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ANALYSES CONCERNING PASSIVE AND ACTIVE SYNTHESIS

Lectures on Transcendental Logic

EDMUND HUSSERL

ANALYSES CONCERNING PASSIVE AND ACTIVE

SYNTHESIS

Lectures on Transcendental Logic

TRANSLATED BY

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TRANSLATIONS

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*For Joseph and Samara*

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## TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

The *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis* was Edmund Husserl's phenomenological investigation into the *origin of truth*. We find here an early indication of an historical reflection and the identification of a "crisis," the description of primordial dimensions of experience, the genealogy of judgment, and the employment of a new, genetic phenomenological method. While a large portion of the material comprised under this heading is a translation of Husserliana XI, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*, it also includes essential additions to the main text of Husserl's lecture, some supplements, and a partial reorganization of the material.

The "Translator's Introduction" is offered as an orientation to this work. This Introduction is divided into four sections. Section I situates the work historically and conceptually, discusses its composition and revised title, and provides a basic overview of material making up this lecture. Section 2 situates the *Analyses* in the context of a genetic phenomenology, since it is this methodological approach that enables the description of phenomena treated in the *Analyses*. Section 3 elaborates upon the novel and significant themes in these lectures, such as passivity, affective allure, association, motivation, the unconscious, etc. Section 4 includes final editorial notes on the translation and my acknowledgements. Rather than reserving a special section to explain the translation of various key terms, I integrate this clarification into the course of the explications of sections 2 and 3, and on occasion, discuss them in footnotes appended to the translated text.

## 1. The Historical and Conceptual Context

Presented here as *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic* is one of Edmund Husserl's most renowned series of lectures presented in the 1920s.



Offered three times, Winter Semester 1920/21, Summer Semester 1923, and Winter Semester 1925/26, Husserl's lectures are virtually contemporaneous with writings devoted to the problem of "intersubjectivity" and "individuation" (1921–1927) his reflections on the reduction from *Erste Philosophie* (1923/24), and his considerations of cultural crises and its potential for renewal in the *Kaizo* articles (1922–24). As such, the *Analyses* occupy both an historical and a conceptual "middle point" of his work.

Historically speaking, the *Analyses* are situated between major, well-known published works. On the one hand, they arise twenty years after Husserl's ground-breaking *Logical Investigations* (1900/01), a decade and a half after his first lectures on time-consciousness (1905), and nearly ten years following his *Ideas* (1913); on the other, they precede by several years his *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and his *Cartesian Meditations* (both from 1929), and they anticipate his *Crisis* (1934–37) by more than a decade.

While the major insights, novel notions, as well as the import and contribution of these lectures will be explained below, it is possible to say provisionally that these lectures also occupy a center point conceptually. As expressive, even exemplary of his genetic method, they succeed Husserl's earlier phenomenology of consciousness by surpassing both the Cartesian static analysis peculiar to the *Ideas* and the formalism of his early time-consciousness lectures, and they anticipate his generative investigations into intersubjectivity, history, and the lifeworld by initiating a regressive style of inquiry into origins that becomes the hallmark of Husserl's later undertakings in the *Crisis*.

Husserl's fame was well established by the time of these lectures. According to the *Quästurakten* or the "registrar's list" at Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg where Husserl held these lectures, Husserl had 176 persons in attendance the first time he gave them under the title of "Logik" in 1920/21, 133 enrolled in 1923 (now entitled "Ausgewählte phänomenologische Probleme" ["Selected Phenomenological Problems"]), and the numbers tallied 65 in 1925/26 in lectures newly entitled "Grundprobleme

der Logik" ["Fundamental Problems of Logic"].<sup>1</sup> A survey of these registrar's lists reveal a number of names familiar to those acquainted with the phenomenological tradition: Alfred Adler, Oskar Becker, Franz-Josef Brecht, Käthe Hamburger, Max Horkheimer, Fritz Kaufmann, Paul Landsberg, Walther Marseille, Arnold Metzger, Fritz Neumann, Hans Reiner, Wilhelm Szilassi (1920/21); Marvin Farber, Karl Hanser, Ludwig Landgrebe, Hasime Tanabe (1923), and Eugen Fink, (again, Ludwig Landgrebe), Walter Sachs (1925/26).

### 1. *Passive Synthesis and Transcendental Logic*

In recent years, these lectures have achieved a near legendary status under the shorthand rubric of "passive synthesis." How does a lecture series preoccupied with the general problem of logic win its world-wide renown as the "passive synthesis" lectures? There are at least two reasons for this, one editorial (a), one philosophical (b). After discussing these reasons, I explain the composition of this English edition and the reasons for its revised title.

A. One reason these lectures have come to be known as the "passive synthesis" lectures—a reason almost too obvious to mention—is due to the title assigned to them by the editor of Husserliana XI, Margot Fleischer, namely, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis* (1966) [*Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis*]. Why this title? The original titles Husserl gave to the lectures—"Logic," "Selected Phenomenological Problems," and "Fundamental Problems in Logic"—she notes, were simply too broad for the collection of texts that she assembled in the Husserliana volume. While the title "Transcendental Logic," which Husserl assigned to the lectures on the folders containing the manuscripts, did give them more specification, this was to her mind still too imprecise. Instead, she wished to capture the sense attributed to these investigations by Husserl himself, to wit, *Urkonstitutionen* or the analyses of primordial modes of constitution. And while she

<sup>1</sup> I am grateful to the Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg's Universitätsarchiv for providing me with the *Quästurakten* of these three semesters in question. I would also like to thank Sebastian Luft and Matthias Haenel for transcribing the lists from the Sütterlin handwriting.

could have also chosen the title "Transcendental Aesthetic" to evoke this sense of the investigations—a title suggested by the occurrence of this expression both in the *Analyses* and in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*—she thought that in the wake of Kant it would have given the reader a false impression of what was to be expected from this work. For these reasons, Fleischer settled on the expression "passive synthesis" for the title of this collection, uniting the main portion of the lectures she collated and the supplementary material. This expression is not unwarranted, for it occurs at least a half a dozen times throughout the work. It has *de facto* proved itself to be a title suited to the material selected for publication in Husserliana XI.

B. The title, however, is not the sole reason for these lectures to have acquired their acclaim as the "passive synthesis" work. While the issue of passive synthesis is a fundamental one and does occupy a large portion of Husserl's investigations in Husserliana XI, the context in which the lectures unfold is a broader one. This context, as intimated above, is *transcendental logic*.

Husserl's *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (published in 1929) was conceived as an "Introduction" to phenomenology, and as such joins the *Logical Investigations*, *Ideas I*, and is later joined by *Cartesian Meditations* and the *Crisis*. In distinction to, e.g., *Ideas I*, the way into phenomenology takes place *via* the natural attitude, in particular, as it is functional in the mathematician and logician. While formal logic—understood both as the apophantic science of propositions and deductive relations as well as the formal ontology of individual objects—serves as the starting point of analysis, it cannot be seen as self-sufficient; it requires an investigation into subjective accomplishments that constitute mathematical and logical truths; it requires a "transcendental logic." But even this, writes Husserl, demands a deeper founding. For as a "critique" of the limits and capacities of logical reasoning, a transcendental logic must understand how a streaming egoic life of consciousness can be constituted as a true being, and it must do this by appealing to a theory of experience and actuality that

founds active cognition and its ideal objects (pp. 112, 259–60, 386).<sup>2</sup>

Thus, when considering the function of the *Analyses* in this broader context, we are witness to a peculiar, but almost typical phenomenological movement, a "zig-zag," if you will. Even though Husserl understood his *Formal and Transcendental Logic* as another "introduction" to phenomenology, and even though this work followed his lectures making up the *Analyses*, Husserl's *Formal and Transcendental Logic* itself can be read as an introduction to the project of the *Analyses*. Let me explain.

Husserl's actual "Introduction" to these lectures given in 1920/21 (included here in the English edition as "Main Text, Part 1," but published only as an appendix to Husserliana XVII, *Formale und Transcendentale Logik*) begins with a preliminary consideration of the term "logic." Tracing the term "logic" back to its Platonic founding and to its Greek roots in "*logos*," and then to the more original "*λέγω*" as "gathering together," and "expounding upon," Husserl detects in logic a vocation of the critical justification of reason, and as such, a vocation to be the science of all sciences (pp. 1, 8, 387). As a radical and universal *a priori* theory of science, logic is not to be understood merely as an axiomatic and formalistic deductive system, formed by abstracting general traits from existing or past sciences; for intrinsic to all factual sciences at our disposal is an animating teleological orientation. Even if we never encounter this teleological idea as such, it nonetheless functions guidingly and efficaciously—even if implicitly—when we practice science or operate from theoretical interest. If we find today that the sciences treat their objects of study in a detached, particularized, and fragmented manner, this would only be an expression of the way in which the particular sciences themselves become detached from "the aim, sense, and possibility of genuine science." They have lost the sense of *their own* orientation that ultimately gives them meaning and to which they refer back as indexes.

<sup>2</sup> All references to the *Analyses* in the "Translator's Introduction" will given to this English edition.

Zach, S  
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Yet despite the fact that the particular sciences have abandoned their own normative sense, a phenomenological investigation will not simply do away with the sciences in their current cultural forms; they cannot simply be passed over in a fundamental analysis. For as scions of the instituting idea of logic, the special sciences still harbor their internal sense even in their self-forgetfulness. By examining them, and more specifically, by examining the science of logic as it has been handed down to us, we can gain a clue, a leading clue, to logic's vocation of critical self-justification and as the universal theory of principles and of norms of all sciences.

This self-forgetfulness and possibility of recovery, however, is not as innocent and facile as it seems. The tragedy we currently face, laments Husserl, is that the sciences have *inverted* the original relation between logic and science such that (1) the sciences have made themselves autonomous; in this ostensible, mystifying self-sufficiency and groundlessness, (2) they have become splintered in relation to each other, and in this process, (3) logic has been transformed into a sub-discipline of the sciences, a pragmatic technology borrowing its methods from mathematics, becoming a limited theoretical instrument brushed aside with scorn.

It is precisely through this inversion and its ramifications that the sciences have lost their internal sense and landed in a kind of self-forgetfulness of scientific objectivism. "In other words, logic, which was originally the torchbearer of method and which claimed to be the pure doctrine of principles of possible knowledge and science, lost this historical vocation and, understandably, remained far behind in its development" (p. 4). The paradox here is that the autonomy of the sciences from logic (logic as a justifying system of principles of all objective justification) has only a putative autonomy, one which exacerbates the sciences' inability to emerge as self-sufficient, since they are completely ignorant of their own sense and without foundation. So, writes Husserl, while at first we novices are filled with enthusiasm in engaging in the positive sciences, we end up being deeply dissatisfied because we do not become wiser and better through them, as is clearly their pretension (p. 6).

For Husserl, the fact that we were no longer moving in the same direction sketched out by this optimal idea of logic suggests that a rupture, a constitutive abnormality, has ensued, one which we might call a crisis in the "spiritual common good of humanity" (p. 28). But provided that we want to be more than mere professionals, specialists, and academics, provided that we want to take ourselves as human beings "in the full and highest sense," we are called upon to "raise ourselves above the self-forgetfulness of the theoretician ... who knows nothing of his accomplishment and of the motivations compelling them, who lives in them, but does not have a thematic view of this accomplishing life itself" (pp. 5).<sup>3</sup>

Phenomenology as transcendental philosophy wants to recover the philosophical spirit of logic. The way proposed to do so in these lectures is a genetic one. Though I will say more in section 2 of the "Translator's Introduction" regarding genetic method, let me remark here in a general manner that by *clarifying its origins*, not as something static, but as origins that are *originating*, we can recover the lost sense of logic, a sense that remains obfuscated in the present sciences. In this way we are in a position to discover the presuppositions of logic by investigating the genetic formations of sense.

Only a transcendental logic can be an ultimate theory of science, for it treats the objects of thought precisely as accomplishments of the activity of thinking. Transcendental phenomenology makes such a theory of science possible because it inquires back from ready-made propositions, from theories "already there," to *thinking life* in which these formations are accomplished; it goes back still more deeply from the givenness of all types of objects that underlie possible theories to the experiencing life in which those objects are *pregiven*, and most radically, it understands how the life of consciousness itself can be

<sup>3</sup> It is not a mere coincidence that the issues of self-forgetfulness and the call for us to become more profoundly human are echoed in other articles Husserl penned during the early 1920s, namely, his "Kaizo" articles (1922-24). The Kaizo articles (Ihua XXV/II), which also presuppose a genetic method, are concerned specifically with the crisis of human culture and its "renewal" as an ethical humanity. See my "The Project of Ethical Renewal and Critique: Edmund Husserl's Early Phenomenology of Culture," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1994), 449-64.



constituted as a "true being," as an ideal correlate of possible verifications (p. 259–60).

In order to undertake a transcendental logic, "tremendous transcendental-phenomenological preliminary work must be accomplished" (p. 7). This preliminary work entails, in part, tracing the accomplishments of thinking to their genetic origins in *passive*, pre-cognitive syntheses. In moving from the dimension of the constituted to the constituting, Husserl incorporates a regressive, archeological movement from the *active* cognitive dimensions to the passive kinaesthetic ones. It is in this sense that the project as it actually took shape in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* becomes an introduction to and preparatory for the *Analyses*. But equally, this beginning regressive movement also has to be understood as preparatory for the inverse direction that the *Analyses* will take for their explicative method.

Once we have regressed back to the origins of the great world of constituting life, we describe this life "by beginning from below and ascending upward, to show how genuine thinking in all its levels emerges here, how it is motivated and is built-up in its founded accomplishment" from the most basic structures of consciousness (pp. 32 and 607 fn. 93), tracing the "storied structure of constitution" (p. 270). The *Analyses* undertake the task of a "transcendental-phenomenological aesthetic" as founding for a transcendental-phenomenological logic, thus investigating the systematic connections of passive sense formation. Only from the sphere of passivity, contends Husserl, can we grasp the most fundamental of all shortcomings in the foundation of traditional logic, one that concerns the validity of logical norms, and the ultimate principle of logical norms, namely, the principle of contradiction and the law of the excluded middle (pp. 143, 149, 386). A genetic method allows us to elucidate the dynamic formations of sense in the passive sphere as foundational for logic. For this reason, "paradoxically," a critique of the ideal structures of logical reason which takes as its point of departure the investigations into a formal and transcendental logic cannot be

limited to the sphere of logic; it demands a transcendental aesthetic.<sup>4</sup>

Described as a "transcendental aesthetic," the tremendous preliminary work mentioned above entails not merely recovering the foundation for active syntheses and cognitive operations, but of describing the passive sphere of experience in its own integrity, its own essential laws and contributions in the constitution of evidence, and the modalizations of evidence peculiar to it. A transcendental aesthetic within a genetic methodological register will bracket all judicative knowing, determinative and predicative thought, and focus on the occurrences of apperception in general, the objects of possible perception that have the sense-form of time and the sense-shape of spatiality, and investigate how sense unities are constituted through associative syntheses. It will require investigations into the structure of sensibility as the continual constitution of space and time through self-temporalization in time-consciousness and lived-bodily kinaesthesia (pp. 444–45).

Extending to all features of space-time constitution, a transcendental aesthetic will broach even a generative analysis of the constitution of space and time in terms of earth-ground and world-horizon, investigating lifeworlds in terms of their normative significance as "home" and "alien."<sup>5</sup> The *Analyses* from the 1920s dealing with "passive synthesis" did not go this far, and stays for all practical purposes on the level of genetic phenomenology, that is, within the span of individual facticity or the intragenerational constitution of community.

On the one hand, by understanding the tenor of this genetic methodological movement that underlies the *Analyses*, we have

<sup>4</sup> In a manuscript belonging to the *Analyses* (F I 37, 68b), Husserl referred to his phenomenology of experience—in distinction to Kant—as a "new transcendental aesthetic." See the "Introduction" to Edmund Husserl, *Lezioni sulla sintesi passiva*, trans. Vincenzo Costa (Milano: Edizioni Angelo Guerini e Associati, 1993) p. 29, fn. 14.

<sup>5</sup> In a manuscript stemming from 1930 or 1931 that deals with the generative phenomena of homeworld and alienworld, Husserl notes: "Important for the method of the constitutive, correlative structure of the transcendental aesthetic—that is, of the correlative system of validity of the world as the world of experience" (Hua XV, p. 214 fn. 1). And in a similar context of elucidating the constitution of a homeworld, Husserl writes: "This becomes the task of a transcendental aesthetic ..." (Hua XV, pp. 234 ff). See also p. 632 fn. 102.



some further philosophical justification for these lectures having acquired their fame as the "passive synthesis" lectures. But the explication of passive synthesis does not complete the *Analyses*, since a transcendental aesthetic must ascend upwards to a transcendental logic, and thus is situated concretely within the problematic of a transcendental logic. To this extent, the rubric of passive synthesis though accurate also misses the broader context of his lectures. This is especially poignant with the inclusion of new manuscript materials that belong to this lecture series. As I will note below, the new material concerns the role of active synthesis and motivation for the constitution of formal ontologies.

In addition to Husserl's actual "Introduction," the material that is published here as Part 3, bearing on active synthesis, demands situating these passive synthesis texts in their original, proper, and broader context, and modifying the title of the edition to reflect this framework. To keep a continuity with the Husserliana edition, its title, and the recognition it has attained internationally under the rubric of "passive synthesis," but also to reflect its context and the content of the new material that completes the lecture series, I have, in consultation with the Husserl-Archives in Leuven, modified the title of the English edition: *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic*. Let me now turn to the composition of this edition and what appears under this title.

## 2. *The Composition of the Analyses*

What is published as Husserliana XI is not the complete lecture series Husserl delivered in the 1920s, but a portion of it, supplemented by relevant appendices and essays. The English edition includes all the material published in Husserliana XI, along with four new manuscript texts, two of which complete the lecture series (Parts 1 and 3 of the Main Text), and another two that complement the supplementary materials. I will mention these texts in the course of explaining the composition of the *Analyses*.

(i) *Main Texts*. The first new text included in this edition is Husserl's actual "Introduction" to these lectures already mentioned above. Entitled here, "Preliminary Considerations of a Trans-

scendental Logic," Part 1 sets up the framework for Husserl's phenomenology, his genetic investigations into the context of transcendental logic, and shows the necessity of beginning with an inquiry into the associative laws of passive synthesis or a transcendental aesthetic. This text from 1920/21, stemming from the manuscript F I 37 was published only in 1974 as an appendix to the Husserliana edition of *Formale und transzendente Logik*.

Part 2, as noted, represents the main text of Husserliana XI and stems partly from manuscript F I 37, but mostly from F I 38. To fit into the comprehensive framework of Husserl's reflections, I have given this Part the subtitle, "Passive Synthesis: Toward a Transcendental Aesthetic." Here, Husserl discusses the problem of evidence, of modalization, articulates his phenomenology of association, and describes the roles of affection and attention for the constitution of sense, and eventually for the constitution and genesis of a phenomenological in-itself.<sup>6</sup> Since I will discuss some of its main themes below in section 3 of this "Introduction," let me highlight the second new addition to this volume.

The second new addition, included here as Part 3: "Active Syntheses: Toward a Transcendental, Genetic Logic," has been recently published as *Active Syntheses: Aus der Vorlesung "Transzendente Logik" 1920/21. Ergänzungsband zu den "Analysen zur passiven Synthesis"* (Kluwer, 2000). Edited by Roland Breuer, this manuscript stems primarily from the signature F I 39 and originally belonged to the same series of lectures that make up the *Analyses* from 1920/21.<sup>7</sup> As Breuer notes, the fact that Husserl both continued to rework this Part and to integrate it into the new pagination of his lecture material (even though he presumably had to leave it out of his subsequent lecture due to

<sup>6</sup> A very small portion, approximately 28 out of 220 Husserliana printed pages of this Part 2 (from the Division on "Modalization") was taken by Landgrebe and used for *Erfahrung und Urteil*, though the order of presentation in the latter does not often correspond to the presentation in Husserliana XI. See D. Lohmar, "Zur Entstehung und den Ausgangsmaterialien von Edmund Husserls Werk *Erfahrung und Urteil*," *Husserl Studies*, Vol. 13 (1996), 31-71.

<sup>7</sup> When Landgrebe edited *Erfahrung und Urteil*, he also drew from Ms. F I 39 that makes up this Part 3. The portion taken equals approximately 31 pages of *Erfahrung und Urteil*. See Lohmar, "Zur Entstehung," Again, Landgrebe selected and published the material in a different order.

lack of time) supports the view that the entire lecture series demands being treated as an integral whole, and accordingly demands being presented under the same cover.<sup>8</sup>

Part 2 traces the constitution of sense through passive associative syntheses leading up to the constitution of the object as such through acts of remembering and expectation. Part 3 picks up on this transition from the passive to the active spheres and describes various levels of "objectivation." Thus, we have the movement from the perceptual to the judicative, from the pre-predicative to the predicative realms, or the genesis of the in-itself or true being. Active objectivation, as I will note below, can take shape with a mix of passive and active syntheses, although the overwhelming contribution here is by means of active, categorial syntheses, culminating in conceptualizing judgment, in particular, the realm of universal judging for all possible objectlike formations, the classification of their relations, and thus, the transcendental grounding of formal logic.

It is within this framework of Husserl's lectures on "Transcendental Logic" that the manuscripts in question rejoin their appropriate context. These three Parts (with two new additions) give the most complete presentation of Husserl's lecture series to date. As a whole, it makes up the Main Text of this volume.

(ii) *Supplementary Texts*. The second half of this edition entitled "Supplementary Texts" is divided into four sections. While Parts 1 and 2 of the Main Text date back to 1920/21, Husserl—in his own words—"unfortunately reworked" it in 1923 and "partly improved, partly spoiled" §§12–40 of Part 2 in 1925/26.<sup>9</sup> Section 1 of the Supplementary Texts reproduces the earliest original version of this segment of lectures from 1920/21; the passages printed here in italics are the passages left in tact by Husserl and reappropriated in the subsequent lecture of 1925/26.

Section 2 of the supplementary materials are the "Appendices." They include all the appendices originally edited by Fleischer and all those edited by Breuer in the *Ergänzungsband* that accompany

Part 3 of the Main Text.<sup>10</sup> By placing all the appendices directly after both versions of the lecture series, I depart from the order given them in Husserliana XI; I place them here because the first two sections of the Supplementary Texts make up a subsection of manuscripts that either have a direct connection to the Main Text (i.e., its earlier draft) or make direct editorial references to the Main Text.

Also included under the heading of Supplementary Texts, but without the same kind of direct reference to the Main Text are two further sections. Section 3 presents two supplementary essays provided by Fleischer that stem primarily from F I 37 and F I 38, with a date of 1920/21, with some pages possibly originating from 1923. These texts, "Perception and its Self-Giving," and "Consciousness and Sense—Sense and Noema," concern the nature of perception, time-consciousness, and the constitution of an objective sense.

The last section of the Supplementary Texts supplies texts that bear generally on phenomenological method, and in particular on the relation between "static and genetic" phenomenology and the phenomenon of genesis. The presentation of this section departs from the original German edition in two ways. First, whereas Fleischer included only one text on static and genetic method from 1921, the English edition includes two additional ones that are companions to the first, stemming from the same manuscript B III 10, but published separately in 1973 in Husserliana XIV, ed., Iso Kern.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> The appendices to Part 2 of the Main text are taken primarily from manuscripts D 19, F I 37, F I 38, and F I 29, but also from A VI 32, A VI 33, D 6, D 13, B III 12; those to Part 3 stem principally from F I 39, but with excerpts from F I 37 and A III 11.

<sup>11</sup> The first two longer essays Husserl wrote at St. Maergen in 1921; the third shorter one carries a possible date of 1923 and makes an allusion to the lectures mentioned above entitled, "Einleitung in die Philosophie" from F I 29. The two not originally published in Hua XI (the second and third essays) are both taken from Hua XIV.

There is one other manuscript on static and genetic method belonging to this cluster of writings on static and genetic method, B III 10, entitled, "Statische und genetische phänomenologische Methode. Eingeborenheit. Genesis von Apperceptionen. Allgemeinster Begriff von Apperception." ["Static and Genetic Phenomenological Method. Innateness. Genesis of Apperceptions. The Most General Concept of Apperception."]; it is, however, unavailable for this edition.

Finally, there are other texts dealing with static and genetic method dating from the 1930s, but they are beyond the scope of the material covering this translation.

<sup>8</sup> See Breuer, "Vorwort des Herausgebers," p. i.

<sup>9</sup> From the "Textkritische Anmerkungen" Hua XI, 445.

Second, rather than being placed in the middle of the edition, preceding the appendices, the English edition positions them at the very end. The reasons for this are two-fold. First, as indicated, these writings on method stem from a different set of manuscripts, the B III 10 series and are not part of the lecture series on "Transcendental Logic." Second, these manuscripts focus explicitly on the question of genesis as a theme for *phenomenology* and on the difference between static and genetic phenomenological methods. In fact, they represent the *first explicit formulation* of this difference. To locate them in the middle of the volume risks losing them among *thematic* matters, when the question of *method*, genetic method, is essential to the undertaking of the *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis* and actually makes them possible. Hence, though they are placed at the end of the edition, they deserve their own prominence in the constellation of issues raised in the *Analyses*.

Because genetic method is at the heart of these lectures, and in order to compensate for the sketchiness of Husserl's presentation of the ideas surrounding static and genetic phenomenology, I devote the next section of this "Introduction" to clarifying the question of method, with a particular emphasis on the difference between static and genetic methods.

## 2. Genesis and Genetic Phenomenological Method

It would be misleading to characterize phenomenological method only as a way of circumscribing modes of givenness, since the phenomenal field on its own part can overstep the bounds of a pronounced or presupposed methodological orientation, demanding the formulation of a new methodology. This is the position in which we find Husserl and his phenomenological philosophy by 1921. For it was at this time that Husserl was led to formulate explicitly the difference between static and genetic phenomenological methods.

Husserl's writings on static and genetic method not only mark Husserl's explicit effort to formulate systematically a difference internal to phenomenological method in terms of the static and the genetic, they also show the distinctive traits of each method, how

the methods are to be organized in terms of the motivational descriptor of guiding threads or "leading clues." To question back is to question after founding relations of validity, and this for Husserl means an inquiry into genesis.

