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PAUL RICŒUR

A KEY TO HUSSERL'S *IDEAS I*

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Table of Contents

Paul Ricœur: Narrative and Phenomenon

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In 1950 Ricœur translated Husserl's famous and somewhat abstruse work, *Ideas,* into French. This translation rapidly became a landmark, providing a powerful and consistent lexicon of French equivalents for Husserl's terminology. A new vocabulary became available and contributed to the development of a typically French phenomenology. Together with his translation, Ricœur also offered a masterful commentary to a work that really needed some interpretive support because of its transitory character in Husserl's itinerary. Such an achievement propelled Ricœur to a position of intellectual authority among Husserl scholars. His ambition, however, exceeded the philological task of phenomenological exegesis. The same year his translation and commentary were made available to a French public, Ricœur also published *Philosophy of the Will: The Voluntary and the Involuntary* (Ricœur 1950), which is an original "application" of the phenomenological method. Later came, among many others, *On Interpretation. Essays on Freud* (Ricœur 1965) and *The Conflict of Interpretations. Essays on Hermeneutics* (Ricœur 1969). From 1983 on, Ricœur started a huge enterprise devoted to practical philosophy with an emphasis on the role of narrative in relation to time (*Time and Narrative*, Ricœur 1983-1985), to action (*From Text to Action*, Ricœur 1986), and to self-identity (*Oneself as Another*, Ricœur 1990).

The titles by themselves already indicate that some shift has taken place in Ricœur's interests. Yet, he has constantly maintained that three motives pervade and unify his whole work: the Cartesian conviction of the unifying role of the Cogito, the phenomenological discovery of the role of intentionality, and the hermeneutic emphasis on a semiotic and interpretive mediation.

Ricœur's itinerary not only appears multifaceted, but also represents an impressive living dialogue: he has unabatedly encompassed the field of contemporary philosophy of the last five decades in its many trends and currents. In the number of works he cites and quotes, and in the

range of intellectual perspectives he adopts before critically scrutinizing them, Ricœur appears as a witness of his time – a time occupied by a *polemos* of discourses and consumed by conflicts of interpretation.

Sartre is often considered the last intellectual of his time. It appears more and more that Ricœur, to use Bernard Stevens' expression (Stevens 1991), will be the referee of his era. Qualifying Ricœur as a referee certainly does not aim at reducing his role to one of taking notes for reporting the exchanges of others. His powerful philosophical acumen, as well as his inclination toward scrutiny and compromise, have kept him away from the temptations of intellectual fashion and made him a contributor in his own right to some more sober accounts of psychoanalysis, structuralism, deconstructionism, postmodernism, etc. With Ricœur, and thanks to him, it became possible to deconstruct a text, thus rejecting the almost sacred ultimate criterion of the author's or speaker's intention, while still claiming that "someone" wrote this text or that "someone" spoke in that utterance.

Jean Grondin has characterized a large part of Ricœur's work as an "apologetics," (Grondin 1990, 123) in the sense that he presented his views by contradistinction to other trends and by engaging in lengthy discussions with them. Although partly accurate, such a characterization might overlook the tremendous pedagogical advantage of such a method of exposition: it turns out to have opened a dialogue between the contemporary philosophical trends which have a tendency to force themselves onto the stage for their own sake. To act as a referee and a witness, as Ricœur does, might move the philosophical arena away from the will to power and restore some form of intellectual responsibility. Ricœur might very well embody Husserl's characterization of philosophers as "the functionaries of mankind."

This introduction to Ricœur's commentary on *Ideas* will not venture into a general presentation of Ricœur's thought, nor will it attempt to offer a commentary on a commentary. Rather, we will examine how Ricœur's notion of narrative extends the boundaries of phenomenology by reformulating two crucial and technical points in Husserl's phenomenology: the passive synthesis and the fulfilment.

1. Husserl's treatment of passive synthesis and fulfilment

The "passive synthesis" is a concept Husserl introduces in order to account for the fact that the activity of constitution by consciousness

has a passivity which is itself already pervaded by some form of activity. In this sense, the synthesis by an Ego has itself a genesis. Husserl thus speaks of "passive synthesis" and "passive genesis," as opposed to an "active synthesis" and "active genesis."

The problem of passive synthesis is closely linked to what Husserl names a "genetic," as opposed to a "static," phenomenology and introduces history as a phenomenological theme. Such a concern has been at the center of a long debate among commentators, since a historical dimension might jeopardize the transcendental character of phenomenology. The debate has narrowed down to two options: either a phenomenology in the strict sense, or its reformulation in terms of hermeneutics. Heidegger took the second path, followed by a host of philosophers. History, culture, in short the others, what Heidegger in *Being and Time* calls the "They," is at the origin of the passivity of the Ego. The world into which Dasein has been thrown has been articulated by the "They." It is precisely from the "They" that Dasein will have to recover, better to re-conquer what will be its "authenticity" in the sense of what will be properly its own (*Eigentlichkeit*).

The second problem, the question of fulfilment, is linked to the first problem and represents the crucial test for a philosophy that puts intentionality at its center. If intentionality overcomes the mere divide of subject and object, it must absolutely be shown how my intentional act can be fulfilled by the givenness of an object, so that I, as a consciousness, will not have to divest myself of my conscious powers in order to discover the world (naive realism), and that the world will not be merely what appears on the stage of my consciousness (naive idealism). This problem of fulfilment challenges phenomenology to give a descriptive account of what is, independently of any practical concern or practical endeavor. Is it possible for our intentional acts to reach a fulfilment without being caught in a referring network where these acts are relevant according to the goals they are pursuing? Again here, Heidegger's answer was negative and he consequently engaged phenomenology in an "analytic of Dasein's existence" which is characterized as "care": Dasein is primordially "concerned" by things which are ready-to-hand.

Although Ricœur draws insights liberally from Heidegger, he still wants to maintain a central role for the Cogito. In order to understand his solution to these problems in terms of narrative, a more specific presentation of the problems at stake is required.

1.1 Passive synthesis

The notion of "passivity" has not received a systematic treatment in Husserl and has left commentators with the burden of elucidating it. Franco Volpi (Volpi 1989, 161 ff.) sees the problem of "passivity" as covering three domains or opening three directions of investigations: 1) a theory of original temporal constitution in the "living present" (lebendige Gegenwart) so that temporal synthesis represents the basic structure of subjectivity. Klaus Held offers a powerful reconstruction of this original temporal constitution (Held 1966). 2) A theory of association which represents the basic level for the activity of constitution to the extent that perception, for example, does not bear on mere sense data, but on a "cluster" where an association has taken place. Elmar Holenstein develops this line of investigation (Holenstein 1972). 3) An analysis of kinesthesis that shows that the most basic perception is already linked to bodily movements. Maurice Merleau-Ponty has become the master of this kind of research (Merleau-Ponty 1945).

As already indicated by these different orientations of research, the problem of passivity is highly complex. For our purpose, we will not delve into the intricacies of this problem nor into the variety of Husserlian terminology. At the expense of nuances, – and for the sake of elucidating the filiation between Ricœur and Husserl – the following methodological device will be put into place: 1) discussion is restricted to "passive synthesis" and "passive genesis": 2) the notion of "passivity" is understood as the fact that, on the one hand, an object is already a whole before I intend it while, on the other, "I" am already a unified field of consciousness before I can intend; 3) the problem of passivity is considered from the vantage point of the problem of intersubjectivity.

At first glance, the very expression of "passive synthesis" seems to threaten the heart of phenomenology in its transcendental endeavor: how can a synthesis be passive and, if it is passive, what performs the synthesis? In the *Cartesian Meditations,* Husserl uses the expressions "passive synthesis" and "active synthesis" for naming the fact that the ego has become what it is, just as the object in its givenness is presented on the basis of a passivity. Since, however, a passivity is not strictly speaking "given" as such, but can only be "reconstructed" once the enterprise of constitution has taken place, one can also speak

of a "passive" and "active genesis." "[...] anything built by activity necessarily presupposes, as the lowest level, a passivity that gives something beforehand; and, when we trace anything actively, we run into constitution by passive generation. The "ready-made" object that confronts us in life as an existent mere physical thing [...] is given, with the originality of the "it itself," in the synthesis of a passive experience" (CM 78). Similarly, on the side of the subject: "it is owing to an essentially necessary genesis that I, the ego, can experience a physical thing and do so even at first glance" (CM 79). The ego is "a substrate of habitualities" (CM 67) which finds itself in "a constituted world [that] already exists for it" (CM 77). The genesis of an ego within a world of objects that have been passively constituted – "the ego always has an environment of 'objects'" (CM 79) – could lead phenomenology to integrate history into its scope: "this [passive] synthesis [...] has its 'history'" (CM 79). However, the quotation marks caution us, at least in the *Cartesian Meditations*: as the title of par. 39 indicates – "Association as a principle of passive genesis" – Husserl intends to limit the possible dissemination of the passivity by the boundaries of what is or can be actively constituted. "Association," he tells us, "is a matter of *intentionality*, descriptively demonstrable as that, in respect of its primal forms, and standing, in respect of its intentional performances, under *eidetic laws*" (CM 80). It is thus possible, as well as necessary, to make understandable every passive constitution, "both the constitution of subjective processes [...] and the constitution of all real natural objects belonging to the Objective spatio-temporal world" (CM 80). Such an association "is a *fundamental concept belonging to transcendental phenomenology*" (CM 80).

The notion of passive synthesis, by integrating a "genetic" and "historical" dimension, opens up the question of intersubjectivity: "The existence-sense (*Seinssinn*) of the world and of nature in particular, as Objective Nature, includes after all [...] thereness for everyone" (CM 92). Since, however, this passive synthesis is a passive genesis, Husserl claims that intersubjectivity is at play within my own ego, in my sphere of ownness: "In any case then, within myself, within the limits of my transcendentally reduced pure conscious life, I *experience* the world (including others) – and, according to its experiential sense, *not* as (so to speak) my *private* synthetic formation but as other than mine alone, as an *intersubjective* world, actually there for everyone, accessible in respect of its Objects to everyone" (CM 91). Although

there is a passivity both of the object (or of the world as an environment of objects) and of my ego, "imperturbably I must hold fast to the insight that every sense that any existent whatever has or can have for me [...] is a sense *in* and *arising from* my intentional life" (CM 91).

This last quote is central for Husserl's understanding of passivity as well as for seeing the contrast with Ricœur's position. Husserl firmly believes that such a passivity can be recovered. A possible strategy for such a recovery could be the following, broken down in two steps: firstly, "from the phenomenon world, from the world appearing with an objective sense, a substratum becomes separated, as the "Nature" included in my ownness" (CM 96); in a second step, this substratum must be distinguished, even separated, from a nature that has been obtained by abstracting from "everything psychic and from those predicates of the Objective world that have arisen from persons" (CM 96). This latter stratum still belongs to the objective world itself and is thus what a scientist can reach. It is what is obtained once we have eliminated, intersubjectively, everything purely psychological or purely "subjective" in the sense of "not shareable by others." Husserl, however, claims that such an objective nature, stripped of all the prejudices we can find, is not the end point of the phenomenological investigation. A second strategy must be put into play that adds one more step to the two already mentioned: The "objective," which is "intersubjective," can again be reduced to the sphere of ownness in which "the sense 'Objective,' which belongs to everything worldly – as constituted intersubjectively, as experienceable by everyone, and so forth – *vanishes completely*" (CM 96).

This second strategy seals the fate of Husserl's enterprise and helps explain Ricœur's position. For the reason for this extra reduction is Husserl's methodology. By and large, Husserl considers that the passivity of the world as well as of the Ego can be seen as a set of activities that can be traced back and re-discovered as they were, so that the passivity becomes a synchronic qualification. With the appropriate method – a questioning-back – the diachrony of a series of synchronies will appear. At any moment – such seems to be Husserl's claim – the passivity can be unveiled as it was in its living present. We will only focus on this methodology as far as intersubjectivity is concerned, which is only one side of passivity, as mentioned above.

Husserl's methodology for accounting for intersubjectivity and its role in a singular Ego's capacities can be broken down into four steps,

three of them counting as many assumptions. First, the impact of the other – or intersubjectivity – on me must be "constituted." Second, such a constitution is only possible through appresentation, thus starting with an experience of the other's body. Third, this process of reduction is only possible if there is a unitary pole "for whom" this process takes place, the sphere of ownness. Fourth, the criterion of self-identity within the sphere of ownness is the harmony of experience. Let us briefly follow these steps.

The first step, if rightly understood, does not offer much difficulty. Phenomenology aims to describe what appears, so that the appearance must be for "someone" who is able to constitute. To claim that whatever I will be able to constitute as belonging to the other will never exceed my constitutive and intentional abilities, is still congruent with the phenomenological thesis. However, Husserl understands the constitution of intersubjective achievements as reducible to the constitution of the other as an animate body – this is the second step. By questioning-back, intersubjectivity appears to be anchored in an experience of the other's body which serves as a point of departure for, then, appresenting the other's constitutive and intentional achievements. The concept of apperception or appresentation – let us consider them here as synonymous – thus explains statically the generation of intersubjectivity. Just as I experience other egos by pairing their own organisms and psychophysical egos with mine, thus appresenting them as other egos, I can appresent what they see from their perspective, thus appresenting a second stratum of what I then perceive as objective: "The experiential phenomenon, Objective Nature, has, besides the primordially constituted stratum [in my sphere of ownness], a superimposed second, merely appresented stratum originating from my experiencing of someone else" (CM 124). Intersubjective constitution is thus recovered by appresentation, from a static point of view: "It is implicit in the sense of my successful apperception of others that their world, the world belonging to their appearance-systems, must be experienced forthwith as the same as the world belonging to my appearance-systems; and this involves an identity of our appearance-systems" (CM 125). Through such a progressive expansion of an ego's set of perspectives, Husserl is confident in having solved the problem of passivity: "it is no longer an enigma how I can identify a Nature constituted in me with a Nature constituted by someone else (or, stated with the necessary precision, how I

can identify a Nature constituted in me with one constituted in me *as* a Nature constituted by someone else)" (CM 126).

The concept of appresentation offers the guarantee that any intersubjective role can, in principle, be brought back to the presence of two Egos: where one can constitute in the present the sense of what is not his or hers. Intersubjective influence is what I will be able to appresent in an experience of the other as a body, so that the potentialities of the other are thereby reduced to what can be appresented through its body.

The condition of possibility for appresentation is the existence of a sphere of ownness, immune from the effects of the others while constituting these very effects. This is the third step in Husserl's account of intersubjectivity and it is linked to the transcendental reduction. This reduction is supposed to reduce everything – the world as well as the others, thus the radical passivity of the ego – to the sphere of ownness. In such a framework, intersubjectivity as an Ego-community "becomes constituted (in my sphere of ownness, naturally)" (CM 107). The sphere of ownness thus represents the only site for constitution: "There is included in my ownness, as purified from every sense pertaining to other subjectivity, a sense, "mere Nature," that has lost precisely that "by everyone" and therefore must not by any means be taken for an abstract stratum of the world or of the world's sense" (CM 96-97). Only such a view, Husserl believes, can account for a passivity both of the subject and the object (or the world). "I, the reduced 'human Ego' ('psychophysical' Ego), am constituted, accordingly, as a member of the 'world' with a multiplicity of 'objects outside me.' But I myself constitute all this in my 'psyche' and bear it intentionally within me" (CM 99). Such is supposed to be the transcendental ego, reached by reduction to my sphere of ownness. To speak of "the transcendental intersubjectivity [that] has an *intersubjective* sphere of ownness, in which it constitutes the Objective world" (CM 107) does not, therefore, mean anything more than this: I can recover in my sphere of ownness the sense of an object or a world as "valid for everyone," so that "the Objective world does not, in the proper sense, *transcend* that sphere [my own essence] or that sphere's own intersubjective essence, but rather inheres in it as an 'immanent' transcendency" (CM 107).

Since my sphere of ownness is the site where my passive genesis, as well as the intersubjective constitution can be recovered, i.e "constituted" as mine, it is assumed that the passivity of my ego, as well as of my world, can be broken down into elements that can be presented to me and thus constituted. Husserl seems to believe that recovering my passivity is not different than plunging into my past through my memory and presentiating (*vergegenwärtigen*) past experiences. In the same way, recovering an intersubjective constitution means to start by appresenting the other as an animate body and, thus, appresenting what the other can see. I could see it too if I took the other's place. In both cases, however, the very starting point has not been made explicit, namely, this very notion of "ownness." If I can have the guarantee of recuperating my past, it must be assumed that what I presentiate has been, in its own present, merely presented. Similarly, I can recover my genesis, as well as the genesis of the world, because it is assumed that the processes of genesis or synthesis in their time were merely presented. The sphere of ownness which is the stage of all these original presentations and presentiations seems to depend itself on something else – what Husserl calls the harmony of experience. This is the fourth step in the constitution of intersubjectivity.

Husserl qualifies the transcendental reduction as an abstraction: "When we thus abstract, *we retain a unitarily coherent stratum of the phenomenon world*, a stratum of the phenomenon that is the correlate of continuously harmonious, continuing world-experience" (CM 96). The "continuously harmonious world experience" Husserl mentions here seems to function as the ultimate criterion of what is "for me," which is the only thing that can be. At the same time, harmony of experience appears as the criterion of ownness. "Harmony," however, can only be such from a static point of view; that is to say, as long as the subject for whom there is harmony is itself unified and aware of its unity. Although Husserl speaks of a "genesis" of the ego, it appears that such a genesis is also "for" the ego, i.e. "constituted." But, if it is the case, the question of the synthesis of this ego "for" whom a genesis of the object can be "abstracted" still remains open. The difficulty can be expressed as follows: harmony is, on the one hand, supposed to be the ultimate warrant that I am successful in remembering and in recovering my passivity or the intersubjective constitution; on the other hand, the concept of "harmony" has to refer in turn to a "who" for whom harmony obtains.

Husserl tries to maintain two seemingly antagonistic claims: on the one hand, the genesis can only be understood retrospectively in

what he calls in the *Crisis* a *Rückfrage*, a questioning-back; but this questioning-back, on the other hand, once it has been performed, does not unsettle the ego, which now sees itself as "generated," and does not fundamentally put into question the world – or the object – which now appears as being "passively" synthesized. The methodology for retrieving my passivity or the passivity of the world has no ontological impact: once my passivity has been recognized, not only am I not different from what I "passively" was, but what or who I am is not dependent on the account I give of who I am. Similarly, the world that has been recovered in its passivity is neither different from what it was "passively" nor dependent in its sense on the retrieval enterprise. What allows the homogeneity to obtain is the sphere of ownness which is supposed to be the guarantee that a genetic – "historical" – dimension can be accounted for, but within the static activity of constitution, as far as "harmony" reaches. Ricœur will reformulate this criterion of "harmony" in terms of a narrative. Let us now turn to the second problem: the possibility of fulfilment.

1.2. The question of fulfilment

The notion of intentionality, or intentional act, only has relevance if there is the possibility for the intentional act to be fulfilled. In the *Logical Investigations,* Husserl puts into place a scheme for intentional acts that anticipate their fulfilment. He starts with the signifying acts. The "physical body" of the signs must be lent a meaning by what Husserl calls a meaning-conferring act. This meaning-conferring act, in turn, in order to fulfil its function, must be correlated with a meaning or sense. This meaning is the mere correlate of the act and therefore does not depend on anything outside the act. It is the content of the act and, as such, an ideal content. Borrowing from Frege, Husserl asserts: "meanings constitute [...] a class of concepts in the sense of 'universal objects'" (Husserl 1970, 330). Husserl extends his theory of meaning to perception: every act of perception has a meaning or a sense and this intentional act can be fulfilled in intuition. This extension, however, represents a challenge. As Dreyfus puts it, "He [Husserl] must exhibit a perceptual sense as correlate of the perceptual act, to correspond to the conceptual sense we have seen to be correlated with each signifying act. And he must show why we can speak of the sense as "what is perceived" in every act of perception"

(Dreyfus 1982, 102). Husserl thus considers there to be a parallel between a perceptual act as a signifying act and the fulfilling sense or intuitive sense, much like the parallel between acts of conferring meaning and conferred meaning.

Following Dreyfus, we can reconstruct the problem as follows: the conferred meaning remains ideal, while the fulfilling sense is supposed to give "the object in person." Husserl tries to avoid the difficulty by dividing the sense of the fulfilling act. A perceptual act, which is supposed to be fulfilling, has to fulfil a certain signifying intention and it must be sensuously given: "a signitive intention merely points to its object, an intuitive intention gives it "presence," in the pregnant sense of the word" (Husserl 1970, 728). Thus, in order to be fulfilling, a perceptual act has to articulate two components: "an act which intends a certain object as having certain characteristics, and an act which presents the object, thereby fulfilling or failing to fulfill this intention" (Dreyfus 1982, 103). The coincidence of these two will verify perception. However, if the intuitive sense, which is supposed to provide the true fulfilment, is itself an abstract moment – and it seems that it can only be abstract – then, one is eager to ask, what is supposed to deliver the "object in person"? Do we not need another act that will connect the intuitive act with the signifying act, and this *ad infinitum*? If the intuitive component of the perceptual act – besides its signifying component – has, in turn, an intentional content or signifying component (since it is abstract), we are caught in an infinite regress where a sense is supposed to fulfill a sense, delaying indefinitely the sensuous fulfilling.

Husserl's difficulty originates from his understanding of sense. Sense, he claims, can be separated from fulfilment, so that an "empty" intention can have a sense (*Auffassungssinn*), but not be met by an intuitive sense (*Anschauungssinn*), and therefore remains unfulfilled. Although this might satisfy a common sense view, the question still remains of how an "intuitive" sense (*Anschauungssinn*) can be possible, the "intuitive" sense being supposed to be the fulfilment of the sense of the empty intention. What supposedly is that moment where consciousness in its self-givenness encounters an object as fully given in person and could thus be satisfied by it? Dreyfus describes Husserl's aporia as follows: "For if even in perception one must always separate the act of meaning from the act of intuition which fills that meaning, it follows that one can have an account of the interpretive sense

(*Auffassungssinn*) but no account of the corresponding intuitive sense (*Anschauungssinn*). One can have an account of what the mind takes the object to be, but no account of our bodily interaction with the object in perceiving it" (Dreyfus 1982, 108).

Husserl seems to have acknowledged the problem in the *Logical Investigations*: " [...] it is clear [...] that the 'fulfilling sense' carries no implication of fullness, that it *does not accordingly include the total content of the intuitive act*" (Husserl 1970, 744. Husserl's emphasis). Gurwitsch tried to remedy this problem by introducing the notion of an "incarnate meaning": something that would be both sensuous and of the order of the sense, a particular, but already informed by a universal form (Gurwitsch 1982).

Husserl's introduction of the noema in *Ideas* represents an advance over the *Logical Investigations* with respect to the treatment of this crucial problem. The noema can cover at least three different elements: it can be the correlate of an act, as a punctual noematic appearance; it can also be the sense (*Sinn* or *Bedeutung*) and as such be the identical or ideal content; and, the noema can name the object constituted in its unity and be, thus, the intentional object (Bernet 1995, 71). In the case of perception, the noema must be, it seems, the perceptual sense. But here again: is it the interpretive sense (*Auffassungssinn*) – as correlate of the signifying act – or the intuitive sense (*Anschauungssinn*) – as correlate of the fulfilling act? Husserl does not really clarify the problem: "perception [...] has its noema, and at the base of this its perceptual meaning (*Wahrnehmungssinn*), that is, the perceived as such" (Husserl 1962, 238). Gurwitsch took this "perceived as such" to be the intuitive sense, what he calls a percept. However, Husserl also considers the noema as a sense: "every noema has a 'content,' namely, its 'meaning,' and is related through it to 'its' object" (Husserl 1962, 333). This extension of meaning from the linguistic realm to the sphere of perception acknowledges the gesture already made in the *Logical Investigations* where the scheme proposed in the first *Investigation* is applied in the fifth and sixth. "Originally these words (*Bedeutung* and *bedeuten*) relate only to the sphere of speech, that of 'expression.' But it is almost inevitable, and at the same time an important step for knowledge, to extend the meaning of these words [...] so that they may be applied [...] to the whole noetico-noematic sphere, to all acts, therefore, whether these are interwoven with expression acts or not" (Husserl 1962, 319).

Although the extension of sense to perception might have opened a path toward making understandable how a fulfilment can take place, Husserl's analysis still remains too "static," as opposed to "genetic." The noema is supposed to be a mediation, but a mediation that does not account for its own possibility, hence the various interpretations of it as: an abstract sense belonging to a third realm – besides subject and object (Føllesdal 1982), as a linguistic meaning (McIntyre and Smith 1982), or just as what the phenomenological analysis produces (Sokolowski 1984). What seems to be lacking is a dynamic-genetic explanation that would account for the fact that, as Dreyfus puts it in concluding his article, "there is only the embodied subject coming to grips with embodied objects" (Dreyfus 1982, 123).

In his later works, Husserl seems to anticipate the objection. He increasingly emphasizes the role of horizons: an object appears within a horizon and is, thus, situated among other objects and finds its place within this referring network. When consciousness intends an object, it is, therefore, within a horizon and the appearance of an object opens other horizons. Consciousness can follow the referring network of the appearance of an object to another appearance of the same object. However, for an object to appear, still means, for Husserl, to become thematic – to be the focus of the attention of intentional consciousness. As Klaus Held notes (Held 1995), the true experience of fulfilment for Husserl must be such that in it the being in itself of an object is given non-thematically. In other words, because of the horizons in which an object is entangled, because of the horizonal character of consciousness itself, it seems that the givenness "in person" of an object to consciousness cannot happen: they can never encounter each other, the two of them being caught in a referring network.

We might say that, in Husserl, no account of an articulation between intention and fulfilment is given. Klaus Held sees in Heidegger the one who offers such an articulation that provides an account of how an intention can be fulfilled. Heidegger, however, changes the framework of investigation. He abandons the focus on perceptual intention or signifying intention and considers action or the world of daily concerns as the true site for phenomenological questioning. "A true fulfilling would be contained in a living experience where we would precisely encounter a tool in its discreet reliability, where the tool in other words would offer its determinate character without

objectifying thematization" (Held 1995, 116). Experiencing something in a world which is a "work-world" means that the "something" cannot be separated from its potential use. The goal is always anticipated so that consciousness, which is "concerned" by things in a daily world, is always ahead of them. Becoming aware of one's own self-identity does not mean anything more than becoming aware of the one for the sake of whom the referring network is at play. Human existence can thereby transcend the mundane way of existing, withdraw from the instrumental world of action, and find oneself as the center of action. This is what Heidegger calls authenticity. By then coming back to things of daily use, human existence is able to disentangle them from instrumental action and, thus, to let the referring network appear. According to Held, only in authenticity can a fulfilment take place. What is then experienced is that the instrumental usages become focuses within which the world all of a sudden shines. The fulfilment, consequently, is not an object. It is not, and cannot be, thematized, but is indicated by affects: it is an affective contentment.

Despite its intellectually attractive and fascinating aspect, this Heideggerean path might escape the phenomenological creed altogether, by overemphasizing the given and downplaying the Ego: givenness becomes more and more a call from afar and the subject is more and more confined to a field of relationships or a mere device for the transmission of a tradition. The phenomenon withdraws from the visible – human – realm. The emphasis on a "phenomenology of the unapparent," which Heidegger mentions in his later works, dangerously folds back upon a speculation on a history of Being or on *Ereignisse* that, as paradigms, escape any phenomenological investigation. Although a close reader of Heidegger, Ricœur has always manifested some uneasiness with this Heideggerian extension of phenomenology that could just seal its end. Ricœur claims to be able to lead phenomenology into the field of hermeneutics, while preserving the Cartesian faith of the former.

2. Narrative as articulation of the phenomenon

The configuring task of the narrative, discourse, or language, that Ricœur has forcefully manifested, seems to represent one of those rare points of encounter between different "trends of thought" of our

finishing century: Heidegger, Gadamer, deconstructionism, postmodermism, French and American literary criticism, and a brand of analytic philosophy (Searle 1995, MacIntyre 1988) came to grant narratives an ontological impact. Things as they are cannot be grasped as such other than through a symbolic mediation, be it linguistic, discursive, or narrative. Ricœur is no stranger to this philosophical encountering between several trends, even if, for now, it is a minimal encounter. He has indeed relentlessly pioneered such a dialogue.

Although Ricœur did not specifically address the two problems of passive synthesis and fulfilment as we presented them, and did not even directly relate to Husserl when laying out his position, it seems that it is not unfair to view his conception of narrative as a solution to these two problems. Regarding the first one, Ricœur decisively accepts that any intentional act is interpretive in character, so that there is not even the option to discount history within the phenomenological enterprise. The possibility of a transcendental philosophy becomes, therefore, a subsidiary concern. Regarding the second problem, Ricœur has devoted more and more of his time and energy to the question of action: only in action, it seems, can one's intentional acts find their fulfilment. Fulfilment, in other words, does not take place in one's own mind, when there is an encounter between an empty intention and the givenness of something; in order to be fulfilled, an intention has to be, first, articulated in signs and, second, made understandable, i.e., concrete and relevant, by how one is to act upon it. Intentional acts are, thus, no longer to be understood as purely mental acts representing the absolute starting point. They are already called for by the way they can be fulfilled in a pragmatic framework. However, Ricœur does not merely turn to pragmatics. His genius is to introduce a pragmatic slant into phenomenology. Action itself is not merely submitted to pragmatic rules or pervaded by pragmatic motives. To act means to act upon intentions, so that action is the embodiment of intentional acts. There is thus a solidarity between action as embodiment of intentions and intentional act as anticipating its pragmatic fulfilment. In such an interplay between intention and action, action is pervaded and articulated by a narrative and is, thus, a quasi-text, just as a text – as a conglomerate of intentional acts – is already pervaded by the potentialities for action. Let us first turn to the question of passivity.

2.1. Passivity as a narrative achievement

In order to establish the link between Ricœur's notion of narrative and Husserl's questions of passivity and fulfilment, let us start with Ricœur's interpretation of the difficult Husserlian concept of "Life-world," considering for the sake of the argument that the life-world is another Husserlian slant of the problem of passivity. In his article "L'originaire et la question-en-retour dans la *Krisis* de Husserl" (Ricœur 1986b), Ricœur attempts to solve Husserl's paradoxical presentation of the life-world. The life-world is both originary as the basis for all activities and originary in the sense of an operation that can be recovered through a questioning-back (*Rückfrage*), once the scientific level has been reached. In the first case, originary means at the origin of all scientific activity and, in the second case, what only scientific activity can discover and recover. Ricœur notes that the lifeworld cannot be separated from the method that posits or discovers it, a method which itself has its point of departure in idealizations and objectifications that have been produced by cultural and scientific activity. In this sense the life-world is out of reach. It is a presupposition that cannot be reactualized in its presence. On the other hand, the perceptive world (*Sinnenwelt*), which seems to be the life-world, is itself already interpretive in character, so that we are always beyond the mere given, and can never go back to it, "because we left it forever, not only to the benefit of mathematics and physics, but also under the pressure of a question which turns against it: the question of an ultimate foundation. For this question does not itself belong to the life-world" (Ricœur 1986b, 292).

In order to understand the paradox, Ricœur draws a distinction between two types of "originary": ontological and epistemological. The life-world has an epistemological function in the sense that, starting from objective science, one can show its lack of foundation and refer it back to what precedes it absolutely, the lifeworld. In this respect, the life-world is not a world from which one wishes to withdraw, but rather a methodological step, a detour, a questioning in order to correct the concept of sciences we have and recover an authentic science, an authentic rationality. However, the idea of science as the source of all legitimation, does not derive from the life-world. The life-world, epistemologically, enters into play only as a contrast. On the ontological side, however, the life-world is the ultimate reference of objective science. The real world has, thus, an ontological priority, whereas the idea of science has an epistemological priority as the ultimate source of validity. Idealities might well be derived from the life-world, since it is the ultimate reference of all scientific enterprises; the validity of these idealities, however, depends on the scientific achievement. "We live in a world that precedes all questions of validity. But the question of validity precedes all our efforts for giving sense to the situations in which we find ourselves" (Ricœur 1986b, 295). When we start to think, we are faced with a dimension of "always already" – a world that was always already there – and we recognize that we are in a world of symbols and rules through which the world in which we live has already been interpreted when we start to think. But when we think, we have the capacity to question our scientific constructions by reference to this originary life-world.

Contrary to some of Husserl's formulations, the life-world – we might say "passivity" – in the ontological sense is dependent on the way it has been posited and, therefore, cannot escape the narrative device of phenomenological investigation. Such a dependence does not amount to relinquishing the life-world to the realm of fiction. It only means that a new dimension has been integrated in phenomenology: the mediation of narrative. The distinction Ricœur draws between the two senses of originary helps us understand that Husserl, by desperately clinging to the "original presence" as the ultimate site of constitution, and thus by positing it almost dogmatically, turned away from the demands of phenomenology: to provide an account of what appears without falling into intellectual constructions.

The mediating role of narratives represents a response to the two alternatives that Gadamer proposes in *Truth and Method* (Gadamer 1986): the alienating distanciation, on the one hand, which permits the objectivity of human sciences, and belonging, on the other, which is the properly Gadamerian thesis aiming at preserving the fundamental relationship between us and our historical concreteness. The first alternative is an emphasis on the method which permits objectivity through distanciation. The second is truth, which is our truly belonging to our life-world, at the expense of objectivity.

Ricœur has argued at length in his long debate with Gadamer against such an alternative. "My own method, Ricœur writes, comes from a refusal of these two alternatives and from an attempt to overcome them" (Ricœur 1986a, 101). The problematic of the text offers Ricœur

the possibility of escaping from these two alternatives, of even reconciling them, and thus offering an encompassing view which does justice to the ontological concreteness of our belonging to a life-world, on the one hand, and to the objective method of a science, on the other. Despite the distanciation it requires through the use of signs, a text permits one to think of human experience as a communication between humans, i.e., as a historical belonging through and within this distanciation. Ricœur mentions five criteria of what he calls textuality: 1) the realization of language as discourse; 2) the realization of discourse as structured work; 3) the relationship between speech and writing in discourse and in discursive works; 4) the discursive work as projection of a world; 5) discourse and discursive work as mediation of the self-understanding (Ricœur 1986a, 102). These five criteria represent the levels of the genesis of intercomprehension, that is to say, of the historical human experience. We might say, in Husserlian terms, that these are the five stages of the passive synthesis.

Language is an anonymous system of combinations of signs. Only in a discourse, when signs are brought together in a sentence uttered by someone, can something happen. Language, then, becomes discourse. As such, this linguistic event takes place in time and discourse becomes a work under someone's responsibility. The work might well be a projection by a Cogito. However, unlike Athena, it has not arisen fully shaped from the head of the utterer. It is rather through its discursive works that a Cogito can come back to itself, in what Ricœur calls a narrative identity. For that to happen, speech needs to be sedimented into writing and a projection of a world needs to be made from discourse toward a work. The Cogito loses itself in a production and deciphering of signs, loses itself and dies, disseminated in the world, in order to construe itself and understand itself at the term of a journey of a life of reading, writing, and interpreting. "There is no self-understanding which is not mediated through signs, symbols, and texts" (Ricœur 1986a, 29). Only through this semiotic mediation can the Cogito, construing itself, come back to itself and rediscover itself such as it was "always already." "The question of self-understanding which, in romantic hermeneutics, occupied the forestage, is now postponed until the end, as final factor, and not as introductory factor, and even less as center of gravity" (Ricœur 1986a, 103).

The Cogito belongs to the same category as the author of a work: as a craftman – the *auctor* – it is responsible for the work. The author, however, is a category originating from the interpretation of the work: it is what the interpretation discovers as its source. Only from the interpretation of the work can a meaning arise and only in interpretation can this meaning be referred and attributed to its author. There is thus correlation as well as precedence between author and work or between Cogito and thought: like the author, and as an author, the Cogito is "a human being individualized by producing individual works" (Ricœur 1986a, 110).

Such a view radically calls into question the strong distinction between explanation and understanding, in the sense that understanding could be a direct link to the author's intention: an empathy which could recover the moment of production of the work. Distanciation, Ricœur claims, is this detour which alone permits a coming back to oneself and an understanding of oneself. Works allow authors to understand themselves, because, before the arising of works, there was no author. To deal with the author's intention, is, on the one hand, to confuse the two distinct moments of the genesis of a work and of its interpretation. It also amounts, on the other hand, to claim that this work can be reduced to the processes of its production. In both cases, the proper self-understanding of the authors has been overlooked: for they had to construe their own self-understanding through and in their works, and only there. In this respect, a work can only become what it is in contextualizing itself – in being written in a network of texts constituting a culture – and the work, conversely, can be decontextualized as well as re-contextualized. The authors' authority does not pertain to their intention, but is itself contextual. Once written works have freed themselves from the constraints of a living dialogue, authors can survive their own present and become writers. Against romantic hermeneutics, and against Dilthey, Ricœur firmly states that distanciation "is not only what understanding can overcome, but also what conditions understanding" (Ricœur 1986a, 112).

2.2 Narrative as the articulation of intention and action

As we have seen, Husserl introduces the notion of noema to resolve the difficulty of fulfilment, but his attempt was not really suc-

cessful. In the introduction to his translation of *Ideas*, Ricœur recognizes the importance of fulfilment and its central role for phenomenology: "Transcendental phenomenology aims to integrate into the noema its relation to its object, that is the 'fullness' which completes the constitution of the full noema [...] To constitute reality is to refuse to leave the 'presence' of reality outside of the 'meaning' of the world" (Ricœur 1996, p. 46) However, Ricœur has to conclude, "this is something *Ideas 1* promises more than it demonstrates" (Ricœur 1996, p. 46). Ultimately, "reality always seems to escape transcendental constitution (Ricœur, 1996, K:324:15).

