Nietzsche's Aesthetic Turn

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Nietzsche's Aesthetic Turn

Reading Nietzsche after Heidegger, Deleuze, and Derrida

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FOR EVE, LOU, FRANÇOISE, GENE, AND RUDI

Contents

PREFACE

I

Thinking that they are doing Nietzsche a service, scholars instinctively strive to peer beneath what appears to them to be the tangled surface of his writings—seeking to elucidate his "truths" and find the "system" underlying what they often experience as a bewildering plethora of voices, literary creations, styles, and mythical settings. Zarathustra is the best known of Nietzsche's characters, but there are many others. Animals, demons, a variety of women, priests, blond beasts, and overmen inhabiting mountains, forests, caves, and even sailing the seas: these are only a few of the characters and settings found throughout his works.

Even when Nietzsche "writes philosophically" and clearly identifies a position in the text as his own, he confounds our expectations by speaking more directly and personally than is normally commended by philosophical custom. Traditionally, scholars are not interested in one person's view, but *the* truth towards which *all* strive. Nietzsche often stresses the partiality of his views. And his views are subject to change. For example, Plato is at one time called the practitioner of a "noble way of thinking," one who knew how to remain master over his instincts (BGE, 14). Later on, in *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche claims to be "a complete skeptic" about Plato. He writes that he had never been able to admire the artist in Plato as scholars are prone to do. Plato throws all stylistic forms together and is therefore a decadent in his style (TI, "Ancients," 2).

In these two references we see yet another challenge facing the interpreter. Nietzsche's writings often take the form of conversations, debates, or analyses of historical figures such as Plato, but these are not done in the style to which we are accustomed. These are not scholarly dissections of the conceptual underpinnings of their thoughts; more often they are psychological or even quasi-physiological investigations of these thinkers' characters—usually punctuated with humorous barbs.

In the struggle to encapsulate Nietzsche's thought, it is tempting to turn to the famous, in some cases infamous, concepts such as "will to power," "overman," or "eternal return," but these notions do not appear all that often in Nietzsche's published writings. The overman or superman (*Übermensch*) appears in neither *On The Genealogy of Morals* nor in *Beyond Good and Evil.* Eternal return is mentioned by name in only a few of Nietzsche's works. Sometimes it is attributed to Zarathustra, but at other times Nietzsche identifies it as his own doctrine. Nietzsche discusses the will to power more frequently than any of his other notions; yet a careful study shows, I think, that there is no single or final interpretation of the doctrine in Nietzsche's work.

If these difficulties (as these aspects of Nietzsche's thought are often experienced) were not enough, we can add at least one more. Nietzsche calls himself the philosopher of masks; he maintains that masks rise naturally around all deep thinkers (BGE, 40). Great thinkers, he asserts, write books in order to hide themselves! All of these things may seem like obstacles to a philosophical understanding of Nietzsche's thought if by "philosophical" we mean a clear and unambiguous understanding of the systematic structure of Nietzsche's truths.

Ironically, many nonscholars find that on the surface Nietzsche's writings are much more straightforward and comprehensible than other philosophers' and certainly more comprehensible than many of his interpreters. His sentences and paragraphs are, for the most part, very clear; yet scholarly attempts to summarize his thought are the source of much confusion. What is it about the secondary literature on Nietzsche that seems, almost inevitably, to lead to this obfuscation? Nietzsche believed that his reevaluation of truth would be one of the hardest things to understand about his work: "the falsity of a judgment is for us not an

objection against a judgment; in this our new language seems strangest" (BGE, 4).

Many ask how Nietzsche can be a relativist without "undermining himself." The stock argument goes as follows: the claim that there are no objective truths somehow discredits itself, but what, after all, is the status of that claim? For Nietzsche, impartiality and certainty are not prerequisites for value. One of his most detailed explanations of will to power comes in an aphorism from *Beyond Good and Evil* which discusses the doctrine in conjunction with the process of interpretation. To speak of the "lawfulness of nature" is, Nietzsche writes, poor philology—a naive humanitarian reversal of the senses. Nature is rather a chaotic amalgamation of unstable forces for which the word "tyrannical" is too mild a metaphor. To those who would object that Nietzsche's vision of nature is only an interpretation, Nietzsche replies, "so much the better" (BGE, 22). Unlike the majority of the western philosophical tradition, Nietzsche values that which he authors over that which pretends to be impartial. The possibility that the will to power may not represent *the* "truth" in no way devalues the theory for Nietzsche.

Whereas western philosophers have traditionally stressed the importance of impartial truths that cohere with one another, Nietzsche never tires of reminding us that his writings express his "truths." Whereas the philosophical tradition has valued objectivity and impartiality, Nietzsche believes that he gives honor and value to those propositions he identifies as his own. If two of his views do not fit with one another, Nietzsche does not feel the need to reject one or to rework both of them in order to bring them into line. And yet his writings do not merely flaunt contradictions.

Given the earnestness with which philosophers have searched for truth and systematicity, it is little wonder that Nietzsche's thought has been such an enigma. Some sort of dialogue must exist between different sections of Nietzsche's works, but his writings clearly do not provide his readers with final, polished, systematic truths. To the extent that his commentators attempt to provide the service of uncovering the truth beneath the surface, they should be wary of their good intentions. Nietzsche's work invites different paradigms of interpretation.

II

Nietzsche's irreverence toward truth and systematicity, and his emphasis upon his own partiality, lead me to suggest the paradigm of an "aesthetic turn" as one way of approaching his last works from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* to *Ecce Homo*. Of course, Nietzsche's first work, *The Birth of Tragedy*, is directly concerned with aesthetics. Beginning with *Beyond Good and Evil*, aesthetics is less overtly the topic of Nietzsche's writings, but the assertion that the views expressed in these last works are the product of his tastes is omnipresent. He uncovers the hidden agendas behind the supposedly "objective" views of other philosophers, while at the same time stressing that his views are no less partial.

Nietzsche's writings may thus be seen as the response of his very idiosyncratic tastes to his cultural and intellectual milieu. Most of his later writings in particular are aphoristic—a series of quick dives into problems followed by quick exits. They include a great deal of psychological analysis of individuals and cultures. Nietzsche himself, Wagner, Goethe, Plato, Socrates, Christ, Christianity, Ancient Greece, France, and Germany are the main foci of these analyses in the later works. His humorous barbs and unconventional judgments distinguish his style from much of the western philosophical tradition. This style is appropriate for these messages. Whereas other philosophers often claim to have established the basis upon which all future philosophy must be built, Nietzsche is most explicit about not seeking followers. The philosophers of the future, he writes in *Beyond Good and Evil*, may love their truths but they will not be dogmatic and they will not want others merely to follow them. "Man must rid himself of the bad taste of wanting to agree with others" (BGE, 43).

He rarely portrays his judgment as definitive. They are his thoughts, suited to a particular time and place, and subject to change. *Beyond Good and Evil*, one of his most "systematic" works, draws to a close with a section entitled "What is Noble?" In the very last aphorism of this section and therefore the last section of the book Nietzsche reflects upon what he has written (actually he writes "my written and painted thoughts"). He laments that his ideas, which had once appeared so colorful, young, and malicious, have lost their luster. He fears that they have already turned to truths because they appear so "eternal, pathetically decent and boring" (BGE, 296).

How do the last works avoid erecting such "pathetically decent truths?" *On the Genealogy of Morals* is populated with priests, master races, artists, gods, blond beasts, ascetics, and fanciful histories of mythic pasts painted as the backdrop to his analysis of the present. These genealogies do not pretend to be factual histories of origins; they are rather myths designed to illuminate Nietzsche's vision of the nineteenth century. They problematize the traditional understanding of notions such as good, bad and evil, without suggesting that his new definitions are definitive. In *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche turns to historical figures and cultural phenomena, but the results are no less personal. In particular, the second to last chapter of this book: "*Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemassen*" represents, on my reading, one of the culminations of Nietzsche's aphoristic style. Kaufmann translates the title of this section "Skirmishes of an Untimely Man" and there is nothing wrong with this, but "*Streifzuge*" can also be translated as "expeditions," "incursions," or the term I favor, and will use throughout this book, "raids."

These "raids" are quick attacks, made on the run against a wide variety of figures and cultural phenomena. Nietzsche the nomadic raider questions the presuppositions of others, but avoids building any massive structures he would have need to defend. The point is not to destroy these idols of modernity, but to use a hammer in order to "sound them out." He reveals their hollow cores, their decadence, and the corruption of their instincts, but rarely do these raids imply dismissal. Aphorisms 7-10 of this section describe how Nietzsche constructs his interpretations as well as what he is trying to avoid. In aphorism 7 he warns against "Colportage psychology." Those who are born to psychology—as well as painters—protect themselves against the instinct to see merely what there is to see. Instead of forming their pictures by abstracting from individual observations or lying in the dust observing nature's "*petits faits*" (little facts), they begin with the conclusion or the result. True artists idealize nature, not by peeling away the inessential, but rather by imprinting their own visions on phenomena though the "monstrous (*ungeheures*) bringing out of the principal characteristics" (TI, "Raids," 8). Artists make everything richer by virtue of their own fullness (*Fülle*). Artists change the things they portray so as to reflect their own power (TI, "Raids," 9). Nietzsche is attacking those who believe that, through "scientific" observations, they can produce "disinterested knowledge." His interpretations do not claim to be—

or even strive to become—exact portrayals of reality. And, once formed, a mask is never very far away. Given their distance from the norm, Nietzsche knows that his unconventional views are open to attack. This knowledge, along with his belief that truth is problematic and not necessarily the ultimate aim of philosophy, leads him to counsel all profound spirits to create masks. In fact, he claims masks grow up naturally around noble spirits.

What I am calling the "aestheticism" of Nietzsche's later works is primarily this omnipresent assumption that his writings are the product of his own idiosyncratic and hyperbolic tastes formed within the confines of his social milieu. These raids lampoon others' pretenses to objectivity while striving to avoid erecting a new canon. Or, to the extent that Nietzsche erects new idols, they unabashedly carry the mark of their creator and avoid the solemnity associated with other philosophers' truths. They are designed to give us new perspectives on these things without erecting pathetically boring truths to take their place. *The Case of Wagner* is another example of a Nietzschean raid. It begins by praising Bizet at the expense of Wagner. Bizet's music is light—it does not sweat and thereby conforms to the first law of Nietzsche's aesthetic: "The good is light, everything godlike walks on tender feet" (CW, 1). Nietzsche never goes on to explicate the other "laws" of his aesthetic and in the Epilogue to this work he claims that his aesthetics is based on "biological presuppositions." Although the book begins with Bizet, Wagner is the idol upon which Nietzsche will tap. The mention of Bizet makes sense within the context of the near deification of Wagner in late nineteenth-century Germany. Bizet becomes the foil to highlight Wagner's pomposity, his lack of rigor and his playing to the crowd. At the end of the work Wagner has been dissected—at least *Nietzsche's* Wagner, or one of his Wagners—and something of Nietzsche and his vision of the 19th century has been revealed. It is not, nor does it desire to be, the definitive portrait of Wagner, Nietzsche, or the 19th century, but a picture composed out of the conjunction of the phenomenon of Wagner and the richness of Nietzsche's soul.

III

What service do I offer in suggesting the paradigm of an "aesthetic turn" for reading Nietzsche's last works? I hope to alert

Nietzsche's readers to some of the ways in which their expectations about truth and systematicity may influence their understanding of his writings. Readers who expect these things from Nietzsche may find them, or they may criticize him if they do not find them, but in either case they will have missed some of what is most innovative in his thought. At one point in his massive study of Nietzsche, Heidegger suggests that philosophy could be revolutionized and metaphysics brought to an end by escaping into what he characterizes as the Presocratic preconceptual way of knowing. In Nietzsche there is no longing for a lost paradise. Exposing the pretenses of western thought, Nietzsche revolutionizes it by questioning some of its most basic values. Both Nietzsche and Heidegger believe that their thought marks a decisive turning point in Western philosophy, but Nietzsche is quite explicit in admitting that his thought will in turn soon be overcome. He encourages us not merely to accept his views but to create our own. In the preface to *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche reflects on *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* calling it the greatest gift humankind has ever received (EH, "Preface," 4). Nietzsche explicitly rejects, however, the label "prophet" for his creation. Zarathustra is neither a fanatic nor a preacher nor a seducer. Zarathustra tells his listeners that he must travel alone and his pupils have the responsibility to leave him and examine his teachings closely. It is no honor to a teacher when one always remains a pupil.

If we have a hard time reconciling two of our "truths," Nietzsche would not ask us choose one or the other. Noble souls contain, Nietzsche writes, many contradictions. At the same time, Nietzsche is neither careless about nor dismissive of the tensions in his thought. He encourages us not to cling to our truths once their time and place are past. Nietzsche lampoons our pretenses to objectivity and impartiality. He reminds us of the biases inherent in our supposedly "objective truths". His writings urge us to hammer on our own sacred idols—not to smash them, but rather to investigate why we have erected them in the first place, what they might say about us, and how and when we might overcome them. Whereas the tradition often invests value in the "truths" it calls "objective," Nietzsche tells us that it is an honor to create values.

There are many aspects of Nietzsche's thought that trouble me. Nietzsche denigrates democracy, glorifies war and rarely finds

anything positive to say about working together with others. Democracy, he suggests in *Beyond Good and Evil*, creates humans who cannot tolerate being by themselves and have neither courage nor respectable customs. He writes that hardness, violence, slavery and a host of like conditions serve to raise the species of humans (BGE, 44). The only communities that he occasionally admits may be of value are very loose associations of "higher" individuals. In *Twilight of the Idols* he calls war his highest virtue—although the war he is speaking about is "the reevaluation of all values" and not any clash between armies. His commentary on the Prussian victory over the French in 1871 also makes it clear that he does not usually associate military victory or brute force with moral superiority. Nietzsche is not as monstrous as he sometimes seems and as he is often portrayed. Indeed, he claims that unlike many of the moral codes of the past his thought is life-affirming. Up to now, Nietzsche writes, almost all morality has been at odds with nature and a condemnation of our instincts. The saint who finds his satisfaction in god is the "ideal eunuch" (TI, "Morality," 4). We no longer go to dentists who cure toothaches by pulling out the tooth nor do we pluck out offending eyes, so why do we insist on listening to moral codes which require us to deny ourselves? Once we stand back from some of Nietzsche's particular moral pronouncements and examine the basis for his moral thinking instead, there is a great deal to learn from it. Nietzsche's reminders about the partiality of our reflections on morality could make us more cosmopolitan in our views of competing moral judgments.

Although he problematizes the notion of the subject and calls the concept of free will the "metaphysics of the hangman," Nietzsche clearly does believe in the efficacy of great individuals. He constantly reminds us of the responsibility of authorship. Nietzsche's writings are filled with examples of characters who oppose the moral judgments of others without recourse to universal laws. The realization that we are the authors of our moral codes reminds us of both our fallibility and our accountability. Those who no longer view moral codes as written in stone by the hand of the divine must admit that these laws are subject to error. Nietzsche frees us to reevaluate the legacy our traditions have bequeathed to us and to write our own moral laws. No longer lying in the dust attempting to uncover moral truths, we are encouraged to identify ourselves as the authors of our codes of action. Along with these

freedoms come both the responsibilities of authorship and the celebration of our human potential. Nietzsche raises us from the dust so that we might embrace the creations of our humanity.

Although I have, in almost all cases, consulted Walter Kaufmann's translations, the citations of Nietzsche's works will be my own translations based on the *Kritische Studienausgabe* (KSA), volumes 1-15 (eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980). Citations from the letters will be my translations of the *Sämtliche Briefe Kritische Studienausgabe* (KSB), volumes 1-8 (eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1986). I gratefully acknowledge the publisher's permission to quote from these works.

References to Nietzsche's works will be made parenthetically in the text. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, *The Gay Science*, *The Case of Wagner*, and *The Anti-Christ*, where all the sections are numbered consecutively, the number following the abbreviated title will refer to the section or aphorism (as the sections in Nietzsche's works are often called, even though they may not fit in that genre precisely), and not the page number. When referring to the other books I will give an abbreviated reference to the title in which the section appears, followed by the number of the section. References to "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense" will be to the page numbers from the KSA.

The citations from the *Nachlass* will include, in this order, volume and page number (from the KSA), manuscript number, and fragment number. References to Nietzsche's letters will include the volume number from the KSB followed by the number of the letter.

With regard to all the quotations, I will usually give my English translation first and then, on occasion, the original. If I give the German or French first, it indicates that I have had difficulty finding an exact translation.

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Abbreviations

A	*The Anti-Christ*
BGE	*Beyond Good and Evil*
BT	*The Birth of Tragedy*
CW	*The Case of Wagner*
EH	*Ecce Homo*
GM	*On the Genealogy of Morals*
GS	*The Gay Science*
KSA	*Kritische Studienausgabe*
KSB	*Sämtliche Briefe Kritische Studienausgabe*
"On Truth"	"On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense"
TI	*Twilight of the Idols*
Z	*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*

INTRODUCTION

This book attempts to make sense out of Nietzsche's last works (from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* to *Ecce Homo*) where he appears unsystematic and often professes to be unconcerned with truth. Nietzsche has engendered a remarkable number of diverse interpretations. What Bernd Magnus says about the eternal return—that the quarrels in the secondary literature are not merely about its specifics, but about its broad outlines—is true for most of Nietzsche's teachings. Few deny that Nietzsche has interesting insights to philosophical problems, but many ask if his thought is simply a series of independent insights or do these insights somehow fit together and enrich one another?

As unclear as Nietzsche's relationship to truth and consistency is, as historians of philosophy we invariably look for these attributes beneath what seems to be the tangled surface of his writings. We look for a way, or more often for *the* way, to systematize his thought even though he calls "the will to system a lack of honesty" (TI, "Sayings," 26). And he, or rather Zarathustra, admits to the limits of his systematic powers. When asked about his comments of the previous day, Zarathustra answers that it is too much for him to remember his own opinions (Z, "On the Poets").

The search for systematicity may not be as unproductive as these comments would lead us to believe. Although few American, British, or French scholars have seriously engaged their as yet untranslated work, two German scholars—Wolfgang Müller-Lauter and Günther Abel—have suggested that there is within Nietzsche's writings all that is necessary to make systematic sense out of them.

Although I am not finally convinced that the system they present is really Nietzsche's, they do show that there is more structure in Nietzsche's work than generally meets the eye. Moreover, that which they forge to a large measure out of the *Nachlass* is, in schematic form, present in the *Beyond Good and Evil* exploration of the will to power. *Beyond Good and Evil* 36 suggests that the will to power can serve as the basis for an explanation of the inorganic and organic worlds, human action, and as a means of evaluating human beings and their actions.

But after *Beyond Good and Evil*, the will to power becomes less prominent in his work. Nietzsche never abandons it, but he no longer mentions it in the published works as an explanation for the inorganic world. Indeed after *Beyond Good and Evil*, he rarely theorizes about the inorganic world. In his last works, from *On the Genealogy of Morals* to *Ecce Homo*, the doctrine is occasionally referred to in conjunction with human behavior, and sometimes mentioned as a measure of higher existence, but it is hard to draw connections between the various uses of it. Certainly the project outlined in *Beyond Good and Evil* 36 is never completed.

What makes Nietzsche doubly difficult to understand, particularly for philosophers, is his eschewal of truth. Even while exploring the explanative possibilities of the will to power in *Beyond Good and Evil*, he problematizes the search for truth by asking why not seek untruth (BGE, 1). He states that the falsity of a judgment is, for him, no objection to it (BGE, 4). The will to power is not a truth, he insists, but only his interpretation (BGE, 22). If Nietzsche's work is finally neither systematic nor truthful, then how are historians of philosophy, or anyone else for that matter, to make sense of it?

As the importance of the will to power diminishes, Nietzsche increasingly focuses upon his own time—the notions it calls truths and its most revered cultural "icons": principally reason, the Greeks, Christianity, the Germans, and Wagner. In *Twilight of the Idols*, the work that best summarizes his later thought, he takes a hammer to these icons, as Heidegger notes, not so much to smash them as to sound them out. These truths and cultural phenomena appear prominently in the titles of his works, particularly his last works: *The Gay Science, Beyond Good and Evil, The Genealogy of Morals, The Case of Wagner, Nietzsche Contra Wagner, Twilight of the Idols, The Anti-Christ*, and *Ecce Homo*. Compare these to the titles of the works of three of his most illustrious German predecessors, Kant,

Hegel, and Schopenhauer: *The Critique of Pure Reason, The Science of Logic,* and *The World as Will and Representation.* His predecessors' titles suggest where the key to understanding the world lies. Nietzsche on the other hand makes reference to the "truths" of the modern age, which his works interrogate. Hegel believes his logic will replace Kant's *Critique,* and Schopenhauer writes of having found the true essence of the world—the thing in itself that had eluded Kant. But Nietzsche's work will change how we view, for example, science, good and evil, morality, and Christianity. He interrogates these "truths" and the mentality that erected them, and deflates their grandiose claims without erecting new truths to take their place.

This may sound similar to Jacques Derrida's interpretation of Nietzsche as it is presented most prominently in his essay "Spurs." Yet there are, at least, two ways in which my vision of Nietzsche differs from his. First, although Nietzsche writes that there is no truth, he maintains that there are some fictions without which we cannot survive. Life is possible only when we create stability in a constantly changing world. In *Beyond Good and Evil* 4 he calls these theories, which create the semblance of stability and enable life, "necessary fictions." But as Nietzsche becomes less inclined to theorize about the natural world, his works increasingly are devoted to the evaluation of cultural phenomena. His theory of necessary fictions makes sense only within the context of his theory of the physical world. There is little talk of these fictions once he is no longer theorizing about the physical world.

More importantly, my differences with Derrida's reading surface as I try to show that in the last works there are prevailing aesthetic concerns that inform much of his writings. The importance of aesthetics in the early work, *The Birth of Tragedy,* has been recognized and explored most recently by John Sallis in *Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy.* The role of aesthetics in his later works, however, has not been sufficiently examined. In the preface to the second edition of *The Birth of Tragedy* (1886), Nietzsche avers that there is no greater contrast than the one between his purely aesthetic understanding and the Christian way of seeing the world. And in *Twilight of the Idols,* Nietzsche writes that his philosophy does not divide the world into the true versus what appears, for the artist values appearance more than reality (TI, "Reason," 6).

Once it is clear that the will to power cannot serve as the foundation for his thought, Nietzsche returns to aesthetics. Increasingly he makes reference to norms of style and taste, which can be broadly labeled "aesthetic criteria" as he evaluates cultural phenomena. He rejects objective criteria of good style and good taste along with objective truth. What remains are personal canons. For example, Nietzsche affirms the superiority of self-created values over values created by someone else. There is no absolute basis for this evaluation. Nietzsche disparages and praises according to canons of taste and style while admitting that the basis for these judgments resides finally in himself. Seeing Nietzsche's judgments about these things as aesthetic will hopefully sensitize us to the limits of any overarching systematization of his views. Tastes are, after all, personal, and judgments of good style and good taste are inherently connected with the context in which they are made.

The importance of aesthetics is also illustrated in the style in which he presents his views. Although his style is generally acknowledged as excellent in a literary sense, it is often bemoaned as an obstacle to philosophical clarity. The theatrics, however, involved in the presentation of his ideas are integral to and uniquely suited to this philosophic project, which questions established truths without attempting to establish new objective canons. Nietzsche's interrogation of the notion of truth in the preface of *Beyond Good and Evil* is a classic example: "Suppose truth is a woman—what? Is the suspicion not grounded that all philosophers, insofar as they were dogmatic, have poorly understood women?"

To understand truth, Nietzsche writes that we must approach it in a more refined manner than is the philosopher's custom. Nietzsche does not claim that truth is a woman, but asks us to suppose that it is. He does not assert that dogmatic philosophers do not understand women, but asks whether or not this is the case. Nietzsche's style raises questions, and suggests reevaluations without promising final answers. It is of a piece with his rejection of final truths.

This is not just a book about Nietzsche, but a comparison of different approaches to philosophy in an age where the possibility of attaining truth and the usefulness of systematicity have been brought into question. Heidegger, Deleuze, Derrida, and Rorty along with Nietzsche all consider themselves rebels within the tradition. This book aims to compare these insurrections. At his best, in my

opinion, Nietzsche makes us aware of the limits of our knowledge. He reminds us that our judgments are rooted in our perspective and brings us to question our claims of objectivity. At its worst Nietzsche's philosophy may lead us into solipsism, a sisyphisian discourse with ourselves where the lack of any universal truth becomes a justification for ignoring the tastes of others. The challenge that Nietzsche's thought presents to us is to develop our own rich aesthetic vision conscious of the limits of our views and respectful of the views of others, in a world where necessity may be found only in fictions.

More specifically, my attempt to piece together a holistic view of Nietzsche's last published writings begins with an analysis of the eternal return. Chapter 1 examines Nietzsche's writings on the eternal return using Heidegger and Bernd Magnus as guides. This leads quickly into the problem of the inconsistency of Nietzsche's thought. His explanations of the eternal return from the published works, the *Nachlass*, and his letters are not at all consistent. There is no single correct reading of the eternal return, but I resist the conclusion, drawn by one interpreter, that the eternal return is a cosmic vision for which argumentation and the criterion of truth are irrelevant. Although, for Nietzsche, interpretations will never be capable of uncovering truth, this does not imply, as some suggest, that language for Nietzsche is useless.

Chapter 2 begins with a study of Heidegger's claim, formulated in the first series of lectures, "The Will to Power" from his *Nietzsche*, that the will to power leads the way to the overcoming of conceptual knowledge. Against Heidegger I maintain that the will to power represents Nietzsche's most conspicuous attempt to be systematic. In *Beyond Good and Evil* 36 the will to power is suggested as the basis for a system which would give a single interpretation to the organic and inorganic worlds, a system for evaluating humans and their cultures, as well as providing a foundation for moral and aesthetic judgments and a theory of the self. This represents Nietzsche's most sustained effort to systematize his thought, but the attempt to understand all things as will to power—organic world, inorganic world, morality, culture, and even the self—quickly becomes too confining for Nietzsche. The will to power figures less prominently in the works that follow *Beyond Good and Evil* (*On the Genealogy of Morals, The Case of Wagner, Twilight of the Idols, The Anti-Christ,* and *Ecce Homo*). When he summarizes his thought

in 1888, it is entitled *Twilight of the Idols* and not *The Will to Power.*

I also examine in detail Wolfgang Müller-Lauter's contention that the will to power provides a solution to the perspectivist's dilemma—namely, by providing Nietzsche with a way to argue for the superiority of the theory of will to power, even though he does not believe in truth. Although this doctrine represents Nietzsche's systematic heights, I maintain that we must look elsewhere to understand the way his last writings hang together.

Still searching for a systematic reading of Nietzsche, chapter 3 turns to Gilles Deleuze's attempt to portray Nietzsche as a pluralist. By "pluralist" Deleuze does not mean what is often associated with that word. He is not, for example, referring to someone who is tolerant of many different perspectives. When Deleuze labels Nietzsche a pluralist he means that, for Nietzsche, reality consists entirely of a plethora of unstable forces. These unstable forces, constantly come into existence, seek to assert themselves by dominating other forces, and then pass out of existence. Furthermore, Deleuze maintains that this conception of reality determines every facet of Nietzsche's thought—including his analysis of cultural phenomena and his moral vision. In *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche does attempt to explain everything as derivative from this notion that the world consists of unstable forces constantly struggling to overcome other forces, but he is never as consequent about this project as Deleuze suggests. The limitations of Deleuze's reading are clearly evident when he tries to apply his pluralism formula to the account of the eternal return found in "The Convalescent" from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra.* In addition, Nietzsche, as I have shown in chapter 2, increasingly turns away from the use of the will to power in his later works.

Deleuze's pluralist reading of Nietzsche seems to me to overstate the systematicity of Nietzsche's thought, but chapter 4 argues that Derrida's Nietzsche is too unsystematic. Whereas Derrida believes that Nietzsche never arrives at definitive interpretations, I maintain that there are some tastes that Nietzsche consistently favors over others. Derrida claims that, for Nietzsche, in the absence of truth there is only a multiplicity of interpretation. He thereby fails to appreciate that Nietzsche is quite emphatic about appreciating some interpretations more than others. Derrida maintains, in his essay "Spurs" (originally entitled "La Question du style"), that

for Nietzsche there is no single good style, but rather only a plurality of good styles. Nietzsche is much more judgmental than Derrida. Even though he does not believe that there are absolute standards of good style, he is nonetheless willing, in certain contexts, to judge some of them as superior to others.

If Nietzsche is more judgmental than Derrida, but admittedly has no secure foundation of truth on which to base his judgments, the question arises: Does Nietzsche believe that he can defend any and every interpretation on the basis of taste alone? Although the main thrust of this book is to show the importance of aesthetics, for Nietzsche's later thought this does not explain all of it—aesthetics does not provide the lens through which all of Nietzschean thought is made clear. Nietzsche's doctrine of necessary fictions, presented most prominently in *Beyond Good and Evil* 4, demonstrates that even if we live in a world devoid of truths, there still exist, Nietzsche believes, certain fictions without which we cannot live.

Chapter 5 traces the development of the doctrine of necessary fictions from its origin in the early essay "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense," through *The Gay Science*, to its final form in *Beyond Good and Evil*. In the last works, however, this doctrine is rarely mentioned—in large part, I believe, because it is based on an understanding of the physical world. Nietzsche rarely theorizes about the physical world in his published writings.

Chapter 6 identifies three stylistic criteria present in Nietzsche's later works. What is important here is not so much the identification of these norms as showing how philosophy continues to function once it questions the notions of truth and systematicity. I also describe how my understanding of Nietzsche's use of style and taste differs from that of Alexander Nehamas. Nehamas, in *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, believes that Nietzsche uses a plurality of styles to make his presence as an author impossible to overlook. He maintains that Nietzsche wants us to create out of our lives a single literary character, which exemplifies perspectivism. This allows Nietzsche to avoid what Nehamas takes to be the self-undermining posture of arguing for perspectivism.

In contrast, I argue that Nietzsche justifies the superiority of certain tastes without worrying about the fact that they are simply his perspective. While his remarks on taste and style can never be tightly systematized, certain trends can be noted. Nietzsche repeatedly emphasizes the importance of formulating one's own values, of

creating one's views out of a wealth of perspectives, and of correcting or idealizing the objects of our investigations. These three criteria are among those to which Nietzsche in the later works repeatedly refers in order to justify the self-proclaimed superiority of his views.

Chapter 7 critiques Nietzsche's social thought from a Nietzschean perspective. Agreeing with Nietzsche that in the absence of truth there are only pragmatic necessities and aesthetic considerations (that is, the necessary fictions discussed in chapter 5 and the aesthetic reasoning discussed in chapter 6), I offer a critique of Nietzsche's lack of social conscience inspired by some of his own best insights. In doing so, I engage Rorty's contention, presented in *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, that we should split ourselves into public and private individuals—pursuing liberalism in our public lives and irony in our private lives. Rorty claims that Nietzsche's radical undermining of the notion of truth, while edifying for our private investigations of personal identity, is extremely dangerous and therefore to be avoided in public life. There is nothing wrong, in my opinion, with Nietzsche's practice of basing our ethical decisions on our personal choices. What I object to is rather the content of his social views. Nietzsche's want of social concern is not suited to a world in which our survival is increasingly dependent upon our working together.

Chapter 1

The Eternal Return and the Plurality of Nietzsche's Voices

On my horizon, thoughts have arisen the likes of which I have never seen before.
—letter to Heinrich Kösterlitz,
August 14, 1881 (KSB 6, 136)

Nietzsche's eternal return is more radical than most other conceptions of cyclical history, for he often seems to argue that everything both has been and will return, eternally. But does he believe in a literal, unending preexistence and return of all things? Or is this strange doctrine simply a metaphor or an aid to help us visualize the difficulty of a Nietzschean affirmation of life? Can we desire everything both to have been and to return again endlessly? I hope to show in this first chapter why to these simple questions there are no simple answers. Karl Löwith, Joan Stambaugh, Bernd Magnus, and Günther Abel have all written outstanding books on the subject, but these studies have been hampered by a failure to appreciate fully the difficulties in giving a systematic reading to Nietzsche's thought.[1]

All attempts to freeze the doctrine of the eternal return, or for that matter most of Nietzsche's other doctrines, into one interpretation will tell us more about the interpreter's intentions than about Nietzsche's.[2] This first chapter will discuss some of difficulties involved in developing a systematic reading of the eternal return. As

Bernd Magnus writes, commentators on Nietzsche quarrel "not merely about the nuances of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, but about its gross outlines."[3] Unlike Magnus, I believe that these difficulties arise in large part because Nietzsche never arrives at a final interpretation of the doctrine. His presentations of it in *The Gay Science*, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the late writings, the *Nachlass*, and his letters are not consistent.[4] He gives it varying interpretations depending upon the context and he underlines the variety of these interpretations by the multiplicity of voices with which he announces the doctrine. After following the eternal return through Nietzsche's published and unpublished works, we will be left, at the end of the chapter, with the question that the rest of this book will attempt to answer: How to make philosophic sense out of a thinker who often seems unsystematic and professes to be untruthful?

I will examine Nietzsche's accounts of the eternal return using as guides the first volume of Heidegger's massive Nietzsche lectures and Magnus's two insightful books on the subject.[5] Heidegger maintains that Nietzsche remains trapped within the web of metaphysical thought. He argues that, while seeking to overcome the metaphysical tradition, Nietzsche unconsciously shares its most basic concern—namely, a preoccupation with the nature of being, which leads to the exclusion of the questioning of Being itself. In particular, Nietzsche's unconscious metaphysical presuppositions are revealed in the doctrine of the eternal return, according to Heidegger.

Using Heidegger's *Nietzsche* we will explore the published references to this doctrine plotting the changes it undergoes. Heidegger is, in some ways, a strange choice for a guide, particularly for the published works, since he claims that the unpublished writings provide the key to understanding the eternal return. But in practice it is in his analysis of the published writings that Heidegger develops his interpretation of the doctrine.[6] In fact, there are two other factors that are more important for judging Heidegger's interpretation of the eternal return. First, the lectures that compose the Nietzsche book were given in the 1930s and 1940s, but first published in 1961. Heidegger wrote in the preface (the preface was written in 1961) to the lectures that he published them to give his readers an insight into "the path his thought had taken from 1930 to the 'Letter on Humanism'" (1947) (1:10). In the "Letter on Humanism" Heidegger counters Sartre's contention that he is a humanist, insisting that his thought had always sought to uncover Being. Heidegger views his

study of Nietzsche as something other than *blosse Auslegung* (simple exegesis) and explicitly warns against taking it as this. He does not clearly delineate between exegesis and the presentation of his own ideas. This is particularly true, as we will see, in his interpretation of "time" and of the "moment" in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. In the guise of interpretation, it is often Heidegger's own views that are being presented in his interpretation of Nietzsche.[7]

I will skirt the second significant problem with Heidegger's interpretation of the eternal return by not saying much about the second volume of Heidegger's Nietzsche study. There is (although Heidegger never admits to this) an important change in his interpretation of the eternal return near the end of the first volume. This change does not originate in any new reading of Nietzsche's text, but rather arises out of an evolution in Heidegger's own thought. Heidegger claims, for most of the first volume, that at least some people are capable of determining what will or will not return. Then, near the end of the first volume and continuing into the second, he argues that the eternal return teaches that we can never decide what returns, but rather "What becomes is the same itself" (2:11). As long as Heidegger believes it is a matter of choice as to what returns (that is, through most of the first volume), he calls Nietzsche a metaphysician based on the general notion that Nietzsche's doctrine is concerned with the Being of being. But when he changes his position and claims that the doctrine means we have no choice as to what returns, this allows Heidegger to specify his reasons for labeling Nietzsche's thought metaphysical.

Given this change in his interpretation of the eternal return, he can argue that Nietzsche thinks of time as the eternal return of discrete moments.[8] Particularly at the beginning of the second volume, Heidegger maintains that the eternal return leads to a *Beständigung des Werdens* (reification of becoming), no longer arguing that in the moment we determine the future, the eternal return is now held to arrest becoming. Heidegger writes here that although Nietzsche wants to embrace becoming, the eternal return metamorphizes becoming into *das Bleibende* (that which remains).[9]

If, in spite of these difficulties, I still use Heidegger as a guide to the published writings, it is because Heidegger and Nietzsche both saw themselves as rebels within the philosophic tradition. Reading Heidegger and Nietzsche, we have a chance to compare two insurrections. Integral to Heidegger's rebellion is his method of reading his

predecessors. Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche is based not only on what Nietzsche says; he also claims to bring out the "unsaid" (*das Ungesagte*) in Nietzsche's writings. As O. Pöggeler writes, rather than explaining Nietzsche's writings, Heidegger seeks to find Nietzsche's place in the history of Western thought.[10] He strives, through a continual *Hinausdenken* (further thinking) in wider nexuses, to uncover the basic characteristics of Nietzsche's thought in order to recognize Nietzsche's metaphysical *Grundstellung* (basic position).[11] The central question of this chapter is whether or not Nietzsche has a "basic position" on the eternal return. Although Heidegger analyzes several of the most important passages about the eternal return in depth, his concern for integrating Nietzsche into the metaphysical tradition causes him to overlook the differences in Nietzsche's eternal return.[12]

Magnus is more sensitive to the twists and turns that this doctrine takes, but he too arrives at a "final" interpretation. He labels it an "existential imperative." Magnus claims that Nietzsche's primary concern was not to describe the nature of beings, but to affirm this life, rather than some otherworldly salvation. We should want everything to return again, exactly as it was. Although in Magnus's more recent writings he has altered some aspects of his interpretations, he continues to seek a unified interpretation of the eternal return and thereby continues to oversystematize it.[13] At the end of this chapter we shall be left with more questions than answers. I shall draw some conclusions concerning the changes that Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal return undergoes. Here the focus is on the limitations of Heidegger's and Magnus's interpretations in order to show that they do not seriously consider the possibility that Nietzsche's doctrine may not be entirely consistent and therefore do not understand what is, in my opinion, the most revolutionary aspect of Nietzsche's thought. My reconstruction of Nietzsche's thought, emphasizing the role that pragmatic and aesthetic criteria play in his choice of interpretations, will follow in chapters 5 and 6.

Eternal Return in *The Gay Science* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*

Heidegger begins his analysis of the eternal return, which lies at the heart of the first volume of his Nietzsche lectures, with a rather

extravagant claim. The will to power, Heidegger writes, is a concept that Nietzsche can formulate only after he has conceived of the eternal return (1:338-39).[14] Nor does the will to power, once introduced, replace or dominate the eternal return. To describe the relationship of the two, Heidegger uses the metaphor of a source and a current. The will to power arises out of the eternal return and remains dependent upon it as a current always relies upon its source (1:338-39).[15] In another place in the first volume, Heidegger writes that the planned book, *The Will to Power*, is from its beginning to its end dominated (*durchherrscht*) by the eternal return. Nietzsche saw his *Hauptaufgabe* (principal task) as the *Auslegung* (exposition) of all occurrences (*Geschehens*) as will to power (1:164). That this effort, however, is carried out through the thought of the eternal return (*vom Gedanken der ewigen Wiederkehr getragen*) is so obvious according to Heidegger that one is almost "embarrassed" to mention the fact.[16]

Even a cursory glance at Nietzsche's writings gives us reason to pause at this claim. The first reference to the doctrine is in the *Nachlass* and stems from August 1881. In the published writings, the idea that all things return is introduced, but not specifically labeled the eternal return, in the second to last aphorism of the fourth book of *The Gay Science* (written in the spring of 1882).[17] It receives its most extended discussion in the published works in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, a book about which Nietzsche writes that its basic concept (*Grundkonzeption*) is the thought of the eternal return.[18] But even here it is not mentioned until Book 3 of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* ("On the Vision and the Riddle"). It is alluded to, without specific mention, in *Beyond Good and Evil* (aphorism 56), mentioned in the last aphorism of *The Twilight of the Idols* ("Ancients," 5), and discussed very briefly twice in *Ecce Homo* (EH: "BT," 5; "Z," 1). Nietzsche never repudiated the doctrine, but it is far from apparent that it dominates his thinking.

The first published reference to the doctrine, aphorism 341 of *The Gay Science*, entitled "The Greatest Weight," consists of a series of questions. When taken together, they define, without using the name eternal return, what would be for Nietzsche the most difficult thing to accept. There are two voices in the text: a narrator's and a demon's. Although Heidegger and others have identified the voice of the narrator's as Nietzsche's voice, I hesitate to do this.[19] Unlike the aphorisms leading up to it in 341, Nietzsche does not identify

himself unambiguously as the author of these thoughts.[20] The narrator addresses the reader with the informal *du* (you). This familarity is typical of many passages in *The Gay Science*. For example in 340, Nietzsche uses the first person plural to encompass both himself and his reader. In 338 the reader is addressed with the second person informal plural. But here the narrator speaks to the listener with the second person *singular* (*du*) and this serves to underline, I think, that this is a challenge to individuals—as the aphorism states in their "loneliest of loneliness"—and not a collective challenge. Each individual reader is asked to imagine a demon who whispers that he or she is condemned to repeat the same life over eternally. The narrator then poses a series of questions probing how one might react if the world were as the demon describes it. The narrator claims this would be the most difficult thing to accept.

Quotation marks set off the voice of the demon from the narrator. Unlike the demon from Descartes's *Meditations*, this demon casts our previous notions into doubt by revealing the "truth."[21] It describes a world in which everything returns, in exactly the same order; all humans can do is either affirm it (say yes to life) or try to ignore it. The narrator does not assert that every thing literally returns, but asks, "If life were so could you affirm it?" Those who could affirm it would be capable of carrying the heaviest weight:[22]

> How would it be if one day or night a demon were to steal up to you in your loneliest loneliness and say to you: "this life, as you now live it and have lived it, you must live it another time, even an infinite number of times. And there will be nothing new in it, rather every pain and every desire and every thought and breath and everything unspeakably small and large in your life must come to you again; everything in the same succession and sequence. (GS, 341)

There are many reasons, according to Heidegger, for calling the eternal return the heaviest thought, but he specifically mentions only two. First when we think it we think being, in its entirety: "It is the heaviest thought in many ways. First in relationship to what is thought in it, being in its entirety (*das Seiende im Ganzen*)" (1:276). Given Heidegger's broader thesis (in most of the first volume), that it is Nietzsche's concern for being (and his forgetting to ask the question concerning Being itself) that makes him a metaphysician, it is not sur-

prising that he would interpret "the heavy weight" in this manner.

In *The Gay Science* 341 there is some justification for Heidegger's claim that the eternal return is a doctrine about beings. The doctrine's heaviness results from our inability to affect what returns. We are asked if we could live with the knowledge that neither human agency, nor a wisdom in nature, select what comes back, but rather all things return exactly as they were. But Nietzsche, or rather the narrator, does not claim that this is the nature of the world; the narrator asks if we could affirm life if it were so. At least in *The Gay Science*, that all beings return highlights the difficulty of affirming life. We should love life so much that we would want everything to return eternally.

Secondly, Heidegger claims that with regard to thinking itself, it is the heaviest thought:

> Then, however, in relationship to thinking itself: with regard to this it is the heaviest thought. For it must think through (*hindurchdenken*) the inner fullness of being, and the outer border of being in its entirety and at the same time through the loneliest loneliness of mankind. (ibid.)

With regard to thinking itself, it is the heaviest thought because it requires us to think through the loneliest loneliness. "The loneliest loneliness" is Nietzsche's phrase, but Heidegger interprets it in a way that seems to me to go beyond what Nietzsche said, or left unsaid. When and where, asks Heidegger, do we arrive at that moment of loneliest loneliness? Not when we become a hermit or concentrate exclusively on our "I," rather when a person[23] "is entirely himself; when he stands in the most essential relationships (*wesentlichsten Bezügen*) of his historical *Dasein* in the middle of being in general." (1:275)

What reasons does the narrator of *The Gay Science* 341 give for calling the eternal return the heaviest thought? The demon compares humans to minute flecks of dust (*Stäubchen vom Staube*) in an hourglass, which is eternally turned over, and asks, Do we love life so much that even if it were so, we could still say yes to it—that is, affirm it and want it to return endlessly?

> The eternal hourglass of *Dasein* will be turned over eternally and you with it, you minute fleck of dust. Would you not throw

> yourself down, gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke like this? Or have you once experienced a moment (*Augenblick*) where you would answer him: "you are a god and never have I heard anything more godly." (GS, 341)

It becomes even more evident as he begins to interpret *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* that most of the first volume of Heidegger's interpretation is marked by his questioning of the nature of *Dasein*. As I have already said, it is possible to trace Heidegger's declining interest in *Dasein* over the course of the lectures. In his interpretation of *The Gay Science* this has not yet occurred. Here Heidegger is still asking questions about the relationship of human existence and being in general. This Heideggerian agenda imposes itself in his interpretation of *The Gay Science* 341.

In particular Heidegger's second reason for calling the eternal return the heaviest weight bears little resemblance to the narrator's reasons. The narrator calls it the heaviest weight because it underscores the insignificance of human existence—that we are nothing more than minute flecks of dust, able, at most, to affirm (but never to alter) the return of all things. Standing in "the most essential relationships" of one's historical *Dasein* is a Heideggerian concern.

In December 1883 Nietzsche writes a series of letters just before the Christmas holidays. Lonely and depressed, he had gone to Nice instead of spending the winter in Genoa, as he had the year before, because Nice usually had over 220 sunny days a year; in six months in Nice he would have as many clear days as Genoa had in the entire year.[24] Over and over again in the letters, Nietzsche writes that clear skies are essential for his health. Even though Nice produced the promised clear skies, Nietzsche writes to Overbeck on December 24 that his health is as poor as it was in Basel. In a Christmas Day letter to his mother and sister we read that his health in the last four months was worse than in his worst times (KSB 6, 478). Then there are almost three weeks of silence. The next letter, to his publisher, is dated January 18, 1884:

> Good news, even more, the best possible news from my perspective: my *Zarathustra* is finished. I did not think last year that I would find this amazing thing, the conclusion to the first two parts, already this winter (to tell the truth in a few weeks). I am happy and, as often in my life, surprised by myself. (KSB 6, 479)[25]

A week later to Overbeck he writes: "the last two weeks were the happiest of my life." It is in this third section that not Zarathustra but a dwarf and Zarathustra's animals, introduce the most terrible of thoughts—the eternal return.

Heidegger's interpretation of the eternal return in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* consists of a long exposition of two passages ("On the Vision and the Riddle" and "The Convalescent") in this third book. In the former, Zarathustra poses a series of questions to a dwarf, who answers only the first. With the help of the latter section, Heidegger believes he discovers why the dwarf remains silent after Zarathustra rebukes him. "The Convalescent," in particular the concept of the *Augenblick* (blink of an eye), holds the key, according to Heidegger, to understanding why Zarathustra claims the dwarf makes it too easy on himself.

As the third book begins, Zarathustra, a friend to all those who travel great distances and do not wish to live without danger, boards a ship that will take him from the blessed isle to a distant land. After two days of silence he speaks with the crew telling them because they are "bold searchers . . . drunk with riddles and glad of the twilight," he will relate to them a riddle, the "vision of the loneliest." "On the Vision and the Riddle" describes a doorway in the mountains over which is written the word *Augenblick*. Here Zarathustra pauses and speaks to the dwarf he has been carrying up the mountains. Zarathustra tells the dwarf that he is the stronger of the two because the dwarf does not know his precipitous thought. Furthermore the dwarf could never bear it. But neither the dwarf's inevitable lack of understanding nor his inability to live with this thought deter Zarathustra from offering him an explanation. At the door two infinite paths come together; one goes forward and the other backwards. To Zarathustra's question, whether or not these paths contradict each other, the dwarf murmurs "disrespectfully" that every straight thing lies. All truth is crooked; time is a circle. In short, the dwarf seems to sketch in his answer the eternal return. But Zarathustra angrily replies that the dwarf is making it too easy on himself and continues, posing a series of questions to him.

Zarathustra asks what the dwarf thinks of the moment, and then replies to his question with another question: "Must not this passage have already been? And are not such things tied together so that this moment pulls along all future things to itself? Even itself? Must we not have all been here and must we not all come again? . . .

must we not eternally return (*ewig wiederkommen*)?" As he speaks these words his voice becomes ever softer due to his fear before his own thought. Suddenly he is distracted by the howling of a dog. The dwarf and the doorway disappear. He wonders if he had only dreamed the dwarf and the doorway.

The dog's howl not only marks the disappearing of the dwarf and the doorway, it also ushers in a second story. Zarathustra tells of how he sees a shepherd boy who has been sleeping with his mouth open. A snake entered into his mouth, and bit and held fast to the back of his throat. Zarathustra is unable to pull the snake out, so he tells the boy to bite off the snake's head, which the boy is able to do. The boy then spits out the head and jumps up radiant and laughing. Zarathustra claims that "never yet has a human being laughed like this boy." It is a laugh that Zarathustra longs for and gnaws at him.

