Remarks on Derrida and Habermas*

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Introduction

Let's begin by dispelling a few misconceptions about Derrida's work. Derrida is not and never was a postmodernist. He is not a private ironist, nor is he some sort of mystical or anarchic neo-Heideggerian. His work does not exacerbate nihilism, nor does it refuse or attempt to overcome the Enlightenment, the Subject, or whatever else. Deconstruction, in Derrida's hands, does not level the genre distinction between philosophy and literature (in fact, the opposite might be closer to the truth), nor does Derrida denigrate politics, society, and history to the status of the ontic.

On the contrary, at least on the reading that I have tried to develop over the years, Derrida's work is motivated by an overriding commitment, which I would call ethical, and which owes more than a small debt to Levinas (i.e., in Habermas's terms, the ethical as distinct from the moral). Furthermore, his work is animated by deep political concerns and has, I think, plausible and powerful political consequences. Although, to my mind, the ethical and political orientation of Derrida's work is evident in his early writing (cf. in particular, "Violence and Metaphysics" (1964) and "The Ends of Man" (1968)), and therefore talk of an ethical *Kehre* in deconstruction is misplaced, there is no doubt that this orientation has become much more strongly foregrounded in his work over the past ten years or so. This is particularly evident in "Force of Law" (1992), *Specters of Marx* (1993), *Politics of Friendship* (1994), and *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas* (1997).

To summarize crudely, thinking of "Force of Law" and *Specters of Marx*, one might now say that what remains *undeconstructable* in any deconstruction is *justice*. One of the tasks of any proposed rapprochement between Derrida and Habermas would be to compare the meaning of justice in both of their projects, and specifically the relation between justice and law. As I see it, justice in Derrida's work is a moment of *formal universality*, a context-transcendent idealization in Habermasian terms. Very importantly, the formal universality of justice is not a regulative principle like the Moral Law in Kant, but is rather the making explicit or formalization of what is implicit in communicative action, in Habermas's terms, or the performative structure of speech acts, in terms closer to Derrida's. I will return to this point later in my remarks. Furthermore – and this is a central point for discussion – this formal universality of justice entails a commitment to a specific political form of society, namely democracy, or what

Derrida calls *la démocratie à venir*, the meaning of which I will try and clarify below. An open question would concern the possible agreement or disagreement between *la démocratie à venir* and Habermas's procedural conception of democracy discussed, say, in "Three Normative Models of Democracy."

As can be seen from certain passages from *Politics of Friendship*, such an investigation of democracy and democratic reason is linked to a certain understanding of the project of Enlightenment, as Derrida remarks with seeming implicit reference to Habermas: "For us there is no Enlightenment other than the one to be thought."[1] One might say that for Derrida, as for Habermas, modernity is understood as the realization – and, moreover, the *deformed* realization – of Enlightenment in history, and is therefore an *incomplete* project, although the nature of this incompletion is undoubtedly approached differently in their writings. To my mind, this commitment to an Enlightenment "to be thought" explains why Derrida can quite consistently state, as he does in "Force of Law," that "Nothing seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal."[2] A further open question for discussion concerns the relation between political action and social emancipation, i.e., what forms of political organization and intervention might be more adequate to the goal of social emancipation, which is something that Derrida expresses in *Specters of Marx* with the notion of "The New International."

So, pulling these initial thoughts together, we might say that Derrida's work is oriented around the quasi-normative axis of an emancipatory, democratic politics, based in the undeconstructible, context-transcendent, formal universality of justice. *Kurz gesagt*, Derrida sounds like Habermas, doesn't he? In a debate with Axel Honneth from 1994, I even jokingly suggested that they might get married.[3] Now, this is doubtless going too far too fast, but in the future we might at the very least be able to imagine a peaceful cohabitation, where they would occupy separate apartments in the same intellectual building, perhaps with a connecting door or two.

Before exploring two areas of possible agreement and disagreement, that I offer simply as a way of opening the discussion, two obvious and significant methodological differences between Habermas and Derrida might be noted.