The notion of narrative Ricœur relies on can be understood not only as a reformulation of the passive genesis, but also as a reformulation of the noema. Ricœur speaks of the "noematic structure of action" (Ricœur 1986a, 192) and understands it in analogy with speech acts: " the noema not only has a propositional content, but also displays 'illocutionary' features fully similar to those of the complete speech act" (Ricœur 1986a, 192). A narrative has a function that exceeds the traditional *oratio*, which is just supposed to convey a preexisting *ratio*. Narratives give shape and form to what, without them, would be unformed, handicapped, impoverished. "What would we know of love and hatred, of ethical feelings and, in general, of all that we call the Self, if all this had not been brought to language and articulated by literature?" (Ricœur 1986a, 116). Narratives configure and mediate in a threefold schema that Ricœur calls *mimesis*.

The first level of this schema, called *Mimesis* 1, is the level of a pre-narrative world, requiring within its own articulation, to be told. "Life is more than experience. There is something in experience that demands the assistance of narrative and expresses the need for it" (Ricœur 1991, 28). At this first level, Ricœur mentions three points of anchorage of narrative in life. 1) The first point of anchorage is manifested by the very structure of action itself. Human action is indeed structured around projects, plans, goals, means, and circumstances which we implicitly understand and which constitute a conceptual network with which we are natively familiar. The experience is already structured semiotically, so that the framework of action is already predelineated within experience. To this extent there is in practical life a semiotic dimension that pervades it, what Ricœur calls a "semiotic of action." 2) Human action itself, inscribed in a structured experience, in turn finds its articulation in signs, rules, norms

which determine or qualify capacities, modes, and means for action. This symbolic mediation "makes action a quasi-text for which symbols provide the rules of signification in terms of which a given conduct can be interpreted" (Ricœur 1991, 29). 3) The third point of anchorage of narrative in life is called "the pre-narrative quality of human experience" (Ricœur 1991, 29). Action takes place in an experience which is already structured and involves plans and goals that can be achieved (first point of anchorage); action itself has to follow some patterns, obey some rules, and submit to some norms, so that performing an action is analogous to writing a text (second point of anchorage). As a chain of actions life is thus a story in its nascent state, an activity and a passion in search of a narrative. Such is the first level of *mimesis*.

The second level, *Mimesis* 2, is the properly narrative level where the symbolic mediation of language and discourse permits a story to be told. Since the story brings to the fore symbolic structures that were already embodied in the practical life of action, the story does not merely render action or life as an imitation through a mirroring effect. The explicitly semiotic aspect of the story shows in a particular fashion the implicit semiotic potentialities of action and of the life-world. Stories thus make us aware of the narrative articulation of our world and, by so doing, represent a reserve of narratives that can be, in return, applied to the lifeworld and can be used to configure new types of actions. There lies, according to Ricœur, the possibility of an iconic increase of the world, a possibility for the world to be enriched by some new alternatives opened by narratives. *Mimesis* 3 is precisely this end result: the impact of narratives on the practical life. The reader can be affected by narratives and act accordingly. As a symbolic discursive mediation, a text opens to action and configures action.

Fictitious narratives, like literature, may present a difficulty to this view, since they do not refer to anything real. Here again Ricœur manifests his acumen. What allows the passage from *Mimesis* 2 to *Mimesis* 3, in the case of works of fiction, is, Ricœur argues, "a second degree reference." In oral discourse, the reference is guaranteed by the ostensive function. Ultimately, a discourse can be made understandable by retroceding to a reality, a thing, or a state of affairs that is common to the speakers and, thus, can be shown. When it cannot be shown, at least it can be situated within a network of rela-

tionships understandable by the interlocutors: what they can remember, what they can check in official documents, etc. Ultimately, the parameters of reference of all discourses are the "here" and "now" of the speakers. In the case of fiction, this possibility of retrocession to a "here" and "now" that could be used for situating the object of reference, by definition, is foreclosed. It is a fiction, a poem, a play, or a novel. However, Ricœur claims, what is abolished is the first degree reference; this abolition itself opens a new reference, at a second degree: if we read and enjoy fictions, it must be that we are somehow able to relate what is invented to what we live. What is referred to in a fiction is "the being-in-the-world which is expounded before the text" (Ricœur 1986a, 114), what Ricœur also calls a "proposal for a world [...] which I could inhabit" (Ricœur 1986a, 115). The expression "being-in-the-world" that Ricœur uses directly alludes to Heidegger. What fictitious narratives, like literature, offer, is indeed a rearticulation of the world: they impinge on the world no longer at the level of manipulable objects alone, but at a level that Husserl designated as "*Lebenswelt* and Heidegger *Being-in-the-world*" (Ricœur 1986a, 114).

These three levels in their interrelationships show that "fiction is only completed in life and that life can be understood only through the stories that we tell about it," so that "an *examined* life, in the sense of the word as we have borrowed it from Socrates, is a life *recounted*" (Ricœur 1991, 30-31). This last quote opens a new ethical dimension: a narrative "turns out to be the first laboratory of moral judgment" (Ricœur 1990, 167).

Although this emphasis on narratives opens a new range of questions and raises a host of difficulties, the mediation of narratives reformulates the problem of intentional act and fulfilment. Since, now, intention itself is narrative in character, to the extent that it must be articulated and therefore semiotically mediated, an intention cannot be separated from its potential fulfilment. The narrative, as the semiotic mediation, is precisely what articulates both intention and fulfilment, and offers the guarantee that, if there is intention, its possible fulfilment was already anticipated for this intention to be articulated.

Similarly, Ricœur has decisively moved the phenomenological debate away from Husserl's intricacies: the passivity of the ego as well as of the world cannot be recovered in a static phenomenology. Passiv-

ity is not what was once present, but is constituted in the sense of reconstructed, within an activity of consciousness. The very notion of reconstruction entails the intrinsically narrative character of the whole enterprise. "Our life [...] appears to us as a field of constructive activity, borrowed from narrative understanding, by which we attempt to discover, and not simply to impose from outside, the narrative identity which constitutes us" (Ricœur 1991, 32). At the same time – and this might retrospectively alleviate Husserl's fears that the presence might be lost – a passivity can only make sense when it is embodied in a story which is under the responsibility of an utterer. If we have to give up a naive conception of presence – an original presence as Husserl calls it – it is not to fall into a dissemination of effects of presence. If presence cannot be this mythical moment which in principle can account for a living constitution, even of what seems to exceed my capacities, presence still remains the site of self-identity that has been gained at the term of a narrative journey.

Note

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Translators' Preface

In 1950 Paul Ricœur translated into French Husserl's major work *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erster Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie.* The original German text was first published in 1913 as a special issue of *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, vol. 1. In this French translation Ricœur provided both a lengthy introductory chapter and a large running commentary in the form of notes. These notes were keyed to the beginning of many of Husserl's sections and to important places within the body of the text. The result of Ricœur's effort gives a chance to see a philosopher of the first rank grapple with the obscurities of the German text. The present translation brings at last this famous commentary into English. In undertaking this work the translators have benefitted from the encouragement of Professor Ricœur himself.

It must be emphasized that the style of his commentary on Husserl, though very authoritative, does not have the smoothness found in Ricœur's essays. One should bear in mind that his comments were originally just notes to Ricœur's French translation of Husserl. As such, they bear the blunt, chopped style of footnotes. While their value lies in their content and not in their style, we have taken great pains to improve the latter while preserving the former.

A word needs to be said about the prefatory references to each note. Four references are given. The first is to the English translation of the *Ideas* by F. Kersten. So, K:12:8 refers to line eight of page twelve of the Kersten text.

The second refers to the page in the German text and to Ricœur's note on that page. So, G:13:2 refers to the second note of Ricœur on page thirteen of the German text. In the body of his text Ricœur himself refers to the German text, so that "Cf. p. 9, n. 5" means Ricœur's footnote five of page nine in the German text. In our nomenclature it reads: "Cf. G:9:5."

The third reference refers to the clothbound edition of the W. R. Boyce Gibson English translation. It is abbreviated, for example, as G:58:6, that is, line six of page fifty-eight in Gibson.

The fourth reference refers to the paperbound edition of Gibson. It is prefaced by "GP." This fourth is included because the pagination of the clothbound and paperbound editions of Gibson differ considerably.

Altogether a typical reference would be prefaced as follows: K:12:8; G:13:2; GC:58:6; GP:51:39.

This apparatus has the advantage in that it may be used as a help for whatever version or translation of Husserl one may have. A single line counter made in the form of a ruler will make this process a little easier.

When Ricœur refers to Husserl's works, he always refers to the German text, except for the *Cartesian Meditations* where he uses the French translation by Peiffer and Levinas. In the latter case only we mention the English pagination for reasons explained *infra*, p. 35, n. b.

Translators' notes are in square backets, followed by the mention "Translators." The Editor's notes are either in footnote or in square brackets, always followed by the mention "Editor."

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Introduction to *Ideas I* of E. Husserl

Dedicated to Mikel Dufrenne

It is impossible, in the limited space of an introduction, to give a complete survey of Husserl's phenomenology. Moreover, the enormous mass of unpublished manuscripts in the *Husserl Archives* at Louvain prevents us from claiming to have at the present time a radical and complete interpretation of Husserl's entire work. Thirty thousand pages in octavo autograph edition, almost all of which is written in shorthand, represents a body of material considerably greater than the writings published during the author's lifetime. The transcription and the publication, either partial or total, of these manuscripts, which was undertaken by the *Husserl Archives* at Louvain under the direction of Dr. H. L. Van Breda, will determine the extent to which our present understanding of Husserl's thought is accurate.[a] This understanding at present essentially relies on *Logical Investigations*,[1] *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*.[2] *Philosophy as a Rigorous Science*,[3] *Ideas I*,[4] *Phenomenology*,[5] *Formal and Transcendental Logic*,[6] *Cartesian Meditations*,[7b] *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*,[8] and *Experience and Judgment*.[9] Therefore the purpose of this introduction is very modest. It attempts, first, to connect some themes arising from the internal critique of *Ideas I* and scattered in the Commentary. Then, it attempts to sketch, with the help of the principal manuscripts of the 1901-11 period, the history of Husserl's thought from the *Logical Investigations* to the *Ideas*.

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[a] Since the publication of Ricœur's translation, more than eighteen volumes have been published in *Husserliana*. Editor.

[b] Ricœur refers to the French translation by Gabrielle Peiffer and Emmanuel Levinas of Husserl's revised lectures in Paris in 1929. The German text was edited by S. Strasser and published in 1950 (*Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*. The Hague: Nijhoff. *Husserliana* vol. 1), based on several manuscripts. Dorion Cairns based his English translation primarily on the German text, but also referred to a typescript, called Typescript C. There is thus no systematic correspondence between the French text, used by Ricœur, and the English translation. Editor.

I
The Development of Reflection in *Ideas I*

It is particularly difficult to treat *Ideas I* as if the text were self-explanatory. What makes the matter so difficult in the case of *Ideas I* is, first of all, the fact that the book is part of a trilogy, of which only the first part has appeared.[a] *Ideas II*, which we were able to consult in the *Husserl Archives*, is a very exacting study of problems concerning the constitution of the physical thing, the psycho-physiological Ego,[b] and the person from the collective point of view of the sciences of the mind. The method that is to be put to use is, thus, only presented in *Ideas I* in its basic form with some very abbreviated examples. According to the introduction of *Ideas I*, *Ideas III*, whose definitive transcript had not yet been completed when we finished our work, is supposed to found first philosophy on phenomenology. Moreover, *Ideas I* presupposes some precise logical knowledge which is worked out in the *Logical Investigations*. Such a knowledge is treated most frequently by allusion in the present work, and one is not in a position to understand it technically without appealing to the *Logical Investigations*. Nor can it be grasped in exact connection with the central idea of transcendental phenomenology without appealing to *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, which reveals the passage of formal logic to its transcendental foundation in phenomenology. Finally, it must be said that *Ideas I* is a book whose meaning remains *concealed*

[a] *Ideas* II and III are now available, both in German and in English translation.

– *Husserliana* vol 4: *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie.* Zweites Buch: *Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution.* Ed. M. Biemel, 1952. Tr. *Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution* by R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer. The Hague: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989.

– *Husserliana* vol. 5: *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie.* Drittes Buch: *Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften.* Ed. M. Biemel, 1953. Tr. *Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences.* Tr. E. Klein and W.E. Pohl. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980. Editor.

[b] Ricœur uses the terms "je," "moi," and "ego." These terms have been uniformally translated by "Ego," except when Ricœur plays with the words, as in "le 'je' de 'je vois,'" which has been rendered as: "the 'I' of 'I see.'" Editor.

and that one is inevitably inclined to look for its meaning elsewhere. At every moment one gets the impression that what is essential is not stated, because the book is more concerned with offering a new vision of the world and consciousness than with providing definite statements about consciousness and the world, which precisely could not be comprehended without this change of vision. This key to the work seems to escape even the reader of the *Cartesian Meditations,* which was written twenty years after the *Ideas.* But the most explicit text which we possess asks the most puzzling questions. This text is not the work of Husserl himself but of Eugen Fink who was Husserl's collaborator for several years. He knew intimately not only Husserl's published work, but also a good part of the handwritten work and was well familiar with the living thought of the master. This text is the extensive article entitled: "Die phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik," published in *Kantstudien.* Vol. XXXVIII (1933), issues 3-4. One might fear that it represents only Fink's interpretation, or Husserl's self-interpretation at a time he was under the influence of Fink. Nevertheless, Husserl has authorized this text in the most explicit way: "I am delighted to be able to say that it does not contain one phrase which I could not completely use and explicitly recognize as the expression of my own conviction." (Introduction.) Therefore this text should not be overlooked by any means, and we shall have recourse to it in our attempt to elucidate the questions which a direct, immediate reading leaves open.

First Section

Ideas I begins with a very difficult chapter on Logic which the reader can provisionally omit for understanding the *spiritual movement* of the work, but which must be eventually reintegrated in order to grasp the status of *phenomenology as a science.* Besides a host of technical difficulties of a local kind which we have tried to clarify in our commentary, an uncertainty remains which weighs on the general interpretation of this chapter: if phenomenology should be "without presuppositions," in what sense is a logical core presupposed? It is impossible to answer this question initially. For the law of the spiritual movement we try to capture in *Ideas I,* precisely starts on the basis of a logic and a psychology; it then moves, in a spiraling movement, to another level and frees itself of those first crutches; eventually, this law appears to itself as *first,* presuppositionless. It is only at

the end of this deepening movement that phenomenology would be able *to ground* the sciences which first initiated it.

The purpose of this chapter of logic is, first, to show that it is possible to construct a nonempirical yet eidetic[10] science of consciousness, and, second, to understand the essences of consciousness as the supreme genera which one finds in the entire "region" of consciousness (as opposed to the "region" of nature).[11] Phenomenology thus turns out to have benefitted from this twofold logical analysis of essences and regions. But phenomenology will build upon this logical analysis and bring to the fore an aspect of the subject which is *constituting,* thus constituting these very sciences which have given phenomenology its basic status. One will see in particular that the "region" of consciousness is not *coordinated* to the "region" of nature, but rather that the latter is related to the former and, indeed, is included, in a special sense of the word, in the former. Also, one suspects that phenomenology, which seemed to carve out its object in total reality (nature and consciousness), can ground other sciences and finally its own methodology, by laying out the general foundation of logic itself, as it appears in *Formal and Transcendental Logic.* For the time being let us put aside this complex relation of Logic to Phenomenology, since this relation is precisely the historical problem of the transition from the *Logical Investigations* to the *Ideas*, which we will deal with in the second part of this introduction.

Second Section

The *Ideas* sketches an ascension which should lead to what Husserl calls reduction, or even better "suspension," of the natural thesis of the world (thesis being equivalent to positing) and which is nothing but the reverse side or the negative of a formative, perhaps even creative, work of consciousness, called transcendental constitution. What is the thesis of the world? What is its reduction? What is constitution? What is *that which* is constituted? *What* is this transcendental subject which is disengaged thereby from natural reality and is engaged in the work of constitution? Such questions cannot be answered "without support" but must be won by the asceticism of the phenomenological method. What is greatly disconcerting to the reader of the *Ideas* is the fact that it is difficult to say when one really employs the famous phenomenological reduction. In this second section reduction is spoken of superficially in enigmatic and even misleading terms (par. 27-32, 33, 56-62). But the most important analyses of the second section are *below* the level of reduction, and it is not certain whether, following Fink, the analyses of the third and fourth sections go beyond a vague level between preparatory psychology and truly transcendental philosophy. Let us leave behind the enigmatic Chapter I, which anticipates this asceticism, and consider the analyses of the second section, which are preparatory for phenomenological reduction, by starting on the level of psychological reflection. Such analyses are still within "the natural attitude" which is precisely to be reduced. These involve two aspects:

First, Chapter II contains the study of the intentionality of consciousness, that remarkable property of consciousness of being consciousness of..., that transcending act of meaning, bursting toward the world.[12] In Chapter 2 this study of intentionality culminates in the discovery of reflection, which is the revelation of consciousness to itself as bursting from itself. Toward what does this analysis tend—an analysis that can be called phenomenological in the broad sense of a description of phenomena, as they present themselves to intuition, but not in the strict sense of transcendental phenomenology introduced by reduction and constitution? The purpose is modest in that it consists in preparing oneself to disengage the natural attitude by breaking that naturalism which is but one of its least subtle manifestations. In Husserlian language, the "region" of consciousness is *other* than the "region" of nature. It is perceived *otherwise*, exists *otherwise*, and is *certain in another way.*[13] One can see the truly *Cartesian* method of finding a starting point. It is a route but not the only route, since *Formal and Transcendental Logic* will solely proceed by the logical route. (The extensive unpublished *Crisis* discerns five different routes[a]).

[a]The *Crisis* has been published under the title: *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie.* (*Husserliana* vol. 6.) W. Biemel (Ed.) The Hague: Nijhoff, 1954. Tr. *The Crisis of European Sciences and transcendental Phenomenology* by D. Carr. Evanston: Northwestern, 1970. A series of manuscripts pertaining to the issues of the *Crisis* has been published under the title: *Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Ergänzungsband. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1934-1937).* (*Husserliana* vol. 29.) R.N. Smid (Ed.). The Hague: Nijhoff, 1993. Editor.

The route is not without peril. It already seems to suggest that reduction consists in removing something (*doubtful* nature) and in retaining by subtraction what remains (*indubitable* consciousness). This mutilation, which in any case only allows the existence of a psychological consciousness and not a transcendental subject, is the counterfeit of true reduction. But the pedagogical method of *Ideas*, which is more Cartesian than Kantian, lends itself to the risk of such a misunderstanding.[14]

Second, Chapter III corrects the analysis by stating that consciousness is not only *other* than reality, but reality is *relative* to consciousness in the sense that reality announces itself in consciousness as *a unity of meaning* among a variety of converging "adumbrations."[15] The mind is thus directed to the notion of reduction and constitution. Husserl shows that it is not contrary to the essence of object and world for appearances to be in accord in different ways or not at all. In this limit-hypothesis which is created by the imagination, but which no essence resists, the world would be annihilated.[16] Consequently, nature is no longer only doubtful but *contingent* and *relative*. Consciousness is no longer only indubitable but *necessary* and *absolute*.[17]

The mind prepared in this way realizes that it has gradually attuned to reduction, a reduction that functions as a magnet pole for a constantly self-improving analysis.

Third. If one now wants to approach the famous phenomenological reduction, one must try to grasp together "natural thesis," "reduction of the thesis," and "transcendental constitution."[18] It would be an illusion to believe that the natural attitude can first be defined from within itself and then be overcome. It is precisely through the reduction that the natural attitude appears as "thesis of the world" and at the same time reduction receives its positive meaning through constitution. That is why everything that can be stated about the natural thesis is initially obscure and confusing. More precisely, one is tempted to try a Cartesian or Kantian scheme, one along the lines of Chapter II and the other along the lines of Chapter III. One might say, for example, that the thesis of the world is the illusion that perception is more *certain* than reflection, or that the thesis of the world is the naïve belief in the existence *in itself* of the world. Reduction would then be something like methodical doubt or the resort to consciousness as an a priori condition of the possibility of objectivity. These are some of the possible paths of approach. In particular reduction is not *doubt*, since it leaves belief intact without involving itself in it. Therefore, the thesis is not belief, properly speaking, but something which contaminates it. Reduction is not the discovery of a regulative action of the mind either, since consciousness continues to be a subject of *intuition* and not of *construction*.[19] The basic intuitionism of Husserlian epistemology is not destroyed by transcendental phenomenology. On the contrary, Husserl will constantly deepen his philosophy of perception as a philosophy of seeing in the broadest sense. The thesis is therefore something that mixes with an indubitable belief and which is, moreover, intuitive. Husserl thus has in view a principle which pervades *belief* without being belief and which contaminates *seeing* without being seeing itself, since *seeing* will leave phenomenological reduction unaltered and sovereign.

We get to the chief point by remarking that the thesis of the world is not something positive which reduction, understood as a negating moment, would later nullify. On the contrary, reduction abolishes a limitation of consciousness by freeing its absolute scope.

What allows us to say so is precisely the connection between thesis, reduction, and constitution. If constitution must be able to be the essential positivity of consciousness, reduction should be the lifting of an interdiction which burdens consciousness.

What interdiction can limit a consciousness which *believes* in the world and which *sees* the world in which it *believes*? One can say (continuing to be metaphorical) that the thesis of the world is consciousness *caught* in its belief, a captive of seeing, and woven with the world in which it goes beyond itself. But this is still misleading, for we should already understand what subject is thus captive, since this captivity does not at all prevent psychological freedom of attention which turns to one thing and away from another, considers this one or that one. This freedom, though, remains a freedom within boundaries which are indeed the natural attitude. To understand the thesis of the world is already to realize myself no longer as a psychological but rather a transcendental subject. In other words, it is already to have reached the summit of phenomenology (a summit which is still provisional).

Being unable to have access immediately to a radical understanding of the transcendental *subject* in relation to which the "thesis of the world" takes its meaning, the analysis of the *Ideas* leaves reduction dangerously associated with the notions of the destruction of the world and the relativity of the world to the absoluteness of con-

sciousness. But the Kantian (and even Cartesian) atmosphere of this pedagogical exaggeration no longer permits an understanding of how, in the fourth section, *intuition* points out the ultimate "legitimation" of every belief, whether it be mathematical, logical, perceptive, etc. For, far from destroying intuition, reduction actually exalts its primitive original character. If intuition must be the last word of all constitution, it is therefore also necessary that the "thesis of the world" be some modification of intuition itself.

A surprising expression of Husserl's moves us forward. Husserl calls intuition, which can "legitimate" every meaning intended by consciousness, "an intuition that gives in original" (originär gebende Anschauung).[20] The fact that intuition can be "giving" is at first more enigmatic than enlightening. I believe that Husserl would be understood if one could understand that the constitution of the world is not a formal legislation but the very giving itself of a sight by the transcendental subject. It could then be said that in the thesis of the world I see without knowing that I am giving. But the "I" of "I see" in the natural attitude is not on the same level as the "I" of "I give" in the transcendental attitude. The first Ego is mundane, as the world is mundane, in which the Ego goes beyond itself. Phenomenological asceticism creates a difference in level between the Ego and the world because it makes the transcendental Ego come forth from the mundane "Ego." Therefore, if the transcendental Ego is the key to constitution, and constitution the key to reduction, and reduction the key to the thesis of the world, one can understand why Husserl could only speak very enigmatically about the thesis of the world when beginning with it as he did in the *Ideas*.

I think that everybody should discover in themselves this movement of going beyond oneself. Thus I will dare to outline the "existential" meaning of the thesis of the world. I am initially forgotten and lost in the world, lost in things, lost in ideas, lost among plants and animals, lost among other people, lost in mathematics. Presence (which will never be denied) is the place of temptation. There is in the sight a trap, the trap of my alienation. I am outside, distracted. Naturalism is the lowest degree of the natural attitude and like the level into which it is dragged by its own folding back movement. For if I lose myself in the world, I am already prepared to treat myself as a worldly thing. The thesis of the world is a sort of blindness in the very core of sight. What one calls *living* is a hiding as a naïve con-

sciousness in the pit of the existence of things: "im natürlichen Dahinleben lebe ich immerfort in dieser Grundform alles aktuellen Lebens."[21] Therefore, phenomenological asceticism is a true conversion of intentional meaning which is initially a *forgetfulness* of consciousness, but later shows itself to be a *gift*.

That is why intentionality can be described before and after phenomenological reduction. Before it, intentionality is an encounter, while, after it, it is a constitution. Thus, it remains the common theme of both pre-phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology. Reduction is the first free act because it is the liberator from mundane illusion. By this act I apparently *lose* the world while truly *gaining* it.

Third Section

Not only in the *Ideas* are the problems of constitution situated in a certain vague region between an intentional psychology and a really transcendental phenomenology,[22] but they are knowingly kept in narrow limits. Only the constitution of "transcendences" is considered, and principally the transcendence of nature, which is considered as a touchstone of the phenomenological attitude.[23] Some transcendences, which are more subtle, are hardly addressed in passing (such as that of the psychological Ego) which are "grounded" in nature through the intermediary of the body.[24] A very small place is made for the transcendence of *logical* essences, although they furnished the principal analyses of the *Logical Investigations*.[25] There is little doubt, on the one hand, that logic is included in the natural attitude and is a concern for reduction and, on the other, that there is a problem of the constitution of logico-mathematical disciplines, as is outlined in Chapter III of the Fourth Section. This outline is important, for it readily shows that logic itself has a transcendental root in primordial subjectivity. The *Logical Investigations* are not therefore disavowed but rather integrated. *Formal and Transcendental Logic* demonstrates this quite thoroughly. But in the *Ideas* the psychological method of commencing phenomenology gives only a poor view of this graft of logic onto the new phenomenological tree. By and large, the *Ideas* have their center of gravity in a phenomenology of sense perception. Hence the wide range of residual problems which will be alluded to at the end.

In the third section, the problems concerning constitution are very carefully presented around the idea of *noema*. This idea is introduced slowly through lengthy methodological preparatory remarks (Chap. I), by reviewing the themes of the first phenomenological analysis (reflection, intentionality, etc.), but raised to another level by the spiraling movement of the analysis (Chap. II). The *noema* is dealt with in Chap. III: it is the correlate of consciousness, though considered as *constituted in consciousness* (in Greek *nous* means mind).[26] But, a) this constitution is still described as a parallel between such and such characteristics of the noema (which is the object-side of consciousness) and such and such characteristics of the noesis (which is the subject-side of consciousness).[27] And, b) This constitution provisionally does not take into account the *matter* of the act (*hyle*) which is animated by the constituting form.[28] Due to the double limitation, constitution does not appear here as creative. From time to time, however, an heroic penetration in the direction of radical problems of phenomenological philosophy suggests the fact that consciousness is what "prescribes" by its "configuration," or its "interconnection," the mode of the giving and the structure of every correlate of consciousness. Conversely, every unity of meaning which is announced in consciousness is the *index* of these interconnections of consciousness.[29]

Unfortunately, the phenomenological exercises in this third section, under the heading of noetic-noematic analysis, do not carry out this promise. They consist of establishing *distinctions* and *correlations* between the characteristics of the intended object (noema) and the characteristics of the intention of consciousness itself (noesis). The most remarkable analyses are devoted to the "characteristics of belief" (certainty, doubt, questioning, etc., on the side of the noesis, and real, doubtful, problematic, etc. on the side of the noema). One progressively constitutes all the characteristics of "that which is intended,"[30] that is, all the characteristics except one which is dealt with in the Fourth Section. These characteristics are constituted in the sense that, for example, the doubtful and the real are included in the very "meaning" of the "that which is intended as such" and appear as *correlative* to a character *pertaining to* the intention of consciousness. Progressively "that which is intended" is fulfilled with all the characteristics which eventually almost amount to reality itself.

But the remaining problems of the Third Section are perhaps more important than explicit analyses. Everything points to the fact that if

the problems of constitution treated in the *Ideas* concern transcendences which are announced in what is experienced[a] (the object-side of what is experienced), then the more radical problem concerns the constitution of the Ego (the subject-side of the Ego).[31] The meaning of the Ego whose free attention pervades all acts remains vague. The *Logical Investigations* affirms that the Ego lies outside among things and that what is experienced is only a cluster of interconnected acts which do not require a reference center in the Ego. In the *Ideas* Husserl revises this condemnation: there is a pure Ego which is not reduced.[32] But is this pure Ego the most radical transcendental subject? Nothing indicates that this is so. On the contrary, it is clearly stated that this pure Ego is constituted in a specific sense.[33] In fact, the problem of time breaks up Husserl's silence on these difficult questions. Moreover, the earliness of a book such as *Zeitbewusstsein* (1904-1910) shows that most radical problems about the study of the Ego are contemporary with the birth of transcendental phenomenology. There is an important group of unpublished manuscripts devoted to this question.[34] In the *Ideas* even the sequence of time implies that reflection is only possible because of the "retention" of the immediate past in the present. Even more radically, one sees that in the immanent connection of the life-stream lies the very enigma of this sensory matter whose variety in the last analysis conceals the ultimate configurations where transcendences are announced. The constitution of transcendences, however, leaves as residue this *hylè* (matter) or this variety of adumbrations. Thus one is permitted to glimpse the constitution of this matter in another degree of depth. Be that as it may, the Ego, temporality, and *hyle* form a trilogy which calls for an original constitution (proto-constitution) only indirectly indicated in the *Ideas*.

Fourth Section

If one abstracts from the deliberate gaps in analyzing the subject and from the correlative difficulties of the object, a final differentiation remains to be filled between what we shall call the "meaning" of the noema and reality. Husserl has tried to constitute the meaning of noema, for example, as the meaning of that tree which I perceive

[a] Ricœur translates *Erlebnis* by "le vécu," litterally: that which is lived. We have translated by: what is experienced. Translators and Editor.

there, as green, rough, and also as perceived with certainty, doubt, conjecture, etc. According to the Third Section, constituting this meaning of the tree amounted to showing that it is correlative to certain structures of consciousness. The very term noema suggests that there is more in the subject than just the subject and that a specific reflection discovers in each act of consciousness a correlate implied in it. Phenomenology, therefore, appears as a reflection not only upon the subject but also upon the object *in* the subject.

Now something essential still escapes this constitution, which is the "fullness" of the perceived presence, the "quasi-fullness" of imagining, or the "merely intended" character of determinations which are only signified.[35] Transcendental phenomenology aims to integrate into the noema its relation to the object, that is, the "fullness" which completes the constitution of the noema. This final change of course in the *Ideas* is of the greatest importance, since the entire theory of evidence set up in the *Logical Investigations* rests on the filling of empty meanings by the "original" presence of the thing *itself* (in original, in person), of the idea itself, etc.[36] The universal function of intuition (whether it be intuition of the empirical individual, of essences of things, of the limit-essences of mathematics or of regulative ideas in the Kantian sense) is to fulfill the "emptiness" of signs by the "fullness" of presences. To constitute reality is to refuse to leave the "presence" of reality *outside* of the "meaning" of the world.

The *Ideas,* therefore, bring us back in the Fourth Section to the initial difficulty which dominated the interpretation of the "thesis" of the world. Transcendental phenomenology would be established if we had actually shown that intuition is "prescribed" through a "sequence of consciousness." This is something *Ideas I* promises more than it demonstrates. The "relation to the object," it is stated, "is the most inward part in the noema...the most central point of the nucleus." The real object represents "an index which always refers to some perfectly determined systems of consciousness presenting a teleological unity."[37]

All transcendental phenomenology is built upon this double possibility. It affirms, on the one hand, the primacy of intuition in every construction, and, on the other hand, it makes the point of view of transcendental constitution triumph over the naïvety of natural man. In his "Postscript...to the *Ideas*" (1931) Husserl emphasizes the conjunction of these two requirements, namely that transcendental subjectivity originating from reduction is itself a "field of experience," which is "described" and not "constructed."[38]

II

Difficulties with a General Interpretation of the *Ideas*

The phenomenology which is elaborated in the *Ideas* is incontestably an idealism and even a transcendental idealism. This term is not in the *Ideas,* although it is encountered in his earlier unpublished writings – *Formal and Transcendental Logic*[39] and *Cartesian Meditations.*[40] Nevertheless, Landgrebe, in his Analytical Index of the *Ideas,* does not hesitate to group the most important analyses of constitution around this word, and Husserl employs it to characterize the *Ideas* in the "Postscript to my *Ideas*"...[41] But it is ultimately impossible on the basis of the *Ideas* alone to characterize definitively this idealism which is only a project, a promise or claim, depending on the point of view. The most elaborate parts of the *Ideas* are either fragments of an intentional psychology (Second Section), or exercises toward a radical constitution of reality – though below the level of the intended idealism (Third and Fourth Sections). Finally, "pure consciousness," "transcendental consciousness," "absolute being of consciousness" and "originally giving consciousness" are titles for a consciousness which oscillates between several levels, or, better, which is described in different phases of its asceticism. This is the source of the errors of interpretation about which Husserl continually and bitterly complained. If one interprets the later phases, while remaining at the starting point, that of intentional psychology, then transcendental idealism seems to be only a subjective idealism. The "being" of the world is reduced to, in the sense of dissolved into, the "being" of consciousness, as it is revealed in the most ordinary inner perception. But then it becomes impossible to reconcile this rudimentary idealism with the consistent and unfailing philosophy of intuition, from the *Logical Investigations* (1900-01) to *Experience and Judgment* (1939).[42] It is intuition, either in its sensible form or in its eidetic or categorial form,[43] which "gives legitimacy" to the meaning of both the world and logic; that is, logic in the broadest sense of the word (pure grammar, formal logic, mathesis universalis. etc.). Transcendental idealism is such that intuition is not denied but rather grounded.

Neo-Kantian critics believed that they discerned in the *Ideas* an inconsistent mixture of Platonic realism and subjective idealism, and

that these mismatched elements were held together by an artifice of Kantian-style language.[44] As Fink has forcefully shown, there was never any Platonic realism in Husserl, not even in the *Logical Investigations*, as one will soon see. Neither is there a subjective idealism in Husserl which would be disguised in a Kantian language. This position ought to be demonstrated now.

However, nothing is more difficult than trying to determine the final meaning of Husserlian idealism, which is realized by progressive reflection. In the *Ideas* we are given just one path among others toward a center which cannot be adequately given from the outside. One has no alternative but to venture an interpretation and then check to see if the "direction signs" scattered in the *Ideas* agree with this interpretation.

In this respect, the interpretation of E. Fink offers some guidance and should be at least *provisionally adopted and tested*, since Husserl himself recognized it as his own at one time.[45]

Husserl's "question," writes E. Fink,[46] is not the same as Kant's. Kant poses the problem of *validity* for possible objective consciousness. That is why he remains within the boundaries of the natural attitude. The transcendental Kantian subject is still an *apriorische Weltform* – a mundane (*weltimmanent*), though formal, subject. The true differentiation of the absolute subject is not effected. The question of Husserl, according to E. Fink, is the question of the origin of the world *(die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Welt)*.[47] It is, so to speak, the question implied in myths, religions, theologies, and ontologies. But this question still had not been elaborated scientifically. Phenomenology alone questions the unity of "being" and of the "form of the world." Phenomenology does not have the naïvety to appeal to another "being," to a world behind this world. What matters is to avoid any *welthaft* form of explanation or foundation, and to craft a new concept of *welttranszendent* rather than *weltimmanent* science. Phenomenological philosophy claims to found even the sphere of the problem with which criticism deals. It is a philosophy which demonstrates the inclusion of the world (of its "being," meaning, essences, logic, mathematics, etc.) in the absoluteness of the subject.

a) This is why the *principal operation* (or *reduction*) is a conversion of the subject itself so that it is freed from the limitation of the natural attitude. The subject which hid from itself as part of the world discovers itself as the foundation of the world.[48]

But, one might say, if this interpretation is corect, why does Husserl not say so at the beginning of the *Ideas*? This very question is quite incomprehensible until the methodical journey shows it to be a question. Phenomenology does not have any motivation in the world prior to itself. It is by phenomenological reduction that the transcendental problem of the world arises as a project. This is why every description of the natural attitude on its own ground is a misunderstanding. More radically still, phenomenology is not a natural possibility of man. In overcoming itself as *human,* the pure subject inaugurates phenomenology. Consequently phenomenology, not motivated by the natural attitude, can only give poor or ambiguous reasons (Cartesian or Kantian) for its own emergence. Reduction alone reveals what mundane belief is and raises it to a "transcendental subject." As long as it is still expressed in the letter and spirit of the natural attitude, reduction only appears to be the mundane inhibition of the intramundane belief in the being of the world.[49]

b) These misunderstandings of reduction are actually misunderstandings of *constitution*. The transcendental subject is not at all outside the world but is, on the contrary, the foundation of the world. This is Husserl's constant affirmation, namely, that the world is the correlate of absolute consciousness. Reality is the indicator of the radical configurations of consciousness. To discover the transcendental subject is just the same as *grounding* the belief in the world.

Every new dimension of the Ego is a new dimension of the world. It is in this sense that intentionality remains the common theme in intentional psychology and in phenomenological philosophy.[50] But every time phenomenological reduction is folded back to psychological consciousness, the meaning of the Ego is reduced to a mere for-itself of mental nature and to powerless thinking which omits the in-itself. As long as reduction is a "limitation" within the world and not a "lifting of limitation"[51] beyond the world, the world is *outside* of consciousness as another region. By transcending the world, "a-regional" consciousness includes it, along with all "regions." In return, the phenomenological method consists of making an exegesis of the Ego by taking the phenomenon of the world as a guiding thread. Thus there are several levels of truth about constitution, just as there is a progressive deepening of reduction. At the lowest level, which is intentional psychology, constitution preserves a moment of receptivity, to which the doctrine of *hyle* is witness. The *Ideas* already

call constitution, anticipating the highest level, the simple correlations between noema and noesis. But Fink assures us that in the final stage transcendental intentionality is "productive" or "creative."[52] These two highly loaded words are endorsed by Husserl.

