

# KANT

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## AND

# HUSSERL

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**THE GOAL** of this study is to place with some exactitude the opposition between the phenomenology of Husserl and the Kantian Critique in the light of the great works devoted to Kant (and particularly to his metaphysics) in the last twenty years, and after a more complete reading of the published and unpublished works of Husserl.

I would like to show that this opposition is not located where the neo-Kantians (who have done a critique of the *Ideen*)<sup>1</sup> thought it was. This critique is still based on an interpretation of Kant that is too epistemological. The opposition ought to be located not on the level of the exploration of the world

of phenomena, but on the level where Kant determines the ontological status of the phenomena themselves.

1. First, using Husserl as guide, we shall notice behind the Kantian epistemology an *implicit phenomenology*, of which Husserl will be in some sense the revealer. In this sense Husserl *continues* something which was obstructed in Kantianism and kept in an embryonic state — although it was necessary to its general economy.

2. Then, taking Kant as guide and taking Kant's ontological scheme seriously, we shall ask ourselves if the phenomenology of Husserl does not represent both the flowering of an implicit

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phenomenology in Kant and the destruction of a problematic of Being which had its expression in the role of limit and of the foundation of the thing in itself. We can ask ourselves if the loss of the ontological dimension of the object as phenomenon is not common to Husserl and to his neo-Kantian critics of the beginning of this century. This would be the reason they located the debate on the sidelines.

We shall therefore be led to reinterpret Husserlian idealism guided by this sense of limit which is perhaps the soul of Kantian philosophy.

3. Since the process of de-ontologization of the object leads Husserl to a crisis of his own philosophy, to a critical point which he himself calls transcendental solipsism, we shall ask ourselves if it is possible to overcome this difficulty and to arrive at intersubjectivity without the help of a practical philosophy in the Kantian style. This time, to the embarrassment of Husserl in the constitution of the *alter ego*, we shall come back again at a later time to Kantianism in order to seek there the ethical and practical determination of the person.

# I THE "CRITIQUE" AS IMPLICIT PHENOMENOLOGY

Since, first, Husserl is to serve as guide to bring to light an implicit phenomenology in Kantianism, it is necessary to say, in at least a few words, what characteristics of Husserl's phenomenology we hold essential in this work of disclosure.

1. I insist first of all, with considerable force, on the necessity of distinguishing in Husserl the *method* that he effectively practiced and the philosophical interpretation of this method which he developed especially in *Ideen I* and in the *Cartesian Meditations*. This

distinction will receive its full meaning when the Kantian philosophy of limit will in turn have opened to us the metaphysical decision implicit in Husserlian phenomenology.

In distinguishing the method practiced and the philosophical interpretation of the method, I by no means intend to reject off hand the philosophical interpretation of the famous phenomenological reduction. This would be to transform phenomenology into a rhapsody of lived experiences and to baptize as phenomenology all complacency toward the curiosities of human life, as happens all too often. The reduction is the narrow gate to phenomenology. But it is in this very act that a methodological conversion and a metaphysical decision cross each other. It is there in this very act that they must be distinguished.

In its strictly methodological intention the reduction is a conversion which causes the "for me" of every ontic position to arise; whether the being be a thing, a state of affairs, a value, an animate being, or a person, the *ἐποχή* "reduces" it to its appearance. A conversion is necessary because the "for me" is at first concealed by the very positing of a being. This concealed positing that Husserl calls the natural attitude (or the general thesis of the world) is itself concealed from reflection. This is why a special ascesis is necessary in order to break its charm. Without doubt one can only speak in negative terms of this "natural thesis" because its sense only appears in reducing it. It will be said then it is not the belief in the existence of it, still less the intuition of it, since the reduction leaves intact this believing and discloses the "seeing" in all its glory. It is rather an operation which interferes with intuition and believing to the point that it omits itself in the ontic positing of this or that.

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This is why the natural attitude is a restriction and a limitation. In turn, the "reduction," in spite of its negative appearance, is the reconquest of the total rapport of the Ego to its world. In a positive way the "reduction" becomes the "constitution" of the world for and in the experience of consciousness.

We have said enough to outline the distinction between method and doctrine which will become clear only after the Kantian ontology has opened our eyes to a problematic other than that of the reduction.

The act of reduction discovers the relativity of what appears to operative consciousness. This relativity defines the phenomenon very precisely. Nevertheless, *for* phenomenology anything is meaningful only in consciousness. Phenomenology wants to be the science of phenomena rigorously gained in the positing of being.

Is everything problematic of Being annulled by the reduction? In order to affirm this, it is necessary to decide whether the problematic of Being was wholly contained in the natural attitude, that is in the positing of each being absolutely without relation to a consciousness. It must be admitted that Husserl never tried to clarify this question. Thus, our duty is to reserve entirely the question of knowing whether the arising of the "for me" of all things, (given the thematization of the world as phenomenon) exhausts completely the question that can still be posed concerning the Being of what appears. My feeling is that the method practiced by Husserl leaves this question untouched. I will further state that the natural attitude is simultaneously the concealment of the *appearance-for-me* of the world and the concealment of *the being of the appearance*. If the natural attitude loses me to the world and takes me into the world as seen, felt, acted, its in-itself

is the false in-itself of an existence without me. This in-itself is nothing but the absolutizing of the ontic, of the "this" of "beings." "Nature is" — there is the naturalistic thesis. In putting an end to this omission of the subject, in discovering the for-me of the world, the "reduction" has opened and not closed my view to the true problematic of Being, because this problematic presupposes the acquisition of a subjectivity. It implies the reconquest of the subject, that being to whom Being opens itself.

2. The phenomenological reduction, which has thus caused the phenomenon of the world to arise as the very meaning of consciousness, is the key that opens the way to an original "experience": the experience of "lived experience" in its "stream of consciousness." The *Ideen* calls it an "immanent perception"; the *Cartesian Meditations* call it a "transcendental experience," which, like all experience, derives its validity from its intuitive character — from the degree of the presence and fullness of its object. The Jamesian echo of the words "lived experience," "stream of consciousness," ought not to mislead us. The accent is fundamentally Cartesian. Whereas the perception of the transcendent thing is always dubitable, because it is caught in the flux of silhouettes and profiles, which can always cease to harmonize in a unity of meaning, the experience of consciousness *schattet sich nicht ab*; it does not appear "in profile" — it is not perceived in successive facets. Phenomenology rests therefore on an absolute perception, which is not only indubitable but apodictic (in the sense that it is inconceivable that its object, lived experience, not be).

Is this to say that phenomenology is a new empiricism, a new phenomenalism? It is here that it is important to recall that Husserl never separated the

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transcendental reduction from that other reduction which he called *eidetic*, which consists in grasping the fact in its essence (*Eidos*). The Ego that the *ἐποχή* reveals, as that to which all things appear, ought not to be described in its fortuitous singularity but as *Eidos-Ego* (*Cartesian Meditations*). This change of plan, principally obtained by the method of imaginative variations, makes a *science* out of "transcendental experience."

It is by virtue of (1) the *reduction* of the being to phenomenon and (2) the descriptive *experience* of lived experience in the eidetic mode that the phenomenology of Husserl can serve as a guide in the work of Kant. Kant himself gives us this authorization. In the letter to Marcus Herz of February 21, 1772, he announces that the great work which he projects on the *Limits of Sensibility and Reason* would include in its theoretical part two sections: (1) phenomenology in general, and (2) metaphysics considered uniquely in its nature and in its method.

However, the *Critique* is not called a phenomenology and is not properly speaking a phenomenology. Why?

1. This question permits us to relate the *Critique* to the "reduction."

Two reasons can be given: the first is that what we will find in the second part refers to this philosophy of *limits*—which in the *Critique* holds as much a place as the investigation of the domain of the phenomena itself.