To be sure, Husserl was not the first to distinguish between static and genetic elements of experience. Husserl himself suggests this by referring to the difference between static and genetic method in the same terms Dilthey used for psychology, namely, as "descriptive" [*beschreibende*] and "explanatory" [*erklärende*].<sup>12</sup> Lurking in the background is not only Dilthey, but also Brentano and his distinction between descriptive psychology and genetic and physiological psychology.<sup>13</sup>

To cite these historical precedents is to acknowledge that phenomenology did not develop in a vacuum; but it does not mitigate the originality of Husserl's own phenomenological distinctions no matter how tardy they may seem to the contemporary reader. Because Husserl had described genetic matters that exceeded the scope of static constitution, including phenomena like apperception, normality and abnormality, kinaesthesia, association, etc.—phenomena that came under the general title of "primordial constitution"—Husserl was provoked by the very matters themselves to catch up reflectively with his own descriptions. This means that Husserl had undertaken genetic analyses implicitly without phenomenology having been explicitly cognizant of itself as having this genetic methodological dimension, and that the distinction between static and genetic methods is internal to the movement of phenomenology.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> See Wilhelm Dilthey, "Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie" (1894) in *Gesammelte Schriften: Band 5. Die Geistige Welt*, ed., Georg Misch (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1957), 139-240. Whereas Dilthey takes description as interpretive description and explanation as something the natural sciences do, Husserl takes descriptive phenomenology in a narrower, "static" sense in order to contrast it with a genetic phenomenological research perspective that takes up an interpretative position with respect to the teleological genesis of sense. See Robert Schaff, "Non-Analytic, Unspeculative Philosophy of History: The Legacy of Wilhelm Dilthey," *Cultural Hermeneutics* (1976): 295-331.

<sup>13</sup> Franz Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, second edition (Leipzig: Meiner, 1924).

<sup>14</sup> T. Sakakibara gives us one example of this, locating Husserl's turn to a genetic phenomenology in Husserl's concept of the pure ego with its habitualities both from the

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Looking back from our privileged perspective, with the distinction between static and genetic method and matters already in hand, we can say that Husserl's initial preoccupation was with matters and an approach that are "static." By static we understand two things: first, a constitutive approach that is concerned with *how* something is given or *modes* of givenness, and second, a concern with *essential structures*. In Husserl's terminology, a static method can address both strictly "phenomenological" (i.e., constitutive) as well as "ontological" (i.e., essential) dimensions of experience. Thus, a static approach can interrogate the interplay of intention and fulfillment, the meant features of an object, the noetic qualities of an act, etc., as well as the structural or essential possibilities of the particular object or act within the intentional correlation. Here one would examine the structures and the being of these structures (for example, formal and material essences, typicalities, regions, etc.).

The fact that Husserl actually began from a static research perspective betrays the following two-fold methodological prejudice: First, it was assumed that it is better to begin with constitutive questions rather than taking the being of things for granted, that is, it is more helpful to see *how sense as constituted* is given to the constituting pole of experience, and *then* to proceed to structural or ontological questions. Second, it was assumed that it is better, constitutively, to proceed with something at rest rather than something in process; it is advantageous to begin with the "simple," and then advance to the "complex." Accordingly, Husserl granted a methodological priority to an investigation into constitutive problems that did not broach the question of temporal genesis.

pencil manuscripts of *Ideas II* (1912) and in the main manuscript for Division 3 of *Ideas II* (1913) concerning the constitution of the spiritual world. See Teisuya Sakakibara, "Das Problem des Ich und der Ursprung der genetischen Phänomenologie bei Husserl," in *Husserl Studies* Vol. 14, No. 1 (1997), 21-39.

Moreover, at least on Husserl's own account, his distinction between static and genetic matters pre-dates even this. For example, in June, 1918, Husserl writes to Paul Natop that "... already, for more than a decade, I have overcome the level of static Platonism and have situated the idea of transcendental genesis in phenomenology as its main theme." Edmund Husserl, *Briefwechsel, Band V: Die Neukantianer*, ed., Karl Schuhmann (Boston: Kluwer, 1994), 137.

By genesis Husserl understands three variations of experience: (1) genesis within the purely active sphere of experience where the ego functions in rational acts, (2) genesis between the active and passive spheres of experience, where one traces the origins of activity in passivity (or between the judicative in the perceptual spheres of experience), and finally, (3) "primordial constitution" as a phenomenology of passive experience, including *apprehension, motivation, affection and association, kinaesthesia, etc.* Ultimately these three dimensions of genesis are bound to the analysis of the genesis of the monad (a point that I address below).

The fact that Husserl began with static structures and a static model of constitution and not genesis does not mean that genesis was absent from the horizon of his thought, for *to prefer* stasis, even if it be in the form of ignorance, is already to acknowledge the problem of genesis for later work, implicitly rooting the problem of stasis in that of genesis—something that Husserl himself came to see. It is for this reason that Husserl provocatively asks whether one could even undertake a static phenomenology with the genetic dimension being fully suspended (see pp. 630f. and 633).

As noted, Husserl thought that the best way to handle more complex matters in phenomenology (like the problem of self-temporalization, or later the problem of cultural communities and historicity, in short, "generativity") was to prepare the groundwork with static investigations. Following such "preparatory" work, it would be suitable to proceed to higher constitutive levels of analysis.

Yet it was only after explicitly tackling the problems of genesis and more "complex" features of experience that Husserl *retro-actively* understood the problem of genesis not to be more complex than that of stasis, but rather, more *concrete* and more fundamental. Likewise, static matters were no longer seen to be "simple," but now more *abstract*. This inversion was only *discerned after having arrived explicitly at genesis* through the leading clue of stasis, even though one could in no way derive genesis from stasis. Genesis has to be seen as more fundamental than stasis, though pedagogically, stasis guided us to the problem of genesis.

Ontological questions, questions concerning the being of things as they can be presented in the natural attitude, function as "leading clues" to constitutive questions, both static and genetic ones. While Husserl was initially wary of genesis (at least in the *Logical Investigations*, since empirical psychology imputed to ideal objects a subjective genesis in consciousness instead of taking logical entities as self-given to consciousness), he did confront the problem of genesis in a forceful manner after 1915. This is not to say that there are no themes peculiar to the problem of genesis earlier, say, as early as the *Logical Investigations* (1900-1) with his notion of motivation or association, or his *Thing and Space* (1907) with descriptions of the kinetic syntheses of perception and kinaesthesia. Husserl's own point is that these and similar analyses are still too implicit and abstract. Even Husserl's work on time-consciousness from his *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time* is not really a full-fledged genetic analysis because it is too formal: "Mere form is admittedly an abstraction, and thus from the very beginning the analysis of the intentionality of time-consciousness and its accomplishment is an analysis that works on [the level of] abstractions" (pp. 173).

Remaining solely on the level of the temporal modes of givenness like impression, retention, protention, is still too formal, too abstract, and it is not until we get to the problems of association and affection, and the individuation of the monad that the problem of genesis really comes into play. This is due to the fact that an inquiry into the question of constitution is not necessarily an inquiry into the problem of genesis... attending to constitution is not attending to genesis, which is precisely the genesis of constitution and operates as genesis in a monad" (see pp. 644 and 639). The matter of genetic phenomenology, then, concerns monadic individuation and its genesis. What is monadic genesis?

The monad is a process of becoming in one unique time with one unique ego. As temporally enduring, the monad is not confined to a Now-point or a collocation of Nows, but exists as having been, a having been that transcends the past toward a futural becoming. As a uniform temporal form by virtue of horizons everything is related and interconnected to everything

else in the dynamic unity of the monad. The monad is a "living unity" capable of having dispositions that are "unconscious." It is true that habitualities as the precipitations of acts are no longer actively conscious since they have receded from the living present and can become sedimented to the null-point of active vivacity; nevertheless, there is a dynamic interplay between act and affection because as expressing an "abiding style" or "abiding *habitus*," the habitual character of the monad can affectively provoke sense, prefiguring a perceptual or even judicative world from the density of that personal character that is not egoic. This density, by which the monad retains its identity passively and that is in part formative of the active ego, points to the concrete individuation of the monad: the fact that the monad is a unique "unity of its living becoming," a unity of its "sedimented history" that it bears as a heritage of the past (see pp. 635 and 637f.). Phenomenology of genesis then is the phenomenology of the primordial becoming in time, of the genesis of one shape of consciousness emerging from another, acquiring a temporal opacity. In short, it is a phenomenology of what Husserl calls at this time, "facticity."

In an important and revealing appendix to the *Analyses* (Appendix 8)—the longest one in this collection—Husserl describes the peculiar temporality of the individual within a genetic register. Transcendental subjectivity (i.e., the "natural" individual as clarified in terms of its constitutive powers and limits—neither the mundane nor the phenomenologizing ego), Husserl writes, neither is born nor dies. This immortality of the individual is due to two things. First, as transcendental subjectivity, the individual is constitutive of time, is the source of temporalization, and to this extent cannot be contained within time.<sup>15</sup> Second, it presupposes that the phenomenological investigations are limited precisely by genetic parameters, parameters articulated by the former constitutive issues. Static phenomenology, let us recall, cannot account for any constitutive disruptions beyond the living present; here something like sleep would be a

<sup>15</sup> Making explicit an earlier insight in the time-consciousness lectures that consciousness as self-temporalizing cannot be understood as "temporal." See PCIT, 88, 345f.

constant barrier to analysis. Genetic phenomenology, however, can give an account of how remembering can potentially span constitutive gaps like sleep, fainting spells, etc. (pp. 151f.), but it cannot cover more radical breaks like birth and death. Only when phenomenology is broadened and deepened to a generative dimension do birth and death become integrated into constitutive world features because now one investigates the constitutive sense of the individual being constituted within generative homeworlds and alienworlds, hence, admitting of transcendental successors and progenitors, the phenomena of sharing births and deaths, being constituted by another (say, as "father" by a child), etc.<sup>16</sup> Within a genetic phenomenology, however, it is quite correct to insist on the immortality of transcendental subjectivity.

Transcendental subjectivity, as individuated in its personal orientation, is the concrete monad. But this concreteness is not tantamount to independence. Husserl writes, for example, that in contrast to his contention in the Third Logical Investigation (and in *Ideas I*, § 15, as well), what is concrete should be regarded as non-independent; only an analysis that makes abstractions can view "phases" as if they were concrete and independent. This holds not only for the temporal phases of impression, retention, and protention in relation to the concrete unity of the living present, or living presents as phases in relation to the concrete monad, but *mutatis mutandis* for the phases of individuated monads in relation to an intermonadic community (see p. 639). Through a genetic account of monadic genesis, a static, one-sided account of intersubjectivity is implicitly called into question.

Although Husserl distinguished between two different methodological orientations, simply naming two different methodological dimensions is not sufficient for describing the (structural) differences between stasis and genesis, for this would still remain static. Rather the very formulation of static and genetic methods and matters itself demands articulating the relation between static and genetic methods, that is, it itself requires a *genetic* description. The questions to be handled now concern "how the investigations

are to be ordered," and working out the order of these "necessary phenomenological investigations" entails addressing "the leading clues of the system" (see pp. 633).

Expressing the differences between static and genetic methods in a relation of *leading clue* produces a ripple effect within transcendental method. First, one does not only move progressively from constitutive phenomenology to eidetic considerations, but now regressively from the natural attitude and essential structures (and the sciences of those structures) to constitutive matters. "Beginning with the natural attitude, one can also take the 'natural concept of the world' [i.e., the lifeworld] as a leading clue" (p. 633).<sup>17</sup> One begins with static method as eidetic analysis, which can take place "naively" within the natural attitude and all its rich implications, and then submit these results to a constitutive, properly speaking phenomenological analysis. And he writes: "*Is not static phenomenology precisely the phenomenology of leading clues, the phenomenology of the constitution of leading types of objects in their being ...*" (p. 644)? Within a static register now, one moves regressively to constitutive phenomenology.

Second, although we can find such a methodological reconfiguration implicitly at the conclusion of *Ideas I* as Husserl prepares to launch into a regional ontology of *Ideas II*, this reconfiguration of transcendental method comes into sharper focus for Husserl when the entire static method of investigation is placed in a relation of leading clue to genetic method. Here static ontology is not merely a leading clue to constitutive problems in general, but static constitution also becomes a leading clue to genesis. "Another constitutive phenomenology" named "phenomenology of genesis" is one that works from results of static constitutive phenomenology; a genetic phenomenology follows the histories of the constitution of objects that are there for the concrete monad as well as traces the genetic "history" of the monad itself (see p. 634).

<sup>16</sup> See my "Liminality and Liminal Experience" in *Alter: revue de phénoménologie*, 6 (1998), 275-296.

<sup>17</sup> This is evocative of what Husserl calls in his *Crisis* writings an "ontology of the lifeworld"; see esp. § 51.



Third, once Husserl has discussed the problem of genetic method and its matters in relation to static method and its matters, and has done this as a relation of leading clue, a peculiar reassessment takes shape. I have already noted that the "higher" more complex phenomena of genesis are now seen as more fundamental; in relation to them, static phenomena are grasped as "finished," as abstractions from temporality. But to recognize this is to reverse the direction of "leading clue." For now it is genesis that orders the investigation into static constitution and into structure. Now one must inquire into the essential relations on the basis of phenomena that are disclosed genetically; this may entail, as it did for Husserl, that one revise the previous results of static analyses *from the perspective of genesis*, but which nevertheless had served formerly as a leading clue to genesis. This is the reason one can move from a genetic constitutive analysis back to an eidetic analysis, back to examining invariant structures in the natural attitude, back to empirical sciences, etc. It is also now that we are able to grapple with both the genesis of structure (i.e., the structure of monadic individuation) as well as the very structure of genesis.

The essays on method by Husserl presented here as a capstone to this English edition give us a privileged and crucial glimpse into a pivotal moment in phenomenology. Such an introductory sketch of the background, import, and implications Husserl's distinction between static and genetic phenomenological methods alerts one all the more to what both needs and can be said about this issue. But even with more said, the formulation of static and genetic methods would not be the ultimate story told for phenomenology—if indeed one could give an exhaustive narrative of the generation of phenomenology and its possibilities. It does, nevertheless, provide an opening for various novel themes that lie at the heart of the *Analyses* and that animates its very enterprise. It is to an explication of some of these key themes that I now turn.

### 3. Novel Themes in the *Analyses*

An overwhelming proportion of Husserl's writings were never intended for publication; many have the tenor of experimental

investigations, often challenging the reader with repetitions, sharp transitions, laconic phrasing, and incomplete sentences. Husserl would take up a theme, develop it, consider it from different angles, relate it to other themes (sometimes even irreconcilably), let it ferment for a time, and pick it up even years later.

Because of the relative dearth of material published during his own life time, the difficulties involved in editing his work, and various contingencies associated with what actually does make it to print, we have labored under a myopic view of Husserl's work as merely a philosophy of consciousness, an egological solipsism, or a transcendental idealism detached from everyday life experience.

But as more and more of his writings have been published and translated, we have gained an appreciably broader and more complex view of Husserl's work than we had, say, in the middle part of the Twentieth Century. We have learned, for example, that Husserl penned literally thousands of pages, not only on well-known themes like the reduction and the lifeworld, but on the issue of intersubjectivity; not simply as the relation of ego to alter ego, but as an interrelation of geo-historical homeworlds and alienworlds; he devoted years to the problem of the lived-body and kinaesthesia, normality and abnormality, the primordial constitution of spatiality and temporality; he dealt prolifically with the problem of ethics, God, aesthetics, etc.

The *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis* is a privileged work, not merely because it enacts a genetic method, but also because it introduces genetic themes, themes that for the English reader cast a new light on what phenomenological research entailed.

What we are privy to here are extremely intricate analyses of phenomenological matters that pertain to the structure of intentionality, evidence, and types of modalization as they are integrated into a genetic phenomenology of association, and as they unfold in both passive and active spheres of experience. In this section of my "Introduction," I deal with themes that are developed in the *Analyses* that might be less familiar to English reader, thus warranting some brief orientation to them. Such an orientation is not intended to be exhaustive. By selecting these



themes, however, I want to indicate the main efforts at work in this text. Throughout this explication, I will introduce several key terms and in this connection mention and/or explain the reasons for their translation. I address these themes under two main headings, (A) passivity and passive synthesis, (B) affection and association.

#### A. Passivity and Passive Synthesis

Passivity designates a dimension of experience that a regressive inquiry into origins uncovers, and which serves as a point of departure for an explicative genetic account that traces motivations leading back "up" to cognitive activity. More particularly, passivity is that realm in which, through fundamental laws of association, affective forces spur an egoic attentiveness to objects, enabling acts of remembering and expectation to constitute objects as such, i.e., as in-themselves-for-us. This summation, however, still leaves the concept of passivity shrouded in ambiguity. For granted that passivity might be a relatively unfamiliar theme to us, for his part, Husserl also overburdens the term with a significance that is at best multivalent, and quite often, cryptic and vague. While Husserl does not explicitly delineate the meanings of passivity when he uses this term, it is possible to discern five distinctive, albeit interrelated meanings. This clarification of passivity will help to elucidate the significance of other key conceptions, like affection and association.

1. By passivity we understand a *lawful, fundamental regularity* in the way in which sense is constituted, particularly, as a mode of *sense-genesis*. This enables Husserl to speak of genesis in terms of "passive genesis". Moreover, since there is also a genesis peculiar to activity, Husserl will refer to the passive genesis as "primordial genesis" and this constitution of sense as "primordial constitution," and sometimes "pre-constitution."

On the side of the subject, or noetically, this fundamental regularity gets expressed as the way in which a present perception passes over into a retentionally lingering perception and fades back as a fundamental form of the past, linking up with previous retentions, motivating protentions or futurally directed intentions.

Such a formal lawful regularity or time-consciousness provides the primordial form of the constitution of the unity and identity of an object, as well as the forms of connection, coexistence and succession. Not only active syntheses, but passive ones as well function to form intelligible, meaningful wholes out of diverse manifolds.

On the side of the object, or noematically, this is articulated genetically in terms of the concordance or discordance of appearances, that is, the way appearances synthetically relate to one another in harmonious or disharmonious manners, forming synthetic unities of identity and heterogeneous fields of difference. Thus, if an appearance shows up that does not fulfill what was pre-figured or sketched out by the past happenings—so that the sense gets "crossed-out" rather than fulfilled—Husserl will speak of a "passive modalization." Modalization is an experience of "otherwise," and arises when a new givenness challenges the intended straightforward presentation of sense. It can do this by annulling, suspending, or by crossing out the intended sense. But this modalization, which is concretely a question of genesis, also radiates back into the retentional phases themselves, preserves the old sense as crossed out, superimposing and reconfiguring a new sense through a "retroactive crossing out."

Evidence, on the other hand, is seeing the self of the object as it is meant in the on-going fulfilling, synthetic realization of the self of the object. "Confirmation" is a special synthetic function of corroboration that takes place in the passing of perception from phase to phase, a distinctive process of ratifying experience in a concordant manner peculiar to the passive sphere of experience. Distinguished from this is a ratifying experience belonging to the active sphere that Husserl calls "verification," and that requires various levels of cognitive interventions.

2. Husserl means by passivity a sphere of experience in which the "ego" is not active, i.e., does not creatively participate or actively orient itself in the constitution of sense. Here, "passive syntheses" refer to productions of sense formed through associative connections that take place prior to the occurrences of "higher lying activities," which in their turn cognitively fix a common element or actively make comparisons. Passivity,

Durch  
streichung  
(cf. Heide  
+ Derrida)

cf. infra  
e 69 ff  
"also see Enda  
"crossing-out"

Evidenz

however, does not mean that no ego is present, but only that the ego is not engaged in active participation.<sup>18</sup> This leads Husserl to a paradoxical formulation of the process as an "active passivity" in order to characterize a constitution and acquisition of sense that is, on the one hand, not nothing and is also somehow "subjective" (since there is in the intentionality of drive, or tendencies of desire toward an objectlike formation), but which, on the other hand, does not stem from "an activity proceeding from the ego."<sup>19</sup>

Seeking some historical anchorage for his concept of passivity, Husserl appeals to the notion of "productive synthesis" in Kant's First Edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. A productive synthesis, he writes, "is nothing other than what we call passive constitution, nothing other than the team-work ... of the constantly higher developing intentionalities of passive consciousness ..." (p. 410). Husserl cites the A edition of the *Critique* because Kant speaks of a faculty, the power of imagination, that is independent of the Understanding rather than being subordinate to and a function of the Understanding. Whereas the understanding has the spontaneous character of *active syntheses* that hold together and connect the sensuous manifold according to rules, sensibility has the character of *passivity*, since the inner and outer senses merely receive sense data. In this case, of course, the expression, "passive synthesis" is oxymoronic from a Kantian perspective.

But Husserl's analyses of "passive synthesis" challenge this schism between the sensibility and the understanding by describing intentionality as the interplay of intention and fulfillment as they both pertain to the perceptual and the cognitive spheres of experience. If truth is not alien to the sphere of sensibility (any more than intuition is to judgment), then passive syntheses are not without epistemic import, and a transcendental aesthetic cannot be foreign to the problems of truth, evidence, and their modalizations. Sensibility does make a contribution to the acquisition of knowledge, and an enterprise that wants to determine the limits, powers, and conditions of human cognition

(i.e., critical philosophy) must not only address active syntheses discernible in a transcendental logic, but it must be attentive to the unique and irreducible sphere of passive syntheses peculiar to a transcendental aesthetic.

The meanings of passivity are also determined *ex negativo*. Active processes include but do not exhaust making judgments, predicating something of an object, reflection, and linguistic acts. On this score, Husserl tends to regard passivity as basically equivalent to *perceptual, pre-predicative, pre-reflective, and pre-linguistic* experience, and thus with an implicit teleological orientation to reason. Because the constitution of space and time genetically and noetically understood also implies the presence of various bodily predispositions, passivity suggests a realm of bodily habits that were once actively acquired but subsequently have become *sedimented* into a style of comportment, and yet are accessible pre-reflectively. While one must not be too hasty in identifying the perceptual with the pre-linguistic (for language, too, becomes sedimented, and can become a passive acquisition without being distinctively aesthetic), Husserl does understand by passive, "aesthetic" experience, appealing both to the sense of the Greek *aesthesis*, and the constitution of spatio-temporal nexus through the kinaesthetic character of experience. This does not mean, as it would for Kant, that pre-meaningful accomplishments of sensibility are apprehended by the understanding in order then to constitute objects of knowledge, but rather that the origin of meaning must be sought in the sphere of passive intentionality, that aesthesis (passivity) is foundational for logos (activity), and echoing this relation of foundation, that a transcendental aesthetic should prepare the work for a transcendental logic.

4. Passivity is the sphere of *pregivenness and objectlike formations*. It is no coincidence that Husserl's use of the expression *pregivenness* [*Vorgegebenheit*] comes into full bloom in the years of the *Analyses*, and continues to flourish through out his subsequent investigations. For it is with the genetic explication of a level of experience (namely, passivity) in which objects are not (yet) constituted by an active ego that Husserl must speak in a way that evokes a mode of self-presentation that is not the givenness of an object in the genuine sense, namely, constituted

<sup>18</sup> It is for a lack of available terms, writes Husserl, that we have recourse to the appositive "passive" even though this dimension of sense constitution is functionally operative and effective (p. 119).

<sup>19</sup> See Ideas II, 349. *Only "passive", then, vivat-ii the ego*

attempting to give an account of the genesis of reason through ascending modes of attentiveness. By passivity, then, Husserl means that which makes the active levels of experience possible; passivity is a "founding" level of experience, the "subsoil" of creative life, provides the "basic, essential conditions of the possibility of a subjectivity itself," and readies what can then be taken up in specifically egoic cognition (cf. pp. 163, 169). Accordingly, the perceptual, passive sphere has the character of being "originary" in relation to the judicative, active sphere.

In sum, one can say that passivity indicates a primordial regularity of sense-genesis in which the ego does not participate; it characterizes a pre-reflective dimension of experience of pre-givenness of objectlike formations, a dimension that is founding for activity. Discerning such a sphere of passivity (and its immanent

being "originary" in relation to the judicative, active sphere. In sum, one can say that passivity indicates a primordial regularity of sense-genesis in which the ego does not participate; it characterizes a pre-reflective dimension of experience of pre-givenness of objectlike formations, a dimension that is founding for activity. Discerning such a sphere of passivity (and its implicit relation to activity) Husserl is able to describe the motivation from the passive to the active spheres under the rubric of fundamental laws of association.

«In our ordinary, everyday attitude, something is present as if the whole object were already there, ready-made. A phenomenological shift in perspective will show that such a presentation is only a pretension, and a two-fold one at that. First, the thing does give itself in perception as the whole object, but by its very nature it does so "paradoxically," incompletely in and through perspectives or modes of givenness (p. 39). Second the object in

constituted as in-itself-for-us. Underlying Husserl's analyses into affection is his attempt to describe fundamental regularities in the

constitution of sense through passive syntheses of association that show *how* something can present it-self-to-us as in-itself, and to investigate the implications this has for a science worthy of its name.

literally thousands of pages to his phenomenology of time-

consciousness. A phenomenology of time-consciousness describes the most general and basic syntheses that connect particular



objectlike structures in a lawfully regulated manner; and it does so in a way that pays no respect to content. These syntheses give a necessary temporal unity to all potentially disparate objectlike formations according to the universal forms of connection: coexistence and succession.

As noted above in section 2, however, merely providing the simultaneous and successive forms of connection is still formal, and to this extent, abstract. It is a formality that is discerned only after more concrete levels are either presupposed or actually disclosed: Time-consciousness is only time-consciousness when it is viewed integrally with other, deeper constitutive structures. So, if we want to investigate what gives unity to a particular concrete object as in-itself, and further, what constitutes differences between concrete objects themselves, the "analysis of time alone cannot tell us, for it abstracts precisely from content" (p. 174); it does not give us appropriate insight into the necessary synthetic structures of the streaming, living present. For this we require a phenomenology of association and an inquiry into various "primordial phenomena" and syntheses. These include the passive constitutive syntheses of similarity, uniformity, concretion and fusion (as modes of homogeneity), contrast, discretion, and prominence (as modes of heterogeneity), and gradation. What is central to these concrete associative investigations is the phenomenon of affection.