As a result there would be three concepts of intentionality: that of psychology, which is synonymous with receptivity, that of the *Ideas*, dominated by the correlation of noema and noesis, (of which one does not know whether it is receptive or creative), and that of genuine constitution which is productive and creative.

E. Fink indicates that reflection on the transcendental Ego already implies a third Ego, which is "the reflecting spectator who contemplates (zuschaut) belief in the world while actually exercising this living act of contemplating without cooperating with it."[53] Radically speaking, it is for this reflecting spectator that the transcendental Ego in its flux of life is belief in the world. Such a reflecting spectator carries out the reduction. He is the "theoretical transcendental spectator," who discovers the belief in the world as the ground of the world.

Needless to say, this interpretation raises the most extreme difficulties. In what sense, and at what level of phenomenological asceticism, is subjectivity a plurality of consciousnesses or an intersubjectivity? Is the most radical subject God? Or, does the question of the "origin," scientifically elaborated by transcendental phenomenology, clear up the problematic of religions as a myth of the natural human being? Only a study of the unpublished writings on the "Urkonstitution" would let us correctly pose these questions.[54]

III
The Birth of the *Ideas*

Only when the *Ideas* are elucidated retrospectively, from the standpoint of later works and within a broader scope, do they make full sense, and, conversely, shed light on the earlier drafts from which they arise.

It is often said that Husserl was realistic in 1901 but idealistic in 1911. The hierarchical character of phenomenological reflection puts us on guard against such opposition. The disadvantage of such an opposition is not only that it is superficial, but that it interprets the development of Husserl's thought on a horizontal plane. The *Ideas* are not at all opposed to the *Logical Investigations* because in the

meantime phenomenology causes a new dimension of consciousness to arise – another level of reflection and analysis.

It is claimed that the *Logical Investigations* extract from subjectivity the logical truths which the *Ideas* include anew in subjectivity. But this is not the same subjectivity Husserl struggled with in 1901 and exalted in 1911. If the idealism of the *Ideas* were subjectivist, the *Ideas* would contradict the *Logical Investigations*. Husserl had such little awareness of such a contradiction that he constantly improved the *Logical Investigations* to bring them to the level of the *Ideas*. Thus the fifth and the sixth *Investigations* were revised in the second and third editions of 1913 and 1922. The material of the first four investigations was newly elaborated in the framework of the first part of *Formal and Transcendental Logic*.

It is true that *Ideas* does not very well indicate how logic can be integrated into phenomenology.[55] The reason for this is that in the *Ideas* the initial method is more psychological than logical. On the other hand, even the most superficial reading of *Formal and Transcendental Logic* leaves no doubt: Logic can still be perfected on the lines of an a priori of formal essences (first part) and then be transferred wholesale on the lines of transcendental philosophy (second part). *Experience and Judgment* confirms this interpretation.[56]

Generally it can be said that the "Prolegomena to Pure Logic" (which forms the first part of the *Logical Investigations*) and the first four *Investigations* of Volume II form a line which goes from formal logic to transcendental logic, passing through *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and *Experience and Judgment*. The fifth and sixth *Investigations*, the *Ideas*, and the *Cartesian Meditations* form another line which goes from the psychological *Cogito* to the transcendental *Cogito*. Just as in Leibniz's work, one has to find a direction in Husserl: Both works are labyrinths with several entrances and perhaps several centers, relative to the different perspectives that can be taken on the whole work. In comparing the *Logical Investigations* and the *Ideas* there is, therefore, a lack of homogeneity because the two works are neither on the same level of reflection nor on the same line of access to the heart of phenomenology.

Nevertheless, in order to discover a contradiction between the great work of logic and the *Ideas*, it will be necessary to attribute to the first work a platonism which is not present and to the second a subjective idealism which is a counterfeit of it. For the alleged platonism

would already be on the level of the problems dealt with in the *Ideas*, but would be opposed to it in advance. Conversely, subjectivist idealism would fall back to the psychologism previously opposed. We have insisted enough on the original idealism of the *Ideas* so that we do not have to return to it. On the other hand, the "neutrality" of the *Logical Investigations*, in relation to the problematic of the *Ideas*, cannot be too strongly emphasized. The task of the "Prolegomena" and the first four *Investigations* is the elucidation of the objective structures of propositions and formal objectivities (whole and part, dependent and independent parts, abstract and concrete, etc.). The objectivity of these structures does not imply any existence of essences in a Cosmos of Ideas. The notion of essence implies only an intelligible constant that resists empirical and imaginative variations. The notion of the intuition of essences implies only the possibility of "fulfilling" logical meanings in a manner analogous to perception which ordinarily "fulfills" the empty meanings relating to things.[57] The objectivity of these structures always has to be reconquered from the subjectivist illusion which confuses concepts, numbers, essences, logical structures, etc., with the individual psychological operations which intend them. This reconquest of objectivity must ever begin anew. Transcendental idealism will always assume this prime victory over psychologism. One may even say that the logicism of the "Prolegomena" is the permanent safeguard of transcendental idealism.

That is why *Formal and Transcendental Logic* begins by giving its highest breadth to formal *objective* [58] logic before carrying it to another level on which objectivity is linked to a more radical subjectivity.[59] Only a flat horizontal view of Husserl's thought prevents understanding that the passage from "logicism" to transcendental subjectivity is made without relinquishing anything. But that passage was not anticipated at the time of the first edition of *Logical Investigations*. The fifth and sixth *Investigations,* in their original form, still only give a descriptive psychology of intentionality and of the "fulfilling" of empty intentions with the fullness of intuition or evidence. From 1907 on Husserl was fully conscious of the limited scope of the two last *Investigations*. He saw them only as a sample of "descriptive psychology" or "empirical phenomenology" which he already distinguished from future "transcendental phenomenology."[60]

What happened, then, between 1901 and 1907? Six years after the publication of *Logical Investigations*, Husserl passed through a phase

of discouragement. Göttingen University had rejected the ministry's plan to name him professor "Ordinarius" of Philosophy. He doubted himself and his own being as a philosopher. In his notebook of September 25, 1906, he passionately assigned himself the task of realizing a *critique of reason*. Because of an inability to attain clarity on the most radical problems, he wrote, "I cannot live in truth and veracity. I have sufficiently tasted the torments of non-clarity and doubt in which I am tossed about in every way. I want to have access to inner coherence."

The idea of a transcendental phenomenology or a transcendental idealism, by way of phenomenological reduction,[62] finds its first public expression in the *Five Lectures* which bear the title *Idea of Phenomenology*.[63]

As evidenced from various minor unpublished manuscripts of the period 1907-1911, a veritable crisis of skepticism is at the origin of the phenomenological question. A hiatus seems to extend between what is "experienced in consciousness" and the object: "*Wie kann sie über sie hinaus und ihre Objekt zuverlässig treffen?*" This question comes back in a thousand forms in the unpublished writings of this period. The menace of a real solipsism, of a true subjectivism, is that which originates phenomenology. (No trace of this perilous situation is found in the *Ideas*). Thus, the task of prime urgency is "to elucidate the essence and objectivity of knowledge" (first lecture). The question lingers like a sting: *"Wie kann das Erlebnis sozusagen über sie hinaus?"* (second lecture). Because of this the *erkenntnis-theoretische* reduction seems to be an exclusion of transcendence or a withdrawal into immanence. At this time it is unquestionable that reduction *sets limits*. The image of the disconnecting (*Ausschaltung*) is found in this third lecture. But at the same time the clear vision of the goal is affirmed – namely, to recover the connection to transcendence as an "inner characteristic of the phenomenon" grasped in its immanence. At this point the fourth lecture introduces intentionality as a new dimension of immanence. As a result, there are two immanences: *"das rell Immanent"* and *"das im intentionalen Sinn Immanent."* This is what the *Ideas* call the noema. Thus the philosopher had only appeared to be shut up in himself in order to better understand intentionality as a structure of consciousness and not as an intra-objective relation. The fifth lecture can then go on to the theme of constitution which is also marked by its victory over skepticism. The immanent data, which

had once appeared to be simply included in consciousness "as in a box," "take form as appearances." These appearances are not themselves the objects, and do not contain the objects, but "in some way create objects for the Ego." Confronting this first sketch of phenomenology, the reader himself has difficulty repressing the feeling that absolute existence is lost and the domain of consciousness has been enlarged to introduce merely the *phenomenon* of the world. Some later manuscripts even fall back below this first position (which was a liberation) and echo the inner battle that the philosopher wages against the phantom of an in-itself which is never reached but always lost.[64] It seems that the first project of transcendental idealism continues to be colored by the subjectivism which it tries to overcome.

The transition to the *Ideas* can be observed in the *Course* of October to November, 1910, entitled *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*,[65] which contains in germ most of the themes of *Ideas I* and even *Ideas II* (in particular, the *Einfühlung* or empathy).[66] This course begins with a remarkable description of the natural attitude and its "prediscovered" (*vorgefundene*) world. In the second chapter, reduction continues to be presented, more clearly than in the *Ideas*, as an elimination of nature and one's own body. Thus the natural attitude seems to be understood by itself in the very framework of the reflection of the natural human being. From that perspective reduction appears as a "self-limitation" to the sphere of immanence. That is what "remains" when the positing of empirical existence has been removed. Everything that Fink regrets in the *Ideas* is exposed here. But, on the other hand, all skeptical repercussion and noteworthy philosophic anxiety has disappeared. At the same time the future direction of thought is clearly revealed: it is strongly affirmed that belief in physical nature remains intact – it is just suspended – and solipsism is avoided by the very fact that the *solus ipse* of psychological consciousness is itself also suspended. In the third and fourth chapters, phenomenological experience, having been brought out by reduction, is expanded from intuition of the present to the temporal horizons of expectation and memory. Thus its temporal span is restored to subjectivity. This path is remarkable because it is oriented toward the self-constitution of inner time *prior* to posing the problem of the constitution of nature: the problem of the unity of the flux of what is experienced (Chapter 1V) even has precedence over every consideration regarding intentionality. Only in Chapter V is intentionality brought up and "that

which resides in *cogitatio* as intentional" is examined. Reduction of nature to what is "perceived" and "remembered" leads us at once to the radical affirmation that nature in phenomenology is only "the indicator of some regulation of consciousness as pure consciousness." Still more strongly put, "the true existence of a thing is the indicator of certain set sequences of appearances which call for a set description." Some of the most radical affirmations of the *Ideas* and the *Cartesian Meditations* are encountered here. The experience of nature is thereby integrated into the temporal flux of what is experienced. Finally, and this is the ultimate expansion of the phenomenological field (Chapter VI), empathy allows us to consider a plurality and community of subjects in the very same framework of the reduction of nature: in this community, each subject is "presented" to itself and all others are "presentiated" to him,"[67] not as parts of nature, but as pure consciousnesses. The level of the *Ideas* is henceforth attained.

To sum up: 1) as regards the methodological point of view, there is no difficulty in the passage from "logicism" to transcendental phenomenology if one takes the latter to be a standard sufficiently elevated and removed from all intentional psychology and from all subjectivist idealism. In 1929 Husserl was sufficiently strengthened to write *Formal and Transcendental Logic* in which he again expanded and reinforced "logicism" prior to integrating it radically into transcendental phenomenology.

2) From the point of view of the *history* of Husserl's thought, however, transcendental phenomenology itself has had a difficult birth, before being in position to present correctly the problem of the integration of objective logic and, in general, of all intuitional forms in phenomenology. The development of Husserl's thought from 1905 to 1911 appears to us to consist in an effort to subordinate increasingly the understanding of the natural attitude to that of phenomenological reduction and to clarify reduction by the transcendental constitution of the world. In the beginning the natural attitude is understood as "physical experience" itself, and reduction is provoked by a skeptical crisis. It is then put forward as a limitation to the *Ego* by excluding *nature*.[68]

If some light is shed on the *Ideas* , on one hand, from the point of view of a more advanced stage of phenomenological philosophy, and, on the other hand, by comparing it to the first attempts at a tran-

scendental idealism, this work appears to be the witness to an intermediary period where the first psychological and even subjectivist motifs of reduction are not yet integrated into the final project of phenomenology.[69] Perhaps they could not be so, if it is true that the ultimate meaning of phenomenology can only be approached by very ambiguous steps. This is most likely why, in 1928, Husserl judged the *Ideas* to be worthy of republication for the third time without alteration, while thousands of other pages, although completed (among them the continuation of the *Ideas*), were withheld from the public in the name of this intellectual rigor and this scrupulous desire for perfection. These were the rare virtues of the master of Göttingen and Freiburg.

May I be permitted, in ending this introduction, to thank Dr. H. L. Van Breda, Director of the *Husserl Archives* at Louvain, for the kindness of giving me access to the unpublished writings and of often helping me to interpret them. I am pleased to associate his name with Dr. St. Strasser and also with Dr. and Mrs. Biemel for their valuable advice which allowed me to improve my translation and better understand this dense and rigorous text.

Notes to the *Introduction*

1. First edition Vol. I (1900), Vol. 11 (1901), Niemeyer (Halle); second edition, revised in 3 volumes. (1913 and 1922); third and fourth editions unchanged (1922 and 1928). [Now available in *Husserliana. Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Werke.* The Hague; Nijhoff. Vol. 18: *Logische Untersuchungen.* Erster Band: *Prolegomena zur reinen Logik.* Ed. E. Holenstein. 1975. Vol 19,1: *Logische Untersuchungen.* Zweiter Band: *Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis.* Erster Teil. Ed. U. Panzer. 1984. Vol. 19,2: *Logische Untersuchungen.* Zweiter Band: *Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis.* Zweiter Teil. Ed. U. Panzer, 1984. Tr. *Logical Investigations.* Tr. John Findlay. New York: Humanities Press, 1970. Editor]. English readers have an ample summary of it in Marvin Farber's excellent work: *The Foundation of Phenomenology, Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Philosophy.* Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1943. XII + 586 p.; cf. particularly p. 99-510.
2. Lectures taken from a course in 1904-5 and works extending from 1905 to 1920, edited in 1928 by Heidegger in the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forshung,* IX, p. 367-496; reproduced separately, Niemeyer (Halle), 1938. [Now available in *Husserliana* vol. 9: *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917).* Ed. R. Boehm, 1966. Tr. *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* by J.S. Churchill. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964. See also: *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917)* tr. by J.B. Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991. Editor]
3. An article published in the review *Logos* I (1911), p. 289-341. [*Philosophy and the Crisis of Philosophy: Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, and Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man.* Tr. Quentin Lauer. New York: Harper & Row, 1965. Editor]
4. First edition of Volume I in the *Jahrbuch* ... 1, 1913; second and third edition separately without change. Niemeyer (Halle). [Now available in *Husserliana* vol. 3,1: *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie.* Erstes Buch: *Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie.* Text of the 1-3 ed., newly edited by K. Schuhman, 1976. Vol. 3,2: *Ergänzende Texte (1912-1929).* Newly edited by K. Schuhman, 1976. Editor.] English translation by W. R. Boyce Gibson (London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: Macmillan), 1931. Preface of E. Husserl published separately with slight modifications under the title: "Nachwort zu meinen *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie.*" *Jahrbuch* ... 1930; published separately Niemeyer, 1930. E. Levinas has given a good resumé

of it in the *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger*, March-April, 1929: "Sur les *Ideen* de M. E. Husserl."

5. An article published in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 1927, fourth edition, Vol. 17, p. 699-702. [Re-printed and translated in Joseph Kockelmans, *Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology*. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1994. Editor.]
6. *Jahrbuch* ... and Niemeyer (Halle), 1930. [Now available in *Husserliana* 17: *Formale und Transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft*. Ed. P. Janssen, 1974. Tr. *Formal and Transcendental Logic* by D. Cairns. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969. Editor.]
7. Paris, 1934, A. Colin (tr. Peiffer and Levinas) [*Husserliana* vol. 1: *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*. Ed. B. Strasser, 1950. Tr. *Cartesian Meditations. An Introduction to Phenomnenology* by D. Cairns. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1991. See Editor's note b p. 35. Editor].
8. Only the first part published, review *Philosophia* I, 1936, p. 77-176, Belgrade. [The complete text is now available in German in two volumes: *Husserliana* vol. 6: *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Philosophie*. Ed. W. Biemel. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1954. *Husserliana* vol. 29: *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Ergänzungsband. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1934-1937)*. Ed. R.N. Smid. The Hague: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993. The first volume has been translated in part by D. Carr: *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970. Editor.]
9. Edit. by Landgrebe, Prague, 1939.[Now available under the title: *Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur genealogie der Logik*. L. Landgrebe (Ed.). Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1985. Tr. *Experience and Judgement. Investigations on a Genealogy of Logic* by J. Churchill and K. Ameriks. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973. Editor.]
10. On essence, cf. the Commentary G:9:5.
11. On region, cf. the Commentary, G:19:1.
12. J. -P. Sartre: "Une Idée fondamentale de la Phénoménologie de Husserl," *Nouvelle Revue Française*. 1939. p. 129-32.
13. Cf. Commentary, G:48:1, G:57:3, G:80:1.
14. Commentary, G:48:3, G:53:1, G:54:1, etc., G:57:4.
15. Commentary, G:87:4, 5.
16. Par. 49.
17. Pars. 54-5.
18. Cf. Commentary, G:48:3, G:53:1, G:54:1, 4, 5, G:56:1, G:57:3, G:59:3.
19. "Nachwort zu meinen *Ideen*...," p. 3-5.
20. Commentary, G:7:5.
21. *Ideen* I, p. 50-1

22. That is why in "Nachwort zu meinen *Ideen* . . ." Husserl insisted at length on the separation of "phenomenological psychology" and "transcendental phenomenology," p. 3-10.
23. *Ideen*, Pars. 47 and 56.
24. Par. 53.
25. Pars. 59-60.
26. Cf. Commentary, G:179:1.
27. Par. 98.
28. P. 171-2, 178, 203.
29. Pars. 90, 96.
30. All of Chapter IV.
31. Cf. Commentary, G:161:1, G:163:1.
32. On this disagreement between *Logical Investigations* and the *Ideas*, cf. Commentary, G:109:1.
33. Cf. p. 163 supra.
34. Group D of the classification of manuscripts elaborated by E. Fink and L. Landgrebe, in 1935, under the title: "Primordiale Konstitution" ("Urkonstitution").
35. Cf. Commentary, G:265:1.
36. *Logical Investigations*. Sixth study, second part.
37. *Ideen*, p. 268-69, 303.
38. "Nachwort . . .," p. 4.
39. Par. 66, "Psychologistischer and Phänomenologischer Idealismus."
40. Par. 40: transition to the problem of transcendental idealism; Par. 41: true phenomenological explanation of the "Ego Cogito" as transcendental idealism.
41. He puts *transzendental-phänomenologischer Idealismus* in opposition to *psychologischer Idealismus*. p. 11.
42. Levinas, *La Théorie de L'Intuition dans la Phénoménologie de Husserl*, Alcan, 1930, p. 101-174. J. Héring has strongly shown in his discussion with L. Chestov that in Husserl there is not any autocracy of reason and logic but the rule of intuition in all its forms. Héring: "Sub specie aeterni." (*Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuse*, 1927), in response to "Memento mori" (*Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger.*, Jan. 1926).
43. Commentary, G:9:5.
44. Fink, *Op. cit.*, p. 321-6, 334-36.
45. In another article, E. Fink speaks of a "risk" of interpretation: "Das Problem der Phaenomenologie E. Husserls," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, Jan. 15, 1939, p. 227.
46. *Op. cit.*, particular case, p. 336 ff.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 338. On Husserl and Kant, cf. G. Berger, *Le Cogito dans la Philosophie de Husserl*, Aubier, 1941, p. 121-33.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 341-43.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 359; in favor of this interpretation: *Méditations Cartésiennes*, p. 70-4 [Eng. p. 83-88. Editor]. G. Berger, op. cit., p. 43-61, gives a remarkable exposé of phenomenological reduction with all its difficulties.
50. *Méditations Cartésiennes* proposes this developed formula of the Cogito: "Ego-cogito-ogitatum," p. 43 [Eng. p. 50. Editor.]
51. *Einschränkung, Entschränkung*, *Op. cit.*, p. 359.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 373. But as it has been said above, this "creating" is not so much a "making" in the mundane sense, but is rather a "seeing." I here agree with G. Berger, *op. cit.*, p. 97-100: "One has to learn to unite two concepts that we usually contrast: phenomenology is a philosophy of *creative intuition*.... The evidence, this completed form of intentionality, is that which is constituting" (p. 100). This creation, "beyond action and passion" (p. 103), is a "creation by intuition." (p. 107).
53. *Op. cit.*, p. 356, 367.
54. Marvin Farber, who studies so carefully and faithfully the *Logical Investigations* in *The Foundation of Phenomenology*, criticizes Husserlian idealism too summarily, p. 543-59.
55. However, cf. *Ideen*, par. 146-49.
56. Cf. a good resumé of *Experience and Judgment*, by Marvin Farber, in the *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 36, n. 9, April 27, 1939, p. 247-49.
57. E. Levinas, *La Théorie de l'intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl*, p. 143-174. Commentary on the *Ideas*, G:9:5.
58. *Die volle Idee der Formalen Logik*, p. 42 ff.
59. *Psychologismus and transzendentale Grundlegung der Logik*, p. 133-56.
60. Unpublished text of Sept., 1907, under signature B II 1 of the *Husserl Archives* at Louvain.
61. Text and information taken from the introduction by Dr. Biemel to the still unpublished transcription of *The Idea of Phenomenology*. [Now available in *Husserliana*: *Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen*. Ed. W. Biemel, 1950. Tr. *The Idea of Phenomenology* by W.P. Alston and G. Nakhnikian. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964. Editor.]
62. The first allusion to reduction is autumn, 1905: Seefelder Blättern A VII5.
63. Summer semester, 1907, F. I 43.
64. M. III 9 II. *Das Problem der Erkenntnistheorie, die Auflösung des Empirischen "Seins" in Zusammenhänge des Absoluten Bewusstseins* (The dissolution of empirical being in the interconnections of absolute consciousness). "All objectivities are 'appearances' in a specific sense, namely, unities of thought, unities of varieties, which (as consciousness) form the absolute in which all objectivities are constituted." M. III 9 III speaks of the "enigma" (*Rätsel*) of knowledge: "In thought itself everything ought to be "legitimized" (as Lotze already remarked, but in an inadequate way). Do I not see that I cannot posit a being over against thought, but only ground it in thought and on the foundation of its motifs?" In the same sense M. III 9 IV. *Transzendenzprobleme*, of the Summer semester, 1909.
65. Text prepared by Landgrebe; some pages are from the beginning of October, 1910; the essential part comes from the first part of the Winter semester 1910-11. M. III 9 IVa and FI.
66. On the translation of *Einfuhlüng* by *intropathie*. cf. *Vocabulaire Philosophique et Critique* of Lalande on the word *intropathie*.
67. On *Gegenwärtigung* and *Vergegenwärtigung*, cf. Commentary, G:11:1 and *Ideas*, par. 99.
68. M. Merleau-Ponty, on the contrary, has put himself at the other extreme to which phenomenology seems to extend in its last phase: it only "reflects" in order to let arise, beyond complete naïvety, the assurance that the world is always "already there"; phenomenology only "reduces" our participation in the presence of the world to break momentarily our familiarity with the world and restore "wonder" to us before the strangeness and the paradox of a world in which we live. It seeks essences only to fall back and reacquire the "factiticy" of our being-in-the-world. *Introduction* of the *Phénoménologie de la perception*. Paris: Gallimard, 1945. One should also consult the lecture of A. de Waelhens in the Collège Philosophique, *De la Phénoménologie à l'Existentialisme*. This ultimate inflexion in the direction of Heidegger's philosophy cannot be perceived yet in the *Ideas*, where the negative aspect of reduction is not yet absorbed into the positive aspect of constitution. But it is incontestably a sign that Husserl is going in this direction when *constituting* and *seeing* are conflated in the theme of an *originally giving consciousness*.
69. No one more than Husserl had the feeling of being on the way and even being at the beginning. He re-claims for himself "the seriousness of a beginning." He aspires to deserve the name of a "real beginner," on the path of this phenomenology which is itself at the "beginning of the beginning," "Nachwort zu meiner *Ideen* ..." p. 21.

HUSSERL'S INTRODUCTION

K:XX:7; G:3:1; GC:44:3; GP:39:39. On the translation of *Realität*, real, unreal, cf. G: 7:4.

SECTION ONE: ESSENCE AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF ESSENCES

CHAPTER ONE: FACT AND ESSENCE

K:3:2; G:7:1; GC:49; GP:43. *Essence and Knowledge of Essences. - This first section of the* Ideas *constitutes a sort of general preface to the work*: the question of phenomenology is not yet dealt with, but, like the whole group of sciences to which it pertains, phenomenology *presupposes* that essences and a science of essences exist (cf. par.18, first lines). This science gathers not only formal truths which can be ascribed to all essences but also material truths which govern their *a priori* distribution into specific "regions." In phenomenology the intuition of essences is also involved, and phenomenology bears—at least in its elementary way—on a "region" of being.

The first chapter establishes in a direct and systematic way these presuppositions. The second chapter corroborates them, indirectly through a polemic, with empiricism, idealism, platonic realism, etc.

K:5:2; G:7:2; GC:51:2; GP:45:2. Chapter One. *This chapter, which is very dogmatic in style and very dense in its movement, works toward two goals*: A) *It establishes the notions of essence and intuition of essences.* Par. 1-8. B) *It examines the a priori conditions of regional properties of essences*, par. 9-17.

K:5:3; G:7:3; GC:51:3; GP:45:3 A) The first group of analyses is subdivided as follows: 1) *The notion of essence*, pars. 1-2; 2) *The intuition of essences*, pars. 3-8.

1) The notion of essence, a) is introduced starting with its contrary and correlate: facts or brute existence of a particular *hic et nunc*, par. 1. A whole sequence of ideas, gravitating around the notion of a fact, is quickly established: experience, natural attitude, the world (i.e., to be true = to be real = to be in the world), perception. The author outlines the general theory of intuition at this

time, since perception is only one kind of intuition, along with intuition of that which is experienced, intuition of the other (empathy), and intuition of essences.

b) Par. 2 shows the passage from fact to essence.

K:5:12; G:7:4; GC:51:12; GP:45:4. "Realität" which we translate as natural or worldly reality always refers, in the *Ideas*, to what is posited as real in the natural attitude and which no longer has a place after phenomenological reduction, pars. 33ff. In contrast, *Wirklichkeit* (reality) still has a meaning within reduction, on the one hand, as modality of belief (certainty, par. 103), and, on the other hand, and more fundamentally, as relation of the noema to the object, pars. 89-90 and especially pars. 128-33. (Husserl moreover introduces the word "reell" which we will comment on in pars. 41, 85, 88). Unfortunately, French does not have the resources to translate these words, of both German and Latin roots, nor an unlimited capacity for verbal invention.

K:5:20; G:7:5; GC:51:20; GP:45:12. *"Originally given" or "given in original"* is opposed to "simply thought," or "empty intention" (pars. 136-138); this notion takes its meaning in the context of a theory of evidence and is understood by the distinction between acts of empty intention and acts of fulfilment through the full presence 'in person' (first *Investigation* and sixth *Investigation*, 2nd edition). As we shall see (G:9:5), there is also an original givenness of forms, relations, "categories" etc. (The theory of evidence and "fulfilling" will be taken over in the *Ideas*, 4th part). The expression "original" is introduced in the 2nd edition of the *Prolegomena to Pure Logic* (1913), p. 190 and 229.

K:5:20; G:7:6; GC:51:21; GP:45:13. *Giving intuition*: This active form of the verb "to give" applied to intuition will be corroborated by the transition to transcendental constitution which is a "giving of meaning": par. 55 (see G:106:1). We will return later to the idealist sense of this expression, though this still does not eliminate the intuitive character of perception and evidence in general. Cf. G: 44:1.

K:6:8; G:8:1; GC:51:20; GP:46:2. Empathy is the subject of some remarks in *Ideas I*; *Ideas II* devotes a lengthy intentional analysis to it. Cf. below G:316:1. On the translation of this word (Einfühlung) as "empathy," cf. the Glossary. [Ricœur translates by "intropathie" and refers to *Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de la Philosophie*, by Lalande—Translators.]

The fifth *Cartesian Meditation* raises this notion of phenomenological psychology to the level of phenomenological constitution.

K:7:23; G:9:1; GC:53:10; GP:47:11. *Ideas I* does not clarify the distinction between essence and empirical law any further (except in par. 6, p. 16), nor the manner of transition to essence. Only the role of imagination is made clear – it tests the resistance of the eidetic constant to real and invented variations of its realizations, par. 4. The author goes directly to the essential thing: any fact includes an essence which is itself subordinated to a hierarchy of essences (par. 12), and any essence includes a range of contingent individuals (this *hic et nunc*). This contingency alone institutes the distinction between essence and fact, which the duality of intuitions will confirm (par. 3). Near the end of par. 2, a second consequence is indicated which will be taken up again in par. 9 – namely, that the hierarchy of essences projects onto the field of the individuals a distribution in regions and categories. Phenomenology, for example, is concerned by the "region" of consciousness.

K:7:26; G:9:2; GC:53:13; GP:47:15. On the translation of *Bestand*, see the *Glossary*. [The Glossary cites two meanings for this word: 1) component (especially in the plural), 2) (eidetic) standing reserve (fonds (eidétique)) Translators.]

K:7:28; G:9:3; GC:53:15; GP:47:18. Necessity and generality are distinguished in par. 6.

K:7:35; G:9:4; GC:53:23; GP:47:26. *Dies da*: tode ti ; cf. par. 14.

K:8:1; G:9:5; GC:53:26; GP:47:29. This sentence offers a very accurate definition of essence, free of any Platonism. In the *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, chap. XI, par. 65, the notion of essence is introduced through the notion of *a priori*: it is asked what "the ideal conditions for the possibility of Science, or of theory in general," are (i.e., a closed deductive system). "It is evident," it is answered, "that truths themselves and especially laws, grounds, and principles, are what they are, whether or not we have of them an intellectual view or any evidence." (*Ibid.*, p. 238). These truths are in themselves the ideal condition for the possibility of their knowledge. It is in this way that one speaks about "the essence of these ideal unities" as an *a priori* law belonging to truth as such, to deduction, or to theory as such. The ultimate question of the

Prolegomena is, thus, the following: "In what does the essence of theory, as such, consist?" (*Ibid.*, p. 241). Pure logic is the theory of theories, that is, "systematic theory based on the essence of theory, or the nomological theoretical *a priori* science which deals with the ideal essence of science proper." (*Ibid.*, p. 242). All primitive concepts, such as object, unity, plurality, etc., are justified by an "*Einsicht in das Wesen*," i.e., an "intuitive *Vergegenwärtigung des Wesens in adäquater Ideation*" (*Ibid.*, p. 244-45). The sixth *Investigation* (2nd section) gives more amplification to this analysis of essence and introduces it from another angle, namely, that intuition is strictly defined by the "fulfilling" of certain acts of thought which, in an empty intention, are not directed toward the "matter" but rather toward the "form" of the proposition (copula, function, connection, subordination, etc.) and which can be called "categorial form." These meanings cannot be fulfilled by a perception or a "sensory" intuition but only by a "categorial intuition." In a broad sense of the word "to see" (or evidence), (p. 138-39), there is a "seeing" which has the same function in relation to non-sensory moments of meaning as does perception in relation to sensory moments (p. 142 ff.). There is a "categorial perception" in which formal elements are originally given in person. The idea of essence requires nothing else. (*Ibid.*, p. 128-55). In the introduction to the 2nd edition of *Logical Investigations,* Husserl declares that if one had read and understood this sixth *Investigation*, so many misinterpretations of the *Ideas* would have been avoided. One cannot insist too much on the non-metaphysical character of the notion of essence; it is introduced here dialectically as a correlate of fact, as that which provides a fact with the necessary determination so that it has this particular meaning rather than another.

K:8:13; G:10:1; GC:54:3; GP:48:1. 2) *The Intuition of Essences*, par. 3-8. This is the principal notion of the chapter and one of the foundations of the entire Husserlian edifice, although the key to Phenomenology is transcendental reduction (on the relations between intuition and reduction, cf. *Introduction*). The critical chapter will make explicit the theory of eidetic intuition, particularly in relation to the reproach of being a form of Platonism, par. 40. (Husserl even speaks of existence pertaining to essences, infra, p. 280: this existence is a character attached to a mere fulfilled meaning and does not imply any duplication of the world or cosmos of essences. a) *Par. 3 begins with the distinction between the two sensory and eidetic intuitions and concludes with their inter-dependence.* The intuition of the individual involves the possibility of turning the perspective on a fact into an essence. The fact remains as an illustration (this function will be elaborated further on), but when I grasp the essence, I no longer posit the individual as existing in the world. As he goes along, Husserl complicates this central analysis with some side remarks. He anticipates the analysis of essences of things which are never known instantaneously, but in "adumbration," in sketches. As a result., knowledge of them is inadequate: par. 41 ff. This foreshadows a possible confusion between *adequate* and *original*: what matters to intuition is not completion or exhausting its object (adequacy), but giving it in person (originality). The original character of the two intuitions is their only analogy. No analogy in the existence of their object can be concluded from it.

K:8:31; G:10:2; GC:54:22; GP:48:21. Representation in the very broad sense includes all the "simple" acts (perception, imagination, remembrance, etc.), as opposed to "grounded" acts (synthesis of predicative judgment and of relations, etc.) *infra* p. 213 *ad finem* and 214. This notion has an unobtrusive role in the *Ideas*. By contrast, a great part of the fifth *Investigation* (p. 345, 426-75) is devoted to the meaning of this notion and seeks to give an acceptable meaning to Brentano's formula: Every act is a representation or depends on representations. This formula amounts to, as here, distinguishing between acts "of a single ray" and acts "of several rays or intentions." Judgment is an example of the latter. (*Ibid.*, p. 459-62).

K:9:3; G:10:3; GC:54:27; GP:48:26. Natural realities other than things are living beings and the psychological Ego. (Cf. par. 53 and especially *Ideas II*).

K:9:14; G:10:4; GC:55:3; GP:48:40. The inadequacy of perception, which is essentially never completed, will play a decisive role in subsequent analysis. By contradistinction, it will lead us from that region called "thing" to the region called "consciousness," the latter escaping this defect. Par. 42 explicates the words "various," "sketch," "adumbration," etc.

K:10:13 G:11:1; GC:55"32; GP:49:29. *Presentiation*: original intuition is not only distinguished from empty meaning as given, as a

presence; it is moreover "original" presence as opposed to presence as "likeness" or "remembrance," par. 99. (*Logical Investigations* VI, 2nd part, par. 45, p. 144, translates *Gegenwärtigsein: das sozusagen in Persona Erscheinen*). Perception presents the thing, whereas likeness and remembrance presentiate (Vergegenwärtigung) it.

K:10:22; G:12:1; GC:56:10; GP:50:9. In this sense, eidetic intuition is a "grounded" act and not a "simple" act such as sensory perception; sixth *Investigation*, 2nd part, par. 48: "characterization of categorial acts as grounded acts."

K:11:7; G:12:2; GC:57:2; GP:50:32. b) *The Illustrative Function of Imagination* must not be overlooked: fiction is the true revealer of essence. The function of serving as an example can thus be accomplished by something other than experience. Fiction allows for experimenting with unlimited variations which yield the eidetic constant. Husserl says further on: "Fiction is the vital element of Phenomenology as well as of all eidetic science," par. 70. In fact, fiction breaks the circle of facticity which culminates in empirical law and which gives its domain over to the freedom of ideation. On the method of imaginative variations, cf. the *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 36, no. 9, 27 April 1929, p. 233-34.

K:11:14; G:12:3; GC:57:9; GP:51:4. *Bloss* is always connected with the non-positional. *Einbilden* is, thus, opposed to *Daseinssetzen*.

K:12:6; G:13:1; GC:58:4; GP:51:37. c) *The distinction,* which is initially subtle *between judgments directly related to essences taken as objects and judgments related to individuals, but under a certain point of view which gives to these judgments an eidetic universality*, gives all its scope to the eidetic field: eidetic knowledge is larger than judgments which expressedly take an essence as their object and extends to judgments which take them, so to speak, indirectly. The Sixth *Investigation* develops the analysis of these rational "mitigated" acts, p. 183-85.

K:12:8 G:13:2; GC:58:6; GP:51:39. *Verhalt*, in the compound *Sachverhalt*, refers to "what is judged" as a correlate of the act of "judging." *Sachverhalt* is the correlate of theoretical judgement. This same judgment as related to an eidetic situation is called *eidetischer Sachverhalt*, or more briefly *Wessensverhalt*. See infra, p. 247 ff.

K:13:16; G:14:1; GC:49:6; GP: 52:34. *Sichtig* is a weaker term than *Anschauung*, in the sense of "*intuitiv bewusst*," "*erfasst*" at the beginning of par. 5: it refers to that indirect implication of essences which is not an intuition of essence as object, though it belongs to the eidetic plane.

K:13:33; G:14:2; GC:59:24; GP:53:11. On the notion of genus, cf. par. 12.

K:14:3; G:15:1; GC:59:33; GP:53:21. d) *The connection between the notions of generalization, necessity, apodicity.* This new analysis assumes that syntheses of judgment are capable of intuition, as the sixth *Logical Investigation* establishes. This extension of intuition to the *Sachverhalt* of judgment extends to the rules of deduction itself, whose connections can be originally present. This last extension of intuition gives it all its meaning. The notion of generalization governs the notion of necessity; it fits with the *true* eidetic state of affairs. Necessity is a continuation of universality when one "applies" eidetic truth to a particular object. The Apodictic fits the judgment in which one becomes aware of the necessary connections between eidetic generality and the particular state of affairs." The continuation of this paragraph carries these notions over to the distinction made in par. 5. The end of the paragraph emphasizes the difference between eidetic generalization and empirical generalization of the laws of nature and therefore defines the opposition, which is only sketched in par. 2, between essence and the empirical types resulting from induction.