Evoking in the Preface to the second edition the "revolution" performed by the *Critique* in the method of metaphysics, Kant declares: *Sie ist ein Traktat von der Methode, nicht ein System der Wissenschaft selbst; aber sie verzeichnet gleichwohl den ganzen Umriss derselben, sowohl in Ansehung ihrer Grenzen, als auch des ganzen inneren Gliederbaus derselben* (B XXII-XXIII).<sup>3</sup>

"It is a treatise on the method, not a system of the science itself. But at the same time it marks out the whole plan of science, both as regards its limits and as regards its entire internal structure."<sup>3</sup>

The two designs of the *Critique* are here clearly posed: to limit the phenomenon and to elucidate its internal structure. It is this second task which could be phenomenological.

That reason is not enough of a reason, for the elucidation of the internal structure of phenomenality is not conducted in the style of a phenomenology. It is necessary to put in question here the properly epistemological concern of the *critique*. The fundamental question: "how synthetic *a priori* judgments are possible" hinders a true description of experience. The problem *de jure*, which manifests itself in the first schema in the *Transcendental Deduction*, crushes the intention of composing a true physiology of *Gemüt*. It is less concerned to describe how mind knows than to *justify* the universality of knowing by the function of the synthesis of the categories and finally by the function of the unity of transcendental apperception. The three correlative notions of nature, experience and objectivity bear the marks of this epistemological concern. Nature, defined (to a certain degree phenomenologically) as "the totality of all phenomena," becomes in epistemological style "nature in general considered as conformity to law" (*Gesetzmässigkeit*). And since nature is the correlate of experience, the *Gesetzmässigkeit* of nature is identical with the *conditions of the possibility* of experience itself. The *Critique*, in its epistemological task, will look for some *a priori* concept making possible the "formal unity of experience" or else "the form of an experience in general." It is in this framework that the problem of objectivity is posed: it is the value of knowing conferred on

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empirical knowledge by its *Gesetzmässigkeit*.

That is just the point. The *Critique* does not close on a purely epistemological determination of objectivity, in other words, on a justification of constituted knowing (mathematical, physical, metaphysical). The *Analytic* goes beyond the purposes of Newtonian physics, and the *Aesthetic* beyond that of Euclidean and even non-Euclidean geometry. It is in this latitude with which the *Critique* exceeds a simple epistemology that there is a chance of finding the beginning of a true phenomenology.

The Copernican revolution, disengaged from hypothetical epistemology, is nothing else than the phenomenological *ἐποχή*; it constitutes a vast reduction which not only goes from constituted sciences, from knowledge which has succeeded to its conditions of legitimacy, it goes from the totality of appearance to its conditions of *constitution*. This descriptive scheme, enveloped in the vindictory scheme of the *Critique*, appears whenever Kant surrenders all claims to support from an established science and directly defines what he calls receptivity, spontaneity, synthesis, subsumption, production, reproduction etc. . . . These embryonic descriptions, often masked in definitions, are necessary to the epistemological enterprise itself, because the *a priori*, which constitutes the formal determinations of all knowledge, is itself rooted in acts, operations, and functions, the description of which largely overlaps the strict domain of the sciences. Can it be said then that the *Critique* involves a "transcendental experience"?

2. This transcendental experience, which discloses itself to the phenomenologist beyond the threshold of the phenomenological reduction, at first seems totally foreign to the genius of Kantian-

ism. The very idea of an "experience" of the Cogito — is it not, for a Kantian, a sort of monster? To regard and describe the Cogito — is it not to treat it as a phenomenon, therefore as an object in nature and not at all as the condition of the possibility of phenomena? Does not the combination of the transcendental reduction and the eidetic reduction repudiate Kant in a most decisive manner by a suspicious mixture of psychologism ("lived experience") and of Platonism (the Eidos-Ego)? Is this not the place to recall that the "I think" of the original apperception is in no way the self grasped in its Eidos and reduced to the function of the unity which supports the work of the synthesis of understanding? How, then, can "transcendental experience" escape from the dilemma: Either, I am "conscious" of the *I think*, but this is not knowledge, or I "know" the self, but is it a phenomenon of nature? As a matter of fact, this is the point made most effectively by Husserl's neo-Kantian critics.

We should recognize that the *Critique* opens a difficult way for itself out of this dilemma, which is purely on the epistemological plane: the "I think" and the "phenomenal self" are defined in terms of objective knowledge. But Kant in fact escapes this dilemma whenever he proceeds to a direct inspection of *Gemüt*. The very term *Gemüt*, so enigmatic, designates this "field of transcendental experience" that Husserl thematizes. It is not at all the "I think" guaranteeing epistemologically the unity of experience but what Husserl calls *Ego Cogito Cogitata*. In short, it is the theme of Kantian phenomenology itself, the theme that the "Copernican revolution" causes to arise. When it is not reduced to the *quaestio juris*, to the axiomatization of Newtonian physics, the revolution is nothing else

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than the reduction of beings to their appearance in *Gemüt*.

With this guide of a transcendental experience of *Gemüt* it is possible to recapture the features of a Kantian phenomenology.

The *Transcendental Aesthetic* is without doubt the least phenomenological part of the *Critique*. The description of the spatiality of the phenomenon — which Kant undertook only because of his concern with mathematics — is crushed between the epistemological concern of justifying, by the concept of pure intuition, the synthetic *a priori* judgments of geometry<sup>4</sup> and the characteristic constructibility of rational mathematics<sup>5</sup> on the one hand, and the ontological concern of exactly locating the being of space on the other hand.<sup>6</sup>

Nevertheless, a phenomenology of spatiality is implied at the moment that space is related to the *subjektiven Beschaffenheit unseres Gemüts* (A 23), (“to the subjective constitution of our mind”). Only this phenomenology can establish that the pure epistemological notion of a *a priori* intuition coincides with that of a “form having its seat in the subject.” Kant is led to describe space as the way in which a subject disposes itself to receive something before the appearance of something. “To render possible an external intuition” is a phenomenological determination far wider than “to render possible the synthetic *a priori* judgments of geometry.” It is no longer the possibility of the order of legitimation but of constitution, of the *Beschaffenheit unseres Gemüts*.

The *Transcendental Aesthetic* nevertheless remains very disappointing not only because of its embryonic but also because of its static character. Space and time are not considered in the movement of total experience but as a preliminary stratum achieved and in-

ert. This is understood once again through the weight of epistemology. For geometry, spatiality is not a stage in the constitution of the “thing,” its determination as pure intuition ought to end in itself in order to assure the complete autonomy of mathematics.

But as soon as Kant sets foot on phenomenological soil and relates space to the possibility of being affected by something, he is involved in the very movement of a dynamic constitution of experience and of thingness. Suddenly the provisional juxtaposition of space and time is put in question. Space ought to be “traversed” in temporal moments, “retained” in a total image and “recognized” as an identical sense (A 95 sq.). The schematization accentuates even more the dynamic character of the spatial constitution itself (A 137 sq.). This reconquest of space by time (“time is a necessary representation which serves as the foundation of all intuitions”) marks the triumph of phenomenology over epistemology.

Moreover, insofar as we dismiss from our concern the axiomatizing of geometry, everything that appeared clear in the epistemological order becomes obscure in the phenomenological order. If space is on the sensible level, we never think of anything in it, we merely dispose ourselves to receive something. But then we are beneath any synthesis and it is necessary to say that this form (epistemological) is a diverse one (phenomenological) (A 76-77). Kant even caught a glimpse of the fact that space concerns the status of a dependent being *seinem Dasein sowohl als seiner Anschauung nach* (die sein Dasein in Beziehung auf gegebene Objekte bestimmt) (B 72) “dependent in its existence as well as in its intuition, and which through that intuition determines its existence solely in relation to given objects.”