In at least one point—and probably in others as well—there is a similarity between the descriptions of the eternal return in *The Gay Science* and *Zarathustra*. In both cases the doctrine is described through a series of questions.

The dwarf, according to Heidegger, sees only two infinite paths; he fails to see their *Zusammenstoss* (collision) in the moment. To see the moment as a collision one must be more than an observer, one must be the moment (Augenblick):

> . . . [between past and present] there is a collision. Obviously only for he who does not remain an observer, rather *himself is* the moment (*selbst der Augenblick ist*), who acts into the future and thereby does not allow the past to fall away, but rather at the same time overtakes and affirms it. He who stands in the moment is facing two directions: for him the past and the future run against one another (*gegeneinander*). He allows that which runs against one another to collide in himself and yet not to come to a stop because he unfolds the conflict of that which is already given up (*aufgegeben*) and that which is given-with (*Mitgegeben*). . . . What does all this say about the right way of thinking the eternal return? *The essential: what becomes in the future is precisely a product of decision.* (1:311-12) [emphasis added].

This person acts in the future and affirms the past. The two infinite paths, future and past, collide, but only for those who stand in the

moment and are not passive observers. In sharp contrast to what he will write two hundred pages later, Heidegger emphasizes that the decisions an individual makes in the moment determine how everything returns.

It becomes increasingly clear as he turns to the "Convalescent" that his interpretation of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, as was the case with *The Gay Science*, is simply not supported by the texts.[26] One of the most notable aspects of Heidegger's discussion of "The Convalescent" is what it lacks—namely, a discussion of Zarathustra's healing. Zarathustra, at the beginning of "The Convalescent," cries out with a terrible voice that drives away all the animals except the snake and the eagle. He proclaims that he is the advocate for life, suffering, and the circle. After crying I call you, my most precipitous thought, he falls down as if he were dead. He regains consciousness, but remains seven days in bed "pale and shaking," cared for by his animals.[27]

When Zarathustra begins to speak after these seven days, he first turns to a discussion of *Schwätzten* (chatter). He compares words to rainbows and calls them *Schein-Brücken* (apparent bridges), claiming that precisely among that which is most similar, appearance betrays most beautifully (ibid.). With speech, people dance over everything. The animals, according to Heidegger, like the dwarf, in "On the Vision and the Riddle," describe what seems to be the thought of the eternal return. Zarathustra laughs and call his animals *Schalks-Narren* (foolish knaves) and *Drehorgeln* (barrel organs). As Heidegger notes, the animals have failed to recognize an essential part of the teaching of the eternal return, but Heidegger is, in my opinion, mistaken as to the nature of the misunderstanding. He claims that about the content of the teaching nothing is said with the exception of the morning song (1:310). He believes that Nietzsche conveys to us only indirectly, through the course of the conversation, the difference between the chatter (*Geschwätz*) of the animals and Zarathustra's teaching of the eternal return.

Zarathustra believes he comes again to the same life: everything—even the little man—comes again. What is terrible in the thought of the eternal return is not that in the moment we decide what will or will not return, but the feeling of impotence that arises when one believes that the same things recur in precisely the same order.[28] Zarathustra's great ennui with regards to humankind—the thought that choked him—was that nothing matters. Even the small

man (*kleiner Mensch*) returns eternally, and therefore the smallest man and the grandest man (*grösster Mensch*) lie all too close together. Even the grandest man is all too human. Only on such an interpretation does the tragedy and the difficulty of affirming the eternal return fully surface. Although it is difficult if not impossible to fathom how the same thing can recur, this is what Zarathustra seems to claim—actually he tries to assert this, but the thought is so terrible that he swoons every time he seriously considers it.

In "The Convalescent" itself there is no evidence that Zarathustra can affirm the thought of eternal recurrence, but at the end of the third book in the section entitled "The Seven Seals (or: The Yes and Amen Song)" Kaufmann characterizes Zarathustra's affirmation of the doctrine as "boundless and without reservation."[29] Although Zarathustra does speak of lusting "after the nuptial ring of rings, the ring of recurrence," he never confronts specifically the possibility of a return of all things—even the little man—which made him swoon in "The Convalescent."

Those who believe in a literal return can point to the fact that in "The Convalescent" it is precisely the return of everything, even the little man, that causes Zarathustra to swoon. These comments in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* are not found within the context of a philosophical treatise. And, furthermore, Zarathustra himself cannot describe the thought. Just thinking of it seems to render him unconscious. How much comfort can the literalist take from words spoken by animals and affirmed by a literary character?

This is not to claim that *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is not a philosophic text, but a thinker who had said that God is dead introduces the doctrine in the *The Gay Science* as the words of a demon. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* it is first spoken by a dwarf and then sung by Zarathustra's animals. All of this might lead us to think that it is more of a poetic than a philosophical doctrine. To this I would reply the way Zarathustra did to his animals—when we try to dismiss *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* claiming that it is poetry and therefore not philosophy we are "making things too easy." The doctrine may be presented poetically in this work, but it has the specificity, complexity, and wide-ranging character that marks philosophic thought.

Zarathustra was not the only one who had difficulty with this thought. To Overbeck, Nietzsche writes on March 8, 1884, that his only source of courage during the time he wrote *Zarathustra* he found within himself. What exactly required courage he does not

explicitly say, but the eternal return is not far to seek: "Courage to carry that thought. Then I am very far from announcing it and presenting it. If it is true or even more believed to be true—then everything changes and revolves and all previous values are devalued" (KSB 6, 494).

Paying careful attention to the various voices with which Nietzsche has described the eternal return, we have noticed that in neither *The Gay Science* nor *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* have we heard unambiguously Nietzsche's own voice. And yet these passages are, arguably, the most important discussions of the eternal return in the published works.

Although Heidegger argues against a literal return of all things here, it is, I believe, mainly for reasons that have to do with his own project. In the middle of the first volume of his Nietzsche interpretation, Nietzsche serves as the mouthpiece for Heidegger's own thought. Without any knowledge of Heidegger's discussion of time from *Being and Time*, Heidegger's summary of "The Convalescent" is, in my opinion, very unclear. Heidegger believes that we can understand Nietzsche's notion of eternity through that of the moment. He interprets the eternal in Nietzsche by contrasting it with that which remains eternally the same (*Ewig-Gleichbleibenden*) (1:315). Nietzsche's concept of the eternity of the moment can only be thought of, according to Heidegger, when the teacher of the eternal return understands himself through the teaching. That which is taught is not simply of academic interest, but rather is existentially relevant. The teacher must understand himself as a necessary sacrifice that must *untergehen* because he is a transition (*Übergang*) (1:314).

This *Untergang* of the moment has a double meaning for Nietzsche, according to Heidegger. First *Hinuntergang als Anerkennung des Abgrunds* (going down as recognition of the groundless) and second *Weggang als Übergang* (going away as transition). The moment of *Untergang* is not simply gone, it is rather the shortest moment, which is therefore the moment that is most past. At the same time, it is the moment that is most fulfilled, "in which flashes the lightest light of being in its totality" (1:314). This is the moment where the whole of the return is grasped.

> Pictorially, however, this is the ring of the serpent, the living ring. And here join together for Nietzsche in the picture of the

> serpent the connection (*Zusammenhang*) of eternity and the blink of an eye to a unity: the living ring of a serpent that is the eternal return and the moment. (1:314)

I agree with David Krell that when Heidegger claims that for Zarathustra in the moment all is decided as to what will or will not return, he is suggesting that Zarathustra's notion of infinity is an authentic notion of time.[30] At this point in the lectures, Heidegger is attributing to Zarathustra essentially his own vision of time. Time as a passage (*Übergang*), which inevitably implies a decline (*Untergang*), is akin to Heidegger's own vision of an authentic understanding of time as the inevitable march towards death, discussed in paragraph 65 of *Being and Time.*

Heidegger holds on to this interpretation of the eternal return for most of the first volume of the Nietzsche lectures. Near the end of the lectures for 1937, Heidegger reviews the concept of the moment and again emphasizes that in the moment the future is decided. Zarathustra knows (in contrast to the dwarf, who remains silent after the second question is posed) that in the moment, everything is decided as to what will and will not return. The teaching of the eternal return is the overcoming of Nihilism (*Überwindung des Nihilismus*). The thought is only thought when we put ourselves *in die Zeitlichkeit des Selbsthandeln und Entscheidens* (in the timeliness of self-motivated actions and decisions). The teaching of the eternal return is not that everything is the same, and therefore that everything is indifferent, rather everything comes again and therefore depends on every moment (1:446).

Heidegger's Nietzsche lectures do give us the promised insight into the path of his thought between 1930 and the "Letter on Humanism." They reveal the connection between his growing pessimism with regard to the overcoming of metaphysics and the declining importance of *Dasein* in his thought. Through most of the first volume Heidegger remains optimistic about the possibility of overcoming metaphysics. Central to this project of overcoming is a new understanding of time. In particular his interpretation of the moment in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (as a never-ending passage) seems to be offered as a precursor to an authentic understanding of time, which would help prepare the way for an eventual overcoming of metaphysical thought. Exactly how such a notion of time would lead to an overcoming of metaphysical thought we

never discover, for in the course of the Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger becomes less optimistic about his ability to overcome metaphysics. And this pessimism about his own project translates into an interpretation where Nietzsche is himself further from overcoming metaphysics.

At the end of the first volume and continuing into the second, Heidegger emphasizes that time for Nietzsche consists of a series of returning moments. The moment is no longer the purely transitory passage (Heidegger called it the "collision") between past and future where all is decided as to what returns. Now Nietzsche remains a metaphysician, because he believes that reality consists of static moments that return eternally. Reality so conceived precludes becoming in a truly transitory sense—as Heidegger refers to it, *das fortgesetzte Andere* (the progressive other) (2:11).

Time, for Nietzsche, in this second of Heidegger's interpretations, is a series of moments—like a string of beads. Each moment is a discrete entity, or, to develop my metaphor, a bead. The hands of time exchange one bead for another. Reality consists in a series of discrete moments turning in an endless circle. Change, in the sense of an entirely new bead (moment) from outside the circle, is excluded. Since there is no change—that is, no new bead from outside the circle—it makes no sense to speak of a *fortgesetzte Andere* (progressive other); rather, the exchange of beads brings the constant return of the same. Becoming, for Nietzsche, means exchange—that is, the exchange of one moment for the next where all moments are contained in an ever-repeating circle. Now the *Augenblick* refers only to the duration of the eternally returning moment.

Heidegger interprets Nietzsche's conception of time as a series of short static integers rather than a seamless never-ending transition from past to present, and therefore Nietzsche is now seen primarily as a metaphysician. But since in Nietzsche's thought these recurring static moments last no longer than the "blink of an eye," Nietzsche has brought metaphysical thought to a close. If he could overcome Nietzsche's arresting of time in the moment, Heidegger seems to believe he could begin to uncover what philosophy since the Greeks had obscured.[31] What, however, marks the second volume is a pessimism about finding a new conception of time.

In the course of this book we shall see that Nietzsche believes his thought to be an overcoming of the tradition, but not through the

invention of a new way of understanding concepts such as time. It involves, rather, a repetition of the tradition and a new attitude toward truth and consistency. Nietzsche is no longer concerned with the Cartesian project of dividing the true from the false in order to build an unshakable foundation. Absolute truth has been undermined, if for no other reason that we can no longer believe in it. Instead of looking for the way to overcome the metaphysical tradition, Nietzsche offers a discourse rendered subversive by its lack of an authoritative voice. Concepts such as the eternal return remain, and at times they seem little different from the truths they replace, but they are whispered by demons, murmured by dwarfs, sung by animals, or preached by Zarathustra.

Eternal Return in *Beyond Good and Evil*, *Twilight of the Idols*, and *Ecce Homo*

The last four published discussions of the eternal return in Nietzsche's works receive scant attention in Heidegger's account—indeed, in most other accounts as well. He devotes a few pages to *Beyond Good and Evil* 56, and mentions that the doctrine is discussed in *Ecce Homo*, but he gives these sections no extended treatment. This is unfortunate, in my opinion, because these latter references add not only to our understanding of the eternal return but, even more importantly, give us a crucial insight into the manner in which Nietzsche philosophizes. Far from establishing a definitive version of the eternal return, they add to the problems of those seeking simple answers. In particular, in one place in *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche seems to give, within a few lines, first a nonliteral interpretation and then a literal one.

In *Beyond Good and Evil* 56, as in *The Gay Science*, the doctrine is alluded to without being specifically mentioned. Nietzsche, using the first person, writes not as if he were offering an interpretation of the world, but rather presents the notion that everything returns as his ideal. He calls it a "tragic" ideal, but cautions that his definition of "tragic" is the inverse of the Buddha's or Schopenhauer's. Unlike Buddha and Schopenhauer, Nietzsche does not associate tragedy with pessimism. Using the conditional, he writes that his ideal would serve the overcourageous, liveliest, and most world-affirming people. They would not only have learned to accept what

was and is, but insofar as something had existed or did exist they would want to have it again, throughout eternity. They would cry *da capo* (from the beginning) not only to themselves, but unlike Zarathustra, to the whole play and spectacle. Even more clearly than in *The Gay Science* 341, Nietzsche is not presenting a theory about the world, but rather asking if we could say yes to such a world. In contrast to the earlier formulation of the doctrine, here the link between the doctrine and Nietzsche's notion of tragedy is made explicit.

After *Beyond Good and Evil* the eternal return is sometimes attributed to Zarathustra and sometimes to Nietzsche. In *Twilight of the Idols*, a work about which Nietzsche wrote "this is my philosophy in nuce," the eternal return is mentioned once.[32] Here tragedy is again contrasted with Schopenhauer's pessimism. Nor is tragedy, as Aristotle claimed, designed to release us from fear and sympathy, but rather it is "yes-saying to life even in its most difficult problems." This means saying yes to the sacrifice of one's highest types (*Typen*) and transforming oneself into the eternal desire of becoming (*die ewige Lust des Werdens selbst zu sein*) (TI, "Ancients," 5). Understanding tragedy as the affirmation of becoming, Nietzsche claims to come full circle and regain the place where his work began—*The Birth of Tragedy*:

> And with this [his understanding of tragedy] I touch again the place from which I first went forth—*The Birth of Tragedy* was my first reevaluation of all values. With this I place myself again on the ground from which my willing and my ability (*Können*) grow. I the last boy of the philosopher Dionysus; I the teacher of the eternal return.

Here being the teacher of the eternal return coincides with the role of the last boy of Dionysus. Both roles are inspired by his understanding of tragedy as an orgastic affirmation of life—a reveling in becoming and the destruction that inevitably accompanies it. The differences between Zarathustra's inability to name the thought in "The Convalescent" and Nietzsche's reveling here, suggest that the doctrine does not mean the same thing for these two. It is true that in the "The Seven Seals" Zarathustra can sing "For I love you, oh eternity," but he cannot or at least does not call himself the teacher of the eternal return in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*.

Of the last references to the eternal return, the one found in *Ecce Homo* discussion of *The Birth of Tragedy* is the most interesting and, to my mind, most problematical. Here Nietzsche quotes, even giving the page number, from his account in *Twilight of the Idols*.[33] Again tragedy is called yes-saying to life in its hardest problems. Nietzsche's philosophy is Dionysian, affirming passing away and annihilation. It says yes to opposition, war, becoming, and radically rejects the idea of being:

> The affirmation of passing away and annihilation, the decisive element in a Dionysian philosophy, the Yes-saying to opposition and war, becoming with a radical rejection of even the concept of Being: on the basis of this I recognize, in all circumstances, what is the closest to me out of all that has been thought up to now. (EH, "BT," 3)

All of this suggests a nonliteral interpretation of the eternal return. But then, immediately following these lines we read: "The teaching of the eternal return: that means of the unconditioned and unending repeated circularity of all things. This teaching could have been taught by Heraclitus" (EH, "BT," 3).

How can the eternal return teach the unconditional and unending repetition of all things and at the same time be the affirmation of passing away and annihilation? And if it involves repetition, how is it a Heraclitian doctrine?[34] Just at the point where it might seem reasonable to interpret the eternal return as a tragic (not pessimistic) affirmation of the transience of life, Nietzsche repeats Zarathustra's claim that all things literally return. The last published reference to the doctrine, in his description of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* in *Ecce Homo*, does little to help us out of the problem. Here, Nietzsche again associates the doctrine with Zarathustra. He writes that the basic concept of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is eternal return. As in *Beyond Good and Evil* the affirmation of the return of all things is called the highest form of *Bejahung* (affirmation) (EH, "Zarathustra," 1). If anything, this confuses matters more by again suggesting that this is Zarathustra's doctrine.

We are back to the problem to which interpreters of the doctrine themselves eternally return. Having sifted through the published works we still have not arrived at a single interpretation of the eternal return. Perhaps the *Nachlass* can be of help.

Eternal Return in the *Nachlass*

Before asking what position Nietzsche takes on the eternal return in the *Nachlass*, I want to consider some of the problems as well as some of the possibilities that the publication of the *Nachlass* has brought with it.

The *Nachlass* is hardly monolithic. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montanari, the editors of the new edition of Nietzsche's works, have divided it into two groups, *nachgelassene Schriften* and *nachgelassene Fragmente*. Under the former they include several essays from Nietzsche's time in Basel, which were not published during his lifetime (for example, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense" belongs to this period). They also consider *The Anti-Christ*, *Ecce Homo*, and *Nietzsche Contra Wagner* (KSA, volume 6) *nachgelassene Schriften*, since they were not published before Nietzsche's fall into insanity. In volumes 7-13 of the KSA the editors assembled the fragments. For the purposes of this book, *Nachlass* will mean both the *nachgelassene Schriften* from volume 1 as well as the fragments (volumes 7-13). Since the manuscripts for *The Anti-Christ*, *Ecce Homo*, and *Nietzsche Contra Wagner* (KSA 6) were ready for the press, and since it seems that Nietzsche had every intention to publish them, I will not differentiate between them and the other works Nietzsche himself published.[35]

The *Nachlass* is a valuable resource for every Nietzsche scholar, but I separate the work that Nietzsche himself published or intended to publish and the fragments published by Nietzsche's editors.[36] It is incumbent on those who do not distinguish between them to explain why Nietzsche chose not to publish a remark. Nietzsche reviewed his unpublished notes extensively in the last years and prepared four books for publication in 1888. He had ample opportunity to publish the notes he considered important. If something appears only in the *Nachlass*, it is very possible Nietzsche was in some way dissatisfied with it. Certainly the notes can provide us with insight into the process that spawned Nietzsche's thought. My interpretation, concerned as it is with not only what Nietzsche said, but how he said it, will be based primarily on the published works. I think of the notes, as Kaufmann and Magnus do, as a place where Nietzsche carried out experiments with his thought, some of which he undoubtedly felt were unworthy of publication.

Those who take the eternal return literally find some support in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (and ought to quote the forementioned passage from *Ecce Homo*, but rarely do), but the *Nachlass* offers their most substantial support. The notes for the eternal return, however, bolster the argument that the *Nachlass* is a thought laboratory—a place where ideas could be experimented with.

In July 1881 Nietzsche went to Sils in search of clear skies, but for the first month the weather was uncharacteristically overcast. His health was bad. He writes Overbeck, on July 30, that he has already suffered from six attacks lasting two to three days each. Two weeks of silence separate that letter and the next, which is the one to Kösterlitz, which along with fragment 11[141] (KSA 9, 494) first announces the eternal return. In the fragments through to the end of that notebook (KSA 9, 572; 11[335])—the last few fragments from this notebook were, the editors tell us, added later—we have the most extended treatment of the eternal return found anywhere in Nietzsche's writings.

These include quite a few short fragments where it is unambiguously asserted that everything returns:

> Everything has returned: the Sirius (the brightest star in the sky) and the spider and your thought in this hour and even this thought that everything comes again. (KSA 9, 524; 11[206])[37]

Other passages suggest that nothing could ever return.

> Is not the existence of any particular difference and incomplete circular form in the world which surrounds us already a sufficient refutation against a completely circular form for all that exists? (KSA 9, 561; 11[311])

There are several fragments that have come to be labeled "proofs" for the eternal return. About these there has been, in recent years, considerable discussion. Magnus has examined some of these "proofs" at great length and concluded:

> Careful attention to the language of Nietzsche's alleged "proof" of recurrence seems to show that no such proof exists unambiguously. Further and more troubling the textual evidence may be taken to suggest that perhaps there can be no unam-

> biguous empirical argument for recurrence in Nietzsche's works at all, and that he was himself aware of this fact.[38]

In fact, in one these "proofs" (KSA 9, 523; 11[202]), according to Magnus, Nietzsche seems to argue both for and against a literal return.[39] Observing that the empirical "proofs" for the doctrine appear only in the *Nachlass* and arguing that they are weak, he concludes that Nietzsche may not have published them because he found them unsatisfactory.[40] It is not, according to Magnus, the cosmological import that was most important for Nietzsche.

One of the major weaknesses I find in Magnus's study is his failure to account for the fact that Nietzsche, even as late as 1888, his last productive year, is still experimenting with proofs of the doctrine in the *Nachlass*.[41] Magnus's examination of the proofs concentrates on the fragments from 1881. Günter Abel disputes Magnus's findings, claiming that within the entire Nachlass Nietzsche has given all the necessary elements to make his argument for the eternal return complete and valid.[42] To go into the dispute between Magnus and Abel in depth would be to risk losing sight of the point I am trying to make. And Abel's study is seriously flawed, in my opinion, by its failure to grapple with the problems of using the *Nachlass*. Indeed we can grant Magnus most of what he attempts to show and still disagree with his conclusion.

Magnus favors a nonliteral interpretation of the eternal return. The doctrine represents, for him, an imperative expressing the way Nietzsche believes life should be lived. It is, Magnus argues, not a moral, but rather an "existential imperative" describing the "being in the world" of the superman.[43] Magnus believes that Nietzsche was uncomfortable with the cosmological implications of the eternal return, and that the truth value of the doctrine is "utterly indifferent . . . recurrence is a visual and conceptual representation of a particular attitude toward life."[44] The empirical truth or falsity of the doctrine has no impact on the doctrine's existential import. In fact, the doctrine's empirical validity stands, according to Magnus, in inverse relation to the doctrine's existential import. It takes an even stronger act of will to affirm what is highly questionable.[45] Magnus is more certain than I am that Nietzsche finally decided what he thought about the eternal return.

It is true that Nietzsche never published any of his proofs of the eternal return, but the fact that he formulated them as often as he

did and over such a long period of time—including his last productive year, 1888—shows that Nietzsche devoted a great deal of thought to their empirical provableness. Nietzsche, for a time, considered studying physics at one of the major universities (first Vienna and then Paris) in order to prove that the doctrine was empirically valid. Even if Magnus is correct that Nietzsche was dissatisfied with his efforts to prove the doctrine, this does not imply that Nietzsche relegated its cosmological import to secondary importance. Nietzsche may have believed that someone more adept in scientific thought would be able to demonstrate it.

In the *Nachlass*, as in the published works, Nietzsche goes back and forth between several different interpretations of the eternal return. There is little evidence that Nietzsche is finally committed to any one reading of the doctrine. The reading he gives changes and is dependent upon the place where he is writing.

In his effort to find one interpretation for the eternal return, Magnus overstates his case, falling into the trap that interpreters of Nietzsche rarely avoid. They assume that Nietzsche speaks with one voice. The evidence is overwhelming, particularly with regard to the doctrine of the eternal return, that Nietzsche is speaking with many voices: his published and his unpublished voice as well as the voice of his letters; the voice of Zarathustra and that of his animals; the voice of a would-be natural scientist as well as that of a philologist-turned-philosopher—who, wanting to live in the moment, understood that if he were to ever have an audience, it would only be in the future.

Final Opinions

Although I will argue that aesthetics plays an important role in the voice that Nietzsche chooses, I cannot agree with Thomas Long who in a recent article claims that any interpretation of the eternal return is bound to fail because "Nietzsche's criterion of truth is both aesthetic and individual."[46] It will become evident in later chapters that I have very different views on the role aesthetics plays in Nietzsche's thought. Long believes that the eternal return is a cosmic vision for which argumentation and the criterion of truth are irrelevant. Long is basically correct that for Nietzsche interpretations will never be capable of uncovering truth, but to imply from

this that for Nietzsche language is inherently useless—as Long does—is to overstate his case.

In chapter 5 I will be arguing that, for Nietzsche, false theories can be quite useful, even indispensable for life. Chapter 6 will show that Nietzsche has a variety of criteria for judging the nobility of interpretations. Nietzsche's refusal to give a unified or final interpretation does not mean that he considers theorizing as useless. Nor does it prevent Nietzsche, at least on occasion, from presenting one interpretation in the guise of truth. For Nietzsche, an interpretation's value is not judged according to its truth or falsity, or at least these are not the exclusive standards of judgment. Furthermore there is a difference between asserting that Nietzsche was unconcerned with reconciling these voices with one another, and the claim that reconciliation was not his only project and certainly not his *forte*. Very often he found it more fruitful to present many sides of an issue than a unified position. Nietzsche was, in at least one sense, profoundly un-Hegelian: he rarely provides us with a final synthesis. This does not mean that he stopped trying. But as we will see in chapter 6, one of the characteristics of the noble soul is the ability to contain contradictions.

In BGE 289, an aphorism crucial both for this chapter as well as this book as a whole, Nietzsche asks, Does not a philosopher write books to hide his secrets?[47] To claim that we must therefore turn to the *Nachlass* to find Nietzsche's true views is to ignore the rest of the aphorism, where it is claimed that it is questionable "whether or not philosophers can have opinions which are final and truly their own" (BGE 289).[48] Nietzsche's doctrines are a reworking of traditional ideas, transformed in part with an eye to the context in which they are presented; often they are meant to clash with that context. When we place too much emphasis on deciding which is the *one* correct interpretation of a Nietzschean doctrine, we have misunderstood the spirit of Nietzsche's thought. Nietzsche does not have final opinions, but rather opinions that are suited to particular moments.

This desire to give a final interpretation to the eternal return is what troubles me most about both Heidegger's and Magnus's interpretations of the doctrine. At first Heidegger seeks to find in Nietzsche a precursor to his new understanding of *Dasein*. That leads him to claim that in the moment all is decided as to what will or will not return. Later he saddles Nietzsche with advocating an

unending return of all moments. In both cases Heidegger reifies Nietzsche's thought. Heidegger, who seeks to overcome the metaphysical tradition, fails to appreciate the innovation spawned in Nietzsche's rejection of final truth. What sets Nietzsche apart from the tradition is not so much any one revolutionary concept or group of concepts, but a different attitude toward conceptual thinking. Magnus is more sensitive to Nietzsche's texts, but he too wishes to arrive at a final interpretation of Nietzsche's doctrine.

If Nietzsche does not give us his final conclusions and truthful opinions, then how does he decide what to publish? If he does not intend to give us the truth, or his best estimation of the truth, what does he write? These are the issues that the rest of this book addresses.

Conclusion

The Gay Science 341 is a series of questions in which the eternal return is never mentioned by name and where the emphasis is placed on how difficult such a vision of reality would be to live with. Zarathustra (or rather a dwarf and Zarathustra's animals) gives us an account of the eternal return where the emphasis does seem to be, despite what Heidegger says, that every moment returns, but what can we conclude with certainty from this account given by a dwarf and animals? *Beyond Good and Evil* 59 relates the doctrine to Nietzsche's notion of tragedy. The last references go further in this, characterizing it as the affirmation of *vergehen und vernichten* (passing away and destruction), a Heraclitian doctrine, but in one place (the discussion of *The Birth of Tragedy* in *Ecce Homo*) a literal return is implied. In the *Nachlass* there is evidence to support both a literal interpretation and a metaphorical one. The letters suggest that although Nietzsche was unsure that he had proven the doctrine was empirically true, he held out hopes that he might one day. How then are we to understand the eternal return?

Instead of trying to give one reading to the idea we should see that Nietzsche presented the doctrine differently at different times. In the majority of cases it may well be something like what Magnus calls an existential imperative, a way to affirm life, but Zarathustra, for one, takes it literally. Magnus also fails to adequately account for the fact that Nietzsche never stops working with the idea of an

empirical proof for the doctrine, even as late as 1888. The key to understanding how to reconcile Nietzsche's different positions on the eternal return, in my opinion, is to see that there is no one monolithic interpretation of the doctrine! The interpretation Nietzsche gives depends upon the context in which he is writing and the audience he addresses. The anonymity of the *Nachlass* gives the would-be natural scientist the liberty to experiment with an empirical proof. Zarathustra and his animals claim that everything returns, and that abets Nietzsche, in the aphoristic work, to make his point about a tragic interpretation of the world.

To give a unified interpretation to the doctrine is to fail to appreciate the style of Nietzsche's thought.

Nietzsche has no final opinion concerning the eternal return, but does the same hold true for Nietzsche's other doctrines, for example, the will to power? In the next chapter, I will examine this question and it will become clear, although it may not be as open-ended as the eternal return, that there is an evolution in Nietzsche's views on the subject. And there are, Nietzsche believes, important differences between his assertion that the world is will to power and nothing else, and the truth claims of other philosophers.

Interpreters of Nietzsche must decide how to approach this unsystematic thinker, especially if they are going to claim that he is a philosopher. Some maintain that Nietzsche is more systematic than he first appears—that is, that there is a systematic character implicit in Nietzsche's thought that Nietzsche himself never fully developed or at least never fully expressed. The other possibility is to expand the traditional notion of philosophic thought, to see it as something other than system-building and search for truth. I think that it is in a Nietzschean spirit to attempt the latter.

Chapter 2

A System of Will to Power?

I am mistrustful of all systematic thinkers—the will to system is a lack of Rechtschaffenheit" *(integrity, honesty, uprightness).*

—(TI, "Maxims," 26)

If chapter 1 has shown that Nietzsche uses a plurality of voices when describing the eternal return, the question arises: Is the rest of Nietzsche's thought so unsystematic? This chapter will examine what I believe to be the most systematic of all Nietzsche's teachings and an idea around which he, for a time, thought about constructing a system: the will to power.[1] *Beyond Good and Evil* (Nietzsche's first book after *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*) contains his most prolonged discussion of the will to power in the published works (and only one allusion to the eternal return). In this work, the will to power is proposed as the core of a theory seeking to explain all life, the inorganic world, the self, and a system of evaluation. In *Beyond Good and Evil* 36 he writes of finding one explanation for all occurrences—human, animal, and inorganic. Will to power would be the basis for Nietzsche's explanation and evaluation of human culture, as well as an explanation for the growth of plants and all occurrences in the inorganic world.

But *Beyond Good and Evil*'s exposition of the will to power represents the pinnacle of Nietzsche's systematic thought. After

toying with the idea of becoming a natural scientist and systematic thinker, Nietzsche turns, in his last works, back to the study of that which he knew best—human culture. His subsequent works are peppered with references to the doctrine, but it ceases to be discussed in the published works as a principle of inorganic matter. After *Beyond Good and Evil*, it is most often used as an evaluative measure rather than a metaphysical description. There is again in *Twilight of the Idols* mention of the will to power in conjunction with a theory of the subject, but these infrequent appearances of the will to power grow increasingly difficult to systematize. The doctrine becomes more akin to a recurring motif than a foundation for a consequent system. To the extent that Nietzsche summarizes his thought it is not entitled, as was once planned, *The Will to Power*, but rather *Twilight of the Idols* and *The Anti-Christ*.[2]

As a prelude to my examination of the systematicity of the will to power, I will peruse Heidegger's attempt to make the doctrine a marker on the *Holzwege* leading to the overcoming of not only systematic thought, but conceptual thought in general. In the first section of the Nietzsche lectures entitled "The Will to Power as Art" (given in 1937), Heidegger sees the doctrine as a propaedeutic to the overcoming of conceptual thought preparing the way for an experience of being itself. Certainly, for both Heidegger and Nietzsche, language is incapable of invoking true essences. But Nietzsche does not attempt the Heideggerian project of overcoming conceptual knowledge in order to return to some original preconceptual experience of Being. Heidegger claims that Nietzsche's thought merely prepares the way for his own project, but again here, as in chapter 1, I wish to emphasize that Heideggerian *Holzwege* often wander rather far from the paths of Nietzsche's thought.[3]

As a postscript I will turn to Müller-Lauter's claim that the will to power forms the basis for the system of Nietzsche's thought, and that his thought distinguishes itself from all previous systems by virtue of its consequence. Müller-Lauter's bid to construct a systematic philosophy of will to power leaves me with the impression that the interpreter is more systematic than the interpreted. Even at the will to power's systematic heights, Nietzsche does not deem this theory to be indubitable or for that matter anything more than his perspective. It is, as Nietzsche himself writes, only an interpretation (BGE, 22). I will argue that, given the decline of this "system" of will to power in the later works, to the extent that it is pos-

sible to systematize Nietzsche's thought, it must be done in more general terms and that, as we will see in chapter 6, aesthetic criteria are the most important.

Heidegger: The Will to Power As the Overcoming of Conceptual Thought

The two hundred fifty pages with which Heidegger's Nietzsche lectures begin are entitled "The Will to Power as Art." They present a recurring discussion of the will to power as that which finds itself through a constant overcoming of itself.[4] David Krell notes what other commentators on Heidegger's lectures often miss—namely, that Heidegger abandons this generally favorable interpretation in the second section of the lectures written in 1938. But in this first section, Heidegger sees the will to power "as nothing less than an ecstatic being-beyond-oneself in the manner of human existentiality or finite transcendence. As a perpetual self-overcoming, Will to Power is another word for *epimeleia*, *Sorge*, 'care'."[5]

As I have already mentioned, there are enormous difficulties associated with reading Heidegger as an interpreter of Nietzsche. At their best these lectures are a remarkably straightforward account of Heidegger's thought between *Being and Time* and "The Letter on Humanism." My chief concern remains to contrast two different modes of thought. When Heidegger interprets the will to power in a way that suggests a remarkable affinity to his own thinking, we can see most clearly the difference between his project and Nietzsche's. Whereas the latter seeks to overcome the tradition through a reevaluation of truth and consistency, Heidegger reflects on the possibility of doing away with conceptual knowledge altogether.

The notion of *entelechy* provides Heidegger with the first occasion for a discussion of the theme of the will to power's self-overcoming. Heidegger writes: "Power as will is that which seeks to go beyond itself, but which is therefore exactly that which comes to itself and finds itself and proclaims itself in the closed simplicity of its essence, in Greek '*entelechy*'" (1:77). *Entelechy* is, in turn, a key word for Müller-Lauter's critique of Heidegger, for Nietzsche seems to reject the notion of a unified will to power or of the will to power coming to itself.[6] Müller-Lauter notes that Nietzsche explicitly rejects the notion of *entelechy*. But Heidegger's interpretation of

this term is not at all the conventional one—as his interpretations rarely are. For, paradoxically, when Heidegger avers that *entelechy* is the key to understanding the coming to itself of the will to power, he is claiming that this coming to itself is at the same time an overcoming.

Heidegger writes that we read Aristotle through the distorting lens of the Middle Ages; they have obscured Aristotle's teaching to the point that we no longer understand it (1:78). Book 9 of *The Metaphysics*, where the relationship between *dynamis*, *energia*, and *entelechy* is discussed, is the most questionable (*frag-würdigste*) in the entire Aristotelian corpus. How, we may ask, can an obscure and questionable section of Aristotle's thought aid us in understanding the will to power? Heidegger's hyphenation of *frag-würdigste* indicates that the word is to be interpreted somewhat differently than is customary. *Würdig* means "worthy" and *frag* is the stem of *fragen* (to question); without the hyphen the term would mean that Aristotle's book is unsound, perhaps inauthentic. The hyphenation suggests that Book 9 of *The Metaphysics* is "worthy of questioning" or worthy of careful study. In short, we can understand Nietzsche's will to power in the light of an obscure, but worthy book from Aristotle, only if, however, we avoid the commonly accepted interpretations of *dynamis*, *energia* and, most importantly, *entelechy*.

What is the difference between the interpretation of the Middle Ages and Aristotle's original intention?

> Since the beginning of modern times philosophy has become stuck in the attempt to understand Being through thought (*das Sein aus dem Denken*). Therefore the determinations of Being—*potentia* and *actus*—were brought into the realm of the most basic forms of thought, of judgments. Possibility, reality and in addition necessity become modalities of Being and of thinking. (1:77)

The Middle Ages have obscured Aristotle's meaning from most of us, but Heidegger has recovered enough for his thought to be of help. Today's scholastic (the word is obviously being used in a pejorative sense) philosophy manipulates Aristotle's concepts in a learned exercise, a display of cleverness; whereas in Aristotle, the investigation of *dynamis*, *entelechy*, and *energia* is still philosophy (1:77). "Today's scholasticism" remains within the realm of conceptual thinking,

whereas Aristotle was still in touch with a tradition that somehow thinks Being without concepts. *Entelechy* plays a key role in describing how the will to power's coming to itself through overcoming itself makes it a benchmark on the path of the overcoming of conceptual thought. It is a concept on the borderline of postconceptual knowledge, and thereby paves the way for postmetaphysical thought—if you believe Heidegger.

This rather abstract discussion is echoed in a more concrete one—namely, in a discussion of art. Particularly in these early lectures (which are, as I have already noted, entitled "The Will to Power as Art"), art is discussed extensively. Heidegger writes that art is not just a *Gestalt* of the will to power, but even more a *Gestalt* of Being in general (*überhaupt*). It is the "exemplary *Gestalt* of Being" and as such demands to be discussed fully. Aesthetics must also be discussed, for it is the most basic consciousness of art:

> Because for us it comes into question to consider art as a *Gestalt* of the will to power, that is as a *Gestalt* of Being in general even more as its exemplary *Gestalt.* Therefore the question of aesthetics must be fully discussed for, it is the fundamental consciousness of art and knowledge of art. (1:94)

Heidegger gives a history of aesthetics, beginning with the Greeks and ending with Nietzsche. I summarize only the first and last of these stages, for they are most important for understanding the affinity Heidegger sees between himself and Nietzsche. According to Heidegger, the pre-Socratics lacked a "*denkerisch-begriffliche Besinnung auf die grosse Kunst*" (thoughtful-conceptual consciousness of great art) (1:95). Instead of experiencing art through concepts and thought, they experienced it "in the dark ebullition of experience which is untouched by concepts and knowledge. The Greeks had fortunately no experiences (*Erlebnisse*), but instead a more originally grown clearer knowledge so that they needed no aesthetic in this clarity of knowledge."

In the time of Plato and Aristotle, in conjunction with the rise of philosophy, the basic concepts were formed, which in the future would define the circle in which all questions concerning art would be found (1:95). These concepts (the most important in the definition of aesthetics being material and form) paved the way for the fall of art. The beginning of aesthetics marks, according to Heidegger, the

end of great art and the great philosophy that accompanied it.

Nietzsche prepares, Heidegger believes, the way back to a preconceptual experience of art. His "aesthetics" involves "scientific research of the body and its processes and the causes which stimulate it" (1:109). By reducing aesthetics to biology—that is, to the recording of the stimulation of nerves and the body—Nietzsche approaches an understanding of art without concepts—and so heralds the age of the end of aesthetics. Heidegger writes that Nietzsche's questioning takes aesthetics to its outer limits but does not overcome it. That would require a more fundamental change of our *Dasein* and knowledge for which Nietzsche's metaphysical thinking only indirectly prepares us (1:154). Nietzsche's reflections on art remain "aesthetic" and therefore "metaphysical," in Heidegger's opinion, because they still represent an attempt to determine the Being of beings (*eine Bestimmung des Seins des Seienden*) (1:154). For Nietzsche, art is "the most important way in which a being is made into a being" (*das Seiende zum Seienden geschaffen wird*) and art is the highest gestalt of the will to power (1:154).

But Nietzsche's thought is so close to the end of aesthetics that it also points toward its overcoming, particularly through his philosophy of great style. The essence of art, for Nietzsche, is found, according to Heidegger, in "great style," which affirms not being, but Being itself:

> Because great style is a giving-yes-saying Will to Being, (*ein schenkend-ja-sagendes Wollen zum Sein ist*) its essence reveals itself precisely first when a decision is made, through great style itself, as to what the Being of being means. (1:158)

The revelation of the essence of great style—which would constitute the affirmation of Being—awaits the decision as to the nature of the Being of beings.

Heidegger contrasts Nietzsche's concept of great style with the notion of classical style. Classical style seeks to bring the wild, almost uncontrollable, under the order of self-established laws. It is neither purely active nor simply a longing after Being and permanence (*Bestand*) (1:158). Formally, according to Heidegger, Nietzsche would say that great style exists where the *Überfluss sich in das Einfache bändigt* (overflow binds itself in the simple) (1:158). It demands that oppositions not be excluded as merely external—that

is, as that which must be fought and negated. Great style not only contains its sharpest contradiction, it metamorphizes itself into its contradictory without losing itself. This metamorphosis (and this represents the decisive difference, for Heidegger, between classical and great style) produces instead *Wesenentfaltung* (the unfolding of essence) (1:159).[7]

Heidegger's discussion of art has, however, only made this return to self more problematic. How is a return to self possible in a world where form seems hardly present? When great style is evidenced in the ability of the will to incorporate its contradictions by metamorphizing itself into its contradictions rather than overpowering them, the question is raised: Does the ensuing identity—the abundance (*Überfluss*), which "binds itself in the simple" (*bändigt sich in das Einfache*), have any character at all? Is that which Heidegger calls "great style" only an amorphous collection of unresolved contradictions?

This notion of *Wesenentfaltung* through a metamorphosis into its contradiction represents more than just an interpretation of Nietzsche's concept of great style. Heidegger claims that *Wesenentfaltung*, so understood, is an explanation of the true nature of power (*echte Macht*). Romantic art has its origins in want and is a desiring of that which wishes to go away from itself, *ein-von-sich-weg-wollen* (1:161). But true willing is actually not something that goes outside itself, rather it goes beyond itself (*über-sich-hinweg*). In this going-beyond-self "the will collects in itself precisely the one who wills, takes it into itself and metamorphizes it" (1:161). True willing occurs where abundance and fullness bring themselves under the law of the simple. True power is not found where there is a "reaction against that which is not yet conquered." Power is rather first found where the simplicity of peace holds sway (1:161). When we understand will as that which "gives all things the freedom to be what they are in their essence and to reach their own self-imposed limits," then we have arrived at the summit of Nietzsche's aesthetic, which is actually no longer an aesthetic: With a vision of that what Nietzsche thinks of as great style and demands of style, we have first arrived at the summit of his aesthetic, which is no longer an aesthetic" (1: 161).

Nietzsche's aesthetic of great style prepares the way out of the learned exercise philosophy has become as well as the way back to what philosophy had been. Analogously, Heidegger maintains that

the Greeks before Plato had an experience of art that was clearer because it was untouched by concepts. Unencumbered by concepts, this early Greek experience of art achieved, Heidegger would have us believe, a level of clarity that the later Greeks lost.[8] Nietzsche's philosophy of great style constitutes a rapprochement with the preaesthetic understanding of early Greek thinking.[9]

Heidegger's interpretation lacks, in my opinion, an adequate explanation of why the process of differentiating beings (*Seiende*) constitutes "a fall" and why salvation would be found in overcoming conceptual thinking. He seems captive to the kind of thinking he wants to escape in a way that he has not recognized. The characteristic sign of metaphysical thought, for Heidegger, is a concern for the Being of beings to the exclusion of Being itself.[10] Nietzsche would agree with Heidegger that many, perhaps all, of the distinctions that, to use Heidegger's words, "the metaphysical tradition" has introduced may be, in some sense, arbitrary or artificial, and some philosophers' concern with differentiation has blinded them to unity. Absolute foundations for knowledge are most likely unattainable and yet, for Nietzsche, neither the excesses of analytic thought nor its seemingly inherent artificiality constitute sufficient grounds to abandon it altogether. Here Heidegger's and Nietzsche's thought are the most disparate. For Nietzsche, paradise is not found in the overcoming of inauthentic distinctions nor in a return to a preconceptual experience.[11] Indeed all talk of paradise—be it the lost world of the Presocratics or the redemption sought beyond conceptual knowledge—is alien to Nietzsche's notion of loving one's fate.[12]

Nietzsche and Heidegger have widely disparate views on the value of conceptual knowledge. Heidegger devotes considerable time, in his Nietzsche lectures, to a discussion of the relationship between Plato and Nietzsche. He asks if Nietzsche's thought constitutes an *Umkehrung* (inversion) of Plato's. There are occasions when Nietzsche himself claims as much, but Nietzsche has another reaction to Plato that Heidegger does not adequately consider. In *Beyond Good and Evil* 14, Nietzsche writes of his respect for Plato's thought. It is "noble," because Plato takes pleasure in opposing (*widerstreben*) the sensual (*Sinnefälligkeit*). Plato's pleasure is both greater and more demanding than the pleasure derived from the senses by Nietzsche and his contemporaries. He knew how to find a higher triumph by being master over the senses: "and this by means of pale cold gray concept nets which they threw over the bright whirling

world of the senses, which Plato calls the sensual mob" (BGE, 14).

This seems like an inversion of Plato's thinking, which makes it all the more important for our purposes. It suggests that Nietzsche has imposed his own agenda upon Plato, revealing at least two important facets of his own perspective on concepts.[13] First, concepts are not capable of exactly representing reality. Although many Nietzsche interpreters, particularly postmodernists, have failed to notice it, Nietzsche often writes that our conceptual schemes are flawed because they do not adequately describe reality (*Wirklichkeit*). His often disparaging attitude toward the concept of "truth" sometimes extends to "reality," but not always.[14] Like Heidegger, Nietzsche believes that the world does not admit of a conceptual order. Instead concepts impose, or attempt to impose, order. As he writes at the beginning of the aphorism—and this is a point to which I will return—even physics is only an interpretation and not an explanation of reality. Second, and this is where Heidegger and Nietzsche differ, Nietzsche does not seek nonconceptual knowing, which would invoke the "dark ebullition of experience" untouched by concepts, but is quite comfortable with the strictures that concepts present. Nietzsche neither laments nor seeks to circumvent the falsification of the world through concepts.

Nietzsche recognized that his indifference to the truth-content of judgments about the world would be difficult for his readers to understand. He writes: "The falsity of a judgement is for us no objection against it; perhaps this is where our new language sounds the strangest" (BGE, 4).

In some places his critique of concepts *seems* to go further, suggesting a rejection of all concepts. For instance, in *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche writes that the whole conceptual opposition of subject and object is nothing but a mistake (GM, 3, 12). Philosophers must protect themselves from the conceptual fables of a pure, timeless subject of knowledge devoid of will, and of pain.[15] Nietzsche also warns here against such contradictory concepts as "pure reason," "absolute spirit," and "knowledge-in-itself." But Nietzsche is not claiming that all concepts are useless or that we need to find a new kind of knowledge beyond conceptual knowledge. His point is rather that certain philosophical concepts, in particular some of those used by Kant and Hegel, are useless and should be avoided because through them "nothing can be thought" (*gar nicht gedacht werden kann*) (GM, III, 12). All concepts are false in

the sense that they simplify reality, but there are some that Nietzsche deems both false and of little value. Included in this group are concepts such as "substance," and "the thing-in-itself." These concepts are self-contradictory and useless.

A second group, and I will go into this in detail in chapter 5, of concepts are, he believes, false, and yet essential for life. In the fifth book of *The Gay Science* Nietzsche asks: "What is this will to truth? . . . why not deceive?" (GS, 344). Both truth and untruth (*Unwahrheit*) could prove to be useful or the will to truth could be *lebensfeindlich* (hostile to life), even destructive (*zerstörerisch*); the will to truth might actually be "the will to death." In *Beyond Good and Evil* 4 he writes that his new language sounds the strangest when he says that the falseness of a judgment never constitutes an objection to it.[16] Without a constant falsification of the world through the inventions of logic, life would not be possible. Numbers, a priori synthetic judgments, and identity are included in this group. Not their truth, but the extent to which propositions encourage life, support life, is, Nietzsche writes, important for him. Life is only possible where we have learned to measure reality (*Wirklichkeit*) on the purely invented world of the unconditional (*Unbedingt*), which is identical to itself. Here Nietzsche is echoing a conclusion he came to in the early manuscript, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense": the fictions of logic create the stability that life requires.[17] *Beyond Good and Evil* 268 elaborates on how concepts contribute to our ability to survive; they are symbols (*Bildzeichen*) for impressions that often recur and arise when people live a long time under similar conditions. Especially when in danger, people need the ability to communicate quickly with each other and not be misunderstood. Concepts facilitate this. The more common one's experiences are, and the more similar humans are, the easier it is for them to survive. Those who are more "select, subtle, and strange" are more likely to succumb to accidents and less likely to propagate.

