

EDMUND HUSSERL
COLLECTED WORKS

VOLUME I

PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF THE SCIENCES

EDMUND HUSSERL

PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF THE SCIENCES

THIRD BOOK

IDEAS PERTAINING TO A
PURE PHENOMENOLOGY AND
TO A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY

TRANSLATED BY

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TRANSLATIONS PREPARED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE
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CONTENTS

TRANSLATORS' INTRODUCTION

vii

HISTORICO-CRITICAL FOREWORD

xiii

CHAPTER ONE: THE DIFFERENT REGIONS OF REALITY

1

- §1. Material thing, material perception, material natural science (physics). 1
- §2. Animate organism, apprehension of animate organism, and somatology. 4
 - a) The specific determinations of animate organism. 4
 - b) The science of the animate organism: somatology. 7
- §3. The delimitation of somatology and psychology. 9
- §4. "Communities" as seen by natural science. 17

CHAPTER TWO: THE RELATIONS BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

19

- §5. The relationship of phenomenology to the sciences. 19
- §6. The ontological foundation of the empirical sciences. 21
- §7. Regional concepts and "generic" concepts. 22
- §8. Rational psychology and phenomenology — experimental psychology. 33
- §9. The significance of phenomenological description for the realm of experience. 46
- §10. Relation of phenomenology to the writings of Bolzano, Lotze, and Brentano. 49
- §11. Differences in the relations of physics and psychology to their ontological foundations. The significance of description in both sciences. 51
- §12. Further clarification of the relationship of rational psychology and phenomenology. 60

CHAPTER THREE: THE RELATIONSHIP OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY

65

- §13. The field of phenomenological research. 65

§14.	Inclusion of the ontologies in phenomenology.	66
§15.	The significance of ontological findings for phenomenology and the difference of attitude in the two sciences.	67
§16.	Noema and essence.	73
§17.	Significance of ontological concepts for psychology.	77

CHAPTER FOUR: THE METHOD OF CLARIFICATION 80

§18.	The dogmatic sciences' need for clarification.	81
§19.	Clarification of the conceptual material.	83
a)	Logical-formal concepts.	84
b)	Regional concepts.	84
c)	Material particularizations.	84
§20.	Making distinct and making clear.	86

SUPPLEMENTS 91

TEXT-CRITICAL NOTES ON THE SUPPLEMENTS 93

SUPPLEMENT I: TRANSITION FROM BOOK II TO BOOK III 94

§1.	The constitution of the psyche (Empathy).	94
§2.	Realizing apprehension of the pure Ego.	99
§3.	First indication of the necessary distinction of natural-scientific and cultural-scientific attitude.	102
§4.	The connection of psyche and animate organism.	103
a)	The animate organism as localization-field of the sensations.	104
b)	The animate organism as organ of volition.	106
f)	The constitutive role of the movement-sensations in comparison with other sensations and the relation between the constitution of animate organism and of physical thing.	107
§5.	Solipsistic and intersubjective experience.	112
§6.	Significance of the problem of constitution; phenomenology and ontology.	116

SUPPLEMENT II, TO P. 9. PERSONAL EGO AND ANIMATE ORGANISM. 119

SUPPLEMENT III, TO P. 15. IDENTITY OF THE PHYSICAL THING AND IDENTITY OF THE PSYCHE. 120

SUPPLEMENT IV, TO §7-9. TYPE — EMPIRICAL CLASSIFICATION. 121

INDEX 128

TRANSLATORS' INTRODUCTION

There is no author's introduction to *Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences*,¹ either as published here in the first English translation or in the standard German edition, because its proper introduction is its companion volume: *General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*.² The latter is the first book of Edmund Husserl's larger work: *Ideas Toward a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, and is commonly referred to as *Ideas I* (or *Ideen I*). The former is commonly called *Ideen III*. Between these two parts of the whole stands a third: *Phenomenological Investigations of Constitution*,³ generally known as *Ideen II*. In this introduction the Roman numeral designations will be used, as well as the abbreviation *PFS* for the translation at hand.

In many translation projects there is an initial problem of establishing the text to be translated. That problem confronts translators of the books of Husserl's *Ideas* in different ways. The *Ideas* was written in 1912, during Husserl's years in Göttingen (1901-1916). Books I and II were extensively revised over nearly two decades and the changes were incorporated by the editors into the texts of the *Husserliana* editions of 1950 and 1952 respectively. Manuscripts of the various reworkings of the texts are preserved in the Husserl Archives, but for those unable to work there the only one directly available for *Ideen II* is the reconstructed one. A new edition of *Ideen I* has been published, however, in which the original text and the revisions and notes are separated in two volumes.⁴

¹Edmund Husserl: *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes Buch: Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften*. (Cited as *Ideen III*) Edited by Marly Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952. (*Husserliana V*).

²Edmund Husserl: *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*. (Cited as *Ideen I*) Edited by Walter Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950. (*Husserliana III*). *Ideas Toward a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*. Translated by W.R. Boyce Gibson. New York: Macmillan, 1931; Collier, 1962, and reprints.

³Edmund Husserl: *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*. (Cited as *Ideen II*). Edited by Marly Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952. (*Husserliana IV*).

⁴See the editors' introductions to *Husserliana III* and *IV*, cited above. Also see the editor's introduction to the new edition of *Ideen I*. *Husserliana III/1*. Edited by Karl Schuhmann. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.

The text of *PFS* has had a different history. Although written in 1912 and not published until 1952, it received almost no revision and was incorporated unchanged into all later versions of the whole work. Translators of *Ideen III* therefore face no problems of textual criticism in order to establish the text to be translated. There is only one, and it is readily available in the *Husserliana* volume edited by Marly Biemel. We did, however, compare it with the original text in the Husserl Archives.

Although text-critical work is not demanded in the case of *PFS*, there is a need for historical criticism. For this, see the historical foreword of this translation by Guy Van Kerckhoven.

In addition to the historico-critical considerations on the historical foreword we wish to comment briefly on the structure of the text.

The train of thought of *PFS* begins with the different regions of reality: material things, animate organisms, and psyches or psychic egos. Each is a distinct type of experienced object, correlated a priori with a typical way of experiencing. Out of this apriori correlation arises in each case a distinct science or family of sciences. This is the first stage of reduction to foundations. Out of the first and third arise physical science and psychology. There is no difficulty in following Husserl here, but out of the second correlation the science of somatology is said to arise, and we know of no such science as such. Husserl recognizes that and discusses the reasons. Even so, we know the natural sciences that deal with animate organisms, such as biology and physiology and zoology. Husserl encountered a problem which he did not solve in this text in regard to the relation of the plant sciences to those of animate organisms. His solution to the relations of the other sciences to each other in terms of the role of sensations may be the clue to this problem's solution or it may be the problem blocking one. There is no discussion of the social-cultural sciences or the humanities in *PFS* for it is restricted to the general region of "reality" or material or natural things in causal interdependence, in contrast to the region of "ideality."

This starting point links the 1912 text with what are often considered later developments in Husserl's thought. He is clearly following an ontological way here in developing his foundationalism, and the advantages of that way are evident here. Further the option of beginning with a formal ontology or logic or with a material ontology or logic or with the ontology of the life-world in this way receives a clarification in practice here. In a sense, and especially when the dependence of *PFS* on the constitution studies of *Ideen II* are taken into account, the analyses begin with the sciences under

discussion and then turn to their formal and material ontologies and logics. However, they do not stop there as if they were the final foundations but turn to the most fundamental ontology and logic, those of the life-world. The term "*Lebenswelt*" or "life-world" does not appear in this text, but the first few sections make it clear that the regions of the sciences are founded upon regions of lived-experience, the life-world.

The train of thought thus begins with the different regions of reality as they are approached in the attitude distinctive of natural sciences, then takes a different approach via a new phenomenological attitude which focuses on the correlation of experienced and experiencing within lived experience itself as a foundation of the sciences. The constitutive rules which account for the necessary and universal structures of this lived experience are the deeper foundation of the sciences. The first set of problems thus focuses on the relations of the sciences to each other, and these are "founding" relations, as well as the relations of the sciences to their foundations in experience.

The title of the second chapter seems to indicate a narrowing of focus to one of the sciences, psychology, and much of the chapter is devoted to several psychologies. Nevertheless, the train of thought does not completely abandon the other sciences here. The problem guiding the analyses is that of the relation of the sciences to their ontologies, and to a lesser extent their logics. These are eidetic sciences and to an extent they are foundational for the empirical sciences. Just as "sensation" is the key to Husserl's solutions to the problems of the relations of the regions and their sciences to each other, so here the key is the different senses and uses of "description."

The third chapter brings the relation of phenomenology and ontology into focus. Transcendental phenomenology is also an eidetic discipline, but Husserl takes great care to distinguish it from logic and ontology in a positive sense. Ontologies are like empirical sciences in that they posit their objects, deal with actualities, and are one-sided or focused only on the objects to be explained and not on their constitution in lived-experience. Phenomenology turns to the ultimate foundations in the necessary and universal structures of lived-experience.

The method of clarification is presented in the fourth chapter as the distinctive way in which phenomenology deals with the sciences and the problem of their foundations. Here we return to the sort of investigation begun in the first chapter with regard to the regional concepts and extend them to the rest of the concepts of the sciences. Fresh insights are to be had here into the difficult issues of found-

dations, presuppositions, essences, types and degrees of evidence, and even a look ahead to genetic constitution.

Readers familiar with the exemplary English translations of Husserl's works by Dorian Cairns will readily recognize our debt to his translations and to his *Guide for Translating Husserl*.⁵ For example, we have followed his lead in translating Husserl's "ego" as "ego" and his "Ich" as "I". The use of upper and lower case letters also provides the reader a way of knowing whether the original term is Latin or German in the case of "Intuition" ("Intuition" in English) and "Anschauung" ("intuition"), and in the case of "objektiv" ("Objective") and "gegenständlich" ("objective"). Whether or not any point of interpretation depends on the difference we leave to the reader to decide. Some people will object to our translation of "Anschauung" by "intuition," but Husserl's use of this term interchangeably with "Intuition" in this text seems to justify our decision. In reading a work like this one a reader must determine the sense of such terms peculiar to it. Furthermore, terms like "anschaulich" ("intuitively") are unmanageable with most alternatives.

The expression "des Zuständlichen" in Section 9 has been translated as "the statal." The German word "Zustand" commonly means either "state" or "condition," and since "conditional" has a more common meaning that is not proper here we have used the same form with "state," that is, "statal." A different sort of decision was made in the case of "Eindeutung" beginning with its first use in Section 2. We simply kept the German word in brackets and translated it as "interpretation." It is an unusual word, one Husserl abandoned later for "Einführung" or "empathy." The term here used is significant for understanding the approach he was taking in 1912 to the difficult problems of intersubjectivity.

The frequent occurrence of "Leib" in this text presented a special problem. It would be most natural, and make for a more readable English text, to translate it simply as "body." We followed Cairns, however, and translated it as "animate organism" in most cases, because in English "body" includes both the German "Leib" and "Körper" and probably "Ding" as well. Husserl is careful in the first section to distinguish "Leibhaftigkeit" from "Körperhaftigkeit" and from "Dinghaftigkeit," and we have tried to preserve his emphasis on the *animate* organism in distinguishing somatology from physics.

⁵Dorian Cairns: *Guide to Translating Husserl*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.

Wesen has been translated as "essence" although the presence of diverse uses of that term in English-language philosophical writing creates a problem. It created one in German too, and Husserl acknowledges it but uses the term anyway. A careful reader will diligently try to discern Husserl's distinctive sense of the term from the text. It means a typical way of being experienced (noematic essence) or of experiencing (noetic essence). In view of Husserl's use of the almost synonymous "*Eidos*," which we have translated as "eidos," we think it best to use "essence" and urge readers to avoid assuming that he means what other thinkers have meant by the term. His sixteenth section on "Noema and Essence," and other discussions in *PFS* go a long way toward clarifying his concept.

The words "*Erflehen*" and "*Erfahrung*" present a distinct problem. We have translated the former as "lived-process" following Cairns and the latter as "experience." "Lived-process" puts the stress on experiencing which is where Husserl's term puts it in German, while "experience" is just as ambiguous between "experienced" and the whole of "experience" as Husserl's German word. The difference should be clear enough from the context, or at least as clear in translation as in the original.

Following what we believe to be the policy of the Husserl Archives, we have attempted to translate as literally as English idiom and syntax will allow, rather than to render the text more readable by paraphrase and interpretation. Our aim has been to preserve not only the substance of the original but, within reasonable limits, its structure and style as well. Thus we do not see our task as one of improving upon Husserl's writing, but simply as one of faithfully making his text available to readers of English.

We offer here, in addition to the main text of *PFS*, a translation of the Supplements (*Beilagen*) which are found in the *Husserliana* edition of *Ideen III*. The first of these supplementary texts should be valuable to students who do not have access to *Ideen II*. Those interested in Husserl's development of a "genetic" phenomenology will be interested in §6 of this Supplement. The remarks there relate "genetic" to "kinetic" method, which is mentioned at the beginning of *PFS*. Notes on the supplementary texts are given just preceding the texts themselves.

We are especially grateful to the Husserl Archives of Louvain, under the direction of Samuel Ijsseling, for assistance and encouragement in our project. In addition, we acknowledge gladly our debt to Reto Parpan and his colleagues at the Archives who read the translation

and made valuable suggestions. Earlier drafts of it were also read by James Street Fulton, David Carr and Jeffner Allen. An earlier translation of Chapter Four, which appeared in *The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* in a special Husserl Issue, was read by J.N. Mohanty. Each reader made valuable suggestions and pointed out passages where further work was needed. In all cases, of course, the use we made of their generous assistance is our responsibility.

Part of the work of translation brought to fruition here was done in Paris, where we were able to use the resources of the Husserl Archives there and Paul Ricoeur's personal library. We are grateful to him, to his assistant at the Archives, Dorian Tiffeneau, and to her colleague, Mireille Delbraccio for their kindness and help. Dorian Tiffeneau is preparing a French translation of *Ideen III*.

The Texas Christian University Research Foundation provided us with a travel grant that helped to make this work possible.

Our text was typed and retyped with great care and skill by Jan Stone, Sally Bohon, and Julie Barker and we are grateful to them.

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HISTORICO-CRITICAL FOREWORD

In 1952, there appeared consecutively in the series *Husserliana* (Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke), under the title *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*¹ and *Drittes Buch: Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften*,² the texts Husserl conceived of as the sequel to the *Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*.³ The latter being the only "book" of the *Ideas* that Husserl published in his lifetime, and that in 1913, together with Alexander Pfänder's *Zur Psychologie der Gesinnungen (Erster Artikel)*, inaugurated the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*.⁴ In fact, the introduction⁵ which Husserl allowed to precede the first book explicitly promised a second and third "book" of the *Ideas*, and, at the same time, gave a short description of their contents.⁶ Nevertheless, that which appeared in 1952 as the second and third book of the *Ideas* agreed only in part with this table of contents. Responsible for this change, were the years of work Husserl had devoted to the continuation of the project of the *Ideas*, during which he was aided by his assistants Edith Stein and Ludwig Landgrebe.

The text, translated here for the first time into English by Klein and Pohl, reproduces those texts which comprise the main text

¹Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution* (Husserliana Band IV), Ed. Marly Biemel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952).

²Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes Buch. Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften* (Husserliana Band V), Ed. Marly Biemel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952).

³Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie* (Husserliana Band III), Ed. Walter Biemel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), [new edition by Karl Schuhmann (Husserliana Band III, and III₂) The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976].

⁴Edmund Husserl, "Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie," in *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, v.1, part 1 (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1913), pp. 7-323.

⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 1-6.
⁶*Ibid.*, p. 5.

printed in Husserliana V: *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes Buch: Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften*,⁷ as well as the Supplements to the Husserliana volume. The "Nachwort," or epilogue to *Ideen I* printed in the same volume of Husserliana, is Husserl's German version of his Preface to Gibson's translation of *Ideen I*,⁸ a text accessible and well-known to English readers and so not included here. Those readers who, with this translation, encounter for the first time the entire project of the *Ideen*, will find in Karl Schuhmann's "Einleitung des Herausgebers" to *Ideen I* (Husserliana Band III/1 and III/2),⁹ as well as in his monography "Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie" in *Die Dialektik der Phänomenologie*,¹⁰ the required information regarding the origin and development of this project. Of fundamental importance for a correct understanding of the place and meaning of the translated text within the project of the *Ideen*, are Marly Biemel's historical and textual comments in Husserliana IV.¹¹ These textual comments also serve as an introduction to the fifth volume.

Between September and December 1912,¹² Husserl wrote a comprehensive manuscript that has become known as the "pencil manuscript" of the *Ideen*. The preparatory work was done in a series of shorter and, in general, preliminary drafts — the so-called "ink manuscripts" of the *Ideen* — written between the end of May and the beginning of September 1912.¹³ The pencil manuscripts of the *Ideen* formed a relatively cohesive unit, a first "major section,"¹⁴ wherein "pure or transcendental phenomenology" attempted to establish

itself as an independent science, different as well from psychology.¹⁵ A subsequent second part was to make explicit that this science could establish itself as the true, fundamental science of philosophy.¹⁶ The first time that Husserl appears to have explicitly considered a clear division within the body of the first major section between a first and second "book" of the *Ideen*,¹⁷ viz., one dealing with the method of introduction to and initiation within the field proper to phenomenology, and a second book devoted to the treatment of the group of problems which would show the true scope of the phenomenological field of investigation,¹⁸ is during the period of preparation for publication in the beginning of 1913.¹⁹ Both the first and the second books of the *Ideen* appear to have originally formed a whole in the pencil manuscript, which was drafted "in one stretch."²⁰

For the most part, the pencil drafts of the manuscript of the *Ideen*, which between September and the middle of October 1912 "were written in six weeks, without plans or supporting material, as if in a trance,"²¹ and which comprise the basic text of the first book that appeared in April 1913 in the *Jahrbuch*, have not been preserved. In contrast, the drafts from "November-December 1912"²² have been preserved, i.e., with the exception of the beginning of the manuscript (pp. "1"–"12"). Together, pages "22a"–"45"²³ along with various inserted pages, comprise the main text printed in Husserliana V: *Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften*. Of pages "13"–"22"²⁴ pages "16b"–"22"²⁵ are reproduced in Husserliana V as "Beilage I" [Supplement I].²⁶ In the original draft these pages preceded the text translated here.

⁷Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes Buch. Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften*, pp. 1–105.

⁸Edmund Husserl, *Ideen: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, Tr. W.R. Boyce Gibson (London: Allen & Unwin, 1931).

⁹Karl Schuhmann, "Einleitung des Herausgebers," in Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie* (Husserliana Band III₁), pp. xv–lvii.

¹⁰Karl Schuhmann, "Reine Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie. Historisch-analytische Monographie über Husserls *Ideen I*," in *Die Dialektik der Phänomenologie II* (Phänomenologica 57) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973).

¹¹Marly Biemel, "Einleitung des Herausgebers," in Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*, pp. xiii–xx. Cf. also Marly Biemel, *ibid.*, Appendix I, "Zur Textgestaltung," pp. 397–401.

¹²MS. K IX 1 (author's copy of the *Ideen*, from *Jahrbuch* special printing): "According to the calendar, on September 18, 1912 I was up to the phenomenological reduction," MS. F III 1/38a (old Archive number F III 1/37): "December 1912."

¹³See Husserliana III₂ (Ergänzende Texte [1912–1929]): "II: Manuscripts of Written Copies of *Ideen I*, A: Ink Manuscript."

¹⁴See *ibid.*, Beilage 6 (Plan for an Introduction to *Ideen I*, ca. July 1912), p. 532.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, Beilage 6, p. 530.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, Beilage 6, p. 532.

¹⁷Edmund Husserl, "Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Einleitung," in *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, v. I, part 1, p. 3.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁹Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, v. I, Foreword to the Second Edition, p. x.

²⁰Letter from Husserl to Arnold Metzger (dated September 4, 1919), printed in *The Philosophical Forum*, v. 21 (1963/64), p. 63.

²¹MS. F III 1/38a (old Archive number F III 1/37), on cover-page: "Elaboration of *Ideen* Book II November–December 1912."

²²MS. F III 1/39a–84a (old Archive numbers F III 1/38–83).

²³MS. F III 1/5a–36a (old Archive numbers F III 1/4–35).

²⁴MS. F III 1/12a–36a (old Archive numbers F III 1/11–35), the text begins on the last line of MS. F III 1/11b (old Archive number F III 1/10).

²⁵See Marly Biemel's critical textual comments to Beilage I in Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes Buch. Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften*, p. 164.

A fixed "Nomenklatur,"²⁷ or catalogue of subject terms, was not present in the initial pencil draft of 1912. The original "old envelope,"²⁸ which contained pages "22a"–"45", bore the title "Aesthesiologie, Psychologie, Ontologie-Phänomenologie." Indeed, it appears from the "original notes and supplementary sheets"²⁹ which were later included, that Husserl considered to change the "Nomenklatur," especially with regard to the terms 'Aesthesiologie' [aestho-physiology] and 'Somatologie' [somatology]. Thus, pages "22a"–"45" are primarily distinguished from the previous pages by their subject-matter. In the preceding pages ("1"–"22"), Husserl had firmly established, "by means of the phenomenological-kinetic method," and had examined the "phenomenological origins" of, those "fundamental distinctions" that underlie all *Weltanschauung* as such: "material thing, body, soul."³⁰ There followed the attempt to validate these distinctions over against those sciences whose thematic fields of study had been infringed upon.³¹ The pages concerning the material thing, corporeal reality and the reality of the soul form a genuine "opening chapter."³² The "Exposition of the Corresponding Sciences and Methods, Methods of Physics, Somatology, Psychology, Phenomenology, etc.," on the other hand, "formed the conclusion."³³

In the beginning of 1913, according to Husserl, "during the printing of *Ideen I*"³⁴ (first book), the original drafts written in November–December 1912 were again taken up; in particular, the introductory chapters concerning material reality [*Dingrealität*] and the realities of corporeal things and the soul. They needed to be enlarged by the analyses of spiritual reality. Together with these "Drafts Nature: Spirit,"³⁵ it also became necessary to take up and rework "some of the supplementary material to the projected text."³⁶ In 1913, as Husserl later noted, "I began the systematic

²⁷ MS. F III 1/111b (old Archive number F III 1/219).

²⁸ See MS. F III 1/2a (old Archive number F III 1/1): "22a–45 in old envelope." This envelope has been retained as MS. F. III 1/38a (old Archive number F III 1/37).

²⁹ MS. F III 1/87a ff. (old Archive number F III 1/195): "Original Notes and Supplementary Material to *Ideen II*. May contain something important."

³⁰ Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes Buch. Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften*, p. 1; cf. MS. F III 1/39a (old Archive number F III 1/38).

³¹ Ibid.

³² MS. F III 1/103a (old Archive number F III 1/211).

³³ See MS. M III 1 II 1/1: *Genesis of Ideen II*. Ludwig Landgrebe's typed text, improved and annotated by Edmund Husserl.

³⁴ Ibid., marginal note for insertion, written by Husserl.

³⁵ Ibid., marginal note for insertion, written by Husserl.

formulation of the part 'Constitution of the Spiritual World'. The preparation of a final draft never exceeded an opening fragment."³⁷ Thereafter, in the middle of April 1913, there appeared in the Introduction to the German edition of the first book of the *Ideen* the announcement of a second book, that "would deal, in a thorough manner, with some particularly important groups of problems whose systematic formulation and typical solution is the pre-condition for the possibility of clarifying the difficult relationship of phenomenology to the physical sciences, to psychology and the socio-cultural sciences [*Gesellschaftswissenschaften*] and, on the other hand, to all of the *a priori* sciences."³⁸

The "development and re-working"³⁹ of a second "book" of the *Ideen* in 1915 concerned the opening chapters. In addition to the research manuscripts, the lecture notes from 1913 and 1915 offered the possibility of elaborating upon the first chapter of the pencil draft.⁴⁰ In 1916, Edith Stein received a large manuscript together with the pencil drafts from 1912 as a "plan"⁴¹ for a "first elaboration."⁴² Folio pages 1–294,⁴³ which represent a copy of Husserl's stenographical pencil drafts of 1912 and his attempted reworking of these in 1915, are followed in pages 294–523⁴⁴ by "the theory of science's part" dealing with "Methods of Physics, Somatology, Psychology, Ontology and Phenomenology."⁴⁵ These latter pages were a copy of the concluding part of the pencil manuscript of 1912.⁴⁶ In addition to the manuscripts with the title "Nature and Spirit," Stein's second revision of *Ideen II* (second book) in 1918 also employed the pages "Concerning the Constitution of the Spiritual World,"⁴⁷ originally drafted in 1913. At this time, due probably to the magnitude which the second book had taken on, the "explanations of the theory of science" (folio pages 294–523), which Stein had

³⁷ Ibid., marginal note for insertion, written by Husserl.

³⁸ Edmund Husserl, "Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Einleitung," in *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, v. 1, part 1, p. 5.

³⁹ MS. F. III 1/103a (old Archive number F III 1/211).

⁴⁰ MS. F III 1/164a (old Archive number F III 1/87), marginal comment.

⁴¹ MS. F III 1/163a (old Archive number F III 1/86), cover-page: "[1915 my re-working and plan for Miss Stein."

⁴² MS. M III 1 I 7/1.

⁴³ MS. M III 1 I 7/1. "These pages have only been preserved in part and are found in Edith Stein's second 'Ausarbeitung,'" MS. M III 1 I 1, MS. M III 1 I 2.

⁴⁴ MS. M III 1 I 7/2–234.

⁴⁵ MS. M III 1 I 7/1.

⁴⁶ MS. M III 1 I 7/1: "from 22a of my pencil –, of my 'original manuscript.'"

⁴⁷ MS. M III 1 I 4 and MS. M. III 1 I 5.

transcribed during the first revision, were "entirely eliminated."⁴⁸ They were set aside with the note (written in blue pencil) "*Ideas III*."⁴⁹ In 1924/25 Ludwig Landgrebe drafted a typed text which, under the title "*Ideas III: The Theory of Science's Part*," represented a copy of the original pencil manuscript of 1912 (pp. "16"—"45").⁵⁰ Husserl submitted this 1924/25 typed version together with "Supplementary Material Public Spirit I and II," which was intended for the main section concerning "The Constitution of the Spiritual World," as a part still to be re-worked and not as an actual book. The paragraph titles and divisions were taken over by Landgrebe from Stein's "first elaboration."⁵¹

Thus, the reader of Klein and Pohl's translation *Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences* encounters a Husserlian text, the plans of which were in a constant state of flux between 1912 and 1925. First drafted in the pencil manuscript of the *Ideas* in 1912, then projected for inclusion with the second "book" of the *Ideas* in the beginning of 1913, it was finally withheld for a third "book." With respect to its content, however, the text underwent no essential modifications between 1912 and 1925. This, in itself, is reason enough to read this text.

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THE DIFFERENT REGIONS OF REALITY

(MATERIAL THING, ANIMATE ORGANISM, PSYCHE),
THE CORRELATIVE BASIC SORTS OF APPERCEPTION,
AND THE SCIENCES ARISING OUT OF THEM.¹

In our phenomenological-kinetic* method we have ascertained the fundamental distinction among merely material thing, animate organism, and psyche, or psychic Ego, which dominates all apprehension of the world, and we have studied it at the same time with respect to its phenomenological primal sources. As an intuitively given articulation of experienced reality it precedes all thinking, and specifically all scientifically theorizing thinking, and inasmuch as experiential thinking in general is capable of drawing its ultimate legitimizing basis from experience only by "adjusting" itself to it — and, above all, this means by binding itself to the proper sense of that which is experienced — it is thus certain from the beginning that such basically essential differentiations of objectivities that arise out of basically essential ones in the constitutive apprehension must be decisive for the separation of scientific areas and for the sense of their problematics. Let us now pursue this matter.

§1. MATERIAL THING, MATERIAL PERCEPTION,
MATERIAL NATURAL SCIENCE (PHYSICS).

First of all we have material things. However intimately — according to our analyses — the constitution of these things may be interwoven with the constitution of the other categories of reality, what gives them unity is a particular type and nexus of constitutive acts. The originally presentive act is the *material perception* (*perception of physical things*), perception of bodies. With this, a basic sort of perception is designated, fully delimited from every other sort of perception. We intentionally do not say "external perception," since the perception of animate organism, which makes up a new basic sort, could also be and would have to be so named. Then too, no one will be able to disapprove of our expression on the grounds that perception is not

⁴⁸ MS. M III 1 II 1/2.

⁴⁹ MS. M III 1 I 7/1.

⁵⁰ MS. M III 1 II 7/20–214.

⁵¹ MS. M III 1 II 7/20, Ludwig Landgrebe's "Preliminary Remarks."

¹ See also Supplement I, p. 94 ff.

*See Supplement I, second paragraph of §6. Transl.

anything material. The designation of the perception of something material as material perception is fully as justified as that of the perception of something external as external perception — which, of course, is not anything external either — and in general it is as justified as any similar and completely unavoidable naming by means of transference. Material perception is a special case of the perception of something *extensive*, to which also, of course, the *perceptions of phantoms belong*.

In the coherence of material experience the *nature* constituting itself therein is experienced in its uniform spatial-temporal-causal interconnection. Whenever this experience becomes theoretical experience and whenever it grounds theoretical thinking about nature, then material natural science arises. The Objectivity of this nature, *nature* in the first and fundamental sense, is based on *mutual understanding* of a plurality of experiencing Egos which have their *animate organisms*, animate organisms that appear to them as well as to those in agreement with them. This interweaving of material nature with animate organicity and the psychic does not hinder its independence at all. The mode of theoretical experiencing and of theoretical thought-intentions goes exclusively by way of the material apprehensions of experience. In the cognition of nature the investigator of nature is naturally there with body and soul, and not only the individual investigator of nature, but also the community of investigators to which each individual knows that he belongs. But however essential this is for the constituting of the Objectivity of nature, it is nevertheless a matter of two essentially different things: on the one hand, to mentally undergo the total apprehension of something material with all constitutive apprehensional components belonging to it essentially — among them apprehensions of the organismic-psychic — in such a way that the theoretically experiencing regard is directed, fixing and determining, toward the material being itself; and, on the other hand, to be directed theoretically towards the animate organisms and psyches, and to engage accordingly in physiological and psychological investigations — of which we shall immediately have to speak. In general, where apprehensions are founded on apprehensions and apprehensions of higher order are shaped, there one must pay attention to this possibility — grounded in the essence of complex apprehensions — of a varying “*attitude*” of the thematic regard, which, as theoretical, determines the theoretical theme, and determines it in the sense prescribed by the apprehension. Since in the apprehension-complex of the constitution of realities the experience of materiality represents

the lowest stage, which constitutes reality at all, the theoretically experiencing regard therefore strikes the material as something existent in itself, something not founded, something not presupposing something else in itself and having something else beneath itself. Material nature stands as something completely closed and preserves its closed unity and that which properly belongs to it in this closedness, not only in the mere coherence of theoretical experience, but also in that of theoretical experiential thinking, which we call, or would have to call, natural science in the usual sense, or, more precisely, material natural science. How the various levels of the cognition of nature are determined by the level by level constitution of material Objectivity with its proper sense accruing to it therein, and, in particular, how the difficult problems of the *clarification of descriptive, as opposed to explanatory, science* are to be solved, how the basically different manner of concept-formation and judgment-formation can be illuminated in both — that is a separate area of phenomenological investigation of the theory of science. We will discuss matters relating to it in another place.

Let us here point out only one thing, which must be constantly borne in mind in all cognition of reality, whether it be material or any sort whatever. According to our analyses and with regard to the essence of the experiences in which reality is constituted, the cognition of reality and the cognition of causality are inseparably one. *All science of the real is causally explanatory if it actually and in the sense of Objective validity wants to determine what the real is*. The cognition of causal relationships is not something secondary to the cognition of the real, as if the real were first of all in and for itself, and then only incidentally, as something extra-essential to its being, came into relation with other realities, having an effect upon them and being affected by them (undergoing effects), as if, accordingly, cognition could bring out and determine an essence proper to the real that would be independent of the cognition of its causal relations. The point, rather, is precisely that it is fundamentally essential to *reality* as such not to have a proper essence of *that sort* at all; rather, it is what it is only in its causal relations. It is something *fundamentally relative*, which demands its corresponding members, and only in this connection of member and corresponding member is each a “*substance*” of real properties. A *substance* that would be *alone* (in the sense that every Objective real thing is a substance) is *nonsense*. A substance in the sense of the well-known definitions of Descartes and Spinoza is therefore something fundamentally different from an Objective reality in the sense of our delimitations. On the other hand,

causality is not so readily given in the context of experience, just as, in another manner, the real itself that stands in causal relations is also not readily given. To be sure, one can, in a certain manner, always say: where there has been experiencing, *something* has been experienced, is thereby given, and given without further ado, e.g., the tree that we see. And it is given in its circumstances. But as for these latter, they lie in the total surroundings viewed along with it, and that in it which is actually a causally determining circumstance remains vague. The theoretically experiencing regard easily grasps distinctive traits in the perceived that are given in accordance with perception, and to the extent that there is consciousness of something real, there is also consciousness of causality — but completely unclear and able to be brought out and prepared and determined conceptually only by means of the theoretical experience-analysis and investigation. On the other hand, the real itself, the subject term of the real relation, is also something indeterminate; the real object is given only one-sidedly; the real state, although perceived, will be able to show itself ever more richly in the process of perceiving, if it is unchanged; in the process of its changes the property that announces itself therein will emerge ever more perfectly under real conditions belonging to it, etc. Thus, as one can see from the beginning, scientific investigation demands an ever-renewed penetration into the real-causal connections. What methods are required in order to obtain Objectively valid judgments about reality (and what conditions must be prescribed in the essence of experience itself for the possibility of such judgments) — to discuss this in a theme all to itself. We have been concerned only to achieve clarity on why causal investigation plays such a dominant role in sciences of reality and why there is therefore so much to be said about causality in our further discussions as well.

<5>

§2. ANIMATE ORGANISM, APPREHENSION OF ANIMATE ORGANISM, AND SOMATOLOGY.

a) *The specific determinations of animate organism.*

A second fundamental sort of apprehension, one that constitutes its object as object of the second level, is the *apprehension of animate organism*. It is a new fundamental sort considering the basically different way in which the uppermost stratum of the animate organism's objectivity, the specific stratum of animate organism, is constituted in contrast with everything that concerns the material of the animate organism.