At one stroke he identifies space — either the formal property of being affected by objects or of receiving an immediate representation of things — with the intentionality of consciousness. This is the very movement of consciousness toward something considered as the possibility of displaying, discriminating, or pluralizing any impression whatsoever.

Thus the more explicit phenomenology of the *Analytic* dispels the false clarity of the *Aesthetic*, so weakly phenomenological.

The phenomenology of the *Analytic* is thrown into relief with evidence if one forces himself to read it to the end, while going back from the transcendental theory of judgment (or the *Analytic of Principles*) to the transcendental theory of the concept, and while lingering with the *Analogies of Experience* before plunging into the difficult chapter on the *Schematism* (that for reasons which will be discussed later). It is natural that Kant's phenomenology be primarily a phenomenology of judgment; that is most fitted to furnish a propaedeutic to epistemology. It is natural by contrast that Husserl's phenomenology be by preference a phenomenology of perception; that is most fitted for illustrating a source of evidence, of originality and of presence, although the *Logische Untersuchungen* begin with judgment and the place of judgment is marked in the stratifications of experience to the level of grounded syntheses.

(We shall see in the second part other explicit reasons for this difference of emphasis and of preference in the description between Kant and Husserl.) In any case, the difference of descriptive *theme* ought not to hide the relationship of the *method* of analysis.

If then we come to the *Analytic* at last, by way of the *Analogies of Experi-*

*ence*, we see developing an ample analysis of judgment as act of subsuming perceptions under the rules of intellectuality. Kant, the epistemologist, takes this operation for a simple "application" of the rules of the understanding previously constituted. But the importance of the description involves analysis in another sense: subsumption is revealed as being a true constitution of experience as experience understood, judged and expressed at the predicative level.

The *Principles*, which from the epistemological point of view are the axioms of a pure physics, the first synthetic *a priori* judgments of a science of nature, give birth to an admirable description of the constitution of *Dinglichkeit*. Beyond the principles of permanence, of production and of reciprocity, it is the intellectuality of the perceived which is thematized. And what is admirable is that, long before Husserl, Kant had tied the structures of *Dinglichkeit* to the structures of temporality; the different manners in which experience is "connected" are also the diverse ways which time structures itself intellectually. The second analogy in particular includes a veritable *phenomenology of the event* which answers the question, what does "to happen" mean? It is in the object in the world that the phenomenologist elaborates the notion of a regulated succession. In Husserlian language, it will be said that the *Analogies of Experience* develop the noematic of experience in the judgment of experience. They consider judgment from the side of the "judged" terminating in the object. (The preceding chapter on the *Schematism* raises, on the other hand, the noetic analysis of the "event" and reflects on the *operation* itself of the liaison as "synthetic power of the imagination" (B 233). We will return to it later.)

If one considers that chapter II of

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the doctrine of judgment, the heart of which is the theory of the Analogies of Experience, shows the noematic face of the judgment of experience, it will be understood that this noematic analysis is achieved in the Postulates of Empirical Thought in General." (A 218 sq.) These, in fact, supply no new determinations to the object but thematize its existence according to the modalities of the real, of the possible and of the necessary. Now what do these postulates signify? They simply pose the fundamental correlation of the existence of things and their perceptibility: *wo also Wahrnehmung und deren Anhang nach empirischen Gesetzen hinreicht, dahin reicht auch unsere Erkenntnis vom Dasein der Dinge* (A 226). "Our knowledge of the existence of things reaches, then, only so far as perception and its advance according to empirical laws can extend." Spatiality had furnished us the style of intentionality as an overture to appearance. The postulates of empirical thought determine the actuality of intentionality as perceived presence of the thing which appears.

It is not therefore by chance that Kant has inserted in this place in the second edition the Refutation of Idealism, which is a premature definition of intentionality: *das blosse, aber empirisch bestimmte, Bewusstsein meines eigenen Daseins beweist das Dasein der Gegenstände im Raum ausser mir* (B 275): "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me." The correlation of the "I am" and the "something is," is in fact intentionality itself.

But if the 2nd chapter of the *Transcendental Doctrine of Judgment* develops the noematic face of the judgment of existence, the 1st chapter devoted to the schematism develops the

noetic face of it. This is why it is so obscure. It continuously anticipates, by means of reflection, the *analogies of experience* which display in the object the work of judgment. Perhaps it is necessary to always read this chapter after following it and come back to it by a reflexive movement which finds again "in" the *Gemüt* what has been shown "in" the object. This is the character anticipated by this chapter which explains the brevity of Kant in the elaboration of the schemata. But these some one hundred lines (A 144-147) are like the subjective side of the immense noematic analysis of the following chapter.

If one considers it in this way, the theory of the schematism approaches what Husserl calls the auto-constitution or the constitution of the self in temporality. It is understood that Kant was himself astonished at this *verborgene Kunst in den Tiefen der menschlichen Seele, deren wahre Handgriffe wir der Natur schwerlich jemals abraten und sie unverdeckt vor Augen legen werden* (A 141), "art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover and to have open to our gaze." Never had Kant been freer in regard to his epistemological pre-occupations. Never had he been nearer to discovering the original time of consciousness beyond constituted time (or time as representation according to the *Transcendental Aesthetic*). The time of the schematism is at the junction of receptivity and spontaneity, of the manifold and unity. It is my power of ordering and the menace of always escaping and being defeated. It is jointly the possible rationality of order and the irrationality always springing up again of experience. It looks toward affection, of which it is the pure flux, and toward intellectuality, since the schema typify in it possible structuring with regard to



the "series," to "content," and to "order." (A 145)

If we follow this phenomenology of mind to the end, it is necessary to reconcile with this noetic analysis of the operation of judgment what Kant repeatedly was led to say of the existence of consciousness. If the noematic analysis culminates in the *Postulates of Empirical Thought*, which coordinate the existence of things to their perceptibility, the noetic analysis culminates in the auto-determination of the "I exist." But one finds only scattered notes on this in the *Critique*. It is here, in fact, that the implicit phenomenology encounters the most notable resistance at the very heart of Kantianism. Every epistemological conception of objectivity tends to make of the "I think" a function of this objectivity and imposes the alternative that we brought up at the beginning: either I lose "consciousness" of the "I think" — but I do not "know" it — or I "know" the self, but it is a phenomenon in nature. This is why phenomenological description tends toward the discovery of a concrete subject which has no tenable place in the system. Yet, Kant approaches it whenever he also approaches primary time as production in judgment by means of the schematism and also when he determines the existence of things as correlates of my existence. It is with reference to this that he declares: "*Ich bin mir meines Daseins als in der Zeit bestimmt bewusst* (B 275) . . . *folglich ist die Bestimmung meines Daseins in der Zeit nur durch die Existenz wirklicher Dinge, die ich ausser mir wahrnehme, möglich*" (B 275-276). "I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time . . . consequently the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of actual things which I perceive outside me." The same

thing is said in the Preface to the 2nd edition (B x 1). The immense difficulty was that of thematizing an existence which would not have been the category of existence, that is a structure of objectivity. It is first confronted at paragraph 25 of the 2nd edition (an existence which is not a phenomenon). The note that Kant adds there (B 158) proposes the task of grasping existence in the act of the *I think* which determines this existence, hence before the temporal intuition of myself which raises my existence to the level of a psychological phenomenon (B 157). The difficulty is immense, especially if one considers that the *I think* only passes to the act in the occasion of a manifold which it logically determines. One recalls especially the famous text in the critique of *Rational Psychology* in which the "I think" is considered as an empirical proposition which includes the proposition "I exist." Kant tries to resolve the problem in the framework of his epistemology by tying to it the existence of an "indeterminate empirical intuition" anterior to all organized experience. This permits him to say: *die Existenz ist hier noch keine Kategorie* (B 423); "the existence here (referred to) is not a category."

