

The desideratum of an Index for the whole work could unfortunately not be realized, since my promising pupil, Dr Rudolf Clemens, who had undertaken to prepare it, had died for his country.

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Investigation VI

Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

Introduction

Our last Investigation may have seemed at first to lose itself in remote questions of descriptive psychology: it has, however, been of considerable help in our attempted elucidation of knowledge. All thought, and in particular all theoretical thought and knowledge, is carried on by way of certain 'acts', which occur in a context of expressive discourse. In these acts lies the source of all those unities-of-validity which confront the thinker as objects of thought and knowledge, or as the explanatory grounds and principles, the theories or sciences of the latter. In these acts, therefore, lies the source, also, of the pure, universal Ideas connected with such objects, whose ideally governed combinations pure logic attempts to set forth, and whose elucidation is the supreme aim of epistemological criticism. Plainly we shall have gone far in our elucidation of knowledge, once we have established the phenomenological peculiarities of *acts* as such, that much debated, little understood class of experiences. By putting our logical experiences into this class, we shall have taken an important step towards the demarcation of an analysis which will 'make sense' of the logical sphere and of the fundamental concepts which concern knowledge. In the course of our Investigation we were led to distinguish various concepts of *content* which tend to become confusedly mixed up whenever acts, and the ideal unities pertaining to acts, are in question. Differences which had already struck us in our First Investigation, in the narrower context of meanings and of acts conferring meaning, appeared once more in a wider context and in the most general forms. Even the highly noteworthy notion of content, that of 'intentional essence', which emerged as a novel gain from our last Investigation, was not without this relation to the logical sphere: for the same series of identities, previously employed to illustrate the unity of meaning, now yielded, suitably generalized, a certain identity, that of 'intentional essence', which applied to all acts whatsoever. By thus linking up, or subordinating, the ideal unities and phenomenological characters of the logical realm, to the quite general characters and unities of the sphere of acts, we importantly deepened our phenomenological and critical understanding of the former.

The investigations carried out in the last chapter, basing themselves on the distinction of act-quality and act-material within the unity of intentional essence, again led us far into the zone of logical interest. We were forced to enquire into the relation of such intentional material to the presentational foundation essential to every act, and were compelled to hold apart several important, constantly confounded concepts of presentation, and so to work out a fundamental part of the 'theory of judgement'. Here as elsewhere a vast amount remains to be done: we have barely made a beginning.

We have not yet even been successful in our more immediate task, that of laying bare the source of the Idea of Meaning. Undeniably and importantly, the meaning of expressions must lie in the intentional essence of the relevant acts, but we have not at all considered the sorts of acts that can thus function in meaning, and whether all types of acts may not be in this respect on a level. But when we seek to tackle this question, we at once encounter – as the next paragraphs will demonstrate – *the relation between meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment*, or to speak traditionally, and in fact ambiguously, the relation between 'concept' or 'thought' on the one hand, understood as mere meaning without intuitive fulfilment, and 'corresponding intuition', on the other.

It is most important that this distinction, touched on even in our First Investigation, should be most minutely explored. In carrying out the appropriate analyses and, in the first instance, attaching them to the simplest naming-intentions, we at once perceive that our whole treatment calls for a *natural extension and general circumscription*. The widest class of acts, in which we meet with distinctions between intention and intention-fulfilment (or intention-frustration), extends far beyond the logical sphere. This is itself demarcated by a peculiarity in the relation of fulfilment. A class of acts – those known as 'objectifying' – are in fact marked off from all others, in that the fulfilment-syntheses appropriate to their sphere have the character of *knowings*, of *identifications*, of a 'putting-together' of things congruent, while their syntheses of frustration, similarly, have the correlative character of a setting apart of things conflicting. Within this widest sphere of objectifying acts, we shall have to study *all the relations relevant to the unity of knowledge*. We shall not have to limit ourselves to the fulfilment of such peculiar meaning-intentions as attach to our verbal expressions, since similar intentions also turn up without grammatical support. Our intentions, further, themselves mostly have the character of intentions, which both require, and very often sustain a further fulfilment.

We shall provide a phenomenological characterization of the quite general notions of *signification* and *intuition* in relation to the phenomena of fulfilment, and we shall pursue the analysis of *various sorts of intuition*, starting with sensuous intuition, an enquiry basic to the elucidation of knowledge. We shall then embark upon the phenomenology of the varying degrees of knowledge, giving clearness and definite form to a related series

of fundamental epistemological concepts. Here certain novel notions of content, barely glanced at in our previous analyses, will take the centre of the tent: the concept of *intuitive content* and the concept of *representing (interpreted)* content. We shall range the notion of *epistemic essence* alongside of our previous notion of intentional essence, and within the former we shall draw a distinction between intentional quality and intentional matter, the latter being divided into *interpretative sense*, *interpretative form* and *interpreted* (appereived, or representing) content. We shall thereby pin down the concept of *Interpretation (Auffassung)* or *Representation*, as the unity of material and representing content by way of interpretative form.

In connection with the graded transition from intention to fulfilment, we shall recognize distinctions of greater or less *mediacy in an intention itself*, which exclude straightforward fulfilment, and which require rather a graded sequence of fulfilments: this will lead to an understanding of the all-important, hitherto unclarified sense of talk about 'indirect presentations'. We then follow up the differences of greater or lesser adequacy of intention to the intuitive experiences which fuse with it, and which fulfil it in knowledge, and point to the case of an *objectively complete adequacy* of the one to the others. In this connection we strive towards an ultimate phenomenological clarification of the concepts of Possibility and Impossibility (harmony, compatibility – conflict, incompatibility), and of the ideal axioms relating to these. Bringing back into consideration the act-qualities that we have for a while neglected, we then deal with the distinction, applicable tothetic acts, of a *provisional* and a *final fulfilment*. This final fulfilment represents an ideal of perfection. It always consists in a corresponding percept (we of course take for granted a necessary widening of the notion of perception beyond the bounds of sense). The synthesis of fulfilment achieved in this limiting case is *self-evidence or knowledge in the pregnant sense of the word*. Here we have *being in the sense of truth*, 'correspondence' rightly understood, the *adequatio rei ac intellectus*: here this *adequatio* is itself given, to be directly seized and gazed upon. The *varying notions of truth*, which all must be built up on one single, selfsame phenomenological situation, here reach complete clearness. The same holds of the correlative ideal of imperfection and therefore of the case of *absurdity*, and as regards the 'conflict' and the non-being, experienced therewith, of falsehood.

The natural course of our Investigation, which at first only concerns itself with such intentions as are meanings, has as a consequence that our treatments all begin with the simplest meanings, and in so doing abstract from *formal differences* among such meanings. The complementary Investigations and will at once lead to a *totally new concept of matter or material*, to a basic contrast between *sensuous stuff* and *categorical form* or – abandoning an objective for a phenomenological stance – to a contrast between *sensuous and categorical acts*. In close connection with this last, we have the important

distinction between sensuous (real) and categorical objects, determinations, combinations etc., regarding which last it becomes clear that they can only be 'perceptually' given in acts which are founded upon other acts, and in the last resort, on acts of sensibility. In general we may say that the intuitive, and accordingly likewise the imaginative, fulfilment of categorical acts, is founded on acts of sense. *Mere* sense, however, never fulfils categorical acts, or intentions which include categorical forms: fulfilment lies rather, in every case, in a sensibility structured by categorical acts. With this goes an *unavoidable extension of the originally sense-turned concepts of intuition and perception*, which permits us to speak of *categorical* and, in particular, of *universal intuition*. The distinction between *sensuous* and *purely categorical* abstraction then leads to a distinction between *sensuous concepts* and *understanding* achieves a much-needed clarity through a distinction between straightforward or sensuous, and founded or categorical intuition. The same is true of the contrast between *thinking* and *seeing* (intuiting), which confuses philosophical parlance by confounding the relations of signification to fulfilling intuition, on the one hand, with the relations of sensuous and categorical acts, on the other. All talk of *logical form* concerns what is purely categorical in the meanings and meaning-fulfillments in question. But the 'matter' of logic, the 'intention' of terms, itself admits, through a graded superimposition of categorical intentions, of distinctions of *matter* and *form*, so that the *logical* antithesis of matter and form points the way to a readily understandable 'relativization' of our absolute distinction.

We shall end the main body of this Investigation by discussing the factors which limit freedom in the actual categorical shaping of given matter. We shall become aware of the *analytic rules of authentic thinking* which, grounded in pure categories, do not depend on the specificity of their materials. Similar factors limit thought in the *inauthentic sense*, i.e. pure acts of meaning to the extent that they might lend themselves to authentic cases of expression, resting on *a priori* principles and not dependent on subject-matters to be expressed. From this demand springs the function of the laws of authentic thinking to provide norms for our acts of mere meaning.

We raised a question at the beginning of this Investigation as to the natural circumscription of sense-giving and sense-fulfilling acts: this is answered by ranging such acts under objectifying acts, and by subdividing the latter into acts of signification and acts of intuition. Having successfully clarified the phenomenological relations which concern fulfilment, we are at last in a position to evaluate the arguments for, and the arguments against, Aristotle's view of optative and imperative sentences as special cases of predication. The last section of the present Investigation is devoted to clearing up this controversial issue.

The aims just sketched are not the final, highest aims of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge in general. Our analyses, comprehensive as they

are, leave untitled the extremely fruitful field of *mediate* thought and knowledge: the nature of *mediate* evidence, and of its correlated *ideal*ia, remains insufficiently illuminated. We consider, however, that our aims have not been too trivial, and we hope that we may have dug down to the genuinely first, underlying foundations of a critique of knowledge. Even such a critique demands of us an exercise of the modesty essential to all strict, scientific research. If this last aims at a real, full completion of the tasks at hand, if it has given up the dream of solving the great problems of knowledge by merely criticizing traditional philosophemes or by probable argumentation, if it has at last seen that matters can be advanced and transformed only by getting to close grips with them, it must then also reconcile itself to tackling the problems of knowledge, not in their higher or their highest, and therefore their most interesting developments, but in their comparatively simplest forms, in the lowest grades of development accessible to us. That even such a modest epistemological enquiry has vastly many difficulties to surmount, that it has in fact still got all its achievements ahead of it, will become clear in the course of the ensuing analyses.

**Objectifying intentions and
their fulfillments: knowledge as
a synthesis of fulfillment and its
gradations**

Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment

§1 Whether every type of mental act, or only certain types, can function as carriers of meaning

We shall now go on with the question raised in our Introduction: whether meaning-something is exclusively the prerogative of certain restricted sorts of mental acts. It might seem at first plain that no such restrictions can exist, and that any and every act might operate in sense-giving fashion. For it seems plain that we can verbally *express* acts of every kind – whether presentations, judgements, surmises, questions, wishes etc. – and that, when we do this, they yield us the meanings of the forms of speech in question, the meanings of names, of statements, of interrogative or optative sentences etc.

The opposite view can, however, lay claim to the same obviousness, particularly in a form that restricts meanings to a single, narrow class of acts. All acts are certainly expressible, if language is sufficiently rich, each has its own appropriate speech-form: sentence-forms, e.g., differentiate themselves into indicative, interrogative, imperative etc., and among the first of these we have categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive and other sentence-forms. In each case the act, in so far as it achieves *expression* in this or that speech-form, must be known for the sort of act it is, the question as a question, the wish as a wish, the judgement as a judgement etc. This will apply also to the partial acts constitutive of such acts, in so far as these too are expressed. Acts cannot, it seems, find their own appropriate expressive forms till their form and content have been apperceived and known. The expressive role in speech lies, accordingly, not in mere words, but in *expressive acts*: these create for the correlated acts to be expressed by them a new expressive material in which they can be given *thinking expression*, the general essence of which constitutes the meaning of the speech-form in question.

A striking confirmation of this view seems to lie in the possibility of a purely symbolic functioning of expressions. The mental (*geistige*) expression, the thinking counterpart of the act to be expressed, attaches to the verbal expression, and can be brought to life by the latter even when the act itself is not performed by the person who understands the expression. We

understand the expression of an act of perception without ourselves perceiving anything, of a question without ourselves asking anything etc. We experience more than the mere words, we enjoy the thought-forms or the expressions. In the opposed case, where the intended acts are themselves actually present, the expression comes to coincidence with what it has to express, the meaning which clings to the words fits itself into what it means, its thought-intention finds in the latter its fulfilling intuition.

It is plainly in close connection with these opposed viewpoints that we have the old dispute as to whether or not the peculiar forms of interrogative, optative, imperative and similar sentences are to count as statements, and their meanings as *judgements*. Aristotle's doctrine places the meaning of all complete sentences in the varied array of psychic experiences, experiences of judging, wishing, commanding and so forth. As against this, another more modern and increasingly influential doctrine locates meaning exclusively in our judgements (or in their purely presentative modifications). An interrogative sentence in a sense expresses a question, but only in so far as this question is realized to be a question, in so far as it is referred in thought to a speaker, and so judged to be *his* experience. And so similarly in other cases. Each meaning is, on this view, either a name-meaning or a propositional meaning, i.e. either the meaning of a complete indicative sentence or a possible predicative sentences, since judgements are, on this view, generally thought of as *predicative acts*: we shall see, however, that the controversy still has a sense even when judgements are looked on as *positing acts in general*.

To find the right stance towards the questions here raised would call for more exact discussion than the above, superficial argumentations have attempted. It will become plain, when we look at the matter more closely, that the appeals to sheer obviousness on one side or the other conceal obscurity and even error.

§2 That all acts may be expressed does not decide the issue. There are two senses to talk about expressing an act

All acts it has been agreed are *expressible*. This cannot, of course, be questioned, but it does not therefore follow, as might be surreptitiously suggested, that all acts for that reason also function as *carriers of meaning*. Talk of 'expressing' is, as we argued earlier,¹ ambiguous, and it remains so even when we connect it with the *acts* to be expressed. What are expressed may be, on the one hand, said to be the sense-giving acts, to which, in the narrower sense, 'voice' is given. But there are other acts which can also be said to be expressed, though this is the case, naturally, in a different sense. I refer here to the very frequent cases in which we *name acts we are now experiencing*, and through such naming manage to say that we are experiencing

them. In this sense I 'express' a wish through the words 'I wish that . . .', a question through the words 'I am asking whether . . .', a judgement through the words 'I judge that . . .', and so on. Naturally we can pass judgement on the words 'I judge that . . .', and so on. Naturally we can pass judgement on our own inner experiences just as we can pass judgement on outward things and, when we do the former, the meanings of the relevant sentences will reside in our *judgements* upon such experiences, and not in the experiences themselves, our wishes, questions etc. Just so, the meanings of statements about external things do not reside in these things (the horses, houses etc.), but in the judgements we inwardly pass upon them (or in the presentations that help to build up such judgements). That the objects judged about in one case transcend consciousness (or purport to do so), in another case are taken to be immanent in consciousness, makes no real difference. Naturally when I express the wish that now fills me, it is concretely one with my act of judgement, but it does not really contribute to the latter. The wish is apprehended in an act of reflex perception, subsumed under the concept of wishing, and named by way of this concept and of the further determining presentation of the wish-content. Thus the conceptual *presentation* makes the same sort of direct contribution to the judgement about the wish (and the corresponding wish-name to the wish-statement), that the presentation of Man makes to a judgement about Man (or the name 'Man' to a statement about Man). Substitute for the subject word 'I' in the sentence 'I wish that . . .' the relevant proper name, and the sense of the sentence remains unaffected in its remaining parts. It is, however, undeniable that the wish-statement can now be understood without change of sense by someone who hears it, and can be imitatively re-judged by him, even though he *does not share the wish at all*. We see, therefore, that, even when a wish chances to form a unity with an act of judgement directed upon it, it does not really form part of the meaning of the latter. A truly sense-giving experience can never be absent if the living sense of the expression is to survive change.

It becomes clear, therefore, that the expressibility of all acts is without relevance to the question whether all acts can function in sense-giving fashion, so far, that is, as such 'expressibility' means no more than the possibility of making certain statements about such acts. For in this connection acts are just not functioning as carriers of meaning at all.

§3 A third sense of talk about the 'expression' of acts. Formulation of our theme

We have just distinguished two senses in which there can be talk about 'acts expressed'. Either they are acts in which the sense, the meaning of the relevant expression is constituted, or they are acts that the speaker attributes to himself as items in his recent experience. This latter conception may be appropriately widened. Plainly the situation that it covers would not differ in any essential respect, were an expressed act *not* to be attributed to the

experiencing ego, but to other objects, and it would not differ for any conceivable form of expression that really (*reell*) named this act as something experienced, even if it did not do it so as to mark the act off as the subject- or object-member of a predication. The main point is that the act, whether directly named or otherwise 'expressed', should appear as the actually present *object of discourse* (or of the objectifying, positing activity behind discourse), whereas this is *not* the case in regard to our sense-giving acts.

There is a *third* sense of the same talk of 'expression' in which we deal, as in our second sense, with a judgement or other objectification related to the acts in question, but not with a judgement *about* the latter – not, therefore, with an objectification of these acts by way of presentations and naming-acts which refer to them; we have rather a judgement *grounded* upon such acts, which does not demand their objectification. That I express my percept of something may, e.g., mean that I attribute this or that content to it: it may also mean that I derive my judgement from my percept, that I do not merely assert but also perceive the matter of fact in question, and that I assert it as I perceive it. My judgement is not here concerned with the perceiving but with the thing perceived. By 'judgements of perception' *tout court* we generally mean judgements belonging to this last class.

In a similar manner we can give expression to other intuitive acts, whether imaginings, remembering or expectations.

In the case of utterances grounded on imagination we may indeed doubt whether a genuine judgement is present: it is in fact plain that this is *not* then present. We are here thinking of cases where we allow our imagination to 'run away' with us, and where we employ ordinary statements, appropriate to things perceived, in giving a name to what then appears to us, or of the narrative form in which story-tellers, novelists etc., 'express', not real circumstances, but the creations of their artistic fancy. As we saw in our last investigation, we are here dealing with conformably modified acts which serve as *counterparts* which correspond to the actual judgements that might be expressed in the same words, just as intuitive imaginings correspond to perceptions, and perhaps also to rememberings and expectations. We shall leave aside all such distinctions for the present.

In connection with the above class of cases, and in connection with the thereby defined new sense of 'expressed act', we wish to make clear the whole relation between meaning and expressed intuition. We wish to consider whether such an intuition may not itself be the act constitutive of meaning, or if this is not the case, how the relation between them may be best understood and systematically classified. We are now heading towards a more general question: Do the acts which give expression in general, and the acts which in general are capable of receiving expression, belong to essentially different spheres, and thereby to firmly delimited act-species? And do they nonetheless take their tone from an overarching, unifying genus of acts, in which all acts *capable of functioning 'meaningfully'*, in the widest sense of the

word – whether as meanings proper, or as 'fulfilments' of meanings – can be brought together and set apart, so that all other genera of acts can *eo ipso*, in law-governed fashion, be excluded from such functions? This, we may say, is the immediate aim of our Investigation. And as our considerations advance, there will be an obvious widening of our sphere of treatment so as to render self-evident the relation of the questions here raised to a general 'sense-making' of knowledge. New and higher aims will then enter our field of view.

§4 The expression of a percept ('judgement of perception'). Its meaning cannot lie in perception, but must lie in peculiar expressive acts

Let us consider an example. I have just looked out into the garden and now give expression to my percept in the words: 'There flies a blackbird!' *What is here the act in which my meaning resides?* I think we may say, in harmony with points established in our First Investigation, that it does not reside in perception, at least not in perception alone. It seems plain that we cannot describe the situation before us as if there were nothing else in it – apart from the sound of the words – which decides the meaningfulness of the expression, but the percept to which it attaches. For we could base different statements on the *same* percept, and thereby unfold quite different senses. I could, e.g., have remarked: 'That is black!', 'That is a black bird!', 'There flies that black bird!', 'There it soars!', and so forth. And conversely, the sound of my words and their sense might have remained the same, though my percept varied in a number of ways. Every chance alteration of the perceiver's relative position alters his percept, and different persons, who perceive the same object simultaneously, never have exactly the same percept. No such differences are relevant to the meaning of a perceptual statement. One may at times pay special attention to them, but one's statement will then be correspondingly different.

One might, however, maintain that this objection only showed meaning to be unaffected by such differences in individual percepts: it might still be held to reside in something *common* to the whole multitude of perceptual acts which centre in a single object.

To this we reply, that percepts may not only vary, but may also vanish altogether, without causing an expression to lose all its meaning. A listener may understand my words, and my sentence as a whole, without looking into the garden: confident in my veracity, he may bring forth the same judgement without the percept. Possibly he is helped by an imaginative re-enactment, but perhaps this too is absent, or occurs in so mutilated, so inadequate a form, as to be no fit counterpart of what appears perceptually, at least not in respect of the features 'expressed' in my statement.

But if the sense of a statement survives the elimination of perception, and is the same sense as before, we cannot suppose that perception is the act in

which the sense of a perceptual statement, its expressive intention, is achieved. The acts which are united with the sound of our words are phenomenologically quite different according as these words have a purely symbolic, or an intuitively fulfilled significance, or according as they have a merely fancied or a perceptually realizing basis: we cannot believe that signification is now achieved in *this* sort of act, and now in *that*. We shall rather have to conceive that the function of meaning pertains in all cases to one and the same sort of act, a type of act free from the limitations of the perception or the imagination which so often fail us, and which, in all cases where an expression authentically 'expresses', merely becomes one with the act expressed.

It remains, of course, incontestable that, in 'judgements of perception', perception is internally related to our statements' sense. We have good reason to say: the statement *expresses the percept*, i.e. brings out what is perceptually 'given'. The same percept may serve as a foundation for several statements, but, however the sense of such statements may vary, it addresses itself to the phenomenal content of perception. It is now one, now another, part of our unified, total percept – a part, no doubt, in a non-independent, attributive sense – which gives our judgement its specific basis, without thereby becoming the true carrier of its meaning, as the possibility of eliminating percepts has just shown us.

We must accordingly say: *This 'expression' of a percept* – more objectively phrased, of a perceived thing as such – *is no affair of the sound of words, but of certain expressive acts*. 'Expression' in this context means verbal expression informed with its full sense, which is here put in a certain relation to perception, through which relation the latter is in its turn said to be 'expressed'. This means, at the same time, that *between* percept and sound of words another act (or pattern of acts) is *intercalated*. I call it an act, since the expressive experience, whether or not accompanied by a percept, always has an intentional direction to something objective. This mediating act must be the true giver of meaning, must pertain to the significantly functioning expression as its essential constituent, and must determine its possession of an identical sense, whether or not this is associated with a confirming perception. The rest of our investigation will show ever more clearly that our conception is workable.

§5 Continuation. Perception as an act which determines meaning, without embodying it

We can go no further without discussing a doubt which crops up at this point. Our treatment seems to demand a definite narrowing down: it appears to cover more than can be fully justified. If perception never constitutes the full meaning of a statement grounded on perception, it seems nonetheless to make a contribution to this meaning, and to do so in cases of the sort just dealt with. This will become clearer if we slightly modify our

example, and instead of speaking quite indefinitely of a blackbird, proceed to speak of *this* blackbird. 'This' is an essentially occasional expression which only becomes fully significant when we have regard to the circumstances of utterance, in this case to an actually performed percept. The perceived object, as it is given in perception, is what the word 'this' signifies. The present tense in the grammatic form of a verb likewise expresses a relation to what is actually *present*, and so again to perception. Plainly the same holds of our original example: to say 'There flies a blackbird' is not to say that some blackbird in general is flying by, but that a blackbird is flying by here and now.

It is clear, of course, that the meaning in question is not attached to the word-sound of 'this'; it does not belong among the meanings firmly and generally bound up with this word. We must, however, allow that the sense of a unified statement is to be found in the total act of meaning which in a given case underlies it – whether or not this may be completely expressed through the universal meanings of its words. It seems, therefore, that we must allow that perception contributes to the significant content of a judgement, in all cases where such perception gives intuitive presence to the fact to which our statement gives judgemental expression. It is of course a contribution that can perhaps also be made by other acts, in an essentially similar manner. The listener does not perceive the garden, but he is perhaps acquainted with it, has an intuitive idea of it, places the imagined blackbird and reported event in it, and so, through the mere picture-work of fantasy, achieves an understanding which follows the intention and which agrees in sense with the speaker's.

The situation permits, however, of another reading. Intuition may indeed be allowed to contribute to the meaning of a perceptual statement, but only in the sense that the meaning could not acquire a *determinate* relation to the object it means without some intuitive aid. But this does not imply that the intuitive act is itself a carrier of meaning, or that it really makes *contributions* to this meaning, contributions *discoverable* among the constituents of the completed meaning. Genuinely occasional expressions have no doubt a meaning which varies from case to case, but in all such changes a common element is left over, which distinguishes *their* ambiguity from that of a casual equivocation.² The addition of intuition has as effect that this common element of meaning, indeterminate in its abstraction, can determine itself. Intuition in fact gives it complete determinateness of objective reference, and thereby its last difference. This achievement does not entail that a part of the meaning must itself lie in the intuitive sphere.

I say 'this', and now mean the paper lying before me. Perception is responsible for the relation of my word to *this* object, but my meaning does not lie in perception. When I say 'this', I do not merely perceive, but a new *act of pointing* (of *this-meaning*) builds itself on my perception, an act directed upon the latter and dependent on it, despite its difference. In this pointing

reference, and in it alone, our meaning resides. Without a percept – or some correspondingly functioning act – the pointing would be empty, without definite differentiation, impossible in the concrete. For of course the indeterminate thought of the *speaker as pointing to something* – which the hearer may entertain before he knows *what* object we wish to indicate by our 'this' – is not the thought we enact in the actual pointing, with which the determinate thought of the thing pointed to has been merely associated. One should not confuse the general character of actual pointing as such with the indefinite presentation of 'a certain' act of pointing.

Perception accordingly *realizes the possibility* of an unfolding of my act of this-meaning with its definite relation to the object, e.g. to this paper before my eyes. But it does not, on our view, itself constitute this meaning, nor even part of it.

In so far as the act-character of a pointing act is oriented to intuition, it achieves a definiteness of intention which fulfils itself in intuition, in accordance with a general feature of acts which may be called their *intentional essence*. For a pointing reference remains the same, whichever out of a multitude of mutually belonging percepts may underlie it, in all of which the same, and *recognizably* the same, object appears. The meaning of 'this' is again the same when, instead of a percept, some act from our range of imaginative presentation is substituted for it, an act presenting the same object through a picture in a recognizably identical manner. It changes, however, when intuitions from other perceptual or imaginative spheres are substituted. We are once more referring to a *this*, but the general character of the reference which obtains here, that of direct, attributively unmediated aiming at an object, is otherwise differentiated: the intention to another object attaches to it, just as physical pointing becomes spatially different with each change in spatial direction.

We hold, therefore, that *perception is an act which determines, but does not embody meaning*. This view is confirmed by the fact that essentially occasional expressions like 'this' can often be used and understood without an appropriate intuitive foundation. Once the intention to an object has been formed on a suitable intuitive basis, it can be revived and exactly reproduced *without* the help of a suitable act of perception or imagination.

Genuinely occasional expressions are accordingly much like *proper names*, in so far as the latter function with their authentic meaning. For a proper name also names an object 'directly'. It refers to it, not attributively, as the bearer of these or those properties, but without such 'conceptual' mediation, as what it *itself* is, just as perception might set it before our eyes. The meaning of a proper name lies accordingly in a direct reference-to-this-object, a reference that perception only *fulfils*, as imagination does *provisionally* and illustratively, but which is not identical with these intuitive acts. It is just in this manner that perception gives an object to the word 'this' (where it is directed to objects of possible perception): our reference to

is fulfilled in perception, but is not perception itself. And naturally the meaning of both types of directly naming expressions has an intuitive origin, from which their naming intentions first orient themselves towards an individual object. In other respects they are different. As 'this' is infected with the thought of a pointing, it imports (as we showed) a mediation and a complication, i.e. a peculiar form absent from the proper name. The proper name also belongs as a fixed appellation to its object; to this constant pertinence corresponds something in the manner of its relation to that object. This is shown in the fact of our knowing a person or thing by name, as something *called* so-and-so: I know Hans as *Hans*, Berlin as *Berlin*. We have, in our treatment, no doubt ignored the case of all those proper names which are *significant in derivative fashion*. When proper names have once been formed in direct application (and so on a basis of intuitions which give things to us), we can, by employing the concept of 'being called', itself formed by reflection on the use of proper names, give proper names to objects, or take cognizance of their proper names, even though such objects are not directly given or known to us, but are only described indirectly as the bearers of certain properties. *The capital of Spain, e.g., is called* (i.e. has the proper name) '*Madrid*'. A person unacquainted with the town Madrid itself, thereby achieves both knowledge of its name and the power to name it correctly, and yet not thereby the individual meaning of the word '*Madrid*'. Instead of the direct reference, which only an actual seeing of the city could arouse, he must make do with an indirect pointing to this reference, operating through characteristic ideas of properties and the conception of 'being called' such and such.

If we may trust our arguments, we must not only draw a general distinction between the perceptual and the significant element in the statement of perception; we must also locate *no part of the meaning in the percept itself*. The percept, which *presents the object, and the statement which, by way of the judgement* (or by the thought-act invoven into the unity of the judgement) *thinks and expresses it, must be rigorously kept apart*, even though, in the case of the perceptual judgement now being considered, they stand to each other in the most intimate relation of mutual *coincidence*, or in the unity of fulfilment. We need not dwell on the fact that a like result applies also to other intuitive judgements, and thus also to statements which, in a sense analogous to that which applies to perceptual judgements, 'express' the intuitive content of an imagination, a remembering, an expectation etc.

Addendum. In the exposition of §26 of Investigation I we began with the understanding of the hearer, and drew a distinction between the 'indicating' (*anzeigende*) and the 'indicated' (*angezeigte*) meaning of an essentially occasional expression and, in particular, of the word 'this'. For the hearer, in whose momentary field of vision the thing that we wish to point out is perhaps not present, only this indefinitely general thought is at first aroused:

Something is being pointed out. Only when a presentation is added (an intuitive presentation if the thing dealt with demands an intuitive pointing out), is a definite reference constituted for him, and so a full, authentic meaning for the demonstrative pronoun. For the speaker there is no such sequence: he has no need of the indefinitely referential idea which functions as 'index' for the hearer. Not the idea of an indication, but an indication itself, is given in his case, and it is *eo ipso* determinately directed thingward. From the first the speaker enjoys the 'indicated' meaning, and enjoys it in a presentative intention immediately oriented towards intuition. If the thing meant cannot be intuitively picked out, as in a reference to a theorem in a mathematical proof, the conceptual thought in question plays the part of an intuition: the indicative intuition could derive fulfillment from an actual re-living of this past thought. In each case we observe a *duplicity* in the indicative intention: the character of the indication seems in the first case to espouse the directly objective intention, as a result of which we have an intention directed upon a definite object that we are intuiting here and now. Our other case does not differ. If the previous conceptual thought is not now being performed, an intention which corresponds to it survives in memory; this attaches itself to the act-character of the indication, thereby lending it definiteness of direction.

What we have just said about *indicating* and *indicated meaning* can have two meanings. It can mean (1) the two mutually resolving thoughts which characterize the hearer's successive understanding: *first* the indeterminate idea of something or other referred to by 'this', *then* the act of definitely directed indication into which a completing presentation transforms it. In the latter act we have the indicated, in the former the indicating meaning. (2) If we confine ourselves to the complete, definitely directed indication which the speaker has from the beginning, we can again see something which determines this, which narrows it down to an indication of 'this thing double about it: the general character of indication as such, and the feature which determines this, which narrows it down to an indication of 'this thing there'. The former can again be called an indicating meaning, or rather the indicating element in the indissoluble unity of meaning, in so far as it is what the hearer can immediately grasp by virtue of its expressive generality, and can use to indicate what is referred to. If I say 'this', the hearer at least knows that something is being pointed at. (Just so in the case of other essentially occasional expressions. If I say 'here', I have to do with something in my nearer or further spatial environment, etc.) On the other hand, the true aim of my talk lies not in this general element, but in the direct intending of the object in question. Towards it and its fullness of content I am directed, and these empty generalities do little or nothing towards determining the latter. In this sense a direct intention is the primary, indicated meaning.

This second distinction is the one laid down by our definition in our previous exposition. (*Inv.* 1, §26). The distinctions achieved in this section,

and our much clearer treatment, will probably have helped towards a further clarification of this difficult matter.

§6 The static unity of expressive thought and expressed intuition. Recognition (*das Erkennen*)

We shall now absorb ourselves in a closer investigation of the relations holding among intuitive acts, on the one hand, and expressive acts, on the other. We shall confine ourselves, in the present section entirely, to the range of the simplest possible cases, and so naturally to expressions and significant intentions which belong to the sphere of *naming*. We shall make, for the rest, no claim to treat this field exhaustively. We are concerned with nominal expressions, which refer themselves in the most perspicuous of possible fashions to 'corresponding' percepts and other forms of intuition.

Let us first glance in this field at a *relationship of static union*, where a *sense-giving thought has based itself on intuition, and is thereby related to its object*. I speak, e.g., of my *inkpot*, and my inkpot also stands before me: I see it. The name names the object of my percept, and is enabled to name it by the significant act which expresses its character and its form in the form of the name. The relation between name and thing named, has, in this state of union, a certain *descriptive character*, that we previously noticed: the name 'my inkpot' seems to *overlay* the perceived object, to belong *sensibly* to it. This belonging is of a peculiar kind. The words do not belong to the objective context of physical thinghood that they express: in this context they have no place, they are not referred to as something in or attaching to the things that they name. If we turn to the experiences involved, we have, on the one hand, as said before,³ the acts in which the words appear, on the other hand, the similar acts in which the things appear. As regards the latter, the inkpot confronts us in perception. Following our repeated demonstration of the descriptive essence of perception, this means no more phenomenologically than that we undergo a certain sequence of experiences of the class of sensations, sensuously unified in a peculiar serial pattern, and informed by a certain act-character of 'interpretation' (*Auffassung*), which endows it with an objective sense. This act-character is responsible for the fact that an *object*, i.e. this inkpot, is perceptually apparent to us. In similar fashion, the appearing word is constituted for us in an act of perception or imaginative presentation.

Not word and inkpot, therefore, but the act-experiences just described, in which they make their appearance, are here brought into relation: in these word and inkpot appear, while yet being nothing whatever in the acts in question. But how does this happen? What brings these acts into unity? The answer seems clear. The relation, as one of naming, is mediated, not merely by acts of meaning, but by acts of recognition (*Erkennen*), which are here also acts of *classification*. The perceived object is *recognized* for an inkpot,

known as one, and in so far as the act of meaning is most intimately one with an act of classification, and this latter, as recognition of the perceived object, is again intimately one with the act of perception, the expression seems to be *applied* to the thing and to clothe it like a garment.

Ordinarily we speak of recognizing and classifying the object of perception, as if our act busied itself with this *object*. But we have seen that there is no object in the experience, only a perception, a thus and thus determine mindedness (*Zumtunsein*): *the cognitive act in the experience must accordingly base itself on the act of perception*. One must not of course misunderstand the matter, and raise the objection that we are putting the matter as if perception was classified rather than its object. We are not doing this at all. Such a performance would involve acts of a quite different, much more complex constitution, expressible through expressions of corresponding complexity, e.g. 'the perception of the inkpot'. It follows that the cognitive experience of this thing as 'my inkpot', is nothing but a recognition which, in a definite and direct fashion, fuses an expressive experience, on the one hand, with the relevant percept, on the other.

The same holds of cases in which *picture-presentations* serve in place of percepts. The imaginatively apparent object, e.g. the identical inkpot in memory or in fancy, is felt to bear the expression which names it. This means, phenomenologically speaking, that a cognitive act in union with an expressive experience is so related to an imaginative act as to be, in objective parlance, spoken of as the recognition of an imaginatively presented object as, e.g., our inkpot. The imagined object, too, is absolutely nothing in our presentation of it, our experience is rather a certain blend of images, fancied sensations, informed by a certain interpretative act-character. To live through this act, and to have an imaginative presentation of the object, are one and the same. If we therefore express the situation in the words 'I have before me an image, the image of an inkpot', we have plainly coupled new acts with our expressions and, in particular, a *cognitive act* which is intimately one with our act of imagining.

§7 Recognition as a character of acts, and the 'generality of words'

The following more exact argument would seem to show conclusively that, in all cases where a name is applied to a thing intuitively given, we may presume the presence of a cognitive act-character mediating between the appearance of the word-sounds, on the one hand (or the complete sense-informed word), and the intuition of the thing on the other. One often hears of the *generality of words*, and usually understands by this highly ambiguous phrase that a word is not bound to an individual intuition, but belongs rather to an endless array of possible intuitions.

In what, however, does this belonging consist?

Let us deal with an extremely simple example, that of the name 'red'. In so far as it names an appearing object as red, it belongs to this object in virtue of the moment of red that appears in this object. And each object that bears a moment of like sort in itself, justifies the same appellation: the same name belongs to each, and does so by way of an identical sense.

But in what does this appellation by way of an identical sense consist?

We observe first that the word does not attach externally, and merely through hidden mental mechanisms, to the individual, specifically similar traits of our intuitions. It is not enough, manifestly, to acknowledge the bare fact that, wherever such and such an individual trait appears in our intuition, the word also *accompanies* it as a mere pattern of sound. A mere concomitance, a mere external going with or following on one another would not forge any internal bond among them, and certainly not an intentional bond. Yet plainly we have here such an intentional bond, and one of quite peculiar phenomenological character. The word *calls* the red thing red. The red appearing before us is what is *referred* to by the name, and is referred to as 'red'. In this mode of naming reference, the name appears as *belonging* to the named and as *one* with it.

On the other hand, however, the word has its sense quite apart from an attachment to this intuition, and without attachment to *any* 'corresponding' intuition. Since this sense is everywhere the same, it is plain that it is not the mere phoneme, rather the true, complete word, endowed on all occasions with the constant character of its sense, that must be held to underlie the naming relation. Even then it will not be enough to describe the union of meaningful word and corresponding intuition in terms of mere concomitance. Take the word, present in consciousness and *understood as a mere symbol* without being actually used to name anything, and set the corresponding intuition beside it: these two phenomena may at once, for genetic reasons, be brought together in the phenomenological unity of naming. Their mere togetherness is, however, not as yet this unity, which *grows out of it* with plain novelty. It is conceivable, *a priori*, that no such unity should emerge, that the coexistent phenomena should be phenomenologically disjointed, that the object before us should not be the thing meant or named by the meaningful word, and that the word should not *belong* to the object as its name, and so name it.

Phenomenologically we find before us no mere aggregate, but an intimate, in fact intentional, unity: we can rightly say that the two acts, the one setting up the complete word, and the other the thing, are intentionally combined in a single *unity of act*. What here lies before us can be naturally described, with equal correctness, by saying that the name 'red' calls the object red, or that the red object is recognized (*known*) as red, and called 'red' as a result of *this recognition*. To 'call something red' – in the fully actual sense of 'calling' which presupposes an underlying intuition of the thing so called – and to 'recognize something as red', are in reality synonymous expressions: they

only differ in so far as the latter brings out more clearly that we have here no mere duality, but a unity engineered by a single act-character. In the intimacy of this fusion, we must nonetheless admit, the various factors implicit in our unity – the physical word-phenomenon with its ensoulng meaning, the aspect of recognition and the intuiting of what one names – do not separate themselves off clearly, but our discussion compels us to presume them all to be there. We shall have more to say on this point later on.

It is plain that the recognitive character of certain acts, which gives them their significant relation to objects of intuition, does not pertain to words as noises, but to words in their meaningful, their *semantic* (*bedeutungsmässigen*) essence. Very different verbal sounds, e.g., the 'same' word in different languages, may involve an identical recognitive relation: the object is essentially known for the same, though with the aid of quite different noises. Naturally the complete recognition of something red, being equivalent to the actually used name, must include the noise 'red' as a part. The members of different speech-communities feel different verbal sounds to be fitting, and include these in the unity of 'knowing something'. But the meaning attaching to such words, and the recognitive act actually attaching this meaning to its object, remains everywhere the same, so that these verbal differences are rightly regarded as irrelevant.

The 'generality of the word' means, therefore, that the unified sense of one and the same word covers (or, in the case of a nonsense-word, purports to cover) an ideally delimited manifold of possible intuitions, each of which could serve as the basis for an act of recognitive naming endowed with the same sense. To the word 'red', e.g., corresponds the possibility of both knowing as, and calling 'red', all red objects that might be given in possible intuitions. This possibility leads on, with an *a priori* guarantee, to the further possibility of becoming aware, through an *identifying synthesis* of all such naming recognitions, of a sameness of meaning of one with the other: this *A* is red, and that *A* is the same, i.e. also red: the two intuited singulars belong under the same 'concept'.

A dubious point emerges here. We said above that a word could be understood even if not actually used to name anything. Must we not, however, grant that a word must at least have the *possibility* of functioning as the actual name of something and so of achieving an actual recognitive relation to corresponding intuition? Must we not say that without such a possibility it could not be a word at all? The answer, of course, is that this possibility depends on the possibility of the recognitions, the 'knowings', in question. Not all intended knowing is possible, not all nominal meaning can be *realized*. 'Imaginary' names may be names, but they cannot *actually* be used to name anything, they have, properly speaking, no extension, they are *without generality in the sense of the possible and the true*. Their generality is *empty pretension*. But how these last forms of speech are themselves to be made clear, what phenomenological facts lie behind them, will be a matter for further investigation.

What we have said applies to *all* expressions, and not merely to such as have generality of meaning in the manner of a *class-concept*. It applies also to expressions having *individual reference*, such as proper names. The fact to be spoken of as the 'generality of verbal meaning' does not point to the generality accorded to generic, as opposed to individual concepts, but, on the contrary, embraces either indifferently. The 'recognition', the 'knowing', of which we speak when a significantly functioning expression encounters corresponding intuition, must not, therefore, be conceived as an actual *classification*, the ranging of an intuitively or cogitatively presented object in a *class*, a ranging necessarily based on general concepts and verbally mediated by general names. Proper names, too, have their generality, though, when actually used to name anything, they can *eo ipso* not be said to classify it. Proper names, like other names, cannot name anything, without thereby also 'knowing' it. That their relation to corresponding intuition is, in fact, as indirect as that of any other expression, can be shown by a treatment exactly analogous to the one conducted above. Each and every name obviously belongs to no definite percept, nor to a definite imagination nor to any other pictorial illustration. The same person can make his appearance in countless possible intuitions, and all these appearances have no merely intuitive but also a recognitive unity. Each appearance from such an intuitive manifold will justify a precisely synonymous use of the proper name. Which-ever appearance is given, the man using the name means one and the same person or thing. And he means this not merely in being intuitively oriented to it, as when he deals with an object personally strange to him; he knows it as this definite person or thing. He knows Hans as *Hans*, Berlin as *Berlin*. To recognize a person as this person, or a city as this city, is again an act not tied to the particular sensuous content of this or that word-appearance. It is identically the same act in the case of a variety (in possibility of an infinite variety) of verbal noises, as, e.g., when several different proper names apply to the same thing.

This generality of the proper name, and of the peculiar meaning which corresponds to it, is plainly quite different in kind from that of the *general name*.

The former consists in the fact that a synthesis of possible intuitions belongs to a *single* individual object, intuitions made one by the common intentional character imparted by every relation to the same object, despite all phenomenal differences among individual intuitions. On this unified basis, the particular unity of recognitive knowing reposes, which belongs to the 'generality of verbal meaning', to its range of ideally possible realizations. In this way the naming word has a recognitive relation to a boundless multitude of intuitions, whose identical object it both knows and thereby names.

The case of the *class-name* is quite different. Its generality covers a *range of objects*, to each of which, *considered apart*, a possible synthesis of percepts, a possible individual meaning and proper name belongs. The general

name 'covers' this range through being able to name each item in the whole range in general fashion, i.e. not by individually recognizing it in the manner of the proper name, but by classifying it, in the manner of the common name. The thing that is either directly given, or known in its authentic self-being (*Eigenheit*), or known through its properties, is now known as *an A* and named accordingly.

§8 The dynamic unity of expression and expressed intuition. The consciousness of fulfilment and that of identity

From the tranquil, as it were *static* coincidence of meaning and intuition, we now turn to that *dynamic* coincidence where an expression first functions in merely symbolic fashion, and then is accompanied by a 'more or less' corresponding intuition. Where this happens, we experience a descriptively peculiar *consciousness of fulfilment*;⁴ the act of pure meaning, like a goal-seeking intention, finds its fulfilment in the act which renders the matter intuitive. In this transitional experience, the *mutual belongingness* of the two acts, the act of meaning, on the one hand, and the intuition which more or less corresponds to it, on the other, reveals its phenomenological roots. We experience how *the same* objective item which was 'merely thought of' in symbol is now presented in intuition, and that it is intuited as being precisely the determinate so-and-so that it was at first merely thought or meant to be. We are merely expressing the same fact if we say that *the intentional essence of the act of intuition gets more or less perfectly fitted into the semantic essence of the act of expression*.

In the previously considered static relation among acts of meaning and intuition, we spoke of a *recognition*, a *knowing*. This represents the sense-informed relation of the name to the intuitive datum that it names. But the element of meaning is not here itself the act of recognition. In the purely symbolic understanding of a word, an act of meaning is performed (the word means something to us) but nothing is thereby known, recognized. The difference lies, as the foregoing paragraphs have established, not in the mere accompanying presence of the intuition of the thing named, but in the phenomenologically peculiar form of unity. What is characteristic about this unity of knowing, of recognition, is now shown up by the dynamic relationship before us. In it there is at first the meaning-intention, quite on its own: then the corresponding intuition comes to join it. At the same time we have the phenomenological unity which is now stamped as a consciousness of fulfilment. Talk about recognizing objects, and talk about fulfilling a meaning-intention, therefore express the same fact, merely from differing standpoints. The former adopts the standpoint of the object meant, while the latter has the two acts as its foci of interest. Phenomenologically the acts are always present, while the objects are sometimes non-existent. Talk of

fulfilment therefore characterizes the phenomenological essence of the recognition more satisfactorily. It is a primitive phenomenological fact, native relation of signification⁵ and acts of intuition can enter into this peculiar relation. Where they do so, where some act of meaning-intention fulfils itself in an intuition, we also say: 'The object of intuition is known through its concept' or 'The correct name has been applied to the object appearing before us'.