1. *Affective Allure.* It was not uncommon for Husserl to appropriate terms from other contexts and give to them a new phenomenological sense. This is the case with the expression, *Reiz* (translated here as "allure"). The expression "*Reiz*" gained its currency in the discipline of medicine and physiology in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries and referred primarily either to mechanistic muscle contractions or sensations caused by the stimulation of nerves, and latter interpreted as the principle of association.<sup>23</sup> We find this sense of *Reiz* imported into the German physiology and

psychology of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, where it is also understood as a naturalistic determination or cause, and even the excitation of "attention," and in this way drew a causal connection between the physical-body and the psyche of animal life.<sup>24</sup> Interpreting *Reiz* as a cause of muscle contractions and sensations, authors like Wundt and Fechner also implicitly reduced an ontology of the normal and the pathological to mere quantitative variations of intensity.<sup>25</sup>

Rather than confining *Reiz* to a quantitatively defined psychophysical relation, or defining it as a causal connection between a physical agitation by the outside world upon the central nervous system, or as naturalistically determining internal psychic life, Husserl gave to "the concept of *Reiz* a fundamentally new sense";<sup>26</sup> he did this by bringing the concept of *Reiz* into the motivational relation between the lived-body [*Leib*] and intentional objectlike formations within a lived context, and by also implicating it in the process of apperception and formations of associative connection between one givenness and another (something that I take up below). This goes hand in hand with his attempt, also at the time of these lectures, to interpret the concepts of normality and abnormality as qualitatively distinct within a constitutive or phenomenological framework.<sup>27</sup> Since the draw or affective tendency on the part of the objectlike formation is motivational and not causal, and to avoid mechanistic,

<sup>23</sup> Erasmus, Darwin, *Zoönomia*, Volumes 1 and 2 (New York: AMS Press, 1974; original ed., London: J. Johnson, 1794-96), see Vol. 1, Sections ii, iv, xi, xii; and David Hartley: *Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1971; original ed., London: S. Richardson, 1749), Part I, esp. Section III ff.; hereafter cited as *Observations*.

<sup>24</sup> See, for example, Ludwig Heinrich von Jakob, *Grundriss der Erfahrungs-Sellenkunde* 1 (1795) and Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus, *Biologie oder Philosophie der lebenden Natur für Naturforscher und Ärzte* 6 (1822). See also William James, *Principles of Psychology* Vol. 1 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981), esp., pp. 89-97. Theodor Lipps, *Grundrissen des Seelenlebens* (Bonn: Max Cohen & Sohn, 1883), esp., Division 2; hereafter *Grundrissen*. And, Johann Friedrich Herbart, *Lehrbuch zur Psychologie* (Amsterdam: E. J. Bonset, 1965; original edition, Königsberg 1834), 30 ff.; hereafter, *Lehrbuch*.

<sup>25</sup> See for example, Wilhelm Wundt, *Grundriß der Psychologie* (Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann, 1896), esp., 49, 123, 299 f. And see Gustav Theodor Fechner: *Elemente der Psychophysik* (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1889; first edition, 1860), esp., 15 ff., 128 ff., 238 ff.

<sup>26</sup> *Ideas II*, 199.

<sup>27</sup> See my "The Phenomenological Concepts of Normality and Abnormality," in *Man and World*, Vol. 28, 1995, 241-260.

reductionistic, or behavioristic connotations, I translate the term *Reiz* as "allure," rather than, say, as "excitation" or "stimulus."<sup>28</sup>

By affection, then, Husserl does not mean a contextless power or a third person force; rather, he understands an "enticement to be" on the part of the "object," a *motivational* solicitation or pull to attentiveness, eventually to respond egoically and epistemically, though the response does not have to be egoic; in fact, even if there is an egoic response in the form of an active turning toward, this not imply the cessation of the affection (e.g., pp. 91, 196, 523). Intrinsic to the notion of affective allure is the notion of motivation. Let me clarify this here.

2. *Motivation.* The concept of motivation was explained in *Ideas II* in contrast to a law of cause and effect peculiar to the "naturalistic" attitude; it is a "because-thus" relation of efficacy peculiar to the "natural" (natural in the broad sense) or "personalistic" attitude, a relation that concerns not things of a natural-scientific reality, but givennesses of experiential actuality.<sup>29</sup> With respect to *Ideas II* one finds the concept of motivation greatly deepened in the *Analyses*. The concept of motivation is deepened in three ways. First, motivation pertains to both passive and active spheres, and the relationship between the two. Second, motivation is described in the context of modalizations of being and belief. Third, it is brought into the framework of affection.

A. Since I have already discussed the significance of passivity above, and address the issue of active synthesis below, I will not dwell on this point here. Suffice it to say that motivations can be functional within the passive and active spheres in different ways, and in a particular instance, motivations in the passive sphere can

<sup>28</sup> R. Rójcewicz and A. Schuwer, for example, translate *Reiz* as "stimulus" in their translation, *Ideas II*. With *Reiz* in the sense of allure, however, one could also speak of attraction, appeal, or lure.

<sup>29</sup> Perhaps one of the best formulations of the concept of motivation in Husserl comes from Merleau-Ponty: one phenomenon *relates* another, not by virtue of some objective efficacy connecting natural events, but by the sense that it offers; there is a "*raison d'être*" that orients the flow of the phenomena without being explicitly posited in the "awakening" or the "awakened" and which functions as an operative reason rather than a judicative rationale. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), 61.

provoke an active response. Relations of motivation permeate all dimensions of intentional life: broadly speaking, with the active sphere in terms of egoic motivations of interest; within the passive sphere, e.g., in terms of a fusion or connection of matters within a sense-field, or again, in terms of kinaesthetic motivations; and in the transition from the passive to the active sphere, typified in the advent of egoic awakening through an attentive turning toward, a turning toward instigated by some *pregiveness* turned givenness.<sup>30</sup>

B. Among the various possible modalizations of evidence that can occur: doubt, annulment, repression and superimposition, disappointment, negation, affirmation, it is *possibility* that stands out as one of the most significant for the issue of motivation. Here Husserl distinguishes between open and enticing possibilities. An *open* possibility is putatively a possibility that can be fulfilled in an indeterminate scope of determinations, where nothing in particular is called for, just, say, the scope of "color," but not any color in particular. An *enticing* possibility, on the other hand, will exercise a demand for a particular determination. Some possibilities will have more "weight" than others, some will speak in favor of or against a possible sense. Some will be overpowering. Thus, motivation is clarified in terms of a demand on the part of the object that entices its very constitution in varying degrees of weightiness. From the side of the "subject" motivations are explicated as soliciting appearances in the world; the subject, too, has a kind of power to usher a world of appearances, but because this is a co-relative structure, the subject's prompting is not an absolute imposition (p. 152).

From Husserl's explication of enticing possibilities, we can glean the noetic and noematic components of motivation. *Noematically* speaking, motivations stemming from the objective vector of the intentional relation can be understood as a "propensity to be"; *noetically* speaking they can be understood as a propensity or enticement to believe and "to turn toward" attentively (see §§11–13). (It is at this point that we can see a

<sup>30</sup> See §13 and Division 2, Chapter 4.

transition from the passive sphere of givenness to the attentive turning toward in the lowest active level, namely, "receptivity.")

C. But all of this still takes on one further step of exposition, for now the notion of motivation, interpreted in terms of enticing possibilities, is articulated in the context of affection—the topic of Division 3 of the analyses. Although Husserl will not give detailed phenomenological descriptions of affection in Division 2, he nonetheless introduces affection in the framework of motivations that function as enticing possibilities. This is more implicit than explicit. Here Husserl speaks of the demand of the enticing possibility as an "affective force" that is "in relief" or "prominent" (pp. 85, 90–1), of the weight as being "strongly affective," and noetically, of the fact that I am motivated not only when the thing exerts an affection or enticement on the ego, but when I yield to the affection either passively without egoic attentiveness, or actively in an attentive turning toward (pp. 86, 134).

Given the connections that Husserl makes in Division 2 between motivation, enticing possibilities, and affection, and given Husserl's later conclusions on the status of affection in the constitution of sense, we would have to read the latter back into the former and determine that concretely and phenomenologically, there really are no purely open possibilities, so that sense is always exerting a demand to be with some degree of intensity. And although Husserl himself hardly makes such a claim, one would also have to assert that from the phenomena of protention to epistemic striving, all consciousness is to some degree already affectively colored (cf. p. 277).

3. *Affective Prominence.* Gestalt psychology has shown that something can only be perceived as a figure against a background, and that this figure/ground organization is an irreducible perceptual structure. What marks Husserl's contribution is not his appeal to a perceptual Gestalt, or figure/ground structure<sup>31</sup>; this is already

operative in his thought. Not presupposing ready-made objects or taking for granted their genetic constitution, as in a data-sensualism peculiar to certain psychologies and epistemologies of his time,<sup>32</sup> Husserl's genetic inquiry demands asking whether or not the formation of sense-unities is given prior to or only along with affective force: Are there unities of sense first constituted as prominent that only subsequently become affective, or does the actual emergence of these unities coming into relief depend upon the play of affective forces (cf. pp. 200ff.)? Because Husserl focuses not on an already determined world, but on the *emergence of prominence* in the genesis of passivity, on the very becoming of sense as is in the *process of becoming determinate*, Husserl's analyses lead him to the conclusion that something coming into relief is *an affectively charged relief; prominence is always already an affective prominence* (pp. 211, 221).

But in the living present there is not just one single ray of affective force on me, for *many things exercise affections and rival for my attention* to some degree or other. In a field of affective tendencies that rival one another for attention, some will be more or less significant than others, and these rivalries can occur within the same sense field or across sense fields. Even though there is an affective force, it is not necessary that it draw my attention to it; it may only be "perceived" in a passive attention as it knocks at the antechamber of the ego; it may not yet or ever achieve an active attention, cognitive or otherwise (pp. 214–15).<sup>33</sup>

Through affective interconnections, one thing is connected to another and charged with affective resonance, prior to active egoic involvement. Just because the ego does not turn attentively toward a particular allure does not mean that it is not exerting its pull on us; it may simply be that the ego is following out some other affective force, or something else is drowning out this affective allure. This is why Husserl rejects an all or nothing account of

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Holenstein notes that the "figure-background" structure was systematically described for the first time by E. Rubin, *Visuell wahrgenommene Figuren* published in 1921 (Elmar Holenstein, *Phänomenologie der Assoziation: Zu Struktur und Funktion eines Grundprinzips der passiven Genese bei E. Husserl* [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972] 287, fn. 37). On the relation between Gestalt Psychology and Husserl's thought, see Holenstein, 275–302.

<sup>32</sup> It is interesting to note as a reminder that Husserl's first lecture of the *Analyses* was Winter Semester 1920/21.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. FTL, 286–88.

<sup>34</sup> I encounter these rivaling forces with a *pre-reflective preferential directedness* that is *always selective/exclusive*, more precisely, a pre-reflective tendency toward the optimum as the principle of selection of practical possibilities (cf. Ms. D 13.3, 151a).



affection, and resorts to the analysis of the *gradation* of affective forces (cf. pp. 215ff.).

4. *The Unconscious and Repression.* A completely undifferentiated field of affective forces is only possible after something has exerted an affective force in some manner in the living present such that the zero of affective force takes place as *lines* in the retentional past, which in principle can be reawakened in a variety of ways. This subsequent dormancy of affective force corresponds to a zero-point of affective force, an affective zero-region that Husserl terms the "unconscious."<sup>34</sup>

When we hear the expression, "the unconscious," most of us immediately think of Freud. Husserl's phenomenology of the unconscious, however, must not be immediately assimilated to Freud's meta-psychological treatment of the unconscious. Briefly, for Freud the unconscious is formed by repressed contents that are affect laden drive or instinct representatives, governed by primary processes, e.g., condensation and displacement; while they are not given straightforwardly to consciousness, they can make it circuitously to consciousness by passing the "censor" in disguised form; they can emerge in jokes, dreams, slips of the tongue; in this way, what is repressed can return to consciousness and become accessible in a new way.<sup>35</sup>

But for Husserl the unconscious is the nil of the vivacity of consciousness, a nil, which he clarifies, is not a nothing; it is only a nothing of affective force that has arisen from original constitution, a nothing with respect to those accomplishments that presuppose an affectivity above the zero-point. The unconscious, then, is the realm in which objectlike formations are no longer affective. Still, they can be reawakened because the constituted sense is implied in the unconsciousness. Awakening occurs through various passive and active associative syntheses, an awakening produced by virtue of an affective communication.

Now, when Husserl uses the term "repression" he means generally the affective eclipse of one thing by another within a

field. Something emerges with more force than something else, thus repressing it, even though what is repressed can continue to exert its allure. In essence, the repression that takes place in this instance is not due to one element being in the present as opposed to something else being in the past; rather, the key to Husserl's epistemology of repression lies in affective force: Something represses another because it exercises a stronger affective force in this particular context. It is only because he tends to identify the strongest affective force with the present that the present is understood to repress the past, which it in fact can do. And in this case, a dormant retentional affection can surface in the present once more by provoking an active turning toward, namely, through remembering.

Still, the identification of the present with affective force is called into question when, for example, we have two or more things in the present beginning to exercise an affective force, issuing in a conflict in the perceptual field. The eclipse or repression of affective forces, where the repressed element still exerts an affective force, triumphs not because it is present *per se*, but because of the power that the affection exercises in this situation. As a consequence (and genetically speaking) something becomes present in and through its affective force, winning out. Insofar as both the repressed and the repressing objectlike formations are still affectively charged, and not the nil of affective vivacity, they cannot be ascribed to the unconscious. Accordingly, this epistemic "region" would warrant the title of the unconscious, not because it is not actively awakened—for this would be to equate the passive sphere (the "pre-consciousness," "pre-giveness," even the habitual lived-body) with the unconscious—rather, there are still affective forces in passivity that are not nil, as well as modes of attention, even if they have not surpassed the threshold of active awakening.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>34</sup> See, for example, pp. 201, 216ff.

<sup>35</sup> See, for example, Sigmund Freud, "Das Unheimliche," in *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 12, ed., Anna Freud (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1947), 229-68.

<sup>36</sup> For a more detailed discussion of themes relating to passivity, affection, and the phenomenology of the unconscious, and on the general problem of the genesis of logic, see Bruce Bégout's insightful work, *La généalogie de la logique: Husserl, l'unité, prédictif et le catégoriel* (Paris: Vrin, 2000). See also, Anne Montavont, *De la passivité dans la phénoménologie de Husserl* (Paris: PUF, 1999).



5. *Self-Giverness and the Object It-Self.* The insight that something coming into relief is always already an affective relief suggests that an affective force is always exerted on the ego, or at least, on a "subject" that can become egoic and exercise an egoic response. It confirms that intentionality is not a structure that stems one-sidedly from consciousness; it is a dynamic co-operative structure, a "*constitutive duet*" (cf. p. 52).<sup>37</sup> Since both sides of the intentional correlation are operative, it is no coincidence that Husserl not only attributes ipseity to the subject, but also to the object. Legion throughout the *Analyses* are references made to the "self" [*Selbst*] of the object. This points not only to an identifiable core that makes up the object, but to the fact that the object is not reducible to consciousness, that it has its own kind of density and otherness that both solicits and evades us, and that one cannot arbitrarily prompt it into being. The object holds itself back, at a distance, which is precisely what allows it to give itself in an intentional relation.

The more common expressions like *Selbstgegebenheit* (with which Husserl means both the giving of the self of the object on the part of the subject as a noetic process, and the self-giving of the self of the object from the object), I render as "self-giveness", in this case, one should hear in the expression "self," then, not the subject, but the ipseity of the object, the self-giveness of object itself in the intentional relation.<sup>38</sup> As such, the object it-self is never experienced in a neutral manner; it exercises an affectively significant allure on the perceiver to be constituted as such, that is, for the "ego" to turn toward it attentively and to constitute it as a theme of interest in an active manner. The fact that something is actually heard or seen or smelled, etc., is due to "affective rays" radiating from the object, drawing in its wake the horizontal referential implications.

But, what more precisely is the object it-self? The object it-self, the object in-itself-for-us, is the normatively significant

<sup>37</sup> It is because of this affective pull that the object can also call out to us from its horizontal referential implications, providing the subject with a kind of pre-understanding that is elicited by a particular side of the object beckoning us to examine it more closely.

<sup>38</sup> Where the context is not always clear when Husserl simply uses the expression "Selbst," I will occasionally translate it with the interpolation: self [of the object].

"optimal."<sup>39</sup> The genetic concept of the optimal (or optimum) replaces or rather deepens the static notion of the "noematic core" of *Ideas I* and clarifies the normative significance of the "objective sense." Not only is normality defined by concordance [*Einstimmigkeit*] as a series of harmoniously interlocking appearances, but as the advent of norms in terms of the maximum of richness and differentiation in a unity. Thus, the thing itself, its true being, is the optimal, or the system of optima, as it is experienced as "saturated" for a perceiver in the context of the lifeworld (p. 61–2). All other possibilities fluctuate around it; they become constituted in experience as "abnormal," i.e., indexes to the optimal as *their* norm of givenness (Hua XIV, 121–23, 134; Hua XIII, 379.)<sup>40</sup>

As the thing it-self, the optimal is not only what is or what was, but what will be. As such, it functions as a norm that orients and guides a concordant course of present perceptions from the future, which is to say, it prescribes a course of possible confirmation and of possible verification that the active ego can discover (pp. 266–69).

6. *Association, Remembering, and the Object.* Husserl's investigation into affection is grounded in his attempt to describe how something can present it-self-to-us as an in-itself, and to investigate the implications this has for phenomenology. The self of the object is constituted as such when the objectlike formation emerges from indeterminacy into prominence; it does this through the allure of the objectlike formation that rivals for determinacy by exercising an affective force on the perceiver as an invitation to be. One of the motivations for the whole Division on association is prefigured in Division 2, namely, the investigation into the origin of truth and into the role that remembering—as constituted through associative motivations and as a source of

<sup>39</sup> D 13 IV, 26: "Das Optimum ist also ein relatives Maximum des geübten Reizes, dem nun auch ein Interesse, eine Zuwendung des Ich, folgen mag. Das Ich ist nun bei dem es affizierenden ...." And D 13 IV, 28: "Jedes außer-zentrale Bild, das das Interesse erweckt, leitet dieses Interesse fort zu seinem Optimum und weckt ein Streben, den geraden Weg dahin zu durchlaufen, um es zu realisieren."

<sup>40</sup> D 13 I, 242b: "Das normale Ding fungiert im Leben zugleich in dem anderen Sinne als normal, als es zur Norm für die anomalen Erscheinungen dient."

definitiveness—plays in constituting the identical object beyond the momentary present. It is his phenomenology of association that then allows Husserl to return in Division 4 immediately to the issue of the in-itself as the true self of the object.

Although there are many different ways of becoming attentive, even within the sphere of passivity itself, the privileged case of becoming attentive for Husserl is the transition from passivity to activity through an egoic “turning toward” the pre-given affectively charged objectlike formation, in turn, constituting it as “object” and now as “given” to consciousness. These affective awakenings or affective interconnections are understood as “associations” by Husserl, and while associations include passive syntheses that accomplish unity and diversity (through pairing, similarity, uniformity, heterogeneity, fusion and contrast, etc.), Husserl favors the affective awakening or association as a specifically *reproductive* temporal act that confers an identity or an ipseity on the object over time, namely, remembering. Before discussing the concept of remembering here, and its yield, let me first clarify Husserl’s phenomenological notion of association.

Needless to say, the theory of “association” has had a long history, and is perhaps most well-known from the English empiricists and the tradition of empirical psychology, especially Locke and Hume, but also Hartley, and a little later, Brown and Mill, and still later Spencer.<sup>41</sup> In connection to Husserl, one should not overlook the movement in the German psychology of the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, represented especially by Lipps, Herbart, Wundt, and Stumpf.<sup>42</sup> The notions of resemblance, contrast, contiguity, vivacity, coexistence and succession, similarity and

contrast, fusion, habit—all notions peculiar to Husserl’s *Analyses*—are present in some form or other in these authors.

It would be fruitless to try to duplicate the historical documentation and philosophical acumen that Elmar Holenstein has brought to the problematic of association as it bears on Husserlian phenomenology and in particular, on the *Analyses*.<sup>43</sup> Here, I want to note two things. First, Husserl’s own contribution to the theory of association is to have taken “association” out of both an objective and subjective explanatory framework by submitting it to a phenomenological clarification, which is to say, for Husserl association designates an *a priori* essential lawful regularity of *genetic*, “passive” constitution of sense, irreducible to habit, custom, or mental processes; he brings associative syntheses into an intentional and *motivational* (and not causal) nexus concerning affectively significant primordial phenomena and their role in the awakening of affective tendencies toward attentiveness (association even dovetails at times with “apperception” as the transference and implication of sense); thus, association is not a juxtaposition or succession of objective facts; rather, it designates an internal referring; and finally, association serves as a way of explicating how objects get constituted as such in the transition from distinctively perceptual functions to cognitive acts.

Second, Husserl’s theory of association challenges a form/content dualism. Since an actual formation of sense necessarily presupposes affective force and affective differentiation, affection is an essential condition for every kind of synthesis, and without it there would not be a living present articulated with objects (pp. 212–13). It is primarily due to Husserl’s phenomenology of affective force as co-eval with the emergence of prominence that Husserl’s phenomenology of association is able to liberate his theory of constitution from a sensualism and a dualism. It is well-known, for example, that Husserl’s earlier theory of constitution was articulated in terms of a form/content (hyle/morphe) dualism whereby an interpretative intentional apprehending act is said to animate the intimately inherent (non-intentional) material sense-data (something that enabled Husserl to account for the fact that,

How Husserl  
deals with  
hylemorphism  
(form/content  
dualism)  
↓

<sup>41</sup> John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), esp. Book II, Chapter 33; David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739), I, 1, 4f; “Of the Connection or Association of Ideas,” Hartley, *Observations*, esp., Part. I, 65–83; Thomas Brown, *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind* in 3 Volumes (Andover: Mark Newman, 1822), esp., lectures 34–37; John Stuart Mill, *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind* (London: Baldwin and Cradock, 1829), esp., Vol. I, Chapter 3; Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Psychology* (London, 1899), §111 ff. 129 ff.

<sup>42</sup> Lipps, *Grundrissen*, esp., Division 3; Johann Friedrich Herbart, *Lehrbuch*, 30 ff. and 132 ff.; Wilhelm Wundt, *Grundriss der Psychologie*, esp., 264, 268 ff. Carl Stumpf, *Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen*, (Berlin: Königl. Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1907), esp. 22 ff. Supplementary Texts, Appendix 17.

<sup>43</sup> Holenstein, *Phänomenologie der Assoziation*.

e.g., the same empirical stuff "over there" could be taken now as a bird, and now as fluttering leaves on a branch.<sup>(44)</sup>

His analyses concerning associative passive synthesis, in particular, his descriptions of affective relief, implicitly, if not explicitly, call into question such a scheme by understanding as *primordial* phenomena, not ready-made undifferentiated "sensations," "stuffs," "materials" upon which something else is structured and with which a lived-experience coincides, but "original singularities," associative concretions and discretions as genetic affective sense-unities which, as affectively prominent, exercise an allure on the perceiver. In doing this, they apperceptively point beyond themselves and elicit an associative transference of sense, an affective awakening.<sup>(45)</sup> In this way, a phenomenology of association implies an undercutting of the traditional form/content dualism characteristic of his earlier static analyses, even though his genetic analyses as such did not in Husserl's own eyes definitively overcome the "apprehension—content of apprehension" schema. Having made these two points concerning the general concept of association in Husserl's phenomenology, let me now turn to the role of remembering as a privileged associative act.

Associations most often run their course without ever being noticed by us. Associations can be of many sorts: They can function in the present between co-present similar or uniform objectlike formations; they can function between the present and the future, or between the present and the past. However, Husserl takes his prime example of an awakening, and thus of an association, as an object exercising an affective allure on the subject, motivating a tendency to reproduce it in memory (cf. §19 "First Version"). Rememberings are occasioned by awakening forces, and in this respect an awakening is called a reproductive

<sup>(44)</sup> This is not to say that Husserl did not see this as a problem earlier. See, for example, Hua X, 269–334 from 1907–09.

<sup>(45)</sup> For a more complete discussion of the overcoming of the form/content dualism peculiar to Husserl's theory of sensation, see Shigetō Nuki, "The Theory of Association after Husserl: 'Form/Content' Dualism and the Phenomenological Way Out," in *Phenomenology in Japan*, ed. Anthony J. Steinbock (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998), pp. 49–67; Holenstein, *Phänomenologie der Assoziation*; Robert Sokolowski, *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964).

renewal and this is why Husserl treats them as "reproductive associations".

Why is remembering privileged? Two reasons. First, it is through remembering that consciousness itself becomes an object for itself such that time-consciousness itself which is immanent is its own first transcendence. Consciousness is in a chiasmic relation to itself through remembering. It itself becomes a streaming idea, a streaming absolute that bears a futural orientation (pp. 255ff.).

Second, a remembering, Husserl relates, "is nothing other than the phenomenon of awakening the past objectlike formation that was constituted in the original living present and has sunken back into retention, and has finally become completely void of force" (p. 244). It is through remembering, through the awakening of a memorial act, that an object gains a temporal density worthy of the name of "evidence." It may be that perception is a mode of consciousness that makes present *originaliter* and, metaphorically speaking, "seizes a present with both hands by its shock of hair" (p. 591); it may be that the present accordingly has an indefeasible validity. "But what good is it," retorts Husserl, "since its validity is only momentary?" "The object is surely constituted from the very beginning as something temporal, and the momentary phase is an abstraction that we must first construct. The incapability of being crossed out peculiar to the moment is thus not primary" (p. 155 and fn. 94). This is one reason why Husserl asserts that a theory that would allow evidence to hold only for the punctual Now is pure non-sense.

The first condition for something to become an object is that affective unities be constituted. This is still prior to remembering, however, and we do not yet have "object"-constitution; we do have sense-unity formations as affective allures and objectlike formations, but again, not objects as such. A genuine object, claims Husserl, is first constituted with the help of remembering; even the retentional past, and the synthesis in the course of these pasts arising in the small circle of the living present, do not yet yield the genuine constitution of the object, but rather, only a fundamental portion of its constitution. An object cannot be constituted as such merely in the momentary present, because it



can only be an object when I can return to it again and again as "the identical," which presupposes remembering (pp. 141, 614f.). But as we noted, the object is also the futural object, and so the future too plays its role by projecting a norm around which perceptual fulfillment be achieved, and in this way expectation has a constitutive function in the constitution of the object it-self.

In the *Analyses*, Husserl does not generally differentiate between different active memorial levels<sup>46</sup> (only between retention and remembering) neither does he differentiate between various levels of active futural orientation (but only between protention and expectation, which he virtually equates with anticipation). Nevertheless, no matter how inchoate, remembering and expectation serve as transitions from passivity to activity; they can both be modes of active attentiveness, and they are formative of more active levels of objectivation.