K:14:11; G:15:2; GC:60:6; GP:53:30. One can outline the matter as follows: Eidetic judging (symbolized or expressed by eidetic judgment or proposition) has for a correlate "what is judged as such" (or the eidetic state of affairs in a modified sense.) Eidetic truth (or the true proposition) has for a correlate the content of truth or the eidetic state of affairs (in a proper sense).

Thus, from the standpoint of the subject, truth is a sort of judging and eidetic judgment. The distinction between judging and the judgement or proposition does not come into play here (cf. *Logical Investigations*, fifth *Investigations* par. 28). From the standpoint of the object, the content of truth is one kind of "what is judged as such," Generalization is attached to the content or state of eidetic truth.

What is judged, as such, which can be either true or false, should not be called the eidetic state of affairs except in a modified sense and in relation to eidetic truth. The notion of truth will be studied in the fourth section of this book.

K:15:6; G:16:1; GC:60:33; GP:54:19. The application of eidetic truths to existing individuals, *and thereby to the order of nature*, comes under the category of eidetic necessity. This remark completes the distinction between eidetic generalization and the generalization of inductive laws. We will need these distinctions later in order to recognize the type of necessity which fits with the posited existence of the Cogito (P. 86-87.)

K:15:31; G:16:2; GC:61:22; GP:55:4. *Conclusion* par. 7-8. We have only to summarize the distinction (par. 7) and the relation of dependence (par. 8) which can be established between the sciences of essences and the sciences of facts.

K:16:4; G:16:3; GC:61:31; GP:55:14. This enumeration of pure eidetic sciences is very rough: the end of par. 8 will supply some more precise observations.

K:17:10; G:17:1; GC:63:4; GP:57:5. The concluding Chapter XI of the *Prolegomena to Logic* allots a triple task to pure logic, in relation to the general goal of establishing *a priori* the possibility of a pure sequence, the possibility of "a unity of a systematically completed theory" (p. 232). (1) Pure logic establishes "primitive concepts" which secure the connection of knowledge, that is, concepts of elementary forms of relation (disjunction, conjunction, subject, predicate, plural, etc.) and, more radically, the formal categories of the object (object, state of affairs, plurality, number, actualities, etc.) (par. 67, p. 242-45). (2) Pure logic also establishes objectively valid laws, grounded on prior categories, from which "theories" follow: theories of inference (ex.: syllogistic), theory of plurality, etc. (par. 68, p. 245-47). (3) Pure logic explores types of possible "theories" along the lines of construction governed by general propositions. "Formal mathematics" (or pure analysis) gives the most remarkable illustration of this theory of possible forms of theories, as "pure theory of multiplicity." (pars. 69-70, p. 207-52). See *infra*, p. 18, n. 2.

K:17:30; G:18:1; GC:63:24; GP:57:5. The distinction between the two types of eidetic sciences is fundamental; the consideration of material essences leads directly to the problem of "regions" and regional eidetics and so to phenomenology. Here is the scheme of eidetic sciences:

(1) Formal (or formal "mathesis universalis").

(a) Formal logic

(b) Disciplines constituting formal ontology: (laws of objectivity in general, cf. G:21:1, Arithmetic, pure analysis, theory of multiplicity).

(2) Material. "Regional" eidetics which deal with the chief type of each region. (Ex: region of "thing," region of "consciousness") are fundamental illustrations of this group of eidetics. At the moment of the phenomenological reduction (par. 59), these distinctions will become meaningful, since "suspension" does not apply to all the eidetic sciences.

K:18:9; G:18:2; GC:64:2; GP:57:15. The theory of multiplicity is given as an illustration and partial realization of the third task of pure logic. (Cf. *supra*, G:17:1). A multiplicity, such as that of whole numbers, falls within a theory of set form, governed by axioms of set form. Thus, this theory is a good example of the "theory of possible forms of theories." The generalization of addition, beyond whole numbers to all real numbers and to complex numbers (then the elaboration of spatial multiplicities to n dimensions), the theories of groups of transformation, etc., are given as examples of this theory of multiplicity at the time of the *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*. Chap. XI, par. 70. *Formal and Transcendental Logic* also deals in a lengthy way with this study: 1st. part, par. 28-36.

K:18:14; G:19:1; GC:64:7; GP:57:21. B) *The Principles of the Regional Eidetic*, par. 9-17: we deal with the second requirement of a theory of essences which phenomenology thus presupposes as an eidetic science (cf. G:7:1; G:7:2).

1) *The Nature of Regional Ontology*, par. 9-10. In par. 2 we encountered the problem of the *hierarchy* of essences. Material essences which rule empirical objects are subordinated to highest types which are the object of a science, i.e., regional ontology. Therefore, ontology of nature deals with properties which belong universally to objects in the region of nature. Par. 10 specifies the bearing of regional ontology on formal ontology, which rules from above the ontologies of a particular region. Formal ontology raises questions such as: What is an object, a property, a relation, etc? Since the very notion of region, which each regional ontology initiates, pertains to formal ontology, one can say that all considerations about the notion of region are henceforth within the province of formal ontology (par. 17, at the beginning).

K:18:34; G:19:2; GC:64:29; GP:58:2. This pure form of objectivity in general depends on formal ontology, which will be dealt with

in par. 10. Actually, all science implies formal logic, formal ontology, and material ontology of the region under consideration, the first two constituting the *formal mathesis* cited on p. 18 and p. 20.

K:19:13; G:20:1; GC:65:10; GP:58:19. Cf. G:18:1.

K:19:18; G:20:2; GC:65:16; GP:58:25. On *Praktik* cf. *infra* par. 117 and especially par. 147.

K:19:18; G:20:3; GC:65:18; GP:58:27. On the meaning of "exact," cf. *infra* pars. 72-5.

K:19:32; G:20:4; GC:65:33; GP:59:1. On the different meanings of the French word *chose* (*Ding* and *Sache*), cf. Glossary. [In the Glossary *Ding* means thing, as opposed to: (1) what is experienced in general, (2) animated beings and men. *Sache* means thing, as opposed to *Wert* (value), sometimes opposed to presupposition: "return to things themselves"—Translators.]

K:20:7; G:20:5; GC:66:10; GP:59:16. The relation of regional ontologies to formal ontology introduces a particular difficulty: the notion of region. This notion — not a particular region, but the form of region in general — belongs to formal ontology as the determination of objectivity in general. It is an empty form which can be applied to all regions. Therefore, we shall speak about formal region with caution as designating the empty form of region in general and about material region (which is a pleonasm) as indicating a particular region (nature, etc.). The notion of region is no broader in the hierarchy of material essences. Its relation to regions is no longer that of genus to species but of formal to material. Thus the fundamental determinations (or categories) of the formal idea of region are analytical, as are all propositions of a formal nature, whereas determinations of a particular region are synthetic, as are all propositions of a material nature. Par. 16 will return to this opposition of analytic and synthetic.

K:20:16; G:21:1; GC:66:18; GP:59:25. This enumeration gives some idea of the questions dealt with by the science of objectivity in general which ushers in formal ontology. Cf. G:18 :1 and p. 22 *ad finem*.

K:21:39; G:22:1; GC:68:6; GP:61:8. The third *Logical Investigation* is devoted to the *theory of the whole and parts*. It is an important chapter on formal ontology, along with reflections on subject and property, the individual, species and genus, relation and collection, unity and number. This chapter corresponds to the first part

of the program which the *Prolegomena* allocates to pure logic (in par. 67). The notions of analytic and synthetic are introduced through notions of dependent (*unselbständig*) and independent (*selbständig*) objects. The latter objects can be "represented separately because of their nature" (*Investigations* III, p. 230), while the others cannot (such as color and extension). However, different kinds of dependences – that is, different ways by which a whole completes a part – are not retained in the general law of dependence which is a formal law. It is therefore necessary that the type of dependence (for example, between color and extension) be governed by the supreme genus of the material sphere being considered, which determines *a priori* how a moment "can be added" to another moment: these are precisely a priori synthetic laws. In this sense "extension is not based analytically on the concept of color" (*Ibid.*, p. 253). We are able to see here how much Husserl's approach differs from Kant's. It is the distinction between formal ontology and material ontologies that governs the distinction between analytic and synthetic.

K:22:8; G:22:2; GC:68:13; GP:61:15. 1) *The Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, par 67, p. 243-45, makes a distinction between two areas in establishing "primitive concepts" (first task of logic): a) We can dwell in the area of meanings as elementary forms of the relation either between propositions (conjunction, disjunction, hypothesis, etc.), or within a proposition (subject, predicates, plural, etc.). "Pure grammar", which is the object of the fourth *Investigation*, develops this undertaking. It applies to *meanings* the inquiry into the modes of dependence (along the lines of the notion established in the third *Investigation*) between the components of meaning: "Pure grammar" thus excludes *Unsinn* (for example: a man and is, a round or), but it does not exclude *Widersinn*, formal absurdity (wooden iron). These *reinlogisch grammatisch* laws are therefore distinguished from purely logical laws and permit the building of a "pure morphology of meanings" (fourth *Investigation*, p. 284-85 and 317-41).

b) The formal categories of the object (object, unity, relation, etc.), constitute the properly logical plan of formal ontology. Par. 134 of the *Ideas* states that the level of a proposition or *apophantic* statement is the level of "expression" in the broad sense. This distinction is necessary to understand par. 11: certain valuable dis-

tinctions that hold true on the level of objectivity in general are suggested by pure grammar understood as a morphology of meanings. This is the case of the distinction examined in par. 11. All of these problems are developed at length in the first part of *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (definition of apophantic is in par. 12, 13, 22; expansion of formal logic, beyond the apophantic, to the dimensions of a *mathesis universalis* in par. 23-27. Par. 27 sums up the route traveled from 1901 to 1929.

K:23:3; G:23:1; GC:69:13; GP:62:13. 2) *Preliminary distinctions to an analytic definition of region.* Par. 11-15. It is, henceforth, within formal ontology that we are going to pursue our reflection about objectivity in general and the empty form of region. The author introduces a series of five distinctions which all attempt to define the fundamental relation of essence to region.

K:23:9; G:23:2; GC:69:20; GP:62:21. a) *The distinction between simple terms and syntactically derived functions is introduced by "pure grammar" in the sense indicated by the fourth Logical Investigation.* (Cf. supra, G: 22:2.) Par. 7 of this study (p. 308) distinguishes even within a single word a syntactic element (root, prefix, suffix, and complex of words). Transposed into the theory of objectivity in general, this grammatical distinction allows us to designate as "syntactic" all developments derived from an object which will have a syntactic construction for expression: For example, the number in the plural. All categories such as property, relation, plurality (implied in syntactic acts such as attributing, putting into relation, multiplying) are derived by comparison with the simple positing of a substratum of these various acts. The problem of the ultimate substrata leads to the difficult question of the *individual* which will be the object of discussion in par. 14. The question cannot be treated without introducing new distinctions. On all these points, cf. *Appendix* I to *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, p. 259-75. On the concept of "terminus," cf. in particular p. 273.

K:24:18; G:25:1; GC:71:1; GP:63:28. b) *The relation between species and genus* is not peculiar to material ontology but also obtains in formal ontology. This thought is intended to define the last specific differences and to pose the problem of eidetic singularity correctly. It is clearly understood that the eidetic individual (number one regarding the supreme category of number, blue regarding the category of sensory quality) is not the existing individual (this red *hic et nunc*). As it will be said later on, the empirical individual is subordinated to the essence which can itself be individual or generic. Individual essence is subordinated to species and to genus.

K:25:1; G:25:2; GC:71:4; GP:63:32. *Sachhaltig* is opposed to *leer* as material to formal.

K:26:1; G:26:1; GC:72:3; GP:64:37. c) *The relation of species to genus is distinguished from the relation of material to formal.* Thus, reflecting about the notion of essence does not amount to attaining the genus of genera of this particular essence and this particular supreme genus or region. It is rather to pass from material to formal.

K:26:37; G:27:1; GC:73:4; GP:65:34. The example given here is borrowed from the theory of meanings, more precisely from the logic of propositions or apophantics. We have seen in par. 10-11 that we pass easily from the latter to the theory of objects as such.

K:27:19; G:27:2; GC:73:26; GP:66:13. Cf. G:25:1. If the hierarchy of material essences (*Generalisierung*), which is the central theme here, is subject as a whole to the essences of formal ontology (which has just been defined in par. 13), this hierarchy, in turn, overall dominates the empirical realm of individuals, of this existent here and now. The individual is *subsumed* under a unique essence, which is *subordinated* to species and eidetic genera which are material and consequently formal.

K:27:23; G:27:3; GC:73:30; GP:66:18. The three meanings of the word "extension" follow from the two pairs of distinctions that have just been drawn. The eidetic genus, whether formal or material, has an eidetic extension regarding its species and eidetic peculiarities. The two other meanings follow from this fundamental meaning: The relation of formal to material introduces the notion of formal or "mathematical" extension over and against the realm of material essences – mathematical here has the sense employed above in *mathesis universalis*. The relation of the eidetic realm (formal and material) to the empirical realm (cf. G:27:2) introduces the third meaning of the word extension.

K:27:32; G:27:4; GC:74:3; GP:66:28. This nuance is not very subtle: the field of the individuals corresponding to an essence is narrower than the field of *possible* individuals realizing this essence. It

is enough to remember the role of imagination beyond actual experience in order to encounter the resistance of essence, cf. par. 4.

K:27:33; G:27:5; GC:74:4; GP:66:30. Cf. G:27:1.

K:27:34; G:28:1; GC:74:6; GP:66:32. d) *A comparison of eidetic singularity and the nonsyntactic substrate.* The distinction between the levels of formal ontology, material ontology and individual existence (par. 14) allows us to reconsider the distinction between the substrate and the syntactical forms which have been introduced by "pure grammar" (par. 11). Thus we speak about material and formal substrates: the formal substrate is the pure "something," whose forms derived by syntactical means, are, as we have seen (par. 11), all forms elaborated in acts of judging (correlate: "state of affairs"), concluding (correlate: "forms of inference"), counting (correlate: "number"), analyzing, constituting a multiplicity, etc. In the "material" order the interesting question to be raised here concerns bifurcation between the level of material essences and the empirical level of existences: to the first belong the *ultimate* material essences and to the second the existing *tóde ti*. Singular essences and individual existences constitute, in the logico-grammatical sense, substrates which are irreducible to new syntactical forms. We conclude as follows: the singular essence of "this" necessarily has the function of a substrate. In the language of pure grammar: the individual is prior to syntactical acts which have as their correlate the categories of state of affairs, relation, property, number, etc.

K:28:28; G:28:2; GC:75:3; GP:67:26. *Formlos* does not here refer to the material as opposed to the formal but to the substrate as opposed to syntactic form.

K:28:29; G:28:3; GC:75:5; GP:67:28. e) *Singular essences of the concrete type and the abstract type.* The definition of concrete is decisive for the rigorous definition of the concept of *region* (Par. 16): that is the purpose of this article. The author accomplishes his goal in starting by drawing a distinction between dependent and independent objects. This distinction is studied at length in the third *Logical Investigation* (to which we alluded while introducing the notions of analytic and synthetic, G:22:1, and then that of logically pure grammar, G:22:2). Dependence or independence is the principal analytical determination (purely formal) of the relationship of part to whole (*Logical Investigations* II, p. 228): "The

independent contents are found where the elements of a representative complex can be represented separately according to their nature." (*Ibid.*, p. 230). Par. 17 of this *Investigation* defines part in the narrow sense, better called *Stück*: "the independent part relative to a whole G," and defines the "moment" or abstract part: "every dependent part relative to this same whole G" (*Ibid.*, p. 255); for example, quality and extension. We thus arrive at the definition of the abstract: "an abstract is an object for which there is a whole in relation to which this object is a dependent part" (*Ibid.*, p. 256). An object and even a part (*Stück*) in relation to its abstract moments is a "relative concrete;" a concrete which is abstract in no way is an "absolute concrete" (*Ibid.*, p. 268). We see, then, that if species and genera are necessarily dependent and thereby abstract, eidetic singularities can only be concrete. However, they can also be abstract, if it is only in composition that a singular essence partakes in the concrete. The word "individual" is saved for a "this" whose material essence is concrete. The concrete therefore refers to a sort of singular essence which also includes abstract singular essences: the real thing, a concrete essence, contains the abstract essences of extension and quality.

K:31:2; G:30:1; GC:77:12; GP:69:32. 3) *Final definition of region and regional eidetic*, par. 16-17. a) *Definition of region.* This is an analytical definition in the sense of par. 10. Differing from the more nominal definition at the beginning of par. 9, it integrates the preceding definitions: subordination of the eidetic singularities to the highest genera (par. 12), incorporation of abstract singularities in concrete singularities (par. 11, 14 and especially par. 15). Thus region is the cluster of highest genera which control abstract singularities included in concrete singularities. It is in this sense that region has an eidetic extension, composed of all abstract singularities.

K:31:12; G:31:1; GC:77:23; GP:70:2. b) *Definition of regional eidetic.* On the relation between material ontology and synthetic truth, cf. *supra*, G:22:1.

K:31:30; G:31:2; GC:78:6; GP:70:20. On apodictic, cf. *supra*, par. 6.

K:31:34; G:31:3; GC:78:9; GP:70:23. These differences partially bear on the manner in which analytic and synthetic notions are determined, according to the doctrine of the whole and parts in the third *Logical Investigation* (cf. *supra*, G:22:1). But they especially

bear on the fundamental conception: such as in Kant, sciences are grounded not on pure logic but on *a priori* syntheses. Furthermore, the latter are not constructions but the objects of eidetic intuition.

K:32:10; G:32:1; GC:78:25; GP:70:40. *General conclusion.* This conclusion does not clarify at all the relation of logic to phenomenology; the principal concern of the author remains that of grounding the empirical sciences not only on pure logic but on regional ontologies as well. Phenomenology is only evoked in an evasive way at the end of the paragraph. The exploration of these "regions" and the constitution of regional ontologies was the task the first phenomenologists assigned themselves. But transcendental phenomenology will want to establish the regional ontologies themselves in another way, although it is first introduced, in an elementary form, as the ontology of the "region" of consciousness. (Cf. E. Fink, "Die phänomenolgische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik," *Kant-Studien* XXXVIII, Heft, 3/4, p. 347-66).

K:32:23; G:32:2; GC:79:5; GP:71:14. In the *Ideas*, "idea" does not have the meaning of *Eidos*, but the Kantian sense of "regulative principle," cf. p. 6, 33, 139, 166, 297. This meaning is what is intended by the title itself: *Ideas to . . .*

K:32:34; G:32:3; GC:79:15; GP:71:24. This problem is investigated at length in *Ideas II.*

CHAPTER TWO: FALSE INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURALISM

K:33:1; G:33:1; GC:30:2; GP:72:2. *Chapter* II. *Defense and illustration of eidetic intuition.* This chapter, which is the only one in polemic style, is directed against psychologism just as were the *Prolegomena to Pure Logic* and the first two *Logical Investigations.*

(1) Par. 19-23 develop the argument: Platonism and Idealism only serve as the occasion to broaden the discussion about empiricism. (2) Par. 24 is the hinge of this chapter; it establishes the full meaning of intuition. (3) Par. 25-26 bring out the last anti-empiricist consequences of this doctrine of intuition.

All of this chapter, as the previous one, will only receive its full meaning when phenomenological reduction is applied to the "transcendence" of essences: par. 59-63 (cf. in particular G:116:2).

K:33:7; G:33:2; GC:80:9; GP:72:10. Phenomenology is provisionally defined as the regional eidetic of the region of consciousness. As such, it is the *foundation* of psychology and sciences of the mind (cf. end of the paragraph). This function of phenomenology is still very elementary compared to the ultimate problems of constitution, particularly in the unpublished work.

K:33:16; G:33:3; GC:80:19; GP:72:20. The discourse on intuition springs itself from intuition: in this sense it is a true beginning in relation to any construction. We may remark that at this stage the intuitive is called *first.* It will be a problem to know how the *constitution* of objectivity within subjectivity can integrate this docility of intuition into that which is simply *seen.* The problems of constitution are on another philosophic level and in this sense more radical than the "principle of principles" or principle of intuition. But phenomenology, seen from this superior level, far from annulling the primacy of intuition, will retain it while constituting it.

K:34:4; G:33:4; GC:80:34; GP:72:36. This *epochè* of philosophy is obviously not phenomenological reduction. The pejorative meaning given to the word philosophy ("philosophy of a point of view") is provisional and recalls the criticism of prejudices in Descartes. The general title of the work and the project of volume III (Intro-

duction, p. 5) sufficiently indicate that the goal of research is the elaboration of a phenomenological *philosophy*.

K:34:34; G:34:1; GC:82:3; GP:73:41. Cf. G:33:2.

K:35:2; G:34:2; GC:82:6; GP:74:2. (1) *The three-fold process of Empiricism, Idealism, and Platonism*, par. 19-23, *is governed by empiricism*, pars. 19-20. The truth of empiricism lies in its respect for "things themselves" (cf. par. 24: *zu den Sachen selbst!*). Its error is the restriction of intuition to sensory experience, par. 19. It cannot escape the skepticism by which it undermines itself, as a dogmatism of experience, par. 20.

K:35:9; G:35:1; GC:82:14; GP:74:11. The word *Sache* is taken here in a non-technical sense: it is everything that is grasped by a kind of intuition (material thing, value, what one experiences as his own, what others experience, etc.). In the technical sense the same word sets material things for *theoretical* consciousness in opposition to values for *affective* and *practical* consciousness, par. 27 and 37. *Ding*, or thing, is the "region" itself of material existences serving as the foundation of living beings and humans, par 149-152 and especially *Ideas* II.

[Ricœur introduces here a second note, also numbered 1, which partly repeats the content of G:35:1. It is most likely a typographic error. Editor].

K:36:30; G:35:2; GC:83:16; GP:75:8. Cf. G:7:5 and G:7:6.

K:36:21; G:36:1; GC:83:37; GP:75:30. Cf. G:13:1.

K:36:24; G:36:2; GC:84:3; GP:74:33. By noetic norms we mean the rules and structures which join types of regions to types of intuitions which can ground the judgments made in the region of consideration. The *Prolegomena to Pure Logic* uses the expression in this sense (which is thus prior to Noema of the *Ideas*). "Noetic" conditions are distinguished there from purely logical conditions which are grounded on the contents (*Inhalt*) of knowledge. They are themselves "based on the idea of knowledge as such and *a priori*, without reference to empirical particularities of human knowledge in its psychological conditions" (*Ibid.*, p. 238). Later on, noesis will designate the side of *constituting* consciousness by contrast with the noema which will designate the *constituted* side, the object side correlative to noesis.

K:36:27; G:36:3; GC:84:6; GP:75:37. We always translate *Einsicht* as evidence, justified by par. 137 of *Ideas*. (Cf. also the end of par. 20 and the beginning of par. 21 which bring together *Einsehen* and *Sehen*). The fourth section develops the theory of evidence.

K:36:36; G:36:4; GC:84:16; GP:76:4. Cf. G:33:3.

K:37:9; G:37:1; GC:84:29; GP:76:17. This is an allusion to the indefinite process of confirmation and invalidation of the perceiving consciousness, par. 138.

K:37:20; G:37:2; GC:85:3; GP;76:29. The text of the *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, which is referred to in this paragraph, explains the opposition between rigorous, categorical laws of logic and conjectural laws of psychology. In particular, the explication of the principle of contradiction by John Stuart Mill is harshly criticized. If the incompatibility of two contradictions is only the psychological incompatibility of subjective acts, skepticism is inevitable and knowledge is relative to the contingent structure of the human species. This skepticism thus introduced is not a metaphysical skepticism, which denies the possibility of knowing things in themselves, but a skepticism which bears "on the possibility of a theory in general" (*Ibid.*; pars. 21-24, p. 60-77: Empiricist consequences of psychologism. And pars. 25-9, p. 78-101: psychologistic interpretation of logic.) These ideas are summarized by Delbos, "Husserl, sa critique du psychologism et sa conception d'une logique pure." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, t. XIX (1911) no. 5, p. 685-98.

K:39:23; G:39:1; GC:87:11; GP:78:33. b) *The idealistic rejection of an intuition of the a priori* is not the occasion for an ordered discussion of the criticist concept of the *a priori*, as E. Fink has attempted from the point of view of transcendental phenomenology; at any rate, this confrontation cannot be seriously begun prior to phenomenological reduction. Husserl defends himself only against the psychologistic interpretation of evidence, which is generally the basis on which criticism rejects the intuition of the *a priori*.

K:39:33; G:39:2; GC:87:22; GP:79:4. The sixth *Logical Investigation*, par. 45 ff., constructs the broadest scope for the concept of intuition and also defines, besides sensory intuition, a categorial intuition which fulfills *in persona* empty categorial meanings of the proposition, in the same way as sensory intuition fulfills the material elements (*stoffliche*) of the proposition. cf. *Supra*, p. 9. n. 5.

K:40:1; G:39:3; GC:87:24; GP:79:7. Cf. G:36:3.

K:40:26; G:40:1; GC:88:21; GP:80:2. c) *The criticism of Platonism* leads again to the case of psychologism. For the criticism of Platonism is associated, among empiricist critics, with a reduction of essences to mental constructions. The discussion summarizes the argument of the *Logical Investigations*. Nevertheless, a few remarks permit a line to be drawn between Husserlian intuitionism and Platonism. Platonism, which could be legendary, would treat essences as things that exist, analogous to empirical, material and mundane existence. But Husserl only deals with the definition of an object by formal ontology, which holds that it is the subject of a true statement. In this sense, Husserl teaches the non-existence of essences. His originality is in holding simultaneously the *intuitive* character of eidetic knowledge (by always understanding that intuition is the fulfilling of empty meaning) and the *non-mundane* character of its object. Thus the two intuitions (sensory and eidetic) are *analogous* as presentations of the fullness of the object. But the types of being of these objects are not *analogous*. The first motif seems to come closer to Platonism, while the second actually moves away from it. In the *Logical Investigations*, where this chapter still stands, there is no eidetic realism which would then have to be denied by a transcendental idealism born of reduction and involved by constitution.

K:41:4; G:40:2; GC:88:31; GP:80:12. Cf. G:7:4.

K:41:13; G:40:3; GC:89:7; GP:80:23. This text is, along with that of par. 2 (cf. G:9:5 of the commentary starting with the *Logical Investigations*), one of the most important in the *Ideas* for properly understanding the Husserlian notion of essence.

K:41:23; G:42:1; GC:90:17; GP:81:35. A certain *construction* presides over the intuition of essences. However, we do not construct the essence but rather the *consciousness of* the essence. The critique of psychologism accordingly requires the anticipation of the analysis of intentionality, par. 36.

K:43:22; G:43:1; GC:91:21; GP:82:34. As regards ideation, why doesn't Husserl posit the principle of intentionality directly rather than through the analogy of fiction? Because the "nothingness" of a centaur is clear proof that it transcends what is experienced and that it does not tend to any "platonic hypostasis." Moreover, the act of invention is similar to that of ideation. Finally, the problem

of fiction will allow us to embark on an examination of a more radical problem concerning the nature of essence. See *infra*. G:43:3.

K:43:24; G:43:2; GC:91:23; GP:82:36. On the notion of production and operation, cf. par. 112 and par. 122.

K:43:35; G:43:3; GC:92:1; GP:83:12. Here is the difficulty: if essence does not exist as things do, doesn't it have the "nothingness" of fiction? The examination of this difficulty refers back to the *analogy* of ideation and perception, no longer from the point of view of being *mundane* but from the *intuitive* point of view of consciousness which intends the essence or the thing. The "nothingness" of a centaur is a modification of the actual presence of the perceived thing. The presence of the essence to ideation is the analogon of the presence of the thing to perception and not the analogon of the modification producing the image. Mundane objects and ideal objects can be apprehended in analogous ways: real, doubtful, illusory, imaginary, etc. The word existence as applied to essence therefore does not have the restricted meaning of mundane existence that it has on p. 12 (end of par. 3), p. 85-86 (*dingliche Existenz*), and p. 153. It has the technical meaning which it will take on beginning with par. 135. This meaning will speak of eidetic existence (p. 280) in the sense that noema is related to an object. One only has access to this new meaning of *Existenz* by the reduction of *Existenz* in the mundane sense. (Cf. *infra* G:135:1).

K:44:10; G:43:4; GC:92:11; GP:83:23. Concerning these modes derived from the fundamental mode of reality and concerning the general theme of "modifications" which affect the "ways of being given" of the object in general, cf. par. 99 and especially par. 104 ff. The first set of modifications (real, doubtful, illusory) is within the positional modality of belief; the modification of them into a "quasi" *neutralizes* every position.

K:44:17; G:43:5; GC:92:18; GP:83:31. (2) The *principle of principles* leads us to the heart of Husserlian intuitionism. But we must not omit the interpretion of this text from the point of view of the sixth *Logical Investigation*: intuition is defined uniquely as a fulfilling of an empty meaning. That is why respect for the pure given (which is as much eidetic as mundane) can be corroborated within the transcendental constitution and will be taken up again in the fourth section when dealing with the constitution of reason par. 136-45.

K:44:23; G:44:1; GC:92:25; GP:83:39. The connection between the two expressions, intuition which *gives*, and that which *is given*, stands out. It contains, in short, all the difficulties of a philosophy of constitution which should continue to be an intuitionism from another point of view. Cf. G:7:6.

K:44:24; G:44:2; GC:92:27; GP:83:40. On truth, cf. fourth section, Chap. I.

K:45:9; G:44:3; GC:93:16; GP:84:25. *The last polemic against psychologism*, par. 25-6. Husserl uses as an argument the fact that the most positivistic scholars with respect to theory have recourse in their practice to real eidetic sciences such as mathematics. This polemic leads to discussing the possibility of an eidetic science in general in relation to empirical sciences.

K:46:31; G:46:1; GC:95:7; GP:86:6. The *conclusion* provides a surprising statement: the respect for intuition spells out a *dogmatic* rather than a *philosophic* attitude, to the extent that philosophy is endless questioning concerning the *possibility* of knowledge, or, in short, skepticism. This *non-critical* usage of intuition, that is, prior to the whole question of the skeptical character concerning the possibility of knowledge, supports what has been said in par. 18 concerning the *epochè* of philosophy. The central question of the *Ideas* is made more pointed: how do transcendental reduction and constitution retain and support this dogmatism of intuition on another level of reflection? (Cf. in particular G:55:3). But this dogmatism is only the priority of the original over what is merely intended. (Cf. G:9:5).

K:47:33; G:46:2; GC:96:9; GP:87:4. *Sachen*, see *supra*, G:35:1.

SECTION TWO: FUNDAMENTAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

K:49:3; G:48:1; GC:99:3; GP:89:3. *This second section* is still preparatory in that it defines phenomenological reduction, par. 31-32, but does not yet apply it (as it is stated at the beginning of par. 33).

Chapter I introduces phenomenological reduction in relation to the natural attitude which it "brackets." Chapters II and III, which are the largest part of this section, *describe consciousness*; they make preparations for phenomenological reduction but do not assume it. Chapter II analyzes perception in particular with the purpose of liberating it from naturalistic prejudices and revealing the *opposition* between two modes of being, which are being as object and being as consciousness. This opposition *separates* the "region" of consciousness. Chapter II goes beyond this opposition and shows the *relativity* of the being of the world to the being of consciousness; the natural attitude is thus "inverted," or "converted." Starting from the natural attitude, the analysis is gradually placed in harmony with reduction which was proposed abruptly in Chapter I. Besides, reduction is not presented radically in the *Ideas*, which explains that it can be gradually reached.

Chapter IV makes the technique of phenomenological reductions explicit. In the *Cartesian Meditations*, on the contrary, there is no prior "intentional psychology": we pass on immediately to the world as "phenomenon." Intentionality itself is described only subsequent to reduction.

CHAPTER ONE: THE THESIS OF THE NATURAL ATTITUDE AND ITS BRACKETING

K:51:3; G:48:2; GC:101:3; GP:91:3. *Chapter* I: (1) *starts from the natural attitude* and describes the various modes of presence which consciousness can apprehend in this attitude par. 27-29 and enunciates the fundamental principle of such an attitude, par. 30.

2) *defines the epochè* first in relation to the methodical doubt of Descartes, par. 31, and then in itself.

K:51:6; G:48:3; GC:101:7; GP:91:8. (1) *The radical sense of the natural attitude* could not appear outside of the process of reduction which reveals it while suspending it. As E. Fink has shown in his article in *Kantstudien*, every initial exposition is condemned to remain on the level which it is attempting to transcend. Caught in the world, the natural attitude cannot appear to itself in its full significance. Therefore, we will only find here a "false" exposition which "appeals to an operation that goes beyond it." Fink, *Op. cit.* p. 346-47. The following analysis already indicates that the natural attitude is broader than psychologism and naturalism, since a good part of the intentional analyses, which is what the *Cartesian Meditations* call phenomenological psychology (theory of the cogito, intentionality, reflection, attention, etc.), is still developed within the natural attitude. The natural attitude is a fundamental limitation, but its boundaries encompass the whole world. This paragraph already shows the world as a correlate of consciousness, whether it be attentive or inattentive, perceptive or thinking, theoretic, affective, axiological, or practical. Par. 28 will make a connection between consciousness and the Cartesian cogito.

K:52:8; G:49:1; GC:102:2; GP:92:2. On attention and the field of inattention, cf. par. 35.

K:52:19; G:49:2; GC:102:13; GP:92:14. Presentiation, cf. *supra*, G:11:1. On all the relations between perception, image, remembrance, and sign, see par. 43-44 and par. 99.

K:52:34; G:49:3; GC:102:30; GP:92:32. On temporal horizons of the present, cf. par. 82 and *Zeitbewusstsein*.

K:53:7; G:50:1; GC:103:3; GP:92:42. On the notion of watchfulness, cf. p. 53 and 63. Watchfulness is the very *life* of consciousness, but as caught within the world. Watchfulness and actuality are synonymous (beginning of par. 28).

K:53:13; G:50:2; GC:103:8; GP:93:5. *Sache* is opposed to *Wert*, as *Ding* is opposed to *Animalien* and *Menschen*; cf. G:20:4 and p. 66-67.

K:53:28; G:50:3; GC:103:26; GP:93:26. The notion of world and of the natural attitude is broadened so that they comprise the "ideal environments." In this sense E. Fink has been able to maintain that the investigation of the *a priori*, in the sense of *Logical Investigations*, and in the Kantian and neo-critical sense of the condition for the possibility of objectivity in general, still remains intramundane and within the natural attitude; *op. cit.*, p. 338, 377 *et passim*. Thus, the discovery of the Cogito still belongs to the natural attitude, even tough it tends to transcend it.

K:53:29; G:50:4; GC:103:29; GP:93:26. On spontaneity, cf. G:42:1; G:43:2.

K:54:10; G:51:1; GC:104:8; GP:94:1. The prereflexive Cogito is intentionality which is still unaware of itself. Reflection will still not be reduction and will separate only the "region" of consciousness, cf. G:48:1.

K:54:27; G:51:2; GC:104:26; GP:94:20. The expression "the world of numbers" does not reintroduce any Platonism (cf. G:40:1). It aims, rather, at enlarging the notion of world in the sense of the natural attitude and including in the natural attitude everything which in some way *exists for me*, and by its intuitive presence, at the same time *conceals* from me my transcendental and constitutive subjectivity which still functions in this very presence. I find myself caught within numbers, just as I find myself caught within things. This article explains partly the inclusion of the arithmetic attitude within the natural attitude, by recalling that the world of things which is permanent serves as a background for the world of numbers which is intermittent.

K:55:13; G:51:3; GC:105:7; GP:94:40. This new enlargement of the natural attitude to the intersubjective position of the world is here barely outlined. The intersubjective reality of the world will hardly be analyzed in *Ideas* I (par. 151). *Ideas* II and especially the fifth *Cartesian Meditation* deal with the constitution of the other in my environment and deal with the constitution of the world in the intersubjectivity of the Ego and the other.

K:56:25; G:52:1; GC:106:9; GP:95:34. What is alluded to here is intentional psychology whose task is more fully analyzed in the *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 28-33, 40-42, 125-126 [Eng. p. 33-39, 46-49, 146-147. Editor.]

K:57:16; G:53:1; GC:106:34; GP:96:19. This paragraph is somewhat disappointing if one expects of it a radical definition of the natural attitude. It doesn't answer the most elementary questions:

(a) Why use the word *thesis* or *position* (*Thesis* = *Setzung* = *Position*) for this attitude which consists in *finding there an existing world*

and accepting it as it is given, as existing? In brief, how is *finding there* equivalent to *positing*? But more exactly, belief, which is concealed in the natural attitude and which reduction will denounce as a limitation to the constituting power of the transcendental Ego, will be recognized only by reduction. And thus reduction, when applied to this limitation, will manifest that this belief, which is given in the natural attitude as discovery or pure receptivity, is actually positing. (b) In par. 30 it may appear that the "naïvety" of the natural attitude is only consistent with the "principle of principles" of par. 26 and with the *epochè* of all philosophy and all criticism which it implies. Will not phenomenological philosophy be a critical or even a skeptical theory? This question can only be answered when intuition has been recovered without the limitation of the "general thesis of the natural attitude," that is, recovered as being constituted as intuition.

K:57:18; G:53:2; GC:107:2; GP:96:21. (2) This chapter only deals with *the fact that the phenomenological epochè is possible in principle*; indirectly and in relation to Cartesian doubt, par. 31; directly and by itself, par 32.

K:58:7; G:53:3; GC:107:24; GP:97:3. This character of presence *is* the general thesis of the world or, more exactly, its correlate. It is an implicit belief which, as "thematized," takes the form of the judgment of existence and of belief itself.