With this there cohere as correlates (apriori, naturally) the designated essential differences between material determinations of animate organism and the specifically animate-organismic ones. To this stratum belong the really uniform *sense fields* in their states of sensation that change according to real circumstances belonging to them. First of all, those fields which actually show in an immediately intuitive way the form of *localization* constitutive for this sort of realization, i.e., above all, the tactual field as the primal field, inasmuch as it has the first, fundamental localization, and the fields stratified upon it, e.g., the hot-cold field (I do not say temperature field, because temperature is a concept belonging to physics that has no business here). In further sequence *every* sense field and every essentially closed sensation group acquires a realizing connection to the animate organism, showing different sides of its real sensitivity and making up different strata of sensation contexts belonging really to it. Thus I can, e.g., recognize my *visual field* as a continuously, incessantly — even if variably — fulfilled visual spread (by disregarding all objective apprehensions that build themselves on it and by virtue of which I see a physical-objective field and know it in a certain appearance), and I can recognize this lasting unity in contexts of experience and thought as belonging to the animate organism, and more precisely as belonging to this retina, as a whole corresponding in its inner order as a spread to the two-dimensional order of the places in the retina. I can then pursue the interconnections coming to cognition through experience and thought between the stimulatory system of the retina, according to the co-extensive ordering (whereby, as with all localization, it is not a matter of the actual spatial form, but only of the coherent integrating in the sense described by the analysis of the situation) and the system of the visual sensations as consequences of stimulation, according to the ordering of the field itself.

In this manner, which is mediated by thinking, I cannot, of course, see the visual field on the retina, but can apprehend it as belonging to it analogously to the way I apprehend the tactual field as belonging to the touch-sensitive surface of the animate organism. Thus, the *universe of sensations* (of the sensuous impressions) of every Ego receives a relationship to the animate organism and to its parts characterized thereby precisely as "sense organs" and itself becomes something animate-organismic, but not material. All the amplifications that possible experience *can* take on in the same regard are tied to the sense already given beforehand through the apprehension of animate organism, and this sense is laid down by *perceived* animate organicity

<6>

with *perceived* localization. And what is localizable is not just anything and everything, but rather it is predelineated according to essence, Sensuous pain, sensuous desire can spread out; therefore they are localizable as they can be perceived factually in localization. Visual sensations are spread out in a field; they are fundamentally localizable, although, in the essence-type of animate organicity that can be inspected in the human animate organism, the possibility of the perception of localized visual sensation is excluded or, empirically speaking, is lacking in us humans. Human animate organism, however, is with regard to essence a particularization of animate organism generally, and in this generality it is evident that the basic condition for the possibility of localization lies in being spread out and that thereby every species of sensation that offers itself mediately or immediately in the manner of being spread out could be perceivable as localized. But that which is organismically connectable is still further amplified by the fact that even what does not fulfill this condition can be proper to the animate organism as really dependent through a fixed correspondence to the parts of the animate organism, to the extent that, with material changes of that part of the animate organism concerned, other real circumstances remaining constant, corresponding changes are continually experienceable on the part of that which is dependent, which is functionally dependent precisely by virtue of this. The apprehension as localization is then not possible, of course; but it does become a similitude.

As for the relationship of the animate organism to the material substratum, different variations are possible. The animate organism can include in itself material parts that can be removed without its remaining an animate organism. But it is also possible for it to remain animate organism with the removal of material parts, and even not to lose all its fields of sensation. Likewise, the animate organism can grow larger.

If I cut off a fingernail or my hair, or if it grows back again, then the animate organism loses something, or it acquires something. It also gains if I take a stick or a tool in hand, likewise by means of clothes. A *tool* is an enlargement of the animate organism, namely, when it is "in use." It is not only an enlargement of the sensing animate organism, but also of the animate organism as *organ of will*. In the fields of sensation that already belong to the animate organism sensation-changes of a content occur that do not occur without the enlargement. In the field of volition, free movements and changes occur that otherwise do not occur. In the fundamentals nothing is thereby changed.

b) *The science of the animate organism: somatology.*

Theoretical investigation can now turn to this realm of being; the perception and experience of animate organism — somatology, as we say — can be that which adopts the mode of theoretical experience and determines theoretical thinking. Since the specifically somatological is not a separate reality, but rather a higher stratum of being that is built upon material reality, the theoretical experience and cognition of the somatic being also requires material experience and corresponding material cognition. But the latter belongs, logically speaking, in material natural science. Therefore, when we call the science of animate organicity somatology, it is material science to the extent that it investigates the material properties of the animate organism. But to the extent that it is specific somatology, it is something new, something distinguished by a new basic form of experience. But if one looks at it more closely, this double position applies to all zoological sciences, e.g., the physiology of man and of the brutes. They are natural sciences in the narrower sense, with regard to the materiality of the animate beings; they are somatology to the extent that they systematically establish relationships to the spheres of sensation in the physiology of the sense organs and the nervous system (which is better called the doctrine of the feelings of the animate organism). Obviously the somatological experimental apprehension predominates here, and without it nothing somatological whatever can be found or indirectly reconstructed. The foundation is finally the direct *somatic perception* that every empirical investigator can effect only on his own body and then the somatic interpretation [*Eindeutung*]* that he performs in the interpretive apprehension of perceived alien animate organisms as such, and performs in a manner which lends to this interpretation the character of an *experience* that may confirm itself through further similar empirical apprehensions and positings, may determine itself more precisely, and perhaps rectify itself — in short, legitimate itself. In the larger sense of the word one can in the case of these interpretations [*Eindeutungen*] even speak of, perceptions, to the extent that the consciousness of personal self-presence characterizes the perception and to the extent that, in the perception of an alien animate organism with the consciousness of the alien animate body's own presence, we also have a certain secondary consciousness of presence in person with

*Translator's note: Husserl uses the unusual word *Eindeutung* here. We have inserted it into the text to call the reader's attention to its occurrence, even though we have translated it simply as "interpretation."

- <9> regard to the interpreted [*ingedeuteten*] moments — a consciousness, of course, such that upon closer examination it shows itself not as a genuine originary being-given, but only as a being-given by means of a kind of representation. In any case, it is not entirely without reason that we say we see a brute or a human being, that we thereby "see on" it its pain when pricked, its sensuous pleasure while eating, and thus also everything specifically psychic. Such acts belong to the sphere of experience and not to the mere reproduction of experiences, such as memories. We refer the reader, by the way, to the more detailed presentations of the essence of interpretation [*Eindeutung*]. According to this presentation, therefore, the whole doctrine of sensation dealt with by physiology and psychology forms a unity with all the well-known doctrines concerning the various peculiarities of the sense regions in their dependence on the sense organs and sense centers as well as on the nature of the physiological sense stimuli, a unity which, with the corresponding doctrines of "affective sensations," of sensations in the broadest sense, belongs to somatology. What is investigated thereby is animate organicity in the sense of somatological experience, the real property-stratum of sensitivities that belongs to the animate organism as such, which sensitivities make themselves known in the original feelings and generally in the sense fields as sets of states of the *soma*. We should also mention here the reason why we have not mentioned general biology, and specifically not botany. The obvious kinship between brute and plant that thrusts itself to the fore and brings with it so many parallel and closely related problems in carrying out investigations directed at plant "life" and brute materiality, i.e., brings with it from this side a unity of the natural sciences (with regard to zoology as the natural science of animate material body), does not go so far that a definite interpretation of the plant as an animate organism has become possible (and ultimately as an animate organism for something psychic in the full sense), which interpretation could have posed its definite somatological problems, as is the case first with the higher brutes and then, pursuing the sequence of levels of the brutes, also with the lower ones. The universal and completely indefinitely performed empathy that permits the analogy is not enough for the investigator; he needs concrete experience of concrete sensitivities related to concrete organs, where-by the analogy of the plant organs with brute-animal ones, to which well-known sensitivities belong according to experience, must be broad enough to ground the probability of the interpretation. If this is lacking, then the treatment of botany as a material natural science suffices — or rather, no other treatment then is possible. It would

therefore not exclude plants' having sensitivities after all; it only means that we would be incapable of recognizing them, because there is lacking any bridge of empathy and of mediately determined analysis. But I only wanted here to be as accommodating as possible to the prevailing field of physiological botany and biology in general, and I leave open the question whether interpretive experience cannot play — or whether in fact it is not playing — its fruitful role after all, as it undoubtedly does in zoology, although here, too, this is often not appreciated.

§3. THE DELIMITATION OF SOMATOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY.

The separation that we have performed here under the title "Somatology" is a completely natural one; it encompasses a class of investigations as radically as is conceivable in the case of a science, namely, by means of a basic form of experience and experiential objectivity. Nevertheless it is understandable that an independent, proper somatology has never been formed, just as it is also understandable that the idea of such a science (as important as it is for reasons relating to the theory of science) has never been conceived. Its conception presupposes the pure separation of sensation from the apprehensional texture into which it is woven, i.e., presupposes unusual phenomenological analyses, and also presupposes a diverting of the regard from that which is given in the full apprehensions and which determines our natural directions of regard. We perceive the animate organism but along with it also the things that are perceived "by means of" the animate organism in the modes of their appearance in each case, and along with this we are also conscious of ourselves as human beings and as Egos that perceive such things by means of the animate organism. The animate organism, apprehended as animate organism, has its localization-stratum of tactual feelings, but we touch this thing here, we "sense" the contact of our clothing, etc. Hence the ambiguity of "to sense." The animate organism senses, and this concerns what is localized. Through it we "sense" things; here, "sensing" is the perceiving of spatial things, and it is we who, in perceiving, have directed our intellectual regard at the thing, and this animate organism is our animate organism.²

But if we analyze phenomenologically the interconnections of apprehensions, then the stratification of apprehensions that we have

²See Supplement II, p. 119.

described in detail becomes evident. And whether it is correctly recognized reflectively or not, it dominates theoretical experience and the problems to be posed on its ground, to the extent that they are correctly posed and successfully worked out problems, as they are in all genuine theories and genuine sciences. And to these belong, of course, zoology and especially physiology and, on the other hand, psychology, all of this understood within the proper limits. For on both sides — and precisely in the sphere of the specifically somatological, which is here in question — great masses of wrongly posed problems are not lacking and attached to them, theories of corresponding value (as, e.g., the whole complex of problems and theories posed under the heading, “psychological origin of the ideas of space, of time, of physical thing,” is full of counter sense, and especially with regard to that which would have to be included in the somatological sphere). The apprehensional stratum in which the sensitivities of the animate organism, and therefore the latter itself, are constituted showed itself to us, on the other hand, as intimately fused with those strata that are constitutive for the psyche and the psychic Ego, and indeed so intimately that the apprehension of psyche must necessarily take into itself the sensation states of the animate organism. Of course, from the standpoint of pure consciousness sensations are the indispensable material foundation for all basic sorts of noeses; and if the consciousness that we call experience of a physical thing or even experience of an animate organism essentially contains in its concrete unity sensations as materials of apprehension (in the *Logical Investigations* I used the misunderstood expression “representative contents”), as every consciousness enters into the apprehension of psyche and becomes the real state of the psyche and of the psychic Ego, with relationship to real circumstances — if that is so, then it is evident that the same sensations that function in the realizing apprehension of material perception as presentive contents for material characteristics receive localization as sensation states and make specific animate organicity appear in the new realizing apprehension we call experience of animate organism; and third, finally, they are components of the psychic under the heading of states of perceiving of the Ego (material perceiving and, likewise, experiencing of animate organism) and therefore belong to the psyche (i.e., sets of states of the psyche) and correspondingly to the life of the Ego. One can see all that, can bring it to clear givenness for oneself; and whoever has followed our exhibitions *has* seen it with us. Therefore it is not accidental, but rather to be understood on essential grounds, if psychology, understood as science of the psyche, also has to do with

<12>

all sensations. The question of how it has to do with them or must have to do with them — that can only be taken from the sense inherent in “psychological experience,” from the psychic-real that is constituted in this new basic form of experience. We have to examine this experience, to see how the psychic is given whenever the intention of this sort of experience, univocally finding fulfillment, effectuates itself — and this not factually, but according to essence. And the same holds regarding the general question of what it has to do with in general, what belongs to it and in what sense, and what principles of method the sense of this “what” prescribes for it.

Others might think differently about this and maintain that one must go to the psychological institutes and interrogate the experts in order to inform oneself about the essence of psychology and its method, as, indeed, one generally finds corresponding convictions widely disseminated among the “experts”: among mathematicians or investigators of nature, e.g., that only a professional mathematician or a professional investigator of nature can provide information about the essence, goals, and methods of mathematics or natural science, respectively — and so it is everywhere. I cannot dispute with anyone so judging the matter, since he has not yet reached the point of understanding what philosophy, as opposed to non-philosophical sciences, is properly about — and must be about. But whoever has understood this *knows* that methodological technique is not the interest and affair of the philosopher, but rather of the dogmatic investigator, of dogmatic science; that, on the contrary, the fundamental essence, the idea of every science of a categorical type and the idea of its method as the “sense” of every science, precedes the science itself and can — and must — be established from the proper essence of the idea of its objectivity, which determines its dogma, that is to say, can be established a priori.

To grasp the “essence” of number, to clarify the basic concept of arithmetic and understand the fundamental sources of its methodology, no theory of integral equations nor any reflections on such theories can instruct us; for that, we do not even need to know the multiplication tables. To clarify or to determine scientifically the essence of the psyche and therewith the possible goals and methods (in *fundamental* universality) is not the business of the psychological technician, i.e., the psychologist, but rather of the philosopher. This holds for all categories of being that lead correlatively back to categorical basic forms of bestowing consciousness. Statements like these: that all scientific method is one and the same; that therefore philosophy has to proceed methodologically according to the model of

<13>

exact science, e.g., mathematics and especially natural science; that philosophy obviously has to lean on special sciences for support, to further process their results — such statements have been repeated so often that they, with all accompanying elucidations, have become completely trivial. The grain of truth that lies in them has not become larger through repetition; on the other hand, the damage caused by the much greater portion of untruth in these distorted statements has become enormous. It threatens to consume German Philosophy.

I find it justifiable that the dogmatists do not listen to the philosophers if they simply want to be experts in their fields and not philosophers, undoubtedly quite sure nonetheless of their dogmatic progress. But if they do want to be philosophers and consider philosophy to be a sort of continuation of dogmatic science, then they are like people who imagine that with sufficient progress in physics and chemistry mankind will come so far that, by remedies à la Ehrlich-Hata, it will cure not only physical but also moral syphilis.

As for the sensations, the answer obviously goes: while according to their mode of experience these are in somatology manifestations of sensitivities of the animate organism, and while it is, therefore, the task of the theoretical thought in this science to pursue the causal connections that belong to these sensitivities, psychology, following the sense of its experience, has to pursue precisely those causal connections that belong to its experiential unity, the psyche, and has to direct toward sensations that real-causal interest which corresponds to their place in the psychic context. We gain all the desired clarity if we enter immediately into the general discussion. If the psyche is the reality that has its sets of states under the heading of consciousness, then, according to what we worked out earlier, this consciousness, whether through self-perception or through interpretive perception, is given as something belonging to an animate organism. That is to say, the Objectivation of animate organism lies at the foundation, and in such a way that the animate organism gets the position of a reality founding the psyche. All in all, a human being is given, given as a reality that includes in itself the material animate thing, that becomes a full human being through the psychic stratum interwoven with the feeling-stratum. We have an intermingling of three realities, each successive one in the series including in itself the preceding one by virtue of the fact that it merely brings in a new stratum. Sensation stands as something common on the boundary, so to speak, between the second and the third level. On the second level it is the manifestation of the sensitivity of the animate organism. On the other hand, it is, on the third level, the material foundation for

perceptive apprehensions, e.g., for material perception, in this case standing in the dual apprehensional functions discussed above: as kinesthetic in the function of the motivating, as the presentive sensation in the function of the motivated, under the circumstances presenting something from the statal content of the material object (e.g., color, smoothness, etc.). All these apprehensions now become involved with higher specifically Egoical consciousness. But whether or not an Ego's regard from this stratum goes through them, whether or not the Ego holds sway in them with its spontaneous Ego-acts, they are in any case (like the spontaneous acts also) not merely occurrences of a pure consciousness. Rather, they themselves undergo their apprehension, precisely their apprehension as psychic states. A human being or a brute is not a mere animate organism with whose sensation-states consciousness is somehow connected; but rather, a human being has a specific psychic character all his own, by virtue of which he so takes up into his consciousness the sensations that he senses by means of his animate organicity, so apprehends them, bears just such a relationship — theoretically experiencing, thinking, evaluating, acting — to that which thereby appears, that the play of his reproductions runs its course precisely in such constellations and with it connects to itself the process of the originary impressions (the sensuous and the non-sensuous), etc.

If we now look by way of comparison at the manner in which sensation functions in somatic experience on the one hand and psychological experience on the other, or at what comes to givenness with sensation, a sharp distinction confronts us. In the two cases sensation is apprehended in a basically different way, and therefore something different also comes to givenness in the two cases: on the one side, a sensitivity of the animate organism, or a feeling as behaviour of the animate organism; on the other side, the feeling, as that which makes known something organismic, has nothing to do with the experience of a psychic state; this somatic apprehension is not, say, a component part of the apprehension of the psychic state, or more precisely, of the state of the perception of a physical thing, in which the sensation functions as presentive, or of the receptive apprehension of a picture-fragment (of the painted "picture") and the like. Nothing in all of this in any way alters the circumstance that the apprehension of psyche is in general founded in the apprehension of animate organism. Both apprehensions become interwoven with one another through the double function of sensation, which is not only a factually double one but one that is also double in its basic nature; and though the two are interwoven, neither enters into the other. That holds for

<14>

<15>

all sensations. It holds also for the sensory feelings founded in the primary sensations, which feelings on the one hand somatologically manifest feeling-sensitivity of the animate organism, while on the other hand they enter into emotional functions and do not import into the latter any somatic apprehensions.

<16>

With this is connected the fact that the question about the How of the investigation of sensation, and, in particular, of the causal investigation of sensation, is answered very differently for somatology and for psychology. Regarded psychically, sensation is merely material for apprehensions (objectifications in a certain sense that must be firmly delimited), whereby we do not forget the background apprehensions by virtue of which the conspicuous foreground apprehension (perhaps going through a primary attending or a secondary noticing) necessarily makes an object of consciousness of something that has surroundings, that "steps out" of its surroundings. Psychological causality is causality that relates to the specifically psychic states. From the psychological standpoint the material is simply there; it is functioning: that is the specifically psychic. A particular causal concern for it comes out of the psychological level. When we inquire about the causality of the material, we have changed our attitude and are doing somatology. There are no other causal questions that might be directed toward sensation than the somatological ones. If we consider now the sphere of specifically psychic causality, it must first of all be said:

It is inherent in the sense of the apprehension of psyche, or the apprehension of the human being, that the human being, with regard to his somatic and psychic states, is dependent on the material animate-organismic thing not only by virtue of the fact that it is the latter's sensations, but also in respect of the specifically psychic. The extent of this is determined, as with any experiential apprehension, by the continuing process of actually occurring experience, which more precisely determines what the form of the apprehensional sense leaves open, what it implies in itself as determinability. Thus do the course of sensory reproductions and, consequently, the course of the reproductions in general, and the entire mode and rhythm of the apprehensional life and further of the intellectual and emotional life dependent on it show themselves to be dependent on the physical organization of the animate organism.

With regard to the kind of causal dependence, the reality of the psychic seems at first to behave quite analogously to the reality of the organismic. But very soon one sees the essential differences. As a fundament of the structure of the founded reality that we call an

animate being we have the material of the animate organism, and to it belongs a self-contained causal nexus that finds its place in material nature. But the issue does not rest with the material causality of the physical animate organism, in which it proves itself a material substance. Rather, if the physical animate organism, in a determinate interweaving of causal circumstances, assumes a material state definitely belonging to it, there then occurs in the somatic sensation-stratum that belongs to it as animate organism a determinately accompanying alteration of feeling. This alteration, for its part, has no reverse effect back into the nature-stratum. The sensations seem, like a sort of shadow (as epiphenomena), to follow certain material states of the animate organism. The situation would be the same for the psychic stratum, if it too, like the somatic stratum of the feelings, could be regarded as an unambiguous functional sequence of organismic states. Psychology, or anthropology and zoology, would then be basically somatological sciences of a higher level. Naturally, all spontaneity, such as the psychic spontaneity manifesting itself in the free movement of the animate organism, would then be a mere "epiphenomenon," and what in free movement we call "willing," and with regard to the psychic Ego call the Egoical act, would all be a pure sequence of certain organismic flows, and the movement itself would be a process brought about purely in the sphere of material causality. Looking at it more closely, however, we found in psychic reality, in view of its dependence on the animate organism and on matter, something essentially different as opposed to every other dependency, even that which is proper to the animate organism: namely, the fundamental impossibility of the unchanging persistence of the psyche and, at one with it, the fundamental impossibility of a return to the same state.³ Already in this a *countersense of the psychophysical parallelism* shows itself. If the psyche were dependent on the physical animate organism in the same manner as sensuousness, it would have to be possible in principle for the psyche of the aged person to develop backward to the psyche of the child — the same child with identical states, who has become an aged person. But that is in principle excluded by the psyche's own specific character, its necessarily developmental character.

In all this the following must be kept in mind: the unilateral and uniform dependence that the occurrences of the sense fields have on the materiality of the animate organism (its determinate material constitution at any given time) does not change the fact that a novel

<18>

³See Supplement III, p. 120.

<17>

objectivity with a novel stratum is constituted by the somatic apperception, or experience. The novel stratum is not eliminated, but rather presupposed in the exploration of the physio-somatic causal relations. And in that case animate *physis* and animate organism stand in causal relations, two realities of which the one is founded in the other: and, as with causal relations of realities generally, so here too, the occurrence of states of the one reality is what is causally dependent (effect) on the occurrence of the pertinent states of the other reality under the appropriate circumstances. The relation to circumstances here, however, means only material circumstances; that is, the unilaterality consists precisely in the fact that the founded reality brings with it no circumstances of its own, that is to say, has no causalities of its own along with those that belong to the foundation. This would also be the case with psyche-apperception, even if the psyche were in this manner a higher annex of the animate organism.

It is certain that dependencies on the psychic run over into the physical-organismic. How far they *actually* reach is a matter for psycho-physiological empirical investigation to decide. How far they *can* reach, on the other hand, that is to say, how far questions about "physiological correlates" and corresponding hypothetical constructions can be sensible and guiding for the process of actual research, is a matter for the phenomenological inquiry into essences. It prescribes limits for psycho-physical investigations that are just as absolutely fixed as those which geometry prescribes for geodetic investigations. But there will be more to say about this when we consider the idea of a rational psychology.

Our investigation has now progressed to the point where the *idea of a psychology* emerges as a science which is directed toward the psychic reality and which must be differentiated from somatology, and indeed from physical somatology (which finds its place in the general science of material nature) as well as from the aesthesiological, and, on the other hand, is involved in it, corresponding precisely to the foundation of the realities. If the psyche is not a proper reality, but only a stratum of reality over the body, then it cannot ground any self-sufficient science. Physical natural science is a self-sufficient science and relatively self-sufficient in its disciplines, as is physical somatology; somatology is a self-sufficient science, but somatological aesthesiology is not self-sufficient, while anthropology (or zoology fully understood), again, is self-sufficient. But that does not prevent an outstanding investigative interest from being turned toward the psyche and the questions of reality belonging to it, and therefore also

questions of causality. In this case, however, as with all sciences of reality, the peculiar Object is precisely the sort of *reality* in question, that is to say, the *psyche*, or the human being with regard to his psyche; and the psyche is not a "bundle" of conscious processes, but rather, the real unity that manifests itself in them. One can maintain dead silence about the psyche, one can scornfully designate it as a *façon de parler*: it is still the dominant thing in the apprehension and, with the ideas that correlatively belong to it, the determining thing in the investigation. But it is better if one speaks correctly and does not interpret away what must, insofar as one is supposed to think correctly, always remain alive.

Our considerations up to this point appear incomplete to the extent that they have not particularly taken into account the pure and psychic Ego, that is, have not more closely considered the way in which it determines the task of psychology and the context of causal investigation. In this regard, however, it must be seen at once that the exploration of the psychic apperceptive Ego is only one level of the general investigation of psyche. How the Ego makes its appearance as pure Ego — that falls in the psychological sphere, to the extent that the latter explores the appearance of acts in the context of nature. How the Ego, as empirical Ego, develops itself, transforms itself, always acquires new dispositions therein — that is only a particularization of the question of how the psyche develops itself, transforms itself, etc., generally. Not everything psychic is something specifically Egoical. Associations are formed, whether the Ego takes part therein or not. Whether and to what extent one's own idiosyncratic regulations belong to the Ego and its acts is a matter for special psychological investigations; in any case, the psychic Ego is co-determined by the whole psychic context, even as it stands under rules which, extending beyond its own proper sphere, are psychically valid in general. We do not need to linger here any longer.

§4. "COMMUNITIES" AS SEEN BY NATURAL SCIENCE.

Taking a foothold first of all in the material world in which the animate organism finds a place, and then, following the sequence of levels of founded experience, we have determined the original domains for a series of corresponding levels of experience. The phenomenological clarification of the apperceptions and the basic sorts of objectivities that are constituted in them affords radical insight into the characteristic sense of corresponding sciences. We

could still further enlarge the sequence of levels, but without gaining anything especially instructive ourselves. If psychic Objects are connected with one another, are combined into associations, societies of various levels, this produces no new Objectiveness with respect to the foundation by original nature. For no new psyche arises hereby as a psyche of higher level built upon the sum of the animate organisms and their psyches, no unitary nexus of consciousness on the ground of which a new reality, that of a communal psyche, might be constituted. What one has here, from the point of view of natural science, is a number of individual human beings each with a particular consciousness, a particular psyche with a particular Ego belonging to each. In the psycho-physical interrelated context that is made possible by the material interrelations of the animate organisms, there arise in the individual psyches acts that are intentionally directed at something psychically external. But what appears here is always only new states of the individual psyches. It is not otherwise than when a plurality of material things has a relatively closed coherence of effect and thereby produces material systems that must perhaps be regarded as material unities. A fundamentally novel science does not thereby arise. It is a different question whether we would also — and would also be allowed to — say such things, if not psyches but rather the *mental personalities* were taken as the elements of these unity-formations. But now there *are* for us no minds. We stand in natural science, defined by the universe of those realities that are either themselves material nature or founded in material nature.

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

CHAPTER TWO

§5. THE RELATIONSHIP OF PHENOMENOLOGY TO THE SCIENCES.

Now we want to turn our particular attention to the relations between psychology and phenomenology. All the analyses of this section were themselves phenomenological ones and could not be misinterpreted as experiential-scientific, even where they began with actual experience. The single datum of experience, e.g., of some "apprehension," "perception," or the like, counted throughout only as an example; we always shifted immediately to the eidetic attitude and explored eidetically what belongs to the essence, the possibilities included in the essence of certain apprehensions: the possibility of passing over into series of intuitions, series of experiences, of thereby univocally fulfilling themselves, and of explicating their sense, i.e., the sense of what is intended, what is experienced as such, and with it the sense of the objectivities concerned. The phenomenological analyses, in pieces of intuitive eidetic analysis, exemplified on the one hand the method and the sort of results sought; but at the same time they served to draw from the primal sources the essence of the reality-categories of matter, animate organism, psyche, and psychic Ego, categories that are founded in one another and therewith to grasp the ordinary sense of the corresponding sciences, which is determined thereby. At the same time, through these analyses — which, if necessary, can still be further developed in the same sense in various directions — all the preconditions are fulfilled (or, can be fulfilled supplementarily) for determining the fundamental characteristics of the method of these sciences and for bringing to intuitive understanding how far, e.g., the method of physical natural science and the psychological method can run parallel and to what extent they must be basically different. Norms that emerge here originally cannot be disregarded without bringing the course of science into confusion and misleading it into wrong ways of setting problems and wrong modes of experience. It is not what calls itself "modern science" and not those who call themselves "experts" that make the method; but

<21>

<21>

<22>

rather, the essence of the objects and the appurtenant essence of possible experience of objects of the category concerned (that is the a priori of the phenomenological constitution) prescribes everything fundamental in the method; and it is characteristic of the expert of genius to grasp this essence intuitively (even if not to bring it in a philosophical way up to the level of rigorous concepts and formulated norms) and to orient the particular problems and particular methods according to it. All discoveries and inventions of the experts move within the framework of an absolutely intransgressible a priori that one can draw not from their doctrines but only from the phenomenological Intuition. To grasp it scientifically, however, is a special task of philosophy and not of the dogmatic sciences themselves. To be sure, what normatively determines method in general is the theme of *general noetics*, which reaches out beyond all categories of objectivities and constitutive Intuitions. But we do not yet possess this. It will be possible only after a general phenomenological eidetic doctrine of cognition has been carried through far enough with respect to Intuition and with respect to specific thinking. But this much is clear even without a completed noetics: that the method of every science must be determined by the sort of originally bestowing intuition, or the basic sort of originary apprehension,⁴ essentially belonging to the object-category to which it is related (perhaps along with other sciences). It is a commonplace that all cognition of nature has its ultimate source in experience, or to put it concretely: that all scientific grounding ultimately rests on acts of experience (on the act which originally bestows nature-objectivity). And if, as we must, we accept this as valid, it is clear that methodological norms that experience brings out of itself and that are obviously grounded in their essence must be determinative for the natural-scientific method. The same must naturally hold for all sciences in general; in all of them, grounding necessarily leads ultimately beyond the sphere of thinking to intuition and ultimately to originally bestowing intuition, which can only not be an experience if its objectivities are other than experiential objectivities (realities of the sphere of nature). We have, of course, already established this: that essentially different constitutive apprehensions, and therefore also basic forms of originally bestowing acts, must correspond to the different object categories.

⁴According to our terminology, the theoretical attitude does not, nor in general does any "look at" anything, belong to mere apprehension.

§6. THE ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF THE EMPIRICAL SCIENCES.

The method in all sciences is also determined by the *universal* essence of the objectivity that Intuitively comes to light in the complete presentation of such objectivity, that is to say in the complete unfolding of the intentions lying in its apprehension, and naturally in the eidetic attitude and in the direction not of apprehension but of the objective affair that is being constituted. The universal essence can be unfolded in thought, and its unfolding necessarily leads to an *ontology*. Complete method presupposes the systematic development of the ontology, i.e., the eidetic doctrine that belongs to this object-category involved. The total inventory of cognitions that it offers is an unconditional norm for everything that possible empirical cognition of the factual sciences related to the categories can ever offer, and it goes along simultaneously into the factual cognition. Every step forward with regard to ontology — and in particular with regard to the formulating of ontological basic cognitions or ontological disciplines that bring to ontological apprehension an as yet not ontologically apprehended side of the objective category concerned — must be to the advantage of the empirical science. We have already talked about that, and we only bring it up here in order to establish the legitimacy, indeed the unconditional necessity, of a *rational psychology*. It was in the investigations toward the phenomenology of cognition (in the *Logical Investigations*) that we first became aware that there must be such a discipline, and, to be sure, one of enormous scope, one not constructed from above out of empty "concepts" (vague word-significations), like the old metaphysical psychology, but rather, an eidetic doctrine drawn from pure Intuition. This seems to have completely escaped all earlier investigators of cognition, investigators of consciousness generally, despite all the age-old talk of an a priori of thinking and will under the titles of logic and ethics. For, what they gave and wanted to give under these titles was anything but psychological eidetic doctrine in the sense in question here. In the above-mentioned work phenomenology was given as a purely immanent description of what is given in inner intuition (in a lax manner it is sometimes called there "inner experience"), a description that does not, however, establish empirical facts, but rather, in the attitude of "ideation," essential interconnections only. Precisely on this rested the definitive refutation (attempted in the "Sixth Investigation") of the psychologism of the theory of cognition. Thereafter in the *Logical Investigations* phenom-

<23>

<24>

ological eidetic doctrine and rational psychology coincided. That it is in various ways incorrect that a rational psychology must be apprehended as the ontology of something real becoming constituted in the nexus of lived-process and cannot then coincide with the essence of a nexus of lived-process, we will be able to see after we have clarified the idea of reality in general as well as that of the psychic reality and have given up the old mistrust (still controlling even the author of the *Logical Investigations*) of psychic and Egoical reality. The remarkable relationship between phenomenology and psychological ontology which permits the former to find its place in the latter and again in a certain manner also permits the latter, like all ontological disciplines, to find a place in the former, will occupy us extensively, and we will learn to see parallel relationships for the *ontology of the mind*.

<25> §7. REGIONAL CONCEPTS AND "GENERIC" CONCEPTS.⁵

First of all it is of greatest importance for the philosopher and phenomenologist to have made perfectly clear intuitively what is distinctive about concepts I have called objective regional ones: namely, the method according to which they can be derived apriori. This derivation is not meant in the sense of a "transcendental deduction" from some postulate or other or from some system of thought that is not itself given through Intuition (like the system of the forms of judgment in the Kantian deduction of what he calls the categories), and yet according to an apodictically evident "transcendental clue," in following which we cannot *deduce* the concepts but rather can *find* them ourselves and step by step in seeing grasp them ourselves. It is necessary to make clear to oneself what gives these concepts their unique significance and predestines them to be regional concepts of ontologies in such a way that there must apriori be as many ontologies as regional concepts: whether these ontologies then are rich or poor in content, whether they break up into great sciences or exhaust themselves in small groups of propositions. It is then further necessary to see that all radical classification of the sciences, the experiential sciences above all, must be dependent upon this concept-formation: "region," particularly that there must be as many fundamentally different empirical sciences (or groups of disciplines) as ontologies. Without exhausting the matter here we only want to say what is necessary in order to exclude misleading empiricist objections.

⁵See Supplement IV, p. 121 ff.

Why, the empiricist will ask, should the concept "material thing" (which we present as a regional one) be something basically different in essence from, or play an essentially different role from, that of the concept "heavenly body"? Naturally it is a very general, one might say in a certain way a most general, concept, encompassing whole groups of disciplines. But concepts arise out of experience through generalization; it must remain open to us to find in generalization experiential grounds to progress still further, and then the more general concept would play the same role as the concept of physical thing. And all the more so the concept of brute (another example of a regional concept): it does not come into being otherwise than does the concept of frog or of reptile; it is only more general. Indeed a further generalizing leads from this to "living being" — and perhaps one could go yet a step further. All concepts, the general as well as the particular, stem from experience, and their usefulness must be confirmed in the continuing process of further experience. We must always be ready to change them in accordance with it.