1. I imagine that Derrida would be rather skeptical about the avowedly *post-metaphysical* orientation of Habermas's work, where all matters must be either empirically or normatively justified. To my mind, deconstruction is a genealogical operation animated by a thought of *heritage*, and the metaphysical tradition is an essential part of that heritage, even when – and arguably most importantly when – that tradition is being deconstructed. This is something admirably demonstrated in the intricate historical analyses of a text like *Politics of Friendship*. Such a conception of heritage, where the very historicity of history emerges as a potentiality or possibility out of a reactivated (Husserl) or destroyed (Heidegger) tradition, is also, for Derrida, the condition

of possibility for the present and future of philosophical thinking. From this perspective, therefore, the notion of the post-metaphysical would be doubtful because it risks throwing out the philosophical baby with the metaphysical bathwater.

2. Related to this first point, one would have to note the significant difference between Derrida's approach and that of Habermas and the entire Frankfurt School tradition, as concerns the understanding of the relation of philosophy to the social sciences. Adopting a Frankfurt School position on the necessary interdependence of philosophical and sociological reflection could lead to the perhaps justifiable criticism of Derrida, namely that his work is *too exclusively philosophical*, and belongs to what Horkheimer would call traditional rather than critical theory. That is, although it is not right to claim, as Habermas does in the *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, that Derrida reduces society, politics, and history to the status of the ontic, it is possible to argue that his theoretical categories lack sufficient sociological mediation insofar as they are derived too directly from an engagement with tradition conceived in exclusively metaphysical or logocentric terms.

For the remainder of my remarks, I would like briefly to outline two areas of more substantive agreement and disagreement between Habermas and Derrida. First, the question of intersubjectivity (a term that Derrida deliberately avoids) or the relation to the other; second, the question of the relation of ethics to politics in Derrida. I will conclude with some clarification of Derrida's use of the concept of democracy.

Intersubjectivity, the Relation to the Other (Symmetry versus Asymmetry)

So, both Habermas and Derrida are committed to an ideal of emancipation, but they are both anti-utopian thinkers.[4] This anti-utopianism is grounded in a certain understanding of the relation to the other, for Derrida, or intersubjectivity, for Habermas. For Habermas, the context-transcendent idealizations at the basis of discourse ethics are based in a formal or universal pragmatics of communication. Now, although this might *prima facie* seem an odd claim to make, I wonder whether there is something similar going on in Derrida's work. I think this can be brought out if we look at Derrida's comments on the concept of the messianic as an a priori structure that, as he puts it, "belongs to all language," as that promisory, performative, or illocutionary dimension to our speech acts, which, as he describes it in an interview, is "the universal dimension of experience."[5] In his "Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism," Derrida says (although it should be pointed out that this was an improvised reply to Richard Rorty and not a written text):

> There is no language without the performative dimension of the promise, the minute I open my mouth I am in the promise. Even if I say that 'I don't believe in truth' or

whatever, the minute I open my mouth there is a 'believe me' in play. And this 'I promise you that I am speaking the truth' is a messianic a priori, a promise which, even if it is not kept, even if one knows that it cannot be kept, takes place and *qua* promise is messianic.[6]

Derrida's discussion of the promise as that illocutionary dimension of speech acts whose denial would lead one into a performative contradiction has obvious Habermasian echoes. And despite Habermas's moral cognitivism and his insistence upon the symmetrical nature of intersubjectivity, it is clear at the very least that there is work to be done here and that possibly Habermas and Derrida share more with each other than they share with, say, Rorty, especially when it comes to political matters.

But if there is a similar and surprising proximity between Habermas and Derrida about the formal pragmatics of language, then in what does their difference consist? This brings me to the question of the symmetrical or asymmetrical nature of what is revealed in linguistic practice. Let me sketch Derrida's position with another quote from his "Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism," where he takes up the question of the need for *infinite responsibility*:

> I believe that we cannot give up on the concept of infinite responsibility, as Rorty seemed to do in his remarks, when he spoke of Levinas as a blind spot in my work. I would say, for Levinas and for myself, that if you give up the infinitude of responsibility, there is no responsibility. It is because we act and we live in infinitude that the responsibility with regard to the other is irreducible. If responsibility was not infinite, if every time that I have to take an ethical or political decision with regard to the other this was not infinite, then I would not be able to engage myself in an infinite debt with regard to each singularity. I owe myself infinitely to each and every singularity. If responsibility was not infinite, you could not have moral and political problems. There are only moral and political problems, and everything that follows from this, from the moment when responsibility is not limitable.[7]

To summarize very rapidly: to my mind the above passage describes something like the ethical (or quasi- or proto-ethical, if you are squeamish) moment in deconstruction. It is an experience of infinite responsibility, which can be qualified as undeconstructible, unconditional, a priori, and universal. However, infinite responsibility only arises within the context of a singular experience, that is, within the empirical event of a concrete speech act, the performative dimension of the promise.