K:58:16; G:54:1; GC:107:34; GP:97:14. This Cartesian approach of the *epochè* in the *Ideas* is a serious source of misunderstanding. This article certainly takes care to distinguish*epochè* from methodical doubt and to characterize it as a suspension compatible with certainty. However, Chapter II and Chapter III, which fall back beneath the level of the envisioned *epochè* (as it is said at the beginning of par. 34) are in Cartesian style. In order to separate the "region" of consciousness, it is characterized as indubitable. (Cf. the title of par. 46: "How inner perception is indubitable and transcendent perception is doubtful"). The "destruction of the world," which makes consciousness appear to be "residuum" is an eminently Cartesian step. Thus the Cartesian preparations of the *epochè* hold a more prominent place than the *epochè* itself in the *Ideas*. Cf. the definition of *epochè* in the *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 16-18, 31-32, 70-71 [Eng. p. 18-21, 36-37, 83-84. Editor].

K:58:21; G:54:2; GC:108:4; GP:97:21. The analysis of doubt pertains to eidetic psychology. It is an essence of the "region" of consciousness. This analysis will be made again in the framework of phenomenology proper, which is dealt with in par. 103.

K:58:32; G:54:3; GC:108:18; GP:97:35. *Materie*, in the sense of *Logical Investigations*, refers to the *quid* of judgment, the same thing (or the same state of affairs) that can be established, desired, ordered etc. On the other hand, quality (*Qualität*) of judgment deals with the fact that this thing or this "matter" is precisely established, desired, ordered, etc., fifth *Investigation* par. 20, p. 411-12. The question is taken up again in the *Ideas*, par. 133.

K:58:35; G:54:4; GC:108:22; GP:97:39. Husserl's method of approach is to extract from methodical doubt, better known than *epochè* , the component which is precisely the *epochè*. This component is more primitive than doubt since the latter adds the exclusion of certainty. The *epochè* consists in an act of suspension rather that negation, conjecture, calculation, or doubt. These modes of belief are at bottom modifications of a basic belief or certainty (par. 103-107). Thus they are undermining a belief which is certain and are, moreover, beyond our freedom. As a result, it is a matter of an alteration of belief which is not a mode of belief but one of an entirely different dimension. It consists in *not employing* certainty, which remains what it is. It is evident that this description continues to be quite unclear because it is still mixed with the very belief which it seeks to transcend. Cf. par. 112-17.

K:59:5; G:54:5; GC:108:32; GP:98:8. These two images, the parenthesis and bracketing, are still mundane and thus deceptive. (a) This is not one *part* of being which is *excluded*, nor even the being of the world as a whole, but its "positing," that is, a conduct (*Verfahren*) before the world (further: *die Thesis ist Erlebnis*). Only as a correlate can it be said that the index of presence which corresponds to that belief is suspended. It is in abbreviated language that we will speak further about the exclusion of this or that (of the natural world, of essences, of logic, etc.) par. 56-61. (b) More radically, this "withholding" only appears to have a private character. If it is true that the natural attitude is a limitation by which the transcendental Ego hides its constituting power from itself, the private aspect of *epochè* is a provisional description. But only

the exercise of the transcendental constitution can reveal the sense of the natural attitude and its suspension. That is why Husserl says that the *epochè* retains what it excludes (p. 142, n. 2.). This statement remains obscure as long as it does not become apparent that retaining is constituting and that excluding is freeing the radical liberality of this subject which gives meaning. Unfortunately, the preparatory analyses of Chapters II and III, by presenting the "region" of consciousness as "residuum" in a process of elimination, tend to interpret *epochè* in a privative sense.

K:59:18; G:55:1; GC:109:6; GP:98:19. Freedom, which is the issue of this section, cannot be understood yet. It is a question of a theoretical freedom of the transcendental Ego which is at work in the suspension of the natural attitude and realizes at the same time the constituting power of this transcendental Ego.

K:59:19; G:55:2; GC:109:6; GP:98:20. The expression "positions" refers to acts of a higher order such as deciding, affirming, negating, appreciating and hating. Cf. par. 115.

K:59:26; G:55:3; GC:109:15; GP:98:29. This supposition of non-being which is added to the *epochè* in Cartesian doubt remains on the level of the modes of belief whose sequence will be studied later. These are: to be certain, to doubt, to reckon, etc., par. 103 ff. Supposition is a "neutralized" belief, such as the expression, "let us imagine that...." It does not "claim" anything. Par. 110. The *epochè* may appear indiscernible from this "neutralization" of certainty. It is precisely an absolutely new dimension in relation to all modes of belief which are all *within* the thesis of the world. If I doubt or make a supposition, I make it on the basis of the world, and when I make a supposition, firm belief is excluded. The *epochè* suspends the thesis in a specific way which, being different from "neutralization" of belief, is compatible with the certainty of intuition.

K:60:1; G:55:4; GC:109:27; GP:99:1. Husserl offers here a glimpse of the vital relation between prephenomenological "intuitionism" and specific "idealism" which is put into play by reduction and constitution. In this sense *epochè* does not suspend intuition, but a specific belief which is involved in it and causes consciousness to be *caught in* intuition.

K:60:13; G:55:5; GC:110:2; GP:99:14. Cf. p. 55 n. 2-3 and par. 110.

K:61:7; G:56:1; GC:110:32; GP:100:3. In what sense is reduction *limited* in its universality? As we will see in the second and third chapters, reduction will be a reduction of transcendence, that is, of everything other than consciousness which is there for it. Reduction is limited to the world which is over against consciousness. At the same time its meaning is dangerously altered; it is only an exclusion which is destined to reveal consciousness again as "residuum" (par. 33, the beginning), that is, as an ontological "region." (par. 33). This separation of *immanence* is only some pedagogical (Cartesian) method, which is to familiarize the reader with this idea that consciousness is not *in* the world, but that the world is *for* consciousness. This reversal is the fruit of this limited reduction, but it is only a preparation for radical reduction which is still merely hinted at in the *Ideas*. In Chapter IV alone will we see a proposal to extend the *epochè* to the eidetic.

K:62:6; G:57:1; GC:111:16; GP:100:26. This non-participation in belief receives all its meaning, if indeed this "positing" of the world makes up a kind of alienation and if the intuition of the world is, moreover, an initial blindness, as Fink says, a blindness which we call life, being man, being in the world.

K:62:9; G:57:2; GC:111:18; GP:100:27. What is in question here is this other *epochè*, the *epochè* of prejudgment expressed in par. 26, within the natural attitude.

CHAPTER TWO:
CONSCIOUSNESS AND NATURAL REALITY

K:63:2; G:57:3; GC:112:2; GP:101:1. *Chapter* II does not carry out the *epochè* but describes consciousness in such a way that the reader is really prepared to carry out reduction starting with this description. But if this analysis is prior to reduction (par. 33, G:57:4 and G:59:1, beginning par. 39), it is actually attracted by a "first glimpse" of transcendental consciousness (par. 33) and thus gradually elevated to the level of reduction. The most important analyses of the *Ideas* are, furthermore, half phenomenological psychology and half transcendental idealism. This is the meaning of the limited reduction announced in par. 32. This *ambiguous* relation between intentional psychology and transcendental phenomenology is the explanation for the procedure in the chapter.

(1) First look at the transcendental consciousness unveiled by reduction, par. 33.

(2) Intentional, prephenomenological description of consciousness, par. 34-38.

(3) Positing the central problem of an eidetic of the "region" of consciousness: in what sense is consciousness something *other* than mundane reality? Par. 39.

The distinction between the two types of reality brings out the opposition between transcendent and immanent perception, par. 40-43.

(4) Comprehensive conclusions of the chapter are drawn: consciousness is absolute, indubitable being, whereas transcendent being is relative and doubtful. Par. 44-46.

K:63:10; G:57:4; GC:112:11; GP:101:12. (1) *The search for a "residuum"* is a provisional expression and full of misunderstandings for the phenomenological method; it exclusively stresses the subtracting character of reduction. At this stage, phenomenology is a regional eidetic which is delineated by the exclusion of the region of nature, while consciousness is the region not touched by this exclusion.

K:64:3; G:58:1; GC:112:25; GP:101:25. On the individual as eidetic singularity and on region, cf. Par. 15-16.

K:64:10; G:58:2; GC:112:33; GP:101:33. Intentional psychology lays the foundation for fundamental phenomenology by showing that such

a thing as consciousness exists. On the pole of the subject of experience and its objects as correlates, cf. par. 80 and par. 84.

K:64:24; G:58:3; GC:113:12; GP:102:13. The natural attitude is not naturalism, but falls back of its full weight upon naturalism. It is really the anticipation of pure phenomenology which redresses description and makes it into a propaedeutic for this new science.

K:65:9; G:59:1; GC:113:25; GP:102:27. Confirmation of G:57:3 and G:58:1.

K:66:5; G:59:2; GC:114:5; GP:103:3. Cf. G:57:4. The continuity between regional eidetic of consciousness and transcendental phenomenology, at least at the stage of the *Ideas*, constitutes the ambiguity of this difficult text. But if consciousness ought to be constitutive, it also ought to be more than one region of reality among others; cf. G:141:2.

K:66:18; G:59:3; GC:114:18; GP:103:18. The meaning of the word transcendental will be explained in par. 86 and at the end of par. 97. Phenomenology, and thus also reduction, is transcendental because it *constitutes* every transcendence in pure subjectivity. The privative meaning of reduction completely gives way before the positive meaning of constitution. This plan and expression, which was originally Kantian, brings about a confrontation between Husserl and criticism, though it is still not possible to confront the two conceptions of the transcendental.

K:66:22; G:59:4; GC:114:23; GP:103:22. On the reductions, cf. chap. IV.

K:67:1; G:60:1; GC:114:30; GP:103:31. (2) *The fundamental notions of the phenomenological description of consciousness*, par. 34-8: attention, intentionality, actuality and non-actuality of the Ego, and reflection. 1) *As far as the method is concerned*, par. 34, we have here a description of intentionality within the framework of the natural attitude and on the eidetic level (on this last point, cf. scruple, G:19:3). Intentionality is first of all an intra-mundane, pre-transcendental relation, a "natural fact." Par. 39 will make clear in what sense existing consciousness mingles with the existing world, caught within it.

K:67:14; G:60:2; GC:115:8; GP:104:3. Cf. par. 2-3.

K:67:21; G:60:3; GC:115:16; GP:104:12. On the exemplary role of image in relation to essence, cf. par. 4.

K:68:20; G:61:1; GC:116:2; GP:104:35. On the Ego of the Cogito, cf. par. 80.

K:69:1; G:61:2; GC:116:12; GP:105:3. Concrete does not mean empirical (par. 15); a concrete essence is that which is independent and upon which abstract moments depend. Everything that is experienced is concrete, as is the temporal flux of what is experienced. On the word flux, cf. par. 81.

K:69:20; G:61:3; GC:116:32; GP:105:24. "*Objectiv*," "*Objekt*," (in quotes) is taken in a non-phenomenological sense as employed in the sciences and in the philosophy of sciences. It is the object elaborated by mathematico-experimental knowledge, as opposed to the subjective; cf. p. 62. *Gegenstand* is the object of perception or representation, as it is given, along with its qualities. *Objekt* is often taken in a phenomenological sense (without quotes). It refers to the correlate of consciousness which is larger than the object of representation and includes the object of perceiving and willing; cf. p. 62 and especially G:66:1.

K:70:4; G:62:1; GC:117:3; GP:105:31. Cf. par. 39 and 43-46.

K:70:15; G:62:2; GC:117:17; GP:106:4. Husserl integrates a familiar distinction in psychology (Wundt: *Blickfeld* and *Blickpunkt*) into intentional psychology. a) Attention is the *actual* mode of intentionality. Wundt's distinction is concerned with the modification in the object. It corresponds, in polar fashion, to the activity of the Ego which turns towards or turns away from something. b) Furthermore, Husserl generalizes the notion of attention in the entire Cogito.

K:70:21; G:62:3; GC:117:22; GP:106:10. Cf. G:61:3.

K:71:12; G:62:4; GC:118:2; GP:106:28. Cf. p. 11, 49, and 50. The image doesn't make something present, as recollection does. It is a "neutralizing" modification, par. 111.

K:71:15; G:62:5; GC:118:5; GP:106:32. This notion of "characterization"—we will speak not only about the "character" of presentation and presentiation but also about the character of belief (real, possible, doubtful, etc.), about actuality and non-actuality, etc. par. 99 ff.—will get its full meaning in relation to the "noematic nucleus," par. 99.

K:72:16; G:63:1; GC:118:31; GP:107-18. Cf. par. 37, 84 *ad finem* and 115.

K:73:5; G:64:1; GC:119:16; GP:107-39. Intentionality is set forth following attention in order to encompass the non-actual Cogito.

K:73:18; G:64:2; GC:119:33; GP:108:11. Intentionality is known before inductive experience, by inspection of the essence of what is "experienced;" it does not refer to an accidental link between *cogitatio* and *cogitatum*. Thought is thought *of* something, and the object is *what* I think. The fifth *Logical Investigation*, entitled *Über intentionale Erlebnisse und ihre "Inhalte,"* p. 343-508, calls the *cogitatio "Aktcharakter"* and the *cogitatum "Aktinhalt."* The *Ideas* also take for granted the definition of consciousness as what is intentionally experienced. This is the third meaning which the word can take. In the first meaning, consciousness is the unity of the flux of what is experienced; in the second sense, it is the inner apperception of what one experiences "as what is properly there in person" ("dans leur ipséité vivante"). These first two meanings are connected by time; the evidence of inner perception depending on the retention of the immediate past in the present of the reflection. In the third sense, consciousness is everything that is experienced as intentional. We pass from the two preceding meanings to the third by this intuition that the fundamental character which consciousness reveals about itself is precisely intentionality (fifth *Logical Investigation*, par. 1-8.) Cf. the definition of intentionality in the *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 28 [Eng. p. 32-33. Editor.])

K:74:10; G:64:3; GC:120:14; GP:108:31. This formula already indicates transcendental phenomenology: from the time when intentionality is no longer an outward connection between a physical fact and a psychic fact, but now merely the implication of an object by a consciousness, it is possible to ground the transcendent *in* the immanent.

K:75:5; G:65:1; GC:120:23; GP:108:41. An allusion to non-intentional matter or *hylè* which reveals the breakdown of the *cogitatio* itself in matter and in form, par. 41, 85, 97. Only form bears the character of intentionality. Husserl gives two examples: one drawn from perception (with its matter or *Empfindungsdaten*), and the other from the area of affection (with its matter or *Sinnlichendaten*). The German word *reel* is always reserved for this composition of the cogitatio and the word *data* is reserved for this matter "animated" by intentionality. We will return to this difficult question, p. 73 ff.

K:75:24; G:65:2; GC:121:4; GP:109:17. This study of the "look," in the broadest sense, serves as a transition between the analysis of intentionality and that of reflection. As a matter of fact, the look

comprises a subject pole from which the look proceeds. In this sense every Cogito is ready for reflection. The theme of this paragraph is the extension of the actuality of the consciousness to non-perceptive acts (thus non-attentive in the narrow sense of the word) such as estimating, evaluating, etc..... They are acts of the affective and volitional sphere.

K:76:13; G:66:1; GC:121:25; GP:109:40. On *Objekt*, cf. G:61:3. The *Gegenstand* is what stands over against perception and connected acts, and therefore over against attention in the strict sense (*erfassen, auf-etwas-achten*). The *Objekt* is what stands over against consciousness in all of its forms (thing and value), and thus over against actuality in the larger sense. But every act can be transformed in such a way that the *Gegenstand* of perception, which conveys the agreeable, the valid, etc., passes to the foreground.

K:76:27; G:66:2; GC:112:6; GP:110:15. On simple acts of representation, cf. p. 213.

K:77:25; G:67:1; GC:123:8; GP:111:11. On the "attitude toward," cf. G:55:1. and par. 115.

K:78:3; G:67:2; GC:123:17; GP:111:21. On "simple" acts and "founded" acts, cf. par. 193.

K:78:7; G:67:3; GC:123:22; GP:111:24. Values, affective aspects, tools, etc., are "grounded" in things, par. 116-117. Thereby they have the world as background. The possibility of unceasingly returning from values to things, of "objectifying" affective and volitional intentions, gives us confirmation that we are in the natural attitude.

K:78:9; G:67:4; GC:123:24; GP:111:26. *Reflection* introduces for the first time the distinction between transcendence and immanence as two directions of looking in which one looks toward oneself and toward the other. It is here that the natural attitude begins to transcend itself: "the phenomenological method moves exclusively in acts of reflection," p. 149. And yet *phenomenological* reflection is not any reflection at all (par. 51); reflection, which is the question here, is still a way of "abstracting" one part of our field of vision from all reality.

K:79:6; G:68:1; GC:124:6; GP:112:4. Impression is the absolutely original act, *Urerlebnis*, in opposition to remembering, the image, and empathy, par. 78. p. 149. On empathy cf. G:8:1.

K:79:20; G:68:2; GC:124:19; GP:112:19. This criterion of immanent perception will be completed by another feature: transcen-

dental perception proceeds by "adumbration," reflection does not, par. 44-6. The concrete unity of reflection with its object in the same flux will be essential for defining the absolute and indubitable character of reflection. The unity of reflection and its object is concrete in the sense of par. 15: the act and the object are abstract, that is, dependent; cf. G:28:3. This is designated as "non-mediated," as opposed to transcendental perception which is mediated by the "figurative matter," p. 77-78.

K:80:7; G:69:1; GC:125:1; GP:112:39. *Reel* (and not *real*: on *real*, cf. G:7:4) always refers to the immanent composition of the Cogito, that is, either the inclusion of matter in the cogitatio (G:65:1), or the inclusion of the cogitatio in the flux of experience. If after the *epochè* the transcendent is "included" in immanence, it is included as other, as *nicht reelles Erlebnismoment*, par. 97. *Reel* is thus always opposed to intentional.

K:80:20; G:69:2; GC:125:13; GP:113:9. The unity of experience realizes, therefore, a real, non-mediated inclusion in the case of perception and an immanent mediated relation in the case of recollection of recollection.

K:80:33; G:69:3; GC:125:25; GP:113:22. Allusion to the relation of this problem of reflection to that of time and, more radically, to that of the constitution of the Ego, par. 81 ff.

K:81:2; G:69:4; GC:125:27; GP:113:24. (3) *The fundamental question of this preparatory eidetic can be stated as follows: what is the connection between consciousness and the natural world?* Par. 39. This question is still within the natural attitude, and examples of what is experienced are mundane (*reale*) events, mixed with the world. This is what makes the separation of the essence of consciousness difficult. How can we separate a consciousness which is intertwined with the world? Par. 40 ff. will prepare for an answer to this question by a study of perception, which is the ultimate source of the natural attitude.

K:81:15; G:70:1; GC:126:5; GP:113:38. Of these two aspects of the union of consciousness with the world (by incarnation and by perception), the second, for Husserl, is the key to the first. The remainder of the paragraph insists on the unity of human composition, since this composition with the world is the most visible. The fifth *Cartesian Meditation* will take up the problem of the body as one's own; allusions, *infra*, par. 53-54.

K:82:14; G:70:2; GC:126:29; GP:114:22. This constitution of the *animalia* and empirical man "on" the foundation of the material world is studied in *Ideas* II. On *real*, cf. G:7:4.

K:82:17; G:70:3; GC:126:32; GP:114:25. This problem of *otherness*, or the mutual *exclusion* of reality and consciousness, is not incompatible with the specific implication of the object in the intentional life of consciousness. The question is only posited in relation to reflection which has made consciousness appear as a conjunction of same with same, as an inclusion of cogitationes in "the closed sequence" of a unique flux. Reflection, on the other hand, constitutes the world as "other," "alien," and "excluded" from the proper being of consciousness. Further, this exclusion is eidetic: I think, in two different "regions" of being, about the meaning of the world and the meaning of consciousness. Thus reflection separates a "region" and introduces a new problem about the relation between two "regions" of being. Henceforth the analysis of perception bears the principle of a response to this problem.

K:83:16; G:71:1; GC:127:22; GP:115:12; Cf. G:70:3.

K:83:17; G:71:2; GC:127:23; GP:115:13. Naïveté as opposed to scientific knowledge. Cf. par. 40 (beginning).

K:84:3; G:71:3; GC:128:3; GP:115:29. Preliminary critical question: perception only reveals to us the presence of the world if we separate the subjectivist interpretation of sensible qualities and if we maintain their transcendence. The primacy of "naïve" perception over scientific knowledge is one of the aspects of respect for facts, par. 24.

K:84:9; G:71:4; GC:128:9; GP:115:35. Meaning with quotation marks of the word "objective." Cf. G:61:3.

K:84:14; G:72:1; GC:128:13; GP:115:39. The theory of the sign will be taken up again in par. 43 and 52. The transcendence of qualities is reality itself. The perceived is the in-itself, par. 47. Transcendental idealism will never be a subjectivist idealism.

K:85:13; G:72:2; GC:129:10; GP:116:33. On the symbol, cf. par. 43. On the notion of multiplicity, *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, par. 69-70. Cf. *supra*, G:17:1, G:18:2.

K:85:28; G:73:1; GC:129:26; GP:117:8. On all this, cf. par. 43 and 52.

K:86:2; G:73:2; GC:129:28; GP:117:10. The *transcendence* of the perceived is described here in contrast to the *inclusion* of matter (*hylè*) in the cogitatio, just as above (par. 38) it had been put in

opposition to the inclusion of the cogitatio itself in the flux of experience. This diversity of adumbration which is the non-intentional matter of the cogitatio (par. 36, G:65:1) thus has an essential significance for "excluding" the thing from consciousness (cf. G:70:2). On the opposition *reel-transzendent*. Cf. G:65:1, G:69:1.

K:87:15; G:74:1; GC:131:5; GP:118:18. We have translated *Abschattung* by "adumbration" (esquisse) which roughly gives us the idea of a fragmentary and progressive revelation of the thing. Profile, appearance, perspective, sketch, etc., would be just as suitable.[a] *Hylè*, sense and affective *data*, the diversity of perception, figurative function: all these expressions are strictly synonymous, according to Husserl, G:65:1. A proper phenomenological discipline, the hyletics, relates to this question, par. 85, 86, 97.

K:88:15; G:75:1; GC:132:6; GP:119:18. The function of apprehension is form (*morphè*), the intentional moment which "animates" matter, par. 85 and 97: "in" it and "through" it consciousness directs itself toward things. Matter "exhibits" (*darstellt*) the material moment of the thing: the white, the sharp, etc. One could possibly translate *Darstellung* by "analogon," but this substantive has no verb; besides, it is necessary to reserve the word "representation" for translating *Vorstellung*.

K:89:8; G:76:1; GC:132:37; GP:120:7. The duality of the hyletic moment of what is experienced and the transcendent moment of a thing is finally the basis of the mutual exclusion of both being as consciousness and being as real thing.

K:89:25; G:76:2; GC:133:16; GP:120:25. The *distinction* between being as what is experienced and being as thing, which allows Chapter III to pose the *relativity* of the second in respect to the first, doesn't bear any cosmological meaning here. It would be wrong to interpret this distinction in the sense of Aristotelian and Medieval ontology in which knowing is a relation within being. Here there are two *modes of intuition*, one immanent and the other transcendent, which, by opposing each other, distinguish the two regions to which they relate. Cf. par. 38.

[a]Ricœur adds: "but these words [French: "profil," "aspect," "perspective," "touche"] do not have a verb form to translate *sich abschatten*." Editor.

K:89:32; G:76:3; GC:133:23; GP:120:32. The ranking of these transcendences is studied roughly in par. 151 where the word *Sehding* is explained. Cf. especially *Ideas* II.

K:90:31; G:77:1; GC:134:20; GP:121: This criterion of immanence is negative; but earlier it was the criterion of transcendence that was negative: the transcendent is not really included in the cogitatio or in the flux of what is experienced. These two criteria are strictly correlated; they will serve to reveal perception to be "dubious" and reflection to be "indubitable," par. 43-46.

K:91:5; G:77:2; GC:134:27; GP:121:32. Even God would perceive through "adumbration," p. 78, 81, 157.

K:91:32; G:78:1; GC:135:19; GP:122:28. This harmony of adumbration is the basis of the synthesis of identification by which the thing appears as one and the same par. 41. It is that which discloses the precariousness of perception: it is possible that it ceases and thereby there is no more world. Par. 46 and 49.

K:94:7; G:80:1; GC:137:18; GP:124:22. (4) *Provisional consequences of Chapter* II: par. 44-6.

a) The perception by adumbration is inadequate; immanent perception is adequate, par. 44. b) In some incomparable sense the thing and what is experienced are ready to be perceived, par. 45. c) Finally and above all, the inadequacy of transcendental perception makes it *dubious*, while immanent perception is *indubitable*, par. 46. The Cartesian tone of these conclusions is striking (end of par. 46); it is in this sense that Cartesian doubt can be called a subsidiary method (G:54:1) of the *epochè*.

K:94:12; G:80:2; GC:137:23; GP:124:28. a) The inadequacy of perception is due exclusively to the figurative role of the diversity of adumbration. Descartes based his doubt on the possible confusion between dream and reality, but the distinction between image and perception established in the preceding paragraph absolutely excludes such a confusion. Husserl establishes the *inadequacy of certain, evident intuition*. This analysis thus provides a new motivation for "suspending" judgment without blurring the distinction between intuition and imagination.

K:94:13; G:80:3; GC:137:24; GP:124:29. This new term for designating adumbration prepares the way for a contrast with the *absolute* of what is experienced, p. 81.

K:95:11; G:81:1; GC:138:24; GP:125:32. Here are woven together the theories of attention, of the hyletic diversity, and of phenomenological time, cf. par. 81.

K:95:12; G:81:2; GC:138:26; GP:125:34. Cf. p. 157 (a) The idea of God in epistemology has only the role of an index for constructing limit-concepts.

K:95:29; G:81:3; GC:139:5; GP:126:7. Cf. G:80:3. Paragraph 46 will define the absolute as "that whose existence is necessary," the opposite being impossible. Par. 49 adds: "that which needs nothing to exist." After transcendental reduction, it will become "the transcendental absolute" (par. 81). It must be said, however, that the transcendental absolute is not the ultimate absolute, but "that it constitutes itself and has its radical origin in a definite and true absolute," p. 163. (The "absolute" transcendent, God, will be reduced as is every transcendence, par. 58).

K:96:28; G:82:1; GC:139:34; GP:126:38. On all this, cf. *Ideas II.*

K:97:24; G:82:2; GC:140:24; GP:127:23. This imperfection in the sequence will lead to the more radical problem of the constitution of time, par. 81. On retention as primary memory and remembrance as secondary memory, cf. *Zeitbewusstsein.* On the difference between memory and remembering (*Wiedererinnerung*), par. 77-78

K:98:1; G:83:1; GC:140:34; GP:127:34. This allusion to presentiations is made only to avert confusion between the differences in clarity of the presentiations (differences between themselves, on the one hand, and between them and original perception, on the other) and the radical difference which separates the adequacy of immanent perception and the inadequacy of transcendent perception; this notion of clarity will be studied later on, par. 66-70.

K:98:21; G:83:2; GC:141:20; GP:128:14. b) *The different perceptibility of the thing and what is experienced is a corollary of the difference of perception*: what is experienced is *ready* for reflection, and, conversely, reflection discovers it as it *already* was – namely, unreflected (this characteristic allows for a response to classical objections to introspection, par. 77-79).

For the thing to be perceptible, it must, at least in part, be in the realm of inattention, and must also, at least in part, be in a possible line of experience which continues a stream of as yet unfinished adumbrations. Thus the thing has a specific way to escape perception which increases its inadequacy.

K:100:6; G:84:1; GC:143:4; GP:129:35. On the constitution of the thing in intersubjectivity, cf. the fifth *Cartesian Meditation* and *Ideas* II.

K:100:13; G:85:1; GC:143:12; GP:129:43. This motivation of possible perception by the field of actual and non-actual perception allows us to give a meaning to the idea of *possible* perception. This "real" possibility does not postulate the thing in itself (cf. par. 48), and yet it distinguishes the perceptibility of the thing from the perceptibility of what is experienced, which alone is always *ready* for perception.

K:100:15; G:85:2; GC:143:14; GP:130:2. c) *Indubitable existence of what is experienced is the conclusion of this eidetic psychology.* Despite the difference in demonstration which separates Husserl from Descartes (G:80:2), this affirmation is Cartesian. In fact, it remains within the natural attitude, that is, on the level of the positing of existence (Existenz or Dasein): *consciousness* is an indubitable *existent.*

K:101:22; G:86:1; GC:144:16; GP:130:41. This indubitability "regarding existence" means that certainty can be recovered by every real Ego, regarding what has been really experienced, in the real world. Eidetic evidence is here, then, contrary to mathematics, illustrated by existential evidence. In the sense of par. 2-3, the Cogito authorizes both an *eidetic* intuition (which can be expressed for example as follows: the essence of the Cogito implies an immanent, indubitable perception) and an *individual* intuition (such actual Cogito, *hic et nunc*, is indubitable). Eidetic intuition is true for all, whereas existential intuition is true only for me.

K:102:21; G:86:2; GC:145:2; GP:131:23. The possibility that the world does not exist is not the possibility that perception is a dream, or a picture, but that the variety of adumbrations does not come to a unity at all and is radically discordant. It is the harmony of the adumbrations of things that is contingent. This is absolutely new in relation to Descartes and does not contradict the principle of intentionality, since what would be discordant is a series of intentionalities. Nor does it contradict the principle of original intuition, since what would appear as having no meaning, because of a lack of harmony, is a corporeal presence. Cf. par. 49.

K:101:28; G:86:3; GC:145:9; GP:131:30. This reality of the Ego is "posited" in the sense of the natural attitude. The analysis of Chapter II thus leads us to the *restricted epochè* introduced in par. 32 and 33: the "thesis" of the world where we trustingly live is discredited by the possibility of the discordance in the intentions of consciousness, but the "thesis" of the Ego is confirmed as "thesis" of a fact, of an existent: This exceptional necessity of the reality that I am is from now on the "residuum" of the exclusion of the thesis of the world.

K:103:5; G:86:4; GC:145:18; GP:131:39. On this necessity as particularization of an eidetic generality, cf. par. 6: The application of geometric truth to natural reality is its standard.

K:103:11; G:87:1; GC:145:24; GP:132:2. The necessity of the existence of what I experience is the necessity of an exceptional empirical law, as is the fact of what is experienced *hic et nunc* exceptional in relation to all the facts of nature.

K:103:11; G:87:2; GC:145:34; GP:132:2. On these notions of weight, equilibrium, overcoming, cf. par. 138. "Adequacy" is defined as excluding all "gradation of weight" being able to originate from the invalidation or the confirmation of current experience.

K:104:1; G:87:3; GC:146:7; GP:132:19. This expression confirms the purpose of this chapter, which is *to separate a region of being.* This very aim imposes a "restricted validity" on the consequences that have been reached (the final word of the chapter). In fact, these consequences can only be in accordance with an *epochè* which is restricted and even limiting, for which consciousness is a *residuum*, not an *origin*.

CHAPTER THREE: THE REGION OF PURE CONSCIOUSNESS

K:105:2; G:87:4; GC:147:2; GP:133:2. *Chapter III completes Chapter II and carries the eidetic description to the threshold of transcendental phenomenology.* (1) Consciousness is not only *distinct* from reality, but it is the absolute toward which every transcendence is *related* as "correlate of consciousness." The hypothesis of the "destruction of the world" is the motivation of this last development, pars. 47-9. (2) This conversion of the natural attitude which placed consciousness in the world is henceforth connected to reduction, which is introduced and glanced at in par. 32-3: the concluding description is the beginning of transcendental phenomenology, par. 50-1. (3) A few clarifications are necessary concerning some transcendences, such as God, physical thing, the human as psychophysical composition, and psychological consciousness, par. 51-4. Consciousness is still a "region" of being (p. 93), but we will soon discover that it is the *Urregion* (par. 76).

K:105:3; G:87:5; GC:147:3; GP:133:3. (1) *Natural reality is relative to consciousness.* Par. 46-49. Having pursued to its conclusion the notion of "contingence" of the world, which has been established earlier, we pass to the following notion: the "relativity" of the factual order (which science elaborates and which is given in perception) to a sequence, style, structure or, as Husserl says, a motivation immanent to what is experienced which rules over the discord or harmony of experience. How can we be sure of this? "By destroying through thought" this order on its two levels, which are scientific and perceptive. This audacious hypothesis, which is worthy of Descartes' evil genius, illustrates very well the role of fiction (par. 4). By limitless variations, imagination looks for the resistance of an eidetic constant, but the factual order of the world is not eidetically necessary. "The idea of empirical consciousness" implies, besides this and other orders, the extreme possibility of the nullity of order.

K:105:9; G:88:1; GC:147:9; GP:133:9. The destruction of the world is attempted by the imagination on two occasions: it is shown first that intuitive experience "motivates" scientific truth, cf. par. 40 and par. 52, and it is then shown that the essence of empirical

consciousness survives the collapse of the intentional *unities* of things.

K:106:9; G:88:2; GC:147:35; GP:133:37. For the first time it is said that perception prescribes the *meaning* of things. Par. 55 will clearly say that perception is a consciousness which "gives meaning." At this preconceptual level meaning is the intentional unity of a stream of appearances; it is the order of that variety which is contingent and destructible in thought. The notion of a bestowing intuition (G:7: 6) is cleared up here.

K:106:21; G:88:3; GC:148:12; GP:134:14. The essence of "empirical consciousness" implies only a processing through successive adumbrations. The non-world would be a chaos of adumbrations. "The sequence of experience" (die Erfahrungszusammenhänge) refers to this more or less organized style which motivates "unities of meaning" or things. *Our* experience is termed "legitimizing" later on in so far as it motivates such unities. It is a contingent form of the idea of experience and has the transcendence of a thing as a correlate – that is, a unity of meaning. Transcendence of a thing is the particular case of the entirely stark idea of transcendence which is revealed by the hyperbole of a non-world.

K:106:21; G:89:1; GC:148:13; GP:134:15. The notion of empirical sequence or motivation allows us to deepen the notion of perceptibility studied in par. 45 and to clarify the denial of the thing-in-itself. Par. 48 reconsiders the difference between empty logical possibility and possibility motivated by the indeterminate horizon of potential consciousness.

K:107:28; G:90:1; GC:149:27; GP:135:28. One of the traps of the natural attitude is to posit the world as initially non-perceived. To reduce non-perceived existence into the horizon of perceived existence, and to reduce perceived existence among the varieties of correlate modes of experience, is to awaken consciousness to the abundance which it did not know it produced: consciousness "gives meaning."

K:108:12; G:90:2; GC:150:7; GP:136:7. Cf. G:88:3.

K:108:15; G:90:3; GC:150:9; GP:136:9. Cf. par. 135, 151-2. The agreement between subjects is not based on the very existence of the world, but intersubjectivity is the medium of the constitution of a common world. (*Ideas* II, fifth *Cartesian Meditation*).

K:109:12; G:91:1; GC:150:32; GP:136:33. This paragraph, which is one of the most famous in the *Ideas*, first of all clarifies par. 47 in this way. The destruction of the world is not the absence of intentionality, but is destruction through the inner conflict of all intentional truth, the generalized "simulacrum." The figurative variety of adumbrations is therefore the key to all this analysis: this "configuration" of this variety bears the destiny of all empirical sequences. Thus the transcendent order of the world is suspended in the inner order of what is experienced. *Husserl draws the radical consequence of this: consciousness does not need things in order to exist. Consciousness is the absolute as stated in* par. 44 (G:81:3) and par. 46.

K:110:23; G:92:1; GC:152:4; GP:137:37. In the destruction of the world, I would still be an intentional consciousness, but intending chaos. In this sense I would be no longer dependent on things and a world. This hypothesis thus raises me from my own shortcomings and testifies to me about the shortcomings of things and the world.

K:110:30; G:92:2; GC:152:12; GP:138:4. Here converge the *being-given* for "naive" intuitionism and the bestowing of meaning for transcendental consciousness.

K:110:36; G:92:3; GC:152:17; GP:138:9. The counter-proof of the destruction of the world is this: the stream of variety of consciousness changes and a world appears.

K:111:16; G:92:4; GC:152:34; GP:138:27. As a "region," consciousness is only *coordinated* to the "region" reality by the notion of object (or of being in the sense of object), of which we know that it is only the first of the categories of formal ontology (cf. p. 11, 29, 40): the object in this sense is "the subject of possible true predications." (p. 21).

K:112:4; G:93:1; GC:153:15; GP:139:5. Par. 52-53.

K:112:13; G:93:2; GC:153:24; GP:139:13. The Leibnizian origin of these statements is attested by the *Cartesian Meditations*, in particular fourth *Meditation*, par. 33. The "closed" character of consciousness does not abolish intentionality and merely excludes the *outward* relation of causality between two absolutes. The idea of *constitution* will confer its own Husserlian meaning on these Leibnizian formulas, and Husserl will say that the world is constituted "in" consciousness, although this inclusion is not "real," but "intentional." Cf. moreover, G:165:3.

K:112:20; G:93:3; GC:153:33; GP:139:23. This text already proclaims Husserlian idealism (par. 55) and the series of equivalences in which this is summed up: being transcendent = being intentional = being *for* consciousness = being relative = contingent unity (and ideally destructible) of a variety of appearances.

K:113:18; G:94:1; GC:154:25; GP:140:14. *Confrontation with phenomenological reduction*: the inversion of the relations between consciousness and reality make the *epochè* possible. In what sense? To understand that the world is the correlate of the natural attitude is to be *ready* to suspend the belief which supports this attitude. In this sense, the hypothesis of the destruction of the world is one of the routes toward the *epochè*: to imagine the non-world is to remove us already from the prestige of an order *which is there*. But *epochè* is more than this subordination of reality to consciousness. It is the transition to the Ego as the spectator who no longer cooperates in belief. Besides the fact that it permits an understanding of the natural attitude on its own ground, the *epochè* adds a *free movement of withdrawal*; cf. G:94:3.