On the other hand it is necessary to make clear to oneself the following: no matter what the much-discussed, even ambiguous, "stemming from experience" may mean — and no matter how, whether in our sleep or by a miracle, we have acquired the disposition to use general words in identical signification — the word-significations can be *valid* as logical essences only if according to ideal possibility the "logical thinking" actualizing them in itself is adaptable to a "corresponding intuition," if there is as corresponding noema a corresponding essence that is graspable through *Intuition* and that finds its true "expression" through the logical concept. The logical essence that constitutes itself in pure thinking and the Intuitive noema stand there in the determinate eidetic relationship of the "fitting expression." If this is the case, the concept is valid in the sense of the "possibility" of a corresponding object. Thereby the eidetic Intuition can be performed on the ground of a single instance of imagination. This Intuition is sufficient for me to grasp the general essence, presupposing that it is so far-reaching that it really brings to givenness the *corresponding* Intuitive noematic essence, i.e., does not leave remaining any component of the thought-conception that would not fit as pure expression of a component of the intuitively given noema. On the other hand, the concept has *existential validity* only if, not imagination, but actually occurring "experience," i.e., originally giving and indisputably giving intuition, posits individual actuality as actuality that is meant in the noetic essence; or if (through

<27>

"mediate grounding") on the ground of further experiences the positing of such actuality is motivated rationally. Where concepts relate to reality, the legitimating intuition and experience in principle leave many things open. In accordance with their sense they leave room for closer determinations and altered determinations; the intuitive noematic essences, and parallel to them in the sphere of expression, the logical essences, the thought-concepts themselves, are accordingly variously encumbered with indefiniteness. In keeping with the endless possibilities, it is then necessary to become better and better acquainted with the real object, to determine more exactly in the ongoing course of experience what remains open (or to imagine the object more and more definitely in the fictive intuition), constantly to bring in new concepts which with those that are first to be expressed are ordered together into more perfect expressions in thought. But since the real actuality is no chaos but rather a regionally ordered whole, there is no need of actual infinities of concepts in order to become acquainted with the thing. It becomes plain that to many real determinations infinitely many others attach themselves as consequences according to cognizable rules, and that there is such a thing as classification, according to which generic and specific concepts can be formed that coordinate limited groups of characteristic conceptual traits to which according to experience innumerable others so attach themselves and from which innumerable others are so excluded that with a systematics of objects under these genera and species there is carried out an actual division of all individuals of a most general existential sphere that is sufficiently separated off by highest class traits. Concepts of such accomplishment are obviously not to be drawn from merely noematic Intuition. It is indeed clear that in addition to their essential signification they all have an existential signification. To put it more correctly: they bring with themselves in addition to their pure signification (their sense free of all assertive positing) a *knowing*, a thesis which has a relation to complexes of assertions, scientifically already fixed, about the real actuality, a precipitate from already obtained cognitive results for the actual factual existence. In general it holds for all sciences (even for ideal sciences) that the formation of concepts, and to be sure of "possible" ones, concepts obtained out of clarity, concretely fixed through adaptation to intuition, serves them for the obtaining of true judgments; it holds that they also end by encumbering the concepts with judgment-values, whereby they themselves become judging concepts for the sphere of objects of science. With such judgment-values the concepts subsequently enter into all further connections.

<28>

Thereby the concept of the concept receives a dangerous ambiguity. We must sharply distinguish: the *pure sense* free of all positing and the sense of the expressions in question which is encumbered with judgment-theses. It is clear that valuable judicative concepts, like those that every investigator of reality seeks, can only be drawn out of actually occurring experience. When he therefore says: all concepts stem from experience, he obviously has in view from the outset the judicative concepts that concern him constantly, that form the constant goal of his work. Understandably he tends to evaluate concept-formations that move on the ground of mere imagination as a "spinning out of empty possibilities," as "scholasticism." But it is clear that, no matter how right he is where it is a question of gaining valuable judicative concepts, nevertheless he cannot be right in every way. And not even with regard to these concepts themselves. They possess after all a pure essence fixable prior to all judicative content, which essence may integrate itself into essential interconnections that may conceal in themselves valuable cognition with regard to the possibility of corresponding objects. And it is of course obvious that these noematic essences make up the sense which is proper to the objectivity which in that case is intuited or thought, and that any pure eidetic truth having its ground in these essences prescribes in general an unconditionally valid norm for possible objectivities of such a sense.

Therefore, if we go back to these noematic essences (whose mere thought-expression the univocal concepts form), then they possess purely as essences their separations and connections, especially their subordination to more general essences and finally to highest genera, which in themselves are absolutely closed, absolutely sharply limited. All differentiations of genus and species to be carried out here in pure Intuition provides something basically other than the genera and the species of the empirical sciences of reality, which gain their sense not through mere essences but rather through a judgment-based cognition-stock of experience.

Now what especially interests us here are certain highest eidetic universalities such as physical thing, animate being, or basic concepts according to which the basic sorts of realities are differentiated. And finally also such an eidetic-universality, an even higher one, as is presented by the concept of reality itself which is fixed by us through eidetic definition (that is to say, drawn purely out of Intuition).

Let us proceed from some definite reality or other that lies before us in an actually occurring experience. Let it be a material thing, more precisely: a piece of gold. It is apprehended by us in this actually

<29>

occurring experience in a definite sense, and according to a part of this sense it authenticates itself as actually given. Carrying out eidetic focusing, we now proceed to the pure sense; we abstract from the existential positing of the actually occurring experience. The sense is an only partially determinate one; it is necessarily indeterminate insofar as it is the sense of something real which as such would exhibit, in endless and manifold series of experience, ever new sides and properties that are not predelineated in a firm content by the sense fixed by the experience that is the starting point, but rather are held open only as indeterminate but determinable possibilities. Through suspension of the experiential positing of their requirements, we are now free from all fetters which physics and chemistry could impose upon us. We move about with free power of choice in the realm of "empty possibilities." Making unlimited use of this freedom, we keep the identity of sense, insofar as the objectivity presented with it is supposed to be able to appear as identical, univocal in itself, in any series of variations that we carry out. Thus freely phantasying we let the thing move, deform its shape in any way we like, let its qualitative determinations, its real properties change themselves as we like; we play with the well known properties and laws of properties as conceived in physics, let the changes of properties so proceed that the laws must be reshaped, must be transformed into completely different ones. We even invent for ourselves new senses or new qualities for the old senses (even if in an indirectly suppositional inventing); we let them extend themselves in spatial shape in place of the old ones and in them let real properties or unheard of transformations of the old ones authenticate themselves. Freely proceeding in this way the phantasy produces the most incredible deformities of things, the wildest physical spectre, scorning all physics and chemistry.

It is clear that the totality of arbitrary productions which we gain out of *one* physical thing are identically obtainable also from every other one; in fact, everything can be continuously converted into everything, the totality of shapings is the same and a fixed one. And yet we see thereby that, even in this phantasy and variation averse to all restriction by natural law, the system of the offspring of our phantasy still retains its rules which justify speaking of a closed system: they are offspring of a phantasy that shapes and reshapes *physical things*, constitutes *physical things* and again destroys *physical thing* constitution, carries out genuine *physical thing* properties and again gives them up as apparent properties. The physical thing that served us as starting point is transformed, remains a little while something appearing to be a physical thing; and if we proceed too

<30>

freely, if we do not respect the essential relation of real properties to real circumstances, if we don't take care that our phantasy so orders the formations that it allows this relation to be sustained, then the thing falls apart in manifolds of phantoms (sensuous schemata), flowing as manifolds that constitute real things simply cannot and may not flow. Physical thing is simply not an existent in general but rather something identical in the combination of causal dependencies. It is something that can live only in the atmosphere of causal lawfulness. But that demands definitely regulated organizations for the constituting sensuous schemata. If freely ruling phantasy breaks through these organizations in an unbridled manner, then not only is an individual schema transformed into a "mere phantom," but the whole world becomes a flow of mere phantoms; it is therefore no longer nature. But it is not for that reason completely lawless. In his singular genius Kant foresaw that and it is expressed in his works in the distinction between transcendental aesthetics and analytics. For the mere phantom-world the pure theory of time and pure geometry still hold; it is however a world without any physics. Also with regard to the sensuous fullness of phantom-extension there exists regularities, but the sensuous fullness authenticates no material properties.

Let us now leave this phantom-world. Let us now hold our phantasy in check. Let us begin again with an experience of a physical thing, say the perception of a tree, of that tree there. We take the thing exactly as that which appears in this perception; we disconnect all indirect knowing, even by physics and chemistry. With this there is fixed a determinate objective sense, which can be described. There appears a tree, a pine etc. That which is appearing, precisely in the given sense, appears actually only by certain sides and is nevertheless meant, though indeterminately, as a "more," over against that which is "actually" appearing. This indeterminateness directs us into the actually occurring perception and further possible perceptions; on the ground of this indeterminateness belonging to the perceptual sense, we can indeed ask, and this question guides us constantly in experience, how this object looks according to its other sides, how it is determined through ever new perceptions and is to be described according to them and is to be determined in thought. Thereby every new experience poses new questions. However unknown the thing is, however little we may, therefore, know what future experience may perhaps teach us, one thing is clear a priori, namely, that an absolutely fixed framework for the course of possible experience is already predelineated and, to be sure, already through the sense of the perception that is the starting point. With it is posited not

<31>

only an object in general, but a physically real thing, a substrate, even if of unknown real properties related to real circumstances no matter how indeterminate. If the perception that is the point of departure is to retain a legitimacy at all, if the objectivity posited in its sense is to be capable of being actual, then the course of possible experiences related to this same object univocally determining it more exactly is prescribed.

Let us try to invent in free choice, holding fast only to this initial perception and its legitimacy; let nothing of other experiential knowing restrict us, no physics, no natural science of any kind. Let us freely invent a progression of experiences which would harmoniously authenticate on all sides and completely that which is perceived; the fixed perceptual sense will force us then to invent real circumstances which as causal correlates of the properties authenticating themselves would fit and would preserve the harmony. If we pursue these environmental realities and also develop them more precisely, while remaining true to the beginnings once made, that is to say, sustaining harmoniously the appurtenant real unities and construing in phantasy the experiential series constitutive of them, then a whole world is finally construed for us, a world that has its laws as conceived in physics but that still in no way would have to be the same world that we would have brought to cognition not out of fiction but rather out of experience and out of experiential science. For in our procedure in phantasy we can, though restricted by the initial starting point, set out upon innumerable ways; each way restricts us anew, but leaves open for us in the further procedures again endlessly many possibilities for experiential progress, and so it is with every new experiential fiction, which is restricted only by the fact that that which is already posited and invented as determinate in ever new experiential beginnings is supposed to be retained harmoniously in its determinations. According to the manner of our inventive determining, we can construe completely different worlds, which would all be worlds for the physical thing that is the point of departure; each of these worlds would have its own and distinct set of laws, its distinct natural science; and therefore in each world the physical thing that is the point of departure (which according to its sense and being is variously outfitted precisely in accordance with the sense of the various worlds) would be a different one, in another nature — of another nature. Phantasy can therefore still rule freely enough; it can no longer pose as world destroyer, but only as world builder; but in this endlessly many possibilities remain for it. So restricted is it, however, by the mere presupposition that the starting perception is supposed to be

valid, that it is supposed to be sustained harmoniously as *perception* of its object, just as it posits it as an extensively real thing, with all indeterminateness remaining open. As soon as we drop this presupposition and demand in general merely a unity sustaining itself (which the phantom already offers), the reality falls apart, and everything is dissolved into a chaos of phantoms, which, if we exhaust all possibilities, would conceal among other things the regulated connections of phantoms in which all possible worlds, realities, are constituted. But finally there also lay in the idea of the phantom a rule that encompasses the circle of possibilities, a law self-regulating in certain directions. Accordingly in the course of all possible experience an apriori is actually predelineated and obviously predelineated by the essence of the physical perception as a basic kind of perception, or experience. Precisely for that reason the idea of physical thing has a unique distinction; it designates a categorial (or, as we might better say, *regional*) *framework* for every sense pertinent to and possible for an experience of such a basic sort, a framework to which, as a necessary form, is bound apriori all more precise determination of an object posited indeterminately in some experience or other. If something is *experienced* at all (within this experiential system), then there is posited therewith eo ipso not only an object in general but a *res extensa*, a *material thing*; and this expression determines not a content, but a *form for all possible objects of possible experience of this sort in general*. However

<33>

experience may run then; even if the object is other than it was posited at first; however far its determination may be altered and revised, as long as it is to be retained at all as existing, all experience, as determining it according to its "how constituted," is regulated; everything due to it is correlatively regulated by a formal sense-composition, which the idea of the thing includes. The idea of physical thing accordingly has a quite different status than the idea of any other universal based on experience. Of course the idea of mineral, the idea of plant, and the like, also prescribes a rule for the course of experience. But in a quite different sense from the idea of the thing. One must not confuse that which a universal concept prescribes and that which the essence of the universal perception as a basic kind of experience prescribes. The concept, more precisely, the conceptual apprehension as mineral, prescribes in the mode of thinking. If the apprehension is to be valid, then it must legitimate itself and legitimate itself in *experience* as conceptual apprehension to whose sense it belongs to be conceptual apprehension of a *physical thing*: in the object as it comes to givenness in experience, the objective moments that were conceptually meant must become

<34>

apparent. But experience with its demands precedes conceptual thinking and its demands. If it is experienceable at all, then it has its form, it is a physical thing. It comes naturally to expression in the concept mineral together with its particular content; it "contains," we say, the concept of the physical thing. But that is just what is peculiar, that the demand for fulfillment that this conceptual composition makes is essentially different from the demand that all other components of such a concept as mineral make: it expresses merely the regional form, the correlate of the basic sort of experience, but the others express particular determinations. A conceptual apprehension and positing of actuality as mineral can be false; experience can prove these or those moments belonging to the concept stone to be invalid; there is only one thing it can never prove to be invalid so long as any experienceable object at all sustains itself validly: precisely that which belongs to the object as object of such a regional sort of experience: the physical. We therefore understand why a concept of the sort "extensive thing" must claim a quite distinctive place as opposed to any other concepts we like.

And we understand it when we study the phenomenological connections of physical thing and constitution of a physical thing. Physical thing is not a generic concept of the same sort as mineral, ranking equally with it and similar generic concepts, only perhaps more general. As long as we ascend in the formation of species and genus and form genuine genera, we ascend from the full materially filled essence of the object to universal eidetic traits that could be common to several, innumerable many, objects; from the materially filled essences of species singled out something materially filled that is "common" can then again be singled out, etc. In this way we acquire from the essence of a determinate tone, placing it in a series with the essence of other tones, the essence of tone in general, the acoustic in general, sensuous quality in general and the like. All its material content, however, is in our sphere of realities "something accidental" that is bound to something "necessary," a necessary form, precisely the one which the concept physical thing expresses. All material content can change and does change in physical *alteration*; only one thing cannot change: the universal physical-thing form. A heavenly body can be altered; the stock of materially filled properties that characterize it can variously change; it finally ceases to correspond to the idea of heavenly body; other generic concepts then take its place. But however it may be altered, even if it were to dissolve into gas and disperse into space: physical thing remains physical thing, and even the dispersal or fragmentation does not change anything in that, for

its possibility is itself predelineated in the universal form "physical thing." Everything materially filled is accidental; it is that which is given through experience and that which is to be determined through experience in its alterations or non-alterations. How it changes: that is fact. But however it may change, so long as there is experience at all, so long as the perception that posits the object retains any legitimacy at all, physical thing is physical thing. However the *what* of the physical thing, its material content, may change, foreseeably or not foreseeably, the universal that the words "physical thing" signify there (and it signifies very much), cannot change; it is the framework in which all alteration takes place. Just as naturally in the free phantasy. I may in my phantasy quite arbitrarily change the physical thing that hovers before me; if I phantasize it as a thing, i.e., if I phantasize myself into an experiencing and maintain the experiential positing "in the phantasy," then I am restricted. And in eidetic attitude I can therefore bring out what is essentially necessary to this restriction, i.e., the essence "physical thing." Thus there is in the world of the essences themselves and of the eidetic concepts a distinction predelineated between *priority* and *posteriority*, which justifies speaking in a certain sense of *apriori* and *aposteriori* concepts. This sense of *apriori* belongs to the concepts of realities and is a "transcendental" distinction insofar as it and its distinction from the *aposteriori* has its source in the basic property and the realities have of "constituting" themselves as unities of multiplicities.

The whole consideration that we have carried out here can obviously be understood as an example. What we have made most evident to ourselves in the idea of the physical thing as *res extensa* is equally evident to us in all similar cases. In the essence of the originally bestowing consciousness in general are grounded cardinal distinctions according to basic sorts, which it is one of the most important tasks of phenomenology to seek systematically and to describe scientifically. To every such basic sort there obviously corresponds a regional concept which delimits the sense-form of the respective basic sort of presentive intuition, and there corresponds in further sequence a region of objects, encompassing all objects to which this sense is proper. With regard to the fact that in the essence of these originally presentive acts basic sorts of foundings are also laid out and that with the latter new basic sorts of presentive intuition arise that are founded precisely in the old ones, there result (as we have studied thoroughly in one case, that of the founding of psychological perception) orders of lowest regional concepts and concepts founded in them and corresponding foundings of regions of

<35>

<36>

object (e.g., material thing, aesthesiological thing, human being, or psyche).

The apriori in the sense of the region is the *source-point of the ontologies* whose necessity and distinct position in the system of all sciences and whose unique methodological function in carrying out factual sciences for the corresponding regional spheres now actually becomes understandable out of the deepest, indeed the primal, bases of phenomenology. It is indeed fully clear that an eidetic science belonging to the regional apriori, e.g., physical thing in general, psyche in general, must have a position and significance regionally different from that of all other eidetic cognitions which attach themselves perhaps to "accidental" particularizations of the idea physicalness, psyche, etc., that is, to materially filled concepts no matter how universal. The series of experiential sciences of real actuality (as factual sciences) is therefore confronted in a particular manner by the ontology of physical nature as theory of essences of *natura formaliter spectata*, likewise the ontology of animate or psychic nature.⁶

<37> That there must be such ontologies is obvious. No essence without eidetic truths; and it is obvious that even real essences, to whose form as reality belongs already manifold and, according to the sort of reality, very different involvement, cannot be without a rich stock of eidetic cognitions. With regard to the ontology of nature we have here sciences that are integrated into it under the titles geometry and kinematics; here belong likewise the apriori truths of pure theory of time, which of course are common property for all sciences of reality whatsoever. What is still lacking up to now, what has not been constructed in any sufficiently systematic-scientific form — that is the ontological sphere of specific materiality, precisely the nucleus of any "pure" regional natural science.

⁶Of course the reason cannot here become evident why the ontology of nature absorbs every particular apriori for the physical sciences to the extent that they want to move and do move on the level of physics or, as we can say, the level of the ultimately valid and full Objectivity, in contrast to the descriptive natural sciences, which do not attain full Objectivity, why every materially filled apriori is lost to us, why the idea of the determinate physical thing of physics is a mathematically formulatable idea that leaves no room open for other concepts as mathematical particularizations of mathematical universality.

§8. RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY — EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Let us consider the psychological sphere. That there must be a rational psychology, whether we have it or not, is evident. The rational existence of science as idea precedes its being possessed. The necessity of a rational geometry was just as discernible before its development as the necessity of rational psychology is now for us who do not possess it. However, that is no longer quite right. Even if there is a lack of a systematic explication of the idea of psychic reality, still we possess already — in the form of phenomenology — a considerable portion of a rational psychology. And here we come back again to the chief interest that guides our investigation, no matter how much this latter still has other necessary functions to fulfill with regard to our further nexus of interests.

<38> In considering the idea of a rational psychology let us disregard all the eidetic truths that belong to the *universal idea of reality in general*, they constitute a closed stock to which, according to that which was already touched on earlier, the rational chronological truths belong, and they are not the sole possession of rational psychology but rather a common possession of all the rational sciences that in general belong to the region of reality. It is then fully certain from the outset that whatever rational truths may otherwise be integrated into rational psychology, in any case all phenomenological truths belong to it also. First and foremost all those which relate to the *really immanent* eidetic moments of possible lived-processes, in further sequence also immediately evident cognitions that belong to the various stages of intentional correlates.

Let us consider the state of affairs more closely. This is all the more necessary since at the present time the naturalism predominating so greatly among psychologists, as among all natural scientists, has as its consequence an almost universal misunderstanding of the sense of phenomenology and of its possible achievements for the psychological science of experience. With this is connected the basically perverted view that with phenomenology it is a matter of a restitution of the method of inner observation or of direct inner experience in general. Only in this way also are explained those superficial (indeed not even superficial, because not understanding at all the sense of the matters) literary rejections of the claim that phenomenology makes, and must make through its own specific character, of paving the way for a reform of psychology (as also, on the other hand, of philosophy) that in the literal sense is fundamental and novel.

An ontology of the psychic or animated realities (if we are not afraid of traditional antipathies we can calmly say: *rational zoology* and anthropology) has primarily to do with the apriori of the particular real sort of unity of real properties that belong to the idea of the *animale real* in general and, included therein, also to the idea of the *psyche*. Talk about real properties leads us to real states. With them, it is a matter of dispositional determinations, of abilities. Abilities are abilities to do something, dispositions are dispositions to do something. And to do what, is clear. We come upon corresponding groups of "lived-processes" in the context of the "psychic" life, and we know that no group of lived-processes is omitted here. Every lived-process is a psychic state, as psychology in general speaks of psychic states in relation to the total sphere of lived-process. Now we already know that there is in the framework of the phenomenological reduction an exploration free of all co-posting of real factual existence, of all posting of factuality, an exploration of that which belongs to any sort of "consciousness," to everything which is there called "psychic lived-process," an exploration, for all genuine moments, for correlates of consciousness, for all possible connections in the nexus of lived-processes: an apriori or eidetic investigation. We have to do with states. If we grasp the psyche not as fact but as eidetic essence, then the states are also taken as eidetic essences and have the eidetic form of the set of states. We can have an interest in disputing this and can see the possibility of doing this. We can limit our eidetic analysis to the *lived-processes in themselves*, disregarding what distinguishes them as sets of states, as authentications of a real psychic unity with psychic properties. But everything that we explore in the framework of such a lived-process would naturally also belong in the framework of rational-psychological investigation. For it is evident that the peculiar essence of every lived-process (as idea and not as fact) is not altered by the realizing apperception and cannot be changed.

Let us recapitulate in order to make it easier for psychologists taking a natural-scientific attitude to understand through examples what must here be accomplished: suppose there are perceptions given in factual experience, perceptions of a physical thing, let us say. In inner perception, in reflection in Locke's sense, they are originally given; in "acts of empathy" in the manner of "noting" such lived-processes in the external state of another, or also in recollections of previously performed reflections or acts of empathy, they are not given in an ordinary manner but rather in the manner of presentations. In any case, they are given there as our lived-processes or as lived-processes of other human beings or brutes, organismic-mental

<40>

realities that have their real surroundings, which belong to a spatio-temporal world. The exploration of such psychic states, called perceptions, as states of actual real individuals of the actual world, is a matter for psychology, for inductive experiential science. How lived-processes of that sort occur in humans and brutes, under what real conditions and with what consequences, according to what general or specific natural laws — that can and must be ascertained according to the methods of the experiential sciences, through observation and experiment. Perceptions, however, can be explored not only as factually existing states in the nexus of factual unities of consciousness, belonging to factual psycho-physical individuals in the factual world, irrespective of whether in the singular individual case or in experiential-scientific universality; rather, we can undertake an "eidetic reduction," exclude all questions about real factual existence, about the judgment-posting of the latter, and carry through the attitude of purely eidetic investigation. We concern ourselves then with the *eidos*, the essence "perception," and with what belongs to a "perception as such," as it were to the sense, ever the same, of possible perception in general. And likewise for every essential sort of perception, e.g., perceptions of physical things, perception of sensuous appearances (which are not given in consciousness as physical things), perceptions of lived-processes of consciousness and the like. We therefore differentiate the "possible" perceptions in general according to basic types; for each one we ask what belongs to it essentially and what it requires according to its essence as necessarily belonging to it, what changes, transformations, connections it makes possible purely through its essence, whether with phenomena of the same sort or with those of another sort, etc. Precisely the same problems result for recollections, phantasies, expectations, obscure ideas, processes of thinking of every sort, processes of feeling, of willing. They, like every not only experientiable or factually experientiable but generally experientiable being (or, as we can also say, every Objectivity of fundamentally possible experience), present their essence to us, the individual intuition turns itself around, which itself is an eidetic possibility, into eidetic intuition, or into the attitude of the thinking which on the ground of Intuition grasps eidetic states of affairs in pure eidetic concepts and expresses them. The eidetic theory of lived-processes must take the lived-processes with the whole content with which they present themselves in the eidetic intuition, and as eidetic it rests (directed toward essences of psychic states, as it is) on psychological intuition, whether it be on psychological experience or on psychological fiction. The whole content of a lived-process standing

<41>

in the view of reflective inner experience, to the extent that this view can grasp at all, or the whole content of that which is given in the view of the reflection of inner phantasy, changes into the essence in the eidetic attitude. It loses only the relation to the fact of the experienced nature-actuality; the factually existent is changed into an essentially existent, the individually unique into a "universal"; likewise the fictive factual existence disappears with the fictive nature-actuality, the fictive individuality. From the lowest essences which stand as mere this-here in the eidetic view and, in complete fullness of content, are not apprehensible in rigorous concepts, consideration passes over to higher universalities, to the sharp separations according to sort, such as perception and recollection, perception and phantasy, thinking and willing, etc. Separations are to be carried out on concrete lived-processes through analysis; there are components to be picked out according to sort, basic sorts of non-sufficient moments to be distinguished; and every rational goal of a systematic analysis of lived-process is to be strived for with an immediately forthcoming multitude of special and completely determinate and obviously solvable problems. Since the "relation to something" and all sorts of correlates belong inseparably to the essence of the lived-processes that are there called intentional and that in a separating manifold of shapings will govern the preponderant interest, then these also cannot remain unmentioned and uninvestigated. The imposing themes of *noesis* and *noema* are necessarily to be treated both out of psychological interest and in the psychological-eidetic apperception. I say in psychological apperception because what is presented to the psychologist in his psychological intuition is precisely something psychic, psychic-real, that is to say the lived-processes in a given case as psychic states. And they enter into this realizing apperception with all that it requires, that is to say, they enter with the relation to space and time into the *eidōs*. Every experiential thesis drops out, even the actuality-thesis of the whole of nature with the space belonging to it, the time belonging to it, as with any eidetic intuition. The pure essence contains no other thesis than an eidetic thesis. That which is experienced is therefore precisely the same as that of the geometrician who turns usual empirical intuition of spatial things into the eidetic, whether it be figures on the board or even models that he gets out of the model closet. His interest is directed to the spatial shape, but not the experienced shape or the shape quasi-experienced in his phantasy, but rather the "pure" spatial shape, i.e., the shape-essence to be grasped in the eidetic attitude on the ground of empirical apprehen-

sions. To the extent that shape is a basically essential moment of the material thing as the *res extensa*, the geometrician, the essence-investigator of possible thing-shapes, is *eo ipso* simultaneously a rational physicist. Precisely so in the case of psychology. And precisely so everywhere that a region of realities is isolated originally and necessarily provides the foundation for two kinds of sciences, for experiential sciences and eidetic sciences. Experiential science pursues factual existence, the eidetic pursues the essence, and the same essence that makes up the "content" of the factually existent and the possible factual existent in general. Eidetic science everywhere precedes experiential science. What the region and what the eidetic content of the reality-shapes apprehensible in Intuition, and therefore also shapes of possible states and circumstances, prescribes *a priori* — that the experiential science can in no way do without. The eidetic truths are valid and are valid in unconditional universality and necessity for everything possible as well as for everything authenticating itself as actual in actually occurring experience. Theoretical experiential investigation does not presuppose the eidetic; the theoretical interest can direct itself to that which is experienced, can observe universal regularities in the experiencing, ascertain, order them, etc. There was an art of surveying before geometry; there was an astronomy before mathematical mechanics. There was also a developed psychology before eidetic psychology; there was one and there still is one in the form of modern experimental psychology. On the other hand it is clear that the constitution of this science must mean a decisive step forward by the corresponding experiential science, if in general the sum of the eidetic truths that belong to a regional sphere of reality is so great that it makes up the field of a proper great science. A science: that means an infinity of systematically connected truths explorable in systematic unity and naturally truths that do not lie at hand but rather are discovered only as fruits of arduous investigation. To recognize as possible and bring into methodical process a rational discipline that establishes or holds out a sure prospect of an infinity of truths for one of the great regions of experience, truths that are valid in unconditional necessity for everything of this region that is experientiable — to do this is to raise to a new level the regional experiential science belonging thereto. In this way physical natural science in the 17th century was raised to a new level through the recognition that geometry, long since established of course, is the foundation of a mathesis of nature encompassing not merely the shape of a physical-thing but the complete material thing, and that its construction must provide a foundation of

method for a new science incomparably more productive because illuminated by the light of rational mathematics. The belief that experience and induction (which was used, after all, long before Galileo and Kepler) made modern exact science — that amounts to a failure to understand the sense and the history of this science. As for psychology, on the other hand, to anyone who has assimilated only a bit of actual phenomenology in its sense and, out of the wealth of *definite* problems, has grasped with understanding a few connected groups of them (perhaps those touched upon in the present treatise) it must be clear that phenomenology, or better, the eidetic theory of lived-processes that is incorporated in the idea of a rational psychology, opens up an infinite field of truths which, as relating apriori to psychic states, endlessly enrich psychological cognition, and do so in a sense similar to that in which mechanical or kinematic and in general mathematical cognition apriori enrich empirical natural science. Whoever believes that psychology accomplishes through inner experience alone what is accomplished in phenomenology speaks just as wisely as does one who thinks that physical observation and experiment alone accomplish what geometry accomplishes for the physicist. Of course the state of affairs, without prejudice to a general analogy, is not the same, and so the comparison must not be exaggerated. Rational psychology is not mathematics, and specifically the phenomenology of lived-processes is not mathematics of lived-processes. Common to both is the fact that they are eidetic theories and eidetic theories connected to the regional apriori. But not every eidetic theory is of the mathematical type. Rather, that is a quite definite scientific-theoretical type, the form of which it is a task of another ontology to bring out systematically: namely, formal mathesis universalis (at one with formal logic). Which scientific-theoretical shaping (theory-form as I called it in the *Logical Investigations*) a regional eidetics has depends on the regional apriori.

If to such an apriori there belongs the idea "space," a certain "Euclidian Manifold," then this theory-form determines a mathematics; but the stream of lived-process offers in its essence nothing like a space, no orderly system of coexistence somehow analogous to space; it is not a field of a mathematics. Much is connected with the fundamentally different scientific-theoretical type. Obvious above all is this: that the number of immediately evident eidetic truths of geometry and of all nature-ontological disciplines is very small (to the extent that we have a right to orient ourselves according to physics and not according to the so-called descriptive natural sciences, about which investigations shall be made and appropriate clarifications

given in the continuing course of this work). The great mathematical sciences that give natural science the apriori of its sphere of being arise in pure deduction out of the few axiomatic bases. It is quite otherwise in rational phenomenology. The field of immediate insights is an endless one, and mediate derivation essentially plays a role only in the roundabout way via other sciences and their psychological significance.⁷

Connected with the sort of eidetic insights required here, however, is the fact that the beginner at first tends to let descriptive psychology and phenomenology blend with one another without distinction. Let us persist at first in not separating the eidetic theory of states of consciousness from transcendental phenomenology (as I did not yet separate them even in the *Logical Investigations*) since, for what follows, it does not matter. Phenomenology would immediately be recognized as an essentially new discipline and would in any case arouse respectful attention, if it built towers of formulae one on top of another and drew deductions in a mathematical manner and made an impression with the accessories of indirect methods, with tables, drawings, with instruments and experimental arrangements. Since it draws purely from intuition, what is it supposed to be that is new, what that is especially scientific? The psychologists say that if intuition is not something mystical then it is experience, and we use that anyway. Now, if the phenomenologist immerses himself in the inner analysis of experience instead of going over into the higher problem-situations of experimental psychology, he then performs a quite useful preliminary work, which best finds its place within modern "psychology." However, those who speak thus have not yet gone to the trouble of studying attentively what lies before them and have not heeded Chwolson's famous XIth Commandment, which one can also formulate in this way: never write a critique before you have understood what is being criticized, according to its simple sense. It makes no pleasing impression to observe how the critic disages where the author has asserted nothing, and a still less pleasant one if, along with that, he amiably agrees where the author likewise has asserted nothing. I have nothing else to say on the matter than the *Logos* article said, perhaps somewhat too conditionally. In every sphere of reality there is description, and description ascertains factual existence, *real/factual existence*. That is: all description expresses in words and word-significations what is *experienced*, whether in the

⁷On the difference between mathematical and phenomenological-descriptive methods, cf. also Book I of *Ideas*, §72.

<46> singular case or as universality of the experience, with which is connected the presumption that future experience would also establish something similar again as actually occurring in the world. "Experience teaches" — that means therefore: something of that sort has been established through perception as factually existent in nature-actuality, thus it is customarily in actuality according to collected experiences. Every description of nature, as carried out in the descriptive natural sciences, is of this sort. There is the description: the lion is yellow. Let us phantasmize blue-green lions, lions of all colors, but experience shows no such lions; therefore they do not occur in any natural history. Of course, the experiential science that we call psychology also describes objects that fall in its sphere; it describes types of characters, dispositions, etc. Not fictive ones but experienced ones. That is to say: they occur. Such is the actual human being of the actual world, or the actual brute. Fictive character types, dispositions, and the like are simply fictive. Newborn persons with a finished language, with complete mathematical knowledge, can be phantasmized, but no psychology will inquire about them. If it further describes various sorts of lived-processes, sensations, representations, feelings, then these again are naturally lived-processes that occur in actuality with brutes and humans. When, not infrequently, we hear that psychologists highly praise the works of the great poets as sources of psychological instruction, there are two reasons for it. In the first place, their opinion is this: it is a characteristic of the poetic genius that its experiential intuition, nature-observation, is the liveliest, richest one, carried out with the greatest intensity of the intuiting interest. Therefore that which is typical of the *actual* factual existence impresses itself upon the poet most deeply, and in his artistic forms he gives the complete expression to it. In the second place, their opinion is this: lively phantasy-intuition is for the psychologist just as good as actually occurring experience brought into play perhaps by external stimuli, since "psychologically" the "phantasy-image" has essentially the same psychic existence as the corresponding (only stronger, more lively) experiential image, even if not the same "Objective signification."

<47> Of course that is one of those fundamentally absurd assertions, as are only possible prior to phenomenology: in truth it demonstrates that phantasy and perception are radically separate sorts of lived-process. As always, even with such interpretations of the phantasy and the imaginative achievements of the artist, it holds that what intuition offers here and scientific description derives from it are exclusively *facts* of Objective actuality, lived-processes or types of

lived-process, as well as character types and types of disposition that have *factual* existence in human actuality.