However – and here we perhaps begin to see the limits to any rapprochement with Habermas – what takes place in the concrete linguistic event of the promise is a relation to an other, what Derrida calls a singularity, which is an experience of *infinite indebtedness*. Thus, the messianic a priori describes the structure of intersubjectivity in terms of an *asymmetrical* obligation that I could never meet, to which I would never be equal. Turning to Habermas, and thinking of "Three Normative

Models of Democracy," one wonders whether Derrida's emphasis on asymmetry and infinite responsibility would, for Habermas, suffer from a version of "the ethical overload" problem that he criticizes in the republican model of democracy.[8] Does not infinite responsibility entail an ethical overload? To which Derrida might respond that ethics is always – and rightly – an experience of overload.

But let me try and clarify Habermas's position a little. Habermasian discourse ethics stands in the Kantian tradition of moral philosophy. However, unlike Kant, Habermas's understanding of morality does not begin from the individuality of Kantian moral self-consciousness, but rather from the recognition of the intersubjective constitution of moral norms and their embeddedness in shared forms of communicative praxis (thereby defusing the Hegelian critique of Kant). But, what Habermas shares with the Kantian tradition is the belief that the *de facto* incommensurability of values or pluralism about the nature of the good life in social modernity entails that moral theory cannot recommend particular values or a single account of the good life. As such, discourse ethics only claims to provide a *procedure* for moral argumentation; that is, a theory of justice capable of legitimating and testing moral norms and resolving the possible conflicts between them. Such a revised version of the Kantian categorical imperative procedure necessarily begins from the premise of *equality*, of the equal treatment of all human beings. Thus, the Habermasian picture of intersubjectivity and the conception of justice connected to that picture is rooted in equality, reciprocity, mutuality, and symmetry.

So, it would seem that despite the formal universality and context-transcendent unconditionality that, on my reading, define both Habermas's and Derrida's approaches to the question of justice, there is a straightforward disagreement about the right picture of intersubjectivity or the relation to the other: symmetry in Habermas, asymmetry in Derrida. I would simply like to know how they view this issue. How do they both see the relation between the symmetrical and asymmetrical descriptions of intersubjectivity? Are they mutually exclusive, or could they supplement each other in an unexpected way?

With regard to the option raised by this last question, it has been argued by Axel Honneth that the symmetrical structure of intersubjectivity within Habermasian discourse ethics requires an additional moment of asymmetry. This is something that, for Honneth, can be achieved either through Winnicottian object-relations psychoanalysis or through a certain reading of Derrida and Levinas in terms of an ethics of care. For Honneth, such an ethics of care articulates a moral counterpoint to Habermasian discourse ethics and shows that the experience of asymmetry and inequality must be granted a place in moral discourse if the goal of solidarity is not to remain an empty abstraction.[9]

A final thought in this connection: is the moment of asymmetry really absent from Habermas's work? At the end of the first appendix to *Between Facts and Norms*, Habermas writes, just after an allusion to Benjamin's notion of anamnesic solidarity with the dead of history:

> The fact that everyday affairs are necessarily banalized in political communication also poses a danger for semantic potentials from which this communication must still draw its nourishment. A culture without thorns would be absorbed by mere needs for compensation . . . it settles over the risk society like a foam carpet. No civil religion, however cleverly adjusted, could forestall this entropy of meaning. Even the moment of unconditionality insistently voiced in the transcending validity claims of everyday life does not suffice. *Another* kind of transcendence is preserved in the unfulfilled promise disclosed by the critical appropriation of identity-forming religious traditions, and *still another* in the negativity of modern art. The trivial and everyday must be open to the shock of what is absolutely strange, cryptic, or uncanny. Though these no longer provide a cover for privileges, they refuse to be assimilated to pregiven categories.[10]

This is a remarkable passage, where Habermas admits that another dimension of transcendence is required in order to supplement the transcending validity claims of discourse ethics. However, this transcendence of the strange, the cryptic, and the uncanny is a description of both aesthetic modernism (one inevitably thinks of Adorno) and religious transcendence. The question is: would the asymmetrical understanding of the relation to the other always be an aestheticizing or quasi-religious conception for Habermas? There is at least a question here, a question that is also provoked by Derrida's qualified use of Benjamin's notion of the messianic in recent writings, and also by his measured proximity to Levinas (I emphasize *measured*). So, keeping all of these thoughts in mind, let's go back to the framing question and ask – or suggest – whether both the symmetrical and asymmetrical dimensions of intersubjectivity are required in order to provide orientation in our moral and political lives? If so, then how? If not, then why not?