What then are Nietzsche's own cherished concepts, like the will to power? They are certainly the product of a strange (and perhaps subtle and select) spirit—hardly necessary for survival; nor are they easily communicated. They cannot be truths, in the conventional sense, and are not necessary fictions. How can Nietzsche claim that they are superior to other philosopher's truths when they are no more truthful?[18]

Nietzsche's Notion of the Subject

Within the system of will to power from *Beyond Good and Evil* there is a theory of subjectivity. Nietzsche uses the word "will" in two ways. He argues that the inorganic world and all living things, including humans, are comprised of forces. These forces of his antiatomistic world are called wills. In addition, the word also represents a common prejudice: many people believe that humans have *a* will that serves as the author of their voluntary actions.

When Nietzsche writes, in *Beyond Good and Evil* 19, that philosophers speak as if the will were the best known thing in the world, he is referring to what he calls the common prejudice or myth of the unified will as the author of our actions. Proponents of this view believe that thinking is an action that necessarily involves a subject as its cause (BGE, 54). This notion of the will as the source of human agency is connected with "a whole chain of mistaken conclusions and false estimations" (BGE, 19). The belief that willing is a sufficient ground for acting arises because most people reserve the attribution of willing for those occasions where they can be relatively sure of a positive outcome. Attributing the success to "the will" reinforces our notion of freedom of the will, allowing an increase in our feeling of power.

But, for Nietzsche, willing is actually a process involving ordering and obeying on the basis of "a societal construction of many 'souls'" (*eines Gesellschaftsbaus vieler "Seelen"*) (BGE, 19). "The will" is something complicated, actually a plurality of feelings—a unity only in word—possessing three basic characteristics. It includes feelings of attraction and repulsion toward objects and the corresponding feeling in the muscles:

> Let us be, for once, more cautious, let us be "unphilosophical," let us say that in every desire (*Wollen*) is first a plurality of feelings, namely the feeling away from something, the feeling towards something, the feeling of this away and towards themselves. There is also an accompanying feeling of the muscles which begins its games through a kind of habit as soon as we "desire" without setting our "arms and legs" in motion. (BGE, 19)

Our bodies are not set in motion through the feelings that accompany the actions of our muscles; the belief that they are is merely a product of habit. There is, in addition to these feelings, a thought accompanying every act of willing. It is the thought that "I am free and it must obey."

The will is, most of all, an affect (*vor allem noch ein Affekt*) (BGE, 19). The will is not effective; it does not cause anything, but rather it is an affect, akin to a mood or feeling whose origin is unclear. Nietzsche writes that it is the affect of the "Commando's" (*jener Affekt des Commando's*). The word *Kommando* (now written with a *k*) is borrowed from military vocabulary and means "command" or "military commander." Walter Kaufmann translates it simply as "command." While it may overstate the case to translate it "commander," his translation does not convey the possibility of personification suggested by the original. The aphorism states repeatedly that there is no unified will, no single force behind an individual's thoughts and actions. Both the individual and the world are the result of the interplay of a multitude of unstable forces constantly overwhelming other forces only to be, in turn, overwhelmed. Calling this interplay in the individual "the affect of the *Commando*'s" is ironic and essentially leaves the origin of the affects unclear. If there is anything which that origin cannot be, it is a unified self, directing, in military fashion, the whole affair.[19] Many of Nietzsche's beliefs concerning the will to power will change, but his vision of the self as an interplay of forces without a commander does not. The belief in a unified self as the cause of our actions is discussed as one of the "Four Great Errors" in *Twilight of the Idols*.[20] A second thing that remains constant is the use of irony at almost every crucial moment in the exposition of the will to power.

This theory of subjectivity anticipates and is perhaps the source for the postmodern dissolution of the subject. It is also troubling for it seems to propose, at the same time, two contrary if not contradictory notions. On the one hand Nietzsche rejects "freedom of the will" and on the other hand he writes of the efficacy of the great individual. For example, he maintains that artists know that they have the greatest feeling of freedom precisely when they no longer create things haphazardly, but rather out of necessity. Necessity and freedom are the same thing for them (BGE, 213).

The Will to Power As an Explanation for the Organic and Inorganic World

It is not possible to use Heidegger's *Nietzsche* as a guide to Nietzsche's writing on the will to power. Unlike his analysis of the eternal return, Heidegger never systematically examines Nietzsche's writings on the will to power. I turn instead to Müller-Lauter who, more than any other, has been responsible for the resurgence of Nietzsche scholarship in Germany, and who has in a series of writings laid out much of what I have organized into a three-part system of will to power. At the heart of the will to power is a theory of force. My understanding of this theory has been heavily influenced by what Müller-Lauter regards as one of his most important services to Nietzsche scholarship: namely, the destruction of the myth of a unitary will to power.[21] Basing his interpretation on the *Nachlass* he claims that to the extent we can speak of "a" will to power, it is constantly changing, a *ständig Änderndes Machtaufbauendes oder Machtabbauendes* (continually changing, augmenting or diminishing of power).[22] Nietzsche does not assume fixed unities (*Einheiten*), but rather an ever-changing quantum of will to power.[23] Furthermore, the will to power is never "singular, isolated, but rather it consists in the plurality of opposing wills in relationship with each other."[24]

While agreeing that the will to power should be viewed as a plurality of unstable forces, I am uncertain why Müller-Lauter builds his interpretation upon the *Nachlass*.[25] Mazzino Montinari, one of the two editors of the *Nachlass*, maintains that *Beyond Good and Evil* represents a compilation of the material from the notes from 1882-1885 that Nietzsche deemed worthy of publication.[26] I would go even further. The *Nachlass* may offer different twists and turns to the will to power, but it contains no more developed and systematic account than the one from *Beyond Good and Evil*. In particular, the first two sections entitled "On the Prejudices of Philosophers" and "Free Spirits" include the first sustained, most systematic and most nuanced, exposition of will and will to power in the published works.[27] They lay out in detail the theory that Müller-Lauter has built upon the *Nachlass*, in particular, that the world and the self consists entirely of unstable forces seeking to dominate each other.[28]

Although this is the most complete account of the will to power that Nietzsche ever published, Nietzsche's primary concern in

these sections is, as their title suggests, not so much to present his own views as to lampoon more traditional philosophic beliefs. At the heart of the prejudices of philosophers lies the belief that reality can be grasped conceptually. Nietzsche ridicules the pretension of a definitive explanation of reality, but he is not averse to offering an interpretation or theory of the world, at the heart of which, during the writing of *Beyond Good and Evil,* is the will to power.[29] Perhaps the greatest difference between Nietzsche's views and other philosopher's prejudices—and unquestionably that which would be most difficult for others to understand—is his reevaluation of truth. As Heidegger suggests, Nietzsche does doubt that reality can be known, but, as I have already mentioned, this does not lead Nietzsche to reject conceptual knowledge altogether.

In *Beyond Good and Evil* 9 Nietzsche calls nature wasteful, indifferent, without intentions and without consideration or justice: "indifference as power." Given its destructive power, it is impossible to live "according to nature." *Beyond Good and Evil* 12 refers to R. G. Boscovich as one of the greatest opponents of appearance (*Augenscheins*).[30] Boscovich is credited with convincing us that "material atomism"—the belief that atoms exist as tiny clumps of matter (*Klümpchen Atom*)—is one of the "best refuted things which exists." According to Nietzsche's view, both the physical world and all living things are made up of a plethora of forces constantly striving to overcome one another; domination, not self-preservation, is their goal.[31] "Life is will to power; self-preservation is only an indirect and frequent result of this" (BGE, 13). Life is essentially appropriation, injury, vanquishing of strangers and those who are weaker, and repression.[32] The ultimate fact of history is that all living things strive not to survive, but to *overcome*: "exploitation belongs to the essence of all living things as the basic organic function. It is the result of their will to power, which is precisely their will to life. . . . In reality it is the most basic fact of all history" (BGE, 259). All life—in other places in *Beyond Good and Evil* and the *Nachlass,* all inorganic forces are included as well—is made up of forces demonstrating the will to power.

As I have said before, it is important both to consider the context in which Nietzsche writes and to pay attention to his style. Building an interpretation on the published works, where Nietzsche carefully attended to these things, allows one to appreciate more fully their importance. It will become increasingly clear that

Nietzsche's "system of will to power" is grounded in rhetorical allusions and ironic juxtapositions. This is particularly true of the longest published treatment of the will to power, *Beyond Good and Evil* 36. This aphorism brings together Nietzsche's vision of the subject (as we have seen he understands the subject as a societal construction or *Gesellschaftsbau* of many competing forces) and his understanding of the organic and inorganic worlds.[33] It begins with the assumption that nothing real is "given" to us with the exception of our world of desires and passions: "Given that nothing else that is real is 'given' (to us) besides the world of desires and passions . . ." (BGE, 36).

Since the self (that is, a bundle of competing forces—forces that are inherently unstable and constantly coming into and going out of existence) is more directly known (actually the only thing directly known), it may serve as the starting point for understanding the physical world. This direct knowledge of the self recalls Descartes, but the self with which it begins and the world it establishes are in ironic juxtaposition to their Cartesian counterparts. Nietzsche has not provided us with any reason to think of these desires and passions as "given." In *Beyond Good and Evil* 16 he calls the belief in direct knowledge—be it Descartes's *cogito* or Schopenhauer's will—superstition.

Why then this claim that the passions are "given," and in light of Nietzsche's critique of the subject, exactly what are they "given" to? I return to *Beyond Good and Evil* 36 in search of an answer.

Understanding thinking as a relationship (*ein Verhalten*) of these drives to one another, is it then not allowed "to ask the question whether this given suffices in order to understand the so called mechanical (or material world)" (BGE, 36)?

First, Nietzsche wants to understand the organic world as a more primitive form of the world of affects (*als eine primitivere Form der Welt der Affekte*):

> In which everything lies enclosed in a powerful unity. That which in the organic process branches off and develops (no matter how moderate, spoiled or weak—) as a kind of world of drives in which several organic functions—self-control, assimilation, nourishment, division, transformation are synthetically tied up with one another—as an early form of life. (BGE, 36)

The organic world, so understood, would give us the right to see all productive power (*wirkende Kraft*) as will to power:

> Given finally that we would succeed in explaining all of our drives as the arrangement and branching of a basic form of the will—namely the will to power—as is my proposition . . . so man would have thereby won the right to call all effective power clearly will to power. (BGE, 36)

Far from explaining how these drives that make up the individual might be directly known, Nietzsche ignores that question and simply propels his "argument" with a second pseudo-Cartesian move. Beginning with the ironic certainty of this Nietzschean self, he infers, using, in good Cartesian style, a maxim—one should not use several explanations of causality if one will do—that the organic world resembles human beings. This maxim—that is, what Nietzsche calls the *Gewissen der Methode* (the conscientiousness of method)—is the only reason he gives for seeking a single explanation for both humans and the rest of the organic and inorganic world: "the conscientiousness of method demands not to assume many types of causality until the attempt to make do with one is taken to its outer limit (—to nonsense, if you please). That is the moral of method which even today we cannot escape" (BGE, 36).

A thinker not known for either his method or conscientiousness remarks that out of the conscientiousness of method (taken to its outer limit—to the point of nonsense!) he attempts to understand the organic world, on the model of the directly known self, as will to power. Nowhere in the published works does Nietzsche ever give us any reason to think that his claims of direct knowledge of the self or the "conscientiousness of method" may be understood other than ironically.[34]

What are we to make of this "argument," which begins with "direct knowledge" of a subject, which seems hardly knowable (for it is a constantly changing societal construction of forces) and is propelled by a maxim—the conscientiousness of method—which hardly seems appropriate for the highly unmethodical Nietzsche? The abundance of hypothetical language here leads Karl Schlechta to believe that this is not a definitive statement of Nietzsche's view. Finding no clear formulation of the will to power anywhere in Nietzsche's work, he concludes that Nietzsche, despite many attempts to elucidate

the doctrine, never arrived at a *vorzeigbaren Resultat* (presentable result).[35]

Müller-Lauter replies that Nietzsche speaks without hypothetical reservation when asserting that it is his proposition (*Satz*) that all instinctual life can be described as will to power. He claims that Schlechta has failed to appreciate that Nietzsche is using a stylistic means to distance himself from his central idea.[36] But I would suggest that instead of distancing himself from his doctrine, Nietzsche's use of the subjunctive makes his one use of the indicative all the more prominent. When taken as a whole, the aphorism underscores the will to power as Nietzsche's interpretation, for the only thing he declares here, without reservation, is that the will to power is *his* interpretation.[37]

Müller-Lauter believes that to characterize the will to power as a perspectival fiction would be to negate it.[38] In response to the charge that his interpretation overrationalizes Nietzsche, he replies that his effort to trace the *Vereinbarkeit* (unity) of Nietzsche's thought should not be equated with an attempt to find in it strictly rational proofs. He compares his search for continuity in the will to power to Heidegger's attempt to show that the will to power and the eternal return are compatible teachings.[39]

It is not logical contradictions that Nietzsche avoids in his description of the will to power, according to Müller-Lauter, but real contradictions. He notes that Nietzsche rejects the law of logical noncontradiction, on the grounds that it conceals the true nature of contradiction, but there is the actual impossibility (*die faktische Unmöglichkeit*) "(to assign to) the same will to power organ, functions which negate each other" (*demselben Organ des Machtwollens einander wechselseitig aufhebende Funktionen zugeordnet worden sein können*).[40] If I understand Müller-Lauter correctly, he is claiming that Nietzsche cannot, at the same time, assign two contrary attributes to the will to power. The actual expression of power must either exist or not exist; it cannot be both possible and impossible.[41] I agree that within Nietzsche's interpretation of the will to power it would make little sense to say something only to negate it unconditionally in the next moment. Meaning presupposes some consistency, and, as I will argue in chapter 6, Nietzsche believes that good style is possible only in the presence of self-imposed limits. But the need for consistency in a passage, a chapter, or within one book does not imply that to save his thought from absurdity Nietzsche must

insist that his interpretation is not merely one perspective or one interpretation among many.

All of Nietzsche's positions are perspectival fictions, and he claims it is nothing more than a moral prejudice to assert that truth is worth more than appearance (*Schein*) (BGE, 34). In *Beyond Good and Evil* 14, Nietzsche writes that there are only interpretations of the world, not definitive explanations, a condition from which in *Beyond Good and Evil* 22 he explicitly refuses to exclude his own thought.[42] Aphorism 22 begins by criticizing the *schlechte Interpretations-Künste* (poor arts of interpretation) of those who speak of the "lawfulness of nature." Such a vision is only a naive human concoction and inversion of the senses; actually, "tyranny" is too mild a word to describe the state of nature. After noting that he construes nature as will to power, Nietzsche ends the aphorism by underlining that this too is "only an interpretation": "Given that this is also only an interpretation and you are alert enough to bring this charge?—well, so much the better" (BGE, 22).

Nietzsche, as I will show in chapter 6, places great importance on the creation of one's own ideas and values. Not that he believes himself to be an entirely original thinker. He recognizes that his ideas have a genealogy. When writing that philosophical ideas belong together like the collective members of a continent, he does not exclude his own notions (BGE, 20). His innovation comes about as a result of a reworking of the tradition—relying in this case, for example, on figures, such as Heraclitus, and Boscovich. He relies on Descartes as well, for an ironic juxtaposition to his renovation and reevaluation of truth and systematicity.

Nietzsche no longer argues, as Descartes had, from indubitable foundations, nor does he seek to establish immutable truths. His parody of Descartes's method reminds us of the differences between his interpretations and Cartesian truths. The will to power is, in particular here in *Beyond Good and Evil*, a prevailing taste for Nietzsche's metaphysical as well as his anthropological and political thought, and he often uses it as a measure of value. But, for Nietzsche, understanding is always provisional; his views—noble as he may consider them—are only one of many possible interpretations. Unlike the "prejudices" of other philosophers, they are presented with ironic distance. Nietzsche touts their superiority—stylistically, pragmatically—and on occasion, particularly in *Beyond Good and Evil*, he even seems to hold that

his is the best approximation of reality. But they are always open to revision, always geared to a particular context, to a particular time and place.

Will to Power As a Standard of Evaluation

Building upon this theory of force, Nietzsche uses the will to power as a basis for a system of evaluation. As a standard of evaluation Nietzsche employs it to measure the worth of, among other things, individuals, moral systems, cultural phenomena, and entire cultures. Often it is used to argue that the evaluation has a physiological base. For example, Nietzsche writes that he is striving to make psychology again the "mistress of the sciences" at whose beck and call all other sciences would serve. But against the moralizing tendencies of his age, his psychology will be a physio-psychology—a morphology, the doctrine of the development of will to power (*Morphologie und Entwicklungslehre des Willens zur Macht*) (BGE, 23).

Given that domination, and not self-preservation, is the essence of life, Nietzsche asserts, against current prejudices, that "hate, grudge, greed, and lust for power" are all necessary for life and therefore must be encouraged and increased. To affirm conflict, is to affirm life itself (BGE, 23). Among equals it can be a sign of good morality (*Sitten*) to refrain from hurting one another, but when made into the principle of society, it becomes the will to the denial of life. Life is essentially the injuring, overpowering of foreigners; therefore in affirming life he affirms all these things as well (BGE, 259).

At times (and this becomes, as we will see, increasingly the case in the later works) Nietzsche's endorsement of violence and destruction is really an endorsement of one kind of life: namely, that of the short-lived, rarer spirits. In these moments Nietzsche presents us with an Achillean dilemma: to live short, glorious, conflict-filled lives and then expire on the plains of our Troys, or else to be mediocre survivors, living to an advanced age and dying in obscurity in our own beds. The mediocre are the "only ones who survive" (BGE, 262). Faced with this decision, Nietzsche affirms not the individual life, but rather what he takes to be the life process, which includes the inevitable decline and overcoming of those great individuals who give themselves over to conflict. Hardness, violence, slavery, danger in the streets and in hearts, hiddenness, and bad-

ness, all contribute to the elevation of the species (BGE, 44), but the higher individuals they produce will be short-lived.

Philosophers are to be judged, according to Nietzsche, among other things, according to their wills. The duty of philosophers has always been to be the bad conscious of their time. They dissect it and find the degeneration that lies beneath the morality of the day. Nothing is so typical of Nietzsche's time as weakness of the will (*Willensschwäche*). Therefore the ideal of greatness for the philosopher must contain strength of the will, hardness and the ability to maintain prolonged resolutions. Nietzsche defines the higher man (*höher mensch*) as beyond good and evil, the master of his virtues and possessor of a surfeit of wills (*Überreiche des Willens*) (BGE, 212).

Will to Power in *On the Genealogy of Morals*

The doctrine reaches its systematic heights in *Beyond Good and Evil*. After this there is an evolution in Nietzsche's thought, which those who fail to distinguish between the *Nachlass* and the published works (and to keep track of the chronology of Nietzsche's work) are at risk of overlooking.[43] Much of *Beyond Good and Evil*'s system of will to power disappears in the later work. Interestingly, it does so in a way that is foreshadowed in *Beyond Good and Evil* 36. As we have seen, in that aphorism first the subject is directly known as will to power and then by analogy the organic world, and finally, out of the "conscientiousness of method," Nietzsche attempts to interpret the inorganic world as will to power.

Although he never again, in the published works, claims to have immediate knowledge of the self, Nietzsche continues to regard it as an interplay of forces expressing the will to power up to the end of his productive life. He maintains that the organic world is will to power in *The Genealogy of Morals*, but this is deemphasized in the four works prepared for publication in 1888. After *Beyond Good and Evil* he no longer suggests, in the published works, that the will to power should be used as an explanation for the inorganic world. And in 1888 he rarely maintains this in the unpublished works.[44]

Beyond Good and Evil's (259) contention that life is a process of overcoming whereby forces seek not to preserve themselves, but rather to dominate other forces is easily incorporated, indeed funda-

mental for his evaluation of humans and their cultures. Nietzsche's belief concerning the instability of these forces can also be adapted and used when speaking of the noble person's need to take care against the underhanded tactics of lower persons. But Nietzsche's analysis of human activity is much too wide-ranging to be meaningfully summed up in the will to power. Like any theory attempting to give a unified explanation to human actions and organic processes, the will to power is inevitably of limited value in explaining human actions.

Faced with the decision of whether to be a physicist or philosopher, Nietzsche turned increasingly in his last works to the study of human culture.[45] He concentrated on analyses of Christianity, Christian morals, nineteenth-century culture—concerns to which the will to power often seems more tangential than central. It should be no surprise to us then that in *Twilight of the Idols*—a work about which he wrote in a letter to George Brandes, "this writing is my philosophy *in nuce*—radical to the point of criminality"—the doctrine is mentioned in only four aphorisms.[46] Although Nietzsche never repudiates the will to power and never admits to the limits of its usefulness, in the works after *Beyond Good and Evil* the doctrine's appearances increasingly have a cameolike quality about them.

The diminished importance of the doctrine is already evident as, in *The Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche turns to a discussion of morality. In this, his first work after *Beyond Good and Evil*, the will to power is mentioned less frequently. Although in *The Genealogy* Nietzsche writes that all organic occurrences are the result of the will to power, the doctrine is primarily used as a means of evaluation. In *The Genealogy*'s first discussion of it (GM, II, 12) the doctrine still purports to describe the underlying nature of all organic life. "All occurrences in the organic world are an overpowering (*Überwältigen*), becoming master of" (GM, II, 12).[47]

On the basis of this theory of the organic world, Nietzsche wants to explain and evaluate the phenomenon of punishment (*Strafe*). It has been naively assumed, Nietzsche writes, that the purpose of punishment arose out of a desire for revenge or prevention. Its purpose is, however, not the product of an original intention nor inherent to anything, but rather it reflects the outcome of current power relationships. Regardless of its origin, that which exists—be it bodily organs, judicial institutions, society's customs, art forms, religious cults or punishment—serves the prevailing force. Meaning,

he claims, is particularly vulnerable to this appropriation; although form is fluid, meaning is even more so. There is no single meaning of punishment, but rather it is composed of a synthesis of many meanings, including traces of its original significance as well as all those that have dominated it, and all these different meanings are impossible to sort out: "It is today impossible to say, with certainty, why we punish. All concepts in which an entire process is semeiotically brought together, escapes definition. Only that which has no history is definable" (GM, II, 13).

Nietzsche claims that the will to power distinguishes him from his democratic age, which has an aversion to domination, preferring nonsensical mechanistic interpretations to his interpretation of *Macht-Willens* (Power-Will). Step by step, such ludicrousness has worked its way into the apparently objective sciences. For Nietzsche, not only is all organic life a process of overcoming, but the "progress" of these dominating powers is measured according to the masses of small powers, which must be sacrificed as the greatest powers assert themselves:

> In short, death is one of the conditions for real progress (*progressus*) . . . if humanity as a mass were sacrificed for the advantage of a single strong species of man—that would be progress (*ein Fortschritt*). (GM, II, 12)

The use of the word "progress" to describe this process is another example of Nietzsche an irony. It serves to contrast his view that society should serve the interest of a noble few with nineteenth-century utopian concepts of progress rather than endorsing any utopian ideal himself.

This aphorism attempts to use the will to power to explain both basic organic functions, such as the development of bodily organs, and cultural phenomena, such as the power relationships within a society. And yet he describes human behavior (and this is also, as we noted, the case in *Beyond Good and Evil* 259) not as a war of all against all, but rather as a struggle of a small community of noble spirits against the masses. As individualistic as Nietzsche is, his vision of a noble human society cannot be reduced, as his model of the organic forces would suggest, to an anarchical war of all against all. This becomes increasingly clear in the course of *The Genealogy of Morals* and in the works from 1888.

A few pages later (GM, II, 18), the will to power is discussed again. When I said earlier that the later appearances of the doctrine often have a cameolike quality about them, it was passages like this that I had in mind. Here Nietzsche equates the instinct for freedom with the will to power, claiming that this same instinct is active in violence-artists (*Gewalt-Künstlern*), the organizers of states, and the creation of bad consciousness. Those afflicted with a bad conscience release this drive against themselves while violence-artists and organizers unleash it against others. The description of the violence-artists meshes easily with the cosmological description of the will to power, for they seek to overcome other forces. They are warriors and have little regard for their own preservation.

When Nietzsche, however, turns to the inward expression of this force, the connection with the previous descriptions of will to power becomes strained. If this form-building and raping power releases itself within the individual, it creates a divided soul out of which arises the possibility for the creation of great beauty. Bad conscience in the divided soul is a sickness, and, at the same time, a pregnancy capable of giving birth (GM, II, 19). Nietzsche avoids suggesting that human agency determines whether the will to power is turned inward or outward, for this would be difficult to reconcile with his notion of the self as it is developed in *Beyond Good and Evil* 19. But still, even without the suggestion that human agency is involved, there has been little to prepare us for this inward turn. How can the essence of life turn inward? Not only is this difficult to integrate into the cosmology from *Beyond Good and Evil*; I am not sure how to integrate it with the description of the will to power presented just four aphorisms earlier. This aphorism is more descriptive than evaluative. It may contain an important psychological insight, but like many of his psychological observations, it seems far removed from the doctrine used to describe all reality or even all organic reality. It is fairly easy to transfer his beliefs about the instability of power relationships from the physical world to the subject. But the basic theory of force, centered around the contention that forces seek to dominate other forces rather than preserve themselves—to enter into the fray and actively try to conquer others rather than sit safely on the sidelines—is of limited use when attempting to explain the complexity of the human psyche and in particular the phenomenon of motivation.

These difficulties are also evident in the third essay of *The Genealogy of Morals*. Here Nietzsche observes that the sick pose the greatest danger for healthy people (GM, III, 14). Whereas competition with other healthy individuals keeps the healthy strong, struggles with the sick are treacherous and should be avoided. While seeking out any and all kinds of power over the healthy, the sick specialize in underhanded methods; they are particularly adept at robbing the healthy of their happiness by provoking pity in them. There is no greater or more disastrous misunderstanding than for the powerful in body and soul to question their right to happiness. Overcoming the strong by invoking pity, the importance of happiness, and the danger involved in questioning one's happiness—these are psychological phenomena that the will to power offers little help in explaining, especially if Nietzsche is still intent on reducing psychology to physiology (or a morphology and doctrine of the development of will to power (BGE, 23). They represent novel ways of looking at human behavior. They are part of the antisocialist critique, which, I will argue in chapter 7, sometimes descends into an asocial nightmare. But even if the description, in some sense, can be related to the will to power, at the same time, it evidences again the limits of this theory, which would give a unified interpretation to the forces of the organic world and human activity that we normally label "intentional." How can the will to power describe both pity and the growth of plants?

Given that the weak can threaten the strong, Nietzsche writes of the steps that the strong should take to protect themselves against the weak (GM, III, 12). To insure that they do not succumb to pity, Nietzsche recommends that the healthy separate themselves. Given the danger the sick present, it cannot be the duty of the healthy to care for the sick. This provides the ascetic priests with their raison d'être. They are sick and hence can care for the sick. These priests combat, with great expertise, the depression of the slaves brought on by their bondage, by granting them small pleasures. Often they encourage the slaves to find pleasure for themselves by bringing happiness to others: to give a gift, lighten someone's load, to comfort or praise. The priests use the command "to love one's neighbor" to stimulate, in careful doses, the most life-affirming of all drives—the will to power (GM, III, 18).[48] The healthy are left to cultivate the *Pathos der Distanz* (pathos of distance) in order to keep themselves free from the harmful influences of the sick.

That the dominance of the strong is not assured, and that the balance between strong and weak is unstable and subject to change—this is of a piece with the instability attributed to all forces in *Beyond Good and Evil*, as well as the warnings he gave concerning the fragility of the higher spirits. Still one could think—given *Beyond Good and Evil*'s theory of force—that the stronger would present more of a danger to the strong than the weak. The will to power is not particularly helpful in this explanation of pity and its possible undermining effects. There are some connections between this passage and the description of will to power from *Beyond Good and Evil*, but again I do not see where the earlier quasi-physical theory of will to power measurably enhances this attempt to explain psychological phenomena.

The important question for this book is whether or not these passages from *The Genealogy of Morals* provide flesh to the bones of *Beyond Good and Evil*'s system of will to power. The limited number of times that the doctrine appears and the obvious limitations involved in trying to describe human motivations and the physical world with the same doctrine, suggests to me that the systematic plan of will to power presented in *Beyond Good and Evil* 36 soon proves too constraining. I would suggest that in *The Genealogy* Nietzsche is experimenting with an idea he found fascinating, but was uncertain how to employ. There is no need to repudiate the doctrine, for some aspects of it are useful in his analysis of human culture, but his treatment of it is less systematic in *The Genealogy of Morals* than it was in *Beyond Good and Evil*, and will become even less systematic in the works follow that.

Will to Power in the Works from 1888

In the last works, all written in 1888 (*Twilight of the Idols*, *The Anti-Christ*, *Nietzsche Contra Wagner*—actually a compilation of earlier writings on Wagner—*The Case of Wagner*, and *Ecce Homo*) two trends can be noted in Nietzsche's descriptions of the will to power. First, the will to power's importance as a description of the interaction of all organic forces continues to decline as its role as a sign or a standard for higher human existence or culture becomes more prominent. Second, the will to power is often mentioned in conjunction with Nietzsche's attempt to reduce psychological phe-

nomena to biological states. Sometimes these two things are combined and Nietzsche writes of the will to power as a biological standard by which higher humans can be judged.

In *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche asserts, as evidence of his greatness, that he has the will to power to an extent that no one has ever had it before (EH, "BT," 4).[49] In another place he writes of the contradictory things on which the Germans nourish themselves. Among other examples, he writes that they nourish themselves on both religious beliefs and science, and on Christian love as well as anti-semitism. The third set of contradictories on which the Germans feed is the "will to power (to *Reich*)" and the gospels (EH, "CW," 1). Here again the will to power is referred to as one among many drives and not, as *Beyond Good and Evil* 36 suggests, the drive by which all others would be explained.

The Genealogy's favorable evaluation of domination is repeated in *The Anti-Christ* and *Twilight of the Idols*, but in these later works, as in the *Ecce Homo* discussion of *The Birth of Tragedy*, the will to power functions not as the underlying fact of all existence. It becomes increasing a sign of higher existence.[50] In *The Anti-Christ* Nietzsche writes that happiness grows when power multiplies and one feels that a resistance has been overcome. The feeling of power, the will to power, and everything that raises the feeling of power and the will to power and power itself in humankind is good while all that arises out of weakness is bad (A, 2). Not peace, but war, is Nietzsche's virtue. His love of humankind is expressed through his first commandment: "the weak and the failures shall perish" (A, 2).[51]

Similarly in *Twilight of the Idols*, the will to power is primarily a sign of higher existence. Here it is the Greeks who are said to be distinguished by virtue of their "wills to power." Nietzsche writes that while others had seen in the Greeks "the beautiful soul" or "the golden mean," his psychological acumen preserved him from this "German silliness" (TI, "Ancients," 3). Against the dominant interpretation of his time, he saw "their strongest instincts: their wills to power." Shuddering at the idea of the unleashed violence of this drive, their institutions were erected as a series of guards against its explosive power. They turned the citizens' inner tensions and reckless hostility outside the city walls. Cities battled against one another to prevent massive conflict between individuals within the cities. As in *The Anti-Christ* and *Ecce Homo* the will to power is not

the principle of all life, but rather is exhibited in the strongest instincts of a few. While retaining the notion that the will to power is a will to dominate, it is no longer a description of how all forces relate to one another, but rather superior individuals are said to have stronger wills to power.

The use of the will to power in the reduction of psychological phenomena to physiology often occurs concurrently with its use as a standard of higher existence. For example, in *The Anti-Christ* Nietzsche warns us not to judge the Greeks by their philosophers, for these philosophers were the decadents of their civilization. Socrates' preaching of morality went against the older nobler tastes of the Greeks, which was evidenced in the power of their drives and not Socrates' or Plato's attempt to preach moral values. Similarly, the concern of his epoch for virtue reveals its rottenness (*Verdorbenheit*): "rottenness" not in any moral sense, but rather physiologically understood. Sacrificing oneself to "a higher ideal" is a sign of physiological decadence, because the corruption involved actually leads to a physical decline. Life is essentially "an instinct for growth, for continuance, for piling up of forces, for power: *where the will to power is absent there is decline* [emphasis added] (A, 6).

Again, as in *The Genealogy of Morals* and *Beyond Good and Evil*, will to power in 1888 is equated not with preservation, but rather with the attempt to dominate others. Here, however, it is a sign of abundant health, and Nietzsche is quite explicit that, in its absence, life is still possible—albeit a life in decline.[52]

In the epilogue to *The Case of Wagner*, after washing his hands of the composer, Nietzsche again defines virtue physiologically with the aid of the will to power. A society's virtues are not determined through any sort of collectivized rational decision. Rather virtue, like aesthetics, is indissolubly tied to biological conditions (*biologische Voraussetzungen*). Cultures have either the virtues of ascending life (*des aufsteigenden Lebens*) or of descending life (*niedergehendes Leben*), but never a mixture of the two, for these two groups of values are mutually exclusive. Descending life produces descending virtues (*niedergehende Tugenden*); for example, Christianity evidences biological decadence. Master morality is a sign of the ascending life.

Nietzsche writes that there is no greater opposition than the one between master morality and Christian morality. Compared to Christian morality, master morality "is the sign language (*Zeichen-*

sprache) of that which has turned out well—the ascending life, the will to power as the principle of life" (CW, epilogue). Nobility is associated with an ascending life—that is, a life that has as its principle the will to power. Again the will to power is not referred to as the principle of all life, but is only explicitly linked with the higher, more noble biological state, which produces master morality.

The reduction of virtue to physical conditions is even more crass in *Twilight of the Idols*. Eric Blondel notes that Nietzsche refers to himself as "medicynic," but claims that Nietzsche is much more cynical than medical. "The impact of numerous 'medicynical' phrases is less physiological than burlesque."[53] Nietzsche, ever the provocateur, claims that all aesthetics (including his own) can be reduced to two principles, actually he calls them "naive truths." Like *Beyond Good and Evil* 36, Nietzsche's argumentation here is grounded in irony. He maintains that, taken together, these two truths would circumscribe the entire realm of aesthetic judgments (TI, "Raids," 20). The first is that "only humans are beautiful," the second that "nothing is more ugly than the degenerating human" (*der entartende Mensch*):[54]

> Nothing is beautiful, only man is beautiful: on this naivete rests all aesthetics, it is its first truth. Let us immediately add, however, its second: nothing is uglier than the degenerate man. (TI, "Raids," 20)

The beautiful and the ugly have physiological effects. Everything that is ugly weakens and diminishes us. By reminding us of decay and danger, ugliness actually causes us to lose power. The effect of ugliness is so pronounced that it can be measured with a dynamometer—an instrument that measures force. What would this dynamometer measure? Presumably when brought into contact with something ugly, a person would show a drop in the energy being produced; in the presence of something beautiful, the energy would increase: "Man's feeling of power, his will to power, his courage, his pride—it falls with the ugly and rises with the beautiful" (TI, "Raids," 20).

Can the beautiful be reduced to a physiological measurement of will to power? As Blondel writes, for Nietzsche the body is only accessible through language. All physiology must first pass through philology; the body is only accessible "as a linguistic *phenomenon*,

as a part of a *semeiotics*, never as a body in-itself, as a non-linguistic *thing-in-itself.*"[55] Although Nietzsche claims that ugliness and beauty have physiological effects and that all aesthetics can be deduced from two principles, there is no detailed explanation of this purposed reduction of aesthetics to physiology.[56] The will to power is mentioned only in the parenthetical phrase—given no more emphasis than courage or pride.

It should surprise no one that, although Nietzsche claims that two "truths" are sufficient to delineate the realm of aesthetics, he never attempts to plot out in any detail the contours of this realm. What is important for Nietzsche, as he makes clear two aphorisms later (TI, "Raids," 22), is not that aesthetics can be reduced to will to power, but rather to differentiate his passionate and engaged attitude toward art from Schopenhauer's view—that aesthetic appreciation of art demands detachment.

Nietzsche's "truths"—that only humans are beautiful and that there is nothing uglier than the degenerate human—are not all that different from Schopenhauer's view that humans are the highest objectification of the will and therefore possess the possibility of containing the most beauty.[57] But, for Schopenhauer, beauty can only be grasped when the subject escapes the will and rises to a willless state (what Schopenhauer calls the pure will-less subject of knowledge).[58] Nietzsche's aesthetics calls for an engaged and directly involved observer rather than Schopenhauer's pure will-less subject. His goal is not to become a disinterested spectator, but to create an aesthetics fueled by the passions. Although both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer view humankind as the summit of beauty, Nietzsche subverts the intent of his forerunner's aesthetics. The will to power functions in the undermining of Schopenhauer, not as the foundation for Nietzsche's aesthetics.

Even though the explicit references to the will to power in the works from 1888 are few, both the measuring of health and decadence, and the corresponding assigning of values based on this quasi-physiological standard, are present throughout the later writings. There are repeated references to physiological conditions in order to support evaluative judgments. For example, in *Anti-Christ* 7 Nietzsche condemns sympathy on the basis that it causes one to lose energy: "Man loses power when one sympathizes." But Nietzsche also gives a second reason for rejecting sympathy and claims that it is more important than the first. Nietzsche writes

that sympathy goes against the most important law of development—namely, the law of selection. It leads to the survival of people who should in fact perish, and therefore weakens the race. That Nietzsche would refer to the second reason as more important than the first indicates that he finds a sociologically more developed reasoning more important than reductionist will to power theories. That is to say that the first reason (one loses power when one sympathizes) is directly related to the will to power theory, for it deals with loss and gain of power. The second is not, for it speaks of socially defined categories such as "selection" and in contrast to *Beyond Good and Evil* 36's attempt to explain everything in terms of will to power, it is the second explanation that interests Nietzsche more than the first.

There are throughout *The Anti-Christ*, and the rest of the later work, references to power and its augmentation and diminution, but at the heart of these books are psychological and sociological explanations, which are too complex to be reduced to a theory of force. Quasi-physiological explanations often appear in the later work, but they are used more in lampooning the theories of others than they are as the foundation for a system of thought. This suggests that it is something other than a system of will to power that Nietzsche has left us. Furthermore, Nietzsche seems to go back and forth on the question of whether or not the will to power underlines all life—as is suggested in *Beyond Good and Evil* 36—or is only associated with higher existence, as is in *The Anti-Christ* 6. These later uses are so varied that I am as skeptical about the chances of systematizing them as I am about unifying the voices with which Nietzsche speaks of the eternal return.[59]

Müller-Lauter's Attempt to Discover Why the Will to Power Is, for Nietzsche, a Superior Interpretation

Of all the attempts to find coherence in Nietzsche's thought with which I am familiar, Müller-Lauter's is one of the most sophisticated. Although I ultimately disagree with him on this issue, he has taught me more about Nietzsche than anyone else. His interpretation is important, not simply as an attempt to unify a thinker notoriously difficult to summarize. Simultaneously, it would answer the

question that Nietzsche's rejection of truth naturally raises: Why is the will to power a superior interpretation?

Not one among many, the will to power is, according to Müller-Lauter, more than simply a human perspective, and more than the perspective of Nietzsche.[60] It escapes the self-defeating character of perspectivism—differentiating itself from other systems by not contradicting itself. Seen from the perspective of the truth criteria of his philosophy, it is the only consistent *Weltdeutung* (interpretation of the world).[61] If we consider merely the formal structure of his thought, then "the individual and radical nature of Nietzsche's interpretation will be hidden from us."[62] To capture its individuality "it is necessary to go after its immanent presuppositions."[63] Only by reflecting on these will we see how Nietzsche's thought fulfills its claim to be the most basic interpretation of reality (*grundlegende Deutung der Wirklichkeit*).[64]

The constantly changing self (described in, among other places, BGE, 19) is the key, according to Müller-Lauter, to understanding how the will to power escapes the perspectivist's paradox:

> Nietzsche is able to interpret the manifold reality, that is the natural being (*das naturhaft Seiende*), as manifold interpreting because man is himself an interpreting being (*Wesen*) and can be this only because that which flows together in him, inorganic and organic being, interprets itself. As a synthesis and plurality of interpretations, humans can have reflexive awareness of their perspectival interpreting (*perspektivischen Interpretierens inne Werden*) in so far as the place of the subject jumps around (*der Subjektpunkt herumspringt*) and from every new point the perspective changes. The subject has knowledge of this jumping around because it, like everything organic, collects experience and has memory at its disposal. The possibility to interpret the interpreting arises out of the change of the interpretations. (*Die Möglichkeit, das interpretieren zu interpretieren, entspringt so dem Wechseln der Interpretationen.*) This requires neither a particular capacity nor is the perspectivity of the act of interpreting abandoned.[65]

In other words: human reality, like all other reality—both organic and inorganic—consists of an infinite number of unstable forces constantly overcoming one another. The subject has the ability to have

reflexive awareness of this process of "jumping around"; that is, it has reflexive awareness of its constantly changing nature. It collects, through memory, and then internalizes this shifting of perspectives that it essentially is. The notion of reflexive awareness of perspectival interpreting (*perspektivischen Interpretierens inne Werden*) is both the key to Müller-Lauter's interpretation as well as at the root of my difficulties with it.

Müller-Lauter would have us believe that this memory of competing forces is no longer simply one perspective among many, but rather a more direct awareness. As I have already mentioned, *Beyond Good and Evil* 12 states that understanding the world as something in flux is possible because, with the help of Boscovich, Nietzsche realized that the world does not consist of static entities. The analogy that Nietzsche offers is to the way in which Copernicus convinced us that the world does not stand still, but rather rotates. If Copernicus or Boscovich convince us, it is not because we ever perceive the turning of the world or the fluidity of "stable" objects. If I understand correctly, Müller-Lauter argues that the consistency of Nietzsche's theory stems from the fact that both the world and the subject are constantly changing, and humans are capable of having reflexive awareness of this change. But I do not believe that Nietzsche ever claims that we observe the flux to which he refers.

Müller-Lauter is correct that, for Nietzsche, the subject is constantly in flux or "jumps around," but Nietzsche never avers that we actually observe the flux. Just as to post-Copernican observers the world still appears flat and unmoving, so to a post-Boscovichian the subject and the world still appear relatively stable. Nietzsche does not argue that belief in an unstable world is based on a direct perception. Müller-Lauter contends that the ever-changing subject has a direct experience of the ever-changing world. But I would suggest that Nietzsche's interpretation of the world is not the direct result of a subject that "collects experience and has memory at its disposal." This is true of all subjects, but only Boscovich, Nietzsche, and a few others believe that the world is in constant flux. The subject's collection of experience will always be an interpretation based not on direct perception, but rather on theoretical assumptions. And if I am right about this—that for Nietzsche there is no direct knowledge of the ever-changing world—then Müller-Lauter has not solved the problem of how Nietzsche can claim his interpretations are superior.

Even if Nietzsche's vision of the subject as constantly changing gives us an insight into why our understanding of the world changes, it does little, it seems to me, to explain how one vision of the world is better than another. If there is a "system of will to power," it does not represent for Nietzsche a solution to the problem of perspectivism. It is not the consistency of his system that makes it superior to other philosophers' visions.

I do not believe, as Müller-Lauter does, that within the will to power we will find the key to understanding why Nietzsche advances it over others.[66] This has been made particularly clear, it seems to me, through my chronological investigation of Nietzsche's published writings (works that Nietzsche published or prepared for publication). For even if Nietzsche believed this during the writing of *Beyond Good and Evil*, through a careful examination of his last published works I have endeavored to demonstrate that the doctrine becomes increasingly difficult to systematize and less important for Nietzsche's philosophical project. Far from providing the answer to the problem of perspectivism, this investigation of the will to power has further highlighted the difficulty of trying to give a systematic reading to even this the most systematic and far-reaching of Nietzsche's teaching. My exploration of these difficulties has underlined the need to look elsewhere for a way of making sense out of this professedly untruthful and seemingly unsystematic thinker.

Conclusion

After carefully comparing the appearances of the will to power, I find that here too it is no easy task to unify Nietzsche's voices. I traced its evolution from an interpretation of all force (in *Beyond Good and Evil*) to an interpretation of organic life, and from a tripartite system to its use as a standard by which to judge nobility and health in the works from 1888. To the extent that there is the intent to create a system, one could almost say a psychology and a physics, of will to power in the mid-1880s (for which *Beyond Good and Evil* 36 represents the outline), by 1888 the will to power becomes more of a means of evaluation than a description of the basic life force.

The will to power is revealed with a more unified and systematic voice than the eternal return, but it is not entirely consistent.

Although it is, arguably, the single most important doctrine in Nietzsche's later work, I do not believe it forms the backbone of a system.[67] The problem that all Nietzsche interpreters face is that when we oversystematize his thought, it resembles a bad imitation of the philosophies that he railed against. Overemphasize its consistency, and his thought becomes a maze of imprecision and leaps of interpretive faith. But to reduce Nietzsche's philosophy to an inconsistent rambling does him little service as well. I seek a middle ground.

Nietzsche certainly wants his doctrines to be consistent in the sense that they avoid unreflected contradictions of the kind that he found in, for example, the thing-in-itself. He is concerned with working out the implications of his thought, and the will to power plays a role in some of its most interesting moments. As we have seen, it is a recurring motif in his descriptions of the self, the world, human motivations and values. But precisely because this motif is so broadly employed, attempts to systematize it often seem contrived. Admitting that there is some change in its meaning, and concentrating on its significance in the moment, we glean Nietzsche's best insights.

For all their differences, both the Heidegger of "The Will to Power as Art" and Müller-Lauter believe that there is something in the concept of will to power that differentiates it from other concepts. I am trying to make the case that it is not so much the originality of any of his concepts that distinguishes Nietzsche from the tradition, but rather his questioning of truth and his willingness to loosen and redefine the bounds of systematic thinking. He does not abandon conceptual thought entirely, as Heidegger would, nor does he, as Müller-Lauter argues, create the only consistent interpretation.

Heidegger, it seems to me, understood the problem Nietzsche faced, but not his solution. Nietzsche's critique of truth, his undermining of absolutes summarized in the sentence "God is dead," leaves Heidegger on the brink of nihilism. Devastated by Nietzsche's critique of conceptual knowledge, Heidegger looks to Nietzsche to liberate him from it. For all the mistakes involved in Heidegger's subsequent readings of the will to power, he is correct that the doctrine does not lead, as he argued in the first year of his lectures (published under the title "The Will to Power as Art"), to the overcoming of conceptual thought.

Müller-Lauter finds in the will to power an answer to the question that Nietzsche's rejection of truth inevitably provokes: By

what criteria does he judge his interpretation to be superior? Müller-Lauter answers, "by virtue of its consistency." Nietzsche would certainly argue that the will to power is free of obvious contradictions that he saw in concepts such as the thing-in-itself. But Nietzsche did not always avoid contradictions, nor was it the avoidance of contradictions, in my opinion, that he believed made his thought preferable to the theories of his opponents: "everyone knows that the ability to bear contradictions is a sign of high culture" (GS, 297). It is characteristic of philosophic thought to seek and value only truth, but Nietzsche separates himself from the tradition by placing value in that which is appropriate for the moment. Having rejected the notion of immutable truth, Nietzsche is free to adapt and modify his doctrines to fit the context in which he writes.

The most revolutionary aspect of Nietzsche's thought was his belief that conceptual knowledge, once stripped of its pretensions to grasp truth, does not lose it allure or its usefulness. By basing our interpretation on the published works and paying careful attention to not only what Nietzsche writes, but how he writes, we have seen the role that parody and irony play in the presentation of his ideas. For Nietzsche, the will to power represents a series of interpretations, and not objective knowledge. Nietzsche is convinced that we can never arrive at objective knowledge of the world. His view—radical at the time, but widely accepted today—is that even physics is not an explanation of the world, but an interpretation. Admitting that he will never arrive at definitive explanations and that his views will inevitably be partial and one-sided, does not stop Nietzsche from offering interpretations of the world.

The will to power is the single most important doctrine of Nietzsche and yet it neither dominates his thinking nor is it entirely consistent. This does not mean that there is no consistency to Nietzsche's thought beyond that which is necessary to ensure that his thought is free of useless contradictory concepts. Nietzsche is consistent, but not, in my opinion, in the way Müller-Lauter suggests. There is, Nietzsche tells us, a stylistic imperative to create unities—that is, to give one's thought a unity of style: "one thing is necessary—to give one's character style" (GS, 290). In chapter 6 I will give my account of how the systematicity of Nietzsche's thought can be fully appreciated only in the light of his aesthetic concerns.

Chapter 3

Deleuze's Reading of Nietzsche As a Pluralist

In chapter 1, I listened for Nietzsche's voice as he spoke of the eternal return, and found many voices. A search through the published works, in chapter 2, looking for a single reading of the will to power, revealed moments of systematicity, particularly in *Beyond Good and Evil,* but this system erodes as Nietzsche turns increasingly to the examination of human culture.