We can readily do justice to the obvious phenomenological difference between the static and the dynamic fulfilment or recognition. In the dynamic relationship the members of the relation, and the act of recognition which relates them, are disjoined in time: they unfold themselves in a temporal pattern. In the static relationship, which represents the lasting outcome of this temporal transaction, they occur in temporal and material (*sachlicher*) coincidence. There we have a first stage of mere thought (of pure conception or mere signification), a meaning-intention wholly unsatisfied, to which a second stage of more or less adequate fulfilment is added, where thoughts repose as if satisfied in the sight of their object, which presents itself, in virtue of this consciousness of unity, as what is thought of in this thought, what it refers to, as the more or less perfectly attained goal of thinking. In the static relationship, on the other hand, we have this consciousness of unity alone, perhaps with no noticeably marked-off, precedent stage of unfulfilled intention. The fulfilment of the intention is not here an event of self-fulfilment, but a tranquil state of being-fulfilled, not a coming into coincidence, but a being coincident.

From an objective point of view we may here also speak of a *unity of identity*. If we compare both components of a unity of fulfilment – whether treating them in dynamic transition into one another, or holding them apart analytically in their static unity, only to see them at once flowing back into one another – we assert their *objective identity*. For we said, and said with self-evidence, that the object of intuition is the *same* as the object of the thought which fulfils itself in it and, where the fit is exact, that the object is seen as being exactly the same as it is thought of or (what always says the same in this context) meant. Identity, it is plain, is not first dragged in through comparative, cogitatively mediated reflection: it is there from the start as experience, as unexpressed, unconceptualized experience. In other words, the thing which, from the point of view of our acts is phenomenologically described as fulfilment, will also, from the point of view of the two objects involved in it, the intuited object, on the one hand, and the thought object, on the other, be expressively styled 'experience of identity', 'consciousness of identity', or 'act of identification'. A more or less complete identity is the *objective datum which corresponds to the act of fulfilment*, which 'appears in it'. This means that, not only signification and intuition, but also their mutual adequation, their union of fulfilment, can be called an act, since it has its own peculiar intentional correlate, an objective

something to which it is 'directed'. Another side of the same situation is again, we saw above, expressed in talk about *recognizing* or *knowing*. The fact that our meaning-intention is united with intuition in a fulfilling manner, gives to the *object* which appears in such intuition, when it primarily concerns us, the character of a thing known. If we try to say more exactly 'as what' we recognize something, our objective reflection points, not to our *act* of meaning (*Bedeutens*), but to the meaning (*Bedeutung*), the self-identical 'concept' itself; talk of recognition therefore expresses our view of the same unified state from the standpoint of the object of intuition (or of the fulfilling act), in its relations to the meaning-concept of the signitive act. Conversely we say, though perhaps in more special contexts, that our thought 'grasps' (*begreift*) the matter, that it is the latter's concept (*Begriff*) or 'grasp'. After our exposition it is obvious that recognition, like fulfillment – the former is in fact only another name for the latter – can be called an act of identification.

Addendum. I cannot here suppress a difficulty connected with the otherwise illuminating notion of the unity of identity or recognition, as an *act* of identification or recognition. This is particularly the case, since this difficulty will reveal itself as a serious one as our clarifications proceed and progress, and will inspire fruitful discussions. Closer analysis makes it plain that, in the cases detailed above, where a name is actually applied to an object of intuition, we refer to the intuited and named *object*, but not to the *identity* of this object, as something at once intuited and named. Shall we say that an emphasis of attention decides the matter? Or ought we not rather to grant that there is not here a fully constituted act of identification: the nucleus of this act, the connective union of significant intention and corresponding intuition is really present, but it 'represents' no objectifying interpretation (*Auffassung*). On the experienced unity of coincidence *no act of relational identification* is founded, no intentional consciousness of identity, in which identity, as a unity referred to, first gains objective status. In our reflection on the unity of fulfillment, in analysing and opposing its mutually connected acts, we naturally, and indeed necessarily, also framed that relational interpretation which the form of its union, with *a priori* necessity, permits. Our second section will deal with this question in its widest form which concerns the categorical characters of acts (see Chapter VI, §48, and the whole of Chapter VII). Meanwhile we shall continue to treat the sort of unity in question as a full act, or we shall at least not differentiate it expressly from a full act. This will not affect the essential point in our treatment, in so far as the passage from a consciousness of unity to a relational identification always remains open, has a possibility guaranteed *a priori*, so that we are entitled to say that an identifying coincidence has been *experienced*, even if there is no *conscious intention* directed to identity, and *no relational identification*.

§9 The differing character of an intention inside and outside the unity of fulfillment

Our introduction of dynamic fulfillment, or of fulfillment strung out in an articulated process, to help interpret the static act of recognition, removes a difficulty which threatens to blur our clear grasp of the relation between significant intention and the full act of recognition. Can we really say that all these factors can be distinguished in the unity of recognition, the verbal expression, the acts of meaning and intuition and, finally, the overarching character of recognitive unity or fulfillment? One might hold that analysis only lays bare *verbal expressions*, particularly names, on the one hand, and intuition, on the other, both unified through the character of recognitive naming. One might reject the idea of an *act of meaning* bound up with the verbal expression, an element distinct from recognitive character and fulfilling intuition, and identifiable with the 'understanding' as opposed to the 'knowing' character of the expression: this would seem, at least, to be an unnecessary assumption.

This doubt affects, therefore, the central conception which in §4 we took to be most intelligible, before we embarked on our analysis of the unity of recognition. We must accordingly re-emphasize the following points in our discussion:

1. If we compare expressions used in recognizing objects with those used outside of such recognition, it is plain that both have the very same meaning. Whether I understand the word 'tree' as a mere symbol, or use it in connection with my intuition of a tree, it is plain that I mean something by the word, and mean the same thing on both occasions.

2. It is plain that it is the significant intention of the expression that 'fulfils' itself in the process of fulfillment, and so achieves 'coincidence' with an intuition, and that the recognition which stems from this process of coincidence is itself this unity of coincidence. The notion of this unity of coincidence plainly involves that we are not here concerned with a divided duality but with a seamless unity, which only acquires articulation when drawn out in time. We must, therefore, maintain that the same act of meaning-intention which occurs in an empty symbolic presentation is also part of the complex act of recognition, but that a meaning-intention that was 'free', is now 'bound' and 'neutralized' in the stage of coincidence. It is so peculiarly inwrought and infused in this combination that, while its semantic essence remains intact, it nonetheless undergoes a certain change of character.

The same holds wherever contents are first studied apart, and then seen in their connection with other contents, as parts knit into wholes. Certain changes would not connect if they made no difference to what they connected. Connectedness necessarily occur, and these are naturally such specific connectednesses as constitute the phenomenological correlatives of what

are objectively *relational* properties. Consider, for example, a line set apart, perhaps on a bare white background, and the same line as part of a figure. In the latter case, it *impinges* on other lines, is *touched, cut* by them etc. If we turn from mathematical ideals to empirically intuited linear stretches, these are phenomenological characters that help determine the appearance of linearity. The same stretch – ‘same’ in internal content – appears ever different according as it enters into this or that phenomenal context and, if incorporated in a line or surface qualitatively identical with it, melts indistinguishably into this background, losing its phenomenal separateness and independence.

§10 The wider class of experiences of fulfilment. Intuitions as intentions which require fulfilment

We may now further characterize the consciousness of fulfilment by seeing in it an experiential form which plays a part in many other fields of mental life. We have only to think of the opposition between wishful intention and wish-fulfilment, between voluntary intention and execution, of the fulfilment of hopes and fears, the resolution of doubts, the confirmation of surmises etc., to be clear that essentially the same opposition is to be found in very different classes of intentional experiences: the opposition between significant intention and fulfilment of meaning is merely a special case of it. We have dealt with this point previously,⁶ and delimited a class of intentional experience under the more pregnant name of ‘intentions’: their peculiarity lies in being able to provide the basis for relations of fulfilment. In this class are ranged all the acts which are in a narrower or wider sense ‘logical’, including the *intuitive*, whose role it is to fulfil other intuitions in knowledge.

When, e.g., a familiar melody begins, it stirs up definite intentions which find their fulfilment in the melody’s gradual unfolding. The same is the case even when the melody is unfamiliar. The regularities governing melody as such, determine intentions, which may be lacking in complete objective definiteness, but which nonetheless find or can find their fulfilments. As concrete experiences, these intentions are of course fully definite: the ‘indeterminateness’ of what they intend is plainly a descriptive peculiarity pertaining to their character. We may say, in fact, with correct paradox (as we did before in a similar case) that ‘indefiniteness’ (i.e. the peculiarity of demanding an incompletely determined completion, which lies in a ‘sphere’ circumscribed by a law) is a definite feature of such an intention. Such an intention has not merely a range of possible fulfilment, but imports a common fulfilment-character into each actual fulfilment from this range. The fulfilment of acts which have definite or indefinite intentions is phenomenologically different, and the same holds of fulfilments of intentions whose indefiniteness points in this or that direction of possible fulfilment.

In our previous example there is also a relation between *expectation* and *fulfilment of expectation*. It would, however, be quite wrong to think, and conversely, that every relation of an intention to its fulfilment was a relation involving expectation. *Intention is not expectancy*, it is not of its essence to be directed to future appearances. If I see an incomplete pattern, e.g. in this carpet partially covered over by furniture, the piece I see seems clothed with intentions pointing to further completions – we feel as if the lines and coloured shapes go on ‘in the sense’ of what we see – but we expect nothing. It would be possible for us to expect something, if movement promised us further views. But possible expectations, or occasions for possible expectations, are not themselves expectations.

The external perceptions of the senses offer us an indefinite number of relevant examples. The features which enter into perception always point to completing features, which themselves might appear in other possible perceptions, and that definitely or more or less indefinitely, according to the degree of our ‘empirical acquaintance’ with the object. Every percept, and every perceptual context, reveals itself, on closer analysis, as made up of components which are to be understood as ranged under two standpoints of intention and (actual or possible) fulfilment. The same applies to the parallel acts of imagining and picture-thought in general. In the normal case intentions lack the character of expectancy, they lack it in all cases of tranquil perceiving or picturing, and they acquire it only when perception is in flux, when it is spread out into a continuous series of percepts, all belonging to the perceptual manifold of one and the same object. Objectively put: the object then shows itself from a variety of sides. What was pictorially suggested from one side, becomes confirmed in full perception from another; what was merely adumbrated or given indirectly and subsidiarily as background, from one side, at least receives a portrait-sketch from another, it appears perspectivally foreshortened and projected, only to appear ‘just as it is’ from another side. All perceiving and imagining is, on our view, a web of partial intentions, fused together in the unity of a single total intention. The correlate of this last intention is the thing, while the correlate of its partial intentions are *the thing’s parts and moments*. Only in this way can we understand how consciousness reaches out beyond what it actually experiences. It can so to say mean beyond itself, and its meaning can be fulfilled.

§11 Frustration and conflict. The synthesis of distinction

In the wider sphere of the acts to which distinctions of intention and fulfilment apply, *frustration* may be set beside fulfilment, as its incompatible contrary. The negative expression that we normally use in this case, e.g. even the term ‘non-fulfilment’, has no merely privative meaning: it points to

a new descriptive fact, a form of synthesis as peculiar as fulfillment. This is so even in the narrower case of significant intentions as they stand to intuitive intentions. The synthesis of recognition, of 'knowing', is the consciousness of a certain agreement. The possibility correlated with agreement is, however, 'disagreement' or 'conflict': intuition may not accord with a significant intention, but may 'quarrel' with it. Conflict 'separates', but the experience of conflict puts things into relation and unity: it is a form of *synthesis*. If the previously studied synthesis was one of *identification*, this new synthesis is one of *distinction* (unfortunately we possess no other positive name). This 'distinction' must not be confused with the other 'distinction' which stands opposed to a positive likening. The oppositions between 'identification and distinction' and between 'likening and distinction' are not the same, though it is clear that a close phenomenological affinity explains our use of the same word. In the 'distinction' which is here in question, the *object* of the frustrating act appears *not the same as*, 'distinct from' the object of the intending act. These distinctions point to wider classes of cases than we have hitherto preferred to deal with. Not only significant, but even intuitive intentions are fulfilled in identifications and frustrated in conflicts. We shall have to explore the whole question of the natural circumscription of the acts to which the terms 'same' and 'other' (we can as well say 'is' and 'is not') have application.

The two syntheses are not, however, completely parallel. Each conflict presupposes something which directs its intention to the object of the conflicting act; only a synthesis of fulfillment can give it this direction. Conflict, we may say, presupposes a certain basis of agreement. If I think *A* to be *red*, when it shows itself to be 'in fact' green, an intention to red quarrels with an intention to green in this showing forth, i.e. in this application to intuition. Undeniably, however, this can only be the case because *A* has been identified in the two acts of signification and intuition. Were this not so, the intention would not relate to the intuition. The total intention points to an *A* which is red, and intuition reveals an *A* which is green. It is in the coincidence of meaning and intuition in their direction to an identical *A*, that the moments intended in union with *A* in the two cases, come into conflict. The presumed red (i.e. red of *A*) fails to agree with the intuited green. It is through identity that such non-coincident aspects *correspond* with each other: instead of being 'combined' by fulfillment, they are 'sundered' by conflict. An intention is referred to an appropriate aspect in intuition from which it is also turned away.

What we have here said with special regard to significant intentions and the frustrations they encounter, applies also to our whole previously sketched class of objectifying intentions. We may generally say: *An intention can only be frustrated in conflict in so far as it forms part of a wider intention whose completing part is fulfilled.* We can therefore not talk of conflict in the case of simple, i.e. isolated, acts.

§12 Total and partial identification and distinction as the common phenomenological foundations of predicative and determining forms of expression

The relation between intention (in particular, meaning-intention) and fulfillment that we have so far considered, was that of total agreement. This limitation due to our aim of maximum simplicity: to achieve this, was abstracted from all form, even from the form that announces itself in the little word 'is'. In the relation of an expression to external or internal intuition, we considered only those parts of the expression that fit what we intuit like a garment. But by bringing in conflict as the possibility opposed to the case of total agreement – conflict that could therefore, somewhat misleadingly, be called 'total conflict' – we are made aware of certain new possibilities, the important cases of *partial agreement* and *disagreement* between an intention and the act which fulfils or frustrates it.

We shall, from the start, keep the closer treatment of these possibilities so general, that the validity of all essential results will be clear for intentions of the above indicated wider class, and not merely, therefore, for meaning-intentions.

All conflict pointed to the fact that the frustrated intention in question was part of a more comprehensive intention, which partially fulfilled itself (i.e. in the supplementary parts) while the original part was estranged. In every conflict there is, accordingly, in a certain fashion, both partial agreement and partial conflict. Our attention to objective relations should have revealed these possibilities, since wherever we can talk of coincidence, we can talk about the correlated possibilities of exclusion, inclusion and intersection.

If we keep to the case of conflict, the following additional points suggest themselves:

If a θ is frustrated in a $\bar{\theta}$ in that θ is associated with other intentions η , \dots which are fulfilled, these latter need not be so united with θ , that the whole Θ (θ , η , \dots) deserves to be called an act constituted on its own, one 'in which we live', and to whose unified object we 'pay heed'. In the texture of conscious, intentional experience, there are many possibilities of pointing selection of acts and act-complexes, which remain for the most part unrealized. And only such pointed unities are relevant when we are speaking of individual acts and their syntheses. The case of *pure and complete frustration* therefore consists in the fact that θ alone, not Θ , is emphasized or at times unity only between θ and $\bar{\theta}$. Our interest in other words, is specially directed to the objects corresponding to θ and $\bar{\theta}$. This happens when a green-intention is frustrated by an intuited red, and the green and red are alone attended to. If the clashing intuition of the red is expressed at all, i.e. by a verbal intention fulfilled in it, we should perhaps say: 'This (red) is not

green'. (Of course this sentence does not have the same meaning as the sentence 'The verbal intention "green" is frustrated by the intuition of red'. For the new expression renders *objective* the relation of acts which concerns us, and turns new meaning-intentions upon the latter in total fulfilment.)

It can also be the case that a $\Theta(\theta; \eta; \dots)$ enters synthesis as a whole, and is herewith either associated with a corresponding whole $\Theta(\theta; \eta; \dots)$ or specially associated with its isolated part θ . In the former case there is in part coincidence among the combined elements, i.e. among η, η, \dots and in part total conflict, (θ, θ). The whole synthesis has the character of a total conflict, but of conflict not pure, but mixed. In the other case θ alone stands out as the corresponding act, for the reason, perhaps, that in mixed conflict the unity of $\Theta(\theta; \eta; \dots)$ is resolved. The special synthesis of conflict unites $\Theta(\theta; \eta; \dots)$ and (θ), which is appropriately expressed by 'This (whole object, the red-tiled roof) is not green'. This important relation may be called one of *exclusion* (*Ausscheidung*). Its central character is plainly unaffected, when θ and θ are themselves complex, so that we can distinguish between *pure* and *mixed* exclusion. Roughly speaking, the latter may be illustrated by the example 'This (red-tiled roof) is no green-tiled roof'.

Let us now consider the case of inclusion. An intention can be fulfilled in an act which contains *more* than its fulfilment needs, in so far as the latter presents an object which contains the intention's object, either as a common-or-garden part, or as a 'moment' explicitly or implicitly thought of as belonging to it. We are of course ignoring the acts in which a more comprehensive objective field is set up as an objective background, acts not delimited as unities nor as preferential carriers of attention: otherwise we should be brought back to the synthesis of total coincidence. Let us suppose that a red-tiled roof is presented to us, and that the meaning-intention behind the word 'red' is fulfilled in it. The verbal meaning is here fulfilled with complete coincidence in the intuited red, but the *total intuition* of the red-tiled roof, relieved sharply as a single item from the background, through the work of attention, still enters into a peculiar sort of synthetic unity with *the meaning-intention Red*: 'This is red'. We speak here of a relation of 'subsumption' (*Einordnung*), the opposite of the exclusion mentioned above. Subsumption can obviously only be pure.

The act of subsumptive synthesis, as the act which puts together the intending and fulfilling acts in its total unity, has its objective correlate in the relation of *partial identity of the corresponding objects*. Talk of subsumption points in this direction: it pictures our grasp of the relation as an activity which subsumes the part in the whole. The same objective relationship is, with a change of conceptual standpoint – pointing to unnoticed phenomenological differences casually revealed in our form of expression – expressed in the words: ' Θ_θ has θ_θ ' or ' θ_θ pertains to Θ_θ '. The index θ makes us aware that it is the intentional objects of the acts in question which enter into these relations; we stress the *intentional* objects, the objects as they are

referred to in these acts. The application of these remarks to the case of exclusion, and to the expressions 'has not' or 'does not pertain', is obvious. To the mere 'is' objective identity belongs in all cases, to the 'is not' non-identity (conflict). That we are specially dealing with a relation of subsumption or exclusion requires other means of expression, e.g. the *adjectival form*, which marks off *what is had* or *what pertains* as such, just as the *substantival form* expresses its correlative, the *thing which has as such*, i.e. in its function as 'subject' of an identification. In the attributive, or more generally determining form of expression (even complete identity determines), being is hidden in the inflexion of the adjective, to the extent that it is not explicitly and separately expressed in a relative clause, or, *per contra*, not wholly suppressed ('this philosopher Socrates'). Whether the always mediate expression of non-identity, whether in cases of predication or attribution, or in substantival forms such as 'non-identity', 'non-agreement', expresses a necessary relation of actual 'negation' to an affirmation which, if not actual, is at least present in modified form, would lead to discussions into which we do not now care to enter.

All normal statements are accordingly statements of identity or non-identity, and expressions of the same wherever there is a relation to 'corresponding intuition', i.e. where the intention towards identity or non-identity fulfils itself in a completely achieved identification or distinction. 'The tiled roof', as we would say in our previous case provided a *mere* intention went before, 'is *really* red'. The predicate-intention fits the subject which is presented and intuited as, e.g., 'this tiled roof'. In the opposite case we say: 'It is not *really* red'; the predicate does not pertain to the subject.

But if the meaning of 'is' finds a fulfilment based on an actual identification (which often has the character of a fulfilment), it is clear that we are here passing beyond the sphere on which we had hitherto always kept our eye, without being quite clear as to its limits, the sphere namely of expressions that can really be fulfilled through corresponding *intuition*. Or rather we are made aware that intuition, in the common-or-garden sense of external or internal 'sensitivity', which we took as an obvious basis in our treatment, is not the only function that can rightly be styled 'intuitive', and can be regarded as capable of carrying out the work of fulfilment. We leave the closer exploration of this emerging difference to the Second Section of the present investigation.

We must stress, in conclusion, that the above exposition has not provided a complete analysis of the judgement, but a mere fragment of the same. We have ignored the quality of the synthetic act, the differences between attribution and predication etc.

Indirect characterization of objectifying intentions and their essential varieties through differences in the syntheses of fulfilment

§13 The synthesis of knowing (recognition) as the characteristic form of fulfilment for objectifying acts. Subsumption of acts of meaning under the class of objectifying acts

We have, in the above treatment, classed meaning-intentions in the wider class of 'intentions' in the pregnant sense of the word. All intentions have corresponding possibilities of fulfilment (or of opposed frustration): these themselves are peculiar transitional experiences, characterizable as acts, which permit each act to 'reach its goal' in an act specially correlated with it. These latter acts, inasmuch as they fulfil intentions, may be called 'fulfilling acts', but they are called so only on account of the synthetic act of fulfilment, or rather of self-fulfilment. *Such transitional experience is not always the same in character.* In the case of meaning-intentions, and not less clearly in the case of intuitive intentions, such experiences are unities of knowing, or unities of identification in respect of their objects. This need not be so in the wider class of intentions in general. Everywhere we may speak of coincidences, and everywhere we shall meet with identifications. But the latter often depend on an inwrought act of a sort which permits of a unity of identification and also serves as the foundation of one in the contexts in question.

An example will clarify the matter. The self-fulfilment of a wish is achieved in an act which includes an identification, and includes it as a necessary component. For there is a law which ties the quality of wishing to a 'mere lying presentation', i.e. to an objectifying act, and more precisely to a 'mere presentation', and this leads to a complementary law tying a wish-fulfilment to an underlying act, which incorporates this presentation in its identifying the underlying mere presentation of the thing wished for becomes transformed into the corresponding percept. What we have, however, is not this mere transformation, the mere fact of imagination dissolved in perception. In both enter in unity into the character of an act of identifying coincidence. In this synthetic character, we have it constituted that *a thing is really and truly*

so (i.e. as we had previously merely pictured and wished): this of course does not exclude the possibility that such 'really being so' is merely putative, and especially, in most cases, that it is inadequately presented. If a wish is based on a purely signitive presentation, this identification can of course involve the more special coincidence described above, in which meaning is fulfilled by an intuition that fits it. The same could plainly be said of all intentions that, as objectifying acts, are based on presentations, and what applies to fulfilment carries over, *mutatis mutandis*, to the case of frustration.

It is clear accordingly, to stick to our example, that even if the fulfilment of a wish is founded on an identification, and perhaps on an act of intuitive recognition, this latter act never exhausts the fulfilment of the wish, but merely provides its basis. The self-satisfaction of the specific wish-quality is a peculiar act-character, different in kind. It is by a mere analogy that we extend talk of satisfaction, and even of fulfilment, beyond the sphere of emotional intentionality.

The peculiar character of an intention accordingly goes with the peculiar character of its fulfilling coincidence. Not only does *every nuance of an intention correspond to some nuance of the correlated fulfilment*, and likewise of the self-fulfilling activity in the sense of a synthetic act, but to the *essentially different classes of intention there also correspond pervasive class-differences in fulfilment* (in the twofold sense mentioned above). And obviously *the members which belong to these parallel series belong also to a single class of acts.* The syntheses of fulfilment in the case of wish- and will-intentions certainly show close affinities, and differ deeply from those occurring, e.g., in the case of meaning-intentions. On the other hand, the fulfilments of meaning-intentions and of intuitive acts are definitely of the same character, and so in the case of all acts that we classed as 'objectifying'. We may say of this class of acts which alone concerns us here, *that in them unity of fulfilment has the character of unity of identification*, possibly the narrower character of a unity of knowing, i.e. of an act to which objective identity is the corresponding correlate.

We must here emphasize the following point: As pointed out above, every fulfilment of a 'signitive' by an intuitive act has the character of a synthesis of identification. But it is not the case, conversely, that, in each synthesis of identification, a meaning-intention is fulfilled, and fulfilled by a corresponding intuition. In the widest sense, certainly, we do ordinarily speak of every actual identification as a recognition. But, in a narrower sense, what is clearly felt to be at issue is an approach to a goal of knowledge and, in the narrowest sense of a critique of knowledge, the arrival at that goal. To turn this mere feeling into clear insight, and to define the precise sense of this approach or arrival, will yet be our task. Meanwhile we shall maintain that *the unity of identification*, and thereby all *unity of knowing* in the narrower and the narrowest sense, has its place of origin in the sphere of *objectifying acts*.

Their peculiar manner of fulfilment will therefore suffice to characterize the unified class of acts to which it essentially belongs. We can accordingly *define* objectifying acts as those whose syntheses of fulfilment have a character of identification, while their synthesis of frustration has a character of distinction. We can also define them as acts which can function phenomenologically as members of possible syntheses of identification and distinction. Lastly, presuming a law as yet unformulated, we can define them as the intending, fulfilling or frustrating acts which have a possible knowledge-function. *To this class belong also the synthetic acts of identification and distinction themselves*: they are themselves either a merely putative grasp of identity or non-identity, or a corresponding *real* grasp of the one or the other. This putative grasp can be either 'confirmed' or 'refuted' in an act of knowing (in the pregnant sense of the word): identity is really grasped, i.e. 'adequately perceived', in the former case, as non-identity in the latter.

Our analyses have been lightly sketched rather than thoroughly executed, but they lead to the result that *both meaning-intentions and acts of meaning-fulfilment*, acts of 'thought' and acts of intuition, *belong to a single class of objectifying acts*. We establish thereby that *acts of another sort can never exercise any sense-giving function*, and that they can be 'expressed' only in so far as the meaning-intentions which attach to words are fulfilled in percepts or imaginations which have as *objects* the acts requiring expression. While, therefore, where acts function meaningfully, and achieve expression in this sense, a 'signitive' or intuitive relation to objects is constituted in them, in the other cases *the acts are mere objects*, and objects, of course, for other acts which here function as the authentic carriers of meaning.

Before we discuss this matter more closely, and seek to refute many plausible counter-arguments – see the final Section of this Investigation – we must explore the remarkable facts of fulfilment somewhat more carefully, and in the sphere of objectifying acts.

§14 Phenomenological characterization of the distinction between signitive and intuitive intentions through peculiarities of fulfilment

(a) Sign, image and self-presentation

In the course of the last discussion we have been led to note how the generic character of an intention closely coheres with that of its synthesis of fulfilment, so that the whole class of objectifying acts can be defined through the identification generically characteristic of their syntheses of fulfilment, whose nature we take to be familiar. This thought leads us on to ask whether the specific differences *within* this class of objectifications, may not likewise rest upon corresponding differences in the mode of fulfilment. Objectifying intentions are basically divided into *signitive* and *intuitive*

intentions: let us try to give an account of the difference between these types of act.

Since the starting point of our treatment lay in expressed acts, we took *signitive intentions* to be the significations, the meanings of expressions. If we leave aside the question whether the same acts which give sense to expressions can also function outside of the sphere of meaning, these *signitive intentions* always have intuitive support in the sensuous side of the expression, but not on that account *intuitive content*. Though in a manner one with intuitive acts, they yet differ from them in kind.

We can readily grasp the distinction between expressed and purely intuitive intentions if we contrast *signs* with *likenesses* or *images*.

The sign has in general no community of content with the thing it signifies; it can stand as readily for what is heterogeneous, as for what is homogeneous with itself. The likeness on the other hand is related to the thing by *similarity*: where there is no similarity, there can be no talk of a likeness, an image. The sign as object is constituted for us in an act of appearing. This act is not significant: it needs, as we held in former analyses, to be tied up with a new intention, a new way of taking things, through which a novel, signified object takes the place of the old, intuitively apparent one. The likeness similarly, e.g. the marble bust, is as much a thing as anything else: the new way of regarding it first makes it a *likeness*. Not merely a thing of marble appears before us, but we have, based on this appearance, a reference to a person through a likeness.

The intentions attaching to the phenomenal content are, in either case, not externally tied up with it, but essentially based upon it, and in such a way that the character of the intention is determined thereby. It would be a descriptively wrong notion of the matter, to think of the whole difference as lying in the fact that the same intention which, in the one case is tied to the appearance of an object *like* the object referred to, is in the other case tied to the appearance of an object *unlike* it. For the sign, too, can be like what it signifies, even entirely like it: the sign-presentation is not thereby made into a presentation by way of a likeness. A photograph of the sign *A* is immediately taken to be a picture of the sign. But when we use the sign *A* as a sign of the sign *A*, as when we write '*A*' as a letter of the Latin written alphabet, we treat *A*, despite its representational similarity, as a sign, and not as a likeness.

The objective fact of similarity between what appears and what is meant, is accordingly irrelevant: it is not, however, irrelevant where something is presented by way of a likeness. This shows itself in the possibility of fulfilling in 'objective' similarity in this context. The likeness-presentation plainly has the peculiarity that, when it achieves fulfilment, the object which appears before it as likeness gets identified through similarity with the object *given* in the fulfilling act. Having held this to be the peculiarity of a presentation by way of likeness, we have admitted that *fulfilment of like by like*

internally fixes the character of a synthesis of fulfillment as imaginative. But, when, on the other hand, casual likeness between sign and thing signified leads to a knowledge of their mutual resemblance, this knowledge is not at all a case of the peculiar consciousness of identity, when similar is referred to similar and made to coincide with it in the manner of likeness and original thing. It is rather of the very essence of a *significant* intention, that in it the apparent objects of intending and fulfilling acts (e.g. name and thing named in their fully achieved unity) 'have nothing to do with one another'. It is clear, therefore, that descriptively distinct modes of fulfillment, being rooted in the descriptively distinct character of our intention, can help us to detect these latter differences, and to find definitions for them.

We have so far only considered the difference between signitive and imaginative intentions. If we ignore less weighty distinctions within the wider sphere of imaginative acts – we have preferred to consider representation by way of physical images, instead of stressing those of fantasy – we must still consider the case of *percepts*.

As opposed to imagination, perception is characterized by the fact that in it, as we are wont to express the matter, the object 'itself' appears, and does not merely appear 'in a likeness'. In this we at once recognize characteristic differences in *syntheses of fulfillment*. Imagination fulfils itself through the peculiar synthesis of image-resemblance, perception through the *synthesis of identical thinghood* (*sachlichen Identität*). The thing establishes itself through its very self, in so far as it shows itself from varying sides while remaining one and the same.

(b) *The perceptual and imaginative adumbration of the object*

We must, however, pay heed to the following distinction. Perception, so far as it claims to give us the object 'itself', really claims thereby to be no mere intention, but an act, which may indeed be capable of offering fulfillment to other acts, but which itself requires no further fulfillment. But generally, and in all cases of 'external' perception, this remains a mere pretension. The object is not actually given, it is not given wholly and entirely as that which it itself is. It is only given 'from the front', only 'perspectivally foreshortened and projected' etc. While many of its properties are illustrated in the nuclear content of the percept, at least in the (perspectival) manner which the last expressions indicate, many others are not present in the percept in such illustrated form: the elements of the invisible rear side, the interior etc., are no doubt subsidiarily intended in more or less definite fashion, symbolically suggested by what is primarily apparent, but are not themselves part of the intuitive, i.e. of the perceptual or imaginative content, of the percept. On this hinges the possibility of indefinitely many percepts of the same object, all differing in content. If percepts were always the actual, genuine

self-presentations of objects that they pretend to be, there could be only a single percept for each object, since its peculiar essence would be exhausted in such self-presentation.

We must, however, note that the object, as it is *in itself* – in the only sense relevant and understandable in our context, the sense which the fulfillment of the perceptual intention would carry out – is *not wholly different* from the object realized, however imperfectly, in the percept. It is part so-to-say of a percept's inherent sense to be the self-appearance of the object. Even if, for phenomenological purposes, ordinary perception is composed of countless intentions, some purely perceptual, some merely imaginative, and some even signitive, it yet, as a *total act*, grasps the object itself, even if only by way of an adumbration. If we may conceive of a percept put into a relation of fulfillment to the adequate percept that would *offer us the object itself*, in the ideally strict and most authentic sense, then we may say that a percept so intends its object that this ideal synthesis would have the character of a *partial coincidence* of the purely perceptual contents of intending and fulfilling acts, and also the character of a complete coincidence of both complete perceptual intentions. The 'purely perceptual' content in 'external' perception is what remains over when we abstract from all purely imaginative and symbolic components: it is the 'sensed' content to which its own, immediate, purely perceptual interpretation is given, which evaluates all its parts and moments as self-projections of corresponding parts and moments of the perceptual object, and so imparts to its total content the character of a 'perceptual picture', a perceptual adumbration of the object. In the ideal, limiting case of adequate perception, this self-presenting sensed content coincides with the perceived object. This common relation to the object 'in itself', i.e. to the ideal of adequation, enters into the sense of all perception, and is also manifest in the phenomenological mutual belongingness of the manifold percepts pertaining to a single object. In one percept the object appears from this side, in another from that side; now it appears close, now at a distance etc. In each percept, despite these differences, one and the same object is 'there', in each it is intended in the complete range of its familiar and of its perceptually present properties. To this corresponds phenomenologically a continuous flux of fulfillment or identification, in the steady serialization of the percepts 'pertaining to the same object'. Each individual percept is a mixture of fulfilled and unfulfilled intentions. To the former corresponds that part of the object which is given in more or less perfect projection in *this* individual percept, to the latter that part of the object that is not yet given, that new percepts would bring to actual, fulfilling presence. All such syntheses of fulfillment are marked by a common character: they are identifications binding self-manifestations of an object to self-manifestations of the same object.

It is at once clear that similar distinctions apply in the case of imaginative presentation. Here too the same object is pictured, now from this and now

from that side. Corresponding to the synthesis of manifold perceptions, where the same object always presents *itself*, we have the parallel synthesis of manifold imaginations, in which the same object appears *in a likeness*. To the changing perceptual adumbrations of the object there are corresponding imaginative adumbrations, and in the ideal of perfect copying the projection would coincide with the complete likeness. If imaginative acts are at one time fulfilled in imaginative contexts, and at another time through corresponding percepts, the difference lies plainly in the character of their synthesis of fulfillment: the passage from likeness to likeness has a different character from the passage from likeness to original thing.

The above analysis will be of use for the further investigations to be carried on in the next chapter; they also show the mutual affinity of percepts and imaginations, and their common opposition to 'signitive' intentions. In all cases we distinguish between an actually given, appearing content, which is *not* what we mean, and an object which *is* what we mean – whether we signify, represent or perceive it – or between a sign-content on the one hand, and the imaginative or perceptual projection of the object on the other. But while sign and thing signified 'have nothing to do with one another', there are inner affinities between a thing's imaginative and perceptual projections and the thing itself, affinities which are part of the very sense of our use of such words. These relationships are phenomenologically documented in differences in their constitutive intentions, and not less in their syntheses of fulfillment.

This account does not, of course, affect our interpretation of *every* fulfillment as being an identification. *In all cases* an intention comes into coincidence with the act which offers it *fulfillment*, i.e. the object which is meant in it is the same as the object meant in the fulfilling act. We were not, however, comparing these objects of meaning-reference, but signs and adumbrations in their relations to such objects, or to what corresponds phenomenologically to these relationships.

Our interest in the preceding paragraphs was primarily directed to peculiarities in syntheses of fulfillment: these enable us to differentiate intuitive and signitive acts in a merely *indirect* manner. Only in the further course of our investigation – in §26 – shall we be able to give a *direct* characterization, based on an analysis of the intentions, and without regard to their possible fulfillments.

§15 Signitive intentions beyond the limits of the meaning-function

In our last discussion we have pinned down certain components of intuitive acts as signitive intentions. But in the whole of our investigations up to this point, signitive acts were for us acts of *meaning*, sense-giving factors attached to expressions. The terms 'signification' and 'signitive intention' were for us synonymous. It is now time to ask ourselves whether the same acts, of

acts essentially similar to those found to function in meaning, may not occur quite divorced from this function and from all expressions.

That this question must be answered affirmatively, is shown by certain cases of wordless recognition, which exhibit the precise character of verbal recognition, although words, in their sensuous-signitive content, are not actually present at all. We recognize an object, e.g. as an ancient Roman milestone, its scratchings as weather-worn inscriptions, although no words are aroused at once, or indeed at all. We recognize a tool as a drill, but its name will not come back to us etc. Genetically expressed, present intuitions stir up an associative disposition directed to the significant expression. But the meaning-component of this last alone is actualized, and this now radiates backwards into the intuition which aroused it, and overflows into the latter with the character of a fulfilled intention. These cases of wordless recognition are none other than fulfillments of meaning-intentions, but phenomenologically divorced from the signitive contents which otherwise pertain to them. Comparable examples are furnished by reflection on the normal interweavings of scientific pondering. We observe here how trains of thought sweep on to a large extent without bondage to appropriate words, set off by a flood of intuitive imagery or by their own associative interconnections.

With this is connected the further fact that *expressive* speech goes so far beyond the intuitive data necessary for the actual appropriateness of the expression of acquaintance. This has, no doubt, an opposed ground in the extraordinary ease with which verbal images are revived by intuitions, and can themselves then revive symbolic thoughts without corresponding intuitions. But we must also observe, contrariwise, how the reproduction of imaged words often lags quite far behind the trains of thought revived by each present intuition. In both these ways a large number of inadequate expressions arise, which do not apply in a straightforward manner to the primary intuitions actually present, nor to the synthetic formations actually built upon them, but range far beyond what is thus given. Curious mixtures of acts result. Objects are, strictly speaking, only 'known', as they are given in their actual intuitive foundation, but, since the unity of our intention ranges further, objects appear to be known as what they are for this total intention. *The character of knowing is accordingly somewhat broadened*. Thus we recognize (know) a person as an adjutant of the Kaiser, a handwriting as Goethe's, a mathematical expression as the Cardanian formula, and so on. Here our recognition can of course not apply itself to what is given in perception, at best it permits possible application to intuitive sequences, which need not themselves be actualized at all. In this manner recognitions, and sequences of recognitions, are possible on a basis of partial intuitions, which would on *a priori* grounds, not at all be possible on a basis of complete actual intuitions, since they combine incompatibles in themselves. There are, and are only too many, *false and even absurd recognitions*. But 'really'

they are not recognitions, i.e. not logically worthwhile, complete 'knowings', not recognitions in the strong sense. To say this is to anticipate later discussions. For we have not yet clarified the ordering of the levels of knowledge (a matter here touched upon), nor the ideals which limit these.

So far we had to do with significative intentions, which exist identically, and just as they are, both within and without the function of meaning. But countless significative intentions lack either a fixed or a passing tie with expressions, though their essential character puts them in a class with meaningful intentions. I here recur to the perceptual or imaginative course of a melody, or of some other familiar type of event, and to the definite or indefinite intentions and fulfillments which arise in such a course. I refer likewise to the empirical arrangement and connection of things in their phenomenal coexistence, in regard to whatever gives the things appearing in this order, and especially the parts in each unified individual thing, the character of a unity involving precisely this order and this form. Representation and recognition through analogy may unite likeness and original (analogon and analogizatum), and may make them seem to belong together, but they cannot unite what is not merely contingently given together, but what appears as belonging together. And even if, in the realization of representations through contiguity, images anticipating what is significantly represented are confirmed by their fulfilling originals, the unity among such contiguous representatives and what is represented through them can be given by no relation of picturing (since such a relation is not operative among them) but only through the entirely peculiar relation of significative representation by way of contiguity.

We may therefore rightly see, in inadequate percepts and imaginations, interwoven masses of primitive intentions, among which, in addition to perceptual and imaginative elements, there are also intentions of a significative kind. We may therefore maintain, in general, that all phenomenological differences in objectifying acts reduce to their constituent elementary intentions and fulfillments, the former bound to the latter through syntheses of fulfillment. On the side of intentions, the only last differences are those between significative intentions, as intentions by way of contiguity, and imaginative intentions, as intentions by way of analogy, each plain and pure in their own kind. On the side of fulfillment, intentions of either sort again function as components, but on occasion (as in the case of perception) we have components which cannot be called intentions, since they only fulfill but require no fulfillment, *self-presentations* of the object meant by them in the strictest sense of the word. The character of the elementary acts then determines the characters of the syntheses of fulfillment, which in their turn determine the homogeneous unity of the complex act. The emphatic power of attention helps to transfer the character of this or that elementary act to the unity of the act as a whole: this whole act becomes imaginative or signification or pure perception. And where two such unified acts enter into

relation, relationships of agreement and conflict arise, whose character is determined by the total acts underlying such relations, and ultimately by their elements.

In the next chapter these relationships will be further tracked down, within the limits in which they can be phenomenologically ascertained and epistemologically evaluated. We shall keep strictly to phenomenologically given unities, and to the sense inherent in these and declared in their fulfillment. We shall thus avoid the temptation to embark on hypothetical construction, with whose doubts a clarification of knowledge should in no way be burdened.

The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge

§16 Simple identification and fulfilment

In describing the relation of significant intention to fulfilling intuition we began with the verbal expression of a percept, and said that the intentional essence of the intuitive act fitted in with, or *belonged to*, the semantic essence of the significative act. This is plainly so in every case of total identification, where acts of like quality, i.e. *both* assertive or *both* unassertive, are synthetically unified; where the acts are of unlike quality, the identification is solely based on their *materials*. This carries over, *mutatis mutandis*, to cases of partial identification, so that we may hold that the *material* or *matter* is the aspect of the character of each act which comes up for synthesis, that is essential for identification (and naturally also for distinction).

In the case of identification, the 'matters' are the special carriers of the synthesis, without themselves being identified. For talk of identification is, in virtue of its sense, concerned with the *objects* presented by such 'matters'. On the other hand, in the act of identification, the matters themselves achieve coincidence. Every example shows, however, that even where qualities are alike, the acts need not become quite alike: this is due to the fact that an act is not exhausted by its intentional essence. What remains over will reveal its importance in a careful phenomenological investigation of the levels of knowledge, which will be our task. It is clear from the start that, if knowledge admits of degrees of perfection, even when matter is constant, matter cannot be responsible for such differences of perfection, and cannot therefore determine the peculiar essence of knowledge as against any identification whatsoever. We shall tie our further investigation to a discussion of the previously studied difference of *mere identification and fulfilment*.

We equated fulfilment with knowledge (in the narrower sense of the word) indicating that we were only talking of certain forms of identification which brought us nearer to the *goal of knowledge*. What this means may be elucidated by saying: In each fulfilment there is more or less complete *intuitive illustration* (*Veranschaulichung*). What the intention means, but presents only in more or less inauthentic and inadequate manner, the fulfilment – the act

attaching itself to an intention, and offering it 'fulness' in the synthesis of fulfilment – *sets directly before us*, or at least more directly than the intention does. In fulfilment our experience is represented by the words: 'This is the thing *itself*'. This 'itself' must not be understood too strictly, as if there must be some percept bringing the object itself to actual phenomenal presence. It is possible that, in the progress of knowledge, in the gradual ascent from acts of poorer, to acts of ever richer epistemic fullness, we must at length always reach fulfilling percepts: this does not mean that each step, each individual identification that we call a fulfilment, need contain a percept as its fulfilling act. The relative manner in which we speak of 'more or less direct' and of 'self', indicates the main point: that the synthesis of fulfilment involves an *inequality in worth* among its related members. The fulfilling act has a *superiority* which the mere intention lacks: *it imparts to the synthesis the fullness of 'self', at least leads it more directly to the thing itself*. The relativity of this 'directness', this 'self', points further to the fact that the relation of fulfilment is of a sort that admits of degrees. A concatenation of such relations seems accordingly possible where the epistemic superiority steadily increases. Each such ascending series points, however, to an *ideal limit*, or includes it as a final member, a limit setting an unsurpassable goal to all advances: *the goal of absolute knowledge, of the adequate self-presentation of the object of knowledge*.

We have thereby achieved, at least in preliminary fashion,² the *characteristic differentiating mark of fulfilments* within the wider class of identifications. For not every identification represents such an approach to a goal of knowledge: there can well be a purposeless infinity of ever further identifications. There are, e.g., indefinitely many arithmetical expressions having the same numerical value 2, which permit us to add identification to identification *in infinitum*. Just so there may be infinitely many images of one and the same thing, determining again the possibility of endless chains of identifications tending to no goal of knowledge. The same holds for the endlessly many percepts of one and the same thing.