### C. Activity and Active Synthesis

If we were to live only in passivity, contends Husserl, and if it were not possible for us to carry out free activity, we would be blind to the sphere of true being. Part 3 of the *Analyses* picks up precisely here with the descriptions of higher and higher levels of attention and processes of active objectivation. In fact, having once moved through careful phenomenological analyses from the level of passivity "up" to that of activity, Husserl—in typical fashion—reinterprets this "higher" level now as "concrete" and understands that passivity and activity are really only phenomenologically designated internal differentiations of cognitive experience, and that we can only gain the level of experience of passivity for reflection by presupposing and *abstracting* from the concrete whole of experience that enables Husserl to consider explicitly in Part 3 the genetic transition from passivity to activity

and to describe the roles of affection and attention in levels of experience peculiar to active cognitive life.

Remembering and expectation are necessary but not sufficient conditions for an object to be constituted as such. In addition, what is required for something to be constituted as an "object" in the "complete and genuine sense" is that it be constituted as identical with itself and that it be originally constituted as the thematic object for the ego in identifying activity (p. 297–98).

A consciousness of the "object" is genuinely carried out only first in egoic acts, and is only there as object for the active ego. "Identical sense," "being," "modalities of being," "true being," "verification," get their genuine character only first within the framework of activity (p. 275). One of Husserl's goals in the *Analyses* is to understand active objectivation as a genetic gradation of thematic accomplishments. Since the intellect is a name for the constitutive accomplishments of objects that the ego has given to itself through activities of identification, and since there are as many modes of identification that we have for a theme as there are modes of objectivation, we can expect a spectrum of so-called "intellectual" or "spiritual" acts that differ in manners of generating the object. Each level entails a new "attitude," new active syntheses, and a corresponding alteration in thematization. From cognitive interest, explication, determinative identification, conceptualization, to as-such judgments. Further, each stage or "attitude" can admit of further differentiation. For example, just within the level of conceptualization, one would have to distinguish between concepts (operating apophantically in meanings and judgments) and essences (operating ontologically in simple and categorical objects), and further, between various levels of essences from empirical universals, to morphological essences and types, to pure *eide*. To make all these differentiations explicit is far beyond the scope of this Introduction. Let me merely sketch the broad parameters of movement mapped out by Husserl to higher levels of active synthesis.

If receptivity is the bridge, as it were, from passivity to activity, and if the awakening peculiar to this transition initially entails a submission that motivates an active turning toward, then what Husserl calls cognitive interest goes beyond receptivity by not

<sup>46</sup> Though on one occasion he does speak of a necessary "self-forgetfulness" in memory or a non-egoic remembering where in memory, the ego is not "awake." See pp. 595–96.

merely focusing on a theme, but by taking it as an object that is in principle explicable as object. Cognitive interest naturally functions a spur to processes of explication, yielding an examination into the theme that a) delves into its content, and b) extends beyond the theme to other objects.

Examination is a special cognitive process in which several things are called to our attention in a unity, whereby one explicates a substrate or a subject in its properties. Now one says "S" is determined by the partial self-identification as  $\alpha, \beta, \gamma$ , whereby the "S" remains one and the same "S" in the unity of this activity, as it progresses to newer and newer concentrations. What was merely a content of the theme (e.g., red), now becomes the thematic object; but here, what has gradually become the special theme enters into the partial identity with the S that is still retained. In this way, the interest in the object that goes from  $\alpha$  to  $\beta$  is fulfilled in the concentration of each moment or special theme, and what we acquire is an enrichment of sense in this synthesis. Even though the special themes of the object are actively made explicit as a way of clarifying "S," the synthesis of coinciding that forms identity and determines their relation and the coinciding of S is *not active*, rather, it is a result of a special *passive synthesis* (pp. 339ff.). Moreover, this passing from object to object that is held together by passive syntheses are excitations for possible determinations, but it itself is not yet the activity of determinative synthesis, it is not a judging.

Judgment is a determining process that *actively* relates one theme to another such that S is determined as the form of the subject, and the  $\alpha$  as the form of determination, etc.

If we focus on the "S" that is enriched in sense, "S" becomes an object of a new apprehension; now an active movement in the transition from, say, "S" to  $\alpha$  is intent on generating the element according to "S." Now we have the active consciousness that the "S" undergoes determination by being expressed as "S is  $\alpha$ " or "S contains  $\alpha$ ."

According to Husserl, the proposition is a correlate, the "What" of the judicative act, and in this regard is the "judicative proposition," the *propositio*. When we substantivize the proposition in the form of "that" statements ("that S is  $\alpha$ "), we have a

new level of objectivation that fulfills the proposition, the judgment maintained as valid, we have an state-of-affairs or *Sachverhalt* (cf. §62). This is the foundation for other possible determinative judgments: the relation between whole and parts, the combination of parts and their forms of connection, the relationships between the elements as connected in these forms, etc.<sup>(47)</sup>

In each case, it is an enrichment of sense that gives occasion to turn to activities of determination that form relations. The universal investigation into the categorical realm, according to its forms, and pure laws determined by these forms, laws of true existence of states-of-affairs, make up the discipline called "formal logic." This is the systematic disclosure of radically different genera of relations that are possible for the object, in formal generality, that is, forms and pure laws of states-of-affairs; it is a matter of a formal classification and axioms of relations. When we are motivated by the association of similarity and our direction of categorical interest is trained on the universal, when the universal and its relation to particulars becomes an explicit issue for thought, and when we judicatively assess the objects as such, we have that mode of synthetic cognition Husserl calls conceptualization.

Grasping the One or the universal has a unique field of interest. In this case, we do not merely attribute similar features to different objects: "The bookcase is brown," "The desk is brown," "The cup is brown"; rather, now we mean by "brown" the same color in all instances, subsuming the individuals under the *eidos*, "brown". Thus, no longer "S is  $\beta$ ," "S is  $\beta$ ," etc., but rather, "S is  $\beta$ ," "S" is  $\beta$ ," "S" is  $\beta$ ," etc. "For now" writes Husserl, "the interest, the ray of attentiveness must pass clear through the individual objects that are already constituted, and by traveling along the path of uniformity and carrying out the coinciding, the One that is constituted becomes thematic" (p. 350). This can yield a still new active determination. By focusing on the particular aspects, they will be shown to all have a peculiar relationship to the universal,

<sup>(47)</sup> A whole is not an state-of-affairs, but an state-of-affairs is a whole insofar as it can be divided up (§59).

namely, as a *particularization of the eidos*. Here, the new judgment arises, "This is an  $\alpha$ ," i.e., it is a particular, an instance of  $\alpha$ .

In turn, the field of openness that is constituted with the universal, (the universal of repetition with unending scope) unleashes the "whatsoever" or *Beliebigekeit*. We can choose any "this" or "that" whatsoever as the determinative theme; not only do new species emerge, but new thematic formations. Accordingly, it is one thing to have this rope before us thematically, and another to make a judgment about it *as such*, about any rope whatsoever whereby this rope gets constituted as an example.

By assuming the as-such into a theme, we have a conceptualizing function of universal and particular conceptual grasping. We can also operate in the scope of pure concepts, in a manifold of possibility; here we gain pure as-such judgments, like judgments of laws, like "A triangle has three angles"; or possibility, "A triangle can have a right angle." We can modify this in free variation and find a lawful regularity. "With this, the realm of universal judging is opened up, the realm of law-giving, the knowledge of law-giving for itself and for all judgments as such, and therefore for all possible objectlike formations" (pp. 354–55).

As these syntheses and categorial objects occur in *natural experience*, they are not yet "critical," and must be submitted to a constitutive or transcendental clarification. Still, as we noted at the outset, the scientific and ontological attitudes, formal logic, mathematics and regional or material ontologies that are constrained by the objects in question, can become clues to a transcendental analysis as an inquiry into the origin of truth. Beginning with a transcendental aesthetic, we will have the foundation for a broad scope of transcendently formed disciplines, like a transcendental physics, as the transcendental science of space and time, a transcendental psychophysics and psychology, a transcendental sociology.<sup>48</sup> But we will also have the foundation for the most

<sup>48</sup> In his later writings, Husserl will regard not only the lived-body as constitutive of spatiality, but the Earth *qua* earth-ground as constitutive of the lived-body and the spatiality of nature. (See, for example: Edmund Husserl, "Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum phänomenologischen Ursprung der Räumlichkeit der Natur"

universal theory of norms of all sciences in principle, transforming them and giving to them their justification, namely, a transcendental logic.

#### 4. Note on the Translation and Acknowledgments

The writings that make up the English edition of the *Analyses* draw from four different sources published in the German Husserliana Critical Edition. In the order of the presentation of the English edition and translation they are as follows: Hua XVII (*Formale und transzendente Logik*), Hua XI (*Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*), Hua XXXI (*Aktive Synthesen*), and Hua XIV (*Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*). The pagination given in the margins of the English text correspond to the pagination of these editions. All of the German editors' insertions are indicated by angled brackets < >, and the translator's insertions by square brackets [].

The *Analyses* are lectures. As such, they were never written with an eye to publication. The advantage is that the lecture format of these presentations provides the reader with a candor not seen in some of his other well-known writings intended for publication; we see Husserl addressing the participants in his lecture directly, and we observe Husserl working out insights and we witness a thinking in process. But this also means that much of what he wrote could be elaborated upon or modified in the course of his lecture. Its disadvantage is that this writing style does not make for the most cogent of presentations, and this is particularly dramatic in the case of Husserl. He is already known for his laconic style; on this score, the situation is only exacerbated.

(1934) in *Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl*, ed., M. Garber (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940), pp. 307–25.) These analyses belong as well to a transcendental aesthetic begun here. Such transcendental problems will ultimately concern the co-generation of a generative nexus in terms of normatively, geohistorically, and socially significant "lifeworlds," i.e., homeworlds and alienworlds peculiar to a "generative phenomenology." See Anthony J. Steinbock, *Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1995).



But this has also meant that many of the connections he makes to earlier sentences or references are ambiguous, connections that he could have easily supplemented in his oral presentations. Rather than try to duplicate the ambiguity or even incomprehensibility of Husserl's text, I have often had to become an overt interpreter of this work, either by substituting nouns for pronouns, or by intervening with explanations and/or interpolations supplied in square brackets []. Where the difficulty in terminology is concerned, the reader should be reminded that Husserl was still in the process of inventing phenomenological language by borrowing from the resources of "natural language," which is at root not bothered with "phenomenological distinctions" (p. 536). Where a common, technical term is used, or where I want to suggest that multiple interpretations of a term are called for, I cite the German expression in a footnote. Finally, some of Husserl's sentences are laboriously long; at times a paragraph can go on for pages. In these instances, I have simplified the syntax by breaking down the sentences, and where the longer passages contain several distinctive thoughts, I have broken down the text into shorter paragraphs.

While undertaking the translation and edition of such magnitude I have benefited from the support, advice, and assistance of several sources and persons. I owe a particular note of thanks to the Southern Illinois University at Carbondale (SIUC) which provided me both with a grant covering three years of funding for this project in the form of travel monies, commodities, contractual services, and a research assistant line, as well as an additional grant in the form of a Summer Research Fellowship. I am also grateful for a stipend from the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) covering two months of Summer work on this translation project (1999). The assistants at the Husserl-Archives in Leuven, and the director of the Archives, Rudolf Bernet, have been supportive in providing me with material and editorial advice. I would also like to thank Roland Breuer for keeping me supplied with advance renditions of "Aktive Synthesen," which has now become "Part 3" of the *Analyses*. Thanks are also due to Rudolf Bernet for allowing me to cite from unpublished manuscripts.

It has also been my fortune to have had capable and amiable research assistants. If this translation has accomplished its goal of providing the reader with an intelligible English rendition that is both accurate and faithful to the sense of this celebrated work of Husserl's, it is due in no small part to the diligent readings by and enlightening conversations with my research assistants, Ms. Stephanie Windolph (1997), Ms. Tanja Stähler (1998), and Ms. Christiane Hochkeppel (1999), all distinguished visiting doctoral students from the Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Germany. Thanks are also due to several people who have read portions of this manuscript and made helpful suggestions on the translation: Jim Hart, Sebastian Luft, Ullrich Melle, and Donn Welton, as well as to those who have offered comments on this "Introduction": Rudolf Bernet, Roland Breuer, Natalie Depraz, Christian Lotz, and Art Luther. Finally, I would like to acknowledge John Hartmann for the arduous task of compiling the index to the English translation.

On occasion, I have consulted Costa's Italian translation of Husserliana XI, *Lezioni sulla sintesi passiva*<sup>49</sup>, and Bégout's, Depraz's, and Kessler's French translation, *De la synthèse passive*<sup>50</sup> either for advice or in order to control various technical terms peculiar to the *Analyses*. Finally, I owe special acknowledgements to Shin Nagai, with whom I first read the *Analysen*, to Donn Welton for having suggested this translation project, and to Leslie Brown, my spouse and best friend, for having encouraged it. Any shortcomings in the translation are solely my responsibility.

This translation is dedicated both to my son, Joseph, who spent many hours as infant and toddler nestled on my lap "helping" me translate, and to my daughter, Samara, who immediately followed suit.

<sup>49</sup> See citation above, fn. 4.

<sup>50</sup> Edmund Husserl, *De la synthèse passive: Logique transcendente et constitutions originaires*, trans., Bruce Bégout and Jean Kessler, with Natalie Depraz and Marc Richir (Grenoble: Jérôme Milion, 1998).



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## <Main Texts>

### <PART I:

#### PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE LECTURE ON TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC><sup>1</sup> [351]

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### <1. Introduction>

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It is my intention in these lectures to present a few fundamental considerations toward a phenomenological logic. By the word "logic" I do not understand a subordinated, theoretical, and normative special science in the sense that it is usually taken today, even, say, in the sense in which the modern mathematician has shaped logic as a special mathematical discipline. Logic in the full and universal sense, the sense that we will have in view, is the science that consciously reappropriates the task that was enjoined to logic in general from its historical origin in the Platonic dialectic: namely, the task to be a universal theory of science, and at the same time, a theory of science in principle. A theory of science in principle signifies a science that is in principle a science of all sciences as such.

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Logic as a theory of science is then the science of the *a priori* of all sciences as such, the theory of what gives them sense as formations of practical reason, what they must necessarily fulfill if they are actually able to be what they want to be, namely, formations of practical reason. As a pure, *a priori* theory of science, logic wants to bring to light "pure" generalities according to the Socratic-Platonic method. Thus, it does not wish to follow

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<sup>1</sup> Editor: Wintersemester 1920/21

Translator: The following pagination to the German text corresponds to Husserliana  
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empirically the same path as the pre-given so-called "sciences," the cultural forms that have emerged in fact and that bear the name "science," only then to abstract from them empirical types. Rather, free from all ties to factuality, it wants to bring to complete clarity the teleological idea one always has obscurely in mind when operating from purely theoretical interest. Steadily pursuing the pure possibilities of a cognitive life in general, it wants to bring to the light of day the essential forms of genuine knowledge and science in all their fundamental shapes, as well as the essential presuppositions to which they are bound, the necessary norms against which is to be measured how far a factual science (initially only a presumptuous science) conforms to the idea of science, the extent to which its particular modes of knowledge are genuine modes of knowledge, its methods, genuine methods—methods, that is, which according to their principle form do justice to a pure and formally general norm. The sense of "formal" here consists in precisely nothing other than this: The guiding question is not the one concerning a particular science with particular regions of science, but rather, the question concerning the aim, sense, and possibility of genuine science as such.

Historically, what we call science in the narrow sense today developed from logic, namely, it developed at first from the normative guidelines elaborated in the Platonic dialectic. The classical expression which says that all sciences have arisen from the maternal ground of philosophy fits especially well for logic and, on the other hand, for sciences in the particular sense that we all have in mind today.

In a broader sense, we likewise give the name "science" to the cosmological theories of the pre-Platonic era, to similar cultural formations of other peoples and times, even to astrologies and alchemies, and the like. But at best they are inchoate forms, preliminary stages of science—and this holds especially for pre-Platonic philosophy or the science of the Greeks no less than it does for ancient Egyptian mathematics, for ancient Babylonian astronomy.

Science in a new sense first arises from the Platonic founding of logic, from the radical and critical reflection on essence and

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eidetic exigencies of genuine knowledge and of genuine science, and from the disclosure of norms according to which a science arises that is henceforth consciously directed toward normative justification, a science consciously justifying its own method. In accordance with its intention, this is a justification from pure principles; that is, a logical justification. Science in the new sense, then, no longer wants to operate naively on the basis of purely theoretical interest. It strives to justify from principles every step it takes in its authenticity, in its necessary validity. Accordingly, in this case, the original sense is such that the logical insight pertaining to principles, taken from the pure idea of possible knowledge and of the method of knowledge in general, precedes the method undertaken in a factual manner as well as the factual formation of science, and guides it in an *a priori* manner; but the sense is not such that the fact of some arbitrary method and science arising naively, and the type read-off from the fact, would have to pose as a norm in order to provide a model for scientific accomplishments in general.

Plato's logic arose as a reaction to the universal denial of science—a denial characteristic of sophistic skepticism. If skepticism denied what is in principle the possibility of something like science in general then Plato had to consider precisely what is in principle a possibility of science, and he had to found it critically. If science as such was called into question, then of course one could not presuppose the fact of science. In this way Plato was led down the path of the pure idea. His purely ideal logic or theory of science that shapes pure norms (and not read-off from factual sciences), had the mission of only now making possible factual science and guiding it practically. And precisely by fulfilling this vocation it actually did help to fashion sciences in the precise sense: new mathematics and natural science, etc., whose further developments in higher levels are our modern sciences.

However, the original relation between logic and science has become curiously inverted in modern times. The sciences made themselves autonomous. They cultivated highly differentiated methods in the spirit of critical self-justification, a spirit that had now become second nature to them; the fruitfulness of these

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methods became evident and certain <through> experience or <through> the reciprocal ratification by all the specialists being in agreement. While they did not cultivate these methods in the naïveté of the everyday person, they did it in a naïveté of a higher level, in a naïveté that dispensed with justifying method from pure principles by having recourse to the pure idea in accordance with ultimate *a priori* possibilities and necessities. In other words, logic, which was originally the torchbearer of method and which claimed to be the pure doctrine of principles of possible knowledge and science, lost this historical vocation and, understandably, remained far behind in its development. Even the grand reformation of mathematics and of the natural sciences in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century by figures like Galileo, Descartes, and Leibniz was still determined by logical reflection on the nature and exigency of genuine natural knowledge, on their *a priori* necessary goals and methods. Thus, if perfecting logic in these beginnings still precedes perfecting science, and if they still go hand in hand, then this essential relationship is modified in the following epoch, in the epoch in which the sciences, rendered autonomous, turn into special branches of science that no longer bother with a logic and that even brush it aside with scorn. But even logic completely departs from its own proper sense and its inalienable task in most recent times. Instead of pursuing the pure essential norms of science according to all their essential formations in order thereby to be able to provide an orientation in principle, it is instead happy to copy norms and rules from the factual sciences, especially from the highly esteemed natural sciences.

Perhaps this signals a deeper and more consequential tragedy of modern scientific culture than what one is in the habit of lamenting in scientific circles. It is said that the number of special branches of science have grown so vast, and each particular one has become so copiously diffuse in their special field of knowledge and methods, that no one is any longer able to make full use of all this wealth, to enjoy having a command of all the epistemological treasures.

The shortcoming of our scientific situation appears to be a much more essential one, a more radical one in the literal sense of the term: it does not concern collective unification and

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appropriation, but the rootedness of the sciences, which is a rootedness in principle, and the unification of them from these roots. It would remain a shortcoming even if an incredible mnemonic technology and a pedagogy guided by it would make it possible for us to have an encyclopedic knowledge of the theoretically and objectively established facts in the sum-total of the respective sciences.

Lacking are the centering ideas that would easily illuminate all thinking in the special branches of science and that would spiritualize all its particular results by relating them to eternal poles; lacking is what removes from all the special branches of science the blinders that are necessary only for their special work; lacking is the capacity to integrate them into the single universal nexus of actual and possible knowledge and thereby to understand this nexus as a nexus that is necessary in principle. But there is still much more that is lacking, namely, the reference back to the phenomenological primordial sources of all knowledge, the deepest founding of all objective sciences arising from the universality of knowing consciousness. Thus, lacking is a systematic fundamental science that would provide an ultimate understanding of all theory arising from the originally sense-giving sources of the subjectivity that accomplishes knowledge.

If the highest task of knowledge is not only calculating the course of the world, but understanding it—as Lotze characterized this task in a well-known dictum—then we have to take this dictum in the sense that we rest content neither with the way in which the positive sciences methodologically shape objective theories, nor with the way in which a theoretical logic directs the forms of a possible genuine theory to principles and norms. We must raise ourselves above the self-forgetfulness of the theoretician who in his theoretical accomplishments devotes himself to the matters, to the theories and methods, and who knows nothing of the interiority of his accomplishment and of the motivations compelling them—who lives in them, but does not have a thematic view of this accomplishing life itself.

We will understand what is accomplished as genuine theory and genuine science only through a clarification of principles that descends into the depths of the interiority that accomplishes

knowledge and theory, i.e., into the depths of transcendental, phenomenological interiority; this is a clarification that investigates the theoretical sense-giving and accomplishment of reason in its essential necessity, a sense-giving and accomplishment that is carried out in the interplay of transcendental nexuses of motivation. But only through such a clarification will we also understand the true sense of that being, the sense that science wanted to bring to light in its theories as true being, as true nature, as the true world of spirit. [355]

Thus, only a transcendental science, that is, a science directed into the hidden depths of accomplishing cognitive life, and thereby a science that is clarified and justified—only this science can be the ultimate science; only a transcendental-phenomenologically clarified world can be a world that is ultimately intelligible, only a transcendental logic can be an ultimate theory of science, only it can be an ultimate, deepest, and most universal theory of principles and of norms of all sciences, and at the same time transform them into clarificatory and intelligible sciences. While the contemporary positive sciences, and even the exact sciences, initially fill the novice with enthusiasm and in fact spiritually enriches him, in the end they leave him deeply dissatisfied; *notabene*: provided that he wants to be more than a professional and a specialist, provided that he wants to understand himself as a human being in the full and highest sense and wants to understand the world, and wants to pose to himself and to the world questions of ultimate knowledge and conscience.

We sense this, and we are particularly sensitive in our unfortunate time to the fact that the sciences are lacking in philosophical spirit, lacking the spirit of ultimate and principle purity and clarity, and above all, the spirit of that clarity that we call phenomenological, transcendental clarity. And this is precisely the reason for the lamentation that we do not become wiser and better through them, as is certainly their pretension.

But if we seize upon the idea of logic once again as broadly and as broad-mindedly as it should be grasped in accordance with its original intention, and if we animate it with the transcendental spirit that has been awakened in the modern era but has not arrived at pure self-consciousness, then we will have to say that what is

lacking in the modern sciences is true logic as the mother of their true method: logic that lights the way for them with a most profound self-knowledge of knowledge and renders them intelligible in all of their activities.

Accordingly, this logic does not want to be a mere technology for sorts of extremely pragmatic accomplishments of spirit that one calls scientific, a technology after all that one orients in an empirical manner toward practical results. It wants once more to precede all possible sciences as a justifying system of principles of all objective justification, a system of principles that understands itself through an absolute method, namely, for what should count as science and should be able to develop as a genuine science.

Just how much the sciences are in need of such a logic, or rather, just how little they are capable of emerging as sciences that are self-sufficient, and of persevering in such a self-sufficiency is seen in the conflict concerning the true sense of their foundations, a conflict that all the sciences share, no matter how exact they may be. And we see that in truth they are completely in the dark regarding their own sense. To be sure, only transcendental logic allows one to understand completely that the positive sciences can only bring about a relative, one-sided rationality, a rationality that leaves in its wake a complete irrationality as its necessary counterpart. But only a comprehensive rational science is science <in> the highest sense, like ancient philosophy originally wanted to be. [356]

At the very least I would like to give you a look into some of the profound levels of this universal logic; and if I am not in the position of making this logic thematic in its entire universality, it is not only because of its magnitude and difficulty (as well as the multitude of its subordinated disciplines), but above all because it has become clear that in order to bring to light an actually intelligible transcendental logic, tremendous transcendental-phenomenological preliminary work must be accomplished from the very beginning. Even if, historically and subjectively speaking, the outlines of the positive sciences and of a positive or theoretical logic have been developed first, phenomenological investigations nevertheless form what is first in itself out of which all fundamental forms of logical structures must proceed in a general

manner and according to an intelligible motivation. We will be exclusively occupied with such transcendental-logical foundations in these lectures.

## 2. "Thinking" as the Theme of Logic. Speaking<sup>2</sup>, Thinking, What is Thought

The term, *logos*, from which the name "logic" is derived, has a great number of meanings that have arisen from quite intelligible modifications of the more original meanings of *λόγος*, that is, from the meanings of gathering together<sup>3</sup>, expounding upon<sup>4</sup>, then expounding upon by words, by means of discourse. In developed language, *λόγος* sometimes means "word" and "discourse" itself, other times what the discourse is about, the matter of the discourse. But it also means, further, thought that is put in the form of sentences and that is generated by a speaking subject for the purpose of communicating or even for the subject himself, thus, so to speak, the spiritual sense of the linguistic proposition, what one also calls simply the theorem without thinking of anything grammatical here, precisely as something meant by the grammatical propositional expression, likewise, the sense of names; in particular, *logos* means, in the case of universal words, the universal concept belonging to them as sense.

Further, in many expressions *logos* also refers to the intellectual<sup>5</sup> act itself, to the activity of stating, to asserting, or to other modes of thinking in which such a sense-content relative to the respective objects or states-of-affairs are generated.

But all these meanings of the word *logos* assume a specific sense—especially everywhere scientific interests are in play—by the idea of a norm of reason entering into this sense. Then *logos* means reason itself as a faculty, but also rational, i.e., evidential thinking or thought directed toward evident truth. More specifically, *logos* also means the faculty of forming legitimate

<sup>2</sup> *Reden*. Translator: Depending upon the context, I use the English expressions

"speech," "speaking," and "discourse" to translate the German term "*Rede*" and "*Reden*."

<sup>3</sup> *zusammenlegen*

<sup>4</sup> *darlegen*

<sup>5</sup> *geistigen*

concepts, and even this signifies the rational formation of concepts as well as this legitimate concept itself.

Finally, we mention an even more specific coinage of these meanings whereby the specifically "scientific" element of its sense also comes to the fore: We then mean a scientific concept, a scientific concept-formation, a scientific thinking or the corresponding intellectual faculty.

If we now take this evidently harmonizing manifold of meanings of the word *logos* as a clue to the formation of the first idea of a science of *logos*, rich and closely related themes are opened up for theoretical research and normative application. It is easy to find a natural course of research here. If we concern ourselves with the second and third groups of meanings, the theme of reason as the faculty of correct thinking to be justified in an evident manner as a conceptual, scientific faculty, will lead us beyond the more general question concerning how temporary acts of an ego ground<sup>6</sup> corresponding habitual faculties, and will lead immediately to the question concerning the nature of the "rational" acts of thought that are under consideration.

