sensations and feelings, which right away I will not get hold of in reflection. I am now paying attention to various sensations of contact with my clothes and, at the same time, I recognize a piece of my memory, according to which just a second ago and a while ago as well I experienced something like these sensations (the content of which is very obscure). And I now reason, in general terms, that for those stretches of consciousness, in regard to which I cannot bring about such a reflection, "unconscious" sensations and background experiences would be present too. Thus, I regard the I-consciousness as a broad stream, of which only stretches are viewed in reflections, or of which only stretches are primarily or at least secondarily noticed; and there are other stretches or lower layers that come to no[17] givenness, or at least not to a givenness that is determinable. That concerns especially the sphere of perceptions of the external world. I look at a "section of the external world." Then I reflect and, in doing so, I exclusively attend to the perceptions as well as the background perceptions of the visual field; I describe them in such and such a way and put down with certainty that such background experiences have been present all the time, although, because of the vagueness of the memories of past perceptions, I can achieve only incompletely, and usually not at all, an actual analysis of the background consciousness.

One is reminded immediately of the psychology of associations. One is immediately aware that the analysis of associations belongs to our sphere. After all, is it not clear that within this sphere we can say that every consciousness leaves behind the "disposition for memory," etc.? "Laws" of association are laws or approximate rules for immanent consciousness.[18]

Up until now we did not make use of *empathy*. Somehow we stood in "our isolated" consciousness of our own, where of course the word "isolated" is rather tricky. For consciousness is not considered a piece

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[16] The reason for the scare-quotes in "unconscious" becomes evident soon in what follows. What is in question is what is non-reflexive and/or unthematic and/or implicit, i.e., something that is not absolutely "unconscious." — Translators' note.

[17] In 1924 or later inserted: "explicit." — Editor's note.

[18] The last sentence was changed in 1924 or later to: " 'Laws' of association are laws of essence; they are not rules for immanent consciousness." — Editor's note.

of the world, in which many isolated consciousnesses exist, being tied together only by physical objectivities, which in turn do not exhibit consciousness.

Empathy, as the perception of the other lived body and as my supposition of the other consciousness, naturally belongs to the context of my consciousness. It implies for my consciousness certain motivational connections (*Motivationszusammenhänge*) which, although they are in certain respects analogous to those related to mere thing-perceptions, nevertheless are very different, because consciousness, i.e., the other consciousness, is supposed[19] to be a stream of consciousness, having an essence and regimentation analogous to "my" stream of consciousness. Thus, we see[20] that in any case a perception is possible that is not only a direct but also an indirect and, at the same time, a well-founded positing of lived experiences, and of characteristic lived experiences at that, which positing neither draws upon any[21] positing of thing-existence (*dinglichem Dasein*), nor is it based upon such transcendent positing. Although it is the case that in these characterized perceptions, etc., things are posited, these things are not the objects of the present investigation, but rather only the perceptions and the motivations and justifications belonging to them, in virtue of which we, for instance, definitely and justifiably expect that such and such further possibilities for perceptions exist, that now, on the basis of these perceptions, such and such new perceptions are [84]

[19] "Supposed" later changed to "posited." — Editor's note.

[20] A supplement (from 1924 or later) that aims merely at the clarification of the sense of this clumsy presentation: one realizes that I, I the phenomenologist at this moment, in the exclusive focusing on consciousness can describe it with respect to singular lived experiences and that in any case with regard to my empathic experiences I can perform purely immanent perceptions and describe them purely in terms of what they are within my living consciousness. Yet one also realizes that I have the possibility of bringing about an indirect and, at the same time, well-founded positing and description of lived experiences and characteristics of lived experiences (i.e., the empathized) that are not mine, without, however, basing my descriptions on the foundation of the achievement of the positings of the objective world that is continuously given to me, as it is in the course of my natural practical life, or in the accounts of descriptive natural sciences, or in the theorizings of physics that refer back to what is given in natural experience. In the perceptions of organic lived bodies that serve as objects of descriptions these are posited, of course, as things of nature; but . . . — Husserl's note.

[21] In 1924 or later inserted: "thematic." — Editor's note.

to be expected, etc. I do not make any inference of the following sort: Because things of such and such a kind stand here and because things interact with me, with my lived body, with my eyes, in such and such a way, *therefore* this or that is to be expected, therefore this or that must occur in my consciousness. One must not be deceived here. Things stand there before my eyes, this ashtray, etc. The "standing there" is my business, my theme, namely this perceptual consciousness, being [85] connected to a motivation: "If I turn my head in this way or that, I will have such and such perceptual appearances." The "if I turn my head" I take to mean: The occurrence of such and such perceptions of my turning my head would condition such and such changes in this perception, which, in turn, as my reflection also teaches me, stands in connection with certain sensory experiences of my head posture of such and such a kind and other complexes of consciousness itself. I find here motivational connections in which such and such changes in consciousness motivate such and such correlates. And the motivation is not only a factual one[22]; rather, the motivation is often an evident justification, or it can be established as one. Then I also recognize that there is a right to expectation, that there are legitimate claims about these connections and about these possible expectations. How far this reaches, what degree of reliability here exists, to what extent it is evidence of certainty, and to what extent reasonable supposition, that is to be investigated in each particular case separately.

However, from the attitude that takes an interest in pure consciousness, we cannot only take empathy as an ingredient of one's own consciousness, along with its pertinent motivations within this consciousness, but also take empathy as a basis, precisely by positing the other consciousness that we thereby presume to exist, and about which, as a *theme*, we can make claims. Just as we have as a theme

[22] Correction (1924 or later): It is not a matter here of an arbitrary factual connection, but rather a connection of motivation that I can disclose through reflective analysis and then legitimize through an evident demonstration. Seeing the front side of a thing, I expect not only factually a certain appropriate backside; or hearing the beginning of a melody, I expect not only factually the appropriate continuation of it — as if for me, the one and the other factual experience together with the dimension of expectation would be senseless moments that just happen to come together. Rather, in reflectively going back to the unthematic but vitally past state of motivation, I can grasp the original legitimacy of the expectation in its form of the "if-then" along with its determinate content. — Husserl's note.

not only one's own present consciousness, which we directly grasp in perceptive reflection, and not only the lived experience of remembering one's former own consciousness, which is or can be reflectively grasped in the Now, but also the *remembered consciousness itself* and, to no lesser degree, one's own consciousness, as it is indirectly [86] assumed within the ongoing flow of the episodes of consciousness, *just so is the other consciousness, as posited in empathy, a theme for us.*[23]

My perception of the other lived body plus what is connected to it motivates, in an evidently justified manner, the positing of the "other" consciousness, that is, one which cannot be gotten hold of in memory or reflection,[24] etc. And this evident motivation can either be further confirmed or else be annulled. This is just as it is in the case of memory, i.e., when a particular memory, being evidently motivated by motives for remembering, for instance, by something perceptually present, is posited by one's own former consciousness, namely in such a way that although the evidence for it does not amount to absolute certainty for the actual being of what is posited, it is nevertheless an evident, justified motive for assuming it, namely precisely in that way that the motivation can be confirmed or else be contradicted by "better," stronger counter-motives.[25]

One must not say: At the very moment we posit the other consciousness as a theme, the other lived body and nature are posited[26] too, since the perception or some other positing of the existence of the other lived body comes first, and it is only by virtue of its analogy to one's own posited lived body that empathy ensues and is possible at all. As opposed to this I maintain: Surely, one's own and the other lived body are posited, just as a world of things is posited, which under certain conditions may be scientifically known, namely as it is posited

[23] Thus, the basic ideas of the lectures of 1910–1911 make their first appearance. — Husserl's note.

[24] "Reflection" later changed to "immediate perception." — Editor's note.

[25] If we direct our thematic gaze exclusively to the side of consciousness and its own motivations, and if we bring about positings exclusively in regard to it, then we have in both cases a pure connection of consciousness, and, indeed, in the first case a connection that leads from my consciousness to the other pure consciousness. This connection is an evident "subjective" motivation that can be brought to an evident positing. — Husserl's note.

[26] Later inserted: "thematically." — Editor's note.

both in the various perceptions, which I now perform and which I have performed, and in the various empirical judgments that I have practiced. But this entire world, including the other body and my own, is not to be the theme now.[27] I do not now inquire after the validity of the respective perceptual positings of things,[28] the positings of memory, and the positings of judgments, which are or can be based on them, etc. [87] I do not now perform these positings, in order to establish on their basis scientifically founded judgments about the things experienced and thought about in them. Rather taking them as purely subjective facts, I turn them into themes and substrates for new perceptions (those of[29] reflection) and new judgments, namely those of *pure psychology*. For instance, if a perception motivates other perceptions, and if in the connection of consciousness itself a consciousness (and not the thing posited in that consciousness)[30] gives rise to the expectation of a new consciousness, which is not itself a given consciousness, then that is my domain. Here I am perceiving the other lived body and to this perception belong certain motivations that are directed at further perceptions of my own, namely those that belong to all of my thing-perceptions. In addition to that, however, the perception (precisely as a normal perception, which includes the positing of certainty) motivates via its meaning-content and appearance-content the positing of a consciousness and conscious life as something "other." Yet it is not given in my reflective perception as my present, not in my remembering as something remembered; it is not something woven into my context of consciousness, and not conceivably something to be woven indirectly into my life of consciousness. Rather it is an entire life of consciousness that is posited by the particular manner of empathy. This positing of empathy makes for a stream of consciousness of its own, extending into an open endlessness, being exactly of the same

[27] I perform a reduction to the purely subjective. — Husserl's note.

[28] "I do not now inquire after the validity of the respective perceptual positings of things" changed in 1924 or later to: "I do not now achieve (as I do in the natural life or the positive sciences that are directed at what is natural or objective — living in these unreflectively, straightforwardly, toward 'the' realities of 'the' world) the validity of the pertinent perceptual positings of things (and the world)." — Editor's note.

[29] Later inserted: "phenomenological." — Editor's note.

[30] "(And not the thing posited in that consciousness)" later crossed out. — Editor's note.

general kind as my stream of consciousness that is "directly" given in my acts of reflection,[31] etc., and it has perceptions, memories, anticipating empty intentions, confirmations, pieces of evidence, etc., all of which, however, are not mine.

Hence, I remain completely in my domain,[32] although it has been expanded through empathy to a sphere of a plurality of self-enclosed streams of consciousness (called I-consciousness), which are joined together with "my" stream of consciousness through contexts of motivation of empathy, and which are interconnected with one another in this way too, or can be so interconnected. This joining together [88] is, according to its sense, no real connection, but a peculiar and unique joining through the empathizing positing. The "separate" consciousnesses are potentially in *communication*; the communication is realized through the perceptions of lived bodies and the motivations emanating from them in a way that begs for a more exact description.

In addition, a further consideration would point to[33] linguistic communication, to the reciprocity through signs of various sorts. This would not result in anything that was in principle new; it would not result in anything that would have to, and that would indeed, change our position, because such matters presuppose the immediate experience of empathy as their foundation.

To the extent that experiential motives for the recognition of the other consciousness exist in communication, namely, first, in the empathizing positing that takes over the function of "perception"[34] and, second, in predicative knowledge, to that extent, then, can we obtain, in terms of a "*pure psychology*," general and not merely particular knowledge about the purely "inner life," about the "purely psychical" being. We can make use of that which is known in one's own consciousness for the interpretation of the other consciousness; and we can make use of what by virtue of communication is known in the other consciousness for the knowledge of one's own consciousness. We can put down general findings that, on the one hand, deal with

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[31] "Reflection" later changed to "self-reflection." — Editor's note.

[32] "Domain" later corrected to "domain of phenomenological experience." — Editor's note.

[33] In 1924 or later inserted "I–You acts." — Editor's note.

[34] "Perception" was later changed to "a secondary perception." — Editor's note.

the essence of consciousness in general,[35] as the essence of a pure (but always[36] *existing*) consciousness and, on the other hand, determine the empirical rules that generally determine the course of the lived experiences in consciousnesses. Further, we can investigate the ways in which consciousness, on the basis of communicative contexts, "influences" the other consciousness or how minds (*Geister*) in a purely intellectual way "act on" one another, e.g.,[37] how the belief in such and such definite contents in representation, judging, feeling, [89] and willing in one mind (within one consciousness) "influences" the consciousness of other minds having this belief. And in this context, we can further investigate how the motivations run their course and how, in general, from among the emerging thoughts the associations pick their selections and how in conjunction with these thoughts such and such definite motivations manifestly come to pass. In short, the individual life of the mind, as well as the entire social life in its course, i.e., the interlacing of many single consciousnesses that rests on empathy, becomes an object of a purely psychological investigation, being both a study of the essence and empirical research.

Here one must distinguish between the *descriptive investigation and the investigation directed at knowledge of general lawfulness*.

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Descriptive investigation of mind, history

Let us say, I descriptively trace out my context of consciousness and, by way of empathy, the context of consciousness of other persons and our communalization (*Vergemeinschaftung*) as well. And let us

[35] In 1924 or later added: "of an I-consciousness and of a communalized I-consciousness, of an intersubjectivity." — Editor's note.
[36] "Always" changed in 1924 or later to "immanent." — Editor's note.
[37] We are speaking of reciprocal influence, of the reciprocity of minds. Thereby one must distinguish sharply the relation of communication (which is not an effecting) and the relations of indirect, through acts of empathy mediated (*vermittelten*) motivations, in the manner of I–you acts. — Husserl's note. For a brief discussion of I–you acts and communicative acts, see below Appendix XII (XVII). — Translators' note.

say, I descriptively delineate their turn of mind and also their acts, be they interior or exterior acts. (In the case of external acts, it is once again not a matter of natural processes as a possible theme, since that lends itself to natural-scientific considerations, but rather the[38] deeds as such, the pure contexts of consciousness as descriptions of a psychological character. These contexts consist in certain characteristic processes of perception and the processes of evaluation and volition that are based on them.) From a purely psychological viewpoint, I can even descriptively delineate the facts of culture, like the sciences, the arts, etc., namely by analyzing them in regard to the motivations of consciousness in which they have come to pass as results of actions. The things in them which could be designated as nature, i.e., the things that exhibit a cultural form, although they are natural objects,[39] as objects of physics and psycho-physics,[40] are precisely not taken in this latter regard, are not investigated, not scientifically determined in the manner of "objective" science. Rather these themes come into consideration only as intentional objects of consciousness. [90] Thus, we undertake[41] a descriptive "history" (*Historie*), narrative history (*Geschichte*) of the pure life of the mind. The pure life of the mind is constantly related to nature posited in this life itself. But the historical (*historische*) science of the life of the mind is not a science of nature: It belongs to the essence of mind to posit nature; it belongs to its essence to achieve the awareness that has the character "perception of nature," etc.[42]

[38] Later inserted: "immanent." — Editor's note.
[39] "Natural objects" later changed to "world-objects." — Editor's note.
[40] "As objects of physics and psycho-physics" later crossed out. — Editor's note.
[41] Later inserted: "phenomenologically." — Editor's note.
[42] That is not sufficient: History (*Geschichte*) is only a subsection of this: The descriptive investigation of mind, the pursuit of contexts of the consciousnesses joined through a kind of consensus, results in more than history. Clear distinctions are missing here. — Husserl's note. See Appendix XII (XVII) for a brief discussion of the themes touched upon in this last paragraph. — Translators' note.

APPENDIX II (XXI) [195]

THE PLAN OF THE 1910–1911 LECTURES (ON INTERSUBJECTIVITY)[1]

(written down in one of the years following shortly thereafter)

A different path on the way that my Winter Lectures of 1910–1911 pursue (at least set in motion altogether) would have the following maxim: It should be a propaedeutic to the idea of phenomenology. There is need for this because we all originally incline toward naturalism.

We all have a first, original, and natural sphere of discovery: nature in the broadest sense of a spatially and temporally determined real existent, the *world*.[2] To it relate the natural sciences, the sciences of physical and psychical nature (the sciences of nature in a stricter sense, and the sciences of the mind (*Geist*) (of minds, of communities of minds (*geistigen Gemeinschaften*), of productions of the mind, etc.).

What other sciences can there be over and above these sciences?

a) From nature we can move on to the idea of nature, the idea of physical nature, the idea of mind, of intellectual communities, etc. We can here, in the framework of eidetic universality, move on from various levels of universality to the highest universality, to the idea of the real in general, to the a priori science of a world in general.

b) We can proceed to the level of formal universality and make the idea of being as such in its formal universality our domain of research: formal ontology (formal *mathesis universalis*).

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[1] This refers to the lecture course "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology" of the Winter Semester 1910–1911, the manuscript of which was given in the preceding number (number 6) of *Husserliana XIII*. — Editor's note. The manuscript referred to comprises the main text (Chapters I–VII) of this volume. — Translators' note.