Gilles Deleuze would make Nietzsche a pluralist. He seeks to make systematic sense out of Nietzsche in a way that is often, I find, not so much mistaken as overstated. Nietzsche does seem to believe, particularly in *Beyond Good and Evil,* that the world is an unending plurality—that there are, as Deleuze suggests, no repeating forms. But not all of Nietzsche's thought originates in his view of the world as the unstable play of forces. Particularly when Deleuze tries to use pluralism as a foundation for a philosophy of value, he runs into difficulties.

Deleuze's attempt to found what I will polemically call an "ethic of pluralism" is subject to the same kinds of problems that in

chapter 2 we saw were associated with the use of the will to power in Nietzsche's analysis of human behavior. Deleuze, like the Nietzsche of *Beyond Good and Evil* 36 (but without the irony), tries to find a single explanation for physics, metaphysics, and psychology. He disregards the important distinction between the *Nachlass* and the published works, and also fails to recognize that, in the last two years of his productive life, Nietzsche no longer uses the will to power as an explanation of physical forces in the published works and rarely does so in the *Nachlass*.

In some ways this discussion of Deleuze could have appeared in chapter 2. There are, however, two reasons for not doing so. First, Deleuze's interpretation is, in my estimation, the most important attempt to date to make systematic sense out of Nietzsche. Published in 1962, it was one of the first significant studies of Nietzsche since the 1930s—influential, not just for Nietzsche studies, but for the development of postmodern thought in general.[1] Second, Deleuze's attempt to sum up Nietzsche's thought under the label of pluralism gives us another opportunity to examine the tensions involved in trying to oversystematize Nietzsche's thought. I will argue that Nietzsche is generally a pluralist, but he is not as dogmatically pluralistic as Deleuze suggests.

Pluralism

Deleuze insists that "the Philosophy of Nietzsche is not understood as long as we do not take into account its essential pluralism."[2] But it is not just Nietzsche's thought that is, for Deleuze, essentially pluralistic. Pluralism and philosophy are one—that is, pluralism is the proper form of philosophical thought. What does he mean by pluralism? Let me begin with what he does not mean.

Deleuze's pluralism has little, if anything, to do with what American philosophers normally call "pluralism." He does not wish to imply, for example, that Nietzsche is tolerant toward other philosophical viewpoints, nor that within his own thought Nietzsche presents multiple (that is, a plurality of) views. For Deleuze, Nietzsche is a pluralist because he believes that the world consists of a network of unstable, impermanent, forces locked in constant struggle with one another. In addition, I would say that Deleuze attempts to make Nietzsche into a consistent pluralist—that is, he tries to

show that all of Nietzsche's metaphysical, moral, and aesthetic thought begins, in this vision of the world, as an unstable network of battling forces. I will be arguing that, although for a time Nietzsche did attempt this, his philosophy, in particular his analysis of human behavior, is not founded on this theory of forces.

For Nietzsche, according to Deleuze, there is not "an event, not a phenomenon, not a word or a thought which does not have many meanings. A thing has as many meanings as there are forces capable of taking hold of it" (*s'emparer*).[3] It is, however, not just meanings that are plural; objects are in themselves pluralities. He attributes to Nietzsche, as Müller-Lauter does, the view that the world is made up of an infinite plurality of unstable forces constantly coming into existence and then being extinguished.[4]

To say that forces are plural entails, for Deleuze as it does for Müller-Lauter, that they always exist in relationship to other forces. It would be absurd to think of them as singular, for they do not exist apart from the struggle for domination linking all forces.[5] "Innocence" is one of the terms Deleuze employs to enlarge upon his notion of pluralism. Innocence "is the reality of the multiple (*la vérite du multiple*)" and "the direct result of the philosophy of force and will":[6]

> Everything is related to (*se rapporte*) a force capable of interpreting it; every force relates to that which it can, from which it is inseparable. It is this manner of relating, of affirming and being affirmed which is particularly innocent. That which does not allow itself to be interpreted by a force, nor evaluated by a will lays claim to another will, capable of evaluating it, *another force* capable of interpreting it.[7]

Forces are defined by their interrelations, rather than any inherent core. Determined by their confrontations with other forces, there is no agent behind the will, nor are they the expression of an inner essence.[8] In addition, by the "innocence of existence" Deleuze means that Nietzsche has made an affirmation out of becoming. This entails affirming that there is only becoming—that is, there is no residue or substance behind that which becomes. This also includes the affirmation of the being of becoming.[9] In short, he is attributing to all forces what Aristotle calls pure actuality and denying that there is any enduring substratum behind that which becomes.

There is no being beyond becoming or beyond the multiplicity of becoming, nor are there multiple realities and eternities that are essences beyond the realm of becoming. Forces do not stand behind objects; rather, all that exists is in itself force:

> The object is in itself force, the expression of a force. This is why there is more or less affinity between the object and the force which takes possession of it. There is not an object (phenomenon) which is not already possessed because in itself it is not the appearance but the apparition of a force.[10]

This seems to contradict what Deleuze said a few pages earlier:

> A phenomenon is not an appearance, not even an apparition, but a sign, a symptom which finds its meaning in a currently existing force. Philosophy in its entirety is a symptomatology (*symptomatologie*) and a semiology.[11]

The phrasing is not as clear as it could be, but I believe that, within the context of the entire study, Deleuze's point is that the object or phenomenon is a network of forces, temporarily dominated by one force. Of course because the world is essentially pluralistic, the domination is only temporary; instability and continual overcoming is the only constant. To know the meaning or sense of something (*le sens*) is to know the force currently dominating the unstable network of forces that constitutes the phenomenon.

That which dominates, for Deleuze's Nietzsche, is not the appearance, but the apparition of a force.[12] The difference between "appearance" and "apparition" is the same in English and French. An apparition can be used to describe a ghost, disembodied spirit, or other supernatural being. In astronomy the term refers to the first appearance of a celestial object, which since it is the first appearance, has something of the eeriness associated with the more common use of the term. To say that an object is an appearance of a force would not rule out that it could be the second, third, or one-thousandth manifestation of that force. Deleuze, however, insists that the becoming inherent to all forces precludes any possibility that they repeat. An object is an apparition of a force—that is, a force that appears for the first and only time, and will not reappear.

Deleuze defines "pluralism" through recourse to the notion of force, and force through the notion of the will or the will to power. He does not notice that there are at least two ways in which Nietzsche uses the word "will."[13] For Deleuze, like Heidegger, will is will to power—that is, a force in a relationship with another force:

> La volonté (volonté de puissance) est l'élément différentiel de la force. (The will [will to power] is the differential element of force.)[14]

At this point, Deleuze turns to *Beyond Good and Evil* 36 and notes that Nietzsche claims that will cannot act on muscles or nerves but only on other wills. From this he concludes that the real philosophical problem is not the relationship between the voluntary and the involuntary, but the rapport between a will that commands and one that obeys.[15]

I have already spent considerable time analyzing *Beyond Good and Evil* 36, but I recall the results of that analysis in order to make a point about Deleuze. Throughout most of the aphorism, Nietzsche speaks with hypothetical reservation. At one point he abandons the use of the subjunctive and states that it is his thesis (*Satz*) that our entire instinctual life is the fulfilling and enlargement of a basic form of the will—namely, the will to power. Returning to the hypothetical mode, he writes that if we could explain organic life as will to power, then we would have earned the right to explain all effective power (*wirkende Kraft*) as will to power.

In *Beyond Good and Evil,* Nietzsche puts forth the notion that the world is made up of forces and not material atoms, but he is more definitive about the validity of his criticisms of atomism than the validity of his theory of force. Nietzsche suggests, in a "proof" based on parody, that the will to power is the best interpretation of the world, but not a definitive explanation. The switch out of the hypothetical mode, at the point in the aphorism where it occurs, indicates that Nietzsche is more certain about the theory's authorship than its applicability.

In addition to this, one could ask if there is any significance in the fact that Nietzsche first "proves" the existence of the self and then extrapolates to the world. Could it be that he was more comfortable about the will to power as an interpretation of organic functions than he was about the will to power as the explanation of all

effective powers? Even if this is not the case in *Beyond Good and Evil* 36, I have given ample documentation that in subsequent works (and after 1887 even in the *Nachlass*) the will to power and Nietzsche's theory of force are no longer used as an interpretation of the inorganic world.

For Deleuze there is no question but that, according to Nietzsche, the world is composed of forces constantly in flux and constantly in opposition with other forces and the "law" of these forces is the will to power. (I put "law" in quotation marks because there can be no law if the world is really an infinite plurality.) Quoting indiscriminately from the *Nachlass* and the published works, Deleuze can find many passages to support this interpretation. Nietzsche is often a pluralist, particularly around the time of the writing of *Beyond Good and Evil*, but is he as doctrinally pure, even at the moment of the will to power's systematic heights, as Deleuze suggests?[16] And what about the irony involved in Nietzsche's presentation of the doctrine that Deleuze seems to ignore. I believe that pluralism is only one of many masks that appears in the Nietzschean satyr-play. It is certainly important, but it does not appear in every scene nor does it always play the same role.

Eternal Return As the Return of Chance

Deleuze does not see any difficulty in reconciling the eternal return with his notion of pluralism, although how a doctrine stating (at least at times) that everything comes back, exactly as it was, fits with pluralism's notion of a world of continually changing forces is not at all apparent.[17] As Michael Roth notes, since the eternal return may be understood as the return of the same:

> though surely appropriate for a philosophy of radical affirmation and *amor fati*, such a notion poses many problems for a thinker (such as Deleuze) who delights in ever greater differentiation.[18]

Deleuze attempts to solve this problem by interpreting the eternal return as meaning *not* that everything is repeated exactly but that we are continually faced with *new* possibilities.[19]

"What is the being of that which becomes?" "Returning is the being of that which becomes."[20] Deleuze uses the metaphor of

play (*jeu*) and in particular the rolling of dice to develop his interpretation of the relationship between being and becoming in the eternal return. The metaphor of a game of dice is suggested by Zarathustra, who in Book 3 muses about what it would be like to play dice with the gods (Z, The Seven Seals). Expanding upon this section considerably, Deleuze writes that affirmation of becoming and affirmation of being are two moments (*temps*), which form themselves through a third term—the player, artist, or child.[21] Throwing the dice the player affirms chance; the resulting combination affirms necessity. To the normal way of thinking, throwing the dice never assures victory. This is certainly true as long as we associate winning with the yielding of certain combinations. But to wish for a particular combination—that is, a winning roll—is a sign, according to Deleuze, of bad players. The bad players' desire to obtain certain combinations is indicative of their yearning to eliminate chance. Bad players favor causality and finality—that is, a world where the outcome is assured because causalities are calculable. These tendencies are rooted in their faith in reason—in particular, in a vision of reason as that which entraps the world in its web. Good players desire exclusively the return of chance. Their sole certitude is that the universe has no goal and no causes.

In Nietzsche's thought, according to Deleuze, there is the affirmation not of probability based on a repetition of the rolling of the dice, but an affirmation of chance. You win every time you affirm chance by rolling the dice. Good players desire not a particular combination, but love their fate. Accordingly, to affirm the eternal return is not to desire the return of a particular thing. Deleuze writes that it is usually thought that becoming and the eternal return are in opposition. That is to say, to believe in the eternal return is to believe that becoming is subject to law. In fact it is possible, he argues, to assert both that the world is chaotic (in the sense that it is pluralistic—that there is no law governing its becoming) and that everything returns. Of the ancients, only Heraclitus knew that this was possible. Becoming is not subject to an outside law, but rather receives its law from itself:[22]

> Nietzsche did not recognize at all his idea of the eternal return in his ancient predecessors. They never saw in the eternal return the being of becoming as such as that of the multiple.[23]

Return of the Little Man

Deleuze believes it is chance, and not any particular, outcome, that returns. He asserts that the eternal return "is not at all a thought of identity (*pensé de l'identique*). . . . We do not understand the eternal return as long as we make out of it a consequence or an application of identity."[24]

The problem with this interpretation is that Nietzsche often claims that everything recurs exactly as it has been. Some passages support Deleuze's reading of the eternal return, but his interpretation seems directly to contradict those passages from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* suggesting that it is not chance that returns but the identical moment. The unbearable nature of the eternal return in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is incomprehensible unless the doctrine means that everything comes again exactly as it was:

> . . . not to a new life or a better life or a similar life: I come again to this life which is the same (*gleichen und selbigen*) in both the big events and the small ones. . . . The small man returns eternally! (Z, "The Convalescent")

Curiously enough, it is exactly this section—which I find the most problematic for his understanding of the eternal return—that Deleuze chooses to support his reading of the doctrine! He mentions Zarathustra's bemoaning of the eternal return of the small man, but interprets it to mean, in what seems to me a flagrant misreading of the text, that the little man does not return.[25] Deleuze quotes from *Ecce Homo*, where Nietzsche writes of the eternal joy of becoming (EH, "BT," 3), and concludes that since the little man does not share this joy, he cannot return.

In and through the eternal return, Deleuze argues, negation, as a quality of the will to power, transforms itself into affirmation. Negation becomes an affirmation of negation—that is, an affirmation of the unrelenting becoming or pluralism of all forces—and leads, Deleuze believes, to the healing of Zarathustra in "The Convalescent." Zarathustra is healed while nihilism conquers itself through the eternal return. But there is a sense in which Zarathustra never really conquers the nihilism that threatens in the eternal return.

After reawakening from his seven-day swoon, Zarathustra laughs when his animals recite his doctrine of eternal return, but

when he himself begins to speak of it he seems on the verge of falling ill again. His animals then interrupt his thought and distract him. At the end of the section, Zarathustra comes again to the doctrine and predicts that he will collapse as the result of his word (*ich zerbreche an meinem Wort*). He goes on to predict that he, as the one who announces the doctrine of the eternal return, will be destroyed (*als Verkündiger gehe ich zu Grunde*). Zarathustra is not healed, but rather his attention is diverted from the consequences of the eternal return. Deleuze is correct that through the eternal return Zarathustra affirms life, but I would argue that negation does not transform itself into affirmation. Zarathustra is not really able to face the thought of the eternal return, and relies on the chatter of his animals to take his thoughts away from this the most terrible of thoughts. He avoids rather than transforms the thought.

The eternal return represents, for Deleuze, the affirmation of plurality; to affirm the eternal return is to affirm one's readiness to roll the dice. In addition, the affirmation he finds in the eternal return involves the willingness to create a hierarchy in a world devoid of inherent ordering systems. It seems, however, that in his haste to separate Nietzsche's doctrine from the idea of exact recurrence, Deleuze loses an aspect of Nietzsche's affirmation. He makes of Nietzsche a creator of values and loses sight of the extent to which both Nietzsche and Zarathustra love their fate, even if it brings about the return of the little man.

Why does Deleuze contradict Nietzsche's explicit claim that the little man does indeed return? Exact return would oppose Deleuze's assertion that Nietzsche is a pluralist. It would imply that the forces that make up the world are not constantly changing. Exact repetition would belie Deleuze's assertion that, for Nietzsche, the world consists of the apparitions of forces, not their reappearances, for it would signify that forces reappear. Deleuze's interpretation would also not allow for the reappearance of the great man. Pluralism, as Deleuze understands it, insists that the world is constantly changing, ever-new.

The challenge presented by Nietzsche's varying accounts of the eternal return is to develop an understanding of Nietzsche's philosophical project that would incorporate all of them. We must account both for the strict interpretation of exact recurrence—which Nietzsche sometimes seems to endorse—as well as the nonliteral interpretation that the doctrine represents an affirmation of life or

amor fati. It may be, as Deleuze suggests, that Nietzsche's main concern was not the establishment of a literal theory of eternal return. This, however, does not mean—and here is where I disagree with Deleuze—that Nietzsche would never argue for the literal return of all things. No consistent pluralist ever would, because they hold that the world is in constant flux: nothing remains the same, and there are no repeating forms. Deleuze goes to great lengths—including an obviously contrived reading of "The Convalescent" from *Zarathustra*—to show that Nietzsche is a consistent "pluralist." I maintain that Nietzsche is generally a pluralist, but not consistently.

The Philosopher As Genealogist

Deleuze argues that genealogy is indispensable for the pluralist, since it alone captures the essential singularity of events by re-creating the stage upon which these events are played.[26] Nietzsche introduces the notion of the philosopher as genealogist, which means, according to Deleuze, that he or she traces heritages while noting the difference and distance between source and offspring. The origin neither completely determines nor is it merely indifferent to its offspring. If origin determined offspring, then the universe could not be, as Deleuze wants to argue, determined by the currently prevailing forces. But neither does Deleuze want to argue that origin has no effect on the current interplay of forces.

In determining the nature of origin and offspring, value plays an important role. Deleuze writes that, for a pluralist, the question of a thing's essence is a question of meaning and value. A thing has no essence apart from the one we give it. "Essence is determined by the forces that stand in affinity with the thing and by the will in affinity (*en affinité*) with these forces."[27] When we ask "what a thing is," we are actually, according to Deleuze, confused, because the only question that makes sense is "What is this thing for me?" The discovery of an essence is a rediscovery or recovering of the meaning and value that the investigator has added.

Deleuze illustrates this by comparing Nietzsche's genealogy to Kant's critical thought—or at least Deleuze's vision of Kant, which seems at times more caricature than interpretation. But bearing this in mind, the comparison is instructive for understanding

Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche. Deleuze claims that, for Kant, the philosopher is a judge who surveys the distribution of domains and the partition of established values. Kant's judge hands down decisions based upon his interpretation of the law. Both the transcendental laws of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the universal moral laws of the *Critique of Practical Reason*, are—by virtue of their universality—the basis upon which the tribunal of reason adjudicates disputes. For genealogists, thinking is in some sense judging, but judging for them means evaluation and interpretation on the basis of laws *they themselves draft*. The genealogist, instead of announcing a Kantian critical peace whereby reason adjudicates all disputes, foretells wars of an intensity not yet known.

Nietzsche writes in *Beyond Good and Evil* (211) that philosophical workers such as Kant and Hegel have a large factual reservoir of evaluations (*Tatbestand von Wertschätzungen*) that have come to dominate and for a time are therefore called "truths." "Real philosophers are commanders and creators of laws" (BGE, 211). In Nietzsche's thought, Kant's concern for universal principles is replaced by the genealogist's sensibility for difference and distance.[28] Deleuze is surely right that, for Nietzsche, the philosopher-genealogist is not merely a recorder of reality, but its shaper as well. They are critics of established values, and the creators of new ones.

What force determines the essence of a thing? For Nietzsche, according to Deleuze, "it is the will to power and the will to power is Dionysus." He is the god of metamorphoses—the one who affirms the many and is affirmed in the many.[29] Nietzsche writes in *Twilight of the Idols* that the tragic artist is Dionysian: not a pessimist, but rather one who says yes to everything questionable and terrible (TI, "Reason," 6). The division of the world into the "true world" and the world of appearances is reminiscent of Christianity, and a symptom of decadence. The artist, on the other hand, values appearance more than reality. Nietzsche writes that the artist knows how to correct reality, to make a selection, and to amplify and correct those elements of reality that he or she values aesthetically (TI, "Truth," 6). For Deleuze, Dionysus is the symbol for the constant change of a pluralistic world. For Nietzsche, Dionysus represents, among other things, one who remolds the world through artistic invention.

As we will see shortly, there is in Deleuze's interpretation an attempt to derive values from the world's plurality. Nietzsche's own

thought is more supple and decidedly less dogmatic, for it contains no moral imperative against the illusions inherent to fictive accounts.[30]

Deleuze's Derivation of Values

Once pluralism is anointed as the legitimate heir to the throne of metaphysics, Deleuze stakes out its claim to the domain of values. Telling for these imperial ambitions is his reliance upon *The Genealogy of Morals*. Although he most often quotes from the literary remains, and occasionally from *Beyond Good and Evil*, his principal source of inspiration is *The Genealogy of Morals*. And that is striking because there are several difficulties entailed in making the transition from the largely metaphysical doctrine of the will to power in *Beyond Good and Evil* to its use in the interpretation and evaluation of human actions and as an explanation of morality in *The Genealogy of Morals*.

Deleuze seeks to trace the relationship between pluralism and a philosophy of value. He asserts that by introducing the concepts of meaning and value (*sens et valeur*) Nietzsche transforms it into a purely critical enterprise. Such a philosophy has left the realm of forms, pierced the masks that suggest the identity and repetition of forces and recognized the particularity—the originality—of each force. True philosophy must be a critical endeavor, according to Deleuze, and the institution of a philosophy of sense and value is the only way to institute this critique.[31] Values, when viewed as autonomous standards by which the phenomena can be judged, are opposed to the Deleuzian critical endeavor, but there is a second way to understand Nietzsche's concept of value. Deleuze argues that values presuppose evaluation, and evaluations are manners of being. His critical project, which he also views as Nietzsche's critical project, is to investigate the origin of values. Our thoughts, beliefs, and sentiments are not accidentally ours; rather, we merit them by virtue of our being and our style of life. For human beings, to exist is to evaluate. It is not our values that determine our being, but our being that determines our values.

> Evaluations when reduced to their element are not values, but manners of being, modes of existence of those who judge and

> evaluate serving precisely the principles of values according to which they judge (*servant précisement de principes aux valeurs par rapport auxquelles ils jugent.*)[32]

Up to this point the argument, while not original, is certainly understandable. It resembles Sartre's contention that we determine our being through the choices we make. The conclusion, however, lacks, in my opinion, the refinement of Sartre. According to Deleuze, Nietzsche believes that our manner of existence is pluralistic, and therefore our values should reflect this pluralism. The noble and the base are not values, but represent *l'élément différentiel dont dérive la valeur des valeurs elles-mêmes* (the differential element out of which originates the value of the values).[33] My problem with this is to understand how it is possible to derive values from the differential element. Deleuze suggests that values may somehow be *derived* from the ever-changing reality, but for Nietzsche, values are *imposed* upon the ever-changing plurality that constitutes existence.[34]

Deleuze develops his views on the derivation of values through an analysis of the famous three-stage metamorphosis described in the first section of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, "On the Three Metamorphoses." He asks why Zarathustra is a lion, while Dionysus has reached the stage of the child. Zarathustra is a lion because he does not simply bear the weight of the negative (like the camel), but finds an affirmation in negation. Zarathustra belongs to the constellation of the lion, but Dionysus belongs to the constellation of being.[35] Deleuze seems to be claiming for Dionysus something akin to Heideggerian authenticity: since Dionysus is the god who constantly changes, he is the authentic representation of a constantly changing reality.

But the third stage in Nietzsche is represented by a child and not by Dionysus. And although Dionysus often reminds us of the instability of life, as a god he is particularly unsuited to represent pluralism, which is grounded in the belief that there are no eternal forms and no recurring forces. Dionysus wears many disguises, but gods are eternal and in their essences unchanging. In *The Bacchae* he takes the form of a human, but the mistake of Pentheus was not to recognize the immortal one behind the mask. To attribute fundamental change to the gods is to impinge upon their divine natures, and that is, as Pentheus discovers, dangerous. Whereas Deleuze

claims that pluralism pierces the masks that suggest the continuity of forces in order to reveal the existence of new forces, piercing the masks of Dionysus reveals the same god. Let us, however, take a closer look at Deleuze's reasoning.

Dionysus progresses beyond the lion to the child, according to Deleuze, because for him affirmation becomes *la raison d'être* for the will to power, and the will to power is the element that produces, reflects, and develops for affirmation its proper reason:

> The will to power is related to affirmation as its *raison d'être* and affirmation to the will to power as the element which produces, reflects and develops its proper reason: such is the task of Dionysus.[36]

I am not sure what Deleuze means when he writes that affirmation becomes *la raison d'être* for the will to power for, as I understand Nietzsche, the will to power does not need a reason to be. It simply is. And while it is true that, for Nietzsche, to affirm the world is to affirm the will to power, still the will to power does not provide the reason for this affirmation—in part because there are difficulties in using the will to power as an explanation or prescription for human behavior.[37] This is particularly true when it is said to be present in such diverse phenomena as the creation of bad consciousness and in the yes-saying of the overman.[38] Deleuze assigns to Dionysus the task of developing an affirmation based on the "principles" of pluralism. I believe that Nietzsche is not as consistent as Deleuze suggests. For Nietzsche, believing that the world is a plurality does not entail any particular affirmation. The plurality that he often attributes to nature in *Beyond Good and Evil* does not directly dictate his evaluations of human behavior.

Nietzsche does refer to the unstable nature of reality when giving his evaluations of human actions, but this is only one of the components of his analysis. His views on the subject are too wide-ranging to be meaningfully summarized in a theory that has its origin, as Deleuze's pluralism does, in a theory of the physical world. In addition, as I will show in chapter 6, affirmation, for Nietzsche, is the product of a personal choice—inexorably bound up with questions of taste. The plurality of existence may provide the beginning point for Nietzsche's "ethic," but it does not supplant the moment of personal choice in the determination of our values.

Nietzsche and Dogmatism

Unlike Deleuze, Nietzsche does not give philosophy one name. He abstains from isms; that is, the battering of the particular with a doctrine. Not that Nietzsche gives up generalizations altogether, but he is cognizant of their limits. For instance, in *Twilight of the Idols* Nietzsche writes that there is much that he does not want to know, because wisdom draws borders for knowledge ("Sayings and Arrows," 5). Nietzsche mistrusts and avoids systematic thinkers: the will to a system is a sign of a lack of integrity ("Sayings and Arrows," 26). These comments, however, should not be read as a wholesale condemnation of all "reason" or all "systematicity," for that would be dogmatism as well.

In the section entitled "Reason in Philosophy," from *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche gives us a short, but fairly complete, summary of his views on the possibilities and limitations of reason. It begins rather bombastically: philosophers are accused of having nothing but mummified concepts. They have nothing that is really alive. They kill and mummify. Seeing death and change as their friend, they claim that everything that becomes, does not really exist, and everything that exists, does not change. These philosophers also see the senses as immoral and as a source of deception. The one exception is Heraclitus who knew, according to Nietzsche, that the apparent world is the only world and that the true world is only *hinzugelogen* (lied into place).

Nietzsche suggests that we philosophize with our noses. This sounds as if he is on the verge of degenerating into irrationality, but then he adds that we only possess a science (*Wissenschaft*) to the extent that we take seriously the evidence provided by the senses. Not all systematic knowledge is rejected, but rather Nietzsche is claiming that overly formal systems do not adequately portray reality. Concepts such as "unity, identity, continuity, substance, cause, and being" lead us, in some sense (*gewissermassen*) into error, and speech is error's constant defender. Nietzsche sounds like Deleuze at this point. He writes that the whole *Empirie* is in contradiction with the categories of reason, but he ends this section by claiming that the artist appreciates appearance more than reality. The artist knows how to select, reinforce, and correct reality.

Deleuze has correctly understood Nietzsche's critique of reason, but he has failed to appreciate Nietzsche's willingness to use

artistic lies. Even in *Beyond Good and Evil*—his most systematic work and the work where he comes closest to being consistently pluralistic—there is an "immoralism" in Nietzsche that is not present in Deleuze's attempt to reduce philosophy to pluralism. Nietzsche is never as consistent about grounding all his thought in the instability of the world, as Deleuze suggests. Deleuze believes that it is possible to derive values from an ever-changing world, but according to Nietzsche, values originate when individuals impose them on a universe that is otherwise devoid of them. In addition, Nietzsche recognizes that the complexity of human behavior is such that a theory that originates in a view of the physical world will never be adequate to describe human behavior. To the extent that his belief about the instability of the world is useful in his descriptions of human behavior, Nietzsche employs it. But when these beliefs are not useful, Nietzsche is not opposed to founding his interpretations on something else.

As we will see in chapter 6, the demands of the moment and of context often determine the interpretation that Nietzsche offers. Nietzsche the philosopher follows the example of the artist. Like any good artist, he feels free to improve upon the given. Not condemned simply to working out the consequences of a system based on the world's instability, such philosophers select and highlight certain aspects of their theoretical creations, in accordance with their aesthetic ideals and the demands of the moment.

Chapter 4

Philosophical Constructions in the Age of the Loss of Absolutes

In a world lacking in clearly defined objective truth, our task has become to discover the criteria for Nietzsche's choice of interpretations. Some criteria have already been rejected. I have suggested that Nietzsche sometimes, in particular in *Beyond Good and Evil,* seems to be what Deleuze calls a "pluralist." But Nietzsche does not always use this criterion to justify his interpretations. Once Nietzsche gives up *Beyond Good and Evil*'s project of explaining everything as will to power, the principle at the heart of Deleuze's pluralism—that the world is in constant flux—no longer plays a dominant role in Nietzsche's thought.

Jacques Derrida rarely if ever asks what the world outside a text might be, but rather explores the terrain of textual significance, nor does he seek, as Deleuze does, to find an affirmation in the face of a vision of the world as an ever-changing play of unstable forces. In one of his most important works on Nietzsche, "La question du style," Derrida writes what is not simply an interpre-

tation of Nietzsche, but—and in this he is not so different from Deleuze—he claims him for his own.[1] What is Nietzsche and what is Derrida in this essay? The boundaries are obscure. At times it seems that Derrida names him as his predecessor, at other moments he reduces himself to Nietzsche's mouthpiece. My intent is therefore, as was the case in my examination of Heidegger, not just to examine Derrida's Nietzsche interpretation, but to suggest where the border between two different "systems" of thought should be drawn.

I will first examine how and why Derrida argues that there are only interpretations of the world—that we never arrive at objective knowledge. This is where Nietzsche and Derrida are most similar. But Derrida does not recognize that, for Nietzsche, there are necessary fictions—that is, notions that are false and yet are nonetheless necessary for human existence. And although Nietzsche and Derrida share the belief that we can only interpret reality—that we never know it definitively—Nietzsche writes, in *Beyond Good and Evil*, that some interpretations do not conform to reality. In the second half of this chapter, I will discuss where the major difference between the two thinkers lies. Nietzsche makes judgments about the worth of interpretations. He and Derrida share the belief that there is no truth, or at least truth is not all philosophers have made it out to be. Nietzsche writes, for example, in *Beyond Good and Evil* 230, that "honesty, love of truth, love of wisdom, sacrifice for knowledge, heroism of the truthful" is all "verbal pomp . . . belonging to the old mendacious pomp, junk, and gold dust of unconscious human vanity." Both believe that there can be no absolute foundation for their philosophic views, but their reactions to this loss are quite different.[2] If Derrida's project may metaphorically be compared with the illuminations of the Middle Ages, Nietzsche's may be compared with the labor of an architect who builds although he or she lacks solid foundations. Nietzsche does not simply critique traditional metaphysics, he also has his preferred interpretations, which he offers in place of those he has undermined. Particularly after *Beyond Good and Evil*, when he abandons the attempt to create a systematic philosophy of will to power, Nietzsche's thought becomes increasingly polemical. His favored interpretations are advanced with a clear vision that they are founded primarily in his aesthetic preferences.

Derrida's Undermining of Metaphysics

Derrida is concerned with the countless number of interpretations that texts may take. In the act of reading or writing, he does not follow a clearly defined path, but rather wanders along Heideggerian *Holzwege*. These are forest paths, used by woodcutters (rather than travelers) or, as one French translator has rendered the word: "paths that lead nowhere" (*les chemins qui ne ménent nulle part*). Derrida's interpretations are not constructed through adherence to rationalist or empirical principles, but through a progression from one trail marker (*éperon*) to the next. Meaning comes from light shining into a clearing in the forest, rather than any clearly indicated progression from the beginning to the end of a trail. The unification of theory and praxis occurs as we are led along from one *éperon* to the next in the texts of Nietzsche. We discuss these trail markers and place them within a context, but we can never definitively plot them.

One of the sentences from Nietzsche's notebooks which the editors decided to publish is "I forgot my umbrella" (the sentence appears in quotations in the notebooks).[3] Derrida writes that this sentence is in *le style éperonant* (the trail marker or *Holzwege* style).[4] We will never know with certainty what Nietzsche wanted to say or do when he wrote these words. Perhaps he copied the sentence, perhaps the sentence has no context and is cut off from what Nietzsche intended to say. Perhaps it comes out of a secret code. Derrida asserts that the totality of Nietzsche's text is of the same sort as "I forgot my umbrella." Since there is no definitive reading of the text, even if a definitive text existed, we would not be able to comprehend it. Derrida believes that Nietzsche shared his belief that it is impossible to reduce various readings of the text to an authoritative reading.[5] This is what Derrida claims Nietzsche meant when he said that "truth is a woman"—that is, always behind a veil, always shrouded in mystery.

For Derrida, Nietzsche's pluralism means not, as it did for Deleuze, adherence to a specific doctrine, but rather adherence to *le style éperont*—that is, to the meandering from one trail marker to the other. The approach that Derrida uses to find his way along the winding forest paths is called "deconstruction." He describes its praxis in *De la grammatologie*, a book that has become a classic text of the postmodern movement. Rather than discarding the traditional

notions of philosophical analysis, he is endeavoring to give evidence for the "systematic and historical solidarity" of these notions and gestures of thought that have been assumed to exist independently.[6] The deconstructionist surrounds sentinel concepts of modern thought with a discourse that is prudent and *minutieux*, and marks the conditions, the milieu and the limits, of their efficacy. When deconstructing the notions of this tradition, his or her intent is not to analyze them on the basis of a truth that is present, anterior, exterior, or superior. To the contrary, she or he inquires into the meaning of the terms that are systematically and genealogically determined by the history of philosophy. There is, Derrida tell us, no sense in renouncing these concepts because they are needed to shake (*ébranler*) the heritage to which they belong—a project that is as close to the heart of the deconstructionists as it was to Nietzsche's iconoclasm.

Writing in the Margins

If deconstruction is limited to a deconstruction of texts, it is because Derrida's notion of "text" is extremely wide, so wide that it encompasses the entire terrain of philosophical discourse. Derrida writes that there is no *hors du texte*. As John Leavey notes, all of Derrida's work could be considered "as prefaces or marginal comments written in the margins of other books or texts."[7]

One of the margins where Derrida writes is the space between the signifier and the signified. Or shall I say nonspace? Whereas the text is the realm of the signifier, the signified is a vestigial remnant of the discourse of presence.[8] Derrida writes that the *l'ordre du signifié n'est jamais contemporain . . . de l'ordre du signifiant* (the order of the signified is never contemporary with the order of the signifier).[9] The signified is not in itself a signifier; the difference between signified and signifier for Derrida can be seen when we ask "what is the signified?" and "what is the signifier?"—that is, when we ask the question, What their respective essences are (*ti esti*)?[10]

Within metaphysical thought the formal essence of the signified is considered to be "presence," whereas of the signifier Derrida writes that its formal essence cannot be determined apart from presence. What does he mean by this? The signified can be determined only inasmuch as it is revealed in *logos*, but the concept of the signified implies that it is something beyond its presence to *logos*. The

sign escapes the question "what is it?"; the sign *est cette chose* (*chose* is written and then crossed out) *mal nommée, la seule qui échappe à la question institutrice de la philosophie: "Qu'est-ce que"*? (is that thing, poorly named, the only thing that escapes the instituting question of philosophy: "What is it?").[11] To reject the question, "What is it?," is to challenge Heidegger's assertion, in *Being and Time*, that the fundamental question of philosophy must be "what is Being itself?"[12]

In *De la grammatologie* Derrida asks if the question of the sense or meaning of Being was not already included in the history of metaphysics as an epoch of presence? As support for this thesis he claims that the sense of Being is never produced as history outside its determination in presence.

Derrida credits Nietzsche with having made an important contribution toward the liberation of the signifier. Instead of viewing language as a medium for the revelation of the signified, Nietzsche sees writing as an original operation. We read in *La voix et le phénomène* that the presence of the present can only be thought through the movement of repetition. Presence is always defined through a reference to the past.[13] Derrida's argument almost takes the form of an Austinian "no sense" claim. It is as if Derrida were saying: "what you call the signified really makes no sense. The only thing that is accessible to us is the signifier.

This division, which metaphysics has sought to create between signifier and signified, undermines itself, for the signified has no meaning outside the signifier." Exploring the discourse that speaks of signifier and signified, Derrida finds that it makes no sense even within its own terms. From a Nietzschean perspective we could comment that this might very well be the case, but it may be useful to assume that there is a signified that can be abstracted from the signifier. As we will see in more detail in chapter 5, for Nietzsche the important question is very often not whether the conceptual distinctions we make are "true," but whether they are useful in maintaining human life.

Trace

Derrida insists that since the signified can never be abstracted from the signifier, the signified is originally and essentially a trace

(*trace*). In employing this term, Derrida wishes to call into question traditional ontology's assumption that being is equivalent to presence and language is the continuity of *parole*. The term is used to render certain notions enigmatic, such as proximity, immediacy, and presence. Derrida calls trace the *archi-phénomène* of memory, which precedes the opposition of nature and culture, animal and human, and belongs to the movement of signification. We may believe that spatial and objective exteriority are self-evident, but in fact this exteriority is meaningless without "the nonpresence of the other which is written in the sense of the present."[14] To call the trace ambiguous would be misleading, for it would be to acquiesce to the logic of presence—that is, the trace is ambiguous only if we believe that there is a presence, clear and distinct (either in our minds or the mind of God), against which we measure the trace.

Normally we think of a trace as a faint image or a small remnant. For example, we speak of traces of steroids in the body of an athlete. Derrida is telling us that the faint images that we see are not faint images of things currently or once present, rather faint and barely definable signs are all that are accessible to us.[15] Derrida writes that in the proposition that "the signified is originally and essentially a trace," the metaphysics of logos—that is, the metaphysics of presence and consciousness—will find that *l'écriture* is its death and its resource.[16] It has found its death, for the meaning that the discourse of presence wished to give to trace is no longer tenable. Derrida has undermined its pretensions to point toward, or represent, a more fundamental reality, and precisely because he has undermined these pretensions, Derrida appropriates the term for his own use. Once undermined, the term suggests the inevitable ambiguity of human knowledge. The trace stands out as a ruin, or a remnant of the lost glories of the discourse of presence, whereby, as in the paintings of Lorrain, its ruined state enhances the trace's allure.

Derrida asks rhetorically, "What guided us in the choice of this word *la trace*?"[17] There can never be a definitive or absolute justification. It is a response to the state of forces and translates a historical calculation. There are a number of givens that have progressively imposed this choice. The word makes reference to several contemporary discourses. The use of this term will allow him to *faire l'économie des développements qui ont chez eux démontré leur efficacité* (allow him to economize with the help of developments that have shown their efficacy by others).[18]

In addition to efficacy it would seem that a second, and perhaps even more important, criterion for Derrida is inclusiveness. The claim that trace provides the resource as well as the demise of the metaphysics of logos is that we can really make sense of the terminology of metaphysics only when we follow the *Holzwege*, which has as its trail marker *la trace*. For Derrida, *la trace* is the alpha and omega of classical ontology.

Nietzsche would be sympathetic, I think, to Derrida's insistence that language is not simply the medium through which we grasp reality, or, to put this in Derrida's language, that the order of the signified is never contemporaneous (*contemporain*) with the signifier. Nietzsche is obviously suspicious of language's ability to represent reality, but in some ways his position is less radical than Derrida's. He certainly would appreciate Derrida's contention that concepts must be understood in terms of their interrelationships. Nietzsche writes that individual philosophical concepts are related to one another like the *sämtlichen Glieder der Fauna eines Erdteils* (the collective members of the fauna of a continent—BGE, 20). But Nietzsche also believes that although language cannot *explain* the world, it can *interpret* it.

Nietzsche even sometimes argues that language can, to some extent, control the world. This we have seen in the passage from *Beyond Good and Evil* (14), where Nietzsche claims that Plato's theory of the forms is born in the enjoyment Plato had in casting a net over the sensual mob. Nietzsche writes (there is no question but that this is an unusual interpretation of Plato) that Plato gained a rare sort of pleasure from his attempt to control reality through the forms. The relevant point for the comparison with Derrida is that Nietzsche is arguing that these concepts control a reality beyond the reality of discourse. Plato's forms, like all other attempts to represent reality, will inevitably fall short, nonetheless they influence something that is qualitatively different, something other than a text.

This does not mean that, having rejected the theory of the forms, Nietzsche goes to the other extreme and embraces some sort of empiricism. Nietzsche calls, for example, Locke's theory on the origin of ideas superficial (BGE, 20), but he probably would refer to Derrida's remarks about the signified as unduly pessimistic. Unlike Derrida, Nietzsche criticizes, in *Beyond Good and Evil* (as we have seen in chapter 2), certain conceptual schemes, such as material

atomism, claiming that they are inconsistent with reality. On the basis of his interpretation, he is prepared to argue that material atomism "belongs to the best-refuted things (*bestwiderlegten Dinge*) that there are" (BGE, 12). Nietzsche claims, according to his *interpretation*, that it is impossible to live according to nature, because it is "wasteful beyond all measure, indifferent without measure, without purpose or consideration, without mercy and justice, fertile and desolate" (BGE, 9). And this is an interpretation that, at least at the moment of publishing *Beyond Good and Evil*, he is prepared to defend against competing notions of reality. Certainly he considers it only an interpretation of reality and not an objective description, but Nietzsche tries to support (at least in *Beyond Good and Evil*) this assumption through the use of empirical argument.

Nietzsche's hypothesis of a world constantly in flux is not simply, to use Derrida's terminology, a claim about *écriture*. It is rather a belief about reality. In short, there is, for Nietzsche, an *hors du texte*.[19]

It is because his critique is not as radical as Derrida's that Nietzsche can write about (and this would seem difficult, if not impossible, for Derrida) the errors caused by the prejudice of reason (*Vernunft-Vorurteile*). Nietzsche writes that—insofar as reason forces us to speak in terms of unity, identity, duration, substance, cause, things, and being—reason, by its very nature, forces us into error. He claims that he knows this on the basis of a rigorous calculation (*einer strengen Nachrechnung*) (TI, "Reason," 5). It is questionable how much "rigor" or convincing "calculations" we find in Nietzsche. Certainly there is some of the former, but that the latter remained unpublished is perhaps a credit to Nietzsche's better judgment. In other places Nietzsche bemoans the fact that certain beliefs (such as the view that spirit can be a cause [TI, "Errors," 3]) are taken for reality. One of the keys to understanding Nietzsche's beliefs about our ability to know the empirical world is to see that his comments concerning it often serve a critical purpose. In particular, they call into question traditional beliefs about the stability of the self and the world.

I do not wish to overstate the case. There is a great deal of agreement between Nietzsche and Derrida on the inability of language adequately to describe the world. Although he supports his "metaphysical beliefs" with empirical arguments, Nietzsche is well aware of the limits of his knowledge about the world and treads gin-

gerly, particularly after *Beyond Good and Evil*, when he strays into this realm. In the second part of this chapter I will discuss where I believe a greater divergence between these two thinkers is to be found. For Derrida, Nietzsche's destruction of absolutes leaves us wandering through a forest of texts unable to plot a definitive route—that is, to arrive at a single unified interpretation. Nietzsche is much too self-conscious and perhaps even self-involved to hide his authorship. He is willing to present a single view—namely, his view—although he does not claim that it is anything more than his interpretation.

La Femme, Le Style Éperonnant, and the Plurality of Style

In *De la grammatologie* we read that the "trace" will serve to pierce "logocentric thought," or to use another phrase "the metaphysics of presence"—the thought that believes that the signifier reveals the signified. In "La question du style" it is the *éperon* that pierces the myth of the presence of the signified and which is also integral to his understanding of style. Nietzsche appreciates, according to Derrida, that there can only be a plurality of styles. Good style in itself does not exist, rather *il faut écrire dans l'écart entre plusieurs styles. S'il y a du style, voilá ce que insinue la femme (de) Nietzsche, il doit y en avoir plus d'un* (one must write in the flash between many styles. If there is style, Nietzsche's woman tells us that there must be more than one)."[20]

Derrida divides the question of "the woman" in Nietzsche's thought into three fundamental propositions. From the point of view of "truth," she is condemned as a power of *mensonge* (falsehood). At other times she is considered to be truth, in the Christian or philosophical sense—no great compliment. From both perspectives she is seen as a castrator. In addition to these two negative pictures of women, there is the positive sense of woman as affirmative, artistic, and Dionysian. Nietzsche only condemns the woman in the sense that she corresponds to a bastardized, masculine femininity. There is not *the* woman, nor *the* sexual difference between men and women, just as there is not *the* truth.[21]

For Nietzsche, according to Derrida, style is, simultaneously, a plurality of styles and *le style éperonnant*. How can it be both? The

answer is not simply that Nietzsche advocated one style but tolerated others. *Le style éperonnant* is a plurality of styles. How is this possible? The question of style, according to Derrida, is always a question of a pointed object. An *éperon* is a point of rocks that pierces waves at the entry to a harbor. It is also that with which one can attack and repel a menacing force, for example, a ship that leads a fleet and pierces the attack of enemy ships.[22] Style, in Nietzsche's thought, advances in the manner of the *éperon*. Style protects against those concepts that present themselves with zealousness. In particular, Derrida mentions the present, but he also includes content, the thing itself, sense, and reality. Style, or, more precisely, *le style éperonnant*, pierces our ordinary conceptions of reality as presence of the signified.

You do not have to be a Freudian to discern the phallic images in Derrida's description of the *éperon*. This does not mean that Derrida is giving Nietzsche's thought a Freudian analysis. In *De la grammatologie* he notes that Freud's theories have marked our epoch as well as his own analyses, but he does not intend to use Freud's theories as a principle of truth. Psychoanalysis must elucidate the law of its proper adherence to metaphysics and occidental culture.[23] Indeed, Derrida claims he wants to distance himself from Freud, to distance himself from phallocentric discourse and write *comme une femme*.[24]

If style is the male, then *l'écriture* is the woman.[25] Women have no essence. They separate (*écarté*) and they surround and annihilate both essence and identity.[26] Truth is a woman, but only insofar as we do not believe that she is *the* truth. The woman represents, for Derrida, skepticism and violent dissimulation. The questions of art, style, and truth are all linked, but the question "What is the woman?," will only mislead us. Instead of attempting to pass through the veil of the woman, we should look into the question of style through the question of interpretation.

The goal of the question of the woman is to suspend the opposition between true and false, and eliminate the attempt to find the "true" meaning of the text. *L'éperon stylé* passes through the veil, not in order to reveal an unveiled truth, but rather to destroy the notion of an opposition between veiled and unveiled. The aim of Nietzsche's style is to delimit (*dé-limité*) the uncertain (*le suspens*).[27] Derrida writes the word with a hyphen so that its meaning becomes to remove limits rather than to cordon off. Uncertainty is not con-

trolled within tight boundaries, but rather pervades all philosophic discourse. Even the question of whether or not this activity constitutes an unveiling cannot, according to Derrida, be determined. It is certainly true that Nietzsche never believed that truth was attainable, but this does not mean, in my opinion, that Nietzsche is left simply tracing the limits of the uncertain. Nor does his disbelief in absolutes limit Nietzsche to contemplating the uncertain.

The inability of the signifier to invoke the presence of the signified is the backdrop for much, if not all, of Derrida's thought. In his essay on Nietzsche this inability is mirrored in the incapacity to pierce the veil. The woman always remains hidden and separate from the man. His bid to possess her fails, as do her attempts to give herself. Yet this failure does not result in an abandoning of deconstruction; it is indeed this failure that first enables deconstruction. Deconstruction is the plotting of the signifier's failure to invoke the presence of the signified, or metaphorically the failure of the *éperon* to pierce the veil and reveal the true woman.

Propriation As Appropriation

Derrida maintains that the vector (again an *éperon*) for all the concepts involved in Nietzsche's analysis of sexual difference is the process of propriation (*propriation*). Propriation is a word that I have been unable to find in any French, French-English dictionary, or English dictionaries with the exception of *The Oxford English Dictionary*. There it is noted that the word is rarely used and means appropriation or "the act of making or the condition of being made one's own." Most of the examples the dictionary gives are from legal discourses. Derrida offers us some help by including a series of terms in parentheses immediately following his introduction of the word. In the parenthesis he adds *appropriation, expropriation, prise, prise de possession, don et échange, maîtrise, servitude* (appropriation, expropriation, take, taking possession of, giving and exchange, mastery, servitude).[28]

There is, in both French and English, an ambiguity in the meaning of the word "appropriation," which serves Derrida's purposes very well. It means to take possession of something but often has the connotation that the thing appropriated does not really belong to the taker. Or to appropriate something may mean that we use it in a

way not originally intended. At first Derrida leads us to believe that there is a difference between appropriation and propriation. To propriation he seems to give the sense of rightful possession. But Derrida then argues that in fact propriation is a myth.[29] In the act of propriation we attempt to take hold of something that is not ours. We never, however, succeed in making it our own. Propriation is always appropriation; any time we attempt to make something our own, to propriate it, it can belong to us only in the manner of being an unrightful possession, or unactualized possession—that is, something appropriated.