K:113:31; G:94:2; GC:155:2; GP:140:27. This very important phrase marks the turning of reduction, which allots a "residuum," to the constitution which retains *"in" itself* what it appears to exclude *"from" itself*. Reduction remained restricted so long as it "separated consciousness" (chap. II). By "Bringing back" reality to itself (chap. III), reduction becomes indistinguishable from transcendental constitution, which discovers the meaning of the world.

K:114;12; G:94:3; GC:155:15; GP:140:40 The repetition of the verb *vollziehen* marks the passage to transcendental phenomenology. That reveals the natural attitude as an *operation which we are free not to do*. Its presence *there* is the horizon of our "life thrust into the world" (hineinleben). But to live "thrust into," is *to exercise*, without knowing it, the positing of the world. To reduce the unscience (*inscience*) proper to the natural attitude is what the *epochè* is about. As soon as I know the natural attitude as an *operation*, I am absolute consciousness – which not only reduces it, but constitutes it.

K:114:24; G:95:1; GC:155:27; GP:141:11. Cf. G:67:4.

K:115:27; G:95:2; GC:156:22; GP:142:1. This important text confirms the fact that the first interpretation of *epochè*, as separation of a "residuum," will be overcome later on.

K:116:11; G:96:1; GC:156:36; GP:142:17. Cf. G:93:2. Thus consciousness is, first of all, a "residuum" which we then discover to be the whole of absolute being.

K:116:25; G:96:2; GC:157:14; GP:142:32. The bearing of this remark is merely negative. If the problem of God is the problem of teleology (Why does this world and this order of facts exist?), then the principle of order is not transcendent in the sense of "mundane," nor immanent in the sense of "what is experienced." It ought to be an absolute which is announced in a specific way in absolute consciousness. Par. 58 will definitely close this open door.

K:117:20; G:97:1; GC:158:4; GP:143:19. Here we find additional remarks to par. 40. We only need to justify the transcendence of what is perceived. Now it is necessary to situate precisely the transcendence of the physical thing in relation to the transcendence of what is perceived and to examine the principle of the constitution of transcendence within immanence. Thus at issue is no longer the "subjectivity" of qualities, but physical realism. This paragraph makes the thesis clear which was assumed by the fiction of the destruction of the world (G:88:1) – namely, that the physical thing is "motivated" by the course of sensory experience. As a result we do not have here a general theory of physics. Rather it is solely a question of reflecting upon the mode of *transcendent existence* of the physical thing.

K:121:36; G:101:1; GC:162:3; GP:147:6. The scientific determinations are therefore intentional correlates of a higher order, actions "based" on "simple" perception (par. 93, par. 116).

K:123:28; G:102:1; GC:163:29; GP:148:33. Cf. G:78:1, G:81:2, G:89:1, p. 157, Husserl's note (a).

K:124:7; G:102:2; GC:164:9; GP:149:10. Cf. p. 66.

K:124:8; G:103:1; GC:164:10; GP:149:11. It may be recalled that consciousness is mingled in the world in two ways: by its body and by perception, par. 39. The first connection is subordinated to the second since in the perceived world consciousness is given as the consciousness of an animal or of a man. The "soul" is in the world, "realized" by its body. Such is a transcendence.

K:125:13; G:103:2; GC:165:6; GP:150:3. Cf. the fifth *Meditation* and supra, par. 47, p. 90.

K:125:18; G:103:3; GC:165:11; GP:150:8. Cf. *Ideas* II. This constitution of the soul upon the foundation of the body has a con-

siderable place in this work. Husserl here only shows that this transcendence does not pose any new problems of existence, since the body appears in adumbration, and that the union of soul and body is still a case of transcendence "based" on a reality of a lower order. The only novelty is that its transcendence is the immanence of consciousness "which is alienated." (*Zu einem Anderen geworden*). That is why par. 54 will apply the hypothesis of the destruction of the world to psychological consciousness in order to attest the relativity of the world to pure consciousness.

K:127:27; G:105:1; GC:167:17; GP:152:10. A critical question is raised here: if personality is a moment of psychological consciousness *constituted in transcendence*, in what sense is absolute consciousness still an Ego? In what sense can intersubjectivity remain as a problem on the transcendental level? This is one of the most difficult points of transcendental phenomenology. It will be roughly treated in par. 57. Husserl acknowledges his various provisional answers and promises a larger response in *Ideas* II, cf. G:109:1.

K:128:28; G:106:1; GC:168:10; GP:152:40. The *concluding paragraph* stresses the positive side of the transcendental attitude, that reduction is the opposite of constitution, and that *Sinnbegung* and *Konstitution* are strict synonyms. The verb *geben* emphasizes the activity of absolute consciousness in intuition itself, which remains intuition (cf. the expression *gebende Anschauung*). All the originality of Husserl's phenomenology resides in this identity of "seeing" and "giving." *Sinn* has a very broad meaning (and not the rational sense of significance). This is an "assumed" unity (p. 86) which is either confirmed or denied. On the definition of constitution, cf. *Cartesian Meditations* p. 45-7 [Eng. p. 53-55. Editor].

K:129:16; G:106:2; GC:168:30; GP:153:20. This is generally the reproach of criticist philosophers, whose objections are summed up by Fink in his lengthy article. They say that Husserl constantly mixed a platonic intuitionism with a disastrous subjectivism; reality is confined to a psychological subject who can only be reached in inner experience. (*Op. cit.* in particular, p. 334-36.).

K:129:34; G:107:1; GC:169:14; GP:154:1. This term *Ursprung* is already used in the *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, par. 67, in the sense of justification by evidence (*Einsicht in das Wesen, intuitive Vergegenwärtigung des Wesens in adäquater Ideation*, p. 244), so also *Zeitbewusstsein*, p. 7-8 (par. 2). The meaning of this word

continues to be enriched in the sixth *Logical Investigation*, par. 44: The *Ursprung* of the concept of being is the "bestowing act" which corroborates the meaning of the concept. (Vol. III, p. 139-142). In the *Ideas*, *Ursprung* has the meaning of radical foundation and is identified with constitution. But according to par. 122, mentioned earlier (p. 105), it emphasizes rather the free spontaneity of constitution. In *Experience and Judgment*, par. 5, 11, 12, the *Ursprung-Analysis* is a genetic analysis, a "genealogy of logic," which reduces judgment to the "original form" of *Selbsgegebenheit* – that is, to pure "experience."

K:130:4; G:107:2; GC:169:18; GP:154:5. As a matter of fact, it has been shown that transcendental "constitution" is itself the object of *intuition*. And this causes a difficulty: *ought not* "seeing," which bears upon the activity of constitution, be constituted in turn? This difficulty will not be treated in the *Ideas*, where only problems of *constitution of transcendence* are touched upon. But there is a problem of the proto-constitution and constitution of the *Ego* (of which only the problem of time is given passing consideration here). Certain unpublished materials of the last period are devoted to these difficult questions.

CHAPTER FOUR:
PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTIONS

K:131:2; G:108:1; GC:171:2; GP:155:2. The possibility of phenomenological reduction having been established, the question of "degrees" of reduction mentioned at the end of par. 33 is taken up again. On the whole there are two levels of reduction: *(1) The reduction of divine transcendence and the psychological ego pertain in a specific manner to the cycle of nature.* Par. 56-8. (2) *The reduction of eidetics constitutes an "enlargement of the first reduction,"* par. 59-60.

K:132:3; G:109:1; GC:172:1; GP:156:1. These remarks on the pure Ego are still very provisional. It is not really stated what it is, or if it is constituted in a more radical way than transcendences. Only two things are firmly stated: (1) that the pure Ego is irreducible a) as "seeing" which pervades all cogitatio b) as the identity, qualified in the first person, of the flux of what is experienced. In the fifth *Investigation*, par. 4 (1st and 2nd ed.), Husserl denied that there was a phenomenological Ego. The unity of flux of what is experienced is a form of connection immanent in what is experienced as such, "*Ohne daß es darüber hinaus eines eigenen, alle Inhalte tragenden sie alle noch einmal einigenden Ichprinzips bedürfte. Und hier wie sonst wäre die Leistung eines solchen Prinzips unverständlich.*" Later (par. 8) Husserl attacks Natorp (*das reine Ich und die Bewusstheit*) who defined consciousness by the "relation to the Ego" and characterized the Ego as "center of reference" of all the contents of consciousness. At that time Husserl thought that the unity of consciousness, i.e., the cluster of what is experienced, does not presuppose the Ego. The third edition presents an unequivocal recanting of the text which is nevertheless left unaltered (p. 354, n. 1, 357, n. 1, 359, n. 1, 363, n. 1, p. 376.) On this discussion, cf. Gurwitsch, "A non egological conception of consciousness," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* I. 325-38, and J.-P. Sartre, "*La transcendence de l'Ego*," *Recherches Philosophiques* VI, p. 85-123. Cf. the entire fourth *Cartesian Meditation*.

K:132:31; G:109:2; GC:172:31; GP:156:34. If it is not a real moment of what is experienced, the Ego is not immanent in the sense

of par. 41 (G:73:2). That is why Husserl calls it a transcendence in immanence.

K:133:14; G:110:1; GC:173:11; GP:157:10. Allusion to the problems of the constitution of transcendence, which alone are treated in *Ideas* I and which form phenomenology as "directed toward the object," par. 80.

K:133:22; G:110:2; GC:173:20; GP:157:20. The transcendence of God is, like that of the Ego, within the immanence of the Cogito (G:96:2), but it is not at *one* with it, as is the ego of the cogitatio. It is announced there "mediately:" a) when the teleological problem, posited by the factual order of the world as constituted in consciousness, arises, b) regarding the development of life and human history, and c) through the motives of religious consciousness.

K:135:2; G:111:1; GC:175:2; GP:158:40. *The transcendence of eidetic order* offers a particular technical difficulty: if phenomenology is an eidetic of the region of consciousness, everything that concerns formal ontology (par. 59) and material ontology (par. 60) cannot be reduced.

K:135:20; G:112:1; GC:175:21; GP:159:19. On formal ontology, cf. par. 8, G:18:1. On the categories of meaning, cf. par. 10, G:22:2.

K:135:21; G:112:2; GC:175:22; GP:159:20. Cf. par. 10. On the object and the category of the object in general in formal ontology, cf. equally par. 10.

K:136:7; G:112:3; GC:176:9; GP:160:3. Cf. *infra*, p. 299, 307.

K:136:17; G:112:4; GC:176:19; GP:160:14. This point will be more amply developed, par. 72-75.

K:136:18; G:113:1; GC:176:20; GP:160:16. One recalls (G:17:1) that the third task of logic, according to the *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, is to formulate the theory of forms that deductive systems can take. This is the theory of "forms of theory."

K:137:5; G:113:2; GC:177:8; GP:160:42. Thus the purely descriptive ideal of phenomenology works a sort of division at the core of formal ontology and retains from it the only science of objectivity in general.

K:137:6; G:113:3; GC:177:9; GP:161:1. The *epochè* causes a second division: at the core of material ontologies. Essences corresponding to "constituted" transcendences are excluded while essences corresponding to what is experienced in immanence are retained. Phenomenology is, then, the eidetics of immanent essences, obtained by the reduction of nature and accompanying transcendences, the eidetics of formal *mathesis* and the eidetics of material eidetics proper to nature.

K:138:14; G:114:1; GC:178:25; GP:162:13. On the limitation of reduction, cf. G:56:1.

K:138:33; G:115:1; GC:179:9; GP:162:32. Phenomenological reduction on the eidetic level seems to have only a negative meaning. No problem of constitution, at least in *Ideas* I, seems to be posited outside the "unities of meaning" appearing through variety of adumbrations.[a] All transcendence *de jure* is "announced" and "constituted" in consciousness. But *Ideas* I does not go beyond the example of sense perception which is, as we have said, the touchstone of the natural attitude, supra, p. 70. We have encountered other limits to the problem of constitution in *Ideas* I; cf. *supra* G:105:1, and especially G:107:2. This is why the negative character of reduction is never totally dispelled in *Ideas* I. Par. 62 adds some clarifications to the boundary between *Ideas* I and *Ideas* III.

K:139:23; G:116:1; GC:180:1; GP:163:22. The phenomenological attitude is "difficult" while the natural attitude is "easy." This is self-evident. It is enough to just live in order to be caught in the thesis of the world.

K:140:28; G:117:1; GC:181:7; GP:164:27. Cf. G:115:1.

K:141:1; G:117:2; GC:181:20; GP:165:1. Allusion to the theory of judgment in the fifth *Logical Investigation.*

K:141:3; G:117:3; GC:181:27; GP:165:7. On *Wesensverhalte* and its translation, cf. G:13:2.

K:141:26; G:118:1; GC:182:10; GP:165:28. The Kantian slant of this paragraph is no less disturbing than the Cartesian slant of Chapters II and III. Criticist objections to phenomenology are based on the contrast between these two styles. On the one hand, phenomenology has been provisionally defined as the *eidetic of a "region";* consciousness appeared as an immanent *Seiendes*, as a "residuum" being attained by elimination of the transcendent *Seiende.* On the other hand, phenomenology is now presented as a *critique* of every science and philosophy: consciousness appears as a *Geltendes*, a source of validity, rather than as a part of being. Criticist philosophers have seen here an incoherent mixture of dogmatic intuitionism and badly assimilated criticism. It is diffi-

[a] In a apparent reference error, Ricœur adds: "cf. p. 117, n. 1," and p. 117, we read: "Cf. p. 115, n.1." Editor.

cult to make a judgment on the basis of the *Ideas*; Chapters II and III are only a pedagogical *approach* to be overcome. As for this paragraph, it expresses less the essence of phenomenology than the effect it has as a consequence upon epistemology. Husserl attributes the critical function to applied phenomenology. It is at this point that he is reunited with Kant. But the center of orientation of the first approach, from which this methodological corollary proceeds remains hidden. Cf. Fink, *Op. cit.*, *passim* (in particular, p. 374-79).

K:141:33; G:118:2; GC:182:17; GP:165:35. The contrast between the two meanings of the word dogmatic in the *Ideas* is striking. In par. 26 it is taken in a favorable sense, along the lines of intuitionism and against all skepticism and criticism. But here it is taken in an unfavorable sense along the lines of the natural attitude. The prudent judgment on philosophy in paragraph 26 turns out to be only provisional.

K:142:13; G:118:3; GC:183:2; GP:166:13. This important expression attests the fact that phenomenology is not essentially a "critique," that is, a science of the possibility of other sciences, but a true science of absolute consciousness. This is the principal difference, among others, from Kant.

K:142:18; G:118:4; GC:183:7; GP:166:19. These last lines usher in the *philosophy of history* from the period of the *Crisis*.

K:142:34; G:119:1; GC:183:24; GP:166:36. *Ideas* III actually exists, though it remains unpublished[a]

K:143:4; G:119:2; GC:183:31; GP:167:4. This note is the only allusion to the connection between eidetic reduction of the logical section and phenomenological reduction proper. The possibility is excluded of a phenomenological reduction without eidetic reduction, that is, of a transcendental empirical phenomenology. We have seen (par. 34), however, that an eidetic of consciousness is possible without phenomenological reduction and that the latter can be prepared by the former. Eidetic phenomenology has related the essence of nature to the essence of consciousness. In particular, the hypothesis of the destruction of the world has tested this eidetic relation and has revealed that the essence of transcendence does not imply the necessity of unities of meaning, that is, the necessity of a "world" in the sense of a cosmos.

[a]As mentioned above p. 36, note a, this volume is now available. Editor.

SECTION THREE: METHODS AND PROBLEMS OF PURE PHENOMENOLOGY

K:145:3; G:120:1; GC:185:3; GP:169:4. *The third part* particularly puts into practice this pure phenomenology, which forms a transition between phenomenological psychology and transcendental philosophy, as will be asserted beginning with *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. The heart of the matter is the study of the noetic-noematic structures. This third part must be seen as a series of phenomenological exercises which acclimate the mind to rethink the various characteristics of knowledge as original dimensions of constituting intentionality.

CHAPTER ONE: PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS OF METHOD

K:147:2; G:120:2; GC:187:2; GP:171:2. Chapter I adds nothing to the theory of reduction and makes the scientific kind of phenomenology specific as *intuitive and descriptive science*. The central idea is that it realizes another type of material eidetic than geometry because of "the inexactness" of the essences which it describes.

K:149:5; G:121:1; GC:189:2; GP:172:42. The paradox of phenomenology: the most *difficult* science, which is the most contrary to the natural tendencies of the mind, ought to be *the clearest* in its principles; this demand for self-transparency involves various "scruples," par. 64-65.

K:149:6; G:121:2; GC:189:3; GP:173:1. (1) *The two scruples examined in paragraph 64 and in paragraph 65* are symmetrical. If the psychological Ego is *excluded*, is not the phenomenologist who practices phenomenology also excluded? If phenomenology is ruled by laws of method, does not the investigation into these laws fall under laws which it does not know yet? As is commonplace with philosophers, Husserl answers that a methodology is discovered by *initially* being practiced in an unreflective way and only *subsequently* by reflecting on its own procedure.

K:151:27; G:124:1; GC:192:2; GP:175:26. (2)[a] *The conditions of an intuitive science,* par. 66-70: a) *First condition: accuracy of expression,* par. 66. The difficulties raised by language (expressions which do not "cover" intuition, equivocation, etc.) have not ceased to preoccupy Husserl any more than Berkeley or Bergson. For, language *preserves* knowledge outside of the intuition which verifies it; this dignity of language is at the same time its peril. Besides, the *convention* upon which it is based is at the origin of "equivocation" of meaning, which adulterates the transmission of intuition.

On the relationship of expression to thought, cf. *Logical Investigations* I (*Expression and Signification*). Chapters I and III of this *Investigation* are principally concerned with the difficulties raised here. The problem of expression will be taken up again even in the framework of noetico-noematic analyses, *infra*, par. 124-27.

K:151:33; G:124:2; GC:192:9; GP:175:35. In the strict sense the concept appertains to the stratum of the expression, infra, p. 258.

K:153:2; G:125:1; GC:193:13; GP:176:35. b) *Second condition of an intuitive science: the clarification of intuition in relation to the perceived or imagined example,* par. 67-70. This problem is raised because of the distinction and the inseparability of fact and essence (par. 2-4). Paragraphs 67-68 specify the terminology and dispel some preliminary confusions. Paragraphs 69-70 contain what is essential in the problem, namely, the relation of the clarity of essence to the clarity of the examples which illustrate it.

K:153:7; G:125:2; GC:193:19; GP:177:2. The metaphor of nearness and distance has already been employed by the Cartesians, especially Malebranche. It serves, in Husserl, to initiate the notion of *degrees of clarity.* The limit of perfection is "the given in person," indeed, even the original given in the sense of G:7:5.

K:155:1; G:127:1; GC:195:14; GP:178:30. Cf. par. 35 and 45 and, more systematically, par. 92.

[a]Ricœur does not mention this number (2) here, but it seems to be an omission. He will mention a number (3) in G:132:2, after a number (1) in G:121:2. These three numbers, as restored, structure the whole chapter: (1) par. 64-65: The two scuples; (2) par. 66-70: The conditions of an intuitive science; (3) par. 70-75: Phenomenology as descriptive eidetic. Editor.

K:155:14; G:127:2; GC:195:28; GP:179:2. This paragraph distinguishes the *proper* clarification of something given from another act necessitated by the addition of representations connected to what is given. Clarification here means, in an *inappropriate* sense, to render intuitive these adventitious representations; it is a clarification in "extension." The clarification *proper* intensifies the clarity of what was already given intuitively and is an "intensive" clarification.

K:155:23; G:127:3; GC:196:2; GP:179:12. On apprehension, cf. p. 172, 203 ff.

K:155:29; G:127:4; GC:196:9; GP:179:19. The distinction of the true concept of clarity is complicated by a secondary remark which concerns the relationship between the obscure and the clear. In what sense does the obscure *refer* to the clear? In another sense than the relationship of the *sign* to what is signified (p. 78) or the relationship of the figurative *hylè* to the *figurative* phase of the thing (p. 75).

K:156:6; G:128:1; GC:196:22; GP:179:34. Here begins the study of *improper* clarification, that in extension. Cf. G:127:2.

K:156:19; G:128:2; GC:197:2; GP:180:10. Paragraphs 69-70 develop the *tactics of the example* by which an eidetic can arouse the intuition of essence, distinguish it from all other eidetics, and surmount difficulties arising from the structure of attention which is always encompassed by indetermination, etc.

K:156:23; G:128:3; GC:197:6; GP:180:15. Cf. infra, par. 118.

K:157:30; G:129:1; GC:198:13; GP:181:20. Imagination, as has been mentioned in principle in par. 4 and as the hypothesis of the destruction of the world has illustrated concretely (par. 47-9), is the principal weapon of these tactics through examples. As the geometrician knows, imagination expands, so to speak, the function of the example and reveals the true resistance of essence and the essence's non-contingency by the imaginative free variations.

K:160:footnote; G:132:1; GC:201: footnote; GP:184:footnote. This bold expression tends, in fact, to confuse essences with the fictions which illustrate them. This matter has been answered in par. 23.

K:160:20; G:132:2; GC:201:16; GP:184:20. 3) *Phenomenology as descriptive eidetic,* par. 70-75. We have assumed (par. 69), in order to exclude "formal ontology as mathesis universalis," that it was

possible to suspend *the logic of deduction* without affecting phenomenology. This possibility finds its justification here. A systematic confrontation with mathematics is elaborated.

K:161:9; G:133:1; GC:202:6; GP:185:8. A theoretical model is defined by the way in which its truths are connected, *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, par. 62. Thus, pure logic has among its tasks that of making the "theory of possible forms of theories," par. 69. Mathematics calls multiplicity (*Mannigfaltigkeit*) the "possible domain of knowledge capable of being ruled by a theory of such form" (par. 70), consequently realizing such relations and ruled by such axioms. The form of the theory appropriate to mathematics is pure deduction. The multiplicity that it rules will be called "definite multiplicity." Husserl, thus, attempts here to define rigorously the ideal of geometric demonstration by which the Cartesians measured philosophy. Cf. *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, par. 31. This distinction between phenomenology and geometry is essential in contrasting Husserl and Descartes. Descartes had not previously cast doubt on the *geometric* type of philosophy (*Cartesian Meditations*, p. 6-7 [Eng. p. 1-2. Editor.]) The result is that one will claim to deduce the certainty of the world from the certainty of the Ego and that one will fall back into an inferred realism (ibid, p. 20-21, 133-34). Cf. Also "Nachwort zu meinen *Ideen...*," p. 5.

K:162:22; G:134:1; GC:203:22; GP:186:23. On "region," par. 12; concrete and abstract, par. 15.

K:163:1; G:134:2; GC:204:2; GP:186:40. On the distinction between empirical laws with their factual necessity and eidetic laws, which alone are a priori. cf. par. 6.

K:163:1; G:135:1; GC:204:19; GP:187:17. On the use of the word "to exist" in this sense, cf. G:43:3 and par. 135.

K:163:26; G:135:2; GC:204:28; GP:187:27. *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, par. 70 (cf. supra, G:133:1). *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, par. 31.

K:163:31; G:135:3; GC:204:33; GP:187:33. Deduction achieves an analytical necessity completely governed by formal logic and formal ontology, that is, by analytical axioms in the sense of par. 16 (cf. Infra and at the beginning of p. 136).

K:164:16; G:136:1; GC:206:22; GP:188:18. Cf. par. 13.

K:164:23; G:136:2; GC:206:2; GP:188:24. Pars. 73-5. Phenomenology is: (1) material eidetic such as geometry; (2) a concrete and non-abstract science different from geometry; (3) such that its abstract phases do not lend themselves to a deductive construction because its essences are *inexact*. This characteristic therefore suggests that phenomenology describes rather that deduces. The concept of inexactness is the key to the chapter.

K:165:18; G:137:1; GC:206:25; GP:189:24. On the original meaning of multiplicity, cf. supra, G:133:1.

K:166:7; G:138:1; GC:207:18; GP:190:13. The eidetic of nature serves as a first illustration of the contrast between exact and inexact essences. This contrast allows us to characterize exact essences as *ideal limits* of inexact essences and to contrast ideation (or idealization) and simple abstraction. (This technical meaning of the word ideation is distinguished from its ordinary meaning of eidetic intuition in general. Par. 32). The idea is the degree-limit of the inexact essence of nature. It is an idea in the Kantian sense of the term. We will wonder, further on, if the inexact essences of consciousness also have an ideal limit in exact essences.

K:166:26; G:138:2; GC:208:3; GP:190:34. On the concept as an expression, cf. G:125:2.

K:166:32; G:138:3; GC:208:10; GP:190:41. The word "origin," as in the case of the word "abstraction" later, is used in the sense of genetic psychology, that is, extraction from experience.

K:167:5; G:139:1; GC:208:23; GP:191:12. Cf. G:138:3. Par. 23 specifies that "abstraction" does not produce essence but the consciousness of essence. What is discussed here is this psychological "abstraction," or this passage to essence. This abstraction thus bears upon all inexact essences whether concrete or abstract (in the purely logical technical sense of par. 15).

K:167:9; G:139:2; GC:208:26; GP:191:16. This is the eidetic extension in the sense of par. 13 (cf. G:27:3).

K:167:18; G:139:3; GC:209:2; GP:191:26. The inexactness of single essences (such as imagination, etc.) excludes our deducing them *more geometrico*. But this inexactness is corrected on the level of more general essences (imagination in general, reality, etc.): It is possible *to determine* these essences in "unambiguous" concepts. In place of an exact science, a "rigorous" science (in the sense of the article in *Logos)* of what is experienced is possible; the positive concept of *rigor* therefore corrects the negative concept of *inexact-*

ness, which at least on the level of eidetic particulars, risks destroying the two first conditions of a *science* of what is experienced – namely, non-ambiguity of expression, par. 66, and clarity of intuition, par. 67-70. On the level of fixed genres, rigorous phenomenology avoids the Bergsonian dilemma of an inexpressible intuitionism and a material or geometric intellectualism.

K:167:22; G:139:4; GC:209:6; GP:191:31. Concept-limits (the circle, for example) are in some way "constructed-under" morphological concepts offered by nature (the ring, for example).

K:167:29; G:139:5; GC:209:12; GP:191:37. This is in fact the possibility of a description being a *science* which is questioned by "inexactness" of the essences of what is experienced. On concrete, abstract, moment, part, etc., cf. G:28:3. On singularity, species, genre, etc., cf. par. 14-15.

K:168:19; G:140:1; GC:209:33; GP:192:18. Eidetic singularity only excludes empirical individuality or "facticity." par. 15.

K:169:6; G:140:2; GC:210:20; GP:193:2. Otherwise, the fluidity of particular essences would spread to genera and *inexactness* would exclude the rigor of the description of those genres.

K:169:26; G:141:1; GC:211:5; GP:193:26. Cf. G:138:1.

CHAPTER TWO: GENERAL STRUCTURES OF PURE CONSCIOUSNESS

K:171:3; G:141:2; GC:212:2; GP:194:3. *Chapter II elaborates the great themes of pure description* which have already been sketched before reduction, such as reflection, the Ego, intentionality, the *hylè*, etc. But now we must proceed to the notion of *noema* in Chapter III, which is really the central concept of the third part. To turn from a merely eidetic psychology to a truly transcendental phenomenology is to understand how all transcendence is originally *included* in the transcendental Ego, after it has been *excluded* from the Ego, which is considered in Part II as simple immanent consciousness. Therefore, this amounts to a progressive change of level, in which consciousness, initially distinguished as a "region" *among* "regions," becomes the proto-region, the *constituting* region. This reversal, which leads from a "separation" of consciousness to an "inclusion" in consciousness, corrects the first apparent meaning of reduction (cf. G:48:1; G:54:1 and G:54:5; G:56:1; G:57:4; G:59:2 and G:59:3; G:70:2; G:87:3 and G:87:4; G:93:2; G:94:2, G:95:2; G:96:1; G:106:1; G:120:1). *Par. 76 and 86 are thus essential for the interpretation of reduction. The analysis which these two methodological articles embrace is divided into three parts: (1) Reflection, par. 77-79; (2) The pure Ego and time, pars. 80-83; (3) Intentionality, matter, and form, par. 84-85.*

K:172:2; G:142:1; GC:213:2; GP:195:4 This is what Chapter III will call noematic analysis. On transcendental and transcendent, cf. *Cartesian Meditations,* p. 22-23. ("Transcendence of unreal inclusion.") [Eng. p. 26. Editor.]

K:172:6; G:142:2 GC:213:7; GP:195:9. Cf. *Ideas* II.

K:173:29; G:144:1; GC:214:32; GP:196:32. Phenomenology remains on the level of genres, for reasons mentioned above, G:139:3.

K:174:2; G:144:2; GC:215:8; GP:197:4. (1) *First theme: reflection* (par. 77-79). This theme serves both as a transition between prephenomenological analysis (par. 38 and 45) and analysis springing from reduction, and between discussions of method (par. 63 and 76) and the direct study of what is experienced. Reflection is,

indeed, both the fundamental procedure of phenomenology and a feature of what is experienced. It is now to be established by *critical discussion* (par. 77) and by *immediate intuition* (par. 78) that *reflection is immediate intuition of what is experienced as it has just been experienced.* The essence of reflection thus refers back to the constitution of phenomenological time.

Skepticism may appear to be based on the initial conclusions of phenomenology. If what is experienced is at first unreflected, intentional, and directed to the other, how can reflection attain what is experienced? It is necessary that reflection reveal what is experienced such as it has just been in the unreflective mode.

K:174:12; G:145:1; GC:216:19; GP:198:10. *Zeitbewusstsein* has given the first analysis of phenomenological time and has initially put in opposition *retention* or "primary memory" (which still participates in immediate intuition), and recollection or memory proper. When what is experienced is "retained" in the present, it is still a moment of what is experienced. Reflection rests on this "retentional" structure of what is experienced. *Zeitbewusstsein* par. 11-13; Appendix I, (p. 84-6) on retention; par. 14, 18 on recollection. Thus *reflected* memory, or recall, rests on a pre-reflective memory – on the characteristic of what is experienced to retain the past: I perceive the thing itself as "just having been." So, a delay can obtain between reflection and its object and reflection can discover something experienced which "has been" but which has not been reflected upon.

K:176:34; G:146:1; GC:218:5; GP:199:32. In discovering unreflective consciousness as it was prior to reflection, reflection discovers itself as a "modification" of what has been experienced unreflectively. Thus reflection comes to orient itself over against unreflection, which it reveals as it was. We will see in what follows the importance and the various forms of the concept of "modification" which are appropriate to "modifications" related to attention, presentiation, rational operations, etc. (cf. G:148:1.) On *Reflexion* and *Urbewusstsein*, cf. *Zeitbewusstsein*, p. 105-07.

K:177:31; G:147:1; GC:219:7; GP:200:31. Because reflection is intuitive, the study of what is experienced and reflection on what is experienced can be intuitive. This is how phenomenology questions, and justifies, itself in its initial study.

K:177:36; G:148:1; GC:219:14; GP:200:40. The many applications of the notion of "modification" reveal an original process of relationship and derivation in a theory which excludes deduction (par. 71-75). However, this relationship introduces not a genesis but a "systematic order," as was just said above. Reduction is itself a modification.

K:178:41; G:148:2; GC:220:16; GP:201:40. *Zeitbewusstsein*, par. 11 ff.

K:179:8; G:149:1 GC:220:25; GP:202:6. The progress of the truly phenomenological analysis of reflection consists of systematically thinking about reflection as one among possible modifications. On the notion of "operation" (*Vollzug* and *Operation* are synonyms), cf. p. 94-5 and 107.

K:179:13; G:149:2; GC:220:31; GP:202:10. Up until now the original was the whole of what is given, or *presence* (p. 7, 36, 126, ff.) which "fulfills" empty meanings. Now the original is understood temporally as the living nature of the *present.* These two meanings of the word are called presence and present: the given is the present. This second meaning calls for a third: the original is more radically the "original" springing forth of the act of consciousness. We see grouped together here a few words which have an essential affinity: *Erzeugung, Operation, Vollzug, Ursprünglich*: the acts of presence and present are acts which are truly "effected" and "original." In relation to every modification they are *Impressionen, Urerlebnisse.* The third meaning, which is the most fundamental, will be elaborated in par. 122 in which the creative spontaneity of consciousness will be affirmed and in which the "originality of consciousness" will be identified with the "springing production," or with the "Fiat" of consciousness.

K:180:28; G:150:1; GC:222:9; GP:204:25. On the identity of the pure Ego and of its look which "pervades" what is experienced, cf. *supra*, G:109:1, and *infra*, pars. 80, 92, 115, and especially par. 122. The *Cartesian Meditations* add, moreover, that the Ego is the substratum of the habitus, par. 32.

K:181:11; G:151:1; GC:222:29; GP:204:3; These propositions about the absolute validity of retention and the relative validity of remembering are the issue of these three paragraphs devoted to reflection.

K:181:31; G:151:2; GC:223:12; GP:204:25. The discussion about introspection is extended to reflection generally. The question is:

Does reflection alter what is experienced and its object? Answer:
(1) All negation and doubt, having a bearing on the validity of reflection, are only known by reflection.
(2) Reflection, that is, a non-distorting reflection, would allow us to say that what is primordially experienced has been altered.
(3) Criticism of reflection is related to the standard of an absolute reflection. This method of discussion, a reductio ad absurdum, is typical of Husserl in the *Logical Investigation* 1 and *supra* par. 20. It is the only possible mode of discussion for a non-deductive science; what matters in the end is to return to intuition.

K:185:20; G:155:1; GC:227:14; GP:208:15. On *Sinn*, cf. par. 55.

K:187:6; G:156:1; GC:229:2; GP:209:40. Cf. G:151:2, on the method of discussion by reductio ad absurdum.

K:187:22; G:157:1; GC:229:18; GP:210:14. Cf. G:77:2; G:78:2; G:81:2. There is no need, it seems, to reconcile this limit-concept with the limit-ideas of geometry (p. 138), nor with the open question (G:141:1) of the possibility of limit-concepts in relation to the inexact concepts of phenomenology. The only things at stake are the eidetic prohibitions which limit our free fantasy. The idea of God here is the indicator of the non-contingency of eidetic laws. If God is the principle of contingent order (par. 58), God does not belong to the eidetic order and is not the creator of eternal truths, as Descartes holds.

K:190:8; G:159:1; GC:232:17; GP:213:21. On the relation of empirical sciences to eidetic sciences, cf. par. 7-8.

K:190:12; G:159:2; GC:232:21; GP:213:25. On essence as possibility in relation to existence, cf. par. 135 (p. 280) and 140.

K:190:13; G:159:3; GC:232:22; GP:213:26. 2) The relation to the Ego and temporality, par. 80-3. The problem of the Ego is very briefly taken up after reduction. Some points that have been accepted (par. 35, 37, 53, 57) are recalled, and two new problems are raised: is a *description* of the pure Ego possible? And what relation obtains between reflection upon the Ego and the problems of constitution? But the problem of the Ego is renewed, especially by the problem of time, par. 81-3.

K:191:20; G:160:1; GC:233:30; GP:214:32. To the first question it is replied: although it is not reduced, the Ego is an object of study. As Malebranche and Berkeley would have said, there is no idea of the soul. The Ego is solely implied in every description as a *way* of behaving. It does not lend itself to the question *Qui sit*, but *Quo modo sit.*

K:192:13; G:161:1; GC:234:22; GP:215:19. The second question raised here is not dealt with: If the problems of constitution treated in the *Ideas* concern transcendences which are announced in what is experienced (thus the object-side of what is experienced), is there a problem of constitution of the Ego, which is the subject-side of what is experienced? If we consider that the Ego is an original transcendence, it is natural for phenomenology to have to deal with this problem, cf. G:162:2. But the problem of time (par. 81-3) and of *hylè*—and in a general the problem of the inner structure of what is experienced (par. 85)—can be considered as samples of this phenomenology "turned toward the Ego" (cf. *infra*, G:163:2 and G:165:3). Time is indeed the immanent connection of flux which has already been characterized as flux of "adumbrations" (par. 41): *hylè* and temporality are therefore interdependent aspects of this immanent structure.

K:192:25; G:161:2; GC:234:35; GP:215:32. On the relation of phenomenological time to "objective" time[a] and to cosmic time, cf. *Zeitbewusstsein*, par. 1, p. 3-8.

K:192:27; G:162:1; GC:235:2; GP:215:34. Cf. par. 53.

K:193:7; G:162:2; GC:235:18; GP:216:8. Cf. par. 41, the relation of "exhibition" (Darstellung) between sense datum (*hylè*) and the corresponding aspect of the object. Is that to say that cosmic time is "exhibited" in phenomenological time in a way completely identical to that of quality or space? The following answers this negatively without pushing the comparison further which would involve the constitution of time.

K:193:34; G:163:1; GC:236:9; GP:216:39. The problems concerning the constitution of *transcendences* have only been touched on up to this point, cf. G:161:2. Reduction of transcendences, or limited reduction (par. 32), can only lead to a "closed" sphere of problems of constitution. The *Urkonstitution* of the Ego, which is in a sense an auto-constitution, is the subject of an important group of unpublished materials. If, as it is said later on, there is an

[a]Ricœur adds here in parentheses: "(in the sense of 63, n. 3)." There is, however, no note 3 p. 63. It most probably should read instead: p. 163, n. 3. Editor.

"enigma" (*Rätsel*) of time consciousness, it is to the extent that this consciousness impinges upon the *Urkonstitution* of the Ego itself. The earliness of the works on *Time Consciousness* (1903-5), published by M. Heidegger, attests that this difficulty has been perceived at the very inception of transcendental phenomenology. The fourth *Cartesian Meditation* shows that temporality of the Ego allows one to pass to the point of view of a "genesis" of the Ego: "the Ego constitutes itself in some way in the unity of a history" (p. 64). This "genesis" is passive or active (p. 65-70) and rests on the "compossibility" of what is experienced in temporal flux.