[2] Instead of "the world," Husserl later writes "and in general the world." — Editor's note.

c) Intertwined with this are the apophantic logic and the related disciplines of probabilities, doubts, and questions. The formal science of the significations of thought. Then formal axiology, etc.

d) The sciences of reason, of scientific reason, of theoretic reason, of reason in valuing and willing.

e) The science of transcendental consciousness, of the transcendental phenomena of phenomenology.

However, I should say that this path contains more than what is necessary for an introduction into phenomenology. Starting from the [196] natural attitude, interpreted for the time being as an attitude toward nature only, I do not need to consider in full which sciences remain standing vis-à-vis the natural sciences. I do not need a classification founded on the principle of sciences in general. Rather I only need what is necessary to confront the temptations of naturalism and especially psychologism, which threaten to block us from entering into phenomenology. What matters alone is to clear the path to the eidetic and to claim its rights and, following that, to make clear the distinction between rational psychology, as the eidetic of the mind, and phenomenology. And that corresponds, on the whole, to the path taken in (the summer of) 1912.[3]

[3] By "the path taken in (the summer of) 1912" Husserl means here his lecture course "Introduction to Phenomenology," Summer Semester, 1912 that immediately preceded the composition of the first volume of *Ideas I*. — Editor's note. Cf. the main body of the lectures of this volume, §12, the first footnote, p. 31 of this volume. — Translators' note.

APPENDIX III (XXII) to §10

IMMANENT PHILOSOPHY — AVENARIUS
(probably from 1915)

The first attempt, undertaken by *Avenarius*, at an exact description of "that which is found in advance" (*das Vorgefundene*) aims at the following idea, albeit not without some wavering and lack of clarity of its own, that is: Make no "theories," keep at bay all theoretical preconceived notions, describe the "given" exactly as it is given and, in addition, describe that which is meant over and above what is given, just as it is meant.

Prior to all theory the world is given. All opinions, warranted or not, popular, superstitious, and scientific ones — they all refer to the world already given in advance. How does the world give itself to me, what can I immediately articulate about it, how can I immediately and generally describe that for what it gives itself, what it is according to its original sense, as this sense gives itself as the sense of the world itself in "immediate" perception and experience?[1] Avenarius describes a universal meaning frame of the world in immediate experience without understanding what he thereby undertakes.

All theory refers to this immediate givenness, and theory can have a justified sense only when it forms thoughts that do not run counter to the general sense of the immediate givenness. No theorizing can contradict this sense. What is the world? It is what I find through describing and theorizing, and theorizing is only the continuation of describing, being a more broadly encompassing describing. To seek for more has no meaning. Avenarius investigates that. He asks: Does it make sense to abandon the "natural" concept of the world? Well, let us [197] see! It is claimed that the world is totally different, that this is not the

[1] But Avenarius does not speak in precisely this way and that is his mistake. — Husserl's note.

real world, that it is a mere appearance of a transcendent, unknowable world, etc. Can something compel me to change the natural concept of the world and to claim (introjection[2]): This given world is just a mere appearance in me, an appearance of an experiencing human, something happening in the brain, etc.?

I see in this a very valuable tendency.

In experience, the world stands over against me, incompletely determined according to some, but not all aspects. Empirical science makes the claim to determine *this* world scientifically. Over and above this, philosophy claims to give a better, ultimate truth about the world. And the natural scientists themselves argue about the reality-status of the theoretical auxiliary concepts that they have introduced, thus drawing on philosophical positions about the subjectivity of consciousness. Siding with none of the parties involved, I wish to adopt a critical attitude. Which attitude is this?[3] I look at the world as such, as given in experience. I look at scientific experiencing, and I look at philosophical theories. I realize that science and philosophy make claims about the world, but that the starting point and the basis for all this is *experience*. The idea is not to talk wildly, but rather to reach by way of thinking insight and knowledge about the world and what it is: the world that I have, that I have by way of experiencing before all theorizing, before all mediated opinion, even though I do not have the world in the sense that it fully satisfies my cognitive desires. Therefore, I have to make a start with describing the world as it gives itself to me *immediately*, that is, I must describe experience with respect to what is experienced as such.

With regard to the controversy whether the experienced being is to be interpreted in this way or that, whether, ultimately, it is a mere appearance to which no "metaphysical" truth accrues, I abstain from every judgment, except the judgments which posit the fact that there is experience and which articulate its sense, the sense about the

[2] For Avenarius, "introjection" is the act by which I insert in the other perceiver what he or she experiences and which divides up the natural unity of the empirical world into an external and inner world. Here, the theory of the other's introjection is applied to oneself. See Manfred Sommer, *Husserl und der frühe Positivismus*, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1985, pp. 70 ff. — Translators' note.

[3] Here let us not restrict ourselves to Avenarius, but rather let us think this through to the end! — Husserl's note.

experienced as such. And subsequent to the *general description of the meaning of experience* or subsequent to the description of the content of the "concept" world (the "sense" of the world) prescribed by experience, I pose the question: *Can this original sense ever be abandoned in a theory which grounds itself on experience*? What can *thinking* achieve if it legitimately founds itself on experience? Can it ever transcend the sense of the original experience upon which the theory of experience is founded? Hence I ask, what is going on and what can go on with the original sense of "world," of what is "experientially given," if legitimate, *thoughtful* experiencing is based on experience. On closer examination, I would have to describe both sides of the correlation, the experiencing (*Erfahrung*) and what is [198] experienced (*Erfahrenes*), and then I would have to describe, on the one hand, experiential thinking (*Erfahrungsdenken*) and what is experientially thought (*Erfahrungsgedachtes*), what is determined by thoughtful experiencing and, on the other hand, the distinctions of legitimate, corroborated experiential thought contents (*Erfahrungsgedachtheiten*), etc. Furthermore, I would have to answer the question: *What is the sense of an experiential theory* (*Erfahrungstheorie*), hence correspondingly: what is the sense of the world of science? And which sense is prescribed by the essence of experience and of thoughtful experience together with their correlates?

In thinking through the driving motivations of this investigation or in reflectively grasping what could fulfill them, we are led to a phenomenological reduction and a phenomenological essence-analysis of "experience" (*Erfahrung*) and experiential thinking (*Erfahrungsdenken*) and, correspondingly, of the phenomenological sense of the experiential world (*Erfahrungswelt*), in particular the experiential world that is intellectually determined by a potentially correct thinking.

But what about the step back to "that which is found in advance" (*das Vorgefundene*)? Here, I "come upon" (*vorfinde*) the *principal coordination*[4] (*Prinzipialkoordination*), the essential relatedness of the object-being (*Objektsein*) to the subject-being (*Subjektsein*), of the central members (*Zentralglieder*) to the counterpart members

[4]Cf. for this concept, R. Avenarius, *Der menschliche Weltbegriff*, Leipzig: 1891, pp. 83 ff. — Editor's note.

(*Gegenglieder*), or rather of the objects as counterpart members to the experiencing I, the "central member." One must differentiate, and Avenarius has not done so, the process of finding things in advance in experience and finding things in advance in the phenomenological attitude. As experience, the finding in advance is surely, first, the experience about objects and the experience about me, the experiencing person, and, second, the experience about other experiencing people.

It is certainly a correct description, if one says, I find a unity in experience, that is, a unity in the matters of experience, in which I find things and fellow humans and myself as the one experiencing, hence myself as the central member:[5] I find all the other objects of the world over against me. But what about the I or the consciousness that finds things in advance? Must we not distinguish the pure I from the human I as an object, as something found? And does one find (*vorfinden*) among the things found (*im Vorgefundenen*) the finding consciousness (*vorfindende Bewusstsein*) with its I? Moreover, the I as an object, as something found (*Vorgefundenes*), is in no way found exactly as a thing is found, having only a different content. I-man (*Ich-Mensch*), I am the one thinking, feeling, and willing, yet the "I think" is something I do not really find in advance as I find in the presence of a thing that "it moves," being a finding that is a realization through "reflection."

On the other hand, I find other subjectivities only in the distinctive manner that I come upon their lived bodies and, by way of empathy, [199] insert in them an I as a subject of acts and an I as a subject of a stream of lived experiences.

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Essence-analysis of things found in advance (Vorgefundenheiten) as such

These are all matters having to do with what is found in advance, and it is necessary to differentiate the different pre-given matters, e.g., the things, the subjects, the I that finds things in advance and makes

[5] Instead of "central member" Husserl erroneously writes "principal member"! — Editor's note.

statements about them, the lived experiences in which things are found in advance, the appearances in which things appear, the expressed meanings in which something is meant, etc., being in contrast to that which is appearing and what is the meant content, etc.; and these expressed meanings can be correct or incorrect, they can be founded or unfounded; and the contexts of founding are differently structured, and these structures condition, so we believe, their correctness or incorrectness.

Can we dissolve everything into relations of "elements" and factual kinds of contexts[6] that could also be completely different? And how are we to understand in the flux and the connectedness of such "complexes" of elements the special characteristic that we find there: a unity of consciousness in which a subject believes to find a world, knows this world, and makes true and false statements about this world, where this world is itself not a world of complexes of elements but what appears in the complexes of elements?[7]

Avenarius starts out with description, but he does not get the pure phenomenological reduction, the different fields of things found in advance, the realm of immanence in the sense of the real immanent datum of consciousness (*reellen Bewusstseinsdatums*), and the noematic and the ontic. And he does not get the particular things found in advance, which are called realities, and their essential relation to appearings, i.e., to elements which are apprehended and by way of which appearings are constituted. He remains hung up on naturalism. He does not bring out the distinction between, on the one hand, what is found in the sense of what appears and what is posited perceptually and, on the other hand, that which is found in advance in the sense of the real immanent (*reell Immanenten*) and what in immanent perception is disclosed as grasped, etc. The beginning in Avenarius is good, but he got stuck.

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[6] This is probably an allusion to Ernst Mach. See the next footnote and Ernst Mach, *Contributions to the Analysis of the Sensations*, trans. C.M. Williams, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1890, 8–25 *et passim*. — Translators' note.

[7] Mach sensualized the hyletic, the features of acts, of objects. — Husserl's note.

APPENDIX IV (XXIII) to §17, pp. 43 ff. [200]

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN PHENOMENOLOGICAL AND POSITIVE (ONTIC AND ONTOLOGICAL) TRUTHS. THE SYNTHETIC UNITY OF POSITIVE AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEMES. DOGMATICALLY AND TRANSCENDENTALLY ELUCIDATED POSITIVITY. REWORKING OF THE FOOTNOTE ON p. 44 OF THE LECTURE COURSE ON THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY (1910–1911) (FROM 1924 OR SOMEWHAT LATER)

The original footnote on p. 44 as well as the passage in the body of the lecture course itself still contains some obscurities.

In judging phenomenologically, I make "no use of" objectivities, nor do I engage judgments about objectivities (the thematic objectivities of the positive sciences in the usual sense). I make no judgment about the world "*simpliciter*" ("*schlechthin*"), about possible worlds, possible objects of nature *simpliciter*, nor any judgment about numbers "*simpliciter*," and about the mathematical *simpliciter*, namely according to the sense of the eidetic sciences of the formal-ontological and formal-logical groups. While I refrain from any judging *simpliciter* about objectivities, I do make judgments about consciousness, which in this sense is called pure consciousness. *In regard to pure consciousness* I judge "*simpliciter*."

Let us say beforehand: Judging *simpliciter* is judging *thematically*. That which is so judged is the *theme*.

To my thematic sphere of judgment belong all positive, objectively directed judgments too. Whereas in the attitude of positivity my thematic sphere consisted of positivities, namely this or that field of objectivities within the total field of the world, so now my thematic sphere is pure consciousness, that is, any consciousness of objectivities and

any judgments about these objectivities as well as any evident judgment, any proof, any justification, in which objective existence and objective characteristics are "articulated." All this is done, however, in such a fashion that if all such consciousness about objectivity becomes thematic for me, then "objectivity *simpliciter*," its existence, and characteristics *simpliciter*, will be disconnected from my thematic field. I refrain in general from every "thematic" judging in this dimension. I do this in a general way. In other words, my theme is subjectivity, i.e., subjectivity alone and in general terms; it is a purely self-contained and independent theme. To show that this is possible and how this is possible is the task of the description of the method of the phenomenological reduction.

Now with regard to this independence, it is doubtlessly correct to say: "Judgments of the kind which, in principle, I do not use in a given scientific domain, are 'without influence'[1] on the findings in that do- [201]
main." For one thing, this is a tautology, i.e., if it means that, in line with the defined nature of the phenomenological method, "positive" judgments can never exercise an "influence" on the phenomenological realm. As long as I am practicing the phenomenological method, I have in principle "put in parentheses" the whole universe of positive judgments and every existence of objectivities, i.e., I have removed all questionability from them, and I have, in this respect and for my thematic intentions "once and for all," suppressed all final position-taking and every "verdict." Nevertheless, I can judge *simpliciter*, albeit not about anything objective. Thus, no judgment that I make has "positive" premises, and in phenomenology no judgment has any deductive dependence on these positive premises. Hence, this is an analytic explication.

However, is there not a difference and a broadening in meaning if I say: What I judge as a phenomenologist can no longer be dependent on judgments of a positive kind, as if it were still possible that afterward upon stepping back from the phenomenological attitude and immersing myself in physics, where I would judge entirely in accordance with the positive attitude, that then some findings could emerge that would force me to modify my phenomenological findings and to relinquish them in the form they had emerged in the respective

[1] See above, p. 43. — Editor's note.

phenomenological attitude? Accordingly, it *seems* that I am allowed to say, almost as if it were only a different expression for this: The validity of phenomenology with all its truths is independent of the validity of all positive sciences, is independent of the truth or falsity of positive findings of any sort. Yet is that really obvious from the outset? Furthermore, is it obvious that no doubt about positive givenness of knowledge (no positive doubt) can trigger a phenomenological doubt and that a universal positive skepticism (like the most skeptical of ancient skepticism that denies or doubts all positivities or objectivities in general) cannot at all affect the phenomenological judgments and their purported insights? If in arithmetic I draw conclusions from given axioms, while firmly leaving out other axioms, then the attained propositions are very well *understandable* independent of those that are excluded, yet they are not disconnected from them in their truth. For if I change them so that they become false, then I easily come to have falsehoods such that if they are combined with the other axioms, which alone I had employed before, they will generate conclusions that stand in contradiction with the propositions that I had deduced. Perhaps, it is the case that doubting or negating the world renders all[2] phenomenological propositions doubtful or false, even though I have [202] found them to be correct while abstaining from judgment in relation to the world.

Moreover, one could recall the following: Formal logic and formal ontology are positive sciences too. But if I make no use of them, this can hardly mean that the logical truths and the formal truths regarding objects are of no importance for phenomenology. The fact that formal logic and formal ontology are positive does not merely signify that customarily they are taken as being related to positivities. For even if they are not taken in this sense (after all, I can understand: something at all = something that can be judged, i.e., that can be judged as something identical and concordant, and then apply logic or formal ontology to this), they are positive, provided they do not emerge within the methodical attitude of phenomenology. This attitude requires that I, in a completely radical way, put in parentheses what is not consciousness. Therefore, even logic, as a possible system of premises, falls to the wayside.

[2] "all" later crossed out. — Editor's note.

Hence, it is still very much the *question* in what respect phenomenological and ontological findings are independent of one another; whether or to what extent *truths* about pure subjectivity and objective truths are *independent* of one another, that is, alternatively put, what this independence, if it exists, legitimately signifies or can signify.

However, that some kind of dependence holds is transparent. If I posit that a thing actually exists and really has such and such characteristics, that is, that the judgments about it are true as such, that they have "eternal validity," then it is evident that thereby for me and for each thing-experiencing subject as well a rule is sketched out, according to which I no longer could have just any odd experiences agreeing with one another, but rather that I am bound to certain systems of experiences. I can understand that this is the case not only for this or that experienced thing, which I posit as being truly real, but also for experienceable things in general, *a priori*, in relation to subjects of possible experiencing. If I judge about things *simpliciter*, if I perform "positive" judgments, if I perform judgments "about" them, how they are, and if I perform existential judgments of a positive kind, e.g., that at such and such a time and at such and such a place (in the world, of course) things with such and such properties are present (I judge that such things "exist"), then I do not judge about experiencing subjects and their experiencing consciousness as well as other consciousness, namely strictly in terms of the consciousness that has an experience *of* these things. And if I judge psychologically, if I altogether judge reflectively, but in the natural attitude, then I judge positively about humans and the inner life of humans. Thereby I can and will pass judgments on human experiencing and thinking *about* things, and, quite likely, I will determine what this experiencing looks like on closer investigation. But then positivities are part of the theme.

However, I can put all positivity in parentheses. For instance, instead of judging positively about things, I can judge *purely* about my or anyone's experience of things, about "the" determinate things that I, or they, or we experience together, or about possible things, possible [203]
things in general, without the interest of this judgment ever thematically aiming at these things, as they are, where and when they exist, and how they have been changed, how they have causally changed others, etc. Or, in the attitude toward possibilities, I can entertain them as possibilities, as "conceivables," and how they would be determined

in the mode of the "As-If." However, this is done in such a manner that not only the existence of these things or possible things remains "disengaged," i.e., that the straightforward thematic performance in regard to them, the judging *simpliciter*, does not take place, but also disengaged remains *any* objective judgment *simpliciter* as well as any implicit co-positing of positivities in general, for they are indeed rendered inoperative in the deliberate *epoché*.