Propriation includes, according to Derrida, among other things, the process by which the woman gives herself and a man takes possession or, more precisely, seems to take possession. In reality there are a series of trompe l'oeil that define the process of propriation. The form of the woman's giving is a "giving of oneself for"—that is, the man acts as if he gives a destination or finality in return for the woman's giving of her virginity. In fact the woman never really reveals herself and the man is incapable of giving the woman a goal. Derrida argues that the consequence of the woman's giving of herself in a relationship dominated by exchange is that men and women change places, or more precisely they exchange their masks ad infinitum. The opposition of giving and taking, of possessing and being possessed, is a kind of *leurre transcendental*[30] (transcendental lure or decoy) produced by "the graphic of the hymen" and therefore the process of propriation escapes all dialectic and all ontological definition (*décidabilité*).[31]

Propriation is a lure because possession of the other is a myth. Giving and taking is a decoy, plotted on the graphic of the hymen because in the act of piercing the hymen a man may mistakenly believe that he is possessing a woman.[32] But the taking or giving of virginity does not alter the fact that the propriation of the other never succeeds in unveiling—that is, in revealing—the presence of the other. As Sarah Kofman writes, for Derrida the "logic" of the hymen, which functions under the law of entry/exteriority (*entre/antre*), excludes all investigation of a meaning. Derrida transforms texts into a play of differences and thereby eliminates the myth of possession.[33] Propriation is then the process of making the other our own—inasfar as that is possible. We never really succeed, for there is always a difference between the other and what the other is for us; our attempts at propriation end inevitably in appropriation.

There are a number of texts in addition to Nietzsche's that these Derridian comments on propriation serve to illuminate. Derrida writes that the question of sense or the truth of Being is inscribed on the question of *proper*. Each time the question of "proper" surfaces, the ontohermeneutic (read Heidegger's) form of interpretation shows its limit. This is not the limit of either an ontological or an ontic realm, but rather the limit of Being itself.[34]

Not that we should ignore the critical resources of the ontological question, nor is it wise, in Derrida's opinion, to assume that the question of propriation is not relevant to the question of Being—that is, to assume that we can address directly the questions concerning propriation. To do this would be to persist in the established discourse of the domain, to remain within the confines of the presuppositions of ontohermeneutic thought, and rest in a precritical relation to the signified. He would also be depriving himself of a margin on which to write his subversive commentary. Why is it unwise to assume that we can address the question of propriation directly? The direct question would be "What is propriation?," and it would constitute a return to the language of presence.

Heidegger's works are a particularly opportune margin for understanding Derrida's discussion of propriation and appropriation. Derrida differentiates between two currents in Heidegger's thought. In some places he believes that Heidegger fails to appreciate the importance of propriation.[35] For example, Heidegger claims that Nietzsche's concept of the will has a unique meaning and belongs to the history of metaphysical thought, without examining the notion of belonging.[36] Derrida believes that there is, however (and this is the second "current"), an "opening" of Heidegger's teaching in the last section of his *Time and Being* when Heidegger submits the question of Being to the question of "proper-ty," or in German *eigen, eignen, ereignen*, and most importantly *Ereignis* (own, owning, making one's own, event). The etymological connection that Derrida is suggesting here provides support for his argument regarding propriation. In English there is no obvious relationship between "making something one's own," and "event," but in German there is a conspicuous connection between *ereignen* and *Ereignis*. The reflexive verb *ereignen* comes from the Middle High German word *eroeugen* and the Old High German word *irougen*, both of which mean to place in front of the eyes or to show. The etymology of the German word for "event" points to a correlation between what is brought

before our eyes and that which belongs to us. For something to happen, it must be brought before our eyes. To see is to possess, while what remains hidden from us—for example, the woman—we never master.

Why does Derrida believe that when Heidegger submits the question of Being to the question of *Ereignis* an "opening" of his thought occurs? To understand Being in terms of *Ereignis* is to have abandoned the search for a definitive source of Being that would exclude or include anything. The "opening" symbolizes the readiness to give equal weight to all that comes before our eyes. To abandon the pursuit of Being in favor of *Ereignis* is to contend that the goal of the philosophical endeavor is not the recovery of what has become merely a faint image on a distant horizon. And when the later Heidegger no longer seeks to recover Being through an examination of its traces, then he approaches, according to Derrida, the position of Nietzsche. I am not interested here in the question of whether or not the thought of the later Heidegger and Nietzsche are in accord with one another. My purpose is rather to highlight Derrida's thought, which in characteristic fashion he brings to the forefront by interpreting the thought of someone else.

Here it is Heidegger, or actually an intersection that Derrida sees between the thought of the late Heidegger and Nietzsche, which illustrates Derrida's own vision. Derrida writes that the later Heidegger recognizes what Nietzsche already knew—that is, that the thought of difference (not as the early Heidegger maintained, the experience of Being itself) precedes metaphysics. Difference englobes the thought of Being and removes the question of the production of truth from the project of a fundamental ontology. Truth and nontruth, veiled and unveiled are returned into the never-ending abyss. No static state is produced, but rather Heidegger subordinates the question of Being (in *Time and Being*) to the never-ending process of the *Ereignis*. We end up with the abyss of truth as nontruth, of propriation as appropriation, (*á-propriation*) or that which Nietzsche calls "style"—the realization that there are many styles. We learn to appreciate that the secret of the woman is not revealed through a parting of the veil, but rather in the recognition of her nonplace (*non-lieu*)—that is to say, in the fact that she remains forever enigmatic and incapable of final definition.

To clarify his interpretation of the difference between the early and the later Heidegger, Derrida writes that the structure of the

"proper" is not fundamental, but rather superficial and without ground. Working against the notion of profundity, Derrida writes that the *le proper* is always flat. Propriation is an abyss into whose depths the "proper" hurls itself without ever finding itself and passes into the other. How can propriation be both flat and an unending abyss? It is flat in the sense that there is no more fundamental ground "behind" *le proper*. It is an abyss because it is not static, but is rather constantly evolving. Propriation is a never-ending process.[37]

The chief difference between Heidegger and Derrida lies in the attitude they take toward the tradition they reject. Whereas Heidegger, throughout most of the Nietzsche lectures, is preoccupied with the attempt to get beyond metaphysics and to find a new kind of understanding, Derrida investigates the dynamics of established discourses. At the time of the Nietzsche lectures (at least in the first volume) Heidegger attempts to overcome metaphysical thought by overcoming all conceptual thought. For Derrida, deconstruction is an overcoming of the tradition of "presence," a renunciation of the attempt to unveil *la femme*—that is, to invoke the signified.[38]

In *De la grammatologie*, at the conclusion of his argument against Lévi-Strauss's notion of *l'écriture*, Derrida alleges that Lévi-Strauss's claim that primitive societies possess *parole* but not *écriture* serves to perpetuate the decoy of the mastered presence (*leurre de la présence maîtrisée*).[39] Language does not represent reality; rather, it serves, like the wooden ducks of the hunters, or (to use Derrida's example) the leather bird of the falconer, to lure. To recognize the presence of *l'écriture* in *parole* is to know that difference and absence are as integral to *parole* as they are to *l'écriture*.[40] To have understood that difference and absence are "present" in parole is "to begin to think the decoy" (*commencer à penser le leurre*). Presence can, Derrida believes, never be mastered, because nothing exists merely as presence; presence actually involves difference and absence. Language "lures" this difference, but never overcomes it. Here is the connection, for Derrida, between the Black Forest and the question concerning women. The *Holzwege* of the woodcutters meander aimlessly and, as such, can never be definitely plotted. Like the woman behind the veil, they remain mysterious and are never completely known.

As we have seen, Derrida also argues in *De la grammatologie* that the signifier escapes the question "What is it?" In "La question du style" he writes that we can no longer ask "What is proper?,"

"What is appropriation?," or "What is expropriation?," or "What is mastery and servitude?" As a sexual operation, propriation is more powerful than the question "What is it?," or the questions concerning the nature of veils, of truth, or of the meaning of Being. He precludes the possibility that propriation could be understood as derivative of the phenomenon of sexuality because sexuality apart from propriation is incomprehensible.

In addition, Derrida argues that the process of propriation organizes the totality of the process of language, including symbolic exchanges and ontological statements (*énoncés*). Propriation for Derrida is the way in which we attempt to take hold of the other; we part the woman's veil only to find another veil. He believes that language, be it written or spoken, never conveys that which is not language, but rather it lures. The wooden ducks of a hunter and the red leather bird of the falconer serve to lure real birds. A decoy presupposes the existence of an authentic other. If the process of propriation is a *lure*, for Derrida, then it is perfectly natural to want to know what it is meant to tempt. But that desire to know the truth leads, Derrida believes, nowhere. The history of truth is always a process of propriation—that is to say, it is a history of failed conquests and women never seen.[41]

Derridian Propriation Versus Nietzschean Foundationless Constructions

Nietzsche certainly shares Derrida's mistrust of foundationalism, but he is not primarily concerned with a delimitation of the unknown nor with showing that all that exists is a never-ending string of possible interpretations. Nietzsche does presuppose that nothing can be definitively known, and that no canonical interpretations exist. But having lost faith in any sort of foundation of absolutes, he still believes that it is possible to do more than deconstruct the undermined tradition. If the paths of Nietzsche's thought are not always easily charted, they are nonetheless not merely inscribed in the margins of other texts. He is willing to give one interpretation—to trace a complete trail, rather than walk a meandering, undefinable path. He may not know *the* woman or *the* truth, but he creates "truths" even without a foundation of absolutes. Nietzsche offers interpretations and makes value judgments, recognizing that

the grounding for those judgments is an intensely personal reworking of the tradition. Not knowing the true meaning of "I forgot my umbrella" or "the woman" would not inhibit him from inventing an interpretation or excluding one and most importantly calling it his own.

This Nietzsche does, as we have seen, when, in *Beyond Good and Evil*, he argues that the world is will to power. Similarly, in his later works, after giving up on the project of interpreting inorganic reality as the will to power, he still evaluates cultural phenomena and even entire cultures.[42] In *The Anti-Christ* Nietzsche claims unambiguously that the feeling of power, the will to power, and everything that raises the feeling of power and the will to power in humankind is good, while all that arises out of weakness is bad (A, 2). These are not universal or absolute values; rather, Nietzsche calls war his "virtue" and refers to his "first commandment" (through which he expresses his love of humankind) that "the weak and the failures shall perish" (A, 2).

The greatest difference between Derrida and Nietzsche lies in the latter's desire to project his voice. If Derrida is a reincarnated monk, illuminating sacred texts of the modernist tradition with images of the profane (or what has been traditionally thought of as profane), Nietzsche is a philosopher with a hammer sounding out the icons (to name a few, Strauss, Kant, and Wagner) of his age. True, Nietzsche borrows from certain texts and literary genres, for example, building upon the model of Rousseau and Augustine, he wrote his "Confessions" in *Ecce Homo*. He borrows his aphoristic style from the seventeenth-century French writers, but the name, Nietzsche, overshadows all others in his writing. If, during his life, he labored in obscurity, it was not for any lack of effort to make his name known. He tells us over and over again that these are his views. They are no more truthful than those he rails against, but rather distinguished by the self-proclaimed nobility of his voice.

According to Derrida, Heidegger and Fink are correct that Nietzsche's thought is a reversal of metaphysics that remains captive to the metaphysical edifice.[43] It is not clear from this statement that Derrida intends to differentiate himself from Nietzsche. Surely to surround the traditional concepts of metaphysics with a discourse is to remain captive to the edifice of metaphysics. The project of deconstruction presupposes and depends upon the metaphysical tradition. Deconstruction questions metaphysics, shakes it, but it does not

overcome it. The difference between Derrida and Nietzsche, which I believe Derrida has failed to appreciate, is that Nietzsche attempts to free himself from the yoke of metaphysical thought through "acquired innocence." He is not genuinely innocent, but rather he constructs a facade of innocence. He asserts his views pretending to be innocent of the fact that he has no secure foundation upon which to build; he is very much aware that he has wiped away the traditional reasons for preferring one interpretation over another.

I have characterized Derrida as a subversive monk. Nietzsche might well have placed Derrida's project at the level of the lion (Z, "On the Three Metamorphoses"). Certainly Derrida is not a camel, passively carrying the loads that others have placed upon him. He is, rather, constantly shaking and undermining traditional discourses, and in this sense deconstruction is a roaring at a text. He is, however, not a child who awakens after the task of breaking down traditional values has been completed. The difference between Derrida and Nietzsche here results from their diverging attitudes. Nietzsche strives for the innocence that would allow him to make judgments, in spite of the fact that he really has no absolute ground on which to stand in making them.

Sometimes Nietzsche associates this way of philosophizing with the Greeks. He claims it is admirable to remain on the surface of things. When he speaks of the *Tapfer bei der Oberfläche* (bravery (or gallantry) at the surface), he is arguing that it is gallant to give the appearance of believing in the forms and the entire Olympus of appearances. Some lies are noble. He is Greek, offering forms, tones, and words in an artistic manner (GS, Preface, 4).[44] How is this preference for the Greek ideal reflected in Nietzsche's theory of interpretation? Derrida is certainly correct in saying that, for Nietzsche, there is not just one interpretation, but many. Indeed the "true" interpretation will always be hidden from us, but the intention of Nietzsche's thought is not just to show us that there are many interpretations. He does not stop at the pronouncement that there is no definitive canon of good style.

In a sense Derrida's problem is Nietzsche's problem: in a world devoid of truth, How do we decide among competing interpretations? Derrida's solution is to transform philosophy into the deconstruction of discourses. He undermines traditional notions of presence and suggests that there is no truth, that the signified is never present, and that there are an infinite number of possible interpre-

tations. This cosmopolitan deftly surrounds the objects of his attention with interpretations that serve to illustrate his principles. His essay on Nietzsche is particularly engaging because Nietzsche is obviously one of the principal inspirations for Derrida. Yet Derrida seems to see only half of Nietzsche's project. He has understood Nietzsche's critique without having noticed that there is also a constructive project. Derrida is philosophically, as well as personally, nomadic: Jew, born in North Africa, philosopher—and yet he often teaches and is read in departments of comparative literature.

Nietzsche predicted (prophesied?) that the twentieth century would be a century of nihilism. Heidegger speaks of Being that will always remain hidden, Derrida of the inability to escape the discourse of presence. The later Heidegger's authentic other (Being) cannot be reached, whereas Derrida writes of the signified which *n'est jamais contemporain* with the signifier. Heidegger, at the end of his life, becomes increasingly pessimistic about philosophy's ability to invoke Being. Nietzsche's answer to this is a philosophy no longer burdened with the loss of truth or absolutes. That loss does not inhibit Nietzsche from building his edifice. The secret of Nietzsche's style is not just that there are many styles, but (as we will see in chapter 6) that, in the absence of foundations of absolutes, it remains possible to build. He is not fascinated by the nonpresence of something sought after, but rather invigorated by his discovery that all is permitted.

Chapter 5

Necessary Fictions

Chapter 4 attempted to show that although for both Derrida and Nietzsche there is no truth, Nietzsche finds some interpretations better than others, and therefore is not condemned to languish in the never-ending abyss between truth and nontruth, veiled and unveiled. Does Nietzsche believe that he can build interpretations arbitrarily? Can he defend any and every interpretation? In this chapter I will argue that the loss of absolutes does not mean this, for Nietzsche. Even if we do exist in a world devoid of absolutes—in some sort of Heideggerian landscape with paths that can never be definitively plotted—there still exist, Nietzsche believes, certain fictions without which we cannot live.

I have already spoken at length, in chapters 1 and 2, about the difficulty that Nietzsche believed his ambivalent attitude toward truth would cause his readers. Equally confusing, if not more so, is his position on falsity: the renunciation of false judgments would be a renunciation of life, a denial of life (BGE, 4). Falsity is a condition of life.

To discover what Nietzsche means by necessary fictions, as well as the consequences that these fictions have for his thought, is

the task set out for this chapter. In the first section, I will discuss Nietzsche's mature doctrine of necessary fictions in *Beyond Good and Evil*, concentrating on showing in what sense he believes they are "necessary." The second section will trace the origins of the theory in the early essay "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense" and *The Gay Science*. Finally, I will discuss why, after *Beyond Good and Evil*, the theory of necessary fictions is no longer discussed in the published works. The doctrine recedes, in large measure, because Nietzsche no longer offers—at least not publicly—interpretations of the physical world, and the necessity of these fictions cannot be understood apart from his vision of the physical world.

The Mature Doctrine of Necessary Fictions from *Beyond Good and Evil*

Nietzsche's mature doctrine of necessary fictions is presented in a number of aphorisms from *Beyond Good and Evil*, the most important of these being *Beyond Good and Evil* 4:

> The falsity of a judgment is, for us, no objection to a judgment; perhaps that is where our new language sounds strangest. The question is, to what extent it promotes life, preserves life, preserves the species or even breeds a species; and we are fundamentally inclined to maintain that the falsest judgments (to which the synthetic *a priori* judgments belong) are for us the most necessary (*unentbehrlichsten*), that without allowing the validity of logical fictions, without a measuring of the reality on the purely invented world of the unconditional, the thing which is identical to itself, without a constant falsification of the world through numbers man could not live—that the renunciation of false judgments would be a renunciation of life, a denial of life. To affirm untruth (*Unwahrheit*) as a condition of life: that means of course to confront in a dangerous way the conventional values (*Wertgefühlen*); and a philosophy which dares to do that, places itself by that alone already beyond good and evil. (BGE, 4)

What are these "necessary fictions"? Nietzsche is not very specific—except for these few examples: "logical fictions," "the purely

invented world of the unconditional," "the thing identical with itself," and "numbers." The first and the last of these are self-explanatory once one understands the phrases "purely invented world of the unconditional" and "thing identical with itself." To understand these phrases it is important to remember the context in which this passage appears. Chapter 2 attempted to show that the first two sections of *Beyond Good and Evil* represent Nietzsche's most developed and systematic attempt to interpret the physical world as will to power. The cornerstone of this theory is that nothing remains the same—that is, that the world is a continual process of becoming. "What is nature?—it is completely indifferent—without intent, or righteousness" (BGE, 9).[1] It is fertile, yet bleak and uncertain, and hostile, rather than nurturing.

In *Beyond Good and Evil* 22, Nietzsche writes that to speak of the "laws" of nature is a naive human "justification and inversion of the senses." The world is a tyrannical, relentless, inexorable process of powers prevailing against one another—totally without laws (BGE, 22). Nietzsche calls "the unconditional" a purely invented world because, in his opinion, everything consists of transitory forces constantly overwhelming one another. And because everything is in flux, there is nothing that remains identical with itself. Anything that suggests such stability is a fiction. Noble fictions are, like all systems of order, justifications and inversions of the senses, but they distinguish themselves from other ways of ordering by being essential coping mechanisms in an unstable world.

The constantly changing world is continually threatening to annihilate humans; to live "according to nature" is a contradiction in terms. Nature is indifferent and therefore human life depends upon "approximating, giving preference, being unfair, being limited and wanting to be different" (BGE, 9). We create stability with artificial systems of order that employ notions of identity and continually falsify the world by quantifying it—that is, through numbers"(BGE, 4).[2] A few may create, in part, their own system and then impose it on the *Pöbel* (masses) of conflicting forces that make up the world, but most people adopt a system created by someone else.

Nietzsche's theory of necessary fictions has several unusual aspects. One of the most eccentric, however, is his belief that the falsest judgments, in particular a priori synthetic judgments, are the most necessary (*unentbehrlichsten*) for us. It is not immediately evident why he considers them particularly false, nor why they should

be so essential in maintaining life. He very rarely discusses synthetic a priori judgments outside *Beyond Good and Evil* 4 and in the one place he does so, just seven aphorisms later (BGE, 11), he seems to dismiss them as unimportant.[3]

Beyond Good and Evil 11 is primarily a critique of Kant. Nietzsche claims that Kant was most proud of his table of categories, in particular of having discovered the capability we have for synthetic a priori judgments. Kant's answer to the question "How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?" is, according to Nietzsche, "by virtue of a capability" (*vermöge eines Vermögens*).[4] Nietzsche compares this to the doctor in a Molière farce who says the power of opium to make one sleepy stems from its power to make one drowsy.[5]

We need, Nietzsche claims, to replace the question Why are synthetic a priori judgments necessary? with the question Why is the belief in these judgments necessary?. Nietzsche is, to some extent, unfair to Kant here, for it seems that Kant was also interested in this question. But the difference between the two thinkers lies in the character they assign to these judgments. We have no right to believe in them, according to Nietzsche, but this belief is nonetheless necessary as "approximation."

Nietzsche claims that the greatest influence that German philosophy had on Europe was to provide an antidote against sensualism. *Beyond Good and Evil* 11 concludes that synthetic a priori judgments play a role in providing this antidote. Synthetic a priori judgments contain in their conclusions a result that extends beyond their premises. Kant's answer to the question 'How are these judgments possible?, was that we order the way the world appears to us through our capacity for knowledge (*Erkenntnis-Vermögen*). For Kant, these relationships were not present in the world in itself, but rather they are the product of our rational minds. Both Nietzsche and Kant reject ascribing order to the world apart from human perception. But while Kant claims that his ordering system is a necessary presupposition for the possibility of knowledge, Nietzsche believes this ordering represents a necessary presupposition for human survival.

The idea of the noble lie is not new. It goes back at least to Plato, but Nietzsche's necessary fictions differ substantially from the noble lies mentioned in *The Republic*. In *The Republic* the guardians invent lies primarily for the lower classes. One has the impression that they would not be needed if society consisted only of

guardians. Nietzsche's fictions have evolved with consciousness and are not only useful, but indispensable. They are not merely for the herd and serve not only to facilitate social life, but they are, Nietzsche believes, necessary for human survival. Contrary to what Alexander Nehamas suggests, Nietzsche believes that these fictions are indispensable.[6] Not simply necessary for the understanding of human life, they are essential to life itself. They are not used by a few "supermen," but every human who survives employs them. One could question whether reality is as chaotic and unordered as Nietzsche suggests. Is all stability a human creation, or does our ability to create some stability in the world lend credence to those who argue that the world admits of regularity, even apart from human systems of ordering? A Nietzschean reply to this question could be that we are not capable of knowing a world apart from our perceptions. Knowledge is never knowledge of an independent object, rather human knowledge is always conditioned by the knower. A certain amount of stability seems to be in the world, but we find it because it is we who have placed it there. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the success with which we order the world is evidence that reality is not so unordered as Nietzsche insinuates.

These, however, are questions for a physicist-philosopher, which is a vocation Nietzsche contemplated but ultimately never took up. His enduring contribution to intellectual history is philosophical and the enduring interest of the doctrine of necessary fictions is the light that it casts upon Nietzsche's reconstruction of the notions of truth and systematicity. Commenting on *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nehamas claims that Nietzsche's apparently extreme view that "untruth is a condition of life" (BGE, 4) "ultimately refers to our ignorance of the exact ways in which our views, at every time, are simplifications of the world and are dependent on particular values."[7]

Nehamas, Derrida, and most other postmodern readers of Nietzsche believe that, for Nietzsche, our views are always interpretations. There are, as I have suggested in chapters 2 and 4, good reasons for this interpretation, not least of which are Nietzsche's own statements from *Beyond Good and Evil* 14. The most important question for Nietzsche, however, is not Is there truth?, but rather How do we live once the great truths have been undermined?

In part, Nietzsche's answer is that some of these undermined notions must be retained. Necessary fictions do show our ignorance,

but more important for both this aphorism and Nietzsche's entire philosophical project beginning with *Beyond Good and Evil* is to supersede such oppositions as true and false, and good and evil.[8] To undermine traditional truth claims and yet admit their efficacy, or even more to assert their necessity, is as Nietzsche writes "to confront, in a dangerous way, conventional values" (BGE, 4). It makes Nietzsche all the more subversive.

Whereas it was once thought that undermined truths were by virtue of their "fallen nature" to be discarded, for Nietzsche the "fallen nature" of these truths provides a certain allure. Furthermore by coupling his undermining of truth with this pragmatic moment, Nietzsche avoids the hubris of believing that the demise of eternal truths means that everything is possible—without replacing the old truths with new ones.

The Three Manifestations of the Metaphoric Drive

That the world is teeming with irregularity and that truth is at best elusive are two of the themes that dominate Nietzsche's early unpublished essay "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense." Although these and other topics discussed in this essay are related to the later Nietzsche's doctrine of necessary fictions, there are substantial differences.[9] I will focus on two of these differences here.

First, the earlier essay is colored by Kantian, or more precisely neo-Kantian, influence stemming, in particular, from Nietzsche's reading of Friedrich Albert Lange's *History of Materialism*.[10] This is most evident in Nietzsche's remarks on time, space, and mathematics where it results in a mutation of Kant's ideas on the pure forms of intuition. In "On Truth" Nietzsche writes that a law of nature is only known to us in relation to other laws of nature. Since the laws of nature receive their meaning in relationship to one another, they are, in their essence, unintelligible:

> What is for us a law of nature? It is not in-itself known to us, but rather only in its effects, that is, in its relations to other laws of nature which are in turn only known as relations. Therefore all these relations continually refer to one another and are, in their essence, thoroughly unintelligible for us (*sind uns ihrem Wesen nach unverständlich durch und durch*). (KSA 1, 885)

That the laws of nature are in some sense false because they are not descriptions of phenomena in the world is a belief that Nietzsche held throughout his writings. The later Nietzsche also held that the "laws of nature" are not known individually, but exist within a "web" of meaning. The later Nietzsche does not, however, infer from this that these laws are "thoroughly incomprehensible" (KSA 1, 885).[11] The evolution of his thought can be traced in how he reacts to this falsity. The Nietzsche of "On Truth" concludes that we know only what we bring to these relationships—that is, time and space, which can be reduced to sequential relationships (*Sucessionverhältnisse*) and numbers. Kant argues that, strictly speaking, knowledge presupposes both intuition (*Anschauung*: to use Kemp-Smith's widely used, but problematic, translation) and understanding.[12] By his own definition, then, Kant seems to be forced to conclude that one can have no knowledge of the pure forms of intuition. Although Kant claims that time is empirically real, he also writes, for example, of the "transcendental ideality of time."[13] Nietzsche also refers to the forms of time and space, and although he does not explicitly refer to them as "pure" forms, he is clear about the fact that we produce these forms ourselves:

> Everything wonderful which we marvel at in the laws of nature, which demands an explanation from us, and which could lead us to mistrust idealism—this must all be attributed solely to the mathematical rigor and inviolability (*Unverbrüchlichkeit*) of the representations of time and space. *These, however, we produce in ourselves and out of ourselves with the same necessity with which the spider spins.* Because we are forced to comprehend (*begreifen*) all things through these forms alone, it is no wonder that we only really comprehend these forms concerning such things (KSA 1, 885-86). [emphasis added]

Like Kant, the early Nietzsche makes the distinction between intuition and understanding, but he views the distinction differently. Nietzsche's mutation of the Kantian doctrine of transcendental knowledge results in the assertion that all we really know are time and space. His position, formulated in Kantian terms, is that we know only the pure forms of intuition: "we only really know that which we bring (to experience): time and space and, in addition, sequential relationships and numbers" (KSA 1, 885).

Nietzsche's vision of reality from *Beyond Good and Evil*—that is, a constantly changing world for which tyranny is too mild a metaphor—does not substantially differ from that of the earlier essay. In line with the Kantian influence in "On Truth" he claims that nature must be thought of as an inaccessible and undefinable "X." We can neither confirm nor deny that a concept is true, for to do either would be dogmatic (KSA 1, 880). Yet shortly thereafter we read something that seems to be a description of reality. Humankind is a "violent, but genial builder" who has managed to build an infinitely complicated conceptual dome over "flowing fundament and running water" (KSA 1, 882). This sounds like the constantly changing nature described in *Beyond Good and Evil* 22. The difference is primarily one of emphasis.

In neither *Beyond Good and Evil* nor "On Truth" does Nietzsche ever claim to know reality definitively. But in this earlier work Nietzsche stresses the traditional Kantian notion that the thing-in-itself is unknowable. The later Nietzsche is involved in an almost Hegelian project of overcoming distinctions such as true and false, and good and evil. Rather than separating the knowable from the unknowable, he is intent upon undermining our confidence in logic and eternal immutable truths, our confidence that good and evil are opposites, or that the true is the good.

This leads to another, and for the purposes of this chapter more important difference between "On Truth" and *Beyond Good and Evil*. In "On Truth" falsification originates in our "drive" to create metaphors—a drive that Nietzsche describes as taking three, interrelated, but distinguishable forms. First it produced language out of the stimulation of nerves. The stimulation began as a picture and ended when the picture was transformed into a word (KSA 1, 879). We believe, Nietzsche tells us, that we know the way things such as "trees, colors, snow, and flowers" are in themselves. In fact, we possess only "metaphors" of these things that are not at all equivalent to their "original essences" (*ürsprungliche Wesenheiten*). Not that our concepts are entirely arbitrary. They do not, he tells us, taking a metaphor from Aristophanes, originate in the cuckoo's nest in the clouds, but neither do they capture the essence of things.

Once the stimulations of the nerves have been translated into enduring metaphors, the metaphoric drive takes a second form. The metaphors created to represent the stimulations of our nerves become, through the force of tradition, canonical, and lose their sen-

sual power. Nietzsche asks What is truth?, and answers that it is a totality of human relationships that are poetically and rhetorically enhanced and passed on. Suitably enough, he describes these metaphors with a series of memorable metaphors. They are illusions that we have forgotten are illusions, or else coins that have lost their pictures (KSA 1, 880-81).

Most striking of all, Nietzsche writes that concepts are the "cemeteries" of intuitions; the Roman columbarium is his model (KSA 1, 886). Scientists are not the builders of this structure, but rather the graveyard workers who busy themselves with the minor details involved in maintaining the "great columbarium of concepts." Although the title of the essay points to an amoral position on the issue of truth and falsity, the metaphor of the cemetery sharply contrasts with the playful immoralism of the later Nietzsche. And, inasmuch as this is the "cemetery of intuitions," the essay shows, in keeping with its mutant heritage, a devaluation of concepts in favor of intuitions.[14] The later Nietzsche does not object to the falsity of our judgments. The fictions of *Beyond Good and Evil* 4 are in some sense illusory, but they have not lost their power. They falsify the world and enable us to survive in it.

After the metaphoric drive has created these canonical metaphors, this drive then takes a third form—born of our desire to escape from the rigidity of the columbarium. Our society tells us to use certain metaphors that have been used so long that we no longer remember that they are metaphors. Metaphors harden into conventions, whose necessity is more social than pragmatic. The regularity of the columbarium acts like a prison fortress seeking to enclose the drive to construct metaphors. The drive seeks a new realm for its expression and finds it in myth and art. Working in this realm it confuses the traditional order through the introduction of new concepts and in general:

> The metaphorical drive shows desires, the world at the fingertips of awakened men to be so colorfully irregular, and inconsequentially held together, fascinating and continually to be shaped anew, as is the world of dreams. (KSA 1,887)

This third manifestation of the metaphoric drive, which Nietzsche also calls humankind's irresistible urge to fantasize, is fundamental in humans. To do away with it would be to do away

with human life. Only through the perception of the rigid and regular conceptual web (*Begriffsgespinnst*) do we know that we are awake. It feels like a dream when art tears this web. But its necessity does not originate in the attempt to live in an ever-changing world, but rather it originates in our frustration with the columbarium. Humans take refuge in the realm of art and myth, where they shake up the old concepts and introduce new metaphors and new names.

During the second and third stages of this metaphoric drive, Nietzsche speaks of necessity, but not of the same sort mentioned in *Beyond Good and Evil*. The conceptual nets become canonical because they have been used over a long period of time. Unlike the conceptual nets from *Beyond Good and Evil* 12, which were necessary to control the sensual mob, the necessity of these concepts in "On Truth" is, for the most part, social in origin—pressed upon us by our society. Nietzsche writes that although the coercive nature of society makes them seem indispensable, pragmatically speaking, these fictions are as replaceable as dice: "but the hardness and the rigidity into which the concepts evolve guarantees nothing as far as the necessity and the exclusive justification of this metaphor is concerned" (KSA 1, 882).

Describing the third manifestation of the metaphoric drive Nietzsche speaks again of necessity, but in a sense that is different from both the first use in "On Truth" and *Beyond Good and Evil*. Our drive to create metaphors is insatiable. The columbarium cannot suppress it, but only reroute it. The drive does not create new metaphors for our nerve stimulations; rather, it accepts the established distinctions and takes refuge in the world of myth. Nietzsche claims that we cannot, even for a moment (*Augenblick*), dispense with this metaphoric drive, for this would result in a dispensing of humankind. But the necessity he is speaking of here is not the necessity of controlling an ever-changing world, it is rather the irrepressible urge to create metaphors in the realms of art and myth despite the constrictions of the conceptual framework that tradition imposes. Nietzsche calls this urge to create metaphors in the realms of art and myth "necessary," for he claims that without it we could not live.

The necessary fictions of *Beyond Good and Evil* exist because they are useful. That they are both false and useful gives them their allure. The later Nietzsche does not believe that metaphors are as replaceable as dice. In "On Truth" our attempts to understand the

world are metaphoric and not descriptive. The later Nietzsche also believes this, but in *Beyond Good and Evil* 4 he emphasizes his indifference to questions concerning the truth and falsity of judgments. It is not the truth of judgments, but rather their usefulness in controlling the uncertainty of the world, that becomes the principal theme:

> The falsity of a judgment is for us no objection to it; perhaps in this way our new language sounds strangest. The question is to what extent it is life-encouraging life-maintaining, species-maintaining, perhaps species-promoting. (BGE, 4)

In *The Gay Science* and *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche becomes less critical of the falsification he views as inexorably tied to conceptual thinking. As Nietzsche's thought develops beyond the moralizing distinctions of good and evil, his concern for the inadequacies of concepts is replaced by an interest in how concepts allow us to live in the world. Consequently concepts evolve from being cemeteries and coins that have lost their profiles to necessary fictions.

Necessary Fictions and *The Gay Science*

Between the columbarium of "On Truth" and the fictions of *Beyond Good and Evil*, there is an intermediate stage in the development of Nietzsche's theory of fictions. In *The Gay Science* we find a number of aphorisms that take up the theme of the falsity of conceptual knowledge. These aphorisms—for my purposes 110, 111, 121, 256, and 344 are the most important—sound much more like the discussion in *Beyond Good and Evil* than the one in "On Truth." For example, the Kantian/neo-Kantian influence present in the earlier essay recedes in *The Gay Science*. There is no mention of the earlier claim to an understanding of time and space.

In keeping with *Beyond Good and Evil*, the pragmatic aspects of falsity are underlined. Nietzsche asserts that for a very long time the intellect brought forth only errors, some of which proved to be useful and preservative of the species (*arterhaltend*—GS, 110). The power of knowledge is not, Nietzsche claims, to be found in its truth, but rather in its *Alter, ihrer Einverleibtheit, ihrem Charakter*

als Lebensbedingung (age, the extent to which it has been incorporated, and its character as a condition of life—GS, 110). These false but useful beliefs include the convictions that things exist over time, that identical things exist, that material things and bodies exist, that a thing is what it appears to be, that our will is free, and that what is good for me is good in and of itself. It is only very late in the history of humankind that these beliefs began to be questioned. "Very late, truth appeared as the least powerful form of knowledge" (GS, 110). Nietzsche gives us various explanations for how errors can be *arterhaltend* (preserving of the species). Those who overlook the fact that everything is in flux—that is, who act as if similar things are actually identical—have a tremendous advantage over the skeptics (GS, 111). The animal who is too careful in subsuming has less of a chance of surviving than the one who immediately equates the similar. While the former contemplates whether or not the food in front of it is the same as what it has eaten the day before, the latter devours it. Where food is scarce, the one who reflects enjoys the least chance of survival.[15]

There is, however, at least one important difference between Nietzsche's position on truth in *The Gay Science* and *Beyond Good and Evil*. Although the usefulness of falsity is stressed in *The Gay Science*, he is not yet prepared to renounce the pursuit of truth and replace it with the pursuit of practicality. Nietzsche attributes, to use Wolfgang Müller-Lauter's term, a relative *Eigenständigkeit* (independence) to true knowledge.[16] What is meant by "independence"? In *Beyond Good and Evil*, truth is called the woman whom philosophers have never really understood (BGE, *Preface*). Nietzsche asks "Why should philosophers seek truth—what is the worth of truth and why not seek untruth? (*Unwahrheit*, BGE, *Preface*). In *The Gay Science* Nietzsche also claims that falsity is essential to life, but he is not yet prepared to renounce truth. Nietzsche maintains that we can incorporate some truth, even if it is not useful. All that is required is that these truths not be detrimental, whereby an explanation of how truth—and by truth here Nietzsche seems to mean a recognition of the constant flux—can be other than detrimental is noticeably lacking. The thinker provides a place where the battle occurs between the "truth drive" and the ancient fundamental errors. This battle transpires after the truth drive has shown itself to be, in some small way, "a life-preserving power" (*lebenerhaltende Macht*). This is the important battle; everything else pales in com-

parison. The last question concerning the condition of life is: To what extent can truth be incorporated? How is it that truth becomes a *lebenerhaltende Macht*?

The difference between Nietzsche's views on truth between *The Gay Science* and *Beyond Good and Evil* can be seen by contrasting the questions he asks about truth. In *The Gay Science* 110 the question is To what extent can we incorporate truth? In *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche writes that the falsity of a judgment is not an objection to it. The question is rather to what extent it promotes life, preserves life or preserves the species (BGE, 4). In another place Nietzsche asks Why seek truth? (BGE, 16). In *The Gay Science* Nietzsche differentiates between truth and falsity, and shows how difficult it is for us to live with truth.

In *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche is no longer interested in the incorporation of truth. Truth, in the later Nietzsche, is not opposed to error, rather differentiating truth and error is a sign of a genre of thought that Nietzsche seeks to avoid. The pragmatic advantages of error are discussed in both *The Gay Science* and *Beyond Good and Evil*, but for different reasons. Implicit in *The Gay Science*'s question To what extent we can incorporate truth?, is that a nonpragmatic truth exists. In *Beyond Good and Evil* we find a description of philosophy after the belief in objective truth and falsity has expired.

There are, however, in *The Gay Science* aphorisms that begin to approach *Beyond Good and Evil* 4: "Last stage of skepticism.—What are then the last truths of mankind?—They are the unrefutable errors of mankind" (GS, 265).

Although it is not explicitly stated, we can probably assume that this last stage of skepticism is not merely a position Nietzsche could envision, but rather the stage that Nietzsche had reached or was about to reach. When the "last truths" are "unrefutable errors," then the opposition between "truth and falsity" has been sublimated. The truth that we attempt to incorporate can be no more than an "unrefutable error."

This skepticism continues in Book 5 of *The Gay Science*.[17] There Nietzsche associates the belief in truth with Platonic thought and with the Christian's belief in God. This belief has lost its power to convince us. Truth has evolved from "not useful, but at least not harmful" (GS, 110), to a metaphysical belief gone up in flames, from whose fire Nietzsche lights his torch (GS, 344).[18]

The Philosopher's Travail

What constraints does the existence of necessary fictions impose upon Nietzsche's interpretations? In a world where truth has been replaced by necessary fictions, the philosopher who has, at least since Plato, been employed in the search for truth needs a new vocation. Perhaps Nietzsche has created a new position. Did he mean for the philosopher to become an archivist—that is, a cataloguer of necessary fictions? In fact we find no catalogue nor does the discussion of necessary fictions occupy an important role in his thought after *Beyond Good and Evil.* Although illness cut short his productive life, *Beyond Good and Evil* was written in 1885 and Nietzsche's productive life lasted three more years. He had time to catalogue them had that been his interest.

A more likely reason for Nietzsche's failure to develop and specify his doctrine of necessary fictions is his turn away from physics. The doctrine makes sense only within the context of Nietzsche's vision of the physical world as an ever-changing hostile environment. When Nietzsche turns increasingly in the writings after *Beyond Good and Evil* to the study of human culture, he no longer has the occasion to discuss necessary fictions.

What function do these fictions serve in Nietzsche's thought in *Beyond Good and Evil,* where he is theorizing about the nature of the inorganic world? Given our dependence on these fictions, do they represent a constraint on our interpretations? It is obvious that Nietzsche does not believe in true interpretations. Does he believe that the existence of necessary fictions must be incorporated into our interpretations? Are we free to portray these fictions as facts or must we always present them as fictions? Can we simply ignore these fictions? What constraints, if any, does the existence of necessary fictions place upon our interpretations?

As necessary as a fiction might be, nowhere in Nietzsche do we find a moral imperative to uncover these fictions. The importance of this doctrine, for Nietzsche, is the attack that it underwrites on the metaphysician's commitment to truth. Necessary fictions are, for Nietzsche, most important for what they call into question.[19] They are a sign that Nietzsche rejects two extremes. Our knowledge of reality is neither as complete nor as limited as some suggest. Against those who maintain that we know nothing of the world, Nietzsche replies that our concepts, although false, allow us to survive. To

those who maintain that we can know the world in itself, Nietzsche responds that our ability to live in the world does not imply that one has a true explanation for it.

Many conclude that in the absence of truth, everything is allowed. However, for Nietzsche this is not the case. There are certain fictions that we employ in order to survive. Nietzsche argues that reality is sensual confusion—that is, entirely contingent. To survive in this contingency humans introduce necessity through the creation of fictions. These fictions remain both contingent and necessary. Another way to say this is that Nietzsche believes in two worlds. The world itself admits of no ordering principles, not even principles of process. It is purely contingent. Human existence however requires order and therefore, to survive, humans create artificial orders: we read order into the world where in actuality none exists. We follow Plato's example and cover the world with conceptual nets, realizing even as we assert their objectivity that they are human inventions.[20] They are attempts to control contingency and are not inherent in the world.

Human ordering is episodic; it manages the flux of the universe rather than transforming flux into certainty. Necessity is reintroduced by Nietzsche in the sense that the ordering schema, which we press upon the world through deception, are necessary for human existence, but they are not part of the process of the universe. Order is an anthropomorphizing of the universe, necessary for human survival.

Although Nietzsche claims that human life is impossible without fiction, his primary philosophical effort is not an attempt to uncover these necessary fictions. They represent only the minimal constraints necessary for human life. This is increasingly the case as Nietzsche turns away from his theorizing about the physical world and turns to the examination of human culture. In his last works, particularly those written in 1888, Nietzsche encourages the philosopher to pursue an aesthetic ideal of life. Whereas necessary fictions are constraints imposed by life, style is a self-imposed constraint. Chapter 6 will highlight the importance of style, as well as discuss Nietzsche's aesthetic ideals.

Chapter 6

Nietzsche's Aesthetic Criteria

> One might call this whole Artists' Metaphysics arbitrary, idle, fantastic—the essential in it is that it already betrays a spirit who in the face of every danger struggles against the moral interpretation and significance of existence (*Dasein*). . . . In truth there is no greater opposition to the purely aesthetic interpretation and justification of the world . . . as the Christian teaching which is purely moral and wishes to remain moral and which with its absolute measures, beginning with the truthfulness of God—casts art, all art in the realm of lies—that is denies, condemns and judges it.
>
> —(BT, "Self-Criticism," 5)

Necessary fictions are more important in undermining truth than they are in determining Nietzsche's own views. Moreover, with the decline of Nietzsche's theory of the physical world, they are less relevant for his philosophical project after *Beyond Good and Evil.* Given that Nietzsche does not believe that humans are capable of apprehending an absolute or unconditioned truth, and never realized *Beyond Good and Evil*'s project of reducing everything to will to power, how then does he construct his interpretations? How does he decide which interpretations to advance and which to deny?

Nietzsche calls himself a recluse, claiming that there is always something arbitrary about the place where the recluse decides to remain standing, turns around, and looks back (BGE, 289). What he probes into or dismantles and what he leaves untouched are not decided through impersonal logic. His philosophical pursuit is fueled

by subjective and therefore, in some sense, arbitrary motivations. They are not completely arbitrary; but no one has, it seems to me, struck the proper balance—that is, found the appropriate idiom that would unify Nietzsche's thought while allowing him his infamous irreverence against both others and himself. The search to describe Nietzsche's highly idiosyncratic, but not entirely random, thought has led me to the term "aesthetic."

The importance of aesthetics in Nietzsche's first published work, *The Birth of Tragedy*, has been recognized, but its importance to his last works has not been as widely acknowledged.[1] In the first preface to *The Birth of Tragedy*, entitled "Foreword to Richard Wagner" and dated "end of the year, 1871," Nietzsche writes that his book discusses very grave "Germanic problems." He wonders if some of his readers will find it offensive that an aesthetical problem would be taken so seriously, that art should be seen as "the highest duty," and "real metaphysical activity of this life" (BT, "Foreword"). In the new preface to the work, "An attempt at Self Criticism," published in 1886 Nietzsche admits that one could call this "Artists' Metaphysics" arbitrary, idle, fantastic, but this would not constitute an objection to it. This Artists' Metaphysics announces a spirit that will struggle against the moral explanation and meaning of individual worth (BT, "Self-Criticism," 5). Nietzsche stresses that there is no greater opposition than the one between this purely aesthetic understanding and the Christian way of seeing the world. His aestheticism, in contrast to Christianity, does not attempt to measure with absolute standards, and places the concept of God in the category of lies.

It is the proliferation of such contrasts between pretensions to truthfulness and Nietzsche's admittedly partial views that prompts me to use the word aesthetics when trying to find continuity in his last works. The word should be understood in the very wide sense of that which provokes pleasure or displeasure and remind us that "objectivity" is not Nietzsche's goal.[2] An aesthetic judgment may have something universalizable in its form, but what pleases is also undeniably personal. The identification of specific "criteria" will illustrate that the rejection of absolute standards does not necessarily entail the rejection of all standards. It is possible to identify recurring justifications that Nietzsche gives why his views are superior to others. Nietzsche's tastes are difficult to codify, because, among other things, they are eminently practical—in the Aristotelian sense

of the word. His judgments depend on the particular settings in which they are offered. His taste displays an intuitive appreciation for the nuances of the moment—with which, of course, it often severely clashes. The genius of Nietzsche is prominently displayed when he questions those truths we once held uncritically and causes us to doubt what we once thought was certain.[3]

Nietzsche writes in *Twilight of the Idols* that his philosophy no longer divides the world into the true as against what appears. The artist values appearance more than reality—but by appearance Nietzsche means reality once more as "a selection, reinforcement, correction (of reality)" (TI, "Reason," 6). While it is impossible to reconstruct any rigid schematic plan of how Nietzsche's writings select, reinforce, and correct reality, it is possible to point to recurring justifications Nietzsche gives for his views. There are certain qualities that Nietzsche repeatedly points to as distinguishing his interpretations from others.

Out of the later work I have distilled three. The most common is to create values: create your own ideals rather than live by someone else's. Second, good style reveals an inner pathos. Nietzsche considers his own style particularly good, because it expresses a plethora of contradictory drives. Third, good artists, philosophers, and psychologists "idealize" the objects of their investigations—that is, they selectively enhance certain aspects. It is not the identification of these norms that is most important here, but to show, as I have already mentioned, that for Nietzsche the loss of absolute standards does not mean that there are no standards.

The identification of criteria that would allow Nietzsche to choose between interpretations without recourse to a truth standard is a task that several scholars have attempted. It is, for example, one of the central aspirations of Alexander Nehamas's *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, a book that deserves the large readership it has attracted. In particular, I admired its attempt to learn from all the major schools of Nietzsche interpretation, without becoming captive to any.[4] It draws from some of the postmodernist's best insights on Nietzsche while achieving a clarity and lucidity that often escapes them. Yet in this clarity may also lie its greatest weakness. To avoid the self-undermining tendency of perspectivism, Nehamas claims that Nietzsche exemplifies perspectivism, but never explicitly argues for it. Nietzsche creates, according to Nehamas, a literary character out of his life and work. And the unity of this character—that all of

its actions be interconnected and essential—becomes the basis for the coherence of Nietzsche's thought.

A second attempt to identify criteria in Nietzsche's thought without recourse to a truth standard has been put forth by Alan Schrift. He offers what he takes to be a Nietzschean solution to the problem of how to construct interpretations once we no longer believe in truth. It is "Nietzschean" and not "Nietzsche's" solution, for Schrift suggests that Nietzsche himself never gave a systematic theory of interpretation, but it is possible to find within his thought the resources for the construction of one. It will be a method of interpretation that avoids what Schrift refers to as the dogmatism of Heidegger and the relativism of the poststructuralists. He suggests that there will always be a tension between the perspective that we inevitably bring to the process of interpretation and "philological" attempts to uncover the meaning of that which is interpreted. Nietzsche inspires a practical rather than ontological solution, for he refrains from positing any universal criteriology for judging the "validity" or "veracity" of interpretations that arise.[5] Nietzsche inspires us instead to adopt a "meta-interpretative standard": that interpretations always present themselves as interpretations. They must always be seen as partial and open to revision, determined by both the text and what the interpreter brings to the text. Rather than choosing between the dogmatic assertion of one meaning and the relativism of accepting any meaning, Schrift suggests that we see these as the two limits between which interpretation must unfold.