If we pay heed to the constitutive elementary intentions in these intuitive examples, we shall of course find moments of true fulfilment entering into the total act of identification. This happens when we set image-presentations side by side which are not of completely equal intuitive content, so that the new image brings out many things much more clearly, and perhaps sets something before us just as it is, while a former image merely 'projects' it or denotes it symbolically. If we imaginatively envisage an object turning itself to every side, our sequence of images is constantly linked by syntheses of fulfilment in respect of its partial intentions, but each new image-presentation does not, as a whole, fulfil its predecessor, nor does the whole series progressively approach any goal. Just so in the case of the manifold percepts belonging to the same external thing. Gain and loss are balanced at every step: a new act has richer fullness in regard to certain properties,

for whose sake it has lost fullness in regard to others. But against this we may hold that the *whole synthesis* of the series of imaginations or *percepts* represents an increase in fullness in comparison with an act singled out from the series: the imperfection of the one-sided representation is, relatively speaking, overcome in the all-sided one. We say 'relatively speaking', since the all-sided representation is not achieved in such a synthetic manifold in the single flash which the ideal of adequation requires, as a pure self-presentation without added analogizing or symbolization: it is achieved piecemeal and always blurred by such additions. Another example of an intuitive fulfillment-series is the transition from a rough drawing to a more exact pencil-sketch, then from the latter to the completed picture, and from this to the living finish of the painting, all of which present the same, visibly the same, object.

Such examples from the sphere of mere imagination show that the character of fulfillment does not require that assertive quality in the intending and fulfilling acts which is part of the logical concept of knowledge. We prefer to speak of 'knowledge' where an opinion, in the normal sense of a *belief*, has been confirmed or attested.

§17 The question of the relation between fulfillment and intuitive illustration

We must now enquire into the part played in knowledge by the various kinds of objectifying acts – *signitive* and *intuitive* acts – and, under the latter rubric, acts of perception and imagination. Here intuitive acts plainly seem to be preferred, so much so, in fact, as to incline one to call all fulfillment *intuitive illustration* (*Veranschaulichung*) – as we did above in passing – or to describe the work of fulfillment, wherever one deals with intuitive intentions, as a mere increase in intuitive fullness. The relation between intention and fulfillment plainly underlies the formation of the conceptual couple: *thought* (more narrowly, *concept*), on the one hand, and *corresponding intuition*, on the other. But we must not forget that a notion of intuition oriented towards this relation does not at all coincide with that of an *intuitive act*, although, through the inherent tendency towards intuition which enters into the sense of all fulfillment, it closely depends on the latter and even presupposes it. To make a thought clear to oneself means, primarily, to give epistemic fullness to the content of one's thought. This can, however, be achieved, in a *certain fashion*, even by a *signitive* presentation. Of course, if we ask for a clearness which will make matters self-evident, which will make 'the thing itself' clear, render its possibility and its truth knowable, we are referred to intuition in the sense of our intuitive acts. For this reason talk of 'clearness' in epistemological contexts plainly has this narrower sense, it indicates recourse to fulfilling intuition, to the 'originative source' of concepts and propositions in their subject-matters themselves.

Carefully analysed examples are now needed if we are to confirm and develop what has just been suggested. These will help us to clear up the relation between fulfillment and intuitive illustration, and to render quite precise the part played by intuition in *every* fulfillment. Differences between authentic and inauthentic illustration (or fulfillment) will distinguish themselves clearly, and the difference between mere identification and fulfillment will also and therewith reach final clarity. The work of intuition will be shown to be that of contributing to the intended act, when authentically fulfilled, a genuinely novel element, to which the name 'fulness' may be given. We are thereby made aware of a hitherto unstressed side of the phenomenological content of acts, which is fundamental for knowledge. 'Fullness' must take its place as a new 'moment' in an intuitive act alongside of its quality and its matter, a moment specially belonging to the matter which it in some manner completes.

§18 The gradations of mediate fulfillments. Mediate presentations

The formation of every mathematical concept which unfolds itself in a chain of definitions reveals the possibility of *fulfilment-chains built member upon member out of signitive intentions*. We clarify the concept $(5^3)^4$ by having recourse to the definitory presentation: Number which arises when one forms the product $5^3 \cdot 5^3 \cdot 5^3 \cdot 5^3$. If we wish to clarify this latter concept, we must go back to the sense of 5^3 , i.e. to the formation $5 \cdot 5 \cdot 5$. Going back further, we should have to clarify 5 through the definitory chain $5 = 4 + 1$, $4 = 3 + 1$, $3 = 2 + 1$, $2 = 1 + 1$. After each step we should have to make a substitution in the preceding complex expression or thought and, were this proceeding indefinitely repeatable – it is certainly so *in itself*, just as it is certainly not so *for us* – we should at last come to the completely explicated sum of ones of which we should say: 'This is the number $(5^3)^4$ "itself"'. It is plain that an act of fulfillment not only corresponded to this final result, but to each individual step leading from one expression of this number, to the expression next in order, which clarified it and enriched its content. In this manner each ordinary decimal number points to a possible chain of fulfillments, whose links are one less in number than the number of their component units, so that chains of indefinitely many numbers are possible *a priori*.

We usually talk as if, in the sphere of mathematics, the straightforward meaning of a word were identical with the content of its complex defining expression. In this case there could be no talk of fulfillment-chains: we should be moving among pure identities wholly tautological in character. But if one considers the complexity of the thought-formations which arise through substitution, and compares them, in those very simple cases where such substitution can be fully carried out, with the significant intentions that one at first experienced, one can hardly seriously think that in these last intentions all this complication was present from the start. It is plain that

there are real differences in intention which, whatever their more precise description, are knit together through relationships of fulfillment which identify them as wholes.

A remarkable property of the cases just discussed, and of the class of significative presentations which they illustrate, lies in the fact that in them the *content* of the presentations – or, more clearly their ‘matter’ – *dictates a determinate order of fulfillment* a priori. The fulfillment which here results immediately, can never also result immediately. To each significative intention of this class there is a *definite*, proximate fulfillment or group of fulfillments, which in its turn has a definite, proximate fulfillment, etc. This property is also characteristic of certain intuitive intentions, as when we *represent a matter to ourselves through images (pictures) of images (pictures)*. The matter of the presentation here also prescribes a prime fulfillment, which puts the primary image ‘itself’ before our eyes, but to this intention a new intention pertains, whose fulfillment leads on to the thing itself. What is common to all mediate presentations, whether intuitive or significative, may be put by saying that they are presentations which do not present their objects straightforwardly, but by way of presentations built upon other presentations to a higher or lower degree. To put it more pointedly, they are presentations which present their objects *as objects of other presentations, or as related to objects so presented*. As objects can be presented in relation to any other objects, so they can be presented in relation to presentations. These presentations are *presented presentations* in the relational presentations: they belong among its intentional *objects*, not among its constituents.

In connection with the class of cases just mentioned, we speak of *mediate* (or superordinate) intentions or fulfillments. The rule holds that *every mediate intention requires a mediate fulfillment*, which naturally, after a finite number of steps, ends up in an immediate intuition.

§19 Distinction between mediate presentations and presentations of presentations

From these mediate presentations we must, however, distinguish *presentations of presentations*, i.e. presentations simply directed upon other presentations as their objects. Although such presented presentations are, generally speaking, themselves intentions, and so capable of fulfillment, the nature of the presenting presentations which are in question requires no mediate fulfillment through fulfillment of the presented presentation. The intention of *P1* (*P2*), a presentation of a presentation, is directed to *P2*: it is fulfilled, and completely fulfilled, when *P2* ‘itself’ is present. It is not enriched when the intention of *P2* is fulfilled in its turn, when its object appears in an image or in a richer image, or even in a percept. For *P1* refers, not to this object, but only to its presentation *P2*. Nothing obviously alters if the *embodiment* becomes more complex, e.g. in the case expressed by the symbol *P1*(*P2*(*P3*)) etc.

The thought ‘significative presentation’, for instance, is fulfilled in the intuition of a significative presentation, e.g. of the presentation ‘integral’, or of the presentation ‘significative presentation’ itself. These examples must not be misunderstood as meaning that the significative presentation ‘integral’ itself claimed an intuitive status, as if the concepts of *intuition* and *significative act* (meaning-intention) were here confounded. It is not the significative presentation ‘integral’ but the *inner percept* of this presentation that serves as the fulfilling intuition to the thought ‘significative presentation’. This presentation is not the intuition to the thought ‘significative presentation’. As the thought of fulfilling intuition, but the *object* of the fulfilling intuition. As the thought of a colour has its fulfillment in the act of intuiting this colour, so the thought of a thought has its fulfillment in an act of intuiting this thought, and its final intuitive fulfillment in an adequate percept of the same. Here as elsewhere, the mere being of an experience involves neither its intuition, nor, more particularly, its perception. It must be noted that, in our general opposition between thought or intention, and fulfilling intuition, intuition is not to be understood as mere outward intuition, the perceiving or imagining of external physical objects. As our just discussed example shows, and as the nature of presentation makes obvious, ‘inner’ perception or ‘inner’ imagination can function as a fulfilling intuition.

§20 Genuine intuitive illustration in every fulfillment. Authentic and inauthentic intuitive illustration

Now that we have sufficiently stressed and clarified the distinction between mediate presentations and presentations of presentations, it will be proper to turn to what they have in common. Each mediate presentation includes, on the above analysis, presentations of presentations, inasmuch as it refers to its object as the object of certain presentations, which it itself presents. Thus if we think of 1000 as 10^3 , we think of it as the number characterized as the *object* of the presentation which would arise were we to carry out the exponentiation in question. From this it is clear that *genuinely intuitive illustrations play the essential part in all fulfillment of mediate intentions, and at each step in such fulfillment*. The characterization of an object as object of a presented presentation (or as one related in a certain manner to objects so presented) presupposes in its fulfillment the fulfillment of these presentations of presentations, and these ‘inwoven’ intuitive fulfillments are the first to give the whole identification its character of a fulfillment. Its gradual increase in ‘fulness’ consists solely in the fact that, one by one, all its presentations of presentations have been fulfilled, whether such presentations were ‘inwoven’ in it from the beginning, or have emerged in the process of fulfillment through realizing ‘construction’ of these *presented presentations*, and through *intuition* of them when realized, so that in the end the dominant, total intention, with its structure of conjoined and subordinate intentions, appears as identified with an immediate intention. This last identification thereby has

as a whole the *character of a fulfilment*. This kind of fulfilment is, however, a case of *inauthentic* intuitive illustration, since we are only entitled to predicate *authentic intuitive illustration* if fullness is not added *anywhere*, but only imparts an increase to the object presented by the presentation *as a whole*, which accordingly becomes more fully presented. This means no more, ultimately, than that a purely significative presentation is without any fullness, and that all fullness rather resides in the actual 'making present' (*Vergegenwärtigung*) of properties that pertain to the object itself.

We shall presently pursue this last thought. Here we shall add that the difference we called one of 'authentic' and 'inauthentic intuitive illustration' could also be called one of 'authentic' and 'inauthentic fulfilment', since an intention aims at its object, is as it were desirous of it, and since *fulfilment*, in the *pregnant sense of the word* only registers the fact that some part of the fullness of the object is imparted to the intention. We must, however, still hold that inauthentic and authentic fulfilments are alike marked out among syntheses of identification by a common phenomenological character (that of fulfilment in the wider sense), and that there is a peculiar principle to the effect that *all inauthentic fulfilment implies authentic fulfilments*, and indeed borrows its character of fulfilment from these authentic cases.

To demarcate the difference between authentic and inauthentic intuitive illustrations somewhat more precisely, and at the same time deal with a class of cases where inauthentic intuitive illustrations have every appearance of authenticity, we add the following remarks:

It is not always the case that, when the fulfilment of a significative intention is consummated on an intuitive basis, the 'matters' of the acts concerned, as presupposed above, are in a *relationship of coincidence*, so that the object which appears intuitively also comes before us as *itself* meant in our act of meaning. Only *when this happens*, however, *may one talk of intuitive illustration in the true sense*: only then is a thought realized perceptually, or illustrated imaginatively. The case is different when the fulfilling intuition presents an *indirectly* represented object, as when the use of a geographical name calls up the imaginative presentation of a map, which blends with the meaning-intention of this name, or as when a statement about certain street-connections, courses of rivers, features of mountains, is confirmed by what stands inscribed on a map before us. Here intuition should not be said to fulfil in the true sense of the word: its own matter does not enter into action. The real basis of fulfilment does not lie in it at all, but in a plainly *significative* intention intertwined with it. That the apparent object here functions *as indirectly* representing the object meant and named, means, phenomenologically speaking, that its constitutive intuition is now the bearer of a novel intention, an intention pointing beyond the apparent object, and thereby characterizing it as a sign. The analogy of what appears and what is meant, which may be present here, does not lead to a straightforward presentation by way of an image, but to a sign-presentation resting upon the latter. The

outline of England as drawn in the map, may indeed represent the form of the land itself, but the pictorial image of the map which comes up when England is mentioned, does not *mean* England itself in pictorial fashion, not even mediately, as the country pictured on the map. It means England after the manner of a mere sign, through external relations of association, which have tied all our knowledge of land and people to the map-picture. When, therefore, our naming intention is fulfilled through this mental picture, it is not the object imagined in the latter (the map), which counts as the very thing meant by the name, but the original object which the name represents.

§21 The 'fullness' of a presentation

It will, however, now be necessary to view the achievement of intuitive intentions more closely. Since the fulfilment of mediate intentions refers back to the fulfilment, the intuitive fulfilment of immediate intentions, and since it has transpired that the final outcome of the whole mediate process is an immediate intention, we now concern ourselves with the question of the intuitive fulfilment of immediate intentions and of the relationships and laws governing their sphere. This question we therefore attack. But we may observe from the start that, in the following investigations, only the 'matter'-side of an act's intentional essence will have relevance for the relationships to be established. The qualities of our intention (whether assertive or merely presentative) can be varied indifferently.

We begin with the following proposition:

To every intuitive intention there pertains, in the sense of an ideal possibility, a significative intention precisely accommodated to its material. This unity of identification necessarily has the character of a unity of fulfilment, in which the intuitive, not the significative member, has the character of being the fulfiller, and so also, in the most authentic sense, the *giver* of fullness.

We only express the sense of this last statement in a different way if we say that significative intentions are in themselves 'empty', and that they 'are in need of fullness'. In the transition from a significative intention to the corresponding intuition, we experience no mere increase, as in the change from a pale image or a mere sketch to a fully alive painting. The significative intention is rather lacking in every sort of fullness: the intuitive presentation first brings fullness to it, and, through identification, into it. A significative intention merely points to its object, an intuitive intention gives it 'presence', in the pregnant sense of the word, it imports something of the fullness of the object itself. However far an imaginative presentation may lag behind its object, it has many features in common with it, more than that, it is like this object, depicts it, makes it really present to us. A significative presentation, however, does not present analogically, it is 'in reality' no 'presentation', in it nothing of the object comes to life. The ideal of complete fullness is, accordingly, the fullness of the object itself, as the sum total of its constitutive properties. The *fullness*

of the presentation is, however, the sum total of properties pertaining to the presentation itself, through which it analogically gives presence to its object, or apprehends it as itself given. *Fulness is, accordingly, a characteristic moment of presentations alongside of quality and matter, a positive constituent only in the case of intuitive presentations, a privation of the case of signitive.* The 'clearer' a presentation is, the higher its *pictorial level*, the richer it is in fulness. The ideal of *fulness* would, accordingly, be reached in a presentation which would embrace its object, entire and whole, in its phenomenological content. If we include individualizing features in the fulness of the object, such features can be embraced by no imagination, only by a percept. But, if we ignore these features, a definite ideal exists for imagination as well.

We must accordingly return to the features of the presented object: *The more of these features enter into the analogical representation and, as regards each separate feature, the greater the similarity with which the presentation represents it in its content, the greater is the fulness of the presentation.* Somehow, no doubt, every feature of an object is included in the scope of every presentation, and so in that of the pictorial presentation, but not every property is analogically represented, *the phenomenological content of the presentation does not contain a peculiar, so-to-say analogizing or depicting moment for each. The sum total of the intimately fused moments which are thought to underlie purely intuitive (in this case imaginative) ways of regarding things, which first gives them the character of being representative of corresponding objective moments, constitutes the fulness of the imaginative presentation.* Hence in addition to imaginative representations, there are also perceptual ones, graspings of the thing itself, self-exhibitions of objective moments. If we assemble the sum total of the imaginatively or perceptively functioning moments of the perceptual presentation, we have marked off the fulness of the latter.

§22 Fulness and 'intuitive substance' (*Gehalt*)

Closely regarded, the concept of fulness is still fraught with an ambiguity. The above mentioned moments can be looked at in respect of their own existential content, without regard to the functions of pure imagination or perception, which first confer on them the value of being a picture or a perceptively slanted self-revelation, and so a value for the function of fulfillment. On the other hand, one can consider these moments *in their interpretation*, i.e. not these moments alone, but the full pictures or slanted self-revelations in question. Ignoring only intentional qualities, one can deal with purely intuitive acts as wholes, which include these moments in themselves, since they give them an objective significance. These 'purely intuitive acts we conceive as mere constituents of the intuitions just mentioned, a relation to corresponding objective properties which are represented through

them. We ignore therewith (in addition to the qualities) the yet further attached *signitive* relations to further parts or sides of the object *which are not, properly speaking (intuitively), represented.*

It is plainly these purely intuitive constituents which impart to total acts the character of percepts or imaginings, i.e. their intuitive character, and which function in the system of serially ordered fulfillments as the element which confers 'fulness', or which enriches or increases the same when already present. To deal with this ambiguity in our talk of 'fulness' we shall introduce the following distinguishing terms:

By *intuitively presentative or intuitively representative contents (Inhalten)* we understand those contents of intuitive acts which, owing to the purely imaginative or perceptual interpretations that they sustain, point unambiguously to definitely corresponding contents in the object, represent these in imagined or perceived perspectival slantings. The act-aspects which characterize them in this manner, we ignore. Since the character of imagination lies in analogical picturing, in 'representation' in a narrower sense, while the character of perception can be called strictly presentative, the following distinctive names suggest themselves: For the intuitively presentative contents in either case – *analogizing or picturing* contents, on the one hand, and *strictly presentative or self-presentative* contents, on the other. The expressions 'imaginatively slanted contents' and 'perceptively slanted contents' are also very apt. The intuitively presentative contents of outer perception define the concept of *sensation* in the ordinary, narrow sense. The intuitively presentative contents of external fantasy are *sensory phantasms* or images.

The intuitively presentative or intuitively representative contents in and with the interpretation put upon them, we call the *intuitive substance (Gehalt) of the act*: in this we still ignore the quality of the act (whether assertive or not), as being indifferent to the distinctions in question. On the above, all signitive components of an act are excluded from its intuitive 'substance'.³

§23 Relationships of weight between the intuitive and signitive 'substance' (*Gehalt*) of one and the same act. Pure intuition and pure signification. Perceptual and imaginal content, pure perception and pure imagination. Gradations of fulness

To increase the clearness of the concepts just marked off, and to aid in the marking off of a new set of concepts, rooted in the same soil, we embark on the following discussion:

In an intuitive presentation (*Vorstellung*) an object is meant in the manner of perception or imagination: in this manner it is more or less perfectly reference to a *here* and a *now*, there must necessarily be a corresponding part or moment of the conscious act. What we do not mean, is simply not

there for our presentation (*Vorstellung*). We now find in general that it is possible to draw the following phenomenological distinction between

- (1) *The purely intuitive 'substance' (Gehalt) of the act*, i.e. all that corresponds in the act to the sum total of the object's properties that 'become apparent'.
- (2) *The signitive 'substance' of the act*, which corresponds to the sum total of the remaining, subsidiarily given properties of the object, which do not themselves become apparent.

We all draw such a distinction, in purely phenomenological fashion, in the intuition involved in the percept or image of a thing, between whatever in the object is truly made apparent, the mere 'side' from which the object is shown to us, and whatever lacks intuitive presentation (*Darstellung*), is hidden by other phenomenal objects etc. Such talk plainly implies, what phenomenological analysis within certain limits definitely proves, that even what is *not* presented (*Nicht-Dargestelltes*) in an intuitive presentation (*Vorstellung*) is subsidiarily meant, and that an array of signitive components must accordingly be ascribed to the latter, from which we have to abstract, if we wish to keep our *intuitive* content pure. This last gives the intuitively presenting (*darstellende*) content its direct relation to corresponding objective moments: other novel and, to that extent, mediate, signitive intentions, are attached to these by contiguity.

If we now define the *weight* of the intuitive (or signitive) content as the sum total of the intuitively (or signitively) presented (*vorgestellte*) moments of the object, both 'weights' in each presentation (*Vorstellung*) will add up to a single total weight, i.e. the sum total of the object's properties. Always therefore the symbolic equation holds: $i + s = 1$. The weights i and s can plainly vary in many regards: the same, intentionally same, object can be intuitively given with more or less numerous, ever varying properties. The signitive content also alters correspondingly, it is increased or diminished.

Ideally we now have the possibility of two limiting cases:

$$\begin{array}{ll} i = 0 & s = 1 \\ i = 1 & s = 0. \end{array}$$

In the former, the presentation (*Vorstellung*) would have only signitive content: no property of its intentional object would remain over which was brought to intuitive presentation (*Darstellung*) in its content. The special case of purely signitive presentations, well-known to us as *pure meaning-intentions*, therefore appears here as a limiting case of intuition.

In the second case the presentation (*Vorstellung*) has *no signitive content* whatever. In it all is fullness: no part, no side, no property of its object fails to be intuitively presented (*dargestellt*), none is merely indirectly and subsidiarily meant. Not only is everything that is intuitively presented also meant – so much is analytically true – but whatever is meant is also intuitively presented. This new class of presentations may be defined as *pure intuitions*, the

term here used with innocuous ambiguity, at times to cover complete acts, at times such acts in abstraction from their quality. We may speak distinguishingly of *qualified* and *unqualified* pure intuitions.

In each presentation (*Vorstellung*) we can therefore surely abstract from all signitive components, and limit ourselves to what is really represented in its representative content. By so doing we form a *reduced* presentation, with a reduced object in regard to which it is purely intuitive. We can accordingly say that the *intuitive substance (Gehalt)* of a presentation comprises *all that is pure intuition in it*, just as we may also speak of *the object's purely intuitive content*, of all that is rendered intuitive in this presentation. The like applies to the signitive substance of the presentation: this can be said to be all that is *pure signification* in it.

Each total act of intuition has either the character of a percept or an imagination: its intuitive substance is then either *perceptual* or *imaginative* substance or content. This must not be confused with the perceptually or imaginatively presenting content in the sense defined in §22.

Perceptual content comprises (though not in general exclusively) strictly presentative contents: imaginative contents comprise only analogizing contents. It is not to the point that these latter contents permit of *another* interpretation (as in the case of physical images), in which they function strictly presentatively.

On account of the mixture of perceptual and imaginative components which the intuitive substance of a percept permits and usually exhibits, we can again consider adopting a division of perceptual content into *pure perceptual content*, on the one hand, and *supplementary image-content*, on the other.

If then, in each pure intuition we take P_p and I_p to be the weights of its *purely* perceptual and *purely* imaginative components, we can write down the symbolic equation

$$P_p + I_p = 1$$

where 1 symbolizes the weight of the total intuitive content of the pure intuition, and thus the total content of its object. If $I_p = 0$, i.e. if the pure intuition is free from all imaginative content, it should be called a *pure perception*: we shall here ignore the qualitatively assertive character usually embraced in the sense of the term 'perception'. But if $P_p = 0$, the intuition is not merely to signitive, but also to imaginative supplements. Therefore, of an impure percept which throws out symbolic components yields the pure intuition which is immanent in it: a further reductive step then throws out everything imagined, and yields the substance of pure perception.

Can the intuitively presentative content in the case of pure perception be identified with the object itself? The essence of pure presentation (in the strict sense) surely consists in being a pure self-presentation of the object,

one which means the intuitively presentative content *directly* (in the manner of 'self') as its object. This would, however, be a paralogism. The percept, as presentation in the strict sense, so interprets the intuitively presentative content, that the object appears as itself given with and in this content. Presentation (in the strict sense) is *pure*, when each part of the object is actually and intuitively presented in the content, and none is merely imagined or symbolized. As there is nothing in the object not strictly presented, so there is nothing in the content not strictly presentative. Despite such exact correspondence, self-presentation may still have the character of the mere, even if all-sided perspectivity (of a completed perceptual picture): it need not attain the ideal of adequation, where the intuitively presenting content is also the intuitively presented content. The pure picture-presentation, which completely depicts its object through its freedom from all signitive additions, holds in its intuitively presentative content a complete likeness of the object. This likeness can approach the object more or less closely, to a limit of complete resemblance. The same may be true in the case of pure perception, with the sole difference, that imagination treats the content as a likeness or image, whereas perception looks on it as a self-revelation of the object. Pure perception no less than pure imagination admits, accordingly, of differing degrees of fulness, without thereby altering its intentional object. Regarding the *degrees of fulness of intuitive content*, to which degrees of fulness of representative content run *eo ipso* parallel, we may distinguish:

1. The *extent or richness* of the fulness, according as the content of the object achieves intuitive presentation with greater or less completeness.
2. The *liveliness* of this fulness, i.e. the degree of approximation of the primitive resemblances of the intuitive presentation to the corresponding moments of content in the object.
3. The reality-level (*Realitätsgehalt*) of the fulness, the greater or less number of its strictly presentative contents.

In all these regards, adequate perception represents an ideal: it has a maximum of extent, liveliness and reality: it is the self-apprehension of the whole, full object.

§24 Graded series of fulfillments

We framed our talk of 'fulness' with an eye to relationships of 'fulfilment'. That peculiar form of the synthesis of identification. But in our last results we not only threw light on the concept of fulness, but also on its differences of greater or lesser completeness, liveliness and reality, as well as on the gradations in pictorialization and perspectival projection, and all by way of relationships among the inner 'moments' of our presentations, or among these and the objective moments that they intend. But it is plain that to these relationships there correspond possible *gradients of increase, founded on synteses of fulfilment*.

Fulfilment arises out of the first application of fulness as such, in the identifying accommodation of 'corresponding' intuition to a signitive intention. In the context of coincidence the intuitive act 'gives' its fulness to the signitive act. The consciousness of increase is here founded on the partial coincidence of the fulness with correlative parts of the signitive intention, while to the corresponding empty parts of both intentions, which alike enter this identifying coincidence, no part of this sense of increase can be ascribed.

A continuous increase in fulfilment is further achieved in the continuity of intuitive acts or serial fulfillments which present the object with ever more extended and intense illustrativeness. That B_2 is a 'more perfect' image than B_1 , means that fulfilment obtains in the synthetic context of the pictorial presentation in question, and increased fulfilment in the direction of B_2 . Here as elsewhere distances pertain to increases, and transitivity to concatenated relationships. If B_2 is at once $> B_1$, and $B_3 > B_2$, then $B_3 > B_1$, and this last distance exceeds those which mediate it. This is so at least if we take separate account of the three moments of fulness, i.e. extent, liveliness and reality, which were distinguished above.

These increases and gradients of increase correspond, as analysis shows, to resemblances and gradients of resemblance among the intuitively presentative contents of the fulnesses. Likeness of presentative contents, or concatenations of such likenesses, are not, however, to be taken to be the same as simple or concatenated increases: they are not so when these 'fulnesses' are considered in their own being as contents, in abstraction from their representative function in the relevant acts. Only through this latter function, i.e. through the fact that, in the order of graded fulfillments, and of the increases obtaining among its acts, each later act of fulness appears richer, do the representative contents of the acts achieve their ascending order. They appear one after the other as not only themselves furnishing fulness, but as furnishing it ever more abundantly. To call such components 'fulnesses' is to talk relatively and functionally: it is to express a characteristic accruing to the contents through the acts, and through the part played by these acts in possible syntheses of fulfilment. Our term here resembles the term 'object'. To be an object represents no positive mark, no possible species of content: it refers to the content only as intentionally correlated with a presentation. For the rest, relationships of fulfilment and increase plainly have their foundation in the phenomenological 'substance' (*Gehalt*) of our acts, considered purely in their specificity. We are concerned throughout only with ideal relationships determined by the ideal Species in question. In the synthesis of intuitive acts there is, however, not always an increase in fulness: partial fulfilment can go hand in hand with partial emptying, as we mentioned above. The distinction between mere identification and fulfilment points back to the fact, we may say, that in the case of the former there may be either no genuine fulfilment, since we have to do only with asserted identities among acts alike lacking in fulness, or because the fulfilment or

enriched fulfillment which obtains together with a simultaneous emptying or surrender of previous fullness, so that no emphatic unmixed consciousness of increase arises. In any case the primitive relations among our elementary intentions are either fulfillments of empty (i.e. purely *signitive*) intentions, or supplementary fulfillment of intentions already to some extent filled, i.e. increase and realization of an imaginative intention.

§25 Fullness and intentional matter

We now wish to discuss the relation between the new concept of presentational content covered by the name 'fulness', with content in the sense of 'matter', which last has played such a large part in our investigation up to this point. 'Matter' was classed as that moment in an objectifying act which makes the act present *just this object in just this manner*, i.e. in just these articulations and forms, and with special relation to just these properties or relationships. Presentations which agree in their matter do not merely present the same object in some general fashion: they mean it in the most complete fashion *as* the same, as having exactly the same properties. The one presentation confers nothing on the object in its intention which the other presentation does not likewise confer. To each objectifying articulation and form on one side there is a corresponding articulation and form on the other, in such a manner that the agreeing elements of the presentations have an identical objective reference. In this sense we said in our Fifth Investigation, in elucidating the concepts of 'matter' and 'semantic essence': 'Two judgements are in essence the same judgement (i.e. judgements with the same 'matter'), if everything that would hold of the state of affairs judged according to one, would likewise hold of it according to the other, and nothing different would hold of it in either case. The truth-value of the judgements is the same'. They *mean* the same in regard to the object, even if they are otherwise quite different, if the one, e.g., is achieved *signitively*, while the other is more or less illustrated by intuition.

I was led to form this notion through a consideration of what is identical in the assertive and understanding use of the same expression, where one may 'believe' the content of some statement, while another leaves it undecided, without disturbing this content's identity, in which case it also makes no difference whether expression occurs in connection with correspondent intuition, and whether it can so occur or not. One might therefore be tempted – I myself hesitated long on this point – to define meaning as this very 'matter', which would, however, have the inconvenience that the moment of *assertion* in, e.g., a predicative statement, would fall outside of that statement's meaning. (One could no doubt limit the concept of meaning in this fashion, and then distinguish between qualified and unqualified meanings.) Our comparison of meaning-intentions with their correlative intuitions, in the static and dynamic unity of identifying coincidence, showed us, however,

that the very thing that we marked off as the 'matter' of meaning, reappeared once more in the corresponding intuition, and furnished the means for an identification. Our freedom, therefore, to add to or take away intuitive elements, and even all correspondent intuitions, wherever we limited our concern to the abiding meaningfulness of a given expression, was based on the fact that the whole act attaching to the sound of our words had the same 'matters' on the intuitive as on the meaning side, in respect, that is, of such elements of meaning as receive intuitive illustration at all.

It is clear, therefore, that the concept of 'matter' must be defined by way of the unity of total identification as *the element in our acts which serves as a basis for identification*, and that all differences of fullness which go beyond mere identification, and which variously determine peculiarities of fulfillment and increase of fulfillment, have no relevance in the formation of this conception. However the fullness of a presentation may vary within its possible gradients of fulfillment, its intentional object, intended as it is intended, remains the same: its 'matter', in other words, stays the same. Matter and fullness are, however, by no means unrelated and, when we range an intuitive act alongside a signitive act to which it brings fullness, the former act does not differ from the latter merely by the joining on of a third distinct moment of fullness to the quality and matter common to the two acts. This at least is not the case where we mean by 'fulness' the intuitive content of intuition. For intuitive content itself already includes a complete 'matter', the matter of an act *reduced* to a pure intuition. If the intuitive act in question was already *purely* intuitive, its matter also would be a constituent of its intuitive content.

The relations which obtain here will be best set forth by establishing the following parallelism between signitive and intuitive acts.

A purely *signitive* act would be a mere complex of quality and matter, if indeed it could exist by itself at all, i.e. be a concrete experiential unity 'on its own'. This it cannot be: we always find it clinging to some intuitive basis. This intuition of a sign may have 'nothing at all to do' with the object of the significative act, it may stand to it in no relation of fulfillment, but it realizes its possibility *in concreto* of being an altogether unfulfilled act. The following proposition therefore seems to hold: An act of signification is only possible in so far as an intuition becomes endured with a new intentional essence, whereby its intuitive object points beyond itself in the manner of a sign proposition does not, however, seem to express the necessities of connection which obtain here with the needed analytic clearness, and perhaps says more than is justified. For we can, it seems, say that it is *not our founding intuition as a whole, but only its representational content*, which really assists the signitive act. For what goes beyond this content, what pins down the sign as a natural object, *can be varied at will* without disturbing the sign's signitive function. Whether the letters of a verbal sign are of wood, iron or printer's ink etc., or seem to be such objectively, makes no difference. Only their

repeatedly recognizable shape is relevant, not as the objective shape of the thing of wood etc., but as the shape actually present in the intuitively presentative sensuous content of intuition. If there is only a connection between the signitive act and the intuitively presentative content of our intuition, and if the quality and matter of this intuition mean nothing to this signitive function, then we ought not to say that each signitive act requires a founding intuition, but only that it requires a founding content. It would seem that *any* content can function in this fashion, just as any content can function as the intuitively presentative content of an intuition.

If we now turn our regard to the parallel case of the *purely intuitive act*, its quality and matter (its intentional essence) are not capable of separate existence on their own: here too a supplement is required. This is furnished by the representative content, i.e. the content – sensuous in the case of a sensuous intuition – which in its present fusion with an intentional essence has acquired the character of being an intuitive representative. If we bear in mind the fact that the same (e.g. sensuous) content can at one time carry a meaning, and at another time an intuition – denoting in one case and picturing in the other – we are led to widen the notion of a representative content, and to distinguish between *contents which represent signitively* (signitive representatives) and *contents which represent intuitively* (intuitive representatives). Our division is, however, incomplete. We have so far considered only the purely intuitive or purely signitive acts. If we bring in the *mixed* acts as well, those we ordinarily class as intuitive, we find them peculiar in the fact that their representative content is pictorial or self-presentative in respect of one part of what it objectively presents, while being merely denotative as to the remaining part. We must accordingly range *mixed* representatives beside purely signitive and purely intuitive representatives: *these represent signitively and intuitively at the same time, and in regard to the same intentional essence*. We may now say:

Each concretely complete objectifying act has three components: its quality, its matter and its representative content. To the extent that this content functions as a purely signitive or purely intuitive representative, or as both together, the act is a purely signitive, a purely intuitive or a mixed act.

§26 Continuation. Representation or interpretation (*Auffassung*). Matter as the interpretative sense, the interpretative form and the interpreted content. Differentiating characterization of intuitive and signitive interpretation

We may now ask what this 'functioning' really stands for, since we have it as an *a priori* possibility that the same content, bound up with the same quality and matter, should function in this threefold manner. It is plain that it can only be the phenomenological peculiarity of the relevant form of unity that

can give a phenomenologically discoverable content to our distinction. This can specially unite the *matter* to the representative content, since the form specially function is unaffected by change in the quality. Whether, e.g., representative picturing claims to be the calling up of a real object or to be an imaginative, makes no difference to its pictorially presentative character, that its content bears the function of an image-content. We therefore call the *phenomenological union of matter with representative content*, in so far as it lends the latter its representative character, the *form of representation*, and the *whole* engendered by these two moments the *representation pure and simple*. This designation expresses the relation between representing and represented content (latter = the object or part of the object represented) by going back to its phenomenological foundation. Leaving aside the object as something not phenomenologically given, and endeavouring merely to express the fact that, when a content functions representatively, we are always differently 'minded', we may speak of a change in *interpretation* (*Auffassung*). We may also call the form of representation the *interpretative form*. Since the matter after a manner fixes the *sense* in which the representative content is interpreted, we may also speak of the *interpretative sense*. If we wish to recall the older term, and at the same time indicate an opposition to form, we may also speak of the *interpretative matter*. In each interpretation we must therefore distinguish phenomenologically between: *interpretative matter or sense, interpretative form and interpreted content*; this last is to be distinguished from the *object of the interpretation*. The term 'apprehension' is unsuitable despite its historical provenance, on account of its misleading terminological opposition to 'perception'; 'apprehension' would be more usable.

Our next question concerns the distinguishing marks of the various modes of representation or interpretation which, as we saw, can be different even when the interpretative matter – the 'as what' of interpretation – is constant. In the previous chapter we characterized differences of representations through differences in forms of fulfilment, in the present context we have regard to an internal characterization limited to the proper descriptive stuff of intentions. If we may make use of the beginnings of an analytical clarification which our previous treatment suggested, as well as of our subsequent advances in the general grasp of 'representation', the following train of ideas suggests itself:

We begin with the observation that *signitive representation* institutes a contingent, *external* relation between matter and representative content, whereas intuitive representation institutes one that is *essential, internal*. The contingency of the former consists in the fact that an identical signification can be thought of as attached to every content whatsoever. *Significative matter* has a general need for supporting content, but between the specific nature of the former and the specific being of the latter no bond of necessity can be found. Meaning cannot, as it were, hang in the air, but for what it means, the sign, whose meaning we call it, is entirely indifferent.

The case of *purely intuitive representation* is quite different. Here there is an *internal, necessary connection between matter and representing content*, fixed by the specific stuff of both. Only those contents can be intuitively representative of an object that resemble it or are like it. Phenomenologically put: we are not wholly free to interpret a content *as this or as that* (or in this or that interpretative sense) and this has more than an empirical foundation – every interpretation including a significant one is empirically necessary – since the content to be interpreted sets limits to us through a certain sphere of similarity and exact likeness, i.e. through its specific substance. The internality of the relation does not merely forge a link between *the interpretative matter as a whole and the whole content*: it links their parts on each side *piece by piece*. This occurs in the presupposed case of pure intuition. In the case of *impure intuition* the specific union is partial: a part of the matter – the matter of the reduced, and therefore, of course, pure, intuition – provides the intuitive sense in which the content is interpreted, while the remainder of the matter undergoes no representation through similarity or exact likeness, but merely through contiguity, i.e. in mixed intuition the representative content functions as intuitive representative for one part of the matter, but as significant representative for the remaining part.

If one finally asks how one and the same content (in the sense of 'same matter') can at times be 'taken up' in the manner of an intuitive, and at times in the manner of a significant representative, in what the differing nature of these interpretative forms consists, I can give them no further answer. We are facing a difference that cannot be phenomenologically reduced.

In these discussions we have treated representation independently as a union of matter and representative content. If we go back again to the complete acts, these reveal themselves as combinations of act-quality with either intuitive or significant representation. The whole acts are called intuitive or significant, a difference determined by these inwrought representations. The study of relations of fulfillment led us above to the concept of intuitive substance or fullness. If we compare that case of concept-formation with the present one, it sets bounds to the purely intuitive representation (i.e. pure intuition) that belongs to an act of impure intuition. 'Fullness' was a notion specially framed for the comparative treatment of acts in their fulfilling function. The limiting case opposed to pure intuition, pure signification, is of course the same as purely significant representation.

§27 Representations as the necessary bases of presentation in all acts. Final clarification of talk about the different modes of the relation of consciousness to its object

Each objectifying act includes a representation in itself. Every act whatever, following the conclusions of the Fifth Investigation (see particularly the

penultimate chapter, §41) is either itself an objectifying act, or has such an act as its basis. The ultimate bases of all acts are therefore 'presentations' in the sense of representations.

Talk of *the differing mode of relation of an act to its objects* has been shown, in the above discussions, to cover the following essential ambiguities:

1. The quality of acts, the modes of believing, entertaining, wishing, doubting etc.
2. The underlying representation, and
 - (a) *the interpretative form*, i.e. whether the object is presented in purely significant, or intuitive, or mixed fashion. Here also belong the differences between a perceptual and an imaginative presentation etc.;
 - (b) *the interpretative matter*: whether the object is presented in this or that 'sense', e.g. significantly through differing meanings, presenting the same object but qualifying it differently;
 - (c) *the interpreted contents*: whether the object is presented by way of this or that sign, or by way of this or that representative content. In the latter case, if we consider the matter more closely, the laws connecting intuitive representatives with matter and form, entail that we are also concerned with differences that affect form even where matter remains constant.

§28 Intentional essence and fulfilling sense. Epistemic essence. Intuitions in specie

In our First Investigation (§14) we opposed 'fulfilling sense' to meaning (or fulfilling meaning to intending meaning) by pointing to the fact that, in fulfillment, the object is 'given' intuitively in the same way in which the mere meaning means it. We then took the ideally conceived element which thus coincides with the meaning, to be the *fulfilling sense*, and said that, through this coincidence, the merely significant intention (or expression) achieved relation to the intuitive object (expressed this and just this object).

This entails, to employ conceptual formations later introduced, that the fulfilling sense is interpreted as the intentional essence of the completely and adequately fulfilling act.

This conceptual formation is entirely correct and suffices for the purpose of pinning down the entirely general aspects of the situation where a significant intention achieves relation to its intuitively presented object: it expresses the important insight that the semantic essence of the significant (or expressive) act reappears *identically* in corresponding intuitive acts, despite phenomenological differences on either side, and that the living unity of the expression realizes this coincidence itself, and so realizes the relation of precisely of this identity, that the 'fulfilling sense' carries no implication of fullness, that it does not accordingly include the total content of the intuitive act, to the extent that this is relevant for the theory of knowledge. It might be

thought objectionable that we have conceived the intentional essence so narrowly as to exclude such an important constituent of the act, and one so decisive for knowledge. We were guided by the thought that the essence of an objectifying intention must be something which no intention of this sort could lack, or which could not be freely varied in it, without having an ideally necessary effect on its relation to its object. Purely signitive acts are, however, 'empty' acts, acts lacking in the moment of fullness, and so only the unity of quality and matter can count as the essence of an objectifying act. It might now be objected that signitive intentions without sensuous support are impossible, that they also have intuitive fullness in their fashion. But, in the sense of our treatment of signitive representation, and our earlier treatments of authentic and inauthentic illustration, this is really not fullness. Or rather it is fullness, but not fullness of the signitive act, but of the act on which it is founded, the act in which the sign is set up as an intuitive object. This fullness may, we saw, vary without limit, without affecting the signitive intention, and what concerns *its* object. Taking into account this circumstance, as well as the fact that, even in intuitive acts, fullness may vary, albeit within bounds, while the same object is constantly meant, with the same properties and with the same act-quality, we plainly need a term to stand for the mere unity of quality with matter.

But it is now also useful, on the other hand, to frame a more embracing concept. We accordingly define as the *epistemic essence of an objectifying act* (in opposition to its merely *semantic essence*) *all the content which has relevance for its knowledge-function*. The three components of quality, matter and fullness (or intuitive content) all belong to it. If we wish to avoid the overlap of the last two components, and have wholly exclusive components, we may make it consist of quality, matter and *intuitively representative content*, the last of which falls away in empty intentions, together with all 'fullness'. All objectifying acts having the same epistemic essence are the 'same' act for the ideal purposes of the theory of knowledge. When we speak of objectifying acts *in specie*, we have a corresponding idea in mind. The same holds of (deliberately) restrictive talk of *intuitions in specie* etc.

§29 Complete and defective intuitions. Adequate and objectively complete intuitive illustrations. *Essentia* (*Essenz*)

In an intuitive presentation a *varying amount of intuitive fullness* is possible. This talk of a varying amount points, as we argued, to possible gradients of fulfillment: proceeding along these, we come to know the object better and better, by way of a presentative content that resembles it ever more and more closely, and grasps it more and more vividly and fully. We know also that intuition can occur where whole sides and parts of the object meant are not apparent at all, i.e. the presentation has an intuitive content not com-

prising pictorial representatives of these sides and parts, so that they are *intuitively* presented 'inauthentically', through inwrought signitive intentions, only presented with these differences, which result in very different modes of presentation for one and the same object, with meaning governed by the same matter, we spoke above of differences in the *extent* of fullness. Here two important possibilities must be distinguished.

1. The intuitive presentation presents its object *adequately*, i.e. with an intuitive substance (*Gehalt*) of such fullness, that to each constituent of the object, as it is meant in this presentation, a representative constituent of the intuitive content corresponds.

2. Or this is *not* the case. The presentation contains no more than an incomplete projection of the object: it presents it *inadequately*.

Here we are talking of the adequacy or inadequacy of a presentation *to its object*. Since, however, we speak more widely of adequacy in contexts of fulfillment, we introduce yet another set of terms. We shall speak of *complete and defective intuitions* (more particularly of complete and mutilated percepts or imaginations). All pure intuitions are complete. The following considerations will at once show that the converse does not hold, and that our proposed division does not simply coincide with that of *pure* and *impure* intuitions.

Whether presentations are simple or complex is a matter regarding which nothing is presupposed in the distinction just drawn. Intuitive presentations may, however, be complex in two ways:

(a) The relation to the object may be simple in so far as the act (more specifically, its matter) has no constituent acts (or no separate matters) that *independently present the same total object*. This does not preclude the possibility that an act should be made up of partial intentions homogeneously fused, which relate to the individual parts or sides of its object. One can scarcely avoid assuming such complexity in the case of 'external' percepts and imaginations, and we have proceeded on this assumption. But, on the other hand we have

(b) the kind of complexity in which the total act is built out of constituent acts, *each of which independently is a full intuitive presentation of the same object*. This we have in those extremely remarkable *continuous syntheses* which bind together a multitude of percepts which pertain to the same object, into a single 'many-sided' or 'all-sided' percept, which deals with the object continuously in 'varying positions'. There are the corresponding syntheses of imagination. In the continuity of a prolonged fusion-into-sameness not broken up into isolated acts, the same single object appears *ever*, not as often as individual acts can be distinguished. It appears, however, with *altering* fullness of content, though the matters, and likewise the *qualities remain steadfastly the same*, at least when the object is known from all angles, and repeatedly comes to light in its unenriched familiarity.