Hence, I can pursue *a pure thematic about subjectivity* and, within this overall framework (of this universal epoché), a pure thematic about the experiencing subjectivity as experiencing "this thing here" or as having the opportunity to experience things in general. Thereby, I can state evident truths that I can ever again verify. Within this thematic, I never run into an empirical-ontic or ontological (in general, a positive) truth. Conversely, if I am in the attitude of positivity I never run into a phenomenological truth.

Of course, it can be the case that I judge falsely when I am in the one or the other thematic attitude, as I myself can notice after gaining access to evidence (now a positive, and then a phenomenological evidence); and my ontic judging may be correct, i.e., in accordance with the ontic (objective, positive) experiences, whereas my phenomenological judging may be incorrect (upon gaining access to the phenomenological experience or evidence, which conflicts with what has been phenomenologically experienced), and vice versa.

Both of the modes of judgment and experience are independent. But that does not mean that this holds for the corresponding truths too, i.e., that each side has nothing to do with the other. On the contrary. As I, in judging purely phenomenologically, open up the universe of pure subjectivity, namely in terms of its actualities and possibilities, I constantly have experiences of the world and, moreover, in my natural life, I may also "experience" ideal positivities (I am involved with mathematical evidence, etc.). This whole life is my theme along with all that which *therein* is a theme to one who experiences, thinks positively, etc. If my thematizing (within positive experiences and my whole positive life) about positive themes of this and that (things, states of affairs, mathematical things, etc.) becomes thematic for me, as a reflecting phenomenologist, then these themes themselves are not, in the sense of the phenomenological epoché, my themes. "I do not judge about positivities '*simpliciter*'" is only another way of saying that I (as a

phenomenologist) exclude these themes. On the other hand, because the positive experiences, judgments, and other positively directed acts of consciousness are my themes, and not only as individual acts, but also as endless and infinite syntheses, all positive truths, being truly [204] positive, fall in my domain "too." Whatever I may ascertain as true being and whatever I may establish as truths in respect to it, the ascertaining and establishing itself of what is true is my theme too, and it is a principal title for phenomenological themes. Thus, what I or the subjectivity as such gather and can gather of the truth belongs to my domain. And if I myself had no positive truths, subject to constant corroboration, I could not make out anything phenomenological in regard to them.

But one must of course bear in mind that as a phenomenologist I have truth in a different way than someone in the positive attitude. As a phenomenologist, I have a positive truth only in terms of having it *as* what it has been had by the positively oriented I. And I have "*simpliciter*" this having as it has been had as such. At any time, I can step back into the thematic attitude of positivity and therefore judge *simpliciter* about what is positive. This "stepping back" means that in the concrete thematic meaning of the phenomenological consciousness are enclosed positive judging, understanding, and recognition (the positive consciousness altogether), including all the truths coming with them, such that I have all this immediately within my reach at all times. And insofar as I previously had to be in the natural positive attitude, I have indeed a legitimate reason to speak of a return or stepping back into the positive attitude.

Furthermore, it is obviously part and parcel of this situation that my manner of judging about the positive has undergone a change through the phenomenological epoché. It is the same judgment, it is the same experience, the same theorizing, etc., exactly with the old content, yet modified in the kind of performance, more precisely, in the thematizing performance. What is decisive for all philosophy is that precisely such a change in the thematic achievement is possible, while maintaining the full content of the entire agency of the I and consciousness (being essentially a thematic agency). And this is done in such a manner that one does not relinquish any positive thematic position-taking in the natural sense of the performance of world-directed position-takings. Nevertheless, each position-taking is put "out of play," since it is rendered non-actual by the exclusive

actualization of the purely subjective interest of the phenomenological thematizing. The respective positive position-taking is invested by this interest in the modified manner. Now the theme becomes the positive having, and what is had as such, the positive positing and what it has posited, its proposition, and its theme, but *as* something posited in the positing. (Of course, that can repeat itself at a higher level, but that does not involve any essential difficulties.)

Every positive truth, justified by positive evidence, belongs to the universal sphere of possible phenomenological experience as *index*, title, and thematic sense of possible knowledge and of an ideal totality, of a total system of such possible knowledge in terms of possible concrete phenomena of the transcendental subjectivity, including all [205] the structural connections included and required by the phenomena. In running through the eidetic possibilities of pure subjectivity, in the totality of these possibilities, all truths have to make their appearance. If a subjectivity as such can intellectually be made present as knowing, or else if it can be constructed *a priori*, then it will also be constructed as knowing truths and that means as an experiencing, thinking, and, finally, rationally justifying subjectivity, being of such a kind that it can and does claim, in the experiential form of evidence, that it does not only judge in general, but also takes hold of "true" being.

It is itself a phenomenological insight that being thematically directed at an entity or, which is the same thing, being-in-a-tendential-attitude-of-discovery means the same as: The respective judging I directs its gaze at what is posited, namely in such a way that it not only posits this very same thing, the posited, as the same throughout the diverse new positings and makes new determinations about it all the time, but also strives after definitiveness for its proposition and the continuing determinations of the respective substrates, namely by way of verification (identity syntheses of fulfillment).

Hence, positive science appears here under the heading of subjectivity, as a researching, theorizing, and demonstrating subjectivity and, connected with that, the various contents of meaning, the theses, the modalities, etc. All of this takes place in the concretion of a life of consciousness with noetic–noematic contents, without which this entire thematic of theory is not thinkable, as phenomenology demonstrates.

Hence, positive truth as truth is not only independent of phenomenological truth, but rather is "locked into" phenomenological

truth itself, albeit never as a theme of phenomenology. What is a straightforward theme in the attitude of the positive scientific enterprise is never a theme in phenomenology itself.

The switch in attitude, which, coming from the side of phenomenology, enables everything positive once again to become a straightforward theme and be put forward as such, implies withholding of the phenomenological mode of judging, namely the one about pure subjectivity. However, what is fundamental is this: If I once have attained the phenomenological insights that relate back to some positivity or other, and if these phenomenological insights become my own as lasting, valid pieces of knowledge, then the positivity of the subsequent straightforward attitude has attained a new character.[3]

I must distinguish between living in *naïve positivity* and living in that positive attitude that is pursuant to the phenomenological attitude and its phenomenological findings. For a while I was living in naiveté, I knew nothing of the essential necessities of phenomenological knowledge, I knew nothing of the essence of that life, in which positivity [206] occurred and where positive true being and theoretical positive truth "made their appearance," being something intuited and rationally corroborated. I knew nothing of the fact that certain essential relations exist between positivity and pure (transcendental) subjectivity, which makes the one inseparable from the other, conferring upon the positive truths the essential sense of ideas and corresponding structural laws of pure subjectivity.

However, since this piece of knowledge is now available, all positivity, as it is apprehended in the presently performed straightforward gaze and in the synthesis of the twofold knowledge, bears the stamp of something that constitutes itself in pure subjectivity. Through this combined attitude, one could say, there emerges from what is positivity *simpliciter* (or dogmatically) the transcendentally disclosed, elucidated, and justified positivity. Now I judge positively once *again* and, in a new return to the phenomenological attitude, I may then at the same time, almost as if in natural reflection, judge about pure consciousness, i.e., have as my horizon the infinities of the purely subjective and, nevertheless, at the same time, have the world and all positivity as a theme, positing them *simpliciter*.

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[3] See the following page. — Husserl's note.

Having laid the foundation for phenomenology, i.e., the life of knowledge in the transcendental attitude, we are faced, on the one hand, with rather peculiar modes of relating to the positivities, and, on the other hand, rather odd entanglements between the phenomenological realm and the positive positings or data. If I return from the phenomenological attitude or the thematic one to the natural positive one, then the comportment of my positive consciousness as well as its themes acquire a new stratum of validity; my experiencing, thinking, valuing, etc., and that which therein is the experienced, the thought, the valued, and my understanding and what therein is understood and corroborated and the here originating lasting beliefs and their truths (e.g., the scientific truths), i.e., the whole world! — everything acquires and bears a new stratum of validity: one deriving from the phenomenological knowing.

How shall we understand this? As a phenomenologist, I have to perform and have constantly performed the epoché in regard to the whole universe of positivity. Only as long as I stand under the norm of this epoché, I am a phenomenologist. If I return to the positive attitude, then I cancel the epoché (this is a tautology). Therefore, one could think, my manner of "natural" living is thus restored, and everything is just as if I had never done phenomenology. And the same is true for the switch of attitude in the opposite direction; on performing the epoché again, I am a phenomenologist again.

However, I am, and I am one and the same I: at first, a natural, naïve I in positive life and, then, an I doing phenomenology and, thereafter, the I of positivity again. This is not just "objectively" the case, but, rather, I realize this in me and for me, and this sameness founds a unity for all my themes — regardless in which of my attitudes they may originate —, especially a unity for all my lasting beliefs (that have lasting validity for me) and all of the truths that are demonstrated and [207] demonstrable by me. This unity does not merely consist in the consideration that these opinions, validities, insights, etc., are in any case all mine and valid for me, and that if I, in the attitudes that they require, again maintain these views, one after the other, I will of course find and recognize them again as mine and, in this transition, make manifest their collective validity. Rather, the insights on both sides have "much to do with one another." Being essentially in a kind of original kinship, they also intrinsically lay the ground for syntheses. When in

the phenomenological attitude, I am a "disinterested" observer and investigate my and anyone's natural and naïve subjectivity. Supposing that I myself am the subject matter, then I am the naïve subject with its naïve acts and beliefs, with its naïve understandings and truths; and I am the very same one who, in the division of the I (*Ichspaltung*), exercises the epoché and establishes a superimposed layer of a second life, namely the phenomenological life. It is only in this layer that the epoché is effective and creates phenomenological truths. But the naïve thematic is still alive and must be so, and it is of course in synthetic coincidence with the phenomenological thematic, which includes the former in the already described manner. Of course, this synthesis is not a thematically achieved synthesis, which, after all, would require the thematic achievement of the connected individual theses.

If[4] at one time I have been a phenomenologist, then I cannot lose the beliefs that have grown out of that experience. Therefore, I will remain a phenomenologist, even if I do not actually experience and think in a phenomenological way and, instead, return to the previous attitude, where, devoted to the positivities, I actually think in a positive and straightforward manner. However, what is thus positively thought is arranged in a synthesis with the phenomenological realm, or, rather, embodied in it is a horizon, which is disclosable, and which has actualizable intentions, and the sense of which is this: By way of reflection this positivity may be turned into a phenomenological theme; the positivity, as my cognitive work, is precisely part of the unity of pure consciousness, insofar as the latter constitutes the positivity and constitutes positive truth through positive, expressed meanings and the corroborations of these meanings, to which, by an essential necessity, formations of consciousness of such and such noetic–noematic structures belong. Yet, this discussion and the exposition of this sense, through which alone this sense can become thematic sense and truth for me, presupposes that I thematically perform the synthesis itself, that I, in the transition from one attitude to the other, keep a firm grip on the thematic of each and simply connect them thematically.

Therefore, I would better say: When I have learned to consistently practice phenomenological research and when I have learned to

[4] The following sentences up to "such and such noetic–noematic structures" were later marked with a sign for deletion. — Editor's note.

explore and investigate, at first, pure consciousness, pure connections of consciousness and, eventually, infinite connections of the constitution of "that which exists," being that which truly shows itself to be [208] evident for a subjectivity, then I can and I will return to the positive attitude. And I am forced to do this as a professional phenomenologist too, since I am not only a phenomenologist but also happen to have my original and constant primary interests in life, being interests in the world, in the positivities as they have grown on me in my naiveté and as they have prompted me to direct action. In short, life — the positive one — demands its rights. With these transitions, i.e., from the naïve to the phenomenological attitude, and vice versa, syntheses are being continuously and necessarily produced. One and the same thing is now a positive theme and then it becomes, by a certain indirect way, a phenomenological theme, namely as the "content" of pure consciousness and the pure contexts of such consciousness.

Consider how this succession of both themes could be joined together into the unity of one theme, motivated by the fact that they are joined together through a continuous synthetic unity. Granting this, then how could it fail to happen that I achieve this thematically, and how could it fail to happen that I say now with evidence: The world of which I speak and always could speak throughout all my natural living is precisely the world of consciousness, the one that I find in the phenomenological attitude, as posited in consciousness, that I study in this attitude in the concretion of its subjective modes, where I always have the exact same thing as posited content that I have in the naïve attitude, although I have the content precisely as the synthetic unity of the relevant essential subjective modes, and thus knowable as something essentially inseparable from them and what is like them?

The *habitus* of the phenomenological epoché is a theoretical *habitus* for the sake of obtaining certain themes, the discoveries of theoretical and practical truths, and to obtain a certain purely self-contained system of knowledge. This thematic *habitus*, however, excludes to a certain extent the *habitus* of positivity. Only in its being closed off to the latter does it lead to the self-contained unity of phenomenology as "first" philosophy, the science of transcendental pure subjectivity. On the other hand, no thematic *habitus* and no "experience" or evidence related to a self-contained unified area excludes any other *habitus*. Every theme can be connected with every other theme through a

thematic synthesis of a higher level; this includes even "relationless" themes, being formally connected in the manner of collective theoretic totalities; and all the more so, if the themes are internally united through a commonality in meaning. And that holds also with regard to the phenomenological and positive themes. To be sure, the phenomenological thematic requires refraining from, whereas the positive thematic requires surrendering to, the thematic performance. *But that does not prevent that the "results" of both attitudes and the sciences of both attitudes meet in an inner thematic synthetic relation out of which new insights spring forth.*

The formal-ontological eidetic has its purely self-contained region. [209] It excludes every positing of individual entities, as well as every eidetic positing with material essential content. But that does not prevent us from combining mathematics with natural science, with the ontology of nature, and with empirical natural science, where the theoretical attitude of these latter disciplines is completely different. What is "purely" mathematical does not belong to these other disciplines, but rather the mathematics of nature, albeit only in terms of the material or empirical particularization of the purely mathematical, being no longer something purely formal. And yet, if we switch from one attitude to the other, then, by synthetic thematizing, we will see that the mathematical of nature is a particularization of the purely formal mathematical, that nature has the form of a certain kind of mathematical manifold, the conceptualization of which, in terms of formal universality and theoretic founding, belongs to the pure *mathesis universalis* as formal ontology. However, such a relationship is completely different from that relationship that, in general, *all* ontological regions and *all* sciences and, in particular, all regions and sciences of positivity have to transcendental phenomenology.

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I judge *phenomenologically*: e.g., I proceed from the perception of this table here and consider the lived experience of that perceiving, according to the moments that are inseparable from it. I then move on to the possibilities of ever-new perceptions, namely perceptions in which I would have the steady awareness: "I am seeing the same

table." What can one say about such perceptual lived experiences, namely in regard to all their contents, considering that one can carry on with these perceptual lived experiences *in infinitum* and according to diverse "directions of perception"? Well, I would point out this: If my perception and what is meant in it (this particular table, meant in such and such a way) as well as my perception's relevant belief are to be constantly valid, then there have to be future operative perceptions about the table, "of it, the self-same thing," where the perceptions have such and such structures, and such and such style of unfolding. Phenomenologically describing the matter thus, I descriptively point out the necessary connections and demarcate what are the generally necessary connections and what is of the character of scientific knowledge, in particular, what is eidetic.[5]

While I go on living in my perceptions, I judge *ontically* in the attitude of positivity: Thus and so is *the* thing. And in the transition to new perceptions I judge: Besides being thus and so, the thing has other characteristics too, i.e., such and such properties belong to it too. Alternatively I may judge: No longer is it thus and so; it is different now. Or else: It was not and is not thus and so, this was a deception and, instead, it is such and such. These are ontic descriptions. I perform ontic judgments, which are either confirmed or confuted in continuous experience; or else they become questionable in doubting; or they are toned down from the status of certainty to the status of presumption. In this progression, the old beliefs are, for the time being, confirmed [210] as valid beliefs and they keep their continued validity for me.

In the eidetic–ontic conception, I think of a thing in general as having existence, as a substrate for judgments that I and everyone else could verify at all times. Since I constantly move in the space of concordant, corroborating possible experiences as such and judgments as such, where one and the same possible thing would persist in its possible existence, I judge that for a thing in general such and such ontological judgments and essential laws are valid.