But now, before the specific quality of this rationality can be considered, the specific quality of thinking itself must naturally become a theme, prior to all distinctions of what is rational and irrational.

We are led by the sense of our talk of *logos* chiefly to conceptual thinking and conceptual thought. Conceptual thinking in general prior to the norm however does not encompass all thinking in general, at least when thinking is taken in the broadest sense of the word. So, let us come back to thinking in the broadest sense, considering it for the time being.

Now, since human thinking is normally carried out linguistically, and all rational operations are practically completely bound to discourse, since all critique, from which rational truth is said to result makes use of language as intersubjective critique, and as a result always leads to statements, then not only acts of thinking and thoughts are at issue initially, but discourse,

<sup>6</sup> Translator: Reading *begruinden* for *bedürfen*. This reading is based on a correction by the Husserl Archives in Leuven of a transcription error.



statements, stated thoughts. Thus, we arrive at the first group of meanings of the term, *logos*.

The first group of meanings of "the logical" can be brought under three headings: speaking, thinking, what is thought. Naturally, we can likewise speak of their corresponding faculties: the faculty of discourse, to be conceived only along with speaking, and by means of thinking relating to what is thought. Thus, we are examining higher psychic beings, human beings, and are not referring to animals. Only human beings have language and reason, only human beings can carry out psychic acts such that they are subject to the normative regulation of reason, at least this is the general conviction.

Only the human being generates cognitive formations in the form of thinking, like those of a scientific culture, and is able to bring them to expression linguistically, documenting them; only human beings have something like literature. [358]

### 3. The Ideality of Linguistic Phenomena

The three headings that we specified above, however, are still quite ambiguous; due to the abundant obscurity of the terms employed they require further distinction and clarification. First, we recognize that we must not overlook a certain distinction where the term speech or language is concerned. We distinguish the articulated word, speech that is spoken at present taken as a sensuous phenomenon, especially as an acoustical phenomenon, from the word and proposition itself or from a string of propositions itself making up a larger discourse. It is for good reason that we speak precisely of a repetition of the same words and sentences in the event we are not understood, repeating [what we have said]. In a treatise, in a novel, every word, every sentence is singularly unique, and it cannot be duplicated by a repeated reading, be it aloud or to oneself. Indeed, in this case it is not a matter of who reads it: each one having his own voice, intonation, etc. We distinguish not only the treatise itself (taken here in merely a grammatical sense of a composition of words and language) from the manifolds of uttered reproductions, but likewise from the manifold documentations that endure on paper

and in print, or on parchment and in ink, on clay tablets in cuneiform, etc. The one and only linguistic composition is reproduced a thousand-fold, for instance, in book form, and we say without hesitation, "the same book" with "the same name," "the same treatise"; and to be sure, this sameness already holds in a purely linguistic regard, while it holds in yet another way when completely distilling the content of signification of which we will soon speak.

Language as a system of signs—signs with which thoughts are expressed in contrast to other types of signs—provides us in general and in many respects with subtle and wondrous problems. One of these problems is the ideality of language that we just encountered and which is usually completely overlooked. We can also characterize it in this way: Language possesses the objectivity of objectlike formations<sup>7</sup>, of the so-called spiritual or cultural world and not that of mere physical nature. As an objective, spiritual formation, language has the same features as other spiritual formations: In this way, we distinguish from the thousand reproductions of an engraving, the engraving itself, and this engraving, that is, the engraved image itself, is intuitively read-off of every reproduction, and is given in every one of them in the same way as identically ideal. Likewise, when we speak of the *Kreutzer sonata in distinction to any of its arbitrary reproductions*. Even if the sonata itself consists of sounds, it is an ideal unity, and its sounds are no less an ideal unity; they are not for instance physicalistic sounds or even the sounds of external, acoustic perception: the sensuous, thing-like sounds, which are only really available precisely in an actual reproduction and intuition of them. Just as a sonata is reproduced over and over again in real reproductions, so too are the sounds reproduced over and over again with every single <sonata> sound<sup>8</sup> of the sonata in the corresponding sounds of the reproduction. The same holds likewise for all linguistic formations; indeed, what is at issue here does not concern what they express (no matter how great a role

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<sup>7</sup> Translator: Reading *Gegenständlichkeit* for *gegenständlichen*. This reading is based on a correction by the Husserl Archives in Leuven of a transcription error.

<sup>8</sup> Translator: <Sonate> added by the Husserl Archives in Leuven.

this may play). When taken as speech replete with sense, it certainly also concerns them as concrete unities of the body<sup>9</sup> of language and of expressed sense, but it already concerns them with respect to their corporeality<sup>10</sup> itself, which is also so to speak already a spiritual corporeality. The word itself, the grammatical sentence itself is, as we saw, an ideal unity that is not duplicated with its thousand-fold reproductions.

The one who expresses himself lives in the efficacious practical intention to articulate this or that view. That must not be understood as if he first formed the opinion *explicitly*, and would only then seek suitable words to express it. We distinguish between the cases where one speaks to another communicatively, and the cases where one speaks to no one, thinking in solitude, expressing oneself monologically. In the first case, understanding and thinking along with another who is addressed corresponds to discourse; in the other case it does not.

In solitary thought in which one expresses to oneself, it is surely not the case that we would first have the formation of thought and then seek the suitable words. Thinking is carried out from the very outset as linguistic. What resides in our practical horizon as something to be shaped is the still indeterminate idea of a formation that is already a linguistic one. The thought that we have in mind and that we bring to expression interiorly is already equivocal, though still determined in an incomplete manner.

25 All meaningful speech as the concrete unity of the linguistic body and of linguistic sense is a "spiritual formation."

The principle discussions of the great problems that concern the clarification of sense and of the so-called transcendental constitution of objectivities of the spiritual world according to all their fundamental shapes—and among them, language—make up an entire domain unto themselves. It suffices to note here that language becomes an issue for logicians in the first place only in its ideality, as the identical grammatical word, as the identical grammatical proposition and nexus of propositions over and above  
35 the actual or possible realizations: in an entirely analogous manner

to the way in which the theme of the aesthetician is the particular work of art, the particular sonata, the particular picture, is the picture "itself," etc., and not the ephemeral physical tonal complex or the physical thing-like picture.

5 If an absolutely faithful reproduction of works of art of every kind were to be discovered, which would repeat the ideal content of the work with absolute indubitability, then the originals would lose all their value of scientific privilege for the aesthetician: they would hold only an affective value: similar to original literary texts after they have been faithfully reproduced with respect to their linguistic composition.

We are not in a position to discuss here the extent to which something holds analogously for all sciences of cultural formations, and then further the extent to which it is necessary to pass over to the study of realizations concerning questions of the historical genesis of spiritual formations of the cultural world; so, for example, in which sense linguistic theory must be occupied with questions of acoustics in order to clarify the genesis of the verbal stock of languages. But it is clear that the moment the linguist becomes a grammarian, he already has before him the word in its ideal unity.

20 And the same holds for the logician, for the logician in a primary sense whose theme is *logos* as theory. Indeed, that already demands a focus on what is expressed linguistically.

#### 25 4. Thinking as a Sense Constituting Lived-Experience

We now consider the second term we named: thinking, a word whose sense must be extracted from the connection in which it is so often joined: "language and thinking." Then this term will have a tremendously broad sense that may nearly seem to encompass the entire psychic life of the human being: for we are accustomed to say that "the human being expresses his psychic life in language."

30 But we must be more careful here. The human being does not actually ex-"press" all of his psychic life in language, nor can he express it through it. If one is wont to speak about this differently it is due to the ambiguous way in which one speaks of

<sup>9</sup> *Leib*

<sup>10</sup> *Leiblichkeit*

“expressing” and the dearth of clarity surrounding the relationships here. We can delimit this way of speaking about “expressing” in a preliminary fashion by noting that something is meant with every word and with every relation of words that is composed to form the unity of a discourse: namely, whenever speech is actually expressive speech, functioning normally. Of course, a parrot, a magpie does not really speak. We also exclude now deceptive speech or lying that means something other than what it says. Corresponding to the unity of discourse is a unity of meaning<sup>11</sup>, and corresponding to the linguistic divisions and forms of discourse are the divisions and formations of meaning. But this is not external or juxtaposed to the words; rather, in speaking we continuously carry out an internal act of meaning<sup>12</sup> that melds with the words, as it were, animating them. The result of this animation is that the words and the entire discourse incarnate within themselves a meaning, and incarnated in them, bear it within themselves as sense.

We do not need to go any further now, and we can delimit the first and broadest sense of thinking provisionally, namely, that it should encompass those psychic lived-experiences in which this act of meaning consists, this act of meaning in which precisely the meaning is constituted for the speaking subject or, in a parallel manner, constituted for the listening, comprehending subject—thus, the signification, the sense that is expressed in discourse. For example, if we pronounce a judgment, if we assert that Germany will rise again in glory, we have carried out a unity of an internally “thoughtful” assertion with the very words of the statement being asserted. Whatever other psychic accomplishments that may be carried out so that the words themselves come about, and whatever role they may play for the fusion generating the “expression,” we only pay attention to what is fused, to the judicative acts that function as sense-giving, as bearing sense within themselves, which therefore constitute within themselves the judicative meaning that finds its expression in the assertoric proposition.

Many kinds of psychic lived-experiences accordingly remain out

of consideration. Not considered are the indicative tendencies belonging to the words, like those belonging to all signs, the phenomena of pointing away-from-itself and into-the-meaning, the phenomena of pointing-toward what is meant. Also not considered are other psychic lived-experiences that emerge along with them, like those for instance in which we turn to an interlocutor to whom we wish to announce our judgment, etc., but naturally only insofar as the character of the address is not itself expressed in the discourse; for example, “I tell you ....” What we have learned with the example of the assertoric statement holds generally. If we express a wish like “God be with me!,” we will have together with the articulated generation of the words a certain wishing, a wishing that is expressed precisely in the articulated organization of words, a wishing that for its part has an articulated content running parallel to it; likewise when we promulgate an order, pose a question, etc. Taken in such a broad manner, thinking means each lived-experience which, during the act of speaking, belongs to the primary function of the expression, precisely to the function of expressing something; thus, it is that lived-experience in which the sense to be expressed is constituted in consciousness; this is thinking, be it a judging or a wishing, willing, questioning, supposing.

Let us retain this broadest concept, which I would like to note at once is not the concept determinative of traditional logic; whether or not we hold fast to this generality, it is important initially to take a stand on it and to examine it scientifically. We hold fast at once to the universality of the coinciding of language and thinking. That designates for us now two parallel domains; they correspond to one another as the domain of possible expressions and as the domain of possible senses, of possible expressive intended meanings. They yield in their intertwined unity the two-sided domain of current and concrete discourse, of sense-fulfilled discourse. Thus, every assertion is at once speech and currently intended meaning, more precisely, judicative intended meaning; every pronounced wish at once optative speech and the current wish itself, the current wish-meaning, etc. It will become clear that there is more than a duality here, so that we must sharply distinguish between the act of intending and the intended meaning.

<sup>11</sup> Meinung

<sup>12</sup> Meinen

indication



the act of judging and the judgment, and in this manner for all cases, so that a three-fold relation results. We investigate, rather, an important general character peculiar to all lived-experiences that exercise a sense-giving accomplishment, wherever expressions actually exercise their expressive function: thus, in normal discourse and listening that comprehends.

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# <5. Sense-Constituting Lived-Experiences as Egoic Acts>

All such lived-experiences are not only modes of consciousness in general, but egoic acts; and this is what we want to make clear now. In the course of our psychic life, waking life is only one type; there is another one besides this one, deep dreamless sleep, unconsciousness. We arrive at both these types in their contrast by presenting actual lived-experiences of awakening, by a retrospective intuitive grasping of preceding phases of consciousness in comparison with wakefulness itself. Even if we cannot say anything in more detail at all about the content of what is past and about what is experienced in a torpid manner, we can describe with evidence the typical essence of the contrast. There is an experiencing taking place when in a stupor, as well. But there is not perception in the genuine sense or an experience of another sort; there is nothing of a cognitive theme; there is nothing of a judgment; there is nothing of an object of an emotional interest; there is nothing properly speaking of an object being loved or hated at present, there is nothing of a desiring or a willing. What is the distinguishing trait of such lived-experiences that, in the very broadest sense (a broadness that is certainly not customary), could be characterized as lived-experiences of interest, and that mark the wakeful psychic life with the character of wakefulness? We can respond: Psychic life is wakeful, that is, the ego is wakeful, and this is the case insofar as it carries out specific egoic functions in the present, that is, carries out in the present an "I perceive"; that is to say, I turn toward an objectlike formation, viewing it, seeing it, I am absorbed in it; likewise, I remember, I am absorbed in viewing the memorial object; likewise, I make comparisons and distinctions; in comparing I recognize that two different perceptual objects possess the same type; or I am inclined to love, to cherish,

to respect someone I have in mind, or I turn against him in hate and contempt; I carry out an act of striving, consider the means, make a decision and do it. Note well the way in which emphasis is placed on the "I," the ego. In such wakeful lived-experiences of experiencing, taking cognizance, drawing conclusions, valuing, willing, we find the ego as the peculiar center of the lived-experiencing, as the one being absorbed in it, or the one suffering it in a conscious manner; it is the identical pole, the center of actions and passions—the latter corresponds to conditions like: I am sad, I am delighted, I am happy. The term "I" here is not empty, and on the other hand, we mean "I" neither as a corporeal human being, nor as the entire psychic life, actually, nothing at all of life and living. Rather, here the ego is identified in reflection as the center of life and lived-experiencing, the center to which are related perceiving, judging, feeling, willing.

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But we understand this in such a way that the expressions, "I perceive," "I judge," "I feel," "I want," designate at the same time an essential shape of these lived-experiences themselves that is essentially given through their ego-centration. Here, the ego is everywhere living in these acts as carrying them out, as being related to the perceptual object, the judged object, the willed object through these acts. The ego is not a box containing egoless lived-experiences, or a slate of consciousness upon which they light up and disappear again, or a bundle of lived-experiences, a flow of consciousness or something assembled in it; rather, the ego that is at issue here can be manifest in each lived-experience of wakefulness or lived-experiential act as pole, as ego-center, and thus as involved in the peculiar structure of these lived-experiences; it can be manifest in them as their outward radiating or inward radiating point, and yet not in them as a part or a piece. This can be seen by the fact that in order to grasp this outward radiating point thematically, we must exercise a peculiar reflection, one going in a opposite direction. We do not find it like a part, as something in the lived-experience or literally on it; rather, the structure of the lived-experience, its directional structure that goes toward what is presented, toward what is wished for, etc., points back to an outward radiating point and to the directedness of this ego toward its intentional theme. It is also

evident here that all such lived-experiences that emerge in this distinctive shape, *ego cogito*, in the unity of a stream of lived-experience, manifest the identically same ego: I, who I perceive, am identically the same as the I who then judges or feels, desires, wants, and only by virtue of this identity can I say that all of these are my acts. A curious polarization of the stream of consciousness! All lived-experiential acts [are] centered in a single, fully identical pole. Only through a reflective grasping of this central ego—which however is only graspable as the subject of its acts, as a subject carrying them out—does every other concept of the ego, even that of the personal and psychophysical human ego get its sense, no matter the number of new determinative moments that may be taken up by these new concepts of the ego.

What we have said here will be further clarified when we note that the wakeful life of an ego does not only contain such egoic lived-experiences in which the central ego emerges as a present functional center, and thus gives to its lived-experiences the shape, *ego cogito* (to speak with Descartes). Wakeful life has, so to speak, a background of non-wakefulness, constantly and with eternal necessity. When I actually perceive an object, that is, look at it, take note of it, grasp it, regard it, it will never be without an unnoticed, ungrasped background of objects. In this case we distinguish what is secondarily noticed from what actually goes unnoticed. In general, in addition to the object that is primarily noticed, with which I am occupied in a privileged way while viewing it, there are still other single objects that are co-noticed, be they given in a second or third order co-grasping. This will take place in such a way that in passing over from the observation of one object to the observation of another, I am indeed no longer looking at the first one, I am no longer primarily occupied with it, properly speaking; but I still have a hold on it, I do not let it slip from my attentive and conceptual hold, and along with that, everything I had previously grasped: It continues to belong to me in a modified way, and in this way I still have a hold on it. I am still present there as the central, present ego; as a wakeful ego, I still have a relation to it in an *ego cogito*. But in contrast to it we have a broad lived-experiential field, or as we can also say, a field of consciousness that has not entered into such a relation with the

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ego or with which the ego has not entered into such a relation: It may knock on the door of the ego, but it does not "affect" the ego, the ego is deaf to it, as it were.

The wakeful ego with its lived-experiences in the specific sense of wakefulness, lived-experiences of the *ego cogito*, thus has a constant, broad horizon of background lived-experiences to which the ego is not present and "in" which it does not reside: They may be sensations, like sensations of sound, but the ego is not alert to them; physical objects or beings with a lived-body may appear in the surrounding space as in transition or as in rest, but the ego does not carry out an "I perceive" or an "I take note" with regard to <them>; affects may be intertwined with these background lived-experiences or with their objects, spilling over into a general atmosphere of well-being or malcontentment; even tendencies, lived-experiences of drive, may be rooted in them, tendencies which for instance incline away from malcontentment, but the ego is not present there. Belonging here are also flashes of insight, imaginings that arise, memories, theoretical insights that emerge or even stirrings of the will, decisions that are not however taken up by the ego. Only when the ego carries them out do they get the shape of "*ego cogito*," of the "I am occupied in imagination with what is shaped by the imagination," "I think through the theoretical insight," "I carry out the stirring of the will," etc. Thus, the wakeful egoic life is distinguished from the egoic life that is not awake, from the ego that is "in a stupor" in the broadest sense, and the two are distinguished by the fact that in the latter, no lived-experience in the specific sense of wakefulness is there at all and no present ego is there at all as its subject, while in the other case, precisely such a wakeful ego is there as the subject of specific acts.

#### 6. Foreground Lived-Experiences and Background Lived-Experiences

Every act in the specific sense has the fundamental character of being a consciousness of something, an "intentional lived-experience." The perceptual lived-experience is in itself a perception of something, for example, a house; the cognitive

lived-experience is in itself a lived-experience of something known, like when the house is recognized as a residence; in every judgment there is something, a judged state-of-affairs, in every desiring is something desired, in every willing, something willed. This is the broad concept of the concept of intentional lived-experience. For even background lived-experiences are intentional. A universal life that is a life of consciousness through and through encompasses the specific acts, those that are specifically ego-consciousness, as well as the background consciousness. Thus within wakeful life, for example, we constantly have a visual space that is filled up and that is present to consciousness. If we take note of a single tree in a landscape that is open before us, then this landscape as a spatial field with multiple objects is given to consciousness and is there for us. That is to say, as a whole and according to all single features, the background objects are objects for us through the fact that they appear, through the fact <that> in their corresponding lived-experiences, they have the character of intentional lived-experiences. Every appearance is the appearance of what is appearing in it, the lived-experience of an appearance of a house <in> the landscape is precisely the appearance of this house, whether we pay particular attention just to it or not. The egoic act in the specific sense is thus a special form of carrying out intentional lived-experiences. Let me mention that I have originally introduced the term "act" in my *Logical Investigations* for this broadest concept of intentional lived-experience; this is the sense in which the term is now customarily employed in the literature. For this reason I now say emphatically "egoic act" or "act in the restrictive sense," where it is a matter of acts having a distinctive form of execution. [365]

Taking place in the life of consciousness is a constant transformation of the modalities of execution; foreground lived-experiences, egoic acts, lose this form of execution and then take on the altered form and *vice versa*. That holds for all types of lived-experiences of consciousness. Cognitive acts, acts of pleasure, volitional acts do not simply disappear when we no longer carry them out from the standpoint of the ego; they become background lived-experiences.

It is evident here that background lived-experiences, in contrast to the acts corresponding to them, are modified through and through, whereas they do indeed share something essentially in common so that we find it necessary to speak further of the same judgments, wishes, etc. Certainly, they are not actually the same. It is not like shoving things in a room away from the window into dark corners, where the things themselves remain unchanged. The moment a background lived-experience becomes present, that is, the moment the ego becomes an ego carrying out acts through it, it has, as lived-experience, become completely and essentially transformed. So too, *vice versa*. And yet even the judging that has been shoved into the background is still a judging of this and that; background perception is still perception of exactly the same thing.

It belongs to the very essence of a lived-experience that it is a consciousness of the same thing in the transition from one mode of execution to another. Purely through their own essence and in passing from one mode to the other, they found the consciousness of the unity and of the sameness of what is given to consciousness in them; a kind of coinciding sets in, the coinciding that ensues precisely according to their intentional content as the content given in them. This situation makes intelligible our way of speaking of acts, acts that become latent and then patent again. [366]

A counter argument that emerges in the background of consciousness during a conflict is initially a latent act; its intentionality (which brings it to the idea of such and such an argument) is a hidden intentionality, up to the point where we intervene<sup>13</sup>, as it were, and now actualize it, that is, carry out an explicit argumentation, an argumentation of the corresponding content that issues from the ego-center.

<sup>13</sup> Translator: Reading *eingreifen* for *angreifen*. This reading is based on a correction by the Hussert Archives in Leuven of a transcription error.



<7. The Interconnection between Expressing and Signifying as the  
Unity of an Egoic Act>

Our theme was the clarification of thinking, of thinking together with speaking, of thinking that exercises the sense-giving function on speaking. Whenever we actually speak or actually take part in a discourse by listening to it and by understanding it, this actuality will consist in the execution of egoic acts in sense we have defined. This initially concerns thinking that gives sense to words. The speaking person means something in the spoken words, and this act of meaning, this "thinking" that belongs to speaking is an act (or a unitary nexus of acts) carried out by the ego. That toward which the ego is intentionally directed in these acts is what the ego means in speaking these words, what the words as discourse "express."

Further, we note that even those lived-experiences in which the words themselves are produced for us as the ones speaking, lived-experiences in which the words are given to consciousness and are there for us, have the character of egoic acts, and [we note] that our analysis has accordingly also taught us something with respect to the specific mode of linguistic consciousness. Words as actually spoken words do not emerge in a background distant from the ego; as speakers, we generate them, and through this generation we are directed toward them in acts, and not in a latent intentionality. Further, if one says that we mean or express this or that with words, then even this synthetic unity of the act of meaning with words belongs to the circle of the specific participation of the ego. In verbal consciousness, words have the character of signs; the character of indicating is inherent in them; radiating from them are indicative tendencies that aim at what is meant and terminate in the content of the meanings. This intertwining belongs to the intentional stock of the unity of verbal and linguistic consciousness, and this peculiarly obviously produces the following: that the expression and what is expressed, that verbal and semantic consciousness are not juxtaposed to one another, disjointed, but rather, make up a unity of consciousness in which the doubled unity of word and sense is constituted. The moment we conceptually do away with these indicative tendencies and rid

ourselves of them, we no longer have words at all, we have meaningless sounds like a parrot makes in its so-called "talk"; we have signs that do not signify anything, in fact they are then no longer really signs, to say nothing of expressions.

Even this intentionality unifying the words themselves and the sense, the lived-experience of the word and thinking, has the character of patent intentionality; the pure ego is present there. The ego seizes the word in regarding it; it grasps its indicative tendency; it willingly allows itself to be guided by it, to be initiated into the execution of thinking; it allows itself to be oriented by what is thought as what is meant by the words. But we do not intend the words themselves here! We can also intend the words in other acts; we can become interested in them, as we are wont to say, making them our "theme" in this interest, possibly making them our theoretical theme like we would do if we were grammarians. In this case, we carry out theoretical judgments and theoretical discourses corresponding to them, discourses that proceed with new words; obviously, then, the difference comes to light between the words that are our grammatical theme, and the words that we use in order to express ourselves on this theme, in order to express our thoughts with respect to them. Both words are essentially given differently to consciousness; in one case, the acts that are directed toward them are acts of interest, in the other, they are not. In the broadest sense, but not in a customary literal sense, we could speak of interest precisely in order to say that an act is altogether carried out, that is, that in it the ego is present to the respective intentional object, that the ego is directed toward something in the act. But the normal concept of interest says more, it means that peculiar mode of carrying out acts whereby what is given to consciousness in it is a theme for the ego. If the words themselves are not given to consciousness thematically in each current discourse, they will still necessarily have a theme, namely, one that resides in what is meant with the words. Thus, the sense-giving act is an intending act in the specific sense of a thematic act that, in the mode of interest, is directed toward a theme residing in the content of the act.

The actuality of indication that adheres to the word in the consciousness of an actual discourse gains a clarifying

determination through our elucidation of the feature of thematic acts. The word points away from itself, as it were, [pointing] toward what is expressed as the thematic sense. This analysis obviously concerns every type of sign, or rather, actual signifying, be it a linguistic or non-linguistic one. A certain imperative, the firm indication of its thematic intending, firmly adheres to every sign according to its essence as sign.

If our interest is nevertheless turned toward the sign itself, then the thematic preference of the sign is one that runs counter to its function; it takes place in it despite this; and one senses that this "despite" has a phenomenological character.

We have arrived at the insight that neither any kind of intentional lived-experience, nor even any kind of act can be found in the sense-constituting function, neither with respect to signs in general, nor accordingly with respect to speaking. Only acts in the mode of thematic acts, acts of interest in a specific sense can function in such a way; only acts through which what is given to consciousness in them has for the ego the preferential character of thematic intending.

Naturally, this character even enters into background modifications, like everything we demonstrate in actual discourse with respect to structures, but precisely as modified; modifications can be bestowed upon all acts, and hence those of discourse, too. In this respect it does not require any further special exposition. Let us remain in the sphere of wakeful activity which is alone fruitful for us. What I state, what I express in speaking is my theme, my "what I intend" in the moment of my current speaking.

If I assert something, then my thematic act is a judging, and I have my judicative theme, a judicative intending. Likewise, if I express a wish, then my wishing is the thematic act, the wish is made as my optative-intending, in interrogative discourse, the interrogative act has thematic form, etc. All in all, there is accordingly a multiplicity of acts carried out by the one presently speaking, acts synthetically connected to one another forming a unity of one act. Not only do we have a continual sequence of acts when moving laterally along discourse in its single words and sentences—a continual sequence of acts that are connected with one another and thereby constituting for the one speaking the unity

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of a discourse built up out of the sense-endowed words and sentences, and which is now a unitarily meaningful discourse. Not only, I say, do we have this multiplicity moving laterally along discourse, but it also belongs to every cross-section, so to speak, to a diversity; that is, it belongs to every part of the discourse and possibly to every part of the word insofar as it is still discourse, still endowed with sense. At each place we have the organization of the act according to word and sense, thus the synthesis itself resulting from an overarching act, namely, from an indicative act that assigns to the connected acts simultaneously a different place and function.