Ethics and Politics

Let me now turn to the second area of possible agreement or disagreement: the question of the relation of ethics to politics. In order to try and clarify what is at stake here, let me go back to Derrida's above-cited remark about infinite responsibility. It is on the basis of this undeconstructible infinite responsibility that one is propelled into moral and political problems, into the realm of decision. It is important to point out here that, for Derrida, the notion of the undeconstructible – justice, the messianic a priori, infinite responsibility – does not function as it does in the Kantian tradition that inspires Habermas, namely as the basis for a decision *procedure* in ethics, a categorical imperative mechanism in the light of which one might propose and test specific maxims. It remains for me an open question as to whether Derrida is justified in this suspicion of proceduralism, particularly as it seems to remove the possibility of *deliberation* from the taking of political decisions.

Be that as it may, let me try to clarify the relation of ethics to politics in Derrida by taking up the problem of foundationalism. I will do this in six argumentative

steps, each of which might be seen as articulating a question to Habermas, although there would seem to be a basic agreement between Habermas and Derrida on the need to separate their conceptions of justice from any accusation of foundationalism.

1. For Derrida, it would seem, politics cannot be founded because such a foundation would limit the freedom of the decision. In politics there are no guarantees. Politics must be open to the dimension of the "perhaps" or the "maybe" which is the constant refrain of the early and central chapters of *Politics of Friendship.* For Derrida, nothing would be more irresponsible and totalitarian than the attempt *a priori* to exclude the monstrous or the terrible.[11] He writes: "Without the possibility of radical evil, of perjury, and of absolute crime, there is no responsibility, no freedom, no decision."[12]

2. So the relation of ethics to politics is that there is a gap or hiatus between these two domains. And here we confront a crucial qualification of the problem of ethics and politics: if politics is not founded in the classical manner, *then it is also not arbitrary*, for this would take us back to some *libertas arbitrarium* and its concomitant voluntaristic and sovereign conception of the will. That is, it would lead us back to an undeconstructed Schmittianism. One of the main burdens of the argument of *Politics of Friendship* is to try and think the notion of the decision outside of its traditional voluntaristic determination, for example in Schmitt, where the possibility of the decision presupposes the existence of the sovereign subject, defined in terms of activity, freedom and the will.

3. To summarize the first two steps of the argument in a question: if politics is neither foundational (because that would limit freedom) nor arbitrary (because that would derive from a conception of freedom), then what follows from this? How does one think a non-foundational and yet non-arbitrary relation between ethics and politics? Derrida's claim would seem to be that there is indeed a link between ethics and politics. In *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas*, Derrida puts the point more strongly, claiming that, "*This relation is necessary (il faut ce rapport)*, it must exist, it is necessary to deduce a politics and a law from ethics."[13] Derrida tries, against Schmitt, to capture this sense of a non-foundational, yet non-arbitrary, relation between ethics and politics with the notion of *the other's decision in me*, a decision that is taken, but with regard to which I am passive.[14] That is to say, on my reading, particular political decisions are taken in relation to the formal universality of an ethical criterion: infinite responsibility to the other, justice, the messianic a priori.

4. Politics, then, is the task of *invention* in relation to the other's decision in me – non-foundationally and non-arbitrarily. But how does one do this exactly? Perhaps in the following way: in a quite banal sense, each decision is necessarily different. Every time I decide, I have to invent a new rule, a new norm, which must be absolutely singular in relation to both the other's infinite demand made on me and the finite context within which this demand arises. I think this is what Derrida means, in "Force of Law" and elsewhere, by his

qualified Kierkegaardian emphasis on the madness of the decision, namely that each decision is like a leap of faith made in relation to the singularity of a context. Such a position might be linked to one of Wittgenstein's more cryptic remarks in the *Philosophical Investigations,* where he writes that in following a rule, "It would almost be more correct to say, not that an intuition was needed at every stage, but that a new decision was needed at every stage."[15]