The distinction between adequacy and inadequacy relates also to these continuous syntheses. An adequate presentation of, e.g., an external thing is

possible in synthetic form in respect of its all-sided surface-contours: in the form of an objectively simple presentation, it is impossible.

Of complete intuitions it is plain that objectively simple ones, but by no means always objectively complex ones, are *pure* intuitions. The pure intuition which corresponds to an empirical thing is denied to us, it lies hidden after a fashion in the complete synthetic intuition itself, but as it were dispersedly, with a perpetual admixture of signitive representation. If we reduce this synthetic intuition to its pure form, we do not have the pure intuition possible in an objectively simple presentation, but a continuum of intuitive contents, in which each aspect of the object quite often achieves intuitive representation, achieves ever varied perspectival projection, and in which only the continuous fusion of identity constitutes the phenomenon of objective unity.

When an intuitive fact serves to give fulness in connection with a signitive intention, perhaps in connection with a meaning-intention expressed in words, similar possibilities arise. The object as it is meant can receive an adequate or an inadequate intuitive illustration. The former possibility covers two separable possibilities in the case of complex meanings:

First, that to all parts (members, moments, forms) of the meaning, which themselves have a meaning-character, fulfilment should accrue through corresponding parts of the fulfilling intuition.

Secondly, that the fulfilling intuition, to the extent that its object is meant in any articulations and forms which have been drawn into the function of fulfilment, is intrinsically adequate to its object.

The first determines the completeness of the adaptation of signitive acts to *corresponding intuitions*; the second the completeness of the adaptation of signitive acts – through *complete* intuitions – to the object itself.

The expression 'a green house' can thus be intuitively illustrated if a house is really present to our intuition as green. This is a case of the first perfection. The second requires an adequate presentation of a green house. We generally only have the former in mind when we speak of an adequate illustration of expressions. To find distinct terms for this *double* perfection we shall speak of an *objectively perfect* intuitive illustration of our signitive presentation as opposed to its adequate, but *objectively defective*, intuitive illustration.

Similar relationships obtain in the case of an intuitive illustration which *conflicts with, rather than fulfilling a meaning*. When a signitive intention encounters frustration from an intuition, because perhaps it refers to a *green A*, though the same *A*, perhaps any *A* at all, is red, and is now intuited as red, the *objective completeness* of the intuitive realization of conflict requires that *all* constituents of the meaning-intention should find an objectively complete intuitive illustration. It is therefore necessary, not merely that the *A*-intention should receive complete objective fulfilment in the intuition in question, but also that the green-intuition should be fulfilled, though

naturally in another intuition which cannot be united to the intuition of the *red A*. It is not then merely the signitive green-intention, but the same intention in its objectively complete fulfilment, which is at odds with the red-intuition: these two intuitive moments are in total 'rivalry', while the *correlative* intuitive wholes are in partial rivalry. This rivalry especially touches, as one might say, the *intuitive* or *intuitively presentative* contents of these fulfilling acts.

If nothing special is prefaced we shall in future speak of 'intuitive illustrations' only in the case of fulfillments (not frustrations).

Distinctions of fulness in cases where quality and matter are identical, prompt us to frame one further important concept:

We shall say that two intuitive acts have the same *essentia* (*Essenz*), if *their pure intuitions* have the same matter. A percept, and the whole possibly existent infinity of imaginative presentations, which all present the same object with the same breadth of fulness, have one and the same *essentia*. All objectively complete intuitions with one and the same matter have the same *essentia*.

A signitive presentation has no *essentia* in its own right. But a certain *essentia* may, in an inauthentic sense, be ascribed to it, if it permits of complete fulfilment through one of the possible manifold of intuitions pertaining to this *essentia*, or, what is the same, if it has a 'fulfilling sense'.

This probably clarifies the true meaning of the scholastic term *essentia*, which certainly hinges on the possibility of a 'concept'.

Consistency and inconsistency

§30 The ideal distinction of meanings into the possible or real (*reale*) and the impossible or imaginary

It is *not* possible to fit intuitive acts to every signitive intention in the manner of an 'objectively complete intuitive illustration'.¹ Meaning-intentions may accordingly be divided into the *possible* (internally consistent) and the *impossible* (internally inconsistent, imaginary). This division, and the law underlying it, does not concern *acts in isolation* – this applies also to all other propositions propounded here – but *their epistemic essence in general*, and therein their 'matters' taken generally. For it is not possible that a signitive intention with matter *M* should find a possibility of fulfilment in some intuition, while another signitive intention with the same matter *M*, should lack this possibility. These possibilities and impossibilities do not refer to intuitions actually found in certain empirical interweavings of consciousness: they are not real (*reale*), but ideal possibilities, with their sole ground in specific character. In the sphere of the verbally expressed, to which we may without essential loss limit ourselves, the axiom runs: *Meanings (i.e. concepts and propositions in specie) divide into the possible and the impossible (the real and the imaginary).*

Drawing on our just made notional constructions, we may define the *possibility* (reality) of a meaning by saying that *there is an adequate essentia which corresponds to it in specie in the sphere of objectifying acts, an essentia whose matter is identical with its own, or what is the same, that it has a fulfilling sense, or that there exists in specie a complete intuition whose matter is identical with its own.* This 'exists' has here the same ideal sense as in mathematics, to reduce it to the possibility of corresponding particulars is not to reduce it to the possibility of anything different, but merely to employ an equivalent turn of phrase. (This is true, at least, when 'possibility' is given its 'pure' and therefore non-empirical, sense, and is 'real' only in this 'pure' fashion.) The idea of the possibility of a meaning really expresses, to look at the matter more exactly, a *generalization of the relation of fulfilment in the case*

of objectively complete intuitive illustration, and the above definitions are to be regarded, not as classifications of words, but as the *ideal*, necessary and sufficient *criteria* of possibility. They really state the specific *law* that where such a relationship obtains between the matter of a meaning and the matter of an *essentia*, possibility also *obtains*, and conversely also that in every case of possibility such a relationship obtains.

Further: that such an ideal relationship obtains at all, i.e. that this generalization holds objectively, and is therefore in its own turn 'possible' – this itself amounts to a law which may be simply expressed in the words: *There are possible meanings* (it must be noted that 'meaning' does not stand for the act of meaning). Not every empirical relationship permits such a generalization. If we find this intuited paper rough, we cannot pronounce generally 'Paper is rough', as we can pronounce generally, on the basis of a certain actual act of meaning: 'This meaning is possible (real)'. Just for this reason the proposition 'Every meaning is either possible or impossible', is no mere case of the law of excluded middle, in the familiar sense which excludes contradictory predicates from *individual subjects*, and can only pronounce such an exclusion for such subjects. The exclusion of contradictory predicates in an *ideal* sphere (e.g. the sphere of numbers, of meanings etc.) is by no means obvious, but must be demonstrated afresh in each such sphere, or set up as an axiom. We may recall that we cannot, for instance, say that every kind of paper is either rough or not rough, for this would entail that every individual paper of a particular sort was rough, or that every individual paper of that particular sort was not rough: such assertions are obviously not valid for every possible species. There accordingly really lies, behind the division of *meanings* into possible and impossible, a peculiar general law rich in content, a law that governs phenomenological moments in ideal fashion by binding their species in the manner of general propositions.

To be able to utter such an axiom, one must *see* its truth, and that we possess self-evidence in our case is certain. If we realize, e.g., the meaning of the expression 'white surface' on an intuitive basis, we experience the reality of the concept: the intuitive appearance really presents something white and a surface, and precisely as a white surface. This implies that the fulfilling intuition does not merely present a white surface, but brings it to intuitive givenness through its content as completely as its meaning-intention demands.

Impossibility is ranged beside possibility as an Idea of equal title, which should not merely be defined as a negation of possibility, but should be realized by way of a peculiar phenomenological fact. This is, moreover, presupposed by the fact that the concept of impossibility can find application, and that it can appear in an axiom: *There are impossible meanings.* The phenomenological fact is to be sought in the realm of conflict.

§31 Compatibility or consistency as an ideal relationship in the widest sphere of contents in general. Compatibility of 'concepts' as meanings

We start with the concept of consistency or compatibility, which governs the widest sphere of contents in general (objects in the widest sense of the word).

Two *contents*, which are parts of any whole, are united in it, and are accordingly *compatible*, *consistent* within the unity of the whole. This seems empty obvious, but the same contents will still be compatible when they chance not to come together. There is good sense in speaking of a compatibility of contents, whose actual union always has been, and always will be, excluded. But if two contents are unified, their union proves not only their own compatibility, but that of an ideal infinity of other cases, namely of all pairs of contents exactly like them and belonging to similar kinds. It is clear what this points to, and that the following axiom is by no means an empty assertion: *Compatibility does not pertain to dispersed individual specimens, but to the Species of contents*. If, e.g., the moments of redness and roundness have once been found unified, a complex Species is at once reached by *ideative abstraction*, and *can forthwith be given*, which embraces both the Species of redness and roundness in its specifically grasped form of combination. It is the ideal 'existence' of this complex Species in which the compatibility of redness and roundness, in each thinkable instance, has its *a priori* foundation, a compatibility which is an ideally valid relationship whether empirical union occurs anywhere in the world or not. If the valuable sense of talk of compatibility is pinned down as the ideal being of the corresponding complex Species, a yet weightier point must be made: that *talk of compatibility always relates to some sort of whole*, which is the decisive point for our logical interest. Such talk is applied when we are considering whether or not certain given contents can be fitted together on a pattern set by certain forms, a question decided in the affirmative if we can exhibit a whole of the sort in question. The correlate of this compatibility of contents is the 'possibility' of the complex *meanings*: this follows from our above criteria of possibility. The appropriate *essentia*, the complete intuitive illustration of the corresponding complex content, proves the compatibility of its parts, and conversely furnishes an *essentia* and a corresponding meaning to such incompatibility. The reality of a meaning is therefore equivalent to: the meaning is an *objectively complete 'expression'* of an intuitive compatibility of content. In the limiting case of a simple content one can define the validity of the simple species as a 'compatibility with self'. Obviously the combination of expression and expressed (meaning and *corresponding*, i.e. objectively quite adequate, intuition) is itself again a combination of compatibles, whose specific content we determined above. In talk of *compatibility as regards meanings* ('concepts'), we are not merely concerned with their compatibility in a whole – this would rather be a *purely logico-grammatical*

compatibility in the sense of our Fourth Investigation – but are rather concerned with a compatibility of meanings in a 'possible' meaning, i.e. a meaning compatible with corresponding intuition in the unity of objectively adequate knowledge. We have here accordingly a *derived*, secondary form of speech. The same is true of the term 'possibility'. The original possibility (or reality) is the validity, the ideal existence of a Species: it is at least fully guaranteed by this. Next the intuition of an individual case which corresponds to this possibility, and the intuitable individual itself, are possible. Finally the meaning realized with objective completeness in such an intuition is said to be possible. The difference between talk about compatibility and talk about possibility consists solely in the fact that, while the latter denotes the simple validity of a Species, the former (prior to the widening of the notion to cover the limiting case) connotes the *relationship of the component Species* in a Species which counts as one, and in connection therewith also the relationship of the partial intuitions in a total intuition, of the partial contents to be intuited within a total content to be intuited as one, of partial meanings to be fulfilled within a total meaning to be fulfilled as one.

Finally we remark that the concept of *essentia*, like the concepts of possibility and compatibility, imparts its original sense derivatively to the realm of meaning. *The original concept of essentia* is expressed in the proposition: *Every valid species is an essentia*.

§32 Incompatibility (conflict) of contents in general

Contents are *incompatible*, to pursue the opposed case down to its general grounds, if they cannot suffer each other in the unity of a whole. Put phenomenologically: no unified intuition must be possible which presents such a whole with complete adequacy. But how shall we know this? In empirical instances we attempt to unite contents, sometimes successfully, sometimes without success – we experience an absolute resistance. But the *factual failure* does not establish a *necessary failure*. Possibly greater power could ultimately overcome the resistance. Nonetheless, in our empirical concern with the contents in question, and our attempted removal of their 'triviality', we experience a peculiar relationship of the contents, again grounded in their specific being, and with an ideality quite independent of the empirical effort, and all the other features of the individual case. *It is the relationship of conflict*.

This relationship puts quite definite *sorts* of content into relation, within quite definite *associations of contents*. Colours conflict with one another, not in general, but only in specific contexts: several moments of colour, of varying specific difference, are incompatible as simultaneous overlays of one and the same bodily extension, while they are quite compatible if set side by side within a single extension. This is universally the case. A content of the sort *q* is never *simply incompatible* with a content of the sort *p*: talk of their

incompatibility always relates to a definite sort of combination of contents $W(a, b \dots p)$ which includes p , and should now include q as well. The word 'should' certainly indicates an intention, a presentative and generally also a voluntary intention, which thinks of the q , given in any intuition $I(q)$, as brought into the present intuition of W , which presents q significantly in W . This intention we shall, however, ignore, just as, in the case of compatibility, we ignored the intention towards unification, as well as the process of transference and union. We only maintain the presence of a descriptively peculiar relationship between q – the remainder of A is variable at will and plays no further part – and p , within the whole of contents W , and that this whole is independent of the individual element in the case. In other words, it is grounded purely in the Species W , p and q . What is specific in the consciousness of conflict pertains to these Species, i.e. the generalization of the situation is actual, is realizable in an intuitively unified consciousness of universality, it yields a unified, valid ('possible') Species which unites p and Q , through conflict, on the basis of W .

§33 How conflict can also be a foundation for unity. Relativity of the talk of compatibility and conflict

To this last expression and sentence there attach a series of disquieting doubts and questions. Does conflict unify? Is the unity of conflict a unity of possibility? Unity in general certainly underlies possibility, but does not the latter absolutely exclude conflict, inconsistency?

These difficulties are resolved when we remember that not only talk of an incompatibility, but also talk of a compatibility, necessarily relates to a certain whole W which, subjectively speaking, governs our intention. Looking out from the specific make-up of this whole, we call its parts compatible. We should call the same contents $p, q \dots$ (which here function as parts) incompatible, if in our symbolic intention towards their unity within such a whole, we experienced intuitive conflict instead of intuitive unity. The correlation of the two possible cases in relation to the two definite sorts of wholes, or combinations of compatible or incompatible contents, is clear. This relation also determines the sense of these terms. We do not call $p, q \dots$ simply *compatible*, merely considering that they are unified and not at all how they are so, but in the light of their union after the manner of W , and that this union of $p, q \dots$ excludes the conflict of the same $p, q \dots$ in relation to the same W . Contents $p, q \dots$ are similarly not said to be simply *incompatible*, but in the light of the fact that they will not 'suffer' one another within the framework of a unity of the sort W which just happens to interest us. The intention to such a unity brings out a conflict instead of such a unity; the exclusion of unity by correlated conflict once more also plays its part. The consciousness of conflict entails 'disunity', since it excludes the W -type unity which is in question here. With this direction of interest, conflict

does not itself count as unity, but as separation, not as a combination but as sundering. But if we change the relations, an incompatibility can also function as a unity, e.g. between the character 'conflict' and the contents separated by it. This character is compatible with these contents, and perhaps incompatible with others. If our dominant intention is upon the whole-shaped-by-conflict which is the whole for the parts just mentioned, then, when we find such a whole, when conflict accordingly obtains, there is compatibility among these parts, $p, q \dots$ in this context, and in the conflict which separates them. This conflict is not a conflict among the members of the intended conflict, whose absence it in fact indicates, but a conflict attaching to the contents $p, q \dots$ united without conflict in one intuition, and the moment of conflict which is made intuitive in another intuition.

The paradox of talking of a unification-through-conflict is cleared up by noting the relativity of these concepts. One can no longer object: 'Conflict absolutely excludes unity. In the manner of conflict anything and everything could ultimately be unified. Where unity fails, there conflict obtains, and to allow this conflict once more to count as a unity, is to obliterate the absolute, stark distinction between unity and conflict, and corrupt its true sense'. No, we may now presume to reply, conflict and unity do not 'absolutely' exclude one another, but only in a variously determined correlation which changes from case to case. In this correlation, they exclude each other as stark opposites, and only if we limit our 'absolutely' to some such tacitly presupposed correlation can we be satisfied with our polemical assertion. Not everything, moreover, can be unified in the form of a conflict, but only such things as serve to base a conflict, and none of the things that are or could be unified. For in the meaning of this talk of union-in-the-form-of-conflict it is implied that the form of conflict of a $p, q \dots$ thought of as in a certain combination W_0 shall count as a unity, which as a unity re-establishes union and compatibility, and so corresponds to the W we mentioned above. But if unity obtains among $p, q \dots$ in respect of the combination W_0 , then these $p, q \dots$ will not permit themselves to be brought into a relationship of conflict in respect of this combination, since combination as such means unity.

So not everything can really be united in the form of conflict, at least not for the stated reason that failure of unity would be manifest in a conflict, which would therefore restore unity through conflict. We understand the confusion here fallen into, the confounding of underlying relations. The failure of the unity W_0 fixes the character of the conflict attaching to not, however, within the context determined by the notion W_0 . This conflict does has the character of a separation, as regards the new unity that of a combination. All this is in order, as an example will make clear. In relation to a peculiar phenomenal context, *red* and *green* are called incompatible, *red* and *round* compatible. The character of conflict determines incompatibility in

the first case, it produces separation between *red* and *green*. Despite this, in regard to another kind of combination, it helps to establish a unity, i.e. in regard to the type of combination *conflict among the sensuous qualities of a phenomenal object*. Conflict is now a unity between *red* and *green*, a unity in respect of the elements *conflict*, *red*, *green*. As opposed to this 'conflict of *red* and *round*' is now disunity in respect of these elements *conflict*, *red*, *round*.

§34 Some axioms

After this elucidation, very important for our basic analysis, of the sense of relations of compatibility, we can lay down primitive axioms and complete their phenomenological clarification. The first would be the *axiom of the convertibility of relations of compatibility* (or incompatibility), which our analysis of the underlying phenomenological relationships makes immediately clear.

The next axiom to be set up requires more consideration: *that unity and conflict* (or *compatibility and incompatibility*) – *each pair related to the same basis of correlation* – *exclude each other reciprocally* (or are *incompatible* with one another). We need no longer emphasize that incompatibility is not the mere privation of compatibility, not the mere fact that a certain unity does not objectively obtain. Union and conflict are notions with different phenomenological foundations, and we are therefore really uttering a statement with content if we say that if a *p* conflicts with a *q* as regards the form of unity $W(p, q \dots)$ – such conflict is a phenomenologically positive character – the union of a *p* with a *q* in the sense of the same *W* is 'impossible'. The phenomenological ground of this fact has been laid bare in the previous discussion: when we try to unite actual conflict between *p, q \dots* with the *corresponding unity* of *p, q \dots* – actually to impose the form of unity *W* which has been somewhere really intuited in the case of items *m, n \dots* in the pertinent case of conflict on the same items *p, q \dots* – a *new conflict* emerges, which has its roots in the first conflict and the elsewhere intuited form of unity. Analogous things are plain in the converse case, which may for the rest be regarded as an application of the first axiom.

The propositions that there is a *conflict*, and the proposition that there is no unity among any given *p, q \dots* (the same in both cases), say exactly the same thing. *Every 'not' expresses a conflict*.

When a conflict attaches to the circumstance that *p, q* shall be in conflict, that *p, q \dots* shall be one in the form of conflict, *p, q \dots* are one. In other words: *If p, q are not in conflict, are not not unified, they are unified* (axiom of double negation) which entails that:

Either unity or conflict obtains – one or other is the case – there is no third possibility.

Four possibilities must here be distinguished, expressed in the following terms:

Unity	{	obtains
Conflict		
	{	does not obtain.

Non-unity is, however, another name for conflict, and non-conflict (according to the previous axiom) an equivalent of unity.

The final elucidation of these axioms, and their relation to purely logical axioms, goes beyond the boundaries of the present investigation. What we have here adduced is only intended to point to the internal relations that we desire to track down later: they make us aware, very vividly, that we are here already working to lay down the phenomenological foundations of pure logic.

§35 Incompatibility of concepts as meanings

Incompatibility, like compatibility, appears in thought in connection with significant intentions directed to certain combinations, in connection, accordingly, with significant and intuitive identifications. The concept of incompatibility does not relate to intentions, but the identically styled concept which relates to intentions is *derivative*, is a special case of the original notion, very definite in scope, and with limited openings for relations of frustration. Here we have an analogue of the matters set forth above (§31) in regard to compatibility or consistency. Talk of incompatibility in regard to meanings ('concepts') may again be said to express, not any and every ideal incompatibility of the same, not, e.g., a purely grammatical incompatibility. It has to do only with the relationship of the partial meanings within a complex meaning, which does not fulfil itself in an objectively complete illustration, but is, or *may* be frustrated. Plainly conflict of the intuitively illustrated contents underlies such frustration, although (be it noted) this conflict is not itself meant and expressed. Otherwise conflict would pertain to the fulfilling 'intuition', and the expression would express adequately, and in an entirely 'possible' manner, an objective impossibility.

The connection between the meaning and *each* of the unified intuitions which cancel each other in the process of intuitive conflict, is likewise one of conflict (of course with partial coincidence).

The ideal laws to be set up for the possibility of meanings are based on the original, more general concepts, and on the axioms set up for such concepts above (which have, however, to be carried further). Here we have such propositions as:

Incompatibility and compatibility among the same meanings, in relation to identical context, are mutually exclusive.

Of a pair of contradictory meanings – of meanings such that what the one means as incompatible the other means as compatible – one is possible and the other impossible.

The negative of a negative – i.e. a meaning which presents incompatibility in a given matter *M* as itself involving incompatibility – is equivalent to the corresponding positive meaning. This positive meaning is defined as the meaning which presents the inner consistency of the same *M* through the same presentative matter (the matter left over after the negations have been cancelled).

Quite obviously a real theory of meanings according to their logical relations would demand that all such propositions should be enunciated and proved in a systematically ordered fashion.

We break off our fragmentary discussions, leaving their completion to later investigations. We need, in the interests of logic, a much more extensive, completely executed phenomenology and theory of identifications and differentiations, particularly of such as are partial, as well as of their obviously close relations to the doctrine of unity and conflict.

Chapter 5

The ideal of adequation. Self-evidence and truth

§36 Introduction

In our discussions up to this point we have said nothing of the *qualities* of acts, nor presumed anything in regard to them. Possibility and impossibility have indeed no special relation to these qualities. It makes no difference, e.g., to the possibility of a proposition, whether we realize the propositional matter as matter for an act of *assertion* (not of an act that assents to something in the accepting or recognizing manner of approval, but in the manner of a simple act of belief or taking for true), or whether we use it, in qualitatively modified fashion, as the matter of a pure presentation. A proposition is always 'possible', when the concrete act of propositional meaning permits of a fulfilling identification with an objectively complete intuition of matching material. It is likewise irrelevant if this fulfilling intuition is a percept, or a pure construction of fantasy, etc. Since the summoning up of imaginative pictures is more subject, in varying degrees, to our will, than that of percepts and assertions, we incline to relate possibility specially to the picture-life of fantasy. A thing counts as possible, if it allows itself, objectively speaking, to be realized in the form of an adequate imaginative picture, whether we ourselves, as particular empirical individuals, succeed in thus realizing it or not. But through the ideal linkage between perception and imagination, this proposition is equivalent to each percept a possible image corresponds, to imagination is equivalent to our own, and the limitation of the concept to imagination not essential.

What we have now to do, quite briefly, is to discuss the effect of these just indicated differences upon relationships of fulfillment, so that our treatments may at least reach a provisional term, as well as a view over further researches.

§37 The fulfilling function of perception. The ideal of ultimate fulfillment

We have seen that differences in the completeness of 'fulness' have an important bearing on the manner in which objects are made present in

presentations. Significant acts constitute the lowest step: they possess no fullness whatever. Intuitive acts have fullness, in graded differences of more and less, and this is already the case within the sphere of imagination. The perfection of an imagination, however great, still leaves it different from a perception: it does not present the object itself, not even in part, it offers only its image, which, as long as it is an image at all, never is the thing itself. The latter we owe to perception. Even this, however, 'gives' us the object in varied gradations of perfection, in differing degrees of 'projection'. The intentional character of perception, as opposed to the mere representation of imagination, is that of direct presentation. This is, as we know, an *internal* difference of acts, more precisely of their interpretative form. But 'direct' presentation does not in general amount to a true being-present, but only to an appearance of presence, in which objective presence, and with it the perfection of veridicity (*Wahrnehmung*, perception) exhibits degrees. This is shown by a glance at the corresponding scale of fulfilment, to which all exemplification of perfection in presentation is here, as elsewhere, referred. We thereby become clear that a difference extends over the fullness of perception that we sought to cover by our talk of perceptual *projection*, a difference that does not concern fullness in respect of its sensuous stuff, its internal character, but means a graded extension of its character *as* fullness, i.e. of the interpretative character of the act. From this point of view many elements of fullness count for us – quite apart from anything genetic, for we know full well that these, like all similar differences, have an associative origin – as *final* presentations of the corresponding objective elements. They offer themselves as identical with these last, not as their mere representatives: they are *the thing itself* in an absolute sense. Other cases again count as mere adumbrations of colour, perspectival foreshortenings etc., in which case it is clear that to such locations something corresponds in the phenomenological content of the act prior to all reflection. We have already dealt with these 'projective' differences, and found them, pictorially transferred, in the case of imagination. Every projection is representative in character, and represents by way of similarity, but the manner of this representation by similarity differs according as the representation takes the projected content as picture or self-presentation (self-projection) of the object.¹ The ideal limit, which an increase of fullness of projection permits, is, in the case of perception, the absolute self of the thing (as in imagination it is its absolutely resembling image), and that for every side and for every presented element of the object.

The discussion of possible relationships of fulfilment therefore points to a goal in which increase of fulfilment terminates, in which the complete and entire intention has reached its fulfilment, and that not immediately and partially, but ultimately and finally. The intuitive substance of this last fulfilment is the absolute sum of possible fullness; the intuitive representative is the object itself, as it is in itself. Where a presentative intention has achieved its last fulfilment, the genuine *adequatio rei et intellectus* has been brought

about. *The object is actually 'present' or 'given', and present as just what we have intended it; no partial intention remains implicit and still lacking fulfilment.*

And so also, *eo ipso*, the ideal of every fulfilment, and therefore of a significant fulfilment, is sketched for us: the *intellectus* is in this case the thought-intention, the intention of meaning. And the *adequatio* is realized when the object meant is in the strict sense given in our intuition, and given as just what we think and call it. No thought-intention could fail of its fulfilment, of its last fulfilment, in fact, in so far as the fulfilling medium of intuition has itself lost all implication of unsatisfied intentions.

One sees that the perfection of the adequation of thought to thing is twofold: on the one hand there is a perfect adaptation to intuition, since the thought means nothing that the fulfilling intuition does not completely present as belonging to the thought. In this the two previously (§29) distinguished 'perfections' are plainly comprehended: they yield what we called the 'objective completeness' of the fulfilment. On the other hand the complete intuition itself involves a perfection. The intuition fulfils the intention which terminates in it as not itself again being an intention which has need of further fulfilment, but as offering us the *last* fulfilment of our intention.

We must therefore draw a distinction between the perfection of the *adaptation to intuition*, which is 'adequation' in the natural, wider sense, and the perfection of final fulfilment which presupposes this fulfilment, and which is an adequation with the 'thing itself'. Each faithful, unalloyed description of an intuitive object or event provides an example of the former perfection. If the object is something in interior experience, and is grasped as it is in reflex perception, then the second perfection may be added, as when, for instance, looking back on a categorical judgement just made, we speak of the subject-presentation in this judgement. The first perfection is, however, lacking, when we call the tree standing before us a 'cultivated' variety of apple-tree, or when we speak of the 'vibratory frequency' of the note just dying away, or, in general, when we speak of such properties of perceptual objects as, however much they may be marginally meant in our perceiving intention, are not even more or less projectively present in what actually appears.

The following observation is also in place. Since an ultimate fulfilment may contain absolutely no unfulfilled intentions, it must issue out of a *pure* percept. An objectively complete percept, but one achieved by the continuous synthesis of impure percepts, will not fill the bill.

Against our mode of treatment, which places the final fulfilment of all intentions in perception, it may be objected that the realized consciousness of the universal, the consciousness which gives fullness to conceptually general presentations, and which sets the 'universal object itself' before our eyes, rests on a ground of mere imagination, or is at least indifferent to the difference between perception and imagination. The same is obviously true, as a consequence of what has just been said, of all self-evident general

assertions, which make themselves plain to us, in axiomatic fashion, 'from our very notions alone'.

This objection points to a gap in our investigation that has already been touched on from time to time. We first took perception, with immediate obviousness, as being the same as *sense-perception*, intuition as being the same as sensuous intuition. Tacitly, without any clear consciousness, we have frequently gone beyond the bounds of these notions, e.g. in connection with our discussions of compatibility. We regularly did this, when, e.g., we spoke of intuiting a conflict or a union, or some other synthesis as such. In our next chapter, which deals generally with categorical forms we shall show the need to widen the concepts of perception and other sorts of intuition. To remove our objection, we shall now only say that the imagination, which serves as basis for generalizing abstraction, does not therefore exercise an actual, authentic function of fulfilment, and so does not play the part of a 'corresponding' intuition. What is individually singular in phenomena, is not itself, as we have several times stressed, the universal, nor does it contain the universal as a real (*reell*) 'piece' of itself.

§38 Positing acts in the function of fulfilment. Self-evidence in the loose and strict sense

Under the rubric of 'intentions', positing and non-positing acts have so far been indiscriminately ranged. Nonetheless, though the general character of fulfilment essentially depends on the 'matter' of acts, which alone is relevant to an array of most important relationships, the quality of acts shares in the determination of others, and to such a degree that talk of intention, of directed aiming, really only seems to suit assertive acts. Our *thought* (*Meinung*) aims at a thing, and it hits its mark, or does not hit it, according as it agrees or does not agree in a certain way with perception (which is here an assertive act). Positing then agrees with positing: the intending and fulfilling act are alike in this quality. Mere presentation, however, is passive: it leaves matters 'in suspense'. Where by chance an adequate percept accompanies a mere presentation, a fulfilling coincidence certainly issues from the mutually fitting 'matters' of the acts: in the transition, however, the presentation acquires an assertive note, and the unity of coincidence itself certainly has this note quite homogeneously. *Each actual identification or differentiation is an assertive act*, whether itself founded on assertions or not. This last briefly-worded proposition adds an all-important characterization to the results of our last chapter, a characterization determining all relationships of compatibility: the theory of identifications and differentiations thereby reveals itself, with more clearness than before, as a chapter in the theory of judgement. For according as positing or non-positing acts function in our intentions or their fulfillments, they illuminate distinctions like that between *illustration*, perhaps *exemplification*, on the one hand, and *verification* of

confirmation and its opposite *refutation*, on the other. The concept of verification relates exclusively to *positing acts in relation to their positing fulfilment*, and ultimately to their *fulfilment through percepts*.

To this last pre-eminent case we now give closer consideration. It is a case in which the ideal of adequation yields us *self-evidence* (*Evidenz*). We speak somewhat loosely of self-evidence wherever a positing intention (a statement in particular) finds verification in a corresponding, fully accommodated percept, even if this be no more than a well-fitting synthesis of coherent single percepts. To speak of *degrees and levels of self-evidence* then has a good sense. Here are relevant all approximations of percepts to the objective completeness of their presentation of their object, all further steps towards the final ideal of perfection, the ideal of adequate perception, of the complete self-manifestation of the object, however it was referred to in the intention to be fulfilled. But the *epistemologically pregnant sense* of self-evidence is exclusively concerned with this last unsurpassable goal, the *act of this most perfect synthesis of fulfilment*, which gives to an intention, e.g. the intention of judgement, the absolute fullness of content, the fullness of the object itself. The object is not merely meant, but in the strictest sense *given*, and given as it is meant, and made one with our meaning-reference. It does not matter, for the rest, whether one is dealing with an individual or a universal object, with an object in the narrower sense or with a state of affairs, the correlate of an identifying or distinguishing synthesis.

Self-evidence itself, we said, is the act of this most perfect synthesis of coincidence. Like every identification, it is an objectifying act, its objective correlate being called *being in the sense of truth*, or simply *truth* – if one does not prefer to award this term to another concept of the many that are rooted in the said phenomenological situation. Here, however, a closer discussion is needed.

§39 Self-evidence and truth

1. If we at first keep to the notion of truth just suggested, *truth* as the correlate of an identifying act is a *state of affairs* (*Sachverhalt*), as the correlate of a coincident identity it is an *identity*: the *full agreement* of what is meant with what is *given as such*. This agreement we experience in self-evidence, in so far as self-evidence means the actual carrying out of an adequate identification. The proposition that self-evidence is the 'experience of truth' cannot, however, be simply interpreted as telling us that the self-evidence is the perception (in a sufficiently wide sense) of truth and, in the case of strict self-evidence, the *adequate perception of truth*. For, to recur to a previously voiced doubt (see the addendum to §8 and chapter 7), we must allow that the carrying out of an identifying coincidence is not as yet an actual perception of objective agreement, but becomes so only through its own act of objectifying interpretation, its own looking towards present

truth. Truth is indeed 'present'. Here we have always the *a priori* possibility of looking towards this agreement, and of laying it before our intentional consciousness in an adequate percept.

2. A second concept of truth concerns the *ideal relationship* which obtains in the unity of coincidence which we defined as self-evidence, among the *epistemic essences of the coinciding acts*. While truth in sense 1 was the *objective* item corresponding to the act of self-evidence, truth in this sense is the *Idea* which belongs to the act-form: the *epistemic essence interpreted as the ideal essence of the empirically contingent act of self-evidence, the Idea of absolute adequation as such*.

3. We also experience in self-evidence, from the side of the act which furnishes 'fulness', the *object given in the manner of the object meant*: so given, the object is fullness itself. This object can also be called being, truth, the 'truth' in so far as it is here not experienced as in the merely adequate percept, but as the ideal fullness for an intention, as that which makes an intention true (or as the ideal fullness for the intention's *specific* epistemic essence).

4. Lastly, considered from the standpoint of the intention, the notion of the relationship of self-evidence yields us truth as the *rightness of our intention* (and especially that of our judgement), its adequacy to its true object, or the *rightness of the intention's epistemic essence in specie*. We have, in the latter regard, the rightness, e.g., of the judgement in the logical sense of the proposition: the proposition 'directs' itself to the thing itself, it says that it is so, and it really is so. In this we have the expression of the ideal, and therefore general, possibility that a proposition of such and such a 'matter' admits of fulfilment in the sense of the most rigorous adequation.

We must further particularly note that the 'being' here in question in our first objective sense of truth, is not to be confused with the 'being' covered by the *copula* in the affirmative categorical judgement. Self-evidence is a matter of *total coincidence*, whereas the 'being' of the *copula* corresponds generally, if not invariably to partial identifications (i.e. judgements of quality).

But even where total identification is predicated, the two 'beings' will not coincide. For we must observe that in the case of a self-evident judgement, i.e. of a self-evident predicative assertion, *being in the sense of truth is experienced but not expressed*, and so never coincides with the being meant and experienced in the 'is' of the assertion. This second 'being' is the synthetic moment in what is in the sense of *is true* – how could it express the fact that the latter is true? There are in fact *several agreements* which are here brought to synthesis: one of these, the partial, predicative one, is meant assertively and perceived adequately, and so self-presented. (What this means will become clearer in the next chapter by way of the more general doctrine of categorical objectification.) This is the *agreement of subject with predicate*, the suiting of predicate to subject. We have, in the second place, the *agreement which constitutes the synthetic form of the act of self-evidence*, and therefore

of the total coincidence of the meaning-intention of our assertion with the percept of the state of affairs itself, a coincidence naturally achieved in stages, which do not here concern us further. *This* agreement is plainly not asserted, it is not objective like the first agreement, which belongs to the state of affairs judged. No doubt it *can* always be asserted and asserted with self-evidence. It then becomes the verifying state of affairs for a new self-evidence, of which the like is true, and so on. At each step, however, one must distinguish the verifying state of affairs from the state of affairs constitutive of the self-evidence itself, we must distinguish the objectified from the not-objectified state of affairs.

The distinctions just drawn lead to the following general discussion.

In our exposition of the relationships of the concepts of self-evidence and truth, we have not drawn a distinction which touches the *objective* side of the acts which, whether functioning as intentions or fulfilments, find their absolute adequation in self-evidence: we have not, that is, distinguished between states of affairs, on the one hand, and other objects, on the other. We have paid no heed, correspondingly, to the phenomenological difference between acts which relate, on the one hand – acts of agreement and disagreement, predicative acts – and acts which do not relate, on the other. We have paid no need, therefore, to the difference between relational and non-relational meanings, or to the relational-non-relational distinction among ideally apprehended essences in general. Strict adequation can bring non-relating as much as relating intentions into union with their complete fulfilments. If we now particularly consider the field of expressions, we need not concern ourselves with judgements as assertive intentions or assertive fulfilments: acts of naming can also achieve their adequation. The concepts of truth, rightness, the true, are generally interpreted more narrowly than we have done: they are connected with judgements and propositions, or with the states of affairs which are their objective correlates. 'Being' is meanwhile mainly spoken of in relation to absolute objects (not states of affairs), though no definite lines are drawn. Our right to our more general interpretation of these concepts is unassailable. The very nature of the case demands that the concepts of truth and falsehood, should, in the first instance at least, be fixed so widely as to span the whole sphere of objectifying acts. It seems therefore most suitable that the concepts of truth and being should be so distinguished, that our concepts of truth – a certain range of equivocality remaining inevitable but hardly dangerous once our concepts are clarified – are applied *from the side of the acts themselves* and their ideally graspable moments, whereas the concepts of *being* (genuine being) are applied to the corresponding *objective correlates*. Truth would then have to be defined in the manner of (2) and (4) as the *Idea of adequation*, or as the rightness of objectifying assertion and meaning. Being would then have to be pinned down according to (1) and (3) as the identity of the object at once meant and given in adequation, or (in conformity with the natural sense of

words) as the adequately perceivable thing as such, in an indefinite relation to an intention that it is to make true or fulfil adequately.

After our concepts have been thus widely fixed and assured phenomenologically, we may pass on, having regard to the distinction between relational and non-relational acts (predications versus absolute assertions) to define *narrower concepts of truth and being*. The narrower concept of truth would be limited to the ideal adequation of a *relational* act to the corresponding adequate percept of a state of affairs: just so the narrower concept of being would concern the being of absolute objects, and would separate this off from the 'subsistence' of the state of affairs.

The following is accordingly clear: if one defines a judgement as an assertive act in general, then the sphere of judgement, subjectively speaking, coincides with the joint spheres of the concepts *true* and *false* in the widest sense of these words. But if one defines it by way of the statement and its possible fulfilment, and ranges under judgements only the sphere of relational assertions, then the same coincidence obtains again, provided that the *narrower* concepts of truth and falsehood are again used as a basis.

In one-sided fashion we have hitherto favoured the case of self-evidence, the act described as one of total coincidence. But, turning to the correlated case of conflict, we encounter *absurdity*, the experience of the total conflict between intention and quasi-fulfilment. To the concepts of truth and being the correlated concepts of *falsehood* and *non-being* then correspond. The phenomenological clarification of these concepts can be carried out without particular difficulty, once all foundations have been prepared. The negative ideal of an *ultimate frustration* would first have to be exactly circumscribed.

When self-evidence is conceived strictly, in the manner made basic here, it is plain that such doubts as have from time to time been expressed in modern times are absurd, doubts as to whether the experience of self-evidence might not be associated with the matter *A* for one man, while absurdity is associated with it for another. Such doubts are only possible as long as self-evidence and absurdity are interpreted as peculiar (positive or negative) *feelings* which, contingently attaching to the act of judgement, impart to the latter the specific features which we assess logically as truth and falsehood. If someone experiences the self-evidence of *A*, it is *self-evident* that no second person can experience the absurdity of this same *A*, for, that *A* is self-evident, means that *A* is not merely meant, but also genuinely given, and given as precisely what it is thought to be. In the strict sense it is itself present. But how could a second person refer in thought to this same thing *A*, while the thought that it is *A* is genuinely excluded by a genuinely given non-*A*? One is, it is plain, dealing with a matter of essence, the same matter, in fact, that the law of contradiction (into whose ambiguities the correlations discussed in §39, p. 264 naturally enter) successfully expresses. It is reliably clear, as a result of our analyses, that being and non-being are not concepts which in their origin express opposition among the *qualities*

of our judgements. Following our interpretation of the phenomenological relationships involved, every judgement is assertive: this assertion does not characterize the 'is' of which the 'is not' is the *qualitative* contrary. The qualitative contrary of a judgement is a mere presentation having the same 'matter'. Differences between 'is' and 'is not' are differences in intentional 'matter'. Just as an 'is' expresses predicative agreement after the manner of a meaning-intention, so an 'is not' expresses a predicative conflict.

Second Section

Sense and understanding

Sensuous and categorial intuitions

§40 The problem of the fulfilment of categorial meaning-forms, with a thought leading towards its solution

In our discussions up to this point we have repeatedly and strongly felt a large gap. It had to do with the categorial objective forms, or with the synthetic functions in the sphere of objectifying acts through which these objective forms come to be constituted, through which they may come to 'intuition' and thereby also to 'knowledge'. We shall now attempt to some extent to fill in this gap, taking our point of departure from the investigation of our first chapter; this was concerned with one limited aim of epistemological clarification: the relation of a meaning-intention as the thing to be expressed, with an expressed sensuous intuition. We shall for the time being again build on the simplest cases of perceptual and other intuitive statements, and shall use them to shed light on the theme of our next treatments, in the following manner:

In the case of a perceptual statement, not only the unwrought nominal presentations are fulfilled: the whole sense of the statement finds fulfilment through our underlying percept. We say likewise that the whole statement gives utterance to our percept: we do not merely say 'I see this paper, an inkpot, several books', and so on, but also 'I see that the paper has been written on, that there is a bronze inkpot standing here, that several books are lying open', and so on. If a man thinks the fulfilment of nominal meanings clear enough, we shall ask him how we are to understand the fulfilment of total statements, especially as regards that side of them that stretches beyond their 'matter', in this case beyond their nominal terms. What may and can furnish fulfilment for those aspects of meaning which make up propositional form as such, the aspects of '*categorial form*' to which, e.g., the copula belongs?

Looked at more narrowly, this question also applies to nominal meanings, in so far as these are not totally formless like the meanings for individuals. The name, like the statement, even in its grammatical appearance, possesses

both 'matter' and 'form'. If it comprises words, the form lies partly in the way these words are strung together, partly in its own form-words, partly in the mode of construction of the individual words, which allows us to draw a distinction between its moments of 'matter' and its moments of 'form'. Such grammatical distinctions refer us back to distinctions of meaning. There is at least a rough expression of the articulations and forms which are rooted in our meaning's essence and the articulations and forms of grammar. In our meanings, therefore, parts of very different kinds are to be found, and among these we may here pay special attention to those expressed by formal words such as 'the', 'a', 'some', 'many', 'few', 'two', 'is', 'not', 'which', 'and', 'or' etc., and further expressed by the substantival and adjectival, singular and plural inflection of our words etc.

How does all this stand as regards fulfilment? Can the ideal of completely adequate fulfilment formulated by us in our third chapter still be maintained? *Are there parts and forms of perception corresponding to all parts and forms of meaning?* In that case we should have the *parallelism* between meaningful reference and fulfilling intuition that talk of 'expression' suggests. The expression would be an image-like counterpart of the percept (i.e. in all its parts and forms to be expressed) but reconstituted in a new stuff – an *expression* in the *stuff of meaning*.

The prototype for interpreting the relation between meaning and intuiting would then be the relation of the 'proper' individual meaning to corresponding percepts. The man who knows Cologne itself, and therefore possesses the genuine 'proper meaning' of the word 'Cologne', has in his contemporary actual experience something exactly corresponding to the future confirming percept. It is not, properly speaking, a representation of the percept, as, e.g., the corresponding imagination would be. But just as the city is thought to be itself present to us in the percept, so the proper name 'Cologne', in its 'proper meaning', refers, as previously argued, to the same city 'directly': it means that city itself, and as it is. The straightforward percept here renders the object apparent without the help of further, superordinate acts, the object *which* the meaning-intention means, and *just as* the latter means it. The meaning-intention therefore finds in the mere percept the act which fulfils it with complete adequacy.

If instead of considering directly naming, unstructured expressions, we rather consider structured, articulated expressions, the matter seems quite the same. I *see* white paper and *say* 'white paper', thereby expressing, with precise adequacy, only what I see. The same holds of complete judgements. I *see* that this paper is white, and express just this by saying: 'This paper is white'.

We are not to let ourselves be led astray by such ways of speaking; they are in a certain manner correct, yet are readily misunderstood. One might try to use them to show that meaning here has its seat in perception, which as we have shown, is not so. The word 'white' certainly means something

attaching to the white paper itself, this 'meaning' therefore coincides, in the state of fulfilment, with the partial percept which relates to the 'white aspect' of the object. But the assumption of a mere coincidence with this aspect is not enough: we are wont to say here that the *white* thus part-percept is known *as white* and is called so. In our normal talk of 'knowledge', we are, however, more inclined to call the object which is our (logical) subject the thing 'known'. In *such* knowledge another act plainly is present, which perhaps includes the former one, but is nonetheless different from it: the *paper* is known as white, or rather as a white thing, whenever we express our percept in the words 'white paper'. The intention of the word 'white' only partially coincides with the colour-aspect of the apparent object; a surplus of meaning remains over, a form which finds nothing in the appearance itself to confirm it. White paper is paper which *is* white. Is this form not also repeated, even if it remains hidden, in the case of the noun 'paper'? Only the quality-meanings contained in its 'concept' terminate in perception. Here also the whole object is known as paper, and here also a supplementary form is known which includes being, though not as its sole form, in itself. The fulfilment effected by a straight percept obviously does not extend to such forms.