#### <8. Theme, Interest, Indication>

At the end of our last lecture, we characterized the entire nexus of expressing and signifying as a unity of an egoic act. Now we can immediately pick up this line of thought here in order to provide the character of thinking with a necessary depth, a depth with which a novel and at the same time especially distinctive mode of execution by egoic acts in general will come to light. If we compare the mode of execution in which the central speaking ego carries out the word-constituting act and, on the other hand, the sense-constituting act, we will encounter a sharp contrast. We also called the latter mode of thinking the act of meaning or intending. For example, what is expressed in propositional speech like "geometry is the science of space," is what the person speaking judicatively "means." But while he means the judgment "with" the words, in this case he does not mean the words themselves. They are given to the ego in a manner that is quite different from the way in which what is judged is given to the ego. Residing in the latter, so to speak, is the *terminus ad quem*, and through this it has a special priority in relation to the word, although the ego's regard was also directed toward the word.

[The fact that we] have in mind words (like objects in general) in specific acts is not yet to say that the acts are directed toward the words by intending them. To be sure, we can also attribute to them the distinction of an intending, but then [this would only occur] in correspondingly altered acts. We can become especially

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interested in the words, as one also says, we can make them our "theme" through this interest, like we do as grammarians, for instance. Then they become our theoretical themes; in relation to them we carry out theoretical judgments and corresponding to them, theoretical discourses that are deployed in new words. Especially clear here is the difference between words that are our grammatical themes, and words that we use in order to pronounce our theoretical thoughts about these themes. Both are given to consciousness in an essentially different manner; in one case, the acts that are directed toward them are acts of interest in the restrictive sense of the term, in the other case, they are not. One could indeed speak in a broadest though unconventional sense of the interest of the ego with respect to each act. For the ego, as pure ego, is absorbed in each act and *interest*<sup>14</sup>; it is directed toward something and absorbed in it. But the normal concept of interest means more; it means a peculiar mode of carrying out an act, whereby in this concept of interest something is given to consciousness, given in the special manner of a theme, of a theme that one has one's eye on.

The expression, "intending" or "meaning" is used generally now and then for all acts in order to depict the directedness of the ego toward the intentional content, and for this reason one must distinguish a thematic intending or the thematic act from intending or act in general. In this way there is a theme with potentially many special themes in every discourse, only that precisely the words themselves of the discourse are not themes. The theme resides in what is meant in the words. The sense-giving act is not only a second interlaced act, but interlaced as a thematic act, an act of interest. The different manner of carrying it out, suggested by the words "interest" and "theme"—where the former points to the ego and its action, and where the latter does not—obviously belongs to the lived-experiential acts even outside of assertoric discourse. It is also apparent here that there are different degrees of interest and, on the other hand, modes of interest that are not merely differences of degree. Thus, an intuitive regard of objects and events of the enviroining-world can be of more or less interest;

the ego has its theme in these matters, but is absorbed in them more or less intensely. On the other hand, while the ego has its primary theme in these matters that the ego regards, it can still not only notice additional events, but can take an interest in them. But then they are secondary themes, interests of a second order.

If we return now for a moment to the special sphere of expression, we will be struck by the curious interconnection between the function of sense as a thematic one and the function of indication, an interconnection whose fundamental character becomes intelligible only now. Expressed in a more complete manner, the word points away from itself and to the sense in normal discourse, that is, the word directs interest. The word-sense that is in itself not a matter of interest serves to draw attention to the sense as something that matters to the ego. [370]

This analysis is obviously fitting for every kind of sign or for acts in which they exercise their present significative function, be they linguistic signs or other types of signs like signals from a boatman. The moment our interest is directed toward the signs themselves and is arrested there (rupturing this normal function), like when it is directed toward the written signs or toward the flag that serves as a signal, abnormality shows up in the lived-experience itself. One feels that it goes against the grain, so to speak, and that one is not only violating a habit, but a habitual determinative end, a practical imperative.

In this way we have thus also gained a deeper insight into the essential structure of living speech, above all the knowledge that sense-giving thinking cannot be just any act, but only one that has the general character of a thematically intending act, be it in other respects a judicative intending, a presumptive intending, an intending of doubt, an intending of a wish or an intending of volition.

#### <9. The Regression from Theoretical *Logos* to the Pre-theoretical Sense-Giving Life of Consciousness>

Now we want our investigation to go beyond the narrow realm to which it has been restricted, [namely,] the realm of thinking as the sense-giving function peculiar to statements. Actually, every

<sup>14</sup> Translator: Husserl uses the Latin expression, taking the term in its literal sense.



step of our preceding analyses of interiority functioning in linguistic thinking has already elicited the demonstration of the general character of consciousness, which points beyond the narrow field. Now we want to enter the broadest generality in which it is no longer a matter of words and statements, although it does concern, in an expanded sense, sense-giveness and furthermore the distinctions between what is rational and irrational—distinctions that belong to the special theme of every logic.

10 As we said right at the beginning, the genuine theme of logic alludes to the group of significations most rich in content and so to speak magnified: the group of significations of the word *logos* related to reason, specifically as scientific reason, and to the achievements that are accomplished in it, accordingly, to the entirety of the linguistically marked structure, the structure which the rubric "scientific theory," "scientific system" expresses. Thus <logic> should encompass the principles and theorems, the deductions and proofs in their entire systematic interconnections, just like they would be objectively presented in an ideal textbook, namely, as the spiritual common good of humanity. As I already said earlier, the term "rational" is a normative term. What is

20 rational is the true, the genuine; it is what even irrationality, the human being insofar as he thinks irrationally, strives toward, but what he lacks in his unclarity and confusion because of an ingenuine, irrational method. We can accordingly say that logic bears on science in the genuine sense, or as we can also put it, it wants and wanted from the very beginning to be the universal theory of science, the science of the essence of genuine science in general. Under the rubric of science, humanity wanted to know the

25 world in a systematic manner, or in the specialization of investigative interests, wanted to know some type of special unending-open region of the world. This guiding idea of science which was initially unclear was supposed to have been made sharp and clear. The essential features of genuine science, those to which the truth of its methods and its theories are bound in regulative necessity, were supposed to be brought to light, and because of their clarity were supposed to be recognized in this pressing necessity. Thus, the goal was simultaneously to gain an

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evident norm for all procedures of practical reason in the foundation of genuine science, and building upon this, to ever higher accomplishments of truth. Since it constantly concerns here the modes of the accomplishing and the results of the accomplishment, the subjective activity of the scientists and the structure of objective spiritual formations following from it, namely theories, the efforts of elucidation and of scientific knowledge pertaining to the theory of science or logic would have to be two-fold: subjectively directed toward the activity of knowing and, on the other hand, objectively directed toward theory.

However, only in the modern era has one seen, or rather first merely felt obscurely and then seen with evidence, how this two-fold structure demands deep and tremendously encompassing investigations if one really wants to reach an understanding of the essence of scientific accomplishment as the essence of an accomplishment of reason. As soon as systematic portions of sciences were won in a certain naive evidence (as already in antiquity, Euclidean mathematics, the beginnings of an astronomy and mechanics, and from there, certain firm and precisely formed theories were given in evidence, theories whose epistemic value seemed incontestable because of this naive evidence), one understandably held onto these models conceptually, and the focus was predominantly fettered by what was objectively available, by the manifold formations of theory. One initially held that theories consist of propositions, they progress from true propositions to true propositions; insight grasps the truth, and thus also justifies the pretension toward truth.

Propositions, whose truth is immediately evident, lead through deductions to conclusions that become evident in their dependent truth. The entire nexus composed of elementary deductions, produced in its unity, is itself the unity of truth as theory. These whole formations that are built up from single propositions are indeed linguistically expressive formations, but the linguistic element in it (for instance, varying according to the national language), is irrelevant here. Prominent in this variation of the mere linguistic element is the pure thought, the pure significance, the identical proposition, or as one also says, the judgment. It is

only to the latter that evidence and the predication of truth or possibly falsity adheres. In this sense not only is a single proposition only a very complex judgment, but so too is the whole unity of a theory.

5 In this way logic was directed toward a theory of theory; it [372]

looked at these pure unities of significance; one examined it in a kind of descriptive and classificatory manner. One systematically distinguished the general forms of these significances, the forms of judgment and of their elements, and the form of the connections through which complex judgments arise; elementary forms of judgment like: *S is P, all S are p, some S are p, if S is p then Q is r*, etc. The systematic production of those forms of judgment-complexes that are called deductions also belonged here. Following this, one could then examine these forms to see to what extent they yield general conditions of possible truth and falsity of judgments formed in such a way. If one examines the forms of deduction in this way, it seems evident that one cannot arbitrarily tie propositions to deductions, or, forms of proposition to forms of deduction, namely, insofar as it is evident that deductions of certain forms are in principle false and that from the standpoint of truth, only certain forms of deduction are admissible. Every deduction with the form "*given all A are B and all B are C, all A are C*" is correct with respect to the consequence, but if it would read "*not all A are C*" the deduction would be false. From there one could see that belonging to the form of judgments as to the form of pure propositional thoughts are laws of form which, depending upon the circumstance, say that judgments and formations of judgments of such and such pure forms are contradictory once and for all, they are in principle false; others are not contradictory, they can be true according to their form.

30 The Aristotelian syllogistic form, and the later, more or less purely shaped formal logic arose in this way. According to the core which is alone useful, it offers in effect the beginnings of a doctrine of forms and a doctrine of validity of judgments related to 35 the pure form, and thus the beginnings of a theory of possible forms of theories. Traditional logic did not bring about anything more with respect to a theory of theory; and on the other hand, with respect to the investigations subjectively directed to the

essence of scientific thinking, scant little was accomplished, that is, in relation to a critique of knowledge. One has sought in vain since Locke to make headway by means of a psychology of knowledge and a theory of rationally valid cognition grounded in it. But the naturalism of this psychology was unable to grasp consciousness and the accomplishment of consciousness from within, and although it had pretensions of being grounded in inner experience, it was even unable to see into this peculiarity of consciousness at all; the naturalism of this psychology got paid back in its absurd theories of knowledge emerging here—absurd in the strongest sense; one indeed felt the absurdity of these theories, but strived in vain to clarify it. What was completely unintelligible in the modern era was this marriage between pure ideal theories of the formal logic of signification, on the one hand, and the theories of epistemological investigations, on the other. 15 The propositions, the theories emerge from the interior of accomplishing thought, somehow; but just what this interior thought looks like, and what it is, and what it accomplishes as so-called "evidence"—that remains obscure. [373]

20 It was only with phenomenology that we first had avenues of access, methods, and insights that make possible an actual theory of science, namely, through its radicality in going back to sense-giving consciousness and the whole of conscious life. It is phenomenology that seriously inquires back from the ready-made propositions, theories, to thinking consciousness and to the broader nexus of the life of consciousness in which these formations are constituted; and it inquires back, going still more deeply from all types of objects as the substrata of possible theories, to experiencing consciousness and its essential characteristics which make the experiencing accomplishment intelligible. It has allowed us to see in a presuppositionless manner the feature of intentionality as the very feature that makes up the fundamental essence of consciousness. It has generated methods of developing the hidden implication of one consciousness in another, an implication that is given everywhere with this feature, and therefore of making intelligible how objectivity as a true being of every kind is shaped as an accomplishment in the subjectivity of the life of consciousness, and is then shaped as a higher level of

accomplishment which is there as theory. If one goes back from theory that is dead, so to speak, and has become objective, to the living, streaming life in which it arises in an evident manner, and if one reflectively investigates the intentionality of this evident judging, deducing, etc., one will immediately be lead to the fact that what stands before us as the accomplishment of thought and was able to show itself linguistically rests upon deeper accomplishments of consciousness. Thus, for example, in order to be able to emanate from actual evidence every theory that refers to nature presupposes natural experience—what we call outer experience. In this way, all theoretical knowledge in general ultimately leads back to an experience.

We see upon closer inspection that already under this rubric, "experience," a sense-giving accomplishment is carried out, indeed, a highly ramified, intricate one, and one that is even covered by a broadly apprehended rubric of reason and unreason, whereby the rational operation alone, one that has taken shape in a certain free spontaneity, can function as a verifying foundation of a genuine theory.

It is impossible to understand what thinking (which is a highly built-up accomplishment) is in the specific sense in order to be able to be expressed by language and universal words and in order to provide a science, a theory, if we do not go back prior to this thinking, back to those acts and accomplishments that make up the most expansive part of our life. For not only does a pre-theoretical life reside in this expansiveness, but a pre-linguistic life as well, one that immediately ceases to be in its original, primitive peculiarity with every expression.

And thus I set the task of our further lectures to open up this expansive, great world of the interiority of consciousness and under the guiding viewpoint of a theory of science, and by beginning from below and ascending upward, to show how genuine thinking in all its levels emerges here, how it is motivated and is built-up in its founded accomplishment.

We want to deal with the great, universal theme of sense-giving. We called thinking sense-giving. And we had already distinguished this sense-giving thinking from what is thought in it, or as one can also say in this correlation, from the thought. Thus,

for example, judicative thinking, judicative intending and on the other hand the judgment itself, the optative intending and the wish itself, the volitional intending and what is willed itself in the intending. The word "intending" or "meaning"<sup>15</sup> is used for both; likewise, the special words judgment, wish, decision, question, etc., are ambiguous. In the psychological, logical, ethical language of the modern era, both of them are indistinguishably muddled, although the clarity and distinctness of the differences that are necessary here are not only useful but fundamental for all these disciplines; the differences are also of decisive importance especially for the pure distinctions concerning the investigative areas of the logical disciplines.

That there are constantly temptations for confusion shows from the very start how important the clarification of the distinction is. By engaging in such a clarification important insights are immediately opened up. Thus, we distinguish the intending and the intended meaning, the sense-giving act and the sense itself (which is given to consciousness thematically in the sense-giving act). This holds generally. When a thematic act is attached to words, what is meant in the act is called the sense of the word, or even, its significance<sup>16</sup> because the word signifies<sup>17</sup>. But independently of the fact whether an act has such a function of lending words significance, and perhaps being able to lend words significance, it has in itself a sense-content. Accordingly, we must liberate the concept of sense from its relation to expressions. Put in a quite general manner, every intentional lived-experience possesses as such its intentional sense; the latter becomes precisely a specifically meant sense when the ego becomes a subject who carries out acts thematically and becomes the subject of thematic interest. Let us now enter this realm of greater generality, the general realm of sense-giving and sense; without an encompassing study of this realm, all attempts to clarify logic in the specific sense are hopeless.

<sup>15</sup> *Meinung*

<sup>16</sup> *Bedeutung*

<sup>17</sup> *deutet auf*



## &lt;10. Perception and Perceptual Sense&gt;

Let us begin with any external perception. If we observe an unchanging object at rest, for example, a tree standing before us, we pass over it with our eyes, now we step closer to it, now back away from it, now here, now there, we see it now from this, now from that side. During this process the object is constantly given to us as unchanged, as the same; we see it as such, and yet a slight turn of our attention teaches us that the so-called perceptual images, the modes of appearance, the aspects of the object constantly change. In a constant variation of modes of appearance, perspectives, that is, during a constant variation in the actual lived-experience of perception, we have a consciousness that runs through them and connects them up, a consciousness of the one and the same object. This variation is given to consciousness, and yet it is hidden in a certain way; in the normal attitude, the natural attitude that is turned outward toward things, we do not consciously notice the variation. [375]

I spoke of a turning of attention. More specifically, I spoke of a turning of the thematic regard and even more precisely of a reflection. In fact, we speak of a reflection in all cases, where in any kind of conscious lived-experience a direction of the thematic regard is prefigured from the very start as normal, that is, as a necessary, thematic attitude that serves as a starting point from which we must turn away in order to get hold of something new in our conscious lived-experience. This is how it works for external perception.

Belonging to external perception is a thematic basic attitude, namely, the attitude directed toward the external object, which without further ado we call the object of perception. Customarily and from the very outset, we consider attentive perceiving,<sup>18</sup> that is, this normal thematic directedness toward the external object, as belonging to the concept of external perception. But a reflective conversion of the thematic regard is possible at any time and in an evident manner, and then our perceptual images themselves become graspable and grasped. In and through their variation, we

also see then, evidently, a thoroughgoing unity of the perceiving lived-experience. However we may conceive of it as temporally articulated and temporally partitioned, we find it composed of perceptions (and it is not conceivable in any other way). Each one has its content of appearance as well as a content of appearance that is constantly different, and each one has its object that appears "there in the flesh." But this object is the same object in all these stretches and phases of the continual unitary perception; it is the same thanks to the thoroughgoing "coinciding" of the appearances being carried out in perception itself. And it is the same for consciousness! It is not the appearances themselves according to their contents of appearance that coincide; to be sure, they are always different and temporally spaced out; and yet there is a certain "coinciding" that is expressed in this evidence, to wit, that in every one of these modified appearances, the same tree appears, and the perceptual intending, the constantly thoroughgoing thematic intending, intends this object that is overall the same. We now name this same object given to consciousness as identical in the continuity of appearance using a preliminary concept: the sense or objective sense of perception. Let me say in advance: In precisely such a manner, every conscious lived-experience possesses its sense within itself. This is to say that instead of carrying out a conscious lived-experience naively, we can make any kind of conscious lived-experience thematic by reflecting on it; and then—be it with respect to the temporal stretches of its variable continuity, be it in comparison with other such separated lived-experiences—we can always find they make possible an evident consciousness of the identity of the content, that what two consciousnesses intend is the same. In each case we call this meant same object the objective sense of these lived-experiences. To be sure, we are remaining for the time being with perception. The objective sense in our example is thus the perceptually appearing tree as such; it is meant in and through all perceptions in an evident manner. [376]

But now it is extremely important to avoid a misunderstanding. The perceived tree is naturally and simply there for us as an existing reality as we live naively in perception: at least in the normal case of perception which is presupposed here, namely, in

<sup>18</sup> *das Gewahrten*

which an experiential motivation for a doubt or a negation is not operative. Of course, this does not rule out the fact that we are still subject to deception. Were that not the case, if perception did not have its incontestable legitimacy that can also be demonstrated through further experience, the tree would exist as an actual part of nature. And *vice versa*: If the tree actually exists, perception has its demonstrable legitimacy in the form of possible acts of legitimating attestation. Both are evidently equivalent. Note now that the objective sense of perception is nothing less than or means the same thing as the actual perceptual object, the sense of perception of a tree nothing less than or means the same thing as the actual natural object, tree. When we speak of sense, we are not at all concerned whether or not the perceiver has carried out a legitimate perception that the perceiver or anyone else can ratify through new experiences. We only inquire into what perceptual lived-experiences bear in their very essence and what they as perceptions irrevocably bear within themselves, no matter how a judgment of legitimacy of it may run, attributing legitimacy to it or contesting its legitimacy. This is to say in other words that we do not inquire into whether this tree, the tree that the perceiver naively sees (and not merely given to the perceiver in a general manner, but posited by the perceiver in the certainty of its existence), has a place in nature, in the totality of realities that are to be posited with legitimacy.

It is a matter of indifference to us whether, in the realm of possible positings of the object to be grounded as legitimate, one of the positings comes about that accords or does not accord with our perception in its very sense-content. Be that as it may, it is beyond doubt that perception possesses in itself what appears to it as such, possesses its perceptually meant object, and that several perceptions with different perceptual contents accord within it in an evident manner and according to an evident identity. We can also put it in this way: Perception is an intentional lived-experience and has immanently, within itself, an intentional object as an inseparable sense. If we make a judgment about this sense, we thus judge something that is demonstrable in an evident manner and therefore has being, but immanent being, even if it also turns out later to be that the perception was a deceptive one.

By conceptually shifting our way of speaking, one speaks of the perceptual object only where one makes the claim to judge reality, like in all normal perceptual judgments about the surrounding things, and <not> merely about purely immanent objects, for example, about the perceived tree as such. No one would disagree <in this case> that nothing in reality corresponds to this tree that I see before me, for instance, in a dream as actually there and in the flesh.

What is designated there as the "tree" is obviously the immanent sense-content of perception itself, and a sense-content is not a tree, not a thing as such; that is, it is not a thing in factual nature. Therefore, a shift of significance has occurred here and—since all similar shifts are customarily alluded to in written form by quotation marks—I also make a habit of expressing the shift as the difference between tree in quotation marks and the tree simpliciter. It is quite similar to the way in which we say, for example, "Socrates is a philosopher," and at another time, "Socrates is a proper name." In the latter case we use quotation marks to show more clearly that we do not speak of Socrates himself, but of the word, Socrates.

Our considerations have thus yielded a fundamental distinction, initially in relation to the very special fundamental shape of consciousness that we call perception:

(1) The full, concrete lived-experience of perceiving. We did not have the occasion to speak of many things that belong here; for example, when it was a thematic perceiving, the moment of the directedness toward the object that results from the pure ego. In particular then,

(2) the variable manifold appearances, aspects necessarily belonging to every phase of perception, but combined in the continuity of perceiving through a peculiar synthesis, a kind of "coinciding," a kind of synthesis, insofar as through it the phenomenally distinguished and possibly completely distinguished aspects form a unity in the evident consciousness of the same object. I—the one experiencing—know about the being of this lived-experience and about the different modifications of it only by a reflective change in perspective through which I grasp it thematically and then judge it thematically.

(3) This same object, the object in quotation marks itself; that which is the same appearing object in each of these appearances, what each appearance means, the intentional object as such.

The introduction of the concept of sense is unclear. Sense is initially introduced as the intentional object, what is meant or intended as such. That is ambiguous, as is the object in quotation marks. When I carry out the phenomenological reduction, I have for every "act" its meant object, the intentional object that contains in it all modalities of being, which is "being."

But then it amounts to this schism between the intentional content and the intentional modal-character, which initially looks like a distinction between two components. The intentional content in this sense, the "material," the "quality," is also the "intentional object," what is merely presented<sup>19</sup>, what is qualified there modally.

That is an entirely different concept of sense and intentional object. All of that will come to light in the following exposition, but it must be pursued in the correct manner from the very start, and the distinctions <must> be made, even if they are only provisional ones.

## <PART 2:

### ANALYSES CONCERNING PASSIVE SYNTHESIS: TOWARD A TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC<sup>20</sup>

[3]

#### <SELF-GIVING IN PERCEPTION>

#### 5 <§1. Original Consciousness and the Perspectival Adumbration of Spatial Objects>

External perception is a constant pretension to accomplish something that, by its very nature, it is not in a position to accomplish. Thus, it harbors an essential contradiction, as it were.

10 My meaning will soon become clear to you once you intuitively grasp how the objective sense exhibits itself as unity <in> the unending manifolds of possible appearances; and seen upon closer inspection, how the continual synthesis, as a unity of coinciding, allows the same sense to appear, and how a consciousness of ever new possibilities of appearance constantly persists over against the factual, limited courses of appearance, transcending them.

Let us begin by noting that the aspect, the perspectival adumbration through which every spatial object invariably appears, only manifests the spatial object from one side. No matter how completely we may perceive a thing, it is never given in perception with the characteristics that qualify it and make it up as a sensible thing from all sides at once. We cannot avoid speaking of such and such sides of the object that are actually perceived. Every aspect, every continuity of single adumbrations, regardless how far this continuity may extend, offers us only sides. And to our mind this is not just a mere statement of fact: It is

<sup>19</sup> *das bloß Vorgestellte*

<sup>20</sup> Translator: The following pagination to the German text corresponds to Husserliana XL.



inconceivable that external perception would exhaust the sensible-material content of its perceived object; it is inconceivable that a perceptual object could be given in the entirety of its sensibly intuitive features, literally, from all sides at once in a self-contained perception.

[4]

Thus, this fundamental division between what is genuinely perceived and what is not genuinely perceived belongs to the primordial structure of the correlation: External perception and bodily "object." When we view the table, we view it from some particular side, and this side is thereby what is genuinely seen. Yet the table has still other sides. It has a non-visible back side, it has a non-visible interior; and these are actually indexes for a variety of sides, a variety of complexes of possible visibility. That is a very curious situation peculiar to the very essence of the matter at hand. For proper to the very sense of every perception is perception's perceived object as its objective sense<sup>21</sup>; that is, this thing, the table that is seen. But this thing is not [merely] the side genuinely seen in this moment; rather (according to the very sense of perception) the thing is precisely the full-thing that has still other sides, sides that are not brought to genuine perception in this perception, but that would be brought to genuine perception in other perceptions.

Generally speaking, perception is original consciousness. We have, however, a curious schism in external perception: Original consciousness is only possible in the form of an actually and genuinely original conscious-having of sides and a co-conscious-having of other sides that are precisely not originally there. I say co-conscious, since the non-visible sides are certainly also there somehow for consciousness, "co-meant" as co-present. But they do not appear as such, genuinely. They are not there like reproductive aspects are, as intuitions that exhibit them; we can nevertheless produce such intuitive presentifications<sup>22</sup> any time we like. Viewing the front side of the table we can, whenever we like, orchestrate an intuitive presentational course<sup>23</sup>, a reproductive

course of aspects through which the non-visible side of the thing would be presented to us. But here we are doing nothing more than presentifying a course of perceptions to ourselves in which we would see the object—passing from a perception to new ones—from ever new sides in original aspects. Still, that only happens in exceptional circumstances. It is clear that a non-intuitive pointing beyond or indicating is what characterizes the side actually seen as a mere side, and what provides for the fact that the side is not taken for the thing, but rather, that something transcending the side is intended in consciousness as perceived, by which precisely *that* is actually seen. Noetically speaking, perception is a mixture of an actual exhibiting that presents in an intuitive manner what is originally exhibited, and of an empty indicating that refers to possible new perceptions. In a noematic regard, what is perceived is given in adumbrations in such a way that the particular givenness refers to something else that is not-given, as what is not given belonging to the same object. We will have to understand the meaning of this.

[5]

Let us first note that every perception, or noematically speaking, every single aspect of the object in itself points to a continuity, to multifarious continua of possible new perceptions, and precisely to those in which the same object would show itself from ever new sides. In every moment of perceiving, the perceived is what it is in its mode of appearance [as] a system of referential implications<sup>24</sup> with an appearance-core upon which appearances have their hold. And it calls out to us, as it were, in these referential implications: "There is still more to see here, turn me so you can see all my sides, let your gaze run through me, draw closer to me, open me up, divide me up; keep on looking me over again and again, turning me to see all sides. You will get to know me like this, all that I am, all my surface qualities, all my inner sensible qualities," etc.