Is not this existence outside category subjectivity itself, without which the "I think" does not merit the title of the first person? Is it not in relation to this original time that the *Analytic* disengages itself beyond the time-representation of the *Aesthetic*?

In short, is it not the existence of the *Gemüt* — of this *Gemüt* which is neither the *I think* as principle of the possibility of the categories, not the self-phenomenon of psychological science — of this *Gemüt* offered to transcendental experience by the phenomenological reduction?

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## II

### THE "CRITIQUE" AS SURVEY OF LIMITS

Our first group of analyses rested on a temporary limitation: We have admitted that one could distinguish in Husserl the method effectively practiced from the philosophical interpretation that the author constantly blends with it, chiefly in the edited works. It is this effective phenomenology which has served to reveal to us an implicit phenomenology in the *Critique*. The kinship of Kant and of Husserl is therefore attained only at the price of a legitimate but precarious abstraction, practiced on the total intention of one and the other work.

But a critique is something different than phenomenology, not only in its epistemological preoccupation but also in its ontological intention. It is here that the *Critique* is more than a simple investigation of the "internal structure" of knowing; it is even more so an investigation of its limits. The rooting of the knowledge of phenomena in the thought of being, not convertible into knowing, gives to the Kantian *Critique* its properly ontological dimension. To destroy this tension between knowing and thinking, between the phenomenon and being, is to destroy Kantianism itself.

One could then wonder if the phenomenology of Husserl, which served as a guide and as a revealer for a descriptive phenomenology of Kantianism, ought not to be considered in turn from the point of view of Kantian ontology. Perhaps the philosophical interpretation which is mixed with the transcendental ἐποχή participates in the destruction of Kantian ontology and sanctions the loss of *Denken* in *Erkennen* and thus flattens philosophy into a phenomenology without ontology.

First, let us take up again the conscious positing of the function which the

in-itself exercises in Kant with reference to the survey of phenomena.

It is impossible to know Being. But this impossibility, which institutes a sort of disappointment at the heart of Kantianism, is itself essential to the final significance of the phenomenon. It is an impossibility in some active and even positive sense. In the face of this impossibility of knowing Being, *Denken* still posits *Being* as that which *limits* the pretension of the phenomenon to constitute ultimate reality. Thus *Denken* confers on phenomenology its standard or its ontological evaluation.

One can trace throughout the *Critique* this connection between a *disappointment* (with regard to knowledge) and a positive act of *limitation*.

As early as the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, where the ontological intention is constantly present, Kant supposes that *a priori* intuition is determined in contrast to a creative intuition which we do not have. The very important note of Kant on *intuitus originarius*, at the end of the *Aesthetic*, is clear: The *Gegen-stand* remains in front of me insofar as it is not the *Ent-stand*, which would arise out of its own intuition.<sup>7</sup> But this metaphysical disappointment is incorporated from the outset in the determination of the meaning of space and time and introduces a negative note on each page of the *Aesthetic*: "all our intuition is only the representation of the phenomenon; the things which we intuit are not in themselves such as we intuit them." The deficiency of the being of the phenomenon is in some way incorporated in it. But this absence is itself the reverse side of a positive act of *Denken*, which in the *Aesthetic* takes the fantastic form of a supposition — the supposition of the destruction of our intuition: "*Gehen wir von der subjektiven Bedingung ab. . . . so bedeutet die Vorstellung vom Rau-*

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me gar nichts" (A 26).<sup>8</sup> He states the same thing further on with reference to time (A 37). This nothingness makes possible part of the notion of transcendental ideality; space is nothing outside of the subjective condition (A 28). This incredible conception expresses the positive reality of this negative one: our lack of original intuition. This positive one is *Denken*, irreducible to our being affected, irreducible consequently to this "dependence" of man *seinem Dasein sowohl als seiner Anschauung nach* (B 72) "with regard to his existence and his intuition," that the end of the *Aesthetic* evokes. It is *Denken* which poses the limit.<sup>9</sup> It is not phenomenal knowledge which limits the use of the categories to experience, it is the positing of Being by *Denken* which limits the pretension of knowing the absolute. Knowledge, finitude, and death are thus tied by an indissoluble bond which is only recognized by the very act of *Denken*, which escapes this condition and considers it in some way external.

One would not be at a loss to show that this supposition of the *nothingness* of our sensible knowledge illuminates the constant affirmation of Kant that transcendental philosophy remains on the dividing line which separates "two faces" of the phenomenon (A 38), the in-itself and the for-us. "*Denn, das was uns notwendig über die Grenze der Erfahrung und aller Erscheinungen hinausgehen treibt, ist das Unbedingte, usw.* (B xx); "For what necessarily forces us to transcend the limits of experience and of all appearances is the *unconditioned*. . . ." It is the *unconditioned* which allows us to speak of things *sofern wir sie nicht kennen* (*Ibid.*), "insofar as we do not know them."

This limiting function of the in-itself finds a striking confirmation in the *Transcendental Analytic*. It completes the meaning of "nature." By indicating

the empty position of an impossible science of creation, it keeps the knowledge of phenomena of nature from ending in a dogmatic naturalism. This limiting function of the in-itself finds its most complete expression in the chapter on the *Distinction of the Objects in Phenomena and Noumena*. The concept of the in-itself, although "problematic" (from the point of view of knowing, but not doubly problematic, only non-contradictory, is necessary "*um die sinnliche Anschauung nicht bis über die Dinge an sich selbst auszudehnen* (A 254), "in order that intuition may not be extended to things in themselves." More clearly again: *Der Begriff eines Noumenon ist also bloss ein Grenzbe- griff, um die Anmassung der Sinnlichkeit einzuschränken, und also nur von negativem Gebrauche*" (A 255), "The concept of a noumenon is thus a merely *limiting concept*, the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility." There would be therefore a sort of *hybris* of sensibility: not, to be sure, of sensibility as such, but of the empirical use of the understanding, of the positive and positivistic praxis of the understanding.

This notion of the use of the categories is capital, for Kant distinguishes it expressly from the meaning of the categories (A 147, A 248). This distinction illuminates well what Kant understood by the presumption of sensibility. Kant says nothing else when he shows the vanity of this pretension by the play of the transcendental illusion and by the sanction of the stalemate (paralogisms and antinomies). It is not reason which is stranded in the *Transcendental Dialectic*, it is rather sensibility in its pretension of applying itself to things in themselves.<sup>10</sup>

If we can believe that this Kantian doctrine serves as a guide for us to in-

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interpret the implicit philosophy of Husserl, we must assure ourselves that Kant was indeed successful in harmonizing this function of limitation with the idealism of his theory of objectivity, as that is the extent of the jurisdiction of the *Transcendental Deduction*. Is objectivity reduced to a synthesis imposed upon multifarious sensibility by apperception by means of the categories? If this conception of objectivity as *production* of transcendental subjectivity is indeed the center of the *Transcendental Deduction*, how can it be expressed by another significance of the object as in itself? Occasionally, it seems, the word "object" can only designate "the collection of my representations," and the intellectual structure of experience is sufficient to detach my representations from myself and oppose them to me as an opposite (one knows the example of the house surveyed, apprehended and recognized) (A 190-1). In this sense the object is only the *Erscheinung im Gegenverhältnis mit den Vorstellungen der Apprehension* (A 191), "appearance in opposition to the representations of apprehension." By distinguishing the succession in the object from the succession of representations, *sofern man sich ihrer bewusst ist* (A 189), "as one is conscious of it," causality, in particular, consolidates the object of my own representations, in the opposite pole of consciousness. And one can speak of truth, that is, of the accord of the representation with its object, since by this process of the *objectivization* of representations there is *das davon unterscheidene Objekt derselben* (A 191), "the object of apprehension distinct from these representations." This constitution of the object in consciousness, as over against consciousness, does it not effectively anticipate Husserl?