I will argue that the works that Nietzsche published or prepared for publication offer a third solution to the perspectivist's dilemma—distinguishable from Nehamas and Schrift. Unlike Schrift, I believe that Nietzsche's published writings contain if not an explicit resolution, then at least a strong indication of how Nietzsche solves the interpretive dilemma. Schrift is correct that Nietzsche never purposes any "universal criteriology" for judging the veracity of interpretations, but there are patterns in the justifications Nietzsche gives as to why he prefers some interpretations over others. Nehamas and I both seek an interpretation that will provide a continuity to Nietzsche's thought, without condemning him to the truth standard.

But Nehamas's attempt to summarize Nietzsche is too neat—more concise and systematic than Nietzsche actually was. For exam-

ple, Nietzsche does not limit himself to one character. Throughout his life he took many roles: philologist, philosopher, a would-be natural scientist, a critic of his time, to name a few. There is no meaningful way to combine all these into one. Although certain tastes predominate in his thought, Nietzsche's keen sense for the exigency of the moment leads him to modify or abandon his ideals. The art of Nietzsche's philosophy is found not in the creation of one literary character, but in the shaping of creative interpretations suited to particular contexts. The aesthetic criteria presented here are broader and allow Nietzsche more freedom than Nehamas's criteria would. At the same time they illustrate that there are recurring patterns in Nietzsche's judgments and that his thought is not condemned to the abyss of incoherently connected thoughts.

Nehamas's Nietzsche: The Unforgettable Author

Style, despite Nehamas's disclaimer not to discuss the topic "in any detail," is the theme of his first chapter: "The Most Multifarious Art of Style." His preface summarizes the role that he believes style plays for Nietzsche. Nietzsche is confronted with the problem of how to argue that we have only perspectival knowledge without maintaining that this claim is true. Unable to assert the truth of his own position, because he no longer believes in truth, Nietzsche resolves the problem, according to Nehamas, by adopting a large number of literary styles and genres in order "to make his presence as an individual author unforgettable."[6] Although Nehamas quickly adds that this is not the only role that style plays in Nietzsche's work, he does not discuss it in any other context. And this admission or omission is important. For Nietzsche, style's most important role is not, as Nehamas suggests, simply to indicate the presence of an author. I will try to show (in the second part of this chapter) that style becomes the basis for accepting and rejecting interpretations. That is to say, Nietzsche chooses his interpretations based on a highly personalized vision of good style.

When Nehamas writes of Nietzsche's "vast" varieties of "styles" he means principally literary genres. This becomes clear in the first chapter. Here we read—an important qualification to the disclaimer mentioned above—that Nietzsche's reliance upon a vast number of literary styles and genres is an "issue which is absolutely

crucial to the reading of Nietzsche presented in this book."[7] The claim is repeated that this fact has been ignored in Nietzsche scholarship, and then the plurality of Nietzsche's "styles" (and here it becomes obvious that "genres" would be a better word) is illustrated. The aphorism is "superficially the most striking of Nietzsche's styles, but only one among many." *Dawn*, *Human All-Too-Human*, *The Gay Science* (Books 1-4), and parts of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and *Twilight of the Idols* are, for Nehamas, primarily aphoristic works. There are essays (*Untimely Meditations*), as well as works that partly depend on the features of a polemical pamphlet (*Twilight of the Idols* and *The Case of Wagner*). *On the Genealogy of Morals* is based on the genre of the scholarly philological treatise, but Nietzsche exploits this genre for his own purposes. *Ecce Homo* plays with the form of the autobiography. Nehamas also denies that *The Will to Power* is an aphoristic work, but does not say under what genre the work falls. Finally he mentions that Nietzsche wrote poems and letters, and these too are a vital part of his writings.[8]

Certainly genre and style are related to one another, but the two concepts can be separated and Nehamas's account suffers from its failure to do so. Style can be loosely applied to genre, but style is also a designation for what happens within a genre. We often, for example, talk of good or bad style, but we rarely label a genre good or bad. Genre is the designation for a type of artistic expression, style is a designation for the particular use of the genre. The confusion created by Nehamas's failure to distinguish between genre and style comes to light as he quotes the section from *Ecce Homo* that gives his first chapter its title:

> Nietzsche himself was always aware of this feature of his writing (i.e. the variety of genres) and wrote about it using the crucial trope to which we shall have to return: "I have many stylistic possibilities—the most multifarious art of style that has ever been at the disposal of one man."(EH,"Good Books," 4)[9]

A close examination of the section to which Nehamas refers (*Ecce Homo*, "Why I write such good books," part 4) reveals that Nietzsche is talking about style in the more restricted sense. He writes of his ability to transform his inner tension, derived from his own pathos, into signs that are revealed in their original tempo. The diversity of his inner conditions is exceptionally high and that is the source of

his multifarious art of style. Nowhere in the aphorism does he mention the variety of genres that he has used, but he does write about the excellence of his German. "No one knew before me what one could do with the German language—what one could do with language in general" (EH, "Good Books,"4). "Multifariousness" refers not to changing styles, but a unified style that expresses the diversity of Nietzsche's spirit—that is, to a style that expresses the multiplicity of his inner states.

Why is Nehamas concerned with genre? We have already seen that he is not questioning why Nietzsche uses any particular style:

> My question addresses not the style of individual works or passages but the fact that he [Nietzsche] shifts styles and genres as often as he does. . . . My answer, as I shall try to show in detail, is that Nietzsche's stylistic pluralism is another facet in his perspectivism: it is one of his essential weapons in his effort to distinguish himself from the philosophical tradition as he conceives it, while at the same time he tries to criticize it and to offer alternatives to it.[10]

A central, if not the central, problem that interests Nehamas is how Nietzsche's assertion, that we can only interpret—never explain—the world, avoids undermining itself. The assertion, Nehamas fears, invites the retort that the metastatement "we have only perspectival knowledge" is itself only a perspective and therefore might be false.[11] Nehamas believes Nietzsche has found a way out of the circularity of the perspectivist: assert your views through a number of genres and you will not have to remind your readers that your views are not truths, but your own perspective. Nehamas's interpretation is that Nietzsche is constantly changing genres to remind us, without specifically telling us, that he is only giving us his perspective.[12]

But there is a fundamental change in Nietzsche's genre with the publication of the aphoristic work *Human All Too Human* in 1878. I believe, contrary to Nehamas, that the vast majority of Nietzsche's work, from *Human All Too Human* to the end of his productive life, is aphoristic. The change comes about, in part, because Nietzsche no longer believes absolute truth is attainable and, in part, because Nietzsche realizes that his genius does not lie in long essays, rather, as he himself claims—and Nehamas notes—a

quick jumping in and out of problems.[13] *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is a half-literary, half-philosophical rendering of this change—a Germanic version of the philosophical novel (*Candide, Zadig, L'Etranger, La Nausée.*) *The Genealogy of Morals* is in style somewhat different from most of his other works. It is more like an essay and less aphoristic. The last works (*The Anti-Christ, Twilight of the Idols,* and *The Case of Wagner*) are more aphoristic than Nehamas admits. Rather than constantly changing genres, to make his presence as an author impossible to overlook; Nietzsche is, for the most part, a writer of aphorisms who occasionally dabbles in other forms.

If Nietzsche wants to show that his views represent only his perspective, why not simply tell us that? As Nehamas notes, Nietzsche does precisely this in *Beyond Good and Evil* 22, but two problems arise when the perspectivist constantly reminds us that his views are only perspectives. First, it is self-defeating: "If the view that everything is an interpretation is itself an interpretation, and therefore possibly false, it may follow that all is not after all interpretation."[14]

Second, when we constantly repeat the phrase "This is only my interpretation," Nehamas believes the gesture soon loses all credibility.[15] This changing of styles (genres) is, according to Nehamas, Nietzsche's way of showing, without explicitly telling us, that this is only his perspective.

There are two problems with Nehamas's reasoning here. First, it does not make much difference whether Nietzsche demonstrates or declares his perspectivism. Nietzsche frequently reminds us that he is offering only an interpretation and not an absolute "truth." In the first section of *Beyond Good and Evil,* "On the Prejudices of Philosophers," Nietzsche makes this claim often and emphatically enough that it would seem unnecessary to include it in every aphorism. The principal prejudice of philosophers is their belief that they have apprehended unconditioned truth. That there is no unconditioned truth, but only interpretation, is, at least implicitly, the theme for almost every aphorism in this section.

There is no less or no more of a loss of credibility when one constantly repeats the phrase "this is only my interpretation" than if one says it once or twice and makes it clear that it holds for the entire work. Obviously it would not be stylistically refined to repeat, at the end of every aphorism, "this is only my opinion," but such a repeated declaration would not make much of a difference in the

force of the argumentation.[16] Either Nietzsche wants perspectivism to apply to his thought or he does not. If he does want it to apply, exemplifying perspectivism rather than explicitly stating the doctrine, does not change much. Particularly if, as Nehamas maintains, Nietzsche's perspectivism "does not forbid that views be developed and accepted, but . . . dictates that they always be presented as views of one's own."[17]

Nehamas writes that if the attaching of the phrase "this is only my interpretation" at the end of every aphorism were "the only concession" made in the fight against dogmatism, then Nietzsche's position would lose all credibility. In fact it is not the only concession. As I have already shown, for Nietzsche, the rejection of truth and the embracing of perspectivism cannot escape pragmatic ramifications. This chapter will trace the importance of aesthetics in a philosophy that no longer believes that an unconditioned truth is obtainable.

The strategy of changing genres is so ineffective at proving perspectivism that I doubt Nietzsche would resort to it. Authors can express what they believe to be an objective truth, through a number of different genres.[18] There are many philosophers—for example, French Enlightenment thinkers such as Diderot, Voltaire, and Rousseau—who used at least as many genres as Nietzsche did to assert that universal truth not only existed, but could be uncovered by the human mind. One could argue that the changing of genres tends to hide the author's presence. Some may use a variety of genres in an attempt to demonstrate that truth can be arrived at through many different ways, and therefore exists independently of author and genre.

Nehamas believes that by changing styles (genres) Nietzsche exemplifies rather than argues for perspectivism, thereby overcoming the potential circularity of the perspectivist. I believe style plays a different role in Nietzsche's thought. Far from being concerned about perspectivism's possible circularity, Nietzsche never misses the opportunity to remind us overtly that his views are the product of his genius. The problem of circularity is not threatening, because he has given up the search for unconditioned truth and embraced aestheticism. His books read like a manual of good style, but a *modern* manual, for in them Nietzsche gives us a sense of what he considers to be good and bad style. For Nietzsche good style cannot be objectively determined. From the modern stylist no one expects anything

more than a personal statement. Instead of worrying about perspectivism's undermining itself, Nietzsche's thought is a celebration of his own subjective taste. Nietzsche does not engage in the elaborate strategy that Nehamas suggests, because stylists need not defend themselves from the charge of circularity. Their superior style originates in the self-proclaimed nobility of their highly idiosyncratic tastes. That this may seem arbitrary to some is, as we have already seen, not an objection for Nietzsche.

A Single Unified Character or a Carnival?

Nehamas compares Nietzsche's world to an artwork, in particular to a literary text.[19] What results is not only a literary model for his views about the world, but a literary character as well, which incorporates these philosophical ideas into a way of life. The literary model illustrates how it is possible to have many different "readings" of the world. Like the readings of a literary text, these may be incomparable, but still may exist alongside each other.

Before describing the unity of the literary character let us consider Nehamas's account of the unity of the world. In the third chapter Nehamas concludes "all things in the world are interconnected and their interconnections are crucial to their very character."[20] Nietzsche maintains, according to Nehamas, not just that the property of a thing is determined in its relationship to other things, but the more radical thesis that a thing is nothing but the sum of its effects. Things do not exist independently from one another, rather they exist only through their interrelations. Since things exists not in themselves, but only in relation to one another, a change in one element affects everything else.

Nehamas writes that Nietzsche's "continual" emphasis on the interconnectedness of everything in the world is an attack on the thing-in-itself. What is meant by thing-in-itself? "An object that is distinct from, more than, beyond, or behind the totality of its effects on every other thing."[21] Nehamas's use of the term "thing-in-itself" here is confusing because the term is inexorably associated with Kant, but Nehamas has something else in mind. Kant claims to know almost nothing about the "thing-in-itself." Kant therefore cannot say whether things-in-themselves exist independently or are interconnected. Things-in-themselves do exist independently,

for Kant, in the sense of independent from our sensual perception, but to the question Do things-in-themselves exist independently of one another?, a good Kantian would reply "I do not know." When Nehamas use the term thing-in-itself he really means thing-by-itself.

It is somewhat exaggerated to claim that Nietzsche continually stresses the world's interconnectedness. Nietzsche views the world as an infinite plurality of interacting forces. But the idea that a change in one force would change the entire world is a consequence that, although not illogical, Nietzsche himself rarely draws. In fact this possible consequence of the theory is practically never presented in Nietzsche's published works, nor is it very prominent in the *Nachlass*. Nehamas builds the theory on the basis of only three or four passages from the *Nachlass* and one section from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*.[22]

For Nehamas the question arises: "How do we know that some effects belong together and form a unity?"[23] Metaphorically speaking, the unities of the world, according to Nehamas, are genealogical. Genealogy replaces ontology because genealogy allows for many alternatives; it neither imposes nor discovers an ultimate reality.[24] Genealogy enables us to connect one set of phenomena with another, but the connections it establishes are not necessary, rather they allow for chance—to continue the metaphor of genealogy—for fortuitous connections, for mutations and for marriages, for violent expansions and intrusions. Change of fortune is possible without changing identity.

In Nehamas's account the genealogical method, like the theory of interconnectedness, points to a lack of intrinsic distinctions. But the reasoning behind the genealogical method is much different, and finally incompatible, with the reasoning behind the theory of interconnectedness. The genealogical theory does not share with the theory of interconnectedness the assumption that a change in one element would change everything else. The basic tenet of the genealogical theory is that there is no definitive genealogy. Each genealogist draws a different family tree. And instead of each element affecting one another, Nehamas writes that the genealogical method shows that there is not always a definitive answer to the question of whether two temporally distant individuals are related. Nehamas believes that genealogy shows the importance of our particular reasons for tracing the genealogy.

There can be no answer to the question, Which family tree depicts the real genealogical connections of everyone in the world? Such a tree would connect "everyone to everyone else in an indefinite variety of ways, and it would therefore generate no family connections at all."[25] For Nehamas, genealogy is a process of selection. Since everyone is related to everyone else, when tracing a family history the genealogist selectively chooses to highlight certain links and leave out others. The genealogist does so in order to illustrate the point she or he is trying to make. Meaning originates not through the tracing of all the interconnections of reality. It is rather, to a large extent, the product of what our interests lead us to highlight:

> To ask what the nature of the world is in itself or which description of it is ultimately correct is like asking which family tree depicts the real genealogical connections among everyone in the world. The answer to this question can be uninformative and trivial: it will connect everyone to everyone else in an indefinite variety of ways.[26]

The theory of interconnection, as Nehamas first presents it, has actually only a negative purpose—that is, to show that there are no things-in-themselves (in Nehamas's sense of this word). As long as the theory of interconnectedness only plays this negative role, then there is no conflict between it and the genealogical method. The problem is that interconnectedness becomes, for Nehamas, the basis of a maxim for the formation of the literary character. Concerning the literary character Nehamas writes that it must have nothing extraneous. Nietzsche advocates, according to Nehamas, the formation of a literary character out of one's life. And one of the characteristics of a well-formed literary character is that all of his or her actions be brought together in a coherent whole. Turning the theory of interconnectedness into a maxim for the formation of a literary character, brings it into conflict with the genealogical theory, in a way that Nehamas fails to recognize.

After introducing the theory of interconnectedness as a refutation of the notion of independently existing objects, Nehamas appropriates the doctrine to another use in his description of the literary character. The integration necessary for a coherent literary character is a particular example of the integration that Nehamas finds in Nietzsche's conception of reality. Nietzsche's solution to the prob-

lem of being a perspectivist—that is, the creation of an integrated character—is one example of his general solution to the problem of perspectivism.[27] This character is supposed to be unique and fashioned so as to exclude direct imitation. Also important, according to Nehamas, is that it be unified. In the case of humans, the subject becomes a unity because humans have the ability "to take certain activities to be coherently connected with one another, that at least anthropocentrically we can interpret them by appealing to their common ends and functions."[28]

But more than this, every part of the creation must be essential: "any alteration would bring about a breakdown of the whole."[29] The motto for this integration is "become what one is." This does not entail achieving some final state, rather:

> It is to identify oneself with all of one's actions, to see that everything one does (what one becomes) is what one is. In the ideal case it is also to fit all this into a coherent whole and to want to be everything that one is: it is to give style to one's character; to be we might say, becoming.[30]

Nehamas's use of the doctrine of interconnectedness as an imperative to "fit all this into a coherent whole"—a whole in which all parts are essential—is unfortunate. Nietzsche, as we will see, believes that coherent wholes are built not through the identifying of one's character with all one's actions, but by carefully constructing a facade.

Yes, a unity is produced when one unites her or his character within a single style, but this is not the unity that consists in identifying one's self with all one's actions. And this is where the literary model leads Nehamas astray. Nehamas illustrates what he takes to be Nietzsche's model of literary unity by juxtaposing *Moby Dick* and *Jaws*. Great literature contains no chance events. Every part of the story belongs to every other part; no one part could be removed without changing the whole. *Jaws* on the other hand is "an artificial unity" held together only by the title.[31] Nehamas does not claim that Nietzsche wants us all to create the same character, but that Nietzsche prescribes a character-type:

> The actions and beliefs, the passions and desires, the preferences and values of each character must be organized in the

> idiosyncratic, recognizable manner that reminds oneself as well as others that these are not discrete, independent objects that can be chosen, discarded, or exchanged at will.[32]

Nietzsche, according to Nehamas, faces the problem of how to warn others against dogmatism without being dogmatic himself. Nietzsche's solution to dogmatism "is to try consciously to fashion a unified literary character out of himself and a literary work out of his life."[33] For Nehamas, Nietzsche's combatting dogmatism is a two-step affair. First, Nietzsche shifts genres to make his presence as an author unforgettable. Second, Nietzsche creates out of his life and work a unified literary character.

Nietzsche is concerned with the creation of a unified character, but there is an element that figures prominently in Nietzsche's account, which is missing in Nehamas. When Nietzsche writes "one thing is necessary—to give to one's character style"(GS, 290), he notes that this will require *eine grosse Masse zweiter Natur* (a large quantity of a second nature). The ugly that cannot be done away with must be hidden or redefined as sublime. Much of what is vague and resists taking a form is saved for sides of the character that can only be seen from a distance (*Fernsichten*). When the work of giving style to one's character is finished, it is less important whether or not it was done with good or bad taste; most important is that it be the reflection of a single taste.

Nietzsche is concerned with the unity of character, but Nehamas has left out an important element in the formation of that unity. Nehamas suggests that the unity of a well-drawn character is achieved through the interconnection of all the givens. Rather than identifying himself with all his actions, Nietzsche's stylistic imperative allows him to hide and distort some parts of his character in order to fit them into a whole. The individual elements do not determine the whole. They provide the starting point, not the limits, for the formation of character. The resulting unities are not natural, rather contrived. To repeat, a great deal of, to use Nietzsche's own term, second nature (*zweiter Natur*) is added and much of its first nature must be carted away.

Nehamas is correct that Nietzsche embraces a kind of aestheticism, but wrong, in my opinion, as to its nature. Nehamas describes Nietzsche's aestheticism as having two facets.[34] First, it involves looking at the world as a literary text; second, the creation

of a unique character impossible to imitate. The metaphor of the literary text is helpful, as long as we remember that it is Nehamas's metaphor. Rarely does Nietzsche tell us to view our interpretations as if they were readings of a literary text, but such a metaphor does help us to understand how some interpretations can be better than others without any being true. Nehamas's interpretation goes astray when it overlooks the contrived or theatrical nature of Nietzsche's theories. Nietzsche's theories respond to a time and a place and a desire to create a certain effect. Nietzsche creates a gallery of characters, with an accompanying commentary on the stylistic merits of each. Nietzsche is not the philosopher of a mask, but rather of a plurality of masks. Unity is important in the construction of each mask, but instead of unifying his entire life and work within one literary character, Nietzsche offers us a carnival of characters.

Nehamas's position breaks down when he establishes two different sets of criteria—one for the world and another for the literary character. Just as the genealogical method admits many different readings of the world, so the unity of character is not essential, but contrived. It makes some sense to say that Nietzsche creates a literary character out of his life, but I seriously doubt that Nietzsche's philosophical project can be as neatly summed up as the analogy to the literary character suggests. The absence of superfluous events has been, at least since Aristotle's *Poetics*, a sign of good literature. But the usefulness of the literary character, as an explanation for Nietzsche's philosophical project, breaks down when one presses the analogy too hard. Nietzsche's philosophical opinions are too varied to be enclosed within one philosophical character.

Create Your Own Values!

Although I disagree with Nehamas that Nietzsche attempts to make of his life and his work a single unified character, there is undeniably a great deal of theatrics in Nietzsche's writings. Nietzsche does value a well-drawn and unified character, but he is too restless to inhabit only one. Nehamas is right that Nietzsche must confront the problem of how to compare perspectives once the criterion of truth has lost its validity. I would also agree with Nehamas that one of Nietzsche's most important criteria for judging the worth of theories is whether the theory represents the creation of

one's own values rather than adopting the values of someone else. Nehamas claims that Nietzsche encourages us to create an original character, embodying perspectivism to avoid directly arguing for it. I believe that Nietzsche unabashedly maintains the superiority of his perspective, without worrying about the problem of circularity, often on the grounds of taste alone.

The task of every true philosopher is to create values (BGE, 211). "Real philosophers are commanders (*Befehlende*) and law givers" (ibid.). The superior person, Nietzsche tells us, believes himself to be a determiner of values (*wertbestimmend*). They do not need to hear from others that they are good. They know that they give honor to things; they create values (*wertschaffend*) (BGE, 260). The common man subjugates himself to the opinion of someone else. He tends toward vanity and cares too much about what the others think of him (BGE, 261). Not vanity, but egoism characterizes the essence of the superior soul (BGE, 265).

In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* ("On the Spirit of Gravity") Zarathustra emphasizes the importance of developing one's own taste. Nietzsche writes that it is unimportant whether one's taste is good or bad; significant is that it is his own. To those who ask Zarathustra about his chosen path he answers: "that is my way, where is yours? The way does not exist." Similarly in the section from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* entitled "On the Gift Giving Virtue," which Nietzsche quotes in the introduction to *Ecce Homo*, Zarathustra says he travels by himself and his pupils should do the same. Zarathustra does not want followers or believers, and pupils who remain pupils are no reward for a teacher.[35]

Allan Megill has also written of the importance of aesthetics and in particular creativity for Nietzsche's philosophical project, but without recognizing the importance of past theories in Nietzsche's creative process. Nietzsche does not believe that one is creative by first rejecting all previous notions and creating one's own theories ex nihilo or what Megill refers to as the romantic longing for "immediacy."[36] We have already seen that Nietzsche's refutation of material atomism calls upon Boscovich (BGE, 12). Boscovich convinced enlightened individuals to abandon their belief in material existence in favor of forces. But Nietzsche does not explicate Boscovich's theories at any great length. Any inclination to conclude that he is only a disciple is quickly put to rest by the exhortation to go beyond this thinker. We must rid ourselves not

only of material atomism, but also of the "atomic need."

In this citation of Boscovich, Nietzsche creates his own values by claiming for an obscure thinker a seminal place in the history of Western thought.[37] In addition we have noted that just because something is untruthful, in no way implies for Nietzsche that it is unuseful or undersireable (BGE, 4). His ability to find value in these "fallen truths" contradicts conventional values and might well be, he thinks, the most difficult part of his philosophy to understand. It also places his thought "beyond good and evil" (BGE, 4).

Similarly that is why Nietzsche uses his hammer in *Twilight of the Idols*, not to smash images such as Socrates, the Germans, or "The Improvers of Mankind," but to sound them out. These idols serve as the building blocks of Nietzsche's thought. There is no longing in Nietzsche for a *tabula rasa* of untainted knowledge. For Nietzsche the scholastic maxim *de gustibus et coloribus non disputandum* no longer holds. The aestheticism of his later writings may originate in his tastes, but it does not end there. Nietzsche and his interlocutors are not reduced to presenting each other with lists of likes and dislikes.[38]

Nietzsche's imperative to create values can, however, take a less subtle form. In *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche extols the virtue of artists who "rape" the things they portray—that is, who force objects to correspond to their ideals.[39] Artists are idealists, but not because they represent things abstracted from their inessential aspects. They are rather idealists because they enrich the objects of their attention out of their own inner richness (TI, "Raids," 8-9). Nietzsche cites the architect as an example of this type of spirit. He admires architects because in their buildings he sees a sign of pride, of victory over natural phenomena like gravity. Buildings seem for Nietzsche to be one of the most natural expressions of the will to power and the exemplary medium for the expression of "great style," which he defines as "power which no longer needs any proof; which disdains pleasing others; which answers powerfully; which lives without the consciousness that there are contradictions against it; which remains in itself fatalistically, a law under laws" (TI, "Raids," 11).

There are no simple recipes in Nietzsche for what is good or bad style. Nietzsche advances general guidelines, but good style arises principally out of their application. Given the continually changing context, good taste cannot be reduced to a formula. There

are a variety of ways Nietzsche constructs his own values: citing past figures, Zarathustra's speeches, or his bombastic praise of architecture. Why are leaders preferred over disciples? Or why is it better to be a determiner of values rather than a follower? Although Nietzsche can explain his preferences, they ultimately have little other foundation except that they are what he prefers—within the confines of a very specific situation. As Nietzsche himself writes, the lack of an "impartial" grounding for his value judgments may cause his works to appear arbitrary, but it is precisely his willingness to acknowledge the very partial origin of his views that distinguishes him from the tradition (BT, "Self-Criticism," 5).

Diversity within the Soul; Diversity of Experience

In his description of "What is noble" (*vornehm*), from *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche writes that every raising of the human type (*Erhöhung des Typus "Mensch"*) is the work of an aristocratic society. Higher culture begins with barbarians who, in possession of unbroken will power, throw themselves on more peaceful and weaker races. The force of these barbarians does not lie, however, in their physical power, but rather in the power in their souls. Their barbarian power, which has been transformed into aristocratic power, arises out of their completeness. They are the "more complete persons" (*die ganzeren Menschen*) containing within themselves the "pathos of distance" (BGE, 257). This pathos arises originally out of the difference between the ruling class and their pawns, but on their way to becoming aristocrats these barbarians internalize it, bringing diversity to their individual souls. The higher human type longs for a soul, which encompasses distance by containing within it rarer, farther, wider, and more comprehensive conditions.

Nietzsche's argumentation here is somewhat puzzling, for it is difficult to understand how the barbarians' power is based on their completeness, rather than physical strength. It is odd that Nietzsche, within a few lines, refers to the barbarians as robbers who possess uninterrupted will power and desire for power, and then writes that their power lies in their souls and not in their physical attributes. But this claim in *Beyond Good and Evil* is no isolated quirk. Three aphorisms later Nietzsche writes that, despite the fundamental difference (*Grundunterschied*) between master and slave moralities, in

all higher cultures as well as in individual souls we find a mixture of these two moral types (BGE, 260).[40]

This position makes sense only within the context of Nietzsche's theory of will to power. Although the people (*Volk*) have only one word for the phenomenon of willing, Nietzsche believes, as we have seen, that willing actually involves ordering and obeying on the basis of a *Gesellschaftsbau vieler "Seelen"* (a societal construction of many souls) (BGE, 19). We are all composed of a multitude of wills, some of which are higher and command, while others are lower and obey. For Nietzsche, the greatest individuals have the greatest diversity of forces within them and yet still remain master of them.

The diversity of the noble soul is also discussed in the works after *Beyond Good and Evil*, but his reasoning becomes much easier to understand. Although Nietzsche, on occasion in the later works, claims to reduce psychology to physiology, in fact *Beyond Good and Evil*'s theory of force grows less important—and becomes more an inspiration for rather than determinant of Nietzsche's interpretations. Aesthetics was always important for Nietzsche, but with the decline of the will to power in the works from 1888 it becomes even more important. When not commenting on the inconsistency of his opponents—or their underhandedness—he often sings his own praises. Given that no one else was singing them, Nietzsche's self-promotion seems more akin to Moses' crying in the wilderness than Madonna's "Truth or Dare."

In *Ecce Homo*, with its chapters such as "Why I Am Fate," "Why I Write such Good Books," and "Why I Am a Destiny" this self-promotion reaches its apotheosis. He writes that although his thought is no truer than anyone else's, his eloquence and style exceed that of his critics (EH "Good Books," 4). One of the keys to its superiority is his ability to give expression to the plurality of his inner states. Nietzsche claims good style is only possible when we observe the established codes. Style originates in the expression of a condition or an inner tension of a pathos (*innere Spannung von Pathos*), but this pathos must be expressed in a way that respects the established codes governing the use of language:

> To express a condition, an inner tension of a pathos through signs, including the tempo of these signs, that is the meaning of every style. And considering that the multiplicity of my inner

> conditions is unusually large I therefore have many stylistic possibilities—the most multifarious art of style which a person has ever had at his disposal. Good is every style that really portrays an inner condition, which does not mistake the signs or the tempo of the signs or the gestures (all laws of a period are concerned with the art of gestures). (EH "Good Books," 4)[41]

Good style reflects an inner pathos without violating the code governing the expression of signs (*Zeichen*). In particular, the good stylist uses the appropriate tempo for the expression of these signs and gestures (*Gebärden*) and respects the formal conditions imposed by the impersonal canon of the period for the use of signs. Nietzsche claims his own style is particularly good because it conveys his extraordinary plethora of contradictory inner states through a writing that respects the established codes. It is this multiplicity of his inner states that gives him many stylistic possibilities and makes his "the most multifarious art of style which one person has ever had at his disposal" (ibid.).

As in the aphorism discussed above from "What is Noble" (BGE, 257), the plurality within is said to be the key to Nietzsche's superiority, but here his theory becomes more understandable. No longer tied so closely to the will to power's theory of force, Nietzsche's reasoning that a multiplicity of inner states leads to a multiplicity of stylistic possibilities, although not developed in any detail, seems more intuitively plausible than the theory tied to the pathos of distance from *Beyond Good and Evil.*

There is a second way in which Nietzsche uses diversity to separate his views from others. Nietzsche values not only the soul that contains multiple wills, but also the soul that has experienced more. This is, in some sense, a claim for inclusiveness, but not in the Hegelian sense, of the *Aufhebung* of all previous levels of thought. Although Deleuze may overstate the case when arguing that Nietzsche and Hegel are irrevocably opposed, there is an anti-Hegelian moment in Nietzsche. What Volker Gerhardt writes about Nietzsche's vision of the "aesthetic process" can be applied beyond the realm of art. "Tension is not sublimated (*aufgehoben*), rather endured (*ausgehalten*)."[42]

Nietzsche is inclusive because he has considered more of reality and not allowed the "truths" of reason or morality to deter his investigations. Nietzsche has sifted through Asian, Jewish, Greek,

Roman, Christian, and European thought, rejecting some aspects, while appropriating others to his own use. He is also exclusive; it is, for example, "Nietzsche contra Wagner" and "Nietzsche against the crucified," but this exclusion does not imply dismissal. Nietzsche is interested in "untruths"—not only necessary fictions, but also those philosophical systems, religious beliefs, and cultural values that he claims to oppose and undermine. Nietzsche, like Derrida, is a marginal thinker. But whereas Derrida's commentary is most often written as commentary to philosophical texts, Nietzsche's illuminations are drawn on the border of entire cultures or as commentary to a variety of historical and mythical figures. Nietzsche writes, in *Beyond Good and Evil* (26), that the man of elevated taste will experience disgust from his intercourse with the common man, but this contact is essential for a man of knowledge (*Erkenntnis*).

The "choice" individual strives for a citadel where he can avoid the crowd, but, at times, he also leaves that protected venue and goes down to study the everyday world, for the rule will be more interesting than the exception. This study will not be enjoyable. It will be, Nietzsche writes, perhaps the most unpleasant and disappointing period in the philosopher's life. Yet choice individuals must get their hands dirty; they must forsake idealized notions of human beings and, despite its "disgusting" nature, explore even the herd. Some philosophers will be fortunate and discover cynicism, which can serve to expedite and lighten the burden of this investigation. The cynics see humans for what they are—namely, animals driven by base passions. Choice individuals will not remain cynics, but rather they use cynicism to uncover those "dark" sides of the human soul that the philosopher explores in order to know as many perspectives as possible.

In a section from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, which is later discussed in *Ecce Homo*, Zarathustra describes the dangers associated with the investigation of the world in more graphic terms. The highest soul is the one that:

> has the longest ladder and goes down to the deepest depths: how is it possible that the greater part of the parasites should not sit there.
>
> —the most extensive soul which to the outer-most limit can walk around in itself, err and stray; the most necessary which desires the fall into the accidental . . .

> —the soul which flees itself, and finds itself again in the widest circles; the wisest soul which exhorts foolishness most sweetly.
> —the soul which loves itself the most in which all things have their current, their ebb and their flow—how can the highest soul not have the worst parasites.(Z, "On the Old and New Tables," 19)

The diversity of this soul is expressed through its possession of a number of contradictions. It dwells in both heights and depths, encompasses both necessity and the accidental; it flees itself and finds itself; it is wise and frivolous. Zarathustra, Nietzsche tells us, has seen further, wanted more, and could do more than every other spirit. All things have their ebb and flow in him, so the highest soul, unfortunately, has the worst parasites as well. He is the most "yes-saying" of all spirits.

What is the cure for a yes-sayer infested with parasites? He or she learns to say no. Nietzsche recognizes the difficulty in affirming that Zarathustra is both a "yes-sayer" and a destroyer of the old values, and refers to it as the "psychological" problem in the character of Zarathustra:[43]

> The psychological problem in the character type exemplified by Zarathustra is how he, who to an extraordinary level (*unerhörten Grade*) says no, does no (*Nein sagt, Nein tut*) to everything to which man has previously said yes but still is able to be the opposite of a no-saying spirit; how he who has the hardest of fates, a spirit which supports a destiny of duty, can be the lightest and the most beyond—Zarathustra is a dancer—; . . . he has the hardest, most frightening insight into reality and has thought the most abysmal thought, but still has no complaint against *Dasein* not even against the eternal return, rather finds through his experience another reason to be a "yes" to all things "the immense and unlimited saying of "yes" and "amen." . . . "In every abyss I take my victorious yes saying."[44] (EH, "Z," 6)

By calling it "psychological," Nietzsche indicates that he does not solve the problem of yes-saying versus saying no to old values by subsuming one to the other. Saying no to the old values is not a

form of yes-saying. He is rather insisting upon both sides of Zarathustra's character.[45,46]

Similarly, it is through the idea of yes-saying to the multiplicity of experience that Nietzsche, while discussing tragedy in *Twilight of the Idols,* links himself with Dionysus, calling himself the god's "last boy and initiate" (TI, "Ancients," 6).[47] Contradicting Schopenhauer, Nietzsche believes that tragedy does not entail pessimism. Tragic means rather: "Saying yes to life even in its most alienating and most difficult problems; the will to live through sacrificing one's highest type."[48] To be happy about one's inexhaustibility and to be the eternal desire of becoming (*die ewige Lust des Werdens selbst zu sein*). This also includes the desire to destroy or to reevaluate the old values. How can one be a "yes-sayer" and at the same time be a destroyer of old values?:

> My taste, which may be (*sein mag*) the opposite of a tolerant taste, is also, in this case, very far away from wholesale yes-saying. It does not say yes happily, rather prefers no and prefers most of all saying nothing.(TI, "Ancients," 1)

Nietzsche believes he can say no to many things, "whole cultures," "books," "places," and "landscapes," and still be a yes-sayer. Nietzsche explains he has an "earnest ambition for Roman style." His style is "terse, severe, filled with as much substance as possible; grounded in a cold wickedness against 'beautiful words' and against 'beautiful feelings'" (TI, "Ancients," 1). One of his models is the Roman historian Sallust, whom Nietzsche admires for his "severity and terseness."

Saying yes to life means, for Nietzsche, to consider everything—that is, not to shy away from the immoral, the gruesome, the untimely, or the unusual. It is, furthermore, to accept the uncertainty and change that life brings; to follow Thucydides and not Plato's example. Plato is a coward who, when confronted with reality, takes shelter in ideals (TI, "Ancients," 2).[49] Nietzsche claims that he and Thucydides both possess an unmitigated will not to deceive themselves. In Thucydides the sophist culture, what Nietzsche also calls the "realist culture" (*Sophisten-Cultur, Realisten-Cultur*), comes to its fullest expression. This sophist element is of inestimable worth in the combatting of the moral and metaphysical ideals of Socrates and his school (TI, "Ancients," 2). How is

Nietzsche both a yes- and a no-sayer? He is a realist like Thucydides, saying yes to the ever-changing and often cruel reality. Nietzsche, however, says no to efforts, like those of Socrates and Plato, to find refuge in the purely invented world of the forms.

IDEALIZATION

Nothing is worse, Nietzsche writes, than modern claims of objectivity. To leave all one's doors open, to lay submissively on one's stomach investigating every small fact, to constantly mix one's self up with other people and things, to jump into, or crash into them—all of this is modern "objectivity" or "poor taste par excellence" (TI, "Germans," 6). Good psychologists trust their instincts to shift through nature; their conclusions (*der Schluss, das Ergebnis*) come into consciousness first and then direct the process of conscious observation.

Once we get beyond the Christian/Kantian/decadent habit of dividing the world into reality and appearance, we become artists valuing appearance more than reality. Lest one conclude that Nietzsche is remaining captive to the style of thinking that opposes truth to falsity, he adds that by appearance he means reality once again, but this time reality as a selection, enhancement, correction (TI, "Reason," 6). Good artists do not copy nature, for nature is contingent; it is a sign of weakness and fatalism to bow before this contingency (TI, "Raids," 7). The great artist idealizes things; not by taking away the nonessential, but rather through a "monstrous (*ungeheures*) bringing out of the principal characteristics" (TI, "Raids," 8).[50] In contrast, literary decadence is recognized where "the whole is no longer whole" (CW, 7). That is to say, the meaning of the whole can be obscured by one of its parts: the word can become sovereign over the sentence, at the price of obscuring the sentence; or the sentence may obscure the meaning of the page, or the page the entire book. Such a breakdown in the whole is a sign of decadent style and disintegration of the will (ibid.).

It is not only in psychology and art that Nietzsche urges idealization. This desire to be unobjective, to mold things according to one's ideal, rather than presenting an "objective view," also applies to his self-presentation. Whereas Nehamas attributes to Nietzsche something akin to authenticity—that is, that he always strives to

make us aware of his role as the author—I take seriously Nietzsche's claim to be a philosopher who wears carefully constructed masks. "Everything which is deep (*tief*) loves masks; and the deepest things hate pictures and likenesses" (BGE, 40). In part, masks serve to protect delicate procedures (*Vorgänge so zarter Art*). Deep suffering tends to raise the spirit, so that it needs a cover to protect it from the coarse manner of those who have not known similar suffering. Nietzsche gives a number of examples of such disguises. Epicureanism takes suffering lightheartedly and combats everything that is sorrowful and deep.[51] There are impudent (*freche*) spirits, which hide irremediably broken, but proud hearts. Foolishness can be the mask for an unhappy all-too-knowing knowledge.

Sometimes a mask serves to protect people from themselves. Profound spirits cloud their memory. This clouding affords profound spirits protection against their own critical inquiries (BGE, 40):

> Every noble spirit and taste chooses to whom it makes itself known. . . . All more refined laws of a style have in this their origin, namely . . . they create distance, they deny "entrance," and understanding—and at the same time they open the ears of those who are related. (GS, 381)

In addition to their protective function, Nietzsche sees masks as a natural element in the configuration of profound spirits. Masks arise naturally out of the superficial interpretations that others give to their words and actions (BGE, 40):

> Every deep spirit needs a mask: even more around every deep spirit a mask continually grows, thanks to the continual false, namely superficial interpretation of every word, every step, every sign of life that this spirit gives forth. (BGE, 40)

That masks result from a simplification of the noble spirits is of a piece with other statements Nietzsche makes (many of which were investigated in chapter 5) regarding the necessity or at least the inexorability of simplification. Behind every surface is a "wider, stranger, and richer world." Every philosophy is a "*Vordergrunds-Philosophie.*" Every philosophy hides a philosophy; every opinion is a cache, every word is a mask (BGE, 289).[52] We are more like artists than we usually recognize (BGE, 192). Reality is so complicated that

we can never observe it in all its detail. In addition, we are uncomfortable with what is new or unknown, therefore we invent most of our experiences, or to say it more pointedly—we are accustomed to lying. Our interpretations never match the richness of the phenomenon they seek to describe and therefore we are free to overstate—to be, as he calls himself in *The Anti-Christ*, a "hyperboler" (A, 1).[53]

Conclusion

Nowhere in Nietzsche do we find these aesthetic criteria (creativity, diversity, and idealization) presented together. They are compiled from a number of places spread across the later writings. Nor is this an exhaustive list. It is meant to be more of an indication of the way in which Nietzsche goes about justifying his choice of interpretations rather than a definitive catalogue. They demonstrate the variety of personal preferences that play an important role in the construction of Nietzsche's interpretations. Although Nehamas begins to see the importance of aesthetic criteria, he fails to recognize the significance of diversity and idealization. And Nehamas's transference of the criterion of interconnectedness from the literary domain to the metaphysical leads him to overlook the importance of context in Nietzsche's thought. In the presentation of a mask it may be critical that the moments of the presentation hang together, but both Nietzsche's character and his thought are too finely attuned to the nuances of the particular situation to be reduced to a single literary character.

Nehamas emphasizes, as I do, the importance of style for Nietzsche, but style plays a very different role in his account. He believes Nietzsche changes styles in order to make his presence as an author impossible to overlook. I have argued that Nietzsche uses stylistic criteria in choosing or justifying his choice of one interpretation over another. Nehamas believes Nietzsche enjoins us to create a literary character out of our lives (which exemplifies perspectivism, and thereby avoids what Nehamas takes to be the self-undermining posture of arguing for perspectivism) such that all its actions are essential. Nehamas's one criterion of interconnectedness cannot encompass the breadth of Nietzsche's philosophical positions. Limiting himself to one literary character would require of the philoso-

pher of masks a reverence not to violate the strictures of this character.

Sometimes Nietzsche does want us to be aware of his role as author, but he can do this without changing his style. He need only make a short self-reference, more often than not to his superior qualities. For example: "Against this let us contrast how different we (I say "we" out of politeness) regard the problem of error and appearance" (BGE, 6). But there is little, if anything, to be gained from exemplifying pluralism rather than explicitly arguing for it.

Having abandoned the pretension to have grasped immutable truth, Nietzsche no longer bends his interpretations to fit an eternal standard. He allows the exigencies of the moment and the setting to form his interpretation without worrying whether his response is exactly of a piece with his previous interpretations. As he writes in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*:

> It is already too much for me to remember all of my opinions; and some birds fly away from it.
>
> And among them I find a bird that has flown in my pigeon loft, which seems strange to me and which shakes when I lay my hand upon it. (Z, "On the Poets")

Nietzsche's tastes can be fit into broad categories, but will never be exactly defined. Systematic thought was not Nietzsche's forte. This is not to say that he contradicts himself as often as some have suggested. Interpreters should be wary of those who claim to have found *the* implicit system of Nietzsche's thought. He was not a system builder. Nietzsche's gift is his ability to appreciate the parameters of the moment and to deliver, at the appropriate time, *le mot juste.*

It is often argued, probably with some justification, that freedom is impossible without some limits. If Nietzsche's philosophy were an incoherent rambling from one position to the next without any continuity, then Nietzsche as "Dionysus's last boy and initiate" might not be a philosopher. Nietzsche does limit himself, and these limits are, as the literary model implies, self-imposed, but they are more flexible than Nehamas's model indicates. Thinking of these self-imposed constraints as questions of style, in the sense in which I have suggested, allows Nietzsche the irreverence, even against himself, for which he is famous without condemning him to a nonposition devoid of all restraints.

Nietzsche is, for me, most compelling when offering his own idiosyncratic vision with a clear appreciation that others are entitled—invited actually—to take another view. As he writes in *Twilight of the Idols*, it is of great value that there are those with opposing values (TI, "Moral," 3). In the end Nietzsche's thought is grounded primarily in his preferences. Nietzsche is not attempting to establish a new canon, but rather he shows us how to live once the faith in established canons has been undermined—how to talk with one another and how to theorize and evaluate our cultural heritage once aesthetics (along with a few necessary fictions) becomes the foundation for philosophical discourse.

Chapter 7

Aesthetics and Morality: The Moral Implications of the Aesthetic Turn

Morality as an attitude: today that goes against our taste.

—(BGE, 216)

If for Nietzsche there is only pragmatic necessity and aesthetics, what does this mean for the moral life? Nietzsche's "moral philosophy" is of a piece with his "metaphysics." There is no neat scheme or system of categories under which Nietzsche classifies his ideal topoi of human existence. He uses, for example, a variety of terms to describe character types that he admires without ever settling on a definitive vocabulary or systematically sorting out his terms. It could be argued that the *Übermensch* is Nietzsche's "ideal," but then why does the term not appear in the two books (*Beyond Good and Evil* and *The Genealogy of Morals*) following *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* where he first introduced it? In particular, we would expect to find it in *The Genealogy of Morals* if it really were his fundamental ideal. Higher person (*höhere Mensch*), noble person, free spirit, and aristocrat are terms that Nietzsche uses *not* interchangeably, but all are given to types of people whom Nietzsche admires.

Even if Nietzsche had one "ideal" for himself he would not recommend it to anyone else. The passages from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* concerning the importance of developing one's own style in "On the Spirit of Gravity" and extolling pupils to leave their teachers "On the Gift-Giving Virtue," show that Zarathustra did not seek disciples, and in this Nietzsche does not seem too much different from his literary creation. Just as he encourages the creation of one's own theories about the world, so he considers it good style to fashion one's own model of good taste for his or her actions.

Contextual considerations are of paramount importance, since the situation in which we act never exactly parallels any previous situation. The norms governing behavior can only guide us and never completely prescribe what course of action a Nietzschean higher person "should" take. A considerable amount of phronesis will be needed to apply the guidelines to the particular instance.

What might we learn from Nietzsche's aestheticization of philosophy? Rorty counsels that Nietzsche's project of questioning values is dangerous and uninstructive in the public realm, and should therefore be confined to our private attempts at self-definition. While attacking some of Nietzsche's particular moral pronouncements, I agree with him that there are only perspectives (and pragmatic necessity) and that the principal justification for these perspectives is to be found in an individual's particular tastes. Rather than question, as Rorty does, Nietzsche's moral relativism in the public sphere, I question his particular pronouncements and whether the present context justifies Nietzsche's emphasis (to my mind an overemphasis) on individuality. Of course, there are no objective refutations of aesthetic choices, but rather there are reasons why Nietzsche's emphasis on individualism no longer counts as good style, given the present context.

Nietzsche's aesthetic turn offers both a challenge and a potential danger. The danger is solipsism. Each stylist may become enmeshed within his or her own pathos and oblivious to the need to communicate with others. Retreating into themselves, stylists can become impervious to the influence of others, refusing to take any other aesthetic seriously. The challenge, which is closely related to the danger, is to make diversity enriching rather than alienating. When philosophical views are seen as "questions of style," this could lead to a greater tolerance of diversity. Different styles can coexist

and enhance one another in a way in which truths rarely can. Furthermore, the admission of diversity can serve as a catalyst for an unrelenting exploration of our world.

Nietzsche's Egoism

I will begin by putting some of Nietzsche's more harsh sounding moral pronouncements into perspective. Nietzsche warned, displeasing as it may sound to innocent ears, that egoism belongs to the nature of the noble soul (BGE, 265).[1] That some individuals must be subordinate to others, noble souls accept without hardness, or compulsion, nor do they view it as capricious. They consider it to be founded in the primordial law of things. And although he wrote that all higher forms of culture are a mixture of master and slave morality, he never really explained why. In his discussion of master morality and slave morality, only the former is called noble.

Nietzsche meant to be provocative here. These passages were written in the 1880s when the movements of the 1860s, which had led to the freeing of slaves in America and the serfs in Russia, were fresh in the minds of both Nietzsche and his readers. In a particularly harsh-sounding moment, he writes that a healthy aristocracy accepts with a good conscience not only slavery, but the sacrifice of a mass of people as well (BGE, 258).[2] What is behind this provocation?