K:194:16; G:163:2; GC:236:31; GP:217:20. To belong to the unique flux *is* to belong to the unique Ego, the "pure Ego" (par. 82). The profound identity between the problem of the pure Ego and the problem of time appears again, p. 165. On "constituting intentionality of time," cf. *Zeitbewusstsein* par. 36.

K:194:25; G:163:3; GC:237:5; GP:217:30. This constitution is the very constitution of the Ego as form of temporality. This form is the object of eidetic intuition and not only, as Kant holds, a condition of possibility attained by regressive analysis. The type of intuition of an *infinite* continuum will be examined in par. 83.

K:195:9; G:164:1; GC:237:26; GP:218:14. On the "now" as "impression" or "originality" cf. G:149:2.

K:195:12; G:164:2; GC:237:28; GP:218:17. Like the expression of constitution, the expression of intentionality extends from the relation of transcendence to intra-subjective relation, that is, to the *temporal form* which binds one element of experience to another and one element that is retained to another.

K:195:23; G:164:3; GC:238:2; GP:218:28. This brings together the ideas of temporal "horizon" and "horizon" of attention or of potential background. This is the same "horizon" considered once as "non-actual" and once as past. Originality also had several meanings (G:149:2). In addition, it will be necessary to add the whole *horizon of originality* of the present.

K:195:32; G:164:4; GC:238:11; GP:218:37. This *Erfüllung* means here, as it does in Kant, that there is no form of time without elements of experience which flow in it. But this meaning finally coalesces with that meaning which intuition gives to that abstract moment, since every element of past experience which fulfills time

can also fulfill the intention which intends it, that is, be perceived in immanence, par. 78 ad finem.

K:196:10; G:165:1; GC:238:37; GP:219:13. Cf. G:161:1; G:163:2.

K:196:20; G:165:2; GC:239:2; GP:219:24. Cf. G:165:3.

K:196:32; G:165:3; GC:239:15; GP: 219:38. The word "closed" has already been used to refer to the self-sufficiency of consciousness, considered in relation to itself, cf. G:93:2.

K:196:32; G:165:4; GC:239:19; GP:219:42. Cf. G:163:2.

K:196:36; G:166:1; GC:239:21; GP:220:2. Problem: How can one have intuition of totality when it is not given in the present? Now this totality is the concrete Ego (p. 61). It is necessary that intuition bear on an idea in the Kantian sense, that is, this totality is an object of reflection, for a look which moves along this flow, ad infinitum. The field of inattention and temporal horizon are therefore mutually implied.

K:198:2; G:166:2; GC:240:25; GP:221:6. Three different uses of the notion of Idea are the essence-limit of geometry (G:138:1), the concept-limit of God (G:157:1) and the total unity of the flow of what is experienced.

K:199:3; G:167:1; GC:241:32; GP:222:5 3) *Intentionality: Matter and form*, par. 84-6. This is the central theme of phenomenology directed toward the object, toward the constitution of transcendences. What more remains to be discovered that the general study of intentionality (par. 36), that the general study of its actual and potential modes (par. 35 and 37), has not taught us yet? There remain all the problems of structure, that is, the "modifications" of all kinds and the hierarchies of the "strata" of simple acts and founded acts. These are the most remarkable aspects of the problems of constitution, as presented in paragraph 86.

K:201:5; G:169:1; GC:244:7; GP:169:11. On the elements of experience that have been effected, initiated, etc. cf. par. 115. Intentionality thus comprises what is experienced as theoretical, affective, volitional, etc., what is actually and what is not actually experienced. Note that the metaphor of nearness has already been used for degrees of clarity, par. 67. Since the time of Descartes and Malebranche we have known that the degree of clarity is in direct relation to the degree of our attention.

K:203:1; G:171:1; GC:246:14; GP:226:10. The study of *hylè* pertains to the constitution of objects in consciousness to the extent

that intentionality animates it. The "hyletics" corresponds to the "noetics" as matter does to form. But in a more profound sense, *hylè* connects with the constitution of time and the *Urkonstitution* of the Ego (cf. p. 163): the flux of the "adumbrations" gives its immanent duration to the intention of an object. As E. Fink has emphasized, if we do not proceed to the constitution of the *hylè*, (and thus time and the pure Ego), the constitution of the thing itself cannot assume its radical sense, that is, as creative. The beginning of par. 85 declares that, because it will not "descend into the obscure profundities of ultimate consciousness which constitutes all temporality of what is experienced," the analysis of the *Ideas* will deal only with transcendent intentionality. Same restriction, p. 172, last paragraph.

K:203:30; G:172:1; GC:247:8; GP:227:2. The bestowing of meaning is the fact of *morphè*, cf. p. 174. "Meaning," according to paragraph 55, is limited to the intentional unity of the thing: the meaning of the word is extended to all degrees of intentionality. In the fourth section, it takes its definitive meaning by being contrasted with the "relation to the object," paragraph 129-31.

K:204:11; G:172:2; GC:247:23; GP:227:18. Cf. G:171:1.

K:206:26; G:175:1; GC:250:12; GP:229:38. Concerning Brentano's thesis and its defects, cf. the fifth *Logical Investigation*, par. 9-11. Husserl cites there this text of Brentano drawn from the *Psychology* (I. 115): "Every psychic phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics in the Middle Ages have called the intentional (or mental) non-existence of an object, what we would name ourselves, with an expression which unfortunately still is equivocal, a relation to a content or a direction toward an object (without understanding by it any reality) or immanent objectivity. Every psychic phenomenon contains in itself something like an object, although each is different from the other." Husserl challenges this terminology, which suggests the existence of a *real* relation between the mental phenomenon and the physical phenomenon, and the terminology of an *inner* relation to consciousness. Brentano is vigorously criticized regarding his confusion of immanence and intentional inclusion. Fundamentally, what is experienced is not a phenomenon which includes another type of phenomena. On Husserl's relation to Brentano, cf. "Nachwort zu meinen *Ideen*," p. 16-20. Husserl acknowledged in 1931 that "the question of

specific being of the Ego (der spezifischen Ichlichkeit) is still not dealt with in volume I of the *Ideas*, p. 19. Cf. also "die Intentionalität bei Husserl und bei Brentano" in Landgrebe's article: "Husserls Phänomenologie und die Motive zu ihrer Umbildung." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 15 January 1939, p. 280-89.

K:207:7; G:175:2; GC:250:32; GP:230:17. On "soul" and "state," cf. the remarks made above on psychological consciousness as it is constituted in the world as the mundane, transcendent Ego, par. 35.

K:207:22; G:176:1; GC:251:11; GP:230:34. Conclusion: functional problems, par. 86. This article is a more systematic continuation of par. 76 of this chapter and definitely corrects the negative appearance of reduction (cf. G:141:2). The origin of the term "function," in Stumpf, is explained at the end of the article; it refers to how objectivity is constituted by consciousness. Is the constitution of the object a creation? In the *Ideas*, it concerns only the noetic moment of what is experienced and assumes a matter to be animated. Thus constitution uniquely bears on the synthesis of the diverse in *a unity of meaning*. We have here the positive reply to the hypothesis of the destruction of the world in par. 47 and 49. The limit of the problems of constitution of *objectivity*, therefore, lies in this notion of matter and in its harmony. But this limit refers back, instead, to the more profound constitution of the Ego and time from this mysteriously evoked radical source, p. 163 and 171. That is why the constitution of the "meaning" of the world still does not reveal the radical origin of the world yet, which E. Fink sees as the final task of transcendental phenomenology.

K:207:29; G:176:2; GC:251:20; GP:231:2. There is an allusion to the problems of reason which are the subject of the fourth section.

K:208:14; G:176:3; GC:252:7; GP:231:25. Here we find allusion to two types of analyses: according to form and matter (constituents), and "simple" theses and "founded" theses.

K:208:18; G:176:4; GC:252:10; GP:231:29. Phenomenology is a teleology, a functional science, in the sense that it subordinates partial problems to the *totality* of constituted "meanings" and to the full flux of consciousness. The subordination of the hyletics to

problems of the constitution of objectivity reflects this subordination of parts to the whole.

K:208:21; G:176:5; GC:252:14; GP:231:32. This is a synonym for constituting: the totalities with many sides assembled by a unity of meaning are prescribed by what is experienced. This word stresses the reversal which Husserlian Idealism effects.

K:209:6; G:177:1; GC:252:37; GP:232:15. Cf. fourth Section.

K:209:26; G:177:2; GC:253:21; GP:232:37. This program will only be partially realized in the *Ideas*; rather we find its fulfillment in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (*Formale und Transzendentale Logik*) and in *Experience and Judgment* (*Erfahrung und Urteil*). Nevertheless, the notion of the noema points to these radical problems: it responds to this necessity of looking into the essence of certain connections of consciousness for the rule of constitution of all possible and real correlates of consciousness.

K:210:14; G:178:1; GC:254:8; GP:233:21. Cf. G:171:1.

CHAPTER THREE: NOESIS AND NOEMA

K:211:2; G:179:1; GC:255:2; GP:235:2 Chapter III, "on the threshold of phenomenology" (p. 180), marks the decisive step toward the constitution of objectivity. We have here a reflection on the object itself, a discovery of the object as a "component" (p. 180) of what is experienced. In the subject there exists more than the subject, in the sense that there is more than the cogitatio or noesis. There is the object itself as it is intended, the cogitatum as it is purely for the subject – that is, as constituted by its reference to the subjective flux of what is experienced. This is what a phenomenology which is "turned toward the object" (p. 161) consists in. It reflects on the object "in the subject." The term noema indicates that the object ought to change its name; its phenomenological baptismal name recalls the *nous* which includes it in some way.

1) The notion of noema, as the original component of what is experienced, is initially introduced in a general way. (par. 87-8).

2) The particular case of perception leads to an initial extension of the notion of noema. It includes, in addition to "meaning," independent of the existence or non-existence of the object, the very index of reality which proceeds from the "thesis" of the existence of the world. Thus existence (as *posited*) is excluded, but the belief in existence (as a *position*) is integrated into the noema, par. 89-90. One may generalize from this first extension of the noema to other indices of non-reality, reproduction, etc., par. 91.

3) Second extension: we include in the noema the "modes of appearing" which correspond to the variation of attention, par. 92.

4) Third extension: what is experienced in a complex way, such as judgment, affective acts, and volitional acts offer the same noetic-noematic structures, although more compounded, par. 93-6.

K:211:3; G:179:2; GC:255:3; GP:235:3. 1) *The general notion of noema: "meaning,"* par. 87-8. Reflection on the object is not easy. It is necessary to overcome a certain "phenomenological naiveté," as will be stated in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, which consists, in the name of the idea of intentionality, of elaborating the different a priori ontologies (logical, ethical, etc.) heterogeneous

to consciousness itself. The transcendental attitude teaches us to join intentionality to constitution and not only to a priorism.

K:212:15; G:180:1; GC:256:10; GP:236:13. According to Husserl himself, the idea of intentionality has at first served to protect the a priori from subjectivism. A real conversion was necessary in order to suspend the a priori in a higher subjectivity, which the initial concern could cause to miss, and in order to reach this intuition, that intentionality is a "non-real" *inclusion* of the correlate in consciousness.

K:213:2; G:180:2; GC:257:2; GP:237:2. The notion of noema is introduced by the notion of the *composition* of what is experienced. Thus we have passed from the opposition between consciousness and reality (par. 33-46) to their correlation (par. 47-55), then to the inclusion of reality in consciousness. But the "real" inclusion of the *hylè* in what is experienced always serves as a contrast (cf. par. 41) to the "intentional" inclusion of noema and keeps transcendentalism from falling back into subjective idealism.

K:214:18; G:182:1; GC:258:16; GP:238:15. The homonymy of *hylè* and object (cf. par. 41 ad finem) becomes a "correspondence," a "correlation" of moments. It justifies the use of these words for both moments: *Gehalt, Mannigfaltigkeit, Data.*

K:214:20; G:182:2; GC:258:18; GP:128:17. The strict sense of the word *Sinn* will appear in par. 99 and especially in pars. 129-133 (cf. p. 172 and p. 174). In the fifth and sixth *Logical Investigations*, which are along the lines of the *Ideas*, the term intentional *content* is still used (*Inhalt*) (fifth *Investigation*, par. 16 ff.) to refer to: a) either the object intended in different intentions (thus, the same person which I successively designate as emperor of Germany, son of Frederick III, etc.), which the fourth section of the *Ideas* will properly call the object, the X identical to various noemata; b) or the "matter" of what is experienced, namely, the "meaning" which differs from one intention to another, the *Quid* of intention (par. 20); c) or finally the intentional or meaningful essence which combines "quality" (or the character of belief) with "matter" (or meaning). The sixth *Investigation* (par. 25-29) adds the new dimension of fullness or *Fülle.* The full presence of an object adds nothing to meaning or to matter, but gives life or corporality to it. Thus there are "signitive" and "intuitive" contents. This difference of fullness "is a phenomenologically irreducible difference" (par. 26). "Cognitive essence" (*erkenntnismässig*) is consequently the name for the total content considered in its meaning or matter, its type of belief or quality, its degree of fullness. Two acts of the same cognitive essence are thus identical in all respects, whereas two acts of the same intentional essence can "coincide," though differing through their fullness (par. 28).

K:214:26; G:182:3; GC:258:25; GP:238:24. This bold usage of the word "immanent" to designate the intentional inclusion of transcendence (cf. also p. 183 supra) attempts to recall that the world has *lost* no characteristic, although it no longer is the world *posited* in reality, but solely perceived, desired, judged, etc., "in" consciousness.

K:216:16; G:183:1; GC:260:18; GP:240:16. 2) *First extension of the term noema*, par. 89-91. We return first of all to the terms noema and meaning with respect to the limited example of perception, par. 89. (We notice at the end of this article that the special "immanence" of noema permits us to speak about a *reflection* on the object as a moment of the subject). Then we establish in what manner the *character of reality,* which remains after the exclusion of the "thesis" of the world, is incorporated into noema, par. 90.

K:217:33; G:185:1; GC:262:2; GP:241:33. On noema and bestowing of meaning, cf. par. 85.

K:218:8; G:185:2; GC:262:13; GP:242:3. This parenthesis, devoted to the *whole noema*, which is more than *meaning*, announces Chapter IV, which will be devoted to other noematic characteristics which are added to meaning: characteristics of belief, syntactical forms, expression, etc.

K:218:10; G:185:3; GC:262:15; GP:242:5. Here the analysis resumes at the point where the preceding paragraph left off. The difficulty is this: if "meaning" is unaffected by the existence or non-existence of the object, is this not a mental duplicate of reality? In order to understand correctly the special immanence of noema, it is necessary to understand that the thesis of reality, once suspended, is retained as an aspect of belief. From then on the *character of reality* is itself part of the noema and is added to "meaning." When we believe that the thing exists, the correlate of our belief is one of these noematic moments which contributes to the full noema anticipated earlier and studied in Chapter IV. Thus, the difference between "meaning" and the "character of reality" of perception still remains within the noema in the broad sense.

K:219:4; G:186:1; GC:263:10; GP:242:39. The discussion begins with a refutation reductio ad absurdum, which, as always, has to return to the simple intuition of the "phenomenological situation." Three arguments are as follows: a) The objection assumes that "meaning" has been taken as a real component of what is experienced, like the *hylè*. It is then separated from reality. b) If, moreover, we interpret this as psychic reality, we duplicate reality. c) We only connect "meaning" to "reality" as a portrait or sign, following an interpretation already criticized, par. 43.

K:220:25; G:187:1; GC:264:36; GP:244:24. This negative phase of reduction has been studied in the second section. Now it is to be shown that noema retains the "character of reality" which did not know itself in natural belief. In this sense it is true that reduction reveals belief as belief and makes it for the first time into a phenomenological object. Cf. Fink, *op. cit.*, p. 348-54.

K:221:5; G:188:1; GC:265:22; GP:245:7. We can generalize thus: if the character of reality, which is the phenomenological residuum of the natural "thesis" in perception, belongs to the complete noema of what is perceived, the character of non-reality, or reproduced reality, also belongs to the complete noema of what is imagined, remembered, etc. The complete noema differs from one class of acts to another, even if the "nucleus of meaning" (it is a tree) remains identical.

K:222:8; G:189:1; GC:266:28; GP:246:9. Hereafter *Gegenstand schlechthin* refers to identical "meaning" (tree) of perception, remembrance, etc., and *Objekt* refers to the whole correlate.

K:222:18; G:189:2; GC:267:4; GP:246:23. 3) *Second extension of the notion of noema: toward attentional modifications*, par. 92. Up to this point we have only spoken about attention from the point of view of the actuality of the Cogito, not from the manner of appearance of the object. The complete noema includes these variations of appearance which are correlative of noetic modifications. It is a question of the characteristics which vary without altering the meaning. The difficulty is to understand how the attentional characteristics of the object (noticed, unnoticed, clarified, brought to the fore, etc.) can, nevertheless, not remain *alien* to the identical nucleus.

K:225:6; G:191:1; GC:269:27; GP:248:40. The hypothesis which is set aside is this: we could think that the noema includes the meaning-such-as-it-appears- to-a-normal-attention. We have certainly included *one* mode of attention in the noema, but this constant mode excludes the variations of attention which in one way ought to be integrated into noetic-noematic structures. The solution is sought in a return to the point of view of the noesis: the acts of positing (cf. p. 169 and par. 115) show how much attention can depend on the familiarity of certain acts. The object is thus correlatively changed through and through; but we know that the way in which the Ego lives in its acts involves the *how* and not the *quid* of these acts. It is the same with corresponding noetic variations: attention affects the object in the *how* of its appearance.

K:225:30; G:192:1; GC:270:13; GP:249:22. Cf. pars. 57 and 80.

K:226:12; G:192:2; GC:270:31; GP:249:41. Cf. par. 122. We know already that the pure Ego is not an object for phenomenology. It is only the "how" of its own engagement in its acts (G:160:1). This had been called *das rein Subjektive der Erlebnisweise* (ibid.). In the text of *Logical Investigations* to which Husserl refers here, attention represents the freedom of consciousness which, in a complex act, can "live" at times in the stratum of expression, at times in the stratum of meaning, at times in the act, at times in its object. (Fifth *Investigation*, par. 19, p. 405-11).

K:226:17; G:193:1; GC:271:2; GP:250:4. 4) *Third extension of the notion of noema: toward complex intentionalities*, par. 93: a) *judgment*, par. 99; b) *affective and practical acts*, par. 95.

K:227:25; G:194:1; GC:272:8; GP:251:14. Reduction relating to the "thesis" of judgment (the *Urteilsfällung*) causes the noema of judgment to appear – i.e., the whole proposition. The *Logical Investigations* had, on the contrary, the purpose of avoiding subjectivism and excluding the proposition of what is psychologically experienced. Subjectivism has been henceforth sufficiently overcome so that it is possible to stress the inherence of what is judged to the act of judging and to include logic in phenomenology.

K:228:5; G:194:2; GC:272:26; GP:252:33. On apophantic, cf. G:22:2.

K:228:7; G:194:3. GC:272:27; GP:251:36. Cf. par. 124-7. The *Logical Investigations*, on the contrary, started with expression, went from there to meaning, and then to "intuition which fulfills it." Here the center of gravity is the theory of perception from which we rise to judgment and to expression.

K:228:16; G:194:4; GC:273:2; GP:252:4. This "how" which completes the "*Quid*" of judgment refers to, as is known, the characteristics of belief, attentional modes, etc.

K:228:24; G:194:5; GC:272:10; GP:252:14. As for perception (par. 90), belief is reintegrated as an object of investigation, cf. G:185:3.

K:228:37; G:195:1; GC:273:25; GP:252:27. On these expressions, cf. the Commentary, G:182:2.

K:230:2; G:196:1; GC:274:37; GP:253:32. This formal noetic of judgment stands out within the noetic study of judgment, as the kernel of meaning of judgment stands out within the complete noema in order to make up the theme of formal logic as applied to predicative meaning. Bolzano, to whom Husserl refers here, is placed next to Leibniz as "one of the greatest logicians of all times," *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, p. 225. Nevertheless, he lacked, Husserl already declared, the key to a "theory of multiplicity" which would embrace the whole realm of *mathesis universalis* (ibid.).

K:230:11; G:197:1; GC:275:9; GP:254:10. The kernel of meaning which the logician studies is an abstract moment of the noema. Thus, phenomenology comprises logic in the twofold sense that the logical proposition is an abstract moment of the noema and the noema is included intentionally in the judicative noesis.

K:230:19; G:197:2; GC:275:18; GP:254:19. On these modalities of belief, cf. pars. 103 ff.

K:231:9; G:197:3; GC:276:9; GP:255:8. Husserl sums up the two innovations of the *Ideas*: "meaning" (or content) is at the same time better distinguished from noesis and from other characteristics of the noema.

K:231:12; G:197:4; GC:276:11 GP:255:10. The second example of what is experienced on a higher level outlines a breakthrough beyond theoretical consciousness. This is the place to pose the question of Husserlian intellectualism. Affective, axiological, volitional, practical acts are "founded" on perceptions, representations in the broad sense, or judgments of things, but in return the affective characteristics, values, etc., constitute an original stratum, as much noematic as noetic. The *Ideas* are not concerned with this stratum as original. Only the universality of the noetic-noematic structure and the unity of problems of reduction and constitution are scrutinized.

K:235:23; G:201:1; GC:281:9; GP:259:30. It is striking to see, after each conquest of analysis, how much concern there is not to relapse back to the "natural totality." There is a natural inclination for words to take us away from pure intuition. Phenomenology is the stake of a contest. We are at the beginning, and everything is difficult. G. Berger emphasizes this tone of pioneering and the mixture of fearlessness and of scrupulousness found throughout the work of Husserl.

CHAPTER FOUR:
PROBLEMS OF NOETIC-NOEMATIC STRUCTURES

K:236:2; G:201:2; GC:282:3; GP:260:4. *Chapter IV contains phenomenological exercises along the lines of the problems of Chapter III.*

1) The confrontation of *hylè* and noema is pressed further, par. 97, and the inclusion of noema in the noesis is more precisely defined, par. 98.

2) The principal analyses bear upon series of "characteristics" which, joined to "meaning", determine the complete noema: the first series concerns the hierarchical relationship of the various "presentiations" and their compounded forms, par. 99-101.

3) The second series of characteristics, which is the most important, since it returns to the problem of the thesis of the world, concerns the modes of belief, par. 101-15. At first, all the derivatives of the original belief or certainty are shown in their hierarchical relationship, then they are globally put in opposition to the modification of *neutrality*. The notion of positing consciousness is seized upon fully when we have understood all its modifications and have understood the universal opposition of positing consciousness and neutral consciousness.

4) The last conclusions are extended: a) to what is experienced when "founded" on simple representations and which add characteristics of validity, agreeableness, etc., to characteristics of being; and b) to the "syntheses" of representations and affective or practical theses, pars. 115-24.

5) Finally the parallelism of the noesis and noema is sought on the level of "expression." This is the stratum of the "Logos," or expressed meanings, pars. 124-7.

K:238:12; G:203:1; GC:284:16; GP:262:15. 1) *Husserl's insistence in opposing the hyletic and noetic components to the noematic components finds here a new motif.* Pars. 85-88 dealt with reacting against the possible misunderstanding of a subjectivist idealism which would put the world in consciousness. Here the principal idea is different: the whole objectivity appears or disappears – appears as such and such, according to the structure and stream of hyletic moments. This was the meaning carried by the hypothesis of the

destruction of the world. Thus two ideas are balanced: the object *is not* included in the noesis as is the *hylè*; and the *hylè* commands, in some way, the object although the noesis "constitutes" it. But the noesis constitutes it "through" the *hylè* whose changes govern the appearance of the object. This role of the *hylè* recalls the idea which was glimpsed several times before: the constitution of the Ego as temporality and *hylè* is more radical than the constitution of objectivity "in" what is experienced.

K:239:14; G:204:1; GC:285:19; GP:263:14. The analysis oscillates between two poles: the noema *is not* included in the noesis as is the *hylè*, this heterogeneity, which, from the beginning, has distinguished transcendence from immanence, is insurmountable. Moreover, the *hylè* is the *foundation* of the constitution of objects: the changes of the *hylè* command the changes of appearances. This double relation concludes with the idea of a necessary and reciprocal *correlation* between such an essence of noesis and such an essence of noema. Stated otherwise, such an intention implies such an object, and such an object implies such a noesis which intends it. The end of the paragraph brings out this idea which is clarified in paragraph 98.

K:241:11; G:206:1; GC:287:17; GP:265:4. The revival of Berkeley's formula is consistent with the idea that the object is included in what is experienced, but the allegedly Berkeleyan meaning is denied, if it is true that it amounts to a "real" inclusion of the *esse* in the *percipere*. That is why there are two kinds of the Eidos, the noematic Eidos and the noetic Eidos. Between the two is an alterity in dependence. It is thus possible to compare the noemata between themselves (morphology of noemata) and to establish a *parallelism* between the two morphologies. The main point of this chapter is devoted to this parallelism.

K:241:31; G:206:2; GC:288:3; GP:265:27. The correlation between noema and noesis is not a likeness. On the one hand, there is an hyletic diversity and, on the other, a noematic unity. But, in turn, this too simple opposition will be overcome by the introduction of a noematic diversity (p. 207, *ad finem*).

K:243:19; G:208:1; GC:289:33; GP:267:11. The idea of a resemblance ("reflection") between the structure of the noesis and the structure of the noema, after having been discarded in a strict sense (p. 206), is restored in an attenuated form through the "modes

of appearance." These are the "characteristics," which are found joined to "meaning," which lend themselves to a parallelism of noesis and noema.

K:243:34; G:208:2; GC:290:13; GP:267:29. 2) *The first direction offered about the parallelism between the complete noesis and complete noema deals with the manner in which the same "meaning" (this is a tree) is given in perception and in the series of simple representations coming forth from perception by way of an appropriate modification,* par. 99-101. This analysis, which was begun in par. 91, was limited to *generalizing* the notion of "mode of givenness." Here the aim is *to differentiate* more exactly the "series" of modifications by which we pass from the "original" mode of givenness in perception to other modes of givenness. a) The simple "series" are first examined, such as reproduction, imagination, sign, par. 99. b) Second, the series of compounded order: the act of remembering "within" a memory, etc., par. 100-101. c) Third, the notion of "character" and "modification" are generalized and other "dimensions" of characterization, the most important of which deals with modalities of belief, can thus be considered. The central idea is that all these modifications affect noema itself and are ways in which the object appears, as correlates of original noetic modifications.

K:244:6; G:209:1; GC:290:24; GP:267:40. On *Gegenstand* and *Objekt*, cf. G:189:1. *Vorstellung* (representation) is divided into *Gegenwärtigung* (original presentation in perception) and *Vergegenwärtigung* (presentiation "in" portrait, remembrance, sign). Memory is the simplest presentiation in that it simply "reproduces" the perceived object. Portrait and sign are more complex. They will only truly be understood after the modification of neutrality, par. 111. Then a more complete definition of presentiation will be given, cf. G:225:1.

K:245:9; G:210:1; GC:291:34; GP:269:4. The best commentary on the image is found in *The Imaginary* of J.-P. Sartre. The status of portrait itself (the picture hanging on the wall) can only be understood when the modification of neutralization has been introduced. The picture is not exactly perceived. It is something perceived which is modified in such a way that I refrain from positing it (Par. 111). But the imaginary object, intended beyond the portrait, also originates from a neutralization, but a neutralization of

memory. It is a memory not posited as having ever existed. I refrain from positing it with respect to its reproduced character (par. 111).

K:245:20; G:211:1; GC:293:10; GP:270:13. Paragraph 111.

K:247:33; G:212:1; GC:294:30; GP:271:30. In all these analyses the attempt is made to achieve a rigorous separation between what pertains to the noema and what pertains to the noesis (cf. beginning of par. 102). Thus, when memory *intends* another memory, it is the noema, that is, the *object* of memory on the first level, which intentionally refers to a memory on the second level. The noetic aspect of the act concerns the level of "reflections" themselves.

K:249:14; G:213:1; GC:296:13; GP:273:3. Here is the transition between the first group of "modifications" (and therefore of noematic and noetic "characteristics") and the second group which will be concerned with the "characteristics" of belief.

K:249:3; G:214:1; GC:296:30; GP:273:20. 3) *The second group of 'characteristics," which modify noema and noesis, is formed by the noematic characteristics of being (being true, being doubtful, being probable, being possible, etc.): there corresponds to them noetic characteristics of belief* (certainty, doubt, conjecture, reckoning). Husserl uses the word *doxic* for "of belief" (*doxa* = belief). This analysis is of great importance: the "thesis" of the world, as we know, is a belief. Thus it is *included* here as a characteristic of noema in the very structure of what is experienced, after having been excluded as naively being lost in the world. Reduction itself goes on to be counted among the "modifications" of original belief (*Urdoxa*), par. 109, and so phenomenology permits the naive belief from which it liberates and the liberating reduction itself to reach the level of object; cf. G:223:1. The analysis is divided as follows: a) First series of doxic modifications (along the same line so to speak);

Noema:	real	possible	probable	problematic	doubtful
Noesis:	certainty	reckoning	conjecture	question	doubt

All these modalities refer back to the original form of what is real and a belief which is certain, par. 103-6. b) All in this series can be modified, in turn, by the confirmation of yes or of the invalidation of no. Affirmation and negation are thus new dimensions of modification which refer back to original belief, par. 106 (pars. 107-108 summarize the two first series of modifications of belief). c) The first two series taken together can be modified, in turn, by *neutralization* in pars. 109-115. The notion of positing is understood in its universality when the global opposition between consciousness which *posits* and consciousness which *abstains* is reached (par. 114).

K:250:9; G:214:2; GC:297:14; GP:273:41. The acts, in the strong sense of taking a position, will be studied later, par. 115.

K:250:37; G:215:1; GC:298:8; GP:274:32. As in *Experience and Judgement*, the doctrine of belief is elaborated on the level of simple representations, "on" the perceived, the remembered, the imagined, below the higher order acts of the "stratum of Logos" (pars. 124 ff.) Thus *belief* is at a level of complexity prior to "judgment."

K:250:39; G:215:2; GC:298:12; GP:274:36. Cf. p. 287-8.

K:251:26; G:216:1; GC:299:2; GP:275:22. We have already employed this expression for complex presentiations; cf. the remarks, G:212:1, about this intra-noematic intentionality.

K:252:9; G:216:2; GC:299:22; GP:276:6. Affirmation and negation constitute a dimension superimposed on the succession of doxic modes, par. 106.

K:252:16; G:216:3; GC:300:2; GP:276:18. Cf. G:215:1.

K:253:1; G:217:1; GC:300:29; GP:277:11. This analysis is strictly parallel to that which has been initiated by complex presentiations, par. 101. It is always a question of properly distributing what is noematic and what is noetic.

K:253:22; G:218:1; GC:301:18; GP:277:36. The concern of this study of doxic characteristics is to facilitate the movement toward a broad notion of belief or *position*. Conjecture, reckoning, and doubt, by referring back to certainty, appear to be ways of *positing* their object – they *posit* it by correcting certainty with a variable index of likelihood, doubt, etc. We will only reach, in par. 117, this general notion of "thesis" after we have enlarged the cycle of modification of belief.

K:253:31; G:218:2; GC:301:28; GP:278:7. b) *Affirmation and negation*, par. 106. The important points of this analysis are: 1) Affirmation and negation are not on the same level as certainty, conjecture, doubt, etc., though they eventually modify all these doxic modes. 2) Those modes lend themselves to a difference of noetic and noematic characteristics which can be treated in peculiar objects of reflection. 3) These modes enlarge the cycle of *positional* characteristics.

K:254:25; G:219:1; GC:302:28; GP:279:1. The same remark as G:214:2.

K:256:2G:220:1; GC:304:20; GP:280:29. The properly phenomenological derivation is not an empirical history or a "genesis" in the psychological sense of the word, but a possibility of the transformation of noeses and noemata.

K:256:8; G:220:2; GC:304:27; GP:280:37. Husserl never stops coming back to the difference between noema and noesis and correcting it. This is because of psychologism being inclined to seek in modes "of consciousness," that is, in the noesis, what can be found *on the object*. The thing is what is doubtful, and it or one of its properties is canceled or emphasized. The conquest of the complete noema is one of the principal issues of these phenomenological exercises.

K:256:29; G:221:1; GC:305:17; GP:281:21. The sixth *Investigation* (Vol. III, Par. 139-142) criticizes Locke, who claims to draw the concept of being from the "internal" sense. But "internal" sense only reveals the act of perceiving itself, or of judging, collecting. reckoning, etc. If it is true that the concept of being is a dependent part of the *Sachverhalt*, it is in the "state of affairs" that I find the copula of affirmation and not in the act as what is experienced in consciousness.

K:257:21; G:222:1; GC:306:9; GP:282:11 c) Par. 109-115. In turn, all the prior modifications appear to be *positings* (positings of certainty, doubt, likelihood, and affirmed or denied) with regard to the new modification which alone does not posit, and *refrains from positing*. This is what the *epochè* puts to work. But it is difficult to isolate it as pure abstention from acts which complicate it. Two of these acts are examined, pars. 110-2, namely, supposition and imagination. After having reached it in its pure form, it is necessary to grasp fully the universal opposition between positing and neutral consciousness, by showing that both are "potentially" included in all their derivations.

K:257:33; G:222:2; GC:306:23; GP:282:26. On the *Annahme*, cf. par. 110.

K:258:2; G:222:3; GC:306:29; GP:282:32. See the Glossary for the translation of *leisten, handeln, tun*. [The Glossary cites the following:

For *leisten*: To act (opposite of: to suspend, to neutralize)

For *handeln*: To act, action (opp. to be passive)

For *tun*: To act (opp. to suffer) — Translators]

K:259:2; G:223:1; GC:307:33; GP:283:32. These lines demonstrate that the analysis indeed has as its object the modification which has made phenomenology possible. Cf. G:214:1.

K:259:12; G:223:2; GC:308:8; GP:284:2. The absence of a rational claim found in the neutralized belief only serves as a criterion to distinguish it from the *Annahme* or *Ansetzen*, which still remains a positing of belief in a very modest form, that is, supposition.

K:260:6; G:224:1; GC:309:8; GP:284:39. This sense will be examined in the name of "Logos," pars. 124-7.

K:260:9; G:224:2; GC:309:11; GP:285:2. Cf. G:215:1.

K:260:12; G:224:3; GC:309:15; GP:285:6. Those transformations which have been studied in the first group of analyses (pars. 99-101): remembrance, image, sign and their reduplications.

K:260:13; G:224:4; GC:309:16; GP:285:7. Having distinguished neutralization from supposition, it is now distinguished from imagination. The close connections between imagination and neutralization account for why imagination has been able to play such a great role in the "destruction" of the world which rids us of the habit of naïve belief in existence itself.

K:260:35; G:225:1; GC:310:9; GP:286:1. This division of presentiations corrects the provisional list given above, cf. G:209:1. It appears that the first series of modifications (perception, remembrance, imagination and sign) was not homogeneous, since the first two relations are the only positing ones and the third is the neutralization of the second. Imagination is thus a very particular type of neutralization. *Zeitbewusstsein* further clarifies this (par. 16 and Appendices II and III p. 86-93): we initially have sensation as *Gegenwärtigung* oder *Präsentation*, to which retention and protention adhere to form the original sphere in the broad sense; then, we have the *setzende Vergegenwärtigung* (recollection, co-recollection, re-recollection, pre-recollection); finally, the *Phantasie-Vergegenwärtigung*.

K:261:33; G:226:1; GC:311:13; GP:286:41. We recall that in the study of imagination (par. 99, G:210:1) we left unexamined the status of the portrait itself which serves as some sort of springboard to the representation of the imaginary object which it "depicts." This portrait is a neutralized perception.

K:262:28; G:227:1; GC:312:15; GP:287:41. We have studied these reduplications in paragraph 100.

K:263:10; G:227:2; GC:313:2; GP:288:20. The division between image and perception and, more particularly, between the *hylè* of the image (phantasm) and the *hylè* of perception (sense data) is absolute. As opposed to empiricism, the difference is one of nature and not one of degree.

K:264:1; G:228:1; GC:313:17; GP:289:1. A new clarification is added to the description of neutralization. We know that all consciousness can be attentive or inattentive, actual or potential. What happens when we apply this distinction to consciousness which *posits* (as certain, probable, doubtful, etc.) and to consciousness which *holds* every positing *in suspension*? A consciousness can *posit* in an inattentive, potential way, and conversion from actual to potential and from potential to actual is always made as a positing. Likewise, consciousness can be "actually" *neutral* or potentially neutral; conversions of attention do not imply that we pass from neutrality to positing. As a matter of fact, a superficial description could lead us to believe that to stop paying attention is to stop *positing*, (believing, conjecturing, doubting, etc.) and that inattention is a way in which belief is neutralized. Another way of saying this is that to pay attention would be *to posit* (to believe, etc.). Potentiality and actuality are thus complexities of positing and of the neutrality of consciousness and in no way cover this cardinal distinction of the modes of belief. On all this, cf. *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 49-51 [Eng. p. 58-60. Editor.]

K:265:14; G:229:1; GC:315:3; GP:290:19. The analysis of double potentiality, that is, of a *positing* consciousness and of a *neutral* consciousness, is extended to immanent perception. The transition is obtained by considering that time consciousness, on which rests reflection or immanent perception, is a sort of perception which can also be *neutralized*.

K:266:25; G:230:1; GC:316:16; GP:291:30. The example of "portrait" nicely clarifies what can be a *neutral* consciousness – oscillating between actuality and potentiality, without ceasing to be neutral. If I focus on the portrait itself, the apprehension of the portrait is actual and yet does not become an authentic perception. I do not "posit" the portrait. The portrait as springboard of the imagination remains a "neutralized" perception. Likewise, a memory not brought to one's attention but potential does not become a "neutralized" memory, that is, an image. Finally, the background of perception is a potential positing, not a neutralized positing. In brief, neutrality can be actual or potential, just as positing can be actual or potential.