We have but to ask, further, what corresponds in perception to the difference between the two expressions 'this white paper' and 'this paper is white', which are both realized on the same perceptual basis, we have but to ask what side of perception is really brought out by this difference – the difference, that is, of the attributive and the predicative mode of statement – and what, in the case of adequate adaptation, this difference brings out with peculiar exactness, and we experience the same difficulty. Briefly we see that the case of structured meanings is not so simple as the case of a 'proper' individual meaning, with its straightforward relation of coincidence with perception. Certainly one can tell one's auditors, intelligibly and unambiguously that 'I see that this paper is white', but the thought behind such talk need not be that the meaning of this spoken sentence expresses *a mere act of seeing*. It may also be the case that the epistemic essence of our seeing, in which the apparent object announces itself as self-given, serves to base certain connective or relational or otherwise formative acts, and that it is to these that our expression in its changing forms is adjusted, and that it is in respect of such changing forms, finds fulfilment. If we now combine these founded acts or rather act-forms with the acts which serve as their foundation, and give the comprehensive name 'founded act' to the whole act-complexes that result from such formal 'founding', we may say: Granted the possibility just sketched, our parallelism may be re-established, but it is no longer a parallelism between the meaning-intentions of expressions and the mere percepts which correspond to them: it is a parallelism between meaning-intentions and the above mentioned *perceptually founded acts*.

§41 Continuation. Extension of our sphere of examples

If we suppose our range of examples widened so as to cover the whole field of predicative thinking, we shall encounter similar difficulties and similar possibilities of resolving them. Judgements in particular will come up which have no definite relation to anything individual which ought to be given through any intuition: they will give *general* expression to relations among ideal unities. The general meanings embodied in such judgements can also be realized on a basis of corresponding intuition, since they have their origin, mediately or immediately, in intuition. The intuited individual is not, however, what we mean here; it serves at best only as an individual case, an example, or only as the rough analogue of an example, for the universal which alone interests us. So, for instance, when we speak generically of 'colour' or specifically of 'red', the appearance of a single red thing may furnish us with a documenting intuition.

It also at times happens, that one calls such a general statement an expression of intuition. We say, e.g., that an arithmetical axiom expresses what we find in intuition, or we raise objection to a geometrician that he merely expresses what he sees in his figure without deducing it formally, that he borrows from his drawing and omits steps in his proof. Such talk has its good sense (as when the objection scores no mean hit against the formal validity of Euclidean geometry) but 'expression' here means something different from the previous cases. Even in *their* case expression was not a mere counterpart of intuition: this is even less the case here, where our thought's intention is not aimed at intuitively given phenomena nor at their intuitive properties or relationships, and *can* in our case not be aimed at them. For a figure understood geometrically is known to be an ideal limit incapable in principle of intuitive exhibition in the concrete. Even in our case, nonetheless, and in the intuitive field as such, intuition has an essential relation to expression and to its meaning: these, therefore, constitute an experience of general knowledge belongingness among them. Even in our case, concept and proposition are related to intuition, no mere togetherness of them all, but a unity of felt oriented towards intuition, through which alone, after corresponding adjustment, self-evidence, the crown of knowledge, emerges. It requires little reflection, on the other hand, to see that the meaning of the expressions in question is not found in intuition at all, that such intuition only gives them a filling of clarity and in the favourable case of self-evidence. We in fact know only too well that the overwhelming majority of general statements and in particular those of science, behave meaningfully without any elucidation from intuition, and that only a vanishing section, even of the true and the proven, are and remain open to complete intuitive illumination. Even in the general realm, as in the realm of individuals, our natural fall has a relation to intuitively founded acts of thought. Should intuition fall

wholly away, our judgement would cease to know anything. It means, in all cases, in cognitive style, just what could be known by the aid of intuition, if such judgement is indeed true at all. Knowledge always has the character of a fulfilment and an identification: this may be observed in every case where we confirm a general judgement through subsequent intuition, as in every other case of knowledge.

Our difficulty then is how identification can arise where the form of the general proposition, and in particular its form of universality, would vainly seek sympathetic elements in individual intuition. To remove this difficulty, as in the previous case, the possibility of 'founded acts' suggests itself. This possibility, carried out more fully, would run more or less as follows:

Where general thoughts find fulfilment in intuition, certain new acts are built on our percepts and other appearances of like order, acts related quite differently to our appearing object from the intuitions which constitute it. This difference in mode of relation is expressed by the perspicuous turn of phrase employed above: that the intuited object is not here itself the thing meant, but serves only as an elucidatory example of our true general meaning. But if *expressive* acts conform to these differences, their significative intention will not move towards what is to be intuitively presented, but towards what is universal, what is merely documented in intuition. Where this new intention is adequately fulfilled by an underlying intuition, it reveals its own objective possibility (or the possibility or 'reality' of the universal).

§42 The distinction between sensuous stuff and categorial form throughout the whole realm of objectifying acts

After these provisional treatments have shown us our difficulty, and have provided us with a thought leading to its possible removal, we shall embark upon our actual discussion.

We started by assuming that, in the case of structured expressions, the notion of a more or less mirror-like mode of expression was quite unavailing in describing the relation which obtains between meanings to be expressed, on the one hand, and expressed intuitions, on the other. This is doubtless correct and need now only be made more precise. We need only earnestly ponder what things can be possible matter for perception, and what things possible matter for meaning, to become aware that, in the mere form of a judgement, only certain antecedently specifiable parts of our statement can have something which antecedently corresponds to them in intuition, while to other parts of the statement nothing intuitive possibly can correspond.

Let us consider this situation a little more closely. Perceptual statements are, completely and normally expressed, articulate utterances of varying pattern. We have no difficulty in distinguishing such types as ' A is P ' (where ' A ' serves as index for a proper name), 'An S is P ',

'This S is P', 'All S are P' etc. Many complications arise through the modifying influence of negation, through the introduction of distinctions between absolute and relative predicates (attributes), through conjunctive, disjunctive and determinative connectives etc. In the diversity of these types certain sharp distinctions of meaning make themselves clear. To the various letters (variables) and words in these types correspond sometimes *members*, sometimes *connective forms*, in the meanings of the actual statements which belong to these types. Now it is easy to see that *only at the places indicated by letters (variables)* in such 'forms of judgement', can meanings be put that are themselves fulfilled in perception, whereas it is hopeless, even quite misguided, to look directly in perception for what could give fulfilment to our supplementary formal meanings. The letters (variables) on account of their merely functional meaning, can doubtless take complex thoughts as their values: statements of high complexity can be seen from the standpoint of very simple judgement-types. The same difference between 'matter' and 'form' therefore repeats itself in what is looked upon, in unified fashion, as a 'term'. But eventually, in the case of each perceptual statement, and likewise, of course, in the case of every other statement that in a certain primary sense, gives expression to intuition, we shall come down to certain final elements of our terms – we may call them elements of stuff – which find direct fulfilment in intuition (perception, imagination etc.), while the supplementary *forms*, which as forms of meaning likewise crave fulfilment, can find nothing that ever could fit them in perception or acts of like order.

This fundamental difference we call, in a natural extension of its application over the whole sphere of objectifying presentation, the *categorial* and *absolute* distinction between the *form* and *matter of presentation*, and at the same time separate it off from the *relative* or *functional* difference which is closely bound up with it, and which has just been subsidiarily touched on above.

We have just spoken of a natural extension of our distinction over the whole sphere of objectifying presentation. We take the constituents of the *fulfilment* which correspond to the material or formal constituents respectively, so *meaning-intentions* as being material or formal constituents respectively, so making clear what is to count as 'material' or 'formal' in the general sphere of objectifying acts.

Of matter (stuff) and form we often talk in many other senses. We must expressly point out that our present talk of 'matter', which has its contrast in categorial form, has nothing whatever to do with the 'matter' which contrasts with the quality of acts, as when, e.g., we distinguish the 'matter' in our meanings from their assertive or merely presentative quality, the 'matter' being what tells us *as what*, or as *now* determined and interpreted, an object is meant in our meanings. To make the distinction easier, we shall not speak of 'matter' in our categorial contrast, but of 'stuff', while wherever 'matter' is meant in our previous sense, we shall talk *pointedly* of 'intentional matter' or of 'interpretative sense'.

§43 The objective correlates of categorial forms are not 'real' (reale) moments

It is now time to illuminate the distinction to which we have just given a name. We shall link on, for this purpose, to our previous examples.

The form-giving flexion *Being*, whether in its attributive or predicative function, is not fulfilled, as we said, in any percept. We here remember Kant's dictum: *Being is no real predicate*. This dictum refers to being *qua* existence, or to what Herbart called the being of 'absolute position', but it can be taken to be no less applicable to predicative and attributive being. In any case it precisely refers to what we are here trying to make clear. I can see colour, but not *being-coloured*. I can feel smoothness, but not *being-smooth*. I can hear a sound, but not that something *is* sounding. Being is nothing in the object, no part of it, no moment tenaning it, no quality or intensity of it, no figure of it or no internal form whatsoever, no constitutive feature of it however conceived. But being is also nothing attaching to an object: as it is no real (*reales*) internal feature, so also it is no real external feature, and therefore not, in the *real* sense, a 'feature' at all. For it has nothing to do with the *real* forms of unity which bind objects into more comprehensive objects, tones into harmonies, things into more comprehensive things or arrangements of things (gardens, streets, the phenomenal external world). On these real forms of unity the external features of objects, the right and the left, the high and the low, the loud and the soft etc., are founded. Among these anything like an 'is' is naturally not to be found.

We have just been speaking of *objects*, their constitutive features, their factual connection with other objects, through which more comprehensive objects are created, and also, at the same time, external features in the partial objects. We said that something corresponding to *being* was not to be sought among them. For all these are perceptible, and they exhaust the range of possible percepts, so that we are at once saying and maintaining that *being is absolutely imperceptible*.

Here, however a clarifying supplement is necessary. *Perception* and *object* are concepts that cohere most intimately together, which mutually assign sense to one another, and which widen or narrow this sense conjointly. But we must emphasize that we have here made use of a certain naturally delimited, natural, but also very narrow concept of perception (or of object). It is well-known that one also speaks of 'perceiving', and in particular of 'seeing', in a greatly widened sense, which covers the grasping of whole states of affairs, and even ultimately the *a priori* self-evidence of laws (in the popularly sense of 'insight'). In the narrower sense of perception (to talk roughly and with our ears or can grasp with any 'outer' or even 'inner sense'. In ordinary speech, no doubt, only *external* things and connective forms of things (together with their immediate qualities) can count as 'perceived by the senses'.

But once talk of an 'inner sense' had been introduced, one should in consistency have widened the notion of sense-perception suitably, so as to include 'inner perception', and so as to include under the name 'sense-object' the correlated sphere of 'inner objects', the ego and its internal experiences.

In the sphere of sense-perception thus understood, and in the sphere, likewise, of sensuous intuition in general – we adhere to our much widened talk of the 'sensuous' – a meaning like that of the word 'being' can find no possible *objective correlate*, and so no possible fulfilment in the acts of such perception. What holds of 'being' is plainly true of the remaining categorical forms in our statements, whether these bind the constituents of terms together, or bind terms themselves together in the unity of the proposition. The 'a' and the 'the', the 'and' and the 'or', the 'if' and the 'then', the 'all' and the 'none', the 'something' and the 'nothing', the forms of quantity and the determinations of number etc. – all these are meaningful propositional elements, but we should look in vain for their objective correlates (if such may be ascribed to them at all) in the sphere of *real objects*, which is in fact no other than the sphere of *objects of possible sense-perception*.

§44 The origin of the concept of Being and of the remaining categories does not lie in the realm of inner perception

This holds – we stress it expressly – both of the sphere of outer sense, and of that of 'inner sense'. It is a natural but quite misguided doctrine, universally put about since the time of Locke, that the meanings in question (or the corresponding substantively hypostatized meanings) – the *logical categories* such as being and non-being, unity, plurality, totality, number, ground, consequence etc. – arise through *reflection upon certain mental acts*, and so *fall in the sphere of 'inner sense', of 'inner perception'*. In this manner, indeed, concepts like Perception, Judgement, Affirmation, Denial, Collecting, Counting, Presupposing and Inferring arise, which are all, therefore, 'sensuous' concepts, belonging, that is, to the sphere of 'inner sense'. The previous series of concepts do not arise in this manner, since they cannot at all be regarded as concepts of mental acts, or of their real constituents. The thought of a Judgement fulfils itself in the inner intuition of an actual judgement, but the thought of an 'is' does not fulfil itself in this manner. Being is not a judgement nor a constituent of a judgement. Being is as little a real constituent of some inner object as it is of some outer object, and so not of a judgement. In a judgement, a predicative statement, 'is' functions as a side of our meaning, just as perhaps, although otherwise placed and functioning, 'gold' and 'yellow' do. The *is* itself does not enter into the judgement, it is merely meant, signitively referred to, by the little word 'is'. It is, however, *self-given*, or at least putatively given, in the *fulfilment* which at times invests the judgement, the *becoming aware* of the state of affairs supposed. Not only

what is meant in the partial meaning *gold*, nor only what is meant in the partial meaning *yellow*, itself appears before us, but also *gold-being-yellow* thus appears. Judgement and judgemental intuition are therefore at one in this self-evident judgement, and pre-eminently so if the judgement is self-evident in the ideally limiting sense.

If one now understands by 'judging', not merely meaning-intentions connected with actual assertions, but the fulfilments that in the end fit them completely, it is indeed correct that *being can only be apprehended through judging*, but this does not at all mean that the concept of being must be arrived at 'through reflection' on certain judgements, or that it can ever be arrived at in this fashion. 'Reflection' is in other respects a fairly vague word. In epistemology it has at least the relatively fixed sense that Locke gave it, that of internal perception: we can only adhere to this sense in interpreting a doctrine which imagines it can find the origin of the concept of *Being* through reflecting on judgements. The relational being expressed in predication, e.g. through 'is', 'are' etc., lacks independence; if we round it out to something fully concrete, we get the *state of affairs* in question, the objective correlate of the complete judgement. We can then say: *As the sensible object stands to sense-perception so the state of affairs stands to the 'becoming aware' in which it is (more or less adequately) given* – we should like to say simply: so the state of affairs stands to the *perception* of it. As the concept *Sensuous Object* (*Real Object*) cannot arise through reflection upon perception, since this could only yield us the concept *Perception* (or a concept of certain real constituents of Perception), so the concept of State of Affairs cannot arise out of reflection on judgements, since this could only yield us concepts of judgements or of real constituents of judgements.

That percepts in the one case, and judgements (judgemental intuitions, percepts of states of affairs) in the other, must be *experienced*, in order that each such act of abstraction should get started, goes without saying, but to be experienced is not to be made objective. 'Reflection', however, implies that what we reflect upon, the phenomenological experience, is rendered objective to us (is inwardly perceived by us), and that the properties to be generalized are really given in this objective content.

Not in reflection upon judgements, nor even upon fulfilments of judgements, but in the fulfilments of judgements themselves lies the true source of the concepts State of Affairs and Being (in the copulative sense). Not in these *acts as objects*, but in the *objects of these acts*, do we have the abstractive basis which enables us to realize the concepts in question. And naturally the appropriate modifications of these acts yield just as good a basis.

It is in fact obvious from the start that, just as any other concept (or Idea, act which at least sets some individual instance of it imaginatively before our eyes, so the concept of Being can arise only when *some being*, *actual or imaginary*, is set before our yes. If 'being' is taken to mean predicative being,

some *state of affairs* must be given to us, and this by way of an *act* which gives it, an *analogue of common sensuous intuition*.

The like holds of all *categorical forms* (or of all *categories*). An aggregate, e.g., is given, and can only be given, in an actual act of assembly, in an act, that is, expressed in the conjunctive form of connection *A and B and C . . .*. But the concept of *Aggregate* does not arise through reflection on this act; instead of paying heed to the act which presents an aggregate, we have rather to pay heed to what it presents, to the *aggregate* it renders apparent in *concreto*, and then to lift the universal form of our aggregate to conceptually universal consciousness.

§45 Widening of the concept of intuition, and in particular of the concepts perception and imagination. Sensible and categorical intuition

If we now ask: 'Where do the categorical forms of our meanings find their fulfilment, if not in the "perception" or "intuition which we tried provisionally to delimit in talking of "sensibility"', our answer is plainly prefigured in the discussions just completed.

We have taken it for granted that forms, too, can be genuinely fulfilled, or that the same applies to variously structured total meanings, and not merely to the 'material' elements of such meanings, and our assumption is put beyond doubt by looking at each case of faithful perceptual assertion. This will explain also why we call the whole perceptual assertion an expression of perception and, in a derivative sense, of whatever is intuited or itself presented in perception. But if the 'categorical forms' of the expression, present together with its material aspects, have no terminus in perception, if by the latter we understand merely *sense-perception*, then talk of expressing a percept must here rest on a different meaning: there must at least be an act which renders identical services to the categorical elements of meaning that merely sensuous perception renders to the material elements. The essential homogeneity of the function of fulfilment, as of all the ideal relationships necessarily bound up with it, obliges us to give the name 'perception' to each fulfilling act of confirmatory self-presentation, to each fulfilling act whatever the name of an 'intuition', and to its intentional correlate the name of 'object'. If we are asked what it means to say that *categorially structured meanings* find fulfilment, confirm themselves in perception, we can but reply: it means only that they relate to the object itself in its *categorial structure*. The object with these categorial forms is not merely referred to, as in the case where meanings function purely symbolically, but it is set before our very eyes in just these forms. In other words: it is not merely thought of, but intuited or perceived. When we wish, accordingly, to set forth what this talk of 'fulfilment' is getting at, what structured meanings and their structural elements express, what unitary or unifying factor corresponds to

them objectively, we unavoidably come on 'intuition' (or on 'perception' and 'object'). We cannot manage without these words, whose widened sense is of course evident. What shall we call the correlate of a non-sensuous subject-presentation, one involving non-sensuous structure, if the word 'object' is not available to us? How shall we speak of its actual givenness, or apparent givenness, when the word 'perception' is denied us? In common parlance, therefore, *aggregates*, *indefinite pluralities*, *totalities*, *numbers*, *disjunctions*, *predicates* (right-ness), *states of affairs*, all count as 'objects', while the acts through which they seem to be given count as 'percepts'.

Plainly the connection between the wider and narrower, the *supersensuous* (i.e. raised above sense, or categorial) and *sensuous concept of perception*, is no external or contingent matter, but one rooted in the whole business on hand. It falls within the great class of acts whose peculiarity it is that in them something appears as 'actual', as 'self-given'. Plainly this appearance of actuality and self-givenness (which may very well be delusive) is throughout characterized by its difference from essentially related acts through which alone it achieves full clarity – its difference from an imaginative 'making present', or from a merely significative 'thinking of', which both exclude 'presence' (so to say appearance 'in person'), though not excluding the belief in being. As regards the latter, imaginal or symbolic representation is possible in two manners: in an assertive manner, asserting something's being in imaginal or symbolic fashion, and in a non-assertive manner, as 'mere' imagination or thinking without taking something to be. We need not enter more closely into the discussion of these differences after the analyses of the previous section, which permit of a sufficiently general interpretation. It is clear, in any case, that the concept of imagination must be *widened in correspondence* with the concept of perception. We could not speak of something super-sensuously or categorially *perceived*, if we could not *imagine* this thing 'in the same manner' (i.e. not merely sensuously). We must therefore draw a quite general distinction between *sensuous* and *categorial* intuition (or show the possibility of such a distinction).

Our extended concept of Perception permits, further, of a narrower and a wider interpretation. In the widest sense even universal states of affairs can be said to be perceived ('seen', 'beheld with evidence'). In the narrower sense, perception terminates upon individual, and so upon temporal being.

§46 Phenomenological analysis of the distinction between sensuous and categorial perception

In our next treatments we shall first only discuss individual percepts, then widen our treatment to take in individual intuitions of the same order.

The division between 'sensuous' and 'supersensuous' percepts was only very superficially indicated and quite roughly characterized above. Anti-quoted talk of external and internal senses, plainly stemming from the naïve

metaphysic and anthropology of daily life, may be useful in pointing out the sphere to be excluded, but a true determination and circumscription of the sensory sphere is not thereby reached, so depriving the concept of categorical perception of its descriptive underpinning. To ascertain and clarify the said distinction is all the more important, since such fundamental distinctions as that between categorical form and sensuously founded matter, and the similar distinction between categories and all other concepts, depends wholly on it. Our concern is therefore to seek more profound descriptive characterizations, which will give us some insight into the essentially different constitution of sensuous and categorical percepts (or intuitions in general).

For our immediate purposes it is, however, unnecessary to carry out an exhaustive analysis of the phenomena involved. That would be a task that would require extraordinarily comprehensive treatments. Here it is sufficient to concentrate on some weightier points, which may help to mark off both sorts of acts in their mutual relation.

It is said of every percept that it grasps its object *directly*, or grasps this object *itself*. But this direct grasping has a different sense and character according as we are concerned with a percept in the narrower or the wider sense, or according as the directly grasped object is *sensuous* or *categorical*. Or otherwise put, according as it is a *real* or an *ideal* object. Sensuous or real objects can in fact be characterized as *objects of the lowest level of possible intuition*, categorical or ideal objects as *objects of higher levels*.

In the sense of the narrower, 'sensuous' perception, an object is directly apprehended or is itself present, if it is set up in an act of perception in a *straightforward* (*schlichter*) manner. What this means is this: that the object is also an *immediately given object* in the sense that, as *this object perceived with this definite objective content*, it is not constituted in relational, connective, or otherwise articulated acts, *acts founded on other acts which bring other objects to perception*. Sensuous objects are present in perception at a *single act-level*: they do not need to be constituted in many-rayed fashion in acts of higher level, whose objects are set up for them by way of other objects, already constituted in other acts.

Each straightforward act of perception, by itself or together with other acts, can serve as basic act for new acts which at times include it, at times merely presuppose it, acts which in their new mode of consciousness likewise bring to maturity a *new awareness of objects which essentially presupposes the old*. When the new acts of conjunction, of disjunction, of definition, and indefinite individual apprehension (that – something), of generalization, and straightforward, relational and connective knowledge, arise, we do not of straightforward, relational and connective knowledge, arise, we do not then have *any* sort of subjective experiences, nor just acts connected with the original ones. What we have are acts which, as we said, *set up new objects*, acts in which something *appears as actual and self-given*, which was not given, and could not have been given, as what it now appears to be, in these foundational acts alone. *On the other hand, the new objects are based on the*

older ones, they are related to what appears in the basic acts. Their manner of appearance is essentially determined by this relation. We are here dealing with a sphere of objects, *which can only show themselves 'in person' in such founded acts*. In such founded acts we have the categorical element in intuition and knowledge; in them assertive thought, functioning expressively, finds fulfilment; the possibility of complete accord with such acts determines the truth, the rightness, of an assertion. So far we have of course only considered the sphere of perception, and only its most elementary cases. But one sees at once that the distinction of straightforward and founded acts can be extended from percepts to all intuitions. We clearly envisage the possibility of complex acts which in mixed fashion have a part-basis in straightforward percepts and a part-basis in straightforward imaginations, and the further possibility of setting up new foundations on intuitions which themselves have foundations, and so building up whole series of foundations upon foundations. We further see that signitive intentions have structures patterned on such foundations whether of lower or higher order, and that again mixtures of signitive and intuitive acts emerge out of such 'founding', founded acts, in short, that are built on acts of one or the other sort. Our first task, however, is to deal with the elementary cases and elucidate them completely.

§47 Continuation. Characterization of sense-perception as 'straightforward' perception

We shall now scrutinize the acts in which sensuous concreta and their sensuous constituents are presented as given; as opposed to these we shall later consider the quite different acts in which concretely determinate States of Affairs, Collections and Disjunctions are given as complex thought-objects, or as objects of higher order, *which include their foundational objects as real parts (veell) in themselves*. We shall then deal with acts of the type of generalizing or indefinitely individual apprehension, whose objects certainly are of higher level, but which do *not* include their foundational objects in themselves.

In sense-perception, the 'external' thing appears 'in one blow', as soon as our glance falls upon it. The manner in which it makes the thing appear present is *straightforward*: it requires no apparatus of founding or founded acts. To what complex mental processes it may trace back its origin, and in what manner, is of course irrelevant here.

We are not ignoring the obvious complexity that can be shown to exist in the phenomenological content of the straightforward perceptual act, and particularly in its unitary intention.

Many constitutive properties certainly pertain to the thing when it appears with a given content, some of them themselves 'falling under perception', others merely intended. But we certainly do not live through all the articulated acts of perception which *would* arise were we to attend to all the details

of the thing, or, more precisely, to the properties of the 'side turned to us', were we to make them objects in their own right. No doubt ideas of such supplementary properties, not given in perception, are 'dispositionally excited', no doubt intentions which relate to them contribute to perception, and determine its total character. But, just as the thing does not appear before us as the mere sum of its countless individual features, which a later preoccupation with detail may distinguish, and as even the latter does not direct the thing into such details, but takes note of them only in the ever complete, unified thing, so the act of perception also is always a homogeneous unity, which gives the object 'presence' in a simple, immediate way. The unity of perception does *not* therefore arise through *our own synthetic activity*, as if only a form of synthesis, operating by way of founded acts, could give unity of objective reference to part-intentions. It requires no articulation and hence no actual linkage. The unity of perception comes into being as a *straightforward* unity, as an *immediate fusion of part-intentions, without the addition of new art-intentions*.

We may also be unsatisfied with a single glance, we may handle the thing from all sides in a *continuous perceptual series*, feeling it over as it were with our senses. But each single percept in this series is already a percept of the thing. Whether I look at this book from above or below, from inside or outside, I always see *this book*. It is always one and the same thing, and that not merely in some purely physical sense, but in the view of our percepts themselves. If individual properties dominate variably at each step, the thing itself, as a perceived unity, is not in essence set up by some overreaching act, founded upon these separate percepts.

Considering things more closely, we should not present the matter as if the one sensible object *could* be presented in a founded act (in a continuously developing act of perceiving), while it merely does not *need* to be presented in such an act. Closer analysis shows that even a continuous perceptual flux involves a *fusion of part-acts in one act, rather than a peculiar act founded upon such part-acts*.

To prove this we embark on the following discussion.

The individual percepts of our series have a continuous unity. Such continuity does not amount to the mere fact of temporal adjunction: the series of individual acts rather has the character of a phenomenological unity, in which the individual acts are fused. In this unity, our manifold acts are not merely fused into a phenomenological whole, but into *one act*, more precisely, into *one concept*. In the continuous running on of individual percepts we continuously perceive the single, selfsame object. Can we now call this continuous percept, since it is built out of individual percepts, a percept founded upon them? It is of course founded upon them in the sense in which a whole is founded on its parts, not however in the sense here relevant according to which a founded act manifests a new act-character, grounded in the act-characters that underlie it and unthinkable apart from these. In

the case before us perception is merely, as it were, extended: it allows parts to be broken off from itself which can function as complete, independent percepts. But the unification of these percepts into a continuous percept is not the performance of some peculiar act, through which a new consciousness of something objective is set up. We find, instead, that absolutely nothing new is objectively meant in the extended act, but that the same object is continuously meant in it, the very object that the part-percepts, *taken singly*, were already meaning.

One might lay stress on this sameness, and say that our unity is plainly a *unity of identification*, that the intention of the serially arranged acts coincides continuously, and that so the unity arises. This is certainly right. But *unity of identification* is unavoidably distinct, *does not say the same as the unity of an act of identification*. An act means something, an act of identification means identity, presents it. In our case an identification is performed, but no identity is meant. The object meant in the differing acts of the continuous perceptual series is indeed always the same, and the acts are one through coincidence, but what is perceived in the series, what is rendered objective in it, is solely the sensible object, never its identity with self. Only when we use the perceptual series to found a novel act, only when we articulate our individual percepts, and relate their objects to each other, does the unity of continuity holding among these individual percepts – the unity of fusion through their coinciding intentions – provide a *point d'appui* for a consciousness of identity. Identity itself is now made objective, the moment of coincidence linking our act-characters with one another, serves as *representative content for a new percept, founded upon* our articulated individual percepts. This brings to intentional awareness that what we now see and what we saw before are one and the same. Naturally we have then to do with a regular act of our second group. Our act of identification is in sober fact a new awareness of objectivity, which causes a new 'object' to appear to us, an object that can only be apprehended or given in its very selfhood in a founded act of this sort.

Before we penetrate further into our new class of acts and objects, we must, however, first round off our treatment of straightforward percepts. If we may presume to have cleared up the sense of the concept of a *straightforward* percept, or, what we take for the same, of sense-perception, then we have also cleared up the concept of a *sensible* or *real object* (in the most basic sense of 'real'). We define a real object as the possible object of a straightforward percept. There is a necessary parallelism between perception and *imagination*, which guarantees that a possible imagination (or more precisely a whole series of imaginations) having the same essence, corresponds to each possible percept, a *straightforward* imagination is correlated with each straightforward percept, thereby giving certainty to the wider concept of *sensible intuition*. We can then define *sensible* objects as the possible objects of sensible imagination and sensible intuition in general: this of

course involves no essential generalization of our previous definition. The parallelism just stressed makes both definitions equivalent.

Through the concept of a real object, the concept of a *real part*, or more particularly, the concepts of a *real piece*, and a *real moment* (real feature), and a *real form*, are determined. Each part of a real object is a real part.

In straightforward perception we say that the whole object is explicitly given, while each of its parts (in the widest sense of 'parts') is implicitly given. The sum total of objects that can be *explicitly or implicitly* given in straightforward percepts constitutes *the most widely conceived sphere of sensible objects*.

Each concrete sensible object is perceptible in explicit fashion, and so also every piece of such an object. How does the matter stand in regard to abstract moments? Their nature makes them incapable of separate being: their representative content, even where there is merely representation by way of analogy, cannot be experienced alone, but only in a more comprehensive concrete setting. But this does not mean that their intuition need be a founded act. It would be one, if the apprehension of an abstract moment was necessarily preceded by the *apprehension* of the concrete whole or of its complementary moments, such an apprehension being an act of intuitive turning towards its object. This I do not find obvious. It is clear, *per contra*, that the apprehension of a moment and of a part generally *as* a part of the whole in question and, in particular, the apprehension of a sensuous feature *as* a feature, or of a sensuous form *as* a form, point to acts which are all founded: these acts are in our case of a relational kind. This means that the sphere of 'sensitivity' has been left and that of 'understanding' entered. We shall now subject the just mentioned group of founded acts to a closer consideration.

§48 Characterization of categorical acts as founded acts

A sensible object can be apprehended by us in a variety of ways. It can, first of all, of course, be apprehended in 'straightforward' fashion. It is this possibility, which like all the other possibilities here in question must be throughout interpreted as 'ideal', which characterizes the sensible object *as* a sensible object. Understood in this manner, it stands as it were simply before us: the parts which constitute it are indeed in it, but are not made out explicit objects in the straightforward act. The same object can, however, be grasped by us in explicating fashion: acts of articulation can put its parts 'into relief', relational acts bring the relieved parts into relation, whether to one another or to the whole. Only through such new modes of interpretation will the connected and related members assume the character of 'parts' (or of 'wholes'). The articulating acts and, taken in retrospect, the act we call 'straightforward', are not merely experienced one after the other

overreaching unities of act are rather always present, in which, *as new objects*, the *relationships of the parts* become constituted.

Let us first look at the relationships of parts and wholes: limiting ourselves to the simplest cases, let us consider the relationships *A is or has α and α is in A*. To point to the founded acts in which these typical states of affairs become constituted as data, and to clear up the just employed forms of categorical statement (to lead them back to their intuitive origin and adequate fulfilment) are one and the same. We are not, however, here concerned with the qualities of acts, but only with the constitution of their interpretative forms: to that extent our analysis, if regarded as an analysis of judgement, will be defective.

An act of perception grasps *A* as a whole, at one 'blow' and in straightforward fashion. A second act of perception is trained upon α , the part or dependent moment, that belongs constitutively to *A*. These two acts are not merely performed together, or after one another, in the manner of disjointed experiences: rather are they bound together in a single act in whose synthesis *A* is first given as containing α in itself. Just so, α can, with a reversal of the direction of relational perception, achieve self-givenness as pertaining to *A*. Let us now try to penetrate a little deeper.

The total intuitive reference to our object implicitly contains an intention to α . For perception purports to grasp the object itself: its 'grasping' must therefore reach to all its constituents in and with the whole object. (Naturally we are here only concerned with what constitutes the object *as* it appears in perception, and *as what* it appears in perception, and not with such constituents as may pertain to it in 'objective reality', and which only later experience, knowledge and science will bring out.)

In the narrowing down of our total percept to one specific percept, the part-intention to α will not be torn out of the total appearance of *A*, so as to break up the latter's unity, but an *independent* act will have α as its own perceptual object. At the same time one's continuously operative total percept will coincide with this specific percept in respect of one implicit part-intention. The 'content' which represents α , will be functioning as the same content in a twofold fashion and, in so far as it does this, it will effect a coincidence, a peculiar unity of the two representative functions: we shall, in other words, have two coincident interpretations, both sustained by the representative content in question. But this unity of these two representative functions will now itself take on a representative role. It will not itself count in its own right as an experienced bond among acts: it will not set itself up *as* our object, but will help to set up another object. It will act representatively, and to such effect, that *A* will now appear to contain α in itself (or, with a reversed direction, α will appear as contained in *A*).

According, therefore, to our 'interpretative standpoint', or to the 'sense of our passage' from part to whole or contrariwise – which are both *mere phenomenological characters* making their contribution to the total intentional

matter of the relating act – there will be two possibilities, marked off in *a priori* fashion, in which the ‘same relation’ can achieve actual givenness. To these correspond two *a priori* possibilities of relation, objectively different, yet tied together by an ideal law, possibilities which can only be directly constituted in founded acts of the sort in question, which can achieve ‘self-givenness to perception’ only in acts built up in this manner.

Our exposition obviously applies to all specific forms of the relation between a whole and its parts. All such relationships are of categorical, ideal nature. It would be a mistake to try to locate them in the straightforwardly given whole, to discover them in this whole by analysis. The part certainly lies hidden in the whole before all division into members, and is subsidiarily apprehended in our perceptual grasp of this whole. But this fact, that it thus lies hidden in the whole, is at first merely the ideal possibility of bringing the part, and the fact that it is a part, to perception in correspondingly articulated and founded acts.

The matter is plainly similar in the case of external relations, from which predications such as ‘*A* is to the right of *B*’, ‘*A* is larger, brighter, louder than *B* etc.’, take their rise. Wherever sensible objects – directly and independently perceptible – are brought together, despite their mutual exclusion, into more or less intimate unities, into what fundamentally are more comprehensive objects, then a possibility of such external relations arises. They all fall under the general type of the relation of part to parts within a whole. Founded acts are once more the media in which the primary appearance of the states of affairs in question, of such external relationships, is achieved. It is clear, in fact, that neither the straightforward percept of the complex whole, nor the specific percepts pertaining to its members, are in themselves the relational percepts which alone are possible in such a complex. Only when one member is picked out as principal member, and is dwelt on while the other members are still kept in mind, does a determination of members by other members make its appearance, a determination which varies with the kind of unity that is present and plainly also with the particular members set in relief. In such cases also the choice of a principal member, or of a direction of relational apprehension, leads to phenomenologically distinct forms of relationship, correlatively characterized, which forms are not genuinely present in the unarticulated percept of the connection as a straightforward phenomenon, but which are in it only as ideal possibilities, the possibilities that is, of fulfilling relevant founded acts.

A real (*reelle*) location of these relations of parts in the whole would be a confusion of distinct things: of *sensuous* or *real* (*realen*) forms of combination, with *categorical* or *ideal* ones. Sensible combinations are aspects of the real (*realen*) object, its actual moments, present in it, if only implicitly, and capable of being ‘lifted out of it’ by an abstractive percept. As against this, forms of categorical combination go with the manner in which acts are synthesized: they are constituted as objects in the synthetic acts built upon our

sensibility. In the formation of external relations sensuous forms may serve as foundations for the categorical forms which correspond to them, as when, in the face of the sensuously intuited contact of the contents *A* and *B* within a comprehensive whole *W*, we, observe, and perhaps verbally express our observation, in the synthetic forms ‘*A* is in contact with *B*’, or ‘*B* is in contact with *A*’. But, in constituting the latter forms, we bring new objects into being, objects belonging to the class of ‘states of affairs’, which includes none but ‘objects of higher order’. In the sensible whole, the parts *A* and *B* are made one by the sensuously combinatory form of contact. The abstraction of these parts and moments, the formation of intuitions of *A*, *B* and contact, will not yet yield the presentation *A* in contact with *B*. This demands a novel act which, taking charge of such presentations, shapes and combines them suitably.

§49 Added note on nominal formations

We shall now make an important addition to our analysis up to this point: this concerns the *shaping* which synthetically combined presentations, each on their own account, may undergo. We have already studied this important point in a special class of cases: we observed, in our Fifth Investigation that an assertion can never be made, in unmodified form, the basis of a synthetic act built upon it, the subject- or object-member of a new assertion. An assertion, we said, must first of all take on nominal form, whereby its state of affairs becomes objective in a new, nominal fashion (Inv. V, §§35, 36). In this fact the intuitive distinction we have in view is brought out, a distinction which does not merely hold of the heretofore discussed syntheses of lowest grade, immediately based on sensibility, but of all presentations presided over by ‘many-rayed’ syntheses of whatever kind or level.

We may at first then hazard the general statement: *Objectifying acts which exist purely on their own, and the same objectifying acts serving to constitute the terms of some relation or other, are not really the same acts: they differ phenomenologically, and differ in respect of what we have called their intentional matter.* Their interpretative sense has changed, and hence the changed meaning of their adequate expression. It is not as if something had merely been shoved in between unchanged presentations, a bond which combined them in merely external fashion. The working of synthetic thought, of intellection, has done something to them, has shaped them anew, although, being a categorical function, it has done this in categorical fashion, so that the sensuous content of the apparent object has not been altered. The object does not appear before us with new real (*realen*) properties; it stands before us as this same object, but in a new manner. Its fitting into its categorical context gives it a definite place and role in this context, the role of a *relatum*, and in particular of a subject- or object-member. These are differences that are phenomenologically evident.

It is no doubt easier to pay heed to changes of meaning in our expressive symbols than to modifications of our direct presentations themselves: the situation, e.g., in the field of straightforward intuitions, when we compare such intuitions within and without some relational function, is far from clear, and I have not therefore touched on it in my last Investigation. There isolated sense-percepts were put on a level with nominally functioning acts (see Inv. v, §33). Just as the object in a straightforward percept directly confronts us, so too does the state of affairs in the act which names it, and so too does any categorially formed object. The gradual constitution of the object has been completed, as a finished object it becomes a term in a relation: it keeps, it seems, its constitutive sense quite unaltered. One can certainly say that the phenomenological change in sense made by entry into a relational act is at first masked by the very fact that the new form includes the whole previous interpretative sense in itself, to which it only imparts the new sense of a 'role'. Perception remains perception, the object is given as it was before given, 'only' it is 'put into relation'. Such shapings due to our synthetic function do not alter the object itself, we count them only as pertaining to our subjective activity, and we therefore overlook them in phenomenological reflections aiming at a clarification of knowledge. We should in consistency therefore say: A state of affairs also is the same state of affairs when it functions as logical subject (or generally when it functions nominally), and it has its *ultimate constitution in the same act of originary intuition as when it functioned in isolation*. When, however, it functions as a relatum in an act of higher level, it is constituted with a new form (and with, so to say, the characterizing costume of its *role*) of which the nominal form is the adequate expression. Further researches will however be necessary for a last clearing-up of the phenomenological situation just tackled.

§50 Sensuous forms categorially grasped but not functioning nominally

We have so far only spoken of the re-shapings of terms put into such relations as that of whole and part. External relations, however, show us how sensuous forms enter into the unity of a relation (in its predicate) *without undergoing nominal reification*, e.g. 'A brighter than B', 'A to the right of B' etc. There are undeniable phenomenological differences – differences in interpretative sense – between cases where we, so to say, pay direct attention to the form of brightness, and make this our *nominal* object, as when we say 'This relation of brightness (between A and B) is more readily noticeable than that one (between M and N)', and the quite different cases, where this form of brightness is meant as in the above expression 'A is brighter than B'. In the latter class of cases we once more have a categorial form pointing to a peculiar function in the total relational situation. Concepts such as Terms of Relations, Form of Relation, Subject, Object etc., concepts not

always clearly expressed and certainly insufficiently clarified, plainly lead back to differences in such categorial forms with which in this and previous paragraphs we have become familiar.

§51 Collectiva and disjunctiva

We have so far discussed, as instances of categorial and synthetic object-forms, only certain very simple forms of states of affairs, those of total and partial relations of identity, and of simple external relations. We now turn our regard to two further examples, to synthetic forms, i.e. which, though not themselves states of affairs, nevertheless play a large part in connection with states of affairs: Collectiva and Disjunctiva. The acts in which these are constituted as data are those which furnish a fulfilling intuition for the meanings of the conjunctions 'and' and 'or'.

What intuitively corresponds to the words 'and' and 'or', to 'both' or 'either', is not anything, as we rather roughly put it above, that can be grasped with one's hands, or apprehended with some sense, as it can also not really be represented in an image, e.g. in a painting. I can paint A and I can paint B, and I can paint them both on the same canvas: I cannot, however, paint the *both*, nor paint the A *and* the B. Here we have only the one possibility which is always open to us: to perform a new act of conjunction or collection on the basis of our two single acts of intuition, and so mean the *aggregate* of the objects A and B. In the situation just viewed as an example this act is constituted as an *imaginative* presentation of A and B, while this aggregate is only given as 'itself', in the manner of perception, and can only be so given, in just such an act, an act merely modified in a conformable manner, and which is founded on the *percepts* of A and B.

That we speak of an act which unites these percepts, and not of any connection or mere coexistence of these percepts in consciousness, depends on the fact that a *unitary intentional* relation is here given, and a unitary object which corresponds to it; this object can only be constituted in such a connection of acts, just as a State of Affairs can only be constituted in those eminent modern logicians who have tried to explain the conjunctive association of names or statements through a mere conscious coexistence of nominal or propositional acts, and have so surrendered *and* as an objective form in Logic.¹

We must also guard against confusing the *straightforward percepts* of *sensuously unified manifolds, series, swarms* etc., with the *conjunctive percepts* in which alone the consciousness of plurality is itself properly constituted. I have tried to show in my *Philosophy of Arithmetic* how the sensuously unifying characters – I there called them 'figural' or 'quasi-qualitative' – they serve as sensuous *points d'appui* for the significantly mediated cognition

of plurality as such, and of plurality of the kind in question – which cognition now has no need of an articulated grasp and knowledge of individual items, but does not therefore as yet possess the character of a genuine intuition of the collection as such.²

§52 Universal objects constituting themselves in universal intuitions

The simple synthetic acts with which we have so far concerned ourselves were so founded upon straightforward percepts that the *synthetic intention* was *subsidiarily directed to the objects of these founding percepts*, inasmuch as it held them together in ideal 'contents' or brought them to a relational unity. This is a *universal* character of synthetic acts as such. We now turn to examples from *another set of categorial acts*, in which the objects of the founding acts do not *enter into* the intention of the founded one, and would only reveal their close relation to it in relational acts. Here we have the field of the *universal intuition* – an expression which no doubt will not seem better to many than 'wooden iron'.

Abstraction gets to work on a basis of primary intuitions, and with it a new categorial act-character emerges, in which a new style of objectivity becomes apparent, an objectivity which can *only* become apparent – whether given as 'real' or as 'merely imagined' – in just such a founded act. Naturally I do not here mean 'abstraction' merely in the sense of a setting-in-relief of some non-independent moment in a sensible object, but Idealational Abstraction, where no such non-independent moment, but its Idea, its Universal, is brought to consciousness, and achieves *actual givenness*. We must presuppose such an act in order that the Very Sort, to which the manifold single moments 'of one and the same sort' stand opposed, may *itself* come before us, and may come before us *as one and the same*. For we become aware of the identity of the universal through the repeated performance of such acts upon a basis of several individual intuitions, and we plainly do so in an overreaching act of identification which brings all such single acts of abstraction into one synthesis. Through such acts of abstraction, woven into new act-forms, there arise, further, acts of universal determination, acts, that is, which determine objects *generally* as subsumed under certain species *A*, or acts in which *unspecified* objects of a sort *A* become present to us.

In an act of abstraction, which need not necessarily involve the use of an abstract name, the universal *itself* is given to us; we do not think of it merely in significative fashion as when we merely understand general names, but we apprehend it, *behold* it. Talk of an intuition and, more precisely, of a *perception of the universal* is in this case, therefore, well-justified.

Difficulties arise, however, from another quarter. Talk of 'perception' presupposes the possibility of correspondent imagination: a distinction between them, we held, is part of the natural sense of our ordinary talk about

'intuition'. But it is just this distinction that we cannot here draw. This seems to stem from the fact that abstractive acts do not differ in consonance with the character of the straightforward intuitions which underlie them; they are quite unaffected by the assertive or non-assertive character of such underlying acts, or by their perceptual or imaginative character. The *Red*, the *Triangle* exemplified in mere phantasy is specifically the same as the *Red*, the *Triangle* exemplified in our percepts. Our consciousness of the universal has as satisfactory a basis in perception as it has in parallel imagination, and, wherever it arises, the Idea *Red*, the Idea *Triangle*, is *itself* apprehended, is intuited in the one unique way which permits no distinction between image and original.