On the other hand, in eidetic phenomenology there is not any description in this sense at all. In its domain every real factual existence, the whole spatio-temporal actuality, is in principle disconnected. Its ascertainties concern not realities but essences; its truths state what is valid for such essences, i.e., for everything falling under such essences *as such* in unconditioned necessity and universality. They speak therefore of lived-processes just as geometric truths speak of bodies, arithmetic truths of numbers, kinematic truths of movements: as little as these speak of the earth or even of the factual universe and the bodies, movements, numbers occurring in it, so little does phenomenology speak of psychic essences and psychic states in this universe, in some sphere or other of actual factual existence. Therefore, whenever the phenomenologist says there are lived-processes, there are psychic states such as perceptions, rememberings, and the like, his "there are" says exactly as much as the mathematical "there are"; for example, a series of numbers: there are relative prime numbers; there is no regular decahedron. This "there are" is established in both cases not through experience, but through eidetic seeing. Experience is a title for acts exhibiting factual existence, acts originally grasping as perception. But what the eidetic seeing brings to originary grasping are not particulars of factual existence but rather essences of lowest universality or, as species and genera, of higher universality; there does not need to be a particular corresponding to them, and if there should be something like that, then only actually occurring experience can exhibit it. Eidetic truths are absolutely binding ones, are intransgressible ones, not to be confirmed or refuted by any experience. Experiential truths, statements that posit factual existence according to their sense, that is to say require the experience of factual existence for their *establishment*, are accidental truths, which, just as they are established through experience, are also modified and annulled through experience: they are valid only presumptively, subject to further experiential confirmation. Even if the description of one's own and another's psychic states and flow of psychic states that binds itself to fact, that limits itself by *experience*, could satisfy the psychologist, in however narrowly limited a province, in such a way that in it eidetic descriptions and insights related to essential interconnections were dispensable, then there would exist in this a powerful enlargement of the cognition that the factual, in its descriptive make-up, has validity not only factually but also as a matter of eidetic necessity. And so in general it is very

<48>

important that we see that not only physical nature but also, in a still much wider scope, psychic nature, and in particular the stream of psychic states of animate subjects, is bound to apriori laws; that all cognition of matters of fact, all laws of matters of fact are regularities which stand out from a powerful background of apriori and absolutely necessary eidetic laws and which only in the individually real factual existence restrict what the stock of eidetic laws has left open: just as physical laws, under the forms of motion that kinematics fixes in absolutely firm and scientifically cognizable lawfulness, make their selection as possible according to experience, as possible under the given real circumstances in real actuality. That this is the case is indubitable truth for him who actually devotes himself to the sense of the present pieces of actual phenomenological research. To find one's way into the completely unaccustomed manner of eidetic seeing and inquiring is of course not easy, and moreover whoever is so fully satisfied by the manner and method of present-day experimental psychology as most representatives of this discipline seem to be, to him it is humanly tempting to do as the Abbé Galiani, who, as is known, refused to look through a telescope: he too was completely certain of his astronomy and fully satisfied with its manner. Here, too, the future will probably teach that evident data cannot be removed by not looking at them, and someday the psychologists will consider the "instrument" of phenomenological eidetic theory to be no less important, indeed at first probably very much more important, than mechanical instruments. The metaphor of the instrument naturally ought not to be pressed. The phenomenological method of course, enters just as little into competition with the experimental-psychological one as do the mathematical methods in physics with the physical ones. Experimental psychology should not be abandoned, but rather made incomparably more fruitful through the phenomenological founding, shaped through it in the genuine sense into an exact, rationally elucidating science. But of course the recognition of phenomenology will also contribute toward removing the over-estimation of the possible achievements of the experiment and toward making it evident that the state of affairs for psychology is for essential reasons not one fully analogous to that in physical natural science, and that with this is connected an incomparably greater significance of intuitive eidetic cognition for the former. And that will also hold quite especially for that completely different sort of psychology which we have not yet appreciated and whose quite differently founded sort has become important only to individual investigators: *psychology as socio-cultural science*. Of course, whoever says such things is listened to

<49>

nowadays very reluctantly and exposes himself to strong repudiations. One speaks of an "attack" against experimental psychology, one acts as if through such utterances (and I did not in the *Logos* essay make others) this science and its investigators were being disparaged, as if an unworthy note were being sounded against them, etc. If I may insert a word here to counter this, then I would like to point to the fact that I have never uttered a word that would go against the obvious respect to which the new experimental psychology is fully entitled, as much as any other science, by virtue of the earnest and, within certain limits, also very fruitful work and by virtue of the significance of its representatives. Opposed to this, there is of course no fundamental criticism reaching to the roots of psychological method. Are the great surgeons such as Volkmann or Billroth less great surgeons because surgery, and likewise the whole of medical therapeutics, is only to a slight extent so founded on natural scientific theory as must be required and as they themselves of course have required? Would anyone have encroached upon their greatness who had furnished through radical criticism the demonstration for this, if they had themselves not perceived it?

Of course I have also said, and I thereby touch sensitivities that I had to touch for the "sake" of the plight of modern academic philosophy, that the mixing of natural scientific psychology and philosophy has lent support to a not only false but also shallow philosophy that considers itself to be philosophy and yet sees no fundamental philosophical problem at all. Every genuine philosopher in our time knows this state of affairs; there is only one voice concerning it; and each one values in the same manner a broad stream of our philosophical literature that goes under the banner of psychological and natural-scientific philosophy. The older representatives of psychology, who as a result of their education still had an inner feeling for philosophical problems and also took part in genuine philosophical work, underestimated the danger of our situation. The younger generation of psychologists, crushed by the monstrously swollen experimental-psychological literature and the difficulties of the construction and control of the technical means, necessarily lacks this feeling, which is simply not to be acquired incidentally through zealous philosophical reading. It falls prey to an unclear and superficial naturalism that goes over so comfortably with the scientific investigator of nature, and it shows its appropriateness for philosophical lectures through literary productions that sin against the idea of a scientific philosophy. I will never take back a word of this judgment, but it does not concern psychology and also not the psychologists as

<50>

such and in general, but rather precisely those psychologists who take philosophy too lightly. An excellent example of this is G. Anschütz in his treatises on psychological method: treatises that deal with the fundamental essentials of method, that is, claim to be philosophical. Every word that he says about phenomenology there is not only wide of the mark but completely misses the sheer sense — not to mention all the censure that must fall on him because of an unbelievably frivolous account. The author appears not even to have become aware that reports publicly made about literary utterances of another must be drawn from an attentive study of his writings, that frivolous falsifications of alien views serve only to degrade their author in the eyes of non-oriented readers, in short, that there are rules of literary decency and that there is such a thing as literary responsibilities.

Let it here be expressly added that the critical refutation of the opinion that one can obtain phenomenological results from natural-scientific experimental psychology, which has arisen only out of a misunderstanding of phenomenology as an empirical analysis of one's own sets of psychic states (or, if one wishes, of one's own lived-processes grasped in inner perception or memory), in no way implies that experimental arrangements cannot acquire phenomenological function in a good sense. Whenever I spoke in my critiques about experimental psychology I stressed sharply enough its essence as experiential science. Indeed the word "experiment" expresses this; it is supposed to have, of course, the same sense as in talk about experimental physics. On the other hand, the exclusion of *experience* for the grounding of cognition does not imply the exclusion of experience as a foundation for the Intuitive conception of the essence. The scientific investigator of nature needs experience because he seeks factual truths; the investigator of essence needs no experience, because he seeks eidetic truths: experience *grounds* none of his truths for him. What he needs, however, is intuition; he needs clear apprehensions of single moments of the essence to be viewed; he operates with exemplary intuitions. In principle now, of course, intuitive phantasies can serve him just as well as perceptions, and it lies in the nature of things that to an incomparably broad extent his eidetic thinking is guided by phantasy. Only it, with its freedom of shaping, gives him, as it does every eidetic investigator, the ability to run through freely and on all sides the endless manifolds of possibilities, here of possibilities of lived-process (to see universalities according to eidetic law, to attack problems like those of the constitution of real things in general). On the other hand, however,

phantasy has well known disadvantages. It does not stand firm, even if it was clear; it quickly loses its fullness; it sinks into the semi-clear and the dark. Naturally the phenomenologist will therefore, wherever he can, draw from the primal source of clarity, from the fully living "impression," no matter how little he may be interested in factual existence. And why then should instrumental aids and experimental arrangements of the same sort as otherwise serve *experientia* not also be able to help obtain intuitive material of the best sort? Even if that is not possible everywhere and in the freest measure, it is possible to a great extent particularly in the field of sensuousness, not merely of the sensuousness of sensation but also of the sensuous intuitions and valuations and volitions. But naturally also beyond this. In this sense every phenomenologist continually makes experiments; naturally without useless protocol, with the fixing of all experimental conditions, description of all arrangements, etc. For the experiment indeed is not supposed to furnish any experience of something real (which is the object of investigation in its "circumstances" by virtue of being directed toward its causalities), but rather a bare exemplary intuition as foundation of an eidetic seeing. The excellent instrumental means of the psychological experiment can also function usefully in this regard, with completely altered method again, according to the altered purpose. In this regard, there are already little beginnings, arisen not out of psychology itself but out of the suggestions of phenomenology, which will surely find their continuation. One should note well that this is not a retreat, but rather confirms precisely what has been said in the *Logos* article and here. (Concerning this possibility of artificial arrangements for the procuring of the exemplary intuitions I have often enough spoken as an academic teacher for a number of years, and I already took the first works of the Würzburg school on the experimental psychology of thinking as the occasion once for discussing in seminar exercises the methodological differences between the psychological and phenomenological experiment, precisely in the manner described here.) The way the external arrangements function here is in principle completely of the same sort as those which the geometers use. The beautiful collections of models that our mathematical institutes keep serve fruitful investigation and teaching, just as well as the drawings on the board and on paper. In principle they achieve no more than the geometrical phantasy over into which they are obviously simultaneously called to lead one; they serve indeed the grasping of essence, but they excite exemplary intuitions, and that has the advantage spoken of. If the phantasy does not want to do us the favor of

<51>

<52>

<53>

furnishing us clear intuitions, then we force the intuition precisely through perception⁸ and thereby simultaneously make possible an aliveness of freely transforming phantasy relating to it.

§9. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION
FOR THE REALM OF EXPERIENCE.

The assertion, that psychology must attain a new rank through the phenomenological investigation of consciousness and the total sphere of lived-processes with their eidetic correlates, is not, however, constructed *a priori* but has arisen out of the recognition of the enormous difficulties in the phenomenological analysis of lived-process according to their moments and strata of lived-process, according to the interweaving of their connections, of their modes of flow, according to their Ego-relations and noematic relations, and this naturally in connection with the obvious insight that all of that enters into the empirical apperception as psychological states and must be well known if psychology is to have at all the capability of expressing in rigorous concepts what the stream of lived-process as a total state of the psyche continually altering itself really is and what the psychic fact within such a total state really is, whose causal-real connection it wants to bring to cognition. Whoever is a stranger to phenomenology does not have the remotest idea of the difficulties, complications, and the manifold eidetic necessities that hold sway here, even if he has done research all his life in the style of the new psychology. For that simply does not lie on the paths of the latter, as any glance into the psychological textbooks and treatises readily shows. Therefore it is indeed wrong when one tries to obtain *phenomenologically* relevant results by the polling of experimenters, that is to say, highly skilled psychologists, and by the study of their protocols. Certainly, every analysis carried out in actual experience can be phenomenologically useful, but on the one hand the limiting to analysis of experience would not make possible any phenomenology that is in any way sufficient; on the other hand, it is no small matter to let the purely given actually come to expression *vis à vis* all transcendences surging into the intentionality of the experiential attitude. The natural scientific attitude is, according to its essence, directed toward the real-causal in the context of actual factual existence. One must radically alter this attitude in order to be able to

⁸Cp. the treatise of Geiger, who expresses himself the same way.

obtain any serious description of the statal, as it is a lived-process. Through the fundamental suspension of the experiential attitude and of all interests directed toward cognition of the real actuality, which phenomenology as eidetic theory carries out, much is therefore already obtained. Whoever lives with the experiential-scientific interest does not see the lived-process from the outset even if he wants to see it, wants to direct his gaze toward it; only when this interest ceases to be the driving force, only when the transcendences that it forces into the gaze lose their power does the lived-process stand firm; then the approach to the given can progress with patient research. Only then can there also come to consciousness the necessity of the further reductions that are interwoven with the growing insight that one must distinguish between immanent and transcendent even in the case of that which is grasped in the eidetic attitude, and that in this regard various things must be separated which of course belong essentially to the lived-process. Whoever is phenomenologically skilled sees right away that all the well-meaning descriptions of psychology scarcely scratch the surface and are essentially wrong even for the surface. One only needs to look at the naive way in which one currently operates with the key words: act, content, object of objectifications, and how under each of these headings, so to speak, everything possible is confused; or to look at the inability of the usual descriptions to understand and to describe in rigorous concepts such cardinal distinctions as those between presentation and the various modes of presentation, e.g., between material perception, corresponding phantasy, memory, expectation, image-intuition, as well as the inability of seeing thereby that in every presentation, in the purest phantasy, a higher level of intentionality, and a radically novel one, is already at hand. And so one could take hold at whatever places one wanted; it would be instructive to illuminate all the completely false problem formulations (e.g., in the so much discussed questions about the "origin" of ideas of space, time, and thing) that arises only out of the lack of pure phenomenological analyses.

But we cannot enter into that here, and moreover it is not even necessary. Anyone who has become acquainted with the phenomenological method and has learned pure seeing, sees it right away and with all desirable clarity. In fact, it is only a question of that, while, as long as such acquaintance is lacking, the impression is predominant and quite understandable that with phenomenology it is a matter of a few meagre distinctions, of something like analytical space-work that one would incidentally tend to where it was necessary between the toils of experimental work. One just cannot see ahead of time what a

<54>

<55>

wealth of difficult and absolutely fundamental investigations are necessary here, and how poor is that which we know so far about consciousness and its eidetic structure. Not until we know something about it and only insofar as we know something about it, namely through pure Intuition, do we have the ground of the describing concepts, the scientifically rigorous and valuable psychological concepts.

What makes them valuable is not verbal univocality, obtained by differentiating the empty word-significations already at hand, but rather the adaptation to the essences separated out in Intuition by analytical study and differentiated from everything interwoven with them. A great number of new concepts is obtained, and the connection to words of the language has only the function of indicating the approximate direction in which they lie, or of making easier by means of pictorial expressions the retention (and for the learner the grasping) of the eidetic moments that are seen.⁹ If one has conquered the thorny path through the entrance gate of phenomenology, if the endless horizon of the new science that appears here as the foundation of rational psychology opens up, then one comes to understand how much phenomenological purposes owe to phantasy-Intuition (and naturally also artistic imagination), and how without the freedom of its movement there would be no thought at all of pursuing systematically and according to essence the connections of the possible formation of consciousness (noematic and noetic) and of penetrating beyond the accidental singularizations of essence-apprehensions to the overwhelming insight into the total structure of consciousness, into the fundamental constitutions that govern it with all its noematic possibilities and, therefore, for all possible worlds. Anyone who has obtained even an inkling of what must actually be achieved here, obtained it through our explanations of the problem of the constitution of realities (or better said: through our suggestions — for only great systematic presentations can give real explanations) will understand, even if he has no philosophical interest at all, what a sum of possible cognitions the free phantasy, if it is the underlying basis of phenomenological eidetic research, would have to offer a scientific psychology. It is actually as the old rationalists believed: an infinity of possibilities precedes actuality. Thus the systematic infinity of the geometric possibilities of physical actuality, thus the infinity of possible formations of consciousness and noematic formations of

psychological actuality and psychology regulated by eidetic necessity — *per se* eidetic necessity. It does not help at all to close one's eyes here; rational psychology is a great science, and it circumscribes the apodictic regulative possibilities to whose absolutely fixed frame the psychological actualities are bound.

§10. RELATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY TO THE WRITINGS OF BOLZANO, LOTZE, AND BRENTANO.

For the cause which I espouse here the following remark will also be useful: with the misunderstanding of the essence of phenomenology is connected the fact that recently, and probably with regard to the impulses that I have received from Lotze and Bolzano and of which I am aware as always with the greatest gratitude, some have called these great investigators founders of phenomenology and have done so in such a manner that it must simply seem as if the best way into phenomenology would be by returning to their writings as the primal sources of the new science. But the great *Logik* of Bolzano has so little pertinence here that he had not even the slightest inkling of phenomenology — of phenomenology in the sense that my writings represent.¹⁰ From the idea of an eidetic investigation of Intuition, from that of an a priori that arises here, a founding of philosophy and psychology upon eidetic cognition, Bolzano is as far removed as Mill, since extreme empiricist utterances are found in his works which are no less so than those of Mill. My way to phenomenology was essentially determined by the mathesis universalis (Bolzano did not see anything of this either), and for the conception of the idea of such a mathesis, to which I was pushed by my studies on formal mathematics, the sketch by Bolzano of a limited bit of this idea, a bit of the theory of propositions in themselves and truths in themselves, was of inestimable value. Had I not already had the pure idea in the mathematical sphere and not already had it also for the sphere of logical mathematics, which in the most recent period has been worked out (independently of Leibniz), then I would have seen the *sense* of Bolzano's theory just as little as all those have seen it who use and cite his *Theory of Science*. The extensive working out of a pure logic of ideas and propositions in themselves, which in no way were recognized by Bolzano as ideal essentialities of the eidetic Intuition in

<57>

⁹Concerning the use of pictorial expressions, cf. the apt discussions by Pfänder: "Zur Psychologie der Gesinnungen", *Jahrbuch*, Vol. I, p. 330.

¹⁰I must add here that the word has become a vogue-word and now just about every author who undertakes to endow the world with a philosophical reform is pleased to bring his ideas into circulation under the heading of phenomenology.

<58> my Platonizing sense, gave me a firm substrate for reflection; with this, as with the whole formal mathesis, are connected the *problems* that forced me to progress from psychology to phenomenology. But even the *problems* were alien to Bolzano. One can learn from him much formal logic, for he was a great investigator in that and not, as Windelband says, an insignificant ponderer; but phenomenology is just as little to be learned from him as critique of reason.

As for Lotze, on the other hand, for all his ingenious remarks in individual cases, he lacks a sense for the radical investigation of principles. It was nowhere his way to return to the ultimate roots and, while putting aside all theoretical preconceptions, to feel his way laboriously upward along the branchings of the problems to the clear, radically established truth. He had his system continually before his eyes at every step; he continually lived in the interest of reconciling understanding and emotion. Radical research, however, is disinterested research. His ingenious interpretation of Platonic theory of ideas will be his greatest, his unforgettable achievement. He has so little drawn the consequences that even today I must still characterize his epistemology as a contradictory hybrid, a product of the incompleteness that balks at ultimate consistency. His "phenomenology" reduces itself to the reference to a few apriori relations in the sphere of sensuous contents; in this connection he lacks, if one looks more closely and does not ascribe to his beautiful sentences a sense foreign to them, the genuine concept of the *essence* to be grasped by eidetic intuition, which could present an *absolute* measure of the truth. He occasionally touches on this sense but only to let it go again in favor of quite worthless concepts of aprioris. Finally, that there could be such a thing as an eidetic doctrine of consciousness at all, and further an eidetic doctrine of the relations of consciousness and noema of consciousness, a constitution of objectivities, etc., of that he never had a notion and therefore had no notion of what *we* here call phenomenology. We do not detract from his greatness, the importance of his impulses, and the gratitude that we owe him when we ascertain this *fact*.

<59> Finally, some take phenomenology as a kind of continuation of the psychology of Brentano. However highly I value this ingenious work, and however strongly it (and also the other writings of Brentano) influenced me in younger years, it must, nevertheless, also be said here that Brentano remained far from a phenomenology in our sense, and that remains so to the present day. But this so much so that he completely declines to recognize the new movement as a step forward. Nevertheless he has acquired epoch-making merits precisely

for making phenomenology possible. He offered the modern period the idea of *intentionality* drawn from the consciousness itself in immanent description; although he often oversteps (as I would say) the lines of pure description, at least many of his concept formations have their source in actual intuition. Thus they could and had to have educative effect for intuition in general and therefore also according to the performed turn in eidetic intuition; but he did not see the essence of intentional analysis.¹¹

§11. DIFFERENCES IN THE RELATIONS OF PHYSICS AND PSYCHOLOGY TO THEIR ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DESCRIPTION IN BOTH SCIENCES.

Not the least thing that leads the psychologist into error is that in the conviction that his science is natural science he is so very inclined to let himself be led by the model of physical natural science and understandably then of physics. To be sure physics rests on rational disciplines, but of quite different fundamental character from that of phenomenology. Phenomenology is an infinite field of eidetic analyses and eidetic descriptions, but not a field of deductions; rational natural science, e.g., pure geometry or kinematics, is an infinite field of deductions but not a field of eidetic analyses and descriptions. Geometry begins by fixing a few concepts derived from intuition. Obviously the conceptual essences are taken from the intuition of spatial formations in a manner that demands no great formalities ("reductions," "analyses"). There arise immediate eidetic insights which are expressed as axioms in conceptual thought: a few axioms and everything else is formal deduction according to the principles of the formal mathesis (for which, by the way, *mutatis mutandis*, i.e., in the framework of formal eidetic intuition, exactly the same thing holds).

In empirical natural science we find then, to be sure, very much description, whole "descriptive natural sciences," and for the de-

¹¹ Not in the sphere of sensuous materials, the apriori of the color and tone orders noted by Lotze, but rather in the full and whole stream of lived-processes and above all in the consciousness with its intentionality and its intentional meanings lie the great problems and investigations of phenomenology. It is those that lay the ground specifically for psychology and on the other hand for the critique of reason. Whoever thinks here that, in the case of phenomenology related to the concrete, complete stream of the pure Ego-processes with the pure Ego itself, it is a matter of something analogous to colour and tone orders does not of course find the way to phenomenology and understandably does not comprehend how such things should mean so much psychologically and philosophically.

scriptive concepts one immediately looks around, when one is coming from phenomenology, for the eidetic regions from which the descriptive concepts would, through Intuition, have to draw their normative essences. There must nevertheless then be a rational discipline that would have to be a fundamental field for eidetic descriptions and would have to serve as the valid foundation of natural science. But here we find the amazing situation that description in the sphere of nature claims no objective validity in the full sense at all, that it claims and strives for nothing so little as for that conceptual rigor which we in psychology, if it is supposed to be a rigorous science, set down as a vital matter, and that description in part even plays a total different role in external nature than in psychic nature. As it is also shown therein that the external description of the descriptive sciences is no theoretical foundation for the explanation of the "abstract" sciences, the nomologically explanatory sciences. Mineralogy, geology and all so-called descriptive sciences are not foundations of physics at all. Physics "explains" what they "describe," but it itself is not built up on descriptions. The procedure of physics, the science of objective nature in its pure objectivity, is a remarkable one as regards the concrete intuitional basis of which it, of course, like every science, makes use. It operates, works with intuitively given things; it names them; it therefore also uses descriptive concepts. But there is nothing to be noticed of a toilsome fashioning of concepts out of sensuous intuition, of a complicated scientific work of clarifying the pre-given empirical concepts that everyday life has formed on intuitions, a grasping of essences and a delimiting of essences to be carried out by eidetic analysis. But there does not have to be present any need at all for these, since it is a matter of such a highly developed science. The psychologist, now consciously, now unconsciously imitating the procedure of physics, likewise has a fresh go at it; he takes the human being and his psychic life in the context of nature as the physicist takes the material things: without entering into eidetic descriptions, he goes immediately into the causalities; he experiments, varies the circumstances and pursues the real dependencies, contenting himself at first, simply and rightly, with the concepts that he has beforehand and that he transforms only according to the motives that the causal investigation offers him and that he connects with other concepts already transformed in accordance with such motives. On the other hand, it had always been felt within psychology itself that something was lacking, that the state of affairs was not the same after all. Hence the esteem, at least with regard to theory, of "descriptive"-psychological research and the

repeatedly and vigorously stressed necessity of such research; indeed, according to Brentano's procedure one went so far as to demand a *specifically psychological discipline* under the heading "descriptive psychology," as a lower-level of "genetic," real-causally explanatory psychology. In this connection it is significant that under this heading "descriptive psychology" there is not missed, sought, or used a description of the sort which really forms the analog of the descriptive natural-scientific sort, that is to say, not anything like description of the different types of habitual dispositions, character-, racial-types, and the like, but rather the descriptive analysis of the "data of inner experience." And therewith it was not even noticed that in descriptive psychology, to the extent that it actually did some good, experience as such — the restriction to the actuality of the imminent "psychic phenomena" that is fixed by the actually occurring doxic theses — was completely irrelevant, and all investigation was to be carried out without further ado in the *eidetic attitude*, wherever not already carried out unnoticed. The full clarification of the situation on the part of the *physical* natural sciences, an understanding of the sense of natural-scientific description and explanation drawn from the *essence* — the answering of the questions touched on above about the a priori of the description: those are problems whose solutions are of great importance in themselves and particularly significant in the context of the sphere of problems of the phenomenological constitution of nature-objectivity, and therefore also for a phenomenology and theory of nature-cognition. We shall let the investigations relative thereto follow below. What we have said *here* will probably suffice, however, to arouse the consciousness of differences in the states of affairs on the natural-scientific and psychological side.

We give it a form still richer in content by pointing to the fact that the chief essential make-up of the *description-concepts of descriptive natural sciences* stands in a fundamentally different relationship to the objects of physical nature than does the whole eidetic content of the descriptive concepts of "descriptive psychology" to the objects of psychic nature.

Let us observe the situation on the side of natural science. One notices that its descriptive concepts mainly stem from that level of the object-constitution on which realities are already constituted as complete for intuition, but realities which, from the standpoint of the ultimately valid idea of nature-Objectivity, are mere "appearances." All properties of these appearances (therefore already real properties), which have not yet shed the relation to the accidental subject, or to the accidental sensibility, belong in the class of the "secondary

qualities," while the "primary" ones are defined accordingly as "Objective" properties. Precisely this difference is the matter in question. *Vis à vis* the real as appearance stands the real as thing itself, as a thing of physics. The first is the thing experienced univocally by the individual subject of normal sensibility, colored, brilliant, sounding, etc., found thus by it and legitimating itself as truly existent. For each subject of the same normal sensibility there is constituted a corresponding phenomenal thing which is identified reciprocally in the reciprocal understanding: the unity being constituted in the univocal experience of the I_1 is the same as the one constituted in the experience of the I_2 . But even if all experiencing subjects were actually of the same "normal organization of senses" and were all experiencing under corresponding "normal" circumstances, so that the appearances belonging to the different subjects agreed exactly, which appearances are related in the identification to the same Objective thing — even if this were so, agreement would nevertheless be accidental. Physics *eliminates* the relation to the "normal organization." It says: normality is something accidental, completely relative, and accordingly that Objectivity which is constituted out of such agreement is not any less a relative and accidental one. What is at one time called normal can at another time be called abnormal, and conversely. Physics therefore rejects as a measure of Objective being this and any normality, and also the relation to "normal circumstances," such as bright daylight and the like, which plays a pervasive role for the constitution of the true thing in the sphere of intuition, or in the sphere of accidental subject-relation. Rather, it apprehends the thing really (intuitively) experienced by the subject as appearance, and if the subject, entering into dealings with other subjects and coming to agreement with them, identifies its phenomenal thing with that of the others and experiences that they do the same, then physics does not for that reason apprehend this thing according to the stock of identifiable predicates of intersubjective intuition as the Objective one, but only as intersubjective "appearance" of the true one.

Because it is so easily overlooked, it must be especially stressed for the understanding of this state of affairs that there is posited by the subject engaged in physics and by his intuitive surrounding world a fixed circle of other subjects with their intuitive surroundings who have dealings with him, and, to be sure, not merely with regard to the accidental, *factually* experiencing subjects, but the *possible* subjects in general. The subject, we can also say, has his surrounding world, which through the stock of his constitutive experiential intuitions is

posited as an infinite one, a world of limitlessness in the progression of possible experiences. With it endlessly many organisms for other subjects are included as experienceable entities, and thereby a determinate framework is predelineated again for infinitely many subjects agreeing with the subject and among one another, which, although encompassing infinitely many possibilities, is nevertheless a framework for prescribed possibilities. It belongs to the essence of this ideal, infinite, communicating group that each subject in it represents every other one, that each one can withdraw and new ones can always enter, but that on the other hand the total framework is fixed by *some one* individual and *factual* subjectivity and its sphere of intuition which belongs to this framework, to the extent that this subjectivity, if it is the point of departure of the constitution of this manifold, is not only included in the latter but also deems equal to itself every other subject posited through interpretation [*Eindutung*]. To this ideal infinite plurality of subjects that is nevertheless encumbered with factuality through *individual* factual existence the *objectivity of nature is essentially related*. The subject in physics, that is to say the one thinking in terms of physics in a particular case, takes his intuitive things, likewise those of any other subject of his social environment, completely as appearance. Many subjects can "accidentally," but not necessarily have the same phenomenon, i.e., it can be accidental that they find themselves agreeing with each other, that they perceive the same thing and harmoniously experience the same thing in their — each in his own — experiential sphere, and that each one must describe with similar experiential concepts what he has experienced, which is the same for all. The intersubjective thing thus described is merely "phenomenal thing" by virtue of its contingency. It is stipulated, however, that experiential factual existence, and, to be sure, a real factual existence, is motivated and that the agreement motivates the factual existence of the same real thing as being experienced by different subjects. This same thing, however, has its true being not in the relative and accidental, but in something necessary, in something that *any* possible subject of the predelineated ideal community can bring out and determine in rational experiential thought on the ground of his "appearances" and the communications of others concerning their "appearances" (i.e., concerning their experiential thing with merely "secondary" predicates), and that each one can bring out and determine as identical substratum of completely identical properties and, if it proceeds rationally (in the natural-scientific method), must bring out and determine in full according with every other one. The method of this determination is

<65>

<64>

the achievement of physics. The Objectively true thing receives exclusively physical ("primary") properties that document themselves in the "appearances" with their "phenomenal properties," the "secondary" ones, but do not themselves appear in them, are not themselves phenomenal properties of higher order. In other words: with the establishment of natural science mankind made the discovery that the world of actually present experience, the actual, subjectively and intersubjectively intuitive world, has a "true" "nature," a nature in a new sense according to which this whole experiential world is the mere appearance of an Objective nature exclusively determined by "exact" mathematical-physical predicates, absolutely not intuitable, not experienceable, and, to be sure, a nature cognizable by the methods of the investigation of nature on the basis of the experiences in experiential-logical thought. The *subject itself as Objective factor*, however, enters this Objective nature in the following form:

<66> There is a unique physical nature (belonging to "our" *ideal sociality* in the sense described above) with the one Objective space and the one Objective time, consisting of nothing but physical things that are characterized purely by concepts having the exactness ascribed in physics. To the class of physical things belong, among other things, *organisms*, which are according to their physical "nature": therefore, likewise mere carriers for abstract thought symbols peculiar to physics, but appurtenantly distinguished by a new stratum of real properties, the "aesthesiological" one. These properties are not, therefore, unities for thinking, related to unities of "appearances," but rather are given or to be given *themselves*, experienceable according to their very own being, excluding according to their essence anything like making known through appearance. Every organism has, without prejudice to the type of the aesthesiological reality, its varying "sensuous organization," functionally dependent on the varying physical nature of the organism. To the organisms belong psyches with real psychic properties, again new real properties again themselves given and making themselves known in the intuition itself and without appearance. Every psyche has, without prejudice to its general psychic sort, its particular and varying psychic organization. All these real unities and their real properties are determinable in their manner, according to the particular and general, in the interconnections of their foundation, that is to say on the ground of the interconnected experience. By recourse to these interconnections and Objectively valid truths belonging to them a physiological (aesthesiological) psychology explains the fact that to every psyche, or to

every psychic subject, the same nature-thing can, and, in any particular case under the given real circumstances, must appear different; and different even to the very same psyche, if the sensuous organization of its organism and perhaps its psychic apprehensional dispositions undergo alterations that are conceivable even under its real circumstances. In the same manner as the alterations of appearance, the alterations of objectively invalid, even though perhaps subjectively useful, modes of judgment, and further, all differences of subjectivity and Objectivity, must be capable of being explained.

If we have correctly characterized the essential sense of the natural-scientific cognition and cognitional Objectivity, and have done so correctly also in the connection — important for us — with the aesthesiological and psychological cognition, then we can now draw the conclusion.

Accordingly, from the standpoint of *Objective* natural science, descriptive natural science represents only a lower level of cognition, that level where the ultimately valid Objectivation is not yet carried out, one satisfying aesthetic and practical and whatever other interest, but not the theoretical interest in nature as it is "Objectively" "in itself." A closer examination of the method of physics allows it to be understood why the physics indeed starts as a matter of course with "appearances," since it is only from appearances of this sort that something Objective can be brought out and determined; that physics, therefore, no less as a matter of course talks about them and describes them; that it has no interest at all, however, in fixing the appearances (in the style of the descriptive natural sciences *systematically* in relation to a human normality), but only in naming them sufficiently for the purposes of Objective-causal analysis according to the universal phenomenal-properties that come into question. Fine distinctions do not matter to the physicist, since all exact determination pertains to the Objective sphere and the appearance is not in itself the Object of interest but rather only a manifestation of Objective properties: not the actually experienced color manifolds as such, but the experienced color as a manifestation of the Objective optical occurrences brought out by thought in the experiential thinking and determined according to thought, of which occurrences mathematical optics sketches and theories; and likewise everywhere.

Quite different is the state of affairs in the sphere of psychological and aesthesiological description. The psyche is not a substance of appearances; the parallel of appearance in the sense indicated above is lacking, as, of course, in general there is lacking here the entire exceedingly complicated system of constitutive unities, each of which

is "appearance" in relation to the unity of the higher level and is for its part a unity that appears in appearances of lower level (sensuous schemata, sight things of various levels and strata, adumbrations). The psychic unity is constituted directly in its states, and the psychic states — those are the "lived-processes of consciousness," themselves given adequately and without mediation by appearance in the plane of immanent temporality (in which all our analyses are kept). The falling away of "relativity" onto the apprehending subjects. There exists the possibility of "deception" but not of the "consideration from different standpoints.")