However, if I judge in an eidetic–phenomenological manner, I put myself in the place of ontic judging as such, in order to describe and to eidetically judge about the connections of possible experiences and possible syntheses of agreement, namely in concrete universality

[5] But this is not transcendental–phenomenological. — Husserl's note.

and with respect to all noetic–noematic essential contents. In such a phenomenological thematization, all things of an ontological and ontical–empirical character have the value of existence and truth within the synthetic manifolds of the consciousness of experience or some other form of consciousness. However, I do not judge *simpliciter* about actual and possible things, and I do not live straightforwardly in the achievement of cognitive experiences, whose relevant performance is thereby hidden and unthematic for me. Rather, I judge about the concrete life, where for me, *qua* I that judges *simpliciter*, such and such a thing and such and such of its properties, of its relations, of its causal connections, etc., are something real, in virtue of which the thing assumes for me its validity, namely in terms of its being thus and so. And the same holds in the case of the eidetic thinking about things in general.

Now I consider how in my consciousness it comes to pass for me that I, in my experiencing, have this thing "before me," as being there, having such and such properties, and that, informed by this, I pass such and such judgments on it, and convince myself of its reality (or its possibility, etc.). And I ask myself, e.g.: What does an experience have to look like, if for me a thing is something immediately seen, grasped, etc., in short, something experienced by me? What does the confirmation or disconfirmation of that which is an experientially given look like? And in lived experience, how does it work when one has occasion to say: "Yet this turned out quite differently"? And if I speak ontically of "reality," what does this talk aim at, and what is present in the demonstrating consciousness? And what is given when I regard reality as absolutely valid, as being-in-itself (*The "Origin" of Concepts*)?

I recognize phenomenologically that every judgment about reality, if it is supposed to be absolutely "final," imposes on the life of consciousness a noetic–noematic rule, a rule for an infinite multitude of structures, namely first, in a negative way, the structures which are ruled out for consciousness; and, on the other hand, the structures which are positive and hypothetical, all of which structures consciousness either must have or already has, and which, should the occasion arise, it could freely realize for itself: namely, in a positive and ultimate regard, the infinite manifolds of possible experiences, which

conform to each other by way of concordantly accomplished syntheses, which would have to confirm in unison the existence of the thing and its (gradually "emerging") properties. However, with regard to the negative aspect, there is the essential law that for the experiencing [211] subjectivity no manifolds of experiences are possible that consistently would dictate the nonexistence of this thing and, moreover, all particular experiences that contradict the existence of that very same thing must be disclosable as "deception" and as an obscuring but exposable illusion, where the exposition of the illusion then manifests the true being in place of the illusion, being then confirmed in the continuous context of further experiences. It would then be shown that every thing is dependent, that the being of a thing has a relation not only to possible experiences of it but also to the universal agreement in my experiences as well as in the experiences of everyone else, etc.

One would have to treat separately each category of the objectivities, of possible themes concerning ontic, positive judging and, in this regard, elucidate the phenomenological problems of experience, that is, the problems of the original self-giving and evidence of judgment (*origin of all categories, regions, and of all formal and material basic concepts*). Accordingly, the total subjective life stands under the law that there are truths in themselves, i.e., it is subject to the law that it may not have certain insights at one point, but may have them under certain circumstances at some later point, that insights, namely in connection with their subjective and continued validity, have an unbreakable validity "in themselves;" that insights have a universal structure which, as particularities, fit in with the universal structures, which in turn render possible subjectivity in the first place.[6] To investigate pure subjectivity in accordance with its essential possibilities is precisely, at the same time, to co-investigate two things, namely, on the one hand, the essential possibilities of an ideally consistent life

[6] This sentence raises a great difficulty in interpreting the metaphysical underpinnings of transcendental phenomenology. Does essence (*Wesen*) truly reign supreme over the facticity (*Faktum*) of transcendental subjectivity, as this passage suggests? Or is what is ultimate the facticity of individuality, the essentialities of monadic single individuals? Or is there an insurmountable tension between essence and facticity, as some later texts suggest? See below Appendix XI (XXX); also, e.g., *Cartesian Meditations* §34 and §39; *Husserliana XV*, 385–386, 403, 668–669. — Translators' note.

of reason, including the essential possibilities of a scientific, science-creating life and, on the other hand, the possibility of a life that in consistent experience constitutes a truly existing world.

Are thereby all scientific pursuits exhausted?[7]

[7] In one respect, an essential correction is necessary for these pages (also pp. 113–124, line 29). Purity as transcendental purity is not to be reached through mere reflection by departing from particular positive considerations. All reflection of consciousness is, no matter how far I enter into the noetic, merely psychological reflection—as long as I do not perform (and correctly introduce) the universal epoché. — Husserl's note.

APPENDIX V (XXIV)

THE PRIMACY OF THE PROBLEM OF THE UNITY OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE VIS-À-VIS THE CRITIQUE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE. SELF-CRITICAL REFLECTIONS CONCERNING THE KEY IDEAS OF THE FOURTH AND FIFTH CHAPTERS OF THE LECTURE COURSE "THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY" (1910–1911)

(probably from 1924)

In the second chapter, the guiding idea was this: It appears that by way of an epoché, performed with regard to the entire world, including all the world's real being, the *ego cogito* is opened up as a "realm" of phenomenological experience (and taking it eidetically, a realm of phenomenological intuition of essences) and hence a realm of sciences. [212]

But is it truly a realm of sciences? Is it the case that through the multifariousness of "phenomenological experiences" a realm is really opened up, a realm which is secured for us and furnished with objects that one can check at any time, and a realm which one can generally turn into a theme for theory?

Looking at it more closely, there are two questions to be asked: One question is dealt with in the fourth chapter, the other in the fifth chapter. Prior to this, the question is: Does phenomenological experience have the sort of evidence that makes it suitable at all as a basis for scientific knowledge?

Thus, in the fourth chapter *critical* objections to phenomenological experiences are discussed and, with that, the problem as such of a critique of phenomenological experience and knowledge is touched upon. On this occasion, first steps toward the differentiation of basic kinds of phenomenological intuition are taken and relevant critical

doubts (related to perception, retention, etc.) are discussed one after the other. However, more pressing is another problem, which actually precedes the critique (although, because of the historical situation and the much-loved skepticism toward the value of "inner experience," both in the epistemological and the psychological attitude, it is a prior concern *for us* to begin with the critique).

Let us suppose that we might have as naïve a trust in phenomenological experience as we have in the natural realm of experience. What does it really yield? If we had not already begun with considerations in the critical attitude, then the task would be to systematically pursue the modes of phenomenological experience. And here, first of all, a doubt occurs: If we perform phenomenological reductions, then we gain individual phenomenological experiences; but is it the case, as it is in regard to nature and, indeed, as it is in regard to the cosmos at large, namely that all experiential givens necessarily converge at the unity of a domain and someday at the domain of a science? The entire world is given through experience, even though it is disclosed on the basis of individual experiences and only via the infinite continuation of possible experiences. The world is the universal region of the universal world-science, and each particular region is the unity of an infinite manifold of possible, particular experiences, and each region provides precisely the unified field for the treatment of a particular science. For example, there is the region of physical nature, and within it there are the forms of unity of space, space-time, etc. Each eidetic science has its region too, e.g., arithmetic has the series of numbers, etc.

What about the various individual experiences that emerge for us as "phenomenological"? How is it with the individual lived experiences which, as pure experiences, we owe to phenomenological perception, retention, remembering, expectation, etc.? Do they not form a disconnected heap? As if it were a matter of course, and corresponding to the "soul" in its psychological sense, we thought of the soul's phenomenological residue in terms of a unified stream of consciousness. But with what justification did we do this? [213]

Here, it is not a question about absolute justification. Often enough, for us external experience becomes unraveled as deception. But as long as external experiences flow on concordantly, they do not give us mere particulars, but connected particulars with a universal horizon

of *this* cosmos. And implied in this is that above and beyond what is experienced, we can, starting from every experiential moment, think the experience endlessly carried on, partly in line with the unobstructed continuation of experience, partly by considering the given possibilities of experience. And in these continua of possible experiences, the universal unity of the world presents itself as experiential, albeit only in anticipation and as a mixture of actuality and possibility. But of this we are certain: However experience may further run its course, however in each case deceptions may be discovered, the infinities of experiences together form a unity of experience, and all particular experiences together form the unity of the world.

How does this relate to the givens of phenomenological experience? Do the givens of phenomenological experiences in essence link up to form a self-contained "world" (as it were)?

Here one must note: From the outset, we have the objective world as world; we know from the start (for we experience the world in this way from the start) that whatever presents itself as real presents itself within the infinite horizon of space, time, and causality. In factual experience, the individual real thing is in principle not given as existing by itself alone. The stock of that which is actually experienced at one time is comprehended within a horizon of experienceability; and if we change the horizon through actualizing experience, the formal structure of the experience remains invariant: ever again a core of actual experience and an open horizon of experienceability.

On the other hand, from the outset we have not constituted a phenomenological world for itself alone. We have the human being in the world and his soul as soul in the world and, together with it, the respective lived body. Only the phenomenological reduction opens up "pure consciousness" for us. Then the question arises as to whether, if we attain this pure consciousness, it, considered *for itself*, constantly points beyond itself to what is like itself. Hence, this question arises too: in establishing pure phenomenological experience, how do we arrive at the consciousness of the universality of this consciousness as a unity, and thus truly arrive at the one all-encompassing "stream of lived experience," which is mine, and which has its characteristic infinite horizon of immanent time, etc. This is dealt with in "the fifth chapter."

APPENDIX VI (XXV) (to §36) [214]

THE INTERSUBJECTIVITY OF THE BODY OF KNOWLEDGE WE CALL NATURAL SCIENCE (1910)

What is true must in principle be knowable for everyone. Every person must be able to come to the conclusion that what has been asserted and justified as true is indeed so, provided that he proceeds correctly, and the person, being endowed with the faculty of intelligence, goes through the pertinent paths of justification.

What exists must be intelligible and must be rationally justifiable. The possibility of rational justification refers to the possibility of intelligence, an intelligent psychic being (I-subject!) that can run through these thought-paths with understanding.

But here a difficulty emerges: Within nature intelligent beings make an appearance as humans, who, as members of nature, are intertwined with the lawful fixedness of the causal nexus. What happens within nature is exactly determined. The acts of cognition, which are manifest among definite actual humans, are determined by circumstances. What occurs has to occur and something else cannot occur. The factual is the necessary, and the necessary is what alone is possible.

How, then, is the character of these connections of exact determinability discernible for every man who is a member of this nature? Does one say, as a matter of fact, only a few exceptional human beings can know nature, albeit with regard to a few particular connections only — and that only these truly know nature? But an ideal possibility of knowledge for everyone does exist, provided that for everyone the ideal possibility exists to attain ideal cognitive dispositions and to walk along ideal paths of knowledge, or insofar as we can entertain the possibility that every simpleton can be replaced by a person of wisdom and by someone who indeed has the necessary premises, experiences, inferences, etc., for all the necessary justifications, and so on.

However, within nature no one can be thought of as being replaced by another *without* changing nature as it actually is, nature as it is supposed to be known. But do we not constantly speak of possibilities of changes that are not actual realities? Do we not consider what would happen if in nature a stone fell down or were thrown against a wall with such and such acceleration, etc.? Does the possibility exist that I shall stand up from here and go somewhere else, although factually I am sitting down right now? Is there no possibility that I could produce a proof now, while in truth I am reading a novel, that I could immerse myself in a proposed philosophical train of thought, whereas in reality I prefer to pass it up without paying any attention to it?

In geometry no possibilities remain open. What is possible in space [215] is what is. That which exists in the geometric realm and what is possible in space are one and the same. In this matter we have to draw a distinction in terms of meaning only if one understands by the "possible" the uncertain: I say, perhaps that is in space (for I do not know it to be so). Now, is not everything in nature which is possible also actual and everything actual identical with the possible? To this one will respond: There is a distinction to be made between the logically possible (*logisch Mögliche*) and the really possible (*real Mögliche*), i.e., the factually possible under the given circumstances. Furthermore, one has to differentiate between what is possible in terms of the generally natural-scientific outlook (the possible in the sense of physics, chemistry, and abstract natural science in general) and that which is possible in terms of the particular individual, the possible according to collocations that factually exist.

"What is logically possible" is here the possible in the sense of the logic of nature (*Naturlogik*), i.e., of the pure science of nature, of the ontology of nature, to which geometry itself belongs. This logic explicates what is contained *a priori* in the idea, the essence of nature, the idea of space, of time, of the spatial–temporal thing, and of the encompassing context of nature. One idea implies more ideas. What is possible is what actually is, and what actually exists is a possibility, i.e., here, an idea.

But does the whole of nature have a definite character in the sense that space and time have such a character? To the extent that the idea of nature prescribes laws of nature, it does not prescribe any *determinate* laws of nature. They are real possibilities (*reale*

Möglichkeiten), selected from the still open possibilities. (Thus, we have an indeterminate, general idea of nature; it contains various specific ideas of nature, which are determined by certain instances of natural lawfulness (*Naturgesetzlichkeiten*), among which there is the singular idea of nature as such, being an individual instance of natural lawfulness.)

But natural lawfulness determines the idea of individual nature in a still incomplete way; all the while it is a form whose content remains open: the collocations. Staying within the logic of nature, within the ontology of nature, I can consider possibilities: namely, possibilities of laws of nature being other than those I have experientially determined. In addition, from within the general natural sciences, I can consider certain possibilities where I do not draw on the facticity of the individual collocations; I modify them. Likewise, one may now say, I can also think that within a particular consciousness, which is connected to a lived body, there are series of presentations and series of cognitive achievements that recognize and accurately recognize nature and ideal matters as well, which I fail to grasp right now.

But now one will argue, the factual collocations and the laws of nature are not unrelated. Rather they are the material contents, the determinations of both the ontological and the real form of nature (*Naturform*). Had we everywhere exhibited these laws in their purity, then they could be individualized by the material contents of individualizing material, in which case all sorts of possibilities would be [216] evident. As when, for example, I conceive an interval of time filled out with such and such temporal material or a geometric construct filled out with material, etc.

But if I conceive a human being with a stream of consciousness, then this is supposed to be tied to a nervous system, to some C,[1] namely in a definite, albeit yet unknown way. And these complexes of physiological facts are also connected to physical processes within the whole of nature, which processes cannot be arbitrary. Rather they must be completely determinate, in order that the physiological processes are possible which in turn make possible the consciousness of

[1] In *Ideen II* (*Husserliana IV*), 291, Husserl uses *C* as a general designation for what is regarded as the respective physiological correlate to a particular state or act of consciousness. — Translators' note.

cognition, as it takes such and such a course. Can I thus say *a priori*: If some nature, or rather, some psycho-physical nature is possible at all, in which human beings appear on the scene, who happen to think, judge, etc., then must it also be possible that in this nature there is a corresponding knowledge of reality itself, the psycho-physical reality?

First of all, there is still the following to be considered. The relation of the thought connections to some C and to what is connected to it is a regular fact. But because it is a mere fact I can abstract from it and imagine a relation of thinking and knowing to a recognized nature without taking account of this fact. For example, I can explore the cognitive relations belonging to the perceived and experienced world of things and the natural laws to which this world is subject, and all this were thinkable without there being a regular connection between that consciousness and C.

Likewise, I can conceive mathematical connections, as they are given in a train of thoughts geared toward producing a proof, without relating these thoughts to some C and to physiology at large.

After all, knowledge is constantly achieved in such a way that I go through certain levels without needing to take into consideration the physiological realm. And on each such level a certain truth holds sway. If not only mathematical but also physical knowledge is achieved without taking into consideration physiology, it also follows that it were thinkable that the linkage of consciousness to some C would not exist at all. Knowledge of the world will be incomplete, if I do not know this and realize it; but a world is possible, indeed a physical world—without there being psycho-physics in the here given sense.

Surely, one can ask: As a matter of principle, is it possible, is it thinkable in principle, that a human being in nature would have all knowledge about the psycho-physical nature? And to this the answer will probably be: No.

Nevertheless, one must first ask, what "all knowledge" is supposed to mean here. Is a world and the human beings belonging to it thinkable, where the human beings, be it on their own or by way of exchanging insights and experiences, gain such knowledge that there is nothing in the world concerning physical and psychical matters [217] and connections in general, which this knowledge does not realize as knowledge? If the neo-Kantians are correct, who look upon "thing"

and "nature" as ideas that can only be determined in an infinite process of knowledge, then there is no empirical intellect and no comprehensive aggregate of such intellects conceivable that would comprehend nature as it ultimately "is."

One could also try the following: Provided that human beings comprehend the external nature and recognize the relations of the psychical to it, then there is an infinity not only with regard to the side of physical nature, but also with regard to the side of the psychical. For if every single thing was to be grasped, if particular or collective knowing were to know all that exists, then it would have to know the knowing itself that is achieved each time, and this would require a new knowing, and so *in infinitum*.