We must, however, note that the examples adduced were all cases of the *adequate* perception of the universal. The universal was here truly grasped and given on the basis of truly correspondent instances. Where this is the case, there seems in fact to be no parallel imagination having the same intuitive content, and this is so in *every* case of adequate perception. For how, we may ask, even in the realm of individuals, could a content pattern itself on itself, since, taken as itself, it cannot also be meant as its own analogon? And how can the note of *assertion* be wanting, where the meant content is the one experienced and given? It is quite different in, e.g., the case where mathematical analysis has given us an indirectly conceived Idea of a certain class of curves of the third order, though we have never *seen* any curve of this sort. In such a case an intuitive figure, e.g. of a familiar third-order curve, perhaps actually drawn, perhaps merely pictured, may very well serve as an intuitive image, an analogon, of the universal we are intending: our consciousness of the universal is here intuitive, but analogically intuitive, in its use of an individual intuition. And does not an ordinary rough drawing function analogically in comparison with an ideal figure, thereby helping to condition the *imaginative character of the universal presentation*? This is how we contemplate the Idea of a steam-engine, basing ourselves on a model of a steam-engine, in which case there can naturally be no talk of an adequate abstraction or conception. In such cases we are not concerned with significations, but with universal representations by way of analogy, with universal imaginations, in short. If, however, the consciousness of mere analogy lapses, as may happen, e.g., in the intuition of a model, we have a case of the *perception of the universal*, even if it is one of *inadequate* perception.

In the same way we may now discover the previously missing differences between *an assertive*, and a *merely contemplative*, *consciousness of the universal*. Where we contemplate a universal object in a merely analogizing, imaginative fashion, we may also mean it assertively, and this act, like any assertive reference, may be confirmed or refuted by adequate future perception. The former happens whenever the universal meaning is fulfilled by an adequate percept, i.e. by a new consciousness of the universal which constitutes itself

on the basis of a 'true' abstraction from the corresponding individual percept. The universal object is then not merely presented and posited, but is itself given to us. Again we can have an analogizing presentation of the universal, without actually positing it. We conceive it, but leave it in suspense. The intention to the universal which here rests on an intuitive basis makes no decision regarding 'being' or 'non-being', only one regarding the *possibility* or impossibility of the universal, and of its presentation through adequate abstraction.

Chapter 7

A study in categorial representation

§53 Backward reference to the researches of our first section

The founded acts analysed by us in select examples were considered by us to be intuitions, and intuitions of the new types of object that they brought to light, objects which can only be given in founded acts of a sort and form which corresponds to each of them. The explanatory value of this extended use of the concept Intuition can only lie in the fact that we are not here dealing with some inessential, merely disjunctive widening of a concept, which permits us to extend the sphere of that concept over the spheres of any heterogeneous concepts whatsoever,¹ but with an authentic generalization, which rests on a community of essential features. We call the new acts 'intuitions' in that, with a mere surrender of a 'straightforward' relation to their object – the peculiar sort of immediacy defined by us as 'straightforwardness' – they yet have all the essential peculiarities of intuitions: we find in their case the same essential divisions, and they show themselves capable of achieving the same fully performed *fulfillments*. This last mentioned capacity is particularly important for our purposes, for it was with a view to such performances that this whole investigation has been conducted. Knowledge as the unity of fulfilment is not achieved on a mere basis of straightforward acts, but in general, on a basis of categorial acts: when, accordingly, we oppose *intuition* to *thought* (as meaning), we cannot mean by 'intuition' merely sensuous intuition.

The conception of categorial acts as intuitions, first brings true perspicuity into the relation of thought to intuition – a relation that no previous critique of knowledge has made tolerably clear: it is the first to render such a conceptual extension the theses of our first section first gain adequate confirmation. To all intuitions, in our present widest sense, however near or far they may stand from sensibility, expressive meanings correspond – as their possible ideal counterparts. The divisions drawn by us within 'epistemic essence', and the concepts framed in close connection therewith, retain their

validity in this wider sphere, though marked off by us in relation to a narrower one.

Each categorial act of intuition has therefore:

1. its quality;
2. its (intentional) material, or interpretative sense;
3. its representing contents.

These distinctions do not reduce to distinctions among *founding* acts. The quality of a total act may differ from that of a basic act, just as basic acts, when many, may be differently qualified, as, e.g., in an idea of a relation between a fictitious object and one taken to be real.

Not only has each of the founding acts its own material, but the founded act imports its own material: it is true to say that this *novel material*, or, where this includes the materials of basic acts, the *newly added part* of it, is *founded on the materials of the basic act*.

Finally, also, the new act has *representing contents* in regard to which there are serious difficulties. *Must new representing contents be assumed for this new material, and what can these be?*

§54 The question of the representing contents of categorial forms

When one begins to analyse categorial acts, one is struck by the apparently irrefutable observation, that all differences of categorial acts reduce to corresponding differences of the acts on which they are founded, i.e. that the new element imported by the categorial function represents an increase of content that cannot be further differentiated. How else could an imaginative presentation of a collection differ from the percept of the same collection, than in respect of the intentional manner in which its members are given? As regards the *form of connection*, one would say, no further intelligible distinction can be drawn in the two cases. Or should one say that the form of a collection – what we express by the word ‘and’ – is specifically different according as it is perceptually or imaginatively apparent? In that case we ought to think that the appearances of phantasy might be bound together by the collective form of perception, while perceptual phenomena might be bound together by the collective form of phantasy, and each differently. But this is plainly unthinkable, nay, unintelligible.

Nothing, it might be objected, is easier than just what has been said. Why should we not assemble certain perceptual objects in thought in order to refer imaginatively to some other aggregate? And why should we not assemble imaginative phenomena in thought in order to refer only to this imaginative aggregate, and so to perceive the latter? We may certainly do exactly this. But the perceptual objects will then be functioning as images, and the act of collection will not be directly founded on percepts, but on the

imaginings built upon them. Just so, in the other case, we shall not be collecting the objects of our fancies, but those fancies themselves, i.e. the act of collection will not be directly founded on fancies, but upon ‘inner percepts’ directed upon these latter. This establishes no difference between ‘real’ collections on a basis of perceived objects, and ‘imaginary’ collections on a basis of imagined objects: such a difference does not exist, except as a difference in underlying acts.

The same seems to hold for all other modifications that the collective consciousness can show us. The universality or specificity, definiteness or indefiniteness, or whatever other categorial forms may come into play for our underlying objects, will also determine the character of our collective presentation, but not so that we shall be able to find phenomenological differences in the connective character itself: it is always the same *and*. According as our underlying presentations differ in type, we have a collection of universal objects before us (e.g. Species of colour, *Red and Blue and Yellow*), or a collection of individual objects (*Aristotle and Plato*), a collection of definite objects (as in the previous example) or of indefinite ones (*a person and another person, a colour and a tone*). One cannot conceive how differences in acts of collection should be possible except in respect of differences in the acts which underlie them.

The same also seems immediately clear in regard to relational intuitions. Relating always displays an identity of form, all variation depending on the underlying acts.

In this situation can we still hope for ascertainable differences between *representing contents* and *interpretative sense* in respect to the newly added part of a founded act, the *form of connection* in the case of synthetic acts? In the case of *straightforward* intuitions, interpretative sense (*material*) and representing content were intimately united: they were mutually related, and far from independent in their variations. Nonetheless they underwent abundant shifts as against one another. The representing sensum could stay the same while the interpretative sense altered, and could vary while the latter remained constant. An imaginative presentation, e.g., can remain identical in respect, not only of material, but also of extent of fulness, and can nonetheless notably change in respect of vivacity. In the sphere of sense, the distinction between material and representing content can be readily pointed out, and unhesitatingly acknowledged. How is it, however, in the case of *categorial* acts, where, if we ignore their act-foundation, variability seems entirely absent? Are we to say that they lack the distinction in question as beyond the representing contents of their underlying acts? When these underlying acts are themselves categorial, e.g. acts of ideation, these too will lack representation, which will be found only in their ultimate foundation of *straightforward* intuitions.

§55 Arguments for the assumption of peculiar categorical representing contents

In default of an attitude to this question we must emphatically observe that, in the previous exposition, the complete absence of differentiation among forms, as against the multifarious changes in the total act and its foundation, has perhaps been exaggerated, even misinterpreted. For when the whole act is a perceptual presentation, its form, *qua* form of a perceptual presentation, certainly differs in character from that of an imaginative presentation. If the form is what is really new and essential in the categorical presentation, it must share in the import of each essential character that penetrates the whole and that belongs to it as a whole. If reflection fails to show us differences of interpretative sense in the form, or at least in the form of the *synthetic* act – the matter has already been treated sufficiently as regards the abstractive act in the discussions of §52 – this can be explained by the fact that we involuntarily abstract from these interpretative characters, since they do not distinguish and mark off the moment of synthesis, but rather pervade the complete, founded act equally. Instead we attend exclusively to the common element that confronts us in, e.g., all forms of collective synthesis. But just this common element could be the representing content that we are looking for. As, in straightforward sense-perception, the homogeneous unity of the perceptual sense pervades the total representation, having definite relations to each separate part of the representing content, without seeming to inner reflection to be made up of separate partial conceptions, so, in the case of categorical intuitions, the interpretative sense pervades the total act and its representing content, without being clearly divided to match the representing contents that can be distinguished by reflection. The above exposition contains, if we allow the interpretation, the important truth that *in all change of founding acts and interpretative forms, there is a unique representing content for each sort of founded act*. The abundant multiplicity of sense-qualities, of sensible forms etc., is at the disposal of straightforward sensuous intuition for purposes of representation. In the sphere of collective intuitions or intuitions of identity etc., we were always limited to *one* sort: the form of *and* is everywhere the same, and so is the *is*-form etc. These forms were here to be understood as analogues of the sense-kernel, of what is sensuous in sensuous intuition: there was to be abstraction from quality and from interpretative sense.

One might here suspect that the wish was being father to the thought, and might direct attention to a fact issuing from our former treatment: that representing contents are by no means essential constituents of acts. For it is the peculiarity of all significant acts that they lack representing contents, i.e. *authentic* representing contents which themselves relate to the internal being of the object. For significant acts, too, have their *non-authentic* representing contents, which do not stand for the object meant in the act, but for some

other object, the object of an underlying act. If non-authentic representing contents suffice, then we of course have no more difficulty, for such contents are present in our case, since underlying acts always provide them. The authentic representing contents of these underlying acts can be seen as non-authentically representative in relation to the acts founded on them.

But the comparison with merely significant acts makes us vividly aware that founded acts cannot do without authentic representation, and representation as regards categorical form. We are made mindful of relations of possible fulfilment, of the 'fulness' which intuitive acts confer on significant ones, of the ascending scales formed among intuitive acts by variable fullness, of final adequation as an ideal limit. Representing contents constitute the difference between 'empty' signification and 'full' intuition: they are responsible for 'fulness', as is shown by the fact that they determine one sense of 'fulness' (see §22). Only intuitive acts render their object apparent, seeable, for the reason, namely, that a representing content is there, which the interpretative form sees as a likeness, or as the very self, of the object. This is a fact rooted in the universal essence of the relation of fulfilment, and must therefore be demonstrable in our present sphere too. In this present sphere, too, we find 'significantly' opposed to 'intuitively': the opposition between objectifying acts which mean a categorical object significantly, and the parallel acts which present the same object through the same interpretative sense intuitively, whether 'in likeness' or 'in very self'. Since the intentional material is the same in both cases, we can again only treat the new element in our categorical intuition as being representative, as setting the object before us *in its content*, as treating experienced contents as representing an object meant. Such representation cannot, however, be exclusively carried out in underlying acts, for it is not solely *their* objects that are presented, but the whole state of affairs, the whole aggregate etc.

§56 Continuation. The mental linkage of combined acts and the categorical unity of corresponding objects

One might for a moment suppose that, in the case, e.g., of a relation, only the relata were presented, and that the new element consisted in a mere mental character connecting the two appearances. A connection of acts is not, however, *pro tanto*, a connection of objects. At best it can help to make such a connection apparent: it is not itself the connection that appears in it. A mental bond can be established among acts, and can cause an objective relation to appear before us, while this relation, though it unites truly existent objects, has no being at all. If we judge significantly, without intuitive representation of the state of affairs judged – as is the case in ordinary arithmetical judgements – the relational unity of the act is articulated, and has a mental form of connection entirely analogous to that of the corresponding intuition. But the state of affairs is not, in the strong sense of the

word, 'apparent': it is merely meant. If we contrast with this a case of intuitive representation, as when we identify the colour of two perceived surfaces, or of two surfaces recalled in memory, or a person represented in two imaginative presentations, then identity is likewise meant, but is meant in a perceptual manner, in a manner that *gives us* the object, or, in the case of imagination, that gives us a likeness of it. What makes such differences possible? Ought we to locate the whole difference in the founding acts? Against this we must object that, e.g., in the sensitive identification, the identity of the meant objects is not experientially *lived through* but is merely *thought of*, whereas, in the case of intuited objects, the identity is indeed perceived or imagined, but is only given and lived through where adequation is full and strict. *The mental bond, which establishes the synthesis, is therefore a bond of thought or meaning (Meinung) and is as such more or less fulfilled.* It is merely a non-independent constituent of the total meaning, a significant constituent of a significant meaning, and an intuitive constituent of an intuitive meaning, but at all events a constituent which itself shares the character of this meaning, and with this its differences of fullness. We are therefore not unjustified in interpreting the situation as involving *that this constituent also exercises a representative function.* As we compare different cases in the light of the possibility just raised, we believe that we may reduce the mental bond experienced in *actual* identification, collection etc. ('actual' = authentic, intuitive) to a *universal common feature*, to be thought of separately from quality and interpretative sense, and yielding in such reduction the representative content that pertains specially to the moment of categorical form.

§57 The representing contents of the founding intuitions are not immediately connected by the representing content of the synthetic form

Certain not unimportant observations must here suggest themselves as natural additions.

Objectively considered, a synthesis, e.g. one of identity, of attribution etc., belongs to the founding *objects*: identity is, e.g., identity of the person, attribution the relation between the subject *tree* and the predicate *fruit-bearing*. The connected objects appear before us by way of their representing contents, and it might be thought that the synthetic bond, in which (or by way of which, perhaps in the manner of a representing content) the connection comes before us as a form, is also the simple and direct phenomenological bond between the representing contents of the underlying objects.

As against this we affirm that *the moment of synthesis establishes no direct connection between the representing contents of the basic acts*, but that, e.g., the phenomenological form of identification has its essential basis in the *underlying acts as such*, i.e. it has its basis in what these acts are and contain in addition to their representing contents.

If the lived-through moment of identity, its mental character, were an immediate bond between the representing sense-contents – we may confine ourselves to the simplest case where the founding acts and objects are sensuous – the unity established by this moment would also be a sensuous unity, like, e.g., the spatial or qualitative patterns or other forms of unity which likewise have their foundation in the sense-contents in question. All sensuous (real) unity, as our Third Investigation has set forth, is unity founded in the various kinds of sense-content. The concrete contents are many-sided, they sustain various abstract moments in themselves, they underlie manifold possibilities of alteration and connection. We accordingly refer many kinds of connection to this or that moment in such contents. If particular unions are not always founded in the generic characters of complex wholes, taken in their complete specific content, they are nonetheless founded in the primitive generic characters which correspond to the moments of the whole in question. The real lack of relation between categorical act-forms and the sense-contents of their bases, shows itself in the limitless variability of the generic characters of these contents; in other words, no genus of content lacks an *a priori* possibility of functioning in the foundation of categorical acts of every sort. What is categorical is not bound up with representing sensuous contents, but only and necessarily with their *objects*, and yet not with them in their sensuous (real) content. This means that *the mental character in which the categorical form is constituted is bound up phenomenologically with the acts in which the objects are constituted.* In these acts, sense-contents are representatively present, and so certainly contribute to such acts. They do not, however, make up the characteristic essence of these acts, and they can also exist without the interpretation which first renders them representative: in the latter case, they *are there*, but nothing thereby *appears*, and nothing is consequently there to be connected, or to be treated as subject or predicate etc., in categorical fashion. The *categorical moment* of the synthetically founded act does not bind these *inessential* elements of the founding acts together, but binds what is *essential* to them both: it connects, in all circumstances, their *intentional materials*, and is in a real sense founded upon these last. This is what was said above quite generally: in all categorical acts, we maintained, the material of the founded acts was founded in the *materials* of the founding acts. Identity, e.g., is no immediate form of unity among sensuous contents, but is a 'unity of consciousness' based upon one or another (repeated or inwardly different) consciousness of the same object. This holds in all cases. It is true, no doubt, that intuitions of all sorts, whether straightforward or categorical, by their nature submit to the same phenomenological formations, but this only means that categorical formation rests functionally essentially on what is universal in an objectifying act, or is a *function* essentially bound up with the generic element in objectifying acts. Only experiences of this class permit categorical syntheses, and such synthesis directly connects their intentional essences.

Particularly in the case of adequate synthetic intuitions, immediately based on individual intuitions, must we guard against the tempting delusion of an immediate phenomenological connection, present at least on this lowest level of categorial synthesis, between the representing sense-contents of the one underlying act and those of the other. In virtue of the functional dependence of the adequation (evidence) of the total act on the adequation of its founding intuitions, the situation would seem to have the following pattern: since the founding acts are adequate, the representing contents coincide with the object represented. If on such a basis the intuition of a relation arises, a relation, e.g., between part and whole, the relational act too is evident in character: the relation itself is truly given with the truly given contents. The mental bond of relating, conceived as a relation among sensuous contents and objects, here binds these experienced sense-contents as with a direct bond.

Binds them with nothing, one might object. Not the sense-contents, but the adequate intuitions of such contents, serve to base the unity of the act of relating. Here as elsewhere we must look to the objects, to the sensuous contents at once representing and represented, in order to perform the act of relating, to relate this content as whole to that content as part. Relations can only be given on a basis of *given* objects: objects are, however, not given in mere lived experience, in itself blind, but only and solely in percepts, and in our case in the perception of lived through contents which no longer represent something beyond themselves.

All this confirms our original introduction of categorial acts as founded acts. It is *essential* to these acts, in which all that is intellectual is constituted, that they should be achieved in stages. Objectivations arise on a basis of objectivations, and constitute objects which, as objects of higher order, objects in a wider, intellectual sense, can only come to light in such founded acts. This excludes from synthetic acts that immediate unity of representation which unites all representative contents of straightforward intuitions. The complete synthetic intuition therefore arises (if we are right in our above attempted interpretation which requires a most careful pondering) in so far as the mental content which binds the underlying acts itself sustains *interpretation* as the objective unity of the founded objects, as their relation of identity, of part to whole etc.

§58 The relation of our two distinctions: outer and inner sense, also sense for categories

It is now extremely important to bring to complete clearness the relation between the two distinctions introduced by us at the very beginning of this investigation, the distinction between outer and inner sensibility, on the one hand, and between straightforward and categorial acts, on the other.

A presentation as a mental experience, whether it be straightforward or founded, sensuous or categorial, belongs to the sphere of 'inner sense'. Is

there no contradiction in this? Is an inner percept, which reflects on an act, and a founded act to boot, e.g. on an actual insight into the equation $2 + 1 = 1 + 2$, not *eo ipso* a founded percept, and therefore a non-sensuous one? In this act of perception the founded act is given together with the acts that underlie it, and is given in the strongest sense of the word. It belongs to that and is part of the real make-up of the (inner) percept. In so far as the latter directs itself to the former act, it is itself related to it, and is therefore itself a founded percept.

We shall here obviously have to reply: to perceive an act, or an act-moment, or an act-complex of any sort, is to perceive sensuously, since it is to perceive *straightforwardly*. This cannot be doubted, since the relation of an act which perceives to an act which is perceived is no relation of foundation, even if we take a founded act to be the act perceived. The foundedness of an act does not mean that it is built on other acts in any manner whatsoever, but that a founded act, by its very nature or kind, is only possible as built upon acts of the sort which underlie it, and that, as a result, the objective correlate of the founded act has a universal element of form which can only be intuitively displayed by an object in a founded act of this kind. The intuitive consciousness of the universal cannot, e.g., exist without underlying individual intuition, nor an identification without underlying acts which relate to the identified objects etc.

The perception, however, which we direct to a founded act could as readily be directed to a non-founded act and to any objects of outer sense, e.g. horses, colours etc. In each case perception consists in a straightforward looking at our object. The material of perception (its interpretative sense) stands in no necessary relation to the material of the perceived act. The whole phenomenological content of this act has rather the sheer character of a representative content, it is objectively interpreted in accordance with the interpretative form of perception, as being this very act of perception itself.

For this reason also, every abstraction based on inner sense, e.g. the abstraction which looks to a founded act, is a sensuous abstraction. As opposed to this, an abstraction which is itself built upon a founded act, is, to the extent that this founded act has the character of an intuition, even that of a categorial intuition, a categorial abstraction. If we look at an intuitive act of identification, i.e. an intuition of identity, and if we abstract from it the moment of identification, we have performed a sensuous abstraction. But if, while living through an identification, we turn our regard to *objective identity*, and make this the basis of our abstraction, we have performed a categorial abstraction (cf. the closer discussion in §60). The objective moment of identity is no act, and no form of an act: it is an objective categorial form. As against this, on the other hand, the moment of identification, that unites the founded acts phenomenologically, is a sensuous and categorial act-form. The same difference essentially divides those concepts framed on a ground of *reflection* on any intuitive acts, from the quite different concepts

framed on the ground of these intuitive acts themselves. I perceive a house and, reflecting on my percept, frame the concept of *perception*. But if I look simply at the house, I use my percept itself, rather than the percept of this percept, as the founding act for an abstraction, and the concept of house arises.

There is accordingly nothing remarkable in saying: *The same mental moments which are sensuously given in inner perception* (and which therefore function in it as sensuous representing contents) *may, in a founded act of the character of a categorial perception or imagination set up a categorial form, and so sustain a totally different categorial representation.*

The non-independence of categorial forms as forms, is mirrored in the department of inner sense in the fact that the moments in which a categorial form can be constituted – moments² narrowly restricted for each form, so that each type of form corresponds to a single type of moment – themselves represent non-independent mental contents, moments founded on characters of acts. Since, however, all characters of acts have their ultimate foundation in the contents of outer sense,³ we note that there is an essential *phenomenological gulf in the field of sense.*

We have principally to distinguish between:

1. the *contents of reflection*, those contents which are themselves characters of acts or founded upon such characters;
2. the *primary* contents, those contents in which all contents of reflection are either immediately or mediately founded.

These latter would be the contents of *'external' sensibility*, which is here plainly not defined in terms of some metaphysical distinction of outward and inward, but through the nature of its representing contents, as being ultimately foundational, phenomenologically lived-through contents. The primary contents form a unique highest genus, which divides into many species. The manner in which the contents of reflection have their foundation in primary contents is the loosest conceivable: it is such that reflective contents are never bound to a narrower class than the whole class of these primary contents.

Corresponding to the difference between purely sensuous and purely categorial objects of intuition, there is a distinction of representing contents: *only reflective contents can serve as purely categorial representing contents.*

One might now try to pin down the concept of a category by saying that *it comprises all objective forms arising out of the forms, and not out of the matters, of conceptual interpretation.* The following misgiving no doubt might arise. Ought we not also to attribute to sensuous intuition the character of a categorial act, in so far as through it the form of objectivity is constituted? For what we perceive does not merely *exist* in perception, but is given in it as an object. The concept of an object is, however, framed as the correlate of the concept of perception, and so presupposes, not merely an act of abstraction, but also acts of relation. It therefore also qualifies as a categorial concept in our present sense.

Chapter 8

The *a priori* laws of authentic and inauthentic thinking

§59 The complication into ever new forms. The pure theory of the forms of possible intuitions

The varied forms of founded acts where, instead of straightforward, sensuously-intuitive objects, categorially formed and synthetically connected objects are constituted, permit manifold complications into new forms: in consequence of certain *a priori* categorial laws, categorial unities may again and again become the objects of new connecting, relating or ideating acts. Universal objects, e.g., can be collectively connected, the collections thus formed can in their turn be collectively connected with other collections of similar or different type, and so on *in infinitum*. The possibility of unlimited complication is here self-evident and *a priori*. Just so, within certain law-bound limits, one can unify states of affairs in new states of affairs, pursue an indefinitely extended search for internal and external relations among all such possible unities, use the results of such discovery as terms for novel relations etc. Obviously such complication is achieved in founded acts of ever higher level. The governing legality in this field is the intuitive counter-part of the grammatical legality of pure logic. In this case, also, we are not settled at different levels. These laws at all events say nothing directly about the ideal conditions of possibilities of adequate fulfilment. To the pure theory of the forms of meanings we here have a corresponding pure theory of the forms of intuitions, in which the possibility of the primitive types of simple and complex intuitions must be established by intuitive generalization, and intuitions must be laid down. To the extent that adequate intuition itself represents a type of intuition, the pure theory of intuitive forms embraces all the laws which concern the forms of adequate intuition: these have a peculiar relevance to the laws of the adequate *fulfilment* of significative intentions, or of intentions already intuitive.

§60 The relative or functional difference between matter and form. Pure acts of understanding and those mixed with sense. Sensuous concepts and categories

The relative, merely functional difference of matter and form hangs together with the possibility of making categorial intuitions the foundations for new categorial intuitions, and thereupon of expressing them in corresponding expressions and meanings. This difference was indicated above in passing (§42). In an absolute sense, a founding sensibility provides the matter for, all acts of categorial form which are built upon it. In a relative sense, the objects of founding acts furnish this matter, relatively, that is, to the newly emergent forms of the founded acts. If we relate two objects already categorial, e.g. two states of affairs, these states of affairs are our matter relatively to the relation which brings them together. To this definite use of the concepts of matter and form the traditional distinction between the matter and form of statements corresponds exactly. The terms of a statement express the founding acts of the whole 'relational presentation', or, what is the same, they are names for its founding objects, and therefore represent the place in which alone contributions of sense may be sought. But founding objects may themselves be categorial in type. Plainly fulfilment is carried out in a chain of acts which take us down a whole ladder of 'foundations'. Indirect presentations here play an essential part, whose exact investigation is an important task in a clarification of the complex forms of cognitive thought.

Acts of straightforward intuitions we called 'sensuous'; founded acts, whether leading back immediately or mediately to sense, we called 'categorial'. But it is worth our while to draw a distinction, within the sphere of categorial acts, between those acts that are purely categorial, acts of 'pure understanding', and mixed acts of understanding that are blended with sense. It lies in the nature of the case that everything categorial ultimately rests upon sensuous intuition, that a 'categorial intuition', an intellectual insight, a case of thought in the highest sense, without any foundation of sense, is a piece of nonsense. The idea of a pure intellect, interpreted as a faculty of pure thinking (= categorial action), quite cut off from a 'faculty of sensibility', could only be conceived before there had been an elementary analysis of knowledge in the irrefragable evidence of its being. Nonetheless, the distinctions just indicated, and with them the concept of a purely categorial act and, if one likes, the further concept of a pure understanding, all have a good sense. If we ponder on the peculiarity of eidetic abstraction, that it necessarily rests on individual intuition, but does not for that reason mean what is individual in such intuition, if we pay heed to the fact that it is really a new way of conceiving, constitutive of generality instead of individuality – then the possibility of universal intuitions arises, intuitions which not merely exclude all individuality, but also all sensibility from their intentional purview. In other

words, we distinguish between sensuous abstraction, which yields sensuous concepts – purely sensuous or mixed with categorial forms – and purely categorial abstraction, which yields purely categorial concepts. Colour, house, judgement, wish are purely sensuous concepts; colourfulness, virtue, the axiom of parallels etc., have a categorial admixture, while unity, plurality, relation, concept are purely categorial. Where we speak absolutely of categorial concepts, purely categorial ones are always meant. Sensuous concepts find their immediate basis in the data of sensuous intuition, categorial concepts in the data of categorial intuition, purely with regard to the categorial form of the whole categorially formed object. If, e.g., the intuition of a relation underlies an abstraction, the abstractive consciousness may direct itself to the relational form in specie, so that everything sensuous in what underlies the relation is discounted. So arise categories, which rubric, understood pointedly, merely covers the primitive concepts in our present context.

We have just identified concept and Species: this was implicit in the whole sense of our completed discussion. But, if one understands by 'concepts' universal presentations instead of universal objects, whether these be universal intuitions or the universal meanings which correspond to them, our distinction carries over simply to these. It carries over similarly to presentations of the form *an A*, having regard to the fact that the Species *A* may include or exclude what is sensible. All logical forms and formulae such as *All S are P*, *No S is P* etc., are purely categorial. Here the letters '*S*', '*P*' etc., merely point indirectly to 'certain', indefinite concepts, variable 'at will'; in the total formula a complex thought, made up of purely categorial elements, corresponds to them. Like all pure logic, so all pure arithmetic, the pure theory of manifolds, pure mathematics, in short, in the widest sense, are pure in the sense that they contain no sensuous concept in their whole theoretical fabric.

§61 Categorial forming involves no real reshaping of the object

Our talk of categorial form, as has been clear from our last set of discussions, is naturally and harmlessly ambiguous, since we have drawn a thoroughgoing distinction between act and object. We mean by categorial form, on the one hand, the characters of founded acts, which give form to acts of new presentations or of already founded intuition, and transform them into new presentations of objects. These latter presentations, as opposed to the acts on which they are founded, set up for us a peculiarly modified objectivity; the original objects are now seen in certain interpretative and connective forms which are our categorial forms in the second, objective sense. The conjunctive connection *A* and *B*, which as a unified act means a categorial unity of objects (the aggregate of them both), will serve as an example.

The expression '*A* and *B*' illustrates, particularly in relation to the meaning of 'and', a further sense of our talk of categorial form, according to which

significative forms, forms which find possible fulfilment in founded types of act, are called categorical forms, or, more cautiously, categorical forms in a *loose* sense of the word.

This being premised, we now wish to bring to explicit clearness, for the sake of its importance, a proposition that we have already enunciated and which is really obvious in the light of our whole exposition. This is the proposition that categorical functions, in 'forming' sensible objects, leave their real essence untouched. The object is intellectually grasped by the intelligence, and especially by 'knowledge' (itself a categorical function), but it is not thereby falsified. To clarify this, let us remember the difference mentioned in passing between categorical unities in the objective sense, and real unities such as the unity of the parts of a thing, or of trees in an avenue etc. The unity of the real elements in a mental experience, or the unity of all experiences which coexist in a single individual consciousness, likewise count among such real unities. All such unities, treated as wholes, resemble their parts in being objects in the straightforward, primary sense: they can be intuited in possible straightforward intuitions. They are not merely categorially unified, constituted through a being-considered-together, through collection, disjunction, relation etc. They are intrinsically unified: they have a form of union, perceivable in the whole as a real property, a real moment of unity, and perceivable in the same sense in which any of their connected members and *their* intrinsic properties are perceivable.

It is quite different in the case of categorical forms. The new objects they create are not objects in the primary, original sense. Categorical forms do not glue, tie or put parts together, so that a real, sensuously perceivable whole emerges. They do not form in the sense in which the potter forms. Otherwise the original datum of sense-perception would be modified in its own objectivity: relational and connective thought and knowledge would not be of what is, but would be a falsifying transformation into something else. Categorical forms leave primary objects untouched: they can do nothing to them, cannot change them in their own being, since the result would otherwise be a new object in the primary, real sense. Evidently the outcome of a categorical act, e.g. one of collection or relation, consists in an objective 'view' (*Fassung*) of what is primarily intuited, a 'view' that can only be given in such a founded act, so that the thought of a straightforward percept of the founded object, or of its presentation through some other straightforward intuition, is a piece of nonsense.

§62 Our freedom in the categorical forming of given material and its limits. Purely categorical laws (laws of 'authentic' thinking)

Real, sensuous forms of unity, whether external or internal, are determined by a law governing the essential nature of the parts to be connected; if the

individuation of these parts is taken in its full extent, they are absolutely determined. All unity points to governing legality, as real unity points to *real* governing legality. What is really one, must also really be made one. Where we speak of *our freedom to unite* or *not to unite*, we are not speaking of contents in their full reality, which includes their spatio-temporal properties. While in this field the consciousness, and especially the direct intuition, of real contents, is *eo ipso* the consciousness of their real connections and forms, the position is quite different in regard to categorical forms. With real contents none of the categorical forms which fit them is necessarily given: there is abundant freedom to connect and relate, to generalize and subsume etc. There are many arbitrary ways to divide up a sensuously unified group into part-groups: we may at will arrange these diversely divisible part-groups, and effect same-level connections among them, we can also build collections of the second, third . . . order upon one another. Many possibilities of categorical shaping therefore arise on the foundation of the same sensuous stuff. Just so, we can compare any item from one and the same sense-complex with any other of its members, or distinguish it from them. We can make either of them the subject-term, or, by arbitrary conversion, the object-term of some relation in question. We can put these relations into relation with one another, connect them collectively, classify them etc.

Great, however, as this *freedom of categorical union and formation* may be, it still has its *low-governed limits*. The very fact that categorical forms constitute themselves in founded characters of acts, and in these alone, involves a certain necessity of connection. For how else could we speak of categorical *perception* and *intuition*, if any conceivable matter could be put into any conceivable form, and the underlying straightforward intuitions therefore permitted themselves to be arbitrarily combined with categorical characters? Where, e.g., we carry out a whole-part relationship intuitively, we can normally convert it, but not in such a manner that the part, with unchanged real content, can be looked on as the whole, and the whole as the part. It is also not open to us to treat this relation as one of total identity or of total exclusion etc. We can no doubt 'think' any relation between any set of terms, and any form whatever on the basis of any matter – think them, that is, in the sense of merely meaning them. But we cannot really carry out 'foundings' on every foundation: we cannot *see* sensuous stuff in any categorical form we like, let alone *perceive* it thus, and above all not *perceive it adequately*.

In framing our widened concept of perception, we found, *eo ipso*, a certain *tied character* in it. This does not mean that the character of perception is really (*really*) bound up with sensuous content. This is never the case, unperceived. Certainly, however, nothing exists that cannot be perceived. This means that the actual performance of actual acts on the ground of just these straightforward intuitions is in the ideal sense *possible*. And these

possibilities, like ideal possibilities in general, are limited by law to the extent that certain impossibilities, ideal incompatibilities, are by law ranged alongside of them.

The ideal laws governing the connection of such possibilities and impossibilities, belong among *categorical forms in specie*, i.e. among categories in the objective sense of the word. They determine *what variations in any given categorical forms there can be in relation to the same definite, but arbitrarily chosen, matter*. They circumscribe the ideally closed manifold of the rearrangements and transformations of categorical forms on the basis of constant, selfsame matter. This matter is here only relevant in so far as it must be kept intentionally identical. But, to the extent that the species of this matter are quite freely variable, and are only subject to the obvious ideal condition of a capacity to sustain the forementioned forms, the laws in question are of an entirely pure and *analytic* character, and *quite independent of the particularity of their matter*. Their general expression, therefore, contains no reference to material species, but makes exclusive use of algebraical symbols as bearers of indeterminately general presentations of certain matters, variable in all but the identity they must keep with themselves.

To gain insight into these laws, does not therefore require an actual carrying out of a categorical intuition, which makes its matters truly intuitive: any categorical intuition suffices, which puts the *possibility* of the *categorical formation* in question before one's eyes. In the generalizing abstraction of this comprehensive possibility the unitary, intuitive 'insight' into the law is achieved: this insight has, in the sense used in our doctrine, the character of an *adequate general percept*. The general object, which is itself present in it, is the categorical law. We may assert: *The ideal conditions of categorical intuition in general are, correlatively regarded, the conditions of the possibility of the objects of categorical intuition, and of the possibility of categorical objects simpliciter*. That an object thus and thus categorially formed is possible, is essentially related to the fact that a categorical intuition – a mere imagination – can set such an object completely before one's eyes, to the fact, in other words, that *the requisite categorical syntheses and other categorical acts can be really performed on the basis of the founding intuitions concerned* (even if the latter are imaginary).

What categorical formations are in fact permitted by given materials of perception or imagination, what categorical acts can be really carried out on the basis of their constitutive sensuous intuitions: on this point our *analytic* laws, which are here our ideal conditions, say nothing. That boundaries of arbitrariness does not here obtain, that 'actual' performativity has not been shown by the character of empirical actuality, but of ideal possibility, is shown by our above examples. These also make plain that it is the particularity of the matter which, from case to case, circumscribes possibility, so that we can, e.g., say that *W* is really a whole as regards *w*, or that *g* is really a property of *G* etc. In such cases, of course, the categorical form (unlike its

real counterpart) is not limited to the kinds of content covered by *W*, *w*, *G*, *g*, so as to have no bearing on contents of other kinds. Contrariwise it is evident that *contents of all kinds can be formed by all categories*. For categorical forms are not founded on material contents, as we have already explained above (cf. §57). These pure laws can therefore not prescribe what forms a given matter can assume, but can only tell us that, when it, and any matter in general, assumes a certain form, or is capable of assuming it, a definitely limited circle of further forms remains open to the same matter. There is, i.e., an *ideally closed circle of possible transformation of a functioning form, into ever new forms*. The ideal possibility of these new forms in relation to the same matter, has its *a priori* guarantee in the before mentioned analytic laws which embody the presuppositions in question.

These are the pure laws of *authentic thinking*, the laws, that is, of *categorical intuitions in virtue of their purely categorical forms*. For categorical intuitions function in the thought of theory as actual or possible fulfillments (or frustrations) of meanings, and impart to statements (according to their mode of functioning) the logical values of truth and falsehood. On the laws here considered the normative regulation of purely signitive, or admixedly signitive, thought depends.

To expound this matter more precisely, and to clear up the special sense implied in talk of the laws of *authentic* thinking, we must take a closer look into the sphere of meanings and of meaning-fulfillments.

§63 The new laws of the validity of signitive and admixedly signitive acts (laws of inauthentic thinking)

In our discussions up to this point we have thought of categorical acts as free from all significative side-structures, as carried out, but not as founding acts of knowing or naming. Every unprejudiced analyst will concede that we can, e.g., intuit aggregates, or many primitive states of affairs, without expressing them nominally or propositionally. We now oppose the case of mere signification to the case of mere intuition: we note that to all acts of categorical intuition, with their categorially formed objects, purely significative acts may correspond. This is an obvious *a priori* possibility. There is no act-form relevant here, to which there is not a corresponding possible form of meaning, and each meaning can be thought of as carried out without a language which can give unambiguous expression to all possible matters and all possible categorical forms. To its words certain significative intentions unambiguously pertain, which can come alive even in the absence of 'corresponding', i.e. of fulfilling, intuition. There is therefore, running parallel to all possible primary and founded intuitions, a system of primary and founded meanings which could possibly express them.

The realm of meaning is, however, much wider than that of intuition, i.e. than the total realm of possible fulfilment. For, on the meaning-side, an endless host of complex meanings arises, which lack 'reality' or 'possibility'. They are patterns of meanings assembled together into unitary meanings, to which, however, no possible unitary correlate of fulfilment can correspond.

For this reason there is *no complete parallelism between categorical types*, i.e. types of categorical intuition, and *types of meaning*. To each categorical type of lower or higher level a meaning-type corresponds, but to every type formed by free significative welding to complex types, there is not a corresponding type of categorical objectivity. We recall types of analytic contradiction such as 'an *A* which is not an *A*', 'All *A*'s are *B*'s and some *A*'s are not *B*'s' etc. Only in connection with primitive types can and must such parallelism obtain, since all primitive meanings 'originate' in the fullness of correlated intuition, or, to put the matter more plainly, since talk of compatibility and incompatibility applies only in the sphere of what is put together, or is to be put together, simple meanings, as expressions of what is simple, can never be 'imaginary'. This applies also to every simple *form* of meaning. While 'Something that is at once *A* and not-*A*' is impossible, 'an *A* and a *B*' is possible, since the and-form, being simple, has a 'real' sense.

If we transfer the term 'categorical' to the realm of meaning, a peculiar significative form (and a peculiar meaning-form *in specie*) will correspond to each *authentic* categorical form, whether to one authentic in the objective sense, or to the corresponding categorical form of intuition (in which what is categorially objective is *perceptually* or *imaginatively* constituted). In this form of signification we achieve significative reference to a collection or a disjunction, an identity or a non-identity etc. Whenever one opposes presentation in the *authentic*, to presentation in an *inauthentic* sense, one normally has the intuitive-significative antithesis in mind (though occasionally, no doubt, one is thinking of the other antithesis of adequate-inadequate). Our present cases would accordingly be cases of collection, disjunction, identification, abstraction etc., *in an inauthentic sense*.

If one includes under the rubric of 'acts of thinking', all the categorical acts through which judgements, as predicative significations, gain fullness and their whole value for knowledge, we must distinguish between *authentic acts of thinking* and *inauthentic* ones. The inauthentic acts of thinking would be the significant intentions behind statements and, by a natural extension, all the significative acts which could possibly function as parts of such predicative intentions: all significative acts can plainly function in this fashion. The *authentic acts of thinking* would lie in the corresponding fulfilments, i.e. the intuitions of states of affairs, and all intuitions which function as possible parts of such intuitions. All intuitions can function in this manner: there is in particular, no categorical form that could not be a constituent of the form of a state of affairs. The *general doctrine of the form of symbolic judgements* (the meanings of statements) includes that of the forms of meaning in general

(the pure logico-grammatical forms). Just so the *general doctrine of the pure forms of the intuitions of states of affairs* (and of the pure forms of states of affairs) includes that of the *categorical forms of intuitions* (and of objective categorical forms) in general.

If, as often happens, *thinking* is identified with *judging*, we should have to distinguish between *authentic* and *inauthentic judging*. The concept of judging would then be pinned down by the element common to statement-intention and statement-fulfilment, i.e. by the intentional essence compounded of quality and intentional material. As acts of thinking in the widest sense, not only acts of judging, but also all possible part-acts in judgements, would have to count: we should be brought back to a definition equivalent to our previous definition of the concept Act of Thinking.

In the sphere of inauthentic thinking, of pure signification, we are beyond all bounds of categorical laws. Here anything and everything can be brought together in unity. We spoke of this in our Fourth Investigation: we pointed to the *purely logico-grammatical laws* which, as laws of complication and modification, distinguish the spheres of sense and nonsense. In inauthentic categorical formation and transformation, we are free as long as our meanings are not nonsensically conglomerated. But if we wish to avoid formal and real nonsense, the widest sphere of inauthentic thought, of the significantly combinable, is very much narrowed. We are now concerned with the *objective* possibility of complex meanings, with the possibility of their application to an intuition which fulfils them totally and singly. *The pure laws of the validity of meanings, of the ideal possibility of their adequate intuitive illustration*, obviously runs parallel to the pure laws governing the combination and transformation of *authentic* categorical forms.

In the pure laws of the validity of meanings, we are again not dealing with laws from which the validity of any given meaning can be read off, but with the possibilities, determined in purely categorical fashion, of the combination and transformation of meanings, that can be undertaken, *salva veritate*, in each possible given case, i.e. without prejudicing the possibility of a fulfilment of meaning, to the extent that this previously existed. If, e.g., the statement '*w* is a part of *W*' is valid, then a statement of the form '*W* is a whole relatively to *w*' is also valid. If it is true that there is an *A* which is *B*, then it is also true that a certain *A* is *B*, or that not all *A*'s are not *B*'s etc. In such propositions, what is material is boundlessly variable: hence all material meanings are replaced by algebraical signs of indirect and wholly unfixd significance. For this reason such propositions are characterized as *analytic*. In this situation, it is again irrelevant whether the matter is constituted in percepts or in imaginations. The possibilities and impossibilities concern the setting up of acts giving adequate intuitive illustration to the form of a meaning whatever its material substratum: we are concerned, in short, with the *pure conditions of the possibility of completely adequate signification in general*, which, in their turn, depend on the *pure conditions of the possibility*

of *categorical intuition in general*. These laws of the validity of meanings are not, of course, themselves identical with the authentic categorical laws, but they follow the latter faithfully, in virtue of the law which regulates the connection of significant intentions with fulfillments of meaning.

The whole treatment that we have just completed requires a natural, obvious extension. We have simplified the matter to the extent of confining our discussion to two extremes only: we opposed completely intuitive, i.e. actually executed categorical act-forms, on the one hand, to purely *signitive*, i.e. not authentically executed act-forms, on the other, forms only to be realized in processes of possible fulfillment. The ordinary cases are, however, mixtures: thought proceeds intuitively in many stretches, in many stretches *signitively*, here a categorical synthesis, a predication, a generalization is really carried out, there a merely *signitive* intention directed to such a categorical synthesis attaches to the intuitively, or to the only verbally presented members. The complex acts arising in this manner have, taken as a whole, the character of inauthentic categorical intuitions: their total objective correlate is not actually, only inauthentically, presented. Its 'possibility', i.e. the objective possibility of its correlate, is not guaranteed. The sphere of inauthentic thinking must accordingly be made wide enough for it to take in these mixed act-forms also. Everything we have said then holds, *mutatis mutandis*, for such an extension. Instead of talking of the laws of the validity of mere meanings, merely symbolic judgements etc., we shall also have to speak of the laws of the validity of *signitively* admitted presentations or judgements. Where there is talk of merely symbolic thinking, it is generally these mixed cases that one has in mind.