These lived-processes as belonging to the true being of the psyche itself are therefore the *theme* of psychology itself and not, say, merely media through which the theme can first be obtained. There is here, therefore, a cardinal difference in the mode of the psychic constitution vis à vis the thing-constitution, which difference determines the method. The *intuitive* thing, the thing of my direct experience, legitimates itself in the sensuous scheme similar to the way the psyche does in its states of consciousness. If the intuitive thing were the Objectively actual one, that of physics, then the physicist, too, would have to describe the sensual schema in any particular case as the momentary and changing state of the physical property, and the physical properties themselves would contain as unified the secondary qualities that would now find their expression in the descriptive concepts. By virtue of the fact that the intuitive thing is a mere "appearance" of the thing of physics, which is itself not even to be had intuitively, and therefore is never *properly speaking* experienced, that which is experienced and its experiential properties are also not the theme as conceived in physics but only a means of coming to the theme. In psychology, however, there are no "appearances" of the psyche, but rather experience of it itself, experience, as there can be experience of something real at all through those states being experienced which now belong to the scientific theme as states of the real and require scientific description. We can also say: if we understand by "description" the conceptual expression of the perceived itself, i.e., of that which is in the proper sense experienced, then the *psychological description* determines the psychic itself, and the psychological description of the lived-processes determines the psychic itself with regard to its states, to which we are obviously led back in all other psychological descriptions. The *natural-scientific description* determines only an appearance, not, however, *that itself* which is supposed to be determined. Thus the infinite field of lived-processes becomes for psychology an infinite field of determinative description,

without whose rigorous scientific shaping it cannot make the claim of being rigorous science. The rigorous shaping of the description, however demands phenomenological analysis; the concepts are only scientific if their pure essences are grasped and rigorously separated and differentiated in their essential interconnection. If one considers now the enormous difficulty (and that is no exaggeration) of keeping apart even only real and ideal components of the lived-process and of avoiding any interminglings from the actually present intentionality of the experiential attitude and of all the actually performed acts that are founded in what is to be described and interwoven with it; if one considers that all such differentiation can succeed only if the lived-process to be considered is subjected to modifications of essence that set its various sides and components in motion, or, if it is compared with many other kinds of possible lived-processes that contain similar sides or components of differing functions; if one recognizes the necessity of carrying out innumerable variations in the manifesting of the intentionality and reflections on the manner of the manifestations — then it is clear that any description restricting itself to the single lived-processes given in the actually present experience cannot furnish any valuable and binding results. That holds for the entire sphere of the psyche, not quite so much for the aesthesiological sphere, although here, too, the goal-conscious phenomenological investigation affords a far more profound insight.

The true method is therefore this: that not in experience, but in the pure essential interconnection, that not in empirical psychology, but in rational phenomenology, the entire work of differentiating essences and of conceptual apprehension of essences is performed, and that then in experiential science the mere application of the phenomenological results takes place. Therewith the cognition of the rational essential interconnections, which must nonetheless find their continual and necessary application in the sphere of experiential science, in that of psychology in the usual sense, is as a matter of course connected simultaneously with the description of essence.

Phenomenology is therefore nothing so little as it is mere descriptive psychology, and it is not even empirical-descriptive *eidetic theory*, i.e., exploration of the essences of lived-process in the context not of the actualities of lived-process given in experience, but rather, exploration of ideal possibilities of lived-process: however much this is something totally different from what has always been understood under the heading of descriptive psychology. Description of essence does not yet in itself produce eidetic law. On the other hand, however, the cognition of eidetic interconnections attaches itself

<70> immediately to the description of essence (namely, grasping of essences in Intuition and conceptual fixation of them), and in each one there already lies concealed a lawfulness in itself of an apriori sort. But, that this is so and that the stream of lived-process in general is no mere fact, but rather a singularization of an idea to which a great number of apriori interconnections belong that make up the fixed framework of all empirical possibilities — that is what one must, as a psychologist, make clear to oneself. (As, quite generally, the idea of a mere fact not standing under eidetic laws is a countersensical one, originating from a wrong interpretation of natural-scientific cognition!)

But it cannot then be an empty universal truth, but rather the recognition is necessary that the total domain of the phenomenological apriori, the total manifold of essences and eidetic laws, must be systematically worked out, and, to be sure, in the interest of experiential psychology itself. In this regard we can again reach back for and seize the comparison to physical natural science, since here again the analogy holds: one does not study the figures of the material bodies by description in experience, but rather at first apriori, as geometric ones. All study of the figures of factual bodies is application of geometric knowledge, and has to be. That is the only *correct* method. And the study of the pure body-shapes produces the system of geometric eidetic laws that make up the absolutely fixed framework to which all empirical movements and formations are restricted and which one must know in order to be able to deal scientifically with their empirical matters in mechanics. And precisely the relationship between phenomenology and natural-scientific psychology is exactly like that, with no prejudice to the differences that have been presented in detail and in the main, no doubt, made clear.

§12. FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY.

<71> We live in a time of great reversals. Rational ontology and rational psychology — how long will it last, and also rational cosmology and theology — the much maligned and apparently permanently abolished disciplines of past epochs, seem to be awakening again to life. But it would be bad if those dead should be awakened again which were alive only as materially insufficient convictions and had to pass away because what they set down as truth had no place in the realm of truth, of eternal life. Only the general idea of such rational

disciplines, but with completely new content, comes to life again in our analyses, and we may calmly trust that a rational psychology like that required here will hold its own sub specie aeterni. To such a rational psychology belongs along with the eidetic doctrine of lived-processes much else of course. Let us only point to the apriori make-up of the psychic Ego, to the doctrine of the pure Ego, etc. I cannot enter into more detail here; the reader will the more easily forego this as in this deliberation the thought has surely already thrust itself upon him that phenomenology really includes all of rational psychology, that remarkably, therefore, the part here devours the whole. If we pass from the empirical world, the empirical human being, the empirical psyche, to the psychic idea, we grasp the idea of all of the psychic sets of states, we isolate them abstractly as we isolate space and spatial shape when we do geometry, and we establish a pure eidetic doctrine of the lived-processes. Wherever the essence reigns, there we must not stop so long as eidetic necessities hold sway; we must pursue all necessary connections, all ideal and therefore inseparable connections, until the circle is closed. But what wonder! The stream of lived-process contains according to ideal possibility (that is therefore a necessary and apodictically necessary possibility) the cogito with Ego and cogitatum; and it contains in itself all sources for possible world-constitutions and psychic-constitutions. Pursuing the apriori we hit upon the eidetic doctrine of possible nature-cognition in general and therewith, in view of the correlates, upon all the transcendencies that we have come to know as various levels of physical constitution, as visual things, etc. And we hit upon empirical Egos, upon animate organisms. The eidetic analyses that are related to them are necessarily made members of the analyses of lived-process; the inquiry into the essence of the lived-processes requires that of the noemata, that of the regulations according to law which are laid out in them as ideal possibilities, that of the multifarious "unities" of "manifolds," each of which indicates a regulation of consciousness in general according to eidetic law. But consciousness in general is nothing other than lived-process in general and nexus of lived-process, or is included therein. Thus really, the part devours the whole, and rational phenomenology finally embraces not only the remaining rational psychology, but all rational ontologies — at least according to their axioms, to the extent that these express immediate essential interconnections of possible consciousness. But then do the deductively derivable propositions of ontology — the clarification of the sense of deductive performance makes this evident — not also in turn express possible interconnections of consciousness?

<72>

Therefore, is not all of geometry, rational kinematics, rational natural science in general and thus *every* rational discipline a piece of phenomenology? In proceeding from empirical psychology, as we continue on to the idea of rational psychology, phenomenology springs up for us as mere eidetic doctrine of the lived-processes, as states of a psyche that is thought of as being in regional universality. The psyche itself is subject to rational deliberation with all that which is due it as reality according to real properties, real circumstances, and real modes of behaviour. That eidetic doctrine is therefore a mere part. Rational psychology itself is presented as one rational discipline among others, interconnected with them, as the idea of its reality-mode requires as a mode in physical nature, then further, realities are objects and, like objects in general, stand under the laws of the formal mathesis, which therefore also stands as the mother, so to speak, of all ontologies in their series. But as we consider the necessary content of phenomenology we see ourselves pressed to fit into this ostensible part of rational psychology the whole of it, and now it devours all ontologies step by step.

It is of the greatest importance to gain the fullest clarity about the true state of affairs. For the psychologist, who treats phenomenology only as an auxiliary discipline and no more has a pure and independent interest in it than does the physicist in geometry, such questions are of little importance. For the investigator of experience it is really only a matter, here just as there, of his having the rational discipline belonging to his sphere and, where he has it imperfectly, of acquiring it through the actual effecting of the eidetic attitude and the investigations that are to be freely shaped within its framework. Thereby it is purely a question of his doings and not of his reflective "philosophical" ideas about it: as, indeed, it does no harm at all when the scientific investigators of nature, after they have done geometry in the eidetic attitude, not at all rarely explain afterward that this is nothing other than empirical science. Quite otherwise when the prevailing interests are precisely not experiential-scientific ones, but rather ones belonging to the theory of science, metaphysical ones, philosophical ones in some good sense, and when in particular the psychologist himself claims to be a philosopher at the same time. If he is not able to get rid of his prejudices that so easily become involved with the naive and experiential-scientific attitude, then he simply cannot be a genuine philosopher; he then engages in a shallow philosophy, a monster of natural science and philosophy. If he does not want that, then he must gain pure clarity, as we others do who

from the outset claim to be philosophers and nothing else.

We shall see that analogous questions will occur with regard to the cultural sciences and the ontology belonging to them. Wherever one begins, all eidetic truths, immediate or mediate, and therefore all rational disciplines that we already know or do not yet know, are, it seems, devoured by phenomenology; and since we tend so much, wherever the word "consciousness" or "lived-process" occurs, to presuppose psychology, even if it is rational psychology, psychology seems to devour everything. Indeed it seems to be obvious enough. Is, then, consciousness something other than something psychic, and is psychology something other than a science of the psychic? Can it be a matter of something other than scholastic subtlety if one still wanted to distinguish between the science of consciousness and psychology?

One also overlooks the fact that the thoughts immediately press on. As rational psychology seems to devour all rational disciplines, so, in connection therewith, does empirical psychology seem to devour all the empirical ones. Does not phenomenology in its ideal contemplation resolve the essence of all objectivities into unities of consciousness-manifolds; does not, therefore, the application to the empirically given imply that all *factual* existence of every sort reduces itself to interconnections of consciousness, factual interconnections, and, by annexation to the fact according to rules of eidetic law and empirical rules, ordered possibilities of interconnections of consciousness according to coexistence and succession? But consciousness, lived-process, is something psychic of course. Therefore we have the most beautiful "psycho-monism." Psychology embraces all sciences.

Reserving this last psycho-monistic question for later expositions, we want to bring the remaining ones to a solution while staying in our own context. First of all, it is of the greatest importance to be freed from the prejudice that lived-process, consciousness, is in itself something psychic, eo ipso a matter of psychology, whether it be of the empirical or the rational, eidetic (if one concedes such) psychology. Of course one must not quarrel over words, and since everyone is accustomed to be enamoured of his own terminology even when it deviates from the historical usage, the antipathy toward another word usage can quite easily be obstructive in seeing the distinctions of the matters themselves. Convinced that we are getting at the actually prevailing sense of psychology and the psychic, we shall continue to understand by the term "psychic" the psychic in the sense clarified by us — and this must be vigorously heeded. Then, a lived-process is something psychic as *state* of the psyche, i.e., of a human or animate Ego, of this reality founded in physical nature.

<75>

Whoever cannot free himself from this particular apperception, whoever cannot perform the phenomenological reductions and grasp the pure, absolutely posited lived-process, the pure consciousness as idea, to him is denied not only the penetration into transcendental phenomenology but also that into philosophy in general. The material thing, the animate organism, the psyche — these are quite determinate and particular transcendencies constituting themselves in their manner and fully understandably in the pure consciousness for the pure Ego, and only by reduction thereto is the "absolute" to be attained, which represents the absolute relational member for all realities whose being is entirely relative being. Pure consciousness has absolute priority in relation to which all being is the aposteriori, and this relation between apriori and aposteriori already belongs in the sphere of essence. Accordingly, it is a fundamental necessity, and of cardinal importance for philosophy, to lift oneself to the recognition that one must differentiate between the eidetics of *states* of consciousness, which is a piece of the rational ontology of the psyche, and the eidetics of the *transcendentally purified* consciousness (or of being lived-process), that the latter, the genuine and pure phenomenology, is just as little rational psychology as rational natural theory. Only one thing justifies characterizing — as we also did above — the eidetics of the psychic *states* of consciousness as phenomenology: namely, the circumstance already touched upon that the pure lived-process with its entire essence enters into the psychic state and experiences only an apperception that does not change the lived-process itself but rather apprehends it appurtenantly. It makes of the apriori an aposteriori and itself in turn presupposes the apriori. For it itself belongs to a pure Ego as its pure lived-process, to which, as to everything, belongs the eidetic possibility of being empirically apperceived and so in infinitum. These are connections which, when one has once understood them, possess nothing wonderful. The wonder of all wonders is pure Ego and pure consciousness; and precisely this wonder disappears as soon as the light of phenomenology falls upon it and subjects it to eidetic analysis. The wonder disappears by changing into an entire science with a plethora of difficult scientific problems. Wonder is something inconceivable; the problematical in the form of scientific problems is something conceivable, it is the unconceived that in the solution of problems turns out to be conceivable and conceived for reason.

CHAPTER THREE

<76>

THE RELATIONSHIP OF PHENOMENOLOGY
AND ONTOLOGY

§13. THE FIELD OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH.

Let us now turn to the general investigation of the relationship of phenomenology and ontology. We place ourselves on the ground of transcendental phenomenology. In transcendental experiencing, *all* "transcendent being," understood in the normal sense as true being, is suspended, "parenthesized." What is solely and alone to remain is "consciousness itself" in its own essence, and in place of transcendent being, the "being meant" of something transcendent and consequently all sorts of correlates, what is meant, the noemata. This was related in particular to the sphere of intentional lived-processes that also interests us again now in a preminent manner. We therefore retain perception and the perceived as such (to the extent, namely, that *after* suspension of the actual being of the perceived we can assert as evidently true that according to its essence perception is precisely perception *of* this or that objective something, that it intends the latter, is consciousness of the latter), we retain memory and what is remembered as such, thinking and what is thought as such, in short, noesis and noema and on the latter side many fundamentally essential distinctions. We also remember that the suspending epoché can have two directions: a transcendent something (that is to say everything that is not itself lived-process or correlate of lived-process) can be posited and then the positing of any kind of position-taking can be parenthesized; but also the reflection can direct itself toward the lived-process itself and the Ego undergoing lived-process, and in this regard find psychic states and psychic subject and psyche: of course here also the reduction is performed. And all of this in eidetic attitude. Then, as we expressly required, all ontologies become subject to reduction.

<77> §14. INCLUSION OF THE ONTOLOGIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY.

However, pure phenomenology seemed to contain within itself all ontologies, the pure phenomenology as well as the one given a psychological turn; more definitely stated in the following manner: the roots of all ontologies are their basic concepts and axioms. These seem to belong in phenomenology; they can be reinterpreted into certain eidetic interconnections of pure lived-processes. If that is so, however, then the consequence seems inevitable that the same must also hold for the corollaries, therefore for each discipline as a whole, since, of course, these establish only in mediate cognitive-connection with axioms what belongs to one and the same essential province, the same one which is defined by basic concepts and axioms. Once we have turned our particular attention to the difficult state of affairs with regard to the axioms of the apriori disciplines, we can answer as follows: it is imperative to carry out the distinction between *science* of transcendental consciousness *in general* and the *Intuitive eidetic doctrine* of this consciousness. With regard to the former, the boundaries stretch very far. First of all can be meant the total stock of eidetic cognitions which, no matter how mediately, and even if never apprehensible by direct Intuition, result for lived-processes in general, yet apprehended in transcendental purity. The transcendental interpretations of all ontologies would also belong there; the apprehension — to be carried out by phenomenological method — of every ontological theorem as an index for quite definite connections of transcendental consciousness that are to be coordinated with it by the method of scientific insight. On the other hand, it becomes apparent (and the reflective reader has surely already said this to himself) that every empirical truth, every proposition of the experiential sciences of every sort, by virtue of the doctrine of the constitution of experienceable realities in the nexus of possible experience and thought, as well as every really existent thing itself that is the "object about which" in the cognitions of experiential science, becomes an index for transcendental interconnections; that, therefore, a manner of research must be possible which makes the total realm of factual consciousness, the total stock of absolute monads with their factual make-up of lived-processes, the object of scientific consideration, even if at first only through backward-pointing interpretation of the factual sciences into the monads' constituent interconnections of consciousness. Everything that the sciences of the *onta*, the rational and empirical sciences, offer us (in the enlarged sense they can all be called "ontologies," insofar as

it becomes apparent that they are concerned with unities of the "constitution"), "resolves itself into something phenomenological" — a figurative locution that must not be misunderstood, and whose more precise sense is still to be established. What must be accomplished here (and nothing that is ever to be accomplished in the ontological sciences, e.g., in some natural sciences or other, can be compared as to overwhelming importance for human cognition with that which we have in view here under the title "regression to the constitutive absolute consciousness") presupposes a transcendental phenomenology in a definite sense, and one already delimited by us, a science which, through the "reductions" described by us, appropriates for itself the field of the transcendental consciousness, apprehends what is given of it in immediate Intuition, practices pure eidetic description and pure description, analyzing and in freedom producing ever new shapings, practicing new apprehensions and determinations of essences, but always remaining within the boundaries of direct Intuition. With description are combined the apodictic and always immediately evident cognitions relating to possible, impossible, necessary interconnections. Phenomenology, in this formulation of it as a science of the transcendental consciousness within the frame of immediate eidetic Intuition, is the great organon of transcendental cognition in general — I mean of every cognition in general that expresses truths for the transcendental consciousness beyond what is immediately secable or "resolves" dogmatic contents of science or whole sciences, such as physical natural sciences and psychology, into factual and essentially necessary regularities of the transcendental consciousness, however far the like may reach and what this may, in its ultimate sense, imply.

§15. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ONTOLOGICAL FINDINGS FOR PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE DIFFERENCE OF ATTITUDE IN THE TWO SCIENCES.

There now remains, however, the real theme of the chapter. It concerns the positings of essences and essential interconnections that are expressed in the ontologies by the fundamental concepts and fundamental principles. According to our findings fundamental ontic concepts that function as fundamental concepts in the ontologies correspond to the fundamental forms of (material and formal) constitution of objectivities in consciousness. They seem therefore from the outset to belong in phenomenology also.

Indeed, have we not regarded it as a fundamental task of phenomenology, and is it not evident that it is such a task, to explore as to its modes of givenness the reality "material thing" corresponding to the fundamental type of experience that we designated as material experience, and to make clear in which phenomenological connections this sort of reality is constituted as a unity? The same obviously holds for the idea of geometric bodies which is constituted already by phantoms or sensuous schemata; it holds for the idea of animate organism, the idea of psychic unity, the idea of animate essence, in short, for all regional categories of possible realities. And even if not in the same manner, it nevertheless holds also *mutatis mutandis* for the other conceivable ontologies, but in particular for formal logic as a science of the significations of thinking in formal universality and of the objects in general corresponding to them that are signified in formal universality. Basically, all such concepts form from the outset guiding concepts for whole phenomenological provinces of investigation. But here belong also the most primitive axioms. This of course comes clearly to light in our investigations, however slightly it was expressly stated. One already has the idea of a physical thing as a possible reality, just as the ontologist does. Like the latter, one explicates for himself that which belongs to this idea: what is essential, one asks, for an extensive thing? It has extension and position in space, is freely movable in space, is, according to ideal possibility, deformable in the sense that a geometric formation is; it has material properties which in their manner have extension, etc. One brings this to full Intuition and pursues the essential interconnections in the datum, pursues the constitutive schemata, the visual things of this or that level, etc. Naturally, all primitive axioms, the primal axioms in the most pregnant sense, are precisely those that "explicate" the essence of the regional concept. Therefore, the same propositions that function as axioms of ontology find in phenomenology itself a place with all fundamental concepts, or their intuitively apprehensible material essences.

The main thing now is to understand how "the same thing" functions as to concepts and propositions in ontological and phenomenological research; whether, disregarding the further nexus into which it enters in the phenomenological sphere, it actually is the same; whether, that is to say, the mutually consonant statements have the same sense, whether on both sides judging is done in the same manner and attitude. In this regard the following must be stated:

In the eidetics of space, or material nature, of mind, etc., we engage in *dogmatic* science under the title "ontology." We judge about

spatial formations as such, psyches and psychic properties as such, about human beings as such.

We judge about what belongs to objectivities like these "as such" in truth, and that implies here: belongs to them in unconditioned necessity and universality. Phenomenology in our sense is the science of "origins," of the "mothers" of all cognition; and it is the maternal-ground of all philosophical method: to this ground and to the work in it, everything leads back. When philosophers again and again stated, or were tacitly guided by, the fact that the natural cognition of the practical life and of the dogmatic sciences did not suffice, that it was burdened with obscurities, that the fundamental concepts of all sciences (sc. of the dogmatic ones) were in need of a "clarification," a reduction to their origins, then what is here felt as a deficiency finds everywhere its ultimate fulfillment in phenomenology, and the said clarification of concepts is only a step toward the phenomenological clarification and the phenomenologically ongoing eidetic investigation in the framework of the problems of phenomenological constitution. The expression "phenomenological" thereby takes on by itself a very extended significance that is harmless if one has seen through the whole situation, as must, however, be expressly stressed. Any investigation and any stock of cognitions, any cognitive result that belongs to phenomenology in our specific sense, can be called phenomenological. In this sense, therefore a clarification of the fundamental geometric concepts would be phenomenological only if it occurred in the framework of the phenomenological problematics. Here already one can distinguish what phenomenology on its own, in its research context, ascertains in systematic analysis of consciousness and correlates of consciousness, and what is a matter of the application of the acquired results to the geometry at hand as a dogmatic science and especially to its fundamentals: namely, to interpret and to "elucidate" them "phenomenologically." All the more so if, on the ground of phenomenology one "interprets back" into the constituting nexus of consciousness the mediate geometric states of affairs, as they are expressed in the theorems, and thus makes understandable its mode of being in the deepest ground by fitting it into the essential nexus into which it is necessarily interwoven. That is the application of phenomenology, not phenomenology itself. The predicate "phenomenological" is naturally carried over to the applications. Further, since phenomenology is an eidetic doctrine of the transcendentially purified consciousness, its objects of investigation, the purified lived-processes and all occurrences essentially belonging to them, are also called phenomenological, and then it happens of itself that not only

those interconnections of factual or eidetic occurrences of the absolute sphere of consciousness that are ascertainable in immediate seeing, but also those ascertainable in the mediate interpretation of dogmatic cognition are characterized as phenomenological. These extensions are therefore to be kept in mind; on the other hand, it can be ascertained as a necessity that before all other transcendental and, as we can say, philosophical work there stands the work of pure seeing, and that in this sphere, as has emerged evidently from all our presentations, there stand not incoherent and accidentally colliding data, but rather it is the case that by virtue of the freedom in the governance of the phantasy — with its freedom of combinatory production of possible complexes of consciousness and single acts of consciousness, of comparisons, analyzing differentiations, apprehensions according to thought; with its freedom, in particular, of pursuing the "intentions" lying in the performed apprehensions, of producing fulfilling or conflicting series of intuitions, and of exercising eidetic seeing and insight according to eidetic law in all directions — the possibility exists of unveiling *systematically* the fundamental composition lying in consciousness in general. Phenomenology in our sense is therefore, despite the restriction to the sphere of mere intuition and eidetic insight, a systematic science and must also be carried through within this limitation.

In all this it must be kept in mind: in geometry we *posit* spatial formations in general — and that means positing spatial formations as such — as truly existent, but existent in eidetic truth and not existent in the world of experience. A geometric judgment is *valid* only if the idea, the essence, *is* space and spatial formation, or, speaking in terms of extension, if a spatial formation *is possible*. The most general possibility, factual existence of space and spatial formation as idea, guarantees the direct eidetic Intuition; it brings to givenness in the example of some shape or other the universal idea of shape, and now the positing that the geometer constantly needs and practices becomes possible, that of a shape (or a particular of the essence in unconditioned universality). For every particular shape, insofar as it is not, like the fundamental shapes straight line, angle, and the like, taken from the direct Intuition, but rather is produced only by the connection of already formed and valid concepts of shape, the "proof of existence" is carried out on the ground of the axioms, i.e., it is immediately shown that there truly is in space according to its essence a geometric essence corresponding to this shape-*concept* (a freely formed logical signification). So long as the proof of existence is not carried out, no geometric judgment as to nature (e.g., about the nature of

regular bodies of ten surfaces) can be made. Every valid geometric judgment posits eidetic particulars (which is equivalent to a positing of corresponding essences as objects) that altogether make up the province of ontology circumscribed by the validly posited regional idea. There can be positing thetically, but then also hypothetically, other things can be posited in necessary consequence on the hypothesis, etc. So it is in general. In arithmetic we ask: what is valid for numbers as such, and of course for "possible" numbers as such; in the rational ontology of physical thinghood we ask: what is valid for possible things in general, and so on. Possibility is everywhere eidetic possibility, and this must finally legitimate itself in immediate Intuition, namely in fundamental concepts and axioms. From this primal source of eidetic validity all derivative concepts and laws draw their validity; all concepts that occur in theorems, excluding only the negative existential propositions bring with them a positing, namely as being valid, a positing as such, for which the proof of existence must be carried out. Negative existential propositions have the function of separating out the invalid concepts, the expressions corresponding to no essence. The propositions of eidetic universality thus obtained then find application in the empirical spheres of cognition; we then know beforehand ("a priori") that nothing can occur in the sphere of factual existence which is excluded according to essence by the essences that are singularized in it, and that, on the other hand, everything that occurs must occur in the way they, as a necessarily decided consequence in them, require it.

With this, we have full clarity about which goals the ontologies set for themselves with regard to essences and eidetic relationships, about the manner in which they judge about them. They make judgments with respect to being (*eidetic* existential judgments), positively and negatively, thetically and hypothetically, etc., concerning them and the eidetic particulars corresponding to them. In other words, the spheres of essences and eidetic particulars designated by the regions are their province: all of science is concerned with what is existent, cognizing it, and making true statements about it. Only *the* existent to which it is in this sense directed, positing and determining it, is precisely its province. Thereby it is also obvious to what extent it judges concerning concepts and concerning noemata in general: occasionally reflecting on them, it has to ascertain the noematic interest: these and those concepts, judgments, theorems are invalid, those are valid.

Let us now consider phenomenology on the other side, and let us look at what it has to do with "the same" essences and eidetic

relationships (sc. the axiomatic ones of the ontologies). Its province is not the spatial shapes, the physical things, the psyches, and so forth as such in eidetic universality, but rather the transcendental consciousness with all its transcendental occurrences that are to be explored in immediate Intuition and in eidetic universality. In its province therefore, falls also, among other things, the intuition of spatial shapes, thinking and the thinking cognition of spatial shapes, the experiencing of physical things, consciousness as in experiential science, etc. Here also occur, therefore, "spatial shape," "physical thing," and whatever other such ontological concepts and essences of the same sort there are. But we already see that it occurs here in a quite different manner, as is already expressed in a certain manner in the fact that it does not designate the *proxime*. In the phenomenology of the consciousness of physical thing the question is not how physical things in general *are*, or what in truth belongs to them as such; but rather how the consciousness of physical things is qualified, what sorts of consciousness of physical thing are to be distinguished, in what manner and with what correlates a physical thing as such presents and manifests itself in the manner peculiar to consciousness. But also how consciousness proceeding from itself can be cognition of the factual existence and non-being, the possibility and impossibility of a physical thing, and what, according to its essence, this is: a factual existence's "legitimizing" itself, grounding of a law of natural science, etc. As we know, there come continually into consideration in the phenomenological exploration of the acts both consciousness itself and the correlate of consciousness, noesis and noema. To describe and determine according to essence the phenomenon of intuition of a physical thing, vague phantasying of a physical thing, memory of a physical thing, and the like, that is at the same time also to keep in mind that the act in itself is the "meaning" of something and that what is meant as such is "physical thing." But to substantiate this, indeed, to make what is meant as physical thing as such, namely as correlate (something perceived as such with regard to the perception, something named as such with regard to the naming), the object of research, to make assertions about what belongs eidetically to these sorts of physical-thing-intentions as such — that is not to explore physical things, physical things as such. A "physical thing" as correlate is not a physical thing; therefore the quotation marks. The theme is therefore a totally different one, even if there are eidetic relations running back and forth.

§16. NOEMA AND ESSENCE.

One must not confuse noema (correlate) and essence. Even the noema of a clear intuition of a physical thing or of a continuing harmonious intuition-nexus that is directed at one and the same physical thing is not, nor does it contain, the essence of the physical thing. The grasping of the one is not the grasping of the other, although here in accordance with essence an alteration of the attitude and of the direction of grasping is possible, by means of which the grasping of the noema in any particular case can pass over into the grasping of the corresponding ontic essence. In the latter case, however, we have a different sort of intuition than in the former case. If we speak of viewing only in the case of intuitive grasping of essences, then we need another term precisely for the intuition of the noema.

It is good here to make clear to oneself first of all that to posit a noema as existing does not imply positing the objectivity "corresponding" to the noema, although it is the signified objectivity in the noema. This can easily be made clear in the case of the significations of thinking, the specifically logical ones. It must be kept in mind in all this that this objectivity in the noema occurs as a unity-moment that *different* noemata can have as "identical," but of course in such a manner that the unity or objectivity is in quotation marks, as we have just with good reason put *identical* in quotation marks. In the case of logical significations, we see now that what is thought as such (logical signification in the noematic sense) can be "countersensical." That it — which, after all, "exists" within the category of being "logical signification," and more generally, "noema" — has its actual being, as for example, the thought signification "round rectangle." It is also understandable of itself that, just as what is signified taken simply (which only is if the signification is a valid one) is something other than the signification, so the *essence* of what is signified is also something other than the signification. There is no essence "round rectangle"; but in order to be able to judge this, it is presupposed that "round rectangle" is a signification existing in this unitariness. It is clear now, further, that in the sphere of intuition it cannot be otherwise than in the sphere of thinking, except that here an important eidetic relationship exists between noema of intuition and essence of what is intuited, that where the noema of intuition and essence of what is intuited, that where the former can be grasped the latter can also, and conversely. This holds generally, even if the

intuition is an imperfect one, namely a merely one-sided one, afflicted with indeterminate determinabilities, as, necessarily, in the case of the intuition of a physical thing. But then precisely the intuition of the essence is also, in an exactly corresponding way, inadequate; one must never overlook the fact that eidetic intuition in no way implies adequate intuition. (But how, for all that, fully valid eidetic cognition is nevertheless possible in axioms and, in a certain manner, a fully sufficient grasping of essence is possible, even if not on the ground of an isolated physical thing-intuition — this we shall work out in more detail in the "Theory of Ideas").

If we are clear about these relationships, it becomes evident that, despite those phenomenologically ascertainable eidetic relationships between Intuitive grasping of noema and Intuitive grasping of ontic essences, it is nevertheless in the case of any intuition of the ontic an essential alteration of the judgmental position if we judge ontologically about the essences and eidetic particulars as such instead of judging phenomenologically about the noema. On the other hand, it is understood that in the stage of the phenomenological constitution, e.g., of the physical thing, there is not judgment about things as such, but the preconditions are fulfilled for being able to grasp the essence "physical thing" harmoniously in the greatest conceivable perfection and to reject dissonant accounts of essence and thereby for being able *eo ipso* to obtain also the most perfect evidentialness of the axioms according to their pure and solely valid sense and to reject false axiomatic accounts as countersensical. As soon as we carry out the alteration of the judgmental direction required for this performance, we have stepped beyond the province of phenomenology and entered that of ontology.

With this the following objection is also met: if in the description of some act or other we assert that it is the consciousness of a house, a human being, a work of art, etc., then the validity of the description must, of course, depend upon whether the concept house, etc., actually fits that which is meant in the act. But how can one know that, if one does not even know what these words "really signify," and that is, of course, what they signify in the *essence*. Only in the clarifying intuition can it become apparent to us, through a purely expressive fitting of the word-signification, the logical one, to the essence given in the intuition, whether the expression with its sense actually fits onto that which is unclearly meant. To this, on the other hand, one will object that, e.g., counter-sensical judgments, such as a proof for the squaring of the circle, are made after all, and that in these cases a corresponding essence cannot exist. But to this the reply could still be

tried that what covered us above cannot cover us here. How could we know what squaring of the circle really signifies if we were not able to make it clear to ourselves? Of course, there is no harmonious essence here. But we do, after all, see the dissonant unity of the intended essences in the counter-sensical judgment, the incompatibility; in this discerned incompatibility we grasp instead of the essence pure and simple (the harmonious one) the *non-essence*, so to speak. No matter whether there is something true in this attempted equation of essence and non-essence, the exposition would not for that reason be anywhere near correct. Rather, it must be said: of course only the "intuition" is convincing as to whether the application of the words with their word-concepts (the mere significations of thinking) of what is meant on the ground of mere obscure acts (obscure phantasies, obscure affective stirrings, etc.) is fitting; the obscure acts must be brought into a union of coincidence with corresponding clear ones in which what is meant is an object of consciousness as precisely the same, but "clear." However, the viewing that accomplishes this must of course be something essentially different from the insight that posits the corresponding essence as truly existing, or the insight into the incompatibility that rejects the essence as not existing. Insights of this kind are ontological. They are necessary not merely to clarify the ontological concepts, but to ground the *validity* of these concepts, the being of the essences and the validity of the eidetic judgments (the being-true of the eidetic relationships). That the one and the other must be separated emerges already from the fact that the clarifying of a concept with geometric sense, such as the squaring of the circle and, what is here of equal value, the demonstration that the thought-concept lying in these words could serve as descriptive for what is meant in an obscure act, still does not require that we carry out the geometric proof of the impossibility of such a conceptual object: of that we would perhaps not even be capable. Here one would surely not rightly reply that actual clarity and perfect insight go parallel with the proof, that full clarity is equivalent in signification to insight. But without entering here into a more detailed discussion, we can say in advance: going parallel and being of equal value would already be a sufficient concession, would be an expression of a distinction that we must not overlook. And where parallelism actually takes place, in clarification, in looking to see whether the descriptive concept actually fits, we have an entirely different attitude from that of insight, in which we posit the validity of the essences, or the non-validity.