Thus, when we asked, how is some nature possible, some psychophysical nature, such that it was completely knowable in all its individuality, we inquired in a wrong-headed way from the start. Such nature is in principle not thinkable. And this is so not only because some physical nature, as an object of external experience, leaves open in principle infinitely many possibilities for new determinations of things, which can be bounded by a firm limit in the infinite progress of experience only (hence the infinite determinability of things), but also because, although knowledge about the psychical in terms of an individual being is indeed possible, it is in principle impossible as knowledge about every individual psychic factual existence. For that constitutes in principle an infinity, since knowledge will always produce new being (*neues Dasein*).

But now we must ask, what comprises the intersubjective character of objective sciences, of the natural sciences? A piece of knowledge is intersubjective, if in grasping the same thing in principally the same manner it is accessible to many, no matter how many subjects.

Every piece of mathematical knowledge is intersubjective. Everyone endowed with an intuition of space (and, if we consider it ideally, infinitely many individual human beings and psyschic individuals at large, whether they have a human body or not) could pass the same judgments on space and also realize the same justifications on the same intuitive bases.

Likewise, all physical knowledge is intersubjective. But for a different reason. With respect to the knowledge of ideas, as in mathematical knowledge, what is known intersubjectively is something universal.

It belongs to the essence of the universal, i.e., to its ideal universality, that it is indifferent to the plurality of single acts of knowing, irrespective of whether these acts belong to a single consciousness or not. By contrast, the intersubjectivity of physical knowledge is to be found in the fact that we all look at one and the same spatial–temporal world, to which we ourselves, as beings composed of body and soul, belong through our lived body, and to which we mutually and quite reasonably accommodate ourselves through psycho-physical experience (empathy). However, this means that it is part of the essence [218] of the cognition of nature (*Naturerkenntnis*) that this cognition itself is to be fitted in, on the one hand, the contexts of cognitive insights (*Zusammenhängen von Erkenntnissen*) present in the same individual and, on the other hand, the corresponding groupings of contexts of cognitive insights (*Erkenntniszusammenhängen*), namely in such a way that each group belongs to a different individual.

Here is the place to describe the connections that exist between these groups. Each empirical cognitive insight of each human being is related to his lived body and hence to the surrounding area, which has its determinate thisness; and for each individual the lived body of the other belongs in the other's surrounding, and vice versa.

Various individuals can, through the "exchange" of their cognitive insights and their cognitive relations, constitute a common system of coordinates, as for instance, a point on the earth or the sun, etc., and a temporal point that is somewhat determinable by a common measure. Every empirical determination contains, therefore, a relation to a "this," which, at best, is something shared by a group of humans, for example, by all humans on the earth. What is essential is only this: Every group of humans that can be singled out in the unity of nature, or every group of intelligent beings who are in a relation of empathy constitutes some intersubjective knowledge. Each piece of intersubjective experiential knowledge is related to an actual or possible group of intelligent beings who are in a relation of possible empathy. However, in this case, possibility means real possibility (*reale Möglichkeit*).

For example, no real possibility exists to establish a relation of empathy between terrestrial humans and some other "humans" living on a planet millions of light years away from us. Yet that may be a contingent matter. If they were humans like us, a relation of empathy

would be very well conceivable as something that might be produced in the course of the progress of physics. But what do we do, if they and we had completely different senses such that fundamental conditions for the possibility of empathy were not fulfilled? The conditions of the possibility of the identification of the experiences of different individuals must be fulfilled, including the fundamental conditions for the possibility of mutual understanding. Ideally considered, the experiences of human beings one-hundred thousand years ago have intersubjective validity, also with respect to us, even though every factual contact with them is cut off. Yet such contact is in principle conceivable. Nevertheless, empty possibility will not suffice; real possibilities are required. However, all this would call for more precise determinations.

APPENDIX VII (XXVI) [219]

MEMORY, STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS, AND EMPATHY. SELF-REFLECTIONS ON THE MAIN IDEAS OF THE FIFTH AND SIXTH CHAPTERS OF THE LECTURE COURSE, "THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY"

(Winter Semester, 1910–1911)

(Written down at the time of the lectures, November or December, 1910)

The ideas that have guided me there will come out more clearly through the following considerations.

I proceed from some actual lived experience or other, a lived impression which of course is reduced. It is then a Now, something lasting that in any case has its halo (*Hof*) of retention and protention.

1) One may very well assert: In principle the halo can be analyzed with respect to the past. It cannot be the case that in truth nothing preceded the Now; and what preceded the Now can be presentified. By way of actualization I arrive at a steady stream of consciousness, which has been presentified by continuous memories, and thus I arrive at a continuum of past *cogitationes*, each of which has its Now and its halo that can be laid out time and again and in different ways. For each Now I have a new region of what is simultaneous to consciousness (*Bewusstseinsgleichzeitig*) and, likewise, a region of what is past to consciousness (*Bewusstseinsvergangene*), as well as "what is to come" (*Künftig*). Thus it is certain that "my" flow of consciousness contains this constant flow of consciousness which never breaks off, although it is of course not given itself. It only acquires givenness in the form of recollections and subsequent reflections within the recollection.[1]

[1] The last sentences, "Thus, it is certain . . . " to " . . . within the recollection" were later, probably in 1921, crossed out. There Husserl added the following remark: "It is to be noted that in pursuing the halo of recollection in the direction of what has

2) The totality of these streams, to which belongs the actual Now as a flowing boundary, my flowing perceptual presence, contains indeed everything that belongs to me. But all these streams are *one* stream that I can construct from each particular memory. This can be explicated in the following way: Each reduced memory posits a past *cogitatio p*, being precisely "mine."[2] First of all, it must be said that each particular memory *claims to posit* a past *cogitatio*. If the latter [220] is valid, a continuous succession of recollections, passing down the respective *cogitationes* to the actually reduced Now,[3] will be possible (and will be motivated). I have then a stream of *cogitationes*, from the *cogitatio p* to the actual *cogitatio a*. Of course, *preceding p* is that which is required by the index of its past halo. Consequently, to each memory, provided it is valid, there corresponds a continuously endless stream of a consciousness *which contains the actual Now*.[4] Every such stream of consciousness is mine.

3) Hence a particular memory does not posit a *cogitatio p* with its halo in isolation; nor does it posit an endless stream of consciousness that is isolated. Rather, it posits a *cogitatio* connected to the Now. If we now have two particular memories which as actualities of the lived experiences of that which is present to consciousness (*Bewusstseinsgegenwart*) are one, it follows that the two respective streams of consciousness (belonging to each of the particular memories), being constructible via disclosing sequences of the respective recollections, are obviously one too. For each such stream belongs to the Now of the

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been, I can establish ever 'new' recollections, therefore I can find for me ever new pasts. But as true as it is that a halo capable of explication always remains, it still must be asked whether a zero-limit must not be assumed. Here, this question is not posed." — Editor's note.

[2] In 1924 or later added: " With all its own past horizons. But not only that. In regard to the fact that the respective futural protentions have been fulfilled in a certain way, each particular memory, qua recollection, has a futural halo, an associative indication of the 'having-been-of-that-which-is-coming-to-be'" (*das Gekommen-gewesene*). — Editor's note.

[3] From every givenness of recollection I can, in the succession of lived experiences, continually disclose the halo of the future of the yet to come that has been and thus steadily advance to the living present. — Husserl's note.

[4] "Continuously endless stream of consciousness that contains the actual Now" changed in 1924 or later to "a continuous stream of consciousness that is disclosable in a continuous actualization. This stream of consciousness contains the actual Now, in which it, so to speak, endlessly comes to an end; endlessly, i.e., in so far as the actual Now, after its own fashion, steadily flows on." — Editor's note.

respective recollections as my present lived experiences, and the two particular memories themselves are presupposed as joined together within one stream.[5] In particular, if I focus a ray of consciousness on the remembered *R* and then subsequently move on to R_1, thereby encompassing both of them in a unity, it follows that I have joined within the actual Now of my ray of consciousness the unity of the two streams of consciousness, into which the recollected *cogitationes* have issued. But two such streams are not two separate lines that meet at a point. Rather, they are *one* stream, *one* filled temporality, to whose essence it belongs that from each later point to each earlier point there is a direct path in the form of direct recollection.[6] Things that are "simultaneous" belong correlatively to the surrounding of the respective other; they are connected within the inseparable unity of one and the same phase of the stream.

4) "Direct" memory[7] — first, the retention, then, direct recollection — corresponds to "*direct*" *expectation* (anticipation of perception).

Apart from the consciousness through which at this moment we find actually given *cogitationes* (which themselves are known "in the flesh" and "now"), we have relations of consciousness to *cogitationes* that are not actually present, not actually now existing: to what has been and will be. Provided that we have them present, as recollected (re-recognized, as it were), or as something pre-recognized (*vorbewusst*), they belong to *us*. To the extent that they were and will be present, they belong to the temporal context of "my" consciousness. [221]

5) *Empathy*, however, does not belong to such modes of "direct" consciousness that presentify my "own" *cogitationes* to me. We can become intuitively aware of certain *cogitationes*, which, when they occur (or have occurred and will occur), are not my *cogitationes* and which do not belong to my pure I.

The gaze, my gaze, can be directed to them, but does not meet them in their *self-being*, but rather in an "*analogy*." In remembering I see the past "again"; I see it itself. However, I do not perceive it

[5] "One stream" later changed to "one consciousness of the present." — Editor's note.
[6] "Recollection," probably around 1921, changed to "experience; for the Now direct perception, for the past direct retention and remembering, for the future direct protention and direct pre-expectation." — Editor's note.
[7] Probably in 1921 "memory" changed to "presentification." — Editor's note.

in its impressional originality (*Ursprünglickeit*). It is not a Now; it was. Wherever I seize something "*itself*" (*etwas* "*selbst*"), there the phenomenological reduction yields an Itself (*ein Selbst*) that belongs to "my" pure consciousness, to my *cogitationes*.[8] Empathy can refer to a Now, but this Now is not something self-given, not something perceived in empathy; it is "objective" as posited now, as "at the same time" as with a self-given Now.

The "itself" signifies originariness (*Originarität*).[9] At any one time, what makes its appearance within the unity of a stream of consciousness appears with originariness,[10] as itself, and in the moment of the Now; and if the Now changes into the past, then it "itself" is and remains a thing of the past.[11] There remains the ideal possibility to cast a special, discerning glance of recollection at it and, "once again," to live through what it is "itself," albeit accompanied by the feature of the consciousness of the once again (*das Nocheinmal*), or, rather, the once-again-as-it-were (*Gleichsam-Nocheinmal*). In this way, the basic feature of the givenness of memory manifests itself, out of which we create our own past.

A second consciousness, a second stream,[12] can never have a memory of something that belongs to the first; it incorporates no consciousness whatsoever that is "direct," that is a grasping of the "itself." In principle, the one and the other consciousness can come into relationship only through empathy, and the temporal relations within the one stream are given differently, nay, they are something different altogether from the temporal relations in the other stream. Within [222] a stream of consciousness, time is, first of all, nothing other than a universal form of all the phases in the stream, of all the lived experiences that will or have been apprehended (as pure *cogitationes*), as being in the *one* stream. But if we speak of "the" time which, as something objective, ranges over the different streams of a plurality

[8] Only memory, namely memory of the past, yields the remembered in the mode of the *Itself*. Even expectation does not presentify the futural *itself* and even less so does empathy (or any pictorial presentation). — Husserl's note.

[9] "Originariness" in 1924 or later changed to "primary or secondary originality." — Editor's note.

[10] "Originariness" in 1924 or later marked with an exclamation point and with the insertion: "i.e., in the mode of consciousness of originality." — Editor's note.

[11] In 1923 or later inserted: "i.e., it has a modified mode of originality in consciousness." — Editor's note.

[12] In 1924 or later inserted: "or correspondingly its I." — Editor's note.

of consciousnesses, then time is a matter of the mediated coordination of the immanent, intrinsic, and characteristic structures being created by and for the same forms of each consciousness, that is, time is a matter of the particular way of gathering within the unity of *one* structure the separate forms and their immanent structures. And the unity of this one structure is no longer the unity of a[13] synthesizing form of the very kind that every consciousness bears in itself, as the form for the various instances of its itself (*Form seiner Selbstheiten*).

"Simultaneity" in my consciousness refers to a definite form of unity.[14] The unity is what comes first here, and what gets united is something that is not self-sufficient, being something that can be united under such a form only. However, the simultaneity which encompasses two diverse streams of a plurality of consciousnesses is nothing less than such an intrinsic unity. *Here a lack of self-sufficiency of what is so connected is out of the question*. Two consciousnesses are phenomenologically coordinated to one another, are related to one another, but are not given to us as one in a steady phenomenological manner, namely as though[15] we would find joined together with the self-given content of one's own consciousness the self-given consciousness of the other consciousness too, thus finding the contents of both consciousnesses, such that we could see both the joined unity and the form, as if they were grounded in the essence of what was joined together.[16] Only within *one* consciousness is there an "authentic" direct seeing, intuiting, and hence a direct seeing of essential connections, as connections of unity, of self-founding, of succession, etc. One stream of consciousness would be thinkable all by itself, i.e., it would be thinkable that every "other" stream of consciousness was crossed out.[17,18]

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[13] In 1924 or later inserted: "originally." — Editor's note.

[14] In 1924 or later inserted: "of my lived experiences becoming conscious in the primal mode of the 'itself' (mode of Now) and in the mode of the past (or more exactly of a steady self-changing continuity of modes)." — Editor's note.

[15] "Namely as though" was crossed out probably in 1921 and above it was written: "originally, intrinsically united." — Editor's note.

[16] At the base is the exemplary simultaneity of my lived embodiment and my interiorities, followed by the simultaneity of the other's lived embodiment with his interiorities, and the other's lived embodiment with my lived embodiment and my external world, etc. — Husserl's note.

[17] In 1924 or later inserted: "that no empathy would be motivated." — Editor's note.

[18] For the problem of the unity of a finite consciousness within the "ownness" or authenticity of a divine all-consciousness, see Appendix XIII. — Translators' note.

In such discussions, fundamental, phenomenological, and essential distinctions come to light: Distinctions between, on the one hand, "direct," "authentic" experience (and more generally speaking, direct intuition, in so far as we must also speak of direct fantasy, *quasi*-experience), that is, between experience (intuition) in the fullest sense, which grasps the "itself," and, on the other hand, empathizing experience or some other experience that presents some objectivity [223] by means of an other "self"-presenting positing (e.g., picturing or analogizing, etc.).[19]

If I envisage *The Roons*[20] and posit it as present, as existing now, then the Now and that which is objective in the Now are in no way self-given. *The Roons* is given to me as something remembered and something past and is now posited as still perduring. But it is not a pictorial consciousness. In any case, its still-existing-now and its being-simultaneous-with the Now of perception — all that is not directly given. This is even more so the case when I think of a city, according to a description. For then I produce a "picture" of the subject matter in my thought. However, this is not a pictorial consciousness in the usual sense: After all, I do not have a posited thing as the bearer of a perceptual (or remembered) subject matter of the picture, etc.

I can let my fantasy roam beyond the actually experienced, I think about what may be "farther afield." Well, certain things, the countryside, towns, etc., will then come into view. The representations are by all means re-presentations, analogizings, etc. And I may have reasons for these positings: Based on experience, I employ seasoned opinions and judgments, yet all that is not the direct experiencing, grasping, seeing of the "itself." Here there is need for key phenomenological

[19] "And, on the other hand, empathizing experience or some other experience that presents some objectivity by means of an other 'self'-presenting positing (e.g., picturing or analogizing, etc.)" was replaced in 1924 or later by: "and, on the other hand, some other kind of experience that is an inauthentic and indirect experience (to which also empathy belongs), where something objective comes to be posited intuitively (through experiencing or fantasizing), yet indirectly posited, namely by means of something else that itself is self-given (or quasi-given) in intuition. The indirect intuition is illustrating, analogizing; in the broadest sense, it is picturing." — Editor's note.

[20] *The Roons* is a restaurant on the Hainberg nearby Göttingen. — Editor's note.

analyses, which must precede everything else; and they are, by all means, essence analyses.[21,22]

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[21] Both preceding paragraphs were changed in 1924 or later and supplemented in the following way: "Thus it is clear that one must make distinctions both within the realm of external experience as well as in the realm of 'natural' intuition. For example, if I envisage *The Roons* and posit it as present, as existing now, then its presence, as it now is, is in no way 'itself' given. Of course, *The Roons* itself is given to me as something recollected, hence given in one or the other memorial past. But that is not all. I posit *The Roons* as perduring longer than these pasts and as still enduring. In any case, there is to be found in this still-being-there-now a being-simultaneous-with the other things originally given to me in perception, and, first among them, are my lived body and my corporeal sensible surroundings. But the Now of the Hainberg itself and this simultaneity are not originally self-given. This elucidation here is rather complicated and very important. In any case, it is clear that the pre-positing (*Vor-setzung*) in consciousness of the 'still'-enduring includes a kind of 'calling up certain re-presentations *according to*' the past (therefore in the mode of what itself is given), therefore a kind of picturing.