Kant, however, does not at all doubt that what places the object radi-

cally outside is the thing in itself. The aim of the phenomenon beyond itself is the non-empirical object, the transcendental X. That is why Kant balances the texts where objectivity originates between *my* representations and *the* phenomenon from the others where the phenomena remain *nur Vorstellungen, die wiederum ihren Gegenstand haben* (A 109), "only representations, which in turn have their object." The transcendental object is *das, was in allen unsern empirischen Begriffen überhaupt Beziehung auf einen Gegenstand, d. i. objective Realität verschaffen kann* (A 109), "what can alone confer upon all our empirical concepts in general relation to an object, that is, objective reality."

Thus the realistic function of intentionality (the object X as "the correlate of the unity of apperception") penetrates through and through the idealistic function of the objectification of my representations.

How is that possible? The key to the problem is the distinction, fundamental in Kant but totally unknown in Husserl, between *intention* and *intuition*. Kant radically disassociates the relation to something, . . . and the vision of something. The *Etwas=X* is an intention without intuition. It is this distinction which subtends thought and knowledge; it not only sustains the tension but the harmony between them.

Kant has not juxtaposed the two interpretations of objectivity, he has granted their reciprocity. It is *because* the relation to the object=X is an intention without intuition that he returns to objectivity as unification of a manifold. Then the relation to the object will be nothing other than "the necessary unity of consciousness, and therefore also of the synthesis of the manifold." (A 109)<sup>11</sup> The objectivity born of objectification returns therefore the one to

the other (A 250); the transcendental ideality of the object returns to the realism of the thing in itself, and the former restores the latter. The *Preface to the 2nd Edition* emphasizes this when it presupposes the mutual implication of the conditioned and the unconditioned.

This structure of Kantianism is without parallel in Husserl's phenomenology. Like the neo-Kantians, Husserl has wrecked the ontological bounds of the phenomenon and with the same blow ruined the possibility of a meditation on the limits and the foundation of phenomenality. This is why phenomenology is not a "Critique," that is, an inspection of the limits of its own field of experience.

Here we have the true guide for discerning in the phenomenological reduction the simply methodological conversion of which we have seen the implications in the first part, and the metaphysical decision which is mingled with it. The second of the *Cartesian Meditations* demonstrates clearly this surreptitious drifting from an act of abstention to an act of negation. While refraining (*mich enthalten*) from positing the world as absolute, I conquer it as world-perceived-in reflexive life. In short, I gain it as phenomenon, and Husserl can legitimately say that "the world is for me that which exists and is equal to my consciousness in a similar Cogito." But it is here that Husserl dogmatically supposes that the world "finds in me and extracts from me its sense and its validity." "*Ihren ganzen, ihren universalen und speziellen Sinn und ihre Seinsgeltung hat sie ausschliesslich aus solchen cogitationes.*"<sup>12</sup> "The world extracts its total sense, at once universal and special, and its ontological validity exclusively from such *Cogitationes*." Ingarden already had reservations about these expressions which, he said, anticipate the result of constitution, *da darin*

*eine metaphysische Entscheidung enthalten ist, eine Entscheidung, die einer kategorischen These über etwas, was selbst kein Element der transzendentalen Subjektivität ist, gleicht*,<sup>13</sup> "for these expressions involve a metaphysical decision which can be compared to a categorical thesis concerning something which is not in itself an element of transcendental subjectivity."

The profound reason for it is that Husserl has confused the problematic of Being with the naïve positing of "beings" in the natural attitude. But this naïve positing is only the omission of the relation of beings to ourselves and is answerable to this *Anmassung* (presumption) of which Kant speaks. Thus, one cannot find in Husserl this interweaving of the two meanings of objectivity that we can find in Kant, an objectivity *constituted* "in" us and an objectivity which is the *fouder* "of" the phenomenon. This is why this world which is "for" me with regard to its *meaning* (and "in" me in the intentional sense of "in") is also "apart from" me with regard to its *Seinsgeltung*, its ontological validity. Since the *εποχή* is the measure of Being and can be measured by nothing, it can only radicalize itself; it cannot be traversed by an absolute positing which, after the manner of the Good in Plato, could give something absolute to perceive to the subject of perception.

I would now like to show that this implicit metaphysics of non-metaphysics explains certain features of Husserl's description itself — not the fidelity and the devotion of attention to "the things themselves" (this reproach could ruin phenomenology purely and simply), but the preferences which turn attention to certain constitutive layers of experience *rather* than toward others.

1) First there is the function of *reason* which differs profoundly in Kant

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and Husserl. In Kant reason is *Denken* itself reflecting on the "meaning" of the categories outside their empirical "usage." One could say that this reflection is both a critique of the transcendental illusion and the justification of the ideas of reason. But Husserl employs the word reason, generally associated with the words "reality" and "truth" in an entirely different sense. Each estimate of the pretensions of lived experience to signify something of the real is a problem of reason. But this estimate of validity consists in comparing each type of signification (perception as such, imagining, judging, willing, sensing as such) with the *original evidence* of the corresponding type.

The problem of reason is not at all oriented toward an investigation of some ambition without vision, of some intention without intuition, which could give to a phenomenon something beyond itself.<sup>14</sup> On the contrary, reason has the task of authenticating the phenomenon itself by its own plenitude.

The phenomenology of reason, then, wholly makes sport of the notion of original evidence (whether this evidence be perceptive, categorial, or something else). It is therefore a critique that phenomenology develops here instead of Kant's. It does more, in fact, than describe a spectacular mode; it measures everything that lays claim to perceiving. Its virtue is not only descriptive but corrective. Every empty meaning (for example, the symbolic signification in which the law of formation is perceived) has *returned* to the presence of reality as it appeared, if it manifested itself in its *Leiblichkeit*, in the flesh. Reason is this movement of returning from the "modified" to "the original."

Thus, phenomenology has become critique, but in an opposite sense from Kant. In Kant, intuition referred back

to the "I think" which limited it; in Husserl, the "I simply think" returns to the evidence which replenishes it. The problem of plenitude (*Fülle*) has replaced that of limit (*Grenze*). In defining truth by the evidence and reality by the original, Husserl no longer meets with the problematic of the "in-itself." Kant was anxious not to be locked up in the phenomenon; Husserl was anxious not to be led astray by unaccomplished thoughts. His problem is no longer the ontological foundation, but the authenticity of experience.

2) But this critique of authenticity ought to lead Husserl from reduction to reduction, and at first to a reduction of the evidence itself. All philosophy of perception threatens to return to naïve realism, that of Husserl more than any, in the dimension in which it insists on the presence "in the flesh" of the thing *itself*. It was this hazard that Husserl never stopped conjuring up. He further insists on the *return* of thought to the originally evident, for it ought to counterbalance the latent hazards of this intuitionism in radicalizing even more the idealistic interpretation of constitution.

This is what the 3rd *Cartesian Meditation* and the unpublished papers of the last period are concerned with. These writings tend to resolve the discord always springing up between the idealistic demand of constitution — which makes of the object a unity of purely ideal sense — and the intuitive demand of reason. It is therefore necessary to perform the reduction on evidence itself with respect to the learned and acquired. Stripped on every side of old, sedimented and suppressed evidence, the evidence is reduced to the living present (*die lebendige Gegenwart*) of consciousness. One again sees here a new effect of this "metaphysical decision" in which we discern everything now in the Husserlian reduction.

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Every presence remains an enigma for description on account of this "excess" (*Zusatz*) which it supplies with reference to my expectation and to my more precise anticipations. Husserl, shattering this last illusion of the "in-itself" which could slip itself into the presence, decides that the presence of the thing itself is *my* present. The radical otherness attached to the presence is reduced to the novelty of the present; the presence of the other is the present of myself.