K:268:19; G:232:1; GC:318:12; GP:293:19. Par. 114 gives a remarkable example of "attentional" transformation of belief. In all modified belief (conjecture, reckoning, doubt, question — affirmation, negation — supposition) the reference to certainty (or proto-doxa) is written in. We can consider this certainty as the attentional background of the modification of belief. The possibility of shifting attention and focusing on the proto-doxa attests to the priority of this proto-doxa which all types of positing consciousness take as their basis for their particular modulations.

K:269:19; G:233:1; GC:319:13; GP:294:15. All analyses, after par. 102, converge at this division between positing consciousness and neutral consciousness. Thus we have taken positing consciousness in its widest scope by considering all its variations and by giving to it a contrary that can compete with it. Thus consciousness is understood in its power to "posit" and "suspend" natural reality.

K:269:24; G:233:2; GC:319:18; GP:294:20. On *Leisten* and *Leistung* cf. *supra*, G:222:3; terminological remarks of G. Berger in *Le Cogito dans la Philosophie de Husserl*, p. 99.

K:270:10; G:233:3; GC:319:35; GP:294:38. Cf. *supra* p. 229.

K:271:11; G:234:1; GC:321:7; GP:286:5. The reduction of all modality of belief to the proto-doxa gives us a chance to reduce all this analysis to two fundamental cases: simple *certainty* with its correlate: such *is*, and neutralized certainty.

K:271:18; G:234:2; GC:321:14; GP:186:13. This is how the attentional transformations studied above, cf. G:232:1, are put to use. The "thesis" of the world can thus be identified in some remote forms where it is only included as a possibility.

K:272:3; G:235:1; GC:321:31; GP:296:29. The perception of time and, in the last analysis, the constitution of time rule the twofold "doxic" and "neutral" constitution of transcendent reality. This constitution, we can say, would be the *doxic positing* of the pure Ego in its temporality and its hyletic diversity.

K:272:28; G:235:2; GC:322:23; GP:297:17. Because of the derivation of all modalities of belief beginning with certainty, its limited

and close opposition between certainty and its neutral form is universally valid for every series of possible modifications (conjecture, doubt, affirmation, negation, etc.).

K:272:30; G:235:3; GC:322:25; GP:297:19. In order to give the duality of positing consciousness and neutralized consciousness all its development, for a last time the point of view of the act (the noesis) is adopted and no longer the point of view of the object (the noema): in order to give to this notion of the act its widest scope. To this end are included in it not only the most inattentive forms, but also the most emerging, vanishing, or *inchoative* forms. At the same time this paragraph indirectly contributes to the theory of the Ego, as it is the Ego which lives and "performs" its acts, par. 80. Cf. *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 38-40 [Eng. p. 44-46. Editor.]

K:273:5G:236:1; GC:322:32; GP:297:27. Reflection, we have seen (par. 77-79), reveals what is experienced unreflectively and inattentively – as it was prior to reflective attention.

K:274:13; G:237:1; GC:324:6; GP:298:35. On positing in the narrow sense, cf. p. 191; on the claim to have being, cf. par. 106 and the beginning of par. 110.

K:275:6; G:237:2; GC:324:31; GP:299:20. Same meaning as G:234:1, G:234:2, and G:235:2.

K:275:31; G:238:1; GC:325:22; GP:300:10. 4) *The parallelism of noesis and noema is complicated if we join to the simple representation: a) the affective volitional theses, "based" on representation, pars. 116-117; b) the "syntheses," introduced by acts of putting in relation, explication, disjunction, collection, etc.*, pars. 118-23. At the same time as we thus add new "characteristics" to the "nucleus of meaning" of the noema, we pursue the preceding analysis of *positing consciousness* and its contrary which is *neutralized* consciousness. "Founded" theses and "syntheses" can be considered extensions of "thetic" consciousness. Thus, the notion of *positing* or *thesis* does not cease to be universalized as new dimensions of characterization are introduced.

K:276:12; G:238:2; GC:326:5, GP:300:28. This has been called presentiation, pars. 99-100.

K:277:15; G:239:1; GC:327:13; GP:301:38. Husserl pursues two ideas at the same time, namely, to show the addition of new "characteristics" to the nucleus of meaning (the agreeable, the valid, etc.), and to show the extension of doxic properties of simple representations to new aspects of the noema. It is precisely the property of a *founded* thesis to add something new and to *enlarge* the analysis of the inner structure in the superstructure.

K:277:23; G:240:1; GC:327:23; GP:302:6. Cf. p. 66 and 198.

K:278:25; G:241:1; GC:328:28; GP:303:7. These are two lines of analysis whose interference we have indicated above. G:239:1.

K:279:6; G:241:2; GC:329:12; GP:303:27. The aim of this paragraph is to show that the agreeable and the valid implicitly contain a *certainty*, a *positing* of certainty which we can extract from it, as we have learned to do with the modalities of belief in simple representations. And thus the notion of thesis takes an increasing extension which henceforth largely exceeds the framework of existential beliefs and includes the framework of practical and affective beliefs.

K:279:12; G:241:3; GC:329:18; GP:303:33. In the sense of par. 115.

K:280:8; G:242:1; GC:330:12; GP:304:26. The bringing together of *Satz* and *setzen* (i.e., proposition and positing) will be justified further on. The proposition is a statement which expresses a thesis of belief, p. 250 ff. Its meaning is enlarged to include all practical, affective, and existential positions.

K:280:16; G:242:2; GC:330:21; GP:304:35. This proposition picks up the thought of par. 114, but dissociates thetic and doxic. The general opposition of positing and neutrality still remain limited to representations of the *thing*, to the exclusion of affective and practical characteristics, in brief, to existential belief, called doxic positing here. This limited category of positions is what one ordinarily calls position or belief, especially if it has the original form of certainty and if, in addition, it includes attention and actuality. In this last form attentive belief is technically called actual protodoxic position.

K:281:7; G:243:1; GC:331:15; GP:305:28. It is the law which has been expressed *supra*, pars. 113-14.

K:281:8; G:243:2; GC:331:16; GP:305:29. The *Logical Investigations* called "quality" the modality of belief in opposition to "matter," here it is called "meaning" or "nucleus of meaning."

K:281:34; G:244:1; GC:332:9; GP:306:18. This proposition bridges the proposition of par. 114: all Cogito is *doxic* or neutral, and the one we have just seen: all consciousness is *thetic*, either actually or potentially. It is possible to extract a *doxic* modality (certainty,

doubt, etc.) from every "thesis," such as wishing, commanding, desiring, etc. To a large extent the implicit "doxic" element is the "logical" aspect of all affective or practical consciousness. In this sense there is indeed a Husserlian intellectualism, but the affective and practical stratum from which we infer "logic" by conversion is original. Thereby Husserl opens the way to a phenomenology which is equally original: the phenomenology of values, goods, utilities, aesthetic, action, etc.

K:282:10; G:244:2; GC:332:23; GP:306:32. On this stratum of "Logos," cf. infra, par. 124. An affective intention only receives a "logical expression" by objectification, that is, by doxic transposition upon the level of "being."

K:282:13; G:244:3; GC:332:26; GP:306:35. On *Gegenstand* and *Objekt* in the framework of noematic analysis, cf. G:189:1.

K:283:1; G:245:1; GC:333:15; GP:307:22. b) *The study of founded "theses" is followed by the study of "syntheses,"* pars. 118-24. At first the type of articulated syntheses, which will be examined, is delimited, par. 118. It is shown that the variety in "rays" of a thinking engaged in a synthesis can be treated as a simple intention, par. 119. The noetico-noematic description of simple theses can be extended to syntheses, par. 120. In particular, syntheses embrace the affective and practical Cogito as well as the theoretical Cogito—love as well as representation-although an affective synthesis can only be "expressed" by objectifying itself in a doxic synthesis, par. 121. The Ego which brings about syntheses is revealed there, better than in the theses, to be a creative *Fiat*, pars. 122-3.

K:283:35; G:246:1; GC:334:17; GP:308:21. This first meaning, which is set aside, of the word synthesis – *Ursynthese* – refers back to the *Urkonstitution*, to the constitution of the transcendental Ego in temporality. cf. G:163:1, G:163:3. *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 33-8, 46-8 [Eng. p. 39-43, 54-57. Editor.]

K:284:10; G:246:2; GC:334:29; GP:308:33. This second meaning of the word synthesis, which is in turn set aside – the synthesis of the spatial thing – has often been brought to mind when dealing with perception. A large part of *Ideas* II is devoted to it. Here synthesis is on the very same level as the diversity of "adumbrations" which it unifies.

K:284:31; G:246:3; GC:335:16; GP:309:17. On formal ontology cf. G:18:1, G:20:5. The categories of objectivity in general are:

object, unity, multiplicity, relation, etc. One may observe that all except the first are constituted in synthetic acts of collection, disjunction, relation, etc. The first task of logic (*Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, par. 67) is to determine the elementary forms of connection. Apophantic logic elaborates them on the level of "expressions." This is the first degree of this formal ontology, cf. G:22:2.

K:286:33; G:248:1; GC:337:24; GP:311:18. Example: S is p; the grass is green. Nominalization: being-p; the green-of-the grass is restful.

K:287:5; G:249:1; GC:337:32; GP:311:26. Cf. G:18:1, G:20:5. Formal mathematics (pure arithmetic, pure analysis, theory of multiplicity) is a part of formal ontology besides the derivations of objectivity in general (relation, order, disjunction, etc.). Now all these categories issue from the "nominalization" of complex objects of synthetic acts such as counting, collecting, separating.

K:287:8; G:249:2; GC:338:2; GP:311:31. The extension to syntheses of notions of positionality and neutrality is the issue in this entire study. But this extension is subject to exact conditions.

K:287:29; G:249:3; GC:338:24; GP:312:16. This is what has been established supra, on page 225 for the object-portrait, and on page 239 for the perceptive support of aesthetic pleasure.

K:288:13; G:250:1; GC:339:10; GP:312:36. This paragraph takes up the connection between what is practically or affectively experienced and what is experienced in a properly doxic mode (cf. pars. 116-17), but on the level of theses and syntheses. Some "expressions" (which will be studied beginning with par. 124) are used to illuminate the fact that synthetic acts can be applied to practical and affective syntheses. The "syntax" of "and," "or," etc., is therefore as well suited to love and to evaluation as it is to representation. "Syntaxes" are thus not doxic de jure. This conclusion is in conformity with what we already know about the "thetic:" namely, that the thetic is broader than the "doxic" but can only be *expressed* by objectifying itself in the doxic thesis.

K:290:31; G:252:1; GC:242:2; GP:315:19. On the *Ursprung*, cf. G:107:1. This term does not designate the psychological genesis but the phenomenological constitution. *Experience and Judgment* takes this question up again in detail.

K:291:1; G:253:1; GC:242:10; GP:315:28. The study of syntheses, from the point of view of the Ego which effects them, par. 122-3, gives way to an analysis of the creative activity of the Ego, which

by far exceeds the limits of this present study. Par. 115 had already shown the differences of *actuality* in the simple theses. The examination of syntheses lets us go further, because the "production" of a synthesis spreads out within time. We can thus intercept an origin, a continuation (keeping in mind, under its grasp, giving up), some interferences, a transition from confused to distinct. We thereby approach a *creative fiat* of the pure Ego. But this doorway is immediately shut. Once more phenomenology which is "directed to the subject" is not the theme of the *Ideas*. Cf. par. 80.

K:291:21; G:253:2; GC:242:32; GP:316:9. The fiat of consciousness embraces both the theoretical Cogito and the practical Cogito (willing, performing). It is the creative moment of every "act," of every "intention" of consciousness.

K:293:9; G:255:1; GC:344:29; GP:317:40. This analysis is intimately connected with the preceding: the obscure and the distinct relate to modes "of act" of syntheses when they pass from the germinal, inchoative stage to the completed stage.

K:294:2; G:256:1; GC:345:28; GP:318:34. 5) *The parallelism of noesis and noema in "expression" (or "stratum of the Logos")*, pars. 124-27. Expression and meaning were the point of departure of the *Logical Investigations*. The principal point is to correctly grasp expression as being above the "meaning," but below the word, due to its "mental," non-corporeal side. This is the level of expressive meaning, of *Logos*, of the concept in the strict sense of the word. Unproductive stratum par excellence, faithful expression "coincides" with the noema which expresses it. a) That is why expression does not pose any new problem about modality, positionality and neutrality, par. 124. b) The extension of the analysis in par. 123 to the stratum of expression is particularly easy, par. 125. c) It is then possible to stress the points in which expression does not coincide with the subjacent stratum, par. 126. d) It is concluded with the difficult question of knowing whether the expression of desire, command, feeling, etc., is built upon expressive doxa, par. 127.

K:294:33; G:256:2; GC:346:29; GP:319:30. Cf. supra p. 172 ff.: meaning is the noematic nucleus.

K:295:21; G:257:1; GC:347:21; GP:320:21. On the *Logos*, cf. *Formal and transcendental Logic*, par. 1.

K:295:32; G:257:2; GC:347:33; GP:32:33. This relation is the object of the fourth Section, p. 265 ff.

K:296:14; G:258:1; GC:348:23; GP:321:18. On matter and quality in the *Logical Investigations*, cf. p. 242, n. 4.

K:298:1; G:260:1; GC:350:18; GP:323:11. This analysis is an extension of par. 123 which overlapped with the logical expression of synthetic acts. We can thus follow a line of thought which begins with attention in perception (par. 92), continues with actuality of "theses" in general (pars. 113-4), and act of syntheses (par. 123), and extends finally to act of expression. This is the subject side of all intentionality. On this last level we again find as our phenomenological *object* the problems which were posited *prior* to the analysis by the phenomenological *method*. These are: faithfulness of expression, clarification, etc., pars. 66-70.

K:299:5; G:260:2; GC:351:19; GP:324:8. This is the meaning of the sixth *Logical Investigation* and of its categorial intuition, cf. supra G:9:5.

K:299:19; G:261:1; GC:352:1; GP:324:25. Having shown the extension of the noetico-noematic analysis to expression, Husserl makes some allusions to characteristics relevant to expression. There is no rigorous parallelism between the articulations of meaning and the articulations of expression, though the latter "reflect" the former. The fourth *Logical Investigation* was precisely devoted to the specific problems of a pure grammar and to a priori laws which govern the "forms of complex meanings" so that they mutually complete each other in a possible unity of meaning (Vol. II, p. 294-95). The *Ideas* only retain from that very technical study the points which concern the absence of structural coincidence between meaning and signifying expression. These points are abridgments, lacunae, etc.

K:300:19; G:262:1; GC:352:35; GP:325:22. The fourth *Logical Investigation* which applies to meanings the notion of dependence and independence, acquired in the third *Investigation*, begins with the distinction of simple meanings (Peter) and complex ones (iron man), (par. 3). Among the latter meanings there are some which do not have any meaning in themselves, but only in a context; they are thus "purely co-significant" (p. 302). The syncategorematic expression attributed to them is opposed to categorematic. This comes from Marty. Categorematic expressions are components of complex expressions and make them meaningful. Examples of syncategorematic meanings are: of the father, for, nevertheless...

An example of categorematic meaning: the founder of ethics. (par. 4).

K:301:9; G:262:2; GC:353:31; GP:326:16. This problem must not be confused with that of the originality of *acts* in the affective sphere, p. 197-244. Here we are only dealing with their *expression*. Is what we express about a noema of desire, for example, the doxic element, that is, the constative statement implied in the desire? The sixth *Investigation*, second part, third edition, p. 204-21, approaches the problem from the standpoint of "fulfilling." Does the grammatical expression of questioning, desiring and willing (called here non-objectifying acts) cover a bestowing of meaning which "fulfills" meaning as does what is perceived or the established state of affairs? Or does it express only that the subject announces what is experienced in questioning, desiring, and willing in the categorical, doubtful mode, etc.?

SECTION FOUR
REASON AND REALITY

K:305:2; G:265:1; GC:357:2; GP:327:3. The *fourth Section* breaks the framework of the preceding analyses. The theme of the latter is "meaning" of noema and the many "characteristics" which modify it. Among the first of these characteristics the doxic ones have been examined. However., a fundamental trait of meaning (perceived, imagined, judged, desired, willed, etc.) has been neglected – namely, that it *is related to an object.* This "claim" of "what is perceived as such," of "the imagined as such," in short, of "what is intended as such," poses a problem of validity which is the very problem of *reason*. This problem, as is seen, does not concern a new "stratum" of meaning, as did, for example, the stratum of judgment and the stratum of logical expression, but an absolutely new dimension – a *reference to the object.* The new twist of the description poses extreme difficulties of interpretation. Husserl declares here that what is the most intimate in intentionality has not yet been accounted for, if in the intended "meaning," in the correlative itself of consciousness, we do not discern a movement of going beyond, an arrow which runs through it and which shows the direction toward objectivity, the intention or claim to objectivity. It is not only consciousness that goes beyond itself in an intended meaning, but this intended meaning also goes beyond itself in an object. The intended meaning was still only a content ("intentional" content, to be sure, yet not "real," as is repeated here, echoing par. 97). This specific inclusion here, this intentional inclusion of transcendent meaning in the immanence of what is experienced, seems to break down again. As E. Fink stresses in the article already cited (p. 364-66), this new twist appears, at first glance, hardly reconcilable with the idea of the whole constitution of the being-of-the world in and by consciousness. If Fink is to be believed, we would have here the most flagrant example of the undetermined position of the *Ideas*, half an intentional psychology and half a truly constituting phenomenology. The psychological noema is only a mental "meaning" which relates to an object *outside* itself. The transcendent noema would be the world itself in its "meaning" *and* in its "being." The relation of

noema to the object would thus have to be *constituted*, by transcendental consciousness, as the ultimate structure of the noema. The last lines of par. 129 proceed along these lines: the objective intention of the noema is declared "*parallel*" to the very intention of consciousness as noesis. To constitute the noema is, for the transcendental Ego, to constitute it as *meaning-referring-to-a-being*. In Fink's language, which Husserl formally approves of in his preface in the *Kantstudien*, "the transcendental noema, considered in the infinite process of identification, cannot refer back to a being which would be beyond this infinity and independent of the noema. The noema *is* being itself, now in the depth — so far unrecognized — of its concealed ontic meaning, namely, as the transcendental unity of validity. Here, the 'relation to the object' only means: the reference of an actual noema (that is, a correlate of a transcendental isolated act) to the many correlates of acts which, by virtue of an unceasing synthesis of fulfilling, erects the unity of the object as an ideal pole." *op. cit.*, p. 364-65. All of par. 131 supports this interpretation. See also p. 280 and p. 302-03.

CHAPTER ONE: NOEMATIC MEANING AND THE RELATION TO THE OBJECT

K:307:3; G:265:2; GC:359:3; GP:331:3. *Chapter I poses the general problem of the relation between noema and the object. By asking in what sense this object is real, we have access to problems of rational consciousness which chapter II solves by a theory of original sight. Chapter III extends these views into the problems of formal and material ontology: a) The problem of the noema and the reference to the "object" is posed in pars. 128-129; b) The central analysis which leads from "meaning" to the "object" intended by the noema is then developed in pars. 130-2. It appears that the object is to meaning what the subject of a proposition is to its predicates – namely, the unifying center, the identical principle distinct from them and yet only determined by them; c) We apply this notion of meaning to simple acts, syntheses, and logical expressions, pars. 133-4; and d) Par. 135 finally introduces the problems of reason from the vantage point of the idea of reality.*

K:265:24; G:265:3; GC:359:26; GP:331:27. Here we find an allusion to the analysis of the second Section in which consciousness and reality have been initially opposed (Chapter II) and then brought back together (Chapter III).

K:310:4; G:267:1; GC:362:12; GP:334:14. This is the language of the *Logical Investigations* (cf. both G:182:2 and G:242:2). Fifth *Investigation*: "concerning what is intentionally experienced and its contents," pars. 20-21: matter = meaning; quality = thetic modality. Matter + quality = intentional or meaningful essence. Intentional essence + intuitive fullness = cognitive essence.

K:311:21; G:269:1; GC:363:24; GP:335:33. Cf. G:265:1, ad finem.

K:312:18; G:270:1; GC:364:17; GP:336:21. The reference to the object is thus this feature of the "Quid" of the noema which is the most opposed to the character of the "Quomodo" (as perceived, remembered, closely looked at, etc.). This text supports Fink who reduces the difference of meaning and object to that of the "noema as object in the how (*im wie*) of its modes of givenness and the object as a noematically identical moment of noemata in their constant changes" (*op. cit.*, p. 364). We arrive then at this: when

the Quomodo of every correlate of thought has been eliminated, the Quid, or meaning, remains. In turn, this meaning is considered to be a cluster of predicates and the meaning of something. The "of" refers to the objective intention of every predicate as referred to a "something" which it determines.

K:315:31; G:273:1; GC:268:1; GP:339:35. Cf. p. 246 ff.

K:316:3; G:273:2; GC:268:9; GP:340:3. Cf. p. 248.

K:316:6; G:273:3; GC:268:14; GP:340:9. Concrete is related to independent, abstract to dependent, p. 29.

K:317:7; G:274:1; GC:269:11; GP:341:2. Cf. the references to *Logical Investigations*, supra G:182:2, G:267:1. In the *Ideas* Husserl decides to use the word proposition for the compound meaning + thetic character, that is, the Quid which is perceived, imagined, etc. + the mode of belief (certainty, doubt, conjecture, etc.), reserving the term "expressive proposition" for statements about the expressive stratum (pars. 124-27).

K:318:1; G:274:2; GC:270:9; GP:341:34. On the extension of meaning, as well as of belief, to simple representations of perception, imagination and remembrance, cf. supra G: 215:1. According to Husserl, these notions of meaning and belief (reunited in the notions of the proposition) are not monopolized by a theory of judgment.

K:319:2; G:275:1; GC:271:3; GP:342:31. On the apophantic, cf. G:22:2. On syntheses of judgment, par. 118. On analysis as explication, ibid., p. 246. The important thing here is that a theory of propositions (as a particular discipline which is prior to phenomenology) is put in place in the building of phenomenology and particularly in relation to the theory of noematic meaning. Cf. *Formal and Transcendental Logic,* second part.

K:319:17; G:276:1; GC:271:19; GP:343:7. On the narrow meaning of the word concept in the level of expression, cf. par. 124.

K:322:8; G:278:1; GC:374:16; GP:345:33. This inverted language, which brings the object back to consciousness, finally connects all prior analysis to the central theme of Husserlian philosophy – that is, to constitution: consciousness constitutes the object as identical by intending it through variable noemata.

K:322:26; G:279:1; GC:375:1; GP:346:13. The example of natural thing dominates the *Ideas*, but values, persons, and mathematical objects pose the same problems. Cf. p. 280, and especially par. 152.

K:323:34; G:280:1; GC:376:9; GP:347:20. The expression of configuration (*Gestaltung*) reminds us that the eidetic specifications, which rule the sequence of transcendental consciousness, are to what is experienced and inexact essences of consciousness what the generation of figures is to geometry. These two pages (279-80) give us a hint at the aims of Husserlian idealism: all *reduced* transcendence, including the transcendence of the eidetic (pars. 59-60), ought to be constituted.

K:323:37; G:280:2; GC:376:12; GP:347:23. Cf. G:43:3.

K:324:15; G:280:3; GC:376:31; GP:347:43. This "turning" is what lays bare the problems of Chapter II on the *phenomenology of reason*. And this turning consists in this: the "reference of the noema to an object" has appeared as the reference to an X subject of the determination-predicates constituted by the "meaning" of the object. It is then asked: Is this pole of identity *real?* The question at first seems strange, for, on the one hand, the notion of reality seems to have already been "constituted" as modality of belief (more exactly as "character of being," correlative to certain belief, par. 103). Thus it seems to be included in the notion of proposition which adds up meaning and belief (or thetic characteristic): par. 133. On the other hand, if the analysis of reality is not exhausted by the analysis of thetic characteristics, what can the notion of reality add to the notion of "X as the identical unifier of predicates?" There is no doubt that by this method of constant repercussion Husserl seeks to radicalize the problem of reality. Suspended by the *epochè*, reality provokes a renewed effort by constituting consciousness. The constitution of thetic characteristics only had bearing upon the reality of the predicable determinations included in "meaning." The real was still only the correlate of a certainty of attribution. The question now is to know what the *reality* of the X is, as unifier of the attributed determinations. Thus, reality always seems to escape transcendental constitution.

K:324:28; G:281:1; GC:377:7; GP:348:14. The facticity to which allusion is made is the factual order that "sequences" or "configurations" of what is experienced realize so as to prescribe such a world and not some other. We recall that this *teleology* poses the problem of the transcendence of God, p. 110. Thus, if the problem of the *factual* order is not posed, the problem of reality is the problem of the correlation between two essences – i.e., rational

consciousness and reality, the latter exercising its "jurisdiction" on the former, and the former "legitimizing" itself in the latter. Chapter II will start on this note.

K:325:25; G:281:2; GC:278:6; GP:349:12. This question emphasizes the central difficulty of transcendental idealism: if reality ceaselessly escapes constitution (Cf. G:280:3), the task of this idealism is to fill up the gap always reopening between "simply intended" (or noema) and "reality."

CHAPTER TWO: PHENOMENOLOGY OF REASON

K:326:2; G:282:1; GC:379:2; GP:350:2. Chapter II resolves the problem of reality, of rational legitimacy, in the theory of "seeing." The theory of the noema had already set the *original* in opposition to the reproduced, the imagined, and the remembered (par. 99) and had made of it a "noematic character." The task now is to extend to the X of every object the positional characteristic which has been brought to light in the still limited framework of noematic determinations. This radicalization of the theory of *intuition*, its flourishing into a vast philosophy of *evidence,* corroborates the proper character of Husserlian transcendentalism in which *seeing* is the culmination of *constitution.* If we are to understand Husserl, we must understand that the highest "bestowing" of transcendental consciousness is "seeing." Cf. G:7:5 and G:7:6; G:106:1. This chapter is inseparable from the sixth *Logical Investigation* which connects intuition with the fulfilling of empty significations.

K:326:13; G:282:2; GC:379:14; GP:350;14. On the position of the reason-reality problem, cf. G:281:1. The entire third *Cartesian Meditation* revives the theory of evidence by adding the theory of "customary" evidence (p. 51-53 [Eng. p. 60-62. Editor]).

K:327:6; G:282:3; GC:280:4; GP:351:2. The sixth *Logical Investigation* shows that intelligible relations are themselves susceptible to being intuited, called "categorial intuition," in the sense that it also fulfills an "empty" meaning. (Second Section, in particular par. 45 ff.).

K:328:8; G:284:1; GC:281:11; GP:352:7. Here is the answer to the first difficulty raised above (G:280:3): isn't the real simply a correlate of certainty and has not everything been said about it by the analysis of characteristics of belief? We see here that intuition "motivates," "legitimates," and "grounds" the character of belief studied in par. 103.

K:329:16; G:285:1; GC:282:19; GP:353:13. *The first task of a phenomenology of reason is to conquer the whole scope of seeing: a) On the level of "sensibility" and "understanding," as is said in the sixth* Logical Investigation, par. 137; b) *In its inadequate form* (ex. : perception of a thing) *and adequate form* (ex.: evidence of what is

experienced), par. 138; c) *By bearing in mind various modalities of belief*, par. 139; d) *and the theoretical and practical forms of belief*, par. 139 and following.

K:330:11; G:285:2; GC:283:12; GP:353:43. Cf. par. 6.

K:331:24; G:286:1; GC:384:28; GP:355:16. Here we find again, inserted into a general theory of seeing, the analysis of *inadequacy* which had only served to distinguish "transcendent perception" from "immanent perception," par. 42-44.

K:332:22; G:287:1; GC:385:32; GP:356:14. One must not forget that the hypothesis of the annihilation of the world (par. 49) is the limit-hypothesis of a radical concurrence, of a total discordance of appearances in which no meaning can be "legitimized" and all meaning is self-destructive.

K:333:26; G:289:1; GC:387:11; GP:357:27. This paragraph restores, in relation to intuition, first the derivation of modes of belief, starting with the proto-doxa (pars. 103-9), and then the theory of affective, axiological, practical belief (p. 242 and par. 121).

K:336:6; G:291:1; GC:390:11; GP:360:3. *Having adopted a view of evidence as broad as possible (pars. 137-9), the various processes of verification are examined; that is, of the transition from non-motivated positing to motivated positing: a) according to whether the latter can be original or not,* par. 140. b) *non-mediated or mediated*, par. 141.

K:336:33; G:292:1; GC:390:30; GP:360:33. Cf. p. 140.

K:336:33; G:292:2; GC:390:31; GP:360:33. Cf. p. 8. The *Cartesian Meditations* show that a new *epochè* is necessary to delimit my proper sphere of ownness (p. 83 [Eng. p. 99-100. Editor]) and thus to reveal the proper type of "appresentation" of the other (p. 91-102).

K:338:1; G:293:1; GC:292:2; GP:361:33. Mediated evidence has a much larger meaning than the logical meaning of inference (and even more so than deduction). So, the legitimacy of memory is drawn from the legitimacy of perception. Inference is only a particular instance of mediation. It is examined at the end of the paragraph.

K:338:23; G:293:2; GC:392:28; GP:362:25. Cf. p. 140.

K:340:20; G:295:1; GC:395:1; GP:364:23. *Pars. 142-45 are devoted to a general view of the problem of truth and being; a) This view is dominated by this fundamental equivalence in Husserlian intuitionism, namely, true being is the correlate of a consciousness which bestows it in an original and perfectly adequate way, par. 142; b) And as the physical thing cannot be adequately given in a finite system of appearances, the true being of the thing remains an Idea in the Kantian sense – that is, the regulative principle of an open series of constantly harmonious appearances, pars. 143-44. c) This theory of evidence is definitively opposed to an affectivist and generally psychologistic interpretation and is finally replaced in the framework of the transcendental conception, par. 145.*

K:343:7; G:298:1; GC:398:4; GP:367:9. The unity of the flux of what is experienced was also such an idea apprehended in a intuitive ideation, par. 83. Cf. *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 52-53 [Eng. p. 61-62. Editor]: "the world, correlative idea of an empirically perfect evidence."

K:343:18; G:298:2; GC:398:15; GP:367:20. Here we find again, in the framework of the phenomenology of reason, the distinction between transcendent being and immanent being, par. 42-44.

K:343:29; G:298:3; GC:398:26; GP:367:31. On "cognitive essence," cf. *Logical Investigations*, p. 182, n. 2. and p. 267, n.1.

K:344:footnote 15; G:300:1; GC:400:footnote; GP:368:footnote. On the "quasi" (*gleichsam*) of neutralization, cf. pars. 109 ff.

K:344:footnote 16; G:300:1; GC:400:footnote; GP:369: footnote. Par. 39 of the sixth *Logical Investigation* is devoted to an enumeration of the different meanings of the word truth, according to the definition of evidence as original fulfilling of an intention of meaning. In the first sense, truth is harmony itself, the coincidence of what is intended and what is given, and evidence is this coincidence intuitively experienced. In a second sense, truth is an ideal generally to be attained, not given in what is experienced in particular, with evidence – namely, the *idea* of an absolute adequacy as such. Moreover we can call truth, in a third sense, the *fullness* of intuition which "makes true" by fulfilling, or, finally, in a fourth sense, the *correctness* of intention which intuition "makes true." It should be understood that "categorial intuition" as "sensory intuition" can play this role of "verification." Thus the notion of truth is no more limited by Husserl to the sphere of judgment and its correlate or state of affairs (Sachverhalt) than the notions of positing, meaning of belief, etc. Reduced to judgment, truth can only have meaning two and four, and the word being suits meanings

one and three better. Therefore we reach some contraries, namely, evidence-absurdity and truth-falsity or being-non-being (p. 126).

K:347:4; G:302:1; GC:402:17; GP:371:18. The end of this chapter stresses the distinctly idealistic interpretation of the notion of reality. Intuitionism is integrated into transcendental philosophy as a specific type of "configuration" and "sequence" prescribed by the flux of what is experienced by the transcendental Ego. This integration of *seeing* into *constituting* is doubtless the most difficult point of phenomenological philosophy. *Cartesian Meditations* develop this theme of "the intentional object as transcendental clue," 26-7 [Eng. p. 30-32. Ricœur could have referred to par. 21 too, which is entitled: "The intentional object as 'transcendental clue.'" Editor.]

K:347:24; G:302:2; GC:402:37; GP:371:30. We have already considered how the doxic modalities (investigated in pars. 103-8) can be taken up from the point of view of the phenomenology of reason, that is, in the perspective of intuitive legitimacy.

CHAPTER THREE: THE LEVELS OF GENERALITY PERTAINING TO THE PROBLEMS OF THEORETICAL REASON

K:349:3; G:303:1; GC:404:3; GP:373:4. *The purpose of Chapter III is to apply to established disciplines, such as formal and material ontologies, the views which we have acquired concerning the noetic-noematic structures and the notions of evidence, truth and reality. In return, these disciplines, which are prior to phenomenology, are placed within the structure of transcendental phenomenology. After a recapitulation of general themes (par. 146), the phenomenology of reason is applied: a) to formal logic and to some parallel disciplines, par. 147; b) to formal ontology par. 148; and c) to material ontologies, par. 149.* The example of the region of the thing is treated at greater length, par. 150-1, then the example of other regions based on the region of the thing is treated, par. 152. This chapter is only a sketch of the great undertaking of *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. The entire second part of this important work is devoted to the transition from traditional logic to a logic having a transcendental foundation. The *Cartesian Meditations* also apply to the constitution of formal objectivities the idea that the intentional object is a "transcendental clue," or "structural rule of the transcendental Ego," p. 43-46, 53-54 [Eng. p. 50-55, 62-64. Editor.]

K:350:9; G:304:1; GC:405:9; GP:374:11. Cf. G:182:2.

K:350:27; G:304:2; GC:405:29; GP:374:32. Phenomenology can integrate these disciplines which are considered by the detour of the theory of *synthetic* acts in the sense of par. 118. We encounter two groups of synthetic acts which interest us here. First, there are syntheses effected according to the forms of formal ontology – namely, the syntheses of collection, disjunction, relation, explanation, etc. Next, there are "founded" acts or affective and volitional acts in which the positing of value is effected and which, as such, are presented as axiological acts.

K:351:3; G:305:1; GC:406:10; G:375:7. Cf. p. 242.

K:351:30; G:305:2; GC:470:2; GP:375:37. Cf. par. 119 (end), p. 249.

K:352:4; G:306:1; GC:407:14; GP:376:7. Cf. par. 121.

K:353:17; G:307:1; GC:409:2; GP:377:27. On the definition of formal ontology, cf. G:18:1; G:22:2. *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, first part, pars. 24-26, 54.

K:355:15; G:309:1; GC:411:6; GP:379:21. On the definition of regional ontologies, cf. G:19:1, G:20:5, G:22:1., G:30:1. Whereas the first section treated regions as objects of an a priori science, the fourth section treats them as "prescribed by consciousness," that is, as transcendentally constituted. A region is then an a priori type of original legitimation for possible intentions of consciousness. The first treatment was logical and prephenomenological; the second alone is phenomenological, that is, transcendental.

K:355:34; G:390:2; GC:411:25; GP:380:5. This is one of the principal subjects of *Ideas* II.

K:358:10; G:311:1; GC:413:36; GP:382:8. Cf. par. 143.

K:359:11; G:312:1; GC:415:6; GP:383:11. Cf. par. 143.

K:360:30; G:314:1; GC:416:28: GP:384:32. The *Cartesian Meditations* (p. 30 [Eng. p. 35. Editor.]) describes this reflection as a *duplication of the Ego*; "above the Ego which is naïvely interested in the world, the phenomenological Ego will be established as a *disinterested spectator*. This *duplication of the Ego* is in turn accessible to a new reflection, a reflection which insofar as it is transcendental, will once more demand a disinterested attitude on the part of the spectator, who would be preoccupied only with seeing and adequately describing."

K:361:32; G:315:1; GC:417:37; GP:385:37. This is what *Ideas* II calls "phantom."

K:362:9; G:315:2; GC:418:16; GP:386:11. Cf. p. 157 Husserl's note (a).

K:363:2; G:316:1; GC:419:16; GP:387:8. The fifth of the *Cartesian Meditations* gives its entire scope to this problem of the constitution of the world in intersubjectivity. Cf. in particular p. 102-9 [Eng. p. 120-128. Editor.] The limited place given to intersubjectivity in *Ideas* I adulterates the overall perspective, Husserl declares in the "Nachwort zu meiner *Ideen* ..." (p. 11): "Transcendental-phenomenological idealism" has not overcome "psychologistic idealism" as long as it has not resolved the difficulty of "transcendental solipsism." The difficulty had been dealt with in

the courses of the winter semester of 1910-11. But in 1913 Husserl was hoping to publish volume II of the *Ideas* soon. Also concerning this question, see *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, cf. par. 96.

K:365:12; G:318:1; GC:421:31; GP:389:18. Cf. p. 70, 103, 175; *Ideas* II studies at length this constitution of *animalia* and men.

K:367:14; G:320:1 GC:424:12; GP:391:26. Cf. par. 118.

K:369:16; G:322:1; GC:426:25; GP:393:36. This term *index,* which appears frequently at the end of *Ideas* I, sums up the change of perspective between *Logical Investigations* and the *Ideas*. The a prioris, which the first work tended *to put in opposition* to psychological consciousness, now serve *to diagnose* in transcendental consciousness "configurations" and "sequences" which prescribe the structure of these a prioris. The passage from psychologism to logicism is not done away with. Rather, the unveiling of the a priori has made possible the correlative discovery of a new level of consciousness, no longer psychological, but transcendental. Cf. *Introduction*, Third Part.

INDEX