5. So, the political decision is made, experientially as it were, *ex nihilo*, and is not deduced or read off procedurally from a pre-given conception of justice or the moral law, and yet it is not arbitrary. It is the demand provoked by the other's decision in me that calls forth political invention, that provokes me into inventing a norm and taking a decision. The *singularity* of the context in which the demand arises provokes an act of invention whose criterion is *universal.*

6. So, to summarize, what we seem to have here is a relation between ethics and politics which is both non-foundational and non-arbitrary, that is, which leaves the decision open for invention while acknowledging that the decision comes from the other. The other's decision in me is not so much a Kantian *Faktum der Vernunft* as what one might call a *Faktum des Anderen*. If the "fact of reason" is the demand of the good that must, for Kant, be consistent with the principle of autonomy, then the "fact of the other" would be the demand of the good experienced as the heteronomous opening of autonomy, the heteronomous ethical source for autonomous political action (which does not at all mean that autonomy is abandoned).

   To conclude: there is a universal criterion for action, but I am passive in relation to this criterion, I have a non-subsumptive relation to this *Faktum*, and the specific form of political action and decision-taking must be singular and context-dependent.

For Derrida, what has to be continually deconstructed in political thinking is the guarantee of a full *incarnation* of the universal in the particular, or the privileging of a specific particularity because it *embodies* the universal; for example, the classical idea of the state. However, it is hugely important to point out that Derrida does not make this move in order to avoid concrete political issues, that is, questions of the specific content of political decisions, but on the contrary to *defend* what he has elsewhere called in relation to Marx, "The New International"; that is, a non-state-based form of internationalist political intervention. In response to the Leninesque question that Derrida raises in his reading of Blanchot in *Politics of Friendship*, "Que faire?,"[16] we might say that what is required is, as Derrida writes, "another international law, another politics of frontiers, another humanitarian politics, even a humanitarian engagement that would hold itself *effectively* outside the interest of nation states."[17] Another interesting area of discussion between Derrida and Habermas would be around the necessity for the state-form in our political thinking, where Habermas, in *Between Facts and Norms*, has defended the notion of the constitutional state.

Democracy-to-come

Let me close by trying to clarify the theme of democracy in Derrida's work, specifically what Derrida calls *la démocratie à venir,* "democracy-to-come." On the last page of *Politics of Friendship*, Derrida concludes with the following question, which picks up the discussion of the problem of foundationalism. He writes:

> If one wishes to retranslate this pledge into a hypothesis or a question, it would, then, perhaps, – by way of a temporary conclusion – take the following form: is it possible to think and to implement democracy, that which would keep the old name 'democracy', while uprooting from it all these figures of friendship (philosophical and religious) which prescribe fraternity: the family and the androcentric ethnic group? Is it possible, in assuming a certain faithful memory of democratic reason and reason *tout court* – I would even say, the Enlightenment of a certain *Aufklärung* (thus leaving open the abyss which is again opening today under these words) – not to found, where it is no longer a matter of *founding*, but to open out to the future, or rather, to the "come," of a certain democracy (*non pas de fonder, là où il ne s'agit sans doute plus de* fonder*, mais d'ouvrir à l'avenir, ou plutôt au 'viens' d'une certaine démocratie*').[18]

Of course, these are rhetorical questions in the best French style and the answer is "*oui*." As Derrida admits a few lines further on, this is "*Juste une question, mais qui suppose une affirmation*" ("Just a question, but one that presupposes an affirmation"). The affirmation here is that of "democracy-to-come," but my question is: *how* might such a notion of democracy be understood?

"Democracy-to-come" is much easier to describe in negative rather than positive terms. Recalling the deconstruction of the idea of presence in his earlier work, Derrida is particularly anxious to distinguish democracy-to-come from any idea of a *future* democracy, where the future would be a modality of presence, namely the not-yet-present. Democracy-to-come is *not* to be confused with the living present of liberal democracy, lauded as the end of history by Fukuyama, but *neither* is it a regulative idea or an idea in the Kantian sense; *nor* is it even a utopia, insofar as all these conceptions understand the future as a modality of presence. For Derrida, and this is something particularly clear in *Specters of Marx*, it is a question of linking democracy-to-come to the messianic experience of the *here and now (l'ici-maintentant)* without which justice would be meaningless. Namely, what was described above as "the universal dimension of experience" that "belongs to all language." So, the thought here is that the experience of justice as the here and now *is* the *à venir* of democracy. In other words, the temporality of democracy is *advent*, it is futural, but it is arrival happening *now*, it happens – and one thinks of Benjamin – as the messianic now blasting through the continuum of the present.