From now on it is from the side of temporality that Husserl will search for the secret of the constitution of everything supposed in itself. The old evidences, abolishing the movement of constitution where they are originally born (*Urstiftung*), ascribe to themselves a mysterious transcendence. The in-itself is the part of the evidence with the possibility of reactivating it in a new present. All of a group of unpublished writings — group C — are engaged in this open breach with the third *Meditation*.

We are returning here to the field of battle, the great problem of temporality. It is because Husserl has discerned beyond the time-representation of the *Transcendental Aesthetic* the original temporality which is even prior to consciousness that he can defy the more ancient illusion of absolute reality. The question is that of knowing whether he ever caught sight of the problem of Being.

3) This de-ontologizing of reality leads to a new turn of fortune: the passage of "static" constitution to "genetic" constitution, marked by the increasing role of temporality in all the problems of origin and authenticity. But the "genetic" constitution is in a good part a "passive" genius. *Erfahrung und Urteil* is the proof of this orientation of Husserl's researches. Each positing of

sense and of presence holds in abridgment a history which is sedimented, then abolished. We have already seen this with respect to the evidence, but this history forms itself in the "anonymous" strata of experience. At the time of the *Ideen*, Husserl did not ignore this side of the "passivity" of consciousness; he rather considered it as the inverse of consciousness (as *hyle* by relation to the intentional form). What remained in the foreground was the active anticipation of a "sense" of a significant unity (thing, animal, person, value, *Sachverhalt*). Above all, Husserl did not fail to underscore that consciousness is a manifold which the phenomenologist must approach with "the transcendental guide of the object." In other words, the noematic analysis had precedence over reflection of lived experience considered noematically. This concern to identify consciousness with synthesis, with the presumption of unity, was at bottom Kantian. But this interest is progressively displaced from the problem of the unity of sense to the problem of *Urstiftung*, that is, the rooting of all sense in actual obvious experience. This displacement of interest could be brought back from logical reason to perceptive reason — the articulation of judgment beginning again on the active mode of structures worked out in the pre-predicative sphere of perception — and from perceptive reason to sensory *impression* with its memory retentions and its kinesthetic protensions.

It is therefore to a new *Transcendental Aesthetic* not devoured by a *Transcendental Deduction* which the more important unpublished papers of groups C and D of the Louvain classification apply themselves.

According to this new *Transcendental Aesthetic*, the object perceived by all "turns back" beneath intersubjectivity to the primordial world such

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as appeared to the *solus ipse*. To the interior of this primordial sphere the "external object" returns by means of the retensions and protensions of temporal constitution to the "immanent object" — to the *Urimpression*.

Thus, Husserl is called back from the genius of Kant to that of Hume. Kant grounded impressions in the priority of sensibility and based the perceived order completely in intellectual objectivity. With the later Husserl it was no longer significant to "rise" to intellectuality but, on the contrary, to build on the ground of the primordial, of the pre-cognitive. It is precisely the genius of Hume to regress thus from signs, symbols, and images to impressions.

4) One could say that by this identification of reason with a critique of the *evidence*, by this reduction of the evidence to present experience and by this return to the *impression*, Husserl totally identifies phenomenology with an egology without ontology.

The more manifest intention of the *Cartesian Meditations* is to lead to this identification. The *Second Meditation* supposes initially that if all reality is a correlate of the Cogito, every cogitatio is a mode of the Cogito. The Cogito, for its part, is the explication of the Ego. Phenomenology thus is an egological analysis. Husserl recognized at once the formidable consequences: "*Sicherlich fängt sie also als reine Egologie an und als eine Wissenschaft, die uns, wie es scheint, zu einem, obschon transzendentalen Solipsismus verurteilt. Es ist ja noch gar nicht abzusehen, wie in der Einstellung der Reduktion andere Ego — nicht als bloss weltliche Phänomene, sondern als andere transzendente Ego — als seiend setzenbar werden können, und damit zu mitberechtigten Themen einer phänomenologischen Egologie.*"

"Assuredly it begins in the style of a pure egology, of a science which condemns us, it seems, to solipsism — at least to a transcendental solipsism. At this stage one absolutely cannot foresee how, in the attitude of the reduction, it could be possible for us to posit the existence of other Egos — not merely as wordly phenomena, but as other transcendent Egos, and that thus we may make of them also the legitimate theme of a transcendental egology." But Husserl heroically accepts the difficulty and is just able to make out that transcendental solipsism ought to remain *eine philosophische Unterstufe* — "a preliminary philosophical stage" — and ought to be provisionally assumed *um die Problematik der transzendentalen Intersubjektivität als eine fundierte, also höherstufige in rechter Weise ins Spiel setzen zu können . . .*,<sup>16</sup> "in order to engage the problematic of transcendental subjectivity in the right manner as a founded problematic, hence one of higher degree."

We shall see in the third part of this study whether Husserl succeeded in crossing the threshold of intersubjectivity. Let us note for a moment to what kind of radicalism Husserl has led this egology and to what kind of paradox he has led transcendental solipsism.

In the *4th Cartesian Meditation*, the Ego itself, as the Ego of the Ego Cogito, is thematized: *also sich in sich selbst als seiend kontinuierlich Konstituierendes*,<sup>17</sup> "it never ceases to be constituted in itself as existing." Husserl ought then to go beyond the old thesis of the *Ideen*, according to which the Ego ist der identische Pol der Erlebnisse — "the identical pole of experience." The Ego is henceforth *das in voller Konkretion genommene ego (das wir mit dem Leibnizschen Worte Monade nennen wollen)*,<sup>18</sup> "the Ego taken in its total concretion which we will designate

by the Leibnizian term of monad." What is the significance of this passage from Cartesian language to Leibnizian language? It marks the total triumph of interiority over exteriority, of the transcendental over the transcendent. Everything which exists for me is constituted in me and this constitution is my concrete life. Then one can indeed say that all the problems of constitution are included in that of the *phänomenologischen Auslegung dieses monadischen ego (das Problem seiner Konstitution für sich selbst)* . . . In weiterer Folge ergibt sich die Deckung der Phänomenologie dieser Selbstkonstitution mit der Phänomenologie überhaupt . . .<sup>19</sup> phenomenological elucidation of this monadic Ego (the problem of its constitution for itself) . . . As a further consequence, it appears that the phenomenology of this constitution of itself for itself coincides with phenomenology in general." Phenomenology will attempt to cross the desert of solipsism by right of philosophical ascesis. Phenomenology is the science of the sole ego of which I have original evidence — mine. Kantianism never could have met such a problem, not only because in its epistemological perspective it could never meet with consciousness in general, the subject of true knowledge, but also because the *Gemüt* that the Critique presupposes as concrete subject is always bent toward the transcendental object=X which escapes the phenomenon and *which can be the absolute existence of another person*. The de-ontologization of the object in Husserl virtually implies that of other bodies and of other persons. Thus the description of the concrete subject, placed under the sign of idealism, leads to this metaphysical solitude which Husserl has assumed with an exemplary honesty in spite of the consequences.

This is why the constitution of others, which assures the passage to inter-

subjectivity, is the touchstone of defeat or success, not only of phenomenology but of the implicit philosophy of phenomenology.

### III

#### "CONSTITUTION OF OTHERS" AND "RESPECT"

All aspects of phenomenology converge on the problem of the constitution of others. Are we deviating, for all that, from a Kantian problematic? Are we penetrating a new land which has not been cleared by the Kantian genius? Not at all. This ultimate peripeteia of Husserlian phenomenology, issuing from what is least Kantian in the "transcendental experience" of Husserl, leads us back in an unforeseen manner to the heart of Kantianism; indeed not to the Critique of Pure Reason, but to the practical philosophy.