Perhaps my ears are innocent, but I often find Nietzsche's description of nobility appalling. A healthy aristocracy, according to Nietzsche, believes itself to be the meaning and highest justification of society. This is why it accepts, with good conscience, the sacrifice of a mass of people as well as slavery (BGE, 259).[3] Similar reasoning was used to justify, among other atrocities, the conquest of Poland and the concentration and death camps.

Nietzsche would not have been a National Socialist, in my opinion. Nietzschean egoists would not allow themselves to be integrated into a mass movement like fascism, nor would they want to lead such a movement. Far from seeing the Polish, as the National Socialists did, as a *minderwertiges Volk* (people of lesser worth), Nietzsche asserted that he was not German, but Polish (EH, "Wise," 3). In making that claim he was being deliberately provocative and untimely in the face of the widespread antislavic sentiment of his day. Furthermore, he unambiguously condemned a much milder

form of German-Prussian militarism, of his own time.[4] Even though Germany had conquered France militarily, it was France that possessed the superior culture.[5] Nietzsche wrote that he believed only in French culture. The small numbers of persons of higher culture whom he found in Germany, were all of French origin (EH, "Clever," 3). In *Ecce Homo* he writes: "There is no worse misunderstanding than to believe that the great armament victory of the Germans proves anything of the superiority of German education (*Bildung*) or its victory over France" (EH, "Untimely," 1).

Then why use words like "egoism" and write of the necessity of slavery and the sacrifice of lower individuals in *Beyond Good and Evil*? In part, these words mesh with his description of the world as will to power. Life, Nietzsche claims in *Beyond Good and Evil* 259, is essentially appropriation, injury, overcoming of what is alien and weaker, suppression, hardness, and exploitation. To refrain from hurting one another or using violence, can be a sign of manners, according to Nietzsche, among those who are roughly equivalent in power. When this, however, becomes the basic principle of a society, it is a sign of the society's decadence. The healthy aristocracy's appropriation of the lower classes is an action in accordance with the primordial fact of all history. This exploitation is not simply a characteristic of primitive society, it is rather the essence of life (BGE, 259). Yet this overcoming, implicit in the will to power, is not, as we have seen in his attack on the Germans, reducible to brute force.[6] Were this the case, then the Germans would have been Nietzsche's *Übermenschen*. In another place Nietzsche compares a "higher society" to a pyramid, claiming that it can only stand on a base of commonness (*Mittelmässigkeit*) (A, 57). But his instructions for the leaders are quite different. Here he writes that the "exceptional people" should treat "commoners" with gentle hands not out of politeness, but rather out of duty.

Nietzsche does sometimes sound as brutal as a National Socialist (in particular in *Beyond Good and Evil* 259 where he talks of a healthy aristocracy needing to be ready to sacrifice the lower classes,) but, at least at times, his philosophy does not endorse brutal suppression of others. Aphorisms such as *Beyond Good and Evil* 259, where he speaks of the sacrifice of masses, are the exception rather than the rule, and they are counterbalanced, in several places, where Nietzsche makes it clear that he does not endorse crass physical dominance.

The Common Character of the Community

More often than the brutal-sounding claim that the noble person is ready to subordinate and sacrifice others, are passages on the solitary nature of the higher individual. Even though his rhetoric might lead us to think otherwise, Nietzsche's higher or noble individual is not primarily an exploiter of others, but more often an individualist, showing little social concern. A sympathetic reader might interpret Nietzsche's comments justifying the sacrifice of lower individuals for the benefit of the higher, as an extreme exaggeration of his belief that those possessing good taste, should not seek the herd's approval.

Every "choice individual strives instinctively after his fortress and secrecy" (BGE, 26). Persons of higher taste are disgusted when they mix with the masses, but this does not mean that they can remain in seclusion. The person of higher taste must say "to the devil with my higher taste—the rule is more interesting than the exception" and then go, as Zarathustra did, down to study the masses.

But to study them in no way implies having anything good to say about them. Although he prides himself on having no moral absolutes, Nietzsche never seems to have seen any positive aspects in the herd. It is one of the most prominent and pervasive of Nietzsche's dislikes. It was, for example, his belief that democracy cultivated the herd instinct, which lay at the root of a large part of his critique of democracy. Why did he find the masses so abhorrent?

Nietzsche gives a variety of reasons for his dislike of the herd. One of those most often cited is its leveling effect. Nietzsche warns his readers not to confuse what he means by "free spirits" with those "levelers" (*Nivellirer*) who are slaves to democratic taste (BGE, 44). The leveler's two principal teachings are "equality of rights" and "compassion for all that suffers." Nietzsche claims that humankind has grown strongest when confronted with danger. Hardness, violence, slavery, danger, and everything "which is evil, terrible, tyrannical, and everything which is akin to beasts of prey and serpents contributes equally well to the raising of the species of man as its opposite" (BGE, 44). Nietzsche assails the *Lockmittel der Abhängigkeit* (the lures of dependence), which lie hidden in honor, money, and offices. He is thankful for need and for his changing health, for they help to free him from prejudice by changing his per-

spective. A philosopher who has gone through many different states of health cannot help but have gone through, at the same time, many different philosophies, because a change in health necessarily leads to a change in one's philosophy (GS, *Preface*, 3). Free spirits are, among other things, investigators to the point of cruelty, and ready to take risks.

Given the importance that Nietzsche placed on creating one's own values rather than passively accepting the values of someone else, his rejection of herd mentality is hardly surprising. It is instructive to explore his reasons. They are in part pragmatic. We grow stronger when confronted with danger and trial. Developing the qualities of the beast of prey serves the preservation of the species. Hardness and violence "contribute to the raising of the species." In what sense do they raise the species? Confronted with danger, the higher spirits' power of invention and pretense has become refined and audacious.

People often conceal weakness behind a doctrine of love or *Mitleid* for others. *Mitleid* can be translated as pity, compassion, or sympathy. It is a combination of *mit*, which means "with," and *leid*, which means suffering. Inextricable from the German word is a sense of shared suffering. In *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche writes that sympathy is only a virtue among decadents and the overcoming of sympathy is one of the noble virtues (EH, "Wise," 4). Experience has taught him to mistrust the so-called selfless love of one's neighbor. It is a weakness. Those who feel sympathy often lose their ability to experience shame and, along with it, their respect for distance. Sympathy "stinks" quickly like the mob and resembles the bad manners of confusion (*Verwechseln*). The object of criticism is not sympathy, as such, it is rather that which sympathy usually turns into.

Sometimes Nietzsche refers to sympathy as a virtue. He writes that the sympathy of the master has great worth (BGE, 293). In another place he calls sympathy along with courage, insight, and loneliness one of the four great virtues over which we must remain a master (BGE, 284). It is not sympathy in itself, but rather the desire to cater to the masses, or bad manners parading in the guise of sympathy, that draws Nietzsche's ire. Yet the virulence with which he attacks those who derive their sense of worth from their community sometimes spills over to a wholesale condemnation of community. Of the four virtues mentioned in *Beyond Good and Evil* 284, only loneliness is explained. Loneliness is a virtue because "every com-

munity makes its members somehow, at some place and at some time common" (BGE, 284). Nietzsche writes that "good is no longer good when it comes out of the neighbor's mouth." The idea of a "common good is a self-contradiction" (BGE, 43). That which can be held in common always has little worth.

Nietzsche does not always denigrate communities. There are "aristocratic communities" where higher individuals work together to survive or to prevail in highly dangerous times. These precarious times force higher individuals to set aside their differences and cultivate hardness, uniformity, and simplicity. Once, however, the danger that forced the alliance is past, then these strong individuals reveal their individuality. At this point in history there appears:

> A beautiful, varied, jungle-like growth and soaring; a competition of growth in a tropical tempo and an unfathomable destruction and self-destruction which results thanks to the wild egos which explode and are directed against one another. While striving for sun and light they become intertwined with each other and no longer know how to erect borders, or bridles or protection with the use of the, until that time, dominant morality. (BGE, 262)

Nietzsche writes that strong egos, on occasion, band together in order to dominate, but that once they become the dominant class, the internal code, which bonded them together, tends to be relaxed, leading to their eventual decline. Seen in the most positive light, communities are, for Nietzsche, these temporary groupings where higher individuals join together in order to dominate.

Does Nietzsche's aestheticism foster his extolling of egoism and his disregard for community? Are not aestheticists often trapped in a kind of solipsism, enmeshed in their own tastes and oblivious to everything but their own needs and styles? As I said at the outset, the stylist can become impervious to the influence of others, and refuse to take seriously any other aesthetic. These are the dangers when taking the aesthetic turn, but the aesthetic turn can also make us aware of our limitations and fallibility. It can serve as a constant reminder of the human origins of our beliefs, reminding us of Cromwell's injunction: "I beseech you in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken." It can serve to sensitize us to the context in which we act. The challenge is to allow different

styles to enrich one another rather than alienate one another. When philosophical views are seen as "questions of style" it could lead to a greater tolerance of diversity.

Neither Nietzschean aestheticians or believers in moral truths are inherently dogmatic, nor is either one necessarily open-minded. I believe that the aesthetic turn can facilitate the engagement of other philosophical positions. We are accustomed to think that questions of aesthetics are, to some extent, grounded in personal preferences and therefore open to debate. Believers in truth often claim to know what truth is and see discussion as only a means to enlighten the uninitiated. The aesthetic turn, while not guaranteeing an end to dogmatism, can provide more favorable conditions for the discussion of moral issues by underlining the role of personal tastes in moral decisions.

The New Context

As uninformed as it is to assume that there is an easy connection between his thought and National Socialism, it is neither difficult nor misguided to consider his lack of social concern. Nietzsche saw one danger in our century, but failed to see a second. His critique of herd mentality reads like a prophetic warning against the dictatorships that have plagued and continue to haunt the twentieth century. But the context of our world has changed in ways that Nietzsche never imagined. We now have, as never before, the ability to destroy the planet. The threat of the destruction of *a* society is not new. From the beginnings of Western literature in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, the Western mind has contemplated the destruction that, for example, warfare has wrought. Although the Trojan war destroyed almost everyone involved, both the victors and the vanquished, it did not destroy the entire world. In the twentieth century, what has changed is the scale of destruction. If a few countries destroy the ozone layer, the whole world perishes, or if two countries fight a nuclear or biological war, the whole planet is threatened. This is something new in the history of the world.[7] The interconnectedness of the entire world has grown dramatically. We live, as never before, in a global community where our actions effect ever-larger numbers of the world's population. The earth's limits have become more apparent. Our survival depends on working together to

solve problems like global pollution. Granted mass movements have instituted reigns of terror, but our survival as a planet is becoming ever-more predicated on community efforts of the sort that Nietzsche's thought seems to denigrate if not preclude.

I do not criticize Nietzsche for failing to predict the rise of problems requiring communal efforts such as the disintegration of the ozone layer, acid rain, and the destruction of South American rain forests. Noting his lack of foresight and his occasional extremism, I propose, in a Nietzschean spirit, to reconsider his particular tastes, without abandoning his aesthetic turn. Statements like "common good is a self-contradiction" are extreme, even for Nietzsche. He was not always so radical. Yet there is little room in Nietzsche's egoism for the kind of cooperation and sense of community that is today so important for our survival. I am suggesting that the time for Nietzsche's radical individualism is past. There are compelling pragmatic and aesthetic reasons why we should now be more open to the positive possibilities of living in a community. There is nothing new about society's need to work together. What has changed is the level of interconnectedness that the technological age has pressed upon us.

The change in context from the nineteenth to the twentieth century is, however, not the only reason and probably not even the principal reason for my disagreement with Nietzsche. Even though the context has changed in ways that Nietzsche could not have predicted, my call for a reevaluation of the value of community is, in large part, motivated by a personal taste that Nietzsche did not share.

I value the preservation of human life more than Nietzsche did. This is a personal value, obviously shared by many, but I do not present it as any kind of moral absolute. Nietzsche's noble spirits' tendency toward solitary existence makes them more delicate than the common people (BGE, 268); their ruination is the rule. Psychologists, and Nietzsche considers himself to be a psychologist, are in great danger of suffocating from pity as they watch this (BGE, 269), but Nietzsche never counsels them to give up some of their independence. He does give some advice aimed at protecting them from the herd, such as the wearing of masks. When, however, faced with the choice of becoming more communally oriented and surviving, or retaining one's independence, Nietzsche invariably favors the latter. He was, after all, one who enjoyed dancing on the edge of cliffs. While valuing the experience of exploring new and possibly

dangerous territory, I prefer to do most of my dancing a few meters back from the edge. On what basis do I prefer a moral code dedicated to the preservation of life over one that glorifies individualism? In this I remain Nietzschean; it is a preference based upon personal taste, developed, not ex nihilo, but within the bounds of a cultural and personal development, and with an eye on the context.

Irony and Autonomy

Richard Rorty in his recent book, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, addresses the issue of how it is possible to speak about matters of public concern once we have adopted Nietzsche's questioning of truth. He believes that Nietzsche's undermining of traditional truth claims can be useful in defining who we are in our private lives, but that Nietzsche is quite dangerous as a public philosopher. The demands of social life are such, Rorty suggests, that we should embrace liberalism. Although Rorty does not believe that liberalism is a value inherent in reason or in nature, he encourages us to act as if it were. Citing John Stuart Mill, he claims that the goal of liberal democracy is to optimize the balance between increasing personal freedom and preventing suffering.[8] Borrowing Judith Shklar's definition, he calls liberals people for whom "cruelty is the worst thing they do" (74).

Rorty encourages us to become "liberal ironists," keeping the private and the public realms separate:

> We should stop trying to combine self creation and politics, especially if we are liberals. The part of a liberal ironist's final vocabulary which has to do with public action is never going to get subsumed under or subsume the rest of her final vocabulary. (Rorty, 120-21)

With regard to our search for personal meaning—that is, when asking questions about our personal identity—there are no absolutes and no need to stop redefining ourselves. This constant redefining and the abolition of absolutes, which accompanies it, make one an ironist. Formally, he codifies what it is to be an ironist with three characteristics. First, they have continual and radical doubts about their chosen vocabulary. When pressed about it, they can give no noncir-

cular justification. Second, they realize that these doubts cannot be overcome. Finally, they do not hold that their beliefs are closer to reality than anyone else's (73).

Although there is, on occasion, a hint of pragmatism in his justification of liberalism, Rorty sees the liberal's call for solidarity primarily as "simply the fortunate happenstance creation of modern times" (68). Certainly, he does not believe reason provides a justification for human solidarity. Rorty wants to replace those explanations of liberalism, which posit a "suprahistorical ground" with a "historical narrative about the rise of liberal institutions and customs"(ibid.). Morality and politics, like science and economics, are "delivered up to a process of language creating protuberances *in just the same way* as art and philosophy" (66).[9] Rorty writes that the ironist liberal takes two projects to be ends in themselves: expanding the liberal community and inventing one's self: "But by 'end in itself,' of course, she means only 'project which I cannot imagine defending on the basis of noncircular argument.'" The key distinction, separating his public and private projects, is that in private he extols us to continually redefine our self-understanding; in our public lives he suggests that we be liberal democrats.

In our private lives Proust serves, for Rorty, as the example of how to embrace autonomy. Rather than accepting the definitions that others have given to him, Proust becomes autonomous by redescribing those who had described him. By redescribing them in many different ways, he makes it clear that there is no privileged viewpoint and no perspective is definitive:

> Proust became autonomous by explaining to himself why the others were not authorities, but simply fellow contingencies. He redescribed them as being as much a product of others' attitudes towards them as Proust himself was a product of their attitudes toward him. (Rorty, 102)

To claim that an ironist is autonomous means two things for Rorty. First ironists do not allow others to define them, but rather create their own character. Second, the works that ironists produce expand our traditional notions of the genre. Proust and Derrida achieve autonomy because "neither *Remembrance of Things Past* nor *Envois* fits within any conceptual scheme previously used to evaluate novels or philosophical treatises" (137).

While extolling the virtue of autonomy in our private lives, Rorty believes it is at best useless in politics (83). Anti-liberal thinkers, such as Nietzsche and Foucault, are looking for a kind of autonomy that can never be embodied in social institutions. The ironist's desire to be autonomous can be pursued in our private lives and remains, unrelated to our liberal desire to avoid cruelty and pain. Indeed this longing should be confined to the private realm to insure that one does not slip into the attitude "that there is some social goal more important than avoiding cruelty" (65).[10] Rorty believes that this splitting of the individual into the autonomous private individual and the liberal public person allows him to graft a conscience on to postmodernism. I believe that Rorty's position is characterized by a number of unhealthy splits.

Rorty tumbles headlong into what Claude Pavur so aptly labels the "All or Nothing Fallacy."[11] In the public realm Rorty believes we have, in a certain sense, "all." Worrying that by questioning our social values we risk endorsing cruelty, he stops questioning liberalism. The liberal edict to maximize individual freedom and minimize cruelty is the maxim for judging all our public acts. Liberalism is a better way to live—in fact, the best way to live. It represents "the last conceptual revolution" Western social and political thought will ever need (Rorty, 63).

There are, it seems to me, some weaknesses with these claims about liberalism. The act of defining and realizing liberalism necessitates much more phronesis than Rorty admits, and this phronesis requires questioning. Rorty's contention that he is not an ironist when theorizing about public morals or social philosophy is based on his refusal to question the maxim that "governments should maximize individual freedom while preventing cruelty." There is nothing wrong with beginning moral inquiry with a broad principle. And who could object to Rorty's starting point that a liberal is one for whom "cruelty is the worst thing they do" (74)? But the real toil of moral philosophy lies, not in the enunciation of such broad platitudes, but rather in seeking out the paths (*Holzwege*?) that lead to a reduction in pain and an increase in personal freedom. The public life of a liberal will be filled with questions about what constitutes cruelty, to what extent do the old models apply, and how they must be amended. Recent history gives us striking examples of how radically liberal values can be redefined. The United States Supreme Court, including such great liberals as William O. Douglas, allowed

the internment of Americans of Japanese heritage in World War II. Forty-five years later the reparations that the United States government has agreed to pay to those interned in these camps attest to the redefinition that liberal values have undergone.

In the private questioning of one's identity, Rorty slides into the "nothing" side of the "All or Nothing Fallacy." The loss of absolutes compels us, Rorty believes, to redefine constantly who we are. Embracing irony leaves us with nothing—that is, no other advice about how to live our private lives other than the vague injunction "be original." In Proust this takes the form, for Rorty, of constantly redefining one's self and one's world. In philosophical writing Derrida's discourse is extolled, in particular his book *Envois*, because it does not fit "within any conceptual scheme which was previously used to evaluate . . . philosophical treatises" (137).

There may well be reasons to argue for a degree of difference in the amount of questioning in public and in private since a Proustian redefinition of self carries less of a risk to others than, for example, a public philosopher's reexamination of cruelty. But questioning our private identity is not without risks. If tradition provides us with useful models for our interactions with others, why would it not do the same for our questions concerning personal identity?

Let me summarize the path my discussion has taken. While criticizing some of Nietzsche's particular tastes, I have argued, contrary to Rorty, that we do not need to insist upon such a large degree of difference between our public and private philosophizing. Rorty's fear of endorsing cruelty leads him to suggest that we split ourselves into private and public individuals. Rorty splits us so as to insure that the questioning of our definitions of self will not effect liberalism's edict to refrain from harming others.

Rorty's attempt to graft a conscience onto Nietzsche's and Derrida's postmodernism leads him, in my opinion, back to modernism. The word autonomy implies that the project of redefinition creates a self independent from the tradition. The word suggests that Proust and Derrida have radically reformed the traditions out of which they came and have therefore achieved independence from them.

Rorty's use of the word *irony* to describe his project for private self-definition makes it seem as though it is a postmodernist undertaking. As vague and impossible as postmodernism is to define, it is nothing if not the conviction of the folly, and the impossibility, of ignoring the interconnection of past and present. Postmodernism

also involves a recognition of the impossibility of reproducing the past. It was, for example, Nietzsche's occasional insistence that the eternal return implied the exact repetition of the past that led Heidegger to call Nietzsche a metaphysician. But if postmodernism recognizes the impossibility of a repetition of the past, it also emphasizes our indebtedness to it and our inability to escape it. It denies that we can be independent or autonomous with regards to our past. Indeed, that "autonomy" is the goal of his private life actually indicates how far Rorty has strayed from his original intention.

Autonomy is a Cartesian value. Descartes believed that reason could provide the guide we would need to reform our thoughts. Reason would allow us to become autonomous from the tradition that seemed to offer only contradictions. To give another example, the Bauhaus set about to redefine radically architecture, to liberate it from the strictures of convention, and create a style independent of the forms found in the tradition. Functionality, rather than the forms of the past, was to dictate the style of their edifices. Rorty, with his endorsement of liberalism, has almost acknowledged being a modernist—with the admittedly important distinction that he views liberalism as simply the happenstance creation of modern times—with regard to morality. But unbeknownst to Rorty, autonomy's usurpation of irony in his account of the private life turns his private person into a modernist as well.

Nietzsche never forgot, even as he criticized his time, his indebtedness to it. He often speaks of the role that exalted figures of the past can play in giving us a taste for greatness, which we can then use in molding our own character.[12] In the formation of a character, originality is of paramount importance for Rorty. The assumption is that the past is defective and that our hope would lie in radical reformation. Nietzsche the genealogist renovates, and renovation excludes neither reformulation nor innovation. Both have a place in our search for how to live. Rorty's insistence upon the autonomy of the private life obscures the creative possibilities that Nietzsche has shown are available in irony. The postmodern project lives in the creative tension between autonomy and irony (innovation and repetition). By overemphasizing autonomy and declaring the end to theoretical positions, Rorty has missed Nietzsche's and the postmodern's insights that repetition is inevitable and the modernist attempts to avoid it unnecessary. Obviously neither Rorty, Nietzsche, nor I believe in independent objective criteria. Uncon-

cerned with the modernist imperative to create from scratch on the basis of reason alone, Nietzsche and Derrida latch on to the past, repeat it, appropriate it, and call it into question at the same time. Instead of insisting upon our autonomy, they create a position aware of both its indebtedness to the past and the inevitable reformulation that accompanies repetition. And that is why they avoid falling into the schizophrenia inherent in insisting upon the all of the public life and the nothingness of the private life.

If Nietzsche has his tastes and I have mine, is there any basis for choosing among these competing views? If everything comes down to disagreements about tastes, are discussions then limited to a recital of one's views? Can we still engage in meaningful moral debate once the truth standard has been brought into question? Even when we believe, with Nietzsche, that there are only interpretations (some of these interpretations are, for Nietzsche pragmatically speaking, indispensable), it is possible to engage other interpretations in discourse. Furthermore we can take the aesthetic turn without endorsing all of Nietzsche's particular tastes. In particular, I have difficulties with Nietzsche's views on community. Although not unaware of the dangers of blind allegiance to a community, I believe that the context of this century demands, more than ever, that we think of ourselves as members of a global community and work together to solve problems.

When taking the aesthetic turn, we are not compelled, as Rorty suggests, to split ourselves into public and private individuals in order to maintain our liberal values. Our attempts to define social responsibilities will be fraught with difficulties and subject to revision. While granting that it is wise to revise to a lesser degree in questions of public policy, I submit that the public discourse should be more open to debate than Rorty suggests. Nietzsche is a good example of, to use Rorty's vocabulary, an ironist who ended up at times sounding like he endorsed cruelty and who genuinely denigrated liberal democracy. But does the problem lie in the aestheticization of philosophy, or in the particular tastes that Nietzsche endorsed? Do we attack the method or its application?

Rorty attacks the method. He believes that the demands of our social existence require us to proceed differently in our public and private lives. Free to redefine constantly our private identity, Rorty holds that we should refrain from constantly redefining society's aims. Society should be liberal—that is, maximizing personal lib-

erty while minimizing cruelty. Individuals, on the other hand, have a private question to ask: What is the meaning of my individual life? Perhaps there are more strictures or guides to the process of the redefinition of the self than Rorty admits. If the process of redefining the self is never-ending, so is, I would argue, the process of identifying cruelty. I agree with Rorty's critique of Nietzsche's attack on liberalism, but Nietzsche's strategy of showing us the contingency of all our views, both our metaphysical and our moral views, is also helpful. We should reevaluate particular tastes. The key to banning inhumane behavior lies not in abstaining from questioning our liberal values, or acting as though these values are something besides a human creation, but rather in the confrontation of specific inhumane activities. The challenge I find in Nietzsche's writings is to develop a rich aesthetic vision, preserving our individuality and yet respecting others, in a world where necessity is found only in fictions.

NOTES

CHAPTER ONE

1. Although, as we will see in chapters 3 and 4, some postmodern interpreters of Nietzsche have discussed these difficulties, there is no one who has done so to my satisfaction.

2. This holds true not only for Heidegger's interpretation of the eternal return. Chapter 3 will discuss how this natural proclivity of philosophers to overemphasize consistency leads Gilles Deleuze to warp the doctrine of the eternal return so as to make Nietzsche a "pluralist." See *Nietzsche et la philosophie* (Presses Universitaires de France: Paris, 1962).

3. *Nietzsche's Existential Imperative* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 72 (hereafter referred to as NEI).

4. The *Nachlass* poses a number of difficulties, the first of which is how to translate the term into English. "Unpublished works"? But they have been published. "Literary remains" makes it sound as though he were writing literature, whereas Nietzsche himself wrote, in a letter to Overbeck, that he would see in reading Zarathustra how far Nietzsche was from a literary person (KSB 6, 473). I will leave the term untranslated and discuss what I mean by it later in this chapter.

5. In addition to the forementioned *Nietzsche's Existential Imperative*, see also *Heidegger's Metahistory of Philosophy* (HMP), (The Hague: Martin Nijhoff, 1970) (hereafter cited as HMP). In his most recent book co-authored with Stanley Stewart and Jean Pierre Mileur, *Nietzsche's Case: Philosophy as/and Literature* (New York: Routledge, 1993), Magnus continues, in my opinion, to seek a single interpretation for this doctrine, whereas I believe

that Nietzsche never settled on one. I will discuss this book along with Madmarie Clark's *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) at length in a forthcoming article. Although I will make reference to this most recent work, I will concentrate on his two previous books. When refering to Heiedgger's *Nietzsche,* it is to the German edition, 2 vols. (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961). All future references in this chapter are to this edition and will be cited parenthetically. The quotes are my own translations of this German edition. I gratefully acknowledge the publisher's permission to quote from this work. For an English translation of this work, see Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche,* trans. David Krell (4 vols.) (New York: Harper and Row, 1979-82).

6. See endnote 35 in this chapter.

7. This is the case with a great deal of Heidegger's writings. For an excellent discussion of Heidegger's use and misuse of "interpretation," see Karl Löwith's, *Heidegger Denker in dürftiger Zeit* (Stuttgart: Fisher, 1953).

8. Among the many commentators of Heidegger, there is no general agreement as to the correct interpretation of Heidegger's *Nietzsche.* My belief that Heidegger's reasons for calling Nietzsche the "Last Metaphysician" is, as we will see, at odds with at least one currently prevailing interpretation of Heidegger's *Nietzsche.* Chapter 2 will discuss Wolfgang Müller-Lauter's claim that a misguided interpretation of the will to power is the basis for Heidegger's assignment of Nietzsche to the metaphysical tradition. See his "Nietzsches Lehre vom Willen zur Macht," *Nietzsche-Studien* 3 (1974): 1-60.

9. It is possible, I think, to trace Heidegger's declining interest in *Dasein* in his *Nietzsche* through the change in his interpretation of the eternal return. The second interpretation—where Heidegger no longer believes that we can determine what returns—coincides and paves the way for his own loss of interest in the investigation of *Dasein.*

10. *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1963), 109.

11. Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche* 1:318. All future references to this work will be made parenthetically in the text.

12. A second reason to use Heidegger as an interpreter of Nietzsche is his deliberate examination of the different passages throughout Nietzsche's texts where the doctrine is discussed. This will serve as a model for my own study. As simple and obvious as such a procedure would seem to be (it was also suited to the demands of the lecture course he was giving), it has to my knowledge never been attempted by anyone else writing on the eternal return.

13. One of the primary changes in his position according to Magnus is that he no longer sees the *Übermensch* as an ideal-type. Instead he now takes it to be only the presentation of a particular attitude toward life. This attitude is captured by the person who wishes nothing more feverently than the eternal return of every moment of his or her life. The relevant point for my interpretation is that Magnus still wants to interpret the eternal return in one way and I have given evidence that Nietzsche never reconciled all his views on the doctrine as neatly as Magnus suggests. See his "Deification of the Commonplace," R. Solomon, ed., *Reading Nietzsche* (New York: Oxford, 1988), 169. Also see "Perfectibility and Attitude in Nietzsche's Übermensch," *Review of Metaphysics* 36 (1983): 633-59, and "Nietzsche's Self-Consuming Concepts," *International Studies in Philosophy*, vol. 21, no. 2 (1989): 63-71.

14. That the eternal return must be thought prior to the will to power is a claim Heidegger also makes in the second volume (2:38).

15. The word Heidegger uses here to describe the eternal return is *Ursprung*. Laurence Lambert takes the opposite position in his commentary on *Zarathustra*, claiming the eternal return arises out of the will to power "as its consequence" (*Nietzsche's Teaching* [Yale University Press: New Haven, 1986], 147).

16. Maudemarie Clark claims that "substantial agreement exists that Nietzsche considered eternal recurrence his most important teaching." For a time this may have been the case, but for reasons that will become clear, I doubt this was true after 1887 (*Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy*, 245).

17. To Heidegger's credit, he recognizes that his belief about the importance of the teaching of the eternal return cannot be supported on the basis of the published writings.

18. Nietzsche writes this in his discussion of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* in *Ecce Homo*.

19. For example, see Alexander Nehamas, *Life as Literature* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 151.

20. For example §340 "The Dying Socrates" begins "I am amazed by the. . . ."

21. I am indebted to Dalia Judovitz for pointing out the way in which this reference to a demon both recalls Descartes as well as serves to differentiate Nietzsche's project from the modernist's search for clear and distinct ideas.

22. Nietzsche's imagery changes somewhat in the course of writing *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. There, it becomes the camel who carries the heavy burden and Nietzsche's ideal becomes the child.

23. As Judovitz has pointed out to me, Heidegger's reference to concentrating exclusively on the "I" reminds us of Descartes and the differences between the Cartesian endeavor and Nietzsche's.

24. See KSB 6, 474, a letter to Kösterlitz.

25. In fact Nietzsche would add a fourth section later.

26. It is also at odds with the interpretation Heidegger gives of the eternal return in the second volume of the lectures.

27. That Zarathustra is described as "pale and shaking" would seem to me obviously to call into question Thomas A. Long's contention that the nausea spoken of in "The Convalescent" is a nausea "recollected." Long tries to argue that nowhere in the text is Zarathustra actually nauseated ("Nietzsche's Eternal Recurrence—Yet Again," *Nietzsche-Studien*, 16 [1987]: 437-43).

28. There are other interpreters who claim, as Heidegger does, that what returns is a matter of choice. Gilles Deleuze does, as I will show in chapter 3. But most see the doctrine as it is expressed in "The Convalescent" to be saying, as I am going to argue, that everything returns. For example, Kathleen Marie Higgens, *Nietzsche's Zarathustra* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 153. Also Laurence Lambert argues against a "selective return" (*Nietzsche's Teaching: An Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986], 218).

29. *The Portable Nietzsche*, 263.

30. *Martin Heidegger*, ed. Michael Haar (l'Editions de l'Herene: Paris, 1983), 205.

31. Although the later Heidegger was more hesitant about his success in overcoming the metaphysical tradition, the Heidegger of the middle and late thirties (i.e., the giver of the Nietzsche lectures) states his position unequivocally. Nietzsche culminates the metaphysical tradition and he himself philosophizes in the wake of its demise.

32. KSB 8, 1134.

33. This passage appears in the *Ecce Homo* discussion of *The Birth of Tragedy*. In *Nietzsche's Case* Magnus writes that Nietzsche turns back to earlier works "not only to accept and approve, but to recreate the earlier

work as the later one as well" (132). Nietzsche's intent is not, Magnus argues, to create any particular doctrine to replace the "dessiccated corpse of Western philosophy." Magnus and I agree that Nietzsche is not attempting to establish a single doctrine. Magnus, however, continues arguing that Nietzsche has but one exhortation: "Be hard" (ibid.). "What emerges from Nietzsche's writing as a "new" doctrine may actually be an old one. This is of no importance to Nietzsche, according to Magnus, as long as "true creators affirm their own inscriptions in a way intended to last" (ibid.). I am not sure what he means by this last statement, but I suspect that our interpretations diverge on this point. If Nietzsche's work really is, as I am trying to show, a dialogue of many voices, what Nietzsche writes at one time does not necessarily affirm what he has written before. For example in *Beyond Good and Evil* 56, Nietzsche cries "bring it on again," whereas Zarathustra, in "The Convalescent," cannot tolerate the thought. I do not see where the *Beyond Good and Evil* account affirms the earlier vision of the eternal return.

34. This linking of the eternal return with the belief that all things are in flux and with the name of Heraclitus, appears in some of the earliest notes on the eternal return in the *Nachlass*, but this is the first mention of it in the published writings. See, for example, KSA 9, 499; 11 [149]. In "Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks" Nietzsche does write that Heraclitus believes in the periodic destruction and reconsitution of the world. But he does not claim that the reconstituted world is exactly like the one that was destroyed. See KSA 1, 830-31.

35. Heidegger, for one, writes that unpublished writings provide the key to understanding Nietzsche's eternal return. His examination of the unpublished writings comes in the first volume of his study, i.e., at the point where he is claiming that the eternal return exemplifies an authentic understanding of time. In my opinion it does not bring to light any new insights to his interpretation. In his interpretation of the *Nachlass*, the moment continues to be understood as the *collision* where we stand and decide the future and preserve the past (1:357). It is remarkable how little direct exegesis we find in the sections of the *Vorlesung*, which Heidegger devotes to the discussion of the eternal return in the *Nachlass*. He spends the greater part of the 150 pages devoted to the interpretation of the eternal return from the *Nachlass* discussing topics related to his interpretation of the eternal return, but the discussion is rarely based directly on Nietzsche's unpublished works. The themes discussed there are central to Heidegger's interpretation. They include the anthropomorphizing of beings, the difference between Nietzsche's proofs for the eternal return and scientific proofs, and the eternal return as belief and as freedom, but the discussion takes place on the basis of the perspective already developed from the exegesis of

the published writings. At no point does Heidegger clearly state what the *Nachlass* adds to his interpretation that he had not already found in the published works. He writes that the essential aspects of the doctrine (*Grundrichtungen*) are contained in *The Gay Science*, aphorisms 341 and 342, but from these passages alone it is not possible for anyone to know what Nietzsche knew and wanted, not even Nietzsche (1:403). Thoughts are never understood by those who first think them (1:404). Given this belief it is not surprising that Heidegger's interpretation rests upon both that which Nietzsche wrote and that which he left unsaid. The question remains whether that which Heidegger claims is unsaid is what Nietzsche could not think, or is it already included, perhaps even surpassed, in Nietzsche's thought. Through the understanding of the word "midday" Heidegger believes that the standpoint of time (*Zeitpunkt*) of the eternal return is determined. It is a moment in time that no clock can measure, and all understanding of the eternal return as the *Grundcharacter* (basic character) of beings in general can only be understood in the light of this moment. In turn only when we understand the relationship of the eternal return to *das Seienden im Ganzen* (totality of beings) will we understand the teaching (1:402). All of this we have read before; it was already in Heidegger's exposition of the published writings.

36. For an excellent discussion of the problems involved in using the *Nachlass*, see Bernd Magnus's "Nietzsche's Philosophy in 1888," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, January 1986, vol. 24, number 1, in particular sections one and two.

37. See also KSA 9, 500; 11[152], and KSA 9, 504-5; 11[163].

38. Magnus NEI, 74.

39. Although Magnus analyzes this passage in depth, I have some problems with his interpretation. The passage begins, as several other passages do, with the assumption that time is infinite, but the mass of all powers is finite. Therefore the different configurations of mass must be practically impossible to measure, but not infinite. Since time is infinite, but the configurations of mass are not, eventually the configurations of mass must be repeated. The conclusion, according to Magnus, expresses a "halting doubt" about the adequacy of the cosmological/empirical formulation of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence (HMP, 14).

40. Kaufmann also suggests that Nietzsche probably did not publish his proofs of the eternal return at least in part because of "his own sense that his efforts were inadequate" (*Nietzsche Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978], 327).

41. See, for example, KSA 13, 374-76; 14[188].

42. *Nietzsche Die Dynamic der Willen zur Macht und die ewige Wiederkehr* (Berlin: de Gruyter 1984) 215.

43. Müller-Lauter also writes of the eternal return in terms of the being in the world of the superman. See his *Nietzsche: Seine Philosophie der Gegensätzte und die Gegensätzte seiner Philosophie* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1971), in particular, chapter 7.

44. NEI 142.

45. This is an important point that Clark does not seem to appreciate. She writes that Magnus does not explain how the eternal return can have an effect on our lives "unless one accepts the cosmology as true or at least probable" (*Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy*, 250). The fact that the doctrine may not be true, Magnus argues, actually increases the difficulty of living as if it were true and therefore increases its existential import.

46. "Nietzsche's Eternal Recurrence —Yet Again," *Nietzsche-Studien*, 16 (1987): 439.

47. This aphorism appears in the chapter entitled "What is Noble," which is a central text for this book. Several aphorisms from this section will be discussed in chapter 6.

48. Müller-Lauter, in his earlier writings, argues as does Heidegger that Nietzsche's real philosophy remains hidden in the *Nachlass*. See "Nietzsche's Lehre vom Willen zur Macht." Heidegger also holds this view (*Nietzsche* 1, 17).

Chapter Two

1. The will to power and the eternal return both surface in Nietzsche's published writing in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, but the will to power appears more frequently in the published and unpublished works. It is first used in the *Nachlass* in the fall of 1882. "Will to life? I found in place of this always will to power" (KSA 10, 187; 5[1]). In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* the doctrine first appears in the first book, written in the summer of 1883. See Montinari's discussion of this in vol. 14 of the KSA, 383-400.

2. That Nietzsche saw these works as his *Hauptwerk* in the place of the will to power is argued quite persuasively by Mazzino Montinari. See KSA 14, 383-400.

3. As Ruprecht has written in a letter to me: "Heidegger is neither the first nor the last thinker in this century to claim that he is tracing out a

trajectory of thought which Nietzsche himself would have taken, had he lived. And his claim is as problematic as most, crippled by his refusal to take seriously and in sufficient detail, what Nietzsche himself has written—and left unsaid."

4. In chapters 3 and 4, we will see how Heidegger's discussion of the will to power is an important foundation for the French postmodern interpretations of Nietzsche.

5. David Krell, *Intimations of Mortality: Time, Truth, and Finitude in Heidegger's Thinking of Being* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986), 131.

6. Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, *Nietzsche: Seine Philosophie der Gegensätzte und die Gegensätzte seiner Philosophie* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971), 31.

7. This does not mean that I accept the idea that the overcoming of self can lead to coming to self without the reintroduction of the teleology that Heidegger claims obscures Aristotle's original intention. I still wonder how something can incorporate its contradictions and yet maintain its identity. If the contradictions are real, does their metamorphosis not lead to a *Wesenveränderung* rather than a *Wesenentfaltung*? Is it possible for something to metamorphize itself into its opposite without losing itself?

8. Heidegger further emphasizes this break from conceptual thinking by assigning to orgiastic frenzy a key role in the overcoming of aesthetics. Heidegger writes that the most basic reality of art, for Nietzsche, is orgiastic frenzy (1:243). Nietzsche understands what Wagner did not, i.e.: "this feeling of the deployment of power, the fullness and the alternating increase of all capacities as the Being which transcends itself and so comes to itself in the highest clearness of Being" (ibid.). In orgiastic frenzy, the transcending of self is a coming to self in the clearness of Being and not in "blind frenzy" (*blinde Verschweben im Taumel*) (1:244). At the same time Nietzsche sees in this the *Heraufkommen des Abgrundes des Lebens* (the arising of the abyss of life), which is not morally bad, but rather something to which we must say yes (1: ibid.). The physiological and the *Sinnlich-leibliche* (sensual-bodily) has in itself the moment of *über-sich-hinaus* (overcoming itself). The inner nature of what Nietzsche means by the sensual (*Sinnlich*) is brought out through the underlining of the connection between orgiastic frenzy and beauty, as well as the relationship between creativity and enjoyment and form. Order, control (*Übersicht*), borders, and laws belong to the nature of beauty. The sensual is in turn arranged so that it is watched over, ordered, controlled and constrained, but it is the sensual and not the order imposed upon the sensual that constitutes reality for Nietzsche (*das Sinnliche*

[macht] die eigentliche Realität aus) (1:244). All beings are the result of human perception. The world of the senses takes its form from the human need for regularity, rather than from any inherent order in the world.

9. Heidegger's description of the will to power in the Nietzsche lectures from 1936 to 1937 stands at the crossroads between his analysis of *Dasein* and his musings (lamentations?) on the failure of language to invoke Being. The self-overcoming that is at the same time a return to self is inspired, at least in part, by his investigation of *Dasein*. Heidegger writes at the end of these lectures that "the overman is the person who grounds Being anew—in the rigor of knowledge and in the great style of creativity" (1:254).

10. See *Being and Time*, paragraph 3.

11. Jürgen Habermas' book, *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988), 192, contains an insightful discussion of the problem of irrationalism in the later Heidegger. He calls the later Heidegger's thought "inverted fundamentalism" where truth claims are reduced to prophetic gestures (*seherischen Gebärde*).—Although Alan Megill does not specifically comment on this passage (*Prophets of Extremity* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985]), I think he would be very sympathetic to Heidegger's interpretation here. He also sees Nietzsche's work as anticonceptual and antiscientific. For the reasons I have given here, I strongly disagree. See also note 29, in this chapter. All future references to Megill will be to this work.

12. This is one of the many insights in this book that I owe to Ruprecht. In his book he has labeled this looking upon the past as some sort of paradise lost, the tragic posture. See his (tentatively titled) *The Tragic Posture in the Modern Age: An essay on Tragedy—Classical, Christian and Modern* (New York: Continuum Press, 1994).

13. I will develop this reading of the aphorism further in chapter 5.

14. See for example *Beyond Good and Evil* 4.

15. Schopenhauer's aesthetics is one of the unstated opponent here. See, for example, Schopenhauer's description of the "pure-will-less subject of knowledge" from chapter 34 of *The World as Will and Representation*, trans. E. F. J. Payton (New York: Dover, 1969), vol. 1. See also my discussion of (TI, "Raids," 22) later in this chapter.

16. I will discuss this section in detail in chapter 5.

17. This is a manuscript to which he sometimes refers in his published writings, but which he himself never published.

18. Maudemarie Clark claims that Nietzsche's position on truth changes radically after *Beyond Good and Evil.* In his last six works "there is no evidence of Nietzsche's earlier denial of truth, no claim that science logic or mathematics falsify reality." For my reaction to this, see note 43 in this chapter (*Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990], 103). All future references to Clark's works, in this chapter, will be to this book.

19. Nietzsche gives a psychological account of why people tend to believe in a unitary will, rather than his notion of the will as a "social construction." The desire to feel an increase in their power prompts them to posit the unity of the will. Concepts that deny that the world is constantly in flux are said by Nietzsche to give their adherents a sense of security. See Müller-Lauter's discussion in *Gegensätzte,* 95-115.

20. It is also discussed in *The Anti-Christ* 14.

21. Müller-Lauter maintains that Heidegger saw the will to power as singular. In light of my discussion of Heidegger, it is obvious that I disagree with Müller-Lauter's assessment of the interpretation of the will to power in the first lectures, "The will to power as Art." In the subsequent lectures I do think that Heidegger tends more to the interpretation that Müller-Lauter suggests.

22. *Gegensätzte,* 33. Other Nietzsche scholars have also held this. For example, Alphonso Lingis writes that the will to power is the differential element of force (a position held by both Müller-Lauter and, as we will see in our next chapter, also by Gilles Deleuze). This difference arises, according to Lingis, "in the self affirmation of a force exercised against another force." It affirms itself and thereby affirms its difference. "For Nietzsche, the feeling of distinction—the pathos of distance—is the fundamental affect of power" (Alphonso Lingis, "The will to power" in *The New Nietzsche,* ed. David B. Allison [New York: Dell, 1977], 41). See also Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche et la philosophie,* 59.

23. Heidegger argues that the will and the will to power are both essentially unities. He maintains that the questions What is will? and What is will to power?, are really only one question. Heidegger writes, "Will is for him [Nietzsche] nothing other than will to power and power is nothing other than the essence of will." Heidegger does not ignore the passage from *Beyond Good and Evil* where Nietzsche writes that the will is something complex. Heidegger interprets this passage to mean that Nietzsche sees "something unitary, more original and at the same time richer behind the coarse word will" (64-65). This is an "interpretation" that circumvents the original intent. Whereas Nietzsche writes that will is a unity only in a word,

Heidegger claims that, for Nietzsche, will is essentially unitary. Granted Heidegger's notion of unity is not simple and involves the incorporation of contradictions, still to find the ultimate aim of Nietzsche's thought in a unity of the will to power, is, in my opinion, to misread Nietzsche.

24. Müller-Lauter, *Gegensätzte*, 32

25. Nietzsche's rejection, in the published works, of the belief in stable entities is not limited to *Beyond Good and Evil*. In *Twilight of the Idols* Nietzsche writes that our senses do not lie, but after receiving the information from our senses, we begin to lie. Reason causes us to create the lies of unity, thingness (*Dinglichkeit*), substance, continual existence over time (TI "Reason," 2). Reason creates stability out of the flux that we confront through our senses. Nietzsche's reaction to created stability is twofold. On the one hand, and this will be discussed at length in chapter 5, he recognizes that the stability needed for life originates in simplification, and furthermore that simplification is at the root of great stylists. On the other hand he maintains that though stabilizing fictions are necessary for life, they are nonetheless fictions.

26. Montinari, KSA 14, 390.

27. The will to power is mentioned in eleven aphorisms in *Beyond Good and Evil*: 9, 13, 22, 23, 36, 51, 186, 198, 211, 227, and 259. It is mentioned in five aphorisms in *Geneology of Morals* (II 12, 18, III 15, 18, 27); in four aphorisms of *Twilight of the Idols* ("Raids,": 11, 20, 38 and "Ancients" 3); five times in *The Anti-Christ* (2, 6, 9, 16, 17) and twice in *Ecce Homo* ("BT," 4 and "CW," 1).

28. I have some difficulty with Magnus's claim that the cosmology of the will to power is discussed only in *Beyond Good and Evil* 36 and *Geneology of Morals* II, 12. I will try to show that there are many aphorisms in the first two sections of *Beyond Good and Evil* that suggest that both organic and inorganic worlds are series of forces striving to overcome one another, i.e., manifesting will to power ("Nietzsche's Philosophy in 1888," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 24:1 [January 1986]).

29. Alan Megill sees in Nietzsche a "commitment to immediacy" and a "movement to aesthetic illusion" underlining the "persistently antiphilosophical, antiscientific strand in his thought" (54). Although he first makes this claim in his discussion of *The Birth of Tragedy*, he soon make it clear that he believes Nietzsche's "commitment to the criterion of immediacy is by no means confined to his early "aesthetic" period. On the contrary, it persists throughout his intellectual career, continuing as an important element in his "mature" thought" (58). In what follows I show how the will to power in *Beyond Good and Evil*, is, among other things, an attempt to interpret the

physical world. One of the major differences between my interpretation of Nietzsche and Megill is that when I use the term *aesthetic* it is not meant to imply (as it does for Megill) that Nietzsche seeks an "immediate" or non-conceptual knowledge. See chapter 6 for how my analysis of Nietzsche's aesthetic criteria differs from Megill's.

30. Boscovich is, to quote the footnote Walter Kaufmann gives in his edition of *Beyond Good and Evil*, "an 18th century Jesuit philosopher somewhat out of the main stream of science . . . [who] had defined atoms only as centers of force, and not as particles of matter in which powers somehow inhere" (Charles Coulston Gillispie, *The Edge of Objectivity: An Essay in the History of Scientific Ideas* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960], 455).

31. As an explanation for the physical world, Kaufmann finds it unconvincing (*Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 207).

32. Nietzsche also affirms this in Book 5 of *The Gay Science*—written after *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886-87). Here we read that Darwin and his followers are wrong; the basic drive of life is not to survive, but to overcome (GS, 349).

33. Few Nietzsche scholars have fully understood the relationship between will and will to power. A notable exception is Müller-Lauter. I recommend in particular his article: "Nietzsche's Auf-lösung des Problems der Willensfreiheit." This is in my opinion the best piece written on the problem of freedom of the will in Nietzsche and my debt to it will be quite obvious ("Nietzsche's Auf-lösung des Problems der Willensfreiheit" in *Nietzsche heute: Die Rezeption seines Werks nach 1986*, ed. Sigrid Bauschinger, Susan L. Cocalis, and Sara Lennox [Bern: Francke Verlag, 1988], 23-73).