§64 The pure logico-grammatical laws are laws for any understanding whatever, and not merely for any human understanding. Their psychological meaning and normative function in relation to inadequate thought

Both sorts of laws are, of course, of an *ideal* nature. That a piece of sensory stuff can only be apprehended in certain forms, and bound together according to certain forms, that the possible transformation of these forms is subject to pure laws, in which the material element varies freely, that the meanings to be expressed are likewise limited to certain forms, which they can change only in prescribed manners, if they are not to lose their true expressibility – all this does not depend on the empirical contingencies of the course of consciousness, not even on the contingencies of our intellectual or common-human organization. It depends on the *specific nature of the acts in question*, on their intentional and epistemic essence; it belongs not to the nature of just our (individual or common-human) sensibility, nor just our understanding, but rather to the *Ideas of Sensibility and Understanding in*

general. An understanding governed by other than the purely logical laws would be an understanding without understanding. If we define understanding, as opposed to sensibility, as the capacity for categorical acts, also, perhaps, as a capacity for expression and meaning directed upon such acts, and made 'right' by them, then the general laws rooted in the specific nature of these acts belong to the definitory essence of understanding. Other beings may gaze upon other 'worlds', they may also be endowed with 'faculties' other than ours, but, if they are minded creatures at all, possessing some sort of intentional experiences, with the relevant differences between perception and imagination, straightforward and categorical intuition, meaning and intuition, adequate and inadequate knowledge – then such creatures have both sensibility and understanding, and are 'subject' to the pertinent laws.

The laws of authentic thinking naturally, therefore, belong *also* to the nature of human consciousness, to our common human 'psychic organization'. But they are not characteristic of this organization in respect of its *peculiar* character. The laws are rooted, we said, in the purely specific character of certain acts: this means that they concern these acts not just in so far as they occur together in a human organization. They pertain rather to all possible organizations which can be made up of acts of this sort. The differentiating peculiarities of each type of mental organization, all that distinguishes, e.g., the *human* consciousness as such, in the manner of a natural historical species, is not at all affected by such *pure* laws as are the laws of thought.

A relation to 'our' mental organization, or to 'consciousness in general' (understood as the aspects of consciousness *common to men in general*), does not define the pure and genuine, but a grossly distorted *a priori*. The notion of a common mental organization, like that of a physical organization, clearly has a merely 'empirical' meaning, the meaning of a mere 'matter of fact'. But pure laws are precisely pure of matter of fact, they tell us not what is generally wont to be in this or that province of the real, but what absolutely goes beyond all wont and all divisions into spheres of reality, and that for the reason that what is in question belongs to the *essential* make-up of what is. The *true logical a priori*, therefore concerns all that pertains to the ideal essence of understanding as such, to the essence of its act-species and act-forms, to that, accordingly, which cannot be eliminated, as long as the understanding, and the acts definitory of it, are what they are, i.e. thus and thus natured, maintaining their selfsame conceptual essence.

The extent, accordingly, to which the logical laws and, in the first instance, the ideal laws of authentic thinking, also claim a *psychological* happening, and the extent to which they govern the course of actual mental happenings, is at once clear. Each genuine 'pure' law, expressing a compatibility or an incompatibility grounded in the nature of a given species, will, in relation to species of mentally realizable contents, limit the empirical possibilities of psychological (phenomenological) coexistence and succession. What is seen to be incompatible *in specie*, cannot be brought together, be

rendered compatible, in empirical instances. In so far as the logical thought of experience is, to an incomparably major extent, conducted inadequately and significantly, we can think, believe, many things which in *truth*, in the manner of authentic thought, the actual carrying out of merely intended syntheses, cannot be brought together at all. Just for this reason *the a priori laws of authentic thinking and authentic expression become norms for merely opinion-forming, inauthentic thought and expression*. Put somewhat differently: on the laws of authentic thinking other laws are founded, formulable too as practical norms, which express in a manner suited to the sphere of signitive or admixedly signitive presentation, the ideal conditions of a possible truth (or *rightness* in general), the ideal conditions, that is, of 'logical' compatibility (logical, since related to possible adequation) within this sphere of admixedly signitive thinking. The laws of inauthentic thinking do not hold *psychologically* like empirical laws governing the origin and change of such thought, but as the possibilities or impossibilities of adequation founded in their ideal purity in the variously formed acts of inauthentic thinking in relation to corresponding acts of authentic thinking.

§65 The senseless problem of the real meaning of the logical

We now also completely understand why the notion of a course of the world violating the laws of logic – the analytic laws of authentic thinking and the consequent norms of inauthentic thinking – or of the need or possibility of first grounding these laws in experience, the 'matter of fact' of sense, and fixing for them their limits of validity – is a piece of pure nonsense. We ignore the fact that even a probabilistic grounding on facts is a grounding which, as such, obeys ideal principles, principles which by anticipation we see to rest upon 'authentic' experiences of probability, both as regards their specific content and their status as laws. Here we must rather stress that the so-to-say facticity of a fact belongs to sensibility, and that to call in sensibility to help provide a basis for purely categorical laws – laws whose very meaning excludes all sensibility and facticity, which make pure assertions of essence about categorical *forms*, as forms of possible correctness and truth as such – represents a most obvious $\mu\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\beta\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$ εἰς ἄλλο γένος. Laws which refer to no fact cannot be confirmed or refuted by a fact. The problem, earnestly and profoundly treated by great philosophers, as to the 'real' or formal meaning of the logical, is therefore a nonsensical problem. *One requires no metaphysical or other theories to explain the agreement of the course of nature and the 'native' regularities of the understanding*. Instead of an explanation, one needs only a phenomenological clarification of meaning: thinking and knowing, and of the ideas and laws which spring from these. The world constitutes itself as a sensuous unity: its very meaning is to be the unity of actual and possible straightforward percepts. Its true being

however, precludes its being adequately given, or given without qualification, in any closed process of perception. It is for us always a quite inadequately meant unity for theoretical research, in part intended through straightforward and categorical intuition, in part through signification. The further our knowledge progresses, the better and more richly will the idea of the world be determined, the more, too, will inconsistencies be excluded from it. To doubt whether the world really is as it appears to us to be, or as it is thought of in contemporary theoretical science, and as it counts for the well-grounded belief of the latter, has a good sense, since inductive science can never construct an adequate world-picture, however far it may carry us. But it is also nonsensical to doubt whether the true course of the world, the true structure of the world in itself, could conflict with the forms of thinking. For this would mean that a definite, hypothetically assumed sensibility, which would bring the world to adequate representation in an ideally complete set of unending perceptual processes, would be capable of assuming categorical forms, while forcing syntheses upon them that are generically ruled out by the universal nature of such forms. That they are thus ruled out, and that the laws of the categories hold as pure laws in abstraction from all sensuous stuff, and are accordingly unaffected by limitless variation of such stuff, this we do not merely think, but we see it to be true. It is given to us in fullest adequacy. This insight is of course achieved subjectively on the basis of any casual empirical intuition, but it is a generic insight relating purely to form. The basis of abstraction contains in this case, as in others, nothing presupposed by the ideal possibility and validity of the Idea abstracted from it.

It would further be possible to demonstrate *ad nauseam* the absurdity involved in considering the *possibility* of an illogical course of the world in signitive thought, thereby making this possibility *hold*, and destroying in one breath, so to say, the laws which make this or any other possibility hold at all. We could also point out that a correlation with perceptibility, intuitability, meaningfulness and knowability, is inseparable from the sense of being in general, and that the ideal laws, therefore, which pertain to these possibilities *in specie*, can never be set aside by the contingent content of what itself happens to be at the moment. But enough of such argumentations, which merely ring the changes on one and the same position, and have already given us guidance in the *Prolegomena*.

§66 Distinction between the most important differences mixed up in the current opposition of 'intuiting' and 'thinking'

The above investigations should have imported a satisfactory, general clearness into the much used, but little clarified, relation between *thinking* and *intuiting*. We here list the following oppositions, whose confusion has vexed

epistemological research so inordinately, and whose distinctness has become quite clear to ourselves.

1. The opposition between *intuition* and *signification*. Intuition as perception or imagination – it is irrelevant whether categorical or sensuous, adequate or inadequate – is opposed to *mere thinking*, as *merely significative reference*. Our parenthetically noted differences are, of course, generally ignored. We consider them very important, and now specially stress them.

2. The opposition between *sensuous* and *categorical intuition*. We therefore oppose *sensuous intuition* in the ordinary, straightforward sense, to *categorical intuition*, or intuition in the extended sense. The founded acts, characteristic of the latter, now count as the thought which 'intellectualizes' sensuous intuition.

3. The opposition between *inadequate* and *adequate* intuition, or, more generally, between adequate and inadequate presentation (since we are classing intuitive and significative presentation together). In an inadequate representation we merely *think* that something is so (appears so), in adequate presentation we look at the matter itself, and are *for the first time made acquainted with its full selfhood*.

4. The opposition between *individual intuition* (usually conceived, with what is plainly baseless narrowness, as sensuous intuition) and *universal intuition*. A new concept of intuition is fixed by means of this opposition. It is opposed to generalization, and so, further, to the categorical acts implying generalization, and also, in unclear admixture, to the significative counter-parts of such acts. 'Intuition', we now say, *merely presents the individual*, while 'thought' points to the *universal*, is carried out by way of 'concepts'. One generally speaks in this context of the opposition between 'intuition and concept'.

How strongly we tend to let these oppositions shade into one another would be shown by a criticism of Kant's theory of knowledge, which throughout bears the impress of the failure to draw any clear distinction among these oppositions. In Kant's thought categorical (logical) functions play a great role, but he fails to achieve our fundamental extension of the concepts of perception and intuition over the categorical realm, and this because he fails to appreciate the deep difference between intuition and signification, their possible separation and their usual commixture. And so he does not complete his analysis of the difference between the inadequate and adequate adaptation of meaning to intuition. He therefore also fails to distinguish between concepts, as the universal meanings of words, and concepts as species of *authentic* universal presentation, and between both, and concepts as universal objects, as the intentional correlates of universal presentations. Kant drops from the outset into the channel of a metaphysical epistemology in that he attempts a critical 'saving' of mathematics, natural science and metaphysics, before he has subjected knowledge as such, the whole sphere of acts in which pre-logical objectivation and logical thought are performed,

to a clarifying critique and analysis of essence, and before he has traced back the primitive logical concepts and laws to their phenomenological sources. It was ominous that Kant (to whom we nonetheless feel ourselves quite close) should have thought he had done justice to the domain of pure logic in the narrowest sense, by saying that it fell under the principle of contradiction. Not only did he never see how little the laws of logic are all analytic propositions in the sense laid down by his own definition, but he failed to see how little his dragging in of an evident principle for analytic propositions really helped to clear up the achievements of analytic thinking.

Additional note to the second edition

All the main obscurities of the Kantian critique of reason depend ultimately on the fact that Kant never made clear to himself the peculiar character of pure Ideation, the adequate survey of conceptual essences, and of the laws of universal validity rooted in those essences. He accordingly lacked the phenomenologically correct concept of the *a priori*. For this reason he could never rise to adopting the only possible aim of a strictly scientific critique of reason: the investigation of the pure, essential laws which govern acts as *intentional* experiences, in all their modes of sense-giving objectivation, and their fulfilling constitution of 'true being'. Only a perspicuous knowledge of these laws of essence could provide us with an absolutely adequate answer to all the questions regarding our understanding, questions which can be meaningfully raised in regard to the 'possibility of knowledge'.

Third Section

Clarification of our introductory problem

Non-objectifying acts as apparent fulfillments of meaning

§67 That not every act of meaning includes an act of knowing

Having gone far enough in our investigation of the relation between meaning and corresponding intuition in regard to much more general problems, and having thus done enough to lay bare the essence of authentic and inauthentic expression, we have reached clearness on the difficult issues which troubled us at the beginning of this Investigation, and which first prompted us to undertake it.

We have, above all, rid ourselves of the temptation to conceive of the meaning-function of expressions as in some sense a case of knowing, and in fact a case of classification, a temptation which springs from a line of thought touched on above (§1), and which always crops up in important epistemological contexts. One says: An expression must surely give expression to some act of the speaker, but in order that this act should find its appropriate speech-form, it must be suitably apperceived and known, a presentation as a presentation, an attribution as an attribution, a negation as a negation etc.

Our reply is that talk of knowledge refers to a relationship between acts of thought and fulfilling intuitions. Acts of thought are not, however, brought to expression in statements and parts of statements, e.g. names, in such a manner that they in their turn are thought of and known. Otherwise these last acts would be the carriers of meaning, it would be *they* primarily that were expressed, they would accordingly be in need of other new acts of thought, and so on *in infinitum*. If I call this intuited object a 'watch', I complete, in naming it, an act of thought and knowledge, but I know the watch, and not my knowledge. This is naturally so in the case of all acts that confer meaning. Should I utter the word 'or' in a context of expressive speech, I carry out a disjunction, but my thought (of which the disjoining is a part) is not trained upon the disjoining but upon the (objective) *disjunctivum*, in so far as this last enters into the unitary state of affairs. This *disjunctivum* is known and objectively denominated. The word 'or' is accordingly no name, and likewise no non-independent appellation of disjoining; it merely gives

voice to this act. Naturally this applies also to complete judgements. If I assert something, I think of *things*, that things stand in this or that manner: this is what I express, and perhaps also know. But I do not think and know my act of judging, as if I were also making it into my object, and were classifying it as a judgement and naming it through this form of expression.

But does not the grammatical adaptation of expression to expressed act point to an act of knowing in which such adaptation is performed? In a certain manner or in certain cases it does, in all those cases, that is, where the sense of 'expression' dealt with by us at the beginning of the present investigation is relevant. This is not the case where we are dealing with expression as a mere 'voice-giving', in which case all meaning-conferring counts as expressed by our words (as verbal noises), and again not where 'expression' means the same as 'meaning', and what is expressed is one and the same meaning. In the two latter senses, every statement, whether merely significative or intuitively fulfilled, expresses something: it expresses the judgement (our conviction), or that 'judgement's content' (the selfsame propositional meaning). But in the former sense only the intuitively fulfilled statement (or the statement which is *to be* intuitively fulfilled) expresses something, in which case not the verbal noise, but the already sense-enlivened locution represents the 'expression' of the corresponding intuition. It is the function that lends meaning to our words which is primarily and universally responsible for the unitary interweaving of the significative intentions attaching to those words. The latter merely make up a significative judgement, in which they lack all fulfilling intuition: the synthesis of agreement or disagreement, which our total significative intention expresses (or claims to express) is here not authentically carried out, only significantly meant. But if, contrariwise, the indicated synthesis is authentically carried out, the authentic synthesis will coincide with the non-authentic one (the synthesis in signification). Both are one and the same intentional essence, representing one and the same meaning, the simple, selfsame judgement, whether carried out intuitively or merely significantly. Similar things plainly hold for cases where only some of our verbalized intentions enjoy intuitive 'fulness'. The significative acts involve the same meaning as the intuitive, though without the latter's fullness; they merely 'express' this meaning. The suggestions of this word are the more fitting, since significative acts likewise preserve the sense of an intuition after the latter has disappeared, like an empty shell without the intuitive kernel. The unity of coincidence is, in the case of the intuitive judgement, a true unity of knowledge (if not a unity of relational cognition): we know, however, that, in the unity of knowledge, it is not the fulfilling act (here the authentic synthesis of judgement) that we know, but the *fact* which is its objective correlate. In intuiting things we carry out a judging synthesis, *an intuitive thus it is or thus it is not*. Because our expressive intention, with its associated word-sounds (the grammatical expression) applies itself to this act of fact-enviagement, we achieve knowledge of the intuited fact in question.

§68 The controversy regarding the interpretation of the peculiar grammatical forms which express non-objectifying acts

We now turn to a final discussion of the seemingly trivial, but, correctly regarded, most important and difficult point at issue (see above, §1 ff.) whether the familiar grammatical forms used in our speech for wishes, questions, voluntary intentions – acts, generally speaking, we do not class as 'objectifying' – are to be regarded as *judgements* concerning our acts, or whether these acts themselves, and not merely such as are 'objectifying', can function as 'expressed', whether in a sense-giving or sense-fulfilling fashion. We are dealing with sentences like 'Is π a transcendental number?' 'May heaven help us!' etc.

The teasing character of the question is shown by the fact that pre-eminent logicians since Aristotle have been unable to agree on its answer. Statements express the fact that something is, or that something is not, they assert, they judge about something. In their case alone can one talk of true and false. A wish or a question asserts nothing. We cannot object to one who utters them: 'What you say is untrue'. He would not even understand our objection.

Bolzano thought this argument invalid. He said: 'A question like "What is the relation of the diameter of a circle to its circumference?" asserts nothing about what it enquires into, but it asserts something nonetheless: our desire, in fact, to be informed concerning the object asked about. It is indeed capable of truth and falsehood, and is false when our desire is mis-stated by it' (Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre* I, §22, p. 88).

We may doubt, however, whether Bolzano has not here confused two things: the adequacy or inadequacy of an expression – here a word-sound – to our thought, and the truth or falsehood which relates it to the content of that thought, and its adequacy to the thing. Regarding the adequacy of an expression (as word-sound) to our thought, we can speak in two senses, one which relates to *unsuitability* – as when a speaker chooses to express the thoughts which fill his mind in words whose customary meaning conflicts with the latter – and one relating to *untruthfulness*, i.e. to deliberately deceptive, lying speech – as when the speaker does not wish to express the thoughts actually filling his mind, but others at variance with these, and merely imagined by him: he wishes to express these thoughts *as if* they were filling his mind. A suitable, sincerely employed expression can still state both what is true and what is false, according as *through its sense* it expresses what is or is not, or, what is the same, according as its sense can be adequately fulfilled or frustrated by a possible adequate percept.

One might now counter Bolzano as follows. One can talk of sincerity and insincerity, of suitability and unsuitability, in the case of *every* expression, but one can only talk of truth and falsehood in the case of statements. A speaker can, accordingly, be objected to in different ways. 'What you say is

false': this is the *factual objection*. And 'You are not speaking sincerely' or 'You are expressing yourself unsuitably': this is the objection of *insincerity* or *inadequacy* of speech. Objections of the latter sort are the only ones that can be made to a questioner. He is perhaps pretending, or is using his words incorrectly, and saying something different from what he intends to say. But one can raise no factual objection to him, since he is making no factual claim. If one treats the objection concerned with unsuitability of expression as showing that a question expresses a judgement, one, i.e., that would be completely expressed in the form 'I am asking whether . . .', one would have in consistency to treat each expression in the same manner, and so to treat the true sense of each statement whatever as being what we adequately express in the word-form 'I am asserting that . . .'. But the same would have to hold of these restatements, which would accordingly land us in an infinite regress. In all this it is easily seen that this abundance of ever new statements is no mere abundance of words, but yields new statements by no means equivalent to the original ones, let alone identical in meaning. Does such nonsensical consistency not compel us to acknowledge an essential difference between one order of sentence-forms and another? (How this difference really must be interpreted is explained in our next section: cf. the final paragraph.)

Here two positions can be taken up. Either one can say: The question of sincerity affects every utterance: a judgement accordingly pertains to each utterance as such, a judgement relating to the experience of the speaker which is to be intimated. A man who speaks, intimates something, and to this the intimating judgement corresponds. But what is intimated or expressed differs from case to case: the interrogative sentence intimates a question, the imperative sentence a command, the indicative sentence a judgement. Each indicative sentence therefore implies a double judgement, a judgement, namely, about this or that fact, and a second judgement, passed by the speaker as such, upon this first judgement as his own experience.

This appears to be Sigwart's position. We read (*Logik*, I, 2nd Edn., 17f. Note):

The imperative undoubtedly includes an assertion, to the effect, namely, that the speaker wills the action he is demanding, the optative that he wishes what he utters. This assertion is involved in the *fact of speech*, not in the content of what he utters; every statement of the form *A is B* accordingly involves the assertion, based on the mere fact of speech, that the thinker thinks and believes what he says. *These assertions regarding the subjective state of the speaker, involved in the fact that he speaks, and valid on the assumption of his sincerity, accompany all speech in the same fashion*, and can accordingly not serve as a basis for differentiating our various sentence-forms.

Another way of conceiving the matter would be to reject the 'intimating judgement', and to regard the consequent duplication of judgement in the

case of indicative sentences as a contingent complication, only exceptionally present, and first brought into the picture, moreover, by descriptive reflection. Against this one might hold that, in each case of adequate, not contextually elliptical speech what was expressed was essentially one, in the interrogative sentence a question, in the optative sentence a wish, in the indicative sentence a judgement. Before I had completed these Investigations, I myself thought this position unavoidable, hard as it was to reconcile with the phenomenological facts. I thought myself compelled by the following arguments, that I now accompany with suitable criticism.

§69 Arguments for and against the Aristotelian conception

According to the doctrine which is opposed to that of Aristotle, a man who, e.g., utters a question will be communicating to another his wish to be informed regarding the state of affairs in question. This communication regarding the speaker's actual experience is, it is held, a statement like any communication. In the form of the question itself there is no express saying that one is asking whether . . .; this form only marks off the question as a question. Our speech, therefore, is a case of contextual ellipticity. The circumstances of utterance make it obvious that it is the speaker himself who asks the question. The complete meaning of the sentence does not, accordingly lie in what its mere word-sounds suggest, but is determined by the occasion, the context, the relation to the person speaking at the moment.

In favour of the Aristotelian conception, many replies could now be given.

(a) The argument ought to apply equally to indicative sentences, so that we have to interpret the sentence 'S is P' as a contextual ellipsis for the new expression 'I judge that S is P', and so on *in infinitum*.

(b) The argument is based on the view that the expressed sense of the interrogative sentence differs from its real sense. For, undeniably, in the interrogative or wish-sentence, the relation of the wish to the wisher does not need to be brought out, as little as, in the case of the indicative sentence, the relation of the judgement to the judging person. If this relation is not part of the explicit sense of the sentence, but only of its contextually variable part, this concession gives one all that one could want. The explicit meaning can be altered in certain circumstances, but there will surely also be circumstances where it will be just what we mean. In such cases the mere question (and similarly the mere request or command etc.) will receive wholly adequate expression.

(c) More careful comparison with the indicative sentences of ordinary speech favours the Aristotelian conception. In verbal communication such a sentence intimates that one is judging, and it is the grammatical form of the indicative sentence which brings out the judgement as such. On the utterance of such grammatically framed speech, the effect forthwith attends, that

the person addressed takes the speaker to be judging. This effect cannot, however, constitute the meaning of the expression, which surely means the same in soliloquy as in communicative speech. The meaning lies rather in the act of judging as the identical judgement-content.

The same could be the case in regard to interrogative sentences. The meaning of an interrogative sentence is unchanged whether we deal with an internal question or an overt one. The relation of speaker to person addressed belongs here, as in the case compared, to the merely communicative function. And just as in that case the 'content of judgement', i.e. a certain specific character of judgement, determined in this or that manner as regards content, constituted the meaning of the indicative sentence, so here the content of the question constitutes the meaning of the interrogative sentence. In both cases the ordinary meaning can undergo circumstantial modifications. We may utter an indicative sentence with the primary intention, not of communicating the relevant state of affairs, but the fact that we have the conviction in question, and mean to put it forward. This intention, buttressed, perhaps, by non-grammatical aids (stress, gesture), may be understood. Here what underlies our words is a judgement relating to our explicit judgement. Just so, in the case of an interrogative or wish-sentence, our primary intention may lie, not in our mere wish, but in the fact that we wish to express the wish to a hearer. Naturally this interpretation could not hold in all cases. It could not hold, e.g., where a burning wish bursts spontaneously from the heart. The expression then is intimately one with the wish, it clings to it immediately and directly.

Criticism. Regarded more closely, this argument only proves that a thought relating to the communicative function cannot be part of the sense of every sentence. The opposing argument is refuted: it rests on the false assumption that all expression is communicative, and that communication is always a judgement regarding the internal (intimated) experiences of the speaker. But its thesis is unrefuted, at least when suitably modified. For we cannot exclude the possibility that the controversial wish-, request-, and command-sentences etc., are still judgements about the relevant experienced acts of wishing, asking and willing, and that it is only as being so, that they can give these experiences adequate expression. If there is no place for judgements here in the narrower sense of predications – Aristotle certainly had this conception of the controversial sentences – perhaps there is place for them in a wider sense of assertive objectifications in general.

1. As regards (a) we note, further, that the case of statements is not the same as, e.g., that of questions. If we transform the sentence 'S is P' into the sentence 'I judge that S is P', or into any related sentence, which expresses a relation to the judging person, however indefinitely, we obtain not merely altered meanings, but such as are not equivalent to the original ones: for the straightforward sentence may be true, the subjectivized sentence false, and conversely. The situation is wholly different in the case compared. Even if

one refuses to speak of true and false in this case, one can surely always find a statement that 'in essence says the same' as the original question or wish-form, e.g. 'Is S P?' = 'I should like to know . . .' or 'One would like to know whether S is P' etc. May such sentence-forms not imply a relation to the speaker, even if only indefinitely and subsidiarily? Does the preservation of 'essential meaning' in the transformed indicative forms not point to the fact that the meaning-giving acts are at least of the same general sort as judgements? These considerations also deal with (b): not the mere experience of wishing or willing, but the inner intuition of these experiences (and the signification adapted to this intuition) will be relevant to our meaning. This conception is, however, affected by the following argument:

2. There is another way in which one might try to interpret the expressed forms in question as judgements. If we utter a wish, even in soliloquy, we put it, and the wished-for content, into words, we accordingly have a presentation of it, and of what constitutes it. The wish is, however, not *any* merely presented wish, but the living wish that we have just taken note of. And it is this wish, and this wish as such, that we want to intimate. It is not, accordingly, our mere presentation, but our inner percept, i.e. really a judgement, that achieves expression. It is not, indeed, a judgement of the same sort as our ordinary assertions, that predicate something of something. In the expression of a wish, it is only our concern to grasp the internally noted experience conceptually (significantly) in straightforward affirmation, and to express its simple existence. It is not our concern to make a relational predication about such an experience, connecting it with the experiencing subject.

Against this conception it may be objected that the situation is exactly the same for expressed judgements as for all other expressed experiences. If we state something, we judge, and our words cover not only the presentation underlying our judgement, but also our judgement itself (i.e. in the form of an assertion). We should, therefore, also conclude here that the judgement is internally perceived, and that the meaning of our statement lies in the straightforwardly affirmative judgement about what we perceive, i.e. about our judgement. If no one finds such a conception acceptable in the case of a statement, it cannot be seriously entertained in the case of other independent sentences. We recall what was said in our last section. The expressions which fit themselves to the expressed experiences, are not related to them in the way that names are, nor in any analogous manner. Our experiences are not first *objectively* presented, and then brought under concepts, as if, together with each new word, a subsumption or predication had taken place. A person who judges gold to be yellow, does not judge that the presentation which accompanies his use of the word 'gold' is yellow: he does not judge that the manner of judging he carries out when he utters the word 'is' falls under the concept 'is' etc. The word 'is' does not in fact symbolize judgement, but the being which is found in a state of affairs. 'Gold', likewise,

does not name a presentative experience: it names a metal. Expressions name experiences only when such experiences have been made objects of presentation or judgement in reflection. The same holds for all words, even syncategorematic ones, in their relation to what is objective: they mean this in their fashion even when they do not name it.

Expressions are not therefore associated as names with the acts which fill our minds at each moment, acts in which we live without judging about them reflectively: such expressions belong rather to the concrete being of the acts themselves. To judge expressly is to judge, to wish expressly is to wish. To name a judgement or wish is not to judge or wish, but merely to name. A judgement named need never be judged by the man who names it, a wish named never wished by him. And, even when this is not so, the naming expresses no judgement or no wish, but a presentation related to one or the other.

Criticism. This objection also exposes the weakness of our at first attractive preliminary argument. It is clear from it, as from our previous discussions, that not every expression (*qua* the expression it is) presupposes a judgement or other act, which makes the intimated experience its object. This again does not dispose of the thesis: we have not shown, just in the case of the sentence-forms under discussion, that they are not judgements about momentary wishing, questioning or requesting experiences, or that they do not express their straightforward existence in the speaker. True, to name a wish is not *therefore* to wish, but is experiencing a wish and naming it in the same breath, not *also* a case of wishing? So that, even if expressed wishing is necessarily a wishing which involves naming and stating, the proposition still holds, that expressed wishing is wishing and not mere naming.

3. The controversial expressions have the form of sentences, and at times the form of categorical sentences with subjects and predicates. From this it follows that they can also be treated as having predication in their content, and not merely as predications in relation to one, same, unmentioned subject 'I'. E.g. 'May God protect the Kaiser', 'The coachman should harness the horses'. A 'may' or a 'should' is uttered: the subject in question is apprehended as standing under a requisition or an obligation.

One could here rejoin: Where a 'should' counts as an objective predicate and is actually attributed as such, the should-sentence has not merely the force of a wish or a command, or not this alone. An objective obligation can be said to hold, though the man stating it need experience no act of the kind which constitutes an actual consciousness of obligation. If I know that someone's will is bound by a relationship of service or by custom or morality, I can judge that he should and must do something. But this expresses no living wish, desire or obligation. Statements of obligation may indeed serve in appropriate contexts to express acts of this sort, e.g. 'John must harness the horses!' But it is clear that here no mere objective obligation is expressed, but my own will, and this not in my words, but rather in my tone

and in the circumstances. In such circumstances the predicative form doubtless does duty for an imperative or optative form, i.e. the thought-predication implied by the words is either not carried out at all, or is merely subsidiary. It is undeniable, lastly, that the predicative interpretation only is plausible in certain cases, and not in the case in question. B. Erdmann, who otherwise leans towards it, does not favour it in this case. (See B. Erdmann, *Logic*, I¹, §45, pp. 271 ff.)

Criticism. It may be questioned whether this refutation suffices. That a should-predicate has an objective sense and value cannot be doubted. But that, where this is not true, nothing is predicated or at least judged, is by no means proved. One might maintain: When we issue a command to someone, e.g. a command to the coachman John to harness the horses, he counts for us as someone subordinate to our will: he is apprehended as such by us and accordingly addressed in this form of expression. We say: 'John, harness the horses!' That he is one who should harness horses is here predicated of him, naturally in the expectation of corresponding practical results, and not merely to attest that he counts as such for me. The expression of the command is relative. We can think of no one commanded, without at the same time thinking, definitely or indefinitely, of someone who commands him. This being wholly obvious requires no explicit expression. Instead of the cumbrous form 'I command etc.', we employ the brief imperative, whose form points to a communicative relation. The speech-forms 'should' and 'must' were not originally used by a commander in face of the commanded to express his actual voluntary intent, but only when a more objective expression of his own or someone else's voluntary intent was needed, e.g. when there was a third person relaying someone else's command or when a legislating will found expression in a law. When communication between commander and commanded lapses, the imperative, which fits the conscious situation of the former, loses application. This conception can be applied generally. One can say: In the optative, what we wish is presented as wished, and stated to be such. Just so, in a requesting form, what we request is presented as requested, in a question what we ask presented as asked etc. These acts are related in our presentation to their intentional objects, and are so themselves made objective as reflexive predicates attaching to the latter.

In the communicative situation, many others of the expressions in question have, like commands, the role of telling the hearer (like essentially occasional expressions) that the speaker is performing certain intimated acts (of request, congratulation, condolence etc.) with an intentional regard to his auditor. To the extent that expressions of all sorts may in full consciousness be informed by the wish to communicate with others, and to acquaint others with one's own convictions, doubts, hopes etc., they are perhaps all accompanied by reflex acts directed upon such inner experiences and, more precisely, by acts which intuitively relate the latter to the speaker and to the

person addressed. This accordingly holds of communicative statements as well. These acts of reflection and reference do not on that account form part of the meaning of a statement and of all other expressions, but this may very well be said of expressions of our controversial class, in virtue of which they are in all cases directed to inner experiences of the speaker.

In solitary mental life – if we disregard exceptional cases of talking to oneself, asking oneself questions, desiring or commanding oneself – relation to an auditor falls away, and the subjective expressions in question, which are still applicable, express the simple being of inner experiences in more or less definite relation to the subject. In a monologue a question is either of the form 'I ask myself whether . . .', or relation to the subject vanishes entirely: the interrogative expression becomes a mere name, or not really even that. For the normal use of a name is in a context of predicative or attributive relation, of which there is here no question. Since the expression becomes one with the intuited inner experience as a knowing of the latter, an interweaving of factors arises having the character of a self-enclosed phenomenon. To the extent that, in such interweaving, we live principally in an interrogative act, with which our expression merely fits in, and to which it gives articulate voice, the whole interweaving is called a question. Knowledge is not here a theoretical function – this is the case only in predication, while here nothing is predicated. The question is known and expressed, without being 'subjectivized', in the sense of being made either the subject or the object of predicative acts. Plainly this directly expressive sense of the interrogative sentence helps to constitute the predicative interrogation – I ask myself whether etc. – or the meaning which corresponds to such altered circumstances.

§70 Decision

If by a 'judgement' one means a predicative act, then our discussions have shown that our disputed sentences *do not invariably express judgements*. Even in these cases, however, an unbridgeable gulf separates us from the logicians who side with Aristotle. On their view, names, statements, optative sentences, interrogations, commands etc., are *coordinated* expressive forms, and coordinated in the following manner: names express presentations, statements express judgements, optative sentences express wishes etc. Presentations, judgements, questions etc., in short, acts of all sorts, can serve to confer meaning in exactly the same fashion, for to 'express acts' means the same in all cases, i.e. to have one's meaning in such acts. We, on the other hand, see a *fundamental difference* between names and statements, on the one hand, and the expressions of our controversial group, on the other. The acts of presentation or judging expressed by names or statements may confer or fulfil meaning, but are not therefore meant; they do not become objects of naming and predication, but are *constitutive of such objects*. On

the other hand we find, in flat contrast, that the acts 'expressed' by our controversial expressions, though seeming to confer meanings, are made into *objects*. This may happen, as we saw, through inner intuition reflectively directed upon such acts, and generally also through relational acts based on such intuitions. It may also happen by way of certain acts of signification, perhaps only partially uttered, which attach as cognitions to these inner intuitions and acts of relating, thereby making their objects, the acts, namely, of asking, wishing, commanding etc., into objects named and otherwise talked of, and perhaps into components of predicated states of affairs. In these acts of objectification lie the true meanings of our controversial expressions. We are not in their case concerned with acts which confer meaning in some fundamentally new manner, but only with contingent specifications of the one, unique class of meaning-intentions. And, just so, the acts which fulfil meaning do not fall into different classes, but belong to the one, unique class of intuitions. It is not the wishes, commands etc., *themselves* that are expressed by these grammatical patterns and their significations; it is rather the intuitions of these acts that serve as fulfillments. When we compare indicative with optative sentences, we must not coordinate judgements with wishes, but *states of affairs* with wishes.

What results accordingly is the fact that:

The ostensible expressions of non-objectifying acts are really contingent specifications of statements and other expressions of objectifying acts which have an immense practical and communicative importance.

The contentious issue here dealt with is of fundamental importance, since on its solution depends, on the one hand, whether we accept a doctrine which makes all meaning, whether in intention or fulfillment, of a single kind – the genus of objectifying acts, with their fundamental division into the significative and the intuitive – or whether, on the other hand, we decide to permit acts of all sorts to confer or fulfil meaning. The issue is, of course, not less important because it is the first to call our attention to the fundamental triplicity of the ambiguity of talk about 'expressed acts', on whose analysis our present Investigation first embarked (cf. §2 above). There it was said that we may mean by 'expressed acts':

1. The *significative acts* which give expressions meaning, and which have, in their significative fashion, a certain objectivity of reference.
 2. The *intuitive acts*, which frequently fulfil the significant intent of an expression, and so represent the significantly meant objects intuitively, and in a parallel intuitive 'sense'.
 3. The acts which are the *objects* of signification, and likewise of intuition, in all cases where an expression (in sense 2) expresses the speaker's *own experiences of the moment*. If these are not objectifying acts, their nature will not permit them to function under the rubrics 1 and 2.
- The root of all our difficulties lies in the fact that, in the direct application of expressions (or acts to be expressed) to intuitively grasped inner experiences,

our significative acts are completely fulfilled by the inner intuition which attaches to them, so that both are most intimately blended, while these same intuitions, being internal, exhaust themselves in the straightforward presentation of the acts that they mean.

Finally we must observe that the distinction made above as against Bolzano – between cases where only the *subjective* objection can be raised – the objection to the expression's sincerity or adequacy – and cases where the *factual objection* can be raised – the objection related to objective truth and falsity – that this distinction has, on a closer survey, no true connection with our controversial question. For it has a quite general concern with the difference between expressions relating to intuitively envisaged act-experiences, and experiences not so relating. In the first class there are many quite uncontroversial predications, e.g. all statements of the form 'I ask whether ...', 'I command, wish that ...' etc. And, be it noted, there can be no factual objections to subjective judgements thus formulated: they are true or false, but *truth here coincides with sincerity*. In the case of other statements which aim at what is 'objective' (i.e. not at the self-expressing subject and his experiences) the factual question concerns our meaning. The question of sincerity depends on the possibility of seeming assertions, from which the genuine, normal act of meaning is absent. Really there is no judgement; the meaning of a statement is presented in the context of an intent to deceive.

Appendix

External and internal perception: physical and psychical phenomena

The concepts of *external perception* and *perception of self*, of *sensuous* and *internal perception*, have for the naïve man the following content. *External perception* is the perception of external things, their qualities and relationships, their changes and interactions. *Perception of self* is the perception that each can have of his own ego and its properties, its states and activities. Asked who this perceived ego may be, the naïve man would reply by pointing to his bodily appearance, or would recount his past and present experiences. To the further question whether all this is included in his percept of self, he would naturally reply that, just as the perceived external thing has many properties, and has had many in the course of its changes, which are not for the moment 'open to perception', so a corresponding fact holds for his perceived ego. In the changing acts of *self-perception* appear, on occasion, such and such presentations, feelings, wishes and bodily activities of the ego, just as the exterior or the interior of a house, or such and such sides and parts of it, enter from time to time into *outer* perception. Naturally, however, the ego remains the perceived object in the one case, as the house is in the other.

For the naïve man our second pair of notions, that of *sensuous* and *internal* perception, does not altogether coincide with the pair just discussed, that of outward perception and perception of self. We perceive sensuously what we perceive by the eye and the ear, by smell and taste, in brief, through the organs of sense. In this field everyone locates, not only external things, but his own body and bodily activities, such as walking, eating, seeing, hearing etc. What we call 'inner perception', on the other hand, concerns mainly such 'spiritual' experiences as thinking, feeling and willing, but also everything that we locate, like these, in the interior of our bodies, do not connect with our outward organs.

In philosophical diction, both pairs of terms – we usually prefer the pair of 'internal and external perception' – express only one pair of concepts. After Descartes had sharply separated *mens* and *corpus*, Locke, using the

terms 'sensation' and 'reflection', introduced the two corresponding classes of perception into modern philosophy. This division has remained in force till today. External perception was regarded, following Locke, as our perception of bodies, while inner perception was the perception that our 'spirits' or 'souls' have of their own activities (their *cogitationes* in the Cartesian sense). A *division of perceptions is accordingly mediated by a division among the objects of perception*, though a difference in *origin* is likewise set beside it. In one case perception arises from the effects of physical things operating through the senses on our spirits, in the other case out of a reflection on the activities carried out by the mind on the basis of 'ideas' won through sensation.

2

In quite recent times men have been much concerned to achieve an adequate overhaul and a deepening of Locke's obviously vague and rough positions.

General epistemological interests were, on the one hand, responsible for this move. We recall the traditional estimate of the relative value for knowledge of the two forms of perception: *external perception is deceptive, inner perception evident*. In this evidence lies one of the basic pillars of knowledge, which scepticism cannot shake. Inner perception is also the only case of perception where the object truly corresponds to the act of perception, is, in fact, immanent in it. It is also, to speak pointedly, the one type of perception that deserves the name. In the interest of perceptual theory, we must therefore enter more exactly into the essence of inner, as opposed to outer perception.

Psychological interests were, on the other hand, involved. Men were concerned with the much-debated *fixing of the domain of empirical psychology* and, particularly, with establishing for it its own justification as against the natural sciences, by marking out for it a peculiar territory of phenomena. Even the prime place in epistemology readily accorded to psychology as basic philosophical discipline, required that its objects be defined with as few epistemological commitments as possible; it should not, therefore, concern itself with transcendent realities of so controversial a type as soul and body as if they were obvious data. Locke's classification of perceptions had just such a presupposition: it was therefore at once unsuited, and not in fact designed, to serve as a basis for a definition of psychology, and to do justice to the interests mentioned. It is clear, further, that if a distinction of perceptions is set up on the basis of an anticipated distinction between bodily and spiritual matters, then the former distinction cannot be used as a basis of distinction between the science of bodily and the science of spiritual phenomena. The matter would be different if one could succeed in finding *purely descriptive marks* for a division of percepts, marks which left out suppositions, would serve to demarcate the corresponding bodily phenomena from psychic phenomena.

A possible path seemed here to be opened by the Cartesian approach through doubt, with its emphasis on the epistemological position of inner perception. We have already touched on this above. The line of thought, which develops here, runs as follows:

However widely I may extend my critical doubts regarding knowledge, I cannot doubt that I exist and am doubting, or again, while I experience them, that I am having presentations, am judging, feeling or however else I may designate such inwardly perceived appearances: to doubt in such a case would evidently be irrational. We accordingly have absolute 'evidence' regarding the existence of the objects of inner perception, we have that clearest cognition, that unassailable certainty which distinguishes knowledge in the strictest sense. It is quite different in the case of outer perception. It lacks 'evidence', and the frequent conflicts in statements relying upon it point, in fact, to its capacity to deceive. We have therefore no right to assume from the outset that the objects of outer perception really and truly exist as they seem to us to be. We have, in fact, many reasons to think that they do not really exist at all, but can at best lay claim to a phenomenal or 'intentional' existence. If one makes the reality of a perceived object part of the notion of perception, then outer perception is not, in this strict sense, perception at all. This *evident character* will in any case give us a *descriptive mark*, free from presuppositions regarding metaphysical realities, which will enable us to sort out our various classes of perceptions. It is a character given with, or absent from, the perceptual experience itself, and this alone determines our division.

If we now consider the *phenomena* presented by these various classes of perceptions, they unmistakably constitute *essentially distinct classes*. This is not to assert that the objects in themselves, i.e. the souls and bodies, that we rightly or wrongly range under them, differ essentially: a purely *descriptive treatment* that avoids all transcendence establishes an unbridgeable gulf between these phenomena. On the one side we have the *sensory qualities*, which in themselves form a descriptively closed class, whether there are such things as senses and sense-organs or not. They form a Kind in the strict Aristotelian sense of the word. To these are added features necessarily attaching, either to sense-qualities in general, or to single ranges of such qualities (again strict Aristotelian species), or, conversely, features themselves necessarily presupposing qualities, and only able to achieve concrete being in association with them. Here well-known propositions come up for treatment, e.g. no intuited spatiality without quality. Many would say that the converse obtained also: No quality without something spatial. Others would here only approve particular cases: No colour, no tactile quality without something spatial. Further propositions of the same class would be: No tone-quality without intensity, no timbre without tone-qualities etc.¹

On the other side we have phenomena such as having presentations, judgments, surmises, wishes, hopes etc. We here enter, as it were, another world.

These phenomena have relation to what is sensible, but are not themselves to be compared with the latter: they do not belong to one and the same (genuine) kind. When we have first clearly seen the descriptive unity of this class through examples, one finds, with a little attention, a positive mark which characterizes them all: the mark of 'intentional inexistence'.

One can of course use the above descriptive distinction of inner and outer perception to arrive at just such a distinction of the two classes of phenomena. It becomes now a good definition to say: Psychic phenomena are the phenomena of inner perception, physical phenomena those of outer perception.²

In this manner a closer treatment of the two sorts of perceptions leads, not merely to a descriptive, epistemologically important characterization of these perceptions themselves, but also to a fundamental, descriptive division of phenomena into two classes, the physical and the psychical. And we seem to have achieved, for psychological and scientific purposes, a metaphysically uncommitted definition, not oriented towards supposed data in some transcendent world, but to what is truly given phenomenally.

Physical phenomena are no longer defined as the phenomena which arise out of the operation of bodies on our minds through our sense-organs, psychic phenomena as the phenomena discovered by us in perceiving the activities of our minds. In both cases the descriptive character of the phenomena, as experienced by us, alone furnishes our criterion. Psychology can now be defined as the science of psychic phenomena, as natural science is of physical phenomena.

These definitions require certain limitations in order to correspond truly to our actual sciences, limitations which point to explanatory metaphysical hypotheses, whereas the phenomena, as descriptively differentiated, remain the true starting-points of our treatments, and the objects to be explained.

The definition of natural science is particularly in need of limiting conditions, for it is not concerned with all physical phenomena, not with the phenomena of imagination, but only with those which come before sense-perception. And, even in their case, it only sets up laws to the extent that these depend on the physical stimulation of the sense-organs. One might express the scientific task of natural science, by saying that natural science is the science which seeks to explain the sequence of the physical phenomena of normal, pure sensations – sensations uninfluenced by peculiar psychological conditions and events – by assuming the action on our sense-organs of a world extended in three space-like dimensions, and taking place in one time-like dimension. Without settling the absolute character of this world, it is satisfied to attribute to it powers provocative of our sensations and influencing each other in their operation, and to set up laws of coexistence and succession for such powers. In stating these, it indirectly states the laws of sequence of the physical phenomena of our sensations, laws conceived in their purity, in scientific abstraction from

concomitant mental conditions, as things taking place for an invariant sensibility. The expression 'science of physical phenomena' must be interpreted in this rather complicated way, if it is to be equated with the meaning of 'natural science'.

(Brentano, *Psychologie*, I, pp. 127–128)

In regard to the conceptual demarcation of psychology, it might appear that the concept of the psychic phenomenon should be widened rather than narrowed, since the physical phenomena of imagination fall as entirely in its field of reference as do psychic phenomena in the previously defined sense, and since even the physical phenomena appearing in sensation cannot be disregarded in the doctrine of sensation. But it is plain that such physical phenomena only enter into descriptions of the peculiarities of psychic phenomena as the content of the latter. The same holds of all psychic phenomena which exist only phenomenally. The true subject-matter of psychology can be regarded as consisting solely of psychic phenomena in the sense of actual states. It is exclusively in regard to the latter that we call psychology the science of psychic phenomena.

(ibid. pp. 129 f.)