In the one case the signification of thinking is fitted to the noema of

<87>

<88>

the underlying act and, in the effecting of the act of clarification, to the noema of the clarifying intuition, which noema identifies itself with the act. Answering in reflection the question about the fitting, we posit nothing but noemata and assert their being in accord (or not being in accord). On the other hand, the noemata also coincide in the ontological attitude, to be sure, but in grasping, we are directed toward the essence. We have posited it from the outset in the ontological judgment; the signification of thinking is content of an actually occurring belief. Likewise, in the transition to the giving intuition, not only do we have what is intuited as noema, but also there takes place a *grasping* of the essence; i.e., the intuition is intuitive positing and, indeed, actually occurring positing of essence. As phenomenologists we also execute positings, actual theoretical position-takings, but they are exclusively directed toward lived-processes and lived-process correlates. In ontology, on the other hand, we perform actual positings that are directed toward the objects pure and simple, instead of toward the correlates and objects in quotation marks. In short, it is a matter of the distinction stressed above: to posit physical things as actually present is not to posit something meant as a physical thing, is not to posit something posited as a physical thing as such. Likewise: to posit essence as actually present is not to posit something meant as essence as such, etc. These are cardinal distinctions that are only universalizations of the simple distinction that to posit significations and to posit objects are two different things: the noema in general is, however, nothing further than the universalization of the idea of signification to the total province of the acts.

For all of that, it is not excluded that ontological axioms can serve as criteria for whether a phenomenological description legitimately applies the descriptive concepts.¹² The manner of consideration is then of course no longer a purely phenomenological one, but rather a mixed phenomenological-ontological one; but it still yields valid results. But since there is such a great interest connected with performing the reductions purely and keeping to them in the investigation, we will discuss this state of affairs not in the framework of phenomenology but of psychology and will note only that as soon as full assurance in the command of phenomenological method is attained and the sense is made clear of every going out beyond the proper phenomenological sphere and of going back into it, methodologically allowed transgressions also come to the fore, which for their part are justified of course from a higher vantage point

¹²Cf. p. 77.

within a fittingly enlarged phenomenological immanence. As phenomenology encompasses everything non-phenomenological in the form of "parenthesizing," so also does it encompass that which is in a given case is called transgression of a phenomenological consideration: all justifications, however, belong according to sense and possible validity in phenomenology, therefore also those of the sorts of transgressions in question.

§17. SIGNIFICANCE OF ONTOLOGICAL CONCEPTS FOR PSYCHOLOGY.

But let us pass over into psychology. It is of great interest in itself to note that what we have here worked out in the contrasting of phenomenology and ontology must obviously extend to the relationship of psychology and ontology. Every phenomenological description, of course, passes over into a psychological one with regard to the lived-processes of a psyche undergoing them through psychological apperception, as, conversely, every description of psychic lived-processes passes over into a purely phenomenological one through the ideally possible reduction (eidetic and purifying of reification). If, therefore, the point is to settle within psychological research the not infrequent dispute as to whether ostensible descriptions concerning perceptions of physical things, of space and spatial formations, of movement and the like are correct, and to be sure, whether it can correctly be said whether the designation of them as perceptions precisely of *physical things*, of *space*, of *movement* is valid (which of course implies something for the essence of the psychic lived-processes), then the interest is obviously not an ontological one, not directed at the essence of physical thing, space, etc. Here it is not in psychology as it is in physical natural science where physical things are the themes of judgment and eidetic insights concerning physical things in general are obviously to be introduced in the judging of the particular physical things experienced in any given case. These eidetic insights themselves belong to the theme. Psychology, however, is not interested in physical things, but in perception of physical things. And, to the extent that perception means something physical, that which is meant as such, the noema, belongs in perception's sphere of description. Now, we said above¹³ that ontological axioms could nevertheless serve as criteria for the correctness of the noematic descriptions. Let us cite something well-known: let it be a question (as

<90>

¹³Cf. p. 76.

<89>

<91>

generally with the structures in question) of unqualified intuitions of transcendent objectivities. These necessarily contain empty, but fulfillable intentions; to them belongs the eidetic possibility of being able to pass over into series of intuitions in which their empty intentions are fulfilled and what is intuited as such holds harmoniously. Discordances are only possible in the case of conceptual apprehensions by virtue of the fact that discordant concepts find application or by virtue of synthetic accounts, as if something grasped as red were at the same time to be posited as green through a synthetic account. If we exclude such things, therefore, if we remain with really unqualified intuitions, then in any given case through a fitting direction of regard, and Intuitively, an essence can be derived from them, namely, from what is intuited, just as it is intuitively meant there. Just as the intuition must in principle be perfected within its categorial type, so must the essence be perfected in its categorial type; and finally every intuition in principle guarantees by itself the possibility of getting so far through its formation in harmonious sense that the categorial essence, e.g., "physical thing" (even if it be as "idea") is grasped in perfection, and therefore also the axioms explicating it are carried out in all evidentness. Accordingly, we can also assert the apriori valid law: every unqualified intuition "contains in itself" the essence of the region corresponding to it and of the regional categories belonging to it, which receive their eidetic positing in the corresponding ontology, and it further contains in itself all axioms of the ontology in question. Conversely, it is evident that the concept of the region and every concept that is itself a determining one of the region as such, and finally every concept that includes the regional concept as particularization, and to the extent that it does this, is validly applicable as a phenomenologically descriptive concept for the intuition in question with regard to what is intuited as such. Likewise it is clear that every descriptive concept is to be rejected that is encumbered with what is excluded by the regional concepts belonging to the intuition, and therefore by the regional axioms also. As soon as we accordingly recognize, through consideration of that which lies in the descriptive concept (by regression, say, to the intuition that requires its possible objective application), that there belongs to this concept as such something which conflicts with those ontological axioms, we know that the concept in the description is falsely applied, that it cannot function as descriptive. In this manner ontological truths (perhaps even mediately) can therefore serve to provide a norm for descriptive concepts. That a natural-scientific description can only be valid if it accords with the

<92>

ontological laws of nature is understood of itself and requires no special discussion, because precisely what is described itself stands among the valid ontological concepts. Obviously, therefore, no discordant geometric concept, e.g., can function as a descriptive one. But here it becomes apparent that even a psychological description of intuitions of a physical thing (and so of intuitions of some reality or other) can only be valid if the descriptive concepts have the designated relation to the ontology of the region of reality in which what is intuited as such would belong. Apparently even that is a triviality, but one of the trivialities that present such great difficulties to the inner understanding. Psychology, to be sure, has its pre-given world in which its explanations move. But as pre-given it can not deal with the objects to which its predicates are related, and if it describes intuitions psychologically, then it describes along with them what is intuited "as such," the noema, but no more. Herein, therefore, lies the particular function of the descriptive concepts that in psychology are inversions of the ontological ones, not these themselves, and exercise a quite different function from that in ontology. The rules of their validity are an important psychological-methodological problem, and this problem finds its solution in our expositions. (There is probably no need for entering into universalizations that suggest themselves.)

One thing, however, must still be added in a word or two. Since ontological laws, to be sure, occur with the claim to absolute validity, or with the claim to being drawn from fully sufficient Intuition, whereas this claim, as is known, often fares very badly, the methodological regression to ontological laws is also *not*, as a rule, a reliable method. It is not for that reason to be completely rejected. The appeal to ontological truths gives a definite direction to the paths of Intuitive research; but only Intuition is the court of last resort that actually decides. But then one also sees that, in the sense of the foregoing general expositions, for psychology as for phenomenology, it is not ontological Intuition, but rather, phenomenological Intuition that here has to make the final decision. Ontology itself, with all its ontic positing, is really something irrelevant for precisely such performances; they stand only as indices for noematic connections with which they are, of course, connected by eidetic law.

THE METHOD OF CLARIFICATION

The investigation just carried out served to clarify the relationship between phenomenology and ontology. We also recognize, however, its significance for the clarification of phenomenological (and likewise psychological) method in a definite direction: with this, difficult and important problems are cleared up — problems of sense and of the relevant testing of the connected phenomenological (or psychological) descriptions by norms. It lies in the nature of phenomenology and of the unique functions which devolve upon it for the whole of our knowledge, that it be continually applied to itself reflectively, that out of phenomenological sources it must bring to fullest clarity the method itself which it practices. There is no science behind it on which it can fob off any work. Any obscurity that remains for it provides a fertile ground for all kinds of confusions and surreptitious intrusions, for corruption of phenomenological results, and also for misinterpretations of the entire phenomenological method, with which then mishandling of the method is connected. Radical science demands the most thorough-going rigor, which for its part demands the most complete illumination in the *method of clarification*. With this remark we have dropped the word that is to form the theme of the following investigations. For what has just been presented has prepared us for it best. We have mentioned in the theory of the reductions also the reduction to the greatest possible clarity, which was spoken of as a special case of a universally important method of clarification in every scientific sphere. It is due to the peculiar position of phenomenology in relation to all other sciences that clarification in general, no matter what it is applied to, and phenomenological clarification stand in a close relationship. That is why, even in the case of one who has already come to know genuine phenomenology but has not reflectively given himself enough of an account of its pure essence and bounds of sense, the concept of phenomenology and phenomenological method easily gets shifted and broadened; and that alteration, no matter how naturally it may occur, can still cause confusion.

§18. THE DOGMATIC SCIENCES' NEED FOR CLARIFICATION.

All sciences are subject to the obvious requirement of a foundation for their stock of propositions and concepts. Their statements are supposed to be valid, and they can be valid only if the concepts are valid in their own way. It could be said that it is an ideal of science to gain in its respective region a valid system of propositions (and thus also of concepts) that in the material of thinking (that is, word-significations) determine unequivocally all events of the field, everything that is there, as regards qualities, relations, contexts. What is required is that this performance, in however narrow a sphere it is considered to have been accomplished, be able to legitimate itself through rational grounding and do so at any time. Being convinced of the truth of a theory and of its practically useful application presupposes in no way the ability to ground it rationally or, what is the same thing, to have fundamental insight into it. Strange to say, however, not even the *formation* of theories or of sciences, as methodic arrangements for obtaining correct theories, presupposes insight and comprehensibility. A remarkable teleology prevails in the development of human culture in general and thus also in scientific culture, in that valuable results can arise without insight or through a mixture of insight and instinct in the exercise of psychic powers. That the results are valuable is proved naturally by reasons subsequently produced that establish the claims to validity within the compass of perfect insight. All sciences, even the most highly developed exact sciences, are cultural values of this kind. No matter how ridiculous it would be to maintain that their formation and development are not, or not to a great extent, grounded in insight, sciences are all far removed from a sufficient, perfect grounding in insight. And that is already true of the conception of the concepts that enter into their predications.

Drawn by the first creators of the sciences in part from the very incomplete naive empiricism of everyday men, in part only one-sidedly and incompletely clarified in the new formation, these concepts enter into the work of science with a stock of confusion, without generally gaining in depth of clarity in the course of this work. Here the reverse process indeed takes place, in which nothing is changed by the occasional reversion of original thinkers to basic concepts, in order to remove painfully felt confusions and mistakes, and by the occasional increase of clarity that goes with the reversion. The more highly developed a science becomes, i.e., the richer its

"methodics" becomes, the more its main work shifts into the symbolic sphere of thought; the concepts originally oriented toward Intuition are used merely symbolically, as counters with which one operates, without recourse to intuition, in the style of the essentially symbolic method that has been developed. The art of continually inventing new symbolic procedures is practiced more and more perfectly and its rationality is essentially one that depends merely on the symbolism and from the outset presupposes, without insight, the value of the symbols. What was relatively a matter of insight on a lower level is symbolized anew on a higher level and robbed of evidences (as a superfluous burden on thought), and so the sciences become what we know them as: factories turning out very valuable and practically useful propositions — factories in which one can work as laborer and inventive technician, factories from which, as a practical man, one can without inner understanding derive products and at best comprehend the technical efficiency. The "experts," i.e., the engineers of the art of science, might in this situation be completely satisfied in the awareness of their greatness and in the organized cooperation of scientific big business in infinitely fruitful achievements. And likewise, the technicians in the usual sense, whose goal is the practical control of reality, might be satisfied. Knowledge is for them from the beginning nothing but an artful invention of thinking for purposes of artful achievements in the practice of controlling nature and man. However much this conception of knowledge seemed to have asserted itself in the "century of technology," there was no lack of reactions, which in the last decade have increased mightily in power and inaugurated a great revolution. The advances of science have not enriched us in treasures of insight. The world is not in the least more intelligible because of them; it has only become more useful for us. Treasures of knowledge may lie in the sciences, indeed, they must lie in them, since we cannot doubt that the claim of their statements to validity is a good one, even though within limits still to be defined. But these treasures of knowledge we do not have; we must first obtain them. For knowledge is insight, is truth drawn from Intuition and thereby completely understood. Only through a work of elucidation and making evident, carried out anew on the given sciences, do we bring out the intrinsic values that are hidden in them. True statements are not, without something further, intrinsic values, and no more so are methods for the production of such statements. Only indirectly, and primarily as means to insight, do they have value, for "insights" are intrinsic values;¹⁴ and then

¹⁴"Insight" means in this case more than the fleeting act of seeing into something. Only truths that are gained from primal instituting in insight and continue to be valid henceforth in the

secondarily as means to founded values, e.g., to activities of val-national and practical reason. *Intuitionism*, therefore, reacted with complete justification against the one-sided surrender of mankind to the expansion of the sciences as techniques of thought. What matters is to put an end to the plight, grown intolerable, of reason, which amidst all the riches of its theoretical possessions sees its proper aim, world understanding, insight into truth, recede ever farther in the distance. But, of course, Intuitionism must not degenerate into mysticism instead of approaching sober tasks that are forthcoming from the situation described. The point is to lead the sciences back to their origin, which demands insight and rigorous validity, and to transform them into systems of cognition based on insight by work that clarifies, makes distinct, and grounds ultimately, and to trace the concepts and statements back to conceptual essences, themselves apprehensible in Intuition, and the objective data themselves, to which they give appropriate expression insofar as they are actually true. Then it must also come out whether and to what extent the sciences are one-sided, giving theoretical formulation only to certain sides of actual reality, and how from the primal ground of Intuitive givenness the goal of an all-round and complete knowledge that solves all reasonably posed problems can be attained.

§19. CLARIFICATION OF THE CONCEPTUAL MATERIAL.

The first work to be undertaken is obviously concerned with the conceptual material with which science operates, and first of all, the primitive concepts. It is by means of concepts that science is related to the objects of its region. Its method, in spite of the deficiencies complained of, is, of course, not altogether a stranger to intuition. The concepts are again and again related to what is intuited, in the experiential sciences they are related to what is experienced, and, conversely, under the guidance of intuition and its data, concepts are formed again and again (diagrams, models, observations, experi-

(97)

consciousness of this acquisition and can be reinstated at any time in the original condition of actual insight, have the value of wisdom, i.e., genuinely personal value. And only they have thereby an objective proof of their truth and can really be claimed as truths. Through grounding in insight it can come about that we subsequently recognize that convictions that we previously had as blind convictions were truths. Insightless judgments also (insightless, insofar as they are not explicitly discerned) can be approved and adopted in the manner of a pronouncement, of an evidence in its way anticipatory; and they can gain their confirmation in further practice, without genuine and logically compelling insight having been developed.

ments). The concepts, nevertheless, are lacking in that clarity which is necessary for the cognitive validity. The given toward which they orient themselves, e.g., the thing experienced in any particular instance, is of course given, but incompletely given; thus even concepts oriented directly toward the given, immediately describing it, are incomplete. The question is, how to proceed here, and what more precise sense the desired perfection has. To begin with, this much is clear: that the concepts of any science concerned with individual being must be of three types:

a) *Logical-formal concepts.*

— which are the common property of all sciences in general, concepts such as "object," "property," "fact," "relation," "number," etc., and concepts that express forms of signification, categories of signification, such as "concept," "proposition in general." They "lie" in a certain manner as "forms" in all particular concepts, such as "categorical proposition," "particular proposition," etc.

b) *Regional concepts.*

— concepts that express the region itself, e.g., "physical thing" and the logical derivations of the region, such as "thing-property," "thing-relation," etc. In a certain way these concepts, too, have formal character; they permeate all sciences of a region and underlie all particular concepts (thus, for example, in all natural-scientific concepts there lies the formal component of physicalness, in the psychological that of psychic reality, etc.).

c) *Material particularizations.*

— of the regional concepts themselves, with which all materially definite statements supply precisely their relations to the materially determinate things according to their material content. Mere modes of number belong to arithmetic, mere modes of the idea of signification belong to the logic of signification, mere modes of spatiality to geometry. These are all formal modes. Of a quite different character are concepts such as color, tone, kinds of sensory feelings, drives, and the like. They contribute the material content to all determinations.

It is evident from the start that, for the elucidation of every science, the elucidation of all these groups is necessary and that

the sequence of the groups prescribes an order of precedence. In itself, the elucidation of the logical-formal concepts would have to take place first; it is a common concern of all sciences. Then the regional-formal concepts would have to be cleared up, and finally the particular concepts, which are the peculiar property of the particular sciences.

If all possible theories of essence, all eidetic disciplines, were historically as well developed as the natural sciences, but were also afflicted with deficiencies similar to theirs, then we would obviously have to say that the elucidation of the ontology must precede that of the empirical sciences. With reference to the clarification of concepts it is indeed to be observed that the whole work, which is demanded for all sciences, would already be accomplished by clarifying the concepts of the ontological disciplines. For, any given concept has its conceptual essence, which fits itself ideally into a genus of essence that could function as a region for a theory of essence. In the totality of ontologies in the widest sense (not merely the formal ones), therefore, all essences would be included. The elucidation of the primitive concepts by going back to primitive essences would thus already have been achieved. In truth, however, only a very few ontologies have been constituted, and that is, as one can well say, because their efficient development as sciences demands from the start a perfection of Intuition, which only exceptionally, only with essences of certain classes, is to be achieved with relative ease. Indeed, connected with this is the fact that already very early a geometry and a part of formal logic and mathematics begin to develop; whereas, even up until today, an ontology of material nature and a rational psychology have been lacking (up to the *psychological phenomenology* just beginning to appear). In these regional spheres the obtaining of adequate, sufficiently deeply penetrating and unconfused Intuitions is attended with that sort of difficulty, difficulties which, however, are thoroughly surmountable after the ground of phenomenology is won. One can say that the *idea of a complete realm of ideas*, a complete system of all intuitively conceivable essences or of a complete system of all eidetic disciplines (or theories of essence), in itself includes the idea of an all-encompassing system of all possible concepts obtained with pure clarity, adequately oriented toward it. Indeed, one could even say that the two are equivalent, since with clear concepts clear axioms and all further consequences are also given. Accordingly, the demand to carry out the task of clarifying the concepts of all given sciences, if we give ourselves to this ideal and set the task at once for all future and possible sciences, leads to the ideal requirement of grounding an

<100>

all-encompassing system of ontologies in pure Intuitive sources. If we may say that the stock of primitive concepts, with which we not only have done scientific work until now but also shall perform it in the future and at any time, is though limited, still a fixed one, then we come to an empirically limited idea of a system of eidetic disciplines, into which all eidetic essences that we can attain arrange themselves. That, however, is no longer an ideal alien to the world, but a practical ideal (which is, even on other grounds, highly important): an ideal encompassing phenomenology, which for its part encompasses in a certain way all other eidetic disciplines.

In order now to make clear to ourselves the essence of this clarification itself, which serves the noetic perfection of all sciences, let us consider in an example the sense of the required achievements: it is a matter of making clear, e.g., the concept of material body, what that "really signifies": of "physical thing," how it looks. We proceed from examples that represent unquestionable applications of the word "thing," e.g., stones, houses, and the like, but are not content with merely snatching these up, so to speak, through the name, that is, with "thinking" by mere word-significations. Rather, we proceed to intuition, to the perception of such details or to lively fantasy, which here plays the role of a "phantasizing oneself into the perceptual givenness of such facts." If we were to make comparisons between the various objects presenting themselves as examples in givenness or quasi-givenness, then we would find differences and common elements. It is, however, not a question of inductively proceeding to find that which is common everywhere. We look rather to that which in the intuitively given is, so to speak, brought out, covered, conceptually meant by the word-concept, and what is not, what the "so-called" therein really is, that is to say, which essential moments there are of the intuitively given, for whose sake the fact is precisely so "called." For all that, in substance the Socratic procedure. Naturally, it is not a question of fixing a linguistic usage, but rather, in such coinciding, it is one of making a noematic essence stand out in what is intuitively given, and of fixing it as that which is meant by the mere word-signification. Precisely in that way does the word-signification, the concept, show itself to be valid; and essence now corresponds to the concept.

<101>

§20. MAKING DISTINCT AND MAKING CLEAR.

The following distinction still has to be made: if the concept is

complex, then *making distinct* and *making clear* are to be kept apart. Making a concept, what is meant by a word as such, distinct is a procedure that occurs within the mere sphere of thought. Before the least step toward clarification is taken and while no intuition or an entirely unsuitable and indirect intuition is one with the word, what lies in the meaning can be considered: e.g., in the "decahedron," a body, a regular polyhedron with ten congruent lateral surfaces. The like can be successively obtained and connected in forms belonging to the sphere of thought: "a geometrical body that is completely bounded by ten congruent plane surfaces." In this procedure the logical form, the "synthesis," in which the material of thought is formed may be a different one. There are many "equivalent" expressions for this same state of affairs. We have, therefore, to distinguish the unanalyzed concept that has not been made distinct and the concept that has been made distinct analytically and the "analytic judgements," in the sense that Kant probably had primarily in view, which represent the noematic object of the former and the latter as the same, identifying them. More exactly, however, it would mean that the unanalyzed concept and another concept that functions in relation to it as its distinct explicate, as the explication of its contents, are to be opposed to one another. For the concept that has been "made distinct" is, as concept, as signification, a different one. With clarification, we go beyond the sphere of mere word-significations and signifying thinking; we bring the significations into congruity with the noematic side of intuition, the noematic object of the former with that of the latter. The congruence must be so perfect that to every partial concept derived by making distinct there corresponds an explicit moment of the intuitive noema. Obviously the explication of that which is meant in an intuition is other than the explication of that which is meant in thought, is signified in thought. It very often happens that a conflict is produced by a measurement against corresponding intuition, which is characterized as corresponding by the fact that at least a partial signification comes to congruence with an intuitive moment, finding in this intuitive moment its plenitude: different explicates of signification demand intuition-correlates which are "not compatible" in the unity of an intuition, i.e., which do not achieve unity in the normal sense, a unity of univocal intuition, but rather achieve a conjoining of two intuitions in the form of conflict with reference to the moments in question. It is further to be noted that not merely the relationship between signification and the intuited as such (noema of thinking and noema of intuition) is to be attended to, but also the relationship of the word

<102>

itself with its word-sound and with the word-tendency clinging to it and with the noemata. The word "means" something, which is to say, its signification demands a suitable essence fulfilling it. It can also be said, however, that the word with the tendency clinging to its word-sound demands a signification and is one with this signification as word. But the word can be equivocal and as word demand various significations, and it can demand now incoherent, now closely related, now wider, now narrower, now more general, now less general significations. Thereby much confusion and error came into science, as it well known. Now, clarification also has the function of giving old words a newly constituted sense. Of the word-tendencies clinging to it, certain ones are, so to speak, stricken, and a single tendency clarified in the intuited is underlined as the one that is valid once and for all and impressed on the memory.

Up to now we have observed the relationships which play between word, word-signification, and intuition. But we have not yet discussed the main work of clarification, which lies on the side of intuition. The making-distinct of a word (verbal sense-analysis) has a propaedeutic function for the Intuitive making-distinct, which really has to be done.

The goal of clarification can also be understood in the sense already explained as that of producing anew, as it were, the concept already given, nourishing it from the primal source of conceptual validity, i.e., intuition, and giving it within the intuition the partial concepts that belong to its originary essence. Therefore, if a "matching" intuition, a corresponding noema of intuition, is found for the already given concept that is to be newly grounded but first to be verified, then it must be fixed in the latter (by means of definition of a concept-content, that is, by analysis of the whole noema) what the essence belonging to the concept is supposed to be exactly and permanently: the "expression" is created for the seen essence, and the related word-tendency is underscored. This distinctive essence is analyzed; corresponding significations are assigned as expressions to the analytic moments, down to the primitive ones or as far as interest requires.

The goal is perfect clarity, and, particularly with all concepts originating out of the sphere of reality, that requires very complicated processes, which we already know and which we can call characteristic on the basis of our analyses. *Clarification must follow precisely the stages of the constitution of the exemplary object of intuition in question.* A thing is not given, a thing-concept is not brought to actual clarity, if a thing is merely seen. A phantom is also seen; a mere seeing also yields no more than what corresponds to the phantom, namely as the sensory

schema. If it is a matter of making clear what "thing" or "real thing-property" means with its essential relation to real circumstances, then the clarifying intuition must follow out the manifolds of sensory schemata in relation to the manifold of schematized circumstances, and it must bring to fulfillment the intuitive components that give to the sensory schemata the value of thing-intuitions. The process of clarification, therefore, means two things: making a concept clear by recourse to fulfilling intuition, and, second, a process of clarification executed in the sphere of intuition itself: the meant object (the intuition "means," too, it also has a noema which is the possible member of noematic manifolds in which the noematic object stands out more and more perfectly) must be brought to ever greater clarity, must be brought ever nearer, must be brought in the process of clarification to perfect self-giveness. Now there is not, to be sure, for objects of every kind (and thus also not for concepts of every kind) such a thing as constitution as a unity of manifolds, e.g., not for sensible contents or acts, which themselves become objects in reflection. But, on the other hand, there is for all objects an intuitive nearness and an intuitive distance, a cropping up into the bright light, which permits analysis of an inner wealth of definite moments, and a sinking back into darkness, in which all becomes indistinct. Those are, of course, images and images with double meanings. For, *the bringing nearer*, in which empty places of the conception fill themselves, in which intuitions, "clear intuitions," must go over into series of intuition, in order to bring the object (which they "mean") representing itself one-sidedly, incompletely and indefinitely in them to progressive "self-giveness" — the bringing nearer is from a totally different direction than that which, e.g., any such intuition admits to the extent that it is not a sufficiently bright, not a sufficiently satiated intuition (for example, an incompletely "lively" phantasy). Therefore, the concepts "clarity" and "clarification" are ambiguous. But *each* sense comes into question here: greatest possible "liveliness," "satiation," on one side and greatest possible fulfilling of those apperceptive, representing, manifesting intentions, which belong to the stock of intuition. Again, one sees from here in complete clarity the general task and the most all-encompassing ideal, although it lies in the infinite: to embrace the world of ideas in systematic completeness, to embrace in intuition and in the most complete clarity the world of possible essence-types, of possible objectivities in general; and, on the basis of the noemata lying in intuition, to obtain all the possible conceptual essences in general and to coordinate with them the word-significations and words themselves expressing them purely, which would make up a whole of

<105>

perfectly clarified concepts as well as terms. From there one comes again to the infinite *ideal of a system of all ontologies* and eidetic disciplines in general. With the explication of the essences in self-givenness and with the consideration of the interconnections of essence, there is regulation of necessities, possibilities, and impossibilities of connection, of manifold relations according to essence, which, expressed in true concepts, become further basic truths of ontology. All such investigation has now, however, in the sense already explicated, close relation to phenomenology. It is itself an eidetic discipline. An all-encompassing system of eidetic disciplines includes it, too. But all clarifying ontological insight executed in the framework of axiomatic clarity that is not directly phenomenological becomes such by a mere *shift of view*, as conversely in the whole of phenomenological insights there must be those which become ontological through a mere shift of view.¹⁵

One may say that all eidetic axioms are found in the context of phenomenology through mere execution of shift of view and of the corresponding positing, and that therefore — and this is surely very significant — they embrace within themselves the maternal ground from which all ontological insights grow. However, it is significant on principle that it owes nothing to the other ontologies and cannot owe them anything, just as little as it can own anything to any other dogmatic science, and that it is nothing so little as it is a kind of continuation of the ontologies, as a uniform ground, on which ontological axioms and other insights of essence grow alongside one another. However, it can and must be said that it is only through the thoroughly reflective work of phenomenology, which analyzes systematically what is necessarily executed on the other side, which fixes all the motives that lie in the phenomena and asks about their motivations, that only by this means can the ontologically founded investigation unfold its full power and only thereby does it receive its full certainty. Only the phenomenologist will be competent to perform the deepest clarifications with regard to the essences building themselves up in systematically constituted layers and thus to prepare the grounding of the ontologies of which we have so great a lack.

SUPPLEMENTS

¹⁵When I clarify a concept, "psyche" for example, I make clear to myself the word-signification and look for the "proper" signification, i.e., I look again for a signification but for the "fulfilling" signification, the noema which belongs to the fulfilling intuition. Here I have no ontic attitude; I do not want to transform the noematic object into the object itself, which I posit, which act is a modification of the judgment-attitude. Insofar as noemata and their noematic unities ("objects" in quotation marks) belong to phenomenology, all clarification belongs to phenomenology, as also the axioms of the theory of signification belong to it as the theory of forms of significations.

TEXT-CRITICAL NOTES ON THE SUPPLEMENTS

SUPPLEMENT I

This supplementary text was the first part of the original 1912 manuscript of *Ideen II*. Parts of it were omitted from the final version of the work. Where large parts of the text are used in *Ideen II* they are omitted from this Supplement, as indicated by notes in the text.

SUPPLEMENT II

The text of this Supplement is bracketed in the manuscript and in the copies of it, indicating the author's reservations concerning it. Thus, the editors included it as a Supplement rather than as part of the main text. Refer to the end of the first paragraph of §3 of Chapter One of *Ideen III*.

SUPPLEMENT III

This Supplement reproduces the original text of a passage that was abbreviated in the final version of *Ideen III*. Refer to the fifth paragraph from the end of §3 of Chapter One of *Ideen III*.

SUPPLEMENT IV

This text reproduces a typescript included in the revision of *Ideen III* by Ludwig Landgrebe. See §7.

Note: These remarks are based on the text-critical notes of the editor of *Husserliana V*,
Marty Biemel.

<109>

SUPPLEMENT I:
TRANSITION FROM BOOK II TO BOOK III*

§1. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PSYCHE. (EMPATHY.)

Let us now look again at the difficult question of the "constitution" of the psyche and of the psychic Ego that is united with it. We see brutes, human beings, as animated beings, and this happens because of the fact that certain physical things are apprehended as animate organisms, i.e., that sequences of events of consciousness and, with these, constitutive unities are ascribed to them. The animate organism must be apprehended as a real unity (even if in no way already as "Objective" material physical thing through intersubjective constitution, which, of course, for its part, already presupposes a relation to a multiplicity of human beings), in order to be able to function as carrier of something psychic (that is, it is given to the pure Ego as a unity of possible schematic multiplicities, recognizable as this unity, that is to say, indentifiable in its own and in separate series of experience). In "empathy" or *interpretation* [*Eindeutung*] it is understood as animate organism, at first simply as carrier of something psychic and therewith not merely as carrier of sensations, but also as carrier of "acts," of intentional lived-processes. With that, precisely, there belongs to the inventory of the interpretation [*Eindeutung*] a *pure subject* as subject of any interpreted [*eingedeutet*] cogito. This pure Ego has its *surrounding world*, has its *Here* and *Now* in relation to which its physicalness is oriented, and this *Here* and *Now* is related to a physical thing appearing in a distinctive manner to the pure Ego, i.e., its animate organism, in a way similar to that in which my *Here* and *Now* is related to my animate organism. If I could "remove from myself" my animate organism, which in actual fact continually has my center of orientation in it, that is to say, continually accompanies my pure Ego and appears to it, then it would present all the series of appearances that other physical things present; it is in itself a physical thing like any other, except that it cannot be removed and can

therefore appear only in limited groups of appearances. Thus the Ego interpreted into [*eingedeutet*] the external physical thing: "animate organism of another," has its non-removable physical thing, its "own animate organism," and this is, in the sense of empathy, precisely the same thing that appears as *carrier* of the empathy or interpretation [*Eindeutung*]. With this is given simultaneously the fact that the *surrounding world of the alien pure Ego is the same one as that of my pure Ego*; and this means: the physical things of the surrounding world are unities of a higher level, constituted by way of interpretation [*Eindeutung*].

Where two persons enter into intercourse with one another the multiplicity of appearances (in all its levels) that constitutes a real physical thing for I₁* and the multiplicity of appearances that constitutes the "same" real thing for I₂ are *different*; the one belongs, as an infinite but determinate sum of possible appearances, to the one flow of consciousness, namely that of I₁; the other belongs to the other one, to that of I₂. In the interpretation [*Eindeutung*] there takes place, according to its "sense," an apprehension, a coordinating of these two multiplicities of appearances, by virtue of which the "Objective" thing is constituted as "the same." Every new pure Ego, I_x, posited by interpretation [*Eindeutung*] multiplies the number of closed groups of multiplicities of appearances, and thus the Objective thing is the unity of an unlimited multiplicity of groups of multiplicities of appearances, and the interpretation [*Eindeutung*] or empathy is one of the basic forms of experience even for external physicalness. We can express precisely this Objectivation in another manner also. We can say, namely: if any physical thing, D_x,** is originally thought of as constituted only for an individual I_x, then it becomes now as this *unity* a member of a multiplicity in whose manifold members one and the same *Objective unity D* is constituted. In other words: what was already a real physical thing, but for one pure Ego that has not yet performed any empathy, that now becomes mere "appearance"; the manifolds of appearance are now the real unities D₁, D₂, D₃... that correspond to the Egos I₁, I₂, I₃, ... and which in the empathy undergo the apprehension: "the same Objective D"; the D is something that only appears in the D_x, but for all that also only is as possibly appearing in such appearances, therefore able to be legitimated as Objective truth only through empathy.

This Objectivation is therefore also undergone by the animate organism, inasmuch as it is a material thing. For every pure Ego I_m

<110>

*"I" from the German "Ich" — Transl.