Kant does not have a phenomenology of the knowledge of others; the phenomenology of *Gemüt* is too implicit and too burdened by epistemological considerations to contain the enticements of a theory of intersubjectivity. At the most one can find the premises for it in the *Anthropology*, in the framework of the theory of emotions which Kant in fact treats as a theory of intersubjectivity. But all this is not much in comparison with the admirable phenomenological essays of Husserl on *Einfühlung*. The theory of *Einfühlung* pertains to descriptive phenomenology before being charged with resolving the paradox of transcendental solipsism. It is intimately united with the phenomenology of perception, the perception of others being incorporated in the signification of the world that I perceive. It is inscribed in the constitution of the thing in which it determines the last layer of objectivity; it is involved in the constitution of cultural objects, of language, of institutions.

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Therefore it is not on properly descriptive ground that phenomenology has something to learn from Kant. Husserl, not Kant, is the guide here.

On the other hand, we meet Kant again in order to resolve the difficulties created by the philosophic interpretation of the reduction, which culminates in the paradox of transcendental solipsism. Husserl has not only proposed to describe how others appear — in what perceptive, affective, or practical modes the meaning of “others,” of “alter ego,” is constituted — he has attempted to constitute it “in” me and still to constitute it as “another.”

This is the task of the 5th *Cartesian Meditation*. One could say that this difficult essay is an untenable wager: the author tries to constitute others as a meaning which is formed in me, in what is most “proper” to the Ego, in what Husserl calls the sphere of belonging. But at the same time that it constitutes others in me according to idealistic exigency, he intends to respect the very meaning which is attached to the presence of others, as other than me and as another me, which has its world, which perceives me, addresses itself to me and maintains with me the relations of intersubjectivity from whence emerges a unique world of science and multiple worlds of culture. Husserl wants to sacrifice neither idealistic exigency nor docility to the specific traits of *Einfühlung*. Idealistic exigency wants others, as the thing, to be a unity of modes of appearance, a presumed ideal sense. The docility of the real wants the other to “transgress” my own sphere of experience, to give rise (within the limits of my experience) to a “surplus” of presence incompatible with the inclusion of all sense in my lived experience.

The problem of others brings to light the latent divorce between the two tendencies of phenomenology: the de-

scriptive tendency and the dogmatic tendency. The genius of Husserl is to have preserved the wager to the end. The descriptive anxiety to respect the otherness of others and the dogmatic anxiety to ground others in the primordial sphere of possession by the ego find their balance in the idea of an *analogical grasp* of the other.

The other is there himself, and nevertheless I do not see his experience; the other is only *appresentiert*, “appresented,” but on the basis of his body, which alone is *präsentiert*, “presented,” with an original evidence in the sphere of my lived experience. “In” me a body is presented which appresents an experience other than mine. This experience is an experience like mine in virtue of the pairing (*Paarung*) between by body here and the other body over there. This configuration doubly grounds the analogy between *eingefühlt* experience and *erlebt* experience, between the experience of the other and my own.

Has Husserl succeeded in constituting the stranger as a stranger in the sphere of experience itself? Has he succeeded in overcoming solipsism without sacrificing the egology? The enigma is that the other, appresented in his body and analogically grasped by “passive synthesis,” has a value of being (*Seinsgeltung*) which tears it away from my primordial sphere. How can an analogy — supposing that I am acquainted with others by analogy — have this transcendent aim, whereas all other analogies proceed from one thing to another inside my experience? If the bodies of others are constituted “in” me, how is the experience of others, which adheres there, presented “outside” me? How can a simple harmony among the modes of appearance of behavior *indizieren* a stranger and not a more subtle thing from “my” world? Has Hus-

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serl succeeded in escaping to the enormous prestige of the constitution of *Dinglichkeit* — of the thing — in a flux of profiles, of silhouettes (*Abschattungen*)? Are others only simple unities of harmonious profiles?

It is true that in *Ideen II* (third part) Husserl radically opposes the constitution of persons to that of nature (things and animated bodies). In one of the appendices he even goes so far as to oppose to the *Erscheinungseinheit* — “the unity of appearances” — of the thing the *Einheit absoluter Bekundung* — “unity of absolute manifestation” — of the person. The person would then be much more than an array of silhouettes; he would be an absolute surging up of presence. But this opposition between the person who “announces himself” and the thing which “appears” is an opposition which description imposes and which the philosophy of the reduction minimizes. It implies a complete overthrow of the idealistic sense of constitution; what the person announces is precisely his absolute existence. To constitute the person is then to mark in what subjective mode the recognition of otherness, of strangeness of other existence, is brought about. Husserl’s idealism ought to be an obstacle to this reversal of the sense of constitution.

It is here that a return to Kant is proposed, not only to complete a description of the appearance of others but in order to comprehend the sense of existence which is announced in this appearance. It is remarkable that it should be a philosophy that is least armed on the terrain of phenomenological description which leads directly to this sense of existence. Kant introduces in the *Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals* the second formulation of the categorical imperative: *Handle so, dass du die Menschheit sowohl in deiner*

*Person, als in der Person eines jeden andern jederzeit als Zweck, niemals bloss als Mittel brauchest* (A 429), “Act in such a way that you treat humanity as well as in your person as in the person of others, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.” One could be offended by this brusque introduction of others in the Kantian formalism, and one could complain that not any description of the knowledge of others precedes this practical determination of others by respect. Cannot one at first know the other as other and subsequently respect him? Kantianism suggests an entirely different response. It is in respect itself, as a practical disposition, that the sole determination of the existence of others resides.

Let us examine very closely the Kantian course. The existence in itself of others is at first hypothetically posed as identical with its value: *Gesetzt aber, es gäbe etwas dessen Dasein an sich selbst einen absoluten Wert hat, was als Zweck an sich selbst ein Grund bestimmter Gesetze sein könnte, so würde in ihm und nur in ihm allein der Grund eines möglichen kategorischen Imperativs, d.i. praktischen Gesetzes, liegen* (A 427-8), “But supposing that there may be something whose existence in itself has an absolute value, something which, as an end in itself, could be a principle of determined laws, it is then in that and that alone that the principle of a categorical imperative is found possible, that is, a practical law.”

In this hypothetical positing of a foundation there appears to be no difference between the existential determination and the practical determination of the person. The opposition of person and thing is first practical — existential: The “thing” belongs as object of my desire to the order of means; the person belongs as Object (*vis-à-vis*) of

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respect to the order of ends in themselves . . . *dagegen vernünftige Wesen Personen genannt werden, weil ihre Natur sie schon als Zwecke an sich selbst . . . aus-zeichnet* (A 428-9), "on the contrary, reasonable beings are called persons because their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves."

It will be objected that respect, like sympathy, is a subjective feeling and has no more power of reaching an in-itself than does sense perception or desire. This is precisely to mistake respect for perception, desire, or even sympathy: respect is the *practical* moment which grounds the transcendent aim of sympathy; sympathy as effect, has no more privilege than hate or love. This is why the enlargement, elsewhere legitimate, of Husserl's phenomenology in the sense indicated by Max Scheler, or by MacDougall or by the French existentialists, changes nothing in the problem of existence, even if it does give a richer inventory of the modes of the appearance of others. Respect, as a *practical* feeling, sets a limit for my faculty of acting. Thus, speaking of humanity, Kant establishes that it is not a "subjective aim" at which my sympathy aims, which should again include it in my inclinations *als Gegenstand, den man sich von selbst wirklich zum Zwecke macht* (A 431), "as an object of which one in reality makes himself of his own will an end." Humanity is an "objective end" like the law of series which constitutes *die oberste einschränkende Bedingung aller subjektiven Zwecke* (*Ibid.*), "the supreme condition restrictive of all subjective aims." Further on, Kant calls it more forcefully *die oberste einschränkende Bedingung im Gebrauch aller Mittel* (A 438), "the supreme limiting condition in the use of all means." The same is true of the person; it is "an end which exists by it-

self," which I can only think of negatively as "*that against which one ought never to act*" (*dem niemals zuwider gehandelt . . . werden muss*) (A 437). Through respect, the person finds himself from the first situated in a field of persons whose mutual otherness is strictly based on their irreducibility to means. When others lose this ethical dimension that Kant calls dignity (*Würde*) or absolute value, then sympathy loses its character of *esteem* and the person is no more than *blosses Naturwesen*, "a purely natural being" — and sympathy an animal affect.