The following example is applicable here: I think for myself a 'representation,' a 'picture' of a city, according to a description. This is not the usual sense of a pictorial consciousness (a picturing), although it has a close kinship to it and has something essentially similar to it. That which I fashion thereby as a representation [224]
(a represented object) is an 'analogue,' a symbol of similarity for the object itself, which for me is inaccessible and unknown, being a more or less clear *picture* in which the described unknown object 'presents' itself, makes itself appear.

Likewise: I can let my imagination roam beyond what is actually experienced by entertaining certain ideas concerning, for example, what a thing looks like, beyond what might be known of it in experience, how it will develop in the future, etc. Such ideas are, in turn, analogizings, picturings, not mere representations of phantasy, but analogical transformations of experience and yet they are 'positing' representations. They are, of course, motivated, based on experience and pre-indicated through horizons of experience. On the other hand, the distinction is clear between these transformations of indirect experience and the original, direct experiences. Every representation via indications (*Anzeige*) and signs (*Zeichen*), which signify factual existence, is a part of this. Just as soon as I make intuitive the empty anticipation, the intuitive has the character of an analogizing, a picturing.

Nevertheless it is also clear that *every expectation* and *every consciousness of horizon* have a place here. Of course, empty co- and pre-consciousness is not picturing consciousness, by which we understand an intuitive consciousness. But it belongs to the essence of the empty consciousness to let itself be intuitively actualized (whereby synthesis of identification, consciousness of sameness takes place). This actualization (filling in the widest sense) is accomplished in the achievement not of the intuition of what was emptily pre- or co-meant *itself*, but rather in the picturing pre-intuition as such in which — according to the delineated features — the expected or co-meant 'presents' 'itself,' 'makes itself appear.'" — Editor's note.

[22] For the explications of this Appendix (*VII*) and the main text as well, to which this Appendix relates, see also Appendix VIII (XXVII). — Editor's note.

APPENDIX VIII (XXVII) [224]

EMPATHY AS APPERCEPTION AND APPRESENTATION. EMPTY INTENTION, INTUITIVE ILLUSTRATION, AND FULFILLMENT IN EMPATHY. SUPPLEMENTS FROM THE SUMMER SEMESTER 1921 TO THE APPENDIX VI (XXVI),"MEMORY, STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS, AND EMPATHY"(November or December, 1910) FOR THE LECTURE COURSE, "THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY (1910–1911)"

In all of these tentative considerations about empathy, sufficient attention has not been given to the following: Empathy is a kind of "apperception," or, as we also may say, a kind of appresentation. Appresentation belongs to every apperception. The spatial-thing apperception is a concrete apperception, apperception of a *concretum*, and, being a simple apperception, it is not founded on any other. Empathy (apperception of a human being) has already a basis in concrete apperception that founds it, and it adds an appresentation of interiority, intellectuality (*Geistigkeit*), which is unperceived and unperceivable by the respective experiencing I. But this, like all appresentation (in which context also belongs the appresentation of a familiar objective surrounding to a perceived objective context, for instance, the anteroom of an already seen room, etc.), originally comes about as an *empty intention*, i.e., as an intention of expectation (taken in [225] a broad sense). In all such intentions, making intuitive illustrations (*Veranschaulichung*) is essentially something that follows afterwards, and intuitive illustration as such is not a filling intention, but just that, namely, intuitive illustration, to whose essence it belongs not to bring that "itself" to intuition that is illustrated. However, in empathy, it belongs to the essence of the appresentation that it in principle cannot find fulfillment through an original presentation of what is psychical

(*von Seelischem*), but rather the fulfillment once again comes to pass via psychical appresentations and in conjunction with parallel sensory presentations (at play in the lived bodily expression). The sensory presentations here essentially complete the filling intention in a presentative way. There are appresentations, being defined by the regional essence structure of animal "soul" and of "intellectuality," which are appresentations of what is "interior," "subjective," and what is "by way of" externalizing expression, and these appresentations take their course in such a manner that, in each phase of the process, they require more or less determinate new appresentations through new expressions. Then the fulfillment comes about through changes in the mimetic outward expressivity that occur in the lived body in a presentative manner, which confirm the required appresentations in real ones. These really appresented expressions stir up new requests, which are "confirmed" by way of mimetic or linguistic expressions. That is, they are confirmed, provided that what is "required" by the appresented will be given through appresentation, namely through further empty intentions (which themselves, however, are not really proper appresentations).

We can also say that, taken together, the perceptually given other lived body (given to me in "exteriority") and the appresentation of what is its foreign interiority (where the appresentation proceeds in accordance with what is specifically of the order of the lived body on the one hand, and what is specific to the I on the other hand) — we can say that the two together function as the *perception* of the human being over there. And this perception is an "incomplete" one, being constantly *open*, since of this human being there and, especially, of his interiority this perception expresses only a few things (being precisely what is "properly" and "actually" appresented), whereas the rest remains indeterminately open, or else refers to what is known through preceding "perceptions," being that which is "co-perceived." "The rest," however, is an undetermined halo, informed by the essential type of a concrete interiority, of an I and its surrounding, appearing in such and such a way. This halo essentially includes mediated intentions within a multiplicity that can be "fleshed out" in terms of possibilities, thus being in reality a continuity of mediated intentions. The more precise determination and fulfillment of these mediated intentions is accomplished by way of proper appresentation, which also yields confirmation for the already appresented intentions. And the

same holds for what is already known about the other I. If in regard to an external thing we speak about the authentically and inauthentically perceived (the back side, etc.), then the inauthentically perceived is similarly a positing through an empty horizonal intention, but where, provided what is perceived is in motion, certain directed empty intentions manifest themselves too. But these are anticipations of what is yet to come, of what is coming for perception, as an ongoing activity; therefore these are pre-expectations that, as such, are pre-fulfillments, as it were, and they find their actual and authentic fulfillment in perception only. On the other hand, they are *appresentations of objects*, being still unfilled and in need of being filled. In empathy, however, the appresentation itself belongs to that which comprises the "authentic" perception. Empathy, as perception of what is *animated*, has its type of fulfillment in the manner sketched above. It is, therefore, very curious that the perception of a human being standing over there is, or at the very least can be, a perception of him without any intuition of his interiority, without even a presentifying intuition. We have yet to study the employment of that intuition that is indicated in the empty intention. If someone, right before my eyes, burns or cuts himself, or else when he gets news of something that I overhear, which results in his emotional suffering, etc., we feel immediately with him (in a feeling-with that is not, in the usual, completely different sense, feeling-with, sympathy) — or at least so it seems. What kind of "intuitive illustration" is this? It does seem somewhat similar to an expectation, as when I, rushing ahead to a coming event, fashion for myself a vivid representation of that which is going to happen. For instance, I expect lovely weather and in my phantasy I anticipatorily see the landscape before me as a lovely day, or I expect the stroke of the bell and anticipatorily "in my phantasy" it begins to strike. This is not a "sketching out of details" as in the cases where I analogically make for myself a "picture" of how something could come about, where the expectation is very indefinite, leaving open many similar figures and forms as possibilities and where, in a general fashion, I mentally sketch out a probable course and think, it will happen in a way somewhat "similar" to this. But in those other cases where the expectation is something determinate I have a representation of what is expected, with the determinate content of what is expected, and yet it is not given in the mode of the "itself," which is exclusively characteristic of perception and memory. [226]

APPENDIX IX (XXVIII) (to §39) [227]

THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE TIME OF ONE'S OWN CONSCIOUSNESS WITH THAT OF THE OTHER CONSCIOUSNESS. THE OTHER I'S IN THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION. NATURE AS INDEX FOR EMPATHIZED SYSTEMS OF EXPERIENCE AND AS CONDITION FOR THE MIRRORING OF MONADS.

(Reworking of the text at p. 85, line 8, to p. 86, line 32 of the lecture course "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology" from 1910–1911)

(probably from 1921)

But the objection may be raised that the act of empathy (*Einfühlungsakt*) and the empathized act (*eingefühlter Akt*) belong to the same time, which fact is registered in consciousness itself. Empathy posits what is empathized (*das Eingefühlte*) as now and posits it as being the very same Now as itself.

However, here one must take note of the following. In other contexts too, there exists a Now that is presentified, which is not recalled at the same time. Thus, there is a Now that is posited in a presentification but not in the manner of an itself, although it is posited as being the same as the actual Now, as for example, if I now presentify *The Roons*.

Thus, the empathized Now is also a presentified Now, but a Now not seen itself in presentification. Further, the one does not belong to the "surrounding" of the other, and vice versa. Also, no possible way of continuity leads from the one to the other, whereas there is such a way leading from what is presentified in memory to the actual Now. The time given in empathizing, if it is a question of empirical empathy (i.e., occurring in the natural attitude), is a time (ordered as now, a short while ago, past, and still-to-come) which is empirically posited, namely as the very same objective time (in the same manner of order) that belongs to the proper consciousness of the one empathizing,

and thus belongs to his empirical world of things given to him in external perception. This identification is mediated through the correlation of both I's to the objective time of their respective lived bodies and the world of things: my consciousness is simultaneous with my lived body and my world of things, in which the other lived body (i.e., that which is understood as lived body in empathy) is to be found, and to his lived body belongs consciousness attributed to it by empathy, etc.

But now let us perform the *phenomenological reduction*.

I, who in the natural attitude find myself vis-à-vis another lived body and another I-subject, which is related to the same surrounding as my own, perform the phenomenological reduction, which yields the following: When the natural objects, which I have experienced, are subjected to bracketing and reduction they yield certain subjective connections of consciousness along with the pertinent systems of motivated possibilities of consciousness. Accordingly, among the natural [228] objects in my surrounding, the present other lived body is reduced to a body-thing (*Körper*).[1] The apperception, however, through which the body is constituted for me, is connected to appresentations. And they are connected by way of a legitimating motivation, in the unity of a self-legitimating apperception of a higher level ("apperception of a human being"). On this higher level is posited a human being and, through empathy, a second I. The second I regards internally this other animated body over there as his lived body. And organized around his lived body, which is given to him by impressions, he looks at a particular part of nature, which is the very same for me, although to him it is given in different forms, through which it appears, and through other forms of consciousness.

It is now clear that if (as has been specified in these lectures) we understand by the phenomenological reduction the "disconnection"

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[1] *Reduziert sich . . . der fremde Leib als Körper.* This statement is not problematic if taken to mean that what is reduced is the body as some real thing existing in the world. But it also could mean that *Leib* is reduced and appears as a body-thing. In this case it suggests that the doxastic disengagement of the presence of the other *Leib* results in a *Körper.* This would surely go against Husserl's teaching that the reduction does not effect a new way of seeing-as; what is manifested is not changed in its objective content. The sentence immediately following this one only partially undoes this confusion, in so far as it suggests that there is first given a body-thing, upon which then are superimposed motivations for appresentations of a person. — Translators' note.

of nature given experientially to "my" I, and if we understand "me" as the subject of empathy, then that which is left for me with respect to nature's correlate is not only the system of actual and motivated possible experiences, namely *my* experiences, but also the *co*-bracketed nature, i.e., the very same nature, namely as it is given within the empathized other I, as this nature is reduced to the experiences of this other I and the possible system of his experiences. Hence "nature" as such is not only an index for my system of possible experiences of nature, being connected with the momentary and changing core of actual experiences of nature, *but it is also an index for corresponding systems of experiences of the other I's, which through empathy are eo ipso empathized systems.* And just as nature in general, so every single thing of nature is such an index. And the index is as manifold as there are other I's given to me in empathy. And in "indirectly imagining" that one or the other of these I's encounters a number of fellow men, whom I do not encounter, and have not encountered, I also think and recognize that one and the same nature is experienced by each and everyone of these people. In the phenomenological reduction (that *I* exercise), nature "as such" is an index for all the pure I's as correlated to all human beings, that is, it is an index for the systems of possible experiences belonging to them as the I's of human beings.

I can also say and recognize: Every other I that I can experience — it can be experienced because in the realm of nature of my possible experiences there is a thing that can present itself as its lived body, hence it can become a substrate of empathy — can exercise phenomenological reduction, yielding in principle the same for it as what it has yielded for me.

Just as "nature" is such an index, so is of course every other point of space, every other point in the objective space of nature an index, namely for a certain coordination of the subjective appearings of nature and their order, as they are related for each I to its zero-point in the lived body. And again, each objective temporal point and each objective "simultaneity," which puts my actual Now in relation to every past and future Now, as it likewise does for all other I's, is an index for [229] a definite lawful coordination that, so to speak, relates every monad to every other. And it does this in regard to completely determinate motivations and connections of consciousness that are correlative and

intertwined. Any possible empathy is the "mirroring" of each monad in the other, and the possibility of such mirroring depends on the possibility of a concordant constitution of a spatial–temporal nature, of an index for the respective constitutive lived experiences, which index extends into all I's.

APPENDIX X (XXIX) (to §39)

THE MEDIATION OF MINDS THROUGH LIVED EMBODIMENT
(probably from 1912)

How would it be possible to think the reality of the mind, the I-subject, without a lived body? In such a case, all groups of sensory impressions would have to be present, that is, both the specific sensory impressions of the lived body (sense impressions), which are not taken as apperceptions that represent external properties of things, and the sensory impressions, which are taken as such apperceptions, excepting only those impressions through which the lived body is presented as a physical thing. Of course, the entire factual world cannot remain the same, for lived bodies as things are themselves something, and they exercise effects or experience effects of a physical kind. Everything belonging to this bodiliness would have to be eliminated.

Yet the entire physical world (for the most part, at least according to its type) is to remain as it is and is to be experienced and to be constantly experienceable in exactly the same way as before. The touching motions (*Tastbewegungen*), the sensations of touch (*Tastempfindungen*) with which I build up the awareness of a touched thing in accordance with its respective properties are there and run their course according to the same rules. The same can be said for the muscle sensations that serve motivations, etc. However, there are just no muscles here, no touching fingers and, in general, there is no lived body at all.

Yet I am able to move things at will, not through my hand, but how? (I am able to touch something at will by voluntarily letting the motivating muscle-sensations run their course, upon which for the subsequent changes in the visual object a certain course of tactile sensations and apperceptions will be given.) I move the thing by touching it, by "grabbing" it, and by shoving it away with certain

sensations of exertion and willpower. Thus I would have my entire lived body as one that senses, feels, and wills, but no physical lived body! There would be none that I myself can see, that would be given to me as a thing, and that would effect its surroundings as a thing. Hence it would be a "spirit" (*Geist*), a ghost (*Gespenst*) (which, however, could not even appear in the manner of a ghostly shadow).

But what if I, who have a lived body, were touched or pushed away, [230] etc., by such a spirit without a lived body?

Now, if what happens to be my lived body, as a physical thing, is the same thing as what is to be touchable by the other, this identity would entail that my series of appearances and the corresponding ones of the spirit constituted the same thing, and this identity required recognizability, required intersubjective recognizability, hence the possibility of reciprocal understanding. If the spirit has the same series of tactile sensations and visual series, etc., as I have, then the spirit will possess the appearance and, possibly, the experience and experiential givenness of exactly the same thing, having exactly the same look to it, having exactly the same feel to it, etc., except for the specific embodiment of course, which must be excluded for the spirit. *But here identity can have no meaning*. If I, on the other hand, sense a series of tactile sensations that are parallel with that of the spirit, i.e., exactly the same, without it being the case that I myself touch me, then, of course, I would suppose someone to be there who is touching me (like in darkness, where I cannot see the one touching me). But if I do not see the other one, then I will say, I am having hallucinations. Likewise, when upon being touched I see the one touching me at the same time, but now, in the attempt to touch him, reach through the colored "ghost" — for that is what he is — then I will say, it does not exist.

In the factual world, embodiment facilitates the communication of the minds of these bodies, that is, the communication of all human beings with respect to their "inner lives." But is communication conceivable otherwise than through lived bodies? Each particular stream of consciousness is something completely separate, a monad, and it would remain without windows of communication if there were no intersubjective phenomena, etc. This is also the condition for the possibility of a world of things that is one and the same for many I's.