34. Clark also argues that this claim of direct knowledge of our drives is reminiscent of Descartes and cannot therefore be taken at face value (214-16).

35. Karl Schlecta, *Der Fall Nietzsche*, 2nd ed. (Munich: Hanser, 1959), 120-22.

36. *Es sei verfehlt ein Stilmittel als eine sachliche Distanzierung im Hauptpunkt auszulegen* (Müller-Lauter, "Nietzsche's Lehre vom Wille zur Macht," *Nietzsche Studien*, 3 [1974]: 10) (hereafter quoted as "Wille").

37. Clark also notes the similarities between Descartes and Nietzsche, and the difficulty of assuming that Nietzsche could be serious about offering these kinds of justifications. She concludes that "we cannot reasonably attribute to Nietzsche the argument of *Beyond Good and Evil*

36" (215). But if this were the case, how do we account for the one use of the indicative, i.e. Nietzsche's claim that the will to power *is* his theory.

38. Müller-Lauter, "Wille" 55.

39. Ibid., 55n.

40. Ibid., 55.

41. Ibid., 54.

42. In another place in *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche is less cautious and asserts unconditionally that the essence of the world is will to power (186). But here in the earlier passages where Nietzsche directly addresses the question of whether or not the will to power is an interpretation or a fact, Nietzsche is unambiguous that it is *his interpretation*.

43. Clark also sees an evolution in Nietzsche's thought after *Beyond Good and Evil*. According to her reading and contrary to Nietzsche's claims, the accounts in *The Gay Science* and *Beyond Good and Evil* presuppose the existence of a "true" or metaphysical world. Starting with *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche becomes a neo-Kantian, whereas before this work he vacillated between a Kantian and neo-Kantian position. Nietzsche's Kantian position was that "transcendental truth is both conceivable and of overriding value, but unattainable for human beings" (92). The neo-Kantian position holds that transcendental truth is inconceivable, a contradiction in terms. Like contemporary "antirealists," Nietzsche in his neo-Kantian phase rejects the notion of thing-in-itself as contradictory, but otherwise follows Kant's position concerning truth. This is to say that he may not have the capacity to determine what truth is in some cases. He insists only that truth cannot be independent of his cognitive interests, of the best standards of rational acceptability (60). In practice this means that for the neo-Kantian, according to Clark, to deny the existence of the true world is to deny that our best empirical theories can be radically false. *Beyond Good and Evil*'s charge that mathematics science and logic falsify reality is a remnant of the Kantian position—a position that he should have abandoned, when in *The Gay Science* and *Beyond Good and Evil* he rejected the thing-in-itself. The works after *Beyond Good and Evil* contain no hint of the view that human truths, such as science or logic, falsify reality—they exhibit a unified respect for facts, senses, and science (105). Going against Clark's interpretation are sections such as the previously discussed "Reason in Philosophy" from *Twilight of the Idols* (see my note 25 in this chapter). In places such as this, Nietzsche does say that our attempts to reconstruct the "true" world by means of language are doomed to failure, but that does not mean that they are worthless.

44. The best discussion of the problem of Nietzsche's plans for *The will to power* I know of is the previously cited essay of Montinari in volume 14 of the KSA (see my note 2). Montinari notes that Nietzsche gives this broader interpretation of the will to power in the following fragment in the notebook from August and September of 1885:

The Will to Power

Attempt at a new Interpretation of all Events
(Preface concerning a threatening "Lack of meaning".) Problem of pessimism

Logic
Physics
Moral
Art
Politics
(KSA 11, 629; 40[2])

Montinari claims that in 1888 Nietzsche no longer writes of the will to power as an interpretation of the "physical world." Although I think this is generally true, it is somewhat overstated. For example Nietzsche writes once in the spring 1888:

Will to Power
Morphology
Will to Power as "Nature"
as Life
as Society
as Will to Truth
as Religion
as Art
as Moral
as Mankind
The opposing movement
The Will to Nothing
The conquered. The waste, the degenerate

Notice that "nature" is put in quotation marks (KSA 13, 254; 14[72]). In KSA 13, 257-58; 14[79] he speaks of will to power replacing the atomic theory as he did in BGE 12.

Montinari also claims that the will to power is never interpreted as a theory of the physical world in the published works. With the important exception of *Beyond Good and Evil*, I would agree.

Bernd Magnus writes that "the rubric of the will to power in nature silently slips from view in all 8 or so post 1887 plans" (i.e., plans for the will

to power). One could argue that the note quoted above is not a plan, and there is certainly less talk of the will to power as a theory of the inorganic world in the *Nachlass* in 1888. It is important to note that this broad interpretation does appear occasionally in 1888 in the *Nachlass*. For Magnus's argument, see his "Nietzsche's Philosophy in 1888."

45. As Eric Blondel writes: for Nietzsche, the object of philosophy is culture—although he asserts this without suggesting that Nietzsche ever thought about being anything but a natural scientist. I will discuss his interpretation in more detail later in this chapter. *Nietzsche The Body and Culture: Philosophy as a Philological Genealogy*, trans. Sean Hand (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 247. All future references to Blondel's work in this chapter will be to this book.

46. KSB 8, 1134.

47. He repeats this near the end of the aphorism reasserting a claim made in, among other places, *Beyond Good and Evil* 186, that the essence of life is will to power. Although the struggle of will affects inanimate objects, there is no claim here that these inanimate objects are composed of a battle of forces. It is the use or purpose of inorganic objects, which is not the result of an original intention, but rather the product of current power relationships.

48. The final reference to the will to power in *Genealogy of Morals* occurs near the end of the third essay (GM III, 27). Nietzsche announces that he is preparing a work entitled *The Will to Power: An Attempt at a Reevaluation of All Values*. In this work he promises that the meaning of ascetic ideals (the subject of the essay) will be dealt with more thoroughly.

49. The difference in tone here is striking when compared to *The Genealogy of Morals* and Nietzsche's advice to the healthy to cultivate a distance between themselves and the sick. Nietzsche shows no fear that his greatness will ever be seriously challenged. The guarded attitude that led him to counsel the cultivation of the pathos of distance is replaced by open exuberance.

50. The notion that nobility and domination are linked is also brought out, in the later work, through a discussion of architecture and the will to power. Nietzsche claims the architects evidence the greatest acts of will (*Willensakt*) analogous to the will to move mountains; they possess the frenzy of the greatest will, which would become art: "their edifices should evidence pride, victory over gravity, the will to power" (TI, "Raids," 11). As in *Beyond Good and Evil* the will to power is associated with the overcoming of an opposing force, but here the will is said to express itself artistically. Through their overcoming these forces, architects evidence great style.

51. This is reminiscent of *The Genealogy*'s (GM II, 12) measuring of nobility according to the masses of smaller powers, which must be sacrificed as the larger power asserts itself.

52. Clark and I agree here that this aphorism clearly suggests that "the will to power is one among other drives" (224). In *Anti-Christ* 17, Nietzsche also claims that when will to power declines, there is a physiological decline.

53. Nietzsche refers to himself as "medicynic" in *Dawn* 203. For Blondel's discussion of this, see Blondel, 228-29.

54. A word that, by virtue of its use by the National Socialists, has a terrible sound for today's readers.

55. Blondel, 125.

56. Blondel argues that this project of basing philosophy on the body goes further than I have suggested. He writes that "In Nietzsche, the text is charged not with designating signifieds (whose discourse has the task of reducing exteriority as much as possible), but with being the signifying process of the body and life, operating as the movement and labor of interpretation" (29). In another place he refers to the text as the sound or echo of the body (80). His argument is quite refined and I will discuss it in note 59.

57. Actually the summit of aesthetic contemplation for Schopenhauer is found in listening to music, but that, he believes, is no longer an objectification of the will, but rather a direct copy of it.

58. See Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, trans. E. F. J. Payton (New York: Dover, 1969), vol. 1, especially § 33, 176-78.

59. Here is a point of agreement as well as a point of divergence between my interpretation and Blondel's. Blondel asks how Nietzsche's philosophy differs from others. It is not, according to his reading, that Nietzsche's discourse is true and the others false. But to say that there are not truths and only interpretations risks, Blondel argues, turning his thought into a thought that mistrusts itself. Nietzsche's solution is to "think through" that which metaphysics has caste aside—namely, the body. But in replacing metaphysics with this discourse of the body, "Nietzsche still runs the risk of offering no more than a super-metaphysical discourse and thought." Nietzsche's original solution is to offer a "para-discourse" or "stand-in discourse," which "finds its coherence on the level of the metaphor, which is represented as the moving truth of life and the interpretation of the body." The metaphor of the body offers "life's secret coher-

ence." Although Nietzsche's text "forever progresses increasingly toward a bodily signifying," this progression is bound to "failure." "Since bodily signifying is pertinent to the degree to which it effaces linguistic signifying and leads to the bodily signifying that lies outside the text" (31). Nietzsche the philologist—that is to say, the Nietzsche who is concerned with the interpretation of texts, must "move away from philology toward physiology (80)." It is, however, impossible to dispense with the text, and therefore the body serves as the best metaphor because it comes closest to expressing the unstable and constantly self-overcoming qualities of Nietzsche's discourse. I do not believe that any *one* metaphor serves Nietzsche's purposes best. Particularly if we restrict ourselves to Nietzsche's published writings, there are many justifications given why his writings are superior to others. In chapter 5 I will highlight Nietzsche's notion of necessary fictions. My aesthetic reconstruction of Nietzsche thought outlined in chapter 6 aims to show how Nietzsche grounds many of his views in his very personal ideas about good and bad style.

60. "Wille" 56.

61. Müller-Lauter also names a second criterion which he believes Nietzsche uses to differentiate the will to power from other interpretations of the world. He maintains that the criterion of *Machtsteigerung* also serves to differentiate the will to power from other philosopher's doctrines. He reasons that an explanation that serves to increase power is, for Nietzsche, more truthful than those that simply preserve power. The will to power is not simply a contemplative doctrine, it is an expression of the desire for power (*Ausdruck des Machtwollens*). The doctrine contains a call for the hearer to adopt it ("Wille" 49-50).

62. "Wille" 50.

63. Ibid., 51.

64. Ibid., 51.

65. Ibid., 58.

66. As citizens of the twentieth century, we are prone to ask if its superiority were a product of its ability to explain more than competing theories. That is, however, as will become clear in chapter 6, not the reason that Nietzsche gives.

67. As Arthur Danto writes: "It is hardly avoidable that we think of will to power in almost exactly the terms in which men once thought of substance, as that which underlies everything else and was the most fundamental of all" *Nietzsche as Philosopher* (New York: Macmillan, 1965) 215.

Chapter Three

1. Deleuze's book *Nietzsche et la philosophie* is certainly one of the most important studies, and arguably the most important study, of Nietzsche in the last thirty years. One commentator writes: "If Deleuze is among the least known French philosophers in America, while for Foucault we live in what might eventually be called a "Deleuzian" century, it is only one more sign of a failure here to sense where the real action was taking place" (Vincent P. Pecora, "Deleuze's Nietzsche and Post-Structuralist Thought," *Substance* 14.3 [1986]: 34-50).

2. Deleuze, *Nietzsche*, 4.

3. Ibid., 5.

4. Müller-Lauter notes some affinity between his interpretation and Deleuze's interpretation. See "Nietzsches Lehre vom Willen zur Macht," *Nietzsche-Studien* 3 (1974): 15. However, at one point he differentiates between his understanding of will to power and Deleuze's interpretation. Deleuze writes that will to power is inseparable from "this or that determinate force, (but) inseparable does not mean identical. Force is that which can, the will to power is that which desires (*veut*) (*Nietzsche et la philosophie*, 57). Deleuze reasons when two forces engage each other, one must be dominate and the other dominated. This concept of a victorious force needs a complement and this complement is "an internal desire" (*vouloir*). It would not be victorious, according to Deleuze, without such an addition (57). Whereas Deleuze sees the inner desire as an addition to the will to power, Müller-Lauter claims the feeling of power has a merely "deductive" meaning (36n-37). Müller-Lauter argues that there are for Nietzsche two concepts of power. The internal feeling of desire belongs to the *mechanical* concept. He claims that the mechanical defintion must be derived geneologically from the will to power, which is to say that it is a *social* construction. While I think Müller-Lauter is right to challenge Deleuze's assertion that the internal desire is a necessary complement to the will to power, at the base of both of their interpretations is the suggestion that the world for Nietzsche consists of an unending plurality of forces.

5. Deleuze's argument here is similar to Müller-Lauter's. Both maintain that Nietzsche's notion of force includes the idea that it stands in opposition to other forces. There is, however, a difference in their reasoning. Müller-Lauter's interpretation is based primarily on his reading of the texts, Deleuze's interpretation of force, although it echoes Nietzsche's text, is not just a textual interpretation; it is grounded in an analysis of the nature of force.

6. Deleuze, *Nietzsche*, 26.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., 27.

9. The "innocence of becoming" is a major point of dispute between Deleuze and Jean Granier. The latter alleges that Deleuze, in his polemic against the Hegelian dialectic, unjustly concludes that there is no place in Nietzsche's thought for Hegel's conception of *une puissance médiatrice de la contradiction* (a mediating power of contradiction). Granier contends that the overman involves a mediating negativity. Moreover the will to power is not, according to Granier, that which opposes one force to another, rather it is inside a force and the principle of the force's *auto dépassement* (self-overcoming). The point of contention between the two may be more of an argument over Hegel interpretation than over Nietzsche. For Deleuze the will that desires the dialectic is a sign of a force *épuisée* (crushed), which no longer has the force to affirm its difference. This force no longer acts, but rather it reacts to the forces that dominate it. It is, however, not clear that Hegel, Nietzsche, or Granier believe that the dialectic strips the forces of their difference. See Jean Granier's book review in "Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger," volume 159 (Paris, 1969), 91-100.

10. Deleuze, *Nietzsche*, 7.

11. Ibid., 3.

12. Ibid., 7.

13. See my discussion of this in chapter 2.

14. Deleuze, *Nietzsche*, 7.

15. Deleuze claims that because all forces are in rapport with one another—either commanding or obeying other forces—the investigation into origins must take the form of an investigation of hierarchies. Since the world is nothing other than a plurality of forces, the recording of these hierarchies of forces is *le fait originaire* (the original act) (Deleuze, *Nietzsche*, 9). Although Nietzsche sometimes uses the word *hierarchy* to signify the triumph of reactive forces—that is, the tyrannical reign of arbitrary values—more important is its use to signify the triumph of active forces over the reactive (Deleuze, 69-70).

16. Another question I have involves the use of Nietzsche's statements about the plurality of the will to support Deleuze's interpretation. Deleuze associates the pluralism in Nietzsche's conception of the will with the pluralism of the will to power. Deleuze uses *Beyond Good and Evil*

19—which, as we saw in chapter 2, is clearly an attack on the superficiality of the traditional concept of will, saying little or nothing about the will to power—to introduce the notion of the plurality of will to power (Deleuze, *Nietzsche*, 8).

17. Most interpreters see a tension between Nietzsche's doctrines of the will to power and the eternal return. Heidegger explicitly rejects Baeumler's discarding of the eternal return. While arguing that the two doctrines can be reconciled, at the same time, he believes that it is no easy task. Heidegger associates the eternal return with Parmenides and considers it the main metaphysical remnant in Nietzsche's thought. On the other hand he connected the will to power with Heraclitus and the overcoming of metaphysics (*Nietzsche*, 1, 465-68). Müller-Lauter strenuously objects to the classification of the will to power as a metaphysical doctrine, but admits that this charge might be correct when brought against the eternal return. See A. Baeumler, *Nietzsche der Philosoph und Politiker* (Leipzig: Reclam, 1931). For Heideger's discussion of Baeumler, see *Nietzsche* 1, 29-31.

18. Michael S. Roth, *Knowing and History: Appropriations of Hegel in Twentieth-Century France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 199.

19. In a later article Deleuze makes what I take to be an important revision in his interpretation of the eternal return and the will to power. He claims that Nietzsche's work is not finished and that these two fundamental concepts of his thought are hardly introduced or developed in either the published works or the *Nachlass*. He adds that, in particular, the eternal return is more hidden than revealed in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. ("Sur La Volonté de Puissance et l'Éternel Retour," *Nietzsche: Cahiers de Royaumont* [Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967], 275-76).

20. Deleuze, *Nietzsche*, 28.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., 33.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., 52-53.

25. Ibid., 80.

26. Michael Foucault also makes this point in his essay "Nietzsche la Généalogie, l'Histoire," *Hommage à Jean Hyppolite* (Paris: Press Universitaires de France, 1971), 145.

27. Deleuze, *Nietzsche*, 87.

28. Ibid., 2 and 104.

29. Ibid., 88.

30. Foucault is more sensitive to Nietzsche's use of artistic invention. He writes that Nietzsche is not afraid to make of history *un savoir perspectif*. While traditional historians try to obliterate all signs of their personality and of the historical moment in which they live, Nietzsche is conscious that the observer always sees the world through a particular perspective. The good historian—the genealogist—knows how to stage *un grand carnival du temps* where the masks from the previous epochs return. Genealogy is *l'histoire comme carnaval concret*" (Foucault, "Nietzsche," 163, 168).

31. Deleuze, *Nietzsche*, 1.

32. Ibid., 1-2.

33. Ibid., 2.

34. Pecora sees the same problem in Deleuze's interpretation but phrases it somewhat differently. Deleuze's interpretation creates in the will to power a "stubborn binarism" by making the will to power both a finite element or mechanism or structure as well as a motivating affirmative and infinitely creative force. This Pecora calls the "dialectical turn at the heart of his interpretation" ("Deleuze's Nietzsche," 40).

35. Deleuze, 221. I am not the only one who finds it strange that Deleuze would write about the "being of becoming." Vincent Descombes writes that it is surprising that Deleuze speaks of a concept of difference, for the true difference for him is between the concept and the nonconcept. Analogously Descombes finds it surprisingly "obstinate" that Deleuze speaks of the *concept* of being desiring that being be considered univocal. Descombes has difficulties reconciling this with Deleuze's claim that "Being is difference" (*Le Même et l'autre* [Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1979] 182n).

36. Deleuze, *Nietzsche*, 221.

37. Michael Roth has in this point not fully appreciated where the problem in Deleuze's interpretation lies. He claims that in Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche "the responsibility of the struggle of responsibility is replaced by the celebration of irresponsibility. . . . our future is simply affirmed to have a meaning and direction." My critique of Deleuze lies not so much in the irresponsibility of his affirmation, but rather his failure to fully appreciate the difficulties in extracting an affirmation out of the inexorable plurality of existence. This involves, in my opinion, an act of affirmation by an

individual that is more than an affirmation of becoming. Deleuze is not irresponsible, but rather Nietzsche's affirmation involves more personal choice than Deleuze realizes (*Knowing and History*, 201.)

38. Deleuze has difficulty in explaining how the will to power can be present in the creation of bad consciousness. He writes: "Nietzsche denounces ressentiment, bad consciousness, the power of the negative . . . : the inactuality of a philosophy which gives its self the project of liberation. . . . The negative expires at the door of being" (*Nietzsche*, 221).

Chapter Four

1. "La Question du Style" is the title given to this work when it was first published in the collection *Nietzsche aujourd'hui?*, 2 vols. (Paris: Union Générale d'Editions, 1973). A revised edition of the essay has been published in French—*Éperons: Les Styles de Nietzsche* (Paris: Flammarion, 1978); this revised version has been published in a bilingual edition—*Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles*, trans. Barbara Harlow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979). I will cite from the original French edition and then include the page number from the bilingual edition.

2. As I noted in chapter 2, even when Nietzsche is most consistent about trying to see the world as will to power, he explicitly claims that the theory is "only my interpretation" (BGE, 22). He also writes, as Derrida notes, that truth is a woman and that philosophers are notorious for their inability to understand women (BGE, *Preface*).

3. The sentence is found in the notebooks from the fall of 1881 (KSA 9, 587; 12 [62] 587). According to Ernst Behler, Derrida's choice of the sentence "I forgot my umbrella" is meant to ridicule Heidegger's concept of *Seinsvergessenheit* ("Nietzsche jenseits der Dekonstruktion," *Nietzsche und die philosophische Tradition*, vol. 1, ed. Josef Simon [Würzberg: Königshaysen and Neumann, 1985], 102).

4. "Le style éperonant" is difficult if not impossible to translate. The translation I offer here is a very narrow one and is intended to help illustrate the metaphor of the *Holzwege* as it applies to Derrida. I will discuss what Derrida means by this term in more depth later in this chapter.

5. As John Leavey writes, the crisis in Derrida is brought about not by the overabundance of meaning but the inability to decide meaning: "Non-choice runs throughout Derrida's texts" "Undecidable and Old Names: Undecidable and Deconstruction," Preface to Edmund Husserl, *Origin of Geometry, with An Introduction*, by Jacques Derrida, trans. John P. Leavey (Stony Brook, New York: Nicholas Hays, 1978), 5.

6. Jacques Derrida, *De la Grammatologie* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1967), 25.

7. Leavey, 2-3.

8. Sarah Kofman writes that, for Derrida, there is nothing before or outside the text (*Lectures de Derrida* [Paris: Éditions Galilée], 17).

9. Derrida, *Grammatologie*, 31.

10. In *La Voix et le phénomène* Derrida discusses his views on the question: "What is it?" There we read that, when we pose this question, we submit that which we have placed in question to a *dasein ontologique*; we assign it a place in an ontology (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), 25-27.

11. Derrida, *Grammatologie*, 31.

12. See Behler.

13. Derrida, *Grammatologie*, 76.

14. Ibid., 103.

15. Vincent Descombes writes of the trace that it alludes to a past, i.e., it is a sign of something that has been. But for Derrida it is *a present trace of a past which never took place*—"an absolute past," *Le Même et l'autre* (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1979), 174.

16. Derrida, *Grammatologie*, 108.

17. Ibid., 102.

18. Ibid.

19. In a recent "biography" of Derrida by Geoffery Bennington and Derrida these two suggest that this is an improper reading of this famous *hors du texte* comment (*Jacques Derrida*, Geoffery Bennington and Jacques Derrida [Paris: Seuil, 1991]).

20. "Style," 287/139.

21. Ibid., 268/101-3.

22. Ibid., 236-37/37.

23. Derrida, *Grammatologie*, 231.

24. He makes this statement in the question and answer section attached to the original French version of the essay from *Nietzsche aujourd'hui*, but it does not appear in the other two versions ("Style," 299).

25. Ibid., 246/57.

26. Ibid., 243/51.

27. Ibid., 270/106.

28. Ibid., 271/109.

29. Descombes notes the importance of deception for Derrida. In particular he writes of how Derrida's deconstruction relies on pretending to speak the language of the discourse that it is attempting to disassemble. Here Derrida first takes the position that there is a difference between "appropriation" and "propriation" only to deny that difference later on, Vincent Descombes, *Le Même et l'autre*, 163.

30. Derrida's use of the word *transcendental* inevitably invokes a comparison with the Kantian sense of transcendental as "necessary presupposition," i.e., the process of propriation is a necessary presupposition for knowledge. There are, however, important differences between what Kant and Derrida mean by "transcendental." For Derrida the necessary presupposition for the possibility of knowledge is the possession of the other, even if this possession is never really accomplished. Kant, at least in the preface to the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, seems convinced that he had elucidated the conditions for the possibility of knowledge. Obviously Kant believes that these presuppositions are ontologically definable. According to Derrida, knowledge is engendered by a process that is not ontologically definable, not even by a dialectical ontology. How can we define what we have never seen?

31. "Style," 273/111.

32. That the act of intercourse with a virgin leads the man to possess her is an old myth. See for example *Der Niebelungs Lied*.

33. Sarah Kofman, *Lectures de Derrida*, 30-31.

34. "Style," 274/ 114-17.

35. As Behler points out, Derrida's attack against Heidegger is not simply one directed against his exegesis of Nietzsche, but rather against Heidegger's principle of *Wahrheit des Seins*. Derrida is reacting against Heidegger's presumption of a presence and a unity that does not tell us what this unity excludes or what this unity reduces to silence ("Nietzsche jenseits der Dekonstruktion," 94).

36. "Style," 275/115.

37. The continuity between his own thought and Heidegger's which Derrida finds in the later work, *Time and Being*, is already at least implicitly

present in the Nietzsche lectures. In these lectures there is an affinity between Heidegger's notion of conceptionless understanding and what Derrida refers to as the never-ending process of the *Ereignis* or the nonplace of the woman. Derrida does not seem aware of this connection between his own work and Heidegger's Nietzsche lectures. In his brief mention of these lectures, he follows the traditional interpretation that, for Heidegger, the will to power is exclusively a metaphysical doctrine ("Style," 274-75/113-15 and *Grammatologie*, 31). I have argued that the will to power, in the first section of the lectures, represents the attempt to overcome metaphysical thought (see chapter 2, in particular the section "Great Style: The Metamorphosis into Contradictions"). Heidegger, in these lectures, sees in the will to power an overcoming of conceptual thought, because the will to power was a constant overcoming of itself. Derrida recognizes that Heidegger shares his deep distrust of conceptual thinking, and against Derrida I would contend that Heidegger, already in some places in the Nietzsche lectures, attributes this distrust to Nietzsche as well. Heidegger's concept of a will that is capable of metamorphosing itself into its contradiction without losing itself, i.e., a finding of self in orgiastic frenzy, shares with Derrida's notion of propriation a rejection of definitive distinctions. Both Heidegger (at this one point in the Nietzsche lectures) and Derrida claim that the origins of their thought is to be found in Nietzsche.

38. Habermas summarizes the difference between Heidegger and Derrida with the help of a religious metaphor. He accuses both of creating only a mystification of easily accessible (*handgreiflicher gesellschaftler*) pathologies. Both, he claims, separate what they consider to be essential (in the case of Heidegger the search for Being, and for Derrida the process of deconstruction) for scientific analysis. Both finish with a *leerformelhaften Beschörung einer unbestimmten Autorität* (empty incantation of an undetermined authority). In Heidegger this authority takes the form of a from *Seiender verstellten Seins* (from beings misplaced Being). In Derrida, it is the authority of the lost holy writing. While I can agree, without reservation, that both Heidegger and Derrida consider their projects to be "unscientific," I do not believe that deconstruction, as Derrida understands it, aims primarily at the recovery of a "lost" text. The emphasis in Derrida's thought is on the deconstruction of the text at hand, while Heidegger emphasizes the inability to invoke Being (Jürgen Habermas, *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne* [Frankfurt am Mein: Suhrkamp, 1988], 214-16).

39. *Grammatologie*, 201.

40. Künzili writes that Derrida concentrates on *écriture* because there the gulf between sign and meaning comes across more clearly, but Derrida also believes that the structure of *écriture* also holds for speech (Rudolf E. Künzili, "Nietzsche und die Semiologie," *Nietzsche Studien*, 5 (1976): 273.

41. "Style," 273/111.

42. Kathleen Higgins makes, I think, the same point, although she phrases it somewhat differently. She argues that Nietzsche is not a postmodernist, because "his writing aims at (a) direct personally invested encounter" ("Nietzsche and Postmodern Subjectivity," *Nietzsche as Postmodernist: Essays Pro and Contra*, ed. Clayton Koelb [Albany: SUNY Press, 1990], 192).

43. *Grammatologie*, 33.

44. Nietzsche's identification with the Greeks is, like many of his evaluations, subject to change. In *Twilight of the Idols* he writes that he has taken little from the Greeks (TI, "Ancients," 2).

Chapter Five

1. Alexander Nehamas does not adequately consider these descriptions of "reality" (*die Wirklichkeit*) when he claims that for Nietzsche, the world does not possess "any features that are in principle prior to and independent of interpretation. In itself the world has no features and these can therefore be neither correctly nor wrongly represented." Although he consistently rejects the idea of truth, he often writes that we can know reality (*Nietzsche: Life as Literature* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985] 45). (All future references to this work are cited as "Nehamas".)

2. An important source for this aphorism is Nietzsche's reading of Maximilian's Drossbach's *Über die scheinbaren und die wirklichen Ursachen des Geschehens in der Welt*. See Rüdiger W. Schmidt, "Nietzsche's Drossbach-Lektüre," in *Nietzsche Studien* 17 (1988): 465-77.

3. He does mention synthetic a priori judgments in the *Nachlass*. At the time of the composition of *The Gay Science* Nietzsche writes that everything that is a priori is true for us and enables us to live. It is impossible for us to rethink this belief in a priori judgments (KSA 9, 551; 11[286]). In another note, written shortly before the composition of *Beyond Good and Evil*, we read that synthetic a priori judgments are possible, but false. The published statement that the "falsest judgments . . . are the most necessary for life" obviously is more pointed (KSA 11, 477; 34[171]). In another place he writes that a priori truths are *eingeübte Gewöhnungen des Glaubens*, without which we could not survive (KSA 11, 153; 26[12]).

4. See *The Critique of Pure Reason*, B 19. Kant also refers to reason as giving us the capacity to have access to the a priori principles of knowledge (B 24). This claim, however, that it is through reason that we have access to

these judgments, is not the same as Nietzsche's assertion that, for Kant, reason provides an explanation for the origin of a priori judgments. Kant's claim is rather that reason is the instrument by virtue of which we discover them.

5. The line appears in "The Imaginary Invalid."

6. Nehamas writes: To recognize that illusion is inevitable is "to realize that though these simplifications are necessary for us and for those like us, they are not necessary for everyone" (Nehamas, 61).

7. Nehamas, 72.

8. In the *Nachlass* there is a passage that would support part, but not all, of Nehamas's interpretation. Nietzsche writes that reality is much more complicated than our logical reconstructions of it. Logic functions like a filter; it is the *Simplifications-Apparat* through which we filter our impressions of the world (KSA 11, 504; 34[249]). This represents a different position than the one Nietzsche offers us in his published work. In *Beyond Good and Evil* the argument is not that we cannot represent the world because it is in constant flux, but rather that we cannot represent the world because it is infinitely complex.

9. It will become obvious very quickly that I disagree with Werner Stegmaier who holds that Nietzsche's views on truth do not change substantially over the course of his career. He writes: "*Die Leitlinien* (the basic ideas) of Nietzsche's argument concerning the theme of truth are consistent from 'On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense' to the late *Nachlass*, so that I, like Granier, can relinquish the task of chronologically differentiating between them." That this assumption is false will be amply documented in the course of my discussion ("Nietzsches Neubestimmung der Wahrheit," *Nietzsche Studien*, 14 [1985]: 71).

10. See Jörg Salaquarda's "Nietzsche und Lange," *Nietzsche Studien*,7 (1978): 237-53. For example Nietzsche writes, in "On Truth" that the *Ding an sich* would be a truth purely without order, incapable of being captured in words and not worth trying to reach (KSA I,879).

11. Similarly we read in the *Nachlass*, in a note written at the time of the composition of the essay (summer 1872 to the beginning of 1873), "Knowledge, rigorously considered, has only the form of a tautology and is empty" (KSA 7, 493; 19[236]).

12. See for example Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (B 103).

13. Kant, *Critique*, B 52-53.

14. On the implications of the columbarium metaphor for Nietzsche's vision of metaphors, see Sarah Kofman, *Nietzsche et la métaphor* (Paris: Galilée, 1983), 95.

15. I am not sure that this is Nietzsche's strongest argument. It seems to me to beg the question of what happens to the animals which, through lack of careful inspection, unwittingly devour poison.

16. "Nietzsche's Auf-lösung des Problems der Willensfreiheit," in *Nietzsche heute: Die Rezeption seines Werkes nach 1968*, ed. Sigrid Bauschinger, Susan L. Cocalis, and Sara Lennox (Bern: Francke, 1988), 47 (cited hereafter as "Nietzsches Auf-lösung").

17. See Müller-Lauter's "Nietzsche's Auf-lösung," 43-44.

18. A third important set of sources for Nietzsche's doctrine of necessary fictions are the unpublished notes. In the summer of 1885 Nietzsche dictated many notes that would later become part of *Beyond Good and Evil*. Among these we find several that speculate on the necessity of certain fictions. For instance Nietzsche writes that although the fiction of the subject, i.e., the "I," may be common and indispensable, that is no proof that it has not been invented. The belief can be *ein Glaube Lebensbedingung* (a belief which is a condition of life), and despite that still be false (*KSA* 598; 38[3]). The word *Lebensbedingung* appears in *Beyond Good and Evil* 4. In another note, Nietzsche claims that "truth" for him is not the opposite of error, but rather an indication of how various errors relate to one another. The "truth" is the error that is older and more deeply ingrained than the others. It is perhaps ineradicable for organic beings such as humans. We might be able to do away with other errors with the help of these ineradicable errors (KSA, 598; 38[4]).

19. This is why I believe Danto is mistaken to claim that Nietzsche advances "a pragmatic criterion of truth." Yes, Nietzsche is a pragmatist, but he does not develop a theory of truth. Nietzsche does analyze what has traditionally been called "truth" and some of those truths he finds pragmatically functional necessary fictions, but some truths are simply nonsense. Nietzsche's aim is not to replace one theory of truth with another, but to undermine the belief in absolute truth (*Nietzsche as Philosopher* [New York: Macmillan, 1965] 72). Alexander Nehamas also criticizes Danto on this point for reasons similar to mine (Nehamas, 54).

20. Again it is important to note that this is Nietzsche's Plato, or more precisely, one of Nietzsche's interpretations of Plato. This interpretation, to which I have already alluded, is elucidated in *Beyond Good and Evil* 14.

Chapter Six

1. For a recent discussion of the importance of aesthetics in the early work, see John Sallis, *Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). See also Volker Gerhardt, *Pathos und Distanz. Studien zur Philosophie Friedrich Nietzsches* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1988). Gerhardt also discusses the importance of aesthetics in Nietzsche's later works, but his analysis is in large part based on the *Nachlass*. Although he claims that for Nietzsche "art takes the place of knowledge, philosophy, and truth," he does not investigate in detail how this occurs. Instead he chooses to explore Nietzsche's concept of art (20-21). The importance of aesthetics in Nietzsche's later works has also been addressed by Alan Megill. I will discuss his interpretation in what follows, see *Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). See also Ernst Bertram *Nietzsche: Versuch einer Mythologie* (Berlin: Bondi, 1918). For a recent discussion of Nietzsche's philosophy of art, see Julian Young, *Nietzsche's Philosophie of Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

2. In the *Nachlass* Nietzsche writes that when we deny absolute truth, we must fall back on aesthetic judgments (KSA 9, 47; 11 [79]). There are a number of other places in the *Nachlass*, including many from this notebook 11, where he make similar claims. I am grateful to Müller-Lauter for having drawn my attention to this passage, as well as for his insightful reading of an early draft of this chapter.

3. There are theories that Nietzsche seems to believe must be "true"—such as that the world is constantly changing rather than fixed, or that the world consists of a multiplicity of wills constantly overcoming one another. Are these theories matters of taste or does Nietzsche believe they describe reality? And how contextually oriented are they? Would Nietzsche argue the opposite, for example, that the world is not in flux—if he thought it suited the context? It is not Nietzsche's intent simply to maintain that there is no objective knowledge. To see Nietzsche's principal project as either affirming or denying objective knowledge would be to reduce his thought to an empty formalism. The distinction between absolutism and relativism is, as Rorty notes, "a clumsy tool."—To answer my question—certain tastes do predominate in Nietzsche's thought. Still, even about beliefs as basic to Nietzsche's thought as the will to power, he writes, as I have already noted in chapter 2, "so you point out that this too is only an interpretation—so much the better" (BGE, 22). Nietzsche calls the will to power a reality that is the *Ur-faktum* (ultimate fact) of all history and then adds *man sei doch so weit gegen sich ehrlich* (if man should be, to such an extent, honest against himself)(BGE, 259). What is this honesty against onesself? It could be the

honesty to accept the will to power. But I think he is referring to the honesty of his own admission that he believes in an "ultimate fact." I have argued, in chapter 5, that, according to Nietzsche, the world impresses upon us a certain necessity. Our lives depend upon our reading stability into the world. Without certain necessary fictions, we could not survive. But the most important element in our constructing of interpretations is the moment of choice. Nietzsche's interpretations are the product of his choices, which are, in turn, based on personal preferences, i.e., the arbitrary (subjectively grounded, but not incoherent) standpoint of the recluse. See Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 44.

4. One exception, however, is the relatively scant attention paid to the new German studies of Nietzsche; in particular I am thinking of Abel, Behler, Müller-Lauter, and Salaquarda.

5. Alan Schrift, *Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 193. For a more extended discussion of this work, see my review in *Man and World*, 26 (1993): 98-102.

6. Nehamas, 4-5.

7. Ibid., 17.

8. Ibid., 18-19.

9. Ibid., 19.

10. Ibid., 19-20.

11. Ibid., 1.

12. Nehamas believes that Nietzsche was a perspectivist already at the time of the *Birth of Tragedy*. But as I have shown in chapter 5 in "On Truth" and *The Gay Science* Nietzsche speaks of truth in opposition to falsity. He grants truth an independence in these works that he no longer does in the works published after *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*.

13. Nietzsche makes this claim in *The Gay Science*, 381.

14. Nehamas, 35.

15. Ibid., 35.

16. By ending each section of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* with the words "Thus Spoke Zarathustra," Nietzsche is doing more or less what Nehamas claims would be self-defeating. Nietzsche is reminding us that these sections are the thoughts of Zarathustra—his perspective—and not absolute truth.

17. Nehamas, 230.

18. Again this is a critique based on the belief that there is an error in Nehamas's reasoning that Nietzsche would not have overlooked.

19. Nehamas, 3.

20. Ibid., 79.

21. Ibid., 80.

22. KSA 12, 299-300; 7 [15] and 316-17; 7[62]. KSA 13, 234; 14 [31] and 257; 14[79]. The principal section is one from the spring of 1888: "In the real world, where, by all means, everything is linked and conditioned (*bedingt*), it means that to condemn or obliterate any thing is to condemn and obliterate everything" (KSA 13, 336-38; 14 [153]). Most of these sections deal with moral problems. Nowhere does Nietzsche focus on this doctrine of interconnectedness alone. Zarathustra says, *Alles verkettet* (everything is connected), but there is no explanation given for what is meant. Nor does he mention that a change in one element would change everything else (Z, IV, 19 [10]).

23. Nehamas, 81.

24. Ibid., 104.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., 230.

28. Ibid., 83.

29. Ibid., 136.

30. Ibid., 191.

31. Ibid., 90.

32. Ibid., 38-39.

33. Ibid., 137.

34. Ibid., 4-5.

35. Gianni Vattimo has pointed out that "nothing is more difficult, in effect, than to identify in contemporary philosophy a 'Nietzschean School' even though his thought has had a great deal of influence" (*Introduction à Nietzsche*, trans. Fabieene Zanussi [Brussels: De Boeck-Wesmael, 1991] 12).

36. Megill writes that the romantics longed for a "knowledge that did not proceed along the killing path of mediation, the path of analysis and concepts. Nietzsche accepts this longing for immediacy, this suspicion of the analytical mind" (36). Nietzsche is committed to immediacy, but only in the sense of feeling an unrequitable longing for it. He values art because it is nonconceptual (37). The major difference Megill sees between the romantics and Nietzsche, on this point, is that whereas the romantics believe "art actually could penetrate to the truth of things . . . Nietzsche denies any such possibility. In Nietzsche's view art is a vehicle not of truth, but illusion" (ibid.).

37. The role that citation, or the reworking of the past, plays in Nietzsche's creation of values is something that, in my opinion, Rorty, among others has not fully appreciated. Rorty writes that for Nietzsche the triumphant life demands escaping from the traditional descriptions and finding new ones. Nietzsche, according to my reading, is very aware of the extent to which the new is a reworking of the past. See *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 29.

38. Megill claims that Nietzsche's Zarathustrian mind "cuts itself off from arguments with other minds, stopping at the level of the assertorial 'this is so'. . . . The Zarathustrian mind is a mind so convinced of the correctness of its vision that it seeks only to work out the implications of that vision, not to establish its grounds. Relating to actuality only aesthetically, it stands as an absolute to itself, naively self-confident, delighting in its own free play, which it seeks without further justification" (63). Although Megill is correct that Nietzsche's views are "grounded" in his personal tastes, Nietzsche in no way cuts himself off from others of opposing views. His writings are not mere tirades about what he believes, rather they are an extensive dialogue with the "idols" of Western culture. As we have seen, Nietzsche writes that going down to study the heard is an odius, but necessary, task for the noble spirits. Nietzsche provides prolonged justifications for his views. For example, he develops at considerable lengths his reasons for calling Socrates decadent in *Twilight of the Idols*.

39. The German word that I am translating as "rape" is *vergewaltigt*. Kaufmann translates it "violate," but his is not the standard translation of the word.

40. In the *Genealogy of Morals* and *Twilight of the Idols* the "Pathos der Distanz" is also mentioned , but in both these cases it refers only to the distance between slave and master (GM, II, 10), (TI, "Raids," 37).

41. Most of the sections in this section of *Ecce Homo* ("Why I write such good books") underwent extensive revision, but this section on style did not.

42. *Pathos und Distanz*, 35.

43. Müller-Lauter has done considerable work on this problem of the conflict between yes-saying and the destruction of previously held values. He has, however, handled the problem on the level of the *Übermensch*. To what extent Zarathustra's and Nietzsche's solution to this problem corresponds with the *übermenschliche* solution, I find it difficult to judge. See his *Nietzsche seine Philosophie der Gegensätze und die Gegensätze seiner Philosophie*, chapter 6 and 186-87.

44. These two quotes are self-quotations from *Zarathustra* III, "Before the Sunrise."

45. This is a perspective supported by the context in which these cited passages are originally found in the section "Before the Sunrise" from *Zarathustra*. Comparing himself to the sky, in particular drawing a comparison between his expansive character and the expansiveness of the sky, Zarathustra claims he hates nothing more than the clouds and everything else that stains the sky. Zarathustra is angry with the clouds, the "predatory-cats," which take from him and the sky that which they have in common: "the immense and unlimited yes and amen saying." Zarathustra's "yes-saying" is not unlimited if the predatory cats can sometimes take it from him. Or, to say the same thing in another way, Zarathustra's yes-saying, rather than an accomplished fact, is a continual effort; not, as we saw in our examination of the eternal return, the superficial chatter of his animals, but rather a travail, not entirely of the negative, but not divorced from it either.

46. Thomas Bernhard in *Wittgensteins Neffe* has another perspective on the consequences of having too much in one's head. He writes that Nietzsche, like his friend Paul Wittgenstein, was constantly throwing his *Denkvermögen* out the window in his head. But the problem with Paul Wittgenstein and with Nietzsche is that the more they through out, the more their spiritual capacity grew: "Sie werfen immer mehr Geistesvermögen zum Fenster (ihres Kopfes) hinaus und es wird gleichzeitig in ihrem Kopf immer mehr und naturgemäss immer bedrohlicher und schliesslich kommen sie mit dem Hinauswerfen ihres Geistesvermögens (aus ihrem Kopf) nicht mehr nach und der Kopf hält das sich fortwährend in ihrem Kopf vermehrende und in diesem ihrem Kopf aufgestaute Geistesvermögen nicht mehr aus und explodiert. So ist Pauls Kopf ganz einfach explodiert, weil er mit dem Hinauswerfen seines Geistesvermögens (aus seinem Kopf) nicht mehr nachgekommen ist. So ist auch Nietzsches Kopf explodiert." They continually throw more of their spiritual capacity out the window (of their head) and, at the same time, in their head, it increases, and naturally becomes more threatening and finally they cannot keep up with the throwing out of their spiritual capacity (from their head) and the head can no

longer hold the persisting, growing (in their head), piling up spiritual capacity, and explodes. This is how Paul's head very simply exploded because he could not keep up with the throwing out of his spiritual capacity (out of his head). This is also how Nietzsche's head exploded (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1987) 39.

47. He makes this claim quite often. For example at the end of *Twilight of the Idols* he calls himself the god's last boy—the teacher of the eternal return (TI, "Ancients," 5). See also BGE, 295, and the preface to *Ecce Homo*, section 2.

48. Much of my thinking on tragedy and Nietzsche's conception of tragedy has been inspired by my discussions with Ruprecht whose book includes a chapter on Nietzsche and tragedy. In particular he has helped me to appreciate the wealth of Nietzsche's definition of tragedy as it is found here in *Twilight of the Idols*.

49. This is a description of Plato quite different from the one that I have often quoted from *Beyond Good and Evil* 14 where Plato is said to have a noble manner of thought taking its pride from remaining master of the senses.

50. That Nietzsche is not an idealist in the traditional sense of the word is made clear in many places in his work. See for example *The Anti-Christ* 8.

51. One can see how much Nietzsche's estimations can change in the course of a single work by comparing what Nietzsche writes here about Epicureanism with that which he wrote earlier, in particular I am thinking of *Beyond Good and Evil* 7. There may not be any contradiction between maintaining that Epicurus was "the old school teacher from Samos" who wrote *against Plato* out of "anger and ambition," and maintaining that Epicureanism is one of the "finest forms of costumes" and "a brave taste raised to the level of a show" (*zur Schau getragene Tapferkeit des Geschmacks*) (BGE, 270), but there is at least an enormous difference in tone.

52. Does this aphorism lend credence to the theory that Nietzsche expresses his true opinions in the literary remains? In my opinion Nietzsche is not principally concerned (as in BGE 270 and 278) with the problem of how to protect the finer spirits. Here Nietzsche is emphasizing the pragmatic reasons to wear masks. Both Nietzsche's published works and the literary remains fail to match the multiplicity of the world.

53. This point is also brought out in *Twilight of the Idols* where Nietzsche writes that "language, it seems, is only for what is average, the mean and the transmittable" ("Raids," 26).

Chapter Seven

1. Also in *The Genealogy of Morals,* Nietzsche extols the virtue of egoism and denigrates the value of sympathy, claiming that it was Schopenhauer's extolling of the "unegotistical" (*Unegoistischen*) that lead to his nihilism (GM, "Preface," 5).

2. In the *Nachlass* Nietzsche writes of the necessity to shape future men through breeding and annihilation of millions of degenerates (KGW VII/2:25). I am indebted to Peter Heller's article, "Concerning the Nietzsche Cult and Literary Cults Generally" for this reference. Heller attaches no significance to the fact that Nietzsche did not publish this note. In *Beyond Good and Evil* the noble individual is detached from the "need" to sacrifice. Great individuals are, in the section that Heller quotes from the *Nachlass,* forced by the energy that drives them to sacrifice these masses. In both cases great individuals are ones who do not suffocate on pity *Nietzsche: Literature and Values,* eds., Volker Dürr, Reinhold Grimm, and Kathy Harms (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 201, 215.

3. This kind of talk was, unfortunately, all too common in the nineteenth century. Marx and Engels, in their private correspondence, also spoke of the need to sacrifice masses of people.

4. In general, Nietzsche is despairing of military power. At one point he does suggest that it would be of great benefit to the spiritual life of Europe if it were forced to band together to face a threat from Russia. This would bring an end to the "long drawn-out comedy of its splinter states" (BGE, 208).

5. That the early Nietzsche considered cultural superiority unrelated to or even inversely related to military conquest, is something that Ruprecht has pointed out to me. In the *Nachlass* from the spring and summer of 1875 Nietzsche writes that the political defeat of Greece is the greatest catastrophe of culture, for it was at the origin of the idea that culture requires one to put on boxing gloves and to be armed to the teeth. Sparta spoiled Greece by forcing it to concentrate entirely on politics (KSA 8, 64; 5 [91]).

6. I would not maintain, as Gerhard Schweppenhäuser does, in his recently published book, *Nietzsches Überwindung der Moral,* that Nietzsche's critique of morality shows that "all historical events are accidental and become (in Nietzsche's thought) accidental appearances (*Erscheinung*) of an unhistorically conceived essence." This would imply that the will to power is fundamental in a way that I believe Müller-Lauter, among others, has shown that it is not (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neuman, 1988), 75.

7. Alan Megill also makes this point. He writes: "For it is clear that human history could indeed come to an end. It could do so with frightening speed and viciousness. The 'end of history' is a practical possibility: the technology that would bring about such an end is already in place" (*Prophets of Extremity* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985], 347).

8. Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Necessity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 63. All future references to this work will be made parenthetically in the text.

9. This is a description that Habermas uses to explain what Rorty is doing, which Rorty quotes and accepts.

10. Rorty modifies this statement, at one point by giving a small social function to the private self-definition. The only role that the constant redefinition of self plays in liberal society, according to Rorty, is in "accommodating the ironist's private sense of identification with her liberal hopes" (68).

11. Claude Pavur has written on reading Nietzsche as a humanist. The discussions that I have had with him are always stimulating, but they have been particularly helpful on this point. See his unpublished dissertation (Emory University, 1991).

12. Here again Pavur has been extremely helpful. He covers this issue extensively in his dissertation.

INDEX

N

T

U

V

W

Y

Z