But, one could say, the proposition: *die vernünftige Natur existiert als Zweck an sich selbst* (A 429), "reasonable nature exists as an end in itself," is only a postulate. Kant readily agrees (see his note at A 429). This postulate is the concept of a Kingdom of ends — that is, the systematic union of reasonable beings by common laws. The historian does not have much trouble recognizing in it the Augustinian idea of the city of God and the Leibnizian idea of the reign of grace. What is properly Kantian is to have reached this idea by a movement of regression toward the foundation of the good will, consequently by the radicalizing of freedom. The plurality and the communication of consciousness cannot be made the object of a description if at first they are not posited by an act of *Grundlegung* ("laying the ground") — the communication of consciousness then is what renders possible the coordination of freedoms and what makes of each subjective will a freedom.

One can doubtless regret the narrowly juridical trick that subsumes this mutuality of freedoms under the idea of an *a priori* legislation; this is without doubt not the most remarkable thing in Kant. What remains admirable is his not having sought for a "situation" for

the person other than his "appurtenances" (as member or as leader) to a practical and ethical totality of persons. Outside of that he is no longer a person. His existence can only be an *existence-value*. The affective revelations of others do not go much beyond the level of the tool or of the commodity.

Thus, the absolute existence of others originally appears to the intention of the good will; only a reflexive movement of *Grundlegung* discovers that this intention involves the act of placing himself as a legislative member in an ethical community.

By the same stroke, the determination of the person as an existing end-in-itself brings us back to the problem of the thing in itself. In the third part we have underscored the limiting function of the thing in itself with regard to the pretensions of the phenomenon. This philosophy of *limits*, totally absent from phenomenology, discovers on the practical plain its full bloom, since the other is that against which I ought not to act. But at the same time the idea of a kingdom of ends makes the positive character of the *foundation* of the in-itself stand out. Only the determination of the in-itself never becomes theoretical or speculative but remains practical and ethical. The only intelligible world in which I am able to "place" myself is that to which I have access by respect; by the autonomy of my will and respect for the autonomy of my will and respect for the autonomy of others, *so versetzen wir uns als Glieder in die Verstandeswelt*, "we transport

ourselves into the intelligible world as its members." But while entering in this world, I cannot *mich hineinschauen, hineinempfinden* (A 459), "While finding its way by thought in an intelligible world, practical reason never goes beyond its limits; it could only go beyond them if it wanted while entering in this world, to perceive or feel it."

Did not Kant basically demonstrate the limits not only of the pretension of the phenomenon, but the limits of phenomenology itself? I am able "to see," "to feel" the appearance of things, of persons, of values, but the absolute existence of the other, model of all existence, cannot be sensed; it is announced as a stranger to my experience by the very appearance of the other in his behavior, his expression, his language, his work. But this apparition of the other does not suffice to announce it as a being in-itself. Its being ought to be practically posited as that which limits the pretension of my sympathy itself to reduce the person to his desirable quality, and as that which grounds his appearance itself.

It is the glory of phenomenology to have raised to the dignity of science, by the "reduction," the investigation of appearance. But the glory of Kantianism is to have known how to coordinate the investigation of the appearance with the limiting function of the in-itself and to the practical determination of the in-itself as freedom and all persons.

Husserl does phenomenology. But Kant limits and grounds it.

## REFERENCES

1. Natorp, Rickert, Kreis and Zocher.
2. All Kant citations are from the edition of the Royal Academy of Prussia.
3. The English translations are from the Norman Kemp Smith translation.
4. Cf. "The Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space," A 25.
5. "Transcendental Theory of Method," A 712 sq.
6. The initial question is of ontological order: *Was sind nun Raum und Zeit? Sind es wirk-*

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- liche Wesen? usw. (A 23) "What, then, are space and time? Are they real existences?"
7. The letter to Markus Herz of February 21, 1772 already posed the problem of the *Vorstellung* with reference to this strange possibility of an intuition productive of its object.
  8. He says the same thing further on: "*Wenn aber ich selbst, oder ein ander Wesen mich, ohne diese Bedingung der Sinnlichkeit, anschauen könnte, so würden eben dieselben Bestimmungen, die wir uns jetzt als Veränderung vorstellen, eine Erkenntnis geben, in welcher die Vorstellung der Zeit, mithin auch der Veränderung gar nicht vorkäme. . . .*" (A 37) "*Wenn man von ihr die besondere Bedingung unserer Sinnlichkeit wegnimmt, so verschwindet auch der Begriff der Zeit.*" (A 37)
  9. "*Aber diese Erkenntnisquellen a priori bestimmen sich eben dadurch (dass sie bloss Bedingungen der Sinnlichkeit sind) ihre Grenzen, nämlich, dass sie bloss auf Gegenstände gehen, sofern sie als Erscheinungen betrachtet werden, nicht aber Dinge an sich selbst darstellen.*" (A 39)
  10. "*Der Verstand begrenzt demnach die Sinnlichkeit, ohne darum sein eigenes Feld zu erweitern, und, indem er jene warnt, dass sie nicht anmasse, auf Dinge an sich selbst zu gehen, sondern lediglich auf Erscheinungen, so denkt er sich selbst einen Gegenstand an sich selbst, aber nur als transzendentes Objekt. . .*" (A 288)
  11. "*Es ist aber klar, dass, da wir es nur mit dem Mannigfaltigen unserer Vorstellungen zu tun haben, und jenes X, was ihnen korrespondiert (der Gegenstand), weil er etwas von allen unseren Vorstellungen Unterschiedenes sein soll, für uns nichts anderes sein könne, als die formale Einheit des Bewusstseins in der Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen der Vorstellungen.*" (A 105)
  12. *Cartesianische Meditationen*, *Husserliana* I, p. 60. A similar statement is made on p. 65, lines 11-16.
  13. *Bemerkungen von Prof. Roman Ingarden*, Appendix to *Husserliana* I, pp. 208-10.
  14. Paragraph 128 of *Ideen I* at first seems to lead to this conclusion. Husserl, remarking that it is the same object given in another manner, calls the object the "X of its determinations." Indeed, he proposed to explain how the noema, "intended as such," can have a relation to objectivity (*Husserliana*, III, p. 315): *Jedes Noema hat einen Inhalt, nämlich seinen Sinn, und bezieht durch ihn auf seinen Gegenstand* (316). But after this Kantian beginning, the analysis turns toward a specifically Husserlian theme: the new intention of the noema towards its object, which seemed to return beyond "sense," designates the degree of plenitude, the mode of "replenishing" sense by intuition. (paragraphs 135 and following)
  15. *Husserliana*, I, p. 69.
  16. *Husserliana*, I, p. 69.
  17. *op. cit.* p. 100.
  18. *op. cit.* p. 102.
  19. *op. cit.* pp. 102-103.

Paul Ricoeur's most recent work to appear in english translation is his *The Voluntary and Involuntary*, published by Northwestern University Press. His study of Freud, *De l'interprétation* (Paris: Ed du Seuil, 1965) is in process of translation and will be published by Yale University Press. He is at present visiting professor at Yale University.