APPENDIX XI (XXX)

CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE IDEAS OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION, AS WELL AS THE AUTONOMY AND THE CONNECTION OF MONADS IN THE LECTURE COURSE "THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY" (1910–1911) (probably from 1921)

Here is the place to call attention to the basic idea which pervades the whole series of lectures: In the phenomenological reduction I do not pass judgments on nature, on the selfsame objectivity, being given to me in experience, but on the experience, its connections, and the pure consciousness in general. I pass judgment on that which in the motivation making up experience is the rightfully given for the [231] pure phenomenological, noetic-noematic reflection. I have an original right to expect noetically[1] that although I am now experiencing this ink bottle in such and such a way, from *these* sides, from *these* perspectives, or put most generally, in such and such manners of appearing, I would have such and such new manners of appearing, if I were I to turn my eyes this or that way, etc. I have a right to trust each empirical expectation, namely in terms of a purely noetic[2] regard for the subjective appearings to come. Likewise, I have an original right in terms of the noetic[3] regard for the givens of memory, namely to have trust in the reality of the former[4] consciousness. We have a right to trust every such original right (*Urrecht*); every right leads back to such original rights. To be sure, we do not mistrust the natural positing of experience either; but it depends on us to make use of it and to judge

[1] "Noetically" in 1924 or later replaced by "in the framework of pure transcendental phenomenological experience." — Editor's note.
[2] In 1924 or later "noetic" replaced by "phenomenological." — Editor's note.
[3] In 1924 or later "noetic" replaced by "transcendental." — Editor's note.
[4] In 1924 or later inserted "transcendental." — Editor's note.

in accordance with this orientation. External experience as such has a lawful directedness to the object. But it also permits a reflection through which the system of the intentions that (rightfully) aim at one another legitimately comes into view. It is our interest now to pursue the connections that rightfully exist in pure subjectivity. If I thus disconnect nature, there appears in empathy a rightful connection in terms of:

1) The connection within the subject of empathy, the system of his immanent life and, therein, the constitutive system for the nature that is experienced in it. Within this pure subjectivity and within the context of what emerges through the reduction, the *ego* in the Cartesian sense, there also appears the respective empathy with the pertinent appresentation of the other subjectivity, which is based on the experience of the other lived bodiliness.

2) Through the reduction of this latter experience, the appresentation is proven to be motivated by the motivational system "other lived body" that is given in the *ego*. The other subjectivity posited in this appresentation does not fall victim to the reduction, and it is not an index for a system of appearings either. Rather it has, as other subjectivity, its own system of appearings. The subjectivity here is not posited as an other human being within nature, which he and I experience, but rather as other *ego* "related to nature," i.e., as an other *ego*, it has certain constituting systems of appearings in itself, which stand in motivational connections with those systems of appearings that can be manifested in me; and they also stand in connection with the rightful identification of what is one and the same intentionally and rightfully posited thing.

Consequently, I have a pure connection *in* my *ego*, but also a connection *of* my *ego* with the other *ego*, which remains in existence for me, i.e., it is not disconnected. In the natural worldview there is nature in itself and, in it, all minds are minds of lived bodies, minds psycho-physically joined to lived bodies. I myself am a mind, the soul of my lived body. And because the lived body functions for me as an organ of perception, I gather experiences through it about things from all over the world and about all other lived bodies and minds. [232]

In the present phenomenological attitude, I find myself as a pure I and I find my stream of lived experiences, wherein is constituted the spatial-temporal nature that spreads out endlessly. And I find this

nature, on the one hand, in terms of an identical, real meaning in the manifold of subjective appearings and, on the other hand, in terms of an intentional rule for further appearings, being an idea that reaches out into infinity. And the idea's actual validation in regard to its content becomes manifest by way of approximation and according to probability (principles of induction). This unity of meaning is contained in the noetic manifoldness,[5] which has its corresponding connection in the systematic cohesion of my subjective appearings. And now I find in the phenomenological attitude not only this systematic context of "expectation" and the context of my entire stream of lived experiences, but also yet another intentionality, which, being in other respects analogous to expectation, is nevertheless not like expectation, although it is intertwined with systems of expectation. This intentionality is one which "connects" my I and its stream to another I and its stream, or, to put it differently, it relates my I through a rational, consistent positing consciousness to a certain other I and its stream of lived experiences and its constituted nature, which has been constituted in its systems of actual and possible expectations, where, however, this nature, this valid, ontic meaning must be necessarily identical with the nature experienced by me.

Considered *absolutely*, there is only the *ego* and its life. And this is "connected to" the other *ego* and its life. And this connection is produced by means of, on the one hand, the constituted nature, which constitution belongs to both I's and, and on the other hand, the bestowal of meaning in these constitutions. This bestowal of meaning, which is constantly confirmed as "existing," leads to an identity of meaning and being, which every I must recognize in relation to that which, through empathy, is given to it of the other person's nature. The In-itself of nature has thus its sense in this intentional identity. Considered *absolutely*, there is nothing besides mind and there is no other connection than that of mind. But there are connections of a certain kind that tie together the non-independent moments of *a single* mind. Among these are immanent connections, which constitutively join together that which, although included in the mind, is [233]

[5] "This unity of meaning is contained in the noetic manifoldness" in 1924 or later replaced by "This unity of meaning is contained as νοητόν in the systematic manifoldness of actual and possible transcendent experiences." — Editor's note.

alien to the I (the hyletic in the original consciousness of time). These immanent connections produce apperceptions of nature and concordant systems of nature and, therein, secure nature as truly existing in itself. But there is also a connection of independent minds through empathy — which we already described.

The connection of independent, absolute essentialities ("substances") is possible only if the independence of those that are thus bound together is not cancelled out. The independence, however, lies in the following. On the one hand, there is indeed a factual connection, provided that the two monads can "accommodate each other," namely in accordance with a rule impressed on both of them, and that they can encounter each other as minds through empathy and reciprocal understanding, and that they can mutually influence each other by mental motivation, and that what occurs to the one, or what the one thinks, feels, etc., can be relived by the respective other through appresenting presentification (hence "representation") and can thus become a motivation.[6] On the other hand, all this does not rob the monad of its independence. For relating-to-one-another and accommodating-each-other in ego activity and ego passivity depend on a particular facticity: In its existence, each monad is not dependent on the other monads. Each monad would continue to exist, and the I would remain this I, even if the world ceased to exist; and this I could have been there, even though nature had not or could not have constituted itself in this I. To that extent *Leibniz* is right when he says that the monads correspond to the Cartesian rigorous concept of substance — if this meant nothing other than this: a being is independent if it is demonstrable that changes in the one substance do not intrinsically require changes in the other.

More questions arise here: Can several I's exist and be completely isolated from one another? Furthermore, if the idea of some nature, originating in the subject's meaning-giving act, signifies a universe of subjects, who are able to communicate with one another; and if the ideas about an absolute universe of a possible community of I's and an all-encompassing nature and on objective world are inseparable from this I, then must there exist only *one* absolute universe of "monads" and one objective world, or could there exist a plurality of

[6] See also the specific I-You acts. — Husserl's note.

such universes or worlds? Is it a sufficient argument for the singularity of the world that several worlds, several absolute universes, would have to be recognizable and that therefore, at the very least, one I would have to be possible as the coexisting correlate of this plurality, and that for this I the possibility to recognize the plurality would have to be secured?

A further question is this: The given nature is a fact for an I. Must it be the case, however, that for every I it is possible that some nature is constituted genetically? What does the possibility of an I signify anyhow? The unity of a stream of consciousness has its essential structure. But this highest idea, i.e., of the stream of consciousness, does not confer a definite character upon the particular stream, which [234] flows into the infinite. What is the relation of the intrinsic necessities, as necessities of a highest genus, to the possibility of what has individual existence? What precisely are these necessities (conditions for the possibility) of the individual existence vis-à-vis necessities pertaining to the genus? For then the singular fact alone is left over, i.e., the fact in its singularity, being eternally irrational. Further, is it possible that in the Absolute one monadic being is independent from every other, for, although each monad is essentially an independent substance, must they not, as facts, be in a relation to one another, in "harmony"? And that leads again to a common world and to nature in the first place.

But what is most important in the course of these lectures is the contribution to the doctrine of phenomenological reduction. In the *Ideas*, I developed it in terms of the reduction to the *ego*, as a Cartesian reduction, and I operated with the possibility of the non-being of nature. Indeed, it is an essential possibility that the nature that I experience does not exist, although I am now experiencing it and have experienced it. This yields knowledge about the first absolute being, the *ego* and its absolute indubitability, hence necessity. If one does not consider the existence of the world, if one refrains from any judgment *simpliciter* about "the" world, what comes to the fore for this "one," i.e., for me, who thinks, is my pure I and my pure *cogito*, my stream of lived experiences. If I move on to the pure investigation of essences, then this necessary fact gives me the opportunity for that kind of pure transpositions into possibilities, which, as pure possibilities, comprise the realm of eidetic research. However, I can not yet say

that this piece of essential knowledge concerning the I and the stream of lived experiences in general would already contain the founding of the possibility of a *plurality of I's* and of a concept of the I, which would have a vast or infinite extension, an extension in the form of an open plurality of compossible I's. Or rather, this is first of all a problem. Perhaps there can exist only *one* I and a plurality is unthinkable: If I have disconnected the world, I at any rate no longer know that there are several human beings and thus several pure I's. The immanent investigation of the essence of the *ego* as "one" *ego* includes the research into the sense-giving and evidence-giving of deliberative reason, as they become manifest in "thinking" or "representing." Among the instances of transcendent sense-giving, in particular, in the form of "external perception," there are, besides the perception of bodies, the perception of animals and the perception of human beings too, i.e., that which I rather poorly called "empathy," or somewhat better, "empathizing perception." On the other hand, we have the immanent sense-givings, the sense-givings or perceptions in which "the subjective" comes to givenness, and this leads to a comparative consideration with the empathizing perceptions, which in turn leads to the recognition that the examination of evidence-giving manifests a right for immanent consciousness, but also for empathized consciousness. [235]

Further, transcendent physical reality, as for instance corporeal reality, is only a correlate of a unity of manifold appearances. It is a unity solely by dint of the sense-giving that comes to pass within the lived experiences of consciousness. The unity of the I is a completely different unity; the unity of the person has an analogy with the unity of the thing, and yet it is distinct from it.

What is essential about empathy is that, in the phenomenological reduction, if we grasp it as a reduction to pure consciousness, empathy goes beyond the stream of consciousness of the *ego* to present the other pure *ego* and its stream of consciousness through appresentation, and that the being of this stream is not dependent on the sense-giving that is achieved by another I and its stream, but rather it is a being that is "in itself and for itself and conceived through its own being." It is, however, a being, which is grasped by others through empathy, albeit by way of mediation through transcendent sense-giving.

APPENDIX XII (XVII of No. 5) [90]

REFLECTION ON THE RELATION BETWEEN THE SECOND, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND THE THIRD, HUMANITIES-BASED, PATH TO PURE CONSCIOUSNESS. THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE MOTIVATION OF THE MIND AND THE CONTEXTS OF MOTIVATION OF INDIVIDUAL MINDS. (around 1910)[1]

On the second path[2] I proceed from the natural-scientific attitude.[3] Natural science wants to be a science of nature, a science of all nature in general, which includes the merely material bodies as well as *zoa*, "psychic beings." In all areas of the one nature, natural science wants to grasp existing entities as something necessary, i.e., as lawfully and exactly determined. The individual thing is taken according to its being thus and so, as a particularization of an exact law. If we look more closely at how that is possible and how that is meant, we come upon the idea of the all-reality, to which every natural-scientific object is subordinated. Everything that in terms of nature is real or actual is dependent on the other actual realities. The [91] dependencies involve parts of reality, dealing with reality as a context of disjunctive realities; each real being is integrated within a system whose elements belong together in such a way that each change of an

[1] The manuscript pages of the following Appendix are at the Husserl Archives, albeit in several manuscript bundles having different cataloging numbers. Originally, they probably constituted, in conjunction with other pages, one individual whole. — Editor's note.

[2] The Cartesian path (cf. *Husserliana II–III*) is the prerequisite for the first-path to pure consciousness. — Editor's note.

[3] Friedrich Jodl: Mind is rooted in nature; it is propped up, born by nature. Mind itself is a piece of nature. Consider also further: the humanities; just as in relation to the scientific objects, i.e., nature and mind, so in relation to the methods no exclusive oppositions exist, e.g., lawful sciences and historical sciences. All sciences are ordered. . . — Husserl's note.

element brings about functional changes in others, in accordance with strict laws (in physical nature these are laws of a mathematical form). Such interconnections pervade the entire world and provide it with its substantial-causal, i.e., real unity. Everything that is, just as it is, is in relation to "circumstances," etc.

Natural science attempts to lay out the laws of these dependencies and to make available the particular methods, which at any rate result from the methodological justification of the laws, in order to work out the causal analysis for every concrete fact of nature in its concrete surroundings, that is, to relate the concrete subject matter to the determining components of the circumstances to which it belongs or to which it is causally connected, such that the subsumption under the law and, through it, natural-scientific "explanation" can be achieved.

Thus the human being with his inner life is nature too; and this nature, which by the way is nothing isolated, just as no part of nature is, poses the problem of the law of nature, the causal analysis, and causal explanation. Psychology as a natural science wants to solve this problem.

If we grant this, then it belongs to the "nature" of the human being that he, among other things, "thinks" (*cogitat*), that he has intentional experiences, and that these come into consideration for the natural scientist as facts of the natural object, the human being, just as for the physicist comes into consideration that water has the properties of a freezing point and boiling point, being dependent on air pressure. The psychical state belongs to human nature, meaning that it is one of its causal properties: Through the changing psychical states, the human being, i.e., what he is, is exactly determinable by causal laws.

If one assumes all this, it is easy to see that the psychic states, which in experience can come to actual givenness, have to be considered, described, and classified, albeit without considering their causal function for the time being. From this starting point, one then proceeds to the doctrine of the essence of the human being (taken in a causal context), to the doctrine of the essence of pure consciousness.

In contrast to this, I propose that we assume the subjective attitude.[4] I consider the I-relations of the bearers of consciousness. I consider

[4] "Subjective attitude" is no longer clearly legible in the manuscript; the expression was later erased and replaced with "egological, personalist attitude." — Editor's note.

human beings as subjects of *cogitationes*, and I consider the world as a world for subjects, namely *as it is found in advance by them* and as it is known to them, as it could be found in advance in further "experience" (how it is an intentional object). In this consideration, I myself connect [92]
5 the relevant facts of these circumstances in such a manner that I include all that which I describe in this world, which I intuitively find, and which I share with the human beings described, etc., as *our* common environment, which we find around ourselves as something that lends itself to intuition and something we are constantly capable
10 of intuiting.

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I am positing now other I's, other minds, and I do this, of course, through interpretation (*Hineindeutung*).[5] Other I's are I's like I myself, and they are subjects of their *cogitationes*; and vis-á-vis themselves they have a world (the same world); and they have their lived body as a
15 field of localisation of their sensations and sensible feelings or drives, and as an organ of their will. In my *cogitationes* I myself am "attuned" to these I's being subjects of their *cogitationes*, in particular, in acts of my position-takings, of love, of pity, etc., in acts of communication, and acts made possible by (those that presuppose) communication,
20 acts of commanding, etc. Likewise, the other I-subjects have a stock of such *cogitationes* attuned to their *socii* and to me as well. (As I am engaged in this interpretation, I am so motivated that I have to ascribe this to them.) These relations — the relations of life — which, through these acts, are brought forth between all subjects of mind,

[5] It would seem that here (1910) Husserl has not yet settled on the term *Einfühlung*, empathy, for the way we make present other I's, other self-awarenesses. Yet, cf. the body of these lectures on "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology" (1910–1911) where Husserl seems comfortable with "empathy." The German word, *Hineindeutung* suggests an act of delving within, as does *Ein-fühlung.* "Apprehension" or "interpretation" suggests misleadingly that it is an *Auffassung*, a perspectival way of taking something in the world. Yet it is a *Deutung* and suggests some parallels, problematic as they might be, with an interpretation of some thing. For Husserl empathy opens up the framework for various interpretations of persons, just similar to the way apprehension or interpretation (*Auffassung*) sets the framework for various interpretations of things and texts. — Translators' note.

signify that each I, each "mind" knows itself as a member of a "spiritual" world and at the same time knows itself as a subject vis-à-vis a world of things. However, other minds confront me in a quite different manner than things. Things confront me as lifeless objects; minds are present to me as addressed or addressing me, as loved or loving me, etc. I do not live in isolation; I live with them a common, integrated life, in spite of the separation of subjectivities. Things are inanimate and they attain an intellectual significance only as esteemed, handled things, etc. And in this regard, they attain a shared intellectual significance, namely as things that are or can be evaluated jointly, as things that can be dealt with jointly, as things that serve a shared purpose, etc. Thus I can take things as objects, but I also can take them as substrates of mental acts, as what they signify for minds, being that upon which minds confer significance. I can take them exclusively as intentional correlates of social consciousness, as they are present in emotions, positive and negative social attitudes (or possibly the refraining from such attitudes). As such they belong to the world of mind. The mind-world is a world of minds, that is, a unified, common intellectual life (*gemeingeistiges*)[6] of individual minds. But the I is only possible if the I is related to something; and all I-ness or mindedness is related to the non-I, to something non-minded, which nevertheless has a character of mindedness to it, namely by being the mind's correlate and by being the non-I that has been posited and esteemed by the I. The non-minded thing belongs, precisely as a correlate, to mindedness, being an essential mode of it. [93]

Furthermore, we must add: Lived bodies are things, and they have their objective properties that one can explore in a natural-scientific way. In the present attitude we must say: *Lived bodies belong to the world of mind*. For one thing, they belong to it just like other things belong to it, namely as something intellectually significant, as having received significance through mind. On the other hand, they belong to it in a distinctive way. And seen from that perspective, a kind of significance accrues to them, which sets them apart from all other things. All lived bodies are not only bearers of sensations, etc., and

[6] *Gemeingeist, gemeingeistiges*, etc., come to be Husserl's technical ways of referring to how a genuine "we" is an analogous "I" and a founded "personality of a higher order" (cf. *Husserliana XIV*, p. 165–232, 404–408). — Translators' note.