You understand what I mean to convey with this suggestive manner of speaking. In the particular present perception I have just

<sup>21</sup> *gegenständlicher Sinn*

<sup>22</sup> *Vergegenwärtigungen*. See translator's note, p. 110, fn. 64.

<sup>23</sup> *Vorstellungsverlauf*. Translator: The term, "*Vorstellung*" is translated throughout as "presentation," and not, for example, as representation. Whereas the latter term suggests an

active cognitive operation, "*Vorstellung*" is functional on a passive level of experience as well.

<sup>24</sup> *Verweisen*

these aspects and their modifications, and no others, just these aspects that are always limited ones. In each moment the objective sense is the same with respect to the object as such, the object that is meant; and it coincides with the continual course of momentary appearances, as for instance this table here. But what is identical is a constant  $x$ , a constant substrate of actually appearing table-moments, but also of indications<sup>25</sup> of moments not yet appearing. These indications are at the same time tendencies, indicative tendencies that push us toward the appearances not given. They are, however, not single indications, but entire indicative systems, indications functioning as systems of rays that point toward corresponding manifold systems of appearance. They are pointers into an emptiness since the non-actualized appearances are neither consciously intended as actual nor presentified. In other words, everything that genuinely appears is an appearing thing only by virtue of being intertwined and permeated with an intentional empty horizon, that is, by virtue of being surrounded by a halo of emptiness with respect to appearance. It is an emptiness that is not a nothingness, but an emptiness to be filled-out; it is a determinable indeterminacy. For the intentional horizon cannot be filled out in just any manner; it is a horizon of consciousness that itself has the fundamental trait of consciousness as the consciousness of something.

In spite of its emptiness, the sense of this halo of consciousness is a *prefiguring that prescribes a rule for the transition to new actualizing appearances*. Seeing the front side of the table, I am also conscious of the back side, along with everything else that is non-visible, through an empty pointing ahead, even though it be rather indeterminate. But no matter how indeterminate it may be, it is still a pointing ahead to a bodily shape, to a bodily coloring, etc. And only appearances that adumbrate things of that kind and that determine more closely what is indeterminate in the framework of this prefiguring can be integrated concordantly; only they can stay the course of an identical  $x$  of determination as the same, being determined here newly and more closely. This holds time and again for every perceptual phase of the streaming process

[6]

of perceiving, for every new appearance, only that the intentional horizon has altered and shifted. Proper to every appearing thing of each perceptual phase is a new empty horizon, a new system of determinable indeterminacy, a new system of progressing tendencies with corresponding possibilities of entering into determinately ordered systems of possible appearances, of possible ways that the aspects can run their course, together with horizons that are inseparably affiliated with these aspects. In the concordant coinciding of sense, they would bring the same object as being ever newly determined to actual, fulfilling givenness. To our mind, the aspects are nothing for themselves; they are appearances-of only through the intentional horizons that are inseparable from them.

We thereby distinguish further between an *inner horizon* and an *outer horizon* of the respective aspect-appearance. It should be recognized that the division applying to what is genuinely perceived and what is only co-present entails a distinction between determinations with respect to the content of the object [a] that are actually there, appearing in the flesh<sup>26</sup>, and [b] those that are still ambiguously prefigured in full emptiness. Let us also note that what actually appears is, in itself, also laden with a similar distinction. Indeed, the call resounds as well with respect to the side that is already actually seen: "Draw closer, closer still; now fix your eyes on me, changing your place, changing the position of your eyes, etc. You will get to see even more of me that is new, ever new partial colorings, etc. You will get to see structures of the wood that were not visible just a moment ago, structures that were formerly only viewed indeterminately and generally," etc. Thus, even what is already seen is laden with an anticipatory intention. It—what is already seen—is constantly there as a framework prefiguring something new; it is an  $x$  to be determined more closely. There is a constant process of anticipation, of preunderstanding. In addition to this inner horizon there are then also outer horizons, prefigurings for what is still devoid of any intuitively given framework that would require only more differentiated ways of sketching it in.

[7]

<sup>25</sup> *Hinweisen*<sup>26</sup> *leibhaft*

<§2. The Relationship of Fullness and Emptiness in the Perceptual Process and the Acquisition of Knowledge>

In order to gain a deeper understanding we must pay attention to how fullness and emptiness stand in relation to one another at each moment, how emptiness adopts fullness in the flow of perception, and how fullness becomes emptiness again. We must understand the structure of interconnections for every appearance as well as the structure that unites all series of appearances. In the continual progression of perception, as in the case of every perception, we have protentions that are continuously fulfilled by what occurs anew, occurring in the form of the primordial-impressional Now. And here as well. As each external perceiving progresses, the protention has the shape of continuous anticipations becoming fulfilled. That is to say, out of the indicative systems of the horizons, certain indicative lines are continually being actualized as expectations; the latter are continuously fulfilled in aspects that are being determined more closely.

In the previous lecture we approached the unity of each external perception from different directions. External perception is a temporal run-off of lived-experience where appearances concordantly pass into one another and form the unity of coincidence corresponding to the unity of sense. We came to understand this flux as a systematic network of progressive fulfillment of intentions that obviously, when viewed from the other side, goes hand in hand with an emptying of intentions that are already full. Every momentary phase of perception is in itself a network of partially full and partially empty intentions. For, in every phase we have genuine appearances, that is, a fulfilled intention, albeit only gradually fulfilled, since there remains an inner horizon that is unfulfilled and an inner horizon of indeterminacy that is still determinable. Moreover, proper to every phase is a completely empty outer horizon that tends toward fulfillment and, in the transition toward a definite direction of progress, strives toward it in the manner of empty anticipation.

Viewed more precisely, we now have to describe the process of perception as a process of acquiring knowledge; and we have to

distinguish further (in the following manner) between fulfillment and the process of determining more closely. While the empty horizon—both inner and outer—fashions its next fulfillment in the march of perception, this fulfillment does not merely consist in tracing over in intuition the prefigured sense of which one is empty conscious. Indeterminacy, as we said, belongs essentially to the empty premonition which is, as it were, the presentiment of what is to come. We also spoke of determinable indeterminacy. Indeterminacy is a primordial form of generality whose nature it is to be fulfilled in the coincidence of sense only by "specification."

As long as this specification itself has the character of indeterminacy (the specific indeterminacy as opposed to the general indeterminacy just mentioned), it can attain further specification, etc., in new steps. But now we should consider that this process of fulfillment, which is a specifying fulfillment, is also a process of knowing something more closely; it is not only a momentary acquisition of knowledge, but at the same time a process of acquisition [that takes place] within knowledge that is abiding and that becomes habitual. This will become clearer shortly.

Let us note in advance that the primordial place of this accomplishment is the continuously co-functioning retention. First, let us recall that the continually progressing fulfillment is at the same time a continually progressing emptying. For, as soon as a new side becomes visible, a side that has just been visible gradually disappears from sight, becoming finally completely non-visible. But what has become non-visible is not cognitively lost for us. Thematic perception does not merely drive at continually possessing some new aspect of the object that would be intuitively grasped from moment to moment, as if what was formerly given would slip away from the grasp of [perceptual] interest. Rather, in passing over the object, perception drives at fashioning a unity of ordinary acquisitions of knowledge through which the object, according to its specific content, would reach an original acquisition, and through it would become an abiding epistemic



possession.<sup>27</sup> And in fact we understand the original acquisition of knowledge by observing the following situation: The process of determining more closely, which comes about with fulfillment, imparts afresh a specific moment of sense. While it vanishes from the field of genuine perception in the progression to new perceptions, it remains held retentionally. (That already takes place prethematically, already in background perceiving. In thematic perception, retention has the thematic character of keeping-a-hold-of.) Accordingly, the empty horizon (into which what is new enters by virtue of retention) has a character other than the empty horizon peculiar to the expanse of perception, that is, before the latter originally appeared. Having already once seen the back side of an unfamiliar object and, turning back to perceive the front side, the empty premonition of the back side now has a determinate prefiguring that it did not have previously. The unfamiliar object is thereby transformed in the perceptual process into a familiar object; in the end, I have exactly what I had started with, namely, a perspectival appearance. And if the object has moved entirely out of our field of perception, then we have an altogether completely empty retention of it. Nevertheless, we still have the entire epistemic acquisition of it, and we still have a hold on it in thematic perceiving. Our empty-consciousness now has an articulated, systematic sense that is sketched in—something that did not exist previously and especially at the beginning of the perception. What was previously a mere framework of sense, a wide ranging generality, is now specified meaningfully in an articulated manner; to be sure, it awaits further experience in order to take on still richer epistemic contents as contents of determination. If I turn back again to the perceptions of the earlier determination, they will issue in the consciousness of recognition, in the consciousness: "I already know all that." Now a mere bringing to intuition takes place, and with it, a fulfilling confirmation of the empty intentions, but no longer the process of determining more closely.

[10]

<sup>27</sup> Every content of an unaltered thing can be reached time and again through perception; I can go around the surface; ideally the thing can be divided, and can be viewed time and again from all surface sides, etc.

### <§3. The Possibility of Our Acquired Knowledge Being Freely at Our Disposal>

By acquiring knowledge originally, perception also acquires permanent, lasting possession of what it has acquired; it is a possession that is at our disposal any time. How is something freely at our disposal? Although this thing that is already familiar to me has become empty, it is freely at my disposal insofar as the empty retention remaining behind can be freely filled up at any time; it can be made present at any time by a re-perception in the sense of a re-cognition. By walking around it, drawing nearer to it, touching it with my hands, etc., I can once more see all the sides that are already familiar to me; I can experience them again, they are ready for perception. And this holds true likewise for the next time. The fact that a re-perception, a renewed perception of the same thing, is possible for transcendence characterizes the fundamental trait of transcendent perception, alone through which an abiding world is there for us, a reality that can be pre-given for us and can be freely at our disposal.

To this we must add yet another essential observation. If we have become familiar with a thing and a second thing appears in our field of vision, and if, with respect to the side genuinely seen, it accords with the earlier and familiar thing, then according to an essential law of consciousness (by virtue of an inner coinciding with the earlier thing awakened through the "association of similarity"), the new thing receives the entire epistemic prefiguring from the earlier one. It is apperceived, as we say, with the same non-visible qualities as the previous one. And even this prefiguring, this acquisition of an inner tradition, is also freely at our disposal in the form of actualizing perception.

But how does this having something freely at our disposal look now upon closer inspection? What makes possible the free foray into our world that is thoroughly interwoven with anticipations; what makes all existing knowledge and new knowledge possible? Let us privilege here the normal and basic instance of the constitution of external existence, namely, the constitution of unaltered spatial things. Whether alterations of things can occur without being perceived and yet can be known in all their

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unperceived elements in a variety of perceptions and experiences that follow—this is a theme for a clarification existing on a higher level, a theme that already presupposes clarifying the possibility of knowing existence in rest.

Thus, in order to understand at least this basic feature of the constitutive problematic, we ask what having acquisitions of knowledge freely at our disposal looks like—acquisitions I already have, however incompletely; what does it look like specifically in the case of unaltered thingliness? What makes it possible?

From what we have said above, we see that every perception *implicit* invokes an entire perceptual system; every appearance that arises in it implies an entire system of appearance, specifically in the form of intentional inner and outer horizons. We cannot even imagine a mode of appearance in which the appearing object would be given completely. No final presentation in the flesh<sup>28</sup> is ever reached in the mode of appearance as if it would present the complete, exhausted self of the object. Every appearance implies a *plus ultra* in the empty horizon. And since perception does indeed pretend to give the object [completely] in the flesh in every appearance, it in fact and by its very nature constantly pretends to accomplish more than it can accomplish. In a peculiar way, every perceptual givenness is a constant mixture of familiarity and unfamiliarity, a givenness that points to new possible perceptions that would issue in familiarity. And that will continue to hold in a new sense, differently from what has come to light up to now.

Let us now take a look at the formation of unity through coinciding as it pertains to sense by examining the transition of appearances, for instance, when approaching or walking around an object, or in eye movement. The fundamental relationship in this dynamic transition is that of intention and fulfillment. The empty pointing ahead acquires its corresponding fullness. It corresponds to the more or less rich prefigured possibilities; but since its nature is determinable indeterminacy, it also brings, together with the fulfillment, a closer determination. Thus, here we have a new "primordial-institution," or as we can say here again, a primordial-impression, since a moment of primordial originality emerges.

What is already given to conscious in a primordial-impressional manner points to new modes of appearance through its halo which, when occurring, emerge as partly confirming, partly determining more closely. By virtue of inner intentions—unfulfilled and those now in the process of being fulfilled—what has already appeared itself becomes enriched. In this progression, moreover, the empty outer horizon that was intertwined with the appearances achieves its next fulfillment, at least a partial one. The part of the horizon that remains unfulfilled passes over into the horizon of the new appearance, and it goes on like this continually. That aspect of the object which has already appeared is partially lost again as it moves away from givenness, i.e., the appearance; the visible becomes non-visible again. But it is not lost. I remain conscious of it retentionally and in such a way that the empty horizon of the appearance present at this time receives a new prefiguring that points in a determinate manner to what has already been given earlier as co-present. Having seen the back side and having turned back to the front side, the perceptual object has kept a determination of sense for me; likewise in emptiness, it points to what was previously seen. They all belong now abidingly to the object. The process of perception is a constant process of acquiring knowledge that holds on to what was acquired epistemically in sense; it thereby fashions an ever newly altered and ever more enriched sense. During the ongoing perceptual process, this sense is added to the grasped object itself in its presumed [complete] presentation in the flesh.

Now, it depends upon the direction of the perceptual processes as to which lines are brought to fulfillment from the system of unfulfilled intentions, that is, which continuous series of possible appearances will be realized out of the entire system of possible appearances of the object. Advancing along this line, the empty intentions are transformed respectively into expectations. Once this line is pursued, the series of appearances run their course in the sense of continuously arousing and steadily fulfilling expectations that stem from the current kinestheses, while the remaining empty horizons are left in dead potentiality.

Lastly, we still have to mention that the integral harmony [taking place] in the coinciding of adumbration-appearances,

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<sup>28</sup> *Leibhaftigkeit*

which pass over into one another by way of intention and fulfillment, not only concerns the appearances taken as wholes, but also all their moments and parts that can be differentiated. Thus, there is something corresponding to every filled spatial point of the object in the entire series of appearances; they continuously pass into one another such that this point in the appearance exhibits itself as a moment of the appearing spatial form.

If we ask, finally, what gives unity within every temporal point of the momentary appearance—unity considered as the entire aspect in which the particular side is exhibited—we will also come across reciprocal intentions that are fulfilled simultaneously and reciprocally. The transition of appearances following one after the other are all in dynamic displacement, enrichment and impoverishment.

The object appearing constantly new, constantly different, is constituted as the same in these exceedingly intricate and wondrous systems of intention and fulfillment that make up the appearances. But the object is never finished, never fixed completely.

We must point here to a side of the noematic constitution that is essential for the objectivation of the perceptual object, [namely,] to the side of kinaesthetic motivation. We mentioned in passing time and again that the courses of appearance go hand in hand with the orchestrating movements of the lived-body<sup>29</sup>. But that must not remain something that we only mention haphazardly in passing. The lived-body is constantly there, functioning as an organ of perception; and here it is also, in itself, an entire system of compatibly harmonizing organs of perception. The lived-body is in itself characterized as the perceiving-lived-body. We recognize it then purely as a lived-body, subjectively movable and in perceiving activity, as subjectively self-moving. In this regard it does not come into consideration as a perceived spatial thing, but rather with respect to the system of so-called "movement-sensations" that run their course during perception, in eye movements, head movements, etc. And they do not simply run

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parallel to the flow of appearances there; rather the kinaesthetic series under consideration and the perceptual appearances are related to one another through consciousness. By viewing an object I am conscious of the position of my eyes and at the same time—in the form of a novel systematic empty horizon—I am conscious of the entire system of possible eye positions that rest at my disposal. And now, what is seen in the given eye position is so enmeshed with the entire system that I can say with certainty that if I were to move my eyes in this direction or in that, specific visual appearances would accordingly run their course in a determinate order. If I were to let the eye movements run this way or that in another direction, different series of appearances would accordingly run their course as expected. This holds likewise for head movements in the system of these possibilities of movement, and again for the movement of walking, etc., that I might bring into play.

Every series of kinaestheses proceeds in its own way, in a manner totally different from the series of sensible data. It runs its course in such a way as to be freely at my disposal, free to inhibit, free to orchestrate once again, as an originally subjective realization. Thus, the system of lived-body movements is in fact characterized with respect to consciousness in a special way as a subjectively free system. I run through this system in the consciousness of the free "I can." It may happen that I involuntarily dwell upon something, that for instance my eyes involuntarily turn this way or that. But at any time, I can capriciously pursue such a path of movement or whatever path of movement I like. As soon as I have an appearance of the thing in such a situation, a system of internally coherent manifold appearances of the same thing is thereby prefigured in the original consciousness of the sequence of appearances.

A propos the appearances I am not free: When I undertake a series of movements in the free system, "I move myself," the appearances that are arriving are already prefigured. The appearances form dependent systems. Only as dependent upon kinaestheses can they continually pass into one another and constitute a unity of one sense. Only by running their course in these ways do they unfold their intentional indicators. Only

<sup>29</sup> *Leib*



through this interplay of independent and dependent variables is what appears constituted as a transcendent perceptual object, precisely as an object that is more than what we directly perceive, as an object that can completely vanish from my perception and yet still persist. We can also say it is constituted as such only by the fact that its appearances are kinaesthetically motivated, and consequently that it is in my freedom, in accordance with the knowledge that I have acquired, to let the appearances run their course randomly as original appearances in their system of concordance. Through the appropriate eye movements and other lived-bodily movements I can, in the case of a familiar object, turn back at any time to the old appearances that give me back the object from the same sides. Or, by freely returning to the appropriate place, I can once again perceive and identify the object no longer perceived. [15]

Thus, in every perceptual process we see a constitutive duet being played: (1) The system of my free possibilities of movement is intentionally constituted as a practical, kinaesthetic horizon. This system is actualized each time I run through single paths of movements with the character of familiarity, that is, of fulfillment. We are not only thereby conscious of every eye position that we have at the moment, every position of the thing-body as the momentary sensation of movement, but we are also conscious of them as a place in a system of places; thus we are conscious of them with an empty horizon which is a horizon of freedom. (2) Every visual sensation or visual appearance that arises in the visual field, every tactile appearance that arises in the field of touch is ordered with respect to consciousness, to the current situation of the consciousness of the parts of the lived-body, creating a horizon of further possibilities that are ordered together, creating a horizon of possible series of appearances belonging to the freely possible series of movement.

In relation to the constitution of transcendent temporality we should note here that every path of actualization that we would *de facto* enter down in realizing this freedom would yield continuous series of appearances of the object. All of these series would exhibit the object for one and the same expanse of time; they would all exhibit the same object in the same duration, only from

different sides. In accordance with the sense of the constituted object, all determinations that would be known through this process would be co-existent.

5 <§4. The Relation of *esse* and *percipi* in Immanent and Transcendent Perception> [16]

10 All this holds only for transcendent objects. An immanent object, like a lived-experience of black, offers itself as a lasting object, and in a certain way through "appearances" as well. But it only does so like any temporal object in general. The temporally extending duration requires the constant modification of the modes of givenness in accordance with the modes of appearance of the temporal orientation. Now, the spatial object is also a temporal object, so the same holds for it, too. But it still has a second, special way to appear. By directing our attention to the temporal fullness and especially to the primordial-impressional phases, we come up against the radical difference between the appearance of transcendent and immanent objects. The immanent object has only one possible way to be given in the original in every Now, and therefore every mode of the past also has only one single series of temporal modifications: to wit, that of presentification, with the changing past objects being constituted in it. But the spatial object has infinitely many ways [to be given in the original] since it can appear in the Now, that is, in an original way from its different sides. Though it appears *de facto* from this side, it could have been able to appear from other sides, and accordingly every one of its past phases have infinitely many ways in which it could exhibit its past fulfilled points of time. We can also say: The concept of appearance has a new and unique sense for the transcendent object.

30 If we consider exclusively the Now phase, then in the case of the immanent object, appearance and that which appears cannot be separated in the Now phase. What arises anew in the original is the particular, new black-phase itself, and without being exhibited. And appearing means here nothing other than a to-be devoid of any exhibiting that points beyond, and a to-be-conscious-of in the original.

5 But on the other hand, with respect to the transcendent object, it  
is clear that the thing of which we are conscious in the flesh as a  
thing in the new Now is given to consciousness only in and  
through an appearance; that is, exhibiting and that which is  
exhibited, adumbration and that which is adumbrated are to be  
distinguished. If we exchange the noematic attitude that we have  
privileged up to now with the noetic attitude in which we turn our  
reflective regard toward the lived-experience and its "intimately  
inherent"<sup>30</sup> components, we can also say that a transcendent object  
such as a thing can only be constituted when an immanent content  
is constituted as substratum. Now, this immanent content for its  
part is substituted, as it were, for the peculiar function of the  
"adumbration," of an exhibiting appearance, of a being exhibited  
in and through it. When we do not regard the appearing thing-  
object, but the optical lived-experience itself, the thing-appearance  
that arises anew in each Now—as we say, the optical  
appearance—is a complex of surface color moments that are  
extended in this way or that; these surface color moments are  
immanent data, and we are thus conscious of them in themselves  
just as originally as, say, red or black. The manifold changing red-  
data in which, e.g., any surface side of a red cube and its unaltered  
red is exhibited, are immanent data.

20 Yet, on the other hand, the matter does not rest with this mere  
immanent existence. In the immanent data, something is exhibited  
in the unique manner of adumbration, which the immanent data  
themselves are not; in the visual field, a sameness, an identical  
spatially extended body-color is exhibited in the alteration of the  
immanently sensed colors. All the noematic moments that we, in  
the natural attitude, see contained in the object and as related to it,  
are constituted by means of the immanent data of sensation, and  
by virtue of the consciousness that, as it were, animates them. In  
this regard we speak of apprehension as of transcendent

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<sup>30</sup> Translator: "really." Whereas "real" for Husserl designates the type of existence or "reality" peculiar to transcendent things, "really" for Husserl depicts what is actual, *wirklich*, without it sharing the ontological status of a real transcendent entity, *res*. Accordingly, *really* concerns the intimate immanence of consciousness. What is "irreal" from the perspective of the "real" can also be "irreally" from the perspective of the "really"; this would bear on what Husserl understood generally as "noema" or "sense."

5 apperception: It characterizes consciousness' accomplishment  
which is to bestow on the mere immanent contents of sensible  
data, on the so-called data of sensation or hyletic data, the function  
of exhibiting something objectively "transcendent." It is  
dangerous here to speak of represented and representing, of  
interpreting data of sensation, or to speak of a function that  
outwardly signifies through this "interpreting."<sup>31</sup> Adumbrating,  
exhibiting in data of sensation, is totally different from an  
interpretation through signs.<sup>32</sup>

10 "Immanent" objectlike formations, accordingly, are for their  
part not given to consciousness through apperception. In their  
case, "being given to consciousness in the original" and "being,"  
"percept" and "esse" converge. And indeed for every Now.  
However, they are to a large extent bearers of apperceptive  
functions, at which time something non-immanent is exhibited in  
and through them. Now the *esse* (for transcendent objects) is in  
principle distinguished from the *percept*. In every Now of external  
perception we do have an original consciousness, but genuine  
perceiving in this Now, that is, that feature in genuine perceiving  
that is primordial-impressional (and not simply retentional  
consciousness of the past phases of the perceptual object) is a  
conscious-having of what is being adumbrated *originaliter*.<sup>33</sup> This  
is not a pure and simple having of the object in which conscious-  
having and being coincide; rather, it is a mediate consciousness,  
provided that only one apperception is had immediately, a store of  
sense-data referring to kinesthetic data, and an apperceptive  
apprehension through which an exhibiting appearance is  
constituted; in and through it, we are conscious of the transcendent  
object as adumbrating or exhibiting *originaliter*. Time and again  
we have the following situation in the process of ongoing  
perceiving in every Now: In principle, the external object is never  
purely and simply had in its original ipseity. It appears in principle

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<sup>31</sup> "durch dieses 'Deuten' hinauszuwendenden Funktion'"

<sup>32</sup> *significatives Deuten*

<sup>33</sup> Perception is original consciousness of an individual object, of a temporal object, and for every Now we have in perception its primordial-impression in which the object in the Now, in its momentary point of originality, is originally grasped. But it must be shown that original adumbration necessarily goes hand in hand with apperception.

only through apperceptive exhibition and in ever new exhibitions; as the latter progress, they bring something new to the original exhibition from its empty horizons.

Yet, it is more important for our ends to recognize as inconceivable that something like a spatial object, which gets its original sense genuinely by means of external perception as adumbrating perception, would be given through immanent perception, be it human or superhuman intellect. But from this it follows as inconceivable that a spatial object and everything like it (for instance, an object of the world in the natural sense), could be exhibited in a discrete, self-contained manner from one point of time to the next, along with its entire ensemble of features (as completely determined) that make up its temporal content in this Now. In this respect we also speak of adequate givenness as opposed to inadequate givenness. To express this theologically and in a drastic manner, worse service cannot be rendered God than conceding him the ability to make an odd number even and to transform every absurdity into truth. Inadequate modes of givenness belong essentially to the spatial structure of things; any other way of givenness is simply absurd. We can never think the given object without empty horizons in any phase of perception and, what amounts to the same thing, without apperceptive adumbration. With adumbration there is simultaneously a pointing beyond what is exhibiting itself in a genuine sense. Genuine exhibition is itself, again, not a pure and simple possession on the model of immanence with its *esse = percipi*; instead, it is a partially fulfilled intention that contains unfulfilled indications that point beyond. The originality of exhibiting the transcendent thing in the flesh necessarily implies that the object as sense has the originality of apperceptive fulfillment and that this harbors inseparably a mixture of actually fulfilling and not yet filled moments of sense. This is the case whether they be moments of sense only prefigured according to the general structure, and apart from that open indeterminate and possible moments, or whether they be moments already distinguished by being specially prefigured. This is why the talk of inadequation as a haphazard lack that a higher intellect could overcome is an unsuitable way of speaking, indeed totally preposterous.