**"D" from the German "Ding" — Transl.

<111>

that wants to interpretively [*endeutend*] grasp another pure Ego I^n with its pure consciousness, the apprehension of the animate organism L^{n*} of I^n , as this is given to I^m (as $L_m^{(n)}$), suffices for the purpose of interpretation [*Endeutung*]. But through interpretation [*Endeutung*] it is identified with the $L_n^{(n)}$ and then further with the corresponding unities that other Egos have of the "same" animate-thing [*Leibding*] as appearances, the symbolically indicated form $L_k^{(n)}$. But of course the sense of the interpreting [*endeutend*] apprehension, precisely as animate organism of the other Ego I^n , is this: that this I^n experiences its $L_n^{(n)}$ in a particular manner and that the animate organism is its animate organism, "connected" with its consciousness, only for *this* I^n . The question will then be what this connection implies, namely for the experiencing pure Ego $I_x^{(n)}$, how it (the connection) is constituted as "connection" of the Objectively apprehended body L^n with a *consciousness*, or rather (as we must hasten to add): with a real, Objective psychic being and psychic Ego. For, to me, the experiencing one, the Objective L_n stands there as connected, not with a bare pure consciousness (to which I can at any time go back), just as not thing-schemata or even adumbrations, sensations face me, the experiencing one, but rather, physical things, and even Objective physical things; except that I *can* a priori go back precisely to the hierarchical objectivities in accordance with the hierarchical formation of experience. When we pose this question, it is clear that as the L_x is constituted in the $L_1, L_2, \dots$ as manifolds, the S_k^{**} the psychically real, is constituted in corresponding manifolds $S_1^k, S_2^k, \dots$; further, one sees that in all this the combinations ($L_1^k S_1^k$), ($L_1^k S_2^k$), $\dots$ are already constituted. Now, what are the S_m^k , the appearances of the Objective real psyche, as it were? They are, so goes the reply, themselves already constituted unities, like the L_n . The latter are constituted through regulated series of schemata, motivated in a certain manner, and, with that, related in a certain manner to circumstances, as we have already described in certain respects. In the case of the S_m^k we don't speak of such a schematization. Nevertheless, they are unities of the constitutive manifestation. If I , as the experiencing pure Ego = I_o^k apprehend an appearing physical thing, given in my orientational space, as an animate organism (the L_o^k , not the Objective L itself), then for the constitution of a human being, M_k^{**} the lowest apprehension level is this: that I interpret [*endeute*] a flow of

*"L" from the German "Leib" — Transl.

**"S" from the German "Seelen" — Transl.

***"M" from the German "Mensch" — Transl.

consciousness into the human being that is as little something already real as is the schema "something physically real." This consciousness is pure consciousness (or, able to be found as pure subsequently in the transition from the full apprehension of psyche and of human being to the Objectivating levels). This pure consciousness has, in the lower level in question here, an ordinary connection with L_o^k , the animate organism of another that appears to me, a connection that requires a separate description that will be given later. For the present, let us say that the animate organism of another that appears to me is, as animate organism, of a peculiar character: as carrier of sensory perceptions, of sensory feelings and drives, as carrier for all the "materials" that are further interwoven with act-characters as noetic forms and the like, so that an entire flow of consciousness is produced, also including in itself acts of the specific form of the cogito and a pure Ego. Therefore, the L_o^k the animate organism of K that appears to me, that enters into this combination, is constituted as a real thing of its level and as something real in the appearing space R_o^* of my experiencing Ego I_o , of my world W_o^{**} . This animate thing has its relation to real circumstances U_o^{**} and is therefore a member of the world W_o , my world of appearances. Now, in the experience of this same Ego, the alien consciousness (the B_o^{****}) that appears connected with the L_o^k is to be found in precisely this way in a regulated dependence of circumstances within the world W_o and undergoes accordingly a realizing apprehension as S_o^k . Therefore, with relation to the dependence in which the empathized alien consciousness is experienceable and is apprehended in this experienceability partly by the appearing animate organism, partly by the remaining surrounding world, something psychically real united with the appearing animate organism appears to me, and it is related to the total empathized and to-be-empathized consciousness, which now has the character of the psychic "state" (total state) or of a psychic "behaviour," in which the psyche manifests itself.

With that, however, we do not yet have the Objectivity of the psyche and the Objectivity of the real connection psyche and animate organism, i.e., *full human being*; rather, it is the — for my experiencing pure Ego I_o — primary intuitive experiential unity: "alien human being for me," mere "appearance," So (an of course easily misunder-

<112>

*"R" from the German "Raum" — Transl.

**"W" from the German "Welt" — Transl.

***"U" from the German "Umstände" — Transl.

****"B" from the German "Bewusstsein" — Transl.

stood expression); any other Ego I^k as a purely experiencing one has an S^k of "the same" S . But what else does this say than that by virtue of a possible mutual understanding this identification is possible, that only with it is constituted the Objective psyche (Objectively united with the Objective animate organism) and therewith the Objective human being (that is, no longer L_m^k and $L_m^k S_m^k$, and also not $L^n^k S_n^k$, but rather $L^k S^k$ and M^k without a lower index). We understand with this the phenomenological construction of the apperception of the psyche and the human being according to noesis and noema, to the extent that constitution is in general in question. The psyche does not appear in the sense that it adumbrates itself; but the psyche becomes objective in every pure consciousness (or for every pure Ego) in a bare (noematic) "objectivational" appearance. Apprehended as Objective being it is the unity that legitimates itself in the mutual understanding and that manifests itself in all these objectifications of the psyche (and every Ego that has experience of the same psyche possesses such an objectivation: the S_k). In the sense of this apperception lies this sort of legitimation (i.e., of the legitimizing experience), and to demand that the psyche itself were given — and given adequately — or that it were given in the same manner as a lived-process or stream of lived-processes, is counter-sensical. Does everyone, therefore, have a more direct experience of his own psyche than of that of another? Every pure Ego has immediate — and that means here: not based on empathy — experience of his consciousness, his pure consciousness. But disregarding the fact that the apperception of one's own animate organism is in many respects more incomplete than of the alien animate organism (however much advantage it may have because of the original grasping of organismal sensations) and the fact that it is the presupposition for grasping alien animate organisms (and disregarding likewise how the grasping of one's own psyche in the subjective level would remain quite rudimentary without the grasping of the alien one), I say disregarding all that, it is all the more clear that the Objectivity of one's own psyche presupposes mutual understanding. One's own psyche, as it is supposed to have Objective factual existence in the Objective world, is the constituted unity of a manifold of "appearances," of "objectivation," which, to be sure, are already "realities" from the standpoint of the individual Ego, but not Objective realities, not "substances." They are mere "appearances," or whatever one wants to name them.

§2. REALIZING APPREHENSION OF THE PURE EGO.

Let us go one step further. Let us consider the pure Ego; not as experiencing, but rather as being understood to be in the appearing and Objectivated animate organism in the interpretation [*Eindeutung*]. It is subject of the empathied cogitations, subject of the surrounding world facing it in consciousness through these cogitations, which is not only the surrounding world of mere things but also the surrounding world of values and the practical surrounding world. The pure Ego is *identical unity*, but not unity presenting, manifesting itself in some sense or other; rather, simply a cogitating unity, and how this is to be understood can only, and can adequately, be derived from every cogito. This Ego is therefore something totally different from all the unities that we have come to know, including the psychic unity, although it, by the way, can, like all of these unities, undergo an intersubjective identification and Objectivation. In the interpreting [*Interpretation*] experience of an alien Ego we can, abstracting from everything that goes beyond its pure consciousness, grasp the identical pure Ego in the interpreted [*Interpretation*] cogitations, and another can grasp precisely the same, he can come to an understanding with us; we can thus in common ascertain a plurality of absolute monads and of apparent pure Egos. But this Objectivation too is of course not a realization. The pure Egos acquire therewith nothing, that is, they do not thereby enter into new apprehensions that are constitutive for new realities. On the other hand, we are not saying that pure Egos cannot accept new apprehensions and thereby transform themselves as it were into real Egos in the sense of these apprehensions. At first, of course, every cogito undergoes a realizing apprehension with the whole stream of consciousness to whose stock it belongs, to the extent that this stream is apprehensible as dependent on the animate organism and through it dependent on the really constituted and posited material world. If I drink a cup of coffee in order to have good theoretical inspirations, the theoretical acts of judgment, deduction, etc. that occur afterward are there as conditioned by this organismal influence. This holds in manifold ways for all cogitations, and, in accordance with the sense of this apprehension, it is a matter for empirical investigation to determine the extent and the particularity of these dependencies; they are only branches of those dependencies that belong to the total stock of the apprehension of the psyche as "reality," and especially as organismally dependent. What is said of the organismal dependencies would no less have to be said of the

idiopsychic ones into which the Ego-acts, like all psychic lived-processes, are interwoven. That, e.g., the performance of a proof proceeds "more easily" with "repetition," that a newly acquired insight cancels out the corresponding earlier errors, or tends to experience the recurring ones in the character of cancelling out, that accordingly such acts are there as dependent on earlier ones — these are known facts. But if we now look at the pure subject of the cogitations and if we consider that it is an identical-unitary something in their many-formed interchange, then we see that it must necessarily undergo with them, precisely as their identical subject, a corresponding realizing apprehension. The Ego which is thinking there is no longer thinking this way one time and differently the next, but rather is *real Ego*, which — belonging to this animate organism, enlivening it and depending on it — comports itself with relation to an interchange of *real* circumstances in an appropriate manner. The *pure Ego* has now entered into an *apprehension*, has undergone an apprehension through which an "*empirical*" *Ego* is constituted, an Ego that is now no longer to be derived from every cogito as that which it is, and is no longer adequately given in the derivation, but rather, an Ego that one must first get to know, and with the cognizance of which one never comes to an end, because it is *experience* which has to give us this cognizance (experience of the type of apprehension that is constitutive precisely for this Ego) and which, like all experience (as related to the real), leads us into the endless possibilities of ever new circumstances, among which the real shows what it is, in the manner of its dependencies.

The pure Ego already receives an experiential relation when it is apprehended as that of an experienced human being; as when I (I_o) posit the human being M_o^k as understanding, interpret [*findet*] into him a psyche S_k and with it a pure Ego I_k . But over against this extraneous essential experiential relation of the Ego stands the *experiential apprehension* that realizes the I_o , apprehends it itself as dependent on real circumstances. As every realization that at first has constituted something real for my world of surroundings is accessible to an Objectivation through entrance into the intersubjective nexus, so also is the realization of the psychic Ego. It becomes the Objective *real Ego* in the intersubjective exchange of experience. In accordance with this everyone will then also be able to apprehend himself.

I grasp myself no longer as pure Ego of my pure cogitations, but rather I grasp myself as an Objective human being in the Objective world, with an Objective psyche, thus also as *Objective real Ego* having the known character (at least I think I know it). For this Ego,

experience has to legitimate how things stand with regard to its dispositions, character traits, etc.; every Ego apprehends itself in a more or less determinate and complete manner as subject of such real properties. I, as pure Ego (namely, in a cogito and nexus of cogitations) apprehend myself *empirically*, namely, I regard myself as existing in the world and as dependent, caused therein; just as I do every one else.

We just said: in the Objective world. For, through the realizing

<115>

apprehension that the pure Ego experiences, it indeed receives (as psyche and real psyche-subject) *Objective spatiality and temporality*. To speak of such things in the case of the pure Ego in itself would make no sense. The empirical Ego, however, is from the outset constituted as a member of an Objective world. It belongs in the latter through its (Ego's) founding in the animate organism. For, with the constitution of the material world, Objective space and Objective time are constituted (and that is the original constitution of this Objectivity). Accordingly, the animate organism, too, is in the Objective spatiotemporal being as matter. The kind of Objectivation of sensations in the form of "localization" then, with the realization of the "animate organism of the senses" — the animate organism endowed with sensibilities — also yields the firm integration of the sensations into the space- and time-world. This happens according to the principle: that which is localized is Objectively simultaneous with the extensiveness that offers the locality. Through interweaving of sensations and the specifically psychic, this and the psychic-real then also acquires its Objective integration. *Immanent time* then becomes a *manifesting of Objective time*, the immanent "simultaneous" becomes a *manifesting of the Objective "simultaneous"*. Thus the world of the realities becomes a single world, encompassed at first by the Objective time-form as reality-form in general. It is impossible to see how Objective temporality of the psychic could legitimate itself otherwise than by relation to the animate organism. Every psychic process has, of course, its immanent time and, in its manner, likewise the psychic Ego. There is, naturally, also in the immanent consciousness a consciousness of the "simultaneous" and the "one after another." But Objective temporality is intersubjectively graspable and determinable, and there it is a priori clear that such (temporality) can only be grasped and determined — with regard to the psychic as with regard to everything — through the only possible medium of mutual understanding, through animate organicity. Only by the fact that I take the animate organism as a Now and take what is interpreted [*als Findende*] into it as simultaneous with the animate organism, do I also grasp the simultaneity and the temporal order of alien conscious-

ness with my own, and likewise conversely. Every time-determination performable in physical nature, which time-determination leads back to intersubjectively graspable periodic processes and space-measurements intersubjectively relatable thereto, can also serve to determine something psychic according to its time, precisely on the basis of the relations mentioned.

§3. FIRST INDICATION OF THE NECESSARY DISTINCTION OF
NATURAL-SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL-SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE.¹

<116>

The essential possibility of the apprehension of the pure Ego as empirical, of which possibility we speak, may also become clear in an analogous example. A tone, considered purely in itself, has in its duration, the temporal continuity of its phases, a unity; it is the identical tone, unchanged in its quality, say, but variable in its intensity and tone-coloring. But now I apprehend it as a tone coming *from the violin*, changing *when* the violin is stroked harder, becoming weaker when it is stroked more lightly, changing according to whether the violin is closer or farther away, according to whether the mute is placed on it or taken off, etc. Now the tone-unity is apprehended in dependence on "real" circumstances and is itself something real, a real tone (according to our concept of reality) that has its real properties manifesting themselves in its changing "states." What is identical about the tone in and of itself becomes, through relation to the circumstances, the dependent something identical and is realized. Likewise with the schema and the schematic manifold and analogously also with the pure Ego. But of course the essential difference in this springs forth. The pure Ego is a unity in a totally different sense than the unity of a continuity of phases that can be in these phases now changed, now unchanged. Even the continuously temporal unity of a cogito is of a totally different character, for here there is nothing identical that could be there changed or unchanged, as identical in the cogito as phenomenon. Moreover the unity of the pure Ego of the cogito is a temporal existent in a totally different manner than the cogito. Properly speaking, *the pure Ego does not extend itself and does not last*; it is the *indivisible* and non-extendable One for the cogito and identical in every other cogito. But as identical subject of all these acts it undergoes *realization* as does the tone-unity

¹The beginning of this § is included in the second Section of *Ideen II* as §34 (p. 139, lines 22ff) and is here omitted.

and enters in its manner into what is realized. Thus the pure Ego also enters into the realized consciousness as psyche and assumes the empirically real character of the psychic state.

According to all of this we therefore distinguish the *real psyche from the real psychic subject*. The animate organism is carrier of the psychic life as the stream of real psychic states, and in this stream there now prevails, with constant relating to real circumstances (which experience always has to produce) the real Ego-subject as a real unity lying in the psychic ground, as its own standing out from it, but not independent. While the psyche cannot be lacking as substratum, the psyche can lack the real subject; the psyche is then a psyche of lower level, a *subjectless psyche*. Subjectless to the extent that to it there belongs no real psychic Ego-subject. In the Objective world there is no relation to causal circumstances which could awaken the psyche out of its stupor and turn on for it the light of an "I think." *The human being, however, has a psychic subject*, although he may have periods where the real circumstances have no states of the sort "I think" as real consequence. Then the real Ego sleeps, i.e. precisely: in the world there are real—but unrealized possibilities for "awaking." With relation to this, the human being, although he does not at the moment carry out any "I think," is apprehended as disposed to an "I think"; and to the extent that empirical grounds present themselves for the apprehension of relating the course of the possible acts to circumstances in such a way that a higher unity, an Egoical individuality, is manifested in it, he has the *character* even when he is sleeping.

The psychic subject, although abstractively distinguishable from the psyche as its fundament, fuses with it into one in the usual mental apprehension. (As already emerges from what was just said: when we speak of the mental Ego of the human being in constast to the animate organism, we separate off the whole of the Ego in and with its psychic ground; if we take the animate organism with it, then we have the whole human being: I, the human being to whom my human animate organism belongs.)

§4. THE CONNECTION OF PSYCHE AND ANIMATE ORGANISM.

If we consider animate organism and psyche in their real relationship to one another, and if we put ourselves on the ground of *nature*, fitting material things as well as animate organisms, and with them the psyches, into nature, then animate organism and psyche show

<117>

themselves to be connected. But the connection is an accidental one only from one side. The psychic reality is founded in the organismal matter, but this is not conversely founded in the psyche. More generally we can say: the material world is, within the total *Objective world* that we call *nature*, a closed world of its own needing no help from other realities. On the other hand, the existence of mental realities, of a real mental world, is bound to the existence of a nature in the first sense, namely that of material nature, and this not for accidental but for fundamental reasons. While the *res extensa*, if we inquire of its essence, contains nothing of mentahness and nothing that would demand beyond itself a connection with real mentahness, we find conversely that real mentahness essentially can be only in connection to materiality as real mind of an animate organism. In all this the term "animate organism" means not merely a material thing in general, which — in whatever way — stands in a complex of functional dependence with a second reality called psyche, or even only with phenomena of consciousness of a stream of consciousness. Let us imagine a consciousness (whether something psychically real belongs to it or not), my consciousness, say, which would stand in relation to a locomotive, so that if the locomotive were fed water this consciousness would have the pleasant feeling that we call satiety; if the locomotive were heated, it would have the feeling of warmth, etc. Obviously, the locomotive would not, because of the make-up of such relationships, become "animate organism" for this consciousness. If, instead of the thing that I at the time call my animate organism, the locomotive stood in my consciousness as the field of my pure Ego, then I could not call it animate organism also, for it simply would not be an animate organism.

<118>

a) *The animate organism as localization-field of the sensations.*

If we ask why, we become aware that an "animate organism" as such is distinguished in a definite manner, not only in general by the fact that certain sorts of real effects that it undergoes in material nature bring with them consequences of consciousness in my consciousness, but also the fact that a considerable part of the large content-class belonging to the sphere of consciousness under the title "material of consciousness" is so intimately at one with the material animate organism that in the intuitive givenness not merely connection but precisely unity is shown. What we call animate organism is therefore already more than material thing; it already has a stratum belonging

to the "psychic" that is not related by us to it merely in relating consideration, but rather is there from the outset — intuitively, therefore — as an apperceptive stratum belonging to the whole of the animate organism itself. We must therefore first abstract from it in order to obtain the merely material animate organism. The animate organism is, we say, often the carrier of sensations and is always "stimulable" anew. It carries sensations, manifold sensations, like touch sensations, kinaesthetic sensations; temperature-, smell-, taste-sensations are "localized" on it and in it; they form an existential stratum lying on it and in it. All other sensations that are not localized in this manner obtain apprehensions mediately and not accidentally, by virtue of which apprehensions they acquire a relationship to the animate organism and to its various "sense organs," which further presuppose localized sensations and therefore, all in all, likewise "belong" to the animate organism in an essentially different manner than do those dependent sensations of the above example of the locomotive. In general, the distinction that the *animate organism as localization-field* of certain sensation groups has is the presupposition for further distinctions that we will discuss in more detail below.

At first the particularity of localization must be described in more detail, since it is of such importance. A certain group of "sensations" (under which heading we can include all contents of consciousness that, speaking from the standpoint of the pure consciousness, have oneness and function of "materials") are therefore given in the immediate experiential intuition as lying in or lying on the experiencing animate organism, spread out over it, existing in it, in short, as localized. One occasionally uses in reference to them the expression "organismal sensations," an unsuitable expression for the reason that all sensations in general are experienced in a certain manner as related to the animate organism, and therefore could be called organismal sensations. We shall speak of "feelings," in order to distinguish the groups of sensations that have that aforementioned "localization" on or in the animate organism. To them is due the fact that animate organism is so essentially different in the simple experiential intuition (therefore already prior to the level of the last Objectivation in which the world of things and the animate organism are constituted as member of Objective "nature") from a merely material thing. Indeed, if we disconnect everything that empirical knowledge and scientific theorizing could bring in here, and also on the other hand what we could owe to the intersubjective relationship of our empirical intuition, then the animate organism confronts us already as a sensing physical thing covered or filled with feelings. On the one hand, it is

<119>

physical thing . . . ² Such occurrences (the feelings) are lacking in the merely material things. Where an animate organism's member comes into physical contact with another one, the feelings are doubled. The cold, smooth fingertip touches the warm, somewhat rough back of the hand. I experience this and experience moreover the flow of the cold- and smoothness-sensations as feelings of the back of the hand, and the flow of the warmth- and roughness-sensations as feelings of the finger. Obviously the correspondingly named material occurrences and feelings are everywhere essentially different. The constant smoothness of the finger is not the flow of the smoothness-sensation of the hand surface touched by the finger, etc.

That not all sensations can possess this peculiarity of feelings, animate organism localization, and in general assume it — this is clear. Sensations of color and sound (phenomenologically so closely related to the feelings) lack this localization. To the seen thing-color there does not correspond a color-feeling as a feeling corresponds to the felt roughness of a physical thing; "seeing with the eye" is essentially different from "feeling with the finger," inasmuch as the eye is not a localization field of the visual sensations as the finger is for the sensations of touch. It (eye) is, to be sure, also a localization-field, but only for contact-sensations . . . ³ . . . the feelings do not disappear. Only the real, on which, localized, they are intuited, disappears from existence. Of course they have this in common with color sensations and other sensations that are not given as localized, but it helps to say that where localization is given it is nothing so little as it is extension.

b) *The animate organism as organ of volition.*

Up to now we have taken the examples from a closed group of feelings. They belong completely to the large class of sensations in a certain pregnant sense, characterized by the fact that they play the role of constituting "materials" in the phenomenological constitution of the material world of physical things. That the other sorts of materials of consciousness are also represented by feelings shall be discussed later. For now we will limit ourselves to the designated class and study the significance of these feelings. We offer a preliminary discussion of a distinction of the kinaesthetic sensations that belongs to the mode of their flowing. Let us proceed from intuition. The animate

<120>

²The text that followed here is used in the second Section of *Ideen II* (p. 145, line 27–p. 146, line 15), and is therefore omitted here.

³The text that followed here is used in the second Section of *Ideen II* (p. 148, line 23–p. 150, line 19), and is therefore omitted here.

organism is not only sensing animate organism but also organ of motion. In it the psyche, or the psychic subject, senses; in it the subject moves and executes performances in the material world by such self-movement (I move — I move something). We have, therefore, to distinguish between mechanical movement, movement of the material-thing: animate organism, as material doing; and spontaneous movement, psychic doing, the action of the organismal subject. Here emerge certain peculiarities of kinaesthetic sensations, if we attend purely to them: they can have a double character in their continuous flows. Either the flow is "spontaneous," is "free" flow, or it is characterized as "something done to" instead of "something done," as a passive flow in which spontaneity has no share.⁴

In this way the animate organism is organ of voluntary movements, and it is this in as many ways as there are series of kinaesthetic sensations and member-movements that appear belonging to them. This establishes extensions in an obvious manner. The subject now becomes simultaneously active in the material extra-organismal world, namely by means of the free movements of its organismal members: I push a physical thing away, lift a weight with my hand, and the like. Only animate organisms have a stratum of localized feelings and among these kinaesthetic ones. They are the only objects immediately movable by a freely willing subject. Mere material things are only mechanically movable and furthermore only immediately spontaneously movable by means of an animate organism. We see here that in the whole of the apprehension of animate organism the spontaneity of kinaesthetic flows plays an essential role to the extent that only through them can the animate organism appear as moving by means of my freedom . . . ⁵

f) *The constitutive role of the movement-sensations in comparison with other sensations and the relation between the constitution of animate organism and of physical thing.*

In order to understand the constitution of the givenness of the animate organism in its essential interconnection with the givenness of the material thing, we must penetrate still deeper. The beginnings of the elucidation that we have given for the constitution of the animate organism were concerned with the organismal stratum of

<121

⁴The text that followed is used in the second Section of *Ideen II* (p. 159, line 33–p. 160, line 9), and is therefore omitted here.

⁵The text that followed is used in *Ideen II* as: "c) The Animate Organism As Organ of Perception And As Center of Orientation," in the first Section, p. 56, line 8–p. 57, line 6. In the second Section §§39–41 correspond to d) and e) of this text. We continue with f).

those distinctive feelings which, like the touch-sensations, can be brought (in their own different content levels) to "coincidence" with the extended-appearing system of the places of sensing surfaces, and this bringing-to-coincidence in the apprehension means the possibility lying in their essence of integrating them into possible series of perceptions in which an object moves over the skin surface, touching as a stimulator, or also in which the object rests relative to the hand, but the skin surface of the hand, feeling over it (the object), moves in a free act of movement. These free acts are not extra-essential; they play an absolutely necessary role; only by means of them can the constitution of physical-thing objects be carried out at all. We have in our case of the animate organism already presupposed that it is there as a physical thing; but it is a physical thing for us in experience only through possible free touching it all over, seeing it all over, and the like, which, for its part, is apprehended as organismal employment, in which the apprehension of the animate organism as physical thing points back again to possible organismal movements, so that we are threatened with an embarrassing situation. (Difficulties also arise in trying to understand the preference of the touch-sensations in their double function as constituting physical things and organismally localized — i.e., in preference to the sensations that are only constitutive of physical things but are not localized.) All these must of course have constituted functions, and these functions must be capable of being understood. Here I can only give a few indications and proceed from the particular distinction that is peculiar to the kinaesthetic sensation-flows and which, as we shall see later, predetermines them to a quite exceptional role for constitution of physical things. The kinaesthetic flows come forth in consciousness in a double character: either the flow is a "spontaneous," a "free" flow, or it is characterized as "done to" instead of "done," as passive flow in which spontaneity has no part. In the apprehension of animate organism the differentiation of the passive movements, the merely mechanical movements of the animate organism as physical thing, and the free organismal movements that are characterized in the mode of the "I execute a movement of the hand," "I lift the foot," etc., this differentiation is conditioned by this double character. If in this objective apprehension the object: animate organism, and the objective organismal movement has the character of activity and passivity, then it is of course abstractively graspable that it already belongs primarily to the kinaesthetic series in regard to the manner of their flows. Let us for the present use nothing more than this peculiarity, and let us make no further use of the apprehension of

animate organism into which what is kinaesthetic enters, no further use of the vague localization that it undergoes in the parts of the animate organism and no further use of the animate organism at all; let us attend, rather, to the remarkable functions that kinaesthetic flows have, by virtue of their spontaneity, for all constituting of extensive physicalness. In general we can assert the following (as a thorough phenomenological analysis would absolutely confirm, which analysis will be presented in another context): in all constituting of spatial physicalness two kinds of sensations with completely different constitutive functions are involved . . .⁶

It is further to be noted that the question here is not whether the kinaesthetic sensations themselves undergo objectifying apprehension, whether they can undergo or have undergone expressly localizing integrating into the animate organism. Certainly my eye moves, my feeling hand moves, when I perceptually bring the object "table" to givenness; but the eye movement, devoted to experiencing the table, does not come into action as such, i.e., as experienced in this apprehension. We can attend to the eye movement and apperceive it as such. But with that we bring in an experiential apprehension whose legitimation itself would have to take place by means of organismal movements, e.g., those of the hand touching the eye, etc. Originally constitutive are only the free flows of the kinaesthetic sensations in their motivational relation to the series of motivated table apprehensions with the orderings of materials implicit therein, with which orderings color, roughness and the like are presented; and if talk of motivation here also implies such a thing as "apprehension" for the kinaesthetic sensations, which is doubtless the case, then it is a totally different apprehension from that on the side of the results of motivation in which the physical-thing object "appears" by means of this attitude.

If we now compare tactile sensations and visual sensations with regard to their significance for the constitution of animate organism, we notice that they belong to quite different constitutive orderings and do not play the same role at all.⁷ This is seen in the fact that a subject with eyes only (an idea that is to be made evident) could not have any appearing animate organism, but a merely tactually endowed subject could, understood only under conditions that are fulfilled in the case of us humans. The former would have its physical-

⁶The text that followed is used in the first Section of *Ideas II* (p. 57, line 10–p. 58, line 29) and was therefore omitted here.

⁷The following sentences appear almost word for word in the second Section of *Ideas II*, p. 150, lines 25–36.

thing appearances in the play of kinaesthetic motivations (which it therefore could not apprehend organismally); it would see real physical things (of course only things pertaining to the senses that would be inaccessible to an intersubjectively performable Objectivation owing to the lack of organismal experiences). It will not be said that the one only seeing *sees* his animate organism, for this seen animate organism would lack the specific distinguishing characteristic *vis-à-vis* any other physical thing, and even the free movement of this "animate organism," movement going hand in hand with the freedom of the kinaesthetic flows, would not make it an animate organism and would not bring about any localization. For, it would then only be as if the Ego, at one with this freedom in the kinaesthetic realm, could immediately freely move any other physical thing at all. What is lacking is the possibility of localizing the visual contents on the visual animate organism, the possibility of seeing the eye as feeling the physical thing seen by the eye, so to speak, and correlatively, the possibility of being able to see the physical thing seen as going across the resting eye, "touching" it continuously (visually touching!) in the familiar manner in which we can go over an object with an actually touching organ, e.g., the hand surface, and can go over the hand surface with the object.⁸ Thus touching offers something two-fold: it feels the object, and the series of touch-sensations in their motivation-relation to the kinaesthetic sensations can undergo apprehensions as roughness or smoothness of the object in a spatial extension. On the other hand, the feeling hand appears, actually present, e.g., in the seeing of the hand or in the feeling of the one hand by the other, in all of which *the same* touch-sensations are fitted into a new apprehension. If the perception of the hand is not an actually occurring one, then it is simply an obscure one, i.e., one such that, if we inquire of it according to the possibilities in it of conversion into legitimating actually occurring experiences, it leads us into such series of perceptions.

In general we are convinced that primary localization belongs only to the touch-sensations and the sensations going parallel with them, the temperature-sensations that follow the stimulated organismal surfaces with their extension, the taste-sensations, and (very imperfectly) the smell-sensations. They function simultaneously as constituting physical things and as constituting animate organisms, and in the latter regard as constituting animate organism as physical thing and animate organism as field of localization, as carrier of feelings. In

⁸The preceding sentences are included almost word for word in the second Section of *Ideen II*, p. 148, lines 1-8.

the constituting of physical things all other sensations are involved through interconnection of the apprehensions; to the constitution of animate organisms they cannot contribute primarily. Only the kinaesthetic sensations — without detriment to the circumstance that they function everywhere as motivating and precisely for this reason do not function in what results from motivation — can simultaneously assume a secondary function of localization along with the motivating function. This happens through continuous interweaving with primarily localized sensations, in particular touch-sensations. But since no parallelism of exactly differentiated levels prevails here like that between temperature-sensations and touch-sensations, the kinaesthetic sensations do not spread out in different levels through the appearing extension. They undergo only a rather indeterminate localization. The latter is however not for this reason insignificant; it makes the unity between animate organism and freely movable thing more intimate.⁹

But now, in further sequence, all of the sensations that are constitutive for the constitution of spatially physical characteristics in the mode of adumbration, which sensations are incapable of localization (even if it be only a secondary one), acquire a definite relationship to the animate organism. The optical sensations, e.g., relation to the eye in the head, which is constituted as movable member of the animate organism through touching. The eye "directs" itself in seeing (in the free act of eye movement) toward what is seen and accommodatively adjusts itself to it. In all perceiving, in all experiencing, the animate organism is there with its sense organs, and all experienced things have in the experiencing a relation to the organismal: already with the relation to the most fundamental strata of experience, of which we have given a few descriptive indications, which are joined by others that are on the whole less difficult because they already presuppose constitution of physical thing and animate organism. In particular we shall not discuss here in any more detail the important distinctive feature the animate organism has of containing within itself the orientation-center and this in connection with the circumstance that it is what continually appears and is as localization-field of all sensation-materials the distinguished Object, that it is there in everything in this particular way. Interwoven with the psychic subject as it is, it is the *subjective Object* to which all other Objects are "*vis-à-vis*," or surrounding Objects. Further, the animate organism is "there too" not only with regard to all experiences of

⁹The preceding sentences are included in the second Section of *Ideen II*, p. 151, lines 7-16.

physical-thing actually but also with regard to the at first intuitively grasped whole world of value and volition. By virtue of the interweavings of all sensuous feelings and drive-sensations the former have an organismal localization, as we have already said above; and if now, with the help of such sensibilities, new kinds of Objectivenesses are constituted, if the appearing Objects of nature receive a new stratum of intuitively given value-predicates or of practical predicates (e.g., as Objects that are there immediately as art works, Objects for use), then these are also related to organicity with regard to the new stratum of being that distinguishes them. Now added to this there is still the distinctive place that the animate organism has as center of all acts, indeed of all immediately intuitive action of the subject; in all operating in the world it is what is immediately freely active and the center of all "operating" in the original sense in relation to other Objects of the world.

But if we still limit ourselves to the mere data of theoretical experience, if we exclude all values and all practical Objectivenesses, then it is an important result of our consideration that "*nature*" and *animate organism*, and, in its interconnection with the latter, the *psyche*, are constituted in mutual relationship to one another, at one with one another.

<125>

§5. SOLIPSTIC AND INTERSUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE.

Our studies of the relations of material thing and animate organism and their constitution in experience were confined to the framework of the lower level of experience that to a certain degree is designated as experience for an individual experiencing subject. Only to a certain degree, for as soon as we speak of an individual subject, ourself, say, as an individual human being with an individual animate organism and an individual psyche, we have already apprehended ourself Objectively, as individual vis-à-vis an actual and possible plurality and, along with this, as an Object that is experienceable by many and is in the experience of many an identical Object. In this Objectivity we grasp everything that is experienced: physical things, animate organisms, psyches or psychic subjects, humans and brutes; everything finds its place in an Objective spatiotemporal world. The components that relate to this Objectivity therefore lie hidden in all natural experience; we have abstracted from them, and moreover they can easily be abstracted; there then remains the whole content of the actually occurring experience, insofar as the content is purely and

simply intuitive experience, purely and simply intuitive perception, pure and simple actually occurring perception-context in which what is perceived legitimately itself in pure self-present givenness. The components that go beyond this point to possible "interpretation" of certain physical things as animate organisms and as animate organisms to which a pure Ego, but not the inwardly seen one, rather, only a presentated Ego, belongs, with an "other" stream of consciousness as the immanently seen stream to which also belong perceptions and in general experiences of precisely the same physical things that we ourselves experience. And thus, all of a sudden, the new manifold is there in which the Objectivity of nature can be constituted; the external experiential contexts that belong to the actually-occurring seeable pure Ego constitute real unities, and "the same" unities are also constituted "correspondingly" in the experiential contexts of other pure Egos only posited interpretatively, and they are constituted there possibly with determinations, with real predicates that cannot belong to them as intersubjectively identical, in which predicates the truly existent only manifests itself as intersubjectively valid, or merely presents itself to a certain extent to the various subjects. One can think of the formation of levels of the constitution with the image of a genesis, by imagining experience to be carried out actually only in the data of the lowest level alone; then that which is new in the next level comes forth, and with it new unities are constituted, etc. But this is a genesis of the same sort as is carried out in mathematics. It would be most wrong-headed here to think of psychological genesis and of an explanation of the ideas of world and Ego in the human being of the world. We are not dealing with that at all here. We are merely depicting what kinds of strata lie in the *essence* of the real data themselves and, on the other hand, what kind of strata there are in the apprehension of these data, in the various levels of presentative acts, in which every stratum of the given is documented as given, as unity of its manifolds of sensations, adumbrations, presentations, etc. These are eidetic complexes when we raise everything actually experienced or everything phantazied as experienced to the level of the pure idea. We must always remain mindful of this. Therefore, we can in certain measure imagine that there is not performed at first any such thing as that interpretation, that interpreting in [*Eindeutung*] (we abstract precisely from all components of apprehension that could find their fulfillment through interpretation [*Eindeutung*]), and then we bring it in ourselves. In principle this level is already there as soon as only a second animate organism understood as such, a second pure Ego and Ego-

<126>

consciousness, is posited, and perhaps even a second *real* Ego, if, even though only very limited, the Egoical-real can be constituted already on the lower level. Inasmuch as the possibility exists in principle that the circle of the intersubjectively associating subjects — exchanging their experiences and thereby measuring, confirming, and refuting them against one another — is again and again broadened and loses members in the manner of a human society through “death,” while it gains through “birth,” without the unity of intersubjective experience thereby suffering (Tradition, Literature), inasmuch as this possibility exists, the question is now: how, in view of this relativism of the “Objectively existent,” that is to say, of what is constituted through intersubjective relation, something *Objectively true* can be worked out; how something like that is possible at all. It is clear that we can no longer remain at the level of mere intuition, even if it is no longer properly perception, at least no longer at the moment when the intersubjective understanding produces discrepancies that cannot be resolved by any subjective experience and broadening of experience.