"organs" of the mind, but also are "expressions" of the mind and the life of the mind, and as such they are the bearers of significance; they are bearers of meaning for all interpretation, which is the condition of the possibility of social life, being the life of the community. Finally, that they are lived bodies and organs warrants special consideration, in so far as it is for the sake of lived bodies and for the sake of their relation to the intellectual realm that they are distinguished objects for evaluation and for action (evaluation of my lived body and that of the other lived body). Already the consideration that they are organs of the will gives them an original volitional character (and this does not rest on any interpretation) and gives them the feature of mindedness.

We are in the attitude of the mind to the extent that we do not take things, lived bodies, subjects of consciousness as objective matters, but posit the minds as minds, as the I's that we recognize as subjects in relation to objects, yet not as objects, that is, as we find them whenever we want in the *inspectio sui*, and as we posit them in that manner as "other minds" in the interpretive inspection. Furthermore, we are in the attitude of the mind when we take things and lived bodies only for what they give themselves to be in the correlation to minds: as things for the I, or for a community of I's, as objects of value, as legal objects, as products of work, as books, etc. And likewise we are in the attitude of the mind when we take the lived bodies as organs of the I and as "expressions" of their intellectual lives. It is clear that this is a completely different attitude, presenting us with distinctive objectivities, findings, and distinctive scientific disciplines, namely the humanities.

In what sense does "nature" belong to the sphere of the mind? Clearly, first of all, as the nature of which we speak when we talk of a walk in nature, of delighting in nature, in which case no one would think of nature in the sense of natural science.

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Now, I can take an interest in a person purely as a *subject of motivation*; that is, I can take an interest in his inner life, regarding it not as a fact of nature, but as a form of life, namely, in so far (and only in so far) as his I is capable of motivating itself; and I take an [94]

interest in other matters only in so far as they are of importance for the occurrence of motivation in his I.[7] The emergence of motivation is not to be explained in a causal manner, just as little as the deflection from motivation is to be so explained. If someone does not complete the proof sequence embarked upon because he gets a telegram that urgently calls him away, then that is a process of motivation. It is a completely different thing if, for example, lightening strikes his house and he faints. In the latter case, a real "chance event" interrupted him, whereas in the former case one motivation crossed out the other. In the former example, the "*because*" states nothing that would require a causally real explanation. Although it refers to a real fact, it does this only to the extent that the consciousness about this fact is a part of the context of consciousness that makes up the motivation, and to the extent that it becomes clear that a continuation and completion of the motivational contexts surrounding the demonstration of the proof are incompatible with the consciousness about the fact of the interruption by the telegram. Therefore the manifestation of this fact makes *intelligible* the non-completion of the proof. However, in the case of a faulty proof, I do understand the motivation to the extent that I construct the disposition of the motivation and, for example, point to the mix-up that has confused the person doing the proof. A causal explanation demonstrating on what basis the confusion would have to happen has no business here.

Surely, the motivational contexts fall under psychology too, being precisely facts of the objective, spatial–temporal nature that can be determined and explained in psychological terms. And if here essential connections determine the course of possible motivations under the titles of validity and invalidity, evidence and non-evidence, confused and clear motivations, etc., then that is indeed of interest to the psychologists, namely in so far (and only in so far) as the essential characteristics of the states of consciousness are here in question, and precisely *in so far* as the psychologist wants to explain the real facts in their factual existence, as they come to pass among real human beings under given circumstances. It is a fundamentally different

[7] The subject of motivation: Is that not the subject of intentional comportment toward the already constituted (and, on a first-level, naturally constituted) objectivities, precisely of the "surrounding"? — Husserl's note.

viewpoint if one considers the human being as a subject of motivation, and purely as such, and then asks, first, how the person lets himself be motivated by nature, which in his consciousness he apprehends as standing vis-à-vis him, and, second, how he lets himself be motivated by his fellow men, whom he apprehends in such and such a way, and, third, how he lets himself be motivated by social institutions.

The form of the judgments made here is seemingly that of objective judgments: One says: "I let myself be influenced by my friend, I did that because he did that, etc." But, in truth, motivations are not causalities: I did not let myself be influenced by my friend, but rather I am influenced through my presencing of my friend, through my "thinking" him and my "thinking" about his agency. And "to influence" does not mean here "to cause" something in the sense of nature, but to motivate: One instance of "I think" has been motivated through another "I think."[8,9] [95]

Nevertheless, the expression ("to influence") is not without its merit. For in the attitude of motivation I am turned, as it were, to the judgment (not the judging consciousness), to the *S is p* and, on the other hand, to the other judgment, the meant state of affairs. Or I am turned toward the resolution: I want to do this; this is what must happen, because X did this and that! The insufferable person is coming downstairs; I will quickly get out of the way! The mailman is coming; I will go to meet him.

Descriptively, then, this means: He saw the mailman approaching and (hence) went to meet him with the expectation of getting the mail, or alternatively, he decided to immediately meet him. In a complete description we will name the acts of consciousness with their correlates. What is of the nature of the real (*Reales*) enters into motivational relationships in so far as it is precisely an object apprehended by consciousness. People "have an effect" on one another not only by virtue of their physical nature (*physische Natur*), but also by

[8] Cf. T. Lipps, *Leitfaden der Psychologie*, Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann, second edition, 1906, 29. — Husserl's note.

[9] Better put: My position-taking is motivated through my friend *perceived*, presenced, so or so thought about, interpreted in such and such a way, which is the *noematic* correlate of my experience. This is just as it is presented more correctly in what follows. We can also say: Motivation has two sides, the noetic and the noematic. — Husserl's note.

virtue of their being natural realities (*Naturrealitäten*). However, they effect one another by motivations brought about through reciprocal understandings.[10] Hence it is via motivations that the real can enter into a characteristic relation with the real. And this "having an effect upon" belongs also to psychology. But if the sociologist and historian attempt to describe, reconstruct and, in general, investigate people's "having an effect upon" each other in practical, social life, then they will not want to determine the causal nexus in nature, but rather, they will intend to give an account of the motivational contexts that held sway here. (What remains to be done is the more exact determination of the concept of motivation that is in question here, since I take the concept of motivation in such a general way that it encompasses all the spheres of the phansic (*das Phansische*[11]).)

The human being lets "himself" be influenced not only by particular other humans (actual or imagined) but also by social objectivities that he feels and apprehends as effective objectivities in their own right, as influencing powers. He is afraid of "the government" and carries out what it commands. He views such and such individuals, for instance, the police officer, etc., as representatives of the government only; he fears the person who is an official representative. The customs, the church, etc., he feels as powers, too.

Seen from the objective perspective of the historian and sociologist, human beings are real and, among them, such and such interconnected relations exist, such and such social objectivities exist, etc. And the task is to describe this in general, concrete and, where possible, in comparative terms, to describe the factual connection, to delineate [96] universal class-concepts and rules, etc., just as in any morphology.

If the community of humankind is to be described historically *in concreto* in its becoming and in its dependence on other communities (for even the social objectivities have their "causality"), then the objective of an *understanding* of the inner connections requires that

[10] The preceding sentences were changed in the following way: "People 'have an effect upon' one another: Not by virtue of their nature, but rather by virtue of motivations brought forth through mutual understanding." — Editor's note.

[11] Often this term refers to the distinctive immanent phenomenality of the stream of consciousness in contrast to the phenomenality of the world; cf., e.g., *Husserliana X*, 315. On occasion Husserl used it in a more precise way; see *Husserliana XXVI*, §8, but especially, p. 143. — Translators' note.

one immerse oneself so deeply in the consciousness of the respective individual human beings, so as to be able to exactly relive their motivations. One must immerse oneself so deeply that one brings to "givenness" their interpretations, supposed experiences, their superstitious fantasies, by means of which they let themselves be "influenced," let themselves be guided, attracted, or repelled. The "real connections" consist in this: Under given circumstances such and such notions, etc., were ("understandably") evoked in human beings, whereby such and such reactions were motivated in them, which in turn determined the course of their development.

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As a matter of course, everything that can be said about motivation in terms of lawful generality is incorporated into psychology as a nomological natural science; and the general doctrine of the essence of mind must serve for its foundation. In exactly the same way, every psychic being which appears in life and history is subject to concrete natural-scientific explanation. Seen from its perspective, history functions as a gathering of data for[12] psychological explanation. By contrast, and owing to the specific characteristics of the mind, a kind of "psychology" is possible, which does not take an interest in any natural-scientific findings; and this is so not because of any insufficiency of knowledge or any theoretical laziness, but for *essential* reasons. This "psychology" interests itself instead in consciousness in itself and its essential properties, and in mind, individual minds, and connections of the mind. In the sphere of what is proper to "humanity," psycho-physical causality is completely irrelevant. The humanities, being scientific disciplines of the mind and its distinctive properties, attempt to investigate mind, individual minds, and the inter-individual connectedness of minds. *Intersubjective motivation — to motivate and being motivated — constitutes a system of its own, i.e., of intersubjective and also real relations of real individuals, and of a self-contained system of "effects" in an historical and psychological sense.* And the context of effecting and being effected has not the [97]

[12] Later inserted: "for natural-scientific psychological." — Editor's note.

meaning of precisely determining spatial–temporal laws about real factual beings and their changes.

Now, concerning the system of such effectings, there is no objective time involved at all, that is, the time of psycho-physical nature, as it is determined by clocks, sundials, etc. Rather the only time that is relevant here is the one that exclusively and immanently belongs to minds and their conscious processes; it is the time that is communicated by way of empathy. What is motivating precedes the motivated, namely in all those cases where we speak of an intellectual "result" in a real sense. Here, it is not the point at all that if what is motivating is given, then the motivated must be given at its site too, namely on the one hand, in this individual, as it is determined in a natural-objective way by his lived body and, on the other hand, in the time determined by nature. But it is very much to the point that if the motivational connection is established, say, if someone acts because his master commanded it, that when the event is "effected" in the servant, it has for its ground his master's command and that it takes place in consequence of the command.[13]

If everything in the world is exactly determined, according to its spatial-temporal factual being, then *eo ipso* every such context of motivation[14] is a piece of the causal nexus of necessity, being in principle but a piece of it. For instance, although the judgment in the conclusion of an argument motivates the thought about the premise, it is never intuitively evident that the thought of the premise, considered in its factual existence and taken just as it occurs within the motivational connection, could dictate the conclusion to follow afterwards as a temporally existing thing, namely, following in the sense of genuine causality, at an objectively determined point in time.[15] But if the researcher of culture and mind, as a historian, as a sociologist, etc., merely pursues the motivations and merely studies the intersubjective contexts of the human reciprocity of mutual "effects" and the motivating influences, and if he brings into view dependencies on the world of things only in so far as this world is intuitively given, then

[13] Husserl crossed out the preceding paragraph and then erased the crossed out part and noted: "This is correct if, in line with the entire discussion, I have in view only the historical causation of mind on mind, not history in every sense." — Editor's note.
[14] Later inserted: "objectively apprehendable as." — Editor's note.
[15] There is just no definiteness in the single monadic being. — Husserl's note.

he is not at all, as it were, a bad researcher of nature, who happens to content himself with imperfect, incomplete constructions.

The humanities consider the mind in relation to the *surrounding of the mind*. Nature, the spatial-temporal world, all of this *remains posited*. It is not put out of play in a phenomenological manner. But the scientific interest aims at the investigation of the different ways the I-subject relates himself to the world, the world that is *for* his presencing, judging, valuing, willing, acting; how he comports himself to things, to fellow human beings with whom the I-subject has to do, and with whom he has in common the thing-world as a unified environing world. Each human being belongs to the surrounding world of the other. In general, the things that are my surrounding world are also the things of the surrounding world of the other. In any case, I can bring into view precisely relations of this kind, which come into consideration as environing relations, or, as we can also say, as sociological relations. Here, things and human beings are not investigated according to what they simply are in their empirical nature. Rather human beings come into consideration as subjects that find themselves "in" the world, which, at the same time, is "over against" them. As such subjects, they "*relate*" to the world, which they make present by judging, valuing, and willing, in short, by taking a position or abstaining from position-taking. Relating to their fellow men, the subjects interact with them in communication, in especially directed acts of love, of trusting, of consoling words, of issuing commands, etc. They enter into "intercourse" with them, live together in the unity of a social life, with active or reactive reciprocity or unilateral relatedness. [98]

The acts constitutive for sociality: The "communicative" acts

There are various acts *resting on* "empathy," on the understanding of the other person. Especially important are the acts that do not merely take the other person in light of a certain understanding, according to which the behavior counts as love, as taking over something for the other, which he himself may not notice at all, but, rather, acts that are *communicative* acts, that is, acts that turn toward the other, in which the other is taken as the one toward whom I turn; being acts, which contain in themselves the idea that the other understands

this turning towards him and may thus possibly modify his behavior accordingly by responding with an act of a similar kind, etc.[16] These are the acts that bring about a higher unity of consciousness between person and person, and integrate the objective world as a common world of judging, willing, and valuing. To the extent that the world shows the incorporation of this relation, it acquires the *character of a social world*, of a world that has taken on significance for the mind.

[16] For example: When I flash the left-turn signal, the drivers in front and behind me know that I am addressing them as drivers, and that I have expectations of them; and they, in turn, are signaled to believe that they may have beliefs about and expectations toward me as a driver. — Translators' note.

APPENDIX XIII (IV of No. 1) [8]

EMPATHY OF THE OTHER CONSCIOUSNESS AND DIVINE ALL-CONSCIOUSNESS (1908)

One acknowledges other consciousness on the basis of *empathy*. One could say: *But that is an analogizing* which, in keeping with its own essence, requires the possibility of adequate perception as the [9] ultimate filling intention. Therefore, the possibility must exist that my empathizing will be ultimately filled in a perceiving of the lived experiences of the other. Just like a belief in a picture fulfills itself when I see the pictured itself and recognize it as what was pictorially meant. In this case, however, the pictorial depiction *means* some *thing* that has its place in the world. Thus, to the pictorial depiction belongs a presentation that refers me intentionally to a certain *path* by which I *myself* can go and see the matter for myself. But how does this work for empathy? If I see my hand and imagine it as touched, then the touched spot comes with a contact-sensation. If the hand of the other person is touched, it, too, is coupled to a contact-sensation; yet I register this only "pictorially." (The sensation of touch is not actually *pictorial*, but rather it involves a kind of belief in a presentational act.) But how can this belief embedded in the presentational act be confirmed through perception? Well, it cannot be so confirmed. Empathy is not keyed to confirmation through perception. For that would entail a contradiction.

Now, if we ascribe to *God* (all-consciousness) the "capacity" to peer into the consciousness of others, this is only conceivable under the condition that God's being holds in itself all other absolute being.[1] There would be no contradiction for God (and, of course, he would not be in need of empathy), because *God* would not have, for example, *one*

[1] But is that conceivable? — Husserl's note.

visual field, but rather as many as there were absolute consciousnesses. Of course, the empathy of an absolute consciousness (the I) directed towards another consciousness would remain in effect, as well as the impossibility that a consciousness *A*, as it is tied to a singular, limited visual field, has a perception that is based on another's visual field. For instance, while looking at the thing here, I can have but a profile of it. It belongs to the essence of the thing to manifest just one actual profile in one Now. In the coordination of several I's, the "same" thing discloses another profile to another I, and the other I has its visual field so filled up that precisely this profile occurs within it (being apperceptively constituted). The visual fields are different. But in the empathizing apperception one and the same thing is constituted, being within one and the same space for all individuals.

God, however, sees the thing from one side (with *my* consciousness) and "at the same time" from the other side (with the consciousness of the *other*).[2] He identifies both apperceptions. But not in the way that I apperceive the different appearances in a sequential flow, but, rather, somehow in such a way as I identify the thing and the "mirror image" of the thing. Yet it is obviously not a matter of a mirror image relation, but rather a coordination relation of its own, corresponding to which there is a definite lawfulness in the coordination of the course of appearances in the diverse finite consciousnesses.

[2] Cf. *Ideas I*, §43, for more on the divine, perspectival perception of the world. See also the immediately preceding text in the folder from which this translated text here is taken, B II 2 (1907–1908), 26b–27b, "*The Possibility of an All-Consciousness*" which wrestles in greater detail with the issues Husserl raises. There we see Husserl arguing that the "All-Consciousness" encompasses all the finite ones, even in their contradictions and conflicts; yet, because it is an excess of consciousness which is not absorbed by or restricted to any of them, it manages to produce a teleological unity for them all. — Translators' note.

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