3

The interesting line of thought that I have just expounded represents, as my longer quotations have made plain, the standpoint of Brentano,³ and also that of a whole succession of thinkers who are theoretically close to him. There are further respects, as is well known, in which 'inner perception' plays an important role in Brentano's psychology. I am here only concerned with his doctrine of inner consciousness. Every psychic phenomenon is not merely a consciousness, but itself the *content* of a consciousness; we are conscious of it in the narrower sense of perceiving it. The flux of inner experience is therefore also a continuous flux of inner percepts, which are most intimately united with the psychic experiences in question. For inner perception is no second, independent act supervening upon a relevant psychic phenomenon; the latter rather involves, in addition to its relation to a primary object, e.g. an externally perceived content, 'itself in all its completeness as presented and known' (ibid. p. 182). In so far as the act directly intends its primary object, it is also subsidiarily directed upon itself. In this way one avoids the endless complication seemingly threatened by the consciousness which accompanies all psychic phenomena (since their multiple division into three 'ground-classes' itself involves an inner perception). The 'evidence' and infallibility of inner perception will also be rendered possible in this manner (ibid. II, ch. 3, pp. 182 ff.). Brentano is here, in one of his main views, i.e. in his interpretation of consciousness as a continuous stream

of internal perception, in harmony with the great thinkers of the past. Even Locke, a true student of experience, defines consciousness as the perception of what goes on in a man's own mind.⁴

Brentano's theories have aroused much opposition. This has not only been directed to the doctrines of inner perception just mentioned, whose subtly constructed complexity still certainly requires a phenomenological foundation, but also against his distinction between perceptions and phenomena and, in particular, against the laying down of the tasks of psychology and natural science which is based upon this.⁵ The relevant questions have repeatedly been made the theme of serious discussion in the past decade, and it is sad that, despite its fundamental importance for psychology and epistemology, agreement has not been reached.

Criticism, it would appear, has not penetrated far enough, to hit upon the decisive points, and to separate what is indubitably significant in Brentano's thought-motivation from what is erroneous in its elaboration. This is due to the fact that the fundamental psychological and epistemological questions which cause controversy in these dimensions of enquiry, have not been sufficiently clarified, a natural consequence of defective phenomenological analysis. On both sides the conception with which men operated remained ambiguous, on both sides there was a consequent falling into delusive confusions. This will be clear from the following criticism of the illuminating views of Brentano.

4

According to Brentano inner perception distinguishes itself from outer perception:

1. by its evidence and its incorrigibility, and
2. by essential differences in phenomena. In inner perception we experience exclusively psychic phenomena, in outer perception physical phenomena. This exact parallelism makes it possible for the first-named distinction to serve as a characteristic distinguishing mark of the perceivable phenomena as well.

As opposed to this, *inner and outer perception* seem to me, if the terms are *naturally interpreted*, to be of an entirely similar epistemological character. More explicitly: there is a well-justified distinction between *evident and non-evident*, or between infallible and fallible perception. But, if one understands by *outer perception* (as one naturally does, and as Brentano also does) the perception of physical things, properties, events etc., and classes all other perceptions as *inner perceptions*, then such a division will not coincide at all with the division previously given. For not every perception of the ego, nor every perception of a psychic state referred to the ego, is certainly evident, if by the 'ego' we mean what we all mean by it, and what we all think we perceive in perceiving ourselves, i.e. our own empirical personality. It is

clear, too, that most perceptions of psychic states cannot be evident, since these are perceived with a bodily location. That anxiety tightens my throat, that pain bores into my tooth, that grief gnaws at my heart: I perceive these things as I perceive that the wind shakes the trees, or that this box is square and brown in colour, etc. Here, indeed, outer perceptions go with inner perceptions, but this does not affect the fact that the psychic phenomena perceived are, *as they are perceived*, non-existent. Surely it is clear that *psychic phenomena*, also, can be perceived transcendently? Exactly regarded, all psychic phenomena seen in natural or empirical-scientific attitudes are perceived transcendently. The pure presentness of experience presupposes a purely phenomenological attitude which will inhibit all transcendent assertions.

I know what will here be objected: that we have forgotten the difference between *perception* and *apperception*. Inner perception means the directly-conscious living-through of mental acts, they are here taken as what they *are*, and not as what they are *apprehended* or *apperceived as*. One must, however, reflect that what is true for the case of inner perception must be true also for the case of outer perception. If the essence of perception does not lie in apperception, then all talk of perception in regard to external things, mountains, woods, houses etc., is misguided, and this, the normal sense of the word 'perception', surely illustrated in these cases above all others, must be abandoned. Outer perception is apperception, and the unity of the concept demands that inner perception should be so too. It is of the essence of perception that something should appear in it: *apperception*, however, *constitutes what we call appearance*, whether veridical or not, and whether it remains faithfully and adequately in the frame of the immediately given, or anticipates future perception in going beyond it. The *house* appears to me – in no other manner than that I apperceive actually experienced sense-contents in a certain fashion. I hear a *barrel organ* – the tones sensed are interpreted *as those of a barrel organ*. In the same way I apperceivingly perceive my own psychic phenomena, the blessedness quivering through 'me', the grief in my heart etc. They are called 'appearances', or rather apparent contents, being contents of apperception.

5

The term 'appearance' is, of course, beset with ambiguities, whose extreme dangers are seen precisely in this case. It will not be useless at this point to list these equivocations explicitly: we have already touched on them in passing in the text of these Investigations. Talk of 'appearance' has a preferred application to acts of intuitive presentation, to acts of *perception*, on the one hand, and to acts of *representation*, on the other, e.g. acts of remembering, imagining, or pictorially representing (in the ordinary sense), on a basis mixed with perception. 'Appearance' accordingly means:

1. The concrete intuitive experience (the intuitive presentness or representativeness of a given object for us): the concrete experience, e.g., when we perceive the lamp standing before us. Since the qualitative character of the act, whether the object is regarded as real or not, is irrelevant, it can also be ignored entirely, and 'appearance' then coincides with what we defined as 'representation' in the last Investigation (cf. VI, §26, p. 740).

2. The intuited (appearing) object, taken as it appears *here* and *now*, e.g. this lamp as it counts for some percept we have just performed.

3. In misleading fashion we also call the *real* (*veellen*) *constituents* of appearances in sense 1, i.e. those of the concrete acts of appearing or intuiting, 'appearances'. Such appearances are, above all, the presentative *sensations*, the experienced moments of colour, form etc., which we fail to distinguish from *apparent properties* of the (coloured, formed) *objects* corresponding to them, and apparent in the act which 'interprets' them. That it is important to distinguish between them, that it does not do to confuse a colour-sensation with an apparent bodily colouring, the sensation of form with bodily form etc., we have often stressed. Uncritical theories certainly ignore the distinction. But even those who would refuse to say with Schopenhauer that 'the world is my idea', are accustomed to speak as if apparent things were compounded out of sense-contents. One could certainly say that *apparent* things as such, the mere things of sense, are composed of a stuff analogous to that which as sensation is counted a content of consciousness. This does not affect the fact that the thing's apparent properties are not themselves sensations, but only appear as analogues of sensations. For they are not present, as sensations are, in consciousness, but are merely represented in it, as properties which *appear* in it, which are transcendently referred to. For this reason perceived external things, likewise, are not complexes of sensations: they are rather objects of appearances, objects appearing as complexes of properties, whose types stand in a peculiar *analogy* to types found among sensations. We could put what we have just said somewhat differently. Under the rubric of 'sensations', we range certain sorts of *experiences* of this or that actual kind belonging to a unity of consciousness. If it now happens that, in a unity of consciousness, real properties of analogous kinds appear as external to, and transcending such sensations, we may then call them after these sensational classes, but they are no longer sensations. We emphasize the word 'external', which must of course not be understood spatially. However we may decide the question of the existence or nonexistence of phenomenal external things, we cannot doubt that the reality of each such perceived thing cannot be understood as the reality of a perceived complex of sensations in a perceiving consciousness. For it is plain, and confirmable by phenomenological analysis in each instance, that the thing of perception, this so-called *sensational complex*, differs in every circumstance, both as a whole and in every

distinct moment of property, from the sensational complex actually lived through in the percept in question, whose objective apperception first constitutes the perceptual sense, and thereby the apparent thing, in intentional fashion.

It may indeed be said that the original concept of appearance was the one given in our second place above: the concept of what appears, or of what could appear, of the intuitive as such. Having regard to the fact that all sorts of experiences (including the experiences of outer intuition, whose objects are therefore called *outer* appearances) can be made objects of reflective, inner intuition, we call all experiences in an ego's experiential unity 'phenomena'. *Phenomenology* is accordingly the theory of experiences in general, inclusive of all matters, whether real (*veellen*) or intentional, given in experiences, and evidently discoverable in them. Pure phenomenology is accordingly the theory of the essences of 'pure phenomena', the phenomena of a 'pure consciousness' or of a 'pure ego': it does not build on the ground, given by transcendent apperception, of physical and animal, and so of psycho-physical nature, it makes no empirical assertions, it propounds no judgements which relate to objects transcending consciousness: it establishes no truths concerning natural realities, whether physical or psychic – no psychological truths, therefore, in the historical sense – and borrows no such truths as assumed premises. It rather takes all apperceptions and judgemental assertions which point beyond what is given in adequate, purely immanent intuition, which point beyond the pure stream of consciousness, and treats them purely as the experiences they are in themselves: it subjects them to a purely immanent, purely descriptive examination into essence. This examination of essence is also pure in a second sense, in the sense of Ideation; it is an *a priori* examination in the true sense. So understood, all the Investigations of the present work have been purely phenomenological, in so far, that is, as they did not have ontological themes, and did not, as in the Third and Sixth Investigation, seek to make *a priori* assertions regarding the *objects* of possible consciousness. They did not speak of psychological facts and laws in an 'objective' nature, only of pure possibilities and necessities, which belong to any form of the pure 'cogito': they spoke of these as regards their real (*veellen*) and their intentional contents, or as regards their *a priori* possibilities of connection with other such patterns in an ideally possible conscious context.

As the term 'appearance' is ambiguous, so also, and consequently, is the term 'perception', and so are all further terms used in connection with perception. These ambiguities fill theories of perception with confused errors. The 'perceived' is, e.g., what appears in perception, i.e. its object (the house) and, further, the sense-content experienced in it, i.e. the sum of the presenting contents, which in their interconnection are 'interpreted' as the house, and singly 'interpreted' as its properties.

5d

Excerpt from the First Edition which was replaced by the first two paragraphs of the third note in the preceding §5 in Edition II.

3. If we are only clear that we have to draw a distinction in our intuition between sensations as lived experiences, which are accordingly components of the subject, and phenomenal determinations, as components of the intentional object, and that both only coincide in the ideal case of adequate intuition (which does not come into question for us), then we readily see that our invoven sensations cannot themselves count as appearances, whether in the sense of acts or of apparent objects. Not in the former, since under the rubric of sensations we sum up certain non-acts, which perhaps receive an objectifying interpretation in acts; not in the latter, since acts would have to be part of the phenomenal objectivity of sensations, acts which would have to direct their intention to them. Such acts are indeed possible, but that they are part of the stock-in-trade of every percept, and this in relation to the percept's presentative sensations, cannot be shown to be necessary either by descriptive analysis or on genetic grounds. All this goes without saying for imaginative intuitions as well, in relation to their imaginatively representative contents.

If one has once got to the point of regarding all components of appearances in sense I as themselves appearances, then it is a further, almost unconscious step to regard everything psychic, all lived experiences in the experiential unity of the ego, as phenomena.

6

How misleading such ambiguities show themselves to be appears in Brentano's theory, with its division into inner and outer perception according to evidential character and separate phenomenal class. We are told that:

Outer perception is not evident, and is even delusive. This is undoubtedly the case if we mean by the 'physical phenomena' what such perception perceives, physical things, their properties and changes etc. But when Brentano exchanges this authentic, and alone permissible sense of the word 'perceive', for an improper sense which relates, not to external objects, but to presenting contents, contents, i.e., present as real parts (*reell angehörigen*) in perception, and when he consequently gives the name of 'physical phenomena', not merely to outer objects, but also to these contents, these latter seem infected with the fallibility of outer perception. I believe that stricter divisions are necessary here. If an external object (a house) is perceived, presenting sensations are experienced in *this* perception, but they are not perceived. When we are deluded regarding the existence of the house, we are not deluded regarding the existence of our experienced sense-contents.

since we do not pass judgement on them at all, do not perceive them in this perception. If we afterwards take note of these contents – our ability to do this is, within certain limits, undeniable – and if we abstract from all that we recently or usually meant by way of them, and take them simply as they are, then we certainly perceive them, but perceive no external object through them. This new perception has plainly the same claim to inerrancy and evidence as any 'inner' perception. To doubt what is immanent (in consciousness), and is meant precisely as it is, would be quite evidently irrational. I may doubt whether an outer object exists, and so whether a percept relating to such objects is correct, but I cannot doubt the now experienced sensuous content of my experience, whenever, that is, I reflect on the latter, and simply *intuit it as being what it is*. There are, therefore, evident percepts of 'physical' contents, as well as of 'psychical'.

If it were now objected that sensuous contents are invariably and necessarily interpreted objectively, that they are always bearers of outer intuitions, and can only be attended to as contents of such intuitions, the point need not be disputed: it would make no difference to the situation. The evidence of the existence of these contents would be as indisputable as before, and would also not be our evidence for 'psychic phenomena' in the sense of acts. The evidence for the being of the whole psychic phenomenon implies that for each of its parts, but the perception of the part is a new perception with a new evidence, which is by no means that of the whole phenomenon.

An analogous ambiguity to that which affects the notion of a physical phenomenon, will also be found, if our conception is consistent, in the case of the notion of the psychic phenomenon. This is not the case for Brentano. He understands by a psychic phenomenon only an actually present act-experience, and by an inner perception a perception which simply apprehends such an experience, just as it is there. Brentano ignores the fact that he has only done justice to one class of percepts of psychic phenomena under the name of 'inner perception', and that it is not possible to divide all percepts into the two groups of outer and inner. He also ignores the fact that the whole evidential prerogative accorded to his 'inner perception' hangs upon the fact that he has employed an essentially distorted concept of perception in the case of inner perception, and that it does not depend on the peculiarity of inwardly perceived 'phenomena'. Had he treated as genuine percepts of physical phenomena only such objective interpretations and apprehensions as survey their objects adequately, he could have attributed evidence to that perception of sense-experiences which was by him assigned to outer perception, and he could not have said of inner perception (in his sense) that it is 'really the only sort of perception in the true sense of the word' (*ibid.* p. 119).

It is absolutely clear that the conceptual pairs of inner and outer, and of evident and non-evident perception, need not coincide at all. The first pair is determined by the concepts of physical and psychical, however these may

be demarcated; the second expresses the epistemologically fundamental anti-thesis studied in our Sixth Investigation, the opposition between *adequate* perception (or intuition in the narrowest sense, whose perceptual intention is exclusively directed to a content truly present to it) and the merely supposing, *inadequate* perception, whose intention does not find fulfilment in present content, but rather goes through this to constitute the lively, but always one-sided and presumptive, presentedness of what is transcendent. In the first case the experienced *content* is also the *object* of perception, in the second, content and object fall asunder. The content represents what it does not itself have, what is, however, made manifest in it, and what is, in a certain sense, its analogue (if we confine ourselves to what is immediately intuited), as body-colour is an analogue of sense-colour.

In this separation we have the essence of the *epistemological* difference that men look for between inner and outer perception. It is the operative factor in the Cartesian treatment of doubt. I can doubt the truth of an inadequate, merely projective perception: the intended, or, if one likes, intentional, object is not immanent in the act of appearing. The intention is there, but the object itself, that is destined finally to fulfil it, is not one with it. How could its existence be evident to me? But I cannot doubt an adequate, purely immanent perception, since there are no residual intentions in it that must yet achieve fulfilment. The whole intention, or the intention in all its aspects, is fulfilled. Or, as we also expressed it: the object is not in our percept merely believed to exist, but is also itself truly given, and as what it is believed to be. It is of the essence of adequate perception that the intuited object itself really and truly dwells in it, which is merely another way of saying that *only the perception of one's own actual experiences is indubitable and evident*. Not every such percept is evident. In the percept of toothache, e.g., a real experience is perceived, and yet our perception often deceives: the pain appears to bore a sound tooth. The possibility of our error is plain. The perceived object is not the pain as experienced, but the pain in a transcendent reference as connected with the tooth. Adequate perception involves, however, that in it the perceived is experienced *as* it is perceived (as the perception thinks or conceives it). In this sense we obviously only have an adequate percept of our own experiences, and of these only to the extent that we apprehend them purely, without going apperceptively beyond them.

7

It might now be objected: An experience is surely the same as a psychic phenomenon. What, then, is the dispute all about? I answer: If one means by 'psychic phenomena' the real (*reellen*) constituents of our consciousness, the experiences themselves that are there, and if one further means by *inner* percepts, or percepts of psychic phenomena, adequate percepts, whose

intention finds immanent fulfilment in the experiences in question, then the scope of *inner perception* will of course coincide with that of *adequate* perception. It is important, however, to note:

1. That psychic phenomena in this sense are not the same as psychic phenomena in Brentano's sense, nor as Descartes's *cogitationes*, nor as Locke's *acts or operations of mind*, since in the sphere of experiences as such all sense-contents, all sensations, also belong.

2. That the *non-inner* perceptions (the remainder class) will not then coincide with *outer perceptions* in the ordinary sense of the word, but with the much wider class of *transcendent, inadequate* perceptions. If a sense-content, or sense-complex or sequence of sense-contents is apprehended as a thing out there, as a multitude, an articulated connection of several things, or as a change in things, an external happening etc., we have an outer percept in the ordinary sense. But a non-sensuous content can also belong to the representative stuff of a transcendent percept, particularly in association with sense-contents. Our perceived object can then as readily be an *external* object with perceived *mental* properties (this happens in differing fashion in the apprehension of one's own and other men's bodily being as 'persons') or, as in psycho-physical apperception, an *inner* object, a subjective experience, perceived with *physical* properties attaching to it.

3. When in psychology, as the objective science of animal mentality, we mean by perceptions of psychic phenomena the perceptions that a man has of his own experiences, which the perceiver apprehends as belonging to himself, this particular person, all inner perceptions are no less cases of transcendent apperception than are outer perceptions. Among these there are some which (with some abstraction) count as *adequate*, in so far as they seize the man's own (relevant) experiences in their very selves. But in so far as even such 'adequate' inner perceptions apperceive the experiences they apprehend as those of a perceiver, psycho-physical, personal ego, and so as belonging to the presented objective world, they are in this respect infected with an essential inadequacy. There are, further, cases of inner perception, as there are cases of outer perception, where the perceived object, in the sense given to it in our percept, has no existence. *The distinction, fundamental even for psychology, between adequate and inadequate perception – psychological adequateness being understood as the abstraction we mentioned – intersects the distinction between inner and outer perception, and therefore pervades the sphere of the former.*

8

The ambiguities of the word 'phenomenon' allow us first to call apparent objects and their properties 'phenomena', then to apply the term to the experiences which constitute their act of appearing (particularly to the experienced contents in the sense of sensations) and, lastly, to all experiences

whatever. These ambiguities explain why we tend to confuse *two essentially different types of psychological division of 'phenomena'*.

1. Divisions of experiences, e.g. the division of experiences into *acts* and *non-acts*. Such divisions naturally fall into the sphere of psychology, which accordingly has to deal with all experiences, which it of course apprehends in transcendent fashion as experiences of animal beings in nature.

2. The division of *phenomenal objects* into, e.g., such as seem to belong to the consciousness of an ego and such as *do not seem to do so*, i.e. the division into psychical and physical objects (contents, properties, relations etc.).

In Brentano these two divisions are confused. He simply opposes physical to psychical phenomena, and defines them unmistakably as a division of *experiences* into acts and non-acts. But he at once mixes up, under the rubric of physical phenomena the contents of sense,⁶ and apparent external objects (or their phenomenal properties), so that the division now becomes a division of *phenomenal* objects into physical and psychical (in an ordinary or near-ordinary sense), in which the latter division furnishes the names.

Closely connected with this confusion is the erroneous criterion, also used by Brentano, to divide the two classes of phenomena: that physical phenomena only exist 'phenomenally and intentionally, while psychical phenomena also 'have an *actual* existence as well as an intentional one'.⁷ If we understand by 'physical phenomena' phenomenal things, it is at least sure that they do not need to exist. The forms of productive fancy, most of the objects of artistic representation in paintings, statues, poems etc., hallucinatory and illusory objects, exist only in a phenomenal and intentional manner, i.e. they do not exist in the *authentic* sense at all: only the relevant *acts of appearing* exist with their real (*reellen*) and intentional contents. The matter is quite different in the case of physical phenomena interpreted as sensed contents. The sensed (experienced) colour-contents, shape-contents etc., which we enjoy when we look at Böcklin's picture of the Elysian Fields, and which, informed by an imaginative act-character, are made into the consciousness of the pictured objects, are real (*reelle*) constituents of this experience. And they do not exist in merely phenomenal, intentional fashion (as apparent, merely intended contents) but in actuality. One must not forget, of course, that 'actual' does not here mean the same as 'external to consciousness', but the same as 'not merely putative'.

Notes

Investigation III: On the theory of wholes and parts

Introduction

- 1 As regards these 'formal objective categories' and the formal ontological truths of essence pertaining to them, see the statements of the last chapter of the *Prolegomena*. (I §§67 f.).

1 The difference between independent and non-independent objects

- 1 The two Husserlian terms, *real* and *reell*, here occur in the same sentence, the former connoting what is actually there in the space-time world, and not abstract or ideal, the latter what is actually immanent in an experience, and not merely 'meant' by it. [Translator's note]

- 2 In the present discussion, there is no danger of confusion between 'presented content', in the sense of any presented object (in the psychological sphere: any psychological datum), and 'presented content' in the sense of 'what the presentation signifies'.

- 3 *Principles*, Introduction, §10.

- 4 Almost exactly as formulated by C. Stumpf in *Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung* (1873), p. 109.

- 5 Stumpf previously used the expression 'partial content', but now prefers to speak of an 'attributive moment'.

- 6 In the following expositions I employed my essay, 'On Abstract and Concrete Contents', (Number I of the 'Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic', *Philos. Monatshefte*, 1894, Vol. xxx).

- 7 Loc. cit. p. 112.

- 8 Loc. cit. p. 113.

- 9 Cf. Ehrenfels, 'Über Gestaltqualitäten', *Vierteljahrsschrift für wiss. Philosophie* (1890); my *Philosophie der Arithmetik* (1891), particularly the whole of ch. XI, Meinong, 'Beiträge zur Theorie der psychischen Analyse', *Zeitschrift f. Psychologie u. Physiologie d. Sinnesorgane*, VI (1893).

- 10 Cf. the words italicized by us.

- 11 The ontological transformation of the notion of self-evidence into one of pure essential lawfulness – a transformation which starts at this point and which decisively influences the content of the rest of the *Investigation* – has already

- been clearly carried out in my 'Bericht über deutsche Schriften zur Logik', (1894) *Archiv für Syst. Philos.* III, p. 225, n. 1.
- 12 See my *Philosophie der Arithmetik* (1891), ch. XI, p. 228 (an 'avenue' of trees, a 'flock' of birds, a 'flight' of duck, etc.).
- 13 From my 'Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik', *Philos. Monatshefte*, (1894), xxx, p. 162.
- 14 Stumpf as is well known at first defines 'fusion' in a narrower sense, as a relation of simultaneous sense-qualities, as a result of which they appear as parts of a sensational whole. He does not however fail to point to the wider concept that we here find pivotal. Cf. *Topsycho-logie*, II §17, pp. 64 ff.
- 15 See *Investigation II*, §41, where we spoke figuratively of a mere 'being emphasized' of dependent moments in the consciousness of ideating abstraction, against those cases where they themselves are the intended, noticed objects.
- 16 The moment which is presentative of the *spatial extension* of the apparent coloured figure in space.
- 17 'Position' and 'magnitude' here naturally stand for phenomena in the sensational sphere, presentative moment for the intentional (apparent) position and magnitude in the straightforward sense.

2 Thoughts towards a theory of the pure forms of wholes and parts

- 1 In the sense namely of the abbreviated mode of speech defined in the last section, which must everywhere be remembered here.
- 2 More precisely: in the unity of a visual *intuitum* as such.
- 3 From Prop. 4 in §14, above.
- 4 See Bolzano's, *Wissenschaftslehre*, I, §58, p. 251, and Twardowski, loc. cit. §9, pp. 49 f.
- 5 A new expression of Prop. 3 in §14, above.
- 6 [Husserl here has 'volumeness' which I take to be an unsuccessful venture into English, *Trans.*]
- 7 See my *Philosophie der Arithmetik* (1891), p. 232.
- 8 One must certainly distinguish the *sensuous moment of likeness* from *likeness as a categorial unity*: the former is related to the latter as the sensuous characters of plurality, which serve us as direct indications of multiplicity and diversity, stand to multiplicity and diversity themselves. See my *Phil. der Arithmetik*, p. 233. This first work of mine (an elaboration of my *Habilitationsschrift*, never published and only partially printed, at the University of Halle, 1887) should be compared with all assertions of the present work on aggregates, moments of unity, combinations, wholes and objects of higher order. I am sorry that in many recent treatments of the doctrine of 'form-qualities', this work has mostly been ignored, though quite a lot of the thought-content of later treatments by Cornelius, Meinong etc., of questions of analysis, apprehension of plurality and combination, is already to be found, differently expressed, in my *Philos. der Arithm.* I think it would still be of use today to consult this work on the phenomenological and ontological issues in question, especially since it is the first work which attached importance to acts and objects of higher order and investigated them thoroughly.
- 9 See §11, above.
- 10 See *Prolegomena*, Vol. I (§§67-72) on the role of formalization for constituting the idea of a pure logic as *mathesis universalis*. We must emphasize again that where we speak simply of 'abstraction', as we have done so far, we mean the

- emphasis on a non-independent 'moment' of content, or the corresponding ideation under the title of 'ideating abstraction', but *not* formalization.
- 11 See §19, above.
- 12 Prop. 3, in §19, above.

Investigation IV: The distinction between independent and non-independent meanings and the idea of pure grammar

Introduction

- 1 We could equally say: 'of presentations'. For plainly an answer to the more specialized question also answers the more general question relating to presentations or objectifying acts as such.
- 2 Twardowski (*op. cit.* above p. 94) removes the whole basis for making such a distinction when he objects, as against Bolzano (whom we here follow) that there are no simple objects. Cf. Twardowski's own question where he speaks expressly of *presented* objects. We are here dealing with objects of reference as such.
- 3 Twardowski, *op. cit.* p. 98.
- 4 B. Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre* (Sulzbach, 1837), I, §57. 'Presentation' means for Bolzano 'presentations-in-themselves', which corresponds to our concept of meaning.
- 5 A. Marty, 'Über subjektlose Sätze', *Vierteljahrsschrift für wis. Philos.*, viiith year, p. 293, note.
- 6 Marty, 'Über das Verhältnis von Grammatik und Logik', *Symbolae Pragenses* (1893), p. 121, n. 2.
- 7 In his last-mentioned article Marty defines a categorematic sign as one which independently arouses a *complete presentation*, through which an object is named. But the definition of the syncategorematic sign which follows (see above) does not clearly bring out that the grammatical division rests on an essential division in the field of meaning, as Marty certainly thought.
- 8 The word 'presentation', carefully regarded, does not here mean 'act of presentation', but merely what is presented as such, together with the articulations and forms with which it is present in consciousness. The 'presentational form' is therefore the form of what is presented as such; we must keep this in mind in what follows.
- 9 A. Marty recently wrote, in his 'Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie' (Halle, 1908) of 'autosemantic' and 'synsemantic' signs (pp. 205 ff.).
- 10 The mode of speech need not be taken as literally as Marty has done in his *Untersuchungen*, pp. 211 f., as meaning that we build total meanings out of 'bricks' of partial meaning that could also exist separately. That this is a wrong conception is precisely the theme of my further argued doctrine of non-independent meanings. I cannot see how the exposition above can bear such an interpretation, and that it is in any way touched by Marty's objections. See the further discussions below regarding the understanding of isolated syncategoremata.
- 11 In so far as these and the rest have not lost their articulate meanings in the evolution of speech.
- 12 We dealt with an analogous, closely related question in §2.
- 13 In our whole exposition 'fulfilment' must of course be taken to cover the opposed state of 'frustration', the phenomenologically peculiar situation in which absurdly combined meanings in a meaningful whole make their incompatibility

plain in intuitive clarification and in 'bringing to insight': the intended unity is 'frustrated' in intuitive disunity.

14 §15.

15 The genuine contribution traditional logic makes to pure logic including the whole logic of the syllogism, is part of the logic of propositional meanings (or 'apophantic' logic).

16 I gladly accept A. Marty's objections (which I do not think otherwise fit the main features of the present Investigation or the other Investigations of this work) that I went too far, in the First Edition when I said that 'all censure of the old doctrine of *grammaire générale et raisonnée* only affects the uncleanness of its historical expressions and their mixture of the *a priori* and the empirical'. Nonetheless, the sharpest words of censure were directed against it for trying to make a rational, logical element count in speech.

Investigation V: On intentional experiences and their 'contents'

1 Consciousness as the phenomenological subsistence of the ego and consciousness as inner perception

1 See my *Ideas towards a Pure Phenomenology, etc.*, in the *Jahrbuch für Philos. u. phänom. Forschung*, 1 (1913), Section 2. [The present paragraph is an insertion in the Second Edition.]

2 Which is only in question *qua* phenomenal, since we exclude all questions regarding its existence or non-existence, and that of the empirical ego which appears in it, if we wish our treatments to have, not a descriptive-psychological, but a purely phenomenological value. One should note how, up to this point and for the future, each analysis can be first conducted as mere psychology, but there really permits of that 'purification' which gives it value as 'pure' phenomenology. [Second Edition comment.]

3 Or what we also call its 'appearance' in the sense given above, which will also be employed in future, the sense in which a (phenomenologically understood) experience is itself styled an 'appearance'.

4 In the First Edition the name 'phenomenological ego' was given to the stream of consciousness as such.

5 The opposition to the doctrine of a 'pure' ego, already expressed in this paragraph, is one that the author no longer approves of, as is plain from his *Ideas* cited above (see *ibid.*, §57, p. 107; §80, p. 159).

6 The text as here set forth is taken over without essential change from the First Edition. It fails to do justice to the fact that the empirical ego is as much a case of transcendence as the physical thing. If the elimination of such transcendence, and the reduction to pure phenomenological data, leaves us with no residual pure ego, there can be no real (adequate) self-evidence attaching to the 'I am'. But if there is really such an adequate self-evidence – who indeed could deny it? – how can we avoid assuming a pure ego? It is precisely the ego apprehended in *carrying out* a self-evident *cogito*, and the pure carrying out *eo ipso* grasps it in phenomenological purity, and necessarily grasps it as the subject of a pure experience of the type *cogito*.

7 Cf. the whole of §4 in Natorp's *Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode*, pp. 11 f.

8 I have since managed to find it, i.e. have learnt not to be led astray from a pure grasp of the given through corrupt forms of ego-metaphysic cf. note to §6.

2 Consciousness as intentional experience

1 My deviations from Brentano are not on the same lines as the qualifications that he found necessary to add to the inadequate simplifications of which he was clearly conscious (See *Psychologie*, I, pp. 127 ff.). This will be plain from the discussions in App. 2 at the end of this volume.

2 We could not say 'experiencing contents', since the concept of 'experience' has its prime source in the field of 'psychic acts'. Even if this concept has been widened to include non-acts, these for us stand connected with, ranged beside and attached to acts, in a unity of consciousness so essential that, were it to fall away, talk of 'experiencing' would lose its point.

3 See further the *Appendix* referred to above.

4 *Psychologie*, I, 115.

5 We are not therefore troubled by such vexed questions as to whether all mental phenomena, e.g. the phenomena of feeling, have the peculiarity in question. We must ask instead whether the phenomena in question *are* mental phenomena. The oddness of the question springs from the unsuitability of its wording. More about this later.

6 Within the framework of psychological apperception, the purely phenomenological concept of experience fuses with that of mental reality, or rather, it turns into the concept of the mental state of an animal being (either in actual nature or in an ideally possible nature with ideally possible animals, i.e. without existential implications). Later on the pure *phenomenological* generic Idea *intentional experience* transforms itself into the parallel, nearly related *psychological* generic concept. According as psychological apperception is kept out or kept in, the same sort of analysis has phenomenological or psychological import.

7 *Psychologie*, p. 111 (end of §3).

8 *Psychologie*, p. 104.

9 Cf. Brentano, *Psychologie*, pp. 266–7, 295 and *passim*.

10 No reference to selective attention or notice is included in the sense of the 'reference' involved in our 'intention'. See also §13.

11 We may here ignore the various possible assertive traits involved in the believed being of what is presented. One should again recall that it is possible to leave out all presupposing of natural reality, persons and other conscious animals included therein in our completed studies, so that they are understood as discussions of *ideal* possibilities. One finally sees them in the light of methodological exclusions, which cut out whatever is matter of transcendent apperception and assertion, so as to bring out what is *really* part of an experience and of its essence. Experience has then become the pure experience of phenomenology, from which psychological apperception has likewise dropped away.

12 As regards the seemingly obvious distinction between immanent and transcendent objects, modelled on the traditional schema of inner conscious image v. extraneous being-in-itself, cf. the Appendix at the end of this chapter.

13 Cf. the additional note to ch. I, above, pp. 93–4, and my *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie*, I, c.

14 Cf. §19.

15 We are in complete agreement with Natorp (*Einleitung in die Psychologie*, 1st edn, p. 21) when he objects to fully serious talk about 'mental activities', or 'activities of consciousness', or 'activities of the ego', by saying that 'consciousness only

appears as a doing, and its subject as a doer, because it is often or always accompanied by conation'. We too reject the 'mythology of activities': we define 'acts' as intentional experiences, not as mental activities.

16 P. Natorp, *Einführung in die Psychologie*, 1st edn, p. 18.

17 Last three sentences added in Edition II.

18 Cf. my 'Psychological Studies . . .', *Philos. Monatshefte*, xxx, (1894), p. 182.

19 The much discussed dispute as to the relation between perceptual and imaginative presentation can have no satisfactory outcome in default of a properly prepared phenomenological foundation and consequent clarity in concepts and questions. The like holds of enquiries as to the relation of simple perception to representational or sign-consciousness. It can be readily shown, I think, that act-characters differ in such cases in pictorial representation, e.g. an essentially new mode of intention, is experienced.

20 *Psychologie*, I, pp. 116 ff.

21 [Paragraph added in Edition II.]

22 Here as elsewhere I identify the pain-sensation with its 'content', since I do not recognize peculiar sensing acts. Naturally I reject Brentano's doctrine that pre-sentative acts, in the term of acts of feeling-sensation, underlie acts of feeling.

23 I point here, for purposes of comparison, and perhaps completion, to H. Schwarz's *Psychologie des Willens* (Leipzig, 1900) which in §12 deals with similar questions.

24 In the First Edition I wrote 'real or phenomenological' for 'real'. The word 'phenomenological' like the word 'descriptive' was used in the First Edition only in connection with *real (reelle)* elements of experience, and in the present edition it has so far been used predominately in this sense. This corresponds to one's natural starting with the psychological point of view. It became plainer and plainer, however, as I reviewed the completed Investigations and pondered on their themes more deeply – particularly from this point onwards – that the description of intentional objectivity as such, as we are conscious of it in the concrete act-experience, represents a distinct descriptive dimension where purely intuitive description may be adequately practised, a dimension opposed to that of *real (reellen)* act-constituents, but which also deserves to be called 'phenomenological'. These methodological extensions lead to important improvements due to a fully conscious now opening before us and considerable improvements due to a fully conscious separation of descriptive levels. Cf. my *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie*, Book I, and particularly what is said of *Noesis and Noema* in Section III.

25 Paragraph added in the Second Edition.

26 *Real* would sound much better alongside 'intentional' but it definitely keeps the notion of thinglike transcendence which the reduction to *real (reell)* immanence in experience is meant to exclude. It is well to maintain a conscious association of the *real* with the thinglike.

27 We have here a case of 'foundation' in the strict sense of our Third Investigation. We only use the term in this strict sense.

28 *Investigation* I, §§9, 10.

29 Cf. §10.

30 We encountered this fact in criticizing the prevailing theory of abstraction. See Inv. II, §22.

31 Cf. the Appendix to this chapter.

32 Confusion results from unavoidable ambiguities in talk of the definite and the indefinite. One speaks, e.g., of the indefiniteness of perceptual judgements, which consists in the fact that the rear side of a perceived object is subsidiarily meant, but indefinitely, whereas the clearly seen front side seems definite. Or one speaks of the indefiniteness of 'particular' assertions, e.g. *An A is B*. *Some A's are B's*, as opposed to the definiteness of the singular assertion 'This A is B'. Such definite-

nesses and indefinitenesses differ in sense from those in the text: they belong among the particularities of possible 'matters', as will be plainer in what follows. 33 One constantly notices that all the empirical psychological aspects of the examples fall out and become irrelevant with the ideational grasp of the phenomenological difference of essence.

34 Cf. §§17, 30.

35 For the moment we permit ourselves this improper mode of expression, which in its proper interpretation assort ill with the image-theory.

36 Which does not mean, we must repeat, that the object is noticed, or that we are thematically occupied with it, though such things are included in our ordinary talk about 'referring'.

3 The matter of the act and its underlying presentation

1 At the time, of course, of the appearance of this work's First Edition.

2 'Mere' presentations, we iterate, as opposed to acts of *belief*. How the sense of Brentano's proposition stands up to changes in our concept of presentation will be thoroughly investigated in the next two chapters.

3 See Inv. III, §§4 ff.

4 I have here ignored the disputed sub-species of Affirmative and Negative Judgement. If anyone accepts them he can everywhere substitute 'Affirmative Judgement' for 'Judgement' in the present discussion, while those who reject them, may take our words as they stand. It makes no essential difference to our argument.

5 Cf. my *Ideas*, Book I, Section 3, §109. A deeper knowledge of the peculiarity of 'qualitative modification' ('neutrality-modification') requires extensions of the doctrine of act-quality. These leave the essential content of our discussions in this chapter untouched, but involve a partial reinterpretation of their outcome.

4 Study of founding presentations with special regard to the theory of judgement

1 Conjunctive or disjunctive plurality on the subject side, as illustrated by '*A* and *B* are *P*', '*A* or *B* is *P*' are therefore excluded. We may also say: the subject-function is *as such* singular, while predication is not *plural* in a wider sense of the word.

2 Here we have, in a pure logico-grammatical context, a certain sort of significant modification grounded in the pure essence of Meaning (cf. Inv. IV).

3 See Inv. IV, §11, and the additional note to §13.

5 Further contributions to the theory of judgement. 'Presentation' as a qualitatively unitary genus of nominal and propositional acts

1 Cf. the examples in §34.

2 It must be noted that this mode of expression is a circumlocution.

3 [§38, from this point onwards, is mainly a Second Edition supplement.]

4 All this must of course not be understood in an empirical-psychological manner. We are concerned here (as everywhere in this investigation) with *a priori* possibilities rooted in pure essence, which are as such grasped by us with apodictic self-evidence.

5 Cf. however the interpretation of a 'community of kind' as a peculiar relation of 'essence and counter-essence' in my *Ideas*, p. 233. The further pursuit of the

results of this investigation has generally led to many essential deepening and improvements. Cf. in particular: *Ideas*, §§109–14, 117 on the neutrality modification.

6 The same is of course true of other act-products, e.g. the aesthetic consideration of pictures.

7 §23.

8 §38.

6 Summing-up of the most important ambiguities in the terms 'presentation' and 'content'

1 Not a good example of the impossible, but a slip. *Translator*.

2 See the criticism of the picture-theory in §21, Additional Note.

3 Cf. Inv. I, §20. Also Inv. II, §20, and the chapter on 'Abstraction and Representation'.

4 *Reell* applies to a thing's actual parts as opposed to what it merely intends or means. *Real* is the being of real things in the world. [*Translator*]

Investigation VI: Elements of a phenomenological elucidation of knowledge

First section: Objectifying intentions and their fulfillments: knowledge as a synthesis of fulfillment and its gradations

1 Meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment

1 *Log. Inv.* I, §12.

2 See *Log. Inv.* I, §26.

3 *Log. Inv.* I, §§9, 10.

4 Cf. my *Psych. Studies of elementary Logic*, II, 'Concerning Intentions and Representations', *Philos. Monatshefte*, 1894, p. 176. I have given up the concept of intuition supported there, as the present work makes plain.

5 I use this expression without specially introducing it as a term, since it is the mere translation of 'meaning'. I shall accordingly often speak of *significant* or *significative acts*, instead of acts of meaning-intention, of meaning etc. 'Meaning-acts' can scarcely be talked of, since *expressions* are used as the normal subjects of meaning. 'Significative' also offers us a suitable terminological opposite to 'intuitive'. A synonym for 'significative' is 'symbolic', to the extent that the modern abuse of a word 'symbol' obtains – an abuse already denounced by Kant – which equates a symbol with a 'sign', quite against its original and still indispensable sense.

6 Cf. §13 of the previous Investigation.

3 The phenomenology of the levels of knowledge

1 See above §14.

2 Cf. the deeper analyses of §24.

3 In the above paragraph, the German terms '*darstellen*', '*Darstellung*' etc. are translated by 'intuitively present', 'intuitive presentation' etc. The terms 'strictly present' etc. are used to translate '*präsentieren*' etc. 'Presentation' *simpliciter* still translates '*Vorstellung*'. [*Translator*]

4 Consistency and inconsistency

1 Understanding of the analytical clarifications attempted in this chapter and the next, and assessment of their possible achievements, depends entirely on keeping the strict concepts hitherto elaborated firmly in mind, and not letting the vague ideas of popular speech take their place.

5 The ideal of adequation. Self-evidence and truth

1 Cf. §23.

Second section: Sense and understanding

6 Sensuous and categorial intuitions

1 Thus we read in Sigwart (*Logic*, I (ed. 2), p. 206): 'The verbal conjoining of sentences through "and" ... expresses only the subjective fact of their coexistence in one consciousness, and it therefore has no objective meaning.' Cf. also p. 278.

2 It was precisely this question: how estimates of plurality and number are possible at a glance, and may therefore be achieved in straightforward, and not in founded intuition, while true collection and counting presuppose articulated acts of higher order – it was this question that independently led me to take note of those intuitively unifying characters which v. Ehrenfels called 'Gestalt-qualities', and which he dealt with in a penetrating manner in a work which appeared before mine, and which was dominated by quite different points of view. ('Über Gestalt-qualitäten', *Viertelj. f. wiss. Philosophie*, 1890. Cf. my *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, ch. XI.)

7 A Study in categorial representation

1 If α represents the constitutive features in a concept and β those of any other concept *whatever*, one can always construct the form: Something that is *either* α or β . This external sort of conceptual extension which I call 'disjunctive', can at times prove very useful. It plays, e.g., an important role in the development of artificial mathematical techniques not sufficiently appreciated by logicians. The logic of mathematics is in fact in its infancy: few logicians have even seen that here is a field of great problems, fundamental for the understanding of mathematics and of mathematicizing natural science, and admitting of strict solution despite all their difficulty.

2 See §55.

3 Naturally not in *particular* kinds of such contents but in the *total* genus of such contents as such.

Appendix: External and internal perception: physical and psychological phenomena

1 It is remarkable that no one has tried to found a positive determination of 'physical phenomena' on these intuitive interconnections. In pointing to them, I depart from my role as a reporter. To employ them seriously, one must, of course, have due regard to the ambiguity of talk about 'physical phenomena', an ambiguity we shall immediately discuss.

- 2 Brentano (*Psychologie*, I, pp. 118 *f*) says it is a distinguishing mark of all psychic phenomena 'that they are only perceived in an inner consciousness, whereas outer perception alone is possible in the case of physical phenomena'. It is emphatically said on p. 119 that this determination characterizes psychic phenomena adequately. 'Inner consciousness' is here merely another expression for inner perception.
- 3 Up to the positive mark of physical phenomena given in 2 above. I hope, further, to have achieved accuracy in restating the main points of view which have been governing factors in the doctrines of the thinkers I value so highly.
- 4 Locke's *Essay*, II, i, 19. Locke is not perfectly consistent in so far as he expressly makes 'perception' an apprehension of ideas, and yet makes the apprehension of the ideas of mental activities depend on *special* acts of reflection, that only at times supervene on these activities. This is obviously due to the wretched dual concept 'idea' which promiscuously covers the *presentations* of contents that may be experienced, and also the experienced contents themselves. See our *Inv.* II, §10.
- 5 Criticism, as it strikes me, generally stops at the first provisional theses of Brentano – psychology as a science of psychic phenomena, natural science of physical phenomena – without thinking of the 'tacit limitations' which Brentano himself expounded with characteristic clarity and acuteness. I have been all the more happy, therefore, to recall them by the full citations given above.
- 6 Brentano understands by 'sensations' *acts* of sensing, and opposes them to sensed contents. In our mode of speech, as expounded above, no such distinction obtains. We call 'sensations' the mere fact that a sense-content and, further, that a non-act in general, is present in the experiential complex. In relation to appearing, talk of 'sensing' only serves to point to the apprehensive function of such contents (that they function as bearers of an interpretation, in which the appearance in question is carried out perceptually or imaginatively).
- 7 Cf. Brentano, loc. cit. §7, p. 120. In detailed examples he says: 'Knowledge, joy, desire, exist actually, colour, tone, warmth only phenomenally and intentionally.' On p. 104 he lists as examples of physical phenomena: 'A figure, *landscape* that I see ... warmth, cold, smell that I *sense*.'

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