The Objectivation is, with regard to all data of “subjective” or “immediate” experience, the same level. It requires not merely empathy but also mutual understanding and thinking that rests on such understanding, which thinking unifies the intersubjective experiences — or better, the experiences that vary from subject to subject and that are nevertheless, by virtue of the mutual understanding, graspable and grasped as experiences of the same thing — and makes that which is identical understandable as that which presents itself differently for the different subjects. Understandable for thinking, however, means explainable. And what does this explaining accomplish?

We have everywhere, as a matter of *experience*, as a matter of at first subjective and then intersubjective experience, a unity of manifolds. Experiencing, however, is a seeing, an intuitive viewing on the basis of details of the manifolds, a perceiving of a unity that is synthetically perceived in the flow of such perceiving in the consciousness of the “one and the same.” *Thinking explicates*. In experiencing, the unity is there as unity of properties and manifoldly changing states, modes of behaviour of the unity under circumstances. But if now the modes of behaviour are given differently, as existing at first differently from subject to subject, which is only reciprocally understandable if a circle of concord (a normality of behaviour with relation to normal organicity and normal circumstances) is given, then the Objective property is posited as the identical something that belongs to the unity, and belongs to it in relation to circumstances whose circle is to

be conceived much more broadly: my organicity is only one among others; organicity varies not only in the way in which mine varies according to circumstances, but rather it is itself a diverse thing and brings differences with it on which the modes of appearance depend. Sense-qualities — this designates “appearing” properties related to particular subjectivity, mine or that of a circle of normal humans. There are, however, variants of subjectivity that reach beyond that and thus are valid for sense-qualities only as unifications of the modes of behaviour of the identical physical thing with relation to limited circles of circumstances. The identical property is, however, the identical something that pervades *all* circumstances as “property.” That is, a stratum of the physical-thing unity pervades manifold presentations. Once it has been constituted, then the question is how far the unity reaches, i.e., what kinds of states belong in this unitary-stratum under *permanent* circumstances. The simple experience sees the unities under the circumstances, but the relations between unities and circumstances (constant unities of the physical-thing properties and unities of the circumstances in a condition of dependence) are not dismembered, and in all this much remains open and unclear, unanalyzed; the unity is seen under circumstances, but not determined (the same physical thing is of course a quite “other” one under different circumstances; therefore simply to describe does not determine; and the surroundings are infinitely many-formed; it is not clear immediately what the physical thing depends on and by what it is thus determined: the determination of the physical thing is description and relation to the circumstances under which the description is valid by virtue of dependency); on the other hand, thinking tries to express Objectively valid truth, that is to say, truth that is plainly and simply valid for the physical thing just as it is expressed. Therefore there is need for the explication of the causal relations. To perform this task, however, means to do physics and mathematics for material things.

If thinking can be abundantly active already on the level of the individual-Ego, it obviously acquires an incomparably higher importance at the level of social experience. Here there arise various large problems. At the very bottom already the question of what in general must be the condition for the possibility of an identical Objectivity for several pure Egos and their life of consciousness. It is a matter here of clarifying what many simply cannot understand: that in the sense of such identical Objectivity there is required the possibility of legitimizing the identity, and that this legitimizing is in principle only conceivable if either the two pure Egos deal with one another or if a

third pure Ego deals with the two. If one further inquires as to the conditions for the possibility of the intercourse, then one comes upon the necessity as *apriori* that in the constituted world each of those in intercourse must be an animate organism, characterized as the animate-organism and an animate organism characterized as the alien one. At a higher level then come the higher transcendental questions as to how the Objectivity must be constituted, with what sense, what is left open as not yet determinate but determinable, with what forms of being it is endowed — all these questions arise in order to make possible *such* determinations as could make possible, in the interchange of ever new Egos with changing subjective peculiarities, the cognition of something true in itself, even if only in the form of determinations that are always only relatively valid but could nevertheless be valid in the continuing enlargement of intersubjective experiences as an approach and substratum of the ultimately valid truth that could as an idea continuously regulate the process of investigation.

§6. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTION;
PHENOMENOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY.¹⁰

Such problems animate Kant's critique of reason, although not in a completely developed form; but they obviously presuppose a phenomenology and an insight into the constitution of the lower levels of experience, a task that Kant did not grasp and of which, even where he touched on it, he did not suspect the magnitude. Therefore he lacks the correct formulation of the problem. The problem of constitution in general in its levels, the necessity of carrying out, in all levels, the systematic descriptions belonging thereto, of setting forth the eidetic-complexes, of considering the various *apriori* possibilities that are open possibilities in the framework of what is fixed, i.e., of the pure Ego and the pure consciousness with all its basic forms; and the problem of then construing these in such a way that justice is done to the idea of an "Objective" cognition — all this is foreign to Kant, how ever much his critique of reason tends in the direction of this problematics and occasionally approaches very near to it. What especially must not be overlooked is the constant reciprocal relation of the constitution of Ego and animate organism on the one hand and of real physicalness on the other; and at the higher level of humans and

human societies, of minds, mental commonalities with communal cognitions, communal evaluations and willings on the one hand and the objective world as nature and cultural world on the other. All investigation must proceed here from the given of experience, insofar as the investigation seeks to fully exhaust it intuitively according to its essential formations: Intuitively, i.e., making clear with the greatest possible completeness what lies in the proper sense of the given of experience. And from there it must reflectively go back to the prescursive consciousness and its modes of constituting such data as unities of manifolds. The one lifts and intensifies the other. One thinks one will soon achieve clarity and will have exhausted the given according to its sense, and as soon as one investigates the modes of givenness and tries to give himself an account of how the legitimizing really looks, what paths it must take, and what immediately plays its role in all that, one notices again and again that one has overlooked much in the Objective attitude, has pushed aside as being apparently irrelevant much that is absolutely essential. So it happens that for objectivities which, like *nature* and *mind*, are not constituted in one level (as are the elementary thought-objects such as number, size, and the like), but rather in manifold levels, an *ontology* has such very great difficulties. For, in itself — and we will have more to say about this — *ontology* is not *phenomenology*.

The ontological mode of consideration is so to speak *katastematisch* [katastematisch]. It takes the unities in their identity, and for the sake of their identity, as something fixed. The phenomenological-constitutive consideration takes the unity in the flow, namely as unity of a constitutive flow; it follows up the movements, the flows, in which such unity and every component, side, real property of such unity is the correlate of identity. This consideration is in certain measure kinetic or "genetic": a "genesis" that belongs to a totally different "transcendental" world than does the natural and natural-scientific genesis. Locke speaks once of a "history" of consciousness, and obviously he meant such a genesis as he, the leader of Empiricism, soon enough confused with the psychological genesis and therewith falsified through and through. Every unity of cognition, in particular every real one, has its "history" or also, correlatively speaking, the consciousness of this real thing has its "history," its immanent teleology in the form of a regulated system of *essentially* appurtenant modes of manifestation and documentation that can be gotten out of it, or interrogated out of it. And what the *thing* [Sache] itself is — that becomes evident on all sides of its essence only in its history, which brings the unities and their moments to prominence by setting

¹⁰ See in regard to this the third chapter of *Ideas* III.

the constitutive manifolds in motion. In the method of phenomenological kinesis both things are separated at once: the essential direction of intentionality and its intentional correlates and the essential determinations of the identical existence of which there is consciousness as something identical in the intentional lived-processes and that makes itself objective as something identical through the regulations of its correlates.

Now as for ontology, it is quite conceivable that someone can actually execute such a perfect insight that he, e.g., is able to analyze the essence of mind or of nature purely and completely, is able to fix the axiomatic principles that belong to it. But *de facto*: what we succeed in so well in mathematics does not turn out successfully for us in the same way in the real ontologies. Here only phenomenology educates us to complete seeing, and although what it strives for is not eidetic doctrine of realities but rather of the constitution of realities and on the other hand of the pure Ego and Ego-consciousness in general, nevertheless, the full eidetic grasp of the real itself, and with it the grounding of ontology according to categorical concepts and principles, will come about only in communion with it.

SUPPLEMENT II, to p. 9

<130>

PERSONAL EGO AND ANIMATE ORGANISM

As soon as we touch upon the Ego, it governs our apprehensions.

It is, of course, not only alive as pure subject of the manifold experiencing, thinking, evaluating, practical position-takings but also preferred Object of our position-takings and as this it is personal Ego, which in its doing and suffering exercises "self-preservation," which has personal properties, rudiments of character, and manifold dispositions with which it is exposed to praise and blame — not least of all to its own, with which it must protect itself tolerably and honestly against the dangers of the world of physical things and the world of human beings or acquire them for itself, use them as a tool, etc. Thus can be understood the view that the animate organism with its organs "reacts" to the external things, that as a consequence of this the Ego has certain perceptions of the physical things and on the basis of these perceptions takes a position toward them in this or that manner. On the one hand stand the physical things, between them the animate organism, which is also only a physical thing, but a physical thing to which a psychic life (psyche and Ego are not separated) is related, first of all perceptions and sensations (which, again, remain unseparated), which the psyche, as it simply is in its causal relation to the animate thing, characteristically localizes toward the animate organism in certain sense fields, in others not. This needs more clarification.

IDENTITY OF THE PHYSICAL THING AND
IDENTITY OF THE PSYCHE

<131>

The material thing may change however it will; to its essence belongs (in the sense of the apprehension of matter) the fact that the circle of the physical states can revert into itself. That which is materially real must remain identical, and, to be sure, in such a way that in reversion to the same circumstances it has the same states, even if de facto the course of the world is such that this is infinitely improbable. The same holds for the organismally real to the extent that the sensibility presents itself in such a way that we can say that if the animate organism is the same one with regard to its materiality and its material states, then it would also, as animate organism, have to be the same one, and in reversion to the identical sets of states of animate organism the stratum of sensation would also have to be the same one. Quite different with the psyche: to its essence belongs, under the title of the formation of dispositions, one-sided mutability. In principle it cannot revert to the same state.

TYPE — EMPIRICAL CLASSIFICATION

A pure grasping of types of phenomenologically concrete formations is quite possible. If we take, e.g., the perceptual appearances of one and the same human being, of one and the same house, or the like, then within the continuity of such appearances belonging to the same Object we will be able in very manifold ways to find single particular appearances and series of appearances which have a typical similarity. Now if we proceed to greater generality and take the type of the Caucasian human being, the Negro, the Mongolian, and the like, then there also corresponds to this empirical type, or to the purely apprehended racial type, a universal typology with regard to the manifolds of appearance. Likewise, if we proceed from a still more general intuited type of a human being in general, an animal in general, etc. And now we see that, just as in the manifold of pure types of experienceable realities we have inexhaustible infinities, so also, and all the more and in greater measure do we have inexhaustible types of perceptual appearances that cannot be fixed by any conceptual system. We see that there could be no thought of a systematic, exhaustive classification of types of perceptual appearances and therefore certainly not any thought of a systematic classification of all types of possible cogitations in general. One can also point to the fact that all possible types of formations produced by nature and by mind, considered in pure idea, also occur as correlate-types for cogitations and that the limitlessness in the correlate-sphere extends to that of the cogitations themselves.

What remains now for phenomenology? The answer, of course, is: even if, e.g., with regard to the perceptual appearances, we not only cannot determine their individual types as these definite concreta, but also cannot determine all possible universal types, which we can however distinguish intuitively should the occasion arise, then we easily attain a height of universality which permits apprehending in concepts that are exact and identifiable again and again according to

<132>

their content. Thus, e.g., with regard to the type: perception of a physical thing, "external" perception. Likewise intuition of a physical thing in general, which does not have to be precisely perception, but can also be retention, recollection, anticipating, awaiting intuition, even mere phantasy.

The phenomenological interest does not and cannot aim at the conceptual fixing of all possible typical particularizations that lie under these fixed universalities. Neither can phenomenology govern the typical particularities down to the undifferentiable concreteness, as geometry, say, through its axioms and its basic concepts governs all possible pure spatial formations. Here there emerges an essential difference in the phenomenological ascertainties of essence over against the geometric ones. It becomes clear if we attend to the fact that the geometric species-formations are not type-differentiations. The type is an intuitive unity, e.g., the type of that which is egg-shaped, that which is serrated, the wavy line, etc. But even though figure in general *can* be understood as a universal type that includes all such types within itself, nevertheless, geometry provides no systematics of these sensory and ideally stated types and no law for such types; rather, it has its own proper sort of concept-formation and its own proper genera of ideas: geometrical purity excludes what is typical in the sensuously intuited data. The types, e.g., the type "egg-shape," are not geometric formations. When we call upon geometry as a doctrine of essences in order to illustrate the scientific character of phenomenology, this indeed has its legitimacy therefore, to the extent that phenomenology is also eidetic doctrine; but we must not put phenomenological and geometrical concept- and judgment-formation on the same level.¹¹

What we can first of all fix, and must fix purely, in phenomenology are the class-ideas of concrete cogitations, which are distinguished by sharp demarcations; and it is then a question of carrying out the eidetic analyses which fix those ideas of real components and of correlates which belong to these class-ideas. It then turns out with regard to the real components that the abstract material, so to speak, the material comprising non-self-sufficient components and formal character traits, out of which all cogitations are constructed, goes back to certain essential basic genera within which one will then have to pursue classification in species. Already included in this is the fact that one will also have to look at the fundamental sorts of the complex forms and will have to fix them by means of stable concepts. This all-

¹¹See pp. 125 ff.

<133>

inclusive elementary analysis, the bringing out of the elements, characters, forms — the really intrinsic ones and those belonging to the correlate — that lie in very different dimensions, is an enormous and extraordinarily difficult task. Since everything takes place in the attitude of the reduction, every ascertainment properly implies an eidetic law for possible singular particulars. This elementary analysis, which proceeds from ideas of concreteness (such as perception, judgment, feeling, will) then finds application in solving the problem of an *a priori* typology of possible concretenesses. First of all, in any case, the material comprising rigorously descriptive basic concepts is acquired, by means of which all concretenesses must be apprehensible, and, conversely, it is possible in free modification of the concrete formations of consciousness which at first thrust themselves to the fore to form ever new concrete formations (cogitations) and to construe concepts of type.

All these tasks are, as to the general type, the same in all spheres of the imagination; everywhere that formations are presented to us in direct intuition we can pursue description, analysis, and also eidetic analysis, and classification. In this regard therefore it is the same with the data of phenomenological intuition, the intuition of cogitations, and with the data of the so-called external intuition, that is to say, as we have earlier discussed, with, e.g., the possible imaginative spatial formations which are to be considered *a priori*, the imaginative data of fulfilled spatial shapes, the possible concrete physical-thing data, etc.

A closer investigation shows that these data of external imagination all belong in phenomenology in a certain manner, even though they can be explored in a way that pays no heed, or virtually none, to characteristics, to the specific side of consciousness. In phenomenology, occupied with the concrete cogitations, we come upon appearing things as such, appearing spatial shapes as such with appearing colors, determinate properties of smell, touch, etc., under the heading of correlate with regard to the acts of so-called sensuous intuition. And going on from there one convinces oneself that all ascertainties of essence, with regard to the appearing data of the external imagination, enter into essential interconnection with ascertainties of essence concerning certain genera of cogitations and finally take their place in a universal eidetic doctrine of the cogitations. From this point of view, namely when one has this taking of place in view, the talk about the phenomenology of the possible physical-thing formations, including the possible spatial and temporal shapes of the physical sphere, and also of the possible sensuous phantoms, etc., is justified. But of course it must be said at

the same time that under such a point of view ultimately everything apriori takes its place in the unity of phenomenology.

The specifically phenomenological consists in the eidetic de-liberation which puts us into the intentional all-encompassing consciousness, which, that is to say, puts everything that eidetic de-liberation yields in a relation to the eidetic essence of the consciousness in which all being is — as I am accustomed to express it — “constituted.”

<134>

If we have turned ourselves without reflection to the numbers and number-relations given in the mathematical Intuition, explored in mathematical thinking, if we carry out the Intuitions and acts of thinking concerned, then we are doing mathematics and we know nothing of phenomenology. But if we take what has been intellectually seen, what has been immediately or mediately grounded as correlate, if we put it in relation to the intellectually seeing, grounding, demonstrating, and construing process of thinking, and if we explore the essential interconnections between number and counting, collection and collecting, between mathematical theorem and mathematical judging, between mathematical proof and acts of proving, etc., then we are doing phenomenology, and all of mathematics acquires phenomenological significance: each of its concepts and theorems becomes an index for phenomenological connections and enters into them as correlate. Likewise: if we move in the sphere of imaginative data of external perception and intuition in general, if we ascertain their essential sorts, their building up out of components that are to be grasped imaginatively, if we engage in an apriori typology of these data, then that is not, to be sure, a natural science in the usual sense, but it is an apriori of possible nature-description which we can acquire in the purely ontic attitude: nature is to be “described purely imaginatively.” Whatever imagination might be, what external intuiting and the like might more precisely be and how it can be more precisely described — that is not in question here. We are addressing ourselves to what is intuited and the essences to be taken therefrom. But as soon as we reflectively shift to the intuiting of the intuited and explore the eidetic relationships between the one and the other, we are doing phenomenology, and now everything which formerly was explored in the ontic attitude acquires phenomenological significance. One can convince oneself, of course, that the eidetics of the data of the external imagination has from the beginning an especially close connection with the eidetics of the cogitations.

Phenomenology is carried on almost completely in the form of

eidetic descriptions which move in direct Intuition. That is, there is not a complete lack of mediate inferences, but they are unimportant compared with the enormous work of direct analyses. Immediate Intuition is everywhere responsible for the decisive ascertainties. But immediate Intuition moves not merely in phansic analyses; it also points out the correlates to us, and dealing with the correlates leads forthwith, within the fundamental class of the external imaginations, to description of nature in general, but at first only of nature precisely as imaginative datum. Since all of us in this age of natural science have indeed been educated in the natural sciences, but have not been educated to regard imaginative natural data in the eidetic attitude as Objects that are as such worthy of scientific treatment; and since we have all first come to this peculiar sphere of being and essence from the new phenomenology, whose interest indeed requires eidetic consideration of the species and forms of sensuous formations, one can understand our tendency to regard such eidetic exploration of imaginative natural data precisely as phenomenology. We speak of phenomenology of physical things, phenomenology of illusion, etc. But one must make clear to oneself that this is a correct designation only in a certain sense, since in the end all sensuousnesses are in themselves eidetically explorable, as well as numbers, in the ontic attitude. Only when we describe them with the consciousness-characteristics in which they present themselves as correlate of consciousness, and only when we describe consciousness itself, in which they come to meanness and givenness: only in this involvement, to which, of course, they belong essentially, do we have in the full sense phenomenology of the sensuousnesses.

In the sphere of the psychological realities it is essentially different than in that of the physical realities. To the essence of the mind, of mental states and qualities, belongs not mathematical determinability; there is not any definite mathematical manifold as ideal scaffolding to be attached to mental actuality. Psychic acts and states, like phantasies, rememberings, judgments, wishes, hopes, willings, are not measurable, not “exactly” determinable as approximations to ideal mathematical formations. There is there also, to be sure, something like continuity, and in many directions; but the psychic phenomena are not resolvable into components each of which could be assigned its place idealiter in a mathematical manifold, and their complication conceals no mathematizable substance in the sense of matter. And this holds all the more, in further sequence, for the psychic dispositions and the real properties of persons interconnected with them. If we reduce phenomenologically to pure consciousness, then the same

<135>

holds of course for the manifold of the cogitations. It is no mathematical manifold. To be sure we can, e.g., in the flow of a perceptual appearance, think exact ideas into it, as we do, of course, when we speak of the temporal phases of the perceptual appearances, when we imagine the phenomenon as a duration with an ideally determined content that is new from one point in time to another; likewise when we speak of a phenomenon fading from clarity into obscurity and there imagine phases of this continuity of the fading away. But there is here in principle a lack of possibilities of approximately determining what is given at any time by exact concepts with a fixed method; and above all the gradual levels are levels of a rich qualitative content and a rich qualitative content of manifold genera and species which one could not somehow grasp mathematically by relating them to continua and exact concepts, or integrate into a mathematical order.

The situation here, indeed, is a quite different one from that in natural science; immediately experienced nature with its immediately experienced properties is only an imperfectly given, always merely appearing, nature, which always has ahead of itself the nature that must first of all be worked out, must be cognized again and again through presentations in different levels. In progressing from experience to experience, from appearances built hierarchically upon one another, mathematically ideal concepts which stand in relation to the pure concepts that are to be taken from the content of appearance itself but are not the concepts themselves, guide us for the working out of the true, mathematically apprehensible nature. We see physical things in color, but the concepts of colors, and also the ideal concepts of pure colors which we can acquire at first are not yet the concepts of colors by means of which what is perceived could undergo exact determination. The concept formations of mathematical optics, which accomplish such things, are rooted in the experience with its experiential colors, but are not themselves immanent in them, are not ideal concepts to be taken from them by direct ideation.

As for the phenomena of consciousness on the other hand, which we want to make into Objects as they are in themselves, they are not, like nature, something presenting itself through something else and not something to be worked out of something else, out of phenomena. The concepts that we use for their determination can be taken only from them themselves, can be abstracted with regard to their givenness and adequate givenness. If we find here something flowing, then we simply must form the idea of the flow; if we find something

vague, the idea of vagueness; if we are able in certain spheres to find only typical differences, then we must form concepts of type. We by no means sink into a flow because of this. We have pluralities of rigorously apprehensible differences that can hardly be overlooked, and also, where lower concretenesses are typically differentiable only in flow, we nevertheless find everywhere in higher universality fixed, even though not mathematical, differences, concepts that cannot be gotten through flowing transitions. Thus perception in general and more especially also perception of the physical is something absolutely fixed and to be described in its universality. Perception and assertion or perception and willing, willing and being glad, and the like, these are phenomenological class-differences which are as firmly and absolutely separated as the imaginative differences of color and tone in the sphere of external experience.

It is precisely this that makes valuable universal differentiations, classifications, and descriptions possible in every sphere of imaginative ideas, even in that of external experience, and gives meaning in these spheres to the goal of a systematic eidetics, since we are really only standing in the flow with the lower concretenesses and concrete universalities, but not when we enter into the higher universalities. A classification of all conceivable imaginative types cannot, as we have just said, be set as the goal in the field of external experience.

At least I do not see that one could set about fixing all possible types of formations even for the field of sensuous spatial shapes; they always have of themselves, and necessarily, something flowing, are mediated by transitional shapes, which one can again apprehend typically. Likewise if we wanted to apprehend all tone-formations which of course pass over into one another in a flow, etc. On the other hand we have concepts which are separated by chasms if we shift to corresponding generality, as e.g., the spatial in general, the acoustical in general, and the like. Further, one will probably be able to fix typical chief and normal differences in every field and thus be able to perform at a certain level of universality descriptions that will remain valuable.

All the more is it so, however, in the sphere of the psychic, and particularly, if we practice the phenomenological reduction, in the sphere of the formations of consciousness.

<136>

<137>

INDEX

- Actuality, 24, 48
- Alien animate organism, 7
- Alien human being, 97ff.
- Animate organism, 1ff., 4ff., 94ff., 103, 104, 119
- Animate thing, 96
- Anschütz, A., 44
- Appearances, 53ff., 97f., 115
- Apperception, 1, 5, 16, 17, 36, 46, 63; of animate organism, 5
- Apprehension: of animate organism, 4ff.; of Ego, 99ff.; of material thing, 1ff., 29; of world, 1; realizing, 99ff.
- Apriori, 20ff., 27, 29, 31f., 38f., 42, 60f., 64, 71, 78
- Art works, 112
- Basis, ultimate legitimizing, 1
- Being, 7, 55, 65, 72f.
- Birth, 114
- Body (*see* Animate organism)
- Bolzano, 49ff.
- Brenano, 49ff.
- Brutes, 23
- Categories, 1, 20ff., 68
- Causality: physical, 3ff.; psychological, 14f. Change, 30
- Chwolson's famous Xlth Commandment, 39
- Clarification, 69, 80ff., 88
- Classification (empirical), 121
- Clue, 22, 25, 27, 66
- Community-ies, 2, 17ff.
- Concepts: and words, 48; and essences, 59; and noumena, 71; apriori and aposteriori, 31, 66; formation of, 3, 24, 25; concept of the concept, 25; eidetic, 31; logical-formal, 84; making c. clear, 86f.; making c. distinct, 86f.; material particularizations of, 84; regional, 22ff., 84ff.
- Conceptual material, 83ff.
- Consciousness, 10, 12f., 46, 61, 64, 66, 96ff.
- Constitution, 1, 31, 54, 58, 67, 74, 88f.
- Correlation (apriori), 5, 16, 30, 46, 72, 73
- Counterfactual, 73, 75
- Death, 114
- Descartes, 3
- Description, 39ff., 46ff., 51ff., 77ff., 79
- Discordances, 78
- Ego, 1, 5, 9, 17; alien pure, 95f.; and animate organism, 5f.; empirical, 17; personal, 119; psychic, 10, 96ff.; pure, 94ff., 99f.; pure and psychic, 17
- Ehrlich-Hata, 12
- Eidetic analysis, 19, 26, 37, 51
- Eidetic attitude, 41, 53, 65
- Eidetic definition, 25
- Eidetic description, 59f.
- Eidetic law(s), 37, 42, 59f.
- Eidetic necessities, 46, 49
- Eidetic particulars, 71
- Eidetic reduction, 35
- Eidetic seeing, 42
- Eidetic truths, 37, 38, 41f.
- Eidos, 35
- Empathy, 34, 94ff.
- Empiricist, 23
- Epiphenomena, 15
- Epoché*, 41, 47, 65
- Essence(s), 3, 11, 23ff.; and concept, 29, 41, 61; and nouma, 73ff.
- Existence, 3, 23, 29f., 34, 36, 39ff., 46, 70f.
- Experience, 1ff., 7ff., 9, 11, 17, 23, 30, 40f., 44, 59, 114ff.
- Experienced, 1ff., 4, 29, 36, 39
- Experiencing, 2ff., 65, 97, 114, 119; theoretical, 2, 4
- "Experts", 11, 12, 19, 20, 82
- Explanation, 52ff.
- Expression(s), 23, 25, 87, 88
- Extension, 2ff., 30
- Feelings, 12, 13, 14, 15, 105f.
- Fiction, 28, 36, 40

INDEX

129

- Fitting, the, 23, 76
- Foundation/founding relations, 2, 3, 12ff., 16f., 21ff., 31, 37, 42, 44, 48, 51ff., 81
- Freedom, 70, 107ff.
- Free variation, 26, 28
- Galiana, Abbé, 42
- Galileo, 38
- Geiger, 8 (footnote), 46
- Generalization, 23
- Genetic method, 1ff., 117ff.
- Genus, 25, 30, 85
- Geometry, 70ff.
- Givenness, 8, 29, 68, 70, 83, 86
- Harmony, 28f., 73, 75, 78
- History, 117
- Human being, 12ff., 96ff., 103
- Hume, 17, 45
- Idea(s), 29, 68, 78, 85; idea of a complete realm of ideas, 85; idea of a complete system of ontologies, 89
- Ideation, 21f.
- Identity, 27, 102, 120
- Imagination, 23, 48, 123ff.
- Immanence, 33, 77
- Immediate insight, field of, 39
- Impression(s), 5, 45
- Insight, 82 (footnote)
- Intentionality, 21, 36, 46, 47, 65
- Interconnections of physical thing, animate organism, and psychic, 2, 5, 7, 10, 12, 14, 35, 103
- Interpretation (*Eindeutung*), x, 7, 8, 55, 94, 99f., 113ff.
- Intersubjectivity, 2, 54, 55, 94ff., 110, 112ff., 115ff.
- Intertwaving of material nature and animate organicity, 2ff.
- Intuition, 20, 23ff., 44, 48, 52, 58, 78ff.
- Intuitionism, 83
- Judgment, 24
- Kant, 22, 27, 87, 116
- Kepler, 38
- Kinesthetic sensations, 106ff.
- Kinetic method, 1ff., 117ff.
- Legitimation/-izing, 1, 7, 23, 24, 29, 41, 98ff., 115
- Leibniz, 49
- Levels (*see* Strata)
- Lived process(es), 22, 33f., 47, 58ff., 64, 76, 77, 98; phenomenology of, 38
- Lived-process correlates, 76
- Localization, 5f., 101, 104ff.
- Locke, 34, 117
- Logical Investigations*, 13, 21, 22
- Logos* article ("Philosophy as Rigor Science"), 39, 43, 45
- Lotze, 49ff.
- Material of animate organism, 4f.
- Material thing, 1ff.
- Mathematics, 11
- Mathesis, 37, 38, 49, 62
- Meaning, 87ff.
- Method: in all sciences, 21, 81ff.; of clarification, 80; of free variation, 26, 28; natural-scientific, 20; phenomenological, 59; phenomenological-kinetic, 1ff., 80f., 117ff.
- Mill, 49
- Mind, 18, 22, 117
- "Mothers", 69
- Naturalism, 33, 43
- Nature, 2, 103ff., 117
- Negative existential propositions, 71
- Noumena, 23ff., 36, 46, 61, 65, 71, 73ff., 87f.; and concept, 71; and essence, 73ff., 88
- Noesis, 10, 20, 23, 36, 65
- Normality, 52, 54, 57, 114
- Norms, 19, 25, 80
- Objectivation, 95ff., 110
- Objective space, objective time, 56
- Objectivities, 20, 78
- Objectivity, 2, 4
- Ontology, 21ff., 32, 51ff., 65ff., 85, 116ff.; and phenomenology, 65ff.
- Origin(s), 47, 69
- Originally bestowing acts, 20
- Originally preservative acts, 31
- Perception, 1ff., 27, 35; of animate organism, 1, 7
- Person, 18
- Pländer, 9 (footnote), 48
- Phantasy, 28
- Phantoms, 2, 27
- Phenomenological reduction, 34f., 47, 51, 65, 69, 125
- Phenomenology, 19ff., 46, 51ff., 59; and ontology, 49; transcendental, 65ff.; way to, 49
- Physical thing, 1, 10, 25ff., 29ff., 77, 86; apprehension of, 29; essence of, 31
- Physics, 16, 51ff., 57ff.
- Physis* (psychic), 16

- Plants, 8f.
- Positing, 30, 71, 76, 90
- Possibility, 23, 29, 48, 55, 71
- Possible concepts, 24
- Possible realities, 68
- Possible subjects, 54
- Possible worlds, 29, 48
- Proof of existence, 70f.
- Province, 41, 66, 72
- Psyche, 1, 10f, 15, 33f, 94f, 103; communal, 18
- Psychic Ego, 1, 12, 96f.
- Psychic subject, 56f.
- Psychologism, 43
- Psychology, 9f, 16f, 19, 42, 51f, 77; experimental, 33, 43; rational, 21, 33f, 60f.
- Psycho-physical parallelism, 15
- Quotation marks, 72, 73, 90 (footnote)
- Reality, 1f, 4, 14, 29, 33, 125; cognition of, 3
- Regions of reality, 1f, 22f, 33, 78
- Res extensa*, 29, 31
- Rules, 24, 29
- Science(s), 37, 81; botany, 8; biology, general 8; cultural, 63; descriptive, 3; empirical, 21; experimental, 36; explanatory, 3; genuine, 10; physical-natural, 16; physics, 51f, 57f; physiology, 10; theory of, 3; zoology, 8
- Self-giveness, 89
- Sensations, 5f, 10, 12f, 26f, 104f; double function of, 13; kinesthetic, 13, 106; movement-sensations, 107; presentive, 13
- Sense fields: localization, 5; visual, 5
- Signification, 23f, 73, 75, 76; word-signification, 81, 86f.
- Solipsistic, 112f.
- Somatology, 4f, 7f.
- Sources, 1, 32; phenomenological, 80
- Space, 101
- Spatiality, 101
- Species, 30
- Spinoza, 3
- Stratum: 9; apprehensional, 10; nature, 15; of animate organism, 4f, 7f; of feeling, 12; of material thing, 1f, 6; of physical-thing unity, 115; of psyche, 16f; somatic s. of feelings, 15, 16, 18
- Substance, 2f, 15, 57
- Symbols, 82
- Technology, 82
- Temporality, 101
- Theory formation, 81
- Thinking, 1f, 7f, 29, 73, 81, 87, 114f.
- Time, 10, 36, 101
- Tone, 102
- Tools, 6
- Transcendental, 64f, 117
- Transcendent being, 46, 47, 65
- Types, 121f.
- Unites, constitutive, 57, 61f, 68
- Unity, 114f, 122; Objective, 95f.
- Validity, 75; existential v. of concepts, 23, 30, 41, 70, 71, 81
- Values, 82
- Volition, 6, 15, 106f.
- "Wonder of wonders", the, 64
- Words, 23, 39, 86f.
- World, 28, 35; cultural, 117; material, 104; mental, 104; Objective, 56, 98, 101, 104; practical surrounding, 99; surrounding, 94f; surrounding w. of values, 99; transcendental, 117.