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We can formulate a principle here that will become much clearer in our future analyses. Whenever we speak of objects, no matter what category of objects they may be, the sense of this manner of speaking about objects originally stems from perceptions as lived-experiences originally constituting sense, and therefore an objectlike formation. But the constitution of an object as sense is an accomplishment of consciousness that is in principle unique for every basic type of object. Perception does not consist in staring blankly at something lodged in consciousness, inserted there by some strange wonder as if something were first there and then consciousness would somehow embrace it. Rather, for every imaginable ego-subject, every objectlike existence with a specific content of sense is an accomplishment of consciousness. It is an accomplishment that must be new for every novel object. Every basic type of object in principle requires a different intentional structure. An object that *is*, but is not and in principle could not be an object of a consciousness, is pure non-sense.

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Every possible object of a possible consciousness is however also an object for a possible originally giving consciousness; and this we call, at least for individual objects, "perception." It is absurd to demand of a material object a perception that has the general structure of an immanent perception, and conversely, to demand of an immanent object a perception that has the structure of external perception. Both sense-giving and sense require one another essentially—and this concerns the essential typicality of their correlative structures.

In this way it is the nature of originally transcendent sense-giving, which external perception carries out, that the accomplishment of this original sense-giving is never finished as one expanse of perception progresses to another and so forth in whatever manner the process of perception may advance. This accomplishment does not simply consist in bringing to intuition something new in a fixed pre-given sense, as if the sense would already be prefigured in a finished manner from the very beginning; rather in the process of perceiving, the sense itself is continually cultivated and is genuinely so in steady transformation, constantly leaving open the possibility of new transformations.



Let us note here that in the sense of concordantly and synthetically progressing perception, we can always distinguish between an unceasingly changing sense and an identical sense running through the changing sense. Every phase of perception has its sense insofar as it has the object given in the How of the determination of the original exhibition and in the How of the horizon. This sense is flowing; it is a new sense in every phase. But the unity of the substrate *x*, which holds sway in a steady coinciding, and which is determined ever more richly—this unity of the object itself, that is, everything that the process of perception and all further possible perceptual processes determine in it and would determine in it—this unity runs through this flowing sense, through all the modes, “object in the How of determination.” In this way, an idea that lies in infinity belongs to every external perception, the idea of the completely determined object, of the object that would be determined through and through, known through and through, where every one of its determinations would be purified of all indeterminacy, and where the full determination itself would be devoid of any *plus ultra* with respect to what is still to be determined, what is still remaining open.

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I spoke of an idea lying in infinity, that is, of an unattainable idea. For, the essential structure of perception itself excludes a perception (as a self-contained process of courses of appearance, continually passing into one another) that would furnish absolute knowledge of the object; it excludes such a knowledge in which the tension would collapse between the object in the How of determination (which is changing and relative, remaining incomplete), and the object itself. For evidently, the possibility of a *plus ultra* is in principle never ruled out. It is thus the idea of the absolute self of the object and of its absolute and complete determination, or as we can also put it, of its absolute individual essence. In relation to this infinite idea which is to be seen, but which as such is not realizable, every perceptual object in the epistemic process is a flowing approximation. We always have the external object in the flesh (we see, grasp, seize it), and yet it is always at an infinite distance mentally. What we do grasp of it pretends to be its essence; and it is it too, but it remains so only in

an incomplete approximation, an approximation that grasps something of it, but in doing so it also constantly grasps into an emptiness that cries out for fulfillment. What is constantly familiar is constantly unfamiliar, and from the very beginning all knowledge seems to be hopeless. To be sure, I said “seems.” And we do not wish to commit ourselves here straight away to a hasty skepticism.

(Of course, the situation is entirely different with immanent objects. Perception constitutes them and appropriates them in their absoluteness. They are not constituted by constant sense modification in the sense of an approximation; only insofar as they become in a future are they laden with protensions and potential indeterminacies. But what has been constituted as present in the Now is an absolute self that does not have any unfamiliar sides.)

We have rejected a hasty skepticism. At all events, we should have initially made the following distinction in this regard. Given that an object is perceived and that we progressively come to know it in the perceptual process, we had to distinguish [a] the particular empty horizon that is prefigured by the process running its course and that is attached to the momentary perceptual phase with its prefiguring, and [b] a horizon of empty possibilities without this prefiguring. Prefiguring means that an empty intuition is there that provides its general framework of sense. It belongs to the essence of such a prefiguring intention that when pursuing a suitable, appropriate direction of perception this would have to occur: [either] the process of determining more closely, which is a fulfilling process, or as we shall address later as a counterpart, disappointment, annulment of sense, and crossing out. There are also, however, partial horizons without such a firm prefiguring. In other words, aside from definite prefigured possibilities, there are counter-possibilities for which there are no support and which remain constantly open.

Speaking purely in terms of the sense-giving process of perception itself, we can say, for example, that when something like an illuminated appearance, a shooting star and the like flashes in my visual field, e.g., while gazing at a star-studded sky, it is a completely empty possibility that is not prefigured in the sense,

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but is left open by it. So, if we confine ourselves to the positive sense-giving process of perception together with its positive prefiguring, the question we pose is both understandable and obvious: whether no enduring and ultimately abiding self of the object is even attainable in going from the non-intuitable empty prefiguring to the fulfilling process of determining it more closely; put differently, whether not only newer and newer objectlike features can enter into the horizon of perception, but whether, in the process of determining more closely, even these features already grasped imply a further determinability, *in infinitum*, hence themselves continually and constantly maintaining the character of the unfamiliar  $x$  that can never gain final determinacy. Is then perception an "exchange" that can in principle never be "cashed in" or "realized" by new, similar exchanges, whose realization leads again to exchange and likewise *in infinitum*? The fulfillment of an intention is carried out by being exhibited in the flesh, to be sure, with empty inner horizons. But is there nothing at all in what has already become exhibited in the flesh that would bring with it a definitiveness so that in fact we are left stuck in an ostensibly empty business of exchange?

20 ◀We feel that it cannot be so, and in fact looking more deeply into the structure of the series of perception, we come up against the peculiarity that is summoned to solve the difficulty initially for praxis and its intuitive sensible world. Also in the case of

25 incomplete fulfillment, that is, in the case of fulfillment laden with indications, it is the nature of genuine appearances as fulfillments of prefigured intentions to point ahead to ideal limits as goals of fulfillment that would be reached by continuous series of fulfillment. But that does not happen right away for the entire

30 object, but rather for the features that have already come to actual intuition in each case. In view of what is genuinely exhibited in the appearance, every appearance belongs systematically to some type of series of appearances to be realized in kinaesthetic freedom in which at least some moment of the shapes would

35 achieve its optimal givenness, and therefore its true self.

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The phantom<sup>34</sup> as a sensibly qualified bodily surface functions as a basic frame for the object of perception. The bodily surface can exhibit itself in continually diverse appearances, and likewise every partial aspect that comes into relief. For each of them we have distant appearances and near appearances. And again, inside each of these spheres we have more favorable and less favorable appearances, and in ordered series we arrive at optima. In this sense, the distant appearance of a thing and a manifold of distant appearances already point back to near appearances in which the form given at first glance<sup>35</sup> and its fullness appear at best in the total overview. This [optimal] form itself given at first glance, which we have for instance when looking at a house from a well chosen standpoint, gives a framework for sketching in further optimal determinations that <would be brought about by> drawing closer, where only single parts would be given, but then, optimally. The thing itself in its saturated fullness is an idea located in a sense belonging to consciousness and in the manner of its intentional structures; and it is, as it were, a  $s$ -<system> of all optima that would be won by sketching in the optimal frameworks. Thematic interest that lives itself out in perceptions is guided by practical interests in our scientific life. And that thematic interest comes to a rest when certain optimal appearances, in which the thing shows so much of its ultimate self as this practical interest demands, are won for the respective interest. Or rather, the thematic interest as practical interest prefigures a relative self: What suffices as practical counts as the self. Thus the house itself and in its true being, and specifically with respect to its pure bodily thingly nature, is quickly given optimally, i.e., experienced as complete for that person who regards it as a buyer or a seller. For the physicist and the chemist, such ways of experience would seem completely superficial and miles away from its true being.

30 I can only say in a word that all such highly ramified intentional analyses, which are difficult in themselves, belong for their part to

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<sup>34</sup> Translator: The "phantom" for Husserl is the "schema" of the concrete material object, that is, examined without regard to a possible nexus of causality.

<sup>35</sup> *oberflächliche Gestalt*

a universal genesis of consciousness, and here especially in the genesis of the consciousness of a transcendent reality. If the theme of constitutive analyses is to make understandable how perception brings about its sense-giving and how the object is constituted through all empty intending as always only exhibiting optimal appearance-sense in a relative manner, and to make this understandable from perception's unique intentional constitution according to intimately inherent components of lived-experience itself, according to the intentional noema and sense, then it is the theme of genetic analyses to make understandable how, in the development proper to the structure of every stream of consciousness, which is at the same time the development of the ego—how those intricate intentional systems develop, through which finally an external world can appear to consciousness and to the ego.

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<DIVISION 1:  
MODALIZATION>

<Chapter 1:

THE MODE OF NEGATION>

5 <§5. Disappointment as an Occurrence that Runs Counter to the  
Synthesis of Fulfillment>

We must now expand our insights in a new direction. Up until now we have investigated the continuous, unitary courses of perception in which the unity of an object is maintained concordantly. This took place by virtue of the unanimity of a coinciding that bestows fulfillment upon the intentions, namely, the intentions that are aroused as perception progresses. The process was a constant process of expanding knowledge. This expansion proceeds through discrete syntheses of perception in such a way that a thing, already fairly familiar through a previous perception, occasionally gets perceived again under a simultaneous remembering of previous perceptions, that is, in straightforward recognition. As we can easily see, the new acquisition of knowledge continues the previous acquisition with respect to new sides. But all of this concerns syntheses of fulfillment, that is, of concordance.

There is, however, an occurrence that runs counter to fulfillment, namely, disappointment; there is an occurrence that runs counter to determining more closely, namely, determining otherwise. Instead of the acquired knowledge being preserved and enriched further, it can be placed in question, annulled. In short, there is something like the difference between the modalized consciousness of being in distinction to the originally non-modalized consciousness of being, and we are now in a position of gaining deeper insights into the structure of the modalities of



being and their constitution, and noetically speaking, insights into the structure of perceptual belief and its modifications such as "doubt," "supposition," "negation," etc.

As we know, the intentional systems occurring in the normal case of perception that we have described (noetically speaking, the apprehensions apperceiving the respective sensation-complexes) have the character of actual or potential expectations. That is, if in perceiving I instigate a kinaesthetic series, for instance, a certain head movement, the appearances will run their course in a motivated succession such that they accord to my expectation. Thus, in the normal case of perception, all fulfillment progresses as the fulfillment of expectations. These are systematized expectations, systems of rays of expectations which, in being fulfilled, also become enriched; that is, the empty sense becomes richer in sense, fitting into the way in which the sense was prefigured.

But every expectation can also be disappointed, and disappointment essentially presupposes partial fulfillment; without a certain measure of unity maintaining itself in the progression of perceptions, the unity of the intentional lived-experience would crumble. Yet despite the unity of the perceptual process occurring with this abiding, unitary content of sense, a break does indeed take place, and the lived-experience of "otherwise" springs forth.

There is also a lived-experience of "otherwise" without a break, a disappointment of a regular style, which by virtue of its regularity can be anticipated and which thus can even be prefigured in the empty horizon. In other words, there is a steady consciousness of alteration whose phenomenological analysis is fundamental for [understanding] the constitution of a change. Change is a continuous process of becoming otherwise; however, this becoming otherwise maintains unity, namely, a unity of the object remaining concordantly the same as the substratum of its continuous alterations in and through which it becomes otherwise, and in and through which it becomes otherwise time and again.

Let us now already assume a unitary object, be it unchanged or changed, that first abides "concordantly" in the continuity of the original experience, "getting known" better and better. But then all of a sudden, and contrary to all expectation, green rather than red

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shows up on the back side that is now becoming visible; instead of the ball-shape indicated by the front side, an indentation or something angular appears, etc. Prior to the ensuing perception of the back sides, perception in its living flow was intentionally prefigured toward red and ball-shaped; perception's referential indicators were determinately directed toward red and ball-shaped. And rather than being fulfilled in this sense, and thereby being ratified, the intentional prefigurings and referential indicators became disappointed. The general framework of sense is retained and fulfilled, and only at this point, only after we have these intentions, does "something else" occur: a conflict between the intentions still living, and the contents of sense being newly instituted intuitively along with their more or less full intentions.

We have a system of continual concordance once again insofar as the insertion of this new framework into the old one restores concordance. But in a partial system we have a superimposing group of intentions that exist in the relationship of disappointment with those upon which they superimpose. After we saw the green and the indentation, and after they lasted concordantly during the course of corresponding appearances, the entire perceptual sense gets altered, and not merely the sense in the current expanse of perception; rather, from it the alteration of sense radiates back to the preceding perception and all its previous appearances. They are reinterpreted in their very sense as "green" and "indented."

Naturally, this does not take place in explicit acts; but if we were to go back actively, we would necessarily find the altered interpretation explicitly and consciously, that is, the continual concordance that has been produced. But layered beneath this is something that does not accord with it, and actually what does not accord pertains to the entire series that has flowed-off insofar as we are still conscious of the old apprehension in memory. But it especially comes to life at that place where "green" and "indented" emerged. Occurring here is not only the phenomenon of conflict involving both contrary determinations, ball-shaped and indented, red and green; rather, the "it is not ball-shaped and not red," the empty red-intention, is "annulled," negated by the superimposing "green," that is, by the full superimposing green-perception; and with it the substratum itself, the thing itself, which

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in the original perceptual series bore the sense determination "red" at the corresponding place of its shape, is in this respect crossed out and at the same time reinterpreted: It is "otherwise."

# <§6. Partial Fulfillment—Conflict through Unexpected Sense [28]

Data—Restored Concordance><sup>36</sup>

Our<sup>37</sup> considerations had taken a new turn in the last lecture. The study of the structure of perceptions with respect to their intentional accomplishments enabled us to gain deeper insights into the essence of modes of being and into the way in which they are intentionally constituted. In the normal case of perception, the perceived object gives itself as being in a straightforward manner, as existing actually. But that "being" can be transformed into "dubitable" or "questionable," into "possible," into "supposed," and then "non-being" can also occur here, and in contrast to this, the emphatic "it really is," the "it is indeed so." Correlatively, (i.e., in a noetic regard), one speaks of a believing inherent in perceiving; from time to time we already speak here of judging, that is, of judicative perception. In the case of normal perception—what is usually and straightforwardly meant by "perception"—even if the object is believed to exist with certainty, this belief can pass over into doubt, into taking-something-to-be-possible, into rejecting, and again into an affirming active acceptance. What one so hotly debated under the rubric of the theory of judgment in the newer logical movement since Mill, Brentano, and Sigwart is at its core nothing other than the phenomenological clarification of the essence and logical function of the certainty of being and modalities of being. Here as everywhere, the phenomenological method alone brought to light the problems of pure consciousness and their genuine sense. That is, it concerns understanding how consciousness necessarily equips sense with modalities of being in every sense-giving that it carries out, and it concerns understanding which feature of

constituting consciousness is to be made responsible for this accomplishment. Here the source of really radical clarifications is perception; and for reasons that will become clearer below, transcendent perception is privileged where these clarifications are concerned. What we have said holds even though the specific concept of judgment, the one that dominates the [inner] logic of theory does not even occur yet in the framework of mere perception. Still, the modalities occur precisely here, and it is no coincidence that perception and judgment have these modalities in common. From there we will be able to show that the modes of belief necessarily play their role in all modes of consciousness. Moreover, we must gain clarity so that we can surmount the confusion that blinded such a brilliant researcher as Brentano concerning the questions of belief and judgment, and on the other hand, so that we can understand the constant role of modalities in logic. Let this suffice as an indication of what is to come.

Our analyses up to now have illustrated that every phase of perception presents itself as a system of rays of actual and potential intentions of expectation. During the continual elapse of phases—and during the normal case of perception, during the so-called perception that occurs usually and straightforwardly—there is a continual process of inciting actualizations, then further, there is the continuous fulfillment of expectations whereby fulfillment is always a process of determining more closely. But we also have now the occurrence of disappointment as a possibility that runs counter to the fulfillment of expectations. In order for a unity of an intentional process to be maintained, however, a certain measure of thoroughgoing fulfillment must be presupposed under all circumstances. From a correlative direction this means that a certain unity of sense must be maintained throughout the course of changing appearances. Only in this way do we have the constancy of a *single* consciousness, a unitary intentionality spanning all phases during the course of lived-experience with its appearances. What happens now if a disappointment occurs in the [perceptual] process rather than a fulfillment, regardless of whether a changing or unchanging object had been constituted in it perceptually? So, for example, we see a uniform, well-rounded red ball; the flow of perception has flowed-off for some time, and

<sup>36</sup> Editor: For §§6-8 see Appendix 1: <Descriptions of the Phenomenon of Conflict without Regard to Position-Taking> pp. 425ff.

<sup>37</sup> Editor: Beginning of a new lecture.

has done so in such a way that this apprehension has been fulfilled concordantly. But now as it progresses a part of the back side that was non-visible gradually appears, and contrary to the way in which the sense was originally prefigured as "uniformly red, uniformly well-rounded ball-shaped," there occurs the consciousness of "otherwise," disappointing the expectation: "Not red, but green, not ball-shaped, but indented." Such is its sense now. A general framework of sense has been maintained in thoroughgoing fulfillment; only a part of the anticipating intention is affected, the part belonging precisely to that place on the surface in question, and the corresponding sense-part gets the character of "not so, rather otherwise." Here a conflict occurs between the still living intentions, and—emerging in newly instituted originality—the contents of sense and the contents of belief, together with the horizons proper to them.

But there is not only a conflict. By being presented in the flesh, the newly constituted sense throws its opponent from the saddle, as it were. By covering it over with the fullness of its presentation in the flesh as the sense that is now demanded, it overpowers the former, which was only an empty anticipation. The new sense "green" in its primordially impressional force of fulfillment is a certainty that has a primordial force which overpowers the certainty of the anticipation of "being red." We are now conscious of it as overpowered; it bears the character of "null." In addition, the "green" is on the other hand integrated into the old framework. The "being green and indented" that occurs in the primordial impression, and in the entire aspect of the thing from the side in question, advances; in accordance with its sense, and as long as we remain on this one level, it advances the preceding series of appearance of which we are still retentionally conscious in a concordant procession.

<§7. Retroactive Crossing Out in the Retentional Sphere and the Transformation of the Previous Perceptual Sense><sup>38</sup>

But surely, a certain duplication in the content of sense essentially belongs to the entire phenomenal state of affairs. Just as the unexpected New and "Otherwise" covers over and voids the prefigured sense "red and ball-shaped" that was prefigured in the train of perception up to this point, so too does something take place retroactively in a corresponding manner for the entire preceding series. That is, the perceptual sense is changed not merely in the momentary primordially impressional expanse of perception. The noematic transformation radiates back in the form of a retroactive crossing out in the retentional sphere, transforming its accomplishment of sense that stemmed from the previous perceptions. The previous apprehension that was harmonized with the consistently unfolding "red" and uniform "round" is "reinterpreted" *implicit* as "green" and "indented."

This retroactive crossing out and "reinterpretation" essentially means that if we were to bring the retentional elements (i.e., the series of appearance of which we are still freshly conscious, but which have become completely obscure) to intuitive givenness in an explicit remembering, we would notice the following situation in memory: We would find in all the horizons of these retentional components not only the previous prefiguring in the previous structures of expectation and fulfillment, just as this prefiguring was originally motivated at that time, but we would find superimposed upon it the corresponding transformed prefiguring that now points continually to "green" and "indented." But it does it in such a way as to characterize the conflicting moments of the old prefiguring as void. However, insofar as these moments of sense are mere moments of a unitary sense organized in a tight uniformity, the entire sense of the series of appearance is altered modally, and this sense is at the same time duplicated. For we are still conscious of the previous sense, but as "painted over," and where the corresponding moments are concerned, crossed out.

<sup>38</sup> Translator: Paragraph title modified.



Accordingly, here we are studying what the phenomenon of "otherwise," of "annulment," of nullity, or of negation originally looks like. We recognize as basic and essential that the superimposition of a new sense over a sense that is already constituted takes place through repression, just like correlatively in the noetic direction, there is a formation of a second apprehension, a second apperception that is not juxtaposed to a first one, but lies over it and contends with it. Belief clashes with belief, the belief of one content of sense and one mode of intuition with a belief of a different content in its mode of intuition. The conflict consists in the peculiar "annulment" of an anticipating intention, the annulment of an expectation through a full primordial impression for which disappointment is only another expression. And specifically, it is an annulment that concerns an isolated component, while the concordance of fulfillment advances where the remaining components are concerned. The objectlike moment the "red" and its anticipated "being" is immediately affected by the annulment, and is that which primarily bears the character of "not." It is only now as a result of this that the thing itself as the substratum of the presumed red is crossed out in the process of belief: The thing "intended" as being red over-all is not; this same thing is rather green at such and such a spot. After the original, simple, and normal perception is transformed by being crossed out, we have once more a perception that is like the normal perception insofar as the transformation of sense, which goes hand in hand with being crossed out, produces a perception of a unitary and thoroughgoing concordant sense, and we constantly find the fulfillment of intentions as perception progresses: With the substitution of "green" and "intended" everything is now in agreement. Yet, there is assuredly a difference insofar as the system of the old perceptual apprehension is also retained in retention for consciousness, and this old perceptual apprehension is partially imbued with the new one. We are still conscious of this old one, but with the character of being annulled. The previous normal sense of consciousness is crossed out in the manner stated above, and the new sense is imposed upon it. We can also say that the old sense is declared invalid, and another sense is interposed as

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valid. These are only different expressions for the negation and substitution of a new fulfilling sense for the intended one.

Let us draw the most important results from this. First, an original negation here essentially presupposes the normal, original constitution of the object, which we have described above as normal perception. The constitution of the object must be there in order for it to be modified originally. Negation is a modification of consciousness that shows up as such in accordance with its own essence. Secondly, the original constitution of a perceptual object is carried out in intentions (where external perception is concerned, in apperceptive apprehensions); these intentions, according to their essence, can undergo a modification at any time through the disappointment of protentional, expectational belief. This modification takes place together with the superimposition of countervailing intentions arising here essentially. But it happens in such a way that some of the intentions are not only somehow affected by those intentions opposing them, but rather as affected in a special way, they are affected such that through this process, these intentions alter precisely their entire intentional accomplishment. Concretely put, and drawing on our example: The green that emerges as opposing the intention toward "red" does not alter anything in the intention toward "red" insofar as we remain conscious of it as the intention toward "red." The character of consciousness of an "annulled," an "invalid" <intention> emerges now, and accordingly red has the modal character of "void."

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In contrast, what is newly perceived has the character of "being valid," even though what is newly perceived disappoints the intention. Likewise, we can say that in such a contrast, every normal perception is a consciousness of validity—every perception in which an occurrence such as disappointment or similar occurrences have not yet arisen. But if we compare the unaltered consciousness, on the one hand, with the consciousness that is altered by being crossed out, on the other hand, and if we make this comparison in view of the content of sense, then we will see that while the intention is indeed transformed, the objective sense itself remains identical. The objective sense still remains the same after being crossed out *precisely* as a crossed out sense; thus,

the content of sense and its modality of being are distinguished: On the one hand, it has the mode of straightforward, uncontested concordance, on the other, it has the mode of being contested and being crossed out.

## 5 <Chapter 2: THE MODE OF DOUBT>

### <§8. Conflict between Two Superimposed Perceptual Apprehensions Having the Same Hyletic Stock><sup>39</sup>

Let us now consider still another affiliated, possible type of occurrence that exhibits the mode of transition to a negating *annulment*, but that *can also occur as a lasting condition*. I mean the phenomenon of doubt that can be resolved, be it in the form of negation or also in the form of affirmation, in the former case [i.e., negation] like in the previous example that we already cited concerning an illusion being unmasked in consciousness: What is initially seen as a human being becomes dubious and is finally disclosed as a mere wax figure. Or conversely, doubt resolves itself in the affirmative form: Yes, it is indeed a human being. During the doubt of whether it is an actual person or a wax figure, two perceptual apprehensions obviously overlap. One of them lives in the normally flowing perception with which we began; we see a human being there for a time, concordantly and uncontested like other things in our surroundings; they were normal intentions, partly fulfilled, partly unfulfilled, being fulfilled normally in the continual succession of the perceptual processes, without any kind of conflict, without any kind of break. And then what follows is not a clean break in the form of a decisive disappointment, not a break such that a perceptual appearance of a normal intentional type clashes with a component of expectation that was aroused, and crossing it out with its fullness, covers it over and annuls it. Rather, in our present example we have the situation that all of a sudden the full concrete content of the genuine appearance

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(alongside the original empty horizon and the original prefiguring) gains a second content, one that overlaps the other: The visual appearance, the spatial shape filled with color, was previously endowed with a halo of intentions of apprehension that gave the sense "human lived-body" and "human as such." And now the sense "dressed up wax figure" is superimposed upon this. Nothing has changed with respect to what is actually seen; indeed, they even have more in common; they both share apperceived clothes, hair, and so forth. But in one case it is flesh and blood, in the other, wax.

If we go back to the ultimate structures, we can also say that one and the same stock of hyletic data is the common support for two overlapping apprehensions. Neither one of them is crossed out during the period of doubt; they stand here in a mutual struggle; each one has, so to speak, its own force, each one is motivated, demanded, as it were, by the previous perceptual situation and its intentional content.<sup>40</sup> But demand opposes demand, one contests the other and is wronged in the same way by the other. There remains in doubt an undecided struggle. Since an objectlike formation is only constituted by the empty horizons together with the common, genuinely intuited core, we accordingly have a bifurcation of original, normal perception (which only constituted one sense in concordance), into a duplicity, as it were, into the form of a doubled perception. We have two interpenetrating perceptions by virtue of the common core-content. But actually, this expression does not really fit. For its conflict also means a certain mutual repression: If the one apprehension overpowers the common intuitive core, if it is actualized, we will see a human being for instance. But the second apprehension, which is directed toward the wax figure, has not become nothing; it is suppressed and put out of commission. Then, for instance, the apprehension "wax figure" obtrudes, and accordingly we now see the wax figure; but now the apprehension "human being" is no longer functional, but is suppressed.

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<sup>39</sup> Editor: For §§8-11 see Appendix 2: <Sense and the Modality of Being in Perception and Remembering> pp. 431ff.

<sup>40</sup> The choice of these expressions is not arbitrary; it shows that all apprehensions consist in tendencies, motivated in their interconnections, and that they have their "force" in this motivation. See below (pp. 81-2) where the propensity to believe is first introduced for doubt. Correlatively we would have to speak of a *inclinatorio ex*.