Democracy-to-come is a difficult notion to get hold of because it has a deliberately contradictory structure: that is, it has both the structure of a promise, of something futural "to come," and it is something that takes place, that happens

right *now*. In terms that Derrida uses in "Force of Law," democracy-to-come has the character of "the incalculable," an irreducible *Faktum* or remainder that cannot simply become the source of a deduction, or the object of a determinate judgment. As such, I think, democracy-to-come has the character of an ethical demand or injunction, an incalculable fact that takes place now, but which permits the profile of a promisory task to be glimpsed.

Finally, and this is a step that Derrida suggests but does not really take, it would be a question of thinking the ethical imperative of democracy-to-come together with more concrete forms of democratic political deliberation, action, and intervention: the very political stuff of democratic life.[19] But for me, democracy should not be understood as a fixed political form of society, but rather as a process or, better, processes of *democratization*. Such processes of democratization, evidenced in numerous examples (the new social movements, NGOs, Greenpeace, Amnesty International, *médecins sans frontières*, the battle in Seattle), work within, across, above, beneath, and within the territory of the democratic state, not in the vain hope of achieving some sort of "society without the state," but rather as providing constant critical pressure upon the state, a pressure of emancipatory intent aiming at its infinite amelioration, the endless betterment of actually existing democracy.[20]

NOTES

* A word on the context for these remarks. They were initially prepared, at the invitation of Axel Honneth, for a meeting between Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas that was scheduled to take place at the Institute for Social Research, Frankfurt in February 1999, and then rescheduled for April 1999. Sadly, the meeting was postponed on both occasions due to illness. It finally took place at the Suhrkamp Haus in Frankfurt on June 24, 2000, where a version of this paper was delivered. The remarks were therefore drafted simply as an informal way of opening the discussion between Derrida and Habermas and should be read in that light. A French version was delivered at a conference in Paris in June 1999, to which Jacques Derrida responded. I would like to thank Nancy Fraser, Bernard Flynn, and others for their helpful responses on that occasion.

1. Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, tr. G. Collins (London & New York: Verso, 1997), 42, cf. 43, 305–6.

2. Derrida, "The Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority,'" in D. Cornell et al., eds., *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice* (London & New York: Routledge, 1992), 28.

3. "Habermas und Derrida werden verheiratet: Antwort auf Axel Honneth," *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 42, no. 6 (1994): 981–92.

4. For Derrida's suspicions of utopia, see his "Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism," in Chantal Mouffe, ed., *Deconstruction and Pragmatism* (London & New York: Routledge, 1996), 82–83.

5. Derrida, "The Deconstruction of Actuality," *Radical Philosophy* 68 (1994): 36.

6. Derrida, "Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism," 82.

7. Ibid., 86.

8. Habermas, "Three Normative Models of Democracy," *Constellations* 1, no.1 (1994): 3.

9. Axel Honneth, "The Other of Justice: Habermas and the Challenge of Postmodernism," in *The Cambridge Companion to Habermas*, ed. Stephen White (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 288–323.

10. Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, tr. W. Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 490.

11. Derrida, *Adieu à Emmanuel Levinas* (Paris: Galilée, 1997), 201.

12. Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, 219.

13. Derrida, *Adieu à Emmanuel Levinas*, 198.

14. Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, 67–70.

15. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* tr. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), 186.

16. Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, 217.

17. Derrida, *Adieu à Emmanuel Levinas*, 176.

18. *Politics of Friendship,* 306.

19. For a Habermasian account of deliberation, see chs. 9 & 10 of *The Inclusion of the Other* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).

20. A more detailed and scholarly presentation of many of the arguments in this text can be found in my *Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity* (London & New York: Verso, 1999). Those wishing to explore the relation between Derrida and Habermas would do well to look at the following two exemplary articles: Richard Rorty, "Habermas, Derrida and Functions of Philosophy," in *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers Volume 3* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) and Richard J. Bernstein, "An Allegory of 'Modernity/Postmodernity': Habermas and Derrida," in *The New Constellation* (